[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                     
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-54]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                         FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                   ON

                      NONGOVERNMENTAL VIEWS ON THE

                      FISCAL YEAR 2022 DEPARTMENT

                           OF DEFENSE BUDGET

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             JULY 20, 2021


[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-452                     WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                Will Metzger, Professional Staff Member
               Geoff Gosselin, Professional Staff Member
                          Emma Morrison, Clerk
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     4
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Pettyjohn, Dr. Stacie, Senior Fellow and Director, Defense 
  Program, Center for a New American Security....................     5
Smithberger, Mandy, Director, Center for Defense Information, 
  Project on Government Oversight................................     7
Zakheim, Roger, Washington Director, Ronald Reagan Presidential 
  Foundation and Institute.......................................     9

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Pettyjohn, Dr. Stacie........................................    49
    Smithberger, Mandy...........................................    66
    Zakheim, Roger...............................................    80

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Langevin.................................................    97
                
                NONGOVERNMENTAL VIEWS ON THE FISCAL YEAR

                   2022 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 20, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Good morning. I will call the meeting to 
order. Once again, we still have a hybrid hearing, so some 
members are participating virtually, and there are rules for 
that, which I will read to you to get us started here.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting. Those members must continue to use the software 
platform's video function while in attendance unless they 
experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that 
render them unable to participate on camera. If a member 
experiences technical difficulties, they should contact the 
committee staff for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room and via the television and internet feeds. Members 
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they 
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking. 
Members who are not participating remotely are reminded--
sorry--who are participating remotely are reminded to keep the 
software platform's video function on the entire time they 
attend. The preceding members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding. If members depart for a short while for reasons 
other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave 
the video function on. If members will be absent for a 
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, 
they should exit the software platform entirely and then rejoin 
it if they return. Members may use the software platform's chat 
feature to communicate with staff regarding technical or 
logistical support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt that proceeding. 
Thank you.
    So, this morning, we are having a hearing basically to 
discuss the budget, you know. Part of that is certainly the top 
line, the overall number, but I am also really hopeful that our 
witnesses will get into the issues of where we spend that 
money, how things are changing and evolving, you know, and how 
we spend the money, what capabilities. Obsessively focusing on 
numbers misses the point that it really matters where we spend 
it.
    We have three witnesses this morning. We have Dr. Stacie 
Pettyjohn, who is the senior fellow and director for the 
Defense Program for the Center for a New American Security, 
represented on the rather awesome-looking screen, if I may say. 
Kudos to my staff. You know, it is almost like she is actually 
here. It looks awesome. So welcome. We have Ms. Mandy 
Smithberger, who is the director of the Center for Defense 
Information Project on Government Oversight, and Mr. Roger 
Zakheim, well known to the committee as former HASC [House 
Armed Services Committee] staffer. Good to have you back. He is 
now the director of The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation 
and Institute.
    Well, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the purpose of 
this hearing is to talk about the budget, the numbers, how much 
money we should be spending on defense, and where we should be 
spending it. This is something that is going to play out a 
great deal in the next 4 or 5 months. There are obviously 
differences of opinion in, you know, appropriators, House, 
Senate, Republican, Democrat, on exactly what that number 
should be. I have said publicly and will continue to say I 
support President Biden's budget. I think the number is right. 
I think there is absolutely no reason on Earth why we cannot 
adequately defend the country for $753 billion. It is actually 
a larger increase than the increase we got from President 
Trump's budget last year, and I think we worked those numbers 
out perfectly fine.
    But part of discussion is if you think the number should be 
higher, tell us why; if you think the number should be lower, 
tell us why. But the other part of it that is really important 
is, where do those numbers come from? And those numbers come 
from the National Defense Strategy. That is where it all 
starts. And from the National Defense Strategy, we build down a 
series of requirements, things that we think we have to be able 
to do. And most of the numbers that I have seen during my 25 
years on this committee don't think too much further than that. 
Okay. Well, it is in the National Defense Strategy. It is a 
requirement. Therefore, we have to spend the money.
    But the job that I want to see this committee do is to look 
at that. Why is that a requirement? Does that requirement make 
sense? Does it actually meet our needs? Was that a requirement 
that we came up with 25 years ago and just decided never to 
change our minds so we keep moving forward? We need to really 
think seriously about those requirements all the time but now 
in particular because of the changing nature of our defense 
strategy and of the threats we face.
    We are all, you know, very much familiar with the fact that 
Russia and China now are our rising peer competitors at a 
minimum, and certainly there is a distinct possibility of them 
being threats. For the last 20 years, much of our focus has 
been on asymmetric warfare, transnational terrorist groups and 
their threat. That is a different set of priorities than having 
to figure out how to deter adversaries with the size and 
capability of Russia, China, and then even emerging, you know, 
countries like Iran and North Korea. That requires us to 
rethink a number of those requirements.
    But, also, the nature of warfare has changed in that how 
important information has become. In order to be successful, we 
have to, number one, be able to access a large amount of 
information. That part we have gotten fairly good at, but, 
number two, we have got to figure out, within that incredible 
morass, what do we really need to know? How do we find the 
information in that pile, you know. People often refer to it as 
trying to find a needle in a haystack. I always liked the way a 
counterterrorism guy said: No, it is like trying to find a 
needle in a needle stack. They are all important, but which one 
is the one we are looking for today and in this moment, and how 
do we find it?
    And then how do you get that information out to the people 
who need it in real time? It is great if some analysts, you 
know, back at the Pentagon can see it. But what about the 
pilot, the ship captain, the infantryman out there? And, 
finally, does he or she have that information in that moment, 
and how do we do that?
    And, as we have all learned, how do you protect all of that 
so that an adversary cannot disrupt it or cut it off? We are 
not as good at that as we need to be.
    And, also, there is the survivability question. Large 
platforms are simply not as survivable as they used to be. And 
I am really struck by the swarm of drones issue, a weapon of 
war that is being used increasingly in the Middle East, was 
used in the Armenian conflict where for a relatively small 
amount of money, I think it is south of a million dollars, you 
can put together a swarm of drones that could pack an 
incredible punch. And the truly interesting thing about it is 
you can't see them coming.
    And I know I have been picking on the F-35 of late. The 
program is incredibly important, but it also deserves to be 
picked upon given the amount of money it has gone over budget 
and the difficulties we have had with it, but think about this: 
A $75 million airplane, the F-35, can't get into some areas 
that a swarm of drones that cost several hundred thousands can. 
How does that change what systems we need, what requirements we 
have in order to get in and attack these places? So I really 
want to get into that examination of requirements, and I will 
close with something that I have complained about a great deal.
    I mentioned that requirements get built. Once the 
requirement gets built, we accept that as, therefore, we must 
spend the money. I also see this in the combatant commander 
issue. Whenever a member is trying to advocate for spending 
more money on a given program, inevitably they will point to 
the fact that, you know, only 60 percent of the combatant 
commander's request for this particular platform were met last 
year. If you really look at that, we never meet the combatant 
commander's request. We never even come close. All right. Now, 
does that mean that we are desperately in jeopardy and are way 
underspending, or might it also mean that we don't have the 
right requirement set, that we don't have the right mission 
statement for what we truly need to accomplish? And I think 
that is the question I am really interested in. At the end of 
that, it may well come out that we need a little bit more 
money, or it may come out that we need a little bit less. But 
we really have to understand what we are spending it on and how 
much we are getting for those dollars spent, not just focus on, 
well, we need more. Isn't more always better? No, actually. In 
many instances, it is not. We have got to make sure we have the 
right capabilities.
    So I look forward to the testimony and the questions and 
answers. And, with that, I yield to Mr. Rogers for his opening 
statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you. And I would point out that from the 
beginning, my friend, the chairman, likes to emphasize that 
this year's increase is larger than the President's last budget 
increase. However, it is basically a $4 billion cut in real 
dollars. And the last President over 4 years increased defense 
spending 13 percent over the rate of inflation. So, if this 
President's budget proposal were carried over 4 years, it would 
be half of what Trump did over his 4 years.
    But I want to thank our witnesses for being here. Today, 
the committee is hearing the views of nongovernmental 
stakeholders on the President's defense budget. Over the past 
month, we have heard budget presentations from Secretary 
Austin, Chairman Milley, and each of the service chiefs and 
secretaries. To date, no one has been able to successfully put 
lipstick on this pig.
    Now, the fact remains this budget is woefully inadequate. 
It doesn't keep pace with China. It doesn't even keep pace with 
inflation. In fact, it constitutes a cut of over $4 billion in 
real dollars. The budget cuts the number of Navy ships and 
destabilizes the shipbuilding industry. It slashes procurement 
across the board. It guts missile defense. It leaves unfunded 
over $25 billion in combatant commanders' priorities. It 
accelerates the divestment of critical capabilities for 
replacements before replacements are available, and it cuts the 
size of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
    We have heard a lot about this budget, how this budget 
invests in modernization while maintaining readiness, but it 
actually does neither. Accelerating divestments and slashing 
the budget for new ships, aircraft, and combatant vehicles 
saves $13 billion, but it undermines readiness by creating 
dangerous gaps in near-term capability. To make matters worse, 
the $13 billion savings are not being reinvested in the 
development of next-generation capability. In fact, those 
savings are not being reinvested anywhere in the DOD 
[Department of Defense]. Instead, they are being used to pay 
for a colossal list of far left priorities.
    The President is proposing to swell nondefense spending by 
a massive 16 percent, and that doesn't count the nearly $2 
trillion already wasted on a so-called COVID [coronavirus 
disease] stimulus bill earlier this year that less than 10 
percent dealt with COVID or the $4 trillion in new mandatory 
spending the President and Democrats are intending to ram 
through Congress later this summer. None of that money, not a 
single dollar, will be spent on the defense of this Nation.
    We are going to talk a lot about the National Defense 
Strategy today and how to properly resource it, but by the 
looks of this budget, it appears that President Biden has 
already settled on the new strategy, and it is a stark 
departure from the past. Instead of deterring conflict with 
China through strength, we are inviting conflict through 
weakness. And if the President continues to underfund national 
security, we will lose that conflict. That is unacceptable, but 
it doesn't have to be that way. I urge my colleagues to reject 
this budget and work in a bipartisan manner to make necessary 
investments for our national defense.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And, Dr. Pettyjohn, you are recognized. We will see if it 
is working in a second, but I am confident it will be. Go 
ahead.

STATEMENT OF DR. STACIE PETTYJOHN, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, 
      DEFENSE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

    Dr. Pettyjohn. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 
Rogers, distinguished members of the committee, and the staff, 
thank you for inviting me to testify today on the fiscal year 
2022 defense budget.
    My remarks draw on a new Center for a New American Security 
report that I co-authored with Becca Wasser and Jennie 
Matuschak. According to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the 
$715 billion fiscal year 2022 defense budget is focused on 
deterring China, the Department's pacing challenge, and is 
biased towards the future. There are, however, signs in the 
fiscal year 2022 budget that the next National Defense Strategy 
might not sufficiently prioritize deterring great power 
aggression, which requires developing a military capable of 
defeating a conventional attack and strengthening strategic 
stability.
    This is disconcerting because, absent significant changes 
to the current U.S. force structure, considerable investments 
in emerging technologies, and the development of new operating 
concepts, the U.S. military could lose a war against a great 
power like China or Russia.
    For too long, the Pentagon has ignored the problem, and as 
a result, the U.S. military edge is eroding. An example is the 
fiscal year 2022 budget, which simultaneously funds advanced 
capabilities to counter China and Russia, sustains a high level 
of readiness, and maintains service end strength. This suggests 
that the administration is trying to do too much with too 
little. There are serious risks with this approach. Addressing 
today's needs will likely continue to prevent investments in 
the future. And as the military tries to do more with less, it 
might find itself trying to do everything but doing few things 
well.
    This is because it is unclear how the next National Defense 
Strategy will handle two critical issues. The first is the 
prioritization of threats. Will the Department explicitly 
preference China and, secondarily, Russia, over other 
challenges, or will it balance among an expanded list that 
includes persistent threats, climate change, and bio threats?
    Second, what is the primary role for the Department of 
Defense and the level of urgency associated with the China 
challenge? Should the U.S. military compete below the threshold 
of armed conflict today, or should the Pentagon focus on 
building a future force capable of defeating a great power 
adversary and a large-scale war tomorrow. It is unlikely that 
the United States can build a force for competition and 
warfighting within any credible top line budget.
    In our CNAS [Center for a New American Security] report, we 
developed three strategies and associated force structures and 
tested them in a series of tabletop exercises on daily 
competition, subconventional territorial aggression, and large-
scale conventional attacks. We found that the strategy we call 
full-spectrum competition most closely resembles the Biden 
administration's current approach of balancing near-term 
competition with modernization and high-end deterrence. 
Notably, this strategy performed poorly against priority 
threats. It cannot defeat a large-scale conventional invasion 
of Taiwan or the Baltics, nor can it halt subconventional 
aggression. It also risks significant overstretch and 
technological overmatch. Similarly, a competition-focused 
strategy that builds a large visible force to actively contest 
daily military provocations and expects to deter through 
presence also fails to defeat both subconventional land grabs 
and conventional aggression.
    More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is 
possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict 
and overturning subconventional aggression within the current 
top line budget but only by accepting some near-term risks in 
subconventional competition, against other threats, and in 
other regions.
    It is important to remember that the fiscal year 2022 
budget is largely a legacy one. Although this budget makes some 
significant investments that align with the high-end deterrence 
strategy, it does not go far enough. As the Pentagon is still 
developing the next NDS [National Defense Strategy], there is 
still an opportunity to course correct. For more than a decade, 
analysts have been warning the Department of Defense that the 
U.S. military could lose a war against a great power adversary 
if it does not significantly change the size and composition of 
its force and the way that it fights. Too much time has been 
lost. The Pentagon must prioritize the future now. Divestments 
are necessary to fund modernization, but alone, they are not 
sufficient. The dual conventional and nuclear modernization 
bill that is now due requires larger trades among capacity, 
capability, and readiness. Because military personnel costs are 
growing more than the overall budget, they reduce the resources 
available for modernization. Shrinking the size of the Active 
Duty force, particularly the Army, which plays an important but 
supporting role in the Indo-Pacific theater, frees up resources 
to focus on high-end deterrence against China.
    The 2022 National Defense Strategy and the fiscal year 2023 
budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to 
prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential 
threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard 
choices or Congress chooses not to support this strategy, it 
risks losing the United States' military technological edge and 
the ability to win a war against a great power.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Pettyjohn can be found in 
the Appendix on page 49.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Smithberger, you are recognized.

