    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-57]

                ENDING THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

                    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    48-524                   WASHINGTON : 2023

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                        ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
        Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
    SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
    KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
    MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
    JIMMY PANETTA, California
    STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                    Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                   Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
                              Emma Morrison, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     4
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department
      of Defense.....................................................     5
    McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central
      Command........................................................    13
    Milley, GEN Mark A., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff........     9

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III...................................   101
        Milley, GEN Mark A...........................................   106

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on General
          Milley's January 8 Phone Call with Speaker Pelosi..........   121
        Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum on General
          Milley's Engagements with the People's Liberation Army
          Leaders....................................................   124
        Representative Bacon's Section 1215 Letter Response..........   131
        Full transcript of ABC News' George Stephanopoulos' Interview
          with President Joe Biden...................................   132

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Courtney.................................................   145
        Mr. Crow.....................................................   146
        Ms. Escobar..................................................   146
        Mrs. Hartzler................................................   145
        Mr. Langevin.................................................   149
        Mr. Moulton..................................................   145
        Mr. Wittman..................................................   145

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Banks....................................................   156
        Mr. Brooks...................................................   152
        Mr. Carl.....................................................   163
        Ms. Escobar..................................................   156
        Mr. Gallagher................................................   153
        Mr. Garamendi................................................   165
        Mr. Golden...................................................   165
        Mrs. Hartzler................................................   150
        Mr. Horsford.................................................   164
        Ms. Jacobs...................................................   167
        Mr. Kahele...................................................   162
        Mr. Keating..................................................   155
        Mr. Khanna...................................................   165
        Mr. Langevin.................................................   149
        Mrs. McClain.................................................   161
        Mr. Moore....................................................   163
        Mr. Morelle..................................................   160
        Mr. Scott....................................................   150
        Mr. Wilson...................................................   150

                ENDING THE U.S. MILITARY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                               House of Representatives
                                    Committee on Armed Services
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 29, 2021.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. I call the hearing to order. Good morning. As
    has been the case for a while, this is a hybrid hearing. We
    have some members participating remotely in addition to the
    members who are present, and there are rules for that. So I
    need to read a statement that sets out those rules before we
    get going.
        Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen
    for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and
    maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
    voting. Those members must continue to use the software
    platform's video function while in attendance unless they
    experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that
    render them unable to participate on camera. If a member
    experiences technical difficulties, they should contact the
    committee staff for assistance.
        Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the
    room via the television/internet feeds. Members participating
    remotely must seek recognition verbally and they are asked to
    mute their microphones when they are not speaking. Members who
    are participating remotely are reminded to keep the software
    platform's video function on the entire time they attend the
    proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If
    members depart for a short while for reasons other than joining
    a different proceeding, they should leave the video function
    on. If members will be absent for a significant period or
    depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the
    software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
        Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
    communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
    support issues only.
        Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
    necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
    inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
        Thank you.
        Good morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses here
    today. We have the Honorable Lloyd Austin III, Secretary of
    Defense; General Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
    and General Frank McKenzie, Commander, U.S. Central Command. I
    want to thank them for their time today as they provide an
    update on the issues surrounding the end of the U.S. military
    mission in Afghanistan and our mission going forward dealing
    with counterterrorism in South Asia and the continuing mission
    to try to get as many Afghans and any remaining Americans out
    of the country.
        I am looking forward to what I hope will be a very
    important policy discussion. At the center of our examination
    of the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan is the desire to
    learn from our 20-year involvement there. We must have an open
    and honest analysis of everything that went into that, not just
    the events of the last year or 6 months.
        But before getting into that, we should take a moment to
    recognize the service of the over 800,000 men and women who
    served in Afghanistan over the last 20 years. More importantly,
    I would like to remember and honor the 2,461 who made the
    ultimate sacrifice, along with the over 20,000 who bore the
    physical wounds of war and those who bear the unseen wounds of
    war.
        While we will vigorously debate policy decisions related to
    the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan, I believe that I
    speak for the entire committee when we express our gratitude to
    those and their families who have sacrificed so much over those
    last 20 years. We owe them a debt that cannot be repaid.
        I agreed and continue to agree with the decision that was
    made to end our military presence in Afghanistan. It was the
    right decision. Our larger mission to help build a government
    in Afghanistan that could govern effectively and defeat the
    Taliban had failed. More money and more lost American lives
    were not going to change that. The events we witnessed in
    Afghanistan in the wake of the collapse of the Afghan
    Government in August happened primarily because of this
    reality, because of the fundamental reality that our mission to
    try to stand up a government in place of the Taliban had
    failed. That reality is what caused the overwhelming majority
    of the problems that we faced.
        There was no easy or safe way to get everyone out of that
    country we wanted to get out. Yet, in the face of that, our
    military conducted the largest human airlift in history, in
    coordination with the rest of the interagency and our allies
    evacuating over 120,000 people. This evacuation, however, did
    not come without costs. We lost 13 U.S. service members and
    dozens of innocent Afghans due to ISIS-K's [Islamic State -
    Khorasan Province's] attack at the Abbey Gate on August 26.
        There was also a tragic mistake on August 29 when a drone
    strike killed as many as 10 civilians. Following this mistake,
    I and others expect to be provided with the results of the
    timely, comprehensive, and transparent investigation of this
    tragedy, including accountability measures and any changes to
    procedures that are deemed necessary.
        Importantly, our work is not done, as there are more who
    remain in Afghanistan who would like to leave. And we must work
    to ensure the interagency has all the tools required and is
    coordinated to assist those remaining individuals.
        There are some, going back to the issue of whether or not
    we should have left Afghanistan, who imagine that there was
    sort of a middle option that we could have kept 2,500 troops
    there in a relatively peaceful and stable environment. I think
    the way that option has been presented by many of the critics
    has been fundamentally disingenuous. The option of keeping
    2,500 troops in Afghanistan in a peaceful and stable
    environment did not exist. I have heard many compare this to
    the troops that we have left in South Korea and Japan. I find
    that analogy just completely idiotic, if I am being honest.
        In South Korea and Japan, we are not under attack. We are
    there as a deterrent. In Afghanistan, we would have been under
    attack, and that is the fundamental fact that too many people
    are forgetting. The peace agreement that was signed by the
    previous President was based on requirement that we get all of
    our troops out by May 1. That is the only reason the Taliban
    had not attacked us in the previous 18 months.
        Once that expired, once we said, nope, we are staying, they
    would have been under attack. And this has been a subject of a
    huge misunderstanding in the last 24 hours that, again, I find
    very, very disingenuous. People are saying that the President
    said nobody offered, no one said that we should keep 2,500
    there. What the President actually said was there was no option
    on the table to keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan in a stable
    environment. That is what he said.
        Not that no one presented that option. That option didn't
    exist in reality and no one presented it. The President, in
    fact, made it clear earlier in that same interview that, yes,
    some of his military leaders had said that we should keep 2,500
    troops there. What he said was, none of them said that we could
    do it in a stable, peaceful environment. And that is the key
    point.
        The other key point is--and I know a lot of energy will be
    expended today trying to get these gentlemen to admit that they
    didn't agree with the President's decision.
        First of all, I never engage in that exercise because I
    believe the President--Democrat, Republican, no matter who it
    is--deserves the, you know, unabridged advice of his or her
    commanders. I mean, you can't give that if you are then going
    to have to go out in public and talk about it.
        But second of all, the President is the one in charge. This
    is ultimately what civilian control of the military means. And
    what I believe is, I believe certainly there were military
    commanders who said, nope, we should stick it out, we should
    keep the 2,500 there. I think they were wrong. And so did the
    President. It is not that they didn't make the advice; it is
    that they were wrong.
        This committee has enormous amount of respect for our
    military leadership. That does not mean that the military
    leadership is incapable of being wrong. And over the course of
    the last 20 years, in Afghanistan, I would have thought we
    would have learned that lesson. President Biden had the courage
    to finally make the decision to say, no, we are not succeeding
    in this mission. Placing more American lives at risk will not
    change that.
        If we could credibly say, you know, if we just stuck it out
    for another year, another 5, another 10 and got to a better
    result, that would be a difficult call. Was that worth the
    risk? But we can't credibly say that. So we would have been
    putting American lives at risk for a mission that we had to
    know was not achievable. The President made the right call on
    that.
        There is the issue of how we withdrew, and I will say--and
    I have been critical of this--I think the effort to get the
    SIVs [Special Immigrant Visas] and the others who wanted to get
    out of Afghanistan certainly could have been handled better and
    could have been started sooner. It certainly seemed rushed, and
    I want to hear from our leaders today about how that played
    out, but, again, let's remember that the other alternative was
    not easy.
        The alternative of let's start pulling people out sooner,
    the Ghani government, the government that was in charge of
    Afghanistan at the time we would have been doing this, was
    adamantly opposed to us pulling all of the military equipment
    and hundreds of thousands of their Afghan supporters out, for
    obvious reasons. How would we have done that against the
    objection of the existing Afghan Government while the Taliban
    were rolling across the countryside?
        It would not have been easy no matter how it was done, but
    we do deserve an accounting for how those decisions were made
    going forward. I think today is an excellent opportunity to do
    that. I look forward to the questions and answers, as well as
    the testimony of our witnesses.
        And with that I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Rogers.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. While I have great
    admiration for my friend the chairman, I could not disagree
    more with his observations about Afghanistan and the
    President's decision. The fact is our coalition partners and
    our military leadership felt that we should have maintained our
    2,500 troops there, along with this roughly 7,500 to 8,000
    coalition troops, and the thousands of contractors that the
    Afghan Army was dependent upon to fight successfully. And I
    think they could have continued, as they have in past years, to
    fight valiantly had we given that support and the President had
    listened to his generals' advice.
        But regardless of how you feel about the decision to remove
    troops from Afghanistan, I think we can all agree that the
    withdrawl was an unmitigated disaster. Hundreds of Americans
    were left behind, thousands of Afghan allies stuck with little
    hope of escape, potentially billions worth of U.S. provided
    military equipment now in the hands of the Taliban.
        Thousands of hardened al-Qaida and ISIS terrorists freed
    from prisons, 10 innocent Afghans, including 7 children, killed
    in a botched air strike. But worst of all, 13 brave American
    service members were murdered by a coward in a suicide vest.
    What is more infuriating is that all of this could have been
    avoided if the President had a plan.
        In briefings and hearings since April, we have demanded to
    know a plan to (a) safely evacuate Americans and Afghan allies
    and (b) conduct counterterrorism operations. For 4 months, the
    response from the Biden administration was, we are working on
    it.
        Now it is clear they never had a plan. The President
    repeatedly assured the American people that the Taliban
    takeover was not inevitable; that we had plenty of time to
    safely evacuate Americans and Afghan allies; that this was not
    going to be a fall like Saigon.
        As late as August 19, the President promised us that if
    there is an American citizen left, we are going to stay to get
    them all out. Now it is clear the President has misled us more
    than once. On August 31, hundreds of Americans left behind, the
    13 service members murdered, the President stood in the East
    Room of the White House and called the withdrawl, quote, an
    extraordinary success, close quote.
        I fear the President is delusional. This wasn't an
    extraordinary success; it was an extraordinary disaster. It
    will go down in history as one of the greatest failures of
    American leadership. We are here today to get answers on how
    the hell this happened.
        I expect our witnesses to give us an honest accounting of
    exactly what went wrong. I also want answers on how we are
    going to conduct counterterrorism operations now that we have
    zero presence in Afghanistan. This was the first question we
    asked you in April and we still don't have an answer.
        According to the latest intelligence assessment, it could
    be as little as 12 months before al-Qaida will use Afghanistan
    as a base to conduct air strikes or strikes against the United
    States. And that is unacceptable. And this talk of over-the-
    horizon capability is a farce. Sure, we can send a drone out to
    take out a terrorist, but we didn't know where the terrorists
    are.
        Without persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] capabilities or reliable intelligence on the
    ground that is impossible. We have neither of those now. It
    doesn't help that we need to fly that drone nearly 1,600 miles
    to reach Afghanistan, leaving little time on station, or that
    we have to fly over Pakistan, an ally of the Taliban, who could
    revoke overfly privileges at any time.
        None of this is giving us much confidence that this
    administration can successfully conduct counterterrorism in
    Afghanistan. We want to know what capabilities we need, where
    they will be based, and how they will be used. In other words,
    we want to see a plan and we want to see it today because,
    frankly, after this debacle of a withdrawl, I don't think
    anyone can trust anything this President says about
    Afghanistan.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Austin. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today to discuss our recent drawdown and
    evacuation operations in Afghanistan. I am pleased to be joined
    by Generals Milley and McKenzie who I know will be able to
    provide you with additional context. I am incredibly proud of
    the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who conducted
    themselves with tremendous skill and professionalism throughout
    the war, the drawdown, and the evacuation. Over the course of
    our Nation's longest war, 2,461 of our fellow Americans made
    the ultimate sacrifice, along with more than 20,000 who still
    bear the wounds of war some of which cannot be seen on the
    outside.
        We can discuss and debate the decisions, the policies, and
    the turning points since April of this year when the President
    made clear his intent to end American involvement in this war,
    and we can debate the decisions over the last 20 years that led
    us to this point, but the one thing not open to debate is the
    courage and compassion of our service members who, along with
    their families, served and sacrificed to ensure their homeland
    would never again be attacked the way it was on September 11,
    2001.
        I had the chance to speak with many of them during my trip
    to the Gulf region a few weeks ago, including the Marines who
    lost 11 of their teammates at the Abbey Gate in Kabul on the 26
    of August. I have never been more humbled and inspired. They
    are rightfully proud of what they accomplished and the lives
    they saved in such a short period of time.
        The reason that our troops were able to get there so
    quickly is because we planned for just such a contingency. We
    began thinking about the possibilities of foreign noncombatant
    evacuation as far back as the spring. By late April, 2 weeks
    after the President's decision, military planners had crafted a
    number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-May, I ordered CENTCOM
    [U.S. Central Command] to make preparations for potential
    noncombatant evacuation operation. Two weeks later, I began
    prepositioning forces in the region to include three infantry
    battalions.
        On the 10th of August, we ran another tabletop exercise
    around a noncombatant evacuation scenario [NEO]. We wanted to
    be ready and we were. By the time that the State Department
    called for the NEO, significant numbers of additional forces
    had already arrived in Afghanistan, including leading elements
    of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit who were already on the
    ground in Kabul.
        Before that weekend was out, another 3,000 or so ground
    troops had arrived, including elements of the 82nd Airborne. To
    be clear, those first 2 days were difficult. We all watched
    with alarm the images of Afghans rushing the runway and our
    aircraft. We all remember the scenes of confusion outside--
        The Chairman. Sorry. We will get that under control. Go
    ahead, sir.
        Secretary Austin [continuing]. Outside the airport, but
    within 48 hours our troops restored order and the process began
    to take hold. Our soldiers, airmen, and Marines in partnership
    with our allies, our partners, and our State Department
    colleagues secured the gates, took control of the airport
    operations, and set up a processing system for the tens of
    thousands of people that they would be manifesting on to
    airplanes. They and our commanders exceeded all expectations.
        We planned to evacuate between 70,000 and 80,000 people.
    They evacuated more than 124,000 people. We planned to move
    between 5,000 and 9,000 people per day. And on average they
    moved slightly more than 7,000 people per day.
        On military aircraft alone, we flew more than 387 sorties,
    averaging nearly 23 per day. At the height of this operation,
    an aircraft was taking off every 45 minutes and not a single
    sortie was missed for maintenance, fuel, or logistical
    problems. It was the largest airlift conducted in U.S. history
    and it was executed in just 17 days.
        Was it perfect? Of course not. We moved so many people so
    quickly out of Kabul that we ran into capacity and screening
    problems at intermediate staging bases outside of Afghanistan,
    and we are still working to get Americans out who wish to
    leave. We did not get out all of our Afghan allies enrolled in
    the special immigration visa program, and we take that
    seriously.
        And that is why we are working across the interagency to
    continue facilitating their departure and even with no military
    presence on the ground, that part of our mission is not over.
        Tragically, lives were also lost. Several Afghans killed
    climbing aboard an aircraft on that first day, 13 brave U.S.
    service members, and dozens of Afghan civilians killed in a
    terrorist attack on the 26th and we took as many as 10 innocent
    lives in a drone strike on the 29th. Noncombatant evacuations
    remain among the most challenging military operations even in
    the best of circumstances, and the circumstances in August were
    anything but ideal.
        Extreme heat, a landlocked country, no government, a highly
    dynamic situation on the ground, and an active, credible, and
    lethal terrorist threat. In the span of just 2 days from August
    13th to August 15th, we went from working alongside a
    democratically elected, long-term partner government to
    coordinating warily with a longtime enemy. We operated in a
    deeply dangerous environment and it proved a lesson in
    pragmatism and professionalism.
        We also learned a lot of other lessons too like about how
    to turn an Air Force base in Qatar to an international airport
    overnight, about how to rapidly screen, process, and manifest
    large numbers of people. Nothing like this has ever been done
    before and no other military in the world could have pulled it
    off, and I think that that is crucial.
        And I know that members of this committee will have
    questions on many things, such as why we turned over Bagram
    Airfield and how real our over-the-horizon capability is, and
    why we didn't start evacuations sooner, and why we didn't stay
    longer to get more people out.
        So let me take each in turn. Retaining Bagram would have
    required putting as many as 5,000 U.S. troops in harm's way
    just to operate and defend it. And it would have contributed
    little to the mission that we had been assigned and that was to
    protect and defend the Embassy, which was some 30 miles away.
        And that distance from Kabul also rendered Bagram of little
    value in the evacuation. Staying at Bagram, even for
    counterterrorism purposes, meant staying at war in Afghanistan,
    something that the President made clear that he would not do.
    And as for over-the-horizon operations, when we use that term,
    we refer to assets and target analysis that come from outside
    the country in which the operation occurs. These are effective
    and fairly common operations.
        Just days ago we conducted one such strike in Syria
    eliminating a senior al-Qaida figure. Over-the-horizon
    operations are difficult, but absolutely possible. And the
    intelligence that supports them comes from a variety of sources
    and not just U.S. boots on the ground.
        As for when we started evacuations, we offered input to the
    State Department's decision, mindful of their concerns that
    moving too soon might actually cause the very collapse of the
    Afghan Government that we all wanted to avoid, and that moving
    too late would put our people and our operations at greater
    risk.
        As I said, the fact that our troops were on the ground so
    quickly is due in large part to our planning and prepositioning
    of forces. As for the mission's end, my judgment remains that
    extending beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled
    our people and our mission.
        The Taliban made clear that their cooperation would end on
    the first of September. And as you know, we face grave and
    growing threats from ISIS-K. So staying longer than we did
    would have made it even more dangerous for our people and would
    not have significantly changed the number of evacuees we could
    get out.
        So as we consider these tactical issues today, we must also
    ask ourselves some equally tough questions about the wider war
    itself and pause to think about the lessons that we have
    learned over the past 20 years.
        Did we have the right strategy? Did we have too many
    strategies? Did we put too much faith in our ability to build
    effective Afghan institutions? An Army, an Air Force, a police
    force, and government ministries? We helped build a state, but
    we could not forge a nation. The fact that the Afghan Army that
    we and our partners trained simply melted away, in many cases
    without firing a shot, took us all by surprise and it would be
    dishonest to claim otherwise.
        We need to consider some uncomfortable truths, that we did
    not fully comprehend the depth of corruption and poor
    leadership in their senior ranks; that we did not grasp the
    damaging affect of frequent and unexplained rotations by
    President Ghani of his commanders; that we did not anticipate
    the snowball effect caused by the deals that the Taliban
    commanders struck with local leaders in the wake of the Doha
    Agreement; that the Doha Agreement itself had a demoralizing
    effect on Afghan soldiers; and that we failed to fully grasp
    that there was only so much for which and for whom many of the
    Afghan forces would fight.
        We provided the Afghan military with equipment and aircraft
    and the skills to use them, and over the years they often
    fought bravely, and tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers and
    police officers died. But in the end, we couldn't provide them
    with the will to win. At least not all of them. And as a
    veteran of that war, I am personally reckoning with all of
    that. But I hope, as I said at the outset, that we do not allow
    a debate about how this war ended to cloud our pride in the way
    that our people fought it.
        They prevented another 9/11, they showed extraordinary
    courage and compassion in the war's last days, they made
    lasting progress in Afghanistan that the Taliban will find
    difficult to reverse and that the international community
    should work hard to preserve.
        And now, our service members and civilians face a new
    mission: Helping these Afghan evacuees move on to new lives in
    new places, and they are performing that one magnificently as
    well.
        I spent some time with some of them up at Joint Base
    McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst this past Monday and I know that you
    share my profound gratitude and respect for their service,
    their courage, and professionalism, and I appreciate the
    support that this committee continues to provide them and their
    families.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Austin can be found in
    the Appendix on page 101.]
        The Chairman. Chairman Milley.

    STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
                                 STAFF

        General Milley. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    thank you for the opportunity to be here with Secretary Austin
    and General McKenzie to discuss Afghanistan.
        During the past 20 years, the men and women of the United
    States military, along with our allies and partners, fought the
    Taliban, brought Osama bin Laden to justice, denied al-Qaida
    sanctuary, and protected our homeland for two consecutive
    decades. Over 800,000 of us in uniform served in Afghanistan.
        Most importantly, 2,461 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
    Marines paid the ultimate price; 20,698 were wounded in action;
    and countless others suffered the invisible wounds of war.
    There is no doubt in my mind that our efforts prevented an
    attack on the homeland from Afghanistan, which was our core
    mission. And everyone, everyone, whoever served in that war in
    Afghanistan should be proud. Your service mattered.
        Beginning in 2011, we steadily drew down our troop numbers,
    consolidated and closed bases, and retrograded equipment from
    Afghanistan. At our peak in 2011, we had 97,000 U.S. troops
    alongside 41,000 NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    troops in Afghanistan.
        Ten years later when Ambassador Khalilzad signed the Doha
    Agreement with Mullah Baradar on 29 February 2020, the United
    States had 12,600 troops with 8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors
    in Afghanistan. This has been a 10-year, multi-administration
    drawdown, not a 19-month retrograde or 17-day noncombatant
    evacuation operation.
        Under the Doha Agreement, the United States would begin to
    withdraw its forces contingent upon the Taliban meeting certain
    conditions which would lead to a political agreement between
    the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. There were seven
    conditions applicable to the Taliban and eight to the United
    States.
        While the Taliban did not attack the United States forces,
    which was one of the conditions, it failed to fully honor any
    other condition under the Doha Agreement and perhaps, most
    importantly for the United States national security, the
    Taliban has never renounced their linkages with al-Qaida or
    broke their affiliation with them. We, the United States,
    adhered to every condition.
        In the fall of 2020, my analysis then was that an
    accelerated withdrawl without meeting specific and necessary
    conditions risks losing the substantial gains made in
    Afghanistan, would potentially damage U.S. worldwide
    credibility, and could precipitate a general collapse of the
    Afghan security forces and the Afghan Government resulting in a
    complete Taliban takeover or general civil war. That analysis
    was a year ago.
        Based on my advice and the advice of the commanders at the
    time, then-Secretary of Defense Esper submitted a memorandum on
    9 November recommending that we maintain the U.S. forces which
    were then at about 4,500 in Afghanistan until conditions were
    met for further reductions. Two days later on 11 November, I
    received an unclassified signed order directing the United
    States military to withdraw all forces from Afghanistan by 15
    January 2021.
        After further discussion regarding the risks associated
    with such a withdrawl, the order was rescinded. On 17 November
    we received a new order to reduce troop levels to 2,500 plus
    enabling forces no later than 15 January.
        When President Biden was inaugurated, there were
    approximately 3,500 U.S. troops, 5,400 NATO, and 6,300
    contractors in Afghanistan tasked to train, advise, and assist
    a small contingent of counterterrorism forces and the strategic
    situation was stalemate.
        The Biden administration through the National Security
    Council process conducted a rigorous interagency review of the
    situation in Afghanistan in February, March, and April. During
    this process, the views of all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    all of us, the CENTCOM Commander General McKenzie, USFOR-A
    Commander General Miller, and myself were all given serious
    consideration by the administration. We provided a broad range
    of options and our assessment of their potential outcomes.
        We couched that in cost, benefit, risk to force, risk to
    mission, all of that was evaluated against the national
    security objectives of the United States.
        On 14 April, the President of the United States, President
    Biden, announced his decision. The U.S. military received a
    change of mission to retrograde all U.S. military forces,
    maintain a small contingency force of 6- to 700 to protect the
    Embassy in Kabul until the Department of State could coordinate
    contractor security support, and also to assist Turkey to
    maintain the Hamid Karzai International Airport, and to
    transition the U.S. mission to over-the-horizon
    counterterrorism support and security force assistance.
        It is clear, it is obvious to all of us that the war in
    Afghanistan did not end on the terms that we wanted with the
    Taliban now in power in Kabul. Although the NEO was
    unprecedented and is the largest air evacuation in history, a
    tactical, operational, and logistical success evacuating
    124,000 people, the war was a strategic failure. It came also
    at an incredible cost in the end with 11 Marines, 1 soldier,
    and a Navy corpsman. These 13 gave their lives so that people
    they never met would have an opportunity to live in freedom,
    and we must remember that the Taliban was and remains a
    terrorist organization and they still have not broken with al-
    Qaida.
        I have no illusions who we are dealing with. It remains to
    be seen whether or not the Taliban can consolidate power or if
    the country will further fracture into civil war, but we must
    continue to protect the United States of America and its people
    from terrorist attacks from Afghanistan. A reconstituted al-
    Qaida or ISIS with aspirations to attack the United States is a
    very real possibility and those conditions to include activity
    in ungoverned spaces could present themselves in the next 12 to
    36 months.
        That mission will be much harder now, but not impossible,
    and we will continue to protect the American people. Strategic
    decisions have strategic consequences. Over the course of 4
    Presidents, 12 Secretaries of Defense, 7 Chairman, 10 CENTCOM
    commanders, and 20 commanders in Afghanistan, and hundreds of
    congressional delegation visits in 20 years of congressional
    oversight, there are many lessons to be learned.
        Among those lessons is the unprecedented speed of the
    collapse of the ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security
    Forces]. However, one lesson we can never forget is that every
    soldier, sailor, airmen, and Marine who served there for 20
    years protected our country against attack from terrorists. And
    for that, we all should be forever grateful and those soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, and Marines should be forever proud.
        Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to address
    a couple of comments about my personal conduct that has been in
    the media lately.
        The Chairman. Yes, yes. Mr. Chairman, you may. Go ahead.
        General Milley. I have served this Nation for 42 years. I
    spent years in combat and buried a lot of my troops who died
    while defending this country. My loyalty to this Nation, its
    people, and the Constitution hasn't changed and will never
    change as long as I have a breath to give. My loyalty to the
    Constitution and to this Nation is absolute and I will not turn
    my back on my fallen.
        With respect to the Chinese calls, I routinely communicated
    with my counterpart General Li with the knowledge and
    coordination of civilian oversight. I am specifically directed
    to communicate with the Chinese by Department of Defense
    guidance in a document known as the Policy Dialogue System.
        These military-to-military communications at the highest
    levels are critical for the security of the United States in
    order to deconflict military actions, manage crisis, and
    prevent war between great powers armed with nuclear weapons.
    The calls on 30 October and 8 January were coordinated before
    and after with Secretary Esper and Acting Secretary Miller's
    staffs and the interagency.
        The specific purpose of the October and January calls was
    generated by concerning intelligence which caused us to believe
    the Chinese were worried about an attack by the United States.
    And last night I briefed that intelligence in detail to the
    Senate Armed Services Committee and I will be happy to brief it
    to any member or group of members at your discretion in a
    classified session.
        And I know and I am certain President Trump did not intend
    on attacking the Chinese and it is my directed responsibility
    by the Secretary of Defense to convey that intent. My task at
    that time was to de-escalate. My message was, again,
    consistent, calm, steady, de-escalate. We are not going to
    attack you.
        At Secretary of Defense Esper's direction, I made a call to
    General Li on 30 October. Eight people sat on that call with me
    and I read out the call within 30 minutes of the call ending.
    On 31 December the Chinese requested a call with me. The
    Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-
    Pacific policy helped coordinate my call, which was then
    scheduled for 8 January, and he made a preliminary call on 6
    January.
        Eleven people attended the call with me and readouts of
    this call were distributed to the interagency that same day. On
    14 December, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Miller had been
    briefed on the entire program. Shortly after my call ended with
    General Li, I informed both Secretary of State Pompeo and White
    House Chief of Staff Meadows about the call among several other
    topics.
        Soon after that I attended a meeting with Acting Secretary
    Miller where I briefed him on the call. Later that same day on
    8 January, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi called me to
    inquire about the President's ability to launch nuclear
    weapons. I sought to assure her that nuclear launch is governed
    by a very specific and deliberate process. She was concerned
    and made various personal references characterizing the
    President. I explained to her that the President is the sole
    nuclear launch authority, but he doesn't launch them alone; and
    that I am not qualified to determine the mental health of the
    President of the United States. There are processes, protocols,
    and procedures in place and I repeatedly assured her, there is
    no chance of an illegal, unauthorized, or accidental launch of
    nuclear weapons.
        By Presidential Directive and SecDef [Secretary of Defense]
    Directives, the Chairman is part of this process to ensure that
    the President is fully informed when determining the use of the
    world's deadliest weapons. By law I am not in the chain of
    command and I know that. However, by Presidential Directive,
    the Department of Defense instruction signed by the President
    and Secretaries of Defense, I am in the chain of communication
    to fulfill my legal statutory role as the President's primary
    military adviser.
        After the Speaker Pelosi call, I convened a short meeting
    in my office with key members of my staff to refresh all of us
    on these procedures which we practice three times a day at the
    action officer level. Additionally, I immediately informed
    Acting Secretary of Defense Miller of her call. At no time was
    I attempting to change or influence the process, usurp
    authority, or insert myself into the chain of command, but I am
    expected to give my advice and ensure the President is fully
    informed on military affairs.
        I am submitting for the record, and I believe you have it,
    a couple of memorandums for record in addition to detailed
    timelines and I am happy to discuss in further detail in either
    classified or unclassified sessions with any or all of you
    about my actions surrounding these events. I welcome a thorough
    walk-through. I will be happy to provide whatever documents,
    phone logs, emails, memoranda, witnesses, or anything else you
    want that will help you understand these events.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 121.]
        My oath is to support the Constitution of the United States
    of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and I
    will never turn my back on that oath. I firmly believe in
    civilian control of the military as a bedrock principle and
    essential to the health of this republic and I am committed to
    ensuring the military stays clear of domestic politics.
        Thank you, Chairman, for the extra time, and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Milley can be found in
    the Appendix on page 106.]
        The Chairman. Thank you. General McKenzie.

      STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. MCKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

