[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-89]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR
AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2023 MARINE CORPS
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 13, 2022
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-526 WASHINGTON : 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey, Chairman
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey, Vice SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
Chair MATT GAETZ, Florida
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii DON BACON, Nebraska
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida RONNY JACKSON, Texas
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Bill Sutey, Professional Staff Member
Kelly Repair, Professional Staff Member
Payson Ruhl, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 2
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
WITNESSES
Stefany, Frederick J., Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisition; LtGen Mark R. Wise, USMC, Deputy Commandant for
Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; and LtGen Karsten S. Heckl, USMC,
Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration,
U.S. Marine Corps.............................................. 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Norcross, Hon. Donald........................................ 27
Stefany, Frederick J., joint with LtGen Mark R. Wise and
LtGen Karsten S. Heckl..................................... 29
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 47
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 47
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 51
FISCAL YEAR 2023 MARINE CORPS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Friday, May 13, 2022.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Norcross
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND
LAND FORCES
Mr. Norcross. Good morning and welcome to what is our
second subcommittee hearing reviewing the Department's fiscal
year 2023 budget request.
But, before I continue, I need to review the protocols for
all members remotely joining the hearing. Members participating
must be visible onscreen for the purposes of identity
verification, establishing and maintaining a quorum,
participating in the proceedings, and voting. Members must
continue to use the software platform's video function the
entire time while in attendance, unless they experience
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
them unable to participate on camera. If a member is
experiencing technical difficulties, they should contact the
committee staff for assistance.
With that, I would like to turn to my opening remarks. As I
mentioned, we believe we have until 11:00, maybe quarter of,
but we are going to stretch that out as far as we can. We
appreciate you working with us.
So, first of all, today, I would like to welcome Mr. Jay
Stefany, Principal Civilian Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; Lieutenant
General Wise, Deputy Commandant for Aviation; and Lieutenant
General Heckl, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, and Deputy Commandant for Combat
Development and Integration.
Thank you for being with us today, and I look forward to
this discussion.
It is important that we acknowledge the context of this
year's Marine Corps modernization budget request. Three years
ago, the Commandant of the Corps embarked on a significant
orientation intended to better align the Corps with national
security challenges posed by the realities of today and
tomorrow. And certainly, anybody who is reading any of the
defense news, plenty to be said about that.
But over these 3 years, Congress has found the Marine Corps
modernization strategy generally relevant, stable, affordable,
and achievable. And accordingly, we have demonstrated our
support.
However, modernization is not without challenges or risk.
There are programs within and outside the jurisdiction of this
subcommittee that certainly merit continued scrutiny. In
today's hearing, we will specifically focus on rotary aviation
and ground systems, which across the Marine Corps program
appear generally in good shape.
We are particularly interested to hear from our witnesses
assessments and impacts on the Department's equipment and
munitions drawdown in support of the conflict in Ukraine.
We also look forward to hearing their thoughts on
modernization management, their use of new acquisition
authorities intended to accelerate research and development,
and the acquisition process.
And finally, we look forward to hearing updates on specific
programs, such as the CH-53K; the ACV, the Amphibious Combat
Vehicle; and tactical network; the long-range anti-ship fires;
and air defense.
There is much to cover, and certainly, we would like to
yield to my partner here on Tactical Air and Land from
Missouri.
Mrs. Hartzler. Missouri.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Norcross. I am a Jersey guy. It says Missouri here. We
are going with that.
But Vicky Hartzler.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Norcross can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to, first of all, thank our witnesses for
being here today and for your dedicated service to our country.
Three years ago, Commandant Berger introduced Force Design
2030, a plan to radically and aggressively redesign and
modernize the Marine Corps into a lighter, more lethal fighting
force, better equipped and more capable to deter and defeat
current and future peer adversary threats.
One of the most commendable aspects of the Marine Corps'
plan was that the Marine Corps proposed paying for and
resourcing the majority of this change from within. The Marine
Corps has continued to deliver on their promise to transition
from older platforms to newer, more capable systems in a
stable, affordable, and achievable way. The majority of Marine
Corps programs have remained on time, on track, and on budget,
and this has not been lost on Congress.
I look forward to a robust conversation with our witnesses
about the current status of the Marine Corps' 2030 Force Design
development and implementation, and the critical defense
programs necessary to yield the Marines with the capabilities
and capacities for success.
Thus far, Congress, and specifically this committee, has
demonstrated our support for this program and the strategy that
the Commandant has placed in front of us. I commend the Marine
Corps leadership for their dedication and their hard work to
continuously reassess modernization investment priorities and
reallocate already limited resources to fund the development
and procurement of essential defense requirements and
capabilities necessary to build a more lethal defense force.
As we discuss the future modernization of Marine Corps'
ground and rotary programs, I would like the witnesses to
identify what risks the Marine Corps is accepting in the short
term in order to keep planned modernization programs affordable
and on course to meet the mid- to long-term defense
requirements of creating a more lethal, resilient, and agile
force able to compete, deter, and win against future threats
from both peer competitors and rogue actors.
I am also interested in the Marine Corps' assessment of how
a flat topline and the resulting imposition of cuts and
decreases to lower-priority programs and investment accounts
affect the health and stability of your modernization strategy,
as well as the industrial base that supports it.
Lastly, the fiscal year 2023 defense budget request did not
factor in Russia's invasion of Ukraine or the ongoing response
by the United States and our allies to provide vehicles,
munitions, missiles, and other military equipment to Ukrainian
forces in support of their fight against Russia. Today, I hope
that our witnesses can inform us on how these missile and
equipment transfers have affected U.S. stockpiles and whether
you are getting what you need through the various supplemental
appropriations to fund these operations, replace vehicle and
equipment transfers, and replenish depleted munition
stockpiles.
If there are additional funding or authorizations we can
provide in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] and budget to get after replenishing some of
these replenishments now, and avoid the need to continue
funding supplemental through 2023 to restore your depleted
capabilities, we need to be having this critical discussion
now.
So, I thank the chairman for organizing this important and
timely hearing, and I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
And again, I just want to mention that what you have been
doing with the limited funds and redirection of those items
that are of the highest priority is not lost on this committee,
and what you are doing is much appreciated. Not to suggest that
there aren't things that are of concern, but I think,
generally, we are heading in a very good direction. I think you
will hear that, speaking for myself, but, generally, we
certainly believe this.
So, Mr. Stefany, great to have you back here, and your
statement, please.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN DEPUTY,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND
ACQUISITION; LTGEN MARK R. WISE, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND LTGEN KARSTEN S. HECKL, USMC,
COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND,
AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION,
U.S. MARINE CORPS
Mr. Stefany. Yes, thank you, sir, and I thank you for that
comment.
Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Lieutenant
General Heckl, and Lieutenant General Wise, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to speak to the
Department of Navy's fiscal year 2023 budget request for Marine
Corps modernization.
