[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 EXAMINING DHS'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE 
                              OPIOID EPIDEMIC

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                     BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION,
                             AND OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 18, 2022

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-56

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________
                               
                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-426 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                  
 
                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California           Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri            Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas                      Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California            Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York           Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida          Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California    Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
                       Hope Goins, Staff Director
                 Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
                          Natalie Nixon, Clerk
                                 ------                                

     SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY, FACILITATION, AND OPERATIONS

             Nanette Diaz Barragan, California, Chairwoman
J. Luis Correa, California           Clay Higgins, Louisiana, Ranking 
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri                Member
Al Green, Texas                      Michael Guest, Mississippi
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex  Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
    officio)                         John Katko, New York (ex officio)
            Brieana Marticorena, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Natasha Eby, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Zachary Wood, Subcommittee Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on 
  Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Clay Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border 
  Security, Facilitation, and Operations.........................     4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6

                               Witnesses

Mr. Brian Sulc, Executive Director, Transnational Organized Crime 
  Mission Center, Office of Intelligence & Analysis, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     7
  Prepared Statement.............................................     8
Mr. Pete Flores, Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office of 
  Field Operations, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    10
  Prepared Statement.............................................    12
Mr. Steven W. Cagan, Assistant Director for Countering 
  Transnational Organized Crime, Homeland Security 
  Investigations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    17
  Prepared Statement.............................................    18

                             For the Record

The Honorable Nanette Diaz Barragan, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of California, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on 
  Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations:
  Pie Chart......................................................     2
  Graph..........................................................    27

                                Appendix

Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Brian Sulc....    35
Questions From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Pete Flores..    35
Questions From Hon. J. Luis Correa for Pete Flores...............    35
Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Steve Cagen...    37

 
         EXAMINING DHS'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, May 18, 2022

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                          Subcommittee on Border Security, 
                              Facilitation, and Operations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Nanette Diaz 
Barragan [Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Barragan, Green, Higgins, Guest, 
and Clyde.
    Chairwoman Barragan. The Committee on Border Security, 
Facilitation, and Operations will come to order. Without 
objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at any 
time.
    Thank you for joining today's hearing to examine the 
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to combat the opioid 
epidemic. The past few years have weighed heavily on the 
American people. A once-in-a-lifetime virus and the resulting 
economic slowdown exacerbated the existing public health 
crises, including our Nation's struggle with drug addiction and 
overdose deaths. In fact, data from the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention suggests that drug overdoses have 
increased sharply since the pandemic began. They believe more 
than 107,000 overdose deaths occurred in 2021, breaking all 
previous yearly records.
    The opioid crisis in the United States claims more lives 
each year than firearms, suicide, homicide, or motor vehicle 
crashes. Tackling the drug crisis is one of our most pressing 
National security, law enforcement, and public health 
challenges. We must do more to protect American lives.
    I am grateful to see this administration tackling the 
challenge head-on. Last month President Biden released a new 
National Drug Control Strategy focused on the actions needed to 
reduce overdoses and save lives. Those actions include 
disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking operations in which 
our witnesses here today play a key role.
    As we are all aware, the rise in the misuse of fentanyl and 
other synthetic opioids has its origins in the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration's approval of the prescription opioid 
painkiller OxyContin in 1995 when it was falsely marketed as a 
nonaddictive pain-management medication. With the increased 
prescription, opioid dependence and addiction became an 
increased demand for synthetic opioids which transnational 
criminal organizations have exploited.
    Almost all of the synthetic opioids harming Americans are 
manufactured outside of the United States. The smuggling of 
these drugs into our country is an issue the Biden 
administration and Democrats are focused on tackling. In the 
past, Chinese fentanyl was frequently shipped directly to the 
United States in small, high-purity quantities. It was also 
shipped to Mexico and then smuggled across the border. However, 
as China took steps to police fentanyl and related drugs, 
production and distribution has increasingly shifted to Mexico. 
It has never been more important to enhance cooperation with 
Mexican authorities and disrupt the movement of hard drugs like 
heroin and fentanyl across the border. This is exactly what the 
Biden administration is doing.
    This administration also understands the overwhelming 
majority of hard drugs, more than 90 percent, are smuggled 
through legal ports of entry by documented travelers, not in 
between them.
    If you look up on the screen you will see a pie chart that 
uses CBT data to illustrate this. That big blue section of the 
pie chart shows 91.3 percent coming in through ports of entry. 
Rather than waste resources building a wall or tearing families 
apart, the Biden administration has directed resources to ports 
of entry to interdict opioid shipments where they are arriving. 
They have also focused attention on disrupting and dismantling 
the transnational criminal organizations that smuggle these 
drugs into our communities.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairwoman Barragan. Despite the talking points I expect we 
will hear today from some of my colleagues, I would like to be 
clear that migrants seeking asylum are not responsible for the 
vast majority of drugs arriving in our communities. According 
to CBP data, there is no correlation between the volume of hard 
drugs being seized at the border and the number of migrants 
encountered.
    For example, we saw seizures of fentanyl and heroin reach 
current levels in June 2020. At the time migration was still 
unnaturally suppressed at the border closures throughout 
Central America. High levels of opioids and other illicit drugs 
are seized at points of entry during times of both high and 
relatively low migration.
    The Department of Homeland Security is in a unique position 
to respond to this crisis, both with its investigative arm and 
through our personnel and technologies stationed at the border, 
including the nonintrusive inspection systems and radiation 
technology to scan travelers, vehicles, and cargo entering the 
United States for narcotics. This technology is critical and I 
support the Department's goal of achieving a 100 percent scan 
rate. However, much more work needs to be done. Currently less 
than 2 percent of private vehicles and 15 percent of commercial 
vehicles are screened for narcotics at the Southwest Border.
    Today I look forward to hearing more about CBP's use of 
technology and K-9 units to detect opioids at our ports of 
entry. I also look forward to hearing more about HSI's efforts 
to investigate transnational criminal organizations and their 
drug supply chains to intercept drug shipments heading to the 
United States.
    Combating illicit drugs is no easy task and enforcement 
alone will not solve the challenge. Tackling the opioid 
epidemic in our country requires a whole-of-society approach 
that goes beyond the scope of border enforcement. Nonetheless, 
the Department of Homeland Security has an important role in 
this fight. We must identify and resolve vulnerabilities, 
especially as traffickers continue to adapt their methods.
    Today's hearing will provide us with an opportunity to 
learn more about the Department's efforts and challenges in 
combatting the opioid epidemic. I look forward to a frank 
conversation on the current situation and our witnesses' 
recommendations on how Congress can take action to further 
protect our communities.
    [The statement of Chairwoman Barragan follows:]
                Statement of Chairwoman Nanette Barragan
                              May 18, 2022
    The past few years have weighed heavily on the American people. A 
once-in-a-lifetime virus and the resulting economic slowdown 
exacerbated existing public health crises, including our Nation's 
struggle with drug addiction and overdose deaths. In fact, data from 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggests that drug 
overdoses have increased sharply since the pandemic began. They believe 
more than 107,000 overdose deaths occurred in 2021, breaking all 
previous yearly records.
    The opioid crisis in the United States claims more lives each year 
than firearms, suicide, homicide, or motor vehicle crashes. Tackling 
the drug crisis is one of our most pressing National security, law 
enforcement, and public health challenges. We must do more to protect 
American lives.
    I am grateful to see this administration tackling the challenge 
head on. Last month, President Biden released a new National Drug 
Control Strategy focused on the actions needed to reduce overdoses and 
save lives. Those actions include disrupting and dismantling drug 
trafficking operations, in which our witnesses here today play a key 
role.
    As we are all aware, the rise in the misuse of fentanyl and other 
synthetic opioids has its origins in the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration's approval of the prescription opioid painkiller 
OxyContin in 1995, when it was falsely marketed as a nonaddictive pain-
management medication. With the increased prescription opioid 
dependence and addiction came an increased demand for synthetic 
opioids, which transnational criminal organizations have exploited.
    Almost all of the synthetic opioids harming Americans are 
manufactured outside of the United States.
    The smuggling of these drugs into our country is an issue the Biden 
administration and Democrats are focused on tackling. In the past, 
Chinese fentanyl was frequently shipped directly to the United States 
in small, high purity quantities. It was also shipped to Mexico and 
then smuggled across the border. However, as China took steps to police 
fentanyl and related drugs, production and distribution has 
increasingly shifted to Mexico. It has never been more important to 
enhance cooperation with Mexican authorities and disrupt the movement 
of hard drugs like heroin and fentanyl across the border--this is 
exactly what the Biden administration is doing.
    This administration also understands that the overwhelming majority 
of hard drugs are smuggled through legal ports of entry by documented 
travelers--not in between them. Rather than waste resources building a 
wall or tearing families apart, the Biden administration has directed 
resources to ports of entry to interdict opioid shipments where they 
are arriving. They have also focused attention on disrupting and 
dismantling the transnational criminal organizations that smuggle these 
drugs into our communities.
    Despite the talking points I expect we will hear today from some of 
my colleagues, I'd like to be clear that migrants seeking asylum are 
not responsible for the vast majority of drugs arriving in our 
communities. According to CBP data, there is no correlation between the 
volume of hard drugs being seized at the border and the number of 
migrants encountered. For example, we saw seizures of fentanyl and 
heroin reach current levels in June 2020. At the time, migration was 
still unnaturally suppressed by border closures throughout Central 
America. High levels of opioids and other illicit drugs are seized at 
ports of entry during times of both high, and relatively low, 
migration.
    The Department of Homeland Security is in a unique position to 
respond to this crisis, both with its investigative arm and through our 
personnel and technologies stationed at the border, including the Non-
Intrusive Inspection systems and radiation technology to scan 
travelers, vehicles, and cargo entering the United States for 
narcotics. This technology is critical, and I support the Department's 
goal of achieving a 100 percent scan rate. However, much more work 
needs to be done--currently less than 2 percent of private vehicles and 
15 percent of commercial vehicles are screened for narcotics at the 
Southwest Border.
    Today I look forward to hearing more about CBP's use of technology 
and canine units to detect opioids at our ports of entry. I also look 
forward to learning more about HSI's efforts to investigate 
transnational criminal organizations and their drug supply chains to 
intercept drug shipments heading to the U.S. Combatting illicit drugs 
is no easy task. And enforcement alone will not solve the challenge.
    Tackling the opioid epidemic in our country requires a whole-of-
society approach that goes beyond the scope of border enforcement. 
Nonetheless, the Department of Homeland Security has an important role 
in this fight. We must identify and resolve vulnerabilities, especially 
as traffickers continue to adapt their methods.
    Today's hearing will provide us with an opportunity to learn more 
about the Department's efforts and challenges in combatting the opioid 
epidemic. I look forward to a frank conversation on the current 
situation and our witnesses' recommendations for how Congress can take 
action to further protect our communities.

    Chairwoman Barragan. With that, the Chair now recognizes 
the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Higgins of 
Louisiana, for an opening statement.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate the 
law enforcement professionals that are here with us today.
    I would like to communicate clearly to Americans that are 
joining us today through this televised hearing, address the 
elders of the communities across America, and clarify a few 
things so you can grasp what we are dealing with in the country 
right now.
    The United States is currently undergoing a horrific drug 
epidemic crisis. Fentanyl, the synthetic opioid, is 80 to 100 
times stronger than morphine. According to the DEA, our own 
Drug Enforcement Administration, just 2 milligrams of fentanyl 
can kill a person by ingestion, inhalation, or even absorption 
through the skin. Fentanyl is now the leading cause of death of 
Americans 18 to 45 years old.
    The Customs and Border Patrol have seized enough fentanyl 
just last year to kill 2.4 billion people. That is over 7 times 
the population of the United States of America. I hope America 
is paying attention to what I am sharing here today.
    It should come as no shock, a reasonable assessment of what 
is happening in our Southern Border. Every American would look 
at that, record numbers of illegal crossings driven by cartels 
that make their monies from trafficking drugs and human beings. 
It is a reasonable and pretty easy connection to make to 
understanding that illegal crossings at the border, that is out 
of control by any measure, is directly related to the opioid 
crisis that we are suffering as a Nation right now and the 
deaths that we are experiencing, 107,000 Americans died from 
opioid overdose last year. We have never seen numbers like this 
before.
    No matter where you are in law enforcement this is touching 
your community. If you are an elder of your community, you 
know, youngsters from your area that you love and care for, 
they have suffered loss and deaths. These kids are taking pills 
that are pressed by dealers with equipment they are buying on-
line or building themselves and make pill presses out of raw 
materials that they are getting from somewhere. It might be a 
clue where they are getting it from if you look at our Southern 
Border. This is just reality.
    My colleagues like to use percentages across the aisle and 
graphs like this, they are entertaining, but no more. Because 
they talk about percentages of seizures. Obviously our ports of 
entry, the large ships or trucks, professional law enforcement 
intercepts large shipments and quantities of drugs based upon 
investigative work and data from confidential informants. They 
don't stumble across a large shipment of drugs on the highway, 
in the belly of a ship, or hidden in the cargo of truck. You 
don't stumble across that stuff. You are watching for that 
vessel, you are watching for that vehicle, you intercept it 
when it comes into your jurisdictional authority, and if your 
confidential informant was right, you have a big drug seizure. 
You law enforcement guys know that what I am saying is true.
    So, of course, you intercept a large volume and quantity of 
drugs in the hold of a ship as compared to on a backpack 
carried across the border. My colleagues like to say that 
migrants seeking asylum are not impacting this drug crisis. 
That is intellectually unsound and even disingenuous because 
the young men that are crossing our border, I think we are 
pushing a million with last year and this year, official 
numbers about 400,000 last year, unknown this year, they are 
called got-aways because they got away.
    They are not seeking asylum. Seeking asylum requires 
interaction with law enforcement professionals at the border to 
begin your process of asylum. You don't do that with a backpack 
of drugs.
    I am asking America to be genuine about this conversation.
    On my side of the aisle we want to have this conversation 
so that we can give the law enforcement professionals the 
assets and the assistance they need to do their job and restore 
American sovereignty at our Southern Border and save America 
from death by overdose that we are experiencing right now.
    But we cannot allow ourselves to be pulled into this false 
narrative of that don't pay no attention to the man behind the 
curtain, nothing here to see, move along. We had 2.4 million 
illegal crossings last year, 500,000 got-aways, these are stout 
young men and a lot of them are carrying backpacks with drugs 
in them. It does not take a lot of fentanyl to produce 
thousands and thousands and thousands of pills that are pressed 
to look like Xanax and Lortab and OxyContin, and they are sold 
on the streets for $5, $10, $15, $25 a pop, at parties where 
your teenagers are going. They are buying these pills and they 
are dying.
    So I encourage all of my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle to engage honestly about what is happening in America 
today. I very much look forward to hearing from our law 
enforcement professionals today.
    Madam Chair, I yield.
    Chairwoman Barragan. I want to thank the Ranking Member. 
Members are reminded that the subcommittee will operate 
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and the 
Ranking Member in their February 3, 2021, colloquy.
    Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be 
permitted to sit and question the witnesses. Additional 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
    Good afternoon and thank you to Chairwoman Barragan for holding 
this important hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's efforts 
to combat the opioid epidemic.
    According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, there were 
91,799 drug-involved overdose deaths reported in America in 2020. 
Opioids are the main cause of drug overdose deaths, with a 6-fold 
increase from 2015 to 2020. In my home State of Mississippi, 440 people 
tragically lost their lives to drug overdoses in 2020. And deaths from 
overdoses have only increased during the pandemic. Opioids pose a 
devastating threat to communities across the country.
    For its part, DHS is working with Federal, State, local, and 
international partners to prevent dangerous drugs from crossing our 
borders. We know that the overwhelming majority of hard drugs such as 
fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine enter our Nation through ports of 
entry, usually concealed in commercial traffic or passenger vehicles. 
CBP officers at ports of entry use Non-Intrusive Inspection systems to 
scan travelers, vehicles, cargo, and packages for contraband. While the 
Department's goal is a 100 percent scan rate, less than 2 percent of 
private vehicles and 15 percent of commercial vehicles are currently 
screened for narcotics at the Southwest Border. We need to keep working 
to increase these scan rates and improve interdiction efforts across 
ports of entry and in our mail facilities. We also need to thwart the 
transnational criminal organizations responsible for smuggling drugs 
into our communities. We need to stop these drugs from ever reaching 
our borders, in addition to seizing the drugs that do make it to our 
borders.
    I will continue to work with the Department to ensure it has the 
personnel and resources it needs to tackle this epidemic head-on. 
However, we must also recognize that this is just one part of the 
solution. Law enforcement and border security, while very important, 
will not be enough. We must also tackle this crisis with treatment and 
recovery options to restore people's health and break the devastating 
cycles of addiction. This must be a robust whole-of-Government 
operation. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on their 
operations, successes, and challenges in preventing drugs from reaching 
our communities. I also welcome any suggestions they have on how we can 
further reduce the flow of narcotics into American communities.

