[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-81]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                    FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET REQUEST

                      OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                      FOR FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND

                       TRAINING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             APRIL 27, 2022

                                     
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
48-515                    WASHINGTON : 2023                                     
  


              SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

                 DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey, Chairman

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey, Vice     SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    Chair                            MATT GAETZ, Florida
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              DON BACON, Nebraska
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida         RONNY JACKSON, Texas
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                 Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
                Kelly Repair, Professional Staff Member
                           Payson Ruhl, Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces...........     4
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey, 
  Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces.........     1

                               WITNESSES

Adams, MajGen James H., USMC, Deputy Director, Requirements and 
  Capability Development, J-8, Joint Staff.......................    12
Fick, Lt Gen Eric T., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F-35 
  Lightning II Joint Program Office..............................    13
Hunter, Hon. Andrew P., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.........................     6
Loiselle, RADM Andrew J., USN, Director, Air Warfare Division, 
  U.S. Navy......................................................    11
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............    15
Nahom, Lt Gen David S., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and 
  Programs, U.S. Air Force.......................................     7
Stefany, Hon. Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
  Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and Senior 
  Acquisition Executive for the F-35 Program.....................     8
Wise, LtGen Mark R., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. 
  Marine Corps...................................................    10

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Adams, MajGen James H........................................    89
    Fick, Lt Gen Eric T..........................................    96
    Hunter, Hon. Andrew P., joint with Lt Gen David S. Nahom.....    50
    Ludwigson, Jon...............................................   116
    Norcross, Hon. Donald........................................    43
    Stefany, Hon. Frederick J., joint with LtGen Mark R. Wise and 
      RADM Andrew J. Loiselle....................................    71

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Table 1: Approved Block 4 Capabilities.......................   147

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mrs. Hartzler................................................   153

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Brown....................................................   157
    Mrs. Hartzler................................................   157
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   158
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   160
    Mr. Turner...................................................   159
                 FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET REQUEST OF THE

  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT 
                                PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
              Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 27, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Norcross 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE 
  FROM NEW JERSEY, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND 
                          LAND FORCES

    Mr. Norcross. Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to the 
first hearing of the subcommittee proposal on the Department's 
fiscal year 2023 budget request.
    We have some folks on the remote. So before we begin, I 
need to review all the protocols that you've heard way too many 
times.
    Members participating must be visible on screen for the 
purpose of identity verification, establishing and maintaining 
a quorum, participating in proceedings, and voting. Video of 
members participating on Cisco WebEx is being broadcast via HRS 
[House Recording Studio] Internet live stream. Members may 
leave and rejoin the proceeding.
    I've designated a member of the committee staff to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
    And now I will go back to my opening remarks and, first of 
all, thank you for coming here today. There are a number of 
issues that we are dealing with that I will review shortly, but 
I very much appreciate it, as we move forward.
    In reviewing this year's service requests for tactical 
aircraft, clearly, there are significant changes to programs, 
plans, the underpinning analysis, and the retirement of force 
structure proposals in this budget that certainly will require 
close scrutiny.
    Last year, I believe, the committee was very supportive of 
General Brown's new force structure, coined the four-plus-one, 
and his goal to logically reduce the types, the models, the 
aircraft that makes the fleet more similar and simplify current 
ownership cost and maintenance challenges.
    The framework of that plan made sense to rightsize, 
particularly the A-10 fleet, to 218 for steady state unless 
there are contingency plans supporting its safe and effective 
operation into the late 2030s; keeping the F-22 fleet relevant 
in the inventory until Next Gen [Generation] Air Dominance 
began fielding; buying a significant number of new F-15EX with 
advanced technology and an increased weapons capacity to 
replace the aging F-15C fleet while keeping options open to 
recapitalize part of the F-15E Strike Eagles; and not 
accelerating the F-35 until Block--or excuse me, TR-3 
[Technical Refresh 3] Block 4 can overcome those development 
challenges.
    However, this year, it seems as though the four-plus-one 
framework has been shattered and retirements significantly 
accelerating. New to everyone this year is the Air Force 
proposed over the next 5 years to retire 646 tactical fighter 
aircraft while only purchasing 246 new aircraft, leaving a 
significant capacity and capability gap of over 400 aircraft.
    The A-10s are now completely out of the inventory by 2028 
and the new F-15EX buy has been cut nearly in half at only 80 
aircraft, one-half of the F-15E fleet. About 105 aircraft will 
be retiring without a plane to replace a similar quality and 
quantity aircraft.
    New F-35 aircraft purchases have been reduced by 42 and a 
capable portion of the F-22 fleet the Air Force has neglected 
over the years is being retired as the Next Gen Air Dominance 
program is delayed far beyond its original plans as briefed to 
this committee.
    The bottom line is that there's a dramatic shift on how 
four-plus-one was initially communicated to us and understood 
by this committee just last year. For the Navy and Marine 
Corps, the force structure plan analysis seems to be another 
challenge.
    The message is just as elusive. Two years ago, the Navy 
strike fighter shortfall would have lasted until 2030. However, 
last year, Navy told us that the strike fighter shortfall would 
be resolved to zero in 2025, primarily due to the solid 
justification for terminating the new F-18 Super Hornet line.
    Honestly, we're skeptical of this year's analysis, given 
the assumptions related to the overly optimistic F-35C 
procurement rates, the lackluster F/A-18 Super Hornet service 
life modification program, and the nonrapid development of the 
Navy's Next Generation Air Dominance.
    Hedging our analysis of last year's data, we authorized an 
additional 12 new F-18s as risk mitigation, having seen this 
play out before back in the 2012 timeframe when the Navy tried 
to convince Congress that the F-35 was on track to meet their 
force structure need, and 1 year later our skepticism proved 
warranted and the Navy now informs us that the strike fighter 
shortfall will not be resolved until 6 years later in 2031 
because of further unplanned reductions in F-35 purchases, the 
reduced aircraft inductions into the F-18 modification program.
    Finally, the Navy is proposing to divest its entire fleet 
of land-based EA-18 Growlers electronic aircraft that are 
currently deployed in Europe supporting the NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization] deterrence and force posture of 
activities against Russian aggression.
    For the Marine Corps, the Commandant's Force Design 2030 
plan issued just 2 years ago significantly reduces the number 
of tactical fighter aircraft in their squadrons and brings into 
question the current program of record that plans to purchase 
420 F-35 aircraft.
    The committee has been waiting for over 2 years to 
officially see the analysis justifying the mandated reduction 
and remains frustrated. The Marine Corps has been unable to 
communicate a final decision on this aspect of the 2030 Force 
Design plan.
    Finally, transitioning to the F-35 program, it's widely 
known that Mrs. Hartzler and my views closely align on the 
occasional accomplishments and the many enduring challenges of 
this program and endeavored to overcome during greater than 20 
years since the F-35 program began.
    And I'd just--one of the articles that were flurrying the 
newspapers in the last day, the military is acquiring up to 152 
F-35s each year for the Air Force, Navy, and Marines. GAO 
[Government Accountability Office] noted that this is nearly 
full production rate and on track to have 1,115 fighters 
delivered by 2023.
    That would mean one-third of the total numbers of F-35s 
expected to be bought would have been delivered before it 
finishes operational testing. We'll get into that in a little 
while.
    There are a tremendous amount of talented people working on 
this program. But it's been our longstanding concern remains 
with the program's high-risk approach to planning [and] 
execution that have proven unrealistic, costing taxpayers much 
more than planned and fielding capabilities later than are 
needed by our warfighters.
    Some of those examples are the--having all the services 
declare that their original initial operating capacity--
capability status many years later than planned; the system 
design and development [SDD] was completed last year, later 
than planned. The program has yet to finish the initial 
operating, testing, and evaluation activities, which is what we 
just talked about--tracked to be 5 years late.
    TR-3 Block 4 development and fielding has slipped later 
than planned repeatedly. The TR-3, which was just rebaselined 
last summer, is not meeting its new scheduling just today, and 
the overrun is estimated to be nearly $550 million. Full 
transition legacy--and John Garamendi is certainly focused on 
this one--from ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System] to 
ODIN [Operational Data Integrated Network] maintenance system 
briefed by our subcommittee in November of 2019 and January 
2020.
    The F-35 program leadership was supposed to be fully 
fielded by December of 2022 this year, and that is certainly 
not occurring.
    And finally, immature and poorly written mission system 
software has been rushed through development, testing, and 
fielding with many bugs still there--issues discovered by the 
warfighters, not the testers. That's not the way we want to do 
it. That's causing a reissue of many of these unplanned and 
time-consuming software updates.
    Finally, we have an existing F-35 propulsion system that 
was not designed to meet the power and thermal management 
specifications required to adequately support Block 4 
capabilities nor is the engine currently meeting mission 
capable cost and maintenance enterprise metrics.
    This is something that we can't afford, and we talked about 
this in today's earlier hearing, is that nearly 70 percent of 
the cost of an aircraft's life is after we purchase it, and 
this goes right to that bottom line.
    With many difficult and challenging acquisitions and 
sustainment objectives occurring this decade, I'd like to 
understand what adjustments that the program's leadership is 
being undertaken to achieve realistic schedules and reliable 
cost estimates that deliver affordable full warfighting 
capability to the many nations that are requiring and support 
their national security requirements.
    Now, after all that and I--there was a mouthful there--I 
want to yield to my good friend and ranking member, Mrs. 
Hartzler, for opening comments.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Norcross can be found in the 
Appendix on page 43.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND 
                             FORCES

    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 
all our witnesses for your dedicated service to this Nation, 
for your support of our service members and families, and for 
being here to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2023 defense 
budget requests for fixed-wing tactical and training aircraft 
programs.
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine over the past 2 months only 
further highlights how critical it is that our tactical fighter 
aircraft force possess the capabilities and the capacity 
necessary to keep pace with, deter, and, if necessary, defeat 
any adversary threat in both the near and the long term. And I 
commend each of you for your tireless efforts to maintain, 
strengthen, and modernize the capability and lethality of your 
fighter aircraft fleets.
    But, once again, the President's fiscal year 2023 budget 
request fails to provide the necessary levels of funding to 
support you in these efforts. The administration's defense top 
line falls dangerously short of adequately funding the 
modernization and equipping of our Armed Forces, ultimately 
forcing each service to make tough choices between future 
modernization programs and the sustainment of existing aging 
and aircraft fleets.
    Recognizing the hard decisions and challenges imposed on 
all of you by the President's proposed budget top line, I look 
forward to working together to determine what is the right 
balance to prioritize and fund both current operational and 
tactical readiness and modernization investments required for 
future capabilities. Both are imperative to our national 
security.
    To this end, I expect our witnesses to lay out the steps 
you are taking to explain the funding required to ensure that 
our current and existing tactical aircraft fleets remain the 
most lethal and capable in the world, ready to fly and fight 
today if called upon to do so.
    Understanding that modernization and the development of 
newer capabilities are critical for our future defense posture, 
I believe it is equally important to ensure that our fighter 
aircraft and the pilots that fly them are capable and ready to 
deter and defeat our adversaries today and in the near term.
    We know that our adversaries are rapidly investing in and 
maximizing their tactical aircraft capabilities and are 
currently posing a threat to global security and stability.
    Just 23 years ago, China only had approximately 175 
aircraft. Think of that. Only had 175. But according to open-
source reports, China's air force and navy now field roughly 
2,800 aircraft with approximately 2,300 of them combat-coded 
aircraft, making them the largest aviation force within the 
Pacific region and the third largest aviation force in the 
world.
    Last year, China announced its annual military budget would 
increase by 6.8 percent, and according to DOD [Department of 
Defense], China's military spending is actually much larger 
than reported because China omits several major categories from 
its official budget.
    Meanwhile, the budget proposed from the Air Force cuts 400 
tactical aircraft over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] 
and the Navy will continue to have a strike fighter shortfall 
through fiscal year 2031.
    With China on a determined path to match and surpass the 
capabilities and capacity of Western air forces, sacrificing 
operational readiness and accepting exceptional near-term risk 
for future longer term modernization development is, 
unfortunately, no longer a luxury that the United States 
possesses.
    The large number of proposed near-term aircraft divestments 
coupled with decreased procurement numbers in both the Air 
Force and Navy budget proposals and FYDP, raise concerns that 
the services are being forced to use their tactical aircraft 
fleets as bill payers for other modernization priorities.
    Thus, from a strategic and operational risk management 
perspective, I expect the witnesses to provide a candid 
assessment of how their future modernization, procurement, and 
fleet restructuring plans are impacting the readiness of 
existing tactical aircraft capabilities and capacity.
    This committee requires a full assessment and understanding 
of the risks and the vulnerabilities, specifically in terms of 
potential aircraft shortfalls, gaps in capabilities, industrial 
base impacts, and future costs each of the military services is 
taking on within its existing tactical air programs under the 
President's proposed budget restraints.
    This information is critical as we review the military 
services' plans for divestments, decreasing fleet sizes, 
squadron relocations, and significant unfunded priority 
requests, and make decisions for this year's National Defense 
Authorization Act.
    So I thank the chairman for organizing this important 
hearing, and I yield back.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you. Obviously, between Mrs. Hartzler 
and myself there's a mouthful and this is why we're holding 
this hearing, because we want to hear from you to refute and 
explain many of those questions.
    So here with us today is the Honorable Andrew Hunter, 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics; the Honorable Jay Stefany, 
performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and Senior 
Acquisition Executive for F-35 program; Major General James 
Adams, Joint Staff Deputy Director for Requirements and 
Capability Development; General--excuse me, Lieutenant General 
David Nahom of the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans 
and Program; Lieutenant General Mark Wise, Marine Corps Deputy 
Commandant for Aviation; Rear Admiral Andrew Loiselle, Director 
of Navy Air Warfare Division; Lieutenant General Eric Fick, F-
35 Joint Program Executive Officer; and Mr. Jon Ludwigson, 
Director of Contracting and National Security Acquisitions for 
the GAO--General Accounting Office.
    Glad to have you here again, and we will start as I 
introduced you, starting with Andrew. Good to see down there 
and thanks for being with us.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW P. HUNTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 
      AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

    Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much, Chairman Norcross, and 
Ranking Member Hartzler and members of the subcommittee. Very 
glad that you have myself and Lieutenant General Nahom here to 
provide testimony on the Air Force's fiscal year 2023 budget 
request for fixed-wing tactical and training aircraft.
    And as a former staffer of this committee, it's great to be 
back and to be with friends. And it's an honor to be here for 
my first hearing as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force 
before this committee.
    We come to you with a well-thought-through plan. It's a 
plan that reflects the completion of the 2022 National Defense 
Strategy and it sets a strategic direction for the Department 
of Defense and for our purposes for the Department of the Air 
Force and for the Air Force acquisition enterprise that's clear 
because it's a clear mandate to strengthen the capabilities of 
our current and future tactical aviation fleet mix to overcome 
the pacing challenges identified and the strategy, particularly 
those presented by China, and to deter the threats of other 
strategic competitors.
    And to just speak briefly to the comments both of you made 
in your introductory remarks, there are changes in this budget 
request and there should be changes in this budget request.
    As the Chief has said, you know, we have to accelerate, 
change, or lose, and so my view is if we had come to you with a 
budget request that was identical to what had been projected 
last year with a new strategy and with a changed world, then 
you would be in a very fair position to critique us.
    You're obviously always in a fair position to critique us 
because that's the nature of this relationship. But I think as 
you dig into the details on this, I hope you'll find that we 
have made good choices and those choices were driven by our 
focus on seven operational imperatives, problems that we have 
to solve to really meet the pacing threat and that's what's 
driving this tremendous change.
    So as I said, we faced a number of tough decisions to 
strike this balance between short-term and future risks. But we 
did through a thoughtful and deliberative process to meet the 
rapidly evolving threats that we see.
    We aim to accelerate the development of a more modern and 
operationally relevant fighter force, delivering capabilities 
to the warfighter at the pace with which the strategic 
environment demands, at the pace at which it's changing by 
balancing along several axes, balancing current capacity versus 
essential modernized capabilities; balancing standoff versus 
stand-in capabilities; balancing the ability to generate mass 
with the ability to have high-end solutions that meet the most 
acute threats.
    Since my arrival in the Air Force earlier this month, I've 
been working with the SAF--Secretary of the Air Force--
acquisition team to assess our current programs, such as the F-
35 and several others, and to evaluate our ongoing efforts to 
adapt our acquisition policies and processes to meet our pacing 
challenges. And this early stages of a number of initial focus 
areas, including making sure that we're delivering operational 
capabilities that serve our actual warfighter requirements, 
meet current and future needs; modernizing our nuclear 
enterprise to ensure safe, reliable, and credible nuclear 
deterrent; sustaining a complex and aging Air Force fleet and 
the new capabilities as we field them; fielding innovative 
capabilities, especially software and software-intensive 
systems where our system historically has struggled; advancing 
our capabilities for digital acquisition to strengthening and 
securing our supply chains and supporting and developing the 
acquisition workforce.
    And I'm going to be working throughout my early days in 
this job to engage with our department's senior leadership, 
with our PEOs [Program Executive Offices] and with industry to 
set and establish a clear set of priorities for the acquisition 
enterprise, and I welcome, you know, coming to talk to you 
about those priorities as I've gone through that process.
    I look forward to working with this subcommittee to ensure 
the Department of the Air Force maintains sufficient military 
advantage to secure our vital national interests, support our 
allies and partners in fiscal year 2023 and beyond, and stand 
ready to address your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hunter and General 
Nahom can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

STATEMENT OF LT GEN DAVID S. NAHOM, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 
             FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE

    General Nahom. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to testify on the fiscal year 2023 budget 
request in the Department of Defense for fixed-wing tactical 
and training programs.
    On behalf of the Department of the Air Force, thank you for 
your continued leadership and unwavering support of the United 
States military and the 689,000 total force airmen that serve 
around the world today.
    In recent years, the Air Force's combat advantage over 
potential peer adversaries has been continually challenged. As 
a nation, we have simply fallen behind in the rate of 
technological advancement demonstrated by our global 
competitors.
    Through the lens of Secretary Kendall's seven operational 
imperatives, we continue to look critically at our investments 
to ensure our resources are properly aligned to a force design 
that will give our adversaries pause.
    During my tenure as the Air Force's lead programmer, 
congressional support for the Air Force investment efforts has 
never been more apparent than with the passage of the fiscal 
year 2022 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and 
Appropriations Act.
    We sincerely appreciate Congress' approval to divest 80 
percent of the requested aircraft in fiscal year 2022, allowing 
over $1 billion to be invested in other top Air Force 
priorities.
    Fiscal year 2023 represents another opportunity for the 
Department of the Air Force and Congress to work together in an 
effort to remain the world's preeminent power projection force.
    I'd like to take a moment to highlight some of the details 
of our fiscal year 2023 budget submission. Future conflict will 
be defined by highly contested warfighting environments and 
driven by emergency operational concepts and rapid weapons 
development timelines.
    The Air Force remains focused on achieving fighter force 
mix that provides a capable, sustainable, survivable, and 
affordable force that can operate across the entire range of 
mission sets.
    Our proposed four fighter platforms achieves just that. 
Together, the Next Generation Air Dominance platform and family 
of systems--F-35, F-15, and F-16 platforms--will provide 
complementary capabilities and capacity to meet worldwide 
demands.
    Our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 
fleet's visibility and persistence play a key role in shaping 
information warfare objectives to influence adversary actions 
and perceptions. Future sensing must ensure continuous sensing 
for foundational intelligence.
    Winning a future high-end conflict requires accelerated 
investment, transitioning our platform's structure to a 
connected, persistent, and survivable force. As we look to the 
future, we must realize that our resources are finite--
manpower, money, and time.
    Working with Congress and within the confines of those 
limited resources, it is our job to shape a force that 
effectively and efficiently provides the most capable airpower 
for our Nation.
    If deterrence fails, our airmen must have the training, 
tools, and platforms, operating systems required to win. 
Developing the technology of the future will require the 
flexibility to achieve our optimal force.
    Looking forward, we must balance risk today so we're 
capable of effectively engaging future warfare against a well-
resourced adversary tomorrow.
    I am honored to sit here today with Honorable Hunter and my 
joint teammates. I look forward to answering all your questions 
regarding the tactical and training aircraft programs.

   STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT 
     SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
  ACQUISITION, AND SENIOR ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE FOR THE F-35 
                            PROGRAM

    Mr. Stefany. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to address the 
Department of Navy's tactical aviation programs.
    A modern sustainable TACAIR [tactical aviation] capability 
is essential to success in the high-end fight and remains the 
cornerstone of the Department's deterrence and power projection 
capabilities. We thank Congress and this committee for your 
continued support of these programs.
    The last year has been a good year for naval aviation. The 
Department delivered 94 new aircraft for Navy and Marine Corps 
units last year, including fourth- and fifth-generation and 
transformational capabilities to our frontline forces.
    They're also in the process of stabilizing the F/A-18 
service life modernization effort and have a solid path forward 
to achieve realistic schedule goals for the first phase of this 
effort.
    In the last year, we reached initial operational capability 
[IOC] of the VH-92 Presidential helicopter program, which is 
not necessarily the purpose of today's hearing, but I wanted to 
just highlight that, and we are now starting the White House 
commissioning efforts for that helicopter.
    We also completed operational testing of the H-53 heavy-
lift helicopter and just yesterday--the day before yesterday 
declared IOC of that aircraft.
    The 2023 budget request continues this progress for the 
naval aviation enterprise. We're requesting funds for 96 fixed-
wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft in fiscal year 2023, 
and 420 aircraft across the FYDP. Of note, though, fiscal year 
2023 does mark the end of the procurement of the H-2D Hawkeye 
aircraft.
    As the service acquisition executive for the F-35 program, 
I see the program as being at a very important inflection 
point. Steady state production is in place and the program is 
shifting focus to sustainment of that aircraft around the world 
while also developing cutting--and cutting in the next 
evolution of vital warfighting capability that's known as Block 
4.
    Ensuring production and sustainment of the aircraft is 
affordable is essential to the success of this transition. To 
that end, we must continue cooperative efforts across all of us 
here to reduce F-35's costs in all areas while also 
implementing a truly global sustainment strategy that supports 
the fleet.
    Key to the sustainment cost reductions is the 2023--fiscal 
year 2021 to 2023 air vehicle sustainment contract that was 
awarded last year that incentivizes our contractor partners to 
simultaneously control costs and improve availability. We 
expect this contract to continue the trend of reducing cost per 
tail per year to achieve the Navy and Marine Corps targets 
later this decade.
    The F-35 enterprise also continues to address engine power 
module shortfalls, as you mentioned, sir, in your opening. Over 
the past year, the Heavy Maintenance Center at Tinker Air Force 
Base has diligently worked to increase their throughput, 
reducing turnaround time by 39 percent.
    We are aggressively applying lessons learned from Tinker as 
we stand up international depots right now and plan the standup 
of our second domestic engine depot at Fleet Readiness Center 
Southeast.
    As a department, we are committed to SECNAV's [Secretary of 
the Navy's] priorities of strengthening our maritime 
superiority, empowering our people, and strengthening the 
strategic partnerships with our allies and with industry.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your 
committee today and I look forward to your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, General Wise, 
and Admiral Loiselle can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

 STATEMENT OF LTGEN MARK R. WISE, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
                  AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS

    General Wise. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the Marine 
Corps' plan for tactical aviation.
    The first priority to discuss is modernizing our aircraft 
fleet to meet the pacing threat. During our transition to F-35B 
and C, the F-18A through D, as well as the AV-8B have 
benefitted from continued readiness and sustainment investments 
we initiated in fiscal year 2017.
    Both platforms are capable and ready but require continuous 
modernization to maintain lethality, survivability, 
availability, as well as fifth-generation interoperability.
    With respect to our F-35s, we have stood up two fleet 
replacement squadrons [FRS], one operational test squadron, and 
six operational line squadrons to date. The F-35 program of 
record remains 420 total aircraft.
    Operationally, we recently deployed 10 F-35Bs from VMFA-211 
as part of a historic multinational carrier strike group aboard 
Her Majesty's ship Queen Elizabeth.
    During this deployment, there were more intercepts of 
Russian aircraft than any time since the end of the Cold War. 
Of note, L-class amphibious ships were critical to this 
deployment since Marine F-35B squadrons could only train and 
qualify air crew and landing signal officers for foreign 
carriers aboard our LHDs [landing helicopter dock amphibious 
assault ships] and LHAs [landing helicopter assault amphibious 
assault ships].
    Earlier this month, USS Tripoli put to sea from San Diego 
with 20 F-35Bs on board as an operational test of the lightning 
carrier concept. When that amphibious ship left the pier, it 
had more fifth-generation capability aboard than any other ship 
in history.
    Another of our priorities is fleet readiness. Proper 
resourcing, depot maintenance throughput, and manning are all 
factors that contribute to aviation readiness. Aircraft and 
component life extension initiatives for the F/A-18 and AV-8B 
will allow their relevance through 2030 and 2027, respectively.
    Continued investment in the survivability and lethality of 
the Lightning II and of its current and future suite of weapons 
will ensure we will be prepared to compete, deter, and, if 
necessary, defeat our peer competitors. Another important 
priority for us is managing manpower across the tactical 
aviation fleet.
    As the Marine Corps continues to modernize its fleet, 
qualified capable Marines remain the key to our ability to meet 
operational requirements. To address pilot shortfalls and 
maintain our retention, we, as a service, are looking at 
monetary and nonmonetary incentives.
    This includes improving aircraft readiness rates and flying 
hours as well as bonus incentives for our pilots and 
maintainers. We continue aggressive management of both our 
enlisted and officer structure to ensure we retain the very 
best.
    In summary, the Marine Corps tactical aviation is ready, it 
is lethal, and it is fully integrated into operations with our 
partners in the United States Navy, the joint force, and with 
our allies and partners.
    Enabled through continued congressional support, the Navy 
and Marine Corps team is deployed forward and postured to 
address threats around the clock and around the world.
    I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today, and I 
look forward to your questions.

