[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



            OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                        THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-27

                               __________

         Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary


		[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


               Available via: http://judiciary.house.gov
               
               
		               ________
	       
	       
	          U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
	       
48-244 			 WASHINGTON : 2022
               
               
               
                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                    JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chair
                MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania, Vice-Chair

ZOE LOFGREN, California              JIM JORDAN, Ohio, Ranking Member
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas            STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee               LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,      DARRELL ISSA, California
    Georgia                          KEN BUCK, Colorado
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          MATT GAETZ, Florida
KAREN BASS, California               MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
HAKEEM S. JEFFRIES, New York         ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island     TOM McCLINTOCK, California
ERIC SWALWELL, California            W. GREG STEUBE, Florida
TED LIEU, California                 TOM TIFFANY, Wisconsin
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland               THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
PRAMILA JAYAPAL, Washington          CHIP ROY, Texas
VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida          DAN BISHOP, North Carolina
J. LUIS CORREA, California           MICHELLE FISCHBACH, Minnesota
MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania       VICTORIA SPARTZ, Indiana
SYLVIA R. GARCIA, Texas              SCOTT FITZGERALD, Wisconsin
JOE NEGUSE, Colorado                 CLIFF BENTZ, Oregon
LUCY McBATH, Georgia                 BURGESS OWENS, Utah
GREG STANTON, Arizona
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
MONDAIRE JONES, New York
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina
CORI BUSH, Missouri

       PERRY APELBAUM, Majority Staff Director and Chief of Staff
               CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Minority Staff Director
                                 ------                                
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                        Thursday, June 10, 2021

                                                                   Page

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chair of the Committee on the 
  Judiciary from the State of New York...........................     2
The Honorable Jim Jordan, Ranking Member of the Committee on the 
  Judiciary from the State of Ohio...............................     4

                                WITNESS

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of 
  Investigation
  Oral Testimony.................................................     7
  Written Testimony..............................................    10

          LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

A video submitted by The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chair of the 
  Committee on the Judiciary from the State of New York..........     2
A photograph of a document entitled, ``United States Department 
  of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Receipt for 
  Property,'' April 28, 2020, submitted by the Honorable Matt 
  Gaetz, a Member of the Committee on the Judiciary from the 
  State of Florida for the record................................    42
A report entitled, ``Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal 
  Elections,'' National Intelligence Council, submitted by the 
  Honorable Mary Gay Scanlon, a Member of the Committee on the 
  Judiciary from the State of Pennsylvania for the record........    84
Materials submitted by the Honorable Sylvia Garcia, a Member of 
  the Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Texas for the 
  record
  An article entitled, `` `They threatened to hang him': Carnival 
    worker charged with hate crime after punching, kicking man in 
    parking lot of Almeda Mall,'' Click2Houston..................   110
  An article entitled, ``METRO rider charged with hate crime 
    enhancement after allegedly attacking bus driver and 2 
    officers,'' ABC 13...........................................   112
  A report entitled, ``Annual Hate Crime Report,'' Houston Police 
    Department...................................................   115
An article entitled, ``The FBI Used Its Most Advanced Spy Plane 
  To Watch Black Lives Matter Protests,'' BuzzFeed News, 
  submitted by the Honorable Cori Bush, a Member of the Committee 
  on the Judiciary from the State of Missouri for the record.....   130

                 QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD

Questions from the Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Member of the 
  Committee on the Judiciary from the State of California for the 
  record.........................................................   142
Questions from the Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Member of the 
  Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Texas for the 
  record.........................................................   144
Questions from the Honorable Tom McClintock, a Member of the 
  Committee on the Judiciary from the State of California for the 
  record.........................................................   146
Questions from the Honorable Scott Fitzgerald, a Member of the 
  Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Wisconsin for the 
  record.........................................................   147
Questions from the Honorable Cliff Bentz, a Member of the 
  Committee on the Judiciary from the State of Oregon for the 
  record.........................................................   148

 
            OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, June 10, 2021

                        House of Representatives

                       Committee on the Judiciary

                             Washington, DC

    The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in Room 
CVC-200, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Jerrold Nadler [Chair of 
the Committee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Nadler, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, 
Cohen, Johnson of Georgia, Deutch, Bass, Jeffries, Cicilline, 
Swalwell, Lieu, Raskin, Jayapal, Demings, Correa, Scanlon, 
Garcia, Neguse, McBath, Stanton, Dean, Escobar, Jones, Ross, 
Bush, Jordan, Chabot, Gohmert, Issa, Buck, Gaetz, Johnson of 
Louisiana, Biggs, McClintock, Steube, Tiffany, Massie, Roy, 
Bishop, Fischbach, Spartz, Fitzgerald, Bentz, and Owens.
    Staff Present: Aaron Hiller, Deputy Chief Counsel; Arya 
Hariharan, Chief Oversight Counsel; David Greengrass, Senior 
Counsel; Moh Sharma, Director of Member Services and Outreach & 
Policy Advisor; Priyanka Mara, Professional Staff Member/
Legislative Aide; Jordan Dashow, Professional Staff Member; 
Cierra Fontenot, Chief Clerk; John Williams, Parliamentarian; 
Ben Hernandez-Stern, Counsel, Crime Subcommittee; Anthony 
Valdez, Professional Staff Member/Legislative Aide, Immigration 
Subcommittee; Chris Hixon, Minority Staff Director; Tyler 
Grimm, Minority Chief Counsel for Policy and Strategy; Stephen 
Castor, Minority General Counsel; Ella Yates, Minority Member 
Services Director; Betsy Ferguson, Minority Senior Counsel; Ken 
David, Minority Counsel; Caroline Nabity, Minority Counsel; 
James Lesinski, Minority Counsel; Michael Koren, Minority 
Senior Professional Staff Member; Andrea Woodard, Minority 
Professional Staff Member; and Kiley Bidelman, Minority Clerk.
    Chair Nadler. The House Committee on the Judiciary will 
come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare 
recesses of the Committee at any time.
    We welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on Oversight 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
    Before we begin, I would like to remind Members that we 
have established an email address and distribution list 
dedicated to circulating exhibits, motions, or other written 
materials that Members might want to offer as part of our 
hearing today. If you would like to submit materials, please 
send them to the email address that has been previously 
distributed to your offices, and we will circulate the 
materials to Members and staff as quickly as we can.
    Finally, I ask all Members, both those in person and those 
appearing remotely, to mute your microphones when you are not 
speaking. This will help prevent feedback and other technical 
issues. You may unmute yourself anytime you seek recognition.
    I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    First, thank you for being here today, Director Wray.
    The world has certainly changed since your last visit to 
the Committee. When you were last here, the COVID-19 pandemic 
had not yet swept the globe, George Floyd was still alive, and 
we had not yet witnessed a terrorist attack on the United 
States Capitol.
    Given the important work of the FBI in bringing the 
perpetrators of that terrorist attack to justice, we have 
little choice in this hearing but to confront the reality of 
January 6 head-on. The reality is that, unlike past 
intelligence failures, where analysts might have failed to 
connect isolated pieces of classified information, we all saw 
this one coming. The attack on the United States Capitol was 
planned in public view.
    The events unfolded on cable news for all to see. President 
Trump used the full media reach of the White House to convince 
his supporters that the election had been stolen, told them to 
gather in Washington on January 6, then stood on a public stage 
and directed them to march to the Capitol.
    Now, some of my Republican colleagues insist that we should 
just push this unpleasant incident aside. They would rebrand 
these traitors as mere tourists. They would rather we forget or 
move on or look the other way.
    How exactly our walls were breached that day may never be 
fully known, because those same Republicans continue to block 
the passage of a bipartisan bill to establish a bipartisan 
commission to investigate the events of January 6.
    The criminals who breached the Capitol, who attacked the 
police, and who sought to capture and murder our leadership did 
so with the express purpose of disrupting our democracy. These 
were no tourists; they were insurrectionists. I, for one, will 
not simply look away.
    I would now direct your attention to the screen for a brief 
video.

[Video available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/hmml7mk0f1sfw0r/2021-06-
10%20
Oversight%20of%20the%20FBI%20Nadler%20Video.mp4?dl=0]

    Chair Nadler. Tourists, indeed.
    That attack is very much still with us, Director Wray. The 
threat is ongoing, and we need your help to do the work of 
reckoning with it.
    For a start, we need to understand what the Bureau knew in 
the run-up to the attack, when it knew it, and what prevented 
it from disrupting the work of the terrorists who planned it.
    Because we know the attack was not a spontaneous event. The 
events of January 6 where largely choreographed in advance. The 
attack was planned in the open on popular social media 
platforms. Right-wing militia groups trained for it. Maps of 
the Capitol Grounds circulated online long before the crowds 
arrived in Washington.
    Of course, President Trump and his allies had been whipping 
his supporters into a frenzy for weeks. He urged them to march 
to the Capitol to, quote, ``stop the steal.'' He told them 
their country would not survive the day unless they were 
willing to fight. He promised them it would be wild.
    According to the bipartisan Senate report released earlier 
this week, quote, ``The FBI issued 15 intelligence products in 
2020 related to domestic violence extremism, the last of which 
was issued on December 30 without any mention of the joint 
session of Congress or the Capitol,'' unquote.
    We need an explanation for that silence, Director Wray, 
because in the lead-up to the attack, in report after report, 
your field agents tried to sound the alarm.
    To be clear, Director Wray, I know that you take the attack 
on the Capitol as seriously as anybody and that under your 
direction the FBI is engaged in a massive undertaking to bring 
the perpetrators of the attack to justice.
    The FBI's inaction in the weeks leading up to January 6 is 
simply baffling. It is hard to tell whether FBI headquarters 
merely missed the evidence which had been flagged by your field 
offices and was available online for all the world to see or 
whether the Bureau saw the intelligence, underestimated the 
threat, and simply failed to act. Neither is acceptable. We 
need your help to get to the bottom of it.
    We also need your help to get at the root causes of the 
attack, the extremism and racism that, to be sure, has been 
with the Nation since before its founding but that former 
President Trump and others have encouraged and would exploit 
for political gain.
    This is not a rhetorical problem. The threat of White 
nationalism and far-right extremism is very real. Studies show 
a surge of hate crimes plagues our country right now. I know 
you to be a man of good conscience and that you condemn these 
acts of hatred in the strongest possible terms, but the time 
has come to put the resources of the Bureau where they belong.
    A recent study found that, quote, ``White supremacists and 
other like-minded extremists conducted two-thirds of the 
terrorist plots and attacks in the United States in 2020,'' 
unquote, and the time has come for the FBI to confront this 
threat directly.
    For too long, the FBI has downplayed the threat of White 
nationalism, focusing instead on far more distant threats and 
occasionally on imaginary threats like Black identity 
extremism. Although the FBI no longer uses that particular 
term, I am just as disturbed by the Bureau's current practice 
of lumping together a wide range of activities under the term 
``racially motivated violent extremism'' as if there were any 
equivalence whatsoever between Black and Brown activists 
marching for justice and the right-wing extremists who attacked 
the Capitol Police and tried to hang Mike Pence.
    The FBI must prioritize this threat. The Bureau cannot be 
afraid to call these groups by their names. The Oath Keepers, 
the Proud Boys, neo-Nazis, and other similar organizations pose 
an immediate threat to my colleagues, my constituents, and my 
family.
    The FBI must also do the hard work of keeping itself 
honest. Ample evidence shows that the crowd that stormed the 
Capitol was full of off-duty police and military personnel. 
Accordingly, it is past time for the FBI to begin what the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Pentagon have already 
begun, a full internal review of White supremacist membership 
within the Bureau.
    I do not mean to downplay your service to the country 
during the chaotic last few years. These have been trying 
times, and I can only imagine what it must be like to do your 
job in the shadow of a President who reportedly threatened to 
fire you for your refusing to launch baseless investigations of 
his political opponents.
    In particular, I want to commend the Bureau for its work on 
the security of our election systems. The FBI is charged with 
preventing both mechanical meddling and disinformation 
campaigns. Your work to secure the 2020 election led to one of 
the most secure elections in our lifetime, and we owe you a 
debt of gratitude for that.
    I look forward to hearing more from you on how the Bureau 
will continue to secure voting systems and to safeguard the 
right to vote next November.
    That work is critical, because, at base, trust in our 
democracy is what keeps our country vibrant and strong. Faith 
in our democratic institutions binds diverse people with 
different values and different backgrounds together in common 
cause. In the wake of the insurrection, nothing could be more 
important in your work or mine than rebuilding that trust.
    Thank you again for being here today. I look forward to 
your testimony.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member of the Judiciary 
Committee, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, thank you for being here.
    Over the past several years, Americans have seen their 
liberties attacked. Every right-- we enjoy under the First 
Amendment has been assaulted, every single one--your right to 
worship, your right to assemble, your right to petition, 
freedom of the press, freedom of speech--every single one.
    There are places today where a full congregation can still 
not meet on a Sunday morning. Your right to assemble? Four 
weeks ago, I spoke to the New Mexico Republican Party in 
Amarillo, Texas. They had to go to Texas for freedom, because 
they weren't allowed to assemble in their own State.
    Your right to petition your government? We sit here today 
on Capitol Hill having an important hearing with the Director 
of the FBI, but our constituents can't come to their Capitol, 
lobby their Member of Congress to redress their grievances, 
because the Speaker of the House won't let them in.
    Freedom of the press? Maybe the best example is, the 
President won't go to the border, the Vice President won't go 
to the border. When Secretary Mayorkas went to the border, he 
wouldn't let the press in the very facilities he was touring.
    Of course, freedom of speech, we all know what has happened 
to that. Big Tech censoring conservatives, the cancel-culture 
mob attacking anyone who disagrees with them, deplatforming the 
sitting President of the United States, Democrats writing 
letters to the network carriers telling them to take certain 
news organizations off their platform.
    Freedom is under attack, and, Director, a lot of Americans 
think you are part of the problem.
    Before you got there, the Comey FBI spied on the Trump 
campaign. Over the last three years, the FBI labeled the 
baseball field shooting where our friend and colleague Steve 
Scalise was shot, labeled that ``suicide by cop,'' for three 
years. We know the guy set out to go after Republicans. He had 
a piece of paper in his pocket with six Republican names on it. 
Somehow, the FBI thought it was suicide by cop. Thank goodness 
you have changed that.
    More recently, the FBI raided the New York apartment of 
Mayor Giuliani, the President's personal lawyer, former U.S. 
attorney, ran the Southern District of New York office. 
According to press accounts, he said he was willing to give 
whatever information you all wanted, whatever the Justice 
Department wanted. No, you kicked in his door instead.
    How about the couple in Alaska? Paul and Marilyn Hueper. 
They sure witnessed an attack on their liberty in an up close 
and personal way. The FBI kicked in their door, handcuffed 
them, held them at gunpoint, interrogated them for four hours 
in their own home. There was just one problem: They had the 
wrong people. Had the wrong people. Took their phones, took 
their laptop, took a pocket-size copy of the Constitution. 
There has to be some irony in that.
    Then there is FISA. In 2018, FISA Court Judge Boasberg said 
there were major privacy violations by the FBI. In 2019, 
Inspector General Horowitz did two investigations. The first 
one was on the Carter Page FISA application. He found 17 errors 
in that one, 51 wrong or unsupported statements in that FISA 
application--17 errors, 51 wrong statements. That is a nice way 
of saying ``68 lies'' that were taken to the FISA court. Mr. 
Horowitz then looked at 25 randomly sampled FISA applications, 
specifically the Woods file, the underlying documents that 
support what is taken to the court. In every single one, he 
said there was a problem, all 25. In four of them, he couldn't 
even find the Woods file.
    The last time the Director was in front of us, February of 
last year, you told us everything was fine. You said this: 
Quote, ``Americans should not lose sleep over the FISA 
application process.''
    Just two months ago, Judge Boasberg was back with another 
report, and he said there are, quote, ``apparent widespread 
violations'' by the FBI of the standards they have in place to 
deal with section 702 of FISA.
    Which raises a sort of fundamental question: Why are you 
using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to spy on 
Americans, Director?
    I appreciate the tough job you have and the good work, the 
good work, that the vast majority of your agents I think do. 
Freedom-loving Americans have concerns about their liberty, but 
they also have concerns about the opportunity cost.
    When you are kicking in the door of the President's lawyer, 
when you are interrogating an innocent couple for four hours, 
when you are spying on Americans, then, by definition, that 
means there are fewer resources going to stop terrorists at our 
southern border, stopping cyber-attacks, prosecuting Antifa, 
terrorists, and other rioters who attacked law enforcement, 
small businesses, the Capitol, and did over a billion dollars 
of damage over the last year. Frankly, that also means there 
are fewer resources to figure out where this virus started.
    So, we are going to have some tough questions for you, 
Director. We appreciate you being here, and we trust that you 
are going to answer our questions, are going to answer them 
directly. Because, again, when you think about what Americans 
have had to live through, the rights that they have that have 
been infringed as citizens of this great country, it is a 
serious time. So, we hope you will answer the tough questions 
that will come from the Republican side.
    With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Jordan.
    Without objection, all other opening statements will be 
included in the record.
    Chair Nadler. We will now introduce today's Witness.
    Christopher Wray became the eighth Director of the FBI on 
August 2, 2017.
    Director Wray began his law enforcement career in 1997, 
serving the Department of Justice as an Assistant U.S. Attorney 
for the Northern District of Georgia. In 2001, he was named 
Associate Deputy Attorney General and then Principal Associate 
Deputy Attorney General in the Office of the Deputy Attorney 
General in Washington, DC.
    Mr. Wray was nominated by President George Bush in 2003 to 
be the Assistant Attorney General for DOJ's Criminal Division, 
which included the Counterterrorism section and the 
Counterintelligence and Export Control section at the time.
    In addition to his extensive time in public service, Mr. 
Wray has spent a total of almost 17 years practicing law in the 
international law firm of King & Spalding, LLP, working in the 
area of government investigations and white-collar crime. At 
the time of his nomination to be FBI Director, Mr. Wray was 
chair of the firm's Special Matters and Government 
Investigations Practice Group.
    He graduated with a bachelor's degree from Yale University 
in 1989 and earned his law degree from Yale Law School in 1992. 
He also clerked for Judge J. Michael Luttig of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
    We welcome Director Wray, and we thank him for 
participating today.
    Now, if you would please rise, I will begin by swearing you 
in.
    Do you swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury, that the 
testimony you are about to give is true and correct, to the 
best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you 
God?
    Let the record show that the Witness has answered in the 
affirmative.
    Thank you, and please be seated.
    Please note that your written statement will be entered 
into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, I ask that you 
summarize your testimony in five minutes.
    To help you stay within that time, there is a timing light 
on your table. When the light switches from green to yellow, 
you have one minute to conclude your testimony. When the light 
turns red, it signals your five minutes have expired.
    Director Wray, you may begin.

          TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER WRAY

    Mr. Wray. Good morning, Chair Nadler, Ranking Member 
Jordan, and the Members of the Committee. Thank you for this 
opportunity to talk about the FBI's enduring efforts to keep 
the American people safe.
    As you know, over our almost-113-year history, the FBI has 
worked tirelessly alongside our trusted partners to confront a 
host of threats facing our country, from the persistent threat 
posed by terrorists both foreign and domestic, to the 
counterintelligence threat posed by the governments of 
aggressive adversaries like China and Russia, to the scourge of 
violence threatening our neighborhoods, to the rising and 
evolving threat posed by cyber criminals who seek to hold 
hostage our companies and our critical infrastructure.
    I suspect we'll be covering these and other topics today, 
but I'd like to start by discussing an issue that is of utmost 
concern to me, to you, and to all Americans, which is the 
prevalence of violence in our country.
    Over the last few years, we've witnessed the troubling 
phenomenon of people resorting to violence and destruction of 
property to further their ideological, political, or social 
goals. Far too often, we are seeing individuals inspired by one 
or more extremist ideologies to commit criminal acts against 
their fellow Americans.
    Now, the FBI does not and should not police ideology, and 
we do not investigate groups or individuals based on the 
exercise of First Amendment-protected activity alone. When we 
encounter violence and threats to public safety, the FBI will 
not hesitate to take appropriate action.
    That is not a controversial issue that should force anyone 
to take sides. We can all agree that violence in any form, in 
support of any set of beliefs, cannot and will not be 
tolerated, because violence undermines one of the most basic 
freedoms of all Americans, the right to feel safe and secure in 
our own homes and communities.
    We saw this kind of extremist violence on January 6 when an 
angry mob used violence and the destruction of property to 
break into the U.S. Capitol in a failed attempt to undermine 
our institutions of government and our democratic process, an 
assault where you, the Members of Congress, were victims, where 
all Americans were victimized and more than 100 law enforcement 
officers were injured in just a few hours.
    Through the dogged work of FBI agents, analysts, and 
professionals, working alongside Federal, State, and local 
partners, we've been able to make close to 500 arrests so far, 
with more to come.
    We also saw extremist violence during last summer's civil 
unrest. Although most citizens made their voices heard through 
peaceful, lawful protests, others, far too many, persistently 
exploited those protests to pursue violent extremist agendas. 
In Portland alone, hundreds of law enforcement officers 
sustained injuries and damage to Federal buildings was 
estimated in the millions of dollars.
    Across the country, Federal, State, and local authorities 
arrested thousands of individuals who committed criminal acts 
surrounding those protests. Nearly every one of the FBI's 56 
field offices opened investigations, amounting to hundreds of 
investigations, involving violent and destructive conduct.
    More recently, we've seen an alarming increase in hate 
crimes across the country, many targeting Members of the Asian-
American/Pacific Islander and Jewish communities. In some 
cases, these crimes are carried out by individuals we 
characterize as racially and ethnically motivated violent 
extremists.
    To confront this threat, we've taken a multipronged 
approach, focusing on our traditional investigative efforts 
through our civil rights program and our Domestic Terrorism-
Hate Crimes Fusion Cell that we created about a year and a half 
ago, but also enhancing our law enforcement training, public 
outreach, and support to our State and local partners.
    Our efforts to stem extremist violence are on top of our 
continued and extensive work to disrupt violent gangs, drug 
organizations, and human traffickers whose criminal acts 
devastate families and communities.
    For many of you, violent crime remains the most significant 
and most pernicious threat you face in your own district. In 
difficult times like these, we must never forget the 
extraordinary bravery of our Federal, State, local, and Tribal 
law enforcement Members, who risk life and safety every single 
day to protect the public and keep the peace.
    I say that because, over the past year, we've seen a 
troubling uptick in violence against Members of the law 
enforcement community. In just the first five months of 2021, 
36 officers have been feloniously killed on the job. That's far 
surpassing the number by this time last year. To put that in 
perspective, that's almost two law enforcement officers shot 
and killed every week.
    That's not counting all those officers who've died in the 
line of duty facing the countless other inherent dangers of the 
job, like racing in pursuit of a suspect and dying in a car 
accident or drowning in an attempted rescue, or even the scores 
of officers who've died from COVID-19, because law enforcement, 
of course, kept coming to work every day, right through the 
teeth of the pandemic.
    Nor is it counting all those officers who've been badly 
injured but thankfully survived but whose lives and whose 
families' lives have been forever changed.
    Now, the loss of any agent or officer is heartbreaking for 
their families, for their departments, for their communities 
that they serve. We in the FBI know that all too well, with the 
terrible, terrible loss of Special Agents Laura 
Schwartzenberger and Dan Alfin this past February, shot and 
killed down near Miami.
    Each one of the officers and the agents we've lost this 
year were people who got up one morning, picked up their badge, 
not knowing whether they'd make it home that night. They did 
their jobs despite all the hardships they've faced in this 
almost epically difficult year, because they were devoted to 
protecting their fellow Americans, both friends and strangers 
alike. We owe these dedicated public servants a debt of 
gratitude. More than that, we owe them our best efforts to help 
stem the tide of violence.
    All of us here today have a shared responsibility to take a 
stand, to protect our communities, to support those who serve 
in law enforcement, and to condemn violence regardless of its 
motivation. We in the FBI are ready to do that exactly, to use 
all the tools at our disposal to uphold the rule of law and to 
fulfill our mission to protect every American. Because there is 
simply no place in this country for hatred, intolerance, or 
violence regardless of its motivation, ideology, or otherwise.
    So, thank you for taking the time to hear from me today. I 
look forward to answering your questions.
    [The statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
    
    

	[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



    Chair Nadler. Thank you for your testimony.
    We'll now proceed under the five-minute rule with 
questions, and I will recognize myself for five minutes.
    According to documents we've received from the Bureau, the 
FBI was aware that several violent extremists already under 
investigation were preparing to travel to Washington in 
January. In December, FBI Atlanta issued an alert that certain 
militia groups were preparing for a significant event in 
January, perhaps on Inauguration Day.
    On January 5th, a report from FBI Norfolk warned about 
specific calls for violence at the Capitol the next day, some 
of them graphic. ``Congress needs to hear with glass breaking, 
doors being kicked in, and blood being spilled.'' The report 
also noted that individuals were sharing maps of the tunnels 
underneath the Capitol complex and listed rally points where 
the attackers would gather before advancing on the building.
    We know that the Norfolk report made it to the FBI's 
Washington Field Office in advance of the attack. Yet, for days 
after the attack, the head of that field office insisted that 
it had received no intelligence suggesting anything other than 
First Amendment activity.
    Director Wray, the warnings coming in from around the 
country were clear. Here in Washington, did the FBI simply miss 
the evidence, or did it see the evidence and fail to piece it 
together?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Chair, as you could imagine, we are 
just as outraged by what happened on January 6th and just as 
determined to do our part to make sure that never happens 
again.
    Now, the Norfolk report that you referenced was a specific 
piece of raw, unverified intelligence that emerged on January 
5th, the day before, from a source online, unvetted. Despite 
the raw nature of it, it was quickly passed, not one, not two, 
but three different ways to the Capitol Police:

    (1)  An email to their representatives on our Joint 
Terrorism Task Force;
    (2)  in a verbal briefing in our command post that included 
Members of the Capitol Police, MPD, et cetera; and,
    (3)  third, in our law enforcement portal, which all law 
enforcement partners have access to.

