[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 2022
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
TIM RYAN, Ohio, Chairman
KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
ED CASE, Hawaii MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
NOTE: Under committee rules, Ms. DeLauro, as chair of the full
committee, and Ms. Granger, as ranking minority member of the full
committee, are authorized to sit as members of all subcommittees.
Steve Marchese, Clerk
Subcommittee Staff
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SECURITY OF THE CAPITOL CAMPUS SINCE THE
ATTACK OF JANUARY 6, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-481 WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
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ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut, Chair
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
BARBARA LEE, California
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
TIM RYAN, Ohio
C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
DEREK KILMER, Washington
MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
GRACE MENG, New York
MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
PETE AGUILAR, California
LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
NORMA J. TORRES, California
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
ED CASE, Hawaii
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
JOSH HARDER, California
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
SUSIE LEE, Nevada
KAY GRANGER, Texas
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
KEN CALVERT, California
TOM COLE, Oklahoma
MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee
JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
CHRIS STEWART, Utah
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
DAVID G. VALADAO, California
DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida
BEN CLINE, Virginia
GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
MIKE GARCIA, California
ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa
TONY GONZALES, Texas
Robin Juliano, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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January 11, 2022
Security of the Capitol Campus Since the Attack of January 6, 2021
Page
J. Brett Blanton, Architect of the Capitol....................... 24
Answers to submitted questions............................... 58
J. Thomas Manger, Chief, U.S. Capitol Police..................... 5
Answers to submitted questions............................... 58
Hon. William J. Walker, Sergeant-at-Arms, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 18
Answers to submitted questions............................... 58
(iii)
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022
----------
Tuesday, January 11, 2022.
SECURITY OF THE CAPITOL CAMPUS SINCE THE ATTACK OF JANUARY 6, 2021
WITNESSES
HON. WILLIAM J. WALKER, SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
J. THOMAS MANGER, CHIEF, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE
J. BRETT BLANTON, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL
Opening Statement of Chairman Ryan
Mr. Ryan. The committee will come to order.
As this hearing is fully virtual, we must address a few
housekeeping matters. For today's meeting, the chair or staff
designated by the chair may mute participants' microphones when
they are not under recognition for the purposes of eliminating
inadvertent background noise. Members are responsible for
muting and unmuting themselves. If I notice that you have not
unmuted yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to
unmute you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will
unmute your microphone.
I remind all members and witnesses that the 5-minute clock
still applies. If there is a technology issue, we will move to
the next member until the issue is resolved, and you will
retain the balance of your time. You will notice a clock on
your screen that will show you how much time is remaining. At 1
minute remaining, the clock will turn to yellow. At 30 seconds
remaining, I will gently tap the gavel to remind members that
their time has almost expired. When your time has expired, the
clock will turn red, and I will begin to recognize the next
member.
In terms of the speaking order, we will follow the order
set forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair and
ranking member; then members present at the time the hearing is
called to order will be recognized in order of seniority; and,
finally, members not present at the time the hearing is called
to order.
Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have
set up an email address to which members can send anything they
wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings or markups.
That email address has been Provided in advance to your staff.
Good morning to our panel. I am pleased to welcome the
Chief of Capitol Police, Tom Manger; the House Sergeant at
Arms, William Walker; and the Architect of the Capitol, Brett
Blanton. Thank you for being with us today.
None of us will ever forget the events of January 6. The
Capitol was attacked by violent insurrection. Lives were lost
in the days and weeks following. 140 police officers were
assaulted. $1.5 million worth of damage was done to the
Capitol, and the lasting impacts of that day continue to be
felt across the Capitol complex and our community. How we
remember and respond will determine how we collectively learn
from the trials and mistakes that day.
As we move forward, we do not want to fall into the trap of
preparing to fight the last war. Rather, we must thoughtfully
plan to ensure the next one never happens. Ignoring the
mistakes of the past or refusing to learn and grow from them
will only continue to leave the Capitol campus vulnerable to
unknown and unexpected threats.
A lot of important work remains to get to the bottom of
what happened that day, and I commend my colleagues on the
select committee who are engaged in that very important work.
The purpose of this subcommittee and this hearing specifically
is not to litigate the facts of that day. Our purpose today is
to review where we are 1 year later and what changes have been
made since January 6, 2021, and to look ahead as what is still
needed to keep Members, staff, visitors, Capitol Police, and
all employees on campus safe.
In May 2021, the House passed a comprehensive security
supplemental bill with significant investments in the Capitol
Police, security improvements, and Member security. But after
inaction in the Senate, a slimmed-down compromise bill was
agreed to in July of 2021. Unfortunately, this included only
$300 million of earmarked funding for the Architect of the
Capitol for windows and doors and new security cameras and
$70.7 million for the U.S. Capitol Police salaries, equipment,
and other expenses related to the January 6 insurrection.
In all, the shortsighted version that could get support
from the Republicans in the Senate did not include other items
such as backfilling the funding reprogrammed away from other
vital activities in the aftermath of the attack, funding for
security screening vestibules, landscape architecture, and
retractable security barriers to protect the Capitol complex,
and resources to improve Member security and security in
district offices.
Today, I hope you can provide updates to the subcommittee
as to how Capitol Police, Sergeant at Arms are currently
protecting the campus and its workforce and to talk about the
next steps to ensure the future physical safety of our campus.
What changes have been made to improve the safety of doors and
windows? What plans are in place to ensure a mob cannot again
overrun access points in the Capitol? What efforts have been
taken to recruit and retain additional Capitol police officers?
Simply, how is the Capitol a safer place to work 1 year later?
This subcommittee is interested in hearing about both how those
supplemental funds are being spent and what gaps remain.
On top of that, I need you to address the consequences to
the safety and security of the Capitol complex if the fiscal
year 2022 regular appropriation is not enacted. As you all
know, the continuing resolution runs out on February 18, and
there are those who believe it is better to punt instead of
doing the hard work of funding the government. What are the
repercussions to the legislative branch if the 2022 bill is not
enacted and we are stuck with a continuing resolution at fiscal
year 2021 funding levels?
I look forward to your answers to the questions I have
raised, and I want you to know that we are very thankful for
your service and that of the staff of your organizations who
work so hard to make this House run.
At this point, I would like to yield to my friend and
colleague, if she is here, Ranking Member Jaime Herrera
Beutler, for any opening comments she would like to make, and
if not, it is Mr. Newhouse.
Opening Statement of Ranking Member Herrera Beutler
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Walker, Chief Manger, and Mr.
Blanton for being here today.
You know, I echo Chairman Ryan's thanks for everything that
you do. We will be forever grateful for the heroic actions of
your officers, your employees on January 6 of last year, and we
are also grateful for the actions of the Metropolitan Police
Department from D.C., the National Guard, and the numerous
other law enforcement agencies that came to the aid of the
Capitol, as well as we are grateful to their families at home.
They did a lot for us and for this Nation.
The security threats that are facing the legislative branch
are growing, and they are changing. After 9/11, we were
primarily concerned about foreign terrorist groups. And, since
January 6, those foreign terrorist groups and the violent
domestic groups on the right and on the left have revealed that
there are a lot of vulnerabilities at the U.S. Capitol. We must
make changes to ensure that no groups can successfully attack
the U.S. Capitol or individual Members. Political violence has
absolutely no place in our society, our democracy, or our
legislative process.
And I hear this over and over again. Over the last year, I
have heard so many people say, ``You know, this group has been
doing it, so this group can do it,'' or ``This group has been
doing it, so this makes this okay,'' and that is--I always come
back to, when is it ever okay? That is a function of our
democracy. That is the thing that sets us apart and makes us
different. It is never okay.
Over the past year, Congress has provided both funding and
reforms to assist you in protecting the Capitol complex.
Through the security supplemental appropriations bill, there
was provided funds for immediate personnel and supply needs of
the Capitol Police and security enhancements for the Capitol
Building itself. We also have provided the Capitol Police Chief
the authority to unilaterally request National Guard and other
agency support in an emergency. We need to ensure that the
brave officers who are protecting the Capitol and the functions
of the legislative branch have the appropriate training and
equipment. They should never again face circumstances like
January 6. We need to ensure that the leadership in place is
providing actual leadership and support and has been trained in
these types of circumstances to provide security coordination
for large scale and just routine events. I believe we need to
ensure that intelligence is gathered, disseminated, and acted
upon in a productive way.
And these changes don't just take funding; they require the
leadership of each of you who is here to testify today. And
that is what we are excited to hear about. We want to hear
about the security supplemental funding is being used and if
there are any additional funding or legislative requirements
necessary to secure the legislative branch and its activities.
Security is fundamental. It is up to you, the members of
the Capitol Police Board, and your agencies, to provide that
assurance so that we may carry out our constitutional duty
representing the American people without obstruction or fear.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Ms. Herrera Beutler.
Next is the chair of the full committee, Representative
Rosa DeLauro.
Opening Statement of Chair DeLauro
The Chair. Thank you, Chairman Ryan and Ranking Member
Herrera Beutler, for holding this hearing. I want to say a
thank you to our guests, to General Walker, to Chief of Police
Manger, and to Mr. Blanton for testifying today.
On January 6, 2021, our Nation gazed into the abyss and
understood more fully than ever before that our democracy is
fragile. A year later, it is still difficult to comprehend the
gravity of this attack on our democracy. And I will never
forget that, amid this insurrection, Capitol Police told us to,
quote, hit the floor and grab the gas masks under our seats as
the mob headed for the House Chamber.
Because of these brave women and men, our democracy proved
its resilience, our institutions withstood the threat, and we
overcame the chaos. In recognition of their sacrifice and to
uphold our responsibility to protect the Republic, this
committee passed into law almost a billion dollars to fund the
Capitol Police and secure the United States Capitol, the
citadel of democracy.
With funding provided in the security supplemental, the
Capitol Police have made changes over the past year in five
critical areas: training, equipment and personnel, operational
planning, the Civil Disturbance Unit, and Intelligence and
Incident Command. But they still need our help. One year after
the horrors of that day, the Capitol Police are still
recovering. While their physical wounds may have healed, there
is still so much more they will need to rebuild.
Over the past year, 135 Capitol Police officers have
retired or resigned, leaving the force dangerously depleted.
Those serious manpower challenges have also made it harder to
take officers away from their posts for their training they
need. For instance, I have heard directly from officers that
they need more and more frequent trainings.
We also know that the Capitol Police itself has identified
the need for more training staff, and a larger training
facility that could better accommodate the force's size and
mission.
I also understand that, while progress has been made, there
continue to be concerns about the adequacy of equipment for
officers to protect themselves and this institution, and I hope
we can discuss that today.
Finally, my colleagues and I have continuing concerns about
the security for Members and our office staff in our districts.
That came up over and over again from Members about the sense
of their security and the security of their families in
districts. While the House included funding for member security
in the Security Supplemental, that funding was--outrageously,
in my view--stripped in the Senate.
The number of potential threats has only grown. So, sooner
or later, we will have to address this issue, and we want to
hear your perspective on that matter. While we have already
passed a security supplemental, we can continue to provide
funding and oversight through this subcommittee's annual
appropriations bill. But sadly, annual funding for the Capitol
Police--which this Committee voted to increase by $88.4
million--is being held up because Republicans are refusing to
negotiate appropriations bills.