   STATEMENT OF RADM ANDREW J. LOISELLE, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR 
                  WARFARE DIVISION, U.S. NAVY

    Admiral Loiselle. Good afternoon, Chairman Norcross, 
Ranking Member Hartzler, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and 
discuss the Department of the Navy's tactical aviation 
programs.
    Naval aviation's striking power resident within our carrier 
air wings is delivered from the 11 most survivable airfields on 
the planet, the nuclear aircraft carrier. It is vital to 
controlling the seas and providing the long-range fires 
necessary to win the high-end fight.
    As we modernize the carrier air wing to pace the threat, we 
continue to focus on a mix of fourth- and fifth-generation 
fighter aircraft.
    Today, the Navy is managing fourth-generation F/A-18 
inventory requirements through service life modification--SLM--
and fifth-generation requirements through continued procurement 
of the F-35C. This is also how the Navy is managing the strike 
fighter shortfall in future years.
    For fourth-generation, we continue to work with our 
partners to drive down the turnaround time and cost of SLM and 
manage the correct footprint of tactical aviation across our 
naval aviation enterprise. In the past year, we have seen a 30 
percent cost reduction in our Phase One 7,500-hour SLM 
deliveries due to the implementation of best practices such as 
pre-SLM grooming, engineering, reutilization, and overall touch 
labor learning and efficiencies.
    We continue--we expect continued cost savings as SLM 
matures and we are executing our planned transition to full kit 
10,000-hour SLM inductions in fiscal 2023. Full kit inductions 
will provide Block III capabilities identical to new production 
aircraft at one-third of the cost, giving us 4,000 additional 
flying hours or enough to fly for 13 additional years.
    While higher Department of the Navy budgetary priorities 
meant deferred procurement of F-35, the Navy is committed to 
the F-35C carrier air wing transition plan and TR-3 Block 4 
upgrades for all aircraft in the Navy's inventory in order to 
reduce long-term sustainment costs associated with maintaining 
both TR-2 and TR-3 configurations.
    After a successful first deployment with VFA-147 [Strike 
Fighter Squadron 147], the Navy continues to learn and better 
quantify costs, mission capable rates, and operations of the F-
35C. We look forward to gaining more deployment data from VMFA-
314 aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln currently deployed as part 
of USMC [U.S. Marine Corps] TACAIR integration.
    We are laying the groundwork for the highly networked air 
wing of the future with the sixth-generation NGAD [Next 
Generation Air Dominance] family of systems that leverages 
manned/unmanned teaming, which will deliver overwhelming 
firepower in contested spaces in the years ahead.
    Our concept refinement remains on schedule and we are 
prioritizing funding to accelerate development of the sixth-
generation capability and other key aviation wholeness 
investments to ensure carrier air wing will maintain strike 
fighter capability and capacity to pace the most stressing 
threat through the 2030s and beyond.
    This includes the long-range weapons necessary to maximize 
the potential of sixth-generation systems. We are developing 
methods to achieve the required training and readiness required 
by advanced tactics, utilizing tactical surrogates, live 
virtual constructive range integration, and improving training 
fidelity at a reduced cost.
    As the naval aviation enterprise manages fiscal 
constraints, we thank Congress and this subcommittee for your 
continued support of important aviation priorities including 
flight hour funding, critical aircraft upgrades, and investment 
in future capabilities.
    I look forward to your questions.

  STATEMENT OF MAJGEN JAMES H. ADAMS, USMC, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 
   REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT, J-8, JOINT STAFF

    General Adams. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, 
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense's 
collaborative work to identify, develop, acquire, and operate 
the most combat-credible mix of tactical aircraft necessary to 
not only address today's challenges but remain relevant in an 
increasingly lethal and electromagnetically complex future 
operating environment.
    Similar to other recent activity, these efforts continue to 
prioritize China as the pacing challenge while addressing 
threats emanating from other global competitors. I would also 
like to thank your staff and the staffs of the other defense 
committees for the hours they have dedicated to discussing this 
important topic with the Department. Their insights have been 
helpful.
    In the interest of time, I'd like to specifically address 
the questions you posed to me as representative of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    As highlighted by the committee in your first question, 
there have been a number of separate but closely related and, 
in many cases, integrated analytic efforts underway across the 
Department to determine the appropriate balance of sixth-, 
fifth-, and fourth-generation capabilities. While not an all-
inclusive list, I will highlight a set of the most important 
efforts.
    Last summer, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the 
combatant commands and services, led a future TACAIR study 
exploring the benefits and risks of various fleet mixes across 
two timeframes during both competition and conflict.
    All these studies were conducted at a very, very high 
classification level and were inclusive of all special access 
program and intel information. Additionally, the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council directed the completion of 
multiple capability portfolio reviews, four of which were 
specifically germane to the TACAIR portfolio.
    The Office of the Secretary of Defense CAPE [Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation] completed a number of 
internal analysis directed by Department leadership to 
investigate TACAIR survivability, lethality, overall 
affordability, and novel concepts of operation to support 
combatant commander needs in conjunction with their 
comprehensive TACAIR study.
    Finally, both the Department of the Air Force and the 
Department of the Navy conducted individual studies focused on 
assessing both near- and long-term TACAIR requirements. These 
were foundational studies that supported all the previous.
    This compendium of analysis provided important decision 
support to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in making 
final decisions related to this strategically significant 
portfolio.
    Study findings informed the development of the recently 
released National Defense Strategy, the forthcoming National 
Military Strategy, and were captured in the President's fiscal 
year 2023 budget submission and associated Future Years Defense 
Program.
    As we proceed with today's hearing, I'm prepared to discuss 
in detail any specific queries you have regarding these 
studies. The findings were also leveraged as inputs to the 
directed readiness framework to calculate and forecast near- 
and mid-term operational risks associated with the issue 
identified in your second question--what is the impact of the 
service divest-to-invest strategies.
    The operational risk associated with these plans is known. 
It's factored into planning and is not forecast to unacceptably 
affect meeting global force management plans and activities of 
the Department of Defense over the next 10 to 15 years.
    Again, thank you for your leadership and continued support 
of today's warfighters and those who will comprise the joint 
force of tomorrow. I look forward to your questions and a 
continued dialogue regarding the TACAIR portfolio.
    [The prepared statement of General Adams can be found in 
the Appendix on page 89.]

   STATEMENT OF LT GEN ERIC T. FICK, USAF, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE 
        OFFICER, F-35 LIGHTNING II JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE

    General Fick. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, 
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
this opportunity to provide an update on the F-35 program.
    Given ongoing aggression from Russia, competition from 
China, and other threats across the globe, the platform's 
capabilities remain more relevant and more critical than ever.
    To date, and to your point, Mr. Chairman, we have delivered 
788 F-35s to our U.S. services, international partners, and 
foreign military sales customers. These aircraft have logged 
over a half million hours while operating from 25 bases and 8 
warships worldwide.
    The platform's impact is real. This air system is making a 
difference every day. As I briefed you last April, the mandate 
of the JPO [Joint Program Office] remains the delivery of a 
capable, affordable, and available air system outpacing 
competitors to win tomorrow's fight as we develop, deliver, and 
sustain these fifth-generation warfighting capabilities at 
high-end fourth-generation costs.
    As we will discuss today, the F-35 program is not without 
challenges. However, these challenges pale in comparison to the 
progress that we have made in recent years. I am grateful for 
this opportunity to share some of that progress with you today.
    We're grateful for your support of Block 4 in the 2022 
NDAA. As we have discussed previously, we have been delivering 
Block 4 capabilities since 2019, ensuring lethality and 
survivability against the world's most sophisticated threats.
    TR-3 hardware delivery will increase our critically needed 
processing, memory, and throughput, and we continue to remain 
laser focused on the completion of TR-3 qualification and 
testing and the delivery of our first TR-3 equipped aircraft in 
Lot 15 in the summer of 2023.
    The ALIS to ODIN modernization effort continues addressing 
critical logistics information system software, hardware, data, 
and infrastructure requirements. We have successfully replaced 
the oldest ALIS hardware in the field and fielded 14 ODIN Base 
Kits to units around the world. These kits are 80 percent 
smaller and 30 percent cheaper than the units they replace, and 
they perform substantially better.
    We also recently deployed barcode scanners to warehouses 
and units around the world, simplifying the complex data entry 
task that accompanies the shipment inventory and installation 
of F-35 parts.
    We continue also to make strides in driving down 
sustainment costs, as mentioned by Mr. Stefany. Under the 2021 
to 2023 annualized sustainment contract we signed last fall, 
the fiscal year 2023 cost per flying hour should be reduced by 
approximately 8 percent and cost per tail per year by 6 
percent.
    This marks a step in the right direction but there's still 
work to be done. I look forward to discussing other actions 
taken by the government and industry to continue our fierce 
focus upon affordability today, as well as with your colleagues 
in the Readiness Subcommittee tomorrow.
    In the interest of ensuring our relevance well into the 
future, we remain laser focused on the evaluation of F-35 
capabilities against existing and emergent high-end threats in 
an extremely high-fidelity simulation facility we call the 
Joint Simulation Environment, or JSE.
    Working closely with modeling and simulation experts at 
Naval Air Systems Command and other synthetic model providers 
across DOD and industry, we continue to make deliberate forward 
progress in the JSE's development and have delivered 90 percent 
of the required component verification and validation packages 
to date.
    Formal operational test activities in the JSE are scheduled 
to begin in January of 2023, and the final 64 runs of F-35 
initial operational test and evaluation [IOT&E] are expected to 
occur there later that summer.
    I will note, however, that just because our final 64 runs 
for score have yet to be completed, that doesn't mean our air 
system is untested.
    In addition to the IOT&E events that we have to conduct in 
the JSE, we have already completed extensive operational 
testing to verify the capabilities that we are delivering to 
the fleet perform to their requirements and to verify that the 
suitability elements of the program meet sustainment 
requirements.
    This testing includes formal IOT&E open air trials executed 
from 2021--I'm sorry, 2018 to 2021, which consisted of 139 test 
missions, 16,436 flight hours, and 463 discrete test events 
using 23 F-35 aircraft and over 900 support personnel.
    Dedicated weapons events included 355 simulated air-to-
surface attacks, 280 simulated AIM-120 [Air Intercept Missile 
120] shots, and 207 live and inert weapons deliveries.
    Finally, we have made significant progress against our most 
critical sustainment degrader, the F135 power module 
availability. This progress is due to the combined efforts of a 
three-pronged enterprise recovery program.
    First, we increased the production at the Air Force 
Sustainment Center's Heavy Maintenance Center at Tinker Air 
Force Base; second, we increased capacity in the global power 
module repair network; and third, we matured our inspection 
procedures and damage tolerance limits to keep engines on wing 
longer.
    While we made real progress in all areas, Tinker really 
crushed its F135 power module production plan, reducing 
turnaround time from 240 days to 122, delivering 51 power 
modules against a target of 40. Tinker is on track to deliver 
60 power modules this year.
    I thank you for your time today and look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Fick can be found in the 
Appendix on page 96.]

STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL 
  SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Mr. Ludwigson. Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, 
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 
to discuss GAO's F-35 acquisition work.
    The F-35 was designed to replace multiple U.S. and allied 
aircraft and perform a wide range of missions from traditional 
airfields, austere forward locations, and carriers.
    The DOD and pilots report that the F-35 provides 
considerable improvements, giving warfighters advantages in 
many situations. Despite the broad needs and promise, the 
program continues to face challenges.
    The program has not completed testing because the 
government has not completed the needed simulator, which is 
more complex than expected. Without the simulator, the program 
cannot validate that the aircraft meets all requirements.
    Despite not completing testing, the program is already 
producing many aircraft. We estimate that over 1,100 aircraft 
will have been produced over 16 years during what is referred 
to as low-rate initial production and before the program is 
approved for full-rate production.
    This equates to about one-third of the total planned 
production, an approach out of the norm and inconsistent with 
leading practices. Our work of the past several years has 
identified challenges with the baseline program including 
production line immaturity, late parts deliveries, supply chain 
challenges, quality issues with engines, and hundreds of still 
open deficiencies. Addressing these should remain a focus.
    The over 700 aircraft already in service have not met 
reliability and maintainability [R&M] goals established for 
them. As a result, aircraft have been unavailable for missions 
more often, required more maintenance, and taken longer to 
repair than planned. There have been improvement in prior years 
but declines this year.
    The program has also struggled with the Block 4 
modernization effort, already seeing schedule slips and cost 
increases. The Block 4 and related TR-3 efforts aim to enhance 
the F-35 to meet modern threats and provide new capabilities.
    Our work on Block 4, however, found, among other things, 
poor software quality, inadequate testing, fielding of 
defective software, and misestimates of the complexity of the 
work.
    These issues delayed deliveries and drove up costs, and we 
made related recommendations. The program has begun to address 
many of these but it's too soon to tell if they will address 
the core of our concerns.
    The program also has plans for less frequent software 
deliveries, a move away from modern software development 
practices. The new TR-3 processors and memory units are 
essential for some Block 4 capabilities but are also at risk of 
further delays.
    Unfortunately, we have been unable to include evaluations 
of cost and schedule estimates this year because formal updates 
have not been available. The cost estimate was last updated in 
2019 and the schedule was last updated last year.
    Chairman Norcross, Ranking Member Hartzler, members of the 
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I'd be happy to 
answer any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 116.]
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you to all of you for your statements, 
and our opening statements that we talked about a number of 
issues.
    Well, we met last year and I would be remiss in not 
thanking those who kept our planes flying, those who are 
building our planes during a pandemic.
    The workforce, particularly early on, who had no idea what 
was facing them, continued to work, and please, on behalf of 
the ranking member and myself, thank them for that.
    But here we are, and a chance to better understand many of 
the things that have changed and reflected in some of the 
statements.
    So, General Nahom, I talked about, in the opening remarks 
about the retirement of 650 aircraft over the next 5 years, 
buying 246--that operational deficit of close to 400. The 
numbers aren't that simple.
    An aircraft retiring and buying one aren't equal. But it is 
an indicator. But more importantly, what specifically caused 
the Air Force to accelerate this so significantly? It wasn't 
explained to us last year. What changed in those 12 months to 
make such a drastic shift?
    General Nahom. Sir, I'll say--and thank you for the 
question, sir.
    You know, first, if you look at it from our 2022 enacted to 
the 2023 PB [President's budget], we have invested $1.2 billion 
more in the fighter force over that period. So we continue to 
invest in the fighter force because it's critical to our 
Nation's defense.
    There is a balance between the capability that we need for 
a peer fight as well as the capacity that is needed worldwide 
for our airmen that are out on point every day, and it's a 
tough balance.
    There are some competing needs as we look at the--in the 
overall Air Force beyond the fighter portfolio, specifically 
the nuclear portfolio, which, as we recapitalize two-thirds of 
the nuclear arsenal and many of those articles now are in 
procurement, not just RDT&E [research, development, test, and 
evaluation] in this FYDP that did--that does crowd out some 
investment that we have to be cognizant of as we look forward 
to the fighter portfolio.
    Mr. Norcross. But that's nothing new to the last 12 months. 
We knew that was coming.
    General Nahom. Yes, sir, it is, but a lot of the 
procurement does enter into this FYDP, if you look at the 
latter part of the FYDP when you look at GBSD [Ground Based 
Strategic Deterrent] and B-21, and many of these things do 
start procuring now, which does tighten our budget a bit.
    Mr. Norcross. I understand, but we knew that was coming.
    General Nahom. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. Okay.
    General Nahom. Absolutely. But I'll tell you, as the threat 
changes--and the F-35 is a perfect example--you know, the F-35 
that we initially bought 20-plus years ago as we envisioned it 
20 years ago was for a threat that is much different right now.
    So we continue to evolve the F-35 and we do--and TR-3 and 
Block 4 and all the modernization is so critical. As well as 
you look at some of the modernization we're putting into F-22 
and some of the advanced weapons that are going to be on these 
aircraft to make sure that we can meet the emerging threat 
because, as Ranking Woman Hartzler pointed out, the changing in 
the Chinese threat over the years is staggering and our 
capability has to advance to meet that, and you look at our 
investment in Next Generation Air Dominance, which will 
ultimately replace the F-22 matches that need.
    And so there, unfortunately, is a balance between how many 
aircraft we can procure and the capability that we need to 
invest in, moving forward.
    Mr. Norcross. So that's one-half the equation, the 
acquisition. How about the retirement accelerated at such a 
rate?
    General Nahom. When you accelerate the aircraft and you 
free up the investment, the money that it takes to maintain 
those aircraft is one thing, and as the Air Force's aircraft 
age--and I'll use the F-15C as an example--almost the entire 
fleet is beyond the original design service life. The 
maintenance costs--the WSS, the weapons system sustainment--is 
going up.
    Even in this increased inflation period we live in right 
now, those costs are still going up at greater than inflation. 
So when you retire them you free up that investment.
    But more importantly, you free up the airmen. You free up 
the personnel that we can bring onto modern systems and not 
just F-35 but other systems throughout the Air Force.
    So--and I'll tell you, if you look at the O&M, just the 
operations and maintenance on a legacy fighter, it's a little 
over 20 fighters that you would retire just to purchase one F-
35. So it takes, actually, a lot of divestment to actually 
invest in future systems.
    Mr. Norcross. I agree with this. This is the conversation 
you and I have had over the last 2 years. But what changed over 
the last 12 months? Because much of this was discussed earlier. 
We know Refresh 3, Block 4 is coming. It reflects the change in 
China.
    But what changed in the last 12 months that we didn't know 
when we were here last year? Why didn't we do this last year if 
it's the same?
    General Nahom. Sir, I'll have to take that for record and 
make sure I compare the right [inaudible]. I don't want to give 
you an answer off the cuff. That's such a critical--a critical 
answer.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Norcross. Because that's the question I'm going to get 
through the committee is we're here with you. We want 
[inaudible] here. So what changed in the last 12 months that we 
are now shifting?
    Mrs. Hartzler.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. We're thinking similarly. Out of 
all your testimony, the thing that stood out the most to me was 
what Major General Adams said--talking about last summer you 
did these scenarios that showed, you know, a need for different 
things and whatever.
    But last summer, we had just passed the NDAA in the House--
in the committee here. It hadn't come up to the floor yet. We 
didn't pass that till December. We didn't pass the budget until 
just in March.
    Yet, we heard nothing about any of these changes, and this 
is a radical change that you proposed to us a couple of days 
ago. Four hundred less aircraft, divest all of the A-10s, 
divest F-18 electronic planes.
    Did you say anything to any Member of Congress about your 
findings when we were in processing last year? How come we 
didn't hear about it until a couple of weeks ago?
    General Adams. Ma'am, thank you for the question. The 
studies that we did didn't define specific actions that the 
services ended up taking. They defined what is the right mix of 
fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-gen platforms that are required to 
meet the changing--the rapidly changing and evolving threat 
from China. And there was thought that, you know, if we 
continued on and leveraged and didn't change in an accelerated 
fashion and used the standard process, which, essentially, 
delivers small changes with each cycle, it will continue to 
increase the gap between the capabilities that the Chinese were 
delivering and the capabilities that we needed to field.
    Mrs. Hartzler. How come you didn't say something sooner, 
though?
    General Adams. The----
    Mrs. Hartzler. I mean, if this is the case, if China is 
making--you're discovering something new, I'm concerned that 
we're waiting a whole almost year before it's brought to us.
    General Adams. Ma'am, I'll take that for the record. I know 
for a fact that the CAPE study delivered probably the earliest 
of them and that was in October of last year, and then 
following that were the deliveries of the other studies. But 
I'll take that for the record as to exactly what was delivered 
and when.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Okay. Thank you. Now to my written 
questions.
    So the first one, General Nahom, and it's kind of a long 
intro but you'll kind of see. Bottom line, I'm concerned about 
a capability gap in between. So we're going to make this big 
change. We're going to divest. What are we going to do in the 
meantime?
    So early this month in an interview with Air Force 
Magazine, you noted that the Air Force requirements have never 
been more in demand, needed to support combatant commanders 
around the world.
    During that interview, you also noted that the Air Force 
fighter fleet age continues to rise and that the Air Force has 
failed to recapitalize several of these aircraft and new 
airframes in a timely manner.
    To get to this readiness problem you agree with former Air 
Force Chief of Staff General Goldfein's assessment the Air 
Force must seek 72 new fighters per year. However, in this 
budget, the Air Force is only requesting procurement funding 
for 57 tactical aircraft between both the F-35A and the F-15EX.
    Even with the additional 7 F-35As on the Air Force's 
unfunded priority list, tactical aircraft procurement will fall 
6 short of the necessary annual procurement minimum of 72.
    Additionally, the Air Force FYDP for 2023 through 2027 
provides a plan to divest--well, I'll just summarize, it's what 
the chairman just said--basically, leaving 400 divested 
aircraft without new fleet replacements. News to this committee 
since we were not provided with the FYDP last year.
    The Air Force now plans to divest of its F-15C and D fleets 
by 2026, the entire A-10 fleet of 281 aircraft by--well, 6 
years, and has cut its planned F-15EX acquisition objective 
from 144 to now only 80 new aircraft, all while shifting 
expected timelines for the NGAD program significantly later 
than originally planned.
    So, equally concerning, you've indicated over the last few 
weeks that the majority of these budgetary decisions were 
budget driven rather than requirement driven. In fact, you've 
acknowledged that you would like to see the Air Force buy more 
new fighters.
    So with an aging fleet, divestments of entire tactical 
aircraft fleets, decreased procurement, and further slipping 
timelines within the Next Generation Air Dominance program, 
this committee has significant concerns regarding not only how 
the Air Force plans to maintain minimum total fighter aircraft 
and combat-coded inventories as required by law, but also 
operational and safety risk the Air Force is accepting both in 
the near and long term.
    So as the Air Force forces its resources--focuses its 
resources on the nuclear recapitalization, which you talked 
about, what is the Air Force plan to mitigate further near- and 
long-term capability and capacity gaps within the tactical 
aircraft fleet to ensure that it's ready when our country needs 
it? And does the fiscal year 2023 proposed budget and FYDP 
adequately resource this mitigation effort?
    Thank you for your patience with that long----
    General Nahom. Ma'am, thank you for the question. I guess, 
first, I'll start with what I think is the good in terms of 
the--in the capability piece.
    The Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems and the 
focus that Secretary Kendall has on it as part of his 
operational imperative, I think is on a very good track and 
we--and I would like to sit down and talk at a classified level 
to show where we are, and I don't--the timelines have not 
changed appreciably from last year on the----
    Mrs. Hartzler. That's not what I saw. I was in a classified 
briefing a couple of weeks ago. That's not what I was told.
    General Nahom. Okay, ma'am. Again, I would love--I would 
look forward to the opportunity to meet, discuss, and make sure 
we're all looking at the same things.
    But I do actually like where Next Generation Air Dominance 
is going because I think it's the right--the right thing to do 
for our Nation. Also, until we get there, we have invested in 
the F-22 advancements to make sure that we have that air 
superiority hedge between now and Next Generation Air Dominance 
fielding, and those advances are going very well.
    Although delayed, we're happy with the current progress on 
TR-3 and Block 4. We look forward to getting that capability 
into the F-35 as well as some of our advanced weapon systems 
that we're invested in.
    In terms of the fighter numbers, I am concerned, as you 
are--as you are, too, we do have an aging fleet. The Air 
Force's fighter force is sitting at nearly 30 years old, and if 
you look at the conditions of some of the fighters in the 
field, I not only worry about the capability that they would be 
asked to counter and, specifically I look at the F-15C. The 
aircraft that I grew up in were A-10s or other things. We do 
owe our airmen better, more modern technology and that's what 
we're trying to get after.
    That said, there are limitations to the resources and we 
had to strike that balance between the capabilities that we 
need to invest in and, certainly, the numbers of aircraft to 
make sure that we can field the proper-sized fighter squadrons 
moving forward, ma'am.
    But we are focused, like I said in my opening. We have 
invested more money this year than we did last year in our 
fighter force and we hope we struck the right balance, and 
that's why, as we sit here talking to you and your colleagues, 
we want to make sure that we did strike that right balance with 
the given resources that we have.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross. Ms. Sherrill, you are recognized.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    Secretary Kendall, over 10 years ago, the Department and 
the Congress determined that a second engine for the F-35 was 
costly and unnecessary.
    Yet, your budget includes almost $300 million to recreate 
the second engine program at the expense of F-35 aircraft 
quantities, funds for F-35 modernization, and NGAD propulsion, 
and you've been publicly quoted as saying you prioritize 
integrating the second engine into the F-35 at the expense of 
those existing programs.
    So can you just describe what has changed? Why are you 
prioritizing investment in a costly second engine, for which we 
don't have a defined requirement, at the expense of the 
existing F-35 program of record or the current propulsion 
system?
    Mr. Hunter. Ma'am, this is Andrew Hunter. I'm going to 
address that question.
    On the engine question, we do have funds invested in our 
AETP [Adaptive Engine Transition Program] program, which is--
has not been a second engine program. It is a technology 
