[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                     
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-10]

                        UNMANNED SYSTEMS OF THE 
                        DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 18, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-340                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                  JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair   JIM BANKS, Indiana
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama

              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
               David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                           Sean Falvey, Clerk
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.........     2

                               WITNESSES

Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
  Research, Development and Acquisition; VADM James W. Kilby, 
  USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting 
  Requirements and Capabilities; and LtGen Eric M. Smith, USMC, 
  Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
  and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration...     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Courtney, Hon. Joe...........................................    37
    Stefany, Frederick J., joint with VADM James W. Kilby and 
      LtGen Eric M. Smith........................................    41
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    39

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Carl.....................................................    63
    Mr. Wittman..................................................    63
             
             
             UNMANNED SYSTEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
            Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, March 18, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION 
                             FORCES

    Mr. Courtney. Good morning, everyone, and thank you for 
joining us today for a briefing regarding the unmanned systems 
in Department of Navy. This hearing will now come to order. I 
want to thank all the members joining today in person and on 
Webex for hearing on again the Navy and Marine Corps 
acquisitions strategies and requirements for UUVs [unmanned 
undersea vehicles], USVs [unmanned surface vessels], and UAVs 
[unmanned aerial vehicles] that reside within this 
subcommittee's oversight.
    Again, a little bit of housekeeping. I am going to make 
that as brief as possible, and then I will yield to my 
colleague, Ranking Member Rob Wittman, for his comments. We 
have numerous members of the subcommittee participating 
remotely today. Members participating remotely are reminded to 
keep themselves on mute until they are recognized to speak.
    In addition, remote members are reminded that once they do 
start speaking, there is a slight delay in the feed switching 
its focus to you. As a result, please include a brief preamble 
of some kind before you start into your questions to the 
witnesses. Lastly, members and witnesses are reminded that they 
should keep their masks on at all times including when 
speaking.
    During our first briefing this year, we received an 
introduction to the Navy's future force structure and the 
Commandant's future design plan aimed at returning the Marine 
Corps to its original maritime mission. As part of that 
discussion, we heard repeated mentions of how unmanned 
platforms could support our sailors and Marines, along with 
more detailed analysis from the Department's unmanned campaign 
framework. I look forward to discussing these capabilities in 
the campaign framework more in depth today.
    But before we begin, I want to dispel any narrative that 
has taken hold in some quarters in Washington that this 
committee, this subcommittee in particular and the House Armed 
Services Committee also, are universally opposed to unmanned 
systems and platforms. In fact, some of our most reliable and 
well-known unmanned platforms like the MQ-1 Predator and the 
MQ-9 Reaper programs were the direct result of direct 
congressional action despite reservations a few years back from 
the Department.
    Just last year, Congress included $50 million in 
appropriations to convert an expeditionary fast transport to an 
unmanned surface vessel to help better develop concept of 
operations for future unmanned surface vessels. We on this 
subcommittee also recognize the advanced capabilities and 
potential impacts unmanned platforms could have on the fleet. 
We are very supportive of new tasking that could include ISR 
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], magazine and 
resupply support, refueling, and antisubmarine warfare, as well 
as anti-mine operations. Each of these missions could free up 
manned vessels and allow our sailors and Marines to better 
focus on facing threats.
    As we head down this new road, which includes larger and 
more complex technology, however, I believe we must incorporate 
the lessons learned from acquisition challenges like the 
littoral combat ship and the DDG-1000 to avoid costly repeated 
mistakes. There must be built-in opportunities for learning 
between initial research and serial production to ensure that 
we proceed pragmatically, effectively, and intelligently.
    Our sailors and Marines deserve reliable and capable 
platforms to ensure that they remain in the fight. While we can 
discuss at length the numbers of ships and fleet makeup needed 
to outpace our adversaries, one thing is clear. Unmanned assets 
will undoubtedly play a role in that overall number, and the 
tools they bring to the fight will be a critical factor in our 
ability to execute and succeed.
    To examine these capabilities and the future architecture 
of the fleet more in depth, we are joined this afternoon by Mr. 
Jay Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, who has been, again, a 
great source of help for our subcommittee over the last couple 
years. This is his maiden appearance as a witness and really, 
welcome to the subcommittee this morning, Jay. Vice Admiral 
James Kilby, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfighting 
Capabilities and Requirements, again who is, you know, going to 
charge rent in terms of his frequent appearances here. Thank 
you again. And the same is true for Lieutenant General Eric 
Smith, Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat 
Development.
    So again, we are grateful to all that these witnesses can 
share with us today, and with that I want to turn it over to my 
friend and ranking member, Rob Wittman, for any opening remarks 
before we begin opening statements from our witnesses.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the 
Appendix on page 37.]

  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
    VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 
                       PROJECTION FORCES

    Mr. Wittman. Well, very good. Well, thank you, Chairman 
Courtney. Thanks again for your leadership and your vision in 
really pushing this forward. This is incredibly important, but 
it is incredibly important to make sure that we get it right. 
And making sure that we are taking a deeper look into the 
readiness of unmanned systems, I think, is one of those high 
priorities, and I thank you for your leadership.
    I also want to thank our witnesses today. Mr. Stefany, 
Lieutenant General Smith, Vice Admiral Kilby, thanks so much 
for all of your efforts, for your continued support to make 
sure we are going in the right direction. The Navy and Marine 
Corps team have a vision of the future and unmanned campaign is 
a road map of sorts to get there. I don't think there is anyone 
in Congress who doesn't see the obvious benefits of this 
unmanned, autonomous capability.
    But I fear the zeal to deliver the future could possibly 
lead to waste today. It is my estimation there are several 
practical acquisition areas that need to be incorporated into 
all of these autonomous developments. First, fail big, and if 
you do, do it early. We would like to have success, but we 
understand this is a very innovative and creative process, so 
if there is a failure, we want to make that sure we acknowledge 
that early.
    We have seen too many acquisition programs that limp along 
well past their useful development. For example, the Navy spent 
$700 million in 16 years on a remote minehunting system and 
this failure has endangered our entire mine warfare capability 
and haunts the Navy 5 years after its termination. Navy and 
Marine Corps need to rapidly develop prototypes, assess, and, 
if necessary, terminate developing programs based on their 
assessment and operational capabilities.
    Second, start with the end in mind. The Navy needs to 
develop an unmanned, long-range, carrier-based, penetrating 
strike capability. Yet this nascent UCLASS [Unmanned Carrier-
Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike] program was usurped 
to field a far less capable MQ-25 tanking drone. I understand 
the need. I understand the timeframes. But we want to make sure 
we have the balance between time and developed capability to 
make sure we have the long term in mind, not just the short 
term.
    Commercial sector, number three. Commercial sector should 
drive military development, not vice versa. While the Navy and 
Marine Corps unmanned capabilities are indeed our future, a 
near-term military capability may be elusive. For example, the 
Navy's extended range UUV has limited battery life; it needs to 
recharge often. Furthermore, the large USV doesn't possess the 
engineering plant to provide the desired autonomy. Instead of 
developing these capabilities, Navy should be leveraging 
commercial technologies for further military application.
    Not only is the technology there, but remember, we are 
going to be in a resource-challenged environment. The way we 
prevail strategically is for us to be able to do more per our 
dollar than the Chinese do for their yuan or the Russians do 
for their ruble. That is the path forward. Navy should indeed 
be leveraging these technologies and I fear that the extended 
range UUV and large USV efforts both, potentially, have the 
cart before the horse.
    And, finally, number four. Command and control of unmanned 
vessels is not essential, it is paramount. The development of 
unique military requirements needs to be addressed early in the 
acquisition process. A few fundamental questions need to be 
answered before we start any new unmanned program. They are: 
whether a vessel is unmanned or optionally manned; how do we 
provide unmanned command and control; how do we implement the 
law of armed conflict and avoid autonomous incidental damage; 
and how to address anti-tampering, especially if it supports 
our latest and greatest missile systems in an over-the-horizon 
environment. If we can't answer these basic questions, we 
should not start serial production of any unmanned system.
    There is no doubt that our future relies on our ability to 
expeditiously develop unmanned, autonomous vehicles, but I will 
not support a misguided acquisition program that wastes 
taxpayers' resources in an effort to deliver this vision. And I 
know that we can get what we need in a timeframe that is 
necessary and at a price that is the best value for the 
taxpayers. We need to be realistic in our technology 
assessments, resolute in our desired end state, and adaptable 
to delivering key attributes of this vision.
    Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you having this important 
hearing. Thanks for all of your leadership on this. Thanks too, 
in what I believe is your balanced and thoughtful approach to 
making sure that we get this right. And with that I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the 
Appendix on page 39.]
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Wittman. And, obviously, 
that approach is something we have talked about a lot, and your 
perspective, obviously, is a big part of where hopefully we are 
going forward here today.
    So it looks like there is a joint statement that the 
witnesses have put together and I guess, Mr. Stefany, if you 
are in the center seat, I guess you are up in terms of the 
floor.

 STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
  OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION; VADM 
   JAMES W. KILBY, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR 
 WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES; AND LTGEN ERIC M. 
     SMITH, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT 
     DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT 
                  DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION

    Mr. Stefany. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Courtney, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss the Department of Navy's 
efforts to develop and field unmanned systems that will provide 
the Department continued and decisive warfighting advantages 
that are required to deter and defeat our adversaries. As you 
mentioned, sir, joining me today are Vice Admiral Jim Kilby, 
our Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems, and 
Lieutenant General Eric Smith, our Deputy Commandant for Combat 
Development and Integration. I will be making a single opening 
remarks for all three of us, sir.
    We thank the subcommittee and all of Congress for your 
leadership and steadfast support of the Department of the Navy. 
Your efforts to fully fund the fiscal year 2021 budget provide 
the Navy and Marine Corps team the stability and predictability 
to build and sustain the naval force that is required to 
execute the National Defense Strategy. For over 245 years, our 
Navy and Marine Corps team has operated forward, protected the 
interest of the United States and our citizens, supported our 
allies and partners, and has created stability that allows free 
and open access to the global commons.
    Today, given the rapid pace of military and technological 
advancements, our adversaries are closing the capability gap 
and are challenging our forces with advanced weapons systems. 
Our Navy and Marine Corps team can no longer assume we will 
control the seas that have allowed free and open access. As 
President Biden highlighted in his Interim National Security 
Guidance, the world is at an inflection point and the United 
States must renew our enduring advantages so that we can meet 
today's challenges from a position of strength.
    As part of renewing our advantages, the Navy-Marine Corps 
team is harnessing America's technological and industrial 
expertise to provide us the capabilities and capacity to 
continue to deter and, if required, defeat our adversaries. The 
Department's recently released Unmanned Campaign Plan outlines 
a critical element of our renewed advantages.
    Unmanned systems have and will continue to have--be a key 
enabler of our distributed force, lethal, scalable, connected, 
and cost effective. That is why the Navy is developing a range 
of unmanned systems to augment our traditional forces and 
proven, relevant platforms. The hybrid force of the future will 
provide the Navy and Marine Corps team the necessary 
capabilities and capacity to operate in day-to-day competition 
as well as the high-end fight, allowing us to maintain the 
advantage over our adversaries. This hybrid force is aligned to 
the Navy's operational concept of distributed maritime 
operations and the Marine Corps operating concept of littoral 
operations in a contested environment, which both are in turn 
aligned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs joint warfighting 
concept. Time is not on our side. We recognize we must harness 
America's ingenuity and industrial might to start building that 
future force now. Although we have that sense of urgency, we 
are mindful of our past technical challenges.
    We also remind that we also have achieved successes where 
we field proven unmanned aerial and underseas systems. We are 
looking at future capabilities as previously mentioned, like 
the large unmanned surface vessel, the extra-large unmanned 
undersea vehicle, and the Marine Corps remotely operated ROGUE 
[Remotely Operated Ground Unit for Expeditionary] Fires 
vehicle, with a critical eye to balancing technology with 
practical applications through early prototyping and 
experiment.
    This approach will inform the enterprise on projected 
costs, schedule performance, and sustainment requirements as 
well as fleshing out policy, legal, and battle force 
interoperability topics before we establish a formal production 
program of record. We know we must take a deliberate path to 
fielding these emerging systems and we are committed to build a 
little, test a little, and learn a lot.
    Although we know we have a whole host of technological and 
policy challenges to solve, we are confident we will succeed. 
We thank you for your strong support this committee has already 
provided our sailors and Marines, and we thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today. We look forward to 
answering your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, Admiral 
Kilby, and General Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 
41.]
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Stefany. And again, just 
for the record, I want to ask that the Unmanned Campaign Plan, 
which was developed as, you know, concurrent with today's 
hearing, be entered into the record. Without objection, so 
ordered.
    [The information referred to is available online.]
    Mr. Courtney. And again, each member's office should have 
gotten a copy of that, you know, it was distributed by 
subcommittee staff and if there is a problem with that just 
certainly let us know. So I am going to reserve in terms of my 
questions, and so at this point I would yield to Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, 
gentlemen, thanks again for joining us.
    Mr. Stefany, I want to start with you. And I had mentioned 
in my opening statement that the Navy had spent over $700 
million on a remote minehunting system. My concern is that the 
program went on, I think, entirely too long, we didn't take 
lessons learned, and we sacrificed needed capability for the 
promise that something better would be coming along.
    I think that those things all have potential pitfalls and I 
want to get your perspective on how do you believe the Navy 
plans to rapidly assess new developments, to look at lessons 
learned, quickly incorporate them, and make decisions as they 
go forward with unmanned systems to make sure that we 
understand it. If we are going to fail, let's fail early, let's 
not waste a lot of resources, and let's move on to something 
else that maybe holds more promise. But also not continue to go 
on chasing technology, because as you know, we never catch up 
if we chase technology.
    Mr. Stefany. Thank you, sir. So to start off with, the 
technology that is being employed in whatever we are doing we 
need to understand, and we may not fully understand both the 
technology and the reliability of that technology in that 
previous program you mentioned. So part of our effort now is to 
build one or two prototypes of something, whatever the 
capability is we are looking at, and then get it out, use it, 
get it into the sailors' and Marines' hands so we can see if it 
is reliable, if it is going to meet the intent that we are 
looking for, make sure our engineering community is also 
heavily involved in making sure it really will have that tried-
and-true capability and reliability when we get it out there.
    And if we see a need, potentially do both land-based as 
well as at-sea testing of whatever that capability is before we 
then come back to a formal program decision and actually start 
building in quantity. And I think taking that pause to make 
sure we actually have the sailors and Marines operating and 
getting their feedback--did it do what we really wanted it to 
do--and make sure the engineers have a say in there that, you 
know, it is not just technologists, it is the engineers saying, 
yes, that actually can work and will be reliable. So, we are 
going to put that into our practices. We have things called 
gate reviews and program reviews where we bring the senior 
technical authority and others in as well as the fleet in to 
make sure that we are reviewing that kind of information before 
we make program decisions to go forward.
    Mr. Wittman. That is great. I think that is the key. Get it 
in the hands of sailors and Marines. Get it in the hands of the 
fleet. Let them push it and try it and figure out what works 
and what doesn't. Use digital twin technology to get immediate 
feedback, make changes. I think that is exactly the path that 
we need to be on.
    Vice Admiral Kilby, last year, the Navy proposed a 32-cell 
vertical launch system on a large unmanned surface vessel. And, 
you know, Navy has looked at, too, what is going to happen with 
proposed divestments in vertical launch systems whether it is 
SSGN [guided-missile submarine] or cruisers. And I guess my 
question is, you look at the value of vertical launch systems 
but why do you believe that the large unmanned surface vessel 
is the best platform versus the tried-and-true platforms that 
we have today?
    I understand the balance between legacy platforms and new 
technology, but explain to me why you think the large USV is 
the best platform, and if it is, how do we transition to where 
we don't have a gap? I think that is the big key. I don't think 
any of us here are saying, hey, let's hang on to legacy systems 
longer than what we need to. The key is, is making sure we 
don't hit that trough where we take one system out and then 
don't have the other one fully developed and operational, so.
    Admiral Kilby. So, Representative Wittman, thanks for that 
question. I think you hit the nail on the head. Our analysis 
over the last several force structures has led us to believe 
that a hybrid force, as Mr. Stefany indicated in his opening 
remarks, is the way we should cost effectively pursue a future 
force architecture.
    So to your point, the VLS [vertical launching] system, the 
Mark 41 VLS system, is a remarkably reliable system. So our 
thought going forth, if we can create this hybrid force where 
we can operate unmanned surface vessels with a magazine 
capability that will rotate and support the force, seems to be 
something we should pursue. There is a lot of devils in the 
details here as you have indicated. There is HM&E [hull, 
mechanical, and electrical] reliability and certainly we need 
to do land-based testing. There is COLREGs [Collision 
Regulations] compliance that we need to pursue to make sure 
those vessels safely operate.
    To Representative Courtney's comment, if they are carrying 
our most precious magazines, how can we ensure they can get to 
the fight and return and do we have to have some kind of escort 
requirement and does that make sense? All that is in play in 
your comments. But the idea here is, as we look at ships that 
are now going to reach their end of service life, and I use the 
cruisers as an example because I am a cruiser guy. I love them. 
But we have gotten a lot of mileage out of those cruisers and 
we are starting to see fatigue--hull, mechanical, and 
electrical fatigue beyond the combat system, which has been 
remarkably updateable because of the work that Admiral Meyer 
did when he created the Aegis system.
    So we are looking to pivot to this different force 
architecture and we think that this hybrid force is the means 
to go do it. We certainly have to have those test points. And 
to your point, if that is not a viable solution, I believe just 
based on my own experience with the Mark 41 VLS that will not 
be the sticking point. It will be the autonomy to go configure 
it to stimulate that magazine to conduct that engagement. And I 
think our first view was, let's start at the relatively simple 
end of this from a strike or a stimulated fire capability, vice 
a reactionary ballistic missile defense capability which is 
much higher on the complexity level.
    So that is our view on how we would kind of start pivoting 
the force to this new architecture. And, of course, involved in 
that is the frigate program, and how we would treat our other 
large surface combatants, DDG Flight III and follow-on systems, 
to create this greater aggregate capability. That is the 
rationale behind the force structure assessments and the future 
naval force structure study we did with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and the Marine Corps.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Rob.
    Okay, now we will turn to Mr. Langevin, who I know did come 
in by Webex. I don't know if he is still with us.
    Mr. Langevin. Yes. I am here, Mr. Chairman, yes. Can you 
hear me okay?
    Mr. Courtney. Actually--okay, great. I couldn't hear you at 
first, so okay, the floor is yours, Jim.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay, can you hear me now?
    Mr. Courtney. It is a little faint, if you can get closer 
or speak up a little louder.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay, I will try speaking up a little bit 
louder. I am on my Bluetooth which should provide the best 
sound but, Admiral, I hope you can hear me. Admiral Kilby, I 
wanted to, first of all, thank you for your service. I wanted 
to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. Admiral, how 
is the Navy working with innovative organizations like the 
National Institute of Undersea Vehicle Technology to expand 
capacity and leverage advances being made in the academic and 
dual-use technology space?
    Admiral Kilby. Sorry. Thank you for that question, 
Representative Langevin. I think we are just at the beginning 
of figuring out how to harness that innovation from 
organizations like AUSVI [Association for Uncrewed Vehicle 
Systems International]. We are participatory--participants in 
their annual conference. But understanding how we take a new 
idea and contract it, incorporate it, and test it, and then 
dovetail it back into our programs of record is something Mr. 
Stefany and I are talking about, so I think we must embrace 
that.
    We are actively taking briefs from companies like Saildrone 
to understand their technology and their methodology and their 
autonomy, and we have brought in several members from industry 
to talk about the campaign framework, which Representative 
Courtney referred to, as well as the underlying classified 
programs and milestones to achieve those to help us understand 
how we can connect this ecosystem.
    I will give you the Reader's Digest version of the Unmanned 
Campaign Plan, and it is that when CNO [Chief of Naval 
Operations] asked me to look at this last summer, we have 
been--this document is a result of about 7 months of 
introspection, and the high-level conclusion is we were focused 
