[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-91]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                      FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET FOR

          NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                              MAY 17, 2022


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 

                                     
                               ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-474            WASHINGTON : 2023  


                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
               Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                           Will Braden, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                               WITNESSES

Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
    Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force
Hruby, Hon. Jill, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 
    Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
    Policy
Rosenblum, Hon. Deborah G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
    Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems 
    Programs, U.S. Navy

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    19
    Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr.................................    73
    Hruby, Hon. Jill.............................................    23
    Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking 
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...................    21
    Plumb, Hon. John F...........................................    50
    Rosenblum, Hon. Deborah G....................................    43
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    60

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Garamendi................................................    87

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Carbajal.................................................    92
    Mr. Cooper...................................................    91
 FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE 
                               ACTIVITIES

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                             Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 17, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:32 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. This hearing will come to order. I would like 
to begin by thanking our distinguished panel of witnesses. We 
look forward to your testimony.
    We have the Honorable Jill Hruby, Administrator of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration; the Honorable Deborah 
Rosenblum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, 
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; the Honorable John 
Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Vice 
Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Director of the U.S. Navy Strategic 
Systems Programs; and Lieutenant General James Dawkins, U.S. 
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and 
Nuclear Integration.
    I would like to ask unanimous consent that the remainder of 
my statement be inserted into the record.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 19.]
    Mr. Cooper. I request the witnesses keep their opening 
remarks to no more than 5 minutes, and that members respect the 
same time limit for their questioning.
    As members know, we are under some time pressure due to the 
pending cascade of votes, which I understand has been delayed a 
little bit. And if a miracle were to happen, we could actually 
complete the public portion of this hearing and get to the 
private session and complete that today. Otherwise, we will 
have to just do the public section today and then try to 
reschedule the classified hearing later.
    I now turn to my ranking member, Mr. Lamborn, for any 
opening remarks that he has.
    Mr. Lamborn. And, Mr. Chairman, I, too, will ask that my 
statement be introduced into the record. And at that point we 
can go straight into questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn can be found in the 
Appendix on page 21.]
    Mr. Cooper. Awesome. I knew I liked you.
    Which witness would like to go first?
    If you all are all right to discuss straight to questions, 
or do you want 5-minutes openings each? Would you like to do 
that?
    Ms. Hruby. If you would like, we can go straight to--I 
think we have----
    Mr. Cooper. Right. Okay.
    Ms. Hruby. I think we have all been warned that you might 
want to go straight to questions.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay.
    Ms. Hruby. But we also all have opening statements, so.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay.
    Ms. Hruby. Your call.
    Mr. Cooper. Well, if it is okay with members, including 
those on video, why don't we just go ahead and go straight to 
questions.
    [The prepared statements of Ms. Hruby, Ms. Rosenblum, Dr. 
Plumb, Admiral Wolfe, and General Dawkins can be found in the 
Appendix beginning on page 23.]
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the witnesses for being here. You 
represent a tremendous amount of accumulated knowledge and 
expertise, also a large portion of the Federal budget.
    And I want to start with you, Dr. Hruby. What can we do to 
help you achieve your tasks, because NNSA [National Nuclear 
Security Administration] is under a lot of time pressure. You 
have a lot going on. What can we do to help, for example, 
quicken the pace of pit production, including getting South 
Carolina started?
    Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, Chairman Cooper, for the 
question.
    You know, we feel that the budget we have is nearly enough 
to do everything we can imagine doing. And, you know, regarding 
pit production, we are, we are planning to complete the design 
efforts, the 90 percent design of Savannah River, and the Los 
Alamos pit production capabilities in 2024. So, we will be 
working on it through 2023.
    And we still have an objective to get to 2030 as close to 
possible on the Savannah River pit production facility.
    Here is the request, though. We do have an unfunded letter 
that is associated with what we now see as real issues arising 
in the supply chain for things that we need in the Savannah 
River pit production facility.
    So, we are requesting some additional funds that the NWC 
[Nuclear Weapons Council] is reviewing, we are reviewing this 
week, to allow us to do early procurements so that when the 
design is complete we can begin construction and not be 
interrupted.
    Mr. Cooper. That sounds good.
    I will turn it over to my ranking member, Mr. Lamborn, if 
he has questions.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I have several.
