[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS
                                 FOR 2022

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 HEARINGS

                                BEFORE THE

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                              FIRST SESSION
                                 ________
 
                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

                         TIM RYAN, Ohio, Chairman

  KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts	JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
  ED CASE, Hawaii			MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
  ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York		DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
  JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia

   NOTE: Under committee rules, Ms. DeLauro, as chair of the full 
committee, and Ms. Granger, as ranking minority member of the full 
committee, are authorized to sit as members of all subcommittees.

                          Steve Marchese, Clerk
                            Subcommittee Staff
                                ________
                            
              SECURITY OF THE CAPITOL CAMPUS SINCE THE 
                      ATTACK OF JANUARY 6, 2021
                      
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                      
                      
                                 ________

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-481                      WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                                ----------                              
                  ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut, Chair


  MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
  DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
  LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
  SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
  BARBARA LEE, California
  BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
  TIM RYAN, Ohio
  C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
  DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
  HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
  CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
  MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
  DEREK KILMER, Washington
  MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
  GRACE MENG, New York
  MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
  KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
  PETE AGUILAR, California
  LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
  CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
  BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
  BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
  NORMA J. TORRES, California
  CHARLIE CRIST, Florida
  ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
  ED CASE, Hawaii
  ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
  JOSH HARDER, California
  JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
  DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
  LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
  SUSIE LEE, Nevada

  KAY GRANGER, Texas
  HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
  ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
  MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
  JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
  KEN CALVERT, California
  TOM COLE, Oklahoma
  MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
  STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
  JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
  CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee
  JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
  DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio
  ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
  MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
  CHRIS STEWART, Utah
  STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
  DAVID G. VALADAO, California
  DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
  JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
  JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida
  BEN CLINE, Virginia
  GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
  MIKE GARCIA, California
  ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa
  TONY GONZALES, Texas

                 Robin Juliano, Clerk and Staff Director

                                   (ii)

                               C O N T E N T S

                               __________

                            January 11, 2022

   Security of the Capitol Campus Since the Attack of January 6, 2021

                                                                   Page
J. Brett Blanton, Architect of the Capitol.......................    24
    Answers to submitted questions...............................    58

J. Thomas Manger, Chief, U.S. Capitol Police.....................     5
    Answers to submitted questions...............................    58

Hon. William J. Walker, Sergeant-at-Arms, U.S. House of 
  Representatives................................................    18
    Answers to submitted questions...............................    58

                                 (iii)

 
               LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022

                              ----------                              

                                         Tuesday, January 11, 2022.

   SECURITY OF THE CAPITOL CAMPUS SINCE THE ATTACK OF JANUARY 6, 2021

                               WITNESSES

HON. WILLIAM J. WALKER, SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
J. THOMAS MANGER, CHIEF, U.S. CAPITOL POLICE
J. BRETT BLANTON, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

                   Opening Statement of Chairman Ryan

    Mr. Ryan. The committee will come to order.
    As this hearing is fully virtual, we must address a few 
housekeeping matters. For today's meeting, the chair or staff 
designated by the chair may mute participants' microphones when 
they are not under recognition for the purposes of eliminating 
inadvertent background noise. Members are responsible for 
muting and unmuting themselves. If I notice that you have not 
unmuted yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to 
unmute you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will 
unmute your microphone.
    I remind all members and witnesses that the 5-minute clock 
still applies. If there is a technology issue, we will move to 
the next member until the issue is resolved, and you will 
retain the balance of your time. You will notice a clock on 
your screen that will show you how much time is remaining. At 1 
minute remaining, the clock will turn to yellow. At 30 seconds 
remaining, I will gently tap the gavel to remind members that 
their time has almost expired. When your time has expired, the 
clock will turn red, and I will begin to recognize the next 
member.
    In terms of the speaking order, we will follow the order 
set forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair and 
ranking member; then members present at the time the hearing is 
called to order will be recognized in order of seniority; and, 
finally, members not present at the time the hearing is called 
to order.
    Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email address to which members can send anything they 
wish to submit in writing at any of our hearings or markups. 
That email address has been Provided in advance to your staff.
    Good morning to our panel. I am pleased to welcome the 
Chief of Capitol Police, Tom Manger; the House Sergeant at 
Arms, William Walker; and the Architect of the Capitol, Brett 
Blanton. Thank you for being with us today.
    None of us will ever forget the events of January 6. The 
Capitol was attacked by violent insurrection. Lives were lost 
in the days and weeks following. 140 police officers were 
assaulted. $1.5 million worth of damage was done to the 
Capitol, and the lasting impacts of that day continue to be 
felt across the Capitol complex and our community. How we 
remember and respond will determine how we collectively learn 
from the trials and mistakes that day.
    As we move forward, we do not want to fall into the trap of 
preparing to fight the last war. Rather, we must thoughtfully 
plan to ensure the next one never happens. Ignoring the 
mistakes of the past or refusing to learn and grow from them 
will only continue to leave the Capitol campus vulnerable to 
unknown and unexpected threats.
    A lot of important work remains to get to the bottom of 
what happened that day, and I commend my colleagues on the 
select committee who are engaged in that very important work. 
The purpose of this subcommittee and this hearing specifically 
is not to litigate the facts of that day. Our purpose today is 
to review where we are 1 year later and what changes have been 
made since January 6, 2021, and to look ahead as what is still 
needed to keep Members, staff, visitors, Capitol Police, and 
all employees on campus safe.
    In May 2021, the House passed a comprehensive security 
supplemental bill with significant investments in the Capitol 
Police, security improvements, and Member security. But after 
inaction in the Senate, a slimmed-down compromise bill was 
agreed to in July of 2021. Unfortunately, this included only 
$300 million of earmarked funding for the Architect of the 
Capitol for windows and doors and new security cameras and 
$70.7 million for the U.S. Capitol Police salaries, equipment, 
and other expenses related to the January 6 insurrection.
    In all, the shortsighted version that could get support 
from the Republicans in the Senate did not include other items 
such as backfilling the funding reprogrammed away from other 
vital activities in the aftermath of the attack, funding for 
security screening vestibules, landscape architecture, and 
retractable security barriers to protect the Capitol complex, 
and resources to improve Member security and security in 
district offices.
    Today, I hope you can provide updates to the subcommittee 
as to how Capitol Police, Sergeant at Arms are currently 
protecting the campus and its workforce and to talk about the 
next steps to ensure the future physical safety of our campus. 
What changes have been made to improve the safety of doors and 
windows? What plans are in place to ensure a mob cannot again 
overrun access points in the Capitol? What efforts have been 
taken to recruit and retain additional Capitol police officers? 
Simply, how is the Capitol a safer place to work 1 year later? 
This subcommittee is interested in hearing about both how those 
supplemental funds are being spent and what gaps remain.
    On top of that, I need you to address the consequences to 
the safety and security of the Capitol complex if the fiscal 
year 2022 regular appropriation is not enacted. As you all 
know, the continuing resolution runs out on February 18, and 
there are those who believe it is better to punt instead of 
doing the hard work of funding the government. What are the 
repercussions to the legislative branch if the 2022 bill is not 
enacted and we are stuck with a continuing resolution at fiscal 
year 2021 funding levels?
    I look forward to your answers to the questions I have 
raised, and I want you to know that we are very thankful for 
your service and that of the staff of your organizations who 
work so hard to make this House run.
    At this point, I would like to yield to my friend and 
colleague, if she is here, Ranking Member Jaime Herrera 
Beutler, for any opening comments she would like to make, and 
if not, it is Mr. Newhouse.

          Opening Statement of Ranking Member Herrera Beutler

    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, General Walker, Chief Manger, and Mr. 
Blanton for being here today.
    You know, I echo Chairman Ryan's thanks for everything that 
you do. We will be forever grateful for the heroic actions of 
your officers, your employees on January 6 of last year, and we 
are also grateful for the actions of the Metropolitan Police 
Department from D.C., the National Guard, and the numerous 
other law enforcement agencies that came to the aid of the 
Capitol, as well as we are grateful to their families at home. 
They did a lot for us and for this Nation.
    The security threats that are facing the legislative branch 
are growing, and they are changing. After 9/11, we were 
primarily concerned about foreign terrorist groups. And, since 
January 6, those foreign terrorist groups and the violent 
domestic groups on the right and on the left have revealed that 
there are a lot of vulnerabilities at the U.S. Capitol. We must 
make changes to ensure that no groups can successfully attack 
the U.S. Capitol or individual Members. Political violence has 
absolutely no place in our society, our democracy, or our 
legislative process.
    And I hear this over and over again. Over the last year, I 
have heard so many people say, ``You know, this group has been 
doing it, so this group can do it,'' or ``This group has been 
doing it, so this makes this okay,'' and that is--I always come 
back to, when is it ever okay? That is a function of our 
democracy. That is the thing that sets us apart and makes us 
different. It is never okay.
    Over the past year, Congress has provided both funding and 
reforms to assist you in protecting the Capitol complex. 
Through the security supplemental appropriations bill, there 
was provided funds for immediate personnel and supply needs of 
the Capitol Police and security enhancements for the Capitol 
Building itself. We also have provided the Capitol Police Chief 
the authority to unilaterally request National Guard and other 
agency support in an emergency. We need to ensure that the 
brave officers who are protecting the Capitol and the functions 
of the legislative branch have the appropriate training and 
equipment. They should never again face circumstances like 
January 6. We need to ensure that the leadership in place is 
providing actual leadership and support and has been trained in 
these types of circumstances to provide security coordination 
for large scale and just routine events. I believe we need to 
ensure that intelligence is gathered, disseminated, and acted 
upon in a productive way.
    And these changes don't just take funding; they require the 
leadership of each of you who is here to testify today. And 
that is what we are excited to hear about. We want to hear 
about the security supplemental funding is being used and if 
there are any additional funding or legislative requirements 
necessary to secure the legislative branch and its activities.
    Security is fundamental. It is up to you, the members of 
the Capitol Police Board, and your agencies, to provide that 
assurance so that we may carry out our constitutional duty 
representing the American people without obstruction or fear.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Ms. Herrera Beutler.
    Next is the chair of the full committee, Representative 
Rosa DeLauro.

