[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-66]
STATE OF THE SURFACE NAVY
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
meeting jointly with the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 3, 2022
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-446 WASHINGTON : 2023
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia JIM BANKS, Indiana
SARA JACOBS, California JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Naajidah Khan, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
JOHN GARAMENDI, California, Chairman
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MIKE WALTZ, Florida
JACKIE SPEIER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JASON CROW, Colorado AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan, Vice JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
Chair MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
Melanie Harris, Professional Staff Member
Ian Bennitt, Professional Staff Member
Naajidah Khan, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 4
Waltz, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Florida, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Readiness...................................... 5
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces......... 2
WITNESSES
Kitchener, VADM Roy, USN, Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S.
Pacific Fleet, Department of the Navy.......................... 8
Lescher, ADM William K., USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy......................................... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 41
Garamendi, Hon. John......................................... 45
Lescher, ADM William K., joint with VADM Roy Kitchener....... 46
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Banks.................................................... 62
Mr. Carl..................................................... 63
Mr. Langevin................................................. 61
Mrs. Luria................................................... 63
Mr. Scott.................................................... 61
STATE OF THE SURFACE NAVY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Meeting
Jointly with the Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 3, 2022.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
FORCES
Mr. Courtney. Good morning, everyone. Call the joint
hearing to order.
And, again, because we are doing this hybrid, just have to
make a quick announcement that, as we all know, is part of
these events.
First, some administrative and technical notes. Members are
reminded that they must be visible on screen within the
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Finally, you will see a 5-minute countdown clock on the
software platform's display, but, if necessary, I will remind
you when your time is up.
With that said, I have opening remarks, which I am going to
submit for the record, just make a couple quick comments, and
then turn it over to my fellow leaders here from Seapower and
from Readiness.
Again, thank you, Admiral Lescher and Admiral Kitchener,
for joining us this morning. Again, the topic today, which is
the state of the Surface Navy, we have had classified briefings
in, you know, the last couple months or so to talk about,
again, events surrounding Bonhomme Richard, also in the context
of McCain and Fitzgerald and, you know, really about the fact
that, you know, the entire enterprise of the Navy, you know,
really, I think, needs congressional input to really make sure
that, you know, the country's investment is being utilized
efficiently and competently.
And I would just say, you know, obviously, all of us up on
the dais here, we have been going to briefings nonstop in terms
of the situation in Ukraine. A lot of the focus is on the land
warfare aspect, you know, with obviously the invasion in the
northern part of the country.
But as we saw this morning, there is definitely a seapower
aspect to this, with, you know, the battle going around
Mariupol, in the coastal region there. And I think a lot of us
know that the U.S. Navy is not absent from this, but it really
reinforces the fact that what we are talking about here today
is really not sort of a, you know, an issue that is sort of in
normal peacetime context.
You know, what we are talking about here is really making
sure that in the world we are living in, that the Navy is going
to be able to, again, participate without any unforced errors,
in terms of its own readiness. And that is really why I think
it is just so important that, you know, the two of you are here
today to help us achieve that goal.
With that, I will yield to my ranking member, Rob Wittman,
for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Chairman Courtney, for
yielding.
I want to specially thank Chairman Garamendi, Ranking
Member Waltz, for participating in this detailed review of our
Navy surface posture. Incredibly important.
Friends, great power competition is already here, and we
are currently not set up to prevail. With President Biden's
inept withdrawal from Afghanistan, Putin's invasion of Ukraine,
and Xi's continued Chinese expansion both in terms of military
size and political will, we have arrived at a new period of
international instability.
Our desire to maintain strategic advantage and tactical
overmatch is being challenged on a daily basis. A change in our
National Security Strategy is sorely needed, one that
prioritizes warfighting in the near term. And yet as I look at
the Department of Defense priorities of tackling COVID
[coronavirus disease], building diversity, and elevating
climate change as a national priority, our warfighting focus
appears to be particularly askew.
Even the Navy continues to advocate for a divest-to-
reinvest strategy that at its core presumes that maritime
conflict will not occur this decade. I categorically reject
this notion. I ascribe to the warnings of our PACOM [U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command] commanders who believe that conflict will
likely occur in the near term. To accomplish this reality, we
need to adjust our strategic priorities to ensure that our
Nation is not ready to support battle force 2045, but, rather,
ready to support a conflict now.
The lack of urgency in national security planning is
particularly disheartening. Last year, the Navy requested that
one destroyer, no amphibs, and proposed to retire seven large
surface combatants whose firepower exceeded that of the entire
British Navy. The Navy provided a 30-year shipbuilding plan
that was only good for 1 year. The Navy submitted a shipyard
recapitalization plan with little financial backing. And the
Navy continues to underman our Surface Navy, who is currently
lacking over 5,000 sailors.
And while I am glad that Congress rebuffed a series of Navy
proposals last year, this lack of national security planning
unsettles our allies and unnerves the industrial base that
craves real leadership. Our Navy needs to wake up, change their
calculus, and support a new strategic reality.
I remain committed toward providing a Surface Navy that
meets the combatant commander's requirements. And while I am
pleased that the Flight III destroyer with a new radar and a
new multimission frigate, I am concerned that the CNO's [Chief
of Naval Operations'] stretch goal of deploying large,
unmanned, surface vessels alongside an aircraft carrier in the
next 5 years is too much too soon. And I am particularly
troubled by the purported amphibious ship reductions.
Commandant Berger's vision should be fully embraced and
resourced.
As to the Surface Navy culture, I want to thank our
witnesses for supporting an independent review of a new surface
warfare officer career path and training alternatives that
align with the merchant marine. Additionally, I am pleased that
we specifically included an assessment in last year's defense
bill to specifically review female retention rates. I think all
of these assessments are essential for a more effective surface
warfare culture.
In closing, I am reminded of one of my favorite Navy quotes
by George Washington, where he said: It follows then as certain
as the night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval
force we can do nothing definitive, and with it, everything
honorable and glorious.
It is time that we relearn the lessons of the past.
Again, I appreciate Chairman Courtney for his leadership,
Chairman Garamendi for his leadership, and Ranking Member Waltz
for their support and efforts in having this important hearing.
And, with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
I will now recognize the chair of the House Readiness
Subcommittee, Mr. Garamendi.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Even as we grow more distance from many of the events, let
us say at the outset that we continue to grieve and remember
the 17 sailors who died on the USS McCain and Fitzgerald in the
collisions of 2017.
We also honor the over 60 sailors and civilians that were
injured while battling the fire on the USS Bonhomme Richard.
And we are holding this hearing today because,
unfortunately, as the Navy itself has concluded, these
tragedies in the Surface Navy were avoidable.
Ensuring that they never happen again requires consistent
attention. I very much appreciate the Navy's attention to
manning, training, maintenance, and cultural issues that
contributed to the losses, and, today, our witnesses' continued
willingness to engage with our subcommittees.
I also recognize the institutional, significant reforms
will take time.
However, I remain haunted by some of the turns of phrases
that appear consistently throughout the investigation of the
accidents: cascade of failures, accumulation of risk, and on
and on.
While I know that this slate of Navy leadership takes these
issues extremely seriously and has given deep thought to
improving the readiness and well-being of the surface forces, a
GAO [Government Accountability Office] report released just
last month contains very troubling testimony from the sailors
of the fleet today. They report being overworked, understaffed,
sleep deprived, insufficiently trained, and ill-equipped to
perform basic maintenance tasks.
I worry that the Navy's progress in implementing findings
from these accident investigations might mostly be on paper and
that, in practice, they are not translated into lasting change.
I don't see the evidence today that the Surface Navy has
yet achieved sufficient progress, reversing the entrenched
habits of inadequate manning and training, delayed maintenance,
and chronic overuse of the force. I do recognize that chronic
overuse of the force is not the Surface Navy's--does not come
from the Surface Navy but rather from the combatant commanders.
I worry that the Surface Navy is not thinking deeply enough
about how to change the culture to evaluate morale and to
employ--and to empower officers and sailors to voice concerns
when they see problems.
Finally, as we consider the sources of these problems and
their potential solutions, I must ask our witnesses to consider
whether they could do more to constrain the combatant
commanders and their insatiable appetite to use the force, so
much so that the force is degraded.
We are experiencing unprecedented challenges today, and we
must consider whether the combatant commanders' requests should
be prioritized or deprioritized to ensure that our ships and
sailors get the adequate time in port, in training, and in
preparation to prepare for any contingency.
I also want to compliment our two witnesses today that have
taken all that I have said and all that others have said into
action. And I expect today that we will hear about how you
intend to address these issues.
Thank you so very much. I yield back my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garamendi can be found in
the Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
I will now recognize the new ranking member on the
Readiness Subcommittee, Mike Waltz, who, this is his, I guess,
maiden voyage as ranking member. Congratulations on that----
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. In the Army, we say that is a case of
beer that I owe everyone, but----
Mr. Courtney. That might be arranged.
Mr. Waltz. Yeah.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE WALTZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Thank you, both of our witnesses, for coming. Thank you for
the conversation over the last few days. And I certainly
associate myself with the comments of the chairman and--both
chairmen and ranking members, and I think you are absolutely
seeing the bipartisan concern and how critically important this
committee takes the health, strength, and readiness of our
surface fleet.
I do want to recognize much has been done since 2017.
Numerous investigations in the aftermath of those incidents
have pointed to some common themes, some common threads and
challenges across the organization. Rightly in many cases, most
cases, the finger was pointed at fatigue, increased demand,
high OPTEMPO [operations tempo], undermanning, poor material
condition, lack of training, low priority on maintenance, among
some other core problems.
Over the past several years, Congress has acted--frankly,
many times we haven't acted in time in terms of the continuing
resolutions. However, Congress has acted, reports were issued,
recommendations implemented within the Navy to drive reform
into a system that was creating unsafe conditions and eroding
our readiness. Yet as we sit here today, I am concerned, and I
share my colleagues' concern, that the Navy, to be candid,
hasn't sufficiently addressed some of these chronic problems.
I was incredibly disheartened to hear--and I read the
entire report--to hear from the GAO report that was issued last
month that painted a picture of a fleet that remains overworked
and understaffed, and that sailors, at their level, continue to
cite some of the exact same issues and conditions that led to
the 2017 disasters is concerning, to say the least.
That same report also detailed a lack of planning and
performance data, which I found really troubling and
surprising, the lack of data in our intermediate level of
maintenance. And as I shared with you, you know, having managed
large Army fleets, what the operator does affects what the
intermediate level maintenance does, greatly affects what
happens at the depot level and, therefore, the readiness of
that fleet and our naval fleet.
So as we are confronted with the challenges my colleagues
have laid out for high-end conflict, and as we discussed, you
know, we are overlaying what we are getting briefed by the
intelligence community of what is imminent and what is around
the corner, versus these longer term problems. I think we have
a timeline disconnect, and I look forward to hearing how you
are going to address that. We just can't afford to talk about
the issues anymore. We need to talk about real solutions and
when they are going to be implemented and what kind of impact
they are going to have.
I do understand some of these are going to take time, but
here we are, almost 5 years from the McCain/Fitzgerald. That
was a wake-up call then, and I think we are getting a wake-up
call in Europe right now, that this type of high-end conflict
isn't a thing of the past.
