[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-19]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL AND THE
SERVICES INSPECTORS GENERAL:
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 15, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-341 WASHINGTON : 2022
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
JACKIE SPEIER, California, Chairwoman
ANDY KIM, New Jersey JIM BANKS, Indiana
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas, Vice Chair LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAT FALLON, Texas
Hannah Kaufman, Counsel
Forrest McConnell, Counsel
Sidney Faix, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Banks, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Indiana, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel............................. 2
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel................. 1
WITNESSES
Castellvi, MajGen Robert F., USMC, Inspector General of the
Marine Corps................................................... 18
Heddell, Gordon S., Former Inspector General of the Department of
Defense........................................................ 3
O'Donnell, Sean, Acting Inspector General of the Department of
Defense........................................................ 12
Said, Lt Gen Sami D., USAF, Inspector General of the Air Force... 16
Smith, LTG Leslie C., USA, Inspector General of the Army......... 14
Smithberger, Mandy, Director of the Center for Defense
Information, Project on Government Oversight................... 5
Snyder, VADM Richard P., USN, Naval Inspector General............ 17
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Castellvi, MajGen Robert F................................... 95
Heddell, Gordon S............................................ 41
O'Donnell, Sean.............................................. 70
Said, Lt Gen Sami D.......................................... 82
Smith, LTG Leslie C.......................................... 76
Smithberger, Mandy........................................... 55
Snyder, VADM Richard P....................................... 88
Speier, Hon. Jackie.......................................... 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 103
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brown.................................................... 134
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 134
Mrs. McClain................................................. 133
Mr. Moore.................................................... 134
Ms. Speier................................................... 111
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL
AND THE SERVICES INSPECTORS GENERAL:
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 15, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jackie Speier
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
Ms. Speier. And it is now 4:00, so I am going to call the
Subcommittee on Military Personnel to order. I want to welcome
everyone to this hybrid hearing on the roles and
responsibilities of the Department of Defense IG [Inspector
General] and the service inspectors general.
Today we will have two panels. The first panel includes Mr.
Gordon Heddell, who served as the Department of Defense IG from
2008 to 2011. He also served as IG for the Department of Labor
and has extensive experience in this area.
Ms. Mandy Smithberger of the Project on Government
Oversight is our second person to testify about considerations
for improving the DOD [Department of Defense] and service IGs.
For full disclosure, she was a wonderful member of my staff
about 8 years ago, and it is nice to see you again.
In the second panel we will hear testimony from Mr. Sean
O'Donnell, Acting DOD IG, and the military services' IG. While
we understand the DOD IG and the service IGs have different
roles, responsibility, and authority than other executive
agency IGs, I think it is important we examine them closely and
make sure that they have the independence, training, staffing,
and resources to provide proper oversight.
I am concerned about this issue because there has been too
many recent examples where the service IGs appeared to be
asleep at the wheel, lacked independence, and whose
responsibilities under service regulations requires
confidential advisers of the commander--requires them to be
confidential advisers of the commander.
From the findings of the FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command]
IG inspection at Fort Hood that suggested all was fine with the
SHARP [Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention]
program there, despite ample evidence that they were not in
compliance with the DOD policy let alone having an effective
program; to the lagging investigations into the medical care of
Private First Class Del Barba; to the failure of Navy IGs to
report sexual harassment allegations against the senior
executive to the DOD IG as they are required to, and enabling a
serial offender to victimize several more Navy civilian
employees and retire with full pension with no accountability--
there is mounting evidence of a disturbing trend across the IGs
of which these are just a few examples.
Besides the authorities, it is imperative we examine the
true independence of the IGs across the Department and
services. It is unclear to me how someone who works for the
commander, who by regulation is supposed to act as the
commander's, quote, ``eyes and ears,'' unquote, and buy into
that commander's leadership philosophy, can also remain
impartial when investigating allegations within their own
command, especially when those allegations involve retaliation
for making a protected disclosure.
The last time that the service IGs testified before the
subcommittee in 2018, the Army inspector general made negative
comments about whistleblowers, which was stunning to me. If the
individuals who are charged with investigating whistleblower
reprisal complaints are prejudiced against them to begin with,
we have no hope of protecting brave service members and
civilians who have come forward to protect wrong--to protect
the American taxpayer and call out wrongdoing.
I also think we need to better understand how DOD and the
services work together when complaints come in. After all, if a
person sends their complaint to the DOD Inspector General
hotline but then the DOD IG passes it to the services to
investigate, it seems like we are setting up a false
expectation of confidentiality for complainants.
Is DOD telling complainants up front that their reports are
being shared with the service IGs who may report to the very
commanders who are the subject of the complaint? What is done
to protect complainants and ensure a quality investigation that
meets a high standard? How is retaliation not the end result,
therefore discouraging service members from coming forward?
I look forward to digging into this critical set of issues
today. And with that, I turn it over to Ranking Member Banks
for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also want to welcome
our witnesses on both panels.
Today's hearing is an important step in building our
members' awareness of the role of inspectors general and the
role that they play within the Department of Defense and in the
services. Oversight is also an important role played by
Congress. In fact, one of the first times the House of
Representatives investigated the military was in 1792, due to
the defeat of General Arthur Sinclaire, on the Indiana/Ohio
border. I figured I would take the opportunity to selfishly
work in some Indiana history for all of you.
Like the oversight and investigation responsibilities of
Congress, all of the inspectors general here today play a vital
role in overseeing, investigating, and preventing fraud, waste,
and abuse, and mismanagement across the Department and the
services.
They have been challenged by investigations, audits, and
evaluations that have run the gamut of issues from major
acquisition programs to material readiness to issues involving
good order and discipline, all requiring inspector general
organizations that are agile and independent. They also require
personnel with a requisite training, experiences, and knowledge
to get after the issues and provide recommendations that will
inform their organizations and Congress.
On panel one, I would like to understand any
recommendations that you may have for the Department of Defense
and service IGs on improving their training and education. I am
also interested in your thoughts on whether you think
independence is an issue for any or all of these IG
organizations.
For our panel two witnesses, I am interested in the
manning, training, and equipping of your organizations. Do you
have the personnel resources you need to effectively execute
your missions? I am also concerned about the results of the
audits, evaluations, and investigations and whether or not they
are often focused on outputs or outcomes. I would like to
understand your thoughts on how we can change that. Again,
thank you for your attendance.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.
We will now move to our first panel. Mr. Gordon Heddell,
who is the former inspector general of the Department of
Defense, followed by Ms. Mandy Smithberger, director for the
Center for Defense Information, Project on Government
Oversight. Thank you both for being here today and for your
participation.
Mr. Heddell.
STATEMENT OF GORDON S. HEDDELL, FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Heddell. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and
esteemed members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
to testify today. I am disturbed by the independence or the
lack of independence of our military component inspectors
general and a command structure that has allowed harassment,
assault, and a flagrant disregard by leadership for the Sexual
Harassment/
Assault Response and Prevention Program known as SHARP.
There is no place in the Armed Forces of the United States
for bias, discrimination, harassment, assault, or retaliation.
Simply stating that we have a zero-tolerance policy will not
make it so. The core strength of our Armed Forces has always
been in its leadership and the men and women who follow that
leadership. Inequities, however, in the way our military
handles harassment and assault investigations are gnawing away
at the very fabric of that strength.
While working with the TIGs, the inspectors general, of
each of the military services, I found them to be men and women
of very high character. I would be surprised if that were not
still true today. Army regulation AR 20-1, the Inspector
General Act duties and procedures regulations, prescribes the
responsibility and policy for the selection and duties of
inspectors general throughout the Army. It is, in effect, the
Army IG's bible.
However, as I reviewed AR 20-1, I was surprised by
statements in the regulation concerning the relationship that
is supposed to exist between the commander and component IGs.
Some examples: component IGs only work for their commanders;
they are the conscience of their commanders; they must
understand the commander's personality; they must be the
commander's confidant and serve as confidential adviser to the
commander; they must work through the chain of command.
There is nothing unusual or improper about a good
relationship or respect for the chain of command. What concerns
me, however, is that we are talking about the policies and
procedures that govern military inspectors general, people who
are supposed to be independent.
The regulation appears to tacitly imply a reverence for the
commander that is inappropriate for an inspector general. I
believe there are things that the military services can learn
from the Inspector General Act. There is no mention or
requirement in the Act that the inspector general be the
Secretary's conscience, that the IG understand the Secretary's
personality, or that the IG work through a chain of command.
The IG Act does not mince words. It addresses the issue of
independence head on, stating that the head of the
establishment shall not prevent or prohibit the inspector
general from completing any audit or investigation. The concept
of independence is manifested throughout the IG Act. Lack of
independence or even a perceived lack of independence is
antithetical to congressional intent.
I recommend to the military service departments that they,
number one, require component IGs to promptly report
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies directly to the respective TIG; number two,
establish policies stating clearly that no one has the
authority to alter IG reports; number three, a central Office
of Inspector General Legal Counsel should be established for
the purpose of providing dedicated legal services to support
component IGs and no one else; number four, component IGs must
have timely access to all agency records; number five,
component IG assignments should not be considered collateral
duty.
The position of component IG as it stands now is not a
career path but a stopover on the way to something else. I
recommend that component IG nominees successfully undergo
training at an IG academy, a state-of-the-art academy, and when
successfully completed, certified graduates be appointed to the
rank of warrant officer.
For the good order and discipline of our military services,
I think the time is long overdue. We must provide state-of-the-
art training and the appropriate tools to our component IGs. We
must make harassment, assault, and retaliation things of the
past. We must do this now once and for all. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Heddell.
Ms. Smithberger.
STATEMENT OF MANDY SMITHBERGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR
DEFENSE INFORMATION, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT
Ms. Smithberger. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking
Member Banks, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you again
for inviting me to testify today. I want to thank the
subcommittee for taking the time to look at whether our
inspector general system is meeting our country's needs. In
particular, I am very encouraged to hear that there is already
going to be a focus on two important issues: protecting the
independence of inspectors general and their investigations,
and having meaningful protections for whistleblowers and
survivors who come forward.
As Mr. Heddell mentioned, our Federal watchdogs perform an
essential role in rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse. One of
their most important responsibilities is their role
investigating whistleblower reprisal complaints. However, POGO
[Project on Government Oversight] and government oversight
entities have repeatedly raised concerns that the system for
protecting military whistleblowers against retaliation is
insufficient.
The DOD IG system can seem unusually complex. The various
roles of the service and the Department and component IGs are
complementary but slightly different. And to people who are
turning to the IG system for help, those differences can be
pretty confusing, particularly when they go to the DOD IG
hotline.
The DOD IG is a civilian, statutory inspector general and
is supposed to be independent from the Department. I think
there are a couple of things about the statutory IGs that we
want to keep in mind for independence. They have subpoena
powers, they have audit functions, and they are also uniquely
dual-hatted, reporting both to Congress and to their agency
head.
In recent years, Congress has strengthened these IGs, most
notably by providing each one with their own general counsel
and requiring the President to provide congressional
notification and justification for their removal and transfer.
Service and component IGs have less independence, and when
it comes to particularly sensitive investigations like a
whistleblower reprisal complaint, we sometimes have concerns
that that undermines their ability to effectively do their job.
At the component IG level, a Department of Justice inspector
general review found that those offices often struggle to
maintain adequate staff and experience because the offices
compete for resources for military components engaged in
military actions around the world. The same review found fully
staffing field IG offices is a lower priority than staffing
other service branch components.
As Congresswoman Speier mentioned, in most cases, DOD IG
hands retaliation allegations over to local or command IGs who
have the least amount of independence and experience in
handling what are often highly complex investigations. We have
worked with whistleblowers who return to that hotline only to
be unpleasantly surprised that their complaint was referred to
a service or component IG. Those referrals can feel like being
thrown into the lion's den, including potentially exposing
whistleblowers to additional retaliation.
Despite a number of reforms, the outcomes for
whistleblowers still look like a system unlikely to protect
truth tellers. DOD semiannual reports to Congress show the vast
majority of reprisal claims are not investigated and only a
handful of those investigated are substantiated. Even when
reprisal claims are substantiated, those who retaliate are
rarely punished.
Remedies for whistleblowers are also elusive, with the vast
majority waiting years for any remedy, if they receive one at
all. Most whistleblowers give up or they end up fighting for
years to get their own records corrected.
I would be remiss to not note that DOD IG has lacked a
permanent leader for over 5 years. This fundamentally
undermines the foundation of the Department's inspector general
system. Not having a permanent leader, especially for a long
period of time, compromises the office's credibility, its
independence, its management, and its strategic direction.
There are a number of other areas of oversights and reforms
that can strengthen both their IG and whistleblower protection
system.
First, Congress must revise the burdens of proof for
military whistleblowers. The odds are stacked against
servicemember whistleblowers. For civilians, the burden of
proof to show a personnel action was warranted and therefore
not retaliatory rests on agency officials. For members of the
military, the reverse is true. And service members must prove
that they were illegally retaliated against by showing there
was no other reasonable explanation for the adverse personnel
action they experienced.
Second, we urge the subcommittee to review whether service
and component IGs have the legal support that they need.
Third, Congress must look at or should consider expanding
alternative dispute resolution options for the military to help
provide expedient relief.
Fourth, all IGs must do more outreach to the public and
Congress about their work, including publishing their reports
in a timely manner, proactively releasing information to the
public that is going to be released anyway under a Freedom of
Information Act request, and announcing upcoming projects that
aren't law enforcement sensitive.
Finally, I hope the service IGs will complete
implementation of measures to protect the confidentiality of
sources. We all count on inspectors general to warn commanders,
senior leaders, Congress, and the public about problems. Their
ability to do so depends on effectively working with
whistleblowers. When individuals come forward, usually at great
personal and professional risk, they must be effectively
protected. The perceived and real failures of the system must
be addressed.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Smithberger can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee
members be allowed to participate in today's briefing, after
all the subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask
questions. Is there any objection?
Hearing none, so ordered.
All right. So I am going to forgo asking my questions until
the end of the panel, so I offer Ranking Member Banks the
opportunity now to pursue his questioning.
Mr. Banks. All right. Thank you, Madam Chair, for that.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I would like to
understand from both of you whether you have any
recommendations regarding how DOD and the services train and
educate their IGs. Also, do you think they have what they need
in terms of resources to execute their mission?
Ms. Smithberger, we will start with you.
Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. I think I am
going to defer to Mr. Heddell a little bit more on some of the
training though. More training is always welcome, and I know
DOD IG has been doing a lot to try and enhance that training,
but I think something else to look at is for some of these
investigations where independence is really important for some
of those investigations, I wonder in some of these cases if the
DOD IG should be retaining more of those investigations than
they are currently and giving DOD IG more of those resources.
As you know, the problem with training, if people are, you
know, circulating in and out of these service and component
IGs, is that this is not going to be part of their long-term
career field and so there is diminishing returns, while if we
have a civilian component that has this expertise, I think that
is probably a better investment in the long term.
Mr. Banks. Mr. Heddell.
Ms. Speier. Turn your mike on, please. Thank you.
Mr. Heddell. Yes, ma'am. The Inspector General Act, I
believe, is a really good perhaps role model for all IGs. And I
think one of the huge concerns that I see is that the component
IG skills and the way they do their work, well-meaning, I am
sure, in many--most respects, has not evolved over the years to
be better than it could be.
It has--where the inspectors general, the Federal
inspectors general, DOD IG, for instance, over the years,
because of the wisdom of Congress, the initial IG Act of 1978
has been amended and improved and has made the inspector
general a stronger, more capable, more talented and determined
and an independent inspector general.
If that had not occurred, I would say that today that the
DOD IG and other Federal IGs would be impotent and the whole
concept of IG in Federal Government would be a failure, but it
isn't a failure. Today our IGs are among the most skilled and
exceptional executives in government.
The same I cannot say is true in terms of our component
IGs. They are basically passing through. They do a 36-month
rotation into their assignments, generally. In my opinion, it
takes a lot longer than that to develop the kind of knowledge
and commitment and the allegiance to what is right within the
ranks of the military.
And so just about the time that I think that they are
really getting their sea legs, they are moving on to another
non-IG assignment. One of the implications of that is that it
reduces the number of mentors that would be around to be
helpful.
Number two, this idea of component IGs, several thousand--2
or 3 thousand of them, it needs to become a profession. It is
not, in my opinion, viewed as a profession. There needs to be
very sophisticated state-of-the-art training academy.
And I believe that individuals who are nominated to become
component inspectors general should go through the academy and
they should be required to pass and then certified. And once
they are certified I believe that they should attain--be
appointed to the rank of warrant officer.
I have nothing against noncommissioned officers. They are
the backbone of our military in many, many ways. But as an
inspector general, I think we have to start at a higher level,
and we have to work from there. It has to become a profession.
The issue, the biggest issue facing the component IGs is
independence. We have to give these component IGs the backbone
and the confidence to do their work, and not worry about what
their commander says. I really believe that there is too much
emphasis on the chain of command, that the component IG is
required to go through his or her commander.
Now, I have great respect having been in the military for
the chain of command, but it doesn't work, in my opinion, when
it comes to inspectors general. Their chain of command must be
directly from them to the respective TIG. Now, that would cause
a lot of headaches under the structure today for the TIGs to
take that kind of, you know, intimate control of the situation,
but I think that is necessary.
We have reached a point with respect to assault,
harassment, retaliation, all of these things are undermining.
When I was in the military, and I am sure it is true today, the
central thought among rank-and-file members is that the
military takes care of its own. Well, I am sure they still
believe in that, and I am sure to a great extent they do, but
that is not happening. There are too many people----
Mr. Banks. I appreciate that, sir, a lot of really great
comments. And with that, Madam Chairman, I yield back.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
I think what we are going to do now is recess for about--I
am sorry. We are not going to recess. We are going to suspend
for about, I guess, 20 minutes. Actually, wait a minute. Maybe
what we will do is go to Ms. Escobar for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Okay. Perfect. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Heddell, I want to pick up where you just left off,
because I am very curious about where you were headed with your
comments with regard to the challenges around chain of command,
trying to remove oneself from conflict of interest, and the
added challenge with the component IGs that rotate out.
What do you think, if you had to reenvision the component
IGs--and actually, this is a question for both of our
panelists. If you had to reenvision this, what would the best
practices be and what would it look like?
Mr. Heddell. You know, I think a very good--I am speaking
as a former Army aviator, and so I sort of use that as my role
model here in that training is what is going to make inspectors
general at the component level really competent and dedicated
and able, and who buy in to the concept that everyone deserves
protection. When they can't get it, it undermines the order and
discipline of the military. And that is not happening.
So training is the first thing, and I think there needs to
be an academy, a real, true-life academy that is focused
entirely on inspectors general at the component level. And they
need to be--those nominees that go to that academy need to pass
the course and be certified. If they are not certified, they
don't become inspectors general.
If they are certified, as I said earlier, I think they
should be appointed warrant officer rank. It is a professional
rank and it--and I think it raises the whole idea of inspectors
general at the component level to a profession. And rotating
people out after 36 months to something that is not related,
they have no commitment.
And, frankly, I do think that when they know they are going
to be rotated out to a non-IG position, they may be thinking
about how am I going to be received when I go to the non-IG
world? I think we have to remove any concerns that an IG might
have that somehow they are going to be treated differently
because they were an IG.
The other thing is the chain of command. There is far too
much emphasis in the Army Regulation 20-1 for the reverence
that a component IG must show to the commander. There are too
many approvals that the commander must provide that really it
should be the TIGs providing.
An example, if a component IG is doing--sees that he has
got a criminal investigation on his hands, but of course he or
she does not have the law enforcement authority to conduct that
criminal investigation, they are required to go to their
commander and then it is up to the commander to decide whether
to ask, in the Army's case, the CID [Criminal Investigation
Division] to open an investigation. They may or they may not,
depending on the facts, but the component IG is really--he is
dependent on what that decision is. I think that decision, when
it comes to criminal investigations, should be made with the
TIG.
The other thing, I think there is a real problem with
respect to legal counsel. The TIGs have their own legal
counsel, I believe, but the component IGs have to submit a
request for advice. And they don't know what kind of a lawyer
or attorney they are going to get, and they don't know whether
that attorney, whether his or her loyalties go to the commander
or to someone else.
We need a commitment that component IGs have a committed
legal counsel that will support them. These are the kinds of
things that will create independence on the part of the IG, it
will create confidence, and it will create confidence by the
people that are retaliated against, who are harassed, who are
assaulted, because right now, if I am a person that is a victim
of harassment, and I read AR-20, I would have to really think
twice before I would go to the component IG. It is----
Ms. Escobar. Mr. Heddell, I am so sorry, we are out of
time. Thank you for your response.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ms. Escobar.
We will now suspend for 20 minutes and return. Again, our
apologies. This is the nature of our vote today, so we will
reconvene then in 20 minutes. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Ms. Speier. We will now reconvene the Military Personnel
Subcommittee. Mr. Fallon, you are next. You are recognized for
5 minutes. Mr. Fallon? Can someone contact Mr. Fallon so he
knows that he is up?
All right. I see Ms. Strickland is with us. Ms. Strickland,
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Madam Chair. So one of the
issues that I am especially interested in is diversity, equity,
inclusion [DEI] within the Department. And under the leadership
of Congressman Brown in the last session, the NDAA included
several provisions related to diversity.
