[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FEMA PRIORITIES FOR 2022:
STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
=======================================================================
(117-41)
REMOTE HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-872PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
BRIAN BABIN, Texas Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania MARK DeSAULNIER, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
Puerto Rico SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee GREG STANTON, Arizona
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
------
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
Emergency Management
DINA TITUS, Nevada, Chair
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky District of Columbia
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
Puerto Rico CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Vice
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi Chair
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JOHN GARAMENDI, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Nevada, and Chair, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management, opening statement......... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,
opening statement.............................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, prepared statement............................. 53
WITNESSES
Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, oral statement............... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Erica Bornemann, Director, Vermont Emergency Management, on
behalf of the National Emergency Management Association, oral
statement...................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Carolyn J. Harshman, MPA, CEM, President, International
Association of Emergency Managers, oral statement.............. 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Dina Titus:
Statement of the American Flood Coalition.................... 53
Statement of June Isaacson Kailes, Disability Policy
Consultant................................................. 55
Statement of the National Association of Home Builders....... 57
Statement of the Reinsurance Association of America.......... 64
Statement of the Union of Concerned Scientists............... 77
Statements from 10 Stakeholder Organizations \\...... 85
APPENDIX
Question from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Erica Bornemann,
Director, Vermont Emergency Management, on behalf of the
National Emergency Management Association...................... 87
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\\ The 10 stakeholder organizations are: Association of State
Floodplain Managers, Inc., BuildStrong Coalition, International
Association of Fire Chiefs, National League of Cities, National Low
Income Housing Coalition, Natural Resources Defense Council, National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association, The Pew Charitable Trusts, The
Refuge Resource Group, and SmarterSafer Coalition.
February 11, 2022
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development,
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``FEMA Priorities for
2022: Stakeholder Perspectives.''
_______________________________________________________________________
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management will meet on Wednesday, February 16,
2022, at 2:00 p.m. in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and
via Zoom to receive testimony on ``FEMA Priorities for 2022:
Stakeholder Perspectives.'' At the hearing, Members will
receive testimony from witnesses who are emergency management
experts and represent key external Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA stakeholders to gauge their perspective regarding
what efforts the agency should prioritize in this year. The
Subcommittee will hear from the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), National Emergency Management Association, and
International Association of Emergency Managers.
BACKGROUND
When disaster strikes, state, territorial, and Tribal
governments may request the President declare a major disaster
or emergency pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).\1\ If the
president declares a major disaster or emergency, FEMA is
authorized to provide response and recovery assistance in the
form of individual assistance, public assistance, or both
funded from the Disaster Relief Fund.
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\1\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5121 et seq.
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FEMA also provides assistance through specialized programs
and grants to assist state, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments prepare for, mitigate against, and respond to
disasters. These include the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) which facilitates mutual aid across
jurisdictions; \2\ the Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams
which are deployed to support search and rescue options; \3\
Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) to support
preparation and capacity at the state and local levels of
government; \4\ Building Resilience Infrastructure and
Communities (BRIC) grant program supporting pre-disaster
mitigation investments; \5\ and the post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).\6\
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\2\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 761.
\3\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 722; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5165f.
\4\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 762.
\5\ Section 1234, Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018, Public Law
115-254.
\6\ 42 U.S.C. 5170c
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (PA)
Pursuant to a declaration under the Stafford Act, FEMA PA
programs reimburse state, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments and certain non-profit organizations for the cost
of emergency protective measures, debris removal, and repair
and replacement of public infrastructure damaged in a
disaster.\7\ Due to the increased frequency and intensity of
natural disasters, fiscal year (FY) 2020 marked the largest
obligation for PA to date--even when excluding PA obligations
related to COVID-19.\8\ FEMA's National Advisory Council found
that applicants consistently report that ``the PA process feels
disjointed, is overburdensome, and has far too many
requirements.'' \9\ Some communities with limited resources
have reported that navigating the PA process is so challenging
that they opt to forgo the program.\10\
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\7\ GAO. (December 2021). Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions
Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers. GAO-22-
104039
\8\ CRS. (2021). FEMA's Public Assistance Program: A Primer and
Considerations for Congress.
\9\ National Advisory Council. (December 2021). Report to the
Administrator. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_nac-2021-report-211216.pdf
\10\ Id.
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PA recipients are responsible for a percentage of recovery
costs, which is termed the non-federal cost-share.\11\ The
President has the authority through the Stafford Act to reduce
or waive the non-federal cost-share. FEMA recommends that the
federal cost share be increased from 75% to 90% if the
estimated cost of PA exceeds $151 dollars per capita.\12\ The
Committee received testimony that suggested that even a reduced
cost share may still be burdensome for some communities.\13\
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\11\ GAO. (December 2021). Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions
Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers. GAO-22-
104039
\12\ CRS. (April 1, 2021). FEMA's Public Assistance Program: A
Primer and Considerations for Congress. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/
homesec/R46749.pdf
\13\ Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
Emergency Management. (October 27, 2021). Hearing: Are FEMA's Programs
Adequately Designed to Assist Communities Before, During, and After
Wildfire? Testimony submitted by Casey Hatcher.
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PA funds sourced though PA mitigation and the post-disaster
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) can be used by
communities to build back more resiliently after a
disaster.\14\ FEMA funds PA mitigation projects with a minimum
75 percent federal share.\15\ Proposed PA mitigation projects
are evaluated by FEMA by considering four factors: risk
reduction, cost-effectiveness, technical feasibility, and
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.\16\ Confusion
surrounds the eligible uses of PA mitigation and HMGP funds for
the same project.\17\ FEMA's Public Assistance Program and
Policy Guide states: \18\
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\14\ FEMA. (2020). Mitigate Disaster Damage with FEMA Public
Assistance. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/fema-
pa406-mitigation-brochure.pdf
\15\ Id.
\16\ Id.
\17\ National Academies Press. (June 2014). Disaster Recovery
Funding: Achieving a Resilient Future? & National Advisory Council.
(December 2021). Report to the Administrator. https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/fema_nac-2021-report-211216.pdf
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK316517/
\18\ FEMA. (June 2020). Public Assistance and Policy Guide: Version
4. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_pappg-v4-
updated-links_policy_6-1-2020.pdf
``The Applicant may use both PA mitigation and HMGP
mitigation funds to implement mitigation measures on the same
facility, but not for the same work. The Applicant cannot use
funds from one of these mitigation programs to meet the non-
Federal cost share of work funded under the other mitigation
program.''
``Eligible PA mitigation measures are those the Applicant
performs on the damaged portion(s) of the facility. If the
Applicant proposes mitigation measures that are distinct and
separate from the damaged portion(s) of the facility, FEMA
evaluates the proposal and determines eligibility on a case-by
case basis considering how the mitigation measure protects the
damaged portion(s) of the facility and whether the mitigation
measure is reasonable based on the extent of damage.''
A survey conducted by FEMA's National Advisory Council
found that PA applicants want to leverage mitigation funds.\19\
However, spending on mitigation though the PA program has not
been consistent with the increase in spending on recovery due
the increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters.\20\
The complexity of the PA mitigation and HMGP guidance has
created an equity issue since applicants with limited resources
are often unable to navigate this process.\21\ As a result,
these applicants cannot build back to be more resilient, which
increases their vulnerability and likelihood for repetitive
loss.\22\
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\19\ National Advisory Council. (December 2021). Report to the
Administrator. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_nac-2021-report-211216.pdf
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id.
\22\ Id.
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INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE (IA)
FEMA IA programs include the Individuals and Households
Program (IHP), Mass Care and Emergency Assistance, the Crisis
Counseling Assistance and Training Program, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance, Disaster Legal Services, and Disaster
Case Management.\23\ IHP is the primary FEMA program to assist
disaster survivors; it covers housing needs such as home
repair, limited property replacement, and rental
assistance.\24\ While FEMA's IA programs--authorized by the
Stafford Act--are not intended to replace insurance or meet the
full post-disaster needs of survivors, recent declared events
have been a cause for concern regarding both denial rates for
IA, as well as suspected fraudulent registrations for FEMA
assistance.\25\
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\23\ FEMA. (May 2021). Individual Assistance Program and Policy
Guide (IAPPG). https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_iappg-1.1.pdf
\24\ CRS. (December 5, 2019) FEMA Individual Assistance Programs:
An Overview (R46014) https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R46014.pdf.
\25\ NPR. (July 1, 2021). As Western Wildfires Worsen, FEMA is
Denying Most People Who Ask for Help. As Climate Change Worsens
Wildfires, FEMA Denies Most California, Oregon Claims : NPR
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In May 2021, Chairs DeFazio and Titus, along with Ranking
Members Graves (MO) and Webster, sent a letter to the FEMA
Administrator expressing frustration that the approval rate for
IHP applications has reached an all-time low.\26\ Following the
September 2020 wildfires in Oregon, FEMA denied 70 percent of
IHP assistance requests after it filtered out applications that
were potentially fraudulent.\27\ Following the 2017 and 2018
fire seasons in California, 48,856 individuals applied for IHP
and about only one-fifth received some amount of
assistance.\28\
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\26\ T&I. (May 13, 2021) Letter to FEMA Administrator. https://
transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-leaders-
question-fema-after-approvals-for-disaster-survivor-aid-program-falls-
to-all-time-low.
\27\ NPR. (July 1, 2021). As Western Wildfires Worsen, FEMA is
Denying Most People Who Ask for Help. As Climate Change Worsens
Wildfires, FEMA Denies Most California, Oregon Claims : NPR
\28\ University of Pennsylvania Risk Management and Decision
Processes Center. (April 16, 2020). Wildfires and Recovery: FEMA's
Individual Assistance Funding Provides Important Support--But Unfunded
Damages Remain. Wildfires and Recovery: FEMA's Individual Assistance
funding provides important support--but unfunded damages remain--Risk
Management and Decision Processes Center (upenn.edu)
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The application process for IHP has repeatedly been
described as overwhelming and confusing by disaster
survivors.\29\ Applicants must navigate a series of steps
before FEMA registers a decision on their application.
Survivors of the December 2021 Kentucky tornadoes have told
Committee staff that their IA denial letters did not clearly
state the reason for a denial. Without a reason for denial,
disaster survivors feel they do not have enough information to
successfully navigate the appeal process.
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\29\ GAO. (October 2019). Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take
Additional Actions to Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges.
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In December 2021, GAO reported that federal recovery
programs, including FEMA's IA programs, lack key information
that would enable officials to identify barriers to access and
disparate outcomes and establish processes to overcome such
barriers and disparities.\30\ In 2021, FEMA requested authority
from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to begin asking
IA applicants for demographic information.\31\ Advocacy groups,
such as the National Low Income Housing Coalition, have urged
FEMA to make this data accessible to the public--once it is
available.\32\
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\30\ GAO. (December 2021). Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions
Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers. GAO-22-
104039.
\31\ Id.
\32\ E&E News. (December 3, 2021). FEMA Wants to Track Race of
Disaster Victims for First Time. https://www.eenews.net/articles/fema-
wants-to-track-race-of-disaster-victims-for-first-time/
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HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE (HMA)
Implementing mitigation measures is a proven way to reduce
the impact of natural disasters.\33\ To make communities more
resilient to future hazard events and minimize the financial
strain of disaster recovery, this Committee has stressed that
investing in mitigation efforts should be a federal priority,
and established permanent authorizations for both pre- and
post-disaster mitigation programs as well as funding them via
calculations from response and recovery expenses from FEMA's
Disaster Relief Fund.\34\
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\33\ GAO. (February 2021). FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
140.
\34\ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended), Sections 203, 404, 404(d).
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As with FEMA's PA program, applicants have expressed
difficulty navigating FEMA's mitigation grants applications,
particularly small, rural, and disadvantaged communities with
limited staff and resources. Communities with large tax-bases
often can afford hiring professional consultants to complete
successful mitigation grant applications. The Committee has
received information from small, rural, and disadvantaged
communities that cannot afford to hire such consultants that
they do not have the fiscal resources for consultants nor the
staff with enough bandwidth or expertise to write grant
applications in addition to their day-to-day emergency
management responsibilities. FEMA's own summary of stakeholder
feedback for its Building Resilient Infrastructure Communities
(BRIC) grants quoted subgrantees that said the BRIC grant was,
``too hard and not worth the time and effort to apply.'' \35\
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\35\ FEMA ((March 2020). Summary of Stakeholder Feedback: Building
Resilient Infrastructure Communities (BRIC). https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-06/fema_bric-summary-of-stakeholder-feedback-
report.pdf
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Removing barriers and simplifying the mitigation assistance
process will make FEMA's programs more equitable and
communities more resilient. Unprecedented investments across
FEMA's HMA suite--$500 million for BRIC and $3.5 billion for
Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) as part of the recently
enacted Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA, Pub. L.
117-58), as well as the president's approval of some Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) assistance for COVID-19 major
disaster declarations--make reforming the mitigation grant
process a timely issue.\36\
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\36\ CRS.(November 16, 2021). Recent Funding Increases for FEMA
Mitigation Assistance. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/
IN11733
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WORKFORCE CHALLENGES
FEMA's workforce is divided into 23 cadres that are
organized by responsibilities of work.\37\ Each cadre is
composed of permanent full-time (PFT) workers, Cadre of On-Call
Response Recovery Employees (CORE), and Reservists.\38\ PFTs
are full-time workers eligible for career tenure.\39\ CORE
employees are hired to work for a period of two to four years;
their positions may be renewed if disaster work is ongoing at
the end of the term and funding is available from the Disaster
Relief Fund.\40\ Reservists serve on an on-call basis and
assist disaster survivors and first responders on the site of
major disasters.\41\
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\37\ https://www.fema.gov/careers/position-types/cadres
\38\ Id.
\39\ Id.
\40\ Id.
\41\ Id.
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FEMA's PFT workforce volume has remained steady over time.
The volume of CORE and Reservist employees has increased by
approximately 30 percent since 2018.\42\ However, in January
2022, a FEMA panel told the GAO that the agency is still
struggling to adequately address its workload.\43\ Every major
disaster declaration adds to FEMA's backlog of work; presently,
the agency is actively managing more than 1,000 incidents.\44\
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\42\ Federal News Network. (January 26, 2022). FEMA Suffering
Staffing Shortages and Natural Disasters Intensify. https://
federalnewsnetwork.com/agency-oversight/2022/01/fema-suffering-
staffing-shortages-as-natural-disasters-intensify/
\43\ Id.
\44\ Id.
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Workforce challenges impact FEMA's ability to successfully
fulfill its mission. The GAO has reported that workforce-
related issues has impacted the quality of recovery services in
Puerto Rico; high turnover rates among employees responsible
for overseeing PA projects has created unnecessary confusion
according to municipal and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico agency
officials.\45\ Low morale and inadequate training within FEMA's
call centers prevented employees from adequately assisting
survivors seeking IA following the catastrophic 2017 and 2018
hurricane seasons.\46\ Most recently, burnout and low morale
have made it challenging for FEMA's workforce to implement the
COVID-19 funeral assistance program.\47\
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\45\ GAO. (January 2022). FEMA Workforce: Long-Standing Challenges
and New Challenges Could Affect Mission Success. GAO-22-105631
\46\ Id.
\47\ Washington Post. (December 2021). ``My Sincere Condolences.''
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/12/21/fema-covid-funeral-
assistance/
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In January 2022, the GAO identified three factors limiting
FEMA's workforce readiness: \48\
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\48\ GAO. (January 20, 2022). FEMA Workforce: Long Standing and New
Challenges Could Affect Mission Success. GAO-22-105631.
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LStaffing shortages: The 2017 and 2018 disaster
seasons resulted in the deployment of over 10,000 FEMA
personnel. A workforce shortage existed when the disaster
season began and 18 of 23 cadres operated with staffing levels
that were 25 percent lower than full capacity. Additionally,
nearly 50 percent of FEMA reservists declined deployments to
certain disasters citing burnout and poor working conditions in
the field. GAO expressed concern that FEMA may be unable to
manage a catastrophic natural disaster because of its workforce
shortages.\49\
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\49\ Id.
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LWorkforce Qualifications: FEMA's qualification
and training processes have not adequately kept pace with need.
Field leaders have told GAO that new hires do not have the
training necessary to fulfill their duties during
deployments.\50\
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\50\ Id.
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LStaff Development: Reservists make up 35 percent
of FEMA's workforce during a disaster deployment. Reservists
have reported that they often receive training to fulfill their
duties on the job site; they are unable to receive compensation
for participating in training programs prior to a disaster
deployment. FEMA hired 3,200 Reservists from June 2017 to May
2019; these new hires now make up 40 percent of the Reservist
work force. Lack of adequate training, increased frequency of
disasters, a workplace culture that contributes to harassment
and discrimination, and few benefits have negatively impacted
workplace morale and retention.\51\
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\51\ Id.
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CONCLUSION
Given the recent intensity and frequency of natural
disasters, it is critical that FEMA make reforms to improve its
mitigation and recovery programs. Improvements to FEMA's
workforce will enable the agency to better assist disaster
stakeholders and survivors. The GAO has provided numerous
recommendations to FEMA (see supplementary information)
regarding reforms that may rectify FEMA's current
shortcomings--many of which remain outstanding.
WITNESS LIST
LChris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
LErica Bornemann, Director, Vermont Emergency
Management, on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association
LCarolyn Harshman, President, International
Association of Emergency Managers
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
The following are GAO recommendations to FEMA marked as
`open':
Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Needed to Identify and
Address Potential Recovery Barriers. (December 2021) \52\
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\52\ GAO. (December 2021). Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions
Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers. GAO-22-
104039
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LThe FEMA Administrator should, in coordination
with the SBA Associate Administrator of the Office of Disaster
Assistance and the HUD Assistant Secretary for Community
Planning and Development, develop, with input from key recovery
partners, and implement an interagency plan to help ensure the
availability and use of quality information that includes (1)
information requirements, (2) data sources and methods, and (3)
strategies for overcoming information challenges--to support
federal agencies involved in disaster recovery in identifying
access barriers and disparate outcomes.
LThe FEMA Administrator should coordinate with the
SBA Associate Administrator of the Office of Disaster
Assistance and the HUD Assistant Secretary for Community
Planning and Development to design and establish routine
processes to be used within and across federal disaster
recovery programs to address identified access parries and
disparate outcomes on an ongoing basis.
COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability
and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response. (October 2021)
\53\
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\53\ GAO. (October 2021). COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to
Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response.
GAO-22-105051
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LThe FEMA Administrator should improve the
consistency of the agency's interpretation and application of
the COVID-19 Public Assistance policy within and across regions
by further clarifying and communicating eligibility
requirements nationwide. See the FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund
and Assistance to state, local, Tribal, and territorial
Governments enclosure.
LThe FEMA Administrator should require the
agency's Public Assistance Program employees in the regions and
at its Consolidated Resource Centers to attend training on
changes to COVID-19 Public Assistance policy to help ensure it
is interpreted and applied consistently nationwide. See the
FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund and Assistance to state, local,
Tribal, and territorial Governments enclosure.
LThe FEMA Administrator should direct the Head of
Contracting Activity to establish a formal process to (1)
collect contracting lessons learned from COVID-19 and future
emergency response efforts; and (2) ensure contracting lessons
learned are shared with the Continuous Improvement Program for
inclusion in FEMA's formal lessons learned process to inform
FEMA's contracting efforts in response to ongoing and future
emergencies.
Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Improving Projects
but Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery. (May
2021) \54\
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\54\ GAO. (May 2021). Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in
Improving Projects but Should Identify and Assess Risks to the
Recovery. GAO-21-264
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LThe FEMA Administrator should, in coordination
with the Government of Puerto Rico and relevant federal
agencies, identify and assess the risks to the remainder of
Puerto Rico's recovery, including internal and external
factors, such as Puerto Rico's capacity to carry out projects.
LThe FEMA Administrator should, in coordination
with the Government of Puerto Rico and relevant federal
agencies, identify potential actions to manage the risks to the
remainder of Puerto Rico's recovery and continuously monitor
risks.
COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action is Crucial as Pandemic
Enters Its Second Year. (March 2021) \55\
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\55\ GAO. (March 2021). COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action is
Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year. GAO-21-387
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LThe FEMA Administrator should adhere to the
agency's protocols listed in its updated 2019 Tribal
Consultation Policy by obtaining Tribal input via the four
phases of the Tribal consultation process when developing new
policies and procedures related to COVID-19 assistance.
LThe FEMA Administrator should provide timely and
consistent technical assistance to support tribal governments'
efforts to request and receive Public Assistance as direct
recipients, including providing additional personnel, if
necessary, to ensure that Tribal nations are able to
effectively respond to COVID-19.
Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
Streamline Hazard Grants and Assess Programs Effects. (February
2021) \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ GAO. (February 2021). Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take
Additional Steps to Streamline Hazard Grants and Assess Programs
Effects. GAO-21-140
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should establish a plan
with time frames to develop pre-calculated benefits for
additional project types, where appropriate.
LThe FEMA Administrator should establish a plan
with time frames to assess PA, HMGP, FMA, and BRIC hazard
mitigation grant processes to identify and implement steps to
reduce the complexity of and time required for grant
applications, including steps to facilitate the use of funding
from more than one FEMA mitigation grant program on a project.
LThe FEMA Administrator should create a
centralized inventory of hazard mitigation resources on the
FEMA website.
LThe FEMA Administrator should develop a plan for
conducting future loss avoidance studies to ensure they can
include more hazard types.
LThe FEMA Administrator should ensure that as new
methods and metrics to assess the effectiveness of hazard
mitigation are developed, FEMA officials consider opportunities
to adopt common methods and metrics across all of its hazard
mitigation programs.
LThe FEMA Administrator should publicly share pre-
calculated benefits studies and state developed records of
effectiveness, such as by posting them to its website.
LThe FEMA Administrator should assess the need for
an agency-wide consolidated standard operating procedures
document for the HMGP that provides detailed information on the
roles and responsibilities, requirements, and key tasks and
milestones for monitoring and closing out program projects.
2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal Actions Helped
Facilitate the Response, But FEMA Needs to Address Long-Term
Recovery Challenges. (February 2021) \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ GAO. (February 2021). 2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal
Actions Helped Facilitate the Response, But FEMA Needs to Address Long-
Term Recovery Challenges. GAO-21-91
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should consider the unique
challenges of recovery missions for large-scale disaster in
U.S. insular and other remote areas to establish appropriate
timeliness goals for the pre-award phase of the Public
Assistance program specific to these types of disasters.
LThe FEMA Administrator should use data relating
to the timeliness of completing various steps of the pre-award
phase of the Public Assistance program to help identify and
address any inefficiencies occurring during this phase of the
program.
LThe FEMA Administrator should develop guidance to
streamline the process to assist direct housing applicants with
proof of residency and proof of ownership requirements in those
locations, such as in insular areas, where the nature of
housing may otherwise result in processing delays due to the
volume of required waivers or modifications to these
requirements.
LThe FEMA Administrator should incorporate lessons
learned from earlier Permanent Housing Construction missions
and address long-standing issues, such as the lack of
architecture and engineering services in its existing
contracts, in guidance that outlines necessary steps to better
plan for and implement the Permanent Housing Construction
program in insular and other remote areas.
Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data and Guidance Would Aid
FEMA Activation Decisions. (December 2020) \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ GAO. (December 2020). Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data and
Guidance Would Aid FEMA Activation Decisions. GAO-21-116
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should identify and make
changes to the applicable data system to capture cost data,
including administrative costs for each of its housing
assistance programs that will allow the agency to analyze the
full cost of providing assistance under each program.
LThe FEMA Administrator should specify the
information needed to compare the projected costs of each
direct housing program in its guidance for assessing which
programs to activate.
Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program. (September 2020)
\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ GAO. (September 2020). Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions
Needed to Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program. GAO-20-
503
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should improve the
completeness and consistency of its communication of the
requirement to apply for an SBA disaster loan prior to being
considered for SBA-dependent other needs assistance.
LThe FEMA Administrator should assess the extent
to which its process for determining an applicant's eligibility
for SBA-dependent other needs assistance limits or prevents
survivors' access to IHP assistance, and work with SBA to
identify options to simplify and streamline the disaster
assistance application process for survivors.
LThe FEMA Administrator should improve the IHP
award determination letters by using federal guidance and best
practices for communicating with the public to ensure that
applicants understand that an ``ineligible'' determination does
not mean they cannot continue to pursue assistance.
LThe FEMA Administrator should identify and
implement strategies to provide additional information to
applicants about how FEMA determined their eligibility for
assistance and the amount of assistance to award.
LThe FEMA Administrator should identify and
implement strategies to provide readily accessible information
and resources, such as guidance and training, about the
Individuals and Households Program to state, local, Tribal, and
territorial officials.
LThe FEMA Administrator should correct and refine
the methodology used to survey survivor experiences with the
IHP by (1) weighting the survey data to reflect the
stratification of its survey design, (2) adjusting the base
sampling weights for survey nonresponse within each stratum,
and (3) calculating the sampling error for the survey data
after adjusting the base sampling weights for nonresponse.
LThe FEMA Administrator should complete the
following key process improvement activities as part of its
effort to redesign the Individual Assistance Program: (1)
engage with additional program customers and stakeholders to
obtain a more comprehensive understanding of their needs; (2)
assess performance gaps between current processes and customer
and stakeholder needs, and develop measurable and achievable
improvement goals to address any identified performance gaps;
and (3) prioritize the processes that need improvement based on
documented selection criteria.
LThe FEMA Administrator should establish time
frames for finalizing the Individual Assistance Division's
draft strategic plan and developing implementation plans that
integrate its IHP improvement efforts.
LThe FEMA Administrator should use desirable
characteristics of employee engagement--including performance
feedback, career development, communication, and attention to
work-life balance--while completing planned activities for
improving morale among call center staff.
LThe FEMA Administrator should use desirable
characteristics of employee engagement--including performance
feedback, career development, communication, and attention to
work-life balance--when assessing NPSC staff satisfaction
scores and identifying additional steps to strengthen employee
morale.
LThe FEMA Administrator should assess the
effectiveness of the IHP training and support for NPSC staff
during surge events and implement any necessary changes.
LThe FEMA Administrator should identify and
implement strategies to help ensure staff deployed to Disaster
Recovery Centers (DRC) have the needed skills and capabilities
to provide support and consistent service to survivors.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to
Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance
Emergency Work Grants. (September 2020) \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ GAO. (September 2020). Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take
Additional Actions to Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public
Assistance Emergency Work Grants. GAO-20-604
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should plan and conduct
regular fraud risk assessments of PA emergency work grants to
determine a fraud risk profile that aligns with leading
practices as provided in the Fraud Risk Framework.
Specifically, this process should include (1) identifying
inherent fraud risks to PA grant funds, (2) assessing the
likelihood and impact of inherent fraud risks, (3) determining
fraud risk tolerance, (4) examining the suitability of existing
fraud controls, and (5) documenting the fraud risk profile.
LThe FEMA Administrator should designate one
entity as the lead entity with responsibility for providing
oversight of agency-wide efforts to manage fraud risks to PA
emergency work grants, including managing the fraud risk
assessment process, consistent with leading practices.
LThe FEMA Administrator should update key training
and guidance documents for the PA grant program to include
information on where and how to report suspected fraud, and
direct PA recipients to include such information in key
training and guidance documents they provide to subrecipients.
LThe FEMA Administrator should update key
resources, such as training and guidance documents, FEMA makes
available to PA applicants to ensure these resources
consistently communicate information on the highest fraud risks
to PA emergency work grant funds and applicants'
responsibilities for managing those risks. The highest fraud
risks may include risks related to procurement and debris
removal, and other risks FEMA identifies through fraud risk
assessments.
LThe FEMA Administrator should implement program-
specific antifraud training for PA staff who work directly with
PA applicants; this training should include information on the
highest fraud risks to PA emergency work grants. The highest
fraud risks may include risks related to procurement and debris
removal, and other risks FEMA identifies through fraud risk
assessments.
FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address Deployment
and Staff Development Challenges. (May 2020) \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ GAO. (May 2020). FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to
Address Deployment and Staff Development Challenges. GAO-20-360
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should develop a plan--
with time frames and milestones and input from field
leadership--to address identified challenges that have hindered
FEMA's ability to provide reliable and complete information to
field leaders and managers about staff knowledge, skills, and
abilities.
LThe FEMA Administrator should develop mechanisms,
including collecting relevant data, to assess how effectively
FEMA's disaster workforce was deployed to meet mission needs in
the field.
LThe FEMA Administrator should create a staff
development program for FEMA's disaster workforce that, at a
minimum, addresses access to training, delivery of on-the-job
training and mentoring, use of performance evaluations, and
consistent developmental opportunities regardless of deployment
status.
Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to Better Support
Individuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. (May 2019) \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ GAO. (May 2019). Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to
Better Support Individuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-
318
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should communicate to
Regional Administrators and Regional Disability Integration
Specialists a written plan for implementing its new disability
integration staffing approach, consistent with the objectives
established for disability integration. Such a plan should
include an implementation timeline and details on staff
responsibilities, which regions could use to evaluate staff
performance.
LThe FEMA Administrator should develop a plan for
delivering training to FEMA staff that promotes competency in
disability awareness. The plan should include milestones and
performance measures, and outline how performance will be
monitored.
LThe FEMA Administrator should develop and
publicize guidance for partners working to assist individuals
who are older or have disabilities for requesting data and
working with FEMA staff throughout the data sharing process to
obtain Individual Assistance data, as appropriate.
Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post
Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery. (April
2019) \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ GAO. (April 2019). Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to
Improve the Use of Post Disaster Contracts to Support Response and
Recovery. GAO-19-281
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe FEMA Administrator should take the lead to
work together with the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to revise the mission assignment policy and related
guidance to better incorporate consideration of contracting
needs, such as demobilization, and to ensure clear
communication of coordination responsibilities related to
contracting.