 STATEMENT OF MANDY SMITHBERGER, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE 
          INFORMATION, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 
Rogers, and members of the committee for inviting me to testify 
before you today. My name is Mandy Smithberger, and I am the 
Director of the Center for Defense Information at the Project 
on Government Oversight. I want to thank the committee for 
holding this hearing today.
    We think that Pentagon spending is continuing to rise at an 
unsustainable rate, now more than at the peak of the Reagan 
buildup. But too often we are paying too much money for too 
little capability. Throwing even more money at the Department 
will only make the problems worse and undermine the kinds of 
reforms we need to see at the Department. We have to have 
accountability for failed programs and wasted funds, including 
real budget consequences.
    The Biden administration's budget proposes cutting a number 
of legacy programs to fund modernization. The Department must 
make tradeoffs and set priorities. But we worry that in too 
many instances the Department proposes getting rid of proven 
and usually cheaper systems in favor of immature technology 
that costs significantly more. The cost of failed or delayed 
modernization programs can be substantial. Over the course of a 
decade, the Department had to cancel programs we had already 
sunk $46 billion into. Many of those canceled programs promised 
leaps in technology that ultimately could not be affordably 
achieved.
    It is also vital that we understand the human cost of 
failed modernization programs. Delays can contribute to 
preventable accidents and loss of life. The National Commission 
on Military Aviation Safety found that maintenance and safety 
of legacy systems across the services deteriorated as leaders 
took resources from them for new programs. When there were 
delays in those new programs, the lives of the now 
underserviced legacy systems had to be extended for years.
    While many have blamed readiness shortfalls on insufficient 
funding, the Commission made clear this was not the case. Their 
primary fiscal concern is not the amount of money but that they 
couldn't count on it. We have a responsibility to change course 
and save lives.
    I want to give you an example of a program in this budget 
that shows that new systems that are too expensive to maintain 
or upgrade can quickly become irrelevant legacies. This budget 
proposes retiring four littoral combat ships. We support this 
cut, but it is emblematic of wasteful spending that could and 
should have been avoided at the outset.
    It is not difficult to imagine a similar fate for the F-35. 
Low readiness rates and high maintenance costs have turned what 
should be a workhorse into something the Air Force Chief of 
Staff called a Ferrari to be used sparingly. This is a case 
study of the massive waste caused by buying before we fly.
    If there is only one thing you take away from what I say 
today, we must make sure we fly before we buy. We understand 
the need to speed up the acquisition process, but rushing 
unproven technology into production increases costs and 
undermines readiness. Programs should start with a process that 
meaningfully analyzes alternatives for new systems, leverages 
competition and prototyping, and enables oversight and 
transparency throughout the process.
    There are a number of areas ripe for cuts without 
compromising military effectiveness, and I am going to tell you 
about three: the shadow workforce, the Department's wish list, 
and nuclear spending. First, the shadow workforce. Last year, 
the Department spent nearly $204 billion on service contracts. 
POGO's [The Project On Government Oversight] review of 
government data found that contractor employees cost nearly 
three times more than the average civilian employee. The 
Defense Business Board and the Pentagon have found similar 
trends. We urge more transparency and enhanced reporting to 
improve oversight and inform smart cuts.
    Second, the Department's wish list. Giving services and 
components two bites at the apple increase the already palpable 
pressure to increase spending. Congress should eliminate the 
statutory requirement and all wish lists, whether they are 
submitted by statute or by request, and should include 
recommended offsets within the component's own budget.
    Finally, nuclear weapon spending. In a single year, 
projected spending on nuclear weapons activities increased by 
29 percent or $113 billion. The upcoming Nuclear Posture Review 
is an important opportunity to consider ways to reduce these 
costs. This year's budget also includes reforms we hope the 
committee will support, most notably, eliminating the Overseas 
Contingency Operations account. We urge the committee not to 
resurrect this account or create new ones.
    The Department of Defense budget aims to address a number 
of major emerging national security challenges. Responding to 
many of these future challenges cannot be fully or even 
principally led by the Department. Ensuring our security for 
the future will require balancing resources to enable the 
United States to make the best use of the power of our economy, 
the power of our diplomacy, and our capacity for innovation. 
For example, addressing China, climate change, and 
cybersecurity will all require whole-of-government approaches. 
We must rein in Pentagon spending and ensure that every dollar 
improves our national security and supports all of those who 
serve and protect us.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy 
to answer any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Smithberger can be found in 
the Appendix on page 66.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Zakheim.

STATEMENT OF ROGER ZAKHEIM, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, RONALD REAGAN 
             PRESIDENTIAL FOUNDATION AND INSTITUTE

