    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-19]

                             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                           INSPECTOR GENERAL AND THE

                          SERVICES INSPECTORS GENERAL:

           ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 APRIL 15, 2021

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                             ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    48-341          WASHINGTON : 2022

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

                     JACKIE SPEIER, California, Chairwoman

    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 JIM BANKS, Indiana
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas, Vice Chair  LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
    SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
    MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas

                            Hannah Kaufman, Counsel
                           Forrest McConnell, Counsel
                               Sidney Faix, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Banks, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Indiana, Ranking Member,
      Subcommittee on Military Personnel.............................     2
    Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California,
      Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel.................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Castellvi, MajGen Robert F., USMC, Inspector General of the
      Marine Corps...................................................    18
    Heddell, Gordon S., Former Inspector General of the Department of
      Defense........................................................     3
    O'Donnell, Sean, Acting Inspector General of the Department of
      Defense........................................................    12
    Said, Lt Gen Sami D., USAF, Inspector General of the Air Force...    16
    Smith, LTG Leslie C., USA, Inspector General of the Army.........    14
    Smithberger, Mandy, Director of the Center for Defense
      Information, Project on Government Oversight...................     5
    Snyder, VADM Richard P., USN, Naval Inspector General............    17

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Castellvi, MajGen Robert F...................................    95
        Heddell, Gordon S............................................    41
        O'Donnell, Sean..............................................    70
        Said, Lt Gen Sami D..........................................    82
        Smith, LTG Leslie C..........................................    76
        Smithberger, Mandy...........................................    55
        Snyder, VADM Richard P.......................................    88
        Speier, Hon. Jackie..........................................    39

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Ms. Speier...................................................   103

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Brown....................................................   134
        Dr. Jackson..................................................   134
        Mrs. McClain.................................................   133
        Mr. Moore....................................................   134
        Ms. Speier...................................................   111

                    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

                      AND THE SERVICES INSPECTORS GENERAL:

           ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                            Subcommittee on Military Personnel,
                              Washington, DC, Thursday, April 15, 2021.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jackie Speier
    (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
       CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

        Ms. Speier. And it is now 4:00, so I am going to call the
    Subcommittee on Military Personnel to order. I want to welcome
    everyone to this hybrid hearing on the roles and
    responsibilities of the Department of Defense IG [Inspector
    General] and the service inspectors general.
        Today we will have two panels. The first panel includes Mr.
    Gordon Heddell, who served as the Department of Defense IG from
    2008 to 2011. He also served as IG for the Department of Labor
    and has extensive experience in this area.
        Ms. Mandy Smithberger of the Project on Government
    Oversight is our second person to testify about considerations
    for improving the DOD [Department of Defense] and service IGs.
    For full disclosure, she was a wonderful member of my staff
    about 8 years ago, and it is nice to see you again.
        In the second panel we will hear testimony from Mr. Sean
    O'Donnell, Acting DOD IG, and the military services' IG. While
    we understand the DOD IG and the service IGs have different
    roles, responsibility, and authority than other executive
    agency IGs, I think it is important we examine them closely and
    make sure that they have the independence, training, staffing,
    and resources to provide proper oversight.
        I am concerned about this issue because there has been too
    many recent examples where the service IGs appeared to be
    asleep at the wheel, lacked independence, and whose
    responsibilities under service regulations requires
    confidential advisers of the commander--requires them to be
    confidential advisers of the commander.
        From the findings of the FORSCOM [U.S. Army Forces Command]
    IG inspection at Fort Hood that suggested all was fine with the
    SHARP [Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention]
    program there, despite ample evidence that they were not in
    compliance with the DOD policy let alone having an effective
    program; to the lagging investigations into the medical care of
    Private First Class Del Barba; to the failure of Navy IGs to
    report sexual harassment allegations against the senior
    executive to the DOD IG as they are required to, and enabling a
    serial offender to victimize several more Navy civilian
    employees and retire with full pension with no accountability--
    there is mounting evidence of a disturbing trend across the IGs
    of which these are just a few examples.
        Besides the authorities, it is imperative we examine the
    true independence of the IGs across the Department and
    services. It is unclear to me how someone who works for the
    commander, who by regulation is supposed to act as the
    commander's, quote, ``eyes and ears,'' unquote, and buy into
    that commander's leadership philosophy, can also remain
    impartial when investigating allegations within their own
    command, especially when those allegations involve retaliation
    for making a protected disclosure.
        The last time that the service IGs testified before the
    subcommittee in 2018, the Army inspector general made negative
    comments about whistleblowers, which was stunning to me. If the
    individuals who are charged with investigating whistleblower
    reprisal complaints are prejudiced against them to begin with,
    we have no hope of protecting brave service members and
    civilians who have come forward to protect wrong--to protect
    the American taxpayer and call out wrongdoing.
        I also think we need to better understand how DOD and the
    services work together when complaints come in. After all, if a
    person sends their complaint to the DOD Inspector General
    hotline but then the DOD IG passes it to the services to
    investigate, it seems like we are setting up a false
    expectation of confidentiality for complainants.
        Is DOD telling complainants up front that their reports are
    being shared with the service IGs who may report to the very
    commanders who are the subject of the complaint? What is done
    to protect complainants and ensure a quality investigation that
    meets a high standard? How is retaliation not the end result,
    therefore discouraging service members from coming forward?
        I look forward to digging into this critical set of issues
    today. And with that, I turn it over to Ranking Member Banks
    for his opening statement.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Speier can be found in the
    Appendix on page 39.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM INDIANA,
           RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

        Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also want to welcome
    our witnesses on both panels.
        Today's hearing is an important step in building our
    members' awareness of the role of inspectors general and the
    role that they play within the Department of Defense and in the
    services. Oversight is also an important role played by
    Congress. In fact, one of the first times the House of
    Representatives investigated the military was in 1792, due to
    the defeat of General Arthur Sinclaire, on the Indiana/Ohio
    border. I figured I would take the opportunity to selfishly
    work in some Indiana history for all of you.
        Like the oversight and investigation responsibilities of
    Congress, all of the inspectors general here today play a vital
    role in overseeing, investigating, and preventing fraud, waste,
    and abuse, and mismanagement across the Department and the
    services.
        They have been challenged by investigations, audits, and
    evaluations that have run the gamut of issues from major
    acquisition programs to material readiness to issues involving
    good order and discipline, all requiring inspector general
    organizations that are agile and independent. They also require
    personnel with a requisite training, experiences, and knowledge
    to get after the issues and provide recommendations that will
    inform their organizations and Congress.
        On panel one, I would like to understand any
    recommendations that you may have for the Department of Defense
    and service IGs on improving their training and education. I am
    also interested in your thoughts on whether you think
    independence is an issue for any or all of these IG
    organizations.
        For our panel two witnesses, I am interested in the
    manning, training, and equipping of your organizations. Do you
    have the personnel resources you need to effectively execute
    your missions? I am also concerned about the results of the
    audits, evaluations, and investigations and whether or not they
    are often focused on outputs or outcomes. I would like to
    understand your thoughts on how we can change that. Again,
    thank you for your attendance.
        With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.
        We will now move to our first panel. Mr. Gordon Heddell,
    who is the former inspector general of the Department of
    Defense, followed by Ms. Mandy Smithberger, director for the
    Center for Defense Information, Project on Government
    Oversight. Thank you both for being here today and for your
    participation.
        Mr. Heddell.

    STATEMENT OF GORDON S. HEDDELL, FORMER INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Heddell. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and
    esteemed members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
    to testify today. I am disturbed by the independence or the
    lack of independence of our military component inspectors
    general and a command structure that has allowed harassment,
    assault, and a flagrant disregard by leadership for the Sexual
    Harassment/
    Assault Response and Prevention Program known as SHARP.
        There is no place in the Armed Forces of the United States
    for bias, discrimination, harassment, assault, or retaliation.
    Simply stating that we have a zero-tolerance policy will not
    make it so. The core strength of our Armed Forces has always
    been in its leadership and the men and women who follow that
    leadership. Inequities, however, in the way our military
    handles harassment and assault investigations are gnawing away
    at the very fabric of that strength.
        While working with the TIGs, the inspectors general, of
    each of the military services, I found them to be men and women
    of very high character. I would be surprised if that were not
    still true today. Army regulation AR 20-1, the Inspector
    General Act duties and procedures regulations, prescribes the
    responsibility and policy for the selection and duties of
    inspectors general throughout the Army. It is, in effect, the
    Army IG's bible.
        However, as I reviewed AR 20-1, I was surprised by
    statements in the regulation concerning the relationship that
    is supposed to exist between the commander and component IGs.
    Some examples: component IGs only work for their commanders;
    they are the conscience of their commanders; they must
    understand the commander's personality; they must be the
    commander's confidant and serve as confidential adviser to the
    commander; they must work through the chain of command.
        There is nothing unusual or improper about a good
    relationship or respect for the chain of command. What concerns
    me, however, is that we are talking about the policies and
    procedures that govern military inspectors general, people who
    are supposed to be independent.
        The regulation appears to tacitly imply a reverence for the
    commander that is inappropriate for an inspector general. I
    believe there are things that the military services can learn
    from the Inspector General Act. There is no mention or
    requirement in the Act that the inspector general be the
    Secretary's conscience, that the IG understand the Secretary's
    personality, or that the IG work through a chain of command.
        The IG Act does not mince words. It addresses the issue of
    independence head on, stating that the head of the
    establishment shall not prevent or prohibit the inspector
    general from completing any audit or investigation. The concept
    of independence is manifested throughout the IG Act. Lack of
    independence or even a perceived lack of independence is
    antithetical to congressional intent.
        I recommend to the military service departments that they,
    number one, require component IGs to promptly report
    particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
    deficiencies directly to the respective TIG; number two,
    establish policies stating clearly that no one has the
    authority to alter IG reports; number three, a central Office
    of Inspector General Legal Counsel should be established for
    the purpose of providing dedicated legal services to support
    component IGs and no one else; number four, component IGs must
    have timely access to all agency records; number five,
    component IG assignments should not be considered collateral
    duty.
        The position of component IG as it stands now is not a
    career path but a stopover on the way to something else. I
    recommend that component IG nominees successfully undergo
    training at an IG academy, a state-of-the-art academy, and when
    successfully completed, certified graduates be appointed to the
    rank of warrant officer.
        For the good order and discipline of our military services,
    I think the time is long overdue. We must provide state-of-the-
    art training and the appropriate tools to our component IGs. We
    must make harassment, assault, and retaliation things of the
    past. We must do this now once and for all. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Heddell can be found in the
    Appendix on page 41.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Heddell.
        Ms. Smithberger.

      STATEMENT OF MANDY SMITHBERGER, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR
          DEFENSE INFORMATION, PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT

        Ms. Smithberger. Thank you, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking
    Member Banks, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you again
    for inviting me to testify today. I want to thank the
    subcommittee for taking the time to look at whether our
    inspector general system is meeting our country's needs. In
    particular, I am very encouraged to hear that there is already
    going to be a focus on two important issues: protecting the
    independence of inspectors general and their investigations,
    and having meaningful protections for whistleblowers and
    survivors who come forward.
        As Mr. Heddell mentioned, our Federal watchdogs perform an
    essential role in rooting out waste, fraud, and abuse. One of
    their most important responsibilities is their role
    investigating whistleblower reprisal complaints. However, POGO
    [Project on Government Oversight] and government oversight
    entities have repeatedly raised concerns that the system for
    protecting military whistleblowers against retaliation is
    insufficient.
        The DOD IG system can seem unusually complex. The various
    roles of the service and the Department and component IGs are
    complementary but slightly different. And to people who are
    turning to the IG system for help, those differences can be
    pretty confusing, particularly when they go to the DOD IG
    hotline.
        The DOD IG is a civilian, statutory inspector general and
    is supposed to be independent from the Department. I think
    there are a couple of things about the statutory IGs that we
    want to keep in mind for independence. They have subpoena
    powers, they have audit functions, and they are also uniquely
    dual-hatted, reporting both to Congress and to their agency
    head.
        In recent years, Congress has strengthened these IGs, most
    notably by providing each one with their own general counsel
    and requiring the President to provide congressional
    notification and justification for their removal and transfer.
        Service and component IGs have less independence, and when
    it comes to particularly sensitive investigations like a
    whistleblower reprisal complaint, we sometimes have concerns
    that that undermines their ability to effectively do their job.
    At the component IG level, a Department of Justice inspector
    general review found that those offices often struggle to
    maintain adequate staff and experience because the offices
    compete for resources for military components engaged in
    military actions around the world. The same review found fully
    staffing field IG offices is a lower priority than staffing
    other service branch components.
        As Congresswoman Speier mentioned, in most cases, DOD IG
    hands retaliation allegations over to local or command IGs who
    have the least amount of independence and experience in
    handling what are often highly complex investigations. We have
    worked with whistleblowers who return to that hotline only to
    be unpleasantly surprised that their complaint was referred to
    a service or component IG. Those referrals can feel like being
    thrown into the lion's den, including potentially exposing
    whistleblowers to additional retaliation.
        Despite a number of reforms, the outcomes for
    whistleblowers still look like a system unlikely to protect
    truth tellers. DOD semiannual reports to Congress show the vast
    majority of reprisal claims are not investigated and only a
    handful of those investigated are substantiated. Even when
    reprisal claims are substantiated, those who retaliate are
    rarely punished.
        Remedies for whistleblowers are also elusive, with the vast
    majority waiting years for any remedy, if they receive one at
    all. Most whistleblowers give up or they end up fighting for
    years to get their own records corrected.
        I would be remiss to not note that DOD IG has lacked a
    permanent leader for over 5 years. This fundamentally
    undermines the foundation of the Department's inspector general
    system. Not having a permanent leader, especially for a long
    period of time, compromises the office's credibility, its
    independence, its management, and its strategic direction.
        There are a number of other areas of oversights and reforms
    that can strengthen both their IG and whistleblower protection
    system.
        First, Congress must revise the burdens of proof for
    military whistleblowers. The odds are stacked against
    servicemember whistleblowers. For civilians, the burden of
    proof to show a personnel action was warranted and therefore
    not retaliatory rests on agency officials. For members of the
    military, the reverse is true. And service members must prove
    that they were illegally retaliated against by showing there
    was no other reasonable explanation for the adverse personnel
    action they experienced.
        Second, we urge the subcommittee to review whether service
    and component IGs have the legal support that they need.
        Third, Congress must look at or should consider expanding
    alternative dispute resolution options for the military to help
    provide expedient relief.
        Fourth, all IGs must do more outreach to the public and
    Congress about their work, including publishing their reports
    in a timely manner, proactively releasing information to the
    public that is going to be released anyway under a Freedom of
    Information Act request, and announcing upcoming projects that
    aren't law enforcement sensitive.
        Finally, I hope the service IGs will complete
    implementation of measures to protect the confidentiality of
    sources. We all count on inspectors general to warn commanders,
    senior leaders, Congress, and the public about problems. Their
    ability to do so depends on effectively working with
    whistleblowers. When individuals come forward, usually at great
    personal and professional risk, they must be effectively
    protected. The perceived and real failures of the system must
    be addressed.
        Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Smithberger can be found in
    the Appendix on page 55.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you. Thank you both for your testimony.
        I would like to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee
    members be allowed to participate in today's briefing, after
    all the subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask
    questions. Is there any objection?
        Hearing none, so ordered.
        All right. So I am going to forgo asking my questions until
    the end of the panel, so I offer Ranking Member Banks the
    opportunity now to pursue his questioning.
        Mr. Banks. All right. Thank you, Madam Chair, for that.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, I would like to
    understand from both of you whether you have any
    recommendations regarding how DOD and the services train and
    educate their IGs. Also, do you think they have what they need
    in terms of resources to execute their mission?
        Ms. Smithberger, we will start with you.
        Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. I think I am
    going to defer to Mr. Heddell a little bit more on some of the
    training though. More training is always welcome, and I know
    DOD IG has been doing a lot to try and enhance that training,
    but I think something else to look at is for some of these
    investigations where independence is really important for some
    of those investigations, I wonder in some of these cases if the
    DOD IG should be retaining more of those investigations than
    they are currently and giving DOD IG more of those resources.
        As you know, the problem with training, if people are, you
    know, circulating in and out of these service and component
    IGs, is that this is not going to be part of their long-term
    career field and so there is diminishing returns, while if we
    have a civilian component that has this expertise, I think that
    is probably a better investment in the long term.
        Mr. Banks. Mr. Heddell.
        Ms. Speier. Turn your mike on, please. Thank you.
        Mr. Heddell. Yes, ma'am. The Inspector General Act, I
    believe, is a really good perhaps role model for all IGs. And I
    think one of the huge concerns that I see is that the component
    IG skills and the way they do their work, well-meaning, I am
    sure, in many--most respects, has not evolved over the years to
    be better than it could be.
        It has--where the inspectors general, the Federal
    inspectors general, DOD IG, for instance, over the years,
    because of the wisdom of Congress, the initial IG Act of 1978
    has been amended and improved and has made the inspector
    general a stronger, more capable, more talented and determined
    and an independent inspector general.
        If that had not occurred, I would say that today that the
    DOD IG and other Federal IGs would be impotent and the whole
    concept of IG in Federal Government would be a failure, but it
    isn't a failure. Today our IGs are among the most skilled and
    exceptional executives in government.
        The same I cannot say is true in terms of our component
    IGs. They are basically passing through. They do a 36-month
    rotation into their assignments, generally. In my opinion, it
    takes a lot longer than that to develop the kind of knowledge
    and commitment and the allegiance to what is right within the
    ranks of the military.
        And so just about the time that I think that they are
    really getting their sea legs, they are moving on to another
    non-IG assignment. One of the implications of that is that it
    reduces the number of mentors that would be around to be
    helpful.
        Number two, this idea of component IGs, several thousand--2
    or 3 thousand of them, it needs to become a profession. It is
    not, in my opinion, viewed as a profession. There needs to be
    very sophisticated state-of-the-art training academy.
        And I believe that individuals who are nominated to become
    component inspectors general should go through the academy and
    they should be required to pass and then certified. And once
    they are certified I believe that they should attain--be
    appointed to the rank of warrant officer.
        I have nothing against noncommissioned officers. They are
    the backbone of our military in many, many ways. But as an
    inspector general, I think we have to start at a higher level,
    and we have to work from there. It has to become a profession.
        The issue, the biggest issue facing the component IGs is
    independence. We have to give these component IGs the backbone
    and the confidence to do their work, and not worry about what
    their commander says. I really believe that there is too much
    emphasis on the chain of command, that the component IG is
    required to go through his or her commander.
        Now, I have great respect having been in the military for
    the chain of command, but it doesn't work, in my opinion, when
    it comes to inspectors general. Their chain of command must be
    directly from them to the respective TIG. Now, that would cause
    a lot of headaches under the structure today for the TIGs to
    take that kind of, you know, intimate control of the situation,
    but I think that is necessary.
        We have reached a point with respect to assault,
    harassment, retaliation, all of these things are undermining.
    When I was in the military, and I am sure it is true today, the
    central thought among rank-and-file members is that the
    military takes care of its own. Well, I am sure they still
    believe in that, and I am sure to a great extent they do, but
    that is not happening. There are too many people----
        Mr. Banks. I appreciate that, sir, a lot of really great
    comments. And with that, Madam Chairman, I yield back.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
        I think what we are going to do now is recess for about--I
    am sorry. We are not going to recess. We are going to suspend
    for about, I guess, 20 minutes. Actually, wait a minute. Maybe
    what we will do is go to Ms. Escobar for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Escobar. Okay. Perfect. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Heddell, I want to pick up where you just left off,
    because I am very curious about where you were headed with your
    comments with regard to the challenges around chain of command,
    trying to remove oneself from conflict of interest, and the
    added challenge with the component IGs that rotate out.
        What do you think, if you had to reenvision the component
    IGs--and actually, this is a question for both of our
    panelists. If you had to reenvision this, what would the best
    practices be and what would it look like?
        Mr. Heddell. You know, I think a very good--I am speaking
    as a former Army aviator, and so I sort of use that as my role
    model here in that training is what is going to make inspectors
    general at the component level really competent and dedicated
    and able, and who buy in to the concept that everyone deserves
    protection. When they can't get it, it undermines the order and
    discipline of the military. And that is not happening.
        So training is the first thing, and I think there needs to
    be an academy, a real, true-life academy that is focused
    entirely on inspectors general at the component level. And they
    need to be--those nominees that go to that academy need to pass
    the course and be certified. If they are not certified, they
    don't become inspectors general.
        If they are certified, as I said earlier, I think they
    should be appointed warrant officer rank. It is a professional
    rank and it--and I think it raises the whole idea of inspectors
    general at the component level to a profession. And rotating
    people out after 36 months to something that is not related,
    they have no commitment.
        And, frankly, I do think that when they know they are going
    to be rotated out to a non-IG position, they may be thinking
    about how am I going to be received when I go to the non-IG
    world? I think we have to remove any concerns that an IG might
    have that somehow they are going to be treated differently
    because they were an IG.
        The other thing is the chain of command. There is far too
    much emphasis in the Army Regulation 20-1 for the reverence
    that a component IG must show to the commander. There are too
    many approvals that the commander must provide that really it
    should be the TIGs providing.
        An example, if a component IG is doing--sees that he has
    got a criminal investigation on his hands, but of course he or
    she does not have the law enforcement authority to conduct that
    criminal investigation, they are required to go to their
    commander and then it is up to the commander to decide whether
    to ask, in the Army's case, the CID [Criminal Investigation
    Division] to open an investigation. They may or they may not,
    depending on the facts, but the component IG is really--he is
    dependent on what that decision is. I think that decision, when
    it comes to criminal investigations, should be made with the
    TIG.
        The other thing, I think there is a real problem with
    respect to legal counsel. The TIGs have their own legal
    counsel, I believe, but the component IGs have to submit a
    request for advice. And they don't know what kind of a lawyer
    or attorney they are going to get, and they don't know whether
    that attorney, whether his or her loyalties go to the commander
    or to someone else.
        We need a commitment that component IGs have a committed
    legal counsel that will support them. These are the kinds of
    things that will create independence on the part of the IG, it
    will create confidence, and it will create confidence by the
    people that are retaliated against, who are harassed, who are
    assaulted, because right now, if I am a person that is a victim
    of harassment, and I read AR-20, I would have to really think
    twice before I would go to the component IG. It is----
        Ms. Escobar. Mr. Heddell, I am so sorry, we are out of
    time. Thank you for your response.
        Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Ms. Escobar.
        We will now suspend for 20 minutes and return. Again, our
    apologies. This is the nature of our vote today, so we will
    reconvene then in 20 minutes. Thank you.
        [Recess.]
        Ms. Speier. We will now reconvene the Military Personnel
    Subcommittee. Mr. Fallon, you are next. You are recognized for
    5 minutes. Mr. Fallon? Can someone contact Mr. Fallon so he
    knows that he is up?
        All right. I see Ms. Strickland is with us. Ms. Strickland,
    you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Madam Chair. So one of the
    issues that I am especially interested in is diversity, equity,
    inclusion [DEI] within the Department. And under the leadership
    of Congressman Brown in the last session, the NDAA included
    several provisions related to diversity.
        So as I think about, you know, the conversation about the
    inspectors general, do you believe that we are sufficiently
    independent in order to ensure that this topic, specifically,
    will be investigated the way it should? And then are there
    other areas within the DEI sphere that you can explore and
    investigate?
        Mr. Heddell. Is that question for me? I am sorry.
        Ms. Strickland. Yes, actually the question is for both of
    you.
        Mr. Heddell. Oh. Well, I will take that first.
        Ms. Strickland. Okay.
        Mr. Heddell. I think the problem is that at the component
    IG level, the issue of independence is a problem. And that
    needs to be addressed by a variety of suggestions,
    recommendations. The biggest one, I think, is simply training
    and then in making the component IG a profession that that
    person would go on throughout their career and be an inspector
    general, and it would be a commitment lifelong.
        Ms. Smithberger. Thank you for the question. I think in
    addition to independence, if you just look generally at command
    climate issues. When you look at the Department of Defense
    Inspector Generals in my annual report, it is pretty striking
    how many instances there are of people being retaliated against
    because they have tried to use the EEO [Equal Employment
    Opportunity] system. So I think that it is a significant
    challenge.
        I know that we are adding to the capacity of the Department
    of Defense Inspector General to work on these issues, but you
    know, this is a significant challenge for the force. That
    independence is extremely important that, you know, obviously
    goes to climate as well.
        Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you very much. I yield back,
    Madam Chair.
        Ms. Speier. The gentlelady yields back. Is Mrs. Bice
    available or Mr. Brown? Mr. Fallon? Mrs. Bice? Mr. Brown? Mr.
    Kim? Any of those members nearby? We are happy to have them ask
    their questions.
        While we wait for them, I will pursue my line of
    questioning. In your testimony--let me just get to it first.
        In your testimony, Mr. Heddell, you referenced that the
    regulations suggest the IGs provide commanders with
    undocumented informal verbal reports, which is a recipe, as you
    put, for suspicion and uncertainty about their independence. I
    don't recall if you
    in your list of improvements if you recommended that these be
    made.
        Mr. Heddell. Now, in the interest of time, the 5-minute
    requirement, I did not list that. But it is an important one,
    because nothing that an inspector general does should be
    informal. Advice should not be informal. It should all be
    documented. And that again goes back, Chairwoman Speier, to the
    idea that IG--component IGs have a certain--are expected to
    have a certain loyalty to their commander, and that they can
    have these private off-the-record conversations when they
    shouldn't happen like that.
        I am not saying that all conversations have to be formal
    when you are dealing with a commander. I am saying that these
    are conversations about their work and about their
    investigations and oversight. As I read the regulation, that
    that is what the commander expects. That they will, as the
    regulation said, circulate among the personnel and observe,
    make observations for the commander, and discuss those
    informally with him or her and undocumented. And so, I just see
    that as a very serious problem in the regulation.
        Ms. Speier. Well, I concur with you on that. And I was
    surprised to see that that is the recommended method.
        Ms. Smithberger, you had referenced this Alternative
    Dispute Resolution Program that would be helpful, is
    operational where at the present time?
        Ms. Smithberger. So, currently, it is operational both at
    the Office of Special Counsel and the Department of Defense
    Inspector General. And I just on your previous question, one of
    the reasons that we think it would be really helpful for the
    service IGs, in particular, to announce their upcoming work is
    that we want to make sure that those investigations become
    investigations and reports and not just conversations from one
    commander to another commander. So that helps to hold everyone
    accountable.
        Ms. Speier. So you are saying with the Dispute Resolution
    Program is presently with the DOD IG. Is that what you said?
        Ms. Smithberger. Correct.
        Ms. Speier. And you are recommending that it be made
    available at the service level as well, is that correct?
        Ms. Smithberger. Either at the service level or as part of
    DOD IG; it is not currently available to military service
    members.
        Ms. Speier. So who is it being used by?
        Ms. Smithberger. Civilians.
        Ms. Speier. I see. Okay. And do you have any data on that
    in how it is working?
        Ms. Smithberger. We do. It is included in semiannual
    reports, but I am happy to provide more for the record.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. If you would do that for the record, that
    would be helpful. Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 103.]
        Ms. Speier. Let's see. I think that is all the questions I
    have. I really very much appreciate your testimony today. It is
    very helpful for us to be able to hear from those who have
    served, those who evaluate. Maybe just one last question.
        It appears in Ms. Smithberger's testimony, you indicated
    that--if I can find it. You referenced the 2019 Roll Call story
    that found that only 1 of the 350 officials that the IGs
    determined had retaliated against whistleblowers was fired. So
    I am presuming from that that there were 350 cases that were
    brought by whistleblowers in which they confirmed that there
    was retaliation, but only one of those officers was fired. Is
    that correct?
        Ms. Smithberger. That is correct.
        Ms. Speier. Is that alarming to either of you?
        Ms. Smithberger. I think it sends the signal that
    retaliation is tolerated and is an inconvenience at most.
        Ms. Speier. Mr. Heddell.
        Mr. Heddell. It is alarming, but I don't think that it is
    unusual in terms of statistics over the last 10, maybe even 15
    years. Maybe even while I was an inspector general. And it is
    alarming. But I don't think it is unusual. So much has gone
    unreported. And so much that is reported that is investigated--
    I will say it is under-investigated, that is the term I would
    use, meaning that you don't see many substantiations. And I
    think the statistics alone tell you that there is a concern.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you very much. My time has
    expired. Your presentations are complete. I don't believe we
    have any other members who wish to be heard. So thank you very
    much. We will change out our panelists.
        All right. We welcome our second panel which includes Mr.
    Sean O'Donnell, the Acting Inspector General for the Department
    of Defense; Lieutenant General Leslie Smith; Lieutenant General
    Sami Said; Vice Admiral Richard Snyder; and Major General
    Robert Castellvi.
        All right. Each witness will provide a brief statement, and
    each member will have the opportunity to question the witnesses
    for 5 minutes. We ask that our witnesses summarize their
    testimony in 5 minutes. Your written statements will be made
    part of the record.
        We are now going to start with the Acting Inspector General
    of the Department of Defense, and the confirmed Inspector
    General of the Department of--no, the EPA [Environmental
    Protection Agency], is that correct?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. Mr. O'Donnell, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF SEAN O'DONNELL, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. O'Donnell. Good afternoon, Chairwoman Speier, Ranking
    Member Banks, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
    inviting me to discuss the roles and responsibilities of the
    inspectors general of the Department of Defense and the
    military services.
        In January 2020, I was sworn in as the Inspector General of
    the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And since April 2020,
    I have served concurrently as the Acting Inspector General with
    the Department of Defense.
        Today, I am here representing the Department of Defense
    Office of Inspector General. Through the IG Act, Congress
    established the DOD OIG as an independent and objective unit to
    prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse in DOD programs and
    operations; to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
    of those programs and operations; and to help ensure ethical
    conduct throughout the DOD.
        Perhaps the most important hallmark of the DOD OIG is its
    independence. This independence ensures the objectivity of our
    work and safeguards our operations against efforts to influence
    or obstruct. Congress has protected our independence by, among
    other things, placing the IG under the general supervision of
    the Secretary of Defense, meaning the Secretary cannot not
    direct or prevent the work of the DOD OIG unless such a
    prohibition is necessary to preserve national security. In
    addition, Congress also requires that the DOD OIG receive
    timely access to all documents and other information available
    to the Department.
        The DOD OIG employs approximately 1,750 dedicated oversight
    professionals. We are responsible for, among other things, one
    of the largest financial statement audits in history,
    evaluating highly complex and highly classified DOD programs,
    evaluating high, excuse me, investigating billions of dollars
    in potential fraud.
        To put our overall work into perspective, in fiscal year
    2020 the DOD OIG issued 138 audit and evaluation reports,
    contributed to criminal recoveries of $2.69 billion, conducted
    35 administrative investigations, and oversaw 499 senior
    official or retaliation investigations completed by the
    military services and the defense agency OIGs.
        We do all this despite having a proportionately smaller
    staff than other Federal IGs. As a point of comparison, the
    larger Federal OIGs typically have a ratio of departmental
    staff to OIG staff of between 50 to 1 and 200 to 1. The DOD OIG
    ratio is closer to 1,700 to 1.
        The DOD OIG is not alone in ensuring robust oversight of
    the DOD. We are part of what we call the Defense Oversight
    Community, which includes the four military service IGs, the
    military criminal investigative organizations, the service
    auditors general, and the defense agency IGs. The IG Act
    recognizes the important role of this community by among other
    things requiring that the DOD OIG give particular regard to the
    community's work with an eye toward avoiding duplication and
    ensuring coordination and cooperation.
        To this end, I chair the Defense Council on Integrity and
    Efficiency, which brings our community together through various
    committees and working groups. In addition, I meet quarterly
    with the service IGs to discuss common issues.
        One of the most significant ways in which we interact with
    the Department of Defense is through the DOD Hotline. We offer
    the DOD Hotline as a confidential, reliable means to report
    without fear of reprisal, allegations of fraud, mismanagement,
    or misconduct that involve DOD personnel and operations. Last
    year, the DOD Hotline received approximately 16,000 contacts.
    This volume often requires the DOD OIG to refer hotline
    contacts to an appropriate entity within the Defense Oversight
    Community.
        For senior official misconduct allegations, we will
    generally assume responsibility for conducting investigations
    against three- and four-star generals and flag officers,
    Presidential appointees, and Senior Executive Service members
    in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Similarly, we will
    generally refer misconduct against one- and two-star general
    and flag officers and SES members within a service to the
    corresponding service IG.
        With respect to whistleblower retaliation allegations, the
    DOD OIG handles complaints involving DOD contractors and other
    select employees, security clearances, and sexual assaults. We
    will generally refer whistleblower retaliation allegations
    involving military service members to their respective service
    IG.
        Even when we refer a contact to another entity, we retain
    oversight responsibility. As such, we require that the
    receiving entity conduct an inquiry according to quality
    standards that ensure independence and objectivity. For most
    referrals, we also require that the receiving entity submit a
    written report to the DOD OIG for oversight. If we determine
    that the report does not meet our quality standards, we will
    return the report to resolve the deficiency.
        We engage the Defense Oversight Community in other ways,
    too. Most notably and relevant to this committee is our
    continuing implementation of our oversight and diversity
    inclusion in the DOD and the handling of supremacist and
    extremist criminal gangs in the Armed Forces as required by
    section 554.
        Finally, we also undertake quality assurance reviews of the
    service IGs' administrative investigations. In closing,
    overseeing increasingly complex DOD programs and operations, as
    well as hotline and other complaints requires the best staff,
    training, and resources, not only for the DOD OIG, but also for
    the service IGs and the broader Defense Oversight Community.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon,
    and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Donnell can be found in
    the Appendix on page 70.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. We will now hear
    from Lieutenant General Leslie Smith, the Inspector General of
    the Army.