So as I think about, you know, the conversation about the
inspectors general, do you believe that we are sufficiently
independent in order to ensure that this topic, specifically,
will be investigated the way it should? And then are there
other areas within the DEI sphere that you can explore and
investigate?
Mr. Heddell. Is that question for me? I am sorry.
Ms. Strickland. Yes, actually the question is for both of
you.
Mr. Heddell. Oh. Well, I will take that first.
Ms. Strickland. Okay.
Mr. Heddell. I think the problem is that at the component
IG level, the issue of independence is a problem. And that
needs to be addressed by a variety of suggestions,
recommendations. The biggest one, I think, is simply training
and then in making the component IG a profession that that
person would go on throughout their career and be an inspector
general, and it would be a commitment lifelong.
Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. I think in
addition to independence, if you just look generally at command
climate issues. When you look at the Department of Defense
Inspector Generals in my annual report, it is pretty striking
how many instances there are of people being retaliated against
because they have tried to use the EEO [Equal Employment
Opportunity] system. So I think that it is a significant
challenge.
I know that we are adding to the capacity of the Department
of Defense Inspector General to work on these issues, but you
know, this is a significant challenge for the force. That
independence is extremely important that, you know, obviously
goes to climate as well.
Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you very much. I yield back,
Madam Chair.
Ms. Speier. The gentlelady yields back. Is Mrs. Bice
available or Mr. Brown? Mr. Fallon? Mrs. Bice? Mr. Brown? Mr.
Kim? Any of those members nearby? We are happy to have them ask
their questions.
While we wait for them, I will pursue my line of
questioning. In your testimony--let me just get to it first.
In your testimony, Mr. Heddell, you referenced that the
regulations suggest the IGs provide commanders with
undocumented informal verbal reports, which is a recipe, as you
put, for suspicion and uncertainty about their independence. I
don't recall if you
in your list of improvements if you recommended that these be
made.
Mr. Heddell. Now, in the interest of time, the 5-minute
requirement, I did not list that. But it is an important one,
because nothing that an inspector general does should be
informal. Advice should not be informal. It should all be
documented. And that again goes back, Chairwoman Speier, to the
idea that IG--component IGs have a certain--are expected to
have a certain loyalty to their commander, and that they can
have these private off-the-record conversations when they
shouldn't happen like that.
I am not saying that all conversations have to be formal
when you are dealing with a commander. I am saying that these
are conversations about their work and about their
investigations and oversight. As I read the regulation, that
that is what the commander expects. That they will, as the
regulation said, circulate among the personnel and observe,
make observations for the commander, and discuss those
informally with him or her and undocumented. And so, I just see
that as a very serious problem in the regulation.
Ms. Speier. Well, I concur with you on that. And I was
surprised to see that that is the recommended method.
Ms. Smithberger, you had referenced this Alternative
Dispute Resolution Program that would be helpful, is
operational where at the present time?
Ms. Smithberger. So, currently, it is operational both at
the Office of Special Counsel and the Department of Defense
Inspector General. And I just on your previous question, one of
the reasons that we think it would be really helpful for the
service IGs, in particular, to announce their upcoming work is
that we want to make sure that those investigations become
investigations and reports and not just conversations from one
commander to another commander. So that helps to hold everyone
accountable.
Ms. Speier. So you are saying with the Dispute Resolution
Program is presently with the DOD IG. Is that what you said?
Ms. Smithberger. Correct.
Ms. Speier. And you are recommending that it be made
available at the service level as well, is that correct?
Ms. Smithberger. Either at the service level or as part of
DOD IG; it is not currently available to military service
members.
Ms. Speier. So who is it being used by?
Ms. Smithberger. Civilians.
Ms. Speier. I see. Okay. And do you have any data on that
in how it is working?
Ms. Smithberger. We do. It is included in semiannual
reports, but I am happy to provide more for the record.
Ms. Speier. Okay. If you would do that for the record, that
would be helpful. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
Ms. Speier. Let's see. I think that is all the questions I
have. I really very much appreciate your testimony today. It is
very helpful for us to be able to hear from those who have
served, those who evaluate. Maybe just one last question.
It appears in Ms. Smithberger's testimony, you indicated
that--if I can find it. You referenced the 2019 Roll Call story
that found that only 1 of the 350 officials that the IGs
determined had retaliated against whistleblowers was fired. So
I am presuming from that that there were 350 cases that were
brought by whistleblowers in which they confirmed that there
was retaliation, but only one of those officers was fired. Is
that correct?
Ms. Smithberger. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. Is that alarming to either of you?
Ms. Smithberger. I think it sends the signal that
retaliation is tolerated and is an inconvenience at most.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Heddell.
Mr. Heddell. It is alarming, but I don't think that it is
unusual in terms of statistics over the last 10, maybe even 15
years. Maybe even while I was an inspector general. And it is
alarming. But I don't think it is unusual. So much has gone
unreported. And so much that is reported that is investigated--
I will say it is under-investigated, that is the term I would
use, meaning that you don't see many substantiations. And I
think the statistics alone tell you that there is a concern.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you very much. My time has
expired. Your presentations are complete. I don't believe we
have any other members who wish to be heard. So thank you very
much. We will change out our panelists.
All right. We welcome our second panel which includes Mr.
Sean O'Donnell, the Acting Inspector General for the Department
of Defense; Lieutenant General Leslie Smith; Lieutenant General
Sami Said; Vice Admiral Richard Snyder; and Major General
Robert Castellvi.
All right. Each witness will provide a brief statement, and
each member will have the opportunity to question the witnesses
for 5 minutes. We ask that our witnesses summarize their
testimony in 5 minutes. Your written statements will be made
part of the record.
We are now going to start with the Acting Inspector General
of the Department of Defense, and the confirmed Inspector
General of the Department of--no, the EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency], is that correct?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. Mr. O'Donnell, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF SEAN O'DONNELL, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. O'Donnell. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking
Member Banks, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
inviting me to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the
inspectors general of the Department of Defense and the
military services.
In January 2020, I was sworn in as the Inspector General of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And since April 2020,
I have served concurrently as the Acting Inspector General with
the Department of Defense.
Today, I am here representing the Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General. Through the IG Act, Congress
established the DOD OIG as an independent and objective unit to
prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in DOD programs and
operations; to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
of those programs and operations; and to help ensure ethical
conduct throughout the DOD.
Perhaps the most important hallmark of the DOD OIG is its
independence. This independence ensures the objectivity of our
work and safeguards our operations against efforts to influence
or obstruct. Congress has protected our independence by, among
other things, placing the IG under the general supervision of
the Secretary of Defense, meaning the Secretary cannot not
direct or prevent the work of the DOD OIG unless such a
prohibition is necessary to preserve national security. In
addition, Congress also requires that the DOD OIG receive
timely access to all documents and other information available
to the Department.
The DOD OIG employs approximately 1,750 dedicated oversight
professionals. We are responsible for, among other things, one
of the largest financial statement audits in history,
evaluating highly complex and highly classified DOD programs,
evaluating high, excuse me, investigating billions of dollars
in potential fraud.
To put our overall work into perspective, in fiscal year
2020 the DOD OIG issued 138 audit and evaluation reports,
contributed to criminal recoveries of $2.69 billion, conducted
35 administrative investigations, and oversaw 499 senior
official or retaliation investigations completed by the
military services and the defense agency OIGs.
We do all this despite having a proportionately smaller
staff than other Federal IGs. As a point of comparison, the
larger Federal OIGs typically have a ratio of departmental
staff to OIG staff of between 50 to 1 and 200 to 1. The DOD OIG
ratio is closer to 1,700 to 1.
The DOD OIG is not alone in ensuring robust oversight of
the DOD. We are part of what we call the Defense Oversight
Community, which includes the four military service IGs, the
military criminal investigative organizations, the service
auditors general, and the defense agency IGs. The IG Act
recognizes the important role of this community by among other
things requiring that the DOD OIG give particular regard to the
community's work with an eye toward avoiding duplication and
ensuring coordination and cooperation.
To this end, I chair the Defense Council on Integrity and
Efficiency, which brings our community together through various
committees and working groups. In addition, I meet quarterly
with the service IGs to discuss common issues.
One of the most significant ways in which we interact with
the Department of Defense is through the DOD Hotline. We offer
the DOD Hotline as a confidential, reliable means to report
without fear of reprisal, allegations of fraud, mismanagement,
or misconduct that involve DOD personnel and operations. Last
year, the DOD Hotline received approximately 16,000 contacts.
This volume often requires the DOD OIG to refer hotline
contacts to an appropriate entity within the Defense Oversight
Community.
For senior official misconduct allegations, we will
generally assume responsibility for conducting investigations
against three- and four-star generals and flag officers,
Presidential appointees, and Senior Executive Service members
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, we will
generally refer misconduct against one- and two-star general
and flag officers and SES members within a service to the
corresponding service IG.
With respect to whistleblower retaliation allegations, the
DOD OIG handles complaints involving DOD contractors and other
select employees, security clearances, and sexual assaults. We
will generally refer whistleblower retaliation allegations
involving military service members to their respective service
IG.
Even when we refer a contact to another entity, we retain
oversight responsibility. As such, we require that the
receiving entity conduct an inquiry according to quality
standards that ensure independence and objectivity. For most
referrals, we also require that the receiving entity submit a
written report to the DOD OIG for oversight. If we determine
that the report does not meet our quality standards, we will
return the report to resolve the deficiency.
We engage the Defense Oversight Community in other ways,
too. Most notably and relevant to this committee is our
continuing implementation of our oversight and diversity
inclusion in the DOD and the handling of supremacist and
extremist criminal gangs in the Armed Forces as required by
section 554.
Finally, we also undertake quality assurance reviews of the
service IGs' administrative investigations. In closing,
overseeing increasingly complex DOD programs and operations, as
well as hotline and other complaints requires the best staff,
training, and resources, not only for the DOD OIG, but also for
the service IGs and the broader Defense Oversight Community.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon,
and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Donnell can be found in
the Appendix on page 70.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. We will now hear
from Lieutenant General Leslie Smith, the Inspector General of
the Army.
STATEMENT OF LTG LESLIE C. SMITH, USA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
ARMY
General Smith. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and
distinguished members of the Military Personnel Subcommittee,
good afternoon.
I am Lieutenant General Leslie C. Smith, the Army's
Inspector General. Thank you for the privilege of appearing
before you today to speak about the Army Inspector General
system and how we function to assist soldiers, Army civilians,
and family members. On behalf of the Acting Secretary of the
Army, Honorable Mr. Whitley, and Army Chief of Staff General
McConville, thank you for support to the military.
We exist for one thing: To help ensure the readiness of our
Army. Since the creation of the U.S. Army Inspector General
System 243 years ago, inspectors generals have been charged to
inspect, observe, train, and report misconduct. This duty has
evolved to our four key functions: inspections, assistance,
investigations, and training.
At the Department of the Army, I am independent, and I
report directly to the Secretary of the Army. However, in
accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, I am charged by law to
fully cooperate with the Department of Defense Inspector
General. And we achieve this cooperation by resolving
allegations of whistleblower reprisal, DOD Hotline, and Army
senior official misconduct all under the direct oversight of
the Department of Defense.
Under the Department of Army level, we conduct independent
inspections of systemic issues and also resolve allegations of
misconduct, fraud, waste, and abuse. We will refer other
allegations that represent criminal misconduct to Army's
Criminal Investigation Command, and discrimination cases to
Equal Opportunity Offices.
Additionally, we provide policy, training, and assistance
to Army IGs worldwide. We also provide trend analysis and
impartial advice to Army senior leaders in all components. For
example, our Inspections Directorate is in direct support of
the Army's focus on countering harmful behaviors. This effort
includes behaviors such as sexual assault, sexual harassment,
discrimination, and extremism, among others. Also, being
independent affords us the ability to understand the scope and
challenges the Army faced in the privatized housing crisis and
to recommend solutions to Army senior leaders. We were able to
quickly shift our assets to deploy to 73 locations across the
United States to get a strategic look at the problem.
Across our Army, we have 1,441 inspectors general and 208
IG offices. We train each of these IGs through our Inspector
General School certified by me and the Secretary of the Army,
with additional advanced courses and continued education to
produce effective IGs. And in this capacity, these field IGs
meet the readiness goals of those field commanders. All Army
IGs work within the parameters of our guiding regulation. That
means they are responsible to their respective commanders, or
responsive to me and Secretary of the Army.
Every Army IG takes an oath to uphold the standards of the
Army without prejudice or partiality, even when the Army may be
the problem. These words represent a tall order and one that
all IGs take very seriously. If an IG falls short of this
standard, I take it very seriously. And I have the authority
revoke their credentials. While I don't enjoy this requirement,
I have taken steps to revoke several IG credentials, both
military and civilian. We occupy a position of public trust,
and we must never violate that trust.
In closing, Army IGs and the Inspector General Agency are
both independent and integrated. We are independent and provide
credible impartial oversight. We are also integrated, serving
vertically and laterally as the eyes, ears, voice, and
conscience of our commanders in the field, helping preserve the
Army's readiness through our four critical functions:
inspections, assistance, investigations, and training.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Smith can be found in
the Appendix on page 76.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. Next, we will
hear from Lieutenant General Sami Said, Inspector General for
the Air Force.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMI D. SAID, USAF, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Said. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks,
committee members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today, along with my colleagues, to discuss our
roles and responsibilities as service IGs. I am mindful of the
limited time today and the number of witnesses, so I will keep
my comments very brief.
We provided the committee with detailed information on the
roles and responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force
Inspector General. So I will avoid covering such information in
any detail, but let me offer a few points to frame the
dialogue.
Generally, the Department of the Air Force IG is charged
with independently assessing, through investigations,
inspections and reviews, the readiness, efficiency, and
discipline of the Department of the Air Force, which includes
both the Air Force and the Space Force.
To empower full independence, the Department of the Air
Force IG and its subordinate organizations reside within the
secretariat chain. And the inspector general reports directly
to the Secretary of the Air Force. All authorities of the
Department of the Air Force IG and all organizations within
directly emanate from the Secretary of the Air Force through
the Air Force IG.
At the Department of the Air Force level, the IG
organization is composed of three field operating agencies and
four directorates, all serving both the Air Force and the Space
Force. Below the Department of the Air Force level, we have
inspector general presence at 186 installations, supporting
both our major commands in the Air Force and our field commands
in the Space Force.
IGs below the Department of the Air Force level support and
report to their chain of command. However, the Department of
the Air Force IG retains oversight of their inspections and
their investigations.
DAF-IG also issues the policies that govern the field IGs'
responsibilities and missions and provides training for all
inspector generals in the Department of Air Force. Across the
Department, we have 2,620 airmen and guardians performing IG
duties, of which 1,880 are military, and 740 are civilians.
Total funded billets, though, for the mission stand at 1,886.
The mix of civilians and military is very important to us.
Our military IGs offer experience, but also critically
important currency in the issues they are charged to inspect
and to investigate. Our civilian IGs bring a wealth of
experience and provide helpful continuity.
Our partnership in collaboration with all our sister
service IGs and DOD IG is, in my view, exceptionally good. We
receive very helpful and healthy oversight from DOD IG, and
across the services we share lessons learned and best practices
with each other. We fully cooperate with DOD IG and have well-
established oversight and handoff guidelines that are common to
all of us that work well.
Independence of the IG at all levels is highly respected
and cherished and protected within the Department of the Air
Force. This element of independence is critical to executing
the mission at all levels.
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the
results of their inspections and investigations are
independent, and oversighted at multiple levels. If any IG
experiences undue influence, they will upchannel their concerns
to their next higher level in the IG chain all the way up to
DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
In terms of overall capacity and resourcing, we have
generally received appropriate support and priority. However,
as with other organizations, we have some capacity shortfalls
primarily at the installation level which we are working to
address.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Said can be found in the
Appendix on page 82.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Lieutenant General. Next, we will
hear from Vice Admiral Richard Snyder, Inspector General for
the Navy.
STATEMENT OF VADM RICHARD P. SNYDER, USN, NAVAL INSPECTOR
GENERAL
Admiral Snyder. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks,
and Military Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you very
much for having us here today to discuss the roles,
responsibilities, and authorities of the services' inspectors
general.
As the Naval Inspector General, my office and duties are
established by statutes, specifically, 10 U.S. Code section
8020. I report directly to the Secretary of the Navy and have
the authority to inspect, investigate, and/or inquire into any
and all matters affecting the discipline or the military
efficiency of the Department of the Navy.
I am the senior administrative investigative official in
the Department of the Navy, and the principal advisor to the
Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps on all matters concerning inspections and
investigations. I am the inspector general for both the
Department of the Navy and the Navy as a service.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General [NAVIG] ensures
an independent and objective evaluation of all complaints
within NAVIG's purview, with the exception of complaints
retained by Department of Defense IG. We conduct periodic
inspections of commands and regions to assess program
compliance, program effectiveness, and risk to the Department
of the Navy. We also have an intelligence oversight
responsibility.
Findings of our investigations and inspections are provided
to the chain of command for action deemed appropriate. We are
not involved in criminal investigations nor audits, as my
office is separate and distinct from the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and the Naval Audit Service.
The Navy IG enterprise is large, consisting of 27 echelon
II, 66 echelon III, 49 echelon IV, and 2 echelon V command IGs
who report administratively to me for policy and oversight, and
report operationally to their respective echelon commander for
most command-level matters. This structure provides the
supported commander a valuable command-level resource for
executing their duties of command. Each of our IG offices has
both an investigation and inspection function.
Because we have a large worldwide enterprise with
considerable activity, we have taken steps to ensure
consistency and effectiveness throughout the enterprise. I
expect every IG, regardless of where they are within the
enterprise, to perform their roles in a fair, impartial, and
independent manner. My office is responsible for providing
policy guidance, training, and professional oversight to that
end. IG offices at more senior echelons provide additional
oversight and may perform IG functions should there be any
concern about capability, fairness, or impartiality.
We are required by statute to cooperate with the Department
of Defense Office of the Inspector General. In particular, our
senior official cases and military whistleblower reprisal cases
are worked closely with our legal staff and are reviewed by the
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General for
quality, accuracy, and oversight approval.
Cases are sometimes referred from the Department of Defense
Office of the Inspector General to my office, and from my
office to lower echelon Navy IG offices for information only or
for appropriate action. Action referrals require a feedback
report to the referring office for review and oversight.
During my almost 3-year tenure as the Naval Inspector
General, I witnessed a team of Navy IG professionals dedicated
to performing accurate, fair, and neutral investigations and
assessments. Our goal is to provide timely, accurate, and
meaningful information to enable Navy warfighting readiness and
support to our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.
Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and Military
Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you for your continued
support of the Navy and our people, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Snyder can be found in
the Appendix on page 88.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General.
Next, we are going to hear from Major General Robert
Castellvi, Inspector General of the Marine Corps.
STATEMENT OF MAJGEN ROBERT F. CASTELLVI, USMC, INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS
General Castellvi. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks,
subcommittee members, thank you for the warm welcome and the
opportunity to appear before you today along with my colleagues
to discuss the roles and responsibilities as service inspectors
general.
As the Inspector General of the Marine Corps [IGMC], I am
the senior investigative official within the Marine Corps, and
I support the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps to promote institutional effectiveness,
efficiency, discipline, ethics and integrity, and combat
readiness.
I am the principal advisor to the Commandant on all matters
concerning inspections and investigations. And I communicate
directly and independently to the Secretary of the Navy, the
Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Naval
Inspector General on all Marine Corps matters.
My staff and I perform this vital role through impartial
and independent inspections, assessments, inquiries,
administrative investigations, and we do it without influence,
pressure, or coercion. I report our findings to the Secretary
of the Navy and the Commandant.
Since assuming this position less than a year ago, not
once, I mean that, not once, have I ever felt any pressure or
influence from either one of them or their staffs. We proudly
refer to ourselves as the standard bearers of our corps--the
place you go to get the answer to what rights should look like.
But my team is supplemented by 41 command inspectors
general [CIGs], some of the finest officers I have met, many of
them, either in person or virtually, and they are assigned to
every general officer command across the Marine Corps. The
command IGs work directly for their commander and serve as a
functional extension. I call them a connecting file within the
enterprise to me and my team at IGMC. They provide the
commander the same support my office provides the Commandant
within the authorities of the individual commander.
It is important to know that they are not out there on
their own. My office plays a key role providing training,
support, oversight, and really mentorship, and I vet their
selection for these local command IGs, and we inspect them to
ensure their independence, their compliance with applicable
regulations.
Although the level of authority and the sphere of influence
varies, all IGs have the same fundamental duties that includes
conducting inspections and providing assistance, and
responsibility to investigate allegations of fraud, waste, and
abuse of authority. Statute dictates our cooperation with the
DOD IG and provides oversight on all our work on senior
official and military whistleblower reprisal cases.
The DOD IG reviews our work for quality, thoroughness, and
accuracy for these cases, as well as any cases they refer to
us. Following their review, the findings of our investigations
and inquiries are provided to Marine Corps leadership for
appropriate action.
