[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-26]
THE AAV MISHAP INVESTIGATION:
HOW TO BUILD A CULTURE OF
SAFETY TO AVOID PREVENTABLE
TRAINING ACCIDENTS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 3, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-486 WASHINGTON : 2022
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JACKIE SPEIER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JASON CROW, Colorado AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan, Vice JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
Chair MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
Ian Bennitt, Professional Staff Member
Sean Falvey, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
WITNESSES
Kitchener, VADM Roy I., USN, Commander, Naval Surface Forces..... 20
Olson, MajGen Gregg P., USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for
Plans, Policies, Operations, United States Marine Corps........ 21
Ostrovsky, Peter, Father of Marine LCpl Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky...... 5
Thomas, Gen Gary L., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps.......................................................... 19
Vienna, Peter, Father of Navy Corpsman Christopher ``Bobby'' Gnem 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kitchener, VADM Roy I........................................ 73
Ostrovsky, Peter............................................. 54
Thomas, Gen Gary L........................................... 61
Vienna, Peter................................................ 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE AAV MISHAP INVESTIGATION:
HOW TO BUILD A CULTURE OF SAFETY TO AVOID PREVENTABLE TRAINING
ACCIDENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Monday, May 3, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:02 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. John Garamendi (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Garamendi. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I call
to order this hearing of the Readiness Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. First, some administrative and
technical notes.
I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members be
allowed to participate in today's briefing after all
subcommittee members have had the opportunity to ask questions.
Is there any objection?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
I also ask unanimous consent that noncommittee members, if
any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
committee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is
there any objection?
Hearing none, without objection, noncommittee members will
be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. And that
will be Mr. Levin in the second and Seth Moulton in the first.
Members are reminded that they must be visible on screen
within the software platform for the purposes of identity
verification. Members must continue to use the software
platform's video function while attending the hearing unless
they experience connectivity issues or other technical problems
that render the members unable to fully participate on camera.
If you experience technical difficulties, please contact the
committee staff.
When you are recognized, the video will be broadcast via
television and internet feeds. You will be recognized as normal
for questions, but if you want to speak at another time, you
can interrupt and seek verbal recognition.
Please mute your microphone when you are not speaking and
remember to unmute prior to speaking. Please be aware that
there is a slight lag between when you start speaking and when
the camera shot switches to you.
Please remember to keep the software platform's video
function on for the entirety of the time you are attending this
hearing.
If you leave for a short period for reasons other than
joining a different proceeding, please leave your video
function on.
If you are leaving to join a different proceeding or will
be absent for a significant period of time, you should exit the
software platform entirely and then rejoin if you return.
Please be advised that I have designated a committee staff
member to mute unrecognized members' microphones, if necessary.
Please use the platform's chat function to communicate with the
staff regarding technical or logistical support issues.
Finally, there is a 5-minute countdown clock on the
software platform's display, usually in the upper right-hand
corner. I will remind you, if necessary, when your time is up.
Now, with these administrative tasks out of the way, I
would like to focus our attention on the hearing at hand. I
will reserve the majority of my opening remarks for the second
panel.
In our first panel, we will hear from the parents of two of
the nine young Americans who died on July 30. Those nine young
men volunteered to serve their country. They died because of a
fully preventable training accident and a total disregard for
their safety.
This tragedy should never have happened. It resulted from a
cascading series of failures, all of which were preventable.
I can think of no better way to begin this hearing than to
take a moment to honor their memory.
I am going to read the names of the eight Marines and one
sailor that we lost, and then I would ask for a moment of
silence.
First, Private First Class Bryan J. Baltierra, Lance
Corporal Marco A. Barranco, Private First Class Evan A. Bath,
Navy Hospital Corpsman Third Class Christopher Gnem, Lance
Corporal Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, Lance Corporal Guillermo S.
Perez, Corporal Wesley A. Rodd, Lance Corporal Chase D.
Sweetwood, and Corporal Cesar A. Villanueva.
And now, in their memory and in their honor, a moment of
silence.
[Moment of silence.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
I will now turn to Mr. Lamborn for any opening remarks he
may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for honoring the
memory of these nine exemplary young men who wanted to serve
our country. Thank you for doing that.
It is sad that we have to be here today and to have the
parents of these young men appear before us. And I am hopeful,
and I am working hard with you, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that
this doesn't have to happen again and we have to have a similar
kind of hearing in the future.
So these young men just wanted to serve our country. It is
fitting that we honor their memory. It is also fitting that we
get to the bottom of whatever the causes were behind this,
including holding accountable anyone who needs to be held
accountable.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
I would like now to welcome and thank our witnesses. First,
Mr. Peter Vienna, the father of Navy Hospital Corpsman Third
Class Christopher Gnem. And secondly, Mr. Peter Ostrovsky, the
father of [Lance Corporal] Jack Ostrovsky, United States Marine
Corps.
Mr. Vienna, if you would like to start.
Hit your mute button, please.
You are good to go.
STATEMENT OF PETER VIENNA, FATHER OF NAVY CORPSMAN CHRISTOPHER
``BOBBY'' GNEM
Mr. Vienna. Good morning, esteemed members of the House
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about our
son, Christopher ``Doc'' Gnem. His family and friends called
him Bobby.
I wish you could also see and hear from my wife today. She
has chosen to allow me to speak on her behalf because she would
be unable to do so without breaking down. I can tell you this:
Her raw emotion and the effect she would have on this panel
would be deeply moving.
I believe all nine mothers should be heard, because today
we are not only mourning our son, but also we mourn the eight
other families that are navigating through this pain.
Nancy became a single mother when Bob was still an infant.
She struggled to give him and his two sisters the best possible
life she could. I came into their lives when Bobby was 14 years
old. What I witnessed was the most incredible mother-son
relationship. The two of them literally lived for each other.
Bobby was a natural athlete, excelling in judo and jujitsu,
never once losing a match. As a high school student athlete, he
played football and basketball, voted team captain as well as
most inspirational on his varsity basketball team. In both
basketball and jujitsu, he volunteered his free time to mentor
the younger boys. He was truly a sensei and coach's dream.
He was the best of us, the favorite of his grandparents,
aunts, uncles, and all of his cousins who looked up to him as a
role model. I can say without prejudice that Bobby touched more
lives positively in his 22 years than most people do in a
lifetime.
Bobby, along with eight others are dead now, and here is
just a short list of some of the reasons given in the
investigation.
Forty-year-old AAVs [assault amphibious vehicles] designed
without safety in mind that came off the ``dead-line,'' end of
life, deemed ``not seaworthy,'' should never even have been put
back in the water.
No real safety boat for this training exercise. Both Marine
and Navy's own policy states two safety boats for every six
AAVs in the water. There were 13 that day.
No emergency egress training. They knew they were sinking
for quite some time, yet they were found with their full body
armor still on, some even with their helmets and rifles still
strapped to their body. They obviously had no idea what to do.
No radio contact or eyes on the AAVs. Our boy's boat was
sinking for 45 minutes while chasing the Somerset that was
traveling away and conducting helicopter exercises.
All 23 gallons of transmission fluid were lost on the trip
to the island. Only 6 gallons were available to replace it, yet
that AAV was sent back into the water to try and reach the
Somerset.
An AAV crew that did not follow its own emergency SOPs
[standard operating procedures]. Had they done so, the AAV
still would have sunk but not with our boys in it. I point that
back at leadership's failed duty to properly train and certify
that crew, just another result of a terrible lack of readiness.
His mother, his surviving sisters, Jasmine and Jade, and
his fiancee Savannah, who received her surprise engagement ring
in a box 7 months after he was killed, have not been able to
accept this loss, especially now knowing how incredibly
preventable it was.
Losing her only son has broken my wife. She is suffering
both mentally and physically. For me, well, frankly, for the
last 9 months I have been on suicide watch. I had no control
over losing my son, but I refuse to lose my wife.
I also refuse to call what happened on July 30 a
``mishap,'' the definition of which is an ``unlucky accident.''
We have all seen that nightmare of an investigation, so we know
that what actually occurred was a predictable outcome resulting
from the reckless disregard for human life by a command that
ignored its own safety standards and operational procedures,
putting mission above the young lives they were supposed to
protect.
Not a combat mission, this was just training. And if I hear
one more time, ``We have to train like we fight,'' I think my
head will explode, because for decades now it has been true
that every year the military loses more lives in training than
they do in combat.
Before I go any further, I wish to say for the record that
even after all the recklessness and gross negligence that took
our only son, my wife and I are still not anti-military. On the
contrary, we believe we owe it to our son to do what we can to
effect the change that leads to a better, stronger, and safer
military. We actually want to help.
I repeat, what happened on July 30 was no ``mishap.'' It
was yet another example of what should be expected under any
institution that is allowed to self-police and self-punish,
allowed to deflect blame away from those at the top, all while
hiding behind an antiquated law that protects it from the
accountability of answering legally to those that it recklessly
harms.
No possibility for a day in court, resulting in our troops
becoming second-class citizens the moment they swear in. Yes, I
am speaking of the Feres Doctrine. And I would argue that its
existence is what will continue to foster this culture across
all the military branches where medical malpractice, sexual
assault, and training deaths that far outpace combat deaths
will continue to plague our precious troops and the civilian
families that love them.
To the Marine and Navy command [inaudible] our sons down,
as well as the subcommittee members questioning them today, my
wife wants me to ask this: What if your son or daughter was on
that AAV?
Our son will never come home. Look, how do we keep other
families from suffering this unbearable pain? Please don't
allow our nine sons to die in vain.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vienna can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, thank you very much for your
testimony, and we certainly attempt to understand the depth of
your sorrow.
I would like now to turn to Peter Ostrovsky.
Peter.
STATEMENT OF PETER OSTROVSKY, FATHER OF
MARINE LCPL JACK-RYAN OSTROVSKY
Mr. Ostrovsky. Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member Lamborn,
and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Readiness and
noncommittee members, on behalf of my entire family, thank you
for the opportunity to speak with you about our fallen son,
Jack-Ryan Ostrovsky, who was a lance corporal and 20 years old
when he drowned with eight other Marines and a Navy corpsman
during a preventable AAV incident off of San Clemente Island,
California.
Our son, Jack-Ryan, and his fraternal twin brother, Samuel,
were born prematurely at 26 weeks and were hospitalized for
2\1/2\ months in the neonatal intensive care unit, along with
another month in a local hospital nursery, before they came
home to us. They were both fighters from the get-go.
My wife, Lynn Ostrovsky, gave up her career as a flight
attendant with a major airline to be a stay-at-home mom. I am a
retired Federal law enforcement officer who dedicated 31 years
of my professional life to service with the Treasury Department
and the Department of Homeland Security.
As a teenager, Jack-Ryan was a very loving boy. He loved
swimming, mountain biking, hiking, snowboarding, marksmanship
training, and military history.
A year after graduating from high school, and after we
moved as a family to Bend, Oregon, Jack-Ryan decided to enlist
in the Marine Corps. He told us that he wanted to serve his
country and do things that he could not do in the civilian
world. He wanted to start at the bottom as a grunt and become a
Marine Corps rifleman.
Jack-Ryan loved being a Marine, and we loved that he loved
being a Marine. With only 13 months of service, he was already
talking about reenlisting and his dream of pursuing a billet in
special operations and making the military his lifelong career.
We will always be proud of Jack-Ryan. He followed in the
footsteps of his great-grandfather, Bill Fischman, who served
in the Navy, and his grandfather, Jack Fischman, who served in
the Army, along with becoming the first Ostrovsky to serve in
the U.S. military.
