[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-67]

                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

                     AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN

                        NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 8, 2022


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 
                          ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-525          WASHINGTON : 2023
 
 
 
 
                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                Robert Ikoku, Professional Staff Member
                 Kyle Noyes, Professional Staff Member
                      Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     2
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Dalton, Melissa G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
  Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, Office of the Secretary of 
  Defense........................................................     3
Richardson, GEN Laura J., USA, Commander, U.S. Southern Command..     5
VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and 
  North American Aerospace Defense Command.......................     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Dalton, Melissa G............................................    53
    Richardson, GEN Laura J......................................    67
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................    94

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Dr. Green....................................................   123
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   123
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   123
    Mr. Wilson...................................................   123

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Banks....................................................   131
    Mrs. Bice....................................................   133
    Mr. Crow.....................................................   137
    Mr. Gaetz....................................................   131
    Mr. Gallagher................................................   130
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   136
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   137
    Mr. Moore....................................................   134
    Mrs. Murphy..................................................   135
    Mr. Scott....................................................   127
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   132
 NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN NORTH AND 
                             SOUTH AMERICA

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 8, 2022.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Go ahead and call the meeting to order. This 
morning, we meet to discuss the national security challenges 
and U.S. military activity in North and South America.
    We have three witnesses with us: Ms. Melissa Dalton, who's 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and 
Hemisphere Affairs at OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]; 
General Laura Richardson, who is the Commander of the U.S. 
Southern Command; and General Glen VanHerck, who is the 
Commander for U.S. Northern Command and North American 
Aerospace Defense Command. Greetings, and thank you all for 
being here.
    There are a lot of challenges in the world right now, as we 
all know. I don't think anyone could argue with the basic 
statement that the threat environment has increased 
significantly in recent years, in recent months, and even in 
recent weeks, and most of our focus on that is overseas in 
other places.
    For the last 20 years, we have had a huge focus on the 
Central Command in Iraq and Afghanistan. You know, we see China 
as, as has been described, the pacing threat in the world. And, 
obviously, we all know the threat from Russia right now, what's 
going on in Ukraine and the broader threat that they pose.
    But I think it is very important that we have the commands 
before us today that we have because it's important to remember 
that our primary job is to protect the United States of 
America--to protect the homeland--and what's closer to home is 
the--are the primary threats that we need to be worried about, 
and there's two big things about that.
    One, there are threats here at home. There continues to be 
a great deal of instability. Certainly, in Latin America, we 
have seen the impacts of that in a variety of different ways--
the drug trade, the criminality, immigration flows. All of that 
has a profound impact on us.
    Obviously, domestically, in the Northern Command, we are 
concerned about how that impacts us. But there are cyber 
threats and many others. So there are threats here in this 
region.
    But I think, as importantly, the threats that are overseas 
are also present here. Certainly, we all know about how 
transnational terrorist threats can come home. But Russia and 
China are both very active in this hemisphere, certainly in 
Latin America and elsewhere.
    So if we are looking at an era of great power competition, 
then that competition is here as well and we need to be aware 
of the threat that that poses.
    As we talk with our witnesses about how we're going to meet 
those threats, you know, I'll hit upon the point that this 
committee has been very focused on for a number of years and 
that is, you know, updating our technology and understanding 
how to meet the threats in this age.
    To me, it's all about, you know, information and 
survivability, and, certainly, here in the Northern Command, 
protecting our information is at the top.
    We are very vulnerable to cyberattacks. How do we make sure 
that we better protect ourselves against that, and then 
equally, how do we take advantage of innovative new 
technologies to make sure that our information system, broadly 
speaking, is robust, effective, and protected?
    It is my opinion, and I know the ranking member shares this 
opinion, that, you know, the Pentagon still needs to pick up 
the pace on implementing those new technologies and making sure 
that we take advantage of AI [artificial intelligence], machine 
learning, and other technologies that are crucial to defending 
us, to understanding how the battlefield has changed and what 
it means to truly defend yourself in the modern era.
    And I think our witnesses today and the commands that 
they're responsible for are incredibly appropriate to answer 
some of those questions. How is it going? How are we doing at 
protecting the homeland?
    How are we doing with dealing with the threats that are 
right here in our hemisphere, even as we see the threats 
metastasize around the world, mindful of the fact that those 
threats around the world are a lot closer than they may appear 
in terms of how they can impact our own security here at home.
    So I look forward to our witnesses' testimony, the 
questions and answers, as always.
    With that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Rogers.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. I thank the chairman for holding this hearing. 
And I thank the witnesses for their attendance and their 
service to our country and the Western Hemisphere.
    As we focus on the following--on the growing threat from 
China and Putin's appalling act in Ukraine, we must not neglect 
the many national security challenges in our own backyard.
    Homeland defense is the foundation of our national 
security. A strong homeland defense enables us to project power 
around the globe. We rely on NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] 
for everything from ballistic missile defense to stopping 
illegal trafficking of drugs and migrants across our borders.
    But its mission has become increasingly difficult. Our 
adversaries are enhancing their ability to strike our homeland 
with ballistic missiles and now threaten us with hypersonics. 
Non-state actors trafficking narcotics and human beings across 
the border continues to be a major problem.
    In fiscal year 2021, Customs and Border Protection [CBP] 
encountered more than 1.6 million inadmissible individuals at 
the southwest land border. That is the most ever encountered. 
Last year, border seizures of cocaine grew by 68 percent and 
seizures of fentanyl increased by 134 percent. CBP is simply 
overwhelmed. It must rely on support from the Department of 
Defense and NORTHCOM just to perform its basic mission.
    I look forward to hearing from General VanHerck and 
Assistant Secretary Dalton's perspectives on how to best tackle 
these threats.
    In Central and South America, instability is growing and 
further undermining our national security. SOUTHCOM [U.S. 
Southern Command] works hard to counter instability by building 
partner capacity, carrying out counternarcotics operations, and 
responding to disasters. They do a tremendous amount of good 
but their job is becoming more difficult.
    China and Russia are expanding their influence both 
economically and militarily in the region. Their presence 
undermines our national security.
    To counter these threats, we must build new, and enhance 
existing, partnerships in the region. I congratulate General 
Richardson on her new command, and I look forward to hearing 
how she intends to tackle these challenges.
    The threats to our national security in North and South 
America are complex and increasingly connected to our great 
power competition. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
and getting their best military advice on how to overcome these 
challenges.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Dalton.

STATEMENT OF MELISSA G. DALTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
  FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE 
                      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Dalton. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    I am the principal civilian policy adviser to the Secretary 
of Defense on homeland defense, mission assurance, defense 
support of civil authorities, Western Hemisphere affairs, and 
the Arctic and global resilience.
    I'd like to emphasize two points up front.
    First, DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] is working to 
increase preparedness to prevent and respond to threats in the 
homeland, namely, from state-based strategic competitors.
    Second, to build resilience against these threats, DOD is 
modernizing our approach to partnerships for homeland defense 
missions.
    The U.S. homeland faces challenges from state and non-state 
competitors, as well as trans-boundary challenges like climate 
change. These can put DOD's ability to defend the homeland, 
project power, and counter aggression.
    The People's Republic of China [PRC] is the pacing 
challenge for the Department. Its rapidly advancing 
capabilities could allow the PRC to hold our homeland at risk 
and disrupt our ability to mobilize the joint force.
    Russia poses an acute challenge to the United States and 
our partners. Abroad, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has already 
resulted in loss of life and threatens global peace and 
security.
    At home, Russia has sought to weaken our democracy. Rogue 
regimes Iran and North Korea pose persistent challenges. Iran 
has attempted to execute influence campaigns in the homeland, 
including the 2020 Presidential election. The DPRK [Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea] focuses its malicious criminal 
activity on exploiting international financial systems, 
allowing it to evade U.N. [United Nations] sanctions.
    The United States faces cyber threats from state and non-
state actors, their proxies, and cyber criminals. The PRC and 
Russia are among our most sophisticated cyber competitors. They 
exfiltrate sensitive information to erode our economic vitality 
and they undermine voter confidence.
    The Western Hemisphere's relative stability can be 
maintained only by building strong defense relationships with 
partners in the region. We know that competitors seek to foster 
instability and that transnational criminal organizations 
enable corruption and erode democratic institutions in the 
region.
    Our Nation also faces natural and manmade hazards. COVID-19 
[coronavirus disease] has claimed the lives of 936,000 
Americans. Last year, the homeland endured 58 major disasters 
including hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding. Climate change 
is affecting the Arctic acutely, opening inroads for U.S. 
strategic competitors.
    DOD's priority is to defend the homeland. One of the key 
ways the Department will do this is through integrated 
deterrence, working seamlessly across warfighting domains, 
theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. 
national power, and our alliances and partnerships to apply a 
coordinated effort to alter our competitors' perceptions of the 
potential costs and benefits of aggression.
    The resilience of our critical infrastructure and 
capabilities at home strengthens deterrence of competitor 
aggression. Central to this effort is building the resilience 
of critical capabilities, particularly non-DOD owned 
capabilities on which we rely.
    This requires cooperation with our partners in other 
departments and agencies; State, local, tribal, and territorial 
governments; and the private sector to address vulnerabilities 
and build resilience.
    In the cyberspace domain, DOD is ensuring the joint force 
can fight and win wars even through disruption and while under 
attack. DOD also executes cyberspace operations to enable its 
partners and to disrupt cyber threats. Protecting our democracy 
from foreign-based malign influence and election interference 
attacks is a DOD top priority.
    DOD supports Federal, State, and local partners in securing 
our borders and responding to manmade and natural disasters. 
Over the last year, this has included providing support to 
whole-of-government responses to COVID-19, Operation Allies 
Welcome, and the southwest border.
    DOD is supporting the national response to COVID-19, 
including approximately 118 requests for assistance last year. 
As of February 28th, DOD had 63 teams totaling 1,424 personnel 
identified to support hospitals and medical centers.
    Over the past year, DOD supported care through Operation 
Allies Welcome for more than 80,000 Afghan evacuees through 
Operation Allies Welcome and with temporary housing and medical 
support at eight domestic military installations.
    DOD's support for evacuees at military installations has 
ended but will continue at a non-DOD facility. DOD has 
supported DHS's [Department of Homeland Security's] mission at 
the southwest border for 17 of the last 21 years. Roughly, 
2,500 DOD personnel are deployed to the border providing 
intelligence analysis, aviation, and other support.
    To address shared threats in the Western Hemisphere, DOD 
has partnered with the region's militaries based on support for 
democratic institutions, civilian control of the military, and 
respect for human rights.
    To conclude, the Department is committed to increasing 
preparedness with partners in and out of government to build 
homeland resilience and advance U.S. national interests.
    Thank you for your support of the Department of Defense and 
I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the 
Appendix on page 53.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Richardson.
    I don't think your microphone is on there.
    General Richardson. Thank you, Chairman.
    The Chairman. Great. Thanks.

  STATEMENT OF GEN LAURA J. RICHARDSON, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. 
                        SOUTHERN COMMAND

    General Richardson. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you alongside General VanHerck and 
Assistant Secretary Dalton, two of my most important teammates 
in keeping this Western Hemisphere safe.
    I am honored to be here with you representing the men and 
women of United States Southern Command to discuss the 
challenges we share with our neighbors in this hemisphere, but 
also the opportunities we can unlock together.
    Today more than ever, America's fate is inextricably linked 
to events beyond our shores. This region, our shared 
neighborhood, is under assault from a host of cross-cutting 
trans-boundary challenges that directly threaten our homeland.
    I have been in command for about 4 months now and the 
biggest eye opener for me has been the extent to which China 
and Russia are aggressively expanding their influence in our 
neighborhood.
    Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing insecurity 
and instability that has been greatly exacerbated by COVID-19. 
The People's Republic of China, our long-term strategic 
competitor, continues its relentless march to expand economic, 
diplomatic, technological, informational, and military 
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and challenges 
U.S. influence in all of these domains.
    Without U.S. leadership, negative PRC influence in this 
region could soon resemble the self-serving predatory influence 
that it now holds in Africa.
    Meanwhile, Russia, a more immediate threat, is increasing 
its engagements in the hemisphere as Putin looks to keep his 
options open and maintain relationships in our near abroad.
    In January, the Russian foreign--the Russian deputy foreign 
minister said he could neither affirm nor exclude that Russia 
would send military assets to Cuba or Venezuela.
    Just days before the Russia unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, 
the Russian deputy prime minister visited Nicaragua, Cuba, and 
Venezuela, countries that maintain close ties with Russia and 
offer Putin a foothold in our hemisphere.
    Finally, recent visits between the presidents of Brazil and 
Argentina with Putin in Russia demonstrate a concerning 
potential broadening of Russian ties in the region.
    In this hemisphere, transnational criminal organizations 
[TCOs] operate nearly uncontested and blaze a trail of 
corruption and violence, and this creates a wedge and allows 
the PRC and Russia to exploit these countries.
    They threaten citizens' security, undermine public 
confidence in government institutions, and drive irregular 
migration to our homeland.
    These TCOs traffic opioids, cocaine, and other deadly drugs 
into the United States, fueling both drug overdoses and drug-
related violence that have affected so many of us and our loved 
ones.
    In my initial travels to the region it has become obvious 
to me that our partners are our best defense. We must use all 
available levers to strengthen our partnerships with the 28 
like-minded democracies in this hemisphere who understand the 
power of working together to counter these shared threats.
    We must maximize important tools like security cooperation 
programs to train and equip our partner militaries.
    Multilateral exercises to build interoperability and the 
State Department's IMET [International Military Education and 
Training], FMF [Foreign Military Financing], and FMS [Foreign 
Military Sales] programs to educate, train, and build capacity 
that our partners use to stand shoulder to shoulder with us.
    Colombia, for example, our strongest partner in the region, 
exports security by training other Latin American militaries to 
counter transnational threats.
    USSOUTHCOM is putting integrated deterrence into action 
every day, using innovative methods to work seamlessly in all 
domains with the other combatant commands, the joint force, 
allies and partner nations, Congress, the U.S. interagency, 
NGOs [non-governmental organizations], and the private sector 
to help build a shared neighborhood that is free, secure, and 
prosperous for our generation and generations to come.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Richardson can be found 
in the Appendix on page 67.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General VanHerck.

   STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. 
 NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