And so, today, I do hope to hear those concrete steps. I
look forward to your candor on how we can work together to
improve the Navy surface readiness.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
It is now time to recognize our witnesses. And I assume,
Vice CNO Admiral William Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations from the Department of the Navy, will lead off. And
the floor is yours, Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM K. LESCHER, USN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Lescher. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Courtney, Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member
Wittman, Ranking Member Waltz, distinguished members of the
House Armed Services Subcommittees on Seapower and Readiness,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the actions
we are taking to deliver consistently strong performance across
the surface force and the broader Navy.
The imperative for us to work together to deliver the
warfighting advantage that American security requires has never
been clearer, as just talked about here, given Russia's
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and an authoritarian China bent
on military growth, allied with Russia.
In this security context today, the U.S. Navy is the
world's most ready and lethal Navy, and that is not happy talk,
that is proven performance, demonstrated and consistently
meeting combatant commanders' objectives across the globe,
while completing, just last year, more than a million flying
hours, 22,000 steaming days, 59 major maintenance
availabilities.
As we speak, the Navy has increased our forward posture in
response to the European commander's assurance and deterrence
requirement with a deployed naval force sufficient to deter and
defeat, if necessary, any aggression in the European maritime
theater. This force includes the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike
Group, which continues to demonstrate integrated, high-end
maritime strike capabilities with our NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] allies.
An important element of our conversation today will be the
actions we are taking to accelerate capabilities and
performance beyond this advantage. We are bringing a strong
sense of urgency in improving today's baseline performance,
given China's clearly stated intent to become the world's
preeminent military and Russia's sustained threats and
unprovoked aggression. This urgency also reflects the
imperative and the opportunity to deliver more consistently
strong Navy performance in service of accelerating that
advantage.
Today's Navy features many strong teams with great culture
and exceptional performance. Yet we also see instances of teams
with poor culture and weak performance. The unacceptable loss
of the Bonhomme Richard is a stark reminder of the gap between
our strongest and our weakest performers, and this gap must be
eliminated.
Our appreciation of the systemic causes underlying this
variability has deepened as we study the similarities and root
causes leading to tragic outcomes, such as the Fitzgerald and
McCain collisions and the Major Fires Review events, as well as
from studying the best practices that we consistently see in
high-performing Navy units.
We have learned that the root causes of the unacceptable
variability in Navy performance stem primarily from an outdated
approach to institutional learning, and this has led to
inconsistent use across the Navy of those Navy best leadership
and problem-solving practices.
Our institutional learning approach has too often treated
poor performance as isolated failures and overemphasized
instructions, checklists, and rules as a fix, while
undervaluing the human element, the development and training of
our people, a learning mind-set, problem ownership, critical
thinking.
The inconsistent use of Navy best-learning and problem-
solving practices results from this weak institutional learning
which has failed to consistently implement across the Navy the
best practices routinely seen in areas such as the impressive
self-critical learning of our air wing and surface warfare
teams during Fallon Integrated Training, which generates the
most combat-capable strike groups in the world, or the
transparently ``embrace the red'' learning in Performance to
Plan efforts that have driven the highest F-18 mission-capable
levels in 10 years, or the strongest self-assessment and
learning that underpins Naval Reactors' world-class safety
record.
Building on this deeper appreciation of root cause, in
January, the Chief of Naval Operations issued a new Charge of
Command and a call to action for every Navy leader to apply the
Navy proven best practices that empower our people to achieve
exceptional performance. We are teaching and leading
implementation of these self-assessing, self-correcting
practices, which we call Get Real, Get Better, through our type
commanders and other community senior leaders.
The call to action also provides specific countermeasures
to the institutional learning weakness with key organizational
changes that ensure it is enduring, and they include the four-
star Learning to Action Board, which tests whether prior
corrective measures remain in effect and are delivering their
intended effect, and the Naval Safety Command, which will now
not only assess frontline unit safety performance, but also
evaluate and hold accountable the entire chain of command for
how it supports subordinate units in managing risk and building
a strong safety culture.
With these changes, the Navy is making clear that we will
reward and promote leaders based not only on the strong
outcomes they achieve, but also on the teams they build and the
learning culture they develop.
I am confident that this approach, in concert with the
initiatives that Vice Admiral Kitchener will highlight, is the
best path to accelerating warfighting advantage, and I look
forward to partnering with the committees to make this advance
in Navy culture come fully alive. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Lescher and
Admiral Kitchener can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
And he is joined today by Admiral Kitchener, who is
Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Again, thank
you for joining us again, Admiral Kitchener, you have been here
before, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF VADM ROY KITCHENER, USN, COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE
FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Admiral Kitchener. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Courtney, Chairman Garamendi, Ranking Member
Wittman, Ranking Member Waltz, and members of the Seapower and
Readiness Subcommittees, I thank you for the opportunity to
testify regarding the state of the Surface Navy.
Today, your ships are underway across the globe and stand
ready to win at sea against any opponent. Sixty-seven surface
combatants are deployed worldwide in support of our Nation's
strategic interests. Daily, our ships are postured forward
where it matters to foster partnerships, bolster ally defenses,
and ensure free sea lanes.
As we approach 5 years since the 2017 collisions, the
surface force has taken essential steps toward improving the
way we produce more ready ships. We have made a lot of
progress, but as a learning organization, it is prudent to
self-assess and continue to find ways to improve our methods
and practices.
The surface force, in line with the Chief of Naval
Operations' call to Get Real, Get Better, is taking urgent
action to analyze our processes, reduce variability, and refine
our methods of producing more ready ships with tactically sound
crews, prepared to deter in competition and win in conflict.
Warfighting at sea is our identity as surface warriors. In
January, I released a strategic alignment document to the
surface force, focusing our efforts across the enterprise to
increase the readiness of the force we have today and prepare
the force of tomorrow. These efforts focus across five lines of
effort, each serving as a pillar to support the most capable
surface force in the world.
The lines of effort include developing the leader--warrior,
mariner, and manager; producing more ready ships; achieving
excellence in fleet introduction; create clear and innovative
operational concepts; and establishing the infrastructure for
the future fleet. The dynamic environment we face today and in
the future demands bold action with urgency now.
Our investments in manning and training the force have
improved our warfighting advantage. Sailors remain our critical
component of that advantage, and we are committed to honing
both their tactical competence and technical proficiency to
keep our ships ready.
Through Ready Relevant Learning on the Surface Training
Advanced Virtual Environment, we modernized the way our sailors
learn the technical and tactical skill sets necessary to fight
and win. We continue to improve our trainers, capitalizing on
live, virtual construct of simulators, to provide complex
warfighting scenarios. The continued develop of our surface
warfighting experts, our WTIs, our warfare tactic instructors,
lead the charge in sharpening our competitive edge and serve as
a means to drive out variability and tactical proficiency
across the force.
The surface force is also improving maintenance and
committed to delivering new ships and weapon systems to the
fleet. We are applying data analytics and leveraging derived
insights to produce more ready ships for tasking.
Since 2019, we have reduced our days of maintenance delay
and CNO availabilities by 41 percent, and our on-time
completion steadily increased from 34 percent in fiscal year
2019 to 59 percent for all 2021 availabilities.
While we have made progress, many challenges lie ahead as
we modernize our force. Our DDG [guided-missile destroyer]
modernization program is online, and the systems we are
bringing to the fleet ensure we will maintain our competitive
edge over our adversaries. Next year, we will commission the
first Flight III DDG, USS Jack Lucas. Today, the captain and
the crew are on board and preparing to deliver enhanced
warfighting capability to the force.
We are using our energy, our activity, and our industry to
prepare for a complex and challenging future. Everything we do
as an enterprise focuses on producing ships and crews ready to
fight and win.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you to both the witnesses.
Again, I just have one question, and I will, again, yield
to other members.
First of all, I just would say that I would note that the
comments of both witnesses where you are acknowledging that
something is going on here that is systemic and that it is not
a one-off type of event, as you said in page 3 of your
testimony, Admiral Lescher, I think actually is significant
that, you know, that we are not going to sort of just sort of
brush this off on an ad hoc, you know, one time and, you know,
nothing to see here kind of approach.
And the--it seemed like one of the levers that you
identified in your testimony in terms of how you are going to
get to that sort of systemic change is the Learning to Action
Board, which is, again, trying to get this new approach sort
of, you know, pushing it down throughout, you know, the entire
enterprise.
But I guess what I was wondering, if you could describe how
the Navy is, you know, going to implement that new type of
learning at every level in the organization, not just at the
Pentagon, but at waterfronts and aboard individual ships and
maybe even, you know, at Great Lakes in terms of just, you
know, at the very, you know, origination of our Navy.
So, again, the floor is yours.
Admiral Lescher. Yeah. Thank you, sir. The Learning to
Action Board is not aspirational. It has met three times
already. And to your point, it is providing the structure that
is closing the feedback loop that I think was absent before.
We had things such as the Readiness Reform Oversight
Council that implemented 111 recommendations from the Fitz/
McCain reviews. The Learning to Action Board is that, but it
stays, it is enduring, and it not only implements and verifies
implementation, but it goes back now and it tests after
implementation, are those recommendations still in effect, are
the fixes making a difference.
Chairman, part of the insight for that was, in 2012, the
USS Miami had an arsonist start a fire, and that ship burned to
an irreparable state. The Navy believed we were a learning
organization and implemented fixes for that that largely
revolved around the NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command]
Instruction 8010. In 2020, the USS Bonhomme Richard has an
alleged arsonist start a fire. That ship burns to an
irreparable state. We are still learning there.
And so what we have learned, as part of the very strong
conversation we had in November, was that that instruction,
those policies, were not coming alive in the private shipyards
and were not coming alive with the triad of the USS Bonhomme
Richard.
So we had unacknowledged risk, unseen risk, in terms of
self-talk, have we put a fix in place, but it was not widely
being, in the private shipyards, effective. And so Learning to
Action Board is a specific countermeasure to that effect.
The L2AB has met three times. It is laser-focused on
bringing velocity to Bonhomme Richard implementation. It also,
at the last board, took as its first feedback look to go back
and look at the Fitz and McCain 111 implementations, are those
still in effect, are they delivering the intended effect.
Chairman, to your question on how do we scale that down
vertically, that is the other structure, so the Naval Safety
Command. And in the interest of time, I perhaps won't go into
that in great detail, but the Naval Safety Command is a
reorientation fundamental of the Naval Safety Center to down
echelon. Where Naval Safety Center never looked at the fleet,
the TYCOM [type commander], or the ISIC commander, it always
looked at the Ech [Echelon] 5 unit as an assist visit; Naval
Safety Command audit the fleet, the TYCOM, the ISIC, the
immediate superior in command. How are you executing your
safety oversight? Audit that, feedback, transfer best practices
at the Ech 5 level, at the unit.
What is new is it will be an evaluation. It will come up
echelon to take our blinders off about what we are seeing
broadly across the fleet, and it will include in the same best
practice as INSURV [Board of Inspection and Survey] does, an
assessment of the unit's ability to self-assess, which is
fundamental to this Get Real, Get Better orientation that will
scale the learning.
