[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-24]
 ___________________________________________________________________________________                       
                         
                
                        MARITIME SECURITY IN THE

                  INDO-PACIFIC AND THE U.N. CONVENTION

                         ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

                               __________

                             JOINT HEARING

                               before the

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

                         AND PROJECTION FORCES

                                 of the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        meeting jointly with the

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC,

                   CENTRAL ASIA AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                 of the

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 29, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                                     
                     ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-360            WASHINGTON : 2023
   


                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                  JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair   JIM BANKS, Indiana
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama

              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
               David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                           Sean Falvey, Clerk
                                 ------                                

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
  SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL ASIA AND NONPROLIFERATION

                   BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman

DINA TITUS, Nevada                   TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia            ANN WAGNER, Missouri
AMI BERA, California                 BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia
                     Don MacDonald, Staff Director
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bera, Hon. Ami, a Representative from California, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and 
  Nonproliferation, Committee on Foreign Affairs.................     5
Chabot, Hon. Steve, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia and 
  Nonproliferation, Committee on Foreign Affairs.................     6
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on 
  Armed Services.................................................     1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, 
  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on 
  Armed Services.................................................     4

                               WITNESSES

Glaser, Bonnie S., Director, Asia Program, the German Marshall 
  Fund of the United States......................................    11
Russel, Hon. Daniel R., Vice President, International Security 
  and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute, Former Assistant 
  Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs..........     8
Sadler, Brent D., Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced 
  Technology, the Heritage Foundation............................    13
Swift, ADM Scott, USN (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Pacific 
  Fleet..........................................................    10

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Glaser, Bonnie S.............................................    75
    Russel, Daniel R.............................................    47
    Sadler, Brent D..............................................    95
    Swift, ADM Scott.............................................    61
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    43

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
 MARITIME SECURITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE 
                             LAW OF THE SEA

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
 Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and 
      Projection Forces, Meeting Jointly with Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central 
                                 Asia and Nonproliferation,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, April 29, 2021.
    The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Joe Courtney (chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Seapower and Projection Forces) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Courtney. Good morning, everyone. This is actually I 
think a pretty unique event, which is to have a joint hearing 
of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House 
Armed Services Committee as well as the House Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and 
Nonproliferation.
    I was thinking the last time I remember Foreign Affairs and 
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] actually doing a joint 
hearing was really probably at the height of the surge when we 
had General Petraeus come and testify before both committees. 
And I really want to thank Chairman Bera and Ranking Member 
Chabot, as well as my good friend and colleague, Mr. Wittman, 
for working together to bring these two committees, which 
really, you know, when you talk about the Indo-Pacific region, 
you know, clearly is at the center I think, frankly, of the 
work that we have ahead of us.
    So, anyway, we have got to do the housekeeping--you know, 
FedEx commercial here--so we will start out by saying I want to 
welcome the members who are joining today's markup remotely. 
Members are reminded that they must be visible on screen of the 
software platform for the purposes of identity verification 
when joining the proceeding and establishing and maintaining a 
quorum.
    Members participating remotely must continue to use the 
software platform's video function while attending the 
proceedings, unless they experience connectivity issues or 
other technical problems that render them unable to fully 
participate on camera. If a member experiences technical 
difficulties, please contact the committee staff for help.
    When recognized, remotely attending members' participation 
will be broadcast in the room and via a television-internet 
feed. Members are asked to mute their microphone when they are 
not speaking. Members will be recognized normally for asking 
questions. But if they want to speak at another time, they must 
seek recognition verbally.
    Members are reminded to keep the software platform's video 
function on for the entirety of the time that they attend the 
proceedings. A member may leave and rejoin the proceedings, 
however. And if they depart for a short period of time other 
than joining a different proceeding, they should leave the 
video function on.
    Members are also advised that I have designated a committee 
staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members' 
microphones to cancel any background noise. Members may use the 
software platform's chat feature to communicate with staff 
members regarding technical or logistical support issues.
    Finally, members should see a 5-minute countdown clock on 
the platform's display. But, if necessary, I will remind 
members when their time is up.
    And, again, this is a joint hearing, so I know Mr. Bera, 
you know, will be participating, you know, as well as the 
ranking members on this--you know, to make this as collegial as 
possible.
    So, again, the genesis of this event with Chairman Bera was 
just, again, a recognition about the rising challenge that we 
have in the Pacific region.
    As my colleagues on the House Armed Services Committee can 
attest, you know, we just went through a whole series of 
posture hearings with combatant commanders from every region of 
the globe. And, you know, really, if there was any sort of 
common theme, you know, whether it was the Arctic, the European 
Command, Southern Command, AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], and 
Indo-Pacific, it really is that there is an erosion of 
international rule of law that extends into the maritime realm, 
into space, into cyberspace, into, you know, aerospace. And, 
frankly, it is something that I think it is an all-of-
government challenge for the U.S. in terms of our diplomacy as 
well as our national defense.
    Today we've got, you know, some great witnesses to sort of 
talk through this issue, particularly in terms of the Indo-
Pacific realm.
    The Honorable Daniel Russel is Vice President of 
International Security and Diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy 
Institute, also former Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs.
    We are additionally joined by Admiral Scott Swift, former 
commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and many of us on HASC 
know well from his service for decades in the Navy.
    Bonnie Glaser, Director of the Asia Program at The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States.
    And Mr. Brent Sadler, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and 
Advanced Technology at The Heritage Foundation.
    Welcome to all of you, and thank you for joining us, and 
thank you for your written testimony, which, again, I had a 
chance to read through. It had really thoughtful stuff. We are 
not going to be able to go through it verbatim, so there will 
be a 5-minute opening remarks. But, again, I just want to, 
again, thank you for the great work that is there.
    And I just want to quickly, you know, just say that from 
the Seapower subcommittee--Mr. Wittman I think can attest to 
this--again, we have heard from, you know, combatant 
commanders, certainly Admiral Davidson, who is about to depart; 
the incoming commander, Admiral Aquilino; Harry Harris, who 
preceded Davidson; you know, who all described, again, this, 
you know, much more contested environment in that part of the 
world.
    China, obviously, is, you know, pushing for rules and norms 
that operate, you know, particularly in the maritime realm, far 
beyond what I think our country deems as, you know, safe 
maritime use of international waters. The island building 
program that they have basically turned sandbars into 
militarized islands that have landing strips, military 
facilities. And this is happening literally in the middle of 
COVID [novel coronavirus disease]. You know, we saw this with 
Woody Island, where, again, they installed a new radome to 
protect radar structures and solar panels for military use.
    Again, this is far from the coastline of the mainland of 
China. And what happens with this island building is it 
basically extends what I think is a totally unsupported claim 
of maritime control and closing off sea space, which is, you 
know, definitely what we are seeing in terms of, you know, our 
Navy platforms that are out in that part of the world.
    I would note that in 2016 the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea treaty heard a claim from the Philippines 
challenging China's claim for maritime control. And, again, 
they issued a very strong decision, unanimous, that rejected 
the nine-dash line claim that China posited as their authority 
to deny sea access to the Philippines.
    This was I think a very significant decision in terms of 
reaffirming rule of law in that area. Unfortunately, the United 
States was not a participant in that proceeding because we have 
not fully ratified UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea], the Law of the Sea Treaty.
    The U.S. tried to get observer status even though--because, 
you know, we couldn't get party status. The tribunal refused to 
even give us observer status because of the lack of 
ratification here in the U.S., and we had to rely on our ally, 
Australia, to basically be our proxy representative, our legal 
aid lawyer, during this whole proceeding.
    Again, the U.S., in both the Obama administration and the 
Trump administration, endorsed the tribunal's ruling. There is 
no question, you know, that they were right on the law. But, 
again, I think that begs a question which we have heard from 
our combatant commanders that really given, again, the 
contested environment that we are seeing here--again, not just 
in the Indo-Pacific region but in other combatant commands in 
the maritime realm--that it really is time for the U.S. to 
become a full participant, along with 168 other countries, in 
the UNCLOS system.
    And Admiral Harris, who is never going to be accused of 
being a soft power kind of guy, made it crystal clear that he 
believes that the U.S. should become a participant in UNCLOS 
because we lose the moral authority and the legal standing to 
really challenge, you know, behavior like what we are seeing 
with China.
    So later today myself and Congressman Don Young, who is the 
Republican from Alaska, will be introducing a resolution 
citing, again, all of the testimony from our combatant 
commanders in support of UNCLOS, calling on the Senate to move 
forward. Senator Hirono will be introducing in the Senate, 
again, a resolution for ratification of UNCLOS, and that is why 
I think today's hearing is obviously very timely. It is not 
really just kind of a thought discussion, which there's nothing 
wrong with that, but that, you know, there really is going to 
be I think bipartisan support for moving forward on this 
critical issue.
    So, with that, I will, again, turn it over to Chairman Bera 
for his opening remarks. We will hear from the ranking members 
and then just go right into the testimony of our outstanding 
witnesses here today.
    Mr. Bera, the floor is yours.
    Mr. Falvey. Sir, this is Sean Falvey from HASC. We have got 
to go over to Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Courtney. Oh, I am sorry. That was in my script, to go 
to Ami, so. My good friend, Mr. Wittman.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
    VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 
                       PROJECTION FORCES

    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Chairman Courtney. Joe, I 
really appreciate your leadership, and thanks for bringing this 
to the forefront. This is an incredibly important strategic 
issue. And I also want to thank Chairman Bera and Ranking 
Member Chabot for their participation in this joint hearing to 
better assess our maritime policies and how they are being 
applied in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] regions.
    As we know, tensions with China continue to increase. Even 
with intense economic ties, strategic competition with China 
and her neighboring countries continue to escalate. Using gray 
zone paramilitary forces, militarizing South China Sea atolls, 
intimidating the regional partners, developing an ever-
expanding naval force, threatening to establish a South China 
Sea air defense identification zone and utterly rejecting 
United Nations tribunal decisions.
    China seeks to shift the regional balance and enforce an 
ever-increasing hegemony on China's regional neighbors. So I am 
forced to the conclusion that this increasing Chinese 
brinkmanship may likely, at some point, conclude in a violent 
confrontation.
    I am hopeful that saner heads will prevail with our 
Nation's largest economic partner, but China's rejection of 
global norms and an ever-expanding intimidation of her regional 
partners foretell a different outcome. To address this 
seemingly preordained trajectory, the United States needs to 
take several steps to deter this collision.
    First, I believe the United States, in consultation with 
our partners and allies, needs to affirm the global norms that 
have maintained this longstanding peace and stability. And I am 
pleased to know that the European Union affirmed their support 
for the United States in this strategic competition and 
expressed concerns for President Xi Jinping's authoritarianship 
to solving global problems.
    I also believe the United States should continue and 
challenge excessive maritime claims and continue a consistent 
level of freedom of navigation operations.
    I am particularly pleased that the Biden administration 
appears to have rejected the Obama administration's Chinese 
appeasement strategy and has also endorsed their continued 
freedom of navigation efforts.
    Additionally, I believe the United States needs to 
significantly expand gray zone competition. This expansion 
should use the entirety of our federal capabilities to include 
a more agile cyber response and a more aggressive United States 
Coast Guard insertion to better manage increasing conflict in 
the global climate.
    Finally, I fervently believe that the best way to preserve 
the peace is to prepare for war. To have foreign policy we 
want, we must have the military we need. Allowing our military 
forces to atrophy and diminish our ability to respond to future 
conflict is the surest path to war. Weakness begets aggression, 
and I categorically reject this path and look forward to 
addressing the administration's reduced national security 
funding later this year.
    In the words of Confucius, I believe ``The strength of a 
nation derives from the integrity of the home.'' I have faith 
in our Nation, our democracy, and our ideals. Despite our 
differences, any strategic competitor should be forewarned that 
our will is strong and resolve is tremendously overwhelming in 
times of peril.
    Unleashing our strategic ideals on the Chinese Communist 
dictates is akin to shining a light in darkness. Nothing can be 
hidden. Strategic gaps become evident.
    Again, I appreciate Chairman Courtney for having this 
important hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Courtney. All right. Well, thank you, Rob. And, again, 
you know, we have worked together on these issues for many 
years, and I think it is an exciting time for both 
subcommittees.
    And now I would like to yield to another friend on the 
Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs on Asia, Mr. Bera.