During this hearing, you will hear that the Marine Corps
has undertaken an aggressive modernization of its warfighting
programs over the last 5 years--sorry--3 years. Lieutenant
Generals Heckl and Wise are going to explain why this
modernization was required, while emphasizing that the
fundamental mission of the Marine Corps--to be the most ready
when the Nation is least ready--has not changed. The Marine
Corps will continue to serve as a force in readiness, prepared
to answer the Nation's call whenever and wherever that may be
around the globe.
As we watch the events unfold in Ukraine, it is clear that
warfare is changing. Small, distributed formations with
powerful and precision lethality, using advanced intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, loitering
munitions, and anti-armor fires have proven to be very
effective in combat operations. It is evidence we cannot stand
still. The Marine Corps Force Design initiative recognizes this
new reality, focusing on more capable intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] platforms, and smaller
systems for our ground formations.
Additionally, the Marine Corps is investing in the research
and development of its future loitering munition, which we call
Organic Precision Fires. We are using middle tier acquisition
authorities for this program and other Force Design programs
that will allow us to rapidly develop fieldable prototypes and
demonstrate new capabilities, speeding the delivery of those
capabilities to the Marines.
The Marine Corps' top priority remains the Navy/Marine
Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, a
ground-based, anti-ship missile system. We have successfully
conducted two tests of NMESIS, most recently in August 2021,
and are currently conducting developmental and operational
assessment events for that system. I believe NMESIS will have
an immediate effect in the operational environment when it is
deployed in 2023.
The fiscal year 2023 budget request continues the pattern
of investing in successful programs that will make a difference
in future conflicts. This includes the Ground/Air Task-Oriented
Radar which is currently supporting NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] operations; the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, which
has just met its benchmarks for mobility, protection, and
safety, and will deploy with Marine platoons later this year;
and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the modern ground vehicle
that will replace legacy Humvees over the next several years.
The Marine Corps' forward posture is reliant on ground,
aviation, and surface mobility. Rotary-wing platforms such as
the CH-53K and the H-1 play critical roles within Force Design,
providing lethality, maneuverability, targeting, flexibility,
and persistent sustainment. We have completed operational
testing of the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter and last month
declared initial operational capability, or IOC, of that
aircraft.
The fiscal year 2023 budget includes a request for block
buy authority for fiscal year 2023 and 2024 aircraft
production, with a projected savings of $150 million over
purchasing the aircraft 1 year at a time.
We have also reached IOC for the VH-92A Presidential
Helicopter Program in the last year and are starting the White
House commissioning efforts.
The success of the Navy-Marine Corps team to be ready to
answer the Nation's call is rooted in being forward-deployed.
This readiness provides options and decision space for our
senior leaders, such as yourself. The Navy-Marine Corps forward
presence also helps incidents from becoming a crisis, or a
crisis from becoming a conflict.
We are confident that the programs in our Marine Corps
portfolio are achievable, affordable, and will make our Marines
more successful.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and for your strong support of Marine Corps modernization. We
look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, General Wise,
and General Heckl can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Wise, you are now recognized.
Mr. Stefany. Sir, that was one statement for all three of
us. Sorry about that.
Mr. Norcross. So, repeat the same, right?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. I am all in. I am all in.
Thank you for your statements. We had read them, and
certainly, this gives us more time for questions, which is
certainly on top of that.
You started one of your statements talking about Ukraine
and what we have been witnessing and the impact particularly of
the Javelins, and the Stinger to a lesser extent, at least in
this area. Given the performance--and that is a tough word to
suggest in the Russians' vehicles in Ukraine--the assessment of
what you are witnessing, both the lack of protection in some
ways of the armor of Russia and the ability for Ukraine to use
the missiles, particularly the Javelin, to literally decimate
much of that armor, the Marine Corps' assessment of that; what
impact it might have on our existing fleet of vehicles, and the
future?
So, Lieutenant General Heckl and Wise, if you could comment
on that?
General Heckl. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
And I want to just echo real quick, sir, Mr. Stefany's
comment about the continued support from this committee and the
subcommittees. I mean, it has just been tremendous. So, from
the Commandant, thank you.
So, sir, I think, first of all, we exercise caution to draw
conclusions too early with what we are seeing in Ukraine
currently, but we are very, very cautiously and closely
monitoring events, and certainly, as it would apply to the
Navy-Marine Corps team.
I think one of the things to consider about just as an
overarching to kind of frame the discussion, the Russian
tactics, techniques, and procedures, TTPs, they have employed
simply don't--it seems like they are not there, right? So, we
use combined arms. So, there is an inherent amount of
protection and safety in the way we employ our forces as a
combined arms MAGTF, Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
Specifically to the weapons system, sir, obviously, I
believe our Nation makes some of the best gear on the planet. I
don't think it; I know it. And it proves itself time and time
again--all the way from the mujahideen throwing the Soviets out
of Afghanistan. You know, they said there was no change in
ideology, no change in tactics. There was Stinger. So, that is
a case from history, and I think we are bearing it out again.
I think the armor issue, the character of warfare is
changing quickly in front of us. And I think we are seeing
where just putting yourself, wrapping yourself in a bunch of
armor that requires a lot of fuel and a lot of sustainment
isn't necessarily going to make you safe and make you effective
on the battlefield.
General Wise. Sir, I think, also, what I would add is the
distributed nature of how the Ukrainians are operating and the
benefits that I've seen from operating in that manner is very
insightful and instructive, and it is the direction the Marine
Corps is going to kind of validate in some ways some of the
approaches that we have taken there from the aviation side,
ISR-wise.
As you talk, much like the Commandant does often, about
sense and make sense, and how that allows you to be more
effective in the battlespace, I think we are seeing some of
that from those operations as well, which flows directly across
to the armor and the Javelin, being able to do that targeting
activity upfront.
So, many good lessons. I would also say, equally, there is
a couple of--we just need to make sure we learn the right
lessons. In other words, what countereffect are the Russians
using, or not, out there? So, that we make sure we put
resilient systems out there that can survive in any
battlespace, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
I want to stay just for a moment with this line and what we
are learning from Ukraine. And we are shipping a tremendous
amount of systems and weapons, in addition to the humanitarian
aid, over to Ukraine. And the Marines have been part of that
drawdown.
So, what I want to ask is, from your perspective, that
assessment of risk of what we are sending versus what we have
available to us, both from an operational capabilities, but
also in terms of what we are shipping, what do we need to have
available to us; in other words, the resupply. In particular,
because of the change in your operating concept--what was the
last number? Five thousand five hundred Javelins, and that is a
rough number, have been provided. It didn't split up where they
are coming from. What the impact is on the Marine Corps?
Mr. Stefany. Sir, I think most of those weapons would be in
General Heckl's area.
So, General.
General Heckl. Yes, sir.