    Administrator, I have another question for you.
    Last fall, Secretary Granholm notified Congress that NNSA 
would be unable to meet the statutory requirement to produce no 
fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. This 
notification triggered a separate legal requirement under 50 
U.S. Code 2538 for the Nuclear Weapons Council to provide 
Congress with a comprehensive plan for getting the program back 
on track.
    However, the Nuclear Weapons Council recently informed us 
that no plan would be provided.
    As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, can you tell us 
why the council has chosen not to comply with this requirement 
to provide Congress with a plan to correct these deficiencies?
    Ms. Hruby. I think what we have in this question is maybe a 
misunderstanding.
    Our intent is to, as a council, to make sure that we 
understand what we can do with the pits that we think are 
reasonable to produce in the timeframes to produce them. And 
the statutory requirement, as I understand it, is to say 
whether or not we will produce 80 pits per year by 2030.
    I don't know if that is your question. But the council, I 
think, is fully committed to doing everything that we need to 
do statutorily. And if we are missing something----
    Mr. Lamborn. What it seems to me that we are missing is 
that since you can't reach that goal, what are you going to do 
instead to make up for that?
    Secretary Plumb, do you want to throw in something?
    Dr. Plumb. Yes, Congressman.
    So, aware of your--the statutory request is, how would we 
break glass to get to 2030 and get the 80 pits by 2030? Nuclear 
Weapons Council, including everyone here that sits in those 
meetings, we don't see any path to doing that. There are places 
where throwing more money at a problem just wastes money.
    And so, instead, we are looking at what is the fastest way 
to get to 80. And we are waiting for a critical design review. 
I think Under Secretary Hruby or Assistant Secretary Rosenblum 
could speak to that, that will give us more and better fidelity 
on where to get to next and how fast we can do it.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Congressman. As the staff director for 
the Nuclear Weapons Council, I can elaborate a little bit.
    There were two letters that were combined that was sent 
from the NWC chair: one that spoke to the pit production, which 
you've just gone over now, in terms of not being able to reach 
that by 2030; coupled with, then, a discussion about the budget 
certification, and whether there was a need for additional 
monies in order to meet, actually, 2030.
    What the NWC is doing now is they are working very closely 
between Department of Energy [DOE] as well as Department of 
Defense to look at where there may be some actions that can be 
taken by DOE that will bring it as close as possible to 2030. 
And that work is underway right now, and will be through the 
summer. And we are expecting to have some initial 
recommendations by early fall when it comes time to be 
producing some of the guidance.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. That does help me understand better, 
although I do want to have the comprehensive plan that is 
called for under the laws that we've passed here in this 
committee.
    Ms. Rosenblum. Understand.
    Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Plumb, I have a couple questions on 
the B83.
    The rationale of this administration to retire the B83 
gravity bomb without a replacement capability is not clear to 
me. In fact, it is my understanding that not only is there no 
replacement capability, but the process to identify candidates 
for a replacement capability has not even yet started.
    However, the hard and deeply buried target set remains a 
requirement for Admiral Richard and U.S. Strategic Command.
    How does the administration justify removing this 
capability from our strategic arsenal, which will effectively 
prevent our military from achieving its deterrence 
requirements?
    Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Congressman Lamborn.
    So, I look at this problem as actually two separate problem 
statements. The first question is what about the B83? The 
second question is hard and deeply buried targets.
    So, let me start with the second.
    Hard, deeply buried targets are a problem. It is a problem 
we are committed to solving. And we have a study underway, I 
believe, for that. And that is an ongoing conversation we are 
going to have to have with this committee and within the 
Department to figure out how to solve it, because our enemies 
are digging deeper and harder.
    Separate problem, B83. Does not solve all these issues, so 
it is of increasingly limited utility. And retiring it does not 
change the hard and deeply buried target problem set.
    A lot of this conversation I am afraid we have to defer to 
the classified session, whenever we have that.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I want to follow up on that part 
of the issue. And I want to raise a side issue with the B83.
    I realize that there is a smaller target set, given 
advances in our defenses. However, that target set still does 
exist. And a critical part of our deterrence posture is 
ensuring that our competitors don't think that they have an 
advantage based on perceived capability gaps.
    So, this decision codifies a capability gap and creates an 
opening for them to consider exploiting. I don't think we 
should give them an inch when it comes to our deterrence 
posture. And this also would include the administration's 
decision to cancel or stop funding the SLCM--SLCM-N [sea-
launched cruise missile-nuclear] program, even though Russia 
has fielded a similar system for years.
    So, why not develop a replacement plan to go after hard and 
buried targets before retiring the B83?
    Dr. Plumb. So, Congressman, we have a time phase problem 
with the way you just phrased that. Again, the hard and deeply 
target problem set is something we are focused on. The B83 
doesn't give us that solution for----
    Mr. Lamborn. It may not give a complete solution.
    Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. But it gives a partial solution more than we 
have otherwise.
    Dr. Plumb. Of increasingly limited value.
    Mr. Lamborn. But right now it is a better solution than 
anything else out there on the table in our, in our arsenal.
    Mr. Cooper. If the gentleman would yield, we might be able 
to discuss this more fully in closed session.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let's----
    Mr. Cooper. Does the gentleman have other questions?
    Mr. Lamborn. No, that is it. Let's do that.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have just one 