on platforms too narrowly and not looking at the enabling 
technologies that will bring those all to bear in this force.
    So I agree with you, Representative. We need to keep that 
door open and look for those opportunities to look at what 
industry is doing.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. I guess you didn't exactly mention 
Naval Agility or SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] or 
other Navy innovation incubators. What do you think 
organizations like this put into your efforts?
    Admiral Kilby. So I will ask Mr. Stefany to come in, but I 
think platforms like NavalX and our tech bridges are already in 
place for us to energize and start bringing those ideas in. 
But, Mr. Stefany, any thoughts on that?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, that is our--we are in the process of 
revamping how our Office of Naval Research works with our 
warfare centers in that early stage of science and technology 
[S&T] to make sure our priorities for what we do with SBIRs and 
other early S&T type programs, grants, things like that, are 
focused on the CNO and the Commandant's top priorities and, of 
course, unmanned technology as well as autonomy are those 
priorities.
    So hopefully you will be seeing from us soon a different 
flavor, a more focused effort in our S&T grants and projects 
and our SBIR programs, sir.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Vice Admiral Kilby or, and Lieutenant General Smith, how 
are the Navy and Marine Corps working to develop a future 
workforce of tech-savvy sailors, Marines, and civilians? 
Obviously, this younger generation are digital natives; they 
are growing up with technology. But how are we leveraging that 
for the workforce of the future?
    Admiral Kilby. Thanks, sir. I will start and I will pass it 
to Eric. We in the Navy have transitioned to these development 
squadrons. We have a UUVRON [Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
Squadron One], which is an undersea, underwater vehicle--I am 
sorry, undersea vehicle squadron which helps introduce those 
technologies in that domain, and we have recently stood up a 
surface development squadron in San Diego to introduce the 
surface vessels into exercises.
    Recently, that squadron stood up an unmanned operations 
center just to understand what it would take to C2, or command 
and control, the Strategic Capabilities Office's vehicles as 
they transited from the gulf coast to the west coast, and it 
was really just an effort on our part to understand what is the 
manning and expertise required to do that.
    So I think there will be a lot of things we need to look at 
from a maintenance perspective. Do we need to stand up a new 
NEC, Navy Enlisted Code, or do we need to have a different 
rating for unmanned vehicles perhaps? Perhaps enginemen might 
be able to maintain diesels on unmanned surface vessels.
    So we have really got to understand creating that expertise 
within the Navy in the civilian force from a maintenance 
perspective and a management perspective and then uniform from 
an operation perspective. But that work is undergoing and those 
development squadrons are a way to scope that effort out and 
understand them.
    Mr. Courtney. So, unfortunately, Mr. Langevin's time has 
expired, but we will hold that thought maybe a little later for 
General Smith. So next up is Congresswoman Hartzler. The floor 
is yours.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you for your testimony. I have been looking 
forward to this hearing. This is really exciting stuff and has 
so much potential. So I have been enjoying reading about and 
learning more about the platforms. Vice Admiral Kilby, once the 
MQ-25 is fielded, do you expect it to strictly serve as a 
refueling asset with limited ISR capabilities or do you see an 
opportunity to incorporate strike as a future mission set?
    Admiral Kilby. So, ma'am, thanks for that question. I think 
the MQ-25 has great promise for us. As you have indicated, our 
initial focus is to introduce this platform and get it 
introduced into the air wing where it can serve its role 
initially in tanking and limited ISR from that perspective. But 
where we are focusing on is launching, landings, moving it 
around on the deck, bringing it up, taking it down in the 
hangar bay, how do we position those assets and how can we 
support the air wing.
    So step one, get fighters out of the business of refueling 
fighters and use the MQ-25 to do that initially close aboard 
the carrier, but eventually at range. But there is some payload 
capacity in that vehicle that we think has great promise for 
us. So I think initially we would transition to ISR, but in an 
air wing of the future view, I think, and talking to Admiral 
Harris and Admiral Whitesell who is our ``Air Boss'' for the 
Navy, we think we could get upwards of 40 percent of the 
aircraft in an air wing that are unmanned and then transition 
beyond that.
    So I think the logical step would be trying to follow a 
logical crawl-walk-run. Let's figure out how to handle it in 
the air wing, let's move to ISR, maybe electronic attack, 
strike, and then other things as complexity grows across that 
mission set. But I think the MQ-25 will most certainly provide 
promise to us because it will be able to perhaps exceed the 
endurance of a manned aircraft.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Yes, and it is definitely needed. It doesn't 
make sense to be using our F-18s for refueling, for sure. So 
the MQ-25 T1 prototype I understand is doing very well in the 
flight test at the MidAmerica [St. Louis] Airport which, of 
course, is in Missouri. Not my district, but we are still 
watching it and very excited about it.
    The MQ-25 is already flying with the government's aerial 
refueling store and there are plans to conduct air refueling 
operations with an F-18 as soon as next month, I hear. So, 
because the MQ-25 is designed with a tremendous range 
advantage, as you referenced, and is already designed to carry 
internal and external weapons, how does the Navy plan to grow 
MQ-25 capability to counter China's capability in the Pacific, 
beyond what I know you have already shared a little bit about, 
moving it to ISR. Is there anything else you want to share on 
that?
    Admiral Kilby. I guess I want to share the--I want to keep 
coming back to this enabling technology piece because there is 
going to be a control center on the carrier for unmanned air 
vehicles. But, ultimately, in the future, let's say there is a 
refueling area for a strike or some other mission area. It 
would be great if a pilot, a manned pilot, saw weather or we 
saw weather and we could divert and move that and not have to 
go to the carrier to do that control.
    So I think an aspiration for us is the control, the manned 
and unmanned teaming in the future between these vehicles and 
not have to go back to the control center. But I think most 
certainly we have got to start with the control center and get 
that right. And there is a relationship here with Project 
Overmatch and the network to control these aircraft and ships, 
quite possibly in the denied area where I might have to have 
low probability of intercept communications and look at some 
other ways vice overhead the carrier that are more secure.
    Mrs. Hartzler. That is going to be interesting to see how 
that all develops, because right now they are totally manned 
control but then eventually that would, there may not be the 
line of sight, and so an aircraft in the air then would take 
over control, right?
    Admiral Kilby. Correct, potentially.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
    Admiral Kilby. That is a vision for us.
    Mrs. Hartzler. It is a big one. Now aren't you having a, 
let's see, the Office of Naval Research will test early Link 16 
software modifications in Boeing's advanced simulation lab very 
soon, so where are you at in the communications realm here?
    Admiral Kilby. So right now, we are still focused on the 
centralized control and we are--this is all part of the MQ-25's 
mission. Where is that space on the carrier? How do we conduct 
those communications with that aircraft? How do we maneuver 
that on deck? So I would say we are at the early stages of that 
and piping and setting up that carrier through installation to 
be able to conduct that work. That is independent of the 
vehicle testing and refueling that you indicated.
    So, to me, we are in the 2024 to 2026 timeframe to deliver 
that capability, and then we need to start rapidly looking at 
what is next and how do we increase the range and capacity of 
that air wing to do what the nation needs it to do.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Perfect. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. All right, thank you, Vicky. Next up is 
Mr. Norcross from New Jersey.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
    Mr. Courtney. Don, can you speak up a little louder? 
Because again, the audio is----
    Mr. Norcross. Yes.
    Mr. Courtney [continuing]. A little quiet.
    Mr. Norcross. Vice Admiral Kilby, I want to drop back and 
take a little bit higher view of our unmanned systems and what 
drives the decision on what you are going to pursue, you know, 
the highest priority and how it is driven. Is it the maturity 
of the technology because you have so many assets which 
virtually so many of them can go unmanned? Is it the 
technology, the maturity of it? Is it somehow the security of 
the personnel or how high of a risk it is? Is it the cost? Is 
it that we are saving costs down the road? Or does it come to 
the risk?
    So, how do you decide, with all the assets, what you are 
going to pursue and what are the drivers behind that?
    Admiral Kilby. Sir, yes. Thank you for that question, 
Representative Norquist--so sorry, Norcross. The framework of 
the Unmanned Campaign Plan is really highlighting this 
overarching leadership and management of this program, so there 
is a lot of competing priorities in that space. I would say 
there are some vehicles we have that have been very mature and 
operated with autonomy and increasing autonomy over time, but 
those are smaller vehicles like Mark 18 unmanned, undersea 
vehicles that support our explosive ordnance teams or our 
oceanographers.
    So, understanding from a higher level how these all fit 
together is an area that we need to work on, and we need to 
focus on, so I wouldn't say it is one priority, it is all those 
priorities. Certainly, we need to focus on the hull, 
mechanical, and electrical reliability for our surface 
platforms. Can they do the mission duration that we expect them 
to do based on our analysis? Can a vessel operate for that long 
and conduct that mission with redundancy? And I know we are 
going to talk about that more in the hearing. But there is a 
security aspect to that too and there is a training aspect to 
that too.
    So, I wouldn't say it is one priority that is driving us. 
What has put us on this vector though is this desire to get at 
a hybrid force and it is threat-driven. We are being driven 
there by our adversaries to try to create a more complex force 
that give them problems that they have to solve. So, I think we 
have to get over all those things, sir.
    Mr. Norcross. Just to follow up with that point is, what 
you start and when you start it for those needs, we understand. 
At what point is there an assessment that we are just not ready 
for that, sort of getting back to Mr. Wittman's approach is, 
when do we decide it is not ready and we will have to take 
another bite at this? Just as important as what you start.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. I would 
say, let's just take one example that is going to be coming up 
here shortly. It is the XLUUV [extra large unmanned undersea 
vehicle]. That vehicle, we are pursuing that vehicle because we 
have operational needs from a combatant commander to go solve a 
specific problem. That vessel really hasn't operated.
    The XLUUV is, as you know, a migration from the Echo 
Voyager from Boeing with a mission module placed in the middle 
of it to initially carry mines. We need to test, get that 
initial prototype built, and start employing it to try to see 
if we can achieve the requirements to go do that mission set. 
And I think to the point so far made several times, if we can't 
meet our milestones, we need to critically look at that and 
decide if we are pursuing--we have to pursue another model or 
another methodology to get after that combatant need.
    But in the case of the XLUUV, we haven't even had enough 
run time with that vessel to make that determination yet. 
Certainly there are challenges with that vehicle though.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. Next up is Mr. Kelly 
from Mississippi.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think this is the 
future, but I agree with Ranking Member Wittman, is we need to 
be prepared to fail and fail fast. We also have to keep a close 
eye on our industrial base and make sure that we are committed 
once they produce these products that we don't change the scale 
or the scope of what we are committed to buy in the future. And 
I use an example, Northrop Grumman does the Triton. And last 
year, or the fiscal year 2021 budget was going to cut both 
aircraft or both unmanned systems and not put them in, and 
Congress, thankfully, put back one. That is a great partnership 
between Australia and the United States.
    I also have the MQ-4 Triton, the MQ-8C Fire Scout, the LUSV 
[large unmanned surface vessel] which Huntington Ingalls is 
involved in, the Sea Hunter which Leidos is involved in, the 
MQ-9--in all these programs do you foresee any issues that 
would prohibit us from going with the plan that the Navy has, 
or Marine Corps, General Smith, do you see any future things 
that would cause a reduction in the production of any of these 
models that I just mentioned? And if I need to go back over 
them, I will.
    Mr. Stefany. No, sir. I think we are familiar with all of 
those that you brought up. On the first one I will give an 
overview and then I will go to General Smith and Admiral Kilby. 
On the Triton, as mentioned by Admiral Kilby before, that 
fleet, that fleet or COCOM [combatant command] feedback is a 
critical thing that we are considering as one of our factors 
and so we receive feedback on an improved mission set. And so 
we decided to take a little pause to make sure that we get the 
technology for the new mission set in place before we start 
building more. And that is not that we were going to stop, we 
just, it was feedback from the fleet that we needed that extra 