                   Opening Statement of Chair DeLauro

    The Chair. Thank you, Chairman Ryan and Ranking Member 
Herrera Beutler, for holding this hearing. I want to say a 
thank you to our guests, to General Walker, to Chief of Police 
Manger, and to Mr. Blanton for testifying today.
    On January 6, 2021, our Nation gazed into the abyss and 
understood more fully than ever before that our democracy is 
fragile. A year later, it is still difficult to comprehend the 
gravity of this attack on our democracy. And I will never 
forget that, amid this insurrection, Capitol Police told us to, 
quote, hit the floor and grab the gas masks under our seats as 
the mob headed for the House Chamber.
    Because of these brave women and men, our democracy proved 
its resilience, our institutions withstood the threat, and we 
overcame the chaos. In recognition of their sacrifice and to 
uphold our responsibility to protect the Republic, this 
committee passed into law almost a billion dollars to fund the 
Capitol Police and secure the United States Capitol, the 
citadel of democracy.
    With funding provided in the security supplemental, the 
Capitol Police have made changes over the past year in five 
critical areas: training, equipment and personnel, operational 
planning, the Civil Disturbance Unit, and Intelligence and 
Incident Command. But they still need our help. One year after 
the horrors of that day, the Capitol Police are still 
recovering. While their physical wounds may have healed, there 
is still so much more they will need to rebuild.
    Over the past year, 135 Capitol Police officers have 
retired or resigned, leaving the force dangerously depleted. 
Those serious manpower challenges have also made it harder to 
take officers away from their posts for their training they 
need. For instance, I have heard directly from officers that 
they need more and more frequent trainings.
    We also know that the Capitol Police itself has identified 
the need for more training staff, and a larger training 
facility that could better accommodate the force's size and 
mission.
    I also understand that, while progress has been made, there 
continue to be concerns about the adequacy of equipment for 
officers to protect themselves and this institution, and I hope 
we can discuss that today.
    Finally, my colleagues and I have continuing concerns about 
the security for Members and our office staff in our districts. 
That came up over and over again from Members about the sense 
of their security and the security of their families in 
districts. While the House included funding for member security 
in the Security Supplemental, that funding was--outrageously, 
in my view--stripped in the Senate.
    The number of potential threats has only grown. So, sooner 
or later, we will have to address this issue, and we want to 
hear your perspective on that matter. While we have already 
passed a security supplemental, we can continue to provide 
funding and oversight through this subcommittee's annual 
appropriations bill. But sadly, annual funding for the Capitol 
Police--which this Committee voted to increase by $88.4 
million--is being held up because Republicans are refusing to 
negotiate appropriations bills.
    That intransigence is keeping the Capitol Police stuck at 
last year's funding levels and denying these heroes the 
resources they need to keep the Capitol and all who work and 
visit here safe.
    As the Architect of the Capitol, Mr. Blanton, put in his 
testimony. Delayed funding for projects has consequences. I 
believe it is time for my Republican colleagues to work with 
Democrats on government funding legislation that supports the 
brave men and women of the Capitol Police. We need to honor 
their sacrifice by providing the certainty that comes with 
sufficient annual funding. We need to have this conference 
process begin, and I hope that we can use the insights from 
this hearing to shape the final legislation.
    We want to hear from you. To our witnesses, what do you 
need? How can we help? What reforms, including the Capitol 
Police Board, must happen? By having these discussions, we can 
continue the long process of helping our community to heal, and 
by doing so, we can keep on moving forward, persisting in our 
quest to build a more perfect Union.
    And, with that, I thank Chairman Ryan and Ranking Member 
Herrera Beutler, and I yield back.

                     CHAIRMAN OUTLINES PROCEEDINGS

    Mr. Ryan. I thank the Chairwoman.
    Without objection, your written testimonies will be made 
part of record. Once the statements are complete, we will move 
to the question-and-answer period. I ask that the panel to 
please summarize your statements and highlight your efforts to 
the committee. We will begin with Chief Manger. After his 
statement, we will turn to Sergeant at Arms Walker for his 
statement, and then we will conclude with Architect of the 
Capitol Blanton.
    Chief, please begin.

                  Testimony of Chief J. Thomas Manager

    Mr. Manger. Thank you. Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member 
Herrera Beutler, Chair DeLauro, Ranking Member Granger, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for providing 
me the opportunity to speak about the significant improvements 
we have made following the events of January 6, 2021, and to 
speak about the work that remains to be done.
    I want to begin by acknowledging the men and women of the 
Capitol Police who work so tirelessly to fulfill their mission 
of protecting the United States Capitol, the Members of 
Congress, and the legislative process every day. And while I am 
proud of our officers, the events of January 6 did expose 
critical department failures and deficiencies with operational 
planning, intelligence, staffing, and equipment.
    I am pleased to report that we have addressed a significant 
portion of the many recommendations issued to the department. 
In fact, of the more than 100 recommendations issued by the 
inspector general, we have implemented or are in the process of 
addressing over 90 of them. However, there is more work to be 
done.
    I also want to thank this committee for its support in 
providing the department the resources needed to address its 
critical needs.
    One of the most critical failures identified in the wake of 
January 6 was the lack of a departmentwide operational plan for 
the joint session. An important first step we took to address 
that concern was onboarding a former Secret Service official 
with extensive experience in major event and national special 
security event planning. Guided by his expertise, we now take a 
multiphase approach to our planning process with a focus on 
information gathering, intelligence, asset determination, 
internal coordination, and, most importantly, departmentwide 
dissemination of all intelligence and critical information 
before all large and high-risk events.
    This includes the creation of the department's first 
Critical Incident Response Plan, which now allows us to more 
effectively and more quickly obtain assistance from our partner 
agencies. In short, a blueprint for operational planning has 
been created and put into place for all significant future 
events.
    If January 6 taught us anything, it is that preparation 
matters. Immediately after the 6th, the department focused on 
the need to strengthen our front line officers, the Civil 
Disturbance Unit, or CDU. For any demonstrations that involve 
the potential for violence, the need for a well-trained, well-
equipped CDU is crucial. Recognizing the tactical importance of 
our CDU officers, we developed a plan to create eight hard 
platoons and incentivize officers to remain in the unit. These 
platoons will be permanent units whose members train together 
and are deployed together.
    Of course, our first responders can't do their job without 
proper equipment. Therefore, we have reviewed all CDU equipment 
and, with the assistance of this committee, are upgrading the 
equipment to protect our officers and enhance our ability for 
crowd control.
    Few changes are as dramatic as the ones that we have made 
in the way we gather, analyze, share, use, and disseminate 
intelligence. Improvements to the department's lead 
intelligence component, the Intelligence and Interagency 
Coordination Division, began before January 6. These 
improvements include a nationwide search for a permanent 
intelligence director, and we are actually only a couple weeks 
away from making that selection. The development of the United 
States Capitol Police intelligence product that is now shared 
with the intelligence community, the issuance of a daily 
intelligence report distributed to all officers and officials, 
biweekly classified intelligence briefings, coordination with 
intelligence and law enforcement partners in advance of large 
or high-profile events, and we have increased our staffing by 
eight intelligence analysts since January 6. We continue to be 
forward looking in our efforts to ensure that the department 
has a strong and proven intelligence collection analysis and 
dissemination program.
    I want to thank all of you for your ongoing support during 
this process. I also acknowledge and appreciate the support 
that we have received from the Capitol Police Board. Today, I 
am confident that the United States Capitol Police Department 
has made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies 
that impacted the department's response on January 6. And, 
while more work remains to be done, the men and women of the 
Capitol Police stand ready to fulfill their mission each and 
every day.
    [The information follows:]
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    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Chief.
    General.

          Testimony of Major General William J. Walker (Ret.)

    General Walker. Good morning, Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member 
Herrera Beutler, Chair DeLauro, and members of the 
Appropriations subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to 
testify before you today and thank you for your ongoing 
support. It is an honor and a privilege to serve this great 
institution.
    Before I begin, I must acknowledge the debt of gratitude we 
owe the United States Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police 
Department, the National Guard, and all the many law 
enforcement officers who came to support the Capitol Police and 
defend democracy a year ago. We must remember those we have 
lost over the past year: Officer Brian Sicknick, Officer Howard 
Liebengood, and Officer Billy Evans, all of the United States 
Capitol Police. And remember that many officers continue to 
bear scars from that fateful day, some seen and some unseen. 
However, their steadfast commitment to this institution serves 
as a powerful inspiration to all of us, and I am fortunate to 
work collaboratively with the brave and dedicated officers of 
the United States Capitol Police.
    Let me get right to the bottom line. We are unquestionably 
safer today than we were a year ago today. The question is, are 
we safe enough? The answer is work remains. Because the threat 
landscape today is ever changing, security of the United States 
Capitol, its Members, their staff, and our visitors is a never-
ending journey, not a destination.
    To meet the security challenges posed by the constantly 
evolving threat, the Office of the House of Sergeant at Arms 
and the United States Capitol Police and our partners, the 
Architect of the Capitol and the Chief Administrative Officer, 
we all must collaboratively work hard and be ever vigilant and 
proactive.
    What has changed? The House Sergeant at Arms is leveraging 
human resources and technology and partnerships like never 
before to provide the safest and most secure atmosphere 
possible. We have hired security subject-matter experts from 
the United States Secret Service, the United States 
intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, 
and other agencies. These experts have deep knowledge, broad 
experience, and a history of success protecting people, 
property, and data. These personnel additions supplement the 
existing dedicated and professional HSAA House Sergeant at Arms 
staff that we already have.
    Member security is my highest priority. The way I am 
approaching this, Member security has five dimensions: Member 
security at the United States Capitol, Member security at their 
residence, Member security during their travel events in their 
districts, and the overall threats to Members.
    After January 6, all spaces within the Capitol complex 
occupied by Members have access to duress alarms, so that is 
security in the Capitol.
    I request resources for every Member to have a state-of-
the-art home security package at their residence in the 
District of Columbia and the metropolitan area and in their 
district residence back home. I also request resources for a 
Member travel operations center to support all domestic and 
foreign travel by Members. This would build on newly created 
partnerships with the Department of Homeland Security, 
specifically the Transportation Security Administration, and 
the Department of State, specifically the Overseas Security 
Advisory Council, which the House Sergeant at Arms has joined, 
and this is helping us regarding threats to Member travel.
    For events in each Member's district, I strongly, strongly 
recommend a standardized suite of training for all district law 
enforcement coordinators be completed. My office is developing 
new training protocols to include videos for district 
coordinators. The topics include security awareness, threat and 
risk assessments, and risk mitigation strategies. I further 
recommend that the coordinators be either a former law 
enforcement officer or someone with strong relationships and 
network in the local law enforcement community. Ideally, I 
would like somebody that is a retired law enforcement officer, 
with H.R. 218--able to carry a weapon under the provisions of 
H.R. 218. The coordinator would routinely meet with local law 
enforcement to assess security for Members. My plan would 
include re-energizing regional and national district 
coordinator security conferences that would be attended by the 
United States Capitol Police leadership and House Sergeant at 
Arms staff to ensure coordinators are kept up to date on the 
latest security solutions.
    I believe threats to Members should also be deterred 
through the aggressive identification and prosecution of 
offenders. The unprecedented number of threats must be 
addressed and disincentivized. The identification, arrest, 
prosecution, punishment, and publicity surrounding the 
adjudication of people making threats against Members will make 
clear this behavior will not be tolerated.
    When I served as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, we had agent attorneys who supplemented U.S. 
Attorney's Offices. They were made Special Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys. The FBI and other agencies also followed this 
practice, and it is to go after and prosecute the cases when 
there is a backlog. I shared this concept with the United 
States Capitol Police, and I am pleased to tell you, to share 
with you that they have followed it, and they have hired 
attorneys who are assisting with the backlog of prosecutions 
against individuals making threats to Members of Congress. I am 
really thrilled about that. This has to stop. It is a huge, 
number one priority of mine.
    In addition, we are also working in concert with the United 
States intelligence community to facilitate the gathering of 
threats against Members. We are collaborating with the 
Department of Justice on prosecutions. The objective is to more 
effectively integrate State and local prosecutors in bringing 
those making threats against Members to justice.
    What I mean by that, Mr. Chairman, is that there are 
counties in the United States that, at the local level, it is a 
crime, and we need to come after this holistically. And, if we 
can't go after an offender Federally, we need to do it State or 
at the county level. My objective is to--so, with this 
objective, I would like to ask Members to urge the Department 
of Justice to provide their full support and assistance to all 
prosecutable threats made against Members. I really believe 
this is something that we have to stop before something tragic 
happens. Threats against Members must be an enforcement 
priority for the Department of Justice as well as State and 
local and county jurisdictions.
    Another priority of mine is the hardening of the Capitol, 
both physically and electronically. We are working 
collaboratively with the United States Capitol Police Board, 
the Architect of the Capitol, who can more fully comment on the 
physical security assessments underway, and the Chief 
Administrative Officer on the cyber threats that are facing the 
Capitol.
    Identity access management is also an initiative that will 
increase security at the Capitol. Working in collaboration with 
the subcommittee and the Capitol Police, I would like to 
institute a Capitol Access Verification Entry System. I am 
calling it CAVES. If this takes off, it would allow the Members 
to know who is coming into the Capitol. It is not telling 
Members you can't bring an individual in, but you should know 
about this--about who is coming to visit you. Just like credit 
card companies know their customers, we should know our 
visitors. So that is another thing that I have.
    Am I out of time? I see the red up there.
    Mr. Ryan. Yeah. Start wrapping up, General.
    General Walker. Okay. All right.
    Mr. Ryan. We will go through a lot of this in questions.
    General Walker. Yes, sir. The last of my security 
priorities is the establishment of Capitol security officers. 
The Capitol security officer concept was based on the United 
States Marshal Service's use of court security officers to 
augment deputy marshals, which protect judges in courtrooms in 
the 94 judicial districts in the United States. So I have--we 
briefed the Capitol Police Board, and I am working with the 
Capitol Police toward implementation.
    So I will just summarize. Thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you all this morning. I am appreciative of your 
unyielding support and the partnerships we are developing to 
enhance security of the complex and its members. I am happy to 
answer your questions. Thank you.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, General.
    Architect of the Capitol Blanton.

