    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-91]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                          FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET FOR

              NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                  MAY 17, 2022

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     48-474            WASHINGTON : 2023

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
        Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                    Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                   Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                               Will Braden, Clerk
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
        Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force
    Hruby, Hon. Jill, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
        Administration, U.S. Department of Energy
    Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
        Policy
    Rosenblum, Hon. Deborah G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
        Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
        Programs, U.S. Navy

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    19
        Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr.................................    73
        Hruby, Hon. Jill.............................................    23
        Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
          Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...................    21
        Plumb, Hon. John F...........................................    50
        Rosenblum, Hon. Deborah G....................................    43
        Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    60

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Garamendi................................................    87

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Carbajal.................................................    92
        Mr. Cooper...................................................    91
     FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE
                                   ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                 Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 17, 2022.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:32 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. This hearing will come to order. I would like
    to begin by thanking our distinguished panel of witnesses. We
    look forward to your testimony.
        We have the Honorable Jill Hruby, Administrator of the
    National Nuclear Security Administration; the Honorable Deborah
    Rosenblum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; the Honorable John
    Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Vice
    Admiral Johnny Wolfe, Director of the U.S. Navy Strategic
    Systems Programs; and Lieutenant General James Dawkins, U.S.
    Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and
    Nuclear Integration.
        I would like to ask unanimous consent that the remainder of
    my statement be inserted into the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 19.]
        Mr. Cooper. I request the witnesses keep their opening
    remarks to no more than 5 minutes, and that members respect the
    same time limit for their questioning.
        As members know, we are under some time pressure due to the
    pending cascade of votes, which I understand has been delayed a
    little bit. And if a miracle were to happen, we could actually
    complete the public portion of this hearing and get to the
    private session and complete that today. Otherwise, we will
    have to just do the public section today and then try to
    reschedule the classified hearing later.
        I now turn to my ranking member, Mr. Lamborn, for any
    opening remarks that he has.
        Mr. Lamborn. And, Mr. Chairman, I, too, will ask that my
    statement be introduced into the record. And at that point we
    can go straight into questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lamborn can be found in the
    Appendix on page 21.]
        Mr. Cooper. Awesome. I knew I liked you.
        Which witness would like to go first?
        If you all are all right to discuss straight to questions,
    or do you want 5-minutes openings each? Would you like to do
    that?
        Ms. Hruby. If you would like, we can go straight to--I
    think we have----
        Mr. Cooper. Right. Okay.
        Ms. Hruby. I think we have all been warned that you might
    want to go straight to questions.
        Mr. Cooper. Okay.
        Ms. Hruby. But we also all have opening statements, so.
        Mr. Cooper. Okay.
        Ms. Hruby. Your call.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, if it is okay with members, including
    those on video, why don't we just go ahead and go straight to
    questions.
        [The prepared statements of Ms. Hruby, Ms. Rosenblum, Dr.
    Plumb, Admiral Wolfe, and General Dawkins can be found in the
    Appendix beginning on page 23.]
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the witnesses for being here. You
    represent a tremendous amount of accumulated knowledge and
    expertise, also a large portion of the Federal budget.
        And I want to start with you, Dr. Hruby. What can we do to
    help you achieve your tasks, because NNSA [National Nuclear
    Security Administration] is under a lot of time pressure. You
    have a lot going on. What can we do to help, for example,
    quicken the pace of pit production, including getting South
    Carolina started?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you, Chairman Cooper, for the
    question.
        You know, we feel that the budget we have is nearly enough
    to do everything we can imagine doing. And, you know, regarding
    pit production, we are, we are planning to complete the design
    efforts, the 90 percent design of Savannah River, and the Los
    Alamos pit production capabilities in 2024. So, we will be
    working on it through 2023.
        And we still have an objective to get to 2030 as close to
    possible on the Savannah River pit production facility.
        Here is the request, though. We do have an unfunded letter
    that is associated with what we now see as real issues arising
    in the supply chain for things that we need in the Savannah
    River pit production facility.
        So, we are requesting some additional funds that the NWC
    [Nuclear Weapons Council] is reviewing, we are reviewing this
    week, to allow us to do early procurements so that when the
    design is complete we can begin construction and not be
    interrupted.
        Mr. Cooper. That sounds good.
        I will turn it over to my ranking member, Mr. Lamborn, if
    he has questions.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I have several.
        Administrator, I have another question for you.
        Last fall, Secretary Granholm notified Congress that NNSA
    would be unable to meet the statutory requirement to produce no
    fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030. This
    notification triggered a separate legal requirement under 50
    U.S. Code 2538 for the Nuclear Weapons Council to provide
    Congress with a comprehensive plan for getting the program back
    on track.
        However, the Nuclear Weapons Council recently informed us
    that no plan would be provided.
        As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council, can you tell us
    why the council has chosen not to comply with this requirement
    to provide Congress with a plan to correct these deficiencies?
        Ms. Hruby. I think what we have in this question is maybe a
    misunderstanding.
        Our intent is to, as a council, to make sure that we
    understand what we can do with the pits that we think are
    reasonable to produce in the timeframes to produce them. And
    the statutory requirement, as I understand it, is to say
    whether or not we will produce 80 pits per year by 2030.