That intransigence is keeping the Capitol Police stuck at
last year's funding levels and denying these heroes the
resources they need to keep the Capitol and all who work and
visit here safe.
As the Architect of the Capitol, Mr. Blanton, put in his
testimony. Delayed funding for projects has consequences. I
believe it is time for my Republican colleagues to work with
Democrats on government funding legislation that supports the
brave men and women of the Capitol Police. We need to honor
their sacrifice by providing the certainty that comes with
sufficient annual funding. We need to have this conference
process begin, and I hope that we can use the insights from
this hearing to shape the final legislation.
We want to hear from you. To our witnesses, what do you
need? How can we help? What reforms, including the Capitol
Police Board, must happen? By having these discussions, we can
continue the long process of helping our community to heal, and
by doing so, we can keep on moving forward, persisting in our
quest to build a more perfect Union.
And, with that, I thank Chairman Ryan and Ranking Member
Herrera Beutler, and I yield back.
CHAIRMAN OUTLINES PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Ryan. I thank the Chairwoman.
Without objection, your written testimonies will be made
part of record. Once the statements are complete, we will move
to the question-and-answer period. I ask that the panel to
please summarize your statements and highlight your efforts to
the committee. We will begin with Chief Manger. After his
statement, we will turn to Sergeant at Arms Walker for his
statement, and then we will conclude with Architect of the
Capitol Blanton.
Chief, please begin.
Testimony of Chief J. Thomas Manager
Mr. Manger. Thank you. Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member
Herrera Beutler, Chair DeLauro, Ranking Member Granger, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for providing
me the opportunity to speak about the significant improvements
we have made following the events of January 6, 2021, and to
speak about the work that remains to be done.
I want to begin by acknowledging the men and women of the
Capitol Police who work so tirelessly to fulfill their mission
of protecting the United States Capitol, the Members of
Congress, and the legislative process every day. And while I am
proud of our officers, the events of January 6 did expose
critical department failures and deficiencies with operational
planning, intelligence, staffing, and equipment.
I am pleased to report that we have addressed a significant
portion of the many recommendations issued to the department.
In fact, of the more than 100 recommendations issued by the
inspector general, we have implemented or are in the process of
addressing over 90 of them. However, there is more work to be
done.
I also want to thank this committee for its support in
providing the department the resources needed to address its
critical needs.
One of the most critical failures identified in the wake of
January 6 was the lack of a departmentwide operational plan for
the joint session. An important first step we took to address
that concern was onboarding a former Secret Service official
with extensive experience in major event and national special
security event planning. Guided by his expertise, we now take a
multiphase approach to our planning process with a focus on
information gathering, intelligence, asset determination,
internal coordination, and, most importantly, departmentwide
dissemination of all intelligence and critical information
before all large and high-risk events.
This includes the creation of the department's first
Critical Incident Response Plan, which now allows us to more
effectively and more quickly obtain assistance from our partner
agencies. In short, a blueprint for operational planning has
been created and put into place for all significant future
events.
If January 6 taught us anything, it is that preparation
matters. Immediately after the 6th, the department focused on
the need to strengthen our front line officers, the Civil
Disturbance Unit, or CDU. For any demonstrations that involve
the potential for violence, the need for a well-trained, well-
equipped CDU is crucial. Recognizing the tactical importance of
our CDU officers, we developed a plan to create eight hard
platoons and incentivize officers to remain in the unit. These
platoons will be permanent units whose members train together
and are deployed together.
Of course, our first responders can't do their job without
proper equipment. Therefore, we have reviewed all CDU equipment
and, with the assistance of this committee, are upgrading the
equipment to protect our officers and enhance our ability for
crowd control.
Few changes are as dramatic as the ones that we have made
in the way we gather, analyze, share, use, and disseminate
intelligence. Improvements to the department's lead
intelligence component, the Intelligence and Interagency
Coordination Division, began before January 6. These
improvements include a nationwide search for a permanent
intelligence director, and we are actually only a couple weeks
away from making that selection. The development of the United
States Capitol Police intelligence product that is now shared
with the intelligence community, the issuance of a daily
intelligence report distributed to all officers and officials,
biweekly classified intelligence briefings, coordination with
intelligence and law enforcement partners in advance of large
or high-profile events, and we have increased our staffing by
eight intelligence analysts since January 6. We continue to be
forward looking in our efforts to ensure that the department
has a strong and proven intelligence collection analysis and
dissemination program.
I want to thank all of you for your ongoing support during
this process. I also acknowledge and appreciate the support
that we have received from the Capitol Police Board. Today, I
am confident that the United States Capitol Police Department
has made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies
that impacted the department's response on January 6. And,
while more work remains to be done, the men and women of the
Capitol Police stand ready to fulfill their mission each and
every day.
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Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Chief.
General.
Testimony of Major General William J. Walker (Ret.)
General Walker. Good morning, Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member
Herrera Beutler, Chair DeLauro, and members of the
Appropriations subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify before you today and thank you for your ongoing
support. It is an honor and a privilege to serve this great
institution.
Before I begin, I must acknowledge the debt of gratitude we
owe the United States Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police
Department, the National Guard, and all the many law
enforcement officers who came to support the Capitol Police and
defend democracy a year ago. We must remember those we have
lost over the past year: Officer Brian Sicknick, Officer Howard
Liebengood, and Officer Billy Evans, all of the United States
Capitol Police. And remember that many officers continue to
bear scars from that fateful day, some seen and some unseen.
However, their steadfast commitment to this institution serves
as a powerful inspiration to all of us, and I am fortunate to
work collaboratively with the brave and dedicated officers of
the United States Capitol Police.
Let me get right to the bottom line. We are unquestionably
safer today than we were a year ago today. The question is, are
we safe enough? The answer is work remains. Because the threat
landscape today is ever changing, security of the United States
Capitol, its Members, their staff, and our visitors is a never-
ending journey, not a destination.
To meet the security challenges posed by the constantly
evolving threat, the Office of the House of Sergeant at Arms
and the United States Capitol Police and our partners, the
Architect of the Capitol and the Chief Administrative Officer,
we all must collaboratively work hard and be ever vigilant and
proactive.
What has changed? The House Sergeant at Arms is leveraging
human resources and technology and partnerships like never
before to provide the safest and most secure atmosphere
possible. We have hired security subject-matter experts from
the United States Secret Service, the United States
intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security,
and other agencies. These experts have deep knowledge, broad
experience, and a history of success protecting people,
property, and data. These personnel additions supplement the
existing dedicated and professional HSAA House Sergeant at Arms
staff that we already have.
Member security is my highest priority. The way I am
approaching this, Member security has five dimensions: Member
security at the United States Capitol, Member security at their
residence, Member security during their travel events in their
districts, and the overall threats to Members.
After January 6, all spaces within the Capitol complex
occupied by Members have access to duress alarms, so that is
security in the Capitol.
I request resources for every Member to have a state-of-
the-art home security package at their residence in the
District of Columbia and the metropolitan area and in their
district residence back home. I also request resources for a
Member travel operations center to support all domestic and
foreign travel by Members. This would build on newly created
partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security,
specifically the Transportation Security Administration, and
the Department of State, specifically the Overseas Security
Advisory Council, which the House Sergeant at Arms has joined,
and this is helping us regarding threats to Member travel.
For events in each Member's district, I strongly, strongly
recommend a standardized suite of training for all district law
enforcement coordinators be completed. My office is developing
new training protocols to include videos for district
coordinators. The topics include security awareness, threat and
risk assessments, and risk mitigation strategies. I further
recommend that the coordinators be either a former law
enforcement officer or someone with strong relationships and
network in the local law enforcement community. Ideally, I
would like somebody that is a retired law enforcement officer,
with H.R. 218--able to carry a weapon under the provisions of
H.R. 218. The coordinator would routinely meet with local law
enforcement to assess security for Members. My plan would
include re-energizing regional and national district
coordinator security conferences that would be attended by the
United States Capitol Police leadership and House Sergeant at
Arms staff to ensure coordinators are kept up to date on the
latest security solutions.
I believe threats to Members should also be deterred
through the aggressive identification and prosecution of
offenders. The unprecedented number of threats must be
addressed and disincentivized. The identification, arrest,
prosecution, punishment, and publicity surrounding the
adjudication of people making threats against Members will make
clear this behavior will not be tolerated.
When I served as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, we had agent attorneys who supplemented U.S.
Attorney's Offices. They were made Special Assistant U.S.
Attorneys. The FBI and other agencies also followed this
practice, and it is to go after and prosecute the cases when
there is a backlog. I shared this concept with the United
States Capitol Police, and I am pleased to tell you, to share
with you that they have followed it, and they have hired
attorneys who are assisting with the backlog of prosecutions
against individuals making threats to Members of Congress. I am
really thrilled about that. This has to stop. It is a huge,
number one priority of mine.
In addition, we are also working in concert with the United
States intelligence community to facilitate the gathering of
threats against Members. We are collaborating with the
Department of Justice on prosecutions. The objective is to more
effectively integrate State and local prosecutors in bringing
those making threats against Members to justice.
What I mean by that, Mr. Chairman, is that there are
counties in the United States that, at the local level, it is a
crime, and we need to come after this holistically. And, if we
can't go after an offender Federally, we need to do it State or
at the county level. My objective is to--so, with this
objective, I would like to ask Members to urge the Department
of Justice to provide their full support and assistance to all
prosecutable threats made against Members. I really believe
this is something that we have to stop before something tragic
happens. Threats against Members must be an enforcement
priority for the Department of Justice as well as State and
local and county jurisdictions.
Another priority of mine is the hardening of the Capitol,
both physically and electronically. We are working
collaboratively with the United States Capitol Police Board,
the Architect of the Capitol, who can more fully comment on the
physical security assessments underway, and the Chief
Administrative Officer on the cyber threats that are facing the
Capitol.
Identity access management is also an initiative that will
increase security at the Capitol. Working in collaboration with
the subcommittee and the Capitol Police, I would like to
institute a Capitol Access Verification Entry System. I am
calling it CAVES. If this takes off, it would allow the Members
to know who is coming into the Capitol. It is not telling
Members you can't bring an individual in, but you should know
about this--about who is coming to visit you. Just like credit
card companies know their customers, we should know our
visitors. So that is another thing that I have.
Am I out of time? I see the red up there.
Mr. Ryan. Yeah. Start wrapping up, General.
General Walker. Okay. All right.
Mr. Ryan. We will go through a lot of this in questions.
General Walker. Yes, sir. The last of my security
priorities is the establishment of Capitol security officers.
The Capitol security officer concept was based on the United
States Marshal Service's use of court security officers to
augment deputy marshals, which protect judges in courtrooms in
the 94 judicial districts in the United States. So I have--we
briefed the Capitol Police Board, and I am working with the
Capitol Police toward implementation.
So I will just summarize. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you all this morning. I am appreciative of your
unyielding support and the partnerships we are developing to
enhance security of the complex and its members. I am happy to
answer your questions. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Ryan. Thank you, General.