His commanding officer described Jack-Ryan as a future
leader and a standout who would seek out fellow Marines that
were struggling and offer them a kind word and a smile.
A week before the AAV incident, Jack-Ryan told me about his
concerns with the AAVs and that, ``They sink all the time.'' It
was hard for me to believe that statement, but now I know there
was more to the story that was the basis for his concern.
The loss of Jack-Ryan has destroyed our family's future
plans. Jack-Ryan was supposed to be the next leader of our
family, who was going to create his own legacy of success
through his military career. We were looking forward to
watching Jack-Ryan build a family of his own and blessing us
with grandchildren. Jack-Ryan was also supposed to look after
his brother Samuel, who has suffered from a life-long
educational disability.
When the Marine Corps briefed Lynn and I on the results of
the investigation, we were shocked and disappointed by the top-
down recklessness, gross negligence, and lack of duty of care
for our son and all of the Marines and sailors in his AAV
company.
While reviewing the investigation report, many issues stood
out to me that are a cause for concern and questions, namely:
Why were dead-lined AAVs, deemed to be in poor condition
and not seaworthy, assigned to a unit that would be deployed as
America's maritime response force?
Why did my son's AAV company not initiate any of the
relevant prerequisite egress training which would have better
prepared him and the others for such an emergency?
Why did the pre-exercise confirmation briefing and its
sections of risk to mission and risk to force not mention any
of the waterborne risks associated with utilizing AAVs that
were in poor condition and embarking Marines that were not
adequately trained?
But yet, the only identified risk was assessed to be
``unlikely to occur'' and was that there could be ``a casualty
to the assault force during embarkation/debarkation
operations'' on San Clemente Island and onboard the USS
Somerset.
As an experienced Federal investigator who has planned,
conducted, and approved many high-risk law enforcement
operations, the lack of detail in the briefing tells me one of
two things: Either it was intentional as an alleged cover-up
for the lack of readiness, or the exercise planners were not
qualified to appropriately assess risk, or perhaps both.
In my opinion, the entire AAV company was placed at extreme
risk due to poor equipment, inadequate training, and a poorly
coordinated and monitored unsafe training exercise.
We expect that the Marine Corps and Navy hold accountable,
from top down, all those who are responsible for this
preventable catastrophic incident, through all of the means
that are available at their disposal, and with transparency.
We also expect that U.S. military systems of accountability
and liability be modernized as a way to ensure that every day,
moving forward, military officers fully appreciate and know the
realities of their burden of command, so that there is no place
for recklessness and gross negligence in the U.S. Marine Corps
and the U.S. Navy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ostrovsky can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
I want to express my deep appreciation and sympathy to our
two presenters. In your presentation, you not only spoke to the
loss that you have had, but you also spoke to the challenge
that the Marine Corps has to create a culture of safety.
I am going to forgo my own questions and would ask my
colleagues to keep their questions short. And really, I want to
get as quickly as possible to the issues that our two witnesses
have presented--the problems that the Marine Corps and the Navy
exhibited in this tragedy.
However, the gavel sheet is as follows. I am going to
withhold my questions. Mr. Lamborn, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Wilson,
and then back to Ms. Speier, in that order.
So, Mr. Lamborn, I turn to you.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to the two fathers and any of the other parents who are
also in this hearing, obviously, your two sons were among our
Nation's finest. There is no question about that.
And we owe it to you to get to the bottom of this so that
you could take solace in the fact that the end result of this
will be that these kinds of accidents will be more prevented in
the future than would have otherwise been the case. And there
is some solace in that.
I will just ask one very brief question per what you just
said, Mr. Chairman.
Do either of you have a comment on the lines of
communication that you had with the Marine Corps after the
incident up until today, any comments that would be helpful to
us to know about? And you will have to unmute your computer.
Mr. Vienna. Speaking to that direct question, I can tell
you that we have filed some complaints about some of the things
that we experienced working with the Casualty Office, through
our Navy Casualty Office.
I would just suggest that in the future they take a look at
what kind of aptitude a person would have that is going to be
assigned to walking a family through this type of madness. I
have expressed those concerns, and I believe they are starting
to be handled. I won't go into detail.
But also, with an investigation like this, we are talking
about finding out that your son has passed away, starting to
get--and not hearing anything back other than, ``Yeah, we don't
know what to tell you. The water was [inaudible] that day and
it just started taking on water and it sunk very rapidly.''
That is basically the story we got.
And then bits and pieces started to come out where there
are questions, but there are 9 months of silence from the other
side. It is maddening for a family.
And then to have them show up at your home 9 months later
and drop a 2,000-page report in your lap and tell you that they
are sorry and then leave you to navigate that and these nine
families to navigate that after the fact was very difficult.
And I can tell you that we pretty much relived it. It is as
if, going through being notified, that your son was killed
twice. But now, with the second time, there is the confusion
and anger and this drive to try to fix it.
So that is kind of where we are left. This investigation
took quite some time.
And I don't doubt that the gentlemen that came, the colonel
and the lieutenant colonel that came to our house, were sincere
and wanted to help. In fact, the colonel that came and
presented to us told us that one of the reasons he was chosen
was he was going to be leading [inaudible] and he needed to
learn. That is great.
They proceeded to tell us about what they were going to do
to fix these specific problems. And my answer was this: Thank
you. I am glad you are going to try to fix these specific
problems. But what about all the other mishaps? What about all
the shoddy equipment? What about all the other nontraining that
is received and terrible decisions that are made? How are you
going to fix that?
The reality is this issue is a cultural issue. It is a
nonsafety cultural issue within the Marines and, obviously,
partly in the Navy as well. I think it goes across all military
branches.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, that is precisely what this
hearing is going to try to accomplish.
Mr. Vienna. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Ostrovsky, I don't know if you have
anything to add.
Mr. Garamendi. You may answer the question.
Mr. Ostrovsky. Yes, I do.
Our experience was different. Our casualty assistance calls
officer, who is a Marine first sergeant from the Reserve Center
in Springfield, Oregon, did a great job. I think he is a highly
seasoned and qualified Marine, very empathetic, very sensitive
to our needs. So we did have a positive experience with him. So
we do appreciate that.
But we do recognize that that job is hard. I am sure it is.
For the first sergeant that we worked with, it was the first
time that he had to do a casualty assistance call, and he did a
great job. So we very much appreciate him and everything that
he has done for us.
Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to
join you and Doug in thanking our two witnesses this morning.
And I just want to share how much I appreciate the powerful
testimony that you presented this morning and I think
challenged all of us on this subcommittee and full Committee of
Armed Services to do more, in terms of action.
I would just want to share with you that, unfortunately,
this has not been the first time that this subcommittee has
experienced a hearing like this. And I chair the Seapower
Subcommittee. We jointly did the investigation and followup in
the wake of the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions that took
place in [2017]. There were at least a half dozen hearings
which occurred in the wake of that.
And I want you to know that as a result of that, there
actually were structural statutory changes that were made in
terms of the surface fleet deployment system. We put safety
measures, safety brakes into the law.
Again, Senator John McCain, it was actually one of his
final milestone moments when he chaired the Senate Armed
Services Committee, and we worked together on the conference
committee. We put 17--excuse me, it was almost 50--statutory
changes in terms of just the way decisions were handled, in
terms of deploying ships for sailors that were not certified
and fully trained up, and equipment that was not ready. It did
not extend to the type of deployments that we are discussing
here today.
But I want you to know that we actually have the ability to
make real change in terms of the National Defense Authorization
Act [NDAA]. And I know Chairman Garamendi and Doug and
certainly in Seapower [Subcommittee], we are going to do
everything in our power to make sure that these hearings and
your testimony actually is going to result in real action,
tangible action, in the wake.
And I just want to just finally note that, Mr. Vienna,
pointing to the Feres Doctrine, thank you for raising that
issue. I think that is an antiquated part of the law that goes
back to a Supreme Court decision in the 1950s, which really
needs to be updated and modernized, as Mr. Ostrovsky said.
I mean, we need to really as lawmakers make some real
modifications and changes to the system to reflect the
complexity of the technology and, frankly, some of the overuse
of outdated equipment.
So thank you to both of you.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman John Garamendi and Ranking
Member Doug Lamborn, for convening this extraordinarily
important hearing. And I am just so grateful that we have the
witnesses before us today.
I want to thank you, both of you, Mr. Vienna and Mr.
Ostrovsky. Your testimony is heartfelt, and what a tribute to
your sons, and your families should be so proud. I am grateful
for both of you being here today and with your families. And no
service member should have a similar example of loss of life as
we have heard today.
As the father of four sons who have served in the Armed
Forces--one is still in the Navy right now--I particularly
identify with what has occurred. And then I want to assure you
that I look forward to working with Chairman Garamendi, with
the ranking member, Doug Lamborn, on whatever we can do to
assist you.
In fact, sadly, I have had personal loss in the military. A
former congressional staff member of mine, Marine Lieutenant
Colonel Trane McCloud, tragically was killed in an accident in
Iraq in 2006. And then, in 1978--it still has affected our
family--my late brother-in-law, Marine Captain Tim Dusenbury,
was killed in a helicopter accident in Greece.
And with that, a question for Mr. Vienna and then Mr.
Ostrovsky. And it really is parallel to what Ranking Member
Lamborn has asked.
But were there shortfalls in the information provided to
you? And I know, Mr. Ostrovsky, that you indicated that there
should have been more transparency.
But on the notification to you, the backup for the
arrangements for the funerals, the notification to every family
person possible, were there shortfalls?
And then is there anything--again, this is so bipartisan--
whatever we can do to address it.
Beginning with Mr. Vienna.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, you have to unmute. You are
still muted, sir.
Mr. Vienna. Hello?
Mr. Garamendi. Good to go.
Mr. Vienna. Okay, thank you. I apologize. I am pressing
over and over again the mute button/unmute button, and it is
just not working well for me.
I am trying to understand the question in regards to our
notification and funeral arrangements and those kind of things.
They go directly to some of the issues that we did have with
our CACO [casualty assistance calls officer] situation.
For example, we had planned the funeral for Saturday. We
were told his body would arrive 4 days prior to that from
Dover. It didn't come until that day, so we had at the last
minute, had to change our funeral plans, move them back a day.
And we had 650 people at the ceremony. It was extremely
difficult.
Also, they could not seem to coordinate flights to try to
make the memorial in San Diego, and we were, in the end, we
were going to miss it. There was just no way, because it was
also the same day that our son's body was supposed to be
arriving now from Dover that evening, and the funeral was the
next morning. It was chaotic.
And we ended up having a--there was someone with money here
in our community that heard about it and ended up flying us
there on his private jet in order to get to San Diego, attend
the memorial of all nine boys, which I am so glad we didn't
miss, and fly us back in time to then go to San Francisco
Airport with our son and have that procession ceremony.
We didn't get him into the funeral home until midnight, and
the very next morning we had to do the funeral. So it was very
rushed, and it was due to ineptitude in being able to get these
schedules squared away for us.
So I believe that is what the question was. I don't want to
go on a tangent about these issues. I wanted to--fixing what
happened so that other----
Mr. Garamendi. If I might, Mr. Vienna, thank you very much.
Mr. Wilson, your time has expired.
Mr. Wilson. As I conclude, I would like to thank Mr.
Vienna. That was specific, and we need to address those.
Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. These questions that we have received from
the members and the responses indicate that there is a series
of issues that need to be dealt with, with regard to family
notification, and we will get into those in detail.
