[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-57]
ENDING THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-524 WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Seventeenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
Chair C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
Emma Morrison, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 4
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department
of Defense..................................................... 5
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 13
Milley, GEN Mark A., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff........ 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III................................... 101
Milley, GEN Mark A........................................... 106
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on General
Milley's January 8 Phone Call with Speaker Pelosi.......... 121
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on General
Milley's Engagements with the People's Liberation Army
Leaders.................................................... 124
Representative Bacon's Section 1215 Letter Response.......... 131
Full transcript of ABC News' George Stephanopoulos' Interview
with President Joe Biden................................... 132
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Courtney................................................. 145
Mr. Crow..................................................... 146
Ms. Escobar.................................................. 146
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 145
Mr. Langevin................................................. 149
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 145
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 145
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Banks.................................................... 156
Mr. Brooks................................................... 152
Mr. Carl..................................................... 163
Ms. Escobar.................................................. 156
Mr. Gallagher................................................ 153
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 165
Mr. Golden................................................... 165
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 150
Mr. Horsford................................................. 164
Ms. Jacobs................................................... 167
Mr. Kahele................................................... 162
Mr. Keating.................................................. 155
Mr. Khanna................................................... 165
Mr. Langevin................................................. 149
Mrs. McClain................................................. 161
Mr. Moore.................................................... 163
Mr. Morelle.................................................. 160
Mr. Scott.................................................... 150
Mr. Wilson................................................... 150
ENDING THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN
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House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 29, 2021.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. I call the hearing to order. Good morning. As
has been the case for a while, this is a hybrid hearing. We
have some members participating remotely in addition to the
members who are present, and there are rules for that. So I
need to read a statement that sets out those rules before we
get going.
Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
voting. Those members must continue to use the software
platform's video function while in attendance unless they
experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that
render them unable to participate on camera. If a member
experiences technical difficulties, they should contact the
committee staff for assistance.
Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the
room via the television/internet feeds. Members participating
remotely must seek recognition verbally and they are asked to
mute their microphones when they are not speaking. Members who
are participating remotely are reminded to keep the software
platform's video function on the entire time they attend the
proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If
members depart for a short while for reasons other than joining
a different proceeding, they should leave the video function
on. If members will be absent for a significant period or
depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the
software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
Thank you.
Good morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses here
today. We have the Honorable Lloyd Austin III, Secretary of
Defense; General Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
and General Frank McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central Command. I
want to thank them for their time today as they provide an
update on the issues surrounding the end of the U.S. military
mission in Afghanistan and our mission going forward dealing
with counterterrorism in South Asia and the continuing mission
to try to get as many Afghans and any remaining Americans out
of the country.
I am looking forward to what I hope will be a very
important policy discussion. At the center of our examination
of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan is the desire to
learn from our 20-year involvement there. We must have an open
and honest analysis of everything that went into that, not just
the events of the last year or 6 months.
But before getting into that, we should take a moment to
recognize the service of the over 800,000 men and women who
served in Afghanistan over the last 20 years. More importantly,
I would like to remember and honor the 2,461 who made the
ultimate sacrifice, along with the over 20,000 who bore the
physical wounds of war and those who bear the unseen wounds of
war.
While we will vigorously debate policy decisions related to
the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, I believe that I
speak for the entire committee when we express our gratitude to
those and their families who have sacrificed so much over those
last 20 years. We owe them a debt that cannot be repaid.
I agreed and continue to agree with the decision that was
made to end our military presence in Afghanistan. It was the
right decision. Our larger mission to help build a government
in Afghanistan that could govern effectively and defeat the
Taliban had failed. More money and more lost American lives
were not going to change that. The events we witnessed in
Afghanistan in the wake of the collapse of the Afghan
Government in August happened primarily because of this
reality, because of the fundamental reality that our mission to
try to stand up a government in place of the Taliban had
failed. That reality is what caused the overwhelming majority
of the problems that we faced.
There was no easy or safe way to get everyone out of that
country we wanted to get out. Yet, in the face of that, our
military conducted the largest human airlift in history, in
coordination with the rest of the interagency and our allies
evacuating over 120,000 people. This evacuation, however, did
not come without costs. We lost 13 U.S. service members and
dozens of innocent Afghans due to ISIS-K's [Islamic State -
Khorasan Province's] attack at the Abbey Gate on August 26.
There was also a tragic mistake on August 29 when a drone
strike killed as many as 10 civilians. Following this mistake,
I and others expect to be provided with the results of the
timely, comprehensive, and transparent investigation of this
tragedy, including accountability measures and any changes to
procedures that are deemed necessary.
Importantly, our work is not done, as there are more who
remain in Afghanistan who would like to leave. And we must work
to ensure the interagency has all the tools required and is
coordinated to assist those remaining individuals.
There are some, going back to the issue of whether or not
we should have left Afghanistan, who imagine that there was
sort of a middle option that we could have kept 2,500 troops
there in a relatively peaceful and stable environment. I think
the way that option has been presented by many of the critics
has been fundamentally disingenuous. The option of keeping
2,500 troops in Afghanistan in a peaceful and stable
environment did not exist. I have heard many compare this to
the troops that we have left in South Korea and Japan. I find
that analogy just completely idiotic, if I am being honest.
In South Korea and Japan, we are not under attack. We are
there as a deterrent. In Afghanistan, we would have been under
attack, and that is the fundamental fact that too many people
are forgetting. The peace agreement that was signed by the
previous President was based on requirement that we get all of
our troops out by May 1. That is the only reason the Taliban
had not attacked us in the previous 18 months.
Once that expired, once we said, nope, we are staying, they
would have been under attack. And this has been a subject of a
huge misunderstanding in the last 24 hours that, again, I find
very, very disingenuous. People are saying that the President
said nobody offered, no one said that we should keep 2,500
there. What the President actually said was there was no option
on the table to keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan in a stable
environment. That is what he said.
Not that no one presented that option. That option didn't
exist in reality and no one presented it. The President, in
fact, made it clear earlier in that same interview that, yes,
some of his military leaders had said that we should keep 2,500
troops there. What he said was, none of them said that we could
do it in a stable, peaceful environment. And that is the key
point.
The other key point is--and I know a lot of energy will be
expended today trying to get these gentlemen to admit that they
didn't agree with the President's decision.
First of all, I never engage in that exercise because I
believe the President--Democrat, Republican, no matter who it
is--deserves the, you know, unabridged advice of his or her
commanders. I mean, you can't give that if you are then going
to have to go out in public and talk about it.
But second of all, the President is the one in charge. This
is ultimately what civilian control of the military means. And
what I believe is, I believe certainly there were military
commanders who said, nope, we should stick it out, we should
keep the 2,500 there. I think they were wrong. And so did the
President. It is not that they didn't make the advice; it is
that they were wrong.
This committee has enormous amount of respect for our
military leadership. That does not mean that the military
leadership is incapable of being wrong. And over the course of
the last 20 years, in Afghanistan, I would have thought we
would have learned that lesson. President Biden had the courage
to finally make the decision to say, no, we are not succeeding
in this mission. Placing more American lives at risk will not
change that.
If we could credibly say, you know, if we just stuck it out
for another year, another 5, another 10 and got to a better
result, that would be a difficult call. Was that worth the
risk? But we can't credibly say that. So we would have been
putting American lives at risk for a mission that we had to
know was not achievable. The President made the right call on
that.
There is the issue of how we withdrew, and I will say--and
I have been critical of this--I think the effort to get the
SIVs [Special Immigrant Visas] and the others who wanted to get
out of Afghanistan certainly could have been handled better and
could have been started sooner. It certainly seemed rushed, and
I want to hear from our leaders today about how that played
out, but, again, let's remember that the other alternative was
not easy.
The alternative of let's start pulling people out sooner,
the Ghani government, the government that was in charge of
Afghanistan at the time we would have been doing this, was
adamantly opposed to us pulling all of the military equipment
and hundreds of thousands of their Afghan supporters out, for
obvious reasons. How would we have done that against the
objection of the existing Afghan Government while the Taliban
were rolling across the countryside?
It would not have been easy no matter how it was done, but
we do deserve an accounting for how those decisions were made
going forward. I think today is an excellent opportunity to do
that. I look forward to the questions and answers, as well as
the testimony of our witnesses.
And with that I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Rogers.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While I have great
admiration for my friend the chairman, I could not disagree
more with his observations about Afghanistan and the
President's decision. The fact is our coalition partners and
our military leadership felt that we should have maintained our
2,500 troops there, along with this roughly 7,500 to 8,000
coalition troops, and the thousands of contractors that the
Afghan Army was dependent upon to fight successfully. And I
think they could have continued, as they have in past years, to
fight valiantly had we given that support and the President had
listened to his generals' advice.
But regardless of how you feel about the decision to remove
troops from Afghanistan, I think we can all agree that the
withdrawl was an unmitigated disaster. Hundreds of Americans
were left behind, thousands of Afghan allies stuck with little
hope of escape, potentially billions worth of U.S. provided
military equipment now in the hands of the Taliban.
Thousands of hardened al-Qaida and ISIS terrorists freed
from prisons, 10 innocent Afghans, including 7 children, killed
in a botched air strike. But worst of all, 13 brave American
service members were murdered by a coward in a suicide vest.
What is more infuriating is that all of this could have been
avoided if the President had a plan.
In briefings and hearings since April, we have demanded to
know a plan to (a) safely evacuate Americans and Afghan allies
and (b) conduct counterterrorism operations. For 4 months, the
response from the Biden administration was, we are working on
it.
Now it is clear they never had a plan. The President
repeatedly assured the American people that the Taliban
takeover was not inevitable; that we had plenty of time to
safely evacuate Americans and Afghan allies; that this was not
going to be a fall like Saigon.
As late as August 19, the President promised us that if
there is an American citizen left, we are going to stay to get
them all out. Now it is clear the President has misled us more
than once. On August 31, hundreds of Americans left behind, the
13 service members murdered, the President stood in the East
Room of the White House and called the withdrawl, quote, an
extraordinary success, close quote.
I fear the President is delusional. This wasn't an
extraordinary success; it was an extraordinary disaster. It
will go down in history as one of the greatest failures of
American leadership. We are here today to get answers on how
the hell this happened.
I expect our witnesses to give us an honest accounting of
exactly what went wrong. I also want answers on how we are
going to conduct counterterrorism operations now that we have
zero presence in Afghanistan. This was the first question we
asked you in April and we still don't have an answer.
According to the latest intelligence assessment, it could
be as little as 12 months before al-Qaida will use Afghanistan
as a base to conduct air strikes or strikes against the United
States. And that is unacceptable. And this talk of over-the-
horizon capability is a farce. Sure, we can send a drone out to
take out a terrorist, but we didn't know where the terrorists
are.
Without persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] capabilities or reliable intelligence on the
ground that is impossible. We have neither of those now. It
doesn't help that we need to fly that drone nearly 1,600 miles
to reach Afghanistan, leaving little time on station, or that
we have to fly over Pakistan, an ally of the Taliban, who could
revoke overfly privileges at any time.
None of this is giving us much confidence that this
administration can successfully conduct counterterrorism in
Afghanistan. We want to know what capabilities we need, where
they will be based, and how they will be used. In other words,
we want to see a plan and we want to see it today because,
frankly, after this debacle of a withdrawl, I don't think
anyone can trust anything this President says about
Afghanistan.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Austin. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss our recent drawdown and
evacuation operations in Afghanistan. I am pleased to be joined
by Generals Milley and McKenzie who I know will be able to
provide you with additional context. I am incredibly proud of
the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who conducted
themselves with tremendous skill and professionalism throughout
the war, the drawdown, and the evacuation. Over the course of
our Nation's longest war, 2,461 of our fellow Americans made
the ultimate sacrifice, along with more than 20,000 who still
bear the wounds of war some of which cannot be seen on the
outside.
We can discuss and debate the decisions, the policies, and
the turning points since April of this year when the President
made clear his intent to end American involvement in this war,
and we can debate the decisions over the last 20 years that led
us to this point, but the one thing not open to debate is the
courage and compassion of our service members who, along with
their families, served and sacrificed to ensure their homeland
would never again be attacked the way it was on September 11,
2001.
I had the chance to speak with many of them during my trip
to the Gulf region a few weeks ago, including the Marines who
lost 11 of their teammates at the Abbey Gate in Kabul on the 26
of August. I have never been more humbled and inspired. They
are rightfully proud of what they accomplished and the lives
they saved in such a short period of time.
The reason that our troops were able to get there so
quickly is because we planned for just such a contingency. We
began thinking about the possibilities of foreign noncombatant
evacuation as far back as the spring. By late April, 2 weeks
after the President's decision, military planners had crafted a
number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-May, I ordered CENTCOM
[U.S. Central Command] to make preparations for potential
noncombatant evacuation operation. Two weeks later, I began
prepositioning forces in the region to include three infantry
battalions.
On the 10th of August, we ran another tabletop exercise
around a noncombatant evacuation scenario [NEO]. We wanted to
be ready and we were. By the time that the State Department
called for the NEO, significant numbers of additional forces
had already arrived in Afghanistan, including leading elements
of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit who were already on the
ground in Kabul.
Before that weekend was out, another 3,000 or so ground
troops had arrived, including elements of the 82nd Airborne. To
be clear, those first 2 days were difficult. We all watched
with alarm the images of Afghans rushing the runway and our
aircraft. We all remember the scenes of confusion outside--
The Chairman. Sorry. We will get that under control. Go
ahead, sir.
Secretary Austin [continuing]. Outside the airport, but
within 48 hours our troops restored order and the process began
to take hold. Our soldiers, airmen, and Marines in partnership
with our allies, our partners, and our State Department
colleagues secured the gates, took control of the airport
operations, and set up a processing system for the tens of
thousands of people that they would be manifesting on to
airplanes. They and our commanders exceeded all expectations.
We planned to evacuate between 70,000 and 80,000 people.
They evacuated more than 124,000 people. We planned to move
between 5,000 and 9,000 people per day. And on average they
moved slightly more than 7,000 people per day.
On military aircraft alone, we flew more than 387 sorties,
averaging nearly 23 per day. At the height of this operation,
an aircraft was taking off every 45 minutes and not a single
sortie was missed for maintenance, fuel, or logistical
problems. It was the largest airlift conducted in U.S. history
and it was executed in just 17 days.
Was it perfect? Of course not. We moved so many people so
quickly out of Kabul that we ran into capacity and screening
problems at intermediate staging bases outside of Afghanistan,
and we are still working to get Americans out who wish to
leave. We did not get out all of our Afghan allies enrolled in
the special immigration visa program, and we take that
seriously.
And that is why we are working across the interagency to
continue facilitating their departure and even with no military
presence on the ground, that part of our mission is not over.
Tragically, lives were also lost. Several Afghans killed
climbing aboard an aircraft on that first day, 13 brave U.S.
service members, and dozens of Afghan civilians killed in a
terrorist attack on the 26th and we took as many as 10 innocent
lives in a drone strike on the 29th. Noncombatant evacuations
remain among the most challenging military operations even in
the best of circumstances, and the circumstances in August were
anything but ideal.
Extreme heat, a landlocked country, no government, a highly
dynamic situation on the ground, and an active, credible, and
lethal terrorist threat. In the span of just 2 days from August
13th to August 15th, we went from working alongside a
democratically elected, long-term partner government to
coordinating warily with a longtime enemy. We operated in a
deeply dangerous environment and it proved a lesson in
pragmatism and professionalism.
We also learned a lot of other lessons too like about how
to turn an Air Force base in Qatar to an international airport
overnight, about how to rapidly screen, process, and manifest
large numbers of people. Nothing like this has ever been done
before and no other military in the world could have pulled it
off, and I think that that is crucial.
And I know that members of this committee will have
questions on many things, such as why we turned over Bagram
Airfield and how real our over-the-horizon capability is, and
why we didn't start evacuations sooner, and why we didn't stay
longer to get more people out.
So let me take each in turn. Retaining Bagram would have
required putting as many as 5,000 U.S. troops in harm's way
just to operate and defend it. And it would have contributed
little to the mission that we had been assigned and that was to
protect and defend the Embassy, which was some 30 miles away.
And that distance from Kabul also rendered Bagram of little
value in the evacuation. Staying at Bagram, even for
counterterrorism purposes, meant staying at war in Afghanistan,
something that the President made clear that he would not do.
And as for over-the-horizon operations, when we use that term,
we refer to assets and target analysis that come from outside
the country in which the operation occurs. These are effective
and fairly common operations.
Just days ago we conducted one such strike in Syria
eliminating a senior al-Qaida figure. Over-the-horizon
operations are difficult, but absolutely possible. And the
intelligence that supports them comes from a variety of sources
and not just U.S. boots on the ground.
As for when we started evacuations, we offered input to the
State Department's decision, mindful of their concerns that
moving too soon might actually cause the very collapse of the
Afghan Government that we all wanted to avoid, and that moving
too late would put our people and our operations at greater
risk.
As I said, the fact that our troops were on the ground so
quickly is due in large part to our planning and prepositioning
of forces. As for the mission's end, my judgment remains that
extending beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled
our people and our mission.
The Taliban made clear that their cooperation would end on
the first of September. And as you know, we face grave and
growing threats from ISIS-K. So staying longer than we did
would have made it even more dangerous for our people and would
not have significantly changed the number of evacuees we could
get out.
So as we consider these tactical issues today, we must also
ask ourselves some equally tough questions about the wider war
itself and pause to think about the lessons that we have
learned over the past 20 years.
Did we have the right strategy? Did we have too many
strategies? Did we put too much faith in our ability to build
effective Afghan institutions? An Army, an Air Force, a police
force, and government ministries? We helped build a state, but
we could not forge a nation. The fact that the Afghan Army that
we and our partners trained simply melted away, in many cases
without firing a shot, took us all by surprise and it would be
dishonest to claim otherwise.
We need to consider some uncomfortable truths, that we did
not fully comprehend the depth of corruption and poor
leadership in their senior ranks; that we did not grasp the
damaging affect of frequent and unexplained rotations by
President Ghani of his commanders; that we did not anticipate
the snowball effect caused by the deals that the Taliban
commanders struck with local leaders in the wake of the Doha
Agreement; that the Doha Agreement itself had a demoralizing
effect on Afghan soldiers; and that we failed to fully grasp
that there was only so much for which and for whom many of the
Afghan forces would fight.
We provided the Afghan military with equipment and aircraft
and the skills to use them, and over the years they often
fought bravely, and tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers and
police officers died. But in the end, we couldn't provide them
with the will to win. At least not all of them. And as a
veteran of that war, I am personally reckoning with all of
that. But I hope, as I said at the outset, that we do not allow
a debate about how this war ended to cloud our pride in the way
that our people fought it.
They prevented another 9/11, they showed extraordinary
courage and compassion in the war's last days, they made
lasting progress in Afghanistan that the Taliban will find
difficult to reverse and that the international community
should work hard to preserve.
And now, our service members and civilians face a new
mission: Helping these Afghan evacuees move on to new lives in
new places, and they are performing that one magnificently as
well.
I spent some time with some of them up at Joint Base
McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst this past Monday and I know that you
share my profound gratitude and respect for their service,
their courage, and professionalism, and I appreciate the
support that this committee continues to provide them and their
families.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Austin can be found in
the Appendix on page 101.]
The Chairman. Chairman Milley.
STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
General Milley. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
thank you for the opportunity to be here with Secretary Austin
and General McKenzie to discuss Afghanistan.
During the past 20 years, the men and women of the United
States military, along with our allies and partners, fought the
Taliban, brought Osama bin Laden to justice, denied al-Qaida
sanctuary, and protected our homeland for two consecutive
decades. Over 800,000 of us in uniform served in Afghanistan.
Most importantly, 2,461 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines paid the ultimate price; 20,698 were wounded in action;
and countless others suffered the invisible wounds of war.
There is no doubt in my mind that our efforts prevented an
attack on the homeland from Afghanistan, which was our core
mission. And everyone, everyone, whoever served in that war in
Afghanistan should be proud. Your service mattered.
Beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers,
consolidated and closed bases, and retrograded equipment from
Afghanistan. At our peak in 2011, we had 97,000 U.S. troops
alongside 41,000 NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
troops in Afghanistan.
Ten years later when Ambassador Khalilzad signed the Doha
Agreement with Mullah Baradar on 29 February 2020, the United
States had 12,600 troops with 8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors
in Afghanistan. This has been a 10-year, multi-administration
drawdown, not a 19-month retrograde or 17-day noncombatant
evacuation operation.
Under the Doha Agreement, the United States would begin to
withdraw its forces contingent upon the Taliban meeting certain
conditions which would lead to a political agreement between
the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. There were seven
conditions applicable to the Taliban and eight to the United
States.
While the Taliban did not attack the United States forces,
which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any
other condition under the Doha Agreement and perhaps, most
importantly for the United States national security, the
Taliban has never renounced their linkages with al-Qaida or
broke their affiliation with them. We, the United States,
adhered to every condition.
In the fall of 2020, my analysis then was that an
accelerated withdrawl without meeting specific and necessary
conditions risks losing the substantial gains made in
Afghanistan, would potentially damage U.S. worldwide
credibility, and could precipitate a general collapse of the
Afghan security forces and the Afghan Government resulting in a
complete Taliban takeover or general civil war. That analysis
was a year ago.
Based on my advice and the advice of the commanders at the
time, then-Secretary of Defense Esper submitted a memorandum on
9 November recommending that we maintain the U.S. forces which
were then at about 4,500 in Afghanistan until conditions were
met for further reductions. Two days later on 11 November, I
received an unclassified signed order directing the United
States military to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan by 15
January 2021.
After further discussion regarding the risks associated
with such a withdrawl, the order was rescinded. On 17 November
we received a new order to reduce troop levels to 2,500 plus
enabling forces no later than 15 January.
When President Biden was inaugurated, there were
approximately 3,500 U.S. troops, 5,400 NATO, and 6,300
contractors in Afghanistan tasked to train, advise, and assist
a small contingent of counterterrorism forces and the strategic
situation was stalemate.
The Biden administration through the National Security
Council process conducted a rigorous interagency review of the
situation in Afghanistan in February, March, and April. During
this process, the views of all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
all of us, the CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, USFOR-A
Commander General Miller, and myself were all given serious
consideration by the administration. We provided a broad range
of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes.
We couched that in cost, benefit, risk to force, risk to
mission, all of that was evaluated against the national
security objectives of the United States.
On 14 April, the President of the United States, President
Biden, announced his decision. The U.S. military received a
change of mission to retrograde all U.S. military forces,
maintain a small contingency force of 6- to 700 to protect the
Embassy in Kabul until the Department of State could coordinate
contractor security support, and also to assist Turkey to
maintain the Hamid Karzai International Airport, and to
transition the U.S. mission to over-the-horizon
counterterrorism support and security force assistance.
It is clear, it is obvious to all of us that the war in
Afghanistan did not end on the terms that we wanted with the
Taliban now in power in Kabul. Although the NEO was
unprecedented and is the largest air evacuation in history, a
tactical, operational, and logistical success evacuating
124,000 people, the war was a strategic failure. It came also
at an incredible cost in the end with 11 Marines, 1 soldier,
and a Navy corpsman. These 13 gave their lives so that people
they never met would have an opportunity to live in freedom,
and we must remember that the Taliban was and remains a
terrorist organization and they still have not broken with al-
Qaida.
I have no illusions who we are dealing with. It remains to
be seen whether or not the Taliban can consolidate power or if
the country will further fracture into civil war, but we must
continue to protect the United States of America and its people
from terrorist attacks from Afghanistan. A reconstituted al-
Qaida or ISIS with aspirations to attack the United States is a
very real possibility and those conditions to include activity
in ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to
36 months.
That mission will be much harder now, but not impossible,
and we will continue to protect the American people. Strategic
decisions have strategic consequences. Over the course of 4
Presidents, 12 Secretaries of Defense, 7 Chairman, 10 CENTCOM
commanders, and 20 commanders in Afghanistan, and hundreds of
congressional delegation visits in 20 years of congressional
oversight, there are many lessons to be learned.
Among those lessons is the unprecedented speed of the
collapse of the ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces]. However, one lesson we can never forget is that every
soldier, sailor, airmen, and Marine who served there for 20
years protected our country against attack from terrorists. And
for that, we all should be forever grateful and those soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and Marines should be forever proud.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to address
a couple of comments about my personal conduct that has been in
the media lately.
The Chairman. Yes, yes. Mr. Chairman, you may. Go ahead.
General Milley. I have served this Nation for 42 years. I
spent years in combat and buried a lot of my troops who died
while defending this country. My loyalty to this Nation, its
people, and the Constitution hasn't changed and will never
change as long as I have a breath to give. My loyalty to the
Constitution and to this Nation is absolute and I will not turn
my back on my fallen.
With respect to the Chinese calls, I routinely communicated
with my counterpart General Li with the knowledge and
coordination of civilian oversight. I am specifically directed
to communicate with the Chinese by Department of Defense
guidance in a document known as the Policy Dialogue System.
These military-to-military communications at the highest
levels are critical for the security of the United States in
order to deconflict military actions, manage crisis, and
prevent war between great powers armed with nuclear weapons.
The calls on 30 October and 8 January were coordinated before
and after with Secretary Esper and Acting Secretary Miller's
staffs and the interagency.
The specific purpose of the October and January calls was
generated by concerning intelligence which caused us to believe
the Chinese were worried about an attack by the United States.
And last night I briefed that intelligence in detail to the
Senate Armed Services Committee and I will be happy to brief it
to any member or group of members at your discretion in a
classified session.
And I know and I am certain President Trump did not intend
on attacking the Chinese and it is my directed responsibility
by the Secretary of Defense to convey that intent. My task at
that time was to de-escalate. My message was, again,
consistent, calm, steady, de-escalate. We are not going to
attack you.
At Secretary of Defense Esper's direction, I made a call to
General Li on 30 October. Eight people sat on that call with me
and I read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending.
On 31 December the Chinese requested a call with me. The
Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-
Pacific policy helped coordinate my call, which was then
scheduled for 8 January, and he made a preliminary call on 6
January.
Eleven people attended the call with me and readouts of
this call were distributed to the interagency that same day. On
14 December, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Miller had been
briefed on the entire program. Shortly after my call ended with
General Li, I informed both Secretary of State Pompeo and White
House Chief of Staff Meadows about the call among several other
topics.
Soon after that I attended a meeting with Acting Secretary
Miller where I briefed him on the call. Later that same day on
8 January, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi called me to
inquire about the President's ability to launch nuclear
weapons. I sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed
by a very specific and deliberate process. She was concerned
and made various personal references characterizing the
President. I explained to her that the President is the sole
nuclear launch authority, but he doesn't launch them alone; and
that I am not qualified to determine the mental health of the
President of the United States. There are processes, protocols,
and procedures in place and I repeatedly assured her, there is
no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch of
nuclear weapons.
By Presidential Directive and SecDef [Secretary of Defense]
Directives, the Chairman is part of this process to ensure that
the President is fully informed when determining the use of the
world's deadliest weapons. By law I am not in the chain of
command and I know that. However, by Presidential Directive,
the Department of Defense instruction signed by the President
and Secretaries of Defense, I am in the chain of communication
to fulfill my legal statutory role as the President's primary
military adviser.
After the Speaker Pelosi call, I convened a short meeting
in my office with key members of my staff to refresh all of us
on these procedures which we practice three times a day at the
action officer level. Additionally, I immediately informed
Acting Secretary of Defense Miller of her call. At no time was
I attempting to change or influence the process, usurp
authority, or insert myself into the chain of command, but I am
expected to give my advice and ensure the President is fully
informed on military affairs.
I am submitting for the record, and I believe you have it,
a couple of memorandums for record in addition to detailed
timelines and I am happy to discuss in further detail in either
classified or unclassified sessions with any or all of you
about my actions surrounding these events. I welcome a thorough
walk-through. I will be happy to provide whatever documents,
phone logs, emails, memoranda, witnesses, or anything else you
want that will help you understand these events.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 121.]
My oath is to support the Constitution of the United States
of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and I
will never turn my back on that oath. I firmly believe in
civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle and
essential to the health of this republic and I am committed to
ensuring the military stays clear of domestic politics.
Thank you, Chairman, for the extra time, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Milley can be found in
the Appendix on page 106.]
The Chairman. Thank you. General McKenzie.
STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
opportunity to testify about recent events in Afghanistan. As a
theater commander, I will confine my opening remarks to those
matters that were under my direct operational control,
specifically, the withdrawl of U.S. forces and the subsequent
noncombatant evacuation operation. These were two distinct
combat missions, both conducted in contact with the enemy.
We had a plan for each of them. We executed those plans.
And thanks to the valor and dedication of thousands of men and
women in harm's way we completed both missions, fulfilling the
President's order to withdraw all U.S. forces and evacuating
over 124,000 noncombatants from Afghanistan. I last appeared
before this body only days after President Biden announced his
decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from that country and my
testimony regarding that decision is already a matter of public
record.
I will only reiterate that I had an opportunity to offer my
professional advice to the President through the Secretary and
I am confident that he weighed it carefully. That is all any
commander can ask.
Once the President made his decision, my headquarters and
that of U.S. Forces Afghanistan under General Scott Miller made
the withdrawl of our forces our top priority. We did this in
close coordination with our allies and partners. Every
departure of every element was carefully synchronized across
the coalition and with our Afghan partners. On no occasion were
they caught unaware by our movements. Every base was handed off
to Afghan forces according to a mutually understood plan.
This is particularly true of Bagram Airfield. Many of you
have visited Bagram at some point over the past 20 years and
were probably struck by two of its defining features: Its
sprawling size and its isolation. Virtues for most of its life
span, they rendered it untenable under the circumstances.
The guidance I received in April was to conduct the
complete withdrawl of U.S. combat forces and plan for a
diplomatic security force of absolutely no more than 650
service members. It was not feasible to preserve the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul, hold and defend Hamid Karzai International
Airport, the Embassy's key link to the outside world, and also
defend Bagram Airfield with 650 soldiers and Marines. This is
important.
The Bagram option went away when we were ordered to reduce
our presence to the 650 personnel in Kabul. I would like to
shift briefly to the NEO, which, as I have noted, was a
completely different operation than the withdrawl. They were
separate.
The withdrawl began in April following the President's
direction. The decision to conduct a NEO rested with the
Department of State, and they made that decision on 14 August.
In our NEO planning, Central Command assumed that we would have
to bring out a very large number of people. We did not regard
the size of a potential NEO as overwhelming or too much to
accomplish. We did not regard a Taliban takeover as inevitable,
but neither did we rule it out, and we identified critical
indicators of an impending collapse of the Afghan National
Defense Forces.
We crafted branches to our base plan to account for a
complete collapse of the Afghan Security Forces. The Secretary
took action in May to make forces available to me for planning.
On July the 9th, I requested that our base NEO force, the core
package that would go in, be put on 96-hour prepare-to-deploy
orders.
By August 11th, it was evident to me that Kabul was at risk
and I requested the deployment of a brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division and other elements of our own alert preplan
force package, and I requested that they be deployed into HKIA,
Hamid Karzai International Airfield. These forces flowed
swiftly into theater even as the Afghan National Defense Forces
disintegrated allowing thousands of civilians access to the
airfield.
Working with Afghan partners composed of elite commando
units who did not fall apart and our arriving NEO forces on
August the 16th, we cleared the airfield and resumed flight
operations in a matter of hours. With security re-established
by force ultimately compromising 5,784 U.S. troops, 8 maneuver
battalions, and hundreds of coalition forces, operations
continued without interruption until our final flights. By that
time we evacuated over 124,000 people from Afghanistan.
This was a difficult mission made possible by the
exceptional professionalism and valor of the joint force on the
ground in Afghanistan and across the entire world. I would
specifically like to use this opportunity to thank the C-17
crews of the Air Mobility Command for a feat rivaling and
exceeding, in fact, the Berlin airlift.
Moments after the last of the final five C-17s lifted off
from HKIA, I held a briefing with the Pentagon press corps and
expressed my gratitude and admiration for the forces who
carried out this NEO. I also provided various figures that
conveyed the magnitude of their accomplishment.
I won't reiterate those figures here and now, but I will
say that after the passage of nearly a month, my pride in their
accomplishment remains undiminished. I don't need to tell this
body that on 26 August, 11 Marines, 1 sailor, and 1 soldier
made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of their country. We will
never forget them.
This was a combat operation of the most difficult sort, a
noncombatant evacuation carried out in contact with the enemy.
The enemy, in this case, was ISIS Khorasan, a vile, tenacious
foe that would undoubtedly had killed many, many more Americans
and innocent Afghans at HKIA if it were not for the vigilance
of our forces there.
On 29 August, we undertook an MQ-9 strike against what we
thought was an imminent threat to HKIA. That strike was a
mistake and I take full responsibility for that strike. I was
under no pressure from any quarter to conduct the strike. It
was based on our intelligence read of the situation on the
ground.
While in many cases we were right with our intelligence and
forestalled ISIS-K attacks, in this case, we were wrong,
tragically wrong. I appreciate that there are many other topics
of interest to this committee and I look forward to answering
your questions on all of them.
I will close here by reiterating my profound gratitude and
appreciation for every soldier, sailor, Marine, airmen, and
guardian, as well as our intelligence and Department of State
comrades who contributed to each of these difficult missions. I
remain humbled by their sense of duty and courage.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I want to drill
down a little bit on the keeping 2,500 troops there and I am
struck as I listened to the comments that, I think the real
problem here is you have to make decisions in the real world.
You don't get to imagine an outcome that would make it more
palatable. And I think that is what really factored in to the
2,500.
And as we talk about the 13 service members who died and
attack the leadership here for not having prevented that, how
you can do that and then advocate that we should have stayed in
Afghanistan longer so that more service members--I guess the
only way you can advocate that is to imagine a scenario whereby
we could have stayed in a chaotic war zone, not had soldiers
get killed, not have made any mistakes--how you cannot make
mistakes in that chaotic environment, I don't know, and every
member serving on this committee has been in those environments
in one way or another.
So you don't have the luxury of waving a magic wand and
making all the problems go away and simply making a decision
where nothing goes wrong. And it is really frustrating to hear
people advocate that we should stay and still decry what
happened.
Do you think fighting in a war zone there wouldn't be
similar mistakes if we had stayed there for another 5 or 10
years, more civilians killed accidentally, more U.S. service
members dead in exactly the same way that we just saw?
Sorry. That is very frustrating, but could you talk to us a
little bit about the 2,500 soldiers or service members who
could have been left there and then how you approached that
decision and what exactly--not what exactly your advice was to
the President for what I said earlier, but how you approached
that decision and then how you attempt to deal with that while
advising the President?
Secretary Austin. First of all, Chairman, let me be clear
that I support the President's decision to end the war in
Afghanistan. I did not support staying in Afghanistan forever.
And let me also say we have talked about the process that we
used to provide input to the President.
I think that process was a very thorough and inclusive
policy process and the recommendations of the commanders were
taken into consideration, discussed, and deliberated on
throughout that process.
As you indicated, I typically--I will always keep my
recommendations to the President confidential, but I would say
that, in my view, there is no, was no, risk-free status quo
option. I think that the Taliban had been clear that if we
stayed there longer, they were going to recommence attacks on
our forces.
I think while it's conceivable that you could stay there,
my view is that you would have had to deploy more forces in
order to protect ourselves and accomplish any missions that we
would have been assigned. It is also my view, Mr. Chairman,
that the best way to end this war was through a negotiated
settlement and sadly that did not happen.
The Chairman. Thank you. And let me just also say that I
know there are members of this committee who think we should
have stayed, who are honest about that.
Sorry. I think of Congressman Waltz who has been very
honest about the fact--both under President Trump and under
President Biden--that we should have stayed. He is very honest
about the fact that there were costs and risks and lives would
have been lost.
That is the type of discussion that we need to have, but to
jump down the President's throat because he actually had to
make the decision in an impossible situation I think does a
grave disservice to this committee's ability to do effective
and honest nonpartisan oversight. Costs were going to be borne
here. There was no easy option. And I do hope that people
remember that as we go through the questions and answers that
will proceed.
With that, I yield to the ranking member.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley, was the DOD [Department of Defense] in
charge of making decisions about troop strength in this
withdrawal or were you in a support role?
General Milley. Let me put it this way-you talking about
the NEO or----
Mr. Rogers. I am talking about--let me go back even
further.