 STATEMENT OF HON. AMI BERA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, 
 CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL ASIA AND 
         NONPROLIFERATION, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Chair Courtney, and to the ranking 
member. I can make my opening statement really short by saying 
I agree with everything that the chairman of the Seapower 
Subcommittee and the ranking member just said.
    When we think about the Indo-Pacific region, you know, the 
United States market is a Pacific nation. And when you think 
about that region, it is home to nearly 40 percent of the 
world's exports and nearly 60 percent of the world's 
population. So, it is a vitally important maritime region for 
us. Approximately 3.4 trillion in ship-borne commerce transits 
through the South China Sea alone each year.
    You know, when I think about Chinese aggression in the 
region, you know, whether it is what we are seeing in the South 
China Sea or we are seeing around the Senkaku Islands, what we 
are seeing in the Taiwan Strait, increasingly this Chinese 
aggression potentially leads to a misadventure and potentially 
a conflict.
    That isn't what we are hoping for. What we are hoping for--
you know, we are fine with being strategic competitors with 
China, but what we want to do is compete based on a rule of 
law. And, you know, I know I have talked to Chairman Courtney 
about this a bit, and the importance of having that rule of 
law.
    So, I do look forward to hearing from the witnesses as we 
talk about UNCLOS and whether the ratification of UNCLOS would 
strengthen our hand. The irony is we hold ourselves to these 
rules, yet by not ratifying that agreement, you know, we 
don't--we are in a weaker position to hold the Chinese to these 
rules.
    You know when I think about the importance of this region, 
it is not just the South China Sea. I think about the freely 
associated states as well, and, you know, the historic ties to 
the United States of America going back to World War II. The 
importance of our engaging with the freely associated states is 
incredibly important.
    In addition, you know, I applaud my friends on the 
Congressional Pacific Islands Caucus who have really been 
leading in this space. Representative Ed Case and Senator 
Schatz and others have been working tirelessly to advance 
legislation that would meaningfully benefit the Pacific Islands 
and help strengthen maritime security in the South Pacific.
    And as a co-chair of that caucus, I have been working 
closely with them on those efforts and look forward to moving 
them forward in this Congress.
    So, again, knowing that we have got a number of members, I 
will keep my opening statement short, and, obviously, have it 
submitted for the record. But I look forward to working with 
your subcommittee, Chairman Courtney, and, you know, the entire 
Congress to both address these issues, and strengthen our 
resolve in the maritime space in the Indo-Pacific.
    You know, obviously I am thrilled that President Biden has 
raised the Quad [Quadrilateral Security Dialogue] coalition--
Japan, India, the United States, and Australia--to the leaders 
level. I think this is a real opportunity for us to continue to 
strengthen that relationship, as well as work closely with 
ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], countries like 
Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and, you know, continue to 
strengthen the security apparatus in the Indo-Pacific and in 
the South China Sea.
    So, with that, let me go yield back, and I really am 
looking forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, chairman. And again I 
think, you know, your comments really show how terrific it is 
that we are working together on the two subcommittees.
    And now I would like to yield to you, to the ranking member 
of the subcommittee who is from the heartland, Mr. Chabot, for 
his opening remarks.

  STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE CHABOT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, 
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL ASIA 
       AND NONPROLIFERATION, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And like Ami, I could say--I could 
make my statement very short by saying that I agree with my 
colleagues, but I won't.
    The United States is reorienting its foreign policy to 
center around the Indo-Pacific. And as we do so, it is 
absolutely essential to get the maritime security aspect in the 
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean right.
    The water of the Indo-Pacific are where many of this 
century's most consequential questions will be decided. Whether 
a rules-based international order continues to serve as the 
world's operating system or the recent ``might makes right'' 
hegemony. Whether the U.S.-anchored system of alliance is still 
up to the task of facing military authoritarians. Whether 
Taiwan will remain a free country. And I don't use the term 
``country'' loosely. It is a country.
    Indo-Pacific waters face a wide variety of maritime 
security threats. Illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing 
threaten ecosystems, economies, and food supplies. Most of the 
river systems responsible for the bulk of plastic waste in the 
oceans empty into the Indo-Pacific.
    Radical Islamist terror groups take advantage of the Indo-
Pacific loosely governed maritime boundaries. Most of the 
region's coastal nations have extensive coastline, but they 
have disputed maritime borders and they have to monitor and 
police their maritime territory.
    It is a very difficult environment but among these 
challenges, one threat stands out above all the rest. That is 
the maritime belligerence and gray zone warfare of the PRC 
[People's Republic of China] as directed by the Chinese 
Communist Party [CCP]. The PRC actions in the Indo-Pacific 
waters are a true reflection of the character and nature of our 
strategic competitor, or our adversary, really, if we are frank 
about it.
    They show CCP's willingness to flagrantly violate 
international law. The PRC's fictitious nine-dash line, their 
territorial claim has been vacated and debunked at 
international arbitration, but China has simply relied on 
Chairman Mao's old wisdom to make its territorial advancement a 
reality. In his words, ``political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun.''
    The PRC's maritime actions also show what little regard the 
CCP has for its international agreements. Since Xi Jinping 
promised the world in 2015, as we have already mentioned, not 
to militarize the South China Sea, they have created over 5 
square miles of artificial land and then topped them with 
military bases.
    This showed CCP willingness to trample the sovereignty of 
smaller nations. Since early March, for example, the People's 
Liberation Army's maritime militia has occupied the waters 
around the Whitsun Reef in the Spratly Islands with a faux 
civilian fishing boat, both [inaudible] sometimes numbering in 
the hundreds.
    It is a transparent attempt to intimidate the Philippines 
and a transparent example of the disdain that the CCP has for 
its neighbors. And the PRC's conduct in Indo-Pacific waters 
also reveals CCP's military ambition.
    At over 300 ships, their navy has already become the 
world's largest, exceeding the U.S. Navy's 293 deployed 
vessels. PRC's artificial island outposts in the Spratly 
Islands are already supporting military operations far from 
China's shore. Dual use ports or outright military bases are 
already a reality with Cambodia, Uganda, Pakistan, and 
elsewhere. The PLA's belligerence is growing dramatically.
    Taken together, we are seeing a long-term attempt to 
fundamentally re-engineer the strategic geography of the 
region, which will challenge U.S. access and threaten the 
security framework that has sustained the Indo-Pacific's 
prosperity since the Second World War.
    Thankfully, none of this is a foregone conclusion. The 
United States has both foreign affairs and defense options to 
check these threats, but doing so will require an overdue focus 
on the Indo-Pacific. Bringing the proper resources to bear, 
accepting that we can't control the ocean and we'll have to 
take a hard look at our priorities, not least making the most 
of our Indo-Pacific allies and partners. This is a major U.S. 
advantage over the PRC.
    And, lastly, I would like to highlight the importance of 
the Quad, which was critical to this endeavor. And I joined my 
colleague, Ami, with the Quad recently, and it was a very 
successful evening that we had.
    Tackling this topic jointly with our Armed Services 
colleagues in an excellent way to continue this conversation in 
Congress, and I'm glad we could bring our subcommittees 
together for this hearing today on what will continue to be a 
vital issue for U.S. imports in the Indo-Pacific.
    Again, thank you for doing this. I yield.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Steve, for your great 
comments.
    So we want to turn to our witnesses, and our first 
testimony will be from Daniel Russel, who, again, I introduced 
earlier, from the Asia Society Policy Institute and former 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs.
    Mr. Russel, the floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL R. RUSSEL, VICE PRESIDENT, 
   INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY, ASIA SOCIETY POLICY 
 INSTITUTE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN 
                      AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

    Mr. Russel. Well, good morning, Chairman Courtney, Chairman 
Bera, ranking members, members of the combined committees, 
thanks very much for the opportunity to testify today alongside 
my very distinguished friends and colleagues on this important 
issue.
    So I served our country for 33 years in the Foreign 
Service, and from 2009 through 2017, I was responsible for 
Asia-Pacific affairs, first on the National Security Council 
and then as Assistant Secretary of State. And my experience 
taught me the immense importance of the Indo-Pacific to 
America's economy and security. And it also showed me the 
significant risks to those interests and to the interests of 
our allies and partners from the growing threats to freedom of 
navigation and overflight.
    I was directly involved in policy and diplomacy on the 
South China Sea, East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, the Western 
Pacific. I worked closely with Admiral Swift and with other 
distinguished defense colleagues. But despite intensive 
diplomatic efforts by the United States, with Beijing, with the 
various claimants, with the littoral states, the situation has 
continued to deteriorate.
    China, as the chairman mentioned, has gone back on its 
word. It has flouted the legally binding ruling by the UNCLOS 
tribunal in 2016. It has ramped up both its incursions into 
Japanese-administered waters in East China Sea and its 
threatening behavior in the South China Sea and the Taiwan 
Strait. And these actions are raising tensions that pose 
serious economic and security challenges directly to the United 
States.
    Throughout my career, Asian partners strongly encouraged, 
begged for, a robust American presence as a stabilizing bulwark 
against Chinese bullying and hegemony. But, in recent years, 
the perception has grown among many of these regional 
governments that the U.S. may no longer be willing or even able 
to play its traditional role as the guarantor of rules-based 
order. And, at the same time, China has taken a full-spectrum 
push through its Belt and Road Initiative--the BRI--to bolster 
its primacy across multiple domains.
    Through the BRI and through China's civil-military fusion 
policy, Beijing is increasing its leverage over countries in 
the region, facilitating the expansion of its own navy's 
logistics network. It is creating opportunities to collect vast 
amounts of data and intelligence, and potentially it is gaining 
the ability to curtail American access to critical waters.
    So it is vitally important that the U.S. take steps that 
will rebuild regional confidence and faith in the U.S. 
commitment, both to the region and to the rules-based order.
    Smaller nations will defend their own interests, they'll 
push back against coercion from a powerful nation, if they 
believe that the U.S. is present, capable, and willing to stand 
up for the rights of the weaker party.
    In my written testimony, I put forward a number of 
practical steps that the U.S. could take to bolster that 
necessary confidence. One is developing programs that will 
build maritime capacity and U.S. interoperability with regional 
partners. Another is building on growing strategic convergence 
with India and supporting India's capabilities as an advocate 
and as a provider of maritime security.
    But the most powerful would be ratifying the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention. Chairman Courtney laid out some very 
powerful reasons to ratify the treaty. Look, I will admit that 
in isolation, just ratifying UNCLOS alone may not do all that 
much beyond removing a talking point from the Chinese script. 
But, as part of a strategy, a U.S. strategy incorporating 
diplomatic and military initiatives, ratification would have a 
powerful galvanizing effect and really bolster U.S. credibility 
and leadership.
    So, with that, let me stop. Thank you, and I look forward 
very much to your questions or comments.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Russel can be found in the 
Appendix on page 47.]
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Russel. And, again, your 
experience I think is really perfect for today's discussion. 
And thank you for your great opening remarks.
    We will now hear from Admiral Scott Swift, who, again, I 
introduced earlier as the former Commander of the U.S. Pacific 
Fleet. Spent a lot of time in this region and, you know, dealt 
with a lot of our allies and other parties there, and really 
pleased that he can join us from Massachusetts where he is 
enjoying his new life. The Admiral left the Navy.
    And, Admiral Swift, thank you again, and the floor is 
yours.