So, sir, we've--the Marine Corps has supplied--first, to
Mrs. Hartzler's comment about the--when this budget request, as
you alluded to, was not constructed with the supply to the
Ukrainians in mind. So, that is an issue; you are exactly
right.
Second, and then, third, we have provided approximately a
thousand Javelin missile systems and approximately a thousand
Stinger missile systems to Ukraine. And they are absolutely
critical to be resupplied for us.
And I would look to Mr. Stefany if there is any industrial
base concerns.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So, the other question you had in
the opening was supplementals. And that first very small
supplemental, I think $3.4 billion--not enough, right?
Obviously, not enough to to resupply. So, we look forward to
both your committee and the larger Congress on the larger
funding effort for the supplemental. But we do have a little
bit of money, and we are starting to recharge that line right
now, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Obviously, you are waiting eagerly for the latest to pass
through the other House and get that moving. But, certainly,
there is nothing unique to the Marines' Javelins and Stingers
that isn't facing the other services.
I just want to shift over a little bit to the CH-53Ks,
which are moving along, and talk about the brownout issue. And,
Lieutenant General Wise, we have read a lot about it; we have
heard a lot about it. There has been some mitigation and
changes made along the lines. Can you tell us where you are
now, and going forward, the risk that we are looking at in the
present configuration?
General Wise. Sir, thank you for the question.
On the 53K--okay, I think the light is just a little dim.
Sorry about that.
Sir, for the 53K, the initial assessment was very early in
the test process. And so, I would answer it in two ways because
we address it from multiple different angles.
The 53K, when we start the test events, we start at the
very heart of the envelope and we work out. And so, the initial
test events are very limited. So, things like, you know, time
limitations within a certain environment. And then, we know
that the envelope will go beyond that, but we test it in
tranches out from there to validate the fact that we got the
envelope right.
So, some of the limitations were based on those initial
envelope limitations. What we have found since then is a couple
of things on the equipment side. One is the diagnostic
capability of this airframe is spectacular, meaning the pilot
could actually get a real-time engine performance capability
readout to make real-time decisions on how the engines are
performing, regardless of the environment, but it includes the
brownout conditions. So, that is part of it. It's actually been
expanding the envelope much wider than those initial
assessments indicated.
The other side, too, is the automation on the airframe.
Because the automation is designed to allow a pilot to get that
airframe into even the worst brownout conditions and on the
ground safely and minimize its time in that particulate matter,
which also really negates the issues we have with, potential
issues you might have with the brownout conditions.
So far, since then, we have actually demonstrated in the
worst brownout conditions that that aircraft has performed for
21 minutes in the worst brownout conditions with zero
degradation of the engines. So, it kind of points back to the
initial test parameters can be taken in the wrong way. We
purposely limit it until we prove ourselves correct as we go
out. But it has been performing brilliantly. But there are
multiple systems onboard that make that airplane the safest one
out there.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Let me shift over for Mr. Stefany. When we talk about
acquisition, quite often, what are we doing right; what we are
doing wrong. But, on this one, you have asked for the block buy
authority rather than a multiyear. Can you explain to us why
the block buy versus a multiyear at this point?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. So, a multiyear is still in our
plan. Our plan is, after the block buy, 2-year block buy, to do
a 5-year multiyear procurement after that. The reason we are
not doing it now right off the bat is the criteria that is in
statute to be able to have a proven design, proven
manufacturing, enough data to give the CAPE [Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation], so they can make an independent
estimate.
We did not have all that at the beginning of the process
for this budget cycle. So, we decided this budget cycle and
next, we will get that data out of Sikorsky, and then we will
be able to provide it to you and to the CAPE to do that
analysis for a multiyear starting, a 5-year multiyear starting
2 years from now.
So, it was more we just didn't have the data to be able to
justify it at this point in time.
Mr. Norcross. But the authority is, obviously, so you can
accelerate and give to your subs and the supply chain that this
is coming?
Mr. Stefany. Yes. So, the part that we really wanted, the
supply chain, the block buy takes care of a big part of that,
right? We can go buy 2 years' worth of equipment at once; get
the supply chain spun up. So that when we do the 5-year
multiyear, they are up to full speed.
Mr. Norcross. Incredibly important, coming off the
pandemic.
With that, I turn to Ranking Member Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
To kind of build on the conversation we have already had,
back to the depleted stocks and the supplementals that have
been through. If the Senate approves the bill that was passed
in the House, is that going to be adequate, or are you going to
need more in the fiscal year 2023 NDAA?
Mr. Stefany. So, ma'am, for what we know right now and what
we project, that would be adequate. Now, again, what the war
continues on and there are more requests for drawdown material,
it could, obviously, change over time. But right now we believe
that is sufficient for what we can project going forward.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Well, please keep us posted on that.
And as it relates to the industrial base, this situation in
the Ukraine, and the ensuing global allied mobilization provide
support by way of equipment and munitions has shone a light on
some serious issues existing with our industrial base and
supply chain. So, how are you working with partners in the
military industrial base and supply chains to mitigate and fix
these issues?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. So, very close partnership of
Stinger and Javelin, obviously, are made with our partners in
the Army and the Air Force. And we are working with--,together
with industry. Recognizing something like Javelin is a little
more modern, that production line is able to scale easier.
Stingers, we are going to have to go back, and probably if not
need more--probably not more authority, but we may need more
industrial base money to kind of get them up to a high enough
production level they can restock us in time. So, that is an
effort we are working with the Army, and we will certainly come
back to this committee, once we get those results.
Mrs. Hartzler. When do you anticipate that to be?
Mr. Stefany. Ma'am, I don't have a date. I will take that
for the record, to get you that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 47.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes, because we need this answer yesterday
really.
Mr. Stefany. Yes. Okay.
Mrs. Hartzler. I mean, you know, so we can produce the
Stingers again or shift to another munition that maybe another
country even has perfected that same capability.
Is there any changes that need to be made in our current
Defense acquisition sustainment strategies to get over these
problems of long lead times, parts and workforce shortfalls,
and material obsolescence?
Mr. Stefany. No, I think between the authorities we already
have, as well as Defense Production Act-type authorities, I
think we have the authorities we need. We now need to finish
the assessment of where the biggest risks are, and then start
moving out on addressing those.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Yes, as soon as possible, obviously.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. And then, as far as the CH-53K, I am really
glad to hear about the problem--I mean the solution, it seems
like, with the brownout concerns to 21 minutes without any
degradation at all. That is encouraging.
But the CH-53K, from its start, though, has had per-unit
cost concerns. So, I wanted to ask about that. Because it
currently costs as much, if not more, per aircraft than the
per-unit cost of a Joint Strike Fighter. So, can you explain
why this is?
General Wise. Ma'am, thank you for the question.
For the 53K, we continue to realize cost reductions in the
acquisition lots. The last two were the lowest two so far, and
each of them came down a level each. And those--the costs for
the most recent 53Ks, if you look at it at the same
measurements that we use for the F-35, it's actually lower,
considerably----
Mrs. Hartzler. How much is it now?