        General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the
    opportunity to testify about recent events in Afghanistan. As a
    theater commander, I will confine my opening remarks to those
    matters that were under my direct operational control,
    specifically, the withdrawl of U.S. forces and the subsequent
    noncombatant evacuation operation. These were two distinct
    combat missions, both conducted in contact with the enemy.
        We had a plan for each of them. We executed those plans.
    And thanks to the valor and dedication of thousands of men and
    women in harm's way we completed both missions, fulfilling the
    President's order to withdraw all U.S. forces and evacuating
    over 124,000 noncombatants from Afghanistan. I last appeared
    before this body only days after President Biden announced his
    decision to withdraw all U.S. forces from that country and my
    testimony regarding that decision is already a matter of public
    record.
        I will only reiterate that I had an opportunity to offer my
    professional advice to the President through the Secretary and
    I am confident that he weighed it carefully. That is all any
    commander can ask.
        Once the President made his decision, my headquarters and
    that of U.S. Forces Afghanistan under General Scott Miller made
    the withdrawl of our forces our top priority. We did this in
    close coordination with our allies and partners. Every
    departure of every element was carefully synchronized across
    the coalition and with our Afghan partners. On no occasion were
    they caught unaware by our movements. Every base was handed off
    to Afghan forces according to a mutually understood plan.
        This is particularly true of Bagram Airfield. Many of you
    have visited Bagram at some point over the past 20 years and
    were probably struck by two of its defining features: Its
    sprawling size and its isolation. Virtues for most of its life
    span, they rendered it untenable under the circumstances.
        The guidance I received in April was to conduct the
    complete withdrawl of U.S. combat forces and plan for a
    diplomatic security force of absolutely no more than 650
    service members. It was not feasible to preserve the U.S.
    Embassy in Kabul, hold and defend Hamid Karzai International
    Airport, the Embassy's key link to the outside world, and also
    defend Bagram Airfield with 650 soldiers and Marines. This is
    important.
        The Bagram option went away when we were ordered to reduce
    our presence to the 650 personnel in Kabul. I would like to
    shift briefly to the NEO, which, as I have noted, was a
    completely different operation than the withdrawl. They were
    separate.
        The withdrawl began in April following the President's
    direction. The decision to conduct a NEO rested with the
    Department of State, and they made that decision on 14 August.
    In our NEO planning, Central Command assumed that we would have
    to bring out a very large number of people. We did not regard
    the size of a potential NEO as overwhelming or too much to
    accomplish. We did not regard a Taliban takeover as inevitable,
    but neither did we rule it out, and we identified critical
    indicators of an impending collapse of the Afghan National
    Defense Forces.
        We crafted branches to our base plan to account for a
    complete collapse of the Afghan Security Forces. The Secretary
    took action in May to make forces available to me for planning.
    On July the 9th, I requested that our base NEO force, the core
    package that would go in, be put on 96-hour prepare-to-deploy
    orders.
        By August 11th, it was evident to me that Kabul was at risk
    and I requested the deployment of a brigade of the 82nd
    Airborne Division and other elements of our own alert preplan
    force package, and I requested that they be deployed into HKIA,
    Hamid Karzai International Airfield. These forces flowed
    swiftly into theater even as the Afghan National Defense Forces
    disintegrated allowing thousands of civilians access to the
    airfield.
        Working with Afghan partners composed of elite commando
    units who did not fall apart and our arriving NEO forces on
    August the 16th, we cleared the airfield and resumed flight
    operations in a matter of hours. With security re-established
    by force ultimately compromising 5,784 U.S. troops, 8 maneuver
    battalions, and hundreds of coalition forces, operations
    continued without interruption until our final flights. By that
    time we evacuated over 124,000 people from Afghanistan.
        This was a difficult mission made possible by the
    exceptional professionalism and valor of the joint force on the
    ground in Afghanistan and across the entire world. I would
    specifically like to use this opportunity to thank the C-17
    crews of the Air Mobility Command for a feat rivaling and
    exceeding, in fact, the Berlin airlift.
        Moments after the last of the final five C-17s lifted off
    from HKIA, I held a briefing with the Pentagon press corps and
    expressed my gratitude and admiration for the forces who
    carried out this NEO. I also provided various figures that
    conveyed the magnitude of their accomplishment.
        I won't reiterate those figures here and now, but I will
    say that after the passage of nearly a month, my pride in their
    accomplishment remains undiminished. I don't need to tell this
    body that on 26 August, 11 Marines, 1 sailor, and 1 soldier
    made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of their country. We will
    never forget them.
        This was a combat operation of the most difficult sort, a
    noncombatant evacuation carried out in contact with the enemy.
    The enemy, in this case, was ISIS Khorasan, a vile, tenacious
    foe that would undoubtedly had killed many, many more Americans
    and innocent Afghans at HKIA if it were not for the vigilance
    of our forces there.
        On 29 August, we undertook an MQ-9 strike against what we
    thought was an imminent threat to HKIA. That strike was a
    mistake and I take full responsibility for that strike. I was
    under no pressure from any quarter to conduct the strike. It
    was based on our intelligence read of the situation on the
    ground.
        While in many cases we were right with our intelligence and
    forestalled ISIS-K attacks, in this case, we were wrong,
    tragically wrong. I appreciate that there are many other topics
    of interest to this committee and I look forward to answering
    your questions on all of them.
        I will close here by reiterating my profound gratitude and
    appreciation for every soldier, sailor, Marine, airmen, and
    guardian, as well as our intelligence and Department of State
    comrades who contributed to each of these difficult missions. I
    remain humbled by their sense of duty and courage.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, I want to drill
    down a little bit on the keeping 2,500 troops there and I am
    struck as I listened to the comments that, I think the real
    problem here is you have to make decisions in the real world.
    You don't get to imagine an outcome that would make it more
    palatable. And I think that is what really factored in to the
    2,500.
        And as we talk about the 13 service members who died and
    attack the leadership here for not having prevented that, how
    you can do that and then advocate that we should have stayed in
    Afghanistan longer so that more service members--I guess the
    only way you can advocate that is to imagine a scenario whereby
    we could have stayed in a chaotic war zone, not had soldiers
    get killed, not have made any mistakes--how you cannot make
    mistakes in that chaotic environment, I don't know, and every
    member serving on this committee has been in those environments
    in one way or another.
        So you don't have the luxury of waving a magic wand and
    making all the problems go away and simply making a decision
    where nothing goes wrong. And it is really frustrating to hear
    people advocate that we should stay and still decry what
    happened.
        Do you think fighting in a war zone there wouldn't be
    similar mistakes if we had stayed there for another 5 or 10
    years, more civilians killed accidentally, more U.S. service
    members dead in exactly the same way that we just saw?
        Sorry. That is very frustrating, but could you talk to us a
    little bit about the 2,500 soldiers or service members who
    could have been left there and then how you approached that
    decision and what exactly--not what exactly your advice was to
    the President for what I said earlier, but how you approached
    that decision and then how you attempt to deal with that while
    advising the President?
        Secretary Austin. First of all, Chairman, let me be clear
    that I support the President's decision to end the war in
    Afghanistan. I did not support staying in Afghanistan forever.
    And let me also say we have talked about the process that we
    used to provide input to the President.
        I think that process was a very thorough and inclusive
    policy process and the recommendations of the commanders were
    taken into consideration, discussed, and deliberated on
    throughout that process.
        As you indicated, I typically--I will always keep my
    recommendations to the President confidential, but I would say
    that, in my view, there is no, was no, risk-free status quo
    option. I think that the Taliban had been clear that if we
    stayed there longer, they were going to recommence attacks on
    our forces.
        I think while it's conceivable that you could stay there,
    my view is that you would have had to deploy more forces in
    order to protect ourselves and accomplish any missions that we
    would have been assigned. It is also my view, Mr. Chairman,
    that the best way to end this war was through a negotiated
    settlement and sadly that did not happen.
        The Chairman. Thank you. And let me just also say that I
    know there are members of this committee who think we should
    have stayed, who are honest about that.
        Sorry. I think of Congressman Waltz who has been very
    honest about the fact--both under President Trump and under
    President Biden--that we should have stayed. He is very honest
    about the fact that there were costs and risks and lives would
    have been lost.
        That is the type of discussion that we need to have, but to
    jump down the President's throat because he actually had to
    make the decision in an impossible situation I think does a
    grave disservice to this committee's ability to do effective
    and honest nonpartisan oversight. Costs were going to be borne
    here. There was no easy option. And I do hope that people
    remember that as we go through the questions and answers that
    will proceed.
        With that, I yield to the ranking member.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Milley, was the DOD [Department of Defense] in
    charge of making decisions about troop strength in this
    withdrawal or were you in a support role?
        General Milley. Let me put it this way-you talking about
    the NEO or----
        Mr. Rogers. I am talking about--let me go back even
    further.
        In January of this year were you of the opinion, in your
    professional military judgment, that we should've maintained
    2,500 troops, U.S. troops in support of the coalition effort
    and contractors in Afghanistan?
        General Milley. Yeah. My assessment that I read in the
    opening statement remained consistent and----
        Mr. Rogers. Did that professional military opinion change
    over the course of the next few months?
        General Milley. Not until Presidential decision and I
    rendered my opinions and it was a fulsome debate on all of
    that. And once decisions are made, then I am expected to
    execute lawful order.
        Mr. Rogers. And you have made that very clear. So my
    question is, when the troop levels were ordered to be drawn
    down to zero and first stopping at 650 as General McKenzie
    outlined, was that your decision or General McKenzie's decision
    to draw down to 650?
        General Milley. It was a task and then a troop-to-task
    analysis with the task being to go to zero, but you also have
    to defend the Embassy--
        Mr. Rogers. I am thinking about the chain of command.
    Somebody's making decisions about troop levels and my
    understanding is it was not the DOD; it was the State
    Department or the White House. I want to know who said we are
    going to go from 2,500 to 650 and just protect Kabul and the
    State Department.
        General Milley. It was a military analysis that 6- to 700
    could adequately defend the Embassy until the contractors come
    up and that was then approved up through the chain and approved
    at the highest levels.
        Mr. Rogers. Who made the decision?
        General Milley. I would say that decision was made in a
    national security consultative process by the highest levels of
    our government.
        Mr. Rogers. General McKenzie, did you receive advice from
    General Miller in the end of 2020 and early 2021 related to
    troop levels in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Ranking Member, I did.
        Mr. Rogers. What was that advice?
        General McKenzie. The advice, his view and my view, were
    essentially the same view. My view was that we needed to
    maintain about 2,500 and that we also needed to work with our
    coalition partners who had about 6,000 troops in there, NATO
    and other core countries that would remain there.
        Mr. Rogers. Did your professional military opinion change
    over the course of the spring?
        General McKenzie. It did not.
        Mr. Rogers. Did you communicate--well, I know you
    communicated to the President. You said you did. Were you
    present in the room when General Miller's recommendations were
    relayed to the President?
        General McKenzie. General Miller was present in executive
    sessions that involved myself, the Secretary here, the
    Chairman, and the President.
        Mr. Rogers. And those recommendations of the parties as
    Secretary Austin said were debated fully----
        General McKenzie. They were debated fully. I felt that my
    opinion was heard with great thoughtfulness by the President.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, you know, Secretary Austin just made the
    point that there was a fulsome debate of the pros and cons and
    the costs and risks, yet in August of this year, President
    Biden told George Stephanopoulos in an interview, no. No one
    said that to me, referring to keeping some 2,500 troops in
    Afghanistan.
        Was that an inaccurate statement by the President?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I am not going to comment on a
    statement by the President.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. General McKenzie, in mid-June your
    commanders on the ground were informing you that things were
    deteriorating as you testified a little while ago. At that
    time, in your judgment, you should stop withdrawal, increase
    forces, or all proceed with the retrograde.
        What did you decide at that time?
        General McKenzie. We decided to proceed with the
    retrograde.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. Were you ordered to do that by the
    President?
        General McKenzie. We followed our original--we had original
    orders. We followed those orders through to completion.
        Mr. Rogers. Was it the President's orders?
        General McKenzie. My orders come from the Secretary of
    Defense to the President. So that is a very short chain of
    command for me.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. Secretary Austin, on the 23rd, you told
    this committee that you had developed a very detailed plan to
    conduct safe, orderly, and responsible withdrawl and were
    executing that plan. On August 18, the President said, quote:
    The idea that somehow there was going to be a way that we could
    have gotten out with chaos ensuing, I don't know how that
    happens, close quote.
        How do you reconcile those discrepancies between what you
    assured the Congress and what the President is telling us?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir. First of all, in terms of
    the withdrawl of our troops and the retrograde of equipment,
    that plan as developed by General Miller and General McKenzie
    was executed as planned, and all of our equipment was
    retrograded and we drew down the force that we wanted to draw
    down to that very small force that you saw at the Embassy at
    the very end there.
        The chaos that ensued followed the collapse of the military
    and the collapse of the government, and when those two things
    happen, then it was going to be a chaotic situation.
        Mr. Rogers. And the collapse of the government and the
    collapse of the military was solely responsibility of this
    administration. I know you are all trying to be careful
    politically, but it was the State Department and the White
    House that told you to make those drawdown of troops from 2,500
    to 650 to zero. It was the speed with which they had done it--
    that they carried out that order that is what caused the chaos
    that we had.
        If they had allowed the DOD to be in a command situation,
    we wouldn't have had this problem. General McKenzie has
    testified that the only reason he couldn't keep Bagram was
    because he had to draw down to 650 troops and his primary
    orders were to keep Hamid Karzai and the State Department safe.
        We just have to admit this was--the State Department and
    the White House that caused this catastrophe, not the Defense
    Department.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I want
    to thank our witnesses for your testimony today and for your
    service to our Nation. My constituents and I have obviously a
    lot of questions about the planning that led up to this, and
    I'll admit that I am concerned that, based on the conditions on
    the ground, General Milley and General McKenzie recommended
    against final withdrawl, I wish the administration had been
    more thoughtful and not had rushed this.
        I have yet to hear an answer to the question, though, of
    why did we not start withdrawing American citizens and SIVs
    sooner? We knew we were going to be withdrawl whether we
    started doing that withdrawing of the Americans and SIVs in
    January or May or sooner than the actual execution of the order
    to withdraw.
        I would like that question answered. Also Secretary Austin,
    given the generals' concerns, were the discussions about
    pushing the withdrawl back to spring of 2022 or conditioning it
    on the criteria in the Doha Agreement to ensure that we did the
    handoff correctly, we already weren't going to fully withdraw
    by May 2021.
        And Secretary Austin, what was the military rationale of
    leaving by the end of August when the Taliban are at their
    strongest in the fighting season as opposed to waiting in the
    winter months when there is more of a lull in the Taliban
    fighting season? It is a relatively low level of activity and
    they are at their weakest. I will start with those questions.
        The Chairman. And I am sorry. Before you get into it, I'm
    going to stick to the 5-minute rule. So when the clock hits
    zero, we are going to move on to other people. Go ahead.
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir. On the issue of why we
    didn't bring out civilians and SIVs sooner, again, the call on
    how to do that and when to do it is really a State Department
    call. We provided input, as I said in my opening statement, to
    the State Department. Their concerns rightfully were that,
    number one, they were being cautioned by the Ghani
    administration that if they withdrew American citizens and SIV
    applicants at a pace that was too fast, it would cause a
    collapse of the government that we were trying to prevent.
        And so I think that went into the calculus and when you add
    also into the calculus that SIV process was very, at that
    point, very slow, deliberate, and not very responsive. With
    your help, we were able to curtail the time that it took to
    work through that process, but a number of things kind of came
    together to cause what happened to happen.
        But, again, we provided our input and we certainly would
    have liked to have seen it go faster or sooner but, again, they
    had a number of things to think through as well.
        In terms of adjusting or why we chose to--why the President
    chose to leave in the summer versus waiting until the next
    year, obviously, a number of things went into his decision
    calculus, but, you know, as we came on board, the agreement
    that had been made was that we were going to depart by May 1.
        We were able to work to get more time to ensure that we
    could conduct a deliberate and safe and orderly retrograde,
    but, again, you know, the President made the decision that we
    would leave in the summer versus going into the next year. So--
    and I will leave it at that, sir, pending any more questions.
        Mr. Langevin. Secretary, I want to know how we now protect
    the country going forward.
        Former CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director and
    Secretary of Defense Panetta said that our national security is
    threatened by the Taliban takeover. One of our missions was to
    prevent a haven for terrorist groups, and--and I quote--``we
    have failed in that mission,'' end quote.
        Similarly, the Director of the DIA [Defense Intelligence
    Agency] has assessed that al-Qaida could threaten the homeland
    in 1 to 2 years.
        So I agree that over-the-horizon operations can be
    effective. However, I am concerned that, without complementary
    operations, they will be insufficient to keep us safe.
        Secretary Austin, are you confident that over-the-horizon
    capabilities on their own can mitigate the terrorist threat we
    face? Are you confident that we can prevent Afghanistan from
    becoming a haven? And how will you keep our country safe?
        The Chairman. And I apologize, but the gentleman's time has
    expired, so that question will have to go unanswered.
        Mr. Langevin. I would like that for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 149.]
        The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In an interview on August 16, President Biden promised to
    keep military troops in Afghanistan until every American
    citizen who wanted to leave was able to leave. This did not
    happen.
        Nor can we confirm the Blinken claim that he sent 19
    separate messages to Americans telling them to leave the
    country since March of this year.
        Also unclear is the truth of the Biden claim that no
    military commander recommended leaving behind a residual force,
    even though all of you, starting courageously with General
    Scott Miller, have now made it clear that your professional
    military advice was to do so.
        On August 26, I formally requested all letters referenced
    that day by Biden from military commanders advising him on the
    Afghanistan withdrawal. To date, I haven't received a response.
        As a 31-year Army veteran myself, grateful to have four
    sons who have served in Iraq, Egypt, the southern border, and
    in Afghanistan, I was immediately skeptical letters existed.
        President Biden left behind thousands of American citizens,
    Green Card holders, brave interpreters, and Afghan media
    reporters who worked with the United States.
        Biden was correct when he said the buck stops with him, as
    the person responsible for Afghanistan as well as for the
    terrorists that are now crossing the southern border to plan
    attacks on American neighborhoods.
        In addition to betraying the American citizens and the U.S.
    allies in Afghanistan, the Biden decision to have a premature
    withdrawal left the people of Afghanistan, who had 60,000
    troops killed by the Taliban, under the complete control of the
    Taliban, a barbaric terrorist organization, as General Milley
    has confirmed, with al-Qaida.
        Again, Biden was correct; the buck stops with him. The war
    has moved from Afghanistan to American neighborhoods, equally
    endangering our allies of India and Israel.
        Mr. Secretary, even before the withdrawal, there were
    frustrating reports of Americans and Green Card holders being
    turned away at the gates of the airport or being instructed by
    the administration to stay away from the airport entirely.
        While other countries were sending their special forces
    into Kabul to retrieve their citizens and bring them to the
    airport, you repeatedly refused to do the same, even after
    promising in a Pentagon press conference on August 18 that,
    quote, ``we are going to get everyone we can possibly to
    evacuate, and I will do that as long as we possibly can until
    the clock runs out or if we run out of capability,'' end of
    quote.
        Mr. Secretary, the American public needs to know: Did the
    clock run out, or did you run out of capability? Did you at any
    point ask President Biden for any more time or more support to
    enable your forces to stay and complete the full evacuations of
    American citizens, not leaving them behind, as promised? If so,
    what was the Biden response?
        Secretary Austin. First of all, sir, thank you for your
    personal service in our military, and thanks for the service of
    your family members. We remain grateful.
        On the issue of evacuating American citizens and SIV
    holders, or SIV applicants, this work continues on. We are not
    finished, and we will make sure that we stay focused on this to
    get out every American citizen that wants to leave and has the
    right credentials to be able to leave.
        On the issue of the security at the airport, it was my
    assessment, and I remain convinced of this, that the risk to
    mission and risk to force was beyond significant, and had we
    stayed there much longer, we would have endured continued
    attacks by ISIS-K and potentially the Taliban.
        And, you know, as each day went forward, as that risk
    increased, you know, we stood to have aircraft shot down, we
    stood to have people injured on--additional people injured on
    the airfield. And so, as we weighed those risks----
        Mr. Wilson. Mr. Secretary, I need to have this completed.
    And, in fact, I will be sending you questions for the record.
    And----
        Secretary Austin. Sure.
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --I really want to know how many
    Americans have been left behind. And so we will get that, but I
    will be providing questions for the record.
        But I sadly believe that American families today are at a
    greater risk of murderous attacks at home than ever before. You
    talked about attacks at the airport. No, they are coming here.
    And that is that, in history, we are at greater risk.
        Suicide bombers can operate from the safe haven of
    Afghanistan just as 9/11 and with the open southern borders.
    The example of May 8th mass murder of over 80 girls in Kabul
    have not been forgotten. The buck stops with 13 murdered
    Marines.
        Mr. Biden is disregarding----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --The military advice, and I
    believe----
        The Chairman. I will call----
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. --The President should resign.
        The Chairman [continuing]. --on Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Wilson. I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. I am prepared to begin my questions, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Larsen. Heads-up, I don't have a speech, so I am
    launching into my questions right now, so get ready to answer
    them.
        General Milley, with regards to the November 11th
    unclassified signed order, whose signature was on that order?
        General Milley. Former President Trump.
        Mr. Larsen. And then 6 days later that was rescinded
    after----
        General Milley. Correct.
        Mr. Larsen [continuing]. --discussion? Is that correct?
        General Milley. Correct.
        Mr. Larsen. And what were the top three concerns with that
    particular order?
        General Milley. Well, the instruction had two lines. Line
    one was, ``Withdraw all U.S. military forces from Somalia by 31
    December.'' Second sentence was, ``Withdraw all U.S. military
    forces from Afghanistan by 15 January.''
        So I went over and spoke to the White House and had some
    conversations with some folks, not the President----
        Mr. Larsen. Sure.
        General Milley [continuing]. --and we discussed the cost-
    risk-benefit, et cetera, and the feasibility, acceptability,
    and suitability of that order.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. All right.
        General Milley. And it was subsequently rescinded.
        Mr. Larsen. Was that the first time--well, I will ask
    Secretary Austin.
        In the last 20 years, given the history in Afghanistan, is
    that the first order at all that has come out asking for a
    withdrawal? Did we have withdrawal plans or withdrawal orders
    at all in the last 20 years from Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Absolutely. As you know, we increased our
    footprint in Afghanistan over time, and then we----
        Mr. Larsen. And shrunk it, but that is--but that is--but
    not----
        Secretary Austin. Not a complete withdrawal.
        Mr. Larsen. Not complete withdrawal. That is different. I
    am talking about zero.
        Secretary Austin. Right.
        Mr. Larsen. Down to zero.
        Secretary Austin. Correct.
        Mr. Larsen. So this would be the first time, then? This
    November 11 order would have been the first ask for a
    withdrawal to zero?
        Secretary Austin. That is correct.
        Mr. Larsen. To your knowledge.
        Secretary Austin. To my knowledge, correct.
        Mr. Larsen. Within the DOD. Okay. From the President or
    anything. Got it. From any President, I should say. Thank you.
    Just trying to get the timeline set.
        And this relates to General McKenzie. You talked about the
    2,500, the recommendation, the discussion you had about 2,500
    troops. Was that for a particular set of missions, and did
    those missions change; therefore, that 2,500 became 650, became
    zero?
        General McKenzie. Sir, when we looked at the 2,500 number--
    --
        Mr. Larsen. Right.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. --we were looking at a force
    that would have the ability to do very limited advise/assist at
    a high level, assist in logistics management for the Afghans,
    but it would have been functioning at a very high level. So
    that was the force that we wanted to continue to keep on the
    ground.
        As we went down to--as we looked at going down to 650, you
    get a force that is almost exclusively built around the ability
    to defend the Embassy and the airfield and provide entry-level
    logistics to the Afghans. By that, I mean a package comes into
    the airport, you give it over to the Afghans, they drive it
    away, and you have no way to track what happened.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
        General McKenzie. We lost that capability when we----
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah, but based on the civilian leadership
    saying, ``This is what civilian leadership wants to do.''
        You get to--and I know you are not arguing this point; you
    are just--you make the recommendations, given your best advice,
    and then civilian leadership has the opportunity to say,
    ``Thank you, but here is what I would rather be doing.''
        General McKenzie. That is absolutely correct.
        Mr. Larsen. So the mission changed----
        General McKenzie. The mission fundamentally changed when
    we--going to zero means you are going to reduce all your
    capability to do any kind of real on-the-ground work, even at a
    truncated level, with the Afghan forces. You are going to be
    talking at the ministerial level, at the very highest levels of
    government only, and you are not going to have any real
    visibility about what is going on on the ground.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay.
        General Milley, did you want to try to address that?
        General Milley. I did. I just wanted to clarify one thing.
    The 11 November order was actually not the first one. The first
    one was the Doha Agreement, which directs going to zero by 1
    May. The 11 November order is an accelerated withdrawal to
    bring it to zero by 15 January. So two different----
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
        General Milley [continuing]. --instructions.
        Mr. Larsen. That is great. Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very
    much. I appreciate that.
        Just for the record I will ask this question, because then
    this gets to kind of a follow-on to all of this, is: How do you
    define over-the-horizon capabilities? Like, what are those
    specifically? And how do we execute those? And are we going to
    explore that a little bit more probably here today?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I would be----
        Mr. Larsen. I have about 15 seconds.
        General McKenzie. I would be prepared to talk a little bit
    about it today, but I think, more importantly, I will be
    prepared to come over at the direction of the Secretary and
    provide a classified briefing.
        Mr. Larsen. I think that would be very helpful. And there
    may be opportunity in the future to travel to the region and
    hear directly what it looks like on the ground.
        The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time----
        Secretary Austin. With the chairman's permission, sir----
        The Chairman [continuing]. --has expired.
        Secretary Austin [continuing]. --I would offer that
    briefing by General McKenzie, along with Joint Staff
    representation and my policy people.
        The Chairman. Yeah, we will definitely be following up on
    that. I mean, the issue of what we do going forward to deal
    with the counterterrorism threat out of South Asia is something
    this committee has already looked at and will continue to look
    at for a very long time.
        Mr. Turner is recognized.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I serve on both the House Armed Services Committee and the
    Intelligence Committee. The Intelligence Committee has already
    been briefed from the intelligence community concerning their
    participation of the August 29 drone attack.
        General McKenzie, you have taken, in front of us, full
    responsibility for that. I have a series of information that I
    would like released to this committee so that we can adequately
    provide oversight to what occurred on August 29.
        What we know from your prior statements is that you did not
    know who it was who was in the car, whose house it was, or who
    or how many people were in the house. This greatly concerns me
    as we look to the over-horizon claims that the administration
    has of its ability for counterterrorism.
        You did not, as your goal was stated, thwart or disrupt an
    imminent attack. You killed an innocent man, and yet an attack
    didn't happen. So there are serious questions concerning both
    the information that you had and the manner in which the
    execution occurred.
        So I would request that it be released to this committee
    and the Intelligence Committee relevant video excerpts from the
    drones of August 29, the protocols that were in place prior to
    this drone attack mission, the intelligence that an attack was
    imminent against our forces, and the approval of any
    authorization to modify those protocols, including approvals
    for delegation of authority, including target engagement
    authority, who approved at the DOD and in the administration,
    and the data that the Secretary released to the IG [Inspector
    General].
        I just want to make it clear, Mr. Secretary, the fact that
    you have an IG investigation does not stop congressional
    oversight.
        I will be sending you a list of all those. I would like
    your consent that you are going to be providing those to us.
    They are certainly within the jurisdiction of our two
    committees.
        Secretary Austin. Acknowledged, sir. And you are correct;
    there is a review going on of the strike.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        General Milley, with indignation in front of the House and
    the Senate, you have commented on the statements in the press
    concerning your phone conversation with your counterpart,
    General Li, in China.
        Let's be clear. To give you some help with the indignation,
    those comments were in the press because that is where you put
    them.
        Now, you claim that you had information--and it is all
    over--that China was worried about an imminent attack. You did
    not tell the President, the Vice President, the White House
    Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of
    Defense, the Secretary of State, the Director of National
    Intelligence, either of the relevant committees in the House,
    including the big eight, which you know include Intel. You
    didn't tell the Intelligence Committee. You didn't tell the
    Armed Services Committee.
        You report that, after you took upon yourself to have this
    phone conversation, that you told them of the conversation, not
    that China believed that we were going to imminently attack
    them--which, by the way, has never been true in my lifetime.
    And it may be true, since they believed it, that is why they
    are digging ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] holes
    faster than they can fill them with ICBMs. But you chose
    instead to handle it yourself with a phone call.
        So, General Milley, you offered all of the concerning
    intelligence, and I am going to request that you provide it to
    us. I would like you to provide us the relevant intelligence
    information that you based your belief that China was going
    to--belief that there was an imminent attack.
        I also want your requests for declassification of the
    approval that you release that information that China believed
    so, including your request for declassification of your
    conversation that you had with General Li, and any approvals. I
    want a transcript of your call with General Li, and I also want
    any readouts, memorandums, notice of calls, or outcomes.
        Now, you chose to talk to reporters instead of us. And that
    is of great concern. No one in Congress knew that one of two of
    the major nuclear powers thought that they were perhaps being
    threatened for attack.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, that turns my questions to you, then.
    Mr. Secretary, if you learn that Russia or China believes that
    they may be subject to an attack by the United States, as a
    member of the President's Cabinet, do you believe that
    information should be handled at the Cabinet level and with the
    President, with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of
    Defense? Do you believe the chair and ranking member of Intel
    and the House Armed Services Committee and Foreign Affairs
    Committee need to know these?
        Or do you believe that a belief of the possibility of an
    attack by the United States against Russia and China is
    appropriately handled by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff in a phone call with his counterpart with one of those
    nations?
        Please tell me that you believe it elevates to the level--
    that you would elevate that to the Cabinet and to Congress and
    not just have it be subsequently told to us all by newspaper
    articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times, as
    General Milley chose to do.
        Secretary Austin. Thank you, sir.
        Obviously, we would want to follow standard protocol. And
    what you described is what I would--the type of actions that I
    would consider taking.
        But General Milley, as what I heard him say yesterday and I
    think again today, is that his chain of command, the Secretary
    of Defense at the time, was aware of the actions. And so----
        Mr. Turner. After. What he said yesterday is after.
        The Chairman. I am sorry, but----
        General Milley. No, that is not correct. What I said
    yesterday and today----
        The Chairman. If I could--hold on just a second, everybody.
        Time has expired. Mr. Turner is very clever. He made a very
    direct attack as his time was expiring. I am going to violate
    the rules here a little bit and let Chairman Milley respond to
    that direct attack, hopefully briefly, and then we will move on
    to the next witness.
        General Milley. With respect to the intelligence, I have it
    right here. I will be happy to share it with you.
        Mr. Turner. Great.
        General Milley. I guarantee that that intelligence was
    disseminated in the President's PDB [President's Daily Brief],
    the Vice President, the DNI [Director of National
    Intelligence], Director of CIA, the Secretary of Defense, the
    Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
    others.
        That was significant, and there was a lot of it. It wasn't
    just a singular report. There was a lot--I will be happy to
    share that with you and go over it with you line by line.
        And it was significant, and it was concerning, to the point
    where Secretary of Defense Esper, Admiral Davidson, and myself,
    along with others, had conversations about it, and I was
    directed by then-Secretary of Defense Esper. First, he directed
    his Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs to
    make calls, and then me, same thing.
        This was all done with oversight, and I tried to lay that
    out in the memoranda. I tried to lay it out in a timeline in an
    unclassified way that you could use----
        The Chairman. And we are going to--I am sorry. We are going
    to have to leave it at that.
        General Milley. I will be happy to take it up at a later
    date, your convenience.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney is recognized.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to the witnesses for your service and
    testimony today.
        One comment, Mr. Chairman, before questions. Over the last
    month, including yesterday's Senate hearing, we heard a lot of,
    in my opinion, over-the-top claims that the U.S. had lost all
    credibility with its allies in the wake of the withdrawal from
    Afghanistan.
        Last week, Mr. Chairman, we saw firsthand in Washington how
    mistaken that claim was. On Wednesday last week, I attended a
    ceremony over in the Senate where the Australian Prime
    Minister, Scott Morrison, said that Australia was proud to go
    into Afghanistan together and leave together, degrading al-
    Qaida and preventing a major terrorist attack, and, in very
    heartfelt terms, thanked the United States, particularly the 11
    Marines, 1 Navy corpsman, and 1 soldier who perished while
    safely evacuating 4,100 Australians from Kabul.
        Boris Johnson, last week, who was also in town, when asked
    about the U.S. standing post-withdrawal said, ``What I said to
    Joe Biden is how grateful I am for the amazing work of the U.S.
    military in helping us extricate in 2 weeks 15,000 British
    nationals from Kabul to whom we owe debts of honor and
    gratitude. The U.S. military were heroic.''
        Of course, they were in town to enthusiastically endorse
    AUKUS [Australia-United Kingdom-United States], the new defense
    agreement in the Pacific, which, as Politico reported, despite
    all the handwringing over the last couple weeks, was a powerful
    reminder that an American security guarantee with our allies
    still reigns supreme and, in the stroke of a pen, has
    reaffirmed our engagement and collaboration with allies in a
    region that the National Defense Strategy has identified as our
    number one priority.
        Secretary Austin, I just want to follow up on the August 29
    drone strike. And General McKenzie, on the 17th, again, gave, I
    guess, a Central Command investigation report, which described
    it as a tragic mistake.
        You also, that day, announced that there was going to be a
    DOD follow-up investigation. Can you tell us, what is the
    difference between what you described and what CENTCOM did? And
    when can we expect to see results from that investigation that
    you described?
        Secretary Austin. Well, I directed a three-star review of
    the incident. And, certainly, it will take into account all of
    the things that General McKenzie and his team have done. But we
    will look at the, you know, soup-to-nuts, you know, policy,
    procedures, whether or not we followed our own practices, our
    outlined practices.
        And we will certainly look at accountability as well. If
    somebody should be held accountable for something that they did
    that was outside of standard practice, then we will take a look
    at that.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        General McKenzie, you mentioned on the 17th that the
    Department is exploring the possibility of ex gratia payments
    as compensation for the individuals who died in that strike.
    And, again, that is a $3-million-per-year set-aside that the
    United States military's operation has used in the past.
    However, in 2020, despite 23 civilians that were killed, there
    were no payments made last year.
        Can you give us, you know, some feeling that, you know,
    this agreement is sufficient to address this issue, which I
    think really is our country's responsibility?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I agree with you; I believe we have
    a significant responsibility here. And I know that, even as we
    speak right now, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is
    engaged in finding the best way to move forward on an ex
    gratia--appropriate ex gratia payment and whatever other
    measures may be contemplated in regard to that family. And I
    will just leave it at that.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And I just would reflect that that
    certainly is a high-volume concern in my district.
        General McKenzie. Sure.
        Mr. Courtney. General Milley, again, we first met in 2013
    on a CODEL [congressional delegation]. You were in Jalalabad,
    Afghanistan. And I think many of us had that same experience of
    seeing you in-country there. And, certainly, your service is
    something that I think should be unquestioned, and commitment
    to our Nation.
        In your testimony, you talked again about the Doha
    Agreement, the conditions that were put into place for the
    Taliban to perform, and that only one out of the eight actually
    had been complied with, even up through February. Nonetheless,
    80 percent of the troops in the U.S. were drawn down from the
    date of the Doha Agreement to January 21.
        Can you just talk about, you know, the noncompliance of the
    Taliban throughout 2020 and the predicament that I think this
    administration was left when it took office with just a
    fraction of the troop level that was there in February 2020?
        General Milley. We had almost 13,000 U.S. troops there in
    February 2020. And you got the numbers for the inauguration.
    But the bottom line is: reduction in violence, nationwide
    cease-fire, and a whole series of other----
        The Chairman. I apologize, but the gentleman's time has
    expired.
        General Milley. I will respond to the record on that.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 145.]
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We on this committee have repeatedly expressed our concern
    that the U.S. military does not have regional basing and
    cooperation agreements required for an effective over-the-
    horizon counterterrorism capability.
        In May, Mr. Helvey, in response to my question in here,
    confirmed that the administration had not yet secured the
    necessary agreements with any of the governments in the region
    to establish these over-the-horizon capabilities.
        So, General McKenzie, has the administration, as of today,
    secured any necessary agreements with a neighboring country to
    provide the basing and overflight requirements needed to
    perform over-the-horizon counterterror operations in landlocked
    Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Representative, as of today, I have the
    ability to enter Afghanistan and to fly missions. It is a long
    haul in, but I have the ability to do that today.
        Mr. Lamborn. But we don't have an agreement with a
    neighboring country. Is that true? Isn't that true?
        General McKenzie. Obviously, it is a neighboring country
    that is allowing us access, but we are not based in--we are not
    based in any neighboring country; that is correct, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So we can safely assume that, as of
    August 31, we did not also have an agreement at that time in
    the past.
        Okay. Thank you.
        General Milley, at the June 23 hearing here, you testified
    to this committee that Bagram was not necessary tactically to
    the military's withdrawal plan. You dismissed my and other
    people's concerns about the military value of Bagram, and you
    seemed to base that on an assessment that the Taliban, at that
    point, had not yet taken major districts.
        Yesterday, though, you told Senator Blackburn that one of
    the courses of action you provided the Commander in Chief was
    to keep Bagram Air Base open, which sounds different from what
    you told us on January 23.
        But, for the record, was it your professional military
    opinion and advice that we should abandon Bagram Air Base? And,
    if not, was this decision forced on you by the arbitrary troop
    cap of roughly 650?
        General Milley. Once the President's decision was made in
    mid-April, 14 April, and we had a change of mission to go to
    zero and bring the troops down to a number that was only
    required to maintain the Embassy, the Bagram decision was made
    at that point. Because, at that point, there was no way you
    could defend both Bagram and HKIA.
        But one additional point. Most of the people that were
    required to be in a NEO were going to be coming out of Kabul.
    And HKIA, as Scotty Miller, General Miller, has already
    testified to, HKIA was always going to be the center of gravity
    of any NEO. But we didn't have the forces available to do both,
    so----
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
        I want to ask General McKenzie a question.
        General McKenzie, had we kept control of Bagram, what
    forces--or what options and capabilities would that have given
    U.S. forces during the withdrawal, had that been in play?
        General McKenzie. Well, in order to hold Bagram, I would
    have needed probably pushing 5,000 more troops on the ground.
    So that would have been a significant decision, to hold Bagram.
    And we were under the direction to go to zero, so it would
    require a basic policy directive to change the plan.
        If you are going to go to zero and you are going to keep
    enough forces to hold your Embassy and the airfield, it is
    incompatible to hold any other base anywhere in the country. So
    that would be a policy decision, to go out and hold Bagram,
    under that case.
        Let me just further add that I did not see any tactical
    utility to Bagram.
        Mr. Lamborn. General McKenzie, isn't it true that the
    President rejected your best military opinion and advice as to
