[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                   
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-40]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                      AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES

                   AVIATION PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES

       RELATED TO THE FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET REQUEST

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                              JUNE 8, 2021
                              
                              
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-342                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                  JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair   JIM BANKS, Indiana
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama

              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
               David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                           Sean Falvey, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.........     3

                               WITNESSES

Hinote, Lt Gen S. Clinton, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
  Strategy, Integration and Requirements, Department of the Air 
  Force; Darlene Costello, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air 
  Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Department of 
  the Air Force; and Lt Gen David S. Nahom, USAF, Deputy Chief of 
  Staff for Plans and Programs, Department of the Air Force......     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Costello, Darlene, joint with Lt Gen David S. Nahom and Lt 
      Gen S. Clinton Hinote......................................    33
    Courtney, Hon. Joe...........................................    29
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    31

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Golden...................................................    67
    Mr. Norcross.................................................    67

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
             AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES AVIATION PROGRAMS

  AND CAPABILITIES RELATED TO THE FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 
                                REQUEST

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
            Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
                             Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 8, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Joe Courtney (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Courtney. Good morning, everyone. This morning, the 
Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee meets to hear 
testimony on the Department of the Air Force fiscal year 2022 
budget request.
    Before us today to discuss that request are three witnesses 
who are no strangers to our subcommittee, and we welcome you 
all back this morning: Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Acquisition, Ms. Darlene Costello; Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Plans and Programs, Lieutenant General David Nahom; 
and Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and 
Requirements, Lieutenant General Hinote. Thank you all again 
for being with us.
    The normal housekeeping that we have heard ad nauseam. I am 
going to make a brief opening statement and then yield to my 
friend, Ranking Member Mr. Wittman, to weigh in, and then we 
will have the witnesses begin with their statements.
    We have members of the subcommittee participating remotely 
today. Members participating remotely are reminded to keep 
themselves on mute until they are recognized to speak. In 
addition, remote members are reminded that once they do start 
speaking, there is a slight delay in the camera feed switching 
its focus to you. As a result, please include a brief preamble 
of some kind before you start into your questions to the 
witnesses.
    So we will get started now with my opening statement.
    The bombers, tankers, and tactical airlifters under our 
subcommittee oversight form the backbone of our ability to 
project force and support operations around the world. With 
increasing age and readiness challenges, the current airlift 
fleet is already strained in meeting key warfighting 
requirements.
    Like fiscal year 2021, the Department of Air Force's budget 
request for 2022 proposes force structure cuts across these 
critical capabilities, retiring dozens of aircraft over the 
next 5 years, and asks Congress to redirect a large share of 
the recouped money towards modernization and emerging 
technologies.
    The question for our subcommittee as we begin our work on 
the next NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] is whether 
this budget request properly balances investment in the future 
with the assumed risk of strained capacity today.
    Important to note at the outset, this budget does bolster 
investment in future bomber forces with increases in funding 
for the B-21, readying Ellsworth Air Force Base to host the 
first operational B-21s, and the modernization of the B-52 
legacy bomber with new engines, communication systems, and 
radars. Almost all of these efforts in the past have had strong 
congressional support, and I expect that trend to continue.
    The budget also continues to procure 14 new KC-46 tankers 
in 2021, while retiring 32 legacy tankers. At the same time, 
the Air Force plans to continue accepting new KC-46s for 
limited operations despite the six Category 1 deficiencies on 
the aircraft. We--I think all of us in this committee, who know 
this issue well--expect consistent and transparent follow-up 
from the Air Force to ensure that the platform that is being 
delivered to our airmen is safe, [effective], and reliable.
    As the witnesses know well, this subcommittee was very 
engaged and active in last year's NDAA in the process of 
addressing the deficiencies. In fact, just a few months ago, 
myself and a dozen or so members had the opportunity to fly in 
a KC-46 and utilize the Remote Vision System firsthand. That 
visit reaffirmed to all of us that there still is a fundamental 
problem with the original RVS design that must be fixed to make 
this system fully operational.
    The good news is, is that a real hardware solution has been 
agreed to with the manufacturer. Now the task ahead for 
Congress and the Air Force is to safely and expeditiously 
execute that solution.
    To that end, the budget asks this committee to authorize a 
balancing act, including retirement of fully functional tankers 
in exchange for the KC-46. I look forward to hearing from the 
witnesses what level of risk this plan will create for the 
[fleet] and its crews.
    In addition, I know a number of members are concerned that 
the Air Force's plan for sustaining the tactical airlift 
capabilities of our Air National Guard. In the past, this 
committee has pursued a two-pronged approach on this important 
issue. First, directing congressional-directed investment in 
modernization like upgraded avionics, safety-enhancing 
propellers, and high-performance engines. And second, pursuing 
congressionally directed procurement of new C-130Js.
    I say ``congressionally directed'' because it has been 
Congress, and in many cases this subcommittee, who has led 
these efforts. The absence of upgrades in the proposed budget, 
frankly, is confounding to me, particularly the propeller 
enhancement, which, in my opinion, is all about safety. I would 
note that this is an issue which has always had strong 
bipartisan support.
    Lastly, the B-52 investments proposed this year are mainly 
in the Commercial Engine Replacement Program, known as CERP, 
due to be awarded this year. The CERP supports nuclear and 
conventional operations by replacing the current aging TF33-
Pratt & Whitney-103 engine on the B-52H aircraft.
    As I stated earlier, you know, overall, I think there has 
been broad consensus in the need to replace the existing 
engine. However, I am particularly concerned that a lack of 
adequate guardrails has resulted in a requested cost increase 
in CERP to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars in just 
1 year. If this reengining program was a regular program at 
this point, that spike would clearly be approaching a Nunn-
McCurdy breach, which I think should be a serious concern to 
every member on this subcommittee. And again, I am sure we will 
be focusing on this issue today and certainly in the lead-up to 
our mark.
    Again, this covers my initial opening comments. And now I 
would welcome opening remarks from my friend and colleague, 
Ranking Member Rob Wittman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the 
Appendix on page 29.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
    VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 
                       PROJECTION FORCES