I am going to now turn to Ms. Speier, who actually heads up
the [Military] Personnel Subcommittee. And this particular
problem is an issue that I know she wants to deal with.
So, Ms. Speier, if you would.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to Ranking Member
Lamborn.
Let me just say to you, Mr. Vienna and Mr. Ostrovsky, we
have had extensive conversations. Your testimony today shows
the palpable pain that you have endured.
And I agree with you, we can no longer use the term
``mishap.'' I don't care if it has been the term used
historically. It is offensive to the families who lose their
children because of either dereliction of duty or gross
negligence or because it is an accident. It is, in fact, not a
mishap.
And to your point, Mr. Vienna, you know that we have made
some changes. The Feres Doctrine is not law. It is a Supreme
Court decision on which we have relied on. We should do more
than we have done, although we have provided, over the course
of 10 years, $400 million to deal with claims by service
members who are victims of medical malpractice at medical
facilities.
I think we need to expand that to deal with gross
negligence in situations like this. And we will have to discuss
this as part of the NDAA. There is a hefty price tag that comes
with it, of course, but the lives that are lost are real lives.
So I want to thank you both for your extraordinary
testimony. We are not going to rest until people are held
accountable and that we can make sure that this kind of conduct
is not tolerated, because it was conduct at the highest levels
that allowed these AAVs to be deployed.
Mr. Ostrovsky, I would just like to give you the floor to
add any other recommendations that you would like to make sure
that we deal with as it relates to these casualty officers and
their interactions with the families.
Mr. Ostrovsky. My comment with regard to transparency
relates to the fact that when the press release came out that
the MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] commander was relieved,
which was the day before we received our briefing on the
results of the investigation, that press release mentioned that
administrative and other action was taken against 10 others
that were found to have some kind of responsibility, yet it
didn't tell us what kind of action was taken.
So when you use that term ``administrative action'' without
any detail, it makes you wonder what is the real action. And I
understand that you can't name names, the Privacy Act. I was a
Federal employee myself for quite some time, so I am familiar
with that.
But at least I think it would be helpful to the families to
know the type of administrative action that was taken, because
it could be anywhere from a day off without pay to months off
without pay or reduction of rank or whatever. So I think it
would be helpful in the future to have some more detail as to
the type of action without naming names.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Ostrovsky.
I think it is also important for us to appreciate that when
persons are ostensibly fired, they are not really fired as we
think of it in civilian society. They are transferred. And I
think we have to take a hard look at whether or not we want
people in leadership in some other unit who have made the
decisions they made in circumstances like this.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Ms. Speier.
The gavel order is as follows: Mr. Bergman, Ms. Slotkin,
Mr. Johnson, and then it would be Mr. Levin.
Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Good morning, everyone. You notice I am flying
the Marine colors behind me here. It is a small way to express
my feelings of your loss.
There are no good casualty officer calls. In my time in
command, we did too many of them. But I can just say to you, I
don't care what side of the aisle our members are on on this
committee, we will take an attitude of holding everyone
accountable, including ourselves. There are no free passes
here. And there is no excuse for bypassing safety when it is in
a training environment.
And I will just end it with that, because that is what I
believe. And I know many of my colleagues here on the committee
believe the same thing. We will do everything that we can to
ensure that this does not happen again.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Bergman. You always remind me
not to mention your past service in the military, so I won't do
that. But you certainly understand.
Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Good morning, everyone.
You know, unlike some of my peers, this is the first time I
have actually been in a hearing where we have heard from
parents of folks who have been lost. And I have a stepdaughter
in the Army, so your testimony was extremely relatable and
powerful. And I am so, so sorry for your loss.
I guess my question is, on the accountability side, maybe
starting with Mr. Ostrovsky, what was the official reason the
Navy--I am sorry, the Marines, said to you in this large report
that you both received for the reason why the craft was allowed
out when not being certified for seaworthiness? What was the
official answer to that?
Mr. Ostrovsky. I think, as I recall, if I recall the
details of the report, is just that it was a matter of
assignment of the equipment. There was assignment of equipment
in poor condition, equipment that was dead-lined.
You know, the other side of it is the lack of training. Not
even initiating the appropriate relevant training is the cause.
And I would say that one thing to say is that when you look
at gross negligence and recklessness by a military officer,
there is nowhere in a military manual or training that conducts
recklessness or gross negligence. And I would say that when
somebody behaves in that fashion, they are outside of the scope
of their duties, and they should bear that responsibility or
that liability for being outside of the scope of their duties.
Now, whether the U.S. military wants to somehow indemnify
them or take that liability on, but that liability exists. They
are outside of the scope of their duties. There is no way that
it can be said, especially in a training environment, that that
kind of behavior is acceptable.
And I am sure there are many military officers that would
echo what I am saying in saying that it is not to be tolerated.
It is substandard.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that is
something I know I personally don't know enough about, but I
think might be worthwhile looking at is sort of the
responsibilities of someone when they are acting outside the
scope of their responsibilities. I know it is a topic we talk
about on other issues, but I certainly would be interested.
And, Mr. Vienna, you said that you were here because you
wanted to make sure this didn't happen to other families, and I
appreciate that.
Can you tell me what the Marines said to you about what
they were going to do to make sure such mistakes don't happen
in the future? Did they give any sort of positive action they
were going to take?
And just remember to unmute.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, you are still muted.
[Problems with mic.]
Mr. Vienna. So in talking about some of the exact issues,
one thing that they had pointed out was they were no longer
going to have the AAV commanders making decisions to splash,
that that should come from a platoon commander or an AAV
platoon commander higher up. You know, some very specific
things that were going to change. Safety boats would now be
absolutely in the water. Things like that.
But what is disheartening to me is there was an article
that came out by a retired colonel, Walt Yates. He just retired
about a year ago. And I spoke with him for about an hour and a
half yesterday. And he alerted us that on August 15, 2017,
there was a similar mishap--well, not a similar mishap. It was
a helicopter accident, where it crashed off the side of one of
the ships, fell into the water. And the reasons given for the
three deaths in that investigation was lack of training, lack
of egress training.
That is in 2017. Those parents went through the same thing
we are going through. They were told that their sons or
daughters would have survived had they only gotten the proper
training. We are now at 3 years, 4 years later, and we are
still in the exact same position that we were before.
And what it boils down to and the reason why this really
goes all the way up to the top is that where that comes from is
really money. It is budget acquisitions. It is the people up at
the very top, and I am talking about the assistant commandant
level, that decides what does and doesn't make the budget.
What ends up happening is lethality gets chosen over
safety.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna.
Mr. Vienna. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Vienna, excuse me.
I am going to have to take a little bit of control of this.
We are now nearly 50 minutes into the 2 hours that we have
available for our hearing. And I know that there are at least
five more members of the committee that would like to ask
questions.
I would ask my committee members and others to not seek the
same answer again. The questions that Ms. Slotkin, you asked,
we want to specifically ask, as Mr. Vienna just said, the
assistant commandant that question: Why, after all of these
years, after all of these accidents, the Marine Corps is still
not properly training its men and women.
So, Ms. Slotkin, your time has expired.
Mr. Vienna, thank you very much for your comments.
I am instructed that all members have the opportunity to
ask questions. If the question has already been asked, then
please move on to another question.
The gavel order is Mr. Golden, Mr. Moore, Ms. Strickland,
Mr. Moulton, Mr. Levin. And I will assiduously follow the 5-
minute clock and interrupt as necessary. So thank you very
much.
Mr. Golden. Mr. Golden, you are on. Mr. Golden. We will
come back to you, Mr. Golden.
Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore, you are up. Hello, Mr. Moore.
We will return to Mr. Golden and Mr. Moore should they come
back on.
Ms. Strickland, it is your 5 minutes.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To Mr. Vienna and Mr. Ostrovsky, I just want to express my
deepest sympathies. And there is nothing like losing a child,
especially when they have signed up to serve our country. So I
am very sorry for your loss.
There was something that Ms. Speier said earlier that
really struck me, and it is the way we use the term ``mishap.''
And as we talk about moving forward, I want to make sure that
we take a look at the term ``mishap,'' because to me it
trivializes what has happened to these young people.
With that said, very briefly, I have a question for each of
the gentlemen who just testified.
There are a lot of things that we need to do better--
accountability, investing in equipment, keeping it up to date.
But if there was one thing that we could do as far as
legislation goes or making an investment, what would you like
to see us do to help give you some solace and rectify this
issue so that other families don't suffer?
Mr. Vienna.
Mr. Vienna. Am I unmuted?
Ms. Strickland. I can hear you.
Mr. Vienna. Okay, great.
I would say carve out something within the Feres Doctrine
that doesn't allow gross negligence.
In a situation like this, where there were as many issues
as there were, we can't call it anything other than gross
negligence.
And when it reaches that level, you don't want to have
these little lawsuits here and there for frivolous things. I
understand that. But in a situation like this, there needs to
be accountability.
And without accountability, this is just going to continue,
and we will be watching in 3 or 4 years another hearing about
lack of training and shoddy equipment and all these things. It
is just going to recycle itself.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Ostrovsky.
Mr. Ostrovsky. Yes, I would seem to agree with Mr. Vienna.
I think the importance of modernizing the system of
accountability and liability is that on the front end, military
officers will comport themselves appropriately if they know on
the back end, if they do something outside of their scope, they
will be held liable.
So it is really all about the front end, so that this never
happens again, we don't find ourself in these situations.
Thank you.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you, gentlemen. And, again, my
deepest sympathies.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Ms. Strickland.
The gavel order has been modified a little bit here. So if
the members would--here is the new order: Mr. Johnson, Mr.
Kahele, Mr. Moulton, Mr. Levin.
Mr. Johnson, you are up. My apologies for skipping over you
a moment ago. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. It is fine, Mr. Chairman. I am going to yield
to allow more time so we move on. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Kahele. Please unmute, Mr. Kahele. You are up.
Mr. Kahele. Same here, Mr. Chair. Thank you so much. Aloha
from Hawaii----
Mr. Garamendi. I am afraid you just remuted yourself. You
are good.
Mr. Kahele. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Aloha from Hawaii.
And I just want to thank both of you testifying today for
your cooperation.
But I will yield my time to the others that I know have
questions that they have. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Kahele.
Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I can't imagine your loss. And I am deeply
affected by your testimony here this morning. I know it is not
easy, so thank you very much for coming and sharing it with the
committee.
As a Marine veteran of 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, this is
a situation that I know well. I spent a lot of time in an AAV,
including in waterborne operations. That is how we got into
Baghdad in 2003. I can tell you we sat on the roof, because we
were afraid it would sink.
So there is a lot of work here to do. And as a Marine
veteran, as a veteran of AAV operations and of MEU operations,
I can promise you that I will do everything I can to get to the
bottom of it.
Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Indeed, we will lean
on you for your expertise and experience as we deal with these
issues.
Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, members of
the subcommittee, for allowing me to waive on.
I also wanted to say thank you to Mr. Vienna and Mr.
Ostrovsky just for being here today under these incredibly
difficult circumstances. Thanks for being here on behalf of
your sons, your families, and the other families who are
suffering in the aftermath of this tragedy.
It is incredible to see your strength on behalf of your
sons as you tell their story and as you work to effect change
so that no parent has to go through your experience in the
future.
I am here today because I proudly represent the service
members and their families at Camp Pendleton. If you have ever
been to our region, to North County, San Diego, or to South
Orange County, you know how much the base and the men and the
women who serve there mean to our region.