    how quickly to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Well, I will say this. It has been my
    view that we should have--that I recommended a level of 2,500,
    a level that would have allowed us to hold Bagram and other
    airfields as well. Once you go below that level and make a
    decision to go to zero, it is no longer feasible to hold
    Bagram.
        Mr. Lamborn. But that was your best opinion and advice.
        General McKenzie. That remains my view now, as it was then.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        And you said to hold Bagram would have taken 2,500. A
    minute ago, you said 5,000.
        General McKenzie. No----
        Mr. Lamborn. It sounds like it was 2,500.
        General McKenzie. Well, it depends on the situation. If you
    are talking about a situation where you are not fighting the
    Taliban and you have the full assistance of the Afghan
    Government or the Taliban's attacks against you are at a
    minimum, yes, you can hold it at 2,500.
        If, however, you posit that you are in Afghanistan, say,
    beyond August the 31st without the tacit agreement of the
    Taliban and without the assistance of the Government of
    Afghanistan, who provided most of the physical security at
    Bagram, then you have to put a big footprint in, just as we did
    at HKIA. It is exactly the same sit---the two situations are
    analogous.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time----
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Has expired.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Gentlemen, thank you so very much for your
    testimony.
        Before I go any further, I want to acknowledge an
    extraordinary effort, and successful effort, made by the U.S.
    military, particularly the Air Force, in the most awesome and
    successful evacuation of civilians ever in the history of this
    world. Well done. Very, very well done. And compliments to all
    involved in that.
        Obviously, the loss of the 13 souls, members of the
    military, was a great tragedy. And you and all of us regret
    that.
        The fog of war is only repeated by the fog of the
    committee. So let me lay out some timeframes here.
        In mid-2018, former President Trump ordered formal and
    direct U.S.-Taliban negotiations without the Afghan Government
    participating.
        In February 2020--excuse me--August 2019, President Trump
    said that he would withdraw all U.S. troops as quickly as
    possible.
        In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed
    a formal agreement in which the United States committed to
    withdraw all of its troops, contractors, and nondiplomatic
    civilian personnel from Afghanistan no later than May 1, 2021.
        In June 2020, the U.S. troop levels reached 8,600.
        In October, former President Trump tweeted, ``We should
    have the small remaining number of our BRAVE Men and Women
    serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas!''
        On November 17, 2020, then-Acting Secretary of Defense
    Miller announced that we will implement former President
    Trump's orders to continue repositioning forces from
    Afghanistan and the 2,500 U.S. troops who remain there by
    January 15.
        On January 15, he announced that there were indeed 2,500
    troops left.
        On January 20, Biden became President. Twenty-five-hundred
    troops were then in Afghanistan.
        On April 14, President Biden announced his intention to
    continue to withdraw all regular U.S. troops by September 11, 4
    months after the preplanned May 1 deadline.
        On July 2, Italy and Germany withdrew their troops.
        On July 17--we have had specific testimony here on what
    then happened from July 17 on. And, if I recall correctly, the
    Afghan Government completely collapsed on the 20th of August,
    wasn't there any longer. And, from there, the evacuations
    commenced.
        General McKenzie, were the 2,500 troops on the ground
    sufficient, as agreed with the Taliban? Were they there in
    accordance with the agreement?
        General McKenzie. Had we held the 2,500, which I stated is
    my position, and as the Secretary has articulated, there would
    have been a clear risk that the Taliban would have begun to
    attack us as we moved past the 1 May deadline.
        However, it was my judgment then that that would still have
    given us a platform to continue negotiations with the Taliban
    to perhaps force a political solution.
        My concern was that, if we withdrew below 2,500 and went to
    zero, that the Afghan military and government would collapse.
    And, of course, that is not a potential counterfactual; that
    is, in fact, what happened. So we have objective--we have
    objective data to understand what happens if you go to zero.
        Mr. Garamendi. Several of us attended a luncheon here in
    the Capitol in late June with President Ghani and Abdullah
    Abdullah, and they were very, very confident that they would be
    able to maintain their government through the--with the
    reduction and the withdrawal of American troops. If they--they
    specifically said that if 300,000 troops, they could do it.
    They needed continued financial support, they needed the
    necessary intelligence from the United States, and they also
    needed to have certain air strikes, drone strikes. That was
    their promise.
        They also said that they did not want to allow Afghans to
    leave. That is what they specifically told us. They did not
    want Afghans to leave. Obviously, Ghani decided that he would
    leave.
        Further questions--my time has expired. I will yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thanks so much for your testimony today.
        General Milley, I want to begin with you, and I want to
    build on a question that Ranking Member Rogers asked.
        On August 18, President Biden said that there is no way
    possible that U.S. troops could be withdrawn from Afghanistan
    without the chaos that we saw unfold.
        In your best military judgment, was there a way to extract
    the troops without the chaos that we saw unfold?
        General Milley. I just want to be clear, we are talking two
    different missions. The retrograde of the troops to 2,500
    everybody is talking about, those were advisors. That was
    complete by mid-July. And that was done, actually, without any
    significant incident. And that is the handover of 11 bases, the
    bringing out of a lot of equipment, et cetera. That was done
    under the command of General Miller.
        The noncombatant evacuation operation is different. The
    noncombatant operation, that was done under conditions of great
    volatility, great violence, great threat. And we inserted 6,000
    troops on relatively short notice because there were some
    contingency plans to do that.
        That is a different operation. And I think that the first 2
    days of that, as we saw, were not only chaotic but violent and
    high-risk. But, because of the skill and leadership of our
    troops, they were able to get control of a situation in the
    airfield in that country that was falling apart and then
    execute the operation.
        So I think it would have been difficult under any
    circumstances, and I think our soldiers performed
    extraordinarily well, actually, in 48 hours getting control of
    an airfield in another country eight and a half time zones
    away.
        Mr. Wittman. But I understand that, but you are talking
    about a very compressed timeframe. I am talking about the full
    extent about what you are looking at. You can talk about two
    missions, but I am talking about, in totality of what we are
    looking at there was a chaotic and disaggregated effort.
        It seems like to me that your professional military
    judgment would probably not have been focused in your
    recommendations in seeing this outcome. I just wanted to get
    your----
        General Milley. My recommendations at the time and my
    analysis at the time were aligned, actually, with what you have
    heard from General Miller previously and General McKenzie, was
    flatline at about 2,500 and go for a negotiated solution and
    make sure it is conditions-based.
        And we all render our advice, and Presidents make
    decisions, and then we execute.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure.
        This morning, you stated that the withdrawal was a
    logistical success but a strategic failure. And I would say
    that probably American citizens and the Special Immigrant Visa
    holders would probably disagree, those that were left behind
    would probably disagree with your assessment of a logistical
    success.
        That being said, I want to focus on the strategic failure
    aspect of that.
        You said yesterday that all you can do--and you just said
    it now--all you can do is provide your best advice, and it is
    up to the President to make the ultimate decision.
        In your best military judgment, did President Biden's
    decisions cause this strategic failure?
        General Milley. I think, as I said yesterday--first of all,
    I am not going to judge a President. That is the job of the
    American people, that is the job of Congress, not my job.
        Mr. Wittman. No, I am asking for your best military
    judgment--for your judgment.
        General Milley. Yeah. So my assessment is, this was a 20-
    year war, and it wasn't lost in the last, you know, 20 days or
    even 20 months, for that matter.
        It was a cumulative effect to a series of strategic
    decisions that go way back--you know, bin Laden, right on the
    Tora Bora, for example. We knew where he was, we were 1,000
    meters away, could have ended it, perhaps, right there.
        The shift from going into Iraq and pulling all the troops
    out of Afghanistan, with the exception of a few others--major
    strategic decision.
        Not effectively dealing with Pakistan as a sanctuary--major
    strategic issue that we are going to have to really unpack.
        The intelligence piece, pulling advisors off 3 or 4 years
    ago out of kandaks, so we blinded ourselves from our ability to
    see the will, the morale, the leadership, and the training.
        There is a whole series of decisions that take place over
    20 years. I don't think that, whenever you get some phenomenon
    like a war that is lost--and it has been, in the sense of we
    accomplished our strategic task of protecting America against
    al-Qaida, but certainly the end state is a whole lot different
    than what we wanted.
        So, whenever a phenomenon like that happens, there are an
    awful lot of causal factors, and we are going to have to figure
    that out. A lot of lessons learned here.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
        And I want to build with your answers to Secretary Austin.
        Secretary Austin, I imagine that you had a number of
    opportunities in your capacity as CENTCOM commanding general to
    brief President Obama, and I imagine that Vice President Biden
    was probably privy to these briefs. Was he a regular attendee
    when you gave these briefs?
        Secretary Austin. The Vice President was frequently in the
    Situation Room when we conducted meetings, yes.
        Mr. Wittman. Let me go from there, then, to the Battle of
    Kunduz, which, we know, Taliban took over, Afghan forces
    retreated.
        Did you recognize that as the beginning of the weakness in
    the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] mission? And
    were there issues at that point of intense interest to Vice
    President Biden?
        The Chairman. I am sorry, that is going to have to be a
    question for the record, because the time has expired.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 145.]
        The Chairman. Ms. Speier is recognized.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for your extraordinary service to our
    country.
        I want to just set the record straight on a couple of
    points.
        It was in 2017 that then-President Trump relaxed rules of
    engagement for air strikes, and there was a massive increase in
    civilian casualties, a 330 percent increase during Trump's
    administration. Compared to the previous 10 years, there was a
    95 percent increase in civilian deaths from 2017 to 2019.
        It was then-President Trump who, in mid-2018, ordered the
    Taliban--ordered talks with the Taliban without the Afghani
    leadership. And it was in February 2020 when that formal
    agreement was made.
        Now, Chairman Milley, you identified the Taliban as a
    terrorist organization. Can you tell us anything about former
    President Trump's intent to invite the Taliban leadership to
    the United States or to Camp David specifically?
        General Milley. I have no personal knowledge of that
    invitation. I saw it in the media, but I was not part of any
    discussions or decision-making on that. I have no personal
    knowledge.
        Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin, did the previous
    administration develop plans for a withdrawal, and was there
    any handoff to you of those plans?
        Secretary Austin. There was no handoff to me of any plans
    for a withdrawal.
        Ms. Speier. So then-President Trump calls for a total
    withdrawal by May 1, 2021, and no plans had been made during
    his administration for withdrawal.
        Secretary Austin. I would say that, you know, I am
    confident that General Miller, who was anticipating, you know,
    a decision one way or the other, was making plans. And I
    certainly would defer to General McKenzie in terms of what he
    might have done.
        But, in terms of handoff from administration to
    administration, Secretary to Secretary, there was no handoff to
    me.
        Ms. Speier. All right.
        Is it not true that, on April 27, President Biden, through
    the State Department, called on all Americans in Afghanistan to
    leave by commercial flights? Can any of you answer that
    question?
        Well, that was, in fact----
        Secretary Austin. I cannot----
        Ms. Speier [continuing]. What happened.
        Secretary Austin. I don't have knowledge of that.
        Ms. Speier. All right. That was, in fact, what happened. So
    we put on notice all Americans in Afghanistan, on April 27, it
    was time to get out.
        Let me ask you this, General Milley: What was the impact of
    President Trump's drawdown to 2,500 troops despite the
    Taliban's noncompliance with much of the peace agreement? And
    how did that affect our intelligence gathering?
        General Milley. So there are two questions there. The first
    question: I think the Doha Agreement itself, because of the
    nature of it--and this is more 20/20 hindsight perhaps, but we
    now believe that the Doha Agreement itself perhaps undermined
    or contributed to the undermining of the morale, confidence in
    the government because it was a bilateral agreement, et cetera.
        But, having said that, there were conditions built into
    that, one of which was met, many of which were not. And the
    drawdown to 2,500 proceeded because the fundamental condition
    of ``they weren't attacking us'' was being met.
        The drawdown to 2,500, the impact that that had on the
    morale, the will of the Afghan military, I believe that it was
    a negative impact. But I don't know that yet. We need to go
    through all of our intelligence and analyze it in an after-
    action review. But I do think that was a contributing factor to
    the morale of the Afghan security forces.
        Ms. Speier. General Milley, there has been a lot of talk
    about retaining 2,500 service members in Afghanistan. I think
    we all forget that there was a negotiation with the Taliban and
    we would have to get them to agree to allow 2,500 troops to
    remain in the country.
        Having said that, in your view, would a small force of
    2,500 be sufficient to achieve anything of value?
        General Milley. I think that the 2,500 would have been at
    great risk in terms of the Taliban--I have no doubt that the
    Taliban would have reinitiated combat operations or attacks on
    U.S. forces and the 2,500 would have been at increased risk
    today.
        What is the value of keeping the 2,500? It has as much to
    do with the morale and the keeping advisors with them and
    having the morale of the Afghan security forces and
    demonstrating confidence in the government.
        Going to zero--it is clear to me that one of the big
    lessons learned we have to unpack from the military side is the
    mirror-imaging in the development of the Afghan military. And
    they became dependent upon our presence----
        The Chairman. I apologize, but----
        General Milley. Sorry.
        The Chairman [continuing]. The gentlelady's time has
    expired.
        Mrs. Hartzler is recognized.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is imperative that we have this hearing today, because
    the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, I believe, is the most
    significant foreign policy failure in a generation, and it is
    going to have ramifications for years to come. And so we need
    to get to the bottom of this.
        And, first, I want to start off, to General Milley, a
    question, that you made a comment earlier that you would be--
    well, I wanted to ask you, did you tell General Li when you
    talked to him on the phone that, if we were going to attack
    China, that you would let him know ahead of time?
        General Milley. naudible.]
        The Chairman. I am sorry. Could you get the microphone a
    little more in front of you there, make sure it is on.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
        General Milley. So this is a longer conversation, and it is
    a VTC [video teleconference] with General Li. And there is a
    body of intelligence that leads up to this that was persuasive
    to Secretary Esper, myself, and many, many others that the
    Chinese thought, wrongly, that the United States was going to
    attack them. I am certain, guaranteed certain, that President
    Trump had no intent to attack. And it was my task to make sure
    I communicated that. And the purpose was to de-escalate----
        Mrs. Hartzler. You shared all that earlier. I understand. I
    just----
        General Milley. And, as part of that----
        Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. Wanted to say: Did you or did
    you not tell him that if we were going to attack you would let
    him know?
        General Milley. As part of that conversation, I said:
    General Li, there is not going to be a war, there is not going
    to be an attack between great powers. And, if there was, the
    tensions would build up. There would be calls going back and
    forth from all kinds of senior officials. I said, hell, General
    Li, I will probably give you a call, but we are not going to
    attack you. Trust me, we are not going to attack you.
        These are two great powers, and I am doing my best to
    transmit the President's intent, President Trump's intent, to
    ensure that the American people are protected from an incident
    that could escalate.
        Mrs. Hartzler. I understand your intent, but I think you
    articulating that, that you would tell him you would give him a
    call, I think is worthy of your resignation. I just think that
    is against our country, that you would give our number one
    adversary that information and tell him that.
        But I would like to go on to General Austin and ask you a
    question. According to President Biden, he chose you to serve
    as his Defense Secretary primarily because you oversaw the full
    withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 from Iraq.
        But, ironically, the 2011 Iraq withdrawal left similar
    conditions of governmental failure, the empowerment of regional
    terrorist organizations, most notably ISIS, and a humanitarian
    crisis of refugees and internally displaced people in desperate
    need of international emergency assistance.
        The 2011 U.S. military exit from Iraq was short-lived, with
    President Obama redeploying U.S. forces into Iraq and Syria in
    2014 to defeat the Islamic State.
        Despite the administration's reassurances, it seems we may
    be on a similar trajectory in Afghanistan. After U.S. forces
    abandoned Bagram Air Base in July, the Taliban quickly took
    over the base and released 5,000 to 7,000 ISIS-K and Taliban
    prisoners.
        When the last U.S. troops evacuated from Afghanistan on
    August 31, this administration handed over total government
    control to the Taliban, a known terrorist organization with
    leaders of the Haqqani terrorist network now in key positions
    within the Taliban's de facto government.
        In recent weeks, the Taliban has deemed education
    irrelevant, barred women and girls from school and work,
    committed horrific retaliatory attacks on members of Afghan
    security forces and interpreters, and established suicide-
    bomber schools within the country.
        We also know that al-Qaida and ISIS-K both have
    reestablished a presence within the country. Even before the
    U.S. withdrew, ISIS-K claimed credit for a suicide bombing,
    which you have mentioned took the lives of 13 service members
    on August 23.
        So, Secretary Austin, is it true that the suicide bomber
    who attacked the Kabul airport on August 23 was a CIA prisoner
    at the Bagram Air Base whom the Taliban released after Biden's
    administration left Bagram in July?
        Secretary Austin. Let me just say a couple of things.
        First, on why the President selected me or nominated me to
    be his Secretary of Defense, you would have to certainly go
    back to the President and ask him specifically why he did that,
    but it wasn't, I am sure, solely based upon my oversight of the
    evacuation of Iraq.
        But I would point to you that there is a government in Iraq
    right now that is holding elections. The United States military
    is in Iraq----
        Mrs. Hartzler. I have 4 seconds. Could you answer my
    question? Was the suicide bomber----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time--the gentlelady's time
    has expired.
        Secretary Austin. I will take the question for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 145.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Gallego.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And generally I don't see eye-to-eye with many generals,
    and certainly General Milley and I have had disagreements, but
    I think what was said earlier was inappropriate in its nature,
    to accuse a member of the military that they would tip off our
    opposition in any way.
        And I would like to give General Milley an opportunity to
    respond to that if he wants. If not, then I will gladly
    continue with my questions.
        General Milley. As I said up front, I am not going to tip
    off any enemy to what the United States is going to do in an
    actual plan.
        What I am trying to do is persuade an adversary that is
    heavily armed, that was clearly and unambiguously, according to
    intelligence reports, very nervous about our behavior and what
    was happening inside this country, and they were concerned that
    we, President Trump, was going to launch an attack. He was not
    going to launch an attack. I knew he wasn't going to launch an
    attack.
        At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, I engaged the
    Chinese in order to persuade them to do that. I would never tip
    off any enemy to any kind of surprise thing that we were going
    to do. That is a different context than that conversation.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
        Thank you to all three witnesses for taking the time to
    testify today.
        Obviously, the resurgence of the Taliban is devastating,
    and it is difficult for many of us to watch. But, sadly, it
    unwinds the reality that, after 20 years, four U.S. Presidents,
    and billions of dollars, the conditions for a peaceful and
    stable Afghanistan could not be created.
        That is why I believe President Biden made the right
    decision to withdraw. Staying in Afghanistan, a prolonged and
    stalled conflict, would have required more troops and more
    resources with no clear timeline. And I don't believe that we
    could ask our service men and women to give their lives for a
    mission that, in the end, wouldn't have been successful.
        I do, like many of you here, applaud our troops for their
    tireless efforts to evacuate American citizens, our allies,
    Afghan citizens, and everyone threatened by the Taliban. And I
    still believe we have a moral imperative to help those who
    helped us in Afghanistan, and I and many of us will do
    everything in our power to continue to do that.
        I have some questions to begin with.
        General Milley, in your testimony, you noted that the speed
    and scale and scope of the collapse of the Afghan Army and the
    government was a surprise. Yet the Taliban was clearly gaining
    ground in June and especially July before the arrival--before
    their arrival in Kabul.
        As we not only look to the future of Afghanistan but also
    think about our operations across the globe, what lessons
    specific to our intelligence gathering and analysis do you
    think DOD can learn from this experience? Do you think it is
    time for a larger rethink within the Department about how to
    assess intelligence in a very rapidly changing environment?
        General Milley. I do. I think--I don't know the full answer
    yet, but I think that the primary reason we missed it was
    because we essentially cannot and we have yet to develop a
    really effective technique to read people's hearts, their will,
    their mind, their leadership sort of skills. Those are
    intangibles. You know, the moral is to the physical as three is
    to one in the conduct of war. So, very difficult to measure.
        When we pull our advisors off of organizations at lower
    levels, you start missing that fingertip touch for that
    intangible of war. We can count the trucks and the guns and the
    units and all that. We can watch that from different
    techniques, but we can't measure a human heart from a machine.
    You have to be there to do that.
        And I think that was probably one of the most significant
    contributing factors to missing the deterioration in the morale
    of the Afghan Army.
        Mr. Gallego. And I guess one of the things that I am deeply
    disturbed by--and this can be either to, you know, General
    McKenzie or also Secretary Austin can jump in.
        Speaking to a lot of service members, enlisted service
    members that have served for decades in and out of Afghanistan,
    they were always telling me something extremely different from
    what I was getting from reports from many of you generals here,
    that the Afghan Army was not ready, that they were not going to
    be sustainable on their own.
        And so, you know, how did we miss that? How is it that a
    lot of, you know, 18-, 19-year-olds, mid-20-year-old E-5s were
    predicting this but yet some of our greatest minds, both on the
    civilian side and, you know, uniformed side, absolutely missed
    this?
        And I think that is something that concerns me, because,
    you know, Afghanistan is done, but we are going to be,
    obviously, engaging all over the world. And this type of
    intelligence failure repeated could be, you know--could be an
    existential threat to the national security of the United
    States.
        I don't know, General McKenzie, do you want to try that?
        General McKenzie. Sure. So I think that is a--I think it is
    a reasonable criticism. We will have to take a look at how we
    actually remain connected to the people who are down at the
    advisory level.
        I think that is something that I--I am conflicted by that
    as well, I will be very candid with you. And we will certainly
    take a look at that, because I have heard that same strain
    myself. It is harder to get the truth as you become more
    senior. We perhaps need to look at ways to ensure that that is
    conveyed in a more rapid and effective way.
        So I will accept that criticism.
        Mr. Gallego. Okay.
        Thank you for you guys' testimony.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Scott is recognized.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, gentlemen, I need your help fairly immediately on two
    issues, one of which can't be discussed in this setting, but
    the other one can.
        And there are 145 Afghan Air Force personnel in Tajikistan.
    They flew 16 aircraft into that country on August the 13th. It
    is now September the 29th. We need to get them out of
    Tajikistan.
        These are people who trained with us, they fought with us,
    they did everything that we asked of them. And we have gotten
    no assistance at all from the State Department to move them.
    And I am asking all three of you for your help in addressing
    the issue.
        Secretary Austin, we need the help.
        Secretary Austin. Acknowledged, sir. And we will get with
    State right away to see if we can move this forward.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        Secretary Austin. I share your concern, sir.
        Mr. Scott. And thank you.
        And I do want to mention this, and I think this is where
    the frustration of every member of the committee comes in, that
    we had people in Uzbekistan. The State Department ignored them,
    as well, and said they would get to them when they got to them.
    But we have a lady in Tajikistan that is 9 months pregnant that
    is one of our pilots. And we need help removing them.
        We also need to make it clear to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
    that that is U.S. military equipment and it is not to be
    returned to Afghanistan. And so I would appreciate if we could
    put that in writing to both of those countries, that the
    equipment belongs to the U.S., not to Afghanistan.
        And, you know, with that said, I appreciate your commitment
    to help.
        I do want to mention one thing, Secretary. You and the
    State Department were using the number 124,000. That 124,000 is
    U.S. and NATO allies, correct?
        Secretary Austin. That is correct.
        Mr. Scott. We had provided a list of names of people who
    were P1, P2 SIVs to Central Command, to everybody we knew to
    get it to, and yet our people were not allowed into HKIA. They
    were at the gates, but they were not allowed into HKIA, even
    though they were on the manifest. And, yet, so many people came
    out of the country that appeared not to be on the manifest.
        So how was the determination made in who got on a plane and
    who didn't get on a plane?
        Secretary Austin. Well, I can't speak to the exact
    processes that were--that existed inside of HKIA at the time,
    in terms of how people were sorted out. I can tell you that we
    tried very, very hard to get everybody that we possibly could
    out, especially American citizens and SIV applicants that had
    worked with us.
        We also owed it to our partners to help them get some of
    their people out as well. And they helped us with some security
    issues and other things while we were there. So----
        Mr. Scott. Secretary, I am close on time, but I will tell
    you, I do think that that is a question that is going to linger
    and that the committee wants answers on. Because we have P1, P2
    SIVs that were left behind, and other people that were not or
    should not have been on the manifest seem to have gotten out.
        Secretary Austin. Well, I will just tell you that we are
    going to continue to work to try to get as many out as we can.
    In the last 48 hours, I think we have brought out an additional
    63 American citizens and 169 legal permanent residents. So we
    are going to continue to work this.
        Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, you answered a lot of the
    questions that I had in your written testimony. You did say
    that in April is when you were given, effectively, a change of
    mission to the 650. What date in April was that?
        General McKenzie. I believe it was on the 15th--14th----
        Mr. Scott. Fifteenth?
        General McKenzie [continuing]. 15th.
        Mr. Scott. So mid-April?
        General McKenzie. Yes.
        Mr. Scott. When did we inform our partner forces that we
    had a change in mission and that we were going to retrograde
    from the 2,500 down to 650?
        General McKenzie. That followed immediately. And that was
    through----
        Mr. Scott. Immediately.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. CENTCOM's headquarters on
    the ground----
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. Through the process of
    outreach both to President Ghani and to----
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. Other members. It might have
    taken a couple of days for that----
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. Process, but it was not kept
    from them. There was no----
        Mr. Scott. Okay. It wasn't a secret.
        Very quick. Was the 650 included in the 2,500, or is the
    650 in addition to the 2,500 number you talked about?
        General McKenzie. The 650 were different capabilities than
    the----
        Mr. Scott. Okay.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. 2,500.
        Mr. Scott. So it would have been a total of 3,150.
        General McKenzie. No, no, no. When we went from 2,500 down
    to an effective zero, we said we would keep 650----
        The Chairman. They went from 2,500----
        General McKenzie [continuing]. At the Embassy.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. They went
    from 2,500 to 650, as I understand it, on their way to----
        General McKenzie. That is correct, sir, but the
    capabilities were different. They were different forces to do
    different things.
        The Chairman. Crucial point. Thank you.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Moulton is recognized.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Milley and Secretary Austin, my first question to
    you at our hearing on June 23 was: Why have you not started the
    evacuation of our allies already? You responded that we have a,
    quote, ``moral imperative to save the Afghans who work by our
    side.''
        Secretary Austin, you said earlier today that moving too
    slow with the evacuation would put our troops at risk.
        So I want to know what you did personally, all three of
    you, between that June 23 hearing and August 15, when Kabul
    fell, to meet that moral imperative.
        Now, I hope it is a long list of things, so I will take
    that for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 145.]
        Mr. Moulton. But let me ask you this: Do you believe you
    did enough?
        Chairman Milley.
        General Milley. I do. I think that we provided the advice
    necessary at the time. Yes.
        Mr. Moulton. Secretary Austin.
        Secretary Austin. I think you heard me say in my opening
    comments that we engaged State early on to provide input to
    their decision-making process on when to move the SIVs----
        Mr. Moulton. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. You said
    that you and the State Department followed the advice of the
    Ghani government that taking out SIVs would precipitate a
    government collapse, yet the vast majority of these heroes
    weren't even working for us or the government any more because
    they supported a force of up to 100,000 U.S. troops over 20
    years and we only had 2,500 troops left. So why on Earth did
    you trust President Ghani?
        Secretary Austin. Again, not my decision. To your point, I
    had input to that decision-making process, but it is not as if
    I was influenced by President Ghani.
        Mr. Moulton. I understand, Mr. Secretary. So you have said
    this repeatedly that this is State's responsibility. What
    responsibility do you have for the Afghans who stood shoulder
    to shoulder with our troops or how many do you commit to
    getting out by the end of the year?
        Secretary Austin. I have a responsibility to get out as
    many as I can over time. And how many do I commit to getting
    out? Everyone that I can.
        Mr. Moulton. General McKenzie, there are reports that DOD
    reduced air strikes as early as May when troops were just
    beginning to withdraw and then had to ramp them back up after
    the Taliban gained ground. There are also reports that you sat
    down with the Taliban leadership in August, drew a circle
    around Kabul, and told them that if the Taliban fighters went
    inside that circle, they would get hit with U.S. air strikes.
        So why did you let up on the Taliban, first at the
    beginning of May and then at the end of our withdrawl in August
    right when we should have been hitting them harder to give
    Americans and Afghan partners time to evacuate.
        General McKenzie. Representative, the report about me
    meeting with the Taliban and telling them if they came inside a
    30-kilometer circle around Kabul is simply factually incorrect.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay. What about May?
        General McKenzie. In May, as through the rest of our
    redeployment period, we continued strikes on the Taliban. Those
    strikes, however, were limited to support of Afghan forces in
    close combat. We were not striking deep and we did not have a
    tremendous amount of resources compared to resources that we
    have had in the past. So those strikes, while effective in
    certain tactical situations, at no time were enough to change
    the strategic calculus of the campaign.
        Mr. Moulton. General McKenzie, you went from 2,500 troops
    in Afghanistan in April to 650 in July and then turned around
    and put 5,000 back into Kabul. You have said repeatedly that
    you personally believe the Afghan Government would fall if we
    didn't maintain a certain number of troops in country. So why
    didn't you plan for an evacuation and leave enough troops on
    the ground to conduct it?
        General McKenzie. So let's be very clear: The evacuation
    has to be ordered by the Department of State. The drawdown of
    U.S. forces was ordered by the President in April and completed
    in July. The noncombatant evacuation operation is a separate
    mission, and it was not completely under the control of the
    Department----
        Mr. Moulton. So you are going to fall back on the
    bureaucracy, the divide between DOD and State----
        General McKenzie. Well, Representative, I am going to fall
    back on the orders----
        Mr. Moulton [continuing]. All of those troops out and then
    had to put more back in?
        General McKenzie. I am going to fall back on the orders
    that I received, Representative.
        Mr. Moulton. Secretary Austin, you presided, in part, over
    the withdrawl of forces from Iraq, though I know you at times
    requested more troops on the ground. Two years later we had to
    send thousands of troops back into Iraq. Do you believe we will
    ever have to send troops back into Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Well, I certainly won't engage in a
    hypothetical. I would just say that obviously that is a
    decision that has to be made by the President and, you know,
    while I won't rule anything out, I would just say it is not
    preordained that we will go back or have to go back into
    Afghanistan, again. But if we do, the military will provide
    good credible options to be able to do that and to be
    effective.
        Mr. Moulton. Gentlemen, you and your predecessors asked
    tens of thousands of young Americans to fight in Afghanistan,
    and they did. And thousands died. Now you keep saying that our
    troops should be proud of that. Where here is a question sent
    to me by one of those soldiers. ``In twenty years our troops on
    the ground never lost a single battle, yet we lost the war--''
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The
    gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Moulton [continuing]. So what is left to be proud of?
        The Chairman. Seth, we are trying to run a meeting here,
    and if you wanted to read that letter, you should have read in
    the first 5 minutes when you had time. So I think it is
    something we need to hear and it is something we should have
    heard during the 5 minutes that you had. The gentleman's time
    has expired.
        Ms. Stefanik is recognized. She is appearing virtually.
        Ms. Stefanik, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Smith. I want to first
    start off by saying that I am honored and privileged to
    represent Fort Drum, home of the 10th Mountain Division the
    most deployed division in the U.S. Army since 9/11, and I want
    to take this opportunity to thank every soldier, every service
    men and women for deployment after deployment after the past
    two decades.
        The North Country, this committee, and this country are
    forever grateful for your service and sacrifice of both you and
    your families.
        I want to direct my question--the first question--to any of
    you on the panel today and it is about the evacuation and force
    protection efforts at the Hamid Karzai International Airport.
    Force protection efforts were made specifically as the ISIS-K
    threat intelligence came in before and after the suicide
    bombing at the airport.
        General McKenzie. Representative, first of all, the 10th
    Mountain was a key part of our defense there at the airport and
    I certainly appreciate their contribution to it. Force
    protection is something we balanced all the time against the
    requirement to let people come in and be processed and get on
    the airplanes. So we looked at that every day and, as you know,
    those two things are in tension and you have to balance them
    every day. We had over 300 credible intelligence reports of
    ISIS-K plans to attack the airport.
        Turns out that they were able to carry out one successful
    suicide vest attack. They also launched rockets at us. There
    were many other attacks that we were able to either vector
    Taliban elements onto prevent or perhaps the Taliban were able
    to prevent those by the outer cordon that they established. But
    force protection was a key thing that we balanced throughout
    the entire operation and we thought the risk was very high at
    all time, again, principally from ISIS-K. And I will pause
    there, ma'am.
        Ms. Stefanik. I am going to follow up. We depended upon the
    Taliban for security to get the evacuees and Americans behind
    enemy lines into the airport. Did the United States or
    coalition forces provide money, any form of payment, or
    assistance to the Taliban to expedite the evacuation of
    Americans as the security environment in Kabul deteriorated?
        General McKenzie. No, we did not. What we did was, we asked
    the Taliban to establish a cordon, about 1,000 meters, 1
    kilometer, beyond each of the gates where we could reduce the
    number of people that were coming down and showing up at the
    gates so we wouldn't have the possibility of a mass attack.
    They did that. They were not compensated or rewarded in any way
    for that. It was a very pragmatic, businesslike discussion. I
    don't trust the Taliban. I didn't trust them then; I don't
    trust them now. So that was the way we approached it.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, General McKenzie. And Secretary
    Austin, I just want to get the Department on record in addition
    to General McKenzie's answer. So there was no form of payment
    by the U.S. or coalition forces at any time during the
    evacuation to the Taliban?
        Secretary Austin. To my knowledge, there was none.
        Ms. Stefanik. And Chairman Milley?
        General Milley. I have no knowledge of any money that
    transmitted from any element of the United States Government to
    the Taliban whatsoever.
        Ms. Stefanik. My next question is, we are 20 years from the
    attacks on 9/11 and I obviously am from the State of New York
    and it is a very, very solemn occasion for all Americans, but
    particularly New Yorkers every year as we commemorate that
    date. I would like to get your assessment, is the terrorist
    threat from Afghanistan greater today or lesser than it was
    pre-9/11?
        I will start with you, Chairman Milley.
        General Milley. I think right this minute it is lesser than
    it was in 9/11; however, I think the conditions are set or
    could be set--and I testified to this yesterday and I will say
    it again. I have said it in public many times--the conditions
    could be set for a reconstitution of al-Qaida and/or ISIS.
        And I gave some specific times in my statement, and I stand
    by those. I think it is a real possibility in a not too distant
    future--6, 12, 18, 24, 36 months that timeframe--for
    reconstitution of al-Qaida or ISIS and it is our job now, under
    different conditions, but it is our job to continue to protect
    American citizens against attacks from Afghanistan.
        Ms. Stefanik. Secretary Austin, your response to that
    question?
        Secretary Austin. I would agree with General Milley that
    al-Qaida has been degraded over time. Now, terrorist
    organizations seek ungoverned spaces so that they can train and
    equip and thrive and so there is clearly a possibility that
    that can happen here going forward. Our goal is to maintain a
    laser-like focus on this so that it doesn't happen----
        The Chairman. And I apologize. The gentlelady's time has
    expired.
        Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to all our
    witnesses that are here today. And I want to start by just, you
    know, one of the things I like about this committee is that we
    are pretty bipartisan, but every once in a while, the partisan
    beast comes out and I am sure it happens from both sides of the
    aisle.
        This is my third term here. The administration from the
    other party not in power is oftentimes--depending what
    perspective you come to it, one is doing everything right and
    the other one is doing everything wrong, and I think it is
    important to shed light on things irrespective of the
    partisanship.
        One can argue that the agreement that President Trump
    reached with the terrorist Taliban in February 2020 was less
    than perfect and we should call that that from both sides of
    the aisle, and we can also argue that the exit from--the
    withdrawl was less than perfect. I certainly can say that I
    supported the Trump administration and the Biden administration
    in its goal to withdraw from Afghanistan, but, again, it has
    been less than perfect.
        And so for me, I just want to shed a little bit of light
    and refresh some of the memory on some of the numbers going
    back a little ways.
        So General Milley, I want to make sure that I understand
    our troop levels since the Doha Agreement that was reached with
    the terrorist Taliban, signed by President Trump between
    February 2020 when the agreement with the Taliban was signed to
    January 2021, and how many troops did the United States
    withdraw from Afghanistan--how many troops were withdrawn from
    January 2017 to January 2021?
        General Milley. 12,600 U.S. troops when the Doha Agreement
    was signed on that day.
        Mr. Carbajal. Can you repeat that, again?
        General Milley. 12,600 U.S. troops on 29 February 2020 with
    8,000 NATO and 10,500 contractors, and the contractors are
    particularly important here. With respect to on inauguration
    day, I am showing 3,500 U.S. troops. That is the 2,500 advisers
    and then there was some additional enablers that were over
    there; 3,500 U.S. troops on 20 January, 5,400 NATO, and 6,300
    contractors in Afghanistan on that day.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And I only draw attention to that
    to show the withdrawl that started many years before. Secretary
    Austin and General Milley, over the course of the 20 years in
    Afghanistan, the United States Special Inspector General for
    Afghanistan Reconstruction estimates that the United States
    spent $83 billion equipping and training the Afghanistan
    National Defense and Security Forces which included almost $10
    billion in aircraft and vehicles.
        We all saw the unexpected and appalling rate of how quickly
    the Afghan military folded under pressure from the Taliban.
        What do U.S. train and equip efforts in Afghanistan suggest
    about security cooperation operations going forward and what
    aspects about train and equip efforts do you think the
    Department should reassess?
        Secretary Austin. I will turn it over to General Milley
    here very quickly, but I think we should reassess everything
    soup to nuts. I think we put a valiant effort into providing
    the Afghans with a great capability.
        And at the end of the day that capability was not employed
    because the security forces fractured and essentially
    evaporated. So we need to look at ourselves to see what we did
    and whether or not that is the right thing to do going forward.
        General Milley. In my view, Congressman, I think when we do
    security force assistance, one of the things we have to guard
    against is mirror imaging. I think from the very beginning with
    the army, the Afghan Army, we wanted to create them in the
    image of the U.S. Army. I think a success story is the
    commandos with the special forces piece, but the broader Army
    became a mirror image, [inaudible]. That is one point.
        The second point is the police forces that was assigned
    under the Bonn agreement in 2002 to the Germans. The Germans
    wanted to make polizei and that sort of thing.
        And the third and last point is they became dependent upon
    us, contractors, U.S. air support, et cetera, and we have to
    avoid dependency on U.S. forces.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Dr. DesJarlais is recognized.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you all for
    being here today to answer our questions. I have had so many
    questions come from constituents in Tennessee that there is no
    way that we could even begin to get through them in 5 minutes,
    but let's jump right in.
        General Milley, on Bagram, in your professional military
    opinion, which facility, HKIA or Bagram Airfield, would have
    been most efficient in conducting the evacuation that we were
    forced to do?
        General Milley. HKIA. And there is a reason for that. The
    majority, the vast majority of those personnel that we expected
    to have to conduct a NEO with were located in Kabul. That is
    point one. Point two is, we were directed to maintain an
    Embassy open and also the international zone for the other
    allied nations.
        So we had to do it out of HKIA. Bagram would have been a
    plus, but it would have required exceptional levels of
    resources to do that.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I think all of you testified
    yesterday that it wasn't a matter of if the Afghan Army would
    fail and the Taliban would take over, it was a matter of when.
    You were all shocked by the rate at which it happened. The
    billions of dollars in equipment that was left behind has been
    under much scrutiny.
        Knowing that they were going to fail, why were more steps
    not taken to secure that military equipment or destroy it?
    Knowing that now it is a well-equipped Taliban army.
        Secretary Austin. So the number is a big number. So let me
    unpack that a little bit. First of all, the $84 billion
    included all of the----
        Dr. DesJarlais. I understand that. Let's just cut right to
    the equipment that was left behind. Why was so much left
    behind? Aircraft? MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