question, but it is a philosophical question that I think is 
actually important for the American people to hear. And I would 
invite any one of the five of you to, to answer it.
    Over the next 10 years we are going to spend $634 billion 
on modernizing our nuclear arsenal. Not building a nuclear 
arsenal, because we already have quite an extensive one, but 
simply modernizing a way to wipe out all human life on this 
planet.
    I sit on this committee because I understand that it is 
important. But how would you explain to your kids why we are 
making this kind of investment?
    Yesterday, it took me exactly 12 hours and 5 minutes to go 
the 450 miles from Boston to Washington. Why? Because our 
entire transportation system breaks down due to a thunderstorm. 
We are the only developed nation in the world that doesn't have 
high speed rail, which would have a train every 20 minutes that 
takes 3 hours to go from Boston to Washington.
    And with $634 billion in 10 years, you could connect every 
city in the Nation with 250-mile-per-hour trains.
    The point is, we are making serious trade-offs to invest 
this kind of money in our nuclear arsenal. Someday my 3-year-
old's going to ask, Why were you voting for this, Daddy?
    How do you explain this to your kids?
    General Dawkins. Can you hear me? Is this on?
    Mr. Moulton. Yes, we can. Thank you, General.
    General Dawkins. So, what I would tell my children is that 
it is a dangerous world. It is increasingly more dangerous, as 
we have seen what has happened with Ukraine, as we hear about 
the strategic breakout with China, of course North Korea and 
others.
    Those countries seem to value nuclear weapons quite a bit. 
In fact, they have all, with the exception of North Korea, of 
course China has now developed a triad. And Russia has had a 
triad for years. They are not stopping any of their work on new 
types of weapon systems.
    And what we found through the years is the best deterrent 
to prevent a nuclear conflict from happening is to ensure that 
what we have on the United States side is safe, secure, 
modernized, and credible.
    And so that is what I would, I would tell my children, so I 
do tell my children. And that if we were going to have a triad, 
which the administration and previous administrations have 
decided that we will, that we have got to make sure whatever we 
put into the field remains safe, secure, reliable, and 
credible.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral.
    Admiral Wolfe. So, I would echo what General Dawkins said. 
And I would also, sir, point out that you made the point we 
have an extensive triad as it is today. That is a true 
statement.
    But if I could add on to what General Dawkins said, but to 
be credible, safe, and reliable, these systems age out. So, we 
are not asking to go put exquisite new systems in place. We are 
not asking to go build to new requirements. We are just asking 
to modernize what we have got today because over the last 50-
plus years it has proven it works.
    But it has got to be reliable and credible. Because it is 
not about what we believe, it is a what, it is what Russia and 
China believe. And the day they believe that our systems don't 
work and they are not credible is the day that they may ask the 
question: Is today the day?
    So, that is exactly why we are asking to modernize what we 
have got. Not increase, not grow numbers, it is just modernize 
what we have today because we have proven throughout time these 
systems perform exactly what we want to perform, which is 
deterrence, credible deterrence from anybody ever challenging 
our way of life.
    Mr. Moulton. Anyone else?
    Ms. Rosenblum. I would just add that, you know, in building 
on what has already been said here, that the administration 
took a hard look at this issue and looked at the threat picture 
and where our adversaries are expected to be 10, 15 years from 
now, and felt that that certainly merited a decision to fully 
fund the triad. And that is what is in the President's budget.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, Mr. 
Chairman, we are going to miss your service, but we wish you 
well in the future.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson. With that, Secretary Hruby, I really appreciate 
your service. As a former deputy general counsel myself of DOE, 
where I had the great opportunity to serve with the very 
legendary Eric Fygi, who retired last Friday, he has just been 
an inspiration of service to our country. And he will be 
missed.
    Secretary Hruby, in your letter to the House Armed Services 
Committee you stated that the President's budget request of 
NNSA is $500 million below the requirements-based budget 
submitted by DOE. This additional funding would allow 
activities to be started as early as possible for the Savannah 
River Plutonium Processing Facility, and support meeting the 
requirements of 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible 
to achieve peace through strength, as a deterrent to Putin, 
Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean modernization.
    Can you break down the $500 million figure for the NNSA 
unfunded priorities letter?
    What is the plan to spend, and how this additional funding 
will help mitigate risk?
    What are the challenges to the current trajectory of 
getting to 80 pits per year if this funding is not obtained?
    Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Congressman.
    The $500 million request is largely to purchase equipment 
that will go in the Savannah River pit production facility and 
allow us to build 80 pits per year after the construction is 
complete.
    What we have found in other large construction projects, 
particularly the Uranium Processing Facility, is that--and with 
COVID, is that there are some pieces of nuclear qualified 
equipment and glove boxes that are taking a very long time 
because, in part, because we are doing so much modernization.
    And so, what we would like to do is specify and procure 
some equipment earlier. This is essentially bringing up costs 
from later in the program to earlier in the program so that it 
will be, we will be able to do construction as uninterrupted as 
possible.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And, Madam Secretary, I am grateful for the news that the 
high winds around Los Alamos National Security Laboratory have 
subsided, allowing firefighters to battle back against the 
deadly brush fires in the area. This underscores the need to 
solidify a two-site solution for plutonium pit production which 
would provide redundancy in the event of further unexpected 
events that could shut down this crucial part of our nuclear 
deterrence strategy modernization efforts.