        I don't know if that is your question. But the council, I
    think, is fully committed to doing everything that we need to
    do statutorily. And if we are missing something----
        Mr. Lamborn. What it seems to me that we are missing is
    that since you can't reach that goal, what are you going to do
    instead to make up for that?
        Secretary Plumb, do you want to throw in something?
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, Congressman.
        So, aware of your--the statutory request is, how would we
    break glass to get to 2030 and get the 80 pits by 2030? Nuclear
    Weapons Council, including everyone here that sits in those
    meetings, we don't see any path to doing that. There are places
    where throwing more money at a problem just wastes money.
        And so, instead, we are looking at what is the fastest way
    to get to 80. And we are waiting for a critical design review.
    I think Under Secretary Hruby or Assistant Secretary Rosenblum
    could speak to that, that will give us more and better fidelity
    on where to get to next and how fast we can do it.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Congressman. As the staff director for
    the Nuclear Weapons Council, I can elaborate a little bit.
        There were two letters that were combined that was sent
    from the NWC chair: one that spoke to the pit production, which
    you've just gone over now, in terms of not being able to reach
    that by 2030; coupled with, then, a discussion about the budget
    certification, and whether there was a need for additional
    monies in order to meet, actually, 2030.
        What the NWC is doing now is they are working very closely
    between Department of Energy [DOE] as well as Department of
    Defense to look at where there may be some actions that can be
    taken by DOE that will bring it as close as possible to 2030.
    And that work is underway right now, and will be through the
    summer. And we are expecting to have some initial
    recommendations by early fall when it comes time to be
    producing some of the guidance.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. That does help me understand better,
    although I do want to have the comprehensive plan that is
    called for under the laws that we've passed here in this
    committee.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Understand.
        Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Plumb, I have a couple questions on
    the B83.
        The rationale of this administration to retire the B83
    gravity bomb without a replacement capability is not clear to
    me. In fact, it is my understanding that not only is there no
    replacement capability, but the process to identify candidates
    for a replacement capability has not even yet started.
        However, the hard and deeply buried target set remains a
    requirement for Admiral Richard and U.S. Strategic Command.
        How does the administration justify removing this
    capability from our strategic arsenal, which will effectively
    prevent our military from achieving its deterrence
    requirements?
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Congressman Lamborn.
        So, I look at this problem as actually two separate problem
    statements. The first question is what about the B83? The
    second question is hard and deeply buried targets.
        So, let me start with the second.
        Hard, deeply buried targets are a problem. It is a problem
    we are committed to solving. And we have a study underway, I
    believe, for that. And that is an ongoing conversation we are
    going to have to have with this committee and within the
    Department to figure out how to solve it, because our enemies
    are digging deeper and harder.
        Separate problem, B83. Does not solve all these issues, so
    it is of increasingly limited utility. And retiring it does not
    change the hard and deeply buried target problem set.
        A lot of this conversation I am afraid we have to defer to
    the classified session, whenever we have that.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I want to follow up on that part
    of the issue. And I want to raise a side issue with the B83.
        I realize that there is a smaller target set, given
    advances in our defenses. However, that target set still does
    exist. And a critical part of our deterrence posture is
    ensuring that our competitors don't think that they have an
    advantage based on perceived capability gaps.
        So, this decision codifies a capability gap and creates an
    opening for them to consider exploiting. I don't think we
    should give them an inch when it comes to our deterrence
    posture. And this also would include the administration's
    decision to cancel or stop funding the SLCM--SLCM-N [sea-
    launched cruise missile-nuclear] program, even though Russia
    has fielded a similar system for years.
        So, why not develop a replacement plan to go after hard and
    buried targets before retiring the B83?
        Dr. Plumb. So, Congressman, we have a time phase problem
    with the way you just phrased that. Again, the hard and deeply
    target problem set is something we are focused on. The B83
    doesn't give us that solution for----
        Mr. Lamborn. It may not give a complete solution.
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. But it gives a partial solution more than we
    have otherwise.
        Dr. Plumb. Of increasingly limited value.
        Mr. Lamborn. But right now it is a better solution than
    anything else out there on the table in our, in our arsenal.
        Mr. Cooper. If the gentleman would yield, we might be able
    to discuss this more fully in closed session.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let's----
        Mr. Cooper. Does the gentleman have other questions?
        Mr. Lamborn. No, that is it. Let's do that.
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have just one
    question, but it is a philosophical question that I think is
    actually important for the American people to hear. And I would
    invite any one of the five of you to, to answer it.
        Over the next 10 years we are going to spend $634 billion
    on modernizing our nuclear arsenal. Not building a nuclear
    arsenal, because we already have quite an extensive one, but
    simply modernizing a way to wipe out all human life on this
    planet.
        I sit on this committee because I understand that it is
    important. But how would you explain to your kids why we are
    making this kind of investment?
        Yesterday, it took me exactly 12 hours and 5 minutes to go
    the 450 miles from Boston to Washington. Why? Because our
    entire transportation system breaks down due to a thunderstorm.
    We are the only developed nation in the world that doesn't have
    high speed rail, which would have a train every 20 minutes that
    takes 3 hours to go from Boston to Washington.
        And with $634 billion in 10 years, you could connect every
    city in the Nation with 250-mile-per-hour trains.
        The point is, we are making serious trade-offs to invest
    this kind of money in our nuclear arsenal. Someday my 3-year-
    old's going to ask, Why were you voting for this, Daddy?