    STATEMENT OF LTG LESLIE C. SMITH, USA, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
                                  ARMY

        General Smith. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and
    distinguished members of the Military Personnel Subcommittee,
    good afternoon.
        I am Lieutenant General Leslie C. Smith, the Army's
    Inspector General. Thank you for the privilege of appearing
    before you today to speak about the Army Inspector General
    system and how we function to assist soldiers, Army civilians,
    and family members. On behalf of the Acting Secretary of the
    Army, Honorable Mr. Whitley, and Army Chief of Staff General
    McConville, thank you for support to the military.
        We exist for one thing: To help ensure the readiness of our
    Army. Since the creation of the U.S. Army Inspector General
    System 243 years ago, inspectors generals have been charged to
    inspect, observe, train, and report misconduct. This duty has
    evolved to our four key functions: inspections, assistance,
    investigations, and training.
        At the Department of the Army, I am independent, and I
    report directly to the Secretary of the Army. However, in
    accordance with title 10, U.S. Code, I am charged by law to
    fully cooperate with the Department of Defense Inspector
    General. And we achieve this cooperation by resolving
    allegations of whistleblower reprisal, DOD Hotline, and Army
    senior official misconduct all under the direct oversight of
    the Department of Defense.
        Under the Department of Army level, we conduct independent
    inspections of systemic issues and also resolve allegations of
    misconduct, fraud, waste, and abuse. We will refer other
    allegations that represent criminal misconduct to Army's
    Criminal Investigation Command, and discrimination cases to
    Equal Opportunity Offices.
        Additionally, we provide policy, training, and assistance
    to Army IGs worldwide. We also provide trend analysis and
    impartial advice to Army senior leaders in all components. For
    example, our Inspections Directorate is in direct support of
    the Army's focus on countering harmful behaviors. This effort
    includes behaviors such as sexual assault, sexual harassment,
    discrimination, and extremism, among others. Also, being
    independent affords us the ability to understand the scope and
    challenges the Army faced in the privatized housing crisis and
    to recommend solutions to Army senior leaders. We were able to
    quickly shift our assets to deploy to 73 locations across the
    United States to get a strategic look at the problem.
        Across our Army, we have 1,441 inspectors general and 208
    IG offices. We train each of these IGs through our Inspector
    General School certified by me and the Secretary of the Army,
    with additional advanced courses and continued education to
    produce effective IGs. And in this capacity, these field IGs
    meet the readiness goals of those field commanders. All Army
    IGs work within the parameters of our guiding regulation. That
    means they are responsible to their respective commanders, or
    responsive to me and Secretary of the Army.
        Every Army IG takes an oath to uphold the standards of the
    Army without prejudice or partiality, even when the Army may be
    the problem. These words represent a tall order and one that
    all IGs take very seriously. If an IG falls short of this
    standard, I take it very seriously. And I have the authority
    revoke their credentials. While I don't enjoy this requirement,
    I have taken steps to revoke several IG credentials, both
    military and civilian. We occupy a position of public trust,
    and we must never violate that trust.
        In closing, Army IGs and the Inspector General Agency are
    both independent and integrated. We are independent and provide
    credible impartial oversight. We are also integrated, serving
    vertically and laterally as the eyes, ears, voice, and
    conscience of our commanders in the field, helping preserve the
    Army's readiness through our four critical functions:
    inspections, assistance, investigations, and training.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Smith can be found in
    the Appendix on page 76.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. Next, we will
    hear from Lieutenant General Sami Said, Inspector General for
    the Air Force.

     STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMI D. SAID, USAF, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
                             THE AIR FORCE

        General Said. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks,
    committee members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today, along with my colleagues, to discuss our
    roles and responsibilities as service IGs. I am mindful of the
    limited time today and the number of witnesses, so I will keep
    my comments very brief.
        We provided the committee with detailed information on the
    roles and responsibilities of the Department of the Air Force
    Inspector General. So I will avoid covering such information in
    any detail, but let me offer a few points to frame the
    dialogue.
        Generally, the Department of the Air Force IG is charged
    with independently assessing, through investigations,
    inspections and reviews, the readiness, efficiency, and
    discipline of the Department of the Air Force, which includes
    both the Air Force and the Space Force.
        To empower full independence, the Department of the Air
    Force IG and its subordinate organizations reside within the
    secretariat chain. And the inspector general reports directly
    to the Secretary of the Air Force. All authorities of the
    Department of the Air Force IG and all organizations within
    directly emanate from the Secretary of the Air Force through
    the Air Force IG.
        At the Department of the Air Force level, the IG
    organization is composed of three field operating agencies and
    four directorates, all serving both the Air Force and the Space
    Force. Below the Department of the Air Force level, we have
    inspector general presence at 186 installations, supporting
    both our major commands in the Air Force and our field commands
    in the Space Force.
        IGs below the Department of the Air Force level support and
    report to their chain of command. However, the Department of
    the Air Force IG retains oversight of their inspections and
    their investigations.
        DAF-IG also issues the policies that govern the field IGs'
    responsibilities and missions and provides training for all
    inspector generals in the Department of Air Force. Across the
    Department, we have 2,620 airmen and guardians performing IG
    duties, of which 1,880 are military, and 740 are civilians.
    Total funded billets, though, for the mission stand at 1,886.
        The mix of civilians and military is very important to us.
    Our military IGs offer experience, but also critically
    important currency in the issues they are charged to inspect
    and to investigate. Our civilian IGs bring a wealth of
    experience and provide helpful continuity.
        Our partnership in collaboration with all our sister
    service IGs and DOD IG is, in my view, exceptionally good. We
    receive very helpful and healthy oversight from DOD IG, and
    across the services we share lessons learned and best practices
    with each other. We fully cooperate with DOD IG and have well-
    established oversight and handoff guidelines that are common to
    all of us that work well.
        Independence of the IG at all levels is highly respected
    and cherished and protected within the Department of the Air
    Force. This element of independence is critical to executing
    the mission at all levels.
        Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the
    results of their inspections and investigations are
    independent, and oversighted at multiple levels. If any IG
    experiences undue influence, they will upchannel their concerns
    to their next higher level in the IG chain all the way up to
    DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
        In terms of overall capacity and resourcing, we have
    generally received appropriate support and priority. However,
    as with other organizations, we have some capacity shortfalls
    primarily at the installation level which we are working to
    address.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Said can be found in the
    Appendix on page 82.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Lieutenant General. Next, we will
    hear from Vice Admiral Richard Snyder, Inspector General for
    the Navy.

       STATEMENT OF VADM RICHARD P. SNYDER, USN, NAVAL INSPECTOR
                                GENERAL

        Admiral Snyder. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks,
    and Military Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you very
    much for having us here today to discuss the roles,
    responsibilities, and authorities of the services' inspectors
    general.
        As the Naval Inspector General, my office and duties are
    established by statutes, specifically, 10 U.S. Code section
    8020. I report directly to the Secretary of the Navy and have
    the authority to inspect, investigate, and/or inquire into any
    and all matters affecting the discipline or the military
    efficiency of the Department of the Navy.
        I am the senior administrative investigative official in
    the Department of the Navy, and the principal advisor to the
    Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of
    the Marine Corps on all matters concerning inspections and
    investigations. I am the inspector general for both the
    Department of the Navy and the Navy as a service.
        The Office of the Naval Inspector General [NAVIG] ensures
    an independent and objective evaluation of all complaints
    within NAVIG's purview, with the exception of complaints
    retained by Department of Defense IG. We conduct periodic
    inspections of commands and regions to assess program
    compliance, program effectiveness, and risk to the Department
    of the Navy. We also have an intelligence oversight
    responsibility.
        Findings of our investigations and inspections are provided
    to the chain of command for action deemed appropriate. We are
    not involved in criminal investigations nor audits, as my
    office is separate and distinct from the Naval Criminal
    Investigative Service and the Naval Audit Service.
        The Navy IG enterprise is large, consisting of 27 echelon
    II, 66 echelon III, 49 echelon IV, and 2 echelon V command IGs
    who report administratively to me for policy and oversight, and
    report operationally to their respective echelon commander for
    most command-level matters. This structure provides the
    supported commander a valuable command-level resource for
    executing their duties of command. Each of our IG offices has
    both an investigation and inspection function.
        Because we have a large worldwide enterprise with
    considerable activity, we have taken steps to ensure
    consistency and effectiveness throughout the enterprise. I
    expect every IG, regardless of where they are within the
    enterprise, to perform their roles in a fair, impartial, and
    independent manner. My office is responsible for providing
    policy guidance, training, and professional oversight to that
    end. IG offices at more senior echelons provide additional
    oversight and may perform IG functions should there be any
    concern about capability, fairness, or impartiality.
        We are required by statute to cooperate with the Department
    of Defense Office of the Inspector General. In particular, our
    senior official cases and military whistleblower reprisal cases
    are worked closely with our legal staff and are reviewed by the
    Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General for
    quality, accuracy, and oversight approval.
        Cases are sometimes referred from the Department of Defense
    Office of the Inspector General to my office, and from my
    office to lower echelon Navy IG offices for information only or
    for appropriate action. Action referrals require a feedback
    report to the referring office for review and oversight.
        During my almost 3-year tenure as the Naval Inspector
    General, I witnessed a team of Navy IG professionals dedicated
    to performing accurate, fair, and neutral investigations and
    assessments. Our goal is to provide timely, accurate, and
    meaningful information to enable Navy warfighting readiness and
    support to our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.
        Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and Military
    Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you for your continued
    support of the Navy and our people, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Snyder can be found in
    the Appendix on page 88.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General.
        Next, we are going to hear from Major General Robert
    Castellvi, Inspector General of the Marine Corps.

