[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 
                             REAUTHORIZATION

=======================================================================

                                (117-46)

                             REMOTE HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             APRIL 6, 2022

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
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     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas    District of Columbia
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              RICK LARSEN, Washington
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOHN KATKO, New York                 JOHN GARAMENDI, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             Georgia
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
MIKE BOST, Illinois                  DINA TITUS, Nevada
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
DOUG LaMALFA, California             JARED HUFFMAN, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas            JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            MARK DeSAULNIER, California
  Puerto Rico                        STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota          GREG STANTON, Arizona
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi           SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York         CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California           JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
Vacancy                              CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
                                     KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
                                     MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
                                     NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
                                     MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
                                     TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure:
    Remarks in memory of Representative Don Young................     1
    Opening statement............................................     2
    Prepared statement...........................................     4
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure:
    Remarks in memory of Representative Don Young................     2
    Opening statement............................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Texas, prepared statement.............................    47

                                WITNESS

Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety 
  Board, oral statement..........................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     7

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Letter of November 18, 2021, from Hon. Frank D. Lucas, Ranking 
  Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and Hon. 
  Brian Babin, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space and 
  Aeronautics, to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National 
  Transportation Safety Board, Submitted for the Record by Hon. 
  Brian Babin....................................................    19
Letter of April 20, 2022, from Catherine Chase, President, 
  Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, to Hon. Peter A. 
  DeFazio, Chair, and Hon. Sam Graves, Ranking Member, Committee 
  on Transportation and Infrastructure, Submitted for the Record 
  by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio.......................................    47

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National 
  Transportation Safety Board, from:
    Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson...................................    53
    Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr...........................    58
    Hon. Dina Titus..............................................    61
    Hon. Mark DeSaulnier.........................................    62
    Hon. Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia................................    63

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                             April 1, 2022

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers of Congress, Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure
    FROM:  LStaff, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure
    RE:      LHearing on ``National Transportation Safety Board 
Reauthorization.''
_______________________________________________________________________


                                PURPOSE

    The Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will 
hold a hearing on Wednesday, April 6, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. ET to 
discuss National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB or Board) 
reauthorization. The hearing will take place in 2167 Rayburn 
House Office Building and via Zoom. The Subcommittee on Coast 
Guard and Maritime Transportation recently held a hearing 
addressing small vessel safety.\1\ Thus, this hearing will 
focus on NTSB's reauthorization proposal and related 
transportation safety issues. The Committee will hear testimony 
from the Chair of the NTSB, the Honorable Jennifer Homendy.
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    \1\ Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
Hearing, March 21, 2022, ``A Review of Coast Guard Efforts to Improve 
Small Passenger Vessel Safety,'' information and videorecording 
available at: https://transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/
hearings/a-review-of-coast-guard-efforts-to-improve-small-passenger-
vessel-safety.
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                               BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

    The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by 
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in 
the United States and significant accidents in other modes of 
transportation--railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and 
commercial space.\2\ The agency establishes the facts and 
circumstances and determines the probable cause of the 
accidents it investigates, and issues safety recommendations 
aimed at preventing future accidents from occurring.\3\ In 
addition, it carries out special studies concerning 
transportation safety and coordinates the resources of the 
federal government and other organizations to assist victims 
and their family members impacted by transportation disasters. 
It also conducts safety research focused on broader safety 
questions and topic areas.\4\
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    \2\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 28, 2022, at 4, 
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/
Fiscal%20Year%202023%20Budget%20Request.pdf.
    \3\ Id.
    \4\ Id.
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    The NTSB also serves as the appellate authority for 
enforcement actions involving aviation and mariner certificates 
issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and United 
States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), and it also adjudicates 
appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.\5\ The NTSB 
was last reauthorized in the FAA Authorization Act of 2018, and 
its current authorization expires at the end of this fiscal 
year 2022.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Id.
    \6\ Pub. L. No. 115-254, Division C (2018), Available at: https://
uscode.house.gov/statutes/pl/115/254.pdf.
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HISTORY OF THE NTSB

    In 1967, Congress consolidated all transportation agencies 
into a new U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
established the NTSB as an independent agency placed within the 
DOT for administrative purposes.\7\ In creating the NTSB, 
Congress envisioned that a single organization with a clearly 
defined mission could more effectively promote a higher level 
of safety in the transportation system than the individual 
modal agencies working separately.\8\ Since 1967, the NTSB has 
investigated accidents in the aviation, highway, marine, 
pipeline, and railroad modes, as well as accidents related to 
the transportation of hazardous materials.
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    \7\ The aviation investigation function of the NTSB originated in 
the Air Commerce Act of 1926, in which the U.S. Congress charged the 
U.S. Department of Commerce with investigating the causes of aircraft 
accidents. The aircraft accident responsibility was later given to the 
Civil Aeronautics Board's Bureau of Aviation Safety, when it was 
created in 1940.
    \8\ Senate Report No. 93-1192 (1974), Transportation Safety Act of 
1974, at p. 14, Available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/
document/0055/12006477.pdf.
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    In 1974, Congress reestablished the NTSB as a separate 
entity from the DOT.\9\ Because the DOT has broad operational 
and regulatory responsibilities that affect the safety, 
adequacy, and efficiency of the transportation system, and 
transportation accidents may suggest deficiencies in that 
system, the NTSB's independence was deemed necessary for proper 
oversight.\10\ This allows the NTSB to conduct investigations 
and make recommendations from a completely objective and 
independent viewpoint.\11\
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    \9\ Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. Law 93-633 (1974).
    \10\ Senate Report No. 93-1192 (1974), Transportation Safety Act of 
1974, at p. 14-17, Available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/
library/document/0055/12006477.pdf.
    \11\ CRS, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): 
Background and Possible Issues for Reauthorization and Oversight, 
R44587, Aug. 10, 2016, at 1, Available at https://www.crs.gov/reports/
pdf/R44587.
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    In 1996, Congress assigned the NTSB the additional 
responsibility of coordinating federal assistance to families 
of aviation accident victims. While originally established to 
provide assistance following major aviation accidents, the 
program has been expanded by Congress to provide assistance in 
all modes of transportation on a case-by-case basis. In 2008, 
Congress directed NTSB to provide assistance to families of 
passengers in fatal rail passenger accidents.\12\
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    \12\ Pub. L. No. 110-432, Division A, Title V, Section 501.
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    Since its inception, the NTSB has investigated more than 
152,000 aviation accidents and thousands of surface 
transportation accidents.\13\ NTSB investigators travel 
throughout the country and internationally to investigate 
significant accidents and develop factual records and safety 
recommendations. To date, the NTSB has issued over 15,000 
safety recommendations to more than 2,400 recipients.\14\
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    \13\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 28, 2022, at 7, 
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/
Fiscal%20Year%202023%20Budget%20Request.pdf.
    \14\ Id.
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MOST WANTED LIST

    The NTSB's Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety 
Improvements highlights safety-critical actions that DOT modal 
administrations, the Coast Guard, and others need to take to 
help prevent accidents and save lives.\15\
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    \15\ NTSB's 2021-2022 Most Wanted List is available at: https://
www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/default.aspx.
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    NTSB's Most Wanted List for 2021-2022 includes the 
following recommendations, organized by NTSB modal office:
    I. LAviation:
       LRequire and Verify the Effectiveness of Safety 
Management Systems in all Revenue Passenger-Carrying Aviation 
Operations
       LInstall Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish 
Flight Data Monitoring Programs
    II. LHighway:
       LImplement a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate 
Speeding-Related Crashes
       LProtect Vulnerable Road Users through a Safe 
System Approach
       LPrevent Alcohol- and Other Drug-Impaired 
Driving
       LRequire Collision-Avoidance and Connected-
Vehicle Technologies on all Vehicles
       LEliminate Distracted Driving
    III. LMarine:
       LImprove Passenger and Fishing Vessel Safety
    IV. LRail, Pipeline, and Hazardous Materials:
       LImprove Pipeline Leak Detection and Mitigation
       LImprove Rail Worker Safety

    More detail on each of these items, including accidents 
that illustrate why each change is needed and information about 
how long the NTSB has sought the change, can be found on NTSB's 
website.\16\
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    \16\ Id.
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    The National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization 
Act of 2018 included a provision for the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) to examine NTSB's methodology for 
evaluating and selecting recommendations for inclusion in the 
Most Wanted List. GAO issued its revised report on March 19, 
2020.\17\ The report discusses: (1) NTSB's methodology for 
developing its Most Wanted List and (2) how NTSB addressed 
statutory requirements and how its methodology aligned with 
components for systematic decision-making, among other 
objectives. GAO reviewed NTSB documentation for its process of 
selecting issues for the Most Wanted List.\18\ GAO also 
interviewed NTSB officials to understand the rationale behind 
the selection methodology and how the process was applied.\19\ 
GAO compared the methodology to essential components for 
systematic decision-making and the statutory requirement that 
NTSB publish a publicly available methodology report that 
describes NTSB's consideration of key elements.\20\
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    \17\ GAO Report GAO-20-395, ``National Transportation Safety Board: 
More Detail Could Increase the Understanding of Selections for the Most 
Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements'' March 2020, 
Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-395.pdf.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.
    \20\ Id.
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    GAO provided two recommendations based on this examination:
    1. LThe Chairman of the Board should require the Safety 
Recommendation and Communication team to fully document its 
evaluations when assessing items to propose for Most Wanted 
List consideration; and
    2. LThe Chairman of the Board should take steps to publicly 
and fully communicate the selection rationale, such as 
including why NTSB believes an issue is ``ripe for action'' to 
its documentation on its website.\21\
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    \21\ Id.

    NTSB agreed with both recommendations, and GAO has since 
determined that the Board has completed recommendation number 
two.\22\ However, the first recommendation is still open, and 
GAO reports that as of February 2022, the Board is still in the 
process of formally establishing the criteria it uses to 
establish the most wanted list.\23\
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    \22\ GAO, National Transportation Safety Board: More Detail Could 
Increase the Understanding of Selections for the Most Wanted List of 
Transportation Safety Improvements [Reissued with revisions on Mar. 19, 
2020.], https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-395.
    \23\ Id.
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COMPLETING INVESTIGATIONS AND REPORTS

    Following its investigations, the NTSB issues reports that 
detail the accident investigated, identify cause or probable 
cause, and often include recommendations. The prompt completion 
of these reports informs the public, Congress, regulators, and 
the regulated community about transportation safety issues with 
an intended goal of preventing reoccurrence. The average length 
of time to conclude these investigation reports vary across the 
NTSB's offices that investigate accidents in the different 
modes. The tables below show the number of reports approved by 
the NTSB and the average time it takes to complete these 
reports.

                      Number of Board Approved Accident and Incident Investigation Reports
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  RPH
                                                               ----------------------------------------    All
           Report Year            Aviation   Highway   Marine                                    RPH     Offices
                                                                 Hazmat   Pipeline   Railroad   Total     Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016............................         2         6         2  ........  ........         3        3         13
2017............................         4         6         4  ........         1         8        9         23
2018............................         3         6         5  ........  ........         7        7         21
2019............................         2         6         3         1         2         5        8         19
2020............................         5         7         6  ........  ........         5        5         23
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  5-year Total..................        16        31        20         1         3        28       32         99
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        Average Time From Event to Release of Board Approved Accident and Incident Investigation Reports
                                                    [Months]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  RPH
                                                               ----------------------------------------    All
           Report Year            Aviation   Highway   Marine                                    RPH     Offices
                                                                 Hazmat   Pipeline   Railroad   Total     Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2016............................      15.0      20.1      18.5  ........  ........      18.7     18.7       18.7
2017............................      21.2      14.1      15.8  ........      20.5      26.1     25.5       20.1
2018............................      16.6      20.8      17.9  ........  ........      22.6     22.6       20.1
2019............................      24.1      16.0      18.6      19.9      22.5      23.6     22.9       20.2
2020............................      18.4      19.5      21.0  ........  ........      28.6     28.6       21.6
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  5-year Average (Months).......      19.1      18.1      18.6      19.9      21.8      24.4     24.1       20.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Letter from Former NTSB Chair Sumwalt dated April 30, 2021.

NTSB REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSAL

    On March 1, 2022, NTSB formally transmitted a 
reauthorization proposal to Congress.\24\ The proposal includes 
three titles: I. Ensuring Readiness for Our Mission, II. 
Enhancing Accountability and Improving Processes and Products, 
and III. Strengthening Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and 
Accessibility. The five-year bill requests authorization of 
appropriations for fiscal years (FY) 2023 through 2027. This 
bill would authorize $129.3 million in FY 2023, $145 million 
for FY 2024, $155 million for FY 2025, $165 million for FY 
2026, and $175 million for FY 2027. The legislative proposal 
includes several workforce development initiatives, changes and 
clarifications to investigative authorities for railroad and 
highway accidents, and changes to recommendation response 
requirements for the U.S. Coast Guard, among other items. The 
NTSB's full reauthorization proposal and section-by-section 
summary are included as appendices to this document.
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    \24\ Letter from NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy to Speaker of the 
House Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 1, 2022) (on file with Committee).
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COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

A. HISTORY OF NTSB INVOLVEMENT IN COMMERCIAL SPACE ACCIDENT 
                    INVESTIGATIONS

    The NTSB has led or supported commercial space accident 
investigations for nearly 30 years and acted as the lead agency 
in conducting two major space vehicle investigations. In 1993, 
the NTSB investigated the procedural anomaly that occurred 
during the launch of an Orbital Sciences Corporation Pegasus 
expendable launch vehicle--the launch was canceled by the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) range 
safety officer, only to then be reactivated independently by 
the Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital Sciences) test 
coordinator.\25\ In its final report, the NTSB issued 17 safety 
recommendations to the Department of Transportation (DOT), 
NASA, and Orbital Sciences.\26\ In 2014, the NTSB investigated 
the accident of the SpaceShipTwo reusable suborbital spaceplane 
that broke up during a rocket-powered test flight, killing the 
co-pilot.\27\ The NTSB issued a total of ten recommendations to 
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (AST) and the Commercial 
Spaceflight Federation (CSF).\28\
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    \25\ NTSB, Commercial Space Launch Incident, Launch Procedure 
Anomaly, Orbital Sciences Corporation, Pegasus/SCD-1, Rpt. No. SIR 93/
02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 1993).
    \26\ Id.
    \27\ NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites 
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, CA, Oct. 31, 2014, Rpt. No. 
AAR 15/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2015).
    \28\ Id.
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    In addition, the NTSB's Office of Aviation Safety (OAS) 
investigators have assisted NASA and Congressional 
investigative boards with the investigations of two space 
shuttle accident mishaps (1986; 2003) and assisted NASA with 
the investigation of the 2004 Genesis Spacecraft reentry 
accident.\29\ More recently, NTSB investigators have observed 
or taken part in several operator-led mishap investigations, 
including the October 2014 Orbital Science ATK Antares engine 
failure shortly after liftoff; the June 2015 launch failure of 
the Space X CRS-7 mission; the September 2016 pad explosion of 
the SpaceX Falcon 9 with the Amos-6 communications satellite; 
and the April 2019 SpaceX Dragon explosion that occurred during 
a ground test.\30\
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    \29\ Joseph M. Sedor, Do We Need An Annex 13 for Commercial Space 
Accidents, ISASI Forum 4-7, (Jan.-Mar. 2021).
    \30\ Id.; see also Jason Rhian, SpaceX Reveals Cause of Crew Dragon 
Explosion, Spaceflight Insider (Jul 15, 2019).
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B. CURRENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY

    The NTSB is authorized to investigate any launch or reentry 
accidents and other certain incidents through its general 
authority under section 1131 of title 49 of the United States 
Code, which states that the NTSB shall investigate ``any other 
accident related to the transportation of individuals or 
property when the Board decides the accident is catastrophic.'' 
\31\ The phrase ``when the Board decides'' gives the agency 
broad discretion to determine which accidents the agency 
investigates.\32\ In addition to NTSB's authority to 
investigate catastrophic transportation accidents, the statute 
also provides the agency with the authority to investigate (1) 
accidents involving problems of a recurring character and (2) 
accidents where the investigation would carry out specific 
authorities explicitly granted to the NTSB.\33\ The NTSB has 
also conducted an analysis on Congressional intent, which 
supported the forgoing assumption of authority.\34\
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    \31\ 49 USC 1131(a)(1)(F).
    \32\ Id.
    \33\ Id.
    \34\ ``The plain meaning of the phrase `related to transportation,' 
requires that accidents covered by section F have a rational 
relationship to transportation. Congress explicitly has addressed 
whether commercial space activity should be considered transportation 
when it determined that `space transportation . . . is an important 
element of the transportation system of the United States. . . .' 51 
U.S.C. Sec.  5090l(a)(8) (emphasis added). The NTSB also notes that the 
FAA's [AST], established by 51 U.S.C. Sec.  50921, has promulgated 
regulations governing commercial space launches. These regulations set 
forth definitions of accidents, incidents, and mishaps, with regard to 
launch and reentry vehicles, as well as a set of definitions 
specifically governing the regulation of such vehicles. 14 C.F.R. Sec.  
401.5. The involvement of the FAA in commercial space launch activities 
signifies that vehicles used in commercial space launches fall within 
the purview of the FAA's authority during specified periods of time, 
either because those activities are `transportation' or because they 
are so closely related to transportation that FAA oversight is 
necessary. In this regard, the involvement of the FAA's AST is both 
logical and reasonable: vehicles involved in commercial space launches 
must travel through the national airspace, wherein launches would need 
to be coordinated with air transportation systems to avoid interference 
with air traffic control as well as other aircraft.'' (See Appendix A 
in NTSB, In-Flight Breakup During Test Flight, Scaled Composites 
SpaceShipTwo, N339SS, Near Koehn Dry Lake, CA, Oct. 31, 2014, Rpt. No. 
AAR 15/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 2015)).
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C. MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING

    In addition to NTSB's statutory authority, there was the 
1985 addition of Appendix H (revised: 1999) to the 1975 
Reimbursable Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the NTSB and 
DOT.\35\ Appendix H established the relationships, notification 
procedures, coordination requirements, and reporting 
responsibilities of the NTSB and AST in connection with 
accident investigations for commercial space launch activities. 
Moreover, the MOA delineated that the NTSB would investigate 
commercial space launch accidents resulting in: (1) a mishap 
when any portion of a commercial space vehicle or payload 
impacts outside the expected launch failure crash zone; or (2) 
a fatality or serious injury to a person not associated with 
the launch activities; or (3) damage greater than $25,000 to 
property not associated with the launch activities.\36\ The MOA 
also stated that nothing in the agreement should be read to 
impair the NTSB's authority to investigate any other commercial 
space launch accident which, in the judgement of the Board, is 
subject to section 1131(a)(1)(F) of title 49, United States 
Code.
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    \35\ Reimbursable Mem. of Agreement between the NTSB & DOT, 
Appendix H (revised: 1999), available at: https://www.faa.gov/space/
legislation_regulation_guidance/media/mou_space_launch_accidents.pdf.
    \36\ Id.
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    Finally, in addition to adhering to the terms of the MOAs, 
the NTSB's 2004 memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the FAA 
and the U.S. Air Force established the relationships among 
agencies during space launch accidents and provided a guide to 
the exchange of information and participation in accident 
investigations.\37\
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    \37\ Mem. of Understanding between NTSB, Dept. of AF, & FAA re: 
Space Launch Accidents (2004), available at: https://www.faa.gov/space/
legislation_regulation_guidance/media/mou_space_launch_accidents.pdf.
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D. COMMERCIAL SPACE ACCIDENT RULEMAKING

    On November 16, 2021, the NTSB issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) regarding commercial space accident 
investigations to update and ensure the transparency of the 
agency's commercial space safety investigative authority.\38\ 
In issuing the NPRM, the NTSB noted that----
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    \38\ NPRM Codifying NTSB's Commercial Space Safety Investigative 
Authority by Creating Subpart F, 86 Fed. Reg. 63324 (proposed Nov. 16, 
2021) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. 831) available at: https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/11/16/2021-24766/commercial-
space-investigations.
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    (1) Lcommercial space launch is a unique mode of 
transportation; and
    (2) Lthe unique investigatory procedures needed for 
commercial space accidents and incidents are distinct enough 
from other modes of transportation to warrant codifying the 
differences.\39\
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    \39\ Id.

    Thus, the NPRM creates a separate Subpart F for Commercial 
Space Investigations and addresses notification requirements 
following an accident or incident, preservation of wreckage and 
records, relationships with other federal agencies, and the 
treatment of investigative information, among other things.\40\
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    \40\ Id.
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    The NTSB maintains that by transitioning and updating the 
information from the MOA and MOU to Subpart F, the commercial 
space industry will have more clarity on how and when the NTSB 
would initiate an investigation of a commercial space mishap. 
The NTSB also maintains that while there is very little change 
to the procedures themselves, the NPRM finally allows the 
commercial space industry the opportunity to provide feedback 
on the NTSB investigative process via the rulemaking 
process.\41\
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    \41\ Letter from Jennifer Homendy, Chair, NTSB, to Rep. Lucas, R.M. 
of House Comm. on SST (Dec. 3, 2021) (on file with Cmte Staff).
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E. COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT

    In the 116th Congress, Aviation Subcommittee Ranking Member 
Garret Graves--along with Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member S. 
Graves, Chair Larsen, and Representative Davids as original 
cosponsors--introduced H.R. 1562, the Commercial Space 
Transportation Safety Act of 2019. The bill would have codified 
the NTSB's authority to investigate commercial space accidents 
into Title 49. Specifically, it amended 49 USC 1131(a)(1) to 
clarify the NTSB's ability to investigate commercial space 
launch accidents, when accidents involve----
     LImpacts outside the hazard-zone;
     LFatalities on board the launch vehicle or 
otherwise; or
     LSubstantial damage not affiliated with the launch 
site and away from the launch site.

NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

    The NTSB estimates there are approximately 1,750 domestic 
aviation accidents and incidents annually it is responsible for 
investigating.\42\ As of May 2020, NTSB had investigated over 
152,000 aviation accidents and incidents in its history.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ NTSB, Office of Aviation Safety, available at https://
www.ntsb.gov/about/organization/AS/Pages/office_as.aspx.
    \43\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 28, 2022, at 7, 
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/
Fiscal%20Year%202023%20Budget%20Request.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On domestic U.S. part 121 airline flights, there has only 
been one commercial airline passenger fatality in more than 90 
million flights in over a decade.\44\ Prior to that single 
passenger fatality in April 2018, the last fatal domestic 
commercial airline accident occurred in February 2009, when 
Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, New York, killing 
all 49 onboard and one person on the ground.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ On April 17, 2018, Southwest Airlines Flight 1380 experienced 
an engine failure, resulting in loss of an engine inlet and cowling. 
Fragments struck the airplane's fuselage and damaged a cabin window, 
killing one passenger onboard. NTSB, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, 
May 27, 2021, at 35-36, Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/
reports/Documents/NTSB-fy22-budget-request.pdf.
    \45\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The NTSB's participation in any foreign accident 
investigation is conducted in accordance with the Chicago 
Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization's 
(ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS), provided in 
Annex 13, which entitles the State of Design and Manufacture of 
the aircraft involved in the accident to appoint an accredited 
representative to participate in the investigation.\46\ The 
NTSB participates in aviation accidents involving any aircraft 
operated by or designed, manufactured, or registered to a U.S. 
company.\47\ In these cases, ``upon receiving ICAO notification 
of the accident or serious incident, the NTSB designates a US-
accredited representative and appoints technical advisors to 
carry out the obligations, receive the entitlements, provide 
consultation, and receive safety recommendations from the state 
of occurrence.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ NTSB, 2020 Annual Report to Congress, 2021, at 21, Available 
at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/NTSB-2020-ARC.pdf.
    \47\ CRS, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): 
Background and Possible Issues for Reauthorization and Oversight, 
R44587, Aug. 10, 2016, at 3-4, Available at https://www.crs.gov/
reports/pdf/R44587.
    \48\ NTSB, 2020 Annual Report to Congress, 2021, at 21, Available 
at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/NTSB-2020-ARC.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. NTSB AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS

    The NTSB's OAS reports to NTSB's Office of the Managing 
Director.\49\ The OAS is responsible for:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ NTSB, NTSB Organization, https://www.ntsb.gov/about/
organization/Pages/default.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1. LInvestigating all civil domestic air carrier, commuter, 
and air taxi accidents; in-flight collisions; fatal and 
nonfatal general aviation accidents; and certain public-use 
aircraft accidents,
    2. LParticipating in the investigation of major airline 
crashes in foreign countries that involve U.S. carriers or 
U.S.-manufactured or -designed equipment to fulfill U.S. 
obligations under International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) agreements, and
    3. LConducting investigations of safety issues that extend 
beyond a single accident to examine specific aviation safety 
problems from a broader perspective.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ NTSB, Office of Aviation Safety, https://www.ntsb.gov/about/
organization/AS/Pages/office_as.aspx.