        How do you explain this to your kids?
        General Dawkins. Can you hear me? Is this on?
        Mr. Moulton. Yes, we can. Thank you, General.
        General Dawkins. So, what I would tell my children is that
    it is a dangerous world. It is increasingly more dangerous, as
    we have seen what has happened with Ukraine, as we hear about
    the strategic breakout with China, of course North Korea and
    others.
        Those countries seem to value nuclear weapons quite a bit.
    In fact, they have all, with the exception of North Korea, of
    course China has now developed a triad. And Russia has had a
    triad for years. They are not stopping any of their work on new
    types of weapon systems.
        And what we found through the years is the best deterrent
    to prevent a nuclear conflict from happening is to ensure that
    what we have on the United States side is safe, secure,
    modernized, and credible.
        And so that is what I would, I would tell my children, so I
    do tell my children. And that if we were going to have a triad,
    which the administration and previous administrations have
    decided that we will, that we have got to make sure whatever we
    put into the field remains safe, secure, reliable, and
    credible.
        Mr. Moulton. Admiral.
        Admiral Wolfe. So, I would echo what General Dawkins said.
    And I would also, sir, point out that you made the point we
    have an extensive triad as it is today. That is a true
    statement.
        But if I could add on to what General Dawkins said, but to
    be credible, safe, and reliable, these systems age out. So, we
    are not asking to go put exquisite new systems in place. We are
    not asking to go build to new requirements. We are just asking
    to modernize what we have got today because over the last 50-
    plus years it has proven it works.
        But it has got to be reliable and credible. Because it is
    not about what we believe, it is a what, it is what Russia and
    China believe. And the day they believe that our systems don't
    work and they are not credible is the day that they may ask the
    question: Is today the day?
        So, that is exactly why we are asking to modernize what we
    have got. Not increase, not grow numbers, it is just modernize
    what we have today because we have proven throughout time these
    systems perform exactly what we want to perform, which is
    deterrence, credible deterrence from anybody ever challenging
    our way of life.
        Mr. Moulton. Anyone else?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I would just add that, you know, in building
    on what has already been said here, that the administration
    took a hard look at this issue and looked at the threat picture
    and where our adversaries are expected to be 10, 15 years from
    now, and felt that that certainly merited a decision to fully
    fund the triad. And that is what is in the President's budget.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, Mr.
    Chairman, we are going to miss your service, but we wish you
    well in the future.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        Mr. Wilson. With that, Secretary Hruby, I really appreciate
    your service. As a former deputy general counsel myself of DOE,
    where I had the great opportunity to serve with the very
    legendary Eric Fygi, who retired last Friday, he has just been
    an inspiration of service to our country. And he will be
    missed.
        Secretary Hruby, in your letter to the House Armed Services
    Committee you stated that the President's budget request of
    NNSA is $500 million below the requirements-based budget
    submitted by DOE. This additional funding would allow
    activities to be started as early as possible for the Savannah
    River Plutonium Processing Facility, and support meeting the
    requirements of 80 pits per year as close to 2030 as possible
    to achieve peace through strength, as a deterrent to Putin,
    Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean modernization.
        Can you break down the $500 million figure for the NNSA
    unfunded priorities letter?
        What is the plan to spend, and how this additional funding
    will help mitigate risk?
        What are the challenges to the current trajectory of
    getting to 80 pits per year if this funding is not obtained?
        Ms. Hruby. Thank you, Congressman.
        The $500 million request is largely to purchase equipment
    that will go in the Savannah River pit production facility and
    allow us to build 80 pits per year after the construction is
    complete.
        What we have found in other large construction projects,
    particularly the Uranium Processing Facility, is that--and with
    COVID, is that there are some pieces of nuclear qualified
    equipment and glove boxes that are taking a very long time
    because, in part, because we are doing so much modernization.
        And so, what we would like to do is specify and procure
    some equipment earlier. This is essentially bringing up costs
    from later in the program to earlier in the program so that it
    will be, we will be able to do construction as uninterrupted as
    possible.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
        And, Madam Secretary, I am grateful for the news that the
    high winds around Los Alamos National Security Laboratory have
    subsided, allowing firefighters to battle back against the
    deadly brush fires in the area. This underscores the need to
    solidify a two-site solution for plutonium pit production which
    would provide redundancy in the event of further unexpected
    events that could shut down this crucial part of our nuclear
    deterrence strategy modernization efforts.
        What other benefits does the two-site solution provide that
    mitigates risk and prevents delays to our crucial nuclear
    modernization needs?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you for that question.
        And we have said all along that we believe this two-site
    solution does two, two things. It is the most efficient and
    cost-effective approach because we can take advantage of a
    qualified nuclear facility that was the shell that was already
    constructed for the mixed metal oxide facility. And we, and we
    will get resilience.
        There are other things that can, you know, any accident,
    even if it doesn't, you know, hurt people, we have to
    investigate completely when it involves plutonium. Any security
    breach, there are a number of things that could happen that
    could close a plutonium facility while being investigated or
    while being fixed.
        But the fires are a good example of why resilience is so
    important in today's world.
        And, yes, so thank you for that question. But we think this
    is both cost-effective approach, best utilizes talent, and
    provides the most resilience.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you for your insight.