General Wise. The last lot was negotiated at $93.7 million
per copy. If you use the same metric for the 35, depending on
which variant, it is approximately $117 to $107, so depending
on the variant.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, how are you working with them to bring
down costs?
General Wise. Yes, ma'am. So, we actually work it in
multiple angles. Part of it is with the program office to drive
cost out of the actual process, as well as with the vendor at
Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin. But there are other things that
are helping us.
One is Congress' generosity for the addition of two
additional airframes in the last two lots per lot. So, that was
four additional airframes, helps drive down the cost through
quantity buy.
Recently, on the international side, the Israelis committed
to purchase 12 aircraft, with an option for 6 more. It looks
very good that they will go down that road. There are
additional opportunities starting to show up for the 53K. I
know it will be part of the Berlin Air Show this year. So,
looking at more opportunities to drive down costs through
quantity buy as well. So, approaching it from multiple angles,
not just manufacturing, but allowing their learning curve to
come up and produce in a more effective manner.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Let's switch to another platform, the
NMESIS. You mentioned that in your opening statement, and it
does sound like a very exciting, very helpful platform. Can you
provide us more information, though, on what this system is and
the advanced capabilities it brings to the fight?
General Heckl. I'm ``on'' now; here we go. Okay. Yes,
ma'am, glad to, and thanks for the question.
NMESIS is another one of the programs kind of alluded to by
yourself and the chairman as far as things going right for us.
The Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System is
our number one modernization priority for the Commandant.
The system consists of two Naval Strike Missiles, which we
work in partnership with our Navy brothers and sisters. And it
is fired from the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle chassis. And we
have had a lot of success.
And as Mr. Stefany alluded to, it has been employed
multiple times, and as recently as the end of April. Doing
envelope expansion, we had very successful shots over the
course of 3 days. So, the weapon system continues to perform.
And quite frankly, from August of 2021, during large-scale
exercise, we actually fired two Naval Strike Missiles against a
maritime target. Both had very successful launch, flight, and
impacts. So, we are very, very pleased with that. And at this
level, the classification level, the range, we are very pleased
with the range as well. So, going forward, we are looking
forward to fielding the system and getting it out to the fleet
as soon as we possibly can.
Mrs. Hartzler. When do you anticipate that fielding? I
mean, it just sounds like a great capability.
General Heckl. End of fiscal year 2023, ma'am, is when it
will start.
Mrs. Hartzler. How many?
General Heckl. I think we are getting out--I would have to
take it. I don't know the exact number, ma'am. Let me take that
for the record. I will get back to you on a specific number.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 47.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Great.
I have a couple more, maybe if we have a second round, but
I will yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Ms. Sherrill, you are now recognized.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to just compliment the Army and Marine
Corps on resourcing initiatives to improve the form, fit, and
function for female soldiers and Marines in their PPE [personal
protective equipment] gear. That has long been a concern of
mine. And I encourage you to continue in those efforts.
Mr. Stefany, we just heard from General Heckl the
battlefield is changing rapidly. In a recent hearing with the
Commandant, General Berger stated that he wanted to give the
enemy multiple problems on the battlefield to solve.
The new Force Design for the Marine Corps is to acquire and
field indirect fire systems with increased range, accuracy,
long-range precision fires that can service both maritime and
ground targets. What, if any, cannon artillery platforms is the
Marine Corps looking at to meet this need?
Mr. Stefany. Ma'am, I would like to defer that one to
General Heckl on that platform.
General Heckl. Yes. Yes, ma'am. So, thanks for the
question. You specifically asked what about cannon artillery?
Ms. Sherrill. Yes.
General Heckl. Okay. So, as you know, ma'am, the Commandant
has said from the start of Force Design that, as we experiment
and within our campaign of learning, which forms the analytical
rigor that underpins every decision we make in Force Design, we
will make changes. The Commandant made a change. We were
initially going to draw down to 5 batteries of 777 155
millimeter artillery. We are now going to go to seven, but we
are also increasing those batteries from six tubes to eight. We
will have four on the West, three on the East.
Did that answer the question?
Ms. Sherrill. That answers the question of what you are
looking at now. Because, surely, the bulk air missile batteries
with long occupation times and a large geographic signature,
will put the MRL [Marine Littoral Regiment] at risk. And so, I
am wondering if the Marines have explored adding some of the
long-range precision fires currently under research and
development as a way to allow the Marine commanders long-range
fires without sacrificing survivability and maneuverability.
General Heckl. You betcha, ma'am, and you are absolutely
right. The towed cannon artillery on the battlefield is very
susceptible, absolutely.
You may or may not know we have HIMARS [High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System] currently within our inventory, and we
are working very closely with the Army. Obviously, the Marine
Corps is not really big enough to pursue programs on our own.
So, we always seek out sister services to work with. It makes
it more affordable. And so, we are doing that with the Army.
We are going down the route. As you know, or may not know,
HIMARS eventually will turn into the MLRS, Multiple Launch
Rocket System, family of munitions, which will include GMLRS
[Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System], ATACMS [Army Tactical
Missile System], and eventually, PrSM [Precision Strike
Missile] missile, which is going to be a phenomenal capability,
which will do both land and surface targets.
Did that get at it, ma'am?
Ms. Sherrill. Yes. Thank you.
And stepping away a bit from the need to service targets, I
would like to talk about how the MLR will sustain itself with
missile platforms being bulky and presenting significant
challenges for commanders hoping to maintain a basic load of
ammunition for their formations in a contested environment.
Does the Marine Corps have a solution for conducting ship-
to-shore resupply of the bulky missile platforms? And when it
comes to combat logistics, I know every bit of space on a
truck, ship, aircraft matters, especially when delivering all
classes of supply to littoral regiments. Do you feel that the
Marines will face a challenge in resupplying the bulk missile
systems throughout the theater?
General Heckl. Ma'am, great. You're just firing one great
question after another.
Obviously, right now, ma'am, within Force Design, I will
tell you that logistics in a contested environment is our
pacing effort right now. It is absolutely our pacing effort. We
are laser-focused on it and getting after it down at my
command, particularly within the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab
and the Capabilities Development Directorate. So, we are all
over it.
It is always--logistics, anybody that tells you otherwise,
logistics is always a challenge, and it can never be emphasized
enough in preparation. I will simply tell you the strength of
the Marine Corps, the MAGTF, which a Marine littoral regiment
is simply a form of a MAGTF. It is tailored for a specific
theater and a specific threat. But we have--the organic lift we
have within the MAGTF, both air and surface, is one of our
greatest strengths.
So, for instance, NMESIS is fully internally transportable
in a 53K. We have demonstrated it. I mean within a KC-130J. We
have demonstrated it multiple times.
