[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING DHS'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE
OPIOID EPIDEMIC
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION,
AND OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-426 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION, AND OPERATIONS
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California, Chairwoman
J. Luis Correa, California Clay Higgins, Louisiana, Ranking
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Member
Al Green, Texas Michael Guest, Mississippi
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Brieana Marticorena, Subcommittee Staff Director
Natasha Eby, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Zachary Wood, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Clay Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
Security, Facilitation, and Operations......................... 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Brian Sulc, Executive Director, Transnational Organized Crime
Mission Center, Office of Intelligence & Analysis, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Pete Flores, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Steven W. Cagan, Assistant Director for Countering
Transnational Organized Crime, Homeland Security
Investigations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
For the Record
The Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations:
Pie Chart...................................................... 2
Graph.......................................................... 27
Appendix
Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Brian Sulc.... 35
Questions From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Pete Flores.. 35
Questions From Hon. J. Luis Correa for Pete Flores............... 35
Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Steve Cagen... 37
EXAMINING DHS'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC
----------
Wednesday, May 18, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border Security,
Facilitation, and Operations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Nanette Diaz
Barragan [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Barragan, Green, Higgins, Guest,
and Clyde.
Chairwoman Barragan. The Committee on Border Security,
Facilitation, and Operations will come to order. Without
objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any
time.
Thank you for joining today's hearing to examine the
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to combat the opioid
epidemic. The past few years have weighed heavily on the
American people. A once-in-a-lifetime virus and the resulting
economic slowdown exacerbated the existing public health
crises, including our Nation's struggle with drug addiction and
overdose deaths. In fact, data from the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention suggests that drug overdoses have
increased sharply since the pandemic began. They believe more
than 107,000 overdose deaths occurred in 2021, breaking all
previous yearly records.
The opioid crisis in the United States claims more lives
each year than firearms, suicide, homicide, or motor vehicle
crashes. Tackling the drug crisis is one of our most pressing
National security, law enforcement, and public health
challenges. We must do more to protect American lives.
I am grateful to see this administration tackling the
challenge head-on. Last month President Biden released a new
National Drug Control Strategy focused on the actions needed to
reduce overdoses and save lives. Those actions include
disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking operations in which
our witnesses here today play a key role.
As we are all aware, the rise in the misuse of fentanyl and
other synthetic opioids has its origins in the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration's approval of the prescription opioid
painkiller OxyContin in 1995 when it was falsely marketed as a
nonaddictive pain-management medication. With the increased
prescription, opioid dependence and addiction became an
increased demand for synthetic opioids which transnational
criminal organizations have exploited.
Almost all of the synthetic opioids harming Americans are
manufactured outside of the United States. The smuggling of
these drugs into our country is an issue the Biden
administration and Democrats are focused on tackling. In the
past, Chinese fentanyl was frequently shipped directly to the
United States in small, high-purity quantities. It was also
shipped to Mexico and then smuggled across the border. However,
as China took steps to police fentanyl and related drugs,
production and distribution has increasingly shifted to Mexico.
It has never been more important to enhance cooperation with
Mexican authorities and disrupt the movement of hard drugs like
heroin and fentanyl across the border. This is exactly what the
Biden administration is doing.
This administration also understands the overwhelming
majority of hard drugs, more than 90 percent, are smuggled
through legal ports of entry by documented travelers, not in
between them.
If you look up on the screen you will see a pie chart that
uses CBT data to illustrate this. That big blue section of the
pie chart shows 91.3 percent coming in through ports of entry.
Rather than waste resources building a wall or tearing families
apart, the Biden administration has directed resources to ports
of entry to interdict opioid shipments where they are arriving.
They have also focused attention on disrupting and dismantling
the transnational criminal organizations that smuggle these
drugs into our communities.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Barragan. Despite the talking points I expect we
will hear today from some of my colleagues, I would like to be
clear that migrants seeking asylum are not responsible for the
vast majority of drugs arriving in our communities. According
to CBP data, there is no correlation between the volume of hard
drugs being seized at the border and the number of migrants
encountered.
For example, we saw seizures of fentanyl and heroin reach
current levels in June 2020. At the time migration was still
unnaturally suppressed at the border closures throughout
Central America. High levels of opioids and other illicit drugs
are seized at points of entry during times of both high and
relatively low migration.
The Department of Homeland Security is in a unique position
to respond to this crisis, both with its investigative arm and
through our personnel and technologies stationed at the border,
including the nonintrusive inspection systems and radiation
technology to scan travelers, vehicles, and cargo entering the
United States for narcotics. This technology is critical and I
support the Department's goal of achieving a 100 percent scan
rate. However, much more work needs to be done. Currently less
than 2 percent of private vehicles and 15 percent of commercial
vehicles are screened for narcotics at the Southwest Border.
Today I look forward to hearing more about CBP's use of
technology and K-9 units to detect opioids at our ports of
entry. I also look forward to hearing more about HSI's efforts
to investigate transnational criminal organizations and their
drug supply chains to intercept drug shipments heading to the
United States.
Combating illicit drugs is no easy task and enforcement
alone will not solve the challenge. Tackling the opioid
epidemic in our country requires a whole-of-society approach
that goes beyond the scope of border enforcement. Nonetheless,
the Department of Homeland Security has an important role in
this fight. We must identify and resolve vulnerabilities,
especially as traffickers continue to adapt their methods.
Today's hearing will provide us with an opportunity to
learn more about the Department's efforts and challenges in
combatting the opioid epidemic. I look forward to a frank
conversation on the current situation and our witnesses'
recommendations on how Congress can take action to further
protect our communities.
[The statement of Chairwoman Barragan follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Nanette Barragan
May 18, 2022
The past few years have weighed heavily on the American people. A
once-in-a-lifetime virus and the resulting economic slowdown
exacerbated existing public health crises, including our Nation's
struggle with drug addiction and overdose deaths. In fact, data from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggests that drug
overdoses have increased sharply since the pandemic began. They believe
more than 107,000 overdose deaths occurred in 2021, breaking all
previous yearly records.
The opioid crisis in the United States claims more lives each year
than firearms, suicide, homicide, or motor vehicle crashes. Tackling
the drug crisis is one of our most pressing National security, law
enforcement, and public health challenges. We must do more to protect
American lives.
I am grateful to see this administration tackling the challenge
head on. Last month, President Biden released a new National Drug
Control Strategy focused on the actions needed to reduce overdoses and
save lives. Those actions include disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking operations, in which our witnesses here today play a key
role.
As we are all aware, the rise in the misuse of fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids has its origins in the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration's approval of the prescription opioid painkiller
OxyContin in 1995, when it was falsely marketed as a nonaddictive pain-
management medication. With the increased prescription opioid
dependence and addiction came an increased demand for synthetic
opioids, which transnational criminal organizations have exploited.
Almost all of the synthetic opioids harming Americans are
manufactured outside of the United States.
The smuggling of these drugs into our country is an issue the Biden
administration and Democrats are focused on tackling. In the past,
Chinese fentanyl was frequently shipped directly to the United States
in small, high purity quantities. It was also shipped to Mexico and
then smuggled across the border. However, as China took steps to police
fentanyl and related drugs, production and distribution has
increasingly shifted to Mexico. It has never been more important to
enhance cooperation with Mexican authorities and disrupt the movement
of hard drugs like heroin and fentanyl across the border--this is
exactly what the Biden administration is doing.
This administration also understands that the overwhelming majority
of hard drugs are smuggled through legal ports of entry by documented
travelers--not in between them. Rather than waste resources building a
wall or tearing families apart, the Biden administration has directed
resources to ports of entry to interdict opioid shipments where they
are arriving. They have also focused attention on disrupting and
dismantling the transnational criminal organizations that smuggle these
drugs into our communities.
Despite the talking points I expect we will hear today from some of
my colleagues, I'd like to be clear that migrants seeking asylum are
not responsible for the vast majority of drugs arriving in our
communities. According to CBP data, there is no correlation between the
volume of hard drugs being seized at the border and the number of
migrants encountered. For example, we saw seizures of fentanyl and
heroin reach current levels in June 2020. At the time, migration was
still unnaturally suppressed by border closures throughout Central
America. High levels of opioids and other illicit drugs are seized at
ports of entry during times of both high, and relatively low,
migration.
The Department of Homeland Security is in a unique position to
respond to this crisis, both with its investigative arm and through our
personnel and technologies stationed at the border, including the Non-
Intrusive Inspection systems and radiation technology to scan
travelers, vehicles, and cargo entering the United States for
narcotics. This technology is critical, and I support the Department's
goal of achieving a 100 percent scan rate. However, much more work
needs to be done--currently less than 2 percent of private vehicles and
15 percent of commercial vehicles are screened for narcotics at the
Southwest Border.
Today I look forward to hearing more about CBP's use of technology
and canine units to detect opioids at our ports of entry. I also look
forward to learning more about HSI's efforts to investigate
transnational criminal organizations and their drug supply chains to
intercept drug shipments heading to the U.S. Combatting illicit drugs
is no easy task. And enforcement alone will not solve the challenge.
Tackling the opioid epidemic in our country requires a whole-of-
society approach that goes beyond the scope of border enforcement.
Nonetheless, the Department of Homeland Security has an important role
in this fight. We must identify and resolve vulnerabilities, especially
as traffickers continue to adapt their methods.
Today's hearing will provide us with an opportunity to learn more
about the Department's efforts and challenges in combatting the opioid
epidemic. I look forward to a frank conversation on the current
situation and our witnesses' recommendations for how Congress can take
action to further protect our communities.
Chairwoman Barragan. With that, the Chair now recognizes
the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Higgins of
Louisiana, for an opening statement.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate the
law enforcement professionals that are here with us today.
I would like to communicate clearly to Americans that are
joining us today through this televised hearing, address the
elders of the communities across America, and clarify a few
things so you can grasp what we are dealing with in the country
right now.
The United States is currently undergoing a horrific drug
epidemic crisis. Fentanyl, the synthetic opioid, is 80 to 100
times stronger than morphine. According to the DEA, our own
Drug Enforcement Administration, just 2 milligrams of fentanyl
can kill a person by ingestion, inhalation, or even absorption
through the skin. Fentanyl is now the leading cause of death of
Americans 18 to 45 years old.
The Customs and Border Patrol have seized enough fentanyl
just last year to kill 2.4 billion people. That is over 7 times
the population of the United States of America. I hope America
is paying attention to what I am sharing here today.
It should come as no shock, a reasonable assessment of what
is happening in our Southern Border. Every American would look
at that, record numbers of illegal crossings driven by cartels
that make their monies from trafficking drugs and human beings.
It is a reasonable and pretty easy connection to make to
understanding that illegal crossings at the border, that is out
of control by any measure, is directly related to the opioid
crisis that we are suffering as a Nation right now and the
deaths that we are experiencing, 107,000 Americans died from
opioid overdose last year. We have never seen numbers like this
before.
No matter where you are in law enforcement this is touching
your community. If you are an elder of your community, you
know, youngsters from your area that you love and care for,
they have suffered loss and deaths. These kids are taking pills
that are pressed by dealers with equipment they are buying on-
line or building themselves and make pill presses out of raw
materials that they are getting from somewhere. It might be a
clue where they are getting it from if you look at our Southern
Border. This is just reality.
My colleagues like to use percentages across the aisle and
graphs like this, they are entertaining, but no more. Because
they talk about percentages of seizures. Obviously our ports of
entry, the large ships or trucks, professional law enforcement
intercepts large shipments and quantities of drugs based upon
investigative work and data from confidential informants. They
don't stumble across a large shipment of drugs on the highway,
in the belly of a ship, or hidden in the cargo of truck. You
don't stumble across that stuff. You are watching for that
vessel, you are watching for that vehicle, you intercept it
when it comes into your jurisdictional authority, and if your
confidential informant was right, you have a big drug seizure.
You law enforcement guys know that what I am saying is true.
So, of course, you intercept a large volume and quantity of
drugs in the hold of a ship as compared to on a backpack
carried across the border. My colleagues like to say that
migrants seeking asylum are not impacting this drug crisis.
That is intellectually unsound and even disingenuous because
the young men that are crossing our border, I think we are
pushing a million with last year and this year, official
numbers about 400,000 last year, unknown this year, they are
called got-aways because they got away.
They are not seeking asylum. Seeking asylum requires
interaction with law enforcement professionals at the border to
begin your process of asylum. You don't do that with a backpack
of drugs.
I am asking America to be genuine about this conversation.
On my side of the aisle we want to have this conversation
so that we can give the law enforcement professionals the
assets and the assistance they need to do their job and restore
American sovereignty at our Southern Border and save America
from death by overdose that we are experiencing right now.
But we cannot allow ourselves to be pulled into this false
narrative of that don't pay no attention to the man behind the
curtain, nothing here to see, move along. We had 2.4 million
illegal crossings last year, 500,000 got-aways, these are stout
young men and a lot of them are carrying backpacks with drugs
in them. It does not take a lot of fentanyl to produce
thousands and thousands and thousands of pills that are pressed
to look like Xanax and Lortab and OxyContin, and they are sold
on the streets for $5, $10, $15, $25 a pop, at parties where
your teenagers are going. They are buying these pills and they
are dying.