INSURV evaluates a unit and a unit commander's ability to
self-assess material condition. Safety Command will assess that
for safety performance.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Admiral.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen,
thank you so much for your service to our Nation, and thanks
for joining us today.
Admiral Lescher, today's hearing is about the state of the
Surface Navy. I want to go to the words of both the former and
present PACOM commander as they look at the threats that they
face, saying that China is indeed the pacing threat, that they
look towards an action by China within this decade, within the
next 6 years. And from that standpoint, I want to ask a series
of questions.
First of all, do you agree with their assessment as far as
China being the pacing threat? Do you agree with the timing of
where the threat would manifest itself? And, if so, what is the
contradiction then on what they are saying with Battle Force
2045 and what we would be facing in 2025?
And going from there, if we are focused on 2025, the
question then is, shouldn't our entire force structure be
focused on the near term? And that calls into question the
divest-to-invest or divest-to-reinvest strategy whose benefit
is probably going to be 20 years out in the future. In fact,
the investing doesn't take place until well outside the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program]. As I tell folks, all of our
dreams to build the Navy of the future come outside the FYDP.
I want to also put in that perspective, last year's budget
request from the Navy requested retiring 15 vessels. Those, I
think, are incredibly important to our fleet, especially these
large surface combatants. I understand all the issues with the
CGs [guided-missile cruisers], but that would retire a missile
capability bigger than the entire British Navy.
So I am just trying to reconcile where the combatant
commanders say we are today, the threats at our doorstep, is
China the pacing threat. If it is, and you agree with both
combatant commanders in the near term of that threat, then how
does that position itself with the 2045 vision versus 2025, and
how the Navy reconciles where we need to be with the divest-to-
reinvest strategy?
Admiral Lescher. Yes, sir. And I appreciate the question.
Pacing threat is clearly China. It is stated in the National
Defense Strategy. I know of no thoughtful observer who thinks
otherwise. The one caveat to that is we do recognize pacing
elements, for example, in Russia undersea, because they have
the pacing technology there. But the pacing overarching threat
is clearly China.
Navy brings a strong view that the decade of concern is
2020, and in some respects, that is not a universal view in the
Department, but we consistently believe and have thought that
that is the decade that we see of peak risk and that we are
going to be ready for.
You highlight so what does that mean in terms of how we
size and shape the force, is it 2025, is it 2045. This is the
fundamental dilemma of every budget submission, which is how
much in current readiness versus future overmatch, and how do
you think about that and how do you get that right.
The way the Navy has consistently delivered our budgets to
size and shape the Navy to deliver the most ready and lethal
Navy possible is with the following prioritization.
Columbia, number one, fact of life, once-in-a-generation
recap of our strategic deterrent, nondiscretionary, time
pressured. Number two priority, readiness today. Number three
is modernization. Modernization is what delivers lethality and
survivability. And number four is capacity.
And our view is, and I believe the committees bring that
same view--it has been our approach for a number of years now--
our view is readiness and modernization, i.e., lethality and
survivability, are table stakes for any capacity we buy. I know
we have the same view of the committees, we are not going to
buy capacity that cannot be properly manned, spared,
maintained, and trained to.
So, in that context, what is the understanding of a budget
that divests? And it is an important question. It fundamentally
revolves around the best judgment, driven, Ranking Member, by
strong analysis. And I know we have shared with the committees
not only the Integrated Naval Force Structure Analysis but
capability analysis.
So making these hard choices about Columbia, readiness,
capability, and capacity, revolves around not only what the
campaign analysis shows is the capacity required to win a
distributed maritime operations fight against China, but also
what is the mix of that force. And, again, I know you and the
committees pay attention to this well.
When CNO talked about a 500-ship Navy, he didn't talk about
500 tug and pallet ships. Talking about a specific mix, which
is to say there is other attributes that we look at very
closely that drive that mix and those choices.
Some of the key attributes that start to indicate why, in
making hard choices, we would divest 30-year-old cruisers,
include our ability to put long-range fires down range, our
ability to maneuver in the adversary weapon engagement zone,
our ability to operate our ships without frequent resupply in a
contested logistics environment, and our ability to defend
against incoming raids and attrite them with hard-kill and
soft-kill capabilities.
So in that context, beyond capacity, bringing these other
important measures and attributes to the force is what leads to
our best judgment that the most ready and lethal force against
the pacing threat of China looks like what was delivered with
the budget.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi, chairman of the
Readiness Subcommittee.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Lescher, thank you for your
discussion about the necessity to balance today, tomorrow, and
the next decade. Obviously very complex. We will spend a lot of
time working through that. Today, I want to really get into how
to make the existing fleet operate more effectively, more
efficiently, more safely.
You have put three different programs before us: the Get
Real, Get Better program, the Safety Program, and the Learn to
Action Board program. Could you speak about the integration of
these three, and also how that integration, assuming they are
to be integrated, how that reduces the paperwork, and how you
would assess the effectiveness?
Admiral Lescher. Thank you for that question, Chairman.
This idea of simplify, streamline, and align is critical,
right? It can't be additive and just--we actually recognize
that as a causal factor for weak performance, where our former
view of what it meant to be a learning organization was to
write an instruction, a guideline, a regulation. And we are
overwhelming our triads and our leadership's ability to process
all of that.
So an absolute foundation of this approach as we work
forward and roll it out across the Navy is to simplify,
streamline, align a bunch of existing activity, existing
related work. Let's make it clearer, let's bring it up--elevate
to principles and playbooks.
In terms of the integration, one of the things I think it
is important to highlight is Get Real, Get Better, which is
scaling existing Navy best practice, is not something
interesting that was read out of a book. It is not--didn't come
out of a powerful Harvard Business School case study or some
consultant. It is real Navy learning. And so for 3\1/2\ years
now, we have been attacking systemic, weak Navy performance,
head down, build a little, test a little, learn a lot, scale
it.
This was the journey that I would highlight as the initial
instantiation of F-18s. We had 250 mission-capable F-18 jets
from 2008 to 2018. We had a decade of 250 mission-capable jets.
The mission-capable rate in 2018 was 55 percent because the
inventory was over 500.
So 2018, 2019, we need to think, act, operate differently.
This was the start of the first Get Real engine, because the
self-talk of the Naval Aviation enterprise, of which I am a
member, was sequestration is killing us, I need more parts, I
need more people, and I need to hire more component repair.
When we got in with a thoughtful new approach called
Perform to Plan, first of all, we made it not work by a
committee, we made an accountable leader, the Air Boss. We
brought in the driver-based performance and we brought in
digital tools and we brought in a cadence of accountability for
learning. That illuminated the foundation of Navy learning, of
what it means to be self-assessing, self-correcting.
In 2019, after a decade of 250 jets, we drove it to the 341
target, and we have sustained it ever since in COVID. The
number today is 350.
So that was the kernel of learning that then scaled into
the private shipyards; 7,000 days of maintenance delay in 2019,
4,000 in 2020. Admiral Kitchener talked about it has been down,
you know, 50 percent. Brought it into supply.
That foundation--and so how do we integrate it? That
illuminated the building on a strong Navy culture--honor,
courage, commitment--but how are we going to change our
behavior in concert. And what really brought velocity to this
rollout was seeing things like Fitz/McCain and Bonhomme
Richard, and we said, hey, we are seeing the same things there,
and so let's bring velocity to it. CNO made the call to the
call to action.
We have to teach this, Chairman, because when I have been
out doing listening tours, if you talk to many people
throughout the Navy, they will say, we are already doing this.
And when I talk to the triads, they said, no, we are not. We
need to have specific understanding of what it means to be
self-assessing, self-correcting.
So I don't want to take more time. Recognizing the need to
simplify, streamline, and align. Recognize the need for the
Learning to Action Board with the Naval Safety Command and this
broader teaching on being self-assessing, self-correcting, they
are all mutually reinforcing.
And I will be happy to perhaps come by when convenient----
Mr. Garamendi. And I would presume that all of that is for
getting at the problems that have been identified: manning,
training, maintenance, overuse of the force, and the like. I
would appreciate a more detailed description of the integration
of these three major tasks that you have undertaken and then
how you intend to judge the successfulness of that integration
of those three major tasks.
Also, if you would please make sure that we know what you
need to carry out these tasks. I am hesitant, in fact, I refuse
to insert my low level of knowledge and overwrite and overrun
what you propose to do, but I will use our position to observe
and hold you accountable for the implementation of what you
intend to do to address the known problems here.
One other point is--and this goes to my colleague who talks
about the Navy of the future and the Navy of today--we added
$24.5 billion to the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act].
And the question for us is, did we spend that additional $24
billion to achieve the goal that our colleague, Mr. Wittman,
has put before us? If we did, good. If we did not use that
money to address the problem that he has identified, then shame
on us. I will let it go at that.
I do have the list of where that money was spent, and
precious little of it was spent to address the problem that he
has identified. That is our problem.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
Next, the chair will now recognize Mr. Wilson from South
Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admirals, again, as a grateful Navy dad, I am just so
honored for your service and your dedication and commitment to
our country.
And, General--excuse me--Admiral Kitchener, as we discuss
weapons systems, what is the Harpoon missile system capable of
as to its placement, portability, range, lethality?
Mr. Courtney. Microphone. Yep, yep, yep.
Admiral Kitchener. The Harpoon weapon system is one of our
legacy weapon systems that we are actually phasing out. It is
one of our surface-to-surface weapons. It has got about a 75-
nautical-mile range, but it is scheduled to be phased out and
replaced by more capable systems.
We could probably have a more robust discussion in a proper
setting. Over.
Mr. Wilson. And can it be placed on land?
Admiral Kitchener. It can be configured in some sort of--we
have experimented with some land options and capability with
Harpoon in the past. That is true.
Mr. Wilson. And as to other missile systems, are they being
in place now to replace the Harpoon, or what is the status?
Admiral Kitchener. We do. We have several different systems
that we are developing. One that we have outfitted on our
littoral combat ships is the Naval Strike Missile, which is a
very capable weapon that has also being utilized by the Marine
Corps in their littoral regiments.
And then we have a Maritime Strike Tomahawk weapon that we
are developing as well, and then some variants of our SM branch
of weapons that we have configured for different missions that
probably we need to change our setting to discuss those.
Mr. Wilson. And, you know, this may be beyond, but can a
Javelin missile be used as a missile to attack a vessel or a
landing craft?
Admiral Kitchener. I would not rule out using any weapon to
attack any type of craft or vehicle. Its limited range and, you
know, some of the maritime environment is a little bit more
unforgiving on certain weapons that were designed for land use.
But, yes, sir, if--I am not going to tell you that, no, we
couldn't use it in a short-range----
Mr. Wilson. Well, indeed, as I am thinking of range, we
have seen Putin's Black Sea Fleet moving toward the incredible
city of Odessa and the horror of the mass murder that Putin,
the war criminal, is planning. And just any way that that could
be interrupted, stopped, is my interest, and I certainly hope
that every effort is being made, working with our Ukrainian
allies and our Black Sea allies of Romania and Bulgaria and
Turkey.