Our Marines and sailors define us. They define our
communities. They come from all across our country to answer
the call of service and to protect our Nation, our values, and
our way of life. And the fact that they do it right down the
street, that makes us incredibly proud.
Many service members, as you also know, stay in our area
when they transition back to civilian life and they make our
communities stronger. And it makes me incredibly sad hearing
about your sons and reading about the other Marines we lost to
think about the pillars of the community that they would have
been. And I know our communities would have wanted to have them
stay here in San Diego.
So I am so sorry for your losses. Your sons were
inspirations. Their legacies continue to be. And, with that in
mind, I know that my colleagues, and myself included, we are
going to do all we can to uncover the facts of this tragedy to
ensure it is not repeated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Levin.
I want to give a very special thank you to our two
witnesses today. These are two of the nine families that have
lost their sons in this accident. And so for the Baltierra
family, the Barranco family, the Bath family, the Perez family,
the Rodd family, the Sweetwood family, and the Villanueva
family, our sympathy goes out to you. Our prayers go out to all
of the families who have suffered so much.
The testimony we receive today gives us the direction and
the desire to get at this problem. There is clearly a safety
culture issue within the Marine Corps--and, unfortunately, we
also find it in other services.
This committee will work diligently with the other
subcommittees to address the issues that have been raised here,
the issues of notification when there is a loss, the issues of
responsibility, as has been highlighted here several times.
And we are now going to recess this panel, and we will take
a 5-minute break. And we will bring the Marine Corps Assistant
Commandant to join us and the Navy C--and the Navy admirals to
join us in the second.
So with that, this panel is recessed. We will return in
about 5 minutes. And so if the membership would stand by as we
change out here.
Thank you very much once again to our two witnesses, Peter
and Mr. Vienna. Thank you so very much for joining us.
With that, we are in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Garamendi. We are back on the record with panel two of
today's hearing. I understand that we have been able to get an
extra half-hour here, so we will go until 1:30.
As I have stated before and it bears repeating, the tragic
events of 30 July 2020 were preventable. As I reread the
investigation in preparation for this hearing, I was once again
gripped by the sense of dread associated with reading the
details of the multiple systemic failures that led to the loss
of nine service members in the prime of their life.
The Marine Corps failed--failed to adequately maintain the
material readiness of the AAV fleet. The Navy and the Marine
Corps totally failed to ensure that personnel were adequately
trained to ensure that this exercise could be performed safely.
The Navy and the Marine Corps failed to effectively
integrate with each other to ensure that roles and
responsibilities were adequately or even minimally understood,
and that there was someone--someone with sufficient seniority
who was paying attention, monitoring the changing events, and
constantly conducting and updating the risk management, the
safety or the lack of safety.
The Navy and the Marine Corps totally failed to understand
and to flag that after two decades of focusing on land-based
combat the proficiency for amphibious operations may have been
lost, may have atrophied, and that personnel needed additional
training to conduct the exercise safely.
The leadership of the Navy and Marine Corps totally failed
to account for the potential problems that COVID-19 would have
on readiness of these units. They were so desperate, as they
showed us, as they said in hearings, formal hearings, that not
to worry, we have overcome the impacts of COVID and our
readiness is not diminished. Gentlemen, that was not true, as
tragically shown in this incident.
What is most upsetting to me is the failure of the Surface
Navy and the Marine Corps to develop a culture of safety that
would empower junior service members to alert the chain of
command when there is a breach of safety protocols, to be
heard, to not be ignored. We don't have to invent that culture.
It does exist. It does exist in Naval Aviation and the Naval
Reactors community. That culture needs to be in every part of
both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and indeed the other
services as well.
The Navy and Marine Corps leadership must make a decision.
They must decide to not allow the status quo to continue. The 9
members of the Marine Corps--the 8 members in the Marine Corps
and 1 member of the Navy that were lost were not the first;
indeed, the Marine Corps has lost 60 Marines in training
accidents in just the last 5 years, 60 in 5 years, and more
than 130 in the previous 10 years.
There is an eerie echo here of the Marine Corps hymn. These
losses have been in the air, on the land and sea. As Mr.
Courtney said in his earlier statement, the Surface Navy is
still struggling to adopt sustained cultural changes in the
wake of the loss of 17 sailors on the USS McCain and
Fitzgerald. We have passed laws, we have provided money, and
these tragedies continue.
We have honored these nine members of our military with
appropriate funerals and services. But I will say this, the
only way to really honor their loss is that the Marine Corps
and the Navy develop a culture of safety. This is not war; this
is training. This subcommittee, and indeed the full committee,
demands better.
I know that there are additional investigations underway,
command investigations, and we will get to those with a
subsequent hearing, and we will be focusing on the events
specific to this tragedy and to what the Navy and the Marine
Corps are doing to prevent it from happening again.
With that, I turn to my colleague and ranking member, Mr.
Lamborn, for his opening statement.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. Thank you for our witnesses for being here.
I am going to keep this short so we can get into your
testimony and the give-and-take with questions afterwards in
the limited time that we have, but I want to know in a broad
sense, what is the Marine Corps doing to foster a better safety
environment. Obviously, there were a number of issues of things
that went wrong in this particular incident.
And, more specifically, I want to know what is happening
with the proficiency for amphibious landings. Amphibious
landings obviously were not a priority in our Iraq and
Afghanistan conflicts in recent years, but with a pivot toward
the Pacific it absolutely becomes a priority.
So I want to know about that in particular and with AAVs.
You know, why are AAVs so decrepit and so poorly maintained? Do
we need to buy new ones? Are they not being maintained in a
good state of readiness? What is the issue there? So those are
the things I want to hear about when we go through our
testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. I will introduce our witnesses, and
following their testimony, we will go through the normal gavel
order of questions.
Joining us today is General Gary Thomas, Assistant
Commandant of the Marine Corps; Vice Admiral Roy Kitchener,
Commander of Naval Surface Forces; and Major General Gregg
Olson, Assistant Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and
Operations, Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Gentlemen,
your formal testimony will be put in the hearing record.
Mr. Thomas, General Thomas, would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GEN GARY L. THOMAS, USMC, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT OF
THE MARINE CORPS
General Thomas. Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member Lamborn,
and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
sinking of an assault amphibious vehicle on July 30, 2020, and
how the Marine Corps can improve its safety culture. Today,
Vice Admiral Kitchener, Major General Olson, and I are prepared
to answer questions about what happened, what we have learned,
and what we are doing to enact change.
First and foremost, the sinking of this AAV and the deaths
of eight Marines and one sailor were preventable, preventable
in so many ways, but we failed. We failed these brave young
men. The testimony that we just heard from the families
represented here today is heartbreaking. We also mourn their
loss and extend our deepest sympathy to their loved ones.
Though it is little comfort to the families, we will honor
their memory by taking the necessary actions to prevent a
tragedy like this from ever happening again. We owe this to
these service members and their families.
The command investigation provided sufficient detail about
the direct causes of the AAV's sinking. However, I believe
there is more that we can learn about how this incident
occurred and how to prevent similar tragedies in the future. I
have directed a general officer to conduct a follow-on
investigation into the forming of the Marine Expeditionary
Unit, including training and readiness oversight up to the
Marine Expeditionary Force level. This investigation is in
progress, and we will provide the findings to this subcommittee
after Headquarters Marine Corps review.
We will also seek the counsel of a blue-ribbon panel of
outside experts so that we can capitalize on the generations of
amphibious experience that resides outside of our ranks. It is
a Navy-Marine Corps imperative to train to standard for
amphibious operations. Future operating concepts and the lives
of our Marines and sailors demand that we increase our common
understanding of the requirements for operations from the sea.
To date, 11 Marines have been or will be held accountable
for their respective roles in this tragedy in accordance with
applicable law and regulations. Some of these accountability
actions are ongoing, including boards to consider separation
from the service. We make decisions regarding accountability
based on an individual's responsibilities and their performance
of duties. An individual's rank neither obligates nor excuses
them from accountability. As we learn more about this tragedy,
we will take additional measures as appropriate.
More broadly, the Marine Corps recognizes that our historic
ground and aviation accident trends must change course. Over
the past few years, we have improved our safety reporting
mechanisms, our information sharing and safety management
practices.
As a result of these and other efforts, we are seeing a
reduction in vehicle rollovers, and from 2019 to 2021, we saw
our lowest aviation flight mishap rate on record. However, the
2020 sinking of this AAV and other recent accidents make it
clear that the Marine Corps safety culture must improve and
that Marines at all levels must make better risk decisions.
Every Marine must be empowered to assess risk and speak up
when they see something unsafe. Commanders must provide the
necessary oversight to mitigate risk and stop operations when
the risk is too high. Commanders must also develop command
climates that value and reward hazard reporting.
At an institutional level, we must provide the guidance and
resources that support good decision-making. We also have to
manage operational tempo so that our Marines and sailors have
the opportunity to complete necessary training in a safe and
productive manner.
We are committed to providing the leadership and resources
to make these changes. We appreciate your oversight and
continued support as we learn from our past and make lasting
changes to our safety culture. We look forward to answering
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Thomas can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
Mr. Garamendi. General, thank you very much.
I now turn to Vice Admiral Kitchener, Commander of Naval
Surface Forces.
STATEMENT OF VADM ROY I. KITCHENER, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL
SURFACE FORCES
Admiral Kitchener. Good morning, Chairman Garamendi,
Ranking Member Lamborn, and distinguished members of the
Readiness Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
today.
I too want to begin by expressing my personal condolences
to the families of our fallen Marines and sailor who served
their country with pride and honor. This devastating loss
underscores the very dangerous work our sailors and Marines
perform each day in our All-Volunteer Force, and it once again
reminds us of our solemn obligation to provide each service
member an environment where risk is being properly managed. We
are committed as a Navy-Marine Corps team to ensure that events
such as this does not happen again.
I just listened to the testimony of Mr. Vienna and Mr.
Ostrovsky about their personal loss and poor experience with
the casualty assistant calls officer, or CACO, process. I spoke
with Mr. and Mrs. Vienna before. Incredibly grateful that they
were willing to share their experience with me. I am deeply
saddened that the Navy CACO process did not work as it should
have for this grieving family. I have reached out to my
counterparts who oversee the CACO process, and they are
reviewing what happened with the Viennas as well as any
improvements that may result.
The Navy is committed to understanding not only how our
actions may have contributed to this tragedy but also how we
can better support families in the future. And I say that not
only as a commander but also as a father of four, three of whom
are serving in the military, including one enlisted Marine at
Camp Pendleton.
Immediately following the tragic events on 30 July, the
Navy and Marine Corps implemented a safety pause of AAV
operations. The Navy has not resumed waterborne AAV operations
and will not do so until we are satisfied that all necessary
policies, procedures, and risk mitigation measures are in
place. Additionally, all commanding officers and well-deck
teams will be trained to these new requirements and will have
reviewed the specific lessons learned before AAVs embark a Navy
ship.
The Marine Corps investigation discovered inconsistencies
in the Navy and Marine Corps operating procedures and policies
for waterborne AAV operations. I am working deliberately and
urgently with my Marine Corps counterpart to look across the
full range of Navy-Marine Corps integrated operations to ensure
that our operating procedures are aligned, including a joint
policy on the use of safety boats and clear lines of
authorities during training evolutions. We are committed as a
Navy-Marine Corps team to put sailors and Marines--to not put
sailors and Marines at risk while we examine our integrated
policies and procedures.
While the Navy fully supports the finding and
recommendations of the Marine Corps investigation, the Marine
Corps investigation did not fully address Navy actions on this
fatal day. We are accountable as an organization and must fully
address whether Navy action or inaction contributed to the
incident and what changes to practice and policy we must make
to recommencing waterborne AAV operations.