        And, also, I want to thank you for highlighting the
    importance of cybersecurity at our nuclear facilities in your
    testimony. I am grateful that the efforts of the Adjutant
    General Van McCarty of the South Carolina Guard, and Chancellor
    Daniel Heimmermann of the USC [University of South Carolina]
    Aiken for investing in the DreamPort facility, which will
    partner with industry and defense to train the next generation
    of cybersecurity experts.
        What are the challenges faced by NNSA for recruiting and
    retaining high-performing cybersecurity professionals?
        Ms. Hruby. Yeah. I think the challenges we have are similar
    to the challenges in other areas. But this is a highly paid
    profession in great demand.
        So, we have to--I always, the first thing we have to do is
    get people who really care about the mission. We can't forget
    to stress the mission. People get to do incredible work for the
    American people when they protect our systems from cyber.
        And, secondly, we have to pay competitive, as close to
    competitive salaries and benefits as we can, at least fair
    salaries and benefits, so that we can attract these people.
        So, we are doing everything we can to get people hooked on
    our mission as early as possible in their education. And
    everything we can to convince them to stay once they have come.
    But it is a challenge.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Wilson. And in my State, I'm working with Congressman
    Rick Allen in Georgia in South Carolina. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Morelle.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to start by saying my district is home to the
    Laboratory for Laser Energetics, LLE, at the University of
    Rochester, a key part of the NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion
    program, which is a critical component of the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program that maintains a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent.
        I am glad to have the opportunity to discuss this program
    in the fiscal year 2023 budget. Which leads me to my question,
    Madam Administrator.
        The NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion facilities, like the
    one I mentioned in my district, are the only facilities capable
    of accessing and studying the high energy density conditions
    responsible for 99 percent of the yield of our nuclear devices.
    And, as such, they are a crucial component of the Science-Based
    Stockpile Stewardship Program that underlies our, underlies our
    confidence in the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our
    nuclear stockpile.
        Despite the ICF [Inertial Confinement Fusion] program's
    critical role in our national security, and strong support from
    this committee and from the Congress, NNSA, excuse me, has
    routinely requested harmful cuts in the program in the
    President's budgets request, including again this year.
        So, I wonder if you could just describe how the proposed
    cuts impact our Nation's high energy density science
    capabilities and NNSA's ability to fulfill its stockpile
    stewardship mission now and in the future?
        Ms. Hruby. Well, thank you.
        As you have stated, our ICF, our Inertial Confinement
    Fusion program is very important to our Stockpile Stewardship
    Program. And the three facilities--your facility, OMEGA; the
    National Ignition Facility; and the Z machine--all contribute
    to that mission.
        Our request is, we believe, a balanced request, it's the
    same request as in fiscal year 2022 for this, for this program
    and the facility. We do have a lot of things on our plate. We
    want to maintain the science, but we have to balance that with
    all the deliverables.
        We have an infrastructure modernization and weapon
    modernization. So, we are fully committed to continuing to fund
    the Inertial Confinement Fusion program, the Laboratory for
    Laser Energetics, and the OMEGA facility. But we are just doing
    it in a balanced manner.
        Mr. Morelle. Well, we may, I may continue to raise this
    with you and continue to talk to committee colleagues about
    that.
        I do want, also, just, if you could just further comment on
    the request notes that the ICF facilities are aging and will
    need significant investments to sustain them. A point I have
    also raised before and Congress has requested the NNSA provide
    a strategic plan for recapitalizing, upgrading, and maintaining
    the major ICF facilities.
        Can you provide a sense of when NNSA may provide that plan,
    what level of resources will be needed to meet the sustainment
    requirements?
        Ms. Hruby. Yes, thank you.
        We do--we are, we are developing the 10-year ICF facility
    and infrastructure plan. And we have, you know, we are,
    actually, with the new Assistant Secretary for Nuclear
    Security, the Deputy, we are--Marv Adams, we are, we are
    talking about this every day, actually. How are we going to get
    the money to sustain our science facilities? Why we need so
    much money to do our production modernization program?
        We appreciate being asked for a plan, and we are working on
    it.
        I am sorry, I will have to get back with you on a date. I
    don't have a date I can promise today.
        Mr. Morelle. And just really quickly. You personally
    outlined challenges confronting the NNSA workforce and the need
    to meet mission requirements and deliver on objectives. We have
    400 scientists, engineers, and staff just at the LLE. And we
    train students in inertial confinement fusion, and high energy
    density physics. We play a critical role in attracting talent.
        Can you talk a little bit about what you intend to do to
    try to not only achieve workforce needs, but also promoting
    expansion of the workforce so that it promotes racial and
    economic equity within that workforce?
        Ms. Hruby. Absolutely. We have, we have a lot of university
    programs. We are very proud of the minority-serving education
    programs that we have.
        We, in fact we just, we are concerned about all elements of
    our workforce, from crafts and technologists through Ph.D.
    scientists. And LLE serves a very important purpose for
    creating scientists.
        And we are also looking to continue our MSIPP programs, the
    Minority Serving Institution Partnership Programs, and
    education programs. And today we just announced a $5 million
    program aimed at technology, crafts, and crafts workers.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I apologize for going
    over, but I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Yes. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. I will try to ask punctual questions and
    hopefully get the same answers, Ms. Hruby.