In January of this year were you of the opinion, in your
professional military judgment, that we should've maintained
2,500 troops, U.S. troops in support of the coalition effort
and contractors in Afghanistan?
General Milley. Yeah. My assessment that I read in the
opening statement remained consistent and----
Mr. Rogers. Did that professional military opinion change
over the course of the next few months?
General Milley. Not until Presidential decision and I
rendered my opinions and it was a fulsome debate on all of
that. And once decisions are made, then I am expected to
execute lawful order.
Mr. Rogers. And you have made that very clear. So my
question is, when the troop levels were ordered to be drawn
down to zero and first stopping at 650 as General McKenzie
outlined, was that your decision or General McKenzie's decision
to draw down to 650?
General Milley. It was a task and then a troop-to-task
analysis with the task being to go to zero, but you also have
to defend the Embassy--
Mr. Rogers. I am thinking about the chain of command.
Somebody's making decisions about troop levels and my
understanding is it was not the DOD; it was the State
Department or the White House. I want to know who said we are
going to go from 2,500 to 650 and just protect Kabul and the
State Department.
General Milley. It was a military analysis that 6- to 700
could adequately defend the Embassy until the contractors come
up and that was then approved up through the chain and approved
at the highest levels.
Mr. Rogers. Who made the decision?
General Milley. I would say that decision was made in a
national security consultative process by the highest levels of
our government.
Mr. Rogers. General McKenzie, did you receive advice from
General Miller in the end of 2020 and early 2021 related to
troop levels in Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. Ranking Member, I did.
Mr. Rogers. What was that advice?
General McKenzie. The advice, his view and my view, were
essentially the same view. My view was that we needed to
maintain about 2,500 and that we also needed to work with our
coalition partners who had about 6,000 troops in there, NATO
and other core countries that would remain there.
Mr. Rogers. Did your professional military opinion change
over the course of the spring?
General McKenzie. It did not.
Mr. Rogers. Did you communicate--well, I know you
communicated to the President. You said you did. Were you
present in the room when General Miller's recommendations were
relayed to the President?
General McKenzie. General Miller was present in executive
sessions that involved myself, the Secretary here, the
Chairman, and the President.
Mr. Rogers. And those recommendations of the parties as
Secretary Austin said were debated fully----
General McKenzie. They were debated fully. I felt that my
opinion was heard with great thoughtfulness by the President.
Mr. Rogers. Well, you know, Secretary Austin just made the
point that there was a fulsome debate of the pros and cons and
the costs and risks, yet in August of this year, President
Biden told George Stephanopoulos in an interview, no. No one
said that to me, referring to keeping some 2,500 troops in
Afghanistan.
Was that an inaccurate statement by the President?
General McKenzie. Sir, I am not going to comment on a
statement by the President.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. General McKenzie, in mid-June your
commanders on the ground were informing you that things were
deteriorating as you testified a little while ago. At that
time, in your judgment, you should stop withdrawal, increase
forces, or all proceed with the retrograde.
What did you decide at that time?
General McKenzie. We decided to proceed with the
retrograde.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Were you ordered to do that by the
President?
General McKenzie. We followed our original--we had original
orders. We followed those orders through to completion.
Mr. Rogers. Was it the President's orders?
General McKenzie. My orders come from the Secretary of
Defense to the President. So that is a very short chain of
command for me.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Secretary Austin, on the 23rd, you told
this committee that you had developed a very detailed plan to
conduct safe, orderly, and responsible withdrawl and were
executing that plan. On August 18, the President said, quote:
The idea that somehow there was going to be a way that we could
have gotten out with chaos ensuing, I don't know how that
happens, close quote.
How do you reconcile those discrepancies between what you
assured the Congress and what the President is telling us?
Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir. First of all, in terms of
the withdrawl of our troops and the retrograde of equipment,
that plan as developed by General Miller and General McKenzie
was executed as planned, and all of our equipment was
retrograded and we drew down the force that we wanted to draw
down to that very small force that you saw at the Embassy at
the very end there.
The chaos that ensued followed the collapse of the military
and the collapse of the government, and when those two things
happen, then it was going to be a chaotic situation.
Mr. Rogers. And the collapse of the government and the
collapse of the military was solely responsibility of this
administration. I know you are all trying to be careful
politically, but it was the State Department and the White
House that told you to make those drawdown of troops from 2,500
to 650 to zero. It was the speed with which they had done it--
that they carried out that order that is what caused the chaos
that we had.
If they had allowed the DOD to be in a command situation,
we wouldn't have had this problem. General McKenzie has
testified that the only reason he couldn't keep Bagram was
because he had to draw down to 650 troops and his primary
orders were to keep Hamid Karzai and the State Department safe.
We just have to admit this was--the State Department and
the White House that caused this catastrophe, not the Defense
Department.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I want
to thank our witnesses for your testimony today and for your
service to our Nation. My constituents and I have obviously a
lot of questions about the planning that led up to this, and
I'll admit that I am concerned that, based on the conditions on
the ground, General Milley and General McKenzie recommended
against final withdrawl, I wish the administration had been
more thoughtful and not had rushed this.
I have yet to hear an answer to the question, though, of
why did we not start withdrawing American citizens and SIVs
sooner? We knew we were going to be withdrawl whether we
started doing that withdrawing of the Americans and SIVs in
January or May or sooner than the actual execution of the order
to withdraw.
I would like that question answered. Also Secretary Austin,
given the generals' concerns, were the discussions about
pushing the withdrawl back to spring of 2022 or conditioning it
on the criteria in the Doha Agreement to ensure that we did the
handoff correctly, we already weren't going to fully withdraw
by May 2021.
And Secretary Austin, what was the military rationale of
leaving by the end of August when the Taliban are at their
strongest in the fighting season as opposed to waiting in the
winter months when there is more of a lull in the Taliban
fighting season? It is a relatively low level of activity and
they are at their weakest. I will start with those questions.
The Chairman. And I am sorry. Before you get into it, I'm
going to stick to the 5-minute rule. So when the clock hits
zero, we are going to move on to other people. Go ahead.
Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir. On the issue of why we
didn't bring out civilians and SIVs sooner, again, the call on
how to do that and when to do it is really a State Department
call. We provided input, as I said in my opening statement, to
the State Department. Their concerns rightfully were that,
number one, they were being cautioned by the Ghani
administration that if they withdrew American citizens and SIV
applicants at a pace that was too fast, it would cause a
collapse of the government that we were trying to prevent.
And so I think that went into the calculus and when you add
also into the calculus that SIV process was very, at that
point, very slow, deliberate, and not very responsive. With
your help, we were able to curtail the time that it took to
work through that process, but a number of things kind of came
together to cause what happened to happen.
But, again, we provided our input and we certainly would
have liked to have seen it go faster or sooner but, again, they
had a number of things to think through as well.
In terms of adjusting or why we chose to--why the President
chose to leave in the summer versus waiting until the next
year, obviously, a number of things went into his decision
calculus, but, you know, as we came on board, the agreement
that had been made was that we were going to depart by May 1.
We were able to work to get more time to ensure that we
could conduct a deliberate and safe and orderly retrograde,
but, again, you know, the President made the decision that we
would leave in the summer versus going into the next year. So--
and I will leave it at that, sir, pending any more questions.
Mr. Langevin. Secretary, I want to know how we now protect
the country going forward.
Former CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director and
Secretary of Defense Panetta said that our national security is
threatened by the Taliban takeover. One of our missions was to
prevent a haven for terrorist groups, and--and I quote--``we
have failed in that mission,'' end quote.
Similarly, the Director of the DIA [Defense Intelligence
Agency] has assessed that al-Qaida could threaten the homeland
in 1 to 2 years.
So I agree that over-the-horizon operations can be
effective. However, I am concerned that, without complementary
operations, they will be insufficient to keep us safe.
Secretary Austin, are you confident that over-the-horizon
capabilities on their own can mitigate the terrorist threat we
face? Are you confident that we can prevent Afghanistan from
becoming a haven? And how will you keep our country safe?
The Chairman. And I apologize, but the gentleman's time has
expired, so that question will have to go unanswered.
Mr. Langevin. I would like that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 149.]
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In an interview on August 16, President Biden promised to
keep military troops in Afghanistan until every American
citizen who wanted to leave was able to leave. This did not
happen.
Nor can we confirm the Blinken claim that he sent 19
separate messages to Americans telling them to leave the
country since March of this year.
Also unclear is the truth of the Biden claim that no
military commander recommended leaving behind a residual force,
even though all of you, starting courageously with General
Scott Miller, have now made it clear that your professional
military advice was to do so.
On August 26, I formally requested all letters referenced
that day by Biden from military commanders advising him on the
Afghanistan withdrawal. To date, I haven't received a response.
As a 31-year Army veteran myself, grateful to have four
sons who have served in Iraq, Egypt, the southern border, and
in Afghanistan, I was immediately skeptical letters existed.
President Biden left behind thousands of American citizens,
Green Card holders, brave interpreters, and Afghan media
reporters who worked with the United States.
Biden was correct when he said the buck stops with him, as
the person responsible for Afghanistan as well as for the
terrorists that are now crossing the southern border to plan
attacks on American neighborhoods.
In addition to betraying the American citizens and the U.S.
allies in Afghanistan, the Biden decision to have a premature
withdrawal left the people of Afghanistan, who had 60,000
troops killed by the Taliban, under the complete control of the
Taliban, a barbaric terrorist organization, as General Milley
has confirmed, with al-Qaida.
Again, Biden was correct; the buck stops with him. The war
has moved from Afghanistan to American neighborhoods, equally
endangering our allies of India and Israel.
Mr. Secretary, even before the withdrawal, there were
frustrating reports of Americans and Green Card holders being
turned away at the gates of the airport or being instructed by
the administration to stay away from the airport entirely.
While other countries were sending their special forces
into Kabul to retrieve their citizens and bring them to the
airport, you repeatedly refused to do the same, even after
promising in a Pentagon press conference on August 18 that,
quote, ``we are going to get everyone we can possibly to
evacuate, and I will do that as long as we possibly can until
the clock runs out or if we run out of capability,'' end of
quote.
Mr. Secretary, the American public needs to know: Did the
clock run out, or did you run out of capability? Did you at any
point ask President Biden for any more time or more support to
enable your forces to stay and complete the full evacuations of
American citizens, not leaving them behind, as promised? If so,
what was the Biden response?
Secretary Austin. First of all, sir, thank you for your
personal service in our military, and thanks for the service of
your family members. We remain grateful.
On the issue of evacuating American citizens and SIV
holders, or SIV applicants, this work continues on. We are not
finished, and we will make sure that we stay focused on this to
get out every American citizen that wants to leave and has the
right credentials to be able to leave.
On the issue of the security at the airport, it was my
assessment, and I remain convinced of this, that the risk to
mission and risk to force was beyond significant, and had we
stayed there much longer, we would have endured continued
attacks by ISIS-K and potentially the Taliban.
And, you know, as each day went forward, as that risk
increased, you know, we stood to have aircraft shot down, we
stood to have people injured on--additional people injured on
the airfield. And so, as we weighed those risks----
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Secretary, I need to have this completed.
And, in fact, I will be sending you questions for the record.
And----
Secretary Austin. Sure.
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --I really want to know how many
Americans have been left behind. And so we will get that, but I
will be providing questions for the record.
But I sadly believe that American families today are at a
greater risk of murderous attacks at home than ever before. You
talked about attacks at the airport. No, they are coming here.
And that is that, in history, we are at greater risk.
Suicide bombers can operate from the safe haven of
Afghanistan just as 9/11 and with the open southern borders.
The example of May 8th mass murder of over 80 girls in Kabul
have not been forgotten. The buck stops with 13 murdered
Marines.
Mr. Biden is disregarding----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --The military advice, and I
believe----
The Chairman. I will call----
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --The President should resign.
The Chairman [continuing]. --on Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Wilson. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. I am prepared to begin my questions, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Heads-up, I don't have a speech, so I am
launching into my questions right now, so get ready to answer
them.
General Milley, with regards to the November 11th
unclassified signed order, whose signature was on that order?
General Milley. Former President Trump.
Mr. Larsen. And then 6 days later that was rescinded
after----
General Milley. Correct.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. --discussion? Is that correct?
General Milley. Correct.
Mr. Larsen. And what were the top three concerns with that
particular order?
General Milley. Well, the instruction had two lines. Line
one was, ``Withdraw all U.S. military forces from Somalia by 31
December.'' Second sentence was, ``Withdraw all U.S. military
forces from Afghanistan by 15 January.''
So I went over and spoke to the White House and had some
conversations with some folks, not the President----
Mr. Larsen. Sure.
General Milley [continuing]. --and we discussed the cost-
risk-benefit, et cetera, and the feasibility, acceptability,
and suitability of that order.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. All right.
General Milley. And it was subsequently rescinded.
Mr. Larsen. Was that the first time--well, I will ask
Secretary Austin.
In the last 20 years, given the history in Afghanistan, is
that the first order at all that has come out asking for a
withdrawal? Did we have withdrawal plans or withdrawal orders
at all in the last 20 years from Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Absolutely. As you know, we increased our
footprint in Afghanistan over time, and then we----
Mr. Larsen. And shrunk it, but that is--but that is--but
not----
Secretary Austin. Not a complete withdrawal.
Mr. Larsen. Not complete withdrawal. That is different. I
am talking about zero.
Secretary Austin. Right.
Mr. Larsen. Down to zero.
Secretary Austin. Correct.
Mr. Larsen. So this would be the first time, then? This
November 11 order would have been the first ask for a
withdrawal to zero?
Secretary Austin. That is correct.
Mr. Larsen. To your knowledge.
Secretary Austin. To my knowledge, correct.
Mr. Larsen. Within the DOD. Okay. From the President or
anything. Got it. From any President, I should say. Thank you.
Just trying to get the timeline set.
And this relates to General McKenzie. You talked about the
2,500, the recommendation, the discussion you had about 2,500
troops. Was that for a particular set of missions, and did
those missions change; therefore, that 2,500 became 650, became
zero?
General McKenzie. Sir, when we looked at the 2,500 number--
--
Mr. Larsen. Right.
General McKenzie [continuing]. --we were looking at a force
that would have the ability to do very limited advise/assist at
a high level, assist in logistics management for the Afghans,
but it would have been functioning at a very high level. So
that was the force that we wanted to continue to keep on the
ground.
As we went down to--as we looked at going down to 650, you
get a force that is almost exclusively built around the ability
to defend the Embassy and the airfield and provide entry-level
logistics to the Afghans. By that, I mean a package comes into
the airport, you give it over to the Afghans, they drive it
away, and you have no way to track what happened.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
General McKenzie. We lost that capability when we----
Mr. Larsen. Yeah, but based on the civilian leadership
saying, ``This is what civilian leadership wants to do.''
You get to--and I know you are not arguing this point; you
are just--you make the recommendations, given your best advice,
and then civilian leadership has the opportunity to say,
``Thank you, but here is what I would rather be doing.''
General McKenzie. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Larsen. So the mission changed----
General McKenzie. The mission fundamentally changed when
we--going to zero means you are going to reduce all your
capability to do any kind of real on-the-ground work, even at a
truncated level, with the Afghan forces. You are going to be
talking at the ministerial level, at the very highest levels of
government only, and you are not going to have any real
visibility about what is going on on the ground.
Mr. Larsen. Okay.
General Milley, did you want to try to address that?
General Milley. I did. I just wanted to clarify one thing.
The 11 November order was actually not the first one. The first
one was the Doha Agreement, which directs going to zero by 1
May. The 11 November order is an accelerated withdrawal to
bring it to zero by 15 January. So two different----
Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
General Milley [continuing]. --instructions.
Mr. Larsen. That is great. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very
much. I appreciate that.
Just for the record I will ask this question, because then
this gets to kind of a follow-on to all of this, is: How do you
define over-the-horizon capabilities? Like, what are those
specifically? And how do we execute those? And are we going to
explore that a little bit more probably here today?
General McKenzie. Sir, I would be----
Mr. Larsen. I have about 15 seconds.
General McKenzie. I would be prepared to talk a little bit
about it today, but I think, more importantly, I will be
prepared to come over at the direction of the Secretary and
provide a classified briefing.
Mr. Larsen. I think that would be very helpful. And there
may be opportunity in the future to travel to the region and
hear directly what it looks like on the ground.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time----
Secretary Austin. With the chairman's permission, sir----
The Chairman [continuing]. --has expired.
Secretary Austin [continuing]. --I would offer that
briefing by General McKenzie, along with Joint Staff
representation and my policy people.
The Chairman. Yeah, we will definitely be following up on
that. I mean, the issue of what we do going forward to deal
with the counterterrorism threat out of South Asia is something
this committee has already looked at and will continue to look
at for a very long time.
Mr. Turner is recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I serve on both the House Armed Services Committee and the
Intelligence Committee. The Intelligence Committee has already
been briefed from the intelligence community concerning their
participation of the August 29 drone attack.
General McKenzie, you have taken, in front of us, full
responsibility for that. I have a series of information that I
would like released to this committee so that we can adequately
provide oversight to what occurred on August 29.
What we know from your prior statements is that you did not
know who it was who was in the car, whose house it was, or who
or how many people were in the house. This greatly concerns me
as we look to the over-horizon claims that the administration
has of its ability for counterterrorism.
You did not, as your goal was stated, thwart or disrupt an
imminent attack. You killed an innocent man, and yet an attack
didn't happen. So there are serious questions concerning both
the information that you had and the manner in which the
execution occurred.
So I would request that it be released to this committee
and the Intelligence Committee relevant video excerpts from the
drones of August 29, the protocols that were in place prior to
this drone attack mission, the intelligence that an attack was
imminent against our forces, and the approval of any
authorization to modify those protocols, including approvals
for delegation of authority, including target engagement
authority, who approved at the DOD and in the administration,
and the data that the Secretary released to the IG [Inspector
General].
I just want to make it clear, Mr. Secretary, the fact that
you have an IG investigation does not stop congressional
oversight.
I will be sending you a list of all those. I would like
your consent that you are going to be providing those to us.
They are certainly within the jurisdiction of our two
committees.
Secretary Austin. Acknowledged, sir. And you are correct;
there is a review going on of the strike.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Milley, with indignation in front of the House and
the Senate, you have commented on the statements in the press
concerning your phone conversation with your counterpart,
General Li, in China.
Let's be clear. To give you some help with the indignation,
those comments were in the press because that is where you put
them.
Now, you claim that you had information--and it is all
over--that China was worried about an imminent attack. You did
not tell the President, the Vice President, the White House
Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National
Intelligence, either of the relevant committees in the House,
including the big eight, which you know include Intel. You
didn't tell the Intelligence Committee. You didn't tell the
Armed Services Committee.
You report that, after you took upon yourself to have this
phone conversation, that you told them of the conversation, not
that China believed that we were going to imminently attack
them--which, by the way, has never been true in my lifetime.
And it may be true, since they believed it, that is why they
are digging ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] holes
faster than they can fill them with ICBMs. But you chose
instead to handle it yourself with a phone call.
So, General Milley, you offered all of the concerning
intelligence, and I am going to request that you provide it to
us. I would like you to provide us the relevant intelligence
information that you based your belief that China was going
to--belief that there was an imminent attack.
I also want your requests for declassification of the
approval that you release that information that China believed
so, including your request for declassification of your
conversation that you had with General Li, and any approvals. I
want a transcript of your call with General Li, and I also want
any readouts, memorandums, notice of calls, or outcomes.
Now, you chose to talk to reporters instead of us. And that
is of great concern. No one in Congress knew that one of two of
the major nuclear powers thought that they were perhaps being
threatened for attack.
Now, Mr. Secretary, that turns my questions to you, then.
Mr. Secretary, if you learn that Russia or China believes that
they may be subject to an attack by the United States, as a
member of the President's Cabinet, do you believe that
information should be handled at the Cabinet level and with the
President, with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of
Defense? Do you believe the chair and ranking member of Intel
and the House Armed Services Committee and Foreign Affairs
Committee need to know these?
Or do you believe that a belief of the possibility of an
attack by the United States against Russia and China is
appropriately handled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in a phone call with his counterpart with one of those
nations?
Please tell me that you believe it elevates to the level--
that you would elevate that to the Cabinet and to Congress and
not just have it be subsequently told to us all by newspaper
articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times, as
General Milley chose to do.
Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir.
Obviously, we would want to follow standard protocol. And
what you described is what I would--the type of actions that I
would consider taking.
But General Milley, as what I heard him say yesterday and I
think again today, is that his chain of command, the Secretary
of Defense at the time, was aware of the actions. And so----
Mr. Turner. After. What he said yesterday is after.
The Chairman. I am sorry, but----
General Milley. No, that is not correct. What I said
yesterday and today----
The Chairman. If I could--hold on just a second, everybody.
Time has expired. Mr. Turner is very clever. He made a very
direct attack as his time was expiring. I am going to violate
the rules here a little bit and let Chairman Milley respond to
that direct attack, hopefully briefly, and then we will move on
to the next witness.
General Milley. With respect to the intelligence, I have it
right here. I will be happy to share it with you.
Mr. Turner. Great.
General Milley. I guarantee that that intelligence was
disseminated in the President's PDB [President's Daily Brief],
the Vice President, the DNI [Director of National
Intelligence], Director of CIA, the Secretary of Defense, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
others.
That was significant, and there was a lot of it. It wasn't
just a singular report. There was a lot--I will be happy to
share that with you and go over it with you line by line.
And it was significant, and it was concerning, to the point
where Secretary of Defense Esper, Admiral Davidson, and myself,
along with others, had conversations about it, and I was
directed by then-Secretary of Defense Esper. First, he directed
his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs to
make calls, and then me, same thing.
This was all done with oversight, and I tried to lay that
out in the memoranda. I tried to lay it out in a timeline in an
unclassified way that you could use----
The Chairman. And we are going to--I am sorry. We are going
to have to leave it at that.
General Milley. I will be happy to take it up at a later
date, your convenience.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney is recognized.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses for your service and
testimony today.
One comment, Mr. Chairman, before questions. Over the last
month, including yesterday's Senate hearing, we heard a lot of,
in my opinion, over-the-top claims that the U.S. had lost all
credibility with its allies in the wake of the withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
Last week, Mr. Chairman, we saw firsthand in Washington how
mistaken that claim was. On Wednesday last week, I attended a
ceremony over in the Senate where the Australian Prime
Minister, Scott Morrison, said that Australia was proud to go
into Afghanistan together and leave together, degrading al-
Qaida and preventing a major terrorist attack, and, in very
heartfelt terms, thanked the United States, particularly the 11
Marines, 1 Navy corpsman, and 1 soldier who perished while
safely evacuating 4,100 Australians from Kabul.
Boris Johnson, last week, who was also in town, when asked
about the U.S. standing post-withdrawal said, ``What I said to
Joe Biden is how grateful I am for the amazing work of the U.S.
military in helping us extricate in 2 weeks 15,000 British
nationals from Kabul to whom we owe debts of honor and
gratitude. The U.S. military were heroic.''
Of course, they were in town to enthusiastically endorse
AUKUS [Australia-United Kingdom-United States], the new defense
agreement in the Pacific, which, as Politico reported, despite
all the handwringing over the last couple weeks, was a powerful
reminder that an American security guarantee with our allies
still reigns supreme and, in the stroke of a pen, has
reaffirmed our engagement and collaboration with allies in a
region that the National Defense Strategy has identified as our
number one priority.
Secretary Austin, I just want to follow up on the August 29
drone strike. And General McKenzie, on the 17th, again, gave, I
guess, a Central Command investigation report, which described
it as a tragic mistake.
You also, that day, announced that there was going to be a
DOD follow-up investigation. Can you tell us, what is the
difference between what you described and what CENTCOM did? And
when can we expect to see results from that investigation that
you described?
Secretary Austin. Well, I directed a three-star review of
the incident. And, certainly, it will take into account all of
the things that General McKenzie and his team have done. But we
will look at the, you know, soup-to-nuts, you know, policy,
procedures, whether or not we followed our own practices, our
outlined practices.
And we will certainly look at accountability as well. If
somebody should be held accountable for something that they did
that was outside of standard practice, then we will take a look
at that.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
General McKenzie, you mentioned on the 17th that the
Department is exploring the possibility of ex gratia payments
as compensation for the individuals who died in that strike.
And, again, that is a $3-million-per-year set-aside that the
United States military's operation has used in the past.
However, in 2020, despite 23 civilians that were killed, there
were no payments made last year.
Can you give us, you know, some feeling that, you know,
this agreement is sufficient to address this issue, which I
think really is our country's responsibility?
General McKenzie. Sir, I agree with you; I believe we have
a significant responsibility here. And I know that, even as we
speak right now, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
engaged in finding the best way to move forward on an ex
gratia--appropriate ex gratia payment and whatever other
measures may be contemplated in regard to that family. And I
will just leave it at that.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And I just would reflect that that
certainly is a high-volume concern in my district.
General McKenzie. Sure.
Mr. Courtney. General Milley, again, we first met in 2013
on a CODEL [congressional delegation]. You were in Jalalabad,
Afghanistan. And I think many of us had that same experience of
seeing you in-country there. And, certainly, your service is
something that I think should be unquestioned, and commitment
to our Nation.
In your testimony, you talked again about the Doha
Agreement, the conditions that were put into place for the
Taliban to perform, and that only one out of the eight actually
had been complied with, even up through February. Nonetheless,
80 percent of the troops in the U.S. were drawn down from the
date of the Doha Agreement to January 21.
Can you just talk about, you know, the noncompliance of the
Taliban throughout 2020 and the predicament that I think this
administration was left when it took office with just a
fraction of the troop level that was there in February 2020?
General Milley. We had almost 13,000 U.S. troops there in
February 2020. And you got the numbers for the inauguration.
But the bottom line is: reduction in violence, nationwide
cease-fire, and a whole series of other----
The Chairman. I apologize, but the gentleman's time has
expired.
General Milley. I will respond to the record on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We on this committee have repeatedly expressed our concern
that the U.S. military does not have regional basing and
cooperation agreements required for an effective over-the-
horizon counterterrorism capability.
In May, Mr. Helvey, in response to my question in here,
confirmed that the administration had not yet secured the
necessary agreements with any of the governments in the region
to establish these over-the-horizon capabilities.
So, General McKenzie, has the administration, as of today,
secured any necessary agreements with a neighboring country to
provide the basing and overflight requirements needed to
perform over-the-horizon counterterror operations in landlocked
Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. Representative, as of today, I have the
ability to enter Afghanistan and to fly missions. It is a long
haul in, but I have the ability to do that today.
Mr. Lamborn. But we don't have an agreement with a
neighboring country. Is that true? Isn't that true?
General McKenzie. Obviously, it is a neighboring country
that is allowing us access, but we are not based in--we are not
based in any neighboring country; that is correct, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So we can safely assume that, as of
August 31, we did not also have an agreement at that time in
the past.
Okay. Thank you.
General Milley, at the June 23 hearing here, you testified
to this committee that Bagram was not necessary tactically to
the military's withdrawal plan. You dismissed my and other
people's concerns about the military value of Bagram, and you
seemed to base that on an assessment that the Taliban, at that
point, had not yet taken major districts.
Yesterday, though, you told Senator Blackburn that one of
the courses of action you provided the Commander in Chief was
to keep Bagram Air Base open, which sounds different from what
you told us on January 23.
But, for the record, was it your professional military
opinion and advice that we should abandon Bagram Air Base? And,
if not, was this decision forced on you by the arbitrary troop
cap of roughly 650?
General Milley. Once the President's decision was made in
mid-April, 14 April, and we had a change of mission to go to
zero and bring the troops down to a number that was only
required to maintain the Embassy, the Bagram decision was made
at that point. Because, at that point, there was no way you
could defend both Bagram and HKIA.
But one additional point. Most of the people that were
required to be in a NEO were going to be coming out of Kabul.
And HKIA, as Scotty Miller, General Miller, has already
testified to, HKIA was always going to be the center of gravity
of any NEO. But we didn't have the forces available to do both,
so----
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
I want to ask General McKenzie a question.
General McKenzie, had we kept control of Bagram, what
forces--or what options and capabilities would that have given
U.S. forces during the withdrawal, had that been in play?
General McKenzie. Well, in order to hold Bagram, I would
have needed probably pushing 5,000 more troops on the ground.
So that would have been a significant decision, to hold Bagram.
And we were under the direction to go to zero, so it would
require a basic policy directive to change the plan.
If you are going to go to zero and you are going to keep
enough forces to hold your Embassy and the airfield, it is
incompatible to hold any other base anywhere in the country. So
that would be a policy decision, to go out and hold Bagram,
under that case.
Let me just further add that I did not see any tactical
utility to Bagram.
Mr. Lamborn. General McKenzie, isn't it true that the
President rejected your best military opinion and advice as to
how quickly to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. Well, I will say this. It has been my
view that we should have--that I recommended a level of 2,500,
a level that would have allowed us to hold Bagram and other
airfields as well. Once you go below that level and make a
decision to go to zero, it is no longer feasible to hold
Bagram.
Mr. Lamborn. But that was your best opinion and advice.
General McKenzie. That remains my view now, as it was then.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And you said to hold Bagram would have taken 2,500. A
minute ago, you said 5,000.
General McKenzie. No----
Mr. Lamborn. It sounds like it was 2,500.
General McKenzie. Well, it depends on the situation. If you
are talking about a situation where you are not fighting the
Taliban and you have the full assistance of the Afghan
Government or the Taliban's attacks against you are at a
minimum, yes, you can hold it at 2,500.
If, however, you posit that you are in Afghanistan, say,
beyond August the 31st without the tacit agreement of the
Taliban and without the assistance of the Government of
Afghanistan, who provided most of the physical security at
Bagram, then you have to put a big footprint in, just as we did
at HKIA. It is exactly the same sit---the two situations are
analogous.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. Has expired.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your
testimony.
Before I go any further, I want to acknowledge an
extraordinary effort, and successful effort, made by the U.S.
military, particularly the Air Force, in the most awesome and
successful evacuation of civilians ever in the history of this
world. Well done. Very, very well done. And compliments to all
involved in that.
Obviously, the loss of the 13 souls, members of the
military, was a great tragedy. And you and all of us regret
that.
The fog of war is only repeated by the fog of the
committee. So let me lay out some timeframes here.
In mid-2018, former President Trump ordered formal and
direct U.S.-Taliban negotiations without the Afghan Government
participating.
In February 2020--excuse me--August 2019, President Trump
said that he would withdraw all U.S. troops as quickly as
possible.
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed
a formal agreement in which the United States committed to
withdraw all of its troops, contractors, and nondiplomatic
civilian personnel from Afghanistan no later than May 1, 2021.
In June 2020, the U.S. troop levels reached 8,600.
In October, former President Trump tweeted, ``We should
have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women
serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!''
On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense
Miller announced that we will implement former President
Trump's orders to continue repositioning forces from
Afghanistan and the 2,500 U.S. troops who remain there by
January 15.
On January 15, he announced that there were indeed 2,500
troops left.
On January 20, Biden became President. Twenty-five-hundred
troops were then in Afghanistan.
On April 14, President Biden announced his intention to
continue to withdraw all regular U.S. troops by September 11, 4
months after the preplanned May 1 deadline.
On July 2, Italy and Germany withdrew their troops.
On July 17--we have had specific testimony here on what
then happened from July 17 on. And, if I recall correctly, the
Afghan Government completely collapsed on the 20th of August,
wasn't there any longer. And, from there, the evacuations
commenced.
General McKenzie, were the 2,500 troops on the ground
sufficient, as agreed with the Taliban? Were they there in
accordance with the agreement?
General McKenzie. Had we held the 2,500, which I stated is
my position, and as the Secretary has articulated, there would
have been a clear risk that the Taliban would have begun to
attack us as we moved past the 1 May deadline.
However, it was my judgment then that that would still have
given us a platform to continue negotiations with the Taliban
to perhaps force a political solution.
My concern was that, if we withdrew below 2,500 and went to
zero, that the Afghan military and government would collapse.
And, of course, that is not a potential counterfactual; that
is, in fact, what happened. So we have objective--we have
objective data to understand what happens if you go to zero.
Mr. Garamendi. Several of us attended a luncheon here in
the Capitol in late June with President Ghani and Abdullah
Abdullah, and they were very, very confident that they would be
able to maintain their government through the--with the
reduction and the withdrawal of American troops. If they--they
specifically said that if 300,000 troops, they could do it.
They needed continued financial support, they needed the
necessary intelligence from the United States, and they also
needed to have certain air strikes, drone strikes. That was
their promise.
They also said that they did not want to allow Afghans to
leave. That is what they specifically told us. They did not
want Afghans to leave. Obviously, Ghani decided that he would
leave.
Further questions--my time has expired. I will yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thanks so much for your testimony today.
General Milley, I want to begin with you, and I want to
build on a question that Ranking Member Rogers asked.
On August 18, President Biden said that there is no way
possible that U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Afghanistan
without the chaos that we saw unfold.
In your best military judgment, was there a way to extract
the troops without the chaos that we saw unfold?
General Milley. I just want to be clear, we are talking two
different missions. The retrograde of the troops to 2,500
everybody is talking about, those were advisors. That was
complete by mid-July. And that was done, actually, without any
significant incident. And that is the handover of 11 bases, the
bringing out of a lot of equipment, et cetera. That was done
under the command of General Miller.
The noncombatant evacuation operation is different. The
noncombatant operation, that was done under conditions of great
volatility, great violence, great threat. And we inserted 6,000
troops on relatively short notice because there were some
contingency plans to do that.
That is a different operation. And I think that the first 2
days of that, as we saw, were not only chaotic but violent and
high-risk. But, because of the skill and leadership of our
troops, they were able to get control of a situation in the
airfield in that country that was falling apart and then
execute the operation.
So I think it would have been difficult under any
circumstances, and I think our soldiers performed
extraordinarily well, actually, in 48 hours getting control of
an airfield in another country eight and a half time zones
away.
Mr. Wittman. But I understand that, but you are talking
about a very compressed timeframe. I am talking about the full
extent about what you are looking at. You can talk about two
missions, but I am talking about, in totality of what we are
looking at there was a chaotic and disaggregated effort.
It seems like to me that your professional military
judgment would probably not have been focused in your
recommendations in seeing this outcome. I just wanted to get
your----
General Milley. My recommendations at the time and my
analysis at the time were aligned, actually, with what you have
heard from General Miller previously and General McKenzie, was
flatline at about 2,500 and go for a negotiated solution and
make sure it is conditions-based.
And we all render our advice, and Presidents make
decisions, and then we execute.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
This morning, you stated that the withdrawal was a
logistical success but a strategic failure. And I would say
that probably American citizens and the Special Immigrant Visa
holders would probably disagree, those that were left behind
would probably disagree with your assessment of a logistical
success.
That being said, I want to focus on the strategic failure
aspect of that.
You said yesterday that all you can do--and you just said
it now--all you can do is provide your best advice, and it is
up to the President to make the ultimate decision.
In your best military judgment, did President Biden's
decisions cause this strategic failure?
General Milley. I think, as I said yesterday--first of all,
I am not going to judge a President. That is the job of the
American people, that is the job of Congress, not my job.
Mr. Wittman. No, I am asking for your best military
judgment--for your judgment.
General Milley. Yeah. So my assessment is, this was a 20-
year war, and it wasn't lost in the last, you know, 20 days or
even 20 months, for that matter.
It was a cumulative effect to a series of strategic
decisions that go way back--you know, bin Laden, right on the
Tora Bora, for example. We knew where he was, we were 1,000
meters away, could have ended it, perhaps, right there.
The shift from going into Iraq and pulling all the troops
out of Afghanistan, with the exception of a few others--major
strategic decision.
Not effectively dealing with Pakistan as a sanctuary--major
strategic issue that we are going to have to really unpack.
The intelligence piece, pulling advisors off 3 or 4 years
ago out of kandaks, so we blinded ourselves from our ability to
see the will, the morale, the leadership, and the training.
There is a whole series of decisions that take place over
20 years. I don't think that, whenever you get some phenomenon
like a war that is lost--and it has been, in the sense of we
accomplished our strategic task of protecting America against
al-Qaida, but certainly the end state is a whole lot different
than what we wanted.
So, whenever a phenomenon like that happens, there are an
awful lot of causal factors, and we are going to have to figure
that out. A lot of lessons learned here.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
And I want to build with your answers to Secretary Austin.
Secretary Austin, I imagine that you had a number of
opportunities in your capacity as CENTCOM commanding general to
brief President Obama, and I imagine that Vice President Biden
was probably privy to these briefs. Was he a regular attendee
when you gave these briefs?