set of mission capability.
    Mr. Kelly. Yes, and I just do, I mean, I personally don't 
think that one, in INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], I 
don't think one Triton is sufficient to surveil what we need to 
in that AOR [area of responsibility], especially considering 
how important that has become and our partnership with 
Australia. So, I just ask that--we understand there is an 
industrial base and we can't start and stop those guys, because 
number one it drives up costs for us and number two we lose the 
workforce and lose capabilities. Second, are there any--
cybersecurity is going to be really key, and are there any key 
elements of cybersecurity for future unmanned naval operations 
that they should consider in the defense industrial base while 
preparing or creating new technology?
    Mr. Stefany. So cybersecurity is critically important and 
we have a set of standards that the Secretary of Defense's 
office has put out and sent to us and to industry to make sure 
that we are meeting at least certain levels of cybersecurity in 
everything we do. These items, all these unmanned systems will 
be connected through Project Overmatch, this overall network of 
networks that will have cyber capabilities built into it. So we 
need to do a better job communicating.
    And Admiral Small, who runs our Project Overmatch, has been 
out talking to industry, but we need to do it more, you know, 
hands-on, talk with industry about cyber requirements overall. 
And then I would like to see if any amplification from Admiral 
Kilby.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, just two points, sir. Thank you for 
that question. I think we need to be very vigorous on our 
introspection about our security of our air vehicles, surface 
vehicles because we know the adversary is doing that. So we 
need to be continually testing and probing our systems to make 
sure they are secure. And two, of the broader question, I 
think, as we work through and, really, the pacer for us now is 
this--is China, so we need to watch what China is doing and if 
we need to make an adjustment to our force design we need to do 
it and we certainly need to communicate it and seek your 
support in doing that moving forward.
    Mr. Kelly. Then final question, does the Navy think about 
future unmanned subsurface vehicles, subsurface vessels, are 
they looking for a large-capacity torpedo firing platform for 
autonomous or remote control missions?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, absolutely, sir. That is another degree 
of difficulty, but we clearly see value in that in the future 
and just watching where things are happening, I think that is a 
great opportunity for us in the future.
    Mr. Kelly. And you guys are amazing. We need to continue 
this program, but we need to understand the risk and we need to 
manage the risk of people overtaking the systems, of not having 
the right security things, and also of any unintentional 
accident based on AI [artificial intelligence] or other things. 
But I think this is the future, so I thank you for committing. 
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Courtney. All right. Well, thank you, Mr. Kelly. And 
again, thank you for reminding us that plus-up add-back for the 
Triton again originated in this subcommittee, and you are 
absolutely right about the need to, you know, keep the 
production line moving and, obviously, the great teamwork with 
Australia.
    So next up--again, also I just want to remind people 
General Smith is on standby and I know he has some good input 
he wants to give, so--and certainly I am going to get to him 
when it is my turn, but I now would yield to Congresswoman 
Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, good morning. And I will start with Mr. 
Stefany. In Battle Force 2045, which was released in December, 
unmanned surface vessels were a significant portion of the 
future fleet architecture. And on February 24th of this year, I 
sent a letter to the Acting Secretary and the CNO requesting 
the analysis and the data behind this proposed architecture and 
also requested that that information be provided to me by March 
10th.
    I have not received any of that information back yet from 
the Secretary or the CNO, and we on this committee want to 
provide the Navy what we need for the future and, you know, 
expect a good-faith effort on the part of the Navy to provide 
the information that we requested in order to inform our 
decision making. So I was curious if you could update me on the 
status of this requested information.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes. Congresswoman Luria, I am very familiar 
with your request. The information we have put together, and it 
is in our final chop cycle, I have seen it so I know it is 
imminent to get to you. We are sorry we missed the March 11th 
date, but it will be to you shortly. And I know Admiral Kilby 
and General Smith will be looking forward to walking through 
that with you once you receive it.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, great. Well, thank you for that update 
and I look forward to that opportunity to discuss that 
background. I also recently reviewed the Unmanned Campaign 
Plan. I was really disappointed in what I saw as a lack of 
substance in the plan. I thought it was full of buzzwords and 
platitude but really short on details. And with the recent 
acquisition program failures that we have had on the last 
several ship classes, rightly, those of us on this committee 
are skeptical of the Navy's ability to shepherd this new 
technology into employable assets that contribute to the 
lethality of our forces.
    When could we expect on this committee to see more granular 
detail on these unmanned programs? And specifically, Admiral 
Kilby, in the provided written statement you indicated that the 
surface development squadron developed a USV CONOPS [concept of 
operations] in January 2021. Do you intend to provide that 
document to this committee?
    Admiral Kilby. Thanks for that question, ma'am, and I 
appreciate your perspective on the framework document which was 
really just a strategic document to kind of focus the naval 
service on the imperative to get after that. But I agree with 
your comments. There is a underlying campaign plan here which 
ties the programs together, so we can certainly come over and 
walk that through with members. But that work will never be 
done, because we will be constantly updated with programs and 
tests and if we reach a milestone, we will need to adjust or 
not adjust if we decide to walk away from that program. So to 
me that is a body of work that is enduring and evolving at all 
times.
    To your CONOPS question, I can get that over to you. It is 
a classified document, I believe. Let me just talk about CONOPS 
a little bit. It is Rev [Revision] 1 and it was released in 
January. We are already working on Rev 2. The idea is we will 
update this annually as we move forward and not wait to get to 
perfect but give a document to the fleet that they can use in 
our exercises and we can test ourselves.
    And that first test will be in April. Not first test, but a 
next test will be in April when we run a PACFLT [Pacific Fleet] 
exercise off San Diego to test some of these across all our 
domains. So I would expect an annual update on that for the 
foreseeable future, ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And I think the biggest 
question I have, and I have had this discussion with several 
members on both sides of the aisle, is that, you know, it is a 
fleet to do what? We are really trying to understand the CONOPS 
and, you know, the proposed missions of investing in these 
unmanned vessels.
    Also you stated that the Navy's LUSV will be a high-
endurance vessel based on commercial specifications capable of 
weeks-long deployments and transoceanic transit. Additionally, 
you stated autonomy is the linchpin to unlocking the potential 
for the Navy's future manned and unmanned maritime vehicle 
fleets to execute missions. During the transit of the Sea 
Hunter from San Diego to Pearl Harbor, just curious, how many 
times did personnel have to board the ship to fix mechanical 
problems?
    Admiral Kilby. Sorry. Ma'am, I believe the number is three, 
and there are three interactions from that vessel on its way 
over. Some were setting electronic switches and some were 
mechanical. The driver of that test was autonomy though--can we 
drive the ship, can we control the ship, and can it have some 
degree of COLREGs compliance--not HM&E reliability.
    So, clearly, we are learning from that. We need to 
understand that. I talked to the Strategic Capabilities Office 
specifically in preparation for this hearing and one of their 
major takeaways is you need to make your HM&E or your 
propulsion plan reliable and simple, simple as possible. So it 
could be that some of our reliability comes from redundancy. 
Maybe we have multiple engines on a propulsion plan and if we 
lose one we can continue on in the mission. We don't have to 
have an operator go over and reset that.
    I am just theorizing that that could be a conclusion we 
come to. But we need to take these prototype vessels, learn 
from them, and then adjust those vessels to make sure they 
require the least amount of operator intervention as possible 
and----
    Mr. Courtney. Great, Admiral. I think we are going to 
follow up with the----
    Mrs. Luria. And thank you. My time has expired. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Courtney. Yes, great. Thank you. And just again for the 
subcommittee members, we are working on getting a briefing when 
people are back in town on Battle Force 2045 and it is going to 
be, again, we are going to have--that is going to happen. And 
Elaine is absolutely right. We need to sort of understand the 
process and the report better.
    Next up is Mr. Gallagher.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
    Lieutenant General Smith, you are not going to get away 
without talking. Could you just give us an update on the ROGUE 
Fires program and explain sort of how that fits within the 
Commandant's vision, particularly in INDOPACOM?
    General Smith. Sure, I can. The ROGUE Fires vehicle, Remote 
Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary, is simply a joint light 
tactical vehicle that has been stripped of its armor, its crew 
cab, and turned into a robotic----
    Mr. Courtney. Excuse me, General. Could you move the mic up 
a little closer?
    General Smith. I can, sir. Can you hear me there, Mr. 
Chairman?
    Mr. Courtney. Yes, that is better. Yes.
    General Smith. So the Remote Operated Ground Unit 
Expeditionary, the ROGUE vehicle, is simply a joint light 
tactical vehicle that has been stripped of its armor and its 
crew cab in order to provide a robotic vehicle that is 
controlled by a, via controller, or it has a LiDAR [light 
detection and ranging] system that it can do leader/follower, 
so it is paired as a manned-unmanned teaming setup.
    You picture an artillery unit that is firing a HIMARS, High 
Mobility Artillery Rocket System, but now firing a Naval Strike 
Missile. That vehicle--paired, optimally, one manned vehicle, 
three robotic vehicles with the command vehicle--would be 
inserted, and it is transportable via our organic means. Sling 
load exceeds 53K, internally transportable KC-130, obviously 
any of our service connectors, LCACs, landing craft utility, 
light amphibious warship or traditional L-class.
    So that is the Fires platform which, by the way, has been 
successfully tested as recently as November, firing a Naval 
Strike Missile. And the key for us, sir, if I can, is that it 
is an existing platform. Joint light tactical vehicle, no new 
technology. Naval Strike Missile, no new technology. We simply 
integrated two existing technologies, and that is how we buy 
down the risk. That is your Fires platform, immediately 
deployable, and can hold adversary ships at risk at ranges of 
excess of a hundred miles, in the unclassified setting in 
excess of a hundred miles. Does that answer your question, sir?
    Mr. Gallagher. That does. And I appreciate how you have all 
moved with a sense of urgency on that platform and I just think 
it is critical to getting a posture of deterrence by denial in 
INDOPACOM.
    Vice Admiral Kilby, I was hoping you could talk a little 
bit more about the CONOPS for the LUSV fleet. Do you primarily 
see these as unmanned ships that can accommodate a crew 
temporarily or as manned vessels that can be operated remotely 
in times of higher threat?
    Admiral Kilby. So, sir, I would like to pursue the former 
category, right. And so there is some accommodation if we need 
a crew to board them when they are operating, but not a manned 
vessel. But we are open for this discussion. We are doing an 
analysis of alternative as directed by Congress to go look at 
options and I am open to the comeback from that option.
    I think the genesis of this was our analysis that we would 
use this large unmanned surface vessel at least initially as a 
way to get munitions to the front faster and not have to pay 
the full bill of a manned ship; so I could augment manned ships 
and their magazines with an unmanned surface vessel that would 
bring munitions back to that force and operate in conjunction 
with that force. So initially, our view was it would be in 
concert with a manned ship and that is that manned/unmanned 
teaming concept.
    Mr. Gallagher. But if you prioritize unmanned in the 
design, what does that buy you in terms of, I mean, do you get 
additional VLS capability on these ships or what does that mean 
in practical terms?
    Admiral Kilby. You could get some additional SWAP to do 
other things; that is space, weight, allowance, power. You 
don't have to pay the integration for the facilities to keep 
the crew fed and treated, et cetera. I mean, I have to put a 
sickbay on that ship if I am going to be there temporarily and 
it is operating with another ship.
    So we believe there is some opportunity to save things. 
Anytime I have to build that in though, there is not a complete 
savings. So in the case of MQ-25, I don't have to have an 
oxygen system. I don't have to have an ejection seat. I don't 
have to have heating. I don't have to have cooling. So that is 
payload I can use for other mission. So, ultimately, that is 
what we want to pursue, but we acknowledge that there will 
probably have to be some accommodation initially. Over.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. In the 20 seconds I have left, I 
just would offer a statement. It would be great if the Biden 