        Last year Congress increased the minor construction
    threshold to $25 million. How helpful was that?
        Can you just outline a couple successes? And how would you
    benefit if we were to do that even more, such as Mr. Verdon,
    your predecessor, had asked for?
        Ms. Hruby. Yeah, thank you. And thanks so much for
    increasing this threshold.
        I actually got some statistics on this. We, since 20--since
    we changed the level from $10 million to $20 million, we have
    completed 16 projects, and have 43 new projects underway, and
    10 proposed for fiscal year 2023.
        If we raise--with the threshold at $25 million now, two
    projects are underway and two projects are proposed for 2023. I
    am a big fan of these minor construction projects because we
    can streamline them. They are much more efficient, they are
    much faster. And I think the higher threshold is an innovative
    way to help us with office space, with general laboratory
    space, and non-nuclear construction.
        And really appreciate the support that has been provided.
    And would love to see it go even higher.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I can probably guess the answer to
    this.
        Just in follow-up, with inflation at 8 percent and
    construction material soaring 20 percent or more, would you be
    supportive of pegging the minor construction threshold to the
    inflation rate so you don't have to come back every year or two
    to make the same ask?
        Ms. Hruby. I would like that. I mean, from my perspective,
    if we could get it to the right level and then increment it by
    inflation, that would be perfect. And I would suggest a level
    above $25 million before we start incrementing for inflation is
    worth a look.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And General Dawkins, if you had to
    describe one thing that is obstructing your ability to do your
    job successfully, what would that be?
        General Dawkins. I don't know that it is obstructing our
    ability to do it right now. But it is clear, consistent, and
    stable funding.
        As we move forward into the nuclear modernization bow wave
    it is more imperative that we are able to have new starts. And
    with inflation coming in as well, that is an important piece
    there.
        So, basically, the less, the less CRs [continuing
    resolutions] we can have, the much better place we will be,
    particularly with regard to MILCON [military construction],
    GBSD [Ground Based Strategic Deterrent] MILCON--or Sentinel,
    I'm sorry. MILCON is such a big part of Sentinel.
        But, again, all of these programs are coming, starting to
    ramp up at the same time. And it is critical, we don't have any
    margin left to delay programs. So, I would say consistent,
    stable funding with your support.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. A lot of questions need to be asked and
    answered.
        With regard to the Sentinel, General Dawkins, we need
    detailed information. You just mentioned MILCON. At the moment
    it's--the detail needed, is not available. Please provide it.
        There was a discussion, General Dawkins, you said this, but
    this goes to all of you, you are talking about a bow wave. The
    last time the bow wave was discussed here was at least 5 years
    ago. I have not seen any recent updates based upon inflation
    and other matters. I would like to have that. So, please, if
    you would, if not to the committee, at least to me.
        Also, Ms. Hruby, what, how many pits can be produced at Los
    Alamos?
        Ms. Hruby. Our goal is to produce 30 pits per year
    reliably.
        Mr. Garamendi. When will they be? When will you reach that
    production level?
        Ms. Hruby. 2026.
        Mr. Garamendi. 2026.
        General Dawkins, when do you need the 87-1 to put on your
    new Sentinel?
        General Dawkins. Sir, the Sentinel field--will field with
    the 87-0 IOC [initial operational capability] of 2029.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Does that 87-0 need new pits?
        General Dawkins. The 87-1 will field in 2030----
        Mr. Garamendi. The answer is the 87-0 does not need a new
    pit.
        General Dawkins. The 87-0 does not need, not need a new
    pit. The 87-1 requires the pits. And we are working with the
    Nuclear Weapons Council and NNSA to ensure that we----
        Mr. Garamendi. I don't have much time. Just, just the
    answer to the question, please.
        So, the 87-1 requires a new pit. When do you need the 87-1?
        General Dawkins. We are planning to integrate it in 2030.
        Mr. Garamendi. 2030. And how many will you integrate each
    year beginning in 2030 for the next decade?
        General Dawkins. Sir, I don't have that information with
    me. I can certainly take that for the record and provide that.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 87.]
        Mr. Garamendi. Please do.
        The point here is, if you are able to produce beginning in
    2026, 30 per year, by 2030 you will have how many? A hundred
    and twenty in stock, right? And then each year thereafter you
    will produce 30.
        Will you repurpose more than 30 per year in the decade 2030
    to 2040? The answer is probably not. And, therefore, why do you
    want to spend $500 million on Savannah River when, in fact, we
    don't need Savannah River to meet the 87-1 pit production.
        Ms. Hruby, your question; the answer, please.
        Ms. Hruby. Yes. Well, all, the reason that we are making
    new pits, all the pits in the stockpile are aging. The pits in
    the stockpile were last produced----
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay, so specifically tell me which pits and
    which weapons will you be needing new, which weapons will you
    be needing new pits, and when?
        Ms. Hruby. Yeah. Sir, that information we are still
    developing as Nuclear Weapons Council. But if we sustain the
    stockpile for another 30 years or more, which I, it kind of
    looks like we are doing, we will need more pits than the 87-1.
        Mr. Garamendi. So, with the next 30 to 50 years we are
    going to start--we need Savannah River now, and you need $500
    million now because you might need--you do, you clearly do not
    need Savannah River to produce the pits necessary for the 87-1.