       STATEMENT OF MAJGEN ROBERT F. CASTELLVI, USMC, INSPECTOR
                      GENERAL OF THE MARINE CORPS

        General Castellvi. Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks,
    subcommittee members, thank you for the warm welcome and the
    opportunity to appear before you today along with my colleagues
    to discuss the roles and responsibilities as service inspectors
    general.
        As the Inspector General of the Marine Corps [IGMC], I am
    the senior investigative official within the Marine Corps, and
    I support the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the
    Marine Corps to promote institutional effectiveness,
    efficiency, discipline, ethics and integrity, and combat
    readiness.
        I am the principal advisor to the Commandant on all matters
    concerning inspections and investigations. And I communicate
    directly and independently to the Secretary of the Navy, the
    Department of Defense Inspector General, and the Naval
    Inspector General on all Marine Corps matters.
        My staff and I perform this vital role through impartial
    and independent inspections, assessments, inquiries,
    administrative investigations, and we do it without influence,
    pressure, or coercion. I report our findings to the Secretary
    of the Navy and the Commandant.
        Since assuming this position less than a year ago, not
    once, I mean that, not once, have I ever felt any pressure or
    influence from either one of them or their staffs. We proudly
    refer to ourselves as the standard bearers of our corps--the
    place you go to get the answer to what rights should look like.
        But my team is supplemented by 41 command inspectors
    general [CIGs], some of the finest officers I have met, many of
    them, either in person or virtually, and they are assigned to
    every general officer command across the Marine Corps. The
    command IGs work directly for their commander and serve as a
    functional extension. I call them a connecting file within the
    enterprise to me and my team at IGMC. They provide the
    commander the same support my office provides the Commandant
    within the authorities of the individual commander.
        It is important to know that they are not out there on
    their own. My office plays a key role providing training,
    support, oversight, and really mentorship, and I vet their
    selection for these local command IGs, and we inspect them to
    ensure their independence, their compliance with applicable
    regulations.
        Although the level of authority and the sphere of influence
    varies, all IGs have the same fundamental duties that includes
    conducting inspections and providing assistance, and
    responsibility to investigate allegations of fraud, waste, and
    abuse of authority. Statute dictates our cooperation with the
    DOD IG and provides oversight on all our work on senior
    official and military whistleblower reprisal cases.
        The DOD IG reviews our work for quality, thoroughness, and
    accuracy for these cases, as well as any cases they refer to
    us. Following their review, the findings of our investigations
    and inquiries are provided to Marine Corps leadership for
    appropriate action.
        The relationship between DOD IG and IGMC is very similar to
    the relationship between our office and our local IGs. Each
    commander enjoys the benefit of an IG to manage local issues,
    conduct local inspections, investigate local matters, and keep
    a pulse on the things that affect the morale and discipline and
    climate of the unit. Whereas IGMC serves as the eye and ears of
    the Commandant--we spend about 50 percent of our time on the
    road--Command IGs serve as the eyes and ears of their
    individual commander.
        Chairwoman Speier, Ranking Member Banks, and Military
    Personnel Subcommittee members, thank you for your continued
    support to IGMC and your Corps of Marines. I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Castellvi can be found
    in the Appendix on page 95.]
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Inspector General. Thank you all for
    your presentations. I am now going to offer the ranking member
    5 minutes to ask his questions.
        Mr. Banks. Thank you, Madam Chair. I wonder for each of you
    if you can let us know as you adapt to meet today's mission if
    you are considering any organization or personnel changes?
    Let's start down here at this end of the table.
        General Castellvi. Yes, sir. We have looked at a
    reorganization of our office, and that has taken place over
    this last several months. I told the Commandant when I first
    took over, that I needed about 2 months to understand where we
    could find some better efficiencies and provide some better
    oversight. I felt that there were some things like timeliness
    of our investigations that needed to be improved.
        I thought there needed to be some better checks and
    balances within our own office. We needed to strengthen some of
    the roles, for example the Chief of Staff and our
    investigators. So I am pleased to say that that has been an
    effective look, and I am ready to put that in place this coming
    up summer with some personnel changes.
        Admiral Snyder. Yeah, Ranking Member, for the Navy side,
    really three things I would focus on. We've had an ongoing
    effort to take what I refer more of an enterprise approach to
    the way we do business. You heard about the various echelons.
    And my goal has been to bring us together and not stovepipe by
    command or by echelon. And so we put several things in place to
    try and work things better as an enterprise, because that is
    how we are going to get things done.
        Just recently, we brought up some of the investigators from
    the lower echelon who had less workload than us, we brought
    them onto our staff on an assignment temporarily to help us
    out. That was enabled by the virtual environment we are in now,
    which is that second area that we are looking to take advantage
    of. Both in the way we work and the way we inspect. Our
    inspections were done almost exclusively in person. We have
    been able to leverage the virtual environment to help that now.
        And then, lastly, looking at processes. You know, our
    caseload continues to go up. And we can certainly continue to
    put more people to that problem, but there is also an
    opportunity with process improvement.
        General Said. Ranking Member, I think you asked about
    organization change, as in moving the boxes on the wiring
    diagram. We don't have any major reorganization initiatives
    underway, but we have a few process initiatives underway. How
    to better inspect, what to inspect, how to improve timeliness;
    those are process issues, but not reorganizational issues.
        General Smith. Thank you, Ranking Member. I think for us we
    really are looking hard at the military-civilian mix, not only
    at the Department of the Army level but also at the subordinate
    IGs. I think the other aspects that we have learned from recent
    things are increasing the number of surveys that we execute and
    the analytics that we use to look at the details of those,
    because that helps us to give a better view for the Secretary
    and then the subordinate commanders.
        And then, lastly, is the oversight. At my level especially,
    my impact of making sure that the subordinate IGs understand
    the significance and importance of timeliness and responding to
    those allegations. That is the most important.
        Mr. Banks. Lieutenant General Smith, we will stick with
    you, when was the last time that you updated or refreshed your
    training or education program?
        General Smith. It is after every course it is updated. So
    that 3-week course that's at the Inspector General School at
    Fort Belvoir, we do an analysis of each one of those classes.
    Even through the virtual form which we continue to execute, we
    strongly look at those courses. And as we speak----
        Mr. Banks. Please. Go ahead.
        General Said. Ranking Member, same. We get feedback after
    every course, and we adjust the course material based on the
    feedback. We also cross-check what our sister services are
    teaching, and we get the best practices from them, similarly
    with DOD IG.
        Mr. Banks. Admiral.
        Admiral Snyder. We've really had a sea change in the last
    year. We have been forced to go virtual, and we took that
    opportunity to also revamp what we are teaching. We added a
    course, NAVIG 101. And we have also brought in training
    professionals to assist our IG professionals in delivering that
    training.
        Mr. Banks. Major General.
        General Castellvi. We too had to go virtual, and we also
    found that we had a gap. We needed to develop very quickly an
    online, an IGMC 101 version as a bridging solution until we can
    get an MTT [mobile team training] online. And because we were
    watching some rookie mistakes being made by brand-new command
    IGs that just needed a little bit more mentoring, needed to get
    trained earlier rather than later.
        And with the COVID environment that we were in, we found
    ourselves needing to make sure that we had a bridging solution.
    And we have unveiled it.
        Mr. Banks. Got it. Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Speier. I thank the gentleman.
        Vice Chair Escobar, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and many
    thanks to our panelists. I have a question, actually, about the
    command IGs. If you all wouldn't mind, each one of you sharing
    with me, from your perspective if you could describe the
    relationship between command IGs and your service and the
    commanders. And I am wondering if you have any recommendations
    or thoughts on how we can ensure absolute independence,
    objectivity, lack of conflict of interest in that relationship
    or in the work that the command IGs do?
        So whoever would like to go first.
        General Smith. Thank you, Representative. So the command
    IG's relationship with the commander is twofold. They are
    responsible to the commander but responsive to me. So what that
    means is we have oversight of everything that they do. So they
    work with the commander to work the actions that are local, but
    every one of the cases that are worked, we have electronic
    views that we can see what the level of work they do and how
    that is being executed.
        And I will just tell you we keep the independence because
    of the oversight that we have. Every quarter, I review the top
    cases that are in our viewpoint sometimes are lagging to find
    out where we are, how we can improve those.
        Thank you.
        General Said. Representative Escobar, the same for us. At
    the installation level, which is the lowest level where we have
    IG functions, they are a critical tool to our commanders,
    because they have two roles. They are doing what we call
    complaints resolution, and they are hearing the complaints and
    the concerns of our airmen and guardians, and they are
    attempting to deal with them on behalf of the commander. And we
    can talk more about that if you would like.
        They are also helping the commander assess their internal
    readiness, their ability to deploy and employ, right? They are
    not providing the grade for the readiness at the installation
    level; that is being conducted at a higher level.
        They are--similar to the Army, their independence is tight,
    because although they report to the chain of command, I have
    oversight of them in terms of the guidance that is given to
    them of how they execute, the training that they get, the
    authority to overturn their investigations and their
    inspections, and the ability to reach down if we sense any
    undue influence.
        Admiral Snyder. Congresswoman, for us, we have quite a few
    civilians in the down-echelon IG offices in large--in fact, a
    large number are non-headquarters IG folks are civilians. At
    those larger commands, our echelon II commands, frequently you
    will have the IG and the deputy IG will be--one will be a
    civilian, one will be a military.
        So we have the continuity and the experience of the
    civilian folks in the command IGs, but then we have the
    operational experience and the military awareness of those
    military IGs.
        Like everyone else has mentioned, that oversight piece is
    very important to us. Those IGs know that they can, but frankly
    must, move up to a higher echelon if what they have either
    feels inappropriate or unable to be handled at their level.
        And then, lastly, it is my relationship with those
    commanders as well. I have complete authority and obligation to
    reach out to those commanders if anything is brought to my
    attention that is inappropriate on their behalf. And I expect
    them to do the same with me if the IGs aren't doing what they
    expect them to do.
        General Castellvi. I think we have a similar model, and I
    think it works for us. We have a military and civilian mix. In
    most cases, it is the military that we have as the CIG with an
    experienced civilian that is providing that continuity.
        And I heard in the previous panel about the talk about
    putting a warrant officer in there. I am not going to tell you,
    in ours--what works for us is just having experienced
    lieutenant colonel and colonel command IGs that actually have
    the credibility, the credibility to be able to walk, to be able
    to represent that commander and inspect and adjudicate and
    understand the independence and be able to walk to another
    commander and say, hey, you have got a serious issue here, and
    I know because I have been in your shoes.
        So it is important for us for the currency we believe to
    have those IGs to have credibility. But we have to make sure,
    we have to make sure that we have them appropriately trained.
    And I brief every commander's course. We brief them and train
    them in our quarterly symposiums. And that is the key. If you
    train them appropriately and emphasize their importance and
    their independence, make sure that the general officers that
    they work for and the commanders they work for understand the
    importance of that independence. And this works as a good
    model.
        Ms. Escobar. Thank you all so much. I very much appreciate
    it.
        I am out of time. Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. Speier. I thank the gentlelady. Mrs. Bice is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, gentlemen for
    your service and for being with us this afternoon.
        My first question is to Mr. O'Donnell. Did I hear correctly
    that you are Acting IG for DOD as well as IG for the EPA?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, ma'am.
        Mrs. Bice. So that seems like a rather large undertaking to
    be able to manage both of those. Is that sort of a temporary
    situation?
        Mr. O'Donnell. As the title indicates, Acting, yes. It is
    temporary. It is a handful, but both offices I am blessed with
    really competent staff and committed professionals.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you. Okay. It was mentioned earlier that
    the IG, the IG position, I think, it is for the services is for
    36 months. Do you all feel like that that maybe impedes the
    opportunity to learn and train, and maybe that timeframe needs
    to be reevaluated?
        General Smith. Thank you for the question. The position is
    actually for 46 months or 4 years. So the--48 months. I think
    the--it gives you the credibility as you select the commander
    with operational background similar to the comments that we
    heard earlier that they know they are the commanders, but they
    understand who they work for.
        It is clear that I work for the Secretary of the Army and
    all know that, and that is where my loyalties lie. And now our
    job is to make sure we understand the issues and concerns that
    subordinate commanders may have, but also those IGs, because we
    have had inspectors general work for us before. We bring both
    of that knowledge of having the experience with commanders and
    also having had IGs work for us before.
        General Said. And very similarly so, experience, currency
    both are important. And as you heard from the opening
    statement, we have a mix of both military IGs and civilian IGs.
    On the military side, they are rotating at a higher rate than
    the civilians. The civilians provide exceptional experience and
    continuity. On the military side, we need recency and currency
    in the issues that the IGs are inspecting and/or investigating.
    For instance, we do nuclear inspections. We do inspections of
    readiness. And currency in what you are inspecting is
    critically important. Having done that mission set 10 years ago
    is very different than having just come out of an operational
    command. And having executed that mission, you know what the
    latest and greatest tactics, techniques, and procedures that
    are relevant. Therefore, your inspections and your results are
    more accurate.
        So you need that credibility with the recency, and that is
    what the military brings to the mix. Yes, they rotate at a
    higher rate, but there is a good balance between the two.
        Admiral Snyder. Congresswoman, I will just add. I am sorry.
    Just a couple of things I would add. Most of our military folks
    are in the inspections branch or division, and so that currency
    is important. And, yes, they do rotate more frequently. Many of
    our civilians have been around for a very long time.
        For me, in particular, typically a 36-month tour, my deputy
    is a civilian deputy who has been there before I got there, and
    hopefully will be there for a long time. And my chief of staff
    is a civilian who has decades of experience at Navy IG.
        So, the last thing I will add is I didn't think I had been
    an IG before either. But what I have learned is going out and
    identifying standards, assessing performance to those
    standards, and making recommendations to make the organization
    better, it is what we have done our whole career and that is
    what we do as IGs.
        General Castellvi. Congresswoman, I will just reinforce my
    colleagues real quickly in some of the key things that I think
    are common that we all feel are important here: it's
    credibility, it's experience, and it's currency.
        So if you have that continuity with the key civilians you
    have as your deputy--I have one that has been in that billet
    for 7 or 8 years now, and he is a retired colonel before that.
    Brings a great depth of experience. What he lacks is that
    currency of what is happening in the Fleet Marine Force at this
    time, having not had a more recent command or command
    experience out there.
        So I think we have a very good mix, I think. Our
    inspections team is headed across the entire headquarters
    Marine Corps of subject matter experts, a good number of those
    are civilians. So it is a decent mix, and I think it seems to
    work.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, gentlemen. And my time has expired.
    So I will yield back to Chair Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mrs. Bice.
        Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Chairwoman, I appreciate it. And
    thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
        After 25 years of Active Duty service to my country and
    retiring as a flag officer in the United States Navy, I know
    what it means to sacrifice and to serve my country. I served
    under three different Presidents in the White House Medical
    Unit, including 8 years in President Barack Obama's tenure when
    I was promoted to admiral. It was not important to me whether
    the President I was serving was a Republican or Democrat.
        I, of course, am a Republican, but I was not concerned
    whether my patient or the person I served was a Republican or a
    Democrat. I was going to do the best of my job to the best of
    my ability.
        During that time in the military, I served alongside a
    diverse group of sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines. When I
    was deployed to Iraq to lead a resuscitative medicine team in
    efforts on the battlefield to combat serious injuries on the
    battlefield, I didn't care of a person's gender, their sexual
    orientation, their political views, their race, or who they
    were. I fought alongside them, and I fought to save their
    lives. I did what I needed to do, plain and simple.
        There were thousands before me, there will be thousands
    after me that serve this country honorably. And we all do it to
    protect one thing, the United States of America.
        Unfortunately, right before our eyes, everything is being
    politicized, including what is supposed to be a nonpartisan
    Department of Defense. I am frustrated and deeply disappointed
    that the organization that I dedicated my life to and that my
    family has dedicated their life to is falling victim to what I
    consider to be woke culture.
        President Biden has requested that we cut spending for the
    Department of Defense and has proposed a top-line number that
    does not keep up with inflation and definitely does not support
    the 3 to 5 percent growth the National Defense Strategy calls
    for. Additionally, he requested that the Department of Defense
    fund social initiatives and promote the New Green Deal. This
    will, in fact, force the Department of Defense to make
    difficult decisions to cut key programs that could protect our
    country in an effort to promote what I consider a political
    agenda.
        What are a few things that the Biden administration is
    pressing that is a lower priority for the Department of Defense
    than the New Green Deal and the social incentives? Number one,
    countering biological threats, modernizing our military, and
    taking care of our military families.
        It truly troubles me how deeply political things have
    gotten and how this administration appears to be weaponizing
    and politicizing organizations like the Department of Defense
    to advance their agenda.
        My first question, as part of this in recent cases
    undermanning, inadequate staffing, and poor training have
    opened the door for the DOD IG to follow political bias instead
    of due process. In these cases, the DOD IG predetermines a
    conclusion that they want to reach. And due to a lack of staff,
    sometimes inadequate training, and sometimes misguided
    political motivations, they inevitably reach their
    predetermined conclusions regardless of what they find. I have
    concerns about the IG's ability to reach these determinations
    if the investigators are under-qualified and under-educated.
        Mr. O'Donnell I believe is on.
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes sir.
        Dr. Jackson. Mr. O'Donnell, could you please describe for
    the subcommittee the challenges faced by the IG that are caused
    by manning shortfalls, by lack of training and education, and
    sometimes by misguided political motivations as the office
    attempts to work through what is supposed to be a nonpartisan
    process.
        Mr. O'Donnell. Thank you for opportunity to answer that
    question. Pursuant to the IG Act, one of the requirements for
    someone to be an inspector general is that they be chosen
    without regard to their partisanship. I am the current IG at
    the Environmental Protection Agency--in that regard, I was
    chosen and confirmed by the Senate without regard to
    partisanship. And in everything I do, there is an objectivity
    as required by the Inspector General Act with respect to how we
    investigate, whether that is at the EPA or at the Department of
    Defense.
        I find that my colleagues at the Department of Defense are
    some of the best trained, most thorough, dedicated
    professionals that I have worked with. I have never once
    encountered a situation where one of my staff have had a
    predetermined decision and mustered the facts in support of
    that. Quite the contrary, their thoroughness in collecting
    evidence and sorting through the evidence and in forming an
    opinion is the model for what I think is the entire IG
    community.
        And so in that regard, Representative Jackson, I think that
    I am very confident in our ability to, in the work that we
    undertake, to do it thoroughly and professionally. Obviously,
    resources are a challenge. As I said, we are much smaller
    relative to the size of the Department than other OIGs, and
    that is why we rely on the Defense Oversight Community. But
    with what we have and what we do, I think you won't find a
    finer OIG in the IG community.
        Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I appreciate that. I think that you
    are going to be on the lookout to make sure that this doesn't
    happen. I think that, you know, this is my opinion, and I have
    served in the military, 25 years in Active Duty, and 4 years in
    the Reserves. And I think there is an impression out there that
    a lot of times the IG approaches investigations with a
    predetermined conclusion at the beginning of the investigation.
        And I think that some people sometimes feel like--and this
    is Active Duty members speaking to me about this on a regular
    basis, even since I have been a Member of Congress, obviously--
    that they feel like the due process is not completely there. So
    I would just say that that is a concern. I think----
        Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Dr. Jackson. Thank you. I yield back my time.
        Ms. Speier. All right. Ms. Jacobs, you will be first when
    we return. We are going to suspend for, I guess, what, 20
    minutes and then return and continue the hearing.
        Thank you all. Again, I apologize that we have to go
    through this, but it is what we have to do presently. Thank
    you.
        [Recess.]
        Ms. Speier. The Military Personnel Subcommittee will
    reconvene. I think our next colleague who was going to ask
    questions was going to be Ms. Jacobs, but I don't see her here
    yet.
        Ms. Jacobs. I am here, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Speier. There you are, okay. Ms. Jacobs, you are
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair.
        So I would like to ask a question to the DOD IG first, and
    that is that despite sustained attention on the issue of sexual
    assault in the military by both Congress and the DOD, reports
    have continued to rise over the past decade.
        The Fort Hood Independent Review Committee report issued in
    November of 2020 found that implementation of sexual assault
    prevention response efforts at the installation was ineffective
    and that the Army Sexual Harassment Assault Response and
    Prevention Program is structurally flawed.
        Why are current efforts to prevent and respond to sexual
    assault in the military falling short, and how can DOD take a
    more effective approach? In particular, how can the DOD IG and
    the services work better together and increase interoperability
    to combat this issue?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Representative Jacobs, thank you for that
    question. I would say, first, if you look at the body of work
    that we have done particularly recently, you will see that we
    have done a pretty good body of work here looking at sexual
    response results--sexual assault responses at the Military
    Academy, the service academies. We presently have ongoing work
    dealing with the special victims counsel, so this is an
    important issue for us.
        And then to amplify that, in the last NDAA, we were
    instructed to form a deputy IG position whose responsibility
    would be overseeing, among other things, the DOD's
    implementation of diversity and inclusion, which I have taken
    to include these issues that you raised, which have to do with
    sexual harassment, sexual assault. These are very important
    because they do serve as an impediment for morale, for
    recruitment.
        I just can't imagine the message it sends to mothers and
    fathers when they send their children, their teenagers to
    serve. And so this is something absolutely we are taking
    seriously, and with this new position that we have been given
    through the Congress, we will be, I think, expanding that work.
    And one of the mandates of section 554 that you gave us was
    closer coordination with the Department of Defense but also
    with the service IGs.
        Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And thank you for
    acknowledging that. I hear from many military parents in my
    district about how fearful they are to be sending their, you
    know, young children, teenagers into the armed services,
    especially their daughters.
        And a followup question, are service members assigned to
    service IGs ever rotated out in the middle of an investigation,
    since we know that was a problem that was found at Fort Hood
    with the Army CIG? And I was wondering if the same problem
    happens with other service IGs.
        General Smith. Ma'am, thanks for the question. For us, the
    important aspect is that we use the database, the IG database,
    so that means every case that is worked is in this system. So
    as that system is updated, they take that information, and even
    if an IG rotates, it is referred back and checked on to the
    others. Also, I have ultimate oversight on each one of those
    cases, so I have the responsibility to make sure every case is
    done and done to the standard as it needs to be.
        General Said. Representative Jacobs, to your specific
    question, it is highly unusual for us in the Department of the
    Air Force that an IG initiates an investigation and then in the
    middle of it suspends and hands off to somebody else. It does
    happen. It is infrequent. It is carefully handed off, and as my
    colleague here said, regardless of a handoff or not, the
    oversight is consistent.
        Admiral Snyder. Yeah, Congresswoman, for the sake of time,
    same thing on the Navy side. It may happen occasionally, but
    there is a very good handover, constant tracking of that case,
    and then oversight at my level.
        General Castellvi. Congresswoman Jacobs, it is very rare
    that it happens, although it did happen during this last year
    since I have been on deck with an investigator that came down
    with COVID, and that happens. You have got to have, I think, a
    good checks and balance, and you have to have a good case
    management system. I think we have a good one right now, so we
    are monitoring that when it happens, and if we have to turn
    somebody over, we do, but it is very rare.
        Ms. Jacobs. All right. Well, thank you all for your
    responses, and thank you for your service to our country.
        And, Madam Chair, I will yield back the remainder of my
    time.
        Ms. Speier. I thank the gentlewoman for her questions.
        Are there any other members seeking to be recognized?
        Okay. Hearing none, then I am going to ask my questions and
    that will probably bring our hearing to a close. I would like
    for you to write these numbers down: Department of Defense,
    1,750; Army, 1,441; Air Force 1,886; Navy, 2,620. I don't have
    a number for the Marine Corps. How many staff does the IG have
    in the Marine Corps?
        General Castellvi. Ma'am, presently, I have got about 41 on
    my staff, and then I extend about another 30 that are
    inspectors that I pull in. That is just within my headquarters,
    ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. Well, within the Marine Corps, the number of
    inspectors general that you have is how many?
        General Castellvi. Total, including our CIGs, I will say,
    it is probably somewhere in the 200 to 300 level, ma'am, but I
    would have to get back to you on the exact number.
        Ms. Speier. Would you please get back to us?
        General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 106.]
        Ms. Speier. Okay. And let's talk about the caseload. How
    many contacts do each of you receive? Department of Defense?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yeah. As I said in my opening statement, I
    think last year we, on our hotline, received 16,000 contacts
    approximately.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. Army?
        General Smith. I think the assistance area is about 55,000
    and 60,000 assistance cases.
        Ms. Speier. Fifty-five and sixty. What do you mean by
    assistance cases?
        General Smith. So those are cases where personnel asks for
    information, and we consider those as contacts also.
        Ms. Speier. Well, how many are complaints that are being
    filed?
        General Smith. The average complaint is about 7,000 cases,
    ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. 7,000?
        General Smith. Yes, Representative Speier.
        Ms. Speier. Air Force.
        General Said. Chairwoman, over the last 3 years, we
    averaged 11,103----
        Ms. Speier. Per year or----
        General Said. Per year, assistance requests from the IG.
        Ms. Speier. Navy.
        Admiral Snyder. Yes. Last year, it was about 6,600 contacts
    or cases.
        Ms. Speier. Marine Corps?
        General Castellvi. Last year it was just over 2,000. I
    would say half of those were assistance cases, so maybe half of
    those were contacts or complaints.
        Ms. Speier. So 1,000?
        General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. All right. What this suggests to me is that the
    DOD IG is woefully understaffed, and, in fact, when you have
    the Air Force and the Navy with more staff than the DOD
    Inspector General, I would suggest we have a problem.
        So I guess my first question is to you. What do you believe
    is the appropriate number for the Department of Defense?
        Mr. O'Donnell.
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. That is a
    difficult question in part because it is when do we need them,
    how can we get them and bring them in. Do we need more?
    Absolutely. We need more because of the amount of mandatory
    work that we are doing required by Congress, which accounts for
    about 50 percent of our work, and then there is the
    discretionary work that we do which diminishes, and then also
    there is the work that comes from requests from the Hill.
        So difficult for me to quantify. Happy to discuss this
    more. I know that we are currently looking to expand our
    workforce so that we can deal with section 554, continue to do
    the work on the CARES Act, but, yes, I absolutely agree, we
    could use more resources, we could use more manpower.
        Ms. Speier. All right. So Inspector General O'Donnell,
    would you provide to the committee some working number that we
    can look at as part of the NDAA, because these numbers are all
    out of whack, the way I look at them. You know, the largest
    number is the Navy and, next to the Marine Corps, the lowest
    number of complaints that are filed.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 103.]
        Ms. Speier. I noticed the Air Force has 740 civilians and
    the Navy has 740 civilians. I presume those civilians work
    within that office for long periods of time. What is the
    average length of time that a civilian works within each of
    your offices?
        Lieutenant General Said.
        General Said. Chairwoman, I don't know the exact number,
    certainly much longer than our military members that rotate at
    a continuing cycle, but we will get back to the committee with
    the average duration. It is pretty extensive. They tend to stay
    for a while, become subject matter experts and provide
    continuity.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 104.]
        Ms. Speier. Right, it makes sense. I mean----
        General Said. It does. Ma'am, can I just offer one thing?
        Ms. Speier. Yes.
        General Said. So the workload, when we said 11,103 assists
    or requests for assists from the IG, that is just on the
    investigation side, right, because as we said before, we have
    to do inspections of every single unit----
        Ms. Speier. No, I understand that.
        General Said [continuing]. For readiness on a recurring
    basis, and that is a huge workload in itself.
        Ms. Speier. I understand that. In fact, one of the things
    I--Members of Congress look at inspectors general as
    independent offices. When we look throughout the Federal
    Government, IGs are independent. They have subpoena power. They
    have, you know, remarkable responsibilities and the ability to
    audit.
        To call the component IGs in particular IGs is a misnomer,
    and even in your roles, because part of your function has
    nothing to do with really the investigative function that we
    look at, the auditing function that we look at, the waste,
    fraud, and abuse function that we look at when we think of IGs,
    you may even be misnamed. But I do think that is what is
    creating part of our concern.
        So where did we leave off? You were giving me--I think,
    Lieutenant General Said, you were telling me that you were
    going to get back to me on the average length of time for those
    who are civilians.
        And, Admiral Snyder?
        Admiral Snyder. Yes, Chairwoman. I show that we have 495
    civilian positions throughout the Navy IG enterprise, and I
    will have to take that for the record as well, ma'am, for the
    average length of service.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 106.]
        Ms. Speier. All right. So, Lieutenant General Smith, you
    indicated that in part of your review you have just fired two
    IGs. Is that correct?
        General Smith. No, ma'am, more than just two. So we have
    averaged, last year, of the 55 cases that, there were about 20
    that were fired. And it is not just command IGs. It is at every
    level. So if there are allegations, we have a professional
    reliability branch that they come in, it is a separate
    investigation. We have oversight. And they get due process, but
    if they don't follow what the requirements are, they lose their
    credentials, both military and civilian.
        Ms. Speier. We are talking about IGs.
        General Smith. That is correct, ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. So you have fired, what was the number again?
        General Smith. This year, it was 20 IGs out of the 55
    allegations that were there.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. How about for you, Lieutenant General
    Said?
        General Said. Ma'am, I will have to get back to you with
    the exact number. I haven't fired anybody. I have de-
    credentialed. We take somebody out of an IG position if they
    don't perform to the level that we expect them to, if they have
    a conflict of interest, or if they become the subject of an
    investigation that is substantiated. They don't have any
    credibility at that point so we automatically remove them. So I
    will get back to you with a specific number. It is an automatic
    de-credentialing instead of a so-called firing.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 104.]
        Ms. Speier. So where do they go then?
        General Said. Depending on the severity of the issue, they
    might actually totally be discharged from the Air Force if it
    is really severe. If it is--because the standards are so high
    to be the IG, they might be able to serve elsewhere because the
    severity of what was substantiated is acceptable to maybe with
    some mentoring to continue service, but certainly not in the
    IG. They would lose automatic credibility.
        Ms. Speier. All right. So you will get us those numbers.
        Admiral Snyder.
        Admiral Snyder. I have not fired anybody. We are in the
    process of, like the Army has set up, establishing a
    professional conduct review board to be able to specifically
    look at any concerns we have with the IG professionals.
        Ms. Speier. So how many have you removed from the IG
    position they hold?
        Admiral Snyder. I have not removed any.
        Ms. Speier. You have not removed anyone?
        Admiral Snyder. No.
        Ms. Speier. All right.
        General Castellvi. Ma'am, of the 41 that we have, I have
    not fired any of them.
        Ms. Speier. All right.
        General Castellvi. Not yet. We--again, I think we have a
    pretty good vetting process. We have denied a few from being
    brought on as CIGs, because we did not think or at least feel
    that they were the proper quality, but we have not had a firing
    yet.
        General Smith. So, Chairwoman Speier, I would like to
    clarify one thing. So when we are talking about IGs, it is more
    than just the lieutenant colonel or colonel command IG. We are
    talking about subordinate IGs.
        Ms. Speier. I understand.
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. All right. To you, Lieutenant General Smith,
    the FORSCOM IG went to Fort Hood and came back and reported, I
    presume to General Garrett, that everything was terrific, if
    you recall. Maybe he didn't use the word ``terrific,'' but he
    basically signed off, did a checklist, said, yes, everything is
    appropriate.
        We then had the Secretary of the Army stand up an
    independent committee. We have had a number of hearings with
    them here. They came back with a very critical report with 70
    recommendations and underscored that the IG did an inadequate
    job. That is frankly what has piqued our interest in looking at
    the IG function generally, because we have a certain perception
    of what an IG is, and it would appear that it is, you know,
    very different in application. So what happened to that IG?
        General Smith. Well, that IG, ma'am, is still in position.
    We have looked at learning from that mission from thereby,
    first, assisting the Fort Hood Independent Review team by
    providing them information. We have studied each one of those
    cases and expanded our survey pieces, which I think was a
    problem area from that of not talking to enough people, not
    making sure that we had the right breakdown for the numbers of
    organizations of people that we talk to and the right gender of
    people.
        Ms. Speier. Lieutenant General, excuse me, but he failed.
    He absolutely failed in his job. He talked to very few people,
    he came back with the wrong assessment, he was criticized by
    this independent review committee, and he is still in his
    position.
        General Smith. Chairman Speier, I think that the key thing
    is that we are a learning organization, and there is areas that
    we can improve in that organization. I have spent time with
    that IG and others to make sure that we have done better.
        Ms. Speier. You know, if I am a doctor and I perform a
    surgery inappropriately, if I create malpractice, I don't get
    to practice medicine anymore. I think that was investigative
    malpractice, and for that individual to still be in that
    position--I am not suggesting he be fired. I am suggesting he
    doesn't belong in that position, and that is part of the
    problem. We need to professionalize these component IGs and
    make them independent, or they are not going to provide the
    value that we expect from them.
        General Smith. Chairwoman----
        Ms. Speier. How is a component IG promoted? Who makes that
    call?
        General Smith. Chairwoman Speier, that is done by a central
    selection board, so it is not their commanders on the ground
    that select them based off their overall background and their
    ability to move to the next level.
        Ms. Speier. All right. I have just a couple more questions,
    and I thank the ranking member for hanging in here. How are
    each of these component IGs selected?
        General Smith. So, Chairwoman Speier, I select each one. We
    review with their background with their previous OERs [Officer
    Evaluation Reports], and there is an interview process. After
    they are selected they go through that 3-week extensive school,
    and we have periodic check-ins with them to make sure that they
    are executing their tasks to standards.
        Ms. Speier. And they serve in that capacity, did you say,
    for 4 years?
        General Smith. It is up to 4 years.
        Ms. Speier. Could be as little as 2?
        General Smith. It could be as little as 2, but it varies
    based off the time. But the key aspect----
        Ms. Speier. Have you considered hiring any civilians, like
    the Navy and Air Force does?
        General Smith. We do. Many of the deputies in the command
    component, as in Forces Command, have deputies or civilians
    that also work on the teams and there are civilian IGs.
        Ms. Speier. But they are not IGs?
        General Smith. They are IGs and they support----
        Ms. Speier. Okay. So how many IGs do you have that are
    civilians?
        General Smith. 427, ma'am.
        Ms. Speier. You have 427 IGs that are permanent?
        General Smith. That are civilian IGs, that is correct.
        Ms. Speier. That are civilian IGs?
        General Smith. Right. It is in the documents that we
    provided, I think, to your--earlier in the week.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. I guess we missed that. All right.
        General Said.
        General Said. Chairwoman Speier, so central assignment
    board is typical in the Air Force, So our IGs are selected
    through that process. There are specific standards and specific
    insight into the type of person we are assigning to that
    position, so we are pretty selective of who ends up in the IG
    positions.
        Admiral Snyder. For the civilian IGs, they go through the
    civilian hiring process so they have to meet certain standards
    in order to be qualified and eligible. A selection panel is
    then convened. Many times someone from my staff--this is at the
    command level, but someone from my staff oftentimes will sit on
    that selection panel. When they have a proposed candidate it
    comes back to my office for vetting, and I have to provide my
    concurrence for that proposed hiree before they are hired.
        On the military side, it comes from the personnel system.
    We get an advanced copy of their record, and once again, I must
    approve their assignment as the IG.
        Ms. Speier. General Castellvi.
        General Castellvi. Yes, ma'am. For the civilian hires, the
    civilian hiring process, we do sit on those boards up at IG
    Marine Corps, and it is a collaborative process with the local
    commanders as well. Our Manpower and Reserve Affairs assigns
    officers to the commands. We vet those individuals working
    along with those commanders to make sure that we have the right
    Marines, officers serving as CIGs.
        Ms. Speier. All right. AR 20-1, you heard the former
    Inspector General Heddell talk about this. I still can't get
    my--you all said that you are all independent. I presume that
    you believe that all your component IGs are independent, but
    you have an AR-20 that says the Army IGs work only for their
    commanders, they are the conscience of their commanders, that
    all IGs must understand their commander's expectations,
    standards, visions, and personality. They are the confidant of
    the commander.
        So I want you to think about this. I am not going to even
    ask you to answer it now. I would like for you to give us some
    written response.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 107.]
        Ms. Speier. I don't know how that squares with being
    independent, and I am deeply troubled that we have a system
    here that for the most part does not provide the kind of
    oversight that we need.
        The only time that sexual assault was mentioned was not by
    any of you. It was mentioned by a colleague. And yet, sexual
    assault and retaliation associated with sexual assault and
    sexual harassment is the big elephant in the room. It was
    former Inspector General Heddell who said that that was a
    serious issue, that inspectors general should be looking at.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on pages 103-106.]
        Ms. Speier. So I am going to close with that.
        I am not going to make a big deal about this, but, Major
    General Castellvi, I met yesterday with family members of the
    AAV [assault amphibious vehicle] in which you were in charge
    of, and the deaths of those nine Marines. And I must say, it is
    a very painful thing for all of us, but I don't quite
    understand how someone gets elevated to the position of an
    inspector general after being in charge of that particular
    disaster.
        So with that, we will stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 6:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 15, 2021