So, we tried to make sure that we got that information to the 
right people.
    Obviously, anytime there is an attack, especially one as 
significant as this one, you can be darn sure that we are going 
to be looking hard at how we can do better, how we can do more, 
how we can do things differently, in terms of collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence.
    Now, you also mentioned individuals under investigation 
before January 6. A couple things on that.
    First, the FBI did disseminate I think about a dozen 
intelligence products, including warning of domestic violent 
extremism related to the election, some talking about it 
continuing past the election all the way through inauguration, 
including reports, together with DHS, put out in December, the 
month before.
    As far as individuals actually under investigation, now 
that we are close to 500 arrests into the matter, you may be 
surprised to learn that, in fact, almost none of the 
individuals charged and found to be involved with the attack on 
the Capitol were, in fact, individuals who were previously 
under investigation.
    Chair Nadler. Okay.
    At 12:53 p.m. on January 6th, rioters broke through the 
outer barricade surrounding the lawn of the Capitol. Shortly 
after 1:45 p.m., the rioters surged past the Capitol Police 
protecting the Capitol's west steps. At 1:49 p.m., officers 
officially declared there was a riot at the Capitol.
    Acting Attorney General Rosen testified before the 
Oversight Committee that he learned that the FBI and the ATF 
received a request for assistance from the Capitol Police and 
were beginning to respond.
    When, specifically, in that timeline of events did Capitol 
Police request assistance from the FBI? How quickly was that 
help deployed?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have the specific time for you, so I 
don't want to misspeak.
    Chair Nadler. Okay.
    The FBI's Washington Field Office is one of the largest 
field offices in the country. The field office was reportedly 
found by an internal review in 2019 to be both ineffective and 
inefficient. Specifically, the review criticized the field 
office's mechanisms for collecting and analyzing threat 
intelligence as well as its procedures for sharing intelligence 
with other law enforcement agencies, including the Capitol 
Police.
    Did the Washington Field Office's domestic terrorism 
shortcomings lead to a delayed response in the lead-up to and 
on January 6th?
    Mr. Wray. My recollection of that particular audit or 
inspection is that it was a while back and that we had recently 
changed the leadership of the Washington Field Office and made 
a number of reforms. So, to my knowledge, at least, none of the 
issues that were discussed in that earlier report contributed 
to the response on January 6th.
    Chair Nadler. Thank you.
    My time is short, but I want to get in one last question.
    In February, the Secretary of Defense convened senior 
military officials and civilian leadership of the Armed Forces 
to assess the problem of extremist ideology in the military's 
ranks.
    In late April, the Department of Homeland Security 
announced it was conducting an internal review to root out 
White supremacy and other extremist ideology in its ranks.
    There can be no question that law enforcement agencies 
across the country face a similar challenge. Is the FBI 
conducting its own internal inspection or review to root out 
White supremacy and other extremist ideology? If not, will you 
commit to conducting such a review?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Mr. Chair, obviously, we take the prospect 
of what the intelligence community or law enforcement would 
refer to as an ``insider threat'' very seriously. We have a 
whole slew of procedures and internal reviews that speak to 
that. I'd be happy to see if we can provide you more 
information on that separately.
    Chair Nadler. Thank you very much.
    My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from 
Ohio, Mr. Jordan.
    Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chair, Mr. McClintock will go first for our 
side.
    Chair Nadler. Mr. McClintock?
    Mr. McClintock. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, last month, 180,000 foreign nationals 
illegally crossed our border. That's a 674-percent increase 
over last May. Nearly a million so far this year.
    The leaders of Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries 
all say this is in direct response to the Biden open-border 
policies. I don't think any question that that's the case. 
These policies have produced the largest human-trafficking 
operation since the international slave trade.
    Can you tell us how many persons on the terrorist watchlist 
have been encountered this year crossing through our southern 
border?
    Mr. Wray. Congressman, I'm not sure that I have that 
number, but it may be that we can provide the specifics 
separately.
    I do know that our field offices down on the border work 
very closely with CBP, especially focused on so-called 
``special interest aliens'' as well as potential--
    Mr. McClintock. I've watched--
    Mr. Wray. I just don't have the numbers.
    Mr. McClintock. --family groups being flagged through 
straight to transportation hubs.
    How many persons with criminal records or criminal warrants 
have been encountered this year crossing our southern border?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have the specific figures. I know that 
our field offices down there, all of which I've visited, work 
very closely with CBP on this issue, and I agree with you that 
it's a significant security concern.
    Mr. McClintock. Well, would you think it's a more dangerous 
threat to our Nation's security than, say, whether Rudy 
Giuliani filed the right paperwork for his lobbying firm?
    Mr. Wray. I really can't discuss any specific individual 
investigation.
    Mr. McClintock. Can you at least give us the FBI estimate 
of how many terrorists, criminals, and gang Members are among 
the hundreds of thousands of got-aways that the Border Patrol 
has been unable to intercept?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I'd be happy to see if I can provide 
specific numbers and information to be helpful to your request 
separately. So, I'm happy to follow up with your staff on that.
    Mr. McClintock. Well, on that point, House Republican 
Leader Kevin McCarthy sent you a letter in April requesting a 
briefing on this subject. Will you commit to keeping Mr. 
McCarthy, in fact, all Members of this Committee, fully 
informed of it?
    Mr. Wray. I believe we have may have already provided the 
briefing that you are referring to for Leader McCarthy.
    Mr. McClintock. Will you provide that for all Members of 
this Committee?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I'm happy to see what information we can 
provide to be helpful.
    Mr. McClintock. Well, I'd hope you could provide me all the 
information.
    Mr. Wray. Again, I have to see what information we can 
provide, but yes.
    Mr. McClintock. Is it true that many of the foreign 
nationals who are being trafficked across our border often 
arrive here deeply indebted to the Mexican crime cartels?
    Mr. Wray. Certainly, we have seen quite a number of such 
instances, absolutely.
    Mr. McClintock. Are those debts collected through 
indentured servitude to the cartels?
    Mr. Wray. In some cases, definitely. We are pursuing--we 
have a number of human-trafficking task forces, as well as 
working on certain task forces with DHS, to try to address that 
issue.
    There's no question that the cartel activity on the other 
side of the border is spilling over in all sorts of ways, and 
you just put your finger directly on one that is extremely 
concerning to us all.
    Mr. McClintock. So, we basically, 170-plus years after the 
13th Amendment, have slavery burgeoning in this country as a 
result of these policies.
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, I do consider human trafficking 
a form of--and I don't like the word, but a modern form of 
slavery.
    Mr. McClintock. Indentured servitude.
    Mr. Wray. I mean, it's almost medieval.
    Mr. McClintock. Indentured servitude certainly is.
    Mr. Wray. Yeah.
    Mr. McClintock. How is that--you mentioned out of the 
country, but, in this country, how is that enforced? Do the 
cartels have gang affiliates who extract these debts?
    Mr. Wray. Well, it varies from case to case. Certainly, the 
cartels have--and different cartels have affiliations with 
different sorts of gangs here in the United States. There's not 
just human trafficking from a labor perspective but also sex 
trafficking.
    Mr. McClintock. So, this is a massive-organized crime 
syndicate burgeoning in this country because of these policies. 
What are you doing about it?
    Mr. Wray. So, we are attacking--it's a team effort, right? 
Obviously, DHS has the primary responsibility for the border 
itself, but we have Safe Streets Task Forces that go after the 
gang activity. We have OCDETF Strike Forces that go after the--
    Mr. McClintock. How many agents and how much money are you 
directing at this threat?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I can see if I can give you specific 
numbers, but I don't have those off the top of my head.
    I will tell you, which is sometimes surprising to people, 
that our criminal programs, our traditional criminal programs, 
which include exactly the thing you are talking about, remain, 
even to this day, with all the national security threats that 
get so much discussion, remain our biggest number of agents, 
our biggest allocation of resources. Violent crime, different 
sorts of violent crime, within the criminal program is by far 
and away the biggest chunk.
    Mr. McClintock. Thank you.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Ms. Lofgren?
    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thanks to you, Director Wray, for your service to our 
country. I want to thank especially the Bureau for the 
diligence with which you have pursued those who attacked the 
Capitol and the Capitol Police and essentially attacked our 
democratic system of government on January 6th. We wish you 
well in those efforts.
    I have a couple of questions about the rule of law. We all 
believe in the rule of law, and we think that--and I know you 
do too--that the rule of law applies to the government as well.
    That leads me to a question about section 702 of the FISA 
law. As you know, there has been a review by the court on the 
use of FISA. As you I am sure know, in its latest review, the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court found widespread 
violations of the FBI's internal rules and the law's 
restrictions on how and when the government may use the 
information it collects under section 702.
    For example, the court found, and I quote, ``compliance 
incidents'' suggesting that, ``the FBI failed to properly apply 
its querying standard when searching 702--acquired information 
was more pervasive than previously believed.'' In one case, FBI 
personnel queried foreign intelligence databases for the names 
of over 100 business, religious, civic, and community leaders 
who'd applied to the FBI Citizens Academy.
    The court also found dozens of cases where agents had 
searched warrantless foreign intelligence collections in the 
course of criminal investigations. In summary, the court 
expressed concerns about, quote, ``widespread violation of 
safeguards on use of warrantless collections.''
    In response to all these criticisms and concerns, the FBI, 
it seems to me, basically said they had been working on changes 
but that had been suspended because of the COVID pandemic 
protocols.
    Here's my question, Director Wray. Section 702 was enacted 
in 2008. The FBI and other intelligence agencies have had more 
than a decade to implement what the law requires. Yet, it's 
2021, and the FISA court is still finding--this isn't the first 
time--still finding widespread violations and failures where 
the FBI uses basically the hook of foreign surveillance but 
it's using it to avoid its warrant requirements for domestic 
law enforcement. Why is this happening?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I obviously want to make sure 
and I'm fiercely committed to making sure that the FBI complies 
with FISA in all respects.
    The FISA court's concerns are certainly concerns that I 
take especially seriously, as somebody who's a former 
prosecutor, former defense attorney, former Assistant Attorney 
General in charge of the Criminal Division, and now FBI 
Director. Our relationship with and our candor with and our 
transparency with and the confidence that we earn with the 
court is of utmost importance to me.
    Now, the opinion that you are referring to from the court 
does approve our procedures, did not, in fact, find abuses or 
misconduct, and has to deal specifically with the querying, the 
running of searches, in our databases. So, we have taken--
    Ms. Lofgren. If I may--they also found that the FBI had 
used data for internal domestic investigations. That's a 
violation of the purpose of 702.
    Mr. Wray. Again, I'm not going to speak to the specific 
instances in the report, because I think that would take longer 
than we have here, among other things. I would say that we've 
done a number of things to try to address the issues identified 
by the court.
    We have made significant changes to the documentation 
requirements to ensure accountability, oversight requirements, 
guidance and training enhancements, systems modifications, 
which may not sound glamorous, but is incredibly important 
because it helps prevent noncompliance.
    Then last but not least, something I particularly want to 
highlight, I created a whole new department in the FBI, an 
office of internal auditing, headed by a senior partner from a 
top--a Big Four accounting firm who also had, prior in his 
life, been an FBI agent and is consulting with a premier, 
outside, world-class consulting firm to stand up an office of 
internal audit specifically focused on FISA to ensure that we 
have a world-class compliance program and world-class internal 
auditing program to make sure that we don't have these--
    Ms. Lofgren. Director Wray.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Lofgren. If I may, Mr. Chair, can we get the Director 
to commit to have this individual brief with the Committee on 
those procedures?
    Mr. Wray. I'd be happy to see if we can get the Committee a 
briefing on what we're doing in this space.
    Chair Nadler. Thank you.
    Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady leads back.
    Mr. Issa?
    Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I'm going to follow up on my colleague. Apparently, 
Californians think alike today.
    In the 20 years that I've sat on the dais and looked at 
report after report of the FBI failure to comply with FISA and 
its long history of spying on Americans using this legislation 
as a backdoor, we've seen a pattern, which is we are promised 
there are going to be changes, and those changes have not ever 
occurred.
    As the gentlelady who just spoke, Ms. Lofgren, would tell 
you, you're coming up for reauthorization. If the 
reauthorization were today, based on--and correct me if I'm 
wrong--the 2019 report by the inspector general that found 17 
significant errors or omissions and 51 wrong or unsupported 
factual assertions in Carter Page's domestic spying, if you 
will, using the FISA statute alone. In addition, we have 
numerous people, including judges, who say if they'd known the 
truth, rather than the false statements, they never would've 
granted those warrants.
    So, now, the question is: Should we--first, do you agree 
with those findings, that at least some of those 68 errors or 
omissions are accurate, including one of your own that was 
prosecuted for it?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, first, let me be clear just in 
case there's any confusion to anybody watching: Of course, all 
these applications were filed before I became FBI Director just 
to be clear.
    Mr. Issa. I know.
    To be honest, Director, the reason we're having this 
conversation, Ms. Lofgren and I both, is that it's your watch. 
Organizations, no matter how great they are, are much like 
airplane pilots. They're not judged on their safe landings; 
they're judged on their crashes. This was clearly a crash, 
wouldn't you say?
    Mr. Wray. Well, what I would say is that the inspector 
general's report describes conduct that I consider 
unacceptable, unrepresentative of who the FBI is, and cannot 
happen again, which is why I implemented over 40 corrective 
measures promptly after the inspector general's report came 
out--accepted every single finding in the inspector general's 
report, implemented every single recommendation in the 
inspector general's report, went above and beyond, installed an 
entirely new leadership team at the FBI, created this new 
office of internal auditing that I just mentioned to 
Congresswoman Lofgren. I can go on and on and on.
    Mr. Issa. Let me not let you go on and on, just because of 
short time, and ask you: What assurances can you give us today 
that a current audit would not find current failures?
    Mr. Wray. Well, as somebody who's worked deeply with 
auditing firms for all sort of organizations, the point of an 
audit is to find problems. So, I can't sit here and tell you 
that no audit would find a problem. That's why we have an 
auditing process, is to find the problems and fix them. That's 
what we're going to do.
    Mr. Issa. Okay.
    Some time ago, under your predecessor, he came before this 
Congress and defended a warrant, an unusual one, one that 
ordered the company Apple to develop software to allow for a 
backdoor reportedly to be on one iPhone used in San Bernadino 
by a murderer or a terrorist. In fact, they were asking for 
software that allowed it to be external, and your predecessor 
claimed that you did not have the technical capability to 
decipher it.
    Shortly after that, a college professor showed that for 
about $300 you could have done it. Yet, you paid $1 million to 
an Israeli firm who did it.
    Today, can you assure us that you have the tools that you 
apparently did not have? Or would we have to assume that you'd 
have to ask a professor for a $300 solution or the Israelis for 
a million-dollar solution?
    Mr. Wray. Well, as you could imagine, the technology 
continues to improve, both for the bad guys and for the good 
guys. So, it's not a static situation. Even today--
    Mr. Issa. Well, knowing that there have been two recent 
failures in cyber-attacks, what assurances can you give this 
Committee that you have the resources and a plan to be on the 
leading edge of cyber, rather than the trailing edge of cyber, 
which appears to be where we are in a number of areas?
    Mr. Wray. We constantly need more resources to get further 
and further ahead of the bad guys in this particular space.
    The technology in terms of encryption, which is sort of the 
point you're getting at with the Apple example, has continued 
to advance in a way that's actually making it harder and harder 
for law enforcement, not just the FBI but all across this 
country, to get into encrypted devices and certainly encrypted 
messaging platforms.
    We saw that, for example, down in Congressman Gaetz's 
district, in Pensacola, with the Naval Air Station attack 
there. We tried to get into Apple's iPhone, the device that the 
terrorist there used--and, by the way, he took the time in the 
middle of the attack to shoot the phone--think about the 
presence of mind that he has to have in the middle of that to 
try to prevent us from getting into his phone. Our folks were 
able, in that instance, to reconstruct the phone. Because of a 
fluke in that particular instance, we were able to actually get 
into the device. It took months and months, hours and hours, 
and lots and lots of taxpayer money to get there.
    Only then, after not having gotten the cooperation that we 
really could've used from Apple at the front end, we found out 
that particular terrorist had been in communication with al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula right on up till the night 
before the attack, not known at the time that the attack was 
disrupted.
    So, it's an illustration of what a challenge this is for 
law enforcement. It affects terrorist investigations, it 
affects an issue that I know is near and dear to every Member 
of this Committee, child sexual exploitation investigations, 
and it's something that I hear about. I've have talked to law 
enforcement--
    Mr. Issa. Yeah.
    Mr. Wray. --in all 50 States, and I hear about it from 
chiefs and sheriffs in every State about this issue.
    So, it is top of mind. We are bringing technical tools, 
using the money that Congress appropriates to us to deal with 
it.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman--
    Mr. Wray. We are moving in a direction where we are going 
darker and darker. So, I appreciate very much your concern.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is well-expired.
    Ms. Jackson Lee?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you for your service, and the FBI agents across the 
Nation.
    Since 2019, the United States has experienced a steep rise 
in hate crimes. African Americans have been targeted in 48.5 
percent of all hate crimes, while hate incidents targeting 
Latinx have risen 8.7 percent, anti-Semitic hate incidents have 
risen by 14 percent, and anti-Asian hate incidents have risen 
by nearly 150 percent.
    Director Wray, my time is short. These questions should 
give just a brief response.
    Is the Bureau prioritizing its investigations into violent 
hate crimes?
    Mr. Wray. Yes, very much so. I could give you more 
information; it just depends on how much you would like here.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. You'll have an opportunity.
    What percentage of domestic terrorism cases investigated by 
the FBI would you now say are motivated by White-supremacist-
type ideology?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I'm not sure that I could give you a 
percentage. Certainly, on the domestic terrorism side, we have 
elevated--I did back in June, summer of 2019--racially 
motivated violent extremism to our very top threat priority 
band, consistent with ISIS. The biggest chunk of that, by far 
and away, the vast majority of that is racially motivated 
violent extremists advocating for the superiority--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. You would say that still today?
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Now, let's direct our attention to the beating of law 
enforcement in Washington on January 6.
    On January 6th, the domestic terrorists who beat law 
enforcement officers and breached the citadel of democracy of 
the United States wore insignias of White supremacist groups, 
waved Confederate flags, hung a noose on the lawn, and they 
were shouting racial epithets.
    As indicated, the NYPD sent a packet of raw intelligence 
concerning potential violence. Why did the FBI not issue a 
formal threat assessment, with all that information, including 
an assessment at headquarters?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I don't know about a formal threat 
assessment. As I was mentioning in response to an earlier 
question, we did put out quite a number, I think a dozen or so, 
intelligence products specifically geared towards domestic 
violent extremism and election-related domestic violent 
extremism--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. On that day? On January 6th?
    Mr. Wray. Over the course of '20, leading up to and right 
on up to and including December, the month--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I get that in writing, as to the 
details of how that progressed and whether there was a threat 
assessment on that day? I need to move on, and I thank you very 
much.
    You know that the Norfolk FBI office has indicated that an 
SIR report, Situational Information Report--these are the 
words: ``Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass 
breaking, doors being kicked in, and blood from their BLM''--
Black Lives Matter--``and Antifa slave soldiers being spilled. 
Get violent. Stop calling this a march or a rally or a protest. 
Get ready for war.''
    Would you agree that these words clearly could indicate 
racial bias and an attempt to use race and racism as a 
potential motive for violence?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I'm not sure I tracked all the words in the 
quote that you read, but, certainly, the Norfolk Situational 
Information Report, the information that was online was 
concerning enough that it was provided, as I said, within--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. It had ``Black Lives Matter,'' ``slave 
soldiers.'' That has some racial overtones.
    Mr. Wray. Absolutely. Of course.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me--as you well know, you've just 
heard me recount the Norfolk, the NYPD. Was the FBI aware of 
any online threats to the Vice President, the Speaker of the 
House, and specific Members of Congress connected with January 
6?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I can't think of any, sitting here right 
now. Certainly, we were aware of and discussed a lot of online 
chatter that was out there--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm going to move on. Thank you.
    Mr. Wray. --but I'm not aware of any--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. On the day of, did headquarters contact 
the Vice President, did they contact the Speaker of the House, 
and did they contact--FBI contact any Member of Congress on the 
day of January 6?
    Mr. Wray. Did any member of the FBI have any contact with 
any Member of the House?
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes. Headquarters I'm going to speak of, 
your office.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I know that there was interaction between--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I'm going to ask for that in writing as 
well.
    Mr. Wray. Okay.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes. I thank you.
    Let me go to the connection of race and the President of 
the United States, former President.
    On December 19th, the former President indicated, ``Big 
protest in DC on January 6. Be there. It will be wild.''
    At 12:15 p.m. on January 6, he said, ``You'll never take 
back our country with weakness.''
    At 1:10 p.m., President Trump said, ``We fight like hell, 
and if you don't fight like hell, you're not going to have a 
country anymore.''
    At 2:11 p.m., rioters breached police lines on the west 
side of the Capitol.
    Director Wray, these words do indicate that the former 
President, Donald Trump, helped motivate the domestic terrorist 
attack on January 6.
    Have any of these words been reviewed to determine whether 
or not President Trump--words and deeds--should be referred to 
the Department of Justice as contributing to the violence of 
the insurrectionists on January 6?
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired. The 
Witness may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure there's a whole lot I can add on 
that subject, but if there's something I can provide in follow-
up, I'm happy to--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I asked if you referred these actions or 
deeds of the President--you're the investigatory agency--to the 
Department of Justice. Donald Trump's actions, words, deeds on 
that day.
    Mr. Wray. I'm not aware of any investigation that 
specifically goes to that, but we have hundreds and hundreds 
and hundreds of investigations related to January 6 involving 
lots and lots of different pieces of it, and I want to be 
careful not to speak with absolutes about a massive 
investigation.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, maybe I can get that back in 
writing. I thank you.
    Mr. Chair, if I might just put on the record for a letter 
back, there are only 4.7 percent African Americans in the FBI. 
Much has come to my attention of the lack of promotion, 
opportunities for leadership in the FBI. The diversity office 
that you now have does not report directly to the FBI Director.
    Would you please provide me in writing where we are with 
diversity in the FBI as it relates to minorities and 
specifically African Americans?
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's--
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Gohmert?
    Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
    Director Wray, we know from the Arizona case the Supreme 
Court said that State and local law enforcement were not to 
enforce immigration laws. Isn't it true that local and State 
law enforcement officers can enforce State and local law even 
if the defendant is in the country illegally?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I want to be a little bit careful since the 
last time I looked at that issue was back in the 2001-2003 
range when I was a lawyer at the Justice Department. My 
recollection is very similar--
    Mr. Gohmert. Look, my time is very short.
    Mr. Wray. --my recollection is similar to yours.
    Mr. Gohmert. It's an easy question.
    Mr. Wray. My recollection is similar to yours, but I'm 
not--
    Mr. Gohmert. Yes.
    Mr. Wray. --speaking as a lawyer right now.
    Mr. Gohmert. Okay. It is the case. I hope you'll refresh 
your recollection and your legal training.
    So, it seems that, since the Federal government is 
welcoming, basically, by its tactics, by its handling of the 
massive surge across our border in such a way to continue to 
encourage it, that there is massive destruction to landowners' 
property. It sounds like, understanding the criminal trespass 
laws of Texas, that perhaps landowners on the border ought to 
have ``no trespassing'' signs, including in Spanish, so that 
local law enforcement can protect the country while they're 
protecting the local property owners.
    There was a question about, also, the FISA court. I'm 
still, as a former judge, particularly disturbed that no FISA 
judge felt strongly enough about people not lying in 
applications for warrants that they took action for contempt of 
court.
    Should DOJ officials that sign applications for warrants 
before the FISA court actually read them before they certify 
that they're true, and correct?
    Mr. Wray. Certainly, it's my practice when, as FBI 
Director, I'm signing applications to--
    Mr. Gohmert. You do read them?
    Mr. Wray. I do review them, yes, absolutely.
    Mr. Gohmert. I would commend you for that. I would ask you 
to look into--
    Mr. Wray. They're not short, by the way.
    Mr. Gohmert. Yeah. They're usually lengthy.
    Mr. Wray. Yeah.
    Mr. Gohmert. Would I commend your looking into Mr. 
Rosenstein's inability to testify that he actually read those, 
regarding the Trump campaign, before he signed them.
    The night before January 6, January 5th, that evening I was 
talking to Capitol Police officers, and I said, let's face it, 
most of the conservatives that come, they don't have any 
intention of being violent. They said, well, we've been briefed 
today that there's a good bit of, it's understood, online 
activity, that there are people that are going to be coming and 
hate Trump but they're going to dress up in red/MAGA/Trump 
paraphernalia to try to blend in and create trouble.
    We had Capitol Police Chief Sund testify that they got no 
information from U.S. intel or from the DOJ, FBI, of any threat 
of the nature that came about.
    Did the FBI have information about the violent threat that 
occurred on January 6 on January 5th?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the answer to that is complicated, 
unfortunately. So, we have already talked about a little bit 
here this morning--
    Mr. Gohmert. It shouldn't be complicated. You either had 
information or you didn't. That was my question.
    Mr. Wray. So, there's different kinds of information. We 
had the online chatter that we just talked about, and the 
Norfolk--so-called Norfolk SIR, situational information report, 
has that. What we did not have, to my knowledge--
    Mr. Gohmert. Did you pass any of that information on to 
Chief Sund?
    Mr. Wray. We passed the Norfolk information on to the 
Capitol Police in three different ways, as well as to--
    Mr. Gohmert. Okay. Well, you were careful to note that most 
of the protesters who were left this last summer were basically 
peaceful, but you haven't said that about the 100,000-200,000 
people that showed up on January 6th. Do you know how many 
people actually came into the Capitol on January 6th that were 
unauthorized?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have an exact number. I do know that 
we've--now are approaching around 500 arrests. To be clear, to 
your point about peaceful, the way, I think, is a fair 
description of January 6th is there's sort of three groups of 
people, almost like an inverse pyramid.
    First group, biggest number of people who showed up 
outside, maybe not on the Capitol grounds, were peaceful, maybe 
rowdy, but peaceful protesters. Then there's a second group 
that were people who, for whatever reason, engaged in, let's 
say, the next level of criminal conduct, trespass, et cetera, 
and that is criminal, that is a violation, and it needs--those 
laws need to be enforced.
    Then there's the third group, which is where you are seeing 
a lot of the arrests, and a lot of them were significant 
charges that are coming out of our work right now, which are 
the people who brought all sorts of weapons, Kevlar tactical 
vests, bear spray, et cetera.
    Mr. Gohmert. Firearms?
    Mr. Wray. What's that?
    Mr. Gohmert. Anybody bring firearms?
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's--
    Mr. Wray. We have--I can think of at least one instance 
where there was an individual with a gun inside the Capitol, 
but for the most part, the weapons were weapons other than 
firearms.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman--
    Mr. Wray. There's three groups, and it's hard to paint with 
one broad brush every single individual.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Cohen.
    Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Cohen is on mute.
    Chair Nadler. Mr. Cohen?
    Mr. Cohen. I am unmuted now.
    Chair Nadler. Okay.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, Director Wray. You've done an admirable job so 
far to put soldiers in the January 6th insurrection, kind of 
like going after Al Capone and getting all the lottery sales 
tickets, the people that do the bootlegging in the street.
    You, to the best of my knowledge, haven't done anything to 
go after the people who incited the riot, the big boss, which 
was Donald Trump. Do you have any investigation, or have you 
done anything to look into Trump's activity on the day of 
insurrection, subpoena records of the White House phone calls 
in and out, and of meetings that he and Roger Stone and others 
may have had with leaders of these groups?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, Congressman, somewhat along the 
lines of something I said earlier, because we have not one but 
now close to 500 pending criminal cases, all of which are in 
the hands of judges who feel very strongly about how much I 
discuss pending cases, I want to be careful about that. We have 
brought, in addition to what you are describing as kind of the 
lower-level type offenses, we have now started to bring a 
number of conspiracy charges of various individuals.
    Mr. Cohen. Yes, you are right.
    Mr. Wray. Yes, I think there's about 30-plus individuals 
who have been charged with conspiracy.
    Mr. Cohen. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Cohen. I appreciate that and understand that, but I am 
talking about Mr. Big, number one. Have you gone after the 
people who incited the riot?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I don't think it would be appropriate for 
me to be discussing whether or not we are or aren't 
investigating specific individuals. I just don't think that's 
appropriate.
    Mr. Cohen. Okay. I'll accept that and understand that, but 
I would urge you to do it. He said, come to Washington on the 
day of the electoral college, a month earlier, no other day, 
and he said it will be big and it will be wild. I read that as 
violence to occur. I was with a Capitol policeman on Sunday who 
said, yes, they had information who said it was going to be 
violent. You and the FBI did not make the case. You should have 
warned, and you had a duty to do that.
    Let me ask you this: Have you seen Mr. McGahn's testimony 
yet?
    Mr. Wray. No, sir.
    Mr. Cohen. I urge you to look--I don't know if you can do 
anything without the direction of the Attorney General, but it 
appears Mr. McGahn was told to lie by the President about 
trying--wanting to fire officials. That would have resulted in 
obstruction of justice. I urge you to look at it. Can you Act 
on that testimony independent of the Attorney General?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I think we have very specific rules about 
predication and approval on certain investigations, so I'd have 
to look at whatever information you wanted to send our way, and 
we can take a look at the information and evaluate whether or 
not there's action we could take.
    Mr. Cohen. It's in the deposition, and it's clear that 
McGahn said that the President told him to lie, and the 
President also lied. I would urge you to look at that and talk 
to Director Garland--Attorney General Garland about that.
    Did you infiltrate the crowds of the BLM, Black Lives 
Matter, protest in Washington, when they were in Washington?
    Mr. Wray. Congressman, we don't infiltrate protests as a 
general rule, certainly. When it comes to criminal activity, we 
have specific rules covered by the Attorney General guidelines 
and the so-called DIOG, which is our implementation of the 
Attorney General guidelines that cover what we can and cannot 
do, and we would have followed those scrupulously, not just in 
general, but in the specific period that you are talking about. 
We don't investigate First Amendment activity. We investigate 
threats of criminal activity.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Director Wray. I know First Amendment 
activity is protected, but was your activities on January 6th 
different from what it was with Black Lives Matter? Did you 
observe? Did you try to get more knowledge about what was going 
on after you had the Norfolk information about the January 6th 
insurrection?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the Norfolk information that we've talked 
about here arrived essentially the night before, or the 
afternoon before January 6th and was promptly passed on. At 
that point it was raw, unverified information that we hadn't 
yet had a chance to vet. Of course, we decided that even though 
it was raw and unverified, we needed to pass it onto all our 
partners, both in the command post and throughout the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force, to make sure they had it.
    Mr. Cohen. Director Wray, thank you. I only have a few 
seconds left. You have compared ransomware to 9/11. Ransomware 
is awful and it's a problem. 9/11 was awful. The insurrection 
on our Capitol, unlike anything known since the Civil War, is 
also awful. Where would you compare the insurrection, and would 
you admit that it was an insurrection on our Capitol with the 
assault on our country on January 6th?
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First, let me just say that 
I don't think any attack, ransomware, or January 6th, can 
fairly be compared to the horror of September 11th, and the 
3,000 or so individuals who lost their lives that day. That 
attack and my engagement with the victims in my last time in 
government was a big part of why I came back into this role in 
the first place. My reference to September 11th and ransomware 
was not about the attack, but about how the country came 
together in response.
    Now, certainly, when it comes to January 6th, it's a unique 
type of attack, not just in terms of the number of individuals, 
but in terms of the effort to disrupt a key part of our 
constitutional system, and the peaceful transition of 
government, which is such a hallmark of our country.
    So, it's a very significant attack in and of its own right, 
and certainly we have, as we've already talked about, close to 
500 arrests. We have all of our field offices fully engaged, 
and the amount of manpower devoted to it is extremely 
significant for one attack, absolutely.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman--
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
    Director Wray, since you last testified before this 
Committee our country has faced increased threats, be it 
malware and ransomware to our computer networks; gang Members 
crossing our southern border and committing horrific crimes 
here within the United States; groups like antifa attempting to 
burn down Federal courthouses; the January 6th attack, as we 
mentioned, on the Capitol; and the surge of illicit drugs 
killing so many Americans. We are facing multiple national 
security threats, all of which need the full attention of 
agencies like the one that you oversee, the FBI.
    I'll first ask you about cyber-attacks. Ransomware 
terrorists have brazenly disrupted the operations of countless 
hospitals, schools, city governments, emergency services, even 
our congressional offices, and an untold number of businesses 
because they typically pay the ransom quietly.
    Last fall, cyber criminals were able to compromise patient 
records and personal information from a hospital in a senior 
living community in my district. More recently, high-profile 
ransomware attacks on Colonial Pipeline and JBS meat processing 
company caused major disruptions to our oil and food supplies.
    I've seen it estimated that there is a victim of a 
ransomware attack every 11 seconds, that they're already 
costing us $20 billion a year, and that you've compared the 
challenge, as Mr. Cohen mentioned, to the September 11th, 2001 
attack on our Nation.
    Mr. Director, the Biden Administration basically--I 
mentioned the attack on the Colonial Pipeline--basically gave a 
wink and a nod to paying off the thugs. I know some of that 
money was gotten back, but don't we need to clarify the policy 
relative to paying off criminals? Aren't we just inviting more 
attacks when you pay off these thugs?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I appreciate the question, and 
I share your concern about--and that's partly why I've made 
some of the comments that I've made publicly--about the effect 
of ransomware and the threat that it poses and the challenge 
and what it requires from all of us to deal with it.
    It is our policy, it is our guidance from the FBI that 
companies should not pay the ransom for a number of reasons: 
First, the one that you mentioned, which is that it encourages 
more of this kind of activity; but then there's, second, some 
more practical issues, which sometimes the encryption or the 
locking up of the system that the actors engage in may not be 
undone. You could pay the ransom and not get your system back, 
and that's not unknown to happen. Third, and the most important 
thing is, whether the company pays or not, what we really need 
is to make sure that the companies or other organizations who 
are victimized reach out and coordinate with the FBI and with 
our partners as quickly and promptly as possible.
    It's when they do that, it enables us to take all sorts of 
creative action that we can't always do, but that certain cases 
we can, and speed matters, which is why, for example, in the 
Colonial instance we were able to essentially seize and 
confiscate the clear majority of the ransom that was extracted.
    In other cases, again, not common but it does happen, we 
are able to actually get the encryption keys and unlock the 
system, even without the company paying the ransom. So, there 
are a whole bunch of things that we can do to prevent this 
activity from occurring if, whether they pay the ransom or not, 
they communicate and coordinate and work closely with law 
enforcement right out of the gate. That is the most important 
part.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Director. I've got two more 
questions, and I only have time for one. The Centers for 
Disease Control announced that there's been an increase in 
overdose deaths. The prevalence of fentanyl is the main thing. 
It comes from China. It comes across our southern border. 
Myself, I and Bob Latta, I have introduced legislation relative 
to fentanyl analogs, which are very similar. It can be changed. 
They get around the law with that.
    My question to you is relative to the fentanyl and the 
analogs as well. The chaos at our southern border, doesn't this 
play right into the drug cartels or the current policies down 
there on the southern border? Isn't it more of that drug coming 
in and killing far too many Americans? Don't we really need to 
control that southern border?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I absolutely agree that the security 
situation at the southwest border is a great concern, both from 
a perspective of drug trafficking, human trafficking, violence 
on both sides of the border, corruption, et cetera. Certainly, 
we are trying to do our part to contribute to that, because, as 
you mentioned, the scourge of opioids, opioid abuse, fentanyl, 
in particular, is something that is sweeping the country. I 
know that in your home State that's a particularly significant 
concern.
    We, from our end, are trying to attack the problem through 
a variety of means. We are going after not just the 
professionals, the prescribers from that end of it; we are 
going after the dark web where it's trafficked there. We are 
going after the gangs that distribute it here locally. We are 
going after the source through our transnational organized 
crime efforts.
    So, there's a whole bunch of things that we are doing with 
our partners. Make no mistake, this goes way beyond law 
enforcement into other agencies, and frankly, the community as 
well.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time is expired.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, I want to thank you for appearing before us 
today and also for your service to the Nation. As I was 
preparing for this hearing, I researched hate crimes data for 
my State of Georgia, and I was troubled by the data that I 
found or, more precisely, what I didn't find.
    We clearly have a deeply flawed system for collecting hate 
crimes data, which has left us with unreliable and incomplete 
counts. The hesitation to report, investigate, and designate 
incidents as hate crimes demonstrates a deep-rooted failure of 
our justice system.
    One thing is clear, since the start of the pandemic, we've 
seen a significant rise in anti-Asian and anti-Chinese 
rhetoric. In March of this year, eight people were tragically 
murdered in a mass shooting in Atlanta, and six of those 
individuals murdered were women of Asian descent. At a press 
conference the next day, a police official famously told those 
assembled that the shooter had, quote, ``had a bad day,'' end 
quote.
    Director Wray, 2 days after the murders, you said in an 
interview with NPR, quote, ``While the motive remains still 
under investigation at the moment. It does not appear that the 
motive was racially motivated,'' end quote. Many people 
believe, Director Wray, that law enforcement reluctance to 
designate a homicide as a hate crime does a disservice to the 
victims and fails to prevent similar future crimes.
    Certainly, comments such as yours during an ongoing 
investigation do not help the cause. Wasn't it inappropriate 
for you, sir, to infer to the press that you didn't believe 
that the murders of the six Asian women was a hate crime when, 
as you said, the motive was still under investigation?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, as you know, Congressman, 
because that's my home city as well, my heart aches for the 
victims of that attack, and I grieve with their families. In 
the instance in question, I think the comment I made was 
consistent with the information we had at the time, but I 
regret if anyone's reaction to that was otherwise.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Well, I submit to you, sir, that 
such comments by the Director of the FBI were not only harmful 
to the ongoing investigation, but also diminished the already 
waning community confidence in law enforcement.
    I want to shift now to another issue. Under current law, 
only those convicted of domestic terrorism-related felonies, or 
hate crimes, are prohibited from possessing firearms, but those 
convicted of misdemeanors that have a nexus to domestic 
terrorism or misdemeanor hate crimes may possess firearms 
without restriction.
    Would you agree that Congress should consider expanding the 
prohibition on the possession of firearms to those convicted of 
violent misdemeanors that are related to domestic terrorism and 
are violent hate crimes?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I don't think it's--I am in a position, as 
FBI Director, to comment on specific legislative proposals, but 
I am happy to provide operational input to you, or have the FBI 
do so with your staff. Certainly, I share the goal of making 
sure that those who are prohibited by law from possessing 
firearms don't get their hands on the firearms.
    Certainly, to the extent that there are things that can be 
done to protect the public, we want to do that. That's why our 
NICS section up in West Virginia processed--and last year 
processed, a record, almost 40 million background checks of 
firearms right through the middle of the pandemic.
    So, we are trying to do our part to make sure that the laws 
on the books related to firearms are enforced and that those 
who are not supposed to have firearms don't get them. 
Individual States have individual laws--
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Okay. Let me stop you there. I've 
got one more issue I want to talk about. When you were here 
last year, you mentioned the creation of the domestic terrorism 
hate crimes fusion cell. Can you provide us with some insight 
into how the fusion cell operates, and to be clear, is it just 
one cell or are there multiple cells?
    Mr. Wray. I appreciate the question very much. So, this is 
something that I stood up about a 1\1/2\ years or so ago, 
bringing together the domestic terrorism expertise that we have 
together with the hate crimes expertise which we have, which is 
more in the civil rights program. Together, the goal was to try 
to be more proactive and to try to do a better job of 
anticipating and preventing hate crimes.
    So, for example, we are very proud of the success that that 
cell helped create in Colorado, where we were able to prevent 
an attack, a hate crime against a synagogue--I've forgotten the 
city in Colorado, but that was a big part of what came out of 
that fusion cell. The fusion cell is one cell in headquarters, 
but it works with all out of our field offices and helps 
coordinate that effort. Again, the whole goal is to try to be 
ahead of the threat. That's the point of it.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Gaetz.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chair. There has been a coverup 
regarding the origins of coronavirus. We see it in the Fauci 
emails. We see it in the G7's call today to renew an inquiry 
into those origins. We see it in the Biden Administration's 
efforts to squelch investigation into the origins of the 
coronavirus. I want to figure out what side the FBI is on.
    On April 28th, Dr. Li-Meng Yan landed at LAX. One of your 
agents interviewed her at that time. She then traveled to New 
York. Your agent from Los Angeles followed her to New York and 
sought an interview on both the 1st of May and the 2nd of May 
in 2020.
    The FBI took Dr. Li-Meng Yan's phone, on which the doctor 
showed evidence of WeChat communications between herself and 
the director of the CDC in Beijing all the way dating back to 
December of 2019 regarding the Chinese military's involvement 
in the development of the virus and specific links to the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology.
    Director Wray, when did you become aware of your agency's 
interface with Dr. Yan? When did you review those WeChat 
messages?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure that there's much I can say about 
any specific investigation. I will say that--a couple things. 
One, as I think you know and the Committee knows, I have been 
very vocal and I intend to continue to be very vocal about the 
counterintelligence threat, which takes a wide variety of 
forms, from the People's Republic of China and the Chinese 
Communist Party. I think it's one of the most significant 
threats facing this country--
    Mr. Gaetz. Is Dr. Yan part of that threat?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, I don't want to speak specifically 
about any particular investigation. The second thing I would 
mention is that--
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, here's why that's important on the first 
thing, Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Yeah.
    Mr. Gaetz. Back in October, or April and May of 2020, we 
didn't have nearly 600,000 people dead as a result of the 
coronavirus. On October 14th, 2020, FBI agent Andrew Zinman 
brought a scientist who was working with the FBI to meet with 
Dr. Yan in New York on October 14th. They met for nearly six 
hours.
    Can you tell us anything about that meeting and what it 
tells us about the origins of this virus? It is simply 
unacceptable to sit here a year later and say you are not going 
to tell us whether or not there was information about the 
origins of the virus when it is so central to the safety and 
health of our fellow Americans.
    Mr. Wray. I certainly understand the point of the question. 
Again, I have to be careful not to discuss specific 
investigations. I will say that, in addition to our 
investigative work, as I think has been recently publicly 
stated by the DNI, and even the President himself, the 
intelligence community has been looking at this issue. There 
are differences of view within the intelligence community about 
the origins of the coronavirus and so forth--
    Mr. Gaetz. I totally understand all that. I am trying to 
resolve those differences--
    Mr. Wray. --and we are taking a deeper dive on that 
subject.
    Mr. Gaetz. Director Wray, we are unable to hold the Chinese 
Communist Party accountable if we throw our hands in the air 
and say, Well, there's differences of opinion. We have to 
assess whether those differences are similarly rooted in fact. 
That's why I need the facts from you.
    Will you provide to this Committee any scientific analysis 
that the FBI has done regarding Dr. Yan's claims, regarding the 
messages she provided to you regarding Beijing's knowledge of 
the origins of this virus, their military's involvement, and 
even efforts to try to present to the world a fake genome 
sequence at the beginning of these developments?
    Mr. Wray. I am happy to see what information we can 
provide. I will have my staff follow up with yours and see what 
information we can share on the subject.
    Mr. Gaetz. You get that if we don't look at that rooted 
information, we are unable to ascertain what differences of 
opinion are correct and incorrect. It's hard to believe that 
the FBI didn't believe Dr. Yan was credible or significant, 
because she lands on April 28th. Your agent, Dana Murphy, takes 
her phone that day. I am holding the receipt from where you got 
the phone that had the WeChat messages that had very important 
information regarding Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party.
    It's not every day that an FBI agent flies from Los Angeles 
to New York to follow a Chinese doctor who is a whistleblower 
and a fact witness. Even if Dr. Yan's technical analysis of the 
virus is incorrect, the fact that she showed up saying that she 
wanted to provide information and tell the truth seems 
significant today.
    Now, back when Dr. Yan made these pronouncements regarding 
the Chinese Communist Party, their military involvement, the 
leak of this virus from the lab, we had a number of people 
trying to discredit her. Are you able to ascertain whether or 
not that effort to discredit Dr. Yan is part of the 
counterintelligence efforts by the Chinese Communist Party?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I want to be careful both about what 
information we can provide, in general, about any kind of 
ongoing investigation, but, about what form that information 
would take, because in some cases, you may be touching on 
things that would be classified and that might require a 
different format.
    So, I certainly understand why you are asking the 
questions. Let me commit to you that I will go back with my 
folks and see what information can be provided and what form it 
would have to take if we can provide any.
    Mr. Gaetz. That would be very helpful.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Deutch.
    Mr. Gaetz. Mr. Chair, may I be recognized? Wait, hold on, 
Mr. Chair. You let everybody else go over. I am asking to be 
recognized just for a unanimous consent request.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Deutch.
    Mr. Gaetz. You are not treating everyone equally, Mr. 
Chair. You went over by more than--
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Gaetz. Mr. Johnson went over by 45 seconds. I just want 
a unanimous consent request.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Deutch. 
What?
    Mr. Gaetz. I just want a unanimous consent request.
    Chair Nadler. You want a unanimous consent for what? Oh, 
oh, oh, okay. I am sorry.
    Mr. Gaetz. Just a UC is all.
    Chair Nadler. Go ahead. Go ahead. Go ahead.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I seek unanimous consent 
to enter into the record the receipt from the United States 
Department of Justice wherein Dr. Yan's phone was taken by FBI 
Agent Dana Murphy.
    Chair Nadler. Without objection. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

