[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-57]

            ENDING THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                           SEPTEMBER 29, 2021


                                     
                [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                
                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
48-524                   WASHINGTON : 2023                 
                

                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
               Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
                          Emma Morrison, Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     4
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department 
  of Defense.....................................................     5
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central 
  Command........................................................    13
Milley, GEN Mark A., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff........     9

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III...................................   101
    Milley, GEN Mark A...........................................   106

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on General 
      Milley's January 8 Phone Call with Speaker Pelosi..........   121
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on General 
      Milley's Engagements with the People's Liberation Army 
      Leaders....................................................   124
    Representative Bacon's Section 1215 Letter Response..........   131
    Full transcript of ABC News' George Stephanopoulos' Interview 
      with President Joe Biden...................................   132

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Courtney.................................................   145
    Mr. Crow.....................................................   146
    Ms. Escobar..................................................   146
    Mrs. Hartzler................................................   145
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   149
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   145
    Mr. Wittman..................................................   145

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Banks....................................................   156
    Mr. Brooks...................................................   152
    Mr. Carl.....................................................   163
    Ms. Escobar..................................................   156
    Mr. Gallagher................................................   153
    Mr. Garamendi................................................   165
    Mr. Golden...................................................   165
    Mrs. Hartzler................................................   150
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   164
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   167
    Mr. Kahele...................................................   162
    Mr. Keating..................................................   155
    Mr. Khanna...................................................   165
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   149
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   161
    Mr. Moore....................................................   163
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   160
    Mr. Scott....................................................   150
    Mr. Wilson...................................................   150

            ENDING THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

                              ----------                              

                           House of Representatives
                                Committee on Armed Services
                     Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 29, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I call the hearing to order. Good morning. As 
has been the case for a while, this is a hybrid hearing. We 
have some members participating remotely in addition to the 
members who are present, and there are rules for that. So I 
need to read a statement that sets out those rules before we 
get going.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting. Those members must continue to use the software 
platform's video function while in attendance unless they 
experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that 
render them unable to participate on camera. If a member 
experiences technical difficulties, they should contact the 
committee staff for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room via the television/internet feeds. Members participating 
remotely must seek recognition verbally and they are asked to 
mute their microphones when they are not speaking. Members who 
are participating remotely are reminded to keep the software 
platform's video function on the entire time they attend the 
proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If 
members depart for a short while for reasons other than joining 
a different proceeding, they should leave the video function 
on. If members will be absent for a significant period or 
depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the 
software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    Thank you.
    Good morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses here 
today. We have the Honorable Lloyd Austin III, Secretary of 
Defense; General Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
and General Frank McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central Command. I 
want to thank them for their time today as they provide an 
update on the issues surrounding the end of the U.S. military 
mission in Afghanistan and our mission going forward dealing 
with counterterrorism in South Asia and the continuing mission 
to try to get as many Afghans and any remaining Americans out 
of the country.
    I am looking forward to what I hope will be a very 
important policy discussion. At the center of our examination 
of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan is the desire to 
learn from our 20-year involvement there. We must have an open 
and honest analysis of everything that went into that, not just 
the events of the last year or 6 months.
    But before getting into that, we should take a moment to 
recognize the service of the over 800,000 men and women who 
served in Afghanistan over the last 20 years. More importantly, 
I would like to remember and honor the 2,461 who made the 
ultimate sacrifice, along with the over 20,000 who bore the 
physical wounds of war and those who bear the unseen wounds of 
war.
    While we will vigorously debate policy decisions related to 
the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, I believe that I 
speak for the entire committee when we express our gratitude to 
those and their families who have sacrificed so much over those 
last 20 years. We owe them a debt that cannot be repaid.
    I agreed and continue to agree with the decision that was 
made to end our military presence in Afghanistan. It was the 
right decision. Our larger mission to help build a government 
in Afghanistan that could govern effectively and defeat the 
Taliban had failed. More money and more lost American lives 
were not going to change that. The events we witnessed in 
Afghanistan in the wake of the collapse of the Afghan 
Government in August happened primarily because of this 
reality, because of the fundamental reality that our mission to 
try to stand up a government in place of the Taliban had 
failed. That reality is what caused the overwhelming majority 
of the problems that we faced.
    There was no easy or safe way to get everyone out of that 
country we wanted to get out. Yet, in the face of that, our 
military conducted the largest human airlift in history, in 
coordination with the rest of the interagency and our allies 
evacuating over 120,000 people. This evacuation, however, did 
not come without costs. We lost 13 U.S. service members and 
dozens of innocent Afghans due to ISIS-K's [Islamic State - 
Khorasan Province's] attack at the Abbey Gate on August 26.
    There was also a tragic mistake on August 29 when a drone 
strike killed as many as 10 civilians. Following this mistake, 
I and others expect to be provided with the results of the 
timely, comprehensive, and transparent investigation of this 
tragedy, including accountability measures and any changes to 
procedures that are deemed necessary.
    Importantly, our work is not done, as there are more who 
remain in Afghanistan who would like to leave. And we must work 
to ensure the interagency has all the tools required and is 
coordinated to assist those remaining individuals.
    There are some, going back to the issue of whether or not 
we should have left Afghanistan, who imagine that there was 
sort of a middle option that we could have kept 2,500 troops 
there in a relatively peaceful and stable environment. I think 
the way that option has been presented by many of the critics 
has been fundamentally disingenuous. The option of keeping 
2,500 troops in Afghanistan in a peaceful and stable 
environment did not exist. I have heard many compare this to 
the troops that we have left in South Korea and Japan. I find 
that analogy just completely idiotic, if I am being honest.
    In South Korea and Japan, we are not under attack. We are 
there as a deterrent. In Afghanistan, we would have been under 
attack, and that is the fundamental fact that too many people 
are forgetting. The peace agreement that was signed by the 
previous President was based on requirement that we get all of 
our troops out by May 1. That is the only reason the Taliban 
had not attacked us in the previous 18 months.
    Once that expired, once we said, nope, we are staying, they 
would have been under attack. And this has been a subject of a 
huge misunderstanding in the last 24 hours that, again, I find 
very, very disingenuous. People are saying that the President 
said nobody offered, no one said that we should keep 2,500 
there. What the President actually said was there was no option 
on the table to keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan in a stable 
environment. That is what he said.
    Not that no one presented that option. That option didn't 
exist in reality and no one presented it. The President, in 
fact, made it clear earlier in that same interview that, yes, 
some of his military leaders had said that we should keep 2,500 
troops there. What he said was, none of them said that we could 
do it in a stable, peaceful environment. And that is the key 
point.
    The other key point is--and I know a lot of energy will be 
expended today trying to get these gentlemen to admit that they 
didn't agree with the President's decision.
    First of all, I never engage in that exercise because I 
believe the President--Democrat, Republican, no matter who it 
is--deserves the, you know, unabridged advice of his or her 
commanders. I mean, you can't give that if you are then going 
to have to go out in public and talk about it.
    But second of all, the President is the one in charge. This 
is ultimately what civilian control of the military means. And 
what I believe is, I believe certainly there were military 
commanders who said, nope, we should stick it out, we should 
keep the 2,500 there. I think they were wrong. And so did the 
President. It is not that they didn't make the advice; it is 
that they were wrong.
    This committee has enormous amount of respect for our 
military leadership. That does not mean that the military 
leadership is incapable of being wrong. And over the course of 
the last 20 years, in Afghanistan, I would have thought we 
would have learned that lesson. President Biden had the courage 
to finally make the decision to say, no, we are not succeeding 
in this mission. Placing more American lives at risk will not 
change that.
    If we could credibly say, you know, if we just stuck it out 
for another year, another 5, another 10 and got to a better 
result, that would be a difficult call. Was that worth the 
risk? But we can't credibly say that. So we would have been 
putting American lives at risk for a mission that we had to 
know was not achievable. The President made the right call on 
that.
    There is the issue of how we withdrew, and I will say--and 
I have been critical of this--I think the effort to get the 
SIVs [Special Immigrant Visas] and the others who wanted to get 
out of Afghanistan certainly could have been handled better and 
could have been started sooner. It certainly seemed rushed, and 
I want to hear from our leaders today about how that played 
out, but, again, let's remember that the other alternative was 
not easy.
    The alternative of let's start pulling people out sooner, 
the Ghani government, the government that was in charge of 
Afghanistan at the time we would have been doing this, was 
adamantly opposed to us pulling all of the military equipment 
and hundreds of thousands of their Afghan supporters out, for 
obvious reasons. How would we have done that against the 
objection of the existing Afghan Government while the Taliban 
were rolling across the countryside?
    It would not have been easy no matter how it was done, but 
we do deserve an accounting for how those decisions were made 
going forward. I think today is an excellent opportunity to do 
that. I look forward to the questions and answers, as well as 
the testimony of our witnesses.
    And with that I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Rogers.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While I have great 
admiration for my friend the chairman, I could not disagree 
more with his observations about Afghanistan and the 
President's decision. The fact is our coalition partners and 
our military leadership felt that we should have maintained our 
2,500 troops there, along with this roughly 7,500 to 8,000 
coalition troops, and the thousands of contractors that the 
Afghan Army was dependent upon to fight successfully. And I 
think they could have continued, as they have in past years, to 
fight valiantly had we given that support and the President had 
listened to his generals' advice.
    But regardless of how you feel about the decision to remove 
troops from Afghanistan, I think we can all agree that the 
withdrawl was an unmitigated disaster. Hundreds of Americans 
were left behind, thousands of Afghan allies stuck with little 
hope of escape, potentially billions worth of U.S. provided 
military equipment now in the hands of the Taliban.
    Thousands of hardened al-Qaida and ISIS terrorists freed 
from prisons, 10 innocent Afghans, including 7 children, killed 
in a botched air strike. But worst of all, 13 brave American 
service members were murdered by a coward in a suicide vest. 
What is more infuriating is that all of this could have been 
avoided if the President had a plan.
    In briefings and hearings since April, we have demanded to 
know a plan to (a) safely evacuate Americans and Afghan allies 
and (b) conduct counterterrorism operations. For 4 months, the 
response from the Biden administration was, we are working on 
it.
    Now it is clear they never had a plan. The President 
repeatedly assured the American people that the Taliban 
takeover was not inevitable; that we had plenty of time to 
safely evacuate Americans and Afghan allies; that this was not 
going to be a fall like Saigon.
    As late as August 19, the President promised us that if 
there is an American citizen left, we are going to stay to get 
them all out. Now it is clear the President has misled us more 
than once. On August 31, hundreds of Americans left behind, the 
13 service members murdered, the President stood in the East 
Room of the White House and called the withdrawl, quote, an 
extraordinary success, close quote.
    I fear the President is delusional. This wasn't an 
extraordinary success; it was an extraordinary disaster. It 
will go down in history as one of the greatest failures of 
American leadership. We are here today to get answers on how 
the hell this happened.
    I expect our witnesses to give us an honest accounting of 
exactly what went wrong. I also want answers on how we are 
going to conduct counterterrorism operations now that we have 
zero presence in Afghanistan. This was the first question we 
asked you in April and we still don't have an answer.
    According to the latest intelligence assessment, it could 
be as little as 12 months before al-Qaida will use Afghanistan 
as a base to conduct air strikes or strikes against the United 
States. And that is unacceptable. And this talk of over-the-
horizon capability is a farce. Sure, we can send a drone out to 
take out a terrorist, but we didn't know where the terrorists 
are.
    Without persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] capabilities or reliable intelligence on the 
ground that is impossible. We have neither of those now. It 
doesn't help that we need to fly that drone nearly 1,600 miles 
to reach Afghanistan, leaving little time on station, or that 
we have to fly over Pakistan, an ally of the Taliban, who could 
revoke overfly privileges at any time.
    None of this is giving us much confidence that this 
administration can successfully conduct counterterrorism in 
Afghanistan. We want to know what capabilities we need, where 
they will be based, and how they will be used. In other words, 
we want to see a plan and we want to see it today because, 
frankly, after this debacle of a withdrawl, I don't think 
anyone can trust anything this President says about 
Afghanistan.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

 STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 
                   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Secretary Austin. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss our recent drawdown and 
evacuation operations in Afghanistan. I am pleased to be joined 
by Generals Milley and McKenzie who I know will be able to 
provide you with additional context. I am incredibly proud of 
the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who conducted 
themselves with tremendous skill and professionalism throughout 
the war, the drawdown, and the evacuation. Over the course of 
our Nation's longest war, 2,461 of our fellow Americans made 
the ultimate sacrifice, along with more than 20,000 who still 
bear the wounds of war some of which cannot be seen on the 
outside.
    We can discuss and debate the decisions, the policies, and 
the turning points since April of this year when the President 
made clear his intent to end American involvement in this war, 
and we can debate the decisions over the last 20 years that led 
us to this point, but the one thing not open to debate is the 
courage and compassion of our service members who, along with 
their families, served and sacrificed to ensure their homeland 
would never again be attacked the way it was on September 11, 
2001.
    I had the chance to speak with many of them during my trip 
to the Gulf region a few weeks ago, including the Marines who 
lost 11 of their teammates at the Abbey Gate in Kabul on the 26 
of August. I have never been more humbled and inspired. They 
are rightfully proud of what they accomplished and the lives 
they saved in such a short period of time.
    The reason that our troops were able to get there so 
quickly is because we planned for just such a contingency. We 
began thinking about the possibilities of foreign noncombatant 
evacuation as far back as the spring. By late April, 2 weeks 
after the President's decision, military planners had crafted a 
number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-May, I ordered CENTCOM 
[U.S. Central Command] to make preparations for potential 
noncombatant evacuation operation. Two weeks later, I began 
prepositioning forces in the region to include three infantry 
battalions.
    On the 10th of August, we ran another tabletop exercise 
around a noncombatant evacuation scenario [NEO]. We wanted to 
be ready and we were. By the time that the State Department 
called for the NEO, significant numbers of additional forces 
had already arrived in Afghanistan, including leading elements 
of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit who were already on the 
ground in Kabul.
    Before that weekend was out, another 3,000 or so ground 
troops had arrived, including elements of the 82nd Airborne. To 
be clear, those first 2 days were difficult. We all watched 
with alarm the images of Afghans rushing the runway and our 
aircraft. We all remember the scenes of confusion outside--
    The Chairman. Sorry. We will get that under control. Go 
ahead, sir.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. Outside the airport, but 
within 48 hours our troops restored order and the process began 
to take hold. Our soldiers, airmen, and Marines in partnership 
with our allies, our partners, and our State Department 
colleagues secured the gates, took control of the airport 
operations, and set up a processing system for the tens of 
thousands of people that they would be manifesting on to 
airplanes. They and our commanders exceeded all expectations.
    We planned to evacuate between 70,000 and 80,000 people. 
They evacuated more than 124,000 people. We planned to move 
between 5,000 and 9,000 people per day. And on average they 
moved slightly more than 7,000 people per day.
    On military aircraft alone, we flew more than 387 sorties, 
averaging nearly 23 per day. At the height of this operation, 
an aircraft was taking off every 45 minutes and not a single 
sortie was missed for maintenance, fuel, or logistical 
problems. It was the largest airlift conducted in U.S. history 
and it was executed in just 17 days.
    Was it perfect? Of course not. We moved so many people so 
quickly out of Kabul that we ran into capacity and screening 
problems at intermediate staging bases outside of Afghanistan, 
and we are still working to get Americans out who wish to 
leave. We did not get out all of our Afghan allies enrolled in 
the special immigration visa program, and we take that 
seriously.
    And that is why we are working across the interagency to 
continue facilitating their departure and even with no military 
presence on the ground, that part of our mission is not over.
    Tragically, lives were also lost. Several Afghans killed 
climbing aboard an aircraft on that first day, 13 brave U.S. 
service members, and dozens of Afghan civilians killed in a 
terrorist attack on the 26th and we took as many as 10 innocent 
lives in a drone strike on the 29th. Noncombatant evacuations 
remain among the most challenging military operations even in 
the best of circumstances, and the circumstances in August were 
anything but ideal.
    Extreme heat, a landlocked country, no government, a highly 
dynamic situation on the ground, and an active, credible, and 
lethal terrorist threat. In the span of just 2 days from August 
13th to August 15th, we went from working alongside a 
democratically elected, long-term partner government to 
coordinating warily with a longtime enemy. We operated in a 
deeply dangerous environment and it proved a lesson in 
pragmatism and professionalism.
    We also learned a lot of other lessons too like about how 
to turn an Air Force base in Qatar to an international airport 
overnight, about how to rapidly screen, process, and manifest 
large numbers of people. Nothing like this has ever been done 
before and no other military in the world could have pulled it 
off, and I think that that is crucial.
    And I know that members of this committee will have 
questions on many things, such as why we turned over Bagram 
Airfield and how real our over-the-horizon capability is, and 
why we didn't start evacuations sooner, and why we didn't stay 
longer to get more people out.
    So let me take each in turn. Retaining Bagram would have 
required putting as many as 5,000 U.S. troops in harm's way 
just to operate and defend it. And it would have contributed 
little to the mission that we had been assigned and that was to 
protect and defend the Embassy, which was some 30 miles away.
    And that distance from Kabul also rendered Bagram of little 
value in the evacuation. Staying at Bagram, even for 
counterterrorism purposes, meant staying at war in Afghanistan, 
something that the President made clear that he would not do. 
And as for over-the-horizon operations, when we use that term, 
we refer to assets and target analysis that come from outside 
the country in which the operation occurs. These are effective 
and fairly common operations.
    Just days ago we conducted one such strike in Syria 
eliminating a senior al-Qaida figure. Over-the-horizon 
operations are difficult, but absolutely possible. And the 
intelligence that supports them comes from a variety of sources 
and not just U.S. boots on the ground.
    As for when we started evacuations, we offered input to the 
State Department's decision, mindful of their concerns that 
moving too soon might actually cause the very collapse of the 
Afghan Government that we all wanted to avoid, and that moving 
too late would put our people and our operations at greater 
risk.
    As I said, the fact that our troops were on the ground so 
quickly is due in large part to our planning and prepositioning 
of forces. As for the mission's end, my judgment remains that 
extending beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled 
our people and our mission.
    The Taliban made clear that their cooperation would end on 
the first of September. And as you know, we face grave and 
growing threats from ISIS-K. So staying longer than we did 
would have made it even more dangerous for our people and would 
not have significantly changed the number of evacuees we could 
get out.
    So as we consider these tactical issues today, we must also 
ask ourselves some equally tough questions about the wider war 
itself and pause to think about the lessons that we have 
learned over the past 20 years.
    Did we have the right strategy? Did we have too many 
strategies? Did we put too much faith in our ability to build 
effective Afghan institutions? An Army, an Air Force, a police 
force, and government ministries? We helped build a state, but 
we could not forge a nation. The fact that the Afghan Army that 
we and our partners trained simply melted away, in many cases 
without firing a shot, took us all by surprise and it would be 
dishonest to claim otherwise.
    We need to consider some uncomfortable truths, that we did 
not fully comprehend the depth of corruption and poor 
leadership in their senior ranks; that we did not grasp the 
damaging affect of frequent and unexplained rotations by 
President Ghani of his commanders; that we did not anticipate 
the snowball effect caused by the deals that the Taliban 
commanders struck with local leaders in the wake of the Doha 
Agreement; that the Doha Agreement itself had a demoralizing 
effect on Afghan soldiers; and that we failed to fully grasp 
that there was only so much for which and for whom many of the 
Afghan forces would fight.
    We provided the Afghan military with equipment and aircraft 
and the skills to use them, and over the years they often 
fought bravely, and tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers and 
police officers died. But in the end, we couldn't provide them 
with the will to win. At least not all of them. And as a 
veteran of that war, I am personally reckoning with all of 
that. But I hope, as I said at the outset, that we do not allow 
a debate about how this war ended to cloud our pride in the way 
that our people fought it.
    They prevented another 9/11, they showed extraordinary 
courage and compassion in the war's last days, they made 
lasting progress in Afghanistan that the Taliban will find 
difficult to reverse and that the international community 
should work hard to preserve.
    And now, our service members and civilians face a new 
mission: Helping these Afghan evacuees move on to new lives in 
new places, and they are performing that one magnificently as 
well.
    I spent some time with some of them up at Joint Base 
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst this past Monday and I know that you 
share my profound gratitude and respect for their service, 
their courage, and professionalism, and I appreciate the 
support that this committee continues to provide them and their 
families.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Austin can be found in 
the Appendix on page 101.]
    The Chairman. Chairman Milley.

STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF 
                             STAFF

    General Milley. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
thank you for the opportunity to be here with Secretary Austin 
and General McKenzie to discuss Afghanistan.
    During the past 20 years, the men and women of the United 
States military, along with our allies and partners, fought the 
Taliban, brought Osama bin Laden to justice, denied al-Qaida 
sanctuary, and protected our homeland for two consecutive 
decades. Over 800,000 of us in uniform served in Afghanistan.
    Most importantly, 2,461 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and 
Marines paid the ultimate price; 20,698 were wounded in action; 
and countless others suffered the invisible wounds of war. 
There is no doubt in my mind that our efforts prevented an 
attack on the homeland from Afghanistan, which was our core 
mission. And everyone, everyone, whoever served in that war in 
Afghanistan should be proud. Your service mattered.
    Beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers, 
consolidated and closed bases, and retrograded equipment from 
Afghanistan. At our peak in 2011, we had 97,000 U.S. troops 
alongside 41,000 NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
troops in Afghanistan.
    Ten years later when Ambassador Khalilzad signed the Doha 
Agreement with Mullah Baradar on 29 February 2020, the United 
States had 12,600 troops with 8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors 
in Afghanistan. This has been a 10-year, multi-administration 
drawdown, not a 19-month retrograde or 17-day noncombatant 
evacuation operation.
    Under the Doha Agreement, the United States would begin to 
withdraw its forces contingent upon the Taliban meeting certain 
conditions which would lead to a political agreement between 
the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. There were seven 
conditions applicable to the Taliban and eight to the United 
States.
    While the Taliban did not attack the United States forces, 
which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any 
other condition under the Doha Agreement and perhaps, most 
importantly for the United States national security, the 
Taliban has never renounced their linkages with al-Qaida or 
broke their affiliation with them. We, the United States, 
adhered to every condition.
    In the fall of 2020, my analysis then was that an 
accelerated withdrawl without meeting specific and necessary 
conditions risks losing the substantial gains made in 
Afghanistan, would potentially damage U.S. worldwide 
credibility, and could precipitate a general collapse of the 
Afghan security forces and the Afghan Government resulting in a 
complete Taliban takeover or general civil war. That analysis 
was a year ago.
    Based on my advice and the advice of the commanders at the 
time, then-Secretary of Defense Esper submitted a memorandum on 
9 November recommending that we maintain the U.S. forces which 
were then at about 4,500 in Afghanistan until conditions were 
met for further reductions. Two days later on 11 November, I 
received an unclassified signed order directing the United 
States military to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan by 15 
January 2021.
    After further discussion regarding the risks associated 
with such a withdrawl, the order was rescinded. On 17 November 
we received a new order to reduce troop levels to 2,500 plus 
enabling forces no later than 15 January.
    When President Biden was inaugurated, there were 
approximately 3,500 U.S. troops, 5,400 NATO, and 6,300 
contractors in Afghanistan tasked to train, advise, and assist 
a small contingent of counterterrorism forces and the strategic 
situation was stalemate.
    The Biden administration through the National Security 
Council process conducted a rigorous interagency review of the 
situation in Afghanistan in February, March, and April. During 
this process, the views of all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
all of us, the CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, USFOR-A 
Commander General Miller, and myself were all given serious 
consideration by the administration. We provided a broad range 
of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes.
    We couched that in cost, benefit, risk to force, risk to 
mission, all of that was evaluated against the national 
security objectives of the United States.
    On 14 April, the President of the United States, President 
Biden, announced his decision. The U.S. military received a 
change of mission to retrograde all U.S. military forces, 
maintain a small contingency force of 6- to 700 to protect the 
Embassy in Kabul until the Department of State could coordinate 
contractor security support, and also to assist Turkey to 
maintain the Hamid Karzai International Airport, and to 
transition the U.S. mission to over-the-horizon 
counterterrorism support and security force assistance.
    It is clear, it is obvious to all of us that the war in 
Afghanistan did not end on the terms that we wanted with the 
Taliban now in power in Kabul. Although the NEO was 
unprecedented and is the largest air evacuation in history, a 
tactical, operational, and logistical success evacuating 
124,000 people, the war was a strategic failure. It came also 
at an incredible cost in the end with 11 Marines, 1 soldier, 
and a Navy corpsman. These 13 gave their lives so that people 
they never met would have an opportunity to live in freedom, 
and we must remember that the Taliban was and remains a 
terrorist organization and they still have not broken with al-
Qaida.
    I have no illusions who we are dealing with. It remains to 
be seen whether or not the Taliban can consolidate power or if 
the country will further fracture into civil war, but we must 
continue to protect the United States of America and its people 
from terrorist attacks from Afghanistan. A reconstituted al-
Qaida or ISIS with aspirations to attack the United States is a 
very real possibility and those conditions to include activity 
in ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to 
36 months.
    That mission will be much harder now, but not impossible, 
and we will continue to protect the American people. Strategic 
decisions have strategic consequences. Over the course of 4 
Presidents, 12 Secretaries of Defense, 7 Chairman, 10 CENTCOM 
commanders, and 20 commanders in Afghanistan, and hundreds of 
congressional delegation visits in 20 years of congressional 
oversight, there are many lessons to be learned.
    Among those lessons is the unprecedented speed of the 
collapse of the ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces]. However, one lesson we can never forget is that every 
soldier, sailor, airmen, and Marine who served there for 20 
years protected our country against attack from terrorists. And 
for that, we all should be forever grateful and those soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and Marines should be forever proud.
    Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to address 
a couple of comments about my personal conduct that has been in 
the media lately.
    The Chairman. Yes, yes. Mr. Chairman, you may. Go ahead.
    General Milley. I have served this Nation for 42 years. I 
spent years in combat and buried a lot of my troops who died 
while defending this country. My loyalty to this Nation, its 
people, and the Constitution hasn't changed and will never 
change as long as I have a breath to give. My loyalty to the 
Constitution and to this Nation is absolute and I will not turn 
my back on my fallen.
    With respect to the Chinese calls, I routinely communicated 
with my counterpart General Li with the knowledge and 
coordination of civilian oversight. I am specifically directed 
to communicate with the Chinese by Department of Defense 
guidance in a document known as the Policy Dialogue System.
    These military-to-military communications at the highest 
levels are critical for the security of the United States in 
order to deconflict military actions, manage crisis, and 
prevent war between great powers armed with nuclear weapons. 
The calls on 30 October and 8 January were coordinated before 
and after with Secretary Esper and Acting Secretary Miller's 
staffs and the interagency.
    The specific purpose of the October and January calls was 
generated by concerning intelligence which caused us to believe 
the Chinese were worried about an attack by the United States. 
And last night I briefed that intelligence in detail to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee and I will be happy to brief it 
to any member or group of members at your discretion in a 
classified session.
    And I know and I am certain President Trump did not intend 
on attacking the Chinese and it is my directed responsibility 
by the Secretary of Defense to convey that intent. My task at 
that time was to de-escalate. My message was, again, 
consistent, calm, steady, de-escalate. We are not going to 
attack you.
    At Secretary of Defense Esper's direction, I made a call to 
General Li on 30 October. Eight people sat on that call with me 
and I read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending. 
On 31 December the Chinese requested a call with me. The 
Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-
Pacific policy helped coordinate my call, which was then 
scheduled for 8 January, and he made a preliminary call on 6 
January.
    Eleven people attended the call with me and readouts of 
this call were distributed to the interagency that same day. On 
14 December, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Miller had been 
briefed on the entire program. Shortly after my call ended with 
General Li, I informed both Secretary of State Pompeo and White 
House Chief of Staff Meadows about the call among several other 
topics.
    Soon after that I attended a meeting with Acting Secretary 
Miller where I briefed him on the call. Later that same day on 
8 January, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi called me to 
inquire about the President's ability to launch nuclear 
weapons. I sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed 
by a very specific and deliberate process. She was concerned 
and made various personal references characterizing the 
President. I explained to her that the President is the sole 
nuclear launch authority, but he doesn't launch them alone; and 
that I am not qualified to determine the mental health of the 
President of the United States. There are processes, protocols, 
and procedures in place and I repeatedly assured her, there is 
no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch of 
nuclear weapons.
    By Presidential Directive and SecDef [Secretary of Defense] 
Directives, the Chairman is part of this process to ensure that 
the President is fully informed when determining the use of the 
world's deadliest weapons. By law I am not in the chain of 
command and I know that. However, by Presidential Directive, 
the Department of Defense instruction signed by the President 
and Secretaries of Defense, I am in the chain of communication 
to fulfill my legal statutory role as the President's primary 
military adviser.
    After the Speaker Pelosi call, I convened a short meeting 
in my office with key members of my staff to refresh all of us 
on these procedures which we practice three times a day at the 
action officer level. Additionally, I immediately informed 
Acting Secretary of Defense Miller of her call. At no time was 
I attempting to change or influence the process, usurp 
authority, or insert myself into the chain of command, but I am 
expected to give my advice and ensure the President is fully 
informed on military affairs.
    I am submitting for the record, and I believe you have it, 
a couple of memorandums for record in addition to detailed 
timelines and I am happy to discuss in further detail in either 
classified or unclassified sessions with any or all of you 
about my actions surrounding these events. I welcome a thorough 
walk-through. I will be happy to provide whatever documents, 
phone logs, emails, memoranda, witnesses, or anything else you 
want that will help you understand these events.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 121.]
    My oath is to support the Constitution of the United States 
of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and I 
will never turn my back on that oath. I firmly believe in 
civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle and 
essential to the health of this republic and I am committed to 
ensuring the military stays clear of domestic politics.
    Thank you, Chairman, for the extra time, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Milley can be found in 
the Appendix on page 106.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. General McKenzie.

  STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, 
                      U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