    Mr. Wittman. Chairman Courtney, thanks again. Thanks much 
for your leadership. And, you know, we have some challenging 
things before us. I appreciate your reflecting on those, and I 
would like to echo some of your concerns. And again, I want to 
thank our witnesses today for coming in to testify.
    Let me begin by saying this: A bad contract leads to 
perverse incentives. And unfortunately, I think that we are 
working with a bad contract with the KC-46A tanker. Think about 
this: To date, the KC-46A has had problems holding the fuel it 
has, delivering fuel it provides, and in some cases has the 
potential to severely damage receiving aircraft. It even has 
problems being able to hold the sewage from onboard passengers.
    Boeing has reported to have lost over $5 billion to date on 
this seemingly simple 767 conversion effort, and it is late in 
delivering a myriad of aircraft, in some cases, dating back to 
aircraft ordered over 5 years ago.
    The Air Force has reported that it does not anticipate 
having a fully functional tanker until 2024; a fully functional 
tanker until 2024. Just think about that.
    I think the root cause of this increasingly troubled 
aircraft is a bad contract. And I further believe that Boeing 
has little incentive to correct these debilitating 
deficiencies.
    Boeing has naturally responded in an attempt to stop the 
bleeding and is seeking additional compensation in sustainment. 
It has been reported Boeing has upcharged one of our FMS 
[Foreign Military Sales] partners by a factor of 15 or 1,500 
percent for previously negotiated spares.
    Additionally, the Air Force has been unable to substantiate 
over $10 million in additional spares and has decided to forgo 
ordering other critical spares for this aircraft. Again, 
perverse incentives. And we all know sustainment is reliant 
upon spares.
    We need to change the course on this troubled contract, I 
believe, and I think one of two options needs to be pursued. 
The Air Force could either change the contract incentive 
structure and actively manage the KC-46A development or it 
could seek a new path and pursue a nondevelopmental recompete 
of the tanker effort.
    Without pursuing one of these paths, at this point, I am 
confident that we will continue to see poor performance and an 
increasingly negative impact on tanker capacity. That capacity 
is going to be diminished. And as we hear from folks across the 
spectrum, whether it is Air Force, whether it is the combatant 
commands, TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], and others, 
that tanker is that critical link for us to be able to compete 
with our pacing adversaries.
    Additionally, I am concerned about the significant cost 
increase in the B-52 reengining program. In fiscal year 2022, 
the budget request in the Air Force projected a 50 percent cost 
increase in development. This effort is being pursued under the 
middle-tier acquisition authority that allows the military 
services to accelerate prototyping efforts. But as we are 
seeing in this case, the lack of rigor and concurrency of 
effort also leads to cost escalation. We can and must do 
better.
    On a positive note, I continue to be impressed by the 
active contract management in collaboration by the Air Force 
with Northrop Grumman on the B-21 contract. So there are good 
things going on. This close cooperation and efficient incentive 
structure leads to success in production and should 
significantly improve long-term maintenance. And I am very much 
looking forward to seeing the first flight of this aircraft 
next year and supporting advanced production of B-21 aircraft 
in our fiscal year 2022 NDAA.
    To quote one of our Nation's foremost physicists, Albert 
Einstein, he said this: We cannot solve our problems with the 
same thinking we used when we created them.
    I believe that we need to revamp our acquisition processes 
to ensure desirable outcomes. We need to be aware of the perils 
of fixed-price development contracts and concurrency of 
development. In the end, we need to emulate the successes of 
the B-21 and replicate this development and production effort 
across a multitude of other acquisition efforts.
    Our witnesses today have the authority to make these 
desired changes, and I will look forward to their testimony.
    Again, I want to thank Chairman Courtney for having this 
important hearing, and I want to thank him for his leadership.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the 
Appendix on page 31.]
    Mr. Courtney. I totally agree with you that that so far has 
really been a pretty strong bright spot in terms of 
acquisition. And I tip my hat to the Air Force in terms of the 
way they have been handling that.
    So it is my understanding that one of the witnesses is 
going to sort of quarterback the opening comments, General 
Hinote. So I will now turn the floor over to you. And again, 
welcome to you and your colleagues for being here this morning.

 STATEMENT OF LT GEN S. CLINTON HINOTE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 
STAFF FOR STRATEGY, INTEGRATION AND REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF 
THE AIR FORCE; DARLENE COSTELLO, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS, 
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE; AND LT GEN DAVID S. NAHOM, USAF, 
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                           AIR FORCE

