[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-30]

                    SHIP AND SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE:

            SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR A CHANGING FLEET

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 6, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




                             ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
48-495               WASHINGTON : 2022 
 

                                     
  


                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

                  JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JACKIE SPEIER, California            JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JASON CROW, Colorado                 AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan, Vice       JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    Chair                            MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington

               Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
                 Ian Bennitt, Professional Staff Member
                           Sean Falvey, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Readiness......................................     1
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, 
  Subcommittee on Readiness......................................     3

                               WITNESSES

Galinis, VADM William J., USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
  Command; RADM Eric H. Ver Hage, USN, Commander, Naval Regional 
  Maintenance Center, and Director, Surface Ship Maintenance and 
  Modernization, Naval Sea Systems Command; and RADM Howard B. 
  Markle, USN, Deputy Commander, Logistics, Maintenance and 
  Industrial Operations, Naval Sea Systems Command...............     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Galinis, VADM William J., joint with RADM Eric H. Ver Hage 
      and RADM Howard B. Markle..................................    36
    Garamendi, Hon. John.........................................    33

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bergman..................................................    51
    Mr. Garamendi................................................    51
    Mr. Golden...................................................    52
    Mr. Moore....................................................    52
    Mr. Scott....................................................    51
    
   SHIP AND SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE: SUSTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS FOR A 
                             CHANGING FLEET

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                                 Subcommittee on Readiness,
                             Washington, DC, Thursday, May 6, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., via 
Webex, Hon. John Garamendi (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
        CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

    Mr. Garamendi. [Inaudible] this hearing of the Readiness 
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
    First, some administrative and technical notes. All of us 
have heard this many times, but nonetheless, our general 
counsel says we must go ahead and do it one more time.
    Members are reminded that they must be visible on screen 
within the software platform for the purposes of identity 
verification. Members must continue to use the software 
platform's video function while attending the hearing unless 
they experience connectivity issues or other technical problems 
that render the member unable to fully participate on camera. 
If you experience technical difficulties, please contact the 
committee staff for assistance.
    When you are recognized, video will be broadcast via 
television and internet feeds. You will be recognized as normal 
for questions. But if you want to speak at any other time, you 
must seek recognition verbally.
    Please mute your microphone when you are not speaking. 
Remember to unmute prior to speaking. Please be aware there is 
a slight lag between when you start speaking and when the 
camera shot switches to you.
    Please also remember to keep the software platform's video 
function on for the entirety of the time you are attending the 
hearing. If you leave for a short period for reasons other than 
joining a different proceeding, please leave your video 
function on. If you are leaving to join a different proceeding, 
or will be absent for a significant period of time, you should 
exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin when you 
return.
    Please be advised that I have designated Melanie on my 
committee staff to be the enforcer. She will mute you if you 
are not muting yourself. If you attempt to speak when you are 
not spoken to, maybe she will unmute you.
    Please use the platform's chat feature only to communicate 
with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues.
    Finally, you will see a 5-minute countdown clock on the 
software platform display. Please pay attention to it. However, 
I will remind you when your time is up.
    Next, I will now seek unanimous consent to permit a non-
committee member, who happens to represent one of the shipyards 
that we will be discussing here. I would like to seek your 
permission for Eric--excuse me, Derek Kilmer to participate. 
Without objection, so ordered.
    Derek, you will be last on the gavel list, as you know, and 
I will call on you when that time arrives.
    So with that out of the way, I would like to make a few 
opening remarks.
    Two of the most significant inhibitors of fleet readiness 
are delayed maintenance and out-of-date shipyard facilities. 
This is a high-stakes problem. As the Navy's fleet is the 
foundation of our global power projection, rigorous and timely 
maintenance means we can have more ships at sea at any given 
time.
    It is also essential to preserving our ships' availability 
throughout their expected service life. Unlike other platforms, 
major ship maintenance work is complex, enormously expensive, 
and takes months to complete, and is relatively infrequent.
    As the administration contemplates a larger fleet of naval 
vessels, we must consider whether an already struggling 
shipyard enterprise has the capacity to sustain them. 
Unfortunately, the planning and performance of the Navy ship 
maintenance seems to be stuck in a cycle of delay due to 
optimistic assumptions in acquisition, and extended 
deployments, deferred maintenance, and also inaccurate 
projections of both the duration and the cost of ship 
maintenance.
    Indeed, since 2012, two-thirds of the Navy ships and 
submarine maintenance availabilities have been completed late, 
leading to tens of thousands of lost operational and training 
days.
    I look forward to hearing about the Navy's efforts to 
address these problems. I understand there are several 
initiatives underway to improve the Navy's maintenance 
operations; for example, shipyard hiring and modernization 
plan, a new contracting strategy, and analytical efforts to 
better forecast maintenance needs, among others. Of these, I am 
most concerned about the modernization of the four public 
shipyards.
    The Navy's 20-year, $21 billion [Shipyard] Infrastructure 
Optimization Plan [SIOP] is essential to fixing the public 
yards, which are all--all--in poor or failing condition, with 
too few functioning dry docks and equipment well past its 
service life.
    I applaud the Navy's development of this plan, which will 
overhaul antiquated facilities, recapitalize equipment, and 
reorganize workflow to reduce wasted time. However, I want to 
see the details of the plan. I want to know what is going to be 
done in the next 5 years, and in the 10 years, and if it goes 
to 20 years, the years 10 to 20.
    Now, Congress directed the development of this plan, and I 
worry that without our continuing prodding that it will fail to 
come to fruition. The Navy is in the unfortunate habit of 
prioritizing resources for new platforms over the essential but 
perhaps less glamorous investment in facilities to sustain and 
the military construction necessary in our shipyards.
    I also worry that the projected 20 years is far too long to 
modernize this critical infrastructure and that the current 
plan leaves no margin for flexibility to accommodate a larger 
and reconfigured nuclear fleet.
    Upgrading our shipyards is one of the prerequisites for 
meeting the needs of tomorrow's Navy. Overhauling the way the 
Navy performs maintenance is another. To this end, I am 
particularly interested in hearing how the Navy is using 
sensors, algorithms, and other data-driven maintenance 
strategies to perform smarter, more cost-effective maintenance 
that will extend the life spans of existing ships.
    Finally, fixing fleet maintenance must also involve 
grappling with self-inflicted damage caused by years of 
misaligned priorities. For far too long, the Navy has operated 
at an untenable pace, sustaining the global presence it has 
maintained 25 years ago--it maintained 25 years ago with a much 
smaller fleet today.
    At the same time, leadership has prioritized building new 
ships over directing resources and management attention to 
maintaining the current fleet. A successful strategy must 
confront both the overall size of the fleet and the guarantee 
that the fleet can be maintained successfully.
    With that, I would like to turn to you, Mr. Wilson, who is 
covering for our ranking member, Doug Lamborn of Colorado, who 
is not with us today.
    Mr. Wilson.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Garamendi can be found in 
the Appendix on page 33.]

   STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH 
              CAROLINA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman John Garamendi. I look 
forward to a productive hearing today. The issues of delays and 
cost increases when it comes to maintaining our ship and 
submarine fleet is unfortunately a problem we have faced for a 
long time as a challenge to deterrence to provide for peace 
through strength.
    The threats we face are only becoming more complex as we 
confront a rising China who is building ships at a faster rate 
than anyone has in recent history and now has the world's 
largest navy. It is more important than ever that we get to 
work on maintaining and repairing our fleet correctly, while 
also expanding it both in size and capability.
    Former Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger 
has advised that the Chinese military buildup is the largest in 
peacetime in world history. This is one of the many reasons I 
am concerned that the budget top line released recently by the 
administration fails to keep pace with inflation and cuts 
defense spending in terms of real dollars.
    Along with Chairman Garamendi, I want to see the budget 
details and assess our progress towards increasing maintenance 
capacity. Our four public shipyards have too few functional dry 
docks that are equipped with capital equipment well beyond a 
service life that was originally manufactured by companies that 
no longer exist. All of this contributed to an aircraft carrier 
average overage of 113 days and overdue submarine 
availabilities an average of 225 days. That also means 75 
percent of the maintenance periods for aircraft carriers and 
submarines were completed late between fiscal year 2015 and 
fiscal year 2019.
    Congress directed the Navy to develop the Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Plan, SIOP, in 2018, to address 
many of these issues. I remain very concerned that the plan 
only accounts for 67 of 68 of the anticipated maintenance 
availabilities of the current fleet. That does not account for 
any of the reconfiguration of the current fleet that may occur 
or even any unscheduled work as we recently saw with the 
Bonhomme Richard.
    We must see real investments in these yards in this year's 
budget. I am not--it is not just a question of allocating the 
required funding but also the resources required to support the 
workload planning that can provide certainty to our partners in 
the private shipyards.
    The Navy contracts with 22 certified private dry docks but 
without consistent, predictable workloads and contracts, it is 
impossible for these yards to make the capital investments 
needed to support the current and future needs.
    I am interested to hear how the persons testifying today 
are working to bring certainty to the workload planning for the 
private yards and increase capacity. When it comes to the 
workforce, we all know that these men and women are critical to 
maintaining these warfighting capabilities and are often 
operating without any room for error.
    Many times, we see skill gaps that are not being adequately 
addressed. I would like to hear how you are working to increase 
the availability of artisans with critical skills, whether it 
is partnering with trade schools or apprenticeships, and how we 
can be supportive.
    This lack of skilled workers has also contributed to the 
Navy continuing to use overtime to complete planned workload. 
GAO's [Government Accountability Office's] analysis found that 
the high overtime among certain production shops, such as 
painting or welding, averaging from 25 to [32] percent for the 
fiscal years 2015 through 2019, with a peak overtime as high as 
45 percent. Core requirements indicate you should be able to 
get planned work done without the use of overtime to allow for 
surge requirements and contingencies.
    I am very concerned that we lack the surge capacity in our 
workforce. I appreciate the continued service and the 
experience of all of you who are here today to provide for our 
Nation, and I look forward to the discussions today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
    I would like to welcome and thank our witnesses appearing 
today, as Vice Admiral William Galinis, Commander of Naval Sea 
Systems Command [NAVSEA]; Rear Admiral Eric Ver Hage, Director 
of the Surface Ship Maintenance and Modernization at NAVSEA; 
and Rear Admiral Howard Markle, Deputy Commander for Logistics, 
Maintenance, and Industrial Operations at NAVSEA.
    Gentlemen, please proceed. I believe, Admiral Galinis, you 
are going to start.

STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM J. GALINIS, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA 
 SYSTEMS COMMAND; RADM ERIC H. VER HAGE, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL 
    REGIONAL MAINTENANCE CENTER, AND DIRECTOR, SURFACE SHIP 
 MAINTENANCE AND MODERNIZATION, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND; AND 
   RADM HOWARD B. MARKLE, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, LOGISTICS, 
   MAINTENANCE AND INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS 
                            COMMAND

    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. Thank you. Chairman Garamendi, 
Congressman Wilson, distinguished lawmakers, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss ship and 
submarine maintenance and specifically the sustainment 
considerations that you raised in your opening statements.
    I will be providing our collective opening remarks. I would 
first like to thank this committee for your very solid and 
continued support of our Navy. It is a privilege to be with you 
here this afternoon to discuss fleet readiness.
    A top priority for Naval Sea Systems Command is delivering 
combat power, principally the on-time delivery of ships, 
submarines, and aircraft carriers out of maintenance.
    In support of our CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations] 
navigation plan and his priority on readiness, our ability to 
deploy combat-ready ships and submarines starts in our public 
and private sector shipyards and ship repair facilities around 
the globe. Nearly 70 percent of our fleet at sea today will 
still be in service in 2030. Our ability to effectively 
maintain these ships and submarines is critical to delivering a 
Navy our Nation needs.
    As our fleet continues to evolve, so does our thinking and 
our efforts to sustain these ships and submarines that we 
operate--how we plan maintenance periods, how we contract for 
the work that we execute, opportunities to improve execution, 
and recapitalize our naval shipyards. We continue to learn and 
pursue world-class performance.
    We have taken lessons learned and input from our fleet, 
from our workforce, and especially private industry in order to 
refine and improve our processes and procedures. Our goal is to 
deliver every ship and submarine out of maintenance on time 
every time.
    And while I am confident we are working on the right things 
and the trends are absolutely moving in the right direction, I 
will tell you we still have more to do as you indicated during 
your initial comments.
    Across surface ship maintenance where the work is done in 
the private sector, our Navy has evolved our contracting 
strategies to provide a better balance of the Navy's cost and 
schedule requirements, industry's needs for stable funding, and 
workload and contract award dates that allow for proper 
planning and material purchasing of the shipyards executing 
these availabilities.
    We have also made great strides in using the data available 
to us to better plan and execute this maintenance by utilizing 
the Navy's Performance to Plan [P2P] analysis and expanding 
directed maintenance strategies and improving our availability, 
duration, and planning tool, known as the Availability Duration 
Scorecard 3.0. This allows us to better forecast availability 
schedules and reduce the number of maintenance delays.
    As we progress with the next-generation destroyer, the 
light amphibious warship, and other new designs, we are 
leveraging our collective maintenance and sustainment knowledge 
into the design process, so these ships are built with 
maintainers in mind.
    Within the four public shipyards, we have grown the size of 
our organic workforce, delivered on new technologies and 
processes that as stated in our written testimony have made 
significant headway in reducing the days of maintenance delay.
    The Shipyard Infrastructure and Optimization Program, SIOP 
as it is affectionately called, is absolutely foundational to 
the Navy's ability to execute planned submarine and aircraft 
carrier maintenance for the next generation of aircraft 
carriers and submarines.
    And as we complete a ``digital twin'' model for each of our 
four shipyards, and build out each shipyard's area development 
plan, we will be able to design and build modern shipyards that 
will maximize work efficiencies and throughput and accommodate 
the Ford-class carriers and the Virginia payload module 
submarines, the new Block Vs coming down the line.
    A newer though no less important effort is our work to 
improve cost and schedule performance in our naval shipyards. 
This plan uses data analytics to identify availability planning 
and execution performance and shortfalls and areas for 
improvement in our four naval shipyards.
    As I mentioned to this committee in March, we are also 
utilizing the Naval Sustainment System-Shipyards effort to 
institute significant and systemic and transformational changes 
across all four public shipyards to improve our planning and 
execution performance.
    Where SIOP is focused on rebuilding and modifying the 
shipyards' physical infrastructure, Naval Sustainment System-
Shipyards will fundamentally change the way we operate the 
shipyards, from a business perspective, focusing on our 
production workforce, their immediate supervisors, our 
engineers and logisticians, to ensure that they have what they 
need when they need them, so they can execute their tasks 
efficiently and not expend unnecessary time and effort on non-
value-added work.
    Leveraging industry best practices, this effort is being 
executed with a collective sense of urgency to empower our 
people at the waterfront to either solve issues immediately or 
push them up the chain of command for resolution.
    As I mentioned when I started, ship maintenance is 
continuing to evolve, and we look forward to the opportunities 
to improve across the enterprise and execute NAVSEA's number 
one priority of delivering combat power on time.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to spend some time 
with you this afternoon, and we look forward to your questions. 
Thank you.
    [The joint prepared statement of Admiral Galinis, Admiral 
Ver Hage, and Admiral Markle can be found in the Appendix on 
page 36.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Admiral, thank you very much for the 
testimony and for the written testimony. The detail in the 
written testimony is extremely helpful to us as is your oral 
testimony here.
    I am going to pose one overarching question, and that is 
you are headed in the right direction on both the public and 
the private yards in what you are intending to do. A lot of 
this came from the previous NDAAs [National Defense 
Authorization Acts]. We will, in the next 3 months, 2 months 
actually, complete the House version of the NDAA.
    What do you need in that law to not only continue what you 
are doing but to advance the timeframe in which these tasks 
will be done? What do you need?
    Admiral Galinis. So, sir, what I would tell you is just to 
start off, you know, on the public sector side--and let me just 
start with the SIOP effort--you know, the focus on being able 
to accelerate the planning efforts is probably top of that 
list.
    When we talked a few months ago, I mentioned kind of 
opportunities to accelerate that plan. We are coming through 
the end stages of that effort and will be ready to discuss with 
you here, you know, in the very near future. But our ability to 
get the planning done up front, which includes the area 
development plans that talk about, you know, the 
infrastructure, the foundational environments that we want to 
build these new buildings in, you know, that is probably a key 
part there.
    The other thing that we are going to be doing over the next 
several months is finishing the digital twin models for each of 
the four shipyards. They will be done by the end of this year, 
so that is absolutely key. So that is important.
    On the private sector side, I think we really do need to 
continue to execute the plan that Admiral Ver Hage and his team 
has laid in place, from a contracting perspective what they are 
doing with, you know, bundling availabilities or materiel 
procurement plans and things of that nature to continue to 
improve on these efforts.
    So those are kind of the near-term things that we need to 
do and need to get after, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Here is what I would like to do, and I will 
take this up with our committee members, is that I would like 
to have a specific plan for the next 5 years on each of those, 
on the government yards, the public yards, as to what you need 
to carry out that planning. And then I would like to have a 
report back.
    Well, we will call you back within the next 6 months to get 
a report, but we are going to write in the NDAA certain 
timeframes in which we expect you to achieve goals that will 
put in place the SIOPs for the public yards.
    So we are going to work together with--our staff will work 
with you over the next month as we prepare, and it is going to 
be step by step, and a date associated with each step and the 
money that is necessary to carry out those steps. Does that fit 
with what you--can you carry that out? Can you do that?
    Admiral Galinis. Absolutely. Yes, sir. We are ready to 
provide that. We can have that for you. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
    I am going to let my--I am going to end my questions there. 
I would hope one of our members takes up the public yards--
excuse me, the private yards, and Admiral Ver Hage's work on 
that.
    Joe, it is your turn, Joe Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And for Admiral Galinis, as you indicated--and this is in 
line with what the chairman just mentioned--the stability of 
the Nation's--of the Navy's maintenance industrial base is an 
important consideration in the context of great power 
competition. Commercial providers that support the Navy 
typically require special skills, facilities, and 
certifications, which limit the ability of the base work at a 
new commercial provider on a short notice.
    How would you assess the industry's ability to handle 
fluctuations in work and accommodate future modernization 
efforts?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. Let me--I just want to make sure 
I understand the question. This was private industry's ability 
to handle----
    Mr. Wilson. Yes.
    Admiral Galinis [continuing]. Future work.
    Mr. Wilson. Yes.
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Wilson. With the stability that you mentioned, so----
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. Okay. I would say right now, you 
know, I think the shipyards that we have are able to handle the 
work that we currently have. One of the ongoing discussions I 
will say that we are having right now is as we, you know, 
potentially look to possibly grow the fleet, what additional 
capability or capacity might we need to bring online? Okay.
    And so, you know, when I think through that on the private 
sector side--and I will ask Admiral Ver Hage to provide his 
comments on this--but, you know, where can we bring on 
additional capacity, okay? You know, we have seen examples of 
that on the west coast as of late, where we have had, you know, 
a couple of new shipyards come into play. We have seen that in 
Pearl Harbor, where we had one ship repair provider, you know, 
leave the island, and a couple of other companies step up and 
come into that.
    There are also a number of smaller shipyards out there that 
I don't think we have fully utilized. So, there is some of that 
capacity that is out there.
    The other part of this is some of the smaller companies 
that really support these larger ship repair yards--so these 
are the subcontractors that provide very specific services, 
whether they be mechanical or electrical, or even support 
services in terms of, you know, things like staging and coding 
applications, things of that nature.
    So that is a part of industry that we really need to 
continue to focus on, and we will continue to look at that.
    Another element of this would be, you know, opportunities 
for CAPEX [capital expenditure]. And I think that is something 
we need to continue to look at for some of our private 
industries. I will tell you, on the current contracting 
strategy and fixed price, you know, frankly, that is probably 
more difficult for industry to find CAPEX money to provide 
there.
    And with that, I will stop, sir, and ask Admiral Ver Hage 
if he has any additional comments, sir.