    Vehicles]? Weapons? Why was that there when you knew they were
    going to fail?
        Secretary Austin. The other thing I would say is that all
    of the equipment that we had that we were using, as I stated
    earlier, was evacuated by General Miller. Now, the reason that
    the Afghans had the equipment they had is because we wanted
    them to be successful and they could not be successful without
    the appropriate----
        Dr. DesJarlais. If they are watching these hearings
    yesterday and today, I am guessing that they probably feel like
    they were played as foolS because you all just said you knew
    they were going to fail. So here we have an army we built up,
    we used them until we didn't need them any more to accomplish
    Biden's objective and Trump's objective of getting out of
    Afghanistan; however, it went horribly wrong as we can probably
    all agree to.
        General Milley, you started today and talked about your
    commitment to your office. You are the principal military
    advisor to the President, correct?
        General Milley. That is correct.
        Dr. DesJarlais. And that is to President Trump and
    President Biden?
        General Milley. That is correct. And the Secretary of
    Defense and the National Security Council.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And Senator Blackburn yesterday asked
    you about your conversations with several book writers and you
    were fine with giving them your opinion and I think you said
    that you had a rather blunt forward phone call with House
    Speaker Nancy Pelosi?
        General Milley. True.
        Dr. DesJarlais. And you were--she was concerned over the
    safety of nuclear weapons?
        General Milley. Correct.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. In a transcript obtained from CNN
    Political, Woodward and Costa quoted Pelosi as saying--and this
    was to you: ``What I am saying to you is that they couldn't
    even stop him from an assault on the Capitol. Who even knows
    what else he may do? And is there anybody in charge at the
    White House who is doing anything but kissing his fat butt all
    over this?''
        Do you recall that?
        General Milley. I haven't seen the transcript.
        Dr. DesJarlais. I think that would be firmly imprinted on
    my mind----
        General Milley. Well, I would just say there was a lot of
    disparaging comments made and my focus was to assure her that
    the nuclear system and weapons were under control.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And according to Costa and Woodward,
    she went on to say, you know, he is crazy. He has been crazy
    for a long time to which they say--and I am sure you haven't
    had a chance to read the book yet--Milley responded, Madam
    Speaker, I agree with you on everything.
        If you are the principal advisor to the President and she
    said that to you, do you think that you were doing service to a
    President by agreeing with the Speaker that your Commander in
    Chief is crazy?
        General Milley. I actually said--I actually said I am not
    qualified to assess the mental health of the President. What I
    am agreeing to is that we have to have a secure nuclear system.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Have you had any conversations with the
    Speaker or any of our foreign leaders about our current
    President's mental capacity? We have a physician right here on
    the panel who was the personal physician to the prior three
    presidents who said President Biden should take a mental
    competency test and we see it in the press, his lack of ability
    to answer questions.
        Have you had any conversations with anybody concerning his
    ability to carry out a nuclear order or any other serious
    engagements?
        General Milley. No. And my answer would be the same. I am
    not qualified to evaluate a President's mental health or your
    mental health or anybody's mental health. I am not a doctor.
        Dr. DesJarlais. But you were concerned about Trump? You
    said you were concerned about him when you made the call to
    China?
        General Milley. No, I didn't. What I said to the call to
    China was I guarantee you that President Trump is not going to
    attack you in a surprise attack. I was carrying out his intent,
    President Trump's intent in order to protect the American
    people----
        The Chairman. And the gentleman's time has expired.
        General Milley [continuing]. To prevent an escalation or an
    incident.
        The Chairman. That was helpful.
        Mr. Brown is recognized.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Each of my questions
    have been asked and answered this morning. Therefore, I will
    use this seldom opportunity with the two most senior officials
    of the Pentagon to make a statement. We cannot ask our men and
    women in uniform to fight forever wars and I commend President
    Biden for recognizing this reality in bringing our troops home.
    But we know the threats faced in our country aren't solely on
    distant battlefields. For decades we have grappled with
    extremist ideologies within our own civilian communities and
    our military ranks, and there are no signs that we are winning
    this fight.
        As FBI Director Wray testified before the Senate Judiciary
    Committee earlier this year, January 6th was not an isolated
    event. Director Wray stated the problem of domestic extremism
    has been metastasizing across the country for a long time now
    and is not going away anytime soon. We know now that 12 percent
    of those charged in the riot on the Capitol had military
    experience with at least one indicted rioter on active military
    duty. That is well above the participant patient rate of adults
    in the military. The last time you both were before this
    committee, you spoke about the issue of extremism in our Armed
    Forces.
        General Milley, you stated from private to general there is
    no room for extremist behavior in the United States military
    and I commend you, Secretary Austin, for ordering the extremism
    stand down this past February to deal with the threat. You
    recognize this issue within the ranks, but I am gravely
    concerned that too many of our military leaders do not.
        In April, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing,
    STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command] Commander Admiral
    Richard said he was, quote, very confident that the number of
    extremists in my force is at zero. And at the same hearing,
    General Dickinson, Commander of Space Command, echoed that
    assessment claiming, ``In the formations that I have had
    throughout my career, I have not seen that. So I believe it is
    close to zero in my organization if not zero.'' This ignores
    the clear evidence on this issue.
        A 2019 Military Times survey found more than one-third of
    Active Duty service members have witnessed White nationalism or
    ideologically driven racism in the ranks. You yourself,
    Secretary Austin, spoke of your experiences with extremism
    while you were in uniform.
        The Army's CID's [Criminal Investigation Division's] 2020
    gang and domestic extremist activity threat assessment found a
    66 percent increase in gang or domestic extremist activity from
    the previous year and then in October of 2020, a Pentagon
    report to Congress detailed how domestic extremists actively
    recruit military personnel.
        We have a problem, the scope of which we don't fully
    understand, but Democrats and Republicans have asked the
    Department for a definition of extremism, improved screening
    processes, and a status report on implementation of
    recommendations. You still have not yet received it--We have
    not received it, which is why just last week the House passed
    the fiscal year 2022 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
    giving DOD additional authorities and resources to counter
    extremism in the Department.
        So I was extremely disappointed to see the administration's
    statement of policy which opposes the countering extremism
    provisions in the NDAA, citing overburdensome training and data
    collection requirements, not a single sentence suggests on how
    to improve the provisions just opposition to Congress.
        Congress is about to authorize and appropriate $768 billion
    to the Department, nearly $25 billion more than the President's
    budget request, yet the administration views additional data
    collection and training requirements to counter the threat of
    extremism as onerous.
        We heard the same pushback when it came to addressing
    sexual assault in the military for 10 years before the
    Department finally realized it was failing and that it needed
    greater tools. And we've documented systemic racism under the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice for at least 50 years, yet the
    Department is making little, if any, progress to address that.
        Whether it is sexual assault or racial injustice, the
    Department repeatedly tells Congress we can handle it,
    commanders are responsible, we are studying it, we are ready to
    fight tonight. We cannot wait years, let alone decades, in the
    face of obstinance from the Department before meeting the
    challenges of extremism in the Armed Forces. The time to
    address it is now.
        As this hearing reveals, there are many important issues
    for our military to address, in addition to the ongoing
    American Afghan evacuations and anticipated over-the-horizon
    operations. We have got to care for our troops and the families
    and that includes combating extremism in your formations in a
    way that we can take care of our troops and secure the Nation.
        So please stop fighting Congress. Partner with us and
    accept the tools that you need to fix the problem. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Kelly is recognized.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being
    here and, Chairman Milley, I just want to start, I understand
    the conversation with the Chinese leader. What I don't
    understand is you going to the press, Chairman Milley, and that
    disappointments me that you talked to the press about that.
    None of the other stuff, I think, you were--I am okay with
    that; I am not okay with you talking to the press or authors.
        I want to talk just a little bit about Bagram. There is two
    runways at Bagram and only one at HKIA. Is that correct?
        General McKenzie. That is correct.
        Mr. Kelly. So there is strategic value to two runways
    versus one. You would agree with that?
        General McKenzie. It is entirely dependent on the mission.
        Mr. Kelly. And the other thing is, there is standoff versus
    an urban environment and there are strategic advantages and
    disadvantages to that. You would agree with that, General
    McKenzie?
        General McKenzie. That is correct.
        Mr. Kelly. I want to talk a little bit about the strike on
    August the 29th, I think. Who set the rules of engagement?
    Where were the rules of engagement? At what level?
        General McKenzie. So under the rules of engagement, we
    would need to get into the details in a classified setting. We
    had----
        Mr. Kelly. No, I don't want to know what the rules of
    engagement were; I want to know whose rules of engagement were
    they.
        General McKenzie. The U.S. military's rules of engagement.
        Mr. Kelly. Was that President Biden's? Was that Secretary
    Austin's? Was that CENTCOM's?
        General McKenzie. They are wholly neutral as to the party
    in power. It has nothing to do with the rules of engagement.
        Mr. Kelly. Okay. And I want to refer to a New York Times
    article on March 3rd described a policy change of the Biden
    administration that placed greater restrictions on drone
    strikes and raids conducted outside conventional battlefield
    zones. Previously authorized by ground commanders, these
    operations now require White House approval.
        Did the strike on August 28th or 29th, the one that killed
    10 innocents, did it require Presidential approval prior to the
    strike?
        General McKenzie. No, it did not.
        Mr. Kelly. Okay. At what level, who was the approval
    authority for that strike?
        General McKenzie. The target engagement authority was
    forward in the theater at the over-the-horizon cell that
    oversees those activities.
        Mr. Kelly. At what level? One-star? Two-star? Three-star?
        General McKenzie. Flag officer level.
        Mr. Kelly. Flag officer level. Okay. And at what point,
    General McKenzie--and this is for all three of you--at what
    point did you know that the strike was bad; that it hit
    civilians?
        General McKenzie. So we knew the strike hit civilians
    within 4 or 5 hours after the strike occurred and U.S. Central
    Command released a press release saying that. We did not know,
    though, that the target of the strike was, in fact, an error--a
    mistake until some time later. It took us a few days to run
    that down, but we knew pretty soon----
        Mr. Kelly. Secretary Austin, when did you know it was a bad
    strike that killed civilians?
        Secretary Austin. As soon as General McKenzie reported that
    there were civilians that had been injured.
        Mr. Kelly. So 4 or 5 hours timeframe. That is all I need.
        Secretary Austin. Typically, as soon as that happens, we
    investigate. We begin an investigation.
        Mr. Kelly. When did you know that civilians were killed in
    that strike? That is my question. It is really easy. It is a
    time. It doesn't take much to answer that.
        Secretary Austin. Right. Several hours after that.
        Mr. Kelly. General Milley, same.
        General Milley. Same thing.
        Mr. Kelly. Okay. So I am assuming there is 15 sixes [O-6
    rank officers] at multiple levels that will get to see those
    investigations. There is a lot of questions I have that have to
    be in a classified environment, but I hope that you guys know I
    also sit on a different committee that has different insight to
    this and I think it is important that we know who authorized,
    at what level, and that we take accountability.
        Listen, I have made strikes. I have lived under rules of
    engagement. I have had rules of engagements I liked and didn't
    like. I have had to make hard decisions. I hope most of them
    are right, but I understand. I don't want to blame some O-6 or
    some O-5.
        I want to make sure we get the level and that the rules of
    engagement were proper and that they were followed at whatever
    level who didn't follow those or either wrote those because
    that just--I think the strike was done to show we had over-the-
    horizon capabilities and we didn't because we reported a
    secondary explosion that was not. We reported all kind of
    stuff.
        Now my next question is the other strike. Who did we kill?
        General McKenzie. I prefer to pass you that name in a
    classified setting.
        Mr. Kelly. Okay. Can you tell me, was it an HVT [high-value
    target] or just a low-level terrorist?
        General McKenzie. I think it was a facilitator and it was a
    good strike. We got someone who, while not directly involved in
    the attack on Abbey Gate on the 26th, certainly fell within
    that circle----
        Mr. Kelly. In a classified I would like to know that. And
    then my next question is, I just don't understand. I guess
    maybe I went to Union Public High School of 1,100. My math--11
    to 15,000 U.S. citizens, 5,400 out--that leaves thousands, not
    hundreds, left that want to get out.
        And I know for a fact every office here we had people
    calling us wanting to get out, U.S. citizens, that were not
    allowed to get in the gate or were kicked off the base or were
    not allowed out. And with that, I just ask, guys, we got to get
    our folks home.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Khanna is recognized.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Milley, I want to first thank you for your 42 years
    of service, for your principled commitment to civilian rule,
    for your commitment to military-to-military communication that
    kept this country safe for three decades during the Cold War,
    and for the sacrifice and patriotism that you and your family
    have shown. As a son of immigrants, I am in your family's debt.
    And I want to thank the three of you for ending America's
    longest war and executing the largest airlift in history.
        Now Secretary Austin, you have testified that had 2,500
    troops stayed past the deadline, the military would likely have
    needed reinforcements and I want to just make this clear: The
    choice for President Biden wasn't zero troops or 2,500 troops.
    It was zero troops or potentially many more troops.
        General Milley, just briefly, would you agree that at some
    point more than 2,500 troops would have been needed had the
    Taliban engaged in offensive strikes?
        General Milley. I am sorry. There is a reasonable prospect
    we would have had to increase forces past 2,500 given that the
    Taliban were very likely was going to start attacking us. And
    there was a range of forces. We are really talking about 2,500
    to 4,500, in that range.
        Mr. Khanna. Appreciate that. I want to talk about the
    strike that killed civilians, and I know--look, I think our
    military cares more about the loss of civilian life than any
    military in the world, any superpower ever in history. And that
    is why I think we ought to talk about this candidly and I
    brought pictures of the seven children who were killed, along
    with the three adults, to remind us that this is not what
    America wants; this is something that we need to prevent in the
    future.
        Press Secretary Kirby who did a fine job during those 10
    days said, you would support evacuating these family members as
    they have requested and resettling them in the U.S. Is that
    correct, Secretary Austin?
        Secretary Austin. It is.
        Mr. Khanna. My question is, can we get the family and the
    coworkers evacuated now and brought to safety? I get the legal
    hoops, but could that happen after? Can we just get them into
    the U.S. or some safe place?
        Secretary Austin. Well, we will continue to work through
    State Department channels to engage the family and if they
    desire to leave, then we will certainly do everything we can to
    facilitate getting them out.
        Mr. Khanna. I hope we can just expedite that and expedite
    the compensation. It is the moral thing to do, it is the right
    thing to do, it is how America conducts itself. And so I hope
    you will take that into consideration.
        General McKenzie, I admire and respect your leadership, but
    I want to see how we can improve the intelligence to prevent
    these kind of strikes in the future. One aspect you said is
    that there was a white Toyota Corolla that led to the attacks.
    I am sure you are aware, is there any car more common than a
    Toyota Corolla in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. It is a very common car. Of course, there
    were many other factors that went into that decision, not
    simply the fact that it was a Toyota Corolla.
        Mr. Khanna. According to the Stars and Stripes, roughly 90
    percent of cars registered in Afghanistan have been Corollas.
    One of the other things that concern me is, based on my reading
    and obviously you know more, the Corolla was parked next to a
    U.S. registered California-based NGO [non-governmental
    organization] that was delivering humanitarian assistance. And
    I guess the question is, did the DOD know about the NGO in
    advance of the strike?
        General McKenzie. I would prefer since that is under
    investigation now, I would like to defer that question.
        Mr. Khanna. I would just hope that we can make sure going
    forward that our Department will cross-check its intelligence
    to make sure that aid organizations are on no-strike lists. I
    assume that if there is an aid organization or hospital, those
    are on no-strike lists?
        General McKenzie. Representative, as are mosques, which are
    often used by ISIS-K as training sites as well.
        Mr. Khanna. Right. Again, I believe that our military goes
    through extraordinary lengths to prevent this. It is not to try
    to be an indictment of anyone; I just want to make sure we
    continue to improve the processes and that we do right by the
    families who suffered this unspeakable tragedy. Thank you,
    again, to the three of you for your leadership and thank you to
    everyone who served.
        Regardless of one's view in Afghanistan, I find the attacks
    on your integrity and patriotism to be a dishonor to this
    committee and a dishonor to your service.
        The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I have to ask the witnesses a question. We have a little
    complicated scheduling thing going on here. We are scheduled to
    have votes at 1:30-ish. My plan would be to, if we could go to
    that period, get through that, take the break then, but it has
    been a while. If you need a break earlier, we can take a 15-
    minute break at 12:30.
        And I wish there was an easier way to do this, but totally
    up to you. Would you like to break at 12:30 or would you like
    to just go until votes?
        Secretary Austin. I think we are good for right now,
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. If you need a break just, you know----
        Secretary Austin. We will fire the star cluster.
        The Chairman. We all have overprotective aides who are like
    pounding on us that they need a break, they need a break. So I
    just figured I would ask. So we will proceed and I appreciate
    that.
        Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
        General McKenzie, the Washington Post reported on August
    28th that the Taliban offered to allow the U.S. military to
    take responsibility for security in Kabul. Did you meet with
    Mullah Baradar to discuss such an offer?
        General McKenzie. I met with Mullah Baradar in Doha on 15
    August to pass a message to him that we were withdrawing and if
    they attempted to disrupt that withdrawl, we would punish them
    severely for that.
        Mr. Gallagher. But did he offer to allow you to have
    security over all of Kabul?
        General McKenzie. As part of that conversation, he said,
    well, why don't you just take security for all of Kabul. That
    was not why I was there. That was not my instruction. And we
    did not have the resources to undertake that mission.
        Mr. Gallagher. Did you convey the offer, however, to the
    President?
        General McKenzie. The offer was made in the presence of the
    President's Special Representative to Afghanistan.
        Mr. Gallagher. Do you know if the SRAP [U.S. Special
    Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan] conveyed it to the
    President?
        General McKenzie. I don't know, but it was conveyed to my
    chain of command.
        Mr. Gallagher. So who made the decision to turn down the
    Taliban offer to allow the U.S. military to secure Kabul and
    put the safety of our troops in the hands of the Taliban?
        General McKenzie. I did not consider that to be a formal
    offer and it was not the reason why I was there, so I did not
    pursue it. So if someone actually made a decision that would
    have been me.
        Mr. Gallagher. So we don't know if it was conveyed to the
    President? We don't know----
        General McKenzie. I do know it was conveyed to my chain of
    command.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay. In military terms, what do you call
    the retreat of military forces under security provided by and
    with the permission of enemy forces?
        General McKenzie. Don't know. I have never done one of
    those operations.
        Mr. Gallagher. I think you just did one of those
    operations.
        General McKenzie. I disagree.
        Mr. Gallagher. You disagree. So you did not withdraw forces
    from Afghanistan after negotiation with the Taliban?
        General McKenzie. That is correct. We did not do that.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So this would not be a conditional
    surrender, in your opinion?
        General McKenzie. This would not be a conditional
    surrender.
        Mr. Gallagher. Well, what would you describe the operation?
        General McKenzie. I would describe it as a noncombatant
    evacuation operation that we conducted with our own timing and
    with our own forces, and we warned the Taliban that if they
    interfered with that operation, we would strike them hard. They
    chose not to interfere with that operation.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So you are saying the meeting you had
    in Doha was just to let the Taliban know this is what we are
    doing, you know, take or leave it, but you were operating at
    that point under the agreement we had negotiated with the
    Taliban for surrender, right, the Doha Agreement?
        General McKenzie. I was there to tell the Taliban that we
    were conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation.
        Mr. Gallagher. Wait, wait. Not a NEO by DOD definition does
    not definitionally include the evacuation of combatants. You
    were also evacuating combatants. So the NEO was part of the
    operation?
        General McKenzie. Actually, no, you are wrong. When I met
    with the Taliban on 15 August, we had completed the withdrawal
    operation. Further forces that went in were forces that were
    core to the NEO operation and, in fact, DOD doctrine would
    include the insertion and extraction of combatant forces as
    part of a NEO operation----
        Mr. Gallagher. But what do we call the withdrawl of
    combatants whether it happened before----
        General McKenzie. It can be called a retrograde, it can be
    called a withdrawal.
        Mr. Gallagher. Was it in your orders, though? What were you
    tasked with doing?
        General McKenzie. I was tasked to conduct a noncombatant
    evacuation operation.
        Mr. Gallagher. Which you just said happened after you had
    withdrawn forces?
        General McKenzie. Largely, that is correct.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay. And you didn't get tasking--what did
    the tasking to withdrawl the forces call that operation?
        General McKenzie. I would have to go back and take a look
    at it. I believe it was a withdrawl.
        Mr. Gallagher. Withdrawl. Okay. Which I believe the
    definition is a repositioning of forces. I would call it a
    conditional surrender. I guess we will have to check the
    dictionary definition on that. Just to go to something that
    General Milley said before, has al-Qaida sworn bayat to the
    Taliban?
        General McKenzie. I believe there is a deep relationship
    between the Taliban----
        Mr. Gallagher. But have they sworn bayat? Just yes or no.
        General McKenzie. I couldn't answer that question for you
    right now.
        Mr. Gallagher. Oh. I believe General Milley said it before.
    Has the Taliban renounced the previous oath that al-Qaida
    swore?
        General McKenzie. The Taliban and al-Qaida have a very
    close relationship, and I do not expect the Taliban to
    seriously interfere with their basing and repositioning in
    Afghanistan, which is, I think, the question you are asking.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay. Yeah. Let me get at it a different
    way. The new interior minister for the Taliban Government is
    Sirajuddin Haqqani. He is a known al-Qaida associate. Is there
    any evidence that he or the Haqqani network has broken with al-
    Qaida?
        General McKenzie. None.
        Mr. Gallagher. Did the March attack on FOB [Forward
    Operating Base] Chapman breach the Doha Agreement, in your
    opinion?
        General McKenzie. No, it did not.
        Mr. Gallagher. It did not. General McKenzie, do you know
    which Taliban forces were actually providing security in front
    of the airport?
        General McKenzie. Yes, we do.
        Mr. Gallagher. Was it Badri 313?
        General McKenzie. They were part of it. There were other
    elements as well. It was a hodgepodge of units----
        Mr. Gallagher. But Badri 313 was part----
        General McKenzie. Among others.
        Mr. Gallagher. Among others? A group that specialized in
    suicide bombing attacks. Had the suicide bomber been
    imprisoned--I think you suggested to Congresswoman Hartzler
    that the suicide bomber might have been in prison in Bagram
    before. Do we know?
        General McKenzie. I don't believe--I don't recall
    suggesting that.
        Mr. Gallagher. Okay. So do we know whether he had been?
        General McKenzie. We are still working very hard to find
    out where the suicide bomber came from.
        Mr. Gallagher. Did we have an opportunity to take him out
    prior to the suicide bombing attack?
        General McKenzie. We did not.
        Mr. Gallagher. We did not have an opportunity to take him
    out. And just, finally, does the over-the-horizon posture that
    we are now adopting, would that be more or less difficult now
    that we are out of the country?
        General McKenzie. I have said on the record it will be very
    difficult to do. It is not impossible to do.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Kim is recognized.
        Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McKenzie, I wanted to start with you. You said
    reports about you engaging with the Taliban about a red line
    around Kabul before its fall were false. Does that mean that
    there was no discussion or consideration in the U.S. of a plan
    to defend Kabul in early August before its fall?
        General McKenzie. There was never a discussion about a plan
    to defend Kabul before its fall. I will say that when I went to
    Doha, I took with me a graphic. It was a map of Kabul with a
    30-kilometer ring on the outside. Our original proposal was, we
    would ask the Taliban to stay outside that ring, but we were
    not going to threaten them. We felt that was the best way to do
    deconfliction; however, on the day of the meeting, they were
    already in downtown Kabul, so the graphic was outdated and we
    had to proceed from the new reality.
        Mr. Kim. Secretary Austin, I wanted to get your thoughts on
    this. When I spent some time in the Situation Room with you in
    2014 when we were fearing the fall of Erbil and Baghdad, U.S.
    CENTCOM Commander immediately drew up some CONOPS [concept of
    operations] defending those positions using air assets. The
    effort was to buy time for the Iraqis and the Iraqi Kurds to
    reconstitute.
        Did it not cross your mind to consider something like that
    in early August before the fall of Kabul?
        Secretary Austin. This is certainly something we
    considered, you know. We took a look at what we would need to
    do to protect the Embassy and if we had to do a NEO, what could
    we do to buy time for that operation to take place.
        Mr. Kim. Chairman Milley, I wanted to switch to you.
    Yesterday you said that you were asked on August 25th to make a
    decision about the August 31st deadline. Was there an actual
    formal request made to the Taliban by the United States to stay
    past August 31st? Was that a request that was then denied that
    you were taking into account in that decision?
        General Milley. I don't make decisions, Congressman. I
    provide advice.
        Mr. Kim. In your recommendation.
        General Milley. I was asked for what is called best
    military advice. I am not aware of a formal request to the
    Taliban one way or the other on staying past the 31st. I am
    very familiar with the advice that we provided on the 25th.
        Mr. Kim. Before the fall of Kabul, did we actually have
    formal Taliban agreement upon an August 31st departure date?
        General Milley. I am not sure what you mean by ``formal,''
    but I do--I think----
        Mr. Kim. Had there ever been a point where the United
    States went to the Taliban saying that we are planning to leave
    on August 31st? I am talking about prior to the fall of Kabul.
        General Milley. I think from a policy perspective Zal
    Khalilzad could give you the detailed information on that. I do
    believe the Taliban knew that we were departing on the 31st. We
    announced it.
        Mr. Kim. But you weren't aware of it----
        General Milley. I am not aware of a formal agreement per
    se, but I think Zal Khalilzad could give you better definition
    of that.
        Mr. Kim. General McKenzie, I want to turn back to you then
    because you were saying that you talked with the Taliban on
    August 15th. Did you use August 31st as a date to end the
    operations? Was there a date set at all in your discussions
    with----
        General McKenzie. I did not use a specific date when I
    talked to them.
        Mr. Kim. So no date was set on August 15th----
        General McKenzie. I did not convey a specific date as part
    of my conversation.
        Mr. Kim. I wanted to switch gears one more time here.
        Secretary Austin, moving forward, when we are looking at
    the fundamental viability of the over-the-horizon effort, is
    the air space over Afghanistan currently considered sovereign
    air space? And I guess I will frame it in a slightly different
    way. Is it currently legal for the United States to conduct ISR
    sorties and air strikes in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Yes.
        Mr. Kim. Under what authority is that legal?
        Secretary Austin. Same authority as we were using before.
        Mr. Kim. And that would be under the Security and Defense
    Cooperation Agreement of 2014. Is that correct?
        Secretary Austin. No. I think what we are prosecuting now
    is--are the authorities that were referred to by General
    McKenzie earlier and you mentioned he would have to take that
    into a classified setting.
        Mr. Kim. Okay. I will certainly follow with you that way.
    General McKenzie, something I wanted to follow with you on.
    Yesterday in your hearing in front of the Senate, you made a
    comment when asked about the war on terror and you said that
    the war on terror is not over, but then you also went on and
    said that the war in Afghanistan is not over. So I just wanted
    a clarification from you. In your opinion, is the war in
    Afghanistan over?
        General McKenzie. So I believe the war in Afghanistan is
    not over. I believe we are no longer a party to that war, but
    that doesn't mean that ISIS and the Taliban aren't going to
    engage in a furious fight this fall that may result in ISIS
    being crushed or it may result----
        Mr. Kim. Oh, I see. So when you are saying that you are
    referring that you believe that there is a civil war in
    Afghanistan, but in terms of the United States war against
    Afghanistan, you would say that that is over?
        General McKenzie. We have no forces in Afghanistan. Our
    only interest in Afghanistan is looking for ISIS-K----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Gaetz is recognized.
        Mr. Gaetz. February 26, 2020, House Armed Services
    Committee, General Mark Milley: ``We know we are not going to
    defeat the Taliban militarily and they are not going to defeat
    the Government of Afghanistan militarily''. You really blew
    that call, didn't you, General?
        General Milley. I believe that that was an issue of
    strategic stalemate and that if we had remained in Afghanistan
    with the advisory levels of effort, then the Government of
    Afghanistan----
        Mr. Gaetz. Well, that is an interesting answer to a
    question. It is just not what I asked. You spent more time with
    Bob Woodward on this book than you spent analyzing the very
    likely prospect that the Afghanistan Government was going to
    fall immediately to the Taliban, didn't you?
        General Milley. Not even close, Congressman.
        Mr. Gaetz. Oh, really? Because you said right after Kabul
    fell that no one could have anticipated the immediate fall of
    the Ghani government. When did you become aware that Joe Biden
    tried to get Ghani to lie about the conditions in Afghanistan?
    He did that in July. Did you know that right away?
        General Milley. I am not aware of what President Biden----
        Mr. Gaetz. You are not aware of the phone call that Biden
    had with Ghani where he said, whether it is true or not, we
    want you to go out there and paint a rosy picture of what is
    going on in Afghanistan? You are the chief military adviser to
    the President. You said that the Taliban was not going to
    defeat the Government of Afghanistan militarily, which, by the
    way, they cut through them like a hot knife through butter, and
    then the President tries to get Ghani to lie. When did you
    become aware of that attempt?
        General Milley. There is two things there, Congressman, if
    I may. One is what I said was the situation was stalemate and
    if we kept advisers with there, the Government of Afghanistan
    and the army would have still been there. That is what I said.
    Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but----
        Mr. Gaetz. Seems wrong now with the Taliban in control. I
    have a question for Secretary Austin.
        Secretary Austin, are you capable of assessing whether
    another has the will to fight?
        Secretary Austin. No, we are not and that is the point that
    the Chairman made earlier.
        Mr. Gaetz. That is just like an incredibly disappointing
    thing for the Secretary of Defense to simply say, I can't
    assess whether someone has the will to fight, but it is
    consistent with your record.
        I mean, during the Obama administration, I think they gave
    you about $48 million to go train up some folks in Syria to go
    take on the Assad government and I think your testimony was
    that only four or five survived first contact with the enemy.
        So what confidence should this committee have in you or
    should the country have in you when you have now confessed to
    us and whether it is the swing and a miss in Afghanistan that
    General Milley talked to the Senate about yesterday, total
    failure, or whether it was your failures in Syria, you don't
    seem capable to look at a fighting force and determine whether
    or not they have the will. Is that an embarrassment?
        Secretary Austin. Well, you will recall, Congressman, that
    the end result was the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] that we
    stood up that was very, very instrumental in turning the tide
    of battle up in Syria.
        Mr. Gaetz. Oh, yeah. Turned it so much you got Assad in
    power in Syria, you got the Taliban in power in Afghanistan.
    Where have you been?
        Secretary Austin. The focus was ISIS, Congressman, and
    those forces had significant affect on the ISIS network.
        Mr. Gaetz. It just seems like you are chronically bad at
    this and you have admitted that, I guess, which is to your
    credit, but when people in the military like Lieutenant Colonel
    Stuart Scheller stand up and demand accountability, when they
    say that you all screwed up, when they point out that General
    Milley's statement that the Government of Afghanistan is not
    going to get defeated by the Taliban, well, he ends up in the
    brig and you all end up in front of us and your former employer
    Raytheon ends up with a lot of money, and we have poured cash
    and blood and credibility into a Ghani government that was a
    mirage. It fell immediately. And while the guy sitting next to
    you was off talking to Phil Rucker and was off doing his thing
    with Bob Woodward, we were buying into the big lie, the big lie
    that this was ever going to be successful and that we could
    ever rely on the Afghanistan Government for anything at all.
        You know, General Milley, you kind of gave up the game
    earlier when you said you wanted to address elements of your
    personal conduct that were in question. We are not questioning
    your personal conduct. We are questioning in your official
    capacity going and undermining the chain of command, which is
    obviously what you did. You have created this whole change----
        General Milley. I did not undermine the chain of command--
    --
        Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, you did. You absolutely did.
        General Milley. Did not.
        Mr. Gaetz. Well, you know what? You said yesterday that you
    weren't going to resign when Senators asked you this question
    and I believe that you guys probably won't resign. You seem to
    be very happy failing up over there, but if we didn't have a
    President that was so addled, you all would be fired because
    that is what you deserve. You have let down the people who wear
    the uniform in my district and all around this country. And you
    are far more interested in what your perception is and how
    people think about you and insider Washington books than you
    care about winning----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Ms. Houlahan is recognized.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And, gentlemen, I
    apologize for the behavior of my colleague. I am deeply, deeply
    appreciative of your service and of the decades of experience
    that you all bring to this conversation. Thank you so much for
    the opportunity to ask important questions of you, questions
    that ought to be asked of you in the spirit of our
    responsibility of oversight rather than provocation.
        So I just have a couple of questions of clarification from
    this testimony that has happened so far, and the first one is
    for you, General McKenzie. You mentioned something about in
    your opening remarks about you having looked at different
    branches to account for the complete collapse of the government
    and the Afghan military. That is the first time, frankly, that
    I have heard that scenario being articulated out loud.
        Most of the testimony that I have heard prior to this has
    been we could have never foreseen that. So as somebody who is a
    branching engineer type person, that is what I do, I am
    intrigued to see if that is, indeed, what you did have and what
    the likelihood you put to that and the cost that you associated
    with that would be.
        General McKenzie. So, as we drew up the NEO plan, one of
    the assumptions of the NEO plan was that the Afghan military
    would be able to continue to secure HKIA, the airfield, because
    the Turks were there, but they only actually secured a small
    fraction of the airfield, maybe 20 percent of it. The rest of
    that long perimeter around the entire runway was actually
    secured by Afghan military forces.
        So our assumption was they would continue to perform that
    function. But we also--since we stated that as an assumption,
    by the way we plan, we have to say if that assumption is wrong,
    because an assumption is a future hypothetical condition that
    we believe is going to occur, we felt that was always something
    that we should challenge.
        So we developed a plan if that assumption failed, if they
    melted away. So we had a branch plan that was developed as part
    of the overall NEO plan where we would introduce adequate
    combat forces to physically take over securing the perimeter of
    that airfield in case the ANDSF did melt away. Well, as we got
    into the first week of August, it began to look increasingly
    likely that they would melt away.
        So I talked to the Secretary, talked to the Chairman, and
    we agreed to begin to flow forces in for that contingency.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. And my question to you related
    for--all three of you, and perhaps we'll start with you,
    General, is, how long have you believed that the Afghan
    military might not be up to the task of taking over and
    maintaining security against the Taliban?
        We discussed a lot of different timelines over the course
    of the last few months. Has it been inevitable for 5 or 10
    years? How long have you been relaying that information or that
    concern possibly to any of our senior leaders or senior
    administration if you could share that with us as well.
        General McKenzie. Ma'am, so I will start. I think it
    actually from the relatively short-term perspective, I think
    the Doha Agreement and the signing of the Doha Agreement had a
    really pernicious affect on the Government of Afghanistan and
    on its military. Psychological more than anything else, but we
    set a date certain for when we were going to leave and when
    they could expect all assistance to end.
        So for the first time there was something out there in
    front of them. Now, I also--I think that is an important thing.
    The other point would be it has been my position and my
    judgment that if we went below an advisory level of 2,500, I
    believe that the government of Afghanistan would likely
    collapse and that the military would follow. And one might go
    before the other, but I believe that was going to be the
    inevitable result of drawing down to zero. And I have expressed
    that opinion in writing for quite a while.
        Now, so taking a look at that, that was sort of my best
    judgment on that. I believe that--so going below 2,500, I
    think, was the other sort of nail in the coffin, if you will,
    that allowed the Afghan--that led to conditions where, first of
    all, we could no longer see what was happening to the force
    because our advisers were no longer down there with those
    units.
        So let me give you an example. If we shipped a box of
    mortar rounds into Afghanistan, we would sign it over on the
    ramp at HKIA and the Afghans would truck it away. There would
    be nobody below that level to help them disburse it, to see if
    it went to the bazaar, or if it went down to the unit that
    needed mortar rounds.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        And, Secretary Austin, it looked like you had something to
    contribute as well.
        Secretary Austin. I certainly agree with the comments that
    General McKenzie has made. I would just add to that that as a
    part of that agreement, we agreed to cease conducting air
    operations against the Taliban. So the Taliban got stronger,
    they increase their offensive operations against the Afghan
    Security Forces and the Afghans were losing a lot of people on
    a weekly basis.
        In addition to that, we caused them to release 5,000
    prisoners, you know, and those prisoners, many of those
    prisoners, went back to fill the ranks of the Taliban. So they
    got a lot stronger, they continued their attacks. You know, we
    got smaller. And so I agree with General McKenzie. That is when
    you could begin to see things really begin to go in a different
    direction----
        Ms. Houlahan. So with the last 4 seconds, I very much
    appreciate your time and a very intriguing that it seems like
    the Doha Agreement might have been a pivotal point. And thank
    you.
        And with that, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Bacon is recognized.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Milley, you
    said today that you saw this as a strategic failure. As a 30-
    year veteran and someone who has been deployed four times
    myself, and I haven't served as long as the three of you, but
    it breaks our heart and I think most veterans feel heartbroken
    knowing that both the blood and the treasure split was----ended
    up in a strategic failure. I think we are enraged by it.
        Then we have the President come out and say that this was a
    success. He had no regrets. That does not break our heart; that
    makes us mad as hell that he would say it that way. So I wanted
    to say that upfront.
        Secondly, the fact that President Biden on ABC said that no
    one that he can recall advised him to keep a force of about
    2,500 troops in Afghanistan. It is not true. We heard yesterday
    and we have heard today that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    and the CENTCOM Commander advised differently. I have no other
    view to see this as a lie, a falsehood from our President. That
    makes us mad as hell too. Thirdly, I think it is important to
    point out that this committee for well over a year cautioned
    both Presidents against a premature withdrawl from Afghanistan.
        In fact, Republican and Democratic members of both the
    House and Senate were so concerned at the risk of a calendar-
    based withdrawl that we passed a lot to prevent it. In fact,
    the chairman of this committee voted for one that restricted
    President Trump. Section 1215 of the 2021 NDAA prohibited any
    President, regardless of political party, from drawing down
    below 2,500 troops until the Secretary of Defense in
    consultation with the Secretary of State and the DNI provided
    Congress a detailed plan explaining how the U.S. would continue
    to conduct counterterror operations in Afghanistan following
    U.S. withdrawl.
        How would the U.S. conduct an orderly transition of
    security functions to the Afghan military? And how would the
    U.S. protect Americans who remained in country and how would
    the U.S. coordinate any such withdrawl with our NATO allies?
        In short, every single failure that we are now witnessing,
    Congress warned against in writing in a law over a year ago.
    But after taking office, President Biden I am referring to
    wrote, to the--we wrote to the Biden administration reminding
    them it was not permitted to go below 2,500 until it provided
    assurances to Congress that our vital interest could be
    secured.
        Despite clear congressional intent backed by statute this
    did not happen. The day after taking office, the newly
    confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl
    wrote to the members of this committee essentially stating that
    President Biden was smarter than Congress, was confident he had
    all the angles covered, and believed it was not in the national
    interest to provide Congress with the assurances required in
    section 1215.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter this letter
    into the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 131.]
        Mr. Bacon. Okay, my first question here: General McKenzie,
    I think one of the reasons that the Afghan forces crumbled much
    quicker than we ever assessed was that we pulled most of our
    air cover, we took the mechanics away from the Afghan forces,
    and we pulled out a lot of our logistics capabilities.
        Do you see this as underlying reasons why the Afghan forces
    collapsed?
        General McKenzie. I think all of those reasons contributed
    to why they collapsed.
        Mr. Bacon. Should it have even surprised us, when we take
    away most of our air power that they were used to having, that
    that would just pull the rug out from underneath them? General.
        General McKenzie. Well, my position all along has been, if
    you go to zero, if you go to a state where you are not going to
    be able to maintain their forces on the ground, that a collapse
    is inevitable.
        I have to further say, I did not see it coming as fast as
    it did. I thought it would be a matter of into the fall or into
    the winter. I did not see it happen in 11 days in August.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        General Milley, I appreciate your candor about this being a
    strategic failure. How does this embolden al-Qaida, ISIS, and
    what does it do to Russia, China, and Iran, seeing how we
    responded in this retreat?
        General Milley. I think the Taliban sitting in Kabul
    significantly emboldens the radical jihadi movement globally.
    The analogy I have used with many others is, it likely will put
    a shot of adrenaline into their arm. Their grandfathers