LThe FEMA Administrator should assess its
workforce needs--including staffing levels, mission needs, and
skill gaps--for contracting staff, to include regional offices
and DART; and develop a plan, including timelines, to address
any gaps.
Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Would Improve Data
Quality and Timeliness of FEMA's Public Assistance Appeals
Processing. (December 2017) \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ GAO. (December 2017). Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions
Would Improve Data Quality and Timeliness of FEMA's Public Assistance
Appeals Processing. GAO-18-143
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LThe Assistant Administrator for Recovery should
develop a detailed workforce plan that documents steps for
hiring, training, and retaining key appeals staff. The plan
should also address staff transitions resulting from
deployments to disasters.
Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess
a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recovery on Its Own.
(September 2012) \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ GAO. (September 2012). Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved
Criteria Needed to Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and
Recovery on Its Own. GAO-12-838
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LTo increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
the process for disaster declarations, the FEMA Administrator
should develop and implement a methodology that provides a more
comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction's capability to
respond to and recover from a disaster without federal
assistance. This should include one or more measures of a
jurisdiction's fiscal capacity, such as TTR, and consideration
of the jurisdiction's response and recovery capabilities. If
FEMA continues to use the PA per capita indicator to assist in
identifying a jurisdiction's capabilities to respond to and
recover from a disaster, it should adjust the indicator to
accurately reflect the annual changes in the U.S. economy since
1986, when the current indicator was first adopted for use. In
addition, implementing the adjustment by raising the indicator
in steps over several years would give jurisdictions more time
to plan for and adjust to the change.
FEMA PRIORITIES FOR 2022: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2022
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Dina
Titus (Chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present remotely: Ms. Titus, Mr. DeFazio, Ms.
Norton, Ms. Davids of Kansas, Mr. Pappas, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr.
Garamendi, Mr. Carter of Louisiana, Mr. Webster of Florida, Mr.
Massie, Miss Gonzalez-Colon, Mr. Guest, Mr. Gimenez, Mr. Graves
of Louisiana, and Mr. LaMalfa.
Ms. Titus. Well, good morning. The subcommittee will come
to order. Thank you all for tuning in, either being in
Washington or virtually.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that the Members who are not
on the subcommittee, but want to sit in, be permitted to do
that at today's hearing, and also ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
As a reminder, please keep your microphones muted unless
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I
will request that the Member please mute their microphone.
To insert a document into the record, please have your
staff email it to [email protected].
Before I begin, I would like to just take a moment of
personal privilege to tell you all that Aaron Davis is leaving
our committee. I hate to hear that, because he has been a great
member of this team, and certainly an asset to me and all of
us, providing excellent information. Aaron has been 3 years on
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. He spent 4\1/
2\ years at FEMA, and brought that experience with him to the
committee. And he served 11 years in different personal House
offices.
He is moving to become the vice president of Federal
relations at the International Code Council, and they are lucky
to have him. He certainly has a lot of background in this area.
I think we will still be seeing Aaron, but now he will be
sitting across the table from us, instead of behind the podium.
So, Aaron, we wish you all the best, and we thank you for
all that you have done for this committee, and we look forward
to interacting and working with you in your new role.
I will now start with my own statement, and then we will go
to Mr. Webster, the ranking member, for his.
Welcome today, our witnesses. This is a very important
hearing, because we are going to be discussing what should be
the priorities of FEMA, moving into 2022.
When we think about FEMA, we typically think about floods,
or hurricanes, or wildfires, or those kinds of immediate
disasters that are usually limited to a specific area. But what
we have learned with the national disaster declaration during
COVID-19 is that unexpected events of all kinds can impact any
community at any time.
Now, during this declaration, which is ongoing, people in
Nevada--and I am sure in all of your States--have really relied
on FEMA to provide certain services that perhaps they haven't
in the past, like setting up community vaccination centers.
In addition to the pandemic, we know that climate change
and severe weather events, which have combined with high-risk
areas having more intense development to really make
emergencies more serious, have changed the emergency management
landscape as a result.
And Government and insurance data show that these disasters
are more expensive and have a greater impact than ever before.
And that is what we need to talk about, as we look at
FEMA's plans for the next year. We need to see how FEMA can
adapt to this new reality in dealing with certain kinds of
disasters, and with those that are unexpected, and how they can
keep our communities and the survivors as a priority as they
move forward.
The demand for Public Assistance has never been greater. It
is used to help repair public infrastructure after a disaster.
That has just increased at rocket speed, as the intensity of
natural disasters have also increased. And presently, FEMA has
the longest queue for Public Assistance to date as a result of
these disasters. You only have to look at Puerto Rico, if you
don't believe me, because they are still trying to get Public
Assistance for the people who were affected by the weather
conditions in those areas, as well as in the Virgin Islands.
Reimbursements are critical from FEMA to these communities
to get back on their feet. But one of the things that we have
heard over the years in the time I have chaired this committee
is there is just too much redtape, too many burdensome
requirements, people don't know where to apply, it is
contradictory information. So, that has got to be a priority,
that we clean up that redtape and simplify the Public
Assistance program to better assist our communities.
The second thing that I know we want to talk about that
should be a priority is the workforce. Two things are happening
at the same time: it is difficult to find people to work, and
yet the disasters are increasing. So, how do we find additional
team members to work with the men and women who have done such
a good job, and worked so hard in these, kind of, trying times,
in order to expand the workforce there?
We need more diversity. We need more longevity of the
members. We need to be able to attract a well-qualified
workforce to FEMA. And so, that has got to be a priority.
I have got legislation that is bipartisan, which will be
introduced, designed to help FEMA meet these needs to recruit
and retain qualified reservists. We need to provide protection
for these folks, we need to provide training, and we need to
provide benefits if we want to have a team who can meet the new
demands.
A third issue that seems to run throughout the priorities
that FEMA should be looking at for the new year is the notion
of building resilience. When you build back, you need to build
back better. And so, I am proud to have championed some
efforts, along with the chairman of this committee, Mr.
DeFazio, in the Resilient AMERICA package, so that we could
provide some of this assistance.
We also sent a letter to FEMA talking about the inequitable
distribution of benefits that need to be considered.
So, I look forward to working with FEMA on these efforts
during 2022. This committee stands ready to do what Congress
can to assist FEMA's efforts. We want to hear how FEMA is
trying to meet the 50 open recommendations that have come from
the GAO that address some of these shortcomings all across the
program.
And I am anxious to hear from Mr. Currie how GAO believes
that FEMA can prioritize these 50 open issues.
And I also want to hear from the emergency management folks
at the National Emergency Management Association and the
International Association of Emergency Managers. They are on
the front lines, and they can tell us, from their standpoint,
how they think things can be improved, how they are working
well, and how we need to make some adjustments.
So, we will look forward to the hearing. We thank the
witnesses for being here.
[Ms. Titus' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Nevada, and Chair, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing and thank our
witnesses for joining us to discuss their perspectives regarding what
FEMA should prioritize in 2022.
While Southern Nevada does not experience many major disasters that
require FEMA intervention, the nationwide major disaster declaration
for COVID-19 reminded us that unexpected events can impact any
community at any time. During this major disaster declaration--which is
still an open event--Nevadans have relied on FEMA's programs, such as
vaccine sites, to provide lifesaving services.
Climate change and associated severe weather, as well as
development in high-risk areas have changed the emergency management
landscape. Disasters are more expensive and have a greater impact than
ever before, supported by government and insurance industry data.
Today we are going to discuss how FEMA can adapt to this new
reality and ensure disaster survivors and their communities remain the
priority.
The demand for Public Assistance, which is used to repair public
infrastructure after a disaster, has skyrocketed with the increased
frequency and intensity of natural disasters.
Presently, FEMA has the largest queue for Public Assistance
worksheets to date, a result of the national scale of the pandemic
declarations, as well as expanded eligibility for pandemic-related
countermeasures.
Reimbursements provided by FEMA's Public Assistance program are
critical for communities trying to get back on their feet post-
disaster. However, we hear time and time again from stakeholders that
this program is plagued by red tape and burdensome requirements. This
year, it must be an agency priority to simplify the Public Assistance
program so that it can better assist communities.
There is no place where the consequences of FEMA's complex Public
Assistance program are more evident than Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. Individuals in these communities are still waiting for
the restoration of full access to basic public infrastructure such as
reliable electricity, health care facilities, schools, and roads
following Hurricanes Irma and Maria nearly five years ago. And I remain
committed to supporting the recovery process in Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands until the last public worksheet has been completed.
When considering how to improve FEMA's programs, focus must be
placed upon its workforce. I am proud that FEMA's workforce has
consistently risen to the challenge--they have been confronted with
unprecedented disaster damage, a pandemic, and expanding
responsibilities.
I expect to soon introduce bipartisan legislation designed to
ensure FEMA has the tools needed to recruit and retain qualified
workers for its cadre of disaster reservists. I believe that providing
FEMA's workforce with access to appropriate protections, training, and
benefits will increase the agency's capabilities and result in better
outcomes for disaster survivors and their communities.
A consistent thread connecting FEMA's challenges is the increasing
severity and cost of disasters. Mitigation projects must be used to
reduce the impact of such incidents and build resilience. That is why I
am proud to have championed expanded mitigation efforts as Chair of
this Subcommittee, including our bipartisan Resilient AMERICA package.
We've also sent a letter to FEMA regarding the inequitable distribution
of mitigation grant dollars.
I look forward to continuing these efforts in 2022.
FEMA has achieved many noteworthy accomplishments--but there is
still much work to be done. The Government Accountability Office has
more than 50 open recommendations to FEMA, which address shortcomings
across all of FEMA's programs.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Currie regarding how the GAO
believes FEMA should prioritize addressing outstanding recommendations.
I also look forward to hearing how state and local emergency managers
represented by the National Emergency Management Association and
International Association of Emergency Managers have been impacted by
FEMA's programs.
I once again thank our witnesses for joining us today to share
their perspective and expertise. We are grateful for your testimony and
look forward to our discussion.
Ms. Titus. And I would now turn to Mr. Webster, the ranking
member, for his opening statement.
[Pause.]
Voice. Say it again.
Ms. Titus. We can't hear you, Mr. Webster.
Mr. Webster of Florida. How is that?
Ms. Titus. OK.
Mr. Webster of Florida. OK, great. Thank you so much. I
just want to say FEMA has a mission critical to our Nation, but
also critical to the State of Florida, my home State.
FEMA leads the Federal Government's response to disasters,
natural and man-made. When FEMA's processes are complicated and
riddled with too much redtape, it slows the preparation for the
recovery from disasters, and it discourages investment in
mitigation.
Over the years, the committee has passed legislation
intended to cut redtape, but these laws are rarely implemented,
and so, they are intended to be done, but they just don't get
done.
The Government Accountability Office has issued dozens of
reports and many recommendations still open across a host of
areas, including recovery, mitigation, and Individual
Assistance. What seems to be the common theme throughout all of
the reports is how confusing and complicated FEMA's process can
be.
It is more critical than ever, with the number of the
disasters we are seeing, for the process to be streamlined. We
need to get assistance out the door quickly to allow
communities and families to rebuild faster and easily build in
mitigation so next time there will be less damage.
That is why I am pleased to cosponsor bipartisan
legislation, the SPEED Recovery Act, introduced by Ranking
Member Sam Graves, which will streamline the process for about
95 percent of the disasters that are happening.
I look forward to hearing from GAO and the stakeholders
here today and those submitting written testimony for the
record.
[Mr. Webster's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
FEMA has a mission critical to our Nation and my home state of
Florida. FEMA leads the federal government's response to disasters--
natural and man-made.
When FEMA's processes are complicated and riddled with too much red
tape, it slows preparation for and recovery from disasters, and it
discourages investment in mitigation. Over the years, this Committee
has passed legislation intended to cut red tape, but these laws are
either rarely implemented as intended, or FEMA finds more red tape to
put back into the process.
The Government Accountability Office has issued dozens of reports
with many recommendations still open across a host of areas including
recovery, mitigation, and individual assistance. What seems to be a
common theme throughout many of these reports is how confusing and
complicated FEMA's process can be.
It is more critical than ever, with the number of disasters we are
seeing, for the process to be streamlined and sped up. We need to get
assistance out the door quickly to allow communities and families to
rebuild faster and easily build in mitigation so next time there will
be less damage.
That is why I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the bipartisan
legislation, the SPEED Recovery Act, introduced by Ranking Member Sam
Graves, which will streamline the process for 95 percent of disaster
projects.
I look forward to hearing from the GAO and stakeholders here today
and those submitting written testimony for the record.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Chair, and I yield back.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Webster. We now turn to the
chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
Mr. DeFazio, for his opening statement.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I certainly also
want to congratulate Aaron on his new position. That
organization is incredibly lucky to have him coming on board,
with his extraordinary breadth and depth of experience. He did
start many years ago in my personal office on the Hill, and
then, as you noted, moved on to many, many other important
positions.
And it has been great to have him on the committee,
especially since I think he is the only person who can master
all of the acronyms of FEMA. I don't think there is another
agency of the Federal Government that has as many acronyms for
as many programs, and I find it incredibly confusing, as I
think many others do, but he can always explain it.
So, again, congratulations.
We put, obviously, extraordinary burdens on FEMA recently
with COVID, the border, and then we are having more and more
extreme natural disasters, both wildfire and weather events
that are exacerbated by climate change. We have to help the
Agency streamline, so that it can, with more facility, deal
with this extraordinary burden that they have. We recognize
that their budgets are stretched, and we also have to meet our
obligations there.
I was particularly interested in the National Emergency
Management Association's thoughts, a paper on what we would do
with wildfire response and recovery, particularly an incredible
concern here, in the Western U.S., as we are now headed into
the 20-some-odd year of what is called a megadrought, the worst
in recorded history if this winter continues the way it is
going. And their comments about the FMAG, DRRA, HMGP, and WUI
are very well taken, and I hope they will amplify on those a
little bit today as they testify.
The other area of major concern beyond all of the
outstanding issues with GAO are things that relate to personal
assistance and the confusion there. We have to simplify these
processes. And we also have to better integrate with other
agencies that can be involved, including HUD or other
disciplines.
We still have people from the fires in Oregon who do not
have long-term housing. And I am concerned that they may soon
have to be paying substantial rent for temporary quarters. And
that is a subject of a letter recently sent.
The chair and the ranking member mentioned legislation that
is pending. I am going to have to get off this, probably pretty
quickly, because I have to go to a chairs meeting, and I am
going to raise the issue of when we are going to bring those
bipartisan bills to the floor, as opposed to post offices and
other things that we have been doing lately. Particularly the
Resilient AMERICA package, I believe, would move expeditiously
through the House, and I am looking forward to that in the not
too distant future.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Titus, and thank you to our witnesses for being
with us today.
Today's witnesses will provide stakeholder perspectives on FEMA's
successes and shortcomings.
As natural disasters become more costly and have greater impact
upon communities across the nation, it is critical that FEMA programs
are as effective and efficient as possible. We've heard time and again
that the quality of FEMA interactions significantly impacts disaster
survivors' recovery.
In 2020, wildfires forced Oregonians to understand the importance
of FEMA's programs more than ever. The Labor Day fires damaged more
than 5,000 structures across the state and tens of thousands of
Oregonians were forced to evacuate.
A year and a half later, the recovery process for this disaster
continues. Just last week, the Seattle Times reported that some
survivors who lost their homes are still struggling to secure long-term
housing solutions.
I continue to follow the progress of survivors and am committed to
helping Oregonians throughout this long recovery process. The entire
Oregon congressional delegation recently joined together to send a
letter to FEMA Administrator Criswell regarding FEMA's direct housing
mission and the possibility of rental charges being assessed on
survivors during a six-month extension, which the agency just approved
at the request of the state.
A series of unprecedented hazard events, including the record cost
of the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons and nationwide major disaster
declarations for COVID-19, have stretched FEMA to its limit. The
agency's oversubscription has made it difficult for FEMA's workforce to
adequately support disaster survivors.
I hope today's discussion will help us consider ways that FEMA
might adapt its programs to ensure quality assistance to survivors in
this new reality, which is fueled by climate change and compounded by a
pandemic.
Disasters do not discriminate. Therefore, it is critical that FEMA
programs are designed to benefit the needs of every single disaster
survivor.
The GAO has highlighted concerns with FEMA's ability to administer
its programs equitably. I am pleased that this Administration has made
equity a priority and that FEMA is in the process of seeking innovative
ways to restructure its programs. I fully support these efforts and am
open to considering statutory changes that may be needed to achieve
this goal.
The increasing frequency, intensity, and cost of natural disasters
makes us ask--what can we do to protect communities before disaster
strikes? The answer is to invest in mitigation efforts.
Time and again we've discussed mitigation as a commonsense, cost-
effective way to save lives and property. That's why I strongly support
finding ways to expand funding for mitigation projects.
I am proud to have introduced the Resilient AMERICA package along
with Chair Titus and Ranking Members Graves and Webster last year. We
successfully advanced this bill out of committee, and I look forward to
the opportunity to debate it on the House Floor. The improvements to
hazard mitigation assistance programs that this legislation provides
will help individuals and communities make needed investments in
mitigation efforts.
However, mitigation cannot be effective unless it is fairly
distributed across all communities. Stakeholder feedback has me
concerned that FEMA's mitigation assistance programs are only reaching
the largest and best-resourced communities. The complexity of the
application processes makes it near impossible for small,
disadvantaged, and rural communities to successfully access these
funds.
I sent a letter with Chair Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and
Ranking Member Graves to FEMA this week to detail my concern and
request an update on the agency's actions to address inequity in the
mitigation grant application process. This concern has been echoed by
the witnesses' written testimony.
Once again, thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. I look
forward to hearing your testimony and learning from your experience.
Mr. DeFazio. So, with that, Madam Chair, I would yield back
the balance of my time.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't believe that Mr. Graves is with us, so, we will go
right to our witnesses.
Thank you all for joining us this morning, and welcome to
our subcommittee. Our witnesses are Mr. Chris Currie, Director
of Homeland Security and Justice with the U.S. GAO; Ms. Erica
Bornemann, director of Vermont Emergency Management, and also
is testifying on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association; and Ms. Carolyn Harshman, who is the president of
the International Association of Emergency Managers.
We thank you for being here today, and we look forward to
your testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record.
Since your written word will now be part of the record, we
would kindly request that you limit your testimony to 5
minutes.
So, we will begin with you, Mr. Currie. Please proceed.
TESTIMONY OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; ERICA
BORNEMANN, DIRECTOR, VERMONT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ON BEHALF OF
THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; AND CAROLYN J.
HARSHMAN, MPA, CEM, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
EMERGENCY MANAGERS
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Chairwoman Titus, Chairman DeFazio,
and Ranking Member Webster, for the chance to be here today to
talk about GAO's work on FEMA priorities.
First, I think it is important to recognize the pressures
and the challenges that FEMA has on it. In recent years, the
Agency has led the pandemic response, responded to year after
year of record-setting hurricanes and wildfires, and also been
asked to help with other national issues such as border
security. At GAO, even though we audit and evaluate FEMA, we
also have respect for the hard-working staff and the mission.
There is not a more dedicated group of Federal employees, and
also I have found FEMA leadership to be very committed to self-
evaluation and improvement.
Having said that, I see four key challenges that FEMA will
have to tackle in the years ahead.
First, as was mentioned in the opening statements, is the
workforce managing its own people. The FEMA workforce is worn
down by a disaster season that really never ends anymore. Also,
the Agency's staffing, training, and hiring processes were
designed for a mission that has changed.
We have found that FEMA has long faced challenges in
deploying staff with the right qualifications and skills to
meet disaster needs.
We have also found that FEMA struggles to train, coach, and
develop its disaster workforce, especially when they are
deployed in the field. For example, reservists, who make up
almost 40 percent of the workforce, face barriers to getting
the training and other developmental opportunities they need
when they are not deployed, including not having paid time and
technology to get training when they are not in the field.
We have made recommendations to fix some of these problems,
but I think broader workforce reform, involving Congress and
this committee, is needed to be able to hire, train, and retain
the staff FEMA needs to meet a growing mission.
The second major challenge area is simplifying disaster
relief and removing barriers for disaster survivors. We have
found that survivors face a number of challenges in
understanding and obtaining FEMA Individual Assistance. We
recently made 14 recommendations in 1 report alone to improve
the Individual Assistance program, including that FEMA overhaul
and improve how it communicates award decisions or denials with
survivors. We found that confusion doesn't just lead to
frustration; it also led to some survivors not pursuing
assistance when they may have been eligible to get it.
The third area of challenge is streamlining and simplifying
complex, lengthy recovery grants and programs for State, local,
Tribal, and Territorial governments. In our work, States,
Tribes, and other localities tell us over and over again that
recovery programs are, at best, overly complicated, and at
worst, actually a disincentive sometimes to recovery.
According to FEMA, the Agency had almost 1,000 open
disasters or emergency declarations going back years, including
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. While most think of FEMA staff as
immediately responding to a disaster, the truth is that much of
FEMA's workforce manages thousands of grants and recovery
projects from prior disasters. Streamlining recovery programs
to be more efficient would help cut down on FEMA's workload,
and going back to the staffing issues I talked about, help the
staff focus on the most pressing matters.
Also, coordination between FEMA, as Chairman DeFazio said,
and other Federal recovery programs like HUD and SBA and
others, would further cut down on the burden and frustration
that States and communities face.
Further compounding the challenges related to complexity,
concerns are also being raised now about the extent to which
disaster assistance programs are helping those most in need,
and how they impact vulnerable populations, as well.
The last and fourth key priority area is building
resilience. This is an area that FEMA has made tremendous
progress on in recent years, partly due to Congress' actions,
too, to create new programs. Mitigation and building resilience
is one of the few solutions that we have to adapt to extreme
weather and severe infrastructure damage. Additional
predisaster mitigation grants like the BRIC program, the
Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program, will
help to address these issues, but FEMA needs to continue to
focus on ensuring these grants encourage mitigation.
We just reported last year that State and local officials
told us that mitigation grant programs were still too lengthy
and complicated, making them even more difficult to use
effectively than some other grant programs.
This completes my statement. I look forward to discussing
how we can address these challenges, and to your questions.
[Mr. Currie's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
FEMA: Opportunities to Help Address Mission and Management Challenges
Chair Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on challenges
facing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
FEMA leads our nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of disasters.
The historic 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons pushed FEMA well beyond its
routine disaster response posture. In 2017, hurricanes Harvey, Irma,
and Maria, and the severe wildfires in California, collectively
affected 47 million people--nearly 15 percent of the nation's
population. In 2018, hurricanes Florence and Matthew and another severe
California wildfire season again necessitated a major federal response.
Furthermore, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and Guam experienced an unprecedented number of disasters in 2018--
including typhoons, earthquakes, mudslides, and volcanic eruptions. In
2020, FEMA responded to 230 presidentially declared emergencies and
major disasters--an all-time high--including a record-breaking
hurricane season in the Atlantic Ocean, and the most active fire year
on record for the West Coast. In 2021, there were 20 weather and
climate-related disaster events with losses exceeding $1 billion each
in the United States, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration.
In addition to its responsibilities responding to the rising number
of disasters and other emergencies, FEMA has been tasked with new
responsibilities. FEMA has played a key role in the federal response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, it established mass vaccination
sites and provided funeral assistance to families, the scope of which
is unprecedented for the agency. According to FEMA data, as of August
30, 2021, the agency's call center had received and was processing
264,544 applications, and FEMA had awarded more than $1 billion for
funeral assistance. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, FEMA had processed
approximately 6,000 cases of funeral assistance over the past decade.
It has also assisted in the Afghan refugee resettlement efforts and at
the southwest border.
While we recognize the difficult job FEMA has been tasked with, in
recent years, we have reported on various mission and management
challenges the agency faces. For instance, FEMA management has had to
redeploy response personnel from one disaster to the next, and the
agency has reported facing staffing shortfalls in response to some
disasters. In addition, a large influx of new employees has added to
the challenges of providing timely, program-specific training. FEMA
hazard mitigation programs and disaster recovery programs sometimes
have complex and lengthy processes and mechanisms that have affected
access to, as well as the speed and delivery of assistance. Some
programs also lack information that would allow them to examine
patterns and indicators to identify access barriers and differing
outcomes for different groups of survivors.
My statement today discusses our prior work and recommendations
related to FEMA's challenges in four key areas: (1) workforce
management; (2) long-term disaster recovery efforts; (3) potential
barriers to disaster assistance and disparate recovery outcomes; and
(4) future disaster resilience and mitigation. Successfully addressing
these challenges is important because the rising number and costs of
disasters and the increasing reliance on the federal government for
disaster assistance will likely continue as the climate changes.\1\
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\1\ GAO, Climate Change: Information on Potential Economic Effects
Could Help Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Fiscal Exposure, GAO-17-720
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2017).
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My statement today is based on products we developed and issued
from January 2015 to December 2021. To perform our prior work, we
reviewed and analyzed federal law, a non-generalizable sample of post-
disaster contracts, agency guidance, and other agency documentation. We
also analyzed data on FEMA's workforce, disaster assistance programs,
and flood mapping efforts, among others. We interviewed officials from
FEMA and other selected federal agencies; and state, territory, local,
and nonprofit officials impacted by disasters. We conducted some of
these interviews as part of visits to locations affected by hurricanes
in 2017 and 2018, where we also met with disaster survivors.
Additionally, we conducted 17 focus groups with FEMA staff. More
detailed information on the scope and methodology of our prior work can
be found in each of the issued reports cited throughout this statement.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Workforce Management
FEMA has faced longstanding challenges related to its workforce,
which have affected its ability to achieve its mission. In recent
years, we have reported on these challenges--(1) staffing shortages;
(2) workforce qualifications; and (3) staff development--and their
impact. We have also made recommendations to address various aspects of
these challenges.
Staffing shortages. Several large-scale disasters and concurrent
emergencies have created an unprecedented demand for FEMA's workforce.
In May 2020, we reported that during the 2017 and 2018 disaster
seasons, FEMA deployed 14,684 and 10,328 personnel, respectively, at
the peak of each of these seasons and reported staffing shortages.\2\
FEMA faced shortages across over half of its cadres--groups organized
by operational or programmatic functions--during the 2017 and 2018
disaster seasons. For instance, according to FEMA's deployment data, 18
of 23 cadres operated with 25 percent or fewer staff available to
deploy when Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico. In addition,
many staff members who were available to deploy declined when requested
to do so, in part due to the austere conditions and burnout, FEMA
officials told us. For example, 48 percent of FEMA staff declined a
deployment to Puerto Rico in 2017 after Hurricane Maria, and 40 percent
declined a deployment to California in response to the November
California wildfires in 2018.
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\2\ GAO, FEMA Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address
Deployment and Staff Development Challenges, GAO-20-360 (Washington,
D.C.: May 4, 2020).
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In light of the aforementioned issues, we are continuing to monitor
FEMA's ability to deploy personnel to catastrophic disasters or
concurrent disasters. We recently initiated work related to FEMA's
recruitment, hiring, and retention.
Workforce qualifications. In addition to staffing shortages, we
found that FEMA faced challenges identifying and deploying staff with
the right qualifications and skills at the right time to best meet
disaster needs. We reported challenges with the reliability of
information from FEMA's qualification and deployment processes and
systems. According to FEMA managers and staff in the field, an
employee's recorded qualification status was not a reliable indicator
of staff's ability to perform their positions in the field. For
example, at the height of FEMA workforce deployments in October 2017,
54 percent of staff were serving in a capacity in which they did not
hold the title of qualified--according to FEMA's qualification system
standards--a past challenge we also identified in 2015.\3\
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\3\ GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on the
Federal Response and Key Recovery Challenges, GAO-18-472 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018).
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In 2020, we recommended that FEMA develop a plan to address
identified challenges that have hindered FEMA's ability to provide
reliable and complete information to field leaders and managers about
staff abilities. FEMA concurred and reported progress in developing
qualification plans for cadre personnel to better inform field leaders
about staff knowledge, skills, and abilities, among other actions, as
of December 2021. We are conducting follow-up to assess the extent to
which FEMA is taking a comprehensive approach and developing a plan
that considers cross-cutting solutions to the complex and interrelated
challenges we identified in our report.
Staff development. Our previous work found shortcomings in FEMA's
ability to ensure staff development--training courses, on-the-job
learning, coaching, and mentoring--for the skills and abilities needed
in the field. We found that at the start of their deployment during the
2017 and 2018 disaster seasons, 36 percent of FEMA's incident
management workforce did not have an official assigned to coach and
evaluate their task performance--the primary mechanism the agency
depends on for coaching. Furthermore, when such officials were
assigned, they often lacked time to coach staff. For example, officials
at one of the joint field offices we visited said mission needs always
come first and coaching and evaluating responsibilities are frequently
not a priority. Supervisors in the field also often inconsistently
completed performance evaluations for deployed staff.
Additionally, reservists--who often comprise the greatest
proportion of FEMA staff in the field during a disaster and made up 35
percent of FEMA's workforce as of August 2021--faced barriers to
accessing developmental opportunities when not deployed, including lack
of paid time and technology needed to access training. Effective and
consistent staff development is particularly important because FEMA has
hired a large number of reservists over the past few years. The
challenges associated with underqualified staff underscore the need for
a comprehensive staff development program that would equip all staff to
meet mission needs in the field.
We recommended that FEMA create a staff development program that
addresses access to training, use of performance evaluations, and
consistent developmental opportunities regardless of FEMA employees'
deployment status. FEMA concurred with our recommendation and, as of
December 2021, has taken steps to improve staff development efforts,
including steps to allow training to be more accessible to staff,
implementing assessments for coaching, and establishing a process for
providing annual performance appraisals for reservists. We are
monitoring FEMA's actions to assess the extent to which they constitute
an integrated and cohesive program for workforce development.
We have reported examples of how these workforce challenges affect
FEMA's operations and those FEMA serves, including that (1) shortages
in contracting staff exacerbated challenges for recovery efforts, and
(2) low morale and high attrition rate affected service delivery.