    Admiral Ver Hage. Congressman Wilson, thank you for that 
question, sir. I do agree we are headed in the right direction. 
There is more work to do, and both industry and the Navy need 
to do more. I do think we are heading on the right trajectory, 
as you said.
    Two parts kind of would be my answer to this. One is we 
need to maximize our productivity for each day that a ship is 
in the yard. So, we need to do better with the capacity that we 
have, and both industry and the government--Navy--has a part in 
that. And so things like awarding earlier to allow better 
planning, speeding our decision-making whenever there is growth 
or new work, you know, providing all of the long lead material 
ahead of time, those are all things that the government is 
doing collaboratively with industry.
    On the industry side, they are focused on schedule 
management, kind of investing in their trades, and exploring 
ways to expand capacity. I think the second piece on expanding 
capacity, I would like to see a CAPEX-like approach, things 
focused on training, things focused on, maybe, dredging or 
expanding dry dock capacity. Those things will give us some 
flexibility and surge capacity, you know, both during kind of 
normal operations and more kind of emergency situations.
    So great partnership ongoing right now with Hampton Roads 
Maritime Consortium. It is the State, the Federal, the local, 
Old Dominion University, all of us working together on how best 
to position our collective ship repair base for long-term 
success.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. A couple of things 
come to mind from that discussion, and thank you for raising 
that set of issues, Mr. Wilson.
    You talked about capitalization. There is a small shipyard 
program in the MARAD [Maritime Administration] over in the T&I 
[Transportation and Infrastructure] Committee. We need to look 
at that specifically. I know that the old program at Mare 
Island in San Francisco Bay, they have a very large dry dock 
that is not operable right now, but with a certain amount of 
capital expenditure, they could be, and then they could bid for 
the repair of naval ships.
    I know that is not unique. I know that is repeated around 
the Nation. And so, as we look at this in a holistic way, we 
need to also bring MARAD into it, so that the privately owned 
docks, not just the big ones that we know so much about, but 
some of the others that are out there that can take on some of 
the smaller jobs, could be made available to the Navy, 
providing more competition and perhaps, hopefully, better 
readiness.
    Admiral Ver Hage, we would like to work with you on that. 
Any suggestions you have, we can take that over to--Salud 
Carbajal is the chairman of that subcommittee. We will work 
with him.
    Here is the gavel order for the next three people--Golden, 
Scott, Luria. So, Mr. Golden, your turn.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Chairman Garamendi.
    I am going to ask Vice Admiral Galinis a question here. 
Admiral, the Congress, as you are aware, is having a 
conversation about investing in critical infrastructure for the 
entire Nation, not just, you know, from a DOD [Department of 
Defense] perspective and a national security perspective, but 
across the board our Nation's infrastructure.
    Looking at the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization 
Plan, I know it is 20 years, about a $21 billion effort to 
recapitalize the public shipyards. Do you have an estimate--
does the Navy have an estimate--for what type of investment is 
necessary for the private yards as well in order to best meet 
the needs of the Navy's maintenance schedule?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. We 
do, and, you know, we have been working with a couple of 
private yards, and where we would potentially make some of that 
investment there are things such as, you know, potential, I 
will say, dredging projects that would help in one port, you 
know, the addition of maybe a ship lift system to better 
utilize the capacity within the shipyard may be another 
project. Okay?
    I think, as Admiral Ver Hage, you know, talked about, the 
development of the workforce is always, you know, high on my 
list anyway in terms of, you know, ensuring that we have a 
well-qualified and trained workforce. So those are a couple of, 
I will say, projects, you know, that we have, kind of shovel-
ready-type efforts if you will.
    You know, so there is some of that out there, and, you 
know, we certainly have--we get a lot of input from industry on 
this as well, and, you know, if that opportunity were to 
present itself, sir, I feel pretty confident we can provide a 
pretty good detailed list, you know, in relatively short order. 
Over.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Admiral. And, you know, I hope the 
chairman would be interested in looking at some of those 
numbers as well. I mean, there is no doubt that this is 
critical infrastructure, and also no doubt that it would be a 
big help to the Navy and important to our national security. 
But, you know, that work needs to be done. If we are able to 
accelerate it, I am sure that is also going to be supporting 
some good jobs and developing, as you said, Admiral, important 
skills, which we need in general in our shipbuilding workforce.
    I think it is something worth looking at in the context of 
the American Jobs Plan, Chairman Garamendi. I don't know what 
the actual cost would be, but certainly very important.
    While we are talking about it, what other ways do you see 
public-private shipyard partnerships being able to help the 
Navy speed up the effort to get a reduction in the schedule 
backlog and maintenance delays going forward?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. So, you know, one of the things 
we are working right now, and the example, we have a couple of 
submarines, as you know, in one of our private-sector 
shipyards, and we are working closely with them to provide 
some, you know, lessons learned from how we finish 688 [SSN 
688, Los Angeles-class] submarines and how we certify the 
submarines for sea.
    We are working with them on SUBSAFE [submarine safety 
standard] qualifications. You know, we have also started a 
partnership with the yards on welding and NDT [non-destructive 
testing] processes, okay, which are key to any ship repair or 
new-construction effort as you well know. So those are a couple 
of, you know, kind of specific things that we are working with 
them on.
    You know, and I will go back on the--you know, back on the 
workforce, if I could, for just one second, and, you know, 
Admiral Ver Hage mentioned the effort ongoing down in Hampton 
Roads, but, you know, we are seeing in the new-construction 
world every new-construction shipyard really does have I will 
say a pretty good apprentice program. And we need to kind of 
leverage some of the work that has been done, you know, up in 
the northeast there or on the gulf coast or, you know, there is 
good apprenticeship programs out there.
    We have got good apprenticeship programs in our public 
shipyards as well, teaming with community colleges, as I 
mentioned during our last discussion back in March. But I 
think, you know, being able to kind of expand that more into 
the private sector, and not just the private repair yards but 
even down to some of those subcontractors that I mentioned, to 
kind of work in that area as well. So I would offer that as 
another we could certainly, you know, kind of advance the 
partnership a little bit. Over.
    Mr. Golden. I see I am out of time, Chairman.
    I appreciate that last bit there, Admiral, and I will let 
you know I am actually working right now with Bath Iron Works 
in Maine, and our community college system in Maine, to get 
some mobile welding opportunities out there to, you know, 
apprenticeship-style programs, so we can get even more people 
trained up quickly to hire at that yard, which I know you are 
familiar with.
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Golden. The program 
that you are working with in Maine, could you please develop 
that information, get it to the committee? And we may want to--
we do want to spread that kind of activity around, so that--you 
know, Maine is good, but there are other places that need to 
have the wisdom of the far northeast.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Golden. I would be more than happy to share that.
    Mr. Garamendi. One of the things that we are going to need 
to do here, as this hearing continues, is to circle back. Our 
committee schedule is full, the formal committee's. I am, after 
just 36 minutes of this hearing, of the opinion that I would 
need to pull together an informal roundtable with the private--
with the admirals, the private shipyard--the government 
shipyards, and the private shipyards, to discuss the good and 
the bad and what needs to be done. We really need to hear from 
the private companies, the issues they have with the Navy and 
what they need.
    The infrastructure issue that you raised, Mr. Golden, is a 
fascinating one, to include in the infrastructure bill 
shipyards. We have certainly talked about dredging, but I don't 
believe we talked specifically about funding not only the 
military but the private shipyards.
    Very good. Okay. Our next witness or next presenter is 
Austin Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Admirals, I am landlocked here in south Georgia, but I 
represent Robins Air Force Base. And one of the key things to 
us as we talk about the air logistics complex is that the Air 
Force has been very public about the fact that they cannot 
operate with any less than three depots, and that obviously 
gives some comfort to the contractors around the base and 
industry that builds up around the base, that the base is going 
to continue to be there in the future.
    Could the Navy survive with less than four--the four 
shipyards that you currently have?
    Admiral Galinis. We could not survive with less than four. 
No, sir. I will tell you that. You know, in fact, one of the 
efforts that we are going through right now is actually to 
expand the productive capacity of our yards. I mean, as you 
know, sir, back, you know, in the late part of the last 
century, in the 1990s, we had eight public shipyards in 
operation, and we necked down to four. We absolutely can go no 
lower. No, sir.
    Mr. Scott. Admiral, that is the point that I was about to 
make is that in 1996 and 1997 we closed 50 percent of the 
public shipyards that our Nation depended on for our naval 
operations, which is obviously probably the most important 
aspect of our national security.
    And, you know, I think it would be worth the Navy 
considering making a very public statement, as the Air Force 
has, that the United States Navy has a position that there will 
be no less than four public shipyards. And I would encourage 
you to consider that, just as the Air Force has made it clear 
that there will be no less than three depots. I think it would 
certainly help you as time goes on with regard to the people 
wanting to build around the bases with infrastructure that 
supports you and other things.
    So have you--you talked about on five and six about best 
practices and improving planning. As I said, I spent more time 
with the Air Force than the Navy, but do you meet with your 
colleagues in the Air Force at the senior level to collaborate 
about best practices, and if you have been able to share across 
the different branches those best practices?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. I can't say I have personally 
met with folks in the Air Force on this. You know, kind of what 
we do in the shipyards and in ship repair, you know, there are 
opportunities occasionally to get together with other services, 
but I can't say that I have specifically talked to them about 
what we are doing.
    But let me turn this over to Admiral Markle, and I think he 
can give you a little bit better answer here, sir.
    Mr. Scott. Okay.
    Admiral Markle. Good afternoon, sir. Appreciate the 
question and the opportunity to talk about our partnerships 
with our sister services.
    So the Department of Defense as a whole brings us all 
together across the services, and in particular the depot 
maintenance community, to share our lessons learned, our 
struggles, our challenges, which, as you can imagine, are 
similar to one another and talk about how it is that we are 
navigating those particular areas as we move forward.
    We do that not only with--the depots are different, but 
they even at times have different funding. Some may need 