Secretary Austin. The Vice President was frequently in the
Situation Room when we conducted meetings, yes.
Mr. Wittman. Let me go from there, then, to the Battle of
Kunduz, which, we know, Taliban took over, Afghan forces
retreated.
Did you recognize that as the beginning of the weakness in
the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] mission? And
were there issues at that point of intense interest to Vice
President Biden?
The Chairman. I am sorry, that is going to have to be a
question for the record, because the time has expired.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
The Chairman. Ms. Speier is recognized.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your extraordinary service to our
country.
I want to just set the record straight on a couple of
points.
It was in 2017 that then-President Trump relaxed rules of
engagement for air strikes, and there was a massive increase in
civilian casualties, a 330 percent increase during Trump's
administration. Compared to the previous 10 years, there was a
95 percent increase in civilian deaths from 2017 to 2019.
It was then-President Trump who, in mid-2018, ordered the
Taliban--ordered talks with the Taliban without the Afghani
leadership. And it was in February 2020 when that formal
agreement was made.
Now, Chairman Milley, you identified the Taliban as a
terrorist organization. Can you tell us anything about former
President Trump's intent to invite the Taliban leadership to
the United States or to Camp David specifically?
General Milley. I have no personal knowledge of that
invitation. I saw it in the media, but I was not part of any
discussions or decision-making on that. I have no personal
knowledge.
Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin, did the previous
administration develop plans for a withdrawal, and was there
any handoff to you of those plans?
Secretary Austin. There was no handoff to me of any plans
for a withdrawal.
Ms. Speier. So then-President Trump calls for a total
withdrawal by May 1, 2021, and no plans had been made during
his administration for withdrawal.
Secretary Austin. I would say that, you know, I am
confident that General Miller, who was anticipating, you know,
a decision one way or the other, was making plans. And I
certainly would defer to General McKenzie in terms of what he
might have done.
But, in terms of handoff from administration to
administration, Secretary to Secretary, there was no handoff to
me.
Ms. Speier. All right.
Is it not true that, on April 27, President Biden, through
the State Department, called on all Americans in Afghanistan to
leave by commercial flights? Can any of you answer that
question?
Well, that was, in fact----
Secretary Austin. I cannot----
Ms. Speier [continuing]. What happened.
Secretary Austin. I don't have knowledge of that.
Ms. Speier. All right. That was, in fact, what happened. So
we put on notice all Americans in Afghanistan, on April 27, it
was time to get out.
Let me ask you this, General Milley: What was the impact of
President Trump's drawdown to 2,500 troops despite the
Taliban's noncompliance with much of the peace agreement? And
how did that affect our intelligence gathering?
General Milley. So there are two questions there. The first
question: I think the Doha Agreement itself, because of the
nature of it--and this is more 20/20 hindsight perhaps, but we
now believe that the Doha Agreement itself perhaps undermined
or contributed to the undermining of the morale, confidence in
the government because it was a bilateral agreement, et cetera.
But, having said that, there were conditions built into
that, one of which was met, many of which were not. And the
drawdown to 2,500 proceeded because the fundamental condition
of ``they weren't attacking us'' was being met.
The drawdown to 2,500, the impact that that had on the
morale, the will of the Afghan military, I believe that it was
a negative impact. But I don't know that yet. We need to go
through all of our intelligence and analyze it in an after-
action review. But I do think that was a contributing factor to
the morale of the Afghan security forces.
Ms. Speier. General Milley, there has been a lot of talk
about retaining 2,500 service members in Afghanistan. I think
we all forget that there was a negotiation with the Taliban and
we would have to get them to agree to allow 2,500 troops to
remain in the country.
Having said that, in your view, would a small force of
2,500 be sufficient to achieve anything of value?
General Milley. I think that the 2,500 would have been at
great risk in terms of the Taliban--I have no doubt that the
Taliban would have reinitiated combat operations or attacks on
U.S. forces and the 2,500 would have been at increased risk
today.
What is the value of keeping the 2,500? It has as much to
do with the morale and the keeping advisors with them and
having the morale of the Afghan security forces and
demonstrating confidence in the government.
Going to zero--it is clear to me that one of the big
lessons learned we have to unpack from the military side is the
mirror-imaging in the development of the Afghan military. And
they became dependent upon our presence----
The Chairman. I apologize, but----
General Milley. Sorry.
The Chairman [continuing]. The gentlelady's time has
expired.
Mrs. Hartzler is recognized.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is imperative that we have this hearing today, because
the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, I believe, is the most
significant foreign policy failure in a generation, and it is
going to have ramifications for years to come. And so we need
to get to the bottom of this.
And, first, I want to start off, to General Milley, a
question, that you made a comment earlier that you would be--
well, I wanted to ask you, did you tell General Li when you
talked to him on the phone that, if we were going to attack
China, that you would let him know ahead of time?
General Milley. naudible.]
The Chairman. I am sorry. Could you get the microphone a
little more in front of you there, make sure it is on.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
General Milley. So this is a longer conversation, and it is
a VTC [video teleconference] with General Li. And there is a
body of intelligence that leads up to this that was persuasive
to Secretary Esper, myself, and many, many others that the
Chinese thought, wrongly, that the United States was going to
attack them. I am certain, guaranteed certain, that President
Trump had no intent to attack. And it was my task to make sure
I communicated that. And the purpose was to de-escalate----
Mrs. Hartzler. You shared all that earlier. I understand. I
just----
General Milley. And, as part of that----
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. Wanted to say: Did you or did
you not tell him that if we were going to attack you would let
him know?
General Milley. As part of that conversation, I said:
General Li, there is not going to be a war, there is not going
to be an attack between great powers. And, if there was, the
tensions would build up. There would be calls going back and
forth from all kinds of senior officials. I said, hell, General
Li, I will probably give you a call, but we are not going to
attack you. Trust me, we are not going to attack you.
These are two great powers, and I am doing my best to
transmit the President's intent, President Trump's intent, to
ensure that the American people are protected from an incident
that could escalate.
Mrs. Hartzler. I understand your intent, but I think you
articulating that, that you would tell him you would give him a
call, I think is worthy of your resignation. I just think that
is against our country, that you would give our number one
adversary that information and tell him that.
But I would like to go on to General Austin and ask you a
question. According to President Biden, he chose you to serve
as his Defense Secretary primarily because you oversaw the full
withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 from Iraq.
But, ironically, the 2011 Iraq withdrawal left similar
conditions of governmental failure, the empowerment of regional
terrorist organizations, most notably ISIS, and a humanitarian
crisis of refugees and internally displaced people in desperate
need of international emergency assistance.
The 2011 U.S. military exit from Iraq was short-lived, with
President Obama redeploying U.S. forces into Iraq and Syria in
2014 to defeat the Islamic State.
Despite the administration's reassurances, it seems we may
be on a similar trajectory in Afghanistan. After U.S. forces
abandoned Bagram Air Base in July, the Taliban quickly took
over the base and released 5,000 to 7,000 ISIS-K and Taliban
prisoners.
When the last U.S. troops evacuated from Afghanistan on
August 31, this administration handed over total government
control to the Taliban, a known terrorist organization with
leaders of the Haqqani terrorist network now in key positions
within the Taliban's de facto government.
In recent weeks, the Taliban has deemed education
irrelevant, barred women and girls from school and work,
committed horrific retaliatory attacks on members of Afghan
security forces and interpreters, and established suicide-
bomber schools within the country.
We also know that al-Qaida and ISIS-K both have
reestablished a presence within the country. Even before the
U.S. withdrew, ISIS-K claimed credit for a suicide bombing,
which you have mentioned took the lives of 13 service members
on August 23.
So, Secretary Austin, is it true that the suicide bomber
who attacked the Kabul airport on August 23 was a CIA prisoner
at the Bagram Air Base whom the Taliban released after Biden's
administration left Bagram in July?
Secretary Austin. Let me just say a couple of things.
First, on why the President selected me or nominated me to
be his Secretary of Defense, you would have to certainly go
back to the President and ask him specifically why he did that,
but it wasn't, I am sure, solely based upon my oversight of the
evacuation of Iraq.
But I would point to you that there is a government in Iraq
right now that is holding elections. The United States military
is in Iraq----
Mrs. Hartzler. I have 4 seconds. Could you answer my
question? Was the suicide bomber----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time--the gentlelady's time
has expired.
Secretary Austin. I will take the question for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And generally I don't see eye-to-eye with many generals,
and certainly General Milley and I have had disagreements, but
I think what was said earlier was inappropriate in its nature,
to accuse a member of the military that they would tip off our
opposition in any way.
And I would like to give General Milley an opportunity to
respond to that if he wants. If not, then I will gladly
continue with my questions.
General Milley. As I said up front, I am not going to tip
off any enemy to what the United States is going to do in an
actual plan.
What I am trying to do is persuade an adversary that is
heavily armed, that was clearly and unambiguously, according to
intelligence reports, very nervous about our behavior and what
was happening inside this country, and they were concerned that
we, President Trump, was going to launch an attack. He was not
going to launch an attack. I knew he wasn't going to launch an
attack.
At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, I engaged the
Chinese in order to persuade them to do that. I would never tip
off any enemy to any kind of surprise thing that we were going
to do. That is a different context than that conversation.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
Thank you to all three witnesses for taking the time to
testify today.
Obviously, the resurgence of the Taliban is devastating,
and it is difficult for many of us to watch. But, sadly, it
unwinds the reality that, after 20 years, four U.S. Presidents,
and billions of dollars, the conditions for a peaceful and
stable Afghanistan could not be created.
That is why I believe President Biden made the right
decision to withdraw. Staying in Afghanistan, a prolonged and
stalled conflict, would have required more troops and more
resources with no clear timeline. And I don't believe that we
could ask our service men and women to give their lives for a
mission that, in the end, wouldn't have been successful.
I do, like many of you here, applaud our troops for their
tireless efforts to evacuate American citizens, our allies,
Afghan citizens, and everyone threatened by the Taliban. And I
still believe we have a moral imperative to help those who
helped us in Afghanistan, and I and many of us will do
everything in our power to continue to do that.
I have some questions to begin with.
General Milley, in your testimony, you noted that the speed
and scale and scope of the collapse of the Afghan Army and the
government was a surprise. Yet the Taliban was clearly gaining
ground in June and especially July before the arrival--before
their arrival in Kabul.
As we not only look to the future of Afghanistan but also
think about our operations across the globe, what lessons
specific to our intelligence gathering and analysis do you
think DOD can learn from this experience? Do you think it is
time for a larger rethink within the Department about how to
assess intelligence in a very rapidly changing environment?
General Milley. I do. I think--I don't know the full answer
yet, but I think that the primary reason we missed it was
because we essentially cannot and we have yet to develop a
really effective technique to read people's hearts, their will,
their mind, their leadership sort of skills. Those are
intangibles. You know, the moral is to the physical as three is
to one in the conduct of war. So, very difficult to measure.
When we pull our advisors off of organizations at lower
levels, you start missing that fingertip touch for that
intangible of war. We can count the trucks and the guns and the
units and all that. We can watch that from different
techniques, but we can't measure a human heart from a machine.
You have to be there to do that.
And I think that was probably one of the most significant
contributing factors to missing the deterioration in the morale
of the Afghan Army.
Mr. Gallego. And I guess one of the things that I am deeply
disturbed by--and this can be either to, you know, General
McKenzie or also Secretary Austin can jump in.
Speaking to a lot of service members, enlisted service
members that have served for decades in and out of Afghanistan,
they were always telling me something extremely different from
what I was getting from reports from many of you generals here,
that the Afghan Army was not ready, that they were not going to
be sustainable on their own.
And so, you know, how did we miss that? How is it that a
lot of, you know, 18-, 19-year-olds, mid-20-year-old E-5s were
predicting this but yet some of our greatest minds, both on the
civilian side and, you know, uniformed side, absolutely missed
this?
And I think that is something that concerns me, because,
you know, Afghanistan is done, but we are going to be,
obviously, engaging all over the world. And this type of
intelligence failure repeated could be, you know--could be an
existential threat to the national security of the United
States.
I don't know, General McKenzie, do you want to try that?
General McKenzie. Sure. So I think that is a--I think it is
a reasonable criticism. We will have to take a look at how we
actually remain connected to the people who are down at the
advisory level.
I think that is something that I--I am conflicted by that
as well, I will be very candid with you. And we will certainly
take a look at that, because I have heard that same strain
myself. It is harder to get the truth as you become more
senior. We perhaps need to look at ways to ensure that that is
conveyed in a more rapid and effective way.
So I will accept that criticism.
Mr. Gallego. Okay.
Thank you for you guys' testimony.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott is recognized.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, I need your help fairly immediately on two
issues, one of which can't be discussed in this setting, but
the other one can.
And there are 145 Afghan Air Force personnel in Tajikistan.
They flew 16 aircraft into that country on August the 13th. It
is now September the 29th. We need to get them out of
Tajikistan.
These are people who trained with us, they fought with us,
they did everything that we asked of them. And we have gotten
no assistance at all from the State Department to move them.
And I am asking all three of you for your help in addressing
the issue.
Secretary Austin, we need the help.
Secretary Austin. Acknowledged, sir. And we will get with
State right away to see if we can move this forward.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Secretary Austin. I share your concern, sir.
Mr. Scott. And thank you.
And I do want to mention this, and I think this is where
the frustration of every member of the committee comes in, that
we had people in Uzbekistan. The State Department ignored them,
as well, and said they would get to them when they got to them.
But we have a lady in Tajikistan that is 9 months pregnant that
is one of our pilots. And we need help removing them.
We also need to make it clear to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
that that is U.S. military equipment and it is not to be
returned to Afghanistan. And so I would appreciate if we could
put that in writing to both of those countries, that the
equipment belongs to the U.S., not to Afghanistan.
And, you know, with that said, I appreciate your commitment
to help.
I do want to mention one thing, Secretary. You and the
State Department were using the number 124,000. That 124,000 is
U.S. and NATO allies, correct?
Secretary Austin. That is correct.
Mr. Scott. We had provided a list of names of people who
were P1, P2 SIVs to Central Command, to everybody we knew to
get it to, and yet our people were not allowed into HKIA. They
were at the gates, but they were not allowed into HKIA, even
though they were on the manifest. And, yet, so many people came
out of the country that appeared not to be on the manifest.
So how was the determination made in who got on a plane and
who didn't get on a plane?
Secretary Austin. Well, I can't speak to the exact
processes that were--that existed inside of HKIA at the time,
in terms of how people were sorted out. I can tell you that we
tried very, very hard to get everybody that we possibly could
out, especially American citizens and SIV applicants that had
worked with us.
We also owed it to our partners to help them get some of
their people out as well. And they helped us with some security
issues and other things while we were there. So----
Mr. Scott. Secretary, I am close on time, but I will tell
you, I do think that that is a question that is going to linger
and that the committee wants answers on. Because we have P1, P2
SIVs that were left behind, and other people that were not or
should not have been on the manifest seem to have gotten out.
Secretary Austin. Well, I will just tell you that we are
going to continue to work to try to get as many out as we can.
In the last 48 hours, I think we have brought out an additional
63 American citizens and 169 legal permanent residents. So we
are going to continue to work this.
Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, you answered a lot of the
questions that I had in your written testimony. You did say
that in April is when you were given, effectively, a change of
mission to the 650. What date in April was that?
General McKenzie. I believe it was on the 15th--14th----
Mr. Scott. Fifteenth?
General McKenzie [continuing]. 15th.
Mr. Scott. So mid-April?
General McKenzie. Yes.
Mr. Scott. When did we inform our partner forces that we
had a change in mission and that we were going to retrograde
from the 2,500 down to 650?
General McKenzie. That followed immediately. And that was
through----
Mr. Scott. Immediately.
General McKenzie [continuing]. CENTCOM's headquarters on
the ground----
Mr. Scott. Okay.
General McKenzie [continuing]. Through the process of
outreach both to President Ghani and to----
Mr. Scott. Okay.
General McKenzie [continuing]. Other members. It might have
taken a couple of days for that----
Mr. Scott. Okay.
General McKenzie [continuing]. Process, but it was not kept
from them. There was no----
Mr. Scott. Okay. It wasn't a secret.
Very quick. Was the 650 included in the 2,500, or is the
650 in addition to the 2,500 number you talked about?
General McKenzie. The 650 were different capabilities than
the----
Mr. Scott. Okay.
General McKenzie [continuing]. 2,500.
Mr. Scott. So it would have been a total of 3,150.
General McKenzie. No, no, no. When we went from 2,500 down
to an effective zero, we said we would keep 650----
The Chairman. They went from 2,500----
General McKenzie [continuing]. At the Embassy.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. They went
from 2,500 to 650, as I understand it, on their way to----
General McKenzie. That is correct, sir, but the
capabilities were different. They were different forces to do
different things.
The Chairman. Crucial point. Thank you.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Moulton is recognized.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley and Secretary Austin, my first question to
you at our hearing on June 23 was: Why have you not started the
evacuation of our allies already? You responded that we have a,
quote, ``moral imperative to save the Afghans who work by our
side.''
Secretary Austin, you said earlier today that moving too
slow with the evacuation would put our troops at risk.
So I want to know what you did personally, all three of
you, between that June 23 hearing and August 15, when Kabul
fell, to meet that moral imperative.
Now, I hope it is a long list of things, so I will take
that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 145.]
Mr. Moulton. But let me ask you this: Do you believe you
did enough?
Chairman Milley.
General Milley. I do. I think that we provided the advice
necessary at the time. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. Secretary Austin.
Secretary Austin. I think you heard me say in my opening
comments that we engaged State early on to provide input to
their decision-making process on when to move the SIVs----
Mr. Moulton. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. You said
that you and the State Department followed the advice of the
Ghani government that taking out SIVs would precipitate a
government collapse, yet the vast majority of these heroes
weren't even working for us or the government any more because
they supported a force of up to 100,000 U.S. troops over 20
years and we only had 2,500 troops left. So why on Earth did
you trust President Ghani?
Secretary Austin. Again, not my decision. To your point, I
had input to that decision-making process, but it is not as if
I was influenced by President Ghani.
Mr. Moulton. I understand, Mr. Secretary. So you have said
this repeatedly that this is State's responsibility. What
responsibility do you have for the Afghans who stood shoulder
to shoulder with our troops or how many do you commit to
getting out by the end of the year?
Secretary Austin. I have a responsibility to get out as
many as I can over time. And how many do I commit to getting
out? Everyone that I can.
Mr. Moulton. General McKenzie, there are reports that DOD
reduced air strikes as early as May when troops were just
beginning to withdraw and then had to ramp them back up after
the Taliban gained ground. There are also reports that you sat
down with the Taliban leadership in August, drew a circle
around Kabul, and told them that if the Taliban fighters went
inside that circle, they would get hit with U.S. air strikes.
So why did you let up on the Taliban, first at the
beginning of May and then at the end of our withdrawl in August
right when we should have been hitting them harder to give
Americans and Afghan partners time to evacuate.
General McKenzie. Representative, the report about me
meeting with the Taliban and telling them if they came inside a
30-kilometer circle around Kabul is simply factually incorrect.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. What about May?
General McKenzie. In May, as through the rest of our
redeployment period, we continued strikes on the Taliban. Those
strikes, however, were limited to support of Afghan forces in
close combat. We were not striking deep and we did not have a
tremendous amount of resources compared to resources that we
have had in the past. So those strikes, while effective in
certain tactical situations, at no time were enough to change
the strategic calculus of the campaign.
Mr. Moulton. General McKenzie, you went from 2,500 troops
in Afghanistan in April to 650 in July and then turned around
and put 5,000 back into Kabul. You have said repeatedly that
you personally believe the Afghan Government would fall if we
didn't maintain a certain number of troops in country. So why
didn't you plan for an evacuation and leave enough troops on
the ground to conduct it?
General McKenzie. So let's be very clear: The evacuation
has to be ordered by the Department of State. The drawdown of
U.S. forces was ordered by the President in April and completed
in July. The noncombatant evacuation operation is a separate
mission, and it was not completely under the control of the
Department----
Mr. Moulton. So you are going to fall back on the
bureaucracy, the divide between DOD and State----
General McKenzie. Well, Representative, I am going to fall
back on the orders----
Mr. Moulton [continuing]. All of those troops out and then
had to put more back in?
General McKenzie. I am going to fall back on the orders
that I received, Representative.
Mr. Moulton. Secretary Austin, you presided, in part, over
the withdrawl of forces from Iraq, though I know you at times
requested more troops on the ground. Two years later we had to
send thousands of troops back into Iraq. Do you believe we will
ever have to send troops back into Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Well, I certainly won't engage in a
hypothetical. I would just say that obviously that is a
decision that has to be made by the President and, you know,
while I won't rule anything out, I would just say it is not
preordained that we will go back or have to go back into
Afghanistan, again. But if we do, the military will provide
good credible options to be able to do that and to be
effective.
Mr. Moulton. Gentlemen, you and your predecessors asked
tens of thousands of young Americans to fight in Afghanistan,
and they did. And thousands died. Now you keep saying that our
troops should be proud of that. Where here is a question sent
to me by one of those soldiers. ``In twenty years our troops on
the ground never lost a single battle, yet we lost the war--''
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The
gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Moulton [continuing]. So what is left to be proud of?
The Chairman. Seth, we are trying to run a meeting here,
and if you wanted to read that letter, you should have read in
the first 5 minutes when you had time. So I think it is
something we need to hear and it is something we should have
heard during the 5 minutes that you had. The gentleman's time
has expired.
Ms. Stefanik is recognized. She is appearing virtually.
Ms. Stefanik, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I want to first
start off by saying that I am honored and privileged to
represent Fort Drum, home of the 10th Mountain Division the
most deployed division in the U.S. Army since 9/11, and I want
to take this opportunity to thank every soldier, every service
men and women for deployment after deployment after the past
two decades.
The North Country, this committee, and this country are
forever grateful for your service and sacrifice of both you and
your families.
I want to direct my question--the first question--to any of
you on the panel today and it is about the evacuation and force
protection efforts at the Hamid Karzai International Airport.
Force protection efforts were made specifically as the ISIS-K
threat intelligence came in before and after the suicide
bombing at the airport.
General McKenzie. Representative, first of all, the 10th
Mountain was a key part of our defense there at the airport and
I certainly appreciate their contribution to it. Force
protection is something we balanced all the time against the
requirement to let people come in and be processed and get on
the airplanes. So we looked at that every day and, as you know,
those two things are in tension and you have to balance them
every day. We had over 300 credible intelligence reports of
ISIS-K plans to attack the airport.
Turns out that they were able to carry out one successful
suicide vest attack. They also launched rockets at us. There
were many other attacks that we were able to either vector
Taliban elements onto prevent or perhaps the Taliban were able
to prevent those by the outer cordon that they established. But
force protection was a key thing that we balanced throughout
the entire operation and we thought the risk was very high at
all time, again, principally from ISIS-K. And I will pause
there, ma'am.
Ms. Stefanik. I am going to follow up. We depended upon the
Taliban for security to get the evacuees and Americans behind
enemy lines into the airport. Did the United States or
coalition forces provide money, any form of payment, or
assistance to the Taliban to expedite the evacuation of
Americans as the security environment in Kabul deteriorated?
General McKenzie. No, we did not. What we did was, we asked
the Taliban to establish a cordon, about 1,000 meters, 1
kilometer, beyond each of the gates where we could reduce the
number of people that were coming down and showing up at the
gates so we wouldn't have the possibility of a mass attack.
They did that. They were not compensated or rewarded in any way
for that. It was a very pragmatic, businesslike discussion. I
don't trust the Taliban. I didn't trust them then; I don't
trust them now. So that was the way we approached it.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, General McKenzie. And Secretary
Austin, I just want to get the Department on record in addition
to General McKenzie's answer. So there was no form of payment
by the U.S. or coalition forces at any time during the
evacuation to the Taliban?
Secretary Austin. To my knowledge, there was none.
Ms. Stefanik. And Chairman Milley?
General Milley. I have no knowledge of any money that
transmitted from any element of the United States Government to
the Taliban whatsoever.
Ms. Stefanik. My next question is, we are 20 years from the
attacks on 9/11 and I obviously am from the State of New York
and it is a very, very solemn occasion for all Americans, but
particularly New Yorkers every year as we commemorate that
date. I would like to get your assessment, is the terrorist
threat from Afghanistan greater today or lesser than it was
pre-9/11?
I will start with you, Chairman Milley.
General Milley. I think right this minute it is lesser than
it was in 9/11; however, I think the conditions are set or
could be set--and I testified to this yesterday and I will say
it again. I have said it in public many times--the conditions
could be set for a reconstitution of al-Qaida and/or ISIS.
And I gave some specific times in my statement, and I stand
by those. I think it is a real possibility in a not too distant
future--6, 12, 18, 24, 36 months that timeframe--for
reconstitution of al-Qaida or ISIS and it is our job now, under
different conditions, but it is our job to continue to protect
American citizens against attacks from Afghanistan.
Ms. Stefanik. Secretary Austin, your response to that
question?
Secretary Austin. I would agree with General Milley that
al-Qaida has been degraded over time. Now, terrorist
organizations seek ungoverned spaces so that they can train and
equip and thrive and so there is clearly a possibility that
that can happen here going forward. Our goal is to maintain a
laser-like focus on this so that it doesn't happen----
The Chairman. And I apologize. The gentlelady's time has
expired.
Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all our
witnesses that are here today. And I want to start by just, you
know, one of the things I like about this committee is that we
are pretty bipartisan, but every once in a while, the partisan
beast comes out and I am sure it happens from both sides of the
aisle.
This is my third term here. The administration from the
other party not in power is oftentimes--depending what
perspective you come to it, one is doing everything right and
the other one is doing everything wrong, and I think it is
important to shed light on things irrespective of the
partisanship.
One can argue that the agreement that President Trump
reached with the terrorist Taliban in February 2020 was less
than perfect and we should call that that from both sides of
the aisle, and we can also argue that the exit from--the
withdrawl was less than perfect. I certainly can say that I
supported the Trump administration and the Biden administration
in its goal to withdraw from Afghanistan, but, again, it has
been less than perfect.
And so for me, I just want to shed a little bit of light
and refresh some of the memory on some of the numbers going
back a little ways.
So General Milley, I want to make sure that I understand
our troop levels since the Doha Agreement that was reached with
the terrorist Taliban, signed by President Trump between
February 2020 when the agreement with the Taliban was signed to
January 2021, and how many troops did the United States
withdraw from Afghanistan--how many troops were withdrawn from
January 2017 to January 2021?
General Milley. 12,600 U.S. troops when the Doha Agreement
was signed on that day.
Mr. Carbajal. Can you repeat that, again?
General Milley. 12,600 U.S. troops on 29 February 2020 with
8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors, and the contractors are
particularly important here. With respect to on inauguration
day, I am showing 3,500 U.S. troops. That is the 2,500 advisers
and then there was some additional enablers that were over
there; 3,500 U.S. troops on 20 January, 5,400 NATO, and 6,300
contractors in Afghanistan on that day.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And I only draw attention to that
to show the withdrawl that started many years before. Secretary
Austin and General Milley, over the course of the 20 years in
Afghanistan, the United States Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction estimates that the United States
spent $83 billion equipping and training the Afghanistan
National Defense and Security Forces which included almost $10
billion in aircraft and vehicles.
We all saw the unexpected and appalling rate of how quickly
the Afghan military folded under pressure from the Taliban.
What do U.S. train and equip efforts in Afghanistan suggest
about security cooperation operations going forward and what
aspects about train and equip efforts do you think the
Department should reassess?
Secretary Austin. I will turn it over to General Milley
here very quickly, but I think we should reassess everything
soup to nuts. I think we put a valiant effort into providing
the Afghans with a great capability.
And at the end of the day that capability was not employed
because the security forces fractured and essentially
evaporated. So we need to look at ourselves to see what we did
and whether or not that is the right thing to do going forward.
General Milley. In my view, Congressman, I think when we do
security force assistance, one of the things we have to guard
against is mirror imaging. I think from the very beginning with
the army, the Afghan Army, we wanted to create them in the
image of the U.S. Army. I think a success story is the
commandos with the special forces piece, but the broader Army
became a mirror image, [inaudible]. That is one point.
The second point is the police forces that was assigned
under the Bonn agreement in 2002 to the Germans. The Germans
wanted to make polizei and that sort of thing.
And the third and last point is they became dependent upon
us, contractors, U.S. air support, et cetera, and we have to
avoid dependency on U.S. forces.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Dr. DesJarlais is recognized.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for
being here today to answer our questions. I have had so many
questions come from constituents in Tennessee that there is no
way that we could even begin to get through them in 5 minutes,
but let's jump right in.
General Milley, on Bagram, in your professional military
opinion, which facility, HKIA or Bagram Airfield, would have
been most efficient in conducting the evacuation that we were
forced to do?
General Milley. HKIA. And there is a reason for that. The
majority, the vast majority of those personnel that we expected
to have to conduct a NEO with were located in Kabul. That is
point one. Point two is, we were directed to maintain an
Embassy open and also the international zone for the other
allied nations.
So we had to do it out of HKIA. Bagram would have been a
plus, but it would have required exceptional levels of
resources to do that.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I think all of you testified
yesterday that it wasn't a matter of if the Afghan Army would
fail and the Taliban would take over, it was a matter of when.
You were all shocked by the rate at which it happened. The
billions of dollars in equipment that was left behind has been
under much scrutiny.
Knowing that they were going to fail, why were more steps
not taken to secure that military equipment or destroy it?
Knowing that now it is a well-equipped Taliban army.
Secretary Austin. So the number is a big number. So let me
unpack that a little bit. First of all, the $84 billion
included all of the----
Dr. DesJarlais. I understand that. Let's just cut right to
the equipment that was left behind. Why was so much left
behind? Aircraft? MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
Vehicles]? Weapons? Why was that there when you knew they were
going to fail?
Secretary Austin. The other thing I would say is that all
of the equipment that we had that we were using, as I stated
earlier, was evacuated by General Miller. Now, the reason that
the Afghans had the equipment they had is because we wanted
them to be successful and they could not be successful without
the appropriate----
Dr. DesJarlais. If they are watching these hearings
yesterday and today, I am guessing that they probably feel like
they were played as foolS because you all just said you knew
they were going to fail. So here we have an army we built up,
we used them until we didn't need them any more to accomplish
Biden's objective and Trump's objective of getting out of
Afghanistan; however, it went horribly wrong as we can probably
all agree to.
General Milley, you started today and talked about your
commitment to your office. You are the principal military
advisor to the President, correct?
General Milley. That is correct.
Dr. DesJarlais. And that is to President Trump and
President Biden?
General Milley. That is correct. And the Secretary of
Defense and the National Security Council.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And Senator Blackburn yesterday asked
you about your conversations with several book writers and you
were fine with giving them your opinion and I think you said
that you had a rather blunt forward phone call with House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi?
General Milley. True.
Dr. DesJarlais. And you were--she was concerned over the
safety of nuclear weapons?
General Milley. Correct.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. In a transcript obtained from CNN
Political, Woodward and Costa quoted Pelosi as saying--and this
was to you: ``What I am saying to you is that they couldn't
even stop him from an assault on the Capitol. Who even knows
what else he may do? And is there anybody in charge at the
White House who is doing anything but kissing his fat butt all
over this?''
Do you recall that?
General Milley. I haven't seen the transcript.
Dr. DesJarlais. I think that would be firmly imprinted on
my mind----
General Milley. Well, I would just say there was a lot of
disparaging comments made and my focus was to assure her that
the nuclear system and weapons were under control.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And according to Costa and Woodward,
she went on to say, you know, he is crazy. He has been crazy
for a long time to which they say--and I am sure you haven't
had a chance to read the book yet--Milley responded, Madam
Speaker, I agree with you on everything.
If you are the principal advisor to the President and she
said that to you, do you think that you were doing service to a
President by agreeing with the Speaker that your Commander in
Chief is crazy?
General Milley. I actually said--I actually said I am not
qualified to assess the mental health of the President. What I
am agreeing to is that we have to have a secure nuclear system.
Dr. DesJarlais. Have you had any conversations with the
Speaker or any of our foreign leaders about our current
President's mental capacity? We have a physician right here on
the panel who was the personal physician to the prior three
presidents who said President Biden should take a mental
competency test and we see it in the press, his lack of ability
to answer questions.
Have you had any conversations with anybody concerning his
ability to carry out a nuclear order or any other serious
engagements?
General Milley. No. And my answer would be the same. I am
not qualified to evaluate a President's mental health or your
mental health or anybody's mental health. I am not a doctor.
Dr. DesJarlais. But you were concerned about Trump? You
said you were concerned about him when you made the call to
China?
General Milley. No, I didn't. What I said to the call to
China was I guarantee you that President Trump is not going to
attack you in a surprise attack. I was carrying out his intent,
President Trump's intent in order to protect the American
people----
The Chairman. And the gentleman's time has expired.
General Milley [continuing]. To prevent an escalation or an
incident.
The Chairman. That was helpful.
Mr. Brown is recognized.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Each of my questions
have been asked and answered this morning. Therefore, I will
use this seldom opportunity with the two most senior officials
of the Pentagon to make a statement. We cannot ask our men and
women in uniform to fight forever wars and I commend President
Biden for recognizing this reality in bringing our troops home.
But we know the threats faced in our country aren't solely on
distant battlefields. For decades we have grappled with
extremist ideologies within our own civilian communities and
our military ranks, and there are no signs that we are winning
this fight.
As FBI Director Wray testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee earlier this year, January 6th was not an isolated
event. Director Wray stated the problem of domestic extremism
has been metastasizing across the country for a long time now
and is not going away anytime soon. We know now that 12 percent
of those charged in the riot on the Capitol had military
experience with at least one indicted rioter on active military
duty. That is well above the participant patient rate of adults
in the military. The last time you both were before this
committee, you spoke about the issue of extremism in our Armed
Forces.
General Milley, you stated from private to general there is
no room for extremist behavior in the United States military
and I commend you, Secretary Austin, for ordering the extremism
stand down this past February to deal with the threat. You
recognize this issue within the ranks, but I am gravely
concerned that too many of our military leaders do not.
In April, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] Commander Admiral
Richard said he was, quote, very confident that the number of
extremists in my force is at zero. And at the same hearing,
General Dickinson, Commander of Space Command, echoed that
assessment claiming, ``In the formations that I have had
throughout my career, I have not seen that. So I believe it is
close to zero in my organization if not zero.'' This ignores
the clear evidence on this issue.
A 2019 Military Times survey found more than one-third of
Active Duty service members have witnessed White nationalism or
ideologically driven racism in the ranks. You yourself,
Secretary Austin, spoke of your experiences with extremism
while you were in uniform.
The Army's CID's [Criminal Investigation Division's] 2020
gang and domestic extremist activity threat assessment found a
66 percent increase in gang or domestic extremist activity from
the previous year and then in October of 2020, a Pentagon
report to Congress detailed how domestic extremists actively
recruit military personnel.
We have a problem, the scope of which we don't fully
understand, but Democrats and Republicans have asked the
Department for a definition of extremism, improved screening
processes, and a status report on implementation of
recommendations. You still have not yet received it--We have
not received it, which is why just last week the House passed
the fiscal year 2022 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
giving DOD additional authorities and resources to counter
extremism in the Department.
So I was extremely disappointed to see the administration's
statement of policy which opposes the countering extremism
provisions in the NDAA, citing overburdensome training and data
collection requirements, not a single sentence suggests on how
to improve the provisions just opposition to Congress.
Congress is about to authorize and appropriate $768 billion
to the Department, nearly $25 billion more than the President's
budget request, yet the administration views additional data
collection and training requirements to counter the threat of
extremism as onerous.
We heard the same pushback when it came to addressing
sexual assault in the military for 10 years before the
Department finally realized it was failing and that it needed
greater tools. And we've documented systemic racism under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice for at least 50 years, yet the
Department is making little, if any, progress to address that.
Whether it is sexual assault or racial injustice, the
Department repeatedly tells Congress we can handle it,
commanders are responsible, we are studying it, we are ready to
fight tonight. We cannot wait years, let alone decades, in the
face of obstinance from the Department before meeting the
challenges of extremism in the Armed Forces. The time to
address it is now.
As this hearing reveals, there are many important issues
for our military to address, in addition to the ongoing
American Afghan evacuations and anticipated over-the-horizon
operations. We have got to care for our troops and the families
and that includes combating extremism in your formations in a
way that we can take care of our troops and secure the Nation.