And as you also know, we are standing up a fourth Active
Duty VMGR KC-130J squadron with 16 aircraft going to Hawaii
specifically to provide additional organic lift within the
Indo-Pacific.
And that brings me to the LAW, the Light Amphibious
Warship. The surface connectors, ma'am, will be absolutely
critical. And just to keep it short here, the important aspect
of a LAW--or Landing Ship Medium really is its appropriate
name--is the fact that it is a shore-to-shore connector.
So, again, what you are seeing play out in Ukraine, big
signatures of any type, whether it is logistics or anywhere in
the electromagnetic spectrum, you know, trails of fuel trucks
to refuel armor, those are signatures and they are targetable
and they become vulnerabilities. So, the shore-to-shore
connector capability of the LAW is critical. We don't require
ports. We don't require big, 12,000-foot runways. We do things
from an austere perspective.
Did that answer it, ma'am?
Ms. Sherrill. Well, thank you. Yes. Thank you very much,
General. And my time has expired, but I will say, maybe for my
oversight responsibilities, I should come test some of those
53Ks for you guys. So, maybe one of these days. Thanks.
And I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stefany, Lieutenant General Heckl, Lieutenant General
Wise, thanks so much for joining us.
General Heckl, let me ask about the Commandant's guidance.
He talks about lightening the force, especially when it comes
to combat and transportation. He also talks about it being
theater-agnostic, to make sure we can operate in the INDOPACOM
[U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], but also have the ability to cross
over into the European theater, wherever we are needed, is to
make sure that lightening the force is able to do that.
The update 2022 I think really refines the testing that you
all have done to really get that concept down, down to where it
needs to be. Can you give us a little more insight about that
whole concept of lightening the force? Where you are with the
testing of this with Marines in the field; figuring this out,
and where you are today? I know you have made a number of
adjustments with the size of battalions, the number of MV-22s,
the number of artillery pieces. Can you tell us a little bit
about how you have that in the Commandant's Planning Guidance,
and how that really allows you to achieve the National Defense
Strategy?
General Heckl. So, sir, again, great question. I know you
and I have talked before, sir.
So, lightening any force simply makes it more agile and
flexible.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Heckl. And therefore, creates a certain dynamic
component of that force. And I think we are seeing that play
out in Ukraine right now real time, right? So, we are seeing
widely dispersed, well-equipped, lethal, precision munitions,
and then, the ability to move. So, let me give you examples to
kind of back into the question previous.
We have demonstrated multiple times how we can load NMESIS
on the KC-130, land--and remember, a KC-130 doesn't necessarily
require an airfield, right? It can land in austere
environments. It has to be prepped, but it can still land. We
do it pretty regularly.
The weapon system offloads, fire capsule launches, the
missile reloads, and gets back in the aircraft and is gone
before the missile actually impacts the target. That is the
kind of dynamic I am talking about.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Heckl. So, lightening any force is going to make
that easier to do.
And I will also say that, with the ubiquity of sensors
right now, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, if you can be seen
and you are a worthy target--meaning the cost of position and
am I going to expend an expensive weapon system--you can be
hit. So, we are getting after signature management in all ways,
and it is kind of back to the future a little bit, right?
We are doing camo netting. We now have companies that we
are on contract with that have netting that can go over
vehicles, as well as people, that reduce and eliminate IR
[infrared] signature, eliminate visual. It is pretty
impressive. So, that technology has advanced as well.
So, the lighter the better from every perspective. The
lighter means less sustainment. You are a less needy force,
which means I am reducing the signature.
Did that get after it, sir?
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Heckl. It's a big question. I could go on all day,
and I don't want to eat up all the time.
Mr. Wittman. No, no, that is spot-on.
Let me ask to look at today's situation. And that is, as
you are looking at lightening the force, one of the challenges
that gets thrown at you is what is happening now with munitions
that are going out the door, both Javelin and Stinger, as we
have heard. And listen, we understand what needs to be done
with the industrial base to resupply, those sorts of things.
But I think the more important and immediate question is,
what does the Marine Corps do in the meantime as a mitigation?
So, as these weapons stores are going down, what happens if
something occurs between now and the time that we resupply? And
what can Congress do to help you in that mitigation strategy?
General Heckl. Well, sir, I think--and Mr. Stefany may have
something to say here--I am not super familiar with how the
industrial base is postured and what capability--you know, like
in World War II, rolling 16 B-17s off line a day, Boeing did.
But I will simply say there are ways to mitigate risk. A
big part of that, sir, is the continued deterrence that is
referenced in the National Defense Strategy.
Mr. Wittman. Uh-hum.
General Heckl. You know, if you look at the whole spectrum
of things, the desire is to never get to the right side, right?
We want to avoid actual kinetic operations.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
General Heckl. The threshold of violence may be breached
every now and then, as we compete and we deter, but the point
is to deter----
Mr. Wittman. Right.
General Heckl [continuing]. To avoid getting to a situation
where the levels of our stores are a concern, right? So, for a
Marine, that means being forward----
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Heckl [continuing]. Being forward, being present
with our allies and partners. And I think, quite frankly, sir,
there is a lot of strength in our allies and partners who
utilize similar weapon systems, and I think we need to play to
that advantage, too.
Sir, I don't know if you have any comments about industrial
base.
Mr. Wittman. Mr. Stefany.
Mr. Stefany. No, I would just add that the Marine Corps has
not reached a place where they cannot support the forward-
deployed Marines, right? We haven't got there, and we will
certainly talk--the Commandant, I am sure, will come and talk
to you before we get to that place. So, it is not like we have
given away all of our missiles.
Mr. Wittman. Right.
Mr. Stefany. We still have plenty of them for the forward-
deployed Marines.
General Heckl. And, sir, has you know, we track very
carefully and closely the training status of our units.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Heckl. Because those same weapon systems have to be
used. Our Marines have to fire them on a periodic basis to
maintain their readiness and proficiency.
Mr. Wittman. That is great. Thanks. Listen, I think it is
incredibly important for us to know well ahead of time.
Because, as you know, the ability to resupply right now has
atrophied, and that is a risk in and of itself.
General Heckl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Norcross. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
I appreciate you gentlemen being here and for your
leadership.
I wanted to ask you about long-range strike capabilities. I
know the Marines are investing in it, so are the Army. A little
more challenging in the Pacific theater, though, because you
have basing concerns.
General Heckl. Yes.
Mr. Bacon. And so, my question would be, how do you
envision this working in the Pacific theater? And I say that
because I know the Air Force has got the B-21. They are going
to have standoff weapons. The Navy will have ship-borne
capabilities. So, is this a real viable forward for the
Marines, Army, and the basing issues? How do we deal with it?
Thank you.
General Heckl. So, a great question.
And as you know, NMESIS is one of our systems. The other
one is long-range precision fires, which is the Tomahawk.
Again, we share that with the Navy, right?
So, an incredibly long-range weapon. We have demonstrated
that weapon system firing off of one of our platforms, ground-
based, and we are very happy with it.