  STATEMENT OF ADM SCOTT SWIFT, USN (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, 
                       U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

    Admiral Swift. Thank you, chairman, and Chairman Bera, and 
Ranking Members Wittman and Chabot, for the opportunity to 
participate in this morning's hearing.
    I am pleased to be before the committee today to testify on 
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and the U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.
    As was mentioned, I retired just short of 3 years ago from 
a career as a naval officer spanning 40 years from enlistment 
until my final tour as the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
With the exception of the tour as the Deputy Commander of Naval 
Forces Central Command and three short tours in the Pentagon, 
my entire career was either centered in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
or I transited through it to the CENTCOM [United States Central 
Command] area of responsibility [AOR].
    Since retirement, I have remained active in national policy 
and security affairs with a focus on the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
    I have submitted my full statement to the combined 
committee, which I ask to be made part of the record, and my 
comments today are pulled from those fuller statements.
    The point of my testimony today is focused on three 
recommendations presented with a practitioner's view of the 
challenges and opportunities faced within the region.
    The first recommendation is to expand the current focus of 
maritime security more broadly beyond the context of the 
Department of Defense generally, and the U.S. Navy 
specifically. The challenges the United States faces in the 
Indo-Pacific are multifaceted and complex. They require a 
multifaceted and inclusive whole of government approach that 
brings to bear all of our national elements of strength to this 
problem set.
    While the current trend of the State Department being in 
the lead on foreign policy issues, with the Department of 
Defense in support where appropriate, is a positive step, other 
cabinet-level departments need to play more proactive roles in 
coordination with the State Department. Further, Congress needs 
to be included more holistically if solutions are going to be 
relevant, especially in the eyes of our allies, partners, and 
friends, as well as competitors.
    To my second recommendation, fully understand the 
perceptions of those outside our borders who could have 
significant roles to play with respect to our own national 
interest. Their perceptions need to be treated as our 
realities. The concept of the rebalance to the Pacific was 
implemented when I was the 7th Fleet Commander. The resultant 
private discussions I had with my counterparts on their 
perspective on the value of the rebalance were overwhelmingly 
positive, as Danny reported.
    They were also overwhelmingly skeptical of the needed long-
term commitment of the United States to follow through on the 
promise and vision of the rebalance. When I returned to the 
Pacific as the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, invariably 
the state of the rebalance came up in my discussions with my 
friends in the region, their common response being ``We told 
you so.''
    Today those discussions have begun to transition from a 
concern for the legitimacy of the United States and the region, 
with respect to foreign policy commitments, to questions of the 
United States' legitimacy.
    The last recommendation in tying these two points together 
is to recognize how important it is to move beyond declarations 
of intent, words of warning, and posturing. The United States 
is no longer being judged on what we say. We are being judged 
on what we do. To be relevant on today's global stage, you need 
to have a body of action against which your declarations can be 
judged.
    One of those actions this committee needs to consider is 
becoming a party to UNCLOS. I expand on this point in my 
statement for the record of how necessary it is to rethink the 
logic of the argument that the United States is empowered by 
remaining outside the Convention and disempowered if they were 
to become a party of it.
    While I can't cover this important issue fully in the time 
I have here, I welcome your questions on this subject and 
consideration of my full comments for the record. While action 
is needed, this does not mean we need to take big, bold, 
headline-grabbing actions. We need to be consistent and firm.
    Many smaller actions are more meaningful than a few big 
ones. Those actions should highlight our democratic ideals 
while rejecting the pursuit of force and coercion. They should 
embrace multilateralism as a rule, bilateralism only as a 
fallback, while fully recognizing that unilateral actions are 
used sparingly, when our national security interests are so 
compelling, are followed, while we take this approach when 
other measures have proven ineffective.
    I will stop at this point, and I look forward to your 
questions and the remainder of the hearing. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Swift can be found in 
the Appendix on page 61.]
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Admiral. And I am sure there 
will be lots of follow-up questions.
    Our next witness is Ms. Bonnie Glaser, Director of Asia 
Program with The German Marshall Fund, and no stranger to the 
Hill. And it is great to have you here with us today, Bonnie. 
The floor is yours.

  STATEMENT OF BONNIE S. GLASER, DIRECTOR, ASIA PROGRAM, THE 
           GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

    Ms. Glaser. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Chairman Courtney, 
Ranking Members Chabot, Wittman, distinguished members of both 
committees, and thank you for the opportunity to testify today 
on what is really a crucially important topic for the United 
States.
    I devoted most of my career to trying to better understand 
Chinese foreign and security policy. China's maritime gray zone 
operations, which were mentioned by Representative Wittman, 
pose serious challenges to the United States and our allies and 
partners in maritime East Asia. These operations are designed 
to gain advantage without provoking a conventional military 
response, and they are, therefore, difficult to counter 
effectively.
    Beijing's objective, to be clear, in conducting these 
operations, is to alter the status quo in its favor, and they 
have seen some success. In the South China Sea, China is 
employing gray zone tactics to advance its illegal nine-dash 
line claim, and these tactics feature persistent harassment 
operations by coast guard vessels and maritime militia boats in 
the exclusive economic zones of other claimants.
    China stepped up military coercion against Taiwan as part 
of a multifaceted campaign that seeks to prevent that 
democratically elected government from pushing for independence 
and to erode the will of the people of Taiwan to resist, so 
they will consent to unification with China.
    And, of course, in the East China Sea, since 2012, China 
has been engaged in an effort to undermine Japan's 
administrative control of the Senkaku Islands.
    International law can play an important role in managing 
maritime disputes, but only if the parties to the dispute are 
willing to avail themselves of the law. And the Convention of 
the Law of the Sea has established norms and behavior among the 
majority of sovereign states, and as Mr. Courtney noted, 
ratified already by 167 states and the European Union.
    Bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to manage and resolve 
territorial disputes between China and its neighbors have not 
been very effective. China generally prefers to use power 
rather than law. And the July 2016 rule by the UNCLOS arbitral 
tribunal of course found the Chinese nine-dash line has no 
legal basis under international maritime law.
    And although the ruling was rejected by Beijing, a growing 
number of countries, including the United States, U.K. [United 
Kingdom], France, Germany, jointly submitted a note verbale to 
the U.N., and also Australia. All of these countries are 
condemning China's unlawful behavior, and especially its 
coercion that prevents smaller countries from accessing their 
rightful fishing and energy resources.
    Beijing is also negotiating with ASEAN on the code of 
conduct for the South China Sea, but I am rather pessimistic. 
Even if an agreement is reached, I don't think it will protect 
the interests of smaller claimants. Let's be clear that China 
has tried to use these negotiations to prevent the Southeast 
Asian states from conducting military exercises with any 
country that isn't party to the agreement and from joining with 
foreign powers to extract oil and gas.
    In my written testimony, I have included several policy 
recommendations. I will cite a few here. I think that the Group 
of Seven or the D10 [D10 Strategy Forums] should be issuing 
collective statements in support of the preservation of freedom 
of navigation, protecting the legal rights of all claimants' 
resources and opposing coercion and the use of force.
    Sanctions I think have a role to play. The sanctions 
implemented under the Trump administration I think were 
targeted perhaps at companies that have already done damage. 
They have built the islands. They have already militarized. We 
should be imposing sanctions on Chinese companies that conduct 
surveys, energy operations, and operate maritime militia boats 
illegally in other countries' EEZs [exclusive economic zones].
    And the goal would be to impose costs on China's state-run 
and private companies that carry out these illegal activities 
and induce them to change their behavior.
    Finally, I want to agree with my other witnesses, panelists 
here, that the United States should ratify UNCLOS. As a party 
to the Convention, the U.S. would be able to strengthen its 
role in the development of the international Law of the Sea. 
Joining the treaty would give the U.S. a voice in the debates 
about matters that affect U.S. interests. rather than ceding 
rulemaking to others.
    Staying outside UNCLOS deprives the U.S. of an opportunity 
to participate in dispute resolution, for example. As a treaty 
member, the U.S. could legally challenge China's objections to 
innocent passage in its territorial sea. It could challenge 
China's straight baselines in the Paracel Islands. And as a 
state party, the U.S. would be able to nominate members of the 
Law of the Sea Tribunal and Continental Shelf Commission.
    So the benefits of joining UNCLOS I think clearly outweigh 
the costs.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser can be found in the 
Appendix on page 75.]
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Bonnie, and it is 
good to see you again.
    Last, but not least, is Mr. Brent Sadler, who is a Senior 
Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at the 
Heritage Foundation and a Navy veteran. Again, I really 
encourage everyone to read his testimony, which is quite 
exhaustive on the subject we are talking about here today. I 
welcome him to the proceedings, and the floor is yours, Mr. 
Sadler.

 STATEMENT OF BRENT D. SADLER, SENIOR FELLOW FOR NAVAL WARFARE 
        AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