    General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the 
opportunity to testify about recent events in Afghanistan. As a 
theater commander, I will confine my opening remarks to those 
matters that were under my direct operational control, 
specifically, the withdrawl of U.S. forces and the subsequent 
noncombatant evacuation operation. These were two distinct 
combat missions, both conducted in contact with the enemy.
    We had a plan for each of them. We executed those plans. 
And thanks to the valor and dedication of thousands of men and 
women in harm's way we completed both missions, fulfilling the 
President's order to withdraw all U.S. forces and evacuating 
over 124,000 noncombatants from Afghanistan. I last appeared 
before this body only days after President Biden announced his 
decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from that country and my 
testimony regarding that decision is already a matter of public 
record.
    I will only reiterate that I had an opportunity to offer my 
professional advice to the President through the Secretary and 
I am confident that he weighed it carefully. That is all any 
commander can ask.
    Once the President made his decision, my headquarters and 
that of U.S. Forces Afghanistan under General Scott Miller made 
the withdrawl of our forces our top priority. We did this in 
close coordination with our allies and partners. Every 
departure of every element was carefully synchronized across 
the coalition and with our Afghan partners. On no occasion were 
they caught unaware by our movements. Every base was handed off 
to Afghan forces according to a mutually understood plan.
    This is particularly true of Bagram Airfield. Many of you 
have visited Bagram at some point over the past 20 years and 
were probably struck by two of its defining features: Its 
sprawling size and its isolation. Virtues for most of its life 
span, they rendered it untenable under the circumstances.
    The guidance I received in April was to conduct the 
complete withdrawl of U.S. combat forces and plan for a 
diplomatic security force of absolutely no more than 650 
service members. It was not feasible to preserve the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul, hold and defend Hamid Karzai International 
Airport, the Embassy's key link to the outside world, and also 
defend Bagram Airfield with 650 soldiers and Marines. This is 
important.
    The Bagram option went away when we were ordered to reduce 
our presence to the 650 personnel in Kabul. I would like to 
shift briefly to the NEO, which, as I have noted, was a 
completely different operation than the withdrawl. They were 
separate.
    The withdrawl began in April following the President's 
direction. The decision to conduct a NEO rested with the 
Department of State, and they made that decision on 14 August. 
In our NEO planning, Central Command assumed that we would have 
to bring out a very large number of people. We did not regard 
the size of a potential NEO as overwhelming or too much to 
accomplish. We did not regard a Taliban takeover as inevitable, 
but neither did we rule it out, and we identified critical 
indicators of an impending collapse of the Afghan National 
Defense Forces.
    We crafted branches to our base plan to account for a 
complete collapse of the Afghan Security Forces. The Secretary 
took action in May to make forces available to me for planning. 
On July the 9th, I requested that our base NEO force, the core 
package that would go in, be put on 96-hour prepare-to-deploy 
orders.
    By August 11th, it was evident to me that Kabul was at risk 
and I requested the deployment of a brigade of the 82nd 
Airborne Division and other elements of our own alert preplan 
force package, and I requested that they be deployed into HKIA, 
Hamid Karzai International Airfield. These forces flowed 
swiftly into theater even as the Afghan National Defense Forces 
disintegrated allowing thousands of civilians access to the 
airfield.
    Working with Afghan partners composed of elite commando 
units who did not fall apart and our arriving NEO forces on 
August the 16th, we cleared the airfield and resumed flight 
operations in a matter of hours. With security re-established 
by force ultimately compromising 5,784 U.S. troops, 8 maneuver 
battalions, and hundreds of coalition forces, operations 
continued without interruption until our final flights. By that 
time we evacuated over 124,000 people from Afghanistan.
    This was a difficult mission made possible by the 
exceptional professionalism and valor of the joint force on the 
ground in Afghanistan and across the entire world. I would 
specifically like to use this opportunity to thank the C-17 
crews of the Air Mobility Command for a feat rivaling and 
exceeding, in fact, the Berlin airlift.
    Moments after the last of the final five C-17s lifted off 
from HKIA, I held a briefing with the Pentagon press corps and 
expressed my gratitude and admiration for the forces who 
carried out this NEO. I also provided various figures that 
conveyed the magnitude of their accomplishment.
    I won't reiterate those figures here and now, but I will 
say that after the passage of nearly a month, my pride in their 
accomplishment remains undiminished. I don't need to tell this 
body that on 26 August, 11 Marines, 1 sailor, and 1 soldier 
made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of their country. We will 
never forget them.
    This was a combat operation of the most difficult sort, a 
noncombatant evacuation carried out in contact with the enemy. 
The enemy, in this case, was ISIS Khorasan, a vile, tenacious 
foe that would undoubtedly had killed many, many more Americans 
and innocent Afghans at HKIA if it were not for the vigilance 
of our forces there.
    On 29 August, we undertook an MQ-9 strike against what we 
thought was an imminent threat to HKIA. That strike was a 
mistake and I take full responsibility for that strike. I was 
under no pressure from any quarter to conduct the strike. It 
was based on our intelligence read of the situation on the 
ground.
    While in many cases we were right with our intelligence and 
forestalled ISIS-K attacks, in this case, we were wrong, 
tragically wrong. I appreciate that there are many other topics 
of interest to this committee and I look forward to answering 
your questions on all of them.
    I will close here by reiterating my profound gratitude and 
appreciation for every soldier, sailor, Marine, airmen, and 
guardian, as well as our intelligence and Department of State 
comrades who contributed to each of these difficult missions. I 
remain humbled by their sense of duty and courage.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I want to drill 
down a little bit on the keeping 2,500 troops there and I am 
struck as I listened to the comments that, I think the real 
problem here is you have to make decisions in the real world. 
You don't get to imagine an outcome that would make it more 
palatable. And I think that is what really factored in to the 
2,500.
    And as we talk about the 13 service members who died and 
attack the leadership here for not having prevented that, how 
you can do that and then advocate that we should have stayed in 
Afghanistan longer so that more service members--I guess the 
only way you can advocate that is to imagine a scenario whereby 
we could have stayed in a chaotic war zone, not had soldiers 
get killed, not have made any mistakes--how you cannot make 
mistakes in that chaotic environment, I don't know, and every 
member serving on this committee has been in those environments 
in one way or another.
    So you don't have the luxury of waving a magic wand and 
making all the problems go away and simply making a decision 
where nothing goes wrong. And it is really frustrating to hear 
people advocate that we should stay and still decry what 
happened.
    Do you think fighting in a war zone there wouldn't be 
similar mistakes if we had stayed there for another 5 or 10 
years, more civilians killed accidentally, more U.S. service 
members dead in exactly the same way that we just saw?
    Sorry. That is very frustrating, but could you talk to us a 
little bit about the 2,500 soldiers or service members who 
could have been left there and then how you approached that 
decision and what exactly--not what exactly your advice was to 
the President for what I said earlier, but how you approached 
that decision and then how you attempt to deal with that while 
advising the President?
    Secretary Austin. First of all, Chairman, let me be clear 
that I support the President's decision to end the war in 
Afghanistan. I did not support staying in Afghanistan forever. 
And let me also say we have talked about the process that we 
used to provide input to the President.
    I think that process was a very thorough and inclusive 
policy process and the recommendations of the commanders were 
taken into consideration, discussed, and deliberated on 
throughout that process.
    As you indicated, I typically--I will always keep my 
recommendations to the President confidential, but I would say 
that, in my view, there is no, was no, risk-free status quo 
option. I think that the Taliban had been clear that if we 
stayed there longer, they were going to recommence attacks on 
our forces.
    I think while it's conceivable that you could stay there, 
my view is that you would have had to deploy more forces in 
order to protect ourselves and accomplish any missions that we 
would have been assigned. It is also my view, Mr. Chairman, 
that the best way to end this war was through a negotiated 
settlement and sadly that did not happen.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And let me just also say that I 
know there are members of this committee who think we should 
have stayed, who are honest about that.
    Sorry. I think of Congressman Waltz who has been very 
honest about the fact--both under President Trump and under 
President Biden--that we should have stayed. He is very honest 
about the fact that there were costs and risks and lives would 
have been lost.
    That is the type of discussion that we need to have, but to 
jump down the President's throat because he actually had to 
make the decision in an impossible situation I think does a 
grave disservice to this committee's ability to do effective 
and honest nonpartisan oversight. Costs were going to be borne 
here. There was no easy option. And I do hope that people 
remember that as we go through the questions and answers that 
will proceed.
    With that, I yield to the ranking member.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley, was the DOD [Department of Defense] in 
charge of making decisions about troop strength in this 
withdrawal or were you in a support role?
    General Milley. Let me put it this way-you talking about 
the NEO or----
    Mr. Rogers. I am talking about--let me go back even 
further.
    In January of this year were you of the opinion, in your 
professional military judgment, that we should've maintained 
2,500 troops, U.S. troops in support of the coalition effort 
and contractors in Afghanistan?
    General Milley. Yeah. My assessment that I read in the 
opening statement remained consistent and----
    Mr. Rogers. Did that professional military opinion change 
over the course of the next few months?
    General Milley. Not until Presidential decision and I 
rendered my opinions and it was a fulsome debate on all of 
that. And once decisions are made, then I am expected to 
execute lawful order.
    Mr. Rogers. And you have made that very clear. So my 
question is, when the troop levels were ordered to be drawn 
down to zero and first stopping at 650 as General McKenzie 
outlined, was that your decision or General McKenzie's decision 
to draw down to 650?
    General Milley. It was a task and then a troop-to-task 
analysis with the task being to go to zero, but you also have 
to defend the Embassy--
    Mr. Rogers. I am thinking about the chain of command. 
Somebody's making decisions about troop levels and my 
understanding is it was not the DOD; it was the State 
Department or the White House. I want to know who said we are 
going to go from 2,500 to 650 and just protect Kabul and the 
State Department.
    General Milley. It was a military analysis that 6- to 700 
could adequately defend the Embassy until the contractors come 
up and that was then approved up through the chain and approved 
at the highest levels.
    Mr. Rogers. Who made the decision?
    General Milley. I would say that decision was made in a 
national security consultative process by the highest levels of 
our government.
    Mr. Rogers. General McKenzie, did you receive advice from 
General Miller in the end of 2020 and early 2021 related to 
troop levels in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Ranking Member, I did.
    Mr. Rogers. What was that advice?
    General McKenzie. The advice, his view and my view, were 
essentially the same view. My view was that we needed to 
maintain about 2,500 and that we also needed to work with our 
coalition partners who had about 6,000 troops in there, NATO 
and other core countries that would remain there.
    Mr. Rogers. Did your professional military opinion change 
over the course of the spring?
    General McKenzie. It did not.
    Mr. Rogers. Did you communicate--well, I know you 
communicated to the President. You said you did. Were you 
present in the room when General Miller's recommendations were 
relayed to the President?
    General McKenzie. General Miller was present in executive 
sessions that involved myself, the Secretary here, the 
Chairman, and the President.
    Mr. Rogers. And those recommendations of the parties as 
Secretary Austin said were debated fully----
    General McKenzie. They were debated fully. I felt that my 
opinion was heard with great thoughtfulness by the President.
    Mr. Rogers. Well, you know, Secretary Austin just made the 
point that there was a fulsome debate of the pros and cons and 
the costs and risks, yet in August of this year, President 
Biden told George Stephanopoulos in an interview, no. No one 
said that to me, referring to keeping some 2,500 troops in 
Afghanistan.
    Was that an inaccurate statement by the President?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I am not going to comment on a 
statement by the President.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. General McKenzie, in mid-June your 
commanders on the ground were informing you that things were 
deteriorating as you testified a little while ago. At that 
time, in your judgment, you should stop withdrawal, increase 
forces, or all proceed with the retrograde.
    What did you decide at that time?
    General McKenzie. We decided to proceed with the 
retrograde.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Were you ordered to do that by the 
President?
    General McKenzie. We followed our original--we had original 
orders. We followed those orders through to completion.
    Mr. Rogers. Was it the President's orders?
    General McKenzie. My orders come from the Secretary of 
Defense to the President. So that is a very short chain of 
command for me.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Secretary Austin, on the 23rd, you told 
this committee that you had developed a very detailed plan to 
conduct safe, orderly, and responsible withdrawl and were 
executing that plan. On August 18, the President said, quote: 
The idea that somehow there was going to be a way that we could 
have gotten out with chaos ensuing, I don't know how that 
happens, close quote.
    How do you reconcile those discrepancies between what you 
assured the Congress and what the President is telling us?
    Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir. First of all, in terms of 
the withdrawl of our troops and the retrograde of equipment, 
that plan as developed by General Miller and General McKenzie 
was executed as planned, and all of our equipment was 
retrograded and we drew down the force that we wanted to draw 
down to that very small force that you saw at the Embassy at 
the very end there.
    The chaos that ensued followed the collapse of the military 
and the collapse of the government, and when those two things 
happen, then it was going to be a chaotic situation.
    Mr. Rogers. And the collapse of the government and the 
collapse of the military was solely responsibility of this 
administration. I know you are all trying to be careful 
politically, but it was the State Department and the White 
House that told you to make those drawdown of troops from 2,500 
to 650 to zero. It was the speed with which they had done it--
that they carried out that order that is what caused the chaos 
that we had.
    If they had allowed the DOD to be in a command situation, 
we wouldn't have had this problem. General McKenzie has 
testified that the only reason he couldn't keep Bagram was 
because he had to draw down to 650 troops and his primary 
orders were to keep Hamid Karzai and the State Department safe.
    We just have to admit this was--the State Department and 
the White House that caused this catastrophe, not the Defense 
Department.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I want 
to thank our witnesses for your testimony today and for your 
service to our Nation. My constituents and I have obviously a 
lot of questions about the planning that led up to this, and 
I'll admit that I am concerned that, based on the conditions on 
the ground, General Milley and General McKenzie recommended 
against final withdrawl, I wish the administration had been 
more thoughtful and not had rushed this.
    I have yet to hear an answer to the question, though, of 
why did we not start withdrawing American citizens and SIVs 
sooner? We knew we were going to be withdrawl whether we 
started doing that withdrawing of the Americans and SIVs in 
January or May or sooner than the actual execution of the order 
to withdraw.
    I would like that question answered. Also Secretary Austin, 
given the generals' concerns, were the discussions about 
pushing the withdrawl back to spring of 2022 or conditioning it 
on the criteria in the Doha Agreement to ensure that we did the 
handoff correctly, we already weren't going to fully withdraw 
by May 2021.
    And Secretary Austin, what was the military rationale of 
leaving by the end of August when the Taliban are at their 
strongest in the fighting season as opposed to waiting in the 
winter months when there is more of a lull in the Taliban 
fighting season? It is a relatively low level of activity and 
they are at their weakest. I will start with those questions.
    The Chairman. And I am sorry. Before you get into it, I'm 
going to stick to the 5-minute rule. So when the clock hits 
zero, we are going to move on to other people. Go ahead.
    Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir. On the issue of why we 
didn't bring out civilians and SIVs sooner, again, the call on 
how to do that and when to do it is really a State Department 
call. We provided input, as I said in my opening statement, to 
the State Department. Their concerns rightfully were that, 
number one, they were being cautioned by the Ghani 
administration that if they withdrew American citizens and SIV 
applicants at a pace that was too fast, it would cause a 
collapse of the government that we were trying to prevent.
    And so I think that went into the calculus and when you add 
also into the calculus that SIV process was very, at that 
point, very slow, deliberate, and not very responsive. With 
your help, we were able to curtail the time that it took to 
work through that process, but a number of things kind of came 
together to cause what happened to happen.
    But, again, we provided our input and we certainly would 
have liked to have seen it go faster or sooner but, again, they 
had a number of things to think through as well.
    In terms of adjusting or why we chose to--why the President 
chose to leave in the summer versus waiting until the next 
year, obviously, a number of things went into his decision 
calculus, but, you know, as we came on board, the agreement 
that had been made was that we were going to depart by May 1.
    We were able to work to get more time to ensure that we 
could conduct a deliberate and safe and orderly retrograde, 
but, again, you know, the President made the decision that we 
would leave in the summer versus going into the next year. So--
and I will leave it at that, sir, pending any more questions.
    Mr. Langevin. Secretary, I want to know how we now protect 
the country going forward.
    Former CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director and 
Secretary of Defense Panetta said that our national security is 
threatened by the Taliban takeover. One of our missions was to 
prevent a haven for terrorist groups, and--and I quote--``we 
have failed in that mission,'' end quote.
    Similarly, the Director of the DIA [Defense Intelligence 
Agency] has assessed that al-Qaida could threaten the homeland 
in 1 to 2 years.
    So I agree that over-the-horizon operations can be 
effective. However, I am concerned that, without complementary 
operations, they will be insufficient to keep us safe.
    Secretary Austin, are you confident that over-the-horizon 
capabilities on their own can mitigate the terrorist threat we 
face? Are you confident that we can prevent Afghanistan from 
becoming a haven? And how will you keep our country safe?
    The Chairman. And I apologize, but the gentleman's time has 
expired, so that question will have to go unanswered.
    Mr. Langevin. I would like that for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 149.]
    The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In an interview on August 16, President Biden promised to 
keep military troops in Afghanistan until every American 
citizen who wanted to leave was able to leave. This did not 
happen.
    Nor can we confirm the Blinken claim that he sent 19 
separate messages to Americans telling them to leave the 
country since March of this year.
    Also unclear is the truth of the Biden claim that no 
military commander recommended leaving behind a residual force, 
even though all of you, starting courageously with General 
Scott Miller, have now made it clear that your professional 
military advice was to do so.
    On August 26, I formally requested all letters referenced 
that day by Biden from military commanders advising him on the 
Afghanistan withdrawal. To date, I haven't received a response.
    As a 31-year Army veteran myself, grateful to have four 
sons who have served in Iraq, Egypt, the southern border, and 
in Afghanistan, I was immediately skeptical letters existed.
    President Biden left behind thousands of American citizens, 
Green Card holders, brave interpreters, and Afghan media 
reporters who worked with the United States.
    Biden was correct when he said the buck stops with him, as 
the person responsible for Afghanistan as well as for the 
terrorists that are now crossing the southern border to plan 
attacks on American neighborhoods.
    In addition to betraying the American citizens and the U.S. 
allies in Afghanistan, the Biden decision to have a premature 
withdrawal left the people of Afghanistan, who had 60,000 
troops killed by the Taliban, under the complete control of the 
Taliban, a barbaric terrorist organization, as General Milley 
has confirmed, with al-Qaida.
    Again, Biden was correct; the buck stops with him. The war 
has moved from Afghanistan to American neighborhoods, equally 
endangering our allies of India and Israel.
    Mr. Secretary, even before the withdrawal, there were 
frustrating reports of Americans and Green Card holders being 
turned away at the gates of the airport or being instructed by 
the administration to stay away from the airport entirely.
    While other countries were sending their special forces 
into Kabul to retrieve their citizens and bring them to the 
airport, you repeatedly refused to do the same, even after 
promising in a Pentagon press conference on August 18 that, 
quote, ``we are going to get everyone we can possibly to 
evacuate, and I will do that as long as we possibly can until 
the clock runs out or if we run out of capability,'' end of 
quote.
    Mr. Secretary, the American public needs to know: Did the 
clock run out, or did you run out of capability? Did you at any 
point ask President Biden for any more time or more support to 
enable your forces to stay and complete the full evacuations of 
American citizens, not leaving them behind, as promised? If so, 
what was the Biden response?
    Secretary Austin. First of all, sir, thank you for your 
personal service in our military, and thanks for the service of 
your family members. We remain grateful.
    On the issue of evacuating American citizens and SIV 
holders, or SIV applicants, this work continues on. We are not 
finished, and we will make sure that we stay focused on this to 
get out every American citizen that wants to leave and has the 
right credentials to be able to leave.
    On the issue of the security at the airport, it was my 
assessment, and I remain convinced of this, that the risk to 
mission and risk to force was beyond significant, and had we 
stayed there much longer, we would have endured continued 
attacks by ISIS-K and potentially the Taliban.
    And, you know, as each day went forward, as that risk 
increased, you know, we stood to have aircraft shot down, we 
stood to have people injured on--additional people injured on 
the airfield. And so, as we weighed those risks----
    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Secretary, I need to have this completed. 
And, in fact, I will be sending you questions for the record. 
And----
    Secretary Austin. Sure.
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --I really want to know how many 
Americans have been left behind. And so we will get that, but I 
will be providing questions for the record.
    But I sadly believe that American families today are at a 
greater risk of murderous attacks at home than ever before. You 
talked about attacks at the airport. No, they are coming here. 
And that is that, in history, we are at greater risk.
    Suicide bombers can operate from the safe haven of 
Afghanistan just as 9/11 and with the open southern borders. 
The example of May 8th mass murder of over 80 girls in Kabul 
have not been forgotten. The buck stops with 13 murdered 
Marines.
    Mr. Biden is disregarding----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --The military advice, and I 
believe----
    The Chairman. I will call----
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --The President should resign.
    The Chairman [continuing]. --on Mr. Larsen.
    Mr. Wilson. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. I am prepared to begin my questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Heads-up, I don't have a speech, so I am 
launching into my questions right now, so get ready to answer 
them.
    General Milley, with regards to the November 11th 
unclassified signed order, whose signature was on that order?
    General Milley. Former President Trump.
    Mr. Larsen. And then 6 days later that was rescinded 
after----
    General Milley. Correct.
    Mr. Larsen [continuing]. --discussion? Is that correct?
    General Milley. Correct.
    Mr. Larsen. And what were the top three concerns with that 
particular order?
    General Milley. Well, the instruction had two lines. Line 
one was, ``Withdraw all U.S. military forces from Somalia by 31 
December.'' Second sentence was, ``Withdraw all U.S. military 
forces from Afghanistan by 15 January.''
    So I went over and spoke to the White House and had some 
conversations with some folks, not the President----
    Mr. Larsen. Sure.
    General Milley [continuing]. --and we discussed the cost-
risk-benefit, et cetera, and the feasibility, acceptability, 
and suitability of that order.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. All right.
    General Milley. And it was subsequently rescinded.
    Mr. Larsen. Was that the first time--well, I will ask 
Secretary Austin.
    In the last 20 years, given the history in Afghanistan, is 
that the first order at all that has come out asking for a 
withdrawal? Did we have withdrawal plans or withdrawal orders 
at all in the last 20 years from Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Absolutely. As you know, we increased our 
footprint in Afghanistan over time, and then we----
    Mr. Larsen. And shrunk it, but that is--but that is--but 
not----
    Secretary Austin. Not a complete withdrawal.
    Mr. Larsen. Not complete withdrawal. That is different. I 
am talking about zero.
    Secretary Austin. Right.
    Mr. Larsen. Down to zero.
    Secretary Austin. Correct.
    Mr. Larsen. So this would be the first time, then? This 
November 11 order would have been the first ask for a 
withdrawal to zero?
    Secretary Austin. That is correct.
    Mr. Larsen. To your knowledge.
    Secretary Austin. To my knowledge, correct.
    Mr. Larsen. Within the DOD. Okay. From the President or 
anything. Got it. From any President, I should say. Thank you. 
Just trying to get the timeline set.
    And this relates to General McKenzie. You talked about the 
2,500, the recommendation, the discussion you had about 2,500 
troops. Was that for a particular set of missions, and did 
those missions change; therefore, that 2,500 became 650, became 
zero?
    General McKenzie. Sir, when we looked at the 2,500 number--
--
    Mr. Larsen. Right.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. --we were looking at a force 
that would have the ability to do very limited advise/assist at 
a high level, assist in logistics management for the Afghans, 
but it would have been functioning at a very high level. So 
that was the force that we wanted to continue to keep on the 
ground.
    As we went down to--as we looked at going down to 650, you 
get a force that is almost exclusively built around the ability 
to defend the Embassy and the airfield and provide entry-level 
logistics to the Afghans. By that, I mean a package comes into 
the airport, you give it over to the Afghans, they drive it 
away, and you have no way to track what happened.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
    General McKenzie. We lost that capability when we----
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah, but based on the civilian leadership 
saying, ``This is what civilian leadership wants to do.''
    You get to--and I know you are not arguing this point; you 
are just--you make the recommendations, given your best advice, 
and then civilian leadership has the opportunity to say, 
``Thank you, but here is what I would rather be doing.''
    General McKenzie. That is absolutely correct.
    Mr. Larsen. So the mission changed----
    General McKenzie. The mission fundamentally changed when 
we--going to zero means you are going to reduce all your 
capability to do any kind of real on-the-ground work, even at a 
truncated level, with the Afghan forces. You are going to be 
talking at the ministerial level, at the very highest levels of 
government only, and you are not going to have any real 
visibility about what is going on on the ground.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay.
    General Milley, did you want to try to address that?
    General Milley. I did. I just wanted to clarify one thing. 
The 11 November order was actually not the first one. The first 
one was the Doha Agreement, which directs going to zero by 1 
May. The 11 November order is an accelerated withdrawal to 
bring it to zero by 15 January. So two different----
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
    General Milley [continuing]. --instructions.
    Mr. Larsen. That is great. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very 
much. I appreciate that.
    Just for the record I will ask this question, because then 
this gets to kind of a follow-on to all of this, is: How do you 
define over-the-horizon capabilities? Like, what are those 
specifically? And how do we execute those? And are we going to 
explore that a little bit more probably here today?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would be----
    Mr. Larsen. I have about 15 seconds.
    General McKenzie. I would be prepared to talk a little bit 
about it today, but I think, more importantly, I will be 
prepared to come over at the direction of the Secretary and 
provide a classified briefing.
    Mr. Larsen. I think that would be very helpful. And there 
may be opportunity in the future to travel to the region and 
hear directly what it looks like on the ground.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time----
    Secretary Austin. With the chairman's permission, sir----
    The Chairman [continuing]. --has expired.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. --I would offer that 
briefing by General McKenzie, along with Joint Staff 
representation and my policy people.
    The Chairman. Yeah, we will definitely be following up on 
that. I mean, the issue of what we do going forward to deal 
with the counterterrorism threat out of South Asia is something 
this committee has already looked at and will continue to look 
at for a very long time.
    Mr. Turner is recognized.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I serve on both the House Armed Services Committee and the 
Intelligence Committee. The Intelligence Committee has already 
been briefed from the intelligence community concerning their 
participation of the August 29 drone attack.
    General McKenzie, you have taken, in front of us, full 
responsibility for that. I have a series of information that I 
would like released to this committee so that we can adequately 
provide oversight to what occurred on August 29.
    What we know from your prior statements is that you did not 
know who it was who was in the car, whose house it was, or who 
or how many people were in the house. This greatly concerns me 
as we look to the over-horizon claims that the administration 
has of its ability for counterterrorism.
    You did not, as your goal was stated, thwart or disrupt an 
imminent attack. You killed an innocent man, and yet an attack 
didn't happen. So there are serious questions concerning both 
the information that you had and the manner in which the 
execution occurred.
    So I would request that it be released to this committee 
and the Intelligence Committee relevant video excerpts from the 
drones of August 29, the protocols that were in place prior to 
this drone attack mission, the intelligence that an attack was 
imminent against our forces, and the approval of any 
authorization to modify those protocols, including approvals 
for delegation of authority, including target engagement 
authority, who approved at the DOD and in the administration, 
and the data that the Secretary released to the IG [Inspector 
General].
    I just want to make it clear, Mr. Secretary, the fact that 
you have an IG investigation does not stop congressional 
oversight.
    I will be sending you a list of all those. I would like 
your consent that you are going to be providing those to us. 
They are certainly within the jurisdiction of our two 
committees.
    Secretary Austin. Acknowledged, sir. And you are correct; 
there is a review going on of the strike.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    General Milley, with indignation in front of the House and 
the Senate, you have commented on the statements in the press 
concerning your phone conversation with your counterpart, 
General Li, in China.
    Let's be clear. To give you some help with the indignation, 
those comments were in the press because that is where you put 
them.
    Now, you claim that you had information--and it is all 
over--that China was worried about an imminent attack. You did 
not tell the President, the Vice President, the White House 
Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National 
Intelligence, either of the relevant committees in the House, 
including the big eight, which you know include Intel. You 
didn't tell the Intelligence Committee. You didn't tell the 
Armed Services Committee.
    You report that, after you took upon yourself to have this 
phone conversation, that you told them of the conversation, not 
that China believed that we were going to imminently attack 
them--which, by the way, has never been true in my lifetime. 
And it may be true, since they believed it, that is why they 
are digging ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] holes 
faster than they can fill them with ICBMs. But you chose 
instead to handle it yourself with a phone call.
    So, General Milley, you offered all of the concerning 
intelligence, and I am going to request that you provide it to 
us. I would like you to provide us the relevant intelligence 
information that you based your belief that China was going 
to--belief that there was an imminent attack.
    I also want your requests for declassification of the 
approval that you release that information that China believed 
so, including your request for declassification of your 
conversation that you had with General Li, and any approvals. I 
want a transcript of your call with General Li, and I also want 
any readouts, memorandums, notice of calls, or outcomes.
    Now, you chose to talk to reporters instead of us. And that 
is of great concern. No one in Congress knew that one of two of 
the major nuclear powers thought that they were perhaps being 
threatened for attack.
    Now, Mr. Secretary, that turns my questions to you, then. 
Mr. Secretary, if you learn that Russia or China believes that 
they may be subject to an attack by the United States, as a 
member of the President's Cabinet, do you believe that 
information should be handled at the Cabinet level and with the 
President, with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of 
Defense? Do you believe the chair and ranking member of Intel 
and the House Armed Services Committee and Foreign Affairs 
Committee need to know these?
    Or do you believe that a belief of the possibility of an 
attack by the United States against Russia and China is 
appropriately handled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in a phone call with his counterpart with one of those 
nations?
    Please tell me that you believe it elevates to the level--
that you would elevate that to the Cabinet and to Congress and 
not just have it be subsequently told to us all by newspaper 
articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times, as 
General Milley chose to do.
    Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir.
    Obviously, we would want to follow standard protocol. And 
what you described is what I would--the type of actions that I 
would consider taking.
    But General Milley, as what I heard him say yesterday and I 
think again today, is that his chain of command, the Secretary 
of Defense at the time, was aware of the actions. And so----
    Mr. Turner. After. What he said yesterday is after.
    The Chairman. I am sorry, but----
    General Milley. No, that is not correct. What I said 
yesterday and today----
    The Chairman. If I could--hold on just a second, everybody.
    Time has expired. Mr. Turner is very clever. He made a very 
direct attack as his time was expiring. I am going to violate 
the rules here a little bit and let Chairman Milley respond to 
that direct attack, hopefully briefly, and then we will move on 
to the next witness.
    General Milley. With respect to the intelligence, I have it 
right here. I will be happy to share it with you.
    Mr. Turner. Great.
    General Milley. I guarantee that that intelligence was 
disseminated in the President's PDB [President's Daily Brief], 
the Vice President, the DNI [Director of National 
Intelligence], Director of CIA, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and 
others.
    That was significant, and there was a lot of it. It wasn't 
just a singular report. There was a lot--I will be happy to 
share that with you and go over it with you line by line.
    And it was significant, and it was concerning, to the point 
where Secretary of Defense Esper, Admiral Davidson, and myself, 
along with others, had conversations about it, and I was 
directed by then-Secretary of Defense Esper. First, he directed 
his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs to 
make calls, and then me, same thing.
    This was all done with oversight, and I tried to lay that 
out in the memoranda. I tried to lay it out in a timeline in an 
unclassified way that you could use----
    The Chairman. And we are going to--I am sorry. We are going 
to have to leave it at that.
    General Milley. I will be happy to take it up at a later 
date, your convenience.
    The Chairman. Mr. Courtney is recognized.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to the witnesses for your service and 
testimony today.
    One comment, Mr. Chairman, before questions. Over the last 
month, including yesterday's Senate hearing, we heard a lot of, 
in my opinion, over-the-top claims that the U.S. had lost all 
credibility with its allies in the wake of the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan.
    Last week, Mr. Chairman, we saw firsthand in Washington how 
mistaken that claim was. On Wednesday last week, I attended a 
ceremony over in the Senate where the Australian Prime 
Minister, Scott Morrison, said that Australia was proud to go 
into Afghanistan together and leave together, degrading al-
Qaida and preventing a major terrorist attack, and, in very 
heartfelt terms, thanked the United States, particularly the 11 
Marines, 1 Navy corpsman, and 1 soldier who perished while 
safely evacuating 4,100 Australians from Kabul.
    Boris Johnson, last week, who was also in town, when asked 
about the U.S. standing post-withdrawal said, ``What I said to 
Joe Biden is how grateful I am for the amazing work of the U.S. 
military in helping us extricate in 2 weeks 15,000 British 
nationals from Kabul to whom we owe debts of honor and 
gratitude. The U.S. military were heroic.''
    Of course, they were in town to enthusiastically endorse 
AUKUS [Australia-United Kingdom-United States], the new defense 
agreement in the Pacific, which, as Politico reported, despite 
all the handwringing over the last couple weeks, was a powerful 
reminder that an American security guarantee with our allies 
still reigns supreme and, in the stroke of a pen, has 
reaffirmed our engagement and collaboration with allies in a 
region that the National Defense Strategy has identified as our 
number one priority.
    Secretary Austin, I just want to follow up on the August 29 
drone strike. And General McKenzie, on the 17th, again, gave, I 
guess, a Central Command investigation report, which described 
it as a tragic mistake.
    You also, that day, announced that there was going to be a 
DOD follow-up investigation. Can you tell us, what is the 
difference between what you described and what CENTCOM did? And 
when can we expect to see results from that investigation that 
you described?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I directed a three-star review of 
the incident. And, certainly, it will take into account all of 
the things that General McKenzie and his team have done. But we 
will look at the, you know, soup-to-nuts, you know, policy, 
procedures, whether or not we followed our own practices, our 
outlined practices.
    And we will certainly look at accountability as well. If 
somebody should be held accountable for something that they did 
that was outside of standard practice, then we will take a look 
at that.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
    General McKenzie, you mentioned on the 17th that the 
Department is exploring the possibility of ex gratia payments 
as compensation for the individuals who died in that strike. 
And, again, that is a $3-million-per-year set-aside that the 
United States military's operation has used in the past. 
However, in 2020, despite 23 civilians that were killed, there 
were no payments made last year.
    Can you give us, you know, some feeling that, you know, 
this agreement is sufficient to address this issue, which I 
think really is our country's responsibility?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I agree with you; I believe we have 
a significant responsibility here. And I know that, even as we 
speak right now, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is 
engaged in finding the best way to move forward on an ex 
gratia--appropriate ex gratia payment and whatever other 
measures may be contemplated in regard to that family. And I 
will just leave it at that.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And I just would reflect that that 
certainly is a high-volume concern in my district.
    General McKenzie. Sure.
    Mr. Courtney. General Milley, again, we first met in 2013 
on a CODEL [congressional delegation]. You were in Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan. And I think many of us had that same experience of 
seeing you in-country there. And, certainly, your service is 
something that I think should be unquestioned, and commitment 
to our Nation.
    In your testimony, you talked again about the Doha 
Agreement, the conditions that were put into place for the 
Taliban to perform, and that only one out of the eight actually 
had been complied with, even up through February. Nonetheless, 
80 percent of the troops in the U.S. were drawn down from the 
date of the Doha Agreement to January 21.
    Can you just talk about, you know, the noncompliance of the 
Taliban throughout 2020 and the predicament that I think this 
administration was left when it took office with just a 
fraction of the troop level that was there in February 2020?
    General Milley. We had almost 13,000 U.S. troops there in 
February 2020. And you got the numbers for the inauguration. 
But the bottom line is: reduction in violence, nationwide 
cease-fire, and a whole series of other----
    The Chairman. I apologize, but the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    General Milley. I will respond to the record on that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 145.]
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We on this committee have repeatedly expressed our concern 
that the U.S. military does not have regional basing and 
cooperation agreements required for an effective over-the-
horizon counterterrorism capability.
    In May, Mr. Helvey, in response to my question in here, 
confirmed that the administration had not yet secured the 
necessary agreements with any of the governments in the region 
to establish these over-the-horizon capabilities.
    So, General McKenzie, has the administration, as of today, 
secured any necessary agreements with a neighboring country to 
provide the basing and overflight requirements needed to 
perform over-the-horizon counterterror operations in landlocked 
Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Representative, as of today, I have the 
ability to enter Afghanistan and to fly missions. It is a long 
haul in, but I have the ability to do that today.
    Mr. Lamborn. But we don't have an agreement with a 
neighboring country. Is that true? Isn't that true?
    General McKenzie. Obviously, it is a neighboring country 
that is allowing us access, but we are not based in--we are not 
based in any neighboring country; that is correct, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So we can safely assume that, as of 
August 31, we did not also have an agreement at that time in 
the past.
    Okay. Thank you.
    General Milley, at the June 23 hearing here, you testified 
to this committee that Bagram was not necessary tactically to 
the military's withdrawal plan. You dismissed my and other 
people's concerns about the military value of Bagram, and you 
seemed to base that on an assessment that the Taliban, at that 
point, had not yet taken major districts.
    Yesterday, though, you told Senator Blackburn that one of 
the courses of action you provided the Commander in Chief was 
to keep Bagram Air Base open, which sounds different from what 
you told us on January 23.
    But, for the record, was it your professional military 
opinion and advice that we should abandon Bagram Air Base? And, 
if not, was this decision forced on you by the arbitrary troop 
cap of roughly 650?
    General Milley. Once the President's decision was made in 
mid-April, 14 April, and we had a change of mission to go to 
zero and bring the troops down to a number that was only 
required to maintain the Embassy, the Bagram decision was made 
at that point. Because, at that point, there was no way you 
could defend both Bagram and HKIA.
    But one additional point. Most of the people that were 
required to be in a NEO were going to be coming out of Kabul. 
And HKIA, as Scotty Miller, General Miller, has already 
testified to, HKIA was always going to be the center of gravity 
of any NEO. But we didn't have the forces available to do both, 
so----
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    I want to ask General McKenzie a question.
    General McKenzie, had we kept control of Bagram, what 
forces--or what options and capabilities would that have given 
U.S. forces during the withdrawal, had that been in play?
    General McKenzie. Well, in order to hold Bagram, I would 
have needed probably pushing 5,000 more troops on the ground. 
So that would have been a significant decision, to hold Bagram. 
And we were under the direction to go to zero, so it would 
require a basic policy directive to change the plan.
    If you are going to go to zero and you are going to keep 
enough forces to hold your Embassy and the airfield, it is 
incompatible to hold any other base anywhere in the country. So 
that would be a policy decision, to go out and hold Bagram, 
under that case.
    Let me just further add that I did not see any tactical 
utility to Bagram.
    Mr. Lamborn. General McKenzie, isn't it true that the 
President rejected your best military opinion and advice as to 
how quickly to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Well, I will say this. It has been my 