    What other benefits does the two-site solution provide that 
mitigates risk and prevents delays to our crucial nuclear 
modernization needs?
    Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you for that question.
    And we have said all along that we believe this two-site 
solution does two, two things. It is the most efficient and 
cost-effective approach because we can take advantage of a 
qualified nuclear facility that was the shell that was already 
constructed for the mixed metal oxide facility. And we, and we 
will get resilience.
    There are other things that can, you know, any accident, 
even if it doesn't, you know, hurt people, we have to 
investigate completely when it involves plutonium. Any security 
breach, there are a number of things that could happen that 
could close a plutonium facility while being investigated or 
while being fixed.
    But the fires are a good example of why resilience is so 
important in today's world.
    And, yes, so thank you for that question. But we think this 
is both cost-effective approach, best utilizes talent, and 
provides the most resilience.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your insight.
    And, also, I want to thank you for highlighting the 
importance of cybersecurity at our nuclear facilities in your 
testimony. I am grateful that the efforts of the Adjutant 
General Van McCarty of the South Carolina Guard, and Chancellor 
Daniel Heimmermann of the USC [University of South Carolina] 
Aiken for investing in the DreamPort facility, which will 
partner with industry and defense to train the next generation 
of cybersecurity experts.
    What are the challenges faced by NNSA for recruiting and 
retaining high-performing cybersecurity professionals?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah. I think the challenges we have are similar 
to the challenges in other areas. But this is a highly paid 
profession in great demand.
    So, we have to--I always, the first thing we have to do is 
get people who really care about the mission. We can't forget 
to stress the mission. People get to do incredible work for the 
American people when they protect our systems from cyber.
    And, secondly, we have to pay competitive, as close to 
competitive salaries and benefits as we can, at least fair 
salaries and benefits, so that we can attract these people.
    So, we are doing everything we can to get people hooked on 
our mission as early as possible in their education. And 
everything we can to convince them to stay once they have come. 
But it is a challenge.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson. And in my State, I'm working with Congressman 
Rick Allen in Georgia in South Carolina. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Morelle.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    I just want to start by saying my district is home to the 
Laboratory for Laser Energetics, LLE, at the University of 
Rochester, a key part of the NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion 
program, which is a critical component of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program that maintains a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear deterrent.
    I am glad to have the opportunity to discuss this program 
in the fiscal year 2023 budget. Which leads me to my question, 
Madam Administrator.
    The NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion facilities, like the 
one I mentioned in my district, are the only facilities capable 
of accessing and studying the high energy density conditions 
responsible for 99 percent of the yield of our nuclear devices. 
And, as such, they are a crucial component of the Science-Based 
Stockpile Stewardship Program that underlies our, underlies our 
confidence in the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our 
nuclear stockpile.
    Despite the ICF [Inertial Confinement Fusion] program's 
critical role in our national security, and strong support from 
this committee and from the Congress, NNSA, excuse me, has 
routinely requested harmful cuts in the program in the 
President's budgets request, including again this year.
    So, I wonder if you could just describe how the proposed 
cuts impact our Nation's high energy density science 
capabilities and NNSA's ability to fulfill its stockpile 
stewardship mission now and in the future?
    Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you.
    As you have stated, our ICF, our Inertial Confinement 
Fusion program is very important to our Stockpile Stewardship 
Program. And the three facilities--your facility, OMEGA; the 
National Ignition Facility; and the Z machine--all contribute 
to that mission.
    Our request is, we believe, a balanced request, it's the 
same request as in fiscal year 2022 for this, for this program 
and the facility. We do have a lot of things on our plate. We 
want to maintain the science, but we have to balance that with 
all the deliverables.
    We have an infrastructure modernization and weapon 
modernization. So, we are fully committed to continuing to fund 
the Inertial Confinement Fusion program, the Laboratory for 
Laser Energetics, and the OMEGA facility. But we are just doing 
it in a balanced manner.
    Mr. Morelle. Well, we may, I may continue to raise this 
with you and continue to talk to committee colleagues about 
that.
    I do want, also, just, if you could just further comment on 
the request notes that the ICF facilities are aging and will 
need significant investments to sustain them. A point I have 
also raised before and Congress has requested the NNSA provide 
a strategic plan for recapitalizing, upgrading, and maintaining 
the major ICF facilities.
    Can you provide a sense of when NNSA may provide that plan, 
what level of resources will be needed to meet the sustainment 
requirements?
    Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you.
    We do--we are, we are developing the 10-year ICF facility 
and infrastructure plan. And we have, you know, we are, 
actually, with the new Assistant Secretary for Nuclear 
Security, the Deputy, we are--Marv Adams, we are, we are 
talking about this every day, actually. How are we going to get 
the money to sustain our science facilities? Why we need so 
much money to do our production modernization program?
    We appreciate being asked for a plan, and we are working on 
it.
    I am sorry, I will have to get back with you on a date. I 
don't have a date I can promise today.
    Mr. Morelle. And just really quickly. You personally 
outlined challenges confronting the NNSA workforce and the need 
to meet mission requirements and deliver on objectives. We have 
400 scientists, engineers, and staff just at the LLE. And we 
train students in inertial confinement fusion, and high energy 