Architect of the Capitol Blanton.
Testimony of J. Brett Blanton
Mr. Blanton. Thank you, Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member
Herrera Beutler, Chair DeLauro, members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I truly
appreciate the support of this subcommittee in protecting the
Capitol after the events of January 6.
As you hear, all of our panelists are united in our efforts
to make the Capitol safe, secure, and open. I can honestly say
that we are safer today than we were on January 5. However,
there is more to do.
As I reflect upon the somber events last week, I remain
focused on ongoing efforts to demonstrate our collective
strength and resolve. The U.S. Capitol is a symbol of Western
democracy. It is among the most significant architectural
buildings in the entire world. With your ongoing support, we
can protect and preserve this cherished institution as well as
all those who serve here.
In doing so, we cannot forget the heroic actions of the
Capitol Police, Sergeant at Arms staff, and my staff on January
6. During those harrowing hours, AOC personnel sheltered
congressional staff in our shops. Staff raced to reverse the
air flow to clear the air of chemical irritants deep within the
Capitol. We set out eye wash stations and provided water for
Capitol police officers in need.
Once the security officials cleared the building, AOC
employees worked tirelessly to clean up and begin repairs.
Carpenters covered windows and doors with plywood. Laborers
removed glass and broken furniture. Hazardous material crews
cleaned up pepperspray, bear repellant, and fire extinguisher
residue. Through their resilient and unwavering efforts, AOC
staff ensured Congress could go back to work. And while
Congress was doing its job, AOC staff worked nonstop to
finalize preparations for the 59th Presidential inauguration.
Haste was urgent and immediate. In order to address these
needs, we received congressional approval to transfer funds
from other important projects so that repair work and an
essential security assessment could be completed right away.
Over the past year, in close coordination with the Capitol
Police, as well as the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms, AOC
staff has improved security measures across campus. While some
of these changes are more visible than others, we have worked
continuously throughout the pandemic to keep the Capitol safe.
We know our efforts are critical to the safety of the Members
and staff working on the Capitol campus. We are proud of the
role we play in ensuring continuity of operations. At the same
time, we all know well the growing costs associated with the
pandemic, including both purchasing of personal protective
inventory and testing kits, is draining our agency resources.
We are extremely appreciative of the funds you provided for the
pandemic response in the CARES Act and the security
supplemental. Looking ahead, we hope to continue working with
you to address ongoing needs.
Our fiscal year 2023 budget request will reflect projects
related to the security needs of Congress, the Supreme Court,
and the entire Capitol complex. We will also seek funding for
projects previously approved by Congress that were put on hold
as a result of the budget transfer that I mentioned earlier. As
the subcommittee considers future campus wide security
improvements, the AOC will need adequate resources to support
our partners in the Capitol Police. It is imperative to
consider the additional requirements and costs levied on the
AOC to support our partners in these campuswide initiatives.
And, while physical security improvements are a top
priority, I am also committed to maintaining a positive work
environment where people have the skills, the training,
equipment, and support to serve Congress on behalf of the
American people.
I would like to take a moment to express my deep
appreciation to all AOC employees. Every day, I am continually
impressed and inspired by the level of commitment, resilience,
and professionalism displayed by our employees. The Capitol is
exceptionally resilient, both in terms of physical structure
and its people. We and the Capitol Police Board share a common
obligation to protect and preserve this international symbol of
democracy. I am confident our Capitol will continue to stand
the test of time. I look forward to continued collaboration
with my colleagues to vigilantly and effectively achieve this
goal. On behalf of all Architect of the Capitol staff, I thank
you again for your support and look forward to answering your
questions.
[The information follows:]
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IMPACT OF CONTINUING RESOLUTION
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Blanton. I appreciate it.
I am going to kick it off here. I asked a couple of
questions in my opening statement that we will get to. I am
hoping you can touch upon those. But, specifically, on the
impact of a continuing resolution to your offices, what would
that mean, if you could each give us an answer on that?
We can--we will go in reverse order, Mr. Blanton, since we
have you on the screen. You know, we are very frustrated about
the continuing resolution, and we would be interested in your
views on the impact of it.
Mr. Blanton. Thank you. My largest concern with the
continuing resolution is actually with the Cannon project. We
need to have money this summer in order to award the next phase
of the Cannon project. If that is delayed, that is going to end
up affecting a move cycle where we won't be able to complete
the project within the 2-year timeframe that is required for
each phase of the project.
There are also additional projects that are concerning to
me: lighting upgrades on the Capitol plaza, some more security
infrastructure, and then update--upgrades to the sprinkler
system within the Capitol so that we actually have a fire-code-
approved building. Any continued delays will just delay the
implementation of any of these projects.
Mr. Ryan. When you said the security projects, which ones
would be affected by the CR?
Mr. Blanton. The barriers and kiosks for the Capitol Police
and truck interdiction systems.
Mr. Ryan. Okay. General?
General Walker. Yes, sir. The greatest impact for the House
Sergeant at Arms is going to be our inability to hire talent.
As everybody knows, there is a war for talent, and we are
trying to acquire security professionals. That is the biggest
thing. There may be some impact on our travel to go out and do
assessments of--security assessments that we have been doing.
It could affect our police services. But number one would be
hiring individuals, and that is pretty much all I have right
now, sir.
Mr. Ryan. Chief.
Mr. Manger. Well, the continuing resolution would impact
just about everything that we are doing to make and sustain
improvements, especially in the areas of intelligence, threat
analysis, dignitary protection, critical security
infrastructure, all those areas where we have increased
workload demands because of the 6th and the recommendations
that we received as a result of the 6th.
It would suspend our health and wellness initiatives, which
are very robust. It would end our student loan repayment
program. But the biggest impact would be our inability to
increase our staffing. You will see in our fiscal year 2022 and
fiscal year 2023 budget, we are asking for 288 new recruit
officers, and our plan is to hire 288 new recruit officers in
both those years to get ahead of attrition. This basically
would leave us in a position where all we could do is replace
the officers that have left. We have got to get ahead of
attrition. Staffing is our biggest challenge that remains.
Mr. Ryan. Okay. Great.
Ms. Herrera Beutler.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you, Chairman Ryan. And I think
it is important, since right now we are spending a lot of time
talking about the CR that the Democrats passed out of the House
that is being negotiated, I think it is important to note that
Republicans are very happy to negotiate that. I think CRs are
as detrimental as the next person.
However, I do think what I have heard from our colleagues
in the Senate that, you know, there are policies that the
Democrats are going to have to come to the table on,
longstanding protections like Hyde, national defense and border
security, you know. There are some pretty big, high-level
issues that need to be addressed. So I think if my friends are
very interested in making sure that we don't end up with a CR,
they should make sure that their counterparts in the Senate are
willing to do that negotiating because, like I said, it came
out of the House. It is done. I don't think CRs are a good
idea, but I also think that there needs to be--if they want
that bipartisan support, there needs to be some bipartisan
effort put into the bills.
COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY REVIEW
And I want to take it back a little bit to where we are at
with regard to, you know, the AOC. I know in the last year that
we have been asked for large sums of money. There has been
money that has been moved from account to account to cover the
cost of the fence, you know, to cover immediate needs, and I
have been supportive of those things pretty much as you have
asked, Mr. Blanton, and part of that is because I do trust.
You know, one of the things you have asked for is money for
a comprehensive security review. And I have got to say, I am a
little frustrated that I have not--our offices--and I don't
know if the majority has. Maybe the minority hasn't seen it. I
did talk with our counterparts on the authorizing side of this
committee, updates on how the money that we have let this year,
the $10 million, the security assessment, updates specifically
on how that money has been spent. Maybe it hasn't been spent,
maybe it isn't completely expended, or you have plans for it.
But I haven't gotten--you know, I hear you saying we need more
support, and I am ready to step up on that front, but I haven't
actually heard the details of what has been done to date,
especially with that specific assessment. Could you provide a
little clarity?
Mr. Blanton. Yes. Thank you for the question. So the
assessment is complete. It is well over 2,000 pages. And what
we are doing now is doing an executive summary of it so that we
can provide that executive summary and say, if you want to see
the 2,000 pages, we will have that in the SCIFs. So there were
some delays with the completion. It was completed in late
December, and so the executive summary should be coming down
shortly.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. I understand delays. I definitely
understand that everybody--you know, everybody here who has
taken on and assumed--some folks have assumed new roles in
leading an agency that needs a lot of fixing. I think there is
just--I have a little bit of frustration. I have heard a little
bit of frustration that we are being told we aren't quite
providing everything, but as far as I know, we haven't even
gotten the update on what your recommendations are. And I am
anxious to see that because I think your campuswide assessment
is critical to putting in place the, you know, soup to nuts,
the whole deal for security of the U.S. Capitol.
CAPITOL POLICE VACANCIES, STAFFING, AND MORALE
I am going to switch gears really quick to the Capitol
Police leadership, and I know, I think it is like six of the
highest--the 11 members of the Capitol Police leadership team
have left for various reasons. There are morale issues in the
department, and it has been heavily scrutinized. I wanted to
see, Chief Manger, if your--what your plans to fill some of
these vacancies, and just honestly, overall, what can be done
to restore some of that morale. I know there were 130 officers
who have left the department this year. I know this is
happening nationwide. I can tell you finding talent has been a
huge issue. And I wanted to know if you are looking at hiring
folks outside of the normal scope, you know, ex-Secret Service
agents, folks from Homeland Security, people who have been
trained, and if there are any impediments there because we need
to do what we can at least to get--at least hit attrition. We
have got to at least tackle that hurdle. So over to you.
Mr. Manger. So, thank you, and it is three questions.
Leadership----
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Sorry.
Mr. Manger. [continuing]. Morale and hiring. Let me hit all
three of them. First of all, the first thing I did when I got
here was to assess my leadership that I had. And as you pointed
out, six out of the top 11 people in the organization had left.
The chief, both Sergeant of Arms, had gone the day after
January 6. But for the Capitol Police, we lost the assistant
chief, who was in charge of operational planning on the 6th.
Gone. The director of intelligence. Gone. The director of
security services. Gone. Two deputy chiefs retired. And so more
than 50 percent of the senior staff was not here when I got
here.
So what I--my biggest task was to assess the leadership
that I had. I wanted to determine who is just waiting around to
see what is going to happen and who has been working since
January 7 to try and improve the failures of this department.
And the folks that have remained, I have great confidence in.
They have done a great deal of work, and some of these folks
include people that had the vote of no confidence, and I
understand that. But a vote of no confidence, while it is
important, it is an important statement by the union, it is not
an objective performance evaluation. And what I did coming in,
I had no preconceived notions, but I have--the folks that I
have are working their tails off.
There is more to be done. We have got to replace those
folks. I think there is strong talent within the organization,
but I also believe that bringing folks in from the outside is
still an option that I am considering, and we will move
forward. And I will certainly keep the committee apprised of my
decisions as we move forward.
In terms of morale, morale is a difficult issue. It is--
morale--what I have learned in 43 years of being a cop is
morale is in the eye of the beholder. You are going to have
some cops that--who took this job, they had expectations, and
then when they get here, they find out that the job's more
difficult than they thought it was going to be, and they have
to sort of reconcile that.