So I encourage all of my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to engage honestly about what is happening in America
today. I very much look forward to hearing from our law
enforcement professionals today.
Madam Chair, I yield.
Chairwoman Barragan. I want to thank the Ranking Member.
Members are reminded that the subcommittee will operate
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and the
Ranking Member in their February 3, 2021, colloquy.
Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be
permitted to sit and question the witnesses. Additional
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
Good afternoon and thank you to Chairwoman Barragan for holding
this important hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's efforts
to combat the opioid epidemic.
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, there were
91,799 drug-involved overdose deaths reported in America in 2020.
Opioids are the main cause of drug overdose deaths, with a 6-fold
increase from 2015 to 2020. In my home State of Mississippi, 440 people
tragically lost their lives to drug overdoses in 2020. And deaths from
overdoses have only increased during the pandemic. Opioids pose a
devastating threat to communities across the country.
For its part, DHS is working with Federal, State, local, and
international partners to prevent dangerous drugs from crossing our
borders. We know that the overwhelming majority of hard drugs such as
fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine enter our Nation through ports of
entry, usually concealed in commercial traffic or passenger vehicles.
CBP officers at ports of entry use Non-Intrusive Inspection systems to
scan travelers, vehicles, cargo, and packages for contraband. While the
Department's goal is a 100 percent scan rate, less than 2 percent of
private vehicles and 15 percent of commercial vehicles are currently
screened for narcotics at the Southwest Border. We need to keep working
to increase these scan rates and improve interdiction efforts across
ports of entry and in our mail facilities. We also need to thwart the
transnational criminal organizations responsible for smuggling drugs
into our communities. We need to stop these drugs from ever reaching
our borders, in addition to seizing the drugs that do make it to our
borders.
I will continue to work with the Department to ensure it has the
personnel and resources it needs to tackle this epidemic head-on.
However, we must also recognize that this is just one part of the
solution. Law enforcement and border security, while very important,
will not be enough. We must also tackle this crisis with treatment and
recovery options to restore people's health and break the devastating
cycles of addiction. This must be a robust whole-of-Government
operation. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on their
operations, successes, and challenges in preventing drugs from reaching
our communities. I also welcome any suggestions they have on how we can
further reduce the flow of narcotics into American communities.
Chairwoman Barragan. Not seeing the Chairman of the full
committee, we will move on. I don't see the Ranking Member of
the full committee. Now I would like to welcome our panel of
witnesses.
Mr. Brian Sulc is the executive director of the
Transnational Organized Crime Mission Center at DHS's Office of
Intelligence & Analysis. Mr. Pete Flores is the executive
assistant commissioner of CBP's Office of Field Operations. Mr.
Steve Cagan is the assistant director for Countering
Transnational Organized Crime at ICE Homeland Security
Investigations.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted into the record.
I will now ask each witness to summarize his statement for
5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Sulc.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN SULC, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME MISSION CENTER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE &
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Sulc. Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Border Security,
Facilitation, and Operations, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the growing opioid epidemic from the perspective of the
DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis. I am honored to
represent the dedicated intelligence professionals at I&A who
work to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.
First I would like to provide contextual information of the
illicit fentanyl supply chain. It is cheaper, faster, and more
resilient than plant-based illicit drugs such as heroin.
Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations, mainly the Sinaloa
and Jalisco New Generation Cartels are leading manufacturers
and smugglers of fentanyl to the United States. These cartels
import precursor chemicals into Mexico, mostly from China and
to a lesser extent India. Suppliers adapt to enforcement
pressure or legal restrictions by adjusting, advertising, or
changing chemical structures that fall outside of existing drug
controls. Dual-use chemicals used in synthetic drugs also
present additional precursor detection challenges as many have
a legitimate use.
After obtaining precursors, fentanyl production involves
three stages: Laboratory synthesis, pill-pressing operations,
and staging for cross-border smuggling. Once fentanyl is
synthesized, a single pill-pressing operation in Mexico can
produce up to 150,000 tablets a day. Pills are then staged in
stash houses along Mexico's Northern Border. Mexico-based drug
traffickers primarily use personally-owned and commercial
vehicles to smuggle fentanyl into the United States through
land border ports of entry. CBP will later address this in more
detail.
Once in the country, the DTOs or their affiliates
distribute synthetic drugs to a large distribution hub such as
Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, and New York. Fentanyl networks
are among the world's first digital native drug networks.
Direct-to-consumer transactions use social media to expand upon
the more traditional distribution onward to local hubs.
This e-commerce model also enables illicit actors to react
rapidly to enforcement detection and reach an even broader
customer base.
We see fentanyl in two predominate forms: Fake prescription
pills and laced into hard drugs. Drug traffickers disguise
fentanyl pills to look like prescription drugs such as the
commonly known OxyContin, Percocet, Vicodin, Xanax, or
stimulants like Adderall. The adulteration of fentanyl into
hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine continue to be a rising
concern as well. Illicit actors are likely adulterating these
drugs to increase their potency and addictive properties to
grow market demand.
Since 2018 synthetic drugs such as fentanyl are the leading
drivers of most drug-induced overdose deaths reported in the
U.S. Provisional data from CDC's National Center for Health
Statistics predicted almost 107,000 overall drug overdose
deaths in the United States for 12 months ending in November
2021, and they appear to have hit the mark. Synthetic drugs
attributed to 75 percent of those overdose deaths.
With this understanding of the illicit fentanyl landscape,
what are we doing about it? Our primary emphasis is
collaboration. As an intelligence agency I&A is working the DHS
intelligence enterprise and the intelligence community to
collect, research, and analyze information on transnational
criminal organizations. Our assessments informed decision
making and operational planning across DHS, Federal agencies,
and State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners to combat
transnational criminal organizations.
The I&A Transnational Organized Crime Mission Center
produces intelligence for maximum utility across law
enforcement and at all levels and the intelligence community.
In terms of fentanyl specifically, I&A remains forward-leaning
by challenging our historical understanding of drug flow.
We strive to embrace alternative analysis because fentanyl
is like any other traditional drug threat. We assess
transnational organized criminal activity holistically to
include other associated crimes and to seek, deter, disrupt,
and dismantle the networks responsible for this opioid
epidemic.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss this critical threat. We remain committed to
keep the homeland safe, secure, resilient by safeguarding the
Nation from terrorists, criminal, and other threat actors.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sulc follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Sulc
Wednesday, May 18, 2022
Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee on Border Security Facilitation, &
Operations. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss threats emanating from the smuggling of opioids. It is an honor
to be here representing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the dedicated
intelligence professionals that keep the Homeland safe, secure, and
resilient.
smuggling of illicit opioids
The lethal drug overdose crisis in the United States, fueled by
foreign drug trafficking organizations, continues at epidemic
proportions while yielding transnational criminal organizations (TCO)
billions of dollars in illicit proceeds. Foreign traffickers supply
U.S.-based gangs with drugs for retail-level distribution and sales,
potentially contributing to heightened levels of criminal violence in
some areas of the country. They are selling fentanyl to users that is
mixed with other controlled substances and in the form of counterfeit
prescription pills to drive addiction and increase repeat customers
through dependency. Reports from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conclude
that a majority of drug overdose fatalities involve highly addictive
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids.
We have learned in our fight against the opioid epidemic that
fentanyl production is cheaper, faster, and more lucrative than plant-
based illicit drugs such as heroin. Mexico-based drug trafficking
organizations (DTOs), principally the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New
Generation Cartel, are leading manufacturers and smugglers of fentanyl
to the United States. These cartels import precursor chemicals into
Mexico mostly from China and, to a lesser but increasing extent, from
India. Suppliers quickly adapt to enforcement pressure or legal
restrictions by adjusting advertising techniques or changing chemical
structures that mimic the desired effect and fall outside of existing
drug controls. Dual-use chemicals used in synthetic drugs also present
additional precursor detection challenges as many have a legitimate
use.
Mexico-based DTOs continue to expand their chemical expertise,
strengthening their adaptability for making synthetic drugs and
increasing their profit margin by controlling more of the supply chain.
After obtaining precursors, fentanyl production involves three stages:
Laboratory synthesis, pill-pressing operations, and staging for cross-
border smuggling. Mexico-based DTOs prefer producing finished fentanyl
in Mexico to mitigate the risks associated with transporting equipment
and precursor chemicals. Once fentanyl is synthesized, a single pill-
pressing operation in Mexico can produce up to 150,000 tablets a day,
worth about $90,000 in Sinaloa or up to $2 billion in U.S. street
value. Pills are then staged in stash houses along Mexico's northern
border.
Mexico-based DTOs primarily use both personally owned and
commercial vehicles to smuggle fentanyl into the United States through
land border ports of entry. Once in the country, the DTOs or their
affiliates distribute synthetic drugs via northbound and eastbound
highways to large distribution hubs such as Los Angeles, Chicago,
Atlanta, and New York. Fentanyl networks are among the world's first
digital-native drug networks. Direct-to-consumer transactions use
social media to expand upon more traditional drug distribution on-ward
to local hubs. This e-commerce model also enables illicit actors to
react rapidly to enforcement detection and reach a broader customer
base, including juveniles.
DTOs have disguised fentanyl pills to look like prescription
opioids such as oxycodone (Oxycontin, Percocet), hydrocodone (Vicodin),
benzodiazepines such as alprazolam (Xanax), or stimulants like
amphetamines (Adderall). Mass production and false marketing of these
counterfeit pills deceive customers and exacerbate the harm to public
health. In addition to illicit prescription pills, fentanyl is also
seen laced with other commonly-abused drugs such as marijuana, heroin,
and cocaine. Illicit actors are likely adulterating these drugs to
increase their potency and addictive properties to grow market demand.
Since 2018, synthetic drugs such as fentanyl are the leading
drivers of most drug-related overdose deaths reported in the United
States. Provisional data from CDC's National Center for Health
Statistics predicted 106,854 overall drug overdose deaths in the United
States for 12 months ending in November 2021. Synthetic opioids
accounted for 70,420, or 66 percent, of the overdose deaths in the
United States during the same period. Fentanyl's wide-spread
availability leads to more overdoses of greater severity, as its
amplified potency diminishes revival response. Law enforcement and
public health professionals report the need for multiple delivery
treatments of naloxone (Narcan) when responding to an overdose incident
involving fentanyl.
i&a actions
The administration's National Drug Control Strategy focuses on two
big drivers of the opioid epidemic untreated addiction--public health
and domestic policies to reduce demand and save lives--and drug
trafficking--on disrupting the DTOs. The catastrophic effects of
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids on society are clear, but a
commodity-centric approach is insufficient. All nationally-significant
smugglers of fentanyl also deal in other illicit drugs and commit other
forms of organized crime to enable their illicit drug supply. To combat
this threat holistically, the strategy seeks to deter, disrupt, and
dismantle the TCO networks responsible. As intelligence providers, I&A,
the DHS intelligence enterprise, and the intelligence community all
collect, research, and analyze information to produce assessments of
TCOs that inform decision making and operational planning across DHS,
Federal agencies, and State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT)
partners in support of their actions to combat TCOs.
The I&A Transnational Organized Crime Mission Center (TOCMC)
produces intelligence on drug trafficking, human smuggling, irregular
migration, and other issues to strengthen engagement between U.S.
officials and foreign partners. Specific to drug trafficking threats,
our analysis is aimed at identifying key TCO leadership figures,
organizational networks, logistical supply chains, smuggling routes,
and the effects of corruption that stand in the way of dismantling
these organized crime groups. Analytic products from TOCMC draw upon
National-level reporting from the intelligence community fused with
DHS-unique data from components as well as information from our law
enforcement partners across all levels of government. Finished
intelligence products related to TCOs are written for the widest
possible dissemination to our Federal and SLTT partners.
Mexican TCOs supply U.S.-based criminal gangs with drugs for on-
ward distribution and retail-level sales, which potentially contributes
to heightened criminal violence in some areas of the country. Because
these networks reach across the border and into our communities, we
combine robust partnerships with our law enforcement partners and other
homeland security partners with DHS and IC data and information to
provide a more complete picture of the TCO threat to the homeland.
I&A seeks front-line information on gangs, other groups, or
individuals inside the United States who are involved in drug
trafficking on behalf of TCOs and on how TCOs establish relationships
with U.S. gangs on drug activities. I&A plays a critical role in fusing
information received from our law enforcement and private-sector
partners with intelligence community holdings. I&A outreach to our SLTT
and private-sector partners helps them recognize the value of
information that they discover incidental to their normal operations
for collection and dissemination in intelligence reporting channels,
while ensuring that proper intelligence oversight safeguards are
observed to protect privacy and civil liberties. I&A's unique and
growing partnership with SLTT counterparts reflects enormous potential
to strengthen our Nation's fight against TCOs and the drug crisis.
I&A also maintains a robust partnership with law enforcement
stakeholders to understand both National and local impacts of TCO
operations and to inform and guide our efforts to counter TCOs through
integrated information sharing and operations with our State, local,
Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners and other Federal agencies,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High-
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program. I&A's deployed intelligence
personnel work closely with DHS components, State and major urban area
fusion centers, and other law enforcement agencies to gather, analyze,
and report information that is uniquely available from these partners.
These insights help shape our understanding of the TCO activities in
the United States. I&A also broadly facilitates the sharing of products
and threat information between these partners using our Homeland
Security Information Network and other dissemination methods.