So please stop fighting Congress. Partner with us and
accept the tools that you need to fix the problem. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kelly is recognized.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being
here and, Chairman Milley, I just want to start, I understand
the conversation with the Chinese leader. What I don't
understand is you going to the press, Chairman Milley, and that
disappointments me that you talked to the press about that.
None of the other stuff, I think, you were--I am okay with
that; I am not okay with you talking to the press or authors.
I want to talk just a little bit about Bagram. There is two
runways at Bagram and only one at HKIA. Is that correct?
General McKenzie. That is correct.
Mr. Kelly. So there is strategic value to two runways
versus one. You would agree with that?
General McKenzie. It is entirely dependent on the mission.
Mr. Kelly. And the other thing is, there is standoff versus
an urban environment and there are strategic advantages and
disadvantages to that. You would agree with that, General
McKenzie?
General McKenzie. That is correct.
Mr. Kelly. I want to talk a little bit about the strike on
August the 29th, I think. Who set the rules of engagement?
Where were the rules of engagement? At what level?
General McKenzie. So under the rules of engagement, we
would need to get into the details in a classified setting. We
had----
Mr. Kelly. No, I don't want to know what the rules of
engagement were; I want to know whose rules of engagement were
they.
General McKenzie. The U.S. military's rules of engagement.
Mr. Kelly. Was that President Biden's? Was that Secretary
Austin's? Was that CENTCOM's?
General McKenzie. They are wholly neutral as to the party
in power. It has nothing to do with the rules of engagement.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. And I want to refer to a New York Times
article on March 3rd described a policy change of the Biden
administration that placed greater restrictions on drone
strikes and raids conducted outside conventional battlefield
zones. Previously authorized by ground commanders, these
operations now require White House approval.
Did the strike on August 28th or 29th, the one that killed
10 innocents, did it require Presidential approval prior to the
strike?
General McKenzie. No, it did not.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. At what level, who was the approval
authority for that strike?
General McKenzie. The target engagement authority was
forward in the theater at the over-the-horizon cell that
oversees those activities.
Mr. Kelly. At what level? One-star? Two-star? Three-star?
General McKenzie. Flag officer level.
Mr. Kelly. Flag officer level. Okay. And at what point,
General McKenzie--and this is for all three of you--at what
point did you know that the strike was bad; that it hit
civilians?
General McKenzie. So we knew the strike hit civilians
within 4 or 5 hours after the strike occurred and U.S. Central
Command released a press release saying that. We did not know,
though, that the target of the strike was, in fact, an error--a
mistake until some time later. It took us a few days to run
that down, but we knew pretty soon----
Mr. Kelly. Secretary Austin, when did you know it was a bad
strike that killed civilians?
Secretary Austin. As soon as General McKenzie reported that
there were civilians that had been injured.
Mr. Kelly. So 4 or 5 hours timeframe. That is all I need.
Secretary Austin. Typically, as soon as that happens, we
investigate. We begin an investigation.
Mr. Kelly. When did you know that civilians were killed in
that strike? That is my question. It is really easy. It is a
time. It doesn't take much to answer that.
Secretary Austin. Right. Several hours after that.
Mr. Kelly. General Milley, same.
General Milley. Same thing.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. So I am assuming there is 15 sixes [O-6
rank officers] at multiple levels that will get to see those
investigations. There is a lot of questions I have that have to
be in a classified environment, but I hope that you guys know I
also sit on a different committee that has different insight to
this and I think it is important that we know who authorized,
at what level, and that we take accountability.
Listen, I have made strikes. I have lived under rules of
engagement. I have had rules of engagements I liked and didn't
like. I have had to make hard decisions. I hope most of them
are right, but I understand. I don't want to blame some O-6 or
some O-5.
I want to make sure we get the level and that the rules of
engagement were proper and that they were followed at whatever
level who didn't follow those or either wrote those because
that just--I think the strike was done to show we had over-the-
horizon capabilities and we didn't because we reported a
secondary explosion that was not. We reported all kind of
stuff.
Now my next question is the other strike. Who did we kill?
General McKenzie. I prefer to pass you that name in a
classified setting.
Mr. Kelly. Okay. Can you tell me, was it an HVT [high-value
target] or just a low-level terrorist?
General McKenzie. I think it was a facilitator and it was a
good strike. We got someone who, while not directly involved in
the attack on Abbey Gate on the 26th, certainly fell within
that circle----
Mr. Kelly. In a classified I would like to know that. And
then my next question is, I just don't understand. I guess
maybe I went to Union Public High School of 1,100. My math--11
to 15,000 U.S. citizens, 5,400 out--that leaves thousands, not
hundreds, left that want to get out.
And I know for a fact every office here we had people
calling us wanting to get out, U.S. citizens, that were not
allowed to get in the gate or were kicked off the base or were
not allowed out. And with that, I just ask, guys, we got to get
our folks home.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Khanna is recognized.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley, I want to first thank you for your 42 years
of service, for your principled commitment to civilian rule,
for your commitment to military-to-military communication that
kept this country safe for three decades during the Cold War,
and for the sacrifice and patriotism that you and your family
have shown. As a son of immigrants, I am in your family's debt.
And I want to thank the three of you for ending America's
longest war and executing the largest airlift in history.
Now Secretary Austin, you have testified that had 2,500
troops stayed past the deadline, the military would likely have
needed reinforcements and I want to just make this clear: The
choice for President Biden wasn't zero troops or 2,500 troops.
It was zero troops or potentially many more troops.
General Milley, just briefly, would you agree that at some
point more than 2,500 troops would have been needed had the
Taliban engaged in offensive strikes?
General Milley. I am sorry. There is a reasonable prospect
we would have had to increase forces past 2,500 given that the
Taliban were very likely was going to start attacking us. And
there was a range of forces. We are really talking about 2,500
to 4,500, in that range.
Mr. Khanna. Appreciate that. I want to talk about the
strike that killed civilians, and I know--look, I think our
military cares more about the loss of civilian life than any
military in the world, any superpower ever in history. And that
is why I think we ought to talk about this candidly and I
brought pictures of the seven children who were killed, along
with the three adults, to remind us that this is not what
America wants; this is something that we need to prevent in the
future.
Press Secretary Kirby who did a fine job during those 10
days said, you would support evacuating these family members as
they have requested and resettling them in the U.S. Is that
correct, Secretary Austin?
Secretary Austin. It is.
Mr. Khanna. My question is, can we get the family and the
coworkers evacuated now and brought to safety? I get the legal
hoops, but could that happen after? Can we just get them into
the U.S. or some safe place?
Secretary Austin. Well, we will continue to work through
State Department channels to engage the family and if they
desire to leave, then we will certainly do everything we can to
facilitate getting them out.
Mr. Khanna. I hope we can just expedite that and expedite
the compensation. It is the moral thing to do, it is the right
thing to do, it is how America conducts itself. And so I hope
you will take that into consideration.
General McKenzie, I admire and respect your leadership, but
I want to see how we can improve the intelligence to prevent
these kind of strikes in the future. One aspect you said is
that there was a white Toyota Corolla that led to the attacks.
I am sure you are aware, is there any car more common than a
Toyota Corolla in Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. It is a very common car. Of course, there
were many other factors that went into that decision, not
simply the fact that it was a Toyota Corolla.
Mr. Khanna. According to the Stars and Stripes, roughly 90
percent of cars registered in Afghanistan have been Corollas.
One of the other things that concern me is, based on my reading
and obviously you know more, the Corolla was parked next to a
U.S. registered California-based NGO [non-governmental
organization] that was delivering humanitarian assistance. And
I guess the question is, did the DOD know about the NGO in
advance of the strike?
General McKenzie. I would prefer since that is under
investigation now, I would like to defer that question.
Mr. Khanna. I would just hope that we can make sure going
forward that our Department will cross-check its intelligence
to make sure that aid organizations are on no-strike lists. I
assume that if there is an aid organization or hospital, those
are on no-strike lists?
General McKenzie. Representative, as are mosques, which are
often used by ISIS-K as training sites as well.
Mr. Khanna. Right. Again, I believe that our military goes
through extraordinary lengths to prevent this. It is not to try
to be an indictment of anyone; I just want to make sure we
continue to improve the processes and that we do right by the
families who suffered this unspeakable tragedy. Thank you,
again, to the three of you for your leadership and thank you to
everyone who served.
Regardless of one's view in Afghanistan, I find the attacks
on your integrity and patriotism to be a dishonor to this
committee and a dishonor to your service.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
I have to ask the witnesses a question. We have a little
complicated scheduling thing going on here. We are scheduled to
have votes at 1:30-ish. My plan would be to, if we could go to
that period, get through that, take the break then, but it has
been a while. If you need a break earlier, we can take a 15-
minute break at 12:30.
And I wish there was an easier way to do this, but totally
up to you. Would you like to break at 12:30 or would you like
to just go until votes?
Secretary Austin. I think we are good for right now,
Chairman.
The Chairman. If you need a break just, you know----
Secretary Austin. We will fire the star cluster.
The Chairman. We all have overprotective aides who are like
pounding on us that they need a break, they need a break. So I
just figured I would ask. So we will proceed and I appreciate
that.
Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
General McKenzie, the Washington Post reported on August
28th that the Taliban offered to allow the U.S. military to
take responsibility for security in Kabul. Did you meet with
Mullah Baradar to discuss such an offer?
General McKenzie. I met with Mullah Baradar in Doha on 15
August to pass a message to him that we were withdrawing and if
they attempted to disrupt that withdrawl, we would punish them
severely for that.
Mr. Gallagher. But did he offer to allow you to have
security over all of Kabul?
General McKenzie. As part of that conversation, he said,
well, why don't you just take security for all of Kabul. That
was not why I was there. That was not my instruction. And we
did not have the resources to undertake that mission.
Mr. Gallagher. Did you convey the offer, however, to the
President?
General McKenzie. The offer was made in the presence of the
President's Special Representative to Afghanistan.
Mr. Gallagher. Do you know if the SRAP [U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan] conveyed it to the
President?
General McKenzie. I don't know, but it was conveyed to my
chain of command.
Mr. Gallagher. So who made the decision to turn down the
Taliban offer to allow the U.S. military to secure Kabul and
put the safety of our troops in the hands of the Taliban?
General McKenzie. I did not consider that to be a formal
offer and it was not the reason why I was there, so I did not
pursue it. So if someone actually made a decision that would
have been me.
Mr. Gallagher. So we don't know if it was conveyed to the
President? We don't know----
General McKenzie. I do know it was conveyed to my chain of
command.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. In military terms, what do you call
the retreat of military forces under security provided by and
with the permission of enemy forces?
General McKenzie. Don't know. I have never done one of
those operations.
Mr. Gallagher. I think you just did one of those
operations.
General McKenzie. I disagree.
Mr. Gallagher. You disagree. So you did not withdraw forces
from Afghanistan after negotiation with the Taliban?
General McKenzie. That is correct. We did not do that.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So this would not be a conditional
surrender, in your opinion?
General McKenzie. This would not be a conditional
surrender.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, what would you describe the operation?
General McKenzie. I would describe it as a noncombatant
evacuation operation that we conducted with our own timing and
with our own forces, and we warned the Taliban that if they
interfered with that operation, we would strike them hard. They
chose not to interfere with that operation.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So you are saying the meeting you had
in Doha was just to let the Taliban know this is what we are
doing, you know, take or leave it, but you were operating at
that point under the agreement we had negotiated with the
Taliban for surrender, right, the Doha Agreement?
General McKenzie. I was there to tell the Taliban that we
were conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation.
Mr. Gallagher. Wait, wait. Not a NEO by DOD definition does
not definitionally include the evacuation of combatants. You
were also evacuating combatants. So the NEO was part of the
operation?
General McKenzie. Actually, no, you are wrong. When I met
with the Taliban on 15 August, we had completed the withdrawal
operation. Further forces that went in were forces that were
core to the NEO operation and, in fact, DOD doctrine would
include the insertion and extraction of combatant forces as
part of a NEO operation----
Mr. Gallagher. But what do we call the withdrawl of
combatants whether it happened before----
General McKenzie. It can be called a retrograde, it can be
called a withdrawal.
Mr. Gallagher. Was it in your orders, though? What were you
tasked with doing?
General McKenzie. I was tasked to conduct a noncombatant
evacuation operation.
Mr. Gallagher. Which you just said happened after you had
withdrawn forces?
General McKenzie. Largely, that is correct.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. And you didn't get tasking--what did
the tasking to withdrawl the forces call that operation?
General McKenzie. I would have to go back and take a look
at it. I believe it was a withdrawl.
Mr. Gallagher. Withdrawl. Okay. Which I believe the
definition is a repositioning of forces. I would call it a
conditional surrender. I guess we will have to check the
dictionary definition on that. Just to go to something that
General Milley said before, has al-Qaida sworn bayat to the
Taliban?
General McKenzie. I believe there is a deep relationship
between the Taliban----
Mr. Gallagher. But have they sworn bayat? Just yes or no.
General McKenzie. I couldn't answer that question for you
right now.
Mr. Gallagher. Oh. I believe General Milley said it before.
Has the Taliban renounced the previous oath that al-Qaida
swore?
General McKenzie. The Taliban and al-Qaida have a very
close relationship, and I do not expect the Taliban to
seriously interfere with their basing and repositioning in
Afghanistan, which is, I think, the question you are asking.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. Yeah. Let me get at it a different
way. The new interior minister for the Taliban Government is
Sirajuddin Haqqani. He is a known al-Qaida associate. Is there
any evidence that he or the Haqqani network has broken with al-
Qaida?
General McKenzie. None.
Mr. Gallagher. Did the March attack on FOB [Forward
Operating Base] Chapman breach the Doha Agreement, in your
opinion?
General McKenzie. No, it did not.
Mr. Gallagher. It did not. General McKenzie, do you know
which Taliban forces were actually providing security in front
of the airport?
General McKenzie. Yes, we do.
Mr. Gallagher. Was it Badri 313?
General McKenzie. They were part of it. There were other
elements as well. It was a hodgepodge of units----
Mr. Gallagher. But Badri 313 was part----
General McKenzie. Among others.
Mr. Gallagher. Among others? A group that specialized in
suicide bombing attacks. Had the suicide bomber been
imprisoned--I think you suggested to Congresswoman Hartzler
that the suicide bomber might have been in prison in Bagram
before. Do we know?
General McKenzie. I don't believe--I don't recall
suggesting that.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So do we know whether he had been?
General McKenzie. We are still working very hard to find
out where the suicide bomber came from.
Mr. Gallagher. Did we have an opportunity to take him out
prior to the suicide bombing attack?
General McKenzie. We did not.
Mr. Gallagher. We did not have an opportunity to take him
out. And just, finally, does the over-the-horizon posture that
we are now adopting, would that be more or less difficult now
that we are out of the country?
General McKenzie. I have said on the record it will be very
difficult to do. It is not impossible to do.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Kim is recognized.
Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKenzie, I wanted to start with you. You said
reports about you engaging with the Taliban about a red line
around Kabul before its fall were false. Does that mean that
there was no discussion or consideration in the U.S. of a plan
to defend Kabul in early August before its fall?
General McKenzie. There was never a discussion about a plan
to defend Kabul before its fall. I will say that when I went to
Doha, I took with me a graphic. It was a map of Kabul with a
30-kilometer ring on the outside. Our original proposal was, we
would ask the Taliban to stay outside that ring, but we were
not going to threaten them. We felt that was the best way to do
deconfliction; however, on the day of the meeting, they were
already in downtown Kabul, so the graphic was outdated and we
had to proceed from the new reality.
Mr. Kim. Secretary Austin, I wanted to get your thoughts on
this. When I spent some time in the Situation Room with you in
2014 when we were fearing the fall of Erbil and Baghdad, U.S.
CENTCOM Commander immediately drew up some CONOPS [concept of
operations] defending those positions using air assets. The
effort was to buy time for the Iraqis and the Iraqi Kurds to
reconstitute.
Did it not cross your mind to consider something like that
in early August before the fall of Kabul?
Secretary Austin. This is certainly something we
considered, you know. We took a look at what we would need to
do to protect the Embassy and if we had to do a NEO, what could
we do to buy time for that operation to take place.
Mr. Kim. Chairman Milley, I wanted to switch to you.
Yesterday you said that you were asked on August 25th to make a
decision about the August 31st deadline. Was there an actual
formal request made to the Taliban by the United States to stay
past August 31st? Was that a request that was then denied that
you were taking into account in that decision?
General Milley. I don't make decisions, Congressman. I
provide advice.
Mr. Kim. In your recommendation.
General Milley. I was asked for what is called best
military advice. I am not aware of a formal request to the
Taliban one way or the other on staying past the 31st. I am
very familiar with the advice that we provided on the 25th.
Mr. Kim. Before the fall of Kabul, did we actually have
formal Taliban agreement upon an August 31st departure date?
General Milley. I am not sure what you mean by ``formal,''
but I do--I think----
Mr. Kim. Had there ever been a point where the United
States went to the Taliban saying that we are planning to leave
on August 31st? I am talking about prior to the fall of Kabul.
General Milley. I think from a policy perspective Zal
Khalilzad could give you the detailed information on that. I do
believe the Taliban knew that we were departing on the 31st. We
announced it.
Mr. Kim. But you weren't aware of it----
General Milley. I am not aware of a formal agreement per
se, but I think Zal Khalilzad could give you better definition
of that.
Mr. Kim. General McKenzie, I want to turn back to you then
because you were saying that you talked with the Taliban on
August 15th. Did you use August 31st as a date to end the
operations? Was there a date set at all in your discussions
with----
General McKenzie. I did not use a specific date when I
talked to them.
Mr. Kim. So no date was set on August 15th----
General McKenzie. I did not convey a specific date as part
of my conversation.
Mr. Kim. I wanted to switch gears one more time here.
Secretary Austin, moving forward, when we are looking at
the fundamental viability of the over-the-horizon effort, is
the air space over Afghanistan currently considered sovereign
air space? And I guess I will frame it in a slightly different
way. Is it currently legal for the United States to conduct ISR
sorties and air strikes in Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Yes.
Mr. Kim. Under what authority is that legal?
Secretary Austin. Same authority as we were using before.
Mr. Kim. And that would be under the Security and Defense
Cooperation Agreement of 2014. Is that correct?
Secretary Austin. No. I think what we are prosecuting now
is--are the authorities that were referred to by General
McKenzie earlier and you mentioned he would have to take that
into a classified setting.
Mr. Kim. Okay. I will certainly follow with you that way.
General McKenzie, something I wanted to follow with you on.
Yesterday in your hearing in front of the Senate, you made a
comment when asked about the war on terror and you said that
the war on terror is not over, but then you also went on and
said that the war in Afghanistan is not over. So I just wanted
a clarification from you. In your opinion, is the war in
Afghanistan over?
General McKenzie. So I believe the war in Afghanistan is
not over. I believe we are no longer a party to that war, but
that doesn't mean that ISIS and the Taliban aren't going to
engage in a furious fight this fall that may result in ISIS
being crushed or it may result----
Mr. Kim. Oh, I see. So when you are saying that you are
referring that you believe that there is a civil war in
Afghanistan, but in terms of the United States war against
Afghanistan, you would say that that is over?
General McKenzie. We have no forces in Afghanistan. Our
only interest in Afghanistan is looking for ISIS-K----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gaetz is recognized.
Mr. Gaetz. February 26, 2020, House Armed Services
Committee, General Mark Milley: ``We know we are not going to
defeat the Taliban militarily and they are not going to defeat
the Government of Afghanistan militarily''. You really blew
that call, didn't you, General?
General Milley. I believe that that was an issue of
strategic stalemate and that if we had remained in Afghanistan
with the advisory levels of effort, then the Government of
Afghanistan----
Mr. Gaetz. Well, that is an interesting answer to a
question. It is just not what I asked. You spent more time with
Bob Woodward on this book than you spent analyzing the very
likely prospect that the Afghanistan Government was going to
fall immediately to the Taliban, didn't you?
General Milley. Not even close, Congressman.
Mr. Gaetz. Oh, really? Because you said right after Kabul
fell that no one could have anticipated the immediate fall of
the Ghani government. When did you become aware that Joe Biden
tried to get Ghani to lie about the conditions in Afghanistan?
He did that in July. Did you know that right away?
General Milley. I am not aware of what President Biden----
Mr. Gaetz. You are not aware of the phone call that Biden
had with Ghani where he said, whether it is true or not, we
want you to go out there and paint a rosy picture of what is
going on in Afghanistan? You are the chief military adviser to
the President. You said that the Taliban was not going to
defeat the Government of Afghanistan militarily, which, by the
way, they cut through them like a hot knife through butter, and
then the President tries to get Ghani to lie. When did you
become aware of that attempt?
General Milley. There is two things there, Congressman, if
I may. One is what I said was the situation was stalemate and
if we kept advisers with there, the Government of Afghanistan
and the army would have still been there. That is what I said.
Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but----
Mr. Gaetz. Seems wrong now with the Taliban in control. I
have a question for Secretary Austin.
Secretary Austin, are you capable of assessing whether
another has the will to fight?
Secretary Austin. No, we are not and that is the point that
the Chairman made earlier.
Mr. Gaetz. That is just like an incredibly disappointing
thing for the Secretary of Defense to simply say, I can't
assess whether someone has the will to fight, but it is
consistent with your record.
I mean, during the Obama administration, I think they gave
you about $48 million to go train up some folks in Syria to go
take on the Assad government and I think your testimony was
that only four or five survived first contact with the enemy.
So what confidence should this committee have in you or
should the country have in you when you have now confessed to
us and whether it is the swing and a miss in Afghanistan that
General Milley talked to the Senate about yesterday, total
failure, or whether it was your failures in Syria, you don't
seem capable to look at a fighting force and determine whether
or not they have the will. Is that an embarrassment?
Secretary Austin. Well, you will recall, Congressman, that
the end result was the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] that we
stood up that was very, very instrumental in turning the tide
of battle up in Syria.
Mr. Gaetz. Oh, yeah. Turned it so much you got Assad in
power in Syria, you got the Taliban in power in Afghanistan.
Where have you been?
Secretary Austin. The focus was ISIS, Congressman, and
those forces had significant affect on the ISIS network.
Mr. Gaetz. It just seems like you are chronically bad at
this and you have admitted that, I guess, which is to your
credit, but when people in the military like Lieutenant Colonel
Stuart Scheller stand up and demand accountability, when they
say that you all screwed up, when they point out that General
Milley's statement that the Government of Afghanistan is not
going to get defeated by the Taliban, well, he ends up in the
brig and you all end up in front of us and your former employer
Raytheon ends up with a lot of money, and we have poured cash
and blood and credibility into a Ghani government that was a
mirage. It fell immediately. And while the guy sitting next to
you was off talking to Phil Rucker and was off doing his thing
with Bob Woodward, we were buying into the big lie, the big lie
that this was ever going to be successful and that we could
ever rely on the Afghanistan Government for anything at all.
You know, General Milley, you kind of gave up the game
earlier when you said you wanted to address elements of your
personal conduct that were in question. We are not questioning
your personal conduct. We are questioning in your official
capacity going and undermining the chain of command, which is
obviously what you did. You have created this whole change----
General Milley. I did not undermine the chain of command--
--
Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, you did. You absolutely did.
General Milley. Did not.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, you know what? You said yesterday that you
weren't going to resign when Senators asked you this question
and I believe that you guys probably won't resign. You seem to
be very happy failing up over there, but if we didn't have a
President that was so addled, you all would be fired because
that is what you deserve. You have let down the people who wear
the uniform in my district and all around this country. And you
are far more interested in what your perception is and how
people think about you and insider Washington books than you
care about winning----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Ms. Houlahan is recognized.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, gentlemen, I
apologize for the behavior of my colleague. I am deeply, deeply
appreciative of your service and of the decades of experience
that you all bring to this conversation. Thank you so much for
the opportunity to ask important questions of you, questions
that ought to be asked of you in the spirit of our
responsibility of oversight rather than provocation.
So I just have a couple of questions of clarification from
this testimony that has happened so far, and the first one is
for you, General McKenzie. You mentioned something about in
your opening remarks about you having looked at different
branches to account for the complete collapse of the government
and the Afghan military. That is the first time, frankly, that
I have heard that scenario being articulated out loud.
Most of the testimony that I have heard prior to this has
been we could have never foreseen that. So as somebody who is a
branching engineer type person, that is what I do, I am
intrigued to see if that is, indeed, what you did have and what
the likelihood you put to that and the cost that you associated
with that would be.
General McKenzie. So, as we drew up the NEO plan, one of
the assumptions of the NEO plan was that the Afghan military
would be able to continue to secure HKIA, the airfield, because
the Turks were there, but they only actually secured a small
fraction of the airfield, maybe 20 percent of it. The rest of
that long perimeter around the entire runway was actually
secured by Afghan military forces.
So our assumption was they would continue to perform that
function. But we also--since we stated that as an assumption,
by the way we plan, we have to say if that assumption is wrong,
because an assumption is a future hypothetical condition that
we believe is going to occur, we felt that was always something
that we should challenge.
So we developed a plan if that assumption failed, if they
melted away. So we had a branch plan that was developed as part
of the overall NEO plan where we would introduce adequate
combat forces to physically take over securing the perimeter of
that airfield in case the ANDSF did melt away. Well, as we got
into the first week of August, it began to look increasingly
likely that they would melt away.
So I talked to the Secretary, talked to the Chairman, and
we agreed to begin to flow forces in for that contingency.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And my question to you related
for--all three of you, and perhaps we'll start with you,
General, is, how long have you believed that the Afghan
military might not be up to the task of taking over and
maintaining security against the Taliban?
We discussed a lot of different timelines over the course
of the last few months. Has it been inevitable for 5 or 10
years? How long have you been relaying that information or that
concern possibly to any of our senior leaders or senior
administration if you could share that with us as well.
General McKenzie. Ma'am, so I will start. I think it
actually from the relatively short-term perspective, I think
the Doha Agreement and the signing of the Doha Agreement had a
really pernicious affect on the Government of Afghanistan and
on its military. Psychological more than anything else, but we
set a date certain for when we were going to leave and when
they could expect all assistance to end.
So for the first time there was something out there in
front of them. Now, I also--I think that is an important thing.
The other point would be it has been my position and my
judgment that if we went below an advisory level of 2,500, I
believe that the government of Afghanistan would likely
collapse and that the military would follow. And one might go
before the other, but I believe that was going to be the
inevitable result of drawing down to zero. And I have expressed
that opinion in writing for quite a while.
Now, so taking a look at that, that was sort of my best
judgment on that. I believe that--so going below 2,500, I
think, was the other sort of nail in the coffin, if you will,
that allowed the Afghan--that led to conditions where, first of
all, we could no longer see what was happening to the force
because our advisers were no longer down there with those
units.
So let me give you an example. If we shipped a box of
mortar rounds into Afghanistan, we would sign it over on the
ramp at HKIA and the Afghans would truck it away. There would
be nobody below that level to help them disburse it, to see if
it went to the bazaar, or if it went down to the unit that
needed mortar rounds.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And, Secretary Austin, it looked like you had something to
contribute as well.
Secretary Austin. I certainly agree with the comments that
General McKenzie has made. I would just add to that that as a
part of that agreement, we agreed to cease conducting air
operations against the Taliban. So the Taliban got stronger,
they increase their offensive operations against the Afghan
Security Forces and the Afghans were losing a lot of people on
a weekly basis.
In addition to that, we caused them to release 5,000
prisoners, you know, and those prisoners, many of those
prisoners, went back to fill the ranks of the Taliban. So they
got a lot stronger, they continued their attacks. You know, we
got smaller. And so I agree with General McKenzie. That is when
you could begin to see things really begin to go in a different
direction----
Ms. Houlahan. So with the last 4 seconds, I very much
appreciate your time and a very intriguing that it seems like
the Doha Agreement might have been a pivotal point. And thank
you.
And with that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bacon is recognized.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Milley, you
said today that you saw this as a strategic failure. As a 30-
year veteran and someone who has been deployed four times
myself, and I haven't served as long as the three of you, but
it breaks our heart and I think most veterans feel heartbroken
knowing that both the blood and the treasure split was----ended
up in a strategic failure. I think we are enraged by it.
Then we have the President come out and say that this was a
success. He had no regrets. That does not break our heart; that
makes us mad as hell that he would say it that way. So I wanted
to say that upfront.
Secondly, the fact that President Biden on ABC said that no
one that he can recall advised him to keep a force of about
2,500 troops in Afghanistan. It is not true. We heard yesterday
and we have heard today that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
and the CENTCOM Commander advised differently. I have no other
view to see this as a lie, a falsehood from our President. That
makes us mad as hell too. Thirdly, I think it is important to
point out that this committee for well over a year cautioned
both Presidents against a premature withdrawl from Afghanistan.
In fact, Republican and Democratic members of both the
House and Senate were so concerned at the risk of a calendar-
based withdrawl that we passed a lot to prevent it. In fact,
the chairman of this committee voted for one that restricted
President Trump. Section 1215 of the 2021 NDAA prohibited any
President, regardless of political party, from drawing down
below 2,500 troops until the Secretary of Defense in
consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI provided
Congress a detailed plan explaining how the U.S. would continue
to conduct counterterror operations in Afghanistan following
U.S. withdrawl.
How would the U.S. conduct an orderly transition of
security functions to the Afghan military? And how would the
U.S. protect Americans who remained in country and how would
the U.S. coordinate any such withdrawl with our NATO allies?
In short, every single failure that we are now witnessing,
Congress warned against in writing in a law over a year ago.
But after taking office, President Biden I am referring to
wrote, to the--we wrote to the Biden administration reminding
them it was not permitted to go below 2,500 until it provided
assurances to Congress that our vital interest could be
secured.
Despite clear congressional intent backed by statute this
did not happen. The day after taking office, the newly
confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl
wrote to the members of this committee essentially stating that
President Biden was smarter than Congress, was confident he had
all the angles covered, and believed it was not in the national
interest to provide Congress with the assurances required in
section 1215.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter this letter
into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 131.]
Mr. Bacon. Okay, my first question here: General McKenzie,
I think one of the reasons that the Afghan forces crumbled much
quicker than we ever assessed was that we pulled most of our
air cover, we took the mechanics away from the Afghan forces,
and we pulled out a lot of our logistics capabilities.
Do you see this as underlying reasons why the Afghan forces
collapsed?
General McKenzie. I think all of those reasons contributed
to why they collapsed.
Mr. Bacon. Should it have even surprised us, when we take
away most of our air power that they were used to having, that
that would just pull the rug out from underneath them? General.
General McKenzie. Well, my position all along has been, if
you go to zero, if you go to a state where you are not going to
be able to maintain their forces on the ground, that a collapse
is inevitable.
I have to further say, I did not see it coming as fast as
it did. I thought it would be a matter of into the fall or into
the winter. I did not see it happen in 11 days in August.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
General Milley, I appreciate your candor about this being a
strategic failure. How does this embolden al-Qaida, ISIS, and
what does it do to Russia, China, and Iran, seeing how we
responded in this retreat?
General Milley. I think the Taliban sitting in Kabul
significantly emboldens the radical jihadi movement globally.
The analogy I have used with many others is, it likely will put
a shot of adrenaline into their arm. Their grandfathers
defeated the Soviet Union in the war in Afghanistan many, many
years ago, and they are taking this on their own networks right
now and declaring it a major victory. So I think it is a big
morale boost.
I think it remains to be seen--I think the Russians are
quite scared--not ``scared''--I guess, concerned of terrorists
coming across the borders into their near abroad.
China is very complicated. They've got a significant issue
in their western hemis--or in their western part of their
country.
I think Iran now has to deal with a very complicated issue
on their border that may or may not be friendly----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, General.
I yield.
The Chairman. And I do want to make a comment, because I
actually watched the George Stephanopoulos interview before
this hearing. Joe Biden did not say that no one suggested that
we should keep 2,500 troops there.
Mr. Bacon. I read the quote, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I have the time at the moment----
Mr. Bacon. It was my quote.
The Chairman. I have the time.
Mr. Bacon. Well, it better not be inaccurate.
The Chairman. And what he said was, you cannot have 2,500
troops stay there in a stable situation.
So we should at least be accurate about what information
was provided. I would urge everyone to go back and actually
look at the words and not take what is being said here as
accurate.
Mr. Bacon. Chairman, I read the quote.
The Chairman. I read it too, and I read it with a clear,
open vision of what he was saying, not with a bent to try and
make sure that we could successfully have a partisan attack on
him.
He was asked, could they stay there in a stable
environment? That is the option he said wasn't on the table,
not because it wasn't offered, but because it didn't exist.
And, while we are ripping apart these three gentlemen here,
I want to remind everybody that the decision the President made
was to stop fighting a war that, after 20 years, it was proven
we could not win. There was no easy way to do that. If he just
kept----
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I believe that General Bacon was
clear----
The Chairman. If he had just kept----
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. And needs to be defended. Thank
you.
The Chairman. I would be happy to yield Mr. Rogers time
when I am done.
What he made clear was we needed to stop fighting a war
that, for 20 years--we have had these conversations over and
over again. Democrats bash on the Republican President more
than they bash on the Democratic Presidents. Republicans bash
on the Democratic Presidents more than they bash on the
Republican Presidents.
But the end result was the same: 20 years of an endless
series of decisions by very intelligent, very capable, very
committed people. Any implication that the three gentlemen in
front of us are not very capable, very intelligent, and very
committed to this country is simply partisan, political
opportunism.
We can look at 20 years. Pick your favorite general, pick
your favorite President, pick your favorite leader. Okay? None
of them could successfully do what so many members of this
committee are sitting here telling these gentlemen that they
are basically idiots for not being able to do.
We should pause for just a moment and think about the fact
that maybe that's the wrong argument. Maybe the mission itself
was really hard to achieve.
And what President Biden said is: We are done. We are not
going to have these hearings anymore. We are not going to have
the funerals anymore. We are not going to lose the
servicemembers, fighting a war that it is clear we cannot be
successful.
And we all pick nits on that decision, that decision, why
didn't you say this, why didn't you do that. Twenty years of a
whole lot of different people leading has led us to this point,
and we said, we are going to stop. Once----
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman [continuing]. We said that----
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. This is inconceivable.
The Chairman [continuing]. It was not----
Mr. Wilson. They are bringing the war here.
The Chairman [continuing]. Going to----
Mr. Wilson. The war is not over. It is coming to America.
The Chairman. Joe----
Mr. Wilson. The funerals are here----
The Chairman. I----
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Mr. Chairman. And we count on you
and your leadership and these----
The Chairman. It is clear----
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Generals to know the war is not
over.
The Chairman. It is clear----
Mr. Bacon. A point of order. Chairman, we are not done with
this war.
The Chairman. The point is, yes, we are going to have to
continue to contain this threat----
Mr. Rogers. And 20 years of mistakes----
The Chairman [continuing]. No question about it, but----
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Aren't an excuse for the failure--
--
The Chairman [continuing]. Having U.S. troops in
Afghanistan----
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Of the withdrawal.
The Chairman [continuing]. Was not succeeding.
Mr. Bacon. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
The Chairman. I have to make that point.
Mr. Rogers is the Ranking Member on the committee, and I
will give him the time to respond.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I did note the Stephanopoulos interview, and I disagree
with your interpretation. Mr. Stephanopoulos came back and
asked him again, ``So you are saying that nobody advised you to
leave the troops,'' and that was his response.
But I think the general officers here and the Secretary
have made it very clear that they gave the President advice
that he wouldn't listen to. The last President, they gave him
advice, and he did listen to it.
So, I mean, I am not challenging and I have not in any way
disparaged these great gentlemen. In fact, in my opening
remarks, I made it abundantly clear, I don't want them
shouldering blame for what happened on this withdrawal, when it
was the administration and the State Department and National
Security Advisor.
And, with that, I will yield----
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Rogers, for correcting the
record.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. A minute to Mr. Bacon.
The Chairman. Mr. Crow is recognized.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dovetailing on Chairman Smith's comment, I just can't help
but think back to my last deployment in Afghanistan in 2005.
And there was a moment where I had been awake for several days,
walking with a heavy rucksack in the mountains of Afghanistan,
and wondering and asking myself, where was the debate? Why
weren't people asking the questions then? Why weren't people
paying attention?