?

      

                        MR. GAETZ FOR THE RECORD

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    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Deutch.
    Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, first, I want to thank you and all the men 
and women of the FBI for what you do every day to keep us safe. 
I also want to extend my condolences, my sympathy to the 
families of Special Agent Alfin and Special Agent 
Schwartzenberger who were shot and killed while serving a 
warrant in Sunrise, Florida, just south of my district.
    I also, Director Wray, would like to just follow up on some 
of the things that you've touched on today. First, you said 
just a little while ago that 9/11 was why you returned to 
public service, and I just wanted just to follow up on that.
    The 9/11 community, as you know, Director Wray, has asked 
the FBI to conduct a full and complete declassification review 
of all documents related to the September 11th attacks. It has 
been nearly 20 years since that horrific day, and these 
families, the American people deserve this. So, I would just 
ask whether you will commit to conducting a full and complete 
declassification review?
    Mr. Wray. We are working very hard on trying to declassify 
as much information as we can, and to share as much information 
as we can. I understand why this is frustrating to any number 
of families, and we will commit to continuing to try to provide 
as much information as we responsibly can.
    Mr. Deutch. I would urge you to pursue the full 
declassification review.
    I want to just follow up on your responses, both to Chair 
Nadler and to Mr. Cohen about the Norfolk memo. You said that, 
``we tried to make sure the information got to the right 
people.'' You said you tried three ways. You emailed it to 
Capitol Police. You did a verbal briefing in command post, 
including Capitol Police, and that you used the law enforcement 
portal that all law enforcement partners have access to.
    You then went on to tell Mr. Cohen that the information 
that arrived essentially, I think you said, the night or 
afternoon before January 6th, that it was properly passed on, 
but it was raw, unverified. We decided that even though it was 
raw and unverified, we needed to pass it on to all of our 
partners, which you did.
    You didn't explain--and I would ask you to explain--what 
happened next. You passed it on, and what did you do to follow 
up with this really important information about what may take 
place the next day in the United States Capitol?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am not sure that there's specific 
investigative activity that I could discuss. I think the point 
in passing this information on, we didn't know what to make of 
it, and that's why I emphasized that it was raw, unverified 
information without a specific identity attached to it.
    The judgment was made, which is not the way we prefer to 
have to do things, but given the framing of the information, we 
decided, out of an abundance of caution, to pass it onto--and 
sometimes when there's a reference to the email, it's important 
to understand we are talking about their chosen representatives 
on the Joint Terrorism Task Force--the whole purpose of which 
is to keep people in the loop.
    Mr. Deutch. Right.
    Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Deutch. No, I understand, and I understand that's their 
purpose. You had a memo that said the report that detailed 
online posts said that individuals in Washington were ready for 
war at the Capitol, called for potential--it talked about 
potential for violence in Washington, DC, in connection with 
plans to stop the scaled protest on January 6th. That's what 
was in the memo.
    I know you passed it on. What did you do once you passed it 
on? I am asking the question because we don't know what the 
answer is. We know that this was out there. We don't know 
whether you did anything other than pass it on through these 
channels, and it was damning enough information, certainly it 
seems in retrospect, that though law, you would have been 
followed up to make sure that every step was followed once you 
passed on the information. So, what happened after you passed 
it on?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I guess, the way we look at it is we passed 
it on not one, not two, but three different ways in order to 
make sure that it got through to the people who needed to have 
that information to exercise their responsibilities to engage 
in the physical security, which is not what we do.
    Mr. Deutch. Well, I--
    Mr. Wray. I may be missing the point of your question.
    Mr. Deutch. I think so. Director Wray, respectfully, I 
think you are. When you say it's not your responsibility to 
ensure physical security, you had this memo that foretold, or 
at least suggested what might happen.
    I am going to finish with this, Director Wray: The reason 
this is so upsetting to me, in particular, is because it just 
reminds me too much of the two tips that the FBI got before the 
mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, one, to 
someone in Mississippi who saw a troubling YouTube comment, the 
other after receiving a 13-minute long voicemail with troubling 
details about this shooter. That was closed as having said 
there's no lead value.
    I understand you thought that there were--this was worth 
passing on, but it seems like there should have been more than 
simply saying it was the night before, it came in late, we just 
passed it on through our channels. That's all we really have 
the responsibility to do.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman--
    Mr. Deutch. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, you articulated in your opening statement 
that perhaps the top concern in our country right now is the 
prevalence of violence and violent crime in our communities, 
and I think we all agree with that.
    One of the other serious concerns we have is the decreasing 
amount of faith that many Americans have in our institutions, 
and among the most important of our institutions in America, of 
course, is our system of justice. Over the past few years, 
millions of Americans have begun to question whether we can 
still rely upon the maxim of equal justice under law and 
whether justice is blind and all the rest.
    One of the reasons for this is the very real perception 
that some individuals within the DOJ and FBI have abused their 
authority and engaged in selective enforcement of certain 
statutes. One example that comes to mind is the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act.
    So, I wanted to ask you if you are aware that during 
Special Counsel Mueller's probe, there were at least five 
indictments of conservatives under FARA, and if you know how 
that compares to the prevalence of previous FARA prosecutions 
since the enactment of that statute more than 80 years ago?
    Mr. Wray. I am probably not the right person to provide a 
whole lot of information about Special Counsel Mueller's 
investigation. I'd rather--that's probably better referred to 
what's left of that office, I suppose.
    Certainly, FARA that you are referring to, is an extremely 
important tool that we in the FBI have been pushing for a while 
to be using more aggressively, in particular against the 
Chinese threat, because so much of it is reflected through 
people engaged in activity that we think could appropriately be 
pursued under FARA. So, exactly how it compares, I am not sure 
I have that information.
    Mr. Johnson of Louisiana. Well, here's the point. We agree 
with that, and I think we need to be aggressive against the CCP 
for sure. We are all on the same page there. According to 
reports, there were as many FARA prosecutions during the 
previous 40 years as there were during the 18 months of the 
Mueller probe.
    George Papadopoulos, for example, stated that he was given 
the choice to either, quote, ``accept the charge that I lied or 
face FARA charges. That while FARA has been widely ignored for 
years, the Special Counsel's Office has dusted the statute off 
as a prime weapon to get Members of the Trump circle to talk, 
right,'' unquote.
    The FBI and the Justice Department used FARA throughout 
their investigation into Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, but 
nothing ever came from those charges. The Justice Department 
stated in its motion to dismiss the case that the FBI's closing 
communication, quote, ``made clear that the FBI had found no 
basis to predicate further investigative efforts into whether 
Mr. Flynn was being directed and controlled by a foreign 
power''--Russia, in that case--``in a manner that threatened 
U.S. national security or violated FARA or its related 
statutes,'' unquote.
    So, the question is, it seems to a lot of Americans that 
alleged FARA violations were used as either a pretext to 
investigate those with ties to President Trump or that FARA 
charges were used to pressure those conservatives in a bid to 
find a connection between the Trump campaign and Russia. So, 
regardless of the details of the Mueller probe, I get that you 
are not the expert on that. The question is, how could anyone 
see this otherwise? Doesn't it look like that was selective 
enforcement?
    Mr. Wray. I certainly understand the purpose of the 
question, the point of the question. I am not sure that I can 
really speak to what people would perceive. What I can say is 
that, again, separate from the special counsel's investigation, 
which is really, respectfully, probably not my place to comment 
on, I do think that more aggressive use of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act is something that former Attorney General Barr 
and I, for example, discussed quite a bit in trying to use it 
more aggressively than it had been used in the past, partly for 
the reason we've already talked about.
    Mr. Johnson of Louisiana. On June 3rd of this year, 
Politico reported that the Justice Department is now 
investigating a Democrat lobbying firm for failing to comply 
with FARA in its representation of Burisma Holdings while 
Hunter Biden served on its board. Up until about a week ago, 
when this news was first reported, there was a very real 
perception that enhanced enforcement is being used only against 
Republicans and conservatives.
    So, the question is, can you confirm the FBI's commitment 
to fervently pursue these violations, as you said, more 
aggressively, but to do it regardless of the political party 
affiliations of the subject of the investigation?
    Mr. Wray. I think political party affiliations should have 
zero place in our decision to enforce the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act or any other statute. You can be sure that as 
long as I have anything to say about it, we are going to 
enforce it in an even-handed way without respect to anybody's 
political affiliation.
    Mr. Johnson of Louisiana. I've got 19 seconds left. I'll 
just say, that even-hand and this perception that we are 
talking about is increasingly important in our republic, 
because if they don't have faith in the system of justice, if 
they think that Lady Justice is a symbol--has the blindfold up 
and she's peering beneath it, then we lose an important element 
that holds the republic together.
    I am out of time. I yield back. Thanks for your time.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Bass.
    Ms. Bass. First, thank you very much for your service, 
Director Wray. I also want to thank you for finally abandoning 
the category of Black identity extremist likely motivated to 
target law enforcement. My understanding now is that there is a 
new category, racially or ethnically motivated violent 
extremists, and I am actually concerned about this as well.
    I am concerned about it because of the FBI's long history 
of collapsing Black activism in the fight for civil rights and 
especially against police abuse with terrorism. So, even in 
this document, several Black individuals and one organization 
is included along with well-known White supremacist domestic 
organizations--domestic terrorist organizations.
    The FBI says, from 2015-2019, approximately 846 individuals 
were arrested for domestic terrorism, and I wanted to know, how 
many of these were African American?
    Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, I appreciate your comments about 
the changes we made in response to some of the conversations 
we'd had early in my tenure on the so-called BIE issue. The 
particular document you are reading from, I am not sure, 
sitting here right now, that I am certain which document you 
are referring to, so maybe the best thing to do there would be 
for us to have my staff follow up with yours--
    Ms. Bass. No problem.
    Mr. Wray. --to be sure and be sure that I am answering--
yeah.
    Ms. Bass. I'm going to ask you several other questions. Do 
you know of any Black domestic terrorist organization? Could 
you tell me their names and what attacks that they have landed? 
I wanted to know if you've considered, or if the movement for 
Black Lives or Black Lives Matter is considered a racially 
motivated violent extremist organization?
    Mr. Wray. So, I appreciate the question, because this is 
something that I think is important for me to be able to 
clarify, really, across the spectrum. So, the first point 
that's really important here is that we don't designate 
domestic terrorist organizations, period.
    Unlike on the foreign terrorist enforcement side where 
there's a specific statutory scheme for designating terrorist 
organizations, there is no such scheme for domestic terrorism. 
Whether it's on the--in the end that you are talking about, or 
any other end. Having said this--
    Ms. Bass. You don't consider any organizations as domestic 
terrorist?
    Mr. Wray. But, could I--sorry.
    I couldn't hear. You flickered out there.
    Ms. Bass. You just said you don't consider--you don't 
designate organizations as domestic terrorist organizations?
    Mr. Wray. That's correct. What we do is investigate 
individuals with proper predication. In some instances, those 
individuals will conspire or engage in criminal conduct with 
each other, and in some cases, we will open a conspiracy 
investigation, or a so-called enterprise investigation.
    Ms. Bass. Do you have indications of Black individuals are 
activists that are involved in the movement around police abuse 
and civil rights in those categories? The reason why I am 
asking that is because there's a number of Black Lives Matter 
individuals, leaders who have been visited by the FBI in their 
homes who have been asked about the plans for various protests, 
et cetera.
    Some of those individuals might not be aware that if they 
misrepresent certain facts to the FBI that they could, in fact, 
be committing a crime. So, I wanted to ask you specifically 
about your surveillance of these organizations, and it's my 
understanding that there were a couple of protests where the 
FBI did use surveillance and used surveillance aircraft, 
actually, with organizations that were protesting in 
Washington, DC, and Baltimore.
    Mr. Wray. So, we are talking about a few different things 
here. So, the first thing is, we do investigate individuals for 
criminal activity and violence that occurs in the middle of 
protests, regardless of what the basis of their protest is. I 
really can't speak to specific cases because I would need to 
know the facts, and I would also need to make sure that I 
wasn't talking about an ongoing investigation.
    We do not investigate First Amendment groups. We don't 
investigate people for speech, for association, for assembly, 
for membership in domestic First Amendment groups. We have had 
a few cases that I can think of off the top of my head in the 
last two years, involving individuals who committed domestic--
what we would consider domestic terror attacks, justifying 
their attacks--lethal attacks, I should add, justifying their 
attacks based on their interpretation of the so-called Black 
Hebrew Israelite faith. So, that is probably the best example 
that I could give you, but that's about the only thing that 
comes to mind as we are sitting here talking right now.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time is expired.
    Mr. Buck.
    Mr. Buck. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for your service to our country. 
I want to personally thank you for the great work of the FBI in 
the case that you mentioned earlier, the synagogue in Colorado.
    Director Wray, I think it's important that the world knows 
that the people on this Committee, certainly, I condemn White 
nationalism, White supremacy, Nazis, and I don't think anybody 
accepts the fact. Many of our relatives, my father fought in 
World War II to rid this planet from the scourge of Nazi 
Germany, and Nazis generally, and it's upsetting to see any 
form of Nazi philosophy come back in this country or anywhere 
else.
    There is--in the Chair's opening statement and in some 
other comments, there seems to be this link between White 
nationalists, White supremacists, Nazis, and hate crimes, as if 
only White supremacists commit hate crimes. I have seen a 
number of videos online recently, and it appears to me that 
hate crimes are much broader than that. I want to get into some 
other questions, but if you could just let me know, is it true 
that the only hate crimes committed in this country are 
committed by White nationalists?
    Mr. Wray. No, certainly, we've seen hate crimes committed 
by a variety of individuals.
    Mr. Buck. Okay. One of the concerns I have, and I agree 
with my friend, Mr. Johnson from Louisiana's comments about the 
perception among--in the public about the evenhandedness of law 
enforcement. I was in law enforcement for 25 years. I feel very 
strongly about the public perception of law enforcement.
    I think that one of the challenges that we face, we have 
two very high-profile:

    (1) LA one-day riot, and
    (2) La series of riots last summer.