We have yet to determine, going forward--it is a larger
missile system than the Navy Strike Missile and the NMESIS. So,
again, from my concern as a requirements guy for the Marine
Corps, I get concerned when I see things that are big and
heavy, read signature; difficult to resupply, signature. The
ground-based Tomahawk, and by the way, it is launched out of a
Mark 41 Vertical Launch System, which is similar, looks similar
to other ones. So, there is opportunities there, as we go
forward, leave at that. So, yes, sir, we have that capability.
It is very viable.
Now, your concern about access, right, with allies and
partners. Absolutely, sir. I mean, one of the things, the
difference is, the Marine Littoral Regiment and the Multi-
Domain Task Force that the Army is fielding. The Multi-Domain
Task Force the Army is fielding and MLR are complementary in
nature. MLR is smaller, a little more nimble, organic lift,
expeditionary. The MDTF, is a little bit bigger, but has bigger
punch and farther punch.
It will be up to allies and partners to determine what they
are going to allow in, right? But I think, from my perspective
as a Marine--and we have units from I MEF [Marine Expeditionary
Force] and, you know, III MEF, the Third Marine Expeditionary
Force lives inside the WEZ [weapons engagement zone] day-in and
day-out. And we work with allies and partners. So, we are
really dependent on what they allow in.
But, to your point, you know, a big missile system might
not be something they would be--or they may be a little bit
concerned about it.
Mr. Bacon. I worry about the access, though. I would think
those blend of capabilities between the Air Force, Navy, Army,
and Marines is best. But if you don't have the basing
abilities----
General Heckl. That is right.
Mr. Bacon [continuing]. That is the concern I have. Maybe
in Europe and the Middle East, there is other--more
opportunities.
I want to ask you, is there a priority weapon that we need
to have replenished for the Marines? What is your number one
and number two things that the Marines need replenished?
General Heckl. Sir, I would tell you right now the
Commandant's number one issue is--not pertaining to this--but
is amphibious ships to be forward-deployed. Weapon system-wise,
our number one priority is the NMESIS, sir.
Mr. Bacon. For dealing with Ukraine, was there certain
weapons that the Marines had to send over that we need to be
focused on for replenishment?
General Heckl. Well, the Javelin and the Stinger.
Mr. Bacon. The Javelins primarily? Okay. I know we touched
on it a little bit. So, that would be your priority?
General Heckl. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. One of the things, I felt like we could
have done it quicker in this Ukraine fight is provided the
capabilities of tanks 20, 30, 40 miles behind the lines. We are
starting to see that. We see other countries that have some
really good capabilities that Ukraine is using right now.
What would be your advice here on how we could be--I guess
these are still our capabilities. You know, our remote piloted
aircraft, for example. I feel like we are hindered by our rule
set. Other countries are filling that capability. Do you see
the same issue? Hope that follows.
General Heckl. So, sir, I think--and I don't know if
[inaudible] wants to chime in here, as you mentioned UAVs
[unmanned aerial vehicles]. You know, I did a couple of years
with NATO as a brand-new one-star, Strike Force NATO in Lisbon.
I spent a good bit of time on the Mount Whitney and doing
exercises.
I think--from our perspective, I think whatever we do, I
think working within the NATO construct and our NATO partners,
that I think we can contribute more. I don't disagree with you.
You always--hindsight, you always wish you could have moved
faster, right?
So, I don't know if you have any more to----
Mr. Stefany. We do have restrictions on UAVs, UASs
[unmanned aerial systems], as you know, sir, that slows us
down.
On the surface, though, I think we could have that
conversation of unmanned surface-type things we are doing in a
different forum that are not as slow as those are going.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. This is the RPA [remotely piloted
aircraft] area. The other countries are moving within our
circle much faster, and I feel like we are losing an
opportunity to provide our great weapons in that case.
But I am running out of time. So, I will yield back. I
thank you for your time.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Dr. Jackson, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; thank you, Ranking
Member Hartzler, for holding this hearing today.
Thank you to our distinguished guests for being here.
I know this is a TAL [Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee] hearing, we are here to discuss modernization
strategies and programs such as rotary aviation and ground
systems. However, I briefly want to touch on the importance of
modernization for the medical community, as an aside here.
As we constantly look for cost savings and ways to
modernize our systems, there seems to be a trend of looking
towards making cuts on the medical side to support the needs of
the line side. Most recently, we saw the Medical Officer [TMO]
of the Marine Corps position get cut, which is a decision that
I wholeheartedly disagree with. A mistake like cutting the TMO
sets us further back in our modernization efforts and could
potentially cause irreparable damage to our medical readiness.
I understand that having the latest aircraft and weapons
systems is extremely important, but that doesn't matter if we
forget to care about our people. If we are forced to compete
and win in the Indo-Pacific, having appropriate leadership and
accountability in the medical community is going to be
paramount for our success. So, as we modernize our military, I
would strongly encourage the Department of the Navy leadership
to reconsider the decision and reinstate the TMO.
That said, I want to shift gears now and talk about some of
the modernization efforts included in this year's budget
request. On Wednesday, the full committee heard testimony from
General Berger that I was impressed with on the modernization
efforts being undertaken by the Marine Corps to adapt to the
needs of the Indo-Pacific theater.
One thing that General Berger mentioned was the need for
Congress to provide funding for the V-22 nacelle improvement.
General Wise, I appreciated you telling this committee a few
weeks ago that you share the same feelings that we have in the
need to ensure that we modernize our V-22 fleet and increase
the platform's overall readiness.
In the unfunded priorities list submitted to Congress,
nearly $75 million was requested for nacelle improvement. These
documents also show a commitment from the Marines to continue
this vital program in future years. Modernizing our V-22 is not
something that we can wait on. It is something that we need to
get started on now.
As you know, the workforce in Amarillo, where I represent,
has risen to the occasion of completing the Air Force's nacelle
improvement process ahead of schedule. There is no doubt in my
mind that this would be the case for the MV-22 nacelle
improvement program as well.
In the written submission to the committee, when asked,
``Do you know of any factors that have the potential to hinder
execution of additional funds for this item in FY 23?'', the
answer was very clearly stated as no. All of this leads me to
wonder if the amount requested on the unfunded priorities list
is enough. That is a question. Or if Congress needs to consider
an even larger amount to ensure that we can dominate any future
conflict.
My question. If additional work can be accommodated by the
workforce conducting nacelle improvement, we should increase
the rate at which this work is done. General Wise, would the
Marines be able to accelerate the nacelle improvement program
further if additional funds were appropriated over the amount
requested in the unfunded priorities list?
General Wise. Sir, great question.
And as we mentioned before, we are very laser-focused on
making sure there is no break in that line and that we continue
that nacelle improvement. We have already laid in money, as you
know, through fiscal year 2023 for the long lead to ensure that
it starts right at the back side of the Air Force upgrades to
keep that going.