    defeated the Soviet Union in the war in Afghanistan many, many
    years ago, and they are taking this on their own networks right
    now and declaring it a major victory. So I think it is a big
    morale boost.
        I think it remains to be seen--I think the Russians are
    quite scared--not ``scared''--I guess, concerned of terrorists
    coming across the borders into their near abroad.
        China is very complicated. They've got a significant issue
    in their western hemis--or in their western part of their
    country.
        I think Iran now has to deal with a very complicated issue
    on their border that may or may not be friendly----
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, General.
        I yield.
        The Chairman. And I do want to make a comment, because I
    actually watched the George Stephanopoulos interview before
    this hearing. Joe Biden did not say that no one suggested that
    we should keep 2,500 troops there.
        Mr. Bacon. I read the quote, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I have the time at the moment----
        Mr. Bacon. It was my quote.
        The Chairman. I have the time.
        Mr. Bacon. Well, it better not be inaccurate.
        The Chairman. And what he said was, you cannot have 2,500
    troops stay there in a stable situation.
        So we should at least be accurate about what information
    was provided. I would urge everyone to go back and actually
    look at the words and not take what is being said here as
    accurate.
        Mr. Bacon. Chairman, I read the quote.
        The Chairman. I read it too, and I read it with a clear,
    open vision of what he was saying, not with a bent to try and
    make sure that we could successfully have a partisan attack on
    him.
        He was asked, could they stay there in a stable
    environment? That is the option he said wasn't on the table,
    not because it wasn't offered, but because it didn't exist.
        And, while we are ripping apart these three gentlemen here,
    I want to remind everybody that the decision the President made
    was to stop fighting a war that, after 20 years, it was proven
    we could not win. There was no easy way to do that. If he just
    kept----
        Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I believe that General Bacon was
    clear----
        The Chairman. If he had just kept----
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. And needs to be defended. Thank
    you.
        The Chairman. I would be happy to yield Mr. Rogers time
    when I am done.
        What he made clear was we needed to stop fighting a war
    that, for 20 years--we have had these conversations over and
    over again. Democrats bash on the Republican President more
    than they bash on the Democratic Presidents. Republicans bash
    on the Democratic Presidents more than they bash on the
    Republican Presidents.
        But the end result was the same: 20 years of an endless
    series of decisions by very intelligent, very capable, very
    committed people. Any implication that the three gentlemen in
    front of us are not very capable, very intelligent, and very
    committed to this country is simply partisan, political
    opportunism.
        We can look at 20 years. Pick your favorite general, pick
    your favorite President, pick your favorite leader. Okay? None
    of them could successfully do what so many members of this
    committee are sitting here telling these gentlemen that they
    are basically idiots for not being able to do.
        We should pause for just a moment and think about the fact
    that maybe that's the wrong argument. Maybe the mission itself
    was really hard to achieve.
        And what President Biden said is: We are done. We are not
    going to have these hearings anymore. We are not going to have
    the funerals anymore. We are not going to lose the
    servicemembers, fighting a war that it is clear we cannot be
    successful.
        And we all pick nits on that decision, that decision, why
    didn't you say this, why didn't you do that. Twenty years of a
    whole lot of different people leading has led us to this point,
    and we said, we are going to stop. Once----
        Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman----
        The Chairman [continuing]. We said that----
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. This is inconceivable.
        The Chairman [continuing]. It was not----
        Mr. Wilson. They are bringing the war here.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Going to----
        Mr. Wilson. The war is not over. It is coming to America.
        The Chairman. Joe----
        Mr. Wilson. The funerals are here----
        The Chairman. I----
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Mr. Chairman. And we count on you
    and your leadership and these----
        The Chairman. It is clear----
        Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Generals to know the war is not
    over.
        The Chairman. It is clear----
        Mr. Bacon. A point of order. Chairman, we are not done with
    this war.
        The Chairman. The point is, yes, we are going to have to
    continue to contain this threat----
        Mr. Rogers. And 20 years of mistakes----
        The Chairman [continuing]. No question about it, but----
        Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Aren't an excuse for the failure--
    --
        The Chairman [continuing]. Having U.S. troops in
    Afghanistan----
        Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Of the withdrawal.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Was not succeeding.
        Mr. Bacon. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman. I have to make that point.
        Mr. Rogers is the Ranking Member on the committee, and I
    will give him the time to respond.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I did note the Stephanopoulos interview, and I disagree
    with your interpretation. Mr. Stephanopoulos came back and
    asked him again, ``So you are saying that nobody advised you to
    leave the troops,'' and that was his response.
        But I think the general officers here and the Secretary
    have made it very clear that they gave the President advice
    that he wouldn't listen to. The last President, they gave him
    advice, and he did listen to it.
        So, I mean, I am not challenging and I have not in any way
    disparaged these great gentlemen. In fact, in my opening
    remarks, I made it abundantly clear, I don't want them
    shouldering blame for what happened on this withdrawal, when it
    was the administration and the State Department and National
    Security Advisor.
        And, with that, I will yield----
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Rogers, for correcting the
    record.
        Mr. Rogers [continuing]. A minute to Mr. Bacon.
        The Chairman. Mr. Crow is recognized.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dovetailing on Chairman Smith's comment, I just can't help
    but think back to my last deployment in Afghanistan in 2005.
    And there was a moment where I had been awake for several days,
    walking with a heavy rucksack in the mountains of Afghanistan,
    and wondering and asking myself, where was the debate? Why
    weren't people asking the questions then? Why weren't people
    paying attention?
        I am glad they are now. I am glad we are having this
    debate. But, as Chairman Smith adequately pointed out, we could
    have been doing this a long time ago. Four administrations,
    Republican and Democrat; 10 Congresses, Republican and
    Democrat--this is a 20-year conflict that our country owns, and
    we have to have a broader discussion. It is not a 2-month
    conflict.
        And I appreciate your candor, and I appreciate the
    seriousness with which all three of you have dealt with this.
        So, with that in mind, the fact that there are serious
    issues that have to be addressed, I have two lines of
    questioning, one about our continuing obligation to our
    partners and the next about the planning in advance of the
    evacuation.
        Now, I want to start the partner question with the
    recognition that I believe firmly that all three of you share
    as deeply as I do a sense that we have a continuing obligation,
    because all three of you served, and I know that all three of
    you have friends who are still there. They have names and
    faces. So I am not going to question your commitment to this.
        The Department has a very narrow but important role going
    forward here, and that role is to provide employment
    verification to folks so they can be properly vetted and
    evacuated. That is very hard to do without boots on the ground
    now.
        So what can the Department do more going forward, and what
    is the plan to do that employment verification, to get that
    paperwork in the hands of our friends so we can get them
    evacuated?
        Secretary Austin. One of my Under Secretaries is leading an
    effort to ensure that we can help improve the process of
    employment verification.
        If you think back 20 years, you know, ago, when people were
    actually helping us, helping contractors that were working for
    us, some of the documentation, very, very difficult to get your
    hands on now.
        So we are working to see what we can do to improve this. We
    want to work with Congress to--if there is any way that we can
    adjust requirements or adjust, you know, our ability to ease
    this process along, we certainly want to do that.
        But this--we are taking this on in a very serious way.
        Mr. Crow. Well, I appreciate that, and we stand ready and
    willing to continue to work with you to solve this. Because,
    certainly, our combat operations are over, but we have that
    continued obligation, as you have often noted.
        The last is about the evacuation planning. There were two
    tabletop rehearsals, one in June and one in August. The June 11
    one dealt with the processing of evacuees. These are
    interagencies--interagency tabletop exercises that involve the
    Department of State. The August 6 one, my understanding, dealt
    with scenarios for both a permissive and a nonpermissive NEO.
        So, for the August 6 tabletop, the State Department was
    involved in that tabletop. Coming out of that tabletop
    exercise, did the Department have, in your opinion, adequate
    understanding as to the State Department's plan and role to
    conduct vetting and processing of evacuees at HKIA?
        General McKenzie. I believe they did, but I also urged
    State--I felt that, by nature, the Department of Defense can
    move very fast on issues like this. I felt that we were not
    completely aligned with State on that. There were still some
    things they could do faster.
        And I believe they tried their very best to address those,
    particularly in terms of providing additional processing power,
    if you will, to move people through the chain, from the
    consular officers and other people, to move them forward. State
    representatives took that message on board very seriously at
    the tabletop exercises.
        Mr. Crow. So the lack of complete alignment, in your view,
    has to do with the processing power that was necessary to push
    forward on the ground?
        General McKenzie. There were probably other things. That
    was the--from my perspective, as who was going to be
    responsible for identifying people, getting them out of
    Afghanistan, and getting them into the pipeline, that is what I
    was personally most concerned about. There were other issues;
    that was my principal concern.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        General Milley. Congressman Crow, if I could just--there
    were two other sessions before that, 28 April and 8 May. I
    think we owe you some answers for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 146.]
        Mrs. Luria [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I now recognize Mr. Banks for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Banks. Thank you.
        General Milley, why is it important for the military to be
    nonpolitical?
        General Milley. I think an apolitical military is critical
    to the health of this Republic.
        Mr. Banks. General, why did you spend--you have already
    established yesterday and today that you spent a significant
    amount of time talking to political book authors and political
    reporters, including Bob Woodward. What compelled you to do
    that?
        General Milley. I believe that part of my job is to
    communicate to the media what we do as a government, what we do
    as a military, to explain to the people. And so I do interviews
    regularly, with print media, books, documentaries, videos on
    TV, TV interviews. I think it is part of a senior official's
    job to be transparent, and I believe in a free press.
        Mr. Banks. What happens when a military general becomes a
    political figure?
        General Milley. I have done----
        Mr. Banks. You would agree that it is dangerous?
        General Milley. I think it is dangerous, and I have done my
    best to remain personally apolitical, and I try to keep the
    military out of actual domestic politics. And I have made a
    point of that from the time I became the Chairman and
    especially beginning last summer.
        Mr. Banks. You told the Senate yesterday you hadn't read
    the book or any of the other political books that have come
    out, but I don't know how anybody could read the Bob Woodward
    book--I don't know how you could read it and not be greatly
    embarrassed about its contents, especially in how it is related
    to you.
        Are you embarrassed by the book?
        General Milley. I haven't read the book yet----
        Mr. Banks. Are you embarrassed by the portrayals of the
    book? No doubt you are aware of them.
        General Milley. Embarrassed, no. I am concerned that there
    is mischaracterizations of me becoming very politicized as an
    individual and that it is my willingness to become politicized,
    which is not true. I am trying to stay apolitical, and I
    believe I am. That is part of my professional ethic.
        And I am trying to keep the military, the actual military,
    out of actual domestic politics. I think that is critical to
    this Republic.
        Mr. Banks. Do you regret with speaking with Bob Woodward?
        General Milley. No. I think that it is important for me to
    speak to the media.
        Mr. Banks. I want to talk about some of the contents of the
    book. Since you haven't read it----
        General Milley. Okay.
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. Maybe I can read some of it to you.
        We have already heard a little bit about the back-and-forth
    with you and Speaker Pelosi. But, in that conversation, you
    said--in a phone call with Speaker Pelosi, she said, quote,
    ``Republicans are enablers of President Trump's behavior. You
    know he's crazy. He's been crazy for a long time.'' You
    replied, ``I agree with you on everything.''
        That was repeated three times in the prologue of the book
    ``Peril,'' that you told Speaker Pelosi you agree with her on
    everything.
        Is that an accurate portrayal of your recounting to Bob
    Woodward about those conversations?
        General Milley. Not exactly, no. I think that--in fact, I
    know----
        Mr. Banks. So is Bob Woodward wrong? Is that portrayal
    wrong?
        General Milley. In fact, I know what I said, which was,
    ``Madam Speaker, I am not qualified to determine the mental
    health or assess the mental health of this President----
        Mr. Banks. Did you tell----
        General Milley [continuing]. Or any President.''
        Mr. Banks.--the Speaker that you agreed with her on
    everything?
        General Milley. And what I was referring to when I said
    that was I agree that we need to have the processes and
    procedures in place to make sure that we don't have an
    accidental or illegal or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
    And I do agree with that. And we do have those procedures.
        Mr. Banks. You said you agree with her, according to Bob
    Woodward----
        General Milley. I am not agreeing with----
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. And either Bob Woodward is right or
    you are right.
        General Milley. I am not agreeing with her assessment of
    the President, nor the----
        Mr. Banks. The book also goes on--in talking about the
    January 6 riot, it says that you told Bob Woodward that you
    wrote a list in your notebook of groups that you personally
    believe are responsible for the attack and that you associated
    with it. And you called these groups, quote, ``domestic
    terrorists,'' or this, ``domestic terrorism.''
        That list included, in your notebook, according to Bob
    Woodward from your conversations with him, Nazis and Oath
    Keepers. But it also included two conservative media outlets
    that you listed in your notebook, including The Epoch Times,
    which, by the way, is a news outlet that was founded by critics
    of the Chinese Communist Party, and Newsmax, which is the
    second-most-watched conservative media outlet in the country
    today.
        Do your notes about January 6 reference both Epoch Times
    and Newsmax as on a list of domestic terrorists?
        General Milley. I am not recalling this conversation at
    all. I don't----
        Mr. Banks. It is in the book.
        General Milley. It may be in the book. I haven't read the
    book. I am not recalling a conversation about Newsmax, Epoch
    Times----
        Mr. Banks. Do you have a notebook that lists Newsmax and
    Epoch Times as domestic terrorists, as recounted by the Bob
    Woodward book ``Peril''?
        General Milley. I----
        Mr. Banks. Or is Bob Woodward lying to us in the book?
        General Milley. I don't know. I don't recall any
    conversation about Epoch Times or----
        Mr. Banks. Do you believe that Newsmax and Epoch Times are
    domestic terrorists or their----
        General Milley. No.
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. Viewers----
        General Milley. I think----
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. Or readers----
        General Milley. No. I think----
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. Are domestic terrorists?
        General Milley. No, not at all. I don't think Epoch Times
    nor Newsmax are domestic terrorist organizations.
        Mr. Banks. Will you produce the notes----
        General Milley. I believe they are----
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. to this committee----
        General Milley. I will produce any notes you want.
        Mr. Banks [continuing]. That you relayed to Bob Woodward in
    the book that you listed different groups who were responsible
    for January 6?
        General Milley. Sure. Absolutely.
        Mr. Banks. I yield back.
        The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
        I will just note for the record that I was quoted in that
    book as well, and a lot of what I said was conflated and not
    100 percent accurately portrayed. It does happen. Just because
    someone says something doesn't mean that it is an accurate
    portrayal and doesn't even mean they are lying. It could be a
    misunderstanding about what was actually said.
        Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for the work
    that you have done.
        I think, obviously, the level of back-and-forth on the
    committee today represents some real stress in the system about
    the withdrawal and what it means but also about, you know, an
    interest in politicizing national security issues, which I have
    real issues with.
        Could I just ask--I think the question I get asked the most
    in my district about our withdrawal from Afghanistan is, are we
    safer now than we were on September 10, 2001?
        And I believe and I have certainly answered many veterans
    who have reached out that I believe their work was valuable and
    worthy. We kept al-Qaida and other groups distracted and
    destabilized so that we could build up our national security
    apparatus, our homeland security here, to make us safer.
        So it is, of course, hard to hear from this panel that
    right now we are safer but we have to watch for the
    reconstitution of these terrorist groups. No one likes to hear
    that.
        I would ask that we get a classified briefing on our over-
    the-horizon posture just so we understand--I understand we
    can't do it in open session, but just so we understand, on this
    committee, what we can expect when it comes to watching those
    threats. So I would ask for that commitment.
        But, as someone who served in Iraq with the CIA, we watched
    the reconstitution of al-Qaida in western Iraq, which became
    ISIS.
        What are the tripwires, I guess Secretary Austin and then
    General Milley, that you are looking for that would push you to
    engage the White House and say, ``Hey, we have a real problem
    here''? What are those specific things that you are looking for
    that would change your assessment from one of, you know, ``We
    are all right now,'' to, ``We need to take more significant
    military action''?
        Secretary Austin. Thanks.
        First, on your request for an over-the-horizon capability
    brief, we will certainly sign up for that. I committed to the
    chairman to do that early on. And I will have General McKenzie
    and the Joint Staff and my policy people in that brief as well.
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
        Secretary Austin. In terms of specific areas that we are
    focused on, we are looking at their ability to develop a
    capability to export terror to the homeland here. Whether or
    not--you know, if we see senior leaders beginning to have
    freedom of movement in Afghanistan, if we see them developing
    capability in training camps and other things, if we see them
    moving people back and forth across international boundaries,
    those are things that we are looking for.
        And, again, it will take time to develop a true intel
    picture of what is going on. And we have begun that work, and
    we will continue--we will remain focused on this throughout.
        Ms. Slotkin. General Milley.
        General Milley. The specific indicators and warnings I
    would like to take to a different session.
        But, in general, what we are looking for: leadership,
    capability, training, those sorts of things, and demonstrations
    of intent that al-Qaida and/or ISIS is going to do external
    operations against the United States or our interests.
        If we pick up on those, then it is our obligation to
    present the President with options to deal with it.
        Ms. Slotkin. And, General Milley, we have seen some reports
    that, in our attempts to try and get over-the-horizon posture
    in countries around Afghanistan, that we have had discussions
    with the Russians about some cooperation.
        Can you help us understand that? For many of us, that just
    gives us--like, the hair on our neck starts to go up. Can you
    explain to us what we are discussing with the Russians and what
    we are willing to do and not do with the Russians?
        General Milley. Again, I would prefer to take that into a
    classified session.
        As you probably know, about a week or 10 days ago, I
    discussed over in Europe with the Russians, had a session with
    32 CHODs [Chiefs of Defences] from all the European NATO
    nations, and then I had a separate session with my counterpart,
    General Gerasimov. And I can talk to you in a classified
    session about that.
        But, in the main, we are not asking permission, we are not
    negotiating, I guess is the word, but President Putin and
    President Biden had a conversation, and I was following up on
    that conversation at other direction--at the----
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
        General Milley [continuing]. Direction of my superiors.
        Ms. Slotkin. I would just say, I think, given that it is
    not permissible right now to share classified information, this
    committee should be informed should there be any movement
    towards that with the Russians.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        The gentlelady's time has expired.
        And we have had classified--we will have continued
    classified briefs. As we have said, as many members have said,
    I think accurately, the counterterrorism strategy in South Asia
    is going to be a crucial policy issue for all of us to deal
    with going forward.
        Ms. Cheney is recognized.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Milley, on January 6, we had a violent attack on
    our Capitol. It was an effort to stop the constitutionally
    prescribed process of counting electoral votes--the first time
    in our Nation's history that we did not have a peaceful
    transfer of power.
        In the aftermath of that attack, many of the members of our
    constitutional system failed to do their duty. Many of them
    punted. Many of them, today, are still attempting to obstruct
    the investigation into that attack, attempting to whitewash
    what happened.
        General Milley, you found yourself, in your
    constitutionally prescribed role, standing in the breach. And
    for any member of this committee, for any American to question
    your loyalty to our Nation, to question your understanding of
    our Constitution, your loyalty to our Constitution, your
    recognition and understanding of the civilian chain of command,
    is despicable.
        I want to apologize for those members of this committee who
    have done so. And I want to thank you for standing in the
    breach, when so many, including many in this room, failed to do
    so.
        With respect to Afghanistan, the only question for us with
    respect to the deployment of forces in Afghanistan or anywhere
    else is, what does U.S. security require?
        In the circumstances we found ourselves in in Afghanistan,
    the deployment of our forces was allowing us to conduct
    counterterrorism operations, counterintelligence operations,
    enabling us to prevent terrorists from establishing safe
    havens.
        General Milley, terrorists now have an entire country of
    Afghanistan. Could you tell the committee whether or not you
    think the current situation in Afghanistan following the
    withdrawal of forces, which began with the Doha Agreement and
    the orders that you have described in the Trump administration,
    which was carried out in the Biden administration, can you tell
    the committee whether or not you think we are now more safe or
    less safe, whether Afghanistan presents more of a threat or
    less of a threat to our homeland than when we were able to
    conduct counterterrorism/counterintelligence operations there?
        General Milley. I think, right now, right this minute, we
    are more safe because of the efforts over the last 20 years.
        However, I do think that conditions are more likely than
    not to develop over the course of time that will allow for the
    reconstitution of al-Qaida and/or ISIS. And that time varies
    depending on which analyst you are listening to, but sometime
    between, say, 6 to 12 and maybe 36 months.
        Ms. Cheney. And when you look at the situation that we face
    today, in terms of what is going to be necessary--the loss of
    life, the loss of treasure has been tragic, has been
    devastating. But when you look at where we are likely to find
    ourselves, do you think that our ability to defend ourselves
    will now be more expensive, will cost us more in terms of lives
    and treasure going forward, or do you believe that the
    withdrawal will present a situation where we have to devote
    less resources to the war on terror?
        General Milley. I think the ends are going to remain the
    same, to protect the American people, but the ways and means
    are going to change. And I think it is going to become much
    more difficult now in order to conduct counterterrorism
    operations against a reconstituted al-Qaida or ISIS in
    Afghanistan. Not impossible. We have the capabilities and means
    to do that. But it will be more difficult.
        Ms. Cheney. Secretary Austin, are members of the Haqqani
    Network still a potential target for the United States
    military?
        Secretary Austin. We do recognize that the members of the
    Haqqani Network are recognized terrorists, yes.
        Ms. Cheney. So they are a potential target for the United
    States military?
        Secretary Austin. Potentially, yes.
        Ms. Cheney. So, Secretary Austin, the Biden administration
    has been saying that the Doha Agreement is still in effect and
    that they will hold the Taliban to their, quote,
    ``counterterrorism commitments'' in the Doha Agreement.
        But the Taliban is using this agreement to protect
    terrorists. The Taliban is intertwined with the Haqqani
    Network. And al-Qaida has, in fact, sworn bayat to the Taliban.
        So can you explain exactly how that agreement that is
    enabling terrorists is going to be useful as some kind of a
    tool to hold the Taliban to any kind of a commitment?
        Secretary Austin. I think we should do everything within
    our power to keep pressure on the Taliban to do what they said
    that they were going to do. And we heard what they have said.
    We will watch their actions.
        But I think we should continue to apply pressure, wherever
    possible, to cause them to keep al-Qaida activity in check.
        And, again, you have heard us say a couple of times today
    that we recognize that this is the Taliban, and trust is not an
    issue here, necessarily. We hear what they are saying; we are
    watching what they do.
        Ms. Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My time has expired.
        The Chairman. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Secretary Austin, General Milley,
    General McKenzie. I have quite a few questions, and some I may
    have to submit for the record, because I think it is important
    to start with this and somewhat echo my Republican colleague's
    opening.
        We have continued to see attacks on our democracy and our
    values from Members representing what, at least historically,
    would have been the extreme elements of the Republican Party--
    attacks including, but not limited to, the horrible attack on
    our Capitol and our Congress on January 6.
        And one of the cornerstones of our democracy and our
    government is civilian, not military, rule. This is sacrosanct
    to those of us who have worn the uniform and, judging from the
    attacks by some members of this committee, poorly understood by
    those who have not.
        I have concerns about how the NEO was executed, but I must
    applaud all of you for scrupulously ensuring our civilian
    government remained the decisionmaking authority as you
    continued to provide your best military advice, even when, at
    times, your advice differed from the decisions made. Thank you.
        I would like to now turn to some questions that I have
    related to the timeline of events.
        So, as I understand it, in February of 2020, President
    Trump made an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw U.S.
    troops by May 1, 2021, in exchange for several conditions,
    including a halt to attacks against U.S. forces and cutting
    ties with al-Qaida.
        By the time he left office, President Trump had drawn down
    forces to 2,500 and publicly indicated his intent to complete
    the withdrawal if he had been reelected.
        And I think, Chairman Milley, you mentioned the 10 November
    2020 withdrawal of troops by 15 January 2020, which was
    rescinded, and then the 17 November 2020 drawdown to 2,500 by
    19 January. Is that correct?
        General Milley. It was a memo dated 11 November, 2 days
    after Secretary Esper was fired. And then, on the 17th, it was
    rescinded. The first memo said go to zero. The second one said
    go to 2,500.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
        And so were you consulted on the decisions to open
    negotiations solely with the Taliban, to the exclusion of the
    Afghan Government, General?
        General Milley. Very, very late in the game, like, days
    before the signing.
        Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, were there concrete
    plans for a withdrawal from the previous administration that
    were shared and developed with military leadership?
        General Milley. Well, we were 12,600 on the day that the
    Doha Agreement--12,600 U.S. military in Afghanistan when the
    Doha Agreement was signed. Part of that agreement was to go to
    8,500 within, I think it was, 135 days. I would have to go back
    to the agreement and look at it. And then it was to bring down
    all the U.S. military, NATO, contractors, close all the bases
    by 1 May.
        So it was an agreement signed by our government. We
    dutifully executed it and delivered drawdown over time, from
    February of 2020 all way through, based on a set of milestones.
    So we did withdraw, and we had a plan to withdraw.
        Ms. Sherrill. Did any of those plans include plans to
    evacuate civilian American personnel, citizens, and SIV
    holders?
        General Milley. Yes. General McKenzie and CENTCOM did
    develop NEO plans, but not, like, the large SIV holders and
    lots of American citizens. It was primarily the Embassy and
    their personnel.
        But I would defer to Frank McKenzie to talk about the
    details of the NEO plans at that time.
        Ms. Sherrill. General McKenzie.
        General McKenzie. So we hold a NEO plan for every country
    in the Central Command region. So, yes, we had a plan to bring
    out mainly American citizens and people associated with the
    Embassy.
        Planning later began to encompass the larger population,
    the at-risk Afghan population, the SIV population. But,
    initially, just like every other plan, it centered on American
    citizens and their families.
        Ms. Sherrill. And when you say the planning later grew to
    include that, what is the timeframe for when you began to
    include SIV holders?
        General McKenzie. No later than the early spring of this
    year.
        Ms. Sherrill. So under this administration?
        General McKenzie. Yes. Yes.
        Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, in your testimony to the
    SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] yesterday, you testified
    that the Trump administration's plans had not been developed
    via a robust interagency process.
        How closely were you and other senior military leaders
    consulted on President Trump's plans as they were developed?
        General Milley. I wasn't consulted on the 11 November order
    that I received. That is why I went over to the White House
    with Acting Secretary Miller and White House Chief of Staff
    Kash Patel to discuss that order. So I wasn't consulted on it.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
        And my time has expired. I will submit the rest of my
    questions for the record.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Waltz is recognized.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And here is where I think we are really talking past each
    other. This war is not done. It is not over. This is a war
    against Islamic extremism. It is a war against an ideology.
    And, just as it took decades--decades, not 20 years, not 30
    years, many more--to defeat the idea of communism, to defeat
    the idea of fascism, it is going to take decades to defeat the
    idea of Islamic extremism.
        General McKenzie, you testified yesterday al-Qaida is still
    at war with us. Do you stand by that statement?
        General McKenzie. Absolutely, Representative.
        Mr. Waltz. DNI Haines, Biden's Director of National
    Intelligence, briefed the Congress that al-Qaida fully intends
    to attack the West again if given the chance.
        The head of al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden's former deputy, has
    pledged allegiance to the head of the Taliban, except now they
    have an entire state to work with--an army, an air force, a
    functioning international airport, and I think, if things
    continue on the path they are, possibly billions in
    international currency reserves.
        So, Mr. Chairman, respectfully, we are not done with this
    war. I would have thought we would have learned the lesson from
    Iraq. I would have thought, Mr. Secretary, you had learned the
    lesson from Iraq, where we pulled out in 2011--Mr. Chairman,
    you issued a statement praising that pullout as ending that
    war--and yet we found ourselves, 3 years later, with soldiers
    going back in.
        But let's look at the situation, because I think the
    American people need to understand this.
        Here we have Iraq. We pulled out. Led to a rise of the ISIS
    caliphate, which was obviously a morphed entity from al-Qaida.
        Look at all of the bases that we had to deal with when we
    went back. We had bases in the Gulf, we had bases in Kuwait, we
    had bases in Turkey, in Jordan, of course in Israel, allied
    bases in Cyprus. We had allies on the ground in the Kurds.
        We didn't let ISIS take over the government in Baghdad and
    the army and all of the functions of the state. We had all of
    these assets to work with to go clean up that mess. And how
    many soldiers and lives did we lose from cleaning up that
    mistaken withdrawal, Mr. Chairman?
        But let's transition over here to Afghanistan. What do we
    see?
        General McKenzie, do we have a single base in Afghanistan
    now?
        General McKenzie. We have no base in Afghanistan.
        Mr. Waltz. Do we have a base in any country neighboring
    Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. We do not.
        Mr. Waltz. Do we have any local allies approaching the
    capability of the Kurds?
        General McKenzie. We do not. There may be----
        Mr. Waltz. No.
        General McKenzie [continuing]. Some options, but we do not.
        Mr. Waltz. We have the Northern Alliance. The Panjshir has
    been taken. Frankly, they are being slaughtered right now, as
    we speak, with our weapons. With our damn equipment, our allies
    are being slaughtered. Every morning, we wake up to beheading
    videos, to executions, to people being hunted down with our own
    database.
        But, when and if you have to present options to the
    President, how many soldiers are we going to lose because we
    have no allies on the ground, we have no bases in the region?
        Now, we are going to get to, really, the crux of the issue,
    which is over-the-horizon counterterrorism. Those drones have
    to fly all the way around Iran and all the way up Pakistan and
    lose 70 to 80 percent of their fuel before they even get
    anywhere near a target.
        And we just saw from the failed attack, the botched attack,
    that you have to have multi-INT [multi-intelligence]
    intelligence confirming what that drone operator is seeing. I
    have called it in, and I know that drone operator would have
    appreciated somebody on the ground saying, no, that is a
    civilian, don't pull that trigger.
        So I appreciate your candor in saying how difficult this is
    going to be, but the President of the United States is selling
    this country a fiction that we can do over here with nothing
    what we are doing over here with neighboring base access, with
    allies on the ground, and with ocean access. That is a fiction
    that I think you all need to own, and we need to be honest with
    the American people.
        I am just livid at the fact of the future Americans that
    are going to have to go back to clean up this mess. We are
    watching this horror movie that Representative Slotkin
    experienced, that we all experienced after Iraq.
        The President continues to say, well, we can do what we do
    in Somalia, we can do what we do in Syria. Mr. Secretary, you
    just briefed about a strike in Syria. We have a lot more
    capability there.
        One more question. Do we have any evidence, intelligence or
    otherwise, of Pakistani troops on the ground--intelligence
    officers, air support, or any troops on the ground--assisting
    the Taliban or command and control assisting the Taliban
    offensive?
        General McKenzie. I would prefer to answer that question in
    closed session.
        Mr. Waltz. I will take that as a yes.
        And, Mr. Chairman----
        The Chairman. Mr. Waltz, your time has expired.
        Mr. Waltz [continuing]. That is not going to go to a civil
    war; it is going to go to a regional war.
        The Chairman. And, just for the record, we are not going to
    put words in the mouths of our witnesses. You can't take it as
    a yes if it was not, in fact, a yes.
        Ms. Escobar is now recognized.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for your incredible
    leadership, your patriotism, and your service to our country. I
    am very grateful for it.
        I want to begin by saying that I am incredibly privileged
    to represent Fort Bliss. I represent El Paso, Texas. And Fort
    Bliss is offering hospitality right now to nearly 10,000 Afghan
    guests. And I want to say to those service members how proud I
    am of the work that they are doing to offer that hospitality.
        I had the privilege to tour the Dona Ana village last month
    with NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] Commander
    General Van Herck, got to speak to many of those service
    members. Morale is high, and I could not be prouder of what
    they are doing. Had an opportunity, also, to speak to our
    Afghan guests, as well, and get a sense from them how they are
    doing.
        We know that the die was cast with the Doha Agreement, an
    agreement that former President Trump entered into with the
    Taliban and the Taliban alone. We have learned that that
    agreement--it was that agreement that demoralized the Afghan
    Army, and the Taliban moved in and began making deals with
    them, which expedited their control. We know that that
    demoralization contributed to the rapid fall--the rapid fall of
    Afghanistan which shocked us all.
        General Milley, earlier, you told us that when former
    President Trump entered into the Doha Agreement there was a
    setting out of very specific conditions that were to be met by
    the time of the May 1 drawdown. Is that correct?
        General Milley. That is correct.
        Ms. Escobar. General Milley, how many of those conditions
    had been met when former President Trump then announced he
    wanted to speed up the withdrawal from May 1 to January 15,
    2020?
        General Milley. There was only one condition that was met.
    That was the condition that asked--or that the Taliban
    committed to not striking against U.S. forces and/or coalition
    forces, which they did not do.
        Ms. Escobar. And when then-President Trump announced the
    expedited drawdown, was he aware that four of the five
    conditions had not been met?
        General Milley. I believe yes.
        Ms. Escobar. Do you know the significance, if there is any,
    of the January 15 expedited drawdown date?
        General Milley. I don't. I was handed a piece of paper and
    went over and talked to folks in the White House, and it was
    rescinded. I don't know why that particular date was picked.
        Ms. Escobar. Okay.
        Have we learned or do we know whether those announcements
    of expedited withdrawal added to or exacerbated the demoralized
    nature of the Afghan Army?
        General Milley. Well, the 11 November order was not
    announced, but the drawdown to 2,500 was. We have detailed
    reporting, but I think, I believe--and we will do this in the
    AARs [after action reviews]--I think that was one of many
    contributing factors, not the only one, but one of many
    contributing factors to the declination of the morale of the
    Afghan security forces.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you, General Milley.
        You have also described the outcome of this withdrawal as a
    strategic failure. Can you share with us what would have been
    considered success for the administration, the service members,
    and military experts who have been involved in this conflict
    for over two decades and what it would have taken for us to get
    to success?
        General Milley. I think and my opinion was that success
    would have been a negotiated solution between the Government of
    Afghanistan and the Taliban for a shared power-sharing
    arrangement in their government and an end to the, you know,
    civil war in that manner. I also assessed that the probability
    of that actually happening was low, but I did think that there
    was a possibility and it wasn't zero.
        So a negotiated solution, I think, was probably the best
    way to describe a proper end to this war.
        I don't think that there was a military solution by us to
    destroy or defeat the Taliban. I think that was not in the
    cards. And I didn't think at the time that if we sustained a
    level of effort in Afghanistan with our military, 2,500 or
    3,500, in those ranges, I didn't think the Taliban could defeat
    the Afghan security forces.
        That was my assessment at the time. And I thought success
    meant a negotiated settlement between the government and the
    Taliban and to have a power-sharing arrangement to end the war.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you, General Milley.
        I have about 15 seconds. Secretary Austin, has the U.S.
    military and Department of Defense begun to reimagine any of
    our existing involvements abroad to better assess risk of a
    fallout such as this one?
        Secretary Austin. We continue to take a look at ourselves
    across the board and how we are----
        The Chairman. And the gentlelady's time has expired, so
    that will have to be taken for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 146.]
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Johnson is recognized.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        There has been a dispute here today about the actual words
    that were shared in the ABC News George Stephanopoulos
    interview with the President. We took the liberty of getting
    the full transcript. I am going to read you the relevant
    excerpt and ask you a question.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to enter
    the transcript into the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 132.]
        Mr. Johnson. So Stephanopoulos asked this. Quote, ``But
    your military advisors warned against withdrawing on this
    timeline. They wanted you to keep about 2,500 troops.''
        Biden: ``No, they didn't. It was split. That--that wasn't
    true. That wasn't true.''
        Stephanopoulos: ``They didn't tell you that they wanted
    troops to stay?''
        Biden: ``No, not at--not in terms of whether we were going
    to get out in a timeframe all troops. They didn't argue against
    that.''
        Stephanopoulos: ``So no one told--your military advisors
    did not tell you, ``No, we should just keep 2,500 troops, it
    has been a stable situation for the last several years, we can
    do that, we can continue to do that'?''
        Biden: ``No. No one said that to me that I can recall.''
        So, gentlemen, with all due respect, the American people
    deserve to know the truth in all this. They are asking us to
    get the truth.
        So here is the thing. There are only three possibilities
    here. Either the President lied to the American people, or he
    legitimately cannot remember the counsel of his top military
    advisors in winding down the longest war in American history,
    or you have not been fully accurate under oath.
        General McKenzie, I will ask you: Which is it?
        General McKenzie. I want to be very direct. I cannot share
    advice I give the President, and I will not do that.
        I will also tell you, though, that it has been my
    consistent position throughout this hearing and the hearing
    yesterday that I believe the appropriate level of our forces in
    Afghanistan should have been 2,500.
        Mr. Johnson. I think we can take that to mean that you gave
    him that advice.
        Let me ask----
        General McKenzie. Sir, I would not take it to mean anything
    other than the words I gave you, please.
        Mr. Johnson. Fair enough.
        Secretary Austin, what is it? What are we to believe by
    seeing all this?
        Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, you heard me say
    earlier, Congressman, that I support the President's decision.
        You also heard me say that I don't view this choice as a
    no-cost, no-risk choice. I do believe that, if we left 2,500
    people there for an extended period of time, you would
    eventually have to reinforce those people, because the Taliban
    was going to--was committed to attacking us.
        Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I understand all that. What we
    are trying to get to is, what did the President know? Did he
    forget what was told to him, or is he not being truthful? Which
    is it?
        Secretary Austin. I would view that as an inappropriate
    question, and I won't----
        Mr. Johnson. Well, you may, but the American people don't.
        Secretary Austin. Okay.
        Mr. Johnson. And the American people want and deserve
    accountability. And we even have service members like
    Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Scheller being thrown in the brig for
    suggesting that.
        The public's faith in our institutions continues to erode
    precisely because everyone in the DC bubble appears to have
    some sort of immunity from the basic standards the rest of
    America is expected to live by.
        This is quite clearly one of the biggest military and
    foreign policy blunders since our withdrawal from Vietnam. So
    my question for all of you is very simple: Where does the blame
    lie?
        Mr. Austin--Secretary Austin.
        Secretary Austin. Well, first of all, you know, I am
    responsible for everything that happens that DOD does, and it
    does a lot. I remain focused on defending this country, and
    that is going to be my focus for the foreseeable future.
        Secondly, you know, I would remind you that we just
    evacuated 124,000 people----
        Mr. Johnson. I appreciate----
        Secretary Austin [continuing]. In 17 days----
        Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that you think that that was a
    big success, evacuation. But the blame for the disastrous
    withdrawal that everyone agrees was a disaster, who is to blame
    for that?
        I will let the silence speak for itself.
        General Milley, you said earlier this month that it is
    possible that we would work with the Taliban to conduct strikes
    against ISIS-K in Afghanistan, presumably referencing our over-
    the-horizon capabilities, but today you testified--you said,
    quote, ``the Taliban remains a terrorist organization with ties
    to al-Qaida.''
        So are you now suggesting that the United States form some
    sort of strategic partnership with a terrorist organization?
        General Milley. No, absolutely not. I am not suggesting
    that at all.
        Could I go to your first question, though?
        Mr. Johnson. Please.
        General Milley. Like Frank McKenzie--like General McKenzie,
    it is not our purview to share specific discussions with the
    President in terms of national security decision-making. But it
    was our opinion at the time, and it has been very consistent.
        And I would also tell you that this administration did--and
    I was part of it, along with the Joint Chiefs--a very rigorous
    process. And this President--it was one of the most informed
    decisions that you can imagine, in terms of all sides of the
    argument.