    General VanHerck. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear today.
    It's my honor to represent the men and women of the United 
States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense 
Command. It's also an honor to appear today with General 
Richardson and Assistant Secretary Dalton.
    NORTHCOM and NORAD face the most dynamic and strategically 
complex environment in their respective histories. The commands 
face multiple simultaneous challenges from strategic 
competitors who have openly declared their intent to hold our 
homelands at risk in an effort to advance their own interest.
    Today's strategic competitors, rogue nations, non-state 
actors possess the capability to strike our institutions and 
critical infrastructure in the United States and Canada.
    To put it bluntly, our country is under attack every day in 
the information space and the cyber domain. Our competitors, 
especially Russia and China, are spreading disinformation, 
actively sowing division and internal discord with the intent 
to undermine the foundation of our Nation, our democracy, and 
democracies around the world.
    We're seeing this play out with Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine. Those same competitors have invested heavily in 
conventional precision strike capabilities and advanced 
delivery platforms, which Russia is currently displaying to the 
world.
    Their intent is to hold targets in the homeland at risk 
below the nuclear threshold in order to limit our decision 
space for our senior leaders by threatening critical 
infrastructure, by disrupting and delaying our ability to 
project power globally while attempting to undermine our will 
to intervene in a regional crisis overseas.
    I believe the strategic deterrent is the foundation of 
homeland defense and that it is necessary for the United States 
to maintain a reliable and effective nuclear triad.
    At the same time, I'm concerned that deterrence by cost 
imposition is currently overweighted and does not adequately 
account for the conventional capabilities our competitors have 
already fielded.
    This overreliance increases the risk of miscalculation and 
escalation because it limits our national leaders' options in 
crisis and in conflict. Our competitors have advanced 
conventional capabilities make it necessary to balance 
deterrence by cost imposition with a model of deterrence by 
denial in an integrated deterrence that employs all elements of 
national influence, leverages the asymmetric advantage of our 
allies and partners, and provides leaders with a wide range of 
timely deterrence options.
    We must continually demonstrate to potential aggressors 
that they will not be successful in achieving their objectives 
with an attack on the homeland by demonstrating our homeland 
readiness, responsiveness, resiliency, and displaying a range 
of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to deter and, if 
required, defend the homeland.
    NORTHCOM support to civil authorities and security 
cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical 
to integrated deterrence as is NORAD's mission to provide 
warning and defend the approaches to North America.
    This strategic environment is the new normal. The operating 
model that assumed we could project power globally from a safe 
and secure homeland has been eroding for the last decade.
    In order to provide national leaders with timely and 
informed options they need to achieve favorable outcomes, 
NORTHCOM and NORAD in our homeland defense design are focused 
on four key principles, starting with all-domain awareness, 
from undersea to on-orbit and everywhere in between to include 
the cyber domain.
    All-domain awareness is required to achieve information 
dominance, which is the use of advanced capabilities like 
machine learning and artificial intelligence to quickly 
analyze, process, and deliver data to decision-makers at the 
speed of relevance.
    By doing so, we will increase senior leaders' decision 
space and enable decision superiority over competitors.
    Finally, today's problems are all global and all domain, 
and demand globally integrated strategies, plans, and actions. 
These principles are vital to elements of our ability to 
execute a layered defense and integrated deterrence, and they 
are critical to our Nation's ability to deter in competition, 
deescalate in crisis, and if necessary, defeat in conflict.
    I'd like to thank the committee for all you've done to 
support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and guardians. 
The fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act 
continues to advance our national defense priorities and the 
missions of U.S. Northern Command and NORAD.
    However, today's strategic environment calls for sustained, 
sufficient, and predictable funding in order to prevail. 
Persistently operating under a continuing resolution has 
continued the erosion of our Nation's competitive advantage 
over the last decade.
    I join my fellow commanders, service chiefs, and the 
Secretary in stressing the importance of passing the fiscal 
year 2022 omnibus and the restoration of normal order in the 
appropriations process as a matter of national security.
    Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in 
the Appendix on page 94.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, and amen on that last 
point. We are optimistic that we'll pass the appropriations 
bills next 48 hours, apparently.
    But, hopefully, we'll get that done in the future. It needs 
to be a lot closer to October 1st than March 1st and we are 
aware of that and working on that.
    Just two quick questions, first, for Ms. Dalton and General 
VanHerck, on the cyber front. We're aware of the threat. What 
would you say are the, you know, two or three most important 
things that this committee can do to help you meet that threat?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Chairman. While we don't have 
specific or credible cyber threats right now as they relate to 
the current crisis in Russia--in Ukraine--we are mindful of the 
prospect and do see that as Russia is conducting cyberattacks 
in Ukraine that there is the potential for spillover----
    The Chairman. Right. But speaking more broadly, like I 
said, we're aware of the threat. What I'm interested in is 
what--you know, as you look at it and you're looking, whether 
it's Russia, whether it's China, whether it's, you know, 
transnational criminals, you know, as our systems are, what are 
the two or three most important things, you think, to meet the 
threat, and I'll broaden it. Not just what this committee can 
do, but what we as a government need to be doing to meet those 
threats?
    Ms. Dalton. Absolutely, Chairman.
    So continued support for U.S. Cyber Command and the unique 
capabilities, talent, and expertise that it brings to the 
equation, and then, more broadly, for authorizers and 
appropriators that support DHS to ensure that they have the 
capacity, talent, and expertise to work as part of a whole-of-
government approach and the engaging with the private sector to 
patch current vulnerabilities is paramount.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. General.
    General VanHerck. Thank you, Chairman. The last one I would 
agree with--capacity. We need to look at the capacity of our 
cyber defenders not only across the Department of Defense but 
Homeland Security as well as CISA [Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency] under Director Easterly.
    This is a domain awareness problem--cyber domain--and we 
need to have tools and capability to ensure we understand the 
vulnerabilities within our cyber infrastructure and the 
critical infrastructure.
    Also, I would say that we need to look closely at policy 
and law, which, today, limits our ability to sometimes look 
inside our own country at specific vulnerabilities.
    As we move forward, I think, from a national security 
perspective, we will only become more vulnerable. We don't know 
what we don't know on some of the critical infrastructure. So 
we need to go assess some of the limitations in policy and law. 
We need to figure out from a policy perspective what the most 
critical infrastructure is that we must defend and apply that 
to the limited resources that we have, Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. And General Richardson, 
as you mentioned, Russia and China are very active in Latin 
America. Where are we most vulnerable?
    What are they trying to do and what should we be doing to 
counter it either in terms of the countries they're closest to 
or what their overall strategy is to destabilize us from being 
active in your command?
    General Richardson. Well, thank you for the question, 
Chairman. And they are very active, certainly, with China and 
the--being our long-term strategic competitor. The advances 
that they've made with the Belt and Road Initiative--21 of 31 
countries have signed on to this initiative.
    As we know, it starts with the infrastructure, economic 
projects, and then furthers into exploitation. A lot of those 
are state-owned enterprises by China and, certainly, we're 
concerned about the dual use, just like in Africa.
    I see that the Chinese are using the same playbook that 
they did in Africa 10 to 15 years ago and they're using that in 
the SOUTHCOM AOR [area of responsibility] now.
    In terms of Russia and what they do to sow discord, 
undermine our U.S. interests globally, the disinformation 
campaigns that they have, Russia Today, Spanish as well as 
Sputnik Mundo, the social media, the meddling in elections, 
that our partner nations are very concerned about.
    And so, certainly, across the entire region, as we work 
with our security partners from Colombia, Brazil, very 
concerned with the inroads that our competitors are making, and 
we look to outcompete our competitors. We have got to be on the 
field. We have got to be with them every day. They want to 
partner with us, and so it's important that we're there and 
that we're working with them with what they need.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. General Richardson, you and General VanHerck 
have done a pretty good job characterizing the threat that both 
China and Russia pose in your areas of responsibility. Do you 
expect to see the resources that you need to combat that threat 
in this year's PBR [President's budget request]?
    General Richardson.
    General Richardson. So I haven't seen the budget just yet. 
But the--I aspire that it will give us modest investments in 
the AOR. I think a comprehensive strategy in the SOUTHCOM 
region as--you know, as we know there--as we look east and west 
quite a bit--we don't look south so much--this is a very 
important AOR and so I'm hopeful that we'll get what we need.
    When we don't, in terms of we look for other ways of low-
cost, high-yield investments, and I'll talk to AI and machine 
learning here in a little bit.
    But the--certainly, as we look at innovation and using our 
AOR as a test bed as well with the capabilities where we might 
not have competitors watching us so closely, we're able to work 
a lot of projects and innovation and things like that for the 
services and for the Department of Defense.
    Mr. Rogers. By saying that you hope you get the modest 
investment that you need, would that be an increase over what 
you had in fiscal year 2021?
    General Richardson. Congressman, I would say that the--in 
terms of as I do my assessment in the region--I've been in the 
seat for about 120 days now--4 months--and I think that we 
could do better in terms of a comprehensive strategy for the 
AOR as opposed to just asking for bits here and there.
    I don't have assigned forces, and so that forces us to be 
very innovative, and as we look to partner with our partner 
nations' militaries and security forces.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. General VanHerck, same questions.
    General VanHerck. So I think from a domain awareness 
perspective, I think I'll see increased support, as I've 
conveyed over the last 18 months since I've been in command. 
But I haven't seen the final budget, Congressman.
    From a theater security cooperation perspective, I think 
there'll still be work to be done. A little goes a long way in 
the Western Hemisphere, and to compete as part of integrated 
deterrence, I think we can do more.
    China and Russia are both global problems. Instead of 
running to the South China Sea or to the EUCOM [U.S. European 
Command] AOR, we need to factor in that they're here in the 
Western Hemisphere and ensure adequate funding for integrated 
deterrence as well.
    Mr. Rogers. But that's the point I want to make is the 
theaters that you all have responsibility for as well as 
AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] are pretty inexpensive for us to 
do what we need to do.
    So what I would request is that if, in fact, what you need 
is not in the President's budget request that you will 
guarantee this committee, that you will try to get it in your 
unfunded requirements list.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I will absolutely do that.
    Mr. Rogers. General Richardson.
    General Richardson. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay.
    General VanHerck, in your testimony you reference Russian 
capability to launch cruise missiles at the homeland. Can you 
update us on what NORAD is doing to improve our capability to 
defend against that threat?
    General VanHerck. Yes, sir. So we're working closely with 
the Department and with the Department of National Defense in 
Canada on our homeland defense design, which starts with domain 
awareness, as I previously discussed.
    I look forward to seeing the 2023 budget. I'm confident 
that we're going to move the ball, if you will, down the field 
on domain awareness, both in the air domain, space domain, and 
undersea domain.
    We do need to work more on NORAD modernization on the way 
forward, which would include infrastructure in the Arctic to 
get after that problem, which also allows me to position forces 
for the cruise missile problem that you're talking about, as 
well as having organized, trained, and ready forces to operate 
throughout my AOR. That's a challenge for the services today 
that we're working closely with.
    The final thing I would say, Congressman, on cruise missile 
defense is the Department needs to select a single point of 
contact to own cruise missile defense of the homeland and we 
haven't done that in accordance with the NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] that direct us, I believe, in 2017.
    Mr. Rogers. Do you expect that to happen?
    General VanHerck. We're working closely with the Department 
on the Missile Defense Review. I've advocated to have a 
specific point of contact. I think we'll get there but I 
haven't seen the final version.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Can you hear me okay?
    The Chairman. Yeah, we got you. Go ahead, Jim.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses for your testimony today.
    The chairman was right to focus on the cyber challenges 
that we face and I want to build on that.
    Ms. Dalton, in your testimony you stated that we are 
developing new opportunities to help partners improve their 
cyber and----
    The Chairman. Hey, Jim? Sorry. Can you get a little closer 
to your mic? We hear you but it's kind of faint.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Is that any better?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. I'll start over again.
    Ms. Dalton, in your testimony you stated that we're 
developing new opportunities to help partners improve their 
cyber and network defense capabilities so they can deter, 
detect, and defend against cyber threats in support of a free 
secure Western Hemisphere.
    And let me just say I'm certainl, glad to hear that. I 
think it's very appropriate, as I've long believed that we'll 
never again fight a war without some type of a cyber component 
to it.
    So in this unclassified setting, can you expand on the work 
that is being done with our partner nations in the Western 
Hemisphere when it comes to cyber?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Congressman, and it's an excellent 
question and an area that I look forward to building upon as 
assistant secretary.
    I'd like to break down the response, actually, into two 
parts in terms of the range of partners that we work with on 
this challenge set.
    First of all, domestically, with the private sector and 
with the defense industrial base, we have three entities that 
work very closely to provide--with the private sector to 
provide cybersecurity services and tools.
    Our Defense Cyber Crimes Center, the National Defense 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, and, of course, NSA 
[National Security Agency], all provide cybersecurity services 
to key defense industrial base [DIB] companies to help identify 
key vulnerabilities, potential mitigations, and also can 
enhance information sharing in the event of attack to other 
partners in the DIB.
    So that's a very important line of effort that we are 
building out closely with our colleagues in the interagency. 
And then with respect to partners in the hemisphere, through 
our security cooperation efforts we are increasingly looking 
for opportunities to provide cybersecurity patches.
    There's a lot of great, actually, capability and technology 
that's off the shelf commercially that we can provide to 
partners. So it's really along those two tracks that we're 
working along those lines. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. I hope we can increase those engagements 
sooner rather than later as well.
    General Richardson and General VanHerck, how is cyber being 
utilized and developed in your defensive strategies?
    General Richardson.
    General Richardson. In terms of cyber, we have--we need to 
do better in cyber. Our countries want to work with us. They 
aren't very long in terms of their cyber capabilities and so in 
terms of working through, they all want help and assistance 
with cyber, with their networks, making sure that they have 
protected networks.
    And so we have small teams--joint cyber capability 
assessment teams--that we send, about 13-man teams with cyber 
experts and network experts to these countries and help with 
our partner nations, help do over-the-shoulder training to try 
to assist them with this because they are very much worried 
about the protection of their cyber capabilities and their 
networks.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, it's important to point out 
the mission of United States Northern Command in the cyber 
domain.
    I'm the DSCA [Defense Security Cooperation Agency] 
synchronizer for support that we provided to CISA if we needed 
to respond outside of either the DODIN [Department of Defense 
Information Networks], the DOD infrastructure, or Federal 
networks that CISA provides. Cyber protection forces would be 
provided through me to support that.
    We're closely partnering with both CISA, Homeland Security, 
and CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] to further our partnerships 
to understand the threat as well.
    I would also provide defense support of civil authorities 
in the event there are outcomes from a cyberattack, such as 
lack of potable water, fuel, those kinds of things as well.
    I think it's important to go back to a comment that I made 
that we're partnering with the Department first but also with 
the interagency through DHS--is to identify the key critical 
infrastructure that must be defended--those things that would 
be strategically significant if identified in a crisis that 
could bring us to our knees, whether that be power projection, 
finance, energy--those kinds of things. Those are all key parts 
of our strategy.
    Mr. Langevin. And last question. In what ways are you 
prioritizing joint initiatives such as JADC2 [Joint All-Domain 
Command and Control]?
    General VanHerck. At NORTHCOM and NORAD we're absolutely 
prioritizing JADC2. As I said in my opening statement, we're 
conducting experiments--the global information dominance 
experiment that brings all the combatant commands together. 
JADC2 is required to execute the integrated deterrence 
strategy.
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. 
The chair recognizes Representative Wilson of South Carolina 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank each of you 
for your service. It's so inspiring and, General Richardson, I 
recently was at SOUTHCOM and so congratulations on your 
command. What extraordinary people that you have serving with 
you.
    I'm grateful that the South Carolina National Guard 
bilateral cooperation is with the nation of Colombia through 
the State Partnership Program. It's only appropriate--Columbia 
to Colombia.
    Our dedicated National Guard soldiers are dedicated to 
working with the Colombian military in capacity. It will be 
used against the criminal cartels who manufacture illicit 
drugs, including fentanyl, which will end up in the United 
States, being smuggled across, sadly, our open border.
    What other bilateral agreements are underway to empower our 
South American partners to fight back against drug smuggling?
    General Richardson. So, Congressman, thank you so much for 
mentioning the State Partnership Program and the State of South 
Carolina's relationship with Colombia, and Columbia to 
Colombia. So, absolutely.
    What a huge enabler to our efforts in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The 
National Guard State Partnership Programs are aligned with our 
strategy and with our campaign plan in SOUTHCOM, and they are 
so important because they've had relationships over decades, 
and you really look at the strength and the trust with our 
partner nations--our National Guard State Partnership Program 
is absolutely key to that.
    And so in terms of the bilateral agreements, I'd like to 
talk about the Colombia staff talks we just had at the SOUTHCOM 
headquarters with the chief of defense and his joint staff that 
came, and we had developed a framework.
    Believe it or not, we have had such a great relationship 
over the past couple of decades with Colombia, but actually 
developed a framework and then lines of effort with things that 
we wanted to work towards.
    They have very important elections in Colombia coming up 
the end of May, and so we want to make sure that what we have 
seen in countries that have elections and change 
administrations is that the security relationships maintained 
are strong.
    They continue to be strong. But we wanted to put in writing 
these lines of effort and our focus areas that we wanted to 
work towards--three lines of effort with about six focus areas 
per each one, and we both signed that, myself and the chief of 
defense, General Navarro, in January.
    So we look forward to continuing to strengthen our military 
partnerships in cyber, in the human rights, rule of law, women, 
peace, and security. I mean, it covers the whole gamut of what 
we do in security cooperation with our partner nations. And, 
quite honestly, our partner nations are our best defense.
    Mr. Wilson. And I want to congratulate you. Socialist 
dictator Maduro of Venezuela, of all things, is violating 
international sanctions in buying oil from Iran, and this--in 
fact, you have already stopped 1.1 million barrels of Iranian 
petroleum products, which were going to Venezuela, which would 
actually pay for terrorist activity to achieve their goal of 
death to Israel, death to America.
    And so what is being done, again, to stop such violations 
by the Maduro dictatorship?
    General Richardson. So, Congressman, I appreciate that. As 
we know, Iran is the single largest state sponsor of terror in 
the world. They exchange arms and petroleum to avoid sanctions 
and they exchange that with Venezuela.
    And so in terms of the sanctions and things like that, 
that's more of an administration question. I don't get into the 
sanctions part of the--of what we do for SOUTHCOM.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. It's inconceivable, a great country 
like Venezuela that should be producing oil and benefitting the 
people of their country, to buy Iranian oil. It's just--it's 
mind-numbing how insane this is.
    Secretary Dalton, I've visited the U.S. border and--with 
Mexico, and it was shocking to me to see an open border where 
there's human trafficking, drug cartels, and terrorists.
    With Homeland Security, how many on the terrorist watch 
lists have crossed the southern border in the last year?
    Ms. Dalton. Congressman, thank you so much for highlighting 
this critical issue for our country and for our partners in the 
region. This will absolutely be a priority of mine as assistant 
secretary to work closely within our agency partners and 
partners in the region to address.
    For your specific question, I will have to take that for 
the record. I don't have the number at my disposal, but would 
be happy to respond.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Well, the American people need to 
know how many terrorists have come across. I yield back. Thank 
you.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General VanHerck, I had some other questions set up. But 
then you mentioned that--it sounded like the DOD was thinking 
of going into the intelligence collection business inside the 
United States.
    Could you clarify your comment so I understand what you 
were talking about and how you propose to stay on your side of 
the line?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I did not say DOD should go 
into intelligence collection. I said from a national security 
perspective we need to analyze policy and law to ensure that it 
best meets our Nation's needs to ensure we have full domain 
awareness of where our----
    Mr. Larsen. So why can't we rely on civilian law 
enforcement to do that with--in a--why can't DOD cooperate with 
civilian law enforcement to do that?
    General VanHerck. We can, certainly. That should be DHS, in 
my mind, doing most----
    Mr. Larsen. So why would you need additional authorities or 
policy to do that when that exists?
    General VanHerck. I just think we need to look at the whole 
broad nature of that and ensure we fully understand where the 
risk and vulnerabilities are. I'm not advocating that we need 
to do it right now. But we do need to understand where our 
vulnerabilities are from a national security perspective. Right 
now----
    Mr. Larsen. Do you say--you might be right. Are you 
saying--have you concluded that we don't?
    General VanHerck. No, I'm not saying that. I said we need 
to go look at it to ensure we fully understand where those 
vulnerabilities may be. The world is changing, Congressman, 
dramatically.
    Mr. Larsen. General, I'm fully aware the world is changing. 
But thank you for reminding me.
    Secretary Dalton, on page 7 of your testimony you discuss a 
recent initiative to institutionalize capability to conduct a 
deep data-driven analysis required to understand critical 
infrastructure and dependencies.
    Is that related to what the general was mentioning or is 
that something different?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Congressman, for highlighting this 
issue. I believe that it is related in the sense that in 
working closely with civilian-led agencies that have the lead 
for protections here at home, DOD is working very closely with 
the interagency to understand where critical vulnerabilities 
may exist, and then if, working together, we have the right 
tool set in place to close those vulnerabilities.
    So that work is ongoing, working very closely with NORTHCOM 
and other components in the Department but in support of 
civilian-led agency efforts.
    Mr. Larsen. All right.
    General, I understand our questions are fervent and, 
perhaps, uncomfortable. So I don't--you know, part of it is 
putting you on the spot just to answer our questions because 
you are sitting on the spot. So I'm not trying to get at you 
personally.
    But I need to--I want to be assured, having been here for 
the 22 years and seeing the world change over that period of 
time and having had experience in those 22 years with oversight 
of the DOD, I want to be sure that at least I'm getting my 
point across about that past experiences where the DOD has 
crossed that line.
    It's not--I'm not comfortable with that. I just want to 
make that point to you and try to do it in a nicer way in my 
second chance with you on that. So that's the first thing.
    Second, I do want to ask you in particular, the 
Department's doing 5G pilot projects throughout the--throughout 
bases in CONUS [continental United States], and just wondering 
if your role, NORTHCOM's role in those 5G projects and what you 
expect to get--the results--what results you expect to get and 
use from those pilot projects?
    General VanHerck. It is not my role. I would point that 
out, Congressman. But I do applaud the Department for looking 
at that.
    In time of crisis and conflict it is important to be able 
to have the ability to command and control forces across the 
homeland and around the globe. 5G could provide additional 
capability and capacity to do that through data and voice 
capability.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Thanks.
    General Richardson, can you comment on the role SOUTHCOM is 
playing--I'm sorry, the role SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations 
Command] is playing in SOUTHCOM, to the extent that you can 
share that with us here in the committee?
    General Richardson. So I have a component command, the 
Special Operations Command South, so SOCSOUTH, and one of the 
Theater Special Operations Commands, and they're doing a 
fantastic job.
    Small teams that are working with partner nations in 12 to 
17 countries, depending on which day, doing low-level--they 
have had these relationships, augmented by 7th [Special Forces] 
Group that--in terms of cultural training, language training, 
working with these Latin American countries for many, many 
years. Already built the trust, and really proud of my special 