And I have tried to tell--you know, tried to tell my folks
over and over since I have been here that the people we serve
appreciate what we do, and what we have got to do--what I think
my responsibility is to restore the confidence that these
officers--I want these officers to have in the department. The
department let them down on January 6. We have got to restore
that confidence, and I am doing everything we can to address
that.
You know, the supplemental, there were a number of things
in there: hazard pay, retention bonus, student loan repayment,
specialty pay for the Civil Disturbance Unit, health and
wellness initiatives. The supplemental allowed us to do all
those things. My hope is they have had some impact on morale,
but we have still got, again, more work to be done there.
Last issue, the hiring. You know, we have got a goal of
trying to hire 288 people this year, 288 people next year. We
have got to get ahead of attrition. One of the reasons we are
so far behind is, as was mentioned, over 130 people left last
year or since January 6, but the year prior, COVID closed down
our--the training academy in Georgia. We weren't able to get
any new hires through in 2020. So you have got a year where we
can't--where we get very few new officers; another year where
we lose 130. That is what has put us in such a difficult
position in terms of staffing.
The good news is, we are not--we have put a lot of
recruitment initiatives together. We are not having any trouble
getting people to apply. The challenge is to make sure we hire
the right people. And I think that we are doing our best to
make sure we hire people that have integrity, a spirit for
public service, courage, compassion, emotional intelligence.
These are the qualities we are looking for, and my hope is that
we are continuing--that we continue to be able to hire good
people to be Capitol police officers.
In terms of the leadership, again, as I said before, I
think we have got good talent internally, but we also need to
look outside to see if there is good folks that we can bring
in.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you.
I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
Chairwoman DeLauro.
REVISITING JANUARY 6TH AND SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING
The Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank our witnesses for the speed and alacrity with which you
moved in the chaos, the aftermath of January 6, and the changes
that you have made, including that we were unable to get you
all of the money that the House proposed in that first--in our
supplemental, and money was taken out. So now what we want to
do is to figure out where the gaps are and be able to help fill
those.
I have to say something quickly before I ask my two
questions, which is about the state of negotiations on the
omnibus. I think it is important to note that, to date, that
there has not been a--the Democratic proposals as reflected in
the bills that are out there, all 12 appropriations bills in
the House and in the Senate, but to date, there has not been a
Republican counteroffer or an offer of what our colleagues on
the other side of the aisle would like to see in an omnibus
going forward. And we continue to ask for that, and my hope is
that we will get there.
With regard to the policy of riders, et cetera, just for
clarification, the normal process of the Appropriations
Committee historically, and I have served on the committee for
some 25, 26 years, is that you deal with--dealing with the top
line, getting the numbers on defense and nondefense laid out
and programmatically go down, and then you deal with the
riders. To say that we would not enter conversations about top
line, et cetera, without the dismissal of all of the policy
issues is unprecedented, in addition to which we have to have a
thorough review, debate, and discussion of all of those in
order to come out with a bicameral but bipartisan piece of
legislation. So just to clear the record.
And, if I can, I would like to get to two questions. Chief
Manger, I want to say thank you. No Member or staff members
were physically injured on January 6. Okay. Now, you note in
your testimony that, without the restrictions of COVID-19, the
Capitol would have been open to the public on January 6. And
so--and that is safe to estimate there would have been
thousands of more people in the Capitol that day, if not for
COVID-19. Can you describe how the police response on the 6th
would have been different with such a substantial increase in
population at the Capitol? Do you expect the same results in
terms of overall safety? Is the funding that was included in
the security supplemental significant enough to ensure the U.S.
Capitol Police is prepared to respond to such an attack with
the Capitol at full staff capacity?
And, quickly, for you, Chief, and for General Walker, the
issue of in-district funding for members and district offices
and families, we know that there are about 10,000 threats. If
you can describe, Chief, the details--in detail the steps the
U.S. Capitol Police is taking to ensure that all threats are
investigated.
And, General Walker, in your testimony, you recommend
standardized training for the district law enforcement
coordinators. Are there other security enhancements needed for
Members and staff to remain safe in their districts? Is
additional funding necessary for such protection?
So, Chief Manger, if you will begin, and then General
Walker.
Mr. Manger. Yes, ma'am. The supplemental did a great deal
to help us out. In fact, I am not sure how we would be able to
have made many of the improvements without that. I mentioned
earlier all the retention bonus, hazard bonus, the funding to
pay overtime to officers. This has helped us just day to day
operationally and helped us retain officers who might otherwise
have left.
But, in addition, it has given us the ability to ensure
that we can order the equipment and get the equipment that our
officers needed. The Civil Disturbance Unit officers, we have
ordered state-of-the-art equipment for them. And that should
be--we are expecting--some of it has come in. We expect it all
to be in within this month is our hope, and we will get that
out to our folks.
But the one thing I should say, that none of our civil
service unit officers, if anything happened today, would be
going out there without equipment. If we don't have equipment
for the folks, we are not deploying them as CDU officers, which
is what happened on the 6th.
There is money for training. There is--the health and
wellness initiatives, the trauma-informed counseling services
that we are able to deliver, the employee assistance programs
that we have been able to initiate, all those are tremendously
important, and we have been able to do.
With regard to--I just have to say that, with regard to
reopening the campus, the equipment, operational planning, all
those kinds of things, we are ready. Staffing is the biggest
issue. We are around 440, 450 officers below where we need to
be to be able to do the workload that we have responsibility
for, and it gets to the threats against Congress. You know, we
are investing--investigating threats against Congress, but I
will tell you. We are barely keeping our head above water for
those investigations. We have been able to put--you know, the
regional offices have been able to help a little bit, but the
fact of the matter is that we are going to have to nearly
double the number of agents that work those threat cases. We
have increased the number over the last couple of years by
necessity, but even now, it needs to be increased even more. So
that is--you know, in their fiscal year 2022, fiscal year 2023
budget, you are going to see additional positions being
requested, whether it is for dignitary protection capability or
investigating threats and all the other places where our
workload has increased dramatically.
So we have got--look. We have got a ways to go before we
can reopen the campus, but we are working toward that. And if I
am able to get 288 new recruits on board this year, it will get
us a long way toward being able to staff the posts that we need
to staff to be able to open back up, but we need some time.
The Chair. Mr. Chairman, if I can just ask General Walker
to comment----
Mr. Ryan. Sure.
The Chair [continuing]. On the in-district piece.
But I just want to say to Chief Manger that, with the team
here, if you can really get to us, get to the chair and to the
ranking member specifically the way you pointed out the
staffing, what is needed, what was there--what are the
resources that are necessary in order for us to keep our head
above water on the threats and how we reopen this campus,
because it is going to be reopened and there will be many,
many, many, many more people here, and we need to be prepared
for that.
Chief Manger. Yes.
SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS FOR MEMBERS AND STAFF
The Chair. So that document will be critically important.
General Walker, if you can just address the security
enhancement for Members and staff in districts. And I know you
have talked about the training for the law enforcement
coordinators and what kind of funding do we need, if you can
just get that to us.
General Walker. Yes, ma'am. I think we need robust funding.
In a best-case scenario, in a perfect world, each district
would have two district law enforcement coordinators. In my
opinion, both of them--both of them should be well versed in
law enforcement, a retired or former law enforcement officer, a
law enforcement officer with 5 to 10 years, the ability to
qualify for H.R. 218 that would allow an officer, man or woman,
to be able to carry a weapon, who knows about protection, who
could understand making the assessments of an event that a
Member is going to attend. So I would double the Member--I
would double the district law enforcement coordinators and have
them travel statewide, have authority to carry a weapon
statewide.
But, regarding your residences, I think we should pour
money into securing residences, lighting that would come on,
motion sensors, motion detectors, video doorbells, video
equipment inside and out that would--and then relationships
that--so we would understand what are the threats in a
community.
Even a new Member, where do you live, how many calls for
service do the police respond to, and what types of calls,
burglaries, robberies, thefts, homicides. We need to understand
where our Members live and what level of protection they need
to be afforded. So we do need to throw funding at protecting
Members. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
The Chair. Thank you for the indulgence of the chair,
ranking member, and the members of the committee for going over
time. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan. No problem.
Representative Clark.
USCP STAFF RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING
Ms. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to echo the sentiments of my colleagues that
our--our deep gratitude to the Capitol Police, to the Sergeant
at Arms, and to the Architect of the Capitol and their staffs
for not only the protections on January 6 but how you are
working to meet the ongoing threat environment that we are in.
We are deeply grateful.
Chief Manger, I wanted to go back to talking about the
almost, I think it is 447 officers that you are short. Are
there themes that we can be helpful with that are merging in
problems in recruiting and training? And I specifically want to
know if the salary disparity between Capitol Police and other
Federal law enforcement agencies is playing a role.
Chief Manger. So, I guess the short answer is, we have
got--with the staffing needs that we have, we have got to give
ourselves every advantage in terms of hiring. And I will
confess that I don't know how competitive our salaries are, but
I know that, with the retention bonus, the hazard pay, the
specialty pays that we have been able to give the specialty
units all help us in terms of recruiting and retaining good
officers.
So I think that we need to look at--and we can have folks
do a study in terms of comparing our salary and benefits
compared to other law enforcement agencies that we compete
with, and if we need to make adjustments, I will be the first
one to let you know.
USCP STAFF RETENTION AND WELLNESS
Ms. Clark. Oh, great. And can you tell me a little bit
about the strategies that you have found to be most effective
in addressing the trauma and stress and burnout within the
force so we can work on improving our retention?
Chief Manger. Yes, ma'am. So, in terms of--for police
officers, and I guess you could really say this for any
occupation, you have really two goals with those kinds of
initiatives: First is helping employees to cope with the daily
stress of the job. The second goal is to help employees through
crises; that is when they are involved in traumatic events,
provide them with trained counselors to help try and build the
resiliency. So you have got the daily stress; you have got the
traumatic incidents.
And we have put together, I think, initiatives. We are
contracting with The Center For Mind-Body Medicine. We have
stood up our health and wellness center, the Howie Liebengood
Center for Wellness. We have got employee assistance, health,
nutrition, trauma-informed care specialists, peer support
programs, support dog program, three fitness centers, and a
chaplain program. So we are trying to really have wraparound
services for whatever our cops need.
INSIDER THREATS
Ms. Clark. For the protection of our force and those they
serve, can you tell me what systems you have put in place to
try and root out any dangerous or extremist groups that may
have infiltrated our force?
Chief Manger. So I think it all begins with the hiring
process, and you have got to make sure that the background
investigations that we do, the polygraph test that we give, the
deep dive into an individual's social media plat--the social
media is also tremendously important to really--to determine,
is this person suitable to be a police officer?
So that is where it starts. But I think that, after you
hire someone you do need to ensure that you have the kind of
checks that are necessary to make sure that there is not
something that has changed in terms of their background.
And right after January 6, as I am sure you are aware,
there were probably at least 30 cases where there were
complaints against officers that questioned their actions
during January 6 and were they somehow assisting the folks that
had broken into the Capitol, the groups there.