Furthermore, I&A is part of a DHS-wide CTOC enterprise that includes
collaboration with ICE, CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, S&T, PLCY, among others.
This enterprise leverages unique authorities and capabilities to the
aforementioned components to create powerful synergies.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss this critical threat and for your continued support of I&A. We
remain committed to keeping the homeland safe, secure, and resilient by
safeguarding the Nation from terrorist, criminal, and other threat
actors and we will continue our efforts at home and abroad to uphold
the National security and public safety of the United States.
Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Sulc, for your
testimony. I now recognize Mr. Flores to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PETE FLORES, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Flores. Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear here today to discuss U.S. Customs &
Border Protection's efforts to combat the illicit flow of drugs
into the United States.
CBP held its annual valor memorial last week. This year 37
names were added to that monument, the names of 37 CBP officers
and agents who gave their lives carrying out CBP's important
mission. I am proud to represent the brave women--brave and
dedicated men and women of CBP who work tirelessly every day in
often dangerous and difficult conditions to protect our border,
our homeland, and our community.
Today I would like to first highlight CBP's seizures and
trends in the border environment and then discuss CBP's multi-
layered enforcement approach to countering the drug threat.
As you are aware, the reach and influence of transnational
criminal organizations, or TCOs, continues to expand across our
borders. TCOs increasingly demonstrate the ability to
manufacture sophisticated synthetic opioids and analogs that
are difficult to detect and identify. They also continuously
adjust operations, including shifting to drugs like synthetic
opioids that can be concealed and transported in smaller
quantities, to circumvent detection, interdiction by law
enforcement.
In fiscal year 2021 CBP seized more than 450 tons of
illegal drugs, the majority being marijuana, but also cocaine,
fentanyl, and methamphetamines. Nation-wide CBP seizures of
fentanyl have increased sharply. In fiscal year 2021 CBP seized
more than 11,000 pounds of fentanyl, more than double the
weight seized in fiscal year 2020, and about 4 times as much as
in fiscal year 2019.
Most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the United
States through the Southwest Border ports of entry. They are
brought in by privately-owned vehicles, commercial vehicles,
and even pedestrians. Although much less frequent now, fentanyl
and other synthetic opioids are also encountered in the
international mail and express consignment carrier shipments.
Most illicit fentanyl is synthesized in Mexico.
We use an aggressive strategic enforcement approach that
leverages advanced information, analytics, and intelligence,
sophisticated detection, and scientific laboratory
capabilities, and strong partnerships to combat cross-border
flow of drugs. CBP's National Targeting Center, or NTC, uses
advanced data along with law enforcement and intelligence
records to identify suspect, high-risk shipments, cargo, and
travelers before they reach our borders. NTC also uses
predictive analysis, focused on providing timely and actionable
information to our partners and our front-line officers and
agents. In the international mail and express consignment
environments CBP obtains electronic shipping information
providing valuable insight into inbound parcels.
All CBP operation environments have sophisticated detection
technology, including nonintrusive inspection systems, commonly
called NII, that reliably and quickly detect the presence of
suspect illegal narcotics within shipments, passenger
belongings, cargo containers, commercial trucks, rail cars, and
privately-owned vehicles.
K-9 operations also provide invaluable detection
capabilities. The CBP K-9 Training Program maintains the
largest and most diverse law enforcement K-9 training program
in the country. Furthermore, all office and field operations
concealed human and narcotic K-9 teams have completed training
to include the odor of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs.
CBP's enforcement approach not only focuses on efficient
detection of suspected illicit drugs but also prioritizes swift
identification of substances. In the field CBP officers use
various field testing devices to rapidly screen suspected
controlled substances. On-site CBP laboratories and scientists,
as well as a 24/7 forensic reach-back center enables CBP
officers to submit data electronically to CBP's scientists for
identification.
All CBP seizure information and laboratory identification
data are provided to NTC and our Federal investigative
partners. It is a collaborative approach that leads to
investigations, prosecutions, and dismantling of TCO networks
and operations.
Our partners are critical. We work closely with our Federal
partners as well as State, local, Tribal, international
partners to share information, collaborate in joint enforcement
operations to identify, target, and disrupt illicit and drug
activity. As the threat of illicit drugs persists in our
communities across the United States, CBP will continue to
prioritize and dedicate resources to counter TCOs to disrupt
the flow of illicit drugs across our borders.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Flores follows:]
Prepared Statement of Pete Flores
May 18, 2022
introduction
Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to
combat the flow of illicit drugs, including synthetic drugs like
methamphetamine and fentanyl, into communities across the United
States.
The reach and influence of Transnational Criminal Organizations
(TCOs) continues to expand across and beyond the Southwest Border.
TCOs, such as Mexican cartels, increasingly demonstrate the ability to
produce synthetic drugs and their analogues that are difficult to
detect and identify. They also continually adjust their operations to
circumvent detection and interdiction by law enforcement by shifting to
drugs that can be transported in small quantities and improving
fabrication and concealment techniques.
CBP recognizes the significant impact opioids and other illicit
drugs have on our local communities. We work with our Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and international partners daily to identify and disrupt
TCOs and stem the flow of illegal narcotics. We dedicate significant
resources and capabilities to the whole-of-Government effort to thwart
the illicit drug supply chain and those networks promoting it.
CBP's efforts to combat the flow of illicit drugs are guided by the
CBP Strategy to Combat Opioids \1\ and implemented through a multi-
faceted approach that includes collaboration and enhanced intelligence
sharing with other agencies and foreign partners, advanced laboratory
capabilities, specialized canines, non-intrusive inspection technology,
and dedicated, highly-trained law enforcement personnel.
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\1\ https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-
Mar/CBP-Opioid-Strategy-508.pdf.
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Our strategy and enforcement approach enables the agency to nimbly
shift resources and swiftly respond to emerging threats, such as the
deadly threat posed by fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, other synthetic
opioids, methamphetamine, and precursor and other chemicals used in
illicit drug production.
trends and interdictions
CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) works in tandem with the
U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) to combat
the flow of illicit narcotics across the border. CBP officers screen
all foreign visitors and returning U.S. citizens and inspect
conveyances and cargo that enters the United States at 328 sea, air,
and land ports of entry (POEs). Between the POEs, USBP and AMO agents
detect, interdict, and prevent the unlawful movement of people, illegal
drugs, and other contraband toward or across our borders.
On a typical day,\2\ CBP seizes approximately 5,000 pounds of
illegal drugs that would otherwise make their way into American
communities. Since October 1, 2021, CBP has seized nearly 340,000
pounds of illegal drugs Nation-wide.\3\ Marijuana, methamphetamine,
heroin, and cocaine remain top-seized drugs by weight, but shifting
trends over recent years produced significant increases in synthetic
drugs like fentanyl, a synthetic opioid analgesic that is 80-100 times
stronger than morphine. Fentanyl is the most frequently-seized illicit
synthetic opioid, but CBP observed fentanyl and 29 of its analogues, as
well as 50 unique synthetic opioids that are not from the fentanyl
class.\4\
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\2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2021.
\3\ As of March 31, 2022, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-
seizure-statistics.
\4\ A complete list can be made available by CBP Laboratories and
Scientific Services.
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During the past several years, the weight of CBP seizures of
fentanyl has increased sharply. In fiscal year 2021, CBP seized 11,201
pounds of fentanyl, more than twice the 4,791 pounds seized in fiscal
year 2020 and approximately four times as much as fiscal year 2019
(2,804 pounds). In fiscal year 2022, since October 1, 2021, CBP has
seized 5,310 pounds of fentanyl Nation-wide.\5\ CBP estimates we
interdicted 1.2 billion potential doses of fentanyl in fiscal year 2020
and 2.6 billion potential doses of fentanyl in fiscal year 2021. By the
measure of potential doses, CBP fentanyl seizures were only second to
methamphetamine, of which an estimated 16 billion doses in fiscal year
2020 and 17 billion doses in fiscal year 2021 were seized. For
reference, Earth's population is approximately 7.9 billion people.\6\
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\5\ As of March 31, 2022, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-
seizure-statistics.
\6\ CBP would be happy to brief the subcommittee on its illicit
drug dose estimation tool and how it derived at these estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the United States
through our Southwest Border POEs. They are brought in by privately-
owned vehicles, commercial vehicles, and even pedestrians. Although
less frequent, fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are also
encountered in international mail facility (IMF) and express
consignment carrier (ECC) environments. Fentanyl shipments largely
originate, and are likely synthesized, in Mexico and are often
concealed within larger shipments of other commodities. Illicit
fentanyl can also be purchased from on-line sellers and then shipped
via international mail packages or ECCs.
The shift in the illicit drug market toward primarily fentanyl, its
analogues, and other synthetic opioids, led CBP to develop and
implement the CBP Strategy to Combat Opioids.\7\ CBP's enforcement
efforts are guided by the Strategy's four key objectives that focus on
ensuring CBP can quickly anticipate and adapt to changing tactics and
techniques used by cartels, traffickers, smugglers, and their networks;
enhance collaboration among key partners; produce actionable
intelligence to target the illicit opioid supply chain; and protect CBP
personnel from exposure to opioids.
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\7\ https://www.cbp.gov/document/publications/cbp-opioid-strategy.
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collaboration and information sharing
Shifting trends and sophisticated TCO tactics mean that now, more
than ever, efforts to counter TCO activity require coordination and
cooperation across the law enforcement community. CBP works extensively
with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners to
address drug trafficking and other transnational threats at POEs, and
in the mail and express consignment environments, along our land
borders and coastal approaches.
CBP works closely with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI) and Department of Justice's
Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ DEA) to facilitate all available
investigative actions regarding CBP seizures. For seizures that do not
meet a Federal threshold, intelligence and information derived from
these seizures are provided to local, State, and regional task forces
for situational awareness and further investigative actions.
Key partners, including ICE, DEA, the United States Postal
Inspection Service (USPIS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
alongside other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international
partners, regularly share information from the headquarters level down
to local POEs and coordinate investigative and enforcement actions.
CBP regularly hosts briefings with Federal, State, local, and
Tribal partners regarding the current state of the border, providing a
cross-component, multi-agency venue for discussing trends and threats.
Engagements focus on interdictions and arrests at the border and
interior areas within United States. These briefings also include
participants from the governments of Canada and Mexico.
CBP also participates in joint operations and multi-agency
enforcement teams, composed of representatives from international and
Federal law enforcement agencies. Working together with State, local,
and Tribal agencies, these operations target drug and transnational
criminal activity, and often contribute to investigations involving
National security and organized crime.
advance information and targeting
Advance electronic shipping information, actionable intelligence,
and information-sharing partnerships are critical components of CBP's
ability to quickly identify, target, and deter the entry of dangerous
illicit drugs in all operational environments.
Authorities and mechanisms that enable CBP to obtain advance
electronic shipping information is a critical element of CBP's ability
to identify shipments that are potentially at a higher risk of
containing contraband. Under section 343 of the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub.
L. No. 107-210), as amended, and under the Security and Accountability
for Every Port Act or SAFE Port Act of 2006, (Pub. L. No. 109-347), CBP
has the legal authority to collect key cargo data elements provided by
air, sea, and land commercial transport companies (carriers), including
ECCs and importers.\8\ This information is automatically fed into CBP's
Automated Targeting System (ATS), a secure intranet-based enforcement
and decision support system that compares cargo and conveyance
information against intelligence and other enforcement data.
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\8\ Under TSA regulations, international mail destined for the
United States is subject to security controls. These security controls,
which include screening for unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and
other destructive substances or items in accordance with TSA
regulations and security program requirements, are applied to
international mail prior to transporting on aircraft at Last Point of
Departure locations to the United States. 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) states:
``The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for
the screening of all passengers and property, including United States
mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that
will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft.'' Under 49 C.F.R. 1540.5,
``Cargo means property tendered for air transportation accounted for on
an air waybill. All accompanied commercial courier consignments whether
or not accounted for on an air waybill, are classified as cargo.
Aircraft operator security programs further define the term `cargo.'
These requirements are not dependent on advance electronic manifest
data, as provided by ECC operators and other participants in the Air
Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot program.''
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At CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), advance data and access
to law enforcement and intelligence records converge to facilitate the
targeting of travelers and items of cargo that pose the highest risk to
our security in all modes of inbound transportation. The NTC takes in
large amounts of data and uses sophisticated targeting tools and
subject-matter expertise to analyze, assess, and segment risk at every
stage in cargo movement and travel life cycles. As the focal point of
that strategy, the NTC leverages classified, law enforcement,
commercial, and open-source information in unique, proactive ways to
identify high-risk travelers and shipments at the earliest possible
point prior to arrival in the United States.
CBP's analytical methodology centers on providing timely and
actionable intelligence to our front-line officers and agents, decision
makers, and partners. To strengthen our intelligence posture in
responding to the complex border threat environment, CBP's Intelligence
Enterprise (IE) was established in 2017 as a cohesive, threat-based,
data-driven, and operationally focused effort to leverage the
collective intelligence capabilities and expertise across CBP's
operational components, including OFO, USBP, AMO, and the Office of
Trade. To enhance its intelligence capacity, CBP IE established
investment priorities that support a whole-of-agency approach to
countering various border threats, such as the use of a common
reporting platform to timely share and disseminate threat information
to disparate offices. CBP's IE was also responsible for launching CBP
Watch, a situational awareness facility that provides trend analysis
and real-time feedback to better support agency operational front lines
24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Investigative case data is fused with CBP targeting information to
strengthen investigations targeting fentanyl smuggling and trafficking
organizations and enable timely law enforcement actions. The NTC works
in close coordination with several pertinent task forces including
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas, and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South and West,
as well as DHS Joint Task Forces.