    It appears to the public that those activities have been 
treated differently by the FBI and by law enforcement. 
Oftentimes, I think the riots involving antifa and other groups 
over the summer, in Portland and cities across the United 
States, were handled by local law enforcement, and not 
necessarily by the FBI.
    Because there appears to be a concerted and coordinated 
effort, it seems to me that the FBI would have a role in 
investigating those activities. I just want to give you the 
opportunity to talk about the fact that you have 500--as you 
mentioned today--prosecutions of the January 6th events at the 
United States Capitol, and, yet, we don't see the leadership of 
antifa or the money behind--there were news reports, for 
example, that the day after Kenosha, there were rioters there 
from Portland, from other cities that converged at that 
location.
    It appears that those are coordinated efforts, and it 
involves, I don't know how you'd put it any other way, but 
organized crime. Could you please comment and tell the American 
people how serious the FBI takes those types of domestic terror 
activities and the fact that there really is no distinction, or 
there is a distinction between the FBI's efforts in one area 
and the other?
    Mr. Wray. So, first, to be clear, the FBI has one standard 
for both, which is based on the law, based on the evidence 
available, based on our effort to protect the American people 
and uphold the Constitution.
    I can certainly understand though--I can certainly 
understand why people might formulate an impression, and part 
of that has to do with the fact that in a lot of the hundreds--
hundreds of investigations we've been conducting related to 
activity over the course of the summer, in some cases, the most 
readily provable offense is a State or local charge rather than 
the availability of a ready-made Federal charge.
    To some extent, what you are seeing related to January 6th 
is that because a lot of the activity was engaged in fairly 
straightforwardly implicates Federal crimes, namely breaching 
Federal property, going inside the Capitol, interfering with 
Congress, et cetera. It's easier to bring Federal charges in 
that attack than it was over the summer.
    So, a lot of those State and local prosecutions that you 
are referring to from over the summer have had our joint 
terrorism task forces--
    Mr. Buck. I don't mean to interrupt you, Mr. Wray--
    Mr. Wray. --working closely with our State and local 
partners--
    Mr. Buck. --but I just want to mention, there were attacks 
on Federal facilities and cities across the United States.
    Mr. Wray. Yes. So, that's the other piece of it, right. We 
have lots of investigations, lots of Federal investigations. 
Like I mentioned I think in my opening remarks, essentially, 
all our 56 field offices have been investigating activity 
there, and we are looking for things that are, of course, 
harder to drill into, but we are looking for things like 
funding, like logistics, like coordination.
    So, a lot of this gets down to the questions of how readily 
available is the evidence? How clear is the Federal 
jurisdiction? When we have charges that we can bring Federally, 
we are all in. We are all in. Some of these are offenses over 
the summer where people have brought--thrown Molotov cocktails. 
In some cases, we were able to bring Federal charges related to 
that.
    In some cases, there's an assault on a Federal law officer, 
and we are able to bring assault on Federal officer charges. 
So, we are looking for those types of offenses, but we are also 
looking at the more systematic type of issue, again, funding, 
logistics, coordination, all that stuff.
    A lot of this boils down to the less glamorous spadework 
that you would recognize from the investigative activities. 
Sometimes the evidence is readily available; sometimes it's 
harder to get at. We are absolutely--we have one standard. I 
don't care whether you are upset at our criminal justice 
system, or upset at our election system, violence, assault on 
Federal law enforcement, obstruction of property is not the way 
to do it. That's our position. One standard.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. 
Jeffries.
    Mr. Jeffries. I thank you, Chair Nadler.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for your presence and your 
service to this country. The dramatic rise in anti-Semitic and 
anti-Asian violence throughout this country is unacceptable, 
unconscionable, and un-American. So, let me begin, Director 
Wray, by just urging you and the FBI to dedicate all necessary 
resources to deal with and address this scourge.
    Director Wray, violent White supremacy is the most 
persistent and lethal threat to the American homeland, correct?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the way we look at it, we've categorized 
it--I think we are saying the same thing, but just to be clear, 
we have elevated racially motivated violent extremism, the vast 
majority which is motivated by advocacy on behalf of White 
superiority, at our highest threat priority level. That's 
commensurate with ISIS.
    It is certainly true that over the last few years, the most 
lethal attacks here in the homeland have been by individuals of 
that racially motivated violent extremist category, 
specifically those advocating for the superiority of the White 
race.
    Mr. Jeffries. Right, otherwise known as White supremacists. 
So, the largest group, just to clarify, of racially motivated 
violent extremists are White supremacist organizations. Is that 
right?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I wouldn't say organizations, but 
individuals, the largest portion of domestic terrorist 
investigations that we have and arrests or investigations of 
the racially motivated
    Mr. Jeffries. Yeah. Well, let me ask you about--oh, thank 
you. Let me ask you about organizations. The Oath Keepers are a 
White supremacist organization, true?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure that I can characterize their 
ideology. I would say that we have charged a number of 
individuals related to specific terrorist activity, or violent 
activity, maybe is a better way of putting it, who self-
identify with the Oath Keepers. I think some of those 
individuals are ones that we would put in this racially 
motivated violent extremist category.
    We also have a number of such investigations of individuals 
who self-identify with the Proud Boys in a similar vein. Again, 
in each of those instances, we are not charging them for their 
membership in Oath Keepers or Proud Boys.
    Mr. Jeffries. Understood.
    Mr. Wray. We are charging them based on their violent 
criminal activity.
    Mr. Jeffries. Understood. The FBI respects the First 
Amendment; so, do we in Congress, and we can agree on that.
    You anticipated my next question. The Oath Keepers clearly 
are a White supremacist organization. That's my observation, 
not yours, but happy to have you join me in that 
characterization. Would you say that the neo-Nazis are a White 
supremacist organization?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I certainly--when I use the term ``neo-
Nazis,'' I think of them as people who are advocating for White 
supremacy. That's at least the way I think of that term.
    Mr. Jeffries. Okay. I am wondering, why is the FBI 
generally reluctant to use the term ``violent White 
supremacy''?
    Mr. Wray. I think we use the term ``racially motivated 
violent extremism'' partly because we are trying to make clear 
to our people and everyone who's involved that our focus--that 
doesn't mean everybody else's focus, but our focus is on the 
violence.
    So, part of the reason we changed some of our nomenclature 
was to make especially sure that what's important to us--it 
gets back to this idea that we have one standard. It doesn't 
matter what your motivation is or how abhorrent or despicable 
your motivation is; what we have to be focused on is the 
violence.
    Mr. Jeffries. I understand that. The violence is largely 
being driven by White supremacy as an ideology. If you don't 
name the problem and claim the problem, it seems to me that 
it's hard to tame the problem. That's why I am raising this 
particular issue.
    In terms of domestic terrorism, I think you've testified in 
the past that this is a growing problem that we've experienced 
in America, correct?
    Mr. Wray. Domestic terrorism? Absolutely.
    Mr. Jeffries. That's correct.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Jeffries. I would argue that it's actually a problem 
that has been with us for centuries. We know that the KKK was 
founded in 1865. That's a terrorist organization. We know that 
the lynchings that took place in the 1800s and the 1900s were 
acts of domestic terror. The murder, the brutal killing of 
Emmett Till in 1955, that was an Act of domestic terror. The 
bombings of the 16th Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, 
Alabama, which took place in 1963, that was an Act of domestic 
terror killing four beautiful, Black, little girls.
    This most recent January 6th instance, the attack on the 
Capitol that resulted in death and mayhem, was an Act of 
domestic terror. The through line through all those instances 
is White supremacy. I hope that the FBI will use all its 
resources to tackle this persistent problem. I yield back.
    Ms. Scanlon. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes Ms. Spartz 
for five minutes.
    Ms. Spartz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Director Wray. I just wanted to follow up on 
some questions that my colleagues from California brought up 
related to the FISC opinion, and the use of section 702. 
Interestingly, I also had a letter with my colleague from 
Congressman Ted Lieu from California, there is some common 
ground between California and Indiana on some issues.
    I appreciate that you assist in direct sending the response 
last night and a few other letters. One thing that he didn't 
respond, and we also requested a briefing and I think my 
Congresswoman from California did too, would we be able to get 
a briefing by the end of this fiscal year?
    Mr. Wray. A briefing on what we are doing to respond to the 
questions from the FISC opinion?
    Ms. Spartz. Yes, that, and on your internal audit 
initiatives.
    Mr. Wray. Sure, we'd be happy to provide a briefing, but 
certainly before the end of--
    Ms. Spartz. Great. Thank you so much. Because as you know, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was 
legislated by Congress to really address unlawful Executive 
Branch surveillance of U.S. citizens. A 2008 law created some 
loopholes which gave exemptions for surveillance of non-U.S. 
citizens on foreign soil, and as you know, it's been a decade. 
Application was very rough.
    In 2018, when Congress renewed this legislation, they 
explicitly required documented all of instances when it was 
violated. As you know, the court also--the FISC also, a report 
in 2000 FISA court, and the 2018 opinion found that the FBI 
procedure were in violation of the First Amendment, and due 
process, and you instill all these new procedures and 
everything else.
    In the 2020 report, pretty much the court had still 
significant concerns with FBI's limitations, violations were 
more pervasive than previously believed, that FBI never applied 
to the FISC for an order, lack of justification for bail (ph) 
queries is a particular concern and technical violation on 
address for nearly a year.
    The report shows that there are a lot of different 
concerns, but in their opinion the court pretty much said there 
is--we are concerned about the apparent widespread violation, 
but we don't have any evidence due to lack of--due to the 
pandemic, we couldn't do this really audit. So, due to the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, the court is willing to 
certify this process.
    Do you know I used to audit them. If PCOB would come to my 
engagement and they say, Okay, you know what, you audited this 
engagement. There is no evidence. Nothing is documented. 
Generally, since we didn't find nothing was documented, no 
evidence provided, it's okay that you said that this audit 
statements is material respect seems to be fair and not 
materially misstated.
    I know that you mentioned that one of your internal audit 
partners is big for auditor, and I am sure he would tell you, I 
would be fired if PCOB would come to my audit and inspect my 
audit, because ultimately whatever not documented is not done.
    So, do you believe that Federal agencies should be also 
held at the same standard as we hold private entities? It's not 
about the law. Do you believe it should hold it to the same 
standard?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the whole--can you hear me? Sorry. The 
whole question about how auditing should be done is, of course, 
as you alluded to, a dense one. The internal auditor that we 
hired--
    Ms. Spartz. I am talking like external, because it's 
internal audit. I have to disagree in your statement when you 
said to Congressman Issa what is audit done for. Maybe your 
internal audits are done to find errors. Your external 
certification done by FISA court is actually to provide an 
opinion that in the material respects you follow the law, not 
find an error. As an auditor, you don't want to find errors. 
That is not the goal of the auditor to find.
    So, do you believe, for 2021, since it's been already a 
decade, you and your internal controls director, would be able 
to attest that you have all this detective, preventative 
control, you've done all these different things, and now this 
point you can actually say that you attest and provide evidence 
that in material respect you follow the law, and if you don't 
follow what an error rate you accept and to be able to say I 
violated First Amendment right for how many citizens is 
acceptable to violate it? Would you be able to attest that for 
your 2021 with all the new procedures and provide for FISA 
court when they do new report this evidence?
    Mr. Wray. So, maybe it would be better for me to be able to 
explain a little bit more about our audit program, and it could 
be that some of this could be better addressed through the 
briefing we are talking about standing up for you.
    To be clear, the individual we brought in is here to stand 
up an Office of Internal Audit and to be able to do--
    Ms. Spartz. As an executive in the office, you are 
responsible for the office. As the CEO of the company, you are 
responsible for the office. You are responsible to follow the 
law as it's written.
    So, would you be able to provide this time an evidence so 
we don't go another decade, because you have authorization in a 
few years, provide this evidence and say, ``Yes, we can provide 
evidence we don't violate the rights of U.S. citizens''?
    Ms. Scanlon. The gentlelady's time has expired, but you can 
answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I think it would be best--this is a complicated 
topic. There's a lot that I have to say on it. It would be 
probably better addressed in a briefing that--
    Ms. Spartz. Okay. I'll look forward to it. Thank you.
    Yield back.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Director Wray, for your service 
to our country. Thank you to the men and women of the FBI.
    Gun violence is an epidemic in our country. In my home 
State of Rhode Island last month, a 31-year-old man was shot at 
a park while playing with his son, a teenage woman was killed 
while sitting in a car, a 20-year-old man was shot to death 
outside his home. The same thing is happening in cities all 
across America. There's no question that this problem has 
gotten worse during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    In 2020, Rhode Island saw a significant increase in gun 
sales, and during that same time we saw an 87 percent increase 
in gun-related deaths, and that trend has continued into 2021.
    So, I hope that you can shed some light on what the FBI can 
do and how Congress can support the agency to fight an epidemic 
that will claim 40,000 American lives this year.
    So, specifically, as I discussed, gun sales skyrocketed 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nearly 23 million firearms were 
purchased nationwide in 2020, a 64 percent increase. For each 
of these sales, a background check is required, putting 
tremendous pressure on our background check system. In fact, in 
March of last year, the start of the pandemic, Federal 
background checks hit a one million in a week mark.
    So, what does that increase in gun sales mean for the 
background check system and for public safety, and particularly 
with respect to your ability to complete a background check 
within three days, as required by the statute?
    Mr. Wray. So, Congressman, I appreciate the question for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is our folks at NICS, 
the background check systems, worked incredibly hard this past 
year, in particular, right through the teeth of the pandemic, 
and had to be very creative in terms of how we kept people 
socially distanced, rotating shifts, et cetera.
    We lived in fear that we would suddenly lose the ability to 
be able to continue to process the checks because we could 
potentially wipe out, in terms of having the quarantine, an 
entire roomful of cubicles of people.
    Mr. Cicilline. Director, I guess my question--
    Mr. Wray. We processed last year 40--
    Mr. Cicilline. Yeah. My question, I guess, is would 
additional resources be helpful to keep up with this pace so 
that we don't have the three-day period passing before the 
background check can be completed?
    Mr. Wray. Absolutely. We have been having to do overtime. 
We've been having to pull people from other key missions to 
staff it. I am very proud of the fact that even though we did a 
record--you used 23 million. My information is that we 
processed 40 million firearms background checks last year, and 
then we were able to complete about 96 percent of those within 
the three days, despite that record--despite the pandemic.
    Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Director.
    So, in 2018, the Center for American Progress, and 
according to FBI data as well, almost 4,000 prohibited 
purchasers were able to get a gun because the background check 
for their sale was not completed within three days.
    This is the loophole that allowed the Charleston shooter, 
who legally should have never been allowed to purchase a 
firearm, to buy a gun and use it to murder nine worshippers in 
a church.
    So, my question is, how is the FBI supporting the ATF's 
recovery of firearms found to be transferred to a prohibited 
purchaser? Are you giving specific instructions nationwide to 
ATF offices on how to do this? Are those practices being 
formalized?
    Because my experience is they're supposed to be recovered 
by AFT, but it doesn't seem like that happens. This is 
individuals who got a gun from a gun store who were legally 
prohibited from owning it.
    I've actually introduced a bill, the Unlawful Gun Buyer 
Alert, that would require local law enforcement be notified if 
firearms are delivered to a prohibited purchaser and wonder 
whether you think that would also be helpful in making 
jurisdictions aware when someone has illegally purchased a gun.
    I am really interested to know what you are doing with your 
field offices with ATF in this recovery and how we can at least 
take on this issue of people getting guns from a gun store who 
don't pass the background check.
    Mr. Wray. I think it might be better for me to offer to 
have my staff provide you more information about the details of 
how we work with ATF. They have a very, very tough job, as you 
alluded to, in recovering the guns that are sold to people who 
are prohibited by law from having them.
    Mr. Cicilline. Will you commit to a briefing on that, 
Director, because that would be very helpful?
    Mr. Wray. We'd be happy to set up a briefing on that 
subject.
    Mr. Cicilline. My last question, Director, is since 
September 11 the FBI has provided tens of millions of dollars 
of counterterrorism training and resources to State and local 
law enforcement agencies.
    How is the FBI reallocating this support to State and local 
partners to address the rise of White supremacists and anti-
government groups? Is the Bureau also giving guidance to the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force to address White supremacist 
extremism?
    Mr. Wray. So, a couple things there. One is we absolutely 
are providing domestic terrorism training to State and local 
partners, and we've actually recently been providing some of 
our more advanced training to the State and local officers, of 
whom there are hundreds and hundreds and hundreds who are task 
force officers on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
    As to the prioritization of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces 
on domestic terrorism, and specifically racially motivated 
violent extremism, when I elevated that to our highest priority 
level back in summer of 2019, the effect of that was to make 
sure that not only all 56 field offices are collecting 
intelligence and disseminating it on that subject, but also to 
make sure that all 200-plus Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the 
4,500 or 5,000 or whatever it is investigators that are on them 
have domestic terrorism--and specifically that part of domestic 
terrorism--squarely within their sights.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Jordan.
    Mr. Jordan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director, why did you take their copy of the Constitution?
    Mr. Wray. I am sorry. Take a copy of whose Constitution?
    Mr. Jordan. The couple in Alaska that turned out to be the 
wrong couple. You kicked in their door, you held them at 
gunpoint, handcuffed them, interrogated them for four hours, 
took their phones, took their laptop, and you took a copy of 
their pocket-sized Constitution. Why did you take the 
Constitution?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, as you know, I can't discuss a 
specific investigation. I am not sure whether your 
characterization is accurate or not, but I can't provide any 
information about a pending investigation.
    Mr. Jordan. Then why did you report--it was reported in the 
press. Our staff has actually talked to these individuals. 
That's what they told us exactly what happened. I am just 
curious. I see why you had the wrong couple, but if you take 
their phone and laptop, I am just curious, why did you take 
their Constitution?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I can't comment on a specific 
investigation and what the contents was.
    Mr. Jordan. Did you personally talk to the Huepers?
    Mr. Wray. Have I talked to who?
    Mr. Jordan. Have you talked to this couple in Alaska? 
Again, the couple who had their door kicked in, damage to their 
door. The FBI has now repaired their door. Held at gunpoint, 
handcuffed, and interrogated for four hours. Have your talked 
to them personally?
    Mr. Wray. No, I have not.
    Mr. Jordan. If you find out it's really--I think it's 
obvious that, based on what we've discovered, that this was the 
wrong couple. These weren't people who did anything wrong. If 
you find out they are, will you call?
    Mr. Wray. I'd have to look at the circumstances of what 
happened. It's an ongoing investigation. That's all I can 
really say on it at this time.
    Mr. Jordan. If it turns out--you sent their phone back to 
them, their laptop back to them. If it turns out that they are 
the wrong couple, as, again, as I think is obvious, what 
happens to the data on the phone that you have?
    Mr. Wray. Can you--I am sorry. Can you explain a little bit 
more what you are asking?
    Mr. Jordan. Did you keep a record--you returned the phone 
to them, but the data on the phone, do you have, like, copies 
of their text messages, emails, anything on their phone? Did 
you keep all that?
    Mr. Wray. Well, when we return people's information, my 
impression is that we don't keep that information, but it 
depends on the circumstances of the investigation.
    Mr. Jordan. It's an innocent couple. Your impression is you 
are not going to keep information?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, I can't discuss a specific 
investigation. If you would like to get more information about 
how it works when we return, more generally, our policies and 
practices when we return information, I'd be happy to see if we 
can provide that information to you separately.
    Mr. Jordan. You would think if they're innocent, they're 
not guilty, and you got information on them, you would get rid 
of that information. You wouldn't--the FBI wouldn't keep it, 
right?
    Mr. Wray. I am not trying to--
    Mr. Jordan. Again, in light of what we've found out about 
FISA, maybe not.
    Mr. Wray. I am not--honestly, I am really not trying to 
quibble with you here. The only reason I am providing what 
sounds like a confusing answer is because each case is 
different. It depends on the circumstances as to how you got 
the information, what the circumstances were.
    We certainly have instances where we purge information that 
we have. I know that happens. We have other instances where we 
may be investigating something, and the information is kept.
    Again, it depends on the circumstances. There's a whole 
network--
    Mr. Jordan. Do you know how this couple was identified? I 
mean, you look on your Twitter site, the posted tweet is a 
crowdsourcing, ``Can you help us find these individuals?'' 
You've got pictures of the individuals. This is relative to 
January 6.
    Was this couple in Alaska found through the crowdsourcing, 
that technique?
    Mr. Wray. I don't know the answer to that sitting here 
right now, and, again, I want to be careful not to discuss a 
specific investigation. I will say that more generally related 
to January 6, part of the purpose of putting out information 
for the public is for the public to identify people.
    Mr. Jordan. Right.
    Mr. Wray. If you know people, to identify them.
    Mr. Jordan. Are you doing that as well for the rioters, the 
people, Antifa in Portland? You are doing that as well for 
them?
    Mr. Wray. Yes. Absolutely.
    Mr. Jordan. Is it a habit of the FBI to take Constitutions 
from people that you are interrogating?
    Mr. Wray. I don't know if it's a habit to pursue any 
particular documents.
    Mr. Jordan. I just found that--
    Mr. Wray. We just seized the evidence that's relevant to 
what's in the affidavit that we--the search warrant affidavit 
that we presented to the judge who signed off on it.
    Mr. Jordan. Did you sign off on the raid on Mayor 
Giuliani's apartment?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I am not going to discuss any specific 
investigation. I don't normally sign off on specific 
operational activity as FBI Director.
    Mr. Jordan. That's not what I asked. I asked, did you sign 
off on this specific FBI activity where the President's 
personal lawyer's apartment in Manhattan was raided?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I am not going to discuss any specific 
investigation.
    Mr. Jordan. Are you aware of any leaks by the FBI or the 
Department of Justice about an investigation of Postmaster 
General DeJoy?
    Mr. Wray. I am aware of news coverage about an 
investigation related to that individual, but I am not aware of 
leaks from people inside the FBI.
    Mr. Jordan. You haven't been briefed on anything?
    You haven't been briefed on anything relative to the FBI or 
the Justice Department relating to that leak of an 
investigation of the Postmaster?
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I can't discuss a specific investigation. I am 
aware of the news coverage about the investigation you are 
referring to. I am just going to have to leave it at that here.
    Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Director.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Swalwell.
    Mr. Swalwell. Director, the plain definition of an 
insurrection is a violent uprising against government.
    On January 6, an officer died. A couple days later, two 
died. Death by suicide. Hundreds were injured that day. An eye 
was lost. Fingers were lost. An officer suffered a heart 
attack. The counting of the electoral college was suspended for 
approximately six hours. Members of Congress retreated to a 
secure location.
    Was January 6 an insurrection?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I certainly understand why you 
would describe it that way. In my role as FBI Director, because 
that's a term that has legal meaning, I really have to be 
careful about using words like that and not getting ahead of 
both prosecutors and judges who have very strong opinions on 
what kind of public commentary, as you may remember from your 
past life, I can engage in.
    So, I certainly understand why you are asking the question, 
given the circumstances both you described and a lot of the 
other details surrounding the attack.
    We are treating it as an Act of domestic terrorism and 
investigating it through our Joint Terrorism Task Force. We 
are, as you know, now in the midst of bringing any number of 
conspiracy charges, which are particularly serious.
    This is a very ongoing investigation, and there's a lot 
more to come, and I would expect to see more charges, and some 
of them may be more serious charges.
    Mr. Swalwell. Director, we are all grateful when we saw the 
FBI SWAT team and its forensics team on the floor after the 
attack. Before the attack, you told the Intel Committee that 
you were looking for and through social media as a key part of 
investigations and that you would get tips from social media 
companies.
    Prior to January 6, did the FBI receive any tips from 
social media companies about threats to the Capitol?
    Mr. Wray. Well, we've had so much information now, I am 
reluctant to sort of answer any question about the word 
``any,'' especially because we are now 500 arrests into an 
investigation and after the fact.
    Certainly, we were aware of online chatter about the 
potential for violence, but I am not aware that we had any 
intelligence indicating that hundreds of individuals were going 
to storm the Capitol itself, to my knowledge.
    Mr. Swalwell. Do you believe the Bureau has the ability to 
monitor publicly available social media or open-source 
intelligence collection?
    Mr. Wray. Could you just repeat the question? I want to be 
sure I answer it.
    Mr. Swalwell. Yeah. Do you have the authority and ability 
to monitor open-source intelligence collection? So, for 
example, any website, chat room where you know consistently 
groups there are posting about threats, whether it's to the 
Capitol, whether it's to law enforcement. Do you have the 
ability, and can you monitor open source?
    Mr. Wray. So, the answer to that, unfortunately, like so 
many things, is complicated. There are Attorney General 
guidelines as implemented through the so-called DIOG that have 
been around for many, many years now that govern what we can 
and cannot do in this space, all which are geared towards 
protecting the First Amendment.
    With proper predication and an authorized purpose, there 
are a lot of things we can do on social media. What we are not 
allowed to do is just sit and monitor social media and look at 
one person's posts, just looking to see if maybe something 
would happen just in case. That, we are not allowed to do.
    Mr. Swalwell. In the public realm, we are learning that 
this attack on the Capitol is not a 500-year storm. In fact, as 
we speak right now, there's a count going on in Arizona related 
to the 2020 election where claims are being made that the 
outcome was fraudulent. The former President is telling people 
that he plans to be reinstated in August. So, you can see that 
when you have those statements, that count, social media may be 
a place to look as far as intentions to try and reinstate the 
President.
    Knowing that a storm may be coming, Director, what can we 
do to make sure that an attack like that does not happen again?
    Mr. Wray. So, what we can do, and we benefit very much 
from, is getting tips and leads about things that are on social 
media from--everything from social media companies themselves 
to Members of the public.
    You often hear the expression that DHS coined of, ``If you 
see something, say something''? Most people imagine when they 
hear that the unattended backpack in a Greyhound bus terminal 
or something. Obviously, we want people to say something then, 
too.
    What we are trying to communicate is, if you see something 
that looks like criminal activity and threat of violence, say 
something, including if you see something on social media, we 
need you to say something.
    That's what our tip center is partly there for, but you can 
contact law enforcement, State and local law enforcement.
    Mr. Swalwell. Has your judgment--
    Chair Nadler. The Committee's--the gentleman's time--
    Mr. Swalwell. Mr. Director, has your judgment changed that 
there was not widespread fraud in the 2020 election?
    Mr. Wray. As former Attorney General Barr and former Acting 
Attorney General Rosen have both said, ``we looked, but we 
didn't see evidence of fraud sufficient to change the outcome 
of the Presidential election.''
    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Director.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
    At this time, the Committee will stand in recess for about 
half an hour. We will resume promptly at 1 p.m.
    [Recess.]
    Chair Nadler. The Committee will come back to order.
    Mr. Lieu. Sorry.
    Mr. Biggs. Okay. Let's try again.
    Mr. Roy. I am here, Chair. Can you hear me?
    Chair Nadler. Yes.
    Mr. Roy. I appreciate that.
    Director Wray, I appreciate your service, appreciate you 
being here today.
    Last month, I had a letter that my colleague Thomas Massie 
and I sent to the Department of Justice requesting further 
information on prosecutions of individuals who were present at 
the Capitol on January 6.
    Now, earlier you talked about there being over 500 
investigations, arrests, or prosecutions that might be 
underway, and you categorized them in three categories: Those 
who had peaceably assembled, those who maybe crossed a line 
they shouldn't have, and then those who had engaged in 
violence, obviously, and damaging property and harming police. 
Those are my words, but roughly that.
    My concern is making sure that those who were there 
exercising their First Amendment rights were not being swept up 
into investigations or being wrongfully arrested. I have 
constituents who are concerned.
    Will you commit to join personally, along with people 
necessary to bring in from the FBI, to have a briefing for all 
Members of Congress, not just this Committee, on this question 
of the arrests, the nature of the arrests, and how that 
investigation is going?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I appreciate the question.
    First, just I want to clarify one thing based on what you 
just summarized. We are not conducting investigations--to my 
knowledge certainly--of peaceful protesters and certainly not 
arresting people for peaceful protests. So, when I gave those 
three groups, I wasn't referring to three types of 
investigations we have, but rather of the three types of people 
who were present in the area.
    Mr. Roy. I understand. I understand that clarification. I 
am a former Federal prosecutor. I get it. Will you commit to 
briefing along those lines?
    Mr. Wray. I am happy to see what kind of briefing we could 
provide to the Committee. Obviously, as I alluded in some of 
the responses to some of the earlier questions, because we have 
now something like 500 cases pending in front of different, 
very particular Federal judges, I really have to be careful 
about what I can commit to share.
    Mr. Roy. I understand. I understand that. A briefing for 
Members of Congress on what happened on January 6 so we can 
understand the investigations of citizens, both for those of us 
who want to ensure people have the law fully enforced who 
engaged in activities they shouldn't have, as well as citizens 
who might be wrongfully targeted. I think we ought to have that 
briefing.
    I want to turn my attention to the border.
    Does the United States have operational control of our 
southern border?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure I am really the right person to 
address that. I think that's a better question for the 
Department of Homeland Security.
    Mr. Roy. As the Director of the FBI and someone keenly 
aware of the illegal and dangerous activities going on with 
cartels along our border, would you say that the United States 
has operational control over our southern border?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I hesitate to use words like ``operational 
control.'' What I would say is that the border security issues 
are of great concern, and they span everything from violent 
crime associated with the border, drug trafficking associated 
with the border, human trafficking associated with the border, 
et cetera. Yeah.
    Mr. Roy. Along those lines, Director--I am sorry, our time 
is limited, I hate interrupting--but are you aware that we've 
had over 700,000 apprehensions since January 1?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have the exact number, but I know there 
are quite a few, to put it mildly.
    Mr. Roy. Does it sound right that maybe 300,000 got away 
and releases have occurred, according to sources on the ground?
    I am going to ask a series of questions. You can answer 
them en masse.
    Are you aware that, through May, the Fentanyl numbers for 
2021 are 7,400 pounds intercepted at the border compared to 
4,700 pounds for all 2020?
    Do you agree that Fentanyl is one of the most dangerous 
drugs in the world?
    Do you agree that it is infiltrating our communities and 
our schools, and that synthetic drugs, including Fentanyl, are 
by far the fastest part of the opioid epidemic, and that there 
were unprecedented overdose deaths in the United States at 
91,000, according to the CDC, from October 2019-October 2020?
    Does that all sound consistent with what you know about 
what's going on with our drug communities and our border 
situation?
    Mr. Wray. Well, given your past background, you will 
understand when I refer to what you just asked as a compound 
question.
    Suffice to say that I totally agree that the drug issues 
related to the border are extremely significant, that 
Fentanyl--the problem with Fentanyl, Fentanyl coming into this 
country from elsewhere, including from the southwest border, is 
something that I think can fairly be described as an epidemic.
    Mr. Roy. Two last questions.
    There are also significant problems with human trafficking, 
upwards of 300,000 people being trafficked in our country, 
20,000 being brought into our country every year even when we 
don't have the massive numbers we have right now.
    The cartel Jalisco New Generation, operating as Los Zetas, 
recently have taken over control of Aguililla. They're driving 
Fentanyl. We now have had an 800 percent increase in Texas of 
Fentanyl seizures. That is a massive number that's coming into 
Texas.
    So, my question for you--and I'll close because I don't 
have time--my question is, what is the FBI doing? Have they 
provided assets directly to CBP to help work to stop the 
dangerous reach of cartels' Fentanyl and human trafficking into 
Texas and the rest of our country?
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I'll provide a brief answer, and then maybe we 
can supply some more information after the fact.
    So, certainly, we are very actively engaged with CBP across 
all our border divisions, Texas all the way over to California, 
and we are working it together with human trafficking task 
forces, safe streets and gangs task forces, and OCDETF strike 
forces.
    We even have tried to contribute on the other side of the 
border down with our legat working closely on human trafficking 
and special interest alien issues.
    Of course, we also have something that a lot of people 
don't realize we do. We have so-called TAGS, or Transnational 
Anti-Gang Task Forces, even all the way down in the Northern 
Triangle where we are trying to work with vetted police 
officers from those countries to try to prevent, at the source, 
some of the threat from MS-13 and others going up to the United 
States.
    So, happy to provide some more detailed information 
separately.
    Mr. Roy. Thank you, Mr. Director.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Lieu.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Chair Nadler.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for your lengthy public service 
and to all the personnel at the FBI for keeping Americans safe.
    Earlier at this hearing it was brought up that COVID-19 
could be a bioweapon. Before I ask you any questions, I just 
want to make a public service announcement.
    If you are watching this and you believe COVID-19 is a 
bioweapon, you can protect yourself: Go get vaccinated. If you 
are fully vaccinated, then COVID-19 largely cannot harm you. 
Please consult your doctor if you have any questions.
    So, Director Wray, I'd like to follow up on the questions 
by Congress Member Zoe Lofgren, Congress Member Issa, as well 
as Congresswoman Spartz, on section 702 of FISA and the 
database.
    As Congresswoman Spartz mentioned, we wrote a letter to you 
about how the FBI got access to private information of 
Americans--without a warrant--from this database. I appreciate 
your response back where you implement a number of procedures 
to mitigate this from happening in the future.
    What I'd like to know is, if in the future the FBI either 
accidentally or intentionally gets this information from the 
foreign surveillance database without a warrant, do you segment 
that information so that if it's ever used in a court of law 
the defendant can challenge it and challenge how it may have 
influenced your investigation?
    Mr. Wray. I think the answer is yes, but I would prefer to 
make sure that I have people follow up with you to make sure 
that we are giving you the technically precise answer to that 
question.
    Mr. Lieu. I'd appreciate it if you could do that. Thank 
you.
    My next question goes to the January 6 insurrection and 
what it was based on. I appreciate that you earlier had stated 
that you investigated alleged voter fraud and you could not 
find any fraud sufficient to overturn the results of the 
election.
    In these 500 or so arrests of the individuals that attacked 
our Capitol, it's true, isn't it, that a number of them went to 
the Capitol to stop the electoral college from being certified 
based on the big lie that the election was stolen.
    In other words, they were there not because they were upset 
about corporate tax rates but because they believed the 
election was stolen. Is that correct?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly some portion of the individuals 
that we arrested, have arrested so far, were individuals whose 
intention was to interfere with or obstruct the operation of 
Congress' constitutional responsibilities here.
    Mr. Lieu. Our constitutional responsibility on that day, on 
January the 6th, was to certify the election results in the 
electoral college, correct?
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    [Audio malfunction.]
    Mr. Lieu. It seems like in the 21st century that these 
cyber-
attacks are only going to increase.
    Would you agree, Director Wray, that we are likely going to 
see an increase in cyber-attacks against both the public and 
private sector?
    Mr. Wray. Yes. We think the cyber threat is increasing 
almost exponentially. Ransomware alone, the total volume of 
amounts paid in ransomware I think has tripled over the last 
year. We are investigating a hundred different ransomware 
variants, and each one of those hundred has dozens, if not 
hundreds, of victims.
    That's just ransomware. That's just ransomware. We 
obviously are investigating scores and scores and scores of 
nation-state intrusions and other kinds of cybercriminal 
attacks.
    So, the scale of this is something that I don't think this 
country has ever really ever seen anything quite like it, and 
it's going to get much worse.
    Mr. Lieu. [Audio malfunction] private sector. That's why I 
have introduced legislation to provide incentives for people to 
go into the cyber-security field. We are simply going to need 
more of these cyber workers to protect Americans in the future.
    Now, some of these hacker groups appear to either be in 
Russia or operate with either the complicity of Russia or 
directly at the behest of Russia.
    Would you agree that there is some State action involvement 
in some of these hacker groups?
    Mr. Wray. Well, of course, it varies from intrusion to 
intrusion. We know the Russians have a very active, clearly 
state-sponsored cyber campaign, including things like the 
SolarWinds intrusion, which we have now publicly attributed to 
the SVR.
    In the past, there have been other indictments where we've 
brought against other Members of the Russian Intelligence 
Services.
    Separate from that there are, of course, cyber-criminal 
actors, any number of whom operate--quite a number of whom 
operate on Russian soil.
    The degree of nexus between those cyber criminals and the 
Russian Government is not something I can discuss in an open 
hearing.
    I will say that the most recent actors, the so-called 
DarkSide actors involved in the Colonial Pipeline attack, are 
individuals who, perhaps not coincidentally, specifically 
target English-speaking victims.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bishop.
    Mr. Biggs.
    Mr. Biggs. Thanks, Mr. Chair. Appreciate it.
    Thanks, Director Wray, for being here.
    I am going to read a quote from a recent commentator:

          We can continue playing compliance whack-a-mole, but at this 
        point it's reasonable to ask whether this sort of large-scale 
        collection on a ``general warrant'' model is inherently prone 
        to these problems in a way that resists robust and timely 
        oversight.
          We've seen this movie before. The court wags its finger at 
        systemic noncompliance but ultimately decides to give the FBI 
        yet another chance.

    Of course, this commentator is referring to the opinion 
from the FISC court that came out in November, which was just 
recently released, on April 20th or 21st.
    In that opinion the judge said, ``While the court is 
concerned about the apparent widespread violation, it lacks 
sufficient information at this time'' to assess the adequacy of 
the FBI system changes and training.
    So, Congressman, the Ranking Member, Jim Jordan, and myself 
wrote to you on May 4, and we presented three questions to you.

    (1)  Please explain why, almost a year after the OIG's 
report about FISA abuses, the FISC found the FBI to still be 
abusing its warrantless surveillance authority under section 
702.

    I think we brought that up because in the one example, you 
had at least 40 individuals surveilled who had nothing to do 
with foreign intelligence whatsoever, and that was a finding.

    (2)  Please provide a detailed accounting of every instance 
since December 2019 in which the FBI has queried, accessed, 
otherwise used information obtained pursuant to section 702 for 
purposes unrelated to national security.
    (3)  Please explain what actions you have taken in the wake 
of the FISC November 2020 memorandum opinion and order to 
prevent the FBI from using its section 702 authorities to 
surveil, investigate, or otherwise examine U.S. citizens.