    Mr. Sadler. Thank you, and good morning, everyone. Chairmen 
Bera and Courtney, Ranking Members Chabot and Wittman, 
distinguished members of the House, thank you for the 
opportunity to join you today.
    Recent events in maritime Asia definitely underscore the 
timeliness of today's hearing to highlight significant 
challenges confronting our Nation on the waters of the East and 
South China Seas. In just the past few weeks, China's military, 
or PLA, air force, and navy have conducted significant and 
sustained operations around Taiwan, signaling diplomatic 
displeasure, practicing wartime operations, and exhausting 
Taiwan defense forces.
    At the same time, over 200 Chinese fishing vessels, Chinese 
coast guard, and maritime militia had massed in Philippine 
waters in what could be a pretext for a season of harassment.
    Last year at this time, and on the heels of Taiwan's 
presidential election and inauguration, the U.S. kept a 
heightened presence in the region, but it was events 
surrounding survey ship West Capella, working for Malaysia's 
national oil company, that was most notable.
    Considering the location, China's response was muted, with 
the U.S. Navy always nearby. Regardless for countries like 
Malaysia, the economic and domestic political imperatives 
necessitate a return to these waters. Unlike the dynamic state 
of affairs in Southeast Asia, the East China Sea has Japanese 
and Chinese maritime forces maintaining a tense balance.
    Since 2012, the number of Chinese air and water incursions 
around the Senkaku Islands remain at historic highs, and it has 
fueled a shift in Japanese diplomatic and military posture. 
Japan's Self-Defense Forces and Coast Guard continue to 
rebalance towards these islands, sustain increased defense 
spending, and revise the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines.
    What the Senkaku Islands and West Capella experience has 
made clear is that naval presence matters. Throughout these 
incidents, a sustained presence that included rare dual 
aircraft carrier operations was followed by a wave of positive 
regional diplomatic and partner military actions. However, such 
forward presence doesn't come cheap. For the U.S. to pace a 
metastasizing risk across a spectrum of rivalry requires an 
invigoration of investment in our naval forces and operations 
to alter Beijing's strategic calculations as well as Moscow's.
    It is also worth noting that in a remarkable display, China 
and Russia flew bombers together in the Sea of Japan in July of 
2019, and again in December of 2020, and the two are set to 
renew a strategic partnership this July, adding complexity to 
an increasingly stressing global maritime competition for our 
Navy.
    Given the intensifying activities in maritime Asia over the 
last decade, what is China's intent? The Communist Party of 
China, under President Xi Jinping, has not been vague. It is a 
core national interest to prevent independence, and, if need 
be, forcefully integrate Taiwan.
    To act on this, the People's Liberation Army, the Party's 
military, has embarked on a decades-long naval expansion, 
adding 117 modern warships while our Navy adds 5, and executed 
military reforms with Taiwan being the principal strategic 
direction. That said, conflict engenders uncertainty, and so 
the Chinese Communist Party has preferred an incremental effort 
below our threshold for retaliation while tangibly changing 
facts at sea in so-called gray zone operations.
    So what is to be done? First, presence for purpose. Naval 
presence needs to be prioritized and resourced more vigorously 
to decisive theaters such as the South China Sea, and new tools 
for gray zone operations provided to our deployed ships.
    Second, build a new modeled Navy, by growing and equipping 
the fleet to meet the combined challenge of China and Russia, 
while recapitalizing shipyards and the workforce to deliver and 
man those ships so urgently needed.
    Third, deliver a compelling cost proposition by rethinking 
the conduct of diplomacy, building partner capacity, and 
economic development, in order to make a more compelling and 
lasting cost proposition for our citizens as well as partners 
to join and strengthen the bargain of a free and open Indo-
Pacific.
    With respect to acceding to the Law of the Sea, I have 
reservations. And given our track record and capacity to 
compete with the Chinese and Russians to date in multilateral 
forums in the near term, its efficacy as a mechanism to 
influence Chinese behavior in the mid, and potential cost in 
the longer term, notably the seabed comment that was brought up 
earlier.
    That said, the dangers at sea are real and no longer a 
distant concern. Both the current and next Indo-Pacific 
commanders, Admirals Davidson and Aquilino, both recently 
testified as much regarding China triggering a conflict in the 
next 6 years. To deter this growing armada arrayed against us 
requires more than matching numbers and arsenals in fleets. We 
must do this while also rethinking naval operations in a wider 
diplomatic and economic statecraft context.
    Needed is an approach that confounds Chinese and Russian 
gray zone activities. A new naval statecraft approach is 
needed.
    And thank you again for the time today. Look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sadler can be found in the 
Appendix on page 95.]
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Sadler.
    And now we are going to move into the question time period. 
And, again, just before beginning or asking my questions, I 
just would note that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has actually 
endorsed ratification, and they obviously watch closely the 
issues of, you know, mineral rights and seabed access.
    And actually, if people could mute their computers, that 
would be much appreciated.
    So, and again, the resolution that Mr. Young, Don Young, 
and I will be introducing cites the chamber's position that is 
on here.
    But also, Admiral Swift, the citation of a comment that was 
made by Admiral Harris, who is your former colleague when you 
served at Pacific Fleet Command, and, again, was President 
Trump's Ambassador to South Korea, and obviously a very 
vigilant, forceful advocate for U.S. presence in the Indo-
Pacific region, he stated when he testified before the U.S. 
Senate, and I quote, ``I think that by not signing on to UNCLOS 
we lose credibility for the very same thing we are arguing for, 
which is the following: accepting rules and norms in the 
international arena. The United States is a beacon. We are a 
beacon on a hill, but I think that light is brighter if we sign 
in fully to UNCLOS.''
    So, Admiral Swift, you made the comment about, you know, 
the benefits or advantages of being outside of UNCLOS in terms 
of trying to, again, solidify international rule of law in 
maritime space versus being a full participant. And I was just 
wondering, you know, using Admiral Harris' comment in terms of, 
you know, his perspective as somebody who really had spent, 
like you, many years of great service to our country in the 
Indo-Pacific region, if you could sort of expand on that, you 
know, to, sort of, the balancing act that our country needs to 
determine in terms of whether becoming a full participant in 
UNCLOS.
    Admiral Swift. Thank you for that question, Chairman. The 
first thing I would say upfront is that I do agree with my 
friend, Harry Harris' assessment then and while I can't speak 
for him, I suggest that his comments, if anything, would be 
further increased in his view how important they are.
    I just point out to the--everything that both chairmen have 
said already, and the ranking members have said, about how the 
competition is going with China. And speaking frankly, it is 
not going well. And it is on that basis that I suggest now is 
an appropriate time to revisit the ratification.
    I recognize the points that others make about the downside 
of ratification, but I think they have been diminished even 
further with the result of the current competition.
    As you mentioned, there are 168 parties that have signed on 
to the Convention. Being on the outside doesn't--it isolates us 
from our allies, partners, and friends. Whether you are talking 
about allied partners, whether you are talking about the seven 
countries that we have a defense pact with, and where it aligns 
us with are those that are self-isolated themselves, the likes 
of Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, while those on the inside, 
Russia and China, as Ms. Glaser pointed out, have free rein to 
define the rules-based order within UNCLOS as they wish. And as 
you pointed, we are excluded when an issue comes before the 
tribunal.
    I would underscore the fact that almost unrecognized is, 
with response to the South China Sea case that was brought by 
the Philippines, not only did China direct the finding of the 
tribunal, they rejected the tribunal itself as having no 
standing.
    So if the international courts have no standing, this falls 
right in line with how Rep. Chabot has represented the approach 
that China has taken. Now is the time to step inside the 
Convention, I would suggest, so that we are in more of a 
position of power to influence more fully this continued 
diminishment that is occurring in the international rules-based 
order.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Admiral.
    And I will now yield to Mr. Wittman for his questions. Do 
we have Rob with us?
    Steve, if you are teed up and ready to go----
    Mr. Wittman. All right. I am here, Joe.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. Sorry about that.
    Mr. Wittman. I was just trying to go through the different 
things on the screen.
    Ms. Glaser and Mr. Sadler, I wanted to ask you specifically 
an issue concerning our freedom of navigation operations 
[FONOPs]. As we have seen through the years, we continue to 
ramp up those operations. We started with doing three in 2016, 
and we are up to nine in 2020. And we continue to push back 
against the Chinese aggressive assertion and their unlawful 
claims that they can operate freely within the South China Sea 
and keep out all other forces.
    And their claims in the East and the South China Sea 
continue to be even more and more aggressive. If you look at 
what they are doing with the East China Sea ADIZ, better known 
as the air defense identification zone, they continue to push 
that, are very aggressive with intercepting any aircraft that 
come into that area, and now it looks like they are going to 
pursue a South China Sea air defense identification zone.
    So, give me your perspective on how you see this, this 
additional aggressive behavior, especially in how they engage 
U.S. naval forces that are freely operating under the current 
law there in the South China Sea and what they are doing with 
the now I believe upcoming expansion of ADIZ, if you can just 
reflect on that. And would you recommend that the Biden 
administration continue the aggressive efforts that we have 
pursued with FONOPs operations, the freedom of navigation 
Operations, and what we do to continue to contest their 
assertion of the East China Sea ADIZ and now potentially a 
South China Sea ADIZ.
    Ms. Glaser. So thank you for that question. I will go 
first, and then turn it over to Brent. I think it is an 
excellent question. I very much support the routine conduct of 
FONOPs. Obviously, this is a global program. It challenges 
excessive maritime claims. It is not exclusively aimed at China 
in the South China Sea. We also conduct FONOPs that are aimed 
at demonstrating that other countries--Vietnam, for example, 
does have some excessive maritime claims, and even some of our 
close allies.
    FONOPs in the South China Sea are necessary, but 
insufficient, and I again want to emphasize that the smaller 
claimants in the region hope that the United States will stand 
up for the rights they have to exploit resources inside their 
EEZs.
    This was an important policy change that was made last July 
during the Trump administration, has now been also reaffirmed 
by the Biden administration, and I think it is very important.
    Another point I would like to make is that, yes, China has 
been conducting far more exercises in the region, and it is 
shadowing, as I understand it, U.S. ships everywhere in the 
South China Sea.
    When, in 2014, the United States and China and other 
countries agreed that we would apply the code of unplanned 
encounters at sea, which had protocols to communicate when 
ships encounter each other, that was useful at the time. In 
this new environment in which China is behaving more 
assertively, I think that we need to think about what else 
should be applied in the South China Sea.
    Frankly, China is not abiding by cues, as I understand it 
from talking to naval operators. In many instances, it is 
simply not using them. And because it is actively shadowing 
U.S. naval ships, this is a change in the circumstances and the 
environment in that area. And I think we need to think about 
other ways that we can avoid accidents that could happen, 
whether they be in the air or at sea.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman. Mr. Sadler.
    Mr. Sadler. Thank you. Great question. I definitely would 
echo Ms. Glaser's comments that our partners in the region 
welcome and need our visible presence as they execute their 
economic rights and their EEZs. As far as mechanisms, there are 
mechanisms that have been in place for quite a while, harkening 
back to the days following the P-3 [Hainan Island incident] 
south of Hainan Island in 2001. And this is the military 
maritime consultative agreement, where we meet with our Chinese 
partners and discuss issues at sea and the airspace over. It 
has a mixed record. It hasn't met in recent times partly 
because of COVID, but also because of our relationships.
    But the freedom of navigation Ops themselves, and also 
associated operations, special reconnaissance-type operations, 
being routinized over the last few years, is extremely 
positive. Disconnecting those freedom of navigation and 
execution of military operations separate from high-level 
engagements and other dialogues is actually very worthwhile. It 
depoliticizes what in the past has been politicized--from time 
to time politicized activity. And so that is a good move, and 
that should be continued against any other resistance.
    What I would say on the flip side is it is also not helpful 
that when we do one of these exercises against a partner or an 
upcoming ally, to go public with these operations, it needs to 
be thoroughly considered and due diligence given before we go 
public with why and where we are doing these.
    The countries that are being targeted can see, and they 
know where we are when we do these. So it is not a surprise 
that our presence was there, but a little bit more diligence on 
the strategic communication part is probably warranted.
    As far as to kind of go back to the UNCLOS comment earlier, 
I am kind of the odd man out on this. My focus is strictly on 
the military in the near- and the mid-term. That is where more 
of my concern is. And that before we get into UNCLOS fully 
formally, we should make sure that we are exercising and that 
we are postured to engage in effective lawfare; in other words, 
that we have resourced. And that record I am not sure is as 
clear.
    And with that, I will yield my time.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Rob.