                     Testimony of J. Brett Blanton

    Mr. Blanton. Thank you, Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member 
Herrera Beutler, Chair DeLauro, members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I truly 
appreciate the support of this subcommittee in protecting the 
Capitol after the events of January 6.
    As you hear, all of our panelists are united in our efforts 
to make the Capitol safe, secure, and open. I can honestly say 
that we are safer today than we were on January 5. However, 
there is more to do.
    As I reflect upon the somber events last week, I remain 
focused on ongoing efforts to demonstrate our collective 
strength and resolve. The U.S. Capitol is a symbol of Western 
democracy. It is among the most significant architectural 
buildings in the entire world. With your ongoing support, we 
can protect and preserve this cherished institution as well as 
all those who serve here.
    In doing so, we cannot forget the heroic actions of the 
Capitol Police, Sergeant at Arms staff, and my staff on January 
6. During those harrowing hours, AOC personnel sheltered 
congressional staff in our shops. Staff raced to reverse the 
air flow to clear the air of chemical irritants deep within the 
Capitol. We set out eye wash stations and provided water for 
Capitol police officers in need.
    Once the security officials cleared the building, AOC 
employees worked tirelessly to clean up and begin repairs. 
Carpenters covered windows and doors with plywood. Laborers 
removed glass and broken furniture. Hazardous material crews 
cleaned up pepperspray, bear repellant, and fire extinguisher 
residue. Through their resilient and unwavering efforts, AOC 
staff ensured Congress could go back to work. And while 
Congress was doing its job, AOC staff worked nonstop to 
finalize preparations for the 59th Presidential inauguration.
    Haste was urgent and immediate. In order to address these 
needs, we received congressional approval to transfer funds 
from other important projects so that repair work and an 
essential security assessment could be completed right away.
    Over the past year, in close coordination with the Capitol 
Police, as well as the House and Senate Sergeant at Arms, AOC 
staff has improved security measures across campus. While some 
of these changes are more visible than others, we have worked 
continuously throughout the pandemic to keep the Capitol safe. 
We know our efforts are critical to the safety of the Members 
and staff working on the Capitol campus. We are proud of the 
role we play in ensuring continuity of operations. At the same 
time, we all know well the growing costs associated with the 
pandemic, including both purchasing of personal protective 
inventory and testing kits, is draining our agency resources. 
We are extremely appreciative of the funds you provided for the 
pandemic response in the CARES Act and the security 
supplemental. Looking ahead, we hope to continue working with 
you to address ongoing needs.
    Our fiscal year 2023 budget request will reflect projects 
related to the security needs of Congress, the Supreme Court, 
and the entire Capitol complex. We will also seek funding for 
projects previously approved by Congress that were put on hold 
as a result of the budget transfer that I mentioned earlier. As 
the subcommittee considers future campus wide security 
improvements, the AOC will need adequate resources to support 
our partners in the Capitol Police. It is imperative to 
consider the additional requirements and costs levied on the 
AOC to support our partners in these campuswide initiatives.
    And, while physical security improvements are a top 
priority, I am also committed to maintaining a positive work 
environment where people have the skills, the training, 
equipment, and support to serve Congress on behalf of the 
American people.
    I would like to take a moment to express my deep 
appreciation to all AOC employees. Every day, I am continually 
impressed and inspired by the level of commitment, resilience, 
and professionalism displayed by our employees. The Capitol is 
exceptionally resilient, both in terms of physical structure 
and its people. We and the Capitol Police Board share a common 
obligation to protect and preserve this international symbol of 
democracy. I am confident our Capitol will continue to stand 
the test of time. I look forward to continued collaboration 
with my colleagues to vigilantly and effectively achieve this 
goal. On behalf of all Architect of the Capitol staff, I thank 
you again for your support and look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
                    IMPACT OF CONTINUING RESOLUTION

    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Blanton. I appreciate it.
    I am going to kick it off here. I asked a couple of 
questions in my opening statement that we will get to. I am 
hoping you can touch upon those. But, specifically, on the 
impact of a continuing resolution to your offices, what would 
that mean, if you could each give us an answer on that?
    We can--we will go in reverse order, Mr. Blanton, since we 
have you on the screen. You know, we are very frustrated about 
the continuing resolution, and we would be interested in your 
views on the impact of it.
    Mr. Blanton. Thank you. My largest concern with the 
continuing resolution is actually with the Cannon project. We 
need to have money this summer in order to award the next phase 
of the Cannon project. If that is delayed, that is going to end 
up affecting a move cycle where we won't be able to complete 
the project within the 2-year timeframe that is required for 
each phase of the project.
    There are also additional projects that are concerning to 
me: lighting upgrades on the Capitol plaza, some more security 
infrastructure, and then update--upgrades to the sprinkler 
system within the Capitol so that we actually have a fire-code-
approved building. Any continued delays will just delay the 
implementation of any of these projects.
    Mr. Ryan. When you said the security projects, which ones 
would be affected by the CR?
    Mr. Blanton. The barriers and kiosks for the Capitol Police 
and truck interdiction systems.
    Mr. Ryan. Okay. General?
    General Walker. Yes, sir. The greatest impact for the House 
Sergeant at Arms is going to be our inability to hire talent. 
As everybody knows, there is a war for talent, and we are 
trying to acquire security professionals. That is the biggest 
thing. There may be some impact on our travel to go out and do 
assessments of--security assessments that we have been doing. 
It could affect our police services. But number one would be 
hiring individuals, and that is pretty much all I have right 
now, sir.
    Mr. Ryan. Chief.
    Mr. Manger. Well, the continuing resolution would impact 
just about everything that we are doing to make and sustain 
improvements, especially in the areas of intelligence, threat 
analysis, dignitary protection, critical security 
infrastructure, all those areas where we have increased 
workload demands because of the 6th and the recommendations 
that we received as a result of the 6th.
    It would suspend our health and wellness initiatives, which 
are very robust. It would end our student loan repayment 
program. But the biggest impact would be our inability to 
increase our staffing. You will see in our fiscal year 2022 and 
fiscal year 2023 budget, we are asking for 288 new recruit 
officers, and our plan is to hire 288 new recruit officers in 
both those years to get ahead of attrition. This basically 
would leave us in a position where all we could do is replace 
the officers that have left. We have got to get ahead of 
attrition. Staffing is our biggest challenge that remains.
    Mr. Ryan. Okay. Great.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you, Chairman Ryan. And I think 
it is important, since right now we are spending a lot of time 
talking about the CR that the Democrats passed out of the House 
that is being negotiated, I think it is important to note that 
Republicans are very happy to negotiate that. I think CRs are 
as detrimental as the next person.
    However, I do think what I have heard from our colleagues 
in the Senate that, you know, there are policies that the 
Democrats are going to have to come to the table on, 
longstanding protections like Hyde, national defense and border 
security, you know. There are some pretty big, high-level 
issues that need to be addressed. So I think if my friends are 
very interested in making sure that we don't end up with a CR, 
they should make sure that their counterparts in the Senate are 
willing to do that negotiating because, like I said, it came 
out of the House. It is done. I don't think CRs are a good 
idea, but I also think that there needs to be--if they want 
that bipartisan support, there needs to be some bipartisan 
effort put into the bills.

                     COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY REVIEW

    And I want to take it back a little bit to where we are at 
with regard to, you know, the AOC. I know in the last year that 
we have been asked for large sums of money. There has been 
money that has been moved from account to account to cover the 
cost of the fence, you know, to cover immediate needs, and I 
have been supportive of those things pretty much as you have 
asked, Mr. Blanton, and part of that is because I do trust.
    You know, one of the things you have asked for is money for 
a comprehensive security review. And I have got to say, I am a 
little frustrated that I have not--our offices--and I don't 
know if the majority has. Maybe the minority hasn't seen it. I 
did talk with our counterparts on the authorizing side of this 
committee, updates on how the money that we have let this year, 
the $10 million, the security assessment, updates specifically 
on how that money has been spent. Maybe it hasn't been spent, 
maybe it isn't completely expended, or you have plans for it. 
But I haven't gotten--you know, I hear you saying we need more 
support, and I am ready to step up on that front, but I haven't 
actually heard the details of what has been done to date, 
especially with that specific assessment. Could you provide a 
little clarity?
    Mr. Blanton. Yes. Thank you for the question. So the 
assessment is complete. It is well over 2,000 pages. And what 
we are doing now is doing an executive summary of it so that we 
can provide that executive summary and say, if you want to see 
the 2,000 pages, we will have that in the SCIFs. So there were 
some delays with the completion. It was completed in late 
December, and so the executive summary should be coming down 
shortly.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. I understand delays. I definitely 
understand that everybody--you know, everybody here who has 
taken on and assumed--some folks have assumed new roles in 
leading an agency that needs a lot of fixing. I think there is 
just--I have a little bit of frustration. I have heard a little 
bit of frustration that we are being told we aren't quite 
providing everything, but as far as I know, we haven't even 
gotten the update on what your recommendations are. And I am 
anxious to see that because I think your campuswide assessment 
is critical to putting in place the, you know, soup to nuts, 
the whole deal for security of the U.S. Capitol.