    So, we sent that on May 4. Then, over a month after that, 
last night we received the response. It wasn't from you. It was 
from your assistant director, excuse me.
    That letter was primarily focused on question (3), which I 
get, and you've mentioned that several times today. I 
appreciate the efforts that you are trying to make to clean 
this up or at least provide some kind of effort to prevent 
this, the kind of systemic abuses that we've seen in the past.
    Director Wray, I think it's imperative that we understand 
the answers to questions (1) and (2), which I reiterated to 
you. You don't have time to answer them all here. It would be 
better if we could have a dialogue, for sure.
    What I want to know is, can you provide us a detailed 
accounting of every instance since December 2019 in which the 
FBI has queried, accessed, or otherwise used information 
obtained by 702 for purposes unrelated to national security?
    Mr. Wray. I can look and see if there's more information we 
can provide you, perhaps in a classified setting.
    I will say that the summary that you just gave, it's 
important, for people not to confuse two different issues. The 
Inspector General's 2019 report has to do with surveillance, 
and we've talked about that at great length, including in a 
prior hearing in front of this Committee.
    The 702, the FISC opinion, has to do with querying, which 
is running searches in a database. There's nothing having to do 
with surveillance. All that is lawfully collected information. 
So, it had nothing to do with surveillance or anything like 
that.
    That does not mean that we don't consider the findings in 
the FISC opinion incredibly important, which is why I am 
putting in place all these measures.
    Mr. Biggs. The judge found them so troubling that he 
required now--and I was going to ask you about this--he 
requires you to provide a report every quarter about 
minimization, querying, your efforts there.
    Have you provided the first quarter's report to the FISC?
    Mr. Wray. I'd have to check. I know that we deal with the 
FISC fairly regularly and provide all sorts of reports to them.
    It's important to note that the court approved our 
procedures, our minimization procedures, our collection 
procedures, our querying procedures, did not find misconduct.
    Mr. Biggs. Didn't find misconduct.
    Mr. Wray. Right.
    Mr. Biggs. It was still--it found widespread--I am going to 
use the word ``improprieties.'' He was very concerned about 
widespread improprieties, and that's why he wants the report, 
wanted it going forward, is to find out what you guys are 
doing. So, I want to know if Congress is going to get a copy of 
that report.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I am happy to see what information we can provide 
you. The court, though, does not speak in terms of 
improprieties, and I think the court knows how to use that term 
when that's what it thinks it's found.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Raskin.
    Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Welcome, Director Wray. Thank you for your service. Thanks 
also for reminding us that if we see something, we should say 
something. I see Donald Trump telling his followers that he is 
about to be reinstated as President of the United States in 
August. So, I wanted to make sure I said something so the FBI 
can be on top of that situation given that he's incited 
violence against the government before.
    I wonder if you can help us understand what the FBI did on 
June 1, 2020, versus what it did on January 6, 2021.
    On June 1, 2020, we saw a full-blown government assault on 
hundreds of Americans who had peacefully assembled in Lafayette 
Square in the Nation's Capital to speak and petition government 
for redress of grievances relating to the murder of George 
Floyd.
    Then America watched as Federal law enforcement in riot 
gear and on horseback cleared peaceful protesters and 
reporters, firing pepper balls and flash grenades into the 
crowd.
    It's been reported that around 2 p.m. on that day top law 
enforcement and military officials assembled at the FBI command 
center, at your command center, for a planning meeting in 
advance of this assault on the civil rights protesters.
    So, I want to ask you, who was the senior-most FBI official 
present handling the Bureau's actions on that day? Was that 
you? If not you, who was it? What was the FBI's general role 
and function in the events of June 1?
    Mr. Wray. Well, there were a lot of people going in and out 
of the command post over the course of that day, so I am not 
sure I can speak exactly to who was doing what at 2:00 p.m. 
that afternoon about a year ago, but--
    Mr. Raskin. Well, who was the highest-ranking person 
involved?
    Mr. Wray. Well, but it's important to be clear about what 
we are talking about here.
    You asked about the FBI's role. So, the FBI does not, did 
not on June 1 of 2020 or on January 6, we don't have the 
skills, the job responsibility, the training, the equipment, or 
the responsibility to engage in crowd control, riot control, 
and things of that sort. So, we were not engaged in that kind 
of activity on June 1 or on January 6.
    We do have a command post at the Washington Field Office, 
and at some point, on the day that you are referring to, at 
different points of the day, especially in the evening and at 
nighttime, I was over there.
    I was not in Lafayette Square. I was in the Washington 
Field Office command post for a good part of that night. At 
different parts of the day, other senior executives at the FBI 
were coming and going.
    The activity that you are describing is not the FBI's--you 
asked about the FBI's role. That was not the FBI's role.
    Mr. Raskin. Well, what was the FBI's role?
    Mr. Wray. So, we had a few different things. First, I think 
our folks do a very good job of running command posts that 
bring different agencies together so that they can all sit 
shoulder to shoulder and exchange information, let each other 
know what they're doing, et cetera. So, that's one thing we 
did.
    Second, we are an intelligence agency. So, to the extent 
that we have intelligence to collect, to analyze, and to 
disseminate, we do that.
    Third, we have tactical response. So, if there is an 
incident that occurs where there's a crime being committed, we 
in certain instances have the ability to send a SWAT team to 
respond, and we sometimes do that.
    Then, last but not least, we investigate criminal activity. 
We are, after all, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, not the 
Federal Bureau of Security, not the Federal police, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. So, we do that.
    So, our folks would have been in a variety of ways 
providing support to our partners using the skill sets that we 
have, which are extensive but not the same as a lot of our 
Federal partners.
    Mr. Raskin. Okay. So, I wonder if you would just translate 
those four functions that you played on June 1, 2020, to 
January 6.
    Did you activate the command post on January 6? Were you 
operating an intelligence agency? Was there tactical response? 
Were you doing investigation on that day?
    Mr. Wray. So, as a general matter, all four of those same 
things applied on January 6 as well. We had the command post--
just like we did back in June, we had the command post stood up 
at the Washington Field Office.
    We also had, just like we did back in June, a national 
command post stood up at our SIOC at headquarters. We were 
collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence when we had it. 
We had SWAT teams at the ready to deploy.
    As we all know now, at the appropriate time, or at some 
point in time over the course of the afternoon, we were asked 
to send our SWAT team, and we did investigative activity.
    Mr. Raskin. Were you present yourself on January 6?
    Mr. Wray. I was present in one of the command posts, in the 
national command post at headquarters. I was in one of the 
command posts, yes.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bishop.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, on June 8, ProPublica published an article 
stating that it, quote, ``has obtained a vast trove of IRS data 
on the tax returns of thousands of the nation's wealthiest 
people, covering more than 15 years,'' close quote.
    The article went on to disclose detailed return information 
spanning five years of several ultra-wealthy Democrats who seem 
to have much more--much less enthusiasm for taxes in private 
than they advocate for publicly.
    Title 26, section 7213 makes it a Federal felony punishable 
by a fine and up to five years in prison willfully to disclose 
return information.
    That statement and the balance of the article reflect the 
commission of tens of thousands of counts of crimes, probably 
by some IRS employee or some other authorized disclose of the 
data or some hacker.
    ProPublica reporters and editors also apparently have 
committed criminal violations under section 7213(a)(3) by 
publishing this data. They write that they intended to commit 
more of that. In fact, they wrote that they thought about the 
privacy implications and concluded that they're effectively 
above the law.
    Has the FBI made any arrests in connection with that 
matter?
    Mr. Wray. I can't comment on any specific--the existence or 
conduct of any specific investigation. To the extent that I can 
speak in this kind of setting, I am not aware of any arrests 
specifically related to the news coverage that you just 
described.
    Mr. Bishop. Has the FBI executed any search warrants or 
raided any offices or given any tips to CNN about such a thing 
in connection with this matter?
    Mr. Wray. I can't--there's no such activity that I can 
describe at this time.
    Mr. Bishop. The FBI has arrested hundreds of people, as 
you've described in your testimony, for trespassing, some of 
them within days of their offense, put them in solitary 
confinement, in some cases for 90 days detention without bail.
    Why is this particular brazen massive crime deprioritized?
    Mr. Wray. You are talking about specifically the leak of 
taxpayer information?
    Mr. Bishop. Tens of thousands of taxpayers.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I don't think we--I am not suggesting any 
lack of prioritization. There is responsibility for activity of 
IRS employees that also involves the IRS Inspector General.
    So, there may be a difference in the areas of 
responsibility as compared to if you are comparing it to 
January 6, where, when it comes to acts of domestic terrorism, 
that's squarely something that we are expected to prioritize. I 
think as the Committee would want; counterterrorism is the 
FBI's number one priority.
    Mr. Bishop. Director Wray, have there been any arrests in 
connection with the New York Times publication last September 
of the details of Donald Trump's tax information?
    Mr. Wray. I am not aware of any.
    Mr. Bishop. Did any criminal charges ever get brought 
against Lois Lerner?
    Mr. Wray. I don't know the answer to that sitting here 
right now.
    Mr. Bishop. Shifting topics a little, Director Wray, but 
maybe thematically connected and touched on by Mr. Buck.
    The FBI has frequently dismissed charges against violent 
rioters over past months in Portland. You made reference to 
that matter some. Reportedly, over half of the charges brought 
have been dismissed. I think the number is about 87, and about 
half of those are gone.
    On May 28 the journalist Andy Ngo released a statement and 
evidence that he was assaulted and beaten while covering the 
latest violent riot by Antifa at that time. He wrote about 
being pursued as he fled through the city streets and having to 
beg refuge in a hotel and fleeing into the upper floors to 
evade being captured and killed by rioters calling for his 
death. Mr. Ngo has been repeatedly targeted and physically 
attacked because of his reporting on Antifa violence in 
Portland and Seattle.
    You mentioned earlier Asian Americans being specifically 
targeted. That includes Mr. Ngo. Members of this Committee have 
written you specifically, before I joined this Committee this 
session, about prior assaults on Mr. Ngo. We did it again early 
this week. There's been no response.
    In 1961, the Attorney General sent 600 U.S. marshals to 
Alabama to protect Freedom Riders from mobs of violent people 
who were attacking them.
    Why is the FBI not living up to its traditions in the 
enforcement of civil rights and protection of journalists like 
Mr. Ngo?
    Mr. Wray. So, the first thing I would say is, when you are 
describing the prosecutions in Portland, to be clear, the FBI 
is not dismissing any cases. We don't--the decisions to 
prosecute or dismiss prosecutions are made by the prosecutors, 
not by the FBI. So, any frustration you might have in that 
regard shouldn't be directed our way.
    Second, we have prioritized investigations of what I would 
call anarchist violent extremism, which includes any number of 
individuals who self-identify, say, with Antifa.
    In fact, we've had a significant number, a significant 
increase in our number of anarchist violent extremist 
investigations during my tenure. In fact, we had more anarchist 
violent extremist arrests last year, in 2020, than the prior 
three years combined.
    So, we are actively pursuing those investigations where we 
can. It's a threat that we take very seriously.
    We saw, for example, the first, in recent memory, the first 
lethal anarchist violent extremist attack last year. It was 
directed by an Antifa identifier who attacked a supporter of 
the other side. He ultimately--that defendant ultimately died 
in a shootout with the marshals, as you may know. So, it's 
something we take very seriously.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chair, could I make a unanimous consent 
request?
    Chair Nadler. For technical reasons, the Committee will 
stand in recess for 10 minutes.
    [Recess.]
    Chair Nadler. The Committee will come to order. Ms. 
Jayapal.
    Ms. Jayapal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, thank you for being with us. In April 2020, 
White supremacists stormed the Michigan State Capitol carrying 
guns, swastikas, confederate flags, and a doll representing 
Governor Whitmer with a noose around its neck. Many of us saw 
those events as a dress rehearsal for the events of January 
6th. Did the FBI consider these events in its preparation and 
intelligence gathering leading up to January 6th?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, threats in Michigan were 
something that were very much on our mind. Among other things, 
as you may know, we investigated and took down a ring of 
domestic terrorists who were attempting to kidnap Governor 
Whitmer, the so-called Wolverines.
    Ms. Jayapal. Did you consider the events as they relate to 
the intelligence that you were seeing relative to January 6th?
    Mr. Wray. It's hard for me to say specifically. Certainly, 
it was something that was on our mind, and we baked in all the 
information we had and the intelligence products that we were 
putting out over the course of 2020 right on up until December 
warning about the potential for domestic violent extremism as 
it relates to the election, continuing past Election Day 
itself, continuing through into inauguration.
    Ms. Jayapal. Thank you, Director Wray. It isn't just White 
supremacists as rioters or insurrectionists that we are 
concerned about; we are also concerned about the infiltration 
of the ranks of law enforcement, something that you earlier in 
this hearing called the internal threat, I believe you said, 
and you said that you were taking it very seriously. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Wray. Yes. I think the phrase I used was the ``insider 
threat.''
    Ms. Jayapal. Insider threat. Thank you. This isn't a new 
threat. In fact, 15 years ago, in 2006, the FBI 
counterterrorism division released an intelligence assessment 
on White supremacist infiltration of law enforcement. Then in 
2015, the FBI counterterrorism division's policy directive and 
policy guide warned agents assigned to domestic terrorism cases 
that the White supremacist groups that they investigate often 
have, quote, ``active links to law enforcement officials.''
    In February of 2020, a confidential intelligence assessment 
concluded that White supremacists were very likely to seek 
affiliation with law enforcement to further their ideologies. 
The report stated that extremists expressed a desire to join 
the military and law enforcement primarily to obtain tradecraft 
to prepare for and initiate a collapse of society. Director 
Wray, are you familiar with these three reports?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure if I am familiar with those 
specific reports, but I am familiar with, in general, with the 
theme that they represent, at least as you've described them.
    Ms. Jayapal. In September of 2020, you testified before the 
House Homeland Security Committee that, quote, ``racially 
motivated violent extremists over recent years have been 
responsible for the most lethal activity in the United 
States.''
    Now, the 2020 intelligence assessment specifically 
highlighted the risk of White supremacists joining law 
enforcement as a way to engage in violence against the U.S. 
Government and certain racial and ethnic groups, which sounds 
eerily familiar to what we saw on January 6th.
    To your knowledge, Director Wray, were there law 
enforcement officers participating in the January 6th attack on 
the Capitol?
    Mr. Wray. Well, there were a whole variety of types of 
individuals involved in the January 6th breach of the Capitol--
    Ms. Jayapal. Were there law enforcement officers?
    Mr. Wray. I was about to finish my answer. There were--
among the many that we have investigated and arrested, there 
have been current, and especially former members of military 
and law enforcement. Among the things, which I think is where 
you are going with your question, that we are doing, and have 
been doing for a while now, is working through our joint 
terrorism task forces, which often have representatives of both 
the military and various police departments, law enforcement 
departments.
    So, we work closely with them because we are obviously 
particularly concerned about anybody engaged in domestic 
terrorism, but especially somebody who might be in a position 
of trust and responsibility, like a member of law enforcement 
or military. We have all kinds of engagement with DOD, for 
example, to try to help screen out--
    Ms. Jayapal. Let me keep going because I want to get to a 
couple of specific questions.
    Mr. Wray. Yes. Yeah.
    Ms. Jayapal. An independent journalist actually documented 
at least 45 law enforcement officials in attendance on January 
6th that have been publicly reported. Since 2000, law 
enforcement officials with alleged connections to White 
supremacist groups, or far-right militant activities, were 
exposed in 14 States, and hundreds of Federal, State, and local 
law enforcement officials were exposed participating in racist, 
nativist, and sexist social media activity.
    Has the FBI, under your leadership, and maybe you were 
getting to some of these specific points, distributed guidance 
to State and local law enforcement to assist them in weeding 
out White supremacist officers?
    Mr. Wray. We have engaged with our partners about better 
identifying domestic violent extremism, including, in 
particular, giving them information about things like 
symbology, tattoos, that kind of thing, things to be sort of on 
the lookout for that may be indicators of individuals who have 
mobilized to violent extremism. That is something that we have 
tried to put out intelligence products and, as you mentioned, 
but then others as well, and we've done a lot of training and 
engagement with our partners on some of these topics.
    Ms. Jayapal. My time is expired--
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time is expired.
    Ms. Jayapal. --but I was hoping that you could provide us 
with specific steps that you've taken to ensure that we are 
weeding out these White supremacists within local law 
enforcement, so perhaps we can get a briefing on some of those 
specific things you are doing, and including collecting 
statistics on White supremacist affiliation with local law 
enforcement.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Tiffany.
    Mr. Tiffany. Director Wray, let me start by highlighting 
national security concerns. Border Patrol recently arrested two 
Yemeni men at our border who were on the FBI terror watch list 
and no-fly list. It's my understanding one of your field 
offices interviewed them. What was gleaned from that interview 
or interviews?
    Mr. Wray. I can't discuss the specific ongoing 
investigations. Certainly, we are concerned about--and our 
joint terrorism task forces, which I think is what you are 
driving at, have been latched up with both CBP at the border 
and to some extent working across the border with our Legat 
Office in Mexico City, with a specific focus on special 
interest aliens. We are looking at Yemenis, for example, who 
may have tried to come in. I am not sure that's anything I can 
share about specific interviews in this kind of setting.
    Mr. Tiffany. People from countries of particular concern 
for terrorist activity, you mentioned a few of them, Yemen, 
Pakistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran have been 
coming. I witnessed it recently during my trip to the Darien 
Gap in Panama, and I would just say, when you talked about--
your quote was the source of the problem, which you cite in the 
Northern Triangle. I would go a little further south than that, 
because when I went down to Panama, I saw it down there.
    The invasion coming into the United States has exploded as 
a direct result of President Biden's promise to all comers that 
he will grant them unobstructed catch-and-release into the 
United States. Should Americans have national security concerns 
with the exponential increase in the worldwide migration 
occurring, as we speak, across our southern border?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, we represent--we consider 
security threats at the border to be an opportunity for 
potential terrorist activity. I would not want to leave you 
with the impression, though, that as we are sitting here, that 
we are tracking any specific credible terrorist threats coming 
from recent individuals crossing the border.
    Mr. Tiffany. That doesn't give me a lot of assurance when 
you have tens of thousands of people basically invading our 
country. The numbers are staggering. They're coming out every 
single day. That would not be reassuring to me if I heard that 
answer as an American.
    I want to go on to a second issue I'd like to cover, our 
two-tiered justice system. This is something I hear regularly 
back home. Time and again, Americans have witnessed justice 
being carried out in unequal ways. I'll give you a couple of 
examples: Secretary Hillary Clinton destroying evidence, no 
consequences; Hunter Biden allegedly lying on his firearms 
background investigation, no consequences; FBI attorney, former 
FBI attorney, you probably know him, Kevin Clinesmith, getting 
probation for lying to secure renewal applications to the FISA.
    On top of that, we have the amorous couple, Page and 
Strzok, who, I am sure you know, that were actively trying to 
put their fingers on the scales in an election in 2016. None of 
these citizens had their homes raided. They all have one thing 
in common: They are Democrats.
    Conversely, your agents have approached conservatives very 
differently. They've executed dramatic raids on the homes of 
Roger Stone, Paul Manafort, Rudy Giuliani, and were negligent 
in the investigation of General Flynn. These citizens all had 
one thing in common: They were Republicans.
    I am leading to a question that happened here in Wisconsin. 
A man named Bernell Trammell was murdered in broad daylight in 
Milwaukee last year. His sin was he was a Trump supporter. Now, 
earlier when you heard some people listing examples of 
minorities who have been killed here in the United States, 
which is a terrible thing, they never mentioned Bernell 
Trammell. African-American man from Milwaukee, well-known for 
going around his neighborhood, wearing a Trump shirt, showing a 
Trump sign, no one ever mentions him.
    It's my understanding his murderer is still at large, and 
the local government has remained quiet on this matter, despite 
actively encouraging anti-Trump rhetoric and protests all last 
year. A request was made to launch a Federal probe into Mr. 
Trammell's murder as it seems to have been politically 
motivated. Director Wray, have you answered that request and 
investigated that politically motivated hate crime of Bernell 
Trammell?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure that I can address that in this 
setting. Certainly, I am happy to follow up with our Milwaukee 
office to see what the status of that particular issue is. I 
don't know the circumstances well enough to be able to speak to 
it. I can assure you that we have one standard, and I've been 
crystal clear with our folks about that, and that's the way 
it's going to be as long as I am FBI Director.
    Mr. Tiffany. I hope you do that.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Tiffany. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back. Ms. Demings.
    Ms. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, it's good to see you again. I also want to 
thank you for protecting the American people and upholding the 
Constitution. As you well know, what happened on January 6th 
was shameful, it was disgraceful. I do believe that as a 
nation, we failed law enforcement, we failed the American 
people, we failed the Members of Congress, even those who 
scrambled on that day for their lives to exit the House floor, 
but now talk as if it wasn't that big of a deal. I also believe 
we failed the Vice President and his staff, and we failed 
congressional staff.
    Director Wray, you said you were just as outraged about 
what happened, but you said the report from the Norfolk FBI 
office was online chatter, that it was raw, unverified 
information, but you passed it on--and you made that quite 
clear several times today--to the Capitol Police.
    Director Wray, as you know, and I certainly do too, the FBI 
is viewed as a premier--the premier law enforcement agency, and 
other Federal, State, and local agencies look to you, and I 
think rightly so. It appears to me the FBI dismissed the 
information. It did not seem there was a sense of urgency. You 
simply passed it on, and if you did more than that, then I want 
to hear you talk about that.
    Let's talk about that information and what resulted. 
Officer Fanone was dragged and severely beaten. Officers 
sustained concussions. One officer lost the tip of his finger. 
Officers were beaten with baseball bats, poles, and ice, and 
two officers committed suicide. I guess that online chatter and 
unverified raw information was credible after all.
    Director Wray, there was a failure on that day, and I would 
like to hear from you what role the FBI played in that failure?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congresswoman, happy to take the question. 
So, I can think the most important thing I would say is that we 
did not dismiss the information in the Norfolk SIR, the Norfolk 
situational information report, in fact, quite the contrary. 
Often, when we get online chatter, or raw information, we take 
time, which would be our preference, to run it to ground and 
figure out whether it's real or not, because, as you can 
imagine, there's all kinds of chatter out there and some of 
it--
    Ms. Demings. Director Wray--
    Mr. Wray. Let me just--
    Ms. Demings. --this one was real. It was real.
    Mr. Wray. Yes, in this instance, rather than dismiss it, we 
distributed it to the Capitol Police, to the MPD, to the other 
partners on the Washington field office, Joint Terrorism Task 
Force. We did it in writing, through an email; and as if that 
wasn't enough, we then made a point of briefing it at the 
command post briefing that evening.
    As if that weren't enough, we put it in the portal so we 
could make sure that everybody got it, all which were actions 
that we wouldn't normally take, frankly, with raw, unverified 
information, but we thought the information was sufficiently 
concerning, that we erred on the side of caution and tried to 
pass it to the relevant people, not once, not twice, but three 
different ways, all in the span of about 24 hours.
    So, from our perspective, we did try to pass that 
information. Now, having said all of that, I don't want to 
leave you or any other Member of this Committee with the 
impression that we think that what happened on January 6th is 
okay. I am not the kind of guy, and I think you and I know each 
other well enough that I know that I am not. I don't use words 
like ``outrage'' lightly.
    Ms. Demings. Do you feel like the FBI did everything within 
your power to properly notify--because you didn't dismiss it, 
so you passed it on. There had to be some concern. Do you feel 
that you did everything within your power to adequately and 
properly notify law enforcement so that they would be 
adequately and properly prepared to deal with all hell breaking 
loose at the U.S. Capitol?
    Mr. Wray. So, anytime there is a successful attack, much 
less an attack of the kind of scale and significance that 
occurred on January 6th, you can be absolutely sure that we are 
asking what else we can do, what we can do better, what we can 
do more of, what we can do differently in terms of collecting 
information, analyzing it, and disseminating.
    I am not aware of information that we didn't share that we 
should have. I am concerned that we need to get better and 
better at developing human sources to be able to anticipate 
acts like this in the future. So, that's one of the things that 
we are looking at. We are going to be looking at a whole slew 
of things, because our goal is to bat 1,000, and we do not 
consider what happened to be--what happened on January 6th to 
be remotely acceptable, and we are determined to do our part 
with all our partners to make sure it never happens again.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time is expired.
    Ms. Demings. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Massie.
    Mr. Massie. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, as you know, the world's largest social 
media companies took the unprecedented step of canceling, 
blocking, or otherwise banning the President's social media 
accounts after January 6th. To the best of your knowledge, did 
anybody at the FBI or anybody representing the FBI, or any 
other branch of the U.S. Government consult with these social 
media companies before they took these actions?
    Mr. Wray. I am not aware of any such consultations, no.
    Mr. Massie. To the best of your knowledge, did the FBI or 
representatives of the FBI, or any other branch of the 
government, consult with the social media companies before they 
took the actions of canceling tens of thousands of accounts in 
that following week?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, I am not aware of any conversations 
the way you just described them. Certainly, we do engage with 
social media companies where we pass them information just like 
they pass us information, and sometimes information that we 
pass to social media companies prompts them to then, under 
their terms of service, take certain action. Whether that 
happened in this particular instance, I can't say because I 
don't know.
    Mr. Massie. So, you are not aware of any--
    Mr. Wray. I am not aware of any action of the sort you've 
described.
    Mr. Massie. From at least 2007-2016, the FBI conducted an 
investigation into evidence that the Saudi Government agents 
provided essential assistance to the first arriving 9/11 
hijackers, and the FBI and DOJ have publicly acknowledged that 
three Saudi Government agents are primary subjects of that 
investigation, which is named Operation Encore.
    We passed a law in Congress, JASTA, to ensure that the 9/
11's family's case against Saudi Arabia could proceed. The 9/11 
families issued a subpoena in 2018 for records from the FBI's 
9/11 investigative files that are critical to that lawsuit.
    According to lawyers for those families of the victims, the 
FBI has refused to search its complete files for responsive 
documents, claiming it would be too burdensome to do so, and 
the FBI has withheld certain key documents and significantly 
redacted others, despite the fact that the records concern 
events that occurred 20 years ago.
    Will you commit today that the FBI will conduct a review of 
all its relevant 9/11 files on an expedited basis to identify 
documents relevant to the families' lawsuit and to produce them 
to the fullest extent possible without sacrificing justice for 
the victims in the name of diplomacy?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I will make sure that our folks are doing 
everything they possibly can be consistent with our 
responsibilities. Obviously, there are matters that involve 
classified information. There are matters that involve grand 
jury information. I do know that the Justice Department has 
asserted the State's secrets privilege, and that I understand 
that that's been upheld by both the magistrate judge and the 
district judge about some information.
    I also know, though, and I think this is important for me 
to add, that we have produced and worked diligently to produce 
thousands of documents including ones that have rarely been 
released. I would not want to leave this exchange without 
telling you how much I care about this issue. The families of 
the 9/11 victims matter deeply to me, and I know they're 
frustrated.
    Mr. Massie. Thank you.
    Let me ask you then, would you commit to formally request 
that the DNI review documents that the FBI has withheld from 
the families to determine if they can be released in the public 
interest as she is authorized to do pursuant to Executive Order 
13256?
    Mr. Wray. I am happy to take a look with the DNI and others 
to see if there's more information that can be declassified.
    Mr. Massie. Okay. Real quickly, the NICS background check, 
which the FBI runs, according to the GAO, in 2017 there were 
112,000 denials, and only twelve U.S. attorney offices' 
prosecutions. Now, I don't want you to impugn the DOJ, or the 
ATF are only prosecuting twelve out of 112,000 of these 
denials. What's obvious here is that there are some false 
denials; in fact, probably a large majority of these denials 
are false denials.
    According to John Lott who worked at the DOJ, because of 
similarities in surnames, and first names among racial and 
ethnic groups, Black Americans are three times more likely to 
get a false denial and Hispanics are two times more likely to 
get a false denial than Caucasians. Are you aware of this?
    Mr. Wray. I am not aware of Mr. Lott's findings.
    Mr. Massie. Would it concern you if there was racial 
disparity and that law-abiding Black Americans and Hispanic 
Americans were being deprived of their right to self-defense?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I would be concerned about false denials, 
and certainly, I would be concerned about racial disparity. You 
mentioned the--
    Mr. Massie. Will you commit to investigating whether there 
is racial disparity in the NICS background check results?
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I am happy to look further into the issue. I 
might have my staff follow up with yours to see--make sure that 
we have the same information that you are referring to. 
Certainly, you've raised issues that I'd want to look into 
further.
    Mr. Massie. Thank you, Director Wray. I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, I also want to thank you and your colleagues 
for your work in protecting Americans on a daily basis. I sit 
on Homeland Security, and I have a special appreciation for 
your work.
    If I can then turn our attention a little bit to 
cybersecurity. You mentioned that part of your job was to 
protect us from foreign nations like China and Russia, a very 
difficult job, an important job, and a job that our national 
security depends on you doing it right the first time around.
    Mr. Wray, if I can talk a little bit about the SolarWinds 
attack, that attack began as early as March 2020 and allowed 
Russian intelligence to access critical data and the breach 
went on for a number of months. This, Mr. Wray, was a major 
breach. It accessed many Federal agencies as well as the 
private sector, and it went undetected for a number of months. 
Mr. Wray, why did it take so long for our Federal investigators 
to detect this breach?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the SolarWinds breach, or intrusion, that 
you are referring to, I think it's fair to say, is one of the 
most sophisticated cyber campaigns ever, and it is a sobering 
reminder of the lengths our adversaries are willing to go to. I 
say that because the SVR, and we've now publicly attributed it 
to the Russian SVR, was basically clandestinely inserting a few 
lines of malicious code in widely used software, a widely used 
software update that with tens--that has tens of thousands of 
lines of legitimate code all to--even though ultimately only 
targeted about 100 or so for future exploitation.
    I think that SolarWinds intrusion highlights the importance 
of the private sector engagement piece. The FBI, on our end, 
can pursue appropriate investigations, but what we can't do is 
just sit on networks and wait and look just in case. So, we are 
aggressively investigating. Yeah.
    Mr. Correa. Sir, if I can ask you a follow-up question. I 
refuse to accept the fact that the Russians are better than us 
at cyber. So, my question is, have you seen any evidence, of 
internal obstruction, or any internal assistance that would 
help to hide or impede the investigation into this cyber 
breach?
    Mr. Wray. Any obstruction? I am sorry. I am not sure I am 
following the question. You mean by the company--
    Mr. Correa. Have you seen any evidence within the Federal 
government--
    Mr. Wray. Oh, I see.
    Mr. Correa. --of people assisting or obstructing, hiding 
this kind of attack on our Nation?
    Mr. Wray. I am not aware that I've seen anybody hiding the 
attack. Like I said, this was a very sophisticated attack, and 
I think we've aggressively made progress on it and sanctions 
have been imposed now. I think something like 38 different 
countries have joined us in different forms of messaging in 
support of our attribution of this to the Russian SVR.
    Mr. Correa. I would say, Director Wray, that we are in a 
very tough situation, given that such a major breach occurred 
in our Federal government. Recently, the Biden Administration 
signed an Executive Order--President Biden signed an Executive 
Order to improve the Nation's cybersecurity and to increase 
Federal capabilities to respond and get Federal agencies to 
better coordinate the records in this area. Can you speak as to 
how the FBI is working to implement this Executive Order?
    Mr. Wray. So, I think what the executive order really 
highlights is the whole-of-government approach, and frankly, 
the whole-of-society approach that we need to take to the cyber 
threat. The FBI, I have heard some people refer to 
cybersecurity and the cyber threat as the ultimate team sport, 
and in this case, the team includes not just the Federal 
government and various Federal agencies each playing its own 
role, but very importantly, the private sector, where something 
like 85-90 percent, as you may know from your other Committee 
assignment, of our critical infrastructure is in the hands of 
the private sector.
    Then, when you add on top of that Americans' personal 
identifying information, PII, it's probably even higher than 
that that's in the private sector. Certainly, our innovation, 
which is targeted by adversaries like China, even higher than 
that. So, in our country, configured the way we are, private 
sector engagement is the key.
    Mr. Correa. Sir, if I may very quickly say that you are 
right, 80-90 percent is private sector, but this breach was of 
the Federal government, and I believe even your FBI files may 
have been compromised.
    So, I am hoping in my last few seconds here to say that I 
look forward to continuing to work with you, both in this 
Committee and Homeland Security, to make sure that this does 
not occur again. Again, I refuse to accept the fact that either 
Russia or China has better cyber capabilities than the United 
States.
    With that, Mr. Chair, I yield.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Steube.
    Mr. Wray. Mr. Chair, may I very quickly respond to that 
last part?
    Chair Nadler. Yes, the gentleman may respond.
    Mr. Wray. First, I totally agree that the Russians and the 
Chinese are not better than we are, and you and I are aligned 
on that; second, FBI systems were not compromised in the way 
that some of the other Federal agencies were; and third, when I 
refer to the private sector in the context of SolarWinds, it's 
important to know that the software update that was the vehicle 
through which the Federal government was compromised was a 
private sector organization, and that's what I meant by 
referring to the private sector in that context. Thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is--the gentleman yields 
back.
    Mr. Steube.
    Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, in your opening statement you described the 
January 6th protest as, quote, ``an angry mob attempting to,'' 
quote, ``undermine our institutions of government.'' You then 
went on to paint BLM and antifa violence as, quote, ``peaceful, 
lawful protests'' that, quote, ``others'' quote, ``exploited to 
pursue violence.'' Why do you feel that you need to qualify 
antifa and BLM violence as exploiting otherwise peaceful 
protest, but you didn't do the same for January 6th?
    Mr. Wray. Well, when I was referring to the civil unrest 
and the violence that occurred among the civil unrest, I was 
speaking obviously of a period that covered an entire summer 
and protests across multiple cities; whereas, of course, in the 
January 6th instance, we are talking about a single event of 
massive significance, however, in the course of one afternoon.
    As I alluded to in response to earlier questions, there 
were--I think I've already said a couple times this morning, 
that there were, on January 6th, not people who were under 
investigation but there were peaceful protesters who were 
rowdy, and then there were the other two groups, and it's the 
other two groups that we are investigating and bringing 
criminal charges against.
    Mr. Steube. In one of those on January 6th that was in the 
Capitol, Ashli Babbitt, an unarmed protester, and Air Force 
veteran, was shot and killed in the Capitol by a police 
officer. Director Wray, yes or no, was the FBI involved in the 
investigation into Ashli Babbitt's killing?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure I can answer that. I know that the 
decision to close the investigation was made by DOJ.
    Mr. Steube. Well--
    Mr. Wray. The officer involved was not--
    Mr. Steube. --and you were involved in it, then you can 
answer whether the FBI was involved in it or not.
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure that we were involved in that one, 
but I just sitting here right now, I can't remember for sure, 
so I don't want to misspeak.
    Mr. Steube. Okay. Well, on June 2, 2020, just days after 
the George Floyd incidents--incident, you gave a press 
conference in which you detailed the ways the FBI would assist 
with the Floyd investigation. Subsequently, the DOJ brought 
civil rights charges under 18 U.S.C. 242 against the officers 
involved.
    May 7, 2021, press release DOJ publicly commended the FBI 
for its investigative efforts on the Floyd case. Yet, in Ashli 
Babbitt's case, where civil rights charges under 18 U.S.C. 242 
were also being considered by DOJ, the FBI didn't assist at 
all, and you are not sure that you were even involved in this 
investigation. So, why did the FBI assist with the 
investigation of George Floyd's death, but not into Ashli 
Babbitt's death that occurred in the Capitol complex?
    Mr. Wray. Well, our decision to assist in the George Floyd 
case was based on obviously discussions with the civil rights 
division under the prior Administration and the Justice 
Department there. The Ashli Babbitt case, I am not trying to 
create more confusion than is warranted. I am just--sitting 
here right now, I can't tell you for sure what role, if any, we 
played in that decision. That's all I can really say on that 
one.
    Mr. Steube. Well, if you are not sure, then it obviously 
wasn't a very active role if you are not sure what involvement 
the FBI had on that.
    Mr. Wray. I wouldn't--I am not sure I would say that, sir. 
We actually have 37,000 employees conducting thousands and 
thousands of investigations, and though I do my best to try to 
stay on top of as many of them as I can, sitting here right 
now, in the span of everything we are talking about I can't say 
for sure whether or not we were involved.
    Mr. Steube. January 6th and how you were in the command 
center. So, you would probably know if the FBI was involved in 
an investigation that occurred in an officer-involved shooting 
of an unarmed person on the Capitol complex if you were 
involved.
    Mr. Wray. As I said, we've had hundreds of investigations--
    Mr. Steube. On the FBI's most wanted website, there's an 
entire section entitled ``Capitol Violence'' targeting 
individuals who came to protest in DC on January 6th. 
Comparatively, little or no attention is paid to violent BLM 
and antifa extremism. BLM and antifa attacked the White House 
with President Trump inside of it last May, and laid siege to 
the Mark O. Hatfield Federal Courthouse in Portland last 
summer, and the FBI doesn't seem interested at all. Can you 
explain what would appear to be a politically motivated 
discrepancy on the FBI's most wanted website?
    Mr. Wray. We used social media and putting out information 
and videos to the public, much as we have with January 6th, in 
connection with the violence among the civil unrest over the 
summer. We got thousands and thousands of tips from the public 
in relation to the violence over the summer and followed up on 
them. In both cases, we used almost all 56 field offices. In 
both instances, we opened hundreds of investigations. In both 
instances, we conducted hundreds of arrests. We consider them 
both extremely serious.
    As I've said several times over the course of this hearing 
today, we have one standard. I don't care whether you are upset 
at our criminal justice system or whether you are upset at our 
elections; there's a right way and a wrong way in this country 
to do it under the First Amendment. Committing violence, 
assaulting Federal law enforcement, and destroying property is 
not the way to do it, and that's my standard for the FBI.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Steube. This seems to be a very--
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Ms. Scanlon.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you, Chair.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for being here today.
    Chair Nadler. Your mike.
    Ms. Scanlon. I want to focus my questions on foreign 
influence in our elections over the last several cycles and how 
that's contributed to the rise of extremist violence which you 
highlighted in your opening remarks.
    I am particularly interested in how Russia's escalating 
disin-
formation campaigns attacking the integrity of our American 
elections and our government contributed to the January 6th 
attack on this building, those who serve here, the brave 
officers who protect it, and the very foundations of our 
government.
    I am interested in the role that Russian disinformation and 
the use of American proxies in spreading that disinformation is 
playing in continuing efforts to contest Mr. Trump's loss of 
the 2020 election, and efforts by State legislators to enact 
laws inspired by conspiracy theories and lies about election 
fraud.
    Now, Russian disinformation is a particular concern for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, which I represent, because our 
election system, and even our electoral college votes have been 
attacked repeatedly by Russian agents and their domestic 
proxies, spreading propaganda and outright lies. The fact and 
the extent of those attacks has been detailed by multiple 
judicial, law enforcement, intelligence, and bipartisan 
congressional investigations, including the special counsel's 
report in 2019, the bipartisan Senate intelligence report last 
August, the indictment of more than a dozen Russian Government 
agents, and the National Intelligence Council's report on 
foreign threats to the 2020 elections in March of this year.
    Since this propaganda appears to have motivated people to 
participate in the ``Stop the Steal'' rally and the attack on 
the Capitol, and continues to motivate efforts in our State 
legislature to make it harder to vote, I'd like to direct your 
testimony to the longstanding and apparently continuing Russian 
efforts to undermine American confidence in our elections.
    To start, I would like to get one thing off the table, the 
difference between election interference and election 
influence. As I understand it, referring to your prior 
testimony and the National Intelligence Council's report, 
election interference is defined as efforts to manipulate the 
mechanical aspects of voting, such as voter registration and 
election results. Is that right?
    Mr. Wray. That sounds right. I don't have the report in 
front of me, but I agree with you that it is important to make 
the distinction between interference and influence.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you. Well, I can give you a copy of the 
report if you'd like. I am not going to get that far into it. 
Specifically, the March report said there was, quote, ``no 
evidence,'' end quote, not through intelligence collection on 
the foreign actors themselves nor through physical security and 
cybersecurity monitoring of voting systems across the country, 
not through post-election audits, and not through any other 
means that a foreign government, or other actors had 
compromised election infrastructure to manipulate election 
results. Do you stand by that conclusion?
    Mr. Wray. We contributed obviously to the national 
intelligence estimate and stand by that estimate.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you. So, my concern is not fictitious 
election interference, which we know didn't happen, but actual 
election influence, which is propaganda designed to impact 
public opinion, and notably the longstanding Russian efforts to 
undermine public confidence in election processes and results 
by claiming that voting systems have been compromised.
    You said in your testimony before Homeland Security in 2020 
that what concerns you the most is the steady drumbeat of 
misinformation. Americans can and should have confidence in our 
election system, and certainly our democracy, but you are 
worried that people will have a feeling of futility because of 
all the noise and confusion that's generated.
    Should we still be concerned about a drumbeat of Russian 
misinformation propaganda that our elections are vulnerable to 
widespread fraud or manipulation?
    Mr. Wray. I think that the drumbeat of misinformation from 
our adversaries, not just the Russians but now also the 
Iranians, for example, is something that we absolutely should 
be concerned about. I think the country has made significant 
strides not just in protecting our election infrastructure from 
interference, back to your distinction there a minute ago, but, 
also, in highlighting the prevalence of misinformation.
    So, I do think, as a general matter, the country is getting 
wiser to misinformation, and social media companies have 
started to play a more responsible role than they used to in 
helping to counter that. Just as we are upping our game, our 
adversaries are upping their game too.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you. One thing that's become more clear 
over the course of your testimony in the March report is that 
there was a shift in Russian tactics in 2020, and they began to 
deploy their propaganda using domestic social media, and I 
believe the quote is, U.S. officials and prominent U.S. 
individuals, some of whom were close to former President Trump.
    Certainly, Mr. Trump and many of his supporters have 
promoted conspiracy theories that claim without evidence that 
we cannot trust our election results. Can you comment on 
whether since the 2020 election, Russia continues to promote 
propaganda and lies about the integrity of our elections and 
whether they're continuing to use U.S. proxies?
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time is expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. I would just say that Russian efforts at disin-
formation in this country continue. It's a 365-day-a-year 
phenomenon. Beyond that, that's really probably all I can say 
right now.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you. I would seek unanimous consent to 
place in the record the March 2021 report from the National 
Intelligence Council on foreign threats to the 2020 U.S. 
foreign elections. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

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                       MS. SCANLON FOR THE RECORD