    The OAS proposes probable causes for domestic aviation 
accidents and incidents to the NTSB Board for approval and 
works with other NTSB offices to formulate recommendations.\51\ 
Office of Aviation staff are located throughout the country to 
maintain closer proximity to potential aviation accident 
sites.\52\ Within the Office of Aviation are the following 
divisions: Major Investigations Division, Operational Factors 
Division, Aviation Engineering Division, Human Performance/
Survival Factors Division, and the Writing and Editing 
Division.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Id.
    \52\ Id.
    \53\ NTSB, Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 27, 2021, at 29-31, 
Available at: https://www.ntsb.gov/about/reports/Documents/NTSB-fy22-
budget-request.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION

    The NTSB plays a critically important role in 
transportation safety by conducting independent investigations 
into the causes and critical factors behind accidents and 
issuing recommendations to prevent reoccurrence of accidents. 
This hearing will address the NTSB's reauthorization proposal 
and other related issues.

                              WITNESS LIST

     LThe Honorable Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National 
Transportation Safety Board

                                                         Appendix A
[The National Transportation Safety Board Authorization Act of 
2022 proposal is retained in committee files and is available 
online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW00/20220406/
114601/HMKP-117-PW00-20220406-SD002.pdf]

                                                         Appendix B
[The National Transportation Safety Board Authorization Act of 
2022 section-by-section analysis is retained in committee files 
and is available online at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/
PW00/20220406/114601/HMKP-117-PW00-20220406-SD003.pdf]

 
          NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REAUTHORIZATION

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2022

                  House of Representatives,
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                            Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room 
2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Peter A. 
DeFazio (Chair of the committee) presiding.
    Members present: Mr. DeFazio, Ms. Norton, Ms. Johnson of 
Texas, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr. Cohen, 
Mr. Sires, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Payne, Mr. 
Lowenthal, Mr. DeSaulnier, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Carbajal, Mr. 
Malinowski, Mr. Stanton, Ms. Davids of Kansas, Mr. Garcia of 
Illinois, Mr. Delgado, Mr. Lamb, Mr. Auchincloss, Ms. 
Bourdeaux, Mr. Kahele, Ms. Strickland, Ms. Williams of Georgia, 
Mr. Graves of Missouri, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Massie, Mr. Rodney 
Davis of Illinois, Mr. Katko, Dr. Babin, Mr. Graves of 
Louisiana, Mr. Weber of Texas, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Westerman, Miss 
Gonzalez-Colon, Mr. Stauber, Mr. Burchett, Mr. Johnson of South 
Dakota, Dr. Van Drew, Mr. Gimenez, and Mrs. Steel.
    Mr. DeFazio. The Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent authorizing the chair to declare 
recess during the hearing.
    And we will now go to my opening statement, which is 
somewhere. I read it before. There it is, thank you. OK.
    Before we start, I would like to ask for a moment of 
silence for our colleague, Don Young, who I served with for 35 
years and some-odd months. He was here longer than that. Don 
was larger than life. I have got Don Young stories like 
everybody else does, with the knife and the--all the other 
things. But we became good friends over those years.
    We served together on the House Committee on Natural 
Resources and then, obviously, on the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure. He did the last significant 
bill originating from this committee on surface transportation 
infrastructure, in my opinion, and we have done one since--the 
SAFETEA-LU bill, which was a great benefit to the Nation.
    He stayed true to his values and the people of Alaska, and 
his service was extraordinary. So, we will just observe a 
moment of silence.
    [A moment of silence is observed.]
    Mr. DeFazio. Now, I would like to thank the Chair, National 
Transportation Safety Board Chair, Jennifer Homendy, for 
appearing before us today. She----
    Voice [interrupting]. Stop for a second.
    Mr. DeFazio. What?
    Voice. You were supposed to call on Sam first.
    Mr. DeFazio [to Mr. Graves of Missouri]. Oh, I am so--oh, 
sorry, sorry.
    OK, well, I moved to another page. OK, Sam.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It was truly 
a sad day for the committee when the Dean of the House and our 
former chairman passed away.
    So, I began my congressional career the same year that Don 
took over the committee in 2001. And from day one, he was 
always a friend and a mentor to me, and I know he was to so 
many of us, obviously, on the committee. And we all know how 
fiercely he fought for Alaska, and how fiercely he fought for 
the people of Alaska. And we also know just how passionate he 
was about this committee, and the work that we do here. And he 
never failed to set a tone of bipartisanship to make sure that 
the work always got done.
    I think that when he had his committee portrait done, he 
knew that one day he would be gone, but he would never want any 
of us to forget his example. So, he made sure that we were 
always able to look right up there, and remember that this 
committee is about working together for the good of America's 
infrastructure and our, obviously, many modes of 
transportation.
    But with that, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 
opportunity, and it is the end of an era.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thanks. Thanks, Sam. Don does have a unique 
portrait.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. DeFazio. We will miss him.
    So, now I would like to formally thank National 
Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy for 
appearing before us today. She has sat on this side for many, 
many years, and worked on this committee. She was a tireless 
advocate for safety, while serving as staff director for the 
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 
from 2004 to 2018.
    We went through a lot of struggles in that time. I 
particularly remember the issue over the tank cars, which is 
mostly solved, but we still get some.
    The NTSB is an independent Federal agency responsible for 
civil transportation accident investigations. It is charged 
with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United 
States and through international agreements overseas, and 
significant accidents that occur in other modes of 
transportation, such as major accidents that involve a 
railroad, highway, maritime operation, or pipeline. The agency 
establishes the facts and circumstances, determines the 
probable cause, and issues safety recommendations aimed at 
preventing future accidents, many of which are still pending.
    The NTSB was last reauthorized in the FAA Reauthorization 
Act of 2018, and its current authorization expires at the end 
of this fiscal year. That is why it is important for us to hear 
from NTSB today about its reauthorization proposal, and its 
challenges and priorities for meeting its safety mission in the 
coming years.
    Even as the transportation safety sector has expanded--the 
size of the U.S. DOT has increased by more than 2,000 employees 
over the last 10 years--NTSB has remained at the same staffing 
levels. With the caseload at NTSB increasing and many long-
serving NTSB employees near retirement, the agency needs to 
attract new talent for the future.
    Moreover, as it expands its hiring pool, it must seek to 
attract a diverse workforce and prioritize equity, inclusion, 
and accessibility.
    Another important item addressed in NTSB's reauthorization 
is the timeliness of its accident investigation reports. From 
2016 to 2020, the average length of time it took NTSB to 
investigate an accident across modes crept up from 18.7 months 
to 21.6 in 2020. The longer it takes NTSB to analyze and then 
issue reports and recommendations, the longer it takes for 
other agencies or Congress to implement them. These delays have 
potential detrimental impacts on safety.
    So, I look forward to hearing from Chair Homendy on what 
resources the agency needs, hopefully unconstrained by concerns 
at OMB or the White House or anywhere else, straight up what 
you need.
    I also want to acknowledge the recent crash on March 21, 
2022, of the Boeing 737-800 NG operated by China Eastern 
Airlines in southern China, killing all 132 passengers and crew 
aboard. Obviously, our thoughts and prayers go out to the 
victims, their families, and friends.
    While we are awaiting details, with the cooperation, 
hopefully, of the Chinese Government, I want to hear about the 
role that NTSB and other U.S.-based stakeholders may play in 
the ongoing investigation. It is a puzzling accident, and we 
need to find out what went on with that flight.
    An ongoing concern for this committee is the FAA's 
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act, ACSAA--acronyms abound--and recommendations 
from the NTSB and other investigative authorities following the 
737 MAX crashes. While the NTSB was not the lead civil aviation 
authority, NTSB did participate and took decisive action by 
issuing a series of recommendations to the FAA in September 
2019 related to assumptions used in the safety assessment 
process and the effects of multiple alerts and indications on 
pilot performance. We based several provisions of the aircraft 
certification reform legislation on those recommendations.
    Now Boeing is seeking certification from the FAA of the 737 
MAX 10, which, unlike every other passenger aircraft being 
produced in the world today and over quite a number of years, 
will not have an advanced flight crew alerting system. It 
became the industry standard in 1982, even before I was on this 
committee, on every other Airbus and Boeing model, except for 
the 737s.
    The aircraft certification bill gave the FAA a 2-year grace 
period to certify aircraft without the advanced flight crew 
alerting system, but that grace period should not be extended. 
And I urge the FAA, who might be listening, to take a close 
look at the NTSB's recommendations and this committee's 
extensive investigations report before completing its 
certification.
    I look forward to hearing from Chair Homendy on these 
issues and others.
    I now recognize the ranking member, Sam Graves, for his 
opening statement.
    [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in 
      Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    I would like to thank National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
Chair Jennifer Homendy for appearing before us today. Chair Homendy's 
dedication to transportation safety has defined her career. She was a 
tireless advocate for safety while serving as the Staff Director of the 
T&I Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials from 
2004 to 2018. That fierce dedication to improving safety led her to the 
NTSB in 2018, and I expect it to shape her tenure as Chair.
    The NTSB is an independent federal agency responsible for civil 
transportation accident investigation. The NTSB is charged with 
investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and 
significant accidents that occur on other modes of transportation--such 
as major accidents that involve a railroad, highway, maritime 
operation, or pipeline. The agency establishes the facts and 
circumstances, determines the probable cause, and issues safety 
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents.
    The NTSB was last reauthorized in the Federal Aviation 
Administration Reauthorization Act of 2018, and its current 
authorization expires at the end of this fiscal year. That's why it's 
important for us to hear from NTSB today about its reauthorization 
proposal, and its challenges and priorities for meeting its safety 
mission in the coming years.
    Even as the transportation sector has expanded and the size of the 
U.S. Department of Transportation has increased by more than 2,000 
employees over the last 10 years, NTSB has remained at the same 
staffing levels. With the caseload at NTSB increasing and many long-
serving NTSB employees near retirement, the agency must attract talent 
for the future. Moreover, as the NTSB expands its hiring pool, it must 
seek to attract a more diverse workforce and prioritize diversity, 
equity, inclusion, and accessibility.
    Another important item addressed in NTSB's reauthorization proposal 
is the timeliness of its accident investigation reports. From 2016 to 
2020, the average length of time it took NTSB to investigate an 
accident across modes crept up from 18.7 months in 2016 to 21.6 months 
in 2020. The longer that NTSB takes to issue reports and 
recommendations, the longer it takes for other agencies to implement 
them--these delays have detrimental impacts on safety. I look forward 
to hearing from Chair Homendy about what resources the agency needs to 
address these challenges.
    Separately, I want to acknowledge the recent crash on March 21, 
2022, of a Boeing 737-800 NG operated by China Eastern Airlines in 
southern China, killing all 132 passengers and crew aboard. My thoughts 
and prayers are with the families and friends of the victims. While we 
are still awaiting details on the causes of the crash, I hope to hear 
from Chair Homendy about the role NTSB and other U.S.-based 
stakeholders may play in the ongoing investigation. We need answers, 
and we need to be ready to take action to ensure the global aviation 
system is as safe as possible.
    An ongoing concern for this committee is the FAA's implementation 
of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (ACSAA) 
and recommendations from the NTSB and other investigative authorities 
following the Boeing 737 MAX crashes. While the NTSB was not the lead 
civil aviation authority for the investigations of the crashes, NTSB 
did participate and took decisive action by issuing a series of 
recommendations to the FAA in September 2019 related to assumptions 
used in the safety assessment process and the effects of multiple 
alerts and indications on pilot performance. We based several 
provisions of the aircraft certification legislation on these 
recommendations.
    Now Boeing is seeking certification from the FAA of the Boeing 737 
MAX-10, which will not have an advanced flight crew alerting system--a 
system that became an industry standard in 1982 and is on every current 
Airbus and Boeing model under production except for the 737s. The 
aircraft certification bill gave the FAA a two-year grace period to 
certify aircraft without the advanced flight crew alerting system, but 
that grace period should not be extended. I urge the FAA to take a 
close look at the NTSB's recommendations and this committee's extensive 
investigation report before completing its certification.
    I look forward to hearing from Chair Homendy on these important 
issues. I now recognize Ranking Member Sam Graves for his opening 
statement.

    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
to our witness, Chairman Homendy, for being here.
    The NTSB plays an important role in ensuring safety across 
all modes of transportation. The committee is aware of the 
NTSB's reauthorization proposal and appreciates today's 
opportunity to discuss it with you.
    The Board was last reauthorized with the FAA 
reauthorization of 2018, where we made a lot of important 
improvements to the agency's organization, how the agency 
conducts investigations, and the kind of information provided 
to Congress in the agency's annual report and Most Wanted List.
    As this committee considers the agency's reauthorization 
proposal this year, we should also be looking at how NTSB has 
implemented the various requirements of its current 
authorization law. I also encourage Members to be thinking 
about additional ideas to ensure that the NTSB carries out its 
duties in a more efficient and effective manner.
    As Chair Homendy knows, the NTSB's backlog of accident 
reports and investigations is unacceptable. While I am pleased 
that the agency is taking action to address the backlog, we 
need to ensure that this kind of issue does not occur again. A 
more efficient NTSB will yield timely reports and 
recommendations and better equip the transportation sector with 
the information that it needs to maintain and improve safety.
    So, I look forward to hearing what you have to say on your 
priorities, and I look forward to reviewing the NTSB's 
reauthorization proposal more closely. Thank you.
    [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair DeFazio, and thank you to our witness, National 
Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy.
    The NTSB plays an important role in ensuring safety across all 
modes of transportation. The Committee is aware of the NTSB's 
reauthorization proposal and appreciates today's opportunity to discuss 
it with the Chair.
    The Board was last reauthorized with the Federal Aviation 
Administration in 2018, where we made important improvements to the 
agency's organization, how the agency conducts investigations, and the 
kind of information provided to Congress in the agency's annual report 
and Most Wanted List.
    As the Committee considers the agency's reauthorization proposal, 
we should also be looking at how the NTSB has implemented the various 
requirements of its current authorization law. I also encourage Members 
to be thinking about additional ideas to ensure the NTSB carries out 
its duties in a more efficient and effective manner.
    As Chair Homendy knows, the NTSB's backlog of accident reports and 
investigations is unacceptable. While I am pleased that the agency is 
taking action to address this backlog, we need to ensure that this kind 
of issue does not occur again. A more efficient NTSB will yield 
timelier reports and recommendations and better equip the 
transportation sector with the information it needs to maintain and 
improve safety.
    I look forward to hearing about Chair Homendy's priorities and to 
reviewing the NTSB's submitted proposal more closely.

    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks, Chairman.
    Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman.
    Chair Homendy, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

           TESTIMONY OF HON. JENNIFER HOMENDY, CHAIR,
              NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

    Ms. Homendy. Thank you, and good morning, Chairman DeFazio, 
Ranking Member Graves, and members and staff of the committee. 
As Chair of the NTSB, I thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today in support of our reauthorization request.
    I would also like to thank you for being one of the NTSB's 
biggest safety champions. Your leadership on transportation 
safety is unparalleled, and your support of NTSB 
recommendations has brought about significant safety 
improvements in the United States and across the globe.
    Unfortunately, many of you know our agency because of our 
investigations of tragedies that occurred in your districts or 
affected your constituents personally, like the duck boat 
sinking in Branson, Missouri, and the Amtrak derailment in 
DuPont, Washington. I would like to take a moment to remember 
those who died or were injured in these and other tragedies 
that we have investigated, and offer our deepest sympathies to 
the survivors and families we have come to know.
    Part of the mission of the NTSB is to support the victims' 
families. We give them the only promise we can: that we will 
investigate and issue safety recommendations aimed at 
preventing similar tragedies, and work vigorously to see that 
those safety recommendations are implemented. That is not just 
our agency's mission, it is also the mission of our workforce.
    We are a small but mighty agency of 404 highly skilled 
professionals, and every single one has dedicated their lives 
to transportation safety. The people of NTSB are on call around 
the clock every day of the year, ready to launch to the scene 
of an accident or crash anywhere in the world. Their dedication 
to safety ensures that lessons are learned from every tragedy 
we investigate.
    Our workforce inspires me every day by putting our mission 
first. Between the time I was nominated and sworn in as Chair, 
I met with staff throughout our agency to listen and learn 
about their needs, our successes, and our greatest challenges. 
This reauthorization proposal was driven by our workforce. It 
addresses their vision for our agency, and we are here today to 
advocate for them.
    Our reauthorization proposal represents an investment in a 
skilled workforce, because it is our people who will ensure the 
NTSB is a mission-first agency for years to come. The bill will 
support our mission in four ways.
    First, it will allow us to begin rightsizing the agency 
workforce, which has been stagnant for two decades. We are at 
roughly the same number of FTEs as we were in 1998, even as the 
demands on our staff rise with increasingly complex 
investigations. Our proposal will allow us to fill empty 
positions and modestly expand in staffing across all modes and 
offices to meet future transportation safety challenges. Quite 
simply, we need more people.
    But it is not just about headcount. The skills we need for 
our future workforce are also important. That leads me to the 
second thing our bill will accomplish, which is to provide our 
workforce with the training and development needed to keep pace 
with the rapid change and technological advancement taking 
place in transportation.
    For example, we are seeing new vehicles on our roads, 
railways, waterways, and in our skies. This includes advanced 
air mobility, unmanned aircraft systems, and autonomous vessels 
and vehicles. We are also seeing new fuel sources like hydrogen 
and lithium-ion batteries, and we are seeing new ways of 
transporting people and goods like commercial human 
spaceflight. While exciting, each of these advancements 
presents unique safety risks, and the NTSB must be--will be--
ready to respond to all of them.
    Third, our bill will allow us to procure the equipment and 
technology our people need to conduct cutting-edge 
investigations in this changing landscape.
    Finally, the bill also includes measures to enhance the 
agency's accountability and improve our processes and products.
    In closing, our reauthorization proposal represents an 
investment in a skilled workforce, because it is our people who 
will ensure we are ready should your constituents or anyone 
else need us in the wake of a transportation tragedy. If we do 
these four things with the funds we have requested, we will be 
better positioned to serve our vital safety mission today, and 
tomorrow will be truly mission-first.
    I appreciate your support of the NTSB. Thank you for your 
consideration, and thank you so much for your transportation 
safety leadership.
    [Ms. Homendy's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
          Prepared Statement of Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair,
                  National Transportation Safety Board
    Good morning, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and members 
of the Committee. As Chair of the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB), I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today in 
support of our request for reauthorization.
    As you know, the NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by 
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United 
States and significant events in other modes of transportation--
highway, rail, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the 
probable cause of the events we investigate, and issue safety 
recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we 
conduct special transportation safety studies and special 
investigations, and coordinate the resources of the federal government 
and other organizations to assist victims and their family members who 
have been impacted by major transportation disasters. We also serve as 
the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and 
mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), and we adjudicate 
appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.
    The NTSB is a small agency relative to our federal partners, in 
terms of the size of our budget and our workforce, but our impact is 
profound. Everyone at the NTSB plays a role in achieving our mission to 
make transportation safer. The reauthorization proposal sent to 
Congress represents a robust investment in a skilled workforce that 
will enhance transportation safety nationwide and across all 
transportation modes. Our dynamic workforce includes:
      Investigators that go to the scene of an investigation 
and those who work in our laboratories;
      Family assistance specialists who support victims and 
their families;
      Writers who develop our reports and help craft our safety 
recommendations;
      Advocates for our safety recommendations;
      Administrative and human resources officers who support 
our ability to recruit, retain, and train our workforce and make sure 
we acquire and manage our resources responsibly;
      Those who keep our technology up-to-date and reliable;
      Judges and legal counsel who decide pilots' and mariners' 
certification appeals; and
      Communications professionals who share the agency's work 
with the public and our stakeholders.

    Their hard work, professionalism, and dedication is the reason that 
the NTSB is regarded as the world's preeminent safety agency, and one 
of the best places to work in the federal government.
    Even as we have seen tremendous growth and technological 
advancements in transportation over the last two decades, the size of 
our agency is virtually the same as it was 20 years ago, with 
approximately 400 employees. To continue as the world's preeminent 
safety agency and complete our investigations and develop 
recommendations that advance safety changes without delays, we must 
meet the challenges that come with the increasing growth and innovation 
in transportation. Therefore, it is critical for the agency to have 
additional resources to respond to events without affecting timeliness, 
quality, or our independence. Our reauthorization proposal to Congress 
includes a request for resources and hiring flexibilities to increase 
staffing, including the number of investigators across all modes of 
transportation. These resources will allow us to hire professionals 
with the required skills, to purchase the equipment necessary for those 
skilled professionals to do their jobs, and to invest in crucial staff 
training and development. Our workforce is our greatest asset and they 
are essential to our mission.
    Despite the challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, over 
the past two years we continued our critical work of completing 
significant and complex investigations and issuing safety 
recommendations to prevent similar tragedies. These completed 
investigations were tragedies that occurred in some of your districts 
or involved your constituents, such as:
      The sinking of an amphibious passenger vessel in Branson, 
Missouri;
      The crash of Atlas Air Flight 3591 in Trinity Bay, Texas;
      A limousine crash in Schoharie, New York;
      A dive boat fire near Santa Cruz, California;
      A collision between a truck driver and motorcyclists in 
Randolph, New Hampshire;
      A natural gas-fueled house explosion in Dallas, Texas; 
and
      A midair collision in Ketchikan, Alaska.