    Chairwoman Barragan. Not seeing the Chairman of the full 
committee, we will move on. I don't see the Ranking Member of 
the full committee. Now I would like to welcome our panel of 
witnesses.
    Mr. Brian Sulc is the executive director of the 
Transnational Organized Crime Mission Center at DHS's Office of 
Intelligence & Analysis. Mr. Pete Flores is the executive 
assistant commissioner of CBP's Office of Field Operations. Mr. 
Steve Cagan is the assistant director for Countering 
Transnational Organized Crime at ICE Homeland Security 
Investigations.
    Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be 
inserted into the record.
    I will now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 
5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Sulc.

  STATEMENT OF BRIAN SULC, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL 
   ORGANIZED CRIME MISSION CENTER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & 
         ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Sulc. Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Border Security, 
Facilitation, and Operations, thank you for the opportunity to 
discuss the growing opioid epidemic from the perspective of the 
DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis. I am honored to 
represent the dedicated intelligence professionals at I&A who 
work to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.
    First I would like to provide contextual information of the 
illicit fentanyl supply chain. It is cheaper, faster, and more 
resilient than plant-based illicit drugs such as heroin. 
Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations, mainly the Sinaloa 
and Jalisco New Generation Cartels are leading manufacturers 
and smugglers of fentanyl to the United States. These cartels 
import precursor chemicals into Mexico, mostly from China and 
to a lesser extent India. Suppliers adapt to enforcement 
pressure or legal restrictions by adjusting, advertising, or 
changing chemical structures that fall outside of existing drug 
controls. Dual-use chemicals used in synthetic drugs also 
present additional precursor detection challenges as many have 
a legitimate use.
    After obtaining precursors, fentanyl production involves 
three stages: Laboratory synthesis, pill-pressing operations, 
and staging for cross-border smuggling. Once fentanyl is 
synthesized, a single pill-pressing operation in Mexico can 
produce up to 150,000 tablets a day. Pills are then staged in 
stash houses along Mexico's Northern Border. Mexico-based drug 
traffickers primarily use personally-owned and commercial 
vehicles to smuggle fentanyl into the United States through 
land border ports of entry. CBP will later address this in more 
detail.
    Once in the country, the DTOs or their affiliates 
distribute synthetic drugs to a large distribution hub such as 
Los Angeles, Chicago, Atlanta, and New York. Fentanyl networks 
are among the world's first digital native drug networks. 
Direct-to-consumer transactions use social media to expand upon 
the more traditional distribution onward to local hubs.
    This e-commerce model also enables illicit actors to react 
rapidly to enforcement detection and reach an even broader 
customer base.
    We see fentanyl in two predominate forms: Fake prescription 
pills and laced into hard drugs. Drug traffickers disguise 
fentanyl pills to look like prescription drugs such as the 
commonly known OxyContin, Percocet, Vicodin, Xanax, or 
stimulants like Adderall. The adulteration of fentanyl into 
hard drugs such as heroin and cocaine continue to be a rising 
concern as well. Illicit actors are likely adulterating these 
drugs to increase their potency and addictive properties to 
grow market demand.
    Since 2018 synthetic drugs such as fentanyl are the leading 
drivers of most drug-induced overdose deaths reported in the 
U.S. Provisional data from CDC's National Center for Health 
Statistics predicted almost 107,000 overall drug overdose 
deaths in the United States for 12 months ending in November 
2021, and they appear to have hit the mark. Synthetic drugs 
attributed to 75 percent of those overdose deaths.
    With this understanding of the illicit fentanyl landscape, 
what are we doing about it? Our primary emphasis is 
collaboration. As an intelligence agency I&A is working the DHS 
intelligence enterprise and the intelligence community to 
collect, research, and analyze information on transnational 
criminal organizations. Our assessments informed decision 
making and operational planning across DHS, Federal agencies, 
and State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners to combat 
transnational criminal organizations.
    The I&A Transnational Organized Crime Mission Center 
produces intelligence for maximum utility across law 
enforcement and at all levels and the intelligence community. 
In terms of fentanyl specifically, I&A remains forward-leaning 
by challenging our historical understanding of drug flow.
    We strive to embrace alternative analysis because fentanyl 
is like any other traditional drug threat. We assess 
transnational organized criminal activity holistically to 
include other associated crimes and to seek, deter, disrupt, 
and dismantle the networks responsible for this opioid 
epidemic.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today to discuss this critical threat. We remain committed to 
keep the homeland safe, secure, resilient by safeguarding the 
Nation from terrorists, criminal, and other threat actors.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sulc follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Brian Sulc
                        Wednesday, May 18, 2022
    Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee on Border Security Facilitation, & 
Operations. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to 
discuss threats emanating from the smuggling of opioids. It is an honor 
to be here representing the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and the dedicated 
intelligence professionals that keep the Homeland safe, secure, and 
resilient.
                      smuggling of illicit opioids
    The lethal drug overdose crisis in the United States, fueled by 
foreign drug trafficking organizations, continues at epidemic 
proportions while yielding transnational criminal organizations (TCO) 
billions of dollars in illicit proceeds. Foreign traffickers supply 
U.S.-based gangs with drugs for retail-level distribution and sales, 
potentially contributing to heightened levels of criminal violence in 
some areas of the country. They are selling fentanyl to users that is 
mixed with other controlled substances and in the form of counterfeit 
prescription pills to drive addiction and increase repeat customers 
through dependency. Reports from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conclude 
that a majority of drug overdose fatalities involve highly addictive 
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids.
    We have learned in our fight against the opioid epidemic that 
fentanyl production is cheaper, faster, and more lucrative than plant-
based illicit drugs such as heroin. Mexico-based drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs), principally the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco New 
Generation Cartel, are leading manufacturers and smugglers of fentanyl 
to the United States. These cartels import precursor chemicals into 
Mexico mostly from China and, to a lesser but increasing extent, from 
India. Suppliers quickly adapt to enforcement pressure or legal 
restrictions by adjusting advertising techniques or changing chemical 
structures that mimic the desired effect and fall outside of existing 
drug controls. Dual-use chemicals used in synthetic drugs also present 
additional precursor detection challenges as many have a legitimate 
use.
    Mexico-based DTOs continue to expand their chemical expertise, 
strengthening their adaptability for making synthetic drugs and 
increasing their profit margin by controlling more of the supply chain. 
After obtaining precursors, fentanyl production involves three stages: 
Laboratory synthesis, pill-pressing operations, and staging for cross-
border smuggling. Mexico-based DTOs prefer producing finished fentanyl 
in Mexico to mitigate the risks associated with transporting equipment 
and precursor chemicals. Once fentanyl is synthesized, a single pill-
pressing operation in Mexico can produce up to 150,000 tablets a day, 
worth about $90,000 in Sinaloa or up to $2 billion in U.S. street 
value. Pills are then staged in stash houses along Mexico's northern 
border.
    Mexico-based DTOs primarily use both personally owned and 
commercial vehicles to smuggle fentanyl into the United States through 
land border ports of entry. Once in the country, the DTOs or their 
affiliates distribute synthetic drugs via northbound and eastbound 
highways to large distribution hubs such as Los Angeles, Chicago, 
Atlanta, and New York. Fentanyl networks are among the world's first 
digital-native drug networks. Direct-to-consumer transactions use 
social media to expand upon more traditional drug distribution on-ward 
to local hubs. This e-commerce model also enables illicit actors to 
react rapidly to enforcement detection and reach a broader customer 
base, including juveniles.
    DTOs have disguised fentanyl pills to look like prescription 
opioids such as oxycodone (Oxycontin, Percocet), hydrocodone (Vicodin), 
benzodiazepines such as alprazolam (Xanax), or stimulants like 
amphetamines (Adderall). Mass production and false marketing of these 
counterfeit pills deceive customers and exacerbate the harm to public 
health. In addition to illicit prescription pills, fentanyl is also 
seen laced with other commonly-abused drugs such as marijuana, heroin, 
and cocaine. Illicit actors are likely adulterating these drugs to 
increase their potency and addictive properties to grow market demand.
    Since 2018, synthetic drugs such as fentanyl are the leading 
drivers of most drug-related overdose deaths reported in the United 
States. Provisional data from CDC's National Center for Health 
Statistics predicted 106,854 overall drug overdose deaths in the United 
States for 12 months ending in November 2021. Synthetic opioids 
accounted for 70,420, or 66 percent, of the overdose deaths in the 
United States during the same period. Fentanyl's wide-spread 
availability leads to more overdoses of greater severity, as its 
amplified potency diminishes revival response. Law enforcement and 
public health professionals report the need for multiple delivery 
treatments of naloxone (Narcan) when responding to an overdose incident 
involving fentanyl.
                              i&a actions
    The administration's National Drug Control Strategy focuses on two 
big drivers of the opioid epidemic untreated addiction--public health 
and domestic policies to reduce demand and save lives--and drug 
trafficking--on disrupting the DTOs. The catastrophic effects of 
fentanyl and other synthetic opioids on society are clear, but a 
commodity-centric approach is insufficient. All nationally-significant 
smugglers of fentanyl also deal in other illicit drugs and commit other 
forms of organized crime to enable their illicit drug supply. To combat 
this threat holistically, the strategy seeks to deter, disrupt, and 
dismantle the TCO networks responsible. As intelligence providers, I&A, 
the DHS intelligence enterprise, and the intelligence community all 
collect, research, and analyze information to produce assessments of 
TCOs that inform decision making and operational planning across DHS, 
Federal agencies, and State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
partners in support of their actions to combat TCOs.
    The I&A Transnational Organized Crime Mission Center (TOCMC) 
produces intelligence on drug trafficking, human smuggling, irregular 
migration, and other issues to strengthen engagement between U.S. 
officials and foreign partners. Specific to drug trafficking threats, 
our analysis is aimed at identifying key TCO leadership figures, 
organizational networks, logistical supply chains, smuggling routes, 
and the effects of corruption that stand in the way of dismantling 
these organized crime groups. Analytic products from TOCMC draw upon 
National-level reporting from the intelligence community fused with 
DHS-unique data from components as well as information from our law 
enforcement partners across all levels of government. Finished 
intelligence products related to TCOs are written for the widest 
possible dissemination to our Federal and SLTT partners.
    Mexican TCOs supply U.S.-based criminal gangs with drugs for on-
ward distribution and retail-level sales, which potentially contributes 
to heightened criminal violence in some areas of the country. Because 
these networks reach across the border and into our communities, we 
combine robust partnerships with our law enforcement partners and other 
homeland security partners with DHS and IC data and information to 
provide a more complete picture of the TCO threat to the homeland.
    I&A seeks front-line information on gangs, other groups, or 
individuals inside the United States who are involved in drug 
trafficking on behalf of TCOs and on how TCOs establish relationships 
with U.S. gangs on drug activities. I&A plays a critical role in fusing 
information received from our law enforcement and private-sector 
partners with intelligence community holdings. I&A outreach to our SLTT 
and private-sector partners helps them recognize the value of 
information that they discover incidental to their normal operations 
for collection and dissemination in intelligence reporting channels, 
while ensuring that proper intelligence oversight safeguards are 
observed to protect privacy and civil liberties. I&A's unique and 
growing partnership with SLTT counterparts reflects enormous potential 
to strengthen our Nation's fight against TCOs and the drug crisis.
    I&A also maintains a robust partnership with law enforcement 
stakeholders to understand both National and local impacts of TCO 
operations and to inform and guide our efforts to counter TCOs through 
integrated information sharing and operations with our State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners and other Federal agencies, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High-
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program. I&A's deployed intelligence 
personnel work closely with DHS components, State and major urban area 
fusion centers, and other law enforcement agencies to gather, analyze, 
and report information that is uniquely available from these partners. 
These insights help shape our understanding of the TCO activities in 
the United States. I&A also broadly facilitates the sharing of products 
and threat information between these partners using our Homeland 
Security Information Network and other dissemination methods. 
Furthermore, I&A is part of a DHS-wide CTOC enterprise that includes 
collaboration with ICE, CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, S&T, PLCY, among others. 
This enterprise leverages unique authorities and capabilities to the 
aforementioned components to create powerful synergies.
                               conclusion
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today to 
discuss this critical threat and for your continued support of I&A. We 
remain committed to keeping the homeland safe, secure, and resilient by 
safeguarding the Nation from terrorist, criminal, and other threat 
actors and we will continue our efforts at home and abroad to uphold 
the National security and public safety of the United States.

    Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Sulc, for your 
testimony. I now recognize Mr. Flores to summarize his 
statement for 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF PETE FLORES, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, 
 OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, 
              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Flores. Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, 
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to appear here today to discuss U.S. Customs & 
Border Protection's efforts to combat the illicit flow of drugs 
into the United States.
    CBP held its annual valor memorial last week. This year 37 
names were added to that monument, the names of 37 CBP officers 
and agents who gave their lives carrying out CBP's important 
mission. I am proud to represent the brave women--brave and 
dedicated men and women of CBP who work tirelessly every day in 
often dangerous and difficult conditions to protect our border, 
our homeland, and our community.
    Today I would like to first highlight CBP's seizures and 
trends in the border environment and then discuss CBP's multi-
layered enforcement approach to countering the drug threat.
    As you are aware, the reach and influence of transnational 
criminal organizations, or TCOs, continues to expand across our 
borders. TCOs increasingly demonstrate the ability to 
manufacture sophisticated synthetic opioids and analogs that 
are difficult to detect and identify. They also continuously 
adjust operations, including shifting to drugs like synthetic 
opioids that can be concealed and transported in smaller 
quantities, to circumvent detection, interdiction by law 
enforcement.
    In fiscal year 2021 CBP seized more than 450 tons of 
illegal drugs, the majority being marijuana, but also cocaine, 
fentanyl, and methamphetamines. Nation-wide CBP seizures of 
fentanyl have increased sharply. In fiscal year 2021 CBP seized 
more than 11,000 pounds of fentanyl, more than double the 
weight seized in fiscal year 2020, and about 4 times as much as 
in fiscal year 2019.
    Most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the United 
States through the Southwest Border ports of entry. They are 
brought in by privately-owned vehicles, commercial vehicles, 
and even pedestrians. Although much less frequent now, fentanyl 
and other synthetic opioids are also encountered in the 
international mail and express consignment carrier shipments. 
Most illicit fentanyl is synthesized in Mexico.
    We use an aggressive strategic enforcement approach that 
leverages advanced information, analytics, and intelligence, 
sophisticated detection, and scientific laboratory 
capabilities, and strong partnerships to combat cross-border 
flow of drugs. CBP's National Targeting Center, or NTC, uses 
advanced data along with law enforcement and intelligence 
records to identify suspect, high-risk shipments, cargo, and 
travelers before they reach our borders. NTC also uses 
predictive analysis, focused on providing timely and actionable 
information to our partners and our front-line officers and 
agents. In the international mail and express consignment 
environments CBP obtains electronic shipping information 
providing valuable insight into inbound parcels.
    All CBP operation environments have sophisticated detection 
technology, including nonintrusive inspection systems, commonly 
called NII, that reliably and quickly detect the presence of 
suspect illegal narcotics within shipments, passenger 
belongings, cargo containers, commercial trucks, rail cars, and 
privately-owned vehicles.
    K-9 operations also provide invaluable detection 
capabilities. The CBP K-9 Training Program maintains the 
largest and most diverse law enforcement K-9 training program 
in the country. Furthermore, all office and field operations 
concealed human and narcotic K-9 teams have completed training 
to include the odor of fentanyl and fentanyl analogs.
    CBP's enforcement approach not only focuses on efficient 
detection of suspected illicit drugs but also prioritizes swift 
identification of substances. In the field CBP officers use 
various field testing devices to rapidly screen suspected 
controlled substances. On-site CBP laboratories and scientists, 
as well as a 24/7 forensic reach-back center enables CBP 
officers to submit data electronically to CBP's scientists for 
identification.
    All CBP seizure information and laboratory identification 
data are provided to NTC and our Federal investigative 
partners. It is a collaborative approach that leads to 
investigations, prosecutions, and dismantling of TCO networks 
and operations.
    Our partners are critical. We work closely with our Federal 
partners as well as State, local, Tribal, international 
partners to share information, collaborate in joint enforcement 
operations to identify, target, and disrupt illicit and drug 
activity. As the threat of illicit drugs persists in our 
communities across the United States, CBP will continue to 
prioritize and dedicate resources to counter TCOs to disrupt 
the flow of illicit drugs across our borders.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Flores follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Pete Flores
                              May 18, 2022
                              introduction
    Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to 
combat the flow of illicit drugs, including synthetic drugs like 
methamphetamine and fentanyl, into communities across the United 
States.
    The reach and influence of Transnational Criminal Organizations 
(TCOs) continues to expand across and beyond the Southwest Border. 
TCOs, such as Mexican cartels, increasingly demonstrate the ability to 
produce synthetic drugs and their analogues that are difficult to 
detect and identify. They also continually adjust their operations to 
circumvent detection and interdiction by law enforcement by shifting to 
drugs that can be transported in small quantities and improving 
fabrication and concealment techniques.
    CBP recognizes the significant impact opioids and other illicit 
drugs have on our local communities. We work with our Federal, State, 
local, Tribal, and international partners daily to identify and disrupt 
TCOs and stem the flow of illegal narcotics. We dedicate significant 
resources and capabilities to the whole-of-Government effort to thwart 
the illicit drug supply chain and those networks promoting it.
    CBP's efforts to combat the flow of illicit drugs are guided by the 
CBP Strategy to Combat Opioids \1\ and implemented through a multi-
faceted approach that includes collaboration and enhanced intelligence 
sharing with other agencies and foreign partners, advanced laboratory 
capabilities, specialized canines, non-intrusive inspection technology, 
and dedicated, highly-trained law enforcement personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-
Mar/CBP-Opioid-Strategy-508.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our strategy and enforcement approach enables the agency to nimbly 
shift resources and swiftly respond to emerging threats, such as the 
deadly threat posed by fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, other synthetic 
opioids, methamphetamine, and precursor and other chemicals used in 
illicit drug production.
                        trends and interdictions
    CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) works in tandem with the 
U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) to combat 
the flow of illicit narcotics across the border. CBP officers screen 
all foreign visitors and returning U.S. citizens and inspect 
conveyances and cargo that enters the United States at 328 sea, air, 
and land ports of entry (POEs). Between the POEs, USBP and AMO agents 
detect, interdict, and prevent the unlawful movement of people, illegal 
drugs, and other contraband toward or across our borders.
    On a typical day,\2\ CBP seizes approximately 5,000 pounds of 
illegal drugs that would otherwise make their way into American 
communities. Since October 1, 2021, CBP has seized nearly 340,000 
pounds of illegal drugs Nation-wide.\3\ Marijuana, methamphetamine, 
heroin, and cocaine remain top-seized drugs by weight, but shifting 
trends over recent years produced significant increases in synthetic 
drugs like fentanyl, a synthetic opioid analgesic that is 80-100 times 
stronger than morphine. Fentanyl is the most frequently-seized illicit 
synthetic opioid, but CBP observed fentanyl and 29 of its analogues, as 
well as 50 unique synthetic opioids that are not from the fentanyl 
class.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/typical-day-fy2021.
    \3\ As of March 31, 2022, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-
seizure-statistics.
    \4\ A complete list can be made available by CBP Laboratories and 
Scientific Services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the past several years, the weight of CBP seizures of 
fentanyl has increased sharply. In fiscal year 2021, CBP seized 11,201 
pounds of fentanyl, more than twice the 4,791 pounds seized in fiscal 
year 2020 and approximately four times as much as fiscal year 2019 
(2,804 pounds). In fiscal year 2022, since October 1, 2021, CBP has 
seized 5,310 pounds of fentanyl Nation-wide.\5\ CBP estimates we 
interdicted 1.2 billion potential doses of fentanyl in fiscal year 2020 
and 2.6 billion potential doses of fentanyl in fiscal year 2021. By the 
measure of potential doses, CBP fentanyl seizures were only second to 
methamphetamine, of which an estimated 16 billion doses in fiscal year 
2020 and 17 billion doses in fiscal year 2021 were seized. For 
reference, Earth's population is approximately 7.9 billion people.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ As of March 31, 2022, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-
seizure-statistics.
    \6\ CBP would be happy to brief the subcommittee on its illicit 
drug dose estimation tool and how it derived at these estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the United States 
through our Southwest Border POEs. They are brought in by privately-
owned vehicles, commercial vehicles, and even pedestrians. Although 
less frequent, fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are also 
encountered in international mail facility (IMF) and express 
consignment carrier (ECC) environments. Fentanyl shipments largely 
originate, and are likely synthesized, in Mexico and are often 
concealed within larger shipments of other commodities. Illicit 
fentanyl can also be purchased from on-line sellers and then shipped 
via international mail packages or ECCs.
    The shift in the illicit drug market toward primarily fentanyl, its 
analogues, and other synthetic opioids, led CBP to develop and 
implement the CBP Strategy to Combat Opioids.\7\ CBP's enforcement 
efforts are guided by the Strategy's four key objectives that focus on 
ensuring CBP can quickly anticipate and adapt to changing tactics and 
techniques used by cartels, traffickers, smugglers, and their networks; 
enhance collaboration among key partners; produce actionable 
intelligence to target the illicit opioid supply chain; and protect CBP 
personnel from exposure to opioids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ https://www.cbp.gov/document/publications/cbp-opioid-strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 collaboration and information sharing
    Shifting trends and sophisticated TCO tactics mean that now, more 
than ever, efforts to counter TCO activity require coordination and 
cooperation across the law enforcement community. CBP works extensively 
with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners to 
address drug trafficking and other transnational threats at POEs, and 
in the mail and express consignment environments, along our land 
borders and coastal approaches.
    CBP works closely with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's 
Homeland Security Investigations (ICE HSI) and Department of Justice's 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DOJ DEA) to facilitate all available 
investigative actions regarding CBP seizures. For seizures that do not 
meet a Federal threshold, intelligence and information derived from 
these seizures are provided to local, State, and regional task forces 
for situational awareness and further investigative actions.
    Key partners, including ICE, DEA, the United States Postal 
Inspection Service (USPIS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
alongside other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international 
partners, regularly share information from the headquarters level down 
to local POEs and coordinate investigative and enforcement actions.
    CBP regularly hosts briefings with Federal, State, local, and 
Tribal partners regarding the current state of the border, providing a 
cross-component, multi-agency venue for discussing trends and threats. 
Engagements focus on interdictions and arrests at the border and 
interior areas within United States. These briefings also include 
participants from the governments of Canada and Mexico.
    CBP also participates in joint operations and multi-agency 
enforcement teams, composed of representatives from international and 
Federal law enforcement agencies. Working together with State, local, 
and Tribal agencies, these operations target drug and transnational 
criminal activity, and often contribute to investigations involving 
National security and organized crime.
                   advance information and targeting
    Advance electronic shipping information, actionable intelligence, 
and information-sharing partnerships are critical components of CBP's 
ability to quickly identify, target, and deter the entry of dangerous 
illicit drugs in all operational environments.
    Authorities and mechanisms that enable CBP to obtain advance 
electronic shipping information is a critical element of CBP's ability 
to identify shipments that are potentially at a higher risk of 
containing contraband. Under section 343 of the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. 
L. No. 107-210), as amended, and under the Security and Accountability 
for Every Port Act or SAFE Port Act of 2006, (Pub. L. No. 109-347), CBP 
has the legal authority to collect key cargo data elements provided by 
air, sea, and land commercial transport companies (carriers), including 
ECCs and importers.\8\ This information is automatically fed into CBP's 
Automated Targeting System (ATS), a secure intranet-based enforcement 
and decision support system that compares cargo and conveyance 
information against intelligence and other enforcement data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Under TSA regulations, international mail destined for the 
United States is subject to security controls. These security controls, 
which include screening for unauthorized explosive, incendiary, and 
other destructive substances or items in accordance with TSA 
regulations and security program requirements, are applied to 
international mail prior to transporting on aircraft at Last Point of 
Departure locations to the United States. 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) states: 
``The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for 
the screening of all passengers and property, including United States 
mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that 
will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft.'' Under 49 C.F.R. 1540.5, 
``Cargo means property tendered for air transportation accounted for on 
an air waybill. All accompanied commercial courier consignments whether 
or not accounted for on an air waybill, are classified as cargo. 
Aircraft operator security programs further define the term `cargo.' 
These requirements are not dependent on advance electronic manifest 
data, as provided by ECC operators and other participants in the Air 
Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot program.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), advance data and access 
to law enforcement and intelligence records converge to facilitate the 
targeting of travelers and items of cargo that pose the highest risk to 
our security in all modes of inbound transportation. The NTC takes in 
large amounts of data and uses sophisticated targeting tools and 
subject-matter expertise to analyze, assess, and segment risk at every 
stage in cargo movement and travel life cycles. As the focal point of 
that strategy, the NTC leverages classified, law enforcement, 
commercial, and open-source information in unique, proactive ways to 
identify high-risk travelers and shipments at the earliest possible 
point prior to arrival in the United States.
    CBP's analytical methodology centers on providing timely and 
actionable intelligence to our front-line officers and agents, decision 
makers, and partners. To strengthen our intelligence posture in 
responding to the complex border threat environment, CBP's Intelligence 
Enterprise (IE) was established in 2017 as a cohesive, threat-based, 
data-driven, and operationally focused effort to leverage the 
collective intelligence capabilities and expertise across CBP's 
operational components, including OFO, USBP, AMO, and the Office of 
Trade. To enhance its intelligence capacity, CBP IE established 
investment priorities that support a whole-of-agency approach to 
countering various border threats, such as the use of a common 
reporting platform to timely share and disseminate threat information 
to disparate offices. CBP's IE was also responsible for launching CBP 
Watch, a situational awareness facility that provides trend analysis 
and real-time feedback to better support agency operational front lines 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
    Investigative case data is fused with CBP targeting information to 
strengthen investigations targeting fentanyl smuggling and trafficking 
organizations and enable timely law enforcement actions. The NTC works 
in close coordination with several pertinent task forces including 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, the High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Areas, and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South and West, 
as well as DHS Joint Task Forces.
    In the postal environment, recent bilateral agreements regarding 
Advance Electronic Data (AED) between the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) 
and foreign postal operators have increased CBP's ability to target 
high-risk shipments. Additionally, the Synthetics Trafficking and 
Overdose Prevention (STOP) Act requires that DHS prescribe regulations 
requiring the USPS to transmit advance electronic information for 
international mail to CBP consistent with the statute. Currently, USPS 
provides AED from more than 129 foreign postal services, and CBP 
utilizes the AED to actively target international mail shipments at 7 
IMFs.
Targeting Precursors
    Many of the precursor chemicals used to synthesize synthetic 
illicit opioids such as fentanyl and methamphetamine are non-regulated 
currently, and many have legitimate uses. CBP has sufficient authority 
to seize precursors if they can be identified as having illicit end-use 
intentions, including the production of illicit drugs. We target 
precursor chemicals shipped through the United States to destinations 
in Mexico and other countries. When these shipments are identified 
through interagency collaboration as having illicit end-use intentions, 
the shipments are offloaded for further inspection and enforcement 
actions.
    In addition to targeting illicit substances directly, CBP also 
targets related equipment such as pill presses and tableting machines. 
The DEA regulates pill press/tableting machines and ICE's Diversion 
Coordinator works on behalf of DHS and coordinates with DEA to oversee 
the investigations of pill press/tablet machine imports being diverted 
for illicit uses. The Diversion Coordinator works closely with the NTC 
to identify and target individuals importing and diverting pill press/
tablet machines to produce illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs.
Pollen Analysis
    One capability CBP is using to close intelligence gaps related to 
the illicit opioid supply chain is palynology, more commonly referred 
to as pollen analysis. Pollen analysis is conducted by CBP's 
Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) scientists on illicit 
narcotic shipments seized at the border. Pollen testing is used to 
geolocate illicit opioid shipments, which may be used to identify 
transit routes of illicit opioids.
    LSS palynologists can analyze approximately 1 kg of seized material 
through a process that dissolves the powder and other residues leaving 
pollen and spores. Through a microscopic examination, LSS palynologists 
identify the pollen compilation from the sample and can quickly 
determine a broad origin or a more regionalized location of origin.
    During the last several years, the LSS pollen program has, through 
the analysis described above, made geolocation identifications for 
several fentanyl seizures that likely originated in China. These 
seizures contained pollen types that are only associated with specific 
areas in mainland China--to the exclusion of most other areas. Based on 
the pollen analysis results, CBP develops intelligence products and 
shares those products with relevant partners.
                       detection and interdiction
    CBP, with the support of Congress, continues to make significant 
investments and improvements in our drug detection and interdiction 
technology. Our officers and agents utilize a variety of technologies 
and narcotic detection canines to detect the presence of illicit drugs, 
including illicit opioids, in all operating environments.
Non-Intrusive Inspection
    CBP utilizes over 350 large-scale and 4,500 small-scale Non-
Intrusive Inspection (NII) X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to 
detect the presence of illicit substances, including synthetic drugs, 
hidden within passenger belongings, cargo containers, commercial 
trucks, rail cars, privately-owned vehicles, as well as ECC and 
international mail parcels. In fiscal year 2021, CBP performed 
approximately 17.5 million NII examinations, which resulted in the 
interdiction of more than 220,000 pounds of narcotics. Approximately 90 
percent of NII-attributable seizures resulted from scanning less than 2 
percent of primary passenger vehicles and 15 percent of fixed occupant 
commercial vehicles crossing the Southwest Border. Beginning in fiscal 
year 2023, CBP expects to increase NII scans of these vehicles as much 
as 40 percent and greater than 70 percent respectively.
    Currently, large-scale NII systems are primarily deployed in 
secondary inspection operations at POEs to examine targeted 
conveyances; however, CBP continues to focus on further closing the 
limited vehicle scanning capacity gap and have prioritized the need for 
drive-through NII operational concepts that will help streamline the 
vehicle inspection process and increase scanning rates, thereby 
increasing the probability of interdiction. With funding provided by 
Congress, CBP made progress toward implementing new drive-through NII 
systems, located in pre-primary inspection versus secondary, that would 
transmit the image to an officer remotely located in a command center. 
This work builds upon prior automation and transformation initiatives, 
leveraging advancements made to scanning and imagery analysis 
capabilities. Overall, this approach will increase security and 
facilitation across our Nation's borders.
Canines
    Canine operations are an invaluable component of counternarcotic 
operations. With 17 additional teams in fiscal year 2022, the CBP 
Canine Training Program maintains the largest and most diverse law 
enforcement canine training program in the country. CBP officers 
utilize specially trained canines for the interdiction of narcotics, 
firearms, and undeclared currency, as well as in support of specialized 
programs aimed at combating terrorism and countering human trafficking.
    Use of canines in the detection of narcotics is a team effort. 
CBP's LSS produces canine training aids and provides analytical support 
to the CBP Canine Training Program, including controlled substance 
purity determinations, training aid quality analyses, and research on 
delivery mechanisms that maximize safe vapor delivery during training 
exercises. Today, all OFO Concealed Human and Narcotic Detection canine 
teams have completed training to include the odor of fentanyl and 
fentanyl analogues.
Laboratory Testing
    Shifting methods of smuggling and the increasing sophistication of 
ready-to-use forms of synthetic drugs coming across the border means 
that the identification of suspect substances has become more 
difficult. However, when it comes to disrupting illicit supply chains 
and stopping the flow of illicit drugs crossing the border, timing is 
everything.
    For suspect substances encountered at the international mail and at 
ECC facilities, CBP officers use various field-testing devices to 
rapidly screen suspected controlled substances and obtain presumptive 
results. CBP officers can transmit sample data to the LSS Teleforensic 
Center's 24/7 Narcotics Reachback for scientific interpretation and 
identification. When controlled substances are presumptively identified 
by the Reachback program, the NTC and our liaisons at the DEA are 
notified. CBP is working to expand the field-testing program, along 
with scientific assets and personnel who can provide real-time 
presumptive analysis of suspect substances.
    Building on the success of the Reachback program, for the past 3 
years, CBP has increased its ability to swiftly identify suspected 
drugs by positioning agency laboratory scientists on-site at IMFs, 
ECCs, and POEs in forward operating labs (FOLs). This effort, which 
started as a special operation at IMF and ECC locations, has expanded 
and proven to be not only a valuable part of CBP's ability to identify 
and seize controlled substances, but also a critical tool for partner 
investigative agencies such as Homeland Security Investigations to make 
law enforcement-controlled deliveries that could potentially lead to 
arrests, shutting down criminal networks.
    The on-site labs provide multiple benefits, including helping CBP 
identify trends. For example, starting in October 2020, the FOLs began 
seeing an increased amount of dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a 
hallucinogenic drug smuggled into the United States. Another trend that 
the FOLs recently discovered is a particular fentanyl analogue coming 
across the Southwest Border increasingly in tablet form. Many of CBP's 
FOLs are along the Southwest Border, but also in locations such as 
Chicago, Miami, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Puerto Rico.
    With the 24/7 Narcotics Reachback and the FOLs positioned at 
strategic locations where new or emerging substances enter the United 
States, LSS can triage quickly if a potentially new analogue of an 
illicit substance or designer drug is being encountered. These 
presumptively identified new substances are sent to the LSS INTERDICT 
Science Center for comprehensive testing. These newly-encountered 
substances, particularly synthetic opioids or other significant 
chemicals of interest, get added to the user libraries of the hand-held 
field-testing devices used by CBP officers and agents to rapidly screen 
suspected substances. Since January 2022, 154 new spectra have been 
added to the equipment's factory library. Since the start of the 
designer drug wave in 2009, LSS has identified over 540 new substances.
    On a monthly basis, LSS aggregates its suspected controlled 
analysis results and creates a report for its stakeholders to inform of 
trends along with new substances discovered. These stakeholders include 
internal CBP officers and agents, supervisors, intelligence analysts, 
and policy makers and external partners at Federal, State, local, and 
international organizations. As America's first line of defense for new 
and emerging drugs, CBP can provide advanced notice on seizure trends 
enabling partners to prepare for a potential threat to their 
communities.
                    protecting front-line personnel
    Contact with potentially hazardous substances, especially illicit 
synthetic opioids, is a very real health and safety risk to law 
enforcement personnel and canines. At first glance, it could easily be 
mistaken for other drugs that appear as white powders, such as cocaine 
or heroin. Due to the risk of unintentional exposure and subsequent 
hazardous drug absorption and/or inhalation, the confirmatory testing 
for the presence of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl and its 
analogues is best executed in a laboratory by trained scientists and 
technicians.
    In addition, CBP deployed the presumptive testing glove box to the 
field to aid in the safe testing and identification of opioids and 
other dangerous drugs. The sampling glove box is designed for use in 
the field as the first level of protection when inspecting, probing, 
and conducting presumptive testing of high-risk or unknown substances.
                               conclusion
    As the drug epidemic devastates communities and families across the 
Nation, CBP continues to prioritize its resources to thwart illicit 
drug supply chains and networks. Together, CBP and its partners are 
focused on enhancing collaboration and information sharing to reduce 
the amounts of illicit opioids that cross our land, sea, and air 
borders.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 
your questions.