I am glad they are now. I am glad we are having this
debate. But, as Chairman Smith adequately pointed out, we could
have been doing this a long time ago. Four administrations,
Republican and Democrat; 10 Congresses, Republican and
Democrat--this is a 20-year conflict that our country owns, and
we have to have a broader discussion. It is not a 2-month
conflict.
And I appreciate your candor, and I appreciate the
seriousness with which all three of you have dealt with this.
So, with that in mind, the fact that there are serious
issues that have to be addressed, I have two lines of
questioning, one about our continuing obligation to our
partners and the next about the planning in advance of the
evacuation.
Now, I want to start the partner question with the
recognition that I believe firmly that all three of you share
as deeply as I do a sense that we have a continuing obligation,
because all three of you served, and I know that all three of
you have friends who are still there. They have names and
faces. So I am not going to question your commitment to this.
The Department has a very narrow but important role going
forward here, and that role is to provide employment
verification to folks so they can be properly vetted and
evacuated. That is very hard to do without boots on the ground
now.
So what can the Department do more going forward, and what
is the plan to do that employment verification, to get that
paperwork in the hands of our friends so we can get them
evacuated?
Secretary Austin. One of my Under Secretaries is leading an
effort to ensure that we can help improve the process of
employment verification.
If you think back 20 years, you know, ago, when people were
actually helping us, helping contractors that were working for
us, some of the documentation, very, very difficult to get your
hands on now.
So we are working to see what we can do to improve this. We
want to work with Congress to--if there is any way that we can
adjust requirements or adjust, you know, our ability to ease
this process along, we certainly want to do that.
But this--we are taking this on in a very serious way.
Mr. Crow. Well, I appreciate that, and we stand ready and
willing to continue to work with you to solve this. Because,
certainly, our combat operations are over, but we have that
continued obligation, as you have often noted.
The last is about the evacuation planning. There were two
tabletop rehearsals, one in June and one in August. The June 11
one dealt with the processing of evacuees. These are
interagencies--interagency tabletop exercises that involve the
Department of State. The August 6 one, my understanding, dealt
with scenarios for both a permissive and a nonpermissive NEO.
So, for the August 6 tabletop, the State Department was
involved in that tabletop. Coming out of that tabletop
exercise, did the Department have, in your opinion, adequate
understanding as to the State Department's plan and role to
conduct vetting and processing of evacuees at HKIA?
General McKenzie. I believe they did, but I also urged
State--I felt that, by nature, the Department of Defense can
move very fast on issues like this. I felt that we were not
completely aligned with State on that. There were still some
things they could do faster.
And I believe they tried their very best to address those,
particularly in terms of providing additional processing power,
if you will, to move people through the chain, from the
consular officers and other people, to move them forward. State
representatives took that message on board very seriously at
the tabletop exercises.
Mr. Crow. So the lack of complete alignment, in your view,
has to do with the processing power that was necessary to push
forward on the ground?
General McKenzie. There were probably other things. That
was the--from my perspective, as who was going to be
responsible for identifying people, getting them out of
Afghanistan, and getting them into the pipeline, that is what I
was personally most concerned about. There were other issues;
that was my principal concern.
Mr. Crow. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
General Milley. Congressman Crow, if I could just--there
were two other sessions before that, 28 April and 8 May. I
think we owe you some answers for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 146.]
Mrs. Luria [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
I now recognize Mr. Banks for 5 minutes.
Mr. Banks. Thank you.
General Milley, why is it important for the military to be
nonpolitical?
General Milley. I think an apolitical military is critical
to the health of this Republic.
Mr. Banks. General, why did you spend--you have already
established yesterday and today that you spent a significant
amount of time talking to political book authors and political
reporters, including Bob Woodward. What compelled you to do
that?
General Milley. I believe that part of my job is to
communicate to the media what we do as a government, what we do
as a military, to explain to the people. And so I do interviews
regularly, with print media, books, documentaries, videos on
TV, TV interviews. I think it is part of a senior official's
job to be transparent, and I believe in a free press.
Mr. Banks. What happens when a military general becomes a
political figure?
General Milley. I have done----
Mr. Banks. You would agree that it is dangerous?
General Milley. I think it is dangerous, and I have done my
best to remain personally apolitical, and I try to keep the
military out of actual domestic politics. And I have made a
point of that from the time I became the Chairman and
especially beginning last summer.
Mr. Banks. You told the Senate yesterday you hadn't read
the book or any of the other political books that have come
out, but I don't know how anybody could read the Bob Woodward
book--I don't know how you could read it and not be greatly
embarrassed about its contents, especially in how it is related
to you.
Are you embarrassed by the book?
General Milley. I haven't read the book yet----
Mr. Banks. Are you embarrassed by the portrayals of the
book? No doubt you are aware of them.
General Milley. Embarrassed, no. I am concerned that there
is mischaracterizations of me becoming very politicized as an
individual and that it is my willingness to become politicized,
which is not true. I am trying to stay apolitical, and I
believe I am. That is part of my professional ethic.
And I am trying to keep the military, the actual military,
out of actual domestic politics. I think that is critical to
this Republic.
Mr. Banks. Do you regret with speaking with Bob Woodward?
General Milley. No. I think that it is important for me to
speak to the media.
Mr. Banks. I want to talk about some of the contents of the
book. Since you haven't read it----
General Milley. Okay.
Mr. Banks [continuing]. Maybe I can read some of it to you.
We have already heard a little bit about the back-and-forth
with you and Speaker Pelosi. But, in that conversation, you
said--in a phone call with Speaker Pelosi, she said, quote,
``Republicans are enablers of President Trump's behavior. You
know he's crazy. He's been crazy for a long time.'' You
replied, ``I agree with you on everything.''
That was repeated three times in the prologue of the book
``Peril,'' that you told Speaker Pelosi you agree with her on
everything.
Is that an accurate portrayal of your recounting to Bob
Woodward about those conversations?
General Milley. Not exactly, no. I think that--in fact, I
know----
Mr. Banks. So is Bob Woodward wrong? Is that portrayal
wrong?
General Milley. In fact, I know what I said, which was,
``Madam Speaker, I am not qualified to determine the mental
health or assess the mental health of this President----
Mr. Banks. Did you tell----
General Milley [continuing]. Or any President.''
Mr. Banks.--the Speaker that you agreed with her on
everything?
General Milley. And what I was referring to when I said
that was I agree that we need to have the processes and
procedures in place to make sure that we don't have an
accidental or illegal or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
And I do agree with that. And we do have those procedures.
Mr. Banks. You said you agree with her, according to Bob
Woodward----
General Milley. I am not agreeing with----
Mr. Banks [continuing]. And either Bob Woodward is right or
you are right.
General Milley. I am not agreeing with her assessment of
the President, nor the----
Mr. Banks. The book also goes on--in talking about the
January 6 riot, it says that you told Bob Woodward that you
wrote a list in your notebook of groups that you personally
believe are responsible for the attack and that you associated
with it. And you called these groups, quote, ``domestic
terrorists,'' or this, ``domestic terrorism.''
That list included, in your notebook, according to Bob
Woodward from your conversations with him, Nazis and Oath
Keepers. But it also included two conservative media outlets
that you listed in your notebook, including The Epoch Times,
which, by the way, is a news outlet that was founded by critics
of the Chinese Communist Party, and Newsmax, which is the
second-most-watched conservative media outlet in the country
today.
Do your notes about January 6 reference both Epoch Times
and Newsmax as on a list of domestic terrorists?
General Milley. I am not recalling this conversation at
all. I don't----
Mr. Banks. It is in the book.
General Milley. It may be in the book. I haven't read the
book. I am not recalling a conversation about Newsmax, Epoch
Times----
Mr. Banks. Do you have a notebook that lists Newsmax and
Epoch Times as domestic terrorists, as recounted by the Bob
Woodward book ``Peril''?
General Milley. I----
Mr. Banks. Or is Bob Woodward lying to us in the book?
General Milley. I don't know. I don't recall any
conversation about Epoch Times or----
Mr. Banks. Do you believe that Newsmax and Epoch Times are
domestic terrorists or their----
General Milley. No.
Mr. Banks [continuing]. Viewers----
General Milley. I think----
Mr. Banks [continuing]. Or readers----
General Milley. No. I think----
Mr. Banks [continuing]. Are domestic terrorists?
General Milley. No, not at all. I don't think Epoch Times
nor Newsmax are domestic terrorist organizations.
Mr. Banks. Will you produce the notes----
General Milley. I believe they are----
Mr. Banks [continuing]. to this committee----
General Milley. I will produce any notes you want.
Mr. Banks [continuing]. That you relayed to Bob Woodward in
the book that you listed different groups who were responsible
for January 6?
General Milley. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. Banks. I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
I will just note for the record that I was quoted in that
book as well, and a lot of what I said was conflated and not
100 percent accurately portrayed. It does happen. Just because
someone says something doesn't mean that it is an accurate
portrayal and doesn't even mean they are lying. It could be a
misunderstanding about what was actually said.
Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for the work
that you have done.
I think, obviously, the level of back-and-forth on the
committee today represents some real stress in the system about
the withdrawal and what it means but also about, you know, an
interest in politicizing national security issues, which I have
real issues with.
Could I just ask--I think the question I get asked the most
in my district about our withdrawal from Afghanistan is, are we
safer now than we were on September 10, 2001?
And I believe and I have certainly answered many veterans
who have reached out that I believe their work was valuable and
worthy. We kept al-Qaida and other groups distracted and
destabilized so that we could build up our national security
apparatus, our homeland security here, to make us safer.
So it is, of course, hard to hear from this panel that
right now we are safer but we have to watch for the
reconstitution of these terrorist groups. No one likes to hear
that.
I would ask that we get a classified briefing on our over-
the-horizon posture just so we understand--I understand we
can't do it in open session, but just so we understand, on this
committee, what we can expect when it comes to watching those
threats. So I would ask for that commitment.
But, as someone who served in Iraq with the CIA, we watched
the reconstitution of al-Qaida in western Iraq, which became
ISIS.
What are the tripwires, I guess Secretary Austin and then
General Milley, that you are looking for that would push you to
engage the White House and say, ``Hey, we have a real problem
here''? What are those specific things that you are looking for
that would change your assessment from one of, you know, ``We
are all right now,'' to, ``We need to take more significant
military action''?
Secretary Austin. Thanks.
First, on your request for an over-the-horizon capability
brief, we will certainly sign up for that. I committed to the
chairman to do that early on. And I will have General McKenzie
and the Joint Staff and my policy people in that brief as well.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
Secretary Austin. In terms of specific areas that we are
focused on, we are looking at their ability to develop a
capability to export terror to the homeland here. Whether or
not--you know, if we see senior leaders beginning to have
freedom of movement in Afghanistan, if we see them developing
capability in training camps and other things, if we see them
moving people back and forth across international boundaries,
those are things that we are looking for.
And, again, it will take time to develop a true intel
picture of what is going on. And we have begun that work, and
we will continue--we will remain focused on this throughout.
Ms. Slotkin. General Milley.
General Milley. The specific indicators and warnings I
would like to take to a different session.
But, in general, what we are looking for: leadership,
capability, training, those sorts of things, and demonstrations
of intent that al-Qaida and/or ISIS is going to do external
operations against the United States or our interests.
If we pick up on those, then it is our obligation to
present the President with options to deal with it.
Ms. Slotkin. And, General Milley, we have seen some reports
that, in our attempts to try and get over-the-horizon posture
in countries around Afghanistan, that we have had discussions
with the Russians about some cooperation.
Can you help us understand that? For many of us, that just
gives us--like, the hair on our neck starts to go up. Can you
explain to us what we are discussing with the Russians and what
we are willing to do and not do with the Russians?
General Milley. Again, I would prefer to take that into a
classified session.
As you probably know, about a week or 10 days ago, I
discussed over in Europe with the Russians, had a session with
32 CHODs [Chiefs of Defences] from all the European NATO
nations, and then I had a separate session with my counterpart,
General Gerasimov. And I can talk to you in a classified
session about that.
But, in the main, we are not asking permission, we are not
negotiating, I guess is the word, but President Putin and
President Biden had a conversation, and I was following up on
that conversation at other direction--at the----
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
General Milley [continuing]. Direction of my superiors.
Ms. Slotkin. I would just say, I think, given that it is
not permissible right now to share classified information, this
committee should be informed should there be any movement
towards that with the Russians.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentlelady's time has expired.
And we have had classified--we will have continued
classified briefs. As we have said, as many members have said,
I think accurately, the counterterrorism strategy in South Asia
is going to be a crucial policy issue for all of us to deal
with going forward.
Ms. Cheney is recognized.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Milley, on January 6, we had a violent attack on
our Capitol. It was an effort to stop the constitutionally
prescribed process of counting electoral votes--the first time
in our Nation's history that we did not have a peaceful
transfer of power.
In the aftermath of that attack, many of the members of our
constitutional system failed to do their duty. Many of them
punted. Many of them, today, are still attempting to obstruct
the investigation into that attack, attempting to whitewash
what happened.
General Milley, you found yourself, in your
constitutionally prescribed role, standing in the breach. And
for any member of this committee, for any American to question
your loyalty to our Nation, to question your understanding of
our Constitution, your loyalty to our Constitution, your
recognition and understanding of the civilian chain of command,
is despicable.
I want to apologize for those members of this committee who
have done so. And I want to thank you for standing in the
breach, when so many, including many in this room, failed to do
so.
With respect to Afghanistan, the only question for us with
respect to the deployment of forces in Afghanistan or anywhere
else is, what does U.S. security require?
In the circumstances we found ourselves in in Afghanistan,
the deployment of our forces was allowing us to conduct
counterterrorism operations, counterintelligence operations,
enabling us to prevent terrorists from establishing safe
havens.
General Milley, terrorists now have an entire country of
Afghanistan. Could you tell the committee whether or not you
think the current situation in Afghanistan following the
withdrawal of forces, which began with the Doha Agreement and
the orders that you have described in the Trump administration,
which was carried out in the Biden administration, can you tell
the committee whether or not you think we are now more safe or
less safe, whether Afghanistan presents more of a threat or
less of a threat to our homeland than when we were able to
conduct counterterrorism/counterintelligence operations there?
General Milley. I think, right now, right this minute, we
are more safe because of the efforts over the last 20 years.
However, I do think that conditions are more likely than
not to develop over the course of time that will allow for the
reconstitution of al-Qaida and/or ISIS. And that time varies
depending on which analyst you are listening to, but sometime
between, say, 6 to 12 and maybe 36 months.
Ms. Cheney. And when you look at the situation that we face
today, in terms of what is going to be necessary--the loss of
life, the loss of treasure has been tragic, has been
devastating. But when you look at where we are likely to find
ourselves, do you think that our ability to defend ourselves
will now be more expensive, will cost us more in terms of lives
and treasure going forward, or do you believe that the
withdrawal will present a situation where we have to devote
less resources to the war on terror?
General Milley. I think the ends are going to remain the
same, to protect the American people, but the ways and means
are going to change. And I think it is going to become much
more difficult now in order to conduct counterterrorism
operations against a reconstituted al-Qaida or ISIS in
Afghanistan. Not impossible. We have the capabilities and means
to do that. But it will be more difficult.
Ms. Cheney. Secretary Austin, are members of the Haqqani
Network still a potential target for the United States
military?
Secretary Austin. We do recognize that the members of the
Haqqani Network are recognized terrorists, yes.
Ms. Cheney. So they are a potential target for the United
States military?
Secretary Austin. Potentially, yes.
Ms. Cheney. So, Secretary Austin, the Biden administration
has been saying that the Doha Agreement is still in effect and
that they will hold the Taliban to their, quote,
``counterterrorism commitments'' in the Doha Agreement.
But the Taliban is using this agreement to protect
terrorists. The Taliban is intertwined with the Haqqani
Network. And al-Qaida has, in fact, sworn bayat to the Taliban.
So can you explain exactly how that agreement that is
enabling terrorists is going to be useful as some kind of a
tool to hold the Taliban to any kind of a commitment?
Secretary Austin. I think we should do everything within
our power to keep pressure on the Taliban to do what they said
that they were going to do. And we heard what they have said.
We will watch their actions.
But I think we should continue to apply pressure, wherever
possible, to cause them to keep al-Qaida activity in check.
And, again, you have heard us say a couple of times today
that we recognize that this is the Taliban, and trust is not an
issue here, necessarily. We hear what they are saying; we are
watching what they do.
Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Secretary Austin, General Milley,
General McKenzie. I have quite a few questions, and some I may
have to submit for the record, because I think it is important
to start with this and somewhat echo my Republican colleague's
opening.
We have continued to see attacks on our democracy and our
values from Members representing what, at least historically,
would have been the extreme elements of the Republican Party--
attacks including, but not limited to, the horrible attack on
our Capitol and our Congress on January 6.
And one of the cornerstones of our democracy and our
government is civilian, not military, rule. This is sacrosanct
to those of us who have worn the uniform and, judging from the
attacks by some members of this committee, poorly understood by
those who have not.
I have concerns about how the NEO was executed, but I must
applaud all of you for scrupulously ensuring our civilian
government remained the decisionmaking authority as you
continued to provide your best military advice, even when, at
times, your advice differed from the decisions made. Thank you.
I would like to now turn to some questions that I have
related to the timeline of events.
So, as I understand it, in February of 2020, President
Trump made an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw U.S.
troops by May 1, 2021, in exchange for several conditions,
including a halt to attacks against U.S. forces and cutting
ties with al-Qaida.
By the time he left office, President Trump had drawn down
forces to 2,500 and publicly indicated his intent to complete
the withdrawal if he had been reelected.
And I think, Chairman Milley, you mentioned the 10 November
2020 withdrawal of troops by 15 January 2020, which was
rescinded, and then the 17 November 2020 drawdown to 2,500 by
19 January. Is that correct?
General Milley. It was a memo dated 11 November, 2 days
after Secretary Esper was fired. And then, on the 17th, it was
rescinded. The first memo said go to zero. The second one said
go to 2,500.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
And so were you consulted on the decisions to open
negotiations solely with the Taliban, to the exclusion of the
Afghan Government, General?
General Milley. Very, very late in the game, like, days
before the signing.
Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, were there concrete
plans for a withdrawal from the previous administration that
were shared and developed with military leadership?
General Milley. Well, we were 12,600 on the day that the
Doha Agreement--12,600 U.S. military in Afghanistan when the
Doha Agreement was signed. Part of that agreement was to go to
8,500 within, I think it was, 135 days. I would have to go back
to the agreement and look at it. And then it was to bring down
all the U.S. military, NATO, contractors, close all the bases
by 1 May.
So it was an agreement signed by our government. We
dutifully executed it and delivered drawdown over time, from
February of 2020 all way through, based on a set of milestones.
So we did withdraw, and we had a plan to withdraw.
Ms. Sherrill. Did any of those plans include plans to
evacuate civilian American personnel, citizens, and SIV
holders?
General Milley. Yes. General McKenzie and CENTCOM did
develop NEO plans, but not, like, the large SIV holders and
lots of American citizens. It was primarily the Embassy and
their personnel.
But I would defer to Frank McKenzie to talk about the
details of the NEO plans at that time.
Ms. Sherrill. General McKenzie.
General McKenzie. So we hold a NEO plan for every country
in the Central Command region. So, yes, we had a plan to bring
out mainly American citizens and people associated with the
Embassy.
Planning later began to encompass the larger population,
the at-risk Afghan population, the SIV population. But,
initially, just like every other plan, it centered on American
citizens and their families.
Ms. Sherrill. And when you say the planning later grew to
include that, what is the timeframe for when you began to
include SIV holders?
General McKenzie. No later than the early spring of this
year.
Ms. Sherrill. So under this administration?
General McKenzie. Yes. Yes.
Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, in your testimony to the
SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] yesterday, you testified
that the Trump administration's plans had not been developed
via a robust interagency process.
How closely were you and other senior military leaders
consulted on President Trump's plans as they were developed?
General Milley. I wasn't consulted on the 11 November order
that I received. That is why I went over to the White House
with Acting Secretary Miller and White House Chief of Staff
Kash Patel to discuss that order. So I wasn't consulted on it.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
And my time has expired. I will submit the rest of my
questions for the record.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Waltz is recognized.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And here is where I think we are really talking past each
other. This war is not done. It is not over. This is a war
against Islamic extremism. It is a war against an ideology.
And, just as it took decades--decades, not 20 years, not 30
years, many more--to defeat the idea of communism, to defeat
the idea of fascism, it is going to take decades to defeat the
idea of Islamic extremism.
General McKenzie, you testified yesterday al-Qaida is still
at war with us. Do you stand by that statement?
General McKenzie. Absolutely, Representative.
Mr. Waltz. DNI Haines, Biden's Director of National
Intelligence, briefed the Congress that al-Qaida fully intends
to attack the West again if given the chance.
The head of al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden's former deputy, has
pledged allegiance to the head of the Taliban, except now they
have an entire state to work with--an army, an air force, a
functioning international airport, and I think, if things
continue on the path they are, possibly billions in
international currency reserves.
So, Mr. Chairman, respectfully, we are not done with this
war. I would have thought we would have learned the lesson from
Iraq. I would have thought, Mr. Secretary, you had learned the
lesson from Iraq, where we pulled out in 2011--Mr. Chairman,
you issued a statement praising that pullout as ending that
war--and yet we found ourselves, 3 years later, with soldiers
going back in.
But let's look at the situation, because I think the
American people need to understand this.
Here we have Iraq. We pulled out. Led to a rise of the ISIS
caliphate, which was obviously a morphed entity from al-Qaida.
Look at all of the bases that we had to deal with when we
went back. We had bases in the Gulf, we had bases in Kuwait, we
had bases in Turkey, in Jordan, of course in Israel, allied
bases in Cyprus. We had allies on the ground in the Kurds.
We didn't let ISIS take over the government in Baghdad and
the army and all of the functions of the state. We had all of
these assets to work with to go clean up that mess. And how
many soldiers and lives did we lose from cleaning up that
mistaken withdrawal, Mr. Chairman?
But let's transition over here to Afghanistan. What do we
see?
General McKenzie, do we have a single base in Afghanistan
now?
General McKenzie. We have no base in Afghanistan.
Mr. Waltz. Do we have a base in any country neighboring
Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. We do not.
Mr. Waltz. Do we have any local allies approaching the
capability of the Kurds?
General McKenzie. We do not. There may be----
Mr. Waltz. No.
General McKenzie [continuing]. Some options, but we do not.
Mr. Waltz. We have the Northern Alliance. The Panjshir has
been taken. Frankly, they are being slaughtered right now, as
we speak, with our weapons. With our damn equipment, our allies
are being slaughtered. Every morning, we wake up to beheading
videos, to executions, to people being hunted down with our own
database.
But, when and if you have to present options to the
President, how many soldiers are we going to lose because we
have no allies on the ground, we have no bases in the region?
Now, we are going to get to, really, the crux of the issue,
which is over-the-horizon counterterrorism. Those drones have
to fly all the way around Iran and all the way up Pakistan and
lose 70 to 80 percent of their fuel before they even get
anywhere near a target.
And we just saw from the failed attack, the botched attack,
that you have to have multi-INT [multi-intelligence]
intelligence confirming what that drone operator is seeing. I
have called it in, and I know that drone operator would have
appreciated somebody on the ground saying, no, that is a
civilian, don't pull that trigger.
So I appreciate your candor in saying how difficult this is
going to be, but the President of the United States is selling
this country a fiction that we can do over here with nothing
what we are doing over here with neighboring base access, with
allies on the ground, and with ocean access. That is a fiction
that I think you all need to own, and we need to be honest with
the American people.
I am just livid at the fact of the future Americans that
are going to have to go back to clean up this mess. We are
watching this horror movie that Representative Slotkin
experienced, that we all experienced after Iraq.
The President continues to say, well, we can do what we do
in Somalia, we can do what we do in Syria. Mr. Secretary, you
just briefed about a strike in Syria. We have a lot more
capability there.
One more question. Do we have any evidence, intelligence or
otherwise, of Pakistani troops on the ground--intelligence
officers, air support, or any troops on the ground--assisting
the Taliban or command and control assisting the Taliban
offensive?
General McKenzie. I would prefer to answer that question in
closed session.
Mr. Waltz. I will take that as a yes.
And, Mr. Chairman----
The Chairman. Mr. Waltz, your time has expired.
Mr. Waltz [continuing]. That is not going to go to a civil
war; it is going to go to a regional war.
The Chairman. And, just for the record, we are not going to
put words in the mouths of our witnesses. You can't take it as
a yes if it was not, in fact, a yes.
Ms. Escobar is now recognized.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your incredible
leadership, your patriotism, and your service to our country. I
am very grateful for it.
I want to begin by saying that I am incredibly privileged
to represent Fort Bliss. I represent El Paso, Texas. And Fort
Bliss is offering hospitality right now to nearly 10,000 Afghan
guests. And I want to say to those service members how proud I
am of the work that they are doing to offer that hospitality.
I had the privilege to tour the Dona Ana village last month
with NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] Commander
General Van Herck, got to speak to many of those service
members. Morale is high, and I could not be prouder of what
they are doing. Had an opportunity, also, to speak to our
Afghan guests, as well, and get a sense from them how they are
doing.
We know that the die was cast with the Doha Agreement, an
agreement that former President Trump entered into with the
Taliban and the Taliban alone. We have learned that that
agreement--it was that agreement that demoralized the Afghan
Army, and the Taliban moved in and began making deals with
them, which expedited their control. We know that that
demoralization contributed to the rapid fall--the rapid fall of
Afghanistan which shocked us all.
General Milley, earlier, you told us that when former
President Trump entered into the Doha Agreement there was a
setting out of very specific conditions that were to be met by
the time of the May 1 drawdown. Is that correct?
General Milley. That is correct.
Ms. Escobar. General Milley, how many of those conditions
had been met when former President Trump then announced he
wanted to speed up the withdrawal from May 1 to January 15,
2020?
General Milley. There was only one condition that was met.
That was the condition that asked--or that the Taliban
committed to not striking against U.S. forces and/or coalition
forces, which they did not do.
Ms. Escobar. And when then-President Trump announced the
expedited drawdown, was he aware that four of the five
conditions had not been met?
General Milley. I believe yes.
Ms. Escobar. Do you know the significance, if there is any,
of the January 15 expedited drawdown date?
General Milley. I don't. I was handed a piece of paper and
went over and talked to folks in the White House, and it was
rescinded. I don't know why that particular date was picked.
Ms. Escobar. Okay.
Have we learned or do we know whether those announcements
of expedited withdrawal added to or exacerbated the demoralized
nature of the Afghan Army?
General Milley. Well, the 11 November order was not
announced, but the drawdown to 2,500 was. We have detailed
reporting, but I think, I believe--and we will do this in the
AARs [after action reviews]--I think that was one of many
contributing factors, not the only one, but one of many
contributing factors to the declination of the morale of the
Afghan security forces.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, General Milley.
You have also described the outcome of this withdrawal as a
strategic failure. Can you share with us what would have been
considered success for the administration, the service members,
and military experts who have been involved in this conflict
for over two decades and what it would have taken for us to get
to success?
General Milley. I think and my opinion was that success
would have been a negotiated solution between the Government of
Afghanistan and the Taliban for a shared power-sharing
arrangement in their government and an end to the, you know,
civil war in that manner. I also assessed that the probability
of that actually happening was low, but I did think that there
was a possibility and it wasn't zero.
So a negotiated solution, I think, was probably the best
way to describe a proper end to this war.
I don't think that there was a military solution by us to
destroy or defeat the Taliban. I think that was not in the
cards. And I didn't think at the time that if we sustained a
level of effort in Afghanistan with our military, 2,500 or
3,500, in those ranges, I didn't think the Taliban could defeat
the Afghan security forces.
That was my assessment at the time. And I thought success
meant a negotiated settlement between the government and the
Taliban and to have a power-sharing arrangement to end the war.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, General Milley.
I have about 15 seconds. Secretary Austin, has the U.S.
military and Department of Defense begun to reimagine any of
our existing involvements abroad to better assess risk of a
fallout such as this one?
Secretary Austin. We continue to take a look at ourselves
across the board and how we are----
The Chairman. And the gentlelady's time has expired, so
that will have to be taken for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 146.]
Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson is recognized.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There has been a dispute here today about the actual words
that were shared in the ABC News George Stephanopoulos
interview with the President. We took the liberty of getting
the full transcript. I am going to read you the relevant
excerpt and ask you a question.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to enter
the transcript into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 132.]
Mr. Johnson. So Stephanopoulos asked this. Quote, ``But
your military advisors warned against withdrawing on this
timeline. They wanted you to keep about 2,500 troops.''
Biden: ``No, they didn't. It was split. That--that wasn't
true. That wasn't true.''
Stephanopoulos: ``They didn't tell you that they wanted
troops to stay?''
Biden: ``No, not at--not in terms of whether we were going
to get out in a timeframe all troops. They didn't argue against
that.''
Stephanopoulos: ``So no one told--your military advisors
did not tell you, ``No, we should just keep 2,500 troops, it
has been a stable situation for the last several years, we can
do that, we can continue to do that'?''
Biden: ``No. No one said that to me that I can recall.''
So, gentlemen, with all due respect, the American people
deserve to know the truth in all this. They are asking us to
get the truth.
So here is the thing. There are only three possibilities
here. Either the President lied to the American people, or he
legitimately cannot remember the counsel of his top military
advisors in winding down the longest war in American history,
or you have not been fully accurate under oath.
General McKenzie, I will ask you: Which is it?
General McKenzie. I want to be very direct. I cannot share
advice I give the President, and I will not do that.
I will also tell you, though, that it has been my
consistent position throughout this hearing and the hearing
yesterday that I believe the appropriate level of our forces in
Afghanistan should have been 2,500.
Mr. Johnson. I think we can take that to mean that you gave
him that advice.
Let me ask----
General McKenzie. Sir, I would not take it to mean anything
other than the words I gave you, please.
Mr. Johnson. Fair enough.
Secretary Austin, what is it? What are we to believe by
seeing all this?
Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, you heard me say
earlier, Congressman, that I support the President's decision.
You also heard me say that I don't view this choice as a
no-cost, no-risk choice. I do believe that, if we left 2,500
people there for an extended period of time, you would
eventually have to reinforce those people, because the Taliban
was going to--was committed to attacking us.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I understand all that. What we
are trying to get to is, what did the President know? Did he
forget what was told to him, or is he not being truthful? Which
is it?
Secretary Austin. I would view that as an inappropriate
question, and I won't----
Mr. Johnson. Well, you may, but the American people don't.
Secretary Austin. Okay.
Mr. Johnson. And the American people want and deserve
accountability. And we even have service members like
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Scheller being thrown in the brig for
suggesting that.
The public's faith in our institutions continues to erode
precisely because everyone in the DC bubble appears to have
some sort of immunity from the basic standards the rest of
America is expected to live by.
This is quite clearly one of the biggest military and
foreign policy blunders since our withdrawal from Vietnam. So
my question for all of you is very simple: Where does the blame
lie?
Mr. Austin--Secretary Austin.
Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, you know, I am
responsible for everything that happens that DOD does, and it
does a lot. I remain focused on defending this country, and
that is going to be my focus for the foreseeable future.
Secondly, you know, I would remind you that we just
evacuated 124,000 people----
Mr. Johnson. I appreciate----
Secretary Austin [continuing]. In 17 days----
Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that you think that that was a
big success, evacuation. But the blame for the disastrous
withdrawal that everyone agrees was a disaster, who is to blame
for that?
I will let the silence speak for itself.
General Milley, you said earlier this month that it is
possible that we would work with the Taliban to conduct strikes
against ISIS-K in Afghanistan, presumably referencing our over-
the-horizon capabilities, but today you testified--you said,
quote, ``the Taliban remains a terrorist organization with ties
to al-Qaida.''
So are you now suggesting that the United States form some
sort of strategic partnership with a terrorist organization?
General Milley. No, absolutely not. I am not suggesting
that at all.
Could I go to your first question, though?
Mr. Johnson. Please.
General Milley. Like Frank McKenzie--like General McKenzie,
it is not our purview to share specific discussions with the
President in terms of national security decision-making. But it
was our opinion at the time, and it has been very consistent.
And I would also tell you that this administration did--and
I was part of it, along with the Joint Chiefs--a very rigorous
process. And this President--it was one of the most informed
decisions that you can imagine, in terms of all sides of the
argument.
We in the military, in the uniformed military, we look at
the costs, the risk to force, the benefit, et cetera, in a
narrow-focused view. Other decisionmakers have a much wider
angle.
Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that. But what we are left with,
in the 9 seconds I have left, is that we are supposed to
believe that the President was either not informed by you of
these very important factors or he forgot it. Either one is
alarming.
I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
And, since the transcript was submitted for the record, we
read through this kind of quick, but Mr. Stephanopoulos says,
``Your top military advisors warned against withdrawing in this
timeline. They wanted you to keep about 2,500 troops.''
``No, they didn't. It was split.''
That is what the President said. He didn't say, ``No,
nobody advised me.'' ``It was split.''
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, read down two more lines.
The Chairman. I will be done in just a second, and then I
will yield it back to you.
And then Stephanopoulos says: ``No, no one said, ``We
should just keep 2,500 troops, it has been a stable situation
for the last several years, we can do that, we can continue to
do that'?''
``No. No one said that to me that I can recall. No one
said, it has been a stable situation for the last several
years, we can do that, we could continue to do that.''
Those are the words on the transcript that was just
submitted. I will leave it to other people to interpret that,
but those are the actual words.
And, yes, I will yield, Mr. Johnson, if you can do it
quickly. Sorry. I want to get to some other people, but I
should give you the chance. Go ahead.
Mr. Johnson. I will do it very quickly, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that.
I mean, you just read it at face value.
Stephanopoulos says: ``So no one told you--your military
advisors did not tell you, ``No, we should just keep 2,500
troops, it has been a stable situation for the last several
years, we can do that, we can continue to do that'?''
Biden says: ``No, no one said that to me that I can
recall.''
The Chairman. You read quickly through the ``it has been a
stable situation'' part, but that is kind of the important
part. Okay.
Mr. Johnson. Well, look, it is open to----
The Chairman. I think we have----
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Individual interpretation.
The Chairman. I think we have both made our point.
Mr. Johnson. All right. But I think----
The Chairman. I will move on to Mrs.----
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. The American people can use
common sense, and it is----
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Alarming, whatever it is.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mrs. Luria, you are recognized.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
And I would like to start, General Milley, by associating
myself with the remarks that Ms. Cheney made at the beginning
of her questions and focus on the timeframe immediately
following the 2020 election.
On November 9, 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper was
replaced by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller.
And, additionally, other key leadership positions at DOD were
abruptly filled with new people.
General Milley, did this rapid replacement of top senior
officials at the Department of Defense in the final days of the
administration give you concern regarding the transition of the
administration?
General Milley. We in the military are trained for
leadership replacement from the time we are a second
lieutenant, follow one drills sort of thing. And it is clearly
in the prerogative of any President to replace any Cabinet
member or any appointee at all at any point in time.
So that is how I would answer that. We are prepared to
execute at a moment's notice if someone is relieved.
Mrs. Luria. And, General Milley, did you have any concerns
at the time that involved the potential misuse of the military
for political reasons?
General Milley. I was determined to make sure that the U.S.
military is properly employed, and I would render my advice to
ensure that the U.S. military is employed not for political
use.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
And it has been referenced a few times during the hearing
today that you did cooperate with several authors for specific
books. And it seems as though your choice to do that was that
you wanted to get the story straight, the facts out there about
different things that transpired during this timeframe. And you
acknowledged today that you frequently speak to reporters and
also yesterday in comments to Senators that you sometimes do
that anonymously.
I think that we would all like full transparency and full
understanding of the facts surrounding this timeframe. And, as
you know, I am a member of the select committee to investigate
the events surrounding January 6. So I can speak for the
committee to say that we will be very interested to have, you
know, the same level of information and be able to speak to you
in the future about those topics.
And I will shift now to another topic of discussion. And if
I could ask my colleagues to please respect my time.
So, General Milley, you have spent half of your career
fighting a war in Afghanistan, roughly. And when did you
personally know that the war was lost?
General Milley. Well, I think if you go back to 5, 6 years
ago, I knew it was stalemated. ``Lost'' is a different word,
but I believed it was stalemated. And I believed 5 or 6 years
ago that it was unwinnable through U.S. military means, for
several reasons.
There is a sanctuary in Pakistan that was not going to be
destroyed or defeated, and that insurgencies are highly
political wars to begin with, and what was important to win is
to have an indigenous government that was seen as legitimate in
the eyes of the people, along with a military, their police and
army, that could adequately deal with that situation.