    Also in 2020 and 2021, we issued 264 new recommendations and closed 
297. Of those closed, 245 (82 percent) were closed acceptably, meaning 
that the recommendation recipient took action to implement the safety 
recommendation.
    Our current investigative workload includes over 1,600 active 
investigations in 49 states and Puerto Rico, in addition to supporting 
approximately 70 foreign investigations in over 40 countries. The vast 
majority of these are aviation accidents being investigated by staff 
from our four regional offices. They also include major investigations 
such as:
      The bridge collapse in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania;
      A ship striking a pipeline off of Huntington Beach, 
California;
      The Washington Metropolitan and Transit Authority 
derailment at the Rosslyn station in Arlington, Virginia;
      Multiple fatal accidents involving railroad employees;
      The United Airlines flight 328 engine incident over 
Denver, Colorado;
      An Amtrak derailment in Joplin, Montana; and
      The Trans Air 810 ditching into the Pacific Ocean near 
Honolulu, Hawaii.
              Developing a Robust and Resilient Workforce
    Our reauthorization proposal represents a strong investment in our 
workforce. They must be able to analyze, understand, and respond to the 
technological changes that we are seeing in the transportation 
industry. This proposal will ensure they can. We greatly appreciate 
Congress's continued support for our budget requests; however, our 
funding has not kept pace with the need to hire additional 
investigative and support staff, to train them, or to make needed 
program investments in information technology and enhanced data 
capabilities.
    While our annual appropriations have increased from $97 million in 
fiscal year (FY) 2013 to $121.4 million in FY2022, our staffing levels 
have remained about the same. Our fiscal year 2023 request of $129.3 
million, however, does not allow us to grow our staff because while our 
funding has modestly grown, annual employee pay increases and required 
increases in retirement and health insurance benefit contributions have 
taken up more than 60 percent of the total appropriations increase. My 
hope is that over time, this proposal will authorize sufficient funding 
to allow the agency to fill empty positions and to expand our staffing 
modestly in order to meet future transportation safety challenges.
    The NTSB has a dedicated and mission driven workforce. On the one 
hand, we have an experienced and seasoned staff. On the other hand, 
many of our employees have spent their careers pursuing transportation 
safety, and they are coming to the end of their working years. In fact, 
right now, roughly 20 percent of our agency is eligible to retire. In 
the first third of this fiscal year, the agency has seen increased 
rates of retirement compared to previous years. This year, we have 
already seen 11 staff retire. Over the next 5 years, the number of 
employees eligible to retire will grow to roughly 41 percent of the 
agency.
    The goal of our reauthorization proposal is to right-size the 
agency over time and to ensure that our employees have the right skill 
set. This year, our goal is to grow by about ten percent, increasing 
our staffing to roughly 412 full-time equivalent positions in 
anticipation of further attrition of the workforce through retirements 
or separations, adding roughly 15 people per year through 2027 in 
addition to filling the vacancies that will occur. These 75 total 
positions do not even fill one-half of the identified needs in our 
agency. In fact, our staff identified the need for an additional 192 
positions over the next five years.
    The NTSB's work requires highly skilled employees with specific 
technical expertise and work experience. Once hired, we must train 
those employees and continue to offer a competitive salary and 
benefits, as well as provide ongoing training in order to retain them. 
To that end, over the next 18 months, we are working with the US Office 
of Personnel Management to develop a strategic human capital plan to 
address the agency's immediate and long-term employment needs based on 
trends in the transportation industry; support employee retention and 
succession planning; and identify areas in which competency gaps 
presently exist. Part of this plan must include efforts to increase the 
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility of the agency workforce 
and facilities. Until that plan is in effect, we are requesting the 
authority to directly hire certain critical technical personnel and 
highly qualified investigators. Our success in developing a robust and 
resilient workforce will depend on these efforts as well as increased 
resources.
     Enhancing Accountability and Improving Processes and Products
    When I became Chair in August of 2021, I asked our leadership team 
to analyze our agency's risks, where we needed to improve our processes 
and products, and where we could enhance our accountability. I also 
engaged with a wide variety of stakeholders, including our rank-and-
file staff in headquarters and in the regions, to get their thoughts on 
where we stand as an agency, and where they think we need to go.
    Numerous changes grew out of that analysis and those conversations 
including significant improvements to our ability to close out 
investigations. The timeliness of our reports had become a risk but our 
ability to complete investigations and issue safety recommendations is 
critical to improving transportation safety. Resources are important to 
ensure that our investigations are done thoroughly and that our 
independence is not compromised. However, the process by which we 
complete the investigation also matters. We established a process that 
filled open investigative and technical review positions to support the 
mission; triaged investigations that were ready for expedited 
completion through reassignment; used retired annuitants to broaden the 
pool of report reviewers in the short-term while creating a longer-term 
solution; enhanced employee performance standards; and developed 
quality metrics and a means to track them for all investigations.
    We prioritized efforts to reduce workplace risk to our people, such 
as implementing a new voluntary safety reporting program and providing 
safety training to improve the competencies of the NTSB workforce. And, 
something that I am incredibly proud of, our leadership team is working 
to finalize a new annual agreement with the State Department to ensure 
that if our staff are injured while participating in an international 
investigation, they can be evacuated during crisis, including medical 
emergencies. Across the agency, we are actively searching for and 
mitigating risks. Resources provided under this reauthorization will 
support those efforts.
    In addition, I discovered that despite a 1986 Executive Order \1\ 
that directed federal agencies to implement a program for drug testing 
certain employees, no program was fully instituted at the NTSB. 
Although we are already taking action to address that issue, this 
proposal includes a provision directing the agency to implement a drug-
testing program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Executive Order 12564 (https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/codification/executive-order/12564.html)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Likewise, safety improvements depend on our recommendation 
recipients being accountable for responding to and implementing our 
safety recommendations. Before 2003, the USCG was required to respond 
to NTSB safety recommendations within 90 days and to provide an annual 
report to Congress on the regulatory status of each recommendation on 
our Most Wanted List. However, when the USCG was transferred from the 
US Department of Transportation (DOT) to the newly established US 
Department of Homeland Security, it was no longer subject to these 
requirements. Our proposal includes a provision that would apply the 
same requirements to the USCG that currently apply to the DOT under 
Title 49 U.S.C. 1135 for responding to NTSB safety recommendations and 
for providing an annual report to Congress on the regulatory status of 
each recommendation on the Most Wanted List. The proposal would also 
require the NTSB, as part of its annual report to Congress, to identify 
each recommendation made to the Secretary of Transportation or the 
Commandant of the Coast Guard that was closed in an unacceptable status 
in the preceding 12 months. This requirement would provide the 
congressional committees of jurisdiction with greater visibility 
regarding the Secretary's or the Commandant's inaction to improve 
transportation safety.
    The proposed bill also includes improvements to our processes and 
would:
      Ensure that our investigators have timely access to 
vehicles and data from accidents and crashes;
      Focus our railroad investigation mandate and resources on 
those events for which an investigation would provide the most safety 
benefits;
      Better define our highway investigation authority;
      Enhance our support for families of those impacted by 
accidents and crashes; and
      Ensure that our reports and other written products are 
accessible to communities and individuals with limited English 
proficiency.
                               Conclusion
    The proposed authorization bill, if enacted, will improve our 
ability to carry out our critical safety mission now and in the future; 
to recruit, retain, and develop a highly qualified, specialized, 
diverse, and inclusive workforce; to prepare the agency for 
investigations involving emerging transportation technologies and 
systems; and to meet existing needs and future challenges through data-
driven decision-making and cross-office risk management.
    Thank you, and I appreciate your support for the NTSB and 
transportation safety.

    Mr. DeFazio. Amazing, perfectly 5 minutes.
    But I do ask unanimous consent that the full testimony of 
the Chair be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    We were having a little chat before the hearing, myself and 
the Chair and Representative Larsen, so, I am going to defer to 
Representative Larsen for the first 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I 
appreciate that.
    As the NTSB continues its support of the investigation in 
China, the China Eastern flight is an issue, obviously, of 
great importance, because the airplane was built in Washington 
State by the great women and men who work on the lines there in 
Renton.
    And so, I was hoping you could give us an update on, to the 
extent that you can, on the investigation, but also maybe talk 
a little bit about this point you made about the increasingly 
complex systems that you are dealing with, but an increasingly 
global conversation we have in aviation, and if there is 
anything in the budget that you think we need to think about in 
terms of getting your people overseas when they need to be 
overseas.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you very much for the question.
    On China, we are the state of design and manufacturer, so, 
the NTSB appointed a U.S.-accredited representative under Annex 
13, and she and two technical advisors from the NTSB, as well 
as four technical advisors from Boeing are in China right now.
    We have a great working relationship with the Civil 
Aviation Administration of China, or CAAC. We have a 
longstanding relationship with them. We have worked with them 
on other investigations. We have even had cross-training with 
them, where our investigators in the past, in 2004, have gone 
to China, and they have come here. And so, they have been very 
helpful in getting our team overseas, getting visas, and then 
making sure that we get a quarantine waiver. And so, that is 
going very well on the ground.
    And in the meantime, we are working on the repair and 
download of the CVR and FDR.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Do you anticipate a timeline, how 
long your folks will need to be in China?
    Ms. Homendy. We don't have a set timeline yet, but I am 
happy to circle back.
    You did ask me about budget needs, and what we may need 
going forward.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes.
    Ms. Homendy. One thing that we did put in place here, which 
I think is tremendous: when I took over as Chair, I encouraged 
our leadership to find areas that we need to address risk for 
the agency. And Dana Schulze, who is behind me as our managing 
director, worked with our special operations senior advisor to 
get an agreement in place with the Department of State to make 
sure that, if something happens, some sort of crisis, even a 
medical crisis occurred, that our folks could be evacuated in 
case of emergency. That is something that the agency personnel 
has wanted in place since 2013. And now, thanks to the efforts 
of the Department of State, we have that in place for this 
investigation, and we would like to move that forward annually. 
It will require us to put funding aside to hold in an account. 
So, that is something that we will need some assistance with.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, and I understand it is early 
in the investigation, and you couldn't answer questions about--
speculate, and we don't want to speculate, anyway. And so, I 
appreciate that very much.
    If you could move towards the other complexities in the 
airspace, with the advent of AAM, FAA maybe certifying the 
first eVTOL, let's say within a year, within 2 years, and as 
advanced air mobility gets introduced, how is the NTSB 
preparing itself for a world of ``The Jetsons,'' if you will?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, well, the NTSB has really been ahead of 
others when it comes to preparing for new technologies. In 
fact, we have called for new technologies before they ever 
existed, going back to 1970, when we called for shutting down 
pipelines and putting in valves before those valves ever 
existed. And so, we have training for our personnel, of course, 
and we have substantial experience.
    We will have to change some of our regulations. Right now, 
we have an unmanned aircraft system rulemaking in place, where 
we will change the definition of what needs to be reported to 
the NTSB for accident and incident response.
    But as far as your question related to the complexity of 
investigations, it is not just the investigation itself, but it 
is also the review by a research and engineering team of new 
technologies. We have iPads, we have phones, we have new 
technologies in aircraft, and new technologies in vehicles and 
vessels that we need to make sure that we are able to evaluate. 
And part of that is working with new manufacturers and entities 
who aren't used to working with the NTSB. And they don't 
understand our process. So, that takes some education.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes, thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman. Representative Garret 
Graves is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
Chairman, I want to thank you for having a moment of silence 
for our colleague, Mr. Young, who contributed so much to this 
committee, and I just want to thank both you and Sam for your 
all's kind words and recognition of his service to this body 
and to the State of Alaska.
    Chair Homendy, welcome back to the committee. Good to see 
you again. The last reauthorization bill for NTSB gave you all 
the authority to operate UAS, unmanned aircraft systems. And I 
understand you are using those to help with accident 
investigations. Are you using any drones that were manufactured 
in China at this point?
    Ms. Homendy. We have seven drones right now, and they are 
all manufactured in China, and we have had them for some time.
    However, we are now in the process of replacing many that 
are ending their life cycle. And so, we are in the process of 
purchasing five. That would be since our reauthorization. And 
none of those will be made in China.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you. I appreciate 
that, and would appreciate you keeping us apprised of that 
progress as you work to replace those.
    The other thing I want to ask you about is commercial space 
accident investigations. As you know, we introduced legislation 
with Chairman DeFazio and Chair Larsen and Ranking Member Sam 
Graves in regard to NTSB's commercial space transportation 
investigation authority, and I am well aware of the notice of 
proposed rulemaking that NTSB has issued in this space.
    Clearly, you have bipartisan support from this committee 
for NTSB to investigate commercial space transportation 
accidents.
    In regard to the notice of proposed rulemaking, the NPRM 
that was issued, a number of comments have been provided, and I 
think that there has been some constructive feedback. Many of 
them I agree with, and we are going to take some of that into 
consideration, because it implicates the approach that we have 
taken, as well, in the legislation.
    I just wanted to ask, as you work through the comments, and 
think about how to tweak the NPRM as it moves to a finalized 
rule, if you would please keep us apprised as well, because we 
are, as I mentioned, going to continue to work on our 
legislative approach, and just want to give you an opportunity 
to perhaps respond to the NPRM, respond to any comments, and 
then I also anticipate you affirming that you would be willing 
to work with us as you all adjudicate the public comments.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, absolutely. And we will work with you and 
the committee. And I know that Mr. Babin also has some 
concerns. And I would be happy to work with you, as well, of 
course, going forward.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. He gave me his proxy.
    [Laughter.]
    Ms. Homendy. And thank you so much for your leadership on 
this issue, and for your assistance. We really appreciate it.
    We are aware of the--obviously, going through the comments 
right now that have been filed with the notice of proposed 
rulemaking. We are in the process now of reaching out to the 
industry.
    I recently visited, within the past few weeks, SpaceX out 
in California. I am going to travel to the other operators to 
talk to them. I asked the Commercial Spaceflight Federation to 
come in and meet with me and our technical team. We had a good 
discussion.
    I think it is important that the NTSB sits down with the 
operators and talks through some of their concerns, listens to 
their concerns, and see where we might be able to address some 
of those concerns. And so, there is going to be tremendous 
outreach in meeting with them at their operations, at their 
facilities, so that I can also appreciate what they are doing, 
as well.
    But we do have significant experience in this area and are 
moving forward. At the same time, I anticipate this won't go to 
a final rule. We will have a supplemental proposed rulemaking 
at some point, but we aren't rushing to do that.
    At the same time, we are going to have conversations with 
the Federal Aviation Administration about our memorandum of 
understanding to see if we can update that. That dates back 
decades, and has not been updated. So, I reached out to the 
FAA, had fantastic conversations with them. I reached out to 
the Deputy Secretary. We also spoke about that. We will be 
sitting down on April 21st to begin those initial 
conversations, and I think that will be helpful.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. In just the remaining 
seconds left, I just want to reiterate what the ranking member, 
Sam Graves, mentioned in the backlog.
    Madam Chair, as you know, it is absolutely critical that 
the ultimate investigation reports be released as quickly as 
possible, so we can make whatever appropriate changes or 
mitigation may be needed to improve safety across all modes of 
transportation. So, I want to thank you for your progress, but 
also, please keep this on the front burner. It is a critical 
issue.
    Ms. Homendy. Absolutely.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I yield back.
    Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman. I would now recognize 
myself for 5 minutes.
    Following up on that last question, is it that accidents 
have become particularly more complicated, or--I mean, what is 
the principal reason why it is taking longer to put forward 
these reports and address whatever needs you might have to 
produce them more timely, quickly?
    Ms. Homendy. No, great question. It is a combination of 
complexity of the investigations, resource needs, and process 
that we have to get in place.
    I will tell you that our managing director, she will say 
her religion is data. She came from the Office of Aviation 
Safety. She ran the Office of Aviation Safety. And she is very 
focused on collecting data on where this gets hung up. We 
learned through that it is not in the investigation phase, it 
is in, really, the report writing and review phase. And so, we 
needed to change some processes, ensure that we are scaling 
investigations appropriately. Not everything is a major 
investigation.
    And then, at the same time, dedicate appropriate resources 
to it. Since I have been on board, we brought on some retired 
annuitants, people who used to work for the NTSB, strictly to 
go through the backlog. In addition, I will say we looked at 
our staffing levels. Our Office of Aviation Safety back in, I 
believe 2013, was at 137 people. When I took over, it was down 
to 108. Vacancies had not been filled for years. They were 
suffering from underinvestment, disinvestment. And so, we need 
to change that. We needed to change that across the agency, and 
get folks hired because they can't do more with less. And that 
is what they were being asked to do.
    So, now we are moving that forward. The first meeting I had 
was with OPM to figure out how do we get people in the door, 
what do we need to change? And now that is all moving forward, 
thanks to the folks behind me. They are doing a great deal of 
work to get things moving again, and it is very exciting. So, 
with all of those improvements, I think we will be able to get 
through a great deal.
    I will say that, at the beginning of February, our director 
of the Office of Aviation Safety had reported that we had 417 
mainly field and limited investigations in aviation that were 
above 2 years. Today we are down to 213, so, we are making 
significant progress. And that was part of what I testified 
about at my confirmation hearing. It is critical.
    Mr. DeFazio. So, those positions were authorized on a 
continuing basis, but they just weren't filled?
    Ms. Homendy. They weren't filling them. And that is not 
just in the Office of Aviation Safety. It is across the board. 
I mean, it is in every single office that we would hover around 
high 300s, 400, and we weren't getting through the process of 
hiring people. I am not sure why, but now we have procedures in 
place. We are hiring a chief human capital officer. I have to 
give great credit to OPM, who walked us through how we could 
change some things in our processes and procedures to get 
people on board.
    And it was really asking our staff across the board, when 
we put together our authorization request, ``How many people do 
you need? What do you need for technology?'' They came back 
with a request of 192 additional people they would need for us 
to flourish. This reauthorization proposal doesn't represent 
that. We would need $250 million to accomplish that.
    Mr. DeFazio. Well----
    Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. But I will take the $250 
million, if you would like to be so generous.
    Mr. DeFazio. Well, the committee will mull that over.
    Quickly, since my time is about to expire, your so-called 
CAROL system, Case Analysis and Reporting Online, my 
understanding is that people who are particularly interested in 
or want to follow these investigations, that it is not very 
user friendly. What are you doing to address that?
    Ms. Homendy. Great question, because we agree. It isn't 
user friendly. And it was unveiled, I think, too early. And 
what we needed to do was meet with the stakeholder community 
and see how it was being used, and see how we can improve it. 
And we are doing that now. And it is a top priority of our 
chief information officer. They are moving forward with changes 
to make sure that it is more user friendly.
    We did talk about how-to videos, except in the last meeting 
we had, I mentioned you shouldn't need a how-to video to find 
our investigations. So, hopefully, we are well on our way to 
moving forward with improvements so everyone can find the 
information that they need.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. And now I would recognize 
Representative Crawford.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. DeFazio [to assistant]. He's on the Republican side.
    Mr. Crawford. Mr. Chairman, thank you----
    Mr. DeFazio [interrupting]. Oh--are you there?
    Mr. Crawford. Yes, you got me?
    Mr. DeFazio. Yes.
    Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Chair, can you give me an idea of how many----
    Mr. DeFazio [interrupting]. Yes, we can't see you for some 
reason. Is your camera on?
    Mr. Crawford. It is.
    Voice. Oh, there, we got him.
    Mr. Crawford. Have you got me now?
    Mr. DeFazio. Yes, OK. Yes, yes.
    Mr. Crawford. OK.
    Mr. DeFazio. Go for it.
    Mr. Crawford. OK. Madam Chair, thank you. Can you give me 
an idea of how many rail-related grade crossing accidents you 
investigate in the course of a year, on average?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much. We review very few rail-
grade crossing accidents. We certainly review the major ones, 
but FRA reviews a majority of the grade crossing accidents.
    Mr. Crawford. Is it my understanding--is this correct, that 
you are considering reducing that number? Is that true?
    Ms. Homendy. Right now, under our highway mandate, there is 
some flexibility for our highway investigators which do the 
grade crossing accidents to choose which grade crossing 
accidents to focus on.
    But in our rail mandate, it says we have to do every rail-
grade crossing accident and every trespasser accident, which we 
are simply not able to do. Right now, our rail office has 11 
investigators to do all fatalities, all serious injuries, all 
passenger rail accidents, plus grade crossings, plus trespasser 
accidents, and we are not able to accomplish that.
    What we do focus on are the ones that have the biggest 
safety impact, and we have conducted the larger major grade 
crossing accidents and the major trespasser accidents. So, we 
do look at each one and decide which one would have the biggest 
safety benefit.
    Mr. Crawford. So, basically, as has been addressed earlier, 
you have got a manpower problem. And is that the biggest 
impediment, or is there a calculation that is given with regard 
to the value of the investigation?
    Does it add to safety by conducting an additional 
investigation, or is it mostly attributed to a lack of 
manpower?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, we do have to make sure that we have the 
manpower, but we do ask ourselves four questions in determining 
whether to investigate: first, is there national interest; 
second, is there an emerging issue, or one that is repeated 
that we see that we would want to investigate this accident; 
can we make a difference is the third question; and fourth, do 
we have the resources?
    Mr. Crawford. Can you just kind of walk me through what the 
protocol is for investigating with regard to FRA and Amtrak, 
and working with those organizations?
    Ms. Homendy. Sure. The Federal Railroad Administration is 
always a party to our investigations, which means they are part 
of our fact-finding in the investigations, as well as Amtrak, 
when there is an Amtrak investigation. So, there is close 
coordination in the fact-finding portion of the investigation 
so that, if there is a safety deficiency, they can address that 
immediately.
    Mr. Crawford. Does the NTSB investigate freight rail 
accidents differently than Amtrak?
    Ms. Homendy. Our legislation requires, when there is a 
fatality or serious injury, and then we have to do all 
passenger rail accidents.
    Mr. Crawford. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield the 
balance of my time.
    Mr. DeFazio. I thank the gentleman.
    Eleanor Holmes Norton, chair of the surface transportation 
subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chair Homendy, I have a special interest in this hearing, 
because in October, the 7000 series Metro car on the Blue Line 
derailed. I know that the NTSB has done inspections of the 
entire fleet, and found that at least 20 cars were defective. 
WMATA has suspended use of all the 7000 series cars. But that, 
of course, has resulted in scaled-back service.
    I would be very interested in anything you could tell me 
about the status of the NTSB's investigation of this critical 
issue.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. And 
we did speak right after that accident, or the derailments, 
occurred. And I really appreciate your leadership on this issue 
and, of course, on all safety issues.
    Right now, WMATA has contracted with the Transportation 
Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado, to do failure analysis 
of the wheel assembly. And I am aware of the actions with 
respect to WMATA on pulling cars out of service. That is 
something they are working on with the safety commission, not 
with the NTSB. We are aware of movement of that, but we are 
really focused on the investigation right now, on the failure 
analysis of the wheel assembly, and actions that were or were 
not taken by WMATA during increasing failures of these wheel 
assemblies.
    So, we will continue to communicate with you, and 
coordinate with you as the investigation goes forward.
    Ms. Norton. I would very much appreciate that.
    In February, I co-led a letter to Secretary Buttigieg 
urging the Department of Transportation to require all highway 
traffic safety seats to utilize up-to-date male and female 
crash test dummy technology.
    You are aware that currently the vehicle safety tests only 
utilize male crash dummies in the driver's seats and passenger 
seats. And that is despite the fact that women's and men's 
bodies are affected differently. And there are real 
consequences here: we see that women are 17 percent more likely 
to die and 73 percent more likely to be seriously injured in a 
vehicle crash than men.
    What would be your opinion of recommending that NHTSA 
require all safety tests to utilize the most up-to-date female 
crash test dummy technology?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 
This is especially important, as we see increases in fatalities 
and injuries on our roads right now, with nearly 40,000 people 
dying annually.
    The NTSB doesn't have a recommendation in this area, but 
you asked for my opinion. And my opinion is that we should 
address that. We should have a crash test--in crash testing, 
NHTSA should use not just male, but female dummies when they 
are doing crash testing.
    Ms. Norton. Why wouldn't the NTSB have a recommendation in 
this area?
    Ms. Homendy. I am sorry?
    Ms. Norton. Why wouldn't the NTSB have a recommendation in 
this area?
    Ms. Homendy. Our recommendations are normally geared toward 
preventing an accident or incident from occurring. And it is 
not something that has come up in a specific accident or 
incident, but it is something that is on our radar, and 
something that we are looking at.
    Ms. Norton. I certainly hope you would look at it and make 
your views known.
    In your testimony you noted that, to satisfy current 
staffing needs, the NTSB will need to hire nearly 200 employees 
over the next 5 years. In that time, the number of retirement-
eligible employees at the agency will grow to roughly 41 
percent. Could you elaborate on the NTSB's strategy to recruit 
and train a diverse workforce to fulfill these growing needs?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, and thank you for that----
    Mr. DeFazio [interrupting]. The gentlelady's time has 
expired, but briefly answer, please.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. We do have a 
strategic human capital plan that we are beginning, a workforce 
development plan, a gap analysis. And we do have a strategic 
plan to recruit, retain, and hire a diverse and inclusive 
workforce that we are now implementing.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK, thank you.
    Representative Babin?
    Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    And Chairwoman Homendy, thank you for being here. In 
addition to having the pleasure of serving on this esteemed 
committee, I also serve as the ranking member of the Science, 
Space, and Technology Committee's Space and Aeronautics 
Subcommittee, and represent the Johnson Space Center, home to 
NASA's human exploration efforts. This gives me a unique 
vantage point to assess critical issues across the entire 
aerospace horizon.
    One issue that has garnered a bit of attention is NTSB's 
recent notice of proposed rulemaking for commercial space 
accident investigations. Chairwoman Homendy, as you might 
recall, I wrote you a letter, along with our Ranking Member 
Lucas, to NTSB last November asking for additional information 
and documents related to this NPRM. And while we received a 
good response in December, which I thank you for, we 
unfortunately were not provided with any of the requested 
records.
    As an ardent advocate for safety in all domains, the 
current NPRM raises some concerns and questions that I think 
should be addressed. First and foremost is how the NPRM could 
potentially impact NTSB's ability to carry out its existing 
statutory responsibilities. I worry that the NTSB is already 
spread thin, and that expanded authority could undercut the 
good work that you perform daily--and we have seen, with just 
the last several questioners today, that there is a manpower 
issue--and that I am also concerned about whether the expertise 
is really there at NTSB to appropriately carry out this very 
highly specialized area.
    So, with that, I would like to ask for unanimous consent to 
add my original letter to the NTSB. Thank you so much.
    Mr. DeFazio. Without objection.
    Dr. Babin. Yes, sir.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
Letter of November 18, 2021, from Hon. Frank D. Lucas, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and Hon. Brian Babin, 
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, to Hon. Jennifer 
Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board, Submitted for the 
                       Record by Hon. Brian Babin
                     Congress of the United States,
                                  House of Representatives,
               Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
                        2321 Rayburn House Office Building,
                                         Washington, DC 20515-6301,
                                                 November 18, 2021.
The Honorable Jennifer L. Homendy,
Chair,
National Transportation Safety Board, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW, 
        Washington, DC 20594.
    Dear Ms. Homendy:
    We write you to seek information regarding the National 
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) recent Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making (NPRM) on Commercial Space Investigations.\1\ NTSB's attempts to 
expand its authority would alter the long-standing commercial space 
accident investigation process and significantly impact the commercial 
space launch industry, U.S. economic competitiveness, scientific 
discovery, space exploration, international cooperation, national 
security, and safety. The expansion of authorities, alteration of 
processes and policies, and the codification of procedures require 
appropriate oversight, coordination, review, deliberation, and 
approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/11/16/2021-
24766/commercial-space-investigations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology is committed 
to ensuring the continued growth and safety of the commercial space 
industry. Our Committee has a long history of legislation related to, 
and oversight of, space activities. Additionally, we have jurisdiction 
over ``[o]uter space, including exploration and control thereof'' 
(emphasis added).\2\ The Committee was established in response to the 
Soviet launch of Sputnik, and wrote not only the Space Act which 
established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
but also the Commercial Space Launch Act that established commercial 
launch activities. Commercial space activities fall firmly within our 
jurisdiction, and our Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee has broad 
oversight over the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Rules of the House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth 
Congress, February 2, 2021; Rule X(1)(p). https://rules.house.gov/
sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/117-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf

        ``All matters relating to astronautical and aeronautical 
        research and development; national space policy, including 
        access to space; suborbital access and applications; National 
        Aeronautics and Space Administration and its contractor and 
        government-operated labs; space commercialization, including 
        commercial space activities relating to the Department of 
        Transportation and the Department of Commerce; exploration and 
        use of outer space; international space cooperation; the 
        National Space Council; space applications, space 
        communications and related matters; Earth remote sensing 
        policy; civil aviation research, development, and 
        demonstration; research, development, and demonstration 
        programs of the Federal Aviation Administration; space law; 
        other appropriate matters as referred by the Chair; and 
        relevant oversight'' (emphasis added).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Rules of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 
House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress. Rule 
VI(b)(4). https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
117th%20Rules%20Final2.pdf

    So that we can better understand NTSB's attempts to expand its 
authorities and evaluate the impact this might have on the success and 
safety of U.S. commercial space activities, we are requesting the 
following information:
    1)  All documents and communications (as defined by attachment A) 
related to the development, drafting, and publishing of NTSB's NPRM 
titled ``Commercial Space Investigations'' in the Federal Register on 
Tuesday, November 16, 2021.
    2)  All documents and communications related to the memorandum 
titled ``SUBJECT: THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD'S AUTHORITY 
TO INVESTIGATE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACCIDENTS'' dated July 1, 2015.