working capital, some are missing funding, but they all share 
the same thing in that they see challenges with development of 
the workforce, the partnerships with the private sector, the 
maintenance of their facilities, et cetera. And we all learn 
from one another in those forums of what we are doing to impact 
work on those individual pieces. Like we have shared our SIOP 
discussion with other services as well. Over.
    Mr. Scott. Sure. And I know that, you know, there is a lot 
of difference in a ship and an airplane. But when it comes to 
the software and some of the other types of onboard systems if 
you will, there is a program in Georgia called Project Synergy 
that is a collaboration between the private sector and the 
public sector in software development. And that would be one 
that I would suggest might be worth taking a look at.
    I know it is different from a construction standpoint, but 
some of the software development and other things, I do think 
there are some opportunities there.
    One other thing--well, I am down to 10 seconds. Let me 
thank you for your time. And if we have another round of 
questions, I will ask those questions then. But I yield the 5 
seconds, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Scott. We will almost 
certainly have a second round of questions.
    We now have Mrs. Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Admiral Galinis, in a March 2021 Congressional Budget 
Office report, the CBO compares the class maintenance plan 
expectation of days in the shipyard and days of labor to the 
scheduled and actual amounts for the extended dry-docking 
selected restricted availability, or EDSRA, the first five 
Virginia-class submarines, and on page 12 of the report shows 
that the class maintenance plan for the EDSRA should have been 
450 days and 203,000 labor days.
    However, the scheduled days for four of these five 
availabilities far exceeds the class plan. And, furthermore, 
the actual days it took to complete these availabilities 
exceeds the class plan by an average of nearly 70 percent 
across the five availabilities, which resulted in a loss of 
1,552 days of operational time.
    And over the 9-year period when these availabilities 
occurred--so the first five Virginia-class submarines--the Navy 
lost 4\1/4\years of operational availability of the submarines.
    Then, in May of 2019, the Navy changed the Virginia-class 
maintenance plan to increase the duration of the EDSRA from 450 
to 590 days, which was a 31 percent increase, even though 
historically at that point these EDSRAs have been taking about 
760 days. And, you know, additionally, the Virginia-class 
submarine, its design was expected to have 22 percent fewer 
days of labor on average than the Los Angeles-class, yet the 
data described in the CBO report shows that the actual labor 
days were 43 percent higher.
    I was curious, what organization developed the Virginia-
class maintenance plan?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes. So, ma'am, thanks. That is a great 
question, and I tell you, it is something that we have had a 
lot of discussion on within our team here, because it is--you 
know, you spoke specifically very eloquently about the 
Virginia-class submarines that we are--what we are seeing, you 
know, similar trends on the 688s [Los Angeles class] where we 
are doing a lot more work.
    Mrs. Luria. Yes. So, Admiral, I hate to cut you off, but I 
have limited time for my questions, and I just wanted to get 
through a few separate parts of it.
    Admiral Galinis. Sure. Yeah. So, it is our submarine 
maintenance and engineering team that does that. They are 
located up at Portsmouth New Hampshire shipyard.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. And so why would you assess that the 
class maintenance plan was so far off from the actual time and 
mandates it took to do the maintenance when it was actually 
executed?
    Admiral Galinis. At a very high level, what we are seeing 
is, you know, replacements and system repair work is required 
inside of the planned service life of that particular component 
or system, and then we couple that with some challenges, 
materiel challenges in getting parts, and whatnot, for the 
submarines. So, it is really systems not lasting to their 
service life, and then spare parts.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. So, Admiral, you know, when I look at 
this kind of data, what it says to me is that the Navy hasn't 
accurately estimated the maintenance requirements. And it is 
one of the many reasons that I think the Navy has a credibility 
problem when you come to us.
    And, you know, you combine that with grossly underestimated 
cost estimates for new construction and timelines for project 
completion, you know, I think misplaced faith in new 
technologies that aren't fully developed, and then an inability 
to deliver promised capabilities.
    I wanted to shift to a statement you made about submarines 
in your remarks. So you said that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
undocked the USS California, SSN 781, ahead of schedule, and 
completed its follow-on steaming program milestones 5 days 
early.
    Is this the same way of saying that the availability 
finished early, or does this mean something else?
    Admiral Galinis. No, ma'am. So, to be specific on that, you 
know, last June we reset--for all availabilities that were in 
execution, we reset the completion dates because of the 
pandemic.
    On California specifically--and this is through targeted 
use of overtime, the use of the reserve, the SURGEMAIN [Surge 
Maintenance] force that we have, and just really the work by 
the shipyard--we were able to actually beat the schedule that 
we set for ourselves last June. So, you know, that early 
undocking and the early delivery was really to the reprogrammed 
schedule.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. I understand the impacts of COVID. So 
with my colleagues, we have been discussing the size of the 
fleet that we need in the future. And if the assumptions that 
we use in the analysis in making those decisions, such as the 
time required in maintenance, are not correct, then the size of 
the fleet that we determine we need can also not be correct.
    And as we start to build the new Columbia class and the 
Constellation class, you know, I hope that the Navy has plans 
in place to be able to better estimate the maintenance 
requirements for these new classes.
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, ma'am. In fact, that is one of the 
efforts that we are working on right now is there is a--I will 
say a new avail [availability] duration model for the public 
sector availabilities that we are doing. We just finished that 
work last month. I talked last time about the 15-year public 
sector maintenance plan. That model, that availability duration 
model, is foundational to that plan.
    We are just coming through some final testing and 
validation of that model, but I think that will give us a much 
better and a more accurate picture of the duration of these 
availabilities.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Admiral. I look forward to learning 
more about that.
    And I know my time has expired, but I just wanted to 
highlight that what I see in this data is that maintenance 
delays are significantly impacting the operational availability 
of our ships and submarines. And like many have said today, the 
investments in the public and private shipyards and in that 
workforce actually increase the effective size of the fleet.
    So investment is needed today and not 20 years from now. So 
thank you, and I yield back.
    Admiral Galinis. Absolutely agree. Yes, ma'am.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mrs. Luria.
    We are going to do a second round of questions, and you can 
certainly expand on that point, which is a very, very good one.
    Mr. Kilmer, welcome. Delighted to have you, and what 
exactly do you represent in Washington?
    Mr. Kilmer. I represent the Sixth District, which includes 
Naval Base Kitsap, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. And thank you, 
Chairman, for inviting me to sit in. I appreciate it.
    And, Admiral Markle, it is good to see you. We miss you out 
in Kitsap.
    As a former member of this committee, too, it is always 
good to be back.
    Admiral Galinis, let me start by just saying thanks. It was 
good to see you out at Puget just a couple of weeks ago. I am 
relieved to see the Navy recognize the need to update and 
modernize their shipyards through the SIOP. I am concerned, 
though, that given the 20-year project life span of the SIOP 
that the $21 billion needed to complete these upgrades may be, 
at one point or another, allocated to other priorities.
    I guess I am less concerned about SIOP being crowded out by 
other forecasted priorities, like the Ford-class carriers or 
Columbia- and Virginia-class subs, which I support. I guess I 
am more concerned about unforeseen budgetary priorities that 
could arise over the next 20 years. Specifically, I am worried 
about the impacts of things like natural disasters, which we 
have seen more frequent and severe hurricanes and other 
catastrophic events like earthquakes.
    Even within the past few years, we have seen natural 
disasters impacting the Navy's planned budgetary spending. The 
funding required to repair damages from the earthquake at China 
Lake and the impacts of Hurricane Sally in the Pensacola area 
are two prime examples. I know those disasters alone have cost 
the Navy upwards of a billion dollars, and that spending has 
cut into other planned priorities.
    So my concern is that unforeseen spending, however 
necessary, could delay the SIOP, and that has--as we have 
discussed over the course of the last 50 minutes, that could 
have disastrous consequences for the Navy's ability to respond 
to the threats of the present and the future.
    So, one, I would love to hear your guarantee that the Navy 
will continue to prioritize the SIOP even as future spending 
needs--expected and unexpected--arise. But what can Congress do 
to maintain focus on SIOP, to invest in the much-needed 
upgrades at our public shipyards? If money is not allocated to 
backfill unforeseen spending, what is the Navy's strategy to 
prevent unexpected missions from drawing funding away and 
resources away from the SIOP?
    Admiral Galinis. Yeah. Congressman Kilmer, good to see you 
again, sir, and thanks for your time when we were up in Puget 
there a couple weeks ago.
    You know, the budget always gets a vote. I think the way I 
would answer your question, I would go back to the request that 
Chairman Garamendi, you know, asked initially when we opened 
this is--is kind of that 5-year plan, and for us to kind of lay 
out, you know, I will say, in a fair amount of detail what our 
plan is, and we have that.
    And, you know, I will just tell you, within the last, you 
know, month, 6 weeks or so, we now have the full program office 
in place, and they have been really kind of getting after the 
acquisition strategy and the details of the plan that the 
chairman asked for.
    But I will also kind of ask Admiral Markle to provide his 
comments on this as well, sir.
    Admiral Markle. Hey, Congressman. Great to see you again. 
Absolutely look back fondly on our time together up in the 
PACNORWEST [Pacific Northwest].
    I will kind of answer with the entry into the discussion of 
greatly appreciate your support then, continue to appreciate 
your support now of both the PACNORWEST and broader on the 
committees that you serve on. It truly is--one thing you can do 
is continued advocacy and support of us, always help when we 
have our congressionals behind us on what we need in order to 
be successful, whether that is through legislation or whether 
that is through, you know, advocating for it in the various 
ways that you engage across the spectrum.
    So I will tell you that, just simplistically, just to build 
upon the admiral's comments, not only do we owe you a plan, and 
a discussion of the plan, we owe that to the broader Navy, and 
then from there, obviously, looking for your support as we move 
out on it.
    Mr. Kilmer. Let me ask quickly, I know even today we have 
heard some discussion around potentially accelerating the work. 
You know, obviously, moving things left reduced the risk of 
things getting crowded out. I also know it is a logistical 
challenge. This is a heck of a game of Jenga, because you are 
trying to modernize the shipyards while they still have to 
work.
    If your evaluation determines that aspects of SIOP can be 