    Mr. Zakheim. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting 
me to testify today. It is truly an honor to be back before 
this committee.
    My testimony, which I will summarize here, considers the 
strategic and budgetary requirements necessary to compete with 
the Chinese Communist Party as well as other significant 
threats, notably Russia, Iran, North Korea, as well as 
terrorism to cyber and digital threats. My approach reflects a 
peace-through-strength strategy that aligns with the findings 
and recommendations of the bipartisan National Defense Strategy 
Commission, on which I have the privilege to serve.
    Most relevant to today's hearing, I reaffirm the NDS 
Commission's endorsement of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
as well as the recommendation of a 3 to 5 percent real growth 
annum increase in the DOD budget.
    The Biden administration's fiscal year 2022 budget request 
falls short of what is required to support the National Defense 
Strategy. The $715 billion request represents a real cut as it 
fails to keep pace with inflation. This departs significantly 
with the NDS Commission's recommendation of this 3 to 5 percent 
real growth that was generally viewed as the minimum necessary 
to sustain the NDS and keep pace with both current and future 
threats. The fiscal year 2022 budget is below the $37 billion 
required to get 3 percent and $52 billion below what would get 
you to the 5 percent growth. Indeed, both represent substantial 
sums of money. But given the strategic environment, as well as 
resources our government is spending on other priorities, it is 
a prudent investment towards sustaining our peace and 
prosperity. This was true in 2019 when the Commission issued 
its recommendation. It is even more critical today with 
inflationary forces on the rise.
    Now, there are some, including thoughtful voices on this 
committee, who reject the NDS Commission recommendation on the 
grounds that it fails to make real strategic choices or come to 
terms with fiscal realities. To those skeptics, I would point 
to the NDS Commission's recommendation, an admonition really, 
that anything short of this recommendation will require the 
Pentagon to, quote, alter the expectations of the U.S. defense 
strategy and our global strategic objectives. In other words, 
the choice is really binary. We either need to resource this 
strategy or change that strategy. If this Congress will not 
fund the current National Defense Strategy, then our civilian 
and military leaders owe you a new strategy that reduces our 
military missions and global posture. In my view, changing the 
strategy in such a manner would have a detrimental and dramatic 
effect on our national security. And the best I can discern 
from the Biden administration's nascent strategy and the first 
budget request is that military missions and mandates will 
increase, not shrink.
    As the Congress considers the defense budget, it ought to 
consider the conduct of its primary competitor, the Chinese 
Communist Party. The White House's Interim National Strategic 
Guidance rightly reaffirmed the Trump administration's 
assertion that the United States faces, quote, a growing 
rivalry with a more assertive and authoritarian China. And 
Secretary Austin correctly described before this committee the 
Chinese Communist Party's People's Liberation Army as, quote, 
the pacing threat. In March of this year, Beijing announced a 
6.8 percent increase in its defense spending despite the 
economic toll of the pandemic. And recent analysis revealed the 
annual dollar value of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] 
procurement is on course to eclipse that of the United States 
military by 2024. If this occurs, then by 2030, the United 
States will no longer boast the world's most advanced fighting 
force in total inventory value. This spending allows the CCP 
[Chinese Communist Party] to fund an active force of 2 million 
and a navy which commissions about 14 ships each year, 
including a new cutting-edge aircraft carrier.
    As the Pentagon's China military power report outlined, the 
CCP is on its way to becoming, quote, a world-class military by 
marshaling the resources, technology, and political will, which 
over the past few decades has allowed them to strengthen and 
modernize the PLA in nearly every respect.
    Advocates of a strong U.S. national security posture often 
invoke President Reagan's peace-through-strength philosophy, 
but it is worth reflecting on the meaning of that core 
principle. At the height of the 1980s military buildup, 
President Reagan argued peace is not the absence of conflict 
but the ability to cope with conflict by peaceful means.
    Now, while this hearing is nominally about the defense 
budget, at its core it is a debate about strategy, and the 
choices before you are clear: option one, resourcing a strategy 
that would seek to prevail in the competition with China while 
holding off adversaries and spoilers in other regions; option 
two, maintaining that strategy but not resourcing adequately 
and absorbing risk; option three, as was laid out, more 
dramatically choosing a more modest strategy that would cede 
our military supremacy and really shrink to a regional power. 
The choice will determine the nature of our peace and the 
likelihood of us prevailing in conflict.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Zakheim can be found in the 
Appendix on page 80.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I appreciate all the testimony. So, as I look at this, I 
mean, there is clear consensus on one point, and that is that, 
you know, strategy and the resources have been bit misaligned 
for a little while. And then the question is, do we change the 
strategy? Do we change the resources? And a lot of what is 
driving this is I think what Ms. Pettyjohn focused on, which 
is, you know, Russia and China. Could we go to, you know, the 
Baltics States, the Balkans and win a war with Russia? Could we 
go to Taiwan and win a war with China?
    So put that aside for a moment. We have a wide range of 
other national security interests, you know. We are still 
dealing with transnational terrorist threats. You know, the 
great power competition is taking place in many instances in 
Africa, in Latin America, and elsewhere. It is not just in 
Russia and--sorry, in China and Eastern Europe. So there is a 
wide range of things we are trying to do. And, also, as we have 
seen, global pandemics are definitely a threat to our national 
security. Climate change is definitely a threat to our national 
security. So we have got all that stuff over here that we are 
doing.
    But it seems to me that the construct that I find--well, 
struggle with, that I don't necessarily agree with is we have 
to be able to win an all-out war with China. We have to be able 
to win an all-out war with Russia. That seems to be what is 
driving the requirements. And I don't think there is any fiscal 
way to guarantee that because China and Russia, they are big 
powers. If that is our mission, then, yes. We ought to have a 
defense budget that is a lot bigger than it currently is. I 
think it is an unachievable mission past a certain point, and 
it is also unnecessary. We have to be able to deter China and 
Russia. But to think that we have to build our military in an 
era when China and--well, China more than Russia, they are 
rising up economically, you know. Our post-Cold War utter and 
complete dominance just simply wasn't going to last. It is not 
the way the world works. Other countries will get up off the 
ground and begin growing and building.
    So we basically set up--you know, we are chasing our tail 
here, trying to be able to defeat them in a war on the road, 
basically, and that is not necessary. Okay. We need to be able 
to deter them. And, by the way, the military is not the only 
way to deter adversaries from doing things that we don't want. 
But once you set that premise up, once you say China and Russia 
are terrible, awful, and doing all of these things, we have to 
stop them, and the only way to stop them is to be prepared to 
win an all-out war, well, then, yeah, you may as well push the 
button to infinity on how much money we could spend on defense.
    So I guess I will start with Ms. Pettyjohn as an answer to 
this question. Why do we have to win an all-out war with China 
and Russia? Why is it--I mean, adversaries far smaller than us 
have successfully deterred us for years for a heck of a lot 
less money. Why can't we do the same thing with China and 
Russia and not buy into this, like, endless expense?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Thank you for that question. I agree that 
competition with China and Russia spans the whole spectrum of 
government and that, actually, other departments and agencies 
should take the lead in the peacetime competition that is going 
on. But what the Department of Defense does and does best is 
deter wars, and you don't deter wars by hoping that you have 
the capability to stop them. You actually need to have the 
forces to prevent them from achieving their objective, what we 
call deterrence by denial.
    The Chairman. Let me just focus my question a little bit on 
that. What you have to be able to do is you have to make sure 
that your adversary decides that there is too much pain 
involved in starting the conflict. It is not a matter, 
necessarily, of winning. It is a matter of they look at this 
and say: Okay, maybe I can win, but it is going to be too high 
a price. Am I wrong about that?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Correct. You need to change their calculus 
where they wonder whether they can win or if they are willing 
to bear the costs. And it sounds like you are suggesting a 
punishment strategy, which one could rely on, but it--the sort 
of gold standard of deterrence is deterrence by denial, and it 
doesn't require infinite resources and capabilities. You focus 
on specific missions that are related to the particular threat 
and scenario that you are focusing on. And if you narrow it 
down, it is something that our analysis suggests that we can do 
where we can build a force that is capable of deterring by 
denial.
    The Chairman. What specifically aren't we spending money on 
now that, in your analysis, do we need more aircraft carriers? 
Do we need more ships? Do we need more planes? What aren't we 
spending money on that could get us to this magical place of 
complete deterrence?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. It is not complete deterrence. Deterrence is 
always, you know, a process and something that is in the eye of 
the beholder. In the near term, I think the biggest areas where 
we could improve are long-range munitions of various types. 
There are some of these in the fiscal year 2022 budget but not 
enough, in my opinion. Anti-ship missiles, anti-radiation 
missiles, anti-armor area effects weapons, and they make the 
capabilities that we have much more effective. We also could 
improve the resiliency of our forces through relatively 
inexpensive measures in terms of passive defenses on the bases 
that we have.
    As we look forward, I think we do need to invest in 
emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and autonomy 
and use those capabilities to help to ensure that we retain 
this edge over the long run, whether it is for conducting all-
domain operations or--and just to reduce our personnel costs, 
which are one of the biggest parts of the defense budget.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thanks. And just quickly, Roger has a 
comment----
    Mr. Zakheim. Mr. Chairman, I always enjoy discussing this 
question. I would just add to Dr. Pettyjohn's list by adding 
undersea capabilities. And I think part of what the National 
Defense Strategy got wrong is that it was ambiguous in terms of 
what we are trying to deter and specifically where we are 
trying to prevail and was looking to invade mainland China. At 
least I am not aware of it. But if you are looking at a Taiwan 
scenario, for example, there are real things we have to do. And 
we can wrap our arms around that in terms of real budget 
priorities by emphasizing the list that was just outlined by my 
colleague, and I would add undersea capabilities there as well.
    The Chairman. Thanks.
    Ms. Smithberger, do you have any comment?
    Ms. Smithberger. The only other thing I would emphasize is 
as you were saying in your remarks, I think we need to be 
focusing on hardening our systems when it comes to 
cybersecurity risks as well. I think that is where we have 
dividends in helping our whole economy.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have never met Dr. 
Pettyjohn before, but I like the way she thinks. I agree with 
her opening statement and answers to her questions, so I am 
going to leave her alone. I got no place to go but down when it 
comes to what she was saying.
    Roger Zakheim, do you believe the President's budget 
request is sufficient to prevail in a conflict with China?
    Mr. Zakheim. I do not, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Rogers. And, Ms. Smithberger----
    Mr. Zakheim. Mr. Ranking Member. Excuse me.
    Mr. Rogers. I like the way it sounds, though. Go ahead.
    Ms. Smithberger, you made the comment that you--and I 
understand there are a lot of critics of the LCS [littoral 
combat ship] on both ends of the Capitol. But you made the 
point that you thought it should have been a project that was 
killed earlier. But we have been talking here about the real 
threat in Taiwan with China trying to militarily take control. 
Were that to happen, what would we do in those shallow waters 
if we didn't have the LCS? What other option would there be?
    Ms. Smithberger. So I think what we learned very early in 
the LCS program is that a lot of our assumptions about how it 
was going to function weren't going to work, that we weren't 
getting the kinds of manning concepts that we were expecting to 
have, that we weren't getting the kind of survivability and 
reliability. So it is not that it is not a capability that we 
need but that this was not a platform that was actually serving 
our needs.
    Mr. Rogers. So you don't think it would have achieved that 
goal in shallow waters around Taiwan with its shortcomings. Is 
that what I am hearing?
    Ms. Smithberger. That is something I have concerns about, 
particularly I think across the platforms that we are buying 
when we have so much complexity, that we are not having the 
kind of reliability that we need to be as lethal as we should 
be.
    Mr. Rogers. Yeah. And I agree with that observation, but 
until we get it, I think we have got to have that platform 
because what we are hearing from our COCOMs [combatant 
commands] is pretty ominous, particularly when it comes to that 
area, and I think it is imminent. So I think we have to be able 
to use that capability until we have got something better to 
replace it.
    You heard the chairman, Mr. Zakheim, make the point that we 
have either got to alter our strategy or alter our spending. Do 
you believe we have the right strategy now, and if not, what is 
the alternative?
    Mr. Zakheim. I believe the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
is the right strategy. The Pentagon, as was outlined by me and 
others here, needs to do a better job of executing against that 
strategy, both in terms of the operational concepts that would 
develop it and the resources and capabilities that we are 
discussing here. I agree with the chairman that if you aren't 
willing to resource that strategy, then come up with an 
alternative. My own view is that we got it right in 2018, and 
we need to execute.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman. I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think for Dr. Pettyjohn, on the budget, is this an 
everything problem, or is it the right investment in talent, in 
people, in skills, or emerging technology, or is it surface 
ships? Is it subsurface ships? Is it aviation? Is it an 
everything problem with the budget, or are there just--are 
there gaps, in your view, in the defense budget based on your 
exercises? You know, we ought to be doing X but not Y, more of 
X and less of Y.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Thank you. It is not an everything problem. 
There are gaps, and there are a lot of things that I think are 
worth commending within this budget. There just need to be 
further shifts to bring it in align with a high-end deterrence 
strategy which would be consistent largely with the 2018 NDS if 
that is the direction the Biden administration goes in. They 
need to continue to, as my colleague on the panel suggested, 
expand undersea capabilities, invest in unmanned systems for 
the future, next-generation air dominance, figuring out how 
they are going to develop intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance [isr] systems to operate in highly contested and 
denied environments. Some people have ideas for autonomous 
networks of mesh UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] that would do 
this, or perhaps you need a penetrating ISR aircraft, but that 
is a critical piece of helping the service to close kill 
chains, in addition to buying a lot more munitions than we 
have. If we have the right munitions on a lot of the platforms 
that we have today, they are much more effective.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Thank you.
    Ms. Smithberger, your testimony is more of a criticism, 
which is all legit. But on the same question, where do you 
think we ought to be investing in the budget?
    Ms. Smithberger. I would agree with the number of the areas 
that some of my colleagues have emphasized, but I think a lot 
of what we focus on is really, how are these systems acquired? 
And I think we just want to make sure that we are doing this in 
a way that we are buying systems that are going to be reliable 
in serving our needs. I think the Department has had a lot of 
trouble acquiring technology over the years that it has made it 
difficult for us to have the kind of insights that we want to 
have.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Thinking ahead, I am not trying to make 
the ranking member's argument, but let's assume that the budget 
is too low and that we need to invest in sort of things that we 
don't want to invest in in order to get to where we want to be. 
Anyone on the panel believe that Congress would allow--after we 
achieve that magical state, anyone on the panel believe that 
Congress would allow us to cut the things that are legacy? 
Roger. I am sorry. Mr. Zakheim.
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman----
    Mr. Larsen. Because I don't, by the way.
    Mr. Zakheim. I know better than to opine what the Congress 
would and would not allow for. That is based on some years 
working for Members like you. But I do think you have a better 
shot that when you take platforms out of the inventory, there 
is a real capability that you can point to you will replace it 
with. And I think the problem we are facing, and I know the 
chairman doesn't like the language of legacy systems, which I 
agree with, is that we talk about things we--capabilities we 
want to remove, and we don't have a clear idea of what is going 
to take its place. And if we do, it often only exists on a 
PowerPoint slide. I think if we can get after that problem, you 
might have more support in this body for those changes.
    Mr. Larsen. I would note in your testimony, in footnote 18 
on your PowerPoint slide, you said rarely does the Pentagon 
deliver the replacement on time or on cost, which is actually 
the problem that we are faced with, not that it is on a 
PowerPoint slide. That should be--should have been the headline 
in your testimony.
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I am heartened that the footnotes 
were read, especially by a Member of Congress, but I----
    Mr. Larsen. Be careful about what you put in a footnote.
    Mr. Zakheim. Well, no. I stand by it. But the reality is, 
for all the problems the Pentagon has with doing things on time 
and well, it is the best we have got in the U.S. Government, 
and it is the only pathway we have.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. I have other questions, and I 
apologize for not getting to them. I would just note--and I 
made this point before--my definition of a legacy system is 
something that the Pentagon doesn't want to do, but Congress 
won't let them stop doing it.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome back, 
Roger Zakheim. I thank the other witnesses too, but you need to 
be aware: Roger was a very effective staff person here advising 
many of us on key issues and making such a positive difference. 
And so we are very happy for your success to be director of the 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, and I am 
confident you will bring the same level of success as you have 
from your service here.
    With that, a question for you. And that is: The Biden 
administration budget request continues the trend of biasing 
air and naval resources at the cost of the Army, despite the 
reality that any near-peer conflict would be all-domain. If 
left unchanged, the Biden budget request would force another 
cut of 1,000 soldiers to the Army's Active Duty force and 
cancel 9 combat training center rotations. If this trend 
continues as the result of the inadequate top lines, what are 
the likely consequences to Army readiness?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman, and it is great to be 
with you. I always enjoyed sitting behind you and bantering 
during a hearing.
    You know, you are hitting on a key point, which is the so-
called choices they have to make in this budget because the 
ceiling on top line is going to take end strength and 
capability out, particularly the Army. And I will make two 
points here, Mr. Wilson. Number one, you know, this is 
something that we all experienced during the operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan where, at that point, whatever reason, we did 
not have end strength to sustain what the President [inaudible] 
needed.
    Now, nobody wants to get into another Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and I think the culture and wisdom is one that we should avoid 
that at all costs, but to at least have an Army that could 
deploy if you need it and sustain it in such a fashion that we 
are not asking too much of those who serve I think is a 
responsible approach. A 3 to 5 percent growth would allow you, 
perhaps, to maintain that number.
    The second thing I would say, and then I will wrap up, is 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs before this committee said 
that the budget has a bias toward future operating environment, 
and I think this committee needs to unpack those words, which 
is we are absorbing risk in the near- and midterm through this 