Shortages in contracting staff exacerbated challenges for recovery
efforts. In 2019, we found that during the 2017 hurricanes and
California wildfires, FEMA experienced shortages in their workforce of
contracting staff, which exacerbated challenges for disaster response
and recovery.\4\ For example, eight of FEMA's 10 regional offices had
only one permanent full-time contracting official.\5\ Regional offices
are responsible for managing post-disaster contracts that can last for
years, even if regional procurement staff were not involved in the
initial award of those contracts.
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\4\ GAO, 2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the
Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery, GAO-
19-281 (Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2019).
\5\ FEMA's 10 regional offices cover all the U.S. states and
territories.
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We also found that FEMA had not assessed its contracting workforce
needs since 2014 and recommended it assess its workforce needs--
including staffing levels, mission needs, and skill gaps--and develop a
plan to address any gaps. FEMA concurred with our recommendation and
officials told us they planned on hiring additional contracting staff
and conducting competency modeling for its contracting staff, as well
as a workforce analysis to identify skill gaps. As of May 2021, these
actions were still in progress.
Low morale and high attrition rates affected service delivery. In
May 2020, participants in our focus groups and field managers we
interviewed cited operational challenges that hindered the cadre's
ability to support mission needs, including low morale.\6\ Furthermore,
in September 2020, we reported on FEMA's call center workforce's
struggles with low morale and their challenges in using program
guidance to assist survivors.\7\ For example, call center staff worked
without adequate training, in part due to high disaster activity in
2017 and 2018. In addition, the training FEMA provided did not
effectively support staff in applying guidance to answer survivors'
questions and process cases encountered in their work, according to
National Processing Service Center staff. These limitations resulted in
missed opportunities to help survivors quickly.
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\6\ GAO-20-360.
\7\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to
Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program, GAO-20-503
(Washington, D.C.: Sep. 30, 2020).
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Additionally, in 2016, we found that the FEMA's Cadre-of-On-Call
Response Employee (CORE) Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT)--
rapid-response teams of FEMA employees that deploy to disaster sites
with little to no notice and remain there for unspecified amounts of
time, depending on mission needs--had experienced high attrition since
its implementation in fiscal year 2013.\8\ According to IMAT officials
from nine of 10 regions and one of three national IMATs, key reasons
cited for the attrition in the initial years of implementing the
program were the relatively low pay and lack of upward mobility for
CORE IMAT team members. This high attrition can be costly because of
the investment required to hire and train new staff.
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\8\ GAO, Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key
Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-16-87
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 05, 2016).
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In 2020, we recommended, among other things, that FEMA use
desirable characteristics of employee engagement while completing
planned activities for improving morale among call center staff,
assessing staff satisfaction scores, and identifying additional steps
to strengthen employee morale.\9\ FEMA concurred and is taking steps to
address our recommendation. In 2016, we also recommended FEMA develop a
process for systematically gathering attrition data and a workforce
strategy for retaining IMAT staff.\10\ FEMA concurred with the
recommendation and implemented it with a series of actions, such as an
assessment of attrition in the IMAT workforce and policy changes
informed by the assessment, which they completed in June 2021.
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\9\ GAO-20-503.
\10\ GAO-16-87.
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Long-Term Disaster Recovery
The federal government has dozens of programs that provide recovery
assistance in the wake of a disaster to eligible state, local, tribal,
and territorial governments; businesses; and individuals and
communities. We have reported on the extent to which FEMA provides
recovery assistance after disasters through its Public Assistance and
Individual Assistance programs, among other initiatives. During our
work relating to disasters that affected the Pacific and Caribbean
regions and California in 2017 and 2018, we found that these recovery
programs can be complex and slow to provide assistance.
Challenges Facing FEMA's Public Assistance Program
FEMA's Public Assistance program reimburses state, local, tribal,
and territorial governments and certain types of nonprofit
organizations for the cost of disaster-related debris removal,
emergency protective measures to protect life and property, and
permanent work to repair or replace damaged or destroyed
infrastructure. According to FEMA's January 2022 Disaster Relief Fund
report, total projected obligations for the Public Assistance programs
from August 1, 2017 through fiscal year 2022 are approximately $112
billion.\11\
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\11\ DHS, FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of December
31, 2021. (Jan. 7, 2022).
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DHS's Fiscal Year 2019-2021 Annual Performance Report states that
the speed at which FEMA obligates funding for Public Assistance
projects is a priority for advancing the recovery process. However,
this report also states that in fiscal year 2019, FEMA awarded only 28
percent of Public Assistance projects within FEMA's target time frames.
In February 2021, we found that FEMA met its goal of awarding Public
Assistance funds within 189 days of a disaster for only 14 percent of
Public Assistance projects in the Pacific region (70 of 492
projects).\12\ On average, it took 13 months for FEMA to award funding
for these projects. Similarly, we reported in November 2019 and May
2021 on slow time frames for awarding Public Assistance funding in
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.\13\ In February 2021, we
recommended that FEMA analyze Public Assistance program data to
identify causes of funding delays and take actions to address those
delays.\14\ FEMA concurred and is working to address this
recommendation.
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\12\ GAO, 2018 Pacific Island Disasters: Federal Actions Helped
Facilitate the Response, but FEMA Needs to Address Long-Term Recovery
Challenges, GAO-21-91 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2021).
\13\ GAO, U.S. Virgin Islands Recovery: Additional Actions Could
Strengthen FEMA's Key Disaster Recovery Efforts, GAO-20-54 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 19, 2019); GAO, Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in
Approving Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the
Recovery, GAO-21-264 (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2021).
\14\ GAO-21-91.
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We have reported on several additional factors that may have
contributed to FEMA's slowness in awarding Public Assistance funding:
Reimbursement model. Most Public Assistance projects utilize a
reimbursement model in which award recipients--state or territorial
governments where the President has declared a major disaster--must
provide upfront funding for projects and later seek reimbursement from
FEMA. We found that this model delayed recovery in some locations.
Specifically, we reported in November 2019 that, due to the U.S. Virgin
Islands' fiscal situation and inability to provide upfront funding for
all Public Assistance projects, the territory had to prioritize certain
projects over others.\15\ Similarly, we reported in May 2021 that
Puerto Rico's fiscal situation made it difficult for Public Assistance
award recipients to provide upfront project funding, and consequently,
construction for many approved projects had not started. For example,
we found that as of January 2021--over 3 years since hurricanes Irma
and Maria struck the island--Puerto Rico had expended less than $158
million (or less than 1 percent) of the $17.5 billion that FEMA
obligated to reimburse award recipients for permanent work Public
Assistance projects.\16\
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\15\ GAO-20-54.
\16\ GAO-21-264.
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In May 2021, we recommended that FEMA coordinate with the
Government of Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies to identify and
assess risks--and potential actions to manage those risks--to the
remainder of Puerto Rico's disaster recovery, including factors such as
Puerto Rico's capacity to carry out Public Assistance projects. FEMA
agreed with this recommendation and has started a formal risk
assessment process. In addition, officials in the U.S. Virgin Islands
told us that pursuing projects under the Public Assistance alternative
procedures program may help to address issues with the reimbursement
model by providing more flexibility regarding when and how projects are
funded. These alternative procedures are discussed below.
Fixed-cost estimates. FEMA developed alternative procedures in
which FEMA provides funding for Public Assistance projects based on a
fixed-cost estimate, which may help alleviate the challenges associated
with the reimbursement model. FEMA intended to expedite the provision
of assistance with these alternative procedures. However, in 2019,
2020, and 2021, we reported that Public Assistance applicants in the
Pacific and Caribbean regions found the process of developing fixed-
cost estimates to be difficult and lengthy, and this estimation process
delayed disaster recovery.\17\ We have made recommendations to help
FEMA improve the use of fixed-cost estimates, and identify and address
related inefficiencies. FEMA concurred and has taken actions to address
these recommendations.
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\17\ GAO-20-54; GAO-21-91; and GAO, Puerto Rico Disaster Recovery:
FEMA Actions Needed to Strengthen Project Cost Estimation and Awareness
of Program Guidance, GAO-20-221 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 2020).
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Wildfire debris removal. We also found in October 2019 that the
unique challenge of removing wildfire debris led to confusion over soil
excavation standards and led to over-excavation of some homeowners'
lots, lengthening the recovery process.\18\ To address this and other
wildfire-related challenges, we recommended that FEMA comprehensively
assess operations to identify any additional updates to its management
controls--such as policies, procedures, or training--that could enhance
future response and recovery from large-scale and severe wildfires.
FEMA is taking steps to address this recommendation, including by
developing analyses to update disaster assessment efforts and working
to update guidance.
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\18\ GAO, Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges, GAO-20-5 (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 9, 2019).
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Challenges Facing FEMA's Individual Assistance Program
FEMA's Individual Assistance program provides financial assistance
and, if necessary, direct assistance to eligible individuals and
households who, as a direct result of a major disaster or emergency,
have necessary expenses and serious needs, and are unable to meet such
expenses or needs through other means. According to FEMA's January 2022
Disaster Relief Fund report, total projected obligations for Individual
Assistance programs from August 1, 2017 through fiscal year 2022 are
approximately $5 billion.\19\
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\19\ DHS, FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of December
31, 2021. (Jan. 7, 2022).
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Individuals and Households Program (IHP). In September 2020, we
reported that survivors faced numerous challenges obtaining aid and
understanding the IHP--one of FEMA's Individual Assistance programs
that provides housing and other needs assistance to individuals
affected by a major disaster or emergency.\20\ We found FEMA, state,
territory, and local officials said that disaster survivors did not
understand and were frustrated by the requirement that certain
survivors first be denied a Small Business Administration (SBA)
disaster loan before receiving certain types of IHP assistance. FEMA
did not fully explain the requirement to survivors and its process for
the requirement may have prevented many survivors from being considered
for certain types of assistance, including low-income applicants who
are less likely to qualify for an SBA loan. For instance, we identified
tens of thousands of potentially low-income IHP applicants who were
referred to the SBA but did not submit a loan application. As a result,
FEMA could not consider these applicants for personal property
assistance--for millions of dollars in verified losses--under its
current process.
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\20\ GAO-20-503.
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We also found that opportunities exist to improve survivors'
understanding of FEMA's eligibility and award determinations for the
IHP; for example, clarifying that an ineligible determination is not
always final but may mean FEMA needs more information to decide the
award. In addition, we reported that state and local officials
generally had trouble understanding the IHP. For example, these
officials said that FEMA did not provide sufficient training, support,
and guidance that was needed in order for them to be able to
effectively work with FEMA to facilitate IHP assistance.
To address these and other challenges relating to the IHP, we made
14 recommendations, including identifying ways to simplify the IHP
application process and providing more information to survivors about
their award, among others. FEMA agreed with our recommendations and is
working to address them. For example, as of October 2021, FEMA
officials told us that they are pursuing a regulatory change to alter
the requirement that disaster survivors apply to SBA and be denied
before seeking assistance from FEMA for some types of IHP assistance.
Additionally, as of fall 2021, FEMA was planning revisions to its
communications to survivors and published guidance for state and local
officials, among other steps in progress.
Permanent housing in remote areas. We have also identified
challenges relating to FEMA's Permanent Housing Construction program--
another Individual Assistance program. Specifically, in February 2021,
we reported that 2 years after typhoons struck the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, FEMA had completed 60 percent (73 out of 121)
of home repairs, and only completed about 11 percent (20 out of 182) of
new construction for survivors enrolled in the Permanent Housing
Construction program (93 of 303 houses).\21\ These delays were due, in
part, to a lack of expertise within FEMA relating to soliciting and
awarding construction contracts and construction errors made by
contracted entities.
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\21\ GAO-21-91.
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We found that these housing assistance challenges were consistent
with lessons learned from prior FEMA missions in other remote areas of
the United States. To address these challenges, we recommended that
FEMA incorporate lessons learned from earlier Permanent Housing
Construction missions and address long-standing issues in guidance that
outlines necessary steps to better plan for and implement the program
in remote areas. FEMA concurred and is planning to implement this
recommendation in a Direct Housing Guide it is developing.
Potential Barriers and Disparate Outcomes with Disaster Recovery
Assistance
As we highlighted above, disaster recovery is a complex process
with many factors that affect individual and community outcomes,
including in various socioeconomic and demographic groups. While
federal disaster recovery programs are not typically targeted toward
only low-income or vulnerable populations, our recent work and
recommendations have identified areas that could help these
populations. Specifically, we have reported on FEMA's efforts to (1)
identify and address potential access barriers to disaster recovery
programs; (2) prioritize flood map investments for vulnerable
populations; and (3) provide assistance to individuals who are older or
who have disabilities.
Identifying and addressing potential access barriers and disparate
outcomes. In December 2021, we reported on six federal disaster
recovery programs with historically large obligations and found the
programs have taken some actions that could help officials identify and
address social and institutional barriers.\22\ However, these recovery
programs generally lacked quality information that would allow them to
identify potential access barriers and disparate recovery outcomes.
Additionally, FEMA and federal partners administering disaster recovery
programs have not established processes to address any potential
barriers and disparate outcomes they identify on an ongoing basis.
However, FEMA and other federal agencies with large recovery programs
can and should work together to devise workable approaches to identify
and address barriers to accessing federal recovery programs and
disparate outcomes.
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\22\ GAO, Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Needed to Identify
and Address Potential Recovery Barriers, GAO-22-104039 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 15, 2021).
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We recommended that FEMA, along with federal partners, (1) develop
and implement an interagency plan to help ensure the availability and
use of quality information; and (2) design and establish routine
processes to be used within and across federal disaster recovery
programs to identify and address potential barriers and disparate
outcomes on an ongoing basis. FEMA agreed with both of the
recommendations and is planning to take actions to address them by the
end of 2022.
Prioritizing flood map investments for vulnerable populations. In
October 2021, we reported that the FEMA flood mapping investments for
fiscal years 2012 through 2020 were lower for communities with higher
levels of social vulnerability and underserved populations, other
factors being equal.\23\ More specifically, we found communities with
relatively higher levels of social vulnerability and underserved
populations had (1) more unmapped miles or paper maps in fiscal year
2012; (2) a smaller increase in the percentage of mapped miles that met
FEMA's quality standard metric; and (3) longer cycle times between the
stages of FEMA's mapping process.
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\23\ GAO, FEMA Flood Maps: Better Planning and Analysis Needed to
Address Current and Future Flood Hazards. GAO-22-104079, (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 25, 2021). Social vulnerability is broadly defined as the
susceptibility of social groups to the adverse impacts of natural
hazards, including disproportionate death, injury, loss, or disruption
of livelihood. Social vulnerability considers social vulnerability as
the social, economic, demographic, and housing characteristics of a
community.
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We recommended that FEMA better use flood risk data to prioritize
flood mapping investments toward priority areas, such as vulnerable
communities. FEMA leadership was interested in examining ways the
agency could use data to inform future annual mapping investment
decisions and agreed with our recommendation. They are taking steps to
address the recommendation and we will continue to monitor their
efforts.
Access to specialized assistance for older and disabled
individuals. In May 2019, we reported that officials from entities that
partnered with FEMA reported challenges providing assistance to
individuals who are older or who have disabilities following the 2017
hurricanes.\24\ For example, officials said that many of these
individuals required specialized assistance obtaining food, water,
medicine, and oxygen, but aid was sometimes difficult to provide. We
also reported that aspects of the process to apply for assistance from
FEMA were challenging for older individuals and those with disabilities
and that FEMA did not provide individuals clear opportunities to
disclose disability-related needs.
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\24\ GAO, Disaster Assistance: FEMA Action Needed to Better Support
Individuals Who Are Older or Have Disabilities. GAO-19-318. Washington,
D.C.: May 14, 2019.
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We recommended, among other things, that FEMA implement new
registration-intake questions to improve FEMA's ability to identify and
address survivors' disability-related needs. FEMA agreed with this
recommendation and implemented it in May 2019 by using revised
registration-intake questions that asked directly if survivors had a
disability. According to FEMA's analysis, the percentage of survivors
that identified having a disability-related need increased
substantially after implementing the revised questions.
Future Disaster Resilience and Mitigation
We have previously reported on the extent to which FEMA programs
encourage resilience before a disaster and as part of recovery efforts
following a disaster. We have found that federal and local efforts to
improve resilience can reduce the effects and costs of future
disasters. FEMA has made progress in this area by establishing an
investment strategy to help federal, state, and local officials
identify, prioritize, and guide federal investments in disaster
resilience. FEMA published the National Mitigation Investment Strategy
in August 2019. However, our prior work highlights opportunities to
improve disaster resilience. Specifically, we reported on FEMA efforts
to (1) to identify flood hazards and (2) improve hazard mitigation:
Identify flood hazards. We found that FEMA had increased its
development of flood maps and other flood risk products, but the agency
faced challenges ensuring they comprehensively reflect current and
future flood hazards.\25\ For example, its flood risk products do not
reflect hazards such as heavy rainfall and the best available climate
science. FEMA was addressing some of these challenges, but many may
require years to address. Also, the agency was operating under an out-
of-date plan that did not reflect new goals, objectives and timeframes,
among other things. In order to address challenges in reflecting
current and future flood hazards, we recommended, among other things,
that FEMA update its plan to identify program goals, objectives,
activities, performance measures and time frames for its various
efforts. FEMA concurred and is working to update its ``Risk MAP Multi-
Year Plan,'' to include the items we identified, by December 2022 to
address our recommendation.
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\25\ GAO-22-104079
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Improving hazard mitigation. In February 2021, we found that state
and local officials from selected jurisdictions reported challenges
with FEMA's hazard mitigation grant programs.\26\ Specifically,
officials we interviewed from 10 of 12 jurisdictions said grant
application processes were complex and lengthy. To address this, FEMA
officials augmented guidance and began monitoring application review
time frames to identify opportunities to streamline the programs.
However, the agency had no documented plan to do this. In addition,
officials from eight of the 12 jurisdictions cited challenges with
applicants' technical capacity to successfully apply for grants. To
address this, FEMA developed training and guidance, but we found that
these resources could be difficult for state and local officials to
locate on different parts of FEMA's website.
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\26\ GAO, Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects, GAO-21-
140 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2021). Hazard mitigation is any
sustainable action that reduces or eliminates long-term risk to people
and property from future disasters.
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We recommended that FEMA establish a plan with time frames to
assess hazard mitigation grant processes to identify and implement
steps to reduce the complexity of and time required for grant
applications. FEMA concurred with this recommendation. As of January
2022, the agency stated it had several ongoing efforts to address our
recommendation, such as drafting strategic plans meant to reduce
complexity. To address difficulties in locating application resources,
we recommended that FEMA create a centralized inventory of hazard
mitigation resources on the FEMA website. FEMA concurred with this
recommendation and, as of January 2022, the agency said it was in
process of updating its web pages and guidance. We will continue
monitoring FEMA's efforts to fully address both recommendations.
Thank you Chair Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and Members of the
Subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Currie.
We will now go to Ms. Bornemann.
Ms. Bornemann. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairwoman Titus
and Ranking Member Webster, for this hearing today. And I would
be remiss if I missed out on acknowledging Chairman DeFazio of
the full committee.
Your retirement is bittersweet for the emergency management
community. Your steadfast leadership during your time at the
helm of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has
truly been impactful to the profession. Your retirement is
well-earned, and we really wish you the best. Fortunately, the
current leadership of the committee will remain intact for the
coming year.
However, there are several areas that State emergency
managers feel we can be effective in working with FEMA and
Congress. The most recent iteration of the FEMA Strategic Plan
is thoughtful, and demonstrates a real commitment to the next
generation of emergency management. As we look toward managing
an ever-changing climate, instilling equity in programs,
diversifying our workforce, and ensuring the Nation has the
highest level of readiness, there are several issues on which
we should focus.
Emergency managers are in need of policies and regulation
that provide more flexibilities to navigate increasingly
complex challenges faced in a rapidly changing environment.
Threats such as the ongoing pandemic, cybersecurity, climate
change, infrastructure failures, and continuing natural hazards
require a streamlined and coordinated Federal approach. As the
complexity of the disasters we respond to and recover from
increases, so do programs that were meant to aid Americans in
their worst hour.
NEMA recently completed work on three position papers,
which Chairman DeFazio referenced in terms of the wildfire one,
which I have submitted for the record with my written
statement. They address the need for greater collaboration on
establishing grant requirements, enhancing coordination between
FEMA and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
and addressing wildfire policy.
You may remember back in October, when my colleague from
Oregon, Andrew Phelps, testified before this committee on
wildfires. NEMA took advantage of this opportunity to
participate in that hearing, and codified in policy many issues
that were discussed. I request your attention to the
recommendations provided in that position paper, and we really
look forward to working with the committee as we look for
opportunities for implementation.
Wildfires are just one hazard that highlight the need for
further examination of the equity of application and
implementation of disaster programs. Small changes in policy or
statute can equal significant impact when measuring results. A
small step, such as implementing a universal application for
disaster survivors, is a seemingly simple measure that equates
to better access for States that may have less resources, and a
better disaster survivor experience.
We remain encouraged by FEMA's forward-leaning approach to
garnering feedback for preparedness grant programs, and expect
clear objectives to be outlined to address known equity
challenges within the program themselves. Beyond equity,
however, there are many other challenges in response and
recovery programs.
For several years now, practically every NEMA witness
before this and other committees has spoken of the need to
simplify Federal programs, to streamline State emergency
management, and make them more accessible to the public. This
doesn't require broad measures. It can be simple steps, such as
clarifying FEMA as a lead Federal agency for all consequence
management; supporting legislation such as the SPEED Recovery
Act, which raises the small project threshold; reviewing the
authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the consolidated
resource centers to ensure they are not overly bureaucratic;
and allowing for the rollover of management cost from one
disaster to the next, thereby building capacity at the State
level and speeding disaster closeout.
Finally, the changing face of disasters means we must
consider challenges such as our changing climate.
Unfortunately, current programs lack adequate guidance and
support to address all hazards intensified by climate change.
NEMA needs to strategically identify, prioritize, and invest in
climate resilience projects that help reduce future losses.
This should be done also with an eye toward measurable
outcomes, so that we know what success looks like.
These goals are not unattainable, and the State emergency
management community believes that, working together across all
levels of Government, we can make preparedness and disaster
programs more accessible and accountable.
On behalf of the entire NEMA membership, thank you again
for holding this hearing, and I look forward to any questions
you have for me.
[Ms. Bornemann's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Erica Bornemann, Director, Vermont Emergency
Management, on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association
Thank you, Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and
distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me to testify
today.
I am proud to represent the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA). NEMA represents the state emergency management
directors of all 50 states, territories, and the District of Columbia.
As Director of Vermont Emergency Management and on behalf of my
colleagues in state emergency management, we thank you for holding this
discussion on recommended priorities of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in 2022.
The relationship between federal, state, and local emergency
management is unique in that each maintains separate authorities and
capabilities but must rely on one another to save lives and protect
property. State emergency management relies on the strength of our
locals, so the success of FEMA is also determined by the strength of
the states. The relationship between state and federal emergency
management is sometimes stressed, but no disagreement cannot be
overcome by understanding each other's priorities, remaining flexible,
and maintaining the shared goal of focusing on disaster survivors. The
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic response and recent change in administration
gave the NEMA membership several opportunities to address continuous
improvements with FEMA and we welcome the committee to this discussion
as we look to 2022.
The state emergency managers applaud the recent strategic plan
developed by FEMA and look forward to working with Administrator
Criswell during implementation. To that end, many of the priorities
outlined in this testimony can find congruency with the goals and
objectives of the strategic plan.
Streamlining and Coordinating Federal Programs
In partnership with the states, FEMA should pursue a comprehensive
review, re-envisioning, and reform of emergency management policies and
regulation to provide more flexibility for emergency managers to
navigate increasingly complex challenges faced in a rapidly changing
environment. Threats such as the ongoing pandemic, cybersecurity,
climate change, infrastructure failures, and continuing natural hazards
requires a streamlined and coordinated federal approach.
As a part of this re-envisioning, FEMA should conduct a review of
headquarters-versus-regional decision-making roles and authorities to
aid in streamlining and consistency. The relationship between FEMA
headquarters and the regions must result in a common, fair, and
equitable application of policy, guidance, and regulations across the
country. COVID-19 demonstrated many of the shortcomings in the existing
disconnect between FEMA headquarters and the regions. Throughout the
pandemic states and FEMA Regions struggled to interpret guidance
changes regarding eligibility of response activities and interpretation
of these policies often differed from Region to Region. For example,
the eligible uses of PPE depending on type of facility and occupation
utilizing the PPE was very difficult for applicants to decipher and
continues to be an issue throughout the country. Public Assistance
program guidance assumes impact from disaster caused by natural hazards
and it is often difficult to apply to other disasters such as pandemics
or cyber-attacks. Simplifying guidance as well as interpretation to be
as straight-forward as possible will lessen the administrative burden
on applicants as well as FEMA and will cost taxpayers less wasted time
in fruitless deliberations.
NEMA recently approved three position papers that address other
aspects of federal coordination and policy implementation. Submitted
with this testimony to be entered into the Congressional Record, these
papers address the following:
1. Coordination of State Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance.
As emergency management and homeland security professionals, the
membership of NEMA appreciates the need for grant programs to remain
dynamic and meet emerging threats. FEMA and the department must develop
a more collaborative process, however, to devise, evaluate, and
implement proposed changes. Therefore, FEMA should encourage DHS to
establish a codified review process for grant guidance that is properly
vetted through the appropriate stakeholders.
2. Interagency Collaboration. With the continued maturation of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the need for
collaboration with FEMA is paramount. Whether addressing cybersecurity
threats or critical infrastructure protection activities, FEMA and CISA
must work closely in the development of policies and regulations. An
Integrated Program Office (IPO) seems the best logical way to ensure
such policy is integrated, coordinated, and clarified for those charged
with saving life and property in the response to a major event. This
would further serve as an opportunity to coordinate policy and avoid
negative consequences prior to major events through better integration
at the federal level.
3. Wildfire Policy. Recent wildfires exposed gaps in assistance
and flaws in the interpretation of existing policy. Leveraging federal
grants for response or mitigation efforts becomes problematic when they
do not have adequate allowances for some of the unique needs of
fighting wildfires. In the long-term approach, state and local land
managers can be proactive in lessening threats to communities, while
federal land managers struggle to implement meaningful fuels reduction
projects near communities. In total, there would be great benefit to
federal agencies taking a more active role in protecting communities
before, during, and after wildland fires originating on federal lands.
The paper includes a robust set of recommendations touching nearly
every aspect of FEMA response and recovery programs.
Addressing Equity in Emergency Management
Disasters are indiscriminate in their impact. They do not
distinguish between party affiliation, arbitrary borders, or income
level. Emergency management programs and policies in this nation must
recognize these qualities and evolve to meet the needs of all
Americans. NEMA embraces the priorities outlined in the FEMA strategic
plan to address equity in emergency management programs. This year the
association created a new policy committee to address diversity and
equity issues. FEMA can aid in this national effort by addressing,
supporting, and cultivating an inclusive and diverse workforce
representing the diversity of communities impacted by emergencies. This
includes removing barriers inhibiting vulnerable and underserved
populations from applying for and receiving aid after a disaster. The
federal government should implement a universal application at the
federal level for all disaster assistance programs, creating a more
equitable and less burdensome process for survivors already
experiencing some of the hardest times in their life.
Furthermore, NEMA encouraged FEMA to create a formalized process by
which to evaluate whether existing or new disaster and non-disaster
grant programs increase or decrease equity for disaster survivors, and
do not aggravate any financial and social disparities that may exist
prior to the event. In addressing these goals, however, FEMA should use
caution in guarding against unintended consequences that could
inadvertently reduce or limit assistance to those in need.
For example, layering additional grant requirements to address
equity concerns can become an equity issue by applying a one-size fits
all approach to all states and assuming all states have the same
resources to meet additional grant requirements. We remain encouraged
by FEMA's forwarding-leaning approach to garnering feedback for the
preparedness grant programs and expect clear objectives to be outlined
to address known equity challenges within the program themselves.
Simplify Federal Recovery Programs
The ongoing response to COVID-19 and other, overlapping events
presented a tidal shift in the view of emergency management at all
levels of government. But where issues may arise during response, the
true test of our capabilities and resiliency as a nation come in the
recovery process. The past two years revealed several issues FEMA
should address in 2022 and beyond, including:
Working with the administration to clarify, improve, and
add capacity to support the agency's role in long-term recovery. They
should be the coordinating agency on behalf of the federal government
with the authority to support federal functions across the disaster
recovery spectrum.
Raising the small project threshold of the Public
Assistance program from $131,100 to $1 million, thereby reducing the
complexity of recovery and expediting recovery dollars to disaster
survivors. If FEMA remains unwilling to effect this change
administratively, NEMA reiterates our support of H.R. 5641, the SPEED
Recovery Act, introduced by Representative Graves.
A review of the authorities, roles, and responsibilities
of Consolidated Resource Centers (CRC). Originally intended as
processing centers, CRCs morphed into bottlenecks in the recovery
process, circumventing decisions made by Federal Coordinating Officers,
and slowing processing of recovery funds at headquarters.
An evaluation of the Individual Assistance (IA) Program
to include eligibility indicators, funding amount, processes, and speed
of resources to disaster survivors. IA should maintain a focus on the
beginning of a disaster and a whole community approach in meeting the
objectives of the needs of individuals.
Immediately beginning the process of amending 44 C.F.R.
Part 207 to allow for the rollover of management costs from one
disaster to the next. This would provide each state an unfunded grant
for both the Public Assistance Program and Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program. It would also allow remaining funds after the close-out of a
disaster to be available to build recovery and mitigation capacity at
the state and local levels, and more expeditiously close-out remaining
disasters which may be more complicated and build resilience for the
next disaster.