In the postal environment, recent bilateral agreements regarding
Advance Electronic Data (AED) between the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)
and foreign postal operators have increased CBP's ability to target
high-risk shipments. Additionally, the Synthetics Trafficking and
Overdose Prevention (STOP) Act requires that DHS prescribe regulations
requiring the USPS to transmit advance electronic information for
international mail to CBP consistent with the statute. Currently, USPS
provides AED from more than 129 foreign postal services, and CBP
utilizes the AED to actively target international mail shipments at 7
IMFs.
Targeting Precursors
Many of the precursor chemicals used to synthesize synthetic
illicit opioids such as fentanyl and methamphetamine are non-regulated
currently, and many have legitimate uses. CBP has sufficient authority
to seize precursors if they can be identified as having illicit end-use
intentions, including the production of illicit drugs. We target
precursor chemicals shipped through the United States to destinations
in Mexico and other countries. When these shipments are identified
through interagency collaboration as having illicit end-use intentions,
the shipments are offloaded for further inspection and enforcement
actions.
In addition to targeting illicit substances directly, CBP also
targets related equipment such as pill presses and tableting machines.
The DEA regulates pill press/tableting machines and ICE's Diversion
Coordinator works on behalf of DHS and coordinates with DEA to oversee
the investigations of pill press/tablet machine imports being diverted
for illicit uses. The Diversion Coordinator works closely with the NTC
to identify and target individuals importing and diverting pill press/
tablet machines to produce illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs.
Pollen Analysis
One capability CBP is using to close intelligence gaps related to
the illicit opioid supply chain is palynology, more commonly referred
to as pollen analysis. Pollen analysis is conducted by CBP's
Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) scientists on illicit
narcotic shipments seized at the border. Pollen testing is used to
geolocate illicit opioid shipments, which may be used to identify
transit routes of illicit opioids.
LSS palynologists can analyze approximately 1 kg of seized material
through a process that dissolves the powder and other residues leaving
pollen and spores. Through a microscopic examination, LSS palynologists
identify the pollen compilation from the sample and can quickly
determine a broad origin or a more regionalized location of origin.
During the last several years, the LSS pollen program has, through
the analysis described above, made geolocation identifications for
several fentanyl seizures that likely originated in China. These
seizures contained pollen types that are only associated with specific
areas in mainland China--to the exclusion of most other areas. Based on
the pollen analysis results, CBP develops intelligence products and
shares those products with relevant partners.
detection and interdiction
CBP, with the support of Congress, continues to make significant
investments and improvements in our drug detection and interdiction
technology. Our officers and agents utilize a variety of technologies
and narcotic detection canines to detect the presence of illicit drugs,
including illicit opioids, in all operating environments.
Non-Intrusive Inspection
CBP utilizes over 350 large-scale and 4,500 small-scale Non-
Intrusive Inspection (NII) X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to
detect the presence of illicit substances, including synthetic drugs,
hidden within passenger belongings, cargo containers, commercial
trucks, rail cars, privately-owned vehicles, as well as ECC and
international mail parcels. In fiscal year 2021, CBP performed
approximately 17.5 million NII examinations, which resulted in the
interdiction of more than 220,000 pounds of narcotics. Approximately 90
percent of NII-attributable seizures resulted from scanning less than 2
percent of primary passenger vehicles and 15 percent of fixed occupant
commercial vehicles crossing the Southwest Border. Beginning in fiscal
year 2023, CBP expects to increase NII scans of these vehicles as much
as 40 percent and greater than 70 percent respectively.
Currently, large-scale NII systems are primarily deployed in
secondary inspection operations at POEs to examine targeted
conveyances; however, CBP continues to focus on further closing the
limited vehicle scanning capacity gap and have prioritized the need for
drive-through NII operational concepts that will help streamline the
vehicle inspection process and increase scanning rates, thereby
increasing the probability of interdiction. With funding provided by
Congress, CBP made progress toward implementing new drive-through NII
systems, located in pre-primary inspection versus secondary, that would
transmit the image to an officer remotely located in a command center.
This work builds upon prior automation and transformation initiatives,
leveraging advancements made to scanning and imagery analysis
capabilities. Overall, this approach will increase security and
facilitation across our Nation's borders.
Canines
Canine operations are an invaluable component of counternarcotic
operations. With 17 additional teams in fiscal year 2022, the CBP
Canine Training Program maintains the largest and most diverse law
enforcement canine training program in the country. CBP officers
utilize specially trained canines for the interdiction of narcotics,
firearms, and undeclared currency, as well as in support of specialized
programs aimed at combating terrorism and countering human trafficking.
Use of canines in the detection of narcotics is a team effort.
CBP's LSS produces canine training aids and provides analytical support
to the CBP Canine Training Program, including controlled substance
purity determinations, training aid quality analyses, and research on
delivery mechanisms that maximize safe vapor delivery during training
exercises. Today, all OFO Concealed Human and Narcotic Detection canine
teams have completed training to include the odor of fentanyl and
fentanyl analogues.
Laboratory Testing
Shifting methods of smuggling and the increasing sophistication of
ready-to-use forms of synthetic drugs coming across the border means
that the identification of suspect substances has become more
difficult. However, when it comes to disrupting illicit supply chains
and stopping the flow of illicit drugs crossing the border, timing is
everything.
For suspect substances encountered at the international mail and at
ECC facilities, CBP officers use various field-testing devices to
rapidly screen suspected controlled substances and obtain presumptive
results. CBP officers can transmit sample data to the LSS Teleforensic
Center's 24/7 Narcotics Reachback for scientific interpretation and
identification. When controlled substances are presumptively identified
by the Reachback program, the NTC and our liaisons at the DEA are
notified. CBP is working to expand the field-testing program, along
with scientific assets and personnel who can provide real-time
presumptive analysis of suspect substances.
Building on the success of the Reachback program, for the past 3
years, CBP has increased its ability to swiftly identify suspected
drugs by positioning agency laboratory scientists on-site at IMFs,
ECCs, and POEs in forward operating labs (FOLs). This effort, which
started as a special operation at IMF and ECC locations, has expanded
and proven to be not only a valuable part of CBP's ability to identify
and seize controlled substances, but also a critical tool for partner
investigative agencies such as Homeland Security Investigations to make
law enforcement-controlled deliveries that could potentially lead to
arrests, shutting down criminal networks.
The on-site labs provide multiple benefits, including helping CBP
identify trends. For example, starting in October 2020, the FOLs began
seeing an increased amount of dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a
hallucinogenic drug smuggled into the United States. Another trend that
the FOLs recently discovered is a particular fentanyl analogue coming
across the Southwest Border increasingly in tablet form. Many of CBP's
FOLs are along the Southwest Border, but also in locations such as
Chicago, Miami, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Puerto Rico.
With the 24/7 Narcotics Reachback and the FOLs positioned at
strategic locations where new or emerging substances enter the United
States, LSS can triage quickly if a potentially new analogue of an
illicit substance or designer drug is being encountered. These
presumptively identified new substances are sent to the LSS INTERDICT
Science Center for comprehensive testing. These newly-encountered
substances, particularly synthetic opioids or other significant
chemicals of interest, get added to the user libraries of the hand-held
field-testing devices used by CBP officers and agents to rapidly screen
suspected substances. Since January 2022, 154 new spectra have been
added to the equipment's factory library. Since the start of the
designer drug wave in 2009, LSS has identified over 540 new substances.
On a monthly basis, LSS aggregates its suspected controlled
analysis results and creates a report for its stakeholders to inform of
trends along with new substances discovered. These stakeholders include
internal CBP officers and agents, supervisors, intelligence analysts,
and policy makers and external partners at Federal, State, local, and
international organizations. As America's first line of defense for new
and emerging drugs, CBP can provide advanced notice on seizure trends
enabling partners to prepare for a potential threat to their
communities.
protecting front-line personnel
Contact with potentially hazardous substances, especially illicit
synthetic opioids, is a very real health and safety risk to law
enforcement personnel and canines. At first glance, it could easily be
mistaken for other drugs that appear as white powders, such as cocaine
or heroin. Due to the risk of unintentional exposure and subsequent
hazardous drug absorption and/or inhalation, the confirmatory testing
for the presence of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and its
analogues is best executed in a laboratory by trained scientists and
technicians.
In addition, CBP deployed the presumptive testing glove box to the
field to aid in the safe testing and identification of opioids and
other dangerous drugs. The sampling glove box is designed for use in
the field as the first level of protection when inspecting, probing,
and conducting presumptive testing of high-risk or unknown substances.
conclusion
As the drug epidemic devastates communities and families across the
Nation, CBP continues to prioritize its resources to thwart illicit
drug supply chains and networks. Together, CBP and its partners are
focused on enhancing collaboration and information sharing to reduce
the amounts of illicit opioids that cross our land, sea, and air
borders.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Green [presiding]. Thank you for your testimony, Mr.
Flores. I now recognize Mr. Cagan to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN W. CAGAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERING
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMELAND SECURITY
INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cagan. Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and
distinguished Members of the House Subcommittee on Border
Security, Facilitation, and Operations, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you and discuss Homeland Security
Investigation's efforts to combat opioid smuggling.
As a principal investigative component of the Department of
Homeland Security, HSI is responsible for investigating and
dismantling transnational criminal organizations flooding the
United States with drugs, fueling the overdose epidemic. To do
this HSI conducts Federal criminal investigations at every
critical location in the illicit supply chain: Internationally,
where TCOs operate and manufacture illegal drugs; at our
Nation's physical borders, where smugglers attempt to exploit
America's legitimate trade, travel, and finance; in our
communities, where criminal organizations earn substantial
profits from selling poison to our friends, neighbors, and
family members.
HSI's counter-drug efforts begin abroad. HSI has the
largest investigative--international investigative presence
within DHS, comprised of hundreds of special agents
strategically assigned to 86 offices in 54 countries. This
includes offices located in Mexico where the vast majority of
fentanyl is produced, and throughout the Asia Pacific region
where precursor chemicals originate. The effectiveness of our
international counter-narcotics efforts is greatly enhanced by
HSI's Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, or TCIUs.
TCIUs are composed of foreign, vetted law enforcement
officials and prosecutors who lead some of HSI's most
significant extraterritorial investigations and prosecutions
targeting TCOs. HSI has established 12 TCOs around the world.
Disrupting and dismantling the fentanyl and methamphetamine
precursor chemical supply chain is an integral element to HSI's
approach to stopping the flow of illicit drugs.
These precursors serve as oxygen the cartels need to
manufacture their poison destined for America's cities and
streets. To date HSI's efforts have resulted in the seizure of
633,000 kilograms of precursor chemicals destined for Mexican
cartels. Many of these enforcement efforts are led by HSI's
TCIU in Mexico, where in addition to seizing precursor chemical
shipments, they also lead investigations targeting the labs
where the chemicals are synthesized into illegal drugs.
Mexican cartels operate on an industrial scale when
procuring precursor chemicals from abroad. The interdiction of
these shipments has a profound effect on the volume of drugs
reaching our country. A seizure of a single kilogram of
fentanyl precursor can prevent the production of almost 20
kilograms of processed fentanyl. A perfect example of HSI's
efforts is a seizure in March 2021 of 750 kilograms of a
fentanyl precursor on its way to Mexico. If that precursor had
reached the hands of the Mexican cartel, it would have produced
7.4 billion doses of fentanyl destined for the hands of
Americans.
HSI's efforts to combat synthetic drugs continue at the
border where HSI is responsible for responding to all CBP
interdictions to start or continue an investigation. HSI
investigations remain one of the best tools for degrading TCO
capabilities and stemming the flow of illicit opioids into the
United States.
HSI's Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, or BEST Task
Forces, represent one of the agency's premiere tools for
turning simple border seizures into TCO-toppling
investigations. The primary mission of the BESTs is to combat
TCOs by employing a full range of State, local, Federal,
Tribal, and international law enforcement resources. There are
currently 82 BESTs comprising more than 2,000 law enforcement
officers and personnel representing 200 agencies. In addition
to the BESTs, each of HSI's 253 offices in all 50 States and
multiple U.S. territories dedicate assets to combat the flow of
illicit drugs.
The illicit drug supply chain fueling the overdose deaths
throughout the country begins abroad and ends on Main Street.
HSI, along with our partners, is dedicated to using its broad
and unique authorities to stop illicit drugs at every critical
location within the supply chain.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
and for your continued support of HSI and the critical role it
plays in attacking the illicit drug supply chain. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven W. Cagen
May 18, 2022
Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished
Members of the House Subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and
Operations:
introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security
Investigations' (HSI's) efforts to combat the smuggling of opioids. My
statement will focus on HSI's work with foreign partners to stop the
synthesis of deadly drugs abroad, so they never reach the United
States; its mission at the borders to turn individual seizures into
cartel-toppling investigations; its focus within the United States to
take deadly drugs off the streets and shut down dark-net vendors; and
its efforts to deny cartels the firearms and illicit proceeds that fuel
their operations.