But I knew years ago that it was stalemated, said that
repeatedly, internal and external, and that winning would be
defined as a negotiated solution, as most insurgencies are
historically. They result in a negotiated solution between the
insurgent and the regime. And I thought that was the best way
that this could be handled. I didn't think there was a military
solution.
Mrs. Luria. So it is interesting to me that you used the
word ``winning.'' Did you think that winning was possible, or
did you think that a stalemate or a status quo was really the
only ultimate outcome that we could hope for in this situation?
General Milley. I think, as I recall, President Bush, at
the very beginning of this thing 20 years ago, said winning
would look a lot different in this war, or words to that
effect. And I think he was right then. And I think that a
negotiated solution was the best way of approaching a, quote/
unquote, ``win.''
I think that would have been in the best interests of the
United States and it would have been the best interests of the
region and the Afghan people, was a negotiated solution between
the Taliban, the insurgents, and the government.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
And I saw Secretary Austin nodding. I know there is very
little time left. Did you want to add something briefly?
Secretary Austin. You heard me say at the very top that,
you know, my hope was that we could reach a negotiated
settlement. A stalemate would actually provide the opportunity
to do that, for both sides to negotiate in earnest if neither
thought that they were going to win.
And, again, we just never reached that point, because the
Taliban had advantages coming into this, because we weren't
striking them, we released prisoners----
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Appreciate
it.
A couple of quick announcements. So there is a vote on. We
have a hard stop at 2:00. We are going to stop at 2:00. I am
going to go vote.
Mrs. Luria, if you could take the chair for just a moment,
I will come back as quickly as I can and then free you of that
obligation.
But it is my intention to roll through that. So, members,
you know, vote accordingly, be here. I think we have Ms. Jacobs
who is up next on our side, so we have a couple people that
will get us through that. But that is what we are going to do.
And Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes, and I will be
right back.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today.
Over the last few weeks, I have heard an outpouring of
concern and frustration from my constituents, veterans and
military families chief among them, who have expressed their
outrage at the disastrous withdrawal and the abandonment of our
Afghan allies and even American citizens.
I, too, am deeply outraged and have been equally stunned by
the lack of leadership shown by President Biden throughout all
of this. The American people deserve to have a full accounting
of the President's decision-making processes and what
ultimately led to a disastrous outcome.
Gentlemen, this is not about whether or not we should have
left or not. This is about how we left. We may not get all the
answers, but the public deserves in today's hearing to know the
facts surrounding this.
My first question, two part, regarding Bagram Air Base.
During the Senate testimony yesterday, General Austin, you said
the choice to abandon Bagram was made carefully based on the
mission to protect the Embassy.
What aspect of security at HKIA made it more secure than
Bagram? And, following that, you mentioned in your opening
statement Bagram had little strategic value. If you could
elaborate on both of those, please.
Secretary Austin. I certainly didn't say Bagram has little
strategic value in my opening statement. We can certainly--we
can break it out and go through it line by line if you would
like.
I would point out to you that I commanded Bagram at one
point in time, so--there may be other people in the room who
have done that, but probably not. So I know a lot about Bagram
and what it offers.
The key point here is that the Embassy was in Kabul. And
our mission at transition was to provide security, additional
security, for the Embassy. And, in the event of an evacuation,
we would have to start with evacuating the Embassy first. And
so Kabul makes all--I mean, it provides everything that you
need to be able to do that--capacity, the proximity. And so I
think it was the right choice.
Mrs. Bice. But isn't it accurate that HKIA has one runway
whereas Bagram had multiple runways, which would have made it
easier for the evacuation of individuals from----
Secretary Austin. And that is a great point. I would have
to secure it. The reason we could stay there with 2,500 people
earlier was because we had the Afghan Security Forces securing
the outer perimeter of Bagram.
If you no longer have that, then you have to commit 5 or
6,000 troops to do that and then secure it, defend it, and then
run the air ops. So that is a substantial additional commitment
of resources.
Mrs. Bice. General Milley or General McKenzie, anything you
would like to add?
General McKenzie. I would just like to briefly talk about
Bagram. It has two runways, but that is actually not what you
want to examine when you look at an airfield. It is an arcane
thing called the MOG [maximum-on-ground]. It is the ability to
load aircraft and move aircraft around the runway. And HKIA had
better facilities than Bagram for that.
Additionally, as the Secretary noted, the simple distance
from where the people are had to be a planning factor. And
last, of course, we were under direction to go to zero, 650 to
secure the Embassy. So Bagram was not an option under those
circumstances.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
General Milley. I would add, if I could, if you have the
assumption that there is no Afghan Army, the, 73 towers at
Bagram, as a minimum, there is 3 big gates. You have to have a
quick reaction force, you're going to have to patrol out to
rocket range, and then you're going to have to secure the 30
miles of road between Kabul and Bagram. We would have never
been able to get 124,000 people out of Bagram. It just wouldn't
have happened.
The center of gravity of a NEO was always going to be HKIA.
The security issues clearly are different at HKIA than they are
at Bagram, but Bagram was really not a feasible option given
numbers of troops, distance, and the security requirements.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, General Milley. Follow-up question,
you mentioned having to evacuate so quickly. Do you trust the
information that you are receiving from our intelligence
community, General Austin?
Secretary Austin. I have confidence in the information that
we get from the intel community, yes. That doesn't say that
they will be 100 percent right all the time.
Mrs. Bice. Given the fact that it seems as though they did
not at all plan for a complete surrender of the Afghan forces
upon the withdrawl of U.S. troops?
Secretary Austin. They predicted that outcome, but a
different timeline as we have--you have heard us say before
so----
Mrs. Bice. In addition to the botched over-the-horizon
activity that killed 10 Afghans, still believe that the
intelligence community can be trusted and is effective?
Secretary Austin. Again, I have confidence in the intel
community. In terms of----
Mrs. Luria [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired.
I will now recognize Ms. Jacobs for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for
being here. I would like to follow up on the questions
regarding the August 29th drone strike that killed Zemari
Ahmadi, a worker for a Southern California-based aid group and
nine of his family members, including seven children. And
General McKenzie, you called the strike a tragic mistake and I
think we can all agree with that characterization.
This is an open hearing so I am not going to ask about the
specific intelligence that led to the strike, but General
Milley, you said even after the truth was revealed that there
was a reasonable certainty that the target was valid.
So I would like to know, do you have that same level of
confidence in the intelligence that you have had for similar
strikes carried out under DOD's authority.
General Milley. Yes, I do. I mean, intelligence is not
perfect. Intel as Representative Johnson just said or Bice just
said, it is never perfect. We are not going to get perfection
in the world of intelligence. They speak in terms of
probabilistic language, what is more likely than not. And I
believe that we have good reason to have confidence in our
intelligence systems.
They are not perfect, but we have good reason to have
confidence in them and I think that has been expressed over
time in the accuracy and precision of these strikes.
Ms. Jacobs. I understand.
General Milley. This one strike was bad. It was tragic. It
was horrible. But that is not to say that the intelligence
system as a whole is wrong.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. But given that we have actually had
multiple of these mistakes that we already know about,
including the AC-130 gunship attack in 2015 that destroyed an
MSF [Medecins Sans Frontieres] hospital and killed 42
civilians, what assurances can you give us and the American
people that our drone program has adequate safeguards?
And Secretary Austin, you said that the Department has
endeavored to learn from this latest mistake; what have you
learned?
Secretary Austin. Thanks. Again, I would just remind you
that I have directed a review of this operation and so I won't
make any comments on specifics here because that review is
ongoing, but in terms of our commitment to learning from all of
our operations, we remain committed to doing that and we are
specifically concerned whenever there is an inadvertent loss of
life and an injury to civilians, and so we take that very
seriously and we hold ourselves accountable for that so.
Ms. Jacobs. Great. And we, in this committee, will be
looking forward to seeing the results of that review and also
having accountability.
General McKenzie, yesterday when asked by Senator Mark
Kelly about the over-the-horizon counterterrorism, you said,
and I quote: As we go forward in our ability to create the
ecosystem that allows you to see on the ground and put it
together, it is going to be harder in places like Afghanistan,
end quote.
I know many of my colleagues have already asked about what
this means for our ability to counter groups like ISIS-K. I
have a different question. What does that mean for our ability
to prevent civilian casualties so that we don't see another
drone strike like the one that took place in Kabul?
And if the ability to prevent civilian casualties becomes
harder, will you and CENTCOM take extra precautions in
selecting target packages or how are you planning to deal with
this extra uncertainty.
General McKenzie. Thank you for the question. The strike
that was undertaken in Kabul on the 29th was a self-defense
strike. It was taken because we believe there was an imminent
attack developing against our forces at HKIA. So that is very
different than the type of strike we would undertake in an
over-the-horizon scenario. The principal differences would be
this: We would not be under the acute pressure of time because
we thought the attack was imminent, because if we are striking
a target in Afghanistan, there is actually no immanency to that
attack. We are talking weeks and maybe months, rather than
hours or minutes.
So you have opportunity to develop pattern life. You have
the opportunity to apply all the other disciplines of
intelligence that can help us whether that is signal, image,
human intelligence, and we would work hard to try to
reconstitute that to a degree. And I will talk more about that
in a future classified session with you.
But it would be wrong to believe that the strike in Kabul,
which I have acknowledged went badly wrong, is the prototype
that we would employ for past or future over-the-horizon
strikes.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. I will look forward to working
with you all to make sure that we do that well, and I will note
your comments on imminence next time we have questions about
war powers with some of these strikes.
But with that, I will yield back.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
And Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Secretary Austin, General McKenzie, General
Milley for being here today. It is a very important hearing
that we are having here. I appreciate the committee's urgency
in making this happen. While there was bipartisan support for
withdrawl from Afghanistan, there were differences in opinion
on how that should have been conducted.
Something we should all be able to agree on is that the
withdrawl should have been conditions-based and there should
not have been any political motivation involved in this
decision, which I don't think was the actual case.
But, gentlemen, I would like to ask you, how often were you
in contact with your Chinese counterpart in discussing our
evacuation efforts in Afghanistan?
General Milley. Zero. And I agree with you, conditions-
based.
Dr. Jackson. General Milley, on August 18th you were quoted
as saying: The timeframe of a rapid collapse was widely
estimated in range from weeks to months and even years
following our departure. There was nothing that I or anyone
else saw that indicated a collapse of this Army and this
government in 11 days.
Between the 18th and the 21st of June, in just 4 days, 21
districts and 9 provinces fell to the Taliban and the Afghan
security forces quickly surrendered and abandoned their post.
This was an obvious beginning to the end of the Afghan Army and
to the Taliban takeover.
General Milley, what were you doing during this timeframe?
Before you answer that question, let me tell you. You were 2
days--just 2 days prior to when these provinces fell, you were
here in our committee on June 23rd. You sat before this
committee and you listed some of your concerns that we talked
in depth about. One was defending critical race theory in the
military, telling us you want to understand White rage, telling
us how offended you were to be labeled as woke, and worrying
about what caused American civilians to enter the Capitol on
January 6th.
I submit to you that perhaps we would not have had 13
service members and hundreds of Afghans killed, 18 service
members wounded, and countless U.S. citizens abandoned and left
as Taliban hostages if you had been more focused on your duty
to this country instead of defending and pandering to the Biden
administration's woke social experiment with the United States
military, doing book interviews, and colluding with Chinese
military officials.
Yesterday Senator Cotton asked you why you haven't resigned
and you said you were not going to resign just because the
President didn't take your advice. Well, I submit to you, sir,
that you should resign because of your dereliction of duty to
this country and your inability to do your job and protect this
country. It has become abundantly clear that the American
people have completely loss confidence in your ability to do
your job.
General Milley, will you now resign?
General Milley. I serve at the pleasure of the President,
Mr. Jackson.
Dr. Jackson. I yield back my time.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. And just for the
record, on that date in question, what Chairman Milley was
doing is he was appearing before this committee at our request
and answering the questions that we asked him. And I appreciate
his willingness and the willingness of all the leadership to
appear before us. That is an incredibly important part of their
job and I don't want to leave any of you with the impression
that we don't want you to do it just because of questions like
that.
Mr. Kahele is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chairman. Aloha, Secretary Austin,
Chairman Milley, General McKenzie. Mahalo for all of your
testimony and taking the time to be here today. As someone who
has also worn a uniform, still wears a uniform, I am very
appreciative of your service and having first deployed through
Operation Enduring Freedom in 2005, I am glad the U.S.
involvement in the war is over. I support the President's
decision, however, I am concerned that the accelerated
withdrawl, the strategic failure and fall of Afghanistan to the
Taliban has damaged U.S. credibility with our allies and
partners.
As a former C-17 mission commander, I will never forget
those images that I saw early in the morning of 15 August from
Kabul with total chaos at HKIA and Afghans falling out of the
sky desperate to flee the country. So I think my questions will
focus on Secretary Austin's testimony and it is really on the
NEO operation that my colleagues Rep. Crow and had referred to.
And so, Secretary Austin, in your testimony you stated that
military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios.
In mid-May, you had ordered CENTCOM to make preparations for a
potential NEO and that on the 10th of August, there was another
NEO tabletop. When did the State Department actually call for
the NEO?
Secretary Austin. I believe it was on the 14th,
Congressman, 14th of August.
Mr. Kahele. On the 14th of August the State Department
called for the NEO. So you stated in your testimony that the
NEO remains among the most challenging military operations even
in the best of circumstances and the circumstances in August
were anything but ideal--extreme heat, a landlocked country, no
government, a highly dynamic situation on the ground, and an
active, credible, and lethal terrorist threat. And that also in
your testimony that you had offered input to the State
Department that although, mindful of their concerns that moving
too soon would actually cause a very collapse of the Afghan
Government that we all wanted to avoid, but that moving too
late would put our people and our operations at greater risk.
And so what I am trying to figure out is, you know, despite
the President's decision to order the withdrawl on April 14th
and that the troop presence will go to zero. On May 1st, a
withdrawl began. You know, by May and June of 2021, the Taliban
had captured a quarter of the country. Representative Crow
identified on June 11, there was a NEO tabletop that was done.
On August 6, the Taliban captured the first capital. On
August 10th, we did a tabletop. Why were we doing a tabletop on
August 10th when the Taliban was rapidly advancing to Kabul? On
August 14th, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif fell and by August
15th, the Taliban had entered Kabul. That is what I am trying
to figure out, Secretary Austin, is why did we wait--I know we
had to wait for the State Department to call for the NEO, but
why did we wait so long to do that, even though we had
prepositioned forces, as you had mentioned, in Afghanistan. We
had the 24th MEU there, 82nd Airborne was coming in, but the
airfield was still in total chaos on August 15th.
Secretary Austin. So I think what changed the equation
here--we anticipated that just based upon the disposition of
forces that were kind of centered around the population center
that the Afghans would, in fact, put up, you know, more
significant resistance.
And so we anticipated that that fighting would be a bit
more intense. As they approached Ghazni, we didn't see the
fight that we thought we would see. And that was a trigger for
us to begin to move some things very quickly.
And then, even as they moved north of Ghazni, we expected
that as they approached Kabul that, again, those forces that
were there would fight more. And we had--there was a government
in place still at the time, but with the government collapsing
and leaving and that precipitated the evaporation of the
security forces and that really panicked the people. And so
what you saw on that first day was a result of that panic.
Mr. Kahele. Should the NEO operation have commenced sooner
than April 14th?
Secretary Austin. I certainly think it could have, yeah.
Again, we had the elements to begin to operate a bit sooner.
But again, that is a State Department call and----
Mr. Kahele. Totally understand.
Secretary Austin [continuing]. We provide our input and it
is based upon a lot of things. And this is not throwing my
State Department colleagues under the bus; it is a very dynamic
and challenging situation.
Mr. Kahele. General McKenzie, you stated that primarily our
NEO plan included AMCITs [American citizens] and Embassy
personnel. When did the NEO planning begin to include Afghans
and SIVs?
General McKenzie. Late in spring, early in the summer. We
began to broaden that plan.
Mr. Kahele. Thank you for your questions.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franklin is recognized.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for your patience and persistence these last 2 days.
I understand that it is a lot of hours to be sitting before all
of us and then when you are tailing Charlie like I am in this
batting order, most of the ground has been broken, but I do
have a couple things.
But, first, I was kind of puzzled hearing General
McKenzie's characterization of our departure now out of
Afghanistan as being something other than a surrender. You
know, it doesn't feel that way to me. It certainly doesn't feel
that way to the American public and 20 years ago exactly I was
sitting in Bahrain, we were planning the initial strikes into
Afghanistan, and at that time our marching orders were to
defeat al-Qaida and to ensure that the Afghanistan would no
longer be a safe haven for terrorists.
And now fast-forward 20 years, those conditions while, you
know, General Milley, you said within maybe to 6 to 36 months
the country will be ripe, again, potentially to be launching
strikes like that or targeting against us, it doesn't feel like
it is anything other than a surrender.
But General McKenzie, you had mentioned that holding Bagram
was untenable under the circumstances and that the Bagram
option went away when you were given an end strength of 650.
I understand that. I assume that you mean that it was
untenable because of the troop limitation. But if you had not
been limited, would your professional military advice been to
relinquish Bagram?
General McKenzie. So, at a troop level of 2,500, we would
have held Bagram and that would have been my recommendation.
That was my position.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. So you had also mentioned that there
was no tactical reason to hold Bagram. Would you elaborate? I
assume that would mean--I don't want to put words in your
mouth, but strategically would you see a value to us still
being----
General McKenzie. When I said there was no tactical reason
to hold Bagram, I was specifically talking about the NEO
operation. So once we went down to 650 and then we were given
the orders to conduct a NEO. For the reasons the Secretary and
the Chairman have already outlined, the center of gravity of
that was actually HKIA. It is where the people are. You got the
MOG operating capacity there to move airplanes in and out.
I will tell you this, though, Representative, we had a
branch plan to seize Bagram Airfield should HKIA have become
untenable, but that would have required as has already been
noted, significant investment in combat power. And HKIA never
became untenable.
So we did not have to consider that plan, although we had a
highly detailed plan to be able to do it. It simply was not
necessary because we were able to maintain the throughput at
HKIA.
And, again, had we gone into Bagram, we would have
introduced significant additional U.S. combat forces into the
country and probably would have provoked another conflict with
the Taliban, which would have been a political decision, not a
military decision.
Mr. Franklin. I understand. Political decision. But, you
know, here it is since 1898 we have maintained Guantanamo Bay.
So we do have a history of keeping territory even in lands
where we don't have friendly forces there at our side, but I do
know seeing already the challenge with over the horizon--
conducting our strikes over the horizon it sure would be nice
to have that field now.
Secretary Austin, I just want to wholeheartedly agree with
Chairman Smith's comment earlier that we make the decisions in
the world that we live in and we don't have the luxury of
having a magic wand. I get that and that is the world you all
face every day. You told us that you would like to have seen
this conflict end with a negotiated settlement.
General Milley, you did as well. I know there has been a
lot of talk about whether President Trump should have been
negotiating with the Taliban or not. But that is a different
conversation for another day, but those terms that were agreed
to were not really complied with by the Taliban, and here it
is--we know that, General Milley, in your testimony, seven of
the eight conditions that were given to the Taliban were
broken.
In light of that failure, Secretary Austin, do you think it
was wise for us to continue with the timeline or do we feel
compelled because I constantly hear the administration pushing
back saying we had no choice. Our hands were tied. The Trump
administration tied our hands to this timeline, but the Taliban
didn't comply with their end of the deal and now we are kind of
stuck in a bad situation. Do you feel that we should have
pushed a timeline not necessarily to stay in Afghanistan. I get
it. I think there is a time for us to start negotiating an exit
there, but in light of how disastrous the hasty withdrawl
turned out to be, we could have used more time to get those
folks out.
Secretary Austin. Quite frankly, because of the fact that,
you know, for a year we weren't striking the Taliban, they were
increasing in combat power. We released 5,000 prisoners which
kind of regenerated combat power for them. They were able to
make advances against the Afghan Security Forces because, you
know, we weren't doing things to fully support----
The Chairman. Again, I apologize. The gentleman's time has
expired. That will have to suffice.
Mr. Panetta is recognized.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you. I appreciate this hearing, Mr.
Chair. And good afternoon and thank you, gentlemen. Thank you
for being here. Thank you for your service, not just in
Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], but throughout your career
service to our great Nation.
As an American, as a veteran of OEF, I want to thank you
for continuing to remind the American public not to reduce the
service of 800,000 men and women who served in Afghanistan down
to a 2-week chaotic withdrawl, not to reduce the sacrifice of
the 2,461 men and women down to a single photo of a C-17 on the
Kabul tarmac.
But as you know and as an American and as a veteran and as
a Representative, it is my duty to ask questions. And let me
tell you, my constituents are asking a lot of questions. And I
think the problem with the withdrawl is that it has left more
questions than answers.
With the withdrawl, we ended our involvement with the war
in Afghanistan, but we still have the war on terror. We
withdrew our troops, but will we have to go in? Yes, we
evacuated 122,000 and you should be proud of that, but what
about the others who remain?
And on that note, I just want you to think about the
definition of success shouldn't be based on how many people you
got out, but how many people we left behind. And so what I am
hearing is a lot of frustration from my constituents who have
family members there in Afghanistan who literally have nobody
to turn to to get out when it comes to on the ground. They are
devastated by the deaths of the 12 Marines and the 1 sailor
and, yes, I got to be frank, they are a little humiliated
seeing the Taliban drive around, screw around with American
equipment.
And this is hyperbole, but I do think it sums it up pretty
good that I heard this quote about this frustration, and it
says: Something is not right when the Taliban can get American-
made ammunition easier than Americans can. And four, I do
believe that we are dumbfounded. Dumbfounded that this
government, the Afghan Government, absolutely disappeared and
hundreds of thousands of well-equipped Afghan troops shed their
uniforms, dropped their weapons, and ran.
I do believe, though, that the underlying foundation for
the reason for why this government crumbled and why those
troops fled is corruption. We basically supported a Potemkin
village and when we left, it fell. It basically set up a system
as we saw throughout the 20 years there from birth certificates
to death certificates, it was all about bribes.
And what we were left with when we were about to leave was
a state that had grown so corrupt that governors were cutting
deals with jihadists to switch sides. Inflation was rampant
because of the money we handed out and it left ghost soldiers,
basically absentees listed on the payroll so commanders could
steal the salaries. Very similar to what happened in Vietnam
and you are seeing a lot of similarities presented to that
case.
And there are a lot of studies obviously after Vietnam
where it said corruption was the fundamental ill that was
largely responsible for the ultimate collapse. So my question
to you is, do you believe that corruption was the fundamental
ill that was largely responsible for the collapse of the Afghan
Government? If so, elaborate. If not, what would you consider
the fundamental ill for the quick collapse of that government?
Secretary Austin. Thank you. I certainly agree that
corruption played a major role in the collapse of the
government and the security forces. I also believe that weak
leadership added to that and the fact that President Ghani
frequently, without any apparent reason, changed out his
commanders which degraded the confidence of the troops in their
leadership.
So I think--and I believe also that the Doha Agreement had
a significant negative affect on the morale of the military.
And so I think there is, you know, a combination of a number of
things that came together to create these effects, but I
certainly agree that corruption was central to this issue.
Mr. Panetta. General.
General Milley. Absolutely. And I would even take it one
level higher. I think it is about the legitimacy of the
government in the eyes of the people and the eyes of its
military, and I think that corruption is one of the
contributing factors to delegitimize.
It is my observation--again, have to gather all the facts,
but I think at the village level, the Government of Afghanistan
was looked at as parasitic as opposed to supportive with the
exception possibly of the Afghan Army itself. But the
government, the local officials, the police forces, et cetera,
were clearly delegitimized in the eyes of the people.
And that, I think was a major contributing factor to the
dissolution of the government and the army and the collapse of
the whole thing in a very, very rapid period of time.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, again.
I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Okay. We have got quickly Mr.
Fallon and then Mr. Horsford and we are going to be done. Mr.
Fallon, you are recognized.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. During this hearing, the
virtue of courage was used to describe the current President
and I think that is misplaced. I think the virtue of courage
should be attributed to the 2,461 troops that we lost, that
gave everything; the 20,698 that were maimed and injured and
wounded; and the 800,000 that served. I am a little perplexed
and thank you for being here. I wanted to clear something up.
During the testimony, General McKenzie, you were asked when
you knew that the drone strike on August 29th had gone
tragically wrong and correct me, just yes or no, you said about
5 or 6 hours later you learned that. Is that correct?
General McKenzie. That is when we learned that civilians
had been killed.
Mr. Fallon. So it went wrong?
General McKenzie. No. I did not say that.
Mr. Fallon. Okay.
General McKenzie. I said that is when we learned that
civilians had been killed----
Mr. Fallon. Would you have considered 5 or 6 hours later a
righteous strike?
General McKenzie. We took that strike based on the belief
that the vehicle was going to be used in an attack against us.
Mr. Fallon. So we knew that people that shouldn't have been
killed were killed 5 or 6 hours after, yes?
General McKenzie. We knew that probably people that were
not involved [inaudible] took us a little longer to learn the
rest of the story.
Mr. Fallon. Agreed. Secretary Austin, same? You learned
about 5 or 6 hours after that people that should not have been
killed were killed?
Secretary Austin. I learned from General McKenzie's
reporting that there was collateral damage. And whenever that
happens, we investigate.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you. Okay. And then, General
Milley, on September 1st, 3 days later, you described it as ``a
righteous strike.'' People that were not supposed to be killed
were killed and you described it as ``a righteous strike.''
General Milley. You have to go back and look at the full
quote. What I said was, we followed the procedures, I had every
reason to believe that we followed our procedures at that point
in time. We knew that there were civilians killed. We knew they
were noncombatants and there was collateral damage.
Mr. Fallon. Yes. You said were others killed? Yes. Who were
they, we don't know. We are trying to sort through all that.
General Milley. That is right. Because I believed, I
believed that the target that we were aiming----
Mr. Fallon. Sir----
General Milley. I believe the target we were aiming at----
Mr. Fallon. Okay. I have 3 more minutes. Now General
Milley, you served under both President Trump and Biden?
General Milley. Correct.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. I have spoken with former Secretary of
State Pompeo, had a very extensive conversation with director--
former National Director of Intelligence John Ratcliffe, and
what was the general sentiment of senior advisers if conditions
weren't met, what would happen in Afghanistan?
How long the Afghan Army and government would last? Do you
recall that? I would imagine you were sitting in on those
meetings.
General Milley. I am not sure I am understanding the
question. If conditions are not met----
Mr. Fallon. If conditions aren't met and we withdraw, how
long is the Afghan Government going to last--back then?
General Milley. I am not going to speak for them; I will
speak for myself----
Mr. Fallon. Please do.
General Milley. I am on record having said that if we go to
zero that there is a high probability of the government and the
Afghan Army collapsing. In terms of time, I put that at between
1 and 3 years at the time I wrote this stuff back in a year ago
in the fall of 2020.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. That is interesting when you say that
because when I talked to both Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Ratcliffe,
they told me that there was unanimity, even President Trump
said, if conditions are not met that the Afghan Army and the
government would collapse within weeks and the longest they
heard maybe a month or two. That's what they gave me. Because I
was just surprised that because Secretary Austin said in his
remarks today that the fact that the Afghan Army--we and our
partners trained simply melted away in many cases was a shock.
John Ratcliffe told me he told his successor that they were
going to collapse instantaneously if those conditions weren't
met; they were going to evaporate. And now [inaudible] but I
think--General Milley, with all due respect----
General Milley. Sure.
Mr. Fallon [continuing]. What I think it is, it was not a
failure of intelligence; it seems to me--I didn't know this
stuff. I wasn't in the room, you were, that it was a failure to
heed that intelligence and act accordingly.
General Milley. I can show you the intelligence reports
that were produced under Mr. Ratcliffe----
Mr. Fallon. I appreciate that. I have 50 seconds left.
Thank you.
General Milley. Sure.
Mr. Fallon. All right. So we got 5,000 bad guys in Bagram,
in jail at Bagram, right? Am I right, General McKenzie? And
then we go down to 650, we can't hold it so we split around
July 1st I think we left.
General McKenzie. 12th.
Mr. Fallon. July 12th and it fell August 15th, correct? And
they got out then? August 16th? And then we have an attack on
our troops couple weeks later. Can any of you guarantee the
American people that out of those 5,000 bad guy scumbags none
of them were directly responsible for killing our troops?
General McKenzie. No. I cannot guarantee that.
General Milley. I cannot guarantee that, no.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Horsford is recognized.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary. And to the generals I will be brief. I have several
questions and appreciate your concise response.
General McKenzie, on August 30th, you told the media that
while you maintained the ability to bring American citizens and
civilians out until immediately before the departure of the
final flight, no civilians were on those aircraft and that
mission ended approximately 12 hours before the exit.
So to clarify, when did the last American citizen
successfully pass through Taliban perimeter into HKIA gate.
General McKenzie. That is a very specific question. I will
have to come back to you on the record, but I will come back to
you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 164.]
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. And when did the last Afghan
civilian successfully pass through the gate?
General McKenzie. Same thing. It was some hours before, but
I will come back to you with an exact time on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 164.]
Mr. Horsford. And how many individuals successfully passed
through the Taliban perimeter in the 72 hours proceeding the
departure of the final flight?
General McKenzie. Probably in the low hundreds, but I will
come back to you with an exact number.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 164.]
Mr. Horsford. Thank you. I understand that on August 19th
ground commanders authorized the use of helicopters to rescue
169 Americans from the Baron Hotel after the initial plan for
them to proceed on foot became too dangerous. At what time were
rotary wing aviation assets no longer operation at HKIA?
General McKenzie. So, first of all, you are right. The
Baron Hotel, we should note, is about 200 meters off the HKIA
compound. So it is not a long distance, but we did use
helicopters for that. We kept helicopters up until the very
end. In fact, one of the final things we did before actually
extracting from the C-17s was breaking down some helicopters
and loading them.
Mr. Horsford. And what were the specific contingency plans
to continue the evacuation if the Taliban closed checkpoints
surrounding the airport?
Mr. McKenzie. So at all times we were prepared to accept
American citizens that were able to make it to the gate. There
was an external Taliban cordon. We've talked about that. The
external Taliban cordon was actually part of the force
protection scheme for the base. Commanders on the ground had to
balance their force protection against the need to allow
Americans, SIVs, and others to enter. So we tried to work
closely when we could with the Taliban to ensure free passage
for Americans.
Mr. Horsford. So why then were the plans not implemented
once it became clear that no additional American citizens were
going to be allowed to pass through the Taliban checkpoints?
General McKenzie. We attempted with the Taliban to allow
Americans to be able to get to the gate up until the very end.
I do not have facts on why that did not happen. Our presence on
the ground then, we should remember, was very small and we were
beginning to turn inward as we prepared to extract.
Mr. Horsford. General Milley, in 2017, the GAO [Government
Accountability Office] released a report on recommendations to
enhance the readiness of the Global Response Force to support
contingency operations. In June of 2021, GAO assessed that the
Department had not implemented any of their three
recommendations to improve readiness due to the ongoing
development of the dynamic force employment concept.
So I am curious, what percentage of the total Immediate
Response Force [IRF] and existing prepositioned forces deployed
in support of Operation Spartan Shield were deployed to HKIA to
assist in the NEO? And how many additional battalions intended
to be-- IRF follow-on force were available for short notice
deployment but not deployed?
General Milley. We had and I will--Frank, can correct me
100 percent here in a minute, but we had two battalions, the
MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit], and another Marine battalion
prepositioned in the Middle East, along with an Army infantry
battalion prepositioned in the Middle East, and there was a
battalion already on the ground.
So that is four, plus we alerted on the Secretary's order
marshaled and deployed the IRF--and the GRF [Global Response
Force], which is a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, very,
very rapidly and we had 6,000 troops at HKIA very, very
rapidly. I think we far exceeded any of the standards that are
published for the GRF or the RF [Response-Force]. In addition
to that, we had a variety of high end special operations forces
that alerted, marshaled, and deployed extraordinarily rapidly.
So we easily met any kind of rapid deployment standards and we
exceeded them.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our
military men and women and to our veterans who served over the
20 years during this longest war in U.S. history. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for your
testimony today and I know certainly it was a contentious
hearing, but it is enormously important that we have the
opportunity to have these conversations. I do not in any way
support some of the comments that some of my colleagues made or
the way they chose to conduct themselves, but that is a small
price to pay for the transparency that we need to allow the
committee to do its job.
I appreciate you being willing to do that in giving us the
opportunity to have this discussion and we will certainly
continue to discuss the situation in South Asia as we go
forward. Appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Rogers, anything for the good of the order?
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, the one thing I would like to ask
is that as soon as practical that we do have the classified
hearing on the over-the-horizon capabilities because as I have
spoken individually with all three of these gentlemen, I am
very concerned about our counterterrorism capabilities and how
we are going to address that.
The Chairman. We will have multiple classified hearings on
that subject. That is going to be an ongoing topic, but yes, it
is something we need to do soon.
Thank you.
Again, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 29, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 29, 2021
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 29, 2021
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 29, 2021
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
General Milley. To my knowledge, the Taliban never deliberately
attacked U.S. or Coalition forces after the signing of the Doha
Agreement. There were isolated instances of Taliban rocket and mortar
fire targeting ANDSF bases that were also cohabited by U.S. Forces. On
occasion there were reports of Taliban fighters returning fire at U.S.
combat aircraft providing close air support to ANDSF.
However, the Taliban failed to fully honor other commitments from
the agreement, including their pledge to not allow terrorists to use
the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States.
They also failed to earnestly negotiate with the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to end the conflict and failed to
reduce violence overall. Moreover, Taliban actions, including its
brutal military campaign and targeted assassinations, completely
undermined the spirit of the agreement, which sought a peaceful
settlement to the conflict, not a military takeover. [See page 28.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Secretary Austin. The Battle of Kunduz took place in 2015, which
was the first year of the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist
mission. During that period, the Taliban briefly captured Kunduz City.
With the support from U.S. forces, the Afghan forces recaptured the
city from the Taliban within a couple of weeks. [See page 33.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to gather
information about the ISIS network responsible for the Abbey Gate
bombing and to analyze the ISIS planning and personnel, including the
bomber, involved in the attack. We received credible information
regarding a threat to Hamid Karzai International Airport in the days
leading up to the attack. Unfortunately, we were unable to disrupt the
attack. [See page 36.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Secretary Austin. We planned for multiple scenarios, including a
contingency where the United States would have to facilitate the
evacuation of our Afghan allies under difficult circumstances. The
Department began planning for the possibility of a noncombatant
evacuation operation (NEO) two weeks after the President's decision in
April to withdraw from Afghanistan by early September, at which point
military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-
May, I ordered U.S. Central Command to prepare for a potential NEO and
DOD began prepositioning forces in the region, including three infantry
battalions.
A key DOD effort in support of expediting Special Immigrant Visa
(SIV) processing was the establishment of ``Project Rabbit,'' through
which DOD provides employment verification of SIV applicants who worked
for DOD contractors or subcontractors directly to the Department of
State. DOD has also endorsed and uploaded referrals for Afghan
nationals under threat due to their association with DOD's mission into
the Department of State's refugee referrals database. DOD will continue
processing these referrals for as long as we continue to receive them
directly from DOD personnel. In addition, the DOD has hosted tens of
thousands of Afghan nationals on our facilities abroad and now at home
as part of Operation Allies Welcome and Operation Allies Refuge. [See
page 40.]
General Milley. Throughout the planning and withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Afghanistan, my primary focus was on safe and deliberate
retrograde U.S. forces, contractors, citizens, and Afghan evacuees from
Afghanistan. I had direct communications with Secretary Austin, General
McKenzie, General Miller, leaders in the Intelligence Community, the
Secretary of State, and the National Security Council to share
information, collaborate, and maintain a common operational picture on
the activities in Afghanistan. My staff, at all levels, maintained
communication to coordinate support for to these activities with their
respective military and interagency (IA) counterparts.
Following the President's announcement on 14 April 2021 to withdraw
U.S forces from Afghanistan, I immediately established a crisis
management team (CMT) and later an Afghan evacuee cell to track the
progress of the plan and enable operations. My staff provided me daily
briefings that included intelligence updates, subordinate commanders'
estimates, the status of security transition to Afghan security forces,
the retrograde of U.S. and Coalition forces and equipment, the status
of American Citizens (AMCITs), and the status of Afghan Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) and other Afghan at Risk personnel in the country.