And most of those cases were handled before I got here, but
I actually have handled, I think, three of them since I have
been here. And there is one officer who we determined, in fact,
his actions were not consistent with the department's mission,
and that officer is no longer here. Another officer, you know,
made a mistake but he was not in cahoots, so to speak, with the
protesters, with the rioters. A third case, I think, the
officer was exonerated.
So, you know, having indepth--having really good, indepth
investigations to determine if an officer is involved or
engaged in some kind of activity that would lead to a question
about their loyalty to our mission, that is important as well,
to make sure that those investigations are done thoroughly and
decisive action is taken on those cases.
Ms. Clark. Thank you so much, Chief.
Mr. Chairman, I have forgotten how quickly 5 minutes goes
by, so maybe a second round.
Mr. Ryan. Yeah, for sure.
INSIDER THREATS
General Walker. Chairman and Ms. Clark, can I just add to
that?
Mr. Ryan. Sure.
General Walker. So the House Sergeant at Arms has developed
an insider threat awareness program to uncover insider threats
and employees who do lose their compass, and that will be
briefed to the Capitol Police Board, if not this month the next
board meeting in February, and we are going to work
collaboratively to hang these briefings. And the goal, the
strategic objective is to have people in the United--police
officers trained as insider threat specialists so we have
recognized the signs and symptoms, the indicators of someone
whose allegiance has changed.
Part two of that is try to introduce some kind of security
clearance for U.S. Capitol Police officers. The thing with a
security clearance, as you all well know, they expire, so you
have to have this periodic reinvestigation: Has your allegiance
changed? Do you have close and continuous contact with groups
that are nefarious? Your foreign travel, on duty or off? That
needs to be reported. Who are you associating with?
So I will leave it there, not to take too much time, but I
just wanted to let you know, Representative Clark and others,
that the Sergeant at Arms has partnered with the intelligence
community and the homeland security agencies and the FBI to
create this robust insider threat program. Thank you.
Ms. Clark. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Chief.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
Mr. Amodei.
USCP FUNDING AND HIRING PROCESS
Mr. Amodei. Hey, Mr. Chairman, good morning. It is nice to
see you again. It has been quite a while. I trust you have been
doing okay without daily kind of support from me, so we will
just get on to this topic of the hearing. Okay?
Mr. Ryan. Sounds good.
Mr. Amodei. Okay.
Mr. Ryan. I will try to make it without you.
Mr. Amodei. Okay. Way to tough it out.
I want to join in Congresswoman Herrera Beutler's thing
about, you know, it would be nice just to have kind of the
general accounting info folks, especially General and Chief,
about burn rates and the money that you have gotten so far. And
the only reason I say that is to be intelligent about what you
need to continue down the road and stuff like that, it would be
kind of nice as an appropriator and in an oversight capacity to
be able to say that we followed up on just what was done with
the supplemental so far, obviously as well as the stuff going
forward.
So I would like to join in that request, and we will circle
back with you folks offline, not on the committee's time to see
if we can--you know, if there is some security aspect, that is
fine. We can get a briefing or whatever. But I do think that is
kind of a fundamental thing as we sit here a year after the
fact and say, okay, what have we learned and what have we
started to do.
Chief, let me ask you just a real quick question. When you
talk about personnel and needing all these folks, remind me how
long it takes to identify, train, whatever from when you decide
I am going to hire Tim Ryan to be on the Capitol Police to when
Tim Ryan actually shows up for his first day of work. That is
not something where you turn it off and on or a 30-, 60-day
thing, I don't recall, but you tell me. How long does it take
from completing what you have to do from recruitment to
background to training to they are on the job?
Chief Manger. The better part of a year.
Mr. Amodei. Okay.
Chief Manger. From the time we focus in on hiring somebody
to the time we can actually put them out by themselves, they
are finished with training and they can go to a post or go to
an assignment by themselves, better part of a year.
Mr. Amodei. So that is an important thing in terms of our
expectations. If we fix all the appropriation problems next
week, we are still in 2023 basically before we start thinking
about fully staffed in a perfect world.
Chief Manger. And someone asked earlier--and now that you
have reminded me, I didn't answer this part of the question--we
do have other strategies to try and get--to ease some of the
staffing issues. We are looking at rehiring annuitants,
retirees, bringing them back. We are looking at hiring lateral
positions so, you know, we can look to other Federal law
enforcement agencies and, you know, allow people to come over
and join our agency, and, plus, the use of contract security
that General Walker talked about.
And so these would all be short-term strategies to allow us
to get us to a point where we can relieve some of the staffing
hardships that we are experiencing today for our officers and
then, as we--you know, if we are able to hire 280 officers a
year over the next couple of years, that is going to get us
ahead of attrition and put us where we need to be.
SCREENING TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Amodei. Okay. And so you are thinking outside of the
box, but, nonetheless, it is like, hey, this is going to--and
good.
I want to let you know that I am going to be requesting a
chance to come sit down with you since I haven't had a chance
since you came on board to talk about some of the other things
you have talked about in your testimony as well as the General.
But I want to alert both of you to something that I think
is an ongoing problem since I have been affiliated with the
committee, and that is actually the office buildings. And I
don't know anything about the Senate ones obviously. I try to
stay away from those. But, nonetheless, I will just tell you, I
think the screening culture needs to change.
I hope that the analysis that the Architect of the Capitol
is doing as well as you guys on the Capitol Police Board bring
a new analysis into that. As I look at--we have kind of done
what we have always done, and you look at that--when you talk
about--when the Sergeant at Arms talks about knowing who is in
your neighborhood and stuff like that, when I look at what goes
on to come into the three buildings that I am familiar with,
and it is like, you know what, it is a pretty cold day out
today so you have got people lined out the door, you have got
the same sort of thing where you are going through the metal
detectors and whatever, and it is like I see no attempt--maybe
I am wrong, but I will meet with you guys to say, hey, how can
we do a better job of this so we don't have people out there
sweating in July and freezing in January, and how are we
actually screening them?
I am encouraged to hear that the Sergeant at Arms wants to
use technology maybe to have a better idea of who is coming and
going. But I have got to tell you, some of the spaces--and this
is not rank and file, this is leadership, where you have got a
space the size of the closet for one of the Cannon entrances
while you have got another entrance that is more spacious that
is not being used because, well, I don't know. It is something
where I think we can do better, and I think with the change in
leadership we probably ought to take a look at that. And I know
some day in the future somebody is going to build a Capitol
Visitor Center over here in a parking lot somewhere, but quite
frankly, I don't think that is imminent.
And so the last thing I will leave you with, and this is
for the General, we have been asking for an update on what we
can do to screen people before they go into vote for the metal
detectors without making it look like an adjunct operation of
the airport. And I anxiously await that, almost a year later,
in terms of the update.
If we want to screen people for metal before they go vote,
that is fine with me. But we ought to be able to do it in a way
where it doesn't look like it is Toledo International and a TSA
operation. And I have been told before that the technology
exists to do that. And so I am really looking forward to an
update on how we are going to restore a little bit of decorum
to just the act of walking into the chambers and making sure
that nobody is carrying. So I look forward to all that stuff
offline.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for your indulgence. I yield back.
Mr. Ryan. Thanks, Mr. Amodei.
Chief, does anybody want to comment on the gentleman from
Nevada's comments? You don't have to.
General Walker. Chairman Ryan, I will share with you that I
have met with the Secret Service. They have come over, and they
have done an assessment. The technology does exist, and we are
working on it. That would be something we would need funding
for, and we would have to work with the Architect of the
Capitol to have something that is less intrusive but protect
the structure.
So we are working aggressively on that as we speak to speed
up the process, make it less like an airport terminal, but at
the same time ensure that nobody is bringing a prohibited item
on to the floor.
Mr. Amodei. Well, and, Mr. Chairman, if I might, and,
General, I look forward to your brand of aggression in the
coming year as opposed to the aggression in the past year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Espaillat.
BOMB SWEEPS AND THREATS
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, all, for your input today.
I have expressed in the past concerns about what may be our
next attack. I feel very strongly that it won't be the same way
we were attacked during January 6, that it may have a different
sort of like approach. And, as such, I have expressed my
concerns about bomb sweeps. As you know, there was two bombs
placed in the DNC and the RNC, and they were placed there, and
it sort of like distracted law enforcement away from the
epicenter of the insurrection.
And I just wanted to know, has any measure been taken to
increase the K-9 unit training and sweeps around the Capitol
complex and the perimeter around the Capitol complex to ensure
that we are not attacked in that form and that fashion? In
addition to that, any potential drone attacks maybe something
that we ought to prevent against. And I wanted to know if any
measures have been taken regarding these two methods that could
be used by insurrectionists in the future.
Chief Manger. Yes, sir. Chief Manger here. Yes to all of
your questions. We have put together a better procedure to do
what we call foundation checks around all of the buildings. I
just got numbers in the last day or two about the number of
sweeps that we have done for--that our K-9s have done around
the buildings over the past year, thousands and thousands of
sweeps.
And we are looking at the number of K-9s that we have and
are looking to increase them over the next year or two just so
we can ensure that we do an adequate number of sweeps, multiple
a day, if need be, to ensure the safety of our campus from
explosives.
Mr. Espaillat. Besides the groups that are conducted to
vehicles entering the Capitol, have you increased the K-9 unit
since January 6? Has there been----
Chief Manger. Yeah, I am not sure. I don't know the answer,
and I will get back to you with the answer if we have
increased. But I know that we are looking over the next year or
two to increase the number of K-9s that we have. But we are
also looking at and working with the Capitol Police Board with
regard to the issue of drones.
Mr. Espaillat. Okay. But nothing has actually occurred
regarding these two--the drone piece and the increase of K-9s?
Chief Manger. Well, we have increased the number of sweeps
that we do with K-9s. That has dramatically increased. And it
is not just the vehicles coming in, it is also around all the
buildings. And there has been work done, and we are working
with contractors to make sure that we have the ability to
counter any drones that come into our airspace, so that work is
underway.
BUILDING SECURITY
Mr. Espaillat. Okay. My second question is regarding the
construction reinforcements to the exterior and interior doors
and camera systems and window replacement throughout the
campus. What has occurred there? Has there been an improvement,
reinforcements to the exterior doors, interior doors, the
camera system, and window replacements in the campus?
Mr. Blanton. I will start with the--this is Brett Blanton
here. I will start with the interior doors. We have done--we
have--prior to being informed by the security assessment, we
have installed in leadership offices peepholes so they can see
outside and breach-resistant hinges to reduce the ability for
people to get inside on the doors.
In the Chamber, we have increased security of doors there.
Unfortunately, the projects themselves are classified, and I am
willing to take an offline discussion where we can go into more
detail. I will say, a good security project, from my
perspective, when it comes to like the chamber, is something
that you don't even know it is there. And I would be willing to
walk you and show you what we have done so you can see, wow,
this looks like it was--like the door was there before, but it
is a different door.
Mr. Espaillat. What about cameras?
Mr. Blanton. So the cameras are under the purview of the
Capitol Police. We install the physical infrastructure for
them, and the Capitol Police determine where a camera needs to
be placed and how many there need to be. So I will pass that
over to the chief.
Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Ryan. I want to thank the gentleman from New York.
The gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Newhouse.
QUESTIONS FROM MR. NEWHOUSE
Mr. Newhouse. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that.
And I want to thank all three of our witnesses today. Thank
you for being here, and thank you for your service, as well as,
please relay my appreciation to everyone that you work with for
their service to us as well. I want to ask all three of you my
questions, and then I will turn the floor back over to you for
your responses.
But, first of all, Chief Manger, as it was, I think, to be
expected, in the months following January 6 of last year,
morale at the U.S. Capitol Police was low. As you alluded to,
rank-and-file officers demonstrated they had little or no faith
in capability of police leadership.
I would like your estimation--you have already addressed
your level of faith in your current leadership, and I
appreciate that. I would like your estimation of the level of
faith that you believe that the police officers on the ground
have in the leadership of your organization at this time.
And then, secondly, I wanted to ask you a little bit about
the U.S. Capitol Police memorial fund that was established, I
think, in 1998 after the tragic loss of two individuals who
defended the Capitol from a lone gunman. And then it was, I
believe, expanded after the congressional baseball shooting in
2017.
My understanding is that many--what, we had 140-plus police
officers injured on January 6. And I just wanted to ask about
the level of distribution to some of the families and to the
individuals and the amounts that may have been given to
individual police officers as a result of January 6.
Then, for General Walker, and I appreciate being able to
visit with you earlier this week and get to know you a little
bit. I look forward to working with you over the coming months
as we work on these important issues. But I wanted to talk to
you, as I intimated earlier, about the opening of the Capitol
campus, and I know there has been some discussion about that.
If you could talk about any conversations you have had related
to that, what metrics or plans that you have been able to
establish for that eventual reopening.
And is there any coordination, I guess, between the House
and Senate? They seem to have a different set of metrics. It
seems things are more open on the Senate side, and I just
wanted to know about some of the differences and the reasons
for those and what we can look forward to in the future. I know
this is a big interest of a lot of Members, and certainly want
to keep staff and Members safe at the same time, but we do want
to open up to--the people's House back to the people.
And then, for Mr. Blanton, the AOC, you stated a year ago,
and I appreciate you coming back to meet with us this year, but
about the fact that you were never contacted about the
possibility of deploying the National Guard to help secure the
Capitol ahead of January 6. And obviously that is a big part of
your responsibility, which, you know, the operation and
preservation of the complex.
You are a member of the Capitol Police Board. So are you--
do you feel that you are engaged in the board's decisionmaking
process, and do you have voting power? I want to ask you if you
feel that in the last year communication among the members of
the police board has improved, and if not, how would you
suggest that it could be improved in order to prevent the kind
of issues that we saw from happening into the future?
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will start with Chief Manger
and appreciate your responses.
USCP OFFICER MORALE
Chief Manger. Yes, sir. So, in terms of the morale from the
officers' perspective, I understand fully after January 6 why
the confidence of the officers, the confidence in the
department, their confidence in the leadership of this
Department was not very good, and that is an understatement.
They believe that the department let them down, that the
Department's lack of operational planning resulted in injuries,
deaths. And I know that a fair number of officers still to this
day are not satisfied that there has been accountability.
I would, again, point out the fact that the following day,
the chief, the Sergeant at Arms, both Sergeant at Arms were no
long in their positions and all the other leadership that has
left the department since then.
But I do understand, from the officers' perspective, but it
was--it is not universally bad morale, you know, or, you know,
in our department. There is a lot of officers that do enjoy
working here who come to work and believe in their mission and
believe that they are doing good work and doing important work
every day. Again, it is a mixed bag in terms of the officers'
perspective.
USCP MEMORIAL FUND
With regard to the memorial fund, there is good news with
the memorial fund. We have just--and I know it has taken a long
time, but we have now got a draft form in place so that
officers who want to apply for money from the memorial fund,
and we have got a policy in place, it is going to go out to the
union here shortly for their input, but it is finally in place
and so that we can move forward with officers actually applying
for money.
Since January 6, there has only been two officers that have
received money from the memorial fund. Both of those officers
were killed in the line of duty, and their families received
money. We typically keep confidential who gets it and how much
they get, but I will say that two officers have received money
from the memorial fund and that the maximum that any family can
get is $200,000.
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
And, Mr. Newhouse, if I could just--I know you didn't ask
me this question, but with regard to the National Guard, I so
appreciate what the Congress did in terms of giving me the
authority to make that call. But let me stress that, you know,
I have spoken with two or three previous--actually three or
four previous Capitol Police chiefs about their relationship
with the Capitol Police Board, and many of them expressed their
view that it was a very dysfunctional relationship. I have not
had that experience at all.
I get great cooperation from the Capitol Police Board. And,
frankly, I think now--you know, Mr. Blanton has been around for
a while, but you have got two new Sergeant at Arms, a new
police chief, and we are working together as a team with one
mission in mind, and that is to make this campus as safe as it
can be. So, for what it is worth, that is my opinion.
Mr. Newhouse. Thank you.
General Walker.
PLANS TO REOPEN THE CAPITOL
General Walker. Yes, Representative Newhouse, thank you for
the question. So we would be ready--we have a plan to reopen
the Capitol. The challenge is everything we are hearing from
Admiral Monahan tells us that opening the Capitol is not safe
right now, that it is--we are focused on security right now
because of the rising number of COVID infections.
So I have had three of my people come down last week with
COVID. And here is what is frightening about this: They have
had both vaccinations, and they were boosted--and they had the
booster. And Chief Manger can tell you the number, and I
apologize, I don't remember the actual number of officers down
because of COVID. So I think we would put an undue burden on
the United States Capitol Police to have them be in a challenge
of--in a COVID environment with an open complex where people
are walking around, some with masks, some without masks.
Representative Newhouse, I see people, Members, staff
without masks. And, you know, I will walk up to them and I will
ask them to put their mask on, and some just walk away from me,
some put it on. So I think if we open this--the people's House,
which will be opened, but I am hoping it is opened once Dr.--
Admiral Monahan gives us the green light to open it. So we are
leaning heavily on what Admiral Monahan is telling us regarding
this pandemic, this epidemic that we are facing right now.
Thank you for the question. I hope that answered it.
Mr. Newhouse. That is helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Blanton.
CAPITOL POLICE BOARD
Mr. Blanton. Yes, thank you, Representative. I will say
unequivocally that this is a completely different board than we
had on January 5, not just in people but I am talking about--in
functionality, in unity, and in engagement across. The
leadership changes have been significant, and I can tell you,
we are in a much better place.
Mr. Newhouse. Okay. I appreciate that.
And I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Clark is right, 5 minutes is shorter than it used to
be, so thank you.
Mr. Ryan. And 7 minutes is shorter than you think too.
Ms. Wexton.
REMARKS BY MS. WEXTON
Ms. Wexton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses coming before us today
and coming to testify and sharing your stories and what you
have been doing. You know, I am the last person to ask
questions in this, at least in the first round, and so I have
the benefit of everybody else having asked their questions, so
that is good. Although, they asked a lot of the same questions
I was going to ask.
But there has been a lot of discussion about morale. And,
Chief Manger, you said that officers believe that the United
States Capitol Police, you know, let them down and did not have
the operational security to take care of them and to protect
them on January 6. And the reason they believe that is because
the USCP did let them down, and so, you know, that is something
that they have had to deal with since that time.
But I very much appreciate the changes that you have made
and what you are doing to show that, you know, that you are
going to not just talk the talk but you are going to walk the
walk, and that the proof is in the pudding, and, you know, show
me, don't tell me. So I appreciate that very much, everything
that you have done for that.
And, related to that, I want to thank everybody for
standing up the Howie Liebengood Center for Wellness, making
that a reality, because that is going to be so helpful for
these officers.
And I also want to thank you, because as most of you know,
Howie was a constituent of mine. I have gotten to know his
family pretty well, and they are so, so pleased and gratified
that hopefully no other Capitol Police family will have to go
through what they did. I want to thank you for that. And I am
glad it will be open soon, and I look forward to coming to the
ribbon cutting with you hopefully in better times when we are
able to do that.
I also want to thank the Capitol Police and the Sergeant at
Arms Office for having that Chamber training. I actually
participated in it. I know a number of folks did. Probably a
lot of Members didn't, but I am really glad I did. And I also
want to thank you very much, and probably on behalf of myself
and Ms. Herrera Beutler as well, for actually putting hair ties
in the escape hoods so that we can put our hair up and actually
get a tight seal because that is something that a lot of people
don't think about. But I want to thank you guys for that. It
was very informative. I hope and pray that we will never need
to use it again, but it is good to have that information there.
USCP RETIREMENT AND OVERTIME COMPENSATION
So about recruitment and retaining new officers within the
United States Capitol Police workforce, one of the things that
we had been talking about was one of the issues that we faced
with them is that they don't get their pension based upon their
overtime pay rates. And I know that many, many officers have
been working a lot of overtime. It has been an issue for many
years. It is probably even still more of an issue.
So I guess my first question for you is, has there been any
discussion about making that change to pensions? And then,
also, what is the status of overtime for fiscal year 2022 thus
far?
Chief Manger. So there has been discussion about including
overtime in the retirement calculations. I can tell you that,
in my years of experience, I have seen departments do that and
then decide that it wasn't sustainable.
So I think that--I have seen how it manifests itself in
terms of, you know, senior officers who, you know, some who
never worked overtime before, but, in their last couple years,
they are working all the overtime they can and how it impacts
other people's ability to work overtime.
So, as long as we work through those issues so that it is
something that is sustainable and that can work, I think we can
find some way to benefit our officers by including some of that
overtime in terms of the retirement calculation.
And now I have lost track of your second question. I am so,
so sorry.
Ms. Wexton. Overtime for fiscal year 2022.
Chief Manger. Yes.
Ms. Wexton. Is it higher than in fiscal year 2021 or
where----
Chief Manger. It is maintaining. I mean, we just--we still
have the staffing issues. I was talking to an officer last
night who had been held over from the previous shift because we
didn't have--and this is more with the spike of COVID. As
General Walker mentioned, when we have got--I think now close
to--it is well over 100 and almost maybe even 200 officers that
are out because of COVID. And, you know, they may just be out
for the isolation period. We have got a number of officers who
are out long term because of COVID, but it is really impacting
us. So, yes, our overtime is going to be--so far every bit as
bad in fiscal year 2022 as it was in 2021.
USCP COVID-19 POLICIES
Ms. Wexton. And what is the United States Capitol Police--
what is the Capitol Police policy for quarantining with COVID
after a positive test?
Chief Manger. We abide by what the Office of the Attending
Physician tells us, and that just changed from, if you are
asymptomatic--and I shouldn't speak for the Attending
Physician, but my recollection was that, if you are
asymptomatic, it has gone from 10 days to 5 days of isolation.
USCP CONTRACT SECURITY
Ms. Wexton. And you testified that you have some contract
laborers, contract security that you are using. How many
contract security officers are you using, and how long do you
anticipate having to keep them on staff?