And then with Turkey, Admiral Lescher, I am grateful that
there has been a commitment from our Turkish partners to
restrict the Russian access to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles
Straits.
Putin's war against innocent people of Ukraine certainly
justifies the decision under the Montreux Convention. How does
the Montreux Convention limitation of warships from non-Black
Sea nations limit our ability for regional naval power
projection? Are there efforts underway to work with the Turkish
Ministry of Defense to permit American naval transit in the
event of crises?
Admiral Lescher. Yeah. Thanks for that question, sir. The
investments we have made--and I will keep it at a fairly high
level for classification--provide the reach that give our
combatant commander opportunity to deliver the effects we need
from multiple bodies of water. So don't necessarily have to be
in the Black Sea, the Ionian, the Adriatic. There is capability
certainly with our current laydown, without doubt, to defend
our NATO allies. So not an issue.
What it does highlight, in a very positive sense, is not
only the applicability of that treaty, but from a strategic
perspective, where we are focused on integrated deterrence by
the U.S. Navy, by the joint force, by the whole of government
that you see being done very incredibly well, and through our
allies and partners. And so that closure is influencing
obviously the ability of Russian ships to flow to the Black Sea
in a way that is much more impactful on them than our combatant
commanders.
Mr. Wilson. And I want to point out too, I was really
grateful with the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe working with Congressman Steve Cohen, Senator Ben
Cardin, Senator Roger Wicker. We visited Varna, Bulgaria, last
year. And the incredible people of Bulgaria would love to have
naval facilities, U.S., to go along with their other military
facilities of Novo Selo, as Bulgaria stands up as a great part
of NATO.
I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Again, I would just note, in terms of the Montreux
Convention and also the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, in 2018,
Putin just totally violated every single principle of maritime
law when he seized three Ukrainian Navy ships, imprisoned the
crew in Moscow for a year, completely incommunicado.
The U.N. [United Nations] Convention for Law of the Sea
treaty tribunal convicted Russia of complete violation of
UNCLOS. And, you know, I would just note, I think, frankly, it
is a perfect example why I think the U.S. should ratify UNCLOS
and get part of the structure of enforcing that type of illegal
behavior. So, anyway, that is my little ad hominem comment and
followup.
Our next member up is Mr. Norcross from New Jersey.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We started out this morning having a quote from General and
President Washington talking about how important a Navy is, and
certainly we couldn't agree more. But something that is
remarkably different from the 1700s to where we are today is
air threats and space threats. And any decisions we make are
made in a very different formula and--where we assess those
choices and the risk. And in many ways, it would be great if we
just had to choose between land and sea. It would make our job
much easier. But the fact of the matter is we are in a very
challenging environment.
And you discussed some of the mishaps, the accidents we
have had over the course of the last decade, and some of the
issues that have been recommended, had been put into place. We
are coming off a 2-year COVID period that has challenged
everybody on this planet but particularly in our Armed Forces.
Admiral Lescher, talk to me about how we are recruiting
that next generation of sailor. How are we getting he or her to
not only join but to stay in the Navy? Because we know it costs
so much more money and time to train somebody new than to
retain somebody who is experienced. Could you touch base on
that?
Admiral Lescher. Yeah. I appreciate the question, sir.
Absolutely. I would highlight a couple of what I think are best
practices and structure we have in the Navy that is making a
real difference on that dimension.
At boot camp, in terms of how we influence the individuals,
one of the key elements is warrior toughness and resiliency
training. And I highlight that not only because it is such a
success at boot camp in Great Lakes, but we are scaling that
now on a continuum across the Navy.
So from the day you come into the Navy, whatever your
accession source is, through milestone events, to the day you
leave, a consistent focus on warrior toughness and resilience
is key.
In terms of with that foundational, cultural orientation,
behavioral orientation, warrior focus, how do we make come
alive their ability to contribute in an important way? And
Ready Relevant Learning is our new approach to improve and
address a number of the training deficiencies that have been
noticed in the GAO report and elsewhere.
And I would ask Admiral Kitchener to give you some specific
detail in the surface force of how Ready Relevant Learning is
making a difference.
The one thing I would highlight, again, before I turn it
over to Admiral Kitchener, sir, that you point, we are very
focused on retention, and it is strong right now, it is at a
very strong level. But part of the reason we are focused on it
is because recruiting is becoming increasingly difficult for
all the services and really even more broadly.
The last data I showed showed that that portion of the U.S.
population that is eligible to serve, their propensity to serve
from 2018 was 13 percent. In 2021, it is down to 10 percent.
I think all the service recruiters are seeing symptoms of
the great resignation and/or a labor market that is so tough
that our new construction shipyards, our repair shipyards, our
aviation depots, all are struggling to bring in--we are all
competing for the same talented group. And so we are laser-
focused on that, strong retention.
And in terms of Ready Relevant Learning, Roy, other
thoughts you might have on that.
Admiral Kitchener. Yes, sir. To answer your question on
some of the things we have done with training, particularly in
the surface force, but I think this applies, writ large, across
the Navy, is, you know, getting that training to the right
sailor at the right time.
And so one of our focus has been really to develop, you
know, from the apprentice to the journeyman to the master,
which is something we got unfocused on over the years. And so
now we have been able to come back, and we are beginning to
measure our ability to--on that training that we have given to
that sailor.
So if you come aboard a ship and you do a tour in an
engineering department, then you would go back to shore to
refine those skills, so when you came back out, you would be
either that strong journeyman or perhaps that master, where
what we found before we embarked on what we call our SURFMEX
[Surface Manning Experience] program, which allows us to
measure these things, is that we certainly had the right people
on the ship, but they didn't have the right expertise, or they
didn't have the years of training that we would require for
that level.
If you look back at how we apply the training to our new
force, to our new sailors, to this generation, it really has
gone back to, you know, focus on a virtual training. If you
look at the engineering training that we conduct at Great
Lakes, 10 years ago, we maybe had one old engine that we would
allow sailors to work on. Today, every engineering course has a
virtual trainer that they can take things apart and look at
things.
We have proliferated that to the waterfront to the point of
need where our sailors can come off ships and go and work on
these things, particularly in the area of tactical training. I
think our investments and our enlisted tactical training is
very significant, and it resonates with our sailors, and we are
able to maintain that proficiency.
Because what we have learned through all the data that we
have collected on all the training initiatives we have is that
it is doing it time and time again is very critical, but it is
also when was the last time you did it. The currency is very
significant. And so putting these trainers at the waterfront
has allowed us to do that.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. And my time expired, but just want
to express gratitude for those who served during the pandemic.
Regardless of their individual health, they kept our country
running.
I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Norcross.
I now recognize Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I was
particularly disturbed by last month's GAO report which
detailed the comments of sailors from 16 different ships. And I
think it is important to note, one of the reasons the GAO went
to sailor interviews so heavily was because of a lack of data
in intermediate maintenance.
And, you know, these sailors discussed their experiences,
and basically they were discussing the same root problems that
led to the disasters of 2017. We are 5 years away from that, as
I mentioned. But I think we could go back as far as the Balisle
report, I believe that was in 2010, and find similar themes and
challenges as to what was now being reported in 2020--or 2022.
So despite your actions--and I want to give credit for many
of those actions--we are still receiving these troubling
reports and comments from sailors reporting--pointing at the
same old problems. So there seems to be a disconnect between
the initiatives and what we are hearing on the ground.
Were you surprised--and to either one of you--were you
surprised by what you were hearing from the sailors in that
report?
Admiral Lescher. Yeah, let me take that. And, Roy, please
pile on.
I was not surprised, partly because of this journey I
alluded to earlier about Navy taking a hard look at
systemically weak performance is very much focused in two ways
on shipyards and maintenance.
What you highlighted as particularly troubling, this
absence of data, is true. And in this case, I can, on an
upside, report to you that is in the intermediate phase now and
we are on it. That used to also be in the depot phase. It took
two four-stars, myself and Admiral Caldwell, to break free the
data in our public shipyards and get that released out of
control so we can use it to drive this Perform to Plan/Get Real
engine, which then is married with our Get Better engine.
So the GAO report talked about a number of issues. It
talked about manning. Let me offer you a few thoughts on that.
The Navy from Fitz/McCain era has recognized that as an issue,
and the Navy has pulled that lever hard.
And so let's talk about why it was still manifest with
those sailors. From January 2017 to today, 10,000 more sailors
at sea; 23,000 increase in end strength since 2017. Crewed as
billets being increased relentlessly, gaps at sea decreasing.
But still, the way we approach, partly as a learning from
Fitz/McCain, is we allocate risk in manpower to the maintenance
phase. And so we have to be eyes wide open about that. And as
we still continue to close the manpower lever, that is what--
and Admiral Kitchener can talk about how we manage that risk in
the maintenance phase.
The related element I would like to highlight is, partly
because of what I talked about in the recruiting context, we
are not going to just solve this by recurringly pulling the
more accessions lever. We need to be thoughtful about demand
reduction.
And I don't mean demand reduction in the context of
Chairman Garamendi said about less COCOMs [combatant commands],
although that is a lever we are pulling to make that a supply-
based discussion we can talk about. But I am talking about in
terms of condition-based maintenance and using our data and our
AI [artificial intelligence] in a best practice, for example,
that Maersk does, to design our maintenance system on the ship
to not oversubscribe the sailors.
Mr. Waltz. Not to jump in, just for the interest of time, I
am all for pulling in private sector best practices, but I have
to tell you, the fact that we didn't have data at the depot
level, we don't have data at the intermediate level, do you
find that acceptable?
Admiral Lescher. It is completely unacceptable. But,
Ranking Member, I can tell you these initiatives broadly that
we have been scaling for 4 years now are absolutely driving
data. If you look in the aviation enterprise and what Air Boss
is doing, it is phenomenally impressive.
The fleet readiness analytic group--and Roy has created a
surface action analytics group that is completely data-driven.
The shipyards now, the public shipyards, absolutely data-
driven. Private shipyards, we need to work as well to make that
richer.
Intermediate maintenance, just as an example, we did use
intermediate maintenance data in some of the earlier Perform to
Plan initiatives in undersea and in the private shipyards. It
is just not as rich as it needs to be. But, Ranking Member, I
will tell you there is no lack of understanding of the power of
data.
And the other thing I would like to highlight, we have an
exceptional data scientist group at Center for Naval Analyses
that uses data in incredibly powerful ways. And, in fact, when
I benchmark personally with senior executives at world-class
companies outside the DOD [Department of Defense] ecosphere in
search of best practice for large-velocity, high-volume
deckplate problem solving, when they see how the Navy has used
large data to leverage and move outcome, they are the ones that
are asking for the next meeting.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you for that. We are running out of time
to do better, and you are going to hear that from me every
single chance. The threat briefs versus the systems that we are
getting in place doesn't line up.
Admiral Kitchener, just in the--I don't see the clock going
so I don't--we are good. All right. Thanks. So I am a little
thrown off on that.
But--we talked yesterday about your 10-year horizon on the
modernization piece, but yet overlaid with probably what I
believe is a 4- to 7-year horizon where we may go to high-end
conflict in the Pacific. Talk to me about that disconnect in
terms of timing.