    Mr. Green [presiding]. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. 
Flores. I now recognize Mr. Cagan to summarize his statement 
for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN W. CAGAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR COUNTERING 
       TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME, HOMELAND SECURITY 
 INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. 
                DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Cagan. Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and 
distinguished Members of the House Subcommittee on Border 
Security, Facilitation, and Operations, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you and discuss Homeland Security 
Investigation's efforts to combat opioid smuggling.
    As a principal investigative component of the Department of 
Homeland Security, HSI is responsible for investigating and 
dismantling transnational criminal organizations flooding the 
United States with drugs, fueling the overdose epidemic. To do 
this HSI conducts Federal criminal investigations at every 
critical location in the illicit supply chain: Internationally, 
where TCOs operate and manufacture illegal drugs; at our 
Nation's physical borders, where smugglers attempt to exploit 
America's legitimate trade, travel, and finance; in our 
communities, where criminal organizations earn substantial 
profits from selling poison to our friends, neighbors, and 
family members.
    HSI's counter-drug efforts begin abroad. HSI has the 
largest investigative--international investigative presence 
within DHS, comprised of hundreds of special agents 
strategically assigned to 86 offices in 54 countries. This 
includes offices located in Mexico where the vast majority of 
fentanyl is produced, and throughout the Asia Pacific region 
where precursor chemicals originate. The effectiveness of our 
international counter-narcotics efforts is greatly enhanced by 
HSI's Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, or TCIUs.
    TCIUs are composed of foreign, vetted law enforcement 
officials and prosecutors who lead some of HSI's most 
significant extraterritorial investigations and prosecutions 
targeting TCOs. HSI has established 12 TCOs around the world. 
Disrupting and dismantling the fentanyl and methamphetamine 
precursor chemical supply chain is an integral element to HSI's 
approach to stopping the flow of illicit drugs.
    These precursors serve as oxygen the cartels need to 
manufacture their poison destined for America's cities and 
streets. To date HSI's efforts have resulted in the seizure of 
633,000 kilograms of precursor chemicals destined for Mexican 
cartels. Many of these enforcement efforts are led by HSI's 
TCIU in Mexico, where in addition to seizing precursor chemical 
shipments, they also lead investigations targeting the labs 
where the chemicals are synthesized into illegal drugs.
    Mexican cartels operate on an industrial scale when 
procuring precursor chemicals from abroad. The interdiction of 
these shipments has a profound effect on the volume of drugs 
reaching our country. A seizure of a single kilogram of 
fentanyl precursor can prevent the production of almost 20 
kilograms of processed fentanyl. A perfect example of HSI's 
efforts is a seizure in March 2021 of 750 kilograms of a 
fentanyl precursor on its way to Mexico. If that precursor had 
reached the hands of the Mexican cartel, it would have produced 
7.4 billion doses of fentanyl destined for the hands of 
Americans.
    HSI's efforts to combat synthetic drugs continue at the 
border where HSI is responsible for responding to all CBP 
interdictions to start or continue an investigation. HSI 
investigations remain one of the best tools for degrading TCO 
capabilities and stemming the flow of illicit opioids into the 
United States.
    HSI's Border Enforcement Security Task Forces, or BEST Task 
Forces, represent one of the agency's premiere tools for 
turning simple border seizures into TCO-toppling 
investigations. The primary mission of the BESTs is to combat 
TCOs by employing a full range of State, local, Federal, 
Tribal, and international law enforcement resources. There are 
currently 82 BESTs comprising more than 2,000 law enforcement 
officers and personnel representing 200 agencies. In addition 
to the BESTs, each of HSI's 253 offices in all 50 States and 
multiple U.S. territories dedicate assets to combat the flow of 
illicit drugs.
    The illicit drug supply chain fueling the overdose deaths 
throughout the country begins abroad and ends on Main Street. 
HSI, along with our partners, is dedicated to using its broad 
and unique authorities to stop illicit drugs at every critical 
location within the supply chain.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
and for your continued support of HSI and the critical role it 
plays in attacking the illicit drug supply chain. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cagan follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Steven W. Cagen
                              May 18, 2022
    Chairwoman Barragan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished 
Members of the House Subcommittee on Border Security, Facilitation, and 
Operations:
                              introduction
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security 
Investigations' (HSI's) efforts to combat the smuggling of opioids. My 
statement will focus on HSI's work with foreign partners to stop the 
synthesis of deadly drugs abroad, so they never reach the United 
States; its mission at the borders to turn individual seizures into 
cartel-toppling investigations; its focus within the United States to 
take deadly drugs off the streets and shut down dark-net vendors; and 
its efforts to deny cartels the firearms and illicit proceeds that fuel 
their operations.
    ICE HSI is the principal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
component responsible for investigating transnational crime. In 
collaboration with its partners in the United States and abroad, HSI 
special agents develop evidence to identify and build criminal cases 
against transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), terrorist networks 
and facilitators, and other criminal elements that threaten the 
homeland. HSI works with prosecutors to arrest and indict violators, 
execute criminal search warrants, seize criminally-derived money and 
assets, and take other actions designed to disrupt and dismantle 
criminal organizations operating throughout the world. These efforts 
protect the National security and public safety of the United States.
    HSI's investigative mission includes dismantling narcotics-
smuggling TCOs, including the Mexican cartels which perennially flood 
the United States with opioids and other illicit drugs and threaten the 
stability of Mexico. HSI conducts Federal criminal investigations at 
every location in the illicit drug supply chain: Internationally, where 
TCOs operate and manufacture illegal drugs; at our Nation's physical 
border and ports of entry (POEs) where smuggling cells attempt to 
exploit America's legitimate trade, travel, and transportation systems; 
and in communities throughout the United States, where criminal 
organizations earn substantial profits from selling poison to American 
citizens. In addition to combating narcotics smuggling, HSI attacks the 
criminal networks operating in the United States and elsewhere that 
source and smuggle U.S.-origin firearms and ammunition to Mexico--
fueling violence and enabling cartels to flourish.
    Today, Mexican cartels serve as the principal source of the illicit 
fentanyl and methamphetamine fueling the drug overdose epidemic in the 
United States. Cartels manufacture these drugs using precursor 
chemicals sourced from China and other foreign nations. HSI targets 
Mexican cartels by collecting, analyzing, and exploiting information 
gathered from interdictions to further on-going investigations; 
developing and pursuing additional investigative leads; and executing 
enforcement actions to disrupt criminal activity. HSI's expertise in 
investigating international supply chains, unique border search 
authority, and broad statutory authorities uniquely position the agency 
to target illicit shipments of fentanyl and methamphetamine precursor 
chemicals from China and other countries to Mexico. Depriving Mexican 
cartels of these precursors is equivalent to depriving them of the 
oxygen they need to function, no chemicals, no drugs. HSI's efforts in 
this area have yielded significant results, including the seizures of 
hundreds of thousands of kilograms of chemicals destined for Mexican 
TCOs.
    Targeting the fentanyl and methamphetamine precursor chemical 
supply chain is an integral element of HSI's approach to stopping the 
flow of illicit drugs. Disruptions to the procurement phase of the 
narcotics production supply chain have an exponential impact on the 
drugs encountered at our border and on our streets. Seizure of a single 
kilogram of key fentanyl precursor chemicals can prevent the production 
of almost 20 kilograms of the processed fentanyl encountered at the 
Southwest Border and in our communities. Mexican cartels operate on an 
industrial scale when procuring precursor chemicals and the 
interdiction of these shipments has a profound effect on the number of 
drugs reaching our country. For instance, a March 2021 HSI seizure of 
750 kilograms of a fentanyl precursor was estimated to yield 
approximately 14,821 kilograms of fentanyl at average purity 
encountered on the Southwest Border. This seizure not only prevented 
the production of a massive quantity of a deadly drug but also denied 
the TCO an estimated $444.6 million in illicit proceeds.
    These organizations, however, have expanded beyond narcotics 
smuggling and are now involved in the associated crimes of weapons 
trafficking, human trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and 
others--all of which HSI investigates. Criminal organizations in the 
21st Century do not limit themselves to a single crime; likewise 
investigative efforts must be broad in scope to fully dismantle 
enterprises that often transcend borders. Rather than narrowly focusing 
on drug trafficking, HSI combats TCOs by using its unique and broad 
investigative authorities to enforce over 400 Federal laws to 
investigate a myriad of crimes.
               hsi international counternarcotics efforts
    HSI's international presence is a key facet of its approach to 
countering transnational organized crime. HSI has the largest 
international investigative presence of all DHS components and 
comprises hundreds of HSI special agents strategically assigned to 86 
offices in 54 countries. This includes more than 2 dozen personnel 
assigned to 8 offices located throughout Mexico, where the vast 
majority of the methamphetamine and fentanyl that sickens Americans is 
produced. This also includes offices located in China and throughout 
the Asia-Pacific region where the majority of precursor chemicals used 
to produce illicit synthetic drugs originate from or transit through.
    HSI takes a forward-leaning approach to identify and mitigate 
threats before they reach our borders. This multi-tiered, multi-pronged 
strategy is one that spans international boundaries and crosses all 
investigative program areas. HSI special agents abroad develop and 
foster relationships with host government law enforcement partners to 
exchange information; coordinate and support investigations; and 
facilitate enforcement actions and prosecutions to disrupt and 
dismantle TCOs that operate abroad but threaten the national security, 
economic prosperity, and public safety of the United States. HSI and 
its counterparts in other countries identify and disrupt sources of 
illicit drugs, transportation and smuggling networks, and money-
laundering operations. These efforts enable HSI and its partners to 
prevent dangerous narcotics and other illicit goods from reaching our 
borders and stop illicit southbound flows of illegally derived currency 
and weapons.
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit Program
    HSI established the Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit 
(TCIU) Program in 2011 to act as a force multiplier in the fight 
against Mexican cartels and other TCOs. HSI TCIUs are composed of host-
country law enforcement officials, including customs officers, 
immigration officers, and prosecutors who undergo a stringent vetting 
process. HSI TCIUs facilitate information exchange and rapid bilateral 
investigations involving violations within HSI's investigative 
authority, including narcotics smuggling; weapons trafficking and 
counter-proliferation; money laundering and bulk cash smuggling; human 
smuggling and trafficking; transnational gang activity; child 
exploitation; and cyber crime. TCIUs enhance the host country's ability 
to investigate and prosecute individuals involved in transnational 
criminal activity that threatens the stability and security of their 
region and ultimately, our homeland. More than 500 vetted and trained 
host-country law enforcement officers comprise the 12 TCIUs and two 
International Task Force units. In Mexico, the TCIU is comprised of 
more than 30 officers and prosecutors from their Attorney General's 
office. TCIU personnel work with HSI on key programmatic areas, 
including narcotics trafficking, and deploy to locations across Mexico 
in furtherance of high-profile investigations targeting Mexican cartels 
and other TCOs. In fiscal year 2021, the HSI Mexico TCIU made 
approximately 100 arrests; seized 3 million USD; 4,300 pounds of 
cocaine; 350 pounds of fentanyl; 717,000 pounds of drug precursor 
chemicals, and 58,000 pounds of other drugs.
National Targeting Center--Investigations
    HSI's National Targeting Center (NTC)--Investigations was 
established in December 2013 in collaboration with U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) to further our shared border security mission. 
HSI's increased manpower and concerted efforts at the NTC support the 
entire border security continuum, from CBP interdictions and HSI 
investigations, to the joint exploitation of intelligence. Working in a 
collaborative environment at the NTC, HSI provides support to HSI 
Domestic and International offices by targeting illicit precursor 
movements within the air and maritime commercial transportation 
modalities.
    The combination of NTC targeting and foreign action through TCIUs 
is critical to stopping the flow of illicit drugs. Using these 
resources, HSI targets the supply chains responsible for foreign origin 
shipments of precursor chemicals used in the illicit production of 
fentanyl and methamphetamine destined for the United States. By 
blending interagency collaboration, industry partnerships, financial 
information, and computer-based tools, HSI processes and derives 
meaning from large volumes of data to identify precursor chemical 
suppliers and Mexican cartel procurers. HSI uses this information to 
target and seize precursor chemicals in the United States and through 
the TCIU in Mexico before they are converted into the synthetic drugs 
fueling overdose deaths. Thus far, this methodology has resulted in the 
seizure of approximately 633,000 kilograms of fentanyl and 
methamphetamine precursor chemicals.
             hsi southwest border counternarcotics efforts
    The vast majority of the methamphetamine and fentanyl flooding 
American streets is smuggled across our border with Mexico. HSI is the 
primary Federal law enforcement agency responsible for investigating 
drug seizures and other criminal activity occurring at POEs. Our 
special agents work every day with CBP officers to identify, seize, and 
investigate drug smuggling organizations attempting to introduce 
illicit contraband into the United States.
    CBP expansion of non-intrusive inspection (NII) scanning at 
Southwest Border POEs is poised to increase the number of CBP-origin 
seizures HSI special agents investigate. To keep pace, HSI needs 
additional staffing to support the investigation and prosecution of 
individuals associated with POE seizures. Recent HSI Congressional 
appropriations tied to NII expansion represent an important, albeit 
limited, initial step. HSI is moving quickly to deploy these new 
resources to Southwest Border POEs receiving NII augmentation. Given 
the required NII expansion to all land border POEs, additional staffing 
will be essential to ensure HSI retains adequate personnel to conduct 
the complex investigations which degrade and remove TCO threats to the 
homeland.
    HSI's ability to conduct complex large-scale investigations 
represents one of DHS's best weapons for dismantling TCOs in a manner 
not possible solely through border interdiction efforts. Conducting 
criminal investigations resulting from arrests associated with border 
seizures is necessary for ensuring the rule of law; however, HSI's 