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 15, 2021

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 April 15, 2021

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                 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Ms. Smithberger. The Department of Defense Inspector General has
    resolved over 140 cases through its Alternative Dispute Resolution
    (ADR) program since October 2017.\1\ The DOD IG's semiannual reports
    also include how many cases are pending in the ADR process, Congress
    might require the inspector general to also report how many cases were
    referred to ADR during the same period. For comparison purposes, the
    Office of Special Counsel's ADR program reported high rates of
    settlements for completed mediation rates, see the chart below from
    their 2019 fiscal year report to Congress:\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Department of Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to
    the Congress October 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020, ii. https://
    media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/30/2002467835/-1/-1/1/
    SAR_MAR_2020_BOOK%20V5%20SIGNED_ FINAL_20200730_508.PDF; Department of
    Defense Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the Congress: April 1,
    2020 through September 30, 2020, 58. https://media.defense.gov/2020/
    Nov/30/2002542685/-1/-1/1/DOD%20OIG%20SEMI
    ANNUAL%20REPORT%20TO%20THE%20CONGRESS%20APRIL%201,%202020 %20TO%20SE
    PTEMBER%2030,%202020.PDF
        \2\ Office of Special Counsel, Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal
    Year 2019, 24. https://osc.gov/Documents/Resources/
    Congressional%20Matters/Annual%20Reports%20to%20Congress/
    FY%202019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        .epsAttorneys representing whistleblowers before both the
    Department of Defense Inspector General and the Office of Special
    Counsel have told us the processes are pretty similar, but that there
    is continued need to educate whistleblowers about the availability of
    these programs as an option. Generally the perception is that ADR is
    very effective for helping whistleblowers find timely and meaningful
    resolutions to their concerns. While not always practical, these
    programs are most effective when whistleblowers can be helped
    confidentially without their name being released.   [See page 11.]
        Mr. O'Donnell. Although the DOD OIG is the largest Federal OIG, we
    are among the smallest when compared to the budget of the department we
    oversee. Similarly, we are disproportionally smaller when compared to
    other large Federal OIGs. During my opening statement, I underscored
    that other larger Federal OIGs typically have a ratio of department
    staff to OIG staff of between 50 to 1 and 200 to 1. The DOD OIG ratio
    is closer to about 1,700 to 1. Accordingly, we evaluate our current and
    future resource requirements regularly. For example, as identified in
    Question 42, we are refining our resource needs to enable us to conduct
    all sexual assault- and sexual harassment-related reprisal
    investigations. In addition, the DOD OIG is working to determine the
    organization, structure, staffing, and funding required to support the
    execution of section 554. We will submit a report detailing this
    information by June 30, 2021, as required by section 554. We will
    continue to work with the Committee and others to further define these
    and other needs as necessary.   [See page 29.]
        Mr. O'Donnell. We take matters of sexual harassment and assault
    seriously. Since FY 2016, at the suggestion of the Judicial Proceedings
    Panel, the DOD OIG has retained control of all whistleblower reprisal
    complaints within the DOD that allege reprisal for reporting or
    preparing to report a sexual assault, being perceived as reporting or
    preparing to report a sexual assault, or assisting someone in reporting
    or preparing to report a sexual assault. Although the DOD's anti-
    retaliation strategy is limited to military members reporting a sexual
    assault, the DOD OIG reviews all reprisal complaints, including
    civilians and employees of DOD contractors, subcontractors, grantees,
    subgrantees, and personal services contractors who report sexual
    assault.   [See page 33.]
        General Smith. The current average time in civilian federal service
    of an Army IG is 11 years. It is important to note that these numbers
    do not reflect other IG or IG-like experiences. Approximately 90% of
    Army IGs are prior service and some Army IGs have previous military IG
    service, civilian IG service with the DOD or our Sister Services, or IG
    service with other Federal Departments. Still others have IG-like
    experience, such as auditors or as criminal investigators. Based on
    2020 demographics, the IG workforce is senior with 78% of the IG
    civilian workforce at 50+ years old and the percentage went up to 97%
    for those 40+ years old.
        Most Army IGs are in the OPM Job Series: 1801, but many require
    specialized education, training, and experience and so are in the
    applicable OPM Job Series (e.g., 2210 for Cyber Security).
        The Inspector General is also the Functional Chief of the Army IG
    Career Program (CP55), to which all Army civilian IGs belong. This
    program provides support and resources for workforce professional
    development.   [See page 29.]
        General Smith. By law, specifically Title 10, United States Code,
    Section 7020, TIG works directly for the Secretary of the Army, who
    directs TIG ``(1) to inquire into and report upon the discipline,
    efficiency, and economy of the Army; and (2) perform any other duties
    prescribed by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff'' (10 USC 7020(b)).
    However, TIG works directly for the Secretary of the Army on the
    Secretariat Staff, and is responsive to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
    In this sense, the Army Inspector General is more independent than
    those who work directly for the Chief of Staff of the Army. The
    Inspector General ensures that only the highest quality Army officers,
    NCOs, and Civilians from all components serve as an Inspector General
    through a vetting process. TIG also develops the policy and doctrine
    they must follow while also training and qualifying them to implement
    that policy and doctrine. TIG also oversees the Army IG system's force
    structure, which even field commanders cannot alter without TIG's
    approval. In other words, a field commander cannot disband the local IG
    office to avoid scrutiny. And when the IG's Commander selects the IG to
    investigate an allegation of impropriety, only TIG can terminate the
    Investigation once it has started. TIG also has investigative oversight
    for selected cases of significant Army interest, and TIG has the
    authority to alter findings if someone (a subject or suspect, for
    instance) requests reconsideration. In short, no one can tamper with
    the IG system to limit an IG's ability to inspect, assists, train, or
    investigate. The IG-Commander relationship is not one of reverence but
    one designed for the practical enhancement of Army readiness.   [See
    page 33.]
        General Said. Across the DAF, we have 607 credentialed civilian
    IGs. The average experience of civilian IGs is 7.08 years. Their
    average duration in current IG positions is 4.65 years.   [See page
    29.]
        General Said. Over the last 3 years, we have de-credentialed or
    prevented from assuming IG duties, 17 airmen.   [See page 30.]
        General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly
    respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of
    independence is critical to executing the mission, at all levels.
    Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of
    their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at
    multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
    channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all
    the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
        The DAF-IG system is grounded in independence and objectivity at
    every level. As such, we do not believe changes are necessary to ensure
    IGs are able to thoroughly and accurately perform their duties,
    investigations, and inspections with full independence.
        INDEPENDENCE OF FIELD INSPECTORS GENERAL--DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR
    FORCE
        1. The investigation and inspection standards, policies and
    guidelines that all IGs, regardless of level, operate under, are
    directed by the Department of the Air Force IG.
        2. The training provided to IGs is governed by the Department of
    the Air Force IG.
        3. While field IGs report to their chain of command, the
    conclusions of their investigations and inspection are not influenced
    by the chain of command.
        4. If field IGs experience any undue influence they must report
    such unacceptable influence to the next level IG and all the way up to
    the Department of the Air Force IG.
        5. Investigations conducted by installation level IGs are
    oversighted by the next level IG, Department of the Air Force IG and
    DOD-IG as well.
        6. Installation IGs cannot conduct investigations in which their
    chain of command is conflicted, directly or indirectly. Such cases must
    be referred to the next-level IG outside the organization. All such
    cases are oversighted by the installation's higher-headquarters IG.
        7. Installation IGs do not conduct formal inspections of their own
    organizations to assess readiness, compliance, climate . . . . Such
    inspections are conducted by the next level IG that is totally
    independent of the installation commander and does not report to them.
    Such inspections are subject to oversight by the Department of the Air
    Force IG.
        8. All inspections by any level IG across the Department of the Air
    Force are subject to oversight by the Department of the Air Force IG.
        9. Department of the Air Force IG may overturn lower-level
    investigations and inspection results.
        10. Nuclear inspections are oversighted by the Department of the
    Air Force IG and Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
        11. Any IG not adhering to the common standards of conduct directed
    by the Department of the Air Force IG, including the critical element
    of independence, will be de-credentialed as an IG and removed from that
    position. We have de-credentialed and removed IGs, but not for
    violation of the independence standard.
        12. The requirement for independence by all IGs is ingrained into
    Department of the Air Force IG training and policies. Direct quotes
    from DAF-IG policies and training are pasted below.
        Examples of DAF-IG Policy Emphasizing Independence
        AFI 90-301IC-1, Page 13 Paragraph 1.2.3.
            ``All IGs must maintain a clear distinction between being an
            extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair,
            impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They
            must be sufficiently independent so those complainants
            requesting IG help will continue to do so, even when they feel
            the commander may be the problem. Commanders must support this
            clear distinction for their IGs to be effective.''
        AFI 90-201, 1.3.4 A
            ``DAF/IG has statutory authority and responsibility to conduct
            inspections and investigations which must guarantee
            independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of
            any appearance of undue influence.''
        Examples of DAF-IG Training Material Emphasizing Independence
          ``The ``Independence'' standard specifically covers our
    requirement for impartiality and to guard against threats that my erode
    impartiality. Some of those threats include; self-interest, bias, undue
    influence, and organizational structure (Chain of Command) threat.''
          ``To sustain a credible Department of the Air Force IG
    system:
            --By conducting independent impartial professional inspections
            and reporting on all matters affecting readiness, discipline,
            efficiency and economy
            --By conducting responsive complaint resolution,
            investigations, and programs characterized by objectivity,
            integrity and impartiality''
          ``Investigating Officers must be impartial, unbiased,
    objective, thorough, and available''
          ``Investigating Officers (IO) must be independent and at
    least one level removed from subjects or complainants
          Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
            --``Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial,
            intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.''
            --``Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without
            independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is
            impaired.''   [See page 33.]
        Admiral Snyder. According to the results of a recent data call, the
    average length of Inspector General (IG) service under the Department
    of the Navy for civilians is 7 years. However, IG professionals in the
    Navy often come to the Navy with IG experience from the Department of
    Defense Office of the Inspector General, other military Service IG
    offices, and other IG offices. The average length of all IG service for
    civilians is 9.25 years.   [See page 30.]
        Admiral Snyder. While Army Regulation 20-1 applies to the Army
    Inspector General, the activities of the Naval Inspector General are
    governed by Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H, titled
    ``Mission and Functions of the Naval Inspector General.'' The
    instruction states ``The NAVIG, NAVINSGEN, and the NAVIG Enterprise
    provide independent, objective, and professional inspections,
    assessments, inquiries, research and evaluation, investigations,
    oversight, and advice on any and all matters of importance to the DON.
    The NAVIG Enterprise operates without command influence, pressure,
    coercion, or fear of reprisal.'' Additionally, Article 0310 of the U.S.
    Navy Regulations, which describes the composition of the Office of the
    Secretary of the Navy, designates the Naval Inspector General as a
    staff assistant within that office.
        Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H further asserts:
          The Navy Enterprise IGs work operationally for their
    commanders and administratively for the Naval Inspector General. When
    carrying out their IG functional duties, they are subject to all Naval
    Inspector General policies, instructions, and guidance.
          A commander with an IG is required to direct appropriate
    inspections and investigations by their respective Command IGs,
    however, any inspection or investigation conducted by Navy IG
    Enterprise personnel, such as Command IGs, will be conducted consistent
    with professional standards established by the Naval Inspector General.
          The Naval Inspector General shall oversee all IG
    functions and report to the Secretary of the Navy on all IG high
    visibility matters to include, but not limited to, sexual assault and
    harassment, extremism, and reprisal. The Naval Inspector General
    reviews these matters and treats them with the utmost seriousness and
    importance.
        Additionally, the Office of the Naval Inspector General takes the
    following steps to ensure independence:
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General manages and
    provides oversight of Navy hotline cases and investigations; if there
    is a conflict, real or perceived, the matter is referred to the
    Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General the Inspector
    General of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Office of the
    General Counsel.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General refers hotline
    complaints to one IG level above the subject's command to avoid
    conflicts of interest, real or perceived.
          The Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General
    conducts or provides oversight of all Navy military whistleblower
    reprisal cases and all Navy senior official IG cases per Department of
    Defense and Secretary of the Navy Instruction.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General is in the final
    stages of establishing a Professional Responsibility Council to review
    allegations of professional misconduct by Navy IG Enterprise personnel,
    such as conduct that undermines the integrity or independence
    reasonably expected of the position.
          Instructions require the entry of all subjects' names
    into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System to avoid the
    perception of prejudgment.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts
    hotline quality standard reviews of hotline cases and investigations
    throughout the investigative process and at case closure.
          Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
    Efficiency guidelines regarding impartiality are taught and applied to
    the conduct and review of all inquiries.   [See page 33.]
        General Castellvi. In the Marine Corps IG community (IGMC personnel
    and all CIGs):
          Total number of USMC IG personnel O/H = 201
          Officers = 34
          Enlisted = 99
          DOD Civilians = 68     [See page 28.]
        General Castellvi. Independence: Marine Corps Order 5040.36J w/
    Admin Change 1 states that ``CIGs are directly responsible to, and
    limited by, their commander's scope of authority. A CIG is a functional
    extension of the IGMC, serving a vital, supporting role in the Marine
    Corps Inspection Program. The relationship between the IGMC and CIGs
    allows direct and expeditious processing of IG-related tasks between
    the two entities.''
        The CIG reports directly to either the commander or to the deputy
    commander and is the principal advisor to the commander on all
    inspection results, identified trends, and IG investigation matters.
    Although the CIG reports to the commander, the Marine Corps Order also
    includes safeguards to ensure objectivity and independence. As well,
    IGMC oversees and inspects the work of each CIG. Every investigation
    and hotline case is reviewed by the Marine Corps IG to ensure quality
    standards, which include objectivity and independence, are met. Because
    each case is put into a central IGMC system, and complaints are made
    directly to this system, CIGs cannot delete a case or complaint once it
    is made. IGMC has oversight of CIG cases in this system, and provides
    frequent spot-checks and reviews to ensure cases are handled
    appropriately. This is captured in the order as follows:
        ``Commander[s] must establish a Hotline Program for the direct
    receipt of complaints. All Hotline Programs established pursuant to
    this order shall be considered part of the IG network; shall be subject
    to oversight, monitoring, and review by IGMC; and shall adhere to the
    requirements set forth in references (e), (h), (i), (j), and this
    Order.''
        As well, the Marine Corps Order directs the following, which allows
    CIGs to remove themselves from a case if they feel compromised or
    pressured towards a certain outcome:
        ``When a Marine Corps organization performing IG functions
    determines it inappropriate to inquire into a matter due to the
    existence or appearance of a conflict of interest, bias, prejudice, or
    other circumstance that may place the independence or impartiality of
    the inquiry in doubt, it shall refer the matter to the next higher
    office in the chain of command with a CIG.''
        While no system is perfect, IGMC conducts frequent inspections and
    has not found any evidence that commanders attempt to limit the
    objectivity and independence of the CIG. The CIGs are in close and
    constant contact with IGMC personnel, and have open access to IGMC
    personnel for any concerns. As well, for all personnel, civilian and
    military, have various non-IG related forms of redress available if
    they feel there is reprisal, retaliation, or pressure from a commander
    for a certain outcome, and civilian personnel are protected under the
    Merit System and Office of Personnel Management regulations.
        Sexual Assault Reprisal: Because of the special training required
    to investigate reprisal related to sexual assault, the DOD Office of
    the IG requires Service IGs to forward complaints of reprisal related
    to sexual assaults to the DOD for investigation. When any Marine Corps
    IG receives a complaint of reprisal related to sexual assault, whether
    from the victim or someone trying to help a victim, they forward the
    complaint to IGMC, who immediately forwards the complaint to DOD. All
    complaints are routed via IGMC for tracking and trend analysis. In
    2019, IGMC received and sent eight complaints of sexual assault/
    harassment related reprisal to DOD, and in 2020 IGMC received and sent
    three complaints of sexual assault/harassment related reprisal to DOD.
    DOD declined investigation on all 11 complaints.   [See page 33.]