    And I just want to assure, you know, Mr. Sadler, you know, 
you are talking to friends when you talk about trying to 
increase our presence and capability in the Navy's budget and 
fleet size.
    So I think Mr. Chabot was having a little bit of technical 
difficulty, so instead of--so to keep it Democrat, Republican, 
I would now yield to Vicky Hartzler, who I think is the next in 
line. Vicky, are you still with us?
    Oh, oops. I am sorry. My bad. I apologize. I misread my 
text here from the staff. So I will move to the chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, Mr. Bera.
    Mr. Bera. No worries. And this just demonstrates the 
bipartisan nature of how we are thinking about the strategy, 
that we don't have a Democrat or Republican on this committee. 
And that is something that we have talked about, you know, Mr. 
Chabot and I, when we think about our strategic approach to the 
Indo-Pacific region. You know, much as we had in the Cold War, 
we need an American approach, and we need to play the long 
game.
    And I think that is a role that both of our subcommittees, 
as well as Congress as a whole, really can start to think about 
what that long-term strategy is from a diplomatic perspective, 
from a defensive national security posture, and start making 
those investments and building those alliances.
    And that is part of the reason why I think it is important 
for us to be in treaties like UNCLOS and international 
coalitions--so we can actually be at the table influencing the 
direction of these groups.
    You know, let me ask a question of Mr. Russel. You know, 
one of the multilateral coalitions is the Quad coalition. And 
this partnership--and I won't call it an alliance, but a 
partnership between the United States, Japan, Australia, and 
India. And, you know, as we think about that from a strategic 
perspective--and, you know, we have talked a lot about the 
South China Sea, and certainly some of the, you know, Chinese 
incursions there, but also the Belt and Road Initiative--and 
with investments in Sri Lanka, you know, with investments in 
Pakistan, you know, port development in Djibouti, if we think 
about the Indian Ocean region, you know, maybe, Mr. Russel, if 
you could talk a little bit about, you know, our partnership 
with the Indians but also the importance with the Quad 
coalition.
    Mr. Russel. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Bera. I, in 
my career, admit to being something of a Quad skeptic because 
it always seemed to loom larger on paper than in reality.
    My view of the Quad has changed, and I am now a true 
believer in the wake of the very successful March Quad Leaders 
Summit, the foreign ministers' meeting that preceded it, 
because it was very concrete in its decisions and its ambition 
and its outcome. And I think we can see that the Quad now is 
greater than the sum of the parts because each of the Quad 
members are contributing something unique to, in this case, the 
provision of COVID-19 vaccines throughout Southeast Asia.
    I think that the Quad more broadly, particularly when it 
comes to security in the Indo-Pacific, is very much a work in 
progress. And among the keys will be inclusivity. What we can't 
allow to evolve is competition between the Quad and ASEAN as 
two alternate centers of gravity.
    Over time the Quad has got to work not only with the ASEAN 
partners in Southeast Asia, but very importantly with the 
Pacific Island nations as well, to look for the points of 
common interest and to develop a common agenda. So, inclusivity 
has got to be a core part of these multilateral enterprises.
    Now, what we see in the Belt and Road is the execution of a 
Chinese strategy to ensure dual-use capabilities to major 
seaports that are adjacent to important sea lanes of 
communication. So we see that in Sri Lanka in the Hambantota 
Port. We see it in Myanmar in the Kyaukphyu Port, in Pakistan 
in the Gwadar Port, and so on.
    And what we need to be thinking of is not the emergence of 
Chinese naval bases. That is 20th century thinking. But, 
instead, critical nodes where the Chinese can not only 
provision and support their naval vessels, but also that are 
integrated into sophisticated technology centers through 
China's digital Silk Road.
    So this is data centers. It is undersea cables. It is what 
they call ``safe cities,'' which is a euphemism for 
authoritarian surveillance technologies, and so on. And related 
to that is the tremendous economic leverage that China is 
acquiring. So as my colleagues have made clear, really, at 
essence what is needed is for the United States to be on the 
field. You can't beat something with nothing. The Chinese are 
bringing a lot of something to the countries along the Indian 
Ocean and throughout the Pacific region.
    We have got to do everything that we can, not, as Admiral 
Swift made clear, limited to the military front but through the 
whole range of diplomatic, informational, legal, and economic 
instruments available to us.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    And if I may just ask a quick question of Ms. Glaser. I 
know, you know, we have talked both about--you know, around 
Taiwan about the issue of strategic ambiguity versus strategic 
clarity, and I really land on, you know, what strategic 
deterrence looks like in this space, and, you know, perhaps if 
you could just allude to your perspective on, you know, how we 
approach strategic deterrence, not just in the Taiwan Strait 
but potentially in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Ms. Glaser. Thank you, Chairman Bera. It is such an 
important question, and I like to think of strategic clarity 
and strategic ambiguity; that is, whether or not the United 
States would come to Taiwan's defense in a nuclear contingency 
as a spectrum.
    And it is not just a choice between one or the other--and I 
believe, for example, that Secretary of State Blinken when 
about a week ago made a statement that it would be a mistake 
for the status quo to be changed by use of force. That is an 
example of a declaratory statement moving more towards 
strategic clarity and away from strategic ambiguity.
    But it is not a statement that says under all circumstances 
we would come to Taiwan's defense. And I think that making that 
kind of a statement would be problematic. It might, in fact, 
provoke the attack that we seek to deter, because I think 
China's domestic politics are more complicated than any of us 
fully know. I mean, it is a black box decision-making within Jo 
Yan Hi [phonetic] and Xi Jinping's inner circle.
    And he is facing I think a very sensitive period now of 
this year the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese 
Communist Party, and then we have next year the 100th 
anniversary of--sorry, next year we have the Olympics and then 
we have a Party Congress coming up in 2022, which is the 20th 
Party Congress.
    And then, of course, we have the founding of the--the 100th 
anniversary of the founding of the PLA, then, in 2027. These 
are very important anniversaries, and we should not, I think, 
say things that could end up provoking a Chinese attack.
    But your question about deterrence is really important 
because the United States must do more to deter an attack on 
Taiwan and in other contingencies in the Indo-Pacific. And 
right now--and there are others on this--in this hearing who 
are far better equipped to assess where we are in terms of our 
capabilities to intervene, for example, to defend Taiwan, but I 
would certainly posit that we do not have enough capability to 
get to the Taiwan Strait adequate military assets quickly 
enough.
    Taiwan also has not done enough for its part to prepare for 
its own defense, and, therefore, to strengthen deterrence. So, 
I agree with Brent's comments about investing in our military, 
and particularly in our Navy. We want to avoid a miscalculation 
from China, but we also want Xi Jinping to wake up every day 
and say, ``This is not the day that I am going to put at risk 
all of my other ambitious agenda items,'' whether those be 
domestically or in the international community, ``and try and 
reunify Taiwan by force.''
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    Mr. Chairman, let me yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
    And so I am not sure if Steve Chabot is able to connect 
back with us. Steve, are you there? Okay. It sounds like he has 
a little bit of difficulty there.
    So, anyway, so now I will yield to Vicky Hartzler, who is 
next in line on the Republican side.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this 
very, very important hearing. Appreciate all of the witnesses.
    And I want to just continue on the thread, a little bit, of 
what you have been sharing, Ms. Glaser, about Taiwan. As you 
talked about, there is a persistent harassment that is going on 
there with the flyovers. And so I just wondered--you said they 
are trying to erode the will of Taiwan so they acquiesce to 
reunification with China.
    Where do you see this going in the near term? I understand 
your advice that we have got to invest in the Navy and things, 
but do you see over the next 6 months Taiwan continuing this 
very aggressive behavior? Or, yeah, what is your thoughts on 
where this is going to go in the next 6 months?
    Ms. Glaser. Well, I personally don't think that China's use 
of force against Taiwan is likely in the next 6 months. But I 
think what we need to focus on is the--again, it is the gray 
zone actions. This is coercion against Taiwan, stealing away of 
Taiwan's diplomatic allies, Taiwan is now down to 15; economic 
coercion against Taiwan, which has not been used very 
extensively, but we have recently seen Beijing lay down a 
marker in its ban of importation of pineapples from Taiwan. 
They could do more in that regard. They could put more pressure 
on Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing company, which has 
become critically important for the United States and supply 
chains in semiconductors.
    TSMC [Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company] has 
operations on the mainland and is very much I think caught in 
the middle supplying semiconductors to China, but of course 
also in compliance with the restrictions that the United States 
has placed on the provision of very advanced semiconductors.
    So we see also, as you mentioned, the military coercion 
around Taiwan. So the United States, I think both under the 
administrations of President Trump and President Biden, have 
signaled greater support for Taiwan appropriately. And the 
Biden administration has talked about having rock-solid support 
for Taiwan.
    There has recently been a revision of the contact guidance 
with Taiwan, which is emphasizing greater--is actually 
encouraging greater interaction and engagement with Taiwan, 
while limiting and restricting that engagement in only very, 
very narrow areas pertaining to sovereignty.
    What I think we need to do is multilateralize this problem 
more. We need to get other countries to stand up for Taiwan. We 
should be issuing collective statements. We should be acting 
together. More countries in Europe--these are countries who are 
concerned about the future of democracy, even countries in Asia 
who--Japan being number one--would be concerned about a 
military takeover of Taiwan.
    And I think that the statement between President Biden and 
Prime Minister Suga, which included a reference to the 
preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, is 
very important.
    So I hope that we can multilateralize this problem more, 
that China needs to know that it is not just the United States 
that cares about Taiwan, but that there are many democratic 
countries around the world that have a stake in the future of 
Taiwan's democracy, and in its participation in the 
international community where Taiwan has so much to offer in 
terms of its expertise on global health and a range of other 
areas.
    And thank you for the question.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Sadler, you mentioned just briefly in your 
statement about China and Russia working together and 
exercising together. I am very concerned about those two 
countries, obviously, working more and more together and having 
similar objectives. Could you expand on what danger that you 
see or the extent to which China and Russia are working 
together militarily?
    Mr. Sadler. Absolutely. This is something that I have been 
very concerned about and watching quietly for years. And 
understanding both kind of the nature of the relationship 
between the Chinese and Beijing, as well as a long history with 
the Russians, it is not a natural relationship. It is not one 
that is very deep, quite frankly. So I have always been a 
skeptic that the two would ever come to anything approaching a 
real, in a meaningful way, strategic partnership.
    That all changed when I was in Tokyo for another conference 
in the summer of 2019, where the Chinese and the Russians 
conducted a circumnavigation between Japan and South Korea, 
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands in the Sea of Japan. And that was 
interesting for me because it necessarily meant there was 
significant pre-coordination or planning between the two to 
pull that off, something I would have never expected despite 
their years of doing very scripted exercises and very 
geographically constrained exercises, still to this day.
    So from the--at the macro level, it seems a little 
unnatural, but there is something that is there that is 
different in the last few years that causes me a lot of 
concern. The challenge for the Navy is we have a global Navy, 
and we have responsibilities that are really principle-based, 
not territorially based. And even our economic interests are 
globally spread and diffused.
    So our Navy has a lot of bases to cover, and now you have 
two potentially strategic nation--or partnership going on on 
opposite ends of the world that will overtax the Navy's 
attention and its resources. And so that is probably the most 
important thing I would take away from that is while China is 
definitely the pacing threat, and the number one challenge, 
comprehensive challenge, Russia is always there, just enough to 
be a distraction at a moment that could be very, very 
disadvantageous for U.S. interest. I mean, comprehensive U.S. 
interest.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Sadler. Ran over a little bit, 
but the point was important, and certainly those of us on 
Seapower hear you loud and clear.
    So next up is Mr. Langevin. And then he will be followed by 
Mr. Chabot.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
thank our witnesses for your testimony today.
    So let me begin with Ms. Glaser. So, climate change is 
obviously a major threat to the Indo-Pacific countries, 
especially island countries. Ms. Glaser, can you talk about 
some of the effects climate change is having on the current 
maritime security situation, and what new challenges can we 
expect in the future?
    Ms. Glaser. Well, I have to say, Congressman, climate 
change is really not in my area of expertise. There may be 
other witnesses who can speak to this in more detail than I 
can. But certainly, across the South Pacific, climate change is 
just the number one issue, and countries are looking for 
assistance in order to make themselves more resilient. They are 
also looking, of course, to the leading emitters of these 