ops team, and then the support that I get from General Clarke 
and SOCOM if we need extra capability or sometimes we cost 
share on some AI/ML [artificial intelligence and machine 
learning] programs, things like that.
    The Chairman. I'm sorry. The gentleman's time has expired. 
And I think Congressman Larsen raises an important point. We 
talked a little bit about it when we met, General VanHerck, and 
I think what you're talking about is the vulnerabilities within 
the U.S. systems.
    A lot of that is in the private sector. We saw it in the 
energy sector when we got hit by cyber. You know, there's all 
manner--also food processing, all kinds of places.
    And while you and others are in charge of protecting our 
critical infrastructure, you don't know. They can be attacked 
and we won't ever see it. So how do we deal with that.
    But Congressman Larsen raises the right point. You know, in 
our country, we don't do it by the government inserting 
themselves. But I think it's going to be a difficult policy 
choice.
    I appreciate him raising that issue and it's something we 
need to talk about--how do we protect against those 
vulnerabilities without having the government reaching into 
information that our Constitution and our laws don't allow them 
to. It is a big challenge to protect ourselves and protect our 
civil liberties.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Dalton, I know you're new to your position so 
maybe that explains it. But I didn't see anything in your 
written statement about missile defense, and yet, that's a 
critical job in your portfolio to help with missile defense, 
NORTHCOM.
    I'm about to ask some questions of General VanHerck about 
that. But I really would urge you to get up to speed as quickly 
as possible. And we haven't seen the Missile Defense Review 
that's supposed--that's, I think, overdue already. I hope 
there's no weakening in that when that comes out on the part of 
this administration.
    Okay. General VanHerck, I was in your office real recently, 
a few weeks ago, and one of the things we talked about was 
North Korea and the missile defense capabilities that we need 
to have to counteract their threat.
    Now, and I know we'll have a classified session later 
today, but here in open session what can you say about our 
ability to keep up with the evolving North Korean missile 
threat?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I'm currently comfortable 
with the capability we have today for ballistic missile defense 
against the threat that I see today out of North Korea.
    Certainly, they're trying to increase their capacity and 
capability. That's why you see the tests, nine since the 
beginning of the year. That will challenge us, going forward.
    I would point out that North Korea is a very tough target 
to gain intelligence to understand their exact capability and 
capacity. Going forward, it is crucial to keep Next Generation 
Interceptor on target on time, if not field it sooner, and 
continue to service life extend the current system to give us 
more reliance and capability as well.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And what about the threat? Do 
we need to make changes in our space architecture to detect 
whether it's that threat or better detect hypersonic threats 
from near peers like Russia and China?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I believe, yes, we need to 
go to space as soon as possible to detect hypersonic threats 
that will challenge my ability from a domain awareness 
perspective to see them and provide what I think is crucial.
    That's threat warning and attack assessment. That directly 
informs continuity of government, posture of the nuclear 
forces, and those kinds of things.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    And General Richardson, you already asked some--or answered 
some very good questions by my colleague, Representative 
Wilson, about drug interdiction and fentanyl, in particular. I 
know you have a lot of responsibilities, but drug interdiction 
is one of those, is it not?
    General Richardson. So, Congressman, by law, we do the 
detection and monitoring to help with our interagency and 
partner nations do the interdictions?
    Mr. Lamborn. That's excellent, because fentanyl is--and 
other drugs are a crisis in our country. And I noticed in our 
briefing paper on page 5 it says DOD has an interest in 
preventing drug-trafficking organizations that operate with 
tacit or explicit support of Venezuelan authorities from 
entering the United States.
    What can you tell us about Venezuela's involvement in drug 
trafficking?
    General Richardson. Well, certainly, drug trafficking is 
very prevalent in the--as it comes from the Central American 
and north tip of South America towards the homeland and, 
certainly, transnational criminal organizations are very 
prevalent. As I said before, we work very hard on the detection 
and monitoring.
    I'd like to highlight that we have 16 interagency at my 
JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] South Command in Key West 
as well as 23 foreign liaison officers and, quite honestly, 
it's a great news story in terms of the training investment 
that we provide with our partner nations, sharing of actionable 
information. They have increased by 62 percent the 
interdiction----
    Mr. Lamborn. That's excellent. I'm going to have to 
interrupt because my time is about to run out. I'm concerned 
about--and I've zeroed in on Venezuela, in particular, because 
according to sources in the news--I don't know if this is 
accurate or not--but, apparently, we have administration 
officials that are about to or have gone to Venezuela to talk 
about importing some of their oil to the U.S. to replace the 
possible loss from stopping Russian oil imports and I would 
just be real concerned if that's true.
    You don't have to answer this. But I'd just be really 
concerned if Venezuela plays any part of supplying U.S. energy 
when we have American energy that's just sitting there not 
being used because we have shut down permitting and pipelines 
and everything else.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. It is worth noting that we're at 
the highest level of production of oil and natural gas that we 
have ever been at and it's going up, literally, every week. 
Certainly, we could do better, but it's going up, not down. I 
just want to make sure we're clear on that.
    Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here this morning.
    General VanHerck, in your testimony--your written 
testimony--on page 6 you did focus on the maritime domain, 
where you talked about the fact that Russia launched its second 
Severodvinsk cruise-missile sub this year with--and there's 
more on deck in their shipyards that are there. You describe 
them as designed to deploy within cruise-missile range of our 
coastlines.
    Again, having been through a few of these hearings, 
normally, that's a focus on EUCOM but, I mean, I think, you 
know, now that it's in NORTHCOM's, you know, we're, obviously, 
dealing, again, with something that is very close to home.
    Later in your testimony on page 17 you talked about the 
fact that we need to increase our maritime domain awareness and 
that we can, in fact, quickly improve that with the IUSS 
[Integrated Undersea Surveillance System] sensors and the OTHR 
[over-the-horizon radar] sensors.
    Again, maybe you can just sort of explain what that means a 
little bit, you know, in an unclassified fashion because 
acronyms, I think, kind of go over a lot of people's heads.
    General VanHerck. Absolutely, Congressman. So, from a 
domain awareness perspective, first, for the submarines that 
you're talking about, that would be the integrated undersea 
surveillance capability that the Navy brings. And I would point 
out that Canada partners with us on and provides some of that 
capability as well to track and maintain awareness of submarine 
positions around the globe; a very challenging environment in 
the Central Atlantic when they get on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge to 
be able to track them.
    And so to hold them accountable, if you will, before they 
become a threat is important. That's part of the integrated 
deterrence that we also talked about, and we partner very 
closely with EUCOM and we need to move that into the Pacific as 
well. I'm confident that we'll see some of that in the 2023 
budget that we talked about.
    You mentioned the Sev, the second one. They're on their way 
to field nine. Russia will be a persistent proximate threat to 
the homeland in the maritime domain within the next 5 years.
    China is about a decade behind but they will do the same 
thing. And so 24/7 in the near future we'll have both 
persistent proximate threat in the sub--from a submarine 
perspective but also surface.
    OTHR--over-the-horizon radar capability--gives us out to 
about 4,000 miles in the maritime domain and the air and space 
domain to be able to see much further than we can today.
    We're limited today by curvature of the Earth because 
typical radar systems have that limit because they can't see 
over that. Over-the-horizon gives us that and the undersea 
gives us the undersea domain awareness as well.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you. I mean, again, I 
think the one comment you made in your testimony is that those 
systems can actually be quickly deployed. And, again, I know 
this committee will be watching for that in the 2023 budget 
when it comes over.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, can I--you're exactly right. 
Over-the-horizon technology exists today. It's employed by 
other nations around the globe. It's something we can move out 
on relatively quickly, as well as undersea surveillance.
    Mr. Courtney. And the point that this is a, really, almost 
iconic example of integrated deterrence. I mean, anti-submarine 
warfare is a team sport, and having Canada with the new 
agreement that the President signed in 2021, you know, to 
modernize NORAD, I think, you know, this is, again, a poster 
child example of that, and the same is true in the North 
Atlantic.
    General Richardson, congratulations on your new position. 
In your testimony you mentioned, again, the success of the LCS 
[littoral combat ship] in terms of counternarcotics, which kind 
of echoes General Faller last time he was here. It seems like 
the LCS has finally sort of found a home in terms of its long 
career.
    But I would just note that, you know, last year the Navy 
came over to decommission four LCSes. We still don't know 
what's in 2023. I think some of the chatter is is that we're 
probably going to see some of that in the budget that's there.
    It seems like, given the fact that we're selling Coast 
Guard ships to Latin American allies, that the LCS, given its 
success that you've described, would be a great candidate for 
foreign military sales to some of our allies to bolster their 
navies. I mean, what's your thoughts on that?
    General Richardson. Well, certainly, I am--I do--I think 
FMS is definitely a tool. We have to make sure that our partner 
nations can maintain the vessel, and that's what's really 
important about the equipment.
    We have to make sure that--it's great to get the equipment. 
We have got to be able to maintain it and help them through 
that as well, and I think that's an area that we can certainly 
help in SOUTHCOM with our partner nation militaries.
    Logistics is hard. Maintenance is hard. The LCS has done a 
fantastic job in my AOR. I don't get a lot of assets. I don't 
have assigned forces and I have very little GFMAP [Global Force 
Management Allocation Plan] resources that I do get.
    But I do have two LCSes right now. They do a fantastic job. 
Working with the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] to get 
maintenance done in the theater, so when it has to do 
maintenance while it's in my AOR it doesn't have to sail back 
to Mayport, Florida, take a week to sail back, a week to sail 
back into theater.
    The Chairman. I'm sorry. The gentleman's time has expired. 
I should have said this at the outset. Even if we're in mid 
question we try to cut it off right at the time and get on to 
the next person, which we will do now, and that is Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Generals, and 
ma'am, thanks for being here. And Ms. Dalton and General 
Richardson, I think this next statement is predominantly for 
you.
    And, Ms. Dalton, I know you've spent a fair amount of time 
at the Defense Intelligence Agency in some--dealing with some 
pretty sporty regions of the world.
    When we talk about SOUTHCOM, we typically talk about the 
fact that more Americans lose their lives to drug overdoses, 
not all of it coming from that region but a lot of it, than to 
terrorism. We talk about gangs. We talk about drugs. We talk 
about crypto, cyber, China, Russia, and the disruptions to 
democracy in the Western Hemisphere.
    Twelve months from now, I think we're going to be talking 
about the issue of hunger and the disruption of democracies in 
the Western Hemisphere because of the lack of food supply.
    This is a direct result of Russia's incursion into the 
Ukraine. It is going to come from the loss of the ability to 
put fertilizer on a lot of crops around the world. My 
understanding is that Russians have now said they're going to 
withhold fertilizer from the rest of the world, including 
countries like Brazil, who produce a tremendous amount of food 
supply.
    I don't expect you to answer this question, necessarily. 
But I do think it would be worthwhile for this committee to see 
work done from the Defense Intelligence Agency on what a 5 
percent reduction in the global food supply and a 10 percent 
reduction in the global food supply would mean to the people in 
the Western Hemisphere and the potential disruption of 
democracies in that hemisphere.
    And so if you could help us have the Defense Intelligence 
Agency work on that I would very much appreciate it. I do think 
this is coming. Russia and Ukraine are responsible for about 12 
percent of the calorie supply inside the United States, it's my 
understanding.
    If the Ukrainians are not able to plant their crops over 
the next couple of months, and it certainly does not look like 
they will be able to, there's going to be a tremendous 
disruption in the food supply.
    And if the fertilizer is not able to come out of the Black 
Sea region, and it does not look like it's going to be able to, 
there's going to be a significant reduction in the global food 
supply.
    I can tell you, farmers in the southeastern United States 
where they normally would plant crops on what we call dry land 
that does not have irrigation and the production on those 
pieces of dirt are not as productive as they are if it's 
irrigated, farmers, because of the cost, whether it be diesel 
or fertilizer, in many cases, are not going to plant the dry 
land fields.
    And I think that it would do well for the U.S. to be 
prepared for the potential disruption in democracies from food 
supply. So any help with that would be appreciated.
    With that said, I want to go back to the Russia issue in 
SOUTHCOM. You've hit on it before. They continue to exert their 
influence in the SOUTHCOM AOR--the disinformation and 
propaganda that they have become very good at.
    General Richardson, would you go over our strategy again 
with regard to how we combat Russia and their misinformation, 
and I would appreciate it especially if you could talk about it 
with regard to Venezuela and Cuba.
    General Richardson. So we were--our partner nations are 
very concerned about this and they voice that. Colombia voices 
that. Very concerned with the disinformation that they sow.
    The Russian media conglomeration Russia Today in Spanish 
[Actualidad RT], as well as the Sputnik Mundo that I mentioned 
earlier, is--continue. I mean, it used to have 7 million 
followers on RT Spanish and now it's over 18 million. Their 
ability to put out disinformation and just sow an environment 
that is full of untruths is very prevalent in the region.
    And so we work very closely with our partner nations to--
with Colombia, with Brazil, with--in the cyber capabilities 
with the small teams that we'll send forward.
    Our National Guard State Partnership Programs, they have 
the cyber battalions that are very effective, and so we try to 
utilize those capabilities because there aren't enough high-end 
capabilities and, certainly, SOUTHCOM is not the priority AOR. 
So we work very closely with our State Partnership Program to--
--
    Mr. Scott. Ma'm, I'm almost out of time. But is there 
discussion about actually taking those channels off the 
networks?
    General Richardson. So we're aware that as of yesterday we 
got the report that Ecuador took RT Spanish off their network, 
which is really good. And so we'll continue to work with our 
partner nations and----
    The Chairman. Thank you. And, again----
    Mr. Scott. Thank you all.
    The Chairman [continuing]. I apologize. The gentleman's 
time is expired.
    Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General 
VanHerck, Ms. Dalton, General Richardson, thank you for 
appearing today, thank you for your testimony.
    I want to hone in on a couple of issues that have been put 
on the table already. We have not spent a lot of time talking 
about the Arctic. We know that it is a new area of considerable 
concern, and we, in the 2022 NDAA, asked for a report.
    Ms. Dalton, what is the status of that and does that report 
look at the necessary assets--military infrastructure, other 
assets--that are necessary to address the Arctic?
    Ms. Dalton. Congressman, thank you for the question. Just a 
question for clarification. Is it the Arctic strategic ports 
report that you're asking about?
    Mr. Garamendi. The Arctic assessment report.
    Ms. Dalton. Arctic assessment? Yes.
    Mr. Garamendi. It's due, like, soon, meaning next month?
    Ms. Dalton. Yes. Congressman, thank you so much for 
highlighting that requirement, and I will expeditiously----
    Mr. Garamendi. In other words, you don't have an answer for 
me today, where it is, and does it deal with any of the 
specific issues like airfields and facilities and over-the-
horizon radar, things of that sort?
    Ms. Dalton. I know we have been working very closely with 
Northern Command on the production of the report. So, perhaps, 
General VanHerck would be best positioned to answer.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, we're working feverishly on 
that report. That report is tasked to me to do. I will 
coordinate with the services and the Department to do that 
report right. It's likely not going to happen this month. We're 
going to seek an extension here in the near future.
    I will be very candid in that report what the Department 
needs to be able to operate in the Arctic.
    Mr. Garamendi. Good. Will it include icebreakers?
    I promised my colleagues here I wouldn't mention 
icebreakers again but it's a promise not kept.
    General VanHerck. It will. We will look at everything. 
Persistence is something we have to have to operate in the 
Arctic; communications. Persistence requires fuel north of 
Dutch Harbor. Communications requires satellite terminals to 
utilize the bandwidth that is being put up there by commercial 
companies and the infrastructure that you're talking about.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, when your pencil gets down to broken 
and no more lead in it, then you'll send the report to us?
    General VanHerck. I will send it as soon as it's done and 
ready. I'm pushing my team harder.
    Mr. Garamendi. As you and I discussed, we'd like this to be 
in this year's NDAA. We don't want to miss another year on this 
one. Thank you.
    Critical infrastructure. Again, I promised my colleagues I 
wouldn't mention GPS [Global Positioning System]. But it is the 
single point of failure for most everything in this Nation. Are 
we addressing that in the critical infrastructure issues that 
you've talked about, General, and Ms. Dalton, and----
    General VanHerck. I work closely with General Dickinson at 
United States Space Command to ensure that we maintain 
precision navigation and timing and GPS capability. It's 
crucial for day-to-day operations. It's crucial for our economy 
to make sure we do that. Yes, we are working that hard.
    Mr. Garamendi. No, you're not. We've been at this for 10 
years--actually, for 23 years and we still do not have a backup 
to the GPS system, and the advanced GPS that the military is 
supposed to have will not be completed for another decade.
    So let's look at critical infrastructure. That's one of 
them.
    But your point about having to defend the critical 
infrastructure is critical and that requires integration with 
the Department of Homeland Defense security, which my colleague 
talked about a moment ago.
    Ms. Dalton, are we--are you working with the Department of 
Homeland in defining the threats that the military, Mr.--
General VanHerck has to deal with?
    Ms. Dalton. Congressman, thank you for the question, and 
absolutely, DHS is one of our closest partners on the homeland 
defense portfolio. In fact, there is a unified coordination 
group on domestic response and preparedness that has been stood 
up to look at the implications of the current crisis in Russia 
and Ukraine. But that is in the broader context of daily 
communication and synchronization with DHS.
    Mr. Garamendi. General VanHerck's testimony speaks to 
critical infrastructure over and over again and what he needs 
to have domain awareness.
    It seems to me, given what my colleague said about the 
titles, that he's not supposed to mess within the United States 
but he has to defend it. That requires very, very close 
coordination, and I'd like far more detail on how you are 
accomplishing that.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Garamendi. Yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. General Richardson, you said in your statement 
that Russia posed a more immediate threat in South America than 
China. As we know, China has their space mission there. We know 
the Chinese space mission is dual-use end to end. Which 
capabilities that Russia maintains in South America concern you 
more than China's space mission?
    General Richardson. I think, Congressman, in terms of--
China is more our long-term strategic competitor. Russia is 
just more of an immediate security concern. I think that the--
they undermine U.S. interest globally. They----
    Mr. Gaetz. No. But in your AOR specifically----
    General Richardson. Right.
    Mr. Gaetz [continuing]. Which Russian capabilities are you 
most concerned about?
    General Richardson. I'm concerned about the relationships 
that they have with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba.
    Mr. Gaetz. Capabilities, not relationships.
    General Richardson. Capabilities would be the aircraft, the 
tanks, the air defense systems that they try to help Venezuela 
maintain in Venezuela that's close to our homeland.
    Mr. Gaetz. And so if Russia wanted to marshal all of their 
South American capabilities to do as much damage to the United 
States as they possibly could, what would they do?
    General Richardson. I think that they would--they would 
provide parts to these capabilities that are in Venezuela. As 
we know, the deputy foreign minister probably about 3 or 4 
weeks ago talked about not taking off the table about 
increasing infrastructure capacity within the region.
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay. So as I'm trying to understand the moving 
pieces, China's got a space mission. That's not the more 
immediate threat than the Russian threat in South America. And 
the worst thing that Russia can do to us is to engage in arms 
enhancements in Venezuela.
    Right now, the Biden administration is working to 
potentially purchase oil from Venezuela. If Venezuela saw a 
mass infusion of cash, what do you assess they would do with 
the money?
    General Richardson. I don't know what Venezuela would do 
with the money but----
    Mr. Gaetz. That's concerning, right?
    General Richardson. That is concerning.
    Mr. Gaetz. If we're making policy choices that could move a 
lot of resources into Venezuela, if your biggest worry about 
Venezuela is Russian military cooperation, isn't it possible 
that if Venezuela all of a sudden ended up with a lot more 
cash, that they would use it to buy Russian military equipment?
    General Richardson. They could. They also have a--quite a 
big humanitarian crisis on their hands as well as their own----
    Mr. Gaetz. Yet, humanitarian issues have never really been 
as important to Maduro as military activity, right?
    General Richardson. That is true.
    Mr. Gaetz. Right. So we cannot rule out that our policy 
choices of swapping Venezuelan oil for Russian oil as some sort 
of moral imperative wouldn't result in our most immediate 
threat in our hemisphere, then using that money to go buy 
Russian arms from the Russian Federation. That's your 
testimony, right?
    General Richardson. Well, I am concerned about the increase 
in relationships, the touch points that Russia is having in the 
region with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
    Mr. Gaetz. How many people does Russia have in South 
America, either through their conventional or unconventional 
forces?
    General Richardson. We anticipate about a hundred.
    Mr. Gaetz. And that's a more--a hundred Russians in South 
America concerns you more----
    General Richardson. Between the three countries----
    Mr. Gaetz [continuing]. Than the sum of China's activity? 
That's very stark to me.
    General Richardson. I don't know that it concerns me more, 
Congressman. I have to worry about all our adversaries and the 
competition within my AOR. So I don't----
    Mr. Gaetz. Why I'm asking is--I didn't expect you to say 
that you saw Russia as the more immediate threat in your AOR 
than China. I always view China as the more immediate threat 
there. But I do appreciate the testimony. I think it's very 
telling, because the way you think that threat would manifest 
is actually exacerbated and made worse by some of the policy 
choices that we see at least under consideration.
    General VanHerck, what percentage of the people that DOD 
trains in Mexico end up working for the cartels or 
transnational criminal organizations?
    General VanHerck. I don't have that info and I'd defer that 
to Homeland Security. Are you talking about DOD----
    Mr. Gaetz. DOD training. I know we do all these train-and-
equip missions with Mexico. So when we train and equip Mexican 
special forces, elite Mexican forces, what percentage of them 
end up working against us and for the cartels?
    General VanHerck. I'll have to take that for the record. I 
don't----
    Mr. Gaetz. Do you know if that's information that we track?
    General VanHerck. I don't, personally, track that in DOD.
    Mr. Gaetz. But you know of cases where that's happened, 
right?
    General VanHerck. I would suspect that some folks have gone 
on and done that. I don't have those numbers, Congressman.
    Mr. Gaetz. I have a number of anecdotal, you know, pieces 
of information. I'll be submitting those for the record here. 
And so maybe, as a question for the record, we could get that 
information. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Dalton, thank you for your testimony. I'm pleased that 
in your written remarks you mentioned that we need to continue 
advancing our defense relationship with Colombia.
    I believe it is our closest military partner in the region 
and as you already know, this year marks 200 years of 
diplomatic relations with Colombia. And as the first Colombian-
American in Congress, I look forward to continuing to work to 
deepen strategic partnerships between the United States and 
Colombia.
    As we mark this important milestone, what states--what 
steps can we take to further strengthen our ties?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you very much, Congressman, for 
highlighting one of the most important defense relationships 
that we have in the hemisphere. The Colombians bring 
significant capabilities to the equation in terms of what 
they're able to do counter VEO [violent extremist 
organizations], what they're able to do to extend their 
influence and exert territorial control in the face of some of 
the extremist groups that have plagued the country for decades, 
and, frankly, also are a great partner in terms of being able 
to train up other partners in the region.
    So I'm very much looking forward to working closely with 
the Colombians with General Richardson in Southern Command to 
advance those partnerships.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ms. Dalton.
    General Richardson, in your written testimony you mentioned 
that Russia intensifies instability, including engaging in 
disinformation campaigns. Could you describe in greater detail 
how you're seeing Russia conduct Spanish-language 
disinformation operations in South America and whether it 
differs from the way China is doing the same in the region? And 
what steps do you think we should take to better combat 
disinformation?
    General Richardson. I think the--with the reach that the 
disinformation has with Russia and then also you add in China, 
and the followers that they have and the prevalence just not in 
terms of in print, on radio, social media, Twitter, all over 
the place, and so, quite honestly, propping up candidates that 
are more authoritarian leaning and talk about aligning with 
China that has the BRI [Belt and Road Initiative] and lots of 
cash and lots of projects, and these fragile democracies, 28 of 
31 are in this region.
    Fragile democracies, trying to make it--trying to deliver 
for their people. COVID has really rolled back the advances 
that some of these countries have made by 10 to even 20 years 
due to the economic impacts of COVID, and depending on what 
area of the region.
    And so they're trying to deliver for their people, and, 
quite honestly, this--the disinformation campaigns are very 
prevalent and we work very closely with the partner nations to 
try to help them counter it and advise them.