    ?

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 15, 2021

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

        Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
    FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
        Mr. O'Donnell. In FY 2020, the DOD OIG requested $387,753,000,
    including $24,254,000 of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.
    Congress appropriated and the DOD OIG received a total of $407,753,000.
    This amount included $20,000,000 in Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
    Economic Security (CARES) Act funding for pandemic-related oversight,
    and $24,254,000 for oversight of OCOs. In FY 2021, the DOD OIG
    requested $395,508,000, including $24,069,000 of OCO funding. Congress
    appropriated and the DOD OIG received a total of $407,500,859. This
    amount included $7,900,000 of unexpended CARES Act funding carried
    forward from FY 2020, $4,000,000 for pandemic-related oversight, and
    $24,069,000 for oversight of OCOs.
        Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
    breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
    employees and contractors?
        Mr. O'Donnell. As of April 24, 2021, the DOD OIG had 1,727 civilian
    employees. In addition, 21 military members (20 commissioned officers
    and 1 enlisted member) and 141 contractors work for the DOD OIG.
        Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
    contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
        --Requests for inspections
        --Requests for administrative investigations
        --Whistleblower Complaints
        --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
    request for assistance)
        How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
    administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
        Mr. O'Donnell. In FY 2020, the DOD OIG received 15,724 contacts
    through the DOD Hotline. The DOD OIG does not track contacts by the
    categories requested. The DOD OIG conducted 35 administrative
    investigations during FY 2020, including 5 senior official
    investigations and 30 whistleblower reprisal investigations. In
    addition, the DOD OIG conducted oversight of 1,281 administrative
    investigations, including 120 senior official investigations and 1,161
    whistleblower reprisal investigations.
        Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
    take to ensure independence throughout the process?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG was created by the Inspector General Act
    of 1978, as amended, as an independent and objective office within the
    DOD with the authority to, among other things, conduct and supervise
    investigations. The work of the DOD OIG is guided by the professional
    standards promulgated by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
    and Efficiency (CIGIE), which requires among other things, that in all
    matters relating to investigative work, the DOD OIG must be free--in
    fact and in appearance--from impairments to independence. These CIGIE
    standards also require that the DOD OIG be organizationally
    independent, and that the DOD OIG must maintain an independent
    attitude. For example, it is the policy of the DOD OIG that any DOD OIG
    staff member who may have a real or perceived conflict of interest in
    the outcome of a case they are working on must consult with their
    supervisor to determine whether the staff member should be recused. To
    ensure independence of its administrative investigations, the DOD OIG
    requires multiple levels of review for its reports of investigations
    (ROIs), including supervisors, senior managers, a quality assurance
    reviewer, and the Office of General Counsel. As part of its oversight
    responsibilities, the DOD OIG requires that the administrative
    investigations it refers to DOD Components remain independent. To this
    end, the DOD OIG has promulgated DOD Instruction 7050.01, ``DOD Hotline
    Program.'' This DOD-wide instruction requires that any administrative
    investigation resulting from a DOD OIG referral must adhere to quality
    standards, including those promulgated by CIGIE. To ensure the
    independence of an administrative investigation referred to DOD
    Components, the DOD OIG continually evaluates whether the receiving
    Component is impartial. If, at any time, the DOD OIG determines that
    the Component lacks impartiality, the DOD OIG refers the matter to
    another Component that is at least one level higher in the
    organization.
        Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
    investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
    release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
    how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
    redacted form?
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG's policy is, to the fullest extent
    possible, to be open and transparent about the DOD OIG's performance of
    its statutory duties. To this end, the DOD OIG will generally release
    the results of administrative investigations that were substantiated.
    To release information, either proactively or in response to a Freedom
    of Information Act (FOIA) request, the DOD OIG evaluates whether the
    public interest in disclosure outweighs any protectable privacy
    interest. When national security interests or the privacy interests of
    one or more individuals outweigh the public's interest in the content
    of an administrative investigation's final ROI, the DOD OIG's policy is
    to not proactively release the report. In those instances, the DOD OIG
    includes a summary of the report in its Semiannual Report to the
    Congress and may also include a summary in its monthly newsletter and
    on its public website. The DOD OIG's memorandum, ``Proactive Release
    under DOD OIG Privacy Act System of Records Notice,'' is available
    here: https://www.dodig.mil/Portals/48/Documents/Policy/
    ProactiveReleaseRecordsNotice.pdf?ver=2017-04-30-201108-967
        In FYs 2019 and 2020, the DOD OIG published 10 final ROIs and 2
    investigative summaries on its public website. The DOD OIG also
    published three final ROIs in response to FOIA requests. The DOD OIG
    shares information about upcoming work by publishing project
    announcements and a monthly newsletter on its public website.
        Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
    to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
    reprisal allegations substantiated?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG conducts each of its whistleblower
    reprisal investigations consistent with the law, gathering all of the
    relevant evidence, weighing that evidence based on the statutory
    standard of proof, and reaching factually-supported conclusions. For
    many reprisal allegations, the evidence is insufficient to meet the
    statutory standard of proof. In addition, many reprisal allegations are
    resolved through the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process,
    which are not counted among substantiated cases. The ADR process is an
    alternative to formal administrative investigations to address
    whistleblower reprisal complaints. The DOD OIG offers ADR to both
    civilian and military complainants. To date, 176 Defense contractor and
    civilian reprisal complaints and 2 military reprisal complaints have
    been resolved through ADR.
        Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
    is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
    of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
    agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
    it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Training for IG staff is conducted in myriad ways,
    including through instructor-led training, virtual classrooms, or by
    the DOD OIG Training, Education, and Development Division or external
    third-party vendor. For administrative investigations, the DOD OIG
    provides training on statutes and policies, complaint-intake
    evaluation, investigative planning, interview techniques, evidence
    analysis, and report writing. The Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center also provides DOD OIG staff training on administrative
    investigations. The average annual duration of administrative-
    investigation training is between 3 and 4 days. The DOD OIG's required
    training for administrative investigators is the same for all
    investigators and does not vary based on rank, grade, or military
    status. DOD OIG staff also offer training to DOD Components on how to
    conduct reprisal and senior official investigations, as well as a
    Hotline course. For example, the DOD OIG developed the DOD Joint IG
    Program for individuals serving as an IG or working for an IG within a
    joint DOD command, such as a Combatant Command or a defense agency.
    These courses enable the DOD OIG to work with other oversight entities
    within the DOD to strengthen the Defense Oversight Community.
        Ms. Speier. How does the DOD IG decide which hotline complaints to
    investigate itself, and which to refer to the service IGs to
    investigate? Does the DOD IG make referrals to the service IGs due to
    capacity concerns? Are such referrals disclosed to the complainant?
    What oversight does the DOD IG conduct of the Service IGs when the
    Service IGs take over investigation of hotline complaints?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG generally takes investigative
    responsibility for allegations of misconduct by three and four-star
    general and flag officers, presidential appointees, and Senior
    Executive Service (SES) members in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense. The DOD OIG will generally refer responsibility for
    allegations of misconduct by one and two-star general and flag
    officers, and SES members within a DOD Component to the corresponding
    IG and retain oversight responsibility of the resulting ROI. The DOD
    OIG has sole authority to investigate complaints under sections 1587
    and 2409, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), and Presidential
    Policy Directive 19, part B. In addition, the DOD OIG retains or
    assumes from the Component IGs, reprisal complaints related to
    reporting a sexual assault. The DOD OIG and Service IGs are authorized
    to receive and handle whistleblower reprisal or restriction complaints
    under the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. 1034. If a
    Service IG handles a whistleblower reprisal or restriction complaint,
    the Military Whistleblower Protection Act requires the DOD OIG to
    oversight the investigation and approve the closing of the case.
        Yes, the DOD OIG refers some of the approximately 16,000 contacts
    it receives each year to the Service IGs.
        Yes, the DOD OIG discloses referrals to the Service IGs through the
    DOD Hotline website and the complaint form, which states that a
    complaint may be referred to a DOD Component for inquiry. If the
    complainant consents to disclosing their identity, the complaint will
    be referred with their name. If they do not consent, their name is
    redacted.
        The DOD OIG retains oversight responsibility when it refers a
    complaint to another entity. Under DOD Directive 5505.06,
    ``Investigations by DOD Components,'' DOD Components are required to
    provide the DOD OIG the final ROI for review, and are also required to
    provide a written report on disciplinary or administrative actions
    taken as a result of substantiated investigations. As such, the DOD OIG
    requires that the receiving entity conduct the inquiry according to
    quality standards that ensure independence and objectivity. If the DOD
    OIG determines that the report is deficient, the reporting entity must
    resolve the deficiency and resubmit the report. This oversight ensures
    that the DOD Component conducted the inquiry in accordance with Quality
    Standards for Hotlines established in DOD Instruction 7050.01, ``DOD
    Hotline Program.''
        Ms. Speier. If there are case the DOD IG would prefer to retain but
    cannot as a result of limited capacity, what additional resources would
    the DOD IG need to investigate those cases?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG prefers to retain and conduct both
    sexual assault and sexual harassment-related reprisal investigations.
    Presently, the DOD OIG is resourced to conduct only sexual assault-
    related cases. To also conduct sexual harassment-related reprisal
    investigations, the DOD OIG will require additional resources. With
    regard to its senior official misconduct caseload, the DOD OIG
    generally takes investigative responsibility for alleged misconduct by
    three and four-star general and flag officers, presidential appointees,
    and SES members in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If the DOD
    OIG broadened this group of covered individuals to also include one and
    two-star general and flag officers, and Component SES civilian
    personnel, the DOD OIG would require substantially more resources. We
    will continue to work with the Committee and others to further define
    these and other needs as necessary.
        Ms. Speier. If the DOD IG had additional resources, what would be
    the highest priorities for the use of those resources?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG evaluates its current and future
    resource requirements throughout the year based on a number of factors
    including DOD OIG equities contained in the annual National Defense
    Authorization Act (e.g., Sec. 554), recurring statutory reporting
    requirements, specific requests from Congress and our own regular
    oversight planning. Our annual Management Challenges and Oversight Plan
    publications highlight our priority areas of oversight. These
    publications are available on the DOD OIG's public website at the
    following links: (https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Top-DOD-Management-
    Challenges/ and https://www.dodig
    .mil/Reports/Oversight-Plan/). We will continue to work with the
    Committee and others to further define these and other needs as
    necessary.
        Ms. Speier. Has DOD IG increased visibility of substantiated
    misconduct for senior officials? If so, how?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes. In June 2016, the DOD OIG amended its proactive
    release policy for administrative investigations with updated guidance
    on factors to consider when determining whether to make a proactive
    release of information. The previous policy was not to publicly post
    final ROIs unless the DOD OIG received three FOIA requests. Under the
    revised policy, to release information, either proactively or in
    response to a FOIA request, the DOD OIG evaluates whether the public
    interest in disclosure outweighs any protectable privacy interest. When
    national security interests or the privacy interests of one or more
    individuals outweigh the public's interest in the content of a final
    ROI, the DOD OIG's policy is to not proactively release the report. In
    those instances, the DOD OIG includes a summary of the report in its
    Semiannual Report to the Congress and may also include a summary in its
    monthly newsletter on its public website. The DOD OIG's memorandum,
    ``Proactive Release under DOD OIG Privacy Act System of Records
    Notice,'' is available at the following link: https://www.dodig.mil/
    Portals/48/Documents/Policy/ProactiveRelease
    RecordsNotice.pdf?ver=2017-04-30-201108-967
        Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
    FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
        General Smith. The information provided only includes the budget of
    the Department of the Army Inspector General (IG) Office, not inspector
    general field offices. The budgets for these offices are managed by
    their respective commands.
        The DAIG budget covers 5 key areas: Payroll, TIG Travel,
    Inspection/Oversight mission travel, The Inspector General School
    Operations, and the IG Network/IG Case Management Systems/Databases.
        There are three important notes for context:
        1. COVID19 has had a significant impact on the DAIG and the budget
    for both FY20 and FY21 as resident IG School classes were replaced with
    virtual training and travel in support of our Inspection and Oversight
    mission were curtailed and, where possible, replaced with virtual
    inspections. This resulted in a return of unused funds in FY20 and
    impacted the size of the DAIG budget in FY21.
        2. The budget of the DAIG historically is very dynamic and funding
    requirements can change significantly in the year of execution
    depending on changing Army priorities and emerging requirements. The
    Army has consistently and fully supported the mission. When more
    funding is needed to execute an IG mission the Army has provided the
    necessary funding. Also the Army has historically funded the DAIG
    payroll to support a 100% civilian fill rate goal.
        3. Our military IGs are paid from a central account and the funding
    for this is not reflected in our budget. Army Senior Leadership,
    including the leadership of the US Army Reserves and National Guard,
    has historically sustained the DAIG at the highest manning priority.
        The requested information follows below
        FY20 Budget Request: $21M
        Total Appropriated Budget: $21M
        Note: During this year, the DAIG only executed $18.6M and returned
    $2.4M due to the impacts of COVID19 on IG Operations
        FY21 Budget Request: $19.5M
        Total Appropriated Budget: $18.2M
        Note: This year's reduced budget reflects the impacts of COVID19.
    There is no anticipated funding shortfall this year and we anticipate
    returning to a pre-COVID19 budget levels in FY22.
        Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
    breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
    employees and contractors?
        General Smith. Based on the Annual IG Force Management Report,
    dated 1 October 2020, the Army IG structure has:
        1014 Military IGs (527 Officers, 10 Warrant Officers, 477 Enlisted)
        427 Department of the Army Civilians
        There are no IG Contractors as IG work is considered inherently
    governmental in nature
        Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
    contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
        --Requests for inspections
        --Requests for administrative investigations
        --Whistleblower Complaints
        --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
    request for assistance)
        How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
    administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
        General Smith.
          Inspectors General received 2,483 Senior Official
    allegations in FY18-20 (closed cases). This resulted in 54 allegations
    substantiated by Inspectors General. (2%) Of the 2,483 Senior Official
    allegations closed in FY18-FY20, there were 152 allegations of
    statutory reprisal; 2 of these allegations we substantiated (less than
    1%)
          Inspectors General received 9,274 Non-Senior Official
    allegations in FY18-20 (closed cases) and 4,342 allegations were
    referred to commanders for further action. This resulted in 1,645 total
    substantiated allegations. (out of 13,616 total allegation = 12.1%) In
    addition, Army Inspectors General actioned 74,035 Requests for
    Assistance and 50,756 Information Requests during the same time period.
          Of the 9,274 Non-Senior Official allegations closed in
    FY18-FY20, there were 2,881 allegations of statutory reprisal; 63 of
    these allegations were substantiated (2%).
          In FY20, Department of the Army Inspectors General
    completed 18 systemic inspections, 70 compliance inspections, and 6
    data calls. In addition, visited 96 CONUS and 24 OCONUS sites making
    contact with 7874 people. Field IGs conduct their own inspections based
    on the Organizational Inspection Program method taught at the Inspector
    General School. This is mandated for battalion-level and above.
          As of April 28, 2021, for FY21, Department of the Army
    Inspectors General completed 2 systemic inspections, 30 compliance
    inspections, and 4 Data calls. In addition, DAIG personnel visited 24
    CONUS and 0 OCONUS sites making contact with 2,528 people.
        Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
    take to ensure independence throughout the process?
        General Smith.
          The Inspector General (TIG) retains oversight of all Army
    1,441 IGs who are organized into 208 offices (93 Active Component, 67
    U.S. Army Reserve, and 28 U.S. Army National Guard).
          Field IGs work directly for the commander of their
    assigned unit or organization but within the parameters (policy
    guidance, personnel selection, training, and oversight) established by
    TIG and his staff.
          A field IG is responsible to his or her commander, but
    responsive to TIG and the needs of the Secretary of the Army and the
    Army Chief of Staff.
          All IGs within the Army IG enterprise, regardless of
    location of assignment, must abide by Army Regulation 20-1 (Inspector
    General Activities and Procedures), pertaining to conduct of assistance
    inquiries, investigative inquiries, and investigations, as well as
    personal conduct.
          If TIG loses confidence in an Army IG's ability, he can
    and will immediately suspend their IG credentials. If, after proper due
    process, he is still of this opinion, he will revoke their credentials
    and remove the inspector general from their position of trust.
          IGs work under the authority of TIG. If there is an
    allegation against an IG, the command either directs the investigation
    or TIG can authorize a higher echelon IG conduct the investigation.
    However, IG investigations are typically not used for negative action
    unless TIG approves. A command investigation allows for the possibility
    of a negative administrative action. A DAIG team provides oversight of
    every investigation against Army IGs, and provides information for
    TIG's final determination.
          DAIG maintains oversight on Field IG cases through IGARS
    and case back-briefs. Every week, TIG receives updates on various cases
    of senior leader interest. Every month, he reviews the oldest cases
    across the enterprise and those of senior leader interest. Every
    quarter, he hosts a forum where command inspectors general (CIGs)
    update him directly on their oldest 50 cases and he provides
    assistance, as required. These CIGs brief any obstacles to completing
    investigations. CIGs also know they have an open door to contact TIG
    concerning investigations, inspections, or significant personnel
    matters.
          DODIG conducts oversight on whistleblower reprisal and
    senior official cases.
        Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
    investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
    release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
    how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
    redacted form?
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
        General Smith. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.
    Sec. 552, provides the statutory framework for the Agency's decisions
    whether to make the results of Army Inspector General (IG)
    investigations public. Army IG investigations may be released to the
    public via the Army's FOIA Library (available at https://
    www.rmda.army.mil/readingroom/), or through the Army Public Affairs
    Office. Investigations may also be released directly to individual
    members of the public via written correspondence. Of the 191 Senior
    Official investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, DAIG made
    3 public. The Army Inspector General Agency generally does not share
    information with the public about planned or ongoing work.
        Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
    to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
    reprisal allegations substantiated?
        General Smith.
          Overall, the relatively low FY 18-20 whistleblower
    reprisal substantiation rates can be primarily be attributed to the
    following factors:
            1) The key elements and variables of a whistleblower reprisal
            allegation are not clearly understood by many complainants.
            2) In the majority of whistleblower reprisal investigations the
            Army conducts, the preponderance of evidence reveals no
            connection between a protected communication and the alleged
            personnel action.
            3) While not perfect, Army commanders and leaders are committed
            to the professional Army Ethic that requires promoting a
            positive environment, taking care of Soldiers and civilians,
            developing disciplined and cohesive units, and maintaining
            readiness.
          In FY18-FY20, we completed investigations into 2,881
    allegations of statutory reprisal that were presented to inspectors
    general; 63 of these allegations were substantiated (2%).
          DODIG conducts oversight of every whistleblower reprisal
    case conducted by Army IGs. Army IG whistleblower reprisal cases only
    close after a DODIG review of the evidence and analysis, and approval
    of the Army IG's findings.
        Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
    is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
    of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
    agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
    it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
        General Smith.
          All detailed Army IGs from all three Components (Active,
    Reserve, National Guard) (including DA civilians) are trained and
    certified by The Inspector General School (TIGS). This school is
    accredited by the American Council on Education and the U.S. Army
    Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Inspector General School
    Basic Course is three weeks in duration, with one week dedicated to
    investigations. This training is conducted by a combination of military
    and civilian staff and faculty with a requirement for all primary
    instructors to have field IG experience prior to being selected to the
    billet. All instructors also go through a three phase, 90-day
    certification process, to include attending an external Instructor
    Training certification course executed by TRADOC, before they are
    deemed fully certified to instruct at TIGS.
          TIGS curriculum is constantly evolving to ensure that we
    remain relevant to the needs of the Army and the Nation. This evolution
    is governed by a disciplined series of course reviews, faculty reviews,
    and constant communication with IGs in the field.
          All Army IGs have access to Army Regulation 20-1
    (Inspector General Activities and Procedures), along with five separate
    doctrinal guides. The combination of this policy and associated
    doctrine governs how IGs in the field execute all four of their IG
    functions; Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and
    Training. As with our curriculum, Army IG doctrinal guides are
    frequently updated to meet the changing requirements of the Army.
          Senior Army Inspectors General can attend the TIGS IG
    Advanced Course to further refine their skills and knowledge of IG
    processes. Additionally, DA civilian IGs are required to attend TIGS
    Advanced Course every five years as a part of functional training for
    all 1801-series personnel.
          All Army IGs can access a variety of TIGS produced
    instructional videos detailing IG procedures and techniques as well as
    interactive simulation software of how to conduct IG investigative
    interviews, to include a version specific to Whistleblower Reprisal
    cases.
        Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
    investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
    Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
    General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
    for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
    quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
    standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
        General Smith. The U.S. Army Inspector General system developed
    more than 20 years ago clear standards and processes for the conduct of
    IG Inspections and IG Investigations. These standards and processes
    directly reflected--and in most cases exceeded--the standards
    established by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and
    Efficiency (CIGIE). These standards and processes exist in the form of
    doctrinal guides developed as an adjunct to Army IG policy prescribed
    in Army Regulation 20-1.
        The Army IG system, defined in paragraph 1-7 of Army Regulation 20-
    1, charges general officer Commanders in the field to use their
    assigned IGs to focus their inspectors general inspection efforts on
    systemic issues affecting the readiness of the command. Systemic issues
    represent a pattern of non-compliance among multiple Army
    organizations, usually within a specific Army command. The IG, as a
    type ``systems analyst,'' looks for these patterns and then recommends
    inspection topics (focusing on these systemic issues) to the Commander,
    who will approve the topics based upon the readiness needs of the
    entire command. The Commander, as an expert in the field of his or her
    command, selects these inspection topics independently and within the
    goals he or she intends to achieve regarding the command's readiness.
    These IG Inspections are not merely compliance inspections but instead
    are top-to-bottom assessments of major Army functions, systems, or
    programs that are not functioning appropriately within the command and
    are therefore a risk to mission readiness. IGs assigned to Commanders
    throughout the various echelons of command are in a unique position to
    identify where those lapses exist and to steer their Commanders toward