On 28 April, I hosted a DOD internal Rehearsal of Concept (ROC)
Drill focused on the retrograde plan and its branches and sequels. On 8
May 2020, I hosted an Interagency table top exercise to review the
retrograde timeline and multiple contingency operations that included
the evacuation of non-combatant personnel. On 6 August 2020, my staff
hosted a Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) rehearsal with the IA leaders
to discuss the security, logistics, authorities, funding, and other
requirements to enable the conduct of a conditions-based evacuation of
AMCITS, SIV, and Afghan at Risk personnel.
In coordination with the Department of State and U.S. Embassy
Kabul, CENTCOM completed contingency planning and prepositioned forces
to support a NEO shortly after this rehearsal. From 14-31 Aug 21, DOD
facilitated the evacuation of over 124,000 AMCIT, Afghan SIV, and
Afghan at Risk personnel as part of Operation Allies Refuge. The DOD's
Operation Allies Welcome and the relocation of Afghan SIV and Afghan at
risk personnel continues today. My staff provides me daily updates on
the movement personnel from Afghanistan and adjacent countries. This
includes the relocation of Afghan personnel from locations in the
Middle East and Europe to military bases in the Continental U.S. We
have successfully received over 84,000 Afghan personnel and resettled
over 78,000 in the U.S. to date. [See page 40.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
General Milley. The purpose of the 8 May 21 Interagency table-top
exercise (TTX) was to refine and ensure a fully coordinated and
synchronized USG and NATO plan for retrograde of forces and personnel
from Afghanistan. My staff continued to conduct daily meetings with
their State Department counterparts to maintain situational awareness
and reinforce the need for a more-involved Interagency planning effort
to ensure the development of a coherent NEO plan. [See page 66.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
Secretary Austin. The Department has multiple efforts underway,
including by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, to conduct an independent review of the evacuation,
the events leading up to it, and lessons learned. The Department is
committed to understanding what worked, what did not work, and ensuring
that we incorporate that into our planning and our strategic assessment
going forward. [See page 77.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 29, 2021
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I agree that ``over the horizon'' operations can be
effective. However, I am concerned that, without complementary
operations, they will be insufficient to keep us safe. Secretary
Austin, are you confident that over the horizon capabilities, on their
own, can mitigate the terrorist threat we face?
Secretary Austin. Department of Defense over-the-horizon operations
employ a mix of capability that contribute to a holistic and
interagency counterterrorism strategy. The Unites States has
significant operational and intelligence capability, to deny external
operations by terrorist organizations that would threaten the homeland.
We continue to work with our partners in the region, who share our
interest in promoting a safe and stable South Asia and preventing a
resurgence of terrorism.
Mr. Langevin. Former CIA director and Secretary of Defense Panetta
said that our national security is threatened by the Taliban takeover.
One of our missions was to prevent a haven for terrorist groups and
``we have failed in that mission.'' Are you confident that we can
prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven?
Secretary Austin. As the President has stated, we have one vital
national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent terrorists from using
Afghanistan to launch attacks against the United States. Department of
Defense over-the-horizon operations employ a mix of capability that
contribute to a holistic and interagency counterterrorism strategy. Our
counterterrorism strategy layers multiple sources of intelligence to
maintain awareness of terrorist threats with the capability to disrupt
those threats directed against the homeland and our other interests.
The United States has significant operational and intelligence
capability, to deny external operations by terrorist organizations that
would threaten the homeland. We continue to work with our partners in
the region, who share our interest in promoting a safe and stable South
Asia and preventing a resurgence of terrorism.
Mr. Langevin. The director of the DIA has assessed that al Qaeda
could threaten the homeland in 1-2 years. How will we keep our country
safe?
Secretary Austin. The Department remains committed to ensure that
Afghanistan cannot become a safe haven for terrorist organizations that
threaten the homeland, and we will use all of the Department's
capabilities in service of that goal. We will continue our
comprehensive, focused intelligence collection to inform U.S. kinetic
and non-kinetic over-the-horizon capabilities. In addition, we will
share appropriate intelligence with like-minded partners with
capabilities to disrupt terrorist threats using a variety of means.
Security cooperation within the region is also a key pillar of this
strategy, working with those governments directly affected by
terrorists and who are well-positioned to counter the threat.
Mr. Langevin. General Milley, we have other train and equip
programs and counterterrorism missions around the world, and we'll
likely have more as great power competition heats up. How can we better
train and equip partner forces? How important is the on-the-ground
human intelligence?
General Milley. We can better train and equip partner forces by
more thoroughly accounting for regional and local politics and building
a deeper understanding of their country's institutional and logistical
capacity to absorb our assistance. We must also carefully balance the
partner's priorities and concerns with our own, cultivating a sense of
local-ownership and accountability.
On-the-ground human intelligence can be important in validating
other forms of intelligence, which together increase our confidence in
threat assessments.
Mr. Langevin. I am also concerned about how many SIV applicants and
holders remain in Afghanistan. They risked their lives for us and now
are under a very real threat from the Taliban. General McKenzie, is
there an impression amongst Syrians and Iraqis that it's too risky to
serve as an interpreter or intelligence asset for the U.S.? How are you
mitigating this possibility?
General McKenzie. Currently, the linguist situation in OIR is
different from that of Afghanistan in August 2021. CJTF-OIR does not
utilize local national linguists and has not done so since April 2020
(when Partner training and the use of local nationals outside of the
bases ceased due to COVID). Today, OIR's linguists are either trained
uniform military members/government employees or U.S. Citizens hired
and vetted as part of a U.S. Government contract to work in Syria and
Iraq. However, the OIR Intelligence Community has observed no
indicators that Iraqis or Syrians view working as a U.S. intelligence
asset as too risky. Neither is there any appearance of a lack of desire
among Syrians and Iraqis to perform linguist duties for the United
States. Many are willing to risk everything to do so, often in hopes of
earning a SIV or as a mechanism to secure their local neighborhood.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Even before the August 31 withdrawal of troops, there
were frustrating reports of Americans and Green Card holders being
turned away at the gates of the airport or being instructed by the
Administration and the U.S. military to stay away from the airport
entirely.
Did you at any point ask President Biden for more time or support
to enable U.S. forces to stay and complete a full evacuation of
American citizens (AMCIT), as promised? If so, what was President
Biden's response?
Secretary Austin. My judgment remains that extending beyond August
31 would have greatly imperiled our people and our mission, as it would
have dramatically increased security risks to U.S. forces. Since that
time, the U.S. Government has continued its mission to evacuate U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents--to date, more than a thousand
have departed by air and land routes.
Mr. Wilson. How many citizens, green card holders, and Afghan
allies were left behind by the military's premature withdrawal on
August 31st? What is the plan now to get these vulnerable people out of
Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Following the non-combatant evacuation operation
phase, the Department of Defense continues to support the Department of
State-led efforts to facilitate the safe and orderly departure of U.S.
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and Afghans allies who wish to
leave Afghanistan. Since September 1, 2021, the U.S. Government has
continued that mission--to date, more than a thousand have departed by
air and land routes.
Mr. Wilson. What U.S. military capabilities existed in Afghanistan
following President Biden's April 14th announcement to withdraw all
forces? When was air support to the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF) stopped? When was logistical support withdrawn?
For how long after April 14th was the U.S. able to conduct intelligence
activities?
Secretary Austin. On 14 April, there were approximately 4,000 U.S.
service members in Afghanistan in primarily advisory and support roles.
U.S. capabilities at this time included organic fixed and rotary wing
aviation and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Between 14
April and 31 July, eight bases were retrograded and consolidated
resulting in a force of approximately 650 U.S. service members to
support U.S. Embassy Kabul and HKIA operations. This retrograde was
conducted in a deliberate manner to meet the President's direction
while mitigating risk to force and risk to mission. U.S. air support
missions continued throughout the month of August 2021. Strikes in
support of ANDSF were conducted as late as 13 August 2021. During the
NEO, air support was largely focused on support of operations at HKIA.
While our logistical support capabilities to the ANDSF and the
Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) decremented to some extent during the
retrograde, a great deal of effort was focused on providing logistical
support from over-the-horizon (OTH) locations, which continued through
the fall of Kabul. Intelligence collection continued without decrement
until the completion of the NEO on 30 August. It continues to this day,
albeit at greatly diminished capacity.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. Secretary Austin, is it true that the suicide bomber
who attacked the Kabul Airport on August 23 was a CIA prisoner at the
Bagram Air Base whom the Taliban released after Biden's Administration
left Bagram in July?
Secretary Austin. I defer to the CIA for a response.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Should Stage I of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
have been activated sooner than August 22, 2021?
Secretary Austin. No. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) augments
Department of Defense (DOD) airlift requirements in emergencies when
the need for airlift exceeds the capacity of available military
aircraft. DOD activated Stage I of the CRAF in anticipation of the need
for additional long-range international passenger aircraft as we
expanded evacuation efforts. Activating the CRAF earlier could have
negatively impacted the commercial carriers' ability to meet their day-
to-day operational commitments before the additional capacity was
required.
Mr. Scott. Did the inter-agency process work as planned during the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Department of Defense planning for the retrograde
operation was robust, and there was significant interagency
participation throughout the process. The President received regular
updates on the progress of the retrograde and the security situation in
Afghanistan. He sought out all perspectives, including from the
Department of Defense, throughout the process.
Mr. Scott. Are you willing to declassify the necessary documents
that pertain to the decisions to reduce forces in Afghanistan in order
to invade Iraq?
General Milley. If directed, we could declassify what are Joint
Staff equities that we are the classification authority on. Most of
this, would be outside JS classification authority and would reside
with Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Scott. In your military opinion, should the Chief of Mission
have declared a NEO sooner than August 14, 2021?
General Milley. The decision to order a NEO is for civilian
leadership and policymakers, not military officials, to make.
In preparation for a possible NEO, and following the President's
decision to remove military forces from Afghanistan, CENTCOM updated
contingency planning for a non-combatant evacuation operation, in
coordination with the Department of State, including Embassy Kabul.
Because the Department of Defense had prepositioned forces in the
region and run practice exercises, thousands of troops were able to
arrive in Kabul, secure the airport, and facilitate the NEO.
Mr. Scott. Did the inter-agency process work as planned during the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
General Milley. Yes. Principals from DOD, DOS, DHS, the
Intelligence Community and the various agencies involved in planning
the Afghanistan withdrawal and subsequent non-combatant evacuation
engaged in robust communication and coordination leading up to the
withdrawal and throughout both operations. Frequent National Security
Council-led Interagency Policy Committee meetings, Deputies meetings
and Principals meetings exhaustively examined the issues and developed
options, directly engaging the President throughout the crises. Senior
leaders across the interagency were kept informed and provided input on
all major decisions related to the withdrawal and evacuation.
Mr. Scott. How did the 8 May 2021 senior officials level
interagency table top exercise miss the impact of the Afghan's morale/
confidence in the aftermath of the July 5, 2021 withdrawal from Bagram
in the dead of night?
General Milley. The DOD was unable to effectively gauge the morale
of the Afghan Security Forces (ANDSF) after we removed U.S. advisors
from its units. The withdrawal of embedded advisor teams from ANDSF
units virtually eliminated America's ability to monitor, track, and
mitigate flagging Afghan morale and confidence. Additionally, the 8 May
21 TTX occurred only three weeks after the President announced the
complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces. At that time, the Taliban
had not yet initiated its decisive offensive effort against the ANDSF
and the primary indicators of Afghan government stability had not been
put under stress.
Mr. Scott. When can we expect Joint Pub 3-68 Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations be updated to reflect the lessons learned from
the Afghanistan NEO?
General Milley. The Joint Force learned multiple lessons during the
conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Afghanistan.
These lessons are already being incorporated into planning for any
potential contingency NEOs. Joint Publication (JP) 3-68 Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations is under revision with the Joint Doctrine
Development Community (JDDC). Joint Staff J-3 will complete
consolidation of comments and lessons learned from the Joint Force in
April. The Director of Operations, Joint Staff J-3, will approve JP 3-
68 at the end of July. Once signed, JP 3-68 will be published and
available to the Joint Force as early as August 2021.
Mr. Scott. Mirror Imaging is clearly one of the many mistakes of
the Afghan War. Do the War Colleges need to do a better job of teaching
their students about the dangers of mirror imaging?
General Milley. As I stated in my testimony on 28 September 2021,
the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to build the Afghan military in the
mirror image of U.S. forces is a significant lesson for the Department
of Defense (DOD) to consider and address as we prepare for future wars.
In Afghanistan, we based the training of Afghan security forces on
``American doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. . .(and we)
made a military that may have been overly dependent upon us, our
presence, contractors, and higher tech systems. . .to fight a
counterinsurgency war.'' Applying strategic and operational lessons
from the War in Afghanistan into education of joint force professionals
aligns with my 2020 Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Professional
Military Education. The war colleges use this guide to educate and
develop students to effectively assess national security challenges in
order to serve as future strategic leaders, planners, and advisors. The
document directs the war colleges to incorporate case studies, like the
War in Afghanistan, to improve experiential learning. Through this
process, students apply analytical frameworks to strategic and
operational problems in order to develop critical thinking, judgment,
and complex problem-solving skills. The war colleges will continue to
adapt curricula with lessons from the War in Afghanistan to better
prepare our joint force professionals for future service at the
strategic level of the U.S. government.
Mr. Scott. In response to questioning, you stated that you
recognized Afghanistan was a stalemate 5-6 years ago. Obviously, this
was before your time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What is
the responsibility of the nation's senior military officer to both the
Commander-in-Chief and the American public should the armed forces of
the United States ever find themselves engaged again in a stalemate?
General Milley. I'm the principal military advisor to the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and NSC as outlined in title 10,
sec 151 of U.S. code. The chain of command goes from the President, to
the Secretary Defense, to the combatant commanders, and the secretaries
of the military departments. My job is strictly advisory--I am very
much involved but I do not have decision authority. I am expected to
give my advice and ensure the President is fully informed on military
matters. I give my best military advice and it's up to the President to
make decisions.
Mr. Scott. AMCIT Charlotte Maxwell-Jones is the director and
founder of Kabul Small Animal Rescue, a veterinary clinic and animal
rescue organization. Ms. Maxwell-Jones and her team had over 100 dogs
in their custody in Hangar 12 of HKIA for nearly a week awaiting
evacuation. All of these dogs had health certificates, proof of rabies
vaccinations, and in the case of over 50 working dogs, photographs
identifying them. The dogs were working dogs, family pet dogs of U.S.
citizens who were forced to leave them behind during the chaos of the
evacuation, and some dogs that had been rescued by the charity.
While Maxwell-Jones was offered safe passage out of the country,
the dogs were not permitted on any of the flights, even when there was
room and didn't take a seat from any human beings. In the end, Maxwell-
Jones was escorted out of the airport and the dogs were released from
their carriers and crates before the U.S. military evacuated. The
result was the confiscation of the working dogs by the Taliban
government, the horrific deaths of some dogs, and the survival of
some--of which Maxwell-Jones is still trying to rescue.
Why was Maxwell-Jones and the dogs in her care not granted space on
any evacuation flights? Who made the decision not to permit them safe
passage to the United States and why? Why was Maxwell-Jones not given
the opportunity to exit the airport with the dogs?
General Milley. U.S. Customs restrictions, stipulated in the 14 Jun
21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the Department of
Health and Human Services notice entitled ``Notice of Temporary
Suspension of Dogs Entering the United States from High-Risk Rabies
Countries,'' prevented the U.S. military from evacuating the Kabul
Small Animal Rescue dogs. Afghanistan was listed as one of the high-
risk rabies countries in the notice.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. We have had 20 years to study this country and think
about our potential exit. The communication issues between the
Department of State and the Pentagon that have plagued our efforts
throughout the last two decades certainly manifested themselves in the
end. I think you all know the difference between tactical and strategic
successes and that one does not necessarily equal the other. How do you
plan to assess these historical problems and address them in moving
forward with strategic planning to counter and deter China?
Secretary Austin. Given that the People's Republic of China (PRC)
is increasingly synchronizing its military and non-military efforts to
achieve its strategic objectives, it is essential that the Department
of Defense (DOD) and other U.S Government departments and agencies are
aligned to address the challenge posed by the PRC. President Biden's
Interim National Security Strategy has set forth a whole-of-government
agenda that will strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to
prevail in strategic competition with the PRC. Pursuant to that
strategy, DOD and other U.S. Government departments and agencies,
including the Department of State, will work together as we address the
China challenge, taking into consideration the critical role of
interagency coordination and synchronization.
Mr. Brooks. We have had 20 years to study this country and think
about our potential exit. The communication issues between the
Department of State and the Pentagon that have plagued our efforts
throughout the last two decades certainly manifested themselves in the
end. I think you all know the difference between tactical and strategic
successes and that one does not necessarily equal the other. How do you
plan to assess these historical problems and address them in moving
forward with strategic planning to counter and deter China?
General Milley. We continuously assess and review our operations
for relevant insights and improvements. The withdrawal from Afghanistan
is no exception. We are already incorporating lessons from these events
into our approaches and processes for dealing with other strategic
challenges, to include China. In fact, given the magnitude of the China
challenge, there is no way to deal with it except through robust
interagency coordination.
The National Security Council is already implementing a robust
schedule of China-focused interagency meetings at all levels:
Interagency policy Committees, Deputies Committees, and Principals
Committees. They have added a weekly China Communications Hub meeting
to increase cross-agency visibility and coordination of strategic
messaging related to China.
Achieving better integration across Departments, especially two as
large and complex as DOD and State, comes down to developing positive
personal relationships between principals and staff at all levels. The
experience of the Afghanistan withdrawal provided a crucible to forge
those relationships among our present leadership. More than scheduled
meetings, these relationships break down the traditional bureaucratic
stovepipes and are helping us move forward in addressing the issues
your question highlights.
Mr. Brooks. Reuters issued a transcript copy of a June 23 phone
call between President Biden and President Ghani. In this call, Biden
tells President Ghani ``there's a need, whether it is true or not,
there is a need to project a different picture.'' Did this lack of
confidence expressed by the President ever give the Administration
pause in considering our withdrawal at that point or consider providing
reinforcement to the Afghan National Security Forces? If not, why not?
General Milley. I did not participate in this phone call, nor am I
familiar with those details. However, I want to go back to the tasking,
the mission that we had from the President, which was to execute a
deliberate, responsible, coordinated, synchronized strategic retrograde
from Afghanistan, of all U.S. military forces. We executed the
retrograde as directed and evacuated over 124,000 people from the
country of Afghanistan. Ultimately, the legacy of our nation's efforts
in Afghanistan are the 20 years that have passed without a major
terrorist attack on our homeland as the reslt of the efforts of our
brave men and women overseas, as well as the thousands of Afghans who
are now living in freedom in the United States.
Mr. Brooks. Did CENTCOM suggest Bagram would be the best option to
prevent bottlenecks and logistical challenges for an evacuation?
General McKenzie. My assessment was that Bagram Air Field (BAF) was
not a suitable location for any potential NEO based on its distance
from Kabul and the U.S. Embassy Kabul (USEK).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, public reporting last year
highlighted the key role NSPM 13 has played in executing offensive
cyber operations as part of U.S. efforts to defend forward. It was
reported that a key element of the success was the delegation of
authority to act to the Secretary of Defense once a campaign was agreed
to. Without discussing any specific campaigns or plans, are these
operations continuing at an equal or greater pace under the Biden
Administration? If not, what impediments are you experiencing to
continuing this reportedly successful program?
Secretary Austin. The existing U.S. policy framework for approving
offensive cyber operations continues to enable the Department to
effectively perform its mission to disrupt threats overseas at the
source. Our forces operate routinely in cyberspace to maintain
awareness of the evolving cyber environment, observe adversary
activities, and generate opportunities to disrupt foreign malicious
cyber activities. The Department conducts offensive cyber operations
when threats meet the threshold for action as established in policy.
Challenges exist as cyberspace is a domain of fleeting opportunity and
constant change.
Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, the Pentagon has said repeatedly
in recent years that the Indo-Pacific is its ``priority theater.'' If
INDOPACOM is the priority theater, would you agree that INDOPACOM
should be the option of last resort for sourcing requests for forces by
other combatant commands, particularly for high-demand, low-density
assets? As the Department of Defense formulates options for conducting
over-the-horizon counterterrorism options in Afghanistan, have you
provided explicit guidance to minimize the use of forces assigned to
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command? If not, would you take this opportunity to
publicly provide that guidance? If not, why not? As our over-the-
horizon planning takes shape, would you commit to having your staffs
report back to this committee on the specific steps you took to avoid
allocating forces assigned to INDOPACOM?
Secretary Austin. The Department's focus is on China as the pacing
challenge, and this is our priority throughout the Global Force
Management (GFM) process. The GFM process provides a robust review of
available forces with the expertise, training, readiness, and
experience necessary to successfully complete the mission and includes
scrutiny at multiple levels within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Their
combined recommendations provide the foundation for a Department-wide
approach to address emergent crises and global challenges. I am
confident that our current processes prioritize requirements related to
the INDOPACOM theater and that we can maintain this focus effectively
while also addressing global counterterrorism requirements, including
in Afghanistan. As always, we would be happy to answer any questions
you may have on how we are meeting the China challenge and executing
over-the-horizon counterterrorism missions, in a classified setting.
Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, I understand the National Security
Council held a drill on May 8 where the interagency rehearsed the
withdrawal. Can you please tell the Committee who from each cabinet
Department represented their agency?
Secretary Austin. Extensive planning was conducted across a range
of U.S Government departments and agencies and the DOD was a full
participant at all levels.
Mr. Gallagher. General Milley, U.S. forces, sensors, and platforms
vary in their relevance for an over-the-horizon counterterrorism
operation. Would you agree that an aircraft carrier operating from the
Arabian Sea is a relatively expensive and inefficient way to conduct
counterterrorism operations? When INDOPACOM is our priority theater,
and when strategic competition with China and Russia are the top
priorities of our strategy, is it really the best use of our limited
fleet of aircraft carriers to operate in the Arabian Sea monitoring
terrorist groups in Afghanistan?
General Milley. Multiple factors contributed to the decision to
maintain a Carrier Strike Group in the CENTCOM region through the
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation and in the period immediately after,
including the need to preserve options to protect U.S. citizens and our
allies in Afghanistan. Additionally, the near proximity of the Carrier
Strike Group greatly reduced the requirement for airborne refueling
capacity, reducing risk to force and mission. The Carrier Strike
Group's position was continuously evaluated throughout the operation
and it was moved as soon as the situation warranted.
As a global force, the Department of Defense strives to balance
priorities worldwide. We align capabilities, not specific assets, to
these priorities and there are many factors to consider when doing so.
This often means an asset like an aircraft carrier, with its wide range
of capabilities and great mobility, will shift from one Combatant
Command to another as we adjust forces globally in support of our
highest priorities.
Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, did you convey the Taliban's
offer, during your meeting with Mullah Baradar, to allow U.S. forces to
take control of Kabul to the President? Who made the decision to turn
down the Taliban offer to allow the U.S. military to secure Kabul and
put the safety of our troops in the hands of the Taliban?
General McKenzie. I met with the Taliban in Doha alongside
Ambassador Khalilizad, however in our discussions the Taliban did not
provide a sincere offer to secure Kabul. Securing Kabul would have
required the additional deployment of a reinforced combat division,
which would have had to deliberately clear the city before securing its
outer perimeter--activities that would have provoked overt hostilities
with the Taliban and jeopardized the NEO. During this meeting, I
reaffirmed the specific purpose for my participation: to warn the
Taliban of the severe consequences of interfering with our NEO. The
Taliban pledged that they had no intention of doing so and subsequently
abided by this commitment. I reported key elements of the meeting to my
chain of command afterward.
Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, on September 29th you said the
attack on FOB Chapman did not breach the Doha agreement, Did we respond
with lethal force to the attack on our base? Did the Taliban get the
message not to breach Doha Agreement via air strikes, drone strikes,
special operations? By not responding to an attack, doesn't that send a
message to Taliban? A message they could act with impunity and Biden
Administration wouldn't respond?
General McKenzie. Following the Doha Accord (29 Feb 20), there were
three indirect fire attacks against FOB Chapman from late March to
early April 2021. All three were attributed to the Taliban, who, we
assessed, thought it was unlikely that we would meet the 1 May 2021
deadline to withdraw U.S. forces and perhaps intended to apply pressure
to meet the deadline. No U.S. or Afghan forces were injured or killed
during these attacks, but CNN later reported that seven Afghan
civilians were reportedly injured (outside the wire) during one of the
attacks. There were no operations conducted specifically in response to
these attacks. I cannot speculate whether the Taliban interpreted a
non-response to the attacks as evidence that they could act with
impunity against U.S. forces. However, the overall level of violence
was reduced following the Doha Agreement. Although a permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire was an agenda item for dialogue and
negotiations, an attack on U.S. forces between 29 February 2020 and 31
August 2021 confirmed to have been conducted by the Taliban or forces
under its direction could be understood as a violation of one of the
Taliban's commitments under the Doha Agreement. However, determinations
concerning whether any particular engagement or engagements violated
the Doha Agreement were policy matters, to be informed by USCENTCOM's
military assessments, rather than military decisions for USCENTCOM to
render.
Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, on September 29th, you testified
the Doha Agreement negatively affected Afghan Troops. Did the failure
of the U.S. to enforce Doha conditions have an even greater impact on
Afghan troops? Did abandoning Bagram without notice have a negative
impact on Afghan troops?
General McKenzie. I believe the February 2020 Doha Agreement was
the operational reason for the eventual collapse of GIRoA. It is not
possible to overstate the pernicious and devastating affect this
agreement had on the ANDSF, particularly aggravated by our negotiation
strategy, which did not subsequently apply conditions. Subsequent
announcements regarding reductions of U.S. force levels contributed
further to the sense of demoralization, as did the closure/handoff of
our bases. Bagram was handed off to the ANDSF in coordination with its
leadership. Nothing indicates that the handoff of this particular base
had any effect on ANDSF morale, which was already in terminal decline
by that point.
Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, does an over the horizon posture
require a partner on the ground? Do you see the Taliban as that
partner? Typically, OTH requires neighboring partners as well. Do we
have any of those around Afghanistan, such as any Central Asian
partners who may have agreed to help?
Do you have confidence that Pakistan will allow us to use their
airspace if we need to go after al Qaeda? Our air assets will take much
longer to reach Afghan airspace than when we could fly them out of
Bagram, correct? Does this mean that they will have less time on
target?
General McKenzie. An OTH posture does not necessarily require a
partner on the ground. There are capabilities that can strike a threat
without partner forces on the ground. OTH does require neighboring
partners. We are currently staging out of the Gulf region and DoS
continues to coordinate with Central Asia Countries on agreements for
conducting OTH operations. In closed-door meetings we are quietly
discussing with Pakistan the continued use of their airspace. Assets
will take longer to get to Afghanistan than assets originating in
Afghanistan. Air assets originating outside of Afghanistan will have
less time on target. This can be minimized but not erased by using
multiple assets.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
Mr. Keating. Secretary Austin, were NATO allies consulted on the
decision to withdraw by August 31st? Did you consult with any NATO
leaders about withdrawal on August 31st? Were NATO in agreement about
withdrawal? Were they consulted during the withdrawal as well? How many
of these countries had troops on the ground in Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. DOD, along with our counterparts throughout the
U.S. Government, conducted dozens of consultations and engagements with
Allies and partners leading up to the April 14, 2021, announcement to
withdraw forces from Afghanistan. This coordination continued through
the conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan,
and consultation remains a priority as the Alliance engages in the
process of examining lessons learned that will inform current and
future operations.
NATO's Resolute Support Mission focused primarily on training,
advising, and assisting Afghans working at the security-related
ministries, in other government institutions, and among the senior
ranks of the army and police. At the time of the April 14 announcement,
7,000 non-U.S. military personnel from 35 NATO and non-NATO countries
supported RSM.
Mr. Keating. In my capacity as a member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, I had the opportunity to question the Special Representative
for Syria Engagement. Specifically, I asked about the timeframe between
the decision to withdraw our service members to when our allies in the
region were notified. I was surprised to hear that hours, or possibly
days, transpired before our allies were notified. Moreover, they had to
hear about the decision in the media. During my questioning, the
Special Representative admitted that was a mistake. I want to know if
that mistake was repeated during our withdrawal in Afghanistan. How
long after the decision to fully withdraw our service members from
Afghanistan were our allies notified?
General Milley. U.S. Government officials from different agencies
and departments conveyed to Allies and partners who had personnel and
citizens on the ground alongside the United States in Afghanistan the
President's decision. Those communications took place over the course
of weeks in different formats--in Washington, at NATO and CENTCOM, in
the capitals of those Allies and partners, and on the ground in
Afghanistan. The discussion was continuous with the sharing of critical
fresh information and coordination for the evacuation of their citizens
and Afghan nationals.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Mr. Banks. Secretary Austin, During the Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing on September 28th, you confirmed to Senator Cotton
that Secretary Blinken missed an important Rehearsal of Concept drill
at the Pentagon on May 8th, 2021 that discussed Afghan withdrawal.
Instead, he sent Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources
Brian McKeon in his place. Did Secretary Blinken indicate why he needed
to miss such a critical meeting? Did Secretary Blinken state where he
would be instead of at that event? Did Secretary Blinken use any DOD
assets, whether aircraft, air bases, personnel, ground transport, etc.
to travel during in the days before or following this critical exercise
between May 7, 2021 and May 10, 2021?
Secretary Austin. For information on Secretary Blinken's travel
schedule and logistics, I recommend contacting the Department of State.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
Ms. Escobar. What is the Department of Defense's guidance with
respect to any military-grade weapons, vehicles, and equipment being
turned over to DLA as a result of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Military Departments make the determinations for
the disposition of their military grade weapons, vehicles and
equipment. As U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) determined that items
were no longer needed, USFOR-A checked Military Department databases
that provide specific disposition instructions. These databases
indicated whether to prepare items for retrograde out of Afghanistan or
to turn the item over to DLA for disposal. If a Military Department had
a requirement for the item, it was typically retrograded for use by
other units. If there was no requirement for the item indicated by a
Military Department, disposition instructions typically direct a
transfer to DLA for disposal. DLA would then dispose of the materiel in
accordance with DOD Manual 4160.21 volumes 1 and 3.
Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon,
and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control
over Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. It is clear that the international community has
a stake in ensuring that the Taliban lives up to its public
commitments. We continue to engage the Taliban on our core interests in
Afghanistan, including counter-terrorism, safe passage for individuals
seeking to leave Afghanistan, and inclusive governance.
Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of
international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first
place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. The terrorist threat that exists today is not the
same threat that brought us to the region in 2001. Over the last 20
years, terrorist organizations have evolved their methods and
structure--but make no mistake: we have evolved our methods and
capabilities as well. Our advances in biometrics, global information
sharing, and security cooperation have increased security measures
throughout the world. Department of Defense over-the-horizon operations
employ a mix of capability that contribute to a holistic and
interagency counterterrorism strategy. The Unites States has
significant operational and intelligence capability, to deny external
operations by terrorist organizations that would threaten the homeland.
We continue to work with our partners in the region, who share our
interest in promoting a safe and stable South Asia and preventing a
resurgence of terrorism.
Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to
placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
Secretary Austin. I will not speculate on future policy decisions.
Any decision to return to Afghanistan would be made by the President.
Ms. Escobar. Can you provide any clarity on the backlog of refugee
cases and/or SIV applicants that still need to be processed? Given that
it was the DOD that contracted and worked closely with these allies and
their families on the ground, what is the Department's level of
involvement in the SIV clearance and resettlement efforts now that DHS
is leading much of the resettlement efforts?
Secretary Austin. The Department of State and the Department of
Homeland Security are the lead federal agencies for the Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP), respectively. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been
involved in the interagency process to accelerate SIV processing since
these efforts began in March. We continue to work closely with the
Department of State to accelerate SIV processing. A key DOD effort in
support of expediting SIV processing was the establishment of ``Project
Rabbit,'' through which DOD provides employment verification of SIV
applicants who worked for DOD contractors or subcontractors directly to
the Department of State. DOD has also endorsed and uploaded numerous
referrals for Afghan nationals who are under threat due to their
association with DOD's mission directly into the State Department's
refugee referrals database. DOD will continue processing these
referrals for as long as we receive them directly from DOD personnel.
Ms. Escobar. While I commend the Department for their steadfast
efforts that helped pull thousands of allies and others from the region
in a timely manner, I was hoping to get clarity on why were evacuation
efforts not ramped up when President Biden set the August withdrawal
date in April 2021?
Secretary Austin. Throughout the planning process, the Department
of Defense collaborated closely with the Department of State on
security arrangements for our Embassy in Kabul and options for
evacuation. In April, the Department of State began reducing the
Embassy staff, ordering non-essential personnel to depart, and issued
numerous messages to U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, urging them to
depart and offering assistance to do so. The Department of Defense
offered inputs to Department of State's planning efforts, mindful of
concerns that urging people to leave too quickly might have created a
sense of panic and cause the very collapse of the Afghan Government
that we sought to avoid. The fact that our forces were on the ground so
quickly to support the non-combatant evacuation is due in large part to
our planning and our pre-positioning of forces.
Ms. Escobar. With many of the SIVs here in the U.S. being housed at
military installations, how will the Department care for those Afghans
it pulled out? And how will it care for those at risk that it has not
yet pulled out?
Secretary Austin. Regarding care for persons evacuated from
Afghanistan and hosted at Department of Defense (DOD) installations,
DOD is honored to host our guests and is dedicated to treating our
guests with dignity and respect while we care for their needs. DOD is
supporting the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and
Human Services and working closely with non-governmental organizations,
and State and local authorities to provide our Afghan guests an
appropriate level of support. This includes transportation from the
port of entry to the location of the accommodation, local
transportation in and around the installation, provision of housing and
other necessary facilities for the humanitarian needs of individuals
and families, sustainment, and necessary medical and dental care
(including medical screenings and referral to off-base, non-DOD care,
if necessary).
Regarding other at-risk Afghans, DOD continues to support the
Department of State-led efforts to facilitate the safe departure of
U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and other Afghans who
are eligible for resettlement who wish to leave Afghanistan. Since
September 1, 2021, more than a thousand individuals have departed
through air and land routes.
Ms. Escobar. The New York Times and other sources have reportedly
claimed that at least 100,000 people were left behind, who might be
eligible for expeditated U.S. visas. What is the Department's strategy
to continue providing protections for such populations and eventually
bringing them to safety here in the U.S.?
Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to support
Department of State-led efforts to facilitate the departure of U.S.
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, Special Immigrant Visa applicants
and other Afghans who are eligible for resettlement. The DOD supports
the Department of State team, led by the Coordinator for Afghan
Relocation Efforts (CARE), in interagency engagements and those with
private organizations to align efforts to enable the safe departure of
these individuals out of Afghanistan. This includes weekly interagency
meetings attended by senior leaders from OSD and the Joint Staff, and
DOD has embedded liaison officers with the State/CARE team to inform
DOD policy and support and the larger U.S evacuation and relocation
effort.
Ms. Escobar. Do you feel like the U.S. intelligence community
provided your personnel with credible and accurate assessments of the
situation on the ground and especially on what would be an
astonishingly quick fall of Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces?
Secretary Austin. We evaluated the situation in Afghanistan based
on a number of different diplomatic, military, and intelligence
assessments, and these assessments yielded a number of different
scenarios we believed were possible. DOD planned for these various
scenarios, including a potential noncombatant evacuation operation
(NEO) under duress. This prudent planning led to the pre-positioning of
thousands of forces in the region who were ready to deploy in support
of the NEO.
Ms. Escobar. How would knowing what we did not know about the
expeditious fall of Kabul have changed things in terms of our exit, if
anything?
Secretary Austin. The rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF) took us by surprise. However, we had
developed numerous plans for a range of scenarios, and we were prepared
for this contingency. As it began to look increasingly likely that the
ANDSF would collapse rapidly, I directed the inflow of additional
forces into theater to prepare for and execute the evacuation.
Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon,
and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control
over Afghanistan?
General Milley. As our relations with the Taliban are a diplomatic
issue, I defer to the White House or the Department of State for a
response.
Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of
international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first
place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
General Milley. We remain committed to preventing Afghanistan from
becoming a terrorist safe haven. In conducting Over the Horizon
Counterterrorism (OTH-CT), the Joint Force leverages the full breath of
intelligence collection capabilities, to include Airborne Intelligence,
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Airborne ISR), Human Intelligence
(HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature
Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to gain and
maintain understanding of terrorist networks' activities and
intentions. When authorized, the Joint Force can also employ a variety
of offensive capabilities, to include precision strikes, to address
threats to the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad.
Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to
placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
General Milley. It would take a Presidential determination that
U.S. military forces on the ground in Afghanistan are necessary to
defend against a threat to the United States. It would require a
significant U.S. military force, at tremendous risk, to establish any
military footprint back in Afghanistan.
Ms. Escobar. Can you provide any clarity on the backlog of refugee
cases and/or SIV applicants that still need to be processed? Given that
it was the DOD that contracted and worked closely with these allies and
their families on the ground, what is the Department's level of
involvement in the SIV clearance and resettlement efforts now that DHS
is leading much of the resettlement efforts?
General Milley. The resettlement process is a Department of State
(DoS) responsibility, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not monitor
the processing times/backlogs in the SIV application process. Since the
start of evacuations from Kabul in July 2021, the DOD has housed over
84,000 Afghan evacuees at 11 different OCONUS Lily Pad facilities and 8
different CONUS Safe Havens. Over the past two months (Dec and Jan),
DOD has closed six different CONUS Safe Havens. As of 7 Feb, DOD
currently houses 935 Afghan evacuees across two OCONUS Lily Pads and
4,820 Afghan evacuees across two CONUS Safe Havens. A total of 2,264
Afghan evacuees remain at the UAE Humanitarian City in Abu Dhabi,
administered by the UAE government. At each of the DOD military bases,
DOD has provided wrap-around services to include food, basic medical
care, vaccinations for Measles and Varicella in-line with CDC guidance
for Afghans traveling to CONUS, initial health screenings and
documentation to support the SIV application process, and data entry
efforts and contracts to process information for Afghan evacuees.
Ms. Escobar. While I commend the Department for their steadfast
efforts that helped pull thousands of allies and others from the region
in a timely manner, I was hoping to get clarity on why were evacuation
efforts not ramped up when President Biden set the August withdrawal
date in April 2021?
General Milley. As soon as President Biden set the August
withdrawal date, the Department of Defense increased focus on the safe
and deliberate withdrawal of U.S. Forces, contractors, citizens, and
potential Afghan evacuees. I established a crisis management team that
developed indicators, planned and executed rehearsals, and monitored
all aspects of the Afghanistan withdrawal to include non-combatant
evacuations in the event of a breakdown of the diplomatic mission in
Kabul. Once those indicators were tripped, and at the request of the
Department of State, DOD transitioned to the non-combatant evacuation
operation; In April 2021, our planning assumption within the crisis
management team was that the U.S. would maintain a diplomatic mission
in Kabul.
If you remember, in April the Afghan government was still in place,
their military was still intact, and we expected the government and
Afghan National Security Forces to maintain control of the country at
least until the Fall. Specific to non-combatant operations, the mission
was to secure the Embassy, keep the Embassy open, and maintain a
diplomatic mission. In May, I hosted an interagency table top exercise
to review the retrograde timeline and contingency operations while my
staff provided daily intelligence updates, the status of Afghan
security forces along with U.S. and coalition forces, and monitored the
status of American Citizens (AMCIT) and Afghans holding and applying
for Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) as well as other Afghan at risk
personnel.
On 6 Aug, my staff hosted a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
(NEO) rehearsal with international assistance leaders to identify and
address any issues that we might come across in the process. Once the
NEO was declared, we facilitated the evacuation of over 124,000 AMCIT,
Afghan SIV, and Afghan at-risk personnel as part of Operation Allies
Refuge. As of 7 Feb, we have continued to help 1,198 AMCITs and legal
permanent residents (LPRs) evacuate back to the U.S. or third countries
since 31 August, and have successfully evacuated and safely integrated
over 84,000 Afghans.
Ms. Escobar. With many of the SIVs here in the U.S. being housed at
military installations, how will the Department care for those Afghans
it pulled out? And how will it care for those at risk that it has not
yet pulled out?
General Milley. The Department of State (DoS) is responsible for
Afghan evacuees located overseas. Once evacuees arrive in the U.S., the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumes responsibility for their
care. At their request, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides
assistance to both DoS and DHS, including providing facilities to house
the evacuees and medical support. Water, beds and bedding, shuttle
services, latrines and showers, food service, linguists, spaces for
recreation and religious observations, and power generation are also
provided. Additionally, further expansion on these sites has provided
cultural and recreational improvements such as space for movies, games,
and meeting with population representatives. As requested, the DOD will
continue to provide appropriate services to all current and future
residents of the temporary safe havens that reside on current military
installations or on a non-DOD installation or facilities.
Ms. Escobar. The New York Times and other sources have reportedly
claimed that at least 100,000 people were left behind, who might be
eligible for expeditated U.S. visas. What is the Department's strategy
to continue providing protections for such populations and eventually
bringing them to safety here in the U.S.?
General Milley. Adjudication of applications for U.S. visas--
whether Special Immigrant (SIV) or refugee (categories P1 or P2) are
the responsibility of the Department of State.
The Joint Staff and Department of Defense work closely with the
Department of State and non-governmental organizations to ensure that
persons eligible for potential resettlement in the United States are
afforded any support to which they might be entitled while the
processing of their applications proceed.
Ms. Escobar. How would knowing what we did not know about the
expeditious fall of Kabul have changed things in terms of our exit, if
anything?
General Milley. In the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an
accelerated withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary
conditions risked losing the substantial gains made in Afghanistan and
could precipitate a general collapse of the Afghan security forces and
the Afghan government, resulting in a complete Taliban takeover or a
general civil war. There are many lessons to be learned, to include the
reasons for the unprecedented speed of the collapse of the Afghan
Security Forces.
Ms. Escobar. What equipment, if any, does the DLA plan to dispose
of through the 1033 program?
General McKenzie. All U.S. origin equipment procured under the
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) which was in the process of
transfer to the GIRoA is under the de facto control of DSCMO-A.
Following the 1532 notification to Congress, the equipment will revert
to U.S. military service control. The services will make a final
determination as to the disposition of the equipment, including
transfer of unwanted equipment to DLA for further disposition or
disposal. U.S. Central Command is not aware of DLA intentions or
disposition plans.
Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon,
and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control
over Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. DOD will follow the direction of the
Administration regarding U.S. relations with the Taliban. DOD will work
with the other departments to execute a strategy developed and led by
the National Security Council. In terms of the Taliban consolidating
control, we anticipate the Taliban will attempt to consolidate control
over Afghanistan, however, there are many steps and several opposition
groups that stand in the way of the Taliban being able to achieve this
aim.
Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of
international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first
place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. While challenging, we will work hard to keep the
threat of international terrorism at bay as we draw upon the lessons we
have learned over the last 20 years. The USG interagency team continues
to address the threats posed by international terrorism through
interagency coordination and action. As it relates to Afghanistan, the
DOD plans to maintain an over the horizon (OTH) capability to identify
and target emerging threats. DOD will also support DoS as it continues
to coordinate with allies and partners on a regional counter-terrorism
(CT) approach to address concerns posed by violent extremist
organization (VEO) activities.
Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to
placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
General McKenzie. A future U.S. foothold in Afghanistan would
require a POTUS-level decision. As appropriate, DOD will support DoS in
decisions the Administration makes regarding a future U.S. presence in
Afghanistan.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
Mr. Morelle. A consistent frustration of mine throughout the
evacuation was the inability of the administration to communicate a
clear set of procedures and guidelines to congressional staff, refugee
advocates, and Afghans on the ground during the evacuation at Kabul
airport. When can we expect briefings for staff on lessons learned from
the lack of clear communication during the evacuation; the current
process to evacuate Afghans from Afghanistan; and what is being done to
ensure communication failures like this do not happen again in the
future?
Secretary Austin. The Department is supportive of congressional
proposals for an independent commission to review the U.S. government's
20-year war in Afghanistan. We also have efforts underway, including by
the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, to conduct an independent review of the evacuation, the events
leading up to it, and lessons learned. The Department is committed to
understanding what worked, what did not work, and ensuring that we
incorporate that into our planning and our strategic assessments going
forward.
Mr. Morelle. One of the challenges with helping SIV applicants
leave Afghanistan has been getting the necessary documents that prove
they served with our military or American contractors. The Department
of Defense has a crucial role to play as a part of the SIV process;
Afghans must obtain an employment letter then receive a letter of
recommendation from their supervisor, and finally get verification of
that recommendation letter. These steps have proven to be a significant
hurdle for Afghans who may not be able to contact their previous
employer or whose supervisor is no longer serving with the armed forces
or employed as a defense contractor. There are similar issues with the
P-2 program. What can DOD do to expedite this process for SIVs and P-2
applicants still on the ground in Afghanistan, and how can we change
this process in the future?
Secretary Austin. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD A&S) has partnered with the Defense
Digital Service (DDS) and Department of State's Afghan Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) team to help expedite and streamline the SIV
process for Afghan nationals who were employed by contractors of the
Department of Defense (DOD). This effort is called Project Rabbit. The
goal of the project is to simplify the Employment Verification & Letter
of Recommendation phase of the SIV application process. Project Rabbit
has replaced the need for companies to write employment verification
letters and letters of recommendations for each of their Afghan
employees who have applied for a SIV. HR data and employment records
are voluntarily provided by companies and matched to data in the
National Visa Center's (NVC) SIV applications submitted by Afghans who
worked under USG contracts, specifically DOD contracts. Since mid-
August, DOD has helped verify information for more than 4,000 SIV
applicants who were missing employment documentation and otherwise
would not have moved forward in the SIV processing.
Mr. Morelle. Our 20 year-long presence in Afghanistan was an
enormous undertaking costing hundreds of millions of dollars, overseen
by four administrations and countless dedicated service members both in
Afghanistan and in the Pentagon. Now that the U.S. military mission in
Afghanistan has ended, how does the department plan to reallocate
dollars and resources to the new challenges this country faces while
maintaining an over the horizon counter-terror presence in Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Terrorism remains a persistent and enduring
global threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) will retain the assets
and capability to monitor and counter threats to the United States and
our allies that emanate from Afghanistan. To conduct over-the-horizon
operations, the U.S. Government has committed aerial intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and other collection
capabilities to support this mission, and we are working with partners
in the region to develop a range of options to enable direct action
when necessary. This will require continued engagement with regional
partners to ensure the United States has viable access, basing, and
overflight.
DOD is taking key steps to prioritize future challenges--most
notably, focusing on China as our primary pacing challenge. DOD must
shift resources from legacy platforms and weapons that are ill-suited
for technologically-advanced threats, to investments in cutting-edge
technologies and capabilities that will provide a military advantage to
the U.S. Joint Force. DOD must combine new technologies with existing
capabilities, continue to develop new operational concepts, and
strengthen our bonds with Allies and partners, to meet our vision for
integrated deterrence.
Mr. Morelle. One of the challenges with helping SIV applicants
leave Afghanistan has been getting the necessary documents that prove
they served with our military or American contractors. The Department
of Defense has a crucial role to play as a part of the SIV process;
Afghans must obtain an employment letter then receive a letter of
recommendation from their supervisor, and finally get verification of
that recommendation letter. These steps have proven to be a significant
hurdle for Afghans who may not be able to contact their previous
employer or whose supervisor is no longer serving with the armed forces
or employed as a defense contractor. There are similar issues with the
P-2 program. What can DOD do to expedite this process for SIVs and P-2
applicants still on the ground in Afghanistan, and how can we change
this process in the future?
General Milley. As the SIV application process owner, any future
changes to the SIV and P-2 application processes are at the discretion
of the Department of State (DoS). Verification of former employment or
support to the Department of Defense in Afghanistan is a part of the
DoS-owned SIV application process.
Mr. Morelle. With thousands of our Afghan SIV's and allies still on
the ground in Afghanistan, how will the individuals on the ground be
identified, contacted, issued visas, and manifested on a flight? If
there is not currently a plan in place, what processes are being
preliminarily discussed? Furthermore, we have seen credible reports
that the Taliban are requiring passports and visas for any Afghans let
onto international flights, how do we plan to get Afghan's passports
and visas without a presence on the ground.
General McKenzie. The State Department's Coordinator for Afghan
Relocation Efforts, Ambassador Beth Jones, oversees the U.S.
Government's ongoing efforts to facilitate the relocation of
individuals from Afghanistan through commercial or charter flights and
overland routes. Currently the State Department is using civilian
aircraft to transport individuals. USCENTCOM contributes to the process
by supporting relocated individuals' temporary stay in third-country
transit points, such as Qatar and UAE. USCENTCOM continues to support
the U.S. Government's efforts to press the Taliban to allow all people
who want to leave Afghanistan to do so, including American citizens and
Afghans.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN
Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting
intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and
intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air
Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military
installation over 20 years?
Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct
intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
Secretary Austin. Following the April 14 decision to withdraw U.S.
forces from Afghanistan, the Department of Defense conducted a planned
transition as part of the retrograde operation, including transitioning
Bagram Air Force Base to the Afghan National Defense Forces. The
Department of Defense considered a range of options, but ultimately,
the Department's military task was to protect the American diplomatic
presence in Kabul--and if needed, to conduct a non-combatant
evacuation--from Kabul's airport. The Department of Defense transferred
Bagram Air Base to the Afghan government, following extensive
consultations.
Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting
intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and
intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air
Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military
installation over 20 years?
Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct
intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
General Milley. U.S. policy directed a full withdrawal of the
military from Afghanistan, leaving only the Department of State led
diplomatic mission in Kabul. Continuing operations at Bagram, even just
for counter-terrorism purposes would have been inconsistent with that
policy. Further, once U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan dropped below
1,000 personnel it was no longer feasible to hold and sustain both
Bagram and the international airport in Kabul.
Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting
intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and
intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air
Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military
installation over 20 years?
Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct
intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
General McKenzie. Bagram Air Field's closure was a function of
policy decisions to limit U.S. troops to approximately 650 personnel
with the mission to secure the U.S. Embassy and support the Turkish-led
security of HKIA. Therefore, it was not feasible to retain Bagram Air
Field in an operational status.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
Mr. Kahele. Secretary Austin, General Milley--DOD is providing
important support to our Afghan allies who are now spending weeks at
U.S. military bases, many without legal counsel to prepare their
immigration cases.
Q1: Can you share your thoughts on how DOD and Congress can work
together to help expedite getting Afghan evacuees from DOD
installations into American communities, and how can we make their
resettlement successful?
Q2: Would you support legislation that would help Afghan adjust
their immigration status, especially given that so many were forced to
destroy their documentation to protect themselves as they left
Afghanistan?
Secretary Austin. Response for Q1: DOD is supporting the
Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and State
by providing temporary housing, sustainment, and other support. DOD
defers to the Departments Homeland Security, Health and Human Services,
and State to address the resettlement process.
Response for Q2: Regarding care for persons evacuated from
Afghanistan and hosted at Department of Defense (DOD) installations,
DOD is honored to host our Afghan guests and is dedicated to treating
our guests with dignity and respect while we care for their needs. DOD
is supporting the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health
and Human Services and working closely with non-governmental
organizations, and State and local authorities to provide our guests an
appropriate level of support. This includes transportation from the
port of entry to the location of the accommodation, local
transportation in and around the installation, provision of housing and
other necessary facilities for the humanitarian needs of individuals
and families, sustainment, and necessary medical and dental care
(including medical screenings and referral to off-base, non-DOD care,
if necessary).
Mr. Kahele. Secretary Austin, General Milley--DOD is providing
important support to our Afghan allies who are now spending weeks at
U.S. military bases, many without legal counsel to prepare their
immigration cases.
Q1: Can you share your thoughts on how DOD and Congress can work
together to help expedite getting Afghan evacuees from DOD
installations into American communities, and how can we make their
resettlement successful?
Q2: Would you support legislation that would help Afghan adjust
their immigration status, especially given that so many were forced to
destroy their documentation to protect themselves as they left
Afghanistan?
General Milley. Over the last two weeks of conflict, the U.S.
military helped evacuate more than 124,000 Americans, Afghans and other
allies--the largest military airlift in history. We continue to support
the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security as the
lead agencies for the resettlement of Afghan evacuees, and will
continue to support them within the bounds of law and policy.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and
trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the
world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
Secretary Austin. The threat from terrorism remains a global and
persistent concern. We remain engaged with our partners and Allies
globally who have shared interests in mitigating the threat of
terrorism, both within their own countries and trans-regionally. A
joint approach and persistent engagement, across all levels of DOD, is
the cornerstone of how we affirm our commitments to our Allies and
partners. At the same time, the Department's pacing challenge is China,
and we are balancing our focus accordingly. In recent years we have
dedicated considerable resources to current and future requirements
needed to enhance integrated deterrence with our Allies and partners to
deter Chinese aggression, assure regional stability, and deny a Chinese
victory should deterrence fail. We also recognize the ongoing threat
posed by Russia and its proxies. I am confident that DOD can
appropriately balance strategic competition requirements while also
effectively executing our counterterrorism mission.
Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and
trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the
world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
General Milley. Confidence and trust in the U.S. military remains
strong among our Allies and Partners. We continue to be actively
engaged and synchronized with Allies and Partners in our operations
around the globe. Each day we participate in deterrence activities and
training exercises side by side with Allies and Partners, and in the
case of countering violent extremist organizations, combined combat
operations. At the same time, the Joint Force continues to build
confidence with Allies and Partners through close consultation and
coordination in a number of routine bilateral and multilateral fora
that include, but are not limited to, NATO, the FVEY nations, the
Military Framework for countering violent extremist organizations, and
other military coalitions. These fora enable us to work with our Allies
and Partners to achieve military objectives and desired strategic
effects related to competition with China and Russia, while enabling
Ally and Partner capabilities to counter violent extremist
organizations. Most importantly, within these fora, we have increased
our communications and taken action to include them earlier in our
planning processes to ensure their national systems are provided the
time needed to align with ours. We are removing ambiguity and providing
them with clarity. It is a balance as we work with Allies and Partners
countering violent extremist organizations to safeguard the homeland--
ours and our Allies' and Partners'--while simultaneously working with
them to compete against China and Russia.
Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and
trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the
world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
General McKenzie. The dynamics in South and Central Asia have
changed with our departure from Afghanistan. However, the threats that
brought the Coalition together still remain. DoS and DOD continue to
develop and build relationships with our allies and partners through
security cooperation efforts. These efforts aim to build trust with our
partners so that we may enable their action in the region. Engagement
with Central Asian States continues through military sales and multiple
training exercises and opportunities. The more engagement and placement
the U.S. has in the region, the more likely we are to counter Russian
and Chinese influence through cost imposition.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
Mr. Moore. I am increasingly concerned that the military does not
have the regional basing and cooperation agreements required for
establishing effective over-the-horizon counter-terrorism capabilities.
In May, Mr. Helvey confirmed that the Administration had not yet
secured the necessary agreements in the region to establish over-the-
horizon capabilities. Did the Administration secure any such agreements
prior to the U.S. military's full departure from Afghanistan on August
31?
Secretary Austin. The Department is currently conducting over-the-
horizon operations supported by agreements in the region and has been
since before August 31.
Mr. Moore. You testified on June 23rd that you had developed and
were executing a detailed plan to conduct a ``safe, orderly, and
responsible'' withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the Taliban began to gain
momentum in the weeks that followed, was there ever a discussion within
the Administration of slowing that withdrawal or altering the plan as
the Taliban began to take control of significant portions of the
country?
Based on your assessment of how things were going in June, how did
things derail so quickly? How was the Administration so caught off
guard and ill-prepared for the overrun of Kabul on August 15th?
Secretary Austin. As part of the planning process, I had many
discussions with my interagency counterparts on the security situation
in Afghanistan during the withdrawal. One aspect of these discussions
was prudent planning for a range of scenarios, including a potential
evacuation under difficult circumstances. The fact that our additional
forces were on the ground so quickly to support the evacuation is due
in large part to our planning and our pre-positioning of forces.
Mr. Moore. What plans were put in place to mitigate the increased
risk to U.S. forces and civilian personnel within Afghanistan following
the release of 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners from the airbase
when the U.S. withdrew from Bagram?
General Milley. I did not assess the 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda
prisoners posed an immediate threat to our forces in Kabul. I assessed
the plans for the military retrograde, and then later for the non-
combatant evacuation operation, included a sufficient force to mitigate
threats to U.S. military and civilian personnel within Afghanistan.
This includes the forces on the ground, as well as those available
``over-the-horizon'' from elsewhere in the region.
Mr. Moore. Has the Biden Administration secured the necessary
agreements to provide you with the basing and over-flight capabilities
you need to perform effective over-the-horizon operations?
General McKenzie. The DOD, in support of the DoS, continues to
engage with countries in the region to ensure the necessary
capabilities are in place to perform effective OTH CT operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
Mr. Horsford. When did the last American citizen successfully pass
through the Taliban perimeter into the HKIA gate?
General McKenzie. At 0536 Local on 30 August, the last group of
U.S. citizens came through the South Gate. There were 41 U.S. citizens
in that group. Since August 31st, the State Department has further
evacuated U.S. citizens via civilian aircraft.
Mr. Horsford. When did the last Afghan civilian successfully pass
through the gate?
General McKenzie. At 0241 Local on 30 August, the last group of
Afghans came through the South Gate.
Mr. Horsford. How many individuals successfully passed through the
Taliban perimeter in the 72 hours preceding the departure of the final
flight?
General McKenzie. In the final 72 hours 166 U.S. citizens, 3651
Afghan citizens, and 31 third country nationals passed through the Tb
perimeter and entered HKIA. Since August 31st, the State Department has
continued evacuation efforts through civilian aircraft.
Mr. Horsford. You stated that you did not have facts on why the
Taliban did not allow Americans to continue to enter HKIA in the final
hours of the evacuation. What were the specific contingency plans to
continue the evacuation after the Taliban closed checkpoints
surrounding the airport? Why were these plans not implemented once it
became clear that no additional American citizens were going to be
allowed to pass through the Taliban checkpoints?
General McKenzie. We fully developed a contingency plan to continue
the NEO in a contested environment. This entailed the deployment of the
rest of the 82nd Airborne Division and other enablers and potentially
involved the seizure and reopening of Bagram Airfield and significant
combat operations. These plans were never implemented because the
Taliban continued to facilitate the passage of AMCITs onto HKIA
throughout the NEO and because we retained--and exercised--the
capability to bring AMCITs in without Taliban involvement or knowledge.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. Now that the Department of Defense and Department of
State have completed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, what steps
are being taken to evacuate the remaining Americans and Afghan SIVs who
still remain in Afghanistan?
Can you speak to any operations or strategies that are being
implemented to assist and communicate with Americans/Afghanistan SIVs
who are still looking to be evacuated?
How is the Taliban working with or obstructing the U.S. regarding
the remaining evacuations?
Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense is committed to
supporting the U.S. Government's priority of facilitating the departure
of U.S. citizens, LPRs, their immediate family members, and eligible
Afghans, from Afghanistan. The facilitated departure of these groups
requires coordination across numerous U.S. Government departments and
agencies to support Department of State-led efforts. Ongoing public-
private coordination with advocacy groups has been beneficial to align
efforts on commonly shared objectives. The Department of State remains
engaged with the Taliban on its commitment to allow the safe passage
and departure of individuals who wish to leave Afghanistan.
Mr. Golden. Now that the U.S. military is no longer in Afghanistan,
you have stated that the department will conduct future ``over the
horizon'' counterterrorism operations in the region. What authorization
authority will the department cite to conduct these kinetic missions?
What assets and equipment will be required to accomplish this mission?
Will this mission require agreements with other countries in the region
to house equipment and personnel?
General Milley. The statutory authority for offensive
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan is the 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force. In conducting Over the Horizon
Counterterrorism (OTH-CT), the Joint Force leverages the full breath of
intelligence collection capabilities, to include Airborne Intelligence,
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Airborne ISR), Human Intelligence
(HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature
Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to gain and
maintain understanding of terrorist networks' activities and
intentions. When authorized, the Joint Force can also employ a variety
of offensive capabilities, to include precision strikes, to address
threats to the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad.
U.S. Central Command has a variety of forces allocated to conduct the
Over-the-Horizon Counterterrorism mission and may request additional
forces should they be required. Our Over-the-Horizon Counterterrorism
efforts will require support from our partners in the region. Many
regional partners strongly support our counterterrorism efforts and are
committed to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe
haven.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. In regards to the information pertaining to the
withdrawal from Afghanistan, did you directly provide the same advice
to President Trump as you gave to President Biden? Please elaborate if
you did not provide any advice or the advice was different. Please
note, we are not asking you to divulge the specifics of the advice just
to clarify if any direct advice was given.
General Milley. It is my statutory obligation to provide my
military advice to the President and I have consistently done that for
both Administrations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
Mr. Khanna. Is DUSD-P involved in the investigation into the Kabul
drone strike? What are they doing to see that this terrible tragedy
isn't repeated again?
Secretary Austin. The August 29, 2021 strike was a tragic mistake.
U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the strike, and I ordered a
45-day three-star independent review conducted by the Air Force
Inspector General. There is also a separate, independent, Department of
Defense Inspector General review underway. These reviews have looked at
policies and procedures, to ensure that this terrible tragedy is not
repeated.
Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will
be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of
addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone
strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these
reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to
periodically review civilian harm resulting from U.S. military
operations, as well as its processes related to minimizing and
responding to civilian harm. In response to reports of civilian harm,
the Department conducts formal investigations and applies lessons
learned, as was the case in the August 29, 2021 strike in Kabul,
Afghanistan. For questions specifically regarding EO 13732, we would
refer you to the White House National Security Council.
Mr. Khanna. One of the concerns raised about the Kabul drone
strike--and other strikes like it including the attack on the MSF
hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 or the killing of 30 pine nut farmers
in 2019--is that we learn that--in contrast to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual
takes the most unusual view that under international humanitarian law,
``no legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons of
objects'' targeted in U.S. attacks.
Will the Department make a commitment for the Office of General
Counsel to review this legal position, and do so in coordination with
the Department of State?
Secretary Austin. The difference in view stems from the fact that
the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions. I fully support the proposition, as expressed more fully
in DOD's Law of War Manual, that lethal attacks may not be directed
based on merely hypothetical or speculative considerations regarding a
contemplated target's possible status as a military objective. In
assessing whether a contemplated target of attack is a military
objective, commanders and other decision-makers must make the decision
in good faith based on the information available to them in light of
the circumstances ruling at the time.
Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will
be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of
addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone
strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these
reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
General Milley. To meet the intent of Section 4, DOD conducts
periodic reviews of civilian harm trends and reports the results to
Congress. We continually review and refine our civilian casualty
assessment process to incorporate lessons and to increase our
transparency and credibility as the global leader in mitigating and
responding to civilian casualty incidents.
The 2018 Joint Civilian Casualty Review provided a number of
recommendations that we have either fully implemented or that we have
plans to implement. Critical to our implementation of many of these
recommendations is the development of a new DOD Instruction on Civilian
Harm Mitigation and Response, which we anticipate publishing in 2022.
The instruction has taken some time to develop due to the need to
establish clear responsibilities across the Department and standardize
procedures related to civilian harm. Building upon the 2018 Joint
Civilian Casualty Review, RAND just completed an independent assessment
of our standards, processes, procedures, and policies related to
civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. The RAND
study further evaluated our mechanisms for identifying, assessing, and
responding to reports of civilian casualties, as well as how we are
resourced and organized to do so.
We anticipate making the report available to Congress soon, and we
are already developing an action plan for implementing RAND's
recommendations. Additionally, IAW section 1057 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2018, DOD submitted four annual
reports to Congress on Civilian Casualties in Connection with U.S.
Military Operations, which include a description of steps the
Department has taken to mitigate harm to civilians in combat
operations. Protection of civilians is both a national security
priority and a moral and ethical imperative, and we will continue to
advance the Department's approach to these issues.
Mr. Khanna. Is DUSD-P involved in the investigation into the Kabul
drone strike? What are they doing to see that this terrible tragedy
isn't repeated again?
General McKenzie. USCENTCOM is unaware of any OUSD(P) involvement
in the SecDef-directed investigation into the 29 August Kabul strike,
which resulted in unfortunate civilian deaths. Any questions regarding
what OUSD(P) may be doing to prevent future similar occurrences should
be referred to OUSD(P).
Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will
be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of
addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone
strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these
reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
General McKenzie. USCENTCOM cannot speak on behalf of the
Administration as to whether periodic reviews of civilian harm trends
are being conducted. However, USCENTCOM takes all allegations of
civilian casualties (CIVCAS), regardless of origin, seriously and
ensures all such allegations are thoroughly assessed. If we believe we
see a potential trend based on these allegations, USCENTCOM will take
appropriate measures to address it.
Mr. Khanna. Regarding the Kabul drone strike, General McKenzie, you
stated that ``the vehicle was observed being approached by a single
adult male assessed at the time to be a co-conspirator.'' It turns out
that man was Ahmad Naser, an innocent civilian and an SIV applicant who
had worked for the U.S. military in Afghanistan. On what basis other
than that he was a military-aged male opening the gate for the Toyota
could the U.S. military have made an assessment that he was a lawful
target and not a civilian?
General McKenzie. Lt Gen Sami Said's public remarks, which followed
the completion of his Secretary of Defense-directed investigation,
confirmed my previous description of the circumstances, and
specifically, that U.S. forces assessed that the vehicle was going to
be used in an imminent attack on U.S. forces and Afghan civilians. No
assessment was made as to whether Mr. Naser was a lawful target because
the vehicle--which was mistakenly assessed to contain explosives
intended to be deployed against U.S. forces and Afghan civilians--and
not Mr. Naser, was the target of the self-defense strike, which
unfortunately resulted in civilian casualties.
Mr. Khanna. General McKenzie, you stated that the strike occurred
under a standard of ``reasonable certainty.'' What is the definition of
``reasonable certainty'' and do you think this definition is understood
the same way across the Department of Defense, CENTCOM, among operators
down range, and JAGS?
General McKenzie. ``Reasonable certainty'' is not strictly defined
in U.S. policy. However, it is commonly understood to be a less
stringent standard than ``near certainty.'' Whether a commander's
certainty of a target is ``reasonable'' or not depends on a number of
factors, including the time available to the commander to observe the
target, the intelligence information reasonably available to the
commander at the time of the strike, and the surveillance resources
available to develop the commander's understanding of the target, each
of which may be further influenced by whether the strike is intended to
be conducted as a deliberate or offensive strike, or whether it is to
be conducted in self-defense of U.S. or coalition forces. In a self-
defense scenario, as was the case with the strike on 29 August 2021,
the ``reasonable'' determinations that an on-scene commander must make
are, first, that the intended target is committing a hostile act or is
engaged in conduct that demonstrates hostile intent to U.S. forces and,
second, that the nature, duration, and scope of the force used by U.S.
forces does not exceed that which is needed to respond decisively to
the hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
Mr. Khanna. DOD's completed investigation of the strike on an MSF
hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 found that the DOD strike cell didn't
have access to the no-strike list at that time.
In an effort to learn such lessons, had DOD known that the building
Ahmadi parked his Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of
a U.S.-based charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help
determine whether Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an
IS-KP operative?
General McKenzie. When assessing a potential threat, all relevant
information can be helpful. As I have previously expressed in detail,
the activities of the vehicle in question were observed for several
hours, and a touchpoint with the NEI compound was one of many. In this
case, the vehicle's activities also correlated with other locations
that our intelligence associated with ISIS-K personnel and activities.
I have reviewed in detail the findings and recommendations of the
SecDef-appointed investigation into this matter, which will inform our
efforts to refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures in a
continued effort to reduce the risk of civilian casualties that is
unfortunately inherent to the conduct of military operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
Secretary Austin. I won't speculate on what would or would not have
occurred with different information available. I am saddened by the
loss of innocent life, and I am determined that we, as an organization,
will learn from this tragic mistake. U.S. Central Command conducted a
review of the strike, and I ordered a 45-day three-star independent
review conducted by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a
separate, independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review
underway. These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to
ensure that this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone
strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with
correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the
NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's
boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
Secretary Austin. The investigation into the August 29th Kabul
airstrike concluded that the strike, conducted to prevent what was
believed to be an imminent threat to Hamid Karzai International
Airport, resulted in the deaths of as many as 10 people, including up
to seven children. U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the
strike, and I ordered a 45-day three-star independent review conducted
by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a separate,
independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review underway.
These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to ensure that
this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
General Milley. U.S. Central Command leadership made the decision
to conduct the strike on 29 August based on the best available
intelligence at the time. Our leaders are trained to evaluate all
available intelligence and modify operations accordingly to mitigate
the potential for civilian casualties.
The Department of Defense conducted a thorough investigation of the
29 August strike in an effort to improve our practices and further
reduce the probability of civilian casualties. The investigation
identified procedures that the DOD can employ to reduce the risk of
confirmation bias and improve information sharing during the strike
process.
Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
General Milley. I am saddened by the loss of innocent life, and I
am determined that we, as an organization, will learn from this tragic
mistake. U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the strike, and the
Secretary of Defense ordered a 45-day three-star independent review
conducted by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a separate,
independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review underway.
These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to ensure that
this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
We will scrutinize what we decided to do and not to do on August
29, as well as how we investigated those outcomes. We owe that to the
victims and their loved ones, to the American people, and to ourselves.
Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone
strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with
correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the
NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's
boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
General Milley. As the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Public Affairs Mr. Kirby said on December 13, 2021 during a press
conference, the strike was a breakdown in process and execution and
procedural events, not the result of negligence, misconduct, or poor
leadership. The strike was a tragic mistake. The results of
investigations led by Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., U.S. Central
Command, and Gen. Richard D. Clarke, the head of the Special Operations
Command, were announced. A third investigation by Air Force Lt. Gen.
Sami D. Said was announced in November and found no violation of law,
including the law of war.
Ms. Jacobs. Before the Senate you said the biggest mistake in
building the Afghan security forces is we tried to make them too much
in our image, so they became organized around on U.S. military doctrine
which did not fit the country and became too reliant on air power which
was never going to last. Are you applying those same insights to other
security assistance the Department is engaged in? I ask this because
while the effort in Afghanistan was certainly unique in scale, the fact
of the matter is we partner with nations across Africa and elsewhere.
General Milley. We are applying those insights. Our experience in
Afghanistan highlights how current and future security cooperation
efforts will need to emphasize our partners' capacity to manage,
maintain, and employ their own forces, independent of sustained U.S.
government support.
In Africa, for example, our defense security assistance is focused
on African solutions for African partners, with efforts aimed at
bolstering the development of sustainable and self-supporting military
capacity.
Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
General McKenzie. When assessing a potential threat, all relevant
information can be helpful. As I have previously expressed in detail,
the activities of the vehicle in question were observed for several
hours, and a touchpoint with the NEI compound was one of many. In this
case, the vehicle's activities also correlated with other locations
that our intelligence associated with ISIS-K personnel and activities.
I have reviewed in detail the findings and recommendations of the
Secretary of Defense-appointed investigation into this matter, which
will inform our efforts to refine our tactics, techniques, and
procedures in a continued effort to reduce the risk of civilian
casualties that is unfortunately inherent to the conduct of military
operations.
Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone
strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with
correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the
NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's
boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
General McKenzie. In deference to the Secretary of Defense-directed
investigation on the 29 August strike in Kabul, I would refer you to
OSD for further comment.
Ms. Jacobs. In answering my question about the ability to prevent
civilian causalities in future ``over the horizon'' counter-terrorism
operations you said that future strikes would not be designed to
prevent an ``imminent attack'' and thus would be subject to more
scrutiny. Often the Department argues that ``imminence'' is required to
justify an Article II/self-defense attack. If the Department is not
rely the prevention of an imminent attack to justify future CT
operations in Afghanistan, would legal rationale will it be using?
General McKenzie. The future over-the-horizon counter-terrorism
operations you refer to will likely be offensive or deliberate strikes
taken pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(2001 AUMF), and not strikes taken in in extremis self-defense to
counter tactical threats to U.S. forces. Any strikes taken pursuant to
the 2001 AUMF will be conducted consistent with the applicable
international laws of armed conflict, including the core principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity, as well as U.S.
domestic laws, policies, and rules of engagement applicable at that
time. I will defer to the legal and policy judgments of the Department
as to the circumstances under which future CT operations in Afghanistan
might be conducted.
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