administration is listening, if they moved with a sense of 
urgency to nominate a Secretary of the Navy. I mean, this is 
our priority force in the priority theater and I think this 
committee would welcome such a person. There are many members 
of the committee on the other side that would make great 
candidates and others in the private sector. So please, 
nominate a SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] as soon as possible.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher. And actually shared 
that with some of the transition team folks about a week or two 
ago. I couldn't agree more.
    Next up is Congresswoman Jacobs from San Diego.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And this first question is for Mr. Stefany. The Navy plans 
to have LUSVs be a platform with high endurance based on 
commercial designs and built around a common missile launcher 
with an integrated combat system. But, currently, neither 
prototype versions are fully compliant with the COLREGs. This 
remains a challenge for the Navy given COLREGs have different 
requirements based on certain conditions, such as weather. To 
be fully compliant, the vessels must be capable of recognizing 
these conditions, which they are not capable of currently.
    So, I was wondering what the plan is of the Navy to address 
this challenge, and what you are doing to prevent us from 
making the same mistakes we did with the LCS [littoral combat 
ship] program, which I think we all agree was rolled out before 
it was ready for primetime because the Navy decided speed was 
more important than adequately addressing capability concerns 
up front.
    Mr. Stefany. Thank you, Representative. That is--I will 
start with what our plans are for LUSV as mentioned that the 
two prototypes we have that are being operated that we are 
about to take possession of from the Strategic Capabilities 
Office, we are buying two more that are being built right now 
so we will have four of those vessels. And we will be using 
those plus the Sea Hunter in experimentation and to get, 
basically to get miles under our belt in different conditions, 
sea conditions, and different weather conditions, different 
environmental and traffic conditions. We have only scratched 
the surface, really, with the two vessels we have of the 
conditions we might find and we need to learn a lot more and 
experiment a lot more before we go in and start the actual 
production program. So, but also back to Admiral Kilby's point, 
our initial instantiation of this, of these vessels is not to 
be fully autonomous. It is to be, you know, a man in the loop 
that would be able to do those kind of interactions that are 
required and then ultimately work over time to be, you know, 
more autonomous and more reliable.
    And whether we ever get to a place where we are full 
COLREGs compliance or not is yet to be seen. We will have to 
work our way through that.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Would any of the other panelists 
want to weigh in on this before I go to my next question?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, ma'am, Admiral Kilby. I would just like 
to add briefly, I think we would be well served to look at 
other industry models here like Google has 250 cars, I 
understand, that they drive around that had hundreds of data 
sources and control time to understand the complexity of this 
task. We need to do the same thing with COLREGs compliance.
    So with the Sea Hunter vessel now, they get away from port 
with a manned crew, but once they are fair at sea, they 
transition and can transition to an autonomous mode. That 
doesn't mean they are fully compliant, to your point. So we 
have got to understand what the limits are and the restrictions 
to safely operate these vessels. And it could be weather 
avoidance, it could be a lot of things that we need to work 
through, but clearly we have a ways to go here, to all your 
points, and we want to be good stewards of the ocean and 
operate our vessels safely.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. On to my next question. The law of 
armed conflict and international humanitarian law governs which 
weapons are considered legal in conflict and regulates their 
use. And given the pace of technological advancement, weapons 
systems with sophisticated autonomous technology that do not 
require humans for targeting and firing decisions could soon be 
introduced to the battlefield. Since it is no secret the Navy 
plans to deploy these unmanned systems in sensitive waters or 
even if it is being considered, what precautions are being 
taken by the Department to, one, make sure the use of such 
systems doesn't inadvertently lead us into a larger armed 
conflict, particularly with China or other adversaries; and 
two, what legal doctrine is the Department developing around 
the use of such systems?
    We know, of course, we have dealt with some of these issues 
with aerial drones in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere, but I 
would imagine deploying or potentially deploying unmanned 
systems to the South China Sea, for instance, would surely 
present a whole new set of potential problems. So I guess, Mr. 
Stefany, if you would like to start.
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, ma'am. So as you mentioned, we have, as a 
Department of Defense, been using lethal weapons for a while 
now and so our policy group within the Navy, JAG [Judge 
Advocate General] Corps and others, have been working and will 
work with the Secretary of Defense's office and the policy 
group as well as the administration to set those policies out. 
We know it is something we have to do, and we are going to work 
through with our Air Force and Army brethren as well because it 
is an issue that actually goes across all of the services in 
the whole Department of Defense.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, I would just add one piece, ma'am, if I 
could. Bringing together this framework and this campaign plan 
is to force all that interaction and discussion, where it might 
not happen on its own if we had a platform-only approach, 
right. If that program manager is worried about delivering that 
one thing, he or she may not think of that, so we need to drive 
it at a higher level.
    To your specific point, the initial instantiation of LUSV 
is to not have them operate autonomously in that zone where 
they are not under the control of a man in the loop. So while 
we want to have reliability and COLREGs compliance and we want 
to be very aggressive on that confidence factor, there will be 
a man to complete that fire control solution in the loop for 
the foreseeable future.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you. Speaking about 
autonomous systems, the clocks are not in alignment here in 
terms of what is on the screen and--but, so we gave you a 
little extra time, Congresswoman, and thank you for asking that 
question, because no, that is a very important piece of this 
discussion and so I really appreciate that.
    Next up is the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Carl.
    Mr. Carl. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Rear Admiral Kilby, I know that EPF [expeditionary fast 
transport] is currently in process of being converted into an 
unmanned prototype. What is the status on that prototype?
    Admiral Kilby. Well, we appreciate the committee giving us 
$50 million to go after that, sir.
    Mr. Carl. Yes.
    Admiral Kilby. And I spoke most recently with Admiral 
Williamson who is the N4 [Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Fleet Readiness and Logistics]. He is our head logistics Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations. But I view there is very little 
daylight between us in the value we can get out of this, so not 
only will we figure out how to handle a dull, dirty, cheap 
mission logistically and make our force able to distribute 
more, but we will also be able to take the benefit of that HM&E 
reliability, the control, the COLREGs compliance that we have 
talked about, more vessels doing this is going to provide more 
data for us to be a better informed force. And I think that 
will pay back to the whole unmanned surface fleet as we move 
forward, so we very much appreciate the committee's support of 
that.
    Mr. Carl. So do I. But real quickly, as a proven platform 
in the use of the Department of the Navy, what benefit is the 
Navy receiving by using the EPF as a prototype rather than a 
brand new acquisition?
    Admiral Kilby. So I think, sir, it allows us to get a 
running start. That is my opinion. I will yield to Secretary 
Stefany, here, for his comments. But to me, because we 
understand that vessel and understand the plant and there is 
certainly some very good capacity in that vessel from a 
logistics perspective, and as you know we are pursuing what I 
call an ambulance or a Role II care mission for that ship to be 
able to, in great conflict, medevac our sailors and the Marines 
and soldiers and airmen at capacity because we have a huge gap 
in our force right now, so to me that resuscitate event in the 
logistics framework is critical and the EPF will play a great 
role in that.
    Mr. Stefany. And to add to that, sir, we are using the EPF-
13, a ship that is currently under construction right now, that 
is expected to come out in late 2022. So by being able to put 
this modification in timeline, if you will, the ship will come 
out next year and we will be able to start experimenting with 
it much faster than if we, you know, did it from scratch and 
were building from scratch, sir.
    Mr. Carl. Gentlemen, I appreciate it. I will take my final 
time here real quickly. I appreciate you all willing to just 
come here and answer questions and I certainly appreciate your 
service to this country. And, General, Oorah. And I yield my 
time back. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Carl. And thank you for 
again kind of spotlighting the EPF initiative in last year's 
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] in the budget, which 
again was a very creative interaction between the Navy and 
committee staff who, you know, understood the EPF as a great 
vessel and it is almost sort of perfectly set up to be, you 
know, again a prototype, and we are going to learn a lot from 
that.
    So next up is Mr. Brown from Maryland. You are on, Anthony.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to our panelists for attending and presenting 
this morning. I just want to ask a few questions about some 
specific systems. I apologize if we are covering ground that 
has already been covered during the hearing, but I have been 
sort of back and forth between hearings.
    I think Mr. Kelly had asked about the MQ-4C Triton. It is 
my understanding that last year, the Navy deployed two to Guam 
as an early operational capability. I recognize that, you know, 
the maritime picture is a complex and crowded picture, but I 
have heard positive reports on the Triton's Guam operations.
    My question is, can you discuss, Admiral, the benefits that 
Triton has been providing in its Guam operations, and also can 
you describe Triton's impact for the warfighters through this 
significant improvement in maritime domain awareness?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. So I 
think we are learning a lot, overall, from two perspectives. 
How would we control these aerial vehicles to provide ISR or 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for the 
warfighter. I have seen pictures myself. I won't tell you 
exactly of what platforms, but they are very interesting 
platforms and Triton provides that connection. So it allows us 
to create a more complete picture of what is out there versus 
what we think is out there. So to me it is a validation. And 
having been an operator in the Pacific, sometimes it corrects a 
mis-ID [identification], for lack of a better word, so I think 
Triton will add tremendous value there.
    To Secretary Stefany's comments, future variants will have 
increased capabilities that will add even more to that mosaic 
of sensors to provide feedback back to the warfighter. So we 
are already seeing great returns. We are learning how to 
operate it. We are understanding the limitations now and 
addressing those to make sure the future variants of that 
provide the most robust capability we can.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you.
    General Smith, for you, regarding the MQ-9, and since it is 
not shipboard, how do you plan to operate them in contested 
areas and how will you protect sensitive sensors if they are 
landing at austere fields and sites?
    General Smith. Sir, the MQ-9A Extended Range, which is the 
same platform that the U.S. Air Force currently operates--we 
actually operate two of them in the Central Command area of 
operations now and ultimately we will procure 16 more for a 
total of 18, that is 3 squadrons of 6. The way that that system 
operates it is from a friendly base. And that could be 
continental United States, it could be Guam, it could be 
Hawaii, or a partner nation. It has systems on board that 
exceed obviously the classification level of this unclassified 
hearing that give it both in-flight protection and protection 
from tampering, and that system is incredibly important to us 
to pass data across the battlefield. It is the closer of the 
kill chain, the maritime kill chain, as we operate underneath 
in an alternate precision navigation and timing network.
    But that system has the duration and the range to be 
operated from those bases that we do control and still give us 
the loiter time that we need to be able to both close the kill 
chain and to move that asset around something as vast as the 
Indo-Pacific theater. I hope that answers your question, sir.
    Mr. Brown. Yes, thanks. And just one follow-up with the 
little bit of time remaining. You know, now that the Marine 
Corps has decided to procure the MQ-9s, can you explain how you 
are going to manage the challenges of making future upgrades to 
that system based on the proprietary hold the OEM [original 
equipment manufacturer] has on the technical data rights?
    General Smith. Sir, I will start and then pass to Secretary 
Stefany. It is obviously a General Atomics aircraft, and so it 
does come with an open architecture concept that those upgrades 
are available. In fact, upgrades, this is the Block 15--I am 
sorry, 5 tac 20, 5 tac 2-0 [5-20]. Those upgrades will continue 
due to that or based upon that open architecture structure that 
that platform has so that it can keep pace with or outpace the 
pacing threat.
    And as we work back and forth with industry, I will defer 