    the problem areas. The IG's independence in this case comes from the
    fact that the Commander empowers the IG by signing an Inspection
    Directive, which in turn affords the IG the authority to carry out the
    inspection without external influence from anyone in the command.
        The Army IG Inspections Process, outlined in The Inspections Guide
    and updated annually, is a detailed roadmap for how an Army IG will
    inspect a systemic issue. The process has three phases and 17 discrete
    steps that have fully integrated, and in many cases exceeded, the seven
    standards set forth in the Quality Standards for Inspections and
    Evaluations published by CIGIE. Most importantly, Army IGs inspect
    independently without external influence on behalf of the Commander and
    within the Commander's authority. Additionally, Army IGs are qualified
    to conduct IG inspections by graduating the Army IG Basic Course after
    The Inspector General vets them and approves them for IG duty. The
    planning of an IG inspection is extensive and resembles in detail the
    Military Decision-Making Process used to plan combat operations.
        Quality control of IG Inspection Reports occurs in multiple ways.
    First, the report must route through the Commander for approval before
    submission. Next, Command IGs are required to send a listing of
    approved, completed IG Inspection Reports up through their higher Army
    Command (ACOM), Army Service Component Command (ASCC), or Direct-
    Reporting Unit (DRU) for subsequent transmittal to DAIG. DAIG's
    Inspections Directorate reviews selected reports from the scores of
    inspections conducted each year to check on quality standards and
    relevance to broader Army systemic issues. DAIG's Inspections
    Directorate also makes all DAIG-level Inspection Reports available to
    Army IGs on the Inspector General Network as examples. Lastly, DAIG
    conducts Staff Assistance Visits with all ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs in
    order to review the quality of assistance case work; the quality of
    Reports of Investigation; and the quality of Inspection Reports.
        Army IGs conduct IG Investigations in much the same way as they
    conduct Inspections--by following the The Assistance and Investigations
    Guide, which is updated annually. It details a 16-step investigations
    process, which is a subset of the larger Inspector General Action
    Process used for both the Assistance and Investigations functions. This
    detailed process, like the Inspections Process, fully integrates all
    aspects of CIGIE's investigatory standards.
        Investigations is the function performed least often by Army IGs,
    because the IG's Commander has other options to resolve allegations of
    impropriety. IGs normally refer allegations to Commanders throughout
    the command for resolution, but the IG must follow-up to ensure that
    the subordinate command resolved the matter properly and that the
    resulting product was of high quality as well as legally and logically
    sufficient. IGs also do not investigate serious criminal misconduct;
    instead, IGs refer those allegations to the Army's Criminal
    Investigations Division (CID). IGs must refer all allegations of sexual
    assault to CID and allegations of sexual harassment to the local Victim
    Advocate and/or the local Sexual Assault Response Coordinator. Serious
    criminal matters are not appropriate for IG action because other
    established avenues of redress are available along with individuals
    specially trained to handle these matters.
        As trained and qualified investigators, IGs primarily conduct
    administrative investigations, and usually only when the matter is
    sensitive in nature and requires discretion. There is one exception: by
    law (10USC1034), IGs must investigate allegations of Whistleblower
    Reprisal, which Army IGs investigate under the auspices of DOD IG. In
    turn, DOD IG provides extensive quality control of the final report.
    The IG's investigatory independence from the command rests in the fact
    that after a general officer Commander initiates an IG Investigation,
    only The Inspector General of the Army can terminate it. Therefore, no
    one in the command can place undue influence on the local Command IG
    and push that IG to terminate an ongoing IG investigation.
        Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
    Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
    objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
    investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
    investigation that a commander opposes?
        General Smith. Regarding Inspections:
          As outlined in AR 20-1, inspectors general will use a
    deliberate process to identify, evaluate, and set priorities for
    potential inspections of systemic and other issues for approval by the
    directing authority and inclusion in the Organizational Inspection
    Program (IG inspections are but one of three types of inspections
    incorporated into this program; the other two are Command Inspections
    and Staff Inspections). IGs should reasonably expect to complete at
    least four inspections of systemic issues a year, but the size of the
    IG staff section and the commander's priorities will ultimately
    determine the number of inspections conducted.
          Detailed doctrinal guidelines for preparing, executing,
    and completing IG inspections appear in The Inspections Guide, one of
    the two primary guides linking our policy to our doctrine. The process,
    as outlined in The Inspections Guide, represents IG doctrine and it is
    authoritative in nature; IGs may shape, tailor, and adapt the
    techniques and steps to meet the commander's guidance and needs, while
    still preserving the integrity of the IG inspections process across the
    Army.
        Regarding Investigations:
          IAW AR 20-1, the investigation is the IG function that
    provides the commander/directing authority another means through which
    to resolve allegations of impropriety. The primary purpose of IG
    investigations and investigative inquiries is to resolve allegations of
    impropriety. IGs may investigate violations of policy, regulation, or
    law; mismanagement; unethical behavior; fraud; or misconduct. However,
    IGs will provide the command the opportunity to resolve allegations
    within command channels. Therefore, IGs will refer all command-
    appropriate allegations to the command in accordance with guidance from
    the directing authority or, if criminal in nature, to CID. Directing
    authorities should opt for an IG investigation or investigative inquiry
    when extreme discretion is necessary or when the command investigation
    is not likely to be efficient or effective. Once an IG initiates an
    investigation or investigative inquiry, the IG will complete the entire
    investigative action to determine if the allegations are
    ``substantiated'' or ``not substantiated'' and if any issues are
    ``founded'' or ``unfounded''.
          TIG has emphasized, and AR 20-1 specifies, findings for
    investigations must be supported by the evidence.
          WBR and HL investigations are provisionally approved by
    commanders and Directing Authorities, but actually reviewed by DAIG and
    ultimately approved by DODIG.
          DAIG maintains investigative oversight for select cases
    of significant interest to provide Army Senior Leader oversight over
    the cases
          AR 20-1 and The Assistance and Investigations Guide
    describes detailed procedures for IGs to request assistance or
    reconsideration from higher commanders, and even higher level IGs, when
    there are disagreements about the findings of cases.
          At the DAIG level, we can disagree, amend, and/or
    overturn the findings of down-trace cases where DAIG has been
    designated as the Office of Record (OOR) as long as facts support this
    decision and we obtain a favorable legal review at the DAIG level.
        Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
    Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
        General Smith. The Inspector General (TIG), US Army, receives legal
    advice from legal advisors assigned to the Department of the Army
    Inspector General (DAIG). TIG's legal office consists of a senior legal
    advisor, a deputy legal advisor, and other attorneys who provide a wide
    spectrum of advice on issues including, but not limited to, Ethics,
    Investigations, FOIA and the Privacy Act, and General Administrative
    Law issues. Army component IGs (i.e., IGs assigned to Army Commands and
    subordinate units, or to Army National Guard or US Army Reserve units)
    receive legal advice, especially regarding the conduct of
    investigations and assistance cases, primarily from their command's
    supporting legal office (typically an Office of the Staff Judge
    Advocate (OSJA)). The SJA and the OSJA's attorneys are Command IGs'
    immediate legal advisors. On occasion, Command IGs of Army units
    receive legal advice from DAIG's legal office, especially where
    interpretation of Army IG policies and procedures, as contained in Army
    regulations or policy documents, is at issue.
        Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
    Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
    example, command, installation, etc.)?
        General Smith.
          The Inspector General and The Inspector General SGM
    execute senior leader training for all individuals selected for General
    Officers during several leadership programs (Basic, Commander,
    Advanced). This training is focused on the role of Inspectors General,
    current trend analysis, and how the IG can enable readiness and
    warfighting capability.
          The DAIG Analysis and Inspections Follow-Up Office (AIFO)
    also produces a Senior Official Front Office Exportable Training
    Package that is designed as a collective training event intended to
    train Senior Officials and their personal/support staffs to avoid
    potential ethical pitfalls.
          The Inspector General and The Inspector General SGM, as
    well as select members of the DAIG staff (primarily senior COL's and
    Senior Enlisted Advisors) conduct monthly engagements with officers and
    senior NCO's who have been selected for battalion and brigade level
    command positions. This occurs either in-person or virtually during the
    second week of the Battalion/Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC), a DA
    mandatory training event for all command-select senior leaders managed
    by the US Army TRADOC. Much like the senior leader training provided at
    the Capstone program, this both large and small group discussion
    focused on role of Inspectors General, current trend analysis, and
    explaining how the IG can enable readiness and warfighting capability.
          Many installations also incorporate the IG office into
    their own Company Commander/First Sergeant Courses, newcomer's briefs,
    and other key events linked to their camp, post, or station. As a part
    of the Teach and Train function, Command IGs routinely execute periodic
    office calls with brigade and battalion leadership teams to discuss
    trend analysis, root causes, and organizational mitigation measures.
        Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
    oversight roles?
        General Smith.
        1) Sharing lessons learned with other Services IGs: The Quarterly
    Service IG Meetings provide an opportunity for TIG to share issues and
    lesions learned with other Service IGs. TIG collaborates with other
    Service IGs with various topics of inspections amongst the other
    Services.
        2) Sharing lessons learned with other Army oversight entities: We
    do share information with other oversight entities. For example, we
    collaborate with the Army Audit Agency in support of each other's
    initiatives and share inspection plans and results as needed.
        3) Sharing lessons learned with DODIG. There is a constant two-way
    dialog between the United States Army Inspector General Agency and
    DODIG reference allegations with shared jurisdiction (e.g.,
    Whistleblower Reprisal, DOD Hot Line, and Senior Official
    Investigations). Lessons learned are shared informally on a daily basis
    and formally through Army IG attendance at DODIG Whistleblower Reprisal
    Training classes and conferences. TIG also attends a meeting with other
    Service IGs hosted by DODIG. This forum also discusses lessons learned.
        4) Sharing lessons learned with Army Commanders. The Inspector
    General uses a variety of strategic communication products to
    communicate with key leaders in the field. The United States Army
    Inspector General Annual Report (see FY 19 report attached), the
    Company Leaders Inspector General Handbook Template (see attached FY 18
    template attached), Inspector General Updates (see attached IG Update:
    Appearance and Grooming Standards template) and the Senior Leader
    Exportable training package (copy attached) and the All these products
    are designed to inform leaders at all levels of the issue that Army IGs
    commonly encounter and provide tips on how to avoid such misconduct in
    the future
        Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
    FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
        General Said. The DAF-IG enterprise-wide budget numbers, when
    aggregated, were approximately as follows:
        FY20: $31M requested and $24M appropriated
        FY21: $33M requested and $22M appropriated
        Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
    breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
    employees and contractors?
        General Said. Across the DAF we have 2,620 airmen and guardians
    performing IG duties, of which 1,880 are military and 740 are
    civilians. On the uniformed military side, 1089 are enlisted and 791
    are officers. Total funded billets however stand at 1,886. The mix of
    civilians and military is important to us. Our military IGs offer
    experience, but also critically important currency in the issues
    they're charged to inspect or investigate. Our civilian IGs bring a
    wealth of experience and provide helpful continuity.
        Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
    contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
        --Requests for inspections
        --Requests for administrative investigations
        --Whistleblower Complaints
        --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
    request for assistance)
        How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
    administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
        General Said. Over the past 3 years we have received an average of
    11,103 contacts per year. Those contacts were comprised of requests for
    assistance, referrals to another unit or agency as necessary,
    whistleblower complaints, and senior official complaints. The vast
    majority of these contacts are requests for assistance (65%) or
    referrals (15%).
            The average number of whistleblower and senior official
            complaints over the past 3 years has been 504 per year.
            Of the 504 whistleblower and senior official complaints
            received each year, an average of 143 each year resulted in a
            formal investigation, while the remainder were resolved during
            our rigorous complaint analysis/preliminary inquiry phase.
            Over the last three years, total number of DAF investigations
            resulting from IG complaints averaged approximately 353 cases
            per year.
            DAF-IGs are responsible for conducting administrative
            whistleblower investigations, both reprisal and restriction, as
            well as senior official investigations. Over the past 3 years
            we have conducted an average of 143 of these investigations
            each year.
            Importantly, DAF-IG also conducts a variety of comprehensive
            independent reviews of matters such as the Racial Disparity
            Review, contracted military housing, unauthorized use of RC-26
            aircraft during civil unrest, and others.
            DAF-IG monitors retaliation of whistleblowers by ensuring every
            complainant that comes to the IG to report potential
            retaliation/reprisal is briefed (educated) on the specific
            protections within the Military Whistleblower Protection
            program, and we advise them to contact the IG in the future if
            any adverse actions are taken against them (or suspected) as
            result of the member's whistleblower complaint--IAW 10 USC
            1034, DODD 7050.06, and AFI 90-301.
        IG inspections are driven by AFI 90-201, DOD policy, or law rather
    than ``requests for inspections.'' Over the past 3 years we have
    conducted an average of 6,864 inspections per year. These activities
    include Unit Effectiveness Inspections (primarily focused on readiness
    to meet wartime taskings, compliance, and unit climate) for our field
    and operational units; Management Inspections for a variety of
    intermediate, MAJCOM/FIELDCOM, and DAF headquarters functions; Special
    Access Program inspections; Nuclear Surety Inspections; Medical
    Inspections; Wounded, Ill, and Injured Facility Inspections; Cemetery
    Inspections; Radioactive Material Permit Inspections; ``By-law''
    Inspections such as--Combating Trafficking in Persons, Federal Voting
    Assistance Program, Personnel Accountability, Suicide Prevention
    Program, Transition Assistance Program, Equal Opportunity, Sexual
    Assault Prevention & Response Program, Intelligence Oversight; and
    others.
        Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
    take to ensure independence throughout the process? [QFR #23, for
    cross-reference.]
        General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly
    respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of
    independence is critical to executing the mission, at all levels.
    Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of
    their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at
    multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
    channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all
    the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
        INDEPENDENCE OF FIELD INSPECTORS GENERAL--DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR
    FORCE
        1. The investigation and inspection standards, policies and
    guidelines that all IGs, regardless of level, operate under, are
    directed by the Department of the Air Force IG (DAF-IG).
        2. The training provided to IGs is governed by the DAF-IG.
        3. While field IGs report to their chain of command, the
    conclusions of their investigations and inspection are not influenced
    by the chain of command.
        4. If field IGs experience any undue influence they must report
    such unacceptable influence to the next level IG and all the way up to
    the DAF-IG.
        5. Investigations conducted by installation level IGs are
    oversighted by the next level IG, DAF-IG and DOD-IG as well.
        6. Installation IGs cannot conduct investigations in which their
    chain of command is conflicted, directly or indirectly. Such cases must
    be referred to the next-level IG outside the organization. All such
    cases are oversighted by the installation's higher-headquarters IG.
        7. Installation IGs do not conduct formal inspections of their own
    organizations to assess readiness, compliance, climate . . . .. Such
    inspections are conducted by the next level IG that is totally
    independent of the installation commander and does not report to them.
    Such inspections are subject to oversight by the DAF-IG.
        8. All inspections by any level IG across the Department of the Air
    Force are subject to oversight by the DAF-IG.
        9. DAF-IG may overturn lower-level investigations and inspection
    results.
        10. Nuclear inspections are oversighted by the DAF-IG and Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency.
        11. Any IG not adhering to the common standards of conduct directed
    by the DAF-IG, including the critical element of independence, will be
    de-credentialed as an IG and removed from that position. We have de-
    credentialed and removed IGs, but not for violations of the
    independence standard.
        12. The requirement for independence by all IGs is ingrained into
    DAF-IG training and policies. Direct quotes from DAF-IG policies and
    training are pasted below.
        Examples of DAF-IG Policy Emphasizing Independence
        AFI 90-301IC-1, Page 13 Paragraph 1.2.3.
          ``All IGs must maintain a clear distinction between being
    an extension of the commander and their duty to serve as fair,
    impartial, and objective fact-finders and problem solvers. They must be
    sufficiently independent so those complainants requesting IG help will
    continue to do so, even when they feel the commander may be the
    problem. Commanders must support this clear distinction for their IGs
    to be effective.''
        AFI 90-201, 1.3.4 A
          ``DAF-IG has statutory authority and responsibility to
    conduct inspections and investigations which must guarantee
    independence, instill confidence in the system, and be free of any
    appearance of undue influence.''
        Examples of DAF-IG Training Material Emphasizing Independence
          ``The ``Independence'' standard specifically covers our
    requirement for impartiality and to guard against threats that my erode
    impartiality. Some of those threats include; self-interest, bias, undue
    influence, and organizational structure (Chain of Command) threat.''
          ``To sustain a credible Department of the Air Force IG
    system:
            o By conducting independent impartial professional inspections
            and reporting on all matters affecting readiness, discipline,
            efficiency and economy
            o By conducting responsive complaint resolution,
            investigations, and programs characterized by objectivity,
            integrity and impartiality''
          ``Investigating Officers must be impartial, unbiased,
    objective, thorough, and available''
          ``Investigating Officers (IO) must be independent and at
    least one level removed from subjects or complainants''
          ``Ethics, Independence, and Confidentiality
            o Objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial,
            intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.
            o Independence is a critical element of objectivity. Without
            independence, both in fact and in appearance, objectivity is
            impaired.''
        Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
    investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
    release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
    how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
    redacted form?
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
        How do you decide whether to make the results of an investigation
    public and what format do you use (i.e., website, news release)? Of the
    investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20, how many reports
    of investigation were made public, at least in redacted form?
        General Said. IG investigations generally involve allegations
    related or personal matters, conduct, and/or performance. As such, they
    often are governed by the Privacy Act. Hence, investigations are made
    available in redacted form when requested under the Freedom of
    Information Act (FOIA). We recognize and diligently work the balance
    between the public's right to know the results of IG investigations
    versus personal privacy and appreciate more disclosure is appropriate
    and necessary when investigations involve senior officials, general
    officers, and members of the Senior Executive Service than those
    involving more junior members. Investigations that have been requested
    by multiple parties under the FOIA are posted to the DAF FOIA Reading
    Room website.
        Other IG work such as our 2020 Racial Disparity Review are made
    available to the public via the DAF website.
        Finally, we routinely share information with DOD-IG to support
    their congressional and public reporting requirements related to
    investigations.
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    Information regarding upcoming work such as our 2020 Racial Disparity
    Review, privatized housing review, and ongoing Disparity Review is made
    available, when appropriate, through the DAF website, via DAF Public
    Affairs, and direct messaging to airmen and guardians.
        Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
    to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
    reprisal allegations substantiated?
        General Said. Every reprisal complaint received by DAF-IG is
    thoroughly reviewed, addressed, and resolved in accordance with the law
    as well as DOD and DAF policy. As it relates to ``so few reprisal
    allegations being substantiated,'' we find that many complainants use
    the term reprisal without a full understanding what reprisal
    technically entails. Frequently, when reprisal complaints don't meet
    the elements present in the law for reprisal to exist, reprisal itself
    may be not substantiated. However, in these cases another violation
    such as abuse of authority may exist, which results in the allegation
    being re-characterized and investigated as such. Whether a complaint
    relates to reprisal, abuse of authority, or another allegation of
    wrongdoing, the outcome of each case is driven by its specifics facts
    and evidence, and determinations as to whether a complaint is
    substantiated or not substantiated are made using the preponderance of
    the evidence standard. DAF-IG findings in reprisal and restriction
    investigations undergo multiple IG and legal reviews before they are
    provided to DOD-IG for final approval. Likewise, DOD-IG provides
    oversight reviews of all our senior official investigations.
        Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
    is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
    of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
    agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
    it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
        General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations:
    Inspector General Training Course-Complaints Resolution (IGTC-Q) is
    required for all officer, enlisted and civilians (regardless of rank or
    grade) to become a Department of the Air Force complaints resolution
    investigator. Training is conducted by DAF-IG and other agency subject
    matter experts. The IGTC-Q course duration is 5 days. Training also
    occurs during the quarterly (DAF-wide) DAF-IG scheduled video
    teleconference meetings (DCS or Zoom). DAF-IG also hosts and conducts
    an annual World Wide training conference. In addition to initial
    training, all DAF-IG complaints resolution and investigations personnel
    are required to receive refresher training every 3 years.
        For Inspections: The Inspector General Training Course-Inspections
    (IGTC-I) is a three to five day course taught by either military or
    government civilian instructors. The course teaches the fundamentals of
    inspections at Wing/Delta and MAJCOM/FIELDCOM levels and is centered
    around the CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation for
    Inspectors General. IGTC-I is taught at the Department of the Air Force
    Inspection Agency (DAFIA), at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico. Before COVID,
    the courses were taught in-residence, but due to COVID restrictions,
    all courses are currently taught virtually. To significantly enhance
    focus on exercise planning and warfighting readiness, DAF-IG added the
    Readiness Exercise Advanced Planning, Evaluation and Reporting (REAPER)
    course in 2017; also taught by DAFIA. Additionally, DAFIA provides the
    Nuclear Surety Inspector Course, to address DAF-specific Nuclear
    Inspection requirements in conjunction with Defense Threat Reduction
    Agency's Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspector Course. Training is the
    same for all students irrespective of rank/grade or military/civilian
    status. Finally, DAFIA participates in IG summits, workshops and
    seminars, and provides IG cross-tell messages focused on current IG
    inspections policy, processes, and lessons learned.
        Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019
    to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you
    implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been
    delayed?
        General Said. Yes. The Automated Case Tracking System (ACTS)
    upgrade in November 2020 enhanced the protection of privacy for
    whistleblowers and complies with the GAO recommendations. Specifically,
    the upgrade imposed stricter case accessibility limits by organization
    to ensure non-DAF organizations using ACTS cannot see DAF cases (and
    vice versa) or cases outside their own organization. It added a flag on
    cases to display whether a complainant has consented to release of
    their identity outside of the IG. The upgrade enabled access
    restrictions for cases that posed a conflict of interest for IGs (e.g.,
    when a complaint is about an IG). And, it imposed a 10 year retention
    date for cases that were discarded to ensure all entries into ACTS are
    accounted for.
        Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
    investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
    Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
    General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
    for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
    quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
    standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
        General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: IG
    investigations are governed by Air Force Instruction 90-301,