    General Hinote. Chairman Courtney and Ranking Member 
Wittman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank 
you for having us here today as we provide testimony on the 
Department of the Air Force's 2022 budget request. And 
additionally, thank you for your leadership and dedication to 
the United States military and to the Department of the Air 
Force's 689,000 Total Force airmen serving around the world 
today. They face, and by extension we face as we support them, 
a complex set of current and future security challenges that 
require that we think differently and act with urgency. And I 
have to agree with Ranking Member Wittman's use of the Einstein 
quote, and what I hope to be able to invite you in is our new 
thinking, especially regarding the future Air Force.
    Our chief of staff of the Air Force, General C.Q. Brown, 
has articulated what is at stake. He says: Unless we make 
significant changes to the Air Force's programmed force, we 
will not meet the pacing threat of China in 2030. And unless 
something changes, we will not be able to accomplish the Air 
Force's core missions in the future operating environment.
    So one of my responsibilities on the Air Staff is to lead 
the team that assesses our position vis-a-vis our competitors, 
including China. And one of the most remarkable differences 
between us and China is the difference in the sense of urgency 
to change and modernize.
    We can say definitively that China's actions show a sense 
of urgency. They see a future that is very different from the 
one that we would want to see, and they are moving with purpose 
to realize that future. Their efforts include a massive buildup 
of military power and a clear intent to use that military to 
create leverage on us and on our allies and partners.
    I think the members of the bipartisan Future of Defense 
Task Force, on which some of you serve, put it well when they 
concluded China represents the most significant economic and 
national security threat to the United States over the next 20 
or 30 years. As I have talked with many of you about this, I 
sense a shift in our collective thinking. And even in today's 
hearing, I think we sense a sense of urgency that is changing. 
We are waking up to this challenge, and 2022 offers us another 
opportunity to change so that our actions match that growing 
sense of urgency.
    Together we have done it before, and under this committee's 
oversight and leadership, along with our industry partners and 
innovative airmen, we have built the preeminent power 
projection capability in the world today. And I am going to 
discuss briefly the elements of that capability and how we 
intend to keep these viable as we go into the future.
    The Air Force provides the sole long-range bomber 
capability for the joint and allied forces, and our fleet is in 
high demand across the globe. Combatant commands have 
discovered the flexibility and messaging power of the Bomber 
Task Force. And this is why you have seen the recent headlines 
highlighting how our bombers are operating with our allies in 
places like Japan and Norway.
    Our 2022 budget continues to fund this flexible bomber 
capability, while setting up a transition from three bomber 
fleets to two, the B-21 and the rebuilt B-52, and we recognize 
the importance of the CERP program and look forward to 
discussing that today.
    As we also discuss power projection, we must remember that 
the Air Force provides air-refueling capacity that makes power 
projection possible for both the joint force and for our 
allies. As we transition to a two-tanker fleet of modernized 
KC-135s and the new KC-46, we will divest of the KC-10, 
primarily so that we can free up the airmen we need to build 
the KC-46 into the capability the taxpayer has paid for.
    And, Ranking Member Wittman, I think we absolutely 
understand the concern that you have. And as we do what 
Chairman Courtney called the balancing act of being able to 
draw down the KC-46 while we stand up the KC--sorry, draw down 
the KC-10 while we stand up the KC-46, our primary driver, our 
limitation is our airmen. We just don't have the manpower to 
keep one at one level while we build the other one up, and that 
is the balancing act that we have to do, understanding the 
limitations that we have had with the airframe so far.
    And what I can say as someone, like Chairman Courtney, who 
has flown in the aircraft recently, is that I think three 
things are true. Number one, this is going to be a good air-
refueling aircraft for us in the future. Number two, it today 
has the capacity and capability to take some of that daily 
responsibility off of the joint force. And we can certainly 
talk about the risks associated with that. But number three, 
and I agree with Chairman Courtney on this, that camera is not 
ready for combat and we have to fix it. And it is frustrating 
to everybody that, well, what we are doing, but we are going to 
go fix it. And that is why our plan makes use of the KC-46 in 
the near term while also fixing that camera as soon as 
possible.
    One area where investments have paid tremendous dividends 
is in airlift. Our airlift fleet is the envy of air forces 
around the world. And this year's budget continues to invest in 
the C-5, the C-17, and C-130 fleets.
    There has been a lot of discussion about tactical airlift 
in the future, and I think it is important to me as the Air 
Force's futurist to say something about it. The risk associated 
with tactical airlift, and especially when you consider the 
potential conflict with China, is relatively low when compared 
to other parts of the Air Force portfolio, as well as other 
parts of this committee's power projection portfolio.
    In areas where we run significant risk in airlift, 
especially in conducting logistics under attack, the C-130 
capability is not well suited to address this risk. And that is 
why we believe we need to retire a certain number of the older 
C-130s, while addressing this airlift in new ways with new 
capability.
    In closing, I want to say a personal thank you to the 
members of this committee and the broader House Armed Services 
Committee, past and present. When I came into the Air Force, 
your predecessors, and even some of you, had worked to develop 
a force that gave my generation what we needed to defend our 
country and interests around the globe. Together, we need to 
modernize and work together for that future generation so the 
next generation can say the same thing about us. We have done 
it before together and I am confident we can do it again.
    I am honored to serve on the same team as Ms. Costello and 
General Nahom. I have to tell you, they work tirelessly to 
think differently about how we plan, program, and acquire the 
force that our future airmen are going to need. And we 
appreciate you having us today and really look forward to 
answering your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Ms. Costello, General 
Nahom, and General Hinote can be found in the Appendix on page 
33.]
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, General. And thank 
you again for coming over earlier this Congress for the Air 
Force 101 briefing, which, again, had very, you know, good 
attendance and lots of good feedback afterwards.
    I am going to ask one question, and then I know there is a 
lot of interest, particularly on the KC-46, from some of the 
other members, so I am going to hold off diving into that 
topic.
    But, Ms. Costello, you know, on the B-52 reengining 
program, again, I think, you know, everybody on this 
subcommittee would stipulate to the fact that, you know, those 
are old planes and they need, you know, to have new engines. 
And again, I don't think there is really any question about 
that.
    The budget that came over--again, just to set it forth for 
the record this morning--includes a total of $715 million in 
RDT&E [research, development, testing and evaluation] and $74.9 
million in procurement, which, again, the staff sort of looked 
at those numbers and sort of compared it to a normal regular 
program, I guess you would say, in the Department of Defense. 
And as I mentioned in my opening comments, and the ranking 
member reiterated, you know, that exceeds a 50 percent increase 
over last year.
    You know, I realize, again, by law, Nunn-McCurdy doesn't 
apply to a contract like this, but I am wondering if you could 
just talk about that a little bit in terms of the sizable 
number.
    And also, you know, given the fact that the contract award 
was supposed to have gone out last December 2020, it is now 
September is the latest we have heard. What is the timing, in 
your mind, in terms of getting this actually executed?
    Ms. Costello. Well, thank you for the question. B-52 CERP 
is actually not--the dollars that you see across the full setup 
is for a multitude of programs, actually. The first part is the 
rapid virtual prototype, where we are going to literally 
virtualize, digitize the solution, and then down-select to one 
engine and then move to another mid-tier acquisition program to 
do a physical prototype. The reason we are doing that is to get 
a better estimate on cost and to reduce risk before going into 
a traditional program. It is our plan to end up in a 
traditional program before we start all of the procurement.
    So along the way, because there are multiple decision 
points put in, and September is what you mentioned, that is the 
next major decision point of whether we continue down this path 
or make a change, will be to look at the rapid virtual 
prototype status, its cost, its risk. Basically, a technology 
risk assessment will be--something like that will be conducted 
in the mid-tier acquisition. And we will use that information 
to determine if we are going to go to the next step and do the 
physical prototype. And then there would be another decision 
point before we would go forward with full, full production for 
replacement.
    We know the capability, it needs to be replaced. So there 
is, you know, a lot of incentives to find a way to do this in 
an affordable and timely manner, but we are also learning our 
way as we go through mid-tier acquisition. I would say this 
program started--was one of the early mid-tier acquisition 
programs and maybe didn't have the rigor of the definition that 
we are now putting on these mid-tier acquisition programs. So 
sometimes when you look at a number from early on till now, it 
might be different. But I have been working very hard with our 
program teams to properly define it. So for this mid-tier 
acquisition effort, we will have the right dollars and schedule 
and will measure against that. The same for the next one and 
the same for the ultimate program.
    We may decide early to just go to a traditional program, 
depending on the data. That is what we are going to be looking 
at. This is our chance to look and see if there still is good 
[inaudible] or if it is time to go forward with a program of 
record.
    Relative to the timing, we talked September and the dollars 
that we have. You know, I have a feeling that some of the 
dollars you are looking at are for a variety of efforts that 
may not only be for the mid-tier acquisition CERP dollars, but 
we will make sure that we clarify that, because there is a lot 
of B-52 work that falls into program lines. And it even 
confuses me sometimes. I always have to ask for the breakout, 
because there is B-52 CERP, RMP [Radar Modernization Program], 
there is lots of other efforts going on, and sometimes the 
dollars get confusing. But we are watching carefully the 
guardrails we set up, and we are looking forward to shaping the 
program properly.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. I mean, again, when we got 
the budget, I guess it was like about 10 days ago, I mean, that 
$800 million increase kind of jumped off the page. So our 
staff--and again, I know Rob, you know, Dave Sienicki and Phil 
and Kelly Goggin, you know, are going to be definitely 