mandate is to turn these individual seizures into multi-jurisdictional, 
multi-defendant, complex investigations to disrupt, dismantle, and 
prosecute high-level members of TCOs.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces
    The Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act was 
signed into law in December 2012. The Act was named in honor of Jaime 
Zapata, an HSI special agent who, while working to combat violent drug 
cartels, was killed in the line of duty in Mexico. This law amended the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to formally establish the BEST (Border 
Enforcement Security Task Force) program, with the primary mission of 
combating emerging and existing transnational organized crime by 
employing a threat-based/risk mitigation investigative task force model 
that recognizes the unique resources and capabilities of all 
participating law enforcement partners.
    BEST units eliminate the barriers between Federal and local 
investigations, close the gap with international partners in 
multinational criminal investigations, and create an environment that 
minimizes the vulnerabilities in our operations that TCOs have 
traditionally capitalized on to exploit our Nation's borders. There are 
currently 82 BESTs located across the United States, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands, comprising more than 2,000 law enforcement 
officers and personnel representing more than 200 Federal, State, 
local, Tribal, and international law enforcement agencies, and National 
Guard units. These personnel include HSI special agents, task force 
officers, intelligence analysts, and investigative support personnel. 
Since inception through mid-March 2022, BESTs have collectively 
initiated more than 46,000 investigations resulting in more than 56,000 
criminal arrests and seizures of more than 3.75 million pounds of 
narcotics, 32,000 weapons, and more than $860 million in cash/monetary 
instruments.
    As part of HSI's response to the exploitation of international 
shipping to move illicit drugs, HSI increased the number of BEST units 
at international mail facilities (IMF), express consignment hubs, and 
international airports acting as IMFs. This strategy facilitates the 
immediate application of investigative techniques on seized parcels, 
which aids in establishing the evidence needed to effect enforcement 
actions on individuals associated with parcels containing illicit 
drugs. Between fiscal years 2018 and 2021, BEST units at international 
airports, IMFs, and express consignment hubs initiated more than 3,790 
investigations resulting in more than 2,750 criminal arrests and 
seizures of more than 68,400 pounds of illicit drugs and drug 
precursors. These seizures included nearly 590 pounds of fentanyl, and 
over $52 million in currency and monetary instruments. These law 
enforcement operations have disrupted the movement of illicit drugs and 
drug precursors transiting through the mail and express consignment 
shipments and aided in dismantling distribution networks.
                 hsi domestic counternarcotics efforts
    The illicit drug supply chain begins abroad and ends on Main 
Street. The drugs smuggled through Southwest Border POEs fuel overdose 
deaths in communities across the country. HSI investigates and thwarts 
this activity from the border to the heartland. Domestically, HSI 
covers the Nation through 253 offices located in all 50 States as well 
as the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands, 
and Saipan. Each office dedicates assets to combat the flow of illicit 
drugs with remarkable results. In fiscal year 2021, HSI narcotics 
enforcement efforts resulted in 12,920 arrests; the seizure of 23,632 
lbs. of opioids, including 14,530 lbs. of fentanyl; 855,780 lbs. of 
cocaine; 234,623 lbs. of methamphetamine; and the associated seizure of 
over $188 million. The impressive narcotics seizures testify not only 
to HSI's diligence in protecting America's borders and securing our 
communities, but also to the ability of TCOs to absorb substantial 
losses while continuing to function.
    HSI counternarcotics efforts are enhanced through its network of 
Federal, State, local, and Tribal partnerships, which includes our 
participation in the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs) 
Program and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Taskforces (OCDETFs) 
Program. These partnerships enable our special agents to collaborate in 
investigations using our unique and far-reaching authorities to 
safeguard the homeland from ever evolving and emerging threats, such as 
those posed by Mexican cartels and other TCOs. For example, in April 
2022, HSI special agents assigned to our Seattle office led an 
investigation that resulted in the arrest of four drug traffickers 
operating in the Portland, Oregon, Metropolitan area and the seizure of 
approximately 150,000 counterfeit prescriptions pills containing 
fentanyl and 20 pounds of suspected bulk fentanyl. This investigation--
conducted in collaboration with our Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement partners--was the largest single fentanyl seizure in Oregon 
State history with an estimated street value of approximately $4 
million.
Cyber-related Efforts
    TCOs and their illicit drug clients are increasingly tech-savvy. 
Many have adopted emerging technologies to replace hand-to-hand drug 
sales with anonymous cryptocurrency purchases facilitated through dark 
net marketplaces. These transactions may involve foreign vendors but 
always result in the shipment of drugs to or within our country. To 
keep pace with rapidly evolving criminal techniques, HSI created the 
Cyber Crimes Center (C3) in 1997. C3 was codified at 6 USC  473 to 
provide investigative assistance, training, and equipment to support 
domestic and international investigations of cyber-related crimes for 
the Department of Homeland Security. C3 supports HSI's mission through 
the programmatic oversight and coordination of investigations of cyber-
related criminal activity and provides a range of forensic, 
intelligence, and investigative support services across all HSI 
programmatic areas. C3 brings together highly technical assets 
dedicated to conducting trans-border criminal investigations of cyber-
related crimes within the HSI transnational crime portfolio and 
authorities.
    C3 performs an essential role in detecting, investigating, and 
preventing the sale and distribution of opioids and other illicit drugs 
on the dark web. With increased capabilities, cyber analytics, trained 
cyber investigators and analysts, C3 supports HSI on-line undercover 
investigations targeting market site operators, vendors, and prolific 
buyers of opioids and other illicit drugs on the dark web. C3 also 
provides critical support on tracing and identifying illicit proceeds 
derived from criminal activity on the dark web and investigating the 
subsequent money-laundering activities. Additionally, C3's Computer 
Forensics Unit and HSI Computer Forensic Program are critical tools in 
combating the flow of drugs into the United States. From the efforts of 
our Computer Forensic Agents and Analysts in the field to seize, 
process, and analyze digital evidence, through the advanced technical 
solutions, such as decryption and accessing secure data, digital 
forensics play an ever-increasing role in investigating complex 
multinational narcotics organizations. The Computer Forensic Unit also 
provides forensic training and support to our State, local, Tribal, 
Federal, and international law enforcement partners.
    A top priority for HSI is to improve collective law enforcement 
capabilities by providing training to partner law enforcement agencies. 
In response to initiatives to reduce opioid demand in the United 
States, C3 developed a cyber-training curriculum with a focus on dark 
web investigations and illicit payment networks associated with opioid 
smuggling and distribution. This training has been successful in 
improving law enforcement capabilities against on-line marketplaces and 
tools for illicit trafficking. Since 2017, HSI has delivered this 
training course in over 70 locations world-wide to more than 12,000 
State, local, Federal, and international law enforcement personnel.
                   southwest border weapons smuggling
    Part of HSI's multi-discipline approach to combating the flow of 
illicit drugs into the United States includes combating the flow of 
illicit guns and ammunition into Mexico. Cartels use corresponding 
southbound pathways to repatriate cash proceeds from illegal activities 
and secure sufficient armaments to remain a persistent threat to 
Mexican security forces.
    Firearms smuggled from the United States into Mexico allow the 
cartels to continue their deadly operations against our Mexican law 
enforcement partners and the local populace. In 2021, the government of 
Mexico estimated at least 342,000 U.S.-sourced guns are illegally 
smuggled into Mexico every year. Mexico's National Public Security 
System reported 34,515 intentional homicides with 70 percent involving 
firearms in 2020. During this period, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) performed traces on 19,762 firearms 
recovered in Mexico. ATF checks determined at least 67.7 percent were 
sourced from the United States with over half traced to a retail 
purchase.
    HSI uses its customs authorities to target weapons moving south 
into Mexico and the procurement networks in the United States. This 
includes Operation Without a Trace (WaT), a unified DHS effort to fight 
the illegal trafficking of guns and ammunition from the United States 
into Mexico. WaT is a Federal partnership between HSI, CBP, ATF, and 
the government of Mexico, focused on the illicit purchase, transport, 
and distribution of firearms, firearms components, and ammunition from 
the United States to Mexico, and one of only three whole-of-Government 
efforts recognized by the White House's National Security Council to 
combat this threat. WaT's three-pronged approach leverages 
intelligence, interdiction, and investigative assets to identify, 
disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations trafficking 
firearms. During fiscal year 2021, WaT partners initiated 198 criminal 
investigations which resulted in 153 arrests, and seizure of 494 
firearms, 2,083 magazines and more than 265,026 rounds of ammunition, 
all destined to TCOs in Mexico.
    To highlight the importance of our partnership with the government 
of Mexico, last month, HSI special agents assigned to our Arizona BEST 
and the ATF executed a Federal search warrant resulting in the seizure 
of multiple firearms intended for Mexico. This enforcement action was 
predicated upon the seizure of approximately 2.8 million rounds of 
ammunition, 128 long guns, 89 grenades, 38 handguns, 19 machine guns, 6 
.50 caliber rifles, and 100 plates of ballistic armor by the Mexican 
Ministry of Defense in March 2022. A significant portion of these 
firearms were found to have originated from the United States.
                  illicit finance--following the money
    Profit is the primary motive for the production and sale of illicit 
drugs. U.S. illicit drug sales continue to net tens of billions of 
dollars in illicit proceeds annually. One of the most effective methods 
for dismantling Mexican cartels and other TCOs engaged in narcotics 
trafficking is to attack the criminal proceeds that are the lifeblood 
of their operations. Every HSI investigation has a financial element. 
Our special agents identify and seize the illicit proceeds of crime and 
target financial networks that transport, launder, and hide ill-gotten 
proceeds. With significant access to financial and trade data, HSI is 
uniquely positioned to identify TCO schemes to hide illegal drug 
proceeds within the stream of legitimate commerce, on vehicles, 
vessels, and persons departing the United States, or when crossing a 
digital border such as the movement of funds electronically, including 
in the form of virtual assets, such as cryptocurrency. HSI's financial 
efforts in fiscal year 2021 resulted in at least 2,198 arrests; 1,417 
criminal indictments; 738 convictions; and the seizure of more than 
$973 million in illicit currency and assets.
National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
    Despite the rise of alternative stores of value, such as virtual 
assets, bulk cash smuggling remains a key mechanism for TCO 
repatriation of drug proceeds. Criminal actors often avoid traditional 
financial institutions which must comply with Bank Secrecy Act 
reporting requirements, instead repatriating their illicit proceeds 
through conveyances such as commercial and private aircraft, passenger 
and commercial vehicles, maritime vessels, and via pedestrian crossings 
at our land borders.
    Established in 2009, HSI's National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center 
(BCSC) is a critical component of the agency's and overall U.S. 
Government's efforts to combat bulk cash smuggling by Mexican cartels 
and other TCOs. The BCSC operates strategic programs that leverage 
advanced data analytics, interagency partnerships, and law enforcement 
technology systems to identify complex money-laundering networks and 
provide support for HSI financial investigations. The criminal 
intelligence functions of the BCSC provide operational analysis in 
support of HSI-led interdiction efforts including port profiles 
highlighting cash-flow activity at targeted POEs and corridor analyses 
to assist in planning the timing, location, and strategy for 
interdiction operations. The Center also administers a targeted, 
investigation-focused license plate reader program to identify larger 
criminal networks and a warrant-based GPS tracking program that 
provides valuable intelligence on the behaviors of criminal groups 
engaged in bulk cash smuggling. Since its inception, the BCSC has 
initiated or substantially contributed to over 8,810 criminal arrests 
and seizures of bulk cash totaling over $2.63 billion.
    TCOs are increasingly augmenting bulk currency smuggling with use 
of alternate value platforms in response to financial regulations and 
law enforcement efforts to identify money-laundering networks. A single 
movement of TCO proceeds may involve bulk cash, stored value cards, 
money orders, cryptocurrency, wire transfers, funnel accounts, and 
trade-based money laundering. HSI adapts to evolving criminal 
methodologies by leveraging new law enforcement technologies to 
identify money laundering activity through these emerging alternate 
value platforms and seize criminal assets.
    While Mexican cartels and TCOs continue to employ traditional 
money-laundering methods, cryptocurrencies are increasingly used to 
facilitate domestic and cross-border crime. HSI has seen nefarious 
actors expend cryptocurrency in furtherance of a wide array of crimes 
HSI investigates. From individual actors to large-scale TCOs, 
cryptocurrency can be exploited by any criminal organization engaged in 
almost any type of illicit activity, and this is especially true as it 
pertains to their use to facilitate on-line distribution of fentanyl, 
methamphetamine, and other dangerous drugs. Both at home and abroad, 
cryptocurrencies are being used to purchase illicit items such as drugs 
on dark-net marketplaces, and to launder criminally-derived proceeds. 
Cryptocurrencies are attractive to TCOs because they offer a relatively 
fast, inexpensive, and pseudonymous system of transactions as compared 
to more traditional financial transactions. As such, HSI investigations 
related to cryptocurrency have risen from one criminal investigation in 
2011, to over 230 criminal investigations in fiscal year 2021. In 
fiscal year 2021, HSI seized over $97 million in cryptocurrency. This 
marked increase signifies growing confidence in cryptocurrency use by 
bad actors and requires that law enforcement become increasingly 
technically proficient in performing these complex investigations.
                               conclusion
    The United States continues to be ravaged by an ever-growing supply 
of illicit drugs, including synthetic drugs like fentanyl and 
methamphetamine, that have become the leading cause of overdose deaths 
in the country. HSI's authorities and dynamic approaches to 
counternarcotics allow us to pursue impactful investigations and 
disrupt, dismantle, and prosecute the TCOs most responsible for 
perpetrating this on-going and evolving public health crisis. While our 
collective efforts are executed with an unrelenting commitment to 
public safety, we recognize that work remains at all levels--
internationally, on the border, and in our communities.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and 
for your continued support of HSI and our enduring efforts to secure 
our borders and protect the American people from the influx of deadly 
narcotics like fentanyl. I look forward to your questions.