    ``Inspector General Complaints Resolution'' and are conducted IAW CIGIE
    Quality Standards, compliance is mandatory. Those standards are
    provided below, and DAF-IG investigation findings undergo multiple IG
    and legal reviews before they are provided to DOD-IG for final
    approval.
        QUALIFICATIONS: Either a Qualified IG IO or an IG trained IO
    conduct IG Investigations
        INDEPENDENCE: Investigative organization must be free from
    impairments to independence; must be organizationally independent; and
    must maintain an independent attitude.
        DUE PROFESSIONAL CARE: Due professional care must be used in
    conducting investigations and in preparing related reports.
        PLANNING: Organizational and case-specific priorities must be
    established and objectives developed to ensure that individual case
    tasks are performed efficiently and effectively.
        EXECUTING INVESTIGATIONS: Investigations must be conducted in a
    timely, efficient, thorough, and objective manner.
        REPORTING: Reports must thoroughly address all relevant aspects of
    the investigation and be accurate, clear, complete, concise, logically
    organized, timely, and objective.
        MANAGING INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION: Investigative data must be
    stored in a manner that allows effective retrieval, reference, and
    analysis, and protection (ACTS).
        For Inspections: DAF-IG inspections are currently conducted IAW Air
    Force Instruction 90-201 ``The Air Force Inspection System'' and
    December 2020 ``CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation''
    (Blue Book). Quality assurance measures are inherent to the DAF
    Inspection System through its Oversight Inspection construct.
    Inspections and inspectors at one level are periodically observed by
    the next higher command echelon. For example, the Department of the Air
    Force Inspection Agency IG inspectors conduct nuclear and non-nuclear
    oversight inspections on MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs, while MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs
    provide oversight of their subordinate Wing/Delta IGs. All formal
    inspections at the Wing/Delta level and above require a formal report
    to be placed into central repository utilized by the DAF-IG enterprise.
    The DAF Inspection System specifically and deliberately follows the
    prescribed ``CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation''
    (Blue Book) listed here:
        INDEPENDENCE: Ensures that inspectors, inspection organizations,
    and their reports are impartial and without bias in both fact and
    appearance.
        COMPETENCE: Ensures that the personnel conducting an inspection
    collectively have the knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience
    necessary to conduct the inspection
        PLANNING: Ensures that inspectors give attention to the selection
    of an inspection's subject matter and the preparation necessary to
    conduct each inspection
        EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Ensures that evidence collected
    and analyzed is focused on the inspection objectives and supports the
    findings, conclusion, and recommendations.
        REPORTING: Ensures the clear communication of inspection results to
    those charged with governance, appropriate officials of the inspected
    entity, other officials charged with oversight of the inspected entity,
    and, when appropriate, the general public. Inspection reports document
    factual data accurately, fairly, and objectively, and present findings,
    conclusions, and recommendations in a persuasive manner.
        FOLLOW UP: Ensures that recommendation follow-up is a shared
    responsibility between the inspection organization and management
    officials in the inspected entity. Corrective action taken by
    management is essential to improving the effectiveness and efficiency
    of government operations.
        QUALITY CONTROL: Ensures that inspectors and inspection
    organizations are following Blue Book standards.
        Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
    Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
    objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
    investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
    investigation that a commander opposes?
        General Said. Independence of the IG at all levels is highly
    respected, cherished, and protected within the DAF. This element of
    independence is critical to executing the mission at all levels.
    Although field IGs report to their chain of command, the results of
    their inspections and investigations are independent and oversighted at
    multiple levels. If any IG experiences undue influence, they will up-
    channel their concerns to the next, higher level in the IG chain, all
    the way up to DAF-IG. All IGs serve under common standards of conduct.
        The DAF-IG system is grounded in independence and objectivity at
    every level. As such, we do not believe changes are necessary to ensure
    IGs are able to thoroughly and accurately perform their duties,
    investigations, and inspections, while maintaining full-independence.
    Please see the answer to QFR #23 above for more information.
        Yes, an IG may pursue an investigation that a commander opposes.
    And, if an IG is pressured by a commander as it relates to the
    performance of IG duties and responsibilities, that IG must report the
    issue to his or her IG functional chain all the way up to DAF-IG.
        Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
    Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
        General Said. At the DAF-IG level, the Department of the Air Force
    Judge Advocate General (DAF/JA) assigns and embeds a number of
    dedicated attorneys to DAF-IG. These attorneys are focused solely on IG
    matters.
        Our Major/Field Command and installation-level IG offices are
    supported by their respective Staff Judge Advocate offices at each
    command and location. Those legal offices assign attorneys to IG
    matters as a part of an individual attorney's portfolio. An attorney is
    assigned to provide legal assistance to each IG investigating officer
    for investigations. And, a different attorney is assigned to complete a
    separate legal sufficiency review at the completion of each IG
    investigation.
        Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
    Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
    example, command, installation, etc.)?
        General Said. For Complaints Resolution and Investigations: DAF-IG
    educates all in-bound Wing/Delta and Group commanders of the IG roles
    and responsibilities during the commander's course at Maxwell AFB. In
    addition, AFI 90-301 requires that IGs at all levels ``Educate Air
    Force members, commanders, and civilian leadership regarding rights of
    and protection for those contacting an IG.''
        For Inspections: The DAF provides its newly-assigned Wing/Delta and
    Group Commanders training covering a wide spectrum of issues to aid
    them in serving successfully in these critical position. In terms of
    Inspectors General relationships, DAF-IG provides a 90 minute block of
    instruction to each group during this 5-day commanders' training
    course. This IG-related instruction covers Wing/Delta and Group
    commander responsibilities, lessons learned, benchmark programs, and
    the commander's role with IGs as these offices conduct independent
    investigations as well as compliance and readiness inspections.
    Additionally, we update this curriculum with pertinent updates gleaned
    from recent investigations and inspections.
        Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
    oversight roles?
        General Said. In the context of complaints resolution and
    investigations, lessons learned are shared with our sister services and
    also cascaded down through the DAF-IG enterprise during our quarterly
    (DAF-wide) DAF-IG scheduled video teleconference meetings.
    Additionally, we conduct an annual World Wide training conference. DAF-
    IG also utilizes Notices to All IGs or NOTIGs to quickly react to
    necessary policy and guidance changes or to share substantive trends.
        Lessons learned from inspections are shared by our Department of
    the Air Force Inspection Agency (DAFIA). DAFIA collaborates laterally
    with the other services and also provides the DAF-IG enterprise a
    constant flow of information garnered from inspection lessons learned
    and benchmarks via a variety of venues and processes. Foremost is
    providing all MAJCOM/FIELDCOM and Wing/Delta IGs pertinent information
    on issues found during inspections. This information, in both
    classified and unclassified mediums, covers a wide spectrum of
    functional areas to include the DAF medical community, nuclear
    enterprise, and operational units in the Air Force and Space Force.
    Additionally, lessons learned from inspection execution are folded back
    into updates to our IG training curriculum to aid in improved
    inspection tools, techniques and procedures. Finally, DAFIA leads
    inspection process review groups attended by MAJCOM/FIELDCOM IGs, Air
    Staff, and USSF Staff that are designed to articulate lessons learned
    and benchmarks and convert these into needed policy upgrades.
        Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
    FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
        Admiral Snyder. The total appropriated budget for the Office of the
    Naval Inspector General fiscal year 2020 actual amount is $9,079,000;
    $1,150,000 for support and $7,929,000 for pay. The total enacted amount
    for FY21 is $14,147; $3,281,000 for support and $10,866,000 for pay.
    The budget request for FY20 was $10,281,000 and FY21 was $15,573,000.
        Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
    breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
    employees and contractors?
        Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General, which
    serves as the headquarters for the Navy Inspector General Enterprise,
    has a total of 113 personnel onboard. This includes 22 enlisted
    personnel, 33 officers, 58 Department of Defense civilians, and 0
    contractors. The Office of the Naval Inspector General's reserve unit
    has an additional 20 Selected Reserve officers that provide part-time
    support at the headquarters. The Navy Inspector General Enterprise is
    made up of an additional 473 personnel onboard. According to the
    results of a recent data call, this consists of about 1 percent
    enlisted personnel, 8 percent officers, 90 percent Department of
    Defense civilians, and 1 percent contractors.
        Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
    contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
        --Requests for inspections
        --Requests for administrative investigations
        --Whistleblower Complaints
        --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
    request for assistance)
        How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
    administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
        During calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020, the Office of the Naval
    Inspector General opened 17,001 cases in the Naval Inspector General
    Hotline Tracking System, for an average of 5,667 cases per year. From
    2018 to 2020, the Office of the Naval Inspector General received or
    conducted the following (the below numbers are totals over the three
    years):
          4 requests for inspection
          17 command inspections and area assessments
          1,038 investigations (693 full investigations and 345
    preliminary inquiries)
          460 military whistleblower reprisal cases (Navy)
          5,258 assistance cases
          5,987 referral cases
        Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
    take to ensure independence throughout the process?
        Admiral Snyder.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General manages and
    provides oversight of Navy hotline cases and investigations; if there
    is a conflict, real or perceived, the matter is referred to the
    Department of Defense Office of Inspector General or the Inspector
    General of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Office of the
    General Counsel.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General refers hotline
    complaints to one inspector general level above the subject's command
    to avoid conflicts of interest, real or perceived.
          The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
    conducts or provides oversight of all Navy military whistleblower
    reprisal cases and all Navy senior official inspector general cases per
    Department of Defense and Secretary of the Navy instruction.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General is in the final
    stages of establishing a Professional Responsibility Council to review
    allegations of professional misconduct by Navy Inspector General
    Enterprise personnel, such as conduct that undermines the integrity or
    independence reasonably expected of the position.
          Instructions require the entry of all subjects' names
    into the Naval Inspector General Hotline Tracking System to avoid the
    perception of prejudgment.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts
    hotline quality standard reviews of hotline cases and investigations
    throughout the investigative process and at case closure.
          Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
    Efficiency guidelines regarding impartiality are taught and applied to
    the conduct and review of all inquiries.
        Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
    investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
    release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
    how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
    redacted form?
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
        Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General releases
    reports in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5,
    United States Code, Section 552. The Freedom of Information Act states
    that an agency shall make available for public inspection all records
    that the agency determines have become or are likely to become the
    subject of subsequent requests, or records that have been requested
    three or more times. Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy
    instruction on the Freedom of Information Act, SECNAVINST 5720.42G,
    interprets the Freedom of Information Act to require posting of any
    records that have been requested three times. The Department of the
    Navy further recommends, but does not require, the proactive posting of
    materials that have been requested once to eliminate the need for
    tracking number of requests. No reports of investigation completed
    during fiscal year 2019 were posted. One report of investigation
    completed during fiscal year 2020 was posted. When an investigation,
    command inspection, or area assessment is released to the public, the
    document is posted in the Freedom of Information Act Reading Room on
    the Office of the Naval Inspector General's website. The Office of the
    Naval Inspector General does not generally make public its upcoming
    work, but it does provide Navy leadership an inspection schedule for
    the next three years every year.
        Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
    to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
    reprisal allegations substantiated?
        Admiral Snyder. Many reprisal allegations are not substantiated
    because they do not meet the statutory requirements of a reprisal
    action. Other forms of retaliation that do not meet the statutory
    reprisal requirements are handled as hotline complaints and potential
    violations of Navy policy.
        Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
    is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
    of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
    agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
    it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
        Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General conducts
    hotline and military whistleblower reprisal training for staff and
    enterprise inspector general personnel. All training was previously
    delivered in-person but is currently conducted virtually by the Office
    of the Naval Inspector General's Training and Certification Division
    via Microsoft Teams and Blackboard Collaborate. While under revision/
    update, the current methodology for training Navy IG personnel is:
              Attend NAVIG 101, a 16-hour training course that is
            an introduction to inspector general business.
              Attend NAVIG 201, a 32-hour training course that
            focuses on basic hotline investigator skills including
            investigations and case management.
              Attend NAVIG 202, a 32-hour training course that
            provides the basic foundation for military whistleblower
            reprisal.
              Further inspector general training to be followed up
            with ``proficiency'' certification and credentialing managed
            and/or overseen by the inspector general chain of command.
          The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
    provides military whistleblower reprisal training to all reprisal
    investigators.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General Hotline Intake,
    Case Management, and Quality Unit provides hands-on training for
    enterprise personnel.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General has recently
    taken steps for enterprise investigators to be temporarily detailed to
    the Office of the Naval Inspector General for Hotline Intake and Case
    Management for approximately one month for hands-on training.
          Navy Inspector General Enterprise personnel are trained
    on hotline quality standards, hotline processes, hotline
    investigations, report writing, and the Naval Inspector General Hotline
    Tracking System during Quality Assurance Reviews, Quality Assurance
    Assists, and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews.
          New Office of the Naval Inspector General hotline
    investigators are provided hands-on hotline training on all hotline
    processes within their first 30 days onboard.
          The Training and Certification Division has developed a
    schedule for in-service training. In-service trainings are specific,
    investigative topics that are taught by subject matter experts in order
    to assist in closing any investigative deficiency gaps in the
    enterprise. These events normally occur on a monthly basis and are
    attended by an average of 80 inspectors general from across the
    enterprise.
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General standardized
    training is provided to all personnel regardless of rank or grade as
    inspectors general are required to acquire the same skills for
    consistency.
        Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019
    to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you
    implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been
    delayed?
        Admiral Snyder. Yes.
        Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
    investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
    Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
    General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
    for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
    quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
    standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
        Admiral Snyder.
          Governing policies for executing DON IG investigations
    include the following:
              Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
            Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations
            (Blue Book)
              Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
            Efficiency Quality Standards for Investigations
              Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
            Efficiency Hotline Best Practices
              Association of Inspectors General Principles and
            Standards for Offices of Inspector General (Green Book)
              Department of Defense Directive 5505.06,
            ``Investigation of Allegations against Senior DOD Officials''
              Department of Defense Directive 7050.01, ``The DOD
            Hotline Program''
              Department of Defense Directive 7050.06, ``Military
            Whistleblower Protection''
              Department of Defense guide titled, ``Guide to
            Investigating Military Whistleblower Reprisal and Restriction
            Complaints''
              Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5370.5C, ``DON
            Hotline Program''
              Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.57H, ``Mission
            and Functions of the Naval Inspector General''
              Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5800.12C,
            ``Investigation of Allegations Made against Senior Officials of
            the Department of the Navy''
              Naval Inspector General Investigations Manual
          Command inspections and area assessments in the Navy
    Inspector General Enterprise utilize the Office of the Naval Inspector
    General Enterprise Inspection Manual.
          Navy Inspector General Enterprise personnel are trained
    on hotline quality standards, hotline processes, hotline
    investigations, report writing, and the Naval Inspector General Hotline
    Tracking System during Quality Assurance Reviews, Quality Assurance
    Assists, and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews. Quality Assurance
    Reviews and Quality Assurance Validation Reviews are conducted to
    ensure compliance with regulatory guidance.
              Quality Assurance Reviews are conducted once every
            two years.
              Quality Assurance Validation Reviews are conducted as
            required.
          Hotline Quality Investigation and Case Review are
    conducted on every case prior to closure to ensure compliance with
    regulatory guidance.
          Quality reviews are conducted on all whistleblower
    reprisal investigations prior to closure.
          Substantiated investigations and case dispositions in
    certain other cases (e.g., senior officials or military whistleblower
    reprisal investigations) receive a legal sufficiency review from a
    Department of the Navy attorney.
          Staff are required to document compliance in the Naval
    Inspector General Hotline Tracking System, and in reports of review to
    commands. The reports of review are kept for future reference.
          Subject matter experts that serve as Inspection Team
    members sign a non-disclosure agreement in which they acknowledge the
    required Ethical Standards of Conduct for an inspection.
        Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
    Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
    objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
    investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
    investigation that a commander opposes?
        Admiral Snyder. Changes are not necessary to ensure Command
    Inspectors General can operate independently and objectively. The
    Office of the Inspector General conducts continuous training and
    oversight of Command Inspectors General and has guidance in place to
    ensure independence and impartiality throughout the execution of
    inspections and investigations by Command Inspectors General.
    Additionally, the administrative relationship between the Naval
    Inspector General and Command Inspectors General enables oversight of
    the Command Inspectors General to ensure they are able to execute their
    roles in an independent and objective manner. Inspections and
    investigations can be directed by either the Command Inspector General
    or the commander, but only the commander can authorize investigations
    on matters outside of inspector general business. Command Inspectors
    General can pursue an investigation that a commander opposes with the
    support and assistance of the Office of the Naval Inspector General.
        Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
    Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
        Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General has two
    military attorneys from the Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps and
    three civilian attorneys from the Navy Office of the General Counsel on
    staff. In addition to traditional legal practice areas such as ethics,
    fiscal law, military justice, and civilian personnel law, these
    attorneys also work closely with investigation and inspection teams to
    ensure that the correct legal standards are applied and products are
    legally sufficient. These attorneys mainly provide legal advice to the
    headquarters staff but are available to the rest of the enterprise for
    reachback on inspector general matters. For most legal support,
    enterprise inspectors general are encouraged to work with their local
    legal counsel. These may be Judge Advocate General Corps and/or Office
    of the General Counsel attorneys, depending on the command or office.
        Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
    Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
    example, command, installation, etc.)?
        Admiral Snyder. Commanders and senior enlisted leaders in the Navy
    attend the Navy Leadership and Ethics Center prior to assuming duties
    as a commander, executive officer, or senior enlisted leader. The Naval
    Inspector General meets with attendees from every Prospective Major
    Command Leadership Course, Command Leadership Course, Executive Officer
    Leadership Course, and Command Master Chief/Chief of the Boat Course,
    either in-person or virtually, to educate them on the duties of
    inspectors general and their relationship with Command Inspectors
    General and the Office of the Naval Inspector General. The Naval
    Inspector General also speaks with Navy flag officers and Senior
    Executive Service personnel at the New Flag and Senior Executive
    Training Symposium, the Intermediate Flag and Senior Executive Training
    Symposium, the Advanced Flag and Senior Executive Training Symposium,
    and the Navy Flag Officer and Senior Executives Symposium. Commanders
    and other inspector general professionals can attend the NAVIG 101
    foundations course. This 2-day orientation discusses the relationship
    and connections between the Naval Inspector General and the enterprise
    as well as who, how, and the importance of the Navy Inspector General
    Enterprise's mission. During command inspections and area assessments,
    the Naval Inspector General meets with commanders and reiterates the
    importance of their inspector general mission and their relationship
    with their Command Inspector General.
        Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
    oversight roles?
        Admiral Snyder. The Office of the Naval Inspector General
    implements lessons learned in several ways including engagements with
    Navy leaders, inspector general professionals, and commands via the
    following:
          Membership in the Navy Senior Management Council
          Regular meetings with the Under Secretary of the Navy and
    the Vice Chief of Naval Operations
          Navy Secretariat Orientation Seminars
          Posting command inspection reports
          Case studies analyzed at the annual Navy Inspector
    General Enterprise Symposium
          Bi-weekly virtual town halls with the Navy Inspector
    General Enterprise
          The Office of the Naval Inspector General training course
    revisions
        Ms. Speier. What was your total appropriated budget for FY20 and
    FY21? What were your budget requests for these years?
        General Castellvi. The Office of the Inspector General of the
    Marine Corps (IGMC) total appropriated budget for both fiscal years
    2020 and 2021 is $3,309,000. The Department of the Navy, Assistant for
    Administration allocates appropriated funds for civilian pay, travel,
    and support (materials). A breakdown of both years is as follows:
          FY20 appropriated budget was $1,674,000.
          FY21 appropriated budget is $1,935,000.
        In addition, the Commandant of the Marine Corps authorized the IGMC
    to task any organization within the Marine Corps to provide Subject
    Matter Experts, as temporary assistant inspector Generals (TAIGs), to
    assist the IGMC Inspections Division in the performance of its mission
    and functions; primarily travel support to carryout comprehensive unit
    inspections. The IGMC provides costs associated with such support, with
    the exception of travel time compensation. IGMC funding requirements
    for TAIGs is estimated and requested though Headquarters Marine Corps,
    Administration and Resource Management Fiscal Branch, from the Deputy
    Commandant for Programs and Resources through the annual Program
    Objective Memorandum. The IGMC did not prepare formal budget requests,
    throughout Future Years Defense Plans, in support of its mission.
        Ms. Speier. How many personnel do you have, and what is the
    breakdown between enlisted personnel, officers, and DOD civilian
    employees and contractors?
        General Castellvi. In the Office of the Inspector General of the
    Marine Corps (IGMC):
          Total number of Marine Corps inspectors general (IGs)
    personnel on-hand (O/H) = 31
          Officers = 13
          Enlisted = 7
          DOD Civilians = 11
        In the Marine Corps IG community (IGMC personnel and all command
    inspectors general (CIGs)):
          Total number of Marine Corps IG personnel O/H = 201
          Officers = 34
          Enlisted = 99
          DOD Civilians = 68
        Ms. Speier. How many contacts do you receive per year? Of those
    contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
        --Requests for inspections