density physics. We play a critical role in attracting talent.
    Can you talk a little bit about what you intend to do to 
try to not only achieve workforce needs, but also promoting 
expansion of the workforce so that it promotes racial and 
economic equity within that workforce?
    Ms. Hruby. Absolutely. We have, we have a lot of university 
programs. We are very proud of the minority-serving education 
programs that we have.
    We, in fact we just, we are concerned about all elements of 
our workforce, from crafts and technologists through Ph.D. 
scientists. And LLE serves a very important purpose for 
creating scientists.
    And we are also looking to continue our MSIPP programs, the 
Minority Serving Institution Partnership Programs, and 
education programs. And today we just announced a $5 million 
program aimed at technology, crafts, and crafts workers.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I apologize for going 
over, but I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Yes. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I will try to ask punctual questions and 
hopefully get the same answers, Ms. Hruby.
    Last year Congress increased the minor construction 
threshold to $25 million. How helpful was that?
    Can you just outline a couple successes? And how would you 
benefit if we were to do that even more, such as Mr. Verdon, 
your predecessor, had asked for?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thank you. And thanks so much for 
increasing this threshold.
    I actually got some statistics on this. We, since 20--since 
we changed the level from $10 million to $20 million, we have 
completed 16 projects, and have 43 new projects underway, and 
10 proposed for fiscal year 2023.
    If we raise--with the threshold at $25 million now, two 
projects are underway and two projects are proposed for 2023. I 
am a big fan of these minor construction projects because we 
can streamline them. They are much more efficient, they are 
much faster. And I think the higher threshold is an innovative 
way to help us with office space, with general laboratory 
space, and non-nuclear construction.
    And really appreciate the support that has been provided. 
And would love to see it go even higher.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I can probably guess the answer to 
this.
    Just in follow-up, with inflation at 8 percent and 
construction material soaring 20 percent or more, would you be 
supportive of pegging the minor construction threshold to the 
inflation rate so you don't have to come back every year or two 
to make the same ask?
    Ms. Hruby. I would like that. I mean, from my perspective, 
if we could get it to the right level and then increment it by 
inflation, that would be perfect. And I would suggest a level 
above $25 million before we start incrementing for inflation is 
worth a look.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And General Dawkins, if you had to 
describe one thing that is obstructing your ability to do your 
job successfully, what would that be?
    General Dawkins. I don't know that it is obstructing our 
ability to do it right now. But it is clear, consistent, and 
stable funding.
    As we move forward into the nuclear modernization bow wave 
it is more imperative that we are able to have new starts. And 
with inflation coming in as well, that is an important piece 
there.
    So, basically, the less, the less CRs [continuing 
resolutions] we can have, the much better place we will be, 
particularly with regard to MILCON [military construction], 
GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent] MILCON--or Sentinel, 
I'm sorry. MILCON is such a big part of Sentinel.
    But, again, all of these programs are coming, starting to 
ramp up at the same time. And it is critical, we don't have any 
margin left to delay programs. So, I would say consistent, 
stable funding with your support.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. A lot of questions need to be asked and 
answered.
    With regard to the Sentinel, General Dawkins, we need 
detailed information. You just mentioned MILCON. At the moment 
it's--the detail needed, is not available. Please provide it.
    There was a discussion, General Dawkins, you said this, but 
this goes to all of you, you are talking about a bow wave. The 
last time the bow wave was discussed here was at least 5 years 
ago. I have not seen any recent updates based upon inflation 
and other matters. I would like to have that. So, please, if 
you would, if not to the committee, at least to me.
    Also, Ms. Hruby, what, how many pits can be produced at Los 
Alamos?
    Ms. Hruby. Our goal is to produce 30 pits per year 
reliably.
    Mr. Garamendi. When will they be? When will you reach that 
production level?
    Ms. Hruby. 2026.
    Mr. Garamendi. 2026.
    General Dawkins, when do you need the 87-1 to put on your 
new Sentinel?
    General Dawkins. Sir, the Sentinel field--will field with 
the 87-0 IOC [initial operational capability] of 2029.
    Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Does that 87-0 need new pits?
    General Dawkins. The 87-1 will field in 2030----
    Mr. Garamendi. The answer is the 87-0 does not need a new 
pit.
    General Dawkins. The 87-0 does not need, not need a new 
pit. The 87-1 requires the pits. And we are working with the 
Nuclear Weapons Council and NNSA to ensure that we----
    Mr. Garamendi. I don't have much time. Just, just the 
answer to the question, please.
    So, the 87-1 requires a new pit. When do you need the 87-1?
    General Dawkins. We are planning to integrate it in 2030.
    Mr. Garamendi. 2030. And how many will you integrate each 
year beginning in 2030 for the next decade?
    General Dawkins. Sir, I don't have that information with 
me. I can certainly take that for the record and provide that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 87.]
    Mr. Garamendi. Please do.
    The point here is, if you are able to produce beginning in 
2026, 30 per year, by 2030 you will have how many? A hundred 
and twenty in stock, right? And then each year thereafter you 
will produce 30.
    Will you repurpose more than 30 per year in the decade 2030 
to 2040? The answer is probably not. And, therefore, why do you 
want to spend $500 million on Savannah River when, in fact, we 
don't need Savannah River to meet the 87-1 pit production.
    Ms. Hruby, your question; the answer, please.
    Ms. Hruby. Yes. Well, all, the reason that we are making 
new pits, all the pits in the stockpile are aging. The pits in 
the stockpile were last produced----
    Mr. Garamendi. Okay, so specifically tell me which pits and 
which weapons will you be needing new, which weapons will you 
be needing new pits, and when?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah. Sir, that information we are still 