I just--I feel like we have to get out of this mode of
asking for what we think we can get versus what we need. And
then talk to us about the gaps, what we get to you or then what
we get to you too late. We need to understand those gaps. How
do you accelerate? And do you have to ask for more resources,
both either internally or to us, to accelerate that
modernization?
Admiral Kitchener. Thank you for the question.
Mr. Waltz. And I would ask you to be brief. I don't want to
monopolize the time.
Admiral Kitchener. Okay. Thank you for the question. When
we put together the strategy or when I put together the
competitive edge strategy, it was to not only make what we have
now more ready and produce more ready ships that I have, and
that was mostly an analytics-driven adventure that we have been
running, and it is producing really good results, so that now
we know.
Because what we have done, to kind of go back to the last
question a little bit, is we do a very good job of deploying
our ships and making them ready when they go forward. They are
manned, they are certified to the missions we decide they are
certified to, and they are trained to a very high level. That
is done very well.
In the maintenance phase and in the initial parts of our
training phase, we take risk because----
Mr. Waltz. We are robbing from Peter to pay Paul.
Admiral Kitchener. Yes, sir. That is where we take our
risk, consciously. And I watch that very carefully. It is
particularly in the maintenance phase, because as a ship comes
out of maintenance and transitions to start its work-up
training, it is a very critical point. You know, it is a high
failure point is what we look at.
And if you don't have the right people on deck and you
don't have the right people certifying to the right standard,
then you could get in trouble. So we pay, I pay very close
attention to that. And so then----
Mr. Waltz. Thank you for that. If you could send the rest
of that for the record, I would appreciate it. I look forward
to having that conversation with you.
Just one quick statement or final point. I want to mention
that we have been made aware of an issue regarding inoperable
ovens on CVN 77 after a lengthy availability, and it is our
hope we can get those fixed. We got to feed the sailors.
Nutrition before mission, as my first platoon sergeant told me.
That came to us at a recent visit, and we wanted to make you
aware of it.
And, again, we are paying close attention to what the
sailors are telling us and what is motivating them to stay in
the Navy and continue to serve this great Nation.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
I now recognize Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you
hear me okay?
Mr. Courtney. Loud and clear.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today.
Thank you for your service.
Let me begin with this, and this is for both of our
witnesses. So I have been told that there is a chronic overuse
of the surface force, causing fatigue, low morale, and safety
concerns. I know we touched on this a bit already this morning.
So the question is: Is the Navy fleet leadership empowered to
relay concerns of fatigue and overwork when a mission is
requested, especially a nonessential mission, and does the
current culture allow fleet leadership to communicate these
concerns?
Admiral Lescher. Yes, sir. So those--I alluded to it in an
earlier answer. Very direct opportunity for the Chief of Naval
Operations to influence requests for forces above the baseline
plan for the year. Obviously, the world gets a vote and it is a
risk decision but with the Navy having a very strong voice.
One element of that that I would highlight, if you look at,
for example, steaming days, in fiscal year 2020, the Navy
executed well above the plan. In fiscal year 2021, last year,
the decrease in the annual steaming days was about 7,000 to
22,000, so a nontrivial substantial decrease, reflecting the
Navy voice that the force was being oversubscribed.
Nonetheless, the concern remains. It is real. The tension
is real between the need for combatant commanders and the
ability to deliver ready, lethal, properly trained and equipped
naval forces.
One other thing I would highlight very quickly before
turning it over to Admiral Kitchener, besides that demand
lever, some of the other actions I talked about, we are very
focused on this fatigue issue within the way a unit is manned
today, to pull workload off the sailor. Clearly, I had
mentioned condition-based maintenance and using AI. In
aviation, we did a maintenance program reset that took 30
percent of the scheduled maintenance out of a VFA [strike
fighter] squadron by giving a homework assignment to
NAVAIRSYSCOM [Naval Air Systems Command] to go back and look at
the totality of maintenance requirements that have been added
over the life of the Hornet. And we learned that they had all
been added and never pulled out. We reduced scheduled
maintenance by 30 percent.
I directed Naval Sea Systems Command to do the same
homework assignment for our ships. And so, again, looking to
see if we can, in terms of the 67-hour designed workweek for
our sailors when deployed, to pull off unnecessary unvalue-
added work.
The last item I would highlight in there, there is also the
opportunity to adjust mission. So OPNAV [Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations] N9 has a homework assignment right now to
look at the required operational capabilities, the mission
assignments which drives the manning requirements for all our
surface ships.
And an example of an actual case, a cruiser that, based on
where it was ordered, did not have the need to do a maritime
interdiction operation, visit, board, search and seizure, and
pull that workload off the sailors. All elements of us thinking
how do you both pull work off as well as bring additional
supply on.
Roy, your----
Mr. Langevin. When will they be reporting back to you,
Admiral, on those requests that you have made and those
changes? Do you have a time certain as to when they will be
reporting back to you?
Admiral Lescher. I am sorry, sir, I didn't catch the
question.
Mr. Langevin. Is there a time certain when they will be
reporting back to you on those findings, the things that you
have laid out in terms of changes?
Admiral Lescher. I believe you are asking about the
homework assignment to NAVSEA to report on the ability
analytically, not just to remove but analytically to remove
maintenance requirements, is that the question?
Mr. Langevin. Yes.
Admiral Lescher. I don't have a solid estimate for that,
but I am happy to close the loop for you when I get that.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, thank you.
Admiral Kitchener.
Admiral Kitchener. I will speak at a very kind of strategic
level here, sir, but I think, to answer your question, we do a
very good job, in my opinion, between myself and the numbered
fleet commander, on ensuring that ships are manned, trained,
and certified for the mission.
I can give you examples of cases where we needed to
accomplish the maintenance or if an entitlement, a training
entitlement wasn't completed, where we delayed a ship from
proceeding on to the next phase of its maintenance.
The one I would tell you that is most recent to me is a
group that just came back, the Essex ARG [Amphibious Ready
Group]. They were going out and they needed to go to the Middle
East to support operations there. And we had to do some
critical repairs to the ship. And I said, hey, this is what we
need to do. It took us a little bit longer than we thought. We
delayed the deployment. We still got there on time and executed
the mission, but we made sure they were ready for it.
We do the same thing with training. So we don't put sailors
in positions or ships in positions where they are not ready to
execute the mission. I think that works very well. If I don't
agree on it with the numbered fleet commander or there is a
disagreement with us, then we go to the four-star fleet
commander and it is adjudicated at that level. It is a robust
C2 [command and control]. It came out of the McCain/Fitz----
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral Kitchener. I mean, we got
the gist, I think, of the answer, so that was good. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Next up is Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
And, Admirals, Mr. Wilson and Chairman Courtney both
alluded to the Black Sea area, and you--certainly timely, maybe
not for the specific subject matter but very timely. And while
you discussed the capabilities that we have in the Black Sea
region, it is my understanding that we do not have a strategy
for the Black Sea region. Is that correct?
Admiral Lescher. Maybe you could amplify more. I don't
understand.
Mr. Scott. My understanding is that NATO nor the U.S. has
developed a strategy for the Black Sea region.
Admiral Lescher. I am unaware of a specific Navy strategy
for the Black Sea.
Mr. Scott. So I have kind of a suggestion, Mr. Courtney,
and this is not a suggestion for admirals, but for the people
that are watching around the world.
I think that the U.N. should declare a no-go zone in the
Black Sea for Russian warships and for the skies above Ukraine.
And I think that the U.N. should ask the world to enforce those
no-go zones.
The Ukrainian people and President Zelensky have done a
tremendous job putting up a fight against superior forces. I
have very serious reservations whether or not they can hold on
if the Russians are hitting them from the air, the land, and
the sea. The world has an obligation, and perhaps it is the
U.N. that should propose the no-go zones and have that vote,
and that the world needs to be prepared to enforce those.
With that said, how much coordination is there with our
NATO allies with regard to procurement, maintenance, material
conditioning, and training? Our NATO allies now recognize,
including Germany, that they are going to have to spend 2
percent. How much coordination is there with the purchase of
the ships and the weapons and the training that we need to
defend the world from people like Vladimir Putin?
Admiral Lescher. You know, I am thinking of specific
examples that might come to mind there. And I am not--I don't
have a lot of detail at my fingertips, so I am happy to take
that for the record as well.
The Foreign Military Sales program, nonetheless, of the
U.S. is robust globally, and my sight picture, it is at a very
strong level. So without being able to provide specific
elements of our NATO allies today, I would offer that as a
baseline context and then offer to get back to you with more
detail.
Mr. Scott. I suppose my point for the committee and for the
admirals is that it is a whole lot cheaper to buy the second
than it is to develop the first of a weapon system. And it
seems to me that perhaps coordination among NATO countries
might get us all more of the weapons and the equipment that we
need for a lot less money.
And so if we are going to buy two and the Brits are going
to buy two and the Germans are going to buy two, then
purchasing six at one time would give the U.S. and our NATO
allies and the world a better deal on what it takes to secure
the world from people like Vladimir Putin.
What are the crews being trained on today with regard to
the combat at sea, potential combat at sea? What specific areas
are you training the most for?
Admiral Kitchener. Sir, we train them at integrated air and
missile defense, you know, against not only ballistic missile
defense threats, but also against air-launched and surface-
launched and sub-launched cruise missiles. We actually share a
facility with the NAWDC [Naval Aviation Warfighting Development
Center] team, my air colleagues up in Fallon, Nevada, where we
integrate our destroyers and our cruiser crews in with pilots
sitting in tubs, and then we network out to the air wing on the
Fallon range. So that is pretty sophisticated.
Our WTIs [warfare tactics instructors] at the Surface and
Mine Warfare Development Center have been working extensively
on a SAG [surface action group] tactics, how to defeat high-end
Chinese surface ships, so we can take those down and allow our
other precision fires to interdict. And then, of course, anti-
submarine warfare, which we continue to get better and better
at as we get more and more practice.
Mr. Scott. If I could ask one quick question, Admiral. Do
you feel like you have enough weapons in your wartime reserve
right now?
Admiral Kitchener. In our wartime reserve? We have enough
weapons going on on our deployed ships, sir, and we are ready
to take the fight there.
Mr. Scott. I yield.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you.
Last year, we had some testimony to the subcommittee about
Conventional Prompt Strike. And I have seen some reports
recently that the timeline might have slipped on deploying that
on the Zumwalt away from fiscal year 2025. I was just curious
for any kind of update you can provide.
Admiral Lescher. Thank you for that question. My sight line
is that Conventional Prompt Strike on the Zumwalt is still
targeted in fiscal year 2025 timeframe and on Virginia Block V
fiscal year 2028. I would put an immense caveat to that,
however, which is we need your partnership to enact the funding
to do that. If the CR [continuing resolution] continues this
year, those timelines will absolutely slide.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. That is helpful.
We have had a lot of support testimony from the Navy over
the last couple of years about follow-on multiyear procurement
related to the DDG Flight III. Of course, this subcommittee
included a provision to tell the Navy to go ahead and do that,
give it the authority to do that last year. We didn't land
there with the Senate, but there was a reporting requirement to
the Navy to get back to Congress about the value of a follow-on
multiyear procurement financially, et cetera.