view that we should have--that I recommended a level of 2,500, 
a level that would have allowed us to hold Bagram and other 
airfields as well. Once you go below that level and make a 
decision to go to zero, it is no longer feasible to hold 
Bagram.
    Mr. Lamborn. But that was your best opinion and advice.
    General McKenzie. That remains my view now, as it was then.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    And you said to hold Bagram would have taken 2,500. A 
minute ago, you said 5,000.
    General McKenzie. No----
    Mr. Lamborn. It sounds like it was 2,500.
    General McKenzie. Well, it depends on the situation. If you 
are talking about a situation where you are not fighting the 
Taliban and you have the full assistance of the Afghan 
Government or the Taliban's attacks against you are at a 
minimum, yes, you can hold it at 2,500.
    If, however, you posit that you are in Afghanistan, say, 
beyond August the 31st without the tacit agreement of the 
Taliban and without the assistance of the Government of 
Afghanistan, who provided most of the physical security at 
Bagram, then you have to put a big footprint in, just as we did 
at HKIA. It is exactly the same sit---the two situations are 
analogous.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Has expired.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your 
testimony.
    Before I go any further, I want to acknowledge an 
extraordinary effort, and successful effort, made by the U.S. 
military, particularly the Air Force, in the most awesome and 
successful evacuation of civilians ever in the history of this 
world. Well done. Very, very well done. And compliments to all 
involved in that.
    Obviously, the loss of the 13 souls, members of the 
military, was a great tragedy. And you and all of us regret 
that.
    The fog of war is only repeated by the fog of the 
committee. So let me lay out some timeframes here.
    In mid-2018, former President Trump ordered formal and 
direct U.S.-Taliban negotiations without the Afghan Government 
participating.
    In February 2020--excuse me--August 2019, President Trump 
said that he would withdraw all U.S. troops as quickly as 
possible.
    In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed 
a formal agreement in which the United States committed to 
withdraw all of its troops, contractors, and nondiplomatic 
civilian personnel from Afghanistan no later than May 1, 2021.
    In June 2020, the U.S. troop levels reached 8,600.
    In October, former President Trump tweeted, ``We should 
have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women 
serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!''
    On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense 
Miller announced that we will implement former President 
Trump's orders to continue repositioning forces from 
Afghanistan and the 2,500 U.S. troops who remain there by 
January 15.
    On January 15, he announced that there were indeed 2,500 
troops left.
    On January 20, Biden became President. Twenty-five-hundred 
troops were then in Afghanistan.
    On April 14, President Biden announced his intention to 
continue to withdraw all regular U.S. troops by September 11, 4 
months after the preplanned May 1 deadline.
    On July 2, Italy and Germany withdrew their troops.
    On July 17--we have had specific testimony here on what 
then happened from July 17 on. And, if I recall correctly, the 
Afghan Government completely collapsed on the 20th of August, 
wasn't there any longer. And, from there, the evacuations 
commenced.
    General McKenzie, were the 2,500 troops on the ground 
sufficient, as agreed with the Taliban? Were they there in 
accordance with the agreement?
    General McKenzie. Had we held the 2,500, which I stated is 
my position, and as the Secretary has articulated, there would 
have been a clear risk that the Taliban would have begun to 
attack us as we moved past the 1 May deadline.
    However, it was my judgment then that that would still have 
given us a platform to continue negotiations with the Taliban 
to perhaps force a political solution.
    My concern was that, if we withdrew below 2,500 and went to 
zero, that the Afghan military and government would collapse. 
And, of course, that is not a potential counterfactual; that 
is, in fact, what happened. So we have objective--we have 
objective data to understand what happens if you go to zero.
    Mr. Garamendi. Several of us attended a luncheon here in 
the Capitol in late June with President Ghani and Abdullah 
Abdullah, and they were very, very confident that they would be 
able to maintain their government through the--with the 
reduction and the withdrawal of American troops. If they--they 
specifically said that if 300,000 troops, they could do it. 
They needed continued financial support, they needed the 
necessary intelligence from the United States, and they also 
needed to have certain air strikes, drone strikes. That was 
their promise.
    They also said that they did not want to allow Afghans to 
leave. That is what they specifically told us. They did not 
want Afghans to leave. Obviously, Ghani decided that he would 
leave.
    Further questions--my time has expired. I will yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thanks so much for your testimony today.
    General Milley, I want to begin with you, and I want to 
build on a question that Ranking Member Rogers asked.
    On August 18, President Biden said that there is no way 
possible that U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Afghanistan 
without the chaos that we saw unfold.
    In your best military judgment, was there a way to extract 
the troops without the chaos that we saw unfold?
    General Milley. I just want to be clear, we are talking two 
different missions. The retrograde of the troops to 2,500 
everybody is talking about, those were advisors. That was 
complete by mid-July. And that was done, actually, without any 
significant incident. And that is the handover of 11 bases, the 
bringing out of a lot of equipment, et cetera. That was done 
under the command of General Miller.
    The noncombatant evacuation operation is different. The 
noncombatant operation, that was done under conditions of great 
volatility, great violence, great threat. And we inserted 6,000 
troops on relatively short notice because there were some 
contingency plans to do that.
    That is a different operation. And I think that the first 2 
days of that, as we saw, were not only chaotic but violent and 
high-risk. But, because of the skill and leadership of our 
troops, they were able to get control of a situation in the 
airfield in that country that was falling apart and then 
execute the operation.
    So I think it would have been difficult under any 
circumstances, and I think our soldiers performed 
extraordinarily well, actually, in 48 hours getting control of 
an airfield in another country eight and a half time zones 
away.
    Mr. Wittman. But I understand that, but you are talking 
about a very compressed timeframe. I am talking about the full 
extent about what you are looking at. You can talk about two 
missions, but I am talking about, in totality of what we are 
looking at there was a chaotic and disaggregated effort.
    It seems like to me that your professional military 
judgment would probably not have been focused in your 
recommendations in seeing this outcome. I just wanted to get 
your----
    General Milley. My recommendations at the time and my 
analysis at the time were aligned, actually, with what you have 
heard from General Miller previously and General McKenzie, was 
flatline at about 2,500 and go for a negotiated solution and 
make sure it is conditions-based.
    And we all render our advice, and Presidents make 
decisions, and then we execute.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure.
    This morning, you stated that the withdrawal was a 
logistical success but a strategic failure. And I would say 
that probably American citizens and the Special Immigrant Visa 
holders would probably disagree, those that were left behind 
would probably disagree with your assessment of a logistical 
success.
    That being said, I want to focus on the strategic failure 
aspect of that.
    You said yesterday that all you can do--and you just said 
it now--all you can do is provide your best advice, and it is 
up to the President to make the ultimate decision.
    In your best military judgment, did President Biden's 
decisions cause this strategic failure?
    General Milley. I think, as I said yesterday--first of all, 
I am not going to judge a President. That is the job of the 
American people, that is the job of Congress, not my job.
    Mr. Wittman. No, I am asking for your best military 
judgment--for your judgment.
    General Milley. Yeah. So my assessment is, this was a 20-
year war, and it wasn't lost in the last, you know, 20 days or 
even 20 months, for that matter.
    It was a cumulative effect to a series of strategic 
decisions that go way back--you know, bin Laden, right on the 
Tora Bora, for example. We knew where he was, we were 1,000 
meters away, could have ended it, perhaps, right there.
    The shift from going into Iraq and pulling all the troops 
out of Afghanistan, with the exception of a few others--major 
strategic decision.
    Not effectively dealing with Pakistan as a sanctuary--major 
strategic issue that we are going to have to really unpack.
    The intelligence piece, pulling advisors off 3 or 4 years 
ago out of kandaks, so we blinded ourselves from our ability to 
see the will, the morale, the leadership, and the training.
    There is a whole series of decisions that take place over 
20 years. I don't think that, whenever you get some phenomenon 
like a war that is lost--and it has been, in the sense of we 
accomplished our strategic task of protecting America against 
al-Qaida, but certainly the end state is a whole lot different 
than what we wanted.
    So, whenever a phenomenon like that happens, there are an 
awful lot of causal factors, and we are going to have to figure 
that out. A lot of lessons learned here.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
    And I want to build with your answers to Secretary Austin.
    Secretary Austin, I imagine that you had a number of 
opportunities in your capacity as CENTCOM commanding general to 
brief President Obama, and I imagine that Vice President Biden 
was probably privy to these briefs. Was he a regular attendee 
when you gave these briefs?
    Secretary Austin. The Vice President was frequently in the 
Situation Room when we conducted meetings, yes.
    Mr. Wittman. Let me go from there, then, to the Battle of 
Kunduz, which, we know, Taliban took over, Afghan forces 
retreated.
    Did you recognize that as the beginning of the weakness in 
the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] mission? And 
were there issues at that point of intense interest to Vice 
President Biden?
    The Chairman. I am sorry, that is going to have to be a 
question for the record, because the time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 145.]
    The Chairman. Ms. Speier is recognized.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for your extraordinary service to our 
country.
    I want to just set the record straight on a couple of 
points.
    It was in 2017 that then-President Trump relaxed rules of 
engagement for air strikes, and there was a massive increase in 
civilian casualties, a 330 percent increase during Trump's 
administration. Compared to the previous 10 years, there was a 
95 percent increase in civilian deaths from 2017 to 2019.
    It was then-President Trump who, in mid-2018, ordered the 
Taliban--ordered talks with the Taliban without the Afghani 
leadership. And it was in February 2020 when that formal 
agreement was made.
    Now, Chairman Milley, you identified the Taliban as a 
terrorist organization. Can you tell us anything about former 
President Trump's intent to invite the Taliban leadership to 
the United States or to Camp David specifically?
    General Milley. I have no personal knowledge of that 
invitation. I saw it in the media, but I was not part of any 
discussions or decision-making on that. I have no personal 
knowledge.
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin, did the previous 
administration develop plans for a withdrawal, and was there 
any handoff to you of those plans?
    Secretary Austin. There was no handoff to me of any plans 
for a withdrawal.
    Ms. Speier. So then-President Trump calls for a total 
withdrawal by May 1, 2021, and no plans had been made during 
his administration for withdrawal.
    Secretary Austin. I would say that, you know, I am 
confident that General Miller, who was anticipating, you know, 
a decision one way or the other, was making plans. And I 
certainly would defer to General McKenzie in terms of what he 
might have done.
    But, in terms of handoff from administration to 
administration, Secretary to Secretary, there was no handoff to 
me.
    Ms. Speier. All right.
    Is it not true that, on April 27, President Biden, through 
the State Department, called on all Americans in Afghanistan to 
leave by commercial flights? Can any of you answer that 
question?
    Well, that was, in fact----
    Secretary Austin. I cannot----
    Ms. Speier [continuing]. What happened.
    Secretary Austin. I don't have knowledge of that.
    Ms. Speier. All right. That was, in fact, what happened. So 
we put on notice all Americans in Afghanistan, on April 27, it 
was time to get out.
    Let me ask you this, General Milley: What was the impact of 
President Trump's drawdown to 2,500 troops despite the 
Taliban's noncompliance with much of the peace agreement? And 
how did that affect our intelligence gathering?
    General Milley. So there are two questions there. The first 
question: I think the Doha Agreement itself, because of the 
nature of it--and this is more 20/20 hindsight perhaps, but we 
now believe that the Doha Agreement itself perhaps undermined 
or contributed to the undermining of the morale, confidence in 
the government because it was a bilateral agreement, et cetera.
    But, having said that, there were conditions built into 
that, one of which was met, many of which were not. And the 
drawdown to 2,500 proceeded because the fundamental condition 
of ``they weren't attacking us'' was being met.
    The drawdown to 2,500, the impact that that had on the 
morale, the will of the Afghan military, I believe that it was 
a negative impact. But I don't know that yet. We need to go 
through all of our intelligence and analyze it in an after-
action review. But I do think that was a contributing factor to 
the morale of the Afghan security forces.
    Ms. Speier. General Milley, there has been a lot of talk 
about retaining 2,500 service members in Afghanistan. I think 
we all forget that there was a negotiation with the Taliban and 
we would have to get them to agree to allow 2,500 troops to 
remain in the country.
    Having said that, in your view, would a small force of 
2,500 be sufficient to achieve anything of value?
    General Milley. I think that the 2,500 would have been at 
great risk in terms of the Taliban--I have no doubt that the 
Taliban would have reinitiated combat operations or attacks on 
U.S. forces and the 2,500 would have been at increased risk 
today.
    What is the value of keeping the 2,500? It has as much to 
do with the morale and the keeping advisors with them and 
having the morale of the Afghan security forces and 
demonstrating confidence in the government.
    Going to zero--it is clear to me that one of the big 
lessons learned we have to unpack from the military side is the 
mirror-imaging in the development of the Afghan military. And 
they became dependent upon our presence----
    The Chairman. I apologize, but----
    General Milley. Sorry.
    The Chairman [continuing]. The gentlelady's time has 
expired.
    Mrs. Hartzler is recognized.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    It is imperative that we have this hearing today, because 
the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, I believe, is the most 
significant foreign policy failure in a generation, and it is 
going to have ramifications for years to come. And so we need 
to get to the bottom of this.
    And, first, I want to start off, to General Milley, a 
question, that you made a comment earlier that you would be--
well, I wanted to ask you, did you tell General Li when you 
talked to him on the phone that, if we were going to attack 
China, that you would let him know ahead of time?
    General Milley. naudible.]
    The Chairman. I am sorry. Could you get the microphone a 
little more in front of you there, make sure it is on.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
    General Milley. So this is a longer conversation, and it is 
a VTC [video teleconference] with General Li. And there is a 
body of intelligence that leads up to this that was persuasive 
to Secretary Esper, myself, and many, many others that the 
Chinese thought, wrongly, that the United States was going to 
attack them. I am certain, guaranteed certain, that President 
Trump had no intent to attack. And it was my task to make sure 
I communicated that. And the purpose was to de-escalate----
    Mrs. Hartzler. You shared all that earlier. I understand. I 
just----
    General Milley. And, as part of that----
    Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. Wanted to say: Did you or did 
you not tell him that if we were going to attack you would let 
him know?
    General Milley. As part of that conversation, I said: 
General Li, there is not going to be a war, there is not going 
to be an attack between great powers. And, if there was, the 
tensions would build up. There would be calls going back and 
forth from all kinds of senior officials. I said, hell, General 
Li, I will probably give you a call, but we are not going to 
attack you. Trust me, we are not going to attack you.
    These are two great powers, and I am doing my best to 
transmit the President's intent, President Trump's intent, to 
ensure that the American people are protected from an incident 
that could escalate.
    Mrs. Hartzler. I understand your intent, but I think you 
articulating that, that you would tell him you would give him a 
call, I think is worthy of your resignation. I just think that 
is against our country, that you would give our number one 
adversary that information and tell him that.
    But I would like to go on to General Austin and ask you a 
question. According to President Biden, he chose you to serve 
as his Defense Secretary primarily because you oversaw the full 
withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 from Iraq.
    But, ironically, the 2011 Iraq withdrawal left similar 
conditions of governmental failure, the empowerment of regional 
terrorist organizations, most notably ISIS, and a humanitarian 
crisis of refugees and internally displaced people in desperate 
need of international emergency assistance.
    The 2011 U.S. military exit from Iraq was short-lived, with 
President Obama redeploying U.S. forces into Iraq and Syria in 
2014 to defeat the Islamic State.
    Despite the administration's reassurances, it seems we may 
be on a similar trajectory in Afghanistan. After U.S. forces 
abandoned Bagram Air Base in July, the Taliban quickly took 
over the base and released 5,000 to 7,000 ISIS-K and Taliban 
prisoners.
    When the last U.S. troops evacuated from Afghanistan on 
August 31, this administration handed over total government 
control to the Taliban, a known terrorist organization with 
leaders of the Haqqani terrorist network now in key positions 
within the Taliban's de facto government.
    In recent weeks, the Taliban has deemed education 
irrelevant, barred women and girls from school and work, 
committed horrific retaliatory attacks on members of Afghan 
security forces and interpreters, and established suicide-
bomber schools within the country.
    We also know that al-Qaida and ISIS-K both have 
reestablished a presence within the country. Even before the 
U.S. withdrew, ISIS-K claimed credit for a suicide bombing, 
which you have mentioned took the lives of 13 service members 
on August 23.
    So, Secretary Austin, is it true that the suicide bomber 
who attacked the Kabul airport on August 23 was a CIA prisoner 
at the Bagram Air Base whom the Taliban released after Biden's 
administration left Bagram in July?
    Secretary Austin. Let me just say a couple of things.
    First, on why the President selected me or nominated me to 
be his Secretary of Defense, you would have to certainly go 
back to the President and ask him specifically why he did that, 
but it wasn't, I am sure, solely based upon my oversight of the 
evacuation of Iraq.
    But I would point to you that there is a government in Iraq 
right now that is holding elections. The United States military 
is in Iraq----
    Mrs. Hartzler. I have 4 seconds. Could you answer my 
question? Was the suicide bomber----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time--the gentlelady's time 
has expired.
    Secretary Austin. I will take the question for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 145.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And generally I don't see eye-to-eye with many generals, 
and certainly General Milley and I have had disagreements, but 
I think what was said earlier was inappropriate in its nature, 
to accuse a member of the military that they would tip off our 
opposition in any way.
    And I would like to give General Milley an opportunity to 
respond to that if he wants. If not, then I will gladly 
continue with my questions.
    General Milley. As I said up front, I am not going to tip 
off any enemy to what the United States is going to do in an 
actual plan.
    What I am trying to do is persuade an adversary that is 
heavily armed, that was clearly and unambiguously, according to 
intelligence reports, very nervous about our behavior and what 
was happening inside this country, and they were concerned that 
we, President Trump, was going to launch an attack. He was not 
going to launch an attack. I knew he wasn't going to launch an 
attack.
    At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, I engaged the 
Chinese in order to persuade them to do that. I would never tip 
off any enemy to any kind of surprise thing that we were going 
to do. That is a different context than that conversation.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
    Thank you to all three witnesses for taking the time to 
testify today.
    Obviously, the resurgence of the Taliban is devastating, 
and it is difficult for many of us to watch. But, sadly, it 
unwinds the reality that, after 20 years, four U.S. Presidents, 
and billions of dollars, the conditions for a peaceful and 
stable Afghanistan could not be created.
    That is why I believe President Biden made the right 
decision to withdraw. Staying in Afghanistan, a prolonged and 
stalled conflict, would have required more troops and more 
resources with no clear timeline. And I don't believe that we 
could ask our service men and women to give their lives for a 
mission that, in the end, wouldn't have been successful.
    I do, like many of you here, applaud our troops for their 
tireless efforts to evacuate American citizens, our allies, 
Afghan citizens, and everyone threatened by the Taliban. And I 
still believe we have a moral imperative to help those who 
helped us in Afghanistan, and I and many of us will do 
everything in our power to continue to do that.
    I have some questions to begin with.
    General Milley, in your testimony, you noted that the speed 
and scale and scope of the collapse of the Afghan Army and the 
government was a surprise. Yet the Taliban was clearly gaining 
ground in June and especially July before the arrival--before 
their arrival in Kabul.
    As we not only look to the future of Afghanistan but also 
think about our operations across the globe, what lessons 
specific to our intelligence gathering and analysis do you 
think DOD can learn from this experience? Do you think it is 
time for a larger rethink within the Department about how to 
assess intelligence in a very rapidly changing environment?
    General Milley. I do. I think--I don't know the full answer 
yet, but I think that the primary reason we missed it was 
because we essentially cannot and we have yet to develop a 
really effective technique to read people's hearts, their will, 
their mind, their leadership sort of skills. Those are 
intangibles. You know, the moral is to the physical as three is 
to one in the conduct of war. So, very difficult to measure.
    When we pull our advisors off of organizations at lower 
levels, you start missing that fingertip touch for that 
intangible of war. We can count the trucks and the guns and the 
units and all that. We can watch that from different 
techniques, but we can't measure a human heart from a machine. 
You have to be there to do that.
    And I think that was probably one of the most significant 
contributing factors to missing the deterioration in the morale 
of the Afghan Army.
    Mr. Gallego. And I guess one of the things that I am deeply 
disturbed by--and this can be either to, you know, General 
McKenzie or also Secretary Austin can jump in.
    Speaking to a lot of service members, enlisted service 
members that have served for decades in and out of Afghanistan, 
they were always telling me something extremely different from 
what I was getting from reports from many of you generals here, 
that the Afghan Army was not ready, that they were not going to 
be sustainable on their own.
    And so, you know, how did we miss that? How is it that a 
lot of, you know, 18-, 19-year-olds, mid-20-year-old E-5s were 
predicting this but yet some of our greatest minds, both on the 
civilian side and, you know, uniformed side, absolutely missed 
this?
    And I think that is something that concerns me, because, 
you know, Afghanistan is done, but we are going to be, 
obviously, engaging all over the world. And this type of 
intelligence failure repeated could be, you know--could be an 
existential threat to the national security of the United 
States.
    I don't know, General McKenzie, do you want to try that?
    General McKenzie. Sure. So I think that is a--I think it is 
a reasonable criticism. We will have to take a look at how we 
actually remain connected to the people who are down at the 
advisory level.
    I think that is something that I--I am conflicted by that 
as well, I will be very candid with you. And we will certainly 
take a look at that, because I have heard that same strain 
myself. It is harder to get the truth as you become more 
senior. We perhaps need to look at ways to ensure that that is 
conveyed in a more rapid and effective way.
    So I will accept that criticism.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay.
    Thank you for you guys' testimony.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Scott is recognized.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, gentlemen, I need your help fairly immediately on two 
issues, one of which can't be discussed in this setting, but 
the other one can.
    And there are 145 Afghan Air Force personnel in Tajikistan. 
They flew 16 aircraft into that country on August the 13th. It 
is now September the 29th. We need to get them out of 
Tajikistan.
    These are people who trained with us, they fought with us, 
they did everything that we asked of them. And we have gotten 
no assistance at all from the State Department to move them. 
And I am asking all three of you for your help in addressing 
the issue.
    Secretary Austin, we need the help.
    Secretary Austin. Acknowledged, sir. And we will get with 
State right away to see if we can move this forward.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you.
    Secretary Austin. I share your concern, sir.
    Mr. Scott. And thank you.
    And I do want to mention this, and I think this is where 
the frustration of every member of the committee comes in, that 
we had people in Uzbekistan. The State Department ignored them, 
as well, and said they would get to them when they got to them. 
But we have a lady in Tajikistan that is 9 months pregnant that 
is one of our pilots. And we need help removing them.
    We also need to make it clear to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
that that is U.S. military equipment and it is not to be 
returned to Afghanistan. And so I would appreciate if we could 
put that in writing to both of those countries, that the 
equipment belongs to the U.S., not to Afghanistan.
    And, you know, with that said, I appreciate your commitment 
to help.
    I do want to mention one thing, Secretary. You and the 
State Department were using the number 124,000. That 124,000 is 
U.S. and NATO allies, correct?
    Secretary Austin. That is correct.
    Mr. Scott. We had provided a list of names of people who 
were P1, P2 SIVs to Central Command, to everybody we knew to 
get it to, and yet our people were not allowed into HKIA. They 
were at the gates, but they were not allowed into HKIA, even 
though they were on the manifest. And, yet, so many people came 
out of the country that appeared not to be on the manifest.
    So how was the determination made in who got on a plane and 
who didn't get on a plane?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I can't speak to the exact 
processes that were--that existed inside of HKIA at the time, 
in terms of how people were sorted out. I can tell you that we 
tried very, very hard to get everybody that we possibly could 
out, especially American citizens and SIV applicants that had 
worked with us.
    We also owed it to our partners to help them get some of 
their people out as well. And they helped us with some security 
issues and other things while we were there. So----
    Mr. Scott. Secretary, I am close on time, but I will tell 
you, I do think that that is a question that is going to linger 
and that the committee wants answers on. Because we have P1, P2 
SIVs that were left behind, and other people that were not or 
should not have been on the manifest seem to have gotten out.
    Secretary Austin. Well, I will just tell you that we are 
going to continue to work to try to get as many out as we can. 
In the last 48 hours, I think we have brought out an additional 
63 American citizens and 169 legal permanent residents. So we 
are going to continue to work this.
    Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, you answered a lot of the 
questions that I had in your written testimony. You did say 
that in April is when you were given, effectively, a change of 
mission to the 650. What date in April was that?
    General McKenzie. I believe it was on the 15th--14th----
    Mr. Scott. Fifteenth?
    General McKenzie [continuing]. 15th.
    Mr. Scott. So mid-April?
    General McKenzie. Yes.
    Mr. Scott. When did we inform our partner forces that we 
had a change in mission and that we were going to retrograde 
from the 2,500 down to 650?
    General McKenzie. That followed immediately. And that was 
through----
    Mr. Scott. Immediately.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. CENTCOM's headquarters on 
the ground----
    Mr. Scott. Okay.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Through the process of 
outreach both to President Ghani and to----
    Mr. Scott. Okay.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Other members. It might have 
taken a couple of days for that----
    Mr. Scott. Okay.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Process, but it was not kept 
from them. There was no----
    Mr. Scott. Okay. It wasn't a secret.
    Very quick. Was the 650 included in the 2,500, or is the 
650 in addition to the 2,500 number you talked about?
    General McKenzie. The 650 were different capabilities than 
the----
    Mr. Scott. Okay.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. 2,500.
    Mr. Scott. So it would have been a total of 3,150.
    General McKenzie. No, no, no. When we went from 2,500 down 
to an effective zero, we said we would keep 650----
    The Chairman. They went from 2,500----
    General McKenzie [continuing]. At the Embassy.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. They went 
from 2,500 to 650, as I understand it, on their way to----
    General McKenzie. That is correct, sir, but the 
capabilities were different. They were different forces to do 
different things.
    The Chairman. Crucial point. Thank you.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Moulton is recognized.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley and Secretary Austin, my first question to 
you at our hearing on June 23 was: Why have you not started the 
evacuation of our allies already? You responded that we have a, 
quote, ``moral imperative to save the Afghans who work by our 
side.''
    Secretary Austin, you said earlier today that moving too 
slow with the evacuation would put our troops at risk.
    So I want to know what you did personally, all three of 
you, between that June 23 hearing and August 15, when Kabul 
fell, to meet that moral imperative.
    Now, I hope it is a long list of things, so I will take 
that for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 145.]
    Mr. Moulton. But let me ask you this: Do you believe you 
did enough?
    Chairman Milley.
    General Milley. I do. I think that we provided the advice 
necessary at the time. Yes.
    Mr. Moulton. Secretary Austin.
    Secretary Austin. I think you heard me say in my opening 
comments that we engaged State early on to provide input to 
their decision-making process on when to move the SIVs----
    Mr. Moulton. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. You said 
that you and the State Department followed the advice of the 
Ghani government that taking out SIVs would precipitate a 
government collapse, yet the vast majority of these heroes 
weren't even working for us or the government any more because 
they supported a force of up to 100,000 U.S. troops over 20 
years and we only had 2,500 troops left. So why on Earth did 
you trust President Ghani?
    Secretary Austin. Again, not my decision. To your point, I 
had input to that decision-making process, but it is not as if 
I was influenced by President Ghani.
    Mr. Moulton. I understand, Mr. Secretary. So you have said 
this repeatedly that this is State's responsibility. What 
responsibility do you have for the Afghans who stood shoulder 
to shoulder with our troops or how many do you commit to 
getting out by the end of the year?
    Secretary Austin. I have a responsibility to get out as 
many as I can over time. And how many do I commit to getting 
out? Everyone that I can.
    Mr. Moulton. General McKenzie, there are reports that DOD 
reduced air strikes as early as May when troops were just 
beginning to withdraw and then had to ramp them back up after 
the Taliban gained ground. There are also reports that you sat 
down with the Taliban leadership in August, drew a circle 
around Kabul, and told them that if the Taliban fighters went 
inside that circle, they would get hit with U.S. air strikes.
    So why did you let up on the Taliban, first at the 
beginning of May and then at the end of our withdrawl in August 
right when we should have been hitting them harder to give 
Americans and Afghan partners time to evacuate.
    General McKenzie. Representative, the report about me 
meeting with the Taliban and telling them if they came inside a 
30-kilometer circle around Kabul is simply factually incorrect.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. What about May?
    General McKenzie. In May, as through the rest of our 
redeployment period, we continued strikes on the Taliban. Those 
strikes, however, were limited to support of Afghan forces in 
close combat. We were not striking deep and we did not have a 
tremendous amount of resources compared to resources that we 
have had in the past. So those strikes, while effective in 
certain tactical situations, at no time were enough to change 
the strategic calculus of the campaign.
    Mr. Moulton. General McKenzie, you went from 2,500 troops 
in Afghanistan in April to 650 in July and then turned around 
and put 5,000 back into Kabul. You have said repeatedly that 
you personally believe the Afghan Government would fall if we 
didn't maintain a certain number of troops in country. So why 
didn't you plan for an evacuation and leave enough troops on 
the ground to conduct it?
    General McKenzie. So let's be very clear: The evacuation 
has to be ordered by the Department of State. The drawdown of 
U.S. forces was ordered by the President in April and completed 
in July. The noncombatant evacuation operation is a separate 
mission, and it was not completely under the control of the 
Department----
    Mr. Moulton. So you are going to fall back on the 
bureaucracy, the divide between DOD and State----
    General McKenzie. Well, Representative, I am going to fall 
back on the orders----
    Mr. Moulton [continuing]. All of those troops out and then 
had to put more back in?
    General McKenzie. I am going to fall back on the orders 
that I received, Representative.
    Mr. Moulton. Secretary Austin, you presided, in part, over 
the withdrawl of forces from Iraq, though I know you at times 
requested more troops on the ground. Two years later we had to 
send thousands of troops back into Iraq. Do you believe we will 
ever have to send troops back into Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I certainly won't engage in a 
hypothetical. I would just say that obviously that is a 
decision that has to be made by the President and, you know, 
while I won't rule anything out, I would just say it is not 
preordained that we will go back or have to go back into 
Afghanistan, again. But if we do, the military will provide 
good credible options to be able to do that and to be 
effective.
    Mr. Moulton. Gentlemen, you and your predecessors asked 
tens of thousands of young Americans to fight in Afghanistan, 
and they did. And thousands died. Now you keep saying that our 
troops should be proud of that. Where here is a question sent 
to me by one of those soldiers. ``In twenty years our troops on 
the ground never lost a single battle, yet we lost the war--''
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Moulton [continuing]. So what is left to be proud of?
    The Chairman. Seth, we are trying to run a meeting here, 
and if you wanted to read that letter, you should have read in 
the first 5 minutes when you had time. So I think it is 
something we need to hear and it is something we should have 
heard during the 5 minutes that you had. The gentleman's time 
has expired.
    Ms. Stefanik is recognized. She is appearing virtually.
    Ms. Stefanik, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I want to first 
start off by saying that I am honored and privileged to 
represent Fort Drum, home of the 10th Mountain Division the 
most deployed division in the U.S. Army since 9/11, and I want 
to take this opportunity to thank every soldier, every service 
men and women for deployment after deployment after the past 
two decades.
    The North Country, this committee, and this country are 
forever grateful for your service and sacrifice of both you and 
your families.
    I want to direct my question--the first question--to any of 
you on the panel today and it is about the evacuation and force 
protection efforts at the Hamid Karzai International Airport. 
Force protection efforts were made specifically as the ISIS-K 
threat intelligence came in before and after the suicide 
bombing at the airport.
    General McKenzie. Representative, first of all, the 10th 
Mountain was a key part of our defense there at the airport and 
I certainly appreciate their contribution to it. Force 
protection is something we balanced all the time against the 
requirement to let people come in and be processed and get on 
the airplanes. So we looked at that every day and, as you know, 
those two things are in tension and you have to balance them 
every day. We had over 300 credible intelligence reports of 
ISIS-K plans to attack the airport.
    Turns out that they were able to carry out one successful 
suicide vest attack. They also launched rockets at us. There 
were many other attacks that we were able to either vector 
Taliban elements onto prevent or perhaps the Taliban were able 
to prevent those by the outer cordon that they established. But 
force protection was a key thing that we balanced throughout 
the entire operation and we thought the risk was very high at 
all time, again, principally from ISIS-K. And I will pause 
there, ma'am.
    Ms. Stefanik. I am going to follow up. We depended upon the 
Taliban for security to get the evacuees and Americans behind 
enemy lines into the airport. Did the United States or 
coalition forces provide money, any form of payment, or 
assistance to the Taliban to expedite the evacuation of 
Americans as the security environment in Kabul deteriorated?
    General McKenzie. No, we did not. What we did was, we asked 
the Taliban to establish a cordon, about 1,000 meters, 1 
kilometer, beyond each of the gates where we could reduce the 
number of people that were coming down and showing up at the 
gates so we wouldn't have the possibility of a mass attack. 
They did that. They were not compensated or rewarded in any way 
for that. It was a very pragmatic, businesslike discussion. I 
don't trust the Taliban. I didn't trust them then; I don't 
trust them now. So that was the way we approached it.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, General McKenzie. And Secretary 
Austin, I just want to get the Department on record in addition 
to General McKenzie's answer. So there was no form of payment 
by the U.S. or coalition forces at any time during the 
evacuation to the Taliban?
    Secretary Austin. To my knowledge, there was none.
    Ms. Stefanik. And Chairman Milley?
    General Milley. I have no knowledge of any money that 
transmitted from any element of the United States Government to 
the Taliban whatsoever.
    Ms. Stefanik. My next question is, we are 20 years from the 
attacks on 9/11 and I obviously am from the State of New York 
and it is a very, very solemn occasion for all Americans, but 
particularly New Yorkers every year as we commemorate that 
date. I would like to get your assessment, is the terrorist 
threat from Afghanistan greater today or lesser than it was 
pre-9/11?
    I will start with you, Chairman Milley.
    General Milley. I think right this minute it is lesser than 
it was in 9/11; however, I think the conditions are set or 
could be set--and I testified to this yesterday and I will say 
it again. I have said it in public many times--the conditions 
could be set for a reconstitution of al-Qaida and/or ISIS.
    And I gave some specific times in my statement, and I stand 
by those. I think it is a real possibility in a not too distant 
future--6, 12, 18, 24, 36 months that timeframe--for 
reconstitution of al-Qaida or ISIS and it is our job now, under 
different conditions, but it is our job to continue to protect 
American citizens against attacks from Afghanistan.
    Ms. Stefanik. Secretary Austin, your response to that 
question?
    Secretary Austin. I would agree with General Milley that 
al-Qaida has been degraded over time. Now, terrorist 
organizations seek ungoverned spaces so that they can train and 
equip and thrive and so there is clearly a possibility that 
that can happen here going forward. Our goal is to maintain a 
laser-like focus on this so that it doesn't happen----
    The Chairman. And I apologize. The gentlelady's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all our 
witnesses that are here today. And I want to start by just, you 
know, one of the things I like about this committee is that we 
are pretty bipartisan, but every once in a while, the partisan 
beast comes out and I am sure it happens from both sides of the 
aisle.
    This is my third term here. The administration from the 
other party not in power is oftentimes--depending what 
perspective you come to it, one is doing everything right and 
the other one is doing everything wrong, and I think it is 
important to shed light on things irrespective of the 
partisanship.
    One can argue that the agreement that President Trump 
reached with the terrorist Taliban in February 2020 was less 
than perfect and we should call that that from both sides of 
the aisle, and we can also argue that the exit from--the 
withdrawl was less than perfect. I certainly can say that I 
supported the Trump administration and the Biden administration 
in its goal to withdraw from Afghanistan, but, again, it has 
been less than perfect.
    And so for me, I just want to shed a little bit of light 
and refresh some of the memory on some of the numbers going 
back a little ways.
    So General Milley, I want to make sure that I understand 
our troop levels since the Doha Agreement that was reached with 
the terrorist Taliban, signed by President Trump between 
February 2020 when the agreement with the Taliban was signed to 
January 2021, and how many troops did the United States 
withdraw from Afghanistan--how many troops were withdrawn from 
January 2017 to January 2021?
    General Milley. 12,600 U.S. troops when the Doha Agreement 
was signed on that day.
    Mr. Carbajal. Can you repeat that, again?
    General Milley. 12,600 U.S. troops on 29 February 2020 with 
8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors, and the contractors are 
particularly important here. With respect to on inauguration 
day, I am showing 3,500 U.S. troops. That is the 2,500 advisers 
and then there was some additional enablers that were over 
there; 3,500 U.S. troops on 20 January, 5,400 NATO, and 6,300 
contractors in Afghanistan on that day.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And I only draw attention to that 
to show the withdrawl that started many years before. Secretary 
Austin and General Milley, over the course of the 20 years in 
Afghanistan, the United States Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction estimates that the United States 
spent $83 billion equipping and training the Afghanistan 
National Defense and Security Forces which included almost $10 
billion in aircraft and vehicles.
    We all saw the unexpected and appalling rate of how quickly 
the Afghan military folded under pressure from the Taliban.
    What do U.S. train and equip efforts in Afghanistan suggest 
about security cooperation operations going forward and what 
aspects about train and equip efforts do you think the 
Department should reassess?
    Secretary Austin. I will turn it over to General Milley 
here very quickly, but I think we should reassess everything 
soup to nuts. I think we put a valiant effort into providing 
the Afghans with a great capability.
    And at the end of the day that capability was not employed 
because the security forces fractured and essentially 
evaporated. So we need to look at ourselves to see what we did 
and whether or not that is the right thing to do going forward.
    General Milley. In my view, Congressman, I think when we do 
security force assistance, one of the things we have to guard 
against is mirror imaging. I think from the very beginning with 
the army, the Afghan Army, we wanted to create them in the 
image of the U.S. Army. I think a success story is the 
commandos with the special forces piece, but the broader Army 
became a mirror image, [inaudible]. That is one point.
    The second point is the police forces that was assigned 
under the Bonn agreement in 2002 to the Germans. The Germans 
wanted to make polizei and that sort of thing.
    And the third and last point is they became dependent upon 
us, contractors, U.S. air support, et cetera, and we have to 
avoid dependency on U.S. forces.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Dr. DesJarlais is recognized.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for 
being here today to answer our questions. I have had so many 
questions come from constituents in Tennessee that there is no 
way that we could even begin to get through them in 5 minutes, 
but let's jump right in.
    General Milley, on Bagram, in your professional military 
opinion, which facility, HKIA or Bagram Airfield, would have 
been most efficient in conducting the evacuation that we were 
forced to do?
    General Milley. HKIA. And there is a reason for that. The 
majority, the vast majority of those personnel that we expected 
to have to conduct a NEO with were located in Kabul. That is 
point one. Point two is, we were directed to maintain an 
Embassy open and also the international zone for the other 
allied nations.
    So we had to do it out of HKIA. Bagram would have been a 
plus, but it would have required exceptional levels of 
resources to do that.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I think all of you testified 
yesterday that it wasn't a matter of if the Afghan Army would 
fail and the Taliban would take over, it was a matter of when. 
You were all shocked by the rate at which it happened. The 
billions of dollars in equipment that was left behind has been 
under much scrutiny.
    Knowing that they were going to fail, why were more steps 
not taken to secure that military equipment or destroy it? 
Knowing that now it is a well-equipped Taliban army.
    Secretary Austin. So the number is a big number. So let me 
unpack that a little bit. First of all, the $84 billion 
included all of the----
    Dr. DesJarlais. I understand that. Let's just cut right to 
the equipment that was left behind. Why was so much left 
behind? Aircraft? MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
Vehicles]? Weapons? Why was that there when you knew they were 
going to fail?
    Secretary Austin. The other thing I would say is that all 
of the equipment that we had that we were using, as I stated 
earlier, was evacuated by General Miller. Now, the reason that 
the Afghans had the equipment they had is because we wanted 
them to be successful and they could not be successful without 