Chief Manger. Well, right now zero. We are trying to get
around 40 or 50 on board. We still have to brief--we are
briefing oversight committees. We are still discussing with the
union. They have some concerns about it. We are still
discussing with the union their concerns to--and we want to
address their concerns. But we're ready to get this done
hopefully in a matter of a few weeks, start getting some
contract folks in to give us some relief in terms of our
staffing.
CELL PHONES FOR OFFICERS
Ms. Wexton. And then you also testified that every Capitol
Police officer now has a cell phone. That wasn't the case
before. Is that correct?
Chief Manger. That is correct. And they are getting
intelligence and operational updates every day.
Ms. Wexton. And are they getting those by cell phone, or
are they getting them in roll call, or how are they--how are
you deploying those briefings?
Chief Manger. You know, with COVID, our roll calls are less
formal than they have been in the past. So we really rely on
the cell phones to ensure that officers are getting
information. But we do, in fact, do in-person updates on a
regular basis as well.
Ms. Wexton. And are those--the ones that go out to their
cell phones, those aren't classified, are they?
Chief Manger. They are law enforcement sensitive but not
classified.
MEMBER PROTECTION
Ms. Wexton. Okay. Very good. And then, in one of the--
again, I don't know if it was in your testimony or in the memo,
there was a discussion of Member protection based on a risk
matrix, is that correct, that you make that determination based
on the risk to the Member?
Chief Manger. Correct, yes.
Ms. Wexton. And is that a proactive or a reactive risk
matrix? Is it based upon previous threats, or is it based upon
possibility of threats due to their being, you know, a high-
profile individual?
Chief Manger. It is more reactive, but we certainly
understand that--I mean, we keep track of the number of threats
that each Member gets, and we are certainly cognizant of that
and do what we can to try and prevent future threats or provide
some advice and some strategies for those Members that have a
high number of threats, how they can maintain a better level of
security.
Ms. Wexton. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I see that I have also overstayed my
welcome and used too much time. So I will yield back with that.
THREATS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Mr. Ryan. I thank the gentlelady. I have got a couple
questions. We are going to do a second round for those members
who want to stick around and ask another question.
General, you talked about real threats to Members. How many
threats have there been in the past year or so to Members of
Congress, and how does that relate to a normal year?
General Walker. So I believe the information I received
from the U.S. Capitol Police, there were almost 9,000, so
double the number that it was last year, so if not 9,000,
approaching 9,000 threats. Now, those threats come in a whole--
a variety of threats, you know, menacing or just somebody
saying something reckless on the internet or social media. But
the number I think I had from the chief was close to 9,000.
Mr. Ryan. And you say there is no law that would allow for
a prosecution of a threat to a Member of Congress, I mean
specifically to a Member of Congress. It would have to be more
a general prosecution?
General Walker. Yes, sir, Chairman Ryan. Right now the
threat has to be investigated: Does the person have the
capability to act on the threat? Is it someone just talking? Is
it diminished mental capacity, someone just getting out there
saying something? And that individual that is in a wheelchair
in a nursing home can't really do it but is just making a
threat.
So we have to investigate the threat. The Capitol Police
has to investigate the threat and then determine, does this
person have the means and capability and motive to act on the
threat? And, once that is determined, sometimes the
prosecution, State, local, Federal is not following through on
bringing these people to justice. That is where I think more
emphasis needs to be leveraged to make sure that if the Capitol
Police believe they have sufficient evidence to go to an
assistant U.S. attorney or a state's attorney, then it needs to
be prosecuted. And I think that would be therapeutic.
Mr. Ryan. Do you think there needs to be, in your
recommendation, more weight behind that, so an additional law
that would be specific to Members of Congress that the U.S.
attorney would be able to then utilize in the prosecution? Or
do you think that the current legal regime is enough to kind of
put the emphasis out there, do the prosecution as a way to
prevent future threats?
General Walker. Well, I think both, Chairman Ryan. I think
if we could strengthen the laws that currently exist, so, if
you make a threat against the President, that is a bucket right
there, a threat against the President or anyone of the
successors to the President, I believe I understand it that
way. I know it is the President, the Vice President, and then
the line of succession.
If Members of Congress could somehow be elevated to have
that kind of status, I believe that would go a long way in
stopping these individuals from making these reckless threats.
Somebody is eventually going to act on it, and it could be a
tragedy if we don't do something about it. So, Chairman Ryan, I
think anytime we can strengthen the laws that protect Members,
I think we should go after that.
Mr. Ryan. I appreciate that. I mean, those of us on this
committee feel a deep sense of responsibility to our
colleagues, knowing that the 9,000 threats that are out there
and the lack of funding, which is why, you know, we saw a
significant increase in a lot of the security measures and the
appropriations in the supplemental from the House version
really tried to address a lot of these issues.
And you mentioned, you know, having robust security at
Members' homes, assessing the neighborhoods they live in, and
what the threats would be from, you know, generally. And so I
appreciate, you know, you speaking up on that. Again, there is
some allowance through our campaign committees to be able to
provide some level of home security, but I don't think people
out there sending us $10 bucks or $15 bucks or $20 bucks for a
reelection they really would want us to use that money for home
security system.
You know, these threats are because of our official
capacity, the official duties that we hold. And so I appreciate
you speaking up on that, because it is very, very frustrating
that, you know, we are not allowed to do these kinds of things
to, you know, protect ourselves and our families when we are
many instances away from home, but our families are still
there. And so, you know, it doesn't make for a good
environment. So I appreciate it, General.
Quickly, Chief----
General Walker. Chairman, can I add just one thing?
Mr. Ryan. Sure.
General Walker. I also think, since you are talking about
law, I think it would be helpful if the United States Capitol
Police Investigative Division could be given concurrent
jurisdiction to have--the FBI right now investigates threats
against Members and they investigate threats against all
Federal employees. But what is the priority?
If the United States Capitol Police--and I am just thinking
of this right now--is given concurrent jurisdiction, the same
authorities that the FBI has to go after people who make these
threats--the Postal Inspection Service, I happen to know for a
fact that they have concurrent jurisdiction to go after postal
employees, separate from what the FBI does. I am sorry; I just
felt compelled to add that, sir.
Mr. Ryan. Yep. No, that is great.
Quickly, Chief, do you have any thoughts on this with
regard to Members' security that you want to add?
Chief Manger. Just a couple of things. One, I agree with
the General that the Capitol Police--and I am not sure that
we--I don't know, and perhaps the General does--I am not sure
we don't have concurrent jurisdiction, but I think we should
make an affirmative statement that it is a shared
responsibility because I don't want there to be any turf
battles in terms of investigating those threats against
Congress.
We have more--we, I think, have the primary interest in
terms of investigating those cases. And so, you know, working
with FBI is good, but we would--we may take a case that the FBI
says, ``No, it doesn't rise to the level of something we would
investigate,'' whereas we would take it and investigate.
So the other thing is that I have--since I have been here,
I have reached out to local law enforcement in home districts
of Members of Congress, and I have had 100 percent cooperation.
And I know that I may get to a point where I don't, you know,
get a chief or sheriff that doesn't want to cooperate, but so
far I have had 100 percent cooperation from the State and local
authorities in terms of getting the assistance that we have
requested with regard to either a Member's home, their family,
safety and security issues.
So we will continue to be that advocate for the Members if
they are having difficulty getting the assistance that they
need in their local jurisdictions. If they come to us, we will
certainly be an advocate for them to try and get what they need
in terms of making sure their families are safe and secure as
well.
Mr. Ryan. And, Chief, so there is obviously a lot of
chatter on the Internet, you know, a lot of stuff that is, you
know, kind of public. I think, after the 6th, a lot of these
groups are trying to figure out how to be more behind the
scenes with some of their plans, some of their views and all
the rest.
Is there anything that we are doing proactively, at least
that we could talk about in the public setting here, that you
are trying to address? If Members are walking around, maybe
there is nothing on Face book, maybe there is nothing on
Twitter, no one says something threatening, but there may be a
threat out in the community somewhere. Is there some strategy
for us to have that connection with maybe the local law
enforcement or in other ways of trying to figure that out?
Chief Manger. Yes. And you are astute in your thought that
we--I don't want to give you our strategies, but what I will
tell you is we have eight people--we have on boarded eight
people as intelligence analysts that are working with other
intelligence agencies and will work with State and local folks
to share information with the whole purpose of keeping our
Members and their families as safe as we can.
WELLNESS PROGRAMS
Mr. Ryan. Great.
And, quickly, on the trauma-informed care, Center for Mind-
Body Medicine, I know we have beefed up the House office of
well-being, which, of course, you all and your staffs will be
able to access the different programmings there. We have got
something with the David Lynch Foundation. We have got
something with a vet's program, Project Welcome Home Troops,
that really digs in on post-traumatic stress with veteran
trauma, which is obviously the same as many of your rank-and-
file members experienced on January 6.
And we just want to constantly encourage the rank-and-file
members to know that these programs are here, that they are
very beneficial. I know you are talking about doing videos and
things like that to let everybody know, you know, exactly how
beneficial these are, and then the peer-to-peer support, which
I think is going to be critical to have the rank-and-file
members really peppered with people who know how to work with
some of these issues around self-care and trauma and all the
rest. So really appreciate you leaning in on this. It is going
to be very important for us to be able to retain a lot of the
members.
USCP RECRUITMENT EFFORTS
Last question and then we will go to Ms. Herrera Beutler.
The issue of competition and recruiting, I am hearing, you
know, 288 or so officers that you want to try to ramp up in the
next year. There is good competition here. I am just a, you
know, small-town guy from Ohio, but, you know, being here in
D.C., seeing what is going on in southern Maryland and some of
those departments, seeing what is going on in Northern
Virginia, which has seen an explosion of growth over the last
20 years, how are we able to compete, and can we compete with
those departments here locally for the talent that we need?
Chief Manger. So we can compete, and we are competing
pretty well. We have not had trouble getting people in the door
to take the test and express interest in wanting to be a part
of the U.S. Capitol Police. Our challenge, as I said earlier,
is making sure we hire the right people.
And so we have got--we have used the money that we got in
the supplemental to expand our recruitment efforts. We have
partnered with different association--law enforcement
associations, the women leaders in law enforcement, other
agencies that will help us not only do outreach to get the
numbers of people but to get a diverse group of applicants as
well.
And we are going to have to bolster our recruiting staff,
our background investigators because, you know, we have got an
ambitious goal to get 280-plus people in, so we are going to
need more recruiters, more background investigators, and we
have got those requests in. But I don't--I think we are going
to be able to do it. I mean, we are going to work hard at it.
We have partnered with a lot of folks. I think we can be
competitive, and I believe we can accomplish this goal.
Mr. Ryan. And our wages and benefits, the retirement are
competitive with those departments?
Mr. Manger. They are competitive, but we don't want to be
in the middle of the pack. We want to be at the top of the heap
so that we can--we have that advantage in terms of our
recruiting efforts. And any place where I think we can bolster
that, you will be hearing from me so that we can make a
decision about whether we want to change the compensation, the
retirement benefits, all those kinds of things. If we can make
them better, we are going to get the advantages we need in
terms of our recruiting, and I will continue that conversation
with you.