    Mr. Green. Thank you for your testimony. I thank all the 
witnesses for your testimony and I remind the subcommittee that 
we will each have 5 minutes to question the panel. I now 
recognize myself for questions.
    I am honored to have the opportunity to ask these questions 
because this is something that has been of concern, and more 
specifically, we are talking about persons bringing in drugs 
via the actual ports of entry juxtaposed to the land mass 
between ports of entry. The indication is that approximately 
194,000 pounds of fentanyl, methamphetamines, and heroin came 
in between ports of entry.
    Mr. Flores, is this a fairly accurate assessment?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. In 
regards to narcotics----
    Mr. Green. Let me do this because I have to lay a 
predicate. I am going to ask you to give me as close as you can 
to a yes or a no.
    Mr. Flores. As far as narcotics coming in between the ports 
of entry, I am not sure on that exact number. What I do know, 
being responsible for our ports of entry, that we see a high 
percentage of narcotics that we intercept at our ports of 
entry.
    Mr. Green. All right. Assuming that we have this high 
number, 194,000 pounds, I respect those who believe that most 
of it comes in between ports of entry. So let us examine the 
numbers, let us just look at the numbers.
    If you assume that just this amount comes in between ports 
of entry, it would take 194,000 people bringing it in if each 
carried 1,000 pounds. Since we know that most people can't 
carry 1,000 pounds, let us assume that each person carries 500 
pounds. It would take 388,000 people coming in between ports of 
entry carrying 500 pounds. A good number of people can't carry 
500 pounds. Let us assume that 250 pounds that each person has. 
That would take 776,000 people. Probably 125 pounds may be 
about what some people can carry. It would take 1,552,000 
people bringing it in between ports of entry.
    It just seems to me that we can accept the premise, or I 
accept it, that this is coming in primarily through ports of 
entry.
    Is there someone on the panel who agrees with this 
assessment, that this is coming in primarily through ports of 
entry?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. Again, 
what we see coming through the ports of entry is what we know 
in regards to volume and seizures, whether that is on a vessel 
in a containerized shipment or that is a tractor-trailer, in a 
vehicle, or on a pedestrian coming in through our ports of 
entry.
    Mr. Green. Let me ask you this. Do you believe that we have 
had 1,552,000 people bringing in 125,000--125 pounds in 
backpacks in 1 year? That is what the statistical information 
indicates.
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, what I do know is that the methods 
used to smuggle narcotics across our borders varies in 
different ways, and whether that is by backpacks, whether that 
is by vehicles, or by use of drones----
    Mr. Green. I believe the backpacks are used, too, no 
disrespect. But do you think that 1,552,000 people are bringing 
it in on backpacks or is most of it coming in through the ports 
of entry, sir?
    Mr. Flores. From my perspective being in charge of the 
ports of entry, what we see is the seizure of narcotics mostly 
at our ports of entry.
    Mr. Green. Thank you. I thank you for that kind answer. 
Friends, this is the problem. Where it comes in, regardless as 
to where it comes in, it is still a problem. I don't in any way 
want to minimize the fact that we have got a problem to deal 
with. But I do think that it is difficult to conceive of 
1,522,000 people bringing this in or carrying it between ports 
of entry. That number just doesn't add up for me.
    Madam Chair, to be kind to my colleagues who all have 
questions, I will yield back my additional 13 seconds.
    Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 
I want to apologize. I am in a competing Energy and Commerce 
mark-up, which is why you see my running out because there is a 
roll call vote and Mr. Green graciously agreed to Chair in my 
absence.
    So I want to thank the witnesses since I didn't have a 
chance to do that.
    The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions 
they may wish to ask the witnesses. As previously outlined, I 
will recognize Members in order of seniority, alternating 
between the Majority and the Minority. Members are reminded to 
unmute themselves when recognized for questions.
    The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the 
subcommittee, Mr. Higgins.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Sulc, your role 
with the Office of Intelligence & Analysis perhaps best equips 
you to answer for our purposes here. I believe every law 
enforcement professional present has insight on this. But I 
would like to ask you specifically regarding the percentages of 
content of fentanyl that we are seeing in final use or pill 
product, pressed into false prescription drugs, primarily, and 
sold on the streets of America, across America.
    My sources tell me that over the course of the last year 
the amount of fentanyl that is pressed into the average pill 
has increased. I am advised that this is because fentanyl is so 
abundant. It is so abundant by now after almost 2 years, let us 
say a year and a half of heavy, heavy crossings at the border, 
the volume of fentanyl is so heavy in the garages of the drug 
dealers and, you know, the drug houses across the country that 
are processing this stuff and getting it out onto the street in 
final user form, I am told there is so much of it that it is 
increasing the percentage of fentanyl to make their product a 
little more powerful, a little more addictive, as you stated in 
your opening testimony.
    To what extent are you saying that is true from the 
intelligence and analysis perspective?
    Mr. Sulc. Thank you for the question, Mr. Higgins. We have 
seen over the last couple of years a slight increase in purity. 
Not a huge increase, but it has increased.
    Mr. Higgins. Could you clarify for America why a dealer 
would want to seek that sweet spot balance? Because if he 
pushed too much, what would happen?
    Mr. Sulc. It would increase deaths, overdose deaths.
    Mr. Higgins. Increase customers dying, exactly. So dealers 
across the country--this is what I am trying to share with 
America. These dealers have so much fentanyl they are giving it 
away. They are pressing fentanyl into their final product that 
they are selling on the streets and the stuff that is coming 
across the border, as much as my colleagues, you know, want to 
point to the ports of entry, may I say that is a criminal 
capture and good for law enforcement. But your ports of entry 
are reflective, those seizures are reflective of investigations 
and confidential informants. These are larger shipments in 
vehicles and vessels, easier to identify and intercept from a 
law enforcement investigative perspective.
    But our front-line enforcement at the border, those men and 
women, they are quite capable of detecting and pursuing and 
apprehending, you know, these stout young men crossing, 5, 10, 
15 at a time, wearing camouflage and carpet shoes, et cetera, 
covering their spores. They have backpacks, they have Camelbaks 
with water, and they are rolling in a manner we haven't seen 
before. They are certainly carrying drugs in a backpack, a lot 
of them. It doesn't take a lot of it in order to impact the 
opioid crisis in America. It is making its way into the 
streets.
    You can't measure that because you are not catching those 
guys. Why? Because our agents are pulled into processing. Who 
are they processing? The citizens from other countries that are 
seeking asylum. But those citizens, those little family units 
and individuals that are seeking, you know, a better life in 
America, God bless them, we wish they would come here legally 
and properly. However, those guys, they are seeking interaction 
with law enforcement, they are not avoiding it. The ones 
crossing it between the ports of entry, carrying backpacks, are 
avoiding law enforcement. There is so much fentanyl has made it 
to the street.
    Mr. Sulc, you are seeing a slight increase. Again, just 
clarify for America why a drug dealer would want to find that 
balance of just how powerful he can make his pills without 
putting too much fentanyl. Explain that to America, please.
    Mr. Sulc. Well, sir, in terms of the addictive properties, 
a seller would seek to increase the addictive properties to 
increase how addictive, if they are lacing heroin or cocaine, 
for instance, they would be seeking to make that more potent 
and more addictive.
    In terms of the false prescription drugs like Xanax and 
Adderall, et cetera, that one is a little hard, at least from 
my standpoint, and my colleagues may have better insight, but 
that one is harder to determine why they would be willing to 
have such a high death by overdose rate simply because the way 
that is purchased, most of the people who purchase it don't 
understand that fentanyl is lacing what they think is a legal 
prescription drug. So they wouldn't be necessarily incentivized 
to continue getting it if they don't even know they are getting 
it. So that one is a little more difficult to understand, but 
in talking to our analysts, their belief is that what is 
happening with those prescription drugs that are being laced is 
that they are just looking to sell it as many ways as possible.
    Chairwoman Barragan. Mr. Sulc, Mr. Sulc, I have to----
    Mr. Higgins. That makes sense, Mr. Sulc. In the interest of 
time, my time has expired. I thank you for your answers, it is 
squared away.
    So, Madam Chair, I yield.
    Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you. The gentleman's time has 
expired. I was trying to be gracious there, but we want to make 
sure our Members get our questions in before votes.
    I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
    I want to put up a chart, if we may, showing the 
correlation, or I should say the lack of correlation between 
migration and opioid seizures. This is a graph we are happy to 
make available.
    [The information follows:]
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    Chairwoman Barragan. The data was taken straight from 
Customs & Border Protection data and it shows that line on the 
bottom that you see that is green is seizures happening between 
the ports of entry. That blue line that you see, which is the 
big one at the top, is the seizures at the ports of entry and 
vehicle checkpoints. So you can see the huge disparity there.
    Then if you see the bars behind there, that shows 
encounters at the border. So if you take a look at that chart 
you will actually see that there is no correlation between 
migration and the opioid seizures. I just want to remind folks 
that the chart that we put up at the beginning, the pie chart, 
is data directly from CBP showing that 91.3 percent of seizures 
are through the ports of entry.
    So staying on message on honesty and data, I think it is 
important that people see the visuals to see the truth. 
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your efforts on what you do 
day-in and day-out to combat and do everything you can to keep 
drugs out of this country. That is why we are having this 
hearing, is to hear from you all what Congress can do.
    Now the opioid epidemic is a public health crisis and I 
applaud CBP and the Department for seizing dangerous opioids 
before they reach our communities.
    Mr. Flores, if I may, what additional resources or 
technology would help CBP detect and interdict opioids at the 
border?
    Mr. Flores. Chairwoman, thank you for the question. You 
know, our employees are our most vital resources. It is even 
during, despite a global pandemic, what we were able to do is 
really dedicate ourselves to ensure staffing levels at our 
ports of entry were maintained at our appropriated staffing 
levels there, we were able to bring on officers and ag 
specialists to ports of entry that we needed them.
    So I would like to thank you for the Congressional support 
given to us despite a decline in collections during the 
pandemic, that we were able to maintain our staffing levels. It 
has put us in a better position to respond to the increasing 
volume of traffic that we see coming back as we get to 
prepandemic levels of trade and travel coming across our 
borders.
    Infrastructure is also an important factor for us, aging 
ports of entry and what our capabilities and what 
infrastructure is for us. So, again, the bipartisan 
infrastructure law that we just passed, the $3.4 billion to GSA 
and the money to CBP, an important aspect of how we vitalize 
ports of entry and really provide the needed space for 
efficient and effective screening inspections, targeting of 
illicit drugs coming across our border there.
    I would say last, technology for us in regards to what we 
are doing, in regards to nonintrusive technology, what we can 
do, drive-through systems, looking at preprimary systems where 
we will get more efficient rates and scannings of people and 
things coming across our border in order to help us make a 
better assessment of narcotics coming in.
    Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Flores. Mr. Cagan and 
Mr. Sulc, the next question is for you. What I have heard is 
that the majority of drugs are seized at the ports of entry, 
generally that is coming from documented travelers.
    Do either of you expect terminating Title 42 would result 
in a significant increase in the amount of drugs being smuggled 
into our communities? Mr. Sulc.
    Mr. Sulc. Thank you, Chairwoman. We believe that we would 
continue to see the same scheme that we have seen in the past. 
We have seen some instances perhaps of migrants and drugs as a 
mixed event, but they are still rare. DTOs and human smuggling 
organizations are opportunistic and transactional with their 
operations. They are strongly motivated by profits.
    So combined drugs and migrant smuggling events are not 
really a routine practice at all. The illicit actors 
facilitating these movements are likely to keep these entities 
separate to minimize the risk of losing the potential revenue 
for the much higher-value drugs such as fentanyl.
    Chairwoman Barragan. Thank you. Mr. Cagan, in 20 seconds if 
you might be able to answer.
    Mr. Cagan. I will be quick so I don't get the gavel. At HSI 
we see the same thing. When we are looking at the entire 
transnational criminal organization and looking at the key 
network spots within the supply chain, we see that drugs and 
human smuggling are separate. They might use the same routes, 
but we predominately see the drugs coming in through the ports 
of entry, just like CBP mentioned.
    Chairwoman Barragan. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. My time 
has expired, I will yield back.
    I now will recognize Representative Guest. You are now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Flores, first I 
want to thank you and the men and women of CBP for your 
service, for all that you do each and every day.
    In April, CBP reported 234,088 immigrants encountered along 
our border, the largest number ever recorded. The month that 
this administration took office, in January of last year, that 
number was 78,414 immigrants. That is an increase of almost 300 
percent in just 15 months. Total encounters under this 
administration, taking numbers since February 2021, are 