the appropriate----
    Dr. DesJarlais. If they are watching these hearings 
yesterday and today, I am guessing that they probably feel like 
they were played as foolS because you all just said you knew 
they were going to fail. So here we have an army we built up, 
we used them until we didn't need them any more to accomplish 
Biden's objective and Trump's objective of getting out of 
Afghanistan; however, it went horribly wrong as we can probably 
all agree to.
    General Milley, you started today and talked about your 
commitment to your office. You are the principal military 
advisor to the President, correct?
    General Milley. That is correct.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And that is to President Trump and 
President Biden?
    General Milley. That is correct. And the Secretary of 
Defense and the National Security Council.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And Senator Blackburn yesterday asked 
you about your conversations with several book writers and you 
were fine with giving them your opinion and I think you said 
that you had a rather blunt forward phone call with House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi?
    General Milley. True.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And you were--she was concerned over the 
safety of nuclear weapons?
    General Milley. Correct.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. In a transcript obtained from CNN 
Political, Woodward and Costa quoted Pelosi as saying--and this 
was to you: ``What I am saying to you is that they couldn't 
even stop him from an assault on the Capitol. Who even knows 
what else he may do? And is there anybody in charge at the 
White House who is doing anything but kissing his fat butt all 
over this?''
    Do you recall that?
    General Milley. I haven't seen the transcript.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I think that would be firmly imprinted on 
my mind----
    General Milley. Well, I would just say there was a lot of 
disparaging comments made and my focus was to assure her that 
the nuclear system and weapons were under control.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And according to Costa and Woodward, 
she went on to say, you know, he is crazy. He has been crazy 
for a long time to which they say--and I am sure you haven't 
had a chance to read the book yet--Milley responded, Madam 
Speaker, I agree with you on everything.
    If you are the principal advisor to the President and she 
said that to you, do you think that you were doing service to a 
President by agreeing with the Speaker that your Commander in 
Chief is crazy?
    General Milley. I actually said--I actually said I am not 
qualified to assess the mental health of the President. What I 
am agreeing to is that we have to have a secure nuclear system.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Have you had any conversations with the 
Speaker or any of our foreign leaders about our current 
President's mental capacity? We have a physician right here on 
the panel who was the personal physician to the prior three 
presidents who said President Biden should take a mental 
competency test and we see it in the press, his lack of ability 
to answer questions.
    Have you had any conversations with anybody concerning his 
ability to carry out a nuclear order or any other serious 
engagements?
    General Milley. No. And my answer would be the same. I am 
not qualified to evaluate a President's mental health or your 
mental health or anybody's mental health. I am not a doctor.
    Dr. DesJarlais. But you were concerned about Trump? You 
said you were concerned about him when you made the call to 
China?
    General Milley. No, I didn't. What I said to the call to 
China was I guarantee you that President Trump is not going to 
attack you in a surprise attack. I was carrying out his intent, 
President Trump's intent in order to protect the American 
people----
    The Chairman. And the gentleman's time has expired.
    General Milley [continuing]. To prevent an escalation or an 
incident.
    The Chairman. That was helpful.
    Mr. Brown is recognized.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Each of my questions 
have been asked and answered this morning. Therefore, I will 
use this seldom opportunity with the two most senior officials 
of the Pentagon to make a statement. We cannot ask our men and 
women in uniform to fight forever wars and I commend President 
Biden for recognizing this reality in bringing our troops home. 
But we know the threats faced in our country aren't solely on 
distant battlefields. For decades we have grappled with 
extremist ideologies within our own civilian communities and 
our military ranks, and there are no signs that we are winning 
this fight.
    As FBI Director Wray testified before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee earlier this year, January 6th was not an isolated 
event. Director Wray stated the problem of domestic extremism 
has been metastasizing across the country for a long time now 
and is not going away anytime soon. We know now that 12 percent 
of those charged in the riot on the Capitol had military 
experience with at least one indicted rioter on active military 
duty. That is well above the participant patient rate of adults 
in the military. The last time you both were before this 
committee, you spoke about the issue of extremism in our Armed 
Forces.
    General Milley, you stated from private to general there is 
no room for extremist behavior in the United States military 
and I commend you, Secretary Austin, for ordering the extremism 
stand down this past February to deal with the threat. You 
recognize this issue within the ranks, but I am gravely 
concerned that too many of our military leaders do not.
    In April, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 
STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] Commander Admiral 
Richard said he was, quote, very confident that the number of 
extremists in my force is at zero. And at the same hearing, 
General Dickinson, Commander of Space Command, echoed that 
assessment claiming, ``In the formations that I have had 
throughout my career, I have not seen that. So I believe it is 
close to zero in my organization if not zero.'' This ignores 
the clear evidence on this issue.
    A 2019 Military Times survey found more than one-third of 
Active Duty service members have witnessed White nationalism or 
ideologically driven racism in the ranks. You yourself, 
Secretary Austin, spoke of your experiences with extremism 
while you were in uniform.
    The Army's CID's [Criminal Investigation Division's] 2020 
gang and domestic extremist activity threat assessment found a 
66 percent increase in gang or domestic extremist activity from 
the previous year and then in October of 2020, a Pentagon 
report to Congress detailed how domestic extremists actively 
recruit military personnel.
    We have a problem, the scope of which we don't fully 
understand, but Democrats and Republicans have asked the 
Department for a definition of extremism, improved screening 
processes, and a status report on implementation of 
recommendations. You still have not yet received it--We have 
not received it, which is why just last week the House passed 
the fiscal year 2022 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 
giving DOD additional authorities and resources to counter 
extremism in the Department.
    So I was extremely disappointed to see the administration's 
statement of policy which opposes the countering extremism 
provisions in the NDAA, citing overburdensome training and data 
collection requirements, not a single sentence suggests on how 
to improve the provisions just opposition to Congress.
    Congress is about to authorize and appropriate $768 billion 
to the Department, nearly $25 billion more than the President's 
budget request, yet the administration views additional data 
collection and training requirements to counter the threat of 
extremism as onerous.
    We heard the same pushback when it came to addressing 
sexual assault in the military for 10 years before the 
Department finally realized it was failing and that it needed 
greater tools. And we've documented systemic racism under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice for at least 50 years, yet the 
Department is making little, if any, progress to address that.
    Whether it is sexual assault or racial injustice, the 
Department repeatedly tells Congress we can handle it, 
commanders are responsible, we are studying it, we are ready to 
fight tonight. We cannot wait years, let alone decades, in the 
face of obstinance from the Department before meeting the 
challenges of extremism in the Armed Forces. The time to 
address it is now.
    As this hearing reveals, there are many important issues 
for our military to address, in addition to the ongoing 
American Afghan evacuations and anticipated over-the-horizon 
operations. We have got to care for our troops and the families 
and that includes combating extremism in your formations in a 
way that we can take care of our troops and secure the Nation.
    So please stop fighting Congress. Partner with us and 
accept the tools that you need to fix the problem. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kelly is recognized.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 
here and, Chairman Milley, I just want to start, I understand 
the conversation with the Chinese leader. What I don't 
understand is you going to the press, Chairman Milley, and that 
disappointments me that you talked to the press about that. 
None of the other stuff, I think, you were--I am okay with 
that; I am not okay with you talking to the press or authors.
    I want to talk just a little bit about Bagram. There is two 
runways at Bagram and only one at HKIA. Is that correct?
    General McKenzie. That is correct.
    Mr. Kelly. So there is strategic value to two runways 
versus one. You would agree with that?
    General McKenzie. It is entirely dependent on the mission.
    Mr. Kelly. And the other thing is, there is standoff versus 
an urban environment and there are strategic advantages and 
disadvantages to that. You would agree with that, General 
McKenzie?
    General McKenzie. That is correct.
    Mr. Kelly. I want to talk a little bit about the strike on 
August the 29th, I think. Who set the rules of engagement? 
Where were the rules of engagement? At what level?
    General McKenzie. So under the rules of engagement, we 
would need to get into the details in a classified setting. We 
had----
    Mr. Kelly. No, I don't want to know what the rules of 
engagement were; I want to know whose rules of engagement were 
they.
    General McKenzie. The U.S. military's rules of engagement.
    Mr. Kelly. Was that President Biden's? Was that Secretary 
Austin's? Was that CENTCOM's?
    General McKenzie. They are wholly neutral as to the party 
in power. It has nothing to do with the rules of engagement.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. And I want to refer to a New York Times 
article on March 3rd described a policy change of the Biden 
administration that placed greater restrictions on drone 
strikes and raids conducted outside conventional battlefield 
zones. Previously authorized by ground commanders, these 
operations now require White House approval.
    Did the strike on August 28th or 29th, the one that killed 
10 innocents, did it require Presidential approval prior to the 
strike?
    General McKenzie. No, it did not.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. At what level, who was the approval 
authority for that strike?
    General McKenzie. The target engagement authority was 
forward in the theater at the over-the-horizon cell that 
oversees those activities.
    Mr. Kelly. At what level? One-star? Two-star? Three-star?
    General McKenzie. Flag officer level.
    Mr. Kelly. Flag officer level. Okay. And at what point, 
General McKenzie--and this is for all three of you--at what 
point did you know that the strike was bad; that it hit 
civilians?
    General McKenzie. So we knew the strike hit civilians 
within 4 or 5 hours after the strike occurred and U.S. Central 
Command released a press release saying that. We did not know, 
though, that the target of the strike was, in fact, an error--a 
mistake until some time later. It took us a few days to run 
that down, but we knew pretty soon----
    Mr. Kelly. Secretary Austin, when did you know it was a bad 
strike that killed civilians?
    Secretary Austin. As soon as General McKenzie reported that 
there were civilians that had been injured.
    Mr. Kelly. So 4 or 5 hours timeframe. That is all I need.
    Secretary Austin. Typically, as soon as that happens, we 
investigate. We begin an investigation.
    Mr. Kelly. When did you know that civilians were killed in 
that strike? That is my question. It is really easy. It is a 
time. It doesn't take much to answer that.
    Secretary Austin. Right. Several hours after that.
    Mr. Kelly. General Milley, same.
    General Milley. Same thing.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. So I am assuming there is 15 sixes [O-6 
rank officers] at multiple levels that will get to see those 
investigations. There is a lot of questions I have that have to 
be in a classified environment, but I hope that you guys know I 
also sit on a different committee that has different insight to 
this and I think it is important that we know who authorized, 
at what level, and that we take accountability.
    Listen, I have made strikes. I have lived under rules of 
engagement. I have had rules of engagements I liked and didn't 
like. I have had to make hard decisions. I hope most of them 
are right, but I understand. I don't want to blame some O-6 or 
some O-5.
    I want to make sure we get the level and that the rules of 
engagement were proper and that they were followed at whatever 
level who didn't follow those or either wrote those because 
that just--I think the strike was done to show we had over-the-
horizon capabilities and we didn't because we reported a 
secondary explosion that was not. We reported all kind of 
stuff.
    Now my next question is the other strike. Who did we kill?
    General McKenzie. I prefer to pass you that name in a 
classified setting.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. Can you tell me, was it an HVT [high-value 
target] or just a low-level terrorist?
    General McKenzie. I think it was a facilitator and it was a 
good strike. We got someone who, while not directly involved in 
the attack on Abbey Gate on the 26th, certainly fell within 
that circle----
    Mr. Kelly. In a classified I would like to know that. And 
then my next question is, I just don't understand. I guess 
maybe I went to Union Public High School of 1,100. My math--11 
to 15,000 U.S. citizens, 5,400 out--that leaves thousands, not 
hundreds, left that want to get out.
    And I know for a fact every office here we had people 
calling us wanting to get out, U.S. citizens, that were not 
allowed to get in the gate or were kicked off the base or were 
not allowed out. And with that, I just ask, guys, we got to get 
our folks home.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Khanna is recognized.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley, I want to first thank you for your 42 years 
of service, for your principled commitment to civilian rule, 
for your commitment to military-to-military communication that 
kept this country safe for three decades during the Cold War, 
and for the sacrifice and patriotism that you and your family 
have shown. As a son of immigrants, I am in your family's debt. 
And I want to thank the three of you for ending America's 
longest war and executing the largest airlift in history.
    Now Secretary Austin, you have testified that had 2,500 
troops stayed past the deadline, the military would likely have 
needed reinforcements and I want to just make this clear: The 
choice for President Biden wasn't zero troops or 2,500 troops. 
It was zero troops or potentially many more troops.
    General Milley, just briefly, would you agree that at some 
point more than 2,500 troops would have been needed had the 
Taliban engaged in offensive strikes?
    General Milley. I am sorry. There is a reasonable prospect 
we would have had to increase forces past 2,500 given that the 
Taliban were very likely was going to start attacking us. And 
there was a range of forces. We are really talking about 2,500 
to 4,500, in that range.
    Mr. Khanna. Appreciate that. I want to talk about the 
strike that killed civilians, and I know--look, I think our 
military cares more about the loss of civilian life than any 
military in the world, any superpower ever in history. And that 
is why I think we ought to talk about this candidly and I 
brought pictures of the seven children who were killed, along 
with the three adults, to remind us that this is not what 
America wants; this is something that we need to prevent in the 
future.
    Press Secretary Kirby who did a fine job during those 10 
days said, you would support evacuating these family members as 
they have requested and resettling them in the U.S. Is that 
correct, Secretary Austin?
    Secretary Austin. It is.
    Mr. Khanna. My question is, can we get the family and the 
coworkers evacuated now and brought to safety? I get the legal 
hoops, but could that happen after? Can we just get them into 
the U.S. or some safe place?
    Secretary Austin. Well, we will continue to work through 
State Department channels to engage the family and if they 
desire to leave, then we will certainly do everything we can to 
facilitate getting them out.
    Mr. Khanna. I hope we can just expedite that and expedite 
the compensation. It is the moral thing to do, it is the right 
thing to do, it is how America conducts itself. And so I hope 
you will take that into consideration.
    General McKenzie, I admire and respect your leadership, but 
I want to see how we can improve the intelligence to prevent 
these kind of strikes in the future. One aspect you said is 
that there was a white Toyota Corolla that led to the attacks. 
I am sure you are aware, is there any car more common than a 
Toyota Corolla in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. It is a very common car. Of course, there 
were many other factors that went into that decision, not 
simply the fact that it was a Toyota Corolla.
    Mr. Khanna. According to the Stars and Stripes, roughly 90 
percent of cars registered in Afghanistan have been Corollas. 
One of the other things that concern me is, based on my reading 
and obviously you know more, the Corolla was parked next to a 
U.S. registered California-based NGO [non-governmental 
organization] that was delivering humanitarian assistance. And 
I guess the question is, did the DOD know about the NGO in 
advance of the strike?
    General McKenzie. I would prefer since that is under 
investigation now, I would like to defer that question.
    Mr. Khanna. I would just hope that we can make sure going 
forward that our Department will cross-check its intelligence 
to make sure that aid organizations are on no-strike lists. I 
assume that if there is an aid organization or hospital, those 
are on no-strike lists?
    General McKenzie. Representative, as are mosques, which are 
often used by ISIS-K as training sites as well.
    Mr. Khanna. Right. Again, I believe that our military goes 
through extraordinary lengths to prevent this. It is not to try 
to be an indictment of anyone; I just want to make sure we 
continue to improve the processes and that we do right by the 
families who suffered this unspeakable tragedy. Thank you, 
again, to the three of you for your leadership and thank you to 
everyone who served.
    Regardless of one's view in Afghanistan, I find the attacks 
on your integrity and patriotism to be a dishonor to this 
committee and a dishonor to your service.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I have to ask the witnesses a question. We have a little 
complicated scheduling thing going on here. We are scheduled to 
have votes at 1:30-ish. My plan would be to, if we could go to 
that period, get through that, take the break then, but it has 
been a while. If you need a break earlier, we can take a 15-
minute break at 12:30.
    And I wish there was an easier way to do this, but totally 
up to you. Would you like to break at 12:30 or would you like 
to just go until votes?
    Secretary Austin. I think we are good for right now, 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. If you need a break just, you know----
    Secretary Austin. We will fire the star cluster.
    The Chairman. We all have overprotective aides who are like 
pounding on us that they need a break, they need a break. So I 
just figured I would ask. So we will proceed and I appreciate 
that.
    Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
    General McKenzie, the Washington Post reported on August 
28th that the Taliban offered to allow the U.S. military to 
take responsibility for security in Kabul. Did you meet with 
Mullah Baradar to discuss such an offer?
    General McKenzie. I met with Mullah Baradar in Doha on 15 
August to pass a message to him that we were withdrawing and if 
they attempted to disrupt that withdrawl, we would punish them 
severely for that.
    Mr. Gallagher. But did he offer to allow you to have 
security over all of Kabul?
    General McKenzie. As part of that conversation, he said, 
well, why don't you just take security for all of Kabul. That 
was not why I was there. That was not my instruction. And we 
did not have the resources to undertake that mission.
    Mr. Gallagher. Did you convey the offer, however, to the 
President?
    General McKenzie. The offer was made in the presence of the 
President's Special Representative to Afghanistan.
    Mr. Gallagher. Do you know if the SRAP [U.S. Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan] conveyed it to the 
President?
    General McKenzie. I don't know, but it was conveyed to my 
chain of command.
    Mr. Gallagher. So who made the decision to turn down the 
Taliban offer to allow the U.S. military to secure Kabul and 
put the safety of our troops in the hands of the Taliban?
    General McKenzie. I did not consider that to be a formal 
offer and it was not the reason why I was there, so I did not 
pursue it. So if someone actually made a decision that would 
have been me.
    Mr. Gallagher. So we don't know if it was conveyed to the 
President? We don't know----
    General McKenzie. I do know it was conveyed to my chain of 
command.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. In military terms, what do you call 
the retreat of military forces under security provided by and 
with the permission of enemy forces?
    General McKenzie. Don't know. I have never done one of 
those operations.
    Mr. Gallagher. I think you just did one of those 
operations.
    General McKenzie. I disagree.
    Mr. Gallagher. You disagree. So you did not withdraw forces 
from Afghanistan after negotiation with the Taliban?
    General McKenzie. That is correct. We did not do that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So this would not be a conditional 
surrender, in your opinion?
    General McKenzie. This would not be a conditional 
surrender.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, what would you describe the operation?
    General McKenzie. I would describe it as a noncombatant 
evacuation operation that we conducted with our own timing and 
with our own forces, and we warned the Taliban that if they 
interfered with that operation, we would strike them hard. They 
chose not to interfere with that operation.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So you are saying the meeting you had 
in Doha was just to let the Taliban know this is what we are 
doing, you know, take or leave it, but you were operating at 
that point under the agreement we had negotiated with the 
Taliban for surrender, right, the Doha Agreement?
    General McKenzie. I was there to tell the Taliban that we 
were conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation.
    Mr. Gallagher. Wait, wait. Not a NEO by DOD definition does 
not definitionally include the evacuation of combatants. You 
were also evacuating combatants. So the NEO was part of the 
operation?
    General McKenzie. Actually, no, you are wrong. When I met 
with the Taliban on 15 August, we had completed the withdrawal 
operation. Further forces that went in were forces that were 
core to the NEO operation and, in fact, DOD doctrine would 
include the insertion and extraction of combatant forces as 
part of a NEO operation----
    Mr. Gallagher. But what do we call the withdrawl of 
combatants whether it happened before----
    General McKenzie. It can be called a retrograde, it can be 
called a withdrawal.
    Mr. Gallagher. Was it in your orders, though? What were you 
tasked with doing?
    General McKenzie. I was tasked to conduct a noncombatant 
evacuation operation.
    Mr. Gallagher. Which you just said happened after you had 
withdrawn forces?
    General McKenzie. Largely, that is correct.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. And you didn't get tasking--what did 
the tasking to withdrawl the forces call that operation?
    General McKenzie. I would have to go back and take a look 
at it. I believe it was a withdrawl.
    Mr. Gallagher. Withdrawl. Okay. Which I believe the 
definition is a repositioning of forces. I would call it a 
conditional surrender. I guess we will have to check the 
dictionary definition on that. Just to go to something that 
General Milley said before, has al-Qaida sworn bayat to the 
Taliban?
    General McKenzie. I believe there is a deep relationship 
between the Taliban----
    Mr. Gallagher. But have they sworn bayat? Just yes or no.
    General McKenzie. I couldn't answer that question for you 
right now.
    Mr. Gallagher. Oh. I believe General Milley said it before. 
Has the Taliban renounced the previous oath that al-Qaida 
swore?
    General McKenzie. The Taliban and al-Qaida have a very 
close relationship, and I do not expect the Taliban to 
seriously interfere with their basing and repositioning in 
Afghanistan, which is, I think, the question you are asking.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. Yeah. Let me get at it a different 
way. The new interior minister for the Taliban Government is 
Sirajuddin Haqqani. He is a known al-Qaida associate. Is there 
any evidence that he or the Haqqani network has broken with al-
Qaida?
    General McKenzie. None.
    Mr. Gallagher. Did the March attack on FOB [Forward 
Operating Base] Chapman breach the Doha Agreement, in your 
opinion?
    General McKenzie. No, it did not.
    Mr. Gallagher. It did not. General McKenzie, do you know 
which Taliban forces were actually providing security in front 
of the airport?
    General McKenzie. Yes, we do.
    Mr. Gallagher. Was it Badri 313?
    General McKenzie. They were part of it. There were other 
elements as well. It was a hodgepodge of units----
    Mr. Gallagher. But Badri 313 was part----
    General McKenzie. Among others.
    Mr. Gallagher. Among others? A group that specialized in 
suicide bombing attacks. Had the suicide bomber been 
imprisoned--I think you suggested to Congresswoman Hartzler 
that the suicide bomber might have been in prison in Bagram 
before. Do we know?
    General McKenzie. I don't believe--I don't recall 
suggesting that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So do we know whether he had been?
    General McKenzie. We are still working very hard to find 
out where the suicide bomber came from.
    Mr. Gallagher. Did we have an opportunity to take him out 
prior to the suicide bombing attack?
    General McKenzie. We did not.
    Mr. Gallagher. We did not have an opportunity to take him 
out. And just, finally, does the over-the-horizon posture that 
we are now adopting, would that be more or less difficult now 
that we are out of the country?
    General McKenzie. I have said on the record it will be very 
difficult to do. It is not impossible to do.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Kim is recognized.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie, I wanted to start with you. You said 
reports about you engaging with the Taliban about a red line 
around Kabul before its fall were false. Does that mean that 
there was no discussion or consideration in the U.S. of a plan 
to defend Kabul in early August before its fall?
    General McKenzie. There was never a discussion about a plan 
to defend Kabul before its fall. I will say that when I went to 
Doha, I took with me a graphic. It was a map of Kabul with a 
30-kilometer ring on the outside. Our original proposal was, we 
would ask the Taliban to stay outside that ring, but we were 
not going to threaten them. We felt that was the best way to do 
deconfliction; however, on the day of the meeting, they were 
already in downtown Kabul, so the graphic was outdated and we 
had to proceed from the new reality.
    Mr. Kim. Secretary Austin, I wanted to get your thoughts on 
this. When I spent some time in the Situation Room with you in 
2014 when we were fearing the fall of Erbil and Baghdad, U.S. 
CENTCOM Commander immediately drew up some CONOPS [concept of 
operations] defending those positions using air assets. The 
effort was to buy time for the Iraqis and the Iraqi Kurds to 
reconstitute.
    Did it not cross your mind to consider something like that 
in early August before the fall of Kabul?
    Secretary Austin. This is certainly something we 
considered, you know. We took a look at what we would need to 
do to protect the Embassy and if we had to do a NEO, what could 
we do to buy time for that operation to take place.
    Mr. Kim. Chairman Milley, I wanted to switch to you. 
Yesterday you said that you were asked on August 25th to make a 
decision about the August 31st deadline. Was there an actual 
formal request made to the Taliban by the United States to stay 
past August 31st? Was that a request that was then denied that 
you were taking into account in that decision?
    General Milley. I don't make decisions, Congressman. I 
provide advice.
    Mr. Kim. In your recommendation.
    General Milley. I was asked for what is called best 
military advice. I am not aware of a formal request to the 
Taliban one way or the other on staying past the 31st. I am 
very familiar with the advice that we provided on the 25th.
    Mr. Kim. Before the fall of Kabul, did we actually have 
formal Taliban agreement upon an August 31st departure date?
    General Milley. I am not sure what you mean by ``formal,'' 
but I do--I think----
    Mr. Kim. Had there ever been a point where the United 
States went to the Taliban saying that we are planning to leave 
on August 31st? I am talking about prior to the fall of Kabul.
    General Milley. I think from a policy perspective Zal 
Khalilzad could give you the detailed information on that. I do 
believe the Taliban knew that we were departing on the 31st. We 
announced it.
    Mr. Kim. But you weren't aware of it----
    General Milley. I am not aware of a formal agreement per 
se, but I think Zal Khalilzad could give you better definition 
of that.
    Mr. Kim. General McKenzie, I want to turn back to you then 
because you were saying that you talked with the Taliban on 
August 15th. Did you use August 31st as a date to end the 
operations? Was there a date set at all in your discussions 
with----
    General McKenzie. I did not use a specific date when I 
talked to them.
    Mr. Kim. So no date was set on August 15th----
    General McKenzie. I did not convey a specific date as part 
of my conversation.
    Mr. Kim. I wanted to switch gears one more time here.
    Secretary Austin, moving forward, when we are looking at 
the fundamental viability of the over-the-horizon effort, is 
the air space over Afghanistan currently considered sovereign 
air space? And I guess I will frame it in a slightly different 
way. Is it currently legal for the United States to conduct ISR 
sorties and air strikes in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Yes.
    Mr. Kim. Under what authority is that legal?
    Secretary Austin. Same authority as we were using before.
    Mr. Kim. And that would be under the Security and Defense 
Cooperation Agreement of 2014. Is that correct?
    Secretary Austin. No. I think what we are prosecuting now 
is--are the authorities that were referred to by General 
McKenzie earlier and you mentioned he would have to take that 
into a classified setting.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. I will certainly follow with you that way. 
General McKenzie, something I wanted to follow with you on. 
Yesterday in your hearing in front of the Senate, you made a 
comment when asked about the war on terror and you said that 
the war on terror is not over, but then you also went on and 
said that the war in Afghanistan is not over. So I just wanted 
a clarification from you. In your opinion, is the war in 
Afghanistan over?
    General McKenzie. So I believe the war in Afghanistan is 
not over. I believe we are no longer a party to that war, but 
that doesn't mean that ISIS and the Taliban aren't going to 
engage in a furious fight this fall that may result in ISIS 
being crushed or it may result----
    Mr. Kim. Oh, I see. So when you are saying that you are 
referring that you believe that there is a civil war in 
Afghanistan, but in terms of the United States war against 
Afghanistan, you would say that that is over?
    General McKenzie. We have no forces in Afghanistan. Our 
only interest in Afghanistan is looking for ISIS-K----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Gaetz is recognized.
    Mr. Gaetz. February 26, 2020, House Armed Services 
Committee, General Mark Milley: ``We know we are not going to 
defeat the Taliban militarily and they are not going to defeat 
the Government of Afghanistan militarily''. You really blew 
that call, didn't you, General?
    General Milley. I believe that that was an issue of 
strategic stalemate and that if we had remained in Afghanistan 
with the advisory levels of effort, then the Government of 
Afghanistan----
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, that is an interesting answer to a 
question. It is just not what I asked. You spent more time with 
Bob Woodward on this book than you spent analyzing the very 
likely prospect that the Afghanistan Government was going to 
fall immediately to the Taliban, didn't you?
    General Milley. Not even close, Congressman.
    Mr. Gaetz. Oh, really? Because you said right after Kabul 
fell that no one could have anticipated the immediate fall of 
the Ghani government. When did you become aware that Joe Biden 
tried to get Ghani to lie about the conditions in Afghanistan? 
He did that in July. Did you know that right away?
    General Milley. I am not aware of what President Biden----
    Mr. Gaetz. You are not aware of the phone call that Biden 
had with Ghani where he said, whether it is true or not, we 
want you to go out there and paint a rosy picture of what is 
going on in Afghanistan? You are the chief military adviser to 
the President. You said that the Taliban was not going to 
defeat the Government of Afghanistan militarily, which, by the 
way, they cut through them like a hot knife through butter, and 
then the President tries to get Ghani to lie. When did you 
become aware of that attempt?
    General Milley. There is two things there, Congressman, if 
I may. One is what I said was the situation was stalemate and 
if we kept advisers with there, the Government of Afghanistan 
and the army would have still been there. That is what I said. 
Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but----
    Mr. Gaetz. Seems wrong now with the Taliban in control. I 
have a question for Secretary Austin.
    Secretary Austin, are you capable of assessing whether 
another has the will to fight?
    Secretary Austin. No, we are not and that is the point that 
the Chairman made earlier.
    Mr. Gaetz. That is just like an incredibly disappointing 
thing for the Secretary of Defense to simply say, I can't 
assess whether someone has the will to fight, but it is 
consistent with your record.
    I mean, during the Obama administration, I think they gave 
you about $48 million to go train up some folks in Syria to go 
take on the Assad government and I think your testimony was 
that only four or five survived first contact with the enemy.
    So what confidence should this committee have in you or 
should the country have in you when you have now confessed to 
us and whether it is the swing and a miss in Afghanistan that 
General Milley talked to the Senate about yesterday, total 
failure, or whether it was your failures in Syria, you don't 
seem capable to look at a fighting force and determine whether 
or not they have the will. Is that an embarrassment?
    Secretary Austin. Well, you will recall, Congressman, that 
the end result was the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] that we 
stood up that was very, very instrumental in turning the tide 
of battle up in Syria.
    Mr. Gaetz. Oh, yeah. Turned it so much you got Assad in 
power in Syria, you got the Taliban in power in Afghanistan. 
Where have you been?
    Secretary Austin. The focus was ISIS, Congressman, and 
those forces had significant affect on the ISIS network.
    Mr. Gaetz. It just seems like you are chronically bad at 
this and you have admitted that, I guess, which is to your 
credit, but when people in the military like Lieutenant Colonel 
Stuart Scheller stand up and demand accountability, when they 
say that you all screwed up, when they point out that General 
Milley's statement that the Government of Afghanistan is not 
going to get defeated by the Taliban, well, he ends up in the 
brig and you all end up in front of us and your former employer 
Raytheon ends up with a lot of money, and we have poured cash 
and blood and credibility into a Ghani government that was a 
mirage. It fell immediately. And while the guy sitting next to 
you was off talking to Phil Rucker and was off doing his thing 
with Bob Woodward, we were buying into the big lie, the big lie 
that this was ever going to be successful and that we could 
ever rely on the Afghanistan Government for anything at all.
    You know, General Milley, you kind of gave up the game 
earlier when you said you wanted to address elements of your 
personal conduct that were in question. We are not questioning 
your personal conduct. We are questioning in your official 
capacity going and undermining the chain of command, which is 
obviously what you did. You have created this whole change----
    General Milley. I did not undermine the chain of command--
--
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, you did. You absolutely did.
    General Milley. Did not.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, you know what? You said yesterday that you 
weren't going to resign when Senators asked you this question 
and I believe that you guys probably won't resign. You seem to 
be very happy failing up over there, but if we didn't have a 
President that was so addled, you all would be fired because 
that is what you deserve. You have let down the people who wear 
the uniform in my district and all around this country. And you 
are far more interested in what your perception is and how 
people think about you and insider Washington books than you 
care about winning----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Ms. Houlahan is recognized.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, gentlemen, I 
apologize for the behavior of my colleague. I am deeply, deeply 
appreciative of your service and of the decades of experience 
that you all bring to this conversation. Thank you so much for 
the opportunity to ask important questions of you, questions 
that ought to be asked of you in the spirit of our 
responsibility of oversight rather than provocation.
    So I just have a couple of questions of clarification from 
this testimony that has happened so far, and the first one is 
for you, General McKenzie. You mentioned something about in 
your opening remarks about you having looked at different 
branches to account for the complete collapse of the government 
and the Afghan military. That is the first time, frankly, that 
I have heard that scenario being articulated out loud.
    Most of the testimony that I have heard prior to this has 
been we could have never foreseen that. So as somebody who is a 
branching engineer type person, that is what I do, I am 
intrigued to see if that is, indeed, what you did have and what 
the likelihood you put to that and the cost that you associated 
with that would be.
    General McKenzie. So, as we drew up the NEO plan, one of 
the assumptions of the NEO plan was that the Afghan military 
would be able to continue to secure HKIA, the airfield, because 
the Turks were there, but they only actually secured a small 
fraction of the airfield, maybe 20 percent of it. The rest of 
that long perimeter around the entire runway was actually 
secured by Afghan military forces.
    So our assumption was they would continue to perform that 
function. But we also--since we stated that as an assumption, 
by the way we plan, we have to say if that assumption is wrong, 
because an assumption is a future hypothetical condition that 
we believe is going to occur, we felt that was always something 
that we should challenge.
    So we developed a plan if that assumption failed, if they 
melted away. So we had a branch plan that was developed as part 
of the overall NEO plan where we would introduce adequate 
combat forces to physically take over securing the perimeter of 
that airfield in case the ANDSF did melt away. Well, as we got 
into the first week of August, it began to look increasingly 
likely that they would melt away.
    So I talked to the Secretary, talked to the Chairman, and 
we agreed to begin to flow forces in for that contingency.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And my question to you related 
for--all three of you, and perhaps we'll start with you, 
General, is, how long have you believed that the Afghan 
military might not be up to the task of taking over and 
maintaining security against the Taliban?
    We discussed a lot of different timelines over the course 
of the last few months. Has it been inevitable for 5 or 10 
years? How long have you been relaying that information or that 
concern possibly to any of our senior leaders or senior 
administration if you could share that with us as well.
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, so I will start. I think it 
actually from the relatively short-term perspective, I think 
the Doha Agreement and the signing of the Doha Agreement had a 
really pernicious affect on the Government of Afghanistan and 
on its military. Psychological more than anything else, but we 
set a date certain for when we were going to leave and when 
they could expect all assistance to end.
    So for the first time there was something out there in 
front of them. Now, I also--I think that is an important thing. 
The other point would be it has been my position and my 
judgment that if we went below an advisory level of 2,500, I 
believe that the government of Afghanistan would likely 
collapse and that the military would follow. And one might go 
before the other, but I believe that was going to be the 
inevitable result of drawing down to zero. And I have expressed 
that opinion in writing for quite a while.
    Now, so taking a look at that, that was sort of my best 
judgment on that. I believe that--so going below 2,500, I 
think, was the other sort of nail in the coffin, if you will, 
that allowed the Afghan--that led to conditions where, first of 
all, we could no longer see what was happening to the force 
because our advisers were no longer down there with those 
units.
    So let me give you an example. If we shipped a box of 
mortar rounds into Afghanistan, we would sign it over on the 
ramp at HKIA and the Afghans would truck it away. There would 
be nobody below that level to help them disburse it, to see if 
it went to the bazaar, or if it went down to the unit that 
needed mortar rounds.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    And, Secretary Austin, it looked like you had something to 
contribute as well.
    Secretary Austin. I certainly agree with the comments that 
General McKenzie has made. I would just add to that that as a 
part of that agreement, we agreed to cease conducting air 
operations against the Taliban. So the Taliban got stronger, 
they increase their offensive operations against the Afghan 
Security Forces and the Afghans were losing a lot of people on 
a weekly basis.
    In addition to that, we caused them to release 5,000 
prisoners, you know, and those prisoners, many of those 
prisoners, went back to fill the ranks of the Taliban. So they 
got a lot stronger, they continued their attacks. You know, we 
got smaller. And so I agree with General McKenzie. That is when 
you could begin to see things really begin to go in a different 
direction----
    Ms. Houlahan. So with the last 4 seconds, I very much 
appreciate your time and a very intriguing that it seems like 
the Doha Agreement might have been a pivotal point. And thank 
you.
    And with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon is recognized.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Milley, you 
said today that you saw this as a strategic failure. As a 30-
year veteran and someone who has been deployed four times 
myself, and I haven't served as long as the three of you, but 
it breaks our heart and I think most veterans feel heartbroken 
knowing that both the blood and the treasure split was----ended 
up in a strategic failure. I think we are enraged by it.
    Then we have the President come out and say that this was a 
success. He had no regrets. That does not break our heart; that 
makes us mad as hell that he would say it that way. So I wanted 
to say that upfront.
    Secondly, the fact that President Biden on ABC said that no 
one that he can recall advised him to keep a force of about 
2,500 troops in Afghanistan. It is not true. We heard yesterday 
and we have heard today that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
and the CENTCOM Commander advised differently. I have no other 
view to see this as a lie, a falsehood from our President. That 
makes us mad as hell too. Thirdly, I think it is important to 
point out that this committee for well over a year cautioned 
both Presidents against a premature withdrawl from Afghanistan.
    In fact, Republican and Democratic members of both the 
House and Senate were so concerned at the risk of a calendar-
based withdrawl that we passed a lot to prevent it. In fact, 
the chairman of this committee voted for one that restricted 
President Trump. Section 1215 of the 2021 NDAA prohibited any 
President, regardless of political party, from drawing down 
below 2,500 troops until the Secretary of Defense in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI provided 
Congress a detailed plan explaining how the U.S. would continue 
to conduct counterterror operations in Afghanistan following 
U.S. withdrawl.
    How would the U.S. conduct an orderly transition of 
security functions to the Afghan military? And how would the 
U.S. protect Americans who remained in country and how would 
the U.S. coordinate any such withdrawl with our NATO allies?
    In short, every single failure that we are now witnessing, 
Congress warned against in writing in a law over a year ago. 
But after taking office, President Biden I am referring to 
wrote, to the--we wrote to the Biden administration reminding 
them it was not permitted to go below 2,500 until it provided 
assurances to Congress that our vital interest could be 
secured.
    Despite clear congressional intent backed by statute this 
did not happen. The day after taking office, the newly 
confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl 
wrote to the members of this committee essentially stating that 
President Biden was smarter than Congress, was confident he had 
all the angles covered, and believed it was not in the national 
interest to provide Congress with the assurances required in 
section 1215.
    Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter this letter 
into the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 131.]
    Mr. Bacon. Okay, my first question here: General McKenzie, 
I think one of the reasons that the Afghan forces crumbled much 
quicker than we ever assessed was that we pulled most of our 
air cover, we took the mechanics away from the Afghan forces, 
and we pulled out a lot of our logistics capabilities.
    Do you see this as underlying reasons why the Afghan forces 
collapsed?
    General McKenzie. I think all of those reasons contributed 
to why they collapsed.
    Mr. Bacon. Should it have even surprised us, when we take 
away most of our air power that they were used to having, that 
that would just pull the rug out from underneath them? General.
    General McKenzie. Well, my position all along has been, if 
you go to zero, if you go to a state where you are not going to 
be able to maintain their forces on the ground, that a collapse 
is inevitable.
    I have to further say, I did not see it coming as fast as 
it did. I thought it would be a matter of into the fall or into 
the winter. I did not see it happen in 11 days in August.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    General Milley, I appreciate your candor about this being a 
strategic failure. How does this embolden al-Qaida, ISIS, and 
what does it do to Russia, China, and Iran, seeing how we 
responded in this retreat?
    General Milley. I think the Taliban sitting in Kabul 
significantly emboldens the radical jihadi movement globally. 
The analogy I have used with many others is, it likely will put 
a shot of adrenaline into their arm. Their grandfathers 
defeated the Soviet Union in the war in Afghanistan many, many 
years ago, and they are taking this on their own networks right 