development program to develop advanced engine technologies for 
things such as greater fuel efficiency and better thermal 
management, which give us operational benefits such as 
increased range and better ability to support advanced mission 
systems.
    That is a program that has been ongoing for some time and 
it has built a couple of demonstrators, which industry is 
currently--is going--doing testing on and evaluating that 
technology.
    Within the fiscal year 2023 budget there are funds 
allocated towards a propulsion solution for the F-35 but no 
decision has yet been made on what that solution will be.
    So we have postured funding in order to enable a solution. 
But the decision on what that solution will be is still 
pending. But the AET program is one of the possibilities that's 
under consideration for that.
    Ms. Sherrill. Well, I guess that AETP--from what I 
understand it would only work for a small subset of the F-35s--
the F-35A fleet of the Air Force--and it's estimated to cost as 
much as $40 billion over the program's life cycle. So 
modernizing the existing engine could save as much as $40 
billion in lifecycle sustainment cost across the fleet, 
benefitting all of the services and our allied partners.
    So why aren't we investing in those engine enhancements to 
field the modernized capabilities across the entire F-35 fleet?
    Mr. Hunter. Ma'am, there is work underway. There are others 
who could probably speak to it on--you know, maybe let General 
Fick speak to the work that's being done to analyze those 
questions.
    General Fick. Yes, sir. Happy to contribute. So the F-35 
Joint Program Office, working in concert with the Air Force, 
the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force Life Cycle Management 
Center, and Naval Air Systems Command, is conducting a business 
case assessment to explore the combinations of engine solutions 
and power and thermal management solutions available or 
proposed to be available to help solve the F-35's cooling-
related propulsion issues.
    We have begun working our way through the engine decks and 
PTMS, power thermal management system, decks to assess the 
performance implications. At the same time, we're looking at 
the cost and the schedule implications associated with the 
creation of a program to move one or more of those solutions 
forward. This BCA [business case assessment] is then going to 
be complemented by an analysis that the Air Force is doing that 
looks at the operational implications of those different 
solutions.
    So if a solution yields additional range or endurance or 
payload, the question is what does that actually mean in a 
warfight--what does that actually mean in the Asia-Pacific when 
it comes to actually employing the system in combat.
    So the BCA that we're doing at the bottom level really 
forms the business case. Above that, the Air Force is looking 
at an operational assessment to be provided to the Secretary 
later this spring. Our full BCA we'll complete later in the 
summer.
    Ms. Sherrill. Well, I guess I would also hope that the BCA 
looked at what that actually meant to our supply chain, what 
that actually meant to the other forces, and what that actually 
meant to the cost of this program, which we have already seen 
severe overruns throughout the life cycle.
    So thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Norcross. Mr. Wittman, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our 
witnesses for joining us today.
    Rear Admiral Loiselle, I want to start with you and I want 
to speak specifically to the choice suite that had been given 
to us by the Navy. The choices go from bad to worse, and one of 
those is the strike fighter shortfall.
    As you know, the minimum requirement under the law is to 
have 10 carrier strike air wings by 2025, and the Navy has 
always paced the carrier strike air wings with the number of 
carriers available. Even though we have been through all kinds 
of machinations with [USS] Ford, she's going to be going on 
deployment or predeployment right now as we speak and we will 
be at 12 carriers by 2025.
    From that particular point, it now sounds like the Navy is 
seeking legislative relief from the 10 carrier air wing 
requirement by 2025. I believe firmly that it was the 
understanding of this committee and the full committee that 
there was only temporal relief for that 10 carrier air wing 
requirement.
    So my question to you is what are the consequences of us 
going below 10 air wings for the carriers and why does the Navy 
no longer intend to field those 10 carrier air wings when there 
was a commitment, I believe, made by the Navy to Congress that 
they would, indeed, do that, based upon the number of carriers 
that will be in the fleet by 2025? And what is the operational 
risk that the Navy is taking on by requesting to go below 10 
carrier air wings?
    Admiral Loiselle. Sir, thank you very much for that 
question. So there were several questions in there so I'll 
stick with where you ended up first and then we can redirect 
after that if you'd like.
    But the primary reason why we asked for legislative relief 
to go back to nine air wings--to remain at nine air wings, 
spoken correctly--is that when you look at our overall master 
aviation plan that delineates where all of our aircraft 
carriers are going to be at any given time, that goes out for a 
10-year period.
    And so as we look at that, there are very few periods of 
time--brief time--where we have more than nine aircraft 
carriers available, predominantly due to one--at least one 
carrier in our COH [complex overhaul] and right now we have 
two--and then one other--at least one other aircraft carrier in 
a docked planned maintenance period that lasts, generally, you 
know, anywhere from 12 to 16 months depending on the workload 
of that aircraft carrier, and those are stacked east and west 
coast as we go through.
    So as we look through that entire timeframe, there were 
very brief periods of time where we had more than 9 aircraft 
carriers available, and so all of our analysis indicated that 9 
carrier air wings was adequate to be able to staff and man the 
aircraft carriers that we were going to have available to use 
at any time in the next 10 years.
    And so given the funding constraints on the overall top 
line in the Navy and the investments required, as you've 
mentioned in your statement, there were higher priority things 
to put that money against, which is why we asked for 
legislative relief.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, as I see it, the problem with that is 
during those times when you will need more than nine carrier 
air wings you're going to be really pushing those jets on a lot 
of hours to be able to bridge those gaps.
    We have seen what's happened with F-18 and putting a lot of 
hours on those aircraft and deep dive depot maintenance level 
work that's needed. We have seen the cost and the time that 
goes along with that.
    So I think there is some risk as you're pushing the 
envelope on those. It sounds great conceptually, but when you 
push those aircraft that hard, we know what happens to the life 
span of aircraft and then what it costs in deep level 
maintenance elements.
    Lieutenant General Wise, I want to get a question in real 
quickly and that is related to Force Design 2030. In the Force 
Design 2030, the Corps' intent is to reduce squadron size from 
16 to 10 primary aircraft, and General Berger previously 
explained that the Corps is going to finalize their F-35 
request.
    This year we see three F-35Bs, three F-35Cs. The question 
then becomes does the Corps anticipate updating their request 
based on the Commandant's comments, based on the current 
request in the PB [President's budget], and what factors is the 
Corps considering in making decisions require--or regarding the 
size of F-35 squadrons?
    General Wise. Sir, I appreciate the question.
    And the initial decision to take it down to 10 planes per 
squadron was based on a couple of things.
    Sorry, there we go. The decision to take it down to 10 
aircraft per squadron was based primarily on the fact that the 
F-35 deploys as a division at any given time, so having two 
divisions.
    But what also happened at the same time is that was kind of 
the placeholder. So we have been doing, as you are aware, a lot 
of the studies, war games, experimentation, to make sure we got 
it right because part of--the other part of the question the 
Commandant is trying to answer is, okay, if we start with that 
we have to exercise it on the amphibs to ensure that the rest 
of the air wing, the flight deck can be managed appropriately, 
all the things to readiness of the aircraft. All those things 
actually equal 10. So that's where a lot of the study is going 
right now.
    As far as adjusting the--I think it would be premature to 
adjust the actual program of record right now, and the other 
factor, I would say, in there is the initial decision to go to 
420, there was a cost constraint piece of it, because if you 
look at the attrition models that was used, it was truncated to 
make it more affordable for a program. If you expand out back 
to what the original attrition model would have been, we'd 
still be pretty close to 420.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate your indulgence. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross. I'm trying to get everybody in.
    Mr. Horsford, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Fick, I've got some questions about initial 
production F-35s and capability differences between earlier 
versions of the aircraft and the Block 4 versions currently 
being fielded. The fiscal year 2023 budget indicates that the 
Air Force currently plans to modify production Lots 8 through 
16 of the F-35A fleet and that it would cost the Air Force 
roughly $16 million per aircraft to upgrade a Lot 2 to 8 
aircraft to the Block 4 configuration.
    I do understand the importance of the technical refresh and 
that these aircraft will represent a significantly improved 
capability. But can you describe the capability differences of 
a Block 4 F-35A and an initial production F-35A from Lots 7 or 
earlier?
    General Fick. Sir, thank you very much for your questions. 
I'll try to address them in the context of what we add in Block 
4 and in TR-3.
    So, first, Block 4 brings with it in its initial 
instantiation 66 unique capabilities, including about 16 
weapons that the initial tranche of F-35s did not, could not, 
would not carry.
    So we're bringing those 66 capabilities in addition to 
those 16 weapons. In the time that's transpired since the 
program began, since the Block 4 or post-SDD [system 
development and demonstration] phase of the program began, we 
have actually also altered the content of what is included in 
what a lot of people refer to as Block 4.
    So Block 4 started off as 66 unique capabilities. Then 
there were a number of capabilities added by the U.S. services 
and by the F-35 governance groups and in three different 
phases. One was kind of an initial phase that added a couple of 
capabilities.
    Then we added what we call a capability Increment 2 which 
was, I believe, an additional 6 or additional 10 capabilities. 
Then capability Increment 3, which is another six capabilities.
    So all in all, that 66 capability set has grown to about 88 
capabilities now being added to the baseline F-35s as we work 
our way through Block 4, which is now to include capability 
Increment 1, which is the baseline, capability Increment 2, and 
capability Increment 3. So it's the extent of all of those 
added capabilities that will not be resident if you don't 
upgrade to the Block 4 configuration.
    Now, I'm aware that some of our customers are going to 
upgrade their aircraft to the TR-3 configuration but, perhaps, 
stop the modification there and not add some of the later 
electronic warfare capabilities.
    Now, that number stopping after TR-3 is about 180 or so 
aircraft across the fleet will be upgraded to TR-3 but not to 
full Block 4. Additionally, there's about another----
    Mr. Horsford. I have a couple of other areas I want to get 
to. So----
    General Fick. So, primarily, weapons and additional 
electronic warfare systems, COMNAV [communications-navigation] 
and info systems, radar modes, and the like. And I can provide 
a full list if you need it.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Horsford. A written response is fine. Thank you.
    General Nahom, it's my understanding that some of the top 
priorities in the Pacific theater are the accelerated building 
of the F-15EX, procurement of an E-3 replacement, and fielding 
improved air-to-air missiles, and I was pleased to see the 
accelerated F-15EX buy included in the fiscal year 2023 budget 
and also to hear yesterday that the Air Force had selected the 
E-7 to fill the gap left by the retirement of the E-3.
    Can you update the committee on the progress being made on 
next-generation air-to-air missiles and any challenges you're 
facing in fielding these capabilities?
    General Nahom. Thank you for the question. It's good to see 
you again, sir.
    On the earlier missile piece, I think--I want to be careful 
and most, I think, I am going to have to take to a classified 
session with you.
    What I will say is we are--right now, our follow-on 
missile, the JADM [Joint Direct Attack Munition], the progress 
alongside our Navy partners is going quite well.
    I would say I don't want to say much more about that until 
we get to a classified session. You know, as we field these 
advanced fifth-generation aircraft, we're very cognizant that 
we have to have fifth-generation-level weapons to go aboard 
these aircraft, and right now our investments are quite well 
placed and the development is going very well. But I want to 
leave it at that.
    Mr. Hunter, unless you want to add anything to that.
    Mr. Hunter. No, I agree with that assessment. We have 
several critical investments in munitions in the budget request 
that we certainly request your support for and that is an area 
where funding is a significant enabler of our efforts.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll take my other 
questions offline.
    Mr. Norcross. You got it.
    Dr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for 
being here today. Can you all hear me? Okay.
    General Fick, let's start with you. The GAO recently 
reported that the F-35 TR-3 development costs are increasing 
and the program office is also tracking additional schedule 
risk. What is the program doing to ensure smooth integration of 
the TR-3?
    General Fick. Sir, thank you for your question. We're 
watching TR-3 development very, very closely. As you know, TR-3 
is not just a capability enhancement, it's also a diminishing 
manufacturing source solution.
    So it's absolutely critical that we cut it into production 
in Lot 15 this coming summer. We work very hard with L3Harris, 
the prime contractor for the integrated core processor, which 
is really the long pole in the TR-3 tent, to progress them 
through a safety of flight qualification testing, which is 
ongoing today, to move us towards a first flight in the mid- to 
late-July timeframe this summer.
    That first flight will be the leading edge of a flight test 
program that will take us all the way through the delivery of 
the first aircraft with TR-3 hardware in the summer of 2023.
    We're also able to protect the production line by procuring 
a number of TR-2 kits that we can use to move aircraft through 
the production line and then cut in TR-3 hardware at the very 
end so that we DD-250 every tail with TR-3 hardware.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Can you articulate the relationship 
between TR-3 and Block 4 capabilities? In other words, how 
dependent are Block 4 capabilities on TR-3 development and how 
will the TR-3 delays and cost increases affect the overall 
Block 4 plan?
    General Fick. Yes, sir. So think of TR-3 as the 
architecture, the computational architecture, that supports the 
software-enabled capabilities that really are the broader Block 
4 capability set. So the iPhone and the apps, if you will.
    TR-3 is actually what we call an integrated core processor. 
So it's like your CPU [central processing unit]. It's a 
aircraft memory unit, so like your RAM [random access memory], 
and it's a display unit just like your monitor.
    So it is, effectively, the computer at the heart of the F-
35. The Block 4 capabilities ride on that computational 
architecture. Interestingly, before we suffered the 
developmental delays on TR-3 the broad Block 4 effort from a 
earned value perspective, from a developmental perspective, was 
actually proceeding very well.
    But because we had to preserve, we had to work the hardware 
cut-in because that's the hardest thing to cut in to a 
production line, we prioritized that when we ran into our cost 
overruns and our budgetary reductions in fiscal year 2021.
    So that we had to delay some of that Block 4 software-based 
capabilities to get TR-3 into the aircraft. Since the 2022 
budget arrived we have restarted all of the critical elements 
of that broader Block 4 capability set and we're working to 
deliver those currently.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, and this will also be for you, 
General Fick, and Mr. Ludwigson, feel free to chime in. The GAO 
reported that F-35 production has continued to experience 
delays in 2021, largely due to the lingering effects of COVID-
19, including the disruption of the labor force and supply 
chain.
    Can you expand on these challenges and their impact on 