scrubbing that one in the days ahead.
    So I will now yield to Mr. Wittman for his questions.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
your perspective and your leadership there. There are a lot of 
challenges in this NDAA coming up that this subcommittee will 
address, and I am confident with your leadership that we will 
do that successfully.
    Ms. Costello, I want to begin with you in asking you about 
the KC-46 contract. And I just want to get your perspective if 
you believe it is delivering the desired capability to the 
warfighter. And if it is not, should the Air Force pursue 
changes to the contract structure to improve performance? I 
just want to get your perspective on how you believe that is 
unfolding before us.
    Ms. Costello. Thank you for that question. So, obviously, 
we are not getting the full capability that we contracted for, 
but the contract does enable us to get that capability, you 
know, at a future time without us having to expend additional 
money, at least for the RVS.
    Mr. Wittman. Yeah.
    Ms. Costello. Looking back, we would definitely--I think we 
would have definitely chosen a different contract structure. 
But at this point where we are in the program, to go and reopen 
this contract, I believe, would cost the government a lot more 
than continuing forward, which is why we are continuing with 
the contract and accepting the deliveries of these aircraft, 
with Boeing committed to funding the fixes when they are 
completed with their design and implementing those so that we 
will have full capability.
    Reference was made to the active management. I think the 
MOA that we did, the memorandum of agreement last year relative 
to the RVS design in our engagement is an example of how we are 
trying to apply the active management to a fixed-price type 
contract. It is an each, but it has worked out to get us the 
solution we need, and we just need to finish that design and 
get it installed so that we can provide our airmen what they 
need.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure. Well, Ms. Costello, I would say that, 
you know, even the RVS agreements and changes, I still believe, 
leave something to be desired as far as how that all had to 
come about. I think it has gotten to a better point, but it 
took a long time to get there. And the myriad of other 
deficiencies with the aircraft I think just point to the 
problems with the contract.
    Again, I want to emphasize, I think the structure of the B-
21 contract is what the Air Force needs to replicate going 
forward. I am still not convinced that it wouldn't be better to 
recompete the KC-46A contract. But that being said, I want to 
get your perspective too about KC-46A spares. It has been 
reported that they have increased, the cost has increased by 
1,500 percent. Give us an idea about your perspective on that, 
and what are you doing to pursue this deficient effort? I just 
think it is mind-boggling to me to understand that that is 
where we are.
    Ms. Costello. So relative to the KC-46 spares and the 
reference you make to the inflated cost for the Japan FMS in 
particular, so we are dealing with commercial of a type in this 
case. So for our FMS customers, the government goes forward and 
tries to get a fair and reasonable price and serve them well. 
And that is what our head of contracting and our contracting 
team was working on.
    We did find that there were several components or spare 
parts that were considered commercial, I will say out of type, 
because they are not sold in like Home Depot or anything, and 
it is not being sold to anyone other than the government, so 
finding data prices was challenging. So there are rules that we 
had to follow, and our head of contracting looked at that and 
for 18 months was trying to get additional data from Boeing. 
Boeing was unable to get it from some of their subcontractors. 
So it did cause us a dilemma, which was a very hard decision 
for our head of contracting to make.
    But in the end, because we had to consider the needs of the 
Japan air force and what they needed these tanker and they 
needed the spares to be there when their tanker arrived, that 
was heavily considered. It was a difficult decision, but our 
head of contracting is allowed to make that, considering all of 
these factors. So that is the decision that was made.
    It was, you know, in the end, within the budget that Japan 
had allocated for it. And we were very transparent with Japan 
all along and told them of what we knew we had fair and 
reasonable pricing on and the amount that we did not. So there 
was full transparency along the way, and in the end, they 
wanted to go forward with that.
    Now, relative to going in the future, we are looking at 
setting up an IDIQ [indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity] 
competitive spares contract to use for all the KC-46 assets so 
that we can be more responsive and not have to deal with sole-
source contracting on every part with Boeing necessarily. So we 
are actively working on that and accelerating that.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, I think that is going to be critical. I 
think this is a very deficient effort, by any measure. Foreign 
military sales, I think, are critical for the United States and 
it just doesn't seem in any way, shape, or form fair to find 
ourselves in this particular situation with the cost of these 
spares, so any way with that.
    Lieutenant General Nahom, let me go to you very quickly. I 
want to ask you about reducing the C-130 force structure and 
transitioning the C-130H squadrons to other missions. And last 
year, as you know, General Brown said the Air Force is 
committed to only remissioning a C-130H unit if it is agreed 
upon and suitable replacement remission can be arranged. So if 
the respective State opposes a C-130H remissioning initiative, 
my question is, is will General Brown pursue a C-130 reduction 
over the State's opposition? I think it is key to understand 
what is that dynamic going to be in that realm.
    General Nahom. Ranking Member, thank you very much for the 
question. Our position has not changed at all from the Air 
Force. We are not intending to force a unit conversion. Our 
vision is a C-130 fleet slightly smaller than what we have 
right now. Outlined very correctly by General Hinote about the 
amount of risk we are buying across the Air Force and the risk 
we have in the tactical lift portfolio, those two are 
inconsistent. We actually have a lot more risk in other parts 
of the portfolio.
    We believe the C-130 fleet at 255. We have actually really 
good data to support that. And I welcome a conversation at a 
classified level so I can show you the data that shows where 
255, we believe, is the right number. We have said all along 
that we will try to get to 255 at the case at which we--that we 
can get there. We are working very closely with the units.
    We need these units. We don't need any units to go away. 
There is a lot of mission that we have as we look forward to 
future combat. A very good example is what we are doing in 
Alabama with the Air Force Reserve C-130H unit. We are going 
to--our intention is to transition them to the MH-139 training 
site for our newest helicopter. We believe it is a win-win. The 
unit is very excited about it. The State is very excited about 
it. And it is a wonderful place to train helicopters because it 
abuts directly up with the Fort Rucker helicopter airspace. And 
so we are looking for win-wins like that across the enterprise.
    We were able to leave the Martin State unit in the A-10, 
which the unit wanted to stay in the A-10, and that actually 
helped us out as well in the Air Force. So, again, I think we 
can find some win-wins out there. Will we get to 255? I don't 
know. I would like to so that we could utilize that manpower 
for other things.
    One mission we are looking to expand and we need to find a 
wing that wants to expand into cyber warfare. And so we are 
actively looking at is there a wing, a State interested in 
opening a cyber warfare wing. We think it is a very attractive 
mission and one we absolutely need to expand into more as we 
look at future warfare, not to mention in the domestic side as 
well.
    So we think there is a potential there, but, again, we will 
continue to work with these units, and we have no intention of 
forcing the unit to transition.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, Lieutenant General Nahom, thanks. I know 
Virginia has been one of the first States to open up a cyber 
unit with its National Guard, so I am sure the Air National 
Guard element there would also be interested.
    Thanks, too, for emphasizing--I think you hit the nail on 
the head. With our C-130H units, it is about working in 
conjunction with the States. The greatest asset that we have 
there is not the aircraft. Listen, the aircraft is great. The 
greatest asset we have there are the aircrews and the pilots 
that keep those aircraft in the air.
    Tactical lift is critically important. Maintaining the 
skill level and the experience with those aircrews and those 
pilots is key. So whatever the Air Force can do to continue 
along on those lines, I think is going to be critically 
important as we go in the future.
    So thanks again.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Rob. I appreciate that and your 
comments particularly about the Air Guards.
    So next up is Mr. Langevin, and he will be followed by Mr. 
Kelly.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
thank our witnesses for their testimony today; very insightful.
    I want to turn further to great power competition and the 
challenges that we face if conflict ever breaks out. Clearly, 
we are going to be fighting the away game and it is going to be 
significantly challenging, to say the least.
    During my CITI [Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and 
Information Systems] Subcommittee hearing on electromagnetic 
spectrum [EMS] operations, one of the witnesses mentioned that 
DOD [Department of Defense] EMS investment is heavily tied to 
legacy platforms and consolidated in limited expensive 
programs.
    The Air Force's first fielded ABMS [Advanced Battle 
Management System] capability, the Airborne Edge Node seems to 
fit this trend. So it will cost, as I understand it, three-
fourths of the Air Force's ABMS RDT&E budget and is designed 
for the KC-46.
    Ms. Costello and General Hinote, should we continue to 
expect big expensive projects from ABMS?
    General Hinote. Representative Langevin, thank you for the 
question. And as always, you are well informed with many of the 
things that we are doing.
    So you mention the idea of the electromagnetic spectrum in 
large platforms, maybe expensive exquisite platforms. And what 
you are seeing right now--in fact, I had the opportunity 
yesterday to sign off on a very different set of requirements 
for our activities in the electromagnetic spectrum. And what 
you are seeing right now is we are walking a very intentional 
path away from specific solutions that are attached to specific 
platforms to much more general or modular solutions that can be 
upgraded, that can be software defined, and even coded on the 
fly. Happy to come over and talk to you more about that, 
because there are some very interesting developments both in 
our R&D [research and development] as well as commercial R&D to 
make that transition.
    I will say that one of our tensions within our Advanced 
Battle Management program is the incremental advances versus 
the disruptive advances. And so what you see in our Increment 1 
or our Capability Release 1 on the ABMS is an incremental 
advance. We want to make sure that the F-22, the F-35, and the 
KC-46--three key elements of power projection for the joint 
force--we want to make sure that they are connected well. And 
after that, what we want to be able to do is build out away 
from that, from that core. So, yes, that is in many ways an 