now and declaring it a major victory. So I think it is a big 
morale boost.
    I think it remains to be seen--I think the Russians are 
quite scared--not ``scared''--I guess, concerned of terrorists 
coming across the borders into their near abroad.
    China is very complicated. They've got a significant issue 
in their western hemis--or in their western part of their 
country.
    I think Iran now has to deal with a very complicated issue 
on their border that may or may not be friendly----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, General.
    I yield.
    The Chairman. And I do want to make a comment, because I 
actually watched the George Stephanopoulos interview before 
this hearing. Joe Biden did not say that no one suggested that 
we should keep 2,500 troops there.
    Mr. Bacon. I read the quote, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I have the time at the moment----
    Mr. Bacon. It was my quote.
    The Chairman. I have the time.
    Mr. Bacon. Well, it better not be inaccurate.
    The Chairman. And what he said was, you cannot have 2,500 
troops stay there in a stable situation.
    So we should at least be accurate about what information 
was provided. I would urge everyone to go back and actually 
look at the words and not take what is being said here as 
accurate.
    Mr. Bacon. Chairman, I read the quote.
    The Chairman. I read it too, and I read it with a clear, 
open vision of what he was saying, not with a bent to try and 
make sure that we could successfully have a partisan attack on 
him.
    He was asked, could they stay there in a stable 
environment? That is the option he said wasn't on the table, 
not because it wasn't offered, but because it didn't exist.
    And, while we are ripping apart these three gentlemen here, 
I want to remind everybody that the decision the President made 
was to stop fighting a war that, after 20 years, it was proven 
we could not win. There was no easy way to do that. If he just 
kept----
    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I believe that General Bacon was 
clear----
    The Chairman. If he had just kept----
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. And needs to be defended. Thank 
you.
    The Chairman. I would be happy to yield Mr. Rogers time 
when I am done.
    What he made clear was we needed to stop fighting a war 
that, for 20 years--we have had these conversations over and 
over again. Democrats bash on the Republican President more 
than they bash on the Democratic Presidents. Republicans bash 
on the Democratic Presidents more than they bash on the 
Republican Presidents.
    But the end result was the same: 20 years of an endless 
series of decisions by very intelligent, very capable, very 
committed people. Any implication that the three gentlemen in 
front of us are not very capable, very intelligent, and very 
committed to this country is simply partisan, political 
opportunism.
    We can look at 20 years. Pick your favorite general, pick 
your favorite President, pick your favorite leader. Okay? None 
of them could successfully do what so many members of this 
committee are sitting here telling these gentlemen that they 
are basically idiots for not being able to do.
    We should pause for just a moment and think about the fact 
that maybe that's the wrong argument. Maybe the mission itself 
was really hard to achieve.
    And what President Biden said is: We are done. We are not 
going to have these hearings anymore. We are not going to have 
the funerals anymore. We are not going to lose the 
servicemembers, fighting a war that it is clear we cannot be 
successful.
    And we all pick nits on that decision, that decision, why 
didn't you say this, why didn't you do that. Twenty years of a 
whole lot of different people leading has led us to this point, 
and we said, we are going to stop. Once----
    Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman----
    The Chairman [continuing]. We said that----
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. This is inconceivable.
    The Chairman [continuing]. It was not----
    Mr. Wilson. They are bringing the war here.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Going to----
    Mr. Wilson. The war is not over. It is coming to America.
    The Chairman. Joe----
    Mr. Wilson. The funerals are here----
    The Chairman. I----
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Mr. Chairman. And we count on you 
and your leadership and these----
    The Chairman. It is clear----
    Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Generals to know the war is not 
over.
    The Chairman. It is clear----
    Mr. Bacon. A point of order. Chairman, we are not done with 
this war.
    The Chairman. The point is, yes, we are going to have to 
continue to contain this threat----
    Mr. Rogers. And 20 years of mistakes----
    The Chairman [continuing]. No question about it, but----
    Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Aren't an excuse for the failure--
--
    The Chairman [continuing]. Having U.S. troops in 
Afghanistan----
    Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Of the withdrawal.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Was not succeeding.
    Mr. Bacon. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
    The Chairman. I have to make that point.
    Mr. Rogers is the Ranking Member on the committee, and I 
will give him the time to respond.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I did note the Stephanopoulos interview, and I disagree 
with your interpretation. Mr. Stephanopoulos came back and 
asked him again, ``So you are saying that nobody advised you to 
leave the troops,'' and that was his response.
    But I think the general officers here and the Secretary 
have made it very clear that they gave the President advice 
that he wouldn't listen to. The last President, they gave him 
advice, and he did listen to it.
    So, I mean, I am not challenging and I have not in any way 
disparaged these great gentlemen. In fact, in my opening 
remarks, I made it abundantly clear, I don't want them 
shouldering blame for what happened on this withdrawal, when it 
was the administration and the State Department and National 
Security Advisor.
    And, with that, I will yield----
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Rogers, for correcting the 
record.
    Mr. Rogers [continuing]. A minute to Mr. Bacon.
    The Chairman. Mr. Crow is recognized.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dovetailing on Chairman Smith's comment, I just can't help 
but think back to my last deployment in Afghanistan in 2005. 
And there was a moment where I had been awake for several days, 
walking with a heavy rucksack in the mountains of Afghanistan, 
and wondering and asking myself, where was the debate? Why 
weren't people asking the questions then? Why weren't people 
paying attention?
    I am glad they are now. I am glad we are having this 
debate. But, as Chairman Smith adequately pointed out, we could 
have been doing this a long time ago. Four administrations, 
Republican and Democrat; 10 Congresses, Republican and 
Democrat--this is a 20-year conflict that our country owns, and 
we have to have a broader discussion. It is not a 2-month 
conflict.
    And I appreciate your candor, and I appreciate the 
seriousness with which all three of you have dealt with this.
    So, with that in mind, the fact that there are serious 
issues that have to be addressed, I have two lines of 
questioning, one about our continuing obligation to our 
partners and the next about the planning in advance of the 
evacuation.
    Now, I want to start the partner question with the 
recognition that I believe firmly that all three of you share 
as deeply as I do a sense that we have a continuing obligation, 
because all three of you served, and I know that all three of 
you have friends who are still there. They have names and 
faces. So I am not going to question your commitment to this.
    The Department has a very narrow but important role going 
forward here, and that role is to provide employment 
verification to folks so they can be properly vetted and 
evacuated. That is very hard to do without boots on the ground 
now.
    So what can the Department do more going forward, and what 
is the plan to do that employment verification, to get that 
paperwork in the hands of our friends so we can get them 
evacuated?
    Secretary Austin. One of my Under Secretaries is leading an 
effort to ensure that we can help improve the process of 
employment verification.
    If you think back 20 years, you know, ago, when people were 
actually helping us, helping contractors that were working for 
us, some of the documentation, very, very difficult to get your 
hands on now.
    So we are working to see what we can do to improve this. We 
want to work with Congress to--if there is any way that we can 
adjust requirements or adjust, you know, our ability to ease 
this process along, we certainly want to do that.
    But this--we are taking this on in a very serious way.
    Mr. Crow. Well, I appreciate that, and we stand ready and 
willing to continue to work with you to solve this. Because, 
certainly, our combat operations are over, but we have that 
continued obligation, as you have often noted.
    The last is about the evacuation planning. There were two 
tabletop rehearsals, one in June and one in August. The June 11 
one dealt with the processing of evacuees. These are 
interagencies--interagency tabletop exercises that involve the 
Department of State. The August 6 one, my understanding, dealt 
with scenarios for both a permissive and a nonpermissive NEO.
    So, for the August 6 tabletop, the State Department was 
involved in that tabletop. Coming out of that tabletop 
exercise, did the Department have, in your opinion, adequate 
understanding as to the State Department's plan and role to 
conduct vetting and processing of evacuees at HKIA?
    General McKenzie. I believe they did, but I also urged 
State--I felt that, by nature, the Department of Defense can 
move very fast on issues like this. I felt that we were not 
completely aligned with State on that. There were still some 
things they could do faster.
    And I believe they tried their very best to address those, 
particularly in terms of providing additional processing power, 
if you will, to move people through the chain, from the 
consular officers and other people, to move them forward. State 
representatives took that message on board very seriously at 
the tabletop exercises.
    Mr. Crow. So the lack of complete alignment, in your view, 
has to do with the processing power that was necessary to push 
forward on the ground?
    General McKenzie. There were probably other things. That 
was the--from my perspective, as who was going to be 
responsible for identifying people, getting them out of 
Afghanistan, and getting them into the pipeline, that is what I 
was personally most concerned about. There were other issues; 
that was my principal concern.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    General Milley. Congressman Crow, if I could just--there 
were two other sessions before that, 28 April and 8 May. I 
think we owe you some answers for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 146.]
    Mrs. Luria [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I now recognize Mr. Banks for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you.
    General Milley, why is it important for the military to be 
nonpolitical?
    General Milley. I think an apolitical military is critical 
to the health of this Republic.
    Mr. Banks. General, why did you spend--you have already 
established yesterday and today that you spent a significant 
amount of time talking to political book authors and political 
reporters, including Bob Woodward. What compelled you to do 
that?
    General Milley. I believe that part of my job is to 
communicate to the media what we do as a government, what we do 
as a military, to explain to the people. And so I do interviews 
regularly, with print media, books, documentaries, videos on 
TV, TV interviews. I think it is part of a senior official's 
job to be transparent, and I believe in a free press.
    Mr. Banks. What happens when a military general becomes a 
political figure?
    General Milley. I have done----
    Mr. Banks. You would agree that it is dangerous?
    General Milley. I think it is dangerous, and I have done my 
best to remain personally apolitical, and I try to keep the 
military out of actual domestic politics. And I have made a 
point of that from the time I became the Chairman and 
especially beginning last summer.
    Mr. Banks. You told the Senate yesterday you hadn't read 
the book or any of the other political books that have come 
out, but I don't know how anybody could read the Bob Woodward 
book--I don't know how you could read it and not be greatly 
embarrassed about its contents, especially in how it is related 
to you.
    Are you embarrassed by the book?
    General Milley. I haven't read the book yet----
    Mr. Banks. Are you embarrassed by the portrayals of the 
book? No doubt you are aware of them.
    General Milley. Embarrassed, no. I am concerned that there 
is mischaracterizations of me becoming very politicized as an 
individual and that it is my willingness to become politicized, 
which is not true. I am trying to stay apolitical, and I 
believe I am. That is part of my professional ethic.
    And I am trying to keep the military, the actual military, 
out of actual domestic politics. I think that is critical to 
this Republic.
    Mr. Banks. Do you regret with speaking with Bob Woodward?
    General Milley. No. I think that it is important for me to 
speak to the media.
    Mr. Banks. I want to talk about some of the contents of the 
book. Since you haven't read it----
    General Milley. Okay.
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. Maybe I can read some of it to you.
    We have already heard a little bit about the back-and-forth 
with you and Speaker Pelosi. But, in that conversation, you 
said--in a phone call with Speaker Pelosi, she said, quote, 
``Republicans are enablers of President Trump's behavior. You 
know he's crazy. He's been crazy for a long time.'' You 
replied, ``I agree with you on everything.''
    That was repeated three times in the prologue of the book 
``Peril,'' that you told Speaker Pelosi you agree with her on 
everything.
    Is that an accurate portrayal of your recounting to Bob 
Woodward about those conversations?
    General Milley. Not exactly, no. I think that--in fact, I 
know----
    Mr. Banks. So is Bob Woodward wrong? Is that portrayal 
wrong?
    General Milley. In fact, I know what I said, which was, 
``Madam Speaker, I am not qualified to determine the mental 
health or assess the mental health of this President----
    Mr. Banks. Did you tell----
    General Milley [continuing]. Or any President.''
    Mr. Banks.--the Speaker that you agreed with her on 
everything?
    General Milley. And what I was referring to when I said 
that was I agree that we need to have the processes and 
procedures in place to make sure that we don't have an 
accidental or illegal or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. 
And I do agree with that. And we do have those procedures.
    Mr. Banks. You said you agree with her, according to Bob 
Woodward----
    General Milley. I am not agreeing with----
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. And either Bob Woodward is right or 
you are right.
    General Milley. I am not agreeing with her assessment of 
the President, nor the----
    Mr. Banks. The book also goes on--in talking about the 
January 6 riot, it says that you told Bob Woodward that you 
wrote a list in your notebook of groups that you personally 
believe are responsible for the attack and that you associated 
with it. And you called these groups, quote, ``domestic 
terrorists,'' or this, ``domestic terrorism.''
    That list included, in your notebook, according to Bob 
Woodward from your conversations with him, Nazis and Oath 
Keepers. But it also included two conservative media outlets 
that you listed in your notebook, including The Epoch Times, 
which, by the way, is a news outlet that was founded by critics 
of the Chinese Communist Party, and Newsmax, which is the 
second-most-watched conservative media outlet in the country 
today.
    Do your notes about January 6 reference both Epoch Times 
and Newsmax as on a list of domestic terrorists?
    General Milley. I am not recalling this conversation at 
all. I don't----
    Mr. Banks. It is in the book.
    General Milley. It may be in the book. I haven't read the 
book. I am not recalling a conversation about Newsmax, Epoch 
Times----
    Mr. Banks. Do you have a notebook that lists Newsmax and 
Epoch Times as domestic terrorists, as recounted by the Bob 
Woodward book ``Peril''?
    General Milley. I----
    Mr. Banks. Or is Bob Woodward lying to us in the book?
    General Milley. I don't know. I don't recall any 
conversation about Epoch Times or----
    Mr. Banks. Do you believe that Newsmax and Epoch Times are 
domestic terrorists or their----
    General Milley. No.
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. Viewers----
    General Milley. I think----
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. Or readers----
    General Milley. No. I think----
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. Are domestic terrorists?
    General Milley. No, not at all. I don't think Epoch Times 
nor Newsmax are domestic terrorist organizations.
    Mr. Banks. Will you produce the notes----
    General Milley. I believe they are----
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. to this committee----
    General Milley. I will produce any notes you want.
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. That you relayed to Bob Woodward in 
the book that you listed different groups who were responsible 
for January 6?
    General Milley. Sure. Absolutely.
    Mr. Banks. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I will just note for the record that I was quoted in that 
book as well, and a lot of what I said was conflated and not 
100 percent accurately portrayed. It does happen. Just because 
someone says something doesn't mean that it is an accurate 
portrayal and doesn't even mean they are lying. It could be a 
misunderstanding about what was actually said.
    Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
    And thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for the work 
that you have done.
    I think, obviously, the level of back-and-forth on the 
committee today represents some real stress in the system about 
the withdrawal and what it means but also about, you know, an 
interest in politicizing national security issues, which I have 
real issues with.
    Could I just ask--I think the question I get asked the most 
in my district about our withdrawal from Afghanistan is, are we 
safer now than we were on September 10, 2001?
    And I believe and I have certainly answered many veterans 
who have reached out that I believe their work was valuable and 
worthy. We kept al-Qaida and other groups distracted and 
destabilized so that we could build up our national security 
apparatus, our homeland security here, to make us safer.
    So it is, of course, hard to hear from this panel that 
right now we are safer but we have to watch for the 
reconstitution of these terrorist groups. No one likes to hear 
that.
    I would ask that we get a classified briefing on our over-
the-horizon posture just so we understand--I understand we 
can't do it in open session, but just so we understand, on this 
committee, what we can expect when it comes to watching those 
threats. So I would ask for that commitment.
    But, as someone who served in Iraq with the CIA, we watched 
the reconstitution of al-Qaida in western Iraq, which became 
ISIS.
    What are the tripwires, I guess Secretary Austin and then 
General Milley, that you are looking for that would push you to 
engage the White House and say, ``Hey, we have a real problem 
here''? What are those specific things that you are looking for 
that would change your assessment from one of, you know, ``We 
are all right now,'' to, ``We need to take more significant 
military action''?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks.
    First, on your request for an over-the-horizon capability 
brief, we will certainly sign up for that. I committed to the 
chairman to do that early on. And I will have General McKenzie 
and the Joint Staff and my policy people in that brief as well.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
    Secretary Austin. In terms of specific areas that we are 
focused on, we are looking at their ability to develop a 
capability to export terror to the homeland here. Whether or 
not--you know, if we see senior leaders beginning to have 
freedom of movement in Afghanistan, if we see them developing 
capability in training camps and other things, if we see them 
moving people back and forth across international boundaries, 
those are things that we are looking for.
    And, again, it will take time to develop a true intel 
picture of what is going on. And we have begun that work, and 
we will continue--we will remain focused on this throughout.
    Ms. Slotkin. General Milley.
    General Milley. The specific indicators and warnings I 
would like to take to a different session.
    But, in general, what we are looking for: leadership, 
capability, training, those sorts of things, and demonstrations 
of intent that al-Qaida and/or ISIS is going to do external 
operations against the United States or our interests.
    If we pick up on those, then it is our obligation to 
present the President with options to deal with it.
    Ms. Slotkin. And, General Milley, we have seen some reports 
that, in our attempts to try and get over-the-horizon posture 
in countries around Afghanistan, that we have had discussions 
with the Russians about some cooperation.
    Can you help us understand that? For many of us, that just 
gives us--like, the hair on our neck starts to go up. Can you 
explain to us what we are discussing with the Russians and what 
we are willing to do and not do with the Russians?
    General Milley. Again, I would prefer to take that into a 
classified session.
    As you probably know, about a week or 10 days ago, I 
discussed over in Europe with the Russians, had a session with 
32 CHODs [Chiefs of Defences] from all the European NATO 
nations, and then I had a separate session with my counterpart, 
General Gerasimov. And I can talk to you in a classified 
session about that.
    But, in the main, we are not asking permission, we are not 
negotiating, I guess is the word, but President Putin and 
President Biden had a conversation, and I was following up on 
that conversation at other direction--at the----
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
    General Milley [continuing]. Direction of my superiors.
    Ms. Slotkin. I would just say, I think, given that it is 
not permissible right now to share classified information, this 
committee should be informed should there be any movement 
towards that with the Russians.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    The gentlelady's time has expired.
    And we have had classified--we will have continued 
classified briefs. As we have said, as many members have said, 
I think accurately, the counterterrorism strategy in South Asia 
is going to be a crucial policy issue for all of us to deal 
with going forward.
    Ms. Cheney is recognized.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley, on January 6, we had a violent attack on 
our Capitol. It was an effort to stop the constitutionally 
prescribed process of counting electoral votes--the first time 
in our Nation's history that we did not have a peaceful 
transfer of power.
    In the aftermath of that attack, many of the members of our 
constitutional system failed to do their duty. Many of them 
punted. Many of them, today, are still attempting to obstruct 
the investigation into that attack, attempting to whitewash 
what happened.
    General Milley, you found yourself, in your 
constitutionally prescribed role, standing in the breach. And 
for any member of this committee, for any American to question 
your loyalty to our Nation, to question your understanding of 
our Constitution, your loyalty to our Constitution, your 
recognition and understanding of the civilian chain of command, 
is despicable.
    I want to apologize for those members of this committee who 
have done so. And I want to thank you for standing in the 
breach, when so many, including many in this room, failed to do 
so.
    With respect to Afghanistan, the only question for us with 
respect to the deployment of forces in Afghanistan or anywhere 
else is, what does U.S. security require?
    In the circumstances we found ourselves in in Afghanistan, 
the deployment of our forces was allowing us to conduct 
counterterrorism operations, counterintelligence operations, 
enabling us to prevent terrorists from establishing safe 
havens.
    General Milley, terrorists now have an entire country of 
Afghanistan. Could you tell the committee whether or not you 
think the current situation in Afghanistan following the 
withdrawal of forces, which began with the Doha Agreement and 
the orders that you have described in the Trump administration, 
which was carried out in the Biden administration, can you tell 
the committee whether or not you think we are now more safe or 
less safe, whether Afghanistan presents more of a threat or 
less of a threat to our homeland than when we were able to 
conduct counterterrorism/counterintelligence operations there?
    General Milley. I think, right now, right this minute, we 
are more safe because of the efforts over the last 20 years.
    However, I do think that conditions are more likely than 
not to develop over the course of time that will allow for the 
reconstitution of al-Qaida and/or ISIS. And that time varies 
depending on which analyst you are listening to, but sometime 
between, say, 6 to 12 and maybe 36 months.
    Ms. Cheney. And when you look at the situation that we face 
today, in terms of what is going to be necessary--the loss of 
life, the loss of treasure has been tragic, has been 
devastating. But when you look at where we are likely to find 
ourselves, do you think that our ability to defend ourselves 
will now be more expensive, will cost us more in terms of lives 
and treasure going forward, or do you believe that the 
withdrawal will present a situation where we have to devote 
less resources to the war on terror?
    General Milley. I think the ends are going to remain the 
same, to protect the American people, but the ways and means 
are going to change. And I think it is going to become much 
more difficult now in order to conduct counterterrorism 
operations against a reconstituted al-Qaida or ISIS in 
Afghanistan. Not impossible. We have the capabilities and means 
to do that. But it will be more difficult.
    Ms. Cheney. Secretary Austin, are members of the Haqqani 
Network still a potential target for the United States 
military?
    Secretary Austin. We do recognize that the members of the 
Haqqani Network are recognized terrorists, yes.
    Ms. Cheney. So they are a potential target for the United 
States military?
    Secretary Austin. Potentially, yes.
    Ms. Cheney. So, Secretary Austin, the Biden administration 
has been saying that the Doha Agreement is still in effect and 
that they will hold the Taliban to their, quote, 
``counterterrorism commitments'' in the Doha Agreement.
    But the Taliban is using this agreement to protect 
terrorists. The Taliban is intertwined with the Haqqani 
Network. And al-Qaida has, in fact, sworn bayat to the Taliban.
    So can you explain exactly how that agreement that is 
enabling terrorists is going to be useful as some kind of a 
tool to hold the Taliban to any kind of a commitment?
    Secretary Austin. I think we should do everything within 
our power to keep pressure on the Taliban to do what they said 
that they were going to do. And we heard what they have said. 
We will watch their actions.
    But I think we should continue to apply pressure, wherever 
possible, to cause them to keep al-Qaida activity in check.
    And, again, you have heard us say a couple of times today 
that we recognize that this is the Taliban, and trust is not an 
issue here, necessarily. We hear what they are saying; we are 
watching what they do.
    Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My time has expired.
    The Chairman. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Secretary Austin, General Milley, 
General McKenzie. I have quite a few questions, and some I may 
have to submit for the record, because I think it is important 
to start with this and somewhat echo my Republican colleague's 
opening.
    We have continued to see attacks on our democracy and our 
values from Members representing what, at least historically, 
would have been the extreme elements of the Republican Party--
attacks including, but not limited to, the horrible attack on 
our Capitol and our Congress on January 6.
    And one of the cornerstones of our democracy and our 
government is civilian, not military, rule. This is sacrosanct 
to those of us who have worn the uniform and, judging from the 
attacks by some members of this committee, poorly understood by 
those who have not.
    I have concerns about how the NEO was executed, but I must 
applaud all of you for scrupulously ensuring our civilian 
government remained the decisionmaking authority as you 
continued to provide your best military advice, even when, at 
times, your advice differed from the decisions made. Thank you.
    I would like to now turn to some questions that I have 
related to the timeline of events.
    So, as I understand it, in February of 2020, President 
Trump made an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw U.S. 
troops by May 1, 2021, in exchange for several conditions, 
including a halt to attacks against U.S. forces and cutting 
ties with al-Qaida.
    By the time he left office, President Trump had drawn down 
forces to 2,500 and publicly indicated his intent to complete 
the withdrawal if he had been reelected.
    And I think, Chairman Milley, you mentioned the 10 November 
2020 withdrawal of troops by 15 January 2020, which was 
rescinded, and then the 17 November 2020 drawdown to 2,500 by 
19 January. Is that correct?
    General Milley. It was a memo dated 11 November, 2 days 
after Secretary Esper was fired. And then, on the 17th, it was 
rescinded. The first memo said go to zero. The second one said 
go to 2,500.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    And so were you consulted on the decisions to open 
negotiations solely with the Taliban, to the exclusion of the 
Afghan Government, General?
    General Milley. Very, very late in the game, like, days 
before the signing.
    Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, were there concrete 
plans for a withdrawal from the previous administration that 
were shared and developed with military leadership?
    General Milley. Well, we were 12,600 on the day that the 
Doha Agreement--12,600 U.S. military in Afghanistan when the 
Doha Agreement was signed. Part of that agreement was to go to 
8,500 within, I think it was, 135 days. I would have to go back 
to the agreement and look at it. And then it was to bring down 
all the U.S. military, NATO, contractors, close all the bases 
by 1 May.
    So it was an agreement signed by our government. We 
dutifully executed it and delivered drawdown over time, from 
February of 2020 all way through, based on a set of milestones. 
So we did withdraw, and we had a plan to withdraw.
    Ms. Sherrill. Did any of those plans include plans to 
evacuate civilian American personnel, citizens, and SIV 
holders?
    General Milley. Yes. General McKenzie and CENTCOM did 
develop NEO plans, but not, like, the large SIV holders and 
lots of American citizens. It was primarily the Embassy and 
their personnel.
    But I would defer to Frank McKenzie to talk about the 
details of the NEO plans at that time.
    Ms. Sherrill. General McKenzie.
    General McKenzie. So we hold a NEO plan for every country 
in the Central Command region. So, yes, we had a plan to bring 
out mainly American citizens and people associated with the 
Embassy.
    Planning later began to encompass the larger population, 
the at-risk Afghan population, the SIV population. But, 
initially, just like every other plan, it centered on American 
citizens and their families.
    Ms. Sherrill. And when you say the planning later grew to 
include that, what is the timeframe for when you began to 
include SIV holders?
    General McKenzie. No later than the early spring of this 
year.
    Ms. Sherrill. So under this administration?
    General McKenzie. Yes. Yes.
    Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, in your testimony to the 
SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] yesterday, you testified 
that the Trump administration's plans had not been developed 
via a robust interagency process.
    How closely were you and other senior military leaders 
consulted on President Trump's plans as they were developed?
    General Milley. I wasn't consulted on the 11 November order 
that I received. That is why I went over to the White House 
with Acting Secretary Miller and White House Chief of Staff 
Kash Patel to discuss that order. So I wasn't consulted on it.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    And my time has expired. I will submit the rest of my 
questions for the record.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Waltz is recognized.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And here is where I think we are really talking past each 
other. This war is not done. It is not over. This is a war 
against Islamic extremism. It is a war against an ideology. 
And, just as it took decades--decades, not 20 years, not 30 
years, many more--to defeat the idea of communism, to defeat 
the idea of fascism, it is going to take decades to defeat the 
idea of Islamic extremism.
    General McKenzie, you testified yesterday al-Qaida is still 
at war with us. Do you stand by that statement?
    General McKenzie. Absolutely, Representative.
    Mr. Waltz. DNI Haines, Biden's Director of National 
Intelligence, briefed the Congress that al-Qaida fully intends 
to attack the West again if given the chance.
    The head of al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden's former deputy, has 
pledged allegiance to the head of the Taliban, except now they 
have an entire state to work with--an army, an air force, a 
functioning international airport, and I think, if things 
continue on the path they are, possibly billions in 
international currency reserves.
    So, Mr. Chairman, respectfully, we are not done with this 
war. I would have thought we would have learned the lesson from 
Iraq. I would have thought, Mr. Secretary, you had learned the 
lesson from Iraq, where we pulled out in 2011--Mr. Chairman, 
you issued a statement praising that pullout as ending that 
war--and yet we found ourselves, 3 years later, with soldiers 
going back in.
    But let's look at the situation, because I think the 
American people need to understand this.
    Here we have Iraq. We pulled out. Led to a rise of the ISIS 
caliphate, which was obviously a morphed entity from al-Qaida.
    Look at all of the bases that we had to deal with when we 
went back. We had bases in the Gulf, we had bases in Kuwait, we 
had bases in Turkey, in Jordan, of course in Israel, allied 
bases in Cyprus. We had allies on the ground in the Kurds.
    We didn't let ISIS take over the government in Baghdad and 
the army and all of the functions of the state. We had all of 
these assets to work with to go clean up that mess. And how 
many soldiers and lives did we lose from cleaning up that 
mistaken withdrawal, Mr. Chairman?
    But let's transition over here to Afghanistan. What do we 
see?
    General McKenzie, do we have a single base in Afghanistan 
now?
    General McKenzie. We have no base in Afghanistan.
    Mr. Waltz. Do we have a base in any country neighboring 
Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. We do not.
    Mr. Waltz. Do we have any local allies approaching the 
capability of the Kurds?
    General McKenzie. We do not. There may be----
    Mr. Waltz. No.
    General McKenzie [continuing]. Some options, but we do not.
    Mr. Waltz. We have the Northern Alliance. The Panjshir has 
been taken. Frankly, they are being slaughtered right now, as 
we speak, with our weapons. With our damn equipment, our allies 
are being slaughtered. Every morning, we wake up to beheading 
videos, to executions, to people being hunted down with our own 
database.
    But, when and if you have to present options to the 
President, how many soldiers are we going to lose because we 
have no allies on the ground, we have no bases in the region?
    Now, we are going to get to, really, the crux of the issue, 
which is over-the-horizon counterterrorism. Those drones have 
to fly all the way around Iran and all the way up Pakistan and 
lose 70 to 80 percent of their fuel before they even get 
anywhere near a target.
    And we just saw from the failed attack, the botched attack, 
that you have to have multi-INT [multi-intelligence] 
intelligence confirming what that drone operator is seeing. I 
have called it in, and I know that drone operator would have 
appreciated somebody on the ground saying, no, that is a 
civilian, don't pull that trigger.
    So I appreciate your candor in saying how difficult this is 
going to be, but the President of the United States is selling 
this country a fiction that we can do over here with nothing 
what we are doing over here with neighboring base access, with 
allies on the ground, and with ocean access. That is a fiction 
that I think you all need to own, and we need to be honest with 
the American people.
    I am just livid at the fact of the future Americans that 
are going to have to go back to clean up this mess. We are 
watching this horror movie that Representative Slotkin 
experienced, that we all experienced after Iraq.
    The President continues to say, well, we can do what we do 
in Somalia, we can do what we do in Syria. Mr. Secretary, you 
just briefed about a strike in Syria. We have a lot more 
capability there.
    One more question. Do we have any evidence, intelligence or 
otherwise, of Pakistani troops on the ground--intelligence 
officers, air support, or any troops on the ground--assisting 
the Taliban or command and control assisting the Taliban 
offensive?
    General McKenzie. I would prefer to answer that question in 
closed session.
    Mr. Waltz. I will take that as a yes.
    And, Mr. Chairman----
    The Chairman. Mr. Waltz, your time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. That is not going to go to a civil 
war; it is going to go to a regional war.
    The Chairman. And, just for the record, we are not going to 
put words in the mouths of our witnesses. You can't take it as 
a yes if it was not, in fact, a yes.
    Ms. Escobar is now recognized.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you so much for your incredible 
leadership, your patriotism, and your service to our country. I 
am very grateful for it.
    I want to begin by saying that I am incredibly privileged 
to represent Fort Bliss. I represent El Paso, Texas. And Fort 
Bliss is offering hospitality right now to nearly 10,000 Afghan 
guests. And I want to say to those service members how proud I 
am of the work that they are doing to offer that hospitality.
    I had the privilege to tour the Dona Ana village last month 
with NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] Commander 
General Van Herck, got to speak to many of those service 
members. Morale is high, and I could not be prouder of what 
they are doing. Had an opportunity, also, to speak to our 
Afghan guests, as well, and get a sense from them how they are 
doing.
    We know that the die was cast with the Doha Agreement, an 
agreement that former President Trump entered into with the 
Taliban and the Taliban alone. We have learned that that 
agreement--it was that agreement that demoralized the Afghan 
Army, and the Taliban moved in and began making deals with 
them, which expedited their control. We know that that 
demoralization contributed to the rapid fall--the rapid fall of 
Afghanistan which shocked us all.
    General Milley, earlier, you told us that when former 
President Trump entered into the Doha Agreement there was a 
setting out of very specific conditions that were to be met by 
the time of the May 1 drawdown. Is that correct?
    General Milley. That is correct.
    Ms. Escobar. General Milley, how many of those conditions 
had been met when former President Trump then announced he 
wanted to speed up the withdrawal from May 1 to January 15, 
2020?
    General Milley. There was only one condition that was met. 
That was the condition that asked--or that the Taliban 
committed to not striking against U.S. forces and/or coalition 
forces, which they did not do.
    Ms. Escobar. And when then-President Trump announced the 
expedited drawdown, was he aware that four of the five 
conditions had not been met?
    General Milley. I believe yes.
    Ms. Escobar. Do you know the significance, if there is any, 
of the January 15 expedited drawdown date?
    General Milley. I don't. I was handed a piece of paper and 
went over and talked to folks in the White House, and it was 
rescinded. I don't know why that particular date was picked.
    Ms. Escobar. Okay.
    Have we learned or do we know whether those announcements 
of expedited withdrawal added to or exacerbated the demoralized 
nature of the Afghan Army?
    General Milley. Well, the 11 November order was not 
announced, but the drawdown to 2,500 was. We have detailed 
reporting, but I think, I believe--and we will do this in the 
AARs [after action reviews]--I think that was one of many 
contributing factors, not the only one, but one of many 
contributing factors to the declination of the morale of the 
Afghan security forces.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, General Milley.
    You have also described the outcome of this withdrawal as a 
strategic failure. Can you share with us what would have been 
considered success for the administration, the service members, 
and military experts who have been involved in this conflict 
for over two decades and what it would have taken for us to get 
to success?
    General Milley. I think and my opinion was that success 
would have been a negotiated solution between the Government of 
Afghanistan and the Taliban for a shared power-sharing 
arrangement in their government and an end to the, you know, 
civil war in that manner. I also assessed that the probability 
of that actually happening was low, but I did think that there 
was a possibility and it wasn't zero.
    So a negotiated solution, I think, was probably the best 
way to describe a proper end to this war.
    I don't think that there was a military solution by us to 
destroy or defeat the Taliban. I think that was not in the 
cards. And I didn't think at the time that if we sustained a 
level of effort in Afghanistan with our military, 2,500 or 
3,500, in those ranges, I didn't think the Taliban could defeat 
the Afghan security forces.
    That was my assessment at the time. And I thought success 
meant a negotiated settlement between the government and the 
Taliban and to have a power-sharing arrangement to end the war.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, General Milley.
    I have about 15 seconds. Secretary Austin, has the U.S. 
military and Department of Defense begun to reimagine any of 
our existing involvements abroad to better assess risk of a 
fallout such as this one?
    Secretary Austin. We continue to take a look at ourselves 
across the board and how we are----
    The Chairman. And the gentlelady's time has expired, so 
that will have to be taken for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 146.]
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Johnson is recognized.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    There has been a dispute here today about the actual words 
that were shared in the ABC News George Stephanopoulos 
interview with the President. We took the liberty of getting 
the full transcript. I am going to read you the relevant 
excerpt and ask you a question.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to enter 
the transcript into the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 132.]
    Mr. Johnson. So Stephanopoulos asked this. Quote, ``But 
your military advisors warned against withdrawing on this 
timeline. They wanted you to keep about 2,500 troops.''
    Biden: ``No, they didn't. It was split. That--that wasn't 
true. That wasn't true.''
    Stephanopoulos: ``They didn't tell you that they wanted 
troops to stay?''
    Biden: ``No, not at--not in terms of whether we were going 
to get out in a timeframe all troops. They didn't argue against 
that.''
    Stephanopoulos: ``So no one told--your military advisors 
did not tell you, ``No, we should just keep 2,500 troops, it 
has been a stable situation for the last several years, we can 
do that, we can continue to do that'?''
    Biden: ``No. No one said that to me that I can recall.''
    So, gentlemen, with all due respect, the American people 
deserve to know the truth in all this. They are asking us to 
get the truth.
    So here is the thing. There are only three possibilities 
here. Either the President lied to the American people, or he 
legitimately cannot remember the counsel of his top military 
advisors in winding down the longest war in American history, 
or you have not been fully accurate under oath.
    General McKenzie, I will ask you: Which is it?
    General McKenzie. I want to be very direct. I cannot share 
advice I give the President, and I will not do that.
    I will also tell you, though, that it has been my 
consistent position throughout this hearing and the hearing 
yesterday that I believe the appropriate level of our forces in 
Afghanistan should have been 2,500.
    Mr. Johnson. I think we can take that to mean that you gave 
him that advice.
    Let me ask----
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would not take it to mean anything 
other than the words I gave you, please.
    Mr. Johnson. Fair enough.
    Secretary Austin, what is it? What are we to believe by 
seeing all this?
    Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, you heard me say 
earlier, Congressman, that I support the President's decision.
    You also heard me say that I don't view this choice as a 
no-cost, no-risk choice. I do believe that, if we left 2,500 
people there for an extended period of time, you would 
eventually have to reinforce those people, because the Taliban 
was going to--was committed to attacking us.
    Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I understand all that. What we 
are trying to get to is, what did the President know? Did he 
forget what was told to him, or is he not being truthful? Which 
is it?
    Secretary Austin. I would view that as an inappropriate 
question, and I won't----
    Mr. Johnson. Well, you may, but the American people don't.
    Secretary Austin. Okay.
    Mr. Johnson. And the American people want and deserve 
accountability. And we even have service members like 
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Scheller being thrown in the brig for 
suggesting that.
    The public's faith in our institutions continues to erode 
precisely because everyone in the DC bubble appears to have 
some sort of immunity from the basic standards the rest of 
America is expected to live by.
    This is quite clearly one of the biggest military and 
foreign policy blunders since our withdrawal from Vietnam. So 
my question for all of you is very simple: Where does the blame 
lie?
    Mr. Austin--Secretary Austin.
    Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, you know, I am 
responsible for everything that happens that DOD does, and it 
does a lot. I remain focused on defending this country, and 
that is going to be my focus for the foreseeable future.
    Secondly, you know, I would remind you that we just 
evacuated 124,000 people----
    Mr. Johnson. I appreciate----
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. In 17 days----
    Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that you think that that was a 
big success, evacuation. But the blame for the disastrous 
withdrawal that everyone agrees was a disaster, who is to blame 
for that?
    I will let the silence speak for itself.
    General Milley, you said earlier this month that it is 
possible that we would work with the Taliban to conduct strikes 
against ISIS-K in Afghanistan, presumably referencing our over-
the-horizon capabilities, but today you testified--you said, 
quote, ``the Taliban remains a terrorist organization with ties 
to al-Qaida.''
    So are you now suggesting that the United States form some 
sort of strategic partnership with a terrorist organization?
    General Milley. No, absolutely not. I am not suggesting 
that at all.
    Could I go to your first question, though?
    Mr. Johnson. Please.
    General Milley. Like Frank McKenzie--like General McKenzie, 
it is not our purview to share specific discussions with the 
President in terms of national security decision-making. But it 
was our opinion at the time, and it has been very consistent.
    And I would also tell you that this administration did--and 
I was part of it, along with the Joint Chiefs--a very rigorous 
process. And this President--it was one of the most informed 
decisions that you can imagine, in terms of all sides of the 
argument.
    We in the military, in the uniformed military, we look at 
the costs, the risk to force, the benefit, et cetera, in a 
narrow-focused view. Other decisionmakers have a much wider 
angle.
    Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that. But what we are left with, 