    Colombia just developed an information operations center--
just stood that up within the last couple of months to try to 
get after this problem.
    Mr. Gallego. Excellent. And then I want to also ask you a 
little more about the Chinese influence in South America. In 
your written testimony--and you just talked a little bit about 
this, about the One Belt, One Road Initiative. Are there 
particular Belt and Road Initiative projects that concern you 
the most? Which types of projects do you think are most 
important for us to prioritize as we not only monitor Chinese 
infrastructure investment but also see seek to provide 
alternatives to it? So not the bigger picture, but specifically 
are there port projects, energy projects, that we should be 
aware of that--you know, that concerns you?
    General Richardson. So the projects that China has in the 
AOR are extremely prevalent, and when I--there are other 
agencies that are providing projects like USAID [United States 
Agency for International Development] and things like that.
    My lever, really, is the Corps of Engineers and the 
projects that they do. But in terms of for the Department of 
Defense, that's only about $250 million in projects over a 5-
year period.
    If I look at what PRC is investing in the AOR over a 5-year 
period of 2017 to 2021, $72 billion. It's off the charts. And I 
can read a couple of the projects. The most concerning projects 
that I have are the $6 billion in projects specifically near 
the Panama Canal, and I look at the strategic lines of 
communication--Panama Canal and the Strait of Magellan.
    But just to highlight a couple of the projects: the nuclear 
power plant in Argentina, $7.9 billion; the highway in Jamaica, 
$5.6 billion; the energy refinery in Cuba, $5 billion; the 
highway in Peru, $4 billion; energy dam in Argentina, $4 
billion; the Metro in Colombia, $3.9 billion; the freight 
railway in Argentina, $3 billion.
    These are not small projects that they're putting in this 
region. This region is rich in resources, and the Chinese don't 
go there to invest. They go there to extract. All of these 
projects are done with Chinese labor, not with those nation 
countries.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General VanHerck and General Richardson, when it comes to 
national security, having secure borders is a critical 
component. Can you describe in what way your command is 
supporting DHS with its border protection mission currently?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, today we have 2,421 
guardsmen on title 10 status that are providing detection and 
monitoring, intel [intelligence] analysis, and aviation support 
to the Department of Homeland Security on a day-to-day basis 
through the end of this fiscal year. That's what NORTHCOM is 
contributing right now.
    In addition to that, I have JTF [Joint Task Force] North, a 
joint task force under me that provides direct support and the 
same kind of supportive analysis in support of Homeland 
Security and other agencies as well trying to get after the 
border problems.
    Mr. Bergman. Thanks.
    General Richardson.
    General Richardson. Yes, Congressman. And so we work very 
closely with our partner nation militaries on the 
professionalization of their force, human rights, the rule of 
law, and in terms of the support that they provide, a lot of 
them have been doing a lot of domestic support, especially with 
COVID, as we have in our own country----
    Mr. Bergman. Let's say directly related to this southern 
border in an unclassified way. Can you get a little more 
particular in that?
    General Richardson. So I would say, Congressman, with JIATF 
South, the command that I have underneath me where we do the 
detection and monitoring and then pass that actionable 
information to our interagency, the Coast Guard, as well as our 
partner nations to do the disruptions and interdictions to 
protect our border.
    Mr. Bergman. Do any capability gaps exist in the mission 
that currently as it exists--any gaps that you see that your 
command could support but you lack resources for?
    General Richardson. So I would say domain awareness is 
absolutely essential in my AOR, and I want to thank Congress 
for the support that you give to me and this AOR in order to 
shore up some of the shortfalls that I do have in the area to 
understand our threat, to know where our threat is, to expose 
our threat. Extremely important.
    And because we don't have enough ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance], and I don't need high-end 
capabilities in this region but I do need--and is just 
capability. I don't need big--I need low-cost high-yield 
solutions, which forces us to work very closely with Honorable 
Moultrie, the director of intelligence. We have Project Maven 
in my region. We also have five joint capability technology 
demos from Heidi Shyu from research and experimentation in OSD. 
And then we're also using actionable information.
    Mr. Bergman. So you got a lot of--I hate to cut short, 
because I got some more questions.
    General Richardson. Yes.
    Mr. Bergman. There's a lot of things you could do.
    General VanHerck, any thoughts?
    General VanHerck. Domain awareness is certainly one of the 
challenges. What I would say is I don't see southwest border, 
which I view as a law enforcement challenge, as an enduring DOD 
mission. I think DHS needs to be fully resourced. They need to 
plan for this mission and execute the mission, which is a law 
enforcement mission on the border.
    And more broadly, I think we need a whole-of-nation and a 
global approach to the problems on the southwest border. 
Candidly, I think transnational criminal organizations are the 
problem.
    The symptoms are human migration, counternarcotics, those 
kinds of things. And a broader strategy to get after that, in 
my mind, such as going after finances, weapons that are flowing 
that direction, challenging the fentanyl or the precursors to 
fentanyl that flow in, those are things from a whole-of-
government approach.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. So, quickly, this is not--you know, but 
for both of you. You know, there's been a debate about whether 
combatant commands being regionally oriented is still 
appropriate, given the changing dynamics of the threat 
environment.
    Any thoughts on do we need to reorient the combatant 
commands based on function or domain? Which would be more 
appropriate? Because we know we get into food fights in 
different ways. Domain or function?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I think we ought to take a 
look at the UCP [Unified Command Plan] and see if it could be 
adjusted based on the world that we're operating in.
    I think the value of day-to-day having regional combatant 
commands is through the relationships, the integrated 
deterrence, the theater security cooperation, the partnerships 
that you build with that.
    Whether we fight regionally or we have a single combatant 
command responsible for a global operation such as against 
China and Russia, we could go take a look at that.
    Mr. Bergman. General Richardson.
    General Richardson. I would say that I agree with General 
VanHerck, quite honestly. It's the relationships that make the 
difference, the trust that we build with our partners. SOUTHCOM 
has a reputation that----
    Mr. Bergman. And I see my time has expired, so I will yield 
back, whatever--that half a second that was left.
    The Chairman. Okay. Appreciate your generosity.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General Richardson, China's Belt and Road Initiative is a 
part of its strategy to assume a greater leadership role in 
global affairs, including in the SOUTHCOM AOR. Chinese 
investments, as has been said, in SOUTHCOM demonstrates the 
need to further U.S. engagement to offer an alternative to the 
countries in the AOR.
    However, we are all very aware that the U.S. has a mixed 
history in Latin America. Iran-Contra comes to mind, for an 
example. That has led to distrust and the need to reset 
relationships. How does SOUTHCOM security assistance funds help 
offer an alternative to China?
    General Richardson. So it's absolutely essential, 
Congressman, and thank you for the question, because that is my 
most important lever is the security cooperation, the 333 
funding and, quite honestly, that is what gets us on the field 
with our jerseys on working with our partner nations.
    As I've said before, our partner nations are our best 
defense, and if we're not there working with them, they're 
going to work with whoever is there. That's how desperate they 
are and, quite honestly, our competitors are there ready to 
take our place. And so that security cooperation funding is 
extremely important as my main lever. My next lever would be 
exercise funding.
    Mr. Carbajal. What proposals have gone unfunded due to 
limited resources and, in addition, what whole-of-government 
initiatives should be expanded in the region to expand your 
work to improve cooperation with countries where there might be 
mistrust of U.S. intentions?
    General Richardson. Congressman, if we did not receive our 
funding in these--in my security cooperation funds, we would be 
absolutely ceding what I call key terrain and we would not be 
present on the field, and that void will be filled and it won't 
be filled with something or by relationships. It'll be with our 
competitors, unfortunately, because they are very prevalent.
    The thing is is that the PRC doesn't have partners. We have 
partners. We have exercises where I have 29 countries that 
participate. For PANAMAX every year I have 29 countries that 
participate in this.
    Tradewinds, which has been known for many, many years, 21 
countries will participate in that. So we have partners and 
we--that is our best defense, and we show integrated deterrence 
through campaigning each and every day in the SOUTHCOM AOR.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General Richardson.
    Generals VanHerck and Richardson, the U.S. Coast Guard 
provides an extraordinary support to U.S. national security in 
defending the homeland and in supporting broader national 
strategic objectives around the world.
    Its mission is to ensure our Nation's maritime safety, 
security, and stewardship. As chairman of the Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation Subcommittee, I would like to explore 
more about how the Coast Guard supports both of your commands. 
What are additional Coast Guard capabilities or assets that 
your commands would benefit from?
    General VanHerck. I'll go first, Congressman. Thanks for 
that.
    Absolutely, the Coast Guard is crucial and as you are well 
aware, they work for Homeland Security. I integrate the Coast 
Guard. They were just in my commanders conference. I visit them 
as much as possible.
    The capabilities--this really comes down to capacity, 
additional capacity that help us for that domain awareness and 
ensure that we're plugged in from a domain awareness 
perspective--any data they have from radar undersea 
capabilities to ensure that we're sharing that to give a 
complete picture of the threats to the homeland.
    General Richardson. So, Congressman, in SOUTHCOM I'd like 
to highlight the Coast Guard is extremely prevalent. I have my 
operations officer that's a coastguardsman. I have my JIATF 
SOUTHCOM--or my JIATF South commander is also a coastguardsman.
    The Commandant of the Coast Guard used to be the ops 
[operations] officer for SOUTHCOM. So that tells you how 
important the Coast Guard and the SOUTHCOM relationship are. We 
have District 7, District 11, that are very close to where I am 
in Miami; and then the assets in terms of the Coast Guard 
supplements an increase with some capability to SOUTHCOM to 
help with the disruptions in the AOR as well. So just really 
can't say enough about the support from the Coast Guard.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Secretary Dalton and General VanHerck, DOD continues to 
support the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Now 
entering into the third year, we have gained a better 
understanding of the virus, our constraints, and our 
limitations in our capacity to fight this virus.
    As the U.S. and other nations prepare to open travel and 
trade to pre-COVID levels, the threat of----
    The Chairman. And I'm sorry but this--the gentleman is out 
of time. That question will have to be submitted for the record 
at a later point.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    The Chairman. And Mr. Waltz is now recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General 
Richardson, VanHerck. Good to see you again, Ms. Dalton.
    If we could just first talk about the Chinese influence and 
presence in your AORs.
    I'll start with you, General Richardson.
    I mean, just looking through your statistics, we have got 
25 of 31 countries hosting infrastructure, 29 port projects, 7 
countries hosting PRC-linked space facilities.
    And I think what's most concerning--I know it's incredibly 
concerning to my constituents--is state-owned Chinese 
investments on the ports on both sides of the Panama Canal.
    Can you talk to what you're seeing and what we can do to 
help you combat this pernicious influence?
    General Richardson. So thank you for the question, 
Congressman, and the--obviously, the resources that I rely on, 
as I talked to previously--the security cooperation funding, 
which is my main lever of competing and being on the field with 
my jersey on, all of my folks in SOUTHCOM--that will really 
hamstring us if we don't get that security cooperation funding. 
That's what allows us to partner with our nations, and like I 
said, our partners are our best defense.
    Everywhere I've been--I've been to Colombia, Brazil, 
Jamaica, Belize--I've done a Central American security 
conference with seven countries. I just got back from Honduras. 
They want to partner with the United States. I have got to have 
all of the SOUTHCOM postured and in the AOR ready to partner 
with our partner nations to counter this.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you, General, and I 
certainly share your concern--I think many of my colleagues--
that this isn't--you know, this is a global competition. This 
isn't just about the Indo-Pacific.
    Ms. Dalton, my understanding is in the Secretary's Global 
Posture Review SOUTHCOM lost force structure, for lack of a 
better term. Can you commit to the Department and the--or 
commit to the committee that the Department will continue that 
security assistance funding that General Richardson so badly 
needs in their request?
    Ms. Dalton. Congressman, thank you for highlighting these 
requirements, and, absolutely, as assistant secretary, I look 
forward to working with General Richardson to ensure that the 
requirements that SOUTHCOM has identified are met, and we also 
work very closely with the State Department, with USAID, with 
other interagency colleagues to address the holistic picture in 
this AOR as well.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah. I can just tell you, from my own 
experience, SOUTHCOM continually gets shortchanged. I'll just 
be--I'll just be candid. This is our backyard. The Chinese and 
Russians are in it. And I think if anything, COVID and current 
events have shown us it's global supply chains matter and 
they're never more secure, I don't think, than in Central and 
South America and Canada in our own hemisphere. So I look 
forward to working with you on that and--going forward.
    Just very quickly, General Richardson, FARC [Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia] delisting--the Biden administration 
delisted FARC. We're now in discussions with Venezuela and 
Maduro. The Colombian president, Duque, said of delisting he 
would have preferred another decision, certainly.
    I think most of our Venezuelan population in Florida and 
Colombian population would have as well. Do you share 
Colombia's concerns that Russian military assistance to the 
Maduro regime will end up in the hands of the FARC and other 
combatants, and that if we end up lifting sanctions and putting 
more money into Venezuela, that would not be a positive outcome 
for stability on the continent?
    General Richardson. Congressman, I know, looking at my 
partner nations eyes of the chief of defense and then the joint 
staff that works for that nation is very concerned about 
Venezuela and what Russia is doing in Venezuela, and you can 
see it in their eyes. They're very concerned about the 
disinformation leading up to their elections and election 
meddling, and we have got to continue to work very closely with 
our partner.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Just in the few seconds I have 
remaining, General VanHerck, can I take for the record--I share 
Chairman Garamendi's concern about our absolute total lack of 
basing in--along our northern coast and in the Arctic.
    I do think Canada needs to step up as well, but I look 
forward to seeing that report. And if you could get back to me 
on exactly the base that you need in--along Alaska's northern 
coast, I'd appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Time has expired.
    Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    You know, I'd like to thank all of you for your service and 
the commitment to keeping America secure, and note that the 
challenges of keeping the homeland safe are complex and 
persistent.
    We briefly discussed the negative impact that climate 
change has, causing damage to installations and equipment and 
reshaping the geostrategic environment.
    So, General VanHerck, as the commander of NORTHCOM and the 
designated DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities, how do you see 
the Department modernizing its systems in the Arctic to meet 
the growing threat posed by Russia and China?
    And then the Army has two brigade combat teams in Alaska, 
in an environment where logistical operations, battery life for 
vehicles and digital systems, and power usage intersect with 
survivability and lethality. As those forces modernize in line 
with the Army's climate strategy, will the complexities 
associated with Arctic operations impact newer, greener 
systems?
    General VanHerck. Ma'am, the last question is, absolutely, 
the complexity of the changing environment in the Arctic will 
absolutely impact our strategy and our ability as we go 
forward.
    So what are we doing and what do we need? Well, presence 
and persistence in the Arctic, and that requires infrastructure 
to do that, whether that be maritime infrastructure, such as a 
commercial port that's deep enough for cruisers, destroyers, 
Coast Guard cutters, to maintain persistence; the communication 
capabilities to operate north of 65 [degrees north, latitude]; 
infrastructure for airplanes to campaign on a day-to-day basis 
not only in Alaska, but across Canada and into Greenland as 
well to execute our homeland defense design.
    It takes services that are equipped and ready to operate in 
this environment and, candidly, we're not there today and we're 
working closely with the Department to get there, Congressman--
or Congresswoman.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    And then, General Richardson, you know, we have been 
receiving reports about the capabilities of China in the 
Southern Hemisphere, their growing presence.
    We certainly have seen Russia try to reassert its 
traditional alliance with Venezuela and we know both those 
nations are adept at misinformation campaigns and have a great 
deal of cyber capabilities.
    So what tools do you need to combat the cyber threat from 
China and Russia in the region?
    General Richardson. So I'm currently assessing that, 
Congresswoman, and thank you for the question because it's 
very, very important. I find that with my own headquarters in 
terms of our capabilities to support our partners in this 
effort are fairly small, and as this becomes very, very 
prevalent in the region, and it already is, we have got to get 
after this.
    And so my--between my components and what we have--my 
components underneath SOUTHCOM and what we have at the 
headquarters--that could be more robust and we're figuring out 
how to do that and how to make that more robust to help our 
partner nations counter those adversaries in that realm as they 
spread disinformation.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. I look forward to seeing your 
request in that area.
    And then with my remaining time, I wonder if you could tell 
us about the fight regarding international criminal syndicates, 
what your responsibility is there, [inaudible], and what tools 
you need to continue the fight there.
    General Richardson. So as I've said before, Congresswoman, 
us being there present with our partner nations, working with 
their militaries and their security forces on their 
professionalism, their strengths, is hugely important.
    As we work our exercises--so I have the Tradewinds exercise 
coming up in May. I have UNITAS coming up in September and then 
also PANAMAX. I mean, this is where we have 29 countries--19 
countries coming together, 21 countries coming together.
    You can't display more integrated deterrence than that and 
that, as I said before, for example, China doesn't have 
partners. But they are using our playbook in our region. So, 
for example, with professional military education, they're 
offering 1-year, 2-year, all-expense-paid to Beijing for 
professional military education with individuals.
    But they don't have exercises and they don't have partners. 
So I've got to be able to keep up the security cooperation and 
the exercises that we do in this region to show the strengths 
of the partnerships.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mrs. McClain is represented--recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 
for being here today. I appreciate it.
    General Richardson, I want to thank you for coming to my 
office last week. I appreciate the conversation.
    I wanted to follow up with you on issues concerning Russia 
and China's operation in the AOR. Russia has been 
continuingly--continuing to try to expand its influence in 
these countries. It already has a significant military 
intelligence operation in both Cuba and Venezuela.
    But the question is really, as the U.S. continues to 
implement sanctions on Russia due to the invasion in Ukraine, 
is there any indication that their grip on this region is 
beginning to wane or lessen or collapse? Part one.
    Part two is should the United States implement any 
additional target sanctions that specifically focus on Russia's 
assets and their influence in the AOR?
    General Richardson. So thank you, Congresswoman, and thanks 
for the questions.
    I can't comment on the sanctions. That would be more for 
the administration to comment on. But in terms of the--what we 
see happening as a result of what Russia is doing to the 
Ukraine and in our AOR, we, certainly, see the reaching out by 
Russia with these countries' leaders trying to reaffirm.
    We had the visit by the deputy prime minister of Russia to 
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela; also the president of their 
congress that visited Cuba and Venezuela as well; and this is 
all within the past 3 weeks.
    And so, definitely, reaching out to solidify, I think, 
their ties. Whether they're going to increase, I have not seen 
that yet but we are watching very closely. And as I've 
commented before, our domain awareness is absolutely essential 
so close to the homeland.
    Mrs. McClain. What is your sense? I mean, you know, I take 
a look at--it takes two things to fight a war, right. It takes 
money and it takes people, and a lot of their attention is on 
Ukraine right now. Do you get a sense that that's going to 
hinder their operations or their----
    General Richardson. I think that it remains to be seen. We 
saw the U.N. vote that took place, the countries that 
abstained--Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and El Salvador. They did 
not vote to condemn what Russia is doing. So I think that the--
quite honestly, we have to wait and see. I hate to say that, 
but I think it's too early to tell.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. All right. I appreciate that.
    And then, Assistant Secretary Dalton, turning to China and 
the AOR, as General Richardson mentioned earlier in her 
testimony, the Belt and Roadway Initiative projects have been 
implemented in, really, a predatory fashion. Congress attempted 
to counteract China's Belt and Roadway Initiatives in 2018, the 
BUILD [Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development] Act.
    As far as I can tell, and I may be incorrect, but there 
seems to be little interest by the underdeveloped nations to 
utilize the U.S. BUILD Act over China. Why do you think these 
nations have been so hesitant to utilize the U.S. and help--to 
help fund their initiatives?
    Ms. Dalton. Congresswoman, thank you so much for the 
question, and I completely concur with General Richardson's 
characterization of what China is doing in the region through 
its gray zone tactics and leveraging BRI.
    We have seen those predatory practices play out in other 
regions of the world and it's disturbing that it is happening 
in the hemisphere as well and with our close partners.
    In response to your question, I would have to defer to the 
Department of State and USAID colleagues in terms of how the 
conversations are proceeding with partners in the region as 
they engage them on the BUILD Act; but certainly to underscore 
the need for a holistic approach to the region to get after the 
gray zone challenge.
    Mrs. McClain. But it seems like we're offering--we're 
offering help and they're not taking it.
    Ms. Dalton. Yes.
    Mrs. McClain. But yet, you know, so when I talk is, is we 
need to provide assistance. We need to provide assistance. We 
need to provide assistance. Then we provide assistance and they 
don't want it. So is that really the issue or is there 
something I'm missing?
    Ms. Dalton. It's an excellent question, Congresswoman, and, 
again, I would have to defer to the State Department, who's on 
the front lines of engaging with partners on that particular 
issue.
    But, certainly, from a Department of Defense perspective, 
we continue our security cooperation, commitments, and 
relationships as a great way to continue to build the 
relationships in the region.
    Mrs. McClain. But we have to get them off of China and our 
adversaries and we have to--we really have to spend some time 
on why, because it really isn't----
    The Chairman. Sorry. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to, first, express my gratitude to all of you 
for your service. It's wonderful to see you all here, and I 
appreciate the opportunity to talk about these really important 
issues.
    I have the incredible privilege, as you all know, of 
representing Fort Bliss, Texas, here in Congress, and Fort 
Bliss was the site of Operation Allies Welcome and I was so 
fortunate to be able to visit early on with both General 
Richardson and General VanHerck. So thank you for allowing me 
to tag along during that early visit.
    I am so incredibly proud of how Fort Bliss, how our service 
members, and our leadership responded during that time, and 
just continue to be proud of that.
    I also recently had the opportunity to sit and visit with 
JTF North leadership to talk through their mission and sort of 
their evolving mission and how they have moved away from, you 
know, more sort of--I don't want to mischaracterize it, but 
more like soldiers on the ground and focusing more on 
intelligence--on gathering intelligence in the field, trying to 
stop crimes like smuggling and human trafficking before they 
get to the border, which is something I have long advocated 
for.
    You know, by the time those challenges, whether it be drug 
trafficking or immigration--by the time it arrives at our 
southern border, it's too late, and so I really appreciate this 
shift in strategy and trying to get--to use intelligence to 
kind of prevent the issues before they arrive at our front 
door.
    And so, General VanHerck, I wanted to ask you what you see 
as the benefits of NORTHCOM and the shift for JTF North towards 
more intelligence gathering. Are you seeing benefits already 
and kind of what's the long-term vision there?
    General VanHerck. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    Absolutely. I think that the benefits are going to be 
enabling our partners who provide the law enforcement more 
opportunities to engage but even not at the border but helping 
our partners in Mexico and even partnering with JIATF South and 
SOUTHCOM to get further ahead, what I call further left of the 
event at the border vice interdicting or generating effects 
much sooner in the chain before it comes to the border.
    I think this is important to focus on data and info, which 
are strategic assets that are available to us today, and 
technology on the border and even further south and across the 
globe that will give us indicators to interdict much sooner 
before it becomes a challenge on our border and giving that 
intel to those agencies who do have law enforcement roles to be 
able to do their law enforcement mission.
    That's what we're focused on, rather than the interdiction 
at the point--we're not going to interdict our way out of this 
problem at the southwest border. We don't have enough capacity 
and capability, and it's actually part of their business model. 
Transnational criminal organizations--they know they're going 
to lose so much. What we have to do is focus more strategic and 
operational and get out of the tactical business.
    Ms. Escobar. I could not agree more with you and I so 
appreciate this very intelligence--this very intelligent, 
rather, strategy that is focused on that intelligence and 
making sure that we do this in the smartest way possible.
    You know, I--my community is right on the U.S.-Mexico 
border. I do also--you know, I need to mention publicly because 
I have been sounding the alarm, not necessarily for your--for a 
comment from you all but just to raise publicly my concerns 
around Operation Lone Star in Texas.