to Secretary Stefany in the time we have--I am sorry for that, 
sir--on how we work with industry to make sure that we are 
getting everything we need from the proprietary data 
standpoint.
    Mr. Courtney. Mr. Brown's time has expired, but again I am 
sure we will try and, you know, close the loop on some of these 
hanging questions.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Anthony. Next up is Mr. Bergman.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one comment on 
the campaign framework. It looks like a 21st century version of 
the mid-1990s when the Pentagon PowerPoint Rangers became a 
force in presentation management, where they developed a slide 
where nobody could read it, but it was really cool. Just a 
little guidance, okay.
    So having said that, since someone had already mentioned 
it, I felt it was important to, you know, I am a Marine. Just 
keep it simple, keep it lots of pictures, and the point is, get 
to the point, and I think we will be fine here. I know this is 
a first effort so there is no badness there, just a little 
observation. Do we still use the term ``SME,'' subject matter 
expert? Is that still a term of art?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. Yes.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. So, is it fair to say in 20th century 
terms that the nuclear Navy is as good as it is because the SME 
was a guy named Rickover? Okay. And when you think about in 
creating the nuclear Navy, you had a person who led that effort 
over, roughly, you know, 60 years, if you will, in uniform. Now 
I am not suggesting that you need someone in uniform for 60 
years, but we do need the ability as political appointees turn 
over, as admirals and generals turn over, and even subject 
matter experts, usually in the grade of O-4 or O-5, probably 
turn over, that because we have a new program and if you wanted 
to call the new program and because you had a Navy before the 
nuclear Navy, it was just the nuclear Navy, the name of the new 
program is Unmanned.
    And I would suggest that the way we are going to be long-
term successful in the fight, in other words, fielding the 
capabilities necessary, is to create some kind of a long-term 
accountability for results within the Department of the Navy, 
and probably, you are going to have to look at doing an 
exception to the rule of, you know, Goldwater-Nichols and all 
of these kind of things to actually create a carve-out, if you 
will, for a career path for that individual who, or small, very 
small group of individuals, who will shepherd unmanned into the 
warfighting capability that we know we need it to be, because 
once you get into the industrial base, there is going to be the 
give and take and the pulling and tugging there.
    So I guess my question is, that given what you see today 
within the Department of the Navy in this particular case, has 
there been any discussion about how you will create an entity 
or a small group that will be here 10 years from now?
    Admiral Kilby. I will start, sir. There is certainly, and 
we haven't come up with the answer. The way this started is CNO 
said, Hey, Kilby, I am uncomfortable with this. Go figure this 
out. So we got together and looked at the state of the union, 
for lack of a better word. I would tell you that we had a 
decentralized approach. We adopted a centralized approach with 
[inaudible] N99 [Unmanned Warfare Systems directorate] and DASN 
Unmanned [Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Unmanned 
Systems], and we abandoned that in 2017 and we were platform-
only.
    I think we need another approach which is not to go one way 
or the other, right full rudder or left full rudder, but to 
have centralized management of this with decentralized 
execution at the platform and the domain level from an air 
perspective, a surface perspective, and an undersea 
perspective, understanding there is going to be cross-
pollination across those domains. So I owe the CNO an answer, 
General Smith, and the Commandant, on how we are going to 
manage this with the secretariat. But your point is well taken, 
sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Well, the point is, you know, you know in 
uniform you hold yourself and others under your command 
accountable, you know, for results. You can delegate authority 
but not responsibility. And I believe that again using the 
Rickover example, he was responsible and truly that was what 
made the nuclear Navy what it is today, so we have a chance 
here to repeat history in a good way to find that medium 
ground.
    And I am over my time and I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Bergman. I again, think 
that is a really interesting perspective and I am not sure if 
Rickover, you know, would have been able to accomplish what he 
did, you know, in the Navy we have today, but--and we should be 
thinking about that as you said when we are dealing with some 
new emerging technologies.
    By the way, you are welcome to come up to Groton and see 
the USS Rickover which is under construction and hopefully you 
can join us maybe at the christening.
    So I am going to, again I reserved at the outset, and again 
I really want to congratulate all the members because I think 
we really covered a lot of important topics, many of which I 
had sort of on my dance card here.
    But General Smith, I wanted to just sort of give you an 
opportunity maybe go a little bit deeper where Mr. Gallagher 
started where, you know, with all the, you know, really dynamic 
change that General Berger is bringing with the future design 
plan, and just sort of talk a little about, again, how the 
unmanned sort of fits into that vision, because, you know, 
obviously, Congress is sort of scrambling to catch up with him, 
you know, in terms of, you know, decisions we are going to be 
making.
    General Smith. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad it 
is not just me who is scrambling to keep up with him, so that 
makes me feel a little better today. Sir, we exist as a naval 
service. We are the fleet reinforce, so we exist to serve, and 
to serve the fleets and the joint force commanders. So 
everything that the Commandant has directed us to go after is a 
way to get after distributed maritime operations and our 
portion of that which is sea denial.
    As Jim said, Admiral Kilby said, we are not--we are program 
and platform agnostic; we are looking for capabilities. So what 
we have done with a very few plays in the playbook that we have 
to be able to do day or night, austere weather, worst possible 
conditions under threat. So the systems that we are looking at, 
and they literally are a handful, it is the ground-based anti-
ship missile on top of the Remote Operated Ground Unit 
Expeditionary, the ROGUE vehicle. That is one. A long-range, 
unmanned surface vessel which now we are going to prototype, we 
wish to prototype five Metal Sharks that we will get after, and 
that is about a 46, 45-foot boat that is a semiautonomous 
vessel that has loitering munitions, that we did some testing 
at a classified level that explained how that combined with the 
Naval Strike Missile puts a very high-dollar, high-value enemy 
platform at risk.
    We have also begun to look at systems that--like the MQ-9A 
Extended Range that provide that data passage from the most 
forward deployed Marines as the stand-in force who are already 
in that first island chain; they are literally there today. How 
all those things fit together to deny certain sea spaces to an 
adversary in order to enable fleet maneuver. So all those 
systems that are all basic technology today that we are simply 
integrating, those systems combine for that distributed 
maritime operation. And again, it is about four very simple 
plays that we can--it is long-range fires, it is command and 
control, and it is operational maneuver.
    If we have those things, we can enable that fleet maneuver 
and we can do that under the most austere and worst conditions 
possible that are dirty, muddy, and dangerous. We also enable 
commanders. Those are tools. They don't replace Marines. They 
enable Marines. And they enable that maneuver and enable that 
commander to execute in a very aggressive fashion their 
contribution to the joint force commander and the joint force 
maritime component commander. I hope that in a fairly succinct 
fashion----
    Mr. Courtney. No, that was excellent. Thank you. And really 
helpful to all of us.
    Admiral, I again, one question. I just wanted to follow up. 
You mentioned again the large unmanned undersea vehicle like 
the Orca program, I guess, is, you know, the term it is called. 
Can you again just sort of give us what is the state of play 
there? It sounded like, you know, maybe we are, and, you know, 
maybe for good reason, you know, as per some of our comments 
here today that, you know, you want to make sure about some of 
its capabilities before we go full steam ahead?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. I will open up and ask Jay to, or 
Secretary Stefany, to add his comments. But the complexity of 
this mission should not be understated. The fact that we want 
to have a large vehicle, undersea, deliver in a clandestine 
manner, mines, sounds relatively simple. I have to avoid 
fishing nets and seamounts and currents and all the things. I 
have to be able to communicate with it.
    I have to be able to sustain it. I have to maybe be able to 
tell it to abort a mission, which means it has to come up to 
surface and communicate or get communications from its current 
depth. Those are all complexities that we have to work through 
with the CONOPS of this vehicle. In its development though, 
there have been delays with the contractor that we are working 
through and we want to aggressively work with them to pursue to 
get this vehicle down to Port Hueneme so we can start testing 
it and understand its capabilities.
    And those to me, the challenges will be all of those things 
to see too the endurance, the delivery of the payload, the 
ability to change mission, potentially, those are all things we 
have to deliver to meet the need of the combatant commander. 
Did I answer your question, sir?
    Mr. Courtney. It did, thank you. I appreciate that. I mean, 
so the program is still alive, I guess. I just want to make 
sure----
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Courtney [continuing]. We are sure about that.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes.
    Mr. Courtney. But it is just again maybe the deployment of 
it might be just a little bit----
    Admiral Kilby. Absolutely, sir. And I think we are going to 
get these first five vessels. And in the spirit of the 
committee, we want to make sure we have got it right before we 
go----
    Mr. Courtney. Right.
    Admiral Kilby [continuing]. Build something else. I think 
it is scoped out, ideally. We have got to get through those 
technical and operational challenges to deliver on the 
capability we are trying to close on, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you. That is very helpful.
    So, I guess we have completed the first round, and we have 
time, a little bit of time maybe for a second round, if the 
witnesses can stay with us a little bit longer. I am done. My 
questions are definitely satisfied. Anyone else, Mr. Wittman? 
Okay. And how about on our side, Mr. Brown, do you have any 
other questions?
    Mr. Brown. I do, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. All right, why don't you hold? The minority 
is up next, and Mr. Gallagher will go first.
    Mr. Brown. Excellent.
    Mr. Courtney. And the floor is yours.
    Mr. Gallagher. Great. So we, obviously, we reduced MQ-25 to 
a tanker, but, I mean, given the ranges involved in countering 
anti-access and area denial strategies, what is--I guess this 
is for Admiral Kilby--what is the Navy's plan to accelerate the 
development of a carrier-based, unmanned, combat strike vehicle 
that could be launched from a carrier in order to bridge that 
gap, and project power ashore? Shouldn't this be a higher 
priority than it is right now?
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. That is a question we wrestle with 
all the time in the Navy trying to make sure we are pacing the 
adversary. We are worried about--I am concerned of chasing that 
very high-complex mission before I do the foundational building 
block approaches to integrating these vehicles in the air wing. 
And that is why I suggested, and I am not an aviator by the way 
so I want to make sure that I don't, I have that underneath my 
responsibilities, the N9 [Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Warfare Systems].
    But my view is we need to introduce those capabilities with 
successive increasing levels of complexity to complement the 
air wing that we have today, so we make it relevant to moving 
it forward. So I think it will be things like electronic attack 
which will be stimulated from another aircraft in this manned 
and unmanned teaming.
    So I would use maybe an unmanned vehicle to provide jamming 
or some kind of other electronic attack means in conjunction 
with a manned aircraft to complete a mission in that A2AD 
[anti-access, area denial] environment you described. Perhaps I 
can provide some surveillance and I can save deck space where I 
don't have to have five E-2Ds on the carrier and I could 
reorient the air wing to provide capability in the future.
    So I think we will ultimately get to your goal because I 
will exceed the ability of a manned aircraft of 12 hours to 
deliver that mission and I am going to push on that window. So 
we certainly have to get there. I don't want to sign up for 
that before we have met some of these rudimentary things to 
integrate capability in the air wing, and I think the MQ-25 is 
our way to start that integration. I am sure I didn't 
completely satisfy you in that answer.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, you know, I think the fundamental 
problem as I see it is you have the--the manned aircraft don't 
have the endurance necessary to do the long-range strike 
mission and then, you know, when people point to the teaming 
between MQ-25 and F-35, I mean, the MQ-25 cannot, it is not 
optimized to fully refuel the F-35s at their operational range.
    And even if it were, I think, based on the new capabilities 
of the DF-21 anti-ship missile, the F-35 is still--it can't 
bridge the distance imposed by the A2AD strategy. I just think 
we have a lot of work to do on that and I just want it to be a 
higher priority for the Navy.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I would just add 