developing as Nuclear Weapons Council. But if we sustain the 
stockpile for another 30 years or more, which I, it kind of 
looks like we are doing, we will need more pits than the 87-1.
    Mr. Garamendi. So, with the next 30 to 50 years we are 
going to start--we need Savannah River now, and you need $500 
million now because you might need--you do, you clearly do not 
need Savannah River to produce the pits necessary for the 87-1. 
If there are other weapons that need pits, please deliver that 
specific information.
    Ms. Hruby. We will.
    Mr. Garamendi. And a general question in the next 1 minute.
    What does it take for deterrence? What does it take for 
deterrence? Triad? A new Sentinel? Columbia-class submarines? 
What does it take?
    I have never heard a rational answer to that question. I 
have heard history, which you just gave us: well, for 50 years 
it has worked.
    What does it take? Be happy to have a discussion later. My 
time is about to expire.
    But until we have a clear answer to that question, and 
don't tell me because it worked for the last 50 years it is 
going to work for the next 50. I don't buy that.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today. I 
wish I were there in person.
    But let me begin following on the deterrence issue. And my 
question, as we know, nuclear deterrence operations do not take 
place in a vacuum. I want to know how is the Air Force thinking 
about other capabilities, like cyber, space, conventional 
capability, et cetera, when it comes to integrated deterrence.
    Dr. Plumb, that is probably a question most appropriate for 
you.
    Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Congressman Langevin.
    So, I want to be clear, integrated deterrence is very 
important. It is how do we get the most out of our capabilities 
and the most deterrence function out of all. It does not reduce 
the role of nuclear weapons as a bedrock of our deterrent 
function.
    But when you mention the different functional offices, 
several of which I have, you know, policy responsibility for, I 
think they all come into play in 21st century warfare.
    As we look at China on the ascendancy, as our pacing 
challenge. The ability to deliver effects both in cyber and in 
space, and using nuclear, our nuclear deterrent is our kind of 
bedrock to prevent a nuclear-level conflict.
    I think they are all important. They all need work, as you 
know, from our other hearings as well. And I believe the entire 
Department would agree that we are pushing hard on all of those 
things. Those are all functions that we need to be well 
invested in and have the right personnel, and the right 
training, and the right equipment.
    Mr. Langevin. And how are we broadcasting that to our 
enemies and adversaries so that they understand what our 
posture is?
    And let me ask you this: How has the Russian Federation's 
invasion of Ukraine affected your perspective on integrated 
deterrence?
    Dr. Plumb. Thank you. I would suggest that the answer to 
those two questions is the same. We are seeing a version of 
integrated deterrence every day in the way Russia is being 
bogged down in Ukraine; the way we have been able to raise 
allies across NATO [North American Treaty Organization] in 
support of supplying Ukrainians with weapons and information; 
the way we are using our intelligence and our cyber and our 
overhead assets for imagery, to declassify and release 
information ahead of the Russian intent, to basically not allow 
them to weaponize the information sphere. These are all 
related.
    I think it is, obviously, early in this approach. But, so 
far what I see is effectiveness. And I see it is a learning 
curve for the Russians, learning some for us. And I also 
believe China is watching and getting the message as well that 
you shouldn't be messing with us.
    Mr. Langevin. Ms. Hruby and Dr. Plumb, let me turn to 
something else with respect to cyber.
    As with any part of our nuclear triad, we must absolutely 
ensure that we have robust cybersecurity practices in place. I 
want to know how are your organizations ensuring that we have 
cyber baked into our nuclear capabilities?
    Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir. Absolutely, cyber is absolutely 
important. And as you know well, you know, cyber warfare is 
just at its beginning. And so, baking in robust cyber defenses, 
not just as a perimeter but in depth, is absolutely essential.
    And, of course, that extends to our nuclear infrastructure, 
not just the weapons themselves but our platforms, and also 
our, you know, NNSA has already spoken to that. It is part of 
every meeting that I am in.
    Ms. Hruby. I would just add from the NNSA perspective that 
while we have been working on cyber and enterprise assurance, 
this, the 2023 budget calls it out as a separate project 
activity and separate line item. So, it will be quite visible. 
And you will see a sustained effort on our part.
    Mr. Langevin. Yeah. Absolutely critical going forward.
    The last thing I will ask, and this may have go to the 
record.
    Ms. Hruby, I am concerned about issues that I've heard with 
respect to recruitment and retention from several nuclear 
weapons labs. How are you working to retain that top talent? 
And what can Congress do to help?
    Ms. Hruby. Yeah, very briefly.
    First, it is a problem.
    Second, we continue to think mission is our biggest asset. 
But we are doing--we offered this year to our M&O [management 
and operating] contractors a mid-year salary adjustment to try 
to keep pace with inflation and stem attrition. We are looking 
at benefits packages.
    And we hope you will support our efforts to stay 
competitive.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the witnesses' 
testimony today. And I yield back the balance of my time. Well, 
time has expired.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    We are about 25 minutes into the first vote in a long 
series. So, we will not have time to move into closed session, 
as I had hoped.
    Unless there is an urgent question from a member right now, 
I plan on adjourning this hearing.
    Is there an urgent question from any of our colleagues?
    If not, then I want to thank the witnesses. I regret the 
inconvenience. I appreciate my colleagues who showed up for the 
hearing coming. And I look forward to rescheduling the closed 
session, which I have always found to be more valuable than the 
public session.
    So, hopefully we can find a time that is convenient for 
everyone. And, hopefully, no votes will interfere in that 
closed session.
    So, I thank the witnesses. The hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 17, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 17, 2022