        We in the military, in the uniformed military, we look at
    the costs, the risk to force, the benefit, et cetera, in a
    narrow-focused view. Other decisionmakers have a much wider
    angle.
        Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that. But what we are left with,
    in the 9 seconds I have left, is that we are supposed to
    believe that the President was either not informed by you of
    these very important factors or he forgot it. Either one is
    alarming.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        And, since the transcript was submitted for the record, we
    read through this kind of quick, but Mr. Stephanopoulos says,
    ``Your top military advisors warned against withdrawing in this
    timeline. They wanted you to keep about 2,500 troops.''
        ``No, they didn't. It was split.''
        That is what the President said. He didn't say, ``No,
    nobody advised me.'' ``It was split.''
        Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, read down two more lines.
        The Chairman. I will be done in just a second, and then I
    will yield it back to you.
        And then Stephanopoulos says: ``No, no one said, ``We
    should just keep 2,500 troops, it has been a stable situation
    for the last several years, we can do that, we can continue to
    do that'?''
        ``No. No one said that to me that I can recall. No one
    said, it has been a stable situation for the last several
    years, we can do that, we could continue to do that.''
        Those are the words on the transcript that was just
    submitted. I will leave it to other people to interpret that,
    but those are the actual words.
        And, yes, I will yield, Mr. Johnson, if you can do it
    quickly. Sorry. I want to get to some other people, but I
    should give you the chance. Go ahead.
        Mr. Johnson. I will do it very quickly, Mr. Chairman. I
    appreciate that.
        I mean, you just read it at face value.
        Stephanopoulos says: ``So no one told you--your military
    advisors did not tell you, ``No, we should just keep 2,500
    troops, it has been a stable situation for the last several
    years, we can do that, we can continue to do that'?''
        Biden says: ``No, no one said that to me that I can
    recall.''
        The Chairman. You read quickly through the ``it has been a
    stable situation'' part, but that is kind of the important
    part. Okay.
        Mr. Johnson. Well, look, it is open to----
        The Chairman. I think we have----
        Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Individual interpretation.
        The Chairman. I think we have both made our point.
        Mr. Johnson. All right. But I think----
        The Chairman. I will move on to Mrs.----
        Mr. Johnson [continuing]. The American people can use
    common sense, and it is----
        The Chairman. Okay.
        Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Alarming, whatever it is.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mrs. Luria, you are recognized.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
        And I would like to start, General Milley, by associating
    myself with the remarks that Ms. Cheney made at the beginning
    of her questions and focus on the timeframe immediately
    following the 2020 election.
        On November 9, 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper was
    replaced by Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller.
    And, additionally, other key leadership positions at DOD were
    abruptly filled with new people.
        General Milley, did this rapid replacement of top senior
    officials at the Department of Defense in the final days of the
    administration give you concern regarding the transition of the
    administration?
        General Milley. We in the military are trained for
    leadership replacement from the time we are a second
    lieutenant, follow one drills sort of thing. And it is clearly
    in the prerogative of any President to replace any Cabinet
    member or any appointee at all at any point in time.
        So that is how I would answer that. We are prepared to
    execute at a moment's notice if someone is relieved.
        Mrs. Luria. And, General Milley, did you have any concerns
    at the time that involved the potential misuse of the military
    for political reasons?
        General Milley. I was determined to make sure that the U.S.
    military is properly employed, and I would render my advice to
    ensure that the U.S. military is employed not for political
    use.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
        And it has been referenced a few times during the hearing
    today that you did cooperate with several authors for specific
    books. And it seems as though your choice to do that was that
    you wanted to get the story straight, the facts out there about
    different things that transpired during this timeframe. And you
    acknowledged today that you frequently speak to reporters and
    also yesterday in comments to Senators that you sometimes do
    that anonymously.
        I think that we would all like full transparency and full
    understanding of the facts surrounding this timeframe. And, as
    you know, I am a member of the select committee to investigate
    the events surrounding January 6. So I can speak for the
    committee to say that we will be very interested to have, you
    know, the same level of information and be able to speak to you
    in the future about those topics.
        And I will shift now to another topic of discussion. And if
    I could ask my colleagues to please respect my time.
        So, General Milley, you have spent half of your career
    fighting a war in Afghanistan, roughly. And when did you
    personally know that the war was lost?
        General Milley. Well, I think if you go back to 5, 6 years
    ago, I knew it was stalemated. ``Lost'' is a different word,
    but I believed it was stalemated. And I believed 5 or 6 years
    ago that it was unwinnable through U.S. military means, for
    several reasons.
        There is a sanctuary in Pakistan that was not going to be
    destroyed or defeated, and that insurgencies are highly
    political wars to begin with, and what was important to win is
    to have an indigenous government that was seen as legitimate in
    the eyes of the people, along with a military, their police and
    army, that could adequately deal with that situation.
        But I knew years ago that it was stalemated, said that
    repeatedly, internal and external, and that winning would be
    defined as a negotiated solution, as most insurgencies are
    historically. They result in a negotiated solution between the
    insurgent and the regime. And I thought that was the best way
    that this could be handled. I didn't think there was a military
    solution.
        Mrs. Luria. So it is interesting to me that you used the
    word ``winning.'' Did you think that winning was possible, or
    did you think that a stalemate or a status quo was really the
    only ultimate outcome that we could hope for in this situation?
        General Milley. I think, as I recall, President Bush, at
    the very beginning of this thing 20 years ago, said winning
    would look a lot different in this war, or words to that
    effect. And I think he was right then. And I think that a
    negotiated solution was the best way of approaching a, quote/
    unquote, ``win.''
        I think that would have been in the best interests of the
    United States and it would have been the best interests of the
    region and the Afghan people, was a negotiated solution between
    the Taliban, the insurgents, and the government.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
        And I saw Secretary Austin nodding. I know there is very
    little time left. Did you want to add something briefly?
        Secretary Austin. You heard me say at the very top that,
    you know, my hope was that we could reach a negotiated
    settlement. A stalemate would actually provide the opportunity
    to do that, for both sides to negotiate in earnest if neither
    thought that they were going to win.
        And, again, we just never reached that point, because the
    Taliban had advantages coming into this, because we weren't
    striking them, we released prisoners----
        The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. Appreciate
    it.
        A couple of quick announcements. So there is a vote on. We
    have a hard stop at 2:00. We are going to stop at 2:00. I am
    going to go vote.
        Mrs. Luria, if you could take the chair for just a moment,
    I will come back as quickly as I can and then free you of that
    obligation.
        But it is my intention to roll through that. So, members,
    you know, vote accordingly, be here. I think we have Ms. Jacobs
    who is up next on our side, so we have a couple people that
    will get us through that. But that is what we are going to do.
        And Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes, and I will be
    right back.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank the witnesses for being with us today.
        Over the last few weeks, I have heard an outpouring of
    concern and frustration from my constituents, veterans and
    military families chief among them, who have expressed their
    outrage at the disastrous withdrawal and the abandonment of our
    Afghan allies and even American citizens.
        I, too, am deeply outraged and have been equally stunned by
    the lack of leadership shown by President Biden throughout all
    of this. The American people deserve to have a full accounting
    of the President's decision-making processes and what
    ultimately led to a disastrous outcome.
        Gentlemen, this is not about whether or not we should have
    left or not. This is about how we left. We may not get all the
    answers, but the public deserves in today's hearing to know the
    facts surrounding this.
        My first question, two part, regarding Bagram Air Base.
    During the Senate testimony yesterday, General Austin, you said
    the choice to abandon Bagram was made carefully based on the
    mission to protect the Embassy.
        What aspect of security at HKIA made it more secure than
    Bagram? And, following that, you mentioned in your opening
    statement Bagram had little strategic value. If you could
    elaborate on both of those, please.
        Secretary Austin. I certainly didn't say Bagram has little
    strategic value in my opening statement. We can certainly--we
    can break it out and go through it line by line if you would
    like.
        I would point out to you that I commanded Bagram at one
    point in time, so--there may be other people in the room who
    have done that, but probably not. So I know a lot about Bagram
    and what it offers.
        The key point here is that the Embassy was in Kabul. And
    our mission at transition was to provide security, additional
    security, for the Embassy. And, in the event of an evacuation,
    we would have to start with evacuating the Embassy first. And
    so Kabul makes all--I mean, it provides everything that you
    need to be able to do that--capacity, the proximity. And so I
    think it was the right choice.
        Mrs. Bice. But isn't it accurate that HKIA has one runway
    whereas Bagram had multiple runways, which would have made it
    easier for the evacuation of individuals from----
        Secretary Austin. And that is a great point. I would have
    to secure it. The reason we could stay there with 2,500 people
    earlier was because we had the Afghan Security Forces securing
    the outer perimeter of Bagram.
        If you no longer have that, then you have to commit 5 or
    6,000 troops to do that and then secure it, defend it, and then
    run the air ops. So that is a substantial additional commitment
    of resources.
        Mrs. Bice. General Milley or General McKenzie, anything you
    would like to add?
        General McKenzie. I would just like to briefly talk about
    Bagram. It has two runways, but that is actually not what you
    want to examine when you look at an airfield. It is an arcane
    thing called the MOG [maximum-on-ground]. It is the ability to
    load aircraft and move aircraft around the runway. And HKIA had
    better facilities than Bagram for that.
        Additionally, as the Secretary noted, the simple distance
    from where the people are had to be a planning factor. And
    last, of course, we were under direction to go to zero, 650 to
    secure the Embassy. So Bagram was not an option under those
    circumstances.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
        General Milley. I would add, if I could, if you have the
    assumption that there is no Afghan Army, the, 73 towers at
    Bagram, as a minimum, there is 3 big gates. You have to have a
    quick reaction force, you're going to have to patrol out to
    rocket range, and then you're going to have to secure the 30
    miles of road between Kabul and Bagram. We would have never
    been able to get 124,000 people out of Bagram. It just wouldn't
    have happened.
        The center of gravity of a NEO was always going to be HKIA.
    The security issues clearly are different at HKIA than they are
    at Bagram, but Bagram was really not a feasible option given
    numbers of troops, distance, and the security requirements.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, General Milley. Follow-up question,
    you mentioned having to evacuate so quickly. Do you trust the
    information that you are receiving from our intelligence
    community, General Austin?
        Secretary Austin. I have confidence in the information that
    we get from the intel community, yes. That doesn't say that
    they will be 100 percent right all the time.
        Mrs. Bice. Given the fact that it seems as though they did
    not at all plan for a complete surrender of the Afghan forces
    upon the withdrawl of U.S. troops?
        Secretary Austin. They predicted that outcome, but a
    different timeline as we have--you have heard us say before
    so----
        Mrs. Bice. In addition to the botched over-the-horizon
    activity that killed 10 Afghans, still believe that the
    intelligence community can be trusted and is effective?
        Secretary Austin. Again, I have confidence in the intel
    community. In terms of----
        Mrs. Luria [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        I will now recognize Ms. Jacobs for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you all for
    being here. I would like to follow up on the questions
    regarding the August 29th drone strike that killed Zemari
    Ahmadi, a worker for a Southern California-based aid group and
    nine of his family members, including seven children. And
    General McKenzie, you called the strike a tragic mistake and I
    think we can all agree with that characterization.
        This is an open hearing so I am not going to ask about the
    specific intelligence that led to the strike, but General
    Milley, you said even after the truth was revealed that there
    was a reasonable certainty that the target was valid.
        So I would like to know, do you have that same level of
    confidence in the intelligence that you have had for similar
    strikes carried out under DOD's authority.
        General Milley. Yes, I do. I mean, intelligence is not
    perfect. Intel as Representative Johnson just said or Bice just
    said, it is never perfect. We are not going to get perfection
    in the world of intelligence. They speak in terms of
    probabilistic language, what is more likely than not. And I
    believe that we have good reason to have confidence in our
    intelligence systems.
        They are not perfect, but we have good reason to have
    confidence in them and I think that has been expressed over
    time in the accuracy and precision of these strikes.
        Ms. Jacobs. I understand.
        General Milley. This one strike was bad. It was tragic. It
    was horrible. But that is not to say that the intelligence
    system as a whole is wrong.
        Ms. Jacobs. Okay. But given that we have actually had
    multiple of these mistakes that we already know about,
    including the AC-130 gunship attack in 2015 that destroyed an
    MSF [Medecins Sans Frontieres] hospital and killed 42
    civilians, what assurances can you give us and the American
    people that our drone program has adequate safeguards?
        And Secretary Austin, you said that the Department has
    endeavored to learn from this latest mistake; what have you
    learned?
        Secretary Austin. Thanks. Again, I would just remind you
    that I have directed a review of this operation and so I won't
    make any comments on specifics here because that review is
    ongoing, but in terms of our commitment to learning from all of
    our operations, we remain committed to doing that and we are
    specifically concerned whenever there is an inadvertent loss of
    life and an injury to civilians, and so we take that very
    seriously and we hold ourselves accountable for that so.
        Ms. Jacobs. Great. And we, in this committee, will be
    looking forward to seeing the results of that review and also
    having accountability.
        General McKenzie, yesterday when asked by Senator Mark
    Kelly about the over-the-horizon counterterrorism, you said,
    and I quote: As we go forward in our ability to create the
    ecosystem that allows you to see on the ground and put it
    together, it is going to be harder in places like Afghanistan,
    end quote.
        I know many of my colleagues have already asked about what
    this means for our ability to counter groups like ISIS-K. I
    have a different question. What does that mean for our ability
    to prevent civilian casualties so that we don't see another
    drone strike like the one that took place in Kabul?
        And if the ability to prevent civilian casualties becomes
    harder, will you and CENTCOM take extra precautions in
    selecting target packages or how are you planning to deal with
    this extra uncertainty.
        General McKenzie. Thank you for the question. The strike
    that was undertaken in Kabul on the 29th was a self-defense
    strike. It was taken because we believe there was an imminent
    attack developing against our forces at HKIA. So that is very
    different than the type of strike we would undertake in an
    over-the-horizon scenario. The principal differences would be
    this: We would not be under the acute pressure of time because
    we thought the attack was imminent, because if we are striking
    a target in Afghanistan, there is actually no immanency to that
    attack. We are talking weeks and maybe months, rather than
    hours or minutes.
        So you have opportunity to develop pattern life. You have
    the opportunity to apply all the other disciplines of
    intelligence that can help us whether that is signal, image,
    human intelligence, and we would work hard to try to
    reconstitute that to a degree. And I will talk more about that
    in a future classified session with you.
        But it would be wrong to believe that the strike in Kabul,
    which I have acknowledged went badly wrong, is the prototype
    that we would employ for past or future over-the-horizon
    strikes.
        Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. I will look forward to working
    with you all to make sure that we do that well, and I will note
    your comments on imminence next time we have questions about
    war powers with some of these strikes.
        But with that, I will yield back.
        Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
        And Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you, Secretary Austin, General McKenzie, General
    Milley for being here today. It is a very important hearing
    that we are having here. I appreciate the committee's urgency
    in making this happen. While there was bipartisan support for
    withdrawl from Afghanistan, there were differences in opinion
    on how that should have been conducted.
        Something we should all be able to agree on is that the
    withdrawl should have been conditions-based and there should
    not have been any political motivation involved in this
    decision, which I don't think was the actual case.
        But, gentlemen, I would like to ask you, how often were you
    in contact with your Chinese counterpart in discussing our
    evacuation efforts in Afghanistan?
        General Milley. Zero. And I agree with you, conditions-
    based.
        Dr. Jackson. General Milley, on August 18th you were quoted
    as saying: The timeframe of a rapid collapse was widely
    estimated in range from weeks to months and even years
    following our departure. There was nothing that I or anyone
    else saw that indicated a collapse of this Army and this
    government in 11 days.
        Between the 18th and the 21st of June, in just 4 days, 21
    districts and 9 provinces fell to the Taliban and the Afghan
    security forces quickly surrendered and abandoned their post.
    This was an obvious beginning to the end of the Afghan Army and
    to the Taliban takeover.
        General Milley, what were you doing during this timeframe?
    Before you answer that question, let me tell you. You were 2
    days--just 2 days prior to when these provinces fell, you were
    here in our committee on June 23rd. You sat before this
    committee and you listed some of your concerns that we talked
    in depth about. One was defending critical race theory in the
    military, telling us you want to understand White rage, telling
    us how offended you were to be labeled as woke, and worrying
    about what caused American civilians to enter the Capitol on
    January 6th.
        I submit to you that perhaps we would not have had 13
    service members and hundreds of Afghans killed, 18 service
    members wounded, and countless U.S. citizens abandoned and left
    as Taliban hostages if you had been more focused on your duty
    to this country instead of defending and pandering to the Biden
    administration's woke social experiment with the United States
    military, doing book interviews, and colluding with Chinese
    military officials.
        Yesterday Senator Cotton asked you why you haven't resigned
    and you said you were not going to resign just because the
    President didn't take your advice. Well, I submit to you, sir,
    that you should resign because of your dereliction of duty to
    this country and your inability to do your job and protect this
    country. It has become abundantly clear that the American
    people have completely loss confidence in your ability to do
    your job.
        General Milley, will you now resign?
        General Milley. I serve at the pleasure of the President,
    Mr. Jackson.
        Dr. Jackson. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. And just for the
    record, on that date in question, what Chairman Milley was
    doing is he was appearing before this committee at our request
    and answering the questions that we asked him. And I appreciate
    his willingness and the willingness of all the leadership to
    appear before us. That is an incredibly important part of their
    job and I don't want to leave any of you with the impression
    that we don't want you to do it just because of questions like
    that.
        Mr. Kahele is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chairman. Aloha, Secretary Austin,
    Chairman Milley, General McKenzie. Mahalo for all of your
    testimony and taking the time to be here today. As someone who
    has also worn a uniform, still wears a uniform, I am very
    appreciative of your service and having first deployed through
    Operation Enduring Freedom in 2005, I am glad the U.S.
    involvement in the war is over. I support the President's
    decision, however, I am concerned that the accelerated
    withdrawl, the strategic failure and fall of Afghanistan to the
    Taliban has damaged U.S. credibility with our allies and
    partners.
        As a former C-17 mission commander, I will never forget
    those images that I saw early in the morning of 15 August from
    Kabul with total chaos at HKIA and Afghans falling out of the
    sky desperate to flee the country. So I think my questions will
    focus on Secretary Austin's testimony and it is really on the
    NEO operation that my colleagues Rep. Crow and had referred to.
        And so, Secretary Austin, in your testimony you stated that
    military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios.
    In mid-May, you had ordered CENTCOM to make preparations for a
    potential NEO and that on the 10th of August, there was another
    NEO tabletop. When did the State Department actually call for
    the NEO?
        Secretary Austin. I believe it was on the 14th,
    Congressman, 14th of August.
        Mr. Kahele. On the 14th of August the State Department
    called for the NEO. So you stated in your testimony that the
    NEO remains among the most challenging military operations even
    in the best of circumstances and the circumstances in August
    were anything but ideal--extreme heat, a landlocked country, no
    government, a highly dynamic situation on the ground, and an
    active, credible, and lethal terrorist threat. And that also in
    your testimony that you had offered input to the State
    Department that although, mindful of their concerns that moving
    too soon would actually cause a very collapse of the Afghan
    Government that we all wanted to avoid, but that moving too
    late would put our people and our operations at greater risk.
        And so what I am trying to figure out is, you know, despite
    the President's decision to order the withdrawl on April 14th
    and that the troop presence will go to zero. On May 1st, a
    withdrawl began. You know, by May and June of 2021, the Taliban
    had captured a quarter of the country. Representative Crow
    identified on June 11, there was a NEO tabletop that was done.
        On August 6, the Taliban captured the first capital. On
    August 10th, we did a tabletop. Why were we doing a tabletop on
    August 10th when the Taliban was rapidly advancing to Kabul? On
    August 14th, Jalalabad and Mazar-i-Sharif fell and by August
    15th, the Taliban had entered Kabul. That is what I am trying
    to figure out, Secretary Austin, is why did we wait--I know we
    had to wait for the State Department to call for the NEO, but
    why did we wait so long to do that, even though we had
    prepositioned forces, as you had mentioned, in Afghanistan. We
    had the 24th MEU there, 82nd Airborne was coming in, but the
    airfield was still in total chaos on August 15th.
        Secretary Austin. So I think what changed the equation
    here--we anticipated that just based upon the disposition of
    forces that were kind of centered around the population center
    that the Afghans would, in fact, put up, you know, more
    significant resistance.
        And so we anticipated that that fighting would be a bit
    more intense. As they approached Ghazni, we didn't see the
    fight that we thought we would see. And that was a trigger for
    us to begin to move some things very quickly.
        And then, even as they moved north of Ghazni, we expected
    that as they approached Kabul that, again, those forces that
    were there would fight more. And we had--there was a government
    in place still at the time, but with the government collapsing
    and leaving and that precipitated the evaporation of the
    security forces and that really panicked the people. And so
    what you saw on that first day was a result of that panic.
        Mr. Kahele. Should the NEO operation have commenced sooner
    than April 14th?
        Secretary Austin. I certainly think it could have, yeah.
    Again, we had the elements to begin to operate a bit sooner.
    But again, that is a State Department call and----
        Mr. Kahele. Totally understand.
        Secretary Austin [continuing]. We provide our input and it
    is based upon a lot of things. And this is not throwing my
    State Department colleagues under the bus; it is a very dynamic
    and challenging situation.
        Mr. Kahele. General McKenzie, you stated that primarily our
    NEO plan included AMCITs [American citizens] and Embassy
    personnel. When did the NEO planning begin to include Afghans
    and SIVs?
        General McKenzie. Late in spring, early in the summer. We
    began to broaden that plan.
        Mr. Kahele. Thank you for your questions.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Franklin is recognized.
        Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    gentlemen, for your patience and persistence these last 2 days.
    I understand that it is a lot of hours to be sitting before all
    of us and then when you are tailing Charlie like I am in this
    batting order, most of the ground has been broken, but I do
    have a couple things.
        But, first, I was kind of puzzled hearing General
    McKenzie's characterization of our departure now out of
    Afghanistan as being something other than a surrender. You
    know, it doesn't feel that way to me. It certainly doesn't feel
    that way to the American public and 20 years ago exactly I was
    sitting in Bahrain, we were planning the initial strikes into
    Afghanistan, and at that time our marching orders were to
    defeat al-Qaida and to ensure that the Afghanistan would no
    longer be a safe haven for terrorists.
        And now fast-forward 20 years, those conditions while, you
    know, General Milley, you said within maybe to 6 to 36 months
    the country will be ripe, again, potentially to be launching
    strikes like that or targeting against us, it doesn't feel like
    it is anything other than a surrender.
        But General McKenzie, you had mentioned that holding Bagram
    was untenable under the circumstances and that the Bagram
    option went away when you were given an end strength of 650.
        I understand that. I assume that you mean that it was
    untenable because of the troop limitation. But if you had not
    been limited, would your professional military advice been to
    relinquish Bagram?
        General McKenzie. So, at a troop level of 2,500, we would
    have held Bagram and that would have been my recommendation.
    That was my position.
        Mr. Franklin. Okay. So you had also mentioned that there
    was no tactical reason to hold Bagram. Would you elaborate? I
    assume that would mean--I don't want to put words in your
    mouth, but strategically would you see a value to us still
    being----
        General McKenzie. When I said there was no tactical reason
    to hold Bagram, I was specifically talking about the NEO
    operation. So once we went down to 650 and then we were given
    the orders to conduct a NEO. For the reasons the Secretary and
    the Chairman have already outlined, the center of gravity of
    that was actually HKIA. It is where the people are. You got the
    MOG operating capacity there to move airplanes in and out.
        I will tell you this, though, Representative, we had a
    branch plan to seize Bagram Airfield should HKIA have become
    untenable, but that would have required as has already been
    noted, significant investment in combat power. And HKIA never
    became untenable.
        So we did not have to consider that plan, although we had a
    highly detailed plan to be able to do it. It simply was not
    necessary because we were able to maintain the throughput at
    HKIA.
        And, again, had we gone into Bagram, we would have
    introduced significant additional U.S. combat forces into the
    country and probably would have provoked another conflict with
    the Taliban, which would have been a political decision, not a
    military decision.
        Mr. Franklin. I understand. Political decision. But, you
    know, here it is since 1898 we have maintained Guantanamo Bay.
    So we do have a history of keeping territory even in lands
    where we don't have friendly forces there at our side, but I do
    know seeing already the challenge with over the horizon--
    conducting our strikes over the horizon it sure would be nice
    to have that field now.
        Secretary Austin, I just want to wholeheartedly agree with
    Chairman Smith's comment earlier that we make the decisions in
    the world that we live in and we don't have the luxury of
    having a magic wand. I get that and that is the world you all
    face every day. You told us that you would like to have seen
    this conflict end with a negotiated settlement.
        General Milley, you did as well. I know there has been a
    lot of talk about whether President Trump should have been
    negotiating with the Taliban or not. But that is a different
    conversation for another day, but those terms that were agreed
    to were not really complied with by the Taliban, and here it
    is--we know that, General Milley, in your testimony, seven of
    the eight conditions that were given to the Taliban were
    broken.
        In light of that failure, Secretary Austin, do you think it
    was wise for us to continue with the timeline or do we feel
    compelled because I constantly hear the administration pushing
    back saying we had no choice. Our hands were tied. The Trump
    administration tied our hands to this timeline, but the Taliban
    didn't comply with their end of the deal and now we are kind of
    stuck in a bad situation. Do you feel that we should have
    pushed a timeline not necessarily to stay in Afghanistan. I get
    it. I think there is a time for us to start negotiating an exit
    there, but in light of how disastrous the hasty withdrawl
    turned out to be, we could have used more time to get those
    folks out.
        Secretary Austin. Quite frankly, because of the fact that,
    you know, for a year we weren't striking the Taliban, they were
    increasing in combat power. We released 5,000 prisoners which
    kind of regenerated combat power for them. They were able to
    make advances against the Afghan Security Forces because, you
    know, we weren't doing things to fully support----
        The Chairman. Again, I apologize. The gentleman's time has
    expired. That will have to suffice.
        Mr. Panetta is recognized.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you. I appreciate this hearing, Mr.
    Chair. And good afternoon and thank you, gentlemen. Thank you
    for being here. Thank you for your service, not just in
    Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF], but throughout your career
    service to our great Nation.
        As an American, as a veteran of OEF, I want to thank you
    for continuing to remind the American public not to reduce the
    service of 800,000 men and women who served in Afghanistan down
    to a 2-week chaotic withdrawl, not to reduce the sacrifice of
    the 2,461 men and women down to a single photo of a C-17 on the
    Kabul tarmac.
        But as you know and as an American and as a veteran and as
    a Representative, it is my duty to ask questions. And let me
    tell you, my constituents are asking a lot of questions. And I
    think the problem with the withdrawl is that it has left more
    questions than answers.
        With the withdrawl, we ended our involvement with the war
    in Afghanistan, but we still have the war on terror. We
    withdrew our troops, but will we have to go in? Yes, we
    evacuated 122,000 and you should be proud of that, but what
    about the others who remain?
        And on that note, I just want you to think about the
    definition of success shouldn't be based on how many people you
    got out, but how many people we left behind. And so what I am
    hearing is a lot of frustration from my constituents who have
    family members there in Afghanistan who literally have nobody
    to turn to to get out when it comes to on the ground. They are
    devastated by the deaths of the 12 Marines and the 1 sailor
    and, yes, I got to be frank, they are a little humiliated
    seeing the Taliban drive around, screw around with American
    equipment.
        And this is hyperbole, but I do think it sums it up pretty
    good that I heard this quote about this frustration, and it
    says: Something is not right when the Taliban can get American-
    made ammunition easier than Americans can. And four, I do
    believe that we are dumbfounded. Dumbfounded that this
    government, the Afghan Government, absolutely disappeared and
    hundreds of thousands of well-equipped Afghan troops shed their
    uniforms, dropped their weapons, and ran.
        I do believe, though, that the underlying foundation for
    the reason for why this government crumbled and why those
    troops fled is corruption. We basically supported a Potemkin
    village and when we left, it fell. It basically set up a system
    as we saw throughout the 20 years there from birth certificates
    to death certificates, it was all about bribes.
        And what we were left with when we were about to leave was
    a state that had grown so corrupt that governors were cutting
    deals with jihadists to switch sides. Inflation was rampant
    because of the money we handed out and it left ghost soldiers,
    basically absentees listed on the payroll so commanders could
    steal the salaries. Very similar to what happened in Vietnam
    and you are seeing a lot of similarities presented to that
    case.
        And there are a lot of studies obviously after Vietnam
    where it said corruption was the fundamental ill that was
    largely responsible for the ultimate collapse. So my question
    to you is, do you believe that corruption was the fundamental
    ill that was largely responsible for the collapse of the Afghan
    Government? If so, elaborate. If not, what would you consider
    the fundamental ill for the quick collapse of that government?
        Secretary Austin. Thank you. I certainly agree that
    corruption played a major role in the collapse of the
    government and the security forces. I also believe that weak
    leadership added to that and the fact that President Ghani
    frequently, without any apparent reason, changed out his
    commanders which degraded the confidence of the troops in their
    leadership.
        So I think--and I believe also that the Doha Agreement had
    a significant negative affect on the morale of the military.
    And so I think there is, you know, a combination of a number of
    things that came together to create these effects, but I
    certainly agree that corruption was central to this issue.
        Mr. Panetta. General.
        General Milley. Absolutely. And I would even take it one
    level higher. I think it is about the legitimacy of the
    government in the eyes of the people and the eyes of its
    military, and I think that corruption is one of the
    contributing factors to delegitimize.
        It is my observation--again, have to gather all the facts,
    but I think at the village level, the Government of Afghanistan
    was looked at as parasitic as opposed to supportive with the
    exception possibly of the Afghan Army itself. But the
    government, the local officials, the police forces, et cetera,
    were clearly delegitimized in the eyes of the people.
        And that, I think was a major contributing factor to the
    dissolution of the government and the army and the collapse of
    the whole thing in a very, very rapid period of time.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, again.
        I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Okay. We have got quickly Mr.
    Fallon and then Mr. Horsford and we are going to be done. Mr.
    Fallon, you are recognized.
        Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. During this hearing, the
    virtue of courage was used to describe the current President
    and I think that is misplaced. I think the virtue of courage
    should be attributed to the 2,461 troops that we lost, that
    gave everything; the 20,698 that were maimed and injured and
    wounded; and the 800,000 that served. I am a little perplexed
    and thank you for being here. I wanted to clear something up.
        During the testimony, General McKenzie, you were asked when
    you knew that the drone strike on August 29th had gone
    tragically wrong and correct me, just yes or no, you said about
    5 or 6 hours later you learned that. Is that correct?
        General McKenzie. That is when we learned that civilians
    had been killed.
        Mr. Fallon. So it went wrong?
        General McKenzie. No. I did not say that.
        Mr. Fallon. Okay.
        General McKenzie. I said that is when we learned that
    civilians had been killed----
        Mr. Fallon. Would you have considered 5 or 6 hours later a
    righteous strike?
        General McKenzie. We took that strike based on the belief
    that the vehicle was going to be used in an attack against us.
        Mr. Fallon. So we knew that people that shouldn't have been
    killed were killed 5 or 6 hours after, yes?
        General McKenzie. We knew that probably people that were
    not involved [inaudible] took us a little longer to learn the
    rest of the story.
        Mr. Fallon. Agreed. Secretary Austin, same? You learned
    about 5 or 6 hours after that people that should not have been
    killed were killed?
        Secretary Austin. I learned from General McKenzie's
    reporting that there was collateral damage. And whenever that
    happens, we investigate.
        Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you. Okay. And then, General
    Milley, on September 1st, 3 days later, you described it as ``a
    righteous strike.'' People that were not supposed to be killed
    were killed and you described it as ``a righteous strike.''
        General Milley. You have to go back and look at the full
    quote. What I said was, we followed the procedures, I had every
    reason to believe that we followed our procedures at that point
    in time. We knew that there were civilians killed. We knew they
    were noncombatants and there was collateral damage.
        Mr. Fallon. Yes. You said were others killed? Yes. Who were
    they, we don't know. We are trying to sort through all that.
        General Milley. That is right. Because I believed, I
    believed that the target that we were aiming----
        Mr. Fallon. Sir----
        General Milley. I believe the target we were aiming at----
        Mr. Fallon. Okay. I have 3 more minutes. Now General
    Milley, you served under both President Trump and Biden?
        General Milley. Correct.
        Mr. Fallon. Okay. I have spoken with former Secretary of
    State Pompeo, had a very extensive conversation with director--
    former National Director of Intelligence John Ratcliffe, and
    what was the general sentiment of senior advisers if conditions
    weren't met, what would happen in Afghanistan?
        How long the Afghan Army and government would last? Do you
    recall that? I would imagine you were sitting in on those
    meetings.
        General Milley. I am not sure I am understanding the
    question. If conditions are not met----
        Mr. Fallon. If conditions aren't met and we withdraw, how
    long is the Afghan Government going to last--back then?
        General Milley. I am not going to speak for them; I will
    speak for myself----
        Mr. Fallon. Please do.
        General Milley. I am on record having said that if we go to
    zero that there is a high probability of the government and the
    Afghan Army collapsing. In terms of time, I put that at between
    1 and 3 years at the time I wrote this stuff back in a year ago
    in the fall of 2020.
        Mr. Fallon. Okay. That is interesting when you say that
    because when I talked to both Mr. Pompeo and Mr. Ratcliffe,
    they told me that there was unanimity, even President Trump
    said, if conditions are not met that the Afghan Army and the
    government would collapse within weeks and the longest they
    heard maybe a month or two. That's what they gave me. Because I
    was just surprised that because Secretary Austin said in his
    remarks today that the fact that the Afghan Army--we and our
    partners trained simply melted away in many cases was a shock.
        John Ratcliffe told me he told his successor that they were
    going to collapse instantaneously if those conditions weren't
    met; they were going to evaporate. And now [inaudible] but I
    think--General Milley, with all due respect----
        General Milley. Sure.
        Mr. Fallon [continuing]. What I think it is, it was not a
    failure of intelligence; it seems to me--I didn't know this
    stuff. I wasn't in the room, you were, that it was a failure to
    heed that intelligence and act accordingly.
        General Milley. I can show you the intelligence reports
    that were produced under Mr. Ratcliffe----
        Mr. Fallon. I appreciate that. I have 50 seconds left.
    Thank you.
        General Milley. Sure.
        Mr. Fallon. All right. So we got 5,000 bad guys in Bagram,
    in jail at Bagram, right? Am I right, General McKenzie? And
    then we go down to 650, we can't hold it so we split around
    July 1st I think we left.
        General McKenzie. 12th.
        Mr. Fallon. July 12th and it fell August 15th, correct? And
    they got out then? August 16th? And then we have an attack on
    our troops couple weeks later. Can any of you guarantee the
    American people that out of those 5,000 bad guy scumbags none
    of them were directly responsible for killing our troops?
        General McKenzie. No. I cannot guarantee that.
        General Milley. I cannot guarantee that, no.
        Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Horsford is recognized.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary. And to the generals I will be brief. I have several
    questions and appreciate your concise response.
        General McKenzie, on August 30th, you told the media that
    while you maintained the ability to bring American citizens and
    civilians out until immediately before the departure of the
    final flight, no civilians were on those aircraft and that
    mission ended approximately 12 hours before the exit.
        So to clarify, when did the last American citizen
    successfully pass through Taliban perimeter into HKIA gate.
        General McKenzie. That is a very specific question. I will
    have to come back to you on the record, but I will come back to
    you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 164.]
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you. And when did the last Afghan
    civilian successfully pass through the gate?
        General McKenzie. Same thing. It was some hours before, but
    I will come back to you with an exact time on that.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 164.]
        Mr. Horsford. And how many individuals successfully passed
    through the Taliban perimeter in the 72 hours proceeding the
    departure of the final flight?
        General McKenzie. Probably in the low hundreds, but I will
    come back to you with an exact number.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 164.]
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you. I understand that on August 19th
    ground commanders authorized the use of helicopters to rescue
    169 Americans from the Baron Hotel after the initial plan for
    them to proceed on foot became too dangerous. At what time were
    rotary wing aviation assets no longer operation at HKIA?
        General McKenzie. So, first of all, you are right. The
    Baron Hotel, we should note, is about 200 meters off the HKIA
    compound. So it is not a long distance, but we did use
    helicopters for that. We kept helicopters up until the very
    end. In fact, one of the final things we did before actually
    extracting from the C-17s was breaking down some helicopters
    and loading them.
        Mr. Horsford. And what were the specific contingency plans
    to continue the evacuation if the Taliban closed checkpoints
    surrounding the airport?
        Mr. McKenzie. So at all times we were prepared to accept
    American citizens that were able to make it to the gate. There
    was an external Taliban cordon. We've talked about that. The
    external Taliban cordon was actually part of the force
    protection scheme for the base. Commanders on the ground had to
    balance their force protection against the need to allow
    Americans, SIVs, and others to enter. So we tried to work
    closely when we could with the Taliban to ensure free passage
    for Americans.
        Mr. Horsford. So why then were the plans not implemented
    once it became clear that no additional American citizens were
    going to be allowed to pass through the Taliban checkpoints?
        General McKenzie. We attempted with the Taliban to allow
    Americans to be able to get to the gate up until the very end.
    I do not have facts on why that did not happen. Our presence on
    the ground then, we should remember, was very small and we were
    beginning to turn inward as we prepared to extract.
        Mr. Horsford. General Milley, in 2017, the GAO [Government
    Accountability Office] released a report on recommendations to
    enhance the readiness of the Global Response Force to support
    contingency operations. In June of 2021, GAO assessed that the
    Department had not implemented any of their three
    recommendations to improve readiness due to the ongoing
    development of the dynamic force employment concept.
        So I am curious, what percentage of the total Immediate
    Response Force [IRF] and existing prepositioned forces deployed
    in support of Operation Spartan Shield were deployed to HKIA to
    assist in the NEO? And how many additional battalions intended
    to be-- IRF follow-on force were available for short notice
    deployment but not deployed?
        General Milley. We had and I will--Frank, can correct me
    100 percent here in a minute, but we had two battalions, the
    MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit], and another Marine battalion
    prepositioned in the Middle East, along with an Army infantry
    battalion prepositioned in the Middle East, and there was a
    battalion already on the ground.
        So that is four, plus we alerted on the Secretary's order
    marshaled and deployed the IRF--and the GRF [Global Response
    Force], which is a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, very,
    very rapidly and we had 6,000 troops at HKIA very, very
    rapidly. I think we far exceeded any of the standards that are
    published for the GRF or the RF [Response-Force]. In addition
    to that, we had a variety of high end special operations forces
    that alerted, marshaled, and deployed extraordinarily rapidly.
    So we easily met any kind of rapid deployment standards and we
    exceeded them.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our
    military men and women and to our veterans who served over the
    20 years during this longest war in U.S. history. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for your
    testimony today and I know certainly it was a contentious
    hearing, but it is enormously important that we have the
    opportunity to have these conversations. I do not in any way
    support some of the comments that some of my colleagues made or
    the way they chose to conduct themselves, but that is a small
    price to pay for the transparency that we need to allow the
    committee to do its job.
        I appreciate you being willing to do that in giving us the
    opportunity to have this discussion and we will certainly
    continue to discuss the situation in South Asia as we go
    forward. Appreciate your testimony.
        Mr. Rogers, anything for the good of the order?
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, the one thing I would like to ask
    is that as soon as practical that we do have the classified
    hearing on the over-the-horizon capabilities because as I have
    spoken individually with all three of these gentlemen, I am
    very concerned about our counterterrorism capabilities and how
    we are going to address that.
        The Chairman. We will have multiple classified hearings on
    that subject. That is going to be an ongoing topic, but yes, it
    is something we need to do soon.
        Thank you.
        Again, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                               September 29, 2021