             CAPITOL POLICE VACANCIES, STAFFING, AND MORALE

    I am going to switch gears really quick to the Capitol 
Police leadership, and I know, I think it is like six of the 
highest--the 11 members of the Capitol Police leadership team 
have left for various reasons. There are morale issues in the 
department, and it has been heavily scrutinized. I wanted to 
see, Chief Manger, if your--what your plans to fill some of 
these vacancies, and just honestly, overall, what can be done 
to restore some of that morale. I know there were 130 officers 
who have left the department this year. I know this is 
happening nationwide. I can tell you finding talent has been a 
huge issue. And I wanted to know if you are looking at hiring 
folks outside of the normal scope, you know, ex-Secret Service 
agents, folks from Homeland Security, people who have been 
trained, and if there are any impediments there because we need 
to do what we can at least to get--at least hit attrition. We 
have got to at least tackle that hurdle. So over to you.
    Mr. Manger. So, thank you, and it is three questions. 
Leadership----
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Sorry.
    Mr. Manger. [continuing]. Morale and hiring. Let me hit all 
three of them. First of all, the first thing I did when I got 
here was to assess my leadership that I had. And as you pointed 
out, six out of the top 11 people in the organization had left. 
The chief, both Sergeant of Arms, had gone the day after 
January 6. But for the Capitol Police, we lost the assistant 
chief, who was in charge of operational planning on the 6th. 
Gone. The director of intelligence. Gone. The director of 
security services. Gone. Two deputy chiefs retired. And so more 
than 50 percent of the senior staff was not here when I got 
here.
    So what I--my biggest task was to assess the leadership 
that I had. I wanted to determine who is just waiting around to 
see what is going to happen and who has been working since 
January 7 to try and improve the failures of this department. 
And the folks that have remained, I have great confidence in. 
They have done a great deal of work, and some of these folks 
include people that had the vote of no confidence, and I 
understand that. But a vote of no confidence, while it is 
important, it is an important statement by the union, it is not 
an objective performance evaluation. And what I did coming in, 
I had no preconceived notions, but I have--the folks that I 
have are working their tails off.
    There is more to be done. We have got to replace those 
folks. I think there is strong talent within the organization, 
but I also believe that bringing folks in from the outside is 
still an option that I am considering, and we will move 
forward. And I will certainly keep the committee apprised of my 
decisions as we move forward.
    In terms of morale, morale is a difficult issue. It is--
morale--what I have learned in 43 years of being a cop is 
morale is in the eye of the beholder. You are going to have 
some cops that--who took this job, they had expectations, and 
then when they get here, they find out that the job's more 
difficult than they thought it was going to be, and they have 
to sort of reconcile that.
    And I have tried to tell--you know, tried to tell my folks 
over and over since I have been here that the people we serve 
appreciate what we do, and what we have got to do--what I think 
my responsibility is to restore the confidence that these 
officers--I want these officers to have in the department. The 
department let them down on January 6. We have got to restore 
that confidence, and I am doing everything we can to address 
that.
    You know, the supplemental, there were a number of things 
in there: hazard pay, retention bonus, student loan repayment, 
specialty pay for the Civil Disturbance Unit, health and 
wellness initiatives. The supplemental allowed us to do all 
those things. My hope is they have had some impact on morale, 
but we have still got, again, more work to be done there.
    Last issue, the hiring. You know, we have got a goal of 
trying to hire 288 people this year, 288 people next year. We 
have got to get ahead of attrition. One of the reasons we are 
so far behind is, as was mentioned, over 130 people left last 
year or since January 6, but the year prior, COVID closed down 
our--the training academy in Georgia. We weren't able to get 
any new hires through in 2020. So you have got a year where we 
can't--where we get very few new officers; another year where 
we lose 130. That is what has put us in such a difficult 
position in terms of staffing.
    The good news is, we are not--we have put a lot of 
recruitment initiatives together. We are not having any trouble 
getting people to apply. The challenge is to make sure we hire 
the right people. And I think that we are doing our best to 
make sure we hire people that have integrity, a spirit for 
public service, courage, compassion, emotional intelligence. 
These are the qualities we are looking for, and my hope is that 
we are continuing--that we continue to be able to hire good 
people to be Capitol police officers.
    In terms of the leadership, again, as I said before, I 
think we have got good talent internally, but we also need to 
look outside to see if there is good folks that we can bring 
in.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you.
    I yield back, Chairman.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
    Chairwoman DeLauro.

            REVISITING JANUARY 6TH AND SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING

    The Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
thank our witnesses for the speed and alacrity with which you 
moved in the chaos, the aftermath of January 6, and the changes 
that you have made, including that we were unable to get you 
all of the money that the House proposed in that first--in our 
supplemental, and money was taken out. So now what we want to 
do is to figure out where the gaps are and be able to help fill 
those.
    I have to say something quickly before I ask my two 
questions, which is about the state of negotiations on the 
omnibus. I think it is important to note that, to date, that 
there has not been a--the Democratic proposals as reflected in 
the bills that are out there, all 12 appropriations bills in 
the House and in the Senate, but to date, there has not been a 
Republican counteroffer or an offer of what our colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle would like to see in an omnibus 
going forward. And we continue to ask for that, and my hope is 
that we will get there.
    With regard to the policy of riders, et cetera, just for 
clarification, the normal process of the Appropriations 
Committee historically, and I have served on the committee for 
some 25, 26 years, is that you deal with--dealing with the top 
line, getting the numbers on defense and nondefense laid out 
and programmatically go down, and then you deal with the 
riders. To say that we would not enter conversations about top 
line, et cetera, without the dismissal of all of the policy 
issues is unprecedented, in addition to which we have to have a 
thorough review, debate, and discussion of all of those in 
order to come out with a bicameral but bipartisan piece of 
legislation. So just to clear the record.
    And, if I can, I would like to get to two questions. Chief 
Manger, I want to say thank you. No Member or staff members 
were physically injured on January 6. Okay. Now, you note in 
your testimony that, without the restrictions of COVID-19, the 
Capitol would have been open to the public on January 6. And 
so--and that is safe to estimate there would have been 
thousands of more people in the Capitol that day, if not for 
COVID-19. Can you describe how the police response on the 6th 
would have been different with such a substantial increase in 
population at the Capitol? Do you expect the same results in 
terms of overall safety? Is the funding that was included in 
the security supplemental significant enough to ensure the U.S. 
Capitol Police is prepared to respond to such an attack with 
the Capitol at full staff capacity?
    And, quickly, for you, Chief, and for General Walker, the 
issue of in-district funding for members and district offices 
and families, we know that there are about 10,000 threats. If 
you can describe, Chief, the details--in detail the steps the 
U.S. Capitol Police is taking to ensure that all threats are 
investigated.
    And, General Walker, in your testimony, you recommend 
standardized training for the district law enforcement 
coordinators. Are there other security enhancements needed for 
Members and staff to remain safe in their districts? Is 
additional funding necessary for such protection?
    So, Chief Manger, if you will begin, and then General 
Walker.
    Mr. Manger. Yes, ma'am. The supplemental did a great deal 
to help us out. In fact, I am not sure how we would be able to 
have made many of the improvements without that. I mentioned 
earlier all the retention bonus, hazard bonus, the funding to 
pay overtime to officers. This has helped us just day to day 
operationally and helped us retain officers who might otherwise 
have left.
    But, in addition, it has given us the ability to ensure 
that we can order the equipment and get the equipment that our 
officers needed. The Civil Disturbance Unit officers, we have 
ordered state-of-the-art equipment for them. And that should 
be--we are expecting--some of it has come in. We expect it all 
to be in within this month is our hope, and we will get that 
out to our folks.
    But the one thing I should say, that none of our civil 
service unit officers, if anything happened today, would be 
going out there without equipment. If we don't have equipment 
for the folks, we are not deploying them as CDU officers, which 
is what happened on the 6th.
    There is money for training. There is--the health and 
wellness initiatives, the trauma-informed counseling services 
that we are able to deliver, the employee assistance programs 
that we have been able to initiate, all those are tremendously 
important, and we have been able to do.
    With regard to--I just have to say that, with regard to 
reopening the campus, the equipment, operational planning, all 
those kinds of things, we are ready. Staffing is the biggest 
issue. We are around 440, 450 officers below where we need to 
be to be able to do the workload that we have responsibility 
for, and it gets to the threats against Congress. You know, we 
are investing--investigating threats against Congress, but I 
will tell you. We are barely keeping our head above water for 
those investigations. We have been able to put--you know, the 
regional offices have been able to help a little bit, but the 
fact of the matter is that we are going to have to nearly 
double the number of agents that work those threat cases. We 
have increased the number over the last couple of years by 
necessity, but even now, it needs to be increased even more. So 
that is--you know, in their fiscal year 2022, fiscal year 2023 
budget, you are going to see additional positions being 
requested, whether it is for dignitary protection capability or 
investigating threats and all the other places where our 
workload has increased dramatically.
    So we have got--look. We have got a ways to go before we 
can reopen the campus, but we are working toward that. And if I 
am able to get 288 new recruits on board this year, it will get 
us a long way toward being able to staff the posts that we need 
to staff to be able to open back up, but we need some time.
    The Chair. Mr. Chairman, if I can just ask General Walker 
to comment----
    Mr. Ryan. Sure.
    The Chair [continuing]. On the in-district piece.
    But I just want to say to Chief Manger that, with the team 
here, if you can really get to us, get to the chair and to the 
ranking member specifically the way you pointed out the 
staffing, what is needed, what was there--what are the 
resources that are necessary in order for us to keep our head 
above water on the threats and how we reopen this campus, 
because it is going to be reopened and there will be many, 
many, many, many more people here, and we need to be prepared 
for that.
    Chief Manger. Yes.

              SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS FOR MEMBERS AND STAFF

    The Chair. So that document will be critically important.
    General Walker, if you can just address the security 
enhancement for Members and staff in districts. And I know you 
have talked about the training for the law enforcement 
coordinators and what kind of funding do we need, if you can 
just get that to us.
    General Walker. Yes, ma'am. I think we need robust funding. 
In a best-case scenario, in a perfect world, each district 
would have two district law enforcement coordinators. In my 
opinion, both of them--both of them should be well versed in 
law enforcement, a retired or former law enforcement officer, a 
law enforcement officer with 5 to 10 years, the ability to 
qualify for H.R. 218 that would allow an officer, man or woman, 
to be able to carry a weapon, who knows about protection, who 
could understand making the assessments of an event that a 
Member is going to attend. So I would double the Member--I 
would double the district law enforcement coordinators and have 
them travel statewide, have authority to carry a weapon 
statewide.
    But, regarding your residences, I think we should pour 
money into securing residences, lighting that would come on, 
motion sensors, motion detectors, video doorbells, video 
equipment inside and out that would--and then relationships 
that--so we would understand what are the threats in a 
community.
    Even a new Member, where do you live, how many calls for 
service do the police respond to, and what types of calls, 
burglaries, robberies, thefts, homicides. We need to understand 
where our Members live and what level of protection they need 
to be afforded. So we do need to throw funding at protecting 
Members. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
    The Chair. Thank you for the indulgence of the chair, 
ranking member, and the members of the committee for going over 
time. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan. No problem.
    Representative Clark.

                  USCP STAFF RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

    Ms. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to echo the sentiments of my colleagues that 
our--our deep gratitude to the Capitol Police, to the Sergeant 
at Arms, and to the Architect of the Capitol and their staffs 
for not only the protections on January 6 but how you are 
working to meet the ongoing threat environment that we are in. 
We are deeply grateful.
    Chief Manger, I wanted to go back to talking about the 
almost, I think it is 447 officers that you are short. Are 
there themes that we can be helpful with that are merging in 
problems in recruiting and training? And I specifically want to 
know if the salary disparity between Capitol Police and other 
Federal law enforcement agencies is playing a role.
    Chief Manger. So, I guess the short answer is, we have 
got--with the staffing needs that we have, we have got to give 
ourselves every advantage in terms of hiring. And I will 
confess that I don't know how competitive our salaries are, but 
I know that, with the retention bonus, the hazard pay, the 
specialty pays that we have been able to give the specialty 
units all help us in terms of recruiting and retaining good 
officers.
    So I think that we need to look at--and we can have folks 
do a study in terms of comparing our salary and benefits 
compared to other law enforcement agencies that we compete 
with, and if we need to make adjustments, I will be the first 
one to let you know.

                   USCP STAFF RETENTION AND WELLNESS

    Ms. Clark. Oh, great. And can you tell me a little bit 
about the strategies that you have found to be most effective 
in addressing the trauma and stress and burnout within the 
force so we can work on improving our retention?
    Chief Manger. Yes, ma'am. So, in terms of--for police 
officers, and I guess you could really say this for any 
occupation, you have really two goals with those kinds of 
initiatives: First is helping employees to cope with the daily 
stress of the job. The second goal is to help employees through 
crises; that is when they are involved in traumatic events, 
provide them with trained counselors to help try and build the 
resiliency. So you have got the daily stress; you have got the 
traumatic incidents.
    And we have put together, I think, initiatives. We are 
contracting with The Center For Mind-Body Medicine. We have 
stood up our health and wellness center, the Howie Liebengood 
Center for Wellness. We have got employee assistance, health, 
nutrition, trauma-informed care specialists, peer support 
programs, support dog program, three fitness centers, and a 
chaplain program. So we are trying to really have wraparound 
services for whatever our cops need.