request, and in some ways, it reflects the concern you outlined 
in your question.
    Mr. Wilson. And thank you for that response. And I am very 
grateful to represent the training facilities of Fort Jackson, 
and I know what great work is done there to protect American 
families.
    And, Mr. Zakheim, there is bipartisan commitment that 
countering China's military buildup, the largest peacetime 
military buildup in history, this requires historic investment 
in the Pacific theater. Yet the Biden defense budget halves 
INDOPACOM's [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's] top priority, 
reducing the crucial missile defense system to protect Guam, to 
protect American families of the patriotic American territory. 
It also omits funding for the Hawaii Homeland Defense Radar. It 
appears that the Pacific defense initiative funding in this 
budget request fails to adequately fund critical joint and 
enabling capabilities and, instead, prioritizes platform-
centric procurement that should be funded elsewhere in the 
budget. How should the committee redirect this Pacific 
Deterrence Initiative spending provided that the budget request 
to ensure it meets the threats?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thanks for that question. First, this 
committee, the chairman and the ranking member, really deserve 
a lot of credit for pushing the Pacific defense initiative. PDI 
[Pacific Deterrence Initiative] is something that--classic case 
where the Congress put forward an important project, and the 
Pentagon adopted it.
    In terms of what the Pentagon was thinking by not funding 
those key priorities like you have highlighted, Guam and Hawaii 
and the missile defense there, it could be they were betting 
that the Congress would do it for them, and they could shoehorn 
in other programs that they thought they might not have room 
for in the budget. I am sure the members here have seen that 
once or twice in previous requests. It happens both in 
Republican and Democratic administrations. The short answer is, 
Mr. Wilson, I would recommend maintaining what the 
administration requested and making sure we have those 
investments to protect Guam and Hawaii.
    Mr. Wilson. And I would like to point out that you have 
already indicated that the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
should be followed through to address the instability that we 
see around the world, whether it be the instability, the hasty 
withdrawal, the potential for mass slaughter in Afghanistan. We 
have got the circumstance of China expanding its influence in 
the South China Sea, threatening Taiwan, and then Russia sadly 
occupying parts of Moldova and Georgia and occupying parts of 
Ukraine with 14,000 persons killed. We need to be ever 
vigilant. And I want to thank you for your efforts, and I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for your testimony today; in particular, Mr. Zakheim. 
Great to see you again. I appreciate the work that you do at 
the Reagan Institute.
    Let me begin on an issue that is important to our national 
security relating to climate change. So, in last year's NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act], we directed the DOD to 
update its 2014 climate change adaptation roadmap and include 
an implementation plan to mitigate nine previously identified 
effects of extreme weather and rising sea levels will have on 
military installations. So this plan would address changing 
energy demands, installation resilience, and the resilience of 
strategic assets.
    So, Ms. Smithberger, how could a climate change adaptation 
and implementation plan reduce the DOD's financial pressure?
    Ms. Smithberger. It is a great question. So I think this is 
going to be pivotal. We are already seeing the billions of 
costs that we are seeing to our different installations by not 
adequately addressing climate change, so I think this is one of 
the instrumental areas where the Department really needs to be 
planning for the future because these are the last things that 
we want to be losing money on. We want to be, you know, 
prioritizing as many dollars as possible to our capabilities 
and not to rebuilding things that we could have protected.
    Mr. Langevin. Yeah. Couldn't agree more. And for the 
record, I really do applaud the Department for its plan to 
release a climate change plan soon, but it still needs to 
update the adaptation roadmap and provide an implementation 
plan so that we can act now to mitigate the effects of extreme 
weather down the road.
    So I want to look at another area I see a disturbing trend 
that really deeply concerns me on research and development 
[R&D] spending. So, in 1996, the U.S. spent $8 for every $1 
that Russia and China spent on research and development. Now, 
we outspend our adversaries by 6 cents. So while I am happy 
that the administration is investing in R&D with the highest 
funding level to date, I have to say that I am disappointed 
that within that top line, we have actually cut basic and 
applied R&D accounts. That is that early-stage research that is 
done, for example, at DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency] and also at colleges and universities.
    So, Dr. Pettyjohn, should we invest more in early-stage 
research? And, if so, by how much? And what are the effects of 
not properly funding R&D?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. Yes, I think we 
do need to be investing in R&D and, in particular, science and 
technology, which are the most advanced capabilities. It will 
lead to that. So that is incredibly important for the 
Department, as it looks to the future, and the Department also 
needs to work on continuing with the process that has been 
underway in terms of reforming acquisition and potentially even 
the PPBE [planning, programming, budgeting, and execution] 
process so that it can better tap into the private sector, 
where a lot of this research is undergoing as well, and bring 
in new capabilities at speed and scale, overcoming the valley 
of death problem that exists today.
    Mr. Langevin. Dr. Zakheim, did you want to add something?
    Mr. Zakheim. Just real quick. I agree with what has been 
said, but it happens to be what you are focusing on. Those S&T 
[science and technology] accounts, the basic research, is where 
the private sector is not operating. That is fundamentally the 
place where government is able to make investments and are 
willing to take some risk in a way that private entities will 
not be able to do because it is too much risk and unsure 
whether they will be able to return a profit. So I think you 
are right to highlight this reduction because no one else will 
do it.
    Mr. Langevin. Yeah. In addition to that though I would say 
that if the private sector knew that government would be 
purchasers of the capabilities that they would develop, I think 
they would be more likely to venture into those areas, which 
would help get and buy commercial-off-the-shelf, while at the 
same time serve as supporting private sector R&D enhanced 
capabilities.
    Mr. Zakheim. Completely agree.
    Mr. Langevin. So thank you for that input.
    Ms. Spanberger--Ms. Smithberger, in your testimony, you 
mention that newer weapons systems are too expensive to upgrade 
and will quickly become irrelevant legacies. How can building 
open software architecture systems avoid costly upgrades? I 
think we are too hardware centric right now, and we really do 
need to be more software centric, but what is your perspective?
    Ms. Smithberger. I think that is a major opportunity for us 
to be able to have cost savings to encourage competition down 
the line and for us to take as many market forces as possible 
to help reduce costs.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. I am not going to have time to get 
to my next question, so, at this point, I will yield back and 
submit the other one for the record, but thank you all to your 
testimony. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Zakheim, it is great to see you, and I remember when 
your father would testify here in committee, so like father, 
like son.
    Mr. Zakheim. I hope so, but thank you for that.
    Mr. Lamborn. My colleague and friend, Joe Wilson, already 
did a great job of addressing the needs with the west Pacific. 
The Indo-Pacific region the last three administrations, 
including this one, are now concentrating more on, but we are 
not really funding everything that is required, and he 
mentioned some examples of what is not being funded. But do you 
think we could be doing a better job of working to make sure 
that Taiwan, which is probably a flashpoint, if there is one 
anywhere in the world, of potential for World War III, you 
know, God forbid. It is one of several flashpoints. That we can 
do a better job of partnering with them so that they could at 
least give a credible, if not prevent completely, at least 
prevent a huge cost deterrent to China for any kind of 
threatened invasion.
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. The short answer to 
your question is yes, and this----
    Mr. Lamborn. And what would that specifically be?
    Mr. Zakheim. Sure. First, I think it is not just hard 
power, but it is a soft power too. Very important for the Biden 
administration to continue to support Taiwan in terms of policy 
statements and the like.
    On the military side, you have got to be cognizant of what 
Admiral Davidson said, that this is a near-term problem. 
Someone on this committee has characterized this as the 
Davidson window, and so making sure that we have capability 
today, and we're not taking capability out of our Navy and that 
it is present; it is kind of peacetime missions, but we know it 
is--this is the center of gravity for the competition is the 
key piece that we need to invest in. So making sure our assets 
are present in the region and making sure we are exercising in 
the region, demonstrating that we have the capability and the 
will to defend Taiwan should such a scenario be required, but, 
most importantly, to convince the Chinese Communist Party that 
they shouldn't exploit this window that Admiral Davidson shared 
with this committee.
    Mr. Lamborn. Well, I want to be real specific about how we 
actually get that job done. Ms. Pettyjohn talked about long-
range munitions. I think that that is a piece of the puzzle. 
You mentioned earlier underwater capabilities. I think that is 
a piece of the puzzle. What about anti-ship mining technology, 
can we do better there? Anti-ship missiles, can we do better 
there? And short-range air power?
    Mr. Zakheim. I think all of that is important. I mean, the 
anti-access aerial denial issue has only become more 
complicated since the time I had the chance to work with you 
when I was on the staff of this committee. It is one that is 
quite a complicated thicket. Our fighter aircraft is challenged 
in the Taiwan scenario. That is no secret. We need to be able 
to have long-range munitions to deter any Chinese aggression 
there. So all the things that you have outlined are spot-on, 
but I want to emphasize it is so important that this is not 
something we are communicating that we can handle in 5 years' 
time or 7 years' time outside the FYDP [Future Years Defense 
Program]. We need to demonstrate we have the will and 
capability today, and the budget put forward before this 
committee needs to reflect that too.
    Mr. Lamborn. And, lastly, changing gears entirely, NATO 
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Russia. Can we be 
doing a better job of providing to our partners and allies in 
Europe, Eastern and Western Europe, what it takes to give a 
huge, credible deterrent against an aggressive Russia?
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, I am glad you raised Russia. It 
seems, you know, to be a far second, and it should be kind of a 
closer second in conversations, particularly in this window 
that I am discussing. Yes. You know, there seems to be this 
kind of incongruence between allies that have the will but 
don't have the capability and allies that have, let's say, the 
capability or the means but don't have the will to defend 
themselves, and that is really the challenge within NATO. 
Poland should be able to have land-based capabilities that we 
sell to them. We need to do more with the Balts in the same 
vein. There are foreign military sales opportunities that I am 
hopeful this administration will deliver for those allies 
willing to defend themselves. And then, of course, particularly 
when it comes to Russia, exercises, joint exercises in that 
region, are a very important message and form of deterrence.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Khanna is recognized. Is he here? You need to unmute 
yourself, Mr. Khanna. At least that is what my staff is telling 
me. Actually, I don't think we have Mr. Khanna. I think I am 
misinformed there.
    So Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Pardon. I apologize.
    Mr. Khanna. I am here.
    Ms. Slotkin. Oh.
    The Chairman. Sorry. A voice from beyond.
    Mr. Khanna, you are with us?
    Mr. Khanna. Yes. I have been here. Was I not on--was I on 
mute?
    The Chairman. Yeah. I believe you were, but you are now 
recognized for 5 minutes. Go ahead.
    Mr. Khanna. Okay. Sorry about that.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing. I would 
like to start by noting that, you know, we have one person from 
the Reagan Institute who wants an increase in the defense 
budget; another witness who is saying, well, we want more 
money, not calling for an increase specifically; and only one 
really witness who is calling for a decrease. So I hope for 
future hearings that we will have a greater diversity.
    The Chairman. Will the gentleman yield for just one moment?
    Mr. Khanna. Sure.
    The Chairman. Just for the record, that was not our intent. 
Okay?
    Mr. Khanna. I am not questioning your intent.
    The Chairman. I am sorry. We are pausing your time. I will 
just get through this. I can't exactly say how that played out, 
but it was not our expectation. Our expectation actually was to 
have one person who said we could reduce it, one person said we 
increase it, one person to defend President Biden's budget. We 
had a heck of a time finding anyone to defend President Biden's 
budget, just as you would have had a heck of a time finding 
anyone to defend President Trump's budget.
    Nobody--I have been through four Presidents in 25 years. 
Nobody ever supports the budget that you actually have to write 
down. Okay? You know, we could all theoretically talk about 
this, that, and the other stuff, but if you are the unfortunate 
soul who has to actually put it in writing, you know, we have 
done this back and forth. Nobody has ever defended any 
President's budget. So, for the new Republicans on the 
committee who think, oh, see, that proves that Biden's budget 
is terrible. No. It proves that every single President's 
budget, because it actually has to be written down, it has to 
add up, you have to have the details, you don't have all of 
that comfortable gray space to play around in gets more 
difficult. So it was our hope to have this be more balanced. 
And I do apologize to the committee for not having achieved 
that, but it was not our intent for this to play out the way it 
did.
    But that is why we have got you, Ro. You can carry all the 
weight on the other side right now. So we will restart your 
time.
    Mr. Khanna. Mr. Chairman, I have great respect for your 
integrity and your leadership, and I certainly don't want to 
imply that you or the staff would not have a balanced hearing. 
That was not my intent. My intent is just that somehow we don't 
agree on the President's budgets, but the defense budget keeps 
going up and up and up. It is sort of like the law of gravity, 
an immutable rule in Washington other than when President 
Clinton was there and President Bush, Sr., and I do think there 
are many organizations who are about strategic ways of reducing 
the defense while maintaining a strong national security.
    Let me begin with Mr. Zakheim. Mr. Zakheim, I appreciate 
your testimony. I have read your statement very carefully. What 
was President Reagan's budget inflation adjusted at the peak of 
the Cold War for defense?
    Mr. Zakheim. Well, what I have here in my notes is, in 
1985, it was about 5.7 percent of GDP [gross domestic product]. 
That is the best I can answer you now.
    Mr. Khanna. So $610 billion inflation adjusted; that would 
be about $110 billion. One of the things--I disagree very 
strongly with President Reagan, but one of the things I often 
say is that he confronted a challenges that were unprecedented 
with the Cold War and had a huge challenge of national 
security.
    Do you really believe that we have more national security 
challenges today than President Reagan confronted in 1985?
    Mr. Zakheim. I do, sir. And here is why: The challenge with 
Soviet Union best I can understand was fundamentally military 
challenge. We have a similar military challenge facing the 
Chinese Communist Party, but what the Chinese Communist Party 
has that the Soviet Union does not have or did not have is this 
overwhelming economy that is rivaling and will potentially 
outpace the U.S. economy.
    So they have the combination of economic power and military 
power that the Soviet Union did not possess. In fact, as you 
know----
    Mr. Khanna. I don't want to cut you off because I have a 
time limit and I would love to engage in the conversation more 
broadly. I disagree that China poses a more serious military 
threat than the Soviet Union did in the 1980s. I think George 
Shultz would disagree. Unfortunately, he has passed. 
Economically, I agree with you, but I think the--to think that 
China either is spending as much militarily as the Soviet Union 
was or poses a greater threat than what the Soviet Union did I 
think is to underestimate actually what President Reagan 
confronted, but it is a longer conversation.
    I just do want to point out that the budget is about $110 
billion more that it was at the peak and height of the Cold 
War. And, you know, I want to turn to Ms. Mandy Smithberger 
because you have done a lot of work, you were very helpful with 
our TransDigm hearing where we had a company that was basically 
ripping off taxpayers in a bipartisan way with the chairman's 
leadership, at the time Representative Meadows and 
Representative Jordan's leadership. We got them to pay back $16 
million to the U.S. Government because they were monopolizing 
industry parts and then charging a thousand percent more to the 
American taxpayers.
    Could you talk about the defense contractors? People often 
say, where can we cut? And I agree; look, there are people on 
the committee who disagree with my view on not needing to 
modernize nuclear weapons. But could you talk about the place 
where we can cut, which is the defense contractors? The CEOs 
[chief executive officers] there make $20 million a year. They 
are not the ones wearing the uniform, risking their lives, you 
know. It reminds me of ``All My Sons,'' the Arthur Miller 
novel. The people who are making the money aren't the ones 
risking their lives. There are a lot of Members on this 
committee, Honorable Members, who have risked their lives. I 
have tremendous admiration for them, but the defense 
contractors making $20 million a year, CEOs; average executive, 
$5 million a year. Why can't we cut that? It is outrageous, and 
how much would we save?
    Ms. Smithberger. So we could save tens of billions of 
dollars if we reduced our reliance on the what we refer to as 
the shadow workforce or service contractors. And I think if we 
had a goal of trying to acquire systems that are less complex, 
that are easier to maintain so that our own personnel can 
maintain them, that we would be both more lethal and more 
effective as a consequence. And in the TransDigm instance, I 
would say that we really do need to strengthen our acquisition 
laws so that taxpayers don't continue to get ripped off, that 
we want to make sure that when something is considered a 
commercial item that is truly commercial that is sold in like 
quantities on the market in too many instances, suddenly 
something is characterized as commercial, then the price goes 
up a 100 percent, and we are not able to challenge that 
information to make sure that we are paying a fair price. These 
are small things that add up, and these are not areas that we 
should be wasting money.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman is recognized.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 
our witnesses for joining us today.
    Mr. Zakheim, I would like to start with you. I look at this 
year's fiscal year 2022 budget and see that all four of the 
service branches have a reduction in end strength. And, listen, 
we know the Air Force because of personnel moving over to Space 
Force, their reduction is smaller, but they still have 
exacerbated issues with pilots and maintainers to make sure 
they have what they need.
    The Marine Corps has kind of accepted a smaller and leaner 
force, but, listen, the Commandant still, I think, speaks about 
how the Marine Corps has to reconstitute itself in order to 
make sure they are relevant in the areas that they need to be 
today. We talk all the time about a Navy that has to grow in 
capability and capacity, yet we see a shorting of at-sea 
billets in the Navy. So, you know, we are seeing the two curves 
going in different directions. More platforms, fewer people 
operating those platforms. We see that exacerbated with 
collisions and also the problem of burning out our most 
talented with long deployments, and we have seen double-pumping 
deployments.
    I mean, I can go on and on about those particular issues, 
and up until this year, the Army's billets continue to grow. So 
the question is, is in relation to what we face, the challenges 
in the Indo-Pacific, are the budget priorities right with where 
we are in reducing end strength in these different areas? Are 
we truly tailoring our forces based on end strength for the 
next fight? And do we maybe need a little more drastic resource 
reallocation based on us still hanging over from a CENTCOM 
[U.S. Central Command]-centric directive that the Department of 
Defense has continued to put in place for now almost two 
decades?
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, great question. I think when it 
comes to the CENTCOM-centric mentality, it is one that this 
committee I know has exercised oversight over, and it needs to 
continue. And that plays out both on the issues you have 
outlined in terms of the demand for ground forces, for example, 
versus investing in end strength across the Marine Corps, Navy, 
and Air Force, as you have outlined. And, of course, it is not 
limited to that.
    ISR requirements, the movement of assets, aircraft carrier 
comes to mind, out of INDOPACOM into CENTCOM, all of that needs 