    Please provide two copies of all documents and communications (one 
for the Majority and one for the Minority) by December 3, 2022. Please 
contact Mr. Tom Hammond of the Committee minority staff with any 
questions related to this inquiry.
    Thank you for your consideration of this matter. We are sure we 
share the same goals of ensuring safety and U.S. economic 
competitiveness and leadership in space. As the Board considers future 
actions related space investigations, please avail yourselves to the 
Committee and its staff. This would ensure that procedural measures 
such as the Congressional Review Act are not necessary.
        Sincerely,
Frank Lucas,
  Ranking Member.
  
Brian Babin,
  Ranking Member, Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee.

    Dr. Babin. In addition to responding to the initial letter 
and document request, I would also like to ask you a few more 
questions, if I may. If you could keep your answers very, very 
short, I would appreciate it. If you can't answer them now, it 
is not a problem. But I would appreciate your response for the 
record.
    Number one, how many staff have the NTSB assigned to 
exclusively specialize in space accidents?
    Number two, could you please explain the NTSB's request to 
investigate not just accidents, but also incidents and 
anomalies that happen routinely, almost every single launch 
that we have?
    Number three, was the NTSB able to coordinate with the 
NPRM, and with the Department of Defense, and also the IC, the 
intelligence community?
    And four, and finally, what is the status of negotiating 
the existing MOU with the FAA on commercial accidents?
    If you could get those to me, or if you could answer some 
of them right now--we have a couple of minutes left--I would 
appreciate that.
    Ms. Homendy. Sure. With the status of the MOU, as I 
mentioned, our first meeting with FAA and with the Office of 
the Secretary will be on April 21st. We have been trying to get 
the FAA to sit down and talk about our updating our MOU since 
2014. I am pleased that we are now going to have that 
opportunity to sit down and discuss it, and look forward to 
working together on safety, as we do in other modes of--or in 
aviation, as well.
    With respect to assets and our ability to conduct 
investigations, our investigators are not--they aren't walled 
off by ``this person is space,'' ``this person is UAS,'' ``this 
person is aviation''; they have particular expertise. We will 
have aerospace engineers, we have human performance experts. We 
have survival factors experts, operations experts.
    And so, in total, once we get full staffing in our Office 
of Aviation Safety, we will have 132 people in our Office of 
Aviation Safety.
    Dr. Babin. But what about the number for space, essentially 
specializing in space accidents?
    Ms. Homendy. As I--we do have a leader, who is our chief 
technical officer for space and aerospace technology, and he 
has incredible expertise. Right now he runs our Office of Major 
Investigations, and has been involved in commercial space and 
what the NTSB has done on commercial space for decades. We have 
conducted a number of investigations involving commercial space 
since 1993.
    But with respect to our resources, they are not walled off 
by industry. They are in particular areas of expertise. So, 
they will do commercial space, and they will do aviation. They 
just do them differently.
    Dr. Babin. Well, we certainly would appreciate if you could 
get those documents to us and those records that we asked for 
in the letter, as well as if we could get written answers from 
you to these four questions that I just asked. I certainly 
would appreciate it, because I am out of time.
    Ms. Homendy. Absolutely, absolutely, sir.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Dr. Babin. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas [presiding]. Thank you, the gentleman 
yields back. The Chair now recognizes Congresswoman Napolitano 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    Chair Homendy, thank you again for visiting California a 
few weeks ago. It was nice seeing you again at the hearing on 
Coast Guard safety.
    But as cochair of the Mental Health Caucus, I am very 
concerned about the mental health trauma endured by the victims 
and their families, and the mental well-being of the NTSB 
personnel that are constantly dealing with tragedies. Your 
proposal discusses improved delivery of family assistance, but 
can you discuss in which NTSB--how they address mental health 
trauma the victims and their families go through?
    And can you discuss what services and training is provided 
to all NTSB personnel to deal with their own mental health 
stress related to the work?
    And how can we assist in these challenges?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you very, very much, Congresswoman. It 
was great to see you in California, and I appreciate your 
leadership on this issue.
    We have a family assistance team that is incredibly 
experienced, that deploys to all our major accidents and 
certain others that fall under our legislation. And in 
addition, we provide training for our personnel that is in the 
field on how to deal with families, as well. But that is really 
the focus of our family assistance team, which has the 
particular expertise.
    With respect to--I did want to provide--certainly, going to 
accidents and incidents for our personnel has an impact on 
their mental health, as well. That is important for the agency. 
We do provide an employee assistance program and encourage 
folks to utilize that program. We have had, for example, 
service animals, compassionate animals for care for mental 
health purposes at our accident scenes, and have had personnel 
counselors from our EAP program on our more major 
investigations.
    Mrs. Napolitano. But do you have any contact with the 
Department of Health and Human Services to provide any mental 
health training to all the NTSB personnel?
    Ms. Homendy. We have our own contracts for providing 
employee assistance and mental health services for our 
personnel, should they choose to utilize that program. And then 
we have training for those in the field for dealing with the 
families of victims and survivors following a tragedy.
    Mrs. Napolitano. My concern is that some of the employees 
may be able to spot stress and be able to recommend health 
services.
    Anyway, Ms. Homendy, are there limitations on NTSB 
investigating accidents that happen on private property, such 
as rail yards, private intermodal facilities, private airports? 
And do you have any concerns about being able to fully 
investigate and receive reporting data regarding the accidents 
on private property? And what can we do to assist in this?
    Ms. Homendy. I am sorry, Congresswoman. I had a little 
trouble hearing.
    Mrs. Napolitano. On NTSB investigating accidents on private 
property.
    Ms. Homendy. If you don't mind, Congresswoman, I would like 
to get back to you on that for the record, and make sure that I 
get the best information to you on that question.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, because I hear from 
some of the employees of the railroad that they have accidents 
on private property that they don't report that we are not 
aware of. And I would like to know if that might happen in the 
intermodal facilities and private airports.
    Ms. Homendy. For accident investigations, whether it is on 
public or private property, the ones that are reported to the 
National Response Center for railroads, for example, would get 
reported to the NTSB. And based on our legislative mandate, we 
would deploy resources to conduct those investigations.
    Mrs. Napolitano. But would you be able to tell whether they 
are on private property or not?
    Ms. Homendy. If you don't mind, Congresswoman, I would like 
to get back to you on that answer.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, and it is nice to see 
you again.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Homendy. It is great to see you again, too. Thank you.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas. The gentlewoman yields back. The 
Chair now recognizes Congressman Davis for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Hello, Madam Chair. We meet 
again. I even got a phonetic pronunciation of your name, 
although I don't need it. I wanted to be able to question you 
for, now, many months, and really, really hit you with the 
hardest hitting questions I possibly can. But you know what? 
Today I've got to say thank you. We have been friends for a 
while, spent a lot of time together traveling to seven 
countries in 8 days. We learned a lot. And I learned a lot 
about you. And the person you are is somebody that I consider a 
friend.
    And I want to say thank you for what you did personally 
when we had a pipeline spill in Edwardsville, Illinois. You 
texted me to make sure I knew that the NTSB was on the ground, 
your team was on the ground. Your updates were phenomenal. You 
put together relevant stakeholders with elected officials. I 
have heard from Mayor Art Risavy of Edwardsville that his chief 
concern moving forward, though, is determining the cause of 
that failure so it doesn't happen again.
    But I want to say publicly, thank you. And I am not usually 
this nice to witnesses in this committee room, but you deserve 
it, and your team deserves it, very much so. But the next time, 
Madam Chair, you know we are going to have a little more fun, a 
little more back and forth.
    But if you want to, let the committee know what your team 
did there in Edwardsville.
    And also, is there anything that we can do to assist in 
your investigation?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, thank you so much for, certainly, for 
those kind words. Having worked on that side for 14 years, it 
is much different on this side, I can say.
    For Edwardsville, I do have to not only thank the NTSB 
team, but also the Marathon Pipe Line team. Shawn Lyon reached 
out to me early. We have had numerous conversations. He is a 
leader when it comes to pipeline safety and, in fact, invited 
us to share some information regarding that investigation at 
their info share with the pipeline industry yesterday. Those 
are usually closed, more confidential conversations. We were 
able to talk about some of our concerns regarding soil 
movement, and geological changes, and that impact on pipelines, 
and how the industry needs to look at that in their integrity 
management and safety management systems.
    So, good working relationship, really pleased with that, 
and we are going to continue to have discussions and see how I 
can be helpful to him in their operation, as well.
    Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Did he or anybody on your 
team give you any indication of when the investigation of that 
particular Edwardsville pipeline burst might be completed?
    Ms. Homendy. I have received indication that it would be 
next year.
    Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Next year? OK, well, I----
    Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. But we do have a preliminary 
report, which we will make sure to get to your office, and we 
will continue to update your office as that moves forward.
    Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Well, I appreciate that. And 
again, hats off to you and your team and all involved. I 
appreciate the job that each of you are doing. I appreciate the 
job you are doing.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. And it is great, again, to 
call you a friend, and great to call you Madam Chair, and I 
look forward to continuing to work with you.
    And lastly, I will just say bravo, and I yield back.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
now recognizes Congressman Cohen for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cohen. [Audio malfunction] . . . Madam Chair, and I 
thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this 
hearing, and for our esteemed witness, Chair Homendy.
    Tennessee--all of the country, but Tennessee as well--had a 
great number of motor vehicle crashes and deaths over the 
years. It increased, increased, and during COVID it was worse 
than ever. Tennessee had a 7-percent increase in traffic 
deaths, 1,217 people lost their lives on the road. Bad times.
    The National Transportation Safety Board--one time Jim Hall 
of Tennessee chaired, I think--a critical role to play in 
preventing these crashes. I have championed this Complete 
Streets Act, and with Ed Markey in the Senate, and it was--
provide safe and accessible options for multiple travel modes, 
including people walking, people bicycling, and other modes of 
transportation. And parts of it were in the bipartisan 
infrastructure bill, but that didn't make it. Our part didn't 
make it, because it was in the House bill and we took the 
Senate bill, which was satisfactory but not pleasing.
    What is your attitude about the Complete Streets Act and 
its effect on traffic safety for pedestrians and bicyclists and 
all the different modes of--skateboarding and whatever else 
they do now?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, and I share your 
concerns about the increase in crashes and traffic deaths on 
our roads, particularly with respect to pedestrians and 
bicyclists, which are now at an astounding more than 7,000 
nationally, annually. And it is only increasing.
    How we build our roads right now is for efficiency and not 
for safety, and that has to be the priority.
    The NTSB does not have a recommendation focused on Complete 
Streets. However, we have issued reports on pedestrian safety, 
bicycle safety, and motorcyclist safety, which really talks 
about refocusing and incorporating the needs of all road users 
in design and planning and infrastructure investment.
    Mr. Cohen. Is that the Safe System approach?
    Ms. Homendy. That is correct. We do endorse the Safe System 
approach. It is on our Most Wanted List of transportation 
safety improvements.
    Mr. Cohen. But you don't have a discouraging word--or 
whatever they say in that song of the West--about Complete 
Streets.
    Ms. Homendy. We don't have a specific recommendation on 
Complete Streets itself. However, we strongly support the Safe 
System approach for eliminating fatalities and serious injuries 
on our roads.
    Mr. Cohen. We always talk about bicycles and safety and 
all, and that is important. But we have also got these little--
--
    [Audio malfunction.]
    Ms. Homendy. Micromobility?
    Mr. Cohen. Yes, whatever they rent and go around on 
scooters. Has there been--Bird, or whatever they are called, 
and a couple of other companies--has there been a large 
increase in accidents and deaths because of those being around?
    Ms. Homendy. Congressman, I am sorry. I am going to have to 
get back to you on the record on fatalities and injuries with 
respect to scooters, and specifically micromobility. But we 
will circle back on that. There have been increases in 
pedestrians and bicyclists, for sure.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Do you have any involvement with the 
FAA on dealing with the 90-second rule of getting people off of 
airplanes in emergencies?
    Ms. Homendy. We do have some recommendations on getting 
people off aircraft in emergencies, including making sure that 
that occurs promptly. And I am happy to provide those 
recommendations for the record, as well.
    Mr. Cohen. I would love that. We had--2018 I got in our 
transportation bill--it might have been the FAA 
reauthorization--a study of seat size and pitch, to see if the 
continued shrinking of seats and pitch made it less likely that 
they could evacuate a plane in the 90 seconds that is required 
by law. They were required to do a study.
    Mr. Dickson, on his last day before he absconded from 
Washington, released the study, which had--nobody in the study 
they tested--they said, oh, they could get people off in 90 
seconds. There was nobody in the study over 60 years of age, 
nobody with a disability, nobody with a child, nobody pregnant, 
no pets, nothing like that at all. So, it wasn't representative 
of the flying public.
    Are you familiar with the completely absurd sample that 
they chose to conduct this, and why it took them 3\1/2\ years 
to do it?
    Ms. Homendy. Sir, I am not familiar with that study, but it 
is something I am pleased to look at, and to also look at our 
recommendations to see if we have recommendations that would 
address that. I don't believe we do, but I will circle back 
with you on that.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, I appreciate it so much. You have got 
such a great reputation [inaudible] job, and the FAA totally 
bungled this, and I don't know if it was because they didn't 
want to get the answers, but you need to have a representative 
of the flying public to get a proper test.
    And with that, I would yield back the balance of my time, 
and thank you for your continuing work that Jim Hall 
[inaudible].
    Ms. Homendy. Well, if I can add, sir, Jim Hall still calls 
me about transportation safety. So, he is sort of an adjunct 
part of the NTSB still.
    Mr. Cohen. Good. I have [inaudible] for over 40, 50 years. 
Great people. Thank you.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
now recognizes Mr. Weber for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. And just as you say that the bell 
starts ringing. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I appreciate that.
    And so, for Chair Homendy, I guess my question is the 
NTSB--and I have been on and offline for different reasons 
today, so, if this is redundant, forgive me. Why does the NTSB 
require direct hire authority to hire accident investigators 
and engineers?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, right now, our process for onboarding 
personnel can take up to 12 months. In the past, it has taken 
up to 2 years. And so, we would like the ability, because we 
have a highly skilled workforce like other agencies such as the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, to direct hire. 
And we would like that direct hire for 3 years, while we pull 
together information that is required for the Office of 
Personnel Management so that we can apply for direct hire 
authority directly to them.
    The authority we are requesting would sunset after 3 years, 
and I believe that has been provided to other agencies, as 
well. So, there is a model for that.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. Sure, OK. You said earlier on in your 
comments--and I didn't get to hear all of them, I think--that 
when you came on board, the agency was down maybe 20 or 30 
employees. Does that sound about right?
    Ms. Homendy. That was just in the Office of Aviation 
Safety. The agency had the ability to hire up to 454, and still 
has that, and we were down in the 300s when I took over.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. So, in aviation safety----
    Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. And today we are at 404, and we 
have 13 in the process that have accepted positions and are 
awaiting or have chosen hiring dates, and we have 21 already in 
the process of hiring right now, in addition to that.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. Thanks. So, in the Office of Aviation 
Safety, speculations or--do you know why, or why do you suspect 
that that office was so low? Why the attrition, turnover? Call 
it whatever you want. Why was that particular office so low, 
any ideas?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, first of all, I will say that most NTSB 
employees, if you find one that has worked there for less than 
20 years, it would be a miracle. We have people who stay on for 
decades and, therefore, we have a pretty high retirement rate. 
Right now, 41 percent of our personnel will be retirement 
eligible within the next 5 years, and that is pretty 
significant.
    So, we are going through a workforce development and 
planning process right now to ensure succession planning. And I 
do want to give credit to that to Ms. Dolline Hatchett, who is 
behind me, who is our principal deputy managing director, for 
really taking that on, finding efficiencies in our hiring 
process, and moving that forward so we can get personnel on 
board.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. Are they area-specific, those 
investigators--west coast, east coast, north, south part of the 
United States? How do they get allotted to an accident 
investigation?
    Ms. Homendy. Right now, we have four regional offices. We 
have one in Ashburn, Virginia; one in Denver, Colorado; 
Seattle, Washington; and Anchorage, Alaska. We also have 
personnel across the United States that are focused on various 
aspects, whether it is aviation or in our rail office or in our 
highway office or in marine, and so that we are able to deploy 
personnel very quickly.
    And so, for our hiring needs, it is really across the 
board, some at our headquarters and some in the field.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. OK, that is good to know. OK. Well, we 
appreciate the job you all do. I know it has to be difficult, 
heart-wrenching, even heartbreaking at many of these accident 
scenes. So, we appreciate that.
    And Madam Chairman, I am going to yield back.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas. Thank you. Thank you, the gentleman 
yields back. And just checking--Mr. Johnson, I think, might 
have dropped off the Zoom. OK, it looks like he did.
    The Chair will now recognize Mr. Payne, the chairman of the 
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee, for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Chair Homendy, it is good to see you. And as chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
Materials, I have a keen interest in ensuring the timely 
delivery of the NTSB reports on incident investigations. And 
with your expertise as the former staff director of this 
subcommittee, I think you would agree with that statement. 
There should not be more than a 2-year period between rail 
incidents and the NTSB reports. So, I stand ready to work with 
the NTSB to help you speed up the report process.
    What lessons have you learned since becoming NTSB Chair 
about the delay in the rail reports, and how can Congress help 
make this process more efficient?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, the process is--thank you so much for 
the question, sir. The processes to improving our ability to 
get out reports--which needs to be done, safety can't be 
improved until those reports are out--although I will say 
parties to our investigation are aware of information well in 
advance of issuance of the reports. From day one, they are part 
of the investigation. They get the facts so they can take 
immediate action.
    With that said, the public needs to know and be aware of 
our findings, a probable cause, and our recommendations, and 
take action. And so, it is a combination of process 
improvements internal to the NTSB, which we are all very 
focused on right now. The entire agency is. And resources, we 
need additional resources.
    In rail, we have 11 investigators in rail. In pipelines and 
hazmat, we have six. And so, we need additional resources. And 
I will point out that our--again, that our fiscal year 2022 
number is $121.4 million. Our request for fiscal year 2023, 
which begins our authorization of appropriations request, is 
$129.3 million. That entire increase is taken up by a 4.6-
percent pay raise and benefits.
    And so, we need the ability to expand beyond that, to grow, 
to fill our gaps right now. And that is what we are doing with 
a hiring surge. But we do also need to put the process 
improvements in place, which our team is very focused on.
    Mr. Payne. So, you would say that you are woefully 
understaffed in these areas. Is that fair to say?
    Ms. Homendy. Our team is top notch. They do a lot with a 
little, and they work around the clock. But it does have an 
impact. And they will do what they need to do, and continue to 
do it because they are very mission-focused. That is the reason 
why they stay so long. But they also need us to invest in them. 
Otherwise, they get burnt out and they leave.
    Mr. Payne. Right.
    Ms. Homendy. They need our support, and that is why we are 
here requesting that. So, yes, we need your help.
    Mr. Payne. OK. As a part of the NTSB authorization 
proposal, I am pleased to see an emphasis on recruiting a 
diverse workforce from underserved communities. I am in strong 
support of this proposal, and believe that tomorrow's workforce 
will be comprised of the brightest minds, no matter their zip 
code.
    Can you elaborate more on the NTSB's proposed actions to 
reach underserved communities, and how [inaudible] recruit from 
them?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First and 
foremost, we have two strategic plans that we have implemented 
in compliance with the Executive orders that were issued to 
increase diversity, equity, accessibility, and inclusion in the 
workforce. We are hiring a chief human capital officer. We are 
implementing recruitment plans. We are identifying and 
deploying strategies to hire and retain a diverse and inclusive 
workforce. We are promoting paid internships. We are improving 
leadership and development to ensure that our hiring managers 
are prepared and best trained to know how to attract and retain 
a diverse workforce. And we are also looking at accessibility.
    But beyond internal, we are looking external. We are 
looking out at communities that we don't normally work with to 
outreach and focus with our safety advocacy work so other 
communities that we have not traditionally worked with can hear 
about the safety issues that we are most concerned about, and 
work with them to hear the issues they are also most concerned 
about.
    In addition to that, we have to work on offering our 
products in other languages. Thank you.
    Mr. Payne. OK.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas. Thank you, the----
    Mr. Payne [interrupting]. And I would suggest, if it hasn't 
been--but it might have already been thought of--our veterans 
[inaudible]----
    Ms. Davids of Kansas [interrupting]. The gentleman's time 
has expired.
    Mr. Payne [continuing]. Might be a good pool to look at.
    Thank you, I yield back.
    Ms. Davids of Kansas. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 
The Chair now recognizes Mr. LaMalfa for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Madam Chair, and good to see you, 
Chair Homendy, thank you.
    Ms. Homendy. Good to see you, too.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thanks for appearing with us here today. And I 
was just hearing about DEI a second ago. Wasn't that being 
applied to crash test dummies in a conversation a little bit 
ago, or not?
    Ms. Homendy. I am sorry?
    Mr. LaMalfa. I thought I heard DEI being applied to crash 
test dummies here a few minutes ago. Is that true?
    [Pause].
    Mr. LaMalfa. You don't have to touch that one. Forget that 
one.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Oh, you never know what you are going to hear.
    So, let me ask--before my other questions--what is the 
overlap in responsibility on airlines with NTSB and FAA, as far 
as passenger comfort, passenger handling, or even rowdy 
passengers like we are hearing these days?
    And does that enter even into the conversation on mask 
mandates and all these things that are causing irritability 
with passengers these days?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. We are only 
involved in accidents and incidents----
    Mr. LaMalfa [interposing]. Right.
    Ms. Homendy [continuing]. And evaluating those. We are not 
involved with airline operations, or the work of the FAA 
regarding those issues, unless for some reason they come up in 
an accident or incident investigation.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Yes, OK. I thought that would be good on the 
record for people to understand what the clear roles are.
    Briefly talking about the budget situation here--and this 
is something I've got to ask, since we are stewards of the 
taxpayers--so, we are looking at--you mentioned current year, 
$124 million?
    Ms. Homendy. The current year is $121.4 million.
    Mr. LaMalfa. $121 million, OK. And so, we are looking at--
in the proposal here is $129 million in 2023; $145 million in 
2024; $155 million in fiscal year 2025; $165 million in 2026; 
$175 million in 2027. So, that is a jump, if my numbers are 
halfway right, between 2023 through 2027, of about 35 percent. 
Is that commensurate with other funding increases you are 
seeing in other agencies or other priorities for the Federal 
Government?
    Ms. Homendy. We have actually gotten more over the years. 
We have had much lower increases over the years and, in fact, 
we have the same level of full-time equivalent personnel as we 
had in 1998. We have had increases in our funding, of course, 
but most--70 percent--of our budget goes towards pay and 
benefits. And so, we need additional investment, not just in 
our workforce, but also IT investments.
    We had a mandate in the last reauthorization bill to 
develop a multimodal database for accidents and incidents, 
something that is critical. But it was unfunded. And so, we did 
finance that, and we moved it forward. But we need additional 
funding to improve it and then maintain it. We are going to 
have to plan for cybersecurity and other contingencies over the 
next several years.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Will you see enough for this equipment side of 
it, not just personnel? Is that going to reflect being able to 
upgrade your equipment and technology, then?
    Ms. Homendy. This reauthorization proposal is modest. It is 
not everything we need. In order to get everything we need that 
was submitted as part of the reauthorization effort to the 
Office of the Chair and the Managing Director, it would require 
an investment of about $250 million, annually. So, this is 
modest. It is what we thought would be reasonable that we can 
move forward with.
    Mr. LaMalfa. OK, I appreciate that. Let me shift gears to 
private aircraft and some of the issues there.
    Of course, I have a very large rural district, a decent 
amount of private aircraft, as well as crop dusters and like 
that. Would you talk about any recommendations you might have, 
your agency would be looking at on rural aircraft usage, 
whether it is something more business-like, like crop dusting, 
or general purpose, private aviation, private aircraft? What do 
you see as needing to be improved, or a focus for you?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, there are definitely improvements in 
general aviation with respect to safety and accident rates over 
the last several years. We are a little over 1,000 annually in 
general aviation accidents, but then it has gone down, which is 
significant, in a large part not just from the community, but 
our focus on safety and improving safety for general aviation.
    I would have to--if you don't mind, I would like to get 
back to you with some of our specific recommendations in rural 
areas with aircraft and crop dusters. And I am happy to do that 
for the record.
    Mr. LaMalfa. OK, thank you. That is really important in my 
area.
    So, how is it, when you have investigations that involve 
the State as well as NTSB, what kind of cooperation are you 
getting with States? Is it difficult? I kind of get the 
impression you have difficulty sometimes with States and 
cooperation and sharing of info, et cetera.
    Ms. Homendy. Our biggest difficulties occur in highway 
safety, especially where we don't have an established 
relationship. We try to establish those relationships in 
advance, by either the Board members or office staff going out 
and developing those relationships with law enforcement. That 
is critical, but it can be an issue on the ground.
    Our legislative proposal, or our mandate right now, states 
that when we conduct a highway investigation, it has to be in 
cooperation with the State. In the past, some States, like New 
York, have taken that to mean--they have argued that we can't 
pursue our safety investigation until they are through their 
criminal investigation, which is not accurate, and not in 
accordance with our mandate.
    Now, fortunately, the courts have ruled against that 
position, and in our favor, which has been helpful. But we are 
asking for some clarification in our reauthorization proposal 
so that we can move forward and clear up any sort of issues.
    But we do try to work very closely with the States and with 
law enforcement.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Yes, it would seem----
    Mrs. Napolitano [presiding]. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. LaMalfa [continuing]. [Inaudible] assume they would 
already have the relationships, but----
    Mrs. Napolitano [interrupting]. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Carbajal, the Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation Subcommittee chair, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Chair Homendy, it is a pleasure to see you again. I 
personally want to thank you for coming to Santa Barbara last 
month to review the Coast Guard's effort to improve small 
passenger vessel safety in response to a number of deadly boat 
incidents, including the tragic Conception boat fire in my 
district.
    I know the NTSB, the National Transportation Safety Board, 
has an important role in investigating incidents and issuing 
recommendations so similar catastrophes do not occur in the 
future. Having seen firsthand how these recommendations can 
guide Congress in ensuring the safety of the American people 
when traveling in different modes of transportation, I 
understand the importance of the NTSB.
    As we look towards reauthorizing the NTSB, can you discuss 
the types of resources you need from Congress to support your 
mission in maybe a little bit more detail than you have done 
already?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding that hearing and for your work, really, bipartisan 
effort over the past few weeks, to move the Don Young Coast 
Guard Authorization Act. We really appreciate the bipartisan 
effort to move that as you implemented or mandated a number of 
NTSB recommendations, including longstanding recommendations 
regarding the duck boats, which goes back to 1999 with a 
terrible tragedy. And so, we really appreciate your work 
supporting the NTSB.
    Essentially, the NTSB, we have some policy improvements 
that we would like to make. Some of our reauthorization 
proposal can be self-implementing, but we are transparent and 
want you to know where we are headed. However, we need 
resources. We need additional resources with equipment. We need 
additional resources in terms of personnel. And we really 
appreciate your support over the years.
    Our workforce is truly incredible. I am always impressed 
with the work that they do with very little, with very little. 
And so, as investigations become even more complex, your 
support, in terms of resources, would be really appreciated.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chair Homendy. Another issue that 
I am interested in hearing from you is in regard to rail quiet 
zones, or the impact that they have had, or not, on rail 
safety.
    As you might know, many localities have established quiet 
zones in their communities. When I was in local government, 
this issue would come up from time to time. Has NTSB issued any 
safety recommendations around quiet zones to balance noise 
pollution and safety?
    And what has been the implications, or not, of quiet zone 
programs and legislation in the past when it comes to safety?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for the question. I would have 
to go back to our rail personnel and provide that for the 
record on what recommendations we might have with respect to 
quiet zones.
    I know it is a hot topic for the committee, as it is 
something I worked on previously when I worked for the 
committee. So, I understand how important it is to each of you, 
and I am happy to provide that for the record.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I know it is a balancing act, 
trying to provide quiet zones for mitigating noise for 
communities, but at the same time, addressing and keeping a 
balance with promoting safety. So, it is just an area that I am 
always interested in learning more about, because these 
continue to be issues in various communities, including my 
district. And it is always nice to hear what the pros and cons 
are of them, as it relates to safety issues, at least looked 
into or considered by NTSB.
    Thank you so much for your time.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields. Next we have Mr. 
Gimenez. You are recognized, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And Ms. Homendy, I also noticed that you asked for close to 
about a 35-percent increase in the next 5 years for your 
agency. You said you have 454, I guess, approved positions in 
your agency. You only have 404 right now. Are those 454 FTEs or 
FTE equivalents? What are they?
    Ms. Homendy. So, the FTEs, we have 412 right now for FTEs. 
But what we are doing is overhiring in anticipation of 
retirements.
    And in the past, since January 1st, we have had 11 
retirements already. And as people return to work, because our 
agency is now back to work, we expect there will be more.
    Mr. Gimenez. By the end of the 5 years, where you are 
asking for another $45 million in funding, are you going to be 
increasing the number of FTEs?
    Ms. Homendy. We will be increasing the number of people on 
board, up to where--that would provide us, barring any other 
contingencies with--let me get back to you on the exact number 
that we would end up with at the end of the 5 years.
    Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me----
    Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. For the record.
    Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me an estimate?
    Ms. Homendy. It is about 480.
    Mr. Gimenez. 480, OK. In the last 5 years, have you had a 
significant increase in the number of investigations that you 
have been conducting?
    Ms. Homendy. We have had an increase in aviation 
investigations, and I would have to look at the investigations 
in the other modes, as well.
    Mr. Gimenez. Can you give me an estimate of what percentage 
increase you have had in investigations?
    Ms. Homendy. I would have to get back to you on the record 
for that.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes, could you please? I would certainly 
appreciate that as we look at your funding request.
    Going to commercial space, NTSB conducts investigations on 
commercial space issues, accidents, et cetera. Who conducts 
investigations on NASA incidents?
    Ms. Homendy. On----
    Mr. Gimenez [interrupting]. NASA.
    Ms. Homendy [continuing]. NASA?
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes.
    Ms. Homendy. We--I mean, we do have a memorandum of 
understanding with NASA to do some investigations at their 
request. But we have done commercial and space investigations 
since 1993, starting with Pegasus.
    Mr. Gimenez. No, I know you do commercial, but who does 
NASA? Does NASA--NASA does NASA, is that what they do?
    Ms. Homendy. NASA, and we have worked with them, as well.
    Mr. Gimenez. All right. Are the procedures for NASA 
investigations any different from the ones that you are 
proposing for commercial space flight?
    Ms. Homendy. I am not familiar with NASA's procedures, but 
our procedures are no different than any other investigation 
that we already conduct, with respect to the party system, and 
working with the operators, and working with the Federal 
agencies closely.
    Mr. Gimenez. I am hearing that some of the commercial space 
operators have issues with some of your rules. So, I guess my 
question again is, are your rules concerning investigations 
different from what NASA uses to investigate its own issues?
    Ms. Homendy. I think the commercial space industry is not 
as familiar with the operations of the NTSB, which is why I am 
currently meeting with the different operators, so I can 
familiarize them with our process. Some are better informed, 
and some have worked with us for many years. But we have had 30 
years of expertise in this area, and have worked with FAA and 
NASA to develop a close working relationship, and with many of 
the operators.
    Mr. Gimenez. Have you communicated with NASA about your 
rules? And are they in favor of those rules, are they in 
agreement with those rules?
    Ms. Homendy. I can't speak for NASA, but I have spoken with 
them. And we participate on a quad chair working group with 