emissions to take actions in order to curb the impact of global 
warming.
    And so they look to the United States, and I think there 
was great disappointment--the United States and China is the, 
of course, two leading emitters. There was disappointment in 
the lack of progress over the last few years, and a lot of 
expectations as to what can be done going forward in order to 
help these countries.
    So whether it is in terms of aid that we can give these 
countries, or in terms perhaps even more importantly of 
expertise, together with our ally, Australia, this will be 
critically important, because if we do not step up, I guarantee 
you that China will step in and provide all sorts of assistance 
to countries in the South Pacific.
    They have been incredibly active there economically, 
politically, and I think increasingly, potentially militarily, 
and there have been some suggestions that they may be seeking 
port access there. So I think this is an area where we need to 
really pay much more attention.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Continuing with you, Ms. Glaser, 
if I could, you mentioned that a robust effort should be 
undertaken to surveil, identify, and categorize Chinese 
maritime militia boats engaging in coercive actions. How would 
you rate our efforts so far? And do you believe that we should 
do more using covert intelligence, or would you place increased 
focus on open source assets?
    Ms. Glaser. So I am not familiar with what has gone on in 
the classified realm. In the open source area, there has been 
very good work that is being done by my former organization, 
CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies], as the 
Asia maritime transparency initiative, and they are tracking 
specific maritime militia boats as well as Chinese coast guard 
operations and seeing how they gather together in certain areas 
to intimidate.
    And the episode recently at Whitsun Reef is just the latest 
example. This happens around Vietnam's holdings, around other 
Philippine holdings. We saw this at Thitu Island when the 
Philippines was planning and starting to repair their runway on 
Thitu Island.
    So I think open source needs to be done. It can be done 
with a great deal of open source instruments. But I am sure 
that in the intelligence realm that we can do even more to 
identify which boats are operating where and, importantly, what 
the companies are that they are tied to.
    And we can see if they are operating in different parts of 
the South China Sea, and they are sitting around places like 
Whitsun Reef, they are not fishing. They are bullying other 
claimants. They are----
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I am going to stop you there in 
the interest of timing.
    I wanted to ask Admiral Swift, our operations in the South 
China Sea will most likely have to be joint if we are to combat 
China's increasing dominance. What were the biggest challenges 
you faced as the Pacific Fleet Commander when it came to 
working with the other services and functional combatant 
commands? And what changes would you make to the Pacific 
Fleet's posture so it can fulfill its role?
    Admiral Swift. Rep. Langevin, than you for that question. 
This is not an area that I think needs focus. The coordination 
that is occurring amongst the component commanders has just 
been extraordinary in my tenure there, and it has continued. 
One of the benefits is that we are all located on an island.
    I think an area to expand on is how we work with our allies 
and partners in the region. We need to understand their 
concerns with the definition of FONOPs. That may be a red line 
for them, but understand where their red lines are, set those 
aside for now, and let's focus on those areas where there is 
overlap in agreement.
    I recognize the time has expired here, but I would be happy 
to carry this conversation on in another venue, should you have 
interest.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Jim, and thank you, Admiral.
    Again, if anybody wants to see the coordination with our 
allies, I mean, I would encourage people to try and participate 
in a CODEL [congressional delegation] during RIMPAC [Rim of the 
Pacific Exercise], which is where I think many of us met 
Admiral Swift, which was a very--it is an impressive, over 20-
nation event in terms of naval coordination that is out there.
    So next, again, Mr. Chabot is back with us. And after Mr. 
Chabot will be Congressman Sherman.
    Well, I guess we just lost Mr. Chabot again, so, Dr. Green, 
I think you are the Republican next in line.
    Dr. Green. Can you guys hear me now?
    Mr. Courtney. Yes, I can.
    Dr. Green. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. The floor is yours.
    Dr. Green. Okay. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member 
Chabot, and Chairman Courtney, and Ranking Member Wittman. And 
thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Greatly 
appreciate it.
    China's increasingly hostile actions in the Indo-Pacific 
are incredibly alarming and threaten international norms and 
regional stability. I am particularly concerned about, of 
course, Taiwan. China has consistently denied Taiwan's 
existence as a free and sovereign nation for decades. 
Protecting the rights of the Taiwanese people against the CCP's 
[Chinese Communist Party's] aggression has been bipartisan U.S. 
policy. We seem to agree on this, and I think it is actually 
one of the hopes that I have for bipartisanship in this 
Congress.
    The U.S. has increased the frequency of its Taiwan Strait 
transit's U.S. bomber missions and arms sales, but for far too 
long the global community has isolated Taiwan in order to 
appease Beijing.
    It is crucial that international organizations in countries 
without diplomatic ties with Taipei recognize this peaceful 
nation and welcome them into the international community. The 
world must no longer give in to Beijing's bullying.
    The U.S. could help by prioritizing a free trade agreement 
with Taiwan, an initiative that would incentivize other 
countries to follow suit. Additionally, the United States must 
not forget the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. While 
in recent years our maritime presence there has waned, it is a 
crucial area for commerce and regional stability, and it 
contains three of the world's seven oil chokepoints.
    While China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean is 
troubling for the United States and our allies, China is not 
the only adversary there. In 2020, Russia established a naval 
base in Sudan, giving Moscow strategic access to the Red Sea 
and, by extension, the Indian Ocean. We must insist on a free 
and open Indo-Pacific and defend this region and our interests 
accordingly.
    A question for, really, anyone. Do you guys think that we 
are doing enough right now? I mean, other than these FONOPs--
and I have heard some questions on this previously--what else 
can we be doing? What else can we be doing to get our, our, you 
know, allies and partners involved in this process to push 
back?
    And anyone--Mr. Sadler, maybe start with you.
    Mr. Sadler. Yes, sir. So one of my last assignments in the 
Navy was as a defense attache in Southeast Asia. So one of the 
areas that I think is really ripe for consideration is in the 
realm of military capacity-building, and more sustained 
training and exercise kind of missions to kind of build up 
shared tactics and procedures, and really dealing with this 
gray zone challenge from the Chinese. It is also the Russians, 
but Chinese in South China Sea. That would be one area I think 
that is really ripe.
    And the Japanese, for quite some time now under Prime 
Minister Abe, have also recognized this need, and they are 
coming into it as well.
    Dr. Green. One other question I had is--and, Mr. Chairman, 
I will just let you know I can't see the calendar, so I will 
need your help knowing when I run out of time.
    But, you know, in China's vow to bring Taiwan--you know, 
they call them a renegade province--you know, back into the 
fold, so to speak, they are doing it diplomatically, isolating 
Taipei. I mentioned that in some of my comments. How can we 
take that on? What can the United States do? What can the 
Congress do?
    I know we did the TAIPEI [Taiwan Allies International 
Protection and Enhancement Initiative] Act, the Taiwan Travel 
Act. What else can we do to get the international community to 
integrate Taiwan into the community better?
    Ms. Glaser, that might be one for you.
    Ms. Glaser. I thought maybe Danny Russel might want to jump 
in on this, as I have already talked a great deal about Taiwan. 
But I think that we need to be getting other countries to work 
with us to do things together with Taiwan. There is this global 
cooperation training framework where we include other 
countries.
    You mentioned a bilateral trade agreement. I would join you 
in endorsing a bilateral trade agreement. We have to start by 
resuming TIFA talks with Taiwan, Trade Investment Framework 
[Agreement] talks, which we have not had since the Obama 
administration. It is a very high priority for Taiwan.
    We should encourage Japan and Australia to be negotiating 
trade agreements with Taiwan, and the EU [European Union] 
should be considering negotiating an investment agreement. My 
view is that for Taiwan economic prosperity is equal to 
security. This is an area where we have all fallen short and we 
need to do more.
    Dr. Green. I am making an assumption here, Mr. Chairman, 
that my time is up, so I will----
    Mr. Courtney. It is.
    Dr. Green [continuing]. Yield.
    Mr. Courtney. But a great question, and, you know, with the 
semiconductor shortage that is out there and the fact that 
Taiwan probably has the most robust supply chain for 
semiconductors, that might be a good incentive for other 
countries to get more interested.
    Dr. Green. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. So next up is Brad Sherman. And at this 
point, in terms of who is left on the screen, he will be 
followed by Anthony Brown and Gerry Connolly.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our relationship with 
China reminds me of 120 years ago and the conflict between a 
rising Germany and a status quo Britain, a rising German naval 
power and a status quo Britain. That resulted in the most 
enormous avoidable war in the history of humankind, and I hope 
we do a better job of managing our relationship with China.
    Military deployments are very expensive, and that is why I 
am pleased that so much of our discussion today has focused on 
ways to confront China without those deployments.
    Mr. Chair, I want to join as a co-sponsor of your bill, 
plus Mr. Other Chair, I--as a fellow member with you on the 
Pacific Islands Caucus, I am glad you brought up the importance 
of us concluding the renewal of the compacts with the Freely 
Associated States, something that is critical from a strategic 
standpoint, not very expensive for the United States.
    Several witnesses have talked about diplomacy, 
cooperability, and finally, of course, we can help Taiwan 
defend itself without that necessarily meaning that we have to 
build more of our own military capacity.
    We have some strengths in dealing with China. Our ideology 
is one of great human democracy, and we are now doing far more 
on global warming. As we saw in the briefing of the Secretary 
of State just a few days ago, China's plan on global warming is 
to increase the amount of carbon inputs into the air until 
sometime next decade. We have the relationships with countries, 
and China is dependent upon the U.S. market.
    Yesterday we listened to our President explain the great 
domestic needs of the country, and so it is important that we 
figure out how to deal with the issues we are talking about 
here without the expense of a huge increase in our military in 
this area. A military response is the most expensive thing we 
can do when we don't use it, and when we do use it, it goes 
beyond most expensive to unparalleled expenditures.
    And my first question is for the admiral. We want Taiwan to 
be able to defend itself. From Xi's standpoint, he knows that 
if he attacks Taiwan, how the United States responds is 
questionable. The Taiwanese military is there on the ground to 
respond. What weapons systems should we sell to Taiwan? And 
what should we encourage them to buy? And is there anything 
they want to buy that we shouldn't sell them?
    Admiral Swift. Well, thank you for that important question. 
I am actually heartened with respect to where Taiwan is with 
respect to its own defense. I won't name the individuals in 
particular, but I have had the benefit of having made two trips 
to Taiwan since my retirement. And my comments to senior 
leadership there in a non-military context is to simply share 
with them the importance of making Taiwan a bitter pill to 
swallow.
    As I have said before, the only thing harder than defending 
against an amphibious landing or an air assault is conducting 
one. The terrain of Taiwan is best suited for----
    Mr. Sherman. I have got limited time. Are there particular 
weapons systems that----
    Admiral Swift. I would say defensive weapons, those weapons 
that can defeat an amphibious landing or an air assault, as 
well as weapons to defend against missile attack.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. I want to move on, chair of the--
along with Mr. Chabot, who is also with us, of the India 
Caucus. Chairman Bera has served as chair of that caucus as 
well. Our focus has mostly been on the Pacific, but this--we 
are focusing here on the Indo-Pacific.
    Admiral, is there a problem with the Indian Ocean being 
divided between the Indo-Pacific Command, Central Command, and 
Africa Command?
    Admiral Swift. I haven't seen it manifest itself. There is 
great collaboration across that line at the COCOM [combatant 
command] level as well as at the individual component level. So 
that wasn't an issue when I have served on both sides of that 
line.
    Mr. Courtney. And I think that will be the final word. So 
thank you, Brad, for those questions.
    And so next up is Mr. Brown, Anthony Brown. You are next in 
line.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am not sure who 
best to answer this question, so I will leave it to the 
panelists perhaps to do--you know, if they are able to answer 
it, please do.
    Currently, the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency, DLA, 
purchases some of its fuel for Indo-Pacific operations from 
foreign suppliers and is delivered on foreign flagships with 
foreign crews. My concern is the availability and reliability 
of that in a conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific. Can you 
comment on, you know, whether increasing fuel purchases from 
U.S. suppliers and requiring the delivery with flagships makes 
sense in increasing reliability and availability of fuel in 
time of--great time of need or in a surge?
    Admiral Swift. Congressman Brown, I will respond quickly 
and say that that is a concern. You are rightful to have that 
concern. It is a concern that is shared by the Joint Staff. I 
have had discussions with the J-4 [Joint Staff Directorate for 
Logistics] in particular about these vulnerabilities. And 
diversity of fuel stocks and supplies broadly is being strongly 
endorsed by both the Joint Staff--and I can only speak for the 