                            INSIDER THREATS

    Ms. Clark. For the protection of our force and those they 
serve, can you tell me what systems you have put in place to 
try and root out any dangerous or extremist groups that may 
have infiltrated our force?
    Chief Manger. So I think it all begins with the hiring 
process, and you have got to make sure that the background 
investigations that we do, the polygraph test that we give, the 
deep dive into an individual's social media plat--the social 
media is also tremendously important to really--to determine, 
is this person suitable to be a police officer?
    So that is where it starts. But I think that, after you 
hire someone you do need to ensure that you have the kind of 
checks that are necessary to make sure that there is not 
something that has changed in terms of their background.
    And right after January 6, as I am sure you are aware, 
there were probably at least 30 cases where there were 
complaints against officers that questioned their actions 
during January 6 and were they somehow assisting the folks that 
had broken into the Capitol, the groups there.
    And most of those cases were handled before I got here, but 
I actually have handled, I think, three of them since I have 
been here. And there is one officer who we determined, in fact, 
his actions were not consistent with the department's mission, 
and that officer is no longer here. Another officer, you know, 
made a mistake but he was not in cahoots, so to speak, with the 
protesters, with the rioters. A third case, I think, the 
officer was exonerated.
    So, you know, having indepth--having really good, indepth 
investigations to determine if an officer is involved or 
engaged in some kind of activity that would lead to a question 
about their loyalty to our mission, that is important as well, 
to make sure that those investigations are done thoroughly and 
decisive action is taken on those cases.
    Ms. Clark. Thank you so much, Chief.
    Mr. Chairman, I have forgotten how quickly 5 minutes goes 
by, so maybe a second round.
    Mr. Ryan. Yeah, for sure.

                            INSIDER THREATS

    General Walker. Chairman and Ms. Clark, can I just add to 
that?
    Mr. Ryan. Sure.
    General Walker. So the House Sergeant at Arms has developed 
an insider threat awareness program to uncover insider threats 
and employees who do lose their compass, and that will be 
briefed to the Capitol Police Board, if not this month the next 
board meeting in February, and we are going to work 
collaboratively to hang these briefings. And the goal, the 
strategic objective is to have people in the United--police 
officers trained as insider threat specialists so we have 
recognized the signs and symptoms, the indicators of someone 
whose allegiance has changed.
    Part two of that is try to introduce some kind of security 
clearance for U.S. Capitol Police officers. The thing with a 
security clearance, as you all well know, they expire, so you 
have to have this periodic reinvestigation: Has your allegiance 
changed? Do you have close and continuous contact with groups 
that are nefarious? Your foreign travel, on duty or off? That 
needs to be reported. Who are you associating with?
    So I will leave it there, not to take too much time, but I 
just wanted to let you know, Representative Clark and others, 
that the Sergeant at Arms has partnered with the intelligence 
community and the homeland security agencies and the FBI to 
create this robust insider threat program. Thank you.
    Ms. Clark. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Chief.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
    Mr. Amodei.

                    USCP FUNDING AND HIRING PROCESS

    Mr. Amodei. Hey, Mr. Chairman, good morning. It is nice to 
see you again. It has been quite a while. I trust you have been 
doing okay without daily kind of support from me, so we will 
just get on to this topic of the hearing. Okay?
    Mr. Ryan. Sounds good.
    Mr. Amodei. Okay.
    Mr. Ryan. I will try to make it without you.
    Mr. Amodei. Okay. Way to tough it out.
    I want to join in Congresswoman Herrera Beutler's thing 
about, you know, it would be nice just to have kind of the 
general accounting info folks, especially General and Chief, 
about burn rates and the money that you have gotten so far. And 
the only reason I say that is to be intelligent about what you 
need to continue down the road and stuff like that, it would be 
kind of nice as an appropriator and in an oversight capacity to 
be able to say that we followed up on just what was done with 
the supplemental so far, obviously as well as the stuff going 
forward.
    So I would like to join in that request, and we will circle 
back with you folks offline, not on the committee's time to see 
if we can--you know, if there is some security aspect, that is 
fine. We can get a briefing or whatever. But I do think that is 
kind of a fundamental thing as we sit here a year after the 
fact and say, okay, what have we learned and what have we 
started to do.
    Chief, let me ask you just a real quick question. When you 
talk about personnel and needing all these folks, remind me how 
long it takes to identify, train, whatever from when you decide 
I am going to hire Tim Ryan to be on the Capitol Police to when 
Tim Ryan actually shows up for his first day of work. That is 
not something where you turn it off and on or a 30-, 60-day 
thing, I don't recall, but you tell me. How long does it take 
from completing what you have to do from recruitment to 
background to training to they are on the job?
    Chief Manger. The better part of a year.
    Mr. Amodei. Okay.
    Chief Manger. From the time we focus in on hiring somebody 
to the time we can actually put them out by themselves, they 
are finished with training and they can go to a post or go to 
an assignment by themselves, better part of a year.
    Mr. Amodei. So that is an important thing in terms of our 
expectations. If we fix all the appropriation problems next 
week, we are still in 2023 basically before we start thinking 
about fully staffed in a perfect world.
    Chief Manger. And someone asked earlier--and now that you 
have reminded me, I didn't answer this part of the question--we 
do have other strategies to try and get--to ease some of the 
staffing issues. We are looking at rehiring annuitants, 
retirees, bringing them back. We are looking at hiring lateral 
positions so, you know, we can look to other Federal law 
enforcement agencies and, you know, allow people to come over 
and join our agency, and, plus, the use of contract security 
that General Walker talked about.
    And so these would all be short-term strategies to allow us 
to get us to a point where we can relieve some of the staffing 
hardships that we are experiencing today for our officers and 
then, as we--you know, if we are able to hire 280 officers a 
year over the next couple of years, that is going to get us 
ahead of attrition and put us where we need to be.

                          SCREENING TECHNOLOGY

    Mr. Amodei. Okay. And so you are thinking outside of the 
box, but, nonetheless, it is like, hey, this is going to--and 
good.
    I want to let you know that I am going to be requesting a 
chance to come sit down with you since I haven't had a chance 
since you came on board to talk about some of the other things 
you have talked about in your testimony as well as the General.
    But I want to alert both of you to something that I think 
is an ongoing problem since I have been affiliated with the 
committee, and that is actually the office buildings. And I 
don't know anything about the Senate ones obviously. I try to 
stay away from those. But, nonetheless, I will just tell you, I 
think the screening culture needs to change.
    I hope that the analysis that the Architect of the Capitol 
is doing as well as you guys on the Capitol Police Board bring 
a new analysis into that. As I look at--we have kind of done 
what we have always done, and you look at that--when you talk 
about--when the Sergeant at Arms talks about knowing who is in 
your neighborhood and stuff like that, when I look at what goes 
on to come into the three buildings that I am familiar with, 
and it is like, you know what, it is a pretty cold day out 
today so you have got people lined out the door, you have got 
the same sort of thing where you are going through the metal 
detectors and whatever, and it is like I see no attempt--maybe 
I am wrong, but I will meet with you guys to say, hey, how can 
we do a better job of this so we don't have people out there 
sweating in July and freezing in January, and how are we 
actually screening them?
    I am encouraged to hear that the Sergeant at Arms wants to 
use technology maybe to have a better idea of who is coming and 
going. But I have got to tell you, some of the spaces--and this 
is not rank and file, this is leadership, where you have got a 
space the size of the closet for one of the Cannon entrances 
while you have got another entrance that is more spacious that 
is not being used because, well, I don't know. It is something 
where I think we can do better, and I think with the change in 
leadership we probably ought to take a look at that. And I know 
some day in the future somebody is going to build a Capitol 
Visitor Center over here in a parking lot somewhere, but quite 
frankly, I don't think that is imminent.
    And so the last thing I will leave you with, and this is 
for the General, we have been asking for an update on what we 
can do to screen people before they go into vote for the metal 
detectors without making it look like an adjunct operation of 
the airport. And I anxiously await that, almost a year later, 
in terms of the update.
    If we want to screen people for metal before they go vote, 
that is fine with me. But we ought to be able to do it in a way 
where it doesn't look like it is Toledo International and a TSA 
operation. And I have been told before that the technology 
exists to do that. And so I am really looking forward to an 
update on how we are going to restore a little bit of decorum 
to just the act of walking into the chambers and making sure 
that nobody is carrying. So I look forward to all that stuff 
offline.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman for your indulgence. I yield back.
    Mr. Ryan. Thanks, Mr. Amodei.
    Chief, does anybody want to comment on the gentleman from 
Nevada's comments? You don't have to.
    General Walker. Chairman Ryan, I will share with you that I 
have met with the Secret Service. They have come over, and they 
have done an assessment. The technology does exist, and we are 
working on it. That would be something we would need funding 
for, and we would have to work with the Architect of the 
Capitol to have something that is less intrusive but protect 
the structure.
    So we are working aggressively on that as we speak to speed 
up the process, make it less like an airport terminal, but at 
the same time ensure that nobody is bringing a prohibited item 
on to the floor.
    Mr. Amodei. Well, and, Mr. Chairman, if I might, and, 
General, I look forward to your brand of aggression in the 
coming year as opposed to the aggression in the past year. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you.
    The gentleman from New York, Mr. Espaillat.

                        BOMB SWEEPS AND THREATS

    Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, all, for your input today.
    I have expressed in the past concerns about what may be our 
next attack. I feel very strongly that it won't be the same way 
we were attacked during January 6, that it may have a different 
sort of like approach. And, as such, I have expressed my 
concerns about bomb sweeps. As you know, there was two bombs 
placed in the DNC and the RNC, and they were placed there, and 
it sort of like distracted law enforcement away from the 
epicenter of the insurrection.
    And I just wanted to know, has any measure been taken to 
increase the K-9 unit training and sweeps around the Capitol 
complex and the perimeter around the Capitol complex to ensure 
that we are not attacked in that form and that fashion? In 
addition to that, any potential drone attacks maybe something 
that we ought to prevent against. And I wanted to know if any 
measures have been taken regarding these two methods that could 
be used by insurrectionists in the future.
    Chief Manger. Yes, sir. Chief Manger here. Yes to all of 
your questions. We have put together a better procedure to do 
what we call foundation checks around all of the buildings. I 
just got numbers in the last day or two about the number of 
sweeps that we have done for--that our K-9s have done around 
the buildings over the past year, thousands and thousands of 
sweeps.
    And we are looking at the number of K-9s that we have and 
are looking to increase them over the next year or two just so 
we can ensure that we do an adequate number of sweeps, multiple 
a day, if need be, to ensure the safety of our campus from 
explosives.
    Mr. Espaillat. Besides the groups that are conducted to 
vehicles entering the Capitol, have you increased the K-9 unit 
since January 6? Has there been----
    Chief Manger. Yeah, I am not sure. I don't know the answer, 
and I will get back to you with the answer if we have 
increased. But I know that we are looking over the next year or 
two to increase the number of K-9s that we have. But we are 
also looking at and working with the Capitol Police Board with 
regard to the issue of drones.
    Mr. Espaillat. Okay. But nothing has actually occurred 
regarding these two--the drone piece and the increase of K-9s?
    Chief Manger. Well, we have increased the number of sweeps 
that we do with K-9s. That has dramatically increased. And it 
is not just the vehicles coming in, it is also around all the 
buildings. And there has been work done, and we are working 
with contractors to make sure that we have the ability to 
counter any drones that come into our airspace, so that work is 
underway.

                           BUILDING SECURITY

    Mr. Espaillat. Okay. My second question is regarding the 
construction reinforcements to the exterior and interior doors 
and camera systems and window replacement throughout the 
campus. What has occurred there? Has there been an improvement, 
reinforcements to the exterior doors, interior doors, the 
camera system, and window replacements in the campus?
    Mr. Blanton. I will start with the--this is Brett Blanton 
here. I will start with the interior doors. We have done--we 
have--prior to being informed by the security assessment, we 
have installed in leadership offices peepholes so they can see 
outside and breach-resistant hinges to reduce the ability for 
people to get inside on the doors.
    In the Chamber, we have increased security of doors there. 
Unfortunately, the projects themselves are classified, and I am 
willing to take an offline discussion where we can go into more 
detail. I will say, a good security project, from my 
perspective, when it comes to like the chamber, is something 
that you don't even know it is there. And I would be willing to 
walk you and show you what we have done so you can see, wow, 
this looks like it was--like the door was there before, but it 
is a different door.
    Mr. Espaillat. What about cameras?
    Mr. Blanton. So the cameras are under the purview of the 
Capitol Police. We install the physical infrastructure for 
them, and the Capitol Police determine where a camera needs to 
be placed and how many there need to be. So I will pass that 
over to the chief.
    Mr. Espaillat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Ryan. I want to thank the gentleman from New York.
    The gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Newhouse.