The relationship between DOD IG and IGMC is very similar to
the relationship between our office and our local IGs. Each
commander enjoys the benefit of an IG to manage local issues,
conduct local inspections, investigate local matters, and keep
a pulse on the things that affect the morale and discipline and
climate of the unit. Whereas IGMC serves as the eye and ears of
the Commandant--we spend about 50 percent of our time on the
road--Command IGs serve as the eyes and ears of their
individual commander.
Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and Military
Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you for your continued
support to IGMC and your Corps of Marines. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Castellvi can be found
in the Appendix on page 95.]
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. Thank you all for
your presentations. I am now going to offer the ranking member
5 minutes to ask his questions.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wonder for each of you
if you can let us know as you adapt to meet today's mission if
you are considering any organization or personnel changes?
Let's start down here at this end of the table.
General Castellvi. Yes, sir. We have looked at a
reorganization of our office, and that has taken place over
this last several months. I told the Commandant when I first
took over, that I needed about 2 months to understand where we
could find some better efficiencies and provide some better
oversight. I felt that there were some things like timeliness
of our investigations that needed to be improved.
I thought there needed to be some better checks and
balances within our own office. We needed to strengthen some of
the roles, for example the Chief of Staff and our
investigators. So I am pleased to say that that has been an
effective look, and I am ready to put that in place this coming
up summer with some personnel changes.
Admiral Snyder. Yeah, Ranking Member, for the Navy side,
really three things I would focus on. We've had an ongoing
effort to take what I refer more of an enterprise approach to
the way we do business. You heard about the various echelons.
And my goal has been to bring us together and not stovepipe by
command or by echelon. And so we put several things in place to
try and work things better as an enterprise, because that is
how we are going to get things done.
Just recently, we brought up some of the investigators from
the lower echelon who had less workload than us, we brought
them onto our staff on an assignment temporarily to help us
out. That was enabled by the virtual environment we are in now,
which is that second area that we are looking to take advantage
of. Both in the way we work and the way we inspect. Our
inspections were done almost exclusively in person. We have
been able to leverage the virtual environment to help that now.
And then, lastly, looking at processes. You know, our
caseload continues to go up. And we can certainly continue to
put more people to that problem, but there is also an
opportunity with process improvement.
General Said. Ranking Member, I think you asked about
organization change, as in moving the boxes on the wiring
diagram. We don't have any major reorganization initiatives
underway, but we have a few process initiatives underway. How
to better inspect, what to inspect, how to improve timeliness;
those are process issues, but not reorganizational issues.
General Smith. Thank you, Ranking Member. I think for us we
really are looking hard at the military-civilian mix, not only
at the Department of the Army level but also at the subordinate
IGs. I think the other aspects that we have learned from recent
things are increasing the number of surveys that we execute and
the analytics that we use to look at the details of those,
because that helps us to give a better view for the Secretary
and then the subordinate commanders.
And then, lastly, is the oversight. At my level especially,
my impact of making sure that the subordinate IGs understand
the significance and importance of timeliness and responding to
those allegations. That is the most important.
Mr. Banks. Lieutenant General Smith, we will stick with
you, when was the last time that you updated or refreshed your
training or education program?
General Smith. It is after every course it is updated. So
that 3-week course that's at the Inspector General School at
Fort Belvoir, we do an analysis of each one of those classes.
Even through the virtual form which we continue to execute, we
strongly look at those courses. And as we speak----
Mr. Banks. Please. Go ahead.
General Said. Ranking Member, same. We get feedback after
every course, and we adjust the course material based on the
feedback. We also cross-check what our sister services are
teaching, and we get the best practices from them, similarly
with DOD IG.
Mr. Banks. Admiral.
Admiral Snyder. We've really had a sea change in the last
year. We have been forced to go virtual, and we took that
opportunity to also revamp what we are teaching. We added a
course, NAVIG 101. And we have also brought in training
professionals to assist our IG professionals in delivering that
training.
Mr. Banks. Major General.
General Castellvi. We too had to go virtual, and we also
found that we had a gap. We needed to develop very quickly an
online, an IGMC 101 version as a bridging solution until we can
get an MTT [mobile team training] online. And because we were
watching some rookie mistakes being made by brand-new command
IGs that just needed a little bit more mentoring, needed to get
trained earlier rather than later.
And with the COVID environment that we were in, we found
ourselves needing to make sure that we had a bridging solution.
And we have unveiled it.
Mr. Banks. Got it. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman.
Vice Chair Escobar, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and many
thanks to our panelists. I have a question, actually, about the
command IGs. If you all wouldn't mind, each one of you sharing
with me, from your perspective if you could describe the
relationship between command IGs and your service and the
commanders. And I am wondering if you have any recommendations
or thoughts on how we can ensure absolute independence,
objectivity, lack of conflict of interest in that relationship
or in the work that the command IGs do?
So whoever would like to go first.
General Smith. Thank you, Representative. So the command
IG's relationship with the commander is twofold. They are
responsible to the commander but responsive to me. So what that
means is we have oversight of everything that they do. So they
work with the commander to work the actions that are local, but
every one of the cases that are worked, we have electronic
views that we can see what the level of work they do and how
that is being executed.
And I will just tell you we keep the independence because
of the oversight that we have. Every quarter, I review the top
cases that are in our viewpoint sometimes are lagging to find
out where we are, how we can improve those.
Thank you.
General Said. Representative Escobar, the same for us. At
the installation level, which is the lowest level where we have
IG functions, they are a critical tool to our commanders,
because they have two roles. They are doing what we call
complaints resolution, and they are hearing the complaints and
the concerns of our airmen and guardians, and they are
attempting to deal with them on behalf of the commander. And we
can talk more about that if you would like.
They are also helping the commander assess their internal
readiness, their ability to deploy and employ, right? They are
not providing the grade for the readiness at the installation
level; that is being conducted at a higher level.
They are--similar to the Army, their independence is tight,
because although they report to the chain of command, I have
oversight of them in terms of the guidance that is given to
them of how they execute, the training that they get, the
authority to overturn their investigations and their
inspections, and the ability to reach down if we sense any
undue influence.
Admiral Snyder. Congresswoman, for us, we have quite a few
civilians in the down-echelon IG offices in large--in fact, a
large number are non-headquarters IG folks are civilians. At
those larger commands, our echelon II commands, frequently you
will have the IG and the deputy IG will be--one will be a
civilian, one will be a military.
So we have the continuity and the experience of the
civilian folks in the command IGs, but then we have the
operational experience and the military awareness of those
military IGs.
Like everyone else has mentioned, that oversight piece is
very important to us. Those IGs know that they can, but frankly
must, move up to a higher echelon if what they have either
feels inappropriate or unable to be handled at their level.
And then, lastly, it is my relationship with those
commanders as well. I have complete authority and obligation to
reach out to those commanders if anything is brought to my
attention that is inappropriate on their behalf. And I expect
them to do the same with me if the IGs aren't doing what they
expect them to do.
General Castellvi. I think we have a similar model, and I
think it works for us. We have a military and civilian mix. In
most cases, it is the military that we have as the CIG with an
experienced civilian that is providing that continuity.
And I heard in the previous panel about the talk about
putting a warrant officer in there. I am not going to tell you,
in ours--what works for us is just having experienced
lieutenant colonel and colonel command IGs that actually have
the credibility, the credibility to be able to walk, to be able
to represent that commander and inspect and adjudicate and
understand the independence and be able to walk to another
commander and say, hey, you have got a serious issue here, and
I know because I have been in your shoes.
So it is important for us for the currency we believe to
have those IGs to have credibility. But we have to make sure,
we have to make sure that we have them appropriately trained.
And I brief every commander's course. We brief them and train
them in our quarterly symposiums. And that is the key. If you
train them appropriately and emphasize their importance and
their independence, make sure that the general officers that
they work for and the commanders they work for understand the
importance of that independence. And this works as a good
model.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you all so much. I very much appreciate
it.
I am out of time. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Speier. I thank the gentlelady. Mrs. Bice is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen for
your service and for being with us this afternoon.
My first question is to Mr. O'Donnell. Did I hear correctly
that you are Acting IG for DOD as well as IG for the EPA?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Bice. So that seems like a rather large undertaking to
be able to manage both of those. Is that sort of a temporary
situation?
Mr. O'Donnell. As the title indicates, Acting, yes. It is
temporary. It is a handful, but both offices I am blessed with
really competent staff and committed professionals.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you. Okay. It was mentioned earlier that
the IG, the IG position, I think, it is for the services is for
36 months. Do you all feel like that that maybe impedes the
opportunity to learn and train, and maybe that timeframe needs
to be reevaluated?
General Smith. Thank you for the question. The position is
actually for 46 months or 4 years. So the--48 months. I think
the--it gives you the credibility as you select the commander
with operational background similar to the comments that we
heard earlier that they know they are the commanders, but they
understand who they work for.
It is clear that I work for the Secretary of the Army and
all know that, and that is where my loyalties lie. And now our
job is to make sure we understand the issues and concerns that
subordinate commanders may have, but also those IGs, because we
have had inspectors general work for us before. We bring both
of that knowledge of having the experience with commanders and
also having had IGs work for us before.
General Said. And very similarly so, experience, currency
both are important. And as you heard from the opening
statement, we have a mix of both military IGs and civilian IGs.
On the military side, they are rotating at a higher rate than
the civilians. The civilians provide exceptional experience and
continuity. On the military side, we need recency and currency
in the issues that the IGs are inspecting and/or investigating.
For instance, we do nuclear inspections. We do inspections of
readiness. And currency in what you are inspecting is
critically important. Having done that mission set 10 years ago
is very different than having just come out of an operational
command. And having executed that mission, you know what the
latest and greatest tactics, techniques, and procedures that
are relevant. Therefore, your inspections and your results are
more accurate.
So you need that credibility with the recency, and that is
what the military brings to the mix. Yes, they rotate at a
higher rate, but there is a good balance between the two.
Admiral Snyder. Congresswoman, I will just add. I am sorry.
Just a couple of things I would add. Most of our military folks
are in the inspections branch or division, and so that currency
is important. And, yes, they do rotate more frequently. Many of
our civilians have been around for a very long time.
For me, in particular, typically a 36-month tour, my deputy
is a civilian deputy who has been there before I got there, and
hopefully will be there for a long time. And my chief of staff
is a civilian who has decades of experience at Navy IG.
So, the last thing I will add is I didn't think I had been
an IG before either. But what I have learned is going out and
identifying standards, assessing performance to those
standards, and making recommendations to make the organization
better, it is what we have done our whole career and that is
what we do as IGs.
General Castellvi. Congresswoman, I will just reinforce my
colleagues real quickly in some of the key things that I think
are common that we all feel are important here: it's
credibility, it's experience, and it's currency.
So if you have that continuity with the key civilians you
have as your deputy--I have one that has been in that billet
for 7 or 8 years now, and he is a retired colonel before that.
Brings a great depth of experience. What he lacks is that
currency of what is happening in the Fleet Marine Force at this
time, having not had a more recent command or command
experience out there.
So I think we have a very good mix, I think. Our
inspections team is headed across the entire headquarters
Marine Corps of subject matter experts, a good number of those
are civilians. So it is a decent mix, and I think it seems to
work.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, gentlemen. And my time has expired.
So I will yield back to Chair Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mrs. Bice.
Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Chairwoman, I appreciate it. And
thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
After 25 years of Active Duty service to my country and
retiring as a flag officer in the United States Navy, I know
what it means to sacrifice and to serve my country. I served
under three different Presidents in the White House Medical
Unit, including 8 years in President Barack Obama's tenure when
I was promoted to admiral. It was not important to me whether
the President I was serving was a Republican or Democrat.
I, of course, am a Republican, but I was not concerned
whether my patient or the person I served was a Republican or a
Democrat. I was going to do the best of my job to the best of
my ability.
During that time in the military, I served alongside a
diverse group of sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines. When I
was deployed to Iraq to lead a resuscitative medicine team in
efforts on the battlefield to combat serious injuries on the
battlefield, I didn't care of a person's gender, their sexual
orientation, their political views, their race, or who they
were. I fought alongside them, and I fought to save their
lives. I did what I needed to do, plain and simple.
There were thousands before me, there will be thousands
after me that serve this country honorably. And we all do it to
protect one thing, the United States of America.
Unfortunately, right before our eyes, everything is being
politicized, including what is supposed to be a nonpartisan
Department of Defense. I am frustrated and deeply disappointed
that the organization that I dedicated my life to and that my
family has dedicated their life to is falling victim to what I
consider to be woke culture.
President Biden has requested that we cut spending for the
Department of Defense and has proposed a top-line number that
does not keep up with inflation and definitely does not support
the 3 to 5 percent growth the National Defense Strategy calls
for. Additionally, he requested that the Department of Defense
fund social initiatives and promote the New Green Deal. This
will, in fact, force the Department of Defense to make
difficult decisions to cut key programs that could protect our
country in an effort to promote what I consider a political
agenda.
What are a few things that the Biden administration is
pressing that is a lower priority for the Department of Defense
than the New Green Deal and the social incentives? Number one,
countering biological threats, modernizing our military, and
taking care of our military families.
It truly troubles me how deeply political things have
gotten and how this administration appears to be weaponizing
and politicizing organizations like the Department of Defense
to advance their agenda.
My first question, as part of this in recent cases
undermanning, inadequate staffing, and poor training have
opened the door for the DOD IG to follow political bias instead
of due process. In these cases, the DOD IG predetermines a
conclusion that they want to reach. And due to a lack of staff,
sometimes inadequate training, and sometimes misguided
political motivations, they inevitably reach their
predetermined conclusions regardless of what they find. I have
concerns about the IG's ability to reach these determinations
if the investigators are under-qualified and under-educated.
Mr. O'Donnell I believe is on.
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes sir.
Dr. Jackson. Mr. O'Donnell, could you please describe for
the subcommittee the challenges faced by the IG that are caused
by manning shortfalls, by lack of training and education, and
sometimes by misguided political motivations as the office
attempts to work through what is supposed to be a nonpartisan
process.
Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you for opportunity to answer that
question. Pursuant to the IG Act, one of the requirements for
someone to be an inspector general is that they be chosen
without regard to their partisanship. I am the current IG at
the Environmental Protection Agency--in that regard, I was
chosen and confirmed by the Senate without regard to
partisanship. And in everything I do, there is an objectivity
as required by the Inspector General Act with respect to how we
investigate, whether that is at the EPA or at the Department of
Defense.
I find that my colleagues at the Department of Defense are
some of the best trained, most thorough, dedicated
professionals that I have worked with. I have never once
encountered a situation where one of my staff have had a
predetermined decision and mustered the facts in support of
that. Quite the contrary, their thoroughness in collecting
evidence and sorting through the evidence and in forming an
opinion is the model for what I think is the entire IG
community.
And so in that regard, Representative Jackson, I think that
I am very confident in our ability to, in the work that we
undertake, to do it thoroughly and professionally. Obviously,
resources are a challenge. As I said, we are much smaller
relative to the size of the Department than other OIGs, and
that is why we rely on the Defense Oversight Community. But
with what we have and what we do, I think you won't find a
finer OIG in the IG community.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think that you
are going to be on the lookout to make sure that this doesn't
happen. I think that, you know, this is my opinion, and I have
served in the military, 25 years in Active Duty, and 4 years in
the Reserves. And I think there is an impression out there that
a lot of times the IG approaches investigations with a
predetermined conclusion at the beginning of the investigation.
And I think that some people sometimes feel like--and this
is Active Duty members speaking to me about this on a regular
basis, even since I have been a Member of Congress, obviously--
that they feel like the due process is not completely there. So
I would just say that that is a concern. I think----
Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Ms. Speier. All right. Ms. Jacobs, you will be first when
we return. We are going to suspend for, I guess, what, 20
minutes and then return and continue the hearing.
Thank you all. Again, I apologize that we have to go
through this, but it is what we have to do presently. Thank
you.
[Recess.]
Ms. Speier. The Military Personnel Subcommittee will
reconvene. I think our next colleague who was going to ask
questions was going to be Ms. Jacobs, but I don't see her here
yet.
Ms. Jacobs. I am here, Madam Chair.
Ms. Speier. There you are, okay. Ms. Jacobs, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair.
So I would like to ask a question to the DOD IG first, and
that is that despite sustained attention on the issue of sexual
assault in the military by both Congress and the DOD, reports
have continued to rise over the past decade.
The Fort Hood Independent Review Committee report issued in
November of 2020 found that implementation of sexual assault
prevention response efforts at the installation was ineffective
and that the Army Sexual Harassment Assault Response and
Prevention Program is structurally flawed.
Why are current efforts to prevent and respond to sexual
assault in the military falling short, and how can DOD take a
more effective approach? In particular, how can the DOD IG and
the services work better together and increase interoperability
to combat this issue?
Mr. O'Donnell. Representative Jacobs, thank you for that
question. I would say, first, if you look at the body of work
that we have done particularly recently, you will see that we
have done a pretty good body of work here looking at sexual
response results--sexual assault responses at the Military
Academy, the service academies. We presently have ongoing work
dealing with the special victims counsel, so this is an
important issue for us.
And then to amplify that, in the last NDAA, we were
instructed to form a deputy IG position whose responsibility
would be overseeing, among other things, the DOD's
implementation of diversity and inclusion, which I have taken
to include these issues that you raised, which have to do with
sexual harassment, sexual assault. These are very important
because they do serve as an impediment for morale, for
recruitment.
I just can't imagine the message it sends to mothers and
fathers when they send their children, their teenagers to
serve. And so this is something absolutely we are taking
seriously, and with this new position that we have been given
through the Congress, we will be, I think, expanding that work.
And one of the mandates of section 554 that you gave us was
closer coordination with the Department of Defense but also
with the service IGs.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And thank you for
acknowledging that. I hear from many military parents in my
district about how fearful they are to be sending their, you
know, young children, teenagers into the armed services,
especially their daughters.
And a followup question, are service members assigned to
service IGs ever rotated out in the middle of an investigation,
since we know that was a problem that was found at Fort Hood
with the Army CIG? And I was wondering if the same problem
happens with other service IGs.
General Smith. Ma'am, thanks for the question. For us, the
important aspect is that we use the database, the IG database,
so that means every case that is worked is in this system. So
as that system is updated, they take that information, and even
if an IG rotates, it is referred back and checked on to the
others. Also, I have ultimate oversight on each one of those
cases, so I have the responsibility to make sure every case is
done and done to the standard as it needs to be.
General Said. Representative Jacobs, to your specific
question, it is highly unusual for us in the Department of the
Air Force that an IG initiates an investigation and then in the
middle of it suspends and hands off to somebody else. It does
happen. It is infrequent. It is carefully handed off, and as my
colleague here said, regardless of a handoff or not, the
oversight is consistent.
Admiral Snyder. Yeah, Congresswoman, for the sake of time,
same thing on the Navy side. It may happen occasionally, but
there is a very good handover, constant tracking of that case,
and then oversight at my level.
General Castellvi. Congresswoman Jacobs, it is very rare
that it happens, although it did happen during this last year
since I have been on deck with an investigator that came down
with COVID, and that happens. You have got to have, I think, a
good checks and balance, and you have to have a good case
management system. I think we have a good one right now, so we
are monitoring that when it happens, and if we have to turn
somebody over, we do, but it is very rare.
Ms. Jacobs. All right. Well, thank you all for your
responses, and thank you for your service to our country.
And, Madam Chair, I will yield back the remainder of my
time.
Ms. Speier. I thank the gentlewoman for her questions.
Are there any other members seeking to be recognized?
Okay. Hearing none, then I am going to ask my questions and
that will probably bring our hearing to a close. I would like
for you to write these numbers down: Department of Defense,
1,750; Army, 1,441; Air Force 1,886; Navy, 2,620. I don't have
a number for the Marine Corps. How many staff does the IG have
in the Marine Corps?
General Castellvi. Ma'am, presently, I have got about 41 on
my staff, and then I extend about another 30 that are
inspectors that I pull in. That is just within my headquarters,
ma'am.
Ms. Speier. Well, within the Marine Corps, the number of
inspectors general that you have is how many?
General Castellvi. Total, including our CIGs, I will say,
it is probably somewhere in the 200 to 300 level, ma'am, but I
would have to get back to you on the exact number.
Ms. Speier. Would you please get back to us?
General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 106.]
Ms. Speier. Okay. And let's talk about the caseload. How
many contacts do each of you receive? Department of Defense?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yeah. As I said in my opening statement, I
think last year we, on our hotline, received 16,000 contacts
approximately.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Army?
General Smith. I think the assistance area is about 55,000
and 60,000 assistance cases.
Ms. Speier. Fifty-five and sixty. What do you mean by
assistance cases?
General Smith. So those are cases where personnel asks for
information, and we consider those as contacts also.
Ms. Speier. Well, how many are complaints that are being
filed?
General Smith. The average complaint is about 7,000 cases,
ma'am.
Ms. Speier. 7,000?
General Smith. Yes, Representative Speier.
Ms. Speier. Air Force.
General Said. Chairwoman, over the last 3 years, we
averaged 11,103----
Ms. Speier. Per year or----
General Said. Per year, assistance requests from the IG.
Ms. Speier. Navy.
Admiral Snyder. Yes. Last year, it was about 6,600 contacts
or cases.
Ms. Speier. Marine Corps?