Navy. I just participated in a Navy-Marine war game on that 
specific issue recently.
    Mr. Brown. Do any of the other panelists want to comment on 
that?
    Mr. Sadler. Absolutely. So this is Brent Sadler. I was also 
a WESTPAC [Western Pacific] sailor myself and operated in the 
Western Pacific. This is a concern, especially if a conflict is 
prolonged, going from months into years as it might be with 
China. So those logistics need to be very resilient in supply 
but also in transit--or transport. So more sealift and more 
availability for wartime of tankers as well.
    Mr. Brown. And is it your view that--or anyone's view that 
this is something that the Navy could take up itself? Or do 
they need guidance or direction from Congress to do this?
    Mr. Sadler. At least it is my----
    Mr. Brown. I mean increasing purchases, procuring fuel from 
U.S. suppliers and U.S. vessels with U.S. [inaudible].
    Mr. Sadler. Well, in that regard, I think it probably has 
to come from outside of the Navy, I mean, because I guess my 
initial argument, we go where--the best quality and the best 
price would be the first thing.
    And then, at the same time, this is where Congress can come 
in, make sure there is more resiliency in the logistics, the 
supply networks, both here in the United States as well as 
forward, thinking that the assumption being that your sea lanes 
do get cut at some point in time. You have to have that forward 
access as well.
    Mr. Brown. Does anyone else want to comment on that issue 
or question?
    Admiral Swift. I would strongly advocate for engaging with 
the Navy to get the Navy's perspective. There are both upsides 
and downsides as well. You want diversity in your logistics, 
the sources.
    I recognize that there certainly is a perspective from 
buying those sources from the U.S. perspective, from U.S. 
suppliers, but there are downsides and risk associated with 
that. The tyranny of distance comes to mind. I would recommend 
starting that conversation with the Navy to understand what 
their requirement is, expand it from there, you know, how you 
might be able to diversify it further.
    Mr. Russel. Congressman Brown, this is Danny Russel. If I 
could offer one thought, it is that this is really a subset of 
a broader issue of U.S. access and logistic options, not only 
in a period of conflict but in a period of tension when the 
tremendous influence that China has acquired among the littoral 
countries in the Indo-Pacific makes them think twice about 
extending the kind of overflight or port access that the United 
States has historically taken for granted.
    And the cure for that is not just ``Buy America'', it is 
for America to be in the game in the region diplomatically, 
economically, and in other respects.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If there is no one else 
that wants to comment on that, I will yield back the balance of 
my time. I appreciate the time and attention from our 
panelists.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
    I will make a quick comment, which is that last year's NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act], we finally restarted a 
maritime tanker program to really address this issue as well as 
the Maritime Security Program, which is using U.S.-flagged 
ships to boost that supply chain. But we have got more work to 
do, and I look forward to doing that with you in Seapower's 
mark this year.
    So next up is Andy Levin, and he will be followed by Gerry 
Connolly.
    Mr. Levin. All right. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Good to see 
you, and I really thank all of the witnesses for joining us 
today.
    I want to talk about some of the implications that China's 
activities in the Indo-Pacific have for human rights and the 
health of environment in the region. There was an NBC [National 
Broadcasting Company] news investigation published last year, 
and it found that China had been sending industrial fishing 
boats to fish illegally off the coast of North Korea.
    Those findings explained a horrible mystery wherein beat-up 
wooden boats, more than 500 of them between 2015 and 2020, 
would wash up on the shore in Japan and in them were skeletons 
of North Korean fishermen.
    NBC News reported that Chinese fishing vessels had 
displaced the fishermen's much smaller boats, leading them to 
take major risks and go farther and farther out to sea to try 
to catch fish, and they would be stranded and have these tragic 
consequences.
    So let me open up this question to any of our witnesses. 
This is, obviously, a grim and alarming example of the 
humanitarian risk posed by China's malign activities in the 
Indo-Pacific. What should the U.S. do to address this kind of 
situation?
    Admiral Swift. Congressman, Admiral Swift here. I will jump 
on this quickly, but I know both Bonnie and Danny are well-
versed in this. I want to come back to a comment that Bonnie 
made earlier about this gray zone that not only is CSIS--and 
Greg Poling is the individual that has done some incredible 
work there--but as well Andrew Erickson at the Center for 
Maritime China Studies at the War College--the term is the 
People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia. This is an organized 
paramilitary force. They fish sometimes for their own benefit, 
but when called they are at the behest, really, of Xi Jinping 
directly. There is a chain of command.
    And what you are seeing them doing are efforts on their own 
to displace others. We have seen this--the Indian Ocean was 
mentioned. We have seen it around Gwadar, and we have seen it 
around Djibouti. So this is not a global force, but it 
certainly spans the area of interest of China from the Bab-el-
Mandeb all the way up into the Sea of Japan.
    So I completely agree with the assessment that you have 
shared here that this is something that needs to be looked at 
more broadly.
    Mr. Russel. Congressman, I will follow Admiral Swift, who 
went with me, or I went with him, as we traveled throughout the 
Pacific Islands meeting with governments there to talk about 
the very relevant issue of illegal, unregulated fishing, and 
the incursions in their national EEZs by, among others, the 
Chinese who are overfishing and badly damaging the ecology of 
the Pacific.
    This connects also to Congressman Langevin's question about 
climate change because extreme weather, flooding, and the 
shifts in the fish stock, which is a principal source of 
protein throughout the region, have huge strategic 
implications.
    So in terms of what--there is not much we can do for the 
North Koreans, I am sorry to say, although this shows what it 
means to have China as an ally. But there is a lot that we can 
do for the Pacific Island nations, and there is a lot that we 
can do for the other littoral states, particularly in the South 
China Sea, by way of assistance in fishing agreements, the 
diplomatic piece to it, maritime domain awareness, EEZ 
protection, small patrol crafts, training, access to fuel, and 
so on.
    And I think that a sustained U.S. effort to provide the 
kind of modest assistance that the countries are asking for and 
desperately need would have huge strategic positive effects and 
would to some degree curtail China's freedom of action.
    Mr. Levin. Well, that is--you know, obviously, I am very 
supportive of providing that aid, because the other example I 
was going to give you was the Pacific flying squid, which I 
believe Japan has been overfishing. The NBC News report 
included some information about that. And that since, you know, 
I guess in about the last--just the last 20 years, the squid 
population has declined in South Korean and Japanese waters by 
more than 70 percent, and, you know, Global Fishing Watch 
attributes that to this illegal Chinese fishing.
    So I think this is something we really--for ecology, for 
climate, and for sustaining human populations with protein, we 
really have to take this seriously.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Andy. And, you know, 
again, it is really nice to see, again, sort of, you know, a 
diplomatic and military perspective in terms of how--you know, 
that is really the way we hopefully can address all of these 
issues.
    So next up is Mr. Connolly from Virginia, and he will be 
followed by his colleague from Virginia, Elaine Luria.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 
panel. Very thoughtful.
    Mr. Russel, let me begin with you. You stressed how 
important it was to ratify UNCLOS, the Law of the Sea Treaty, 
in your testimony. I vividly remember then Jesse Helms, the 
late Senator Jesse Helms, just browbeating--I believe it was 
Tom Pickering--who had been the chief U.S. negotiator for Law 
of the Sea, to try to get him to almost renounce his support 
for his own treaty. That was the climate in the U.S. Senate, 
unfortunately, with respect to the treaty.
    By not ratifying, as you point out, we created an enormous 
void that China has been only too happy to fill. You talked 
about it in sort of broader terms, but maybe you could talk 
about some of the specific things we lose out on by not 
engaging in Law of the Sea. They have lots of structures and 
committees and subcommittees we are not members of.
    We don't have any influence or voice really in a lot of 
that, and China does, and China has exploited that. And that 
goes to, you know, ores and nodules in the sea, harvesting 
natural resources, navigational policies, and so forth.
    Could you just talk a little bit about some of the specific 
costs to us that are not in our interest--those costs--that we 
lose because we are not a member of the Law of the Sea Treaty?
    Mr. Russel. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. And Tom 
Pickering was my boss for many years in the Foreign Service and 
true champion of U.S. interests, including in negotiating 
UNCLOS.
    I think that Bonnie Glaser's paper contains a number of the 
very specific steps that would advantage the United States were 
we to ratify and that we are disadvantaged. I won't try to 
recreate all of them, but certainly our inability to weigh in 
in support of the Philippine pleading to the tribunal revealed 
a major weakness that flows from our self-exile, along with 
North Korea and a few other unsavory states, from UNCLOS 
membership.
    I think that it also means that the Chinese have a much 
wider purview for nominating individuals to senior positions 
and positions of decisive influence within the UNCLOS system. 
It typically removes us from the platform where issues that are 
directly germane to our economic and security issues are being 
adjudicated.
    And, Congressman, this is part of a broader trend. In 
multiple multilateral fora, institutional organizations, and so 
on, the Chinese have stolen a march on the U.S. in their 
ability to gain positions of control as director generals, as 
specialized agencies, and really are stacking this up.
    Mr. Connolly. And, Mr. Russel, because of my time, I get 
that, and all I can say is I do think that while we talk about 
Law of the Sea, we need to be speaking in specifics in terms of 
what the United States is not influencing and is losing out on 
and the Chinese are gaining.
    The more we can be specific, the more people get the value 
of the treaty. And I think we have to move beyond, well, the 
U.S. prestige and influence to, no, there are specific costs in 
the United States interest and here they are. And the Chinese 
are taking advantage of that and benefitting from it at our 
expense.
    And I just think we need to revisit this issue, and I am so 
glad you pointed that out in your testimony. Thank you.
    Given the interest of time, Admiral, you are in 
Massachusetts. I would love to know where. I am from 
Massachusetts. But I wonder if you could just address, how far 
should the United States--and is the United States prepared to 
be aggressive in asserting its rights in the South China Sea? 
And how aggressive are we or should we be in protecting our 
allies' territorial jurisdictions? Conflict is an ever-present 
likelihood with China.
    Admiral Swift. Yes. So easy question, I am in Westport, 
Mass. But more specific to the question that you asked, I think 
ask the questions of yourselves. I have said many times as the 
PACFLT [U.S. Pacific Fleet] Commander that what I needed more 
than anything else, was policy relief.
    Deterrence is the nation's ability to act. I think 
readiness, as the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] pointed out, 
is the most critical element. We are going to have to fight 
with the force that we have, but it is that commitment to use 
that force that comes from the civilian control of the 
government that is most important.
    And I note that time has expired, so I will pause there.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I just--I think we--I think the United States 
has to obviously assess how much risk are we willing to take. I 
am for an aggressive posture with respect to the Chinese 
because otherwise they de facto create self-candidacy in this 
Chinese lake. And that steps on a lot of toes, including allied 
or partner toes. But we need to, as a country, have a cold-
hearted or clear-eyed look at what risks are we prepared to 
take.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Gerry.
    And watching Admiral Swift nodding his head shows that I 
think you kind of posed the question of the day. So thank you.
    So next up is, let's see, Elaine Luria. I apologize, 
Elaine. You are up.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Mr. Sadler, nice to see you. Last month I wrote a 
letter to President Biden detailing the need for a sense of 
urgency in countering the real and proximate threat that exists 
from China today in the Western Pacific. And I see you provided 
in your statement--you echoed my call for a Battle Force 2025, 
a plan to address today's challenges in the region, and you 
also note in your statement that the Navy struggles to maintain 
a persistent presence at the critical crossroads of the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans, with little more than two warships on any 
given day.
    Yet just yesterday the CNO continued to call for reducing 
the size of the fleet in the near term in order to provide 
funding for programs in the future by getting rid of what he 
terms as legacy platforms.
    I would like to start with some simple yes/no questions. Do 
you agree that naval presence matters to counter Chinese 
activity in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Mr. Sadler. Yes, absolutely.
    Mrs. Luria. And do you agree that it requires ships in 
order to have this presence?
    Mr. Sadler. Yes, absolutely again. But not in isolation.
    Mrs. Luria. Admiral Swift, in your statement, you also 
noted that the nation's commitment to their shared strategic 
vision for free and open maritime domain is the use of their 
military resources to underscore their resolve. And when you 
took command of Pacific Fleet in 2015, the People's Liberation 
Army Navy, the PLAN, had 255 battle force ships in its fleet 
according to ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence], and today that 
number is 360. And in just a few more years, it will be over 
400.
    The Chinese continue to pursue and build on their illegal 
maritime claims in the region, along with their artificially 
imposed nine-dash line. And I would argue that persistent U.S. 
naval presence in the region is the best way to push back on 
these claims.