Do you know anything about the status of that get back and
when we might be able to expect something back from the Navy?
Admiral Lescher. I am not familiar with the status, but we
will get that back to you.
Mr. Golden. Yeah, if we could get that back for the record,
I would appreciate it very much. Thank you.
That is it. Thanks.
Mr. Courtney. The chair now recognizes Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. I keep getting demoted on this committee, by
the way. I have to wait longer, but----
In response to Representative Wilson's questions, Admiral
Lescher, about Ukraine working with Turkey, you said, quote:
What it does highlight in a positive sense from a strategic
perspective, we are focused on integrated deterrence that you
see being done very incredibly well.
I am intrigued by this concept of integrated deterrence. I
am eagerly awaiting the publication of the National Security
Strategy and then the National Defense Strategy, and assume
integrated deterrence will be the cornerstone of it.
But in this context and in light of your comments, two
questions about integrated deterrence. What do you see being
integrated into deterrence that wasn't there before?
Admiral Lescher. So the concept, as I was highlighting it,
is integrating across all domains. So you see an increased
focus in the joint warfighting concept multidomain, integrating
the domains, which is not to say they weren't before. It is an
evolution for sure.
And then the broader, again, evolution to focus and
deliver, as part of a joint force, as part of whole of
government, and working in particular with allies and partners,
all an evolution and an emphasis I think that you are familiar
with.
Mr. Gallagher. But if we are doing integrated deterrence
very incredibly well in Ukraine, it raises a second question,
which is, what did we deter?
Admiral Lescher. An excellent question, I suppose. So we
are deterring any expansion into the NATO territories that we
are committed to defend.
Mr. Gallagher. But in a very real sense, I think, would it
be fair to say deterrence--we failed to deter Putin from
invading, correct?
Admiral Lescher. Oh, absolutely. Yeah.
Mr. Gallagher. So there was a deterrence failure. I don't
mean this to, like, score a cheap point. I just think that is
interesting. That is something we should study. We should
understand why it happened.
My own view--and this gets to integrated deterrence and
part of why I am skeptical of the concept--is that if it is
used to suggest that we can rely on nonmilitary tools,
specifically sanctions, or hashtag diplomacy in order to deter,
uncoupled from a credible military threat, then we will have
further deterrence failures. My bias is that you have to put
hard power in the path of people like Putin or Xi Jinping in
order to have a hope of deterrence.
I would go further and say this is the first test, real
world test of integrated deterrence, and it failed. We need to
learn from that, right? I want to deter. We all want to deter.
We don't want to deal with an incursion into NATO. We certainly
don't want to deal with a conflict over Taiwan.
But if integrated deterrence is a smokescreen for cutting
our investments in hard power and somehow believing that
untested technology which won't be fielded until the end of the
decade or the next decade or allies or statements coming out of
Davos or the U.N. can substitute for hard power, I think we are
going to see further deterrence failures. Now, I understand
there are many in the building who disagree with me, and I am
open to the counterargument, but it is a matter of fact that
deterrence failed in this case.
I welcome the stiffening of the Europeans' position, the
shift that I perceive in Germany, the unification of the West.
These are great developments that we should build upon. But
deterrence still failed. And so I would argue, perhaps we
didn't do integrated deterrence, whatever that means, very
incredibly well.
And I think it would help--usually I actually ask
questions, I don't do speeches like this. But you have touched
a nerve for me.
One way I think--the best lesson I think we can learn from
this is actually in a different theater. It is in INDOPACOM
[U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]. I think the lesson is we need to
think about how we arm Taiwan yesterday, right? After things
start going boom, it is going to be hard to surge support.
And we are engaged in a process of trying to deter the PLA
[People's Liberation Army] by denial. And the threat of
sanctions and the threat of a sternly worded mean tweet from
the State Department press secretary is not going to deter Xi
Jinping.
I yield my remaining second.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Actually, just one response, which, again, I think you
raised a really excellent question there. But there is examples
of integrated deterrence that is happening out there,
particularly in the ASW [anti-submarine warfare] domain, where
our allies are very integrated, in terms of the U.S. Navy, as
far as dealing with that specific threat.
And I don't know if you want to----
Admiral Lescher. No, I appreciate the opportunity to
amplify. It is almost a straw man to say integrated deterrence
would somehow be divorced from a comprehensive integrated
approach that relies on military power. I would be, equally
with you, Representative, if that somehow decoded as a
stovepipe device comprehensive approach.
And to your point, is it successful or not? The context of
the U.S. approach here would be in defense of the NATO allies,
and--well, I believe we will see how that----
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
The chair now recognizes Congresswoman Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Yes. I was going to shift back, Admiral
Lescher, to some things that you mentioned in your statement.
So I will just quote what you wrote. You said: ``Too often,
from an institutional perspective, we have viewed poor
performance as one-off failures, made short-term adjustments,
and focused on administrative solutions, adding burdensome
regulations and guidance over developing our people,'' end
quote.
But then you go on to talk about all the administrative
solutions and guidance that you have put in place to fix this
problem, such as Get Real, Get Better; Learning to Action
Board; Safety Management System; Performance to Plan; Navy
Sustainment System; additional fire safety inspections and
requirements; more requirements for training officers. And the
list is pretty long.
So just looking at the Bonhomme Richard as an example, and
you have talked about different causes for these types of
incidents, would you say that that was cultural? Was it
training? Was it programmatic? Can you describe where you think
that failed?
Admiral Lescher. Yeah. My fundamental diagnosis of Bonhomme
Richard was remarkable organizational drift and an
insufficiently intrusive ISIC. That is a bad combination.
So the question that then emerges is why. What drove that?
I believe our sight picture on--we hadn't properly trained our
individuals going into these maintenance depots necessarily. So
the damage control industrial certification being one remedy
for that.
It is a very fair question on whether we are not, where by
proliferating guidelines, regulations, instructions as our
primary method of learning, if that is not oversubscribing the
ability of our triads and our people to process them.
There is a really interesting learning example in Naval
Reactors, which you might say is the exemplar of that culture.
And they are on a strong push to step back from 100-page
instructions and really start making that knowledge come alive
with a principles-based approach, where the principles are very
logical.
Mrs. Luria. Perhaps in the--the time we have is limited, so
I would love to follow up and learn more about, you know, how
they are evolving that and perhaps learn from Admiral Caldwell
as well.
So none of the things that we talked about, you know,
specifically within this statement and the problems within the
surface fleet involve warfighting. They involve basic routine
navigation, for example, and in-port maintenance operations.
But if you look at warfighting, for example--and I asked
Admiral Aquilino this question a few years ago in a similar
hearing when he was still the commander of Pacific Fleet--just
want to know where you assess and are we taking appropriate and
equal actions to evaluate our proficiency in the warfighting
realm?
Admiral Lescher. Yeah. I think there is very strong--
particularly in the surface community, very strong progress on
warfighting.
If you want to amplify it a bit, Roy.
Admiral Kitchener. Yes, ma'am. I think one of the--what we
have done is we are trying to emulate what we did with
developing our maritime skills continuum. You know, we did a
really good job of, after the collisions, in saying, okay, here
is what we need to be, how we need to be proficient, and here
is how we get there and what we need to measure.
We have taken the same approach to tactical proficiency,
and we have sort of turned our WTIs loose at our Surface and,
you know, Mine Warfare Development Center to come up with this
program. The initial results are we have gone in and we are
looking and measuring through a series of tests where our
students are coming out of, say, department head school or some
of our milestone schools. And then we have a methodology for
evaluating them during exercises and building that expertise,
getting them into those trainers and then integrating them. But
I think what is essential to it has been the ability to
measure, so that now we can actually get them into a trainer,
understand where their deficiencies are and correct those.
And so it is something that we have embarked on over the
last year and utilizing those trainers we developed and
collecting that data, and that is the trajectory we are on. And
I would be happy to talk to you about it further.
Mrs. Luria. Sure. And, you know, you talked about this is
for ship handling, these go/no-go checkpoints. So some data I
would like to know is, you know, how many officers have been
through these checkpoints? How many have been a no-go?
Specifically, how many prospective commanding officers have
been no-goes and not passed that milestone in order to go to
command?
And, moreover, this kind of ties back into my question
about warfighting is, why is the surface fleet not doing
something similar to the submarine commanders course, where all
of these elements are evaluated before someone can actually
take command?
Admiral Kitchener. I think that is the journey that we were
on. I think that that is eventually what we want to do. We want
to get to a tactical course, a capstone course that they go
through that they do before a command.
To answer your question directly on the number of COs
[commanding officers] that have been through, I will have to
come back to you on that, but I believe the number is about 13
that have not been able to proceed on to command, that were no-
go at their command assessment.
Mrs. Luria. And for scale sake, what percentage, or 13 out
of several hundred or----
Admiral Kitchener. It is probably--I will come back to you
on that one, because I don't want to speculate, but it is----
Mrs. Luria. Okay. Just kind of want to understand the
scope. But, I mean, it is good to hear that it is actually a
checkpoint and that the people who are not meeting that are
actually not progressing on.
Admiral Kitchener. And that is at both the commander--the
command level and at the major command level.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Bergman.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admirals, you have touched a nerve in several of us. I was
sitting up in my office. I am a pretty fast writer, sometimes
not legible, but I was writing as fast as I could when the
acronyms and the buzzwords started to flow, Admiral Lescher.
L2AB. Okay. Simplify, streamline, and design. Get Real, Get
Better; Perform to Plan; self-assessing, self-correcting.
I am not sure what year you got your wings, but did Benny
Suggs and Anymouse exist? As a naval aviator, we used to have--
and this was not just to the aviation units, but Anymouse,
which was an acronym for anonymous at the time. You had your
little box in the squadron ready room or in the maintenance
spaces where you could actually--anybody, whether you were that
newest sailor or Marine in that unit or that, you know, someone
below--the CO and the XO [executive officer] and the NATOPS
[Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization
officer], and the safety, can sit there and get real-time
feedback from those under your command about just, hey,
anonymous, this is what is going on. Benny Suggs, Beneficial
Suggestions, you know.
Those were two very simple feedback loops that were used
50-plus years ago. I don't know if they worked. I do know that
as a former NATOPS and safety officer at the squadron level
that the only thing I feared is if I ever had a perfect flight,
I would never ever get into an aircraft ever again, because
that would mean the next one was going to be a real bear. All
right.
So the point is--and, again, not to dwell on aviation here,
but I think it is a comparative example that we continue to
learn from. There was a time in naval aviation that aviators
didn't really fear a sim [simulator] ride. Ah, it is just
another--I will take my chances in the aircraft itself. Well,
as a commercial airline pilot, if we didn't pass our check
ride, we didn't have a paycheck or a job.
So that culture, I believe, has changed over the last few
decades, because of what we can do in simulators for all of
our--you know, all of our service men and women, regardless of
your--you know, regardless of your service.
I guess what concerns me is that we at the higher levels
have spent too much time playing with words rather than
challenging people, our young folks who come into our services
at this day and age, come in with maybe different skill sets,
different levels of maturity. Because an 18-year-old in our
country today, according to the data that is out there by some
very good social scientists, the average 18-year-old in our
country today is performing emotionally at about 16\1/2\ to 17.