production and costs and do these issues show any signs of 
abating in the near future?
    General Fick. Sure. So while Lockheed did not request any 
equitable adjustment relative to the impacts or implications of 
COVID as we worked our way through calendar year 2020 or 2021, 
I will tell you that the impacts of COVID are being felt in our 
ongoing negotiations for Lot 15 through 17.
    And while I won't talk about the details of that 
negotiation, I will tell you it is being challenged by supplier 
and prime contractor posture relative to the uncertainty in the 
economic environment, uncertainty with COVID, inflation, among 
other things.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Mr. Ludwigson, you can touch on that, 
too. But I also wanted to just, while we have time left, you 
know, you come before this committee every year and your 
reports essentially say the same thing, that the F-35 program 
is experiencing more schedule delays and more cost overruns. 
What are some constructive advice that you could offer or 
suggest to us on what the F-35 program could do differently, 
going forward, to change the narrative?
    Mr. Ludwigson. Thank you very much for the question.
    On production, I would mention that in our recent reports 
we have identified that COVID was a partial culprit. But we 
have identified concerns with the production line for a couple 
of years, dating back to immaturity in the production processes 
that were in place.
    I know that they've continued to work on those things with 
the introduction of new equipment and, in some cases, new parts 
suppliers, I think, compound some of those challenges.
    I also believe that the supply chain issues that COVID 
exacerbated, of course, but there were supply chain issues with 
deliveries getting there late, not just engines, which all 
were--well, almost all were late this year, but considerable 
late to dock sort of situations with parts for the airframe. 
Those issues were there before COVID. COVID made them worse.
    With respect to what can be done, I really think when you 
think about the baseline aircraft there are a few things that 
you can do that, I think, have material and lasting effects and 
really focusing on trying to achieve the R&M metrics. Those are 
the metrics that are going to define how this aircraft is going 
to perform in the field, and that's first and foremost.
    I know the program has put money on the table with respect 
to the R&M improvement program. Those efforts may well bear 
fruit but they will take time, and I think it's worth giving 
that a little bit of time but focusing on what parts are going 
bad, what are the issues with respect to the service intervals 
for the engine or other parts. Those are important things.
    With respect to Block 4, from my perspective, I think 
you've really got to get back to the basics of good software. 
You know, write good code, write tests while you're writing 
good code, test stuff before it gets to the field, do a good 
job on estimating, and I would say lean into more frequent 
software deliveries. Don't back away from the basic principles 
of agile.
    Sorry, that was a big answer. A lot of questions.
    Mr. Norcross. Good answers.
    Mr. Gallego is recognized.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Hunter and General Nahom, thank you both for your 
testimony today.
    Could you share any details of those--details about the 
findings of A-10/F-35 flyoff and does the Air Force plan to 
release an unclassified version of the report? And if not, do 
you have any plans to brief Congress on the results in a 
classified session?
    General Nahom. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    On the flyoff, I know the report was made available. I'm 
not sure what I can share here so I want to make sure I take 
that for the record, just so I'm careful here.
    But we were pleased this year that we were able to provide 
the report because the test has been done for some amount of 
time and we're pleased that we could share the results. But if 
I could take that for the record to make sure I don't share 
anything I shouldn't in open session.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. Mr. Hunter. Secretary Hunter.
    Mr. Hunter. I concur with that assessment, sir.
    Mr. Gallego. Well, we're happy to hear that the report is 
finally out. I think we have been asking for it for quite a 
while.
    General Nahom, thank you for your responses so far. 
Regarding the F-35, I'd like to ask you about an ongoing 
program next door to my district, at Luke Air Force Base.
    On any given day, you will see American, Dutch, Danish, 
Norwegian, and Singaporean flights flying the same aircraft, 
rehearsing the same tactics, and learning to operate advanced 
technology as a unit.
    Is this the template for the future and are there 
additional opportunities to expand this integrated tactical-
level training with allies and partners?
    General Nahom. Yes, sir. I'll tell you, you know, when you 
look at some of the real--you know, we've talked about a lot of 
the challenges with the F-35 today, but there's some really 
good opportunities with so many of our allies and partners 
flying that airplane and it seems to expand every month with a 
different partner now flying the airplane.
    And when you look at the integration, especially as--one of 
the best examples of what's going on in Europe with not only 
with our aircraft now stationed there at RAF [Royal Air Force] 
Lakenheath but with all our partners flying alongside of us, 
and then now we're starting to see the opportunities in the 
Pacific as well.
    I think this--if you look at a way allies and partners 
integrate the F-35 is going to give us an incredible 
opportunity once we completely fully realize the capabilities 
of that aircraft, moving forward, sir.
    Mr. Gallego. General Wise and Rear Admiral Loiselle, in 
2021, the F-35 fleet saw two deployments at sea, the F-35Cs 
aboard the USS Carl Vinson in the South Pacific and the F-35Bs 
aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Mediterranean.
    Each ship lost one aircraft while underway, and it was 
noted the sea conditions, at least in the Pacific, were causing 
extensive corrosion to the jets' low observable [LO] coating.
    What are some lessons learned each of your services is 
gathering from these early at-sea deployments regarding the F-
35 and its usage?
    General Wise, let's start with you.
    General Wise. Congressman, I very much appreciate the 
question. The investigations, obviously, are just in their 
final stages, and from a safety perspective, we don't want to 
impede the investigative process.
    But I would say that what we have learned we don't know at 
this point that anything was aircraft malfunction related. 
That, of course, was one of our colleagues in the U.K. [United 
Kingdom] as far as the aircraft.
    But it's imperative on us to make sure that the training, 
the preparation for the operations, are done appropriately to 
ensure that we minimize that risk to the crews on board. And 
I'll defer for the other question.
    Admiral Loiselle. Yes, sir. And so same answer. The 
investigation is ongoing on the loss of the aircraft so I can't 
comment on that until it's complete.
    General Wise and I are tomorrow going down to Lockheed 
Martin. In fact, that's our next stop after we leave here is to 
the airport, and we are attending the post-cruise debrief from 
the first deployment with VFA-147, where we're going to discuss 
exactly the things that you are asking about, some of which are 
classified in nature.
    So I'm happy to take that as a lookup and get you the 
performance of corrosion in LO coatings during deployment.
    Mr. Gallego. I think it would concern us a lot after all 
this investments on these platforms, especially considering how 
we intend to use them vis-a-vis China if our biggest hindrance 
is going to end up being nature versus a Sidewinder.
    Thank you. Appreciate it.
    Mr. Norcross. Mr. Bacon, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. Appreciate all of our leaders being 
here and the great job you're doing. Sorry, I missed out. I was 
doing some interviews here. So, hopefully, I won't be 
duplicating questions.
    If I--I'd like to just say for the record up front, the 
President's budget, you know, calls for a 4 percent increase in 
defense spending and a 12 percent increase for nondefense 
spending and domestic spending. So that seems to be where the 
priorities are at.
    Inflation is at 8.5 percent. So if we stick to this budget, 
we're going to see a 4.5 percent cut to the military. And I 
think because of that we have been able to still maybe procure 
or have an acquisition program for our nuclear triad. But we're 
going to have to cut the Air Force to do so. We're going to 
have to cut the Navy.
    So I don't like where we're going, especially after Ukraine 
and a rising China. So it's my hope that we can get the budget 
to the right spot so that we don't have to cut the Air Force, 
Navy, Marines, and the Army for--and while still doing the 
nuclear triad recapitalization.
    So I wanted to say that up front. I want to thank Mr. 
Hunter and General Nahom for working with me on the EC-37. We 
have a commitment to try to get to 10 aircraft, maybe not in 
the timing that we would like.
    I'm grateful that you put four of them on the unfunded 
requirements list. So we will do that, and I would like to say 
for the committee I hope we get one or two funded through the 
unfunded because you can't operate a combat unit with six 
aircraft and also do the training required.
    And so that would maybe take me to take my first question. 
General Nahom, you've worked with small fleets in the past. 
Could you explain to us the impact if you only have, like, a 
six-aircraft weapon system and how you would use it in war 
trying to sustain your training?
    General Nahom. First of all, I'm having trouble with the 
button here.
    Yeah, small fleet dynamics are very difficult, sir, and you 
and I have talked about this before and you and I--you in your 
career and me in my career have experienced this.
    When you only have a couple airplanes and a couple of them 
are broken it's very challenging. And it's also, like you said, 
challenging when you do deploy to operations to have some fleet 
left at home to absorb new aircrew and new maintenance crew as 
they come into the unit.
    So we're going to watch the EC-7 very closely--EC-37 very 
closely. Six--the reason the Chief did put those on the UPL 
[unfunded priority list] is because we would like to get to 10 
because we understand that 6 is not enough to ensure we have 
that deployable capability and a healthy environment for the 
crews and the maintainers, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Well, that's why I hope that this committee will 
band together and try to make that happen.
    For Mr. Hunter, could you explain a little bit, too, if you 
have a 2-year gap in trying to modify EC-37 aircraft from a 
Lear jet, how difficult is it to maintain that expertise when 
you decide to finish those four? In other words, I think it's 
important to try to put this through incrementally. Otherwise, 
you're going to lose this expertise. But I'd love to have your 
thoughts on that.
    Mr. Hunter. You're correct, sir. There are industrial base 
implications of our production profile. So, currently, the 
aircraft that were previously funded by the Congress, for which 
we thank you for providing those resources, those are going 
through that rehosting process of bringing the equipment over 
from the prior aircraft onto the current aircraft.
    And so they are continuing that work, notwithstanding that 
there was not an aircraft procured formally last year and in 
2023, but the point will come where they will finish the work 
that they have doing and if we are to procure additional 
aircraft they would need to induct the next set.
    I did want to highlight one of the items on the unfunded 
list was engines. In the case of the engines, the production 
line there is also winding down.
    On that one in particular, if the Congress were so moved as 
to provide something off the unfunded list the engines would be 
particularly significant from being able to get those engines 
in before the production line finishes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. A followup question for General Nahom 
on pilot training.
    I understand that you'd like to divest some of the T-1A 
fleet. That could impact some of the heavy and mobility pilot 
training. Will this move some of the training onto the 
squadrons when they do basic training or MQ or is that not an 
issue?
    General Nahom. We don't believe it's an issue, sir. I think 
what you're looking at is in pilot training 2.5, as we train 
our mobility crews, in the future what we would like to do is 
use the T-6 where a pilot--a young pilot would show up and do 6 
months of T-6, and then instead of going to a T-1 at that 
business jet training they go to an enhanced simulator program 
for a few months, and then from that point go on to their major 
weapon system.
    So it actually trains a pilot in a shorter period of time 
and we believe we're going to--you're going to see that we can 
train the pilots as well without needing that business jet 
fleet, moving forward. So it will not change that at all, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. And one last question in my short 
time left, when do you think we'll have our first operational 
NGAD fighter? What timeline are we looking at?
    General Nahom. Sir, and I don't want to jump in front of 
Mr. Hunter here, but I think we--I really want to get you 
offline because many of the dates and the specifics of the NGAD 
family of systems program are classified for all the right 
reasons, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross. And I'm sorry, he's out of time.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Kahele, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and mahalo.
    To all of our witnesses, aloha for being here today.
    Earlier today the full committee heard from the Air Force 
Secretary and the Chief of Staff and their intent to transition 
to a four-plus-one fighter fleet, which includes NGAD, F-35, F-
15EX, F-15 or it's--F-16 or its successor, plus the A-10.
    It's my understanding that the Air Force plans on divesting 
21 A-10s from Fort Wayne's Air National Guard Base, Indiana, 
and replace this capability with 21 post-Block F-16s from a 
location still to be determined.
    First question for Assistant Secretary Hunter--has the Air 
Force identified the location of these F-16s, where they'll be 
coming from and when are these 21 A-10s expected to be 
divested?
    Mr. Hunter. Sir, I'm going to defer to General Nahom on the 
shift in the basing of the aircraft. That's more in his line.
    General Nahom. Sir. And it is planned on being--first of 
all, it's planned on being an fiscal year 2023 move. So that's 
actually in the beginning of the FYDP, and we think it's 
actually a good-news story.
    You know, the Indiana Guard at Fort Wayne, they're excited 
about the move. They're ready to go. The, specifically, 
aircraft tails, let me just take that for the record and make 
sure I get you the correct answer on that. But those are post-
Block F-16s that will be coming into the Indiana Guard.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. Well, let's jump over to Hawaii then. 
General Nahom, you know Hawaii is a unique and strategically 
important location and its F-22 Raptors not only provide 
homeland defense for the Hawaiian Islands but also the ability 
to project fifth-generation combat airpower throughout the 
Indo-Pacific.
    There have been discussions about new Air Force aircraft 
for Hawaii, including NGAD, EX, and F-35s, and in addition, 
what and where those combat Air Force structures would look 
like throughout INDOPACOM.
    So my questions are or my question is, are there any plans, 
General Nahom, to divest any combat aircraft in Hawaii and 
replace them with a different platform that the committee is 
not aware of?
    General Nahom. Sir, right now, as you look in the near 
future with Hawaii with the F-22s, we see F-22s there for a 
while and, actually, frankly, we see F-22s in the Air Force for 
a while, probably the next decade or so, as we continue to 
develop the Next Generation Air Dominance systems.
    What follows on in Hawaii is yet to be determined for the 
F-22 and I think that that's actually okay. There's, obviously, 
commitment to Hawaii. We're always going to have fighter 
aircraft on the islands for all the right reasons--its location 
in the Indo-Pacific, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.
    What follows the F-22 will be a question because when--as 
we develop the Next Generation Air Dominance family of 
systems--and, again, without getting into specifics--where 
those are postured is still an open question as well.
    And so right now, we're much more worried about the posture 
inside of the FYDP and just outside the FYDP--let's say, in the 
next 10 years, with the weapon systems that are going to expire 
between now and then--your A-10s, your pre-Block F-16s, your F-
15Cs, and some of those older systems. That's more of the 
concern right now.
    Right now, with Hawaii with the F-22 we know that's going 
to be flying for a number of years and we will replace it. We 
just don't know with what yet.
    Mr. Kahele. So do you think--is it fair to say that the F-
22 would remain in Hawaii at least for the next decade?
    General Nahom. Sir, without getting into the details of the 