Accordingly, we initiated our own command investigation
with a team of 16 Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian subject
matter experts in areas such as planning, Navy and Marine Corps
integration and training, and operational safety. Our
investigation is expected to be completed within 30 days.
Professional seamanship is the standard with no exception.
We owe that to the Marines and sailors in our care. It is in
our culture to critically evaluate, then make and effectively
implement necessary changes. Although we operate in a dangerous
and demanding environment and will never be able to eliminate
all risk, you have my word that we will, with great speed,
provide you, the American people, and our Navy-Marine Corps
team, with our critical assessment of our current procedures
and our plan to best mitigate risk as we move forward with
integrated amphibious operations to ensure this never happens
again.
On behalf of all sailors, their families, and our Navy
civilians, I thank you for your continued support and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Kitchener can be found
in the Appendix on page 73.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Admiral.
I now turn to Major General Gregg Olson, Assistant Deputy
Commandant, Plans, Policies, Operations.
STATEMENT OF MAJGEN GREGG P. OLSON, USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR PLANS, POLICIES, OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES
MARINE CORPS
General Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. As
I make ready to answer your questions, let me note my deep
sadness regarding this preventable tragedy. I have years of
experience with amphibious assault vehicles, including my first
tour as a 20-something lieutenant. I can put myself in the
place of these young men who were counting on others to keep
them safe.
I have done my underwater egress training, and I know the
fear and disorientation that results when you are rapidly
submerged. I also know the value of the training in saving
lives. Every time I review the details of this tragedy, I am
struck by its senselessness. My heart goes out to the families
of the young men who died, and I especially appreciate the
bravery of the two witnesses who testified in the previous
panel.
As I answer your questions, please do not mistake my
matter-of-fact tone for any lack of empathy. I am simply trying
to keep my emotions in check. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, General.
I have a document dated March 26, 2021, and it is signed by
General Thomas. It speaks to the issues at hand and to what the
Marine Corps is specifically doing to address the tragedy and
the failures that occurred in this incident.
Point number eight, General Thomas, you said the loss of
these eight Marines and one sailor was a preventable tragedy.
You went on to say, we mourn the loss of their lives and share
their families' enduring grief. The Marines and sailors who
died made the ultimate sacrifice while serving their fellow
Marines and the Nation will never be forgotten.
General Thomas, those words need to be followed up by
action. You have laid out seven specific actions that the
Marine Corps intends to take. In our communication prior to
this hearing, I told you that the construction industry in the
United States has instituted a safety officer always on site,
always there to review and with a whistle to stop the
construction activity if something is not safe.
I recommended to you that the Navy should consider such a
safety officer on all risky operations. As I look at the seven
recommendations that you have made, I don't see an opportunity
in any of those for someone to blow the whistle and call
timeout. Clearly, that could and should have happened in this
tragedy, but it didn't.
I want to hear from you how you can assure us that the
issues of safety will be paramount in exercises. General
Thomas, what assurances can you give us that your seven
recommendations will lead to someone having the power to blow
the whistle and stopping the exercise until safety can be
assured?
General Thomas. Thank you, Chairman. The first thing that I
would say is that--and you have alluded to this, this is, our
safety culture has got to improve. All Marines need to
understand that a safety culture or a culture of excellence is
integral to mission success.
I share your view on making sure we have adequate
oversight, and we are looking at adding additional safety
specialists at the right place to ensure that our exercises are
as safe as they possibly can be. That, in addition to safety
protocols, are the types of things that are required to get our
safety culture where it needs to be.
I would point out that no one person is able to see all the
intricacies of an exercise, and so equally as important as to
having the right people with oversight is to, as you alluded
to, Chairman, empowering Marines to stand up or speak up when
they see something that is unsafe and for them to be heard, and
then for leaders at all levels to provide necessary oversight
to mitigate risk and then to stop operations when that risk is
too high.
I would tell you, Chairman, that in all the exercises that
we do across the Marine Corps every day, every exercise at some
point Marines are standing up and pausing operations, and that
is exactly what we need to do in this case, which is where we
failed in this particular exercise. But we are taking a hard
look at that, Chairman, and we will keep this committee
informed as we go forward.
Mr. Garamendi. I am going to forgo additional questions. I
suspect most of the questions will be asked by my colleagues
that I would have asked, so I am going to turn it over to Mr.
Lamborn. But before I do, I think the number is 137 Marines
that died in various accidents, training accidents over the
last decade, 60 in the last 5 years.
Mr. Lamborn, it is your turn, 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, Mr. Lamborn, you are now
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Can you hear me okay?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, please, go ahead.
Mr. Lamborn. And, Mike Johnson, you may want to mute, Mike
Johnson.
Okay. General or Admiral, whoever wants to take this
question, obviously there were some real deficiencies with the
training regime that was in place that were not followed or
should have been followed, shouldn't have been in place. But
also when it comes to the equipment and the AAVs in particular,
it seemed like it was a disaster waiting to happen.
These AAVs were taking on water, the bilge pumps weren't
able to keep up, the batteries weren't sufficient. There were a
lot of specific things that were wrong with these AAVs, and a
subsequent inspection found that many of them failed. I believe
the majority, once they were inspected, failed inspection and
should not be used.
So what will the Marine Corps do with the need for better
AAVs in the future? This is something our subcommittee, besides
the training aspect, is going to want to look at. So what is
the best insight you can give us on how to get to a better
state where we have AAVs that are good for training and
actually good in actual conflict? Thank you.
General Thomas. Congressman, I will start and then I will
turn it over to General Olson. But let me be clear, the AAV
platoon should have received vehicles in a higher state of
material readiness than they did. These are old vehicles, but
they are broadly well understood of what is required to keep
them up, although we have learned some things since the mishap
that General Olson will describe. But we will--I assure you, we
will fully resource any requirement to keep this vehicle in a
high state of material readiness until its sundown in 2026.
Let me turn it over to General Olson for any additional
fill-in.
General Olson. Ranking Member Lamborn, you are 100 percent
correct, sir. These vehicles were delivered in, as the
investigating officer notes, horrible condition. Twelve of the
thirteen were inoperable on the 20th of April. All should have
been ready for both land and water operations.
The AAV platoon mechanics, augmented by three mechanics
from the parent battalion, did return them to condition code
for land operations in time for a land-only mechanized rate
course. By the time they got onboard ship, they had been
returned to what we thought was waterborne capable.
What we found in our subsequent inspections, after safety
review's message came out on the 31st of July, was that we had
a problem across the fleet with our watertight integrity. Some
54 percent of the vehicles that were inspected had failures in
the watertight integrity of their plenum doors. That is the
large intakes on the front that permit air to come in and out
of an engine that is underwater. Eighteen percent had cargo
hatches that were leaking in excess of what they should have
been, and fully 50 percent had inoperable emergency escape
lighting systems. There were other discrepancies as well.
None of those vehicles are permitted back into the water
until they are returned to operable condition. The watertight
integrity testing regime has been instantiated into our
technical manuals and into our technical instructions. We had
not been inspecting to the level of detail necessary to
determine these discrepancies.
As Chairman Garamendi noted, it may have been that 20 years
of land-road operations have caused us to lose some of our
amphibious edge. To that end, we are moving out on a detailed
watertight integrity regime that will ensure that no vehicle
goes in the water without being watertight and integral.
You are correct about the bilge pumps. There are bilge
pumps on every AAV that can expel water at a rate far greater
than typically enters. AAVs leak, but the 400-some-odd gallons
per minute that they can pump over the side should have been
sufficient in this case; in this case, it was not. The vehicle
had far greater mechanical degradation than we knew of.
And when the transmission failed, the hydraulic bilge pumps
failed. When the transmission failed, the engine went to idle
and ceased charging the batteries. And then when the engine
compartment itself filled with water, the generator failed, and
effectively, the vehicle was without power.
We know we have things to fix, and we know we have a glide
slope to 2026 when the amphibious combat vehicle [ACV] will be
fully operationally capable. In the meantime, we will continue
to sustain and fund the AAV fleet, to include finishing off the
return to condition code alpha [RCCA], to think about sending a
vehicle back for depot-level maintenance and its return to you
in like-new condition.
While even though inspections of the RCCA vehicles learned
that we have a watertight integrity issue that must be
addressed, we will make these vehicles watertight, and we will
not put them in the water unless they are so.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Garamendi. The gavel order is Courtney and Wilson and
then we will have additional. I note Representative Moulton,
when he spoke earlier and talked of his own experience with the
AAV and their rocky situations, that he and his colleagues sat
on top fearing being unable to get out if they had to, if they
were inside. We will come to you, Mr. Moulton, a little later,
and I suspect you will want to talk about that.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses.
Admiral Kitchener, in 2017, we had the two collisions in
the Indo-Pacific region, Fitzgerald and McCain. And after that,
CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Richardson ordered a complete
comprehensive review, and that was in addition to all the
normal investigations which we have already heard about this
morning for this incident.
And, but the point of the comprehensive review was really
to look at structural changes in terms of the whole decision-
making for sending large surface ships out in the Pacific
region where, again, the operations commander was kind of
overruling or, you know, just overriding any concerns regarding
training certifications, ship readiness. And clearly, there was
this string of completely unacceptable accidents and loss of
life that was identified as flowing from it.
Again, the CR, the comprehensive review, ended up with a
large number of recommendations. You described a command-level
report that is in the works right now that we are going to get
back within the next 30 days or so. Is that what that is
looking at? Is that looking, again, not just at the specifics
of who is responsible but really the structural system that is
in place in terms of sending AAVs out that really are not safe?
Admiral Kitchener. Representative Courtney, thank you for
the question. The Navy cooperated fully with the Marine Corps
and the investigation and provided access to, you know,
records, logs, and many witnesses. And when we reviewed the
investigation we agreed with the fundamental conclusion that is
there were no causal factors attributable to the Navy. However,
what we did find left a few questions unanswered. And what we
are--so we decided to open our own investigation to understand,
you know, what actions and decisions that Navy personnel made
that day could have contributed to the tragedy and then what
policies and practices may be required and must be improved.
So we stood up a team of 16 people that is made up of Navy,
Marine Corps, and civilian personnel, and we specifically asked
them to look at the actions of the personnel that day and the
planning and the approval and the execution of the operation.
Additionally, we asked them to look at the communications
between Navy and Marine Corps personnel prior to, during, and
in the aftermath of the incident.
We also asked them to look at a number of--assess the
impact of a number of conditions that day that may have been
contributing factors. You know, for example, the sea state in
the morning and the sea state in the afternoon; the operation,
the use--the policies and use of safety boats and who was
making those decisions; and, finally, we asked them to look at
the command-and-control structure, and was there a rigid one in
place that clearly delineated authorities. Was it [inaudible]
geared to [inaudible] during the operation.
You know, as from the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents, we
have worked very hard at our safety culture, and we expect and
encourage all sailors to have a questioning attitude, to expect
to find conditions that require and to also make sure that they
act on unsafe conditions and not ignore them. And it is up to
us as leaders to create that environment that facilitates that
action.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Admiral. You know, I would
just note though that the CR did come back and identify real
weaknesses in the existing system after McCain and ways that we
could structurally and by law actually prevent that. And as I
mentioned earlier today, I mean, Congress actually adopted that
and now that is actually in law.