So think about that when those young recruits enter boot camp
at Great Lakes.
By the way, the Navy--and thanks to Vern Clark for what he
did in his vision of that new basic training center up at Great
Lakes. I was a guest there a long time ago and had a chance to
tour it. Because you are getting in the minds and the heads of
those young trainees. I was even impressed with the Dr.
Scholl's little machine you stood on there to see if your
shoes, your boots were going to fit right. You know, as
Marines, that never really happened. You know, you were lucky
to have, you know, things that didn't leak or didn't create
fungus on your feet. But that is a different story.
But you have done so much, but we are not there. We are not
there, and we need to be there. And we need to stop with the
acronyms to a point, get back to things like Anymouse or
Bennys, whatever we are going to call it. Create a feedback
loop that gives it to you immediately.
And I am going to give you one acronym that, if you want to
use it, great. We have all heard about tough love, right? You
get nothing done out of hate. It is all out of love. So in this
case, the tough--as a Marine, I am spelling challenged, so I am
just going to say T-U-F, and that is train until failure.
Because if you fail in your training, you learn.
And, with that, I yield back. And I thank you for never
quitting on those sailors, Marines, and civilians under your
command. And set the expectations high, and don't try to BS
this group, because we are here to help you. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Bergman.
The chair now recognizes Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral Lescher, a lot of my colleagues have already
brought up the findings of the recent GAO report, but I want to
focus on one specific issue that I believe deserves extra
focus. GAO found that the surface fleet is 15 percent
undermanned compared to required levels.
Since undermanning was part of the reason for the
Fitzgerald and McCain disasters, why has more not been done to
fix this in the last 5 years? What is the Navy doing to
increase manning? And when will surface ships be fully manned
with the proper fit?
Admiral Lescher. Thanks for that question. A couple of
dimensions on which to answer it. I talked about the remarkable
growth in end strength in the Navy since 2017 and the GAO
report. So, very much getting after it. And part of the reason
that it remains undermanned is because we have been adding
billets as well.
So as we have added--you know, the end strength of the Navy
has grown 23,000, as we have talked about, since 2017. As we
add billets to address the overwork issue and make sure the
crew is sized for everything that is expected on that ship, we
are then chasing that with our accessions. So we are closing
the gaps across the Navy.
The other element is we have very strong certification and
focus on what the manpower, the manning that we deploy our
ships with. And so the remaining work for us to get after with
a strong sense of urgency is across the full OFRP [Optimized
Fleet Response Plan] cycle as well.
There is an element--and I see that Ranking Member Waltz
has left--where he was talking about, hey, where is data being
used by Navy? And I would like Admiral Kitchener to talk about
the surface maintenance experience point, which shows another
way, ma'am, which the Navy is bringing a sense of urgency to
not only bring in more sailors, to get the proper requirements
level on the destroyers, but also to allocate that scarce
resource in the most data-driven powerful way.
And, Roy, if you would care to talk about that.
Admiral Kitchener. Yes, sir. And so what we found as we man
our ships to the 92/95 fit/fill was that we weren't necessarily
getting the right combination of people. I talked a little bit
about it earlier with the apprentice/journeyman/supervisor
thing.
So I did not have a vote on where to send certain people.
And so we stood up a SURFMEX. We looked at the aviation model,
where they look at tracking, expertise, and proficiency. So we
did it with six rates in the Navy, and most of it was in
engineering and some warfighting rates as well.
And what we do now is we track each individual and what
their proficiency and experience is, and then we are able to
put them where we think we need them. For example, you know, if
a ship is down in a number of years of experience in an
engineering work center or an Aegis fire control system, we can
actually make sure we send the right person there that
increases the proficiency.
It is a much better measure of fit. We have been doing it
for a year now. Right now, it is part of the manning process,
but we are using it extensively to sort of fill those gaps at
sea that we talked about, making sure we have the right people
to go there.
So very encouraging results to date, and I think it is a
metric that we are going to continue to go after and allow us
to make sure we have that manning right on the ship.
Ms. Jacobs. Perfect. Well, I appreciate that, especially
because we had a hearing on the effectiveness of suicide
prevention programs yesterday. And it was extremely
disheartening to hear reports that ships' crew members reported
that they have lost at least one service member to suicide and
dozens of others due to mental health issues over a 7-month
period.
And so I really hope that you are working on, you know,
addressing the unsafe conditions and the safety measures and
the hours and leave and all of that so that we are addressing
that issue.
In my last minute, I also wanted to ask that the GAO has
also found that the Navy is not enforcing its fatigue policies
in the surface fleet, with most sailors receiving 5 hours or
less of sleep. Why has the Navy failed to fix this, and what
are you doing to ensure sailors receive the required amount of
sleep?
Admiral Kitchener. About a year ago, we finally came up in
the Surface Navy with a pretty rigorous policy for what we want
to do for fatigue management. We set our goal as 7.5 hours of
sleep a night. Today, I can tell you we get to about 6 hours,
so clearly some more work to be done.
We are teamed up with the National Health Center, ONR
[Office of Naval Research], the Naval Postgraduate School, a
bunch of other groups, some fitness experts that we work with,
measuring actual--you know, giving people wearables on ship so
we can measure how much time, so we actually have the data to
understand it.
We have introduced some watch station tools, and we have
also--so a CO can manage his people as he tracks their fatigue.
So I am encouraged, but we still have a lot of work to do. And
I could talk about it at another time on how we monitor how
well we are doing at it. Over.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much. As a Representative of
San Diego, these issues are deeply personal to me and my
constituents. So I will continue pushing you to do better for
our surface warfare officers.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And thank you for those questions,
Ms. Jacobs.
Next up is Mr. Moore. Is he still on Webex?
Mr. Moore. Yeah, I am on Webex. I am here. Thank you.
Can you hear me okay?
Mr. Courtney. Hear you fine.
Mr. Moore. Great. I want to--I am a little distracted
today. I wanted to personally apologize to both of you, to
Admiral and Vice Admiral. The House of Representatives failed
the military and veteran community today.
There is a bill about toxic burn pits that passed
unanimously out of the Senate, and then Speaker Pelosi puts a
different bill that she knows Republicans won't broadly
support. We have delayed this for too long.
There are numerous Republicans that have been very
supportive. I have cosponsored legislation on this. This is
just one of the most frustrating things that I have seen in my
time here related to our veteran community, and I wanted to
just personally apologize to you and take that few moments to
do.
I am not trying to be political about this. I have shared
my thoughts with other Members. We owe it to our veterans to
not play partisan political games with your lives. If we truly
care about toxic burn pits, we would have passed and put on the
floor the version that passed unanimously in the Senate. There
is no way around that. That is a sheer partisan game, and it is
the most frustrating thing that I have seen.
But dealing with the topic at hand, there has been a lot
that has been highlighted about the detrimental and toxic
impacts of insufficient manning, inadequate training, and low
morale. I applaud the Navy for having the foresight and
humility to take an introspective look at how we can do better
to avoid these tragic accidents.
The reforms discussed today will certainly save lives, from
your testimonies, and improve lethality and effectiveness of
our Surface Navy. As co-chair of the Depot Caucus, I would like
to use my time to discuss the degraded material condition,
delayed maintenance, and expired training certificates of our
forward-deployed ships.
Again, depot work is very important to my district and to
many across the country and vital for our readiness. I pose
these questions to both of you gentlemen, either of you or one
of you wants to respond.
Investigation into these incidents revealed that fleet
leadership often properly reported on material deficiencies,
only to be ignored or relieved. Were these reports ignored due,
in part, to deficiencies or lack of capacity at our shipyards
and the Navy organic industrial base? Can you shed a little
light on that?
Admiral Lescher. Sir, I am unfamiliar with the details of
what you described. Is there a source or can you help me
understand better?
Mr. Moore. I don't have any particular source on it right
now. And I am happy to submit something more specific, more
substantive via written if you would prefer.
Admiral Lescher. That would be helpful. I will say, again,
we have been swarming, I would say, very intensely the depot
maintenance issues, since 2018 in particular, to look at this.
In the private shipyards, Admiral Kitchener leads the effort to
Perform to Plan to drive improvements there. And it is focused
on being very radically transparent about what we see. Again,
it was the genesis, the kernel of what it means to Get Real.
Public shipyards as well, my view, we are approaching an
inflection point in the performance of the public shipyards.
And so I will be eager to see and address the issues that you
highlight.
Mr. Moore. Even if we just make it about delayed
maintenance, has delayed maintenance, just in general without
any specifics, played a role in these training mishaps? Would
you be able to pinpoint any examples there?
Admiral Kitchener. I can talk about it. I think in the past
what we found, particularly in the forward deployed naval
force, was that we did not have a good record of doing our
continuous maintenance. As we came out of that incident, we
have corrected that, and so now all the maintenance gets done.
We still struggle a little bit in one of the ports out there,
in Sasebo, because of a capacity issue.
But overall, in general, we are not deferring maintenance.
And if we do defer any kind of maintenance on a ship, it is
done at the highest level, that decision is made. But that
perhaps is what you are referring to. In the past, there was an
issue, particularly in the forward deployed naval force.
Admiral Lescher. The one thing I might add very quickly,
sir, is--and it gets back to the earlier comment about the
impact of a CR--we will be deferring maintenance nontrivially
if we--I am just looking at the numbers, in terms of a
continuing resolution for the balance of this year.
Mr. Moore. I appreciate your comments on the continuing
resolution. Again, another example of my apologies to you about
how ineffective and decrepit our House of Representatives is.
And we are playing games, partisan games, and not providing our
military what they need. It is a frustrating thing.
So I have a whole other question on being fully funded. I
am out of time. And I appreciate the opportunity to speak with
you today. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Mrs. McClain.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Admiral Kitchener, I am sure you are familiar with the
retired Vice Admiral Balisle's 2010 report on the health of the
Surface Navy. The report was pretty scathing in which I read
the Navy's declining surface readiness. This committee has
conducted several investigations since his report and still has
grave concerns facing the fleet.
In the simplest of terms--I don't have a military
background and I am a layman--so if you could explain to me in
layman's terms and, really, the American people in layman's
terms, we had four accidents in 2017, where, if my data is
correct, three collisions and one ran aground. One ship ran
aground, which seems crazy to me with how big the ocean is and,
I mean, to have three accidents, three ships hit each other.
They are pretty big vessels. It is not like you can't see them.
So if you can explain to me, in layman's terms, without--
and I would echo Mr. Bergman's, I don't know all the acronyms.
Just in layman's terms, how does that happen? I am sorry. Is it
a training? Is it equipment? Just in the simplest terms.
Admiral Kitchener. When we looked at those incidents that
you referred to, ma'am, we kind of focused on two specific
areas. One was on the training, which you brought up. And we
found that, at the time, a surface junior officer, one of our
newest people coming to, you know, control the ship, drive the
ship, their training--we weren't giving them enough time. We
weren't giving them enough time in simulators, giving them the
fundamentals.
So we focused on the training, and we developed a continuum
that now--you know, back then----
Mrs. McClain. Has that been corrected then?