to be revisited. And it is an area of the National Defense 
Strategy that the Pentagon has not done enough work on, which 
is not how do we reduce our presence or capability in the 
Middle East, for example; how do we do it differently so the 
high end assets go to INDOPACOM? I would align with what you 
are saying and highlight that point.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Zakheim. I want to 
now talk a little bit more in depth about the issue of the 
total picture of our Nation's defense. President Eisenhower 
once said, you will not find it difficult to prove that 
battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost 
primarily because of logistics. You know, we all get focused on 
combat systems and all those fancy elements, but in order to 
make things work, logistics is key.
    We have a regular Army now nearing 481,000 soldiers, and 
there is not a proper sealift capacity. So, if you have the 
best Army in the world and you can't get them to the fight, the 
question is, are we really doing the things necessary to 
achieve our strategic goals to deter China?
    And I know that sealift is technically a Navy requirement, 
but the Navy never really has been interested in that. It is 
kind of like: Hey, we are in the warship business. You know, we 
are going to be at the fight. We really don't care how 
everybody else gets to the fight.
    And I am just being brutally honest about what I think 
things are. The question now becomes, shouldn't the Army be a 
little more involved in advocating to say, whoa, whoa, wait a 
minute. What are we doing about logistics? What are we doing 
about making sure that we can get to the fight, that we have 
our soldiers at the fight, that we have our equipment at the 
fight? Because it seems like, you know, everybody is pointing 
fingers at each other. You know, logistics is yours. Sealift is 
yours. Airlift is yours. And nobody seems to really be focused 
on it, yet the service branch that is most at risk to me is the 
Army. Can you comment on that?
    Mr. Zakheim. I think it is a great point. When I was on the 
NDS [National Defense Strategy] Commission, the most impactful 
briefing didn't come from Central Command, didn't come from at 
the time PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command]; it came from TRANSCOM 
[U.S. Transportation Command]. Because as you pointed out, they 
have to figure out how to get our capability to the fight. That 
is why forward presence is so important, but I think--yes, I 
agree with you. I think the Army needs to internalize it, but 
TRANSCOM is where I would go. And in the end, we rely on 
contractors to do this. I mean, as you know, it is something 
that the military departments have looked outside the force to 
answer.
    Mr. Wittman. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I want to thank all 
the witnesses for being here today.
    When I came to Congress, I was appalled at how little 
comprehensive audits had been done for the Department over the 
years, and oftentimes, over the years, I would hear about all 
these skirmishes about wanting to get audits for various 
agencies for the Federal Government, and it was just appalling 
for me to hear all the spending we do in our military, but yet 
we weren't as committed to making sure all our spending was 
being done in the most appropriate way. So it did catch my 
attention.
    Ms. Smithberger, with the Department having undergone its 
third annual audit in 2020, I would like to know from your 
independent analysis the most important lessons learned so far? 
In addition, could you speak further to the recommendation in 
your testimony on how the Department can make changes to 
service contracting that would result in cost savings without 
compromising military readiness? And I know you touched on that 
a little bit, but if you could elaborate a little bit more, 
that would be great.
    Ms. Smithberger. Thank you so much for the question. So, on 
the audit, I think one of the things that we are learning is 
that we actually have very weak internal controls, that we are 
not always able to keep track of everything that we have 
purchased. And I think--a theme that we have seen throughout 
this hearing is that we focus so much on platforms, that we 
often forget about the other management issues that need to be 
a priority at the Department to make sure that we are being 
responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.
    When it comes to service contracting, one of the biggest 
challenges that we have is that we actually don't track the 
data about how much we spend on service contracts, and we 
haven't set up a good process for the Department to make smart 
decisions about when to outsource something versus when to do 
something else. And never mind having a process; what if we 
just shouldn't do it period?
    I think the other thing we are seeing over and over is that 
we are asking the Department to do too much, and I would be 
happy to work with you on some of the ways--we thought the Army 
was doing a lot of great work on helping to build systems where 
we could make smarter decisions about service contracting, and, 
unfortunately, those have really fallen apart.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I would submit that as committed 
as we all are to our national security, we are remiss in not 
being as committed to making sure that we have more 
accountability and transparency in how we go about our 
spending. So I really appreciate your feedback.
    Dr. Pettyjohn, what are the most important investments in 
fiscal year 2022 budget that provide assurances to our allies?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. There are a number of investments that 
provide assurances to our allies, and I think you have to think 
of assurance as across time, not just immediately. Our allies 
have become accustomed to the fact that we assure them by being 
there with bases or military forces that rotate forward. And we 
are doing that, and we are taking steps in the fiscal year 2022 
budget to improve the resiliency and capabilities of the 
posture in Europe to a lesser extent than I would like to see 
in the Pacific as well, but our allies should also be assured 
by the fact that we are taking steps to modernize and to put in 
place a force that would be able to prevail in a conflict 
should one occur because that strengthens deterrence.
    Having forces that are not capable that are forward have 
been shown, what is often called a trip wire, are not actually 
effective deterrence. So there are a number of steps that we 
are taking here that should be quite reassuring to our allies.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Zakheim.
    Mr. Zakheim. Quick addition, sir. Resiliency, right, 
distributing the force. So not pocketing in one area, and I 
think our nuclear modernization is key. The extended deterrence 
we provide both to our allies in Europe and in Asia is critical 
for assurance.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Dr. Pettyjohn, in your perspective, how can fiscal year 
2022 budget better balance the needs to preserve present 
readiness with long-term goals, including investments in 
emerging technologies? In addition, are there any programs or 
areas that you think the Department is overinvesting in?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Thank you, Congressman. I do think 
preserving readiness is important. You have heard Generals 
Berger and Brown argue that we need to shift our mindset about 
readiness. We obviously don't want a force that is not prepared 
for the potential missions that it might be called on to fight, 
but we have gotten in the habit of considering ready forces 
ready to deploy and sending them on purely presence missions or 
to the Middle East to deal with insurgents or terrorists, and 
as we look to focus on great power competitors----
    The Chairman. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired. So we will move on.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Sure.
    The Chairman. Mr. Kelly is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all you 
witness for being here.
    I just want to go back to an earlier point that you made, 
Mr. Zakheim. China is much more dangerous in my opinion than 
Russia ever was, and it is not just because of their economy; 
it is also because of their diplomatic efforts. Russia never 
had good allies that weren't forced to be allies. China is 
doing a much better job at at least trying to incorporate 
allies. We are still way ahead in that game, but China is 
improving.
    Information, which is part of the DIME [diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic], they also are very far 
advanced in that area, much farther and greater, I think, than 
Russia was in the height of the Soviet Union. Also, their 
military and obviously their economic.
    I do want to talk just a little bit--in this budget, the 
President's budget, there is $617 million for climate change. I 
am a climate change--I am all for climate change, but not in 
the military budget. That is $617 million that does not go to 
building ships, to research and development, to paying 
soldiers, to maintaining equipment.
    So do you consider that part of the defense budget when it 
is not for defense?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thanks for that question. I don't know 
specifically where that $600 million is going. I do think it is 
important, like, when you think about the case of the Arctic, 
that if climate change is having an impact there, which it is, 
that our military needs to be ready to make that another area 
for the competition. It is clear that is where Russia is 
seeking to exploit. That to me is an important nexus point 
between climate change and the U.S. military.
    Last point on climate change, sir, it is a new mission. It 
is one that this administration wants to emphasize. So we need 
to be clear in how that is going to impact policy and budgets.
    Mr. Kelly. And I am fine with doing that. I just think that 
the defense budget is not the place to do that. There are other 
places. I want to talk a little bit--we have always fought the 
last war, been prepared to fight the last war. If you go back 
to World War II--I mean, World War I, you know, we didn't want 
to use tanks. We didn't want to use planes because they were 
unproven. We just wanted to use grunts on the ground. If you go 
back to World War II, we had all these great battleships, but 
we were not prepared for the carrier war. If you look--every 
one we transfer, and so my question is, we have to be ready and 
prepared to fight tonight. That is maintaining legacy systems, 
the systems we have. We cannot divest in those until we have a 
true product that replaces them. I see right now we are 
managing that risk, but I think people are talking about the 
future about things that we may have, but we don't have yet. We 
have to build real ships, real airplanes, real drones, real--
all those things, but we are talking about concepts that people 
aren't doing.
    So are we really preparing for the future? Are we investing 
in the right things? Are we replacing systems--are we replacing 
them when we have something to replace them with, or are we 
replacing them with ideas that may or may not come to fruition?
    Mr. Zakheim. I agree with those comments, sir, and I think 
you have to--I will bring up General Milley's testimony before 
this committee that this budget has a bias towards future 
operating environments, that is to say that they are going to 
absorb risk. This budget absorbs risk in the near-term. And 
when you think about the Davidson window, that could be a 
strategic mistake on our part because that may be where the 
Chinese Communist Party would seek to exploit. And if they do 
seek to exploit in that window, we are going to need the types 
of capabilities that are in the inventory today, and we ought 
to be careful not to remove them unless, as you point out, 
there is something else that can be in the inventory to replace 
it.
    Mr. Kelly. And the final point I just want to make is I 
think we have to be prepared to fight today. I think that is 
necessary, but I also think we have got to redo the way we 
acquire stuff in the military. We acquire ideas. We need to go 
after capabilities, be very specific, and we need professional 
contract lawyers not generals running the acquisition program 
who take them to task and make them--if they say they are going 
to deliver this for X dollars, then they deliver that, or we 
don't pay the contract. But we also owe a duty to our 
industrial base that when we ask them to do something and 
commit for them to build something, we can't then withdraw the 
contract and lay people off by the thousands because we changed 
our mind or we want something new and more shiny.
    So how can we reinvent the acquisition system to get 
professionals who are doing the contracts who get us the 
products that we want and deserve at the cost that we agree to?
    Mr. Zakheim. Well, I am going to channel President Reagan 
here. Competition is the only thing that increases quality, all 
right, and increases the quantity, right, with the price going 
down. That is where I would go follow.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Slotkin.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thanks to the witnesses for being here. Mr. 
Zakheim, good to see you again. I guess if you can help me 
understand you're calling for this 3 to 5 percent increase in 
the top line. Can you fill in, show your math a little bit? 
Where did that number come from? What is the basis of that?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you. It is great to see you, 
Representative Slotkin. It is from General Dunford and 
Secretary Mattis, and it was actually their testimony before 
this committee what was required to sustain the previous 
defense program, that is the program before we had the 2018 
National Defense Strategy. On top of that for this year's 
budget, you have the unfunded requirement, as well as deeper 
investments in the RDT&E [research, development, test, and 
evaluation] accounts where I have emphasized and then holding 
off on the legacy platforms this budget would take out in terms 
of ships and aircraft and the like. You do that and you quickly 
go to the kind of end pocket of that 5 percent real growth. You 
are way beyond $50 billion.
    Ms. Slotkin. And so, you know, if the top line weren't 
raised--I mean, I think we can probably both agree and probably 
all of our witnesses agree that it is not like there is not fat 
in the Pentagon budget, right? There is fat in there. There is 
no way. So, given that you are not in government, you are not a 
HASC staffer any more, tell us what you would do if you were 
king for the day and had to make up that 3 to 5 percent by 
cutting from existing fat?
    Mr. Zakheim. First, I would thank you for the opportunity 
to be king for the day.
    Ms. Slotkin. You are welcome.
    Mr. Zakheim. It doesn't happen anywhere, especially my 
home. But it is manage radically inside the Department and let 
the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] and the President of 
the United States publicly tell the Secretary of Defense that 
whatever you find, you get to reinvest. And this has been a 
consistent failure--you have seen in your time in government 
where the Department of Defense was told to find savings that 
they could reuse, both Republican and Democratic 
administrations, and ultimately OMB said, ``I would like to 
take that back.''
    Where would I put it? R&E [research and engineering] is a 
key place. Obviously, some money towards readiness.
    Ms. Slotkin. No. Where would you take it from? We all have 
ideas of where we would put it. It is taking it that is the 
problem. So you are not up for re-election here, so why don't 
you tell us where you would take it from.
    Mr. Zakheim. All right. I would go into programs of record, 
and I would compete the hell out of them. The program of record 
is the single most--I think the biggest obstacle towards 
finding savings and introducing new capabilities. It hasn't 
been revisited in decades. So take it from the inefficiencies 
in programs of record. They block new ideas, and they drive 
inertia and ultimately waste.
    Ms. Slotkin. You know, I have kind of come to this idea 
when it comes to, for instance, competition with China. You 
know, it is sort of like it is them not us. Our system is so 
bureaucratic, so big, so slow to acquire new technology, so 
difficult to understand our supply chains, as Mr. Gallagher and 
I have been looking at, that we are more bureaucratic than 
China for various reasons. Of course, we are a democracy.
    Are there processes at the Defense Department that should 
be changed in order to save money, not just programs of record, 
right, a big system, for instance, but processes?
    Mr. Zakheim. I think the budget process needs to be changed 
radically. You have to go back to Secretary McNamara in terms 
of the process the Department follows today. Now, obviously, I 
am channeling a different Zakheim here in terms of expertise, 
but it is mind-boggling that we have $715 billion budget and we 
are using a budget process that comes from the 1960s. Fortune 
500 companies, small companies, would look at our process and 
laugh. I mean, the fact that you are preparing a budget 2 years 
in advance and it doesn't account for any changes in real time 
because it just doesn't allow for it, immediately to me screams 
out that that needs to be radically reformed.
    Ms. Slotkin. Great. Thank you.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. For the members' information, we 
have got the comptroller, Mr. McCord, coming over to talk to us 
tomorrow, 11 o'clock, for a briefing on precisely that issue, 
that 2-year budgeting process. Because when you are talking 
about innovation's happening a lot faster, and we are losing 
out on a lot. We do the R&D, we develop the technology, and it 
is okay, two years from now, we will tell you whether or not we 
are going to buy it, and it disappears. So we really need to 
reform that process. The appropriators are incredibly hostile 
to the idea of reforming that process. They like to control it. 
But here is where I think congressional control is undermining 
what we need to do to really spend money efficiently at the 
Pentagon. So that is a recommendation for tomorrow's briefing, 
11 a.m. with Mr. McCord.
    Mr. Gallagher, you are recognized.
    Mr. Gallagher. It has taken us an hour and a half, talking 
about threats to America, I am glad we finally identified that 
the appropriators are among them.
    The Chairman. For the record, that is not what I said.
    Mr. Gallagher. That is what I chose to hear.
    Let's talk a little bit about the Davidson window. I wish I 
would have trademarked the term, Mr. Zakheim, but I am glad 
that you mentioned it. I assume, based on your comments, that 
you agree with what Admiral Davidson said in terms of within 
the next 6 years, the Taiwan scenario could be likely and maybe 
talk specifically about how you think the Olympics plays in 
that?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. And I should have 
footnoted you on the Davidson window, but yeah. I defer to 
Admiral Davidson. He has seen it in the ops and intel more 
closely than I have, but I do think if I am China, the window 
is post-Olympics. 2022 is going to be a huge propaganda 
platform for the Chinese Communist Party. Once they get that, 
the endorsements, the participation, then they will feel the 
confidence and the risk profile goes down, given that they 
would have already achieved the Olympics. So I would look kind 
of after 2022. And I think it brings before this Congress 
perhaps not within jurisdiction of this committee to really 
think deeply about what the United States should or should not 
be doing vis-a-vis the Olympics in China.
    Mr. Gallagher. I guess for the rest of the panel, do you 
disagree with Admiral Davidson's assessment, or maybe put 
differently, do you disagree that it makes sense, regardless of 
how likely or unlikely you think an attempted invasion of 
Taiwan is, do you think it still makes sense to plan around 
that most dangerous course of action by the PLA, if that makes 
sense?
    Ms. Smithberger. Go ahead. Dr. Pettyjohn.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I am sorry. Please.
    Mr. Gallagher. Go ahead.
    Ms. Smithberger. I think we need to make sure that we are 
not discounting the power of our allies in those kinds of 
circumstances, and I think particularly with the Olympics 
scenario that you are talking about that we should not forget 
about I think there are going to be a lot of opportunities for 
people to remember why China isn't their chosen ally for a lot 
of goals that we all share and how we want rule of law and our 
international system to work.
    So I think there are opportunities for us there in addition 
for things for us to be worried about.
    Mr. Gallagher. Dr. Pettyjohn.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I agree that is a scenario we should be 
focused on and that we have to balance risk across time, but I 
think there are many ways to do that that don't mortgage the 
future because if we focus too much on the present right now, 
we won't be making the investments that we need to modernize 
our capabilities and get those leap-ahead technologies.
    Mr. Gallagher. Since we all agree we should be planning 
around that scenario, I mean, if you had a minute with the 
Secretary of Defense, and he asked, what is sort of the one 
thing we could do to deter, not win the conflict, deter the 
conflict over Taiwan from happening, what would be that one 
thing? We will start with Mr. Zakheim.
    Mr. Zakheim. In this respect, I think it is a combination 
of presence and policy. Statements that we are there to support 
Taiwan, the free people of Taiwan, and, third thing, weapons 
sales.
    Mr. Gallagher. Ms. Smithberger.
    Ms. Smithberger. I would just reemphasize the policy aspect 
in that, again, that we need to focus on hardening our systems 
so that we can show that we are going to be strong against 
them.
    Mr. Gallagher. Ms. Pettyjohn.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Long-range munitions and improving the 
resiliency of our existing posture in the Pacific.
    Mr. Gallagher. Great. And, finally, Mr. Zakheim, I thought 
your response to Mr. Khanna was quite good in terms of, I 
think, what makes this competition more complex is just the 
economic component of it. My own view is slightly different. I 
think the primary threat is neither military nor economic per 
se, but rather ideological. I think--and I think if you sort of 
interrogate what the CCP has said recently, they have gone to 
school on the failures of the Soviet Union and concluded, Xi 
himself has concluded, that part of the reason they failed was 
insufficient commitment to the party and its ideology.
    And I think the real threat posed by China is that they are 