                      QUESTIONS FROM MR. NEWHOUSE

    Mr. Newhouse. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate that.
    And I want to thank all three of our witnesses today. Thank 
you for being here, and thank you for your service, as well as, 
please relay my appreciation to everyone that you work with for 
their service to us as well. I want to ask all three of you my 
questions, and then I will turn the floor back over to you for 
your responses.
    But, first of all, Chief Manger, as it was, I think, to be 
expected, in the months following January 6 of last year, 
morale at the U.S. Capitol Police was low. As you alluded to, 
rank-and-file officers demonstrated they had little or no faith 
in capability of police leadership.
    I would like your estimation--you have already addressed 
your level of faith in your current leadership, and I 
appreciate that. I would like your estimation of the level of 
faith that you believe that the police officers on the ground 
have in the leadership of your organization at this time.
    And then, secondly, I wanted to ask you a little bit about 
the U.S. Capitol Police memorial fund that was established, I 
think, in 1998 after the tragic loss of two individuals who 
defended the Capitol from a lone gunman. And then it was, I 
believe, expanded after the congressional baseball shooting in 
2017.
    My understanding is that many--what, we had 140-plus police 
officers injured on January 6. And I just wanted to ask about 
the level of distribution to some of the families and to the 
individuals and the amounts that may have been given to 
individual police officers as a result of January 6.
    Then, for General Walker, and I appreciate being able to 
visit with you earlier this week and get to know you a little 
bit. I look forward to working with you over the coming months 
as we work on these important issues. But I wanted to talk to 
you, as I intimated earlier, about the opening of the Capitol 
campus, and I know there has been some discussion about that. 
If you could talk about any conversations you have had related 
to that, what metrics or plans that you have been able to 
establish for that eventual reopening.
    And is there any coordination, I guess, between the House 
and Senate? They seem to have a different set of metrics. It 
seems things are more open on the Senate side, and I just 
wanted to know about some of the differences and the reasons 
for those and what we can look forward to in the future. I know 
this is a big interest of a lot of Members, and certainly want 
to keep staff and Members safe at the same time, but we do want 
to open up to--the people's House back to the people.
    And then, for Mr. Blanton, the AOC, you stated a year ago, 
and I appreciate you coming back to meet with us this year, but 
about the fact that you were never contacted about the 
possibility of deploying the National Guard to help secure the 
Capitol ahead of January 6. And obviously that is a big part of 
your responsibility, which, you know, the operation and 
preservation of the complex.
    You are a member of the Capitol Police Board. So are you--
do you feel that you are engaged in the board's decisionmaking 
process, and do you have voting power? I want to ask you if you 
feel that in the last year communication among the members of 
the police board has improved, and if not, how would you 
suggest that it could be improved in order to prevent the kind 
of issues that we saw from happening into the future?
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will start with Chief Manger 
and appreciate your responses.

                          USCP OFFICER MORALE

    Chief Manger. Yes, sir. So, in terms of the morale from the 
officers' perspective, I understand fully after January 6 why 
the confidence of the officers, the confidence in the 
department, their confidence in the leadership of this 
Department was not very good, and that is an understatement.
    They believe that the department let them down, that the 
Department's lack of operational planning resulted in injuries, 
deaths. And I know that a fair number of officers still to this 
day are not satisfied that there has been accountability.
    I would, again, point out the fact that the following day, 
the chief, the Sergeant at Arms, both Sergeant at Arms were no 
long in their positions and all the other leadership that has 
left the department since then.
    But I do understand, from the officers' perspective, but it 
was--it is not universally bad morale, you know, or, you know, 
in our department. There is a lot of officers that do enjoy 
working here who come to work and believe in their mission and 
believe that they are doing good work and doing important work 
every day. Again, it is a mixed bag in terms of the officers' 
perspective.

                           USCP MEMORIAL FUND

    With regard to the memorial fund, there is good news with 
the memorial fund. We have just--and I know it has taken a long 
time, but we have now got a draft form in place so that 
officers who want to apply for money from the memorial fund, 
and we have got a policy in place, it is going to go out to the 
union here shortly for their input, but it is finally in place 
and so that we can move forward with officers actually applying 
for money.
    Since January 6, there has only been two officers that have 
received money from the memorial fund. Both of those officers 
were killed in the line of duty, and their families received 
money. We typically keep confidential who gets it and how much 
they get, but I will say that two officers have received money 
from the memorial fund and that the maximum that any family can 
get is $200,000.

                          CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

    And, Mr. Newhouse, if I could just--I know you didn't ask 
me this question, but with regard to the National Guard, I so 
appreciate what the Congress did in terms of giving me the 
authority to make that call. But let me stress that, you know, 
I have spoken with two or three previous--actually three or 
four previous Capitol Police chiefs about their relationship 
with the Capitol Police Board, and many of them expressed their 
view that it was a very dysfunctional relationship. I have not 
had that experience at all.
    I get great cooperation from the Capitol Police Board. And, 
frankly, I think now--you know, Mr. Blanton has been around for 
a while, but you have got two new Sergeant at Arms, a new 
police chief, and we are working together as a team with one 
mission in mind, and that is to make this campus as safe as it 
can be. So, for what it is worth, that is my opinion.
    Mr. Newhouse. Thank you.
    General Walker.

                      PLANS TO REOPEN THE CAPITOL

    General Walker. Yes, Representative Newhouse, thank you for 
the question. So we would be ready--we have a plan to reopen 
the Capitol. The challenge is everything we are hearing from 
Admiral Monahan tells us that opening the Capitol is not safe 
right now, that it is--we are focused on security right now 
because of the rising number of COVID infections.
    So I have had three of my people come down last week with 
COVID. And here is what is frightening about this: They have 
had both vaccinations, and they were boosted--and they had the 
booster. And Chief Manger can tell you the number, and I 
apologize, I don't remember the actual number of officers down 
because of COVID. So I think we would put an undue burden on 
the United States Capitol Police to have them be in a challenge 
of--in a COVID environment with an open complex where people 
are walking around, some with masks, some without masks.
    Representative Newhouse, I see people, Members, staff 
without masks. And, you know, I will walk up to them and I will 
ask them to put their mask on, and some just walk away from me, 
some put it on. So I think if we open this--the people's House, 
which will be opened, but I am hoping it is opened once Dr.--
Admiral Monahan gives us the green light to open it. So we are 
leaning heavily on what Admiral Monahan is telling us regarding 
this pandemic, this epidemic that we are facing right now.
    Thank you for the question. I hope that answered it.
    Mr. Newhouse. That is helpful. Thank you.
    Mr. Blanton.

                          CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

    Mr. Blanton. Yes, thank you, Representative. I will say 
unequivocally that this is a completely different board than we 
had on January 5, not just in people but I am talking about--in 
functionality, in unity, and in engagement across. The 
leadership changes have been significant, and I can tell you, 
we are in a much better place.
    Mr. Newhouse. Okay. I appreciate that.
    And I appreciate your indulgence, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Clark is right, 5 minutes is shorter than it used to 
be, so thank you.
    Mr. Ryan. And 7 minutes is shorter than you think too.
    Ms. Wexton.

                         REMARKS BY MS. WEXTON

    Ms. Wexton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to all the witnesses coming before us today 
and coming to testify and sharing your stories and what you 
have been doing. You know, I am the last person to ask 
questions in this, at least in the first round, and so I have 
the benefit of everybody else having asked their questions, so 
that is good. Although, they asked a lot of the same questions 
I was going to ask.
    But there has been a lot of discussion about morale. And, 
Chief Manger, you said that officers believe that the United 
States Capitol Police, you know, let them down and did not have 
the operational security to take care of them and to protect 
them on January 6. And the reason they believe that is because 
the USCP did let them down, and so, you know, that is something 
that they have had to deal with since that time.
    But I very much appreciate the changes that you have made 
and what you are doing to show that, you know, that you are 
going to not just talk the talk but you are going to walk the 
walk, and that the proof is in the pudding, and, you know, show 
me, don't tell me. So I appreciate that very much, everything 
that you have done for that.
    And, related to that, I want to thank everybody for 
standing up the Howie Liebengood Center for Wellness, making 
that a reality, because that is going to be so helpful for 
these officers.
    And I also want to thank you, because as most of you know, 
Howie was a constituent of mine. I have gotten to know his 
family pretty well, and they are so, so pleased and gratified 
that hopefully no other Capitol Police family will have to go 
through what they did. I want to thank you for that. And I am 
glad it will be open soon, and I look forward to coming to the 
ribbon cutting with you hopefully in better times when we are 
able to do that.
    I also want to thank the Capitol Police and the Sergeant at 
Arms Office for having that Chamber training. I actually 
participated in it. I know a number of folks did. Probably a 
lot of Members didn't, but I am really glad I did. And I also 
want to thank you very much, and probably on behalf of myself 
and Ms. Herrera Beutler as well, for actually putting hair ties 
in the escape hoods so that we can put our hair up and actually 
get a tight seal because that is something that a lot of people 
don't think about. But I want to thank you guys for that. It 
was very informative. I hope and pray that we will never need 
to use it again, but it is good to have that information there.

               USCP RETIREMENT AND OVERTIME COMPENSATION

    So about recruitment and retaining new officers within the 
United States Capitol Police workforce, one of the things that 
we had been talking about was one of the issues that we faced 
with them is that they don't get their pension based upon their 
overtime pay rates. And I know that many, many officers have 
been working a lot of overtime. It has been an issue for many 
years. It is probably even still more of an issue.
    So I guess my first question for you is, has there been any 
discussion about making that change to pensions? And then, 
also, what is the status of overtime for fiscal year 2022 thus 
far?
    Chief Manger. So there has been discussion about including 
overtime in the retirement calculations. I can tell you that, 
in my years of experience, I have seen departments do that and 
then decide that it wasn't sustainable.
    So I think that--I have seen how it manifests itself in 
terms of, you know, senior officers who, you know, some who 
never worked overtime before, but, in their last couple years, 
they are working all the overtime they can and how it impacts 
other people's ability to work overtime.
    So, as long as we work through those issues so that it is 
something that is sustainable and that can work, I think we can 
find some way to benefit our officers by including some of that 
overtime in terms of the retirement calculation.
    And now I have lost track of your second question. I am so, 
so sorry.
    Ms. Wexton. Overtime for fiscal year 2022.
    Chief Manger. Yes.
    Ms. Wexton. Is it higher than in fiscal year 2021 or 
where----
    Chief Manger. It is maintaining. I mean, we just--we still 
have the staffing issues. I was talking to an officer last 
night who had been held over from the previous shift because we 
didn't have--and this is more with the spike of COVID. As 
General Walker mentioned, when we have got--I think now close 
to--it is well over 100 and almost maybe even 200 officers that 
are out because of COVID. And, you know, they may just be out 
for the isolation period. We have got a number of officers who 
are out long term because of COVID, but it is really impacting 
us. So, yes, our overtime is going to be--so far every bit as 
bad in fiscal year 2022 as it was in 2021.

                         USCP COVID-19 POLICIES

    Ms. Wexton. And what is the United States Capitol Police--
what is the Capitol Police policy for quarantining with COVID 
after a positive test?
    Chief Manger. We abide by what the Office of the Attending 
Physician tells us, and that just changed from, if you are 
asymptomatic--and I shouldn't speak for the Attending 
Physician, but my recollection was that, if you are 
asymptomatic, it has gone from 10 days to 5 days of isolation.