ICE HSI is the principal Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
component responsible for investigating transnational crime. In
collaboration with its partners in the United States and abroad, HSI
special agents develop evidence to identify and build criminal cases
against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), terrorist networks
and facilitators, and other criminal elements that threaten the
homeland. HSI works with prosecutors to arrest and indict violators,
execute criminal search warrants, seize criminally-derived money and
assets, and take other actions designed to disrupt and dismantle
criminal organizations operating throughout the world. These efforts
protect the National security and public safety of the United States.
HSI's investigative mission includes dismantling narcotics-
smuggling TCOs, including the Mexican cartels which perennially flood
the United States with opioids and other illicit drugs and threaten the
stability of Mexico. HSI conducts Federal criminal investigations at
every location in the illicit drug supply chain: Internationally, where
TCOs operate and manufacture illegal drugs; at our Nation's physical
border and ports of entry (POEs) where smuggling cells attempt to
exploit America's legitimate trade, travel, and transportation systems;
and in communities throughout the United States, where criminal
organizations earn substantial profits from selling poison to American
citizens. In addition to combating narcotics smuggling, HSI attacks the
criminal networks operating in the United States and elsewhere that
source and smuggle U.S.-origin firearms and ammunition to Mexico--
fueling violence and enabling cartels to flourish.
Today, Mexican cartels serve as the principal source of the illicit
fentanyl and methamphetamine fueling the drug overdose epidemic in the
United States. Cartels manufacture these drugs using precursor
chemicals sourced from China and other foreign nations. HSI targets
Mexican cartels by collecting, analyzing, and exploiting information
gathered from interdictions to further on-going investigations;
developing and pursuing additional investigative leads; and executing
enforcement actions to disrupt criminal activity. HSI's expertise in
investigating international supply chains, unique border search
authority, and broad statutory authorities uniquely position the agency
to target illicit shipments of fentanyl and methamphetamine precursor
chemicals from China and other countries to Mexico. Depriving Mexican
cartels of these precursors is equivalent to depriving them of the
oxygen they need to function, no chemicals, no drugs. HSI's efforts in
this area have yielded significant results, including the seizures of
hundreds of thousands of kilograms of chemicals destined for Mexican
TCOs.
Targeting the fentanyl and methamphetamine precursor chemical
supply chain is an integral element of HSI's approach to stopping the
flow of illicit drugs. Disruptions to the procurement phase of the
narcotics production supply chain have an exponential impact on the
drugs encountered at our border and on our streets. Seizure of a single
kilogram of key fentanyl precursor chemicals can prevent the production
of almost 20 kilograms of the processed fentanyl encountered at the
Southwest Border and in our communities. Mexican cartels operate on an
industrial scale when procuring precursor chemicals and the
interdiction of these shipments has a profound effect on the number of
drugs reaching our country. For instance, a March 2021 HSI seizure of
750 kilograms of a fentanyl precursor was estimated to yield
approximately 14,821 kilograms of fentanyl at average purity
encountered on the Southwest Border. This seizure not only prevented
the production of a massive quantity of a deadly drug but also denied
the TCO an estimated $444.6 million in illicit proceeds.
These organizations, however, have expanded beyond narcotics
smuggling and are now involved in the associated crimes of weapons
trafficking, human trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and
others--all of which HSI investigates. Criminal organizations in the
21st Century do not limit themselves to a single crime; likewise
investigative efforts must be broad in scope to fully dismantle
enterprises that often transcend borders. Rather than narrowly focusing
on drug trafficking, HSI combats TCOs by using its unique and broad
investigative authorities to enforce over 400 Federal laws to
investigate a myriad of crimes.
hsi international counternarcotics efforts
HSI's international presence is a key facet of its approach to
countering transnational organized crime. HSI has the largest
international investigative presence of all DHS components and
comprises hundreds of HSI special agents strategically assigned to 86
offices in 54 countries. This includes more than 2 dozen personnel
assigned to 8 offices located throughout Mexico, where the vast
majority of the methamphetamine and fentanyl that sickens Americans is
produced. This also includes offices located in China and throughout
the Asia-Pacific region where the majority of precursor chemicals used
to produce illicit synthetic drugs originate from or transit through.
HSI takes a forward-leaning approach to identify and mitigate
threats before they reach our borders. This multi-tiered, multi-pronged
strategy is one that spans international boundaries and crosses all
investigative program areas. HSI special agents abroad develop and
foster relationships with host government law enforcement partners to
exchange information; coordinate and support investigations; and
facilitate enforcement actions and prosecutions to disrupt and
dismantle TCOs that operate abroad but threaten the national security,
economic prosperity, and public safety of the United States. HSI and
its counterparts in other countries identify and disrupt sources of
illicit drugs, transportation and smuggling networks, and money-
laundering operations. These efforts enable HSI and its partners to
prevent dangerous narcotics and other illicit goods from reaching our
borders and stop illicit southbound flows of illegally derived currency
and weapons.
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit Program
HSI established the Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit
(TCIU) Program in 2011 to act as a force multiplier in the fight
against Mexican cartels and other TCOs. HSI TCIUs are composed of host-
country law enforcement officials, including customs officers,
immigration officers, and prosecutors who undergo a stringent vetting
process. HSI TCIUs facilitate information exchange and rapid bilateral
investigations involving violations within HSI's investigative
authority, including narcotics smuggling; weapons trafficking and
counter-proliferation; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; human
smuggling and trafficking; transnational gang activity; child
exploitation; and cyber crime. TCIUs enhance the host country's ability
to investigate and prosecute individuals involved in transnational
criminal activity that threatens the stability and security of their
region and ultimately, our homeland. More than 500 vetted and trained
host-country law enforcement officers comprise the 12 TCIUs and two
International Task Force units. In Mexico, the TCIU is comprised of
more than 30 officers and prosecutors from their Attorney General's
office. TCIU personnel work with HSI on key programmatic areas,
including narcotics trafficking, and deploy to locations across Mexico
in furtherance of high-profile investigations targeting Mexican cartels
and other TCOs. In fiscal year 2021, the HSI Mexico TCIU made
approximately 100 arrests; seized 3 million USD; 4,300 pounds of
cocaine; 350 pounds of fentanyl; 717,000 pounds of drug precursor
chemicals, and 58,000 pounds of other drugs.
National Targeting Center--Investigations
HSI's National Targeting Center (NTC)--Investigations was
established in December 2013 in collaboration with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to further our shared border security mission.
HSI's increased manpower and concerted efforts at the NTC support the
entire border security continuum, from CBP interdictions and HSI
investigations, to the joint exploitation of intelligence. Working in a
collaborative environment at the NTC, HSI provides support to HSI
Domestic and International offices by targeting illicit precursor
movements within the air and maritime commercial transportation
modalities.
The combination of NTC targeting and foreign action through TCIUs
is critical to stopping the flow of illicit drugs. Using these
resources, HSI targets the supply chains responsible for foreign origin
shipments of precursor chemicals used in the illicit production of
fentanyl and methamphetamine destined for the United States. By
blending interagency collaboration, industry partnerships, financial
information, and computer-based tools, HSI processes and derives
meaning from large volumes of data to identify precursor chemical
suppliers and Mexican cartel procurers. HSI uses this information to
target and seize precursor chemicals in the United States and through
the TCIU in Mexico before they are converted into the synthetic drugs
fueling overdose deaths. Thus far, this methodology has resulted in the
seizure of approximately 633,000 kilograms of fentanyl and
methamphetamine precursor chemicals.
hsi southwest border counternarcotics efforts
The vast majority of the methamphetamine and fentanyl flooding
American streets is smuggled across our border with Mexico. HSI is the
primary Federal law enforcement agency responsible for investigating
drug seizures and other criminal activity occurring at POEs. Our
special agents work every day with CBP officers to identify, seize, and
investigate drug smuggling organizations attempting to introduce
illicit contraband into the United States.
CBP expansion of non-intrusive inspection (NII) scanning at
Southwest Border POEs is poised to increase the number of CBP-origin
seizures HSI special agents investigate. To keep pace, HSI needs
additional staffing to support the investigation and prosecution of
individuals associated with POE seizures. Recent HSI Congressional
appropriations tied to NII expansion represent an important, albeit
limited, initial step. HSI is moving quickly to deploy these new
resources to Southwest Border POEs receiving NII augmentation. Given
the required NII expansion to all land border POEs, additional staffing
will be essential to ensure HSI retains adequate personnel to conduct
the complex investigations which degrade and remove TCO threats to the
homeland.
HSI's ability to conduct complex large-scale investigations
represents one of DHS's best weapons for dismantling TCOs in a manner
not possible solely through border interdiction efforts. Conducting
criminal investigations resulting from arrests associated with border
seizures is necessary for ensuring the rule of law; however, HSI's
mandate is to turn these individual seizures into multi-jurisdictional,
multi-defendant, complex investigations to disrupt, dismantle, and
prosecute high-level members of TCOs.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces
The Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act was
signed into law in December 2012. The Act was named in honor of Jaime
Zapata, an HSI special agent who, while working to combat violent drug
cartels, was killed in the line of duty in Mexico. This law amended the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to formally establish the BEST (Border
Enforcement Security Task Force) program, with the primary mission of
combating emerging and existing transnational organized crime by
employing a threat-based/risk mitigation investigative task force model
that recognizes the unique resources and capabilities of all
participating law enforcement partners.
BEST units eliminate the barriers between Federal and local
investigations, close the gap with international partners in
multinational criminal investigations, and create an environment that
minimizes the vulnerabilities in our operations that TCOs have
traditionally capitalized on to exploit our Nation's borders. There are
currently 82 BESTs located across the United States, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, comprising more than 2,000 law enforcement
officers and personnel representing more than 200 Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and international law enforcement agencies, and National
Guard units. These personnel include HSI special agents, task force
officers, intelligence analysts, and investigative support personnel.
Since inception through mid-March 2022, BESTs have collectively
initiated more than 46,000 investigations resulting in more than 56,000
criminal arrests and seizures of more than 3.75 million pounds of
narcotics, 32,000 weapons, and more than $860 million in cash/monetary
instruments.
As part of HSI's response to the exploitation of international
shipping to move illicit drugs, HSI increased the number of BEST units
at international mail facilities (IMF), express consignment hubs, and
international airports acting as IMFs. This strategy facilitates the
immediate application of investigative techniques on seized parcels,
which aids in establishing the evidence needed to effect enforcement
actions on individuals associated with parcels containing illicit
drugs. Between fiscal years 2018 and 2021, BEST units at international
airports, IMFs, and express consignment hubs initiated more than 3,790
investigations resulting in more than 2,750 criminal arrests and
seizures of more than 68,400 pounds of illicit drugs and drug
precursors. These seizures included nearly 590 pounds of fentanyl, and
over $52 million in currency and monetary instruments. These law
enforcement operations have disrupted the movement of illicit drugs and
drug precursors transiting through the mail and express consignment
shipments and aided in dismantling distribution networks.
hsi domestic counternarcotics efforts
The illicit drug supply chain begins abroad and ends on Main
Street. The drugs smuggled through Southwest Border POEs fuel overdose
deaths in communities across the country. HSI investigates and thwarts
this activity from the border to the heartland. Domestically, HSI
covers the Nation through 253 offices located in all 50 States as well
as the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands,
and Saipan. Each office dedicates assets to combat the flow of illicit
drugs with remarkable results. In fiscal year 2021, HSI narcotics
enforcement efforts resulted in 12,920 arrests; the seizure of 23,632
lbs. of opioids, including 14,530 lbs. of fentanyl; 855,780 lbs. of
cocaine; 234,623 lbs. of methamphetamine; and the associated seizure of
over $188 million. The impressive narcotics seizures testify not only
to HSI's diligence in protecting America's borders and securing our
communities, but also to the ability of TCOs to absorb substantial
losses while continuing to function.
HSI counternarcotics efforts are enhanced through its network of
Federal, State, local, and Tribal partnerships, which includes our
participation in the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs)
Program and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Taskforces (OCDETFs)
Program. These partnerships enable our special agents to collaborate in
investigations using our unique and far-reaching authorities to
safeguard the homeland from ever evolving and emerging threats, such as
those posed by Mexican cartels and other TCOs. For example, in April
2022, HSI special agents assigned to our Seattle office led an
investigation that resulted in the arrest of four drug traffickers
operating in the Portland, Oregon, Metropolitan area and the seizure of
approximately 150,000 counterfeit prescriptions pills containing
fentanyl and 20 pounds of suspected bulk fentanyl. This investigation--
conducted in collaboration with our Federal, State, and local law
enforcement partners--was the largest single fentanyl seizure in Oregon
State history with an estimated street value of approximately $4
million.
Cyber-related Efforts
TCOs and their illicit drug clients are increasingly tech-savvy.
Many have adopted emerging technologies to replace hand-to-hand drug
sales with anonymous cryptocurrency purchases facilitated through dark
net marketplaces. These transactions may involve foreign vendors but
always result in the shipment of drugs to or within our country. To
keep pace with rapidly evolving criminal techniques, HSI created the
Cyber Crimes Center (C3) in 1997. C3 was codified at 6 USC 473 to
provide investigative assistance, training, and equipment to support
domestic and international investigations of cyber-related crimes for
the Department of Homeland Security. C3 supports HSI's mission through
the programmatic oversight and coordination of investigations of cyber-
related criminal activity and provides a range of forensic,
intelligence, and investigative support services across all HSI
programmatic areas. C3 brings together highly technical assets
dedicated to conducting trans-border criminal investigations of cyber-
related crimes within the HSI transnational crime portfolio and
authorities.