offering a model that we may not understand as attractive, but 
a lot of people around the world could understand as 
attractive. So that is less of a question, more of a comment, 
but I would be curious if there are any quick lessons based on 
your knowledge of Reagan that we can learn about the nature of 
ideological competition.
    Mr. Zakheim. I think it is actually our advantage because I 
think from the ideological standpoint, freedom wins. And I 
think that is a lesson from Reagan. He started everything with 
the Soviet Union talking about freedom and talking about the 
plights of dissidents before he got into the economic or the 
military issues.
    The Chairman. Ms. Sherrill.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And thank you to all our witnesses 
for being here today.
    Ms. Smithberger, I think it was really interesting you 
pointed out the cost of privatizing so many of the jobs in our 
military. I was in the military at a time when I think just 
about every flag officer made an extra star by privatizing some 
portion of our workforce, and I think we are seeing the results 
of that now. Over the past few months in talking to sustainment 
officers and acquisition officials about the amount of risk we 
are taking on with certain modernization priorities, there are 
places where we are spending so much time and money shoring up 
weaknesses today without enough attention being paid to the 
long-term sustainment costs that these programs are going to 
incur.
    So I think we can all agree that modernization is a 
critical effort, but I am starting to fear that we are boxing 
ourselves in by throwing all of our resources at programs that 
are effectively going to eat our innovation budget in years to 
come. So can all of you provide your assessment of the DOD's 
innovation enterprise? Are we investing in a cost-effective 
way? Are we prioritizing short-term gains at the cost of long-
term sustainability?
    I just would be very interested in your thoughts in that 
area. Thank you.
    Ms. Smithberger. I will go ahead and go first. So I think 
one thing I would really underscore is, as we pursue this 
innovation, something that the Department is starting to 
emphasize more that I hope Congress will support, is that we 
get the intellectual property rights for some of these things 
because that is going to really be key to being able to control 
costs later down the line, and that is, again, where I think it 
is important to have some real budget consequences for some of 
these kinds of programs as well because I think that, without 
that, we are going to continue to see poor performance, to see 
programs have huge cost overruns, and that is going to eat into 
other priorities. I think accountability is just so important.
    Ms. Sherrill. And what do you see as the consequences in 
program areas that we do not have the IP [intellectual 
property] rights per our contract?
    Ms. Smithberger. So that is where you get the TransDigm 
kinds of situations where you get companies that are able to 
buy the suppliers for these different kinds of parts and where 
we see prices go hugely over cost where we aren't able to get 
cost or pricing information that we need to in order to be able 
to control those costs, where we don't have the kind of 
acquisition workforce that we need and have them be empowered, 
or probably underinvesting in the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
[DCAA] as well. I think if you know that there is going to be 
someone looking over your shoulder, you are going to be a much 
better steward.
    Mr. Zakheim. Just a little bit of disagreement there. I 
think if we are trying to modernize the force for the digital 
era, we need to introduce software. Software in the commercial 
sector is all about maintaining the IP. The way that I think we 
could incentivize those low prices or lower prices is by having 
competition in the program of record when it comes to software. 
I think that is a much better course of action than trying to 
own the IP and asking DCAA to enforce. I think that has failed 
us when hardware was the rule for acquisition. I would not 
recommend it when it comes to software.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I would just add that, in terms of the 
innovation enterprise, you see that you want to innovate by 
encouraging the services to compete and fostering a healthy 
competition among them, and I think that Deputy Secretary Hicks 
is attempting to do that, to encourage them to--and reward them 
with a larger share of the budget if they come up with 
innovative and cost-effective ideas that make a difference on 
the battlefield.
    I would also point out that the operations and maintenance 
costs of our older weapons are growing significantly and are 
one of the big things that consumes a large portion of the 
budget today.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And, Dr. Pettyjohn, I can't help 
but ask if you would just expound a little bit upon your 
comment that we need to focus on long-range munitions, 
something really, I think, critical to our workforce in my 
district?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Absolutely. In all of the war games I have 
run, we have run out of munitions, we don't have the right 
ones, which means we have to put our forces at risk. So we need 
long-range anti-ship missiles. We need long-range anti-surface 
missiles and anti-radiation and anti-armor munitions. That 
means we can launch strikes from farther away and enhance the 
survivability of our forces.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you so much.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And appreciate our 
panelists today. My first question is to Mr. Zakheim, and then 
I have got some other general questions for the whole panel. I 
think the current administration and the previous one has made 
a very strong case why we need to have a military focused on 
China. The rising threat to include the economic side of it and 
the military side, and there is portions of their military that 
are more advanced than ours, like hypersonic weapons. What 
concerns me, though, is the actions do not match the words in 
this administration.
    This budget is a 1.7 percent increase in spending, and it 
was made at a time we had 2 to 2.5 percent inflation. So, Mr. 
Zakheim, to me, that equates to about a $5 billion cut. What is 
the analysis you have there?
    Mr. Zakheim. I think your numbers are accurate. If you are 
not growing, you are falling behind, and particularly in a 
competition. And that is why today I have advocated for the 
recommendation from the National Defense Strategy Commission to 
see that top line not only have real growth, but get this 3 or 
5 percent window, I think a lot of the capabilities that my 
colleagues today have said we need, not just to prevail in the 
strategy in the Middle East and Europe, we may absorb risk 
there even at a 5 percent increase scenario, but to at least do 
what we need to do in the Indo-Pacific, we are absolutely going 
to need real growth.
    Mr. Bacon. So, in reality, we are looking at about a 1 
percent cut in our defense budget at the time this budget was 
made. Now this month we are looking at 5 percent inflation, and 
I saw a number yesterday, 7 percent. We are talking a $30 
billion to $40 billion cut in real terms if those numbers hold 
true.
    Again, the actions of this administration is not matching 
the words of trying to get a budget that meets the Chinese 
threat, and I think we have to make that clear. One more 
question for Mr. Zakheim. Is our budget taking us in the right 
direction to sustain our nuclear modernization particularly in 
the ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thanks for that question. This budget fully 
funds. It is a $28 billion towards modernization. I think this 
committee and no doubt the oversight will do this, look at this 
Nuclear Posture Review. There is some language in the Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance which suggests that the 
administration wants to rely less on nuclear weapons. My own 
view from the National Defense Strategy Commission is that it 
plays an even more important role, given what we are trying to 
do by focusing on China.
    Mr. Bacon. Ms. Pettyjohn, you talk about long-range fires. 
Does the B-21 factor at large with your analysis there?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Absolutely. Bombers, including the next-
generation bomber, the B-21, are important in terms of being 
able to deliver some of those missiles, although we would be 
looking at finding better and preferred munitions for most of 
our platforms as a way of enhancing their capability.
    Mr. Bacon. I know the Army's been talking about long-range 
surface-to-surface missiles, there is a basing issue, but where 
do you see that piece fit into the puzzle?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I do think that there is an access challenge 
in the Pacific right now with respect to Army missiles. You do 
imagine that they could be useful in some situations for 
hitting fixed targets early in a conflict, but they are 
reasonably expensive and need to have a lot of range in the 
Pacific because it is a very large theater.
    Mr. Bacon. I am the co-chair of the Baltic Security Caucus. 
So really to any one of the panelists here, are we doing enough 
to deter for our three Baltic countries? Is there more that we 
should be doing? Curious for your assessment.
    Mr. Zakheim. I had an opportunity to go to Lithuania pre-
COVID. Seems like a long time ago, but it wasn't that long ago. 
Military sales are critical; cooperation on cyber, which this 
committee led on years ago, continues to be something that they 
focus on; and then the distributed force out of European 
Command, some level of presence there makes a huge difference 
not only in the straight up deterrence by denial concept, but 
also in the psychology and support and assurance of our allies.
    Mr. Bacon. Anyone else?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I would just add that the Army is making 
improvements, and it is stocking the prepositioned heavy 
equipment in Europe, but it is still in Western Europe, and it 
has to get to the east in the event of a conflict. So we could 
do more in terms of putting heavy Army forces farther or 
forward to the east and make sure that they have the right 
enablers in terms of air defenses and rocket artillery that is 
long-range enough to allow them to overmatch the Russians.
    Mr. Bacon. I will just close on this point. I have asked 
the administration to consider some permanent basing options 
for the Baltics because, ultimately, U.S. flag is probably the 
most important thing for deterrence.
    So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 minutes. You are muted, or 
at least we can't hear you at any rate. So, if there is a way 
to unmute there; thoughts? Go ahead. Nope. Sorry. You have 
technical problems, and we are not hearing you. We will attempt 
to resolve those technical problems here shortly.
    And, with that, I will recognize Mr. Courtney while we try 
to resolve those problems. We will get back to Ms. Jacobs if we 
can.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So this year, actually, is the first year of full official 
production of what I think a lot of the leaders in the 
Department of Defense have described as the country's number 
one acquisition program, which is the Columbia program. And 
good news, Ms. Smithberger. The 85 percent design completion 
before production and lot of prototyping, knock on wood. You 
know, we are going to see some of the issues that you raised 
addressed, but, again, we are looking now, you know, 
prospectively between now and well into the 2030s of about $5 
billion to $6 billion a year. I mean, this is just a big 
program. And it is a must-do program, I think, is pretty 
widespread agreement across the board.
    Back in 2015, Congress passed the National Sea-Based 
Deterrence Fund [NSBDF], which was a piece of legislation 
recognizing the fact that this expenditure is just going to sit 
on the shipbuilding account year in and year out, even though 
it is a platform which carries about 70 percent of our nuclear 
stock--available stockpile and, frankly, isn't really part of 
the Navy. It reports to Strategic Command not to--through the 
channels there. It also created multiyear authorities that 
created efficiencies that, again, is one of the reasons why I 
think it appears to be a promising program in terms of avoiding 
wasteful funding and giving supply chain folks, you know, 
confidence that they can, you know, do the work that they need 
to do in terms of, you know, as I said, reducing unnecessary 
costs. You know, it is--the NSBDF, which, again, ran into a lot 
of opposition from the appropriators, was a recognition, again, 
that this is a once in a multigeneration moment to deal with a 
program where these boats are going to be on patrol till the 
2080s. I just was curious whether Mr. Zakheim or Pettyjohn have 
any comments regarding whether this approach that Congress 
enacted, it is law right now, but it has not been fully 
embraced by the Pentagon in terms of making it a special 
account recognizing what we thought was a strategic program as 
opposed to necessarily a shipbuilding program. Just curious 
what your take is if you can comment.
    Mr. Zakheim. Sure. And I remember when you and I think 
Congressman Forbes and others pushed this forward rightly 
seeing, looking around the corner knowing that this needed to 
be prioritized. I mean, your work on the Columbia class and 
then the fast boats Virginia class and demonstrating to 
everybody how multiyears helped the industrial base and 
actually helped bring costs down has been instrumental in the 
undersea capability. To me, whether you have--I would support 
any approach that maximizes shipbuilding in any form.
    Now, whether you go with the fund that you have proposed or 
doing it out of the shipbuilding accounts doesn't really matter 
to me other than we need to make sure we are getting maximal 
investment in what everybody agrees is a critical priority, and 
I think the multiyear authorities you put in there are 
absolutely critical. Industry needs that. It is a great message 
to allies and important message to adversaries alike, and we 
tend to get more capability for less money.
    Mr. Courtney. Ms. Pettyjohn, do you have any--
    Dr. Pettyjohn. Sure. I would just add that I think that 
there have been proposals, and I have seen beyond putting all 
of the nuclear forces into their own account to take them out 
of the services budget because we have the modernization bill 
coming due for all three legs of the triad right now, and that 
is taking up a significant portion of the investment budget; 
but that could be a sensible thing to do to pull that out so 
then you can see what is left for your conventional forces.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. I mean, the other advantage of the law 
is that it gives the Pentagon the ability to sweep up funds 
that are unobligated, and, you know, every penny that you can 
use, again, is a penny saved for, again, other shipbuilding 
programs, which, again, we are going through this, again, this 
year in terms of trying to figure out a way, you know, with a 
tight top line to make sure that we, again, address what I 
think is the National Defense Strategy call for maritime 
defense.
    So, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks is recognized.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Zakheim, in the last couple of years, you have been a 
part of two very significant efforts. One was the Future of 
Defense Task Force that was led by this committee that 
Representative Moulton and I both co-chaired. And the other 
effort was something that you led, something I think is very 
significant and deserves a lot more attention, the Reagan 
Institute's Task Force on 21st Century National Security 
Technology and Workforce.
    And in both of those efforts and in both of those reports, 
a lot of attention was drawn to something called the valley of 
death, and I wonder for purposes of this committee if you could 
spend a couple of minutes and explain what the valley of death 
is and provide us with some policy recommendations from the 
Reagan Institute on what we can do to solve it.
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman, and thanks so much for 
your participation on the Reagan Institute Task Force, and 
really kudos to you and Congressman Moulton on the work you did 
on the Future of Defense Task Force. The valley of death is one 
of those metaphors that is spot on accurate. You can't accuse 
it of being kind of overly dramatic. It is when you have 
investments in RDT&E, you have something that might get some 
pilot funding, but it can't enter a program of record. It just 
gets cut out. It can't kind of muscle its way in to where the 
real resources reward a program or an idea. And so it is kind 
of like early venture stage that doesn't get that late round 
funding that allows it to really go big time and get the 
support from an IPO [initial public offering] or private equity 
company. And so, if we can't get those new technologies that we 
are experimenting with to enter a program of record either to 
be a part of or to be its own program record, it will die in 
that valley of death.
    Mr. Banks. What can we do about it? I have heard the valley 
of death term for 5 years as a Member of Congress, and it 
doesn't seem like it is going away.
    Mr. Zakheim. A lot of ink has been spilled on this. The one 
I am thinking about today is integrating it into a program of 
record, competing elements within a program of record to 
introduce these new technologies and capabilities. So it is 
classic competition and really breaking down the stubbornness 
of a program of record not to allow new things in, as opposed 
to--one approach that we heard, you heard in the Future of 
Defense Task Force, which you ran which is, let's just go big 
on perhaps an RDT&E program and give them procurement authority 
is already met. I am fine with that. It just hasn't happened. 
Let's compete within a program of record is the other thing I 
would offer.
    Mr. Banks. And why don't you tell us for purposes of the 
committee, where can Members of Congress and those who are 
paying attention to this hearing today find the Reagan 
Institute's Task Force report?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you for that opportunity. Never walk 
away from self-promotion here for the Reagan Institute. Go into 
the Google machine and write ``Reagan Institute Task Force,'' 
and you will see the recommendations there.
    Mr. Banks. I think it is really important, so I appreciate 
you drawing more attention to that. I know there has been a lot 
of attention today drawn toward the President's overall budget, 
and I wonder, Mr. Zakheim, can you--again, I know it is 
repetitive, but, again, give us a sense of how this budget 
lines up with our greatest and growing concern of a rising 
Chinese military, especially the Chinese Navy. Is this budget 
submission by the Biden administration, is it good enough for 
us to compete with the greatest adversary that we face on the 
globe today?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you for that, Congressman. I think I 
stand with the statement of the Chairman and Joint Chiefs who 
testified before this committee like I mentioned before that 
this budget has a bias toward future operating environments, 
and that bias to me, I understand it to mean, absorbing risk in 
this near-term window. When we think about the Davidson window, 
which I had a chance to discuss with Congressman Gallagher, 
right, we are exposing ourselves too much in the short term, 
and that is reflected in this budget by taking out inventory of 
platforms that could be useful within this 5-year window. So I 
would say that is the biggest highlight I have in terms of what 
the risk is.
    The good thing is, going forward, I think we could do more, 
but I like the investments in RDT&E. It should be celebrated. I 
like the investments in terms of nuclear modernization. But, as 
you know well, Congressman--you have done this work--the near-
term window is one we have to pay very close attention to, and 
if we invite a vulnerability, it very well may be exploited.
    Mr. Banks. I have grave concerns we aren't doing enough, 
but I appreciate that feedback.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We will give Ms. Jacobs another 
try.
    Ms. Jacobs. All right. Can you hear me now?
    The Chairman. Yes, we can. Go ahead.
    Ms. Jacobs. All right. Victory. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And 
thank you to our witnesses for being here. I wanted to start 
with you, Ms. Smithberger. In your written testimony, you say 
you worry that, in too many instances, the proposed Biden 
budget proposes getting rid of proven and cheaper systems in 
favor of immature technology and costly ones. I know we have 
talked a little bit about this already here, but I was 
wondering if you could talk about some examples of that. I know 
on the committee we talk a lot about the question of the 
current Minuteman III system versus, you know, what could it 
come from that with modernization, but I was wondering if you 
could point out some other examples where you think the 
Department is pursuing costly new systems when the current 
systems are adequate?
    Ms. Smithberger. I think one system that we would really 
focus on is the A-10 in relation to the F-35. We already have 
so many of these fighter jets. We already are going through 
testing. There are so many retrofits that we are going to have 
to make based on problems that we are discovering that I don't 
think accelerating acquisition of the F-35 is beneficial to us. 
And while I hope we don't have to keep on fighting ground wars, 
we think the close air support capacity that the A-10 provides 
is an important one.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you so much.
    And, Dr. Pettyjohn, you talk a lot about the risks of 
overstretch and argue that the Biden administration's current 
approach performs poorly against priority threats. Yet you seem 
to support this divest in order to invest since retiring old 
and less capable weapons is necessary to fund modernization. I 
guess, you know, I know that what we have already asked you to 
talk about what places you would divest from, but do you agree 
that many of these new programs are coming in over cost and 
behind schedule? And, you know, in my short time here, we have 
seen a lot of failures whether it is the LCS delays in the DD-
21 [Zumwalt-class land attack destroyer] program, or this 
recent abandonment of the electromagnetic rail gun, just 
examples that we end up spending a lot of money on things that 
don't end up working. And so the tradeoff is really a lot 
harder than just divest to invest because we are actually not 