    =======================================================================

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               September 29, 2021

    =======================================================================

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                       DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               September 29, 2021

    =======================================================================

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                               September 29, 2021

    =======================================================================

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY

        General Milley. To my knowledge, the Taliban never deliberately
    attacked U.S. or Coalition forces after the signing of the Doha
    Agreement. There were isolated instances of Taliban rocket and mortar
    fire targeting ANDSF bases that were also cohabited by U.S. Forces. On
    occasion there were reports of Taliban fighters returning fire at U.S.
    combat aircraft providing close air support to ANDSF.
        However, the Taliban failed to fully honor other commitments from
    the agreement, including their pledge to not allow terrorists to use
    the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States.
    They also failed to earnestly negotiate with the Government of the
    Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to end the conflict and failed to
    reduce violence overall. Moreover, Taliban actions, including its
    brutal military campaign and targeted assassinations, completely
    undermined the spirit of the agreement, which sought a peaceful
    settlement to the conflict, not a military takeover.  [See page 28.]
                                     ______

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
        Secretary Austin. The Battle of Kunduz took place in 2015, which
    was the first year of the Resolute Support train, advise, and assist
    mission. During that period, the Taliban briefly captured Kunduz City.
    With the support from U.S. forces, the Afghan forces recaptured the
    city from the Taliban within a couple of weeks.  [See page 33.]
                                     ______

               RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
        Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to gather
    information about the ISIS network responsible for the Abbey Gate
    bombing and to analyze the ISIS planning and personnel, including the
    bomber, involved in the attack. We received credible information
    regarding a threat to Hamid Karzai International Airport in the days
    leading up to the attack. Unfortunately, we were unable to disrupt the
    attack.   [See page 36.]
                                     ______

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
        Secretary Austin. We planned for multiple scenarios, including a
    contingency where the United States would have to facilitate the
    evacuation of our Afghan allies under difficult circumstances. The
    Department began planning for the possibility of a noncombatant
    evacuation operation (NEO) two weeks after the President's decision in
    April to withdraw from Afghanistan by early September, at which point
    military planners had crafted a number of evacuation scenarios. In mid-
    May, I ordered U.S. Central Command to prepare for a potential NEO and
    DOD began prepositioning forces in the region, including three infantry
    battalions.
        A key DOD effort in support of expediting Special Immigrant Visa
    (SIV) processing was the establishment of ``Project Rabbit,'' through
    which DOD provides employment verification of SIV applicants who worked
    for DOD contractors or subcontractors directly to the Department of
    State. DOD has also endorsed and uploaded referrals for Afghan
    nationals under threat due to their association with DOD's mission into
    the Department of State's refugee referrals database. DOD will continue
    processing these referrals for as long as we continue to receive them
    directly from DOD personnel. In addition, the DOD has hosted tens of
    thousands of Afghan nationals on our facilities abroad and now at home
    as part of Operation Allies Welcome and Operation Allies Refuge.   [See
    page 40.]
        General Milley. Throughout the planning and withdrawal of U.S.
    forces from Afghanistan, my primary focus was on safe and deliberate
    retrograde U.S. forces, contractors, citizens, and Afghan evacuees from
    Afghanistan. I had direct communications with Secretary Austin, General
    McKenzie, General Miller, leaders in the Intelligence Community, the
    Secretary of State, and the National Security Council to share
    information, collaborate, and maintain a common operational picture on
    the activities in Afghanistan. My staff, at all levels, maintained
    communication to coordinate support for to these activities with their
    respective military and interagency (IA) counterparts.
        Following the President's announcement on 14 April 2021 to withdraw
    U.S forces from Afghanistan, I immediately established a crisis
    management team (CMT) and later an Afghan evacuee cell to track the
    progress of the plan and enable operations. My staff provided me daily
    briefings that included intelligence updates, subordinate commanders'
    estimates, the status of security transition to Afghan security forces,
    the retrograde of U.S. and Coalition forces and equipment, the status
    of American Citizens (AMCITs), and the status of Afghan Special
    Immigrant Visa (SIV) and other Afghan at Risk personnel in the country.
        On 28 April, I hosted a DOD internal Rehearsal of Concept (ROC)
    Drill focused on the retrograde plan and its branches and sequels. On 8
    May 2020, I hosted an Interagency table top exercise to review the
    retrograde timeline and multiple contingency operations that included
    the evacuation of non-combatant personnel. On 6 August 2020, my staff
    hosted a Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) rehearsal with the IA leaders
    to discuss the security, logistics, authorities, funding, and other
    requirements to enable the conduct of a conditions-based evacuation of
    AMCITS, SIV, and Afghan at Risk personnel.
        In coordination with the Department of State and U.S. Embassy
    Kabul, CENTCOM completed contingency planning and prepositioned forces
    to support a NEO shortly after this rehearsal. From 14-31 Aug 21, DOD
    facilitated the evacuation of over 124,000 AMCIT, Afghan SIV, and
    Afghan at Risk personnel as part of Operation Allies Refuge. The DOD's
    Operation Allies Welcome and the relocation of Afghan SIV and Afghan at
    risk personnel continues today. My staff provides me daily updates on
    the movement personnel from Afghanistan and adjacent countries. This
    includes the relocation of Afghan personnel from locations in the
    Middle East and Europe to military bases in the Continental U.S. We
    have successfully received over 84,000 Afghan personnel and resettled
    over 78,000 in the U.S. to date.   [See page 40.]
                                     ______