    And I realize that is under a different authority but, you 
know, we have got to do better on that front for our National 
Guard, and I hope that Governor Greg Abbott sends our National 
Guard home quickly, as soon as possible.
    In the remaining of--almost 30 seconds I have--actually, 
General Richardson, I had a question for you, but I've got 30 
seconds. You and I had a great conversation earlier and so I'll 
just follow up with you.
    Again, thank you all so much for your service and your 
leadership. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Mr. Bacon is recognized.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to thank Ms. Dalton 
for being here, also both generals. Appreciate working--I had 
the honor of working with Brigadier General Richardson when I 
was a brigadier general back in the day, and I got to know 
Lieutenant General VanHerck, and so congratulations, both of 
you, on how well you've done and the leadership that you're 
performing now.
    I have--my first question is for General VanHerck. It's 
about medical readiness for pandemics. In the 115th Congress 
and the 116th Congress, we put a requirement out for DOD to 
start building a surge capacity for pandemics and then we got 
hit with one--with COVID. So the planning for a future one got 
overtaken by events of a real pandemic.
    But I think we're at this point now we should start looking 
outward again and start planning for the next pandemic because 
there's always going to be some at some interval. We just don't 
know what those intervals are.
    So in 2020 and 2021, Congress directed DOD to establish a 
National Disaster Medical System to provide a surge capacity. 
I'm told that you were made the supported commander in this 
strategy or this plan.
    So we're interested to know how DOD wants to fund this and 
the prioritization of it, for starters, and there's a self-
interest here because the DOD picked five surge centers that 
they wanted to build off of and Omaha is one of them, and Omaha 
would like to partner with DOD to make this happen.
    So my question to you, General VanHerck, is what do you see 
as your role in this medical readiness or a surge capacity for 
future pandemics and what kind of resources do you think you 
need? Thank you.
    General VanHerck. Congressman, first, I would say my role 
is defense support of civil authorities. If it's required to 
provide DOD forces to support medical in the homeland, then I 
provide that through my DSCA synchronizer role. I think that 
the task is not mine specific for the overall task. I'm looking 
at our ability within the homeland and moving those forces in 
the event of another pandemic but, more importantly, in the 
event of a crisis or conflict with medical capacity.
    The one thing that the pandemic has shown us is that 
medical capacity is challenging. We don't need to just solely 
look at a pandemic response. We need to look at medical 
capacity from a crisis or conflict that may be global in 
nature, and not only in DOD but more broadly across the whole 
of the Nation to be able to provide that medical support.
    As far as specific capacity today, I'll defer to the 
services and DHA [Defense Health Agency] and the Department on 
our current readiness.
    Mr. Bacon. [Inaudible] but thank you very much.
    General Richardson, first of all, I'm sorry I missed you 
the other day. Votes came at a bad time for your visit. But we 
appreciate you coming by. I know how important ISR is to you 
and Southern Command and the services you provide other 
countries. But could you share with us the challenges that you 
have with ISR, because every COCOM, or combatant command, is 
wanting it and how can we better support you?
    General Richardson. So it's essential for domain awareness. 
I've said that a couple of times this morning and--but it's 
absolutely critical to know where our threats are, what our 
threats are doing, and be able to expose them and expose the 
bad behavior.
    And so with ISR, I want to thank Congress for the extra 
that I get to--in order to contract the capability to have some 
domain awareness.
    It forces us to look for other low-cost high-yield solution 
sets in the AOR using unclassified data that we're able to--you 
know, with patterns of life information, actionable information 
we can share with our partners as well, and that helps. So, 
certainly want to thank Congress for that.
    All of the tools that I have--I did want to talk just 
briefly about the levers that I have because I use the 333 
security cooperation funding. I use the FMS--foreign military 
financing, foreign military sales, the professional military 
education, the IMET--all of these levers, and as I'm--what I am 
finding is that we have got to speed these processes up in 
order to outcompete our competitors that are also out there 
vying for these partner nations' attention, and their money and 
getting embedded in their countries.
    And so I look forward to working with my Department of 
State colleagues and also in my own Department with the 
teammates to making those processes faster.
    Mr. Bacon. With the short time I have left, as a percentage 
what would you say is--how much of your ISR needs are being met 
in Southern Command?
    General Richardson. Well, I get about 1 percent of the 
global ISR that's available. So like I said, domain awareness 
is essential, especially in my AOR. I can fly to 80 percent of 
my AOR in 2 to 3 hours, about the time that it takes here to 
fly to Washington, DC. That's pretty close.
    The Chairman. Sorry. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Mr. Panetta is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. I'm not hearing you, Jim. I don't know--Mr. 
Panetta, are you with us?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. All right. He is not.
    Ms. Jacobs, are you with us?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. Okay. We're off to a bad start.
    Mr. Green, I can physically see you here in real life in 
3D. So Mr. Green is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Rogers. Thank you for scheduling this very important hearing on 
the defense posture in Western Hemisphere, and I want to thank 
our witnesses for being here and, of course, congratulations 
for the new assignment. It's great to see the Pentagon making 
good decisions on its future leaders.
    The events of recent weeks have made one thing abundantly 
clear. Cultivating strong partnerships with our neighbors in 
the Western Hemisphere is more crucial than ever.
    As the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee 
on Western Hemisphere, I am particularly interested in how we 
can coordinate U.S. military's presence with our diplomatic and 
homeland security efforts.
    Hard power and soft power are complementary tools. During a 
trying time for peace and national security, we must ensure the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department 
of Homeland Security cooperate effectively. Our diplomats, our 
law enforcement, and our warriors should be working hand in 
glove to build friendships and deter enemies with all tools at 
our disposal.
    Unfortunately, it's clear that President Biden either 
doesn't understand this or is ignoring the challenges facing us 
in the Western Hemisphere.
    The Biden administration is currently negotiating with the 
murderous Maduro regime to lift oil sanctions on Venezuela. 
This catastrophic idea reflects the naivete that dictators can 
be wooed or somehow appeased into acting in the interest of the 
United States.
    The actions of Vladimir Putin clearly illustrate that 
dictators cannot be appeased and do not work for the good of 
the global community. Venezuela has long been allied with the 
Kremlin, of course Havana, and now Beijing.
    We shouldn't signal to our friends in South America that 
you can violate human rights, imprison American citizens, if 
you sell us your oil. That's why I've just introduced a new 
bill today banning not only purchases from Russia but Venezuela 
and Iran.
    We need to produce more energy here in America, not buy it 
from our adversaries. That is a national security imperative. 
We need to produce it right here for another reason. We're the 
most environmentally safe producers of oil. Why not produce it 
here instead of asking people to produce it elsewhere? They're 
still on the same planet and the impact to the globe is the 
same. Doing so is, as I said, a national security imperative.
    Changing the subject, though, Cubazuela--and I say that 
specifically and purposefully--Cubazuela is metastasizing 
throughout Latin America. Authoritarians tend to link 
themselves to other authoritarians like Russia and China. 
Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela--the dominoes are falling.
    And it appears we're facing a new entity, this 
narcoterrorist state where authoritarian governments are 
partnering with transnational criminal organizations to 
basically create a formidable alliance that crosses departments 
from State, Homeland, and DOD. And I want to hear--and my first 
question centers around this--how is DOD working with Homeland 
and State to address this new sort of entity?
    I guess it's not really new, but how Cuba and Venezuela and 
the drug organizations are working--partnering with Bolivia and 
other countries' militaries? How are we working together in 
some task force mechanism strategically to address that? And 
that's my first question and, perhaps, start with the SOUTHCOM 
commander.
    General Richardson. So in terms of in the Western 
Hemisphere and with our Department of State colleagues in the 
Western Hem, and quite honestly, none of us have the resources 
to counter our competitors and so we--it forces us to work 
extremely well and extremely close together.
    I will say that having our ambassadors in place in this 
region is really, really important, and what we have started 
back up in SOUTHCOM is--and we have been able to brief up four 
ambassadors as they stop to SOUTHCOM before they go into the 
AOR and assume their position.
    So we start that relationship very, very quickly. But it 
takes all of us and that's why I say integrated deterrence is 
very prevalent in our AOR already because we all bring--allies 
and partners. We have U.K. [United Kingdom], Canada, the 
Netherlands, France, all within my AOR as well. But it requires 
all of us to work very closely together.
    Dr. Green. It would be helpful and, perhaps--I've heard 
resources every time I've been in the room and I know you 
mentioned it too, sir. If you guys could send our office a 
list, just these are the top 20 things we have to have. I mean, 
that would be very helpful.
    And I know I may have missed testimony earlier where that 
was--had to go talk about China in another meeting on Foreign 
Affairs. So--but it would be great to get that list. You know, 
Congressman Green, these are the top 10 or 15 or 20 things we 
have to have.
    Because I don't want you saying we don't have the 
resources, right. I mean, that just bothers me. That's a 
failure of this side of the--this branch of government to get 
you what you need.
    I appreciate the ambo mention there. Unfortunately, that's 
the other side of the building, and we'll push those guys to 
get people, you know, through the nom [nomination] process, and 
because I understand Panama and some of these countries haven't 
had ambassadors for a very long time and that's unfortunate and 
shouldn't happen. So we'll push that.
    But a resources list would be great, and with that, I 
yield.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. I'm with you on the ambassador 
point. I will point out that the Senate, you know, and, in 
particular, a few Senate Republicans have, you know, blocked 
just about every appointment that's been offered for one reason 
or another, and if we could get rid of this tradition--it's a 
bipartisan tradition, by the way, that if you don't like some 
policy the administration is doing, you're just going to stop 
them from appointing anybody.
    If we could get rid of that, I think it would really help 
our country, and like I said, it's, you know, Republicans now 
because it's a Democratic President, but I've seen it happen 
the other way, too.
    Just a couple quick announcements. So we have a classified 
brief at 1:00 o'clock. That is actually the INDOPACOM [U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command]--classified INDOPACOM and Korea 
classified brief at 1:00 o'clock--2212--in 2212. We have a hard 
stop here at 12:30 just so--well, I can get lunch, basically, 
in time but before that 1:00 o'clock so--and staff as well. So 
we'll go till 12:30 if--you know, no further than 12:30. Let's 
put it that way. Then we've got to reconvene in 2212.
    With that, we will give Mr. Panetta another shot.
    Mr. Panetta, are you with us?
    Mr. Panetta. I'm with you. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, and 
thank you for this opportunity, and thanks to the witnesses for 
being available for these types of questions and providing the 
thorough answers that you are doing.
    I know you focused a lot on the Southern Hemisphere. Let me 
focus north. Obviously, the Arctic is a convergent point for a 
great power competition as we're seeing. Considering just 
months before Russia started moving troops towards Ukraine, we 
saw an unprecedented buildup of Russian military might in the 
Arctic.
    At the same time, China is looking to become a, quote, 
``Polar great power'' by 2030, and including they had a white 
paper in which they said that controlling the region would 
afford its government a three continents and two oceans 
advantage.
    My first question to Ms. Dalton, at the strategic level, 
where do we see the Arctic in our national security priorities; 
and then two, given Russia and China's posture towards the 
Arctic, can we expect to see a bigger presence of the Arctic in 
the forthcoming National Defense Strategy?
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Congressman, for highlighting the 
importance of Arctic security. From our perspective in OSD 
Policy, we see, really, three U.S. national security interests 
in play in the region.
    First is the need to defend the homeland, the second is in 
terms of deterring aggression, and the third is preserving our 
economic interests in the region as an Arctic nation.
    And to the second part of your question, in my prior 
position before being confirmed into this one I was one of the 
members of the team working on the National Defense Strategy 
and I can assure you that the Arctic is receiving due focus in 
that review and that review will be forthcoming to Congress in 
the next several weeks.
    And going forward, of course, at Congress' urging, we are 
standing up a DASD-ship [Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
office] focused on Arctic and Global Resilience that will be 
within my team, and so I look forward to engaging this 
committee, going forward, on those issues.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you, Ms. Dalton.
    General VanHerck, as you probably know, I have the Naval 
Postgraduate School in my district there in Monterey, 
California, and I do believe they're doing excellent work when 
it comes to studying our Arctic capabilities.
    However, what I've learned from them is that there's sort 
of a gap in our cold weather training for our armed services. 
Now, I know we send troops to Sweden, Norway, and Colorado. But 
I think, and you can probably agree with me, that that doesn't 
compare to actually being within the Arctic Circle.
    So as you undertake the--an independent assessment of the 
Arctic security initiatives outlined in the 2022 NDAA, can you 
explain how NORTHCOM plans to improve training our forces to 
operate in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, first, I'd say NORTHCOM 
seeks every opportunity to have access, either forces allocated 
to me or that volunteer to train in the Arctic. But, candidly, 
we don't have the forces trained, ready, equipped, to operate 
in this environment.
    Now, I am encouraged. Right now, we do have Arctic Edge 
ongoing. It's a longstanding exercise we had planned with a 
limited number of forces, slightly over a thousand, that are 
training in the Arctic region today.
    With that said, I'm also encouraged by the strategies. The 
Department has a strategy and the services all have strategies. 
Now the question is, are we going to fund those strategies.
    I look forward to seeing the fiscal year 2023 budget to see 
if we do fund, as part of the Arctic strategy, the actual 
capabilities that you're talking about.
    Mr. Panetta. You and me both, and I'll leave it at that and 
I appreciate your time today.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our 
witnesses for joining us today.
    General VanHerck, I want to go to you, and specifically 
about your emphasis on the importance of deterrence by denial. 
And I think that's incredibly important, especially as we see 
this increasing aggressive behavior, obviously with Russia's 
attack but also with China and them being opportunists.
    I think your observation that we have to be resilient and 
we have to use both kinetic and non-kinetic means to be able to 
deter are incredibly important across the spectrum.
    I know that you told this committee that, based on your 
mission set in NORTHCOM, your ability to combat these growing 
threats continues to erode, things like having a ballistic 
missile defense system that's not up to par to be able to 
counter hypersonic glide vehicles and other hypersonic weapons.
    And in testimony on March 1st you observed that China's 
effort to develop hypersonic weapons is tenfold to that of the 
United States. You also mentioned earlier in the hearing as far 
as the things that you have in the offing to deter hypersonics 
include things like over-the-horizon radars. Could you explain 
a little bit more about how do you bring what we have today to 
address the threat today, but also what are we doing to not 
only catch up but what do we do to hopefully advance past 
others in these realms where, unfortunately, we have delayed 
that? In fact, I have NASA [National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration] Langley right on the edge of the district, and 
for years they did great hypersonic research there.
    Beginning about 6 years ago, for some reason, somebody 
thought, well, let's just stop funding hypersonic research 
because we really don't need to do that. In hindsight, when we 
stopped the others caught up and here we are today.
    So let me get your perspective on where we need to be and 
where do we need to make the appropriate investments to not 
only catch up but to advance.
    General VanHerck. Well, thank you for the question.
    And to go back, what I was talking about on the tenfold was 
with regards to testing, specifically. China has tested more, 
about tenfold, than we have.
    What do we need to do today? First of all, it's about 
domain awareness and sharing data and information that 
oftentimes is available today but is actually in stovepipes and 
not shared and available for decision-makers.
    I think a focus on defense in the homeland, certainly we 
have to figure out what it is we must defend but, more broadly, 
I would say we need to get further left and by that I mean 
sooner in the kill chain and even before the launch actually 
occurs to be able to create deterrence options such as 
posturing of forces or use of the information space from the 
President or the Secretary.
    That's my focus on deterrence by denial. In addition to 
that, we need to demonstrate every single day with the 
capabilities we have today across all levers of influence and 
with allies and partners our readiness, responsiveness, 
capability, and resiliency.
    We hide too many things, candidly, in classified areas. It 
has no deterrent effect if the adversary or potential 
competitor cannot see that.
    Mr. Wittman. Now, listen, I agree and you know the 
complexity of the physics of trying to shoot down a hypersonic 
weapon, especially one that doesn't gain a lot of altitude and 
then can maneuver going to target. That physics problem becomes 
right on the edge of impossible.
    So the question then becomes just as you said. What do we 
do to give just enough information to our adversaries to know 
that if they fire one at us and say, per se, take out an 
aircraft carrier that there will be a dozen that go back to 
them and take out a number of different targets in different 
areas?
    Because the concept of mutually assured destruction when it 
comes to the use of those weapons is very much like we use in 
the nuclear arsenal. You want to, as you said, get left of boom 
so that you are deterring those adversaries from even thinking 
about launching it.
    So if you could maybe elaborate just a little bit more on 
that about how do we do that specifically?
    General VanHerck. Well, thanks. What I would say, again, 
it's about sharing data and information, and having the right 
domain awareness sensors that aren't singularly focused on a 
single threat that actually give us the ability to see multiple 
threats from a small UAS [unmanned aerial system] all the way 
to a ballistic missile.
    The capability exists today. Those are things that we 
should do. Then we should share that and make it available for 
all levels of command across DOD and the interagency as well so 
that we can collaborate real time across all domains and 
develop a common picture, the common outcomes, and validate 
through logistics if those outcomes or options are actually 
executable.
    Mr. Wittman. Are we making those investments today and, if 
so, should we be doing more? There's more this committee should 
do in this year's NDAA to address that?
    General VanHerck. I think the Department is. The deputy 
secretary is very aggressive. She's provided over $50 million 
and provided personnel at each of the combatant commands to 
work some of this problem. My challenge is we don't go fast 
enough for me. We're in an Industrial Age acquisition process 
when we need to be thinking about a software-based process.
    Mr. Wittman. Yeah, very good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kahele is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I really 
appreciate this hearing.
    I guess my question--I'd like to start with General 
VanHerck. You said the Air Force did a review for an 
[inaudible] to detect ballistic and hypersonic missiles from 
space. That analysis----
    [Audio malfunction.]
    The Chairman. I do apologize, but you have frozen on us. So 
there's not much we can do about that.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. I guess my question for the general would 
be, you know, would any type of space-based capability change 
his requirements for land-based systems?
    General VanHerck. What I would say is I think you have to 
work land-based systems with space-based capabilities. They're 
not mutually exclusive. So, for example, Space Force and Space 
Command are going down a space-based capability to detect 
hypersonics. The over-the-horizon capabilities that I'm talking 
about also contribute to space domain awareness and those 
systems have to be mutually integrated and share that data for 
the more broad domain awareness that we need.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. Well, based on that answer then, is there 
any way that you could provide some type of details on how 
those plans or any type of cruise missile defense for the 
homeland would exist and any critical gaps that exist today?
    General VanHerck. Yes, there are multiple critical gaps 
that exist today for hypersonics and cruise missile defense. 
I'm confident that what I'm asking for from the Department is 
getting consideration. I look forward to seeing the budget in 
2023. I think we're going to make some progress on that.
    I would ask for a single point of contact for cruise 
missile defense of the homeland be designated by the Department 
in the Missile Defense Review. The Department has been very 
transparent and inclusive, and once that's complete I look 
forward to seeing the Missile Defense Review.
    Mr. Kahele. In regards to the development then of the Next 
Generation Interceptor [NGI], are there any areas where you 
have concern early in the program which you feel need to be 
addressed?
    General VanHerck. I'm very comfortable with where we are 
with the NGI, the inclusiveness of the Department and MDA 
[Missile Defense Agency]. I'm very closely partnered with Vice 
Admiral Hill at MDA and everything appears to be on schedule 
right now.
    It would be very concerning if the Next Generation 
Interceptor is delayed. I look forward to potentially fielding 
it sooner than 2028.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Richardson, I want to talk about a facility in your 
AOR which has not gotten a lot of attention today. There are 
currently 39 detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, and Chairman 
Smith has long argued that the facility at Guantanamo is not 
worth the cost to the American taxpayer to continue to operate 
such an expensive facility for so few detainees.
    So, General Richardson, given that so few military 
commissions have even started, when do you realistically think 
sentences for all of the remaining detainees will even 
conclude?
    It's been over 20 years since most of the remaining 
detainees were first brought to Guantanamo--I was in middle 
school back then--and the news yesterday that a detainee, 
Mohammad Al-Qahtani, was repatriated to Saudi Arabia is a step 
in the right direction.
    So what efforts are being made to repatriate or resettle 
any of the other detainees already cleared for release from 
Guantanamo?
    General Richardson. So, Congresswoman, thank you very much 
for the question and, yes, we're down to--with that transfer 
that occurred yesterday, we're down to 38 detainees there in 
Guantanamo Bay.
    And so in terms of what I do, SOUTHCOM provides the safe, 
legal, humane care of these law-of-war detainees. We don't--we 
aren't involved in the scheduling of the transfers or the 
hearings or anything--the commissions that will take place. And 
so I'd have to refer you to the Department of Defense for more 
information on that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. I will look forward to getting 
that information from you.
    Ms. Walsh, I don't know if you have anything additional to 
add there.
    Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Congresswoman. So the oversight of 
the Guantanamo Bay issue is actually in OSD Policy, SO/LIC 
[Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict], not within my 
assistant secretaryship. So, similarly, we're happy to take 
that question back to that authority.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Ms. Jacobs. Sounds good. Completely changing topics here, 
the Biden administration has prioritized addressing root causes 
of migration, including violence, climate change, and economic 
hardship in the Northern Triangle.
    Just last year, USAID announced its Centroamerica Local 
initiative to empower local actors in those three countries to 
address drivers of irregular migration. General Richardson, how 
are our military operations in these countries complementary 
and aligned with these efforts and has DOD increased its 
coordination with the State Department and USAID on its 
programs and operations since these efforts were announced?
    General Richardson. So, Congresswoman, we work very closely 
with our partner nation militaries on their professionalization 
on human rights, the rule of law, and stress that, that the--as 
they become or try to become the most trusted partner or 
trusted entity within their own country regarding migration, 
obviously, corruption, insecurity, instability, the economy, 
causes people to move and become on the move.
    And so we work through the professionalization of the 
militaries through all the levers that I've talked about during 
this hearing to make them more professional with human rights 
at the top of the list.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And on the topic of human 
rights, we'll move a little further south. We have seen some 
concerning reports of continued human rights violations by the 
Colombian paramilitary forces and by police forces during the 
protests last year.
    How does SOUTHCOM encourage partners to act in accordance 
with the protection of human and civil rights and how would you 
grade our efforts to teach and train human rights values to the 
Colombian military and police, given the continued uptick in 
violence from state security forces?
    General Richardson. Thank you for the question, 
Congresswoman.
    And so we work very closely with the military. We don't 
work with the police or the paramilitary and so, again, it's 
the professionalization of the military, and us--by just us 
being there with them, partnering with them, them participating 
in our exercises, they are also--I'd like to highlight the 
Colombian military as an exporter of training. They go to other 
Latin American countries to train other militaries and security 
forces.
    They also run schools within Colombia that are taught in 
Spanish and, certainly, the--we work very closely with them. I 
can't highlight enough our Colombian military partners are 
outstanding military partners. I'd also like to highlight that 
they fought beside us in the Korean War. So when we look for 
partners in my region, Colombia with the Korean War and Brazil 
in World War II.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. Well, I would encourage you to 
continue focusing on human rights and governance of the 
security sector because as good as all the work is you're doing 
we're still seeing very concerning reports.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Those are all the questions that we have today. I want to 
thank our witnesses for their presentation and, more 
importantly, for the work they are doing on behalf of our 
country, and we look forward to working with you throughout the 
rest of the year.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 8, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 8, 2022