        --Requests for administrative investigations
        --Whistleblower Complaints
        --Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other
    request for assistance)
        How many command inspections do you conduct per year? How many
    administrative investigations do you conduct each year?
        How many contacts do you receive per year? For the 12-month period
    ending 16 April, Marine Corps inspectors general received 2173 contact.
    Of those 2173 contacts, 978 contacts were received by IGMC, and 1195
    were received by subordinate Command Inspectors General.
        General Castellvi. In 2019, the Marine Corps received 1,812
    contacts; in 2020, the Marine Corps received 2,060 contacts. Of the
    2,020 contacts, 13 percent were related to implementation of COVID
    force protection measures.
        Of those contacts, can you please categorize as follows:
        Requests for inspections: 0. Marine Corps IGs establish an
    inspection schedule to ensure each command is inspected on a regular
    basis. Each commander uses his or her own IG for any ah-hoc
    inspections, in addition to the scheduled inspections.
        Requests for administrative investigations: The Marine Corps does
    not track/record whether the contact requested an investigation. Each
    contact is analyzed to determine whether an actual investigation is
    warranted (does the contact address a matter that violates any order,
    rule, law, or policy?). If the complaint alleges a violation of an
    order, rule, law, or policy, an initial inquiry is done to determine
    whether there is information that was not known to the contact that
    precludes investigation. In 2018, Marine Corps IGs conducted 98
    investigations; in 2019, there were 51 investigations and in 2020,
    there were 47 investigations.
        Whistleblower Complaints: In 2019, Marine Corps IGs received 77
    complaints of military whistleblower reprisal; 12 of those complaints
    met prima facie for investigation under 10 USC 1034; 1 investigation
    substantiated reprisal.
        In 2020, Marine Corps IGs received 51 complaints of military
    whistleblower reprisal; 8 of those complaints met prima facie for
    investigation under 10 USC 1034; 1 investigation substantiated
    reprisal.
        Other (and please identify as regulation question, or other request
    for assistance): The Marine Corps initially categorizes all contacts as
    Assistance Cases. Marine Corps IGs sub-classify cases as Fraud/Waste/
    Abuse of Authority/Mismanagement (FWAM); Congressional Inquiries;
    Dependent/Quality of Life Issues; Freedom of Information Act Requests;
    Misconduct; Reprisal; and Non-IG (anything else that is not reprisal,
    senior official related, or FWAM). Some examples of non-IG matters are
    requests to correct records, cancellation, or modification of military
    permanent change of station orders, notification of scams, civilian
    hiring practices, voter issues, awards processing, and civil matters
    (neighbor disputes; off-base landlord issues; non-military harassment
    not on a military installation, etc.).
        In 2019, Marine Corps IG received 1745 non-whistleblower reprisal
    contacts.
        In 2020, Marine Corps Inspectors General received 2012 non-
    whistleblower reprisal contacts.
        How many administrative investigations do you conduct each year? In
    2018, Marine Corps Inspectors General conducted 98 investigations; in
    2019, there were 51 investigations and in 2020, there were 47
    investigations.
        Ms. Speier. For administrative investigations, what steps do you
    take to ensure independence throughout the process?
        General Castellvi. IGMC takes a proactive approach to independence.
    Commanders receive education about the IGs, the IGs' role, and the
    commanders' relationship with the IGs. Throughout this training, IGMC
    stresses the importance of independence and objectivity. IGMC also
    trains the IGs, and stresses that they have a direct line to all
    personnel in the IGMC office, to include the IGMC, if they feel they
    need support or guidance in navigating a case or an issue.
        For cases that IGMC tasks to a CIGs for investigation, IGMC is the
    directing authority and has supervision and review responsibilities for
    the case. The end report of investigation must demonstrate independence
    and objectivity, as well as completeness and thoroughness, before IGMC
    will approve the report.
        For all cases received by the CIG, IGMC reviews the reports of
    investigation as part of the IGMC oversight and inspection process.
        Ms. Speier. How do you decide whether to make the results of an
    investigation public and what format do you use (i.e. website, news
    release)? Of the investigations that were completed in FY19 and FY20,
    how many reports of investigation were made public, at least in
    redacted form?
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
        General Castellvi. IGMC shares the results of investigations, in
    accordance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), when they are
    requested. In 2019 and 2020, IGMC responded to 21 and 15 FOIA requests,
    respectively. The information released in response to FOIA is released
    directly to the requesting individual.
        How do you share information with the public about upcoming work?
    IGMC does not publically share information about upcoming work.
    Inspections in the Marine Corps are generally short/no-notice, and
    sharing information publically would inhibit the IG's ability to get an
    ``any-day'' look at a unit. As a matter of course, to protect the
    investigative process and the privacy and rights of all complainants,
    witnesses, and subjects, IGMC does not discuss investigations until
    they are complete. For these same reasons, the IG does not publically
    announce their commencement.
        Ms. Speier. Since 2012, of more than 8,000 reprisal complaints made
    to the DOD or Service IGs, only 273 were substantiated. Why are so few
    reprisal allegations substantiated?
        General Castellvi. Many reprisal complaints that meet prima facie
    under 10 U.S.C. Section 1034 fail to demonstrate a direct correlation
    between the protected communication and the personnel action taken. For
    example, a complainant will make a protected communication, and shortly
    thereafter receive an unfavorable personnel action, but upon
    examination, it is apparent that the personnel action was a valid,
    reasonable response to something other than the protected
    communication.
        An IGMC investigator interviews every reprisal complainant. During
    this recorded and transcribed interview, the complainant is given an
    opportunity to fully explain his or her case, and provide information
    that was not included in the original complaint. As well, the
    investigator will ask questions to ensure full understanding of the
    issues at hand, and seek clarifying documenting when appropriate. After
    this interview, a preliminary inquiry of records, and occasionally
    additional interviews with witnesses is made. After the inquiry, IGMC
    notifies Department of Defense (DOD) of its recommendation to
    investigate or dismiss the case because there is no indication of a
    correlation between the protected communication and personnel action.
    IGMC must get DOD approval to close a reprisal case. The complainant
    receives a copy of the completed report of investigation, regardless of
    finding, if the IGMC completes and investigation.
        In 2019, the Marine Corps received 77 reprisal complaints. Of those
    77 complaints, 12 required an investigation to determine whether or not
    there was a direct correlation between the protected communication and
    the personnel action. Only 1 of the 12 cases that met criteria for a
    full investigation found a direct correlation between the protected
    communication and personnel action.
        In 2020, the Marine Corps received 51 reprisal complaints. Of those
    51 complaints, 8 required an investigation to determine whether or not
    there was a direct correlation between the protected communication and
    the personnel action. Only one of the eight cases that met criteria for
    a full investigation found a direct correlation between the protected
    communication and personnel action.
        Common reasons that cases fail to go to investigation or
    substantiate are misconduct of the complainant that led to the
    personnel action; no evidence that the person taking the personnel
    action knew of the protected communication; the personnel action was
    required by a higher regulation and was non-discretionary; and
    evaluations that are lower than a complainant desires when an
    established pattern of performance existed well before the protected
    communication.
        Ms. Speier. How is training for IG staff conducted? What training
    is offered on investigations, in particular, and what is the duration
    of the training? Is training conducted in house or by a third-party
    agency or organization? Is training the same for all personnel, or does
    it vary by rank/grade and civilian or military status?
        General Castellvi. Training for IG staff is conducted in-house and
    via third party, and the same training is offered to all personnel.
        Historically, in-house training was conducted by mobile training
    teams. COVID-19 restrictions challenged IGMC's in-house training
    efforts, but recognizing the need to keep the IG community engaged and
    up-to-date, IGMC instituted quarterly teleconferences and ad-hoc
    computer-based training. Additionally, IGMC has almost completed the
    development and implementation of two online IG courses. One of these
    courses will serve as a certification course. IGMC will resume in-
    person training in the near future.
        Certification as a Marine Corps IG requires completion of an IGMC
    mobile training team (MTT) course; the DOD IG Joint IG Course; the
    Association of Inspectors General Inspectors General Course; the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center IG Course, or another Service's
    inspector general training course. All IGs are required to complete 80
    hours of job-related training every two years to remain current, and
    attend a Marine Corps training event or symposium once every two years.
        The DOD IG is currently offering its joint IG course virtually. The
    two-week course allows the student to receive IG accreditation upon
    completion. Class size is currently increasing in an attempt to catch
    up from time lost during the pandemic.
        IGMC's MTTs are three to four days of in-person lecture,
    discussion, practical application, and evaluation on all core IG
    topics. While all topics are covered, the focus is on Council of the
    Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Blue Book
    standards and their application to assistance and investigations.
        To preserve the integrity of the investigative process and the
    independence of the command IG, IGMC conducts all senior official
    investigations and all investigations concerning whistleblower
    reprisal. Investigators receive on-going in-house training as policies
    and procedures related to investigations change.
        Ms. Speier. Have you implemented the GAO recommendations from 2019
    to better protect the identity of whistleblowers? If not, when will you
    implement these recommendations, and why has implementation been
    delayed?
        General Castellvi. Yes. IGMC made case management system
    enhancements during the 1st quarter of calendar year 2020 and
    implemented a new case management system, the Inspector General Case
    Action Manager (IGCAM). The IGCAM has an option to restrict access of
    identifying information about confidential complainants to any
    subordinate organization below the level that received the complaint.
        Even if a contact does not request confidentiality, by default,
    IGMC will protect his or her identify as much as possible by not
    releasing any information beyond that which is required to address the
    contacts concern.
        As well, IGMC has adopted a report-writing style to minimize the
    use of the names of complainants and witnesses when possible.
        Ms. Speier. What standards do you use for inspections and
    investigations? Do you, for example, follow either the Silver Book or
    Blue Book standards promulgated by the Council of the Inspectors
    General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE)? Or CIGIE's 2011 standards
    for conducting investigations? Or other standards, and which ones? What
    quality assurance efforts have you implemented to make sure any
    standards are met? Do you require staff to document compliance?
        General Castellvi. Standards: Marine Corps IGs use CIGIE's Blue
    Book Standards: Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluation, for
    all inspections and investigations.
        Quality Assurance and Compliance:
        Inspections: IGMC inspects all command inspectors general adherence
    to CIGIE standards during IGMC inspections and provides the commanders
    with a report on the findings of the inspections. IGMC makes a detailed
    follow-up report within 30 days of the inspection, and requires a
    corrective action plan within another 30 days. Any non-mission capable
    command receives another inspection after a short period of time given
    to correct deficiencies.
        IGMC employs subject matter experts (SME) to conduct inspections.
    Following the initial inspection, the lead inspector reviews the SME's
    adherence to CIGIE standards; following the lead inspector's review,
    the director of inspections reviews the report for final approval.
        Investigations: IGMC conducts all whistleblower reprisal and all
    senior official investigations to ensure independence. Investigators
    self-certify their work, which is reviewed by in-house counsel for
    legal sufficiency before final review and approval by the IG. Once IGMC
    approves an investigation, the report and all supporting documents are
    sent to DOD for final oversight and review. Throughout the process,
    from investigator to final DOD approval, reports are measured against
    CIGIE standards.
        For all other investigations, the investigator self-certifies
    compliance with CIGIE standards and the report is reviewed by an
    attorney for legal sufficiency. IGMC does a final review of all cases
    referred to the local IG. For cases received at the command level, IGMC
    review is made via the inspection process.
        Ms. Speier. Do you think changes are needed to ensure that the
    Command IGs truly can feel free to operate independently and
    objectively? For example, who decides what inspections and
    investigations to perform--the IG or the commander? Can an IG pursue an
    investigation that a commander opposes?
        General Castellvi. IGMC recognizes that there is room for conflict,
    or the appearance of conflicts, based upon the fact that CIGs work for
    the commanders. A solid relationship between the commander and the IG
    is imperative, and should be mutually beneficial. We are open to
    considering any suggestions or recommendations to strengthen the
    authorities of the IGs in a way that fully integrates them into the
    command and staff team as an independent advisor to the commander,
    without inhibiting the commanders' ability to maintain good order and
    discipline.
        IGMC's efforts to create independence and objectivity focus on
    education of the IGs and the commanders of the role of each, the value
    of one to the other, and the vital importance of independence and
    oversight.
        The IGMC case management system has a complainant/contact directly
    into the system design. This ensures all contacts are put into the
    system, and nothing is lost or misplaced. IGMC has visibility and
    oversight of everything in the system, and whether via direct review of
    a case, or during an inspection, reviews the CIG's work for all quality
    standards, to include independence and objectivity.
        Most importantly, all IGs know they can come directly to any member
    of the IGMC staff for assistance if they feel their independence or
    objectivity is at risk, or if they feel they are being pushed to act
    against their best judgement. Should this occur, IGMC will remove the
    case in question from the local command and assign it to a higher
    headquarters or to someone within IGMC.
        While commanders have some discretion on inspections, IGMC mandates
    the minimum inspection requirements, not the commander. The commander
    has discretion on exact timing and anything beyond the IGMC established
    minimum inspections, but IGMC sets the baseline requirement and reviews
    all inspections, and also inspects the inspectors in the execution of
    their duties.
        Ms. Speier. Who/how is legal advice provided to the Service IGs?
    Who/how is legal advice provided to Component IGs?
        General Castellvi. IGMC obtains independent legal advice from a
    civilian attorney assigned to the IGMC. IGMC Counsel provides
    comprehensive legal advice in all areas under the cognizance of IGMC,
    including administrative investigations. To maintain independence,
    IGMC's counsel reports to the Counsel for the Commandant of the Marine
    Corps (CMC) (CL), who reports to the Department of the Navy Office of
    the General Counsel.
        Component IGs receive legal advice from the command staff judge
    advocate and/or CL counsel assigned to the geographic command.
    Component IGs are also free to contact IGMC Counsel to discuss any and
    all IG matters or concerns.
        Ms. Speier. What kind of training does your Service provide
    Commanders about their relationship with their respective IG (for
    example, command, installation, etc.)?
        General Castellvi. The IGMC presents an introductory class to all
    O-5 and O-6 Marines selected for command. Additionally, the IGMC
    teaches all newly selected/promoted brigadier generals about the IGs,
    and the commanders' relationship with their IGs.
        During inspections, the IGMC will meet with the commanders in the
    local inspection area and provide necessary guidance or information
    related to IG matters and the commanders' relationship with the IGs.
        During inspections, the IGMC or his representative will speak with
    the commander about his or her inspection program, make recommendations
    to improve things, and note any identified gaps in the relationship
    between the commander and the IG.
        On an ad-hoc basis, IGMC will speak at the general officer
    symposiums, held twice each year, to discuss any relevant IG trends or
    observations.
        Ms. Speier. How do you implement lessons learned with other
    oversight roles?
        General Castellvi. IGMC provides quarterly updates with the CMC on
    trends observed and challenges across the Marine Corps, as identified
    by inspections, investigations, and assistance cases.
        IGMC also shares information and trends associated with inspection
    results with the deputy commandants responsible for the various
    inspected programs. These trends serve to identify trouble spots, or
    areas where orders and directives are unclear or require a standard
    that is unobtainable with current resources.
        IGMC conducts in- and out-briefs for each inspection, where the
    inspection team discusses what they have seen across the Marine Corps
    and to share lessons learned and best practices. During out-briefs, the
    inspection team discusses all findings and discrepancies, and helps to
    identify the root-cause of non-compliance or poor execution. From this
    information, the commander can decide where to enhance training or
    provide additional resources.
        At all training opportunities for commanders and IGs, the IGMC
    shares best practices and lessons learned so that all may benefit.
        Ms. Speier. Did the Marine Corps IG interview the widow of Chai
    Suthammanont in its investigation of the death of Mr. Suthammanont at
    Marine Corps Base Quantico? If not, why not?
        When will the Marine Corps IG release the report investigating the
    death of Chai Suthammanont or create a publicly releasable document
    that details the results of the investigation into the death of Chai
    Suthammanont?
        Is the report on Chai Suthammanont's death a product of the Marine
    Corps Office Inspector General? If not, which agency owns this report?
        Does the Marine Corp Inspector General serve as counsel for the
    Marine Corps?
        Did the Marine Corps IG interview the widow of Chai Suthammanont in
    its investigation of the death of Mr. Suthammanont at Marine Corps Base
    Quantico? If not, why not?
        General Castellvi. The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr.
    Suthammanont.
        When will the Marine Corps IG release the report investigating the
    death of Chai Suthammanont or create a publicly releasable document
    that details the results of the investigation into the death of Chai
    Suthammanont? The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr.
    Suthammanont and thus has no report to release.
        Is the report on Chai Suthammanont's death a product of the Marine
    Corps Office Inspector General? If not, which agency owns this report?
    The IGMC did not investigate the death of Mr. Suthammanont. The
    Commander, Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region owns the
    report on Mr. Suthammanont's death.
        Does the Marine Corp Inspector General serve as counsel for the
    Marine Corps? The IGMC provides information to Marine Corps leaders to
    inform their decisions. The IGMC informs leadership of trends,
    identified deficiencies and problems, and resource shortfalls. When
    appropriate, IGMC will identify potential solutions and challenges.
    However, the IGMC would not be considered counsel for the Marine Corps.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
        Mrs. McClain.As you conduct an investigation into the space command
    basing decision, are you working with Air Force IG Sami D. Said on
    examining the mission readiness impacts of moving personnel that are
    successfully accomplishing the mission at Peterson AFB? I am concerned
    the Air Force decision to move the command from Colorado Springs will
    make it difficult to retain critical personnel with expertise in space
    operations considering the command has been at Peterson for nearly two
    years. There is precedence in losing civilian employees declining to
    relocate when a mission has been moved.''
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG is working with relevant Air Force
    organizations and personnel, including personnel from the Air Force
    IG's office, as part of the DOD OIG's evaluation of the Air Force
    selection process for the permanent location of the U.S. Space Command
    headquarters. The project announcement is available on the DOD OIG's
    public website at the following link: https://media.defense.gov/2021/
    Feb/19/2002585712/-1/-1/1/D2021-DEV0SO-0099.000_
    REDACTED.PDF
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
        Dr. Jackson. Mr. O'Donnell, in an instance where a whistleblower
    does not request anonymity, can you tell me whether the DOD OIG
    contacts or interviews the whistleblower, assuming they have presented
    a credible allegation?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG generally contacts whistleblowers
    who do not request anonymity for additional information when their
    complaints do not contain sufficient details to determine appropriate
    action on the complaint. In addition, whistleblowers may be interviewed
    as part of a subsequent audit, evaluation, or investigation. [Question
    #4, for cross-reference.]
        Dr. Jackson. Over the past five years, how many instances occurred
    when the DOD IG elected not to interview or contact a whistleblower to
    follow-up on allegations of potential waste, fraud and abuse submitted
    to its Hotline? If there are any, can you please provide me with
    detailed information regarding the rationale for that decision or those
    decisions?
        Mr. O'Donnell. As discussed in response to Question 4, the DOD OIG
    generally contacts whistleblowers who do not request anonymity for
    additional information when their complaints do not contain sufficient
    details to determine appropriate action on the complaint. However, the
    DOD OIG does not track the rate at which whistleblowers are interviewed
    to provide additional details or as part of subsequent audits,
    evaluations, or investigations.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
        Mr. Brown. You noted in your testimony that you look ``forward to
    working with the Service IGs in the implementation of our oversight of
    diversity and inclusion in the DOD and the handling of supremacist,
    extremist, and criminal gang activity in the Armed Forces, as required
    by section 554 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.'' How
    are you intending to use the new DOD IG to address extremism in the
    Department and racial, gender, and ethnic disparities? Can you please
    describe who is involved in establishing the roles and responsibilities
    for the Deputy IG for D&I and the decision-making processes involved?
        Mr. O'Donnell. The DOD OIG will use the new Deputy Inspector
    General (DIG) in a manner consistent with applicable laws, including
    section 554 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act and the
    Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The DOD OIG is working to
    determine the organization, structure, staffing, and funding required
    to support the execution of those duties and responsibilities. The DOD
    OIG will submit a report detailing this information by June 30, 2021,
    as required by section 554.
        Mr. Brown. The FY21 NDAA requires that the DOD IG submits to HASC/
    SASC a report describing the Deputy IG for D&I's roles,
    responsibilities, organization, and additional administrative details
    180 days after enactment, which is June 30, 2021. Is your office on
    track to meet this due date? Besides the report that you are required
    to issue to Congress, where else will you publish the roles and
    responsibilities for the Deputy IG for D&I?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, the DOD OIG is on track to submit a report
    describing the new DIG's roles and responsibilities, and organization,
    including structure and staffing, by June 30, 2021, as required section
    554 of the FY21 NDAA. The roles and responsibilities of the new DIG are
    published on the DOD OIG's public website at the following link:
    https://www.dodig.mil/About/Organization/
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
        Mr. Moore. I deeply respect the role whistleblowers play in
    providing transparency and accountability; they shed light on
    wrongdoing that would otherwise go untouched. I realize that the
    Hotline may receive many submissions which on their face do not merit
    follow-up for example due to lack of substantive evidence or personal
    bias. But setting those aside, what standard to you use in determining
    who receives follow-up, including an interview and review of submitted
    materials?
        Mr. O'Donnell. Specifically, if a whistleblower timely submitted
    multiple evidentiary submissions, including hundreds of pages of legal
    and factual analyses, relevant to an investigation that the DOD Office
    of Inspector General was at that time conducting, and if that
    whistleblower made multiple offers to meet, would it not be standard
    practice to interview the whistleblower?
        The DOD OIG conducts a thorough and independent review of each
    complaint it receives, in accordance with CIGIE and DOD standards. In
    many cases, a whistleblower or complainant provides a full description
    of the information in their possession along with the names of
    witnesses or documents that contain direct evidence of the matter under
    review. The DOD OIG fully reviews the information contained in the
    whistleblower's or complainant's complaint to determine whether and
    what additional information might be needed to further review the
    complaint. For example, in a case where the whistleblower or
    complainant provides hundreds of pages of legal and factual analysis,
    it is not necessary to collect additional information when that
    complainant is not a percipient witness, but rather an aggregator of
    publicly available information. Another example might be where other
    Government entities, including administrative or law enforcement
    entities, have already interviewed the non-percipient witness.
        Mr. Moore. I recognize that every Inspector General does its best
    to ensure that its reports are accurate upon publication. I also
    realize that from time-to-time mistakes are made; that is why the
    Government Auditing Standards and DOD OIG policy provide guidance for
    the correction of inaccuracies identified after the issuance of and OIG
    report.
        My question is what if there is an error or inadequate evidence
    supporting one or more statements in a published OIG report. Where is
    Congress or even members of the public to go if an IG is unwilling to
    look at the matter or have an independent review done to get the issues
    reviewed independently?
        Mr. O'Donnell. I take seriously questions or concerns raised by the
    Congress or the public regarding the accuracy of a published report. As
    such, I am always willing to review those questions and give them all
    due consideration. I have the authority to withdraw or amend a final
    report that I determine to be inaccurate or not supported by competent
    evidence, and I have not hesitated to do so under the appropriate
    circumstances. This is a very rare occurrence, and when it does happen,
    pursuant to law, policy, and practice, we address it publicly. Should
    Congress or members of the public have concerns that the contents of a
    published DOD OIG report are erroneous, they may always address such
    concerns to me.