in the 9 seconds I have left, is that we are supposed to 
believe that the President was either not informed by you of 
these very important factors or he forgot it. Either one is 
alarming.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    And, since the transcript was submitted for the record, we 
read through this kind of quick, but Mr. Stephanopoulos says, 
``Your top military advisors warned against withdrawing in this 
timeline. They wanted you to keep about 2,500 troops.''
    ``No, they didn't. It was split.''
    That is what the President said. He didn't say, ``No, 
nobody advised me.'' ``It was split.''
    Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, read down two more lines.
    The Chairman. I will be done in just a second, and then I 
will yield it back to you.
    And then Stephanopoulos says: ``No, no one said, ``We 
should just keep 2,500 troops, it has been a stable situation 
for the last several years, we can do that, we can continue to 
do that'?''
    ``No. No one said that to me that I can recall. No one 
said, it has been a stable situation for the last several 
years, we can do that, we could continue to do that.''
    Those are the words on the transcript that was just 
submitted. I will leave it to other people to interpret that, 
but those are the actual words.
    And, yes, I will yield, Mr. Johnson, if you can do it 
quickly. Sorry. I want to get to some other people, but I 
should give you the chance. Go ahead.
    Mr. Johnson. I will do it very quickly, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate that.
    I mean, you just read it at face value.
    Stephanopoulos says: ``So no one told you--your military 
advisors did not tell you, ``No, we should just keep 2,500 
troops, it has been a stable situation for the last several 
years, we can do that, we can continue to do that'?''
    Biden says: ``No, no one said that to me that I can 
recall.''
    The Chairman. You read quickly through the ``it has been a 
stable situation'' part, but that is kind of the important 
part. Okay.
    Mr. Johnson. Well, look, it is open to----
    The Chairman. I think we have----
    Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Individual interpretation.
    The Chairman. I think we have both made our point.
    Mr. Johnson. All right. But I think----
    The Chairman. I will move on to Mrs.----
    Mr. Johnson [continuing]. The American people can use 
common sense, and it is----
    The Chairman. Okay.
    Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Alarming, whatever it is.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mrs. Luria, you are recognized.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
    And I would like to start, General Milley, by associating 
myself with the remarks that Ms. Cheney made at the beginning 
of her questions and focus on the timeframe immediately 
following the 2020 election.
    On November 9, 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper was 
replaced by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller. 
And, additionally, other key leadership positions at DOD were 
abruptly filled with new people.
    General Milley, did this rapid replacement of top senior 
officials at the Department of Defense in the final days of the 
administration give you concern regarding the transition of the 
administration?
    General Milley. We in the military are trained for 
leadership replacement from the time we are a second 
lieutenant, follow one drills sort of thing. And it is clearly 
in the prerogative of any President to replace any Cabinet 
member or any appointee at all at any point in time.
    So that is how I would answer that. We are prepared to 
execute at a moment's notice if someone is relieved.
    Mrs. Luria. And, General Milley, did you have any concerns 
at the time that involved the potential misuse of the military 
for political reasons?
    General Milley. I was determined to make sure that the U.S. 
military is properly employed, and I would render my advice to 
ensure that the U.S. military is employed not for political 
use.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
    And it has been referenced a few times during the hearing 
today that you did cooperate with several authors for specific 
books. And it seems as though your choice to do that was that 
you wanted to get the story straight, the facts out there about 
different things that transpired during this timeframe. And you 
acknowledged today that you frequently speak to reporters and 
also yesterday in comments to Senators that you sometimes do 
that anonymously.
    I think that we would all like full transparency and full 
understanding of the facts surrounding this timeframe. And, as 
you know, I am a member of the select committee to investigate 
the events surrounding January 6. So I can speak for the 
committee to say that we will be very interested to have, you 
know, the same level of information and be able to speak to you 
in the future about those topics.
    And I will shift now to another topic of discussion. And if 
I could ask my colleagues to please respect my time.
    So, General Milley, you have spent half of your career 
fighting a war in Afghanistan, roughly. And when did you 
personally know that the war was lost?
    General Milley. Well, I think if you go back to 5, 6 years 
ago, I knew it was stalemated. ``Lost'' is a different word, 
but I believed it was stalemated. And I believed 5 or 6 years 
ago that it was unwinnable through U.S. military means, for 
several reasons.
    There is a sanctuary in Pakistan that was not going to be 
destroyed or defeated, and that insurgencies are highly 
political wars to begin with, and what was important to win is 
to have an indigenous government that was seen as legitimate in 
the eyes of the people, along with a military, their police and 
army, that could adequately deal with that situation.
    But I knew years ago that it was stalemated, said that 
repeatedly, internal and external, and that winning would be 
defined as a negotiated solution, as most insurgencies are 
historically. They result in a negotiated solution between the 
insurgent and the regime. And I thought that was the best way 
that this could be handled. I didn't think there was a military 
solution.
    Mrs. Luria. So it is interesting to me that you used the 
word ``winning.'' Did you think that winning was possible, or 
did you think that a stalemate or a status quo was really the 
only ultimate outcome that we could hope for in this situation?
    General Milley. I think, as I recall, President Bush, at 
the very beginning of this thing 20 years ago, said winning 
would look a lot different in this war, or words to that 
effect. And I think he was right then. And I think that a 
negotiated solution was the best way of approaching a, quote/
unquote, ``win.''
    I think that would have been in the best interests of the 
United States and it would have been the best interests of the 
region and the Afghan people, was a negotiated solution between 
the Taliban, the insurgents, and the government.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
    And I saw Secretary Austin nodding. I know there is very 
little time left. Did you want to add something briefly?
    Secretary Austin. You heard me say at the very top that, 
you know, my hope was that we could reach a negotiated 
settlement. A stalemate would actually provide the opportunity 
to do that, for both sides to negotiate in earnest if neither 
thought that they were going to win.
    And, again, we just never reached that point, because the 
Taliban had advantages coming into this, because we weren't 
striking them, we released prisoners----
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Appreciate 
it.
    A couple of quick announcements. So there is a vote on. We 
have a hard stop at 2:00. We are going to stop at 2:00. I am 
going to go vote.
    Mrs. Luria, if you could take the chair for just a moment, 
I will come back as quickly as I can and then free you of that 
obligation.
    But it is my intention to roll through that. So, members, 
you know, vote accordingly, be here. I think we have Ms. Jacobs 
who is up next on our side, so we have a couple people that 
will get us through that. But that is what we are going to do.
    And Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes, and I will be 
right back.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today.
    Over the last few weeks, I have heard an outpouring of 
concern and frustration from my constituents, veterans and 
military families chief among them, who have expressed their 
outrage at the disastrous withdrawal and the abandonment of our 
Afghan allies and even American citizens.
    I, too, am deeply outraged and have been equally stunned by 
the lack of leadership shown by President Biden throughout all 
of this. The American people deserve to have a full accounting 
of the President's decision-making processes and what 
ultimately led to a disastrous outcome.
    Gentlemen, this is not about whether or not we should have 
left or not. This is about how we left. We may not get all the 
answers, but the public deserves in today's hearing to know the 
facts surrounding this.
    My first question, two part, regarding Bagram Air Base. 
During the Senate testimony yesterday, General Austin, you said 
the choice to abandon Bagram was made carefully based on the 
mission to protect the Embassy.
    What aspect of security at HKIA made it more secure than 
Bagram? And, following that, you mentioned in your opening 
statement Bagram had little strategic value. If you could 
elaborate on both of those, please.
    Secretary Austin. I certainly didn't say Bagram has little 
strategic value in my opening statement. We can certainly--we 
can break it out and go through it line by line if you would 
like.
    I would point out to you that I commanded Bagram at one 
point in time, so--there may be other people in the room who 
have done that, but probably not. So I know a lot about Bagram 
and what it offers.
    The key point here is that the Embassy was in Kabul. And 
our mission at transition was to provide security, additional 
security, for the Embassy. And, in the event of an evacuation, 
we would have to start with evacuating the Embassy first. And 
so Kabul makes all--I mean, it provides everything that you 
need to be able to do that--capacity, the proximity. And so I 
think it was the right choice.
    Mrs. Bice. But isn't it accurate that HKIA has one runway 
whereas Bagram had multiple runways, which would have made it 
easier for the evacuation of individuals from----
    Secretary Austin. And that is a great point. I would have 
to secure it. The reason we could stay there with 2,500 people 
earlier was because we had the Afghan Security Forces securing 
the outer perimeter of Bagram.
    If you no longer have that, then you have to commit 5 or 
6,000 troops to do that and then secure it, defend it, and then 
run the air ops. So that is a substantial additional commitment 
of resources.
    Mrs. Bice. General Milley or General McKenzie, anything you 
would like to add?
    General McKenzie. I would just like to briefly talk about 
Bagram. It has two runways, but that is actually not what you 
want to examine when you look at an airfield. It is an arcane 
thing called the MOG [maximum-on-ground]. It is the ability to 
load aircraft and move aircraft around the runway. And HKIA had 
better facilities than Bagram for that.
    Additionally, as the Secretary noted, the simple distance 
from where the people are had to be a planning factor. And 
last, of course, we were under direction to go to zero, 650 to 
secure the Embassy. So Bagram was not an option under those 
circumstances.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
    General Milley. I would add, if I could, if you have the 
assumption that there is no Afghan Army, the, 73 towers at 
Bagram, as a minimum, there is 3 big gates. You have to have a 
quick reaction force, you're going to have to patrol out to 
rocket range, and then you're going to have to secure the 30 
miles of road between Kabul and Bagram. We would have never 
been able to get 124,000 people out of Bagram. It just wouldn't 
have happened.
    The center of gravity of a NEO was always going to be HKIA. 
The security issues clearly are different at HKIA than they are 
at Bagram, but Bagram was really not a feasible option given 
numbers of troops, distance, and the security requirements.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, General Milley. Follow-up question, 
you mentioned having to evacuate so quickly. Do you trust the 
information that you are receiving from our intelligence 
community, General Austin?
    Secretary Austin. I have confidence in the information that 
we get from the intel community, yes. That doesn't say that 
they will be 100 percent right all the time.
    Mrs. Bice. Given the fact that it seems as though they did 
not at all plan for a complete surrender of the Afghan forces 
upon the withdrawl of U.S. troops?
    Secretary Austin. They predicted that outcome, but a 
different timeline as we have--you have heard us say before 
so----
    Mrs. Bice. In addition to the botched over-the-horizon 
activity that killed 10 Afghans, still believe that the 
intelligence community can be trusted and is effective?
    Secretary Austin. Again, I have confidence in the intel 
community. In terms of----
    Mrs. Luria [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    I will now recognize Ms. Jacobs for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for 
being here. I would like to follow up on the questions 
regarding the August 29th drone strike that killed Zemari 
Ahmadi, a worker for a Southern California-based aid group and 
nine of his family members, including seven children. And 
General McKenzie, you called the strike a tragic mistake and I 
think we can all agree with that characterization.
    This is an open hearing so I am not going to ask about the 
specific intelligence that led to the strike, but General 
Milley, you said even after the truth was revealed that there 
was a reasonable certainty that the target was valid.
    So I would like to know, do you have that same level of 
confidence in the intelligence that you have had for similar 
strikes carried out under DOD's authority.
    General Milley. Yes, I do. I mean, intelligence is not 
perfect. Intel as Representative Johnson just said or Bice just 
said, it is never perfect. We are not going to get perfection 
in the world of intelligence. They speak in terms of 
probabilistic language, what is more likely than not. And I 
believe that we have good reason to have confidence in our 
intelligence systems.
    They are not perfect, but we have good reason to have 
confidence in them and I think that has been expressed over 
time in the accuracy and precision of these strikes.
    Ms. Jacobs. I understand.
    General Milley. This one strike was bad. It was tragic. It 
was horrible. But that is not to say that the intelligence 
system as a whole is wrong.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. But given that we have actually had 
multiple of these mistakes that we already know about, 
including the AC-130 gunship attack in 2015 that destroyed an 
MSF [Medecins Sans Frontieres] hospital and killed 42 
civilians, what assurances can you give us and the American 
people that our drone program has adequate safeguards?
    And Secretary Austin, you said that the Department has 
endeavored to learn from this latest mistake; what have you 
learned?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks. Again, I would just remind you 
that I have directed a review of this operation and so I won't 
make any comments on specifics here because that review is 
ongoing, but in terms of our commitment to learning from all of 
our operations, we remain committed to doing that and we are 
specifically concerned whenever there is an inadvertent loss of 
life and an injury to civilians, and so we take that very 
seriously and we hold ourselves accountable for that so.
    Ms. Jacobs. Great. And we, in this committee, will be 
looking forward to seeing the results of that review and also 
having accountability.
    General McKenzie, yesterday when asked by Senator Mark 
Kelly about the over-the-horizon counterterrorism, you said, 
and I quote: As we go forward in our ability to create the 
ecosystem that allows you to see on the ground and put it 
together, it is going to be harder in places like Afghanistan, 
end quote.
    I know many of my colleagues have already asked about what 
this means for our ability to counter groups like ISIS-K. I 
have a different question. What does that mean for our ability 
to prevent civilian casualties so that we don't see another 
drone strike like the one that took place in Kabul?
    And if the ability to prevent civilian casualties becomes 
harder, will you and CENTCOM take extra precautions in 
selecting target packages or how are you planning to deal with 
this extra uncertainty.
    General McKenzie. Thank you for the question. The strike 
that was undertaken in Kabul on the 29th was a self-defense 
strike. It was taken because we believe there was an imminent 
attack developing against our forces at HKIA. So that is very 
different than the type of strike we would undertake in an 
over-the-horizon scenario. The principal differences would be 
this: We would not be under the acute pressure of time because 
we thought the attack was imminent, because if we are striking 
a target in Afghanistan, there is actually no immanency to that 
attack. We are talking weeks and maybe months, rather than 
hours or minutes.
    So you have opportunity to develop pattern life. You have 
the opportunity to apply all the other disciplines of 
intelligence that can help us whether that is signal, image, 
human intelligence, and we would work hard to try to 
reconstitute that to a degree. And I will talk more about that 
in a future classified session with you.
    But it would be wrong to believe that the strike in Kabul, 
which I have acknowledged went badly wrong, is the prototype 
that we would employ for past or future over-the-horizon 
strikes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. I will look forward to working 
with you all to make sure that we do that well, and I will note 
your comments on imminence next time we have questions about 
war powers with some of these strikes.
    But with that, I will yield back.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Secretary Austin, General McKenzie, General 
Milley for being here today. It is a very important hearing 
that we are having here. I appreciate the committee's urgency 
in making this happen. While there was bipartisan support for 
withdrawl from Afghanistan, there were differences in opinion 
on how that should have been conducted.
    Something we should all be able to agree on is that the 
withdrawl should have been conditions-based and there should 
not have been any political motivation involved in this 
decision, which I don't think was the actual case.
    But, gentlemen, I would like to ask you, how often were you 
in contact with your Chinese counterpart in discussing our 
evacuation efforts in Afghanistan?
    General Milley. Zero. And I agree with you, conditions-
based.
    Dr. Jackson. General Milley, on August 18th you were quoted 
as saying: The timeframe of a rapid collapse was widely 
estimated in range from weeks to months and even years 
following our departure. There was nothing that I or anyone 
else saw that indicated a collapse of this Army and this 
government in 11 days.
    Between the 18th and the 21st of June, in just 4 days, 21 
districts and 9 provinces fell to the Taliban and the Afghan 
security forces quickly surrendered and abandoned their post. 
This was an obvious beginning to the end of the Afghan Army and 
to the Taliban takeover.
    General Milley, what were you doing during this timeframe? 
Before you answer that question, let me tell you. You were 2 
days--just 2 days prior to when these provinces fell, you were 
here in our committee on June 23rd. You sat before this 
committee and you listed some of your concerns that we talked 
in depth about. One was defending critical race theory in the 
military, telling us you want to understand White rage, telling 
us how offended you were to be labeled as woke, and worrying 
about what caused American civilians to enter the Capitol on 
January 6th.
    I submit to you that perhaps we would not have had 13 
service members and hundreds of Afghans killed, 18 service 
members wounded, and countless U.S. citizens abandoned and left 
as Taliban hostages if you had been more focused on your duty 
to this country instead of defending and pandering to the Biden 
administration's woke social experiment with the United States 
military, doing book interviews, and colluding with Chinese 
military officials.
    Yesterday Senator Cotton asked you why you haven't resigned 
and you said you were not going to resign just because the 
President didn't take your advice. Well, I submit to you, sir, 
that you should resign because of your dereliction of duty to 
this country and your inability to do your job and protect this 
country. It has become abundantly clear that the American 
people have completely loss confidence in your ability to do 
your job.
    General Milley, will you now resign?
    General Milley. I serve at the pleasure of the President, 
Mr. Jackson.
    Dr. Jackson. I yield back my time.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. And just for the 
record, on that date in question, what Chairman Milley was 
doing is he was appearing before this committee at our request 
and answering the questions that we asked him. And I appreciate 
his willingness and the willingness of all the leadership to 
appear before us. That is an incredibly important part of their 
job and I don't want to leave any of you with the impression 
that we don't want you to do it just because of questions like 
that.
    Mr. Kahele is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chairman. Aloha, Secretary Austin, 
Chairman Milley, General McKenzie. Mahalo for all of your 
testimony and taking the time to be here today. As someone who 
has also worn a uniform, still wears a uniform, I am very 
appreciative of your service and having first deployed through 
Operation Enduring Freedom in 2005, I am glad the U.S. 
involvement in the war is over. I support the President's 
decision, however, I am concerned that the accelerated 
withdrawl, the strategic failure and fall of Afghanistan to the 
Taliban has damaged U.S. credibility with our allies and 
partners.
    As a former C-17 mission commander, I will never forget 
those images that I saw early in the morning of 15 August from 
Kabul with total chaos at HKIA and Afghans falling out of the 
sky desperate to flee the country. So I think my questions will 
focus on Secretary Austin's testimony and it is really on the 
NEO operation that my colleagues Rep. Crow and had referred to.
    And so, Secretary Austin, in your testimony you stated that 
military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios. 
In mid-May, you had ordered CENTCOM to make preparations for a 
potential NEO and that on the 10th of August, there was another 
NEO tabletop. When did the State Department actually call for 
the NEO?
    Secretary Austin. I believe it was on the 14th, 
Congressman, 14th of August.
    Mr. Kahele. On the 14th of August the State Department 
called for the NEO. So you stated in your testimony that the 
NEO remains among the most challenging military operations even 
in the best of circumstances and the circumstances in August 
were anything but ideal--extreme heat, a landlocked country, no 
government, a highly dynamic situation on the ground, and an 
active, credible, and lethal terrorist threat. And that also in 
your testimony that you had offered input to the State 
Department that although, mindful of their concerns that moving 
too soon would actually cause a very collapse of the Afghan 
Government that we all wanted to avoid, but that moving too 
late would put our people and our operations at greater risk.
    And so what I am trying to figure out is, you know, despite 
the President's decision to order the withdrawl on April 14th 
and that the troop presence will go to zero. On May 1st, a 
withdrawl began. You know, by May and June of 2021, the Taliban 
had captured a quarter of the country. Representative Crow 
identified on June 11, there was a NEO tabletop that was done.
    On August 6, the Taliban captured the first capital. On 
August 10th, we did a tabletop. Why were we doing a tabletop on 
August 10th when the Taliban was rapidly advancing to Kabul? On 
August 14th, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif fell and by August 
15th, the Taliban had entered Kabul. That is what I am trying 
to figure out, Secretary Austin, is why did we wait--I know we 
had to wait for the State Department to call for the NEO, but 
why did we wait so long to do that, even though we had 
prepositioned forces, as you had mentioned, in Afghanistan. We 
had the 24th MEU there, 82nd Airborne was coming in, but the 
airfield was still in total chaos on August 15th.
    Secretary Austin. So I think what changed the equation 
here--we anticipated that just based upon the disposition of 
forces that were kind of centered around the population center 
that the Afghans would, in fact, put up, you know, more 
significant resistance.
    And so we anticipated that that fighting would be a bit 
more intense. As they approached Ghazni, we didn't see the 
fight that we thought we would see. And that was a trigger for 
us to begin to move some things very quickly.
    And then, even as they moved north of Ghazni, we expected 
that as they approached Kabul that, again, those forces that 
were there would fight more. And we had--there was a government 
in place still at the time, but with the government collapsing 
and leaving and that precipitated the evaporation of the 
security forces and that really panicked the people. And so 
what you saw on that first day was a result of that panic.
    Mr. Kahele. Should the NEO operation have commenced sooner 
than April 14th?
    Secretary Austin. I certainly think it could have, yeah. 
Again, we had the elements to begin to operate a bit sooner. 
But again, that is a State Department call and----
    Mr. Kahele. Totally understand.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. We provide our input and it 
is based upon a lot of things. And this is not throwing my 
State Department colleagues under the bus; it is a very dynamic 
and challenging situation.
    Mr. Kahele. General McKenzie, you stated that primarily our 
NEO plan included AMCITs [American citizens] and Embassy 
personnel. When did the NEO planning begin to include Afghans 
and SIVs?
    General McKenzie. Late in spring, early in the summer. We 
began to broaden that plan.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you for your questions.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Franklin is recognized.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
gentlemen, for your patience and persistence these last 2 days. 
I understand that it is a lot of hours to be sitting before all 
of us and then when you are tailing Charlie like I am in this 
batting order, most of the ground has been broken, but I do 
have a couple things.
    But, first, I was kind of puzzled hearing General 
McKenzie's characterization of our departure now out of 
Afghanistan as being something other than a surrender. You 
know, it doesn't feel that way to me. It certainly doesn't feel 
that way to the American public and 20 years ago exactly I was 
sitting in Bahrain, we were planning the initial strikes into 
Afghanistan, and at that time our marching orders were to 
defeat al-Qaida and to ensure that the Afghanistan would no 
longer be a safe haven for terrorists.
    And now fast-forward 20 years, those conditions while, you 
know, General Milley, you said within maybe to 6 to 36 months 
the country will be ripe, again, potentially to be launching 
strikes like that or targeting against us, it doesn't feel like 
it is anything other than a surrender.
    But General McKenzie, you had mentioned that holding Bagram 
was untenable under the circumstances and that the Bagram 
option went away when you were given an end strength of 650.
    I understand that. I assume that you mean that it was 
untenable because of the troop limitation. But if you had not 
been limited, would your professional military advice been to 
relinquish Bagram?
    General McKenzie. So, at a troop level of 2,500, we would 
have held Bagram and that would have been my recommendation. 
That was my position.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. So you had also mentioned that there 
was no tactical reason to hold Bagram. Would you elaborate? I 
assume that would mean--I don't want to put words in your 
mouth, but strategically would you see a value to us still 
being----
    General McKenzie. When I said there was no tactical reason 
to hold Bagram, I was specifically talking about the NEO 
operation. So once we went down to 650 and then we were given 
the orders to conduct a NEO. For the reasons the Secretary and 
the Chairman have already outlined, the center of gravity of 
that was actually HKIA. It is where the people are. You got the 
MOG operating capacity there to move airplanes in and out.
    I will tell you this, though, Representative, we had a 
branch plan to seize Bagram Airfield should HKIA have become 
untenable, but that would have required as has already been 
noted, significant investment in combat power. And HKIA never 
became untenable.
    So we did not have to consider that plan, although we had a 
highly detailed plan to be able to do it. It simply was not 
necessary because we were able to maintain the throughput at 
HKIA.
    And, again, had we gone into Bagram, we would have 
introduced significant additional U.S. combat forces into the 
country and probably would have provoked another conflict with 
the Taliban, which would have been a political decision, not a 
military decision.
    Mr. Franklin. I understand. Political decision. But, you 
know, here it is since 1898 we have maintained Guantanamo Bay. 
So we do have a history of keeping territory even in lands 
where we don't have friendly forces there at our side, but I do 
know seeing already the challenge with over the horizon--
conducting our strikes over the horizon it sure would be nice 
to have that field now.
    Secretary Austin, I just want to wholeheartedly agree with 
Chairman Smith's comment earlier that we make the decisions in 
the world that we live in and we don't have the luxury of 
having a magic wand. I get that and that is the world you all 
face every day. You told us that you would like to have seen 
this conflict end with a negotiated settlement.
    General Milley, you did as well. I know there has been a 
lot of talk about whether President Trump should have been 
negotiating with the Taliban or not. But that is a different 
conversation for another day, but those terms that were agreed 
to were not really complied with by the Taliban, and here it 
is--we know that, General Milley, in your testimony, seven of 
the eight conditions that were given to the Taliban were 
broken.
    In light of that failure, Secretary Austin, do you think it 
was wise for us to continue with the timeline or do we feel 
compelled because I constantly hear the administration pushing 
back saying we had no choice. Our hands were tied. The Trump 
administration tied our hands to this timeline, but the Taliban 
didn't comply with their end of the deal and now we are kind of 
stuck in a bad situation. Do you feel that we should have 
pushed a timeline not necessarily to stay in Afghanistan. I get 
it. I think there is a time for us to start negotiating an exit 
there, but in light of how disastrous the hasty withdrawl 
turned out to be, we could have used more time to get those 
folks out.
    Secretary Austin. Quite frankly, because of the fact that, 
you know, for a year we weren't striking the Taliban, they were 
increasing in combat power. We released 5,000 prisoners which 
kind of regenerated combat power for them. They were able to 
make advances against the Afghan Security Forces because, you 
know, we weren't doing things to fully support----
    The Chairman. Again, I apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired. That will have to suffice.
    Mr. Panetta is recognized.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. I appreciate this hearing, Mr. 
Chair. And good afternoon and thank you, gentlemen. Thank you 
for being here. Thank you for your service, not just in 
Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], but throughout your career 
service to our great Nation.
    As an American, as a veteran of OEF, I want to thank you 
for continuing to remind the American public not to reduce the 
service of 800,000 men and women who served in Afghanistan down 
to a 2-week chaotic withdrawl, not to reduce the sacrifice of 
the 2,461 men and women down to a single photo of a C-17 on the 
Kabul tarmac.
    But as you know and as an American and as a veteran and as 
a Representative, it is my duty to ask questions. And let me 
tell you, my constituents are asking a lot of questions. And I 
think the problem with the withdrawl is that it has left more 
questions than answers.
    With the withdrawl, we ended our involvement with the war 
in Afghanistan, but we still have the war on terror. We 
withdrew our troops, but will we have to go in? Yes, we 
evacuated 122,000 and you should be proud of that, but what 
about the others who remain?
    And on that note, I just want you to think about the 
definition of success shouldn't be based on how many people you 
got out, but how many people we left behind. And so what I am 
hearing is a lot of frustration from my constituents who have 
family members there in Afghanistan who literally have nobody 
to turn to to get out when it comes to on the ground. They are 
devastated by the deaths of the 12 Marines and the 1 sailor 
and, yes, I got to be frank, they are a little humiliated 
seeing the Taliban drive around, screw around with American 
equipment.
    And this is hyperbole, but I do think it sums it up pretty 
good that I heard this quote about this frustration, and it 
says: Something is not right when the Taliban can get American-
made ammunition easier than Americans can. And four, I do 
believe that we are dumbfounded. Dumbfounded that this 
government, the Afghan Government, absolutely disappeared and 
hundreds of thousands of well-equipped Afghan troops shed their 
uniforms, dropped their weapons, and ran.
    I do believe, though, that the underlying foundation for 
the reason for why this government crumbled and why those 
troops fled is corruption. We basically supported a Potemkin 
village and when we left, it fell. It basically set up a system 
as we saw throughout the 20 years there from birth certificates 
to death certificates, it was all about bribes.
    And what we were left with when we were about to leave was 
a state that had grown so corrupt that governors were cutting 
deals with jihadists to switch sides. Inflation was rampant 
because of the money we handed out and it left ghost soldiers, 
basically absentees listed on the payroll so commanders could 
steal the salaries. Very similar to what happened in Vietnam 
and you are seeing a lot of similarities presented to that 
case.
    And there are a lot of studies obviously after Vietnam 
where it said corruption was the fundamental ill that was 
largely responsible for the ultimate collapse. So my question 
to you is, do you believe that corruption was the fundamental 
ill that was largely responsible for the collapse of the Afghan 
Government? If so, elaborate. If not, what would you consider 
the fundamental ill for the quick collapse of that government?
    Secretary Austin. Thank you. I certainly agree that 
corruption played a major role in the collapse of the 
government and the security forces. I also believe that weak 
leadership added to that and the fact that President Ghani 
frequently, without any apparent reason, changed out his 
commanders which degraded the confidence of the troops in their 
leadership.
    So I think--and I believe also that the Doha Agreement had 
a significant negative affect on the morale of the military. 
And so I think there is, you know, a combination of a number of 
things that came together to create these effects, but I 
certainly agree that corruption was central to this issue.
    Mr. Panetta. General.
    General Milley. Absolutely. And I would even take it one 
level higher. I think it is about the legitimacy of the 
government in the eyes of the people and the eyes of its 
military, and I think that corruption is one of the 
contributing factors to delegitimize.
    It is my observation--again, have to gather all the facts, 
but I think at the village level, the Government of Afghanistan 
was looked at as parasitic as opposed to supportive with the 
exception possibly of the Afghan Army itself. But the 
government, the local officials, the police forces, et cetera, 
were clearly delegitimized in the eyes of the people.
    And that, I think was a major contributing factor to the 
dissolution of the government and the army and the collapse of 
the whole thing in a very, very rapid period of time.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, again.
    I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Okay. We have got quickly Mr. 
Fallon and then Mr. Horsford and we are going to be done. Mr. 
Fallon, you are recognized.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. During this hearing, the 
virtue of courage was used to describe the current President 
and I think that is misplaced. I think the virtue of courage 
should be attributed to the 2,461 troops that we lost, that 
gave everything; the 20,698 that were maimed and injured and 
wounded; and the 800,000 that served. I am a little perplexed 
and thank you for being here. I wanted to clear something up.
    During the testimony, General McKenzie, you were asked when 
you knew that the drone strike on August 29th had gone 
tragically wrong and correct me, just yes or no, you said about 
5 or 6 hours later you learned that. Is that correct?
    General McKenzie. That is when we learned that civilians 
had been killed.
    Mr. Fallon. So it went wrong?
    General McKenzie. No. I did not say that.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay.
    General McKenzie. I said that is when we learned that 
civilians had been killed----
    Mr. Fallon. Would you have considered 5 or 6 hours later a 
righteous strike?
    General McKenzie. We took that strike based on the belief 
that the vehicle was going to be used in an attack against us.
    Mr. Fallon. So we knew that people that shouldn't have been 
killed were killed 5 or 6 hours after, yes?
    General McKenzie. We knew that probably people that were 
not involved [inaudible] took us a little longer to learn the 
rest of the story.
    Mr. Fallon. Agreed. Secretary Austin, same? You learned 
about 5 or 6 hours after that people that should not have been 
killed were killed?
    Secretary Austin. I learned from General McKenzie's 
reporting that there was collateral damage. And whenever that 
happens, we investigate.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you. Okay. And then, General 
Milley, on September 1st, 3 days later, you described it as ``a 
righteous strike.'' People that were not supposed to be killed 
were killed and you described it as ``a righteous strike.''
    General Milley. You have to go back and look at the full 
quote. What I said was, we followed the procedures, I had every 
reason to believe that we followed our procedures at that point 
in time. We knew that there were civilians killed. We knew they 
were noncombatants and there was collateral damage.
    Mr. Fallon. Yes. You said were others killed? Yes. Who were 
they, we don't know. We are trying to sort through all that.
    General Milley. That is right. Because I believed, I 
believed that the target that we were aiming----
    Mr. Fallon. Sir----
    General Milley. I believe the target we were aiming at----
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. I have 3 more minutes. Now General 
Milley, you served under both President Trump and Biden?
    General Milley. Correct.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. I have spoken with former Secretary of 
State Pompeo, had a very extensive conversation with director--
former National Director of Intelligence John Ratcliffe, and 
what was the general sentiment of senior advisers if conditions 
weren't met, what would happen in Afghanistan?
    How long the Afghan Army and government would last? Do you 
recall that? I would imagine you were sitting in on those 
meetings.
    General Milley. I am not sure I am understanding the 
question. If conditions are not met----
    Mr. Fallon. If conditions aren't met and we withdraw, how 
long is the Afghan Government going to last--back then?
    General Milley. I am not going to speak for them; I will 
speak for myself----
    Mr. Fallon. Please do.
    General Milley. I am on record having said that if we go to 
zero that there is a high probability of the government and the 
Afghan Army collapsing. In terms of time, I put that at between 
1 and 3 years at the time I wrote this stuff back in a year ago 
in the fall of 2020.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. That is interesting when you say that 
because when I talked to both Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Ratcliffe, 
they told me that there was unanimity, even President Trump 
said, if conditions are not met that the Afghan Army and the 
government would collapse within weeks and the longest they 
heard maybe a month or two. That's what they gave me. Because I 
was just surprised that because Secretary Austin said in his 
remarks today that the fact that the Afghan Army--we and our 
partners trained simply melted away in many cases was a shock.
    John Ratcliffe told me he told his successor that they were 
going to collapse instantaneously if those conditions weren't 
met; they were going to evaporate. And now [inaudible] but I 
think--General Milley, with all due respect----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Fallon [continuing]. What I think it is, it was not a 
failure of intelligence; it seems to me--I didn't know this 
stuff. I wasn't in the room, you were, that it was a failure to 
heed that intelligence and act accordingly.
    General Milley. I can show you the intelligence reports 
that were produced under Mr. Ratcliffe----
    Mr. Fallon. I appreciate that. I have 50 seconds left. 
Thank you.
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Fallon. All right. So we got 5,000 bad guys in Bagram, 
in jail at Bagram, right? Am I right, General McKenzie? And 
then we go down to 650, we can't hold it so we split around 
July 1st I think we left.
    General McKenzie. 12th.
    Mr. Fallon. July 12th and it fell August 15th, correct? And 
they got out then? August 16th? And then we have an attack on 
our troops couple weeks later. Can any of you guarantee the 
American people that out of those 5,000 bad guy scumbags none 
of them were directly responsible for killing our troops?
    General McKenzie. No. I cannot guarantee that.
    General Milley. I cannot guarantee that, no.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Horsford is recognized.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 
Secretary. And to the generals I will be brief. I have several 
questions and appreciate your concise response.
    General McKenzie, on August 30th, you told the media that 
while you maintained the ability to bring American citizens and 
civilians out until immediately before the departure of the 
final flight, no civilians were on those aircraft and that 
mission ended approximately 12 hours before the exit.
    So to clarify, when did the last American citizen 
successfully pass through Taliban perimeter into HKIA gate.
    General McKenzie. That is a very specific question. I will 
have to come back to you on the record, but I will come back to 
you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 164.]
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you. And when did the last Afghan 
civilian successfully pass through the gate?
    General McKenzie. Same thing. It was some hours before, but 
I will come back to you with an exact time on that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 164.]
    Mr. Horsford. And how many individuals successfully passed 
through the Taliban perimeter in the 72 hours proceeding the 
departure of the final flight?
    General McKenzie. Probably in the low hundreds, but I will 
come back to you with an exact number.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 164.]
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you. I understand that on August 19th 
ground commanders authorized the use of helicopters to rescue 
169 Americans from the Baron Hotel after the initial plan for 
them to proceed on foot became too dangerous. At what time were 
rotary wing aviation assets no longer operation at HKIA?
    General McKenzie. So, first of all, you are right. The 
Baron Hotel, we should note, is about 200 meters off the HKIA 
compound. So it is not a long distance, but we did use 
helicopters for that. We kept helicopters up until the very 
end. In fact, one of the final things we did before actually 
extracting from the C-17s was breaking down some helicopters 
and loading them.
    Mr. Horsford. And what were the specific contingency plans 
to continue the evacuation if the Taliban closed checkpoints 
surrounding the airport?
    Mr. McKenzie. So at all times we were prepared to accept 
American citizens that were able to make it to the gate. There 
was an external Taliban cordon. We've talked about that. The 
external Taliban cordon was actually part of the force 
protection scheme for the base. Commanders on the ground had to 
balance their force protection against the need to allow 
Americans, SIVs, and others to enter. So we tried to work 
closely when we could with the Taliban to ensure free passage 
for Americans.
    Mr. Horsford. So why then were the plans not implemented 
once it became clear that no additional American citizens were 
going to be allowed to pass through the Taliban checkpoints?
    General McKenzie. We attempted with the Taliban to allow 
Americans to be able to get to the gate up until the very end. 
I do not have facts on why that did not happen. Our presence on 
the ground then, we should remember, was very small and we were 
beginning to turn inward as we prepared to extract.
    Mr. Horsford. General Milley, in 2017, the GAO [Government 
Accountability Office] released a report on recommendations to 
enhance the readiness of the Global Response Force to support 
contingency operations. In June of 2021, GAO assessed that the 
Department had not implemented any of their three 
recommendations to improve readiness due to the ongoing 
development of the dynamic force employment concept.
    So I am curious, what percentage of the total Immediate 
Response Force [IRF] and existing prepositioned forces deployed 
in support of Operation Spartan Shield were deployed to HKIA to 
assist in the NEO? And how many additional battalions intended 
to be-- IRF follow-on force were available for short notice 
deployment but not deployed?
    General Milley. We had and I will--Frank, can correct me 
100 percent here in a minute, but we had two battalions, the 
MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit], and another Marine battalion 
prepositioned in the Middle East, along with an Army infantry 
battalion prepositioned in the Middle East, and there was a 
battalion already on the ground.
    So that is four, plus we alerted on the Secretary's order 
marshaled and deployed the IRF--and the GRF [Global Response 
Force], which is a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, very, 
very rapidly and we had 6,000 troops at HKIA very, very 
rapidly. I think we far exceeded any of the standards that are 
published for the GRF or the RF [Response-Force]. In addition 
to that, we had a variety of high end special operations forces 
that alerted, marshaled, and deployed extraordinarily rapidly. 
So we easily met any kind of rapid deployment standards and we 
exceeded them.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our 
military men and women and to our veterans who served over the 
20 years during this longest war in U.S. history. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for your 
testimony today and I know certainly it was a contentious 
hearing, but it is enormously important that we have the 
opportunity to have these conversations. I do not in any way 
support some of the comments that some of my colleagues made or 
the way they chose to conduct themselves, but that is a small 
price to pay for the transparency that we need to allow the 
committee to do its job.
    I appreciate you being willing to do that in giving us the 
opportunity to have this discussion and we will certainly 
continue to discuss the situation in South Asia as we go 
forward. Appreciate your testimony.
    Mr. Rogers, anything for the good of the order?
    Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, the one thing I would like to ask 
is that as soon as practical that we do have the classified 
hearing on the over-the-horizon capabilities because as I have 
spoken individually with all three of these gentlemen, I am 
very concerned about our counterterrorism capabilities and how 
we are going to address that.
    The Chairman. We will have multiple classified hearings on 
that subject. That is going to be an ongoing topic, but yes, it 
is something we need to do soon.
    Thank you.
    Again, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                           September 29, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                           September 29, 2021