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 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]     
   

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              May 17, 2022

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            RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

    General Dawkins. The Air Force defers to their colleagues at the 
National Nuclear Security Administration in regard to this question.   
[See page 11.]

?

      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 17, 2022

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

    Mr. Cooper. Both you and the Nuclear Weapons Council have said that 
producing 80 pits per year by 2030 is unachievable, even with increased 
funding for Savannah River. What impact will the delay have? What is a 
realistic goal for when we will be able to produce 80 pits per year?
    Ms. Hruby. Based on the latest conceptual designs and the cost and 
schedule ranges developed by subject matter experts, producing 30 war 
reserve (WR) pits per year (ppy) at LANL in 2026 is achievable; 
however, DOE/NNSA determined that the additional required 50 WR ppy 
production rate at SRS will not be achieved in 2030. Based on current 
planning, the pits produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
are key to supporting the W87-1 Modification Program. The first war 
reserve pit for the W87-1 is scheduled for production in fiscal year 
(FY) 2023, seven years before the warhead's first production unit (FPU) 
in FY 2030. If delays to the LANL pit production rate occur, DOE/NNSA, 
in coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), will explore risk 
mitigation options, including potential pit reuse.
    DOE/NNSA is currently maturing the design for the Savannah River 
Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) and is on track to complete 
design in early 2024. Implementation options to reduce schedule risk 
are being developed as the design matures with the goal to achieve 80 
WR ppy as close to 2030 as technically and economically feasible.
    Mr. Cooper. We are aware of the immense amount of work that NNSA is 
undertaking with a small, specialized workforce to sustain our legacy 
weapons and infrastructure, while also recapitalizing the nuclear 
enterprise. We already have concerns about NNSA's ability to deliver 
new and modified warheads on-time and on-budget. What would be the 
consequence of adding additional work related to expanded sustainment 
and/or life extension of the B83 or the development of a new or 
modified warhead for a SLCM-N? Would adding these activities create 
additional schedule risk for the rest of the program of record?
    Ms. Hruby. Such detailed workload analyses require definition of 
scope and timing due to the highly integrated nature of the nuclear 
security enterprise complex. The Sea Launch Cruise Missile-Nuclear 
(SLCM-N) program would have shared the W80-4 warhead with the Long 
Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO). SLCM-N was not included in the 
President's FY 2023 Budget, but would have resulted in additional scope 
to the W80-4 program, increasing schedule risk for the warhead and thus 
LRSO. The FY 2023 Budget does not include funding for activities to 
extend the B83-1 system's life. NNSA submitted a classified report to 
Congress titled, ``Current Status and Surveillance Findings for the 
B83-1 System,'' which included an assessment of potential schedule 
effects of a B83 extension to other weapons programs across the nuclear 
security enterprise.
    Mr. Cooper. NNSA is undertaking a strategic review of the Office of 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation's mission, organization, scope of 
efforts, and integration with other parts of NNSA, among other things. 
What motivated this review? What are the parameters and scope of the 
review? What do you hope it will accomplish?
    Ms. Hruby. NNSA has requested an independent strategic review of 
its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs. NNSA 
works to continually evolve its approach to meet current and future 
threats, and this strategic review will further inform ongoing efforts 
in this dynamic global environment. The goal of the review is to 
identify significant national and global threats and opportunities 
facing DNN over the next 5-15 years and to inform NNSA on where it 
should consider investing more resources, how it can best leverage its 
resident expertise at U.S. National Laboratories, and how it can 
maximize its impact through collaboration with other NNSA, interagency, 
and international partners to advance NNSA's overarching global 
security mission.
    Mr. Cooper. NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council have said that 
producing 80 pits per year by 2030 is unachievable, even with increased 
funding for Savannah River. How has DOD adjusted its plans to account 
for this reality? In what year must NNSA be able to produce 80 pits per 
year in order to meet DOD requirements?
    Dr. Plumb. The Nuclear Weapons Council is currently assessing 
actions to produce as close to 80 pits per year as possible by 2030, 
with initial recommendations to be made by early fall of this year. 
Although the statutory requirement remains that, consistent with the 
needs of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, during 
2030, will produce not less than 80 war reserve plutonium pits, DOD is 
working through the Nuclear Weapons Council to mitigate the impact of 
any delays to programs of record.
    Mr. Cooper. How is the administration thinking about arms control 
and strategic stability following Russia's invasion of Ukraine? What is 
the administration's plan for nuclear arms control after New START?
    Dr. Plumb. Strategic stability dialogues, transparency measures, 
and arms control are all important for reducing the risk of nuclear 
use. Deterrence alone is insufficient. Although the current security 
environment--exacerbated by Russia's further invasion of Ukraine--poses 
a substantial obstacle, we will pursue further dialogue, transparency, 
and arms control with Russia if and when conditions allow. Both Russia 
and the United States have expressed support for extending nuclear arms 
control beyond New START.
    Mr. Cooper. When should we expect an unclassified version of the 
Nuclear Posture Review?
    Dr. Plumb. The Department of Defense expects to release the 
unclassified Nuclear Posture Review after the release of the 
unclassified National Security Strategy.
    Mr. Cooper. In the late 2020s and 2030s, the Air Force will face a 
difficult task of transitioning silo fields from Minuteman III to 