    So I will ask you the same question. Do you agree that 
naval presence matters in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Swift. I do. Very much so.
    Mrs. Luria. And do you agree that it requires ships to have 
this presence?
    Admiral Swift. Absolutely.
    Mrs. Luria. And in order to provide this urgently needed 
presence in the INDOPACOM AOR, and in the Western Pacific 
specifically, do you think it is prudent to decommission ships 
with remaining life, such as our cruisers and our LCS [littoral 
combat ships], when remaining platforms are years away, 
essentially decommission ships faster than we can replace them?
    Admiral Swift. It depends. It is a complicated question. It 
is, what are the trades that we are buying for reducing the 
number of ships? If they are not relevant in today's conflict, 
then it makes sense to me. But I would need more time to share 
the details behind it.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Let me just--quickly, referring to the 
cruisers, do you think that our cruiser fleet remains relevant 
in the current environment?
    Admiral Swift. If you are talking about some of our older 
cruisers, you can see the challenge it has been to maintain 
them. We have had one in particular--I am sure Rob Wittman 
understands this. It sits right in his front yard. Trying to 
get that cruiser underway was very problematic because of its 
age.
    Mrs. Luria. Yes. I understand the Vella Gulf, based here 
out of Norfolk in my district, and have been tracking it 
closely on the cruiser modernization.
    But, you know, I just wanted to focus on the fact, in order 
to be present, we need to have enough ships, and I think that 
whatever we do over the next 4 years will ensure either the 
U.S. maintains maritime superiority in the Western Pacific or 
we cede that to China.
    And I feel that we desperately need a national defense 
strategy that acknowledges and prioritizes the maritime nature 
of the current strategic environment.
    And, you know, Mr. Sadler, I know you have written 
extensively on this for The Heritage Foundation. Can you 
comment--do you think the Navy has provided that brand today?
    Mr. Sadler. I think Navy needs to do a better job of 
getting that plan out. There has been a lot of due diligence 
that is done internally, looking at the engineering and the 
budget elements of the equation. But Navy definitely needs to 
do a better job of getting that message out.
    Mrs. Luria. So I have had some time to review the future 
naval forces study, structure study, and other documents from 
the Navy. In every single one of these, they use a going-in 
assumption, that this is all we are going to get. We are going 
to start with the fact that we are only going to see 2.1 
percent growth, and then we are going to buy what we can buy 
out of that allocation that they assume they are going to get.
    Do you feel like they are self-constraining themselves 
rather than coming to the table and telling Congress, telling 
the American people, you know, what force, what fleet we need, 
something along the lines of the 1984 maritime strategy that 
Secretary Lehman presented in the Reagan administration? Do you 
feel like that is lacking?
    Mr. Sadler. Yes. I agree very much with that assessment, 
with your assessment on that. I think it would be better to 
start with a threat-informed or threat-led analysis that then 
is budget-informed, but not the other way around. And then, of 
course, at the end, having something that is structured around 
an effective strategy.
    So those three things have to go together, but the budget 
can't be the front end. We have to focus in on the military 
efficiencies and resiliency and strategic effectiveness first.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you for sharing those 
comments, and I appreciate following your work with The 
Heritage Foundation.
    And thank you, all the witnesses, for being here today. And 
I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Elaine.
    And I am now going to recognize Congresswoman Houlahan. And 
I also am going to hand off the gavel to Mr. Bera because I 
have a family commitment and I have got to jump off.
    I want to thank all of the witnesses and all of the members 
for their participation in what I think, again, is going to be 
a dominant priority for both of our subcommittees as well as 
Congress as a whole.
    So, Congresswoman Houlahan, the floor is yours.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of 
the witnesses and panelists.
    My first question is for Mr. Russel. Just this morning, 
several of my colleagues on a different subcommittee for the 
HASC were looking very closely at the importance of securing 
our rare earth element supply chain.
    I was wondering if you could speak a little bit about the 
possibility and feasibility of deep sea mining for rare earth 
elements and how the UNCLOS would possibly manage or plug into 
this process. And if in fact you have any input on that, are 
you also aware of any other nations who are experimenting with 
this undersea mining?
    Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Congresswoman Houlahan. I 
regret I don't know what the right answer is to your pair of 
questions. I do know, though, that not only are the Chinese 
seeking to sustain a virtual monopoly on rare earths, and have 
a record of using rare earths as leverage specifically against 
Japan in economic retaliation for political acts, but that they 
are aggressively exploring undersea mineral mining in both the 
South China Sea and also they would like to do so in the 
Arctic.
    And I believe that, you know, at a minimum, ratification of 
UNCLOS would put the United States in position to be able not 
only to contest Chinese behavior within the legal context of 
UNCLOS but to raise the effectiveness of our broader political 
and diplomatic effort to shine a spotlight on problematic 
Chinese behavior.
    Ms. Houlahan. That was in fact the recommendation and the 
conclusion of the panel that we were speaking with today 
regarding the real concern over access to rare earth elements 
and processing rare earth elements, and also, you know, the 
recommendation was definitely to get back--or get involved in 
the UNCLOS process and ratification thereof.
    You have led me into my second question, and I want to ask 
Mr. Sadler this. And then if you have anything to contribute or 
add, I wonder if you might, because you mentioned the Arctic. 
Do you believe that--and this is for Mr. Sadler--do you believe 
that China's degree of compliance with international Law of the 
Sea in the South China Sea has any implications for 
understanding the potential Chinese behavior regarding its 
compliance with international law in the Arctic? And what 
lessons can we be learning or should we be learning from the 
South China Sea as we try to look towards the Arctic and apply 
those same lessons?
    Mr. Sadler. Thank you for the question. I think it is 
instructive to note that the Chinese change the legal basis or 
their position based on the geography of the issue at hand. So 
in the South China Sea, it is more of a territorial, historical 
basis. That doesn't really comport with our and the popular 
understandings, legal understandings, of UNCLOS.
    In the Arctic, the Chinese almost sound like we do, so 
there is an interesting dichotomy that is going on there. So it 
is instructive as far as it is their pragmatism and where they 
play very loose with legal constructs.
    Ms. Houlahan. Mr. Russel, do you have anything to 
contribute there, since you brought up the Arctic?
    Mr. Russel. Yeah. I think that this is a classic case of 
Beijing seeking to exploit the inherent rights and freedoms of 
maritime user states in UNCLOS, without accepting the 
limitations and the responsibilities of UNCLOS members. And our 
ability to directly contest that hypocrisy is curtailed by our 
status as a non-party state.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thanks very much for that. I am hopeful, as 
many of us are, of really looking at what is going on in the 
Arctic and the concern about the possibility of China's rise 
particularly in that area.
    With the last 40 seconds, I just wanted to ask Mr. Swift, 
Admiral Swift, we were talking with Representative Luria about 
the dominance of China and the Navy and that they have the 
opportunity with fishing boats, with maritime militia boats, 
with coast guard cutters, and naval ships, to really flood the 
region with their naval abilities.
    And I was just wondering, as a practical matter, what, if 
anything, could be done to roll back their increasingly 
dominant--increasing dominance in land and sea, if it isn't 
about solutions with our own Navy.
    Admiral Swift. Well, the South China Sea is about the 
legitimacy of the Communist Party and Xi Jinping himself. So 
rolling back needs to be cautious, and I think Congress is the 
right place for that discussion to occur.
    We have sufficient force in place. What is key is 
readiness, I believe.
    And just to touch on the Arctic, China describes their 
responsibility and abilities in the Arctic as driven by the 
fact that they are a near-Arctic state. So the South China Sea 
is just a petri dish of the overall view that China is applying 
to the world. But thank you for that question.
    Ms. Houlahan. You are welcome.
    And I have run out of time, so I yield back.
    Mr. Bera [presiding]. Great. Thanks, Ms. Houlahan.
    And let me recognize Ms. Jacobs from California.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you so much, Chair Bera, and thank you to 
all of the witnesses. It has been really interesting so far.
    I wanted to ask--I know we have talked a lot about UNCLOS, 
and I agree with my colleagues that we should ratify it, and 
that there are a lot of drawbacks to not doing so. But let's 
take, as a hypothetical, that the Senate does not do what we 
want them to do and does not ratify it.
    And I was hoping, Ms. Glaser, you could talk about what 
other options we might have in that scenario. How would we be 
able to enforce international Law of the Sea in South China Sea 
and East China Sea, and mitigate some of those drawbacks that 
have been so clearly articulated about not ratifying?
    Ms. Glaser. Well, thank you for the question, but I am 
afraid that I think that there are very few options for the 
United States to enforce international law in the South China 
Sea, if we are not a member of UNCLOS, because we cannot shape 
the rules.
    Certainly, we can enforce freedom of navigation by 
conducting FONOPs and presence operations. We have that option 
available to us. We can help by, as others have talked about, 
bolstering the maritime domain awareness of littoral states, so 
that they know what is going on inside of their exclusive 
economic zones, and that might deter some of China's illegal 
behavior. This is an ongoing program that we, of course, should 
continue to bolster those capabilities.
    But in terms of international law, UNCLOS is really all I 
think that is basically available. The Chinese are the ones 
that have ratified the treaty but are not abiding by it, and 
the United States of course stands outside the treaty, but we 
are essentially respecting it as a matter of customary law.
    And I think that many countries in the world don't even 
understand what that means or why we take this position. It is 
baffling to the world, and the United States, therefore, is 
charged by China, as others have said, as being hypocritical.
    So I don't think we really have the means--I am not an 
international maritime lawyer, but I don't really think we have 
other legal means available to us. We can use diplomatic means 
certainly. We can encourage the code of conduct to include the 
right provisions. We have military means, but I don't think 
there is alternative legal means.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    Do any of the other witnesses want to comment on our 
alternative----
    Admiral Swift. I will jump in quickly, if I could, and this 
goes back to I would agree with Bonnie. The only other 
alternative is diplomatic. There is a disconnect between 
diplomacy and what we do in the military, and it goes back to 
my comments with respect to relevancy of the United States and 
now the legitimacy piece.
    So the problem with FONOPs right now is the United States 
has drifted from the strategic concept and objectives of 
FONOPs. Peer competitors recognize this, primarily that being 
China that is the most advanced and adept at adopting the 
approach. And they get their word out on a FONOP before the 
U.S. does, and their word is consistent.
    These are actions of a faded regional colonial hegemony 
using military power to back up a failed form of government, 
ensuring the region remains destabilized and prevent the 
nations of the regions from self-determination.
    And because of their use of force and coercion other 
nations are reluctant to speak up. That is why the comment 
about the EU strategy being published was so important. So we 
need to take a playbook from our allies, partners, and friends, 
and be careful about taking a page from the playbook of the PRC 
and the Chinese Communist Party in our response. That is even 
more important if we don't become a party to UNCLOS.
    Mr. Russel. Congresswoman, Danny Russel here. If I could 
add, the situation and the challenge set that the United States 
and our allies and partners face in maritime space in the Indo-
Pacific is so serious that we simply don't have the luxury of 
opting to ignore one of the limited tools at our disposal. So 
legal tools, diplomatic tools, military tools, economic tools, 
all of these need to be applied as part of a coherent strategy 
with enough enthusiasm and resolve that our partners are 
convinced that we really mean it, we are here to stay, and that 
our adversaries are convinced of the same thing.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    And with that, that is our last speaker.
    You know, Mr. Russel, I think you summed it up, that, you 
know, we need an American strategy to the region. We, as 
Congress, have a real role in laying out what that strategy 
looks like, and we have to play the long game here, so that 
there is certainty with our allies in the region, but also 
certainty that our adversaries understand that we are here to 
stay.
    And, again, that takes all of our resources--diplomacy, 
defense, strategic partnerships with our allies, and in some 
ways marrying the trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific strategy 
together as well.
    And then I will just put out there, having an economic 
strategy in the region, you know, that will allow us to compete 
and bring nations together.
    So I want to thank each of the witnesses for your 
testimony, your service to our country.
    And with that, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittees were 
adjourned.]



      
=======================================================================




                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 29, 2021

=======================================================================

      



      
=======================================================================


              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 29, 2021

=======================================================================

      

      
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]