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
    
    
    

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 8, 2022

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

    Ms. Dalton. The Department of Homeland Security has information 
specifically about individuals who may have illegally crossed the 
southern border in the last year. We will pass along your question to 
DHS to facilitate direct communications.   [See page 15.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Dalton. The Biden Administration is committed to the closure of 
the detention facility at Guantanamo. Accordingly, the Administration 
is currently focused on responsibly reducing the population by pursuing 
transfers for the 20 detainees eligible for transfer. The Department of 
State has lead for the diplomacy associated with those efforts. 
Military Commissions are administered by the Department of Defense's 
Office of Military Commissions. Currently, there are 10 detainees 
involved in the military commissions process, all at varied points in 
the commissions process.   [See page 45.]
    General Richardson. On your question regarding efforts to 
repatriate or resettle detainees who are cleared for transfer, I would 
refer you to the Department of State, which is responsible for engaging 
with foreign nations for potential relocation of detainees. On your 
question about the military commissions, I would refer you to the 
Office of Military Commissions within the Department of Defense.   [See 
page 45.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. GREEN
    General Richardson. In addition to the resources requested in the 
President's FY23 budget, USSOUTHCOM transmitted a list of unfunded 
priorities to the Defense congressional oversight committees on April 
5, 2022. We provided this list to your office as well. This list 
includes resourcing for security cooperation, our main lever for 
building partner capacity to counter all threats in the region. It also 
includes resourcing for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
programs and assets that will increase our domain awareness of those 
threats. We also look to counter these threats by piercing the 
information space and engaging with our partners to maintain presence 
throughout the region.   [See page 40.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    General VanHerck. My independent assessment as required by the 
Arctic Security Initiative, Section 1090 in the FY22 NDAA is ongoing, 
and I expect to deliver it to the Secretary of Defense by 31 May 2022. 
I believe it will provide valuable information to support the 
Secretary's future Arctic policy decisions. I have an operational 
requirement for the ability to refuel ships north of Dutch Harbor, AK, 
enabling persistent presence and supporting maritime power projection 
and sustainment. I am agnostic about the specific solution to mitigate 
this capability gap, but am closely tracking the development of the 
Port of Nome to assess how that effort might address my requirements.   
[See page 32.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 8, 2022