NASA, and the Air Force, and FAA, and meet quarterly with them, 
and have discussed this and other measures, including our MOU 
over the years.
    Mr. Gimenez. Are NASA rockets any different than commercial 
rockets?
    Ms. Homendy. I would have to defer that question to our 
investigators.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK, thank you very much. I really appreciate 
it, thank you.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Malinowski, 
you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And Madam Chair, welcome, thank you so much. I would like 
to use my time today to talk about trucks and trucking and 
safety.
    Like many of us, I am concerned about the shortage of 
truckdrivers in America today, the impact that is having on our 
supply chain challenges. We all know there are many reasons for 
the shortage, everything from an aging workforce, to a 
workforce with high turnover, a job that is hard, a job that 
involves time away from family, training certification 
requirements, in many cases low pay. But certainly, one of the 
reasons for the shortage that I think doesn't get enough 
attention is treatment of drivers by management, specifically 
the demands that are put on them--some of them, at least--to 
continue to drive when they are too tired to do so safely.
    As we have done before in this committee, I turned for 
support to one of our informal T&I advisers, John Oliver of 
HBO, who did a segment on this recently. He told a story of a 
truckdriver who was forced to take his mandatory break during 
the day, when he couldn't sleep, and forced to drive at night, 
when he was obviously too tired to do so. The driver knew this 
wasn't right, so, he recorded a conversation that he had with 
his dispatchers.
    And I wanted to, technology permitting, play that exchange 
for us today. So, let's see if this works.
    [Video shown.]
    Mr. Malinowski. Did you get the gist of that, or was it 
hard to--yes.
    Ms. Homendy. A little bit hard to hear.
    Mr. Malinowski. Yes. He is saying he is not safe to drive 
at the moment. They are telling him, just go out, take a walk, 
get a cup of coffee. He said I think I am going to hurt 
somebody, and they say that we don't have time for that 
``bullshit,'' that is not how we work here at K&B.
    So, look, it is one anecdote, but we know that NTSB has 
looked back at a sample of its major investigations across 
various modes of transportation, and found that a full 20 
percent of them identified fatigue as a major contributing 
factor to accidents. And in the highway-related investigations, 
you all found fatigue was present in 40 percent of them.
    I know that NTSB first made recommendations to address the 
safety risks associated with fatigue 50 years ago, in 1972. So, 
my question to you is, are we better off than we were 50 years 
ago?
    And what are some of the most important outstanding 
recommendations from NTSB related to driver fatigue that have 
yet to be implemented? Thank you.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question, and I would love--
first, before I answer the question, I would like to get back 
to you with our recommendations on fatigue, because we have 
many, including for commercial truckdrivers, and it has been on 
our Most Wanted List in the past as a serious safety issue that 
needs to be addressed.
    We do have recommendations on hours of service and 
electronic logbooks. We always look at hours of service as part 
of any of our investigations, and have found significant 
concerns regarding scheduling and the impact of that scheduling 
on commercial drivers. So, I am happy to get you specific 
recommendations for the record.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much. And in particular, 
recommendations that have not yet----
    Ms. Homendy [interrupting]. Been implemented.
    Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. Been implemented by agencies. 
And of course, separately, if you feel that Congress needs to 
take additional actions.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, there are many. We will get those to you.
    Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. We will have 
Mrs. Steel, followed by Mr. Stanton and Mr. Burchett.
    Mrs. Steel, you are on for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mrs. Napolitano. Mr. Burchett, you are on for 5 minutes, 
sir.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Chairlady.
    I suppose you all can tell by my accent I am probably not a 
Northeasterner, I am from Knoxville, Tennessee. I am over here, 
to your right, ma'am. Right here. You see me? OK, yes, ma'am. 
Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Homendy. I was waiting for you to pop up on the screen.
    Mr. Burchett. That is all right. I try to do the live, live 
action.
    Ms. Homendy. I try to do live, too, so.
    Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am. Well, thank you for being here, 
and I want to thank those folks behind you. I know they've got 
to just be sitting here in mindless wander this whole time, 
having to listen to all this. So, I appreciate you all very 
much, too. You all don't get any credit, but you all are 
putting up with a lot, just by having to sit here all day. So, 
thank you all, as well.
    But I have listened to your testimony, and listened to 
everybody else, but I guess where I am concerned is that--the 
barriers that I think that are entry for folks looking to join 
the National Transportation Safety Board workforce. And I am 
wondering, is there a skills gap involved with that?
    I said I was not educated in the Northeast, I was educated 
at the University of Tennessee, and I have a degree in 
technological adult education. So, skills seem to be where it 
is at right now. And it has been continuously, and it seems to 
be even more so now. And I was wondering if you could address 
that issue.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you very much. And we do have 
plenty of people who apply at the NTSB and want to work for the 
NTSB. Part of it is our process in getting people in the door.
    And we do have a process or a program in place where we 
work with Pathways, which are recent college graduates, to get 
them in the door and then train them up to be investigators. 
You have a number of great universities, including the 
University of Tennessee and Middle Tennessee State University 
folks that I have talked to on aerospace and aviation.
    And so, I would encourage recent graduates to go to the 
Pathways program, because the NTSB and other Federal agencies 
utilize them, and try to get them in the door and up to speed 
on a lot of our processes.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you. Let me change gears a little bit 
on that. I am wondering how many of the National Transportation 
Safety Board employees that are in mission-critical or 
essential occupations were forced to leave their jobs last year 
because of the President's vaccine mandate for Federal workers.
    Ms. Homendy. I would like to get back to you for the record 
on that number. I don't believe we had anyone leave because of 
that, but I want to be sure that I accurately answer that and 
provide that for the record.
    Mr. Burchett. OK, I would really appreciate that.
    One last thing. How do you think the reauthorization 
proposal--how do you think it is going to help you recruit 
enough skilled workers to fill those positions and avoid future 
workforce shortage?
    Ms. Homendy. That is a great question. Right now, we are 
working with the Office of Personnel Management on a strategic 
human capital plan. We are in the process of hiring a chief 
human capital officer, as the NTSB has not had one at an SES 
level in the past. And we are working on a succession plan and 
gap analysis to ensure that we are prepared for the future, 
that we are hiring the right personnel.
    In addition, we have a training center right now, and are 
working to refocus the training center on career development 
and investment in training in our workforce to enable our 
employees to each have an individual training plan, so that 
they have core skills and that they have advanced training as 
they continue on throughout their career.
    Mr. Burchett. OK. Madam Chair, I am going to yield back the 
rest of my time.
    But thank you so much for being here and for answering our 
questions. I guess I don't share the infatuation that my friend 
Rodney Davis does with you, but I am sure, if we spent enough 
time, that I would. So, thank you so much, ma'am, for answering 
these questions. And if you could please get back to me on that 
other one.
    Ms. Homendy. I will, thank you, sir.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you so much, ma'am.
    Chairlady, I yield back to you.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back----
    Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. And I want to note that you 
are always very well dressed and exceptionally well dressed, 
ma'am.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Burchett. I just want to compliment you on that.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much, and I must compliment 
you on the question about education.
    And I have asked at the hearing that we had in Santa 
Barbara to give us names of the universities you outreach to, 
because we would like to help with the recruitment.
    Ms. Homendy. Absolutely.
    Mr. Burchett. Chairlady, it doesn't help you in our caucus 
if you compliment me. It usually helps if you say something 
derogatory towards me I have noticed, so----
    Mrs. Napolitano [interrupting]. No way.
    Mr. Burchett. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Next we will--the gentleman yields back. 
The next Member is Representative Stanton.
    You are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I want 
to welcome Chair Homendy.
    I want to thank you and all of the dedicated employees at 
the National Transportation Safety Board for your steadfast 
commitment to improving the safety of our transportation 
system.
    The NTSB currently has a number of active investigations in 
my home State of Arizona, including the Union Pacific train 
derailment, which occurred in my district in 2020. I look 
forward to seeing the Board's final report and recommendation, 
hopefully later this year.
    The NTSB is charged with investigating civil aviation 
accidents in the United States, and providing safety 
recommendations to prevent future accidents. Black box data 
recorders, which capture the voice and data during a flight, 
are critical to providing insights into the cause of aircraft 
accidents. The current requirement in the United States is for 
recorders to record just 2 hours of flight time, meaning 
anything over 2 hours is overwritten and not accessible. 
Europe, on the other hand, has implemented a requirement for 
recorders on commercial aircraft to cover 25 hours. What is 
NTSB's position on this issue?
    Ms. Homendy. I believe we are supportive of that proposal. 
And I would like to get back to you on the record to make sure 
it is the right recommendation that I am responding to. But 
data recorders are critical. They are critical not just for 
accident investigation, but they are critical for the operators 
themselves to determine if there are safety deficiencies after 
an accident occurs. And that is where the biggest safety 
measures can be addressed immediately. So, I appreciate that.
    Also, just to respond on the rail accident you mentioned in 
Tempe, our rail personnel--I checked with them before coming to 
the hearing, and they mentioned that they believe that 
investigation will be completed this year.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much. Are there instances where 
the 2-hour record of data has been insufficient for the NTSB's 
needs in the course of investigation?
    Ms. Homendy. Congressman, I would like to get back to you 
on that question for the record, and check with our Office of 
Aviation Safety.
    Mr. Stanton. Please do. Thank you very much. And can you 
speak to the importance of data collection, and the role it 
plays in an investigation and to the NTSB's ability to identify 
potentially systemic concerns and mitigate future accidents?
    Ms. Homendy. It's very critical to have that information 
not just for accident investigation, but, as I said, for the 
operator and for the FAA to determine if there are any safety 
deficiencies that need to be addressed immediately after an 
accident or incident. So, that information is critical.
    I will say we have other recommendations, including for 
helicopter manufacturers, on crash-resistant recorders, which 
we have recommended for numerous years that the FAA has failed 
to implement. And so, we reissued those to the manufacturers 
themselves to ensure that they are in helicopters to help us 
not only in investigations, but identifying safety gaps.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you. I look forward to getting the swift 
response to the answers that you weren't able to answer 
immediately here today.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back, and we have the 
next Member.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning 
to our witness today. I just have a few questions, and one of 
them is coming from a Territory.
    Sometimes we ask ourselves how long is it going to take for 
your office to investigate, or to respond to a maritime issue 
or a plane crash in Puerto Rico or more distant Territories 
like American Samoa.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. When we are 
notified of an accident, it goes through our response 
operations center, and the personnel there are on duty 24 hours 
a day and constantly monitoring information that comes in. They 
notify our duty officer, and then immediately we begin to 
gather information around the accident and incident. When we 
are able to deploy, we do have access to the FAA planes out of 
National Airport, and then we have other personnel throughout 
the United States that can be on the ground fairly quickly.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. How are investigators stationed to 
ensure there is a timely and rapid response in those cases?
    Ms. Homendy. We have investigators for all modes of 
transportation in various parts of the United States. We have 
four regional offices: one in Anchorage; one in Seattle; one in 
Ashburn, Virginia; and one in Denver, Colorado. But then we 
also have a number of investigators across all modes of 
transportation in the NTSB that work throughout the United 
States in various States. And so, we do have the ability to 
send many of those in advance, even if it is not their mode of 
transportation, to be the first person on scene.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you. I know your office and the 
Coast Guard updated their work MOU in June of last year. I 
would love to know your words in terms of how important you 
think it is to institutionalize those best practices that have 
been developed in the wake of tragedies like El Faro in the 
Caribbean area.
    Ms. Homendy. I have to say that we have an excellent 
working relationship with the United States Coast Guard. That 
relationship didn't always exist, but we worked really hard on 
both sides to get a close working relationship and develop the 
most recent memorandum of understanding. The leadership there 
has been phenomenal and partners with us, and we partner with 
them on many investigations, and we work closely together.
    We were off the coast of Santa Barbara, working together on 
the Conception dive boat tragedy which Chair Napolitano had 
mentioned, but others as well. And we continue to work 
together. I greatly support their efforts. They do a lot with 
very little, as does the NTSB.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Can you describe briefly the type of 
equipment or technology that your office uses, and the one that 
you may need that you may not have at this time, just for me to 
understand it, and if there is a way that Members of Congress 
can do a tour of your district office here.
    Ms. Homendy. Yes. Our technology--and I would love to get 
you a list, because we do have a long list of our technology 
needs. But technology in general, we have more complex 
investigations right now. So, we are going to need additional 
resources in terms of technological improvements for our 
research and engineering staff. That includes--and you have 
mentioned a lot on marine safety--that includes in marine 
safety.
    And just to add, our workforce in marine safety, their 
workload has increased eightfold in the past decade, but their 
staffing is pretty low. They have 20 staff right now, and 11 
investigators just for marine safety.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. In all the Nation?
    Ms. Homendy. Just for marine safety, yes. And they have 
requested an additional 17.
    And so, as you see, there are needs for the Marine Safety 
Office, and across the agency, and across the board.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. How do you think--I mean, how much has 
your workload increased during the last few years? I mean, has 
it is been----
    Ms. Homendy. Oh, tremendously. And it is changing, because 
we have new technologies right now. Whether it is automated 
vehicles, driver assistance systems right now that we are 
evaluating, or new avionics and aircraft--we are talking about 
drone ships now. And so, it is becoming more complex.
    And it is not just the technologies in terms of vehicles 
and vessels, it is in terms of new fuel sources. So, we had 
just done a report and investigation on the impact of lithium-
ion battery fires on emergency responders following high-impact 
crashes, and found that there wasn't enough information for 
emergency responders, and that NHTSA had to do additional 
research. Whenever we are moving towards these new 
technologies, whether it is a vehicle or a vessel or a new fuel 
source, we have to remember that we are also evaluating and 
have to make it a priority to evaluate the safety of those 
systems.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The lady's time has expired.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Yes, I yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, she yields back. We have 
Representative Garcia, followed by Ms. Williams and Mr. 
Lowenthal.
    Mr. Garcia, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, of 
course, I want to thank Chair DeFazio and, of course, thank 
you, Chair Homendy, for appearing today.
    So, we have made significant progress over the past few 
decades in making our transportation system safer, except our 
roadways. Fatalities on our roadways actually increased in 
recent years. In 2020, 38,824 people died in traffic crashes in 
the U.S. This is the highest number since 2007.
    I want to highlight a mind-boggling statistic: more 
Americans died in car crashes from 2000 to 2019 than the 
combined total number of Americans who died in World War I and 
World War II.
    Speeding is one of the top two causes of traffic crashes. 
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, speeding was a contributing factor in 26 
percent of all traffic fatalities in 2019. Chair Homendy, most 
jurisdictions in the U.S. set speed limits using what is known 
as the 85th percentile speed. NTSB has recommended that the 
85th percentile speed be phased out. Can you explain what the 
85th percentile speed is, and why the NTSB recommends it be 
phased out?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes, thank you for that question. And speeding 
is a significant concern, as 10,000 fatalities on our roads are 
attributed to speeding annually.
    The 85th percentile is something we focused on in a number 
of our investigations, including some of our vulnerable road 
user reports. What it means is that States, when they are 
evaluating speed limits and the adequacy of speed limits, they 
are looking at what 85 percent of the traffic is traveling at, 
and then they set the speed limit within 5 miles per hour of 
that number.
    Frankly, that method for determining and setting speed 
limits goes back to the 1950s. So, we are setting speed limits 
based on a 1950s-era configuration. What it is not looking at 
is how our roads are being used. It doesn't look at pedestrians 
or bicyclists or motorcyclists. It just sets it on an arbitrary 
number.
    And what ends up happening is, over time, speed limits 
increase. So, now we have speed limits as high as 85 miles per 
hour in the United States, which has a significant impact, even 
more impact not just on drivers, but on vulnerable road users.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And this recommendation to stop 
using the 85th percentile speed to set speed limits applies to 
all types of roadways, correct?
    Ms. Homendy. That is right. It is not just on interstates. 
That 85th percentile applies--it is a one-size-fits-all 
approach. It is the engineering rule of thumb in the U.S. right 
now, where they are setting speed limits on the highways just 
like they are setting speed limits on local roads----
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois [interposing]. Yes.
    Ms. Homendy [continuing]. Although there has been a move 
recently to turn that over to local and municipal jurisdiction, 
which is a good thing.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Yes, thank you. The NTSB has 
recommended that we use instead what is called a Safe System 
approach to road safety. This is something that was a prominent 
policy in Chairman DeFazio's INVEST Act. Can you explain what a 
Safe System approach is to road safety, and why that is the 
recommended approach?
    Ms. Homendy. Yes. In the past few decades--thank you for 
the question. In the past few decades, we have really focused 
on education enforcement, which isn't going to get us very far. 
We need a comprehensive, holistic approach to address road 
safety, and look at how we design our roads, how those roads 
are designed for use.
    In the past, we have focused on the design of roads--on 
efficiency, and getting people from A to B, and not for safety 
and how they are being used.
    In addition, we need to look at safe vehicles. That is part 
of the Safe System approach, and implementing technology on 
vehicles that can save lives, like automatic emergency braking 
and forward collision warning.
    Certainly, we are not saying education and enforcement 
isn't part of the holistic approach; it is. But other parts of 
the system also are critical and need an equal share of 
addressing fatalities and serious injuries on our roads.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Stauber, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    I see that the NTSB's Most Wanted List for transportation 
and safety improvements--the NTSB includes pipeline leak 
mitigation as a priority.
    We have all seen the stories and the near tragedies that 
involved incidents where pipeline protesters and anti-jobs and 
anti-energy activists have gone out to pipelines to cause 
damage to the pipeline and the environment they claim to 
support. We saw many incidents in my district, when they failed 
to stop the Enbridge Line 3 replacement project. Valve-turning 
incidents, and even cases of protesters shooting pipelines with 
guns are extremely concerning, especially since these very 
criminals see little to no jail time.
    Ms. Homendy, the NTSB is prioritizing pipeline leak 
mitigation. What specifically is the NTSB doing to combat these 
violent protesters from committing acts of environmental 
terrorism on the pipelines and putting so many people's lives 
at risk?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. When it comes to 
criminal activities, the NTSB, if we determine that an accident 
or incident is criminal in nature, we have an MOU with the FBI, 
and turn over those criminal matters to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
    Mr. Stauber. That MOU, does it give the FBI the 
jurisdiction to lessen the crime, or reduce the sentence?
    Ms. Homendy. The MOU is just geared towards our activities 
and our work with the FBI, and when we would turn over criminal 
matters, and what resources they would help the NTSB on any of 
our investigations.
    Mr. Stauber. Would you agree that pipeline protesters and 
anti-jobs and anti-energy activists who are doing this to 
pipelines put not only themselves, the environment, but the 
workers themselves at risk?
    Ms. Homendy. It is not an issue I have been focused on, and 
I am happy to get back to you on that.
    Mr. Stauber. OK, but you are aware of the pipeline 
protesters?
    Ms. Homendy. I am aware of pipeline protesters, yes.
    Mr. Stauber. Which protesting pipelines are you aware of, 
then?
    Ms. Homendy. There have been numerous ones over the past 
several years of protests, including TransCanada Keystone 
Pipeline.
    Mr. Stauber. Right. How about Enbridge Energy replacement 
Line 3? Are you aware of those protesters?
    Ms. Homendy. I am aware that there are objections, yes.
    Mr. Stauber. Objections or protesters?
    Ms. Homendy. Or protesters.
    Mr. Stauber. OK. What do you think it costs the local 
communities to safeguard, prepare, defend, and charge these 
anti-jobs, anti-energy activists? What do you think it costs 
the local communities?
    Ms. Homendy. I don't know the answer to that, sir.
    Mr. Stauber. Is that something that you should consider in 
working your MOU with the FBI, if you think it is a serious 
enough crime, and do you think it is a serious enough crime?
    Ms. Homendy. The NTSB does not have jurisdiction over 
criminal matters. We have jurisdiction over accidents and 
incidents, as defined in our law.
    Mr. Stauber. Is an incident a protester?
    Ms. Homendy. If it is criminal in nature, it would not be 
under our jurisdiction.
    Mr. Stauber. So, what you are saying is the NTSB refers 
everything to the FBI.
    Ms. Homendy. If it is criminal in nature.
    Mr. Stauber. OK. The fact of the matter is--I will share 
with you, in case you don't know--Enbridge Line 3 came through 
part of our district. We had protesters inside the pipe while 
it was being raised. Workers were put in serious jeopardy for 
their safety. It taxed the local law enforcement community. In 
fact, they had to bring in more law enforcement to secure the 
appropriate area.
    And I hope that the NTSB, as you go forward, Madam, I hope 
that you would look into the fact that the NTSB should weigh in 
heavily on these anti-jobs, anti-energy protesters, which are 
affecting communities across this Nation.
    And with that, I will yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. We have Ms. 
Williams of Georgia, followed by Mrs. Steel.
    Ms. Williams, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    From travelers using the world's busiest and most efficient 
airport to folks getting where they need to go with the 
Nation's eighth largest rapid transit system to drivers 
navigating our busy roads, now Georgia's Fifth Congressional 
District is always on the move. And a lot of people on the move 
means a lot of people that we need to keep safe. That is why 
the work of the National Transportation Safety Board is so 
important, especially in my district.
    A small but mighty agency, the Board investigates 
transportation accidents and helps prevent future accidents 
from happening. To ensure the Board truly serves us is up to 
Congress to make sure that we provide it the resources and the 
support that it needs. Today I look forward to hearing from 
Chair Homendy how we can do that through reauthorization.
    Chair Homendy, according to the Board's data, investigating 
a highway accident takes an average of 18 months, and 
investigating aviation accidents takes an average of 19 months. 
In your reauthorization proposal, are there specific resources 
or supports that ensure that the Board can provide the most 
efficient, thorough assessments possible to guide timely 
investigations and subsequent safety recommendations?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you very much for the question, and 
thank you for your leadership on safety.
    The NTSB is very focused on reducing our backlog of 
investigations and improving the timeliness of issuing our 
accident reports. Part of that is through dedicating the 
appropriate resources, and part of that is through implementing 
process improvements, which we have done at the agency.
    As far as resources, we need to fill the gaps. Right now, 
we have a number of vacancies that we need to fill that have 
been, quite frankly, on the books for some time. And we are 
working diligently to do that. But then we also need to expand 
our resources.
    With respect to the timeliness in particular, not only have 
we put certain processes in place, but we have added a couple 
of personnel, some former employees from the NTSB who are 
retired annuitants, who will be solely focused on the backlog 
in aviation. We are doing very well on the backlog in other 
modes. In some modes, it is non-existent.
    So, we are working and making significant improvement, and 
would appreciate your consideration of our reauthorization 
proposal, which would provide us a modest increase in resources 
and personnel, which would help us improve the timeliness of 
our accident investigations.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you. Additionally, the 
National Transportation Safety Board's Most Wanted List 
recommends protecting vulnerable road users through a Safe 
System approach. We have heard witnesses testify in previous 
hearings about the Safe System approach as an alternative way 
States and localities can address traffic safety.
    Could you elaborate on how the Safe System approach 
promotes more equitable and effective traffic safety 
enforcement?
    And how would your reauthorization proposal support this 
approach?
    Ms. Homendy. The NTSB has on its Most Wanted List of 
transportation safety improving the safety of vulnerable road 
users through the Safe System approach.
    We have issued a number of reports--pedestrian safety, 
bicyclist safety, and motorcyclist safety--focused on improving 
their safety on our Nation's roads. And within that, we have 
hundreds of recommendations that still require implementation, 
everything from improving safety on our roads to how they are 
designed, how they are built, to ensure that they are built for 
the use of all road users, not just vehicles, to looking at 
improving the safety of vehicles themselves.
    So, we do endorse the Safe System approach and are working 
hard to promote that through all our actions at the NTSB.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you. And in addition to 
that, reducing inequalities and creating opportunities for 
diversity and inclusion is something that I also take just as 
seriously as safety. So, as your agency focuses on diversity, 
equity, and inclusion to create a more talented workforce, what 
impact would a broader range of perspectives at the agency have 
on ensuring potential safety issues are identified and 
reported?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, with respect to impact, it would be 
tremendous. And just so you are aware, part of our core values 
is diversity and inclusion. And we have begun to implement two 
strategic plans focused on diversity, equity, inclusion, and 
accessibility, including retaining, hiring, and attracting a 
diverse workforce, which is critical to the NTSB, critical to 
our investigation because people who bring different 
experiences, different thoughts, and different backgrounds help 
in our investigations and in all our work at the NTSB.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. And while I do have more 
questions, I am, unfortunately, out of time. So, Madam Chair, I 
yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentlelady yields back. We will 
recognize Mrs. Steel, followed by Mr. Lowenthal and Mr. Sires.
    Mrs. Steel, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much.
    Madam Chairwoman, the National Transportation Safety Board 
plays an important role in investigating transportation 
accidents. And I want to commend the work that NTSB has done in 
my district, especially with the recent fatal helicopter crash 
of a Huntington Beach officer, Nicholas Vella.
    The NTSB also plays an important role in providing safety 
recommendations to Federal and State agencies. Unfortunately, 
both alcohol-impaired and drug-impaired driving deaths have 
become a common issue in Orange County. As you know, drug-
impaired driving is very difficult to detect, compared to 
alcohol-impaired driving. How is the NTSB improving drug 
testing protocols, and what are some of the lessons learned 
from the past accidents?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. Ending drug and 
alcohol impairment is on our Most Wanted List of transportation 
safety improvements. And in fact, we have a pretty 
comprehensive report coming out this fall focused on drug-
impaired driving, and we will make sure to brief you on that.
    But we have several recommendations, including improving 
drug testing, setting a standard to determine impairment, like 
we have with alcohol. That is not something the NTSB does. It 
is something we recommend, and have issued recommendations both 
to the Department of Transportation, and I believe we have also 
issued recommendations to the Department of Health and Human 
Services, as well.
    Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much. With the emerging 
transportation technologies, including commercial space, 
unmanned aircraft systems, and even autonomous vehicles, how 
are you collaborating with the commercial stakeholders in these 
transforming sectors in support of NTSB's broader mission of 
improving transportation safety?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. We have tremendous 
outreach with the commercial community, whether it is through 
speaking with different organizations, visiting their sites, or 
speaking at events they have, or participating in workgroups 
where we work together on emerging safety issues and discuss 
those openly, including what we are seeing in accidents and 
incidents and trends in safety and transportation. So, we work 
very closely with them.
    And then, in our accident investigations, if an operator 
is--if something occurred with that operator, the operator more 
than likely would be provided party status, which means they 
would be part of our fact-finding portion of the investigation. 
We would work closely together, and they would be able to 
identify safety gaps immediately that they could address.
    Mrs. Steel. So, when is the report going to come out, is it 
right now that you are going through the process?
    Ms. Homendy. I am sorry, it was difficult to hear.
    Mrs. Steel. When is this report going to come out that you 
are putting all this information together after all these 
meetings, are we going to expect it by the end of this year or 
the next few months? And some--like a progress report is going 
to come out?
    Ms. Homendy. With respect--I am sorry, with respect to drug 
testing and impairment, or just our work with private entities?
    Mrs. Steel. Private entities regarding unmanned aircraft 
systems and then autonomous vehicles. And these are actually 
creating a lot of accidents, too. Hopefully, not, but 
[inaudible] has begun, and is that coming out from your agency 
or not?
    Ms. Homendy. Well, we work on individual accident 
investigations, and we do have certain accident investigations 
right now involving urban air mobility, or advanced air 
mobility, and involving driver assistance systems. Those 
reports--I would have to check on the dates of those reports, 
and get back to you for the record for those accident 
investigations.
    Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentlelady yields back. Mr. Lowenthal, 
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, and thank you, Chair Homendy, for 
being with us today. I am going to return to a theme that we 
have heard frequently during this hearing and this 
reauthorization, and that is the theme of why do investigations 
and data collection or reporting take so long.
    You mentioned in your opening testimony your agency's 
ongoing investigation into the ship striking a pipeline off the 
coast between Huntington Beach and Long Beach, California. This 
incident substantially impacted communities and ecosystems 
throughout southern California, including residents of my 
district.
    And while I understand that many agencies and many people 
are investigating this incident, and you cannot comment on the 
specifics of this ongoing matter, I would like to emphasize how 
important a quick resolution of this process and a timely 
report will be to my constituents.
    As you are aware, pipeline investigations take an average 
of 21.8 months. Oh, and that is the average over the last 5 
years. Can you elaborate on what Congress can do and what your 
agency can do to reduce this time lag and produce timely and 
actionable data more quickly?
    Ms. Homendy. Thank you for the question. And for that 
specific pipeline accident, we will have our own report, but I 
believe the Coast Guard is the lead in that investigation.
    With respect to our investigative process, we are looking 
at efficiencies. Right now, we have looked at the data, we have 
identified areas where we believe have held up the 
investigations. It is actually not in the investigative process 
many times, but is in the report writing and editing process. 
And there are efficiencies taking place in that area.
    And we are also dedicating additional resources where we 
can, filling gaps in vacancies, making sure they have adequate 
resources. I will tell you that, for our pipeline personnel, we 
have six pipeline investigators. This one in particular that 
you mentioned, regarding the Elly Platform, is being led by our 
marine safety team, and they have 11 investigators. So, while 
we put forward process improvements in terms of scaling 
investigations and making sure we have adequate processes in 
place to move forward on investigations, we also need to match 
that with additional resources.
    And certainly, in marine safety, our accidents profile has 
increased eightfold over the last decade, but our investigation 
staff has not.
    Mr. Lowenthal. So, you are saying that, with the numbers of 
people that you have doing the investigation, that the slowdown 
in actual reporting is really due to the report writing?
    Ms. Homendy. We did collect data, and report writing and 
review has taken most of the time. We didn't have--before I was 
Chair, we didn't have information on where the holdup was. Our 
team behind me really took leadership, and identified where the 
areas were that we could improve, including the review. Our 
investigation will get done, but then the review process takes 
longer than it should, and we need to get those through.
    In addition, there is one more area that I do want to 
mention that can hold up our investigations, and that has been 
when the Coast Guard and others have pursued criminal matters. 
It can close off our investigation very quickly, because 
witnesses tend to not want to discuss things with us. So, that 
can be an increased complexity in our investigations, and has 
been happening more and more. And it is something that we are 
looking to address and trying to address with our partners in 
safety.
    Mr. Lowenthal. And just before I yield back, I realize that 
you can't comment specifically on this case, but that last 
comment that you made about people being reluctant to testify 
because of potential criminal matters may be applicable to the 
rupture of this pipeline.
    So, with that, I yield back.
    Mrs. Napolitano. The gentleman yields back. We have Mr. 
Sires, Mr. Lynch, and Mr. Auchincloss. Are they available?
    [No response.]
    Mrs. Napolitano. Well, with that, that concludes our 
hearing.
    I want to say to Madam Homendy that you are doing a lot 
with a little. And the question from Mr. Gimenez substantiating 
the reason for a request to increase in budget, be sure we get 
that so the committee can review, and congratulations to you 
and your staff for the preeminent investigative body that you 
have.
    This concludes our hearing, as I said. I would like to 
thank you for your testimony. It has been very helpful and 
informative.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such a time as our witness has provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted to her in 
writing.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments and information 
submitted by Members or the witness to be included in the 
record of today's hearing.
    And without objection, is so ordered.
    The committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