    If there are other weapons that need pits, please deliver that
    specific information.
        Ms. Hruby. We will.
        Mr. Garamendi. And a general question in the next 1 minute.
        What does it take for deterrence? What does it take for
    deterrence? Triad? A new Sentinel? Columbia-class submarines?
    What does it take?
        I have never heard a rational answer to that question. I
    have heard history, which you just gave us: well, for 50 years
    it has worked.
        What does it take? Be happy to have a discussion later. My
    time is about to expire.
        But until we have a clear answer to that question, and
    don't tell me because it worked for the last 50 years it is
    going to work for the next 50. I don't buy that.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
    okay?
        Mr. Cooper. Yes.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today. I
    wish I were there in person.
        But let me begin following on the deterrence issue. And my
    question, as we know, nuclear deterrence operations do not take
    place in a vacuum. I want to know how is the Air Force thinking
    about other capabilities, like cyber, space, conventional
    capability, et cetera, when it comes to integrated deterrence.
        Dr. Plumb, that is probably a question most appropriate for
    you.
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Congressman Langevin.
        So, I want to be clear, integrated deterrence is very
    important. It is how do we get the most out of our capabilities
    and the most deterrence function out of all. It does not reduce
    the role of nuclear weapons as a bedrock of our deterrent
    function.
        But when you mention the different functional offices,
    several of which I have, you know, policy responsibility for, I
    think they all come into play in 21st century warfare.
        As we look at China on the ascendancy, as our pacing
    challenge. The ability to deliver effects both in cyber and in
    space, and using nuclear, our nuclear deterrent is our kind of
    bedrock to prevent a nuclear-level conflict.
        I think they are all important. They all need work, as you
    know, from our other hearings as well. And I believe the entire
    Department would agree that we are pushing hard on all of those
    things. Those are all functions that we need to be well
    invested in and have the right personnel, and the right
    training, and the right equipment.
        Mr. Langevin. And how are we broadcasting that to our
    enemies and adversaries so that they understand what our
    posture is?
        And let me ask you this: How has the Russian Federation's
    invasion of Ukraine affected your perspective on integrated
    deterrence?
        Dr. Plumb. Thank you. I would suggest that the answer to
    those two questions is the same. We are seeing a version of
    integrated deterrence every day in the way Russia is being
    bogged down in Ukraine; the way we have been able to raise
    allies across NATO [North American Treaty Organization] in
    support of supplying Ukrainians with weapons and information;
    the way we are using our intelligence and our cyber and our
    overhead assets for imagery, to declassify and release
    information ahead of the Russian intent, to basically not allow
    them to weaponize the information sphere. These are all
    related.
        I think it is, obviously, early in this approach. But, so
    far what I see is effectiveness. And I see it is a learning
    curve for the Russians, learning some for us. And I also
    believe China is watching and getting the message as well that
    you shouldn't be messing with us.
        Mr. Langevin. Ms. Hruby and Dr. Plumb, let me turn to
    something else with respect to cyber.
        As with any part of our nuclear triad, we must absolutely
    ensure that we have robust cybersecurity practices in place. I
    want to know how are your organizations ensuring that we have
    cyber baked into our nuclear capabilities?
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, sir. Absolutely, cyber is absolutely
    important. And as you know well, you know, cyber warfare is
    just at its beginning. And so, baking in robust cyber defenses,
    not just as a perimeter but in depth, is absolutely essential.
        And, of course, that extends to our nuclear infrastructure,
    not just the weapons themselves but our platforms, and also
    our, you know, NNSA has already spoken to that. It is part of
    every meeting that I am in.
        Ms. Hruby. I would just add from the NNSA perspective that
    while we have been working on cyber and enterprise assurance,
    this, the 2023 budget calls it out as a separate project
    activity and separate line item. So, it will be quite visible.
    And you will see a sustained effort on our part.
        Mr. Langevin. Yeah. Absolutely critical going forward.
        The last thing I will ask, and this may have go to the
    record.
        Ms. Hruby, I am concerned about issues that I've heard with
    respect to recruitment and retention from several nuclear
    weapons labs. How are you working to retain that top talent?
    And what can Congress do to help?
        Ms. Hruby. Yeah, very briefly.
        First, it is a problem.
        Second, we continue to think mission is our biggest asset.
    But we are doing--we offered this year to our M&O [management
    and operating] contractors a mid-year salary adjustment to try
    to keep pace with inflation and stem attrition. We are looking
    at benefits packages.
        And we hope you will support our efforts to stay
    competitive.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the witnesses'
    testimony today. And I yield back the balance of my time. Well,
    time has expired.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
        We are about 25 minutes into the first vote in a long
    series. So, we will not have time to move into closed session,
    as I had hoped.
        Unless there is an urgent question from a member right now,
    I plan on adjourning this hearing.
        Is there an urgent question from any of our colleagues?
        If not, then I want to thank the witnesses. I regret the
    inconvenience. I appreciate my colleagues who showed up for the
    hearing coming. And I look forward to rescheduling the closed
    session, which I have always found to be more valuable than the
    public session.
        So, hopefully we can find a time that is convenient for
    everyone. And, hopefully, no votes will interfere in that
    closed session.