good at that invest piece either.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I would agree. We don't have a great track 
record lately of investing, and that is one area where the 
Pentagon needs to improve, and I know this administration is 
focused on improving and really pushing forward the defense 
innovation agenda and ensuring that they come up with ways to 
overcome the valley of death.
    So, yes, the recent track record is not great in many 
respects, but at the same time, the weapon systems that we 
have, many of them, are increasingly costly to operate. Every 
single hour that you fly or sail one of these costs more money, 
and that is eating up an increasingly large proportion of the 
budget, which means that we can't make any future investments 
and that we are locked in to these systems that eventually are 
going to go beyond their service life and that we are not going 
to be able to extend.
    So, at some point, we have to figure out how to perform the 
acquisition process and to acquire new platforms in a timely 
manner that perform as promised.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you.
    And, Ms. Smithberger, I don't know if you had anything to 
add around that question of these new programs.
    Ms. Smithberger. I think for a lot of this, it is about 
having discipline in our acquisition process. We don't need 
that many new laws; we need to actually follow the laws that we 
have. And when the Department issues waivers to those laws and 
it increases risk, they need to be reporting to these 
committees about why they are doing so, and that information 
should be made public so that we can make sure that we are 
making responsible decisions.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. Thank you, all.
    And, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Johnson is recognized.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Zakheim, I haven't had the pleasure of working with 
you. Got out here a little late after you left. Glad you are 
back. In your testimony, you asserted that the fiscal year 2022 
budget's top line request is inadequate to support the National 
Defense Strategy, of course, and you correctly pointed out that 
the top line figure actually represents a cut from fiscal year 
2021 levels because it fails to keep pace with inflation, which 
is skyrocketing, and you have called for a 3 to 5 percent 
annual increase in line with the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy.
    So I was just going to see if you could expound a little 
bit more on what will be some of the real world impacts of not 
funding our military at that target level of 3 to 5 percent 
annual growth.
    Mr. Zakheim. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity to 
answer that question. What I have been trying to outline today 
is we are faced with a serious tension between deterring today 
and making investments, I think, everybody on this panel agrees 
we need to make to prevail in a conflict with China in the 
future and to deter them in the future and that the force needs 
to change. The question is, how much risk are we willing to 
absorb today and whether it will be self-defeating because it 
would invite an adversary to exploit that vulnerability?
    The $37 billion to $52 billion that you would get this 
fiscal year at a 3 to 5 percent would allow you to mitigate 
some of that risk while also increasing investments for the 
future. It is important, Congressman, to keep in mind that we 
are not just talking about a one-off for this year, but it 
actually would put you in trajectory that year over year would 
compound and give you additional dollars for investment.
    I just want to make one more point on 3 to 5 percent real 
growth. Even if this Congress were to fund this number, it 
would still be below the 4 percent GDP threshold that many 
people point to. A 3 percent growth would be 3.6 percent GDP, 5 
percent growth would be 3.7 percent GDP. By contrast, as I 
mentioned before in 1985, the Congress authorized and 
appropriated 5.7 percent GDP dealing with the challenge of the 
Soviet Union.
    Mr. Johnson. And speaking of the 1980s, you said earlier 
that China is really a greater threat than the Soviet Union was 
at the height of the Cold War because not only do they have 
this great military prowess now, but also the economic power as 
well. And so it occupies a lot of our attention for obvious 
reasons. Of course, their goal is to become a world-class 
military, and I think that is their term, by the end of 2049, 
but you note that the annual dollar value of the PLA 
procurement is on course to surpass ours by 2024. That is 
tomorrow in my estimation.
    So, in your view, where is China in this mission that they 
have stated to become world-class by 2049? Are they ahead of 
schedule?
    Mr. Zakheim. I mean, they are rapidly progressing. They are 
doing everything, as far as we can tell, to pursue that. That 
is not a hollow statement, but is something that they are 
actually trying to achieve. We will see if they realize it. We 
need a cost-imposing strategy. We need to demonstrate to them 
that their investments will be thwarted, that they need a new 
approach if they are going to challenge us or our allies, and 
that is the essence of the competition.
    But make no mistake, I am not trying to make them 10 feet 
tall, but they are in pursuit of becoming 10 feet tall, and we 
need to compete with them along the way.
    Mr. Johnson. And they are not exactly engaging in full 
transparency, so we don't know what is going on behind the 
closed doors and everything they are planning and plotting and 
spending. Despite its flaws, one of the areas in the budget 
request that I was pleased to see was the full funding of 
nuclear modernization efforts, and this has come up this 
morning. Because of some of the shortcomings elsewhere in the 
budget request, the inadequate top line, reductions in aircraft 
procurement, et cetera, does that give the nuclear 
modernization elements an even greater level of importance.
    Mr. Zakheim. Well, I think nuclear modernization has a 
heightened level of importance in this National Defense 
Strategy because as we try to shift investments to the future, 
as we recognize that we need to push platforms out of Europe or 
the Middle East into the Indo-Pacific, the way we assure and 
deter is through our nuclear weapons, full stop. So we need to 
modernize them because if they don't work, then we lose that 
deterrence. That is true. The administration does a great job 
in fiscal year 2022. I would encourage this committee to 
exercise a strict oversight of the Nuclear Posture Review 
because they may be going in a different direction, but those 
are facts not yet in evidence.
    Mr. Johnson. Very good.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Horsford is recognized.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our witnesses 
for your testimony.
    Ms. Smithberger, the fiscal year 2022 budget request fully 
funds all aspects of the Department's planned nuclear 
recapitalization efforts, including the Ground Based Strategic 
Deterrent. This funding is included even though the Nuclear 
Posture Review is ongoing. The current intercontinental 
ballistic system, the Minuteman III, was designed to operate 
for 10 years, but it is now over 50 years old. While multiple 
life extensions have kept the system safe and reliable, I 
understand the Air Force determined another such life extension 
would cost more than GBSD and would not meet system 
requirements. Yet, some continue to suggest another life 
extension.
    In your testimony, you argue that nuclear weapons spending 
is growing at an unsustainable rate. The spike in spending you 
highlight is largely due to the GBSD acquisition and other 
recapitalization efforts. I firmly believe that any delay in 
recapitalization to include another life extension of Minuteman 
III will lead to exponentially higher costs in the mid to long 
term and sacrifice critical strategic deterrent capabilities 
that cannot be brought back. Strategic deterrence underpins 
every Department of Defense mission and investment and is the 
most critical component of our national security. Ms. 
Smithberger, your testimony highlights concerns over the near-
term spending increases caused by nuclear recapitalization but 
fails to consider the long-term impacts of delaying these 
investments.
    So putting the unthinkable risks of a failure of strategic 
deterrence aside, how do you consider the future financial 
risks of delayed recapitalization in your analysis of the 2022 
budget?
    Ms. Smithberger. I think these are going to be significant 
investments no matter what we make and that we have 
overwhelming nuclear superiority. I think it is important that 
we continue to maintain our deterrence, but I think as we look 
at the very--all the different kinds of national security 
threats that we are trying to address, we are not going to be 
able to pay for everything. And I think it is important for 
everything to be on the table to make sure that we are 
considering where there might be opportunities for cost savings 
so that we can be the most effective force that we can be.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
    And, Ms. Smithberger, I do agree with your assessment of 
the risks of cuts to so-called legacy programs to fund unproven 
next-generation capabilities. You testified that in too many 
instances, the Department proposes getting rid of proven and 
usually cheaper systems in favor of immature technology and 
more costly systems. You write that these programs are nearly 
always over cost and behind schedule.
    For this reason, I am concerned by the Air Force's 
continued effort to end procurement of the MQ-9 Reaper. While I 
support the efforts the services may be making towards a next-
generation ISR capability, we cannot overlook the incredible 
value the MQ-9 platform provides to commanders today. The MQ-9 
is the most effective--cost-effective platform the Air Force 
owns. It flies 11 percent of the total Air Force flying hours 
at only 2.6 percent of the Air Force's total flying hour cost 
and is needed more now than ever as we complete our withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.
    So, Ms. Smithberger, can you expand on your concerns 
related to an overreliance on new and immature systems when 
compared to proven and cost-effective platforms, such as the 
MQ-9 Reaper?
    Ms. Smithberger. Absolutely. So, as Mr. Zakheim was 
referring to, I think in too many instances, what we have being 
promised is a PowerPoint and that we don't have a proven 
capability to replace something. So I think for any proposal 
that comes before this body, it is important to look at whether 
we are willing to take the risk that is being proposed.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you. Short, succinct, and to the point. 
I appreciate that, and I yield back.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carl.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers.
    I would like to thank our witnesses, obviously, for joining 
us today and talking about this topic that is very important to 
all of us.
    By 2030, the Chinese Navy is expected to have about 425 
ships with the U.S. Navy at 350 ships. It is clear the Chinese 
will continue to invest large numbers, large amounts of money 
into the navy during this coming decade. Unfortunately, the 
Biden administration has submitted a budget request that does 
not adequately meet this threat. The Biden administration even 
fails to increase at a 3 to 5 percent above inflation as 
recommended by the bipartisan National Defense Strategy 
Commission.
    Mr. Zakheim, did I pronounce that correctly?
    Mr. Zakheim. It is Zakheim, sir, but I will respond to 
anything.
    Mr. Carl. Zakheim. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate the 
correction.
    In your written testimony, you highlighted your concern 
with the low top line numbers from the Biden administration and 
the impact this has on our Navy. Given the Chinese Navy is 
expected to be at 425 ships by the end of the decade, can you 
expand on what this budget request does to our readiness now 
and into the future?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you for that question, Congressman. And 
I think particularly when it comes to the Navy, quantity has a 
quality all of its own, and the number of ships matter. I think 
in this budget, the seven cruisers that this proposal would 
take out of the fleet is one that I think this committee needs 
to look at. And if you have the 3 to 5 percent real growth, you 
can mitigate and keep that in the Navy.
    With respect to what the Chinese are doing, you know, let 
them build ships. Just invest in our capabilities that my 
colleagues have spoken about to take those out. Let's make that 
part of our cost-imposing strategy, and I think that needs to 
be the mindset. We need to see what they are doing, learn from 
it, and then make those investments so we kind of turn this 
thing on them where we have some cost-imposing strategies. So 
yes, I think in the near-term window, this Davidson window that 
we have been discussing, we need to make sure that we keep 
those ships in the fleet and then also make those investments 
where we make the Chinese understand that they are wasting 
their money on their shipbuilding efforts.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I will turn it back to you. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Waltz is recognized.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I wanted to talk about the Army for just a moment, and, 
again, thank you to all of the witnesses. You know, I think we 
have talked a lot about deterrence today, and I completely 
agree having a ship offshore, having long-range fires has a 
deterrent effect. I don't think we can lose sight of the fact 
that having an American soldier wake up in a foxhole next to 
its ally also has a very strong deterrent effect.
    But, Mr. Zakheim, or really, any of the witnesses, I am 
interested in what we can do, though, in terms of cost savings 
going forward. I am particularly interested in what we can do 
with the Guard. You look at particularly Army Guard formations, 
but both Army and Air Guard, you're looking at 30 to 40 percent 
of the cost, yet you do get that strategic deterrent value and 
capability. You also get a domestic capability that the Active 
Duty Army doesn't have. But you have the ability, particularly 
through the State Partnership Program, to also deploy and have 
that partnering and allied effect. So I think you get a lot of 
bang for the buck there. Do you see perhaps force structure 
transferring to the Guard as a way in a resource constrained 
environment that we can do a lot of those things that we still 
need to do, everything from hurricanes and wildfires to fight 
our land wars at less of a cost?
    Mr. Zakheim. Thank you, Congressman. It is great to see 
you.
    I think in terms of the Guard capability, we should make 
sure we are giving them assets that are valuable, both in how 
they would deploy overseas but also what they can use at home. 
To the extent that the Army can get that balance right, I think 
that is a wise investment.
    The State Partnership Program, which you highlighted, is 
absolutely critical as a form of assurance and, frankly, 
coordination with our allies and partners. I think that is a 
great initiative. And I think, overall, forward presence is 
something that is really critical for deterrence that we 
discussed today, and the American people, quite frankly, 
support this. When we have asked in our Reagan National Defense 
Survey, which I know you are familiar with, would you support 
having forces overseas to support kind of peace, they 
overwhelmingly stand behind that. And I think some of what you 
are describing here would be actions to support that objective.
    Mr. Waltz. So I completely agree. I could just foresee a 
construct in the future, again, in a budget constrained 
environment where our Active forces are primarily forward. But 
the strategic aspect, which is going to take weeks, if not 
months, to get on the civilian Reserve fleet that Mr. Wittman 
rightly pointed out is very lacking, you know. It is that kind 
of domestic force rather than having Active Duty armored 
divisions sitting in CONUS [continental United States]. I think 
we could get maybe perhaps a different mix.
    I just want to switch to the Navy. Frankly, I think a lot 
of the discussions are somewhat nibbling around the margins of 
LCS or retiring cruisers. The bottom line is we don't have the 
industrial base to compete. The Chinese are approaching an 
estimated 1,000 shipyards, yet we have around 24, many of which 
are a century old and are decrepit and falling apart. Yet there 
is not a single shipyard requested in President Biden's 
infrastructure package. Anywhere between $600 billion and $3.5 
trillion that we are debating here on the Hill, and none of it 
addresses shipyards, when we are a maritime nation, and with 
the Chinese building ships at a rate of 5 to 1, they are 
cranking out one every 6 weeks. Does anyone disagree? Speak up 
if you disagree that shipyards are considered infrastructure 
and should be in this infrastructure package.
    Ms. Smithberger. I think, when we are looking at the 
private shipyards, that we need to look at some of the moral 
hazard that occurs by giving handouts to some of these 
companies that have been underinvesting in their own 
infrastructure in this manner. And a lot of these--several of 
these companies have been engaging in stock buybacks at the 
kinds of levels that we are proposing to give to them to make 
these kinds of repairs. So I think we have to make sure that, 
if we are including shipyard funding, I think it is very hard 
to make a compelling case to the American people that the 
Department of Defense does not already have adequate resources 
to cover those needs.
    Mr. Zakheim. I just quickly disagree. I think the 
opportunity with the infrastructure bill is to incentivize not 
only the building and manufacturing of semiconductors in this 
country but also what you are talking about, shipbuilding, and 
it could be put in there.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I yield you back 5 
seconds.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    We are about wrapped up. Mr. Fallon is going to be the last 
person to ask questions, and then we will adjourn.
    Mr. Fallon, you are recognized.
    Mr. Fallon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank 
you to all the witnesses. It has been fascinating. I am just--I 
am new, a freshman, trying to learn and absorb and be a sponge. 
And a lot of very good questions have already been asked, and I 
don't want to rehash any of those.
    So Secretary Austin, he testified here in March, and he 
said that the number one threat that we face is--the U.S. that 
is, that it is China. And then they announced that they are 
going to increase their defense budget approximately 7 percent, 
I believe.
    And so the question for the panel, anybody who wants to 
jump in, is what kind of justification do the Chinese have? 
Granted, they have a lot of international frontiers, but what 
significant threat do they face from any of their neighbors in 
that theater to justify a 7 percent increase, or is it simply 
obviously because they are trying to pass us in the world 
stage? If anyone just wanted to--I guess I will go with Dr. 
Pettyjohn first.
    Dr. Pettyjohn. I think that they are clearly trying to 
supplant the United States in the Indo-Pacific and to establish 
themselves as the dominant power in the region. They don't have 
to justify their defense expenditures to a domestic audience 
like we do, given the different government that they have.
    Mr. Zakheim. I am just going to add that this is the number 
one--well, will be the largest economy in the world. To sustain 
that economy, they have to reach out beyond their region and 
extend globally. Energy interest is an example of why China is 
interested in the Middle East. So it is almost a natural course 
that they would seek to have this type of military and make 
this kind of investment.
    Ms. Smithberger. And I would just add that China has 
significant internal problems as well, and whenever you have 
significant internal problems, it is very helpful to focus 
outward----
    Mr. Fallon [continuing]. Yeah. We have seen that in the 
past.
    One of the things that I find concerning just with the 
budget is from a--just a real dollar perspective, or not real 
dollar, rather, just raw dollars, it is a 1.7 percent increase. 
But inflation, as we have talked about repeatedly in Congress, 
if it is just 3 percent this year, which it very well may be 
much higher than that, that would be--just to match inflation, 
it would be $22 billion. And if it was a 5 percent increase, 
inflation--inflationary increase, it would be $37 billion just 
to have a flat budget. So, you know, these seem to be real, 
real cuts.
    And one question I had for Mr. Zakheim is--pivoting a 
little bit is your assessment of the European Deterrence 
Initiative. We have been focusing a lot on the Pacific theater, 
and we have new allies in NATO. And I loved your comment about 
how certain allies have the will but not the capabilities, and 
others have the capabilities and not the will. And I thought in 
my head, not, you know, necessarily any order, Poland and 
Germany. And you mentioned Poland, so if you just want to touch 
on that.
    Mr. Zakheim. Yeah. I mean, the European Deterrence 
Initiative which, again, I believe this committee, along with 
elements in the European Command really led on, was critical in 
deterring Russia. And it was a responsible thing for the U.S. 
to do after Russia's invasions in Georgia and Ukraine, and I 
think it needs to be sustained but in a fashion that is 
proportionate to what needs to happen relative to the Indo-
Pacific. And I think it is what we have been talking about 
today is the same theme, different variation, distributing the 
force, presence, exercises, and making sure that these are 
resilient.
    If I can, I will just add on to your point on inflation. I 
think something that this committee I am sure intuits but may 
want focus on is that inflationary forces are more dramatic in 
the defense industrial base than they are in the macro U.S. 
economy. In other words, whatever is happening in terms of 
inflation, it is going to be more acute for the Department of 
Defense, and they will get less bang for the buck.
    Mr. Fallon. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    I really want to thank our witnesses for a very informative 
discussion. I appreciate it.
    And, Mr. Rogers, do you have anything for the good of the 
order.
    He does not, so we are good, and we are adjourned. Thank 
you again.
    [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             July 20, 2021
   