incremental way of looking at our advancement.
    At the very same time, we have disruptive programs that are 
really more like efforts in the hopper ready to go. And as we 
experiment and learn, we expect that we are going to be going 
from that more incremental, more traditional way of connecting 
our platforms to something that looks much more modular, much 
more software defined, much more flexible and, frankly, that 
has a government reference architecture that we can scale 
across all of our platforms.
    And so I will turn it over to Ms. Costello to see if she 
has anything further on that.
    Ms. Costello. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin. I did want to get to just, if I could, 
General Hinote, can you talk to what we are doing to improve 
the projection forces' survivability in an era of great power 
competition? And I also wanted to ask how you would incorporate 
directed energy into the Air Force's projection force, before 
my time runs out.
    General Hinote. Okay. Sure. Yes, sir. As we think about 
power projection and especially as about bombers and tankers, 
certainly as we are thinking through the types of capabilities 
that, say, our future bombers, future ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] equipment is going to need, 
we are going to need to be able to incorporate the most 
advanced electromagnetic waveforms and techniques. And what you 
are seeing right now is, the inside of those programs is 
developing a much more modular system for that, much more 
software-defined.
    And this is where we have a brand-new, very exciting effort 
going on with our electromagnetic spectrum wing. These are 
going to be the airmen that are going to be in charge of making 
sure that we go from the library of electromagnetic threats--
that is the traditional way of doing it. We just have a huge 
library; we upload the library every few months--and what we 
are going to is a much more programmed, on-the-fly capability.
    And I would need to come over and talk to you more about 
that in a closed forum to be able to get into the details of 
that.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. And that is a really important question, and 
hopefully, you know, we will figure out a way to take you up on 
that offer, because I think it is a point well taken.
    Mr. Langevin. Yes. Please, let's do. And I apologize to Ms. 
Costello that I didn't get to her. Five minutes goes by fast, 
and I needed to get those questions in.
    Mr. Courtney. All right. Well, next up is General Kelly, 
and he will be followed by Mr. Norcross.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
witnesses, for being here today.
    I recognize the importance of a strong Air Force Reserve 
Component that can provide needed surge capability to the 
Active Component during times of peak demand. The Reserve 
Component is an especially critical force provider of inter- 
and intra-theater mobility assets to the United States 
Transportation Command via the Air Force's Air Mobility 
Command. To that end, I am concerned that the Air Force 
continues to divest legacy aircraft from the Reserve Component 
while it modernizes the Active Component.
    Lieutenant General Hinote, can you describe the Air Force's 
sustainment and modernization plans for the global fleet of C-
17 and C-130 aircraft broken out by Active and Reserve 
Components?
    General Hinote. Sir, I am going to have to let General 
Nahom take that one. That is in his job jar, so we will pass it 
off here.
    General Nahom. Congressman, thank you for the question. You 
know, I assure you, as we look at the fleet for U.S. Air Force, 
we always look across the total force. It is certainly not a 
divesting of our Reserve forces at their expense for the Active 
forces, not at all, because when we fight, we fight as a total 
force. And we know we look--we look at the entire fleet as 
that.
    In terms of the C-17, the C-17 is a long-term platform, and 
the modernization efforts are fully funded. And again, that is 
across the entire fleets, Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty.
    On the C-130 side, C-130Js, we obviously still have some 
congressionally procured aircraft coming in over the next few 
years, and we will be upgrading those to the [Block] 8.1 to 
make sure we get those to the level we need.
    In terms of the C-130Hs, the center wing boxes, all the 
required avionics, AMP [Avionics Modernization Program] 
[Increment] 1, AMP 2. And then in cases where we needed the 
added performance, would be the propellers and the motor--and 
the new motors.
    If you look at our C-130 fleet, when I said 255, you know, 
that breaks down--right now we have 163 C-130Js either existing 
or on order. And then that breaks down to 92 C-130Hs, which we 
intend to upgrade that to a level we need to and move forward 
with that fleet. And I certainly know we want to maintain that 
fleet moving forward, but I will tell you also, in a tactical 
airlift fleet--and I do want to pass to General Hinote real 
quickly because we have got to look beyond. When we look at 
lift, especially tactical lift, we have got to look to the 
future, because it is not just C-130s. There are other things 
we need to do in--if you don't mind if I pass it off to you.
    General Hinote. No. And, in fact, there is a really 
exciting story to be told here. It is not reflected in this 
budget yet because we are still looking to see where we could 
go with this. But, clearly, as we think about logistics and 
logistics under attack, they could be under attack by China, 
Russia, or any other adversary. What we see is that the 
capability for vertical lift is going to be really important 
for us, i.e., getting away from the fixed runway so that we can 
do logistics in a way that is somewhat disruptive and, frankly, 
a lot harder to target.
    So there are quite a few efforts going on. As an example, 
we are following very closely with the Army's Future Vertical 
Lift set of programs. And at the very same time, we are 
exploring vertical lift programs inside of our RDT&E as well. 
And what we think is that this may be a very important Reserve 
Component, part of the Reserve Component, because the idea of 
vertical lift could also play a huge role in some of the 
responsibilities that, say, Governors have.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. Let me--I have got one more question I 
want to get to, if I can. And I apologize for interrupting, but 
like they said, 5 minutes is a short time.
    I propose that we put tail numbers on the new aircraft that 
we are issuing to our Guard and Reserve. And I am getting a lot 
of pushback on that. And I want you guys to tell me why I think 
a fleet of rental cars would be managed better than a personal 
automobile that I own myself that I make the payment on. And so 
I am getting a lot of pushback on that, something that we have 
done for--going back to World War II, people had their names 
painted on aircraft. They named them. They loved them. The 
crews and pilots loved that aircraft, and they took care of it 
because it was theirs.
    But I am getting pushback in wanting to do a study. Well, 
we don't need a study. We know airmen take care of the aircraft 
they own that is theirs. So can you guys explain to me why we 
would not want, other than to take away all--push all the 
legacy equipment to the Guard and Reserve, can you tell me why 
we wouldn't want to put aircraft tails on aircraft that we have 
been doing for a century or as long as we have been flying?
    General Nahom. Sir, I think--I am sure I don't have the 
time. I may have to dive into this question a little more. When 
aircraft are in the Guard, they actually stay in the Guard and 
the Active Duty. We don't switch those aircraft. And the only 
time an aircraft leaves a location [is] when it goes to long-
term depot maintenance and, historically, it comes back to that 
unit.
    Now, there is some differences in some of our heavy fleets. 
I know the tankers and others, that they actually, when an 
aircraft goes to depot, they take the next one off the depot 
line and bring it back. There is some switching there, because 
it makes the most sense in certain fleet management.
    I grew up in the fighter world where a tail was owned by a 
unit, whether it was the Guard, Active, Reserve, and it 
returned to that unit following depot. So I think we very 
carefully manage these things. And I think we are actually in a 
really good spot. And certainly we do not give the oldest 
platforms to the Guard. I tell you, the F-35 beddown is the 
perfect example. And that is four beddowns that are all going 
to Guard and Reserve units.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. General, I am sorry.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Because I actually was very interested in 
hearing the answer to that question. And hopefully we will 
continue, Trent, because I can feel your passion coming 
through.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay.
    Mr. Norcross is up next. And I think Mr. Carl was slated 
next. I am not sure if he is still with us or not. And if Mr. 
Carl is not, then Mr. Vela was after him. And I am not sure if 
Fil is still with us or not, and if Fil is not with us, then it 
will be Mr. Golden, followed by Mrs. Luria.
    So, Don, you are up.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just the conversations we continue to have with KC-46, it 
is so frustrating, but we are getting closer by the day. But I 
want to talk about the B-52 engine issue.
    Ms. Costello, you talked about the reason for the mid-tier 
acquisition was so that you could minimize the risk. I am 
paraphrasing. Exactly what risk are you speaking of? Is it 
technological? Is it cost? Is it time? Which risk in this 
program is your biggest concern?
    Ms. Costello. So for the B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement 
Program and the mid-tier acquisition associated with that, the 
first one is the virtual prototype. So it is taking 
commercial--modern commercial engines and basically creating a 
digital twin, a digital model of how that would be in the B-52. 
So it is integration risk. It is making sure that everything 
will fit and function properly.
    And doing that instead of starting a brand-new program and 
going 2 years before you can even get to that phase, by using 
the mid-tier acquisition we can start that modeling working 
with industry right away, working with multiple, and then we 
can select which one we want to go forward. So that is the risk 
that I was thinking of in this first phase.
    Mr. Norcross. So, it is all of the above then. Because, you 
know, the chairman talked about that $800 million, and that 
certainly has caught people's attention. The idea of going 
through was it was a more mature engine that could much easier 
have been shifted over but, also, the costs should have been 
relatively more focused. We shouldn't be getting those type of 
surprises.
    Are you comfortable where the numbers are coming in from 
the program?
    Ms. Costello. So, we will be having a review in the future 
that will work with the cost estimate, and that is coming up in 
the summer, before we go forward with the program beyond this 
point. Again, I believe the budget numbers includes a variety 
of things within B-52. And I would like to be able to provide 
that clarity to you all in a separate--provide that product to 
you to make sure the visibility of how the funds break out 
within the B-52 program, because there are a variety of 
efforts. And it is easy to, you know, compare that number to 
what was a number before. I just want to make sure we are all 
with the right number. So I will get that back for you all so 
we have that.
    Mr. Norcross. I appreciate it.
    General Nahom, the KC-46, from when the original program of 
record started to where we are now with the RVS, has, (a), been 
primarily a [inaudible] time, we lost the time and you really 