        So, I thank the witnesses. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                  May 17, 2022

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                  May 17, 2022

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     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                  May 17, 2022

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                RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

        General Dawkins. The Air Force defers to their colleagues at the
    National Nuclear Security Administration in regard to this question.
    [See page 11.]

    ?

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                  May 17, 2022

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

        Mr. Cooper. Both you and the Nuclear Weapons Council have said that
    producing 80 pits per year by 2030 is unachievable, even with increased
    funding for Savannah River. What impact will the delay have? What is a
    realistic goal for when we will be able to produce 80 pits per year?
        Ms. Hruby. Based on the latest conceptual designs and the cost and
    schedule ranges developed by subject matter experts, producing 30 war
    reserve (WR) pits per year (ppy) at LANL in 2026 is achievable;
    however, DOE/NNSA determined that the additional required 50 WR ppy
    production rate at SRS will not be achieved in 2030. Based on current
    planning, the pits produced at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
    are key to supporting the W87-1 Modification Program. The first war
    reserve pit for the W87-1 is scheduled for production in fiscal year
    (FY) 2023, seven years before the warhead's first production unit (FPU)
    in FY 2030. If delays to the LANL pit production rate occur, DOE/NNSA,
    in coordination with the Department of Defense (DOD), will explore risk
    mitigation options, including potential pit reuse.
        DOE/NNSA is currently maturing the design for the Savannah River
    Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) and is on track to complete
    design in early 2024. Implementation options to reduce schedule risk
    are being developed as the design matures with the goal to achieve 80
    WR ppy as close to 2030 as technically and economically feasible.
        Mr. Cooper. We are aware of the immense amount of work that NNSA is
    undertaking with a small, specialized workforce to sustain our legacy
    weapons and infrastructure, while also recapitalizing the nuclear
    enterprise. We already have concerns about NNSA's ability to deliver
    new and modified warheads on-time and on-budget. What would be the
    consequence of adding additional work related to expanded sustainment
    and/or life extension of the B83 or the development of a new or
    modified warhead for a SLCM-N? Would adding these activities create
    additional schedule risk for the rest of the program of record?
        Ms. Hruby. Such detailed workload analyses require definition of
    scope and timing due to the highly integrated nature of the nuclear
    security enterprise complex. The Sea Launch Cruise Missile-Nuclear
    (SLCM-N) program would have shared the W80-4 warhead with the Long
    Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO). SLCM-N was not included in the
    President's FY 2023 Budget, but would have resulted in additional scope
    to the W80-4 program, increasing schedule risk for the warhead and thus
    LRSO. The FY 2023 Budget does not include funding for activities to
    extend the B83-1 system's life. NNSA submitted a classified report to
    Congress titled, ``Current Status and Surveillance Findings for the
    B83-1 System,'' which included an assessment of potential schedule
    effects of a B83 extension to other weapons programs across the nuclear
    security enterprise.
        Mr. Cooper. NNSA is undertaking a strategic review of the Office of
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation's mission, organization, scope of
    efforts, and integration with other parts of NNSA, among other things.
    What motivated this review? What are the parameters and scope of the
    review? What do you hope it will accomplish?
        Ms. Hruby. NNSA has requested an independent strategic review of
    its Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs. NNSA
    works to continually evolve its approach to meet current and future
    threats, and this strategic review will further inform ongoing efforts
    in this dynamic global environment. The goal of the review is to
    identify significant national and global threats and opportunities
    facing DNN over the next 5-15 years and to inform NNSA on where it
    should consider investing more resources, how it can best leverage its
    resident expertise at U.S. National Laboratories, and how it can
    maximize its impact through collaboration with other NNSA, interagency,
    and international partners to advance NNSA's overarching global
    security mission.
        Mr. Cooper. NNSA and the Nuclear Weapons Council have said that
    producing 80 pits per year by 2030 is unachievable, even with increased
    funding for Savannah River. How has DOD adjusted its plans to account
    for this reality? In what year must NNSA be able to produce 80 pits per
    year in order to meet DOD requirements?
        Dr. Plumb. The Nuclear Weapons Council is currently assessing
    actions to produce as close to 80 pits per year as possible by 2030,
    with initial recommendations to be made by early fall of this year.
    Although the statutory requirement remains that, consistent with the
    needs of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, during
    2030, will produce not less than 80 war reserve plutonium pits, DOD is
    working through the Nuclear Weapons Council to mitigate the impact of
    any delays to programs of record.
        Mr. Cooper. How is the administration thinking about arms control
    and strategic stability following Russia's invasion of Ukraine? What is
    the administration's plan for nuclear arms control after New START?
        Dr. Plumb. Strategic stability dialogues, transparency measures,
    and arms control are all important for reducing the risk of nuclear
    use. Deterrence alone is insufficient. Although the current security
    environment--exacerbated by Russia's further invasion of Ukraine--poses
    a substantial obstacle, we will pursue further dialogue, transparency,
    and arms control with Russia if and when conditions allow. Both Russia
    and the United States have expressed support for extending nuclear arms
    control beyond New START.
        Mr. Cooper. When should we expect an unclassified version of the
    Nuclear Posture Review?
        Dr. Plumb. The Department of Defense expects to release the
    unclassified Nuclear Posture Review after the release of the
    unclassified National Security Strategy.