General Castellvi. Last year it was just over 2,000. I
would say half of those were assistance cases, so maybe half of
those were contacts or complaints.
Ms. Speier. So 1,000?
General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. All right. What this suggests to me is that the
DOD IG is woefully understaffed, and, in fact, when you have
the Air Force and the Navy with more staff than the DOD
Inspector General, I would suggest we have a problem.
So I guess my first question is to you. What do you believe
is the appropriate number for the Department of Defense?
Mr. O'Donnell.
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. That is a
difficult question in part because it is when do we need them,
how can we get them and bring them in. Do we need more?
Absolutely. We need more because of the amount of mandatory
work that we are doing required by Congress, which accounts for
about 50 percent of our work, and then there is the
discretionary work that we do which diminishes, and then also
there is the work that comes from requests from the Hill.
So difficult for me to quantify. Happy to discuss this
more. I know that we are currently looking to expand our
workforce so that we can deal with section 554, continue to do
the work on the CARES Act, but, yes, I absolutely agree, we
could use more resources, we could use more manpower.
Ms. Speier. All right. So Inspector General O'Donnell,
would you provide to the committee some working number that we
can look at as part of the NDAA, because these numbers are all
out of whack, the way I look at them. You know, the largest
number is the Navy and, next to the Marine Corps, the lowest
number of complaints that are filed.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
Ms. Speier. I noticed the Air Force has 740 civilians and
the Navy has 740 civilians. I presume those civilians work
within that office for long periods of time. What is the
average length of time that a civilian works within each of
your offices?
Lieutenant General Said.
General Said. Chairwoman, I don't know the exact number,
certainly much longer than our military members that rotate at
a continuing cycle, but we will get back to the committee with
the average duration. It is pretty extensive. They tend to stay
for a while, become subject matter experts and provide
continuity.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 104.]
Ms. Speier. Right, it makes sense. I mean----
General Said. It does. Ma'am, can I just offer one thing?
Ms. Speier. Yes.
General Said. So the workload, when we said 11,103 assists
or requests for assists from the IG, that is just on the
investigation side, right, because as we said before, we have
to do inspections of every single unit----
Ms. Speier. No, I understand that.
General Said [continuing]. For readiness on a recurring
basis, and that is a huge workload in itself.
Ms. Speier. I understand that. In fact, one of the things
I--Members of Congress look at inspectors general as
independent offices. When we look throughout the Federal
Government, IGs are independent. They have subpoena power. They
have, you know, remarkable responsibilities and the ability to
audit.
To call the component IGs in particular IGs is a misnomer,
and even in your roles, because part of your function has
nothing to do with really the investigative function that we
look at, the auditing function that we look at, the waste,
fraud, and abuse function that we look at when we think of IGs,
you may even be misnamed. But I do think that is what is
creating part of our concern.
So where did we leave off? You were giving me--I think,
Lieutenant General Said, you were telling me that you were
going to get back to me on the average length of time for those
who are civilians.
And, Admiral Snyder?
Admiral Snyder. Yes, Chairwoman. I show that we have 495
civilian positions throughout the Navy IG enterprise, and I
will have to take that for the record as well, ma'am, for the
average length of service.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 106.]
Ms. Speier. All right. So, Lieutenant General Smith, you
indicated that in part of your review you have just fired two
IGs. Is that correct?
General Smith. No, ma'am, more than just two. So we have
averaged, last year, of the 55 cases that, there were about 20
that were fired. And it is not just command IGs. It is at every
level. So if there are allegations, we have a professional
reliability branch that they come in, it is a separate
investigation. We have oversight. And they get due process, but
if they don't follow what the requirements are, they lose their
credentials, both military and civilian.
Ms. Speier. We are talking about IGs.
General Smith. That is correct, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. So you have fired, what was the number again?
General Smith. This year, it was 20 IGs out of the 55
allegations that were there.
Ms. Speier. Okay. How about for you, Lieutenant General
Said?
General Said. Ma'am, I will have to get back to you with
the exact number. I haven't fired anybody. I have de-
credentialed. We take somebody out of an IG position if they
don't perform to the level that we expect them to, if they have
a conflict of interest, or if they become the subject of an
investigation that is substantiated. They don't have any
credibility at that point so we automatically remove them. So I
will get back to you with a specific number. It is an automatic
de-credentialing instead of a so-called firing.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 104.]
Ms. Speier. So where do they go then?
General Said. Depending on the severity of the issue, they
might actually totally be discharged from the Air Force if it
is really severe. If it is--because the standards are so high
to be the IG, they might be able to serve elsewhere because the
severity of what was substantiated is acceptable to maybe with
some mentoring to continue service, but certainly not in the
IG. They would lose automatic credibility.
Ms. Speier. All right. So you will get us those numbers.
Admiral Snyder.
Admiral Snyder. I have not fired anybody. We are in the
process of, like the Army has set up, establishing a
professional conduct review board to be able to specifically
look at any concerns we have with the IG professionals.
Ms. Speier. So how many have you removed from the IG
position they hold?
Admiral Snyder. I have not removed any.
Ms. Speier. You have not removed anyone?
Admiral Snyder. No.
Ms. Speier. All right.
General Castellvi. Ma'am, of the 41 that we have, I have
not fired any of them.
Ms. Speier. All right.
General Castellvi. Not yet. We--again, I think we have a
pretty good vetting process. We have denied a few from being
brought on as CIGs, because we did not think or at least feel
that they were the proper quality, but we have not had a firing
yet.
General Smith. So, Chairwoman Speier, I would like to
clarify one thing. So when we are talking about IGs, it is more
than just the lieutenant colonel or colonel command IG. We are
talking about subordinate IGs.
Ms. Speier. I understand.
General Smith. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. All right. To you, Lieutenant General Smith,
the FORSCOM IG went to Fort Hood and came back and reported, I
presume to General Garrett, that everything was terrific, if
you recall. Maybe he didn't use the word ``terrific,'' but he
basically signed off, did a checklist, said, yes, everything is
appropriate.
We then had the Secretary of the Army stand up an
independent committee. We have had a number of hearings with
them here. They came back with a very critical report with 70
recommendations and underscored that the IG did an inadequate
job. That is frankly what has piqued our interest in looking at
the IG function generally, because we have a certain perception
of what an IG is, and it would appear that it is, you know,
very different in application. So what happened to that IG?
General Smith. Well, that IG, ma'am, is still in position.
We have looked at learning from that mission from thereby,
first, assisting the Fort Hood Independent Review team by
providing them information. We have studied each one of those
cases and expanded our survey pieces, which I think was a
problem area from that of not talking to enough people, not
making sure that we had the right breakdown for the numbers of
organizations of people that we talk to and the right gender of
people.
Ms. Speier. Lieutenant General, excuse me, but he failed.
He absolutely failed in his job. He talked to very few people,
he came back with the wrong assessment, he was criticized by
this independent review committee, and he is still in his
position.
General Smith. Chairman Speier, I think that the key thing
is that we are a learning organization, and there is areas that
we can improve in that organization. I have spent time with
that IG and others to make sure that we have done better.
Ms. Speier. You know, if I am a doctor and I perform a
surgery inappropriately, if I create malpractice, I don't get
to practice medicine anymore. I think that was investigative
malpractice, and for that individual to still be in that
position--I am not suggesting he be fired. I am suggesting he
doesn't belong in that position, and that is part of the
problem. We need to professionalize these component IGs and
make them independent, or they are not going to provide the
value that we expect from them.
General Smith. Chairwoman----
Ms. Speier. How is a component IG promoted? Who makes that
call?
General Smith. Chairwoman Speier, that is done by a central
selection board, so it is not their commanders on the ground
that select them based off their overall background and their
ability to move to the next level.
Ms. Speier. All right. I have just a couple more questions,
and I thank the ranking member for hanging in here. How are
each of these component IGs selected?
General Smith. So, Chairwoman Speier, I select each one. We
review with their background with their previous OERs [Officer
Evaluation Reports], and there is an interview process. After
they are selected they go through that 3-week extensive school,
and we have periodic check-ins with them to make sure that they
are executing their tasks to standards.
Ms. Speier. And they serve in that capacity, did you say,
for 4 years?
General Smith. It is up to 4 years.
Ms. Speier. Could be as little as 2?
General Smith. It could be as little as 2, but it varies
based off the time. But the key aspect----
Ms. Speier. Have you considered hiring any civilians, like
the Navy and Air Force does?
General Smith. We do. Many of the deputies in the command
component, as in Forces Command, have deputies or civilians
that also work on the teams and there are civilian IGs.
Ms. Speier. But they are not IGs?
General Smith. They are IGs and they support----
Ms. Speier. Okay. So how many IGs do you have that are
civilians?
General Smith. 427, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. You have 427 IGs that are permanent?
General Smith. That are civilian IGs, that is correct.
Ms. Speier. That are civilian IGs?
General Smith. Right. It is in the documents that we
provided, I think, to your--earlier in the week.
Ms. Speier. Okay. I guess we missed that. All right.
General Said.
General Said. Chairwoman Speier, so central assignment
board is typical in the Air Force, So our IGs are selected
through that process. There are specific standards and specific
insight into the type of person we are assigning to that
position, so we are pretty selective of who ends up in the IG
positions.
Admiral Snyder. For the civilian IGs, they go through the
civilian hiring process so they have to meet certain standards
in order to be qualified and eligible. A selection panel is
then convened. Many times someone from my staff--this is at the
command level, but someone from my staff oftentimes will sit on
that selection panel. When they have a proposed candidate it
comes back to my office for vetting, and I have to provide my
concurrence for that proposed hiree before they are hired.
On the military side, it comes from the personnel system.
We get an advanced copy of their record, and once again, I must
approve their assignment as the IG.
Ms. Speier. General Castellvi.
General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am. For the civilian hires, the
civilian hiring process, we do sit on those boards up at IG
Marine Corps, and it is a collaborative process with the local
commanders as well. Our Manpower and Reserve Affairs assigns
officers to the commands. We vet those individuals working
along with those commanders to make sure that we have the right
Marines, officers serving as CIGs.
Ms. Speier. All right. AR 20-1, you heard the former
Inspector General Heddell talk about this. I still can't get
my--you all said that you are all independent. I presume that
you believe that all your component IGs are independent, but
you have an AR-20 that says the Army IGs work only for their
commanders, they are the conscience of their commanders, that
all IGs must understand their commander's expectations,
standards, visions, and personality. They are the confidant of
the commander.
So I want you to think about this. I am not going to even
ask you to answer it now. I would like for you to give us some
written response.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 107.]
Ms. Speier. I don't know how that squares with being
independent, and I am deeply troubled that we have a system
here that for the most part does not provide the kind of
oversight that we need.
The only time that sexual assault was mentioned was not by
any of you. It was mentioned by a colleague. And yet, sexual
assault and retaliation associated with sexual assault and
sexual harassment is the big elephant in the room. It was
former Inspector General Heddell who said that that was a
serious issue, that inspectors general should be looking at.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on pages 103-106.]
Ms. Speier. So I am going to close with that.
I am not going to make a big deal about this, but, Major
General Castellvi, I met yesterday with family members of the
AAV [assault amphibious vehicle] in which you were in charge
of, and the deaths of those nine Marines. And I must say, it is
a very painful thing for all of us, but I don't quite
understand how someone gets elevated to the position of an
inspector general after being in charge of that particular
disaster.
So with that, we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 15, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 15, 2021
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 15, 2021
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Smithberger. The Department of Defense Inspector General has
resolved over 140 cases through its Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) program since October 2017.\1\ The DOD IG's semiannual reports
also include how many cases are pending in the ADR process, Congress
might require the inspector general to also report how many cases were
referred to ADR during the same period. For comparison purposes, the
Office of Special Counsel's ADR program reported high rates of
settlements for completed mediation rates, see the chart below from
their 2019 fiscal year report to Congress:\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to
the Congress October 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020, ii. https://
media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/30/2002467835/-1/-1/1/
SAR_MAR_2020_BOOK%20V5%20SIGNED_ FINAL_20200730_508.PDF; Department of
Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress: April 1,
2020 through September 30, 2020, 58. https://media.defense.gov/2020/
Nov/30/2002542685/-1/-1/1/DOD%20OIG%20SEMI
ANNUAL%20REPORT%20TO%20THE%20CONGRESS%20APRIL%201,%202020 %20TO%20SE
PTEMBER%2030,%202020.PDF
\2\ Office of Special Counsel, Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal
Year 2019, 24. https://osc.gov/Documents/Resources/
Congressional%20Matters/Annual%20Reports%20to%20Congress/
FY%202019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
.epsAttorneys representing whistleblowers before both the
Department of Defense Inspector General and the Office of Special
Counsel have told us the processes are pretty similar, but that there
is continued need to educate whistleblowers about the availability of
these programs as an option. Generally the perception is that ADR is
very effective for helping whistleblowers find timely and meaningful
resolutions to their concerns. While not always practical, these
programs are most effective when whistleblowers can be helped
confidentially without their name being released. [See page 11.]
Mr. O'Donnell. Although the DOD OIG is the largest Federal OIG, we
are among the smallest when compared to the budget of the department we
oversee. Similarly, we are disproportionally smaller when compared to
other large Federal OIGs. During my opening statement, I underscored
that other larger Federal OIGs typically have a ratio of department
staff to OIG staff of between 50 to 1 and 200 to 1. The DOD OIG ratio
is closer to about 1,700 to 1. Accordingly, we evaluate our current and
future resource requirements regularly. For example, as identified in
Question 42, we are refining our resource needs to enable us to conduct
all sexual assault- and sexual harassment-related reprisal
investigations. In addition, the DOD OIG is working to determine the
organization, structure, staffing, and funding required to support the
execution of section 554. We will submit a report detailing this
information by June 30, 2021, as required by section 554. We will
continue to work with the Committee and others to further define these
and other needs as necessary. [See page 29.]
Mr. O'Donnell. We take matters of sexual harassment and assault
seriously. Since FY 2016, at the suggestion of the Judicial Proceedings
Panel, the DOD OIG has retained control of all whistleblower reprisal
complaints within the DOD that allege reprisal for reporting or
preparing to report a sexual assault, being perceived as reporting or
preparing to report a sexual assault, or assisting someone in reporting
or preparing to report a sexual assault. Although the DOD's anti-
retaliation strategy is limited to military members reporting a sexual
assault, the DOD OIG reviews all reprisal complaints, including
civilians and employees of DOD contractors, subcontractors, grantees,
subgrantees, and personal services contractors who report sexual
assault. [See page 33.]
General Smith. The current average time in civilian federal service
of an Army IG is 11 years. It is important to note that these numbers
do not reflect other IG or IG-like experiences. Approximately 90% of
Army IGs are prior service and some Army IGs have previous military IG
service, civilian IG service with the DOD or our Sister Services, or IG
service with other Federal Departments. Still others have IG-like
experience, such as auditors or as criminal investigators. Based on
2020 demographics, the IG workforce is senior with 78% of the IG
civilian workforce at 50+ years old and the percentage went up to 97%
for those 40+ years old.
Most Army IGs are in the OPM Job Series: 1801, but many require
specialized education, training, and experience and so are in the
applicable OPM Job Series (e.g., 2210 for Cyber Security).
The Inspector General is also the Functional Chief of the Army IG
Career Program (CP55), to which all Army civilian IGs belong. This
program provides support and resources for workforce professional
development. [See page 29.]
General Smith. By law, specifically Title 10, United States Code,
Section 7020, TIG works directly for the Secretary of the Army, who
directs TIG ``(1) to inquire into and report upon the discipline,
efficiency, and economy of the Army; and (2) perform any other duties
prescribed by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff'' (10 USC 7020(b)).
However, TIG works directly for the Secretary of the Army on the
Secretariat Staff, and is responsive to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
In this sense, the Army Inspector General is more independent than
those who work directly for the Chief of Staff of the Army. The
Inspector General ensures that only the highest quality Army officers,
NCOs, and Civilians from all components serve as an Inspector General
through a vetting process. TIG also develops the policy and doctrine
they must follow while also training and qualifying them to implement
that policy and doctrine. TIG also oversees the Army IG system's force
structure, which even field commanders cannot alter without TIG's
approval. In other words, a field commander cannot disband the local IG
office to avoid scrutiny. And when the IG's Commander selects the IG to
investigate an allegation of impropriety, only TIG can terminate the
Investigation once it has started. TIG also has investigative oversight
for selected cases of significant Army interest, and TIG has the
authority to alter findings if someone (a subject or suspect, for
instance) requests reconsideration. In short, no one can tamper with
the IG system to limit an IG's ability to inspect, assists, train, or
investigate. The IG-Commander relationship is not one of reverence but
one designed for the practical enhancement of Army readiness. [See
page 33.]
General Said. Across the DAF, we have 607 credentialed civilian
IGs. The average experience of civilian IGs is 7.08 years. Their
average duration in current IG positions is 4.65 years. [See page
29.]
General Said. Over the last 3 years, we have de-credentialed or
prevented from assuming IG duties, 17 airmen. [See page 30.]
General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly
respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of
independence is critical to executing the mission, at all levels.
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of
their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at
multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all
the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
The DAF-IG system is grounded in independence and objectivity at
every level. As such, we do not believe changes are necessary to ensure
IGs are able to thoroughly and accurately perform their duties,
investigations, and inspections with full independence.
INDEPENDENCE OF FIELD INSPECTORS GENERAL--DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR
FORCE
1. The investigation and inspection standards, policies and
guidelines that all IGs, regardless of level, operate under, are
directed by the Department of the Air Force IG.
2. The training provided to IGs is governed by the Department of
the Air Force IG.
3. While field IGs report to their chain of command, the
conclusions of their investigations and inspection are not influenced
by the chain of command.
4. If field IGs experience any undue influence they must report
such unacceptable influence to the next level IG and all the way up to
the Department of the Air Force IG.
5. Investigations conducted by installation level IGs are
oversighted by the next level IG, Department of the Air Force IG and
DOD-IG as well.
6. Installation IGs cannot conduct investigations in which their
chain of command is conflicted, directly or indirectly. Such cases must
be referred to the next-level IG outside the organization. All such
cases are oversighted by the installation's higher-headquarters IG.
7. Installation IGs do not conduct formal inspections of their own
organizations to assess readiness, compliance, climate . . . . Such
inspections are conducted by the next level IG that is totally
independent of the installation commander and does not report to them.
Such inspections are subject to oversight by the Department of the Air
Force IG.
8. All inspections by any level IG across the Department of the Air
Force are subject to oversight by the Department of the Air Force IG.
9. Department of the Air Force IG may overturn lower-level
investigations and inspection results.
10. Nuclear inspections are oversighted by the Department of the
Air Force IG and Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
11. Any IG not adhering to the common standards of conduct directed
by the Department of the Air Force IG, including the critical element
of independence, will be de-credentialed as an IG and removed from that
position. We have de-credentialed and removed IGs, but not for
violation of the independence standard.
12. The requirement for independence by all IGs is ingrained into
Department of the Air Force IG training and policies. Direct quotes
from DAF-IG policies and training are pasted below.
Examples of DAF-IG Policy Emphasizing Independence
AFI 90-301IC-1, Page 13 Paragraph 1.2.3.
``All IGs must maintain a clear distinction between being an
extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair,
impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They
must be sufficiently independent so those complainants
requesting IG help will continue to do so, even when they feel
the commander may be the problem. Commanders must support this
clear distinction for their IGs to be effective.''
AFI 90-201, 1.3.4 A
``DAF/IG has statutory authority and responsibility to conduct
inspections and investigations which must guarantee
independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of
any appearance of undue influence.''
Examples of DAF-IG Training Material Emphasizing Independence
``The ``Independence'' standard specifically covers our
requirement for impartiality and to guard against threats that my erode
impartiality. Some of those threats include; self-interest, bias, undue
influence, and organizational structure (Chain of Command) threat.''
``To sustain a credible Department of the Air Force IG
system:
--By conducting independent impartial professional inspections
and reporting on all matters affecting readiness, discipline,
efficiency and economy
--By conducting responsive complaint resolution,
investigations, and programs characterized by objectivity,
integrity and impartiality''
``Investigating Officers must be impartial, unbiased,
objective, thorough, and available''
``Investigating Officers (IO) must be independent and at
least one level removed from subjects or complainants
Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
--``Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial,
intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.''
--``Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without
independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is
impaired.'' [See page 33.]
Admiral Snyder. According to the results of a recent data call, the
average length of Inspector General (IG) service under the Department
of the Navy for civilians is 7 years. However, IG professionals in the
Navy often come to the Navy with IG experience from the Department of
Defense Office of the Inspector General, other military Service IG
offices, and other IG offices. The average length of all IG service for
civilians is 9.25 years. [See page 30.]
Admiral Snyder. While Army Regulation 20-1 applies to the Army
Inspector General, the activities of the Naval Inspector General are
governed by Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H, titled
``Mission and Functions of the Naval Inspector General.'' The
instruction states ``The NAVIG, NAVINSGEN, and the NAVIG Enterprise
provide independent, objective, and professional inspections,
assessments, inquiries, research and evaluation, investigations,
oversight, and advice on any and all matters of importance to the DON.
The NAVIG Enterprise operates without command influence, pressure,
coercion, or fear of reprisal.'' Additionally, Article 0310 of the U.S.