And I think we have actually seen some progress in terms of
not having, you know, sailors untrained and uncertified, again,
on large surface fleet ships. And hopefully that is what I
think--I am speaking for myself at Seapower and I am sure other
members, that is what we want in terms of getting specific
problems here.
Because as the chairman said, this is just happening too
frequently, and that says that there is something more than
just, you know, kind of, you know, trust us, we will take care
of this. We have really got to look at the structure of command
and control and decision-making. And Congress needs to step in
and, like we did with McCain and Fitzgerald, make real changes.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
The gavel order is as follows: Mr. Johnson and Ms. Speier
in that order. Mr. Wilson will return, and I will come back to
him when he returns.
Mr. Johnson, you are up.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very
much and thank the generals for their time. And this is an
important hearing. We did hear that heart-wrenching testimony
earlier, and it is so disturbing to all of us.
Let me just get right to a couple of questions. I apologize
if some of this has been answered already in previous
statements or questions. My internet has been a little
intermittent today.
But we know that we had multiple mishap--I know the term we
are having concerns with as well, but mishap investigations
have revealed that unit leadership properly reported on
training and material deficiencies, but we have these reports
that they were ignored or even later relieved.
How are you remedying this? Let me ask this, General
Thomas, I guess, how are you remedying this and empowering
commanders to highlight deficiencies and escalate concerns
without facing punitive action? And then, secondly, how should
a leader that raises these types of issues within their chain
of command proceed when that chain of command is not responsive
enough to ensure mission success and safety?
General Thomas. Thank you, Congressman. I think you are
getting right to the culture, you know, issue. Again, I would
just start by, you know, some of the things we are--we have got
to instantiate with our leaders is the importance that they
have in terms of oversight, identifying risk, and stopping
operations, and then actually rewarding that. We are now, you
know, incorporating some of that into our commander training,
new commander training.
But we also have to create the environment where if someone
raises the alarm within the chain of command or even just a
junior Marine, that is exactly what we want them to do, and we
have to figure out ways to reward those Marines who are
taking--we would say, again, that is part of mission success.
I mean, obviously, you know, when you have a tragedy like
this, it is a failure from beginning to end. If we can, you
know, with our education system, our reporting systems create
an environment where people are comfortable, I think we will
make a lot of headway towards the safety culture that we need.
Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that response. One of the
questions we have is, would there perhaps be value in
developing an independent safety process inside DOD for leaders
to raise those issues, and is that something you all have
considered so far?
General Thomas. You know, I am a fan of, you know,
independent, you know, views just because of the ability to
provide eyes-on that perhaps an organization may be missing.
That is something that came out of one of the commission's
safety reports. We do have a mechanism within DOD, a joint that
has been probably more dormant than it had--should have been
over the past few years. That may be something that we could
use going forward to instantiate some of the things that you
just described, Congressman.
Mr. Johnson. It makes sense. I mean, from a layperson's
viewpoint, that is just, to us it seems kind of commonsense.
But let me ask you one more question. Mishap investigations, as
we know, often produce lengthy lists of recommendations for
actions.
So what is your process for ensuring that those changes are
actually incorporated in the service's policy and doctrine?
General Thomas. We have an oversight panel led by a flag
officer looking at all the recommendations and then having
individuals, you know, come back and brief on the progress it
has made until that progress is--until, you know, that action
is actually complete.
Part of that process, by the way, includes coming back to
the subcommittee and describing, here is the action plan and
here is the progress that we are making until action complete.
Mr. Johnson. I appreciate that. We take that responsibility
seriously, and I am grateful for that cooperation and your
acknowledgment of that.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
General Thomas, you correctly said that, in your March 26
memo, the eight things and then the subsets. And indeed we will
come back to you in due course, probably 6 months or so, and
say, is it actually happening? Are you actually doing these
things? The other part of this, and this has been mentioned in
your opening testimony, General Thomas, and that is the issue
of accountability. We will probably hear more about that.
I am now going to turn to Ms. Speier for your questions.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all, for your presentations this afternoon.
General Thomas, you used the word ``preventable,'' that
this was a preventable set of circumstances. Major General
Olson, you said it was ``senseless.'' General Thomas and
General Olson, do you both recognize that this was also
reckless? General Thomas.
General Thomas. Congresswoman, I think that some of the
actions taken were reckless, yes.
Ms. Speier. Major General Olson.
General Olson. Ma'am, I was surprised at how cavalier some
of the actions were. I would say that some of them rose to
recklessness.
Ms. Speier. Would you support us providing compensation to
the families for reckless or gross negligence? General Thomas.
General Thomas. Ma'am, I will have to take that one for the
record, because it is a policy issue. This is something that we
would come back to you with based on response from the--along
with our leaders at Office of Secretary of Defense.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Speier. All right. Major General Olson, yes or no?
General Olson. Ma'am, I would have to associate myself with
the assistant commandant's remarks. I don't know enough about
the issue to speak authoritatively.
Ms. Speier. All right. Vice Admiral Kitchener. Actually,
you are muted. I am going to move on. I think you are probably
going to say the same thing as your colleagues.
Who made the decision--who was responsible for the
readiness of the MEU?
General Thomas. Congresswoman, I will, you know, give you a
broader view and let General Olson fill in. But the Marine
Expeditionary Unit is a composite unit, and before it forms,
comes together--normally 6 months prior to deployment--those
are separate units, and there is an individual that has
responsibility for the readiness of those individual units,
nominally the division. Once the MEU comes together, the MEU
has--the commander has responsibility for the readiness and the
MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] has oversight responsibility.
General Olson, would you like to add something to that?
Ms. Speier. I want a name.
General Olson. Elaborating briefly, ma'am, the commander of
1st Marine Division at the time would have been responsible for
the initial readiness of the division units forming the ground
combat element, as would the wing commander be responsible for
the aviation units, and the Marine Logistics Group commander be
responsible for the logistics units that composited together to
form the subordinate elements of the 15th Marine Expeditionary
Unit.
Ms. Speier. So that was General Castellvi, correct?
General Thomas. General Castellvi was the division
commander at the time, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. All right. And he was found responsible for a
lack of training. No action was taken against him, and up until
last week he was, in fact, the inspector general for the Marine
Corps, correct?
General Thomas. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. And he is now on administrative leave, I
believe?
General Thomas. He has been suspended from his duties, that
is correct.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Who made the decision to deploy the AAVs
that were in a lot designated as too broken to operate?
General Thomas. General Olson.
General Olson. That would have been the former commander,
lieutenant colonel board-slated commander of the 3rd Assault
Amphibian Battalion.
Ms. Speier. And who was that?
General Olson. Ma'am, I don't have his name at my
fingertips.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Would you provide that to the committee?
General Olson. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Speier. And you said--you have said to us a number of
times that eight people were fired in that chain of command,
but as we all know, firing in the military is not the same term
as it is in civilian status. So they were all transferred, but
they are still in the military. Is that correct?
General Thomas. Ma'am, I will take that one. So it is
actually 11, and the majority of those 11 are being considered
for separation from the service and some have had lesser
discipline taken against them.
I would just point out that one of those being held
accountable suffered drowning injuries. One of those being held
accountable, you know, dove into the water to rescue one of the
Marines that came to the surface. All of those Marines have
suffered traumatic stress injuries, and, of course, as you
know, they have to live with the decisions that they made that
led to this incident.
Ms. Speier. I understand that. But if you go through the
list of problems with these AAVs, they make your head spin. It
was egregious behavior, and maybe we should be talking to some
of those who have been, quote, fired to find out where the
pressure was coming from that required them to move forward
with this exercise.
Four of the AAVs were inoperable once they were on the
island. I mean, this was a deathtrap in which we put these
service members, nine of whom are now dead.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Ms. Speier. We will probably have
a second round of questions and so for the--for my colleagues,
you should prepare for that.
The gavel order is as follows: Mr. Golden, Mr. Moulton, and
Mr. Levin. Our Republican colleagues are welcome to come back
on to the screen if they would like to, and we will intersperse
them.
Mr. Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You got me all right
here?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes. Please proceed.
Mr. Golden. Very good.
A couple of questions for our Marines on the panel. I think
one of the--I think the ranking member really started down this
line of questioning. One of the biggest concerns was the
inoperability and just general unpreparedness of the AAVs. The
Marine Corps job is to be ready to fight, fight today really.
This committee often has a conversation with the Marine
Corps ongoing about what you need for the future, but what
about readiness today? And, in particular, as the Marine Corps
is pivoting back to a real focus on amphibious operations, I am
very concerned about the status of these AAVs for the next 5
years.
Would you say with confidence, either one of you, that this
committee is fully aware of what the Marine Corps needs to
ensure the operability and general readiness of the AAV fleet
in the United States Marine Corps?
General Thomas. Congressman, I will begin. I am not sure if
the committee is fully aware of what we are doing to ensure
that the AAV is fully ready until it is sundowned in 2026, and
we look forward to working with the committee on those things.
I would tell you that one of the things that we are
learning about this mishap is how we are actually reporting
readiness. You know, the metrics that we are using, I think, in
some cases, indicated a higher state of readiness across the
fleet than was actually warranted, and I think General Olson
can speak to that.
I think the other thing that we have learned is--based on
this tragedy is that the--there were things as the AAV aged
that made the previous inspection regime no longer, you know,
appropriate, and that is something that we are going to have to
pay attention to going forward. But I would say, broadly----
Mr. Golden. Let me just--if I could just jump in, I just
want to really stress the importance that this committee knows
what is necessary to make sure that you are in a state of
readiness for amphibious operations as an organization.
Don't let it be for lack of communicating. It is always
admirable--you know, I was a Marine, sir. We always say with
pride that we make do with less, which is a great culture to
have on the battlefield, but in terms of this communication and
congressional oversight, I think it can be a real danger and an
impediment.
The Marine Corps I know is interested in accountability in
this instance, and I have full, you know, faith that that is
going to move forward with these investigations and that we
will get answers and the right steps will be taken. But what I
want to know is that the Marine Corps is prepared to
communicate to Congress what it needs and not think that it is
limited in making the hard ask for what is necessary from the
Nation to ensure that our Marines are safe, that our sailors
are safe, but just as importantly, this is a readiness issue.
Are you ready for the fight, and is the equipment in place that
you need?
One thing that really jumps out at me is what looks like a
lack of communications operability. The fact that one thing
pointed out is that no one noticed safety boats in the water--
not in the water, failed to notice the distress flag. Why
wasn't there comms? You know, is there a lack of communications
readiness between the Marine Corps and the Navy, between our
AAVs and the ships that carry them? I am very concerned about
that. Have we given you the equipment that you need to carry
out this mission successfully is what I am trying to ask.
General Olson. I will take that, if I might.
General Thomas. Go ahead.
General Olson. One of the upgrades that is being done to
the remaining fleet of the AAVs that will carry it through to
2026 is an upgrade to the radio suite, both for operability
reasons and also for compatibility reasons with the cryptologic
requirements moving forward.
Another place where communications failed in this tragedy
was inside the AAV itself. All of our AAVs that will remain in
service to 2026 will be getting an internal communications
modification as well. A third modification is to a backup
battery power system for the emergency egress lighting system.
And then a fourth is to put an up-gunned weapon station on it
that is the same remote weapon station as will be on the
amphibious combat vehicle.
We are confident the funding profile for the AAV line and
our ability to both cannibalize AAVs that are being taken out
of service for usable parts or selectively interchange between
AAVs that remain in service for usable parts will carry this
vehicle--in combination with the return to condition code alpha
depot-level effort--carry this vehicle to 2026 when the ACV is
fully operational.