        Mr. Cooper. In the late 2020s and 2030s, the Air Force will face a
    difficult task of transitioning silo fields from Minuteman III to
    Sentinel, while operating both missiles simultaneously for several
    years. What steps has the Air Force taken to prepare for this
    transition? Are you confident that the appropriate personnel,
    resources, and oversight arrangements will be in place?
        General Dawkins. Yes, I am confident that the appropriate
    personnel, resources, and oversight arrangements will be in place.
        The Minuteman system is programmed to remain operational for the
    next 14 years (through FY36). It will continue conducting mission
    assessments, condition-based maintenance, and testing until the system
    is fully transitioned to Sentinel.
        The Sentinel weapon system (missile) will replace Minuteman
    missiles in a one-for-one fashion at a rate of 1 sortie (missile) per
    week for 9 years.
        During the transition from Minuteman to Sentinel, the enterprise
    will maintain 400 missiles on alert with no degradation to the triad.
        Until the last Minuteman missile is removed from alert, it will
    remain a safe, secure, reliable, and credible element of the land leg
    of the nuclear triad.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
        Mr. Carbajal. The work NNSA does around the world through the
    Global Material Security program and its nonproliferation programs is
    critical to making the world a safer place.
        Can you explain opportunities for nonproliferation and nuclear
    security efforts with countries that are not traditional international
    partners? How do you work with countries to minimize the risk of
    nuclear material from being smuggled to non-state or rogue actors? What
    programs within the nuclear proliferation portfolio would benefit from
    additional resources and funding above the budget request?
        Ms. Hruby. Over the past two decades, NNSA's Office of Global
    Material Security (GMS) has built relationships and partnered with over
    100 countries, representing every region of the world. However, there
    are some countries, for example, Egypt, India, and South Africa, who
    have been hesitant to have direct, bilateral relationships with the
    United States on nuclear security. In these cases, GMS has been able to
    work with international organizations, such as the International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA), to form multilateral partnerships with countries,
    or to work through laboratory-to-laboratory partnerships. In addition,
    GMS has worked with the full range of international organizations, such
    as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United
    Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the World Customs Organization
    (WCO), which take their cue to engage as the international law
    enforcement and customs communities from United Nations Security
    Council Resolution 1540, which obliges all states to prevent the
    illicit trafficking of all WMD-related materials. In areas of concern
    where GMS cannot work directly; for example, in Afghanistan, Iran,
    Russia, and Belarus, GMS works in surrounding countries to bolster
    capabilities to increase material security and detect smuggling.
    Overall, GMS explores multiple avenues to connect with partners and
    increase international material security.
        GMS' Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD)
    works to build the capacity of partner countries to detect, disrupt,
    and investigate smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials that
    could be used in acts of terrorism. NSDD provides partners with
    tailored radiation detection systems based on assessments of high-risk
    smuggling pathways and operational environments. More specifically,
    NSDD provides detection systems at (1) high-priority points of entry,
    including land border crossings, rail crossings, airports, and
    seaports, (2) along frontier areas in between official crossing points,
    and (3) within the interior of states, including through cooperation
    with law enforcement and security services. These deployments create a
    layered defense and increase the probability of detecting smuggling
    activity. To facilitate long-term system operability, NSDD works with
    partners to develop their capabilities for the long-term use and the
    sustainability of deployed systems.
        NSDD works with over 80 countries around the world, and typical
    partners include international law enforcement, intelligence, and
    border security organizations. NSDD is conducting outreach to more
    countries in the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia to
    address additional high risk smuggling pathways. NSDD coordinates
    closely with other U.S. Government agencies (e.g., Departments of
    Homeland Security, State, Defense, Commerce, and Justice) to maximize
    the impact of U.S. Government resources, and collaborates with
    international organizations such as INTERPOL, IAEA, the Border
    Monitoring Working Group, the WCO, and the Global Initiative to Combat
    Nuclear Terrorism, to promote consistency in global efforts to counter
    nuclear smuggling.
        NNSA supports the President's FY 2023 Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation budget request of $2.34B. This request provides the
    level of support needed to advance NNSA's nuclear security, arms
    control, and nonproliferation programs.
        Mr. Carbajal. The GAO published a report in August 2021 regarding
    the Defense Nuclear Enterprise entitled ``DOD Can Improve Processes for
    Monitoring Long-Standing Issues.'' The report recommended the
    Department provide guidance that the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group
    members periodically assess the process and outcome metrics and
    milestones for the remaining 2014 nuclear enterprise review
    recommendations. DOD concurred with this recommendation stating the DOD
    will draft updated guidance for the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group
    members. Has this guidance been written and transmitted?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, the Department of Defense has drafted updated
    guidance that is currently under review and awaiting Secretary of
    Defense's approval.
        Mr. Carbajal. The GAO published a report in August 2021 regarding
    the Defense Nuclear Enterprise entitled ``DOD Can Improve Processes for
    Monitoring Long-Standing Issues.'' The report recommended the
    Department provide guidance that the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group
    members periodically assess the process and outcome metrics and
    milestones for the remaining 2014 nuclear enterprise review
    recommendations. DOD concurred with this recommendation stating the DOD
    will draft updated guidance for the Nuclear Deterrent Working Group
    members. Has this guidance been written and transmitted?
        Dr. Plumb. This effort is well underway but has not been finalized.