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                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                           September 29, 2021

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                           September 29, 2021

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY

    General Milley. To my knowledge, the Taliban never deliberately 
attacked U.S. or Coalition forces after the signing of the Doha 
Agreement. There were isolated instances of Taliban rocket and mortar 
fire targeting ANDSF bases that were also cohabited by U.S. Forces. On 
occasion there were reports of Taliban fighters returning fire at U.S. 
combat aircraft providing close air support to ANDSF.
    However, the Taliban failed to fully honor other commitments from 
the agreement, including their pledge to not allow terrorists to use 
the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States. 
They also failed to earnestly negotiate with the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to end the conflict and failed to 
reduce violence overall. Moreover, Taliban actions, including its 
brutal military campaign and targeted assassinations, completely 
undermined the spirit of the agreement, which sought a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict, not a military takeover.  [See page 28.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
    Secretary Austin. The Battle of Kunduz took place in 2015, which 
was the first year of the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist 
mission. During that period, the Taliban briefly captured Kunduz City. 
With the support from U.S. forces, the Afghan forces recaptured the 
city from the Taliban within a couple of weeks.  [See page 33.]
                                 ______
                                 
           RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to gather 
information about the ISIS network responsible for the Abbey Gate 
bombing and to analyze the ISIS planning and personnel, including the 
bomber, involved in the attack. We received credible information 
regarding a threat to Hamid Karzai International Airport in the days 
leading up to the attack. Unfortunately, we were unable to disrupt the 
attack.   [See page 36.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Secretary Austin. We planned for multiple scenarios, including a 
contingency where the United States would have to facilitate the 
evacuation of our Afghan allies under difficult circumstances. The 
Department began planning for the possibility of a noncombatant 
evacuation operation (NEO) two weeks after the President's decision in 
April to withdraw from Afghanistan by early September, at which point 
military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-
May, I ordered U.S. Central Command to prepare for a potential NEO and 
DOD began prepositioning forces in the region, including three infantry 
battalions.
    A key DOD effort in support of expediting Special Immigrant Visa 
(SIV) processing was the establishment of ``Project Rabbit,'' through 
which DOD provides employment verification of SIV applicants who worked 
for DOD contractors or subcontractors directly to the Department of 
State. DOD has also endorsed and uploaded referrals for Afghan 
nationals under threat due to their association with DOD's mission into 
the Department of State's refugee referrals database. DOD will continue 
processing these referrals for as long as we continue to receive them 
directly from DOD personnel. In addition, the DOD has hosted tens of 
thousands of Afghan nationals on our facilities abroad and now at home 
as part of Operation Allies Welcome and Operation Allies Refuge.   [See 
page 40.]
    General Milley. Throughout the planning and withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from Afghanistan, my primary focus was on safe and deliberate 
retrograde U.S. forces, contractors, citizens, and Afghan evacuees from 
Afghanistan. I had direct communications with Secretary Austin, General 
McKenzie, General Miller, leaders in the Intelligence Community, the 
Secretary of State, and the National Security Council to share 
information, collaborate, and maintain a common operational picture on 
the activities in Afghanistan. My staff, at all levels, maintained 
communication to coordinate support for to these activities with their 
respective military and interagency (IA) counterparts.
    Following the President's announcement on 14 April 2021 to withdraw 
U.S forces from Afghanistan, I immediately established a crisis 
management team (CMT) and later an Afghan evacuee cell to track the 
progress of the plan and enable operations. My staff provided me daily 
briefings that included intelligence updates, subordinate commanders' 
estimates, the status of security transition to Afghan security forces, 
the retrograde of U.S. and Coalition forces and equipment, the status 
of American Citizens (AMCITs), and the status of Afghan Special 
Immigrant Visa (SIV) and other Afghan at Risk personnel in the country.
    On 28 April, I hosted a DOD internal Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) 
Drill focused on the retrograde plan and its branches and sequels. On 8 
May 2020, I hosted an Interagency table top exercise to review the 
retrograde timeline and multiple contingency operations that included 
the evacuation of non-combatant personnel. On 6 August 2020, my staff 
hosted a Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) rehearsal with the IA leaders 
to discuss the security, logistics, authorities, funding, and other 
requirements to enable the conduct of a conditions-based evacuation of 
AMCITS, SIV, and Afghan at Risk personnel.
    In coordination with the Department of State and U.S. Embassy 
Kabul, CENTCOM completed contingency planning and prepositioned forces 
to support a NEO shortly after this rehearsal. From 14-31 Aug 21, DOD 
facilitated the evacuation of over 124,000 AMCIT, Afghan SIV, and 
Afghan at Risk personnel as part of Operation Allies Refuge. The DOD's 
Operation Allies Welcome and the relocation of Afghan SIV and Afghan at 
risk personnel continues today. My staff provides me daily updates on 
the movement personnel from Afghanistan and adjacent countries. This 
includes the relocation of Afghan personnel from locations in the 
Middle East and Europe to military bases in the Continental U.S. We 
have successfully received over 84,000 Afghan personnel and resettled 
over 78,000 in the U.S. to date.   [See page 40.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
    General Milley. The purpose of the 8 May 21 Interagency table-top 
exercise (TTX) was to refine and ensure a fully coordinated and 
synchronized USG and NATO plan for retrograde of forces and personnel 
from Afghanistan. My staff continued to conduct daily meetings with 
their State Department counterparts to maintain situational awareness 
and reinforce the need for a more-involved Interagency planning effort 
to ensure the development of a coherent NEO plan.   [See page 66.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
    Secretary Austin. The Department has multiple efforts underway, 
including by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, to conduct an independent review of the evacuation, 
the events leading up to it, and lessons learned. The Department is 
committed to understanding what worked, what did not work, and ensuring 
that we incorporate that into our planning and our strategic assessment 
going forward.   [See page 77.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                           September 29, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. I agree that ``over the horizon'' operations can be 
effective. However, I am concerned that, without complementary 
operations, they will be insufficient to keep us safe. Secretary 
Austin, are you confident that over the horizon capabilities, on their 
own, can mitigate the terrorist threat we face?
    Secretary Austin. Department of Defense over-the-horizon operations 
employ a mix of capability that contribute to a holistic and 
interagency counterterrorism strategy. The Unites States has 
significant operational and intelligence capability, to deny external 
operations by terrorist organizations that would threaten the homeland. 
We continue to work with our partners in the region, who share our 
interest in promoting a safe and stable South Asia and preventing a 
resurgence of terrorism.
    Mr. Langevin. Former CIA director and Secretary of Defense Panetta 
said that our national security is threatened by the Taliban takeover. 
One of our missions was to prevent a haven for terrorist groups and 
``we have failed in that mission.'' Are you confident that we can 
prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven?
    Secretary Austin. As the President has stated, we have one vital 
national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent terrorists from using 
Afghanistan to launch attacks against the United States. Department of 
Defense over-the-horizon operations employ a mix of capability that 
contribute to a holistic and interagency counterterrorism strategy. Our 
counterterrorism strategy layers multiple sources of intelligence to 
maintain awareness of terrorist threats with the capability to disrupt 
those threats directed against the homeland and our other interests. 
The United States has significant operational and intelligence 
capability, to deny external operations by terrorist organizations that 
would threaten the homeland. We continue to work with our partners in 
the region, who share our interest in promoting a safe and stable South 
Asia and preventing a resurgence of terrorism.
    Mr. Langevin. The director of the DIA has assessed that al Qaeda 
could threaten the homeland in 1-2 years. How will we keep our country 
safe?
    Secretary Austin. The Department remains committed to ensure that 
Afghanistan cannot become a safe haven for terrorist organizations that 
threaten the homeland, and we will use all of the Department's 
capabilities in service of that goal. We will continue our 
comprehensive, focused intelligence collection to inform U.S. kinetic 
and non-kinetic over-the-horizon capabilities. In addition, we will 
share appropriate intelligence with like-minded partners with 
capabilities to disrupt terrorist threats using a variety of means. 
Security cooperation within the region is also a key pillar of this 
strategy, working with those governments directly affected by 
terrorists and who are well-positioned to counter the threat.
    Mr. Langevin. General Milley, we have other train and equip 
programs and counterterrorism missions around the world, and we'll 
likely have more as great power competition heats up. How can we better 
train and equip partner forces? How important is the on-the-ground 
human intelligence?
    General Milley. We can better train and equip partner forces by 
more thoroughly accounting for regional and local politics and building 
a deeper understanding of their country's institutional and logistical 
capacity to absorb our assistance. We must also carefully balance the 
partner's priorities and concerns with our own, cultivating a sense of 
local-ownership and accountability.
    On-the-ground human intelligence can be important in validating 
other forms of intelligence, which together increase our confidence in 
threat assessments.
    Mr. Langevin. I am also concerned about how many SIV applicants and 
holders remain in Afghanistan. They risked their lives for us and now 
are under a very real threat from the Taliban. General McKenzie, is 
there an impression amongst Syrians and Iraqis that it's too risky to 
serve as an interpreter or intelligence asset for the U.S.? How are you 
mitigating this possibility?
    General McKenzie. Currently, the linguist situation in OIR is 
different from that of Afghanistan in August 2021. CJTF-OIR does not 
utilize local national linguists and has not done so since April 2020 
(when Partner training and the use of local nationals outside of the 
bases ceased due to COVID). Today, OIR's linguists are either trained 
uniform military members/government employees or U.S. Citizens hired 
and vetted as part of a U.S. Government contract to work in Syria and 
Iraq. However, the OIR Intelligence Community has observed no 
indicators that Iraqis or Syrians view working as a U.S. intelligence 
asset as too risky. Neither is there any appearance of a lack of desire 
among Syrians and Iraqis to perform linguist duties for the United 
States. Many are willing to risk everything to do so, often in hopes of 
earning a SIV or as a mechanism to secure their local neighborhood.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
    Mr. Wilson. Even before the August 31 withdrawal of troops, there 
were frustrating reports of Americans and Green Card holders being 
turned away at the gates of the airport or being instructed by the 
Administration and the U.S. military to stay away from the airport 
entirely.
    Did you at any point ask President Biden for more time or support 
to enable U.S. forces to stay and complete a full evacuation of 
American citizens (AMCIT), as promised? If so, what was President 
Biden's response?
    Secretary Austin. My judgment remains that extending beyond August 
31 would have greatly imperiled our people and our mission, as it would 
have dramatically increased security risks to U.S. forces. Since that 
time, the U.S. Government has continued its mission to evacuate U.S. 
citizens and lawful permanent residents--to date, more than a thousand 
have departed by air and land routes.
    Mr. Wilson. How many citizens, green card holders, and Afghan 
allies were left behind by the military's premature withdrawal on 
August 31st? What is the plan now to get these vulnerable people out of 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Following the non-combatant evacuation operation 
phase, the Department of Defense continues to support the Department of 
State-led efforts to facilitate the safe and orderly departure of U.S. 
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and Afghans allies who wish to 
leave Afghanistan. Since September 1, 2021, the U.S. Government has 
continued that mission--to date, more than a thousand have departed by 
air and land routes.
    Mr. Wilson. What U.S. military capabilities existed in Afghanistan 
following President Biden's April 14th announcement to withdraw all 
forces? When was air support to the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces (ANDSF) stopped? When was logistical support withdrawn? 
For how long after April 14th was the U.S. able to conduct intelligence 
activities?
    Secretary Austin. On 14 April, there were approximately 4,000 U.S. 
service members in Afghanistan in primarily advisory and support roles. 
U.S. capabilities at this time included organic fixed and rotary wing 
aviation and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Between 14 
April and 31 July, eight bases were retrograded and consolidated 
resulting in a force of approximately 650 U.S. service members to 
support U.S. Embassy Kabul and HKIA operations. This retrograde was 
conducted in a deliberate manner to meet the President's direction 
while mitigating risk to force and risk to mission. U.S. air support 
missions continued throughout the month of August 2021. Strikes in 
support of ANDSF were conducted as late as 13 August 2021. During the 
NEO, air support was largely focused on support of operations at HKIA. 
While our logistical support capabilities to the ANDSF and the 
Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) decremented to some extent during the 
retrograde, a great deal of effort was focused on providing logistical 
support from over-the-horizon (OTH) locations, which continued through 
the fall of Kabul. Intelligence collection continued without decrement 
until the completion of the NEO on 30 August. It continues to this day, 
albeit at greatly diminished capacity.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
    Mrs. Hartzler. Secretary Austin, is it true that the suicide bomber 
who attacked the Kabul Airport on August 23 was a CIA prisoner at the 
Bagram Air Base whom the Taliban released after Biden's Administration 
left Bagram in July?
    Secretary Austin. I defer to the CIA for a response.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Should Stage I of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 
have been activated sooner than August 22, 2021?
    Secretary Austin. No. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) augments 
Department of Defense (DOD) airlift requirements in emergencies when 
the need for airlift exceeds the capacity of available military 
aircraft. DOD activated Stage I of the CRAF in anticipation of the need 
for additional long-range international passenger aircraft as we 
expanded evacuation efforts. Activating the CRAF earlier could have 
negatively impacted the commercial carriers' ability to meet their day-
to-day operational commitments before the additional capacity was 
required.
    Mr. Scott. Did the inter-agency process work as planned during the 
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Department of Defense planning for the retrograde 
operation was robust, and there was significant interagency 
participation throughout the process. The President received regular 
updates on the progress of the retrograde and the security situation in 
Afghanistan. He sought out all perspectives, including from the 
Department of Defense, throughout the process.
    Mr. Scott. Are you willing to declassify the necessary documents 
that pertain to the decisions to reduce forces in Afghanistan in order 
to invade Iraq?
    General Milley. If directed, we could declassify what are Joint 
Staff equities that we are the classification authority on. Most of 
this, would be outside JS classification authority and would reside 
with Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Mr. Scott. In your military opinion, should the Chief of Mission 
have declared a NEO sooner than August 14, 2021?
    General Milley. The decision to order a NEO is for civilian 
leadership and policymakers, not military officials, to make.
    In preparation for a possible NEO, and following the President's 
decision to remove military forces from Afghanistan, CENTCOM updated 
contingency planning for a non-combatant evacuation operation, in 
coordination with the Department of State, including Embassy Kabul.
    Because the Department of Defense had prepositioned forces in the 
region and run practice exercises, thousands of troops were able to 
arrive in Kabul, secure the airport, and facilitate the NEO.
    Mr. Scott. Did the inter-agency process work as planned during the 
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
    General Milley. Yes. Principals from DOD, DOS, DHS, the 
Intelligence Community and the various agencies involved in planning 
the Afghanistan withdrawal and subsequent non-combatant evacuation 
engaged in robust communication and coordination leading up to the 
withdrawal and throughout both operations. Frequent National Security 
Council-led Interagency Policy Committee meetings, Deputies meetings 
and Principals meetings exhaustively examined the issues and developed 
options, directly engaging the President throughout the crises. Senior 
leaders across the interagency were kept informed and provided input on 
all major decisions related to the withdrawal and evacuation.
    Mr. Scott. How did the 8 May 2021 senior officials level 
interagency table top exercise miss the impact of the Afghan's morale/
confidence in the aftermath of the July 5, 2021 withdrawal from Bagram 
in the dead of night?
    General Milley. The DOD was unable to effectively gauge the morale 
of the Afghan Security Forces (ANDSF) after we removed U.S. advisors 
from its units. The withdrawal of embedded advisor teams from ANDSF 
units virtually eliminated America's ability to monitor, track, and 
mitigate flagging Afghan morale and confidence. Additionally, the 8 May 
21 TTX occurred only three weeks after the President announced the 
complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces. At that time, the Taliban 
had not yet initiated its decisive offensive effort against the ANDSF 
and the primary indicators of Afghan government stability had not been 
put under stress.
    Mr. Scott. When can we expect Joint Pub 3-68 Noncombatant 
Evacuation Operations be updated to reflect the lessons learned from 
the Afghanistan NEO?
    General Milley. The Joint Force learned multiple lessons during the 
conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Afghanistan. 
These lessons are already being incorporated into planning for any 
potential contingency NEOs. Joint Publication (JP) 3-68 Noncombatant 
Evacuation Operations is under revision with the Joint Doctrine 
Development Community (JDDC). Joint Staff J-3 will complete 
consolidation of comments and lessons learned from the Joint Force in 
April. The Director of Operations, Joint Staff J-3, will approve JP 3-
68 at the end of July. Once signed, JP 3-68 will be published and 
available to the Joint Force as early as August 2021.
    Mr. Scott. Mirror Imaging is clearly one of the many mistakes of 
the Afghan War. Do the War Colleges need to do a better job of teaching 
their students about the dangers of mirror imaging?
    General Milley. As I stated in my testimony on 28 September 2021, 
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to build the Afghan military in the 
mirror image of U.S. forces is a significant lesson for the Department 
of Defense (DOD) to consider and address as we prepare for future wars. 
In Afghanistan, we based the training of Afghan security forces on 
``American doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. . .(and we) 
made a military that may have been overly dependent upon us, our 
presence, contractors, and higher tech systems. . .to fight a 
counterinsurgency war.'' Applying strategic and operational lessons 
from the War in Afghanistan into education of joint force professionals 
aligns with my 2020 Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Professional 
Military Education. The war colleges use this guide to educate and 
develop students to effectively assess national security challenges in 
order to serve as future strategic leaders, planners, and advisors. The 
document directs the war colleges to incorporate case studies, like the 
War in Afghanistan, to improve experiential learning. Through this 
process, students apply analytical frameworks to strategic and 
operational problems in order to develop critical thinking, judgment, 
and complex problem-solving skills. The war colleges will continue to 
adapt curricula with lessons from the War in Afghanistan to better 
prepare our joint force professionals for future service at the 
strategic level of the U.S. government.
    Mr. Scott. In response to questioning, you stated that you 
recognized Afghanistan was a stalemate 5-6 years ago. Obviously, this 
was before your time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What is 
the responsibility of the nation's senior military officer to both the 
Commander-in-Chief and the American public should the armed forces of 
the United States ever find themselves engaged again in a stalemate?
    General Milley. I'm the principal military advisor to the 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and NSC as outlined in title 10, 
sec 151 of U.S. code. The chain of command goes from the President, to 
the Secretary Defense, to the combatant commanders, and the secretaries 
of the military departments. My job is strictly advisory--I am very 
much involved but I do not have decision authority. I am expected to 
give my advice and ensure the President is fully informed on military 
matters. I give my best military advice and it's up to the President to 
make decisions.
    Mr. Scott. AMCIT Charlotte Maxwell-Jones is the director and 
founder of Kabul Small Animal Rescue, a veterinary clinic and animal 
rescue organization. Ms. Maxwell-Jones and her team had over 100 dogs 
in their custody in Hangar 12 of HKIA for nearly a week awaiting 
evacuation. All of these dogs had health certificates, proof of rabies 
vaccinations, and in the case of over 50 working dogs, photographs 
identifying them. The dogs were working dogs, family pet dogs of U.S. 
citizens who were forced to leave them behind during the chaos of the 
evacuation, and some dogs that had been rescued by the charity.
    While Maxwell-Jones was offered safe passage out of the country, 
the dogs were not permitted on any of the flights, even when there was 
room and didn't take a seat from any human beings. In the end, Maxwell-
Jones was escorted out of the airport and the dogs were released from 
their carriers and crates before the U.S. military evacuated. The 
result was the confiscation of the working dogs by the Taliban 
government, the horrific deaths of some dogs, and the survival of 
some--of which Maxwell-Jones is still trying to rescue.
    Why was Maxwell-Jones and the dogs in her care not granted space on 
any evacuation flights? Who made the decision not to permit them safe 
passage to the United States and why? Why was Maxwell-Jones not given 
the opportunity to exit the airport with the dogs?
    General Milley. U.S. Customs restrictions, stipulated in the 14 Jun 
21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the Department of 
Health and Human Services notice entitled ``Notice of Temporary 
Suspension of Dogs Entering the United States from High-Risk Rabies 
Countries,'' prevented the U.S. military from evacuating the Kabul 
Small Animal Rescue dogs. Afghanistan was listed as one of the high-
risk rabies countries in the notice.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
    Mr. Brooks. We have had 20 years to study this country and think 
about our potential exit. The communication issues between the 
Department of State and the Pentagon that have plagued our efforts 
throughout the last two decades certainly manifested themselves in the 
end. I think you all know the difference between tactical and strategic 
successes and that one does not necessarily equal the other. How do you 
plan to assess these historical problems and address them in moving 
forward with strategic planning to counter and deter China?
    Secretary Austin. Given that the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
is increasingly synchronizing its military and non-military efforts to 
achieve its strategic objectives, it is essential that the Department 
of Defense (DOD) and other U.S Government departments and agencies are 
aligned to address the challenge posed by the PRC. President Biden's 
Interim National Security Strategy has set forth a whole-of-government 
agenda that will strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to 
prevail in strategic competition with the PRC. Pursuant to that 
strategy, DOD and other U.S. Government departments and agencies, 
including the Department of State, will work together as we address the 
China challenge, taking into consideration the critical role of 
interagency coordination and synchronization.
    Mr. Brooks. We have had 20 years to study this country and think 
about our potential exit. The communication issues between the 
Department of State and the Pentagon that have plagued our efforts 
throughout the last two decades certainly manifested themselves in the 
end. I think you all know the difference between tactical and strategic 
successes and that one does not necessarily equal the other. How do you 
plan to assess these historical problems and address them in moving 
forward with strategic planning to counter and deter China?
    General Milley. We continuously assess and review our operations 
for relevant insights and improvements. The withdrawal from Afghanistan 
is no exception. We are already incorporating lessons from these events 
into our approaches and processes for dealing with other strategic 
challenges, to include China. In fact, given the magnitude of the China 
challenge, there is no way to deal with it except through robust 
interagency coordination.
    The National Security Council is already implementing a robust 
schedule of China-focused interagency meetings at all levels: 
Interagency policy Committees, Deputies Committees, and Principals 
Committees. They have added a weekly China Communications Hub meeting 
to increase cross-agency visibility and coordination of strategic 
messaging related to China.
    Achieving better integration across Departments, especially two as 
large and complex as DOD and State, comes down to developing positive 
personal relationships between principals and staff at all levels. The 
experience of the Afghanistan withdrawal provided a crucible to forge 
those relationships among our present leadership. More than scheduled 
meetings, these relationships break down the traditional bureaucratic 
stovepipes and are helping us move forward in addressing the issues 
your question highlights.
    Mr. Brooks. Reuters issued a transcript copy of a June 23 phone 
call between President Biden and President Ghani. In this call, Biden 
tells President Ghani ``there's a need, whether it is true or not, 
there is a need to project a different picture.'' Did this lack of 
confidence expressed by the President ever give the Administration 
pause in considering our withdrawal at that point or consider providing 
reinforcement to the Afghan National Security Forces? If not, why not?
    General Milley. I did not participate in this phone call, nor am I 
familiar with those details. However, I want to go back to the tasking, 
the mission that we had from the President, which was to execute a 
deliberate, responsible, coordinated, synchronized strategic retrograde 
from Afghanistan, of all U.S. military forces. We executed the 
retrograde as directed and evacuated over 124,000 people from the 
country of Afghanistan. Ultimately, the legacy of our nation's efforts 
in Afghanistan are the 20 years that have passed without a major 
terrorist attack on our homeland as the reslt of the efforts of our 
brave men and women overseas, as well as the thousands of Afghans who 
are now living in freedom in the United States.
    Mr. Brooks. Did CENTCOM suggest Bagram would be the best option to 
prevent bottlenecks and logistical challenges for an evacuation?
    General McKenzie. My assessment was that Bagram Air Field (BAF) was 
not a suitable location for any potential NEO based on its distance 
from Kabul and the U.S. Embassy Kabul (USEK).
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, public reporting last year 
highlighted the key role NSPM 13 has played in executing offensive 
cyber operations as part of U.S. efforts to defend forward. It was 
reported that a key element of the success was the delegation of 
authority to act to the Secretary of Defense once a campaign was agreed 
to. Without discussing any specific campaigns or plans, are these 
operations continuing at an equal or greater pace under the Biden 
Administration? If not, what impediments are you experiencing to 
continuing this reportedly successful program?
    Secretary Austin. The existing U.S. policy framework for approving 
offensive cyber operations continues to enable the Department to 
effectively perform its mission to disrupt threats overseas at the 
source. Our forces operate routinely in cyberspace to maintain 
awareness of the evolving cyber environment, observe adversary 
activities, and generate opportunities to disrupt foreign malicious 
cyber activities. The Department conducts offensive cyber operations 
when threats meet the threshold for action as established in policy. 
Challenges exist as cyberspace is a domain of fleeting opportunity and 
constant change.
    Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, the Pentagon has said repeatedly 
in recent years that the Indo-Pacific is its ``priority theater.'' If 
INDOPACOM is the priority theater, would you agree that INDOPACOM 
should be the option of last resort for sourcing requests for forces by 
other combatant commands, particularly for high-demand, low-density 
assets? As the Department of Defense formulates options for conducting 
over-the-horizon counterterrorism options in Afghanistan, have you 
provided explicit guidance to minimize the use of forces assigned to 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command? If not, would you take this opportunity to 
publicly provide that guidance? If not, why not? As our over-the-
horizon planning takes shape, would you commit to having your staffs 
report back to this committee on the specific steps you took to avoid 
allocating forces assigned to INDOPACOM?
    Secretary Austin. The Department's focus is on China as the pacing 
challenge, and this is our priority throughout the Global Force 
Management (GFM) process. The GFM process provides a robust review of 
available forces with the expertise, training, readiness, and 
experience necessary to successfully complete the mission and includes 
scrutiny at multiple levels within the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Their 
combined recommendations provide the foundation for a Department-wide 
approach to address emergent crises and global challenges. I am 
confident that our current processes prioritize requirements related to 
the INDOPACOM theater and that we can maintain this focus effectively 
while also addressing global counterterrorism requirements, including 
in Afghanistan. As always, we would be happy to answer any questions 
you may have on how we are meeting the China challenge and executing 
over-the-horizon counterterrorism missions, in a classified setting.
    Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, I understand the National Security 
Council held a drill on May 8 where the interagency rehearsed the 
withdrawal. Can you please tell the Committee who from each cabinet 
Department represented their agency?
    Secretary Austin. Extensive planning was conducted across a range 
of U.S Government departments and agencies and the DOD was a full 
participant at all levels.
    Mr. Gallagher. General Milley, U.S. forces, sensors, and platforms 
vary in their relevance for an over-the-horizon counterterrorism 
operation. Would you agree that an aircraft carrier operating from the 
Arabian Sea is a relatively expensive and inefficient way to conduct 
counterterrorism operations? When INDOPACOM is our priority theater, 
and when strategic competition with China and Russia are the top 
priorities of our strategy, is it really the best use of our limited 
fleet of aircraft carriers to operate in the Arabian Sea monitoring 
terrorist groups in Afghanistan?
    General Milley. Multiple factors contributed to the decision to 
maintain a Carrier Strike Group in the CENTCOM region through the 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation and in the period immediately after, 
including the need to preserve options to protect U.S. citizens and our 
allies in Afghanistan. Additionally, the near proximity of the Carrier 
Strike Group greatly reduced the requirement for airborne refueling 
capacity, reducing risk to force and mission. The Carrier Strike 
Group's position was continuously evaluated throughout the operation 
and it was moved as soon as the situation warranted.
    As a global force, the Department of Defense strives to balance 
priorities worldwide. We align capabilities, not specific assets, to 
these priorities and there are many factors to consider when doing so. 
This often means an asset like an aircraft carrier, with its wide range 
of capabilities and great mobility, will shift from one Combatant 
Command to another as we adjust forces globally in support of our 
highest priorities.
    Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, did you convey the Taliban's 
offer, during your meeting with Mullah Baradar, to allow U.S. forces to 
take control of Kabul to the President? Who made the decision to turn 
down the Taliban offer to allow the U.S. military to secure Kabul and 
put the safety of our troops in the hands of the Taliban?
    General McKenzie. I met with the Taliban in Doha alongside 
Ambassador Khalilizad, however in our discussions the Taliban did not 
provide a sincere offer to secure Kabul. Securing Kabul would have 
required the additional deployment of a reinforced combat division, 
which would have had to deliberately clear the city before securing its 
outer perimeter--activities that would have provoked overt hostilities 
with the Taliban and jeopardized the NEO. During this meeting, I 
reaffirmed the specific purpose for my participation: to warn the 
Taliban of the severe consequences of interfering with our NEO. The 
Taliban pledged that they had no intention of doing so and subsequently 
abided by this commitment. I reported key elements of the meeting to my 
chain of command afterward.
    Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, on September 29th you said the 
attack on FOB Chapman did not breach the Doha agreement, Did we respond 
with lethal force to the attack on our base? Did the Taliban get the 
message not to breach Doha Agreement via air strikes, drone strikes, 
special operations? By not responding to an attack, doesn't that send a 
message to Taliban? A message they could act with impunity and Biden 
Administration wouldn't respond?
    General McKenzie. Following the Doha Accord (29 Feb 20), there were 
three indirect fire attacks against FOB Chapman from late March to 
early April 2021. All three were attributed to the Taliban, who, we 
assessed, thought it was unlikely that we would meet the 1 May 2021 
deadline to withdraw U.S. forces and perhaps intended to apply pressure 
to meet the deadline. No U.S. or Afghan forces were injured or killed 
during these attacks, but CNN later reported that seven Afghan 
civilians were reportedly injured (outside the wire) during one of the 
attacks. There were no operations conducted specifically in response to 
these attacks. I cannot speculate whether the Taliban interpreted a 
non-response to the attacks as evidence that they could act with 
impunity against U.S. forces. However, the overall level of violence 
was reduced following the Doha Agreement. Although a permanent and 
comprehensive ceasefire was an agenda item for dialogue and 
negotiations, an attack on U.S. forces between 29 February 2020 and 31 
August 2021 confirmed to have been conducted by the Taliban or forces 
under its direction could be understood as a violation of one of the 
Taliban's commitments under the Doha Agreement. However, determinations 
concerning whether any particular engagement or engagements violated 
the Doha Agreement were policy matters, to be informed by USCENTCOM's 
military assessments, rather than military decisions for USCENTCOM to 
render.
    Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, on September 29th, you testified 
the Doha Agreement negatively affected Afghan Troops. Did the failure 
of the U.S. to enforce Doha conditions have an even greater impact on 
Afghan troops? Did abandoning Bagram without notice have a negative 
impact on Afghan troops?
    General McKenzie. I believe the February 2020 Doha Agreement was 
the operational reason for the eventual collapse of GIRoA. It is not 
possible to overstate the pernicious and devastating affect this 
agreement had on the ANDSF, particularly aggravated by our negotiation 
strategy, which did not subsequently apply conditions. Subsequent 
announcements regarding reductions of U.S. force levels contributed 
further to the sense of demoralization, as did the closure/handoff of 
our bases. Bagram was handed off to the ANDSF in coordination with its 
leadership. Nothing indicates that the handoff of this particular base 
had any effect on ANDSF morale, which was already in terminal decline 
by that point.
    Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, does an over the horizon posture 
require a partner on the ground? Do you see the Taliban as that 
partner? Typically, OTH requires neighboring partners as well. Do we 
have any of those around Afghanistan, such as any Central Asian 
partners who may have agreed to help?
    Do you have confidence that Pakistan will allow us to use their 
airspace if we need to go after al Qaeda? Our air assets will take much 
longer to reach Afghan airspace than when we could fly them out of 
Bagram, correct? Does this mean that they will have less time on 
target?
    General McKenzie. An OTH posture does not necessarily require a 
partner on the ground. There are capabilities that can strike a threat 
without partner forces on the ground. OTH does require neighboring 
partners. We are currently staging out of the Gulf region and DoS 
continues to coordinate with Central Asia Countries on agreements for 
conducting OTH operations. In closed-door meetings we are quietly 
discussing with Pakistan the continued use of their airspace. Assets 
will take longer to get to Afghanistan than assets originating in 
Afghanistan. Air assets originating outside of Afghanistan will have 
less time on target. This can be minimized but not erased by using 
multiple assets.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
    Mr. Keating. Secretary Austin, were NATO allies consulted on the 
decision to withdraw by August 31st? Did you consult with any NATO 
leaders about withdrawal on August 31st? Were NATO in agreement about 
withdrawal? Were they consulted during the withdrawal as well? How many 
of these countries had troops on the ground in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. DOD, along with our counterparts throughout the 
U.S. Government, conducted dozens of consultations and engagements with 
Allies and partners leading up to the April 14, 2021, announcement to 
withdraw forces from Afghanistan. This coordination continued through 
the conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan, 
and consultation remains a priority as the Alliance engages in the 
process of examining lessons learned that will inform current and 
future operations.
    NATO's Resolute Support Mission focused primarily on training, 
advising, and assisting Afghans working at the security-related 
ministries, in other government institutions, and among the senior 
ranks of the army and police. At the time of the April 14 announcement, 
7,000 non-U.S. military personnel from 35 NATO and non-NATO countries 
supported RSM.
    Mr. Keating. In my capacity as a member of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, I had the opportunity to question the Special Representative 
for Syria Engagement. Specifically, I asked about the timeframe between 
the decision to withdraw our service members to when our allies in the 
region were notified. I was surprised to hear that hours, or possibly 
days, transpired before our allies were notified. Moreover, they had to 
hear about the decision in the media. During my questioning, the 
Special Representative admitted that was a mistake. I want to know if 
that mistake was repeated during our withdrawal in Afghanistan. How 
long after the decision to fully withdraw our service members from 
Afghanistan were our allies notified?
    General Milley. U.S. Government officials from different agencies 
and departments conveyed to Allies and partners who had personnel and 
citizens on the ground alongside the United States in Afghanistan the 
President's decision. Those communications took place over the course 
of weeks in different formats--in Washington, at NATO and CENTCOM, in 
the capitals of those Allies and partners, and on the ground in 
Afghanistan. The discussion was continuous with the sharing of critical 
fresh information and coordination for the evacuation of their citizens 
and Afghan nationals.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
    Mr. Banks. Secretary Austin, During the Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing on September 28th, you confirmed to Senator Cotton 
that Secretary Blinken missed an important Rehearsal of Concept drill 
at the Pentagon on May 8th, 2021 that discussed Afghan withdrawal. 
Instead, he sent Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources 
Brian McKeon in his place. Did Secretary Blinken indicate why he needed 
to miss such a critical meeting? Did Secretary Blinken state where he 
would be instead of at that event? Did Secretary Blinken use any DOD 
assets, whether aircraft, air bases, personnel, ground transport, etc. 
to travel during in the days before or following this critical exercise 
between May 7, 2021 and May 10, 2021?
    Secretary Austin. For information on Secretary Blinken's travel 
schedule and logistics, I recommend contacting the Department of State.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
    Ms. Escobar. What is the Department of Defense's guidance with 
respect to any military-grade weapons, vehicles, and equipment being 
turned over to DLA as a result of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Military Departments make the determinations for 
the disposition of their military grade weapons, vehicles and 
equipment. As U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) determined that items 
were no longer needed, USFOR-A checked Military Department databases 
that provide specific disposition instructions. These databases 
indicated whether to prepare items for retrograde out of Afghanistan or 
to turn the item over to DLA for disposal. If a Military Department had 
a requirement for the item, it was typically retrograded for use by 
other units. If there was no requirement for the item indicated by a 
Military Department, disposition instructions typically direct a 
transfer to DLA for disposal. DLA would then dispose of the materiel in 
accordance with DOD Manual 4160.21 volumes 1 and 3.
    Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon, 
and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control 
over Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. It is clear that the international community has 
a stake in ensuring that the Taliban lives up to its public 
commitments. We continue to engage the Taliban on our core interests in 
Afghanistan, including counter-terrorism, safe passage for individuals 
seeking to leave Afghanistan, and inclusive governance.
    Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of 
international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first 
place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. The terrorist threat that exists today is not the 
same threat that brought us to the region in 2001. Over the last 20 
years, terrorist organizations have evolved their methods and 
structure--but make no mistake: we have evolved our methods and 
capabilities as well. Our advances in biometrics, global information 
sharing, and security cooperation have increased security measures 
throughout the world. Department of Defense over-the-horizon operations 
employ a mix of capability that contribute to a holistic and 
interagency counterterrorism strategy. The Unites States has 
significant operational and intelligence capability, to deny external 
operations by terrorist organizations that would threaten the homeland. 
We continue to work with our partners in the region, who share our 
interest in promoting a safe and stable South Asia and preventing a 
resurgence of terrorism.
    Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to 
placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
    Secretary Austin. I will not speculate on future policy decisions. 
Any decision to return to Afghanistan would be made by the President.
    Ms. Escobar. Can you provide any clarity on the backlog of refugee 
cases and/or SIV applicants that still need to be processed? Given that 
it was the DOD that contracted and worked closely with these allies and 
their families on the ground, what is the Department's level of 
involvement in the SIV clearance and resettlement efforts now that DHS 
is leading much of the resettlement efforts?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of State and the Department of 
Homeland Security are the lead federal agencies for the Special 
Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
(USRAP), respectively. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been 
involved in the interagency process to accelerate SIV processing since 
these efforts began in March. We continue to work closely with the 
Department of State to accelerate SIV processing. A key DOD effort in 
support of expediting SIV processing was the establishment of ``Project 
Rabbit,'' through which DOD provides employment verification of SIV 
applicants who worked for DOD contractors or subcontractors directly to 
the Department of State. DOD has also endorsed and uploaded numerous 
referrals for Afghan nationals who are under threat due to their 
association with DOD's mission directly into the State Department's 
refugee referrals database. DOD will continue processing these 
referrals for as long as we receive them directly from DOD personnel.
    Ms. Escobar. While I commend the Department for their steadfast 
efforts that helped pull thousands of allies and others from the region 
in a timely manner, I was hoping to get clarity on why were evacuation 
efforts not ramped up when President Biden set the August withdrawal 
date in April 2021?
    Secretary Austin. Throughout the planning process, the Department 
of Defense collaborated closely with the Department of State on 
security arrangements for our Embassy in Kabul and options for 
evacuation. In April, the Department of State began reducing the 
Embassy staff, ordering non-essential personnel to depart, and issued 
numerous messages to U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, urging them to 
depart and offering assistance to do so. The Department of Defense 
offered inputs to Department of State's planning efforts, mindful of 
concerns that urging people to leave too quickly might have created a 
sense of panic and cause the very collapse of the Afghan Government 
that we sought to avoid. The fact that our forces were on the ground so 
quickly to support the non-combatant evacuation is due in large part to 
our planning and our pre-positioning of forces.
    Ms. Escobar. With many of the SIVs here in the U.S. being housed at 
military installations, how will the Department care for those Afghans 
it pulled out? And how will it care for those at risk that it has not 
yet pulled out?
    Secretary Austin. Regarding care for persons evacuated from 
Afghanistan and hosted at Department of Defense (DOD) installations, 
DOD is honored to host our guests and is dedicated to treating our 
guests with dignity and respect while we care for their needs. DOD is 
supporting the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and 
Human Services and working closely with non-governmental organizations, 
and State and local authorities to provide our Afghan guests an 
appropriate level of support. This includes transportation from the 
port of entry to the location of the accommodation, local 
transportation in and around the installation, provision of housing and 
other necessary facilities for the humanitarian needs of individuals 
and families, sustainment, and necessary medical and dental care 
(including medical screenings and referral to off-base, non-DOD care, 
if necessary).
    Regarding other at-risk Afghans, DOD continues to support the 
Department of State-led efforts to facilitate the safe departure of 
U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and other Afghans who 
are eligible for resettlement who wish to leave Afghanistan. Since 
September 1, 2021, more than a thousand individuals have departed 
through air and land routes.
    Ms. Escobar. The New York Times and other sources have reportedly 
claimed that at least 100,000 people were left behind, who might be 
eligible for expeditated U.S. visas. What is the Department's strategy 
to continue providing protections for such populations and eventually 
bringing them to safety here in the U.S.?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to support 
Department of State-led efforts to facilitate the departure of U.S. 
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, Special Immigrant Visa applicants 
and other Afghans who are eligible for resettlement. The DOD supports 
the Department of State team, led by the Coordinator for Afghan 
Relocation Efforts (CARE), in interagency engagements and those with 
private organizations to align efforts to enable the safe departure of 
these individuals out of Afghanistan. This includes weekly interagency 
meetings attended by senior leaders from OSD and the Joint Staff, and 
DOD has embedded liaison officers with the State/CARE team to inform 
DOD policy and support and the larger U.S evacuation and relocation 
effort.
    Ms. Escobar. Do you feel like the U.S. intelligence community 
provided your personnel with credible and accurate assessments of the 
situation on the ground and especially on what would be an 
astonishingly quick fall of Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces?
    Secretary Austin. We evaluated the situation in Afghanistan based 
on a number of different diplomatic, military, and intelligence 
assessments, and these assessments yielded a number of different 
scenarios we believed were possible. DOD planned for these various 
scenarios, including a potential noncombatant evacuation operation 
(NEO) under duress. This prudent planning led to the pre-positioning of 
thousands of forces in the region who were ready to deploy in support 
of the NEO.
    Ms. Escobar. How would knowing what we did not know about the 
expeditious fall of Kabul have changed things in terms of our exit, if 
anything?
    Secretary Austin. The rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense 
and Security Forces (ANDSF) took us by surprise. However, we had 
developed numerous plans for a range of scenarios, and we were prepared 
for this contingency. As it began to look increasingly likely that the 
ANDSF would collapse rapidly, I directed the inflow of additional 
forces into theater to prepare for and execute the evacuation.
    Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon, 
and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control 
over Afghanistan?
    General Milley. As our relations with the Taliban are a diplomatic 
issue, I defer to the White House or the Department of State for a 
response.
    Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of 