                  RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
        General Milley. The purpose of the 8 May 21 Interagency table-top
    exercise (TTX) was to refine and ensure a fully coordinated and
    synchronized USG and NATO plan for retrograde of forces and personnel
    from Afghanistan. My staff continued to conduct daily meetings with
    their State Department counterparts to maintain situational awareness
    and reinforce the need for a more-involved Interagency planning effort
    to ensure the development of a coherent NEO plan.   [See page 66.]
                                     ______

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
        Secretary Austin. The Department has multiple efforts underway,
    including by the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Policy, to conduct an independent review of the evacuation,
    the events leading up to it, and lessons learned. The Department is
    committed to understanding what worked, what did not work, and ensuring
    that we incorporate that into our planning and our strategic assessment
    going forward.   [See page 77.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               September 29, 2021

    =======================================================================

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. I agree that ``over the horizon'' operations can be
    effective. However, I am concerned that, without complementary
    operations, they will be insufficient to keep us safe. Secretary
    Austin, are you confident that over the horizon capabilities, on their
    own, can mitigate the terrorist threat we face?
        Secretary Austin. Department of Defense over-the-horizon operations
    employ a mix of capability that contribute to a holistic and
    interagency counterterrorism strategy. The Unites States has
    significant operational and intelligence capability, to deny external
    operations by terrorist organizations that would threaten the homeland.
    We continue to work with our partners in the region, who share our
    interest in promoting a safe and stable South Asia and preventing a
    resurgence of terrorism.
        Mr. Langevin. Former CIA director and Secretary of Defense Panetta
    said that our national security is threatened by the Taliban takeover.
    One of our missions was to prevent a haven for terrorist groups and
    ``we have failed in that mission.'' Are you confident that we can
    prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven?
        Secretary Austin. As the President has stated, we have one vital
    national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent terrorists from using
    Afghanistan to launch attacks against the United States. Department of
    Defense over-the-horizon operations employ a mix of capability that
    contribute to a holistic and interagency counterterrorism strategy. Our
    counterterrorism strategy layers multiple sources of intelligence to
    maintain awareness of terrorist threats with the capability to disrupt
    those threats directed against the homeland and our other interests.
    The United States has significant operational and intelligence
    capability, to deny external operations by terrorist organizations that
    would threaten the homeland. We continue to work with our partners in
    the region, who share our interest in promoting a safe and stable South
    Asia and preventing a resurgence of terrorism.
        Mr. Langevin. The director of the DIA has assessed that al Qaeda
    could threaten the homeland in 1-2 years. How will we keep our country
    safe?
        Secretary Austin. The Department remains committed to ensure that
    Afghanistan cannot become a safe haven for terrorist organizations that
    threaten the homeland, and we will use all of the Department's
    capabilities in service of that goal. We will continue our
    comprehensive, focused intelligence collection to inform U.S. kinetic
    and non-kinetic over-the-horizon capabilities. In addition, we will
    share appropriate intelligence with like-minded partners with
    capabilities to disrupt terrorist threats using a variety of means.
    Security cooperation within the region is also a key pillar of this
    strategy, working with those governments directly affected by
    terrorists and who are well-positioned to counter the threat.
        Mr. Langevin. General Milley, we have other train and equip
    programs and counterterrorism missions around the world, and we'll
    likely have more as great power competition heats up. How can we better
    train and equip partner forces? How important is the on-the-ground
    human intelligence?
        General Milley. We can better train and equip partner forces by
    more thoroughly accounting for regional and local politics and building
    a deeper understanding of their country's institutional and logistical
    capacity to absorb our assistance. We must also carefully balance the
    partner's priorities and concerns with our own, cultivating a sense of
    local-ownership and accountability.
        On-the-ground human intelligence can be important in validating
    other forms of intelligence, which together increase our confidence in
    threat assessments.
        Mr. Langevin. I am also concerned about how many SIV applicants and
    holders remain in Afghanistan. They risked their lives for us and now
    are under a very real threat from the Taliban. General McKenzie, is
    there an impression amongst Syrians and Iraqis that it's too risky to
    serve as an interpreter or intelligence asset for the U.S.? How are you
    mitigating this possibility?
        General McKenzie. Currently, the linguist situation in OIR is
    different from that of Afghanistan in August 2021. CJTF-OIR does not
    utilize local national linguists and has not done so since April 2020
    (when Partner training and the use of local nationals outside of the
    bases ceased due to COVID). Today, OIR's linguists are either trained
    uniform military members/government employees or U.S. Citizens hired
    and vetted as part of a U.S. Government contract to work in Syria and
    Iraq. However, the OIR Intelligence Community has observed no
    indicators that Iraqis or Syrians view working as a U.S. intelligence
    asset as too risky. Neither is there any appearance of a lack of desire
    among Syrians and Iraqis to perform linguist duties for the United
    States. Many are willing to risk everything to do so, often in hopes of
    earning a SIV or as a mechanism to secure their local neighborhood.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
        Mr. Wilson. Even before the August 31 withdrawal of troops, there
    were frustrating reports of Americans and Green Card holders being
    turned away at the gates of the airport or being instructed by the
    Administration and the U.S. military to stay away from the airport
    entirely.
        Did you at any point ask President Biden for more time or support
    to enable U.S. forces to stay and complete a full evacuation of
    American citizens (AMCIT), as promised? If so, what was President
    Biden's response?
        Secretary Austin. My judgment remains that extending beyond August
    31 would have greatly imperiled our people and our mission, as it would
    have dramatically increased security risks to U.S. forces. Since that
    time, the U.S. Government has continued its mission to evacuate U.S.
    citizens and lawful permanent residents--to date, more than a thousand
    have departed by air and land routes.
        Mr. Wilson. How many citizens, green card holders, and Afghan
    allies were left behind by the military's premature withdrawal on
    August 31st? What is the plan now to get these vulnerable people out of
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Following the non-combatant evacuation operation
    phase, the Department of Defense continues to support the Department of
    State-led efforts to facilitate the safe and orderly departure of U.S.
    citizens, lawful permanent residents, and Afghans allies who wish to
    leave Afghanistan. Since September 1, 2021, the U.S. Government has
    continued that mission--to date, more than a thousand have departed by
    air and land routes.
        Mr. Wilson. What U.S. military capabilities existed in Afghanistan
    following President Biden's April 14th announcement to withdraw all
    forces? When was air support to the Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces (ANDSF) stopped? When was logistical support withdrawn?
    For how long after April 14th was the U.S. able to conduct intelligence
    activities?
        Secretary Austin. On 14 April, there were approximately 4,000 U.S.
    service members in Afghanistan in primarily advisory and support roles.
    U.S. capabilities at this time included organic fixed and rotary wing
    aviation and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Between 14
    April and 31 July, eight bases were retrograded and consolidated
    resulting in a force of approximately 650 U.S. service members to
    support U.S. Embassy Kabul and HKIA operations. This retrograde was
    conducted in a deliberate manner to meet the President's direction
    while mitigating risk to force and risk to mission. U.S. air support
    missions continued throughout the month of August 2021. Strikes in
    support of ANDSF were conducted as late as 13 August 2021. During the
    NEO, air support was largely focused on support of operations at HKIA.
    While our logistical support capabilities to the ANDSF and the
    Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) decremented to some extent during the
    retrograde, a great deal of effort was focused on providing logistical
    support from over-the-horizon (OTH) locations, which continued through
    the fall of Kabul. Intelligence collection continued without decrement
    until the completion of the NEO on 30 August. It continues to this day,
    albeit at greatly diminished capacity.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
        Mrs. Hartzler. Secretary Austin, is it true that the suicide bomber
    who attacked the Kabul Airport on August 23 was a CIA prisoner at the
    Bagram Air Base whom the Taliban released after Biden's Administration
    left Bagram in July?
        Secretary Austin. I defer to the CIA for a response.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
        Mr. Scott. Should Stage I of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
    have been activated sooner than August 22, 2021?
        Secretary Austin. No. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) augments
    Department of Defense (DOD) airlift requirements in emergencies when
    the need for airlift exceeds the capacity of available military
    aircraft. DOD activated Stage I of the CRAF in anticipation of the need
    for additional long-range international passenger aircraft as we
    expanded evacuation efforts. Activating the CRAF earlier could have
    negatively impacted the commercial carriers' ability to meet their day-
    to-day operational commitments before the additional capacity was
    required.
        Mr. Scott. Did the inter-agency process work as planned during the
    U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Department of Defense planning for the retrograde
    operation was robust, and there was significant interagency
    participation throughout the process. The President received regular
    updates on the progress of the retrograde and the security situation in
    Afghanistan. He sought out all perspectives, including from the
    Department of Defense, throughout the process.
        Mr. Scott. Are you willing to declassify the necessary documents
    that pertain to the decisions to reduce forces in Afghanistan in order
    to invade Iraq?
        General Milley. If directed, we could declassify what are Joint
    Staff equities that we are the classification authority on. Most of
    this, would be outside JS classification authority and would reside
    with Office of the Secretary of Defense.
        Mr. Scott. In your military opinion, should the Chief of Mission
    have declared a NEO sooner than August 14, 2021?
        General Milley. The decision to order a NEO is for civilian
    leadership and policymakers, not military officials, to make.
        In preparation for a possible NEO, and following the President's
    decision to remove military forces from Afghanistan, CENTCOM updated
    contingency planning for a non-combatant evacuation operation, in
    coordination with the Department of State, including Embassy Kabul.
        Because the Department of Defense had prepositioned forces in the
    region and run practice exercises, thousands of troops were able to
    arrive in Kabul, secure the airport, and facilitate the NEO.
        Mr. Scott. Did the inter-agency process work as planned during the
    U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
        General Milley. Yes. Principals from DOD, DOS, DHS, the
    Intelligence Community and the various agencies involved in planning
    the Afghanistan withdrawal and subsequent non-combatant evacuation
    engaged in robust communication and coordination leading up to the
    withdrawal and throughout both operations. Frequent National Security
    Council-led Interagency Policy Committee meetings, Deputies meetings
    and Principals meetings exhaustively examined the issues and developed
    options, directly engaging the President throughout the crises. Senior
    leaders across the interagency were kept informed and provided input on
    all major decisions related to the withdrawal and evacuation.
        Mr. Scott. How did the 8 May 2021 senior officials level
    interagency table top exercise miss the impact of the Afghan's morale/
    confidence in the aftermath of the July 5, 2021 withdrawal from Bagram
    in the dead of night?
        General Milley. The DOD was unable to effectively gauge the morale
    of the Afghan Security Forces (ANDSF) after we removed U.S. advisors
    from its units. The withdrawal of embedded advisor teams from ANDSF
    units virtually eliminated America's ability to monitor, track, and
    mitigate flagging Afghan morale and confidence. Additionally, the 8 May
    21 TTX occurred only three weeks after the President announced the
    complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces. At that time, the Taliban
    had not yet initiated its decisive offensive effort against the ANDSF
    and the primary indicators of Afghan government stability had not been
    put under stress.
        Mr. Scott. When can we expect Joint Pub 3-68 Noncombatant
    Evacuation Operations be updated to reflect the lessons learned from
    the Afghanistan NEO?
        General Milley. The Joint Force learned multiple lessons during the
    conduct of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in Afghanistan.
    These lessons are already being incorporated into planning for any
    potential contingency NEOs. Joint Publication (JP) 3-68 Noncombatant
    Evacuation Operations is under revision with the Joint Doctrine
    Development Community (JDDC). Joint Staff J-3 will complete
    consolidation of comments and lessons learned from the Joint Force in
    April. The Director of Operations, Joint Staff J-3, will approve JP 3-
    68 at the end of July. Once signed, JP 3-68 will be published and
    available to the Joint Force as early as August 2021.
        Mr. Scott. Mirror Imaging is clearly one of the many mistakes of
    the Afghan War. Do the War Colleges need to do a better job of teaching
    their students about the dangers of mirror imaging?
        General Milley. As I stated in my testimony on 28 September 2021,
    the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan to build the Afghan military in the
    mirror image of U.S. forces is a significant lesson for the Department
    of Defense (DOD) to consider and address as we prepare for future wars.
    In Afghanistan, we based the training of Afghan security forces on
    ``American doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. . .(and we)
    made a military that may have been overly dependent upon us, our
    presence, contractors, and higher tech systems. . .to fight a
    counterinsurgency war.'' Applying strategic and operational lessons
    from the War in Afghanistan into education of joint force professionals
    aligns with my 2020 Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for Professional
    Military Education. The war colleges use this guide to educate and
    develop students to effectively assess national security challenges in
    order to serve as future strategic leaders, planners, and advisors. The
    document directs the war colleges to incorporate case studies, like the
    War in Afghanistan, to improve experiential learning. Through this
    process, students apply analytical frameworks to strategic and
    operational problems in order to develop critical thinking, judgment,
    and complex problem-solving skills. The war colleges will continue to
    adapt curricula with lessons from the War in Afghanistan to better
    prepare our joint force professionals for future service at the
    strategic level of the U.S. government.
        Mr. Scott. In response to questioning, you stated that you
    recognized Afghanistan was a stalemate 5-6 years ago. Obviously, this
    was before your time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What is
    the responsibility of the nation's senior military officer to both the
    Commander-in-Chief and the American public should the armed forces of
    the United States ever find themselves engaged again in a stalemate?
        General Milley. I'm the principal military advisor to the
    President, the Secretary of Defense, and NSC as outlined in title 10,
    sec 151 of U.S. code. The chain of command goes from the President, to
    the Secretary Defense, to the combatant commanders, and the secretaries
    of the military departments. My job is strictly advisory--I am very
    much involved but I do not have decision authority. I am expected to
    give my advice and ensure the President is fully informed on military
    matters. I give my best military advice and it's up to the President to
    make decisions.
        Mr. Scott. AMCIT Charlotte Maxwell-Jones is the director and
    founder of Kabul Small Animal Rescue, a veterinary clinic and animal
    rescue organization. Ms. Maxwell-Jones and her team had over 100 dogs
    in their custody in Hangar 12 of HKIA for nearly a week awaiting
    evacuation. All of these dogs had health certificates, proof of rabies
    vaccinations, and in the case of over 50 working dogs, photographs
    identifying them. The dogs were working dogs, family pet dogs of U.S.
    citizens who were forced to leave them behind during the chaos of the
    evacuation, and some dogs that had been rescued by the charity.
        While Maxwell-Jones was offered safe passage out of the country,
    the dogs were not permitted on any of the flights, even when there was
    room and didn't take a seat from any human beings. In the end, Maxwell-
    Jones was escorted out of the airport and the dogs were released from
    their carriers and crates before the U.S. military evacuated. The
    result was the confiscation of the working dogs by the Taliban
    government, the horrific deaths of some dogs, and the survival of
    some--of which Maxwell-Jones is still trying to rescue.
        Why was Maxwell-Jones and the dogs in her care not granted space on
    any evacuation flights? Who made the decision not to permit them safe
    passage to the United States and why? Why was Maxwell-Jones not given
    the opportunity to exit the airport with the dogs?
        General Milley. U.S. Customs restrictions, stipulated in the 14 Jun
    21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the Department of
    Health and Human Services notice entitled ``Notice of Temporary
    Suspension of Dogs Entering the United States from High-Risk Rabies
    Countries,'' prevented the U.S. military from evacuating the Kabul
    Small Animal Rescue dogs. Afghanistan was listed as one of the high-
    risk rabies countries in the notice.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
        Mr. Brooks. We have had 20 years to study this country and think
    about our potential exit. The communication issues between the
    Department of State and the Pentagon that have plagued our efforts
    throughout the last two decades certainly manifested themselves in the
    end. I think you all know the difference between tactical and strategic
    successes and that one does not necessarily equal the other. How do you
    plan to assess these historical problems and address them in moving
    forward with strategic planning to counter and deter China?
        Secretary Austin. Given that the People's Republic of China (PRC)
    is increasingly synchronizing its military and non-military efforts to
    achieve its strategic objectives, it is essential that the Department
    of Defense (DOD) and other U.S Government departments and agencies are
    aligned to address the challenge posed by the PRC. President Biden's
    Interim National Security Strategy has set forth a whole-of-government
    agenda that will strengthen our enduring advantages and allow us to
    prevail in strategic competition with the PRC. Pursuant to that
    strategy, DOD and other U.S. Government departments and agencies,
    including the Department of State, will work together as we address the
    China challenge, taking into consideration the critical role of
    interagency coordination and synchronization.
        Mr. Brooks. We have had 20 years to study this country and think
    about our potential exit. The communication issues between the
    Department of State and the Pentagon that have plagued our efforts
    throughout the last two decades certainly manifested themselves in the
    end. I think you all know the difference between tactical and strategic
    successes and that one does not necessarily equal the other. How do you
    plan to assess these historical problems and address them in moving
    forward with strategic planning to counter and deter China?
        General Milley. We continuously assess and review our operations
    for relevant insights and improvements. The withdrawal from Afghanistan
    is no exception. We are already incorporating lessons from these events
    into our approaches and processes for dealing with other strategic
    challenges, to include China. In fact, given the magnitude of the China
    challenge, there is no way to deal with it except through robust
    interagency coordination.
        The National Security Council is already implementing a robust
    schedule of China-focused interagency meetings at all levels:
    Interagency policy Committees, Deputies Committees, and Principals
    Committees. They have added a weekly China Communications Hub meeting
    to increase cross-agency visibility and coordination of strategic
    messaging related to China.
        Achieving better integration across Departments, especially two as
    large and complex as DOD and State, comes down to developing positive
    personal relationships between principals and staff at all levels. The
    experience of the Afghanistan withdrawal provided a crucible to forge
    those relationships among our present leadership. More than scheduled
    meetings, these relationships break down the traditional bureaucratic
    stovepipes and are helping us move forward in addressing the issues
    your question highlights.
        Mr. Brooks. Reuters issued a transcript copy of a June 23 phone
    call between President Biden and President Ghani. In this call, Biden
    tells President Ghani ``there's a need, whether it is true or not,
    there is a need to project a different picture.'' Did this lack of
    confidence expressed by the President ever give the Administration
    pause in considering our withdrawal at that point or consider providing
    reinforcement to the Afghan National Security Forces? If not, why not?
        General Milley. I did not participate in this phone call, nor am I
    familiar with those details. However, I want to go back to the tasking,
    the mission that we had from the President, which was to execute a
    deliberate, responsible, coordinated, synchronized strategic retrograde
    from Afghanistan, of all U.S. military forces. We executed the
    retrograde as directed and evacuated over 124,000 people from the
    country of Afghanistan. Ultimately, the legacy of our nation's efforts
    in Afghanistan are the 20 years that have passed without a major
    terrorist attack on our homeland as the reslt of the efforts of our
    brave men and women overseas, as well as the thousands of Afghans who
    are now living in freedom in the United States.
        Mr. Brooks. Did CENTCOM suggest Bagram would be the best option to
    prevent bottlenecks and logistical challenges for an evacuation?
        General McKenzie. My assessment was that Bagram Air Field (BAF) was
    not a suitable location for any potential NEO based on its distance
    from Kabul and the U.S. Embassy Kabul (USEK).
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
        Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, public reporting last year
    highlighted the key role NSPM 13 has played in executing offensive
    cyber operations as part of U.S. efforts to defend forward. It was
    reported that a key element of the success was the delegation of
    authority to act to the Secretary of Defense once a campaign was agreed
    to. Without discussing any specific campaigns or plans, are these
    operations continuing at an equal or greater pace under the Biden
    Administration? If not, what impediments are you experiencing to
    continuing this reportedly successful program?
        Secretary Austin. The existing U.S. policy framework for approving
    offensive cyber operations continues to enable the Department to
    effectively perform its mission to disrupt threats overseas at the
    source. Our forces operate routinely in cyberspace to maintain
    awareness of the evolving cyber environment, observe adversary
    activities, and generate opportunities to disrupt foreign malicious
    cyber activities. The Department conducts offensive cyber operations
    when threats meet the threshold for action as established in policy.
    Challenges exist as cyberspace is a domain of fleeting opportunity and
    constant change.
        Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, the Pentagon has said repeatedly
    in recent years that the Indo-Pacific is its ``priority theater.'' If
    INDOPACOM is the priority theater, would you agree that INDOPACOM
    should be the option of last resort for sourcing requests for forces by
    other combatant commands, particularly for high-demand, low-density
    assets? As the Department of Defense formulates options for conducting
    over-the-horizon counterterrorism options in Afghanistan, have you
    provided explicit guidance to minimize the use of forces assigned to
    U.S. Indo-Pacific Command? If not, would you take this opportunity to
    publicly provide that guidance? If not, why not? As our over-the-
    horizon planning takes shape, would you commit to having your staffs
    report back to this committee on the specific steps you took to avoid
    allocating forces assigned to INDOPACOM?
        Secretary Austin. The Department's focus is on China as the pacing
    challenge, and this is our priority throughout the Global Force
    Management (GFM) process. The GFM process provides a robust review of
    available forces with the expertise, training, readiness, and
    experience necessary to successfully complete the mission and includes
    scrutiny at multiple levels within the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Their
    combined recommendations provide the foundation for a Department-wide
    approach to address emergent crises and global challenges. I am
    confident that our current processes prioritize requirements related to
    the INDOPACOM theater and that we can maintain this focus effectively
    while also addressing global counterterrorism requirements, including
    in Afghanistan. As always, we would be happy to answer any questions
    you may have on how we are meeting the China challenge and executing
    over-the-horizon counterterrorism missions, in a classified setting.
        Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, I understand the National Security
    Council held a drill on May 8 where the interagency rehearsed the
    withdrawal. Can you please tell the Committee who from each cabinet
    Department represented their agency?
        Secretary Austin. Extensive planning was conducted across a range
    of U.S Government departments and agencies and the DOD was a full
    participant at all levels.
        Mr. Gallagher. General Milley, U.S. forces, sensors, and platforms
    vary in their relevance for an over-the-horizon counterterrorism
    operation. Would you agree that an aircraft carrier operating from the
    Arabian Sea is a relatively expensive and inefficient way to conduct
    counterterrorism operations? When INDOPACOM is our priority theater,
    and when strategic competition with China and Russia are the top
    priorities of our strategy, is it really the best use of our limited
    fleet of aircraft carriers to operate in the Arabian Sea monitoring
    terrorist groups in Afghanistan?
        General Milley. Multiple factors contributed to the decision to
    maintain a Carrier Strike Group in the CENTCOM region through the
    Noncombatant Evacuation Operation and in the period immediately after,
    including the need to preserve options to protect U.S. citizens and our
    allies in Afghanistan. Additionally, the near proximity of the Carrier
    Strike Group greatly reduced the requirement for airborne refueling
    capacity, reducing risk to force and mission. The Carrier Strike
    Group's position was continuously evaluated throughout the operation
    and it was moved as soon as the situation warranted.
        As a global force, the Department of Defense strives to balance
    priorities worldwide. We align capabilities, not specific assets, to
    these priorities and there are many factors to consider when doing so.
    This often means an asset like an aircraft carrier, with its wide range
    of capabilities and great mobility, will shift from one Combatant
    Command to another as we adjust forces globally in support of our
    highest priorities.
        Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, did you convey the Taliban's
    offer, during your meeting with Mullah Baradar, to allow U.S. forces to
    take control of Kabul to the President? Who made the decision to turn
    down the Taliban offer to allow the U.S. military to secure Kabul and
    put the safety of our troops in the hands of the Taliban?
        General McKenzie. I met with the Taliban in Doha alongside
    Ambassador Khalilizad, however in our discussions the Taliban did not
    provide a sincere offer to secure Kabul. Securing Kabul would have
    required the additional deployment of a reinforced combat division,
    which would have had to deliberately clear the city before securing its
    outer perimeter--activities that would have provoked overt hostilities
    with the Taliban and jeopardized the NEO. During this meeting, I
    reaffirmed the specific purpose for my participation: to warn the
    Taliban of the severe consequences of interfering with our NEO. The
    Taliban pledged that they had no intention of doing so and subsequently
    abided by this commitment. I reported key elements of the meeting to my
    chain of command afterward.
        Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, on September 29th you said the
    attack on FOB Chapman did not breach the Doha agreement, Did we respond
    with lethal force to the attack on our base? Did the Taliban get the
    message not to breach Doha Agreement via air strikes, drone strikes,
    special operations? By not responding to an attack, doesn't that send a
    message to Taliban? A message they could act with impunity and Biden
    Administration wouldn't respond?
        General McKenzie. Following the Doha Accord (29 Feb 20), there were
    three indirect fire attacks against FOB Chapman from late March to
    early April 2021. All three were attributed to the Taliban, who, we
    assessed, thought it was unlikely that we would meet the 1 May 2021
    deadline to withdraw U.S. forces and perhaps intended to apply pressure
    to meet the deadline. No U.S. or Afghan forces were injured or killed
    during these attacks, but CNN later reported that seven Afghan
    civilians were reportedly injured (outside the wire) during one of the
    attacks. There were no operations conducted specifically in response to
    these attacks. I cannot speculate whether the Taliban interpreted a
    non-response to the attacks as evidence that they could act with
    impunity against U.S. forces. However, the overall level of violence
    was reduced following the Doha Agreement. Although a permanent and
    comprehensive ceasefire was an agenda item for dialogue and
    negotiations, an attack on U.S. forces between 29 February 2020 and 31
    August 2021 confirmed to have been conducted by the Taliban or forces
    under its direction could be understood as a violation of one of the
    Taliban's commitments under the Doha Agreement. However, determinations
    concerning whether any particular engagement or engagements violated
    the Doha Agreement were policy matters, to be informed by USCENTCOM's
    military assessments, rather than military decisions for USCENTCOM to
    render.
        Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, on September 29th, you testified
    the Doha Agreement negatively affected Afghan Troops. Did the failure
    of the U.S. to enforce Doha conditions have an even greater impact on
    Afghan troops? Did abandoning Bagram without notice have a negative
    impact on Afghan troops?
        General McKenzie. I believe the February 2020 Doha Agreement was
    the operational reason for the eventual collapse of GIRoA. It is not
    possible to overstate the pernicious and devastating affect this
    agreement had on the ANDSF, particularly aggravated by our negotiation
    strategy, which did not subsequently apply conditions. Subsequent
    announcements regarding reductions of U.S. force levels contributed
    further to the sense of demoralization, as did the closure/handoff of
    our bases. Bagram was handed off to the ANDSF in coordination with its
    leadership. Nothing indicates that the handoff of this particular base
    had any effect on ANDSF morale, which was already in terminal decline
    by that point.
        Mr. Gallagher. General McKenzie, does an over the horizon posture
    require a partner on the ground? Do you see the Taliban as that
    partner? Typically, OTH requires neighboring partners as well. Do we
    have any of those around Afghanistan, such as any Central Asian
    partners who may have agreed to help?
        Do you have confidence that Pakistan will allow us to use their
    airspace if we need to go after al Qaeda? Our air assets will take much
    longer to reach Afghan airspace than when we could fly them out of
    Bagram, correct? Does this mean that they will have less time on
    target?
        General McKenzie. An OTH posture does not necessarily require a
    partner on the ground. There are capabilities that can strike a threat
    without partner forces on the ground. OTH does require neighboring
    partners. We are currently staging out of the Gulf region and DoS
    continues to coordinate with Central Asia Countries on agreements for
    conducting OTH operations. In closed-door meetings we are quietly
    discussing with Pakistan the continued use of their airspace. Assets
    will take longer to get to Afghanistan than assets originating in
    Afghanistan. Air assets originating outside of Afghanistan will have
    less time on target. This can be minimized but not erased by using
    multiple assets.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
        Mr. Keating. Secretary Austin, were NATO allies consulted on the
    decision to withdraw by August 31st? Did you consult with any NATO
    leaders about withdrawal on August 31st? Were NATO in agreement about
    withdrawal? Were they consulted during the withdrawal as well? How many
    of these countries had troops on the ground in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. DOD, along with our counterparts throughout the
    U.S. Government, conducted dozens of consultations and engagements with
    Allies and partners leading up to the April 14, 2021, announcement to
    withdraw forces from Afghanistan. This coordination continued through
    the conclusion of the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan,
    and consultation remains a priority as the Alliance engages in the
    process of examining lessons learned that will inform current and
    future operations.
        NATO's Resolute Support Mission focused primarily on training,
    advising, and assisting Afghans working at the security-related
    ministries, in other government institutions, and among the senior
    ranks of the army and police. At the time of the April 14 announcement,
    7,000 non-U.S. military personnel from 35 NATO and non-NATO countries
    supported RSM.
        Mr. Keating. In my capacity as a member of the Foreign Affairs
    Committee, I had the opportunity to question the Special Representative
    for Syria Engagement. Specifically, I asked about the timeframe between
    the decision to withdraw our service members to when our allies in the
    region were notified. I was surprised to hear that hours, or possibly
    days, transpired before our allies were notified. Moreover, they had to
    hear about the decision in the media. During my questioning, the
    Special Representative admitted that was a mistake. I want to know if
    that mistake was repeated during our withdrawal in Afghanistan. How
    long after the decision to fully withdraw our service members from
    Afghanistan were our allies notified?
        General Milley. U.S. Government officials from different agencies
    and departments conveyed to Allies and partners who had personnel and
    citizens on the ground alongside the United States in Afghanistan the
    President's decision. Those communications took place over the course
    of weeks in different formats--in Washington, at NATO and CENTCOM, in
    the capitals of those Allies and partners, and on the ground in
    Afghanistan. The discussion was continuous with the sharing of critical
    fresh information and coordination for the evacuation of their citizens
    and Afghan nationals.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
        Mr. Banks. Secretary Austin, During the Senate Armed Services
    Committee hearing on September 28th, you confirmed to Senator Cotton
    that Secretary Blinken missed an important Rehearsal of Concept drill
    at the Pentagon on May 8th, 2021 that discussed Afghan withdrawal.
    Instead, he sent Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources
    Brian McKeon in his place. Did Secretary Blinken indicate why he needed
    to miss such a critical meeting? Did Secretary Blinken state where he
    would be instead of at that event? Did Secretary Blinken use any DOD
    assets, whether aircraft, air bases, personnel, ground transport, etc.
    to travel during in the days before or following this critical exercise
    between May 7, 2021 and May 10, 2021?
        Secretary Austin. For information on Secretary Blinken's travel
    schedule and logistics, I recommend contacting the Department of State.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
        Ms. Escobar. What is the Department of Defense's guidance with
    respect to any military-grade weapons, vehicles, and equipment being
    turned over to DLA as a result of the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Military Departments make the determinations for
    the disposition of their military grade weapons, vehicles and
    equipment. As U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) determined that items
    were no longer needed, USFOR-A checked Military Department databases
    that provide specific disposition instructions. These databases
    indicated whether to prepare items for retrograde out of Afghanistan or
    to turn the item over to DLA for disposal. If a Military Department had
    a requirement for the item, it was typically retrograded for use by
    other units. If there was no requirement for the item indicated by a
    Military Department, disposition instructions typically direct a
    transfer to DLA for disposal. DLA would then dispose of the materiel in
    accordance with DOD Manual 4160.21 volumes 1 and 3.
        Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon,
    and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control
    over Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. It is clear that the international community has
    a stake in ensuring that the Taliban lives up to its public
    commitments. We continue to engage the Taliban on our core interests in
    Afghanistan, including counter-terrorism, safe passage for individuals
    seeking to leave Afghanistan, and inclusive governance.
        Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of
    international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first
    place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. The terrorist threat that exists today is not the
    same threat that brought us to the region in 2001. Over the last 20
    years, terrorist organizations have evolved their methods and
    structure--but make no mistake: we have evolved our methods and
    capabilities as well. Our advances in biometrics, global information
    sharing, and security cooperation have increased security measures
    throughout the world. Department of Defense over-the-horizon operations
    employ a mix of capability that contribute to a holistic and
    interagency counterterrorism strategy. The Unites States has
    significant operational and intelligence capability, to deny external
    operations by terrorist organizations that would threaten the homeland.
    We continue to work with our partners in the region, who share our
    interest in promoting a safe and stable South Asia and preventing a
    resurgence of terrorism.
        Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to
    placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
        Secretary Austin. I will not speculate on future policy decisions.
    Any decision to return to Afghanistan would be made by the President.
        Ms. Escobar. Can you provide any clarity on the backlog of refugee
    cases and/or SIV applicants that still need to be processed? Given that
    it was the DOD that contracted and worked closely with these allies and
    their families on the ground, what is the Department's level of
    involvement in the SIV clearance and resettlement efforts now that DHS
    is leading much of the resettlement efforts?
        Secretary Austin. The Department of State and the Department of
    Homeland Security are the lead federal agencies for the Special
    Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    (USRAP), respectively. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been
    involved in the interagency process to accelerate SIV processing since
    these efforts began in March. We continue to work closely with the
    Department of State to accelerate SIV processing. A key DOD effort in
    support of expediting SIV processing was the establishment of ``Project
    Rabbit,'' through which DOD provides employment verification of SIV
    applicants who worked for DOD contractors or subcontractors directly to
    the Department of State. DOD has also endorsed and uploaded numerous
    referrals for Afghan nationals who are under threat due to their
    association with DOD's mission directly into the State Department's
    refugee referrals database. DOD will continue processing these
    referrals for as long as we receive them directly from DOD personnel.
        Ms. Escobar. While I commend the Department for their steadfast
    efforts that helped pull thousands of allies and others from the region
    in a timely manner, I was hoping to get clarity on why were evacuation
    efforts not ramped up when President Biden set the August withdrawal
    date in April 2021?
        Secretary Austin. Throughout the planning process, the Department
    of Defense collaborated closely with the Department of State on
    security arrangements for our Embassy in Kabul and options for
    evacuation. In April, the Department of State began reducing the
    Embassy staff, ordering non-essential personnel to depart, and issued
    numerous messages to U.S. citizens in Afghanistan, urging them to
    depart and offering assistance to do so. The Department of Defense
    offered inputs to Department of State's planning efforts, mindful of
    concerns that urging people to leave too quickly might have created a
    sense of panic and cause the very collapse of the Afghan Government
    that we sought to avoid. The fact that our forces were on the ground so
    quickly to support the non-combatant evacuation is due in large part to
    our planning and our pre-positioning of forces.
        Ms. Escobar. With many of the SIVs here in the U.S. being housed at
    military installations, how will the Department care for those Afghans
    it pulled out? And how will it care for those at risk that it has not
    yet pulled out?
        Secretary Austin. Regarding care for persons evacuated from
    Afghanistan and hosted at Department of Defense (DOD) installations,
    DOD is honored to host our guests and is dedicated to treating our
    guests with dignity and respect while we care for their needs. DOD is
    supporting the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and
    Human Services and working closely with non-governmental organizations,
    and State and local authorities to provide our Afghan guests an
    appropriate level of support. This includes transportation from the
    port of entry to the location of the accommodation, local
    transportation in and around the installation, provision of housing and
    other necessary facilities for the humanitarian needs of individuals
    and families, sustainment, and necessary medical and dental care
    (including medical screenings and referral to off-base, non-DOD care,
    if necessary).
        Regarding other at-risk Afghans, DOD continues to support the
    Department of State-led efforts to facilitate the safe departure of
    U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and other Afghans who
    are eligible for resettlement who wish to leave Afghanistan. Since
    September 1, 2021, more than a thousand individuals have departed
    through air and land routes.
        Ms. Escobar. The New York Times and other sources have reportedly
    claimed that at least 100,000 people were left behind, who might be
    eligible for expeditated U.S. visas. What is the Department's strategy
    to continue providing protections for such populations and eventually
    bringing them to safety here in the U.S.?
        Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to support
    Department of State-led efforts to facilitate the departure of U.S.
    citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, Special Immigrant Visa applicants
    and other Afghans who are eligible for resettlement. The DOD supports
    the Department of State team, led by the Coordinator for Afghan
    Relocation Efforts (CARE), in interagency engagements and those with
    private organizations to align efforts to enable the safe departure of
    these individuals out of Afghanistan. This includes weekly interagency
    meetings attended by senior leaders from OSD and the Joint Staff, and
    DOD has embedded liaison officers with the State/CARE team to inform
    DOD policy and support and the larger U.S evacuation and relocation
    effort.
        Ms. Escobar. Do you feel like the U.S. intelligence community
    provided your personnel with credible and accurate assessments of the
    situation on the ground and especially on what would be an
    astonishingly quick fall of Afghan National Defense and Security
    Forces?
        Secretary Austin. We evaluated the situation in Afghanistan based
    on a number of different diplomatic, military, and intelligence
    assessments, and these assessments yielded a number of different
    scenarios we believed were possible. DOD planned for these various
    scenarios, including a potential noncombatant evacuation operation
    (NEO) under duress. This prudent planning led to the pre-positioning of
    thousands of forces in the region who were ready to deploy in support
    of the NEO.
        Ms. Escobar. How would knowing what we did not know about the
    expeditious fall of Kabul have changed things in terms of our exit, if
    anything?
        Secretary Austin. The rapid collapse of the Afghan National Defense
    and Security Forces (ANDSF) took us by surprise. However, we had
    developed numerous plans for a range of scenarios, and we were prepared
    for this contingency. As it began to look increasingly likely that the
    ANDSF would collapse rapidly, I directed the inflow of additional
    forces into theater to prepare for and execute the evacuation.
        Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon,
    and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control
    over Afghanistan?
        General Milley. As our relations with the Taliban are a diplomatic
    issue, I defer to the White House or the Department of State for a
    response.
        Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of
    international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first
    place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
        General Milley. We remain committed to preventing Afghanistan from
    becoming a terrorist safe haven. In conducting Over the Horizon
    Counterterrorism (OTH-CT), the Joint Force leverages the full breath of
    intelligence collection capabilities, to include Airborne Intelligence,
    Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Airborne ISR), Human Intelligence
    (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature
    Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to gain and
    maintain understanding of terrorist networks' activities and
    intentions. When authorized, the Joint Force can also employ a variety
    of offensive capabilities, to include precision strikes, to address
    threats to the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad.
        Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to
    placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
        General Milley. It would take a Presidential determination that
    U.S. military forces on the ground in Afghanistan are necessary to
    defend against a threat to the United States. It would require a
    significant U.S. military force, at tremendous risk, to establish any
    military footprint back in Afghanistan.
        Ms. Escobar. Can you provide any clarity on the backlog of refugee
    cases and/or SIV applicants that still need to be processed? Given that
    it was the DOD that contracted and worked closely with these allies and
    their families on the ground, what is the Department's level of
    involvement in the SIV clearance and resettlement efforts now that DHS
    is leading much of the resettlement efforts?
        General Milley. The resettlement process is a Department of State
    (DoS) responsibility, the Department of Defense (DOD) does not monitor
    the processing times/backlogs in the SIV application process. Since the
    start of evacuations from Kabul in July 2021, the DOD has housed over
    84,000 Afghan evacuees at 11 different OCONUS Lily Pad facilities and 8
    different CONUS Safe Havens. Over the past two months (Dec and Jan),
    DOD has closed six different CONUS Safe Havens. As of 7 Feb, DOD
    currently houses 935 Afghan evacuees across two OCONUS Lily Pads and
    4,820 Afghan evacuees across two CONUS Safe Havens. A total of 2,264
    Afghan evacuees remain at the UAE Humanitarian City in Abu Dhabi,
    administered by the UAE government. At each of the DOD military bases,
    DOD has provided wrap-around services to include food, basic medical
    care, vaccinations for Measles and Varicella in-line with CDC guidance
    for Afghans traveling to CONUS, initial health screenings and
    documentation to support the SIV application process, and data entry
    efforts and contracts to process information for Afghan evacuees.
        Ms. Escobar. While I commend the Department for their steadfast
    efforts that helped pull thousands of allies and others from the region
    in a timely manner, I was hoping to get clarity on why were evacuation
    efforts not ramped up when President Biden set the August withdrawal
    date in April 2021?
        General Milley. As soon as President Biden set the August
    withdrawal date, the Department of Defense increased focus on the safe
    and deliberate withdrawal of U.S. Forces, contractors, citizens, and
    potential Afghan evacuees. I established a crisis management team that
    developed indicators, planned and executed rehearsals, and monitored
    all aspects of the Afghanistan withdrawal to include non-combatant
    evacuations in the event of a breakdown of the diplomatic mission in
    Kabul. Once those indicators were tripped, and at the request of the
    Department of State, DOD transitioned to the non-combatant evacuation
    operation; In April 2021, our planning assumption within the crisis
    management team was that the U.S. would maintain a diplomatic mission
    in Kabul.
        If you remember, in April the Afghan government was still in place,
    their military was still intact, and we expected the government and
    Afghan National Security Forces to maintain control of the country at
    least until the Fall. Specific to non-combatant operations, the mission
    was to secure the Embassy, keep the Embassy open, and maintain a
    diplomatic mission. In May, I hosted an interagency table top exercise
    to review the retrograde timeline and contingency operations while my
    staff provided daily intelligence updates, the status of Afghan
    security forces along with U.S. and coalition forces, and monitored the
    status of American Citizens (AMCIT) and Afghans holding and applying
    for Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) as well as other Afghan at risk
    personnel.
        On 6 Aug, my staff hosted a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
    (NEO) rehearsal with international assistance leaders to identify and
    address any issues that we might come across in the process. Once the
    NEO was declared, we facilitated the evacuation of over 124,000 AMCIT,
    Afghan SIV, and Afghan at-risk personnel as part of Operation Allies
    Refuge. As of 7 Feb, we have continued to help 1,198 AMCITs and legal
    permanent residents (LPRs) evacuate back to the U.S. or third countries
    since 31 August, and have successfully evacuated and safely integrated
    over 84,000 Afghans.
        Ms. Escobar. With many of the SIVs here in the U.S. being housed at
    military installations, how will the Department care for those Afghans
    it pulled out? And how will it care for those at risk that it has not
    yet pulled out?
        General Milley. The Department of State (DoS) is responsible for
    Afghan evacuees located overseas. Once evacuees arrive in the U.S., the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumes responsibility for their
    care. At their request, the Department of Defense (DOD) provides
    assistance to both DoS and DHS, including providing facilities to house
    the evacuees and medical support. Water, beds and bedding, shuttle
    services, latrines and showers, food service, linguists, spaces for
    recreation and religious observations, and power generation are also
    provided. Additionally, further expansion on these sites has provided
    cultural and recreational improvements such as space for movies, games,
    and meeting with population representatives. As requested, the DOD will
    continue to provide appropriate services to all current and future
    residents of the temporary safe havens that reside on current military
    installations or on a non-DOD installation or facilities.
        Ms. Escobar. The New York Times and other sources have reportedly
    claimed that at least 100,000 people were left behind, who might be
    eligible for expeditated U.S. visas. What is the Department's strategy
    to continue providing protections for such populations and eventually
    bringing them to safety here in the U.S.?
        General Milley. Adjudication of applications for U.S. visas--
    whether Special Immigrant (SIV) or refugee (categories P1 or P2) are
    the responsibility of the Department of State.
        The Joint Staff and Department of Defense work closely with the
    Department of State and non-governmental organizations to ensure that
    persons eligible for potential resettlement in the United States are
    afforded any support to which they might be entitled while the
    processing of their applications proceed.
        Ms. Escobar. How would knowing what we did not know about the
    expeditious fall of Kabul have changed things in terms of our exit, if
    anything?
        General Milley. In the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an
    accelerated withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary
    conditions risked losing the substantial gains made in Afghanistan and
    could precipitate a general collapse of the Afghan security forces and
    the Afghan government, resulting in a complete Taliban takeover or a
    general civil war. There are many lessons to be learned, to include the
    reasons for the unprecedented speed of the collapse of the Afghan
    Security Forces.
        Ms. Escobar. What equipment, if any, does the DLA plan to dispose
    of through the 1033 program?
        General McKenzie. All U.S. origin equipment procured under the
    Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) which was in the process of
    transfer to the GIRoA is under the de facto control of DSCMO-A.
    Following the 1532 notification to Congress, the equipment will revert
    to U.S. military service control. The services will make a final
    determination as to the disposition of the equipment, including
    transfer of unwanted equipment to DLA for further disposition or
    disposal. U.S. Central Command is not aware of DLA intentions or
    disposition plans.
        Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the Taliban from hereon,
    and does the Department anticipate the Taliban consolidating control
    over Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. DOD will follow the direction of the
    Administration regarding U.S. relations with the Taliban. DOD will work
    with the other departments to execute a strategy developed and led by
    the National Security Council. In terms of the Taliban consolidating
    control, we anticipate the Taliban will attempt to consolidate control
    over Afghanistan, however, there are many steps and several opposition
    groups that stand in the way of the Taliban being able to achieve this
    aim.
        Ms. Escobar. How will the U.S. deal with the threat of
    international terrorism, that brought us into the region in the first
    place, again taking root in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. While challenging, we will work hard to keep the
    threat of international terrorism at bay as we draw upon the lessons we
    have learned over the last 20 years. The USG interagency team continues
    to address the threats posed by international terrorism through
    interagency coordination and action. As it relates to Afghanistan, the
    DOD plans to maintain an over the horizon (OTH) capability to identify
    and target emerging threats. DOD will also support DoS as it continues
    to coordinate with allies and partners on a regional counter-terrorism
    (CT) approach to address concerns posed by violent extremist
    organization (VEO) activities.
        Ms. Escobar. What will it take for the U.S. to possibly return to
    placing a stronger foothold in Afghanistan again?
        General McKenzie. A future U.S. foothold in Afghanistan would
    require a POTUS-level decision. As appropriate, DOD will support DoS in
    decisions the Administration makes regarding a future U.S. presence in
    Afghanistan.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
        Mr. Morelle. A consistent frustration of mine throughout the
    evacuation was the inability of the administration to communicate a
    clear set of procedures and guidelines to congressional staff, refugee
    advocates, and Afghans on the ground during the evacuation at Kabul
    airport. When can we expect briefings for staff on lessons learned from
    the lack of clear communication during the evacuation; the current
    process to evacuate Afghans from Afghanistan; and what is being done to
    ensure communication failures like this do not happen again in the
    future?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is supportive of congressional
    proposals for an independent commission to review the U.S. government's
    20-year war in Afghanistan. We also have efforts underway, including by
    the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, to conduct an independent review of the evacuation, the events
    leading up to it, and lessons learned. The Department is committed to
    understanding what worked, what did not work, and ensuring that we
    incorporate that into our planning and our strategic assessments going
    forward.
        Mr. Morelle. One of the challenges with helping SIV applicants
    leave Afghanistan has been getting the necessary documents that prove
    they served with our military or American contractors. The Department
    of Defense has a crucial role to play as a part of the SIV process;
    Afghans must obtain an employment letter then receive a letter of
    recommendation from their supervisor, and finally get verification of
    that recommendation letter. These steps have proven to be a significant
    hurdle for Afghans who may not be able to contact their previous
    employer or whose supervisor is no longer serving with the armed forces
    or employed as a defense contractor. There are similar issues with the
    P-2 program. What can DOD do to expedite this process for SIVs and P-2
    applicants still on the ground in Afghanistan, and how can we change
    this process in the future?
        Secretary Austin. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for
    Acquisition & Sustainment (OUSD A&S) has partnered with the Defense
    Digital Service (DDS) and Department of State's Afghan Special
    Immigrant Visa (SIV) team to help expedite and streamline the SIV
    process for Afghan nationals who were employed by contractors of the
    Department of Defense (DOD). This effort is called Project Rabbit. The
    goal of the project is to simplify the Employment Verification & Letter
    of Recommendation phase of the SIV application process. Project Rabbit
    has replaced the need for companies to write employment verification
    letters and letters of recommendations for each of their Afghan
    employees who have applied for a SIV. HR data and employment records
    are voluntarily provided by companies and matched to data in the
    National Visa Center's (NVC) SIV applications submitted by Afghans who
    worked under USG contracts, specifically DOD contracts. Since mid-
    August, DOD has helped verify information for more than 4,000 SIV
    applicants who were missing employment documentation and otherwise
    would not have moved forward in the SIV processing.
        Mr. Morelle. Our 20 year-long presence in Afghanistan was an
    enormous undertaking costing hundreds of millions of dollars, overseen
    by four administrations and countless dedicated service members both in
    Afghanistan and in the Pentagon. Now that the U.S. military mission in
    Afghanistan has ended, how does the department plan to reallocate
    dollars and resources to the new challenges this country faces while
    maintaining an over the horizon counter-terror presence in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Terrorism remains a persistent and enduring
    global threat. The Department of Defense (DOD) will retain the assets
    and capability to monitor and counter threats to the United States and
    our allies that emanate from Afghanistan. To conduct over-the-horizon
    operations, the U.S. Government has committed aerial intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and other collection
    capabilities to support this mission, and we are working with partners
    in the region to develop a range of options to enable direct action
    when necessary. This will require continued engagement with regional
    partners to ensure the United States has viable access, basing, and
    overflight.
        DOD is taking key steps to prioritize future challenges--most
    notably, focusing on China as our primary pacing challenge. DOD must
    shift resources from legacy platforms and weapons that are ill-suited
    for technologically-advanced threats, to investments in cutting-edge
    technologies and capabilities that will provide a military advantage to
    the U.S. Joint Force. DOD must combine new technologies with existing
    capabilities, continue to develop new operational concepts, and
    strengthen our bonds with Allies and partners, to meet our vision for
    integrated deterrence.
        Mr. Morelle. One of the challenges with helping SIV applicants
    leave Afghanistan has been getting the necessary documents that prove
    they served with our military or American contractors. The Department
    of Defense has a crucial role to play as a part of the SIV process;
    Afghans must obtain an employment letter then receive a letter of
    recommendation from their supervisor, and finally get verification of
    that recommendation letter. These steps have proven to be a significant
    hurdle for Afghans who may not be able to contact their previous
    employer or whose supervisor is no longer serving with the armed forces
    or employed as a defense contractor. There are similar issues with the
    P-2 program. What can DOD do to expedite this process for SIVs and P-2
    applicants still on the ground in Afghanistan, and how can we change
    this process in the future?
        General Milley. As the SIV application process owner, any future
    changes to the SIV and P-2 application processes are at the discretion
    of the Department of State (DoS). Verification of former employment or
    support to the Department of Defense in Afghanistan is a part of the
    DoS-owned SIV application process.
        Mr. Morelle. With thousands of our Afghan SIV's and allies still on
    the ground in Afghanistan, how will the individuals on the ground be
    identified, contacted, issued visas, and manifested on a flight? If
    there is not currently a plan in place, what processes are being
    preliminarily discussed? Furthermore, we have seen credible reports
    that the Taliban are requiring passports and visas for any Afghans let
    onto international flights, how do we plan to get Afghan's passports
    and visas without a presence on the ground.
        General McKenzie. The State Department's Coordinator for Afghan
    Relocation Efforts, Ambassador Beth Jones, oversees the U.S.
    Government's ongoing efforts to facilitate the relocation of
    individuals from Afghanistan through commercial or charter flights and
    overland routes. Currently the State Department is using civilian
    aircraft to transport individuals. USCENTCOM contributes to the process
    by supporting relocated individuals' temporary stay in third-country
    transit points, such as Qatar and UAE. USCENTCOM continues to support
    the U.S. Government's efforts to press the Taliban to allow all people
    who want to leave Afghanistan to do so, including American citizens and
    Afghans.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN
        Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting
    intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and
    intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air
    Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military
    installation over 20 years?
        Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct
    intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
        Secretary Austin. Following the April 14 decision to withdraw U.S.
    forces from Afghanistan, the Department of Defense conducted a planned
    transition as part of the retrograde operation, including transitioning
    Bagram Air Force Base to the Afghan National Defense Forces. The
    Department of Defense considered a range of options, but ultimately,
    the Department's military task was to protect the American diplomatic
    presence in Kabul--and if needed, to conduct a non-combatant
    evacuation--from Kabul's airport. The Department of Defense transferred
    Bagram Air Base to the Afghan government, following extensive
    consultations.
        Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting
    intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and
    intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air
    Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military
    installation over 20 years?
        Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct
    intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
        General Milley. U.S. policy directed a full withdrawal of the
    military from Afghanistan, leaving only the Department of State led
    diplomatic mission in Kabul. Continuing operations at Bagram, even just
    for counter-terrorism purposes would have been inconsistent with that
    policy. Further, once U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan dropped below
    1,000 personnel it was no longer feasible to hold and sustain both
    Bagram and the international airport in Kabul.
        Mrs. McClain. Why was relinquishing Bagram Air Base and conducting
    intelligence operations from ``over-the-horizon'' a better military and
    intelligence strategy than keeping and utilizing the large Bagram Air
    Base which we had developed and turned into an effective military
    installation over 20 years?
        Could the U.S. not have kept Bagram and continued to conduct
    intelligence and counter-terror operations safely from that location?
        General McKenzie. Bagram Air Field's closure was a function of
    policy decisions to limit U.S. troops to approximately 650 personnel
    with the mission to secure the U.S. Embassy and support the Turkish-led
    security of HKIA. Therefore, it was not feasible to retain Bagram Air
    Field in an operational status.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
        Mr. Kahele. Secretary Austin, General Milley--DOD is providing
    important support to our Afghan allies who are now spending weeks at
    U.S. military bases, many without legal counsel to prepare their
    immigration cases.
        Q1: Can you share your thoughts on how DOD and Congress can work
    together to help expedite getting Afghan evacuees from DOD
    installations into American communities, and how can we make their
    resettlement successful?
        Q2: Would you support legislation that would help Afghan adjust
    their immigration status, especially given that so many were forced to
    destroy their documentation to protect themselves as they left
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Austin. Response for Q1: DOD is supporting the
    Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, and State
    by providing temporary housing, sustainment, and other support. DOD
    defers to the Departments Homeland Security, Health and Human Services,
    and State to address the resettlement process.
        Response for Q2: Regarding care for persons evacuated from
    Afghanistan and hosted at Department of Defense (DOD) installations,
    DOD is honored to host our Afghan guests and is dedicated to treating
    our guests with dignity and respect while we care for their needs. DOD
    is supporting the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health
    and Human Services and working closely with non-governmental
    organizations, and State and local authorities to provide our guests an
    appropriate level of support. This includes transportation from the
    port of entry to the location of the accommodation, local
    transportation in and around the installation, provision of housing and
    other necessary facilities for the humanitarian needs of individuals
    and families, sustainment, and necessary medical and dental care
    (including medical screenings and referral to off-base, non-DOD care,
    if necessary).
        Mr. Kahele. Secretary Austin, General Milley--DOD is providing
    important support to our Afghan allies who are now spending weeks at
    U.S. military bases, many without legal counsel to prepare their
    immigration cases.
        Q1: Can you share your thoughts on how DOD and Congress can work
    together to help expedite getting Afghan evacuees from DOD
    installations into American communities, and how can we make their
    resettlement successful?
        Q2: Would you support legislation that would help Afghan adjust
    their immigration status, especially given that so many were forced to
    destroy their documentation to protect themselves as they left
    Afghanistan?
        General Milley. Over the last two weeks of conflict, the U.S.
    military helped evacuate more than 124,000 Americans, Afghans and other
    allies--the largest military airlift in history. We continue to support
    the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security as the
    lead agencies for the resettlement of Afghan evacuees, and will
    continue to support them within the bounds of law and policy.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
        Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and
    trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the
    world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
        Secretary Austin. The threat from terrorism remains a global and
    persistent concern. We remain engaged with our partners and Allies
    globally who have shared interests in mitigating the threat of
    terrorism, both within their own countries and trans-regionally. A
    joint approach and persistent engagement, across all levels of DOD, is
    the cornerstone of how we affirm our commitments to our Allies and
    partners. At the same time, the Department's pacing challenge is China,
    and we are balancing our focus accordingly. In recent years we have
    dedicated considerable resources to current and future requirements
    needed to enhance integrated deterrence with our Allies and partners to
    deter Chinese aggression, assure regional stability, and deny a Chinese
    victory should deterrence fail. We also recognize the ongoing threat
    posed by Russia and its proxies. I am confident that DOD can
    appropriately balance strategic competition requirements while also
    effectively executing our counterterrorism mission.
        Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and
    trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the
    world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
        General Milley. Confidence and trust in the U.S. military remains
    strong among our Allies and Partners. We continue to be actively
    engaged and synchronized with Allies and Partners in our operations
    around the globe. Each day we participate in deterrence activities and
    training exercises side by side with Allies and Partners, and in the
    case of countering violent extremist organizations, combined combat
    operations. At the same time, the Joint Force continues to build
    confidence with Allies and Partners through close consultation and
    coordination in a number of routine bilateral and multilateral fora
    that include, but are not limited to, NATO, the FVEY nations, the
    Military Framework for countering violent extremist organizations, and
    other military coalitions. These fora enable us to work with our Allies
    and Partners to achieve military objectives and desired strategic
    effects related to competition with China and Russia, while enabling
    Ally and Partner capabilities to counter violent extremist
    organizations. Most importantly, within these fora, we have increased
    our communications and taken action to include them earlier in our
    planning processes to ensure their national systems are provided the
    time needed to align with ours. We are removing ambiguity and providing
    them with clarity. It is a balance as we work with Allies and Partners
    countering violent extremist organizations to safeguard the homeland--
    ours and our Allies' and Partners'--while simultaneously working with
    them to compete against China and Russia.
        Mr. Carl. How the Department plans to earn back the confidence and
    trust of our Allies for future counter terrorism efforts around the
    world, while addressing threats from foes like China and Russia?
        General McKenzie. The dynamics in South and Central Asia have
    changed with our departure from Afghanistan. However, the threats that
    brought the Coalition together still remain. DoS and DOD continue to
    develop and build relationships with our allies and partners through
    security cooperation efforts. These efforts aim to build trust with our
    partners so that we may enable their action in the region. Engagement
    with Central Asian States continues through military sales and multiple
    training exercises and opportunities. The more engagement and placement
    the U.S. has in the region, the more likely we are to counter Russian
    and Chinese influence through cost imposition.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
        Mr. Moore. I am increasingly concerned that the military does not
    have the regional basing and cooperation agreements required for
    establishing effective over-the-horizon counter-terrorism capabilities.
    In May, Mr. Helvey confirmed that the Administration had not yet
    secured the necessary agreements in the region to establish over-the-
    horizon capabilities. Did the Administration secure any such agreements
    prior to the U.S. military's full departure from Afghanistan on August
    31?
        Secretary Austin. The Department is currently conducting over-the-
    horizon operations supported by agreements in the region and has been
    since before August 31.
        Mr. Moore. You testified on June 23rd that you had developed and
    were executing a detailed plan to conduct a ``safe, orderly, and
    responsible'' withdrawal from Afghanistan. As the Taliban began to gain
    momentum in the weeks that followed, was there ever a discussion within
    the Administration of slowing that withdrawal or altering the plan as
    the Taliban began to take control of significant portions of the
    country?
        Based on your assessment of how things were going in June, how did
    things derail so quickly? How was the Administration so caught off
    guard and ill-prepared for the overrun of Kabul on August 15th?
        Secretary Austin. As part of the planning process, I had many
    discussions with my interagency counterparts on the security situation
    in Afghanistan during the withdrawal. One aspect of these discussions
    was prudent planning for a range of scenarios, including a potential
    evacuation under difficult circumstances. The fact that our additional
    forces were on the ground so quickly to support the evacuation is due
    in large part to our planning and our pre-positioning of forces.
        Mr. Moore. What plans were put in place to mitigate the increased
    risk to U.S. forces and civilian personnel within Afghanistan following
    the release of 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners from the airbase
    when the U.S. withdrew from Bagram?
        General Milley. I did not assess the 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda
    prisoners posed an immediate threat to our forces in Kabul. I assessed
    the plans for the military retrograde, and then later for the non-
    combatant evacuation operation, included a sufficient force to mitigate
    threats to U.S. military and civilian personnel within Afghanistan.
    This includes the forces on the ground, as well as those available
    ``over-the-horizon'' from elsewhere in the region.
        Mr. Moore. Has the Biden Administration secured the necessary
    agreements to provide you with the basing and over-flight capabilities
    you need to perform effective over-the-horizon operations?
        General McKenzie. The DOD, in support of the DoS, continues to
    engage with countries in the region to ensure the necessary
    capabilities are in place to perform effective OTH CT operations.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
        Mr. Horsford. When did the last American citizen successfully pass
    through the Taliban perimeter into the HKIA gate?
        General McKenzie. At 0536 Local on 30 August, the last group of
    U.S. citizens came through the South Gate. There were 41 U.S. citizens
    in that group. Since August 31st, the State Department has further
    evacuated U.S. citizens via civilian aircraft.
        Mr. Horsford. When did the last Afghan civilian successfully pass
    through the gate?
        General McKenzie. At 0241 Local on 30 August, the last group of
    Afghans came through the South Gate.
        Mr. Horsford. How many individuals successfully passed through the
    Taliban perimeter in the 72 hours preceding the departure of the final
    flight?
        General McKenzie. In the final 72 hours 166 U.S. citizens, 3651
    Afghan citizens, and 31 third country nationals passed through the Tb
    perimeter and entered HKIA. Since August 31st, the State Department has
    continued evacuation efforts through civilian aircraft.
        Mr. Horsford. You stated that you did not have facts on why the
    Taliban did not allow Americans to continue to enter HKIA in the final
    hours of the evacuation. What were the specific contingency plans to
    continue the evacuation after the Taliban closed checkpoints
    surrounding the airport? Why were these plans not implemented once it
    became clear that no additional American citizens were going to be
    allowed to pass through the Taliban checkpoints?
        General McKenzie. We fully developed a contingency plan to continue
    the NEO in a contested environment. This entailed the deployment of the
    rest of the 82nd Airborne Division and other enablers and potentially
    involved the seizure and reopening of Bagram Airfield and significant
    combat operations. These plans were never implemented because the
    Taliban continued to facilitate the passage of AMCITs onto HKIA
    throughout the NEO and because we retained--and exercised--the
    capability to bring AMCITs in without Taliban involvement or knowledge.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
        Mr. Golden. Now that the Department of Defense and Department of
    State have completed the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, what steps
    are being taken to evacuate the remaining Americans and Afghan SIVs who
    still remain in Afghanistan?
        Can you speak to any operations or strategies that are being
    implemented to assist and communicate with Americans/Afghanistan SIVs
    who are still looking to be evacuated?
        How is the Taliban working with or obstructing the U.S. regarding
    the remaining evacuations?
        Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense is committed to
    supporting the U.S. Government's priority of facilitating the departure
    of U.S. citizens, LPRs, their immediate family members, and eligible
    Afghans, from Afghanistan. The facilitated departure of these groups
    requires coordination across numerous U.S. Government departments and
    agencies to support Department of State-led efforts. Ongoing public-
    private coordination with advocacy groups has been beneficial to align
    efforts on commonly shared objectives. The Department of State remains
    engaged with the Taliban on its commitment to allow the safe passage
    and departure of individuals who wish to leave Afghanistan.
        Mr. Golden. Now that the U.S. military is no longer in Afghanistan,
    you have stated that the department will conduct future ``over the
    horizon'' counterterrorism operations in the region. What authorization
    authority will the department cite to conduct these kinetic missions?
    What assets and equipment will be required to accomplish this mission?
    Will this mission require agreements with other countries in the region
    to house equipment and personnel?
        General Milley. The statutory authority for offensive
    counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan is the 2001 Authorization
    for Use of Military Force. In conducting Over the Horizon
    Counterterrorism (OTH-CT), the Joint Force leverages the full breath of
    intelligence collection capabilities, to include Airborne Intelligence,
    Surveillance, And Reconnaissance (Airborne ISR), Human Intelligence
    (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature
    Intelligence (MASINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to gain and
    maintain understanding of terrorist networks' activities and
    intentions. When authorized, the Joint Force can also employ a variety
    of offensive capabilities, to include precision strikes, to address
    threats to the U.S. homeland, our allies, and our interests abroad.
    U.S. Central Command has a variety of forces allocated to conduct the
    Over-the-Horizon Counterterrorism mission and may request additional
    forces should they be required. Our Over-the-Horizon Counterterrorism
    efforts will require support from our partners in the region. Many
    regional partners strongly support our counterterrorism efforts and are
    committed to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe
    haven.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. In regards to the information pertaining to the
    withdrawal from Afghanistan, did you directly provide the same advice
    to President Trump as you gave to President Biden? Please elaborate if
    you did not provide any advice or the advice was different. Please
    note, we are not asking you to divulge the specifics of the advice just
    to clarify if any direct advice was given.
        General Milley. It is my statutory obligation to provide my
    military advice to the President and I have consistently done that for
    both Administrations.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
        Mr. Khanna. Is DUSD-P involved in the investigation into the Kabul
    drone strike? What are they doing to see that this terrible tragedy
    isn't repeated again?
        Secretary Austin. The August 29, 2021 strike was a tragic mistake.
    U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the strike, and I ordered a
    45-day three-star independent review conducted by the Air Force
    Inspector General. There is also a separate, independent, Department of
    Defense Inspector General review underway. These reviews have looked at
    policies and procedures, to ensure that this terrible tragedy is not
    repeated.
        Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will
    be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of
    addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone
    strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these
    reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
        Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense continues to
    periodically review civilian harm resulting from U.S. military
    operations, as well as its processes related to minimizing and
    responding to civilian harm. In response to reports of civilian harm,
    the Department conducts formal investigations and applies lessons
    learned, as was the case in the August 29, 2021 strike in Kabul,
    Afghanistan. For questions specifically regarding EO 13732, we would
    refer you to the White House National Security Council.
        Mr. Khanna. One of the concerns raised about the Kabul drone
    strike--and other strikes like it including the attack on the MSF
    hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 or the killing of 30 pine nut farmers
    in 2019--is that we learn that--in contrast to the International
    Committee of the Red Cross, the Department of Defense Law of War Manual
    takes the most unusual view that under international humanitarian law,
    ``no legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons of
    objects'' targeted in U.S. attacks.
        Will the Department make a commitment for the Office of General
    Counsel to review this legal position, and do so in coordination with
    the Department of State?
        Secretary Austin. The difference in view stems from the fact that
    the United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
    Conventions. I fully support the proposition, as expressed more fully
    in DOD's Law of War Manual, that lethal attacks may not be directed
    based on merely hypothetical or speculative considerations regarding a
    contemplated target's possible status as a military objective. In
    assessing whether a contemplated target of attack is a military
    objective, commanders and other decision-makers must make the decision
    in good faith based on the information available to them in light of
    the circumstances ruling at the time.
        Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will
    be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of
    addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone
    strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these
    reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
        General Milley. To meet the intent of Section 4, DOD conducts
    periodic reviews of civilian harm trends and reports the results to
    Congress. We continually review and refine our civilian casualty
    assessment process to incorporate lessons and to increase our
    transparency and credibility as the global leader in mitigating and
    responding to civilian casualty incidents.
        The 2018 Joint Civilian Casualty Review provided a number of
    recommendations that we have either fully implemented or that we have
    plans to implement. Critical to our implementation of many of these
    recommendations is the development of a new DOD Instruction on Civilian
    Harm Mitigation and Response, which we anticipate publishing in 2022.
    The instruction has taken some time to develop due to the need to
    establish clear responsibilities across the Department and standardize
    procedures related to civilian harm. Building upon the 2018 Joint
    Civilian Casualty Review, RAND just completed an independent assessment
    of our standards, processes, procedures, and policies related to
    civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. The RAND
    study further evaluated our mechanisms for identifying, assessing, and
    responding to reports of civilian casualties, as well as how we are
    resourced and organized to do so.
        We anticipate making the report available to Congress soon, and we
    are already developing an action plan for implementing RAND's
    recommendations. Additionally, IAW section 1057 of the National Defense
    Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2018, DOD submitted four annual
    reports to Congress on Civilian Casualties in Connection with U.S.
    Military Operations, which include a description of steps the
    Department has taken to mitigate harm to civilians in combat
    operations. Protection of civilians is both a national security
    priority and a moral and ethical imperative, and we will continue to
    advance the Department's approach to these issues.
        Mr. Khanna. Is DUSD-P involved in the investigation into the Kabul
    drone strike? What are they doing to see that this terrible tragedy
    isn't repeated again?
        General McKenzie. USCENTCOM is unaware of any OUSD(P) involvement
    in the SecDef-directed investigation into the 29 August Kabul strike,
    which resulted in unfortunate civilian deaths. Any questions regarding
    what OUSD(P) may be doing to prevent future similar occurrences should
    be referred to OUSD(P).
        Mr. Khanna. The Civilian Casualty EO, in Section 4, says there will
    be a periodic review of civilian harm trends with the goal of
    addressing problems like the ones we saw in the August Kabul drone
    strike. So, why hasn't the current Administration been doing these
    reviews? Do they plan to resume them?
        General McKenzie. USCENTCOM cannot speak on behalf of the
    Administration as to whether periodic reviews of civilian harm trends
    are being conducted. However, USCENTCOM takes all allegations of
    civilian casualties (CIVCAS), regardless of origin, seriously and
    ensures all such allegations are thoroughly assessed. If we believe we
    see a potential trend based on these allegations, USCENTCOM will take
    appropriate measures to address it.
        Mr. Khanna. Regarding the Kabul drone strike, General McKenzie, you
    stated that ``the vehicle was observed being approached by a single
    adult male assessed at the time to be a co-conspirator.'' It turns out
    that man was Ahmad Naser, an innocent civilian and an SIV applicant who
    had worked for the U.S. military in Afghanistan. On what basis other
    than that he was a military-aged male opening the gate for the Toyota
    could the U.S. military have made an assessment that he was a lawful
    target and not a civilian?
        General McKenzie. Lt Gen Sami Said's public remarks, which followed
    the completion of his Secretary of Defense-directed investigation,
    confirmed my previous description of the circumstances, and
    specifically, that U.S. forces assessed that the vehicle was going to
    be used in an imminent attack on U.S. forces and Afghan civilians. No
    assessment was made as to whether Mr. Naser was a lawful target because
    the vehicle--which was mistakenly assessed to contain explosives
    intended to be deployed against U.S. forces and Afghan civilians--and
    not Mr. Naser, was the target of the self-defense strike, which
    unfortunately resulted in civilian casualties.
        Mr. Khanna. General McKenzie, you stated that the strike occurred
    under a standard of ``reasonable certainty.'' What is the definition of
    ``reasonable certainty'' and do you think this definition is understood
    the same way across the Department of Defense, CENTCOM, among operators
    down range, and JAGS?
        General McKenzie. ``Reasonable certainty'' is not strictly defined
    in U.S. policy. However, it is commonly understood to be a less
    stringent standard than ``near certainty.'' Whether a commander's
    certainty of a target is ``reasonable'' or not depends on a number of
    factors, including the time available to the commander to observe the
    target, the intelligence information reasonably available to the
    commander at the time of the strike, and the surveillance resources
    available to develop the commander's understanding of the target, each
    of which may be further influenced by whether the strike is intended to
    be conducted as a deliberate or offensive strike, or whether it is to
    be conducted in self-defense of U.S. or coalition forces. In a self-
    defense scenario, as was the case with the strike on 29 August 2021,
    the ``reasonable'' determinations that an on-scene commander must make
    are, first, that the intended target is committing a hostile act or is
    engaged in conduct that demonstrates hostile intent to U.S. forces and,
    second, that the nature, duration, and scope of the force used by U.S.
    forces does not exceed that which is needed to respond decisively to
    the hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.
        Mr. Khanna. DOD's completed investigation of the strike on an MSF
    hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 found that the DOD strike cell didn't
    have access to the no-strike list at that time.
        In an effort to learn such lessons, had DOD known that the building
    Ahmadi parked his Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of
    a U.S.-based charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help
    determine whether Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an
    IS-KP operative?
        General McKenzie. When assessing a potential threat, all relevant
    information can be helpful. As I have previously expressed in detail,
    the activities of the vehicle in question were observed for several
    hours, and a touchpoint with the NEI compound was one of many. In this
    case, the vehicle's activities also correlated with other locations
    that our intelligence associated with ISIS-K personnel and activities.
    I have reviewed in detail the findings and recommendations of the
    SecDef-appointed investigation into this matter, which will inform our
    efforts to refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures in a
    continued effort to reduce the risk of civilian casualties that is
    unfortunately inherent to the conduct of military operations.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
        Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
    Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
    charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
    Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
        Secretary Austin. I won't speculate on what would or would not have
    occurred with different information available. I am saddened by the
    loss of innocent life, and I am determined that we, as an organization,
    will learn from this tragic mistake. U.S. Central Command conducted a
    review of the strike, and I ordered a 45-day three-star independent
    review conducted by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a
    separate, independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review
    underway. These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to
    ensure that this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
        Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone
    strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with
    correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the
    NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's
    boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
        Secretary Austin. The investigation into the August 29th Kabul
    airstrike concluded that the strike, conducted to prevent what was
    believed to be an imminent threat to Hamid Karzai International
    Airport, resulted in the deaths of as many as 10 people, including up
    to seven children. U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the
    strike, and I ordered a 45-day three-star independent review conducted
    by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a separate,
    independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review underway.
    These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to ensure that
    this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
        Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
    Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
    charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
    Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
        General Milley. U.S. Central Command leadership made the decision
    to conduct the strike on 29 August based on the best available
    intelligence at the time. Our leaders are trained to evaluate all
    available intelligence and modify operations accordingly to mitigate
    the potential for civilian casualties.
        The Department of Defense conducted a thorough investigation of the
    29 August strike in an effort to improve our practices and further
    reduce the probability of civilian casualties. The investigation
    identified procedures that the DOD can employ to reduce the risk of
    confirmation bias and improve information sharing during the strike
    process.
        Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
    Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
    charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
    Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
        General Milley. I am saddened by the loss of innocent life, and I
    am determined that we, as an organization, will learn from this tragic
    mistake. U.S. Central Command conducted a review of the strike, and the
    Secretary of Defense ordered a 45-day three-star independent review
    conducted by the Air Force Inspector General. There is also a separate,
    independent, Department of Defense Inspector General review underway.
    These reviews have looked at policies and procedures, to ensure that
    this terrible tragedy is not repeated.
        We will scrutinize what we decided to do and not to do on August
    29, as well as how we investigated those outcomes. We owe that to the
    victims and their loved ones, to the American people, and to ourselves.
        Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone
    strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with
    correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the
    NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's
    boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
        General Milley. As the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
    Public Affairs Mr. Kirby said on December 13, 2021 during a press
    conference, the strike was a breakdown in process and execution and
    procedural events, not the result of negligence, misconduct, or poor
    leadership. The strike was a tragic mistake. The results of
    investigations led by Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., U.S. Central
    Command, and Gen. Richard D. Clarke, the head of the Special Operations
    Command, were announced. A third investigation by Air Force Lt. Gen.
    Sami D. Said was announced in November and found no violation of law,
    including the law of war.
        Ms. Jacobs. Before the Senate you said the biggest mistake in
    building the Afghan security forces is we tried to make them too much
    in our image, so they became organized around on U.S. military doctrine
    which did not fit the country and became too reliant on air power which
    was never going to last. Are you applying those same insights to other
    security assistance the Department is engaged in? I ask this because
    while the effort in Afghanistan was certainly unique in scale, the fact
    of the matter is we partner with nations across Africa and elsewhere.
        General Milley. We are applying those insights. Our experience in
    Afghanistan highlights how current and future security cooperation
    efforts will need to emphasize our partners' capacity to manage,
    maintain, and employ their own forces, independent of sustained U.S.
    government support.
        In Africa, for example, our defense security assistance is focused
    on African solutions for African partners, with efforts aimed at
    bolstering the development of sustainable and self-supporting military
    capacity.
        Ms. Jacobs. Had DOD known that the building Ahmadi parked his
    Toyota Corolla in front of was in fact the office of a U.S.-based
    charity, would DOD have first contacted NEI, to help determine whether
    Ahmadi might have been an aid worker instead of an IS-KP operative?
        General McKenzie. When assessing a potential threat, all relevant
    information can be helpful. As I have previously expressed in detail,
    the activities of the vehicle in question were observed for several
    hours, and a touchpoint with the NEI compound was one of many. In this
    case, the vehicle's activities also correlated with other locations
    that our intelligence associated with ISIS-K personnel and activities.
    I have reviewed in detail the findings and recommendations of the
    Secretary of Defense-appointed investigation into this matter, which
    will inform our efforts to refine our tactics, techniques, and
    procedures in a continued effort to reduce the risk of civilian
    casualties that is unfortunately inherent to the conduct of military
    operations.
        Ms. Jacobs. Up until now DOD has insisted that the Kabul drone
    strike that killed Zemari Ahmadi and 9 members of his family began with
    correct intelligence about an ``ISIS safe house.'' But yesterday the
    NYT found that this was wrong too. The ``safe house'' was Ahmadi's
    boss's family home. Is the NYT reporting, correct?
        General McKenzie. In deference to the Secretary of Defense-directed
    investigation on the 29 August strike in Kabul, I would refer you to
    OSD for further comment.
        Ms. Jacobs. In answering my question about the ability to prevent
    civilian causalities in future ``over the horizon'' counter-terrorism
    operations you said that future strikes would not be designed to
    prevent an ``imminent attack'' and thus would be subject to more
    scrutiny. Often the Department argues that ``imminence'' is required to
    justify an Article II/self-defense attack. If the Department is not
    rely the prevention of an imminent attack to justify future CT
    operations in Afghanistan, would legal rationale will it be using?
        General McKenzie. The future over-the-horizon counter-terrorism
    operations you refer to will likely be offensive or deliberate strikes
    taken pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
    (2001 AUMF), and not strikes taken in in extremis self-defense to
    counter tactical threats to U.S. forces. Any strikes taken pursuant to
    the 2001 AUMF will be conducted consistent with the applicable
    international laws of armed conflict, including the core principles of
    necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity, as well as U.S.
    domestic laws, policies, and rules of engagement applicable at that
    time. I will defer to the legal and policy judgments of the Department
    as to the circumstances under which future CT operations in Afghanistan
    might be conducted.

                                      [all]