accelerated, do you expect additional funding will be needed?
    Admiral Markle. So as you look at the potential for 
acceleration, there is obviously two very large constraints 
that would constrain that. And those are funding and those are 
the ability to accelerate those and integrate them with the 
ongoing maintenance, ensuring that we could meet our mission.
    Opportunities certainly can exist as we continue to study 
SIOP and perform our analysis on those mega-projects. Clearly, 
we are focused on the docks up front. You can see that in the 
previous President's budget, and you will likely see further 
commitment to that. But as we look to the broader optimization 
piece and those things that support that, those are certainly 
areas of opportunity for us to accelerate integrating with 
overall mission execution. Over.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
    Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. One of the reasons that I am driving so hard 
for a 5-year, what are we going to do next year and the year 
after that and the next 3 years beyond is--I will give you an 
example. Last week, several billion dollars was returned to the 
Department of Defense for military construction programs.
    To my knowledge, none of that will be available for this 
particular purpose, because none of the programs that we have 
been talking about, none of the activities we have been talking 
about here, are yet in the military construction, MILCON, 
program, they're not programmed.
    So I am going to drive very hard--Admiral Galinis, you know 
this--for detail for the next 5 years, so that we can every 
year know what you need, and then, Mr. Kilmer, we become the 
problem, not the Navy. And so we can, you know, begin to 
discipline ourselves.
    Okay. I want to go to a piece here that we have talked 
about, and that is that the repair of a ship when it arrives at 
the dock--is there satisfactory and sufficient information on 
what needs to be done on that ship? Some call this analytics, 
data analytics. I call it big data. But it seems to me that we 
now have the necessary tools to have a much better 
understanding of what a ship will need when it gets to the 
dock, long before it arrives, so that the parts and pieces and 
spares and drive shafts and other equipment will be there when 
the ship arrives rather than--and this takes us to the delay 
that--the delays that Mrs. Luria talked about.
    It seems as though most of those delays are caused by, 
``Gee, we didn't know we needed this piece until the ship 
arrived.''
    So, Admirals, whichever one of you wants to take it, make 
me really happy and tell me that you are doing data analytics, 
that you are getting ahead of it, that you are data mining, and 
that when that ship arrives, you know 99 percent of what will 
be needed when it gets to the dock. Admiral----
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Galinis, do you want to start?
    Admiral Galinis. I will start, and then I will turn it over 
to my colleagues here. But I would tell you the answer is yes, 
we are using data analytics in both the public and the private 
sector side. You know, foundationally, it all starts with the 
class maintenance plan. And as Congresswoman Luria pointed out, 
you know, in some cases, you know, we have got work to do on 
the class maintenance plan.
    The second part of this is the assessments that we do and 
the tests that we do on the ships and the submarines before we 
get them into the yard to get a better understanding of the 
condition of the ship. And one of the things that we have done 
over the last couple of years is we have driven more discipline 
into that process. There is a clear understanding by the fleet 
that that needs to be done, that they need to allocate the time 
for the ship or the submarine to be able to do those tests, and 
so that is an important piece.
    So with that, I will turn it over to Admiral Ver Hage, and 
he can talk a little bit on the private sector side, and then 
Admiral Markle.
    Admiral Ver Hage. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that 
question. Congresswoman Luria came over to our war room and 
spent--very graciously spent 2 hours with us and got to see I 
think in person kind of our passion for data and for analytics 
and using it to drive or to inform our thinking and, more 
importantly, drive our actions.
    And we have expanded our partnership on that effort to 
include with the Office of Naval Research, a number of 
universities, and of course already had Center for Naval 
Analyses and Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona, who leads our 
Navy's analytics for NAVSEA.
    One quick vignette, which I think hopefully will give you 
confidence. So just this week, we had a ship that was getting 
ready for about a 60-day mission, and she had a problem with 
one of her gas turbine engines or gas turbine generator. We 
were able to take the data off that ship, send it to our in-
service engineering agent in Naval Surface Warfare Center 
[NSWC] Philly, Philadelphia. They analyzed the data and 
provided that information back to our regional maintenance 
center. It allowed us to target the technicians we needed to 
put on that ship to get--to make the effective repairs.
    And so what would have taken quite a long time was--we were 
able to speed that up and compress it because of the use of 
that--what we call ICAS [Integrated Condition Assessment 
System] data and the digital twin that we had in Philadelphia. 
So that is a combined initiative with NAVSEA 05--our chief 
engineer--our warfare centers, and SEA 21 [Director for Surface 
Ship Maintenance, Modernization and Sustainment], and our RMC 
[regional maintenance center]. So that is a good example.
    We have got more to do, but that is a good example where we 
are using data to inform our thinking and get more operational 
availability out of our platform. So that ship is sailing today 
for the Mediterranean with repairs completed quicker than they 
otherwise would have because of data. Over.
    Admiral Markle. Yes, sir. Building upon that, and not 
repeating anything that has been said, just a couple of 
thoughts. We talked about the Performance to Plan initiative 
that we have that takes the totality of the data that we have, 
gets some data scientists involved, provides us the analytics 
to both--to what has been discussed, take a look at how better 
to project what it is that we need in order to estimate cost 
and schedule for the availability.
    It provides us the focus areas that we need to work on, 
down to the individual levels. It provides us a better 
understanding of what components need to be repaired when. And 
then things like Admiral Ver Hage talked about, looking at 
things like vibration analysis that gives us indications of 
what we need to work on and when.
    And then just to take a slightly different look at what 
large data can do for us, doing things such as 3D scanning of 
and modeling of the hulls themselves provides us an opportunity 
to help our folks train on realistic conditions of what the 
specific configurations of the ship are and provides us a 
better planning tool such that we can write more accurate paper 
ahead of the availability to prepare for those upcoming 
assessments. Over.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. We will be following 
this data trail very, very closely, and, frankly, demanding 
that you not only do what you are doing but you do more of what 
you are presently doing.
    With regard to the gavel order: Wilson, Golden, Scott. Mr. 
Wilson, you are up.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Garamendi.
    And, Admirals, I am particularly impressed by your 
presentations, and I also want you to be aware that I am a very 
grateful and proud Navy dad. I have a son who is an orthopedic 
surgeon in the Navy, and it just is inspiring to me to see the 
leadership of our Navy, and I look forward to joining with 
Chairman Garamendi to work with you.
    And, Admiral Ver Hage, what are you doing to prepare for 
the maintenance requirements of a growing and modernizing 
fleet? Does the $21 billion Shipyard Infrastructure 
Optimization Plan account for forecasted maintenance needs for 
an expanded fleet?
    Admiral Ver Hage. Congressman Wilson, thank you for that 
question. Two strategies for that. One is, as we talked a 
little bit earlier, make the maximum use of the capacity that 
we have today. And there are improvements needed on both the 
government side and industry side to get to where we want to 
be.
    One of the best things to do is to give industry a stable 
and predictable demand signal. And when they have that, then 
they can make wise investment choices to improve their 
performance.
    We are awarding our contracts earlier than we used to. As 
we speak, our average days prior to the start of the avail that 
we have ordered--we have awarded our contracts this year is 123 
days prior, which is I think a magnificent improvement.
    We are also adding a second ship sometimes, which we call a 
horizontal bundle, and that is to provide certainty to the 
company that wins that second ship, two in a row, but also 
allows others that didn't win that contract some certainty as 
well to inform their planning.
    So better demand, level loading our ports, making better 
use of the capacity we have, and we each have a part. And then 
we talked earlier about CAPEX-like or the MARAD grant, which I 
have read up on. You know, those types of things I think could 
be useful as we work to, you know, support properly a larger 
fleet.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much for that insight.
    And, Admiral Markle, a 2019 GAO report found that since 
2014 Navy ships spent more than 33,700 more days in maintenance 
than expected as a result of insufficient shipyard capacity and 
a shortage of skilled workers. What metrics does the Navy use 
to measure progress toward growing more shipyard capacity?
    Admiral Markle. Yes, sir. Appreciate the comment and 
appreciate the opportunity to discuss our need to balance the 
workload, the workforce, and the partnering that obviously is 
necessary there with the private sector.
    So we often look to Admiral Ver Hage to talk about the 
private sector, and of course, as I execute my workload, and we 
look to find the right levers to execute it, clearly, there is 
a partnership to be had in the individual ports with the 
private sector, whether that is on larger avails, as Admiral 
Galinis discussed earlier in contracting them out to the 
Electric Boats and Newport News Shipbuildings of the world, or 
it is the discrete contracting that I do for preservation work 
and other items on the major availabilities utilizing some of 
the same private partners that Admiral Ver Hage has.
    As we look to what Admiral Galinis talked about with our 
15-year maintenance plan, it is in fact just that: taking a 
look at historical data, taking a look at the demand signals of 
the future and coming up with an articulation of both what we 
need to do within the public sector and what we need to develop 
within the private sector with our partners in order to execute 
that workload.
    Mr. Wilson. And, finally, for Admiral Galinis, how has the 
Navy been performing with respect to reducing the idle time for 
submarines?
    Admiral Galinis. Yeah. I will tell you, Congressman, we 
still have work to do in that area, frankly. Okay? While we are 
seeing a downward trend in the days of maintenance delay, we 
really have not put much of a dent into the idle time, which 
is--as you well know, you know, is the time from the 
certification expiration date of the submarine before it enters 
the maintenance availability.
    So, again, the throughput of the submarines through their 
maintenance period needs to improve. This gets back in a little 
bit to Congresswoman Luria's comments about the class 
maintenance plan and the work that we are doing being so much 
higher than what is in the class maintenance plan, sir.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
    I believe it is Mr. Golden. You are next.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Chairman Garamendi.
    You know, I would say quickly, you are asking for details 
on apprenticeships and training that goes on in the northeast, 
and I can speak to Maine, and my staff will be following up 
with yours and the subcommittee's [staff] on some details.
    But as Bath Iron Works, specifically, in Maine, is working 
to grow their workforce, they are building the destroyers, as 
you know, sir. They are looking at accelerated training 
programs to bring in new unskilled workers, get them the skills 