C3 performs an essential role in detecting, investigating, and
preventing the sale and distribution of opioids and other illicit drugs
on the dark web. With increased capabilities, cyber analytics, trained
cyber investigators and analysts, C3 supports HSI on-line undercover
investigations targeting market site operators, vendors, and prolific
buyers of opioids and other illicit drugs on the dark web. C3 also
provides critical support on tracing and identifying illicit proceeds
derived from criminal activity on the dark web and investigating the
subsequent money-laundering activities. Additionally, C3's Computer
Forensics Unit and HSI Computer Forensic Program are critical tools in
combating the flow of drugs into the United States. From the efforts of
our Computer Forensic Agents and Analysts in the field to seize,
process, and analyze digital evidence, through the advanced technical
solutions, such as decryption and accessing secure data, digital
forensics play an ever-increasing role in investigating complex
multinational narcotics organizations. The Computer Forensic Unit also
provides forensic training and support to our State, local, Tribal,
Federal, and international law enforcement partners.
A top priority for HSI is to improve collective law enforcement
capabilities by providing training to partner law enforcement agencies.
In response to initiatives to reduce opioid demand in the United
States, C3 developed a cyber-training curriculum with a focus on dark
web investigations and illicit payment networks associated with opioid
smuggling and distribution. This training has been successful in
improving law enforcement capabilities against on-line marketplaces and
tools for illicit trafficking. Since 2017, HSI has delivered this
training course in over 70 locations world-wide to more than 12,000
State, local, Federal, and international law enforcement personnel.
southwest border weapons smuggling
Part of HSI's multi-discipline approach to combating the flow of
illicit drugs into the United States includes combating the flow of
illicit guns and ammunition into Mexico. Cartels use corresponding
southbound pathways to repatriate cash proceeds from illegal activities
and secure sufficient armaments to remain a persistent threat to
Mexican security forces.
Firearms smuggled from the United States into Mexico allow the
cartels to continue their deadly operations against our Mexican law
enforcement partners and the local populace. In 2021, the government of
Mexico estimated at least 342,000 U.S.-sourced guns are illegally
smuggled into Mexico every year. Mexico's National Public Security
System reported 34,515 intentional homicides with 70 percent involving
firearms in 2020. During this period, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) performed traces on 19,762 firearms
recovered in Mexico. ATF checks determined at least 67.7 percent were
sourced from the United States with over half traced to a retail
purchase.
HSI uses its customs authorities to target weapons moving south
into Mexico and the procurement networks in the United States. This
includes Operation Without a Trace (WaT), a unified DHS effort to fight
the illegal trafficking of guns and ammunition from the United States
into Mexico. WaT is a Federal partnership between HSI, CBP, ATF, and
the government of Mexico, focused on the illicit purchase, transport,
and distribution of firearms, firearms components, and ammunition from
the United States to Mexico, and one of only three whole-of-Government
efforts recognized by the White House's National Security Council to
combat this threat. WaT's three-pronged approach leverages
intelligence, interdiction, and investigative assets to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations trafficking
firearms. During fiscal year 2021, WaT partners initiated 198 criminal
investigations which resulted in 153 arrests, and seizure of 494
firearms, 2,083 magazines and more than 265,026 rounds of ammunition,
all destined to TCOs in Mexico.
To highlight the importance of our partnership with the government
of Mexico, last month, HSI special agents assigned to our Arizona BEST
and the ATF executed a Federal search warrant resulting in the seizure
of multiple firearms intended for Mexico. This enforcement action was
predicated upon the seizure of approximately 2.8 million rounds of
ammunition, 128 long guns, 89 grenades, 38 handguns, 19 machine guns, 6
.50 caliber rifles, and 100 plates of ballistic armor by the Mexican
Ministry of Defense in March 2022. A significant portion of these
firearms were found to have originated from the United States.
illicit finance--following the money
Profit is the primary motive for the production and sale of illicit
drugs. U.S. illicit drug sales continue to net tens of billions of
dollars in illicit proceeds annually. One of the most effective methods
for dismantling Mexican cartels and other TCOs engaged in narcotics
trafficking is to attack the criminal proceeds that are the lifeblood
of their operations. Every HSI investigation has a financial element.
Our special agents identify and seize the illicit proceeds of crime and
target financial networks that transport, launder, and hide ill-gotten
proceeds. With significant access to financial and trade data, HSI is
uniquely positioned to identify TCO schemes to hide illegal drug
proceeds within the stream of legitimate commerce, on vehicles,
vessels, and persons departing the United States, or when crossing a
digital border such as the movement of funds electronically, including
in the form of virtual assets, such as cryptocurrency. HSI's financial
efforts in fiscal year 2021 resulted in at least 2,198 arrests; 1,417
criminal indictments; 738 convictions; and the seizure of more than
$973 million in illicit currency and assets.
National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
Despite the rise of alternative stores of value, such as virtual
assets, bulk cash smuggling remains a key mechanism for TCO
repatriation of drug proceeds. Criminal actors often avoid traditional
financial institutions which must comply with Bank Secrecy Act
reporting requirements, instead repatriating their illicit proceeds
through conveyances such as commercial and private aircraft, passenger
and commercial vehicles, maritime vessels, and via pedestrian crossings
at our land borders.
Established in 2009, HSI's National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
(BCSC) is a critical component of the agency's and overall U.S.
Government's efforts to combat bulk cash smuggling by Mexican cartels
and other TCOs. The BCSC operates strategic programs that leverage
advanced data analytics, interagency partnerships, and law enforcement
technology systems to identify complex money-laundering networks and
provide support for HSI financial investigations. The criminal
intelligence functions of the BCSC provide operational analysis in
support of HSI-led interdiction efforts including port profiles
highlighting cash-flow activity at targeted POEs and corridor analyses
to assist in planning the timing, location, and strategy for
interdiction operations. The Center also administers a targeted,
investigation-focused license plate reader program to identify larger
criminal networks and a warrant-based GPS tracking program that
provides valuable intelligence on the behaviors of criminal groups
engaged in bulk cash smuggling. Since its inception, the BCSC has
initiated or substantially contributed to over 8,810 criminal arrests
and seizures of bulk cash totaling over $2.63 billion.
TCOs are increasingly augmenting bulk currency smuggling with use
of alternate value platforms in response to financial regulations and
law enforcement efforts to identify money-laundering networks. A single
movement of TCO proceeds may involve bulk cash, stored value cards,
money orders, cryptocurrency, wire transfers, funnel accounts, and
trade-based money laundering. HSI adapts to evolving criminal
methodologies by leveraging new law enforcement technologies to
identify money laundering activity through these emerging alternate
value platforms and seize criminal assets.
While Mexican cartels and TCOs continue to employ traditional
money-laundering methods, cryptocurrencies are increasingly used to
facilitate domestic and cross-border crime. HSI has seen nefarious
actors expend cryptocurrency in furtherance of a wide array of crimes
HSI investigates. From individual actors to large-scale TCOs,
cryptocurrency can be exploited by any criminal organization engaged in
almost any type of illicit activity, and this is especially true as it
pertains to their use to facilitate on-line distribution of fentanyl,
methamphetamine, and other dangerous drugs. Both at home and abroad,
cryptocurrencies are being used to purchase illicit items such as drugs
on dark-net marketplaces, and to launder criminally-derived proceeds.
Cryptocurrencies are attractive to TCOs because they offer a relatively
fast, inexpensive, and pseudonymous system of transactions as compared
to more traditional financial transactions. As such, HSI investigations
related to cryptocurrency have risen from one criminal investigation in
2011, to over 230 criminal investigations in fiscal year 2021. In
fiscal year 2021, HSI seized over $97 million in cryptocurrency. This
marked increase signifies growing confidence in cryptocurrency use by
bad actors and requires that law enforcement become increasingly
technically proficient in performing these complex investigations.
conclusion
The United States continues to be ravaged by an ever-growing supply
of illicit drugs, including synthetic drugs like fentanyl and
methamphetamine, that have become the leading cause of overdose deaths
in the country. HSI's authorities and dynamic approaches to
counternarcotics allow us to pursue impactful investigations and
disrupt, dismantle, and prosecute the TCOs most responsible for
perpetrating this on-going and evolving public health crisis. While our
collective efforts are executed with an unrelenting commitment to
public safety, we recognize that work remains at all levels--
internationally, on the border, and in our communities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of HSI and our enduring efforts to secure
our borders and protect the American people from the influx of deadly
narcotics like fentanyl. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Green. Thank you for your testimony. I thank all the
witnesses for your testimony and I remind the subcommittee that
we will each have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now
recognize myself for questions.
I am honored to have the opportunity to ask these questions
because this is something that has been of concern, and more
specifically, we are talking about persons bringing in drugs
via the actual ports of entry juxtaposed to the land mass
between ports of entry. The indication is that approximately
194,000 pounds of fentanyl, methamphetamines, and heroin came
in between ports of entry.
Mr. Flores, is this a fairly accurate assessment?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. In
regards to narcotics----
Mr. Green. Let me do this because I have to lay a
predicate. I am going to ask you to give me as close as you can
to a yes or a no.
Mr. Flores. As far as narcotics coming in between the ports
of entry, I am not sure on that exact number. What I do know,
being responsible for our ports of entry, that we see a high
percentage of narcotics that we intercept at our ports of
entry.
Mr. Green. All right. Assuming that we have this high
number, 194,000 pounds, I respect those who believe that most
of it comes in between ports of entry. So let us examine the
numbers, let us just look at the numbers.
If you assume that just this amount comes in between ports
of entry, it would take 194,000 people bringing it in if each
carried 1,000 pounds. Since we know that most people can't
carry 1,000 pounds, let us assume that each person carries 500
pounds. It would take 388,000 people coming in between ports of
entry carrying 500 pounds. A good number of people can't carry
500 pounds. Let us assume that 250 pounds that each person has.
That would take 776,000 people. Probably 125 pounds may be
about what some people can carry. It would take 1,552,000
people bringing it in between ports of entry.
It just seems to me that we can accept the premise, or I
accept it, that this is coming in primarily through ports of
entry.
Is there someone on the panel who agrees with this
assessment, that this is coming in primarily through ports of
entry?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. Again,
what we see coming through the ports of entry is what we know
in regards to volume and seizures, whether that is on a vessel
in a containerized shipment or that is a tractor-trailer, in a
vehicle, or on a pedestrian coming in through our ports of
entry.
Mr. Green. Let me ask you this. Do you believe that we have
had 1,552,000 people bringing in 125,000--125 pounds in
backpacks in 1 year? That is what the statistical information
indicates.
Mr. Flores. Congressman, what I do know is that the methods
used to smuggle narcotics across our borders varies in
different ways, and whether that is by backpacks, whether that
is by vehicles, or by use of drones----
Mr. Green. I believe the backpacks are used, too, no
disrespect. But do you think that 1,552,000 people are bringing
it in on backpacks or is most of it coming in through the ports
of entry, sir?
Mr. Flores. From my perspective being in charge of the
ports of entry, what we see is the seizure of narcotics mostly
at our ports of entry.
Mr. Green. Thank you. I thank you for that kind answer.
Friends, this is the problem. Where it comes in, regardless as
to where it comes in, it is still a problem. I don't in any way
want to minimize the fact that we have got a problem to deal
with. But I do think that it is difficult to conceive of
1,522,000 people bringing this in or carrying it between ports
of entry. That number just doesn't add up for me.
Madam Chair, to be kind to my colleagues who all have
questions, I will yield back my additional 13 seconds.
Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
I want to apologize. I am in a competing Energy and Commerce
mark-up, which is why you see my running out because there is a
roll call vote and Mr. Green graciously agreed to Chair in my
absence.
So I want to thank the witnesses since I didn't have a
chance to do that.
The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions
they may wish to ask the witnesses. As previously outlined, I
will recognize Members in order of seniority, alternating
between the Majority and the Minority. Members are reminded to
unmute themselves when recognized for questions.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Sulc, your role
with the Office of Intelligence & Analysis perhaps best equips
you to answer for our purposes here. I believe every law
enforcement professional present has insight on this. But I
would like to ask you specifically regarding the percentages of
content of fentanyl that we are seeing in final use or pill
product, pressed into false prescription drugs, primarily, and
sold on the streets of America, across America.
My sources tell me that over the course of the last year
the amount of fentanyl that is pressed into the average pill
has increased. I am advised that this is because fentanyl is so
abundant. It is so abundant by now after almost 2 years, let us
say a year and a half of heavy, heavy crossings at the border,
the volume of fentanyl is so heavy in the garages of the drug
dealers and, you know, the drug houses across the country that
are processing this stuff and getting it out onto the street in
final user form, I am told there is so much of it that it is
increasing the percentage of fentanyl to make their product a
little more powerful, a little more addictive, as you stated in
your opening testimony.
To what extent are you saying that is true from the
intelligence and analysis perspective?