can't make up for that. But would you say the system that we 
are looking at now, that it is probably unparalleled in the 
world for the accuracy in what it can do?
    General Nahom. Sir----
    Ms. Costello. Are you speaking on the RVS system 
specifically?
    Mr. Norcross. Yes.
    General Nahom. As General Hinote said in the lead-in, as 
well as what Ranking Member Wittman said, we couldn't agree 
more, the RVS system--we have to fix the RVS system. Now, that 
being said, it can refuel airplanes. And we both flew on that 
airplane that day with a bunch of the members. And you watch 
it, it works. There is limitations----
    Mr. Norcross. I am talking about the system that we agreed 
or close to agreeing upon. We wanted much different with a 
three dimensional. That system is 10 years newer than we would 
have gotten if we accepted the original one. Is that correct?
    Ms. Costello. That is absolutely true. The RVS 2.0 digital 
system is the latest, greatest technology. It is not what was 
on the contract initially, and we wouldn't have gotten it on 
the day of that contract award. So the RVS 2.0 effort that we 
have gotten is taking advantage of current technology and state 
of the art.
    Mr. Norcross. And that would be helpful if we go to an 
unmanned system. It can work much better under what would be 
the new configuration for the next generation. Isn't that 
correct?
    Ms. Costello. We do consider that is a step in the right 
direction for an unmanned system, and I believe Boeing also 
does.
    Mr. Norcross. Can you agree--we can have the conversation 
here--the EMP [electromagnetic pulse], a hardening of a KC-46 
versus the legacy KC-10 and 135. Can you talk about what each 
of those platforms can and cannot do in the event of a pulse?
    Ms. Costello. I don't have that data with me to compare 
among them, but I would be happy to take that for the record 
and get that information to you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 67.]
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    The point I am trying to make is, time is lost and there is 
no excuse in the world. And I am not defending Boeing at all, 
but we have a platform that will be a communication mode that 
is unparalleled going forward. We just wish we could have done 
it a lot quicker.
    With that, I yield back my time. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Don.
    Next up is Mr. Golden followed by Mrs. Luria.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Chairman Courtney.
    Ms. Costello, the United States Air Force has proposed to 
move 11 National Guard KC-135s from the primary mission 
aircraft inventory [PMAI] to the backup aircraft inventory 
[BAI]. As I am sure you know, the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, 
Congress opposed this move understanding that it could possibly 
result in a reduction of training hours, manpower, and base 
funding for existing National Guard aircrews.
    So I wanted to ask, have any changes been made in the last 
year that would yield a different result to the National Guard 
with the proposed KC-135 from PMAI to BAI move in fiscal year 
2022?
    General Nahom. Sir, this is General Nahom. I apologize, it 
was a little hard to hear you. I think this is about the 11 KC-
135s from PMAI to BAI. Is that correct, sir?
    Mr. Golden. Yes, sir. I don't know if you are hearing me 
better here. But I guess the question is, given the fact that 
we rejected this as a body last year, what has changed?
    General Nahom. Sir, we are working very closely with, 
obviously, your staffs as well as AMC [Air Mobility Command] to 
try to get this PMAI/BAI right. And we do want to continue the 
discussion, because I think it is a really good discussion to 
have. Because when you look at our fleets--I will broaden this 
out just for 2 seconds on the rest of the fleets. We have many 
fleets that are misaligned.
    BAI is very important because when aircrafts go into long-
term maintenance depot, that is one of the reasons why you have 
BAI, so you don't have airplanes that should be on the line 
flying missions, where you have crews that you are spending 
money on flying hours, weapon system sustainment, and other, 
for airplanes that are sitting in long-term depot.
    The 135 fleet was very much out of line, like many of our 
fleets were that we had an excess amount of airplanes in depot 
and much less airplanes that were actually BAI. So the bottom 
line is we had many PMAI airplanes sitting in depot, where back 
at the units we--not only do you have crews, but you are also 
paying for weapon systems sustainment and flying hours on 
airplanes that aren't there. We did this very successfully with 
the F-15E. We are doing this right now with the Active Duty F-
16s, because they are a little bit out of line with some of the 
mod [modification] lines.
    So we make sure that we have our fleets better aligned. 
Because I tell you, from being a commander, there is nothing 
worse than not having enough airplanes on the ramp to keep my 
crews current, and that happens if you are out of alignment. 
And that is what we are attempting to do with the KC-135 fleet 
as well.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you for that.
    Lieutenant General, I appreciate you working with my staff 
and other committee staff. You know, clearly, upping 
maintenance is an important issue and we want to make sure that 
they have what they need from the manpower and training hour 
perspective. That is, as you know, a very important mission up 
there. The refueling mission is what I am talking about.
    I guess another question in the same vein, how does the Air 
Force envision itself maintaining the Air Guards' training, 
funding, and readiness levels with the proposed KC-135 force 
structure alignment?
    General Nahom. Sir, I guess I may have to take that for the 
record and work with your staff because I am not really sure. 
Right now, we are doing everything we can in terms of readiness 
to maintain all our funding, because I tell you, readiness, you 
know, when you look at--as we look at austere times with budget 
cuts or flat budgets like we are looking at now, you know, 
modernization, readiness, and force structure are the three 
bins. And I will tell you, we are doing everything we can to 
protect readiness. And I don't make that statement for Active 
Duty; that is Guard, Active Duty, Reserve, that is the Air 
Force. We have got to maintain our readiness.
    And I will tell you, this PMAI/BAI I think is an important 
part of that, because we have to make sure our readiness 
dollars are correctly aligned through all our fleets, and the 
135s is certainly a big part of that. But I can certainly work 
with your staff if I am not hitting the mark on that answer, 
sir.
    Mr. Golden. Yes. I certainly look forward to continuing the 
discussion and getting something back on the record. Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 67.]
    General Nahom. Sure.
    Mr. Courtney. All set, Jared? Okay. Thank you.
    And next up is Mrs. Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you. And I want to thank our witnesses 
for being here for this hearing today.
    I want to go back to a comment that General Kelly made 
along the theme of divest to invest. I see this to be a theme 
with all the services in this budget. And I specifically wanted 
to focus in on the B-21 bombers.
    In your budget request for this year, I see that the Air 
Force plans to decrease its bomber inventory by 17 B-1s this 
year, but the B-21s are not yet ready to replace these 
aircraft. So by retiring aircraft earlier, we are leaving a gap 
in countering our current growing threats today with China and 
Russia and other malign actors. Can you quantify that and how 
you will mitigate for any gap that is being left by retiring 
these aircraft?
    General Hinote. Representative Luria, thank you for the 
question. And it gets directly after what I think is the 
fundamental tension that is facing the leadership of the 
Department of Defense right now. You correctly say that all of 
us are dealing with this tension.
    And when I was talking about the relative risk of different 
parts of the portfolio, and, frankly, different parts of the 
portfolio that this subcommittee has oversight on, this is a 
perfect example. And when we look at the, as an example, 
tactical airlift risk versus the bomber risk, I will tell you, 
I am much more concerned, there is a bigger sense of urgency in 
the bomber portfolio than in the tactical airlift portfolio for 
the exact reason that you are saying. And it is just true that 
we can't get the B-21 fast enough as these aircraft, these--
specifically the B-1s, have become, in essence, more--it costs 
more to sustain them than the benefit you get from them.
    And those were decisions that were made a long time ago to 
defer modernization and focus on readiness. We could go back to 
the sequestration years. But this is why we say risk is not 
equivalent across all the portfolios. You correctly identify a 
big risk that we have.
    I will turn it over to General Nahom to talk about how we 
are trying to mitigate that as much as we can.
    General Nahom. Yeah. I will tell you, ma'am, and the 17 B-
1s is very important. So we had a fleet of 62. We very 
carefully went through, we analyzed. We thought the number was 
going to be higher. We actually looked at each aircraft and 
said which ones are, frankly, too expensive and too hard to 
fix, because we overflew this fleet so much over the ensuing 
years. Seventeen was the number. And by reducing the fleet by 
17 and leaving 45 there, keeping the same level of manpower, in 
maintenance manpower, until the B-21 arrives, we think we can 
get the readiness level of that bomber actually higher. We can 
actually have more airplanes available for the combatant 
commanders in the interim by getting rid of the oldest, most 
problem aircraft in the fleet. We think that is actually paying 
off.
    Now, it is important that we work together and we maintain 
45 until these units shake hands with the B-21s as they arrive. 
We have no intention of going below 45 because the combatant 
commanders need that bomber firepower in the next 5, 7, 10 
years until the B-21s start showing up in the numbers we need 
them. But we are watching it very closely.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And I want to clarify. So you have mentioned the number 45. 
And I was going to ask about the combatant commanders' 
requirements for their most limiting OPLANs [operation plans] 
and the different scenarios that you are evaluating globally. 
Because, obviously, we can't count on the fact that, if we 
encounter one conflict, that we won't have, you know, malign 
actors elsewhere.
    With 45 in this current plan, can you meet those 
requirements in our most limiting OPLAN or conflict for which 
we are planning?
    General Nahom. I will tell you right now, ma'am, we--this 
leads a little into what General Hinote was saying about, you 
know, we are going to have to look at some near-term risk if we 
are going to get our Air Force and certainly our DOD--but, you 
know, we are concentrating on the Air Force--to where we need 
it to be for peer competition in the future.
    Mrs. Luria. I am not asking about the future----
    General Nahom. Our 45 and up----
    Mrs. Luria. General, I am sorry, I am not asking about the 
future; I am asking about today. I am asking about today and 
the next 3 to 5 years before the B-21 starts coming online.
    General Nahom. First, I will say, I think 45--I will let 
you answer, but I will tell you, it is better than we had, the 
extra 17 airplanes, because we are able to concentrate our 
maintenance on the 45 that are left and give ourselves more 
capable airplanes.
    Is it enough? I would say probably not, but I will let----
    General Hinote. No, ma'am. I mean, I will just be flat-out: 
No. This is why I say the risk in the bomber portfolio is high.
    We have to do better. We have to accelerate the B-21 