they need to get a foot inside the yard. The union is really 
working with the company to look at the continued ongoing 
training opportunity from there.
    But there is also, you know, a deeper relationship as well, 
with Maine Maritime Academy, where, you know, a true, more 
traditional apprenticeship program as well, which is important, 
I think, when you are looking at the career opportunity for 
young men and women wanting to get into the shipbuilding trade.
    But, Admiral Galinis, I wanted to ask--one thing that we 
have seen at Bath Iron Works, certainly other private yards, 
with fluctuations where we see increases in--decreases in the 
shipyard workflow schedule can lead to issues, which I know you 
are familiar with the term ``the bathtub effect'' where we end 
up with, you know, an older workforce that is, you know, 
looking to retire, moving on, and then a very young workforce 
that is--as the yard accelerates and is growing, and they are 
lacking that kind of middle experience group. It can cause a 
lot of problems, and, you know, I think certainly a big concern 
at a lot of private yards.
    Are you seeing similar outcomes and effects at public 
shipyards with their workforce? And, if so, do you have any 
recommendations on how to utilize training and other methods to 
maintain a skilled workforce at our public shipyards?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. We are seeing that. And I will 
ask Admiral Markle to talk about the training strategy that he 
has put in place in the public shipyards. But we are seeing 
that.
    And if you look at the demographics in the public 
shipyards, and go back, you know, I will say 10 years or so, 
you know, the average experience of our mechanics in the yards 
at that point was in the 14- to 15-year point, okay? If you 
looked at that same metric today, it is down to about 7 to 8 
years. So, you know, you kind of see that delta in the 
experience, okay, of the trade.
    So we are absolutely seeing that, and I will tell you, from 
my experience, having worked with both the public and the 
private sector side, that is a common trait as you indicated, 
sir, across, you know, both public and private yards, and I 
would say both in repair as well as new construction.
    And so I will ask Admiral Markle to kind of talk about what 
he is doing in training on the public side.
    Admiral Markle. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I appreciate the 
question, Congressman. So just like you talked about, so, it is 
providing the opportunities for the future artisans to enter 
the workforce and provide them growth opportunities, whether 
that is through a high school work-study program where you 
provide some level of initial understanding and opportunity for 
the folks that enter the shipyard and understand what the 
trades are, further developing it into an apprenticeship 
program, to your point partnering with the local community 
college that can ultimately provide them, alongside their trade 
skills, the college skills necessary to work on both their 
associate's degree when they graduate from the apprentice 
program and then leveraging to build upon that later on as they 
develop into baccalaureate and wherever they may go.
    To the question on training, of course, you know, the 
apprenticeship program is wonderful, and it is a great 
opportunity to develop someone into a journeyman. But, of 
course, everyone needs work along the way in order to make sure 
that their golf game stays the way they want it to be.
    So, providing just-in-time training when needed in order to 
continue the development of those folks, to make sure that 
their experience level is where they need to be, and to perform 
the way we expect them to be at the waterfront, is incredibly 
important.
    That same program, of course, is what we utilize to get 
people faster [inaudible] and reduce our time to train folks by 
upwards of--on average of 50 percent, and takes it from 1 to 2 
years to getting people on the deck plate to 1 to 4 months.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you to both of you for that. I think it 
is helpful background for the committee. Appreciate it very 
much.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Golden, I believe your time has expired. 
Thank you very much.
    Mr. Scott, you are next.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me. Mr. Scott, before you go, I am 
going to go Scott, Luria. I noticed that Mr. Kahele was here 
earlier. I don't know if he is still on. If he is still on, he 
will come after you, Mr. Scott. Otherwise, it will be Mrs. 
Luria. Go ahead, Mr. Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And most of my 
questions revolve around the $21 billion over 20 years, and 
certainly $21 billion is a lot of money. But when it is spread 
over 20 years, and over the course of the magnitude of the 
shipyards that we have, you know, just the same questions that 
other members had about, you know, the money ended up going to 
other places, and whether or not it was going to be enough to 
put us in the position we need to be to service the fleet.
    So I will skip that and move to kind of a Russia/China-type 
question if you will. Are our investments in our shipyards 
keeping pace with what we are seeing from our peer competitors 
in China and Russia? Or are they doing a better job of--with 
their infrastructure for the maintenance of their fleets than 
we are?
    Admiral Galinis. Sir, I would have to tell you at this 
point I think the yards in China are probably more advanced 
than what we have in the U.S., at least certainly in the public 
sector side right now.
    Mr. Scott. How far ahead of us are they? And when did they 
pass us?
    Admiral Galinis. Well, they have long had much more 
shipbuilding capacity than we have, just with the number of 
shipyards. I don't have those numbers off the top of my head. 
We can certainly provide those. But they have had a larger 
number of shipyards than we have for some time now. I think 
what you are seeing as of late is kind of an increased focus 
on, you know, building navy platforms, a transitioning from 
commercial shipbuilding into the military shipbuilding, sir.
    Mr. Scott. Sure. And I suppose I could have prefaced that 
that I was speaking more specifically on the military 
shipbuilding. Just approximately, I mean, did they catch us on 
the military side 5 years ago? Was it 10 years ago? When did--
--
    Admiral Galinis. Yeah. Let me--I would have to go probably 
do, you know--I mean, they have really--from my assessment, 
really kind of in the last 5 to 10 years, they have really 
turned the corner on their military shipbuilding. I don't know 
that their processes and their capabilities, quite frankly, are 
better than ours. In fact, I would say they are not. I think 
what we do, inside our public shipyards, there is no other 
group of shipyards in the world that maintains nuclear ships 
like we do. Okay?
    Mr. Scott. Yes.
    Admiral Galinis. So we have a tremendous capability. What 
we need to do is get better at how we use that capability.
    Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
    Admiral Galinis. But I will turn it over to Admiral Markle.
    Mr. Scott. They don't have any--I doubt they have anywhere 
near the quality that we have. I do worry about their ability 
to pump out quantity, and quantity, you know, at some point 
becomes a quality in and of itself when you are in a fight.
    I do--if I can mention something for you and for the 
members. Admiral Faller the other day testified that Communist 
China's money laundering is the number one source of illicit 
funds for the transnational criminal organizations. It was the 
first time that I had heard somebody at Admiral Faller's level 
call it out publicly like that in a hearing.
    And then General Townsend a week later called out China for 
the illegal fishing off of the coast of Africa and the damage 
that it was doing and the widespread hunger that it had the 
potential to create inside of that continent, in several 
countries in that continent, and the potential civil unrest.
    You guys said that the China fight would be a naval fight. 
I mean, what is your assessment of China's activity in the 
Taiwan area and the illegal fishing?
    Admiral Galinis. Yeah. Sir, I really appreciate the 
question. I am not sure I am in a position to give you a real 
good answer there. But we can certainly take a question and get 
back with you on that one, sir.
    Mr. Scott. Well, I know that wasn't the subject of the 
meeting, but it is--I picked up very clearly that some 
extremely high-ranking military leaders that I've very long 
trusted are now speaking publicly about things that we used to 
say behind closed doors. And I picked up on the G7 [Group of 
Seven] coming together to effectively caution China on any 
action against Taiwan.
    I worry about our dependence on not just chips but other 
things similar to what we would consider to be semiconductor or 
an optical chip and dependence on companies in other countries 
that manufacture those that we have to have in all of our 
computer systems, whether it be an aircraft or a naval vessel.
    With that, I yield the remainder of my time. Thank you for 
what you all do.
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Scott.
    I want to bring to your attention, and I think the other 
committee members probably know it also, we have been working 
on trying to energize the American shipbuilding industry using 
the export of natural gas and petroleum products, but that 
would be on American-built ships.
    We do know that the American shipbuilding industry has 
atrophied and basically given the commercial market to Japan, 
Korea, and China. And in that, we have lost a great deal of our 
capacity upon which the Navy would depend, not only for the 
ongoing repair but for ships that we would need to get to 350 
or even more.
    So it is an issue that goes beyond just the naval ships. It 
goes to the commercial ships. Similarly, the Jones Act plays 
into this, and the ability of the shipyards.
    My final point I guess for all of us, and, Admirals, for 
your awareness and pushback to us, is that the shipyards are 
going--the privately owned shipyards are going to need to be 
upgraded, capital upgrades, particularly the smaller ones that 
could provide additional services.
    And I would like to have from you, Admiral Galinis, the 
estimate of smaller private shipyards that you would intend to 
contract with for certain kinds of repairs. I want to feed that 
back into the issue that was raised earlier by one of our 
colleagues about the infrastructure bill.
    Okay. Mrs. Luria, it is your turn.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the first round, I 
discussed the class maintenance plan for the Virginia-class 
submarine, but I would like to shift to surface ships for the 
second round. Many people use the term ``legacy platforms'' to 
describe anything that they want to get rid of, and I found 
that it is interesting today that people are using the term 
``legacy platform'' for ships that are not even 10 years old, 
like the LCS [littoral combat ship], the first four in the 
class, and they are also applying it to the Ticonderoga-class 
cruisers, which still have usable service life remaining.
    I served as the XO [executive officer] on USS Anzio, so I 
understand it costs more, and it is difficult to maintain these 
ships. But global presence matters, even if the presence isn't 
the latest shiny object. And divesting of these platforms today 
will--their replacement is nothing more than a concept in the 
future. I don't think it is prudent, and, as we know, both the 
outgoing and incoming INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] 
commanders testified recently to the Senate that China could 
make an offensive move on Taiwan in the next 6 years.
    So it is curious to me why we would suggest getting rid of 
these platforms without a replacement. So I think the Navy 
needs to look at today, Battle Force 2025, before we can truly 
talk about Battle Force 2045.
    So just some information that I would like to know, Admiral 
Galinis, if you could provide the committee--the amount of 
funds over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan] that would be 
required to maintain the 11 cruisers and the first 4 LCS that 
the Navy is proposing to decommission in the Battle Force 2045.
    Admiral Galinis. Okay. Yes, ma'am. We will take that 
question, and we will get a more detailed answer than I can 
provide you in this setting. But I understand the question, I 
think it is a fair one, and we will get you that information. 