Sentinel, while operating both missiles simultaneously for several 
years. What steps has the Air Force taken to prepare for this 
transition? Are you confident that the appropriate personnel, 
resources, and oversight arrangements will be in place?
    General Dawkins. Yes, I am confident that the appropriate 
personnel, resources, and oversight arrangements will be in place.
    The Minuteman system is programmed to remain operational for the 
next 14 years (through FY36). It will continue conducting mission 
assessments, condition-based maintenance, and testing until the system 
is fully transitioned to Sentinel.
    The Sentinel weapon system (missile) will replace Minuteman 
missiles in a one-for-one fashion at a rate of 1 sortie (missile) per 
week for 9 years.
    During the transition from Minuteman to Sentinel, the enterprise 
will maintain 400 missiles on alert with no degradation to the triad.
    Until the last Minuteman missile is removed from alert, it will 
remain a safe, secure, reliable, and credible element of the land leg 
of the nuclear triad.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Mr. Carbajal. The work NNSA does around the world through the 
Global Material Security program and its nonproliferation programs is 
critical to making the world a safer place.
    Can you explain opportunities for nonproliferation and nuclear 
security efforts with countries that are not traditional international 
partners? How do you work with countries to minimize the risk of 
nuclear material from being smuggled to non-state or rogue actors? What 
programs within the nuclear proliferation portfolio would benefit from 
additional resources and funding above the budget request?
    Ms. Hruby. Over the past two decades, NNSA's Office of Global 
Material Security (GMS) has built relationships and partnered with over 
100 countries, representing every region of the world. However, there 
are some countries, for example, Egypt, India, and South Africa, who 
have been hesitant to have direct, bilateral relationships with the 
United States on nuclear security. In these cases, GMS has been able to 
work with international organizations, such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), to form multilateral partnerships with countries, 
or to work through laboratory-to-laboratory partnerships. In addition, 
GMS has worked with the full range of international organizations, such 
as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the World Customs Organization 
(WCO), which take their cue to engage as the international law 
enforcement and customs communities from United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, which obliges all states to prevent the 
illicit trafficking of all WMD-related materials. In areas of concern 
where GMS cannot work directly; for example, in Afghanistan, Iran, 
Russia, and Belarus, GMS works in surrounding countries to bolster 
capabilities to increase material security and detect smuggling. 
Overall, GMS explores multiple avenues to connect with partners and 
increase international material security.
    GMS' Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) 
works to build the capacity of partner countries to detect, disrupt, 
and investigate smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials that 
could be used in acts of terrorism. NSDD provides partners with 
tailored radiation detection systems based on assessments of high-risk 
smuggling pathways and operational environments. More specifically, 
NSDD provides detection systems at (1) high-priority points of entry, 
including land border crossings, rail crossings, airports, and 
seaports, (2) along frontier areas in between official crossing points, 
and (3) within the interior of states, including through cooperation 
with law enforcement and security services. These deployments create a 
layered defense and increase the probability of detecting smuggling 
activity. To facilitate long-term system operability, NSDD works with 
partners to develop their capabilities for the long-term use and the 
sustainability of deployed systems.
    NSDD works with over 80 countries around the world, and typical 
partners include international law enforcement, intelligence, and 
border security organizations. NSDD is conducting outreach to more 
countries in the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia to 
address additional high risk smuggling pathways. NSDD coordinates 
closely with other U.S. Government agencies (e.g., Departments of 
Homeland Security, State, Defense, Commerce, and Justice) to maximize 
the impact of U.S. Government resources, and collaborates with 
international organizations such as INTERPOL, IAEA, the Border 
Monitoring Working Group, the WCO, and the Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism, to promote consistency in global efforts to counter 
nuclear smuggling.
    NNSA supports the President's FY 2023 Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation budget request of $2.34B. This request provides the 
level of support needed to advance NNSA's nuclear security, arms 
control, and nonproliferation programs.
    Mr. Carbajal. The GAO published a report in August 2021 regarding 
the Defense Nuclear Enterprise entitled ``DOD Can Improve Processes for 
Monitoring Long-Standing Issues.'' The report recommended the 
Department provide guidance that the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group 
members periodically assess the process and outcome metrics and 
milestones for the remaining 2014 nuclear enterprise review 
recommendations. DOD concurred with this recommendation stating the DOD 
will draft updated guidance for the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group 
members. Has this guidance been written and transmitted?
    Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, the Department of Defense has drafted updated 
guidance that is currently under review and awaiting Secretary of 
Defense's approval.
    Mr. Carbajal. The GAO published a report in August 2021 regarding 
the Defense Nuclear Enterprise entitled ``DOD Can Improve Processes for 
Monitoring Long-Standing Issues.'' The report recommended the 
Department provide guidance that the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group 
members periodically assess the process and outcome metrics and 
milestones for the remaining 2014 nuclear enterprise review 
recommendations. DOD concurred with this recommendation stating the DOD 
will draft updated guidance for the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group 
members. Has this guidance been written and transmitted?
    Dr. Plumb. This effort is well underway but has not been finalized.