A clarification of the challenges experienced by states
as it relates to the sharing of personally identifiable information
(PII) in the IA National Flood Insurance programs. FEMA should create a
standardized information sharing form which disaster survivors can sign
to allow the pertinent recovery agencies with identified resources or
program support to receive their information.
Integrating Climate Adaptation Priorities
Adapting to the more complex weather we experience and the
consequences that come along with it require flexibilities to emergency
response systems. Current programs lack the adequate guidance and
support which helps manage these new extreme climate disasters. FEMA
needs to strategically identify, prioritize, and invest in climate
resilience projects that help reduce future losses. This would include
coordinating interagency investments for consistency, efficiency, and
maximum return.
In addition to a review of current programs through a more climate-
conscious lens, FEMA should ensure the utilization of all reasonable
and pertinent federal partnerships to achieve relief and recovery from
all aspects of a disaster. This coordination of climate change relates
to mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery programs with other
federal agencies--including risk, vulnerability, and consequence
assessments. In doing this, FEMA must guard against simply adding
``climate change'' into existing guidance, verbiage, and doctrine.
Efforts outlined at the federal level must be measurable to include
benchmarks to determining success. Furthermore, program eligibility
must incorporate the full spectrum of disasters exacerbated by climate
change including wildfire and drought. Only through a whole-of-
government approach can FEMA allow for adequate capacity to respond and
with a focus on information sharing, it will allow programs to properly
provide relief to victims as they work to recover.
Conclusion
On behalf of the state emergency managers, thank you again for
holding this hearing on where FEMA should focus in the coming year.
Collectively, emergency managers believe we must work together in
building our respective capacities to respond, enhance equity in state
and federal programs, and streamline FEMA programs to get assistance
more quickly to the people who need it most. We can accomplish this by
working together across all levels of government and ensuring the role
of emergency management is clear regardless of the hazard. In doing all
this, we look forward to continuing the strong relationship we have
with this committee and with FEMA, and I welcome any questions.
__________
Position Paper 1
National Emergency Management Association
Homeland Security Committee
Position Paper
DATE: January 10, 2022
SUBJECT: State Homeland Security Grant Program Policy Changes
DISCUSSION:
The basis of the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) pre-
dates the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) came about shortly after the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security in 2003. These two programs form the
cornerstone of preparedness funding for states and locals to address
emerging and dynamic threats to the homeland. They support the
building, sustainment, and delivery of core capabilities in states,
territories, urban areas, and local and tribal governments and to
develop a more secure and resilient nation.
These programs represent a partnership between states and locals to
aid the federal government in their mission to close nationwide
preparedness gaps. In 2018, the National Homeland Security Consortium
conducted a study to evaluate the past investment of funds on terrorism
preparedness, the augmentation of that funding by federal assistance,
and what capabilities states, and localities now have that were not
available pre-2001. To collect this information, a survey was issued to
all 50 states and to jurisdictions from 50 urban areas currently and
formerly eligible for UASI funds to determine how much money has been
invested by state and local governments.
A key finding from the survey is that for every SHSGP and UASI
grant dollar invested, the median return was $1.70 for responding state
emergency management and homeland security agencies; for local
emergency management and homeland security agencies, it was $0.92.
Furthermore, return on investment also generally increased when
considering other jurisdictional agencies that were involved with, but
not responsible for preparedness activities.
In recent years, administrations waited until the completion of the
appropriations process and the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) to
roll-out proposed programmatic changes to the SHSGP and UASI programs.
An example of these proposed changes includes a requirement for certain
percentages of funding to meet core priorities. Furthermore, in 2020
the department ``banded'' states based on threat which fundamentally
altered the funding formula for states. While the department ultimately
sidelined these proposed changes primarily due to the continuing
response to COVID, they reflect a repeated pattern of attempts to
change the rules during the application process.
As emergency management and homeland security professionals, the
membership of NEMA appreciate the need for these programs to remain
dynamic and meet emerging threats. The department must develop a more
collaborative process, however, to devise, evaluate, and implement
proposed changes. The planning process for grant funding typically
takes several years, so the 45-day window of a standard NOFO is wholly
inadequate to affect smart and effective changes. Also, with a multi-
year performance period for the grant, changing the national priorities
in the middle of the period means states and locals cannot achieve or
sustain impactful progress.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. DHS should establish a codified review process for grant
guidance that is properly vetted through the appropriate stakeholders.
Organizations such as NEMA, the National Homeland Security Consortium,
or National Advisory Council are natural partners in such an effort.
2. Completion of the review and concurrence should occur not less
than 12 months from the end of the previous fiscal year to give
grantees adequate time for planning adjustments.
Moved: Brian Hastings, Alabama
Second: Chris Stallings, Georgia
DISPOSITION: Passed Unanimously
Authenticated: Mike Willis, NEMA Secretary
__________
Position Paper 2
National Emergency Management Association
Homeland Security Committee
Position Paper
DATE: January 10, 2022
SUBJECT: CISA-FEMA Integrated Program Office
DISCUSSION:
With the reorganization of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) and awarding the agency operational status, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created an agency focused on
protecting critical infrastructure and assisting the nation in
enhancing cybersecurity. The unintended consequence of this new
organization, however, is the separation of mission of critical
infrastructure protection and the response and recovery mission of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Despite the organization
separation within the department, these mission sets are inextricably
linked in policy.
For response and recovery functions after a natural or man-made
physical disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is a
logical state partner with regional personnel, grant structure, and
experience in consequence management. After a cyber-incident, with or
without a physical impact, state and local governments and the private
sector look to CISA for support. Naturally, CISA needs FEMA and vice
versa in both policy development and practical application of response
capabilities. This reliance among DHS components, however, can cause
barriers to reasonable and appropriate response time and action.
For example, throughout the stakeholder community, questions abound
relating to the federal government's processes for responding to major
cybersecurity attacks. Preparedness, response, and recovery functions
for such events work together with one another, therefore so too should
federal policy and operations. Furthermore, the recently passed
Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework included $1 billion over the next
four years for a cybersecurity preparedness grant. As this new grant is
brought online, collaboration will be required between CISA as the
subject matter experts and FEMA as the department's grant-making
entity.
An Integrated Program Office (IPO) seems the only logical way to
ensure such policy is integrated, coordinated, and clarified for those
charged with saving life and property in the response to a major event.
This would further serve as an opportunity to coordinate policy and
avoid negative consequences prior to major events through better
integration at the federal level.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. DHS should establish IPO, modeled after those at the Department
of Defense, between FEMA and CISA. The mission of this office would be
to coordinate all policy and response doctrine as it would apply to
cybersecurity, critical infrastructure protection, and any other
subject of shared interest.
Moved: Brian Hastings, Alabama
Second: Chris Stallings, Georgia
DISPOSITION: Passed
ABSTAIN: Florida
Authenticated: Mike Willis, NEMA Secretary
Position Paper 3
National Emergency Management Association
Response and Recovery Committee
Position Paper
DATE: January 2, 2022
SUBJECT: State Emergency Management Wildfire Hazard Recommendations
DISCUSSION:
In 2020, 58,950 wildfires burned 10.1 million acres, the second-
most acreage impacted in a year since 1960.\1\ According to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture Forest Service, recent increased fire
activity is due to at least four factors: increasingly hot and dry
summers; stronger winds; insect and disease infestations; and human
population growth in the Wildland Urban Interface.
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\1\ Congressional Research Service, In Focus, September 8, 2021.
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Wildfires cannot be viewed as merely a fire service function of
first responders. As these fires continue to spread and have broader
impacts, they become a whole-of-community hazard which must be treated
as such to include robust prevention activities. To understand
wildfires, one must first understand forest management, drought, and
the interplay with existing programs at the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). NEMA would not recommend creating new,
hazard-specific programs; existing programs within response, recovery,
and mitigation could be tailored to meet the evolving wildfire threat.
Leverage Federal Partnerships. The United States government owns
around 640 million acres of land across the Nation. The Bureau of Land
Management, Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National
Park Service own 94 percent of that total \2\. Each wildfire that burns
on federal land presents cascading effects that impact local, tribal,
and state government, so policy coordination and land-use agreements
are critical prior to heightened wildfire activity to ensure there are
no delays in recovery due to ownership issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Congressional Research Service, Federal Land Ownership:
Overview and Data, February 21, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendations:
1. FEMA should engage earlier, facilitate the integration of non-
natural resource/non-firefighting federal agencies into wildfire risk
reduction, response, and recovery planning and operations, and take a
stronger role in interagency coordination for the federal government in
multi-agency incidents across all phases of a wildfire, including
recovery.
2. FEMA should have the authority to work with and help direct
those federal agencies that own and manage land to reduce wildfire risk
and recovery from wildfires that impact local, tribal, and state-owned
lands. This should include coordinating and directing with agencies
whose missions are to sustain environmental and energy resources on
risk reduction and recovery planning and operations.
Declaration Criteria and Incident Period. Unlike events that are
predictive and leave specific damages, wildfires are unpredictable,
overlapping, and often combine with one another. Current policies
dictating the establishment of an incident period are not conducive to
this type of hazard across multiple jurisdictions and authorities.
Currently, if a federally declared Fire Management Assistance Grant
(FMAG) burns in more than one county, FEMA requires all counties to
meet declaration criteria independently. This creates inequity in
recovery initiatives for counties that were damaged by the fire but may
not reach the threshold for assistance. Furthermore, the declaration
criteria used for Individual and Public Assistance disasters are not
well-suited for informing fire declaration decisions as they do not
consider the full range of impacts of large fires on the diverse local,
and especially rural, communities and states.
Recommendations:
1. Revise declaration criteria to qualify the initial attack of a
wildfire for emergency protective measures once the National Geographic
Area Coordination Center (GACC) or the National Interagency Fire Center
(NIFC) reach Preparedness Level (PL) 5.
2. Revise declaration criteria to consider statewide impacts
including ongoing firefighting incident instead of only localized
impacts.
Prepositioning Deployments. When preparing to fight wildfires, one
of the most valuable capabilities is that of prepositioning
firefighting assets. Currently, pre-deployment through a FMAG is
limited to out-of-state resources.
Recommendation:
1. Allow the state to utilize FMAG assistance for the
prepositioning of in-state resources for wildfire response, including
the pre-staging of firefighting resources to prevent fires from
reaching the severity where an FMAG is needed.
Emergency Work and FMAG Eligibility. Large fires expose burn scars
to erosion from wind and soil saturation that most often lead to
landslides and mudslides. The federal firefighting services recognize
this hazard and take emergency protective measures to protect property
within their jurisdiction under the Burned Area Emergency Response
(BAER) and the Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation (ESR)
programs. Similar emergency stabilization measures taken by state and
local governments are eligible Category B measures under FEMA Public
Assistance (PA) declarations. In managing an FMAG, however, emergency
protective measures outside the FMAG incident period are ineligible,
putting additional strain on state and local resources. Furthermore,
the provision of funding for FMAGs is authorized by linking the
authorities of the Stafford Act Section 403 Essential Assistance within
Section 420 Fire Management Assistance. Section 403 is also the section
that authorizes the provisions of funding in the FEMA PA program
despite being authorized under the same section of the Stafford Act and
with identical definitions of entities eligible to receive assistance.
Recommendation:
1. FMAG program guidance should mirror the same eligibilities and
timeframes for emergency work as those found elsewhere in the PA
program.
2. FEMA should revise the FMAG policy, program, and regulations to
include the same categories of eligible applications under the PA
programs.
3. FMAG project on-line project tools should include a portfolio
of best practices and lessons learned.
Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG) Modifications.
Current language of the PAPPG disproportionately favors other hazard
events (such as floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes) with little regard
to the unique qualities of wildfires. For example, when considering
wildfire damage to trees, the current guidance specifically covers tree
damage typically realized from wind and hurricane force wind but does
not provide guidance on wildfire effects such as tree burns \3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ PAPPG, V4 2020, p. 102
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation:
1. FEMA should update the PAPPG to include wildfire-specific
challenges such as debris removal emergency protective measures and the
toxicity that is left behind when a wildfire moves through a community
including the contamination of drinking water resources.
Leverage the DRRA. Wildfires dramatically alter the terrain and
ground conditions of the affected area. Communities impacted by
wildfire may be at an even greater risk of flooding and mudslides.
Thus, the Disaster Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) made clear that post-
wildfire mitigation efforts to avoid future damage, hardship, loss, or
suffering in any area affected by a wildfire (like activities that
avoid flooding and landslides) are eligible for funding.
Recommendation:
1. FEMA should utilize the flexibility afforded in the DRRA to the
maximum amount possible and apply the same criteria used by other
federal agencies for approving soil stabilization and reseeding
projects on non-federal land when post-fire mitigation funds are used.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs (HMGP) Evaluation. Through HMGP,
FEMA could leverage the programs that fall under grants to be more
inclusive of the wildfire hazard. There is a very short timeframe
between fire season and flood season, especially as the fire season is
quickly becoming a year-round hazard. The Building Resilient
Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) grant program is one example that
can elevate such fire mitigation projects. Another example FEMA could
use to elevate their mitigation tactics is in evaluation of community
programs.
Recommendation:
1. Expand the HMGP performance periods to assist in expediting
mitigation projects.
2. Leverage programs such as BRIC and home hardening projects to
enforce more sustainable mitigation programs for wildfires.
3. FEMA should accept pre-identified, pre-vetted `packages' for
home hardening that can be easily and rapidly replicated to achieve
meaningful and timely risk reduction.
4. Allow fire districts to have the same leeway as Private Non-
Profits (PNPs) to receive HMGP funding.
Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) criteria adjustments. The current BCA
for hazard mitigation assessments is linear and disproportionately
weighs the financial impact of loss, such as the dollar value of a
property or asset. The BCA to a lesser extent considers socioeconomic
vulnerabilities and other non-financial factors that contribute to
risk. In addition, BCAs are among the largest technical barriers to
entry for many economically disadvantaged rural communities that seek
to conduct basic wildfire mitigation measures. Data collecting has
advanced to the point where there is enough national data on defensible
space project costs and benefits to determine basic thresholds and
criteria.
Recommendations:
1. FEMA must evaluate current BCA criteria and adjust accordingly
to consider the broader range of factors, ensuring prioritization of
projects based upon new BCA criteria to address highest priority needs
and optimize greatest return on investment.
2. Establish a BCA pre-calculated benefits criterion for common
defensible space mitigation projects.
3. Ecological and societal health, carbon sequestration, improved
water quality, and lessening disaster impact on traditionally
underserved communities should be factors that contribute to the BCA.
Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) Considerations. WUI is the space
where development of communities meets wildland vegetation. As an
establishment may be considered for pre-calculated benefits criteria,
defensible space activity proposals in pre-determined WUI areas that
meet the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Categorical
Exclusions N11 and adhere to basic Firewise-like standards should
automatically be deemed cost-effective if its project is below an
established threshold amount.
The current HMA programmatic guidance prohibits actions related to
improving or increasing water supply in high-risk wildfire areas, based
on the premise that these actions constitute preparedness or even
response support rather than mitigation. Water utilities and special-
purpose districts serving WUI neighborhoods need encouragement to
upgrade and expand their storage and delivery systems to accommodate
and support wildfire threats, including the purchase and installation
of dry-hydrants and heli-hydrants in extreme-risk areas. Current HMA
guidance already allows for other wildfire-related upgrades and
expansions of WUI water systems (such as installing back up power
generators on wellheads and retrofitting system components with
ignition-resistant materials) and could easily be broadened within
programmatic guidelines.
Recommendations:
1. Establish pre-calculated benefits criterion for WUI areas for
defensible space activity proposals that would align with the
established BCA pre-calculated benefits criterion.
2. FEMA should reconsider the interpretation that improving water
supply in high-risk wildfire areas is not a measure for mitigation,
especially given the ever-worsening water availability situations in
areas with extreme wildfire risk profiles.
3. Provide WUI projects a more streamlined approach utilizing
collected data to help implement a full review and expansion on NEPA
categorial exclusions where necessary to hinder administrative delays.
4. Expand the eligible wildfire project types to include water
availability upgrades in WUI areas.
Expedite Environmental and Historic Preservation (EHP) Reviews. EHP
reviews have become lengthy specifically for Hazard Mitigation
Assistance (HMA) wildfire mitigation proposals. This is often due to
the lack of applicable NEPA Categorical Exclusions, which leads to
needing full environmental assessments that can take at minimum a year
or more to complete. This process may result in the delay of simple
targeted pruning and thinning in rural-residential neighborhoods; or
planting native samplings on a burned hillside. These administrative
delays impact these communities that need simple mitigation tactics
quickly.
Recommendations:
1. Conduct a full review of the EHP processes to explore metrics
for all mitigation projects to be processed more expeditiously.
2. Allow creative approaches and/or reductions to cost share, as
well as flexibility in the grant application timeframe, particularly
for disadvantaged communities.
Conclusion. Wildfires are a threat that are year-round and
persistent across most of the Western United States but is certainly no
longer exclusive to this region as Florida, Georgia, Alabama,
Tennessee, and other states east of the Mississippi River also
experienced large wildfires in recent years. We are seeing increasingly
large and severe wildfires; drought conditions, low reservoir levels,
and parched landscapes; and stress on the electric grid due to extreme
heat. These challenges are interconnected and cannot be looked at, or
responded to, in isolation, yet FEMA's policies and response strategies
have not evolved with the hazard. These shortcomings can be resolved by
a recognition of the unique threat posed by wildfires, the need for
adaptive policies, and a whole-of-government approach to finding
solutions. The state directors of emergency management, through NEMA,
stand ready to work with Congress and FEMA in identifying and
implementing the necessary changes to better respond to this dynamic
threat.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. FEMA should engage earlier, facilitate the integration of non-
natural resource/non-firefighting federal agencies into wildfire risk
reduction, response, and recovery planning and operations, and take a
stronger role in interagency coordination for the federal government in
multi-agency incidents across all phases of a wildfire, including
recovery.
2. FEMA should have the authority to work with and direct those
federal agencies that own and manage land to reduce wildfire risk and
recovery from wildfires that impact local, tribal, and state-owned
lands. This should include coordinating and directing with agencies
whose missions are to sustain environmental and energy resources on
risk reduction and recovery planning and operations.
3. Revise declaration criteria to qualify the initial attack of a
wildfire for emergency protective measures once the National Geographic
Area Coordination Center (GACC) or the National Interagency Fire Center
(NIFC) reach Preparedness Level (PL) 5.
4. Revise declaration criteria to consider statewide impacts
including ongoing firefighting incident instead of only localized
impacts.
5. Allow the state to utilize FMAG assistance for the
prepositioning of in-state resources for wildfire response, including
the pre-staging of firefighting resources to prevent fires from
reaching the severity where an FMAG is needed.
6. FMAG program guidance should mirror the same eligibilities and
timeframes for emergency work as those found elsewhere in the PA
program.
7. FEMA should revise the FMAG policy, program, and regulations to
include the same categories of eligible applications under the PA
programs.
8. FMAG project on-line project tools should include a portfolio
of best practices and lessons learned.
9. FEMA should update the PAPPG to include wildfire-specific
challenges such as debris removal emergency protective measures and the
toxicity that is left behind when a wildfire moves through a community
including the contamination of drinking water resources.
10. FEMA should utilize the flexibility afforded in the DRRA to
the maximum amount possible and apply the same criteria used by other
federal agencies for approving soil stabilization and reseeding
projects on non-federal land when post-fire mitigation funds are used.
11. Expand the HMGP performance periods to assist in expediting
mitigation projects.
12. Leverage programs such as BRIC and home hardening projects to
enforce more sustainable mitigation programs for wildfires.
13. FEMA should accept pre-identified, pre-vetted `packages' for
home hardening that can be easily and rapidly replicated to achieve
meaningful and timely risk reduction.
14. Allow fire districts to have the same leeway as Private Non-
Profits (PNPs) to receive HMGP funding.
15. FEMA must evaluate current BCA criteria and adjust accordingly
to consider the broader range of factors, ensuring prioritization of
projects based upon new BCA criteria to address highest priority needs
and optimize greatest return on investment.
16. Establish a BCA pre-calculated benefits criterion for common
defensible space mitigation projects.
17. Ecological and societal health, carbon sequestration, improved
water quality, and lessening disaster impact on traditionally
underserved communities should be factors that contribute to the BCA.
18. Establish pre-calculated benefits criterion for WUI areas for
defensible space activity proposals that would align with the
established BCA pre-calculated benefits criterion.
19. FEMA should reconsider the interpretation that improving water
supply in high-risk wildfire areas is not a measure for mitigation,
especially given the ever-worsening water availability situations in
areas with extreme wildfire risk profiles.
20. Provide WUI projects a more streamlined approach utilizing
collected data to help implement a full review and expansion on NEPA
categorial exclusions where necessary to hinder administrative delays.
21. Expand the eligible wildfire project types to include water
availability upgrades in WUI areas.
22. Conduct a full review of the EHP processes to explore metrics
for all mitigation projects to be processed more expeditiously.
23. Allow creative approaches and/or reductions to cost share, as
well as flexibility in the grant application timeframe, particularly
for disadvantaged communities.
Moved: Andrew Phelps, Oregon
Second: Tina Titze, South Dakota
DISPOSITION: Passed
ABSTAIN: Alabama
Authenticated: Mike Willis, NEMA Secretary
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much.
We will now go to our last witness, Ms. Carolyn Harshman.
Ms. Harshman. Yes, good afternoon, Committee Chairman
DeFazio, Subcommittee Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster,
and members of the subcommittee.
My name is Carolyn Harshman, and I am a certified emergency
manager and the very proud president of the International
Association of Emergency Managers. IAEM is a professional
organization comprised of dedicated emergency management
practitioners who wake up every day thinking about and planning
for natural and human-caused emergencies.
As the profession of emergency management continues to
shake off the ``Chicken Little'' stereotype of days gone by, we
are benefiting greatly from the abundance of higher education
programs and graduates. The usefulness of our profession was
infinitely clear during the early stages of COVID-19, as we
coordinated organizations and resources to adapt to the
evolving needs of our communities.
In the meantime, the frequency of disasters and ever-
present changes in climate are increasing the numbers of people
and property impacted by hazards. I see us standing at the
crossroads now, as the ravaging days of the pandemic begin to
wind down, and we are seeing a range of emergency managers
emerge from a broad spectrum of industries and disciplines.
With that expansion, and emergency management protocols
becoming more and more politicized, the profession needs strong
guidance that will ensure we forge the best path forward.
FEMA's Strategic Plan could not have come along at a better
time. In order to be effective emergency managers, it is
imperative that we treat all of the members of our communities
as equals. All politics, income level, socioeconomic standing,
and other polarizing characteristics need to be set aside in
order to ensure equitable delivery of services in a community's
greatest time of need.
FEMA's Strategic Plan goal number 1 instills equity as a
foundation of emergency management. I began my career in
emergency management with the county of San Diego back in the
1980s. I transferred into the position from the regional
planning department, where I worked as a land-use planner
processing subdivisions, facilitating community plans, and
preparing the county's first water conservation ordinance.
Writing the ordinance nudged me into realizing we don't live in
a limitless environment, and that the negative impacts have the
greatest effect on the most impoverished.
As a budding emergency manager, I took my knowledge of
demographics and quickly saw patterns of inequity when aligned
with the region's hazards. Public service announcements
regarding the storage of food and water were only dreams to the
families struggling to live day to day. Equally ineffectual
were the culturally insensitive deliveries of emergency food
supplies. Emergency managers need tools in order to better
understand the cultures and realities of the communities they
serve.
Strategic Plan goal number 2 inspires emergency managers to
lead the whole community in matters relating to climate
resilience. Like the water conservation I mentioned earlier,
emergency managers must work hand in hand with planners,
engineers, and fire professionals to create a better-built
environment. As new and redeveloped construction projects are
considered by a jurisdiction, it is very rare for an emergency
manager to have a say in whether or not a project should be
approved. Instead, the enforcers of codes and ordinances
conduct reviews to determine whether or not a project conforms.
Building better in the first place will eliminate the need for
spotty retrofits and other incremental solutions. Most
importantly, solidifying relationships will bring the enforcers
into mitigation planning and open the door for emergency
managers to participate in climate adaptation plans and other
programs aimed at climate resilience.
Strategic Plan goal number 3 promotes and sustains a ready
FEMA and prepared Nation. These actions will greatly strengthen
emergency management community capacity. At present, many of
our emergency managers wear multiple hats: administrators,
first responders, and other officials. The same is true for our
nongovernmental organizations, where the emergency managers are
also the risk manager, safety officer, and in charge of
environmental compliance. Any and all of FEMA's efforts to
standardize training, plans, and exercises will be well
received, especially by those struggling with multiple hats.
Equally important is the need to train and empower
individuals and community groups to serve as force multipliers
as we recognize the potential and willingness of our citizens
to actively engage in an emergency's initial response.
In closing, the U.S.A. Council of IAEM is 5,100 members
strong, and already working very hard within its 25 committees
and caucuses to share ideas and develop new solutions for our
members and the communities they serve. We stand ready to
contribute to the success of FEMA's new Strategic Plan.
Thank you so much.
[Ms. Harshman's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carolyn J. Harshman, MPA, CEM, President,
International Association of Emergency Managers
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and
members of the Subcommittee. My name is Carolyn Harshman, and I am a
Certified Emergency Manager and President of the International
Association of Emergency Managers. IAEM is a professional organization
comprised of dedicated emergency management practitioners who wake up
every day thinking about and planning for both natural and human-made
emergencies. I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to testify
today before this Subcommittee to provide input on FEMA priorities for
the coming year.
As the profession of emergency management continues to shake off
the ``Chicken Little'' stereotype of days gone by, we are benefitting
greatly from the abundance of higher education degree programs and
graduates. The usefulness of our profession was infinitely clear during
the early stages of COVID-19 as we coordinated organizations and
resources to adapt to the evolving needs of our communities. In the
meantime, the frequency of disasters and ever-present changes in
climate are increasing the numbers of people and properties impacted by
hazards.
I see us standing at a crossroads now as the ravaging days of the
pandemic begin to wind down and we're seeing a range of emergency
managers emerge from a spectrum of industries and disciplines. With
that expansion and emergency management protocols becoming more
politicized, the profession needs strong guidance that will ensure we
forge the best path forward. FEMA's Strategic Plan could not have come
along at a better time.
In order to be effective emergency managers, it's imperative that
we treat all of the members of our communities as equals. All politics,
income levels, socioeconomic standing, or other polarizing
characteristics need to be set aside to ensure equitable delivery of
services in a community's greatest time of need. FEMA's Strategic Plan
goal #1 instills equity as a foundation of emergency management.
I began my career in emergency management with the County of San
Diego back in the early 1980s. I transferred into the position from the
Regional Planning Department where I worked as a land-use planner
processing subdivisions, facilitating community plans, and preparing
the county's first water conservation ordinance. Writing the ordinance
nudged me into realizing we don't live in a limitless environment and
that the negative impacts have the greatest effect on the most
impoverished. As a budding emergency manager, I took my knowledge of
demographics and quickly saw patterns of inequity when aligned with the
region's hazards. Public service announcements regarding the storage of
food and water were only dreams to the families struggling to live day-
to-day. Equally ineffectual were the culturally insensitive deliveries
of emergency food supplies. Emergency managers need tools to better
understand the cultures and realities of the communities they serve.
Strategic Plan goal #2 inspires emergency managers to lead the
whole of community in matters relating to climate resilience. Like the
water conservation ordinance I mentioned earlier, emergency managers
must work hand-in-hand with planners, engineers, and fire professionals
to create a better-built environment. As new and redeveloped
construction projects are considered by a jurisdiction, it is very rare
for the emergency manager to have a say in whether or not a project
should be approved. Instead, the enforcers of codes and ordinances
conduct reviews to determine whether or not a project conforms. This
means emergency managers need to get onboard with codes and ordinances
to assist in altering the future. Building better in the first place
will eliminate the need for spotty retrofits and other incremental
solutions. Most importantly, solidifying relationships will bring the
enforcers into mitigation planning and open the door for emergency
managers to participate in climate adaptation plans and other programs
aimed at climate resilience.
Strategic Plan goal #3 promotes and sustains a ready FEMA and
prepared nation. These actions will greatly strengthen emergency
management community capacity. At present, many of our emergency
managers wear multiple hats--administrators, first responders, and
other officials. The same is true in non-governmental organizations
where the emergency manager is also the risk manager, safety officer,
and in charge of environmental compliance. Any and all of FEMA's
efforts to standardize training, plans, and exercises will be well
received especially by those struggling with multiple hats. Equally
important is the need to train and empower individuals and community
groups to serve as ``force multipliers'' as we recognize the potential
and willingness of our citizens to actively engage in an emergency's
initial response.
In closing, the USA Council of the International Association of
Emergency Managers is 5,100 members strong and already working hard
within its 25 committees and caucuses to share ideas and develop new
solutions for our members and the communities they serve. Collectively,
we stand ready to contribute to the success of FEMA's new Strategic
Plan.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, and I think we see some themes
emerging, based on the statements that we made earlier, and
some of your observations, and those reports that have been
issued by FEMA.
Well, now I would go to Chairman DeFazio, who has to leave
us, to ask questions first.
Mr. DeFazio. Oh, thanks, Madam Chair. Yes, actually, I am
going to have to depart momentarily for the chairs meeting. But
I was informed by Chief of Staff Kathy Dedrick that we think we
will have an opportunity next month to bring that legislation I
mentioned earlier to the floor. So, that will be good.
But beyond that, I want to just say this is great
testimony, and you have given us an awful lot of things that we
have to think about and deliver on. I think the most difficult
is going to be some coordination that was mentioned by GAO, and
I believe implied by the others between SBA, HUD, and FEMA. And
that is, I guess, our job, to work with those other committees,
and I don't think I have to ask a question on that.