 Prepared Statement of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in 
                    Congress from the State of Texas
    Thank you, Chairman DeFazio, and Ranking Member Graves, for holding 
today's hearing on reauthorizing the National Transportation Safety 
Board. I would also like to thank our esteemed panelist for testifying 
today.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) plays a paramount 
role in investigating transportation accidents and ensuring that what 
we learn from these accidents prevents them from happening again. The 
NTSB's proven record of accomplishment adds credibility to every 
investigation they are involved in, and their role as a U.S. emissary 
in international incidents helps foster diplomacy and cooperation 
between nations.
    The NTSB recently completed an investigation of a natural gas 
explosion in Dallas, Texas, that killed a 12-year-old girl, injured 
four others and destroyed three homes. The investigation found that 
Atmos Energy Corporation should have acted earlier and could have 
prevent this deadly accident.
    It also found a need for more oversight from federal, state, and 
local agencies. This was a real tragedy for the whole community and 
we're anxious to learn what is being done to prevent this from 
happening to anyone else.
    I look forward to hearing from our witness what additional 
resources the National Transportation Safety Board needs to continue 
the great work it is doing to improve transportation safety here in the 
United States and throughout the world.

                                 
 Letter of April 20, 2022, from Catherine Chase, President, Advocates 
for Highway and Auto Safety, to Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, Chair, and Hon. 
      Sam Graves, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
   Infrastructure, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
                                                    April 20, 2022.
The Honorable Peter DeFazio, Chair,
The Honorable Sam Graves, Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
    Dear Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Graves:
    Thank you for holding the April 6, 2022, hearing, ``National 
Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization.'' We respectfully request 
that this letter be included in the hearing record.
    Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) is a coalition of 
public health, safety, law enforcement, and consumer organizations, 
insurers and insurance agents that promotes highway and auto safety 
through the adoption of federal and state laws, policies and 
regulations. Advocates is unique both in its board composition and its 
mission of advancing safe vehicles, safe motorists and road users, and 
safe roadway environments.
    As this Committee is well aware, our nation's roads have become 
more dangerous and deadly. In 2020, 38,824 people were killed in 
traffic crashes--the highest annual total in more than a decade. 
Increased incidence of impaired driving, speeding, and lack of seat 
belt use contributed to this spike. Data for the first nine months of 
2021 find the horrific rise in traffic fatalities continued, with a 12 
percent upsurge over the same period in 2020 and the highest percentage 
jump during the first nine months in the recorded history of data in 
the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). Additionally, nearly 
5,000 people were killed and more than 145,000 more were injured in 
crashes involving large trucks in 2020. Crashes also impose a 
tremendous societal cost estimated to exceed one trillion dollars 
annually.
    This state of calamity and catastrophe on our roadways makes the 
work performed by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) all 
the more necessary. The NTSB is an effective and essential agency with 
a remarkable 55-year record of advancing transportation safety 
including on our nation's roads. Through their expert crash 
investigations, safety recommendations, biennial Most Wanted List of 
Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL), and other activities, the 
NTSB plays a critical role in bringing needed attention to safety 
deficiencies and identifying solutions for preventing crashes, saving 
lives and reducing injuries. Advocates and many other stakeholders 
dedicated to improving transportation safety rely on the NTSB's 
leadership and expertise to inform their organizations' agendas and 
priorities, and then urge Congress to advance legislation on needed 
improvements. It is vital that this agency has sufficient resources to 
perform its lifesaving mission. We strongly urge the Committee to 
support robust funding, including for necessary staff and expertise as 
was requested by the agency, to advance their work.
    As NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy discussed during her testimony 
before the Committee, the NTSB is increasingly sought to investigate 
fatal crashes involving cars equipped with automated driving systems 
(ADS) and varying levels of driving automation. These investigations 
have and will continue to identify safety deficiencies, determine 
contributing causes, and result in recommendations for government and 
industry actions to prevent future deadly incidents. As vehicles become 
more technologically advanced, the NTSB must have sufficient staff with 
highly technical knowledge and skills. ADS and autonomous vehicles 
(AVs) are complex ``computers on wheels'' often traveling in 
complicated driving environments, and properly assessing their 
performance will require appropriately educated and trained personnel. 
The public is supportive of the NTSB's unique expertise and critical 
role in ensuring the safety of vehicles with ADS. In a 2018 public 
opinion poll commissioned by Advocates, 80 percent of respondents 
indicated they believed the NTSB investigations will be helpful in 
identifying problems and recommending improvements.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ORC International CARAVAN Public Opinion Poll, Commissioned by 
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, July 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The NTSB investigations also underscore the need for requirements 
for collection of and access to vehicle performance and crash data. To 
that end, Advocates continues to urge the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT) to issue a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
(FMVSS) requiring all vehicles be equipped with event data recorders 
(EDRs) to capture all necessary data in a standardized format to 
understand and evaluate the safety performance of vehicles, especially 
those equipped with an ADS and AVs. If the U.S. DOT does not take this 
action, Congress should advance legislation requiring them to do so by 
a date certain for issuance of a rule and for compliance. Not only will 
this data be essential for the NTSB to carry out its investigative 
duties, but it should also be available to leading safety 
organizations, researchers and the public.
    We once again commend this Committee for its leadership and 
dedication to advancing the INVEST in America Act (H.R. 3684), from 
which many of the safety advances were included in the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act ((IIJA), Pub. L. 117-58). While Advocates 
worked together with Congress to include significant safety provisions, 
many of which were rooted in NTSB recommendations, there is still more 
work to be done including on outstanding NTSB recommendations. Since 
the IIJA enactment, Advocates has been urging the U.S. DOT to act 
expeditiously on the safety directives and to treat the provisions as a 
``floor'' and not a ``ceiling'' for its end products. We have attached 
a list of safety issues, which are aligned with the NTSB MWL, 
recommendations and reports.
    The safety of all road users relies on the imperative and 
influential work of the NTSB. Its mission, which includes ``Making 
transportation safer by conducting independent accident 
investigations'' and ``advocating safety improvements,'' is 
foundational to protecting everyone in and around vehicles of today, as 
well as during the transition as vehicles become increasingly 
automated. Advocates urges this Committee to authorize the resources 
needed to bolster the agency's effectiveness and efficiency. Thank you 
again for your safety leadership.
        Sincerely,
                                           Catherine Chase,
                  President, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.