Navy Regulations, which describes the composition of the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy, designates the Naval Inspector General as a
staff assistant within that office.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H further asserts:
The Navy Enterprise IGs work operationally for their
commanders and administratively for the Naval Inspector General. When
carrying out their IG functional duties, they are subject to all Naval
Inspector General policies, instructions, and guidance.
A commander with an IG is required to direct appropriate
inspections and investigations by their respective Command IGs,
however, any inspection or investigation conducted by Navy IG
Enterprise personnel, such as Command IGs, will be conducted consistent
with professional standards established by the Naval Inspector General.
The Naval Inspector General shall oversee all IG
functions and report to the Secretary of the Navy on all IG high
visibility matters to include, but not limited to, sexual assault and
harassment, extremism, and reprisal. The Naval Inspector General
reviews these matters and treats them with the utmost seriousness and
importance.
Additionally, the Office of the Naval Inspector General takes the
following steps to ensure independence:
The Office of the Naval Inspector General manages and
provides oversight of Navy hotline cases and investigations; if there
is a conflict, real or perceived, the matter is referred to the
Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General the Inspector
General of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Office of the
General Counsel.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General refers hotline
complaints to one IG level above the subject's command to avoid
conflicts of interest, real or perceived.
The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General
conducts or provides oversight of all Navy military whistleblower
reprisal cases and all Navy senior official IG cases per Department of
Defense and Secretary of the Navy Instruction.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General is in the final
stages of establishing a Professional Responsibility Council to review
allegations of professional misconduct by Navy IG Enterprise personnel,
such as conduct that undermines the integrity or independence
reasonably expected of the position.
Instructions require the entry of all subjects' names
into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System to avoid the
perception of prejudgment.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts
hotline quality standard reviews of hotline cases and investigations
throughout the investigative process and at case closure.
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency guidelines regarding impartiality are taught and applied to
the conduct and review of all inquiries. [See page 33.]
General Castellvi. In the Marine Corps IG community (IGMC personnel
and all CIGs):
Total number of USMC IG personnel O/H = 201
Officers = 34
Enlisted = 99
DOD Civilians = 68 [See page 28.]
General Castellvi. Independence: Marine Corps Order 5040.36J w/
Admin Change 1 states that ``CIGs are directly responsible to, and
limited by, their commander's scope of authority. A CIG is a functional
extension of the IGMC, serving a vital, supporting role in the Marine
Corps Inspection Program. The relationship between the IGMC and CIGs
allows direct and expeditious processing of IG-related tasks between
the two entities.''
The CIG reports directly to either the commander or to the deputy
commander and is the principal advisor to the commander on all
inspection results, identified trends, and IG investigation matters.
Although the CIG reports to the commander, the Marine Corps Order also
includes safeguards to ensure objectivity and independence. As well,
IGMC oversees and inspects the work of each CIG. Every investigation
and hotline case is reviewed by the Marine Corps IG to ensure quality
standards, which include objectivity and independence, are met. Because
each case is put into a central IGMC system, and complaints are made
directly to this system, CIGs cannot delete a case or complaint once it
is made. IGMC has oversight of CIG cases in this system, and provides
frequent spot-checks and reviews to ensure cases are handled
appropriately. This is captured in the order as follows:
``Commander[s] must establish a Hotline Program for the direct
receipt of complaints. All Hotline Programs established pursuant to
this order shall be considered part of the IG network; shall be subject
to oversight, monitoring, and review by IGMC; and shall adhere to the
requirements set forth in references (e), (h), (i), (j), and this
Order.''
As well, the Marine Corps Order directs the following, which allows
CIGs to remove themselves from a case if they feel compromised or
pressured towards a certain outcome:
``When a Marine Corps organization performing IG functions
determines it inappropriate to inquire into a matter due to the
existence or appearance of a conflict of interest, bias, prejudice, or
other circumstance that may place the independence or impartiality of
the inquiry in doubt, it shall refer the matter to the next higher
office in the chain of command with a CIG.''
While no system is perfect, IGMC conducts frequent inspections and
has not found any evidence that commanders attempt to limit the
objectivity and independence of the CIG. The CIGs are in close and
constant contact with IGMC personnel, and have open access to IGMC
personnel for any concerns. As well, for all personnel, civilian and
military, have various non-IG related forms of redress available if
they feel there is reprisal, retaliation, or pressure from a commander
for a certain outcome, and civilian personnel are protected under the
Merit System and Office of Personnel Management regulations.
Sexual Assault Reprisal: Because of the special training required
to investigate reprisal related to sexual assault, the DOD Office of
the IG requires Service IGs to forward complaints of reprisal related
to sexual assaults to the DOD for investigation. When any Marine Corps
IG receives a complaint of reprisal related to sexual assault, whether
from the victim or someone trying to help a victim, they forward the
complaint to IGMC, who immediately forwards the complaint to DOD. All
complaints are routed via IGMC for tracking and trend analysis. In
2019, IGMC received and sent eight complaints of sexual assault/
harassment related reprisal to DOD, and in 2020 IGMC received and sent
three complaints of sexual assault/harassment related reprisal to DOD.
DOD declined investigation on all 11 complaints. [See page 33.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 15, 2021
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
Mr. O'Donnell. In FY 2020, the DOD OIG requested $387,753,000,
including $24,254,000 of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.
Congress appropriated and the DOD OIG received a total of $407,753,000.
This amount included $20,000,000 in Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act funding for pandemic-related oversight,
and $24,254,000 for oversight of OCOs. In FY 2021, the DOD OIG
requested $395,508,000, including $24,069,000 of OCO funding. Congress
appropriated and the DOD OIG received a total of $407,500,859. This
amount included $7,900,000 of unexpended CARES Act funding carried
forward from FY 2020, $4,000,000 for pandemic-related oversight, and
$24,069,000 for oversight of OCOs.
Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
employees and contractors?
Mr. O'Donnell. As of April 24, 2021, the DOD OIG had 1,727 civilian
employees. In addition, 21 military members (20 commissioned officers
and 1 enlisted member) and 141 contractors work for the DOD OIG.
Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
--Requests for inspections
--Requests for administrative investigations
--Whistleblower Complaints
--Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
request for assistance)
How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
Mr. O'Donnell. In FY 2020, the DOD OIG received 15,724 contacts
through the DOD Hotline. The DOD OIG does not track contacts by the
categories requested. The DOD OIG conducted 35 administrative
investigations during FY 2020, including 5 senior official
investigations and 30 whistleblower reprisal investigations. In
addition, the DOD OIG conducted oversight of 1,281 administrative
investigations, including 120 senior official investigations and 1,161
whistleblower reprisal investigations.
Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG was created by the Inspector General Act
of 1978, as amended, as an independent and objective office within the
DOD with the authority to, among other things, conduct and supervise
investigations. The work of the DOD OIG is guided by the professional
standards promulgated by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency (CIGIE), which requires among other things, that in all
matters relating to investigative work, the DOD OIG must be free--in
fact and in appearance--from impairments to independence. These CIGIE
standards also require that the DOD OIG be organizationally
independent, and that the DOD OIG must maintain an independent
attitude. For example, it is the policy of the DOD OIG that any DOD OIG
staff member who may have a real or perceived conflict of interest in
the outcome of a case they are working on must consult with their
supervisor to determine whether the staff member should be recused. To
ensure independence of its administrative investigations, the DOD OIG
requires multiple levels of review for its reports of investigations
(ROIs), including supervisors, senior managers, a quality assurance
reviewer, and the Office of General Counsel. As part of its oversight
responsibilities, the DOD OIG requires that the administrative
investigations it refers to DOD Components remain independent. To this
end, the DOD OIG has promulgated DOD Instruction 7050.01, ``DOD Hotline
Program.'' This DOD-wide instruction requires that any administrative
investigation resulting from a DOD OIG referral must adhere to quality
standards, including those promulgated by CIGIE. To ensure the
independence of an administrative investigation referred to DOD
Components, the DOD OIG continually evaluates whether the receiving
Component is impartial. If, at any time, the DOD OIG determines that
the Component lacks impartiality, the DOD OIG refers the matter to
another Component that is at least one level higher in the
organization.
Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
redacted form?
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG's policy is, to the fullest extent
possible, to be open and transparent about the DOD OIG's performance of
its statutory duties. To this end, the DOD OIG will generally release
the results of administrative investigations that were substantiated.
To release information, either proactively or in response to a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request, the DOD OIG evaluates whether the
public interest in disclosure outweighs any protectable privacy
interest. When national security interests or the privacy interests of
one or more individuals outweigh the public's interest in the content
of an administrative investigation's final ROI, the DOD OIG's policy is
to not proactively release the report. In those instances, the DOD OIG
includes a summary of the report in its Semiannual Report to the
Congress and may also include a summary in its monthly newsletter and
on its public website. The DOD OIG's memorandum, ``Proactive Release
under DOD OIG Privacy Act System of Records Notice,'' is available
here: https://www.dodig.mil/Portals/48/Documents/Policy/
ProactiveReleaseRecordsNotice.pdf?ver=2017-04-30-201108-967
In FYs 2019 and 2020, the DOD OIG published 10 final ROIs and 2
investigative summaries on its public website. The DOD OIG also
published three final ROIs in response to FOIA requests. The DOD OIG
shares information about upcoming work by publishing project
announcements and a monthly newsletter on its public website.
Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
reprisal allegations substantiated?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG conducts each of its whistleblower
reprisal investigations consistent with the law, gathering all of the
relevant evidence, weighing that evidence based on the statutory
standard of proof, and reaching factually-supported conclusions. For
many reprisal allegations, the evidence is insufficient to meet the
statutory standard of proof. In addition, many reprisal allegations are
resolved through the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process,
which are not counted among substantiated cases. The ADR process is an
alternative to formal administrative investigations to address
whistleblower reprisal complaints. The DOD OIG offers ADR to both
civilian and military complainants. To date, 176 Defense contractor and
civilian reprisal complaints and 2 military reprisal complaints have
been resolved through ADR.
Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
Mr. O'Donnell. Training for IG staff is conducted in myriad ways,
including through instructor-led training, virtual classrooms, or by
the DOD OIG Training, Education, and Development Division or external
third-party vendor. For administrative investigations, the DOD OIG
provides training on statutes and policies, complaint-intake
evaluation, investigative planning, interview techniques, evidence
analysis, and report writing. The Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center also provides DOD OIG staff training on administrative
investigations. The average annual duration of administrative-
investigation training is between 3 and 4 days. The DOD OIG's required
training for administrative investigators is the same for all
investigators and does not vary based on rank, grade, or military
status. DOD OIG staff also offer training to DOD Components on how to
conduct reprisal and senior official investigations, as well as a
Hotline course. For example, the DOD OIG developed the DOD Joint IG
Program for individuals serving as an IG or working for an IG within a
joint DOD command, such as a Combatant Command or a defense agency.
These courses enable the DOD OIG to work with other oversight entities
within the DOD to strengthen the Defense Oversight Community.
Ms. Speier. How does the DOD IG decide which hotline complaints to
investigate itself, and which to refer to the service IGs to
investigate? Does the DOD IG make referrals to the service IGs due to
capacity concerns? Are such referrals disclosed to the complainant?
What oversight does the DOD IG conduct of the Service IGs when the
Service IGs take over investigation of hotline complaints?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG generally takes investigative
responsibility for allegations of misconduct by three and four-star
general and flag officers, presidential appointees, and Senior
Executive Service (SES) members in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The DOD OIG will generally refer responsibility for
allegations of misconduct by one and two-star general and flag
officers, and SES members within a DOD Component to the corresponding
IG and retain oversight responsibility of the resulting ROI. The DOD
OIG has sole authority to investigate complaints under sections 1587
and 2409, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), and Presidential
Policy Directive 19, part B. In addition, the DOD OIG retains or
assumes from the Component IGs, reprisal complaints related to
reporting a sexual assault. The DOD OIG and Service IGs are authorized
to receive and handle whistleblower reprisal or restriction complaints
under the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034. If a
Service IG handles a whistleblower reprisal or restriction complaint,
the Military Whistleblower Protection Act requires the DOD OIG to
oversight the investigation and approve the closing of the case.
Yes, the DOD OIG refers some of the approximately 16,000 contacts
it receives each year to the Service IGs.
Yes, the DOD OIG discloses referrals to the Service IGs through the
DOD Hotline website and the complaint form, which states that a
complaint may be referred to a DOD Component for inquiry. If the
complainant consents to disclosing their identity, the complaint will
be referred with their name. If they do not consent, their name is
redacted.
The DOD OIG retains oversight responsibility when it refers a
complaint to another entity. Under DOD Directive 5505.06,
``Investigations by DOD Components,'' DOD Components are required to
provide the DOD OIG the final ROI for review, and are also required to
provide a written report on disciplinary or administrative actions
taken as a result of substantiated investigations. As such, the DOD OIG
requires that the receiving entity conduct the inquiry according to
quality standards that ensure independence and objectivity. If the DOD
OIG determines that the report is deficient, the reporting entity must
resolve the deficiency and resubmit the report. This oversight ensures
that the DOD Component conducted the inquiry in accordance with Quality
Standards for Hotlines established in DOD Instruction 7050.01, ``DOD
Hotline Program.''
Ms. Speier. If there are case the DOD IG would prefer to retain but
cannot as a result of limited capacity, what additional resources would
the DOD IG need to investigate those cases?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG prefers to retain and conduct both
sexual assault and sexual harassment-related reprisal investigations.
Presently, the DOD OIG is resourced to conduct only sexual assault-
related cases. To also conduct sexual harassment-related reprisal
investigations, the DOD OIG will require additional resources. With
regard to its senior official misconduct caseload, the DOD OIG
generally takes investigative responsibility for alleged misconduct by
three and four-star general and flag officers, presidential appointees,
and SES members in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If the DOD
OIG broadened this group of covered individuals to also include one and
two-star general and flag officers, and Component SES civilian
personnel, the DOD OIG would require substantially more resources. We
will continue to work with the Committee and others to further define
these and other needs as necessary.
Ms. Speier. If the DOD IG had additional resources, what would be
the highest priorities for the use of those resources?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG evaluates its current and future
resource requirements throughout the year based on a number of factors
including DOD OIG equities contained in the annual National Defense
Authorization Act (e.g., Sec. 554), recurring statutory reporting
requirements, specific requests from Congress and our own regular
oversight planning. Our annual Management Challenges and Oversight Plan
publications highlight our priority areas of oversight. These
publications are available on the DOD OIG's public website at the
following links: (https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Top-DOD-Management-
Challenges/ and https://www.dodig
.mil/Reports/Oversight-Plan/). We will continue to work with the
Committee and others to further define these and other needs as
necessary.
Ms. Speier. Has DOD IG increased visibility of substantiated
misconduct for senior officials? If so, how?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes. In June 2016, the DOD OIG amended its proactive
release policy for administrative investigations with updated guidance
on factors to consider when determining whether to make a proactive
release of information. The previous policy was not to publicly post
final ROIs unless the DOD OIG received three FOIA requests. Under the
revised policy, to release information, either proactively or in
response to a FOIA request, the DOD OIG evaluates whether the public
interest in disclosure outweighs any protectable privacy interest. When
national security interests or the privacy interests of one or more
individuals outweigh the public's interest in the content of a final
ROI, the DOD OIG's policy is to not proactively release the report. In
those instances, the DOD OIG includes a summary of the report in its
Semiannual Report to the Congress and may also include a summary in its
monthly newsletter on its public website. The DOD OIG's memorandum,
``Proactive Release under DOD OIG Privacy Act System of Records
Notice,'' is available at the following link: https://www.dodig.mil/
Portals/48/Documents/Policy/ProactiveRelease
RecordsNotice.pdf?ver=2017-04-30-201108-967
Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
General Smith. The information provided only includes the budget of
the Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) Office, not inspector
general field offices. The budgets for these offices are managed by
their respective commands.
The DAIG budget covers 5 key areas: Payroll, TIG Travel,
Inspection/Oversight mission travel, The Inspector General School
Operations, and the IG Network/IG Case Management Systems/Databases.
There are three important notes for context:
1. COVID19 has had a significant impact on the DAIG and the budget
for both FY20 and FY21 as resident IG School classes were replaced with
virtual training and travel in support of our Inspection and Oversight
mission were curtailed and, where possible, replaced with virtual
inspections. This resulted in a return of unused funds in FY20 and
impacted the size of the DAIG budget in FY21.
2. The budget of the DAIG historically is very dynamic and funding
requirements can change significantly in the year of execution
depending on changing Army priorities and emerging requirements. The
Army has consistently and fully supported the mission. When more
funding is needed to execute an IG mission the Army has provided the
necessary funding. Also the Army has historically funded the DAIG
payroll to support a 100% civilian fill rate goal.
3. Our military IGs are paid from a central account and the funding
for this is not reflected in our budget. Army Senior Leadership,
including the leadership of the US Army Reserves and National Guard,
has historically sustained the DAIG at the highest manning priority.
The requested information follows below
FY20 Budget Request: $21M
Total Appropriated Budget: $21M
Note: During this year, the DAIG only executed $18.6M and returned
$2.4M due to the impacts of COVID19 on IG Operations
FY21 Budget Request: $19.5M
Total Appropriated Budget: $18.2M
Note: This year's reduced budget reflects the impacts of COVID19.
There is no anticipated funding shortfall this year and we anticipate
returning to a pre-COVID19 budget levels in FY22.
Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
employees and contractors?
General Smith. Based on the Annual IG Force Management Report,
dated 1 October 2020, the Army IG structure has:
1014 Military IGs (527 Officers, 10 Warrant Officers, 477 Enlisted)
427 Department of the Army Civilians
There are no IG Contractors as IG work is considered inherently
governmental in nature
Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
--Requests for inspections
--Requests for administrative investigations
--Whistleblower Complaints
--Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
request for assistance)
How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
General Smith.
Inspectors General received 2,483 Senior Official
allegations in FY18-20 (closed cases). This resulted in 54 allegations
substantiated by Inspectors General. (2%) Of the 2,483 Senior Official
allegations closed in FY18-FY20, there were 152 allegations of
statutory reprisal; 2 of these allegations we substantiated (less than
1%)
Inspectors General received 9,274 Non-Senior Official
allegations in FY18-20 (closed cases) and 4,342 allegations were
referred to commanders for further action. This resulted in 1,645 total
substantiated allegations. (out of 13,616 total allegation = 12.1%) In
addition, Army Inspectors General actioned 74,035 Requests for
Assistance and 50,756 Information Requests during the same time period.
Of the 9,274 Non-Senior Official allegations closed in
FY18-FY20, there were 2,881 allegations of statutory reprisal; 63 of
these allegations were substantiated (2%).
In FY20, Department of the Army Inspectors General
completed 18 systemic inspections, 70 compliance inspections, and 6
data calls. In addition, visited 96 CONUS and 24 OCONUS sites making
contact with 7874 people. Field IGs conduct their own inspections based
on the Organizational Inspection Program method taught at the Inspector
General School. This is mandated for battalion-level and above.
As of April 28, 2021, for FY21, Department of the Army
Inspectors General completed 2 systemic inspections, 30 compliance
inspections, and 4 Data calls. In addition, DAIG personnel visited 24
CONUS and 0 OCONUS sites making contact with 2,528 people.
Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
General Smith.
The Inspector General (TIG) retains oversight of all Army
1,441 IGs who are organized into 208 offices (93 Active Component, 67
U.S. Army Reserve, and 28 U.S. Army National Guard).
Field IGs work directly for the commander of their
assigned unit or organization but within the parameters (policy
guidance, personnel selection, training, and oversight) established by
TIG and his staff.
A field IG is responsible to his or her commander, but
responsive to TIG and the needs of the Secretary of the Army and the
Army Chief of Staff.
All IGs within the Army IG enterprise, regardless of
location of assignment, must abide by Army Regulation 20-1 (Inspector
General Activities and Procedures), pertaining to conduct of assistance
inquiries, investigative inquiries, and investigations, as well as
personal conduct.
If TIG loses confidence in an Army IG's ability, he can
and will immediately suspend their IG credentials. If, after proper due
process, he is still of this opinion, he will revoke their credentials
and remove the inspector general from their position of trust.
IGs work under the authority of TIG. If there is an
allegation against an IG, the command either directs the investigation
or TIG can authorize a higher echelon IG conduct the investigation.
However, IG investigations are typically not used for negative action
unless TIG approves. A command investigation allows for the possibility
of a negative administrative action. A DAIG team provides oversight of
every investigation against Army IGs, and provides information for
TIG's final determination.
DAIG maintains oversight on Field IG cases through IGARS
and case back-briefs. Every week, TIG receives updates on various cases
of senior leader interest. Every month, he reviews the oldest cases
across the enterprise and those of senior leader interest. Every
quarter, he hosts a forum where command inspectors general (CIGs)
update him directly on their oldest 50 cases and he provides
assistance, as required. These CIGs brief any obstacles to completing
investigations. CIGs also know they have an open door to contact TIG
concerning investigations, inspections, or significant personnel
matters.
DODIG conducts oversight on whistleblower reprisal and
senior official cases.
Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
redacted form?