Mr. Sulc. Thank you for the question, Mr. Higgins. We have
seen over the last couple of years a slight increase in purity.
Not a huge increase, but it has increased.
Mr. Higgins. Could you clarify for America why a dealer
would want to seek that sweet spot balance? Because if he
pushed too much, what would happen?
Mr. Sulc. It would increase deaths, overdose deaths.
Mr. Higgins. Increase customers dying, exactly. So dealers
across the country--this is what I am trying to share with
America. These dealers have so much fentanyl they are giving it
away. They are pressing fentanyl into their final product that
they are selling on the streets and the stuff that is coming
across the border, as much as my colleagues, you know, want to
point to the ports of entry, may I say that is a criminal
capture and good for law enforcement. But your ports of entry
are reflective, those seizures are reflective of investigations
and confidential informants. These are larger shipments in
vehicles and vessels, easier to identify and intercept from a
law enforcement investigative perspective.
But our front-line enforcement at the border, those men and
women, they are quite capable of detecting and pursuing and
apprehending, you know, these stout young men crossing, 5, 10,
15 at a time, wearing camouflage and carpet shoes, et cetera,
covering their spores. They have backpacks, they have Camelbaks
with water, and they are rolling in a manner we haven't seen
before. They are certainly carrying drugs in a backpack, a lot
of them. It doesn't take a lot of it in order to impact the
opioid crisis in America. It is making its way into the
streets.
You can't measure that because you are not catching those
guys. Why? Because our agents are pulled into processing. Who
are they processing? The citizens from other countries that are
seeking asylum. But those citizens, those little family units
and individuals that are seeking, you know, a better life in
America, God bless them, we wish they would come here legally
and properly. However, those guys, they are seeking interaction
with law enforcement, they are not avoiding it. The ones
crossing it between the ports of entry, carrying backpacks, are
avoiding law enforcement. There is so much fentanyl has made it
to the street.
Mr. Sulc, you are seeing a slight increase. Again, just
clarify for America why a drug dealer would want to find that
balance of just how powerful he can make his pills without
putting too much fentanyl. Explain that to America, please.
Mr. Sulc. Well, sir, in terms of the addictive properties,
a seller would seek to increase the addictive properties to
increase how addictive, if they are lacing heroin or cocaine,
for instance, they would be seeking to make that more potent
and more addictive.
In terms of the false prescription drugs like Xanax and
Adderall, et cetera, that one is a little hard, at least from
my standpoint, and my colleagues may have better insight, but
that one is harder to determine why they would be willing to
have such a high death by overdose rate simply because the way
that is purchased, most of the people who purchase it don't
understand that fentanyl is lacing what they think is a legal
prescription drug. So they wouldn't be necessarily incentivized
to continue getting it if they don't even know they are getting
it. So that one is a little more difficult to understand, but
in talking to our analysts, their belief is that what is
happening with those prescription drugs that are being laced is
that they are just looking to sell it as many ways as possible.
Chairwoman Barragan. Mr. Sulc, Mr. Sulc, I have to----
Mr. Higgins. That makes sense, Mr. Sulc. In the interest of
time, my time has expired. I thank you for your answers, it is
squared away.
So, Madam Chair, I yield.
Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
expired. I was trying to be gracious there, but we want to make
sure our Members get our questions in before votes.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
I want to put up a chart, if we may, showing the
correlation, or I should say the lack of correlation between
migration and opioid seizures. This is a graph we are happy to
make available.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Barragan. The data was taken straight from
Customs & Border Protection data and it shows that line on the
bottom that you see that is green is seizures happening between
the ports of entry. That blue line that you see, which is the
big one at the top, is the seizures at the ports of entry and
vehicle checkpoints. So you can see the huge disparity there.
Then if you see the bars behind there, that shows
encounters at the border. So if you take a look at that chart
you will actually see that there is no correlation between
migration and the opioid seizures. I just want to remind folks
that the chart that we put up at the beginning, the pie chart,
is data directly from CBP showing that 91.3 percent of seizures
are through the ports of entry.
So staying on message on honesty and data, I think it is
important that people see the visuals to see the truth.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your efforts on what you do
day-in and day-out to combat and do everything you can to keep
drugs out of this country. That is why we are having this
hearing, is to hear from you all what Congress can do.
Now the opioid epidemic is a public health crisis and I
applaud CBP and the Department for seizing dangerous opioids
before they reach our communities.
Mr. Flores, if I may, what additional resources or
technology would help CBP detect and interdict opioids at the
border?
Mr. Flores. Chairwoman, thank you for the question. You
know, our employees are our most vital resources. It is even
during, despite a global pandemic, what we were able to do is
really dedicate ourselves to ensure staffing levels at our
ports of entry were maintained at our appropriated staffing
levels there, we were able to bring on officers and ag
specialists to ports of entry that we needed them.
So I would like to thank you for the Congressional support
given to us despite a decline in collections during the
pandemic, that we were able to maintain our staffing levels. It
has put us in a better position to respond to the increasing
volume of traffic that we see coming back as we get to
prepandemic levels of trade and travel coming across our
borders.
Infrastructure is also an important factor for us, aging
ports of entry and what our capabilities and what
infrastructure is for us. So, again, the bipartisan
infrastructure law that we just passed, the $3.4 billion to GSA
and the money to CBP, an important aspect of how we vitalize
ports of entry and really provide the needed space for
efficient and effective screening inspections, targeting of
illicit drugs coming across our border there.
I would say last, technology for us in regards to what we
are doing, in regards to nonintrusive technology, what we can
do, drive-through systems, looking at preprimary systems where
we will get more efficient rates and scannings of people and
things coming across our border in order to help us make a
better assessment of narcotics coming in.
Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Flores. Mr. Cagan and
Mr. Sulc, the next question is for you. What I have heard is
that the majority of drugs are seized at the ports of entry,
generally that is coming from documented travelers.
Do either of you expect terminating Title 42 would result
in a significant increase in the amount of drugs being smuggled
into our communities? Mr. Sulc.
Mr. Sulc. Thank you, Chairwoman. We believe that we would
continue to see the same scheme that we have seen in the past.
We have seen some instances perhaps of migrants and drugs as a
mixed event, but they are still rare. DTOs and human smuggling
organizations are opportunistic and transactional with their
operations. They are strongly motivated by profits.
So combined drugs and migrant smuggling events are not
really a routine practice at all. The illicit actors
facilitating these movements are likely to keep these entities
separate to minimize the risk of losing the potential revenue
for the much higher-value drugs such as fentanyl.
Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you. Mr. Cagan, in 20 seconds if
you might be able to answer.
Mr. Cagan. I will be quick so I don't get the gavel. At HSI
we see the same thing. When we are looking at the entire
transnational criminal organization and looking at the key
network spots within the supply chain, we see that drugs and
human smuggling are separate. They might use the same routes,
but we predominately see the drugs coming in through the ports
of entry, just like CBP mentioned.
Chairwoman Barragan. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. My time
has expired, I will yield back.
I now will recognize Representative Guest. You are now
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Flores, first I
want to thank you and the men and women of CBP for your
service, for all that you do each and every day.
In April, CBP reported 234,088 immigrants encountered along
our border, the largest number ever recorded. The month that
this administration took office, in January of last year, that
number was 78,414 immigrants. That is an increase of almost 300
percent in just 15 months. Total encounters under this
administration, taking numbers since February 2021, are
2,735,000 encounters, a number greater than the population of
13 States. A number greater than the population of Vermont,
Alaska, North and South Dakota, Delaware, Rhode Island,
Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, Hawaii, West Virginia, Idaho,
Nebraska, and New Mexico. At the current rate, next month it
will eclipse three additional States including my home State of
Mississippi.
We know that narcotic seizures along the Southwest Border
have continued to rise. You actually address that in page 2 of
your testimony. You say there in page 2 that in the fiscal year
2021 CBP seized 11,201 pounds of fentanyl, over twice the
number seized in fiscal year 2020. You go on to say since
October 1, 2021 CBP has seized 5,310 pounds of fentanyl. You go
on to say that if you measure that by dosage units, that 2.6
billion, billion with a B, potential doses of fentanyl were
seized in fiscal year 2021 and that 17 billion, with a B, doses
of methamphetamine were seized in 2021. Then to put that in
perspective you go on to say that the Earth's population is
approximately 7.9 billion people.
Secretary Mayorkas has been here to Congress before, he sat
in the very seat where you sit today, and he has testified that
the border is closed, that the border is secure, and that we
have operational control of the border.
So my question to you, Mr. Flores, is that in light of
these figures that I have just spoken, do you believe that our
border is closed? Do you believe that our border is secure?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. In
regards to field operations at our ports of entry, our
priorities are and continue to be our National and economic
security priorities at our ports of entry along the entirety of
the United States. By doing that we inspect, we facilitate, we
target, we screen high-risk shipments and individuals coming
into our ports of entry. We do that every day, our men and
women that are operating at our ports of entry can do that and
do an excellent job at that every single day as they are
dealing with legitimate trade and travel, looking for those
individuals that are looking to do this country harm in the
communities we live in.
So we will continue to operate as we have been in ensuring
our National priorities are being taken care of as well as our
economic priorities.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Flores, I don't argue with you, I don't
disagree with you, I would agree. I have been to the border on
numerous occasions. I have met with officers of CBP, I have met
with community leaders. They all tell me the same thing without
exception is they feel like that this administration has
abandoned them. They have told us that this is the worst that
they have ever seen the Southwest Border.
So my question to you is very simple, is a yes or no
answer. I am asking your personal opinion, I am not asking the
opinion of Secretary Mayorkas, I am not asking the opinion of
CBP, I am asking your opinion. Do you believe that our border
is secure and do you believe that our border is closed?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, I will say ports of entry, the men
and women from field operations at our ports of entry and the
entirety of CBP, we are doing the best job we can do given the
current environment.
Mr. Guest. I agree with you, you need more resources, you
need more manpower, and I am not arguing that. But I have got
10 seconds and I would like an answer in that 10 seconds,
either yes or no. Is the border closed and is the border
secure? Could you please answer that?
Mr. Flores. From the port of entry perspective our borders
have been open in regards to being able to process legitimate
trade and travel coming across our ports of entry as well as
enforcing, again enforcing----
Mr. Guest. Are our borders secure?
Mr. Flores. From a port of entry perspective we have
officers, again, doing the best they can in securing this
border every single day.
Chairwoman Barragan. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair now recognizes Representative Clyde, the gentleman from
Georgia.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you. Our Nation is currently facing a
myriad of crises: Record-breaking high inflation, runaway
Washington spending, and an open Southern Border that is
allowing an out-of-control number of illegal aliens and illegal
and dangerous drugs to flow into our borders.
The CDC recently announced that more than 107,000 Americans
died of drug overdoses last year. Of those deaths, nearly two-
thirds of fatal overdoses were caused by fentanyl or another
synthetic opioid. That is a 23 percent increase from 2020.
Fentanyl, as Ranking Member Higgins has already noted, is now
the leading cause of death of Americans from the ages of 18 to
45. It may be as much fentanyl poisoning as anything else. That
is an incredible statistic, that is a heartbreaking statistic.
That fentanyl is coming across our Southern Border.
In my home State of Georgia, between 2012 and 2019,
fentanyl overdoses claimed the lives of nearly 1,250
individuals. Last year alone customs and border protection in 8
ports of entry, just 8, 8 alone, seized 588 pounds of fentanyl
coming across the border. That is enough to kill over 133
million people, to kill all the residents of Georgia 12 times
over.
So for each of you, Mr. Cagan, I will start with you, yes,
or no, do you believe that border security is related directly
to National security?
Mr. Cagan. HSI is there to investigate south of the border.
Mr. Clyde. Just yes or no would be fine, sir.
Mr. Cagan. Say again, repeat the question.
Mr. Clyde. Do you believe that border security is related
directly to National security?
Mr. Cagan. It is one of the factors of National security,
sir.
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Between our ports of entry do you
think we have a secure border? Yes or no is fine.
Mr. Cagan. HSI is not the one to answer the question as it
pertains to----
Mr. Clyde. So you don't know.
Mr. Cagan [continuing]. The physical border.
Mr. Clyde. So you don't know?
Mr. Cagan. No, sir.
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Mr. Flores, I am going to ask you
the same thing. Do you believe that border security is related
directly to National security?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. I do
believe that they both are important and they are related, yes.
Mr. Clyde. OK. Great. So between our ports of entry, do you
believe we have a secure Southern Border?
Mr. Flores. I believe the men and women of the U.S. Border
Patrol and CBP, as a whole, collectively, we are putting--doing
our best.
Mr. Clyde. I know you are doing the best job you can, that
is not my question. My question is, do we have a secure
Southern Border between our ports of entry?
Mr. Flores. From a responsible for our United States ports
of entry, from the field operations perspective, from the U.S.
Border Patrol perspective, probably better answered by them,
but, again, with the resources that the U.S. Border Patrol has
between the ports of entry----
Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Then, Mr. Sulc, I am going to ask
you the same question. Do you believe that border security is
related directly to National security?
Mr. Sulc. Sir, yes, I do.
Mr. Clyde. OK. Thank you. Do you believe we have a secure
Southern Border between our ports of entry?