international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first 
place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
    General Milley. We remain committed to preventing Afghanistan from 
becoming a terrorist safe haven. In conducting Over the Horizon 
Counterterrorism (OTH-CT), the Joint Force leverages the full breath of 
intelligence collection capabilities, to include Airborne Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Airborne ISR), Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature 
Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to gain and 
maintain understanding of terrorist networks' activities and 
intentions. When authorized, the Joint Force can also employ a variety 
of offensive capabilities, to include precision strikes, to address 
threats to the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad.
    Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to 
placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
    General Milley. It would take a Presidential determination that 
U.S. military forces on the ground in Afghanistan are necessary to 
defend against a threat to the United States. It would require a 
significant U.S. military force, at tremendous risk, to establish any 
military footprint back in Afghanistan.
    Ms. Escobar. Can you provide any clarity on the backlog of refugee 
cases and/or SIV applicants that still need to be processed? Given that 
it was the DOD that contracted and worked closely with these allies and 
their families on the ground, what is the Department's level of 
involvement in the SIV clearance and resettlement efforts now that DHS 
is leading much of the resettlement efforts?
    General Milley. The resettlement process is a Department of State 
(DoS) responsibility, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not monitor 
the processing times/backlogs in the SIV application process. Since the 
start of evacuations from Kabul in July 2021, the DOD has housed over 
84,000 Afghan evacuees at 11 different OCONUS Lily Pad facilities and 8 
different CONUS Safe Havens. Over the past two months (Dec and Jan), 
DOD has closed six different CONUS Safe Havens. As of 7 Feb, DOD 
currently houses 935 Afghan evacuees across two OCONUS Lily Pads and 
4,820 Afghan evacuees across two CONUS Safe Havens. A total of 2,264 
Afghan evacuees remain at the UAE Humanitarian City in Abu Dhabi, 
administered by the UAE government. At each of the DOD military bases, 
DOD has provided wrap-around services to include food, basic medical 
care, vaccinations for Measles and Varicella in-line with CDC guidance 
for Afghans traveling to CONUS, initial health screenings and 
documentation to support the SIV application process, and data entry 
efforts and contracts to process information for Afghan evacuees.
    Ms. Escobar. While I commend the Department for their steadfast 
efforts that helped pull thousands of allies and others from the region 
in a timely manner, I was hoping to get clarity on why were evacuation 
efforts not ramped up when President Biden set the August withdrawal 
date in April 2021?
    General Milley. As soon as President Biden set the August 
withdrawal date, the Department of Defense increased focus on the safe 
and deliberate withdrawal of U.S. Forces, contractors, citizens, and 
potential Afghan evacuees. I established a crisis management team that 
developed indicators, planned and executed rehearsals, and monitored 
all aspects of the Afghanistan withdrawal to include non-combatant 
evacuations in the event of a breakdown of the diplomatic mission in 
Kabul. Once those indicators were tripped, and at the request of the 
Department of State, DOD transitioned to the non-combatant evacuation 
operation; In April 2021, our planning assumption within the crisis 
management team was that the U.S. would maintain a diplomatic mission 
in Kabul.
    If you remember, in April the Afghan government was still in place, 
their military was still intact, and we expected the government and 
Afghan National Security Forces to maintain control of the country at 
least until the Fall. Specific to non-combatant operations, the mission 
was to secure the Embassy, keep the Embassy open, and maintain a 
diplomatic mission. In May, I hosted an interagency table top exercise 
to review the retrograde timeline and contingency operations while my 
staff provided daily intelligence updates, the status of Afghan 
security forces along with U.S. and coalition forces, and monitored the 
status of American Citizens (AMCIT) and Afghans holding and applying 
for Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) as well as other Afghan at risk 
personnel.
    On 6 Aug, my staff hosted a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation 
(NEO) rehearsal with international assistance leaders to identify and 
address any issues that we might come across in the process. Once the 
NEO was declared, we facilitated the evacuation of over 124,000 AMCIT, 
Afghan SIV, and Afghan at-risk personnel as part of Operation Allies 
Refuge. As of 7 Feb, we have continued to help 1,198 AMCITs and legal 
permanent residents (LPRs) evacuate back to the U.S. or third countries 
since 31 August, and have successfully evacuated and safely integrated 
over 84,000 Afghans.
    Ms. Escobar. With many of the SIVs here in the U.S. being housed at 
military installations, how will the Department care for those Afghans 
it pulled out? And how will it care for those at risk that it has not 
yet pulled out?
    General Milley. The Department of State (DoS) is responsible for 
Afghan evacuees located overseas. Once evacuees arrive in the U.S., the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumes responsibility for their 
care. At their request, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides 
assistance to both DoS and DHS, including providing facilities to house 
the evacuees and medical support. Water, beds and bedding, shuttle 
services, latrines and showers, food service, linguists, spaces for 
recreation and religious observations, and power generation are also 
provided. Additionally, further expansion on these sites has provided 
cultural and recreational improvements such as space for movies, games, 
and meeting with population representatives. As requested, the DOD will 
continue to provide appropriate services to all current and future 
residents of the temporary safe havens that reside on current military 
installations or on a non-DOD installation or facilities.
    Ms. Escobar. The New York Times and other sources have reportedly 
claimed that at least 100,000 people were left behind, who might be 
eligible for expeditated U.S. visas. What is the Department's strategy 
to continue providing protections for such populations and eventually 
bringing them to safety here in the U.S.?
    General Milley. Adjudication of applications for U.S. visas--
whether Special Immigrant (SIV) or refugee (categories P1 or P2) are 
the responsibility of the Department of State.
    The Joint Staff and Department of Defense work closely with the 
Department of State and non-governmental organizations to ensure that 
persons eligible for potential resettlement in the United States are 
afforded any support to which they might be entitled while the 
processing of their applications proceed.
    Ms. Escobar. How would knowing what we did not know about the 
expeditious fall of Kabul have changed things in terms of our exit, if 
anything?
    General Milley. In the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an 
accelerated withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary 
conditions risked losing the substantial gains made in Afghanistan and 
could precipitate a general collapse of the Afghan security forces and 
the Afghan government, resulting in a complete Taliban takeover or a 
general civil war. There are many lessons to be learned, to include the 
reasons for the unprecedented speed of the collapse of the Afghan 
Security Forces.
    Ms. Escobar. What equipment, if any, does the DLA plan to dispose 
of through the 1033 program?
    General McKenzie. All U.S. origin equipment procured under the 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) which was in the process of 
transfer to the GIRoA is under the de facto control of DSCMO-A. 
Following the 1532 notification to Congress, the equipment will revert 
to U.S. military service control. The services will make a final 
determination as to the disposition of the equipment, including 
transfer of unwanted equipment to DLA for further disposition or 
disposal. U.S. Central Command is not aware of DLA intentions or 
disposition plans.
    Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon, 
and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control 
over Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. DOD will follow the direction of the 
Administration regarding U.S. relations with the Taliban. DOD will work 
with the other departments to execute a strategy developed and led by 
the National Security Council. In terms of the Taliban consolidating 
control, we anticipate the Taliban will attempt to consolidate control 
over Afghanistan, however, there are many steps and several opposition 
groups that stand in the way of the Taliban being able to achieve this 
aim.
    Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of 
international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first 
place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. While challenging, we will work hard to keep the 
threat of international terrorism at bay as we draw upon the lessons we 
have learned over the last 20 years. The USG interagency team continues 
to address the threats posed by international terrorism through 
interagency coordination and action. As it relates to Afghanistan, the 
DOD plans to maintain an over the horizon (OTH) capability to identify 
and target emerging threats. DOD will also support DoS as it continues 
to coordinate with allies and partners on a regional counter-terrorism 
(CT) approach to address concerns posed by violent extremist 
organization (VEO) activities.
    Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to 
placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
    General McKenzie. A future U.S. foothold in Afghanistan would 
require a POTUS-level decision. As appropriate, DOD will support DoS in 
decisions the Administration makes regarding a future U.S. presence in 
Afghanistan.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. A consistent frustration of mine throughout the 
evacuation was the inability of the administration to communicate a 
clear set of procedures and guidelines to congressional staff, refugee 
advocates, and Afghans on the ground during the evacuation at Kabul 
airport. When can we expect briefings for staff on lessons learned from 
the lack of clear communication during the evacuation; the current 
process to evacuate Afghans from Afghanistan; and what is being done to 
ensure communication failures like this do not happen again in the 
future?
    Secretary Austin. The Department is supportive of congressional 
proposals for an independent commission to review the U.S. government's 
20-year war in Afghanistan. We also have efforts underway, including by 
the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, to conduct an independent review of the evacuation, the events 
leading up to it, and lessons learned. The Department is committed to 
understanding what worked, what did not work, and ensuring that we 
incorporate that into our planning and our strategic assessments going 
forward.
    Mr. Morelle. One of the challenges with helping SIV applicants 
leave Afghanistan has been getting the necessary documents that prove 
they served with our military or American contractors. The Department 
of Defense has a crucial role to play as a part of the SIV process; 
Afghans must obtain an employment letter then receive a letter of 
recommendation from their supervisor, and finally get verification of 
that recommendation letter. These steps have proven to be a significant 
hurdle for Afghans who may not be able to contact their previous 
employer or whose supervisor is no longer serving with the armed forces 
or employed as a defense contractor. There are similar issues with the 
P-2 program. What can DOD do to expedite this process for SIVs and P-2 
applicants still on the ground in Afghanistan, and how can we change 
this process in the future?
    Secretary Austin. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 
Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD A&S) has partnered with the Defense 
Digital Service (DDS) and Department of State's Afghan Special 
Immigrant Visa (SIV) team to help expedite and streamline the SIV 
process for Afghan nationals who were employed by contractors of the 
Department of Defense (DOD). This effort is called Project Rabbit. The 
goal of the project is to simplify the Employment Verification & Letter 
of Recommendation phase of the SIV application process. Project Rabbit 
has replaced the need for companies to write employment verification 
letters and letters of recommendations for each of their Afghan 
employees who have applied for a SIV. HR data and employment records 
are voluntarily provided by companies and matched to data in the 
National Visa Center's (NVC) SIV applications submitted by Afghans who 
worked under USG contracts, specifically DOD contracts. Since mid-
August, DOD has helped verify information for more than 4,000 SIV 
applicants who were missing employment documentation and otherwise 
would not have moved forward in the SIV processing.
    Mr. Morelle. Our 20 year-long presence in Afghanistan was an 
enormous undertaking costing hundreds of millions of dollars, overseen 
by four administrations and countless dedicated service members both in 
Afghanistan and in the Pentagon. Now that the U.S. military mission in 
Afghanistan has ended, how does the department plan to reallocate 
dollars and resources to the new challenges this country faces while 
maintaining an over the horizon counter-terror presence in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Terrorism remains a persistent and enduring 
global threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) will retain the assets 
and capability to monitor and counter threats to the United States and 
our allies that emanate from Afghanistan. To conduct over-the-horizon 
operations, the U.S. Government has committed aerial intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and other collection 
capabilities to support this mission, and we are working with partners 
in the region to develop a range of options to enable direct action 
when necessary. This will require continued engagement with regional 
partners to ensure the United States has viable access, basing, and 
overflight.
    DOD is taking key steps to prioritize future challenges--most 
notably, focusing on China as our primary pacing challenge. DOD must 
shift resources from legacy platforms and weapons that are ill-suited 
for technologically-advanced threats, to investments in cutting-edge 
technologies and capabilities that will provide a military advantage to 
the U.S. Joint Force. DOD must combine new technologies with existing 
capabilities, continue to develop new operational concepts, and 
strengthen our bonds with Allies and partners, to meet our vision for 
integrated deterrence.
    Mr. Morelle. One of the challenges with helping SIV applicants 
leave Afghanistan has been getting the necessary documents that prove 
they served with our military or American contractors. The Department 
of Defense has a crucial role to play as a part of the SIV process; 
Afghans must obtain an employment letter then receive a letter of 
recommendation from their supervisor, and finally get verification of 
that recommendation letter. These steps have proven to be a significant 
hurdle for Afghans who may not be able to contact their previous 
employer or whose supervisor is no longer serving with the armed forces 
or employed as a defense contractor. There are similar issues with the 
P-2 program. What can DOD do to expedite this process for SIVs and P-2 
applicants still on the ground in Afghanistan, and how can we change 
this process in the future?
    General Milley. As the SIV application process owner, any future 
changes to the SIV and P-2 application processes are at the discretion 
of the Department of State (DoS). Verification of former employment or 
support to the Department of Defense in Afghanistan is a part of the 
DoS-owned SIV application process.
    Mr. Morelle. With thousands of our Afghan SIV's and allies still on 
the ground in Afghanistan, how will the individuals on the ground be 
identified, contacted, issued visas, and manifested on a flight? If 
there is not currently a plan in place, what processes are being 
preliminarily discussed? Furthermore, we have seen credible reports 
that the Taliban are requiring passports and visas for any Afghans let 
onto international flights, how do we plan to get Afghan's passports 
and visas without a presence on the ground.
    General McKenzie. The State Department's Coordinator for Afghan 
Relocation Efforts, Ambassador Beth Jones, oversees the U.S. 
Government's ongoing efforts to facilitate the relocation of 
individuals from Afghanistan through commercial or charter flights and 
overland routes. Currently the State Department is using civilian 
aircraft to transport individuals. USCENTCOM contributes to the process 
by supporting relocated individuals' temporary stay in third-country 
transit points, such as Qatar and UAE. USCENTCOM continues to support 
the U.S. Government's efforts to press the Taliban to allow all people 
who want to leave Afghanistan to do so, including American citizens and 
Afghans.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting 
intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and 
intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air 
Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military 
installation over 20 years?
    Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct 
intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
    Secretary Austin. Following the April 14 decision to withdraw U.S. 
forces from Afghanistan, the Department of Defense conducted a planned 
transition as part of the retrograde operation, including transitioning 
Bagram Air Force Base to the Afghan National Defense Forces. The 
Department of Defense considered a range of options, but ultimately, 
the Department's military task was to protect the American diplomatic 
presence in Kabul--and if needed, to conduct a non-combatant 
evacuation--from Kabul's airport. The Department of Defense transferred 
Bagram Air Base to the Afghan government, following extensive 
consultations.
    Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting 
intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and 
intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air 
Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military 
installation over 20 years?
    Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct 
intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
    General Milley. U.S. policy directed a full withdrawal of the 
military from Afghanistan, leaving only the Department of State led 
diplomatic mission in Kabul. Continuing operations at Bagram, even just 
for counter-terrorism purposes would have been inconsistent with that 
policy. Further, once U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan dropped below 
1,000 personnel it was no longer feasible to hold and sustain both 
Bagram and the international airport in Kabul.
    Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting 
intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and 
intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air 
Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military 
installation over 20 years?
    Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct 
intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
    General McKenzie. Bagram Air Field's closure was a function of 
policy decisions to limit U.S. troops to approximately 650 personnel 
with the mission to secure the U.S. Embassy and support the Turkish-led 
security of HKIA. Therefore, it was not feasible to retain Bagram Air 
Field in an operational status.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
    Mr. Kahele. Secretary Austin, General Milley--DOD is providing 
important support to our Afghan allies who are now spending weeks at 
U.S. military bases, many without legal counsel to prepare their 
immigration cases.
    Q1: Can you share your thoughts on how DOD and Congress can work 
together to help expedite getting Afghan evacuees from DOD 
installations into American communities, and how can we make their 
resettlement successful?
    Q2: Would you support legislation that would help Afghan adjust 
their immigration status, especially given that so many were forced to 
destroy their documentation to protect themselves as they left 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. Response for Q1: DOD is supporting the 
Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and State 
by providing temporary housing, sustainment, and other support. DOD 
defers to the Departments Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, 
and State to address the resettlement process.
    Response for Q2: Regarding care for persons evacuated from 
Afghanistan and hosted at Department of Defense (DOD) installations, 
DOD is honored to host our Afghan guests and is dedicated to treating 
our guests with dignity and respect while we care for their needs. DOD 
is supporting the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health 
and Human Services and working closely with non-governmental 
organizations, and State and local authorities to provide our guests an 
appropriate level of support. This includes transportation from the 
port of entry to the location of the accommodation, local 
transportation in and around the installation, provision of housing and 
other necessary facilities for the humanitarian needs of individuals 
and families, sustainment, and necessary medical and dental care 
(including medical screenings and referral to off-base, non-DOD care, 
if necessary).
    Mr. Kahele. Secretary Austin, General Milley--DOD is providing 
important support to our Afghan allies who are now spending weeks at 
U.S. military bases, many without legal counsel to prepare their 
immigration cases.
    Q1: Can you share your thoughts on how DOD and Congress can work 
together to help expedite getting Afghan evacuees from DOD 
installations into American communities, and how can we make their 
resettlement successful?
    Q2: Would you support legislation that would help Afghan adjust 
their immigration status, especially given that so many were forced to 
destroy their documentation to protect themselves as they left 
Afghanistan?
    General Milley. Over the last two weeks of conflict, the U.S. 
military helped evacuate more than 124,000 Americans, Afghans and other 
allies--the largest military airlift in history. We continue to support 
the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security as the 
lead agencies for the resettlement of Afghan evacuees, and will 
continue to support them within the bounds of law and policy.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
    Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and 
trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the 
world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
    Secretary Austin. The threat from terrorism remains a global and 
persistent concern. We remain engaged with our partners and Allies 
globally who have shared interests in mitigating the threat of 
terrorism, both within their own countries and trans-regionally. A 
joint approach and persistent engagement, across all levels of DOD, is 
the cornerstone of how we affirm our commitments to our Allies and 
partners. At the same time, the Department's pacing challenge is China, 
and we are balancing our focus accordingly. In recent years we have 
dedicated considerable resources to current and future requirements 
needed to enhance integrated deterrence with our Allies and partners to 
deter Chinese aggression, assure regional stability, and deny a Chinese 
victory should deterrence fail. We also recognize the ongoing threat 
posed by Russia and its proxies. I am confident that DOD can 
appropriately balance strategic competition requirements while also 
effectively executing our counterterrorism mission.
    Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and 
trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the 
world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
    General Milley. Confidence and trust in the U.S. military remains 
strong among our Allies and Partners. We continue to be actively 
engaged and synchronized with Allies and Partners in our operations 
around the globe. Each day we participate in deterrence activities and 
training exercises side by side with Allies and Partners, and in the 
case of countering violent extremist organizations, combined combat 
operations. At the same time, the Joint Force continues to build 
confidence with Allies and Partners through close consultation and 
coordination in a number of routine bilateral and multilateral fora 
that include, but are not limited to, NATO, the FVEY nations, the 
Military Framework for countering violent extremist organizations, and 
other military coalitions. These fora enable us to work with our Allies 
and Partners to achieve military objectives and desired strategic 
effects related to competition with China and Russia, while enabling 
Ally and Partner capabilities to counter violent extremist 
organizations. Most importantly, within these fora, we have increased 
our communications and taken action to include them earlier in our 
planning processes to ensure their national systems are provided the 
time needed to align with ours. We are removing ambiguity and providing 
them with clarity. It is a balance as we work with Allies and Partners 
countering violent extremist organizations to safeguard the homeland--
ours and our Allies' and Partners'--while simultaneously working with 
them to compete against China and Russia.
    Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and 
trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the 
world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
    General McKenzie. The dynamics in South and Central Asia have 
changed with our departure from Afghanistan. However, the threats that 
brought the Coalition together still remain. DoS and DOD continue to 
develop and build relationships with our allies and partners through 
security cooperation efforts. These efforts aim to build trust with our 
partners so that we may enable their action in the region. Engagement 
with Central Asian States continues through military sales and multiple 
training exercises and opportunities. The more engagement and placement 
the U.S. has in the region, the more likely we are to counter Russian 
and Chinese influence through cost imposition.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. I am increasingly concerned that the military does not 
have the regional basing and cooperation agreements required for 
establishing effective over-the-horizon counter-terrorism capabilities. 
In May, Mr. Helvey confirmed that the Administration had not yet 
secured the necessary agreements in the region to establish over-the-
horizon capabilities. Did the Administration secure any such agreements 
prior to the U.S. military's full departure from Afghanistan on August 
31?
    Secretary Austin. The Department is currently conducting over-the-
horizon operations supported by agreements in the region and has been 
since before August 31.
    Mr. Moore. You testified on June 23rd that you had developed and 
were executing a detailed plan to conduct a ``safe, orderly, and 
responsible'' withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the Taliban began to gain 
momentum in the weeks that followed, was there ever a discussion within 
the Administration of slowing that withdrawal or altering the plan as 
the Taliban began to take control of significant portions of the 
country?
    Based on your assessment of how things were going in June, how did 
things derail so quickly? How was the Administration so caught off 
guard and ill-prepared for the overrun of Kabul on August 15th?
    Secretary Austin. As part of the planning process, I had many 
discussions with my interagency counterparts on the security situation 
in Afghanistan during the withdrawal. One aspect of these discussions 
was prudent planning for a range of scenarios, including a potential 
evacuation under difficult circumstances. The fact that our additional 
forces were on the ground so quickly to support the evacuation is due 
in large part to our planning and our pre-positioning of forces.
    Mr. Moore. What plans were put in place to mitigate the increased 
risk to U.S. forces and civilian personnel within Afghanistan following 
the release of 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners from the airbase 
when the U.S. withdrew from Bagram?
    General Milley. I did not assess the 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda 
prisoners posed an immediate threat to our forces in Kabul. I assessed 
the plans for the military retrograde, and then later for the non-
combatant evacuation operation, included a sufficient force to mitigate 
threats to U.S. military and civilian personnel within Afghanistan. 
This includes the forces on the ground, as well as those available 
``over-the-horizon'' from elsewhere in the region.
    Mr. Moore. Has the Biden Administration secured the necessary 
agreements to provide you with the basing and over-flight capabilities 
you need to perform effective over-the-horizon operations?
    General McKenzie. The DOD, in support of the DoS, continues to 
engage with countries in the region to ensure the necessary 
capabilities are in place to perform effective OTH CT operations.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. When did the last American citizen successfully pass 
through the Taliban perimeter into the HKIA gate?
    General McKenzie. At 0536 Local on 30 August, the last group of 
U.S. citizens came through the South Gate. There were 41 U.S. citizens 
in that group. Since August 31st, the State Department has further 
evacuated U.S. citizens via civilian aircraft.
    Mr. Horsford. When did the last Afghan civilian successfully pass 
through the gate?
    General McKenzie. At 0241 Local on 30 August, the last group of 
Afghans came through the South Gate.
    Mr. Horsford. How many individuals successfully passed through the 
Taliban perimeter in the 72 hours preceding the departure of the final 
flight?
    General McKenzie. In the final 72 hours 166 U.S. citizens, 3651 
Afghan citizens, and 31 third country nationals passed through the Tb 
perimeter and entered HKIA. Since August 31st, the State Department has 
continued evacuation efforts through civilian aircraft.
    Mr. Horsford. You stated that you did not have facts on why the 
Taliban did not allow Americans to continue to enter HKIA in the final 
hours of the evacuation. What were the specific contingency plans to 
continue the evacuation after the Taliban closed checkpoints 
surrounding the airport? Why were these plans not implemented once it 
became clear that no additional American citizens were going to be 
allowed to pass through the Taliban checkpoints?
    General McKenzie. We fully developed a contingency plan to continue 
the NEO in a contested environment. This entailed the deployment of the 
rest of the 82nd Airborne Division and other enablers and potentially 
involved the seizure and reopening of Bagram Airfield and significant 
combat operations. These plans were never implemented because the 
Taliban continued to facilitate the passage of AMCITs onto HKIA 
throughout the NEO and because we retained--and exercised--the 
capability to bring AMCITs in without Taliban involvement or knowledge.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
    Mr. Golden. Now that the Department of Defense and Department of 
State have completed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, what steps 
are being taken to evacuate the remaining Americans and Afghan SIVs who 
still remain in Afghanistan?
    Can you speak to any operations or strategies that are being 
implemented to assist and communicate with Americans/Afghanistan SIVs 
who are still looking to be evacuated?
    How is the Taliban working with or obstructing the U.S. regarding 
the remaining evacuations?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense is committed to 
supporting the U.S. Government's priority of facilitating the departure 
of U.S. citizens, LPRs, their immediate family members, and eligible 
Afghans, from Afghanistan. The facilitated departure of these groups 
requires coordination across numerous U.S. Government departments and 
agencies to support Department of State-led efforts. Ongoing public-
private coordination with advocacy groups has been beneficial to align 
efforts on commonly shared objectives. The Department of State remains 
engaged with the Taliban on its commitment to allow the safe passage 
and departure of individuals who wish to leave Afghanistan.
    Mr. Golden. Now that the U.S. military is no longer in Afghanistan, 
you have stated that the department will conduct future ``over the 
horizon'' counterterrorism operations in the region. What authorization 
authority will the department cite to conduct these kinetic missions? 
What assets and equipment will be required to accomplish this mission? 
Will this mission require agreements with other countries in the region 
to house equipment and personnel?
    General Milley. The statutory authority for offensive 
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan is the 2001 Authorization 
for Use of Military Force. In conducting Over the Horizon 
Counterterrorism (OTH-CT), the Joint Force leverages the full breath of 
intelligence collection capabilities, to include Airborne Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Airborne ISR), Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature 
Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to gain and 
maintain understanding of terrorist networks' activities and 
intentions. When authorized, the Joint Force can also employ a variety 
of offensive capabilities, to include precision strikes, to address 
threats to the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad. 
U.S. Central Command has a variety of forces allocated to conduct the 
Over-the-Horizon Counterterrorism mission and may request additional 
forces should they be required. Our Over-the-Horizon Counterterrorism 
efforts will require support from our partners in the region. Many 
regional partners strongly support our counterterrorism efforts and are 
committed to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe 
haven.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
    Mr. Garamendi. In regards to the information pertaining to the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, did you directly provide the same advice 
to President Trump as you gave to President Biden? Please elaborate if 
you did not provide any advice or the advice was different. Please 
note, we are not asking you to divulge the specifics of the advice just 
to clarify if any direct advice was given.
    General Milley. It is my statutory obligation to provide my 
military advice to the President and I have consistently done that for 
both Administrations.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
    Mr. Khanna. Is DUSD-P involved in the investigation into the Kabul 
drone strike? What are they doing to see that this terrible tragedy 
isn't repeated again?
    Secretary Austin. The August 29, 2021 strike was a tragic mistake. 
U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the strike, and I ordered a 
45-day three-star independent review conducted by the Air Force 
Inspector General. There is also a separate, independent, Department of 
Defense Inspector General review underway. These reviews have looked at 
policies and procedures, to ensure that this terrible tragedy is not 
repeated.
    Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will 
be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of 
addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone 
strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these 
reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to 
periodically review civilian harm resulting from U.S. military 
operations, as well as its processes related to minimizing and 
responding to civilian harm. In response to reports of civilian harm, 
the Department conducts formal investigations and applies lessons 
learned, as was the case in the August 29, 2021 strike in Kabul, 
Afghanistan. For questions specifically regarding EO 13732, we would 
refer you to the White House National Security Council.
    Mr. Khanna. One of the concerns raised about the Kabul drone 
strike--and other strikes like it including the attack on the MSF 
hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 or the killing of 30 pine nut farmers 
in 2019--is that we learn that--in contrast to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual 
takes the most unusual view that under international humanitarian law, 
``no legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons of 
objects'' targeted in U.S. attacks.
    Will the Department make a commitment for the Office of General 
Counsel to review this legal position, and do so in coordination with 
the Department of State?
    Secretary Austin. The difference in view stems from the fact that 
the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions. I fully support the proposition, as expressed more fully 
in DOD's Law of War Manual, that lethal attacks may not be directed 
based on merely hypothetical or speculative considerations regarding a 
contemplated target's possible status as a military objective. In 
assessing whether a contemplated target of attack is a military 
objective, commanders and other decision-makers must make the decision 
in good faith based on the information available to them in light of 
the circumstances ruling at the time.
    Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will 
be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of 
addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone 
strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these 
reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
    General Milley. To meet the intent of Section 4, DOD conducts 
periodic reviews of civilian harm trends and reports the results to 
Congress. We continually review and refine our civilian casualty 
assessment process to incorporate lessons and to increase our 
transparency and credibility as the global leader in mitigating and 
responding to civilian casualty incidents.
    The 2018 Joint Civilian Casualty Review provided a number of 
recommendations that we have either fully implemented or that we have 
plans to implement. Critical to our implementation of many of these 
recommendations is the development of a new DOD Instruction on Civilian 
Harm Mitigation and Response, which we anticipate publishing in 2022. 
The instruction has taken some time to develop due to the need to 
establish clear responsibilities across the Department and standardize 
procedures related to civilian harm. Building upon the 2018 Joint 
Civilian Casualty Review, RAND just completed an independent assessment 
of our standards, processes, procedures, and policies related to 
civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. The RAND 
study further evaluated our mechanisms for identifying, assessing, and 
responding to reports of civilian casualties, as well as how we are 
resourced and organized to do so.
    We anticipate making the report available to Congress soon, and we 
are already developing an action plan for implementing RAND's 
recommendations. Additionally, IAW section 1057 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2018, DOD submitted four annual 
reports to Congress on Civilian Casualties in Connection with U.S. 
Military Operations, which include a description of steps the 
Department has taken to mitigate harm to civilians in combat 
operations. Protection of civilians is both a national security 
priority and a moral and ethical imperative, and we will continue to 
advance the Department's approach to these issues.
    Mr. Khanna. Is DUSD-P involved in the investigation into the Kabul 
drone strike? What are they doing to see that this terrible tragedy 
isn't repeated again?
    General McKenzie. USCENTCOM is unaware of any OUSD(P) involvement 
in the SecDef-directed investigation into the 29 August Kabul strike, 
which resulted in unfortunate civilian deaths. Any questions regarding 
what OUSD(P) may be doing to prevent future similar occurrences should 
be referred to OUSD(P).
    Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will 
be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of 
addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone 
strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these 
reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
    General McKenzie. USCENTCOM cannot speak on behalf of the 
Administration as to whether periodic reviews of civilian harm trends 
are being conducted. However, USCENTCOM takes all allegations of 
civilian casualties (CIVCAS), regardless of origin, seriously and 
ensures all such allegations are thoroughly assessed. If we believe we 
see a potential trend based on these allegations, USCENTCOM will take 
appropriate measures to address it.
    Mr. Khanna. Regarding the Kabul drone strike, General McKenzie, you 
stated that ``the vehicle was observed being approached by a single 
adult male assessed at the time to be a co-conspirator.'' It turns out 
that man was Ahmad Naser, an innocent civilian and an SIV applicant who 
had worked for the U.S. military in Afghanistan. On what basis other 
than that he was a military-aged male opening the gate for the Toyota 
could the U.S. military have made an assessment that he was a lawful 
target and not a civilian?
    General McKenzie. Lt Gen Sami Said's public remarks, which followed 
the completion of his Secretary of Defense-directed investigation, 
confirmed my previous description of the circumstances, and 
specifically, that U.S. forces assessed that the vehicle was going to 
be used in an imminent attack on U.S. forces and Afghan civilians. No 
assessment was made as to whether Mr. Naser was a lawful target because 
the vehicle--which was mistakenly assessed to contain explosives 
intended to be deployed against U.S. forces and Afghan civilians--and 
not Mr. Naser, was the target of the self-defense strike, which 
unfortunately resulted in civilian casualties.
    Mr. Khanna. General McKenzie, you stated that the strike occurred 
under a standard of ``reasonable certainty.'' What is the definition of 
``reasonable certainty'' and do you think this definition is understood 
the same way across the Department of Defense, CENTCOM, among operators 
down range, and JAGS?
    General McKenzie. ``Reasonable certainty'' is not strictly defined 
in U.S. policy. However, it is commonly understood to be a less 
stringent standard than ``near certainty.'' Whether a commander's 
certainty of a target is ``reasonable'' or not depends on a number of 
factors, including the time available to the commander to observe the 
target, the intelligence information reasonably available to the 
commander at the time of the strike, and the surveillance resources 
available to develop the commander's understanding of the target, each 
of which may be further influenced by whether the strike is intended to 
be conducted as a deliberate or offensive strike, or whether it is to 
be conducted in self-defense of U.S. or coalition forces. In a self-
defense scenario, as was the case with the strike on 29 August 2021, 
the ``reasonable'' determinations that an on-scene commander must make 
are, first, that the intended target is committing a hostile act or is 
engaged in conduct that demonstrates hostile intent to U.S. forces and, 
second, that the nature, duration, and scope of the force used by U.S. 
forces does not exceed that which is needed to respond decisively to 
the hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
    Mr. Khanna. DOD's completed investigation of the strike on an MSF 
hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 found that the DOD strike cell didn't 
have access to the no-strike list at that time.
    In an effort to learn such lessons, had DOD known that the building 
Ahmadi parked his Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of 
a U.S.-based charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help 
determine whether Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an 
IS-KP operative?
    General McKenzie. When assessing a potential threat, all relevant 
information can be helpful. As I have previously expressed in detail, 
the activities of the vehicle in question were observed for several 
hours, and a touchpoint with the NEI compound was one of many. In this 
case, the vehicle's activities also correlated with other locations 
that our intelligence associated with ISIS-K personnel and activities. 
I have reviewed in detail the findings and recommendations of the 
SecDef-appointed investigation into this matter, which will inform our 
efforts to refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures in a 
continued effort to reduce the risk of civilian casualties that is 
unfortunately inherent to the conduct of military operations.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his 
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based 
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether 
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
    Secretary Austin. I won't speculate on what would or would not have 
occurred with different information available. I am saddened by the 
loss of innocent life, and I am determined that we, as an organization, 
will learn from this tragic mistake. U.S. Central Command conducted a 
review of the strike, and I ordered a 45-day three-star independent 
review conducted by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a 
separate, independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review 
underway. These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to 
ensure that this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
    Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone 
strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with 
correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the 
NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's 
boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
    Secretary Austin. The investigation into the August 29th Kabul 
airstrike concluded that the strike, conducted to prevent what was 
believed to be an imminent threat to Hamid Karzai International 
Airport, resulted in the deaths of as many as 10 people, including up 
to seven children. U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the 
strike, and I ordered a 45-day three-star independent review conducted 
by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a separate, 
independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review underway. 
These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to ensure that 
this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
    Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his 
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based 
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether 
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
    General Milley. U.S. Central Command leadership made the decision 
to conduct the strike on 29 August based on the best available 
intelligence at the time. Our leaders are trained to evaluate all 
available intelligence and modify operations accordingly to mitigate 
the potential for civilian casualties.
    The Department of Defense conducted a thorough investigation of the 
29 August strike in an effort to improve our practices and further 
reduce the probability of civilian casualties. The investigation 
identified procedures that the DOD can employ to reduce the risk of 
confirmation bias and improve information sharing during the strike 
process.
    Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his 
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based 
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether 
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
    General Milley. I am saddened by the loss of innocent life, and I 
am determined that we, as an organization, will learn from this tragic 
mistake. U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the strike, and the 
Secretary of Defense ordered a 45-day three-star independent review 
conducted by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a separate, 
independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review underway. 
These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to ensure that 
this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
    We will scrutinize what we decided to do and not to do on August 
29, as well as how we investigated those outcomes. We owe that to the 
victims and their loved ones, to the American people, and to ourselves.
    Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone 
strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with 
correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the 
NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's 
boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
    General Milley. As the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
Public Affairs Mr. Kirby said on December 13, 2021 during a press 
conference, the strike was a breakdown in process and execution and 
procedural events, not the result of negligence, misconduct, or poor 
leadership. The strike was a tragic mistake. The results of 
investigations led by Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., U.S. Central 
Command, and Gen. Richard D. Clarke, the head of the Special Operations 
Command, were announced. A third investigation by Air Force Lt. Gen. 
Sami D. Said was announced in November and found no violation of law, 
including the law of war.
    Ms. Jacobs. Before the Senate you said the biggest mistake in 
building the Afghan security forces is we tried to make them too much 
in our image, so they became organized around on U.S. military doctrine 
which did not fit the country and became too reliant on air power which 
was never going to last. Are you applying those same insights to other 
security assistance the Department is engaged in? I ask this because 
while the effort in Afghanistan was certainly unique in scale, the fact 
of the matter is we partner with nations across Africa and elsewhere.
    General Milley. We are applying those insights. Our experience in 
Afghanistan highlights how current and future security cooperation 
efforts will need to emphasize our partners' capacity to manage, 
maintain, and employ their own forces, independent of sustained U.S. 
government support.
    In Africa, for example, our defense security assistance is focused 
on African solutions for African partners, with efforts aimed at 
bolstering the development of sustainable and self-supporting military 
capacity.
    Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his 
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based 
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether 
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
    General McKenzie. When assessing a potential threat, all relevant 
information can be helpful. As I have previously expressed in detail, 
the activities of the vehicle in question were observed for several 
hours, and a touchpoint with the NEI compound was one of many. In this 
case, the vehicle's activities also correlated with other locations 
that our intelligence associated with ISIS-K personnel and activities. 
I have reviewed in detail the findings and recommendations of the 
Secretary of Defense-appointed investigation into this matter, which 
will inform our efforts to refine our tactics, techniques, and 
procedures in a continued effort to reduce the risk of civilian 
casualties that is unfortunately inherent to the conduct of military 
operations.
    Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone 
strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with 
correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the 
NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's 
boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
    General McKenzie. In deference to the Secretary of Defense-directed 
investigation on the 29 August strike in Kabul, I would refer you to 
OSD for further comment.
    Ms. Jacobs. In answering my question about the ability to prevent 
civilian causalities in future ``over the horizon'' counter-terrorism 
operations you said that future strikes would not be designed to 
prevent an ``imminent attack'' and thus would be subject to more 
scrutiny. Often the Department argues that ``imminence'' is required to 
justify an Article II/self-defense attack. If the Department is not 
rely the prevention of an imminent attack to justify future CT 
operations in Afghanistan, would legal rationale will it be using?
    General McKenzie. The future over-the-horizon counter-terrorism 
operations you refer to will likely be offensive or deliberate strikes 
taken pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(2001 AUMF), and not strikes taken in in extremis self-defense to 
counter tactical threats to U.S. forces. Any strikes taken pursuant to 
the 2001 AUMF will be conducted consistent with the applicable 
international laws of armed conflict, including the core principles of 
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity, as well as U.S. 
domestic laws, policies, and rules of engagement applicable at that 
time. I will defer to the legal and policy judgments of the Department 
as to the circumstances under which future CT operations in Afghanistan 
might be conducted.

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