                         USCP CONTRACT SECURITY

    Ms. Wexton. And you testified that you have some contract 
laborers, contract security that you are using. How many 
contract security officers are you using, and how long do you 
anticipate having to keep them on staff?
    Chief Manger. Well, right now zero. We are trying to get 
around 40 or 50 on board. We still have to brief--we are 
briefing oversight committees. We are still discussing with the 
union. They have some concerns about it. We are still 
discussing with the union their concerns to--and we want to 
address their concerns. But we're ready to get this done 
hopefully in a matter of a few weeks, start getting some 
contract folks in to give us some relief in terms of our 
staffing.

                        CELL PHONES FOR OFFICERS

    Ms. Wexton. And then you also testified that every Capitol 
Police officer now has a cell phone. That wasn't the case 
before. Is that correct?
    Chief Manger. That is correct. And they are getting 
intelligence and operational updates every day.
    Ms. Wexton. And are they getting those by cell phone, or 
are they getting them in roll call, or how are they--how are 
you deploying those briefings?
    Chief Manger. You know, with COVID, our roll calls are less 
formal than they have been in the past. So we really rely on 
the cell phones to ensure that officers are getting 
information. But we do, in fact, do in-person updates on a 
regular basis as well.
    Ms. Wexton. And are those--the ones that go out to their 
cell phones, those aren't classified, are they?
    Chief Manger. They are law enforcement sensitive but not 
classified.

                           MEMBER PROTECTION

    Ms. Wexton. Okay. Very good. And then, in one of the--
again, I don't know if it was in your testimony or in the memo, 
there was a discussion of Member protection based on a risk 
matrix, is that correct, that you make that determination based 
on the risk to the Member?
    Chief Manger. Correct, yes.
    Ms. Wexton. And is that a proactive or a reactive risk 
matrix? Is it based upon previous threats, or is it based upon 
possibility of threats due to their being, you know, a high-
profile individual?
    Chief Manger. It is more reactive, but we certainly 
understand that--I mean, we keep track of the number of threats 
that each Member gets, and we are certainly cognizant of that 
and do what we can to try and prevent future threats or provide 
some advice and some strategies for those Members that have a 
high number of threats, how they can maintain a better level of 
security.
    Ms. Wexton. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I see that I have also overstayed my 
welcome and used too much time. So I will yield back with that.

                     THREATS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Mr. Ryan. I thank the gentlelady. I have got a couple 
questions. We are going to do a second round for those members 
who want to stick around and ask another question.
    General, you talked about real threats to Members. How many 
threats have there been in the past year or so to Members of 
Congress, and how does that relate to a normal year?
    General Walker. So I believe the information I received 
from the U.S. Capitol Police, there were almost 9,000, so 
double the number that it was last year, so if not 9,000, 
approaching 9,000 threats. Now, those threats come in a whole--
a variety of threats, you know, menacing or just somebody 
saying something reckless on the internet or social media. But 
the number I think I had from the chief was close to 9,000.
    Mr. Ryan. And you say there is no law that would allow for 
a prosecution of a threat to a Member of Congress, I mean 
specifically to a Member of Congress. It would have to be more 
a general prosecution?
    General Walker. Yes, sir, Chairman Ryan. Right now the 
threat has to be investigated: Does the person have the 
capability to act on the threat? Is it someone just talking? Is 
it diminished mental capacity, someone just getting out there 
saying something? And that individual that is in a wheelchair 
in a nursing home can't really do it but is just making a 
threat.
    So we have to investigate the threat. The Capitol Police 
has to investigate the threat and then determine, does this 
person have the means and capability and motive to act on the 
threat? And, once that is determined, sometimes the 
prosecution, State, local, Federal is not following through on 
bringing these people to justice. That is where I think more 
emphasis needs to be leveraged to make sure that if the Capitol 
Police believe they have sufficient evidence to go to an 
assistant U.S. attorney or a state's attorney, then it needs to 
be prosecuted. And I think that would be therapeutic.
    Mr. Ryan. Do you think there needs to be, in your 
recommendation, more weight behind that, so an additional law 
that would be specific to Members of Congress that the U.S. 
attorney would be able to then utilize in the prosecution? Or 
do you think that the current legal regime is enough to kind of 
put the emphasis out there, do the prosecution as a way to 
prevent future threats?
    General Walker. Well, I think both, Chairman Ryan. I think 
if we could strengthen the laws that currently exist, so, if 
you make a threat against the President, that is a bucket right 
there, a threat against the President or anyone of the 
successors to the President, I believe I understand it that 
way. I know it is the President, the Vice President, and then 
the line of succession.
    If Members of Congress could somehow be elevated to have 
that kind of status, I believe that would go a long way in 
stopping these individuals from making these reckless threats. 
Somebody is eventually going to act on it, and it could be a 
tragedy if we don't do something about it. So, Chairman Ryan, I 
think anytime we can strengthen the laws that protect Members, 
I think we should go after that.
    Mr. Ryan. I appreciate that. I mean, those of us on this 
committee feel a deep sense of responsibility to our 
colleagues, knowing that the 9,000 threats that are out there 
and the lack of funding, which is why, you know, we saw a 
significant increase in a lot of the security measures and the 
appropriations in the supplemental from the House version 
really tried to address a lot of these issues.
    And you mentioned, you know, having robust security at 
Members' homes, assessing the neighborhoods they live in, and 
what the threats would be from, you know, generally. And so I 
appreciate, you know, you speaking up on that. Again, there is 
some allowance through our campaign committees to be able to 
provide some level of home security, but I don't think people 
out there sending us $10 bucks or $15 bucks or $20 bucks for a 
reelection they really would want us to use that money for home 
security system.
    You know, these threats are because of our official 
capacity, the official duties that we hold. And so I appreciate 
you speaking up on that, because it is very, very frustrating 
that, you know, we are not allowed to do these kinds of things 
to, you know, protect ourselves and our families when we are 
many instances away from home, but our families are still 
there. And so, you know, it doesn't make for a good 
environment. So I appreciate it, General.
    Quickly, Chief----
    General Walker. Chairman, can I add just one thing?
    Mr. Ryan. Sure.
    General Walker. I also think, since you are talking about 
law, I think it would be helpful if the United States Capitol 
Police Investigative Division could be given concurrent 
jurisdiction to have--the FBI right now investigates threats 
against Members and they investigate threats against all 
Federal employees. But what is the priority?
    If the United States Capitol Police--and I am just thinking 
of this right now--is given concurrent jurisdiction, the same 
authorities that the FBI has to go after people who make these 
threats--the Postal Inspection Service, I happen to know for a 
fact that they have concurrent jurisdiction to go after postal 
employees, separate from what the FBI does. I am sorry; I just 
felt compelled to add that, sir.
    Mr. Ryan. Yep. No, that is great.
    Quickly, Chief, do you have any thoughts on this with 
regard to Members' security that you want to add?
    Chief Manger. Just a couple of things. One, I agree with 
the General that the Capitol Police--and I am not sure that 
we--I don't know, and perhaps the General does--I am not sure 
we don't have concurrent jurisdiction, but I think we should 
make an affirmative statement that it is a shared 
responsibility because I don't want there to be any turf 
battles in terms of investigating those threats against 
Congress.
    We have more--we, I think, have the primary interest in 
terms of investigating those cases. And so, you know, working 
with FBI is good, but we would--we may take a case that the FBI 
says, ``No, it doesn't rise to the level of something we would 
investigate,'' whereas we would take it and investigate.
    So the other thing is that I have--since I have been here, 
I have reached out to local law enforcement in home districts 
of Members of Congress, and I have had 100 percent cooperation. 
And I know that I may get to a point where I don't, you know, 
get a chief or sheriff that doesn't want to cooperate, but so 
far I have had 100 percent cooperation from the State and local 
authorities in terms of getting the assistance that we have 
requested with regard to either a Member's home, their family, 
safety and security issues.
    So we will continue to be that advocate for the Members if 
they are having difficulty getting the assistance that they 
need in their local jurisdictions. If they come to us, we will 
certainly be an advocate for them to try and get what they need 
in terms of making sure their families are safe and secure as 
well.
    Mr. Ryan. And, Chief, so there is obviously a lot of 
chatter on the Internet, you know, a lot of stuff that is, you 
know, kind of public. I think, after the 6th, a lot of these 
groups are trying to figure out how to be more behind the 
scenes with some of their plans, some of their views and all 
the rest.
    Is there anything that we are doing proactively, at least 
that we could talk about in the public setting here, that you 
are trying to address? If Members are walking around, maybe 
there is nothing on Face book, maybe there is nothing on 
Twitter, no one says something threatening, but there may be a 
threat out in the community somewhere. Is there some strategy 
for us to have that connection with maybe the local law 
enforcement or in other ways of trying to figure that out?
    Chief Manger. Yes. And you are astute in your thought that 
we--I don't want to give you our strategies, but what I will 
tell you is we have eight people--we have on boarded eight 
people as intelligence analysts that are working with other 
intelligence agencies and will work with State and local folks 
to share information with the whole purpose of keeping our 
Members and their families as safe as we can.

                           WELLNESS PROGRAMS

    Mr. Ryan. Great.
    And, quickly, on the trauma-informed care, Center for Mind-
Body Medicine, I know we have beefed up the House office of 
well-being, which, of course, you all and your staffs will be 
able to access the different programmings there. We have got 
something with the David Lynch Foundation. We have got 
something with a vet's program, Project Welcome Home Troops, 
that really digs in on post-traumatic stress with veteran 
trauma, which is obviously the same as many of your rank-and-
file members experienced on January 6.
    And we just want to constantly encourage the rank-and-file 
members to know that these programs are here, that they are 
very beneficial. I know you are talking about doing videos and 
things like that to let everybody know, you know, exactly how 
beneficial these are, and then the peer-to-peer support, which 
I think is going to be critical to have the rank-and-file 
members really peppered with people who know how to work with 
some of these issues around self-care and trauma and all the 
rest. So really appreciate you leaning in on this. It is going 
to be very important for us to be able to retain a lot of the 
members.

                        USCP RECRUITMENT EFFORTS

    Last question and then we will go to Ms. Herrera Beutler. 
The issue of competition and recruiting, I am hearing, you 
know, 288 or so officers that you want to try to ramp up in the 
next year. There is good competition here. I am just a, you 
know, small-town guy from Ohio, but, you know, being here in 
D.C., seeing what is going on in southern Maryland and some of 
those departments, seeing what is going on in Northern 
Virginia, which has seen an explosion of growth over the last 
20 years, how are we able to compete, and can we compete with 
those departments here locally for the talent that we need?
    Chief Manger. So we can compete, and we are competing 
pretty well. We have not had trouble getting people in the door 
to take the test and express interest in wanting to be a part 
of the U.S. Capitol Police. Our challenge, as I said earlier, 
is making sure we hire the right people.
    And so we have got--we have used the money that we got in 
the supplemental to expand our recruitment efforts. We have 
partnered with different association--law enforcement 
associations, the women leaders in law enforcement, other 
agencies that will help us not only do outreach to get the 
numbers of people but to get a diverse group of applicants as 
well.
    And we are going to have to bolster our recruiting staff, 
our background investigators because, you know, we have got an 
ambitious goal to get 280-plus people in, so we are going to 
need more recruiters, more background investigators, and we 
have got those requests in. But I don't--I think we are going 
to be able to do it. I mean, we are going to work hard at it. 
We have partnered with a lot of folks. I think we can be 
competitive, and I believe we can accomplish this goal.
    Mr. Ryan. And our wages and benefits, the retirement are 
competitive with those departments?
    Mr. Manger. They are competitive, but we don't want to be 
in the middle of the pack. We want to be at the top of the heap 
so that we can--we have that advantage in terms of our 
recruiting efforts. And any place where I think we can bolster 
that, you will be hearing from me so that we can make a 
decision about whether we want to change the compensation, the 
retirement benefits, all those kinds of things. If we can make 
them better, we are going to get the advantages we need in 
terms of our recruiting, and I will continue that conversation 
with you.
    Mr. Ryan. Right. I appreciate it.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. I actually had a question for General 
Walker. Did he just leave? I wanted a clarification on his 
comments. Is that possible for--is he completely gone?
    Mr. Ryan. No. He is--I think he is taking a comfort break.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Ah, sorry. I was like, go grab him. 
Okay. Well, then I will wait. When he comes back----
    Voice. 1 minute.