=======================================================================

	[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back. Mr. Fitzgerald.
    Mr. Fitzgerald. Director Wray, on May 14, 2021, yourself as 
Director of the FBI and the Secretary of DHS, in consultation 
with Director of National Intelligence jointly produced the 
report containing the strategic assessment and data on domestic 
terrorism.
    Of note, the FBI finally designated the 2017 shooting of 
Congressional Republicans as an Act of domestic terrorism 
carried out by a domestic violent extremist, rather than 
suicide by cop, as the FBI initially had classified the 
shooting. How did the FBI initially reach its conclusion that 
the attack was suicide by cop, and who made the determination 
and then, ultimately, why was there a change, do you believe?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I appreciate the question. So, 
as you may know, after a very thoughtful conversation I had 
with Congressman Wenstrup in April, I asked my team to go back 
and take a hard look at that particular shooting.
    I think what we found is that from the time that I first 
arrived as Director, the FBI's understanding of domestic 
violent extremism has evolved. More and more we see domestic 
violent extremists motivated by mixes or almost mishmashes of 
ideological, sociopolitical, and personal grievances.
    I think the shooter at the baseball practice that day, back 
in 2017, is fairly considered an early example of that 
phenomenon. So, that's part of why I want it to be clear that 
the FBI considers that shooting an Act of domestic terrorism, 
that we look at it under the umbrella of domestic violent 
extremism, and that if it--same thing had occurred today, we 
would absolutely open it as a domestic terrorist investigation. 
We tried to make that explicit, both directly to Congressman 
Wenstrup and in the report, which you referred to, which we 
formally transmitted to Congress.
    Mr. Fitzgerald. So, would you consider that a change in 
posture by the FBI on domestic terrorists overall?
    Mr. Wray. Well, it's part of a--I don't know about posture, 
but it's part of a more evolved understanding of the way in 
which domestic violent extremism affects this country. We are 
seeing much more often now not people who commit attacks based 
on some nice, neat, cookie-cutter ideology, and this is their 
sole motivation, but rather, people who take bits and pieces of 
things together with some personal beef and then attack.
    We consider that to be, in many ways, the most increasingly 
common form of domestic violent extremism. So, again, I would 
view it not so much a change in posture as that attack was one 
of the earlier versions of this phenomenon that is quite 
rampant now.
    Like just the other day, we had these folks in Minneapolis, 
for example, who were so-called Boogaloo boys, but they were 
ultimately charged with trying to provide material support to 
Hamas. We had a guy the other day who was subscribing to 
various Islamist violent extremism but also considered himself 
a neo-Nazi.
    Then with all of them wrapped up with them, you have these 
people who blend into it personal agendas, having nothing to do 
with ideology at all. So, when you put all that together in 
sort of a salad bar of motivations, we think it's fair to look 
at something like the Simpson field shooter as a domestic 
violent extremist, a domestic terrorist. That's why, again, if 
it would happen today, I think we would certainly consider that 
part and parcel of what we call domestic terrorism.
    Mr. Fitzgerald. So, since the George Floyd incident, 
there's been hundreds of flare-ups domestically in many of the 
large municipalities throughout the Nation. It was a long, hot 
summer last summer. What is the approach that the FBI is taking 
as we--here we are at the beginning of June--as we look 
forward, and what is the approach that the FBI is using with 
those types of domestic flare-ups that we are seeing, again, 
across the Nation?
    Mr. Wray. Well, we are latched up very tightly with our 
State and local partners. When I go, and I've been to all 56 of 
our field offices, most of them more than once, I am almost at 
all of them at least twice now, I've met with law enforcement 
from all 50 States, chiefs, sheriffs, commissioners, colonels, 
et cetera, and we are all very concerned about the rise in 
violent crime, the homicide rates in particular. We all think 
that, in some ways, the summer could be the worst yet to come 
in a while.
    So, through our safe streets task forces, through on the 
terrorism side, our joint terrorism task forces, our violent 
crime gang task forces, a whole variety of ways we are working, 
trying to be latched up very tightly with our State and local 
partners to do our part. Again, the FBI is just one part of a 
broader law enforcement response, to try to make sure that we 
do our best to protect our neighborhoods.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Fitzgerald. Yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Garcia.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    First, I want to thank Director Wray for coming to visit 
with us again. I know it's been a long day, but just take a 
deep breath. We are almost there. There's just a few more of us 
to go. I want to first thank you and your 37,000 employees for 
the great job that you do in keeping America safe.
    I just want to first associate myself with all the concerns 
that many of us have raised about the January 6th incident and 
everything that has happened. I think that it would be 
important for us to continue a full investigation. That's why I 
do support a 9/11-type commission so that we can get an 
investigation top to bottom, to make sure we find out who is 
responsible, holding them accountable, and taking steps so it 
doesn't happen again. So, hopefully, the FBI can play a role in 
that as we continue forward.
    I want to change the focus now on some of the hate crime 
issues that I have seen generally across America, but here in 
my city of Houston. Let me be clear: It is inherently un-
American and unconscionable for anyone to discriminate against 
another because of the color of your skin, or where they're 
from. Yet, here in Houston, just this last month, we've seen 
two incidents that tell me that we are not doing enough.
    On May 14, a bus driver who refused to get off a bus, 
attacked the Hispanic bus driver saying he hates wetbacks, 
which you may know is a very derogatory term. Several charges 
were filed with an enhancement to a hate crime. Now, this was 
February 14th. Two days later, May 16th at a mall where they 
had one of these carnivals that come and go, a group of 
carnival workers punched and kicked a man after they pulled him 
out of his vehicle and yelled racial slurs. They told the 
victim that they do not like, quote, ``Black people and they 
threatened to hang him.''
    Two reported incidents almost back-to-back, and both 
charges were filed for some other things, and they were all 
enhanced to hate crimes. This tells me that it's still 
happening and happening too much.
    Our police department's hate crime report indicates that in 
Houston, the hate crimes have almost tripled in the last 50 
years. Many of the crimes here in Houston have been formulated 
to attacks against Latinos for as this--the instance that I 
mentioned on May 14th of people thinking they're, 
quote,``wetbacks''unquote.
    So, my question to you is, is this a trend that you are 
seeing nationally of more attacks against Latinos or 
immigrants; and if so, what has that cost you to do to 
reallocate your resources and to make sure that the FBI has 
what they need to investigate?
    I am sure my compadre, Veronica Escobar, would like for me 
to talk about the most horrific about the hate crimes, which 
was the gun shooting in El Paso. What are you all doing to step 
it up, to make sure that we protect everyone no matter where 
they're from?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I appreciate the question. Hate crimes are 
certainly a high priority for us. We, in fact, had a--from 
fiscal years 2019-2020, a 63 percent increase in FBI hate 
crimes investigations opened. This year, fiscal year 2021, we 
have had the highest number of hate crime investigations 
initiated in the past five years. So, yeah, that's about 307 or 
so hate crimes investigations pending, and they cover the 
waterfront.
    You also heard me refer earlier to the domestic terrorism 
hate crimes fusion cell that we created to try to capture the 
synergy between those two, so that's part of it. As far as--and 
we also do a lot and we are trying to do a lot to engage with 
the community and with State and local law enforcement, because 
one of the things we know about hate crimes really across the 
gamut is that they are historically underreported. So, a big 
part of it is trying to get--
    Ms. Garcia. My question was, have you seen an increase in 
attacks against Latinos, and what are you doing to reallocate 
your resources to get to the root causes of that?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am not sure about root--investigating 
root causes. We are investigating hate crimes, including 
against Latinos. I don't have the figures for you about 
increases by a demographic, but--yeah.
    Ms. Garcia. Well, let me move on because you also 
mentioned, because my concern is that if you don't do enough, 
then we'll see what happens here in Houston that even victims 
don't report because they're scared, number one, and two, 
there's language barriers, and they don't see enough outreach 
from the FBI for people not being able to know.
    You told us earlier, you want to--if we see something, we 
need to say something. Unless you tell that to people in 
Spanish, or you make sure you let them know that if they're 
victims of crimes, that they should report it, it's just not 
going to happen.
    Mr. Wray. I agree that public outreach is important.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time expired. The Witness 
may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. Certainly, for example, with the rise in hate 
crimes against the Jewish community, we have, for example, in 
New York, done an advertising campaign recently both in Hebrew 
and in Yiddish to try to make sure we are reaching people 
there. So, it may be that a similar approach is underway from 
the relevant field offices. I know in El Paso, I personally 
visited the crime scene myself as a measure of how seriously I 
take that attack.
    Ms. Garcia. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    Ms. Fischbach.
    Ms. Fischbach. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to yield 
my time to the Ranking Member, Mr. Jordan.
    Mr. Jordan. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
    Director, it always seems that the leaks from our 
institutions in government agencies benefit Democrats. I mean, 
we just had the--as Mr. Bishop pointed out, we just had the 
fact that the IRS leaked personal tax returns of U.S. citizens. 
It just happened to be at the time that Democrats are trying to 
raise taxes on the American people.
    Then, of course, there's what happened if--someone from the 
FBI or DOJ leaking information about the fact that Mr. DeJoy, 
at least has been reported, that Mr. DeJoy is under 
investigation, under investigation for, if you can believe 
what's written in the press, for alleged campaign finance 
violations that took place between 2004 and 2015. So, even if 
he did it, it seems to me the statute of limitations has run.
    So, I want to ask about that in particular. Is there an 
internal investigation at the Justice Department, or more 
specifically, at the FBI? I know you have an inspections 
division. This is the division on--my understanding that looked 
into Andy McCabe's issue when he leaked information that he 
shouldn't have leaked. Is there some kind of internal 
investigation going on?
    Mr. Wray. Well, as you by now, have probably come to expect 
from me, Congressman, of course, I can't confirm any specific 
investigations, but what I can tell you--
    Mr. Jordan. No, I am not talking about an investigation 
that the FBI is--I am talking about an internal investigation 
to actions that someone in your division may have leaked 
information to the press regarding the Postmaster General.
    Mr. Wray. Likewise, I wouldn't confirm a specific 
investigation. Our inspection division has a unit dedicated to 
internal investigations, and we've put some of our best people 
in it because of how important it is. We also have, that I 
stood up in the last Administration, in our counterintelligence 
division, a dedicated leak unit to pursue criminal 
investigations where that is appropriate. In some cases, they 
work with each other, because there's an administrative side 
and a criminal side. Really that's all I can say. I can't 
really confirm specific investigations.
    Mr. Jordan. No, I understand. You've given that answer that 
to us, and I get that. You've given that answer to us a 
thousand times a day and a thousand times in the other times 
you testified. I understand that. We are talking about the 
Postmaster General of the United States. We are talking about 
the tax returns of the American--of American citizens, again, 
all conveniently timed, it seems to me.
    I mean, last summer the Democrats--many of the Democrats 
called for the Postmaster General to step down. They left had 
all kinds of protesters at his house last summer and the whole 
debate about mail-in voting. Then we see this story sort of out 
of nowhere that supposedly he's under investigation. I just was 
curious if you'd tell us if it's internal.
    Does the FBI give critical race theory training to your 
agents and employees?
    Mr. Wray. Not to my knowledge. We certainly provide 
different kinds of diversity training just like almost any 
organization these days, but certainly, I've never heard of any 
kind of critical race theory training.
    Mr. Jordan. Is that a yes or no? Is there a critical race 
theory training going on at the FBI? Yes or no?
    Mr. Wray. My answer is, not that I am aware of.
    Mr. Jordan. Not that you are aware of, okay. How about the 
issue of this--Washington Post reported back in April that the 
FBI sent, quote, ``geofence search warrants to Google and got 
information about January 6th,'' phone numbers of folks here on 
Capitol Hill, and that include Members and staff and others who 
were authorized to be in the Capitol on that date.
    How did you distinguish--it's our understanding, according 
to the news reports, there's an exclusion list of folks who 
were supposed to be in the Capitol that day. How is that all 
being handled? How did you determine who's on the exclusion 
list? Who isn't? How did you get that information? What are you 
doing with that information now, particularly the phone numbers 
and identifying phones of Members of Congress and staff who are 
supposed to be on Capitol Hill?
    Mr. Wray. So, I think you anticipated probably the most 
important part in your question, which is, again, and I want to 
be careful not to talk about any specific investigation, but 
the geolocation data that we are talking about is, again, it 
doesn't identify a person. It identifies a device.
    So, one of the first things we needed to do, because on 
January 6th itself our focus was on trying to secure you all 
and the facility, so we weren't arresting people here on site. 
So, after the fact we needed to figure out who was here by 
looking at the list of device numbers.
    Then with that, we needed to be able to get from--and I 
think we got it from the Capitol Police, but I am not sure 
about that, a list of who was, as you said, supposed to be here 
so that we could exclude those people and focus on the 
numbers--
    Mr. Jordan. We know that--
    Mr. Wray. --of people that were not supposed to be here, 
and then using those numbers, then start to pursue logical 
investigative leads on the people who were not supposed to be 
here.
    Mr. Jordan. No, I appreciate that, and thank you. Some 
people who were supposed to be here we know were subsequently 
called by the FBI, and they were staff on Capitol Hill. That's 
because you didn't know? You were finding out? I mean, what was 
going on there?
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time is expired. The 
gentleman may--the Witness may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, I don't want to speak to any 
specific investigation, but our reasons for going to interview 
witnesses about things are a lot more than geolocation data. 
So, it may have been that we saw a video footage of somebody, 
and we think this person saw something in this place, or some 
witness told us go talk to this person because they know what 
happened over here.
    So, there's a whole host of reasons why we would have gone 
to interview somebody that might have nothing to do with 
geolocation data. So, I can't really speak to any specific 
person who--
    Mr. Jordan. The exclusion--
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time is expired.
    Mr. Neguse.
    Mr. Neguse. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, first, I want to say thank you for your 
testimony, and I want to thank you as well for your service to 
our country.
    Several years ago, as you might be aware, a young man named 
Elijah McClain died in Colorado, my State, after being placed 
into two chokeholds by police officers, and then being 
administered ketamine by paramedics during the arrest.
    Nearly one year ago, on June 30th of 2020, the Colorado 
U.S. Attorney's Office, the Department of Justice, and the 
Denver Division of the FBI announced that in 2019, they had 
begun reviewing the facts of this case for potential Federal 
civil rights investigation.
    I'll quote from their statement. They said, quote, ``The 
standard practice of the DOJ is to not disclose the existence 
or progress of investigations. However, there are specific 
cases in which doing so is warranted if such information is in 
the best interest of the public and public safety. Recent 
attention on the death of Elijah McClain warrants such 
disclosure,'' end quote.
    Given that statement, Director Wray, can you confirm 
whether the DOJ has opened a Federal civil rights investigation 
into this matter?
    Mr. Wray. I would need to consult with the Department about 
what information we can provide in response to that question, 
but I am happy to have my staff circle back to you after we've 
done that.
    Mr. Neguse. Thank you. I appreciate that, Director Wray, 
and we'll follow up with your team.
    As I mentioned, Mr. McClain was administered the ketamine 
by EMS personnel. In your opinion, are there any acceptable, 
nonmedical reasons for law enforcement officers to administer 
or encourage attending EMS personnel to use sedatives or other 
medications to subdue a person under arrest?
    Mr. Wray. I am really not comfortable trying to answer a 
hypothetical that cuts across such a broad range of possible 
scenarios, so I am afraid I am going to have to decline to 
really offer much on that particular subject. I am not sure I 
am the right person to speak to it.
    Mr. Neguse. Well, I appreciate that, Director Wray. I would 
just simply say, in my opinion, it's not acceptable for law 
enforcement to administer--EMS personnel to be administering 
ketamine to subdue a person under arrest outside of a hospital 
setting. It's why we'll be introducing legislation to ensure 
that ketamine is used for medical purposes only and not as a 
tool for restraint. We look forward to working with the FBI and 
other law enforcement agencies on that legislation.
    I want to turn to a different topic, which my colleague, 
Representative Cicilline touched on earlier, you'll recall, 
Director Wray, during the morning portion of today's hearing, 
which is the epidemic of gun violence in America.
    On March 22nd of this year, a gunman killed 10 people, 
including a police officer at a grocery store in my district, 
Boulder, Colorado, allegedly using an AR-15-style pistol which 
fired rifled rounds and had been modified with an arm brace. 
The AR pistol brace attachment, as you know, allows a shooter 
to fire an easily concealable pistol with rifle-like accuracy 
and firepower.
    I would like you, Director Wray, if you might, to describe, 
in your view, how these types of weapons, these short-barreled 
rifles, can pose additional risk to law enforcement and 
ultimately to a community.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I appreciate the question, Congressman. 
First, just to be clear, I don't want to be weighing in on 
specific legislative proposals. From a law enforcement 
perspective, and, of course, there are a variety of different 
types of high-powered or high-capacity type weapons that are 
out there, those are things that can be of particular concern 
to--any time there's an operation that law enforcement is 
conducting, it's something that we have to be particularly 
mindful of.
    Of course, this hits particularly close to home for me and 
for us at the FBI, because the two special agents that I 
mentioned in my opening, Laura Schwarzenberger and Dan Alfin, 
were shot and killed by an individual child pornography subject 
using an AR-style weapon. He killed those two agents and 
injured four others who, thankfully, have survived.
    So, it's an illustration of how the wrong weapon in the 
wrong hands is something that we should all be deeply concerned 
about.
    Mr. Neguse. I appreciate that, Director Wray, and we 
certainly grieve and mourn with you for the agents that you've 
lost and for their families. We recognize their great sacrifice 
and service to our country. I share your concern, and I think 
many here on Capitol Hill do as well.
    It's why the Biden Administration's decision, at least with 
respect to the short-barreled rifles and assault pistols, 
regulations that they now--the President has asked the ATF to 
issue. I joined the President and Attorney General Garland at a 
press conference not that long ago, about seven weeks ago, 
regarding that step. I think it was an important step and moves 
us in the right direction.
    I think there's clearly other steps that we need to take as 
Congress to ensure that these weapons of war are not in our 
community, so that we can keep the entire community, including 
Members of law enforcement, safe.
    With that, I thank you again, Director Wray. I would yield 
back the balance of my time, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Scanlon. [Presiding.] The Chair recognizes 
representative Owens for five minutes. Can you unmute?
    Mr. Owens. Sorry. Okay. According to USA Today, last year, 
2020, United States counted more than 20,000 murders, the 
highest total since 1995, and 4,000 more than 2019. Preliminary 
FBI data for 2020 points to a 25 percent surge in murders, the 
highest single year increase since the agency began publishing 
uniform data in 1960.
    For the record, hate is hate. Hate is evil regardless of 
the color. To the victims of hate and their families, it makes 
no difference the color of the perpetrator. The result is the 
same: Death. Looking at the numbers, I am going to guess that 
White on Black crimes are up, Black on White crimes are up, 
Black on Asian crimes are up, attacks against Hispanics and 
Jewish community are up, and for sure, Black on Black crime is 
up.
    Ninty percent of the Black crimes perpetrated on Black 
Americans are done by other Blacks. This evil of hate has 
become so prevalent, that too many Americans, both Black and 
White, simply shrug their shoulders, think it's normal, and 
turn the page.
    I keep hearing from my friends across the aisle about White 
supremacy. Based on the unconscionable high death tally of 
Black Americans in their own communities, it's evident that 
evil White supremacist is not the greatest threat. Are evil 
Black perpetrators, predators leading among us?
    I ask my fellow lawmakers not to continue to think this 
plague of evil is normal, shrug our shoulders, and turn the 
page. It's time for us to work together to end the policies 
that is keeping too many poor Black Americans, living mostly in 
urban cities, living in fear, illiteracy, joblessness, 
hopelessness, and anger.
    With that, I want to turn the remainder of my time over to 
Mr. Jordan.
    Mr. Jordan. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I 
appreciate his important points.
    Director, earlier you said, and I think I am quoting 
accurately here, we pass information back and forth with social 
media companies. Can you explain that, because, I mean, just 
read maybe out of context, I think people have concerns about 
that. Can you tell me what that means?
    Mr. Wray. I appreciate the question. As I think back to my 
answer to that question, I was fearful that it might get 
misconstrued, so I appreciate you asking. What I was referring 
to is a couple different things, so, one, in connection with 
foreign misinformation, election influence stuff from, for 
example, the Russians, there have been instances where we will, 
based on intelligence we've received from overseas or other 
places, pass that to social media companies saying, hey, we 
know this particular account is actually controlled by some 
Russian troll farm, for example. Then social media companies 
then take action against that account. They then do their own 
international investigation, and that then sometimes leads them 
to--
    Mr. Jordan. Are we talking about a foreigner or an 
American?
    Mr. Wray. What's that?
    Mr. Jordan. Are we talking about a person, and if we are 
talking about a person, is it a foreign person or an American 
person?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the classic example, the one that I just 
gave is, a foreign source, who is essentially posing as a U.S. 
voice, and that's the essence of the Russian troll farm that's 
been--gotten so much attention.
    So then, in turn, the social media companies take action. 
They often will find other accounts linked to that account and 
take appropriate action. We've seen the same thing, to some 
extent, with the Iranians in connection with the last election. 
You may remember when Director Ratcliffe and I did a press 
conference.
    Mr. Jordan. Right.
    Mr. Wray. It's a little bit of that going on there. So, 
that's the essence of the back and forth of social media 
companies that I was referring to. There are other situations, 
other situations where sometimes social media companies see a 
threat to life, a violent threat of some sort on their 
platforms that they will refer to us, which is the responsible 
thing to do.
    Mr. Jordan. Thank you. So, I just want to be clear, there 
are times at the direction of the government social media 
companies take certain action?
    Mr. Wray. Not at the direction, no.
    Mr. Jordan. Well, you just said, you give them information. 
You said, we were concerned about this who we believe to be a 
foreign actor. I mean, let me step back a second. The broader 
concern is we just recently saw communications that were 
largely redacted between Dr. Fauci and the CEO or the head of 
Facebook, most of it redacted, and we know what the result of 
all that was a year ago. It was keeping information that they, 
at the time, deemed misinformation but, in fact, wasn't very 
credible information that they kept from the American people.
    So, that's my broader concern. It sounds to me like you 
are--this is something different potentially, but that's the 
concern we have, I think as Members of the Judiciary Committee, 
and, frankly, I know American citizens have. So, when you say 
passing information back and forth working with the social 
media companies, we are in the context now of this 
communication, this email communication between Mr. Zuckerberg 
and Dr. Fauci that is largely redacted, but we know that they 
colluded to keep information from the American people.
    Mr. Wray. I understand that you are concerned. We are 
talking about two very different things.
    First, social media companies aren't taking action under 
their terms of service at our direction. Some days I wish they 
might, but that ain't happening.
    Mr. Jordan. I don't wish--
    Mr. Wray. I am kidding.
    Mr. Jordan. I am nervous about all of it.
    Mr. Wray. I am being a little flippant, but--
    Mr. Jordan. I get it.
    Mr. Wray. No, we pass information. We are investigating. We 
ask them for information. In the course of passing information 
to them, they then use that information and sometimes make 
decisions, again, they would tell you, very much on their own.
    Mr. Jordan. If this information involves an American 
citizen there would have to be a warrant involved, right?
    Ms. Scanlon. The gentleman's time has expired. You can 
answer this question. Thank you.
    Mr. Wray. I am sorry. Could you repeat the question?
    Mr. Jordan. If the information involves an American 
citizen, there will have to be some kind of warrant involved. 
If the government's asking for information from a social media 
company, there would have to be some kind of warrant involved 
for you to get that information.
    Mr. Wray. Well, there's a variety of legal process--
subpoenas, et cetera--where we pass information, where we are 
asking for information from them, they provide information in 
response to the legal process from us.
    A lot of the engagement that we are talking about is not 
that different from the engagement that we have with lots of 
other industries, as well as financial services, et cetera.
    Ms. Scanlon. Thank you.
    The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Garcia, is recognized for a 
unanimous consent.
    Ms. Garcia. Madam Chair, I ask for a unanimous consent to 
submit three documents for the record.
    One is a Click2Houston report on `` `They threatened to 
hang him': Carnival worker charged with hate crime after 
punching, kicking man in parking lot of Almeda Mall.''
    The second is from channel 13, ``METRO rider charged with 
hate crime enhancement after allegedly attacking bus driver and 
2 officers.''
    The third is the Houston Police Department annual Hate 
Crime Report that indicates the three-times increase in hate 
crimes.
    Madam Chair, I ask for unanimous consent.
    Ms. Scanlon. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

?