I do want to ask quickly, one of the issues that GAO noted
was high staff turnover, which has led to a lack of expertise
and delayed recovery. What do you think accounts for that, is
it just burnout because it is so constant? Or what other issues
could we address that would help mitigate that?
I would ask Mr. Currie from GAO, if he could.
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good question. I think
there is a number of things that account for the retention
issues.
Obviously, just the workload over the last few years,
really starting in 2017, with Hurricanes Irma and Maria and
Harvey, just the back-to-back sequential nature, then followed
by the wildfires you are aware of. There is no disaster season
anymore; the whole year is disaster season. So, that has really
complicated FEMA's ability to plug people in nationwide, where
they are needed.
But on top of that, I think there are some rules and some
administrivia behind how they can deploy certain employees that
complicates their ability to train and get them qualified and
ready.
For example, their reservists are part-time. They are only
called up for a specific disaster, and they can only do
training and development and get coaching when they are
assigned to a disaster. And you can imagine, as an employee,
that is probably not the best time to be trained and get
development. Part of that has to do with just the restrictions
on only being able to use disaster relief fund money for a
specific disaster. So, I think that is one cause.
But there are many other things like that. That is why I
think it is really important that, well, we need to look at
FEMA workforce through a lens of comprehensive reform, similar
to what was done years ago with the National Guard and the
military reserve, in terms of how we get them trained and ready
for deployment.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes, it is an excellent point regarding how we
target certain National Guard units for the highest level of
training to be ready to instantly deploy without, really,
much--any additional preparation. So, that is an excellent
point that I would hope FEMA should follow up on, and perhaps
we can, too.
The other major concern is--for any of the panelists--
resilience, BRIC, and how are we going to do mitigation more
quickly. And if anybody wants to address that quickly, that
would be great.
Ms. Bornemann, I see you moving around. Did you want to
address that?
Ms. Bornemann. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman DeFazio.
That is definitely a challenge that we experience, long
periods of time between application, submission, and
obligation. I won't horrify you with some of the timelines I
have, but just take my word for it that they are very long. And
you can--what we--we call it getting RFI'd to death, receiving
sequential requests for information, for clarifying a certain
application, just really overly complicated.
We have to accelerate climate adaptation, and we have an
opportunity with BRIC. And as a mitigation program, the award
under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program under the COVID-19
disaster declaration was just an amazing opportunity. But we
can't--we have to do our work at the State level to develop
those projects.
But we also have to have the trust that FEMA is resourced
and ready to be able to turn around obligations on those
projects quickly. That comes down to staffing and understanding
and training around the regulations, and making sure that the
regulations have evolved to reflect the hazards that we have in
front of us today. That is not just flooding, although flooding
is a large one, but it is about the hazards posed by wildfire,
by drought, and so many others, and making sure that we have
the tools available to us to be able to mitigate those hazards.
Mr. DeFazio. OK, thank you. Thank you for that answer.
Thanks to all the panelists.
My time has expired, and I have got to go to this other
meeting. So, thanks, everybody.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. I will now recognize Mr. Webster,
ranking member.
[Pause.]
Ms. Titus. And I can't hear you, Mr. Webster, I don't know
if anybody else can or not.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Maybe now.
Ms. Titus. Yes.
Mr. Webster of Florida. How is that?
Ms. Titus. That is better.
Mr. Webster of Florida. OK.
Ms. Bornemann, you had mentioned in your opening remarks a
bill, House bill 5641, SPEED Recovery, sponsored by--I am a
cosponsor of that, but it was sponsored and introduced by
Ranking Member Sam Graves--which raises the small project's
threshold to $1 million. And can you talk a little more about
how raising that threshold can reduce the complexity of
projects, and maybe speed up recovery?
Ms. Bornemann. Yes, sir, I can. Right now, we have
different categorizations between small projects and large
projects. And small projects can be managed at the State level,
but the threshold for those projects is relatively low. And
when you look at especially larger disasters, you can actually
have multiple small projects within one jurisdiction, which
just becomes administratively burdensome. And so, raising the
small project threshold allows the States to utilize their
management costs that are a part of that disaster declaration
to be able to manage those more effectively.
We know the terrain, we know the people, we know the
contacts, and so, often we are able to move those projects
along, to close out a little bit quicker. FEMA is a large
bureaucracy. And so, they are trying to manage project by
project. If we raise the large project threshold, that means
FEMA can spend their time doing the more complicated projects
that are larger, and they can potentially have some cost
savings around the time that they spend doing all of the
administrative pieces for small projects.
I want to highlight, though, it is really important--we
very much support raising the small project threshold, but it
is also really important to have a measure that will allow us
to carry over management costs from disaster to disaster. I
will just raise the example of Vermont. I think we have, like,
10 or 11 open disaster declarations in a very short period of
time--we have disasters quite often here--but we are only able
to use management costs for that specific disaster, and that
doesn't allow us to build any capacity or sustain any capacity
over a number of years, that--this already right-sized because
it is only based on the size of the disaster.
So, if we are going to be able to raise the small project
threshold, we really want to try and also be able to carry over
management costs that will give us the capacity to do the
additional management of small projects.
Mr. Webster of Florida. OK, thank you so much.
Mr. Currie, the statistics GAO cites, relative to the
percentage of FEMA--the workforce and the training they have
had, are a little bit concerning. And I was wondering, is there
something we can do to get the training information they need,
so, it would be more a part of the solution than the problem?
Can you talk more about your recommendations for FEMA
workers?
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. Well, the challenge in the past has
been that--and what we have found is that FEMA has struggled
for years. It has a system of qualifying its employees. It has
almost 20,000 people that are available to deploy to a
disaster. And so, they have a system that qualifies each person
at a certain level and a certain area, and then they use that
to deploy around the country wherever they are needed.
The challenge has been, that system has not always been
that reliable for indicating a person's readiness or their
experience level to go staff a disaster. So, they get in the
field, and they are not ready, and they are not able to do the
job as well. And we heard this directly from FEMA field
leadership, too, the people that manage the disaster.
What we have recommended internally is they take a number
of steps to try to clean that up, and get better information so
they can make better staffing decisions realtime.
But I think it is important to say that I think there needs
to be a more holistic look at the entire workforce structure
and what authorities and legislation might be needed to
overhaul that. The truth is the mission today and the pace
has--it has totally changed. The current workforce was designed
for 20 years ago, and it is just a different world today, and
the workforce is not going to be able to meet the mission that
is expected of it unless we look at it as a whole.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.
I yield back.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Webster. I am glad you brought up
the SPEED Recovery Act, and we have mentioned it several times.
That was a bill that I was pleased to work on with Mr. Graves
and you, Mr. Webster, and Chairman DeFazio. It shows that
bipartisan efforts can work, and we have done a good job of
that on the committee.
I was also glad to hear Mr. DeFazio bring up how we should
perhaps look at FEMA and training and deployment like we look
at the National Guard. I have been hearing--I heard you, Mr.
Currie, say that is a good idea. I have been introducing this
bill, and talking to former heads of FEMA and everybody I can
about treating these reservists like we do treat the National
Guard, and providing them with some employment security. It
seems like that would just help a lot to recruit and retain
people, if they don't have to go off and work on a disaster for
4 months, and then come back and can't get their job.
I wonder, Mr. Currie, if you could address that, if you
support that notion, if you think it would help, and if we
should move on with legislation to that effect.
Mr. Currie. Yes, ma'am. I think that securing their
employment would need to absolutely be a piece of any sort of
workforce reform. So, absolutely, I think you would have to
look at that, particularly in this day and age, with--I mean,
nationwide we face a challenge. Everyone is having trouble
getting workers and people to work for them, and FEMA is--they
are part of that, too. So, I think that needs to absolutely be
part of any sort of reform effort.
Ms. Titus. Well, good. I am glad to hear you say that,
because I am going to come with that legislation again, and I
welcome all the members of the committee to sign on to it.
Maybe we can get at least that one little piece done.
Another thing that I would ask all of you is, when we talk
about FEMA and these programs, we act like we are operating in
a vacuum, but we really aren't. There are a lot of politics
that surround this, and a lot of that is related to accepting
climate change, and how to address climate change, and whether
climate change even exists or not.
I would ask the two representatives from associations if
you have similar problems like that among your members, and if
you do, how do you try to address it or get beyond it?
Ms. Harshman. This is Carolyn. For several years, because
of the politicized aspects of climate change, we didn't have a
caucus or working committee that was tasked with that. The
effects of climate change were built into things like flood
control and other caucus areas that we did spend a lot of time
on. And just recently, over the last couple of years, we do
have a dedicated group that is looking specifically at climate
change. We also have a new mitigation caucus that includes
climate resilience and adaptation.
And so, I think that, as the gates are sort of being lifted
on some of the political sensitivities, the association is
definitely standing up, and there are lots of our members eager
to be working towards a solution, and really delighted that
they have been able to be, you know, let free to be able to
maybe write ordinances, help jurisdictions prepare climate
adaptation plans, and things like that.
One of the things I would like to mention--it kind of ties
over a couple of the other subjects that we have been touching
on--and part of what I alluded to in my presentation is that,
as a recovering land-use planner, I can tell you that, after
working in that field, planners are not trained on hazards.
There is one little piece of the general plan that talks--in
the safety element, that talks about if you have earthquake
faults, and you are prone to tornadoes, and things like that.
But planners don't really perceive that they have
responsibility for doing anything about that. And as a result,
it just gets passed off to the emergency manager, who now has
to clean up the mess.
And so, I think, until we really address that sort of
elephant in the room, we will continue to have two professions
that should be more closely aligned and, instead, they hardly
know each other exists.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. That is a really good point.
Ms. Bornemann?
Ms. Bornemann. In the past couple of years, NEMA has
reorganized ourselves, as well. We have several policy
committees that just take a real focused look at different
areas of the field. And last year, our previous president
created the Resilience Committee, recognizing that there needed
to be a focused effort on hazard mitigation, but also climate
adaptation.
When we look at the emergency management of the future--
hopefully I will be still doing this in 30 years--in 30 years,
I expect that the disasters and hazards that we are presented
with today will likely be different.
When we talk with emergency managers throughout the
country, it is in front of their face. Climate change is in
front of their face, especially anybody that has been doing
this for a period of time. They see the change right in front
of them. And so, honestly, we don't see politics play into some
of the planning and work that we do, because it is right there,
and there is really just no denying it. But we are very focused
on how we can adapt to climate change.
Ms. Titus. Well, I am glad to hear that. These discussions
shouldn't be ideological, they should just be based on science
and facts. It sounds like that is what your two associations
are doing.
I may come back to ask about how the three levels of
Government, as well as the different agencies, horizontally can
coordinate better. But at this point I will go to, let's see,
Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And first I want to
thank all of our witnesses for being here today. I want to take
the few moments that I have to talk a little bit about the FEMA
mitigation buyout program, and specifically how these programs
impact rural America.
Mississippi and other rural States often struggle to get
local governments and our citizens to participate in the FEMA
mitigation buyout program, so, we know that these programs are
extremely successful. These programs result in the avoidance of
future damages. I think studies have shown that, for every
dollar that is spent on land acquisition, we avoid roughly $5
in future damages, particularly those damages that would be
caused by things such as flooding.
But when looking at these programs, we know that the FEMA
buyout programs are weighted more heavily toward urban
communities, and they are--and that is the reason, is because
often we see in these urban communities that--we see the
mitigation is often streamlined through larger resources at the
local level. I think there were some statistics I saw that
showed roughly 75 percent of mitigation buyouts have occurred
in urban communities, and only 25 percent in rural communities.
And the average completion of these projects can often be
extremely lengthy in nature. I think it is approximately 5
years for the completion of these mitigation buyout programs.
And so, under the current FEMA buyout system, it seems that
we are unintentionally underserving some of our rural and low-
income areas. The current structure, which reimburses local
governments, benefits the high-revenue areas, because they can
afford to take on the debt, and they can afford to hold that
debt until the lengthy process of reimbursement occurs.
We have also seen recently private companies that
specialize in mitigation practices that are frequently being
utilized by both State, local, and the private sector to
quickly and efficiently complete mitigation strategies, and
often do so at a lower cost.
So, my question--and I will start with you, Mr. Currie, and
then ask others if they would like to weigh in--I would like
you to provide your thoughts on public-private partnerships,
how we can best utilize the P3s to conduct mitigation buyouts,
to do so in a more efficient way, and to see that we are best
spending FEMA dollars.
And specifically, if you can talk about how those relate to
rural America, where the reimbursement structure and cost
sharing of these programs are at times counterproductive to
participation in the programs themselves.
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Congressman. Great question. I think
you have set that up really well.
The first thing I would say is that buyout programs, like
all mitigation programs, are incredibly complicated, and there
is a really complex process. Unlike building infrastructure,
and making it more resilient, there is a whole sort of local
political process you have to go through with the buyout, all
sorts of studies, cost-benefit evaluations, things like that.
It makes it very, very difficult to do, first of all, even for
large urban communities.
But you think rural communities, it is all about an issue
of capacity and funding, which you have set up. These are
already difficult. So, which communities are going to be less
likely to be able to navigate that process, and have the
resources to do it? It is going to be rural communities, poorer
communities, vulnerable communities, things like that.
So, I could not agree more, that these programs are
incredibly technically complicated, and even more so for rural
and small communities.
Mr. Guest. Would any of our other witnesses care to kind of
weigh in on these programs, particularly the relationship that
they have to some of our rural communities, and the fact that
it makes it much more difficult for rural communities to
participate in programs, which are very, very beneficial?
I think the benefit of these programs is clearly proven. No
one is trying to say that these programs don't, in the long
run, save dollars, because clearly they do. But are there any
ideas that members of this panel have as to how we can make
these programs more accessible, and include more rural
communities in these types of programs that FEMA has to offer?
Ms. Bornemann. Yes, sir. As you probably know, the State of
Vermont is a very rural State, and we really appreciate when we
are able to exercise flexibility within the hazard mitigation
programs. We need to have a maximum flexibility to be able to
apply these programs in a way that fits the jurisdictions
within our State.
In Vermont, for example, at the State level, we utilize
contract support, and make it available to local jurisdictions
that don't have the resources to contract for those resources
themselves. I don't have enough money to put hazard mitigation
planners in every single jurisdiction. I would love to. But we
do utilize some contract support in leveraging those public-
private partnerships to make that available on behalf of and to
local jurisdictions.
I would say the level of FEMA scrutiny and in
micromanagement on some of these hazard mitigation projects is
just crushing sometimes, especially when you are a community of
2,000 people--that is where I live, I live in a community of
2,000 people. They just don't have the capacity to be able to
manage a project like that, yet they are getting repetitive
damage every other year or every year.
Making measured changes to the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program to treat it more like a block grant, and give States a
little bit more flexibility to be able to apply the same hazard
mitigation guidance and the same intent of the law, but at the
State level, and being able to apply it utilizing that support
at the State level, would be really beneficial.
Mr. Guest. Thank you.
Ms. Harshman. I would just----
Ms. Bornemann. Thank you.
Mr. Guest. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. The gentleman's time is expired.
Ms. Harshman. Oh.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. We have got Ms. Holmes Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Madam Chair. Can you hear me?
[No response.]
Ms. Norton. Can you hear me?
Ms. Titus. Yes.
Ms. Norton. OK. I appreciate this important hearing on
FEMA's priorities, and I particularly appreciate our witnesses
and their testimony. It has been very useful.
My first question is for Mr. Currie. I noted a New York
Times article in June 2021 that reported that White disaster
victims and communities receive more aid from FEMA than people
and communities of color, even when the amount of damage to
their homes and property is the same. I was befuddled by that.
Mr. Currie, how does GAO's December 2021 recommendation to
FEMA on improving the process for identifying potential
barriers to access racial inequality--no, I am phrasing that
wrong.
How does GAO's December 2021 recommendation to FEMA on
improving their process for identifying potential barriers to
access take racial inequality into account?
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question.
So, what we looked at in that report is we went out to
answer that question and see to what extent FEMA--not just
FEMA, but SBA and HUD, too--look at the outcomes of their
programs to see who they are affecting and how they are
affecting different groups.
What we found is that none of the agencies really collect
the kind of data on the outcome to really identify what the
barriers are for certain communities. And that is a problem
because, if you don't collect the data, then you can't measure
it, and certainly, if you can't measure it, you can't fix it.
But we have also identified a number of barriers in FEMA's
process for Individual Assistance that apply to everybody, but
particularly probably land harder on communities of color and
vulnerable populations. For example, the Individual Assistance
program, the one you register for when you are a survivor of a
disaster, is incredibly complicated and confusing to survivors.
I will just give you one example. The letters that FEMA
provides when somebody registers whether they are going to get
assistance often will say ``denied'' or ``not eligible,'' even
if the person may be eligible, they just need to provide
additional documentation, or additional information, or wait
for insurance to pay out, and things like that.
So, all these things--there are a lot of other examples I
have in the process, and all these little things are
disincentives. When you get a communication like that from the
Federal Government, it doesn't incentivize people to continue
on. So, the burden is on the survivor to keep pulling from
FEMA, give more information, give more information. And
ultimately, some of them just stop trying to get the
assistance.
So, I think we have made a number of--we think it needs to
be much more simple for survivors, and integrated across
agencies, and the burden shouldn't be on the survivor to prove
for months and months that they are eligible for the
assistance.
Ms. Norton. So, have you made it more simple?
Mr. Currie. We are working on it, and we have made--in that
1 report on Individual Assistance, we have made 15
recommendations to FEMA on different parts of their process.
Now, what they have said is they are working on all those
things, and they are reengineering the program completely. So,
they are tackling it, step by step. But it is complicated. And
as you know, Congresswoman, they don't move quickly.
I think they get it. They understand the problem, and you
see it in their Strategic Plan. You see the new Administrator
is committed to equity. But like anything else, you are not
going to fix a problem that was created over many years
overnight. But I think they are on the right track. But
continued oversight of them to make sure they do it, and not
just talk about it, it is key.
Ms. Norton. It certainly is.
Ms. Bornemann, in your testimony you stated that--and here
I am quoting you--``Layering additional grant requirements to
address equity concerns can become an equity issue by applying
a one-size-fits-all approach to all States.'' Could you please
explain to me in what way adding equity requirements to a grant
application might create racial inequality issues?
Ms. Bornemann. Yes, ma'am. So, the point being made there
is that the more complex a system or a grant is to access makes
it inherently an equity issue, because the folks with the
greater resources have the ability and resources to be able to
access those grant programs and to meet the grant requirements.
And the folks that don't have the resources, maybe from a rural
community, maybe from historically underprivileged communities,
they don't necessarily have the resources to be able to meet
those grant requirements.
We have talked a lot about this within NEMA, in addressing
where equity--and equity, I know, is a term that gets thrown
around quite a bit. But where grant programs are more complex
and have additional requirements can actually be a barrier to
entry. And therefore, if we can identify them, then we can
address them. And that is really what the point was there.
Ms. Norton. Well, how would you propose to streamline
Federal and State emergency collaboration?
Ms. Titus. I think--if you can answer that briefly, but the
time has expired.
Ms. Norton. Well, if the time has----
Ms. Bornemann. I could keep you here all afternoon.
Ms. Titus. OK, well, we better not, then. We better go on
to Mr. Gimenez, and we can come back to that later.
Ms. Bornemann. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Madam Chair. I just find this
conversation fascinating, being that I was the emergency
manager for the city of Miami during Hurricane Andrew.
And one of the comments was that, 20 years ago, that maybe
they did things very well. I don't think they did things really
well 20 years ago, back during Hurricane Andrew. And it took us
in the city of Miami, and then later in Miami-Dade County, it
takes over a decade to close out an account, which is crazy.
And so, I guess my question--my questions are--yes--I am
going to make comments.
OK, number one, the forms need to be a lot easier. The
problem, I think, is that the forms are made out by the
people--we started out with all these acronyms, right? The
forms are made out by the people inside the Agency, not really
for the people that are the customer.
So, I am wondering, do you have focus groups every time you
put out a form, which ask, ``Do you understand what this form
says?'' Something as simple as that? Anybody from FEMA?
[No response.]
Mr. Gimenez. Anybody?
When a form is produced, do you actually go out to the
customer and find out if the form is actually understood by the
customer?
Ms. Bornemann. Sir, I am not from FEMA, but I just want
to--I do want to note that there are often times where NEMA,
the National Emergency Management Association, will have
opportunity to provide comment and to provide feedback on the
accessibility of policies and different program changes.
But that is a really excellent suggestion and definitely
something I would like to take back to our organization to take
a look at, as well.
Mr. Gimenez. And by the way, don't use your people either,
because your people understand FEMA a lot better than most
people do. And so----
Ms. Bornemann [interposing]. Right.
Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. You need to go into the public
and say, ``I have this form, we want it to do this. Do you
understand it, that it wants to do this, or you think it is
something else?'' Because a lot of these forms are really
intimidating, especially if they come from the Federal
Government.
The second thing is we need to make this a heck of a lot
easier. And maybe my idea would be to empower the States more,
and empower the counties more, to be more accountable to the
process, and to actually be more like a block grant that is
given. You get an estimation of what the damages are, and then
you give a block grant to these States of what they actually
need, and then they have to justify it at the end, not so much
this process that--and all these hoops that we have to go
through.
By the way, at the end, it is going to cost us more,
because it takes us so many years to actually put out a
process, and to get something built or rebuilt, that all these
prices just keep escalating. And so, the process that FEMA has
today is just astronomical.
Does anybody know how much FEMA spends on administrative
overhead?
[No response.]
Mr. Gimenez. I will bet you it is a lot. OK. And maybe that
money would be better spent in other ways, and push this thing
down to the States and to the localities.
As an end user, I can tell you that FEMA was one of the
most burdensome, bureaucratic agencies that I have ever dealt
with. And that is not a good testament either to the
localities, or to the people, or to the people who are trying
to--these people have already gone through enough, and now we
are making them go through another disaster, which is called
``go through trying to get the money out of FEMA.'' You thought
the hurricane was bad? This is going to be worse. And that is
what I found during my time as mayor and emergency manager down
in South Dade.
And so, like, I had a bunch of comments. I really don't
have too many questions. So, with that, I yield back. Thank
you.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Gimenez. We will now go to Mrs.
Napolitano.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a couple of
comments to make. I am listening to this very intently, and I
have several concerns.
One is, we now have 365 days a year fire alarms in
California. And I understand that about 40 percent of FEMA
employment declined deployment to California, which leads me to
believe that you have a problem with personnel. It is low
morale, the burnout. So, what are you doing about getting new
candidates for employment, and where are you looking for them?
And is the training sufficient, and what about the
training? The training is different, as it is in the East, for
hurricanes. California has fire, floods, earthquakes, and the
heat because of climate change.
So, what are you doing to promote better employees with
training, more employment for people who want to work for FEMA,
and where are you doing such a thing, Mr. Currie?
Mr. Currie. Yes, ma'am, thank you. So, at GAO we have
looked at a number of things related to FEMA's workforce and
wildfires. So, let me kind of take that one by one.
So, on the training issue, I think they have faced
challenges trying to get their folks qualified and trained at
the level they need to be effective in their deployment. So, we
have made a number of recommendations behind the scenes to try
to address that issue. Earlier we talked about there needing to
be more comprehensive reform around making sure we can train
people before a disaster so they are ready to go after a
disaster.
I do want to say something about the wildfires, though,
because I think you make a really good point. Prior to 2017,
wildfires were common, but what was happening is FEMA disaster
declarations for a wildfire were not as common. So, after 2017,
there has been a ton of them, where the FEMA programs now are
being used to respond and recover to wildfires in the Western
United States and other parts of the country, too.
The problem is that everything in a wildfire is different.
The response and the recovery programs, they don't work the
same for a wildfire as they do for a flood or a hurricane. And
this is something we reported on a couple of years ago, and
recommended that FEMA really look at all its programs to figure
out what it needs to do to tailor these programs to better fit
wildfires. For example, housing after a disaster. After a
wildfire, the house is gone, and it is going to be gone for a
long time. So, how and where you house folks is totally
different than how you might house people after a flood, when
the structure may be intact, and they are able to use a mobile
unit, or something else like that.
So, I think a lot of work needs to be done tailoring these
programs more specifically to wildfires, as well.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, I have a great concern of the mental
health of the employees, because if they are overburdened or
burnt out, they certainly need some help. What do you do with
the employees who need mental health services?
Mr. Currie. So, what FEMA has told us that they are doing
is they are trying to stagger these deployments for people, so
they have a break.
So, what was happening in 2017, for example, there were
some people that deployed to Hurricane Harvey, then deployed
immediately to Hurricane Irma, then immediately to Hurricane
Maria, then immediately to the California wildfires. And so,
what they have tried to do, since their disaster season--there
is no season anymore, it is all year--is to try to factor in
these breaks to give people some downtime, but also continue--
--
Mrs. Napolitano [interposing]. Good.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. Hiring more people and getting
more people trained, so they don't have to keep redeploying the
same people is a part of that, as well.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, I wonder if you would let us know,
or have FEMA let us know, if you are conducting any
recruitment, so we can notify our colleges and universities of
the employment opportunities.
Certainly, I am concerned about the low morale. And you are
right, being without a break certainly could have an impact on
them.
Does FEMA talk to the other agencies on a regular basis, or
this is something that is just catch-as-catch-can?
Mr. Currie. This is an area that we have also identified as
a challenge.
FEMA, as we have talked about, has its own very complicated
programs. But for a State or a locality, they are often
absorbing a number of other very complicated Federal programs
from HUD, from SBA, from Treasury, other agencies.
There is some informal coordination, but, unfortunately,
the programs are not synchronized and harmonized in a way that
makes them easier to use. In fact, oftentimes what we hear from
States and localities is that it just exponentially increases
the complexity when more agencies are involved.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, they need to keep each other in
touch with their own rules and regulations, so they can talk in
tandem.
Thank you, Madam Chair. My time is up.
Ms. Titus. Yes, I know that Mr. Graves is concerned about
that, when it comes to HUD coordination. And we will hear from
him here in a minute, I know.
And when you go to recruit at college campuses, we want to
be sure that you are going to our historic Black colleges and
minority-serving institutions, so we can help to build a
diversity in that workforce.
Next, we have Mr. LaMalfa.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the hearing today.
FEMA is always a key issue, especially in our Western States,
as well.
A lot of chatter about climate change, climate change,
every committee, every conversation, yet we suffer out here
with forests that are not managed. We had a million-acre Dixie
fire just last year, and several other fires in the six-digit
range, and as well, the Camp fire in Paradise was a big one. I
will be talking about that in a moment here. Yet we can hardly
get the Forest Service and others to get out of their tracks to
actually manage the lands in a way that will give us some way
to battle fire and contain fire much more easily. So, it is
talk on one side, but not much action. But Forest Service has
time this week to go down and shoot cattle from helicopters in
New Mexico. They managed to find time to do that. Pretty
freaking amazing.
Anyway, to our folks in FEMA, when we look back at the Camp
fire in Paradise, there was an issue post-fire, where there
were a lot of damaged trees, dead trees, and blackened trees
that were left behind because, I think, FEMA really had a lot
of practice with those protocols on what you do with still-
standing trees and treating them as debris. So, you had many,
many acres in an area that were still considered dangerous and
left behind.
So, we were able to update those policies, and get the
debris cleaning to apply to more of those trees, which was
helpful, so, I appreciate that effort. But it did take a lot of
effort with local groups and local inputs about these kinds of
realities after a wildfire, et cetera. So, what it really
underlined is that we need FEMA to have more flexibility to
adapt to situations, and not have a slowdown in bureaucracy and
checking forms--and it has been alluded to several times in
this conversation.
So, let me toss that out to Ms. Bornemann and Ms. Harshman,
about some of the things that FEMA could be doing, and how our
committee might be able to help to be more flexible in disaster
response and not just having to deal with forms and checking
boxes, but immediate needs. Because what we are talking about
is, in this situation with housing, post the Camp fire in
Paradise and other ones, is that getting the FEMA trailers that
were sometimes--well, indeed, needed in this case, and in other
fires. It took a lot--it was a lot of difficulty with that.
So, please allude to what we can do to increase the
flexibility, and still have accountability on that.
Ms. Harshman. This is Carolyn. Just a couple of quick notes
on that.
Some of the challenges that the local jurisdictions have--
and the majority of our members are from local government
jurisdictions, a variety of different Government entities--one
of the challenges that they have is, when they are going to be
reimbursed by FEMA or some other Federal entity, that there is
a fairly comprehensive purchasing process that they have to go
through, and they have to get bids, and then they can't just go
through their regular hiring practices. And so----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Yes, that has been very
difficult to get----
Ms. Harshman [continuing]. Lots of times----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. To get the land set aside to do
the bond, and then the land has to meet a certain
specification. Then it becomes terrifically expensive, where
maybe flexibility on getting--well, it is the temporary deal,
usually 1 year, 1\1/2\ years, 2 years. That is what we need.
Ms. Harshman. True, and that is part of the challenge, is
that some of the creative solutions the local jurisdiction
might come up with are the relationships that they have with
maybe someone providing temporary housing, or a school that is
not being used for the next 2 or 3 years while it is going
through redevelopment.
Mr. LaMalfa. Are you bound by statutes? Are you bound by
statute from being able to do it that flexibly? Do you have to
check boxes, so to speak, on that? What slows that ability down
to be a little more adept on that?
Ms. Harshman. Well, and I am sure Erica can speak to this,
as well, it is the Federal regulations that are going to be
reimbursed by the Federal Government, that there are purchasing
requirements that are much more arduous than what the local
jurisdiction usually does, which is typically a list of three.
They have vendor lists that they rely on for everything. They
don't have to go to outside bidders, in terms of outside of the
State, outside of the county.
So, the regulations are very different, because we are
watching--the Federal Government is watching----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Is this something you see as a
complaint across the board that makes it more difficult for
FEMA personnel--makes their jobs more stressful?