dates because of the nature of the Next Generation Air 
Dominance system, I'd like to take that for the record for a 
classified conversation.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. Thank you.
    A question for Mr. Ludwigson. It feels like every year, and 
you've heard the chair and many other members talk about the F-
35 program, but every year, the GAO office reports the same 
thing--more schedule delays, cost overruns.
    For example, out of 150 F135 engine deliveries only 22 were 
delivered on time. In 2020, 159 engines were delivered but only 
44 of them were delivered on time. Last year alone, out of 152 
engines delivered only 6 were delivered on time.
    I'm worried that this trend will continue for the life of 
the program. So what could be done in the F-35 program to do 
something differently, going forward, to change that narrative.
    And I know you maybe have already discussed it previously 
and I'm sorry that I wasn't here to hear your response.
    Mr. Ludwigson. No, I appreciate the opportunity to answer 
the question. I wish it was more upbeat this year than last. 
But I do think that my answer that I provided previously, that 
one of the things that, I think, on the baseline program you 
can focus on is the reliability and maintainability efforts, 
make sure that the aircraft is going to be funded to meet those 
needs because in the long term that's one of the things that 
matters.
    I'd mention that we have a recommendation that if the--that 
the program office should take a look at the R&M metrics and 
figure out whether or not some of them are unachievable and 
make changes to them if that's needed and appropriate, but do 
that in a public way to say this is somehow the way we can look 
at it now and have a conversation with this committee and 
others in Congress about that and what it means for 
sustainability costs and those issues which are critically 
important as you look down range, given challenges with 
sustaining this aircraft in the field.
    But from my standpoint, on the Block 4, I'll say again that 
getting back to basics of writing good code and building test 
scripts, using automated testing to get that out, making sure 
that you're not fielding flawed code, and doing estimates of 
work that makes it likely that you're going to be able to 
complete the work in a timeframe that's allowed, I think is 
critically important to making Block 4 get on the right footing 
rather than repeating what we have seen with the baseline 
program for the past 20-plus years.
    Mr. Kahele. Alright. Thank you. Mahalo, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    Dr. Jackson, you're now recognized.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 
Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
    This morning at the Air Force posture hearing, my question 
focused on the new T-7 advanced trainer that's being fielded to 
train future Air Force fighter pilots and replace the legacy T-
38.
    General Nahom, when a young fighter pilot is training, how 
large a gap is there between the current T-38 and the fifth-
generation aircraft and how will the T-7 help bridge that gap 
when a new fighter pilot is training?
    And, additionally, Mr. Hunter, I would like to ask you, if 
additional funds were to be provided by Congress over the 
President's budget request, would we be able to begin procuring 
the T-7 sooner and faster?
    General Nahom. On your first part of your question, I'll 
start. We can't get the T-7 fast enough. There is a huge gap. 
You know, the T-38 is--you know, if you if you look at the tail 
on most T38s it'll have a 60 on there--60 something on there 
when it was produced.
    We have got to get these aircrew training in a much more 
modern aircraft that will help bridge them into these fifth-
generation aircraft that they're moving into. So the answer is 
we do need the T-7 as quickly as possible.
    Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir, I agree, and that's why I brought it 
up because I'm going to be pushing hard to make sure that we 
get them as fast as we possibly can and, in particular, I want 
to get them to Sheppard Air Force Base as fast as we possibly 
can as well because I know there's a plan to push them out in a 
certain order.
    Mr. Hunter. Sir, and on the procurement of the aircraft, we 
are just about to take delivery of the test aircraft--the EMD 
[engineering and manufacturing development] aircraft--to allow 
us to begin doing flight tests.
    So I would say it would be premature to accelerate 
procurement of the production aircraft in fiscal year 2023. I 
can get back to you on the record on whether there might be any 
long lead items that could be useful.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Hunter. But right now, my assessment would be 
accelerating production to 2023 would be a challenge. But there 
may be--I want to keep a close eye on the test program and see 
what we learn from that and there may be issues that arise 
there that we could address.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
    Shifting gears just a little bit, the Navy's first fleet 
logistics multi-mission squadron recently completed its first 
operational deployment on the USS Carl Vinson. The maiden 
deployment was a success with a very impressive 98 percent 
mission completion rate and a mission capable rate of 75 
percent.
    A big part of this, I believe, was the success of the CMV-
22 [tilt-rotor aircraft]. The Navy's program of record for the 
CMV-22 is 48 aircraft, yet funding has only been provided for 
44 aircraft. Despite being included in last year's unfunded 
priorities list, the final four aircraft have yet to be funded.
    Admiral Loiselle, have you been pleased with the capability 
of the--that the platform brings to the carrier air wing and do 
you envision the mission set for the CMV-22 potentially 
increasing in the future?
    Admiral Loiselle. Sir, thank you for that question. So as 
you know, we designed that as a three-ship system in order to 
account for some of the longer phase inspections associated 
with tilt-rotor aircraft. So a 30-day phase as opposed to more 
of an 8-day phase.
    And so given that you've quoted the correct statistics for 
first deployment, our second deployment is ongoing now. We're 
learning a lot of lessons. So I agree that the program numbers 
in our program of record as purchased are there.
    We had them on the UPL last year in 2022. Did not get them, 
and so we didn't want to ask the same question twice and so 
that's why we didn't put it on for this year.
    And then due to reduction in F-35 numbers, specifically in 
2023, that's where the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] put the 
priority for the UPL this year with a request for six. But we 
are pleased with what we have done.
    We're looking at specifically the cargo-loading mechanisms 
that we use and whether or not we can make those more 
efficient. But we'll be looking forward to the lessons learned 
out of that deployment soon as well.
    Dr. Jackson. Well, I'm sure, as you may know, Bell 
Helicopter is in my district so I'm interested in helping you 
get the aircraft that you need as quickly as possible.
    My last question--I've seen plans stating that the Marine 
Corps expects to operate the V-22 [tilt-rotor aircraft] well 
beyond 2050, and I'm not aware of a plan to develop its 
replacement at this point.
    General Wise, I am pleased to see that the Marine Corps 
recognizes the need to begin the nacelle improvement project on 
the MV-22s beginning in fiscal year 2023. Air Force is already 
doing that now. I think this is something they need to do as 
well.
    We here on the committee know that we need to get that 
funded or we'll experience a very costly break in the 
production line in the next few years.
    General Wise, could you speak to the importance of 
maintaining the readiness of the MV-22 fleet, and in what ways 
could you see the MV-22 mission potentially expanding in the 
future?
    General Wise. Congressman, thank you for the question and 
it's a very good one. Of course, the MV-22 for us has been a 
game changer, really. I know that can be an overused phrase.
    But when you start to look at battlefield tempo and what it 
can achieve, none of our adversaries can come close. So 
readiness of that platform is essential for us and, really, one 
of the reasons, especially as we look at the Indo-Pacific, the 
best kind of sustainment you have to do is the kind you don't 
have to do, right--the tail you don't have to bring out there.
    So in answer to your question, we're very committed to 
nacelle improvement and being right on the tail of our Air 
Force brothers and sisters as they go through and finish their 
CV-22s. So we're very committed to that.
    We have also got other programs in order to increase 
readiness and make sure that platform is viable well into the 
future.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I think my time is up. It's 
good to hear, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross. You got it. And the bell just rang. So Mrs. 
Hartzler or myself are going to try to get in a quick question.
    And, Mr. Hunter, let's have a question here, and I'm not 
trying to put people on the spot. I'm trying to better 
understand what's changed and why are we doing it.
    So the F-15EX we talked about. It was original goal was 
144. So it was fifth generation. We all heard that was the only 
thing we were going to buy and then the EX came into it for 
reasons that were later explained.
    And we're in agreement. We need 144, because not only for 
its capabilities working with the F-35, it was also about 
replacing, to some degree, the F-15C and E models.
    Now, what new requirements have changed that we're going to 
pretty much cut in half those EXes?
    Mr. Hunter. Yeah. There's sort of two parts to the F-15EX 
story, sir. The one that is of greatest focus for me is the 
actual increase in the production rate, which we are executing 
with the fiscal year 2023 budget, doubling it from 12 to 24.
    So from my seat, in the near term we're ramping up 
production and we're doing that to meet the fact that with the 
aircraft that the F-15EX is replacing in the near term, as 
General Nahom articulated earlier--and I'll give him a chance 
to speak to it again--those aircraft, you know, very much need 
to be replaced and they're just--both from a threat perspective 
and just a sustainability and--perspective that we need to do 
that.
    And so in the near term, we have accelerated F-15EX to do 
that. Over the longer term, you know, the challenge of the FYDP 
is, is all of the different priorities that we're trying to 
address, and I'll let General Nahom speak to that.
    General Nahom. On the EX, there is a fleet size of the F-15 
platform we need to keep in the Air Force. The F-15 platform 
offers us the ability to carry some outsized weapons, do some 
point defense, sensor package on it. It does offer some things 
that the F-35 doesn't offer. We can talk more about that 
offline.
    Mr. Norcross. We're on board with that.
    General Nahom. Yeah. The size of the fleet, though, what 
we're looking at--again, this is probably a conversation for 
offline, too--we're not changing that, roughly. We're going to 
keep about the same size fleet.
    Right now, based on resources and based on tradeoffs we're 
making, we're going to have to keep more F-15Es than we 
initially would have thought we would have kept. We're going to 
have to have a certain size F-15 fleet. In a resource 
unconstrained world those would all be EXes with a lot newer 
airplanes, better sustainability, more time on them, et cetera.
    Right now as we look at the budgets, moving forward, we're 
likely to keep more of the F-15Es to be part of that F-15 
fleet.
    Mr. Norcross. That explains it, certainly. If you're told 
you're going to have a great 2 years but your life ends, it's 
still a tough thing to swallow.
    Mrs. Hartzler, you are on board.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
    F-18. So under your tactical aircraft procurement plan, 
after 2025 the Navy will have just one manufacturer of tactical 
aviation aircraft for a number of years until NGAD reaches IOC. 
If the United States is drawn into a conflict with China in the 
2027-28 timeframe, what will the inventory look like then? And 
Admiral Loiselle. Sorry.
    Admiral Loiselle. Yes, ma'am. So we are at a total fleet 
right now. When I talk about Super Hornets, I divide them into 
Block Is and Block IIs with Block IIIs coming off the line as 
new production now through the first quarter of 2026, based on 
the 12 additional that we got last year.
    And so right now our SLM plan is our rheostat that we're 
using to control availability in the out-years, depending on 
schedules and future budgets that are unknowns at this point in 
time.
    So, right now, I do not plan to do SLM on the entirety of 
my Block II force and I do not plan to do it on my Block I 
force. And so if there are changes in the future that require 
additional capabilities, i.e., more Block III aircraft, then I 
have the ability to dial up that rheostat on SLM and it'd be 
able to do that for a longer period of time and to, 
potentially, use the FRCs [Fleet Readiness Centers] to increase 
capacity for SLM beyond the currently planned 35 per year.
    If necessary, we can also go further in. We have done an 
experiment with one Block I--actually, two Block I aircraft in 
our initial 7,500-hour SLM and, based on the results of that, 
decided not to go on at this point in time with Block I SLM 
unless there's some requirement in the future to do so.
    Mrs. Hartzler. So what will the inventory look like? Did I 
get the answer? I heard a lot about SLM and this or that. Can 
you give me a number.
    Admiral Loiselle. No, I can't, ma'am. So I can give you the 
strike fighter shortfall numbers per year. And so----
    Mrs. Hartzler. How many short will we be in----
    [Simultaneous speaking]
    Admiral Loiselle. In 25 last year--as quoted by the 
chairman, we were at zero and 25 last year. This year we're at 
13. We redo those numbers every month, and in the calculation 
of those numbers we have alloted a turnaround time for an SLM 
jet of 15 months. Despite Boeing saying they can do it in 12, 
we just added a conservative factor to that.
    No, our fixed numbers of F-18s will not change in the 
future, going forward. What will change is the number of 
aircraft that we do SLM on, which will give each of those 
remaining aircraft an additional 4,000 hours and about 13 years 
of service life.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Great. Yeah. Last year, you shared 
that the Navy can only resolve its strike fighter shortfall by 
repurposing a number of F/A-18s currently assigned to Navy 
Reserve adversary air aggressor squadrons.
    And so it follows that these squadrons will no longer be 
deployable to meet warfighting contingency requirement and 
that's concerning.
    So, additionally, those F/A-18s will now be backfilled with 
less capable aircraft such as F-5, pre-Block F-16s. Do you have 
any concerns about whether this strategy will enable our pilots 
to meet future training requirements?
    Admiral Loiselle. Well, ma'am, we actually utilize our 
Reserves to conduct those training requirements and so those F-
5s and those pre-Block F-16s are what conduct a large portion 
of our adversary requirements for our training. And so our FRS 
[Fleet Replacement Squadron] students don't require a high-end 
adversary in their initial thing. So that's why we have them 
utilizing F-5s as the lowest cost solution for that.
    With your--with regard to the Reserve question, our 
predominant response should Reserves be required are to take 
one--a squadron or an aircraft from an off-cycle air wing that 
is outside of their sustainment window and utilize those 
aircraft as necessary to support frontline air wings; they all 
go through their maintenance cycle.
    Mrs. Hartzler. So if they're using F-5s and F-16s now, does 
that really represent a near-peer threat-based scenarios?
    Admiral Loiselle. We are using the entirety of our systems 
to include live, virtual, and constructive to get through all 
of that.
    So another thing that we are using with our adversary force 
is a program called Red Net that allows them to simulate 
advanced adversary capabilities. But you are correct.
    There are only so many things that are going to go at the 
speed of a top line foreign fighter, and so for the speed 
aspect we use the F-16. But trying to get something that does 
that signature in a live environment is not affordable and so 
we rely on virtual, constructive to do that.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. I have some additional questions. 
Maybe I can submit it for the record.
    Mr. Norcross. Absolutely.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross. We are pushing down 7 minutes and 36 seconds 
to get there.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. Yes.
    Mr. Norcross. First of all, I'd like to thank everybody for 
coming today. We understand things change. But as Mrs. Hartzler 
said, you know, you had a year, and to get surprised on so many 
things--we want to be with you. These are great platforms. We 
understand there's always a budget issue. But it's risk and we 
have to do our job as oversight.
    So we appreciate your time and, certainly, there's a number 
of followups for both Vicky and myself that we are looking 
forward to getting with you.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 27, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 27, 2022