cc:  Members of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

                                                         Attachment
                 NTSB's Most Wanted List 2021-2022 and
                 Advocates' Recommendations for Action
    The MWL is a prime example of the agency providing a national focus 
on persistent and emerging safety issues and solutions which should be 
spotlighted and which are supported by their investigations and 
research reports. The 2021-2022 MWL identifies five issue areas to 
improve highway safety, followed by Advocates' recommendations for 
action, including the below, among others:
``Implement a Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Speeding-Related 
        Crashes''
      Why Action is Needed: Excess speed can contribute to both 
the frequency and severity of motor vehicle crashes. Speeding is a 
leading contributor to traffic crashes, and fatalities in speeding-
related crashes spiked a staggering 17 percent in 2020.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Stewart, T. (2022, March). Overview of motor vehicle crashes in 
2020 (Report No. DOT HS 813 266). National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      What Action is Needed:
      +  Automated enforcement (AE), the use of speed and red-light 
cameras to augment traditional enforcement, is an effective deterrent 
against dangerous driving behavior including speeding and is proven to 
improve safety. We were encouraged that the IIJA lifted the prohibition 
on use of federal funding for AE systems in school and work zones and 
urge the Committee to remove the remaining restrictions. Advocates, 
along with AAA, Governors Highway Safety Association, the Insurance 
Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), and National Safety Council 
published the ``Automated Enforcement Program Checklist'' to signal 
support from our organizations and provide practical suggestions for 
successful planning, implementing and evaluating of AE programs.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Automated Enforcement Program Checklist, available at https://
saferoads.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AE-checklist-May-2021.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      +  U.S. DOT should update guidelines that require use of the 
``85th percentile'' in speed limit setting to instead focus on safety. 
The 85th percentile speed is the speed at or below 85 percent of the 
vehicles on a road are traveling on the day and time that speed is 
measured. This speed is then used to set speed limits. This method 
ignores evidence obtained by the NTSB and others that people often 
drive faster than the speed limit and that average speeds tend to 
increase whenever speed limits are raised which leads to an escalation 
in repeated speed limit increases.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ IIHS: Speed, IIHS available at https://www.iihs.org/topics/
speed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      +  U.S. DOT should complete research on vehicle safety 
technologies which hold potential to reduce speeding such as 
intelligent speed assistance (ISA). These systems can provide 
information to drivers about present speed limits, warn drivers when a 
car's speed is above the limit, and discourage speeding.\5\ U.S. DOT 
should also complete a rulemaking on speed limiters for commercial 
motor vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ European New Car Assessment Programs: Speed assistance systems, 
available at: https://www.euroncap.com/en/vehicle-safety/the-ratings-
explained/safety-assist/speed-assistance/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      +  Roadway infrastructure changes such as speed humps, road 
diets, protected bike lanes, speed reduction zones and other measures, 
can help to improve safety by reducing excess speed, better protecting 
vulnerable road users (VRUs) and preventing crashes. These changes are 
consistent with a Safe System Approach (SSA) to improving roadway 
safety infrastructure and we laud the provisions in the IIJA which 
incentivize such. We urge the U.S. DOT to encourage states and 
localities to take advantage of the funding opportunities in the IIJA 
to make their roads safer through infrastructure improvements.
``Protect Vulnerable Road Users through a Safe System Approach''
      Why Action is Needed: In 2020, fatalities of pedestrians 
and bicyclists reached their highest levels in more than three decades. 
NTSB Chair Homendy has championed a SSA and been instrumental in 
raising awareness of this comprehensive strategy to improve safety for 
all road users and especially VRUs. The SSA is also closely aligned 
with Advocates' longstanding mission and approach and our recent work 
as a member of the Johns Hopkins Center for Injury Research and Policy 
Safe System working group which in 2021 released its Recommendations of 
the Safe System Consortium. The SSA anticipates human error as being 
unavoidable and injury tolerance as having limitations and seeks to 
prevent fatalities by minimizing conflicts and reducing crash forces 
when crashes do occur. The SSA can be especially beneficial to VRUs 
through its focus on safe speeds and by supporting the adoption of the 
identified road safety improvements as well as protected intersections, 
accessible sidewalks, leading intervals for signaling, and others.
      What Action is Needed:
      +  Advanced vehicle safety technologies such as automatic 
emergency braking (AEB) that detects and responds to VRUs including 
pedestrians and bicyclists should be required as standard equipment on 
new vehicles. We urge the U.S. DOT to ensure the final rule for AEB, 
which was required by the IIJA, specifies response to these road users 
as part of the minimum performance standard.
      +  The severity of collisions between VRUs and vehicles can be 
reduced by requiring the hood and bumper areas of vehicles to be more 
forgiving when crashes do occur. We urge the U.S. DOT to commence and 
complete rulemaking with a date certain for compliance.
``Prevent Alcohol- and Other Drug-Impaired Driving''
      Why Action is Needed: In 2020, fatalities in alcohol-
impaired driving crashes jumped 14 percent. Drunk driving continues to 
account for approximately 30 percent of crash fatalities and has for 
over a decade. When drug and alcohol use is combined, known as 
``polyuse,'' impairment can be amplified.
      What Action is Needed:
      +  The IIHS has found that alcohol-detection systems can save 
more than 9,000 lives a year if widely deployed.\6\ We urge the U.S. 
DOT to meet the deadlines in the IIJA to issue a final rule requiring 
advanced impaired driving prevention technology be equipped as standard 
on new vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Alcohol-detection 
systems could prevent more than a fourth of U.S. road fatalities (Jul. 
23, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      +  The NHTSA should undertake research to identify a causal link 
between marijuana use, impairment, and crashes; to develop verified 
roadside testing technology; and, to develop an impairment standard for 
marijuana (noting current research does not support a per se level). 
The agency should also continue funding for law enforcement training 
programs to detect and prevent impaired driving.
      +  Reducing the limit of alcohol and driving to .05 percent blood 
alcohol concentration (BAC) is a research-based countermeasure employed 
around the world to deter drunk driving. A study, Evaluation of Utah's 
.05 BAC Per Se Law, released by NHTSA on February 11, 2022, finds that 
Utah experienced a nearly 20 percent drop in traffic fatalities in 2019 
(248), the first year that the law was in effect, compared to 2016 
(281), the last year before the law was enacted.\7\ Driving at .05 
percent BAC or higher is dangerous, and public health researchers, 
experts, a coalition of safety advocates and the NTSB agree that state 
laws lowering BAC will reduce the horrific toll of deaths and injuries 
caused by drunk driving. Advocates urges Congress to revise the Section 
405 National Priority Safety Program to create a new highway safety 
incentive grant award for states that reduce the BAC limit while 
driving to .05 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ United States Department of Transportation, NHTSA, Office of 
Behavioral Safety Research, Evaluation of Utah's .05 BAC Per Se Law 
[Traffic Tech], DOT HS 813 234; February 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Require Collision-Avoidance and Connected-Vehicle Technologies on all 
        Vehicles''
      Why Action is Needed: The IIHS has shown that collision-
avoidance systems, also known as advanced driver assistance systems 
(ADAS), have remarkable potential to reduce crashes. For example, AEB 
can decrease front-to-rear crashes with injuries by 56 percent in 
passenger vehicles.\8\ In large trucks, AEB can reduce front-to-rear 
crashes by 40 percent.\9\ Notably, motor vehicle crashes are a leading 
killer of teenagers in the U.S., and teen drivers are far more likely 
than other drivers to be involved in fatal crashes because they lack 
driving experience and tend to take greater risks. IIHS research has 
found that ``crash avoidance features and teen-specific vehicle 
technologies have the potential to prevent or mitigate up to three-
quarters of fatal crashes involving teen drivers.'' \10\ Absent a 
minimum performance standard, access to these technologies is 
inequitable as consumers may have to purchase a luxury vehicle or 
expensive trim model to get the safety features. All families should 
have the safest braking systems. Moreover, without a standard there is 
no certainty that the technology will perform as needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ IIHS, Real world benefits of crash avoidance technologies, 
available at: https://www.iihs.org/media/259e5bbd-f859-42a7-bd54-
3888f7a2d3ef/e9boUQ/Topics/ADVANCED%20DRIVER
%20ASSISTANCE/IIHS-real-world-CA-benefits.pdf.
    \9\ IIHS, Study shows front crash prevention works for large trucks 
too, available at: https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/study-shows-front-
crash-prevention-works-for-large-trucks-too
    \10\ IIHS, Driving technology promises large safety benefits for 
teens, September 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      What Action is Needed:
      +  NHTSA should expeditiously issue a final rule requiring all 
new vehicles (passenger vehicles, buses, and trucks) to be equipped 
with ADAS. The IIJA initiates this process.
      +  Connected vehicle technologies, including vehicle-to-vehicle 
(V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), and vehicle-to-everything 
(V2X), can relay information and augment safety benefits. Connected 
vehicle technology should be advanced by NHTSA updating and completing 
the 2017 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on V2V as well as partnering 
with the Federal Highway Administration to study the needs and benefits 
of V2I with the goal of V2X.\11\ The IIJA required DOT to expand 
research efforts to ensure VRUs will be incorporated into connected 
vehicle systems within 180 days and report to Congress not later than 
two years. We urge NHTSA to issue the rule on V2V and complete its work 
on V2X swiftly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 82 FR 3854 (Jan. 12, 2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Eliminate Distracted Driving''
      Why Action is Needed: Distracted driving is a pervasive, 
yet underreported, issue on our nation's roadways. A new public opinion 
poll released by Advocates and Selective Insurance Group found that 
nearly three-quarters (70 percent) of licensed drivers used a mobile 
device while driving for personal reasons in the past 90 days. When 
asking those who drive for work, the number was even more alarming with 
86 percent reporting mobile device use when driving for work in the 
last three months.\12\ Another new poll from Nationwide Insurance found 
that 66 percent of drivers believe holding their phone while driving is 
dangerous, yet half (51 percent) admitted to doing so.\13\ Distracted 
driving may become further exacerbated as vehicles are equipped with 
automated driving system features, which still require an attentive and 
ready driver to take over the driving task at any time, yet could allow 
for driver disengagement, automation complacency or foreseeable misuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ The Harris Poll on behalf of Selective Insurance and Advocates 
for Highway and Auto Safety, March 2022.
    \13\ Nationwide, Survey: 86 percent of drivers support hands-free 
legislation, April 15, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      What Action is Needed:
      +  Driver monitoring technology offers a potential technological 
countermeasure against distracted driving. The IIJA directed NHTSA to 
initiate research on driver monitoring technology within three years 
and report to Congress not later than 180 days after the research is 
completed, with the discretion to determine if a rulemaking is 
required. Advocates urges U.S. DOT to meet this requirement.
      +  State laws banning distracting viewing activities, such as 
video conferencing, viewing social media and apps behind the wheel, are 
needed to deter this dangerous behavior. A new grant opportunity in the 
IIJA is intended to encourage states to upgrade their laws to do so. We 
urge this Committee and NHTSA to enhance safety incentive grant 
programs to assure they are prompting state action as well as providing 
states the resources they need for enforcement of such.
  NTSB's Investigations Expose Safety Problems and Inform Advocates' 
       Policy Recommendations on Commercial Motor Vehicle Issues
    As the NTSB has been at the forefront of investigating devastating 
crashes involving large trucks, motorcoaches, and school buses, its 
work has uncovered serious safety lapses and recommended commonsense 
actions to prevent such incidents in the future. As a result, Advocates 
urges action by Congress and U.S. DOT on the following issues, among 
others:
      Truck underride guards to prevent a passenger vehicle 
from traveling under the rear or side of a trailer and significantly 
increase the chances of survival: The IIJA directed NHTSA to update the 
standard for rear guards and research side underride guards within one 
year. The U.S. DOT should act to meet these deadlines, and if the 
agency does not issue a final rule on side underride guards with 
deadlines for completion and compliance, Congress should direct them to 
do so.
      Speed limiters for commercial motor vehicles (CMVs): On 
average, over 1,000 lives are lost annually to speeding CMVs. NHTSA and 
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) should partner 
and issue a final rule requiring all new CMVs to be equipped with speed 
limiting devices and to compel their use in CMVs in which they are 
already installed. Speed limiters should be set at speeds no higher 
than 65 miles per hour.
      Driver training which includes a minimum number of 
behind-the-wheel hours, a requirement not currently included in the 
Entry-Level Driver Training Rule: The U.S. DOT should amend the rule 
for entry level driver training for all commercial driver license (CDL) 
candidates to include a minimum number of behind-the-wheel training 
hours to ensure that novice drivers receive adequate training before 
operating a large truck on public roads.
      Oversight of the CMV industry: FMCSA should require that 
truck companies be assessed before the commencement of operations and 
subject new carriers that accumulate violations to stricter oversight.
      Prevention of truck driver fatigue, a major contributor 
to truck crashes: The U.S. DOT and Congress should reject special 
interest exemptions from hours of service (HOS) rules and the 
requirement to utilize electronic logging devices (ELDs) to ensure 
compliance. Additionally, drivers should be properly screened for 
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) and receive the medical treatment they 
need to prevent fatigue while driving.
      Improve bus safety: NHTSA should expeditiously issue the 
overdue rule on anti-ejection countermeasures for motorcoaches, as 
required by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-
21, Pub. L. 112-141) which is now eight years past the deadline. Three-
point seat belts, AEB and electronic stability control (ESC) should be 
required on school buses. Additionally, research followed by rulemaking 
should be undertaken on fire prevention and mitigation, motion-
activated detection systems that can perceive pedestrians located near 
the outside of the school bus, seat belt reminder systems, and ``hot 
cars'' detection and alert systems for school buses. The FMCSA should 
also improve school bus operations including medical fitness and driver 
training.

                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


    Introduction to responses from Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, 
National Transportation Safety Board: Thank you again for the 
opportunity to discuss our reauthorization proposal. I am pleased to 
answer the additional questions posed by Members of the Committee, 
below.
    Our reauthorization proposal and the budget request that we 
outlined for you represent a modest investment to address our agency's 
need to meet future transportation safety challenges. The requested 
authorized amount of $129.3 million for the first year under our 
proposal, which is equal to the president's fiscal year (FY) 2023 
budget request, is an increase of $7.9 million above our current 
appropriation; however, 92 percent of that increase would be allocated 
to the 4.6 percent required salary increase, nonpay inflationary 
increases, and other associated costs for personnel to modestly 
increase our staffing from 412 to 425 full-time equivalent positions. 
We have identified the need for at least $6.2 million in additional 
funding for needed programmatic investments. We are, therefore, 
requesting an appropriation of $135.5 million for FY 2023.

  Questions from Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, 
              Chair, National Transportation Safety Board

    Question 1. Chairwoman Homendy, following the investigation of the 
devastating gas explosion in Dallas, NTSB made 14 recommendations where 
improvements could be made to prevent this from happening again. Can 
you tell me what progress is being made by Atmos Energy and the 
federal, state, and local oversight agencies in implementing these 
recommendations?
    Answer. Eleven of the 14 recommendations stemming from that 
investigation are open. On May 11, 2022, three of the five 
recommendations that we made to Atmos Energy Corporation were 
classified ``Closed--Acceptable Action.'' In addition, the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the American Gas 
Association, Gas Piping Technology Committee (GPTC) have planned 
actions to address the recommendations. Unfortunately, to date, we have 
not received responses from the Texas Railroad Commission or the Dallas 
Fire-Rescue Department (DFR) regarding any actions to address the 
recommendations, and we are following up with them. Any assistance that 
you could provide to facilitate responses from those agencies would be 
appreciated. Below are the recommendations and a summary of each 
recipient's planned and completed actions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Recommendation and
             Number                     Status            Planned or
                                                       Completed Actions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-1..........................  Open--              TO PIPELINE AND
                                  Acceptable           HAZARDOUS
                                  Alternate            MATERIALS SAFETY
                                  Response..........   ADMINISTRATION:
                                                       Expand incident
                                                       reporting
                                                       requirements in
                                                       Title 49 Code of
                                                       Federal
                                                       Regulations Part
                                                       191 so that
                                                       events that may
                                                       meet the
                                                       definition of
                                                       ``incident'' are
                                                       immediately
                                                       reported to the
                                                       National Response
                                                       Center [NRC] even
                                                       when the source
                                                       of the natural
                                                       gas has not been
                                                       determined.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-2..........................  Open--              TO THE PIPELINE
                                  Acceptable           AND HAZARDOUS
                                  Response..........   MATERIALS SAFETY
                                                       ADMINISTRATION:
                                                       Evaluate
                                                       industry's
                                                       implementation of
                                                       the gas
                                                       distribution
                                                       pipeline
                                                       integrity
                                                       management [DIMP]
                                                       requirements and
                                                       develop updated
                                                       guidance for
                                                       improving their
                                                       effectiveness.
                                                       The evaluation
                                                       should
                                                       specifically
                                                       consider factors
                                                       that may increase
                                                       the likelihood of
                                                       failure such as
                                                       age, increase the
                                                       overall risk
                                                       (including
                                                       factors that
                                                       simultaneously
                                                       increase the
                                                       likelihood and
                                                       consequence of
                                                       failure), and
                                                       limit the
                                                       effectiveness of
                                                       leak management
                                                       programs.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-3..........................  Open--              TO THE PIPELINE
                                  Acceptable           AND HAZARDOUS
                                  Response..........   MATERIALS SAFETY
                                                       ADMINISTRATION:
                                                       Assist the
                                                       Railroad
                                                       Commission of
                                                       Texas in
                                                       conducting the
                                                       audit recommended
                                                       in Safety
                                                       Recommendation P-
                                                       21-4.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-4..........................  Open--              TO THE RAILROAD
                                  Await                COMMISSION OF
                                  Response..........   TEXAS: With
                                                       assistance from
                                                       the Pipeline and
                                                       Hazardous
                                                       Materials Safety
                                                       Administration,
                                                       conduct a
                                                       comprehensive
                                                       audit of Atmos
                                                       Energy
                                                       Corporation's
                                                       incident-
                                                       reporting
                                                       practices;
                                                       policies and
                                                       procedures for
                                                       responding to
                                                       leaks, fires,
                                                       explosions, and
                                                       emergency calls;
                                                       and integrity
                                                       management
                                                       programs.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-5..........................  Open--              TO THE DALLAS FIRE-
                                  Await                RESCUE
                                  Response..........   DEPARTMENT:
                                                       Revise the
                                                       continuing
                                                       education
                                                       requirements for
                                                       your arson
                                                       investigators to
                                                       include training
                                                       on building fuel
                                                       gas systems.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-6..........................  Open--              TO THE DALLAS FIRE-
                                  Await                RESCUE
                                  Response..........   DEPARTMENT:
                                                       Revise your
                                                       procedures to
                                                       require gas
                                                       monitoring after
                                                       the occurrence of
                                                       a gas-related
                                                       structure fire or
                                                       explosion.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-7..........................  Open--              TO THE DALLAS FIRE-
                                  Await                RESCUE
                                  Response..........   DEPARTMENT:
                                                       Develop and
                                                       implement a
                                                       formal process to
                                                       alert appropriate
                                                       local, state, and
                                                       federal agencies
                                                       of potential
                                                       systemic safety
                                                       issues that
                                                       should be
                                                       investigated
                                                       further.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-8..........................  Closed--            TO ATMOS ENERGY
                                  Acceptable           CORPORATION:
                                  Action............   Provide initial
                                                       and recurrent
                                                       training to
                                                       Dallas Fire-
                                                       Rescue Department
                                                       arson
                                                       investigators and
                                                       firefighters on
                                                       the local natural
                                                       gas distribution
                                                       system and
                                                       associated
                                                       hazards.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-9..........................  Closed--            TO ATMOS ENERGY
                                  Acceptable           CORPORATION:
                                  Action............   Develop and
                                                       implement more
                                                       rigorous inside
                                                       leak
                                                       investigation
                                                       requirements in
                                                       response to fires
                                                       and explosions
                                                       when gas
                                                       involvement
                                                       cannot be
                                                       excluded,
                                                       including clear
                                                       guidance on
                                                       pressure testing
                                                       and inside gas
                                                       measurements and
                                                       the potential
                                                       need to return to
                                                       the property
                                                       after
                                                       firefighters have
                                                       departed.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-10.........................  Closed--            TO ATMOS ENERGY
                                  Acceptable           CORPORATION:
                                  Action............   Develop a clear
                                                       procedure to
                                                       coordinate with
                                                       local emergency
                                                       responders when
                                                       investigating all
                                                       fires and
                                                       explosions that
                                                       may be gas
                                                       related to
                                                       conclusively
                                                       determine whether
                                                       your system can
                                                       be excluded as a
                                                       potential
                                                       contributor, and
                                                       collecting the
                                                       necessary
                                                       evidence to
                                                       support the
                                                       conclusion of
                                                       your
                                                       investigations.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-11.........................  Open--              TO ATMOS ENERGY
                                  Acceptable           CORPORATION:
                                  Response..........   Revise your
                                                       policies and
                                                       procedures for
                                                       responding to
                                                       leaks, fires,
                                                       explosions, and
                                                       emergency calls
                                                       to address the
                                                       challenges caused
                                                       by wet weather
                                                       conditions. The
                                                       revised policies
                                                       and procedures
                                                       should include:
                                                       (1) leak
                                                       investigation
                                                       methods that are
                                                       reliable in wet
                                                       weather; (2) leak
                                                       investigation
                                                       procedures that
                                                       assess all viable
                                                       gas migration
                                                       paths; (3)
                                                       criteria for when
                                                       to shut down or
                                                       isolate gas
                                                       distribution
                                                       systems and
                                                       pressure test
                                                       main and service
                                                       lines; and (4) an
                                                       alternate safe
                                                       response such as
                                                       evacuation when
                                                       reliable leak
                                                       investigations
                                                       are not possible
                                                       due to wet
                                                       weather or other
                                                       circumstances.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-12.........................  Open--              TO ATMOS ENERGY
                                  Acceptable           CORPORATION:
                                  Response..........   Without delay,
                                                       assess your
                                                       integrity
                                                       management
                                                       program, paying
                                                       particular
                                                       attention to the
                                                       areas identified
                                                       in this
                                                       investigation,
                                                       and revise the
                                                       program to
                                                       appropriately
                                                       consider: (1)
                                                       threats that
                                                       degrade a system
                                                       over time, and
                                                       (2) the increased
                                                       risk that can
                                                       result from
                                                       factors that
                                                       simultaneously
                                                       increase the
                                                       likelihood and
                                                       consequence of
                                                       failure.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-13.........................  Open--              TO THE GAS PIPING
                                  Acceptable           TECHNOLOGY
                                  Response..........   COMMITTEE:
                                                       Develop
                                                       additional
                                                       guidance that
                                                       identifies steps
                                                       gas distribution
                                                       operators can
                                                       take to safely
                                                       respond to leaks,
                                                       fires,
                                                       explosions, and
                                                       emergency calls,
                                                       considering the
                                                       limitations due
                                                       to wet weather
                                                       conditions, that
                                                       includes: (1)
                                                       criteria for when
                                                       to shut down or
                                                       isolate gas
                                                       distribution
                                                       systems, pressure
                                                       test main and
                                                       service lines,
                                                       and begin
                                                       evacuations; (2)
                                                       leak
                                                       investigation
                                                       methods that are
                                                       reliable in wet
                                                       weather, (3)
                                                       require an
                                                       alternate safe
                                                       response, such as
                                                       an evacuation
                                                       when reliable
                                                       leak
                                                       investigations
                                                       are not possible
                                                       due to wet
                                                       weather, and (4)
                                                       leak
                                                       investigations
                                                       that assess all
                                                       viable gas
                                                       migration paths,
                                                       including
                                                       granular backfill
                                                       and crawlspaces.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
P-21-14.........................  Open--              TO THE GAS PIPING
                                  Acceptable           TECHNOLOGY
                                  Response..........   COMMITTEE:
                                                       Develop guidance
                                                       that identifies
                                                       steps that gas
                                                       distribution
                                                       operators can
                                                       take to ensure
                                                       that their gas
                                                       distribution
                                                       integrity
                                                       management
                                                       program, at a
                                                       minimum,
                                                       appropriately
                                                       considers: (1)
                                                       threats that
                                                       degrade a system
                                                       over time, and
                                                       (2) the increased
                                                       risk that can
                                                       result from
                                                       factors that
                                                       simultaneously
                                                       increase the
                                                       likelihood and
                                                       consequence of
                                                       failure.
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question 2. Chairwoman Homendy, I'm pleased to hear that you are 
making diversity and equity part of your hiring goals. As the 
Chairwoman of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, I know 
there are many STEM focused minorities and HBCU students that would be 
a perfect fit for jobs at NTSB. Can you describe what steps you're 
taking to reach out to minority job candidates?
    Answer. The NTSB has developed strategic plans to support and 
address presidential Executive Orders (EOs) 13985, Advancing Racial 
Equity and Support for Underserved Communities, and 14035, Diversity, 
Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility [DEIA] in the Federal Workforce. 
Our strategic plans include focusing on creating increased employment 
equity and external stakeholder equity services for individuals 
belonging to underserved communities that have historically been denied 
such opportunities.
    Additionally, we have taken several steps to ensure that diversity 
and equity are central to our hiring goals. First, I have designated 
the NTSB's director of the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, 
Diversity, and Inclusion (EEODI) as our agency's chief diversity 
officer. She has been with our agency since 2000, and during her time 
here, she has established proactive policies and customized educational 
training programs and barrier analysis studies to ensure inclusion, 
fairness, and nondiscrimination in the NTSB's employment services. 
Second, the EEODI office is in the process of hiring a DEIA program 
manager to support outreach to women, underrepresented groups, and 
persons with targeted disabilities. We expect that person to be on 
board by the end of summer.
    Third, as part of our strategic human capital plan, we are in the 
process of hiring a chief human capitol officer (CHCO) to lead 
strategic workforce development and implement policies and procedures 
to recruit, hire, develop, promote, and retain a workforce with greater 
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. The CHCO will also 
exercise managerial responsibility for all administrative and technical 
aspects of the NTSB Human Capital Management and Training Office; 
direct human capital policies, procedures, and guidelines; and assure 
that the NTSB is well structured to support its mission requirements.
    Finally, the agency continues to participate in recruitment and 
other outreach activities at several Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities, including Morgan State, Howard University, and Elizabeth 
City State University, as well as at Hispanic Serving Institutions, 
including the University of Central Florida and the University of 
Puerto Rico-Mayaguez. We have also partnered with the Chickasaw Nation 
for many years to host summer interns through their program. In 
addition, our Diversity and Inclusion Advisory Committee is working 
with hiring managers and office directors to revise marketing and 
outreach plans, including considering strategies to improve outreach to 
universities and colleges, that will coincide with proposed paid 
student pathway vacancy announcements.