Because we get the calls, people are frustrated, or even
angry. They are still living on someone's couch or in hotel
space. Is this something that we could be helping to legislate
with you to take the burden off you, as well as get a better
result for people?
Ms. Harshman. Well, I am here to represent the Association
of Emergency Managers, and not FEMA. We certainly have many
FEMA members.
Mr. LaMalfa. OK.
Ms. Harshman. So----
Mr. LaMalfa. Mr. Currie, can you jump in on that real
quick?
I am sorry, time is so short.
Ms. Harshman. No worries.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you. Mr. Currie, can you jump in on
that?
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. I think--and the GAO, we evaluate
FEMA. This issue of housing and wildfire-specific programs, it
has been a challenge.
First of all, FEMA's programs were typically used in the
past for floods and hurricanes and things like that. So, some
options just don't make sense. And so, part of this is just
Agency applications of the existing programs. A lot of these
things are new.
So, for example, the Paradise fire, housing was a huge
challenge because, first of all, you couldn't live near some of
those locations because they were toxic.
Mr. LaMalfa. Right.
Mr. Currie. And then second of all, when you tried to
relocate people, you couldn't find housing, because it is so
expensive. And there was no housing in the area. So, they came
up with campground options, as I am sure you are aware of, as a
secondary option.
So, part of this is that these programs were not really
designed for these types of, like, urban-wild interfaces that
are just destroyed. And they need to be, given how many fires
we are facing. And so, that is what we have recommended, is
these programs that were designed for floods and hurricanes,
they need to be tailored for the wildfire situation, because
these are not a surprise.
I mean, it is not a surprise that we are going to have
housing shortages in northern California after a wildfire.
Mr. LaMalfa. Yes.
Mr. Currie. So, we need to preplan and prepare better.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Mr. LaMalfa. That would be helpful. Thank you, I appreciate
that.
And although we had some fits and starts, FEMA really did
listen to us, and responded about as well as possible in the
situation.
So, thank you, Madam Chair. I will yield back.
Ms. Titus. All right, Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Madam Chair, and for the
witnesses. It is very, very important to all of us. Mr. LaMalfa
and I share much of the problems that he just talked about in
our current districts. Going forward, it seems to me that a lot
of questions that have been raised have to do with the
bureaucracy, the rules, the regulations that FEMA has.
About--let's see, that would be 2013--this committee
addressed some of those by establishing the section 428
alternative procedures program, presumably for the purpose of
trying to provide flexibility at the local level. Some of that
had to do with upfront funding by FEMA for the recovery
programs and for the mitigation programs, so that the small
counties, cities, and others who are unable to fund it
themselves would have the money to do so. It really hasn't
worked at all.
And I would like to get at it, because it might be a
solution to much of what we talked about here: giving the local
governments the authority and the responsibility of putting the
program together and the funding to do it. So, let's go at
this, Mr. Currie. If you would, opine on this briefly, if you
have studied it. If you have not, we tried to put this in
legislation that you would study it. We may have to go back at
that.
And then I would like to go to Ms. Bornemann, and your view
on the section 428 programs.
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir, I will answer that.
So, we have looked at section 428 several times, both in
the context of the post-Hurricane Sandy recovery in the
Northeast, but also more recently in Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. And I think it has been a mixed story.
What you said is absolutely right. I think the goal of that
was to create a process where we could upfront, maybe in the
first year, come up with a complicated cost estimate, and then
allocate the funding all at once, and be done with the back-
and-forth for a decade that we usually have. We have had--that
has not been the case.
For example, in Puerto Rico, frankly, sir, it has actually
been more complicated, I think. We have spent 4 to 5 years
trying to get to a cost estimate upfront, and all the work and
engineering and technical work that has gone into that, and
both sides, I think, have been really kind of hesitant to kind
of come up with a final number. So, just getting to that
obligation upfront has been incredibly difficult, let alone the
stage where we are just actually going to start work on these
projects and go back and forth to verify the cost.
So, frankly, I think we almost added a way more complicated
part upfront. That is not what was intended in the law, but I
actually think this is something that gets more towards just
FEMA execution of the law. I think the law was pretty clear in
what it was trying to do. I just don't think it has been
executed that way.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Ms. Bornemann?
Ms. Bornemann. I am going to speak from a little bit of
experience here with section 428, because Vermont implemented
the first section 428 project after [inaudible] right here, in
the office complex that I am sitting in. It was a project that
was in recovery from Tropical Storm Irene, which devastated
Vermont in 2011.
And it was successful here. But, we have to say that the
issue with the section 428 procedure is that FEMA is generally
very involved, and it speaks to what Mr. Currie just said. It
was supposed to be a simple process to streamline Public
Assistance. But if FEMA is going to be as involved as they are
in developing the cost estimate and project management as with
the regular Public Assistance process, most locals don't really
want to take that gamble, and they don't want to close the door
on recovery cost overruns that are pretty common when you are
looking at recovery from a disaster, as well as trying to build
back in a way that makes that structure, or whatever you are
trying to put back, more resilient.
It is a huge gamble, especially for rural communities. And
so, there may be ways that we can work together to make that
legislation be, in implementation, what it was meant to be. But
it is very risky for us.
Mr. Garamendi. It just seems to me that the fundamental
problem is that the local government has to come up with a
plan--engineering, construction--and then held to that number
with no flexibility provided by FEMA. Is that correct?
Ms. Bornemann. That is--yes, that is the crux of the issue.
And again, especially when you are looking at large
projects that are multimillion-dollar projects, it is very easy
for the cost estimate in 2013 to look very different in 2018,
when you are trying to close on that project.
Mr. Garamendi. Understood. And that is what change orders
are all about in every construction project that I have ever
seen over the last many, many decades. Change orders.
So, if there was a procedure that provided the flexibility
on the cost or the change orders that might occur, could the
section 428 program resolve many of the issues that have been
discussed here today?
Ms. Bornemann. Oh, that is a really good question----
Ms. Titus. Well, we will have to ask you to keep it brief,
because the time is expired.
Ms. Bornemann. I was going to----
Mr. Garamendi. Chair, I yield back. We will get at this. It
is not going to go away. Thank you.
Ms. Titus. That is right. OK, thank you. Now, Mr. Graves.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I
appreciate the witnesses, and I really appreciate you all
having this hearing today.
Director Currie, I am curious if you could talk about some
of your all's recommendations related to
DisasterAssistance.gov. I know you talked about this a little
bit.
We had numerous instances where we had folks that had
applied for DisasterAssistance.gov. They were just denied,
weren't given any reason. The reality is it wasn't a final
denial. It was a lack of information, or incomplete
applications. There was not a process for these people to go
back and amend applications. Has GAO made recommendations in
terms of the user friendliness or just applicability of
DisasterAssistance.gov?
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir, we have. We dove into the Individual
Assistance process and the ``.gov'' interface to it, as you
mentioned, and we found a number of challenges with usability
in that process. You mentioned one of them.
One of them was just how they communicate with the survivor
through a letter that often says denied or ineligible. But that
doesn't mean a denial. It could just mean, for example, that
the person's insurance needs to pay first, or they need to
provide more documents. But the effect of that is sort of
chilling, because if you get a letter from the Federal
Government that says denied, you are going to think denied, you
are not going to continue the process. And that is what we
found, is that people that could have been eligible maybe
didn't even get the amount they would be eligible for, or
didn't continue the process. And that is just one of many
things.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Well, thank you. I appreciate it.
And then something else I wanted to bring up, and I know
the Chair mentioned this earlier, and I know that Congressman
Carter is also interested in it.
And that is right, I just called you out. You saw that,
Troy?
And so--but we have got this issue. Congressman Carter and
I both have been dealing with constituents that have been just
tremendously impacted from Hurricane Ida last year. And you
have got the immediate assistance that may be available from
SBA or FEMA. And then you have got HUD that comes in, later on.
I mean, look, we worked really hard to get funds included
in the C.R. back in September for the 2021 disasters. HUD
hadn't even allocated the funds yet. And as you know,
allocation simply means you are going to get this much to the
State, which then the States have to go through, do action
plans, apply. So, here we are, appropriated money in September.
It is now February, and they haven't even allocated the funds.
After they make the allocation, we are probably looking at--and
I am probably being generous--about 9 months before the State
can actually start cutting checks. I mean, so these are,
meanwhile, disaster victims.
So, can you just speak to, kind of, the handoff with the
different agencies, whether it be SBA who starts, or FEMA,
depending on the loan or grant situation, and then HUD?
And if you all have made recommendations about just
stopping the Federal Government from continuing to victimize
these people that are victims?
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir, definitely. And there is no better
State than Louisiana to understand all the Federal programs
over the last few years----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana [interrupting]. You could have
stopped at Louisiana. You could have stopped at Louisiana.
Mr. Currie. Yes. So, yes, we have pointed this out.
So, there are multiple levels of problems. I mean, there
are problems within FEMA in its own programs and the timeframes
and the different regulations. But then there are problems
across the Department.
So, I think what is key to understand is these programs
were never designed to work together. They were all created
separately. There are separate regulations. They have separate
timeframes. They have separate execution. They have separate
documentation requirements not designed to work together. But
they are used together in disasters routinely now. It used to
be they weren't. Now they are. So, that is a problem that has
to get addressed.
But on the HUD issue, just one example, it has been bad in
Louisiana, but I will give you an example of Puerto Rico. Those
funds, they haven't even really started to be spent yet from 5
years ago. It has taken that long to get a HUD rule and plan
together and start executing the funding.
So, what we hear from States and locals is: How are we
supposed to plan recovery projects, let alone invest in
mitigation projects, which are even more complicated, if we
have no idea when we are going to get the money, or if we are
going to be able to use it together?
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. So, I am going to show you this.
This is our Restore Louisiana website [displaying the website
on his laptop]. We appropriated $1.7 billion in late 2016 and
early 2017. Here we are, over 5 years later, and this is how
much they have made available to homeowners: $666 million out
of $1.7 billion, 5 years later.
This performance is inexplicable, and Madam Chair, I want
to thank you. I know you had worked with us on the bill we did
with Congresswoman Stacey Plaskett, trying to help put this all
under FEMA's roof, so that way, you have one agency that is out
there doing more of the immediate and the long term, and giving
States a larger role. I know Mr. Rouzer has a bill, as well,
and I just want to re-urge that we continue looking at this. I
think it is a really important issue that we have seamless
handoff, and have our Government stop revictimizing some of
these survivors or flood victims.
And I apologize to the other two witnesses. We are going to
be submitting questions for the record for you, but thank you
for your participation.
I yield back.
[Pause.]
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. You are muted. Dina, if you are
speaking, you are muted.
Ms. Titus. Oh, I am sorry, excuse me. That sounded so
brilliant, too. I am sorry you all missed that.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Titus. I was just saying to Mr. Graves we hear that the
problems are coordination vertically and horizontally across
agencies, and among the different levels of Government.
They often find, though, that when people get in these
silos, jurisdiction becomes so critical. Nobody wants to give
up power, personnel, jurisdiction. You have to kind of break
those down. So, I am committed to working with you, Mr. Graves,
to continue to do this sort of work, because I think that it is
important, and there is a lot of it ahead of us.
We will now go to Mr. Carter.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Thank you very much, Madam Chair
and Ranking Member. I stand in concert with my colleague from
Louisiana, my dear friend, Mr. Graves.
We, oftentimes, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina,
found ourselves tag-teaming, fighting for Louisiana residents,
asking what we thought and what we agreed--and even later,
everyone agrees--were just very basic, simple questions of why
so much redtape? Why insult to injury? Why add more redtape and
more difficulty to what is already a very difficult time for
people?
As Garret mentioned, many times it was applications that
were not completely filled out, or maybe a box that was not
checked properly, and there was no appeal process to come back
and fix it without us painstakingly getting involved and really
getting people back to the table. Well, the fact of the matter
is, people who have already been hurt by a storm should not
have added insult by having a bureaucracy that swallows them
up.
So, I have got a question: What steps can be done to help
FEMA be more user-friendly, to take out some of the redtape,
and minimize some of the changing policies?
We know our State and local governments are developing
public policy projects, and we need to make sure that they
dovetail, and they work together, and not cause a further
logjam. So, can you share with me some thoughts on how FEMA
could do a better job, and how we might help them do a better
job?
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir, it is Chris Currie.
Ms. Bornemann. I----
Mr. Currie. Oh----
Ms. Bornemann. Sorry.
Mr. Currie. Sorry.
Ms. Bornemann. No, go ahead.
Mr. Currie. All right, I will start quick, so you have
time.
So, I think that, first of all, the mindset and the culture
has to change, that these programs need to be focused on
service delivery and efficiency. And there was an Executive
order that the President issued in December, focusing on
Federal Government programs and improving service delivery.
FEMA's disaster programs is one of them.
But you can't just talk about it. You have got to get in
there, and you have got to pick apart these programs, and look
at every part of the process, look at the barriers that are
within them. We have pointed out many of them in our reports.
And then you need to completely reengineer them and retrain the
staff so there is a cultural shift in how they are run.
It is no different from how a business would want to shift
its focus to customer service. That is what needs to be done,
program by program. And then, across these departments, they
need to look at how they can work together to streamline and
harmonize these programs. It can be done with effective
leadership. It has just got to be a priority.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Mr. Currie, let me interrupt you
for a second. Are there plans to do that?
Because, very respectfully, we have storms that come every
year. They come stronger, they come faster, they come bigger,
they come harder. And this is not new to us. And these kind of
battles that we have had with FEMA or other Federal agencies,
it seems like we are having the same conversations every time.
Some of the things are so basic and so elementary that it
really should not require rocket science to move them.
Mr. Currie. Yes.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. So, I hear you, that there
shouldn't be more talk, there should be more action. Can you
share with me some ideas that we can help facilitate that will
become action items in advance of the next series of natural
disasters?
Mr. Currie. Well, I think part of this is asking FEMA
through oversight, through hearings like this, but also through
requests for information, or meetings, or whatever, press them
on specifics about what they are doing within these programs to
break down some of these barriers.
It is great to implement some of these things in the
Strategic Plan, and talk at a high level about priorities. But
that takes a while to trickle its way down into the programs
and into the people that run them. This requires a cultural
change.
We have a number of recommendations on areas that they are
working on. I think they do get it. They understand they need
to--there is a lot of pressure on them to----
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. I am not just dumping on them. I
am not just dumping, because I think they have heard us, and
they have tried, and they have made adjustments as we brought
it to their attention.
But some of the adjustments are so elementary that, one,
they should not have needed our intervention. But two, some of
the changes appear to be partial, and then they slip right back
to the old way they were doing it. It needs to be memorialized
in a policy change, and not just, oh, the congressman called,
and therefore, we fixed it.
And real quickly, before I go, because my time is going to
be up, I asked this question before, and I am going to double
down on it. As cyberattacks increase, is the GAO studying the
potential for cyberattacks during a natural disaster?
And if not, is there something that is going to be done
that you are going to look into that? Because that is one step
away from something that we can find ourselves in a very
devastating position in the middle of a natural disaster, and
some terrorist group decides to take advantage of an otherwise
strained system. Have you given some thought to that? Are there
some things going on that you can share with us?
Mr. Currie. Thank you, sir. I am not aware of any study or
any evaluation we have done of cyberattacks specifically during
a natural disaster. We have done work on cybersecurity across
all the agencies that would be involved in a disaster. But I
will take that back and talk to our cybersecurity experts, and
I can get back to you on our plans for that, or whether we need
to work together to do that in the future.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. I would definitely do that. I
suspect that it is something that we should be concerned about,
and suspect that there may be some work going on. And if we can
collaborate among agencies to make sure that we have the best
practices in place to be prepared, I would greatly appreciate
it.
I yield back, Madam Chair. Thank you very much.
Ms. Titus. Thank you----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Madam Chair, if you don't--just
one point on what Mr. Carter just brought up.
We had thousands of constituents that essentially got
hacked. Somebody else applied for their disaster assistance,
and then our constituents that were real disaster victims were
blocked out. He made a great point.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Carter and Mr. Graves.
We now go to Miss Gonzalez-Colon, who can certainly talk
about this issue from her perspective and her district in
Puerto Rico.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking
Member, and I think this is a timely hearing and the witnesses
are sharing with us their expertise. And I was hearing Mr.
Garamendi and Mr. Graves, and I cannot agree more. I know that,
beside the witnesses today, there are numerous stakeholders
presenting written briefs for the record, whose input I will
deeply appreciate.
Unfortunately, Puerto Rico has become too familiar with
FEMA over the past 5 years and the current COVID emergency, the
2019 and 2020 earthquakes, and of course, our top of the list,
Hurricane Maria in 2017. And our recovery is on track to be
one, if not the largest, in FEMA's history.
FEMA has allocated more than $41.6 billion, and obligated
$38.8 billion, and outlaid $15.8 billion to the island.
However, in 2020, 3 years after Maria, no permanent work has
started yet. Major obligations for long-term infrastructure
rebuilding only began being announced in late 2020, and today
we are still in planning and having RFPs status.
So, many of my constituents have expressed a lot of
frustration with these delays, and the risk of having clawbacks
on already-approved benefits. I think greater agility and
accountability are imperative.
There are recent bills, such as Mr. Graves' H.R. 539, the
Preventing Disaster Revictimization Act, and my H.R. 2016, the
Federal Disaster Assistance Coordination Act, that both passed
the House already, and H.R. 2020, the Post-Disaster Assistance
Online Accountability Act, need to be considered to address
these issues.
And I do have a lot of questions, but I know the time is
difficult here. But my first question will be to Director
Currie.
In your written testimony--and happy to see you again--in
your written testimony, you review the prior GAO findings on
workforce issues and speed of disbursement in the report on the
recovery efforts in Puerto Rico in May of last year. You made
two recommendations.
First, that FEMA should, in coordination with the
Government of Puerto Rico and other Federal agencies, identify
and assess risks to the remainder of the recovery, including
internal and external factors such as the capacity to carry out
projects, and for example, taking into consideration if we have
the resources to start and finish projects within a time limit,
or if more time is needed.
And the second one, that FEMA should identify potential
actions to manage risks to the remainder of Puerto Rico's
recovery, and continuously monitor those risks.
My questions will be: What response or followup has there
been to those recommendations?
Second, would your office make such a followup, should the
committee require one, or should we require FEMA to report to
us the response?
Should the committee, as part of the [inaudible] establish
a timetable for FEMA to report what they are doing about those
recommendations?
I think those should be direct questions, and I do have
more.
Mr. Currie. Sure, I--yes, I think that it would be a good
idea to hold FEMA accountable to those recommendations.
And let me just say that at GAO, we are very focused on the
recovery in Puerto Rico. Almost 5 years later, September, we
have done several reviews on it. We are starting up another
one. I plan to go back to Puerto Rico next month. I have been
there five times since Hurricane Maria. The Federal Government
potentially is going to spend well over $50 billion there. So,
it is a huge priority for GAO, but not just from the amount of
money that is being spent.
I am very concerned about the long-term recovery.
Congressman Graves made a good point earlier, and he said that
it is one thing to get the money obligated, but that doesn't
actually mean that money is being spent, and shovels are
working, and projects are going. And my concern about the
situation in Puerto Rico, unlike other States that have the
funding and the upfront money, is that there is not going to be
the capacity, the funding, and the people to do all of this
work. We are having labor shortages across the entire country,
and I think we are going to have huge challenges actually
executing a lot of this work.
So, we stand behind those recommendations to FEMA. I think
this needs to be a huge area of focus continuing in the future.
And we are not going anywhere, ma'am. We are going to continue
to focus on this, and do oversight on it.
Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you.
I know my time has expired. But Madam Chair, I think we
should look into that opportunity for the committee to ask for
those responses for FEMA, including [inaudible] if we need to.
And I do have other questions for the record, and those are
for FEMA, but I will submit it in written form.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, all the witnesses.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses for
their testimony. I think it has been a very interesting
conversation.
There seems to be a lot of consensus among those who
testified, as well as the members of the committee who were
asking questions. But we have got a lot of work to do, but I
think we will be able to accomplish that, and want to look at
FEMA as it meets those requirements or suggestions that have
been made by GAO.
We can go back to Mr. Currie's four points. I think that
summarizes very well what we need to work on. Most of it comes
down to bringing FEMA into the 21st century: changes we need to
make in the workforce; doing away with the confusion and
redtape; streamlining complex projects and working with all
levels of Government and all agencies of Government; and
finally, building in resistance and mitigation to any kind of
changes that we should make. So, I look forward to doing that.
I welcome any members of the committee to make suggestions,
introduce legislation. You have my commitment that we will try
to work with the chairman of the committee to push some of this
through, because, as you heard from him early on, he is
concerned about these things, as well.
COVID affected all of us. It is a national disaster. So,
you overlay that with wildfires, like Nevada's--the driest and
the hottest State in the country, and getting worse--tornadoes,
earthquakes, floods, it is all there, and it is coming faster
and harder.
So, that is my commitment to you, and I appreciate you all
tuning in this morning for the hearing.
Now, let me get my script here for the conclusion. While I
am doing that I would like to say that Aaron has left us in
good hands.
I want to introduce our new staffer, who is Lauren Gros.
She has a degree from Georgetown. She worked for Rick Larsen's
office, and comes to the committee as a legislative assistant,
and will be our main person on the committee. So, we welcome
her.
I am looking for it here. Let me see what we have left to
do.
All right, that concludes our hearing. I want to thank, as
I have already done, all the witnesses for their testimony. It
has been very helpful.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that you might have and might be
submitted for the record in writing.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Has anybody got anything they want to say?
All right. The committee is adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Titus, and thank you to our witnesses for being
here today.
On a bipartisan basis, this committee has worked to improve FEMA
and the federal government's emergency management system.
The goal is to help communities prepare for, mitigate against, and
respond and recover from disaster.
It helps no one when communities must spend significant resources
to figure out how to fill out FEMA paperwork and navigate the process.
That is why I introduced bipartisan bills, including the Preventing
Disaster Revictimization Act and the SPEED Recovery Act, to help
individuals and communities cut through the red tape in FEMA
assistance.
I look forward to hearing from the GAO and stakeholders today on
their priorities.
Thank you, Chair Titus. I yield back.
Statement of the American Flood Coalition, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Dina Titus
The American Flood Coalition (AFC) applauds Chairwoman Titus,
Ranking Member Webster, Chairman DeFazio, and Ranking Member Graves for
holding this subcommittee hearing to solicit stakeholder perspectives
on top 2022 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) priorities. AFC
is grateful for the opportunity to submit written testimony for the
record.
Comprised of more than 280 members across 21 states, AFC is a
nonpartisan group of political, military, business, and local leaders
that have come together to drive adaptation to the reality of higher
seas, stronger storms, and more frequent flooding. AFC is a coalition
of people on the front lines of flooding: cities and towns, state and
local elected officials, military leaders, businesses, and civic
groups. Together, we seek to advance national solutions that support
flood-affected communities and protect our nation's residents, economy,
and military installations.
While much work remains to be done, AFC recognizes and appreciates
FEMA's efforts over the past year to support flood-affected
communities, particularly as the agency tackles challenges including
the COVID-19 public health emergency, devastation caused by wildfires
and extreme weather events, and additional urgent demands on the
agency's staff and resources.
While FEMA has many responsibilities and priorities, AFC's comments
focus on the agency's essential work to build resilient communities and
ensure equitable, timely, and thoughtful recovery in the wake of major
flooding. We urge the agency to build on its progress to date by
prioritizing the following areas in the year ahead.
Continue and expand efforts to instill equity across all FEMA
programs. AFC commends FEMA's work to evaluate its programs and
policies to further the agency's goal of delivering equity for all,
including through its April 2021 Request for Information (RFI) \1\.
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\1\ Federal Register, ``Request for Information on FEMA Programs,
Regulations, and Policies,'' April 22, 2021.
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As the agency reviews responses to the RFI and other comments
submitted by stakeholders, AFC emphasizes that participation in such
agency processes remains a privilege. In the wake of a flood, many
individuals often cannot advocate for themselves and their communities.
Survivors have valuable feedback to contribute but likely lack the time
and capacity to submit comments or attend meetings because they are
rebuilding homes and businesses, while coping with the emotional and
physical toll of the disaster. Similarly for community-based
organizations, seeking to improve federal processes, undertaking a
comprehensive review of proposed federal legislation, or submitting
comments by a deadline can be virtually impossible while simultaneously
supporting flood victims.
With these realities in mind, FEMA must recognize underserved
community members' time constraints and create spaces to meet community
members where they are. Additional engagement strategies, such as
providing childcare at meetings or seeking input from residents at an
existing community event, can make a meaningful difference. AFC cannot
overstate the importance of directly engaging flood-affected
communities to better understand their unique challenges and needs.
Beyond these important recognitions and the urgency of community
engagement, AFC's RFI comment letter \2\ provides overarching themes
and specific policy recommendations to help FEMA deliver on its goal of
equity for all.
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\2\ Regulations.gov, ``Comment submitted by the American Flood
Coalition,'' July 22, 2021
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Expand access and technical assistance for Hazard Mitigation
Assistance (HMA) Programs. AFC urges FEMA to provide robust technical
assistance for all grant programs, in addition to targeted application
and project assistance to underserved communities. We also encourage
Congress to review the statutory definition of ``small and
impoverished'' communities and to consider adjusting federal cost-share
ratios so that FEMA programs can better support more high-need areas.
Smaller, rural, and underserved communities often lack the time and
expertise to decipher FEMA's complex application processes. They also
typically lack resources to hire external consultants to outsource this
work. As a result, underserved communities are less able to develop
competitive applications and can be effectively shut out of FEMA's HMA
funding opportunities. A recent survey of AFC's membership affirmed
that capacity challenges are among the greatest hurdles to securing
federal funds to execute resilience projects.
These realities were reflected in the applicant pool and ultimate
grant recipients for FEMA's inaugural Building Resilient Infrastructure
and Communities (BRIC) program. More than $3 billion in project
applications were submitted for just $500 million in available funding,
which demonstrates both significant demand for mitigation dollars and
an extremely competitive application process. These dynamics remain
true even with the administration's commitment to allocate $1 billion
for BRIC funding in 2021,\3\ as well as an additional $200 million in
annual funding for the next five years codified under the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).\4\ Of 991 total
applicants for BRIC's 2020 grant cycle, only 98 were small and
impoverished communities.\5\ Furthermore, five of the nation's
wealthiest states received 70% of the $500 million in available
funding, while small, impoverished communities were awarded just$36
million in total.\6\
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\3\ The White House, ``FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Invests $1
Billion To Protect Communities, Families, and Businesses Before
Disaster Strikes.''
\4\ Congress.gov, ``Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.''
\5\ FEMA, ``FY2020 Building Resilient Infrastructure and
Communities Application Submissions.''
\6\ E&E News, ``Climate grants meant for poor places went to rich
states.''
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Another major hurdle to applying to FEMA's HMA grant programs is
that many entities cannot cover local cost-share requirements. Most HMA
grant recipients must pay for 25% of a project's cost while the federal
government covers the remaining 75%. Under current law, communities
defined as ``small and impoverished'' benefit from an increased 90%
federal cost-share, but that definition remains extremely narrow. AFC
urges the subcommittee to explore expanding this definition so that
more communities could qualify for an increased cost share. We also
encourage Congress to provide a higher federal cost-share for the
highest-need communities, as this would significantly increase FEMA's
HMA programs impact among small, rural, and underserved communities.
AFC believes that robust technical assistance is fundamental to
addressing such barriers and ensuring BRIC's overall success. While we
commend FEMA's increased efforts on this front, we note that in the
2020 BRIC cycle, only eight communities were supported through the BRIC
program's non-financial direct technical assistance.\7\ This is likely
because most localities are unaware that such resources are available
and often lack the capacity to seek out and manage assistance.
Reframing technical assistance to be ``opt out'' rather than ``opt
in''--so that FEMA and state governments proactively approach
communities and offer direct assistance--would be a welcome shift.
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\7\ FEMA, ``Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities FY
2020 Subapplication Status.''
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Implement the Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk Mitigation
(STORM) Act (P.L. 116-284).\8\ Finally, AFC urges FEMA to advance
regulations for the STORM Act's Hazard Mitigation Revolving Loans
Funds, which received $500 million in seed funding under the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).\9\ AFC commends
Congress for creating this new program and for providing funding to
help states establish revolving loan funds for resilience projects.
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\8\ Congress.gov; ``Safeguarding Tomorrow through Ongoing Risk
Mitigation Act or the STORM Act.''
\9\ Congress.gov, ``Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.''
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In particular, we appreciate that among other eligible uses, STORM
Act revolving loans could support local government activities such as
zoning, land-use planning studies, and establishing and enforcing
building codes. AFC also supports the program's prioritization of
projects that increase regional resilience, consider the regional
impacts of hazards, and harden major economic sectors or critical
national infrastructure. AFC encourages FEMA to proceed with rulemaking
so that counties and local governments can begin accessing funding and
more proactively manage their flood risk.
Once again, AFC appreciates the subcommittee's attention and
interest on these pressing issues, as well as FEMA's work to drive
meaningful progress across our outlined priorities to date. AFC stands
ready to work with both Congress and FEMA on shared efforts to build
stronger, more resilient communities.
Statement of June Isaacson Kailes, Disability Policy Consultant,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Dina Titus
Suggested Solutions for Changing the Training Environment--
Content, Process, and Delivery Mechanisms
My work focuses on building critical disability practice
competencies and capabilities in health care and emergency management
by using actionable details. These details operationalize the equity
and specificity needed to include people with disabilities and others
with access and functional needs. Much of her work converts the laws,
the case laws, regulations, and guidance into tangible building blocks,
tools, and operating procedures that close service gaps, prevent civil
rights violations, and deliver inclusive, equally effective services.