                        CAPITOL COMPLEX FENCING

    Ms. Herrera Beutler. No, take his time.
    I wanted to ask about--gosh, this might also be him. With 
regard to what the matrix--you know, a risk matrix for, you 
know, that was something we were talking earlier with regard to 
responding to threats on Members. What is the risk matrix or 
the co--you know, the standard for deciding when or when not to 
put up the fence, or is that not something we are going to do 
again? And is that a General Walker question? I don't know. 
Chief?
    Mr. Manger. Ma'am, I am happy to give you a little bit of 
information. I think all of us--and as the Capitol Police 
Board, I know we have had these discussions. We are all aware 
of the impacts when we decide to put up the fence. We 
understand the impact it has on the community. Many Members 
don't like it. So we are going to be very discerning in the--
you know, moving forward about when we put it up.
    But I think one of the things that the Architect has done 
that just really improves the situation is he can put that 
fence up within 24 hours' notice. And as you may have seen on 
September 18--well, you probably didn't see it because we had 
it up and down within--24 hours to get it up, 24 hours to get 
it down on September 18. So the Architect has things in place 
that we can get the fence up and down very quickly.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Can I ask--Can I ask?
    Mr. Manger. Go ahead.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. I know you guys are so sensitive to 
what it means to put that up. Is there a matrix or a standard 
list of things that have to tip for you to consider putting it 
up, or is it a gut-level decision that you make when that 
happens?
    Mr. Manger. Well, yeah. There are certainly criteria that 
we consider. I don't know that we have a hard and fast matrix 
and say, okay, well, if this happens, this happens, this 
happens. But, if we feel there is a potential for violence, if 
we feel that there is an intent from a group to try and breach 
the Capitol, I mean, those are two things that we would say, 
you know, better, in an abundance of caution, maybe we should 
put it up.
    One of the things that is different from the 6th is that as 
we look--if we have an event that we feel there is a potential 
for violence or we feel there is a potential for someone to try 
and breach the Capitol, the staffing that we are going to have 
around the Capitol is going to be vastly different than what we 
had on January 6.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Yeah. Thank you for that.
    Quickly, because I wanted to ask about trying to hire more. 
Maybe we will stay with you before I go back to General Walker. 
So what strategies are you guys considering when it comes to 
taking on officers who maybe are already trained? I was told 
that there was an impediment to allowing you to hire former 
Secret Service agents or Homeland Security agents, you know, 
folks who we know are trained, possibly to a higher level than 
some folks, and in this environment, what is preventing or 
broadening that recruitment pool, or is there nothing?
    Mr. Manger. No, there is. We are, in fact, looking at 
hiring laterals, lateral transfers in. We are looking at hiring 
retirees. And it depends on--if you hire a retiree to come in 
at the level of a police officer, it may not be an issue when 
you look at what their pension is plus what their salary is, 
but that is the issue. The pension plus the salary can't be 
above a certain level. And so, if you hire folks, you know, at 
mid-levels or in leadership levels, you really are limiting 
yourself because of the salary cap that we have to deal with.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. So they can't come in because they are 
used to a higher salary that would bump their pension, and it 
messes up our budget?
    Mr. Manger. Correct.

                    CAPITOL COMPLEX REOPENING STATUS

    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Is that right? Okay. Thank you for 
that.
    And, General Walker, I wanted to ask because I wasn't 
clear. So is the House side of the Capitol not open because of 
security, or is it because of COVID?
    General Walker. Representative Herrera Beutler, it is 
because of COVID.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Okay.
    General Walker. So I am responsible for security, and to 
me, COVID is a security risk that we are not going to take.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Okay----
    General Walker [continuing]. Monahan has made it clear to 
me that it is not safe to open the Capitol to every--you know, 
the COVID challenge is just too big.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Okay. I wasn't clear if it was like a 
threat or a staff, an officer, you know, issue, and that is why 
the House side isn't open because I had understood that it was 
COVID, which is what you--I think you are saying. How do you 
square--I get that. It makes sense to me, but how do you then 
square that with the fact that the Senate is open? Like, how do 
I answer my constituents who want to come for tours? Like, how 
do you--how do you answer that?
    General Walker. Well, it is just perception, you know, when 
people comprehend things. What I have comprehended from the 
Attending Physician is that it is not safe to bring people into 
the Capitol. It is no different than--it is just high risk to 
bring--to open up the Capitol to everyone that would have--
would have COVID. So how do we do the 6 feet spacing? How do we 
do all the other things that would come with--how do we enforce 
the masks?
    So, right now, it is a Federal law. You are to obey the 
directions of a flight attendant or a crew member. So I have 
flown. I had 6 feet distance, and I had that mask on, and I 
never took it off. I am afraid of COVID, to be honest with you. 
So, until he says different, we are going to follow the 
direction and the guidance of the Attending Physician. And I 
really can't speak to why the Senate--maybe they are listening 
to a different medical professional.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. I mean, it is one Attending Physician, 
and I know you don't make that decision. I just was trying to 
understand, like, just the disparity that we are trying to 
explain to constituents. The Senators don't wear masks. They 
don't. They are not shut down. It is just--it is a challenge, 
so I will leave that one for the record. Thank you.
    General Walker. Yes, ma'am. I will just add, the number of 
my own staff here who have--one person went on vacation, came 
back with COVID, and then we all had to be tested. And some--we 
had members--a member of the staff catch it, and they were 
vaccinated. So it is just a risk that I don't think we need to 
take.
    Mr. Ryan. All right. Thank you, Ms. Herrera Beutler.
    Ms. Herrera Beutler. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan. Ms. Clark.

                        SECURITY THREAT ANALYSIS

    Ms. Clark. Thank you so much. I wanted to follow up with 
some questions for General Walker. I wondered if you could just 
go over briefly some of the information that you have shared 
about how the improvements you have made for the speed and 
accuracy of threats being disseminated, not only to Members but 
to their staff as well, and anything that the chief or the 
Architect had to add. I think we saw a real breakdown in 
communication, and I would love to hear about what you have put 
in place to help with that.
    General Walker. Yes, Representative Clark. So the House 
Sergeant at Arms has hired former Senior Executive Service 
level intelligence professionals from the Department of 
Homeland Security, the U.S. intelligence community, and other 
agencies to help get right to the heart of a threat. And we are 
working collaboratively with the Capitol Police and their 
Intelligence Division to best understand any kind of threat 
that could be facing the Capitol, the Members, visitors, and 
staff. So it is really about acquiring the talent.
    Ms. Clark. But you have also made cell phones available 
to----
    General Walker. The Capitol Police has done that, the 
United States Capitol Police----
    Ms. Clark. Yeah.
    General Walker [continuing]. Has given every police officer 
cell phones. So it is a rapid dissemination of information.
    Ms. Clark. Could you talk about that a little bit, about 
how those lines of communication have been improved?
    Mr. Manger. You know, one of the biggest intelligence 
failures on the 6th was the fact that we had intelligence but 
didn't disseminate it to our own people. And so the--one of the 
quick fixes that was put in place very quickly after the 6th 
was to ensure that our officers each had a cell phone. And now, 
every day, they get updates, intelligence updates and 
operational updates from their phone. In fact, some of my cops 
tell me sometimes it is almost too much information. Obviously, 
we would rather have too much than not enough.
    The other shortcoming, and again, this has been fixed by 
the fact that we have got, you know, new intelligence analysts 
and more intelligence analysts, that we are doing a better job 
at sharing information, you know, within the intelligence 
community here at the Capitol and within the intelligence 
community around the region and around the world or around the 
Nation, anyway. So, you know, the way we--the way we share it, 
the way we disseminate it, but the way we use it, that is 
another key is that we are using the intelligence that we have 
to inform our operational decisions.
    And it goes back to Ms. Herrera Beutler's question about 
the fence. I mean, this--you know, the criteria we use comes 
largely from the intelligence that we have about an event 
upcoming. So we are making sure that we share information, that 
we disseminate it to our own people, and that we use it 
correctly.

                      LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATORS

    Ms. Clark. Thank you. And just a quick question for the 
General. If you had your preference, would these law 
enforcement coordinators--I completely support your plans for 
regionalizing and trying to get former law enforcement. Would 
you ultimately like to see that reside under your office, or do 
you think that would be a more efficient way to hire and train 
and coordinate with local law enforcement than the individual 
Members designating someone on their staff?
    General Walker. Thank you, Representative Clark, for the 
question. I think it would--it should come to the Capitol. I am 
not sure if should be the House Sergeant at Arms or the United 
States Capitol Police. They have a lot on their plate already. 
But, as I think about it, in answer to your question, I do 
think it should most likely be under police services of the 
House Sergeant at Arms or, or under the Capitol Police in their 
Operational Division because, at the end of the day, police 
talk to police. So, as Chief Manger has said, and we are both 
members of IACP, the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, Fraternal Order of Police, we go to these 
organizations. People, police chiefs know us. When you make 
those phone calls, police officer to police--police chief to 
police chief, they are very effective. But to have a 
standardized across the board for 441 Members, this is what a 
law enforcement coordinator is, and this is what it is not. And 
then to have, best case scenario, two of them, two of them, and 
these are people that really know law enforcement work, 
protection, assessment, security threats, and threat 
mitigation.
    Ms. Clark. Great. Thank you so much.

                     Chairman Ryan Closing Remarks

    Mr. Ryan. Thanks, Ms. Clark.
    I appreciate it.
    Thank you to the panel for sticking around. We held you an 
extra 10 minutes. We have got, you know, a lot more questions. 
I think--Mr. Blanton, real quick, I think--do we need to have a 
classified or a private briefing from you on some of these 
issues with regard to the hardening of the Capitol and those 
kind of things?
    Mr. Blanton. Yes, Chairman, and I would welcome that and 
welcome also a discussion of the comprehensive physical 
security assessment as well in any classified setting.
    Mr. Ryan. Yeah. I think we should do that and, obviously, 
sooner rather than later. And, also, you know, with some of the 
intelligence stuff too, Chief, I think we should--you know, we 
should do that in a private setting. I don't think we want to 
tip our hand to anybody as to what the Capitol looks like now 
versus a year ago, but just--you all have given us assurances 
that it is much safer today than it was.
    I think the chief touched upon, you know, some of the 
things that from the intelligence perspective and getting the 
word out to the rank-and-file members, but we should definitely 
do something in a SCIF to be able to really understand this in 
a way so that we can make the arguments for the needs to our 
colleagues based upon that information. And, you know, we 
certainly want to keep it going.
    But, to the extent you all can continue to speak up, you 
carry a lot of weight with the Members around this place. And I 
think the more you speak up on Member security, on, you know, 
the needs--Chief, you know, I am looking at our police 
departments back home and the labor situation back home. And, 
you know, to get 288 up in the next year is going to be, you 
know, a grind. So we want to do everything we can to try to 
help you make that happen because I know it is the case there 
are still 15 or 20 applicants for every one officer that you 
will be able to swear in. Is that still about right?
    Mr. Manger. Yes, it is.
    Mr. Ryan. Okay. So we have got some work to do.
    I want to thank all our staff on the subcommittee for 
helping put this together.
    I want to thank Ms. Herrera Beutler and the panel.
    I will see you all real soon in the classified setting. 
With that, the hearing is adjourned.

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