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

    Mr. Scott. How might recognizing Transnational Criminal 
Organizations (TCOs) formally as threats to national security in key 
national strategic documents result in direct positive impacts in the 
region?
    General Richardson. Recognizing transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs) formally as threats to national security in the 
National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy would better 
position programs and activities aimed at countering these threats to 
be prioritized for resourcing.
    Supporting our partners (Allies, partner nations, and the US 
Interagency) in the region on this shared threat helps to strengthen 
partnerships and provides the U.S. with access and presence to sustain 
a balance of power that supports democracy in our hemisphere. Not doing 
so provides further inroads for the People's Republic of China and 
Russia.
    Mr. Scott. The Drug Enforcement Agency estimates 99 percent of all 
cocaine destined for the United States travels through either the 
Caribbean Sea or the eastern Pacific. How many additional personnel and 
platforms are needed to interdict 100% of the cocaine? Please be 
specific in terms of personnel, manned and unmanned aircraft/ships, and 
any other desired capabilities or platforms.
    General Richardson. To substantially reduce cocaine coming to the 
United States requires a whole of government effort, supported by 
partner nation initiatives as well. The Department of Defense is one 
part of this broader effort, as the lead U.S. federal agency for the 
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal 
drugs toward the United States. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South 
(JIATFS) conducts the detection and monitoring mission in this AOR, 
which then supports the interdiction and apprehension efforts performed 
by U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies. To support the 
reduction of the estimated cocaine flow by 50%, JIATFS would require a 
sustained deployment of approximately 27 force packages across the 
Eastern Pacific and Caribbean seas, as well as additional personnel to 
execute Command and Control of these resources. A force package 
consists of a long-range ship equipped with an over the horizon 
interceptor boat and a helicopter capable of conducting Airborne Use of 
Force (AUF), paired with an airborne ISR platform. For FY21, JIATFS had 
control of an average of six force packages across a 42 million square 
mile operating area.
    Our partner nations also play a key role in this effort. Using the 
capabilities that we have helped build through our critical security 
cooperation programs, partner nations were involved in 62% of JIATFS 
facilitated interdictions in FY21.
    Interdicting drugs is only one important aspect of reducing this 
overall threat posed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs). 
Eradicating illicit crops harvested to produce dangerous drugs is also 
a necessary aspect for an effective counternarcotic strategy, as are 
law enforcement investigations that lead to successful judicial 
proceedings that ultimately degrade and dismantle TCOs.
    Mr. Scott. Does the United States needs a single element to take 
control of law enforcement assets within the JIATF South operating area 
to tackle the counternarcotics mission and unify the strategic goals of 
DOD and the Coast Guard?
    General Richardson. The Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard 
strategic counterdrug objectives are aligned and pursued through a 
unity of effort coordinated by JIATFS. The U.S. Coast Guard provides 
critical support to counter transnational criminal organizations in the 
SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility. Title 10 of U.S. Code, Section 124, 
designates Department of Defense as the lead federal agency for the 
detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal 
drugs toward the United States. JIATFS performs this unified mission 
within a Joint Operating Area that spans almost the entire Western 
Hemisphere. JIATFS executes tactical control over detection and 
monitoring resources employed to cue interdiction and apprehension 
efforts performed by appropriate U.S. law enforcement agencies or 
Partner Nations. JIATFS' organizational construct is optimized to 
coordinate resources from all U.S. Federal Agencies and over 21 
international partners.
    Mr. Scott. Brazil was the only country to fight alongside the 
Allies in World War II. August 2022 marks the 80th Anniversary of their 
entry into the war on the side of the Allies. Does SOUTHCOM have any 
plans to commemorate Brazil's contributions to the Allied cause in 
World War II?
    General Richardson. Brazil is one of our strongest partners in the 
hemisphere and that partnership does include their commitment to fight 
alongside the Allies in World War II. SOUTHCOM does not currently have 
a planned commemoration for the 80th anniversary of their entry into 
the war. Brazil would generally take great pride in hosting a 
commemoration event for an occasion like the 80th Anniversary of their 
entry into the war. However, they are unlikely to host an event in 
August this year because they are hosting the multi-nation exercise 
UNITAS in September which will bring 19 partner nations together for a 
very important amphibious and maritime exercise. Also, the October 
presidential elections will complicate event scheduling for the 
Brazilian military.
    In May 2020, Brazil planned to commemorate the 75th Anniversary of 
Victory in Rio de Janeiro but was unable to hold the celebration due to 
COVID lockdowns and travel restrictions. Brazil is considering 
rescheduling this commemoration in the May-June timeframe but have not 
confirmed the event.
    Mr. Scott. Admiral James Stavridis, U.S. Navy (Retired), wrote in 
the July 2021 issue of Proceedings an article entitled, ``Great Power 
Competition Requires Theater Deterrence.'' According to Admiral 
Stavridis, ``Deterrence is the art of creating the fear of attack in 
the mind of an opponent. Theater deterrence, then, can be defined as 
having sufficient combat power within a given geographic theater that 
the enemy would hesitate to undertake hostile operations. If you have 
sufficient military force available to overmatch an opponent if you get 
into a fight, the bad guys will be hesitant to start one.'' How can 
SOUTHCOM better deter the non-state actors in the AOR?
    General Richardson. The best way to deter non-state actors in the 
SOUTHCOM AOR is to work at being the best partner every day. SOUTHCOM 
aims to be the partner of choice for all democracies in this region. We 
do this through our security cooperation programs that build our 
partners' capabilities to counter all threats together--ranging from 
malign state actors to transnational criminal organizations and natural 
disasters. We build interoperability through our exercise program, 
taking full advantage of our convening power to bring together dozens 
of partner nations and Allies for exercises such as Fuerzas Comando, 
PANAMAX, and Tradewinds. We also work closely with our interagency 
partners to bring the full support of the U.S. Government to our 
neighborhood with programs like the Department of State's Foreign 
Military Financing, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military 
Education and Training. All of our programs are transparent and include 
training on respect for human rights and the rule of law--democratic 
values shared by most nations in our AOR.
    As ADM Stavridis discusses in his article--presence matters. We 
need to be present to be the best partner and deter any enemy or 
competitor. Presence does not have to be in the form of combat power 
like aircraft carriers and fighter jets, but it does have to be 
consistent, transparent, and at the speed of relevance to our partners.
    Mr. Scott. What new tools and tactics do you need to dismantle the 
illegal narcotics trade?
    General Richardson. JIATFS tactically leads my team of teams aimed 
at disrupting the flow of illegal narcotics departing Central and South 
America and the Caribbean bound for the U.S. JIATFS-cued drug 
interdictions tangibly result in a reduction of drugs available in the 
U.S. These interdictions performed by U.S. law enforcement also produce 
critical evidence used in U.S. courts to dismantle Transnational 
Criminal Organizations promulgating the illegal narcotics trade. To 
further enhance JIATFS' ability to detect and monitor illegal drug 
flows across their 42 million square mile operating area, we are 
actively exploring wide area, long dwell, high resolution, edge 
processing-enabled detection and monitoring capabilities. We are 
incorporating artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) 
designed to efficiently process large volumes of collected data at 
machine speeds. I have also tasked JIATFS to work with other elements 
of SOUTHCOM to pierce the information space that cartels currently 
operate in with impunity.
    Mr. Scott. The Marine Corps lacks a permanent installation in the 
Arctic. With no permanent infrastructure or regular rotational Alaskan 
deployments, is the U.S. Marine Corps ill-equipped and -trained to 
operate in the maritime Arctic environment?
    General VanHerck. No, the Marine Corps has a long history of 
conducting regular Extreme Cold Weather Training, most notably through 
recurring events in Norway. I would like to see the Navy-Marine Corps 
team build on this by increasing the resources allocated to achieving 
their ``Blue Arctic'' strategy objectives of maintaining enhanced 
presence in the Arctic and building Naval forces more capable of Arctic 
operations. USNORTHCOM must be able to defend the homeland throughout 
its area of responsibility, and therefore I have a requirement for 
Joint Forces prepared to operate persistently in the Arctic across all 
domains; however, the extent of the Marine Corps' role in meeting this 
requirement is the purview of the Secretary of Defense.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Navy can take now 
and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. The Navy-Marine Corps team's ``Blue Arctic'' 
strategy lays out appropriate objectives to meet this requirement, if 
resourced properly. Maintaining enhanced presence and building a 
capable Arctic Naval force, in particular, are ``Blue Arctic'' 
objectives the Navy should continue to emphasize and resource. I 
believe the Navy must invest in organizing, training, and equipping 
forces to campaign and if necessary conduct decisive combat operations 
in the high north. I also have a requirement for fuel capacity north of 
Dutch Harbor, AK; the Port of Nome, once expanded under a U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers plan, would serve as the only deep-draft port in the 
U.S. Arctic region.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Army can take now 
and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. The campaign design described in the Army's 
``Regaining Arctic Dominance'' strategy lays out an effective approach 
to meeting this requirement, if resourced properly. I believe the Army 
must invest in the infrastructure required to conduct sustained 
operations in the Arctic, and in organizing, training, and equipping 
forces to campaign and if necessary conduct decisive combat operations 
in the high north.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Air Force can take 
now and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the 
Arctic?
    General VanHerck. The lines of effort detailed in the Air Force's 
2020 Arctic Strategy provide an effective approach to meeting this 
requirement if resourced properly, and I support the efforts of the Air 
Force's Arctic strategy implementation team. I believe the Air Force 
must invest in the infrastructure required to conduct sustained 
operations in the Arctic, and in organizing, training, and equipping 
forces to campaign and if necessary conduct decisive combat operations 
in the high north.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Marine Corps can 
take now and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the 
Arctic?
    General VanHerck. I believe the Navy-Marine Corps team's ``Blue 
Arctic'' strategy lays out appropriate objectives to meet this 
requirement, if resourced properly. Maintaining enhanced presence and 
building a more capable Arctic Naval force, in particular, are ``Blue 
Arctic'' objectives the Navy should emphasize. I believe the Marine 
Corps must invest in organizing, training, and equipping forces to 
campaign and if necessary conduct decisive combat operations in the 
high north.
    Mr. Scott. Should the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard prioritize 
personnel exchanges with partner navies and coast guards operating in 
the High North? If so, why?
    General VanHerck. I see significant potential value in learning 
from and leveraging the Arctic experience and capabilities of our 
Allies and partners, several of whom spend considerably more time 
operating in Arctic environments that U.S. forces do currently. While 
personnel assignment decisions like this are the purview of the Navy 
and Coast Guard, both the Navy's ``Blue Arctic'' strategy and the 
Department of Homeland Security's ``Strategic Approach for Arctic 
Homeland Security'' include objectives or goals that emphasize improved 
engagement and cooperation with international partners, and might be 
pursued through personnel exchanges.
    Mr. Scott. Is the United States prepared to respond to disasters 
and fully participate in the High North with SAR capability, 
environmental disaster mitigation, scientific research, and other 
activities?
    General VanHerck. I won't speak for ``the United States'' but I 
will speak for NORAD and US Northern Command--it is my assessment that 
NORAD and NORTHCOM lack access to ready and trained forces and the 
capacity to operate throughout the year and across our areas of 
responsibility, including the Arctic in response to SAR, disaster, and 
other activities. I believe the Department and Services need to commit 
the resources necessary to implement concepts detailed in their Arctic 
strategies.
    Mr. Scott. Does the United States lack the capabilities to advance 
U.S. security interests in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. NORAD and US Northern Command lack capabilities 
such as infrastructure, communications, and access to ready and trained 
forces to operate year round in the Arctic in support of US security 
interests. It is my personal assessment that the United States has a 
range of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military capabilities 
that can be brought to bear to advance security interests in the 
Arctic--if we choose to resource and allocate them to the region. 
However to improve our military options, I believe we need to invest in 
the infrastructure required to fight in the Arctic, and in organizing, 
training, and equipping more forces to campaign and if necessary 
conduct decisive combat operations in the high north.
    Mr. Scott. Is more private sector investment needed in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. Yes, as the Department of Defense advocate for 
Arctic capabilities I support investment in Arctic infrastructure as 
well as reliable communications above 65 degrees north latitude. The 
Arctic is a strategic region demanding our presence and persistence as 
part of an integrated deterrence. I require infrastructure and 
capability to operate in and out of the Arctic to execute my homeland 
defense design.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. General Richardson, under your command is an 
organization called JTF-Bravo which provides some military assets to 
Latin American operations. As the U.S. competes with China for 
influence in the region, and regional stability declines, would you 
welcome a greater U.S. military presence on the ground in Latin America 
to assist our partners and respond to any contingencies?
    General Richardson. Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo), located in 
Soto Cano Honduras, is SOUTHCOM's forward deployed presence in Central 
America. JTF-Bravo conducts and supports joint operations, activities, 
and investments to enhance regional security, stability, and 
cooperation and is my only immediate capability to assist in 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations.
    While I do not believe we need a large, permanent footprint 
throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, presence does matter, and 
we must be on the field to compete with external state actors that are 
active in the area.
    SOUTHCOM makes great use of low-cost, rotational deployments of 
Security Force Assistance teams and Special Operations forces that 
offer a high return on investment. Small teams of special operations 
personnel deploy to 60% of the countries in the region to train with 
partner nation special forces. Likewise, Security Force Assistance 
teams deploy to train, advise, and assist partner nation military and 
security forces. Both elements build strong relationships that promote 
enhanced interoperability and demonstrate a commitment to our partner 
nations and their military forces, while subsequently exposing and 
illuminating violent extremist and malign activities that create 
instability in the region. Maintaining and potentially expanding this 
type of presence would increase our ability to better assist our 
partners and respond to contingencies.
    Mr. Gallagher. General VanHerck, the FY22 NDAA required an 
independent assessment with regards to the Arctic by NORTHCOM in 
coordination with EUCOM and INDOPACOM, can you speak both to the 
progress of this assessment and to the importance of the corresponding 
Arctic Security Initiative which would enable you to overhaul U.S. 
military infrastructure, strategy, and posture in the Arctic region 
over the next five years?
    General VanHerck. My independent assessment as required by the 
Arctic Security Initiative, Section 1090 in the FY22 NDAA is ongoing, 
and I expect to deliver it to the Secretary of Defense by 31 May 2022. 
I believe it will provide valuable information to support the 
Secretary's future Arctic policy decisions.
    Mr. Gallagher. General VanHerck, there are mentions in the PLA's 
2020 Science of Military Strategy of possible conventional strikes 
against the U.S. homeland, assuming these strikes would be targeted 
against critical facilities such as U.S. Western ports and munitions 
facilities as a way to keep the U.S. out of a Taiwan fight. Can you 
speak a little more to that threat and what we should be doing to 
secure those facilities?
    General VanHerck. Regarding the threat, I assess in the next decade 
the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will likely have the 
capability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land targets 
from its submarines and surface combatants using land-attack cruise 
missiles (LACMs), notably enhancing the PRC's global power projection 
and increasing the threat to CONUS. As for securing critical 
facilities, we must pursue all-domain awareness through a network of 
sensors and systems that provide persistent and complete battle-space 
awareness from subsurface to space and cyberspace. All-domain awareness 
includes information dominance systems that ingest, aggregate, process, 
display, and disseminate data that enables decision superiority that 
will mitigate risk to critical infrastructure in the homelands. When 
gained, all-domain awareness increases warning time for National 
leadership against multiple threats, expanding available response 
options. Investment in exceedingly capable technologies such as 
improved over the horizon radars, joint all-domain command and control, 
and undersea surveillance systems, will ultimately allow the earliest 
detection of the near-term LACM threat from China. To further mitigate 
risk to the homelands, I need clear policy guidance on what to defend. 
With policy, we can design global layered defense and integrated 
deterrence solutions, including partnering with the Interagency and 
private sector to increase domestic resilience of our critical 
infrastructure that supports continuity of government, nuclear command 
and control, force projection, force protection, and the defense 
industrial base.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
    Mr. Gaetz. Venezuela has bought over $11.4 billion in Russian 
military equipment and weapons including fighter jets, attack and 
transport helicopters, air defense and naval platforms, tanks, armored 
personnel carriers (APC), self-propelled artillery, and various small 
arms to include surface-to-air-missiles.
    In your testimony, you stated the primary military threat from 
Russia, should Venezuela receive an influx of cash from American oil 
sales, would be their ability to provide critical parts and maintenance 
for Russian supplied military equipment. The underlying issue being 
Russia can increase Venezuela's military readiness which poses a direct 
threat to U.S. interests in the region.
    Which specific Russian provided military systems and/or 
capabilities are you most concerned about? Why are these capabilities 
most concerning to you? What steps can SOUTHCOM take to frustrate that 
supply chain process?
    General Richardson. Venezuela possesses Russian surface-to-air 
missile systems (SAMs) that are primarily defensive in nature. 
Venezuela also has up to 1,500 Russian SA-24 (Igla-S) Man-portable air-
defense systems (MANPADS) with 5,000 missiles. An enduring concern is 
improper storage and accountability of MANPADS. SAMs pose a credible 
threat to military, civilian, and unmanned aircraft operating in the 
region. This includes posing a credible threat to U.S. forces 
conducting exercises with regional partners and operations in the 
Caribbean and South America. Venezuela's Army possesses Russian T-72 
tanks and BM-21 and BM-30 multiple rocket launcher systems that could 
be used in a potential conflict against neighboring countries. 
Neighboring nations largely lack the capability to defend effectively 
against such direct or area attacks. Venezuela's Air Force acquired 24 
Russian Su-30 fighter aircraft in 2008. Caracas struggles to conduct 
routine maintenance, but Venezuela seeks to extend the Su-30s' service 
life. Su-30s ensure sovereignty through patrolling and deterrence, to 
include past intercepts of U.S. military aircraft conducting 
reconnaissance flights. SOUTHCOM will continue to identify and publicly 
message about shortfalls in reliability and performance of Russian 
military equipment, to include potential sanction violations of 
breaking any US agreements. This public messaging will speak to 
readiness of the Venezuelan military and act as a deterrent to other 
nations who might consider buying Russian equipment. Numerous countries 
have agreements in place for Russian equipment and others consider 
purchasing Russian weapons and equipment based on initial cost. Given 
growing global concerns about the unprovoked Russian invasion of 
Ukraine, the US now has an opportunity to offer alternatives, and 
expand security cooperation and assistance in the region.
    Mr. Gaetz. According to the Security Force Monitor, a project of 
the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School and the University of 
California-San Diego's Mexico Violence Resource Project, between 2007 
and 2012, the U.S. was providing tactical training to an average of 261 
members of Mexican security forces per year. After 2012, that number 
reached 1,454. According to Mexico's defense ministry, about 1,383 
elite soldiers deserted between 1994 and 2015.
    When NORTHCOM provides military training to Mexican forces, is 
there a mechanism or procedure to track who was trained and if any of 
those trainees have defected to the Mexican cartels?
    If so, what is the percentage of U.S.-trained forces that have 
defected to Mexican cartels? If not, are there plans to develop this 
capability?
    General VanHerck. The Office of Defense Cooperation is tasked with 
the responsibility of tracking Mexican military personnel trained by 
the United States. USNORTHCOM is not tasked to provide this metric nor 
do we have a mechanism to track Mexican military members who have left 
military service.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
    Mr. Banks. One of the priorities of U.S. Southern Command is to 
counter transnational criminal organizations that traffic drugs and 
weapons and engage in other criminal activity. The Joint Interagency 
Task Force-South plays an instrumental role in targeting, detecting, 
and monitoring illicit drug trafficking, while coordinating with the 
Coast Guard, law enforcement, and partner nations for interception and 
seizure of illicit narcotics. To assist in this critical mission, 
JIATF-South relies on government-owned, contractor-operated aircraft 
for advanced detection and monitoring. The U.S. military has two 
Cooperative Security Locations, located in El Salvador and Aruba-
Curacao, which allow U.S. and partner nation aircraft the use of 
existing airfields to support the region's multinational efforts to 
combat transnational organized crime.
    General Richardson, I want to ask you about the sufficiency of your 
resources for detecting and monitoring narcotics traffickers at sea.
    1. Is maritime airborne ISR an effective way of detecting and 
monitoring narcotics traffickers? Would you say that more ISR flight 
hours leads to more seizures of illicit narcotics?
    2. Do you have enough dedicated maritime patrol aircraft to perform 
this mission?
    3. Would additional ISR resources be helpful to assist our 
government partners and other partner-nations with interdiction?
    4. Have there been discussions with international partners in the 
region to allow for more Cooperative Security Locations, which could 
expand the footprint of our maritime ISR assets?
    General Richardson. Airborne ISR is a critical component of any 
force package JIATFS employs to detect and monitor illicit drug 
trafficking and cue interdictions in the maritime domain. Without ISR, 
JIATFS' probability of detecting a drug trafficker is approximately 
15%. ISR increases that probability of detection to 60%. Video 
collected by ISR also serves as a critical enabler to law enforcement 
and partner nation counternarcotic efforts. In FY21, partner nations 
were involved in 62% of JIATFS facilitated interdictions. With 
additional ISR capabilities, we can better vector US and our very 
willing and capable partner nation forces onto trafficking targets. In 
FY21, JIATFS' was allocated 50% of the ISR necessary to meet drug 
seizure goals, and contracted ISR is used to partially mitigate this 
shortfall. Congressional support for four Government Owned Contractor 
Operated aircraft is greatly appreciated; a fifth platform is in the 
FY23 budget request. While there have been no formal discussions about 
establishing additional Cooperative Security Locations, SOUTHCOM 
routinely works with our international partners to operate U.S. ISR 
from locations throughout the hemisphere. JIATFS also employs Downrange 
Logisticians in Costa Rica, Panama, and Ecuador to optimize logistic 
support for steady-state and short notice Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
operations.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) 
plays an instrumental role in targeting, detecting, and monitoring 
illicit drug trafficking. To assist in this critical mission, JIATF-
South relies on government-owned, contractor-operated aircraft for 
advanced detection and monitoring. The U.S. military has two 
Cooperative Security Locations, located in El Salvador and Aruba-
Curacao, which allow U.S. and partner nation aircraft the use of 
existing airfields to support the region's multinational efforts to 
combat transnational organized crime. General Richardson, is maritime 
airborne ISR an effective way of detecting and monitoring narcotics 
traffickers, and do you have enough dedicated maritime patrol aircraft 
to perform this mission?
    Have there been discussions with international partners in the 
region to allow for more Cooperative Security Locations, which could 
expand the footprint of our maritime ISR assets?
    General Richardson. Airborne ISR is a critical component of any 
force package JIATFS employs to detect and monitor illicit drug 
trafficking and cue interdictions in the maritime domain. Without ISR, 
JIATFS' probability of detecting a drug trafficker is approximately 