2,735,000 encounters, a number greater than the population of 
13 States. A number greater than the population of Vermont, 
Alaska, North and South Dakota, Delaware, Rhode Island, 
Montana, Maine, New Hampshire, Hawaii, West Virginia, Idaho, 
Nebraska, and New Mexico. At the current rate, next month it 
will eclipse three additional States including my home State of 
Mississippi.
    We know that narcotic seizures along the Southwest Border 
have continued to rise. You actually address that in page 2 of 
your testimony. You say there in page 2 that in the fiscal year 
2021 CBP seized 11,201 pounds of fentanyl, over twice the 
number seized in fiscal year 2020. You go on to say since 
October 1, 2021 CBP has seized 5,310 pounds of fentanyl. You go 
on to say that if you measure that by dosage units, that 2.6 
billion, billion with a B, potential doses of fentanyl were 
seized in fiscal year 2021 and that 17 billion, with a B, doses 
of methamphetamine were seized in 2021. Then to put that in 
perspective you go on to say that the Earth's population is 
approximately 7.9 billion people.
    Secretary Mayorkas has been here to Congress before, he sat 
in the very seat where you sit today, and he has testified that 
the border is closed, that the border is secure, and that we 
have operational control of the border.
    So my question to you, Mr. Flores, is that in light of 
these figures that I have just spoken, do you believe that our 
border is closed? Do you believe that our border is secure?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. In 
regards to field operations at our ports of entry, our 
priorities are and continue to be our National and economic 
security priorities at our ports of entry along the entirety of 
the United States. By doing that we inspect, we facilitate, we 
target, we screen high-risk shipments and individuals coming 
into our ports of entry. We do that every day, our men and 
women that are operating at our ports of entry can do that and 
do an excellent job at that every single day as they are 
dealing with legitimate trade and travel, looking for those 
individuals that are looking to do this country harm in the 
communities we live in.
    So we will continue to operate as we have been in ensuring 
our National priorities are being taken care of as well as our 
economic priorities.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Flores, I don't argue with you, I don't 
disagree with you, I would agree. I have been to the border on 
numerous occasions. I have met with officers of CBP, I have met 
with community leaders. They all tell me the same thing without 
exception is they feel like that this administration has 
abandoned them. They have told us that this is the worst that 
they have ever seen the Southwest Border.
    So my question to you is very simple, is a yes or no 
answer. I am asking your personal opinion, I am not asking the 
opinion of Secretary Mayorkas, I am not asking the opinion of 
CBP, I am asking your opinion. Do you believe that our border 
is secure and do you believe that our border is closed?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, I will say ports of entry, the men 
and women from field operations at our ports of entry and the 
entirety of CBP, we are doing the best job we can do given the 
current environment.
    Mr. Guest. I agree with you, you need more resources, you 
need more manpower, and I am not arguing that. But I have got 
10 seconds and I would like an answer in that 10 seconds, 
either yes or no. Is the border closed and is the border 
secure? Could you please answer that?
    Mr. Flores. From the port of entry perspective our borders 
have been open in regards to being able to process legitimate 
trade and travel coming across our ports of entry as well as 
enforcing, again enforcing----
    Mr. Guest. Are our borders secure?
    Mr. Flores. From a port of entry perspective we have 
officers, again, doing the best they can in securing this 
border every single day.
    Chairwoman Barragan. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
Chair now recognizes Representative Clyde, the gentleman from 
Georgia.
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you. Our Nation is currently facing a 
myriad of crises: Record-breaking high inflation, runaway 
Washington spending, and an open Southern Border that is 
allowing an out-of-control number of illegal aliens and illegal 
and dangerous drugs to flow into our borders.
    The CDC recently announced that more than 107,000 Americans 
died of drug overdoses last year. Of those deaths, nearly two-
thirds of fatal overdoses were caused by fentanyl or another 
synthetic opioid. That is a 23 percent increase from 2020. 
Fentanyl, as Ranking Member Higgins has already noted, is now 
the leading cause of death of Americans from the ages of 18 to 
45. It may be as much fentanyl poisoning as anything else. That 
is an incredible statistic, that is a heartbreaking statistic. 
That fentanyl is coming across our Southern Border.
    In my home State of Georgia, between 2012 and 2019, 
fentanyl overdoses claimed the lives of nearly 1,250 
individuals. Last year alone customs and border protection in 8 
ports of entry, just 8, 8 alone, seized 588 pounds of fentanyl 
coming across the border. That is enough to kill over 133 
million people, to kill all the residents of Georgia 12 times 
over.
    So for each of you, Mr. Cagan, I will start with you, yes, 
or no, do you believe that border security is related directly 
to National security?
    Mr. Cagan. HSI is there to investigate south of the border.
    Mr. Clyde. Just yes or no would be fine, sir.
    Mr. Cagan. Say again, repeat the question.
    Mr. Clyde. Do you believe that border security is related 
directly to National security?
    Mr. Cagan. It is one of the factors of National security, 
sir.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Between our ports of entry do you 
think we have a secure border? Yes or no is fine.
    Mr. Cagan. HSI is not the one to answer the question as it 
pertains to----
    Mr. Clyde. So you don't know.
    Mr. Cagan [continuing]. The physical border.
    Mr. Clyde. So you don't know?
    Mr. Cagan. No, sir.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Mr. Flores, I am going to ask you 
the same thing. Do you believe that border security is related 
directly to National security?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. I do 
believe that they both are important and they are related, yes.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Great. So between our ports of entry, do you 
believe we have a secure Southern Border?
    Mr. Flores. I believe the men and women of the U.S. Border 
Patrol and CBP, as a whole, collectively, we are putting--doing 
our best.
    Mr. Clyde. I know you are doing the best job you can, that 
is not my question. My question is, do we have a secure 
Southern Border between our ports of entry?
    Mr. Flores. From a responsible for our United States ports 
of entry, from the field operations perspective, from the U.S. 
Border Patrol perspective, probably better answered by them, 
but, again, with the resources that the U.S. Border Patrol has 
between the ports of entry----
    Mr. Clyde. OK. All right. Then, Mr. Sulc, I am going to ask 
you the same question. Do you believe that border security is 
related directly to National security?
    Mr. Sulc. Sir, yes, I do.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Thank you. Do you believe we have a secure 
Southern Border between our ports of entry?
    Mr. Sulc. I do. I believe we have vulnerabilities----
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Thank you. All right. That is fine. All 
right. Now, Mr. Flores, you testified that last year that 
11,200 pounds of fentanyl was seized between--both at ports of 
entry and between ports of entry, correct?
    Mr. Flores. Right.
    Mr. Clyde. Now we had 400,000 got-aways we think, that 
people that were not caught at the Southern Border that came 
into the United States, possibly as many as 800,000, and many 
of them were carrying backpacks. So what is the average amount 
of a fentanyl seizure? I mean, from 11,200 pounds on an annual 
basis, what is the average amount that Border Protection 
seizes?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. Just 
average, you mean per seizure?
    Mr. Clyde. Per seizure, I am sorry, yes. Per seizure.
    Mr. Flores. That would vary depending on the type or the 
mode it was being transported or smuggled. That could be in a 
tractor-trailer or----
    Mr. Clyde. I get that. What is the average amount per 
seizure that you normally--that you could see?
    Mr. Flores. Well, we could see anywhere from a kilo to 
potentially 15 kilos.
    Mr. Clyde. OK, 15 kilos, about 30 pounds. Anywhere from a 
couple pounds to 30 pounds easily carried by an individual. All 
right. So do you know is it different whether it is between a 
port of entry or between ports of entry?
    Mr. Flores. Typically in between the ports of entry, the 
seizures that I am aware of have been smaller amounts. But if 
they are hidden in a conveyance, a commercial conveyance or 
some type of passenger vehicle, those tend to be larger 
amounts.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Then when you look at potentially 400,000 
got-aways and you are looking at maybe 2 pounds----
    Chairwoman Barragan. The gentlemen's time has expired.
    Mr. Clyde [continuing]. That is potentially a tremendous 
amount that we are not even seeing. So I don't think there is a 
correlation between what you get at a port of entry and what 
you get between ports of entry because we don't have that 
information, so we can't really say that.
    Chairwoman Barragan. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you, I yield.
    Chairwoman Barragan. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
Chair will now recognize Representative Bishop from North 
Carolina for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am sorry, I had 
another committee hearing so I am late, but I hope I can ask a 
question that is cogent. It may tread over grounds you all have 
well covered.
    I take it there has been a good discussion about the drugs 
coming in at the ports of entry and not between the ports of 
entry. So at risk, I am sure, of recreating the wheel a little 
bit, but maybe somebody can help me understand.
    A lot of what we are talking about today is fentanyl, which 
can kill in extraordinarily small amounts. So you don't have to 
have truckloads coming across in order to do immense damage. So 
let me just ask the question of whoever on the panel is capable 
of helping orient me.
    Why is it if you have 6-, 700,000, 750,000 got-aways, why 
is there not immense risk of fentanyl entering the country via 
got-aways? Maybe Mr. Flores.
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. In 
regards to fentanyl coming into the country, at our ports of 
entry is where we see a significant volume of fentanyl as 
approaches coming into our ports of entry.
    Mr. Bishop. So thank you for that. I think I got that even 
before I sat down and even recited, I understood we trod that 
ground. The question I am asking is another one, which is that 
implies, because you say you believe it comes in through the 
ports of entry, it would imply that allowing 750,000 got-aways 
to come across the border without interdicting them is not 
really a risk for illicit drug purposes because how could there 
be any harm? What I am asking you, am I wrong when I say my 
understanding is that very small amounts of fentanyl can kill 
hundreds of thousands of people? Why wouldn't the use of mules 
coming across at places other than points of entry and evading 
Border Patrol so they are got-aways, and you know we have got 
lots of got-aways, why is that not a material risk of the entry 
of illegal drugs?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thank you for the question. In 
regards to got-aways, those are unknown. So in regards--I will 
not say there is no risk because there is absolutely, but with 
the unknown there is risk there on what they could be 
introducing into the country. So it is just an unknown.
    Mr. Bishop. So I have lately been given the understanding 
that with respect to fentanyl, you can have like four grains 
out of a saltshaker and that can kill a person. Isn't that 
true? Whether that is precisely the right number or not, small 
miniscule amounts like that can cause death to a human, isn't 
that right?
    Mr. Flores. Yes.
    Mr. Bishop. OK. If you take like what might be in a sugar 
packet that you would put in your coffee, that quantity can 
kill many humans, correct?
    Mr. Flores. Depending on the purity of what that fentanyl 
makeup is, correct, and chemical composition.
    Mr. Bishop. Why isn't the introduction of fentanyl in 
substantial quantities into this country, why isn't that a 
terrorism risk? Isn't this a chemical weapon?
    Mr. Flores. Congressman, thanks for the question. In 
regards to why isn't it a terrorist threat, I wouldn't be the 
correct person to answer to that.
    Mr. Bishop. Is there someone on this panel that could speak 
to why that is not considered terrorism? Let me ask this 
question, and I will ask whoever is competent to say something 
about it.
    You have heard of anthrax and ricin, poisons that 
transmitted to Congress or something that could kill tons of 
people. How is fentanyl less dangerous than anthrax or ricin? 
Does anybody know that it is less dangerous?
    Well, let me just say in the 53 seconds I have got that 
remain, if I understand the thrust of this hearing is to 
suggest that the Biden administration's catastrophic 
relinquishment of control of the border is not jeopardizing 
America with a flood of drugs because drugs are interdicted at 
the point of entry and are not otherwise coming across. That is 
lunacy.
    When you have huge numbers of got-aways because you have 
overloaded the process, there is very good prospect that you 
are going to see that large quantities of drugs come in, and I 
see no way it is different than a risk of a terrorist with 
another type of dangerous chemical.
    Mr. Higgins, I am sorry, I did not save any time to yield 
to you, but I give you whatever I got.
    Mr. Higgins. I thank the gentleman. Madam Chair, I would 
like to submit for the record an article, a media article, 
quoting Secretary Mayorkas saying regarding the border, we are 
going to lose, it is unsustainable.
    Chairwoman Barragan. There is no objection, the article 
will be admitted.* Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The information was not available at the time of publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I want to thank the witnesses, gentlemen, for your valuable 
testimony, and the Members for their questions. You know, I 
would be interested in continuing the conversation with you and 
your teams as to how we can prevent these drugs from reaching 
American communities and focus on the solutions. I want to 
thank you, Mr. Flores, for offering some of the things that 
Congress can do to be helpful. So I will reach out after this 
hearing to continue the conversation so we can get to 
solutions.
    The Members of the subcommittee may have additional 
questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond 
expeditiously in writing. The Chair reminds Members that the 
committee record remains open for 10 business days.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

     Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Brian Sulc
    Question. It's critical that we work to stop drugs from ever 
reaching our borders. What challenges does the Department face in 
working with international partners to prevent transnational 
organizations from manufacturing and smuggling opioids?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Pete Flores
    Question 1a. The Securing America's Ports Act was enacted into law 
last year, requiring DHS to develop a plan to achieve 100 percent cargo 
scanning rate of commercial and passenger vehicles at land ports of 
entry by using large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technology.
    What progress has CBP made to reach the 100 percent scanning rate?
    Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made 
significant progress toward increasing the percentage of arriving 
vehicles scanned at Land Ports of Entry (LPOE) on the Southwest Border 
(SWB). In fiscal year 2021, CBP procured Low-Energy Portal (LEP) 
systems and Multi-Energy Portal (MEP) Drive-Through Non-Intrusive 
Inspection (NII) systems. CBP estimates the procured systems will 
enable CBP to scan 40 percent of Passenger Occupied Vehicles (POV) and 
more than 70 percent of Commercially Occupied Vehicles (COV) at SWB 
LPOEs. For POVs, LEP systems are planned for deployment at 27 SWB 
LPOEs. For COVs, MEP systems are planned for deployment at 19 SWB 
LPOEs.
    CBP is working with multiple stakeholder groups at each LPOE to 
complete deployment activities in preparation for installing the 
systems in the coming years. CBP will continue to engage with Congress 
and provide updates on LEP and MEP deployment plans, scanning rate 
estimates, and the specific locations, as deployment activities are 
executed. A final deployment schedule is anticipated by the end of 
fiscal year 2022.
    Question 1b. What challenges does CBP face in attaining the 100 
percent scanning rate?
    Answer. CBP does not currently have the resources to scan 100 
percent of conveyances at LPOEs, nor is such a goal necessary or cost-
effective. The fiscal year 2019 investment in NII provided will allow 
CBP to significantly increase scanning capacity by about 20-fold in the 
POV and COV environments on the SWB once procured systems are deployed, 
which demonstrates a significant increase in scanning capacity. CBP 
currently scans 1 to 2 percent of POVs and 12 to 15 percent of COVs.
    Question 1c. What are the agency's plans to mitigate these 
challenges and what resources are needed to increase scanning?
    Answer. CBP's layered enforcement approach encompasses risk-based 
screening. This approach has proven effective, and CBP will continue to 
utilize risk-based screening to inform which conveyances to scan during 
NII operations. CBP will continually assess NII technology needs and 
transmit validated requirements through the Department's annual budget 
request.
           Questions From Hon. J. Luis Correa for Pete Flores
    Question 1a. In 2019, CBP conducted a pilot program at the cost of 
a private American company that successfully demonstrated the 
capabilities of passive muon tomography scanning systems designed to 
identify anomalies within dense cargo entering U.S. sea and land ports. 
After seeing the value and need for this technology, CBP publicly 
announced their intention to procure and deploy these systems beginning 
in our seaports. However, 3 years later, CBP still has not deployed a 
single passive muon tomography scanning system that they acknowledge 
addresses a known gap in their layered enforcement strategy. This delay 
has received a lot of attention and scrutiny from my colleagues and 
myself in particular, inquiring about the rationale behind CBP's 
decision making throughout this procurement process. CBP's responses 
have not only been woefully late but are also lacking in substance and 
dialog.
    Furthermore, it has recently come to light that a junior staffer 
within CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) has intentionally spread 
misinformation to Members of Congress and their staff in CBP's 
responses to our Congressional inquiries. Not only has this 
misinformation been intentionally sent to Capitol Hill to deliberately 
paint this American company in a bad light, but directly contradicts 
CBP's official position on muon tomography imaging technology. To 
confirm and reiterate CBP's interest in procuring this technology and 
the need for designated funding from Congress, you responded to the 
company with a letter stating CBP's official stance on the technology 
and its place within U.S. homeland security. To my knowledge, this 
junior staffer is still employed within the CBP's OFO.
    Two weeks ago, after learning of the actions of this junior staffer 
at CBP's OFO, I sent a letter to Commissioner Chris Magnus outlining my 
deep concerns with the broken procurement process and the internal 
dysfunction at CBP. In my letter, I discussed the lack of 
responsiveness from CBP to our official inquiries, the intentional 
spreading of misinformation to those Congressional inquiries by CBP, 
and how this broken process has severely stifled this and future 
public-private partnerships.
    Are you aware of the fact that someone within your own office (OFO) 
has been intentionally providing misinformation to Members of Congress 
and their staff who inquired about the delay in procurement and 
deployment of this technology?
    Answer. No, the CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) is not aware 
of any staff member within OFO intentionally providing misinformation 
to Members of Congress and their staff, nor would CBP permit such 
behavior.
    Question 1b. If ``YES,'' then: What plans do you have to rectify 
this public-private partnership and quickly procure and deploy this 
technology in our sea and land ports?
    Question 1c. If ``NO,'' then: What do you plan on doing to remedy 
the situation to alleviate the dysfunction internally at CBP?
    Answer. OFO is not aware of any staff member within OFO providing 
misinformation to Members of Congress and their staff regarding the 
procurement of the Discovery System (Muon Tomography system 
manufactured by Decision's Sciences International Corporation (DSIC)).
    Over the past 3 years, CBP has responded to several official 
letters and has held meetings regarding the results of the Discovery 
No-Cost Technology Demonstration conducted at Mariposa cargo facility 
within the Nogales Port of Entry. CBP's communications, to both 
Congress and DSIC, regarding the results of the No-Cost Technology 
Demonstration, were consistent based on the outcome of the Technology 
Demonstration.
    Question 2a. Congress has repeatedly directed CBP to engage in 
public-private partnerships with American companies to develop, 
produce, test, and deploy innovative technologies like passive muon 
tomography scanning systems. This internal dysfunction at CBP has 
delayed the procurement of this innovative technology for over 2 years, 
further stifling the prototypical public-private partnership they are 
supposed to facilitate.
    What is your official position on the deployment of passive muon 
tomography scanning systems?
    Answer. CBP conducted a No-Cost Technology Demonstration (TD) of 
Discovery. This TD was conducted under a no-cost Product/Service 
Demonstration Agreement between CBP and DSIC to test the Discovery 
system at the Mariposa cargo facility in the Port of Nogales, Arizona. 
The TD took place from January 2019 through December 2019. During the 
TD, the Discovery system was employed for both stream of commerce and 
deliberate test scenarios. Under controlled conditions, the Discovery 
system was able to display contrast between cargo and large quantity 
contraband for dense, inorganic cargo. Overall, the Discovery system 
demonstrated unique capabilities relative to CBP's current X-ray 
transmission systems. While the TD did not establish that Discovery was 
a suitable replacement for X-ray imaging technology, the TD did find 
the system could potentially compliment X-Ray imaging technology in the 
right operational environment. CBP remains interested in further 
assessing the Discovery system through a follow-on TD and has 
identified the New York/Newark seaport as a possible location. CBP must 
carefully weigh the additional TD with competing operational 
priorities, and ensure any future procurement is done in accordance 
with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies.
    Question 2b. With these types of delays, how do we expect private 
American companies to continue doing business with the Federal 
Government to increase our homeland security?
    Answer. CBP, as always, will continue to utilize fair and open 
competition procedures to acquire the products and services that meet 
our agency's needs. Once a need is identified, CBP solicits interest 
and information from industry partners, and always welcomes and 
encourages industry partners to stay apprised of our publicly-posted 
acquisition opportunities.
     Question From Chairwoman Nanette Diaz Barragan for Steve Cagen
    Question. It's critical that we work to stop drugs from ever 
reaching our borders. What challenges does the Department face in 
working with international partners to prevent transnational 
organizations from manufacturing and smuggling opioids?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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