one other further complicating thing is, I have to increase the 
range of my air-to-air missiles to be effective in that as 
well, so that is a complement to that endurance aircraft 
because they will work together. That aircraft, the closer it 
gets to China the more it will be under that C4ISRT [command, 
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and targeting] network, C5ISRT [command, 
control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting] network, so we 
will have to make sure we are thinking about that whole system, 
that capability to include the weapon.
    Mr. Gallagher. Another thing a confirmed Secretary of the 
Navy could help us think through. So, dear President Biden, if 
you are listening, please nominate a SECNAV.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher. So I am told that 
Ms. Luria is still on. The only other member I saw was Mr. 
Brown, but I think--is Ms. Luria still with us?
    Mrs. Luria. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I am still here.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. So, Mr. Brown, she was next up on the 
list, so I apologize.
    Mr. Brown. Absolutely. I understand.
    Mr. Courtney. Okay. I would yield the floor to Ms. Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, and thank you for the 
opportunity to ask additional questions. I think two things we 
have covered today for the surface vessels that are really 
important are both autonomy, but then also reliability, 
reliability of the HM&E systems.
    And I wonder, Admiral Kilby, if you could comment further, 
because as we finished up the last rounds of questions, you 
know, we talked about the fact that in a transit from San Diego 
to Pearl Harbor there was intervention required for operating 
the diesel engines. And kind of putting this in context of, you 
know, the Navy and the Navy's reticence and sort of cultural 
way of operating things has not really been to move to unmanned 
or minimal manning and even previous attempts to have smart-
ship capability on manned ships has been very limited. You 
know, how are you going to address these HM&E reliability 
issues, you know, technology for diesel engines that can 
operate autonomously for a very long period of time?
    And then just touch on sort of the cultural issue with the 
Navy, you know, my experience in the Navy as an engineering 
officer of the watch was, you know, still having a clipboard 
where logs were taken manually and if parameters were out of 
spec they were circled in red and reported. And there is a long 
way between that which is the standard operation for most Navy 
diesel engines and a fully autonomous system, and it feels like 
there is a long bridge to gap there.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question and 
I appreciate the difficulty here. First, I would just again, 
the Sea Hunter vessel is a prototype and not designed with that 
full autonomy in mind, though we certainly are yielding a lot 
from that including the lessons you highlighted. The three 
interventions, right, where I had to go reset a switch because 
I hadn't created the electrical distribution system a way to 
automatically shift to another source. So we have got to take 
those lessons in mind and build it in.
    But I still go back to this conversation I had with the 
Strategic Capabilities Office, like keep it simple. Don't make 
it as difficult as we can, and redundancy is probably a 
capability in and of itself. So maybe I require a shaft to have 
multiple engines on it so I can still operate and meet mission 
if one of those engines fails or fails to switch over. I do 
know we are working with the Strategic Capabilities Office 
[SCO] and DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] on 
how to get after these greater reliability things and I think 
land-based testing is clearly a way to do that.
    I want to highlight the SCO transit of the Ranger from the 
gulf coast to San Diego. There was one interaction where we had 
to go replace a belt on a water jet, so perhaps that is not the 
best propulsion system. I don't know what is, but maybe that 
isn't. If it continues to cause us problems, then we need to 
look at something more reliable in those transit schemes. So, I 
think we have got a lot to learn but we do have to prize 
reliability to your point at a higher level. And the autonomy 
piece, I think you are getting at the cultural piece, we want 
to do it by ourselves. Are we looking at this autonomy 
correctly? Are we unleashing all the potential that exists out 
there? I think we have to be very introspective about that 
moving forward, to not just do it the way we have always done 
it and recreate that system that we are used to, and look at 
the opportunity to leverage off of industry. So I think we have 
got a lot to learn, ma'am, and your points are valid.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you. And, you know, I think that we 
are all focusing on this as, you know, a potential way to 
expand our capabilities against our, you know, most present 
adversary and complicate that with any sort of future potential 
conflict with China, and we want to be able to have a 
distributed maritime operations concept so there is either full 
autonomy, but there is the necessity of in that battle problem 
communicating with this vessel for the use of any installed 
weapons systems.
    And so it is still a big concern for me in what we could 
presume to ultimately be a GPS-denied environment and have the 
limited ability to communicate with these vessels, how they 
would have a utility in that scenario. So I wonder if you could 
briefly comment on that in the time remaining.
    Admiral Kilby. Yes, ma'am. Thanks. So, I would say there is 
a definite relationship between this thing called Project 
Overmatch and our Unmanned Campaign Plan. And Project Overmatch 
means ideal--deliver the network that can support manned and 
unmanned vessels in a robust, resilient manner in an area where 
I may be denied communications.
    So to your point, I have got to go from a point-to-point 
mentality to a service mentality where I can use multiple 
networks to provide data. Admiral Small is a direct report 
program manager to Secretary Stefany and the CNO and the 
Commandant, frankly, because the Marine Corps is involved in 
Project Overmatch, to make sure that we are delivering this 
incremental system to satisfy our needs. So, I know I am out of 
time, but I would love to talk more about this connection 
between Project Overmatch and our unmanned system because there 
is a relationship there that has to happen to bring it to a 
full fruition.
    Mr. Courtney. Great.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you, Admiral Kilby and the 
other witnesses, and I look forward to learning more about 
that. Thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Ms. Luria.
    And now, Mr. Brown who has been patiently waiting, the 
floor is yours.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a 
follow-up on Representative Gallagher's question. Once the--and 
this is for you, Admiral Kilby. Once the MQ-25 is fielded, do 
you expect it to strictly serve as a refueling asset with 
limited ISR capabilities, or do you see an opportunity to 
incorporate strike as a future mission set?
    Admiral Kilby. Great question, sir. I think there is 
definitely opportunity to look at additional payloads in that 
platform, but its initial instantiation is truly tanking and 
ISR. What we have to do is do the examination. Does that 
payload capacity meet the capability needs we have, or do we 
have to pivot to another means?
    So I just don't have enough confidence right now to testify 
before you and say this is the plan and I think we are going to 
achieve it. I am definitely interested in all the capability we 
can pull out of that aircraft and we need to explore it to its 
fullest extent.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. Secretary Stefany, returning back to 
the MQ-4C, so it is my understanding that for fiscal year 2021, 
which was last year, the Navy originally paused production of 
the Triton in the President's budget submission. Now with the 
added air vehicle in continuing production, do you have any 
concerns with the level at which we are fielding, producing and 
fielding, and what can you say in terms of the overall 
requirement for the Triton throughout the fleet or in the 
force?
    Mr. Stefany. Yes, thank you for that question, 
Representative Brown. Overall, we have 18 Tritons under 
contract plus the 1 that was added, so there is 19. You have 
heard we have early-fielded two of those so there are a number 
still in the pipeline. And I think it was a relatively small 
risk to take, well, for us to take a year off, but the one that 
got added back in. And I think the production line will be fine 
from what we have seen of the industrial base to pick back up 
in 2022 or 2023, and we, obviously, that will be a future 
budget decision that you will see shortly.
    But I think that one year, taking 2021 and going down to 
just one, there is still many in the production line being 
built and I don't think we are going to have a major production 
line impact, sir.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I just want to close by taking a little bit 
of issue with Representative Gallagher. While I respect the 
Navy, I have a fondness for the fleet, and certainly it has got 
the lead in the Indo-Pacific, as a former Army officer, I would 
like to suggest that the Army is the premier service globally 
in every combatant command AOR.
    But I love the Navy. Go Army. Go Navy.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Courtney. You know, I knew when you joined Seapower it 
was going to be interesting around here. So Mr. Gallagher has 
left, but I am sure, you know, you will have plenty of 
opportunities to remind him of your comments.
    Mr. Wittman, the ranking member, has asked to follow up or 
finish up with the final question of the day, so the floor is 
yours, Mr. Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Vice Admiral Kilby, Lieutenant General Smith, 
give me your perspective on how the law of armed conflict will 
manifest itself in weaponized vehicles and what will the Navy 
and Marine Corps do to help avoid autonomous killing machines? 
I think there is a whole element of that. I think that, you 
know, having those platforms with offensive capability is 
incredibly important, but there is also another element to it 
also that the question is going to be asked, so I just kind of 
want to get your perspective on where that goes.
    General Smith. Congressman, I will start and then pass it 
to my shipmate Jim Kilby. What I would say very briefly, the 
law of armed conflict is the law of armed conflict. When that 
lethal munition is released, it is released under control of a 
human. As we get to semiautonomous or autonomous systems that 
human is in the loop. The question will be how far back is that 
human in the loop.
    But what is not envisioned is an offensive, lethal, fully 
autonomous system. That fully autonomous system alerts the 
human that is in fact an enemy target, if an enemy has been 
declared hostile. That is a far cry from I have alerted it and 
now I am going to fire on it offensively. Defensive mechanisms 
in my assessment are different because they protect members of 
a Marine unit or a crew. But the law of armed conflict does not 
change, much like a--well, simplified--a Predator in previous 
conflicts, there is a human in the loop that authorizes the 
release of that lethality.
    So I view no difference there, sir. It is a question of how 
far back must the human in the loop be and the temporal change 
between approval and execution of the target. And I will pass 
to my shipmate, Jim Kilby, who will say that much better than 
I.
    Admiral Kilby. Sir, the only thing I would add to what 
General Smith said is we have learned with the advent of things 
like Navy Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air that we can 
connect our systems to create a whole that is greater than the 
sum of its parts.
    Mr. Wittman. Right.
    Admiral Kilby. And I think we are going to continue on that 
road. So how do we use these vehicles to add to that picture 
with clarity and decision-making quality data to exactly what 
General Smith said and that is really what we are about here 
is, how do we connect that system in a different more resilient 
manner.
    So it could be that some of these unmanned vessels are 
providing sensory data back as an update to a weapon that is 
flying to another point. It could be that I am stimulating a 
system to go do something. But I agree absolutely with what 
General Smith said. There will be a man in the loop here and we 
will respect the law of armed conflict.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure. Yes, I think that is important just for 
people to understand. That is the reason I asked the question, 
just to make sure that people understand. Because many times 
they have a concept that somehow autonomous vehicles out there 
are going to be, you know, on their own, and with the dawn of 
artificial intelligence you will program them, they will learn 
and then all of a sudden--boom--they are out of control. So it 
is great to understand that.
    It is great to hear you talk too that these platforms 
provide a tremendous amount of not only capability but capacity 
in the battlespace, and specifically in that battlespace 
providing options for folks that are there looking at, you 
know, what is the threat. The more options you have the better 
off you are in either countering that threat or sometimes even 
dissuading folks from operating that threat. So I think that is 
incredibly important.
    But I wanted to make sure that, you know, we got out there 
the distinction on that, so people understand how this is going 
to be integrated and what an incredibly impactful tool it will 
be for the Navy-Marine Corps team.
    So again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Wittman. And on that 
note, this will bring the--well, first of all, though, I do 
want to thank the witnesses for their outstanding testimony.
    Again, I think it was a very good exchange and members, 
obviously, the interest level was very high.
    And, Mr. Stefany, as your maiden trip here, I mean, no one 
would have known. Again, your answers were really, you know, 
perfectly easy to follow and very informative, so 
congratulations on your first, and hopefully we will see you 
back here again in the future.
    And again, to the other witnesses, I really appreciate your 
input today. So with that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 18, 2021