GAO has been making recommendations about FEMA workforce
development since 2015. For example: ``The FEMA Administrator should
create a staff development program for FEMA's disaster workforce that,
at a minimum, addresses access to training, delivery of on-the-job
training and mentoring, use of performance evaluations, and consistent
developmental opportunities regardless of deployment status.'' FEMA
Disaster Workforce: Actions Needed to Address Deployment and Staff
Development Challenges GAO-20-360 May 04, 2020.
However, FEMA personnel are just one part of the emergency
preparedness workforce development audience. One of the significant
issues is the lack of coordination and integration among the many
federally supported preparedness training programs. (see links to these
programs at https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-
preparedness/training)
``Funding for the Congressionally-authorized National
Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) is an annual
appropriation through the Homeland Security National Training
Program Cooperative Agreement . . . Congress has invested
millions of dollars into the development of the NDPC, ensuring
that all US emergency responders/receivers have access to high-
quality training. This funding allows the NDPC to develop and
deliver training at no direct cost to state and local
agencies.''
``Traditionally, Continuing Training Grant (CTG) recipients
have not shown the ability to sustain training beyond the
initial funding period. As such, many of the CTG developed
courses, if deemed to have ongoing need and relevance, have
been assumed by existing NDPC members who have the facilities,
infrastructure, and ability to sustain them.'' https://ndpc.us/
about/congress-and-the-ndpc/ (online 2-22-2022)
While there may be a high-level coordinating body for training
activities, each of the individual programs seems committed to ``stay
in its lane'' and not meaningfully collaborating on the content or
course development. Asking any entity to integrate with any other
federally supported group seems to result in a range of responses from
``that's not our role'' to ``we cannot change someone else's course
material or delivery methods.''
This is particularly problematic for new, emerging, and evolving
content areas such as integrating people with access and functional
needs. However, given the continuously evolving preparedness issues
such as pandemic response, wildfire, and the yearlong disaster season,
it seems clear that the training process needs to become better
coordinated and more flexible, nimble, and responsive.
It is well past time to update the national preparedness training
environment--content, process, and delivery mechanisms--to address 21st
century needs, platforms, and opportunities.
If FEMA is going to be able to address workforce development
priorities, FEMA's multiple training programs, activities, and funding
support need to be placed in the context of overall federal investment
in preparedness training. FEMA should not continue to reinforce or fund
training ``silos.''
While this issue is probably widespread across many areas of
emergency management, to illustrate the point, I would like to address
one specific area as an example. Some of the recommendation from the
FEMA National Advisory Council (NAC) were included in the May 2017
report to the FEMA administrator. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-08/fema_nac-report_06-2017.pdf
``IV. Training for Incorporating People with Disabilities and
others Access and Functional Needs, including Children (3
recommendations)
Issue 8: There is a lack of emergency management, response,
and recovery training incorporating people with access and
functional needs and children. This puts these populations at
risk. Note: the NAC has made previous recommendations regarding
this issue (see 2016-28 and 2017-09) and it remains unresolved.
Recommendation 17-26: FEMA should create and support a Center
of Excellence (CoE) type training program for emergency
management personnel that enables experts to acquire, adopt,
disseminate and deliver content specializing in how to fully
integrate the needs of individuals with disabilities and others
with access and functional needs and children into all aspects
of emergency planning, response, recovery and mitigation.
Recommendation 17-27: FEMA should more fully integrate
content related to persons with disabilities, access and
functional needs and children into all existing and future
emergency management trainings. To fulfill this objective, FEMA
should map and prioritize FEMA courses delivered to emergency
management personnel and first responders . . .''
As noted in the May 2017 report, the FEMA National Advisory Council
(NAC) made earlier recommendations regarding this issue, yet it
remained unresolved.
There has been little progress in almost five years since these NAC
recommendations were made. Outdated and potentially damaging
information remains in FEMA course and exercise content. This seriously
undermines the significant progress that has been made in whole
community inclusion in emergency preparedness. Integration of course
and exercise content needs to consistently conform with contemporary
planning, response, and recovery priorities to end counterproductive
teaching of outdated, old model, old school, ``special needs'' content.
Funding support is needed for a timelier way to incorporate access,
and functional needs content consistently and routinely into all
appropriate course materials. Attention to covering the issues in the
appropriate depth, beyond just a separate and special course, is needed
for appropriate workforce development. This may also be true for other
emerging and evolving emergency preparedness issues.
The process of how contractors are selected and utilized needs to
be examined. A tremendous amount of time and resources is spent fixing,
redoing, and repairing uninformed contractor work specifically related
to access and functional needs. Contractors often lack expertise on the
diversity of the populations included in access and functional needs,
how to translate the nuanced words into applied practice, etc. FEMA
should partner with led organizations (such as the Partnership for
Inclusive Disaster Strategies https://disasterstrategies.org/) to
establish rigorous criteria for identifying and evaluating course
developers, trainers, and reviewers to ensure they are truly subject
matter experts (including relevant specialized experience).
Use training evaluation methods that measure the effectiveness of
delivery, performance, impact, and outcomes rather than just rating the
process: how many attended, how many answered so many post-test
questions correctly, and the learners' reactions to and satisfaction
with the training and presenters. A quality companion product focused
on just-in-time training should also be developed for whatever training
is created or revised. This is because the people we trained yesterday
won't be there tomorrow. The gold standard should include metrics
related to performance in the trenches.
The Committee may also want to ask GAO to look at preparedness
training issues in a broader context beyond just FEMA. To make
recommendations about rewarding agencies for collaborative activities,
streamlining course development and delivery, reducing redundancy and
inconsistency, and identifying training gaps and new opportunities,
which will move beyond the long-entrenched current approaches to
workforce development.
Moving forward, FEMA needs to be a part of the solution, not a part
of the problem.
Statement of the National Association of Home Builders, Submitted for
the Record by Hon. Dina Titus
I. Introduction
NAHB represents more than 140,000 members who are involved in land
development, building single-family and multifamily housing, remodeling
and other aspects of residential and light commercial construction.
NAHB's members construct approximately 80 percent of all new housing
built in the United States each year.
NAHB's mission is to enhance the climate for housing and the
building industry, including providing and expanding opportunities for
all people to have access to safe, decent and affordable housing. Due
to the wide range of activities they conduct on a regular basis to
house the nation's residents, our members are often required to comply
with various regulatory and incentive-based programs to address issues
related to climate change and resilience.
NAHB is leading the way to improve resiliency and the performance
of new and existing homes. As a longtime leader in the drive to make
homes more energy efficient, NAHB has also repeatedly demonstrated a
commitment to sound federal disaster and floodplain management policies
and cost-effective, market-driven solutions that maintain housing
affordability while balancing the needs of growing communities with the
need for reasonable protection of life and property.
II. Background
The unusual number of significant natural disasters over the past
several years has been sobering. At the same time, they have ignited a
nationwide dialogue about risk, resiliency and mitigation. NAHB has
been actively engaged in these discussions for many years and we have
taken a leadership role in improving the resiliency and performance of
new and existing homes. In fact, NAHB and its members have a long
history of supporting, developing and participating in many state and
local initiatives, as well as various federal activities aimed and
reducing disaster losses and improving resiliency. We have repeatedly
demonstrated our commitment to working with all levels of government to
promote and implement sound disaster and floodplain management policies
and improve the resiliency of the homes we build and the communities we
serve. In doing so, we take pride in helping to develop cost-effective,
market-driven solutions that maintain housing affordability while
balancing the needs of growing communities with the need for reasonable
protection of life and property.
As stakeholders in both the public and private sectors wrestle with
finding the right balance of regulations and programs to protect homes
and their occupants from severe weather events and hazards, some argue
that more should be done. But most additional efforts come at costs
that not only curtail homeownership and significantly hinder housing
affordability, but also can severely impact state and local economies.
This is because these policies can greatly influence how existing
structures and cities are reengineered, rebuilt and/or remodeled and
impact how and where new homes and communities are built. Depending on
how they are developed and implemented, they can also be inflexible and
overly protective, fail to target areas of highest risk, reduce the
availability of buildable land, tax limited resources, and have
significant cost implications that can have a detrimental impact on
housing affordability in many areas of the country.
With this as a backdrop, NAHB has identified one specific priority
and six general themes that should be woven into each of FEMA's actions
as it ``Builds the FEMA our nation needs and deserves.''
Complete Endangered Species Consultation for the National
Flood Insurance Program
Acknowledge that Structures Built to Modern Codes are
Resilient
Identify and Promote Opportunities to Mitigate/Modernize
Existing Buildings
Provide Incentives to Mitigate/Modernize Existing
Buildings
Recognize and Retain State/Local Land Use Authority
Embrace and Improve Stakeholder Engagement
Provide Updated Resources and Data
III. NAHB's Suggested Priorities
a. Complete Endangered Species Consultation for the National Flood
Insurance Program
Over the last decade, FEMA has been locked in an ongoing legal
battle regarding how specific NFIP programs, such as a letter of map
revisions and minimum eligibility requirements for community
participation demonstrate compliance with the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Most recently, in 2017, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) issued a biological opinion (BiOp) that concluded the
implementation of the NFIP, as it exists today in the states of Oregon
and Washington, violates the ESA's prohibition against any
discretionary federal action that may result in ``jeopardizing the
continued existence of'' an endangered or threatened species or the
``destruction or adverse modification'' of designated critical habitat.
NMFS's rationale as to why the NFIP violates the ESA is that the very
existence of the program encourages future land development and
construction activities in and around floodplains--areas that may serve
as important critical habitat for certain federally-protected aquatic
species. Because of these purported important ecological functions, it
claims the federal government could prohibit or at least restrict
future land development or construction activities from occurring
within floodplains.
Although FEMA is taking steps to address this issue by developing a
national programmatic framework for ESA compliance, this task is long
overdue. Equally problematic, FEMA's interim regulatory guidance to
address ESA compliance, issued in 2016, creates a wholly new process
that does not exist under the ESA or under the Service's consultation
regulations and creates significant implementation problems across the
board. In short, the Agency's regulatory guidance attempts to illegally
pass off FEMA's responsibilities as a federal ``action agency'' and
instead foist its obligations upon non-federal entities (i.e., local
governments or private landowners) to perform the ESA's consultation
functions. Instead of performing its duties under the ESA's
consultation regulations, FEMA expects non-federal permittees to obtain
documentation from the FWS that their proposed activities will have no
impact upon federally protected species or their designated critical
habitat and then provide FEMA with copies of FWS's ``no effect''
letters.
Alternatively, FEMA's interim regulatory guidance directs non-
federal entities who request certain letters of floodplain map revision
that could impact an endangered species or designated critical habitat,
to first obtain an expensive and complicated ESA Sec. 10 Incidental
Take Permit (ITP). This completely contravenes Congress's intent that
ITPs only apply to private landowners whose proposed activities
actually result in the ``take'' (i.e., death or injury) of an
endangered species. Likewise, it confuses the ESA's existing
authorization process, as ITPs are not intended to be used for private
activities that have a ``federal nexus'' (e.g., activities that require
federal approval or funding), such as a request to FEMA to revise
floodplain maps, which federal courts have already determined trigger
the ESA's consultation requirements. Clearly, FEMA's approach fails to
recognize the Agency's own role and responsibilities under the ESA as a
federal ``action agency'' whose activities are subject to the ESA
Sec. 7 consultation process. Rather than developing creative ways to
avoid its ESA responsibilities, FEMA needs to comply with the ESA's
consultation regulations. If it is unwilling or unable to do so, it
should work with Congress to seek targeted legislative reforms to NFIP
or even the ESA to better define which portions of the NFIP are
discretionary federal actions and thereby when ESA consultations are
required. Whichever approach to demonstrating compliance with the ESA
is chosen, NAHB urges FEMA to avoid outcomes that needlessly harm NFIP
participating communities and developers' and builders' efforts to
provide safe and affordable housing.
b. Acknowledge that Structures Built to Modern Codes are Resilient
Building codes are designed to establish minimum requirements for
public health and safety for commercial and residential structures
(i.e., be disaster resistant). Despite this, FEMA continues to place
undue effort on increasing their stringency. Not only is this
unnecessary, as structures built to modern codes are shown to be more
resilient, but also doing so oftentimes makes new homes unattainable
for many home buyers. Instead of improving new construction, which is
the focus of most building codes, FEMA should acknowledge that modern
building codes are resilient and pivot its attention to improving the
resilience of existing structures.
Although they have existed in various forms for decades, building
codes in the United States achieved a milestone in 2000 when the three
regional code organizations were consolidated into the International
Code Council (ICC) and their codes were combined to create the first
set of ``I-Codes,'' which were published in 2000. While there are other
building codes available, the I-Codes are the most widely used model
building codes, with some form of the International Building Code (IBC)
adopted in all 50 states and versions of the International Residential
Code (IRC) adopted in 49 states. The I-Codes are modified through a
formal public consensus process every three years. This has resulted in
the publication of a new edition in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
and 2021. Work has commenced on the 2024 version of the code and final
votes will take place in the fall of 2022.
When the I-Codes were created, a number of major improvements were
immediately made to the traditional building code requirements within
the residential building code to address issues observed after
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the California earthquakes of 1989 and
1994. Although additional improvements have been made since the I-
Codes' debut in 2000, the number of changes incorporated into the newer
editions of the IRC that dramatically impact structural reliability and
occupant life safety within residential structures have greatly
diminished. In other words, the modern building codes (e.g., post-2000)
have proven to be resilient and the need for triannual updates is not
necessary for improved resilience.
Despite this, many believe that homes built following the ``latest
published edition'' of the building code equate to more resilient
homes, but that is not necessarily the case when compared to those
built to previous editions of the IRC. Homes built to modern building
codes--defined as any edition of the IRC--have been shown to be
resilient. Evidence from FEMA and others demonstrate the IRC,
throughout its history, has been very effective in preventing the
destruction of homes due to various storms and earthquakes and
significantly reducing damage to wall and roof coverings. Further,
because many of today's new homes are built with additional sustainable
and high-performance building features, they are even more durable and
resilient.
The successful performance of the IRC is also an indication of the
``maturing'' of building codes as they have gone through the iterative
process of refinement since 2000. While tweaking the code to reflect
technological advances will continue, it is clear that major changes
aren't as necessary as they used to be. Similarly, because the codes
are nearing a point of diminishing returns in terms of the cost/benefit
ratio, additional updates may not be cost-effective. Homes can be built
to withstand any disaster, but homes cannot yet consistently be built
to withstand any disaster and be affordable. New homes built to modern
codes are efficient. New homes built to modern codes are safe. New
homes built to modern codes are resilient. FEMA must embrace this fact
throughout its efforts and actions. Instead of taking every opportunity
to increase the stringency of building codes (whether such updates are
necessary or not), FEMA should trust the code development process and
resultant codes and focus its energy on improving the resiliency of the
existing housing stock.
c. Identify and Promote Opportunities to Mitigate/Modernize Existing
Buildings
The American housing stock continues to age and due to the recent
decrease in production, there is increasing pressure to keep existing
homes in service longer--homes that may not perform as well or be as
resilient as newer homes. One hundred and thirty million homes out of
the nation's housing stock of 137 million were built before 2010, and
therefore, most were not subject to the modern building codes that are
now in effect. Equally problematic, the latest Census statistics show
the number of homes built before 1970 that are taken out of commission
is only about six out of every 1,000 being retired per year. These low
rates of replacement mean that the built environment in the U.S. will
change slowly and continue to be dominated by structures that are at
least several decades old.
Older homes are less resilient and energy efficient than new homes.
They were not built to the stringent requirements contained in modern
codes, use (and lose) more energy, and are more susceptible to damage
from natural disasters. Many of FEMA's post-disaster investigations
support this conclusion. For example, FEMA's Mitigation Assessment Team
Report regarding Hurricane Sandy reads, ``Many of the low-rise and
residential buildings in coastal areas [that had observable damage]
were of older construction that pre-dates the NFIP.'' Similarly, the
Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety stated in its
preliminary findings report for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma that,
``[t]otal destruction from wind occurred to mobile homes, as well as
older site built conventional homes,'' and ``[n]ewer homes generally
performed better than older buildings.''
Clearly, these statistics and studies demonstrate that improvements
in construction practices and building codes have made significant
strides in improving the efficiency and resiliency of new construction
and that further gains will be difficult and costly. As FEMA takes
steps to mitigate the effects of future natural disasters, it needs to
create opportunities to facilitate upgrades and improvements to the
older homes, structures and infrastructure that are less resilient to
natural disasters.
Support Voluntary Compliance
Mitigation efforts that recognize and promote voluntary above code
compliance for improved resilience in lieu of mandates have been proven
to produce results, show value to consumers and are cost-effective. In
other words, they are driven by the market. FEMA is strongly urged to
develop and provide workable solutions to facilitate and promote the
use of voluntary means to increase the resiliency of the existing
housing stock.
Because one size never fits most, it is important that builders,
home buyers and homeowners have choices when it comes to finding
strategies to increase the resiliency of their homes. One reason
federal mandates are ineffective is because they fail to take into
account the needs or desires of consumers and others, and typically
lack the flexibility needed for realistic, widespread application.
Flexibility allows builders to choose the specific efficiency
component(s), program or green certification that best suits their
needs and the desires of the home buyers based on their ability to
afford and willingness to pay. In other words, having options versus
requirements allows the market to function as intended.
As a result, voluntary, above-code programs such as the ICC700
National Green Building Standard, Leadership in Energy & Environmental
Design (LEED) Resilient Design Pilot credits, RELi 2.0 pilot, FORTIFIED
Home and the U.S. Resiliency Council (USRC) rating all have widespread
participation. Numerous similar initiatives have also been successful
and many homeowners voluntarily take other steps to improve their
home's performance. The popularity of these programs has led to proven
track records in improving home resiliency. For example, over 345,000
units have been certified to the ICC 700 National Green Building
Standard to date and 36,000 homes have the FORTIFIED designation. In
addition to increasing resiliency, these programs provide value to
consumers through insurance discounts, peace of mind and other
benefits. The many choices also allow stakeholders to pick and choose
the specific elements that fit their needs and budgets, which make
voluntary alternatives inherently cost-effective.
Provide Cost-Effective Options
In September 2015, FEMA released a publication that describes
alternative mitigation measures intended for a variety of housing types
that could not feasibly be elevated.\1\ In the guidance, FEMA
specifically acknowledged that the techniques had applicability in
single-family homes, 1-4 family midrise multifamily residential
buildings and high-rise multifamily residential buildings. This
publication was intended to fulfill the requirement of Section 26 of
the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA) passed by
Congress in 2014, which directed FEMA to: (1) issue guidelines for
property owners that provide alternative methods of mitigation efforts
(other than building elevation), to reduce flood risk to residential
buildings that cannot be elevated due to their structural
characteristics; (2) inform property owners how the implementation of
these methods may affect NFIP risk premium rates; and (3) take into
account, when calculating the risk premium rate, the implementation of
any mitigation method identified in the FEMA guidelines. However,
FEMA's adherence to this mandate is only partially complete.
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\1\ FEMA, Reducing Flood Risk to Residential Buildings That Cannot
Be Elevated, FEMA P-1037 / September 2015.
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First, the alternative mitigation options identified in the
publication are extremely limited and only marginally more realistic
for many properties than the elevation requirement they are designed to
avoid. Second, FEMA has yet to complete its work on those measures that
could more reasonably be implemented in a broader array of situations,
such as Wet Floodproofing (Elevate Building Utilities, Floodproof
Building Utilities, and use of Flood Damage-Resistant Materials), Dry
Floodproofing (Passive Dry Floodproofing System) and Barrier Measures
(Floodwall with Gates and Floodwall without Gates, Levee with Gates and
Levee without Gates). While these clearly provide a more reasonable
range of options to reduce flood risks, FEMA continues to conduct
further analysis to determine the appropriate premium reduction
associated with each measure.
NAHB urges FEMA to prioritize the release of these analyses, as
they will not only have a direct impact on the affordability of NFIP
premiums today, but also will help incentivize the necessary mitigation
and building activities to minimize risk moving forward. If we are to
collectively work to provide resilient affordable housing where it is
needed, local jurisdictions must have information about the full range
of mitigation activities available and not be forced into a costly and
less effective choice because it is the only option they feel they
have. At a minimum, FEMA should revise its flood insurance rating to
provide premium reductions for all of the mitigation measures
documented in Reducing Flood Risk to Residential Buildings that Cannot
be Elevated, not just the interior modification/retrofit measures. If
these activities are shown to reduce risks, there is no reason not to
recognize the benefits.
Further, FEMA should continue to conduct research into other cost-
effective mitigation techniques. At a minimum FEMA should develop a
comprehensive database of flood damage assessments and observations
collected from its various MAT teams or other field teams that could be
used by FEMA, its industry partners or research institutions to improve
the understanding of how buildings perform under a variety of flood
conditions and use that data and information to target and refine the
NFIP construction standards to be more cost-effective.
Finally, recognizing that many households do not have the interest
or means to conduct larger scale renovation projects, NAHB, in concert
with FEMA, the International Code Council, and the Insurance Institute
for Business & Home Safety, is developing a series of Tech Notes that
describe different types of retrofit techniques that can be used to
increase the resiliency of existing buildings. Importantly, these focus
on strategies that require minimal costs (generally less than $1,000
for a typical home) but have a significant impact on reducing damage.
The first six topics include sealed roof decks, attachment of roof
coverings, flashing and sealing of roof penetrations, use of hurricane
shutters, use of impact resistant doors and methods of preventing ice
dams. These resources help homeowners understand their options,
recognize that certain mitigation options can be cost-effective, and
compel them to take action, and we urge FEMA's continued support of
their development.
d. Provide Incentives to Mitigate/Modernize Existing Buildings
Incentive programs that offset the increased costs for above-code
and mitigation activities are an important tool to reduce the barriers
that many resiliency opportunities pose and encourage more homeowners
to invest in home modernization. For example, due to the high initial
costs associated with purchasing and/or installing certain features to
increase their home's resiliency, many homeowners are unable to finance
desired or necessary upgrades and, without assistance, would likely
forego the improvements. Incentives that are available at the federal
and state levels, as well as those that could be offered through the
real estate valuation and transaction processes, can address this
issue, produce results and have proven to be attractive alternatives to
mandates. FEMA should identify, embrace, support and promote a wide
range of incentives and incentive programs to help improve overall
resiliency.
For example, the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 includes a
number of actions related to improving the ability of existing
structures to withstand catastrophes, such as the National Public
Infrastructure Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program, which provides federal
funding for pre-disaster mitigation. Increasing the resiliency of the
existing housing stock would be a prudent use of this funding stream.
Likewise, the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities grant
program is an important tool, but portions of it need to be reworked so
that it recognizes and incentivizes a wider range of mitigation
options.
States also play a role in enticing positive behavior--efforts that
can be compounded with FEMA support. One alternative that has been used
in several states is providing insurance discounts to homeowners who
conduct specific activities. In Texas, the state's hurricane insurance
pool, the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, offers premium
discounts of 19 percent to 33 percent for building code compliance. In
Rhode Island, insurers are required to waive the hurricane deductible
for insured homeowners who voluntarily implement mitigation measures
that are specified in the insurance regulation. In Alabama, tax credits
of up to $3,000 are available for retrofitting a taxpayer's legal
residence to make it more resistant to hurricanes, tornadoes, other
catastrophic windstorm events, or rising floodwaters.
In addition, the Alabama state legislature established the
Strengthen Alabama Homes Act in 2011 to provide grants to qualified
homeowners to retrofit their homes to reduce property damage caused by
hurricanes or other catastrophic windstorm events. Currently, the
response to the program has been so overwhelming that the program
administrator has temporarily stopped taking new grant applications.
Clearly, these state programs have proven to be popular, as they
provide value through loss reduction, yet enable and facilitate broader
participation through reduced costs. The recognition and expansion of
programs like these is one way to engage participation while offsetting
the hefty costs associated with upgrades.
There are also a number of other opportunities to facilitate,
incentivize, and offset the costs of voluntary above-code construction
and/or pre-disaster mitigation that could be achieved by FEMA working
with its federal partners and/or other collaborations. These options
include working with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to make modifications
to property valuation and financing protocols; ensuring loans, grants
and other federal funding programs are accessible and widely
applicable; and providing insurance premium reductions within the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), among others.
Under current practice, in most instances, mortgage companies,
appraisers and real estate professionals do not consider the costs or
benefits associated with various resiliency or energy efficiency
upgrades. This creates a disincentive to take proactive steps to reduce
a home's exposure, as those expenditures are not necessarily considered
to add value. If the improvements are not included in the appraisal or
appraised value of the structure, not only is the buyer uninformed
about the home's qualities, his or her willingness to pay more can be
significantly diminished.
In an effort to spur private investment in efficiency and
resiliency, the value and benefit of the above code practices and
mitigation measures should be incorporated into standard real estate
lending practices and real estate listings. By recognizing and
valuating the upgrades, appraisers can consistently give weight to
these improvements, lenders may reconsider qualifying loan ratios,
realtors can promote their benefits, homeowners would get assurances
that the investments they have made will retain value and be recognized
in resale and homes would be more likely to get the upgrades needed to
improve their performance.
Similar to the valuation process and state insurance discounts,
recognizing improved resiliency can also be done by tweaking the NFIP.
Currently, all improvements to fortify a home against flood hazards do
not result in flood insurance premium discounts. For example, in its
``Reducing Flood Risk to Residential Buildings That Cannot Be
Elevated'' document, FEMA outlines several alternative actions that can
be taken in lieu of elevation. Of the measures discussed, however, only
50 percent of them are eligible for flood insurance premium reductions.
e. Recognize and Retain State/Local Land Use Authority
FEMA has frequently stated that it has no authority over local land
use decisions and that state and local governments maintain primary
authority over local land use and building practices to not only
maintain their self-interests, but also because they have better
knowledge of local conditions and needs. Indeed, one of the strengths
of the NFIP, for example, is that it allows states and communities to
dictate actions based on their individual risks and circumstances.
Officials at all levels of government must work together so that lives,
homes, schools, businesses and public infrastructure are protected from
the damages and costs incurred by flooding and other disasters, local
communities must retain the ability to provide the first line of
defense in terms of land use policies and practices. They are in the
best position to determine the risks and challenges they and their
citizens face and follow code adoption, implementation, and enforcement
processes that reflect their available resources and needs.
Resiliency, risk avoidance, and mitigation planning should be
viewed in the same context; it is best undertaken by localities who
know their communities best. FEMA must not intrude on a locality's
ability to conduct community planning, economic development, coastal
zoning planning and other planning activities; instead, it must take
care to ensure such state and local prerogatives are not undermined and
that any FEMA activities are complementary to these local actions.
To do so, FEMA could be of great help in providing resources,
information and technical assistance. For example, FEMA could ask
communities what assistance they need and fulfill those requests.
Likewise, the Agency could provide benefit to mitigation planning by
improving data tracking and integration--working with state or local
agencies that track relevant data on sea level rise or flood levels and
integrating their data to produce more accurate risk for the future and
cataloging and disseminating that data. FEMA could also help
incentivize the necessary mitigation and building activities to
minimize risk in the future by providing state and local jurisdictions
with the best available information about the full range of mitigation
activities available so they are not forced into implementing the most
costly or least efficient choice possible because it is the only one
they feel they have. Local, state and federal governments all are
looking for approaches to mitigate the effects of potential climate and
natural disaster risk events. FEMA must be aware of such initiatives
and develop policies and take actions that support, not conflict, with
these efforts.
f. Embrace and Improve Stakeholder Engagement
FEMA administers a number of programs and priorities aimed at
preparing for, and responding to disasters, hazards, and other
emergencies. It also manages the National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP), including overseeing the development and updating of the 100-
year floodplain maps, disaster assistance, and mitigation. In each of
its past several strategic plans, FEMA has set out goals to improve
collaboration and work with stakeholders. While NAHB believes this
interaction has improved, more work needs to be done. FEMA must
continue to prioritize its outreach, solicitation of feedback, and
engagement of residential building experts and other members of the
public.
For example, in completing its work, FEMA relies on a myriad of
guidance documents, handbooks, policy statements and other directives
to explain its programs, expectations, and policies. Because many of
these documents are used to direct the activities of landowners and
citizens, they have the force and effect of the law and its
implementing rules, and, hence, meet the definition of ``regulation''
outlined in E.O. 13771, yet FEMA has not consulted the public in their
development. Examples include the Guidelines and Standards for Risk
Analysis and Mapping, Community Rating System Coordinator's Manual, and
Community Resilience Indicators and National-Level Measures. Not only
have these documents not been vetted through the public, but many
people do not know they exist and many are difficult to locate, yet the
agency expects the public to be knowledgeable and comply. FEMA is
strongly urged to revisit its standard protocol for advising the public
of potential policy changes and soliciting feedback. Only through
providing opportunities for adequate notice and comment, timely
updates, and broad outreach will the agency be able to reach its
constituency and ensure its programs are effective and workable on the
ground.
Similarly, although FEMA recognizes the value and need of bringing
communities together to create more resilient places, the Agency rarely
calls upon the expertise of the home building industry to help direct
its actions. NAHB's members possess a wealth of experience and
knowledge that is directly related to much of FEMA's work. Building
technology, construction techniques, and best practices are the
language of the trade, yet FEMA has failed to regularly involve NAHB or
its representatives on projects affecting residential construction.
Building homes and communities are our members' livelihoods,
whether those homes are constructed in urban areas, mountainous
topography, for low-income residents, or within the 100-year
floodplain. Our staff and members have the experience and expertise to
help ensure FEMA programs and practices that affect residential
construction are effective, cost-efficient and workable on the ground.