15%. ISR increases that probability of detection to 60%. Video 
collected by ISR also serves as a critical enabler to law enforcement 
and partner nation counternarcotic efforts. In FY21, JIATFS was 
allocated 50% of the ISR necessary to meet drug seizure goals, and 
contracted ISR is used to partially mitigate this shortfall. 
Congressional support for four Government Owned Contractor Operated 
aircraft is greatly appreciated; a fifth platform is in the FY23 budget 
request. While there have been no formal discussions about establishing 
additional Cooperative Security Locations, SOUTHCOM routinely works 
with our international partners to operate U.S. ISR from locations 
throughout the hemisphere, including Guatemala, Panama, Colombia and 
Ecuador. JIATFS also employs Downrange Logisticians in Costa Rica, 
Panama, and Ecuador to optimize logistic support for steady-state and 
short notice Maritime Patrol Aircraft operations.
    Mr. Waltz. Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), SOUTHCOM 
has had considerable success using an innovative new software system 
for targeting that relies upon commercially sourced data. Can you share 
some of the results this system is yielding and any discussions you 
have had with other senior leaders to bring this capability to other 
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)?
    General Richardson. Since August 2019, the Asymmetric Target 
Acquisition Center (ATAC), managed out of SOCSOUTH, has supported many 
operational achievements for SOUTHCOM. It has assisted in over 25 
tactical Special Operations Forces operations, seven strategic 
operations (while also giving near real time support to teams deployed 
forward), provided refinement to the limited airborne ISR in theater to 
allocate the assets in a much more efficient manner, helped in two 
humanitarian assistance/disaster response efforts, and spearheaded the 
development of patterns and movements of non-traditional targets of 
interest across the intelligence community. The application of this 
toolset is very diverse, supporting the gamut of intelligence 
disciplines helping SIGINT, HUMINT, OSINT, All-Source, and more 
recently, undergoing testing of counterintelligence and personnel 
recovery missions.
    Additionally, the diversity of the analytic process and data serve 
a range of problem sets, from TCOs to malign state actors. The 
collection, and derived intel from the ATAC feeds more than DOD. In the 
last fiscal year, law enforcement agencies have requested support, 
leading to the identification and location of 196 targets of which the 
ATAC has located approximately 184 with high confidence. The rate at 
which targets are found often exceeds the ability of law enforcement to 
judicially finish them.
    SOUTHCOM is engaged with other Geographic Combatant Commands and 
supporting other units to develop pilot tests in other areas of 
responsibility that could benefit from this capability. Expansion of 
ATAC's tools and data sets would detect problem sets that cross 
Combatant Commands and lead to better detection of malign activities 
worldwide.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. BICE
    Mrs. Bice. The Committee is aware of developmental unmanned 
platforms that have the potential to stay airborne for upwards of 
several months at a time. Can you speak towards how this type of 
platform could be used in the SOUTHCOM AOR? Would this type of platform 
be a useful tool to help alleviate the shortage of persistent ISR 
capabilities at SOUTHCOM?
    General Richardson. To mitigate our persistent lack of ISR 
capability, SOUTHCOM is leveraging innovation. SOUTHCOM can serve as an 
innovative test bed for DOD and other interagency partners to try out 
new technologies to counter threats. SOUTHCOM leverages over $150 
million of technology prototypes to fulfill its mission and is leading 
the way when it comes to operationalizing resilient, energy efficient 
platforms that reduce emissions and enhance the mission through the 
innovative use of High-Altitude Balloons (HABs), stratosphere 
platforms, hydrogen, and solar powered technology. Non-standard ISR 
collection methods such as the employment of the long dwell autonomous 
solar powered aircraft known as the Autonomous Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
and the use of HABs are low cost, multi-intelligence sensor suites that 
can perform ISR in austere environments for months at a time. These 
advanced ISR tools offer persistent, AOR-wide coverage without risk to 
personnel at a relatively low cost and puts us in a position to better 
compete against adversaries.
    Mrs. Bice. I understand that SOUTHCOM is participating in a Joint 
Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) for the development of a 
long-range, persistent, heavy payload, solar-powered unmanned ISR 
platform. Could you provide an update on how the JCTD is progressing 
and provide a timeline?
    General Richardson. The Autonomous Maritime Patrol Aircraft (AMPA) 
technical effort is on track. All systems have been thoroughly tested 
and checked for proper functionality (Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 
6 achieved). The manufacturer ``Skydweller'' is currently working 
through a ``safety pilot'' vehicle stage of development, implementing 
the control systems necessary to deliver an unmanned version of the 
aircraft for a 7-day, continuous technical flight demonstration later 
this year. The team is about to complete the development of Fly-by-Wire 
capability which replaces most of the mechanical pilot systems with the 
components necessary for autonomous unmanned control. The first flight 
test of this autonomous configuration, from takeoff to landing (with 
pilot onboard as a safety backup only), is planned for the beginning of 
May. At completion of that step, AMPA will move to fully unmanned 
operations in preparation for the 7-day technical demonstration. We 
anticipate achieving a TRL 7 at the completion of the technical demo 
and a TRL 8/9 with the completion of Military Utility Assessment in 
Summer 2023.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. Regional stability is compromised when adversaries 
exploit many of our neighbors social and economic liabilities. Any 
increase in Russian or Chinese influence diminishes American 
leadership. Through the lens of defense and security cooperation, how 
can the U.S. stop the growing relationship between South America and 
China and is it possible to reverse the emergent Chinese influence?
    Ms. Dalton. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has a growing 
interest in Latin America and the Caribbean. The PRC seeks to establish 
new relationships with our defense partners in the region for both 
diplomatic and economic purposes. The PRC has made some inroads on 
defense cooperation and military sales. The PRC often entices partners 
with no cost training and military equipment sales free of conditions.
    The Department of Defense bases its partnerships in the region on 
shared values of democracy, individual rights, sovereignty, and respect 
for the rule of law. The PRC activities are concerning to the 
Department because they could undermine our shared values. The 
Department is committed to strengthening our bilateral and multilateral 
defense partnerships to minimize PRC activities when they occur and to 
remain the trusted partner in the region.
    Mr. Moore. I share the grave concern of others on this committee 
about China's success in having South American countries no longer 
recognize Taiwan. What do you think the U.S. could have done different 
to avoid this pattern?
    Ms. Dalton. The PRC has spent decades encouraging the dwindling 
number of countries that recognize Taiwan diplomatically to switch 
recognition by offering financial and diplomatic incentives. Currently, 
eight of the 14 partners that recognize Taiwan are in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. From the Department's perspective, humanitarian and 
disaster relief efforts such as medical engagements, civil affairs 
activities, and deployment of the hospital ship USNS COMFORT 
demonstrate our enduring solidarity and friendship with partners in the 
region, while countering negative messaging by adversarial nations such 
as the PRC. I defer to the Department of State to provide a diplomatic 
and economic perspective.
    Mr. Moore. Colombia's rapid transformation over the last 30 years 
continues to be a regional model of how to progress beyond internal 
conflict. Specifically, in what other countries in your AOR do you feel 
Colombia's success could be replicated?
    Ms. Dalton. The transformation of the Colombian military over the 
last 30 years provides an example of what can be accomplished if 
partners have the political will to change, and the United States 
applies a long-term view and a whole-of-government approach to the 
problem set.
    The success of Plan Colombia can be attributed to four main 
factors: (1) It had overwhelming bipartisan U.S. congressional support; 
(2) it was a whole-of-government effort, and interagency partners 
collaborated effectively to deliver results; (3) it was sustained year 
after year with predictable funding; and, most importantly, (4) the 
Government of Colombia played a strong leadership role, was committed 
to the plan, and provided the majority of the funding.
    There are best practices and lessons learned from the Colombia 
model that the U.S. Government could apply to other regional partners' 
internal conflict. However, to build partner nations' capacity and 
transform defense ministries effectively, the Department designs 
security cooperation programs based on the particular country's 
requirements and problem sets rather than trying to replicate a model 
design for another country, such as Colombia.
    Mr. Moore. Regional stability is compromised when adversaries 
exploit many of our neighbors social and economic liabilities. Any 
increase in Russian or Chinese influence diminishes American 
leadership. Through the lens of defense and security cooperation, how 
can the U.S. stop the growing relationship between South America and 
China and is it possible to reverse the emergent Chinese influence?
    General Richardson. I believe the U.S. has an opportunity right now 
to reverse progress that Russia has made with countries in the Western 
Hemisphere. Given Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, countries 
that may have once considered a partnership with Russia are taking 
pause, whether because they do not want to be associated with Russia on 
principle, or because they realize Russia has diminished its resources 
in this invasion. Even those countries that already have Russian-made 
weapons and equipment, may look to replace those with Western-made 
equipment, which will have a more reliable supply chain for spare parts 
and training. The U.S. should strive to be that partner of choice in 
this potential void.
    The PRC presents a more long-term, strategic challenge. Twenty-one 
countries in this AOR have joined the Belt and Road Initiative, which 
opens the door for critical infrastructure investments that have 
potential for dual civilian/military use. PRC has 29 port development 
projects in 17 countries in the AOR, to include near the Panama Canal--
a strategic line of communication. There are seven PRC-linked space 
facilities in three countries and ten countries are using safe city 
technology, which gives Chinese state-owned enterprise technicians 
access to government networks. Our best defense against China's 
ambitions in this region is our partnerships, as well as building and 
maintaining a shared awareness of the threat. Our security cooperation 
programs like Sec 333 training and equipping, institutional capacity 
building, exercises, and Department of State's Foreign Military 
Funding, Foreign Military Sales, and International Military Education 
and Training programs all contribute to strengthening our partnerships 
with the democracies in the region. While we do not need to outspend 
China to outcompete them, we must maintain presence and cooperation, at 
the speed of relevance to our partners.
    Mr. Moore. Colombia's rapid transformation over the last 30 years 
continues to be a regional model of how to progress beyond internal 
conflict. Specifically, in what other countries in your AOR do you feel 
Colombia's success could be replicated?
    General Richardson. Colombia has gone from being a nation in a 
decades-long civil war under siege by terrorist groups and drug 
traffickers, to being a linchpin of security and prosperity in South 
America. A number of factors contributed to this incredible progress. 
First, it took decisive commitment and determination from the 
Government and people of Colombia. The U.S. committed to sustained, 
bipartisan support across multiple Administrations, as did others 
throughout the international community. Plan Colombia, which was signed 
into law in 2000, aimed to address a wide range of security, economic, 
and social factors. U.S. commitment was largely driven by the concern 
that the drug traffickers and terrorist groups in Colombia posed a 
direct threat to our own national security. U.S. funding made up less 
than 20% of the overall Plan Colombia funding and was largely focused 
on security as the immediate need, without which economic development 
could not take hold. Colombia bore the majority of the financial 
burden, imposing a war tax to raise funds for the effort. It was also 
Colombian personnel--military and national and local police--who 
carried the security mission, with U.S. personnel in support. 
Colombians assumed the responsibility for restoring security and 
bringing government control to previously ungoverned areas. There are 
areas in this AOR that face many of the same security challenges that 
Colombia did prior to 2000, however, the unique set of circumstances 
that drove political will both in the United States and in these 
partner nations may not exist to the extent necessary to drive this 
type of transformation.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
    Mrs. Murphy. I am particularly concerned about the influence of 
Russia and China in Caribbean countries. As an example, the Bahamas is 
just 50 miles from Florida, and we have heard of ongoing efforts by 
China to loan money and rebuild infrastructure in an effort to gain 
influence over the Bahamas. As you know, the Bahamas experienced 
hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure damage as a result of 
Hurricane Dorian. I am concerned China will try to exploit this need of 
the Bahamas by offering to loan more money and rebuild infrastructure 
to advance their presence and influence. Would U.S. aid or investment 
specifically targeted at rebuilding infrastructure damaged by Hurricane 
Dorian help?
    General Richardson. While all U.S. engagement and investment are 
helpful in building stronger partnerships, I would defer to U.S. 
Northern Command, which has responsibility for the Bahamas and would be 
better positioned to provide details specific to aid related to 
Hurricane Dorian.
    Mrs. Murphy. I am particularly concerned about the influence of 
Russia and China in Caribbean countries. As an example, the Bahamas is 
just 50 miles from Florida, and we have heard of ongoing efforts by 
China to loan money and rebuild infrastructure in an effort to gain 
influence over the Bahamas. As you know, the Bahamas experienced 
hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure damage as a result of 
Hurricane Dorian. I am concerned China will try to exploit this need of 
the Bahamas by offering to loan more money and rebuild infrastructure 
to advance their presence and influence. Would U.S. aid or investment 
specifically targeted at rebuilding infrastructure damaged by Hurricane 
Dorian help?
    General VanHerck. Yes, U.S. aid or investment targeted to 
rebuilding hurricane-damaged infrastructure would help. The U.S.-
Bahamas military-to-military relationship is strong, and improving 
regional security relies on close economic, diplomatic, and military 
partnerships. Additional funding for The Bahamas rebuilding efforts 
would support our position as the trusted partner and help counter 
Chinese influence in the region.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. I'm curious about the support NORTHCOM is providing 
to the Department of Homeland Security at the border. This mission has 
suffered well-documented challenges related to crime, discipline, and 
morale. At the same time, anecdotal reports from soldiers on the ground 
lead me to question the effectiveness of their utilization at the 
border.
    It's my understanding that for fiscal year 2021, the total 
cumulative cost for border support provided to DHS was $514 million, 
and the cost so far for fiscal year 2022 is $158 million. It is also my 
understanding that these title 10 forces are deployed in a temporary 
duty, or ``TDY'', status--sometimes for periods of more than a year.
    In fiscal year 2021, how many migrants did National Guard troops 
directly assist DHS in apprehending, and what percentage of total 
detentions does this represent?
    How many apprehensions in which National Guard troops directly 
assisted DHS led to the seizure of narcotics or weapons; or a disrupted 
human trafficking?
    Ms. Dalton. National Guard personnel providing DOD support to U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are not directly participating in 
law enforcement activities. According to CBP, during fiscal year 2021, 
DOD support provided by National Guard personnel at the southern border 
assisted CBP indirectly in:
      Eighteen percent of the apprehensions of migrants by CBP 
(i.e., 322,550 of 1,734,686) at the southern border of the United 
States; and
      The CBP seizure of approximately 7,260 pounds of 
narcotics and 650 conveyances used for smuggling, including human 
smuggling.
    Mr. Horsford. Has DHS asked DOD for support to CBP along the 
southern border for fiscal year 2023?
    If so, what will this support entail, which States' National Guards 
do you expect to be affected, and what impact will their deployments 
have on readiness?
    Ms. Dalton. Yes. Secretary Austin is considering a DHS request and 
has not yet made a decision. Should this request be approved, the 
Department will notify Congress in accordance with Section 1707 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 
116-92).
    During previous years in which DOD provided support to DHS, 
participating units continued to maintain readiness levels, as 
continually assessed by the Military Services.
    Mr. Horsford. I'm curious about the support NORTHCOM is providing 
to the Department of Homeland Security at the border. This mission has 
suffered well-documented challenges related to crime, discipline, and 
morale. At the same time, anecdotal reports from soldiers on the ground 
lead me to question the effectiveness of their utilization at the 
border.
    It's my understanding that for fiscal year 2021, the total 
cumulative cost for border support provided to DHS was $514 million, 
and the cost so far for fiscal year 2022 is $158 million. It is also my 
understanding that these title 10 forces are deployed in a temporary 
duty, or ``TDY'', status--sometimes for periods of more than a year.
    In fiscal year 2021, how many migrants did National Guard troops 
directly assist DHS in apprehending, and what percentage of total 
detentions does this represent?
    How many apprehensions in which National Guard troops directly 
assisted DHS led to the seizure of narcotics or weapons; or a disrupted 
human trafficking?
    General VanHerck. The National Guard soldiers in Title 10 status 
supporting the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on the Southwest 
Border are prohibited by law from conducting law enforcement operations 
and therefore are not directly involved in apprehensions or detentions. 
Their mission includes detection and monitoring, intelligence analysis, 
and aviation support. In their detection and monitoring role, the 
National Guard soldiers potentially enabled approximately 200,000 
Customs and Border Patrol apprehensions. I defer to DHS for details 
regarding apprehensions, detentions, seizure of narcotics, weapons, or 
the disruption of human trafficking.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
    Mr. Crow. The theater special operations commands (TSOC) provide a 
critical C-WMD capability in protection of the homeland. Are the TSOCs 
appropriately postured to execute this mission in support NORTHCOM?
    General VanHerck. Yes, Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) 
is currently postured to perform their assigned essential tasks during 
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction missions in the homeland and 
throughout the USNORTHCOM Area of Responsibility in accordance with 
specific plans and standing orders. The Department is reviewing Special 
Operations Forces future force posture, which could affect SOCNORTH. We 
are closely monitoring potential impacts of any force posture decisions 
for SOF.
    Mr. Crow. Russian military activities and competition in the Arctic 
is increasing and this will continue due to the effects of climate 
change. Is NORTHCOM postured to deter Russian aggression and malign 
activities in the Arctic?
    General VanHerck. This question is best discussed in a classified 
setting. However, in the interim, Russia has demonstrated a consistent 
and increasing willingness to ignore international norms; we risk U.S. 
national interests if we assume Russia will abide by the rules-based 
order in the Arctic, particularly in light of Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine. To compete with and deter a more aggressive Russia, that is 
expanding its Arctic military presence and arming it with advanced 
weapon systems, the Joint Force must demonstrate the ability to 
maintain a persistent presence and conduct the full range of military 
operations in the high north. USNORTHCOM requires routine access to 
forces organized, trained, and equipped to deploy to the Arctic, and 
that are supported by resilient infrastructure, high north 
communications capabilities, and effective command structures.
    Mr. Crow. What is NORTHCOM's cyber role role and is it sufficiently 
integrated in the whole-of-government response to a major cyber 
incident impacting critical infrastructure within the U.S.?
    General VanHerck. As a whole-of-government partner, USNORTHCOM is 
the DOD Synchronizer for all domain operations for Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities (DSCA), to include cyber. Upon approval of a Request 
for Assistance (RFA) from a federal agency, USNORTHCOM is supported by 
USCYBERCOM to conduct DSCA cyber response actions for DHS Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). We have a liaison officer 
that resides at, and integrates with CISA to coordinate RFA needs, and 
we collaborate weekly with CISA through the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Joint 
Operations Center for information exchange sessions. Furthermore, we 
participate with USCYBERCOM through OSD in the CISA-led Joint Cyber 
Defense Collaborative, which leads the development of plans for cyber 
defense operations and coordinates execution across the federal 
government, critical infrastructure owners and operators, industry, and 
academia.
    Mr. Crow. The 140th Wing, Colorado National Guard provides critical 
fighter support for the NORTHCOM and NORAD's ``no-fail'' protection of 
the Homeland mission. To date, the Air Force has not committed to 
replacing the 140th Wing's aging F-16 Block-30 aircraft with new 
fighter aircraft. Are you aware of any Air Force plans to end the 140th 
Wing's flying mission? Would the loss of the 140th Wing's flying 
mission put NORTHCOM's homeland defense mission at risk?
    General VanHerck. No, I am not aware of Air Force plans to end the 
flying mission at the 140th Wing. The loss of the 140th could create an 
unacceptable gap in the NORAD aerospace control alert (ACA) posture. If 
this was the case, another unit would need to be identified, trained 
and tasked to continue the defense of the nation's interior.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. Is there any evidence to suggest that China and/or 
Russia is working to place capabilities in South America solely for the 
purpose of causing harm to the United States?
    General Richardson. Chinese and Russian efforts to build influence 
often directly undercut U.S. goals in the region and have the potential 
to cause harm to the United States.
    China develops capabilities and infrastructure under the guise of 
economic, academic, or diplomatic purposes that could also potentially 
be used for military purposes. The PRC also takes advantage of corrupt 
officials to win contracts for their state-owned enterprises. Such 
activity is especially concerning in South America when evaluating 
Chinese activities near the Strait of Magellan and the Panama Canal--
two strategic lines of communication in the Western Hemisphere. China-
based companies are engaged in or bidding for several projects related 
to the Panama Canal. In addition, a Chinese state-owned enterprise is 
attempting to secure rights to build installations near the port of 
Ushuaia, which would provide the PRC presence at the Strait of Magellan 
and improve access to Antarctica.
    Russia continues to attempt to destabilize the region with 
disinformation through Russian media outlets and Moscow retains the 
capability to project military power throughout the region with Long 
Range Aviation and warship port calls. Additionally, Russia's 
capabilities in Nicaragua and Cuba consisting of two intelligence 
collection sites have the potential to cause harm to the United States.
    Mr. Lamborn. In the hearing, you mentioned that USSOUTHCOM receives 
a marginal amount of ISR. Has the command made efforts to work with 
commercial companies, particularly commercial space companies, to 
bridge this gap? Can you elaborate on specific arrangements that have 
been productive?
    General Richardson. Given the paucity of ISR we receive, commercial 
capabilities are a key part of SOUTHCOM's ISR toolkit. Through our 
partnerships with NGA and NRO, we have access to spaced-based 
geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) from the satellite constellations of 
companies like Planet Labs, MAXAR, Blacksky, and Hawkeye 360. Not only 
do these capabilities allow us to mitigate our limited ISR allocation, 
but they also provide unclassified, easily shareable GEOINT products 
that we can provide to our regional partners to enable their operations 
against shared threats. This regular sharing of unclassified products 
also allows us to develop the capacity of our regional partners, 
increasing our overall effectiveness in getting after shared threats.
      Commercial, space-based GEOINT has been critically 
important during our support to US forces and aid workers on the ground 
engaged in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations 
during Haiti's earthquake in August 2021 and Hurricanes Eta and Iota in 
2020. SOUTHCOM regularly used these shareable images to provide 
awareness of road hazards, flooding, and damaged critical 
infrastructure.
      Planet and MAXAR imagery and products have been crucial 
in helping the Command counter transnational criminal organizations 
(TCOs) and supporting our partners' actions to neutralize these 
networks. For example, between January and March 2022, we provided the 
Colombian military with imagery of 11 maritime and three air facilities 
to assist their efforts to stem a recent uptick in vehicle borne 
improvised explosive devices attacks against security forces. These 
products derived from commercial imagery bolstered force protection and 
intelligence preparation of the environment to safeguard not only 
regional partner forces but also US personnel on a train, advise, and 
assist mission in country who were often collocated with Colombian 
forces.
    SOUTHCOM also maintains a partnership with the University of 
Miami's Center for Southeastern Tropical Advanced Remote Sensing 
(CSTARS), which provides the Command with access to commercial 
synthetic aperture radar imagery. CSTARS is a core part of our effort 
to use artificial intelligence and machine learning to enable automated 
detections that allow us to expand domain awareness by providing early 
warning of changes in the environment, such as indicators of illicit 
maritime trafficking. Appropriations in FY21 and FY22 for commercial 
remote sensing capabilities have been key to SOUTHCOM retaining this 
capability.