Mr. Golden. I see that I am out of time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Golden. We are going to
follow up on what Mr. General Olson just said about
reconditioning and the maintenance of this. I would point out
to my committee members that it is going to come down to where
is the money going to be spent.
And the Readiness Subcommittee has had serious concerns
throughout all of the departments about money being spent on
new, bright, shiny equipment and while not maintaining the
existing equipment. So we will be following up on all of the
equipment that is being used throughout, certainly in the
Marine Corps and also the other services.
With that, I will turn to--I don't see our Republican
colleagues returning at this moment, so, Mr. Moulton followed
by Mr. Gallego and then Mr. Levin. Mr. Moulton, you are on.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
Mr. Moulton. And let me just begin by reaffirming or
seconding your last remark. I remember sitting on the deck of
an amphibious ship off the coast of Kuwait before the Iraq
invasion and loading ammunition into our rifles that was dated
1967 and 1968 for the Vietnam war.
So we can find countless examples across the services of
places where we have not invested in the basic requirements for
front-line troops, those men and women in the infantry, while
we have no problem spending hundreds of millions of dollars on
lots of F-35s that can't even reach China. So there is a lot to
be discussed there in the broader committee.
Gentlemen, the mech [mechanized] raid, of course, is one of
several ways that you can get Marines to shore and,
operationally, it is only approved for low-threat environments.
General Thomas, in your written testimony, you state that
amphibious operations is one of our core capabilities and
future operational concepts demand we increase our common
understanding of the requirements of operations from the sea.
But, General, as you know, the last major amphibious
invasion, my company's invasion of Baghdad aside, took place at
Inchon during the Korean war. Seventy years later, on 30 July
2020, what future operational concept were these Marines
training for? Were these Marines risking their lives for
something that, realistically, we aren't going to ever do?
General Thomas. Congressman, I would just offer, you know,
this: If you look at our new concepts, Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations [EABO], particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and
the requirement to seize key maritime terrain, I would argue
that movement of forces over the surface will continue to be an
enduring mission. Not the only one. Some by air, of course, as
you well know and you have experienced during your time with
the Marine Corps. But it continues to be an important mechanism
that we will have to use, you know, to execute Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations.
Now, the conditions are going to have to be set
differently, because of the threats, et cetera. But just
because of the size of forces and the equipment that we would
need to move, you know, move ashore, that is going to still be
an important function for us.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I just hope we are carefully considering
that. And I can certainly imagine myself as a commander, given
the reputation for AAVs in the Marine Corps for at least the
last 20 years that I have known, I would certainly be reluctant
to put Marines in them if I had other options available,
literally almost any other option available. So I think we need
to carefully consider that as we look at our capital
requirements going forward.
Vice Admiral Kitchener, a similar question to you. You
articulated concerns in your written testimony that have led
you to curtail waterborne operations. Are you also
investigating whether or not AAV operations are relevant in
future operating environments, and when can we expect to hear
the results of those findings?
Admiral Kitchener. Congressman, thank you for the question.
First, we are looking, with our Marine Corps colleagues, at the
planning documents that we have and our documents that oversee
AAV operations, and we are making sure we are aligned there.
I would echo General Thomas' answers to the question,
where, on an EABO concept and in the fighting scheme of
maneuver in the Western Pacific, there is still a need for that
capability to move large pieces of equipment and seizing that
terrain and controlling SLOCs [sea lines of communication] on
some of the--within the first island chain out there. So I do
see value as we move ahead and incorporate the new ACVs into
the fleet.
And additionally, we will continue to work as one team in
making sure we are, you know, aligned on those policies and how
we are going to employ those assets.
Mr. Moulton. My next question is about accountability.
Historically, the Marine Corps has a culture of instinctively
relieving everyone after a mishap or a disaster without parsing
individual command responsibilities. And I think there was an
attempt to do this in the report. I read it thoroughly.
But I have to say, I am heartened to know that the Marine
Corps is looking at division responsibilities, because there
clearly was some oversight there that should have happened.
Whether in regards to COVID training timelines or basic
oversight of this AAV battalion, clearly some things were
missed.
Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back. And I have further
questions if we come back around.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Moulton. Your question goes
to the larger policy issues, Mr. Moulton. I know that
Commandant Berger looks forward to an opportunity to explain to
the full committee the Marine Corps strategies for the future.
And embedded in your question--or embedded in his testimony
should be answers to the questions that you raised, which are
fundamental to our work overseeing and providing the necessary
programs and money to carry out that mission.
I am now going to turn to--here is the gavel order that we
have: Mr. Gallego and then Mr. Levin.
Mr. Gallego, you are on.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Chairman.
You know, I actually spent 7 months living on AAVs. In the
great scheme of things, somehow the Marine Corps thought the
best way to transport men around Iraq was to shove us into
AAVs. They were deathtraps. We knew they were deathtraps.
Because of that, I think, in total, we lost 18 Marines to IED
[improvised explosive device] strikes in Iraq.
And, you know, the joke in the Marine Corps, especially
among leadership, is, ``How many Marines can you fit into an
AAV? Always one more.'' And that certainly was the situation
why so many of my brothers died, because there was always one
more we could fit in there. We were jammed. We were packed,
packed with ammo, and certainly, you know, set in a very
dangerous, precarious situation.
What disturbs me, is that with this report, was that there
was warning signs, and warning signs were missed. One of the
things that I remember when I was enlisted in the Marine Corps,
I was told if I ever saw something that was endangering,
especially in terms of any exercises, that I could call for an
immediate stop and there would be no, you know, ramifications
for that, even though I was just a lance corporal. Well,
clearly that is not true. And I think that is what happened
here.
So, General Thomas, one of the things I want to get an
assurance from you on is that you are going to work to change
that culture, right? Things happen in war. People die. I have
seen it, been there. But the worst thing that can ever happen,
especially to our family members, is that when our men and
women die because of recklessness, because of a Marine Corps
attitude that we have to be tough and we have to be rough
during training, because that is the culture, when we should be
focusing on the actual training exercises, not on establishing
this culture of, you know, of just cruelty, Spartan-like
cruelty, which does not in the end create, in my opinion,
deterrence or readiness.
So, General Thomas, do you see that people actually
understand what happened and how this is actually going to--
because we can update the AAV all we want, but it is, you know,
really, you know, dumb muscle usage instead of actually, you
know, brainpower and management that will end up getting more
men and women killed in these types of training exercises.
General Thomas. Congressman, I would agree with you in
terms of your points regarding the safety culture. That is
exactly what we are trying to get after.
And then your experience of, you know, when you were
serving and how you felt like you could, you know, raise a
concern and be listened to, that is something that we have got
to inculcate across the entire Marine Corps. I would argue,
sir, that in many of our exercises that occurs every day, but
clearly it didn't happen in this case. So it shows that we have
got a lot of work to do.
The other thing that I would say is that when we talk about
culture and, you know, Marine Corps culture--and many of the
members are familiar with that--is that a safety culture and a
culture of mission accomplishment are not mutually exclusive.
As a matter of fact, a safety culture is integral to mission
success.
And that is what leaders--that is what we are sharing with
our leaders in leaders courses now, and that is what we have
got to get all the way down to the deck-plate level.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
And, Vice Admiral, when I was I think a young PFC [private
first class], I actually did a helo dump training, where they
would put us in a helo and throw us underwater, you know, with
gear, to train us to get out in case we ever, you know, had a
helo operation that, you know, hit water.
I couldn't find that in the report. Maybe I just missed it.
Was there, you know, that type of training for these men on the
AAV prior to actually even entering, you know, water that is
moving around in not a very controlled environment, like a dump
tank so they know how to get out, what to do, how not to panic,
things of that nature?
General Thomas. Congressman, if I may.
Mr. Gallego. Yes.
General Thomas. I will take that one if I can. That
training does exist. That is part of the underwater egress
training. However, the embark troops on this particular
vehicle----
Mr. Gallego. Did not do it.
General Thomas [continuing]. Were only partially trained
and did not do that. They should have done that, and they
should have never participated in the exercise, having not
completed that training.
General Olson, would you add anything to that?
General Olson. Sir, I would not. I would say that we can
put 240 people through underwater egress training a week at
Camp Pendleton, and that is almost 10,000 a year if we use the
device to its full capabilities. The capability was there.
These Marines were not trained in it.
Mr. Gallego. Well, I think that, you know, for future, if
we are going to keep the AAV platform, then we also need to
invest in the training side of it and maybe add more dunk tanks
in order for them to do this, or else we are going to have this
situation. Because in there and, you know, trying to get out of
the hatch in an emergent situation--and I have had to do that--
with all your gear on is a horrifying experience on men. And I
can't imagine what happens when water is coming in. And God
bless those men and their families.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Gallego.
I now turn to Mr. Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Thomas, I have some questions similar to those
explored earlier. Given the conclusions of the initial Marine
Corps investigation and the decision last year to suspend all
AAV waterborne operations, pending a review that included
equipment, and the concerns with these vehicles being pretty
obvious, are AAVs currently in use at this time to train or
support the mission?
And I ask because your written testimony describes AAV
operations at Camp Pendleton last month, but it wasn't entirely
clear to me in your earlier response.
General Thomas. Congressman, the resumption of AAV
waterborne operations had resumed, with strict limits. There
are no ship-to-shore or shore-to-ship, and they are only AAV
crews for proficiency training.
I think General Olson can provide some additional detail.
General Olson. The assistant commandant is correct. We have
more gates to cross before we are prepared to return. As was
noted previously, we need to make sure that our doctrine,
techniques, and procedures are 100 percent aligned between the
Navy and Marine Corps team before we can safely return to water
operations.
Right now, we are training crews to regain proficiency that
they have lost over the last year, but they are not training
with passengers in the back.
Mr. Levin. Thank you. In your testimony, you write that
additional inspections with new criteria for hull watertight
integrity, bilge pump function, and emergency egress lighting
systems have been ordered.
Have the new inspection criteria had an impact on AAV use?
For example, were the vehicles that Major General Olson
described as no longer allowed in the water because they leak
in use prior to the new inspections criteria?
General Olson. ACMC [Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps], I will take that.
Sir, they were up until the 31st of July. Then none were
being allowed in the water until such time as we understood
what the overall material condition of the fleet was. What we
found is that we had excessive leakage. We want to get that
leakage down to about 18 gallons an hour, which is the standard
that we believe is safe for operations.
The pumps onboard the vehicles can expel 400 gallons an
hour, so there is a great margin of safety that can be
achieved. We know that the through-hull penetrations for the
suspension and some other places in the AAV, some water is
going to come in, but we expect it to be a minimal amount of
water and that the pumps will able to expel it at a far greater
rate than it could come in.
Just on a note from a previous question, the amphibious
combat vehicle is a different hull form and does not share many
of the through-hull penetrations that the AAV itself does. It
also has no plenums, which is the greatest source of our
leakage.
Mr. Levin. General Thomas, I understand the Marine Corps
canceled the AAV survivability upgrade in 2018, instead opting
to go all-in on replacing the AAV with the ACV. That program
involved upgrading AAVs with a new engine and transmission.
The investigation into this incident found transmissions
failure impacted the bilge pumps. So how would you reconcile
the July 2020 disaster with the decision to cancel the program
to replace AAV transmissions; and were any steps taken to
ensure the vehicles would remain safe, given the awareness that
they were in need of upgrades?
General Thomas. Congressman, the mechanism that was to keep
the vehicles safe or up to speed was through depot repair, the
so-called RCCA vehicles, returned to code condition alpha.