    Question 3. Chairwoman Homendy, the NTSB budget request asks for 
significant funds to hire additional staff. I know every case is 
different, but would these additional staff members allow the NTSB to 
expedite their investigations?
    Answer. Recently, the NTSB has faced several issues that affected 
the timeliness of our reports, such as government shutdowns, global 
pandemics, and parallel criminal investigations of accidents that slow 
the process of evidence collection. We are actively pursuing ways to 
expedite our processes while keeping in mind the time required to 
complete thorough and accurate investigations. Our Office of Aviation 
Safety is leading the agency effort and has several initiatives 
underway. Our focus has been on process improvements, eliminating the 
backlog, and adding resources where most needed. For example, we are 
now using a data-driven approach to evaluate each step of an 
investigation to identify efficiencies and process improvements. That 
approach has already improved our report review process and reduced the 
review timeline. We are also utilizing that approach to better monitor, 
track, and measure progress, make adjustments if projects are delayed, 
and hold employees accountable for performance.
    Additionally, we have identified staffing shortages as one source 
of timeliness issues. The reduction in workforce due to staff 
retirements means that there are simply fewer people to accomplish the 
same amount of work. This retirement trend is only projected to 
increase over the next several years; therefore, as an interim measure 
to meet the immediate need, we have hired retired investigators as 
reemployed annuitants to provide writing and final report processing 
support for certain investigations. We have also streamlined our hiring 
process to expedite filling vacancies, to the extent we are able under 
current budget constraints.
    Support of our reauthorization proposal would allow the NTSB to 
hire more staff to meet the expanded need for transportation 
investigations, including those related to emerging issue areas. Funds 
will also allow us to focus investigations on our aging infrastructure 
and to reinforce our current recommendations.

  Questions from Hon. Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr. to Hon. Jennifer 
          Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board

    Question 1. Americans are increasingly returning to work in-person 
and more often than not, using roads to get there. Consequently, from 
January through September 2021, over 30,000 people died in motor 
vehicle traffic crashes--an increase of approximately 12 percent from 
for the first nine months of 2020, when folks mostly worked from home. 
While car crashes impact all of us, the number of Black Americans who 
died in such crashes was up 23 percent from 2019, the largest increase 
in traffic deaths among racial groups.
    Mrs. Homendy, how concerned are you about the disproportionate 
impact on Americans of color and what steps is NTSB taking to combat 
the rising traffic fatalities among these communities?
    Answer. As you mention, data show that communities of color 
disproportionately experience higher numbers of transportation-related 
injuries and deaths. In fact, last year, Black Americans saw the 
largest increase in traffic deaths compared to any other racial group. 
One reason for this increase is that infrastructure in historically 
low-income and underserved communities does not support safe 
transportation for vulnerable road users, such as pedestrians and 
bicyclists. We have long stressed the need to improve safety for such 
road users. Safe and equitable access to transportation is everyone's 
right.
    The NTSB's history of conducting multidisciplinary investigations 
has taught us that equitable access to safe transportation can be 
achieved by prioritizing what is known as a ``Safe System Approach.'' A 
Safe System Approach holistically and comprehensively considers human 
error and vulnerability to design a transportation system with 
redundancies that enhance protection for everyone. This approach 
addresses all aspects of traffic safety: road users, vehicles, speeds, 
roads, and postcrash care. We believe so strongly in the benefits of a 
Safe System Approach that we have included it on our 2021-2022 Most 
Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (MWL).
    The NTSB is identifying and reaching out to organizations in 
underserved communities to expand the reach of our safety messages and 
to promote safe systems, not just automotive safety. We are also 
working to produce targeted materials in languages other than English 
to ensure that everyone can benefit from our safety advocacy and 
protect their communities and families. We believe these actions will 
facilitate safety improvements and reduce fatalities and serious 
injuries from road users in vulnerable communities.

    Question 2. Each year, thousands of people are killed and injured 
in preventable crashes. That's why last year, in the House-passed 
INVEST Act, I authored several provisions including a requirement that 
trucks be equipped with life-saving automatic braking systems, which 
prevent a collision or decrease its severity in the few seconds before 
it occurs. Collision-Avoidance technologies like these can warn the 
driver of an upcoming hazard and act if the driver doesn't respond.
     Mrs. Homendy, how can we ensure that these potentially lifesaving 
technologies are rolled out in vehicles as soon as possible, while 
bearing in mind that some cars lack the existing capacity to fully 
implement this technology?
    Answer. In 2019, almost 2.1 million rear-end crashes occurred on 
the nation's highways, resulting in more than 2,300 fatalities and 
almost 600,000 injured people. Many of these crashes could have been 
mitigated, or possibly even prevented, had rear-end collision-avoidance 
technologies been in place. Collision-avoidance technologies, 
especially forward collision warning and automatic emergency braking 
(AEB) systems, have been shown to reduce crash frequency and severity. 
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety found that equipping 
vehicles with these systems could eliminate more than 40 percent of 
rear-end crashes involving large trucks and half of the crashes 
involving passenger vehicles.
    Our 2021-2022 MWL calls for collision-avoidance and connected-
vehicle technology on all vehicles. Our investigations have led to the 
issuance of more than 25 recommendations in this area, many of which 
have been directed to the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA). Currently, we have recommendations to NHTSA to 
develop and apply performance standards and protocols to assess forward 
collision avoidance systems in commercial vehicles; to expand test 
protocols to forward collision avoidance systems to include higher test 
velocities, detection of bicyclist, pedestrians, motorcyclist, and 
highway hardware; and to incorporate forward collision avoidance 
systems into the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) rating system for 
passenger vehicles and to include those ratings on the Monroney label 
(the new car window sticker). Implementing these recommendations would 
ensure that life-saving technologies are installed as standard 
equipment in commercial trucks. Safety and performance standards give 
manufacturers an incentive to improve performance and drive public 
demand for crash-avoidance technologies and driver assistance systems.
    The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) included a 
provision for the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and, by 
delegation, NHTSA, to require that all newly manufactured passenger 
motor vehicles include forward collision warning, AEB, and lane-keeping 
assistance technology. Although regulations require mandatory 
compliance and are enforceable, they also require substantial time to 
complete; therefore, in addition to regulations, the NCAP can 
effectively encourage fleets to adopt AEB technology.
    The IIJA also requires the DOT to update the NCAP by establishing 
the following:
      Performance test criteria for crash-avoidance technology
      Criteria for rating vehicles on pedestrian, cyclist, and 
other vulnerable road user safety
      A roadmap for future updates to the NCAP, including 
meetings and feedback from diverse stakeholders interested in vehicle 
safety

    NHTSA has developed basic testing protocols for forward collision 
avoidance systems in passenger vehicles; however, as we stated earlier, 
those protocols must be expanded to include more scenarios that better 
represent the hazards encountered on roadways. Additionally, the NCAP 
does not rate these technologies, and their performance or presence is 
not included in the overall 5-star safety rating. The NTSB considers 
this slow NCAP expansion to be the primary reason for the underuse of 
its potential. We continue to believe in the potential benefits of the 
NCAP to encourage the deployment of advanced vehicle technologies and 
ensure consumer recognition, demand, and use of these technologies. 
However, these benefits require an updated and dynamic NCAP.
    The real-world safety benefits of these technologies are projected 
to be substantial, but incorporating them into vehicle fleets remains 
slow, so any potential lifesaving benefits have not been fully 
realized. Although we recognize NHTSA's progress, the goal of including 
collision-avoidance and connected-vehicle technology on all vehicles 
remains unmet until all these systems are required in all newly 
manufactured vehicles with minimum performance standards. In the 
interim, consumers must be provided with clear ratings on these safety 
technologies when purchasing new vehicles.

    Question 3. Each year, the NTSB's Most Wanted List (MWL) highlights 
transportation safety improvements needed now to prevent accidents, 
reduce injuries, and save lives. While the NTSB can urge, advocate and 
educate, it can not always implement these recommendations.
    a.  Mrs. Homendy, what important NTSB safety recommendations to DOT 
are not currently being addressed?
    Answer. As you know, the purpose of the MWL is to increase 
awareness and encourage adoption of our safety recommendations, which 
are the critical safety improvements that industry, labor, government, 
and the public must make across all modes of transportation to prevent 
accidents and crashes, reduce injuries, and save lives. There are 
currently 87 open recommendations to the secretary of transportation 
and the DOT modal administrations that are associated with the MWL. On 
May 6, 2022, we transmitted our evaluation [https://www.ntsb.gov/news/
Documents/NTSB%20Evaluation%20of%20DOT%202021-22%20MWL%20Final.pdf] of 
the DOT's report to Congress regarding the status of its 
recommendations. We are encouraged by the potential for progress in 
some areas; however, we remain concerned that there is still much work 
to be done to implement many recommendations related to the MWL that 
are currently in an unacceptable status or where implementation has 
been delayed.

    b.  How can Congress help the NTSB to ensure these safety 
recommendations are coordinated between the various federal agencies 
involved and implemented as quickly as possible to ensure thee highest 
possible safety standards?
    Answer. This Committee has been a key player in ensuring that many 
of our recommendations have been implemented, achieving key safety 
improvements across transportation modes. You have mandated positive 
train control, improved marine passenger vessel safety, and passed 
numerous requirements implementing a Safe Systems Approach in the IIJA.
    We look forward to continuing to work together to ensure that our 
safety recommendations are addressed by the recipients; however, DOT 
agencies have often told us they cannot take the recommended action on 
several issue areas because of congressionally imposed mandates. For 
example:
      PHMSA asserts that legislation prohibits it from acting 
on NTSB recommendations to require automatic or remote shut-off valves 
on existing transmission pipelines. Therefore, the new rule only 
applies to new pipeline and would not have prevented the tragedies that 
the NTSB has investigated in the past, including the gas-fueled fire 
and explosion in San Bruno, California. Congress could address this 
serious safety gap by requiring pipeline operators to retrofit existing 
lines with automatic or remotely controlled valves to ensure the flow 
of oil and gas is stopped in cases of ruptures or leaks.
      Roadway (rail track) workers are not covered employees 
under the hours-of-service law, so the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) claims it cannot prescribe hours-of-service requirements for 
these employees as we have recommended. Congress could amend the hours-
of-service law or require the FRA to strengthen fatigue countermeasures 
for track employees.
      The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 
has indicated it cannot make any progress on implementing our 
recommendation regarding screening for and treating obstructive sleep 
apnea (OSA) due to restrictions placed on the it by Public Law 113-45. 
Congress should revise this law so the FMCSA can address the dangers of 
OSA.
      The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has indicated 
that it will not require helicopter air ambulance (HAA) or other Part 
135 operators to have flight data monitoring (FDM) programs to analyze 
FDM data due to certain statutory protections of voluntarily submitted 
information. Although we believe that the FAA can take the recommended 
actions, we also believe that Congress should explicitly give the FAA 
the authority to require FDM programs.
      In our report on the January 2020 multivehicle crash in 
Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania, we found that DOT leadership is needed to 
establish regulatory certainty and resolve critical issues related to 
vehicle-to-everything communication protocols; interference from 
unlicensed devices, such as those that use wi-fi; and sufficiency of 
communication spectrum needed for advanced connected vehicle 
applications. Accordingly, we recommended the DOT implement a plan for 
nationwide connected vehicle technology deployment that (1) resolves 
issues related to interference from unlicensed devices, such as those 
that use wi-fi; (2) ensures sufficient spectrum necessary for advanced 
connected vehicle applications; and (3) defines communication protocols 
to be used in future connected vehicle deployment. However, the DOT 
cannot act unilaterally on our recommendation and must coordinate with 
the FCC, but division continues to hinder progress on this lifesaving 
technology.

    We stand ready to provide information and offer any assistance to 
Congress in its efforts to improve transportation safety.

    Question 4. As the NTSB notes in its most wanted safety 
improvements list, connected-vehicle technologies can help mitigate the 
severity of crashes or even stop them from occurring in the first 
place. Connected vehicles exchange information with highway 
infrastructure and other vehicles using safe, interoperable wireless 
communications. Networked vehicles are designed to improve traffic 
safety and mobility, while minimizing environmental impacts. 
Unfortunately, recent regulatory decisions by the Federal 
Communications Commission substantially shrank the communication 
spectrum dedicated to connected-vehicle technology. As NTSB noted if 
this decision to reallocate bandwidth is not reversed, progress on 
improving automotive safety may be slowed.
    Mrs. Homendy, has the NTSB made any progress in reaching consensus 
with the FCC on this bandwidth allocation?
    Answer. I have met with FCC Chair Rosenworcel and expressed the 
NTSB's strong support for vehicle-to-everything communication. Although 
we have not yet seen consensus that would allow for the widespread 
adoption of connected-vehicle technology, I remain committed to working 
with the FCC to ensure the availability of an appropriate bandwidth for 
current and future transportation safety communications.
    In our report on the Mt. Pleasant, Pennsylvania, crash, we 
concluded that the future deployment of connected vehicle technology is 
threatened by the recent FCC regulatory action that you mention. This 
action decreases the size of the intelligent transportation system 
communication spectrum, allows harmful interference from unlicensed 
devices, such as those that use wi-fi, and introduces significant 
regulatory uncertainty. We recommended that the FCC implement 
appropriate safeguards to protect vehicle-to-everything communications 
from harmful interference from such devices. Earlier this year, we 
released a video series [https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safety-topics/
Pages/v2x.aspx] related to our MWL item regarding connected vehicle 
technology to help educate and inform people about this issue.

    Questions from Hon. Dina Titus to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, 
                  National Transportation Safety Board

    Question 1. We have seen examples in recent years of missing 
aircraft and black boxes that are never found, such as with Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 370 in 2014. Modern technology allows black boxes to be 
connected to the cloud so that in the event of an anomaly in flight the 
black box could be capable of offloading its data to the cloud.
    Wouldn't it be useful to the NTSB if the data on black box 
recorders were cloud connected and recoverable immediately following a 
crash?
    Answer. In 2014, the NTSB convened a forum on emerging flight data 
and locator technology where we discussed these issues. As a result, we 
made two recommendations to the FAA regarding transmitting flight data 
to ground-based systems; both of these recommendations are classified 
``Open--Acceptable Response.''
      A-15-1. Require that all aircraft used in extended 
overwater operations and operating under Title 14 Code of Federal 
Regulations (1) Part 121 or (2) Part 135 that are required to have a 
cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder, be equipped with a 
tamper-resistant method to broadcast to a ground station sufficient 
information to establish the location where an aircraft terminates 
flight as the result of an accident within 6 nautical miles of the 
point of impact.
      A-15-3. Require that all newly manufactured aircraft used 
in extended overwater operations and operating under Title 14 Code of 
Federal Regulations (1) Part 121 or (2) Part 135 that are required to 
have a cockpit voice recorder and a flight data recorder, be equipped 
with a means to recover, at a minimum, mandatory flight data 
parameters; the means of recovery should not require underwater 
retrieval. Data should be captured from a triggering event until the 
end of the flight and for as long a time period before the triggering 
event as possible.

    Question 2. On January 26, 2020, a Sikorsky S-76B helicopter 
collided with hilly terrain near the city of Calabasas, California. The 
pilot and eight passengers (including Kobe Bryant and his daughter) 
were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed. Because there 
is no requirement, this helicopter was not equipped with a flight data 
monitoring (FDM) recorder or cockpit voice recorder. The synopsis from 
the NTSB's report recommends that FAA require all Part 121 and 135 
operators to install data monitoring programs and retrofit turbine-
powered aircraft with crash-resistant flight recorders to record 
cockpit audio and cockpit images.
    Could you speak to the need to equip more helicopters with voice 
and data recorders and why this is important to help prevent future 
tragedies?
    Answer. A crash-resistant flight recorder system capable of 
capturing audio and images can provide valuable information on the 
circumstances of an accident, including the visual cues the pilot saw, 
the pilot's actions, or the helicopter's flight track, all of which can 
help determine why the accident occurred, possibly enabling us to 
identify additional safety issues and develop additional, focused 
safety recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future. 
Additionally, flight recorder systems can be used for an FDM program 
that collects data during normal operations, then reviews the data to 
identify safety issues and allow an operator to develop mitigations 
before an accident occurs. It is critical that FDM programs are 
required to analyze the data they collect, not just that FDM recorders 
should be installed.
    We have previously issued safety recommendations to require 
recorders on helicopters. On May 6, 2013, we recommended that the FAA 
do the following:
      A-13-13. Require all existing turbine-powered, 
nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not equipped 
with a flight data recorder [FDR] or cockpit voice recorder [CVR] and 
are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 
135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight recorder system. 
The crash-resistant flight recorder system should record cockpit audio 
and images with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of 
the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and 
system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order C197, 
``Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.''

    Safety Recommendation A-13-13 is on our current MWL under the issue 
area, ``Install Crash-Resistant Recorders and Establish Flight Data 
Monitoring Programs.''
    The types of CVRs and FDRs that are required to be installed on 
certain aircraft are designed to stringent crash-survivability 
standards. Crash-resistant image recorders are generally less expensive 
to purchase and install, lighter weight, and able to record much of the 
same information as CVRs and FDRs, as well as additional information 
(such as weather and pilot actions) from cockpit images.
    In the years since we issued Safety Recommendation A-13-13, we have 
reiterated it six times based on our findings from investigations of 
other fatal accidents. We have been issuing similar recommendations 
since 2000. In 2017, in an effort to help inform FAA's analysis of the 
benefits of such a requirement, we identified all accidents in our 
database since 2005 that involved turbine-powered, nonexperimental, 
nonrestricted-category aircraft and in which flight crewmembers were 
killed. There were 185 such accidents, 159 of which involved advanced 
aircraft with complex systems, which can be challenging to investigate 
when recorded information is lacking. A recent update of the data 
review found that, in NTSB investigations of aviation accidents between 
2005 and 2020 involving turbine-powered, nonexperimental, 
nonrestricted-category aircraft operating under Part 91 or 135 in which 
flight crew were killed, 83 percent had no recording equipment 
installed.

    Question 3. Over 90 percent of transportation fatalities occur on 
our roadways, yet the Office of Highway Safety is among the smallest 
within NTSB.
    How is the Board able to meet its goals for improving safety on the 
roads, which is often a multi-faceted issue, with these limited 
resources?
    Answer. OHS is responsible for investigating the largest proportion 
of transportation deaths and injuries. Almost 95 percent of the 
nation's transportation deaths occur on our roadways, and fatalities 
are on the rise. An estimated 42,915 people died in motor vehicle 
crashes in 2021, an increase of 10.5 percent over 2021.
    As our second largest modal office (with 18 investigators), OHS 
investigates bridge collapses, mass casualties and injuries on public 
transportation vehicles, highway-railroad grade crossing collisions, 
and crashes that involve new technologies (such as automated vehicles 
and alternatively fueled vehicles). The office also investigates 
certain other incidents based on initial analysis about how the 
conclusions from the investigation may advance safety.
    Part of our congressional mandate is to conduct objective, precise 
accident investigations and safety studies and advocate for and promote 
our safety recommendations. This requires investigators to analyze, 
understand, and respond to technological changes in the transportation 
industry. To match the growth of highway crashes and fatalities and be 
responsive to the increasing complexity of emerging technologies, we 
must increase our budget. Our funding has not kept pace with the need 
to hire additional investigative and support staff, to train them, or 
to make needed program investments in information technology and 
enhanced data capabilities. Our reauthorization proposal ensures that 
we can accomplish all these things and represents a strong investment 
in our workforce. We greatly appreciate Congress's continued support by 
providing the NTSB with the requested authorization of appropriations 
to ensure mission readiness.

  Question from Hon. Mark DeSaulnier to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, Chair, 
                  National Transportation Safety Board

    Question 1. As I'm sure you recall, on June 7, 2017, there was a 
potentially catastrophic near-miss aircraft incidents in which an Air 
Canada flight arriving at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) 
lined up and prepared to land on an occupied runway. In response, I met 
with dozens of stakeholders, including the NTSB, to develop the Safe 
Landings Act, which outlines a comprehensive response to this incident 
and addresses some of the safety concerns identified by experts. I 
sincerely appreciate the NTSB's support and cooperation through the 
drafting. Short of this legislation passing into law, however, what 
steps can the NTSB take today to reduce the risk of other near-misses?
    Answer. Thank you, Representative DeSaulnier, for your leadership 
with the Safe Landings Act following our investigation of the 2017 SFO 
incident. Although we are not mandated to investigate aviation safety 
incidents, we investigate a number of them each year because they 
result in important safety lessons. As you know, the value in 
investigating incidents is that they share the same root causes as 
accidents that result in injuries and fatalities. If investigated, 
these incidents are an opportunity to discover system-wide improvements 
and proactively address risks that may, if unaddressed would likely 
result in lives lost in the future.
    That is why we are also interested in incidents that occur in 
emerging industries, such as commercial human spaceflight. To be clear, 
our intention is not to investigate every incident; however, 
significant incidents that do not result in injuries or fatalities 
still represent opportunities for safety lessons and improvements that 
will save lives.
    With the current level of funding, the NTSB has limited resources 
to fully investigate all these incidents, and we must prioritize those 
with the greatest effect on public safety. As a result, we may have to 
limit the scope and depth of other investigations and potentially miss 
some opportunities to advance safety. With the requested funds, 
however, we can expand our investigations of critical near-miss 
incidents, and thereby identify areas for safety improvements and 
inform significant safety legislation, like the Safe Landings Act.

Questions from Hon. Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia to Hon. Jennifer Homendy, 
              Chair, National Transportation Safety Board

    Question 1. For Chair Homendy: For many years, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) cited a flawed statistic that 94 
percent of vehicle crashes are caused by human error. You have been 
very critical of NHTSA's use of this flawed statistic and NHTSA 
thankfully removed the statistic earlier this year from their website, 
in part due to your efforts. Can you:
    a.  Explain why this commonly cited, but flawed statistic, that 94 
percent of vehicle crashes are due to human error is so wrong;
    Answer. The statistic that cites that 94 percent of vehicle crashes 
as due to human error comes from research that examined the last 
failure just prior to a crash event, with a focus on the driver. 
Although the research itself indicates that the results were not 
intended to be interpreted as the cause of the crash, they are used 
incorrectly by many, including NHTSA, many state departments of 
transportation, and some in the autonomous vehicle industry. Using this 
false and flawed statistic gives the impression that the only person 
who can prevent a crash is a driver. That is inaccurate and contrary to 
the Safe System Approach on our MWL. For example, speeding, which 
killed almost 12,000 people in 2021, can be addressed through the 
following:
      Changes in road design
      Lowering speed limits and granting authority to local 
municipalities and cities to lower limits (avoiding the one-size-fits-
all approach to speed limit setting by states)
      Eliminating the 85th percentile approach to setting speed 
limits (which dates back to the 1950s and just leads to ever-increasing 
speed limits)
      Mandating vehicle technologies, such as advanced speed 
limiters and collision-avoidance systems
      Using speed safety cameras that have the effect of 
slowing traffic
      Increasing enforcement
      Educating drivers and passengers
      Investing in postcrash care to ensure responders, in the 
event of a crash, can save lives

    b.  Explain the harm that occurs when the federal government's 
leading agency on traffic safety uses a flawed statistic that inhibits 
efforts to address preventable traffic crashes and fatalities; and
    Answer. As a result of misinformation perpetuated by repeating the 
94 percent myth, solutions to saving lives on our highways focus on 
changing driver behavior, which, though important, is only a single 
solution in a complex system. By taking a Safe System Approach, we 
focus on understanding the entire system in which these crashes occur--
this means examining the driver plus the roadway environment, including 
speeds and weather; the vehicle and its design for both usability and 
occupant protection; and the emergency response. This full examination 
identifies a broad range of actions and changes that can prevent or 
mitigate a crash. Further, the Safe System Approach allows for road 
designers, public health officials, lawmakers, vehicle makers, 
transportation providers, and communities to find multiple and 
redundant solutions to reducing roadway fatalities rather than limiting 
our solutions to driver-based ones.

    c.  Highlight any other statistics that NHTSA currently uses that 
should be revised, withdrawn, or given more context.
    Answer. We will continue to review other NHTSA statistics to see if 
there are any that need to be revised, withdrawn, or given more 
context. However, I will take this opportunity to highlight that the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) should rescind its guidance to 
use the 85th percentile to set speed limits. This is it a guiding 
factor used to determine speed that unintentionally results in 
dangerous conditions by setting higher and higher speeds. This approach 
is deeply flawed because it rests on the fundamental assumption is that 
drivers operate at speeds they perceive as safe. This design makes 
drivers feel safe traveling at higher speeds, which then increases the 
85th percentile. In 2017, we issued a safety study, Reducing Speeding-
Related Crashes Involving Passenger Vehicles [https://www.ntsb.gov/
safety/safety-studies/Pages/DCA15SS002.aspx], which identified concerns 
with using the 85th percentile, including that there is not strong 
evidence that, within a given traffic flow, the 85th percentile speed 
equates to the speed with the lowest crash involvement rate on all road 
types, and that unintended consequences of using the 85th percentile 
speed for changing speed limits in speed zones include higher operating 
speeds and new, higher 85th percentile speeds in the speed zones, as 
well as an increase in operating speeds outside the speed zones.
    Our study recommended that the FHWA revise its regulations to 
strengthen requirements for all speed-engineering studies and remove 
the guidance that speed limits in speed zones be within 5 mph of the 
85th percentile speed. This issue is on our 2021-2022 MWL.

                             [all]