      

                       MS. GARCIA FOR THE RECORD

=======================================================================



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    Ms. Garcia. Thank you, and I yield back.
    Ms. Scanlon. Sure. Thank you.
    The gentlewoman from Georgia is recognized for five 
minutes.
    Ms. McBath. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you so much 
for conducting this oversight hearing today.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for being here. We really 
appreciate your time and effort.
    I represent Georgia, where we have unfortunately had some 
very high-profile incidents of violence in the very past few 
years, including the Ahmaud Arbery killing as recent and also 
eight individuals and including six women of Asian descent that 
just happened this past March. So, these shootings just have 
continued to rattle our communities and are especially 
troubling for communities of color.
    Unfortunately, we know that these high-profile incidents 
are just part of a broader trend of increasing hate crimes that 
we are seeing all across the country. My colleagues have 
already earlier today just mentioned the startling statistics 
from the FBI's annual report showing the increases in hate 
crimes against Latinos, Jewish people, and those of Asian 
descent.
    I just have one question in this regard there. How is the 
FBI taking steps to help local police respond to the rise in 
the anti-Asian hate crimes?
    Mr. Wray. So, as I mentioned, hate crimes are a high 
priority to me. You mentioned Georgia. Of course, that is my 
home as well, so I take those cases particularly seriously and 
personally there.
    We do a number of different things.
    One, we, obviously, investigate hate crimes wherever we 
can. As I mentioned, we have had the highest number of hate-
crime initiations this year that we've had in the past five 
years and about a 63-percent increase in hate-crimes 
investigations initiated over the past couple of years or so. 
So, it's about 370, give or take, hate-crimes investigations 
ongoing right now.
    We also provide support to State and local, because 
sometimes the most readily provable offense is a State or local 
offense. Even in those instances, we provide support with 
forensics expertise, that kind of thing.
    We work with the Civil Rights Division over at the Justice 
Department to figure out when Federal charges can be brought.
    We also do a lot of public outreach, both to the community 
and to law enforcement. One of the themes we've heard about a 
little bit already today and discussed is the fact that these 
crimes aren't reported reliably enough--it's just a chronically 
underreported area.
    That is something that we need to reach out to the 
communities and to law enforcement, so we do trainings, liaison 
events. For example, in the AAPI community, I think we've done 
60 or so events, liaison events, specifically targeting that 
community just since last March, right through the pandemic.
    With the Jewish community, I think there have been 340 or 
so training and liaison events. I mentioned earlier, in New 
York, we recently put out sort of a public service campaign, 
including putting it in Hebrew and Yiddish to reach certain 
parts of the community that might be reluctant or unwilling to 
report.
    So, there's a whole bunch of things like that that we are 
trying to do to help.
    Ms. McBath. Thank you for that. I really appreciate it.
    I'd also like to discuss, though, guns. Just recently, the 
President and the Attorney General proposed new regulations, 
for parts needed to build ghost guns to have serial numbers, 
and those that are purchased, seeing them undergoing background 
checks. As you know, ghost guns are firearms that can be easily 
produced from an online kit that requires no background check 
or has no serial number.
    Is the current data showing an increase in ghost guns found 
at crimes scenes? You can just give me a simple ``yes'' or 
``no'' answer to that.
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure I have the reliable numbers, but I 
do believe we are anecdotally starting to seize so-called ghost 
guns more and more frequently. Of course, in the wrong hands, 
those can be very dangerous, just like other kinds of guns. I 
believe, as you alluded to, DOJ has recently issued a proposed 
rule on the subject.
    Ms. McBath. All right.
    As you know, law enforcement relies heavily on gun tracing 
in their criminal investigations. I understand that law 
enforcement is just unable to trace those guns because they 
lack those serial numbers.
    So, can you please tell us why gun tracing is so important? 
How does the inability to trace ghost guns impact criminal 
investigations and your own, the FBI's ability to help the 
public stay safe?
    Mr. Wray. Well, tracing firearms is a time-honored tactic 
in law enforcement investigations of crimes of violence. It's 
an all-too-common scenario where you are recovering a firearm 
and need to figure out where it came from. So, absolutely, it's 
something we need to do as much as we can.
    That's why, for example, outside the concept of ghost guns, 
you have individuals, for example, who will obliterate serial 
numbers. The reason they try to obliterate the serial numbers 
is precisely the reason that you alluded to, which is they want 
to prevent us from being able to trace the weapon.
    That is already a crime, to obliterate a serial number, 
but, certainly, it's a subject that is increasingly concerning 
to us as we start to seize ghost guns, so-called ghost guns, in 
a number of our cases.
    Chair Nadler. [Presiding.] The time of the gentlelady--
    Ms. McBath. Thank you.
    I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Stanton?
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Good morning, Director Wray. Good afternoon, at this point. 
Before I begin, I just want to say thank you for the job that 
you do, and please pass on my thanks to the women and men who 
serve with you at the FBI. Their efforts are diligent, 
tireless, and too often thankless, so please let them know we 
appreciate their work.
    I have a couple lines of questions that I have for you.
    First, I'd like to ask you about an ongoing violent 
epidemic, an issue that's of critical importance to me and my 
home State of Arizona. As you may recall, the last time you 
testified before this Committee, we discussed the crisis of 
missing and murdered indigenous women and girls.
    It's a grim reality that Native-American women are murdered 
at a rate 10 times the national average. For Native-American 
women, homicide is the third-leading cause of death. The 
National Crime Information Center has reported approximately 
1,500 missing indigenous people, and Arizona, tragically, has 
the third-highest number of missing and murdered indigenous 
women and girls in the country.
    Recently, Congress acted. We passed Savanna's Act, which 
directs the DOJ to review, revise, and develop protocols to 
address this crisis, and the Not Invisible Act, which 
coordinates intergovernmental efforts to combat this violence.
    There is a Presidential task force addressing this crisis. 
Our former colleague, Secretary Deb Haaland, established the 
Missing and Murdered Unit at the Department of the Interior. 
The FBI has directed to enhance its investigations into missing 
and murdered indigenous women and girls.
    So, as FBI Director, what specifically are you doing to 
seek justice for these victims? What are you doing to 
coordinate with other agencies? What additional training and 
resources are you providing to your agents in Indian Country?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I appreciate the question. I do remember 
our exchange from the last time we testified--or the last time 
I testified before this Committee on this subject.
    Certainly, as you mentioned, there is the task force that's 
specifically focused on missing and murdered American Indians 
and Alaskan Natives.
    Our primary vehicle to engage on this subject is through 
the FBI's Safe Trails Task Forces, which include not just FBI 
personnel but partner personnel from other agencies, including 
Tribal law enforcement. I think we have about 140, give or 
take, agents that I've dedicated specifically to those Safe 
Trails Task Forces.
    That number is actually probably almost double that now, in 
a way, because, as you may know, in Oklahoma, because of the 
Supreme Court's McGirt decision, the range of crimes that's now 
considered Native-American jurisdiction has dramatically 
expanded. So, we have probably about 140 surged agents to deal 
with crime of the sort you are describing in that State.
    I also took the head of our FBI field office in Arizona but 
also in New Mexico with me, together, and met with the head of 
the Navajo Nation and spent some time with his leadership team 
and drove around Indian Country to get a better sense of the 
challenges out there. I am told that I am the first FBI 
Director to ever go meet with them.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you, Director, very much.
    I'd like to shift gears a little bit and talk some more 
about ransomware, a subject that other Members have asked 
about. In this case, I want to talk specifically about the 
issue of ransomware attacks that threaten local governments and 
local infrastructure.
    Before serving in Congress, I served as a Mayor, Mayor of 
Phoenix, Arizona. So, I am particularly concerned about cyber 
criminals targeting our local governments. In recent years, 
we've seen major U.S. cities like Atlanta and Baltimore 
hampered by ransomware attacks.
    So, based upon the data and pattern of attacks the Bureau 
has identified, what local infrastructure facilities do you 
believe are most at risk of being targeted? What can Congress 
and the FBI do to better support our local government 
officials?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am not sure I could give you a specific 
type of local network that's most at risk, because it has less 
to do with the type of service they provide so much as it is 
with their own IT infrastructure and the vulnerability that it 
represents, combined with the perception that ransomware actors 
have that they would be a particularly easy-to-leverage target.
    You are absolutely right that one of the trends we are 
particularly concerned about with ransomware is more 
sophisticated targeting of, for example, municipalities or in, 
say, States that are more rural, rural hospitals and things 
like that. School systems is another example.
    So, we are trying to go after the ransomware actors through 
a variety of means. Our National Cyber Investigative Joint Task 
Force leads a whole-of-government campaign that's prioritizing 
the most damaging variants of ransomware and going after the 
entire cybercriminal ecosystem.
    So, by that, I mean not just the people demanding the 
ransom, but the malware developers, the money launderers, the 
shady internet service providers. We are going after the 
actors, their helpers. We are going after the criminals' 
infrastructure. We are going after their cryptocurrency.
    So, we are trying to engage in joint, sequenced operations 
designed to maximize the impact on the adversaries. Then we are 
trying to feed the information we get back and learn from those 
investigations in the form of intelligence that we share with 
potential victims--so, in your example, local governments, 
municipalities, but also all the victims in the private 
sector--indicators of compromise and things like that, and then 
working with CISA over at the Department of Homeland Security 
to better help those victims protect themselves.
    This is--I used the expression before--a team sport. This 
is a team sport where the team is not just government, Federal 
government, not just, frankly, local government, but also, very 
importantly, the private sector in a whole variety of ways.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Ms. Dean?
    Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for being here today, more 
importantly, for your service to our country. Especially, the 
tremendous, talented men and women of the FBI, thank you for 
their service.
    As you've said often, the mission of the FBI is to protect 
the American people and to uphold the Constitution of the 
United States. Two important parts of that mission.
    My first focus today will be on the scourge of gun violence 
and how we can partner, continue to partner. Because it's going 
to be all-hands-on-deck to reduce and, I hope, someday 
eliminate the scourge of gun violence.
    Before I came to Congress, I served in the Pennsylvania 
House for 6\1/2\ years and had the chance to meet with the 
State Police who administered our PICS system, the Pennsylvania 
Instant Check System. As you know, the FBI, administer the NICS 
system.
    The difference between the two systems is important. The 
NICS system, has both, I want to say, operate with tremendous 
speed. I give all those who administer this great credit.
    The PICS system has a difference that is critically 
important that I hope we will someday build into the NICS 
system. PICS allows 10 days for the State to try to get clarity 
on a background check to see if the person is a prohibited 
purchaser, and, after those 10 days, if there is not clarity, 
it defaults to ``no.'' The NICS system, as you know, allows 
just three days, and if it can't get clarity, it defaults to 
allowing the purchase of the gun.
    Sadly, we know that it was that same loophole that allowed 
Dylann Roof after three days to purchase a weapon which he 
later used to murder nine people at Emanuel AME Church in 
Charleston. Just several days later, it was revealed that he 
was a prohibited purchaser.
    In 2018, more than 270,000 NICS background checks not 
completed within three business days resulted in more than 
4,800 gun transfers to people whose background checks 
ultimately revealed they were prohibited purchasers. Per the 
most recent FBI report, about 3,000 people a year pass the NICS 
background checks as a result of this loophole.
    We passed H.R. 1446, which would be the enhanced background 
closing of that Charleston loophole. Do you agree that NICS 
could be a more effective background system if we put forward 
that logical 10-day default to ``no''?
    Mr. Wray. Well, as is customary, I am not in a position to 
comment on specific legislative proposals, as FBI Director, and 
get out in front of the Administration on that.
    What I would say is that our NICS folks work incredibly 
hard, and, last year, even with 40 million, a record number of 
background checks, and even with the pandemic, they were still 
able to process 96 percent, or close to 96 percent, within the 
required time.
    Certainly, it gets hard. COVID made it even harder, in many 
ways, because, of course, part of the drill--and it's probably 
the same with PICS--they have to reach out to the State and 
local police.
    Ms. Dean. I appreciate that. I absolutely admire the work 
and the commitment of the folks who are administering NICS. 
With their pressure--the increased numbers and the increased 
pressure to get it done in three days, otherwise it's allow the 
purchase, that has proven to be a lethal loophole, as we know, 
way too many times.
    In November of 2017, Congress passed the Fix NICS Act--and 
it was following another shooting, in a church in Sutherland 
Springs, Texas--to ensure that Federal agencies were reporting 
convictions that would prohibit firearm ownership.
    However, recent data shows a gross underreporting coming 
from DOD, in which all four military branches provided less 
than 31 percent of the requisite background check information.
    Is the FBI committed to supporting agencies to meet the Fix 
NICS requirements?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly, the Fix NICS Act has been a big 
help to us, and we've had a significant, very significant, 
increase in new records over the past three years.
    We are trying to do our part to engage with our partners, 
Federal, State, and local, to increase the information that's 
in there. That's the whole point, that's the essence of the 
system. We are doing a lot of outreach and engagement. We've 
got massive staffing and technological resources devoted to it, 
and we've asked for more in the various budgets that have been 
put forward.
    Ms. Dean. I know my time is up, sadly. There's so much more 
I'd like to you ask. I do hope that FBI will partner with us, 
the legislative branch and this Administration, to do something 
about gun violence.
    Also, the second area that I wanted to make sure we talk 
about at some point is the use-of-force statistics and the 
collection of that data. So, maybe I'll have a chance to talk 
with you and your staff separately and offline.
    With that, I yield back, and I thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady leads back.
    Ms. Escobar?
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Director Wray, thanks so much for being here, and many 
thanks to you and the women and men of the FBI for your 
service.
    We know that, leading up to the January 6th attack, former 
President Donald Trump and others pushed the ``big lie'' that 
the election was stolen. We know that his political 
organization funded the January 6th ``Stop the Steal'' rally in 
Washington, DC. We know that he told his supporters to attend. 
At the rally, we know he whipped them up into a frenzy and 
warned them that if they, quote, ``don't fight like hell, you 
are not going to have a country anymore,'' end quote. Then he 
directed them to go to the Capitol.
    Leading up to and even still in the wake of the deadly 
attack on the Capitol, we've seen and heard Republican Members 
of Congress as well as Republican State and local leaders and 
candidates continue to spread the dangerous and deadly ``big 
lie.'' We've also seen it amplified by very irresponsible media 
outlets.
    Earlier, you told us, if you see something, say something. 
Well, I've seen and heard something, so I am telling you about 
it today. There's a new and dangerous lie. The former President 
is telegraphing that he will be reinstated in August. This 
lunacy is being amplified by incredibly irresponsible parties.
    What's most alarming is that this new lie is quickly 
gaining support in Trump's political party. Currently, one in 
three Republicans believes he will be reinstated as President 
in August.
    Despite everything we knew via open sources about threats 
of violence on January 6th, there were catastrophic failures 
leading up to the attack on our Capitol and on our democracy. 
Taking into consideration the growing popularity of this new 
dangerous lie, as FBI Director, is this on your radar? Are you 
concerned about this? What are you doing ahead of August to 
prevent another January 6th?
    Mr. Wray. So, I guess a couple things I would say on this.
    First, as I think I testified earlier, like former Attorney 
General Barr, like former Acting Attorney General Rosen, we've 
looked at the issue with an open mind, but we did not find the 
evidence of fraud that would have changed or could have changed 
the outcome of the Presidential election.
    Now, as to rhetoric that's out there, I have to be careful 
not to be weighing in, as FBI Director, on different people's 
rhetoric. We speak through our work; we speak through our 
investigations.
    We have a very, very active domestic terrorism 
investigation program. We have--even before January 6th, under 
my watch, we elevated, as you've heard me testify earlier 
today, elevated racially motivated violent extremism to our 
highest threat band. We have doubled--I doubled the amount of 
domestic terrorism investigations, including in this space, 
over the prior years. Now, with January 6th, that number has 
exponentially increased.
    So, we are very actively at work on this subject and 
determined to do our part to make sure that what happened on 
January 6 never happens again.
    Ms. Escobar. Director Wray, are you paying attention to 
what's happening with regard to the claims about August, yes or 
no?
    Mr. Wray. We are looking at all sorts of information that's 
out there as we try to evaluate and distribute intelligence and 
conduct investigations. That's what I would say on that 
subject.
    Ms. Escobar. Okay.
    Well, I want to shift now a little bit. We'll shift the 
subject to White supremacy, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and the 
threat that this toxic combination poses to security in 
communities like mine.
    We have and will unfortunately continue to hear Republican 
Members of Congress try to paint immigrants as criminals, 
asylum seekers as invaders, and border communities like mine as 
unsafe. That rhetoric, especially the use of the word 
``invasion,'' which one of my colleagues on this Committee used 
multiple times in this hearing--the use of the word 
``invasion'' is dangerous.
    Indeed, that same language was used by a domestic terrorist 
who drove from his home in Allen, Texas, to my community, El 
Paso, Texas, on August 3rd to slaughter Mexicans and 
immigrants.
    Members have more than once asked you questions about 
terrorists at the border. I am sure, Mr. Wray, as FBI Director, 
that you are aware that attempted entry into the U.S. by known 
terrorists is extremely rare on the southern border and, in 
fact, far more likely to happen and is happening frequently at 
airports.
    So, when responding to questions like those you've heard 
from my colleagues about terrorists on the border, questions 
that are intended to fuel xenophobia, I am asking that you, as 
FBI Director, that you provide the context I just provided. It 
would be important to defuse the anti-immigrant rhetoric that 
puts communities like mine at risk.
    I thank you for your testimony.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Jones?
    Mr. Jones. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you, Director Wray, for your time today. You've been 
very patient with all of us.
    Before I go further, I do want to encourage you to allow 
your staff to receive an education in critical race theory. I 
know that certain Members of this Committee could certainly 
benefit from that kind of educational experience.
    Unsurprisingly, I want to ask you about what happened on 
January 6th.
    A sitting Member of Congress recently described that 
assault as a, quote, ``normal tourist visit,'' if you can 
imagine that. Would you describe what happened at the Capitol 
on January 6th as a, quote, ``normal tourist visit''? Just yes 
or no.
    Mr. Wray. That's not the way I would describe it.
    Mr. Jones. Okay. Thank you.
    The insurrectionists were seen with handcuffs, zip ties, 
explosives devices, bear spray, and tactical gear. Director, 
yes or no, would you bring those weapons on a tourist visit to 
the Capitol?
    Mr. Wray. No.
    Mr. Jones. Okay. Thank you.
    The January 6th attack on the Capitol was planned out in 
the open. It was incited by the former President of the United 
States, make no mistake about that.
    The danger did not end on January 6th. As many of my 
colleagues today have discussed, the threat of domestic 
terrorism by White supremacists, anti-government forces, and 
militias is at an all-time high.
    With that in mind, Director, I want to ask you whether 
several troubling recent incidents raise red flags in your mind 
about these threats.
    For example, Michael Flynn, the former National Security 
Advisor, said at a rally, quote, ``I want to know why what 
happened in Myanmar can't happen here. No reason it shouldn't 
happen here.''
    Does that suggestion of a military coup raise a red flag to 
you, Director? A simple yes or no.
    Mr. Wray. With respect, I just don't think it's appropriate 
for me, as FBI Director, to be weighing in on other people's 
public comments.
    It's not that I am not sympathetic to the reason you are 
asking the question, but, in my role, I think I have to be 
careful to speak through our work. When the FBI Director 
speaks, I speak through our investigations and our intelligence 
products.
    So, I don't think I should be starting to start chiming in 
on other people's public chatter or rhetoric, no matter what it 
is.
    Mr. Jones. Well, Director, it's true that you have an 
obligation to protect the American public, right? To the extent 
you can help the American public to understand what kind of 
dangerous rhetoric poses a threat to the safety and security of 
the American people, you can do so as a public service.
    I mean, it's pretty simple, right? I mean, this guy is 
calling for a military coup. Is that something that would not 
be of concern to you in your capacity as the FBI Director?
    Mr. Wray. A military coup would be of great concern to me 
if I thought it was happening.
    Mr. Jones. Thank you, Director.
    Or consider this: Prominent officials within one party--
I'll just say it--the Republican Party, have attended events 
and spoken alongside White nationalists, instigators of the 
insurrection on January 6th, and leaders of domestic terrorist 
groups.
    When leaders of one of our major political parties in this 
country attend extremist events, does their attendance lend 
legitimacy to those extremists who are seeking to bring other 
folks into fold and convert people to their ideologies, yes or 
no?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I am not trying to be difficult here, but 
it's just, with respect, I don't think it's my role or the 
appropriate role for any FBI Director to be weighing in on 
other people's First Amendment activity.
    What I think we need to do at the FBI is to Act through our 
work, to aggressively investigate domestic violent extremism, 
to aggressively investigate election influence or interference, 
to aggressively investigate the things that we are entrusted 
with investigating to protect the American people and uphold 
the Constitution.
    Mr. Jones. Let me ask you this.
    Mr. Wray. It's not that I am unsympathetic to why you are 
asking the question, but I don't think that's my role.
    Mr. Jones. I understand.
    I suspect the answer is yes, if you were to be forthcoming 
about that.
    How about this: A former attorney to President Trump 
falsely stated, quote, ``It should be that he can simply be 
reinstated.'' I think you've heard other of my colleagues say 
this today. To finish this quote, ``Biden is told to move out 
of the White House, and President Trump should be moved back 
in.''
    Could statements like that encourage attacks of the kind 
that we saw on January 6th, yes or no?
    Mr. Wray. Same answer.
    Mr. Jones. Wow.
    Director Wray, I've asked you these questions because the 
insurrectionists threatened more than our lives; they 
threatened our democracy, and the fact is, they still do. I 
hope that you see that.
    Those who incited the assault with their calls to ``stop 
the steal'' now threaten to incite another one with their calls 
to stage a coup or to, quote, ``reinstate'' Donald Trump.
    The violent far-right nationalism that caused the 
insurrection is still with us, stoked by elected officials and 
even the former, disgraced, defeated President of the United 
States, Donald J. Trump. The American people, sir, need to know 
that the FBI is working as hard to protect our democracy as the 
far right is working to overturn our democracy.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman's--
    Mr. Jones. I hope that we can have that confidence.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Chair Nadler. The gentleman yields back.
    Ms. Ross?
    Ms. Ross. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you very much, Director Wray, for being with us today 
and for your patience. I know it's been a long day.
    I have two lines of questioning, so hopefully we can get 
through the first one quickly, because my second one is the 
area where Congresswoman Dean wanted to talk about, use of 
force.
    The first I have to go to because I am from North Carolina, 
and it deals with the Colonial Pipeline. In my district, during 
that horrible week-long period, about three-quarters of our gas 
stations simply didn't have the fuel for my constituents.
    Can you walk me through the different ways that a company 
employing inadequate cybersecurity measures could endanger 
Federal supply chains like this case, and especially with 
crucial needs like oil and gas infrastructure?
    Mr. Wray. Well, of course, a very good question, but I 
think a fulsome answer to that would way exceed the amount of 
time we have allotted. So, I want to be sensitive to your time 
constraints here.
    Certainly, all critical infrastructure increasingly is 
dependent on internet connectivity and increasingly online. So, 
to the extent that a company doesn't have strong cybersecurity, 
we are more and more dependent on their cybersecurity for our 
physical security.
    I think that's one of the things that the recent ransomware 
attacks demonstrate, is that it's not just affecting those 
companies, but it can affect the average American at the gas 
pump or when they're buying a hamburger.
    Ms. Ross. So, Director Wray, do you think that Congress 
should take actions to have mandatory cybersecurity standards 
for private folks doing critical infrastructure?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, as I've said in response to other 
topics, I want to be careful about proposing or weighing in on 
specific legislation.
    I will say that I do believe that the private-sector piece 
of our cybersecurity as a Nation is absolutely indispensable. 
Until we figure out a way to ensure that the private sector has 
adequate cybersecurity--and, maybe just as importantly, a key 
part of cybersecurity is closely latched up and informing, 
informing the Federal government, the FBI, CISA, et cetera--we 
are going to have a problem adequately defending the country.
    So, I think anything that goes at those issues is something 
worth taking a close look at.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you very much for that answer.
    On the use-of-force issue, I want to quickly follow up on 
that issue, especially since Representative Dean didn't get a 
chance to ask her question. I want to talk about the FBI's 
collection of use-of-force data.
    I worked on this issue in North Carolina with full 
cooperation from law enforcement on traffic statistics and who 
gets stopped and who gets searched. We have a pretty model 
legislation in North Carolina for doing that.
    Given the possibility that the FBI National Use-of-Force 
Data Collection Program may be discontinued as early as 
December of 2022, what other options are there for collecting 
law enforcement use-of-force data? What have you considered, 
and how long would it take to establish an alternative?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I'd be happy to have my staff help with 
more detailed information. What I would say is that we are 
working very hard to increase the reporting, and we've been--of 
national use-of-force data, because we believe strongly that 
only through that are we going to be able to have a thoughtful, 
informed conversation that's actually based on the hard facts.
    I think we've made good progress. I think we've recently 
now crossed the threshold of about 40 percent of sworn--I think 
that's about right--40 percent of sworn Federal, State, and 
local law enforcement officers across the country. We are 
driving hard to try to get that number high enough so that we 
can start sharing the results of that collection more broadly.
    So, it was a big milestone, one of them, one of the 
milestones we crossed recently; allowed us to take certain 
steps. We are hoping to cross future milestones before too 
long. Anything that you can do to encourage the law enforcement 
community--not just you personally, but Members of Congress, 
can do to encourage State and local law enforcement in their 
communities to provide that data, that would certainly be 
appreciated.
    Ms. Ross. Well, I will certainly do that in North Carolina.
    Do you have any estimated time for when you might be able 
to provide some information when you have a critical amount of 
that?
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady's time has expired. The 
Witness may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. Let me have somebody follow up with you about 
where we are on time estimates. I am not sure if I've got the 
latest on that.
    Ms. Ross. Thank you, Mr. Director.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    Ms. Bush?
    Ms. Bush. St. Louis and I thank you, Chair, for convening 
this hearing today.
    Director Wray, thank you for being here as well. Thank you 
for being here with us, taking this time.
    So, as an activist and as an organizer from the front lines 
of the Ferguson movement, I am intimately aware of the tactics 
the Bureau has used when surveilling and investigating and 
intimidating activists like myself, from the height of the 
civil rights movement, to Ferguson in 2014, to today. We now 
know that the Bureau did, in fact, investigate and surveil 
those protesting for racial justice and against police 
brutality.
    In anticipation of this hearing, I wrote to you on June 4th 
requesting access to all the information that the Bureau may 
have gathered about me since 2014, the Ferguson uprising, and 
up to now. When can I expect to hear back from the Bureau 
regarding that information?
    Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, I was just recently told that you 
had sent such a letter asking for information. As you know, we 
receive thousands of requests for files, as it were, and 
there's a process for that. I would be happy to have my staff 
follow up with yours to help you understand how the process 
works, and that can give you a little bit better sense about 
timing and other steps that have to be gone through.
    Ms. Bush. Okay.
    Mr. Wray. As you probably can determine from the way I've 
answered a lot of questions today, I am very much a process guy 
and I want to make sure we follow the process here.
    Ms. Bush. That's fine. Sure.
    In the next 7 days, is it possible that we can get this 
resolved, possibly? I mean, we can go through the steps; I just 
want to--
    Mr. Wray. I'll have somebody follow up with you about the 
right process.
    Ms. Bush. We can follow up. Okay. Thank you.
    I ask because I am concerned about the FBI's treatment of 
protesters. I want to walk through the FBI's response to the 
White supremacist insurrection on the Capitol and the FBI's 
response to mass protests that swept through the country last 
year seeking justice for George Floyd and for Breonna Taylor.
    Isn't it true that the Department deputized and deployed 
thousands of Federal law enforcement, including FBI personnel, 
in, quote, ``response to the events related to civil unrest,'' 
end quote, during the summer of 2020? A yes or no is fine.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am not sure I have a yes or no answer to 
that.
    I don't know that the FBI--I don't recall the FBI being 
deputized for things. The FBI fulfilled our mission, some of 
which I've described earlier in response to one of your 
colleague's questions.
    Whether other agencies were deputized by the Justice 
Department would be a question better referred to the Justice 
Department.
    Ms. Bush. Okay. I think that the answer that we are looking 
for is yes. We have this information--we have evidence that the 
records that identify SWAT resources and special agent bomb 
techs, that they were deployed. That's what's in my hand.
    What about, was the FBI authorized to use force in response 
to the January 6th White supremacist insurrection on the 
Capitol? Just a yes or a no.
    Mr. Wray. Was the--
    Ms. Bush. Was the FBI authorized to use force in response 
to the White supremacist attack on January the 6th?
    Mr. Wray. I think the--I am not aware of any specific 
authorization to use force. I think the FBI has policies about 
its use of force, and those policies would have been in effect 
on January 6.
    Ms. Bush. Thank you.
    So, you stated earlier that the Bureau does not surveil 
First Amendment protests. Director Wray, isn't it true that the 
FBI did deploy some 120 surveillance aircraft--I know it was 
alluded to earlier--to monitor ``Justice for George Floyd'' 
protests around June 1st in Washington, DC? That can just be a 
yes or a no.
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, I am not sure it lends itself to a 
yes or no answer. We have specific policies that govern our use 
of various techniques and tools that we have available to us, 
the Attorney General guidelines and the DIOG that I referred to 
earlier.
    Ms. Bush. Okay.
    Mr. Wray. So, the circumstances under which we would've 
used aviation assets over the course of the summer would've 
been covered by those.
    Ms. Bush. So, yes, Director, here are the flight path 
records.
    I'd like to introduce this article that cites the flight 
path records--flight paths into the record.
    [The information follows:]

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                        MS. BUSH FOR THE RECORD

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    Ms. Bush. Was the FBI authorized to conduct surveillance or 
deploy surveillance aircraft and/or drones in response to the 
January 6th White supremacist insurrection on the Capitol, yes 
or no? I am going to--I would love for you to answer that.
    Mr. Wray. I don't recall whether or not aviation assets 
were called for or used in the January 6th.
    Ms. Bush. Well, you can just--that's fine. That's fine.
    Mr. Wray. I just don't know off the top of my head.
    Ms. Bush. Okay. The evidence is clear. We've witnessed it 
with our own eyes. The Bureau has a White supremacy problem 
within its ranks. The choice to not pursue White supremacist 
violence like what we saw on January 6th is not because the 
Bureau does not have the resources or the statutory discretion 
to do so; it is a blatant dismissal of White supremacy as a 
threat. It is racist. It's unethical. It's unconscionable.
    Protestors last summer rose up to save lives, and they were 
violently removed with chemical weapons, pepper spray, tear 
gas, smoke canisters, stun grenades, and rubber bullets.
    That's why we, as activists and protesters, must continue 
to pursue transparency from the Bureau. I am talking to 
activists right now: File your FOIA requests.
    We are not a threat.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Chair Nadler. The gentlelady yields back.
    This concludes today's hearing. We thank Director Wray for 
participating.
    Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days 
to submit additional written questions for the Witness or 
additional materials for the record.
    Chair Nadler. Without objection, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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