Yes, ma'am.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Thank you. I look forward to that. And 
next, sort of pivoting back to the CBO report that I discussed 
during the first round of questions, it has a really 
interesting chart in there where it compares workload versus 
the workforce. So if you look back to when we had eight 
nuclear-capable shipyards, the workforce exceeded the workload 
capacity by about 10 percent, and then we reduced to four 
nuclear shipyards and the workforce and workload were balanced 
for about 5 years.
    However, as we decommission conventional carriers, the 
workload exceeds the workforce in every year. And in the CBO 
report, it forecasts out that even with the full implementation 
of the SIOP, that workload will exceed workforce capacity in 25 
of the next 30 years. I think that is not even taking into 
account the ships that we plan to build, the additional 
submarines, and Battle Force 2045. It is clear that the public 
shipyards will not be able to maintain the pace of that 
maintenance.
    So, Admiral Galinis, in your assessment, with such an 
ambitious plan as Battle Force 2045, and the number of 
submarines we plan to build, do you feel like it is time to 
invest in another nuclear-capable shipyard?
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, ma'am. I think that is a great 
question. I will tell you, at this point--and it has to go back 
to the 15-year maintenance plan that we are working on right 
now. I will tell you that submarine maintenance is probably my 
number one priority right now.
    And how we execute that, especially as we get out into the 
late 2020s and into the early 2030s, okay, when we start, you 
know, we are going to--as you well know, you know, based on the 
ship construction plan, we are going to go through a little bit 
of a valley here over the next few years, but then it quickly 
ramps up in the late 2020s and into the 2030s.
    And our ability to be able to support that fleet and to--
you know, what we are doing right now with the SIOP effort, the 
naval sustainment system work, to really kind of buy back that 
productive capacity, and then lay over the 15-year plan to 
determine, do we have the capacity within the public yards, and 
then how much would we outsource to the private yards. That 
would probably better inform that type of a discussion, and I 
am happy to have that with you when we get that analysis 
completed.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And just--we have a minute 
remaining, so I just wanted to point out that, you know, the 
one thing I hear most frequently in my visits across the 
waterfront here in Hampton Roads, you know, one-quarter of all 
of the shipbuilding and repair in the country happens here, and 
you have referenced the importance of the region for 
maintaining the Navy readiness.
    It is level loading. It is level loading of the port so 
that there can be predictability, so that our partners in the 
private shipyards can make the investment in their 
infrastructure and their workforce.
    And so I went and visited the Gettysburg and the Vicksburg 
recently, and, you know, here we are, you know, it is shocking 
when they have made investments in the work that is coming down 
the pipeline to modernize the cruisers, yet all of a sudden a 
plan comes out now with--it shows yet more unpredictability 
that, you know, we might decommission 10 or 11 of these 
cruisers.
    And, you know, every time that happens, it is 600, 800, 
maybe more workers across the waterfront who are laid off, and 
those are skills that are difficult to replace. So, you know, 
just making a point of what I am hearing the most from the 
waterfront here and our private partners.
    And I know my time has expired, so I will yield back.
    Admiral Galinis. I would just say, ma'am, I appreciate that 
comment, and I get the same thing when we interface with 
industry. And as Admiral Ver Hage pointed out, you know, that 
stable and predictable workload, I think we owe industry that 
plan. So, thank you for those comments. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mrs. Luria.
    We are definitely going to have a roundtable with the 
private shipyard owners to discuss a range of issues, some of 
which have already been mentioned here. Certainly, the 
scheduling is an issue, what kind of repairs need to be done, 
all of those things.
    And, Admirals, we will invite you to that. It will have to 
be an informal hearing, just because of the scheduling.
    I believe we now have Mr. Kilmer.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks again to 
you and your staff for the generosity of letting me 
participate.
    Admiral, I worry a bit--and maybe it is just after this 
last year--I worry that the sands of the hourglass could run 
out before we have had a chance to shore up the infrastructure 
at our shipyards. You know, what we have learned over the past 
year is that anything can happen, and it is certainly possible 
that a natural disaster could strike one of the shipyards at 
any moment and render it or a crucial portion of it unusable. I 
touch wood every day that a seismic event doesn't happen here 
in our neck of the woods.
    So has the SIOP program office built any contingency plans 
into the SIOP in the event that a natural disaster occurs? Or 
would the program office need to kind of go back to the drawing 
board and completely rework the plan? I realize we can't plan 
for every possible scenario, but I am just curious to know what 
level of preparation has been completed in case a shipyard 
experiences an unexpected catastrophe.
    Admiral Galinis. Yes, sir. No, I appreciate that question. 
I think it is a fair one, you know, and it is especially 
pertinent up in the northwest as you indicated. You know, I 
think our near-term opportunities to accelerate, as I mentioned 
earlier, are on the design and the planning piece. And, you 
know, we have got to get that work done, and then, you know, 
from there we can advance into the actual construction and 
execution stage.
    You know, that work is ongoing. The execution work, the 
production work is ongoing, as you well know, up in Portsmouth. 
They are well along. We have got some fairly significant 
projects going on down in Norfolk right now. We are working 
through the planning piece out in Pearl to be able to--you 
know, to start, in the 2023 timeframe, the dry dock in Pearl, 
the new dry dock out there.
    And I will tell you we are going through right now, you 
know, what happens in Dry Dock 6 up there in Puget and how that 
planning piece comes out--plays out. So, you know, of the three 
dry docks that we are actually building new, if you will, in 
Portsmouth, Pearl, and Puget--you know, that is probably the 
third in line at this point based on the current plan that we 
have.
    You know, if there is opportunities to accelerate that--
because I will tell you, as you mentioned, you know, there is 
concern about the dry dock up there and the seismic, you know, 
safety of it. And, you know, that happened because it was 
designed and built prior to the current seismic requirements 
that are in place in your part of the country, sir. Over.
    Mr. Kilmer. I want to touch on one other subject. But 
quickly, Admiral, I guess I was trying to get at, are there 
contingency plans in place if there is a disaster or does the 
SIOP program office just have to go back to the drawing board?
    Admiral Galinis. Yeah. We have not----
    Mr. Kilmer. And other--Puget or any place else.
    Admiral Galinis. Right. Right. I mean, I can't say that is 
part of our plan. We would have to--we would readjust. I liken 
it to a, kind of a ship construction contract when we have a 
major hurricane, for example. You know, and think about, you 
know, Katrina hitting the gulf coast several years ago, and I 
was involved in that, with our--you know, with our plan or, you 
know, even like we kind of came through COVID this last year. 
You mentioned the pandemic and how this year was unlike, you 
know, anything we have experienced.
    And, you know, frankly, it was the--you know, it was the 
ingenuity, the resourcefulness of the workforce and the 
leadership in the shipyards that really kind of kept the 
shipyards open. As you know, we didn't close any of our 
shipyards for a single day over the last year. You know, there 
were--sometimes they were better than others, but the team kept 
getting after it. And so we would take the same approach.
    Mr. Kilmer. That is a good segue to the other thing I 
wanted to ask. I think our public shipyards undertook a 
herculean task of continuing to work. I think it was textbook 
in terms of adapting in the face of a pandemic.
    Having said that, obviously, we lost workdays. The Navy 
lost approximately 66,000 workdays per month across the four 
yards. I was encouraged to see the Reserve force step up to 
fill that gap. At Puget and other public shipyards, as you 
know, the Reserve mobilized over 1,300 Navy Reserve sailors or 
Surge Maintenance.
    I understand that many of them have been demobilized. Have 
the COVID-induced backlogs been eliminated? And outside of 
COVID, would the shipyards benefit from an increased employee 
base?
    Admiral Galinis. Yeah. I will turn it over to Admiral 
Markle.
    Admiral Markle. Hey, sir. Appreciate the discussion. So 
particularly in--you know, having the opportunity to 
acknowledge the absolutely fantastic support we got from our 
Reserve force who obviously exist even in the landlocked port 
of Georgia. Many folks from the entirety of the country came in 
support of what we trained them to go do, and when we mobilized 
they came to the fight.
    So I would say that some of the discussion of what we had 
as far as delays, those are already incurred. We have rolled 
those into the schedules and adjusted for them. The SURGEMAIN 
workforce was vitally important. As we saw the ebbs and flows 
in COVID-positive rates throughout the country, they backfilled 
and helped us stem the tide, maintaining a productive level of 
workforce to preclude further delay.
    So I would say that is how I would answer the question, and 
that we have accounted for what we ultimately found ourselves 
in in the early days of COVID, put in place the mitigations, 
one of which you addressed in SURGEMAIN, and ultimately got 
ourselves to a stable workload-workforce balance where we sit 
right now.
    Mr. Kilmer. Thank you.
    Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Kilmer.
    Mr. Wilson, do you have another question? I am complete 
with questions and prepared to close out.
    Mr. Wilson. I yield back. But I, again, thank the 
participants today. And what inspiring people that we have 
serving our country. We appreciate it so much. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
    Admiral Galinis. Thank you, sir, and we thank your son for 
his service.
    Mr. Wilson. A proud Navy doctor. We are really grateful to 
the Navy family. So thank you.
    Admiral Galinis. Very good. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi. So I think we have completed the hearing 
here. We have got some follow-ups that we have talked about 
throughout the hearing today. Staff will be in touch with 
Admiral Galinis, and, of course, Admiral Ver Hage and Admiral 
Markle.
    We want you to be able to do your job, and we want to be a 
partner in getting that done. My sense of the Department of 
Defense over the last decade, but maybe longer than that, is it 
has neglected the maintenance across all services. We are going 
service by service. It is now the Navy's turn today. And we 
want you to have the resources you need to adequately maintain 
all of the fleet.
    And as has been said here, when you buy new ships or 
submarines, that the maintenance requirements are built into 
that issue at the very outset. That has not been the case all 
too often. We will be pursuing all of that. There are other 
things we will be talking about.
    Admirals, we appreciate your testimony today. We look 
forward to working with you. Our staff will be working--the 
professional staff will be working with you on follow-up 
questions.
    If any of the members have specific questions, they can ask 
directly or they can come to us and we will put those forward 
going forward.
    I want to thank the members for their participation. Mr. 
Wilson, thank you for filling in here for Mr. Lamborn.
    Generals, thank you--excuse me, Admirals, thank you so very 
much for your participation today.
    And with that, this meeting is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 6, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 6, 2021