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
General Smith. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 552, provides the statutory framework for the Agency's decisions
whether to make the results of Army Inspector General (IG)
investigations public. Army IG investigations may be released to the
public via the Army's FOIA Library (available at https://
www.rmda.army.mil/readingroom/), or through the Army Public Affairs
Office. Investigations may also be released directly to individual
members of the public via written correspondence. Of the 191 Senior
Official investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, DAIG made
3 public. The Army Inspector General Agency generally does not share
information with the public about planned or ongoing work.
Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
reprisal allegations substantiated?
General Smith.
Overall, the relatively low FY 18-20 whistleblower
reprisal substantiation rates can be primarily be attributed to the
following factors:
1) The key elements and variables of a whistleblower reprisal
allegation are not clearly understood by many complainants.
2) In the majority of whistleblower reprisal investigations the
Army conducts, the preponderance of evidence reveals no
connection between a protected communication and the alleged
personnel action.
3) While not perfect, Army commanders and leaders are committed
to the professional Army Ethic that requires promoting a
positive environment, taking care of Soldiers and civilians,
developing disciplined and cohesive units, and maintaining
readiness.
In FY18-FY20, we completed investigations into 2,881
allegations of statutory reprisal that were presented to inspectors
general; 63 of these allegations were substantiated (2%).
DODIG conducts oversight of every whistleblower reprisal
case conducted by Army IGs. Army IG whistleblower reprisal cases only
close after a DODIG review of the evidence and analysis, and approval
of the Army IG's findings.
Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
General Smith.
All detailed Army IGs from all three Components (Active,
Reserve, National Guard) (including DA civilians) are trained and
certified by The Inspector General School (TIGS). This school is
accredited by the American Council on Education and the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Inspector General School
Basic Course is three weeks in duration, with one week dedicated to
investigations. This training is conducted by a combination of military
and civilian staff and faculty with a requirement for all primary
instructors to have field IG experience prior to being selected to the
billet. All instructors also go through a three phase, 90-day
certification process, to include attending an external Instructor
Training certification course executed by TRADOC, before they are
deemed fully certified to instruct at TIGS.
TIGS curriculum is constantly evolving to ensure that we
remain relevant to the needs of the Army and the Nation. This evolution
is governed by a disciplined series of course reviews, faculty reviews,
and constant communication with IGs in the field.
All Army IGs have access to Army Regulation 20-1
(Inspector General Activities and Procedures), along with five separate
doctrinal guides. The combination of this policy and associated
doctrine governs how IGs in the field execute all four of their IG
functions; Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and
Training. As with our curriculum, Army IG doctrinal guides are
frequently updated to meet the changing requirements of the Army.
Senior Army Inspectors General can attend the TIGS IG
Advanced Course to further refine their skills and knowledge of IG
processes. Additionally, DA civilian IGs are required to attend TIGS
Advanced Course every five years as a part of functional training for
all 1801-series personnel.
All Army IGs can access a variety of TIGS produced
instructional videos detailing IG procedures and techniques as well as
interactive simulation software of how to conduct IG investigative
interviews, to include a version specific to Whistleblower Reprisal
cases.
Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
General Smith. The U.S. Army Inspector General system developed
more than 20 years ago clear standards and processes for the conduct of
IG Inspections and IG Investigations. These standards and processes
directly reflected--and in most cases exceeded--the standards
established by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE). These standards and processes exist in the form of
doctrinal guides developed as an adjunct to Army IG policy prescribed
in Army Regulation 20-1.
The Army IG system, defined in paragraph 1-7 of Army Regulation 20-
1, charges general officer Commanders in the field to use their
assigned IGs to focus their inspectors general inspection efforts on
systemic issues affecting the readiness of the command. Systemic issues
represent a pattern of non-compliance among multiple Army
organizations, usually within a specific Army command. The IG, as a
type ``systems analyst,'' looks for these patterns and then recommends
inspection topics (focusing on these systemic issues) to the Commander,
who will approve the topics based upon the readiness needs of the
entire command. The Commander, as an expert in the field of his or her
command, selects these inspection topics independently and within the
goals he or she intends to achieve regarding the command's readiness.
These IG Inspections are not merely compliance inspections but instead
are top-to-bottom assessments of major Army functions, systems, or
programs that are not functioning appropriately within the command and
are therefore a risk to mission readiness. IGs assigned to Commanders
throughout the various echelons of command are in a unique position to
identify where those lapses exist and to steer their Commanders toward
the problem areas. The IG's independence in this case comes from the
fact that the Commander empowers the IG by signing an Inspection
Directive, which in turn affords the IG the authority to carry out the
inspection without external influence from anyone in the command.
The Army IG Inspections Process, outlined in The Inspections Guide
and updated annually, is a detailed roadmap for how an Army IG will
inspect a systemic issue. The process has three phases and 17 discrete
steps that have fully integrated, and in many cases exceeded, the seven
standards set forth in the Quality Standards for Inspections and
Evaluations published by CIGIE. Most importantly, Army IGs inspect
independently without external influence on behalf of the Commander and
within the Commander's authority. Additionally, Army IGs are qualified
to conduct IG inspections by graduating the Army IG Basic Course after
The Inspector General vets them and approves them for IG duty. The
planning of an IG inspection is extensive and resembles in detail the
Military Decision-Making Process used to plan combat operations.
Quality control of IG Inspection Reports occurs in multiple ways.
First, the report must route through the Commander for approval before
submission. Next, Command IGs are required to send a listing of
approved, completed IG Inspection Reports up through their higher Army
Command (ACOM), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), or Direct-
Reporting Unit (DRU) for subsequent transmittal to DAIG. DAIG's
Inspections Directorate reviews selected reports from the scores of
inspections conducted each year to check on quality standards and
relevance to broader Army systemic issues. DAIG's Inspections
Directorate also makes all DAIG-level Inspection Reports available to
Army IGs on the Inspector General Network as examples. Lastly, DAIG
conducts Staff Assistance Visits with all ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs in
order to review the quality of assistance case work; the quality of
Reports of Investigation; and the quality of Inspection Reports.
Army IGs conduct IG Investigations in much the same way as they
conduct Inspections--by following the The Assistance and Investigations
Guide, which is updated annually. It details a 16-step investigations
process, which is a subset of the larger Inspector General Action
Process used for both the Assistance and Investigations functions. This
detailed process, like the Inspections Process, fully integrates all
aspects of CIGIE's investigatory standards.
Investigations is the function performed least often by Army IGs,
because the IG's Commander has other options to resolve allegations of
impropriety. IGs normally refer allegations to Commanders throughout
the command for resolution, but the IG must follow-up to ensure that
the subordinate command resolved the matter properly and that the
resulting product was of high quality as well as legally and logically
sufficient. IGs also do not investigate serious criminal misconduct;
instead, IGs refer those allegations to the Army's Criminal
Investigations Division (CID). IGs must refer all allegations of sexual
assault to CID and allegations of sexual harassment to the local Victim
Advocate and/or the local Sexual Assault Response Coordinator. Serious
criminal matters are not appropriate for IG action because other
established avenues of redress are available along with individuals
specially trained to handle these matters.
As trained and qualified investigators, IGs primarily conduct
administrative investigations, and usually only when the matter is
sensitive in nature and requires discretion. There is one exception: by
law (10USC1034), IGs must investigate allegations of Whistleblower
Reprisal, which Army IGs investigate under the auspices of DOD IG. In
turn, DOD IG provides extensive quality control of the final report.
The IG's investigatory independence from the command rests in the fact
that after a general officer Commander initiates an IG Investigation,
only The Inspector General of the Army can terminate it. Therefore, no
one in the command can place undue influence on the local Command IG
and push that IG to terminate an ongoing IG investigation.
Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
investigation that a commander opposes?
General Smith. Regarding Inspections:
As outlined in AR 20-1, inspectors general will use a
deliberate process to identify, evaluate, and set priorities for
potential inspections of systemic and other issues for approval by the
directing authority and inclusion in the Organizational Inspection
Program (IG inspections are but one of three types of inspections
incorporated into this program; the other two are Command Inspections
and Staff Inspections). IGs should reasonably expect to complete at
least four inspections of systemic issues a year, but the size of the
IG staff section and the commander's priorities will ultimately
determine the number of inspections conducted.
Detailed doctrinal guidelines for preparing, executing,
and completing IG inspections appear in The Inspections Guide, one of
the two primary guides linking our policy to our doctrine. The process,
as outlined in The Inspections Guide, represents IG doctrine and it is
authoritative in nature; IGs may shape, tailor, and adapt the
techniques and steps to meet the commander's guidance and needs, while
still preserving the integrity of the IG inspections process across the
Army.
Regarding Investigations:
IAW AR 20-1, the investigation is the IG function that
provides the commander/directing authority another means through which
to resolve allegations of impropriety. The primary purpose of IG
investigations and investigative inquiries is to resolve allegations of
impropriety. IGs may investigate violations of policy, regulation, or
law; mismanagement; unethical behavior; fraud; or misconduct. However,
IGs will provide the command the opportunity to resolve allegations
within command channels. Therefore, IGs will refer all command-
appropriate allegations to the command in accordance with guidance from
the directing authority or, if criminal in nature, to CID. Directing
authorities should opt for an IG investigation or investigative inquiry
when extreme discretion is necessary or when the command investigation
is not likely to be efficient or effective. Once an IG initiates an
investigation or investigative inquiry, the IG will complete the entire
investigative action to determine if the allegations are
``substantiated'' or ``not substantiated'' and if any issues are
``founded'' or ``unfounded''.
TIG has emphasized, and AR 20-1 specifies, findings for
investigations must be supported by the evidence.
WBR and HL investigations are provisionally approved by
commanders and Directing Authorities, but actually reviewed by DAIG and
ultimately approved by DODIG.
DAIG maintains investigative oversight for select cases
of significant interest to provide Army Senior Leader oversight over
the cases
AR 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide
describes detailed procedures for IGs to request assistance or
reconsideration from higher commanders, and even higher level IGs, when
there are disagreements about the findings of cases.
At the DAIG level, we can disagree, amend, and/or
overturn the findings of down-trace cases where DAIG has been
designated as the Office of Record (OOR) as long as facts support this
decision and we obtain a favorable legal review at the DAIG level.
Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
General Smith. The Inspector General (TIG), US Army, receives legal
advice from legal advisors assigned to the Department of the Army
Inspector General (DAIG). TIG's legal office consists of a senior legal
advisor, a deputy legal advisor, and other attorneys who provide a wide
spectrum of advice on issues including, but not limited to, Ethics,
Investigations, FOIA and the Privacy Act, and General Administrative
Law issues. Army component IGs (i.e., IGs assigned to Army Commands and
subordinate units, or to Army National Guard or US Army Reserve units)
receive legal advice, especially regarding the conduct of
investigations and assistance cases, primarily from their command's
supporting legal office (typically an Office of the Staff Judge
Advocate (OSJA)). The SJA and the OSJA's attorneys are Command IGs'
immediate legal advisors. On occasion, Command IGs of Army units
receive legal advice from DAIG's legal office, especially where
interpretation of Army IG policies and procedures, as contained in Army
regulations or policy documents, is at issue.
Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
example, command, installation, etc.)?
General Smith.
The Inspector General and The Inspector General SGM
execute senior leader training for all individuals selected for General
Officers during several leadership programs (Basic, Commander,
Advanced). This training is focused on the role of Inspectors General,
current trend analysis, and how the IG can enable readiness and
warfighting capability.
The DAIG Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Office (AIFO)
also produces a Senior Official Front Office Exportable Training
Package that is designed as a collective training event intended to
train Senior Officials and their personal/support staffs to avoid
potential ethical pitfalls.
The Inspector General and The Inspector General SGM, as
well as select members of the DAIG staff (primarily senior COL's and
Senior Enlisted Advisors) conduct monthly engagements with officers and
senior NCO's who have been selected for battalion and brigade level
command positions. This occurs either in-person or virtually during the
second week of the Battalion/Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC), a DA
mandatory training event for all command-select senior leaders managed
by the US Army TRADOC. Much like the senior leader training provided at
the Capstone program, this both large and small group discussion
focused on role of Inspectors General, current trend analysis, and
explaining how the IG can enable readiness and warfighting capability.
Many installations also incorporate the IG office into
their own Company Commander/First Sergeant Courses, newcomer's briefs,
and other key events linked to their camp, post, or station. As a part
of the Teach and Train function, Command IGs routinely execute periodic
office calls with brigade and battalion leadership teams to discuss
trend analysis, root causes, and organizational mitigation measures.
Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
oversight roles?
General Smith.
1) Sharing lessons learned with other Services IGs: The Quarterly
Service IG Meetings provide an opportunity for TIG to share issues and
lesions learned with other Service IGs. TIG collaborates with other
Service IGs with various topics of inspections amongst the other
Services.
2) Sharing lessons learned with other Army oversight entities: We
do share information with other oversight entities. For example, we
collaborate with the Army Audit Agency in support of each other's
initiatives and share inspection plans and results as needed.
3) Sharing lessons learned with DODIG. There is a constant two-way
dialog between the United States Army Inspector General Agency and
DODIG reference allegations with shared jurisdiction (e.g.,
Whistleblower Reprisal, DOD Hot Line, and Senior Official
Investigations). Lessons learned are shared informally on a daily basis
and formally through Army IG attendance at DODIG Whistleblower Reprisal
Training classes and conferences. TIG also attends a meeting with other
Service IGs hosted by DODIG. This forum also discusses lessons learned.
4) Sharing lessons learned with Army Commanders. The Inspector
General uses a variety of strategic communication products to
communicate with key leaders in the field. The United States Army
Inspector General Annual Report (see FY 19 report attached), the
Company Leaders Inspector General Handbook Template (see attached FY 18
template attached), Inspector General Updates (see attached IG Update:
Appearance and Grooming Standards template) and the Senior Leader
Exportable training package (copy attached) and the All these products
are designed to inform leaders at all levels of the issue that Army IGs
commonly encounter and provide tips on how to avoid such misconduct in
the future
Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
General Said. The DAF-IG enterprise-wide budget numbers, when
aggregated, were approximately as follows:
FY20: $31M requested and $24M appropriated
FY21: $33M requested and $22M appropriated
Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
employees and contractors?
General Said. Across the DAF we have 2,620 airmen and guardians
performing IG duties, of which 1,880 are military and 740 are
civilians. On the uniformed military side, 1089 are enlisted and 791
are officers. Total funded billets however stand at 1,886. The mix of
civilians and military is important to us. Our military IGs offer
experience, but also critically important currency in the issues
they're charged to inspect or investigate. Our civilian IGs bring a
wealth of experience and provide helpful continuity.
Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
--Requests for inspections
--Requests for administrative investigations
--Whistleblower Complaints
--Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
request for assistance)
How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
General Said. Over the past 3 years we have received an average of
11,103 contacts per year. Those contacts were comprised of requests for
assistance, referrals to another unit or agency as necessary,
whistleblower complaints, and senior official complaints. The vast
majority of these contacts are requests for assistance (65%) or
referrals (15%).
The average number of whistleblower and senior official
complaints over the past 3 years has been 504 per year.
Of the 504 whistleblower and senior official complaints
received each year, an average of 143 each year resulted in a
formal investigation, while the remainder were resolved during
our rigorous complaint analysis/preliminary inquiry phase.
Over the last three years, total number of DAF investigations
resulting from IG complaints averaged approximately 353 cases
per year.
DAF-IGs are responsible for conducting administrative
whistleblower investigations, both reprisal and restriction, as
well as senior official investigations. Over the past 3 years
we have conducted an average of 143 of these investigations
each year.
Importantly, DAF-IG also conducts a variety of comprehensive
independent reviews of matters such as the Racial Disparity
Review, contracted military housing, unauthorized use of RC-26
aircraft during civil unrest, and others.
DAF-IG monitors retaliation of whistleblowers by ensuring every
complainant that comes to the IG to report potential
retaliation/reprisal is briefed (educated) on the specific
protections within the Military Whistleblower Protection
program, and we advise them to contact the IG in the future if
any adverse actions are taken against them (or suspected) as
result of the member's whistleblower complaint--IAW 10 USC
1034, DODD 7050.06, and AFI 90-301.
IG inspections are driven by AFI 90-201, DOD policy, or law rather
than ``requests for inspections.'' Over the past 3 years we have
conducted an average of 6,864 inspections per year. These activities
include Unit Effectiveness Inspections (primarily focused on readiness
to meet wartime taskings, compliance, and unit climate) for our field
and operational units; Management Inspections for a variety of
intermediate, MAJCOM/FIELDCOM, and DAF headquarters functions; Special
Access Program inspections; Nuclear Surety Inspections; Medical
Inspections; Wounded, Ill, and Injured Facility Inspections; Cemetery
Inspections; Radioactive Material Permit Inspections; ``By-law''
Inspections such as--Combating Trafficking in Persons, Federal Voting
Assistance Program, Personnel Accountability, Suicide Prevention
Program, Transition Assistance Program, Equal Opportunity, Sexual
Assault Prevention & Response Program, Intelligence Oversight; and
others.
Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
take to ensure independence throughout the process? [QFR #23, for
cross-reference.]
General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly
respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of
independence is critical to executing the mission, at all levels.
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of
their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at
multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all
the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
INDEPENDENCE OF FIELD INSPECTORS GENERAL--DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR
FORCE
1. The investigation and inspection standards, policies and
guidelines that all IGs, regardless of level, operate under, are
directed by the Department of the Air Force IG (DAF-IG).
2. The training provided to IGs is governed by the DAF-IG.
3. While field IGs report to their chain of command, the
conclusions of their investigations and inspection are not influenced
by the chain of command.
4. If field IGs experience any undue influence they must report
such unacceptable influence to the next level IG and all the way up to
the DAF-IG.
5. Investigations conducted by installation level IGs are
oversighted by the next level IG, DAF-IG and DOD-IG as well.
6. Installation IGs cannot conduct investigations in which their
chain of command is conflicted, directly or indirectly. Such cases must
be referred to the next-level IG outside the organization. All such
cases are oversighted by the installation's higher-headquarters IG.
7. Installation IGs do not conduct formal inspections of their own
organizations to assess readiness, compliance, climate . . . .. Such
inspections are conducted by the next level IG that is totally
independent of the installation commander and does not report to them.
Such inspections are subject to oversight by the DAF-IG.
8. All inspections by any level IG across the Department of the Air
Force are subject to oversight by the DAF-IG.
9. DAF-IG may overturn lower-level investigations and inspection
results.
10. Nuclear inspections are oversighted by the DAF-IG and Defense
Threat Reduction Agency.
11. Any IG not adhering to the common standards of conduct directed
by the DAF-IG, including the critical element of independence, will be
de-credentialed as an IG and removed from that position. We have de-
credentialed and removed IGs, but not for violations of the
independence standard.
12. The requirement for independence by all IGs is ingrained into
DAF-IG training and policies. Direct quotes from DAF-IG policies and
training are pasted below.
Examples of DAF-IG Policy Emphasizing Independence
AFI 90-301IC-1, Page 13 Paragraph 1.2.3.
``All IGs must maintain a clear distinction between being
an extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair,
impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They must be
sufficiently independent so those complainants requesting IG help will
continue to do so, even when they feel the commander may be the
problem. Commanders must support this clear distinction for their IGs
to be effective.''
AFI 90-201, 1.3.4 A
``DAF-IG has statutory authority and responsibility to
conduct inspections and investigations which must guarantee
independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of any
appearance of undue influence.''
Examples of DAF-IG Training Material Emphasizing Independence
``The ``Independence'' standard specifically covers our
requirement for impartiality and to guard against threats that my erode
impartiality. Some of those threats include; self-interest, bias, undue
influence, and organizational structure (Chain of Command) threat.''
``To sustain a credible Department of the Air Force IG
system:
o By conducting independent impartial professional inspections
and reporting on all matters affecting readiness, discipline,
efficiency and economy
o By conducting responsive complaint resolution,
investigations, and programs characterized by objectivity,
integrity and impartiality''
``Investigating Officers must be impartial, unbiased,
objective, thorough, and available''
``Investigating Officers (IO) must be independent and at
least one level removed from subjects or complainants''
``Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
o Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial,
intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.
o Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without
independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is
impaired.''
Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
redacted form?
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
How do you decide whether to make the results of an investigation
public and what format do you use (i.e., website, news release)? Of the
investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, how many reports
of investigation were made public, at least in redacted form?
General Said. IG investigations generally involve allegations
related or personal matters, conduct, and/or performance. As such, they
often are governed by the Privacy Act. Hence, investigations are made
available in redacted form when requested under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). We recognize and diligently work the balance
between the public's right to know the results of IG investigations
versus personal privacy and appreciate more disclosure is appropriate
and necessary when investigations involve senior officials, general
officers, and members of the Senior Executive Service than those
involving more junior members. Investigations that have been requested
by multiple parties under the FOIA are posted to the DAF FOIA Reading
Room website.
Other IG work such as our 2020 Racial Disparity Review are made
available to the public via the DAF website.
Finally, we routinely share information with DOD-IG to support
their congressional and public reporting requirements related to
investigations.
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
Information regarding upcoming work such as our 2020 Racial Disparity
Review, privatized housing review, and ongoing Disparity Review is made
available, when appropriate, through the DAF website, via DAF Public
Affairs, and direct messaging to airmen and guardians.
Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
reprisal allegations substantiated?
General Said. Every reprisal complaint received by DAF-IG is
thoroughly reviewed, addressed, and resolved in accordance with the law
as well as DOD and DAF policy. As it relates to ``so few reprisal
allegations being substantiated,'' we find that many complainants use
the term reprisal without a full understanding what reprisal
technically entails. Frequently, when reprisal complaints don't meet
the elements present in the law for reprisal to exist, reprisal itself
may be not substantiated. However, in these cases another violation
such as abuse of authority may exist, which results in the allegation
being re-characterized and investigated as such. Whether a complaint
relates to reprisal, abuse of authority, or another allegation of
wrongdoing, the outcome of each case is driven by its specifics facts
and evidence, and determinations as to whether a complaint is
substantiated or not substantiated are made using the preponderance of
the evidence standard. DAF-IG findings in reprisal and restriction
investigations undergo multiple IG and legal reviews before they are
provided to DOD-IG for final approval. Likewise, DOD-IG provides
oversight reviews of all our senior official investigations.
Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations:
Inspector General Training Course-Complaints Resolution (IGTC-Q) is
required for all officer, enlisted and civilians (regardless of rank or
grade) to become a Department of the Air Force complaints resolution
investigator. Training is conducted by DAF-IG and other agency subject
matter experts. The IGTC-Q course duration is 5 days. Training also
occurs during the quarterly (DAF-wide) DAF-IG scheduled video
teleconference meetings (DCS or Zoom). DAF-IG also hosts and conducts
an annual World Wide training conference. In addition to initial
training, all DAF-IG complaints resolution and investigations personnel
are required to receive refresher training every 3 years.
For Inspections: The Inspector General Training Course-Inspections
(IGTC-I) is a three to five day course taught by either military or
government civilian instructors. The course teaches the fundamentals of
inspections at Wing/Delta and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM levels and is centered
around the CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation for
Inspectors General. IGTC-I is taught at the Department of the Air Force
Inspection Agency (DAFIA), at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Before COVID,
the courses were taught in-residence, but due to COVID restrictions,
all courses are currently taught virtually. To significantly enhance
focus on exercise planning and warfighting readiness, DAF-IG added the
Readiness Exercise Advanced Planning, Evaluation and Reporting (REAPER)
course in 2017; also taught by DAFIA. Additionally, DAFIA provides the
Nuclear Surety Inspector Course, to address DAF-specific Nuclear
Inspection requirements in conjunction with Defense Threat Reduction
Agency's Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspector Course. Training is the
same for all students irrespective of rank/grade or military/civilian
status. Finally, DAFIA participates in IG summits, workshops and
seminars, and provides IG cross-tell messages focused on current IG
inspections policy, processes, and lessons learned.
Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019
to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you
implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been
delayed?
General Said. Yes. The Automated Case Tracking System (ACTS)
upgrade in November 2020 enhanced the protection of privacy for
whistleblowers and complies with the GAO recommendations. Specifically,
the upgrade imposed stricter case accessibility limits by organization
to ensure non-DAF organizations using ACTS cannot see DAF cases (and
vice versa) or cases outside their own organization. It added a flag on
cases to display whether a complainant has consented to release of
their identity outside of the IG. The upgrade enabled access
restrictions for cases that posed a conflict of interest for IGs (e.g.,
when a complaint is about an IG). And, it imposed a 10 year retention
date for cases that were discarded to ensure all entries into ACTS are
accounted for.
Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: IG
investigations are governed by Air Force Instruction 90-301,
``Inspector General Complaints Resolution'' and are conducted IAW CIGIE
Quality Standards, compliance is mandatory. Those standards are
provided below, and DAF-IG investigation findings undergo multiple IG
and legal reviews before they are provided to DOD-IG for final
approval.
QUALIFICATIONS: Either a Qualified IG IO or an IG trained IO
conduct IG Investigations
INDEPENDENCE: Investigative organization must be free from
impairments to independence; must be organizationally independent; and
must maintain an independent attitude.
DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE: Due professional care must be used in
conducting investigations and in preparing related reports.
PLANNING: Organizational and case-specific priorities must be
established and objectives developed to ensure that individual case
tasks are performed efficiently and effectively.
EXECUTING INVESTIGATIONS: Investigations must be conducted in a
timely, efficient, thorough, and objective manner.
REPORTING: Reports must thoroughly address all relevant aspects of
the investigation and be accurate, clear, complete, concise, logically
organized, timely, and objective.
MANAGING INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION: Investigative data must be
stored in a manner that allows effective retrieval, reference, and
analysis, and protection (ACTS).
For Inspections: DAF-IG inspections are currently conducted IAW Air
Force Instruction 90-201 ``The Air Force Inspection System'' and
December 2020 ``CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation''
(Blue Book). Quality assurance measures are inherent to the DAF
Inspection System through its Oversight Inspection construct.
Inspections and inspectors at one level are periodically observed by
the next higher command echelon. For example, the Department of the Air
Force Inspection Agency IG inspectors conduct nuclear and non-nuclear
oversight inspections on MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs, while MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs
provide oversight of their subordinate Wing/Delta IGs. All formal
inspections at the Wing/Delta level and above require a formal report
to be placed into central repository utilized by the DAF-IG enterprise.
The DAF Inspection System specifically and deliberately follows the
prescribed ``CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation''
(Blue Book) listed here:
INDEPENDENCE: Ensures that inspectors, inspection organizations,
and their reports are impartial and without bias in both fact and
appearance.
COMPETENCE: Ensures that the personnel conducting an inspection
collectively have the knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience
necessary to conduct the inspection
PLANNING: Ensures that inspectors give attention to the selection
of an inspection's subject matter and the preparation necessary to
conduct each inspection
EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Ensures that evidence collected
and analyzed is focused on the inspection objectives and supports the
findings, conclusion, and recommendations.
REPORTING: Ensures the clear communication of inspection results to
those charged with governance, appropriate officials of the inspected
entity, other officials charged with oversight of the inspected entity,
and, when appropriate, the general public. Inspection reports document
factual data accurately, fairly, and objectively, and present findings,
conclusions, and recommendations in a persuasive manner.
FOLLOW UP: Ensures that recommendation follow-up is a shared
responsibility between the inspection organization and management
officials in the inspected entity. Corrective action taken by
management is essential to improving the effectiveness and efficiency
of government operations.
QUALITY CONTROL: Ensures that inspectors and inspection
organizations are following Blue Book standards.
Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
investigation that a commander opposes?
General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly
respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of
independence is critical to executing the mission at all levels.
Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of
their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at
multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all
the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
The DAF-IG system is grounded in independence and objectivity at
every level. As such, we do not believe changes are necessary to ensure
IGs are able to thoroughly and accurately perform their duties,
investigations, and inspections, while maintaining full-independence.
Please see the answer to QFR #23 above for more information.
Yes, an IG may pursue an investigation that a commander opposes.
And, if an IG is pressured by a commander as it relates to the
performance of IG duties and responsibilities, that IG must report the
issue to his or her IG functional chain all the way up to DAF-IG.
Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
General Said. At the DAF-IG level, the Department of the Air Force
Judge Advocate General (DAF/JA) assigns and embeds a number of
dedicated attorneys to DAF-IG. These attorneys are focused solely on IG
matters.
Our Major/Field Command and installation-level IG offices are
supported by their respective Staff Judge Advocate offices at each
command and location. Those legal offices assign attorneys to IG
matters as a part of an individual attorney's portfolio. An attorney is
assigned to provide legal assistance to each IG investigating officer
for investigations. And, a different attorney is assigned to complete a
separate legal sufficiency review at the completion of each IG
investigation.
Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
example, command, installation, etc.)?
General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: DAF-IG
educates all in-bound Wing/Delta and Group commanders of the IG roles
and responsibilities during the commander's course at Maxwell AFB. In
addition, AFI 90-301 requires that IGs at all levels ``Educate Air
Force members, commanders, and civilian leadership regarding rights of
and protection for those contacting an IG.''
For Inspections: The DAF provides its newly-assigned Wing/Delta and
Group Commanders training covering a wide spectrum of issues to aid
them in serving successfully in these critical position. In terms of
Inspectors General relationships, DAF-IG provides a 90 minute block of
instruction to each group during this 5-day commanders' training
course. This IG-related instruction covers Wing/Delta and Group
commander responsibilities, lessons learned, benchmark programs, and
the commander's role with IGs as these offices conduct independent
investigations as well as compliance and readiness inspections.
Additionally, we update this curriculum with pertinent updates gleaned
from recent investigations and inspections.
Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
oversight roles?
General Said. In the context of complaints resolution and
investigations, lessons learned are shared with our sister services and
also cascaded down through the DAF-IG enterprise during our quarterly
(DAF-wide) DAF-IG scheduled video teleconference meetings.
Additionally, we conduct an annual World Wide training conference. DAF-
IG also utilizes Notices to All IGs or NOTIGs to quickly react to
necessary policy and guidance changes or to share substantive trends.
Lessons learned from inspections are shared by our Department of
the Air Force Inspection Agency (DAFIA). DAFIA collaborates laterally
with the other services and also provides the DAF-IG enterprise a
constant flow of information garnered from inspection lessons learned
and benchmarks via a variety of venues and processes. Foremost is
providing all MAJCOM/FIELDCOM and Wing/Delta IGs pertinent information
on issues found during inspections. This information, in both
classified and unclassified mediums, covers a wide spectrum of
functional areas to include the DAF medical community, nuclear
enterprise, and operational units in the Air Force and Space Force.
Additionally, lessons learned from inspection execution are folded back
into updates to our IG training curriculum to aid in improved
inspection tools, techniques and procedures. Finally, DAFIA leads
inspection process review groups attended by MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs, Air
Staff, and USSF Staff that are designed to articulate lessons learned
and benchmarks and convert these into needed policy upgrades.
Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
Admiral Snyder. The total appropriated budget for the Office of the
Naval Inspector General fiscal year 2020 actual amount is $9,079,000;
$1,150,000 for support and $7,929,000 for pay. The total enacted amount
for FY21 is $14,147; $3,281,000 for support and $10,866,000 for pay.
The budget request for FY20 was $10,281,000 and FY21 was $15,573,000.
Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
employees and contractors?
Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General, which
serves as the headquarters for the Navy Inspector General Enterprise,
has a total of 113 personnel onboard. This includes 22 enlisted
personnel, 33 officers, 58 Department of Defense civilians, and 0
contractors. The Office of the Naval Inspector General's reserve unit
has an additional 20 Selected Reserve officers that provide part-time
support at the headquarters. The Navy Inspector General Enterprise is
made up of an additional 473 personnel onboard. According to the
results of a recent data call, this consists of about 1 percent
enlisted personnel, 8 percent officers, 90 percent Department of
Defense civilians, and 1 percent contractors.
Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
--Requests for inspections
--Requests for administrative investigations
--Whistleblower Complaints
--Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
request for assistance)
How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
During calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020, the Office of the Naval
Inspector General opened 17,001 cases in the Naval Inspector General
Hotline Tracking System, for an average of 5,667 cases per year. From
2018 to 2020, the Office of the Naval Inspector General received or
conducted the following (the below numbers are totals over the three
years):
4 requests for inspection
17 command inspections and area assessments
1,038 investigations (693 full investigations and 345
preliminary inquiries)
460 military whistleblower reprisal cases (Navy)
5,258 assistance cases
5,987 referral cases
Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
Admiral Snyder.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General manages and
provides oversight of Navy hotline cases and investigations; if there
is a conflict, real or perceived, the matter is referred to the
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General or the Inspector
General of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Office of the
General Counsel.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General refers hotline
complaints to one inspector general level above the subject's command
to avoid conflicts of interest, real or perceived.
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
conducts or provides oversight of all Navy military whistleblower
reprisal cases and all Navy senior official inspector general cases per
Department of Defense and Secretary of the Navy instruction.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General is in the final
stages of establishing a Professional Responsibility Council to review
allegations of professional misconduct by Navy Inspector General
Enterprise personnel, such as conduct that undermines the integrity or
independence reasonably expected of the position.
Instructions require the entry of all subjects' names
into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System to avoid the
perception of prejudgment.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts
hotline quality standard reviews of hotline cases and investigations
throughout the investigative process and at case closure.
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency guidelines regarding impartiality are taught and applied to
the conduct and review of all inquiries.
Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
redacted form?
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General releases
reports in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5,
United States Code, Section 552. The Freedom of Information Act states
that an agency shall make available for public inspection all records
that the agency determines have become or are likely to become the
subject of subsequent requests, or records that have been requested
three or more times. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy
instruction on the Freedom of Information Act, SECNAVINST 5720.42G,
interprets the Freedom of Information Act to require posting of any
records that have been requested three times. The Department of the
Navy further recommends, but does not require, the proactive posting of
materials that have been requested once to eliminate the need for
tracking number of requests. No reports of investigation completed
during fiscal year 2019 were posted. One report of investigation
completed during fiscal year 2020 was posted. When an investigation,
command inspection, or area assessment is released to the public, the
document is posted in the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room on
the Office of the Naval Inspector General's website. The Office of the
Naval Inspector General does not generally make public its upcoming
work, but it does provide Navy leadership an inspection schedule for
the next three years every year.
Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
reprisal allegations substantiated?
Admiral Snyder. Many reprisal allegations are not substantiated
because they do not meet the statutory requirements of a reprisal
action. Other forms of retaliation that do not meet the statutory
reprisal requirements are handled as hotline complaints and potential
violations of Navy policy.
Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts
hotline and military whistleblower reprisal training for staff and
enterprise inspector general personnel. All training was previously
delivered in-person but is currently conducted virtually by the Office
of the Naval Inspector General's Training and Certification Division
via Microsoft Teams and Blackboard Collaborate. While under revision/
update, the current methodology for training Navy IG personnel is:
Attend NAVIG 101, a 16-hour training course that is
an introduction to inspector general business.
Attend NAVIG 201, a 32-hour training course that
focuses on basic hotline investigator skills including
investigations and case management.
Attend NAVIG 202, a 32-hour training course that
provides the basic foundation for military whistleblower
reprisal.
Further inspector general training to be followed up
with ``proficiency'' certification and credentialing managed
and/or overseen by the inspector general chain of command.
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
provides military whistleblower reprisal training to all reprisal
investigators.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General Hotline Intake,
Case Management, and Quality Unit provides hands-on training for
enterprise personnel.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General has recently
taken steps for enterprise investigators to be temporarily detailed to
the Office of the Naval Inspector General for Hotline Intake and Case
Management for approximately one month for hands-on training.
Navy Inspector General Enterprise personnel are trained
on hotline quality standards, hotline processes, hotline
investigations, report writing, and the Naval Inspector General Hotline
Tracking System during Quality Assurance Reviews, Quality Assurance
Assists, and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews.
New Office of the Naval Inspector General hotline
investigators are provided hands-on hotline training on all hotline
processes within their first 30 days onboard.
The Training and Certification Division has developed a
schedule for in-service training. In-service trainings are specific,
investigative topics that are taught by subject matter experts in order
to assist in closing any investigative deficiency gaps in the
enterprise. These events normally occur on a monthly basis and are
attended by an average of 80 inspectors general from across the
enterprise.
The Office of the Naval Inspector General standardized
training is provided to all personnel regardless of rank or grade as
inspectors general are required to acquire the same skills for
consistency.
Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019
to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you
implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been
delayed?
Admiral Snyder. Yes.
Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
Admiral Snyder.
Governing policies for executing DON IG investigations
include the following:
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations
(Blue Book)
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency Quality Standards for Investigations
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency Hotline Best Practices
Association of Inspectors General Principles and
Standards for Offices of Inspector General (Green Book)
Department of Defense Directive 5505.06,
``Investigation of Allegations against Senior DOD Officials''
Department of Defense Directive 7050.01, ``The DOD
Hotline Program''
Department of Defense Directive 7050.06, ``Military
Whistleblower Protection''
Department of Defense guide titled, ``Guide to
Investigating Military Whistleblower Reprisal and Restriction
Complaints''
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5370.5C, ``DON
Hotline Program''
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H, ``Mission
and Functions of the Naval Inspector General''
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5800.12C,
``Investigation of Allegations Made against Senior Officials of
the Department of the Navy''
Naval Inspector General Investigations Manual
Command inspections and area assessments in the Navy
Inspector General Enterprise utilize the Office of the Naval Inspector
General Enterprise Inspection Manual.
Navy Inspector General Enterprise personnel are trained
on hotline quality standards, hotline processes, hotline
investigations, report writing, and the Naval Inspector General Hotline
Tracking System during Quality Assurance Reviews, Quality Assurance
Assists, and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews. Quality Assurance
Reviews and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews are conducted to
ensure compliance with regulatory guidance.
Quality Assurance Reviews are conducted once every
two years.
Quality Assurance Validation Reviews are conducted as
required.
Hotline Quality Investigation and Case Review are
conducted on every case prior to closure to ensure compliance with
regulatory guidance.
Quality reviews are conducted on all whistleblower
reprisal investigations prior to closure.
Substantiated investigations and case dispositions in
certain other cases (e.g., senior officials or military whistleblower
reprisal investigations) receive a legal sufficiency review from a
Department of the Navy attorney.
Staff are required to document compliance in the Naval
Inspector General Hotline Tracking System, and in reports of review to
commands. The reports of review are kept for future reference.
Subject matter experts that serve as Inspection Team
members sign a non-disclosure agreement in which they acknowledge the
required Ethical Standards of Conduct for an inspection.
Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
investigation that a commander opposes?
Admiral Snyder. Changes are not necessary to ensure Command
Inspectors General can operate independently and objectively. The
Office of the Inspector General conducts continuous training and
oversight of Command Inspectors General and has guidance in place to
ensure independence and impartiality throughout the execution of
inspections and investigations by Command Inspectors General.
Additionally, the administrative relationship between the Naval
Inspector General and Command Inspectors General enables oversight of
the Command Inspectors General to ensure they are able to execute their
roles in an independent and objective manner. Inspections and
investigations can be directed by either the Command Inspector General
or the commander, but only the commander can authorize investigations
on matters outside of inspector general business. Command Inspectors
General can pursue an investigation that a commander opposes with the
support and assistance of the Office of the Naval Inspector General.
Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General has two
military attorneys from the Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps and
three civilian attorneys from the Navy Office of the General Counsel on
staff. In addition to traditional legal practice areas such as ethics,
fiscal law, military justice, and civilian personnel law, these
attorneys also work closely with investigation and inspection teams to
ensure that the correct legal standards are applied and products are
legally sufficient. These attorneys mainly provide legal advice to the
headquarters staff but are available to the rest of the enterprise for
reachback on inspector general matters. For most legal support,
enterprise inspectors general are encouraged to work with their local
legal counsel. These may be Judge Advocate General Corps and/or Office
of the General Counsel attorneys, depending on the command or office.
Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
example, command, installation, etc.)?
Admiral Snyder. Commanders and senior enlisted leaders in the Navy
attend the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center prior to assuming duties
as a commander, executive officer, or senior enlisted leader. The Naval
Inspector General meets with attendees from every Prospective Major
Command Leadership Course, Command Leadership Course, Executive Officer
Leadership Course, and Command Master Chief/Chief of the Boat Course,
either in-person or virtually, to educate them on the duties of
inspectors general and their relationship with Command Inspectors
General and the Office of the Naval Inspector General. The Naval
Inspector General also speaks with Navy flag officers and Senior
Executive Service personnel at the New Flag and Senior Executive
Training Symposium, the Intermediate Flag and Senior Executive Training
Symposium, the Advanced Flag and Senior Executive Training Symposium,
and the Navy Flag Officer and Senior Executives Symposium. Commanders
and other inspector general professionals can attend the NAVIG 101
foundations course. This 2-day orientation discusses the relationship
and connections between the Naval Inspector General and the enterprise
as well as who, how, and the importance of the Navy Inspector General
Enterprise's mission. During command inspections and area assessments,
the Naval Inspector General meets with commanders and reiterates the
importance of their inspector general mission and their relationship
with their Command Inspector General.
Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
oversight roles?
Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General
implements lessons learned in several ways including engagements with
Navy leaders, inspector general professionals, and commands via the
following:
Membership in the Navy Senior Management Council
Regular meetings with the Under Secretary of the Navy and
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Secretariat Orientation Seminars
Posting command inspection reports
Case studies analyzed at the annual Navy Inspector
General Enterprise Symposium
Bi-weekly virtual town halls with the Navy Inspector
General Enterprise
The Office of the Naval Inspector General training course
revisions
Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
General Castellvi. The Office of the Inspector General of the
Marine Corps (IGMC) total appropriated budget for both fiscal years
2020 and 2021 is $3,309,000. The Department of the Navy, Assistant for
Administration allocates appropriated funds for civilian pay, travel,
and support (materials). A breakdown of both years is as follows:
FY20 appropriated budget was $1,674,000.
FY21 appropriated budget is $1,935,000.