As far as accelerating, I believe the line does have the
capacity to accelerate. We would also have to balance that with
aircraft off the line to make sure we had an optimum
sequencing, so the rest of the readiness of the fleet to deploy
is balanced. So, that part, I would have to take for the record
as far as how could we accelerate it further in order to make
sure we still have adequate capacity for deployments and still
maximize the line.
But, certainly, are very interested in the program because
it does offer so many readiness perks for us, of course.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 47.]
Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I agree with that. And I have had
the opportunity to go out to Bell and look at these things when
they tear them apart, when they are doing them. And some of
them look fairly good, and some of them look like they really
need a lot of work. And so, I would like to see us do that as
soon as possible.
On a bipartisan basis, many members of the committee have
agreed that the President's budget request does not give us the
resources that we need. I do anticipate that we will need to
provide additional funding to account for the inadequate budget
that we received.
General Wise, one more question. I would like to ask you
another question related to the V-22. As we looked at the need
to compete and win in the Indo-Pacific in, potentially, just a
few years, what are the capability gaps that we would face, if
we didn't have an adequate level of readiness for our V-22
fleet? And are there any other platforms that would be able to
accomplish this mission instead?
General Wise. So, the V-22 is extraordinarily capable, as
you know, just because of the speed, the battlefield tempo it
develops. There is still nothing else that can do it that way.
Can we lift folks, I mean assault support, with 53 [CH-53],
with other platforms? Can you do those missions? You can, not
at the speed, and speed is very, very important. So, it does
fill a unique capability, and that something that we need to
make sure that we maximize readiness to have those assets
forward when we need them.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I think my time is up here,
but I just wanted to also say I have a third question I will
submit for the record. It is related to the Army's Future
Vertical Lift and where the Marines are looking, if they are
looking at what the Army is doing. Because I hope that we go
down that path at the Marine Corps as well.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
Just to note they have called votes, but there are at least
one question that Vicky and I have. Do you have another? Okay.
And I will let Vicky jump in here.
Let's talk about the Humvees. Obviously, we are moving
towards the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle]. But it is no
surprise to anybody in this room, many of the accidents have
taken the lives of our young service men and women. And the
mitigation that has been going on, you are well aware of that.
Yet, there is nothing in this year's request in terms of
mitigating that.
Can you explain to us why you have elected not to include
any of the safety upgrades, General Heckl?
General Heckl. Absolutely, sir.
So, the Marine Corps is all in on JLTV, and we are not
retaining the Humvee. So, we are going to get out of the Humvee
business, period. So, the faster we can do that, the better.
The JLTV has proven itself to be a really solid weapon
system. It is more safe, more capable, more survivable from
every perspective. It has a lot of safety features that are
inherent.
And by the way, sir, some of the older lot Humvees that we
have you can't even upgrade. And we have very carefully
identified the best of breed and the worst of breed. We are
getting rid of the worst as quickly as we can. The older
vehicles are in worse shape.
But the JLTV has, as you know, the anti-lock braking
system. It has electronic steering control, all the things that
contribute to a lower mishap rate all the way around--things
such as rollovers.
So, again, I think we have fielded approximately 2,500 of
them, and our AAO [approved acquisition objective] is 12,500.
And we are just moving out as quickly as we can, sir. That's
our whole--so as you know, I think there is 413 in this request
and there are some on the unfunded priorities list. So, the
faster we can go with JLTV, the faster we can replace Humvee.
Mr. Norcross. We agree with you with the JLTV. It is a
great vehicle. But at today's estimate, we are talking about
2031 before we get rid of those--mitigation, getting rid of
those that can't be retrofitted, obviously. That is a long
time, and this is a serious issue that we know how to fix at a
relatively low cost. And it is something that we believe is
extremely important. And nobody likes to throw good money after
a bad system, but 2031 is a long time off.
And I will just defer to Mrs. Hartzler for any additional
comments.
Mrs. Hartzler. Just a quick follow-up. It was my impression
that in this budget the JLTV is on the unfunded priorities
list, that there is none. So, you just said there is 413
requested?
General Heckl. I am pretty sure we have 413 vehicles in
this budget request, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Norcross. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Wise, I just wanted to talk a little bit. We talked
a lot about the platforms, but the most important part of that
platform is the pilot. And I wanted to get your thoughts on
rotary-wing pilot retention and recruitment into the future. It
looks like to me, at the company level between third and eighth
year, those pilots become more and more of a challenge to be
able to keep. Give us your perspective on what the Marine Corps
is doing, and needs to do, to make sure we retain those pilots,
which we are going to need in the years to come.
General Wise. Yes, sir, thank you for the question.
So, obviously, we track very closely all of our pilot
retention issues. There are some areas that are very complex
and challenging right now, as we know. And we attack those from
multiple different directions.
So, some of it is making sure the accession piece is
adequate. But the big thing, which I think really gets more
towards the question, is the retention side of the house. So,
some of that is looking at bonuses. We have got a range of
bonuses, depending on the platform, in order to provide some
enticement.
I would tell you, from a very personal perspective, when I
was being looked at for retention in the early years, that,
though enticing and nice it was not the sole thing that kept
me. Because what really comes into play--and I think most would
agree with me--is that right command climate, selecting the
right people to provide that atmosphere that people want to
come to work every day; they want to be part of something like
that. So, we are very focused there as well.
The other good piece of it is being very tied in closely
with my counterparts in the Naval Aviation Enterprise,
specifically, CNATRA, so Chief of Naval Aviation Training, and
watching those pipelines to make sure, as they go through, that
we are meeting our requirements for those pilots.
For instance, we are a few short this year, but, of course,
the year is only about half over. So, it will fluctuate a
little bit towards the end, but we watch them so closely
because we don't want to get behind. In most communities, we
are actually considered healthy, which is 85 percent or above,
in the rotary-wing community. I would not say that is true
across the board. There are plenty of challenges to go around.
But, that one, we stay very glued to. We are relatively healthy
right now in that regard.
Mr. Norcross. Mr. Veasey, you are now recognized.
Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
General Wise, I wanted to ask you a question. Now that each
Service is orienting its modernization strategy and priorities
on some variation of multi-domain operations, how does the V-22
fit into this and any future tilt-rotor platforms?
General Wise. Sir, thank you for the question.
Looking at really distributed operations, widely
distributed operations, particularly, as we look at the
Pacific, the V-22 is, for us, very uniquely capable, not just
because of the fact that it can deliver sustainment to anywhere
or people, but it is the speed at which it can do that. It has
demonstrated over and over, since it started combat deployments
in 2007, that it is uniquely capable to do things that no other
platform can do.
So, the tilt-rotor side I think is demonstrated across all
the services, as we have seen it take in the Navy and Air Force
Special Operations. Everyone is seeing the value of that
platform. The Japanese have come onboard as well.