But to do so, NAHB needs to be at the table--appointed as a member of
project review panels or Mitigation Assessment Teams or otherwise have
its input solicited at early stages of any FEMA or FEMA-funded project
affecting residential construction.
g. Provide Updated Resources and Data
The increased focus on sea level rise, climate change, more intense
storms and recent flooding events further illustrate the need for the
public to have ready access to good data and information so that they
can make informed decisions. NAHB urges FEMA to not only engage with,
but also to provide the necessary resources to builders, developers,
building code officials and others to enhance their knowledge of the
national model codes and acceptable and realistic mitigation
strategies. This will help to expand opportunities and improve
compliance with the construction codes and land development
requirements that will lead to enhanced resiliency in communities
across the country.
Maps
Current, accurate and scientifically sound Flood Insurance Rate
Maps (FIRMS) are essential components of the NFIP, as they are the
backbone for depicting the location of the 100-year floodplain. FEMA
has spent countless hours and federal resources to develop and maintain
its floodplain-mapping program over the last four decades. Despite
technical advances in the field and numerous efforts by Congress and
the Administration to advance public policy in the area through the
establishment of the Technical Mapping Advisory Committee (TMAC),
creation of the Map Modernization Program, or its successor FEMA's Risk
MAP Program, continuing technical and funding challenges have stymied
attempts to modernize national mapping efforts. As the maps and the
mapping process continue to evolve, there remain ongoing concerns about
how the maps are made, what information is used and depicted, and how
corrections are made. FEMA is urged to focus efforts on updating the
maps and creating and following a plan to ensure the maps are
maintained and updated on a regular basis. In doing so, the Agency must
ensure that minimum construction requirements and mapping standards
reflect the variation in flood risk across the country. Requirements
developed based on observations, data and modeling for the Gulf Coast
and Florida should not be imposed on coastal areas in the Northeast,
around the Great Lakes, or in riverine flood plains where the geography
is vastly different.
RR 2.0 Mitigation Details
FEMA has initiated a long-term effort to transform the NFIP to make
it more consumer friendly and better reflect the actual risks
properties face. Through Risk Rating 2.0, FEMA intends to create a more
accurate and fair calculation of structure-specific risks and improve
the policy application process--efforts that it hopes will compel more
property owners to purchase flood insurance.
To do so, FEMA is reassessing and recalculating the factors it
looks at when determining flood insurance rates. The shift will move
the NFIP from the current practice, which looks at risk across broad
bands associated with flood zones and categories of properties to
create an individualized picture of each property's risk. Information
used to determine the new rates will include property-specific
information, such as distance to the coast or other water sources,
exposure to different types of flood risk, and the cost to rebuild the
home, among others.
Despite this program going into effect on October 1, 2021, for new
policies and April 1, 2022, for renewals, FEMA has yet to fully
disclose the basis for premium rates to the public, such as information
about how location, elevation, and other factors are translated into
rates and has deliberately been discrete about how premiums are being
determined. Further, after repeated requests, the Agency has also
failed to share the details regarding which mitigation practices can
create policy credits, making it difficult for the nation's home
builders to take steps during the construction process to reduce rates
for future homeowners. Rate transparency is a vital component of the
program and the public's perception of it. FEMA is strongly urged to
disclose the rating factors and premium calculation methodology, along
with details about what practices may result in mitigation credits
prior to Risk Rating's full implementation.
IV. Conclusion
NAHB appreciates the opportunity to provide this statement
regarding FEMA's priorities for 2022. NAHB and its members understand
the importance of building safe, strong, and resilient communities
while also considering market-driven solutions that maintain housing
affordability. NAHB looks forward to future opportunities to discuss
how FEMA can protect homes and their occupants from severe weather
events and hazards without detrimentally impacting housing
affordability. If you have any questions or need additional
information, please contact Heather Voorman.
Statement of the Reinsurance Association of America, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Dina Titus
Chair Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit a statement for
the record for today's hearing entitled, ``FEMA Priorities for 2022:
Stakeholder Perspectives.''
The Reinsurance Association of America (RAA) is the leading trade
association of property and casualty reinsurers doing business in the
United States. RAA membership is diverse, including reinsurance
underwriters and intermediaries licensed in the U.S. and those that
conduct business on a cross border basis. The RAA represents its
members before state, federal and international bodies.
The RAA encourages the Subcommittee, full Committee, Congress, and
Administration to improve America's community resilience in the face of
climate and natural disaster risks, including the risk of flooding. The
RAA specifically recommends that legislation establish Community
Disaster Resilience Zones (CDRZ). Our CDRZ proposal would direct public
and incentivize private sector investment to help improve
infrastructure resilience, including affordable housing resilience, for
communities that are the most in need and most at risk from natural
disasters. Our CDRZ proposal is described in detail below. The RAA also
supports a long-term reauthorization of the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) and flood insurance reforms.
Climate Change and Natural Disaster Risks
The RAA's longstanding policy recognizes climate change and the
impacts of climate change, and the RAA is committed to working with
policymakers, regulators, and the scientific, academic, and business
communities to assist in promoting awareness and understanding, as well
as addressing the risks associated with climate change. A copy of the
RAA's climate change policy can be found on our website and in Appendix
A of this statement.\1\ At the federal, state, and local levels, it is
especially critical that the private sector address significant natural
disaster risks associated with floods, wildfire, earthquake, or other
devastating natural disaster events. Urgently addressing these risks is
particularly important as the frequency, severity, and costs of many
natural disasters continue to increase due to climate change.
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\1\ https://www.reinsurance.org/Advocacy/RAA_Policy_Statements/
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The U.S. Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) National Centers for Environmental Information
reported that, ``The U.S. has sustained 310 weather and climate
disasters since 1980 where overall damages/costs reached or exceeded $1
billion (including CPI adjustment to 2021). The total cost of these 310
events exceeds $2.155 trillion.'' \2\ According to NOAA, ``Each state
has been affected by at least 1 billion-dollar disaster since 1980.''
\3\ Tables 1-4, by Aon's Catastrophe Insight division, demonstrate the
increase in the number of natural disaster events and overall and
insured losses in the U.S. and globally from 1980 to 2021. In 1980, the
U.S. had 60 natural loss events that resulted in $60 billion in overall
losses, including $5 billion in insured losses, compared to 210 natural
loss events globally that resulted in $191 billion in losses, including
$8 billion in insured losses.\4\ Fast forward to 2021, and the U.S. had
96 natural loss events that resulted in $172 billion in overall losses,
including $95 billion in insured losses, compared to 401 natural loss
events globally that resulted in $353 billion in losses, including $134
billion in insured losses.\5\
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\2\ https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/
\3\ https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2010-
2019-landmark-decade-
us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate
\4\ Catastrophe Insight division, Aon plc, February 2021
\5\ Catastrophe Insight division, Aon plc, February 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Insurance is a critical component for economic and social recovery
from the effects of extreme weather and climate driven events. In the
financial services sector, property casualty insurers and reinsurers
are the most exposed to natural disasters, especially those impacted by
climate and weather. The industry would be at great financial risk if
it did not understand global and regional climate impacts, variability
and developing scientific assessment of a changing climate. Integrating
this information into the insurance sector is an essential function.
Insurance pricing also is a mechanism for conveying the consequences of
decisions about where and how we build and where people choose to live.
Our industry is science based. Blending the actuarial sciences with
the natural sciences is critical to providing the public with the
financial resources needed to recover from natural catastrophic events.
As the scientific community's knowledge of climate change continues to
develop, it is important for (re)insurers to incorporate that
information into the exposure and risk assessment process and that it
be conveyed to stakeholders, policyholders, the public and public
officials that can or should address adaptation and mitigation
alternatives. Developing an understanding about climate and its impact
on various risks--for example, wildfires, droughts, heat waves, the
frequency and intensity of tropical hurricanes, thunderstorms, and
convective events, rising sea levels and storm surge, more extreme
precipitation events and flooding--is critical to our role in
translating the interdependencies of weather, climate risk assessment
and pricing.
Climate-related and natural disaster risk exposure is broad-
ranging. These risks are widespread, geographically diverse, and
include a range of natural disaster perils impacting homeowners and
renters, property owners, servicers, mortgage investors, taxpayers, and
communities. It is important to ensure that these risk exposures are
addressed and mitigated. Natural hazard mitigation includes physical
enhancements and insurance to better protect residential properties and
other infrastructure against damage caused by natural disasters. For
government programs, government-sponsored enterprises, private sector
financial institutions, and taxpayers, financial mitigation also is
important to protect against any mortgage credit default risk
associated with natural disaster risk.
The RAA believes a variety of solutions should be used to improve
community resilience to the benefit of all those in the value chain of
climate and natural disaster risk exposure. The RAA also believes that
it is important to address geographic, natural disaster peril, and
socioeconomic diversity. Some traditional solutions, like property
insurance protections for homeowners certainly can and should be
utilized, but new analytical capabilities that increasingly and
intelligently can help reduce risk and direct resources to achieving
that goal also should be pursued.
Investing in Resilience for America's Communities is Critical, Logical,
and Smart
Dedicated federal appropriations in the form of grants are one
option but limited, and for the federal government, the costliest
mechanism to pay for resilience projects. Table 5 provides an example
of the cost to federal taxpayers to fund a $100,000 resilience project
using federal appropriations versus direct pay bonds and private
activity bonds. For fiscal year 2020, FEMA made $700 million available
for hazard mitigation grant programs but received over 1,200
applications requesting an estimated $4 billion.\6\ There is demand,
but traditional appropriation funding is inadequate.
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\6\ https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/building-resilient-
infrastructure-communities/
fy2020-subapplication-status#2020-chart
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In December 2019, the National Institute of Building Sciences
issued its U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-funded
``Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves'' report.\7\ The report describes
that federal disaster mitigation has saved $6 for every $1 invested
since 1995. Other mitigation-related activities, such as updating
building codes to ensure resilient structures, and investments can save
between $4 and $11 for every $1 spent. Investing in mitigation can
reduce the impact of future disasters on lives, property, and the
economy. Congress and the Administration can increase these investments
by directing both public and incentivizing private sector resources to
support infrastructure, including housing, resilience projects.
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\7\ https://www.nibs.org/projects/natural-hazard-mitigation-saves-
2019-report
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Reducing the impact of climate and natural disaster risk in the
first place, followed by other protections like traditional insurance
and risk transfer--particularly to benefit vulnerable homeowners and
renters in rural and urban areas--should be a top public and private-
sector priority for climate and natural disaster resilience and risk
management.
As a member of the BuildStrong Coalition, the RAA supports the
Coalition's work to further the achievements of the bipartisan
``Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018,'' which significantly increased
America's investment in pre-disaster mitigation to help communities
protect against disaster risk. The RAA specifically supports the
Coalition's objectives, including to:
Enact the ``Resilient Assistance for Mitigation for
Environmentally Resilient Infrastructure and Construction by Americans
Act,'' or the ``Resilient AMERICA Act'' (H.R. 5689), introduced by
Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Subcommittee Chair Titus, and
Subcommittee Ranking Member Webster; \8\
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\8\ https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/tandi-
leaders-introduce-bipartisan-
legislation-to-help-communities-prepare-for-and-respond-to-disasters/;
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5689/
text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A
%5B%22resilient+america+act%22%2C%22resilient%22%2C%22america%22%2C%22ac
t%22%5D
%7D&r=3&s=2
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Increase disaster mitigation funding for FEMA's Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program;
Provide incentives for state and local communities to
strengthen and enforce building codes;
Invest in risk-reducing enhancements to improve the
resilience of lifeline infrastructure;
Create incentives and investments that help to improve
resilience;
Encourage the use of American-made products for
resilience projects; and
For state, local, and tribal governments, provide
resources and eliminate barriers to enhance resiliency and protect
against all hazards.\9\
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\9\ https://buildstrongamerica.com/about-us/; https://
homeland.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2021-06-08-EPRR-HRG-Testimony-
Williams.pdf
The RAA also is a member of the SmarterSafer Coalition and supports
the Coalition's priorities for Congress in relation to infrastructure
legislation:
Enhance infrastructure-related research, including that
which pertains to climate risk, and match new findings from new
research with advanced pre-disaster mitigation plans and investment in
pre-disaster mitigation.
Invest in natural and climate resilience infrastructure
projects.
Improve infrastructure resilience in America's
floodplains, as envisioned in the ``Flood Risk Management Act'' (S.
1688), the ``Flood Resiliency and Taxpayer Savings Act'' (H.R. 481) and
the ``Built for Future Disasters Act of 2021'' (H.R. 2632); and
consider and address the racial inequities inherent in federal disaster
assistance and hazard mitigation assistance programs that reflect and
perpetuate discriminatory practices and historic redlining.
Facilitate and strengthen public-private partnerships,
such as transferring risk to private financing, insurance, and
reinsurance to shift some of the financial burdens associated with
climate change from the government's balance sheet to willing private
sector participants to improve the implementation of federal programs.
Direct federal funds to outcome-driven projects that
strengthen communities and reduce long-term risk, such as requiring
stronger minimum design standards and incorporate forecasts of future
conditions for federal infrastructure investments, as envisioned in the
``Build to Last Act'' (S.1282/H.R.2760).\10\
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\10\ https://www.smartersafer.org/about-us/;
https://www.smartersafer.org/2021/07/15/smartersafer-
infrastructure-priorities-letter/
The RAA endorsed the ``Insurers' Principles of Climate Change
Adaptation'' released by the Insurance Institute for Business & Home
Safety (IBHS), which ``outline the steps policymakers--in collaboration
with the insurance industry and other private sector stakeholders--
should take to improve the resilience of American homes, businesses,
and communities.'' Details about the Principles can be found online,
but an overview is as follows:
Principle 1: Climate Change Adaptation is Necessary;
Principle 2: Building Codes and Land Use Support
Tomorrow's Resilience;
Principle 3: Prioritize Funding for Increasing Resilience
of Existing Structures;
Principle 4: Make Resilience Available for All;
Principle 5: Leverage Climate Data and Analytics to
Support Climate Change Adaptation; and
Principle 6: Enhance Resilience for Public Infrastructure
and Facilities.\11\
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\11\ https://adaptingtoclimate.com/
The RAA also supports legislation to use the tax code to provide
homeowners and business with incentives to improve building resilience
and better protect against the natural disaster risks they face,
including:
The ``Disaster Mitigation and Tax Parity Act'' (S.2432/
H.R.4675) provisions that, like federal disaster mitigation grants,
would exempt from federal taxation state disaster mitigation grants
that help people protect their homes against windstorms, earthquakes,
or wildfires; and
The ``Strengthening Homes and Eliminating Liabilities
Through Encouraging Readiness (SHELTER) Act (S.1805/H.R.3925) to
provide individuals and businesses a disaster mitigation tax credit,
specifically 25% of qualifying mitigation expenses of up to $5,000.\12\
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\12\ https://www.cassidy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
cassidy-bennet-introduce-new-tax-credit-for-working-families-small-
businesses-preparing-for-natural-disasters-;
https://crist.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2386
FEMA's BRIC and other programs, U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development programs, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Capital Magnet Fund, and other federal programs should direct funding
resources toward achieving housing climate and natural disaster
resilience for ``extremely low- and very low-income households'' that
face significant natural disaster risk and particularly that expose
taxpayer-backed federal housing programs to climate and natural
disaster risks.\13\ In general, the RAA also recommends that the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and all of its members
prioritize climate and natural disaster resilience efforts for
federally funded and federally-backed residential properties in
communities that are the most in need and most at risk from significant
natural disaster(s).
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\13\ https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/htf/;
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/programs/cmf
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The RAA's Community Disaster Resilience Zones Proposal
Low-income and minority neighborhoods are disproportionately
impacted by natural disasters.\14\ This fact should be a priority
consideration for policymakers and the private sector as we work to
understand and address the climate and natural disaster-related risks
facing communities across America. The RAA has developed an innovative
approach to addressing climate and natural disaster resilience,
specifically to improve infrastructure resilience in the face of
natural disasters and address socio-economic disparities. The RAA urges
Congress and the Administration to include our proposal as part of
infrastructure or other legislation that may become law during the
117th Congress.
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\14\ https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/
LowIncomeResilience-2.pdf
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In general, the RAA's proposal would create a federal structure
that directs public and incentivizes private-sector funding for
resilience projects to communities most in need and most at risk from
significant natural disaster(s). More specifically, it would:
1) Address the impact of climate change through data-driven
analysis;
2) Establish Community Disaster Resilience Zones (CDRZ) for
communities most in need and most at risk from significant natural
disaster(s); and
3) Direct and incentivize public and private-sector investment in
the CDRZ to improve infrastructure resilience.
Under the proposal, CDRZ communities would be provided a menu of
funding and financing options to pay for resilience projects to better
protect them against significant natural disaster risk(s). Climate and
natural disaster resilience projects could include:
Nature-based solutions designed to increase climate and
natural disaster resilience, such as the creation of open space, the
restoration of wetlands, coastal barriers, beaches, and natural
protections;
Retrofit existing facilities to increase climate and
natural disaster resilience, including the construction of emergency
storm shelters, safe rooms, upgraded roofs, and other risk-reducing and
community-resilience enhancing actions;
Construction of new facilities with design and
construction features that provide climate and natural disaster
resilience;
Retrofit, construction, or other updates to lifeline
infrastructure, including water, electric, and communications
infrastructure, that increase the infrastructure's climate and natural
disaster resilience; and
Programs that provide funding to property owners to
retrofit existing structures, including single-family homes,
multifamily homes, and commercial buildings, with design and
construction features that provide climate and natural disaster
resilience.
The RAA's legislative proposal has a few core components to help
achieve these objectives:
I. Codify, enhance, and utilize FEMA's National Risk Index for
Natural Hazards (NRI) data to find the intersection of risk,
vulnerability, and low community resilience scores, as the basis to
identify and establish the CDRZ that reflect diversity among the states
by geography and type of peril, such as fire storm/wildfire, tornado,
hurricane, flooding, ice storms, earthquake, wind, hail, and drought.
II. Within CDRZ, coalesce a variety of funding mechanisms,
providing a menu of financing enhancements and tax incentives that can
focus federal, state, local, charitable, and private-sector investment
in resilience projects. To help fund resilience projects in CDRZ the
proposal would establish:
CDRZ taxable direct pay bonds, like Recovery Zone
Economic Development Bonds, which were one of three types of Build
America Bonds that Congress created in 2009 as part of financial crisis
economic recovery legislation (these bonds are federally subsidized
bonds issued by state and local governments for local projects that
support community resilience);
CDRZ tax-exempt facility private activity bonds
subject to a separate volume cap, like Recovery Zone Facility Bonds
(also in the 2009 recovery legislation), and provide for life and
property/casualty insurers' exclusion from proration for investments in
these CDRZ bonds (the proceeds from these federally tax-exempt bonds
would be utilized by private or quasi-governmental entities to fund
resilience projects that benefit a public purpose);
Federal transferrable tax credits for individuals for
resilience improvements to housing in CDRZ;
Federal tax credits for charitable contributions for
resilience projects in CDRZ; and
Federal tax credits for community-level projects in
CDRZ that are tradeable, transferrable, and do not expire, and allow
proceeds from the sale of certified tax credits to be used to, for
example, meet matching requirements for federally funded resilience
projects.
Limited federal funds can leverage non-federal funding if
Congress establishes a variety of options to pay for resilience
projects. Some CDRZ communities--with good credit issuer ratings and a
tax base that can support resilience projects--will be eligible to use
taxable direct pay bonds and private activity bonds. CDRZ communities--
that are unable to access the debt markets because they do not have a
tax base that can support additional borrowing or have reached their
debt limits will need Congress to provide options like transferrable
tax credits, similar to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and
charitable tax credits, versus deductions, to incentivize and direct
the business and philanthropic communities to invest and donate funds
to pay for resilience projects.
CDRZ resilience project bonds and tax credits are likely to
be very attractive to corporations, especially given the increasing
corporate focus on investing and charitable contributions to achieve
objectives related to Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)
factors. The insurance industry (property casualty, life, and health)
is one of the largest holders of bonds in the U.S. The $1.2 trillion of
$4.4 trillion in U.S. Treasury, corporate, and municipal bonds held by
the insurance industry will mature and need to be reinvested over the
next 5 years. Federal bond and tax incentives could encourage
investments toward CDRZ resilience projects.
III. Set aside and unlock federal program funding to invest in
resilience projects in CDRZ. This could include waiving, reducing, or
allowing other forms of financing, such as the proceeds from the sale
of tax credits mentioned above and in-kind and charitable donations, to
qualify for matching funds for resilience projects in CDRZ. Allowing a
variety of resources to contribute to and invest in resilience projects
in CDRZ, as they relate to federal program matching fund requirements,
could significantly unlock resources for CDRZ resilience projects. For
example, with more flexibility to meet matching fund requirements, CDRZ
resilience projects could more likely benefit from FEMA's BRIC program
funding and funding from other federal programs. FEMA, HUD, and other
federal agencies also should provide resources, such as financial and
technical assistance, to CDRZ communities to help facilitate resilience
project planning.
The RAA developed a data analytics tool and the CDRZ legislative
proposal that aligns with Congressional interests and President Biden's
plan, Executive orders, announcement, and fiscal year 2022 budget
proposal \15\ to rebuild America's infrastructure, enable green
initiatives and smart building to address the impact of climate change,
create needed jobs, fuel economic recovery, support historically
underserved communities where the need is often greatest, and provide
sources of much-needed resilience project funding to states and
localities.
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\15\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/; https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/05/20/
executive-order-on-climate-related-financial-risk/; https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/05/25/2021-11168/climate-
related-financial-risk; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
statements-releases/2021/05/24/fact-sheet-biden-administration-invests-
1-billion-to-protect-communities-families-and-businesses-before-
disaster-strikes/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/05/26/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan-will-produce-
preserve-and-retrofit-more-than-2-million-affordable-housing-units-and-
create-good-paying-jobs/; https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2021/05/budget_fy22.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RAA's data analytics tool utilizes publicly available data to
very clearly, by county, Congressional district, and census tract in
each state, understand where natural perils, older housing stock, and
disadvantaged populations converge. The data in the RAA's data
analytics tool is from FEMA's NRI supplemented with data from the U.S.
Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). NRI includes data that
identifies communities by census tract in each state and county that
are the most at risk from 18 natural hazards, such as coastal and
riverine flooding, earthquake, hail, hurricane, strong wind, tornado,
and wildfire.\16\ The NRI is different from other natural disaster risk
scoring approaches because it scores census tract level loss exposure
values (buildings, agricultural and population equivalence), social
vulnerability, and community resilience across 18 natural hazard risks,
to provide a more holistic view of risk.\17\ The RAA urges policymakers
to use the same information, particularly to understand the U.S.
landscape and pinpoint and prioritize communities that are most in need
and most at risk from significant natural disasters, diversified by
state, Congressional district, and natural disaster peril.\18\
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\16\ https://www.fema.gov/flood-maps/products-tools/national-risk-
index
\17\ https://www.fema.gov/flood-maps/products-tools/national-risk-
index/overview
\18\ https://hazards.geoplatform.gov/portal/apps/MapSeries/
index.html?appid=ddf915a24
fb24dc8863eed96bc3345f8; https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RAA's proposal was favorably mentioned during four
Congressional 2021 hearings:
March 18, 2021, House Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management hearing on ``Building Smarter: The Benefits of Investing in
Resilience and Mitigation''; \19\
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\19\ https://transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
building-smarter-the-benefits-of-investing-in-resilience-and-mitigation
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May 18, 2021, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs hearing on, ``Reauthorization of the National Flood
Insurance Program, Part I''; \20\
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\20\ https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/05/11/2021/
reauthorization-of-the-national-flood-insurance-program-part-i
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May 19, 2021, House Committee on Ways and Means hearing
on ``Leveraging the Tax Code for Infrastructure Investment'',\21\ and
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\21\ https://waysandmeans.house.gov/legislation/hearings/ways-and-
means-committee-hearing-leveraging-tax-code-infrastructure-investment
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
July 20, 2021, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs hearing on, ``21st Century Communities: Climate Change,
Resilience, and Reinsurance'' (RAA testified).\22\
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\22\ https://www.banking.senate.gov/hearings/21st-century-
communities_climate-change-resilience-and-reinsurance
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Housing Resilience
Most Federal housing programs fall under the jurisdiction of the
House Committee on Financial Services, which also has an important
leadership role to play in prioritizing and directing federal program
funding toward housing resilience, which is the third core component of
the RAA's legislative proposal mentioned above. Housing, especially
affordable housing, that can withstand the most significant disaster(s)
that vulnerable communities across the country face is an investment in
critical infrastructure. Witnesses from a variety of organizations have
raised this point in testimony delivered during Congressional hearings,
for example:
``We invest in disaster recovery and resilience work
because people of modest means are most likely to be harmed by
disasters and tend to be the slowest to recover. Through our Building
Resilient Futures initiative, we are working to ensure that
sustainable, resilient, affordable housing becomes the norm and that
communities are equipped to withstand and recover from disasters.
Despite growing interest and commitment, our housing, infrastructure,
and regions are not mitigating or adapting at the necessary pace of
change. It's time for America to invest in modern infrastructure that
is built to last.'' \23\
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\23\ https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=407532
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--Jacqueline Waggoner, Enterprise Community Partners, Inc.,
House Financial Services Committee hearing, April 14, 2021
``America built the transatlantic railroad in six years
but somehow we struggle to deliver long term housing assistance to our
most vulnerable citizens whose lives have been upended by natural
disasters.'' \24\
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\24\ https://transportation.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/
an-assessment-of-federal-recovery-efforts-from-recent-disasters
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--Reese C. May, SBP (The St. Bernard Project),
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee hearing, October
22, 2019
To that end, the RAA supports provisions in the ``Housing is
Infrastructure Act'' (H.R. 4497), which was introduced by House
Financial Services Committee Chairwoman Maxine Waters, that: prioritize
applications for the $75 billion authorized for public housing agencies
located in areas that have a plan to increase ``climate and natural
disaster resilience and water and energy efficiency,'' authorize at
least $19.1 billion for ``climate and natural disaster resilience and
water and energy efficiency'' for ten federal affordable housing
programs, and authorize at least $10.7 billion for affordable housing
in areas of high and persistent poverty. The RAA also supports the
bill's $11.9 billion authorization for the National Flood Insurance
Program's (NFIP) Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA).\25\
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\25\ https://financialservices.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=408154
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The RAA will continue to work with Chairwoman Waters on the
``Housing is Infrastructure Act'' and other legislation the House
Financial Services Committee and this Committee may consider so that it
can most impactfully help improve resilience in vulnerable communities
that are most in need and most at risk from significant natural
disaster(s).
The Protection Gap, (Re)Insurance, and the NFIP
Natural Disaster Insurance Protection Gap
Homeowners and renters, property owners, mortgage investors,
taxpayers, and communities face risks due to climate change, natural
disaster risks, and the lack of insurance coverage or underinsurance of
such coverage. There is a serious and significant natural disaster
insurance protection gap in the United States. The U.S. Department of
the Treasury's Federal Insurance Office's Federal Advisory Committee on
Insurance (FACI) has a subcommittee that is dedicated to addressing it.
Several RAA members serve on both the FACI and the ``Subcommittee on
Addressing the Protection Gap through Public-Private Partnerships and
Other Mechanisms.'' During FACI's December 2019 meeting, the
Subcommittee cited statistics to provide examples of the insurance
protection gap in the U.S. and issued recommendations that FHFA should
consider.\26\ The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) has published alarming statistics about the disaster insurance
protection gap. For example, one NAIC statistic cited in the
Subcommittee's presentation is that ``Only 1% of properties outside of
flood zones have flood insurance, yet half of U.S. floods occur in
these areas.'' Various studies and reports, including a 2018 report by
AIR Worldwide, have warned that the next big earthquake to impact
California, likely by 2044, could result in $170 billion in total
damage and almost half would be residential-related loss, $37 billion
of which would be uninsured.\27\ Given the likelihood of future,
significant, and costly natural disasters throughout the U.S. and
uninsured residential costs, it is important to have a coordinated
effort focusing on closing the insurance protection gap.
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\26\ https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/311/
December2019FACI_ProtectionGap
Presentation.pdf; https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/311/
December2019FACI_ProtectionGap
ProposedRecs.pdf
\27\ https://www.air-worldwide.com/Publications/Infographics/Who-
Will-Pay-for-the-Next-Great-California-Earthquake-/
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Congress, the Administration, the NAIC, state and local officials,
and the private sector, including reinsurers, should develop a
comprehensive strategy to identify and address the natural disaster
insurance protection gap in the U.S. and the risks it poses to
homeowners and renters, property owners, individuals, businesses, and
federal programs and taxpayers. It also is important to close the
insurance protection gap. Congress and federal regulators should help
initiate efforts to close the insurance protection gap via traditional
insurance and risk transfer. Congress and federal regulators can
further facilitate a private market for flood insurance, potentially
providing consumers with more flood insurance options. One way to
achieve this is for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and HUD's
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to align their regulations and/or
guidance for private flood insurance with those issued in 2019 by
federal lending regulators.\28\ (In 2020, HUD issued a proposed
regulation to align its regulations and guidance with that of the 2019
federal lending regulators \29\).
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\28\ https://www.fdic.gov/news/financial-institution-letters/2019/
fil19008.html
\29\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/23/2020-
25105/acceptance-of-private-flood-insurance-for-fha-insured-mortgages;
https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/
HUD_No_20_191
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Primary Insurance
Traditional insurance solutions--such as primary property insurance
protection, including earthquake, wind, fire, and flood insurance--are
critical for people, property, jobs, businesses, and communities to be
resilient in the aftermath of natural disasters. That is especially
true since federal disaster assistance is provided only when there is a
federally declared disaster and typically results in a fraction of what
insurance assistance can provide. For example, according to FEMA, in
2019, the average, annual flood insurance premium was $700 (about $58
per month), and the average claim payout was $53,000.\30\ Meanwhile, in
2019, federal disaster assistance was capped at $34,900 with an average
annual payment of $6,246.\31\ Ensuring that the protection gap is
bridged, and property insurance adequately covers the climate and
natural disaster risk(s) involved are of utmost importance. Risk