In addition, the Commandant of the Marine Corps authorized the IGMC
to task any organization within the Marine Corps to provide Subject
Matter Experts, as temporary assistant inspector Generals (TAIGs), to
assist the IGMC Inspections Division in the performance of its mission
and functions; primarily travel support to carryout comprehensive unit
inspections. The IGMC provides costs associated with such support, with
the exception of travel time compensation. IGMC funding requirements
for TAIGs is estimated and requested though Headquarters Marine Corps,
Administration and Resource Management Fiscal Branch, from the Deputy
Commandant for Programs and Resources through the annual Program
Objective Memorandum. The IGMC did not prepare formal budget requests,
throughout Future Years Defense Plans, in support of its mission.
Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
employees and contractors?
General Castellvi. In the Office of the Inspector General of the
Marine Corps (IGMC):
Total number of Marine Corps inspectors general (IGs)
personnel on-hand (O/H) = 31
Officers = 13
Enlisted = 7
DOD Civilians = 11
In the Marine Corps IG community (IGMC personnel and all command
inspectors general (CIGs)):
Total number of Marine Corps IG personnel O/H = 201
Officers = 34
Enlisted = 99
DOD Civilians = 68
Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
--Requests for inspections
--Requests for administrative investigations
--Whistleblower Complaints
--Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
request for assistance)
How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
How many contacts do you receive per year? For the 12-month period
ending 16 April, Marine Corps inspectors general received 2173 contact.
Of those 2173 contacts, 978 contacts were received by IGMC, and 1195
were received by subordinate Command Inspectors General.
General Castellvi. In 2019, the Marine Corps received 1,812
contacts; in 2020, the Marine Corps received 2,060 contacts. Of the
2,020 contacts, 13 percent were related to implementation of COVID
force protection measures.
Of those contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
Requests for inspections: 0. Marine Corps IGs establish an
inspection schedule to ensure each command is inspected on a regular
basis. Each commander uses his or her own IG for any ah-hoc
inspections, in addition to the scheduled inspections.
Requests for administrative investigations: The Marine Corps does
not track/record whether the contact requested an investigation. Each
contact is analyzed to determine whether an actual investigation is
warranted (does the contact address a matter that violates any order,
rule, law, or policy?). If the complaint alleges a violation of an
order, rule, law, or policy, an initial inquiry is done to determine
whether there is information that was not known to the contact that
precludes investigation. In 2018, Marine Corps IGs conducted 98
investigations; in 2019, there were 51 investigations and in 2020,
there were 47 investigations.
Whistleblower Complaints: In 2019, Marine Corps IGs received 77
complaints of military whistleblower reprisal; 12 of those complaints
met prima facie for investigation under 10 USC 1034; 1 investigation
substantiated reprisal.
In 2020, Marine Corps IGs received 51 complaints of military
whistleblower reprisal; 8 of those complaints met prima facie for
investigation under 10 USC 1034; 1 investigation substantiated
reprisal.
Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other request
for assistance): The Marine Corps initially categorizes all contacts as
Assistance Cases. Marine Corps IGs sub-classify cases as Fraud/Waste/
Abuse of Authority/Mismanagement (FWAM); Congressional Inquiries;
Dependent/Quality of Life Issues; Freedom of Information Act Requests;
Misconduct; Reprisal; and Non-IG (anything else that is not reprisal,
senior official related, or FWAM). Some examples of non-IG matters are
requests to correct records, cancellation, or modification of military
permanent change of station orders, notification of scams, civilian
hiring practices, voter issues, awards processing, and civil matters
(neighbor disputes; off-base landlord issues; non-military harassment
not on a military installation, etc.).
In 2019, Marine Corps IG received 1745 non-whistleblower reprisal
contacts.
In 2020, Marine Corps Inspectors General received 2012 non-
whistleblower reprisal contacts.
How many administrative investigations do you conduct each year? In
2018, Marine Corps Inspectors General conducted 98 investigations; in
2019, there were 51 investigations and in 2020, there were 47
investigations.
Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
take to ensure independence throughout the process?
General Castellvi. IGMC takes a proactive approach to independence.
Commanders receive education about the IGs, the IGs' role, and the
commanders' relationship with the IGs. Throughout this training, IGMC
stresses the importance of independence and objectivity. IGMC also
trains the IGs, and stresses that they have a direct line to all
personnel in the IGMC office, to include the IGMC, if they feel they
need support or guidance in navigating a case or an issue.
For cases that IGMC tasks to a CIGs for investigation, IGMC is the
directing authority and has supervision and review responsibilities for
the case. The end report of investigation must demonstrate independence
and objectivity, as well as completeness and thoroughness, before IGMC
will approve the report.
For all cases received by the CIG, IGMC reviews the reports of
investigation as part of the IGMC oversight and inspection process.
Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
redacted form?
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
General Castellvi. IGMC shares the results of investigations, in
accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), when they are
requested. In 2019 and 2020, IGMC responded to 21 and 15 FOIA requests,
respectively. The information released in response to FOIA is released
directly to the requesting individual.
How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
IGMC does not publically share information about upcoming work.
Inspections in the Marine Corps are generally short/no-notice, and
sharing information publically would inhibit the IG's ability to get an
``any-day'' look at a unit. As a matter of course, to protect the
investigative process and the privacy and rights of all complainants,
witnesses, and subjects, IGMC does not discuss investigations until
they are complete. For these same reasons, the IG does not publically
announce their commencement.
Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
reprisal allegations substantiated?
General Castellvi. Many reprisal complaints that meet prima facie
under 10 U.S.C. Section 1034 fail to demonstrate a direct correlation
between the protected communication and the personnel action taken. For
example, a complainant will make a protected communication, and shortly
thereafter receive an unfavorable personnel action, but upon
examination, it is apparent that the personnel action was a valid,
reasonable response to something other than the protected
communication.
An IGMC investigator interviews every reprisal complainant. During
this recorded and transcribed interview, the complainant is given an
opportunity to fully explain his or her case, and provide information
that was not included in the original complaint. As well, the
investigator will ask questions to ensure full understanding of the
issues at hand, and seek clarifying documenting when appropriate. After
this interview, a preliminary inquiry of records, and occasionally
additional interviews with witnesses is made. After the inquiry, IGMC
notifies Department of Defense (DOD) of its recommendation to
investigate or dismiss the case because there is no indication of a
correlation between the protected communication and personnel action.
IGMC must get DOD approval to close a reprisal case. The complainant
receives a copy of the completed report of investigation, regardless of
finding, if the IGMC completes and investigation.
In 2019, the Marine Corps received 77 reprisal complaints. Of those
77 complaints, 12 required an investigation to determine whether or not
there was a direct correlation between the protected communication and
the personnel action. Only 1 of the 12 cases that met criteria for a
full investigation found a direct correlation between the protected
communication and personnel action.
In 2020, the Marine Corps received 51 reprisal complaints. Of those
51 complaints, 8 required an investigation to determine whether or not
there was a direct correlation between the protected communication and
the personnel action. Only one of the eight cases that met criteria for
a full investigation found a direct correlation between the protected
communication and personnel action.
Common reasons that cases fail to go to investigation or
substantiate are misconduct of the complainant that led to the
personnel action; no evidence that the person taking the personnel
action knew of the protected communication; the personnel action was
required by a higher regulation and was non-discretionary; and
evaluations that are lower than a complainant desires when an
established pattern of performance existed well before the protected
communication.
Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
General Castellvi. Training for IG staff is conducted in-house and
via third party, and the same training is offered to all personnel.
Historically, in-house training was conducted by mobile training
teams. COVID-19 restrictions challenged IGMC's in-house training
efforts, but recognizing the need to keep the IG community engaged and
up-to-date, IGMC instituted quarterly teleconferences and ad-hoc
computer-based training. Additionally, IGMC has almost completed the
development and implementation of two online IG courses. One of these
courses will serve as a certification course. IGMC will resume in-
person training in the near future.
Certification as a Marine Corps IG requires completion of an IGMC
mobile training team (MTT) course; the DOD IG Joint IG Course; the
Association of Inspectors General Inspectors General Course; the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center IG Course, or another Service's
inspector general training course. All IGs are required to complete 80
hours of job-related training every two years to remain current, and
attend a Marine Corps training event or symposium once every two years.
The DOD IG is currently offering its joint IG course virtually. The
two-week course allows the student to receive IG accreditation upon
completion. Class size is currently increasing in an attempt to catch
up from time lost during the pandemic.
IGMC's MTTs are three to four days of in-person lecture,
discussion, practical application, and evaluation on all core IG
topics. While all topics are covered, the focus is on Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Blue Book
standards and their application to assistance and investigations.
To preserve the integrity of the investigative process and the
independence of the command IG, IGMC conducts all senior official
investigations and all investigations concerning whistleblower
reprisal. Investigators receive on-going in-house training as policies
and procedures related to investigations change.
Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019
to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you
implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been
delayed?
General Castellvi. Yes. IGMC made case management system
enhancements during the 1st quarter of calendar year 2020 and
implemented a new case management system, the Inspector General Case
Action Manager (IGCAM). The IGCAM has an option to restrict access of
identifying information about confidential complainants to any
subordinate organization below the level that received the complaint.
Even if a contact does not request confidentiality, by default,
IGMC will protect his or her identify as much as possible by not
releasing any information beyond that which is required to address the
contacts concern.
As well, IGMC has adopted a report-writing style to minimize the
use of the names of complainants and witnesses when possible.
Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
General Castellvi. Standards: Marine Corps IGs use CIGIE's Blue
Book Standards: Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluation, for
all inspections and investigations.
Quality Assurance and Compliance:
Inspections: IGMC inspects all command inspectors general adherence
to CIGIE standards during IGMC inspections and provides the commanders
with a report on the findings of the inspections. IGMC makes a detailed
follow-up report within 30 days of the inspection, and requires a
corrective action plan within another 30 days. Any non-mission capable
command receives another inspection after a short period of time given
to correct deficiencies.
IGMC employs subject matter experts (SME) to conduct inspections.
Following the initial inspection, the lead inspector reviews the SME's
adherence to CIGIE standards; following the lead inspector's review,
the director of inspections reviews the report for final approval.
Investigations: IGMC conducts all whistleblower reprisal and all
senior official investigations to ensure independence. Investigators
self-certify their work, which is reviewed by in-house counsel for
legal sufficiency before final review and approval by the IG. Once IGMC
approves an investigation, the report and all supporting documents are
sent to DOD for final oversight and review. Throughout the process,
from investigator to final DOD approval, reports are measured against
CIGIE standards.
For all other investigations, the investigator self-certifies
compliance with CIGIE standards and the report is reviewed by an
attorney for legal sufficiency. IGMC does a final review of all cases
referred to the local IG. For cases received at the command level, IGMC
review is made via the inspection process.
Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
investigation that a commander opposes?
General Castellvi. IGMC recognizes that there is room for conflict,
or the appearance of conflicts, based upon the fact that CIGs work for
the commanders. A solid relationship between the commander and the IG
is imperative, and should be mutually beneficial. We are open to
considering any suggestions or recommendations to strengthen the
authorities of the IGs in a way that fully integrates them into the
command and staff team as an independent advisor to the commander,
without inhibiting the commanders' ability to maintain good order and
discipline.
IGMC's efforts to create independence and objectivity focus on
education of the IGs and the commanders of the role of each, the value
of one to the other, and the vital importance of independence and
oversight.
The IGMC case management system has a complainant/contact directly
into the system design. This ensures all contacts are put into the
system, and nothing is lost or misplaced. IGMC has visibility and
oversight of everything in the system, and whether via direct review of
a case, or during an inspection, reviews the CIG's work for all quality
standards, to include independence and objectivity.
Most importantly, all IGs know they can come directly to any member
of the IGMC staff for assistance if they feel their independence or
objectivity is at risk, or if they feel they are being pushed to act
against their best judgement. Should this occur, IGMC will remove the
case in question from the local command and assign it to a higher
headquarters or to someone within IGMC.
While commanders have some discretion on inspections, IGMC mandates
the minimum inspection requirements, not the commander. The commander
has discretion on exact timing and anything beyond the IGMC established
minimum inspections, but IGMC sets the baseline requirement and reviews
all inspections, and also inspects the inspectors in the execution of
their duties.
Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
General Castellvi. IGMC obtains independent legal advice from a
civilian attorney assigned to the IGMC. IGMC Counsel provides
comprehensive legal advice in all areas under the cognizance of IGMC,
including administrative investigations. To maintain independence,
IGMC's counsel reports to the Counsel for the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) (CL), who reports to the Department of the Navy Office of
the General Counsel.
Component IGs receive legal advice from the command staff judge
advocate and/or CL counsel assigned to the geographic command.
Component IGs are also free to contact IGMC Counsel to discuss any and
all IG matters or concerns.
Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
example, command, installation, etc.)?
General Castellvi. The IGMC presents an introductory class to all
O-5 and O-6 Marines selected for command. Additionally, the IGMC
teaches all newly selected/promoted brigadier generals about the IGs,
and the commanders' relationship with their IGs.
During inspections, the IGMC will meet with the commanders in the
local inspection area and provide necessary guidance or information
related to IG matters and the commanders' relationship with the IGs.
During inspections, the IGMC or his representative will speak with
the commander about his or her inspection program, make recommendations
to improve things, and note any identified gaps in the relationship
between the commander and the IG.
On an ad-hoc basis, IGMC will speak at the general officer
symposiums, held twice each year, to discuss any relevant IG trends or
observations.
Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
oversight roles?
General Castellvi. IGMC provides quarterly updates with the CMC on
trends observed and challenges across the Marine Corps, as identified
by inspections, investigations, and assistance cases.
IGMC also shares information and trends associated with inspection
results with the deputy commandants responsible for the various
inspected programs. These trends serve to identify trouble spots, or
areas where orders and directives are unclear or require a standard
that is unobtainable with current resources.
IGMC conducts in- and out-briefs for each inspection, where the
inspection team discusses what they have seen across the Marine Corps
and to share lessons learned and best practices. During out-briefs, the
inspection team discusses all findings and discrepancies, and helps to
identify the root-cause of non-compliance or poor execution. From this
information, the commander can decide where to enhance training or
provide additional resources.
At all training opportunities for commanders and IGs, the IGMC
shares best practices and lessons learned so that all may benefit.
Ms. Speier. Did the Marine Corps IG interview the widow of Chai
Suthammanont in its investigation of the death of Mr. Suthammanont at
Marine Corps Base Quantico? If not, why not?
When will the Marine Corps IG release the report investigating the
death of Chai Suthammanont or create a publicly releasable document
that details the results of the investigation into the death of Chai
Suthammanont?
Is the report on Chai Suthammanont's death a product of the Marine
Corps Office Inspector General? If not, which agency owns this report?
Does the Marine Corp Inspector General serve as counsel for the
Marine Corps?
Did the Marine Corps IG interview the widow of Chai Suthammanont in
its investigation of the death of Mr. Suthammanont at Marine Corps Base
Quantico? If not, why not?
General Castellvi. The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr.
Suthammanont.
When will the Marine Corps IG release the report investigating the
death of Chai Suthammanont or create a publicly releasable document
that details the results of the investigation into the death of Chai
Suthammanont? The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr.
Suthammanont and thus has no report to release.
Is the report on Chai Suthammanont's death a product of the Marine
Corps Office Inspector General? If not, which agency owns this report?
The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr. Suthammanont. The
Commander, Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region owns the
report on Mr. Suthammanont's death.
Does the Marine Corp Inspector General serve as counsel for the
Marine Corps? The IGMC provides information to Marine Corps leaders to
inform their decisions. The IGMC informs leadership of trends,
identified deficiencies and problems, and resource shortfalls. When
appropriate, IGMC will identify potential solutions and challenges.
However, the IGMC would not be considered counsel for the Marine Corps.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
Mrs. McClain.As you conduct an investigation into the space command
basing decision, are you working with Air Force IG Sami D. Said on
examining the mission readiness impacts of moving personnel that are
successfully accomplishing the mission at Peterson AFB? I am concerned
the Air Force decision to move the command from Colorado Springs will
make it difficult to retain critical personnel with expertise in space
operations considering the command has been at Peterson for nearly two
years. There is precedence in losing civilian employees declining to
relocate when a mission has been moved.''
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG is working with relevant Air Force
organizations and personnel, including personnel from the Air Force
IG's office, as part of the DOD OIG's evaluation of the Air Force
selection process for the permanent location of the U.S. Space Command
headquarters. The project announcement is available on the DOD OIG's
public website at the following link: https://media.defense.gov/2021/
Feb/19/2002585712/-1/-1/1/D2021-DEV0SO-0099.000_
REDACTED.PDF
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
Dr. Jackson. Mr. O'Donnell, in an instance where a whistleblower
does not request anonymity, can you tell me whether the DOD OIG
contacts or interviews the whistleblower, assuming they have presented
a credible allegation?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG generally contacts whistleblowers
who do not request anonymity for additional information when their
complaints do not contain sufficient details to determine appropriate
action on the complaint. In addition, whistleblowers may be interviewed
as part of a subsequent audit, evaluation, or investigation. [Question
#4, for cross-reference.]
Dr. Jackson. Over the past five years, how many instances occurred
when the DOD IG elected not to interview or contact a whistleblower to
follow-up on allegations of potential waste, fraud and abuse submitted
to its Hotline? If there are any, can you please provide me with
detailed information regarding the rationale for that decision or those
decisions?
Mr. O'Donnell. As discussed in response to Question 4, the DOD OIG
generally contacts whistleblowers who do not request anonymity for
additional information when their complaints do not contain sufficient
details to determine appropriate action on the complaint. However, the
DOD OIG does not track the rate at which whistleblowers are interviewed
to provide additional details or as part of subsequent audits,
evaluations, or investigations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Brown. You noted in your testimony that you look ``forward to
working with the Service IGs in the implementation of our oversight of
diversity and inclusion in the DOD and the handling of supremacist,
extremist, and criminal gang activity in the Armed Forces, as required
by section 554 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.'' How
are you intending to use the new DOD IG to address extremism in the
Department and racial, gender, and ethnic disparities? Can you please
describe who is involved in establishing the roles and responsibilities
for the Deputy IG for D&I and the decision-making processes involved?
Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG will use the new Deputy Inspector
General (DIG) in a manner consistent with applicable laws, including
section 554 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act and the
Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The DOD OIG is working to
determine the organization, structure, staffing, and funding required
to support the execution of those duties and responsibilities. The DOD
OIG will submit a report detailing this information by June 30, 2021,
as required by section 554.
Mr. Brown. The FY21 NDAA requires that the DOD IG submits to HASC/
SASC a report describing the Deputy IG for D&I's roles,
responsibilities, organization, and additional administrative details
180 days after enactment, which is June 30, 2021. Is your office on
track to meet this due date? Besides the report that you are required
to issue to Congress, where else will you publish the roles and
responsibilities for the Deputy IG for D&I?
Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG is on track to submit a report
describing the new DIG's roles and responsibilities, and organization,
including structure and staffing, by June 30, 2021, as required section
554 of the FY21 NDAA. The roles and responsibilities of the new DIG are
published on the DOD OIG's public website at the following link:
https://www.dodig.mil/About/Organization/
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
Mr. Moore. I deeply respect the role whistleblowers play in
providing transparency and accountability; they shed light on
wrongdoing that would otherwise go untouched. I realize that the
Hotline may receive many submissions which on their face do not merit
follow-up for example due to lack of substantive evidence or personal
bias. But setting those aside, what standard to you use in determining
who receives follow-up, including an interview and review of submitted
materials?
Mr. O'Donnell. Specifically, if a whistleblower timely submitted
multiple evidentiary submissions, including hundreds of pages of legal
and factual analyses, relevant to an investigation that the DOD Office
of Inspector General was at that time conducting, and if that
whistleblower made multiple offers to meet, would it not be standard
practice to interview the whistleblower?
The DOD OIG conducts a thorough and independent review of each
complaint it receives, in accordance with CIGIE and DOD standards. In
many cases, a whistleblower or complainant provides a full description
of the information in their possession along with the names of
witnesses or documents that contain direct evidence of the matter under
review. The DOD OIG fully reviews the information contained in the
whistleblower's or complainant's complaint to determine whether and
what additional information might be needed to further review the
complaint. For example, in a case where the whistleblower or
complainant provides hundreds of pages of legal and factual analysis,
it is not necessary to collect additional information when that
complainant is not a percipient witness, but rather an aggregator of
publicly available information. Another example might be where other
Government entities, including administrative or law enforcement
entities, have already interviewed the non-percipient witness.
Mr. Moore. I recognize that every Inspector General does its best
to ensure that its reports are accurate upon publication. I also
realize that from time-to-time mistakes are made; that is why the
Government Auditing Standards and DOD OIG policy provide guidance for
the correction of inaccuracies identified after the issuance of and OIG
report.
My question is what if there is an error or inadequate evidence
supporting one or more statements in a published OIG report. Where is
Congress or even members of the public to go if an IG is unwilling to
look at the matter or have an independent review done to get the issues
reviewed independently?
Mr. O'Donnell. I take seriously questions or concerns raised by the
Congress or the public regarding the accuracy of a published report. As
such, I am always willing to review those questions and give them all
due consideration. I have the authority to withdraw or amend a final
report that I determine to be inaccurate or not supported by competent
evidence, and I have not hesitated to do so under the appropriate
circumstances. This is a very rare occurrence, and when it does happen,
pursuant to law, policy, and practice, we address it publicly. Should
Congress or members of the public have concerns that the contents of a
published DOD OIG report are erroneous, they may always address such
concerns to me.