Admiral Kitchener. Yes. And so when an ensign reported
aboard a ship back in 2017, they got about 150 hours in a
simulator, which we just had a discussion on. Today, they get
750 hours of training. And so that was one of the areas we
approached.
Another one was we looked at maintenance, which we just had
a discussion on. And in the forward deployed naval force at the
time, we weren't doing all of our continuous maintenance. And
so----
Mrs. McClain. They weren't doing it why?
Admiral Kitchener. We weren't doing it because of that the
ships were required to be operational. There wasn't that
balance we have now, where we have a tension between the
operational team and the maintenance.
Mrs. McClain. There was no slack in the system. They had to
be deployed?
Admiral Kitchener. There was a demand signal for ships to
be operational. And so what we did is we went back and we
looked at that, and we corrected the maintenance that we did.
And at the same time, we looked at, are they certified to do
the missions? Are we taking these people that are trained,
putting them on ships, and putting them in a situation that
they are not trained for? We corrected that.
So, now, all the certifications are completed before we
send a ship out on a mission. I described a little bit earlier
as the type commander, the individual responsible for man,
training, and equipping those ships, I have a good, healthy
tension with that fleet commander out there who wants to use
them for operations. And if they are not ready, then we have a
discussion. And if we can't agree to it, then it is resolved at
the four-star command level.
Mrs. McClain. And, again, forgive my newness.
Admiral Kitchener. That is okay.
Mrs. McClain. But when you say we have a discussion if they
are not ready, I will assume, if they are not ready, we are not
going to deploy them?
Admiral Kitchener. They do not go.
Mrs. McClain. Okay. Thank you, sir.
With that, I will yield my time back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mrs. McClain. Thank you for asking
that question, because that was sort of the debate after McCain
and Fitzgerald about whether we should put a safety brake on
the system, which Admiral Richardson, who was CNO at the time,
you know, described. And, again, I think, you know, that really
is one of the real accomplishments. Still we are not perfect
yet, but, you know, that helped, right?
Mrs. McClain. I appreciate [inaudible].
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
Congresswoman Luria requested about a minute and a half or
so just for another followup question. The chair recognizes
Mrs. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you for the additional time.
And I just wanted to follow up to my previous question, and
it was really about the effectiveness of our warfighting. So
you have done a good job today, and I have had separate
conversations with Admiral Lescher many times about, you know,
how you are improving in the basic things. And you have metrics
for that, and you can say it for the ship driving, for
navigation. You can show it in things with maintenance, where
you have done a very analytical basis.
But, I mean, the bottom line is, what do we have to show
that we are ready and we are ready to fight a peer competitor,
as far as our warfighting skills and capabilities? So that is
really, you know, where my question lies. And we can follow up,
and I would love to learn more in-depth information about, you
know, how you are measuring that. I think that that is the next
step and the most important step as we face what we are facing
in the Pacific.
But the next thing is language. You know, reading your
statements, hearing you speak, you seem to choose your words
very carefully, but they don't really sound like, you know,
normal people in the Navy speak. They don't sound like, you
know, the normal public would listen to.
And even, you know, some of the things that have been put
out, you know, by the Navy and various commands within the Navy
on social media that are trying to reach the broader public to
explain, you know, the purpose of your mission and why we have
a Navy and why these investments are so important and really
have never been more critical.
So I just urge you a lot, like my colleague maybe did, in
all forums to just look at the language you are using and make
sure it is clear and concise and to the point. Like, you are
getting a message out there. You want the public to know that a
Navy is absolutely essential to our national defense and
especially in the environment that we are in today.
So I think that would be helpful, not only in coming to us
to let us as Congress know why you are asking for the things
you are asking in the budget, for the broader public to know
why it is a good investment of their tax dollars.
So thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Garamendi for final comments.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The comment is
very, very quick.
Today's testimony, the questions and the answers lead me to
believe that the Navy is in the process of addressing the
manifold problems that have been brought--highlighted in this
hearing.
I look forward to seeing the specific plan, the integration
of the four different elements that you have described, and
then also how you intend to drive those activities down onto
each and every ship and then how to monitor the success of
that. I look forward to that. We will be following up.
And my final point is, if it takes direction, money beyond
the current little problem of the continuing resolution, we
need to know.
With that, I yield back, and thank the witnesses. Thank
you.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
To both my colleagues, again, and to the witnesses, we
covered actually a broader range today, but, obviously, with
events going on, that is not unexpected. Obviously, we will be
seeing you soon, I am sure, once we get the President's budget
and the posture hearings. Thank you again for, you know, again,
the followup from our classified briefing and today's public
hearing.
And, with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 3, 2022
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 3, 2022
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 3, 2022
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. When will the ``homework assignment'' to Naval Sea
Systems Command report to analytically, pull off non value work, adjust
mission, and remove maintenance requirements be completed?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Langevin. How are you going to change the culture for the
Surface Navy so that fleet leadership and all sailors are empowered to
report deficiencies and how will you make sure these concerns are acted
upon, not ignored or punished?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Langevin. How are you going to change the culture for the
Surface Navy so that fleet leadership and all sailors are empowered to
report deficiencies and how will you make sure these concerns are acted
upon, not ignored or punished?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. When can we expect IOC of hypersonics onboard U.S. Navy
warships? Are hypersonics a priority for the U.S. Navy's surface fleet?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. What are the leaders of the Navy's surface force doing
to harness the creative potential of service members to achieve a
common purpose like they did in the years before World War II?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Is there a role for aggressor surface squadrons in the
Surface Navy?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Do the crews of the surface fleet receive the difficult
and realistic training needed on how to fight in a mine warfare
environment and how to support minesweeping/hunting efforts? If not,
why not?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. What steps have you taken to enhance the focus of the
Surface Navy's warfighting skills? What steps do you plan to take in
the next 12 months?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Would today's sailors still find that their leadership
is distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the
successful execution of administrative functions rather than their
skills as a warfighter? What needs to be done for the Surface Navy's
leadership to focus on warfighting?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the Surface Navy do enough to cultivate and retain
talent? What more needs to be done?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the surface fleet still suffer from a dominant and
paralyzing zero-defect mentality?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the surface fleet have a corrosive over-
responsiveness to the media culture?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the Navy's surface fleet still suffer from an
expanding culture of micromanagement?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. What is the minimum number of deployed days per quarter
surface ships need to be fully combat ready?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Scott. When can we expect IOC of hypersonics onboard U.S. Navy
warships? Are hypersonics a priority for the U.S. Navy's surface fleet?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. What are the leaders of the Navy's surface force doing
to harness the creative potential of service members to achieve a
common purpose like they did in the years before World War II?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Is there a role for aggressor surface squadrons in the
Surface Navy?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Do the crews of the surface fleet receive the difficult
and realistic training needed on how to fight in a mine warfare
environment and how to support minesweeping/hunting efforts? If not,
why not?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. What steps have you taken to enhance the focus of the
Surface Navy's warfighting skills? What steps do you plan to take in
the next 12 months?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Would today's sailors still find that their leadership
is distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the
successful execution of administrative functions rather than their
skills as a warfighter? What needs to be done for the Surface Navy's
leadership to focus on warfighting?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the Surface Navy do enough to cultivate and retain
talent? What more needs to be done?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the surface fleet still suffer from a dominant and
paralyzing zero-defect mentality?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the surface fleet have a corrosive over-
responsiveness to the media culture?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. Does the Navy's surface fleet still suffer from an
expanding culture of micromanagement?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Scott. What is the minimum number of deployed days per quarter
surface ships need to be fully combat ready?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Mr. Banks. Who was held accountable for the USS Bonhomme Richard
fire? Have they been fired?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Banks. A key recommendation of the Navy's 2017 Comprehensive
Review of the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain collisions was to
accelerate deployment and fully fund the replacement of our aging
surface search radar and navigation systems with the new Next
Generation Surface Search Radar, referred to as NGSSR. It is reassuring
to hear that the NGSSR has transitioned to a mature program with
multiple units rolling off the production line and beginning to be
delivered to shipyards. It's imperative for the Navy to prioritize the
full fleet integration of NGSSR, including training and sparing.
Vice Admiral Kitchener, in light of the Fitzgerald and McCain
collisions, is the Navy committed to ensuring uninterrupted production
of this radar to enable timely outfitting of the fleet?
Are you taking steps in your role as the Surface Warfare Type
Commander to ensure the NAVSEA Commander understands the need to
prioritize and accelerate NGSSR's fielding across the fleet?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Banks. Admiral Kitchener, as the Navy's top Surface Warfare
Commander responsible for manning, training, and equipping our surface
ship sailors, and in light of the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions:
1. What steps are you taking to ensure the NAVSEA Commander
prioritizes NGSSR and accelerates deployment of the Next Generation
Surface Search Radar's (NGSSR's) fielding across the fleet for which
you are responsible.
2. Since the Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) is a key
element to ensuring the safety of our fleet, is the Navy committed to
ensuring uninterrupted production of this radar to enable timely
outfitting of the fleet? Please explain.
3. Please explain how the Navy's current plan for fielding of the
Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) is in line with the CNO's
fielding plan for a 500 ship Navy?
4. The Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) uses a software
defined architecture to allow adaption to evolving threats. Does the
current funding plan enable the Navy to leverage the radar's full range
of software adaption capabilities as threats evolve? Please explain.
5. How is the Navy ensuring that proper sparing is being funded to
ensure that the Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) is fielded
and available for the fleet?
6. Is the Navy confident that the appropriate funding and timelines
have been made available to ensure adequate training is in place for
the Next Generation Surface Search Radar (NGSSR) program ahead of fleet
integration?
7. One of the large benefits of the Next Generation Surface Search
Radar (NGSSR) is its ability to integrate with the Aegis and SSDS
combat systems. What is the Navy doing to ensure this radar can
interface with all required combat systems for the various ship classes
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
Mrs. Luria. How many total surface warfare officers have been
through the new ``Go/No-Go'' checkpoint system? And how many of those
resulted in a No-Go status?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mrs. Luria. What progress has the Navy made to establishing a
capstone course for Surface Warfare Commanders' Course, similar to the
Submarine Commanders' course? Does the surface fleet have a corrosive
over-responsiveness to the media culture?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
Mr. Carl. We discussed many vital topics during this hearing, such
as maintenance, crew strength, communications, and leveraging growth in
technology. In your effort to deter adversaries and assure allies, can
you elaborate on how unmanned ships and advances being made in autonomy
and artificial intelligence will be a part of helping you achieve your
requirements of readiness, communications capability, and potentially
lethality?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Carl. In regard to naval maintenance needs, how does the Navy
plan to address the lack of dry-dock capacity in the Western Pacific?
What is the status of placing a dry dock in Guam and Subic Bay to
provide repair capability for forward deployed ships?
Admiral Lescher. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Carl. We discussed many vital topics during this hearing, such
as maintenance, crew strength, communications, and leveraging growth in
technology. In your effort to deter adversaries and assure allies, can
you elaborate on how unmanned ships and advances being made in autonomy
and artificial intelligence will be a part of helping you achieve your
requirements of readiness, communications capability, and potentially
lethality?
Admiral Kitchener. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
[all]