So, as far as future of tilt-rotor and other
opportunities--and there was a question earlier having to do
with Future Vertical Lift, and how the Marine Corps is really
expanding its view of some of the capabilities that have been
developed through that program--that would suggest that some of
the tilt-rotor and, potentially, unmanned capabilities to
further expand our ability and capacity to sustain forces in
widely distributed environments, there is huge potential in
that area moving forward.
So, we are working very closely with all the vendors, the
Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, through what we are now
calling ``a family of systems'' within the Future Vertical Lift
to address those specific additional capacity requirements.
Mr. Veasey. What about the tilt-rotor industrial base and
the rotary-wing aviation industrial base? What is like just
your kind of overall assessment of that right now?
General Wise. For the industrial base, I would probably let
Mr. Stefany talk to that one.
Mr. Veasey. Yes, please.
General Wise. I am happy to follow up, though, with
anything you would like.
Mr. Veasey. Yes, please. Thank you.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, I think it is we are kind of in a--you
know, certain lines coming to an end. And Army is first, but
Future Vertical Lift is the future, and we have this kind of
gap in the middle, right? That is why the nacelle program was
potentially a very good way of filling that void to keep the
workforce hot, as first the Army, then the Navy and Marine
Corps make our selections for Future Vertical Lift.
We are looking at both major aircraft suppliers and engine
suppliers, the whole group, to try to make sure we are doing it
smartly with our Air Force and Army counterparts.
Mr. Veasey. What do you think are the biggest challenges?
You know, as you look at that base, what do you think are some
of the biggest challenges that we are going to have to be able
to overcome to keep moving forward?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. I think, as we go, well, just the
skilled workers, right? Being able to get the right skilled
mechanics in the right area. It is maybe not as appealing a
career field as maybe it was 10 or 20 years ago. And so,
getting the right skills or the right workforce, not losing
them in places like Amarillo, but, also, other parts of the
country, making sure we, as a nation, are keeping those blue-
collar skills active and a choice career for our younger folks.
Mr. Veasey. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Yes, we are definitely
seeing a lot of that in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.
Thank you very much. I appreciate your answers.
And I will turn it back over to the chairman.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
And to our witnesses, very much appreciate it.
Votes have been called. So, this is perfect timing.
And very much appreciate the testimony, and certainly,
answering those questions.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 13, 2022
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 13, 2022
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 13, 2022
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mr. Stefany. As the Primary Inventory Control Activity for Stinger,
the Army is currently in contract negotiations with Raytheon to expand
capacity of the Stinger production line and procure additional test
equipment. No additional support is needed to accomplish this critical
expansion. In addition, the Army has contracted for the replenishment
of Stinger missiles that were recently provided to support the
Ukrainian conflict efforts. With raw material on hand, Raytheon will be
able to replenish the Marine Corps' 1000 missiles, but delivery will
not begin until FY25 based upon limited part availability and long-lead
items. The current USMC inventory of Stinger missiles will be capable
of sustaining the USMC War Reserve Munition Requirement and live fire
training requirements through FY24. Beginning in FY25, the USMC will
need to balance the need for live fire training with recently fielded
simulation-based training. [See page 9.]
General Heckl. The Marine Corps will begin fielding the Navy Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) to Medium Missile
(MMSL) Batteries starting in (FY) 2023. The fielding plan calls for
incrementally fielding up to 14 batteries across the Marine Corps by
FY2030.
A Medium Missile Battery at full capacity will have up to 18
launchers. The Marine Corps' acquisition objective for launchers is
261, which will support 18 NMESIS per operational battery. This
acquisition objective will also provide systems for additional training
and sustainment. [See page 11.]
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
General Wise. Maximum capacity for Nacelle Improvements kit
production and installations at Bell is 36 per year in the first year
of execution. 36 Installs a year would represent a higher risk of
execution in the first year of installations on MV-22B aircraft due to
the adaptation of the installation team to the MV-22B. Based on prior
experience with commencing a significant modification program,
executing 30 installs in the first year of execution represents a lower
execution risk to the program and enables the MV-22B community to ramp
to a higher rate in following years. Lead time for the components of a
Nacelle Improvements Kit is 22 months from contract award to delivery.
The FY23 budget includes 9 NI kits, which are planned to be
installed at the completion of the CV-22 NI install program, currently
scheduled for late FY24. The FY23 Unfunded Priority List (UPL) included
an additional 15 NI kits, for a total of 24 NI Kits; which balanced
program affordability with execution. 30 Kits is the optimum
installation quantity the MV-22 Fleet can support in the first year of
execution. Since submission of the UPL, the program learned of a Bell-
Boeing $1.2M NI Kit unit cost increase. The cost of an installed
Nacelle Improvements Modification is $6.9M per aircraft ($5.48M for the
kit and $1.42M for the install). The total required for procurement of
30 NI kits is $164.4M. The cost for the installs of these kits in FY25
will be: $42.6M. [See page 18.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 13, 2022
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
Dr. Jackson. While the entire Department of Defense remains focused
on modernization, each of the services are undergoing various unique
lines of effort as well.
The Army's Future Vertical Lift Cross Functional Team is
aggressively looking to modernize much of their rotary platforms.
One example is the Future Long Range Assault Aircraft which will
eventually replace all of the Army's Black Hawk helicopters.
As the Army has worked through its hurdles in fielding this new
platform, I feel like there is much to learn.
General Wise, could you speak to the development of future rotary
aircraft for the Marine Corps and if the Marines are taking lessons
learned from the Army's Future Vertical Lift major acquisition
programs?
General Wise. USMC future vertical lift development pivoted from
pursuing the Attack Utility Replacement Aircraft to a Vertical Takeoff
and Landing (VTOL) Family of Systems (FoS) as the Service redirected
its focus under the 38th Commandant's Planning Guidance and Force
Design 2030. HQMC Aviation and Combat Development & Integration are
currently conducting a modified capabilities-based assessment of the
current USMC vertical lift inventory to identify gaps operating in
support of Expeditionary Advanced Bases Operations (EABO). This gap
analysis will serve as a foundational study, informing the development
of an Initial Capability Document (ICD) to support a VTOL FoS
portfolio. Multiple Capability Development Documents will be derived
from the ICD to develop vertical lift capabilities within the VTOL FoS
portfolio. The USMC VTOL FoS portfolio will take a capabilities-based
approach versus a platform-based approach. The USMC VTOL FoS is a
member of the OSD FVL Joint Council of Colonel (JCoC). The OSD FVL JCoC
is a forum that allows each service to provide monthly updates,
collaboration, and sharing of information regarding their specific
service's FVL efforts. HQMC is closely monitoring sister service FVL
efforts, such as the Army's analysis of alternatives for its FARA
aircraft and their approach to accelerated acquisitions programs. The
USMC VTOL FoS will continue to maintain its dialogue amongst the joint
FVL efforts as it develops a capability-based portfolio.
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