Mr. Ryan. Right. I appreciate it.
Ms. Herrera Beutler.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. I actually had a question for General
Walker. Did he just leave? I wanted a clarification on his
comments. Is that possible for--is he completely gone?
Mr. Ryan. No. He is--I think he is taking a comfort break.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Ah, sorry. I was like, go grab him.
Okay. Well, then I will wait. When he comes back----
Voice. 1 minute.
CAPITOL COMPLEX FENCING
Ms. Herrera Beutler. No, take his time.
I wanted to ask about--gosh, this might also be him. With
regard to what the matrix--you know, a risk matrix for, you
know, that was something we were talking earlier with regard to
responding to threats on Members. What is the risk matrix or
the co--you know, the standard for deciding when or when not to
put up the fence, or is that not something we are going to do
again? And is that a General Walker question? I don't know.
Chief?
Mr. Manger. Ma'am, I am happy to give you a little bit of
information. I think all of us--and as the Capitol Police
Board, I know we have had these discussions. We are all aware
of the impacts when we decide to put up the fence. We
understand the impact it has on the community. Many Members
don't like it. So we are going to be very discerning in the--
you know, moving forward about when we put it up.
But I think one of the things that the Architect has done
that just really improves the situation is he can put that
fence up within 24 hours' notice. And as you may have seen on
September 18--well, you probably didn't see it because we had
it up and down within--24 hours to get it up, 24 hours to get
it down on September 18. So the Architect has things in place
that we can get the fence up and down very quickly.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Can I ask--Can I ask?
Mr. Manger. Go ahead.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. I know you guys are so sensitive to
what it means to put that up. Is there a matrix or a standard
list of things that have to tip for you to consider putting it
up, or is it a gut-level decision that you make when that
happens?
Mr. Manger. Well, yeah. There are certainly criteria that
we consider. I don't know that we have a hard and fast matrix
and say, okay, well, if this happens, this happens, this
happens. But, if we feel there is a potential for violence, if
we feel that there is an intent from a group to try and breach
the Capitol, I mean, those are two things that we would say,
you know, better, in an abundance of caution, maybe we should
put it up.
One of the things that is different from the 6th is that as
we look--if we have an event that we feel there is a potential
for violence or we feel there is a potential for someone to try
and breach the Capitol, the staffing that we are going to have
around the Capitol is going to be vastly different than what we
had on January 6.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Yeah. Thank you for that.
Quickly, because I wanted to ask about trying to hire more.
Maybe we will stay with you before I go back to General Walker.
So what strategies are you guys considering when it comes to
taking on officers who maybe are already trained? I was told
that there was an impediment to allowing you to hire former
Secret Service agents or Homeland Security agents, you know,
folks who we know are trained, possibly to a higher level than
some folks, and in this environment, what is preventing or
broadening that recruitment pool, or is there nothing?
Mr. Manger. No, there is. We are, in fact, looking at
hiring laterals, lateral transfers in. We are looking at hiring
retirees. And it depends on--if you hire a retiree to come in
at the level of a police officer, it may not be an issue when
you look at what their pension is plus what their salary is,
but that is the issue. The pension plus the salary can't be
above a certain level. And so, if you hire folks, you know, at
mid-levels or in leadership levels, you really are limiting
yourself because of the salary cap that we have to deal with.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. So they can't come in because they are
used to a higher salary that would bump their pension, and it
messes up our budget?
Mr. Manger. Correct.
CAPITOL COMPLEX REOPENING STATUS
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Is that right? Okay. Thank you for
that.
And, General Walker, I wanted to ask because I wasn't
clear. So is the House side of the Capitol not open because of
security, or is it because of COVID?
General Walker. Representative Herrera Beutler, it is
because of COVID.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Okay.
General Walker. So I am responsible for security, and to
me, COVID is a security risk that we are not going to take.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Okay----
General Walker [continuing]. Monahan has made it clear to
me that it is not safe to open the Capitol to every--you know,
the COVID challenge is just too big.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Okay. I wasn't clear if it was like a
threat or a staff, an officer, you know, issue, and that is why
the House side isn't open because I had understood that it was
COVID, which is what you--I think you are saying. How do you
square--I get that. It makes sense to me, but how do you then
square that with the fact that the Senate is open? Like, how do
I answer my constituents who want to come for tours? Like, how
do you--how do you answer that?
General Walker. Well, it is just perception, you know, when
people comprehend things. What I have comprehended from the
Attending Physician is that it is not safe to bring people into
the Capitol. It is no different than--it is just high risk to
bring--to open up the Capitol to everyone that would have--
would have COVID. So how do we do the 6 feet spacing? How do we
do all the other things that would come with--how do we enforce
the masks?
So, right now, it is a Federal law. You are to obey the
directions of a flight attendant or a crew member. So I have
flown. I had 6 feet distance, and I had that mask on, and I
never took it off. I am afraid of COVID, to be honest with you.
So, until he says different, we are going to follow the
direction and the guidance of the Attending Physician. And I
really can't speak to why the Senate--maybe they are listening
to a different medical professional.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. I mean, it is one Attending Physician,
and I know you don't make that decision. I just was trying to
understand, like, just the disparity that we are trying to
explain to constituents. The Senators don't wear masks. They
don't. They are not shut down. It is just--it is a challenge,
so I will leave that one for the record. Thank you.
General Walker. Yes, ma'am. I will just add, the number of
my own staff here who have--one person went on vacation, came
back with COVID, and then we all had to be tested. And some--we
had members--a member of the staff catch it, and they were
vaccinated. So it is just a risk that I don't think we need to
take.
Mr. Ryan. All right. Thank you, Ms. Herrera Beutler.
Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you.
Mr. Ryan. Ms. Clark.
SECURITY THREAT ANALYSIS
Ms. Clark. Thank you so much. I wanted to follow up with
some questions for General Walker. I wondered if you could just
go over briefly some of the information that you have shared
about how the improvements you have made for the speed and
accuracy of threats being disseminated, not only to Members but
to their staff as well, and anything that the chief or the
Architect had to add. I think we saw a real breakdown in
communication, and I would love to hear about what you have put
in place to help with that.
General Walker. Yes, Representative Clark. So the House
Sergeant at Arms has hired former Senior Executive Service
level intelligence professionals from the Department of
Homeland Security, the U.S. intelligence community, and other
agencies to help get right to the heart of a threat. And we are
working collaboratively with the Capitol Police and their
Intelligence Division to best understand any kind of threat
that could be facing the Capitol, the Members, visitors, and
staff. So it is really about acquiring the talent.
Ms. Clark. But you have also made cell phones available
to----
General Walker. The Capitol Police has done that, the
United States Capitol Police----
Ms. Clark. Yeah.
General Walker [continuing]. Has given every police officer
cell phones. So it is a rapid dissemination of information.
Ms. Clark. Could you talk about that a little bit, about
how those lines of communication have been improved?
Mr. Manger. You know, one of the biggest intelligence
failures on the 6th was the fact that we had intelligence but
didn't disseminate it to our own people. And so the--one of the
quick fixes that was put in place very quickly after the 6th
was to ensure that our officers each had a cell phone. And now,
every day, they get updates, intelligence updates and
operational updates from their phone. In fact, some of my cops
tell me sometimes it is almost too much information. Obviously,
we would rather have too much than not enough.
The other shortcoming, and again, this has been fixed by
the fact that we have got, you know, new intelligence analysts
and more intelligence analysts, that we are doing a better job
at sharing information, you know, within the intelligence
community here at the Capitol and within the intelligence
community around the region and around the world or around the
Nation, anyway. So, you know, the way we--the way we share it,
the way we disseminate it, but the way we use it, that is
another key is that we are using the intelligence that we have
to inform our operational decisions.
And it goes back to Ms. Herrera Beutler's question about
the fence. I mean, this--you know, the criteria we use comes
largely from the intelligence that we have about an event
upcoming. So we are making sure that we share information, that
we disseminate it to our own people, and that we use it
correctly.
LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATORS
Ms. Clark. Thank you. And just a quick question for the
General. If you had your preference, would these law
enforcement coordinators--I completely support your plans for
regionalizing and trying to get former law enforcement. Would
you ultimately like to see that reside under your office, or do
you think that would be a more efficient way to hire and train
and coordinate with local law enforcement than the individual
Members designating someone on their staff?
General Walker. Thank you, Representative Clark, for the
question. I think it would--it should come to the Capitol. I am
not sure if should be the House Sergeant at Arms or the United
States Capitol Police. They have a lot on their plate already.
But, as I think about it, in answer to your question, I do
think it should most likely be under police services of the
House Sergeant at Arms or, or under the Capitol Police in their
Operational Division because, at the end of the day, police
talk to police. So, as Chief Manger has said, and we are both
members of IACP, the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, Fraternal Order of Police, we go to these
organizations. People, police chiefs know us. When you make
those phone calls, police officer to police--police chief to
police chief, they are very effective. But to have a
standardized across the board for 441 Members, this is what a
law enforcement coordinator is, and this is what it is not. And
then to have, best case scenario, two of them, two of them, and
these are people that really know law enforcement work,
protection, assessment, security threats, and threat
mitigation.
Ms. Clark. Great. Thank you so much.
Chairman Ryan Closing Remarks
Mr. Ryan. Thanks, Ms. Clark.
I appreciate it.
Thank you to the panel for sticking around. We held you an
extra 10 minutes. We have got, you know, a lot more questions.
I think--Mr. Blanton, real quick, I think--do we need to have a
classified or a private briefing from you on some of these
issues with regard to the hardening of the Capitol and those
kind of things?
Mr. Blanton. Yes, Chairman, and I would welcome that and
welcome also a discussion of the comprehensive physical
security assessment as well in any classified setting.
Mr. Ryan. Yeah. I think we should do that and, obviously,
sooner rather than later. And, also, you know, with some of the
intelligence stuff too, Chief, I think we should--you know, we
should do that in a private setting. I don't think we want to
tip our hand to anybody as to what the Capitol looks like now
versus a year ago, but just--you all have given us assurances
that it is much safer today than it was.
I think the chief touched upon, you know, some of the
things that from the intelligence perspective and getting the
word out to the rank-and-file members, but we should definitely
do something in a SCIF to be able to really understand this in
a way so that we can make the arguments for the needs to our
colleagues based upon that information. And, you know, we
certainly want to keep it going.
But, to the extent you all can continue to speak up, you
carry a lot of weight with the Members around this place. And I
think the more you speak up on Member security, on, you know,
the needs--Chief, you know, I am looking at our police
departments back home and the labor situation back home. And,
you know, to get 288 up in the next year is going to be, you
know, a grind. So we want to do everything we can to try to
help you make that happen because I know it is the case there
are still 15 or 20 applicants for every one officer that you
will be able to swear in. Is that still about right?
Mr. Manger. Yes, it is.
Mr. Ryan. Okay. So we have got some work to do.
I want to thank all our staff on the subcommittee for
helping put this together.
I want to thank Ms. Herrera Beutler and the panel.
I will see you all real soon in the classified setting.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
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