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                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 27, 2022

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 27, 2022

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            RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

    General Adams. There were several internal Service and Joint Staff 
Tactical Aircraft analytical efforts conducted in 2021-2022, 
specifically, by the US Navy, by the US Air Force, and one by the Joint 
Staff J-8. These efforts informed DOD Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation's (CAPE) review of TACAIR Modernization plans and USN and 
USAF Next Generation Air Dominance efforts, which was directed in the 
FY21 NDAA. These directed studies were submitted to Congress per the 
NDAA guidance.   [See page 19.]


      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 27, 2022

=======================================================================

      

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

    Mrs. Hartzler. With regard to the F-15EX fleet, in FY22, the Air 
Force informed this committee that 144 aircraft was the minimum 
required aircraft within the F-15EX fleet. We have also heard a strong 
pull from combatant commanders in INDOPACOM and EUCOM to have the F-
15EX based in their theaters. But now in FY23, the Air Force plans to 
cut the planned F-15EX fleet size from 144 aircraft to only 80 total 
aircraft.
    Can you help this committee to better understand the rationale 
behind this decreased fleet size from 144 total aircraft to only 80 
aircraft? Specifically, what operational requirement has changed to 
lessen the requirement so significantly? How will a smaller fleet of F-
15EX aircraft affect the Air Force's ability to support the combatant 
command's operational and tactical requirements?
    How will the reduced procurement number affect the unit cost per 
aircraft moving forward? What impact will the unexpected decision to 
buy less on an accelerated timeline have on the current production line 
and industrial supply chain?
    Mr. Hunter. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mrs. Hartzler. The committee understands that the T-7 program has 
delayed its Low-Rate Initial Production Decision by 18 months because 
the program has run into flight control software development challenges 
and is also struggling to establish the global supply chain for 
critical parts. Can you describe the challenges the program currently 
has and what cost growth you might expect from the program going 
forward with these new challenges? How does the Air Force plan to 
mitigate these challenges? Do plans remain on track for delivery of the 
first EMD aircraft in FY23?
    Mr. Hunter. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mrs. Hartzler. In its 2019 Justification and Approval for the 
program, the Air Force stated that replacing the existing F-15 
inventory with anything other than the F-15EX would be ``cost-
prohibitive.'' According to the Air Force, converting these units from 
legacy F-15s to F-15EX rather than F-35s offered not only the necessary 
complementary mix of capabilities, but also saves billions in 
transition costs and dramatically reduces disruption to ``the mission 
ready status of current F-15 units.'' If the Air Force now plans to buy 
only 80 F-15EXs, it seems safe to assume that some of the current F-15C 
units are not going to have flying missions in the future. Is that an 
accurate assumption?
    What is the rationale behind the Air Force's additional FYDP 
proposal to divest all F-15E aircraft that are powered by the Pratt & 
Whitney -220 engine, which currently totals 105 aircraft. How will that 
further impact the future mission of current F-15C units?
    General Nahom. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mrs. Hartzler. In the FY22 budget cycle when the Air Force 
presented it's A-10 divestment request and ATTACK Wing Replacement 
Program plans, the story was that the Air Force planned to keep a fleet 
of 218 A-10 aircraft within its tactical aircraft inventory through the 
mid- to late-2030 timeframe.
    But now, the Air Force plan has changed to one of full A-10 fleet 
divestment by 2028. What has caused this abrupt change?
    What will this new divestment plan mean for the missions of the 
current A-10 squadrons?
    General Nahom. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
    Mr. Brown. We have heard that one of the limitations of the F-35 
today is the number of weapons that it can carry internal and external 
on the aircraft. What is the USAF doing concerning integration of 
advanced weapons on the platform, and what can Congress do to help in 
this regard?
    General Nahom. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. Secretary Hunter, I'm concerned that this budget does 
not accelerate procurement of long-range standoff weapons that will be 
critical in a future high-end fight. While the Air Force has proposed 
procurement of 550 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles, they only 
requested 28 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles
    Given the rapid consumption of smaller precision munitions that 
we've seen in our Ukraine, and the importance of these long-range 
standoff weapons in a high-end fight, are you confident that these 
procurement levels will meet the needs of the Air Force in a near-term 
conflict? Is there an issue with production line capacity or are low 
``L-RASM'' procurement levels due to fiscal constraints?
    Mr. Hunter. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Horsford. I understand the Navy has begun fielding of the Joint 
Precision Approach and Landing System, intended to improve the safety 
and efficiency of carrier landings. Can you speak to the importance of 
this system in improving safety for carrier landings? What percentage 
of carrier air wings have received this system and when do you 
anticipate fielding will be complete?
    Admiral Loiselle. The AN/USN-3 Joint Precision Approach and Landing 
System (JPALS) achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) May 4, 
2021 and is being installed aboard Aircraft Carriers (CVNs) and 
Amphibious Assault ships (LHD/LHAs).
    Currently, there are six (6) JPALS units installed onboard CVN 
ships (54.5%) and five (5) JPALS units installed onboard Amphibious 
Assault ships (45.5%). Full Operational Capability (FOC) for shipboard 
installed systems is FY25.
    JPALS provides precision guidance in support of coupled flight to 
200 feet Height Above Touchdown (HAT) for the F-35B to LHD/LHA type 
ships and precision guidance in support of auto-land for the F-35C, MQ-
25A, CMV-22 and future platforms to CVNs. JPALS meets or exceeds 
capability requirements to support Precision Approach and Landing 
Capability (PALC) of all JPALS-capable aircraft during operations at 
sea in virtually any weather condition (within aircraft limitations). 
Additionally, JPALS is required for future MQ-25A CVN Operations.
    The feedback from the first CVN JPALS deployment on the USS Carl 
Vinson was resoundingly positive. Over the course of deployment, 450 
JPALS approaches were attempted by F-35C aircraft with a 99.6% boarding 
rate. Additionally, USS Abraham Lincoln recently completed an overseas 
deployment executing 599 JPALS Approaches with a 99.5% boarding rate. 
The enhanced all weather capability has improved carrier landing safety 
and efficiency while the redundant system design has led to a 99% 
operational availability.
    Mr. Horsford. It's my understanding that initial production F-35s 
have some unique differences given how early in the program they were 
fielded, to include differences between individual aircraft as opposed 
to lots. Can you describe some of the unique characteristics of the 
earliest F-35As and any maintenance challenges associated with these 
specific aircraft?
    General Fick. Most legacy aircraft are configuration controlled at 
the block/lot level with each aircraft in that block/lot identical in 
design. However, the F-35 has each aircraft individually configuration 
controlled, which allows design break in production changes anywhere in 
a block/lot. This has the advantage of allowing for faster break in of 
improved parts, allows for use of previous parts until exhaustion, and 
does not require design changes to wait for a break in at the start of 
a new block/lot. As with any new production design, changes are desired 
and required, both to correct deficiencies and to reduce production 
costs as the design matures during production and fielding. Early Low-
Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft are naturally less mature, have 
more unknown deficiencies, and require additional maintenance and 
modification support until the aircraft receive modifications to 
correct or remove those deficiencies.
    From a maintenance perspective, the earliest F-35A aircraft 
required additional flightline inspections and unscheduled maintenance 
tasks. Examples include: 1) earlier aircraft experience accelerated 
wear and seam interference damage with the original tape/seam designs 
leading to more inspections and higher repair time; 2) hoist point 
corrosion and Outer Mold Line (OML) corrosion seen on earlier LRIP due 
to water pooling and coating issues; 3) landing gear hydraulic control 
valves on earlier LRIP aircraft life limitations due to internal design 
flaws, requiring unscheduled maintenance for failures or scheduled 
downtime to implement the modification to the newer valve design.
    Mr. Horsford. The FY23 budget indicates that the Air Force 
currently plans to modify production lots 8 through 16 of the F-35A 
fleet and that it would cost the Air Force roughly $16 million per 
aircraft to upgrade a Lot 2 through 8 aircraft to the Block 4 
configuration. I understand the importance of the Technical Refresh 3 
and Block 4 modifications, and that these aircraft will represent a 
significantly improved capability over initial production aircraft.
    Can you describe the capability differences of a Block 4 F-35A and 
an initial production F-35A from lots 7 or earlier? In what ways are 
Block 4 F-35As uniquely superior to initial production F-35As?
    General Fick. The F-35's Block 4 capabilities, as defined in the F-
35 Block 4 Capability Development Document (CDD) and supplemental 
program directives, are being delivered via an incremental approach 
known as Continuous Capability Development and Delivery (C2D2). Using 
this approach, individual capabilities are delivered incrementally when 
the required hardware and software modifications are complete, rather 
than all at once at the end of an extended development program 
associated with a more traditional ``big bang'' approach. The fielded 
F-35 fleet has benefitted from is process since 2018, when the first 
C2D2-based software load was delivered in a software release identified 
as 30P00. Lot 7 F-35A--and prior--aircraft have benefitted from this 
approach and have already been upgraded with the Block 4 capabilities 
that have been completed to date. These early production lot aircraft 
will continue to be upgraded with Block 4 capabilities to the extent 
their legacy avionics architecture and hardware supports the 
capabilities, or as long as the US Services are able to fund the 
required hardware retrofits. The current avionics architecture, known 
as Technology Refresh 2 (TR2), is the limiting factor for future Block 
4 capability insertion; as such, the last planned TR2 software load 
with new capabilities is 30P08, which will be delivered to the fielded 
fleet in Oct 2023. At this point, the majority of the remaining Block 4 
capabilities will require the Technical Refresh 3 (TR3) hardware suite. 
This upgrade will establish the architecture--specifically the 
computational power, memory, and throughput--to support increased data 
processing required achieve the performance associated with future 
sensor and communications hardware upgrades.
    The tables below contain the full list of approved F-35 Block 4 
capabilities. Green indicates already delivered capabilities and yellow 
indicates capabilities that will be delivered for TR2 aircraft by 2024. 
The remaining capabilities in white will only be available on aircraft 
with TR3 hardware. An acronym list is provided below the table for 
reference as needed.
    [The tables referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 147.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. Your testimony before this committee states a Cost Per 
Tail Per Year (CPTPY) of $6.3M for an F-35A at the end of 2023. I 
understand from JPO documents that you project a $7.7M CPTPY in 2033 
when the program reaches steady state. What is causing the JPO to 
project a $1.4M increase in CPTPY when over 800 new aircraft will be 
added to the fleet over the next 10 years? As you know, the air vehicle 
portion of F-35 O&S costs has been coming down and you testified that 
it is continuing to decrease in the FY21-23 contract. Please provide a 
detailed explanation for the increase in O&S costs over the next ten 
years, a period when these costs should be naturally declining due to 
the scaling of the fleet.
    General Fick.
      The JPO team remains laser-focused on Enterprise 
affordability, and the PEO remains committed to cost reduction across 
the acquisition lifecycle.
      The JPO's 2021 Annual Cost Estimate (ACE) shows $6.6M 
Cost Per Tail Per Year (CPTPY) for USAF F-35A in FY23 in Constant Year 
2012$ (CY12$). The program now predicts a range of $6.1M to $6.6M CPTPY 
in FY23 (CY12$), informed by outcomes for air vehicle, propulsion, JPO, 
and Services initiatives post the finalization of the 2021 ACE.
      The USAF defines their Steady State (SS) period as 
occurring in FY36-41 for F-35A. The USMC defines SS as FY33-37 for F-
35B and F-35C. USN defines SS as FY36-43 for F-35C.
      For the USAF F-35A, the ACE estimates a CPTPY of $7.0M in 
FY33 and $7.5M across the USAF SS period of FY36-41. Based on the 
latest data noted above, the program now predicts a range of $6.5M to 
$7.0M in FY33 and $7.0M to $7.5M across SS FY36-41.
      Maintaining CPTPY within the Services' targets for the 
NDAA Sec 141 in FY27 and their SS affordability constraints get 
pressurized by inclusion of sustainment related air vehicle 
modifications and engine overhauls and due to projections for labor and 
material outpacing inflation in future years. These pressures drive 
CPTPY increases as the program enters the SS phase.
      Alongside these pressures, the JPO tracks opportunities 
that may help drive down costs and offset the cost pressures noted 
above. These opportunities include organic repair/support, air vehicle 
repair cost improvements, air vehicle reliability improvements, and 
propulsion improvements as repair capabilities come online, life limits 
expansion occurs, and MVRs complete, allowing overhaul cost reductions. 
The program's ability to take advantage of opportunities like these 
depend on Services' investments in sustainment infrastructure. The ACE 
can reflect these opportunities as the program obtains more data around 
their definition and impacts.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. Why is the Navy investing in the TCTS II Program of 
Record without a requirement for blended live, virtual and constructive 
training, particularly given that the Air Force and Navy already 
developed the Secure LVC Air Training Environment (SLATE) advanced 
technology program that provides LVC capability?
    Admiral Loiselle. The Navy's requirement for a tactical combat 
training system includes blended live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) 
training capability in addition to baseline encrypted air combat 
maneuvering instrumentation (ACMI). Several key components to that 
requirement include:
      NSA Type 1 encryption
      Multi-Level security
      Tethered and untethered operations
      Multi-platform interfaces
      LVC supportable data link
      Weapon simulations
      Enhanced constructive threat environment
      Open system architecture to support future competitive 
upgradability
    The TCTS II contract was awarded in 2017 following a full and open 
competition. TCTS II is the joint selected program of record (PoR) for 
the USN, USMC, and USAF, enabling interoperability across the Services' 
training and test ranges. TCTS II Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 
Q1FY23, will meet these requirements through National Security Agency 
(NSA) Type 1 encryption, 4-channel multilevel security, an LVC capable 
waveform, real-time kill notification, weapons simulation, and 
constructive threat scenario generation. The Navy has validated the 
TCTS II program baseline to meet the above requirements.
    Dr. Jackson. What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to 
competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation 
training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to 
coalition partners? Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been 
conducted to verify TCTS II Baseline estimates to deliver SITL LVC 
capability?
    Admiral Loiselle. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has 
identified Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training as a critical 
warfighting enabler. Naval aviation is supporting the CNO's LVC NAVPLAN 
Implementation Framework through multiple efforts, to include Naval 
Aviation Distributed Mission Training, the Integrated Training Facility 
(ITF), Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE), and training range 
investments.
    A key portion of the Navy's broader LVC environment includes the 
Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II). The TCTS II 
contract awarded in 2017 following a full and open competition. TCTS II 
is the joint selected program of record (PoR) for the USN, USMC, and 
USAF, enabling interoperability across the Services' training and test 
ranges. TCTS II provides critical LVC technologies, such as a National 
Security Agency (NSA) Type 1 encryptor, 4-channel multilevel security, 
an LVC capable waveform, and initial Synthetic Inject to Live (SITL) 
capabilities, and will achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 
2022.
    Independent government estimates were conducted in support of TCTS 
II Initial Operational Capability (IOC) capabilities at Milestone C in 
2020. TCTS II's open systems architecture enables affordable 
incorporation of additional LVC capabilities. Government estimates on 
additional LVC and SITL technologies developed by the joint test 
community and advanced technology demonstrations were completed to 
support Navy budget plans.
    The TCTS II program will incorporate additional LVC and SITL 
technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced 
technology demonstrations, with projected fielding updates to TCTS II 
systems in FY25. The program office has received interest from 
coalition partners and is diligently working with Navy Security 
Programs Office and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisitions and Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)) Office of International 
Cooperation on exportability requirements for TCTS II.
    Dr. Jackson. When will the TCTS II program receive its NSA 
accreditation for its encrypter and Cross Domain solution? Does TCTS II 
have the capability to connect live aircraft to fleet simulators or the 
Next Generation Threat System?
    Admiral Loiselle. The NSA certified the KOV-74 encryptor used by 
TCTS II in 2014. The program is updating the KOV-74 to the KOV-74A to 
allow Over-the-Network Keying capability, and updated NSA certification 
is on track to complete July 2022. Cross Domain Solution (CDS) 
certification will be issued in July 2022 after completion of the Site 
Based Security Assessment. The Navy Cross Domain Solution Office is the 
CDS certification agency.
    TCTS II utilizes the Next Generation Threat System (NGTS) and can 
connect live aircraft to fleet simulators. Last year TCTS II, 
demonstrated its capability to connect to the Navy Continuous Training 
Environment (NCTE), the USS Bainbridge (in training mode), and the 
Joint Semi Automated Forces (JSAF) system. In 2022, TCTS II 
demonstrated ability to connect to an E-2D fleet simulator, an F/A-18 
fleet simulator, an F-35 effects-based simulator, the Link Inject to 
Live (LITL) system including NGTS, and Naval Aviation Distributed 
Training Center (NADTC) Atlantic.

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