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             July 20, 2021

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             July 20, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. The Department is moving forward on a number of key 
concepts that will be vital for competing with a peer competitor, 
especially Joint All-Domain Command and Control and electromagnetic 
spectrum operations. Do you believe we are adequately funding these 
programs for great power competition?
    Dr. Pettyjohn. In general, I believe that the Department is 
investing a reasonable amount of money in Joint All-Domain Command and 
Control (JADC2) in the fiscal year 2022 budget, but it remains to be 
seen whether these investments are sustained over time and how the 
different components of JADC2 fit together. Moreover, it is important 
to remember that taking steps to strengthen conventional deterrence 
against China and Russia extend beyond JADC2 and there is room for the 
Department to do more in other areas.
    There are several factors that make it difficult to discern whether 
the Department is adequately funding JADC2. The first factor is the 
absence of the future-year defense program (FYDP). Trends in spending 
are critical, especially for key advanced technologies, such as 
artificial intelligence (AI), that require a sustained level of long-
term investment. When looking at the fiscal year 2022 budget, we simply 
do not know if current levels will be reduced, maintained, or expanded 
into the future.
    Second, each military department is pursuing its own approach to 
JADC2 and these are not fully integrated conceptually, bureaucratically 
or technically. The Army has Project Convergence, the Navy and Marine 
Corps have Project Overmatch, and the Air and Space Forces have the 
Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). While all these concepts aim 
to create a domain agnostic network of sensors and shooters and to 
improve and accelerate U.S. decision making with the assistance of 
machine learning (ML) and AI, it is not clear how these separate battle 
networks will be integrated.
    Third, each of the Department's variants of JADC2 is not a single 
program or even type of capability. Instead, JADC2 includes 
technologies that enhance interoperability between different weapons 
systems; the digital infrastructure or network that forms the 
communications backbone; efforts to enhance data compatibility; and 
applications and algorithms that fuse and process data and accelerate 
decision making. In fact, the only program of record is the Air Force's 
ABMS. In the President's FY22 budget, the Air Force asks for $204 
million for ABMS, which is $245.4 million dollars less than what the 
FY21 FYDP had planned. Yet this does not indicate a lack of interest or 
investment in ABMS, but instead reflects the Air Force's effort to lay 
out a clear plan with tangible and executable steps to show how this 
unusual capability, which is not a singular weapons platform, will be 
developed. This includes Capability Release 1, a pod for the KC-46 
tanker, that will allow F-35 and F-22 stealth fighter aircraft to 
communicate, which is currently not possible. Additionally, the Air 
Force plans to develop cloud-based architecture that utilizes AI/ML 
applications to build a common operating picture for NORTHCOM [U.S. 
Northern Command].
    Moreover, JADC2 extends beyond ABMS. The Air Force has dozens of 
other program lines that total more than $800 million devoted to other 
elements necessary for JADC2, including investments in decision and 
information sciences, joint cyber command and control, and datalinks, 
among others. Additionally, the Air Force request asks for $811 million 
to modernize AF information technology infrastructure--a foundational 
element for all future operations.
    Similarly, the Departments of the Navy and the Army are making 
investments in their own battle networks. The Navy reportedly has three 
classified program lines related to Project Overmatch, but two of its 
highest priority unfunded requests were related to JADC2. The Navy 
asked for $53.9 million to fast-track naval tactical grid and $87 
million to improve the resiliency of communications and precision, 
navigation, and timing for its combat logistics fleet. Even though the 
Army's overall budgets for research and development and procurement 
have decreased, it is spending $537 million on its tactical network and 
more than a $100 million for Project Convergence demonstrations. The 
Army also makes other investments in AI, satellite communications, and 
data management.
    Thus, when taken together it appears that the Department is 
investing a considerable amount in JADC2, but that the Navy requires 
additional resources to fund all of its desired programs in this area. 
Nevertheless, as my recent CNAS report, Risky Business: Future Strategy 
and Force Options for the Department of Defense, concludes, overall the 
services could make further cuts in areas less relevant for great power 
competition and invest this money into capabilities relevant for JADC2 
and a high-end war fight. It remains to be seen whether these JADC2 
investments will be continued in the future and how all of these 
different pieces will fit together to enable the services to seamlessly 
implement all-domain operations as a joint force.
    Mr. Langevin. The Department is moving forward on a number of key 
concepts that will be vital for competing with a peer competitor, 
especially Joint All-Domain Command and Control and electromagnetic 
spectrum operations. Do you believe we are adequately funding these 
programs for great power competition?
    Ms. Smithberger. The current funding levels indicate that this is 
something the Department of Defense is taking seriously. We have some 
concerns about the wisdom, feasibility, and reliability of connecting 
all of these systems together. For example, a 2018 Government 
Accountability Office review found several instances where engineers 
failed to reset passwords for commercial and open source technologies, 
making it easy for cyber test teams break in and control those systems. 
The Department of Defense's Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber 
Deterrence also raised concerns about the proliferation of 
vulnerabilities as we increasingly connect our sensors into a single 
network. Each system we add to the network is a calculated risk.
    It is clear that our adversaries are focused on opportunities to 
disrupt our networks. Protecting those operations will require much 
more vigilance and hardening those networks, and becomes even more 
important the more they are connected together. Unfortunately, we have 
seen in too many cases that the defense industry is resisting and 
failing to adequately invest in hardening our cyber security. We are 
glad to see the Department is continuing to push industry in this arena 
but its success will be dependent on the backing they receive from 
Congress, including requiring the Department to fully test the networks 
and systems of contractors to ensure they meet security requirements 
and include cybersecurity as part of the basic design of future weapons 
programs. The services also must maintain the ability to operate 
effectively without Joint All Domain Command and Control. There will be 
times when the U.S. military is unable to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum. When that happens, the force that can still fight well 
without their information and communications networks will likely win.
    Mr. Langevin. The Department is moving forward on a number of key 
concepts that will be vital for competing with a peer competitor, 
especially Joint All Domain Command and Control and electromagnetic 
spectrum operations. Do you believe we are adequately funding these 
programs for great power competition?
    Mr. Zakheim. Congress and the current administration have both 
rightfully prioritized developing and modernizing electronic warfare 
and cyber systems that allow the U.S. military to maintain supremacy in 
these constantly evolving domains of competition. Congress has 
emphasized the increasing importance of Joint All Domain Command and 
Control (JADC2) and electromagnetic spectrum operations for great power 
competition through RDT&E funding increases. The question now, however, 
is less about whether they are adequately funded--it is whether they 
are adequately defined.
    While I applaud the quick development and approval of the 
Department's JADC2 strategy, many of the programs and concepts within 
the new communications system continue to be ill-defined, making 
sufficient appropriations to fund the strategy a more complicated task. 
For example, critical data fabric and software definitions, which would 
specify funding requirements, have yet to be constructed. This includes 
identifying management solutions and institutionalizing versatile 
software for cross-service use. For electromagnetic operations, DARPA's 
funding request has continued to grow, while Defense-wide spending 
remains the same, signaling increased research interest in the field. 
The implementation of the 2017 Electronic Warfare Executive Committee 
strategy was restrained by its own portfolio constraints, including the 
Chief Information Officer's inability to influence the individual 
service budgets or actions on electromagnetic developments and 
acquisitions. Both JADC2 and electromagnetic operations are critical to 
great power competition, especially against a rising China that is 
rapidly developing next-generation technologies and malware. It is 
critical, therefore, that DOD address the shortfalls in concept 
development and key definitions about roles and strategy to provide the 
basis for properly funding their continued operations and driving 
innovation at DOD.

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