      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 18, 2021

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 18, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

    Mr. Wittman. Mr. Stefany, given the Navy and Marine Corps diverse 
set of needs for large and extra-large UUVs, do you see additional 
programs of record on the immediate horizon that adopt low cost 
architectures to meet those specific needs other than Orca XLUUV or 
Snakehead LDUUV?
    Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Wittman. Mr. Stefany, one of the advantages of unmanned systems 
is that it provides the Navy the ability to deploy a large quantity of 
distributed sensors in an affordable manner. With this in mind, what is 
the Navy's approach to procuring low-cost, commercial large and extra-
large UUV to support that need?
    Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Wittman. Vice Admiral Kilby, given the Navy and Marine Corps 
diverse set of needs for large and extra-large UUVs, do you see 
additional programs of record on the immediate horizon that adopt low 
cost architectures to meet those specific needs other than Orca XLUUV 
or Snakehead LDUUV?
    Admiral Kilby. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Wittman. Vice Admiral Kilby, one of the advantages of unmanned 
systems is that it provides the Navy the ability to deploy a large 
quantity of distributed sensors in an affordable manner. With this in 
mind, what is the Navy's approach to procuring low-cost, commercial 
large and extra-large UUV to support that need?
    Admiral Kilby. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
    Mr. Carl. Mr. Stefany, the costs associated with the design, 
construction, and testing of completely new vessels have regularly been 
much higher than expected. At a time where the DOD's budget is already 
spread thin, I think it is unwise to take on unnecessary costs. Rather 
than developing a completely new platform, the Navy is in the process 
of converting an EPF into an autonomous prototype. Can you elaborate on 
whether or not the Navy is considering the use of an existing platform, 
such as the EPF, as the base design for the LUSV?
    Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Carl. Vice Admiral Kilby, the costs associated with the design, 
construction, and testing of completely new vessels have regularly been 
much higher than expected. At a time where the DOD's budget is already 
spread thin, I think it is unwise to take on unnecessary costs. Rather 
than developing a completely new platform, the Navy is in the process 
of converting an EPF into an autonomous prototype. Can you elaborate on 
whether or not the Navy is considering the use of an existing platform, 
such as the EPF, as the base design for the LUSV?
    Admiral Kilby. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

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