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 6, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

    Mr. Garamendi. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 
FY2021, the House Armed Services Committee tasked the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to report to Congress on the feasibility and advisability 
of using automated manufacturing technologies to increase the supply of 
suitable, mission-critical repair parts available to the Department of 
Defense.
    Vice Admiral William J. Galinis, you previously stated that the key 
piece of repairing our ships and subs is availability of parts, whether 
those are parts coming from the supply system, or depot level 
repairable pool items. Being cognizant of the reporting requirement 
that was due on March 1st, 2021, and your repair parts challenges, what 
has the Navy learned in compiling the information required for this 
report?
    What tools does the Navy need to further leverage the manufacturing 
innovations being made in this space and how are you reaching out to 
the industrial base, specifically the OEMs, small businesses and non-
traditional defense contractors to signal that you need help with this 
issue? Who have you reached out to so far in this process?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
    Mr. Bergman. As of 22 March 2021, we understand an additional 
$300.5 million for the Department of Defense to address readiness 
activities has not been released by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. Have these funds been released to the Navy? When released, how 
much of these funds will go towards the Navy Common Readiness Model''?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Sustainment Modeling and the application of the Navy 
Common Readiness Modeling (NCRM) is optimizing decision making and 
sustainment investments, helping to reduce lifecycle and readiness 
costs, put money where it's needed most and provide predictive insight 
for the Warfighter to maintain readiness. Can you provide the Navy's 
detailed roadmap and timeline of implementation for the NCRM across all 
sea platforms and systems? When is full implementation of the NCRM 
expected to be completed? Do you have appropriate funding in the FYDP 
to complete this effort?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. Is the 20-year Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan 
(SIOP) based on the needs of a peacetime Navy or a wartime Navy?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. In retrospect, was it a mistake to close (4) public 
shipyards in the 1990s?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. Should the need arise to establish new public shipyards 
like what happened after the start of World War II, does the Navy have 
the authorities it needs to procure the land and build a modern 
shipyard to private industry standards on a wartime footing? If not, 
what laws or regulations would the Navy seek relief from?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. What is the optimal number of drydocks needed across the 
(4) public shipyards for a wartime Navy whose ships may need to be 
repaired from battle damage?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. How is ``super flooding'' dry docks to float submarines 
they service in and out of the dock an efficient use of taxpayer 
dollars given it damages electrical equipment that is not meant to be 
submerged?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. When new classes of warships are built, why aren't there 
dry docks at the public shipyards long enough to hold them in the event 
they need to be repaired from battle damage shortly after 
commissioning?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. What is the private industry standard for the age of dry 
docks, shipyard production shop facilities, capital equipment, and 
general shipyard facilities like buildings and warehouses? Is the 
private industry standards for all of the above more optimal for a 
wartime Navy?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. If the 6 percent minimum infrastructure investment 
required of the Navy by law is only sufficient to prevent further 
degradation in mission-essential facilities, what is the recommended 
minimum infrastructure investment needed to put the U.S. Navy on a 
wartime footing?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. Much has also been written about our ship repair 
backlog, the sad case of the Los Angeles-class submarine Boise comes to 
mind and the fact that the ship has spent over 10 percent of its 
expected life waiting to be overhauled. Also, it is my understanding 
that both our cruiser and destroyer modification plans are now years 
behind schedules, forcing us to retire platforms before we had 
originally planned. What is the Navy's plan to add repair capacity to 
its industrial base and to set predictable schedules for commercial 
repair yards to plan and execute?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. In terms of preparing for wartime operations, how does 
the U.S. Navy's (4) public shipyards compare to Russia's or Communist 
China's public shipyards?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
    Mr. Golden. As the VIRGINIA (VA) CLASS sustainment effort continues 
to have issues with VA Class part supply shortages due to a limited 
pool of suppliers and a lack of tracking data during earlier 
maintenance availabilities: How is the Program Office leveraging its 
relationships with public shipyards to mitigate supply shortage issues 
moving forward? Are the VA Class supply shortage lessons learned being 
collected by the Program Office and public shipyards to minimize 
similar issues with procurement of the COLUMBIA class?
    Admiral Galinis. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. Do you feel the $21 billion dollar estimate for the SIOP 
is adequate to address the challenges identified here today and if 
further funds were authorized, is the Navy prepared to allocate these 
resources to meet established timelines?
    Admiral Ver Hage. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Moore. In this subcommittee I have advocated for the need of an 
OIB wide infrastructure optimization plan. What can be learned from the 
success and shortcomings of the SIOP as we begin to explore how to best 
address issues across the entire military depot and industrial 
facilities ecosystem?
    Admiral Ver Hage. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Moore. We have heard today about the wave of retirements 
experienced amongst shipyard workers due to in part to furloughs and 
work stoppages. Do you feel recent changes to hiring authorities in the 
organic industrial base have given the flexibility needed to fill 
critical vacancies at shipyards? How can this committee best help the 
services where hiring challenges are concerned?
    Admiral Ver Hage. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Moore. Do you feel the $21 billion dollar estimate for the SIOP 
is adequate to address the challenges identified here today and if 
further funds were authorized, is the Navy prepared to allocate these 
resources to meet established timelines?
    Admiral Markle. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Moore. In this subcommittee I have advocated for the need of an 
OIB wide infrastructure optimization plan. What can be learned from the 
success and shortcomings of the SIOP as we begin to explore how to best 
address issues across the entire military depot and industrial 
facilities ecosystem?
    Admiral Markle. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Moore. We have heard today about the wave of retirements 
experienced amongst shipyard workers due to in part to furloughs and 
work stoppages. Do you feel recent changes to hiring authorities in the 
organic industrial base have given the flexibility needed to fill 
critical vacancies at shipyards? How can this committee best help the 
services where hiring challenges are concerned?
    Admiral Markle. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]