capability as quickly as we can. But, in the short term, the 
answer is no. Those decisions were made 5, 10, 15 years ago, 
and we are now----
    Mrs. Luria. Is there anything that this committee can do--
--
    General Hinote [continuing]. We are now facing that----
    Mrs. Luria. Sorry, I am about to run out of time, but as my 
last question: Is there anything this committee can do to help 
accelerate the delivery of the B-21?
    I know, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
    Ms. Costello. So, relative to B-21, the most important 
thing for us to do is get through the design and complete it 
and not introduce the concurrency like we have talked about in 
some of our other programs.
    Once we get through that design and get the first ones 
delivered, we can adjust production rates and maybe affect them 
that way. But we have to get through the engineering with solid 
discipline.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. So am I understanding that this aircraft 
is not even fully designed and we are retiring aircraft and we 
don't even have the design for the aircraft that is meant to 
replace them?
    I would love to follow up on that and----
    Ms. Costello. We have the design. There are two test 
aircraft built, but it will take a little while to get through 
all of the testing, and, therefore, there could be some changes 
as a result of the testing. So that is all I was just talking 
about there.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you.
    And, again, it is my understanding that I think Mr. Wittman 
and Mr. Norcross may be organizing a trip out to Palmdale. And 
I would encourage all the members to get out there and see 
firsthand. Because, you know, again, concurrency is, you know, 
obviously, a negative, you know, place to be. But having said 
that, I think, you know, that this program, as Mr. Wittman said 
at the outset, is really probably an all-star right now in 
terms of procurement. But, still, you know, we want to make 
sure the risk is reduced as much as possible.
    So, again, we have now completed the first round of 
questions. I actually did want to ask another question, and we 
have some members that have stayed with us here. So, certainly, 
we, you know, I think, actually have done well today in terms 
of moving right along, and I certainly would invite them to ask 
a question or two.
    Again, to the witnesses, you know, one program which we 
have not talked about this morning is the Air Force One 
recapitalization.
    And, General Nahom, you know, I guess, based on the latest 
in terms of what is in the budget and, you know, certainly some 
of the feedback that we are hearing about this program--again, 
for the record, the Air Force request is for $680 million 
RDT&E. The Contract Management Agency has assessed that Boeing 
is at least 1 year late on the delivery of the first VC-25B 
aircraft, the Air Force One. COVID is apparently cited as one 
reason, as well as the bankrupt subcontractor for the interior 
of the plane.
    So, you know, certainly the, you know, rumor mill is that 
there is going to be a request for equitable adjustment to 
extend the schedule and increase the VC-25B fixed-price 
contract cost. You know, obviously, this is a disappointment to 
all of us, you know, which we thought maybe this was a program 
where the government actually maybe got a good deal here.
    I was wondering, you know, can you tell us when we are 
going to see a new schedule? And any other, you know, updates 
regarding the status of Air Force One?
    Ms. Costello. So thank you for that question. I will take 
that one.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. Sure.
    Ms. Costello. We have received from Boeing notification of 
a revised schedule on their part. We are in the midst of doing 
a schedule risk assessment, our program is. And at that point, 
when they complete that probably later this summer, we will 
determine if we need to make any adjustments to the schedule.
    What they came in with was about 12 months later than 
before, and they did make reference to impacts from their 
contractor going out of business, as well as COVID impact. We 
will assess all of that.
    You made reference to a potential REA [request for 
equitable adjustment]. They have submitted an intent letter, is 
what they have been asked to do, if they believe they have been 
impacted by COVID, with an intent letter to tell us, and then 
we start that negotiation process too.
    So we have had a couple of those come in at a smaller level 
on some other programs. In our negotiation process, we 
typically have been much, much smaller than [inaudible].
    So, at the moment, we are assessing the schedule that they 
have submitted. We have completed recent design activity 
[inaudible], and we have also been working with our 
[inaudible], as this is an ACAT [Acquisition Category] 1-D 
program, to make sure they are kept informed, and we have been 
transparent across the board on the program.
    As soon as we get the updated schedule, we will determine 
if we have to adjust our baseline or schedule, and we will make 
sure you all are informed of that information. I expect it will 
be in the fall, September time.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for the update. I mean, 
obviously, that sort of begs the question about the fact that, 
you know, the existing Air Force Ones, which are getting a 
little long in the tooth, are--you know, we are going to be 
faced with a lot of the same questions we've talked about this 
morning with other platforms, which is that, you know, trying 
to extend their service life is, you know, carries an 
additional price tag.
    So, anyway, thank you for the update, and we will obviously 
be tracking that and following it very closely.
    Mr. Wittman, did you have any other follow-up questions you 
wanted to ask?
    Mr. Wittman. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any additional 
questions at this time. But, again, thanks to the witnesses for 
joining us. I think that there are a number of challenges out 
there with KC-46A, as well as how we are going to 
operationalize in a continued way the C-130s and making sure we 
are cognizant of the incredible asset that our Guard units are. 
So we will continue to focus on those issues.
    Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    I see Mr. Langevin still on the screen with us. Do you have 
any follow-up questions? The floor is yours.
    Mr. Langevin. Sure. Sure. I will take advantage of that if 
that is okay. Thank you for the extra time.
    Just on your question, Ms. Costello, I wasn't clear on the 
answer. So how much time are we set back by the Air Force One 
program right now? Is it significant?
    Ms. Costello. So Boeing has proposed or informed us that 
they believe that it will be about 12 months beyond their 
original schedule. That doesn't mean that we agree with that 
yet. We are in the middle--our program team is looking at what 
they have assumed in their schedule and doing a--what we call a 
schedule risk assessment to come up with what the program 
schedule would be. I wouldn't expect it to be more than what 
Boeing would say. We will look at that and determine if there 
is any additional risk or different risk that we see, and we 
will adjust our schedule accordingly. We have been--being 
transparent with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]. And 
probably in the September time period is when we will expect to 
have a new schedule, if there are changes required.
    Mr. Langevin. Is that specific to the two new 747 models? I 
know there are other models that are also classified as Air 
Force One within that Presidential fleet.
    Ms. Costello. Yeah, that is relative to the VC-25B program, 
which is the two brand-new replacement--what would replace the 
VC-25A. And, of course, it will be important when we see what 
the VC-25B schedule is to determine any impact to VC-25A and 
when it stays in service or goes out of service. We may need to 
put in one more maintenance cycle for that aircraft, depending 
on the time delay.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Switching gears to the other question I didn't get to 
earlier. Last year, Dr. Roper said that tankers were going to 
be the first platforms to get fielded ABMS equipment. Ms. 
Costello, since tankers are easy to shoot down high-value 
targets for our adversaries, why are we focusing on the tanker 
fleet first for ABMS? And that goes to my--you know, when I set 
up the question earlier about looking at, you know, great power 
competition fighting the away game.
    General Hinote. Representative Langevin, I will take that, 
if you don't mind. Because we have quite a bit of both gaming 
data, modeling and simulation data on the use of tankers in a 
power projection situation. And what we focus--you are right in 
that, in fact, it is a high-value asset that our adversaries 
want to shoot down, which means that we have to protect it. And 
there was a time not that long ago where we didn't worry that 
much about protecting our high-value assets in the air, and 
that time has passed. And we have got to, in our tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, protect the tanker.
    But because the tanker is so important, that gas in the way 
that we fight is such a critical input to the combat 
capability, we must protect the tanker. And it is one of those 
essential elements that you must protect and even forward as 
you need to.
    And so what we find is we structure the design around our 
force of being able to protect the tanker. What that means is 
the tanker will be there. And because the tanker will be there, 
it is a great platform of opportunity for a node, not--you 
know, we are going to have thousands, hundreds of thousands, 
maybe millions of nodes eventually in our command and control 
architecture. But this will be one important node, and we can 
count on it when it is on station to have excess power, a 
significant amount of space, as well as the connectivity back 
to other parts of the joint force.
    Because of that, we are going to take advantage of it. And 
that is why our Capability Release 1 of the Advanced Battle 
Management System puts a capability inside the KC-46.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    Anybody else have anything to add?
    Ms. Costello. No, I think he covered that one well.
    Mr. Langevin. All right. Thank you very much.
    I appreciate the extra time, Mr. Chairman. I will yield 
back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Jim.
    Ms. Costello, just to follow up really quickly on the Air 
Force One, you know, question that Mr. Langevin asked. So 
assuming, let's just say, a 12-month delay was granted, again, 
the delivery date as of now was 2024. Is that right? Just--is 
my memory correct?
    Ms. Costello. That is correct.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. So if it was 12 months, it would be 
2025?
    Ms. Costello. And that is what we are looking at in our 
schedule risk assessment.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. Thank you.
    I see Mrs. Luria is still connected. I am not sure if she 
is--she is not on the screen. Oh, there she is.
    Elaine, do you have any follow-up questions you want to 
ask?
    Mrs. Luria. Mr. Chairman, no. Thank you so much again to 
our witnesses, but I think that they addressed my question in 
the first round.
    Mr. Courtney. Very good.
    All right. Well, like everyone else, I do want to thank all 
the witnesses for their, you know, very straightforward answers 
this morning. And we have obviously got some work to do on a 
pretty compressed schedule. So I am sure, you know, you will be 
on speed dial over the next few months or so as we move 
forward.
    So thank you again to all the members for joining. And at 
this point, I will declare the hearing adjourned. Thank you, 
and have a good day.
    [Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
     