Mr. Sulc. I do. I believe we have vulnerabilities----
Mr. Clyde. OK. Thank you. All right. That is fine. All
right. Now, Mr. Flores, you testified that last year that
11,200 pounds of fentanyl was seized between--both at ports of
entry and between ports of entry, correct?
Mr. Flores. Right.
Mr. Clyde. Now we had 400,000 got-aways we think, that
people that were not caught at the Southern Border that came
into the United States, possibly as many as 800,000, and many
of them were carrying backpacks. So what is the average amount
of a fentanyl seizure? I mean, from 11,200 pounds on an annual
basis, what is the average amount that Border Protection
seizes?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. Just
average, you mean per seizure?
Mr. Clyde. Per seizure, I am sorry, yes. Per seizure.
Mr. Flores. That would vary depending on the type or the
mode it was being transported or smuggled. That could be in a
tractor-trailer or----
Mr. Clyde. I get that. What is the average amount per
seizure that you normally--that you could see?
Mr. Flores. Well, we could see anywhere from a kilo to
potentially 15 kilos.
Mr. Clyde. OK, 15 kilos, about 30 pounds. Anywhere from a
couple pounds to 30 pounds easily carried by an individual. All
right. So do you know is it different whether it is between a
port of entry or between ports of entry?
Mr. Flores. Typically in between the ports of entry, the
seizures that I am aware of have been smaller amounts. But if
they are hidden in a conveyance, a commercial conveyance or
some type of passenger vehicle, those tend to be larger
amounts.
Mr. Clyde. OK. Then when you look at potentially 400,000
got-aways and you are looking at maybe 2 pounds----
Chairwoman Barragan. The gentlemen's time has expired.
Mr. Clyde [continuing]. That is potentially a tremendous
amount that we are not even seeing. So I don't think there is a
correlation between what you get at a port of entry and what
you get between ports of entry because we don't have that
information, so we can't really say that.
Chairwoman Barragan. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you, I yield.
Chairwoman Barragan. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair will now recognize Representative Bishop from North
Carolina for his 5 minutes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am sorry, I had
another committee hearing so I am late, but I hope I can ask a
question that is cogent. It may tread over grounds you all have
well covered.
I take it there has been a good discussion about the drugs
coming in at the ports of entry and not between the ports of
entry. So at risk, I am sure, of recreating the wheel a little
bit, but maybe somebody can help me understand.
A lot of what we are talking about today is fentanyl, which
can kill in extraordinarily small amounts. So you don't have to
have truckloads coming across in order to do immense damage. So
let me just ask the question of whoever on the panel is capable
of helping orient me.
Why is it if you have 6-, 700,000, 750,000 got-aways, why
is there not immense risk of fentanyl entering the country via
got-aways? Maybe Mr. Flores.
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. In
regards to fentanyl coming into the country, at our ports of
entry is where we see a significant volume of fentanyl as
approaches coming into our ports of entry.
Mr. Bishop. So thank you for that. I think I got that even
before I sat down and even recited, I understood we trod that
ground. The question I am asking is another one, which is that
implies, because you say you believe it comes in through the
ports of entry, it would imply that allowing 750,000 got-aways
to come across the border without interdicting them is not
really a risk for illicit drug purposes because how could there
be any harm? What I am asking you, am I wrong when I say my
understanding is that very small amounts of fentanyl can kill
hundreds of thousands of people? Why wouldn't the use of mules
coming across at places other than points of entry and evading
Border Patrol so they are got-aways, and you know we have got
lots of got-aways, why is that not a material risk of the entry
of illegal drugs?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. In
regards to got-aways, those are unknown. So in regards--I will
not say there is no risk because there is absolutely, but with
the unknown there is risk there on what they could be
introducing into the country. So it is just an unknown.
Mr. Bishop. So I have lately been given the understanding
that with respect to fentanyl, you can have like four grains
out of a saltshaker and that can kill a person. Isn't that
true? Whether that is precisely the right number or not, small
miniscule amounts like that can cause death to a human, isn't
that right?
Mr. Flores. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. OK. If you take like what might be in a sugar
packet that you would put in your coffee, that quantity can
kill many humans, correct?
Mr. Flores. Depending on the purity of what that fentanyl
makeup is, correct, and chemical composition.
Mr. Bishop. Why isn't the introduction of fentanyl in
substantial quantities into this country, why isn't that a
terrorism risk? Isn't this a chemical weapon?
Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. In
regards to why isn't it a terrorist threat, I wouldn't be the
correct person to answer to that.
Mr. Bishop. Is there someone on this panel that could speak
to why that is not considered terrorism? Let me ask this
question, and I will ask whoever is competent to say something
about it.
You have heard of anthrax and ricin, poisons that
transmitted to Congress or something that could kill tons of
people. How is fentanyl less dangerous than anthrax or ricin?
Does anybody know that it is less dangerous?
Well, let me just say in the 53 seconds I have got that
remain, if I understand the thrust of this hearing is to
suggest that the Biden administration's catastrophic
relinquishment of control of the border is not jeopardizing
America with a flood of drugs because drugs are interdicted at
the point of entry and are not otherwise coming across. That is
lunacy.
When you have huge numbers of got-aways because you have
overloaded the process, there is very good prospect that you
are going to see that large quantities of drugs come in, and I
see no way it is different than a risk of a terrorist with
another type of dangerous chemical.
Mr. Higgins, I am sorry, I did not save any time to yield
to you, but I give you whatever I got.
Mr. Higgins. I thank the gentleman. Madam Chair, I would
like to submit for the record an article, a media article,
quoting Secretary Mayorkas saying regarding the border, we are
going to lose, it is unsustainable.
Chairwoman Barragan. There is no objection, the article
will be admitted.* Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information was not available at the time of publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I want to thank the witnesses, gentlemen, for your valuable
testimony, and the Members for their questions. You know, I
would be interested in continuing the conversation with you and
your teams as to how we can prevent these drugs from reaching
American communities and focus on the solutions. I want to
thank you, Mr. Flores, for offering some of the things that
Congress can do to be helpful. So I will reach out after this
hearing to continue the conversation so we can get to
solutions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have additional
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing. The Chair reminds Members that the
committee record remains open for 10 business days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Brian Sulc
Question. It's critical that we work to stop drugs from ever
reaching our borders. What challenges does the Department face in
working with international partners to prevent transnational
organizations from manufacturing and smuggling opioids?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Pete Flores
Question 1a. The Securing America's Ports Act was enacted into law
last year, requiring DHS to develop a plan to achieve 100 percent cargo
scanning rate of commercial and passenger vehicles at land ports of
entry by using large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology.
What progress has CBP made to reach the 100 percent scanning rate?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made
significant progress toward increasing the percentage of arriving
vehicles scanned at Land Ports of Entry (LPOE) on the Southwest Border
(SWB). In fiscal year 2021, CBP procured Low-Energy Portal (LEP)
systems and Multi-Energy Portal (MEP) Drive-Through Non-Intrusive
Inspection (NII) systems. CBP estimates the procured systems will
enable CBP to scan 40 percent of Passenger Occupied Vehicles (POV) and
more than 70 percent of Commercially Occupied Vehicles (COV) at SWB
LPOEs. For POVs, LEP systems are planned for deployment at 27 SWB
LPOEs. For COVs, MEP systems are planned for deployment at 19 SWB
LPOEs.
CBP is working with multiple stakeholder groups at each LPOE to
complete deployment activities in preparation for installing the
systems in the coming years. CBP will continue to engage with Congress
and provide updates on LEP and MEP deployment plans, scanning rate
estimates, and the specific locations, as deployment activities are
executed. A final deployment schedule is anticipated by the end of
fiscal year 2022.
Question 1b. What challenges does CBP face in attaining the 100
percent scanning rate?
Answer. CBP does not currently have the resources to scan 100
percent of conveyances at LPOEs, nor is such a goal necessary or cost-
effective. The fiscal year 2019 investment in NII provided will allow
CBP to significantly increase scanning capacity by about 20-fold in the
POV and COV environments on the SWB once procured systems are deployed,
which demonstrates a significant increase in scanning capacity. CBP
currently scans 1 to 2 percent of POVs and 12 to 15 percent of COVs.
Question 1c. What are the agency's plans to mitigate these
challenges and what resources are needed to increase scanning?
Answer. CBP's layered enforcement approach encompasses risk-based
screening. This approach has proven effective, and CBP will continue to
utilize risk-based screening to inform which conveyances to scan during
NII operations. CBP will continually assess NII technology needs and
transmit validated requirements through the Department's annual budget
request.
Questions From Hon. J. Luis Correa for Pete Flores
Question 1a. In 2019, CBP conducted a pilot program at the cost of
a private American company that successfully demonstrated the
capabilities of passive muon tomography scanning systems designed to
identify anomalies within dense cargo entering U.S. sea and land ports.
After seeing the value and need for this technology, CBP publicly
announced their intention to procure and deploy these systems beginning
in our seaports. However, 3 years later, CBP still has not deployed a
single passive muon tomography scanning system that they acknowledge
addresses a known gap in their layered enforcement strategy. This delay
has received a lot of attention and scrutiny from my colleagues and
myself in particular, inquiring about the rationale behind CBP's
decision making throughout this procurement process. CBP's responses
have not only been woefully late but are also lacking in substance and
dialog.
Furthermore, it has recently come to light that a junior staffer
within CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) has intentionally spread
misinformation to Members of Congress and their staff in CBP's
responses to our Congressional inquiries. Not only has this
misinformation been intentionally sent to Capitol Hill to deliberately
paint this American company in a bad light, but directly contradicts
CBP's official position on muon tomography imaging technology. To
confirm and reiterate CBP's interest in procuring this technology and
the need for designated funding from Congress, you responded to the
company with a letter stating CBP's official stance on the technology
and its place within U.S. homeland security. To my knowledge, this
junior staffer is still employed within the CBP's OFO.
Two weeks ago, after learning of the actions of this junior staffer
at CBP's OFO, I sent a letter to Commissioner Chris Magnus outlining my
deep concerns with the broken procurement process and the internal
dysfunction at CBP. In my letter, I discussed the lack of
responsiveness from CBP to our official inquiries, the intentional
spreading of misinformation to those Congressional inquiries by CBP,
and how this broken process has severely stifled this and future
public-private partnerships.
Are you aware of the fact that someone within your own office (OFO)
has been intentionally providing misinformation to Members of Congress
and their staff who inquired about the delay in procurement and
deployment of this technology?
Answer. No, the CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) is not aware
of any staff member within OFO intentionally providing misinformation
to Members of Congress and their staff, nor would CBP permit such
behavior.
Question 1b. If ``YES,'' then: What plans do you have to rectify
this public-private partnership and quickly procure and deploy this
technology in our sea and land ports?
Question 1c. If ``NO,'' then: What do you plan on doing to remedy
the situation to alleviate the dysfunction internally at CBP?
Answer. OFO is not aware of any staff member within OFO providing
misinformation to Members of Congress and their staff regarding the
procurement of the Discovery System (Muon Tomography system
manufactured by Decision's Sciences International Corporation (DSIC)).
Over the past 3 years, CBP has responded to several official
letters and has held meetings regarding the results of the Discovery
No-Cost Technology Demonstration conducted at Mariposa cargo facility
within the Nogales Port of Entry. CBP's communications, to both
Congress and DSIC, regarding the results of the No-Cost Technology
Demonstration, were consistent based on the outcome of the Technology
Demonstration.
Question 2a. Congress has repeatedly directed CBP to engage in
public-private partnerships with American companies to develop,
produce, test, and deploy innovative technologies like passive muon
tomography scanning systems. This internal dysfunction at CBP has
delayed the procurement of this innovative technology for over 2 years,
further stifling the prototypical public-private partnership they are
supposed to facilitate.
What is your official position on the deployment of passive muon
tomography scanning systems?
Answer. CBP conducted a No-Cost Technology Demonstration (TD) of
Discovery. This TD was conducted under a no-cost Product/Service
Demonstration Agreement between CBP and DSIC to test the Discovery
system at the Mariposa cargo facility in the Port of Nogales, Arizona.
The TD took place from January 2019 through December 2019. During the
TD, the Discovery system was employed for both stream of commerce and
deliberate test scenarios. Under controlled conditions, the Discovery
system was able to display contrast between cargo and large quantity
contraband for dense, inorganic cargo. Overall, the Discovery system
demonstrated unique capabilities relative to CBP's current X-ray
transmission systems. While the TD did not establish that Discovery was
a suitable replacement for X-ray imaging technology, the TD did find
the system could potentially compliment X-Ray imaging technology in the
right operational environment. CBP remains interested in further
assessing the Discovery system through a follow-on TD and has
identified the New York/Newark seaport as a possible location. CBP must
carefully weigh the additional TD with competing operational
priorities, and ensure any future procurement is done in accordance
with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies.
Question 2b. With these types of delays, how do we expect private
American companies to continue doing business with the Federal
Government to increase our homeland security?
Answer. CBP, as always, will continue to utilize fair and open
competition procedures to acquire the products and services that meet
our agency's needs. Once a need is identified, CBP solicits interest
and information from industry partners, and always welcomes and
encourages industry partners to stay apprised of our publicly-posted
acquisition opportunities.
Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Steve Cagen
Question. It's critical that we work to stop drugs from ever
reaching our borders. What challenges does the Department face in
working with international partners to prevent transnational
organizations from manufacturing and smuggling opioids?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]