Regarding the transmission, and I would defer to General
Olson on this, but, you know, there have been no significant
problems identified with the transmission. It is true that this
particular vehicle had a loose, you know, drain line, which
allowed the oil to leak out of the transmission and eventually
cause the engine, you know, to--or the system to stop working.
I do not believe that that is a systemic issue that has been
identified.
General Olson, can you clarify?
General Olson. ACMC, I recommend we take the remainder of
that for the record and have PM [Program Manager] AAV explain
in detail.
My understanding, it was the mechanical failure of this
individual transmission due to the loose drain line that
permitted the transmission oil to leak out, not the failure of
the transmission itself but the fact that there was no oil in
the transmission. But may we please take that for the record
and come back with additional detail.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Levin. Sure. And I am running short of time and I have
one final question. I understand the Marine Corps has
contracted BAE Systems for production of the ACV and that 18 of
those vehicles were delivered in November of 2020, with the
intent of fully replacing the AAV by 2028.
General Thomas, what training is currently happening across
the fleet to allow Marines to familiarize themselves with this
new equipment?
General Thomas. Congressman, as you know, the ACV has been
introduced there in Camp Pendleton, with an appropriate
training program and certainly incorporating all the lessons
learned from this tragedy.
Mr. Levin. Thank you, General.
I am out of time, so I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Levin.
We now have a second round. We have very, very little time.
On the gavel order, Garamendi, Lamborn, Golden, Johnson, in
that order. I am going to just make a quick statement and then
not ask a question.
This goes to Vice Admiral Kitchener. The Navy's role in
this is very significant and definitely led to the tragedy. You
have a command investigation underway. When that is completed,
I am certain you will pass it over to us. I would anticipate a
followup hearing on all of this sometime this year, probably in
the late summer or into the fall. That will depend upon two
investigations that are now in process, a command investigation
in the Marine Corps and similarly in the Navy.
So, with that, I simply note the Navy's dereliction in this
process. My words. We will see what the investigation comes
forward.
Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, I am going to follow your
example. I don't have any more questions. The committee has
done an excellent job of probing into all the details. I think
our work is cut out for us to monitor how this goes forward.
The equipment and the training failures that we saw, that
those have to all be rectified. And we are going to be dogging
this very closely.
I also want to say, the Marines on our subcommittee and
full committee are amazing contributors to this overall
understanding and getting to the bottom of this. Jack Bergman,
Ruben Gallego, Jared Golden, and Seth Moulton, I think are all
wonderful additions who help us get to the bottom of this.
So I just want to note that for the record. And I yield
back to you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garamendi. Point very, very well made. We are
definitely enhanced by the experience of our members.
Mr. Golden, speaking of experience, have at it.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. I just had a point I wanted to make,
and I guess also it would be a question as well for General
Thomas and Major General Olson.
When I was serving, I was in the 3rd Battalion 6th Marines
and in the infantry unit, and there were times when we made
decisions as a team, as a unit, to forgo certain equipment
requirements.
You know, I guess I would describe in Afghanistan, being a
small unit operating remotely in the mountains, we often made a
decision to run patrol slick without our SAPI [Small Arms
Protective Insert] plates, confident that speed was a safety
measure in and of itself. Some Marines perhaps lost their lives
as a result of a lack of SAPI plates, but I think we also felt
quite confident as a unit that we were making the right
decision.
There have been other experiences in training where I saw
at the unit level, the squad level, or the platoon level,
decisions made about what type of equipment to go with or not
go with, which may have been contrary to what the book may have
said.
One thing that I noted in this investigation was discussion
about Marines being found having gotten out of the AAV
successfully, still sadly losing their lives, being found in
their battle gear, which prevented the flotation devices from
being able to rescue them. Some discussion that had they been
deployed at the surface it might have worked, but they were not
in that situation.
I am just curious. Has there been any discussion in the
investigation about what type of changes might need to be made
in the culture to ensure that decisions could be made about
what type of gear to deploy in? I know I personally would not
have been confident in an AAV taking on water to leave my SAPI
plate and gear on and, you know, would have been looking for
the flexibility to remove that.
So what lessons has the Marine Corps learned? Certainly,
the idea is that if you are going to be doing an amphibious
assault, you want the very best gear, but sometimes there are,
you know, tradeoffs that need to be made.
So what can you tell me about what the Marine Corps is
learning as a result of the information you have gathered from
the investigation?
General Thomas. Congressman, we continue to review what
specific gear would be the most efficient to aid in the, you
know, safe egress of troops leaving an AAV. And I will let
General Olson, you know, go into more detail.
What I would also say is that, as has already been
discussed, this vehicle slowly took on water for 45 minutes. If
the crew had only had the embarked troops egress in a more
timely fashion, whether they had everything on, their flotation
device was more than sufficient to keep them afloat. That
doesn't address your question, which is a good one, is that
sometimes less is more, and we are taking a hard look at that.
General Olson.
General Olson. Sir, I have got very little to add to that.
The body armor is provided with a quick release. One of the
things that we will examine is the interaction between the body
armor and the life preserver unit, just to make sure that
nothing is impeded. But we are going forward in a deliberate
egress working group regarding how we get out of our armored
vehicles, depending on what kit we are wearing.
What I would note is that over the years we have gone to a
standard of you wear your protective gear inside vehicles
because of things like rollovers, where that body armor
actually shields you and prevents torso injuries, much as your
helmet does. So everything is a compromise. But water and flak
jackets may not be a good mix, and we need to take a very close
look at that.
Mr. Golden. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I appreciate your time today and the
thoroughness of the investigation.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the hearing.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Golden.
I will note that because two of the AAVs, maybe three, were
found to be inoperable, they were left on the beach and the
personnel that was in those were added to the other AAVs. Some
of those personnel did not have life jackets as they returned
to the ship. So once again, fundamental safety was ignored.
I am going to now turn to Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson, are you still with us?
Mr. Moulton for a quick third round.
Mr. Moulton. Just a second round for me, Mr. Chairman, but
thank you very much.
Just a few quick points. First of all, gentlemen, I
obviously have some serious concerns here about how this all
happened. I also understand the importance of hard training.
And a story that this brings to mind is my own experience
of training in Kuwait in anticipation of our second deployment
to Iraq, when we were brought to a shoot house and I was the
only platoon commander who brought his Marines through that
shoot house completely on NVGs [night vision goggles]. It was
considered a very risky thing to do. I felt we were prepared
for it. But I have no doubt that there would be a hearing like
this or at least a significant investigation if one of my
Marines had been killed in that training. Many people would be
inclined to say Lieutenant Moulton was taking risks with
training that were not necessary because this wasn't Iraq, it
was Kuwait.
But just a few weeks later, we found ourselves in the
situation where enemy RPG [rocket-propelled grenade] gunners
were shooting at Marines inside of a building because they had
white-light flashlights on. And I was very proud that my
platoon, at least, was safe from that threat, because we were
confident using our NVGs in an actual combat environment.
So it is critical to me that we get to the bottom of this
investigation to understand what happened here. It is also
critical that we don't become a Marine Corps that is afraid of
hard training, that is afraid of taking risks in training. It
is a constant balancing act.
We have to ask questions like is this operation even
realistic to justify the risk that we are going to take? And
that is the leading question I had, the leadoff question I had
for all of you. I am not sure in this case, a waterborne
mechanized raid, that it is. But we do need to do hard training
and it will entail risk.
The second thing I want to say is that we need to improve
the culture of being able to question authority. And this is
something that my colleague Mr. Gallego focused on. I am not
sure that that culture exists in the Marine Corps today. And a
recent trip that I made to IOC [Infantry Officer Course]--which
might appropriately be renamed OCS [Officer Candidate School]
part two, based on what I saw--confirmed to me that this is not
the style of leadership that is being inculcated in our junior
infantry officers. I think that is something that we need to
look at very carefully.
The commandant himself is questioning assumptions, and I
have praised him publicly all the time for doing that. We need
to ensure that that same culture is encouraged among our junior
leaders. That when we do that and when we talk about how to
have accountability at the end of the day, we also have to be
wary of having a zero defect mentality.
This is another thing I have seen in the Marine Corps,
where whatever happens, a ton of people get relieved. We don't
actually get to the bottom of what really happened and we are
not thoughtful about where that accountability lies. If you
take that approach, then you are not going to have thoughtful
leaders, thoughtful leaders who know how to take risks in
training that are appropriate, who know how to balance risks
with the realism of the operation that they are training for,
and ultimately who are going to be willing to question
authority themselves.
So this is tough. This is hard. And I recognize that you
are the ones in the fight. You are the ones who have to do this
hard work going forward. It is going to be our job to ensure
accountability, not just for these families, although I cannot
imagine their loss, but also for every Marine who will come
after them.
The Marine Corps must be the Nation's premier fighting
force. We can't become a Marine Corps that only cares about
safety. But we also have to be smart about how we get there.
So, gentlemen, thank you very much for all your work. And,
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence of my questions
today.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Moulton, you could not have said it
better. And I will not repeat it, but I will certainly take
your testimony. We will write it up and we will put it on a
placard for all to see.
Mr. Levin, your final.
Mr. Levin. No further questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate our witnesses being here with us today.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Mr. Lamborn, if you
would like to make some closing remarks, I will make mine
following yours and we will adjourn.
Mr. Lamborn. I will just briefly say, Mr. Chairman, I am
glad we had this hearing. There have been some really
penetrating questions asked by each of the members of the
subcommittee and others who joined us.
And I think that we are on a good path to at least get to
the bottom of what happened with the training failures and the
equipment failures and, even broader, the accountability issues
that are raised in an incident like this.
So we have our work cut out for us to track this in the
next months ahead, and we are going to do that, because we owe
it to our men and women in uniform and those who were lost in
this horrific accident 9 months ago that they have the best
training and equipment possible. And I will work with you, Mr.
Chairman, and other members of the committee to make sure we
get that done.
And with those who are serving us in the Marines and Navy,
I thank you for your service, but we are going to have to work
hard to overcome this.
Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
I am going to close with where we started, and that is the
tragedy itself, the loss of life, the effect on the families,
their losses, and the sadness that exists. And it is obvious
that is not just with the families, it is with the Marines
themselves and the units who lost their partners in this
accident.
Unfortunately, we do far too many hearings on accidents and
tragedies. Mr. Courtney spoke to those. We have also done our
own hearings with regard to land-based accidents. And I suspect
that we will do this again. But I would hope that when we have
an accident in the future that we will not find the kind of
derelictions and problems that occurred in this tragedy.
So, with that, General Thomas and General Olson, I will
circle back on this in several months and review the work that
has been done, not only with this accident but with the issues
of maintenance, with the issues of accountability, and with the
very difficult balance that Mr. Moulton has brought to our
attention in his closing comments: Safety and the necessity to
have realistic exercises. So we will go back through all that
again.
Admiral Kitchener, you have been mostly on the side here.
We will review your report when it is available. And I suspect
that we will find that there are also very serious derelictions
in the U.S. Navy part of this participation in this accident
and the accountability going forward.
We will continue to review these. I want to assure the
military, in this case the Navy and the Marine Corps, that this
subcommittee is profoundly concerned about the readiness, the
maintenance of equipment, whether that is a ship at sea or it
is an AAV or any other piece of equipment.
We do understand the need to bring on new equipment, but it
is the responsibility of this committee that the existing
equipment of all types be properly maintained and be available
when needed and be in full working order, along with the
training that goes with that particular piece of equipment.
And so, with that, this hearing is adjourned. I thank you
all for your participation. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
May 3, 2021
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