=======================================================================

                            A P P E N D I X

                              June 8, 2021
      
=======================================================================


              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              June 8, 2021

=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


=======================================================================


              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              June 8, 2021

=======================================================================



             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NORCROSS

    Ms. Costello. The KC-46 is designed to be survivable in a nuclear 
environment and has met its requirement threshold for operations 
following an EMP. The KC-46 is continuing further survivability testing 
for the nuclear environment. The KC-135 has latent airframe EMP 
protection built into the original construction of the aircraft. KC-135 
modernization efforts have not been fully EMP tested and do not meet 
current EMP survivability standards. The KC-10 does not have EMP 
protection.   [See page 16.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
    General Nahom. Thank you for your 8 June 2021 question, expressing 
your concern for the 101st Air Refueling Wing at Bangor Air National 
Guard (ANG) Base, Maine. I appreciate your interest and support of the 
KC-135 enterprise in regards to maintaining training, funding and 
readiness levels with the proposed KC-135 force structure alignment.
    The KC-135 fleet is a critical lever of the Air Force's ability to 
project power and support the National Defense Strategy. Therefore, the 
Air Force is committed to ensuring the 101st Air Refueling Wing (ARW) 
is ready to fight at a moment's notice. Each year the Air Force 
examines how we are allocating funding and resources as part of the 
annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM). As requirements continue to 
evolve we will adjust KC-135 manpower, flying hours and weapon system 
sustainment (WSS) funding to ensure the KC-135 remains a vital lever 
for our national defense.
    Military Operations and Maintenance manpower authorizations are 
determined based on wartime requirements (i.e., Unit Type Codes--UTCsf 
UTCs are the baseline for the military requirement. The Full Time (FT) 
manpower requirement is based on many factors to include the number of 
primary aircraft, flying hours, sorties, crew currency and aircraft 
maintenance history. FT manpower is earned to perform the Organization, 
Administration, Recruiting, Instruct, and Train (OARIT) functions of a 
KC-135 unit. The ANG feels confident the manpower requirements and 
funding are appropriate to meet requirements and readiness.
    Therefore, the Air Force decreased the entire KC-135 fleet's flying 
hours in the fiscal year 2022 (FY22) POM, commensurate with forecasted 
reduced tasking levels; however, manpower and WSS were not reduced in 
ANG units. Additionally, the Air Force plans to retain ANG unit's 
primary aircraft inventory (PAI) at the FY21 PAI levels.
    Thank you yet again for your dedicated support to the men and women 
of the Air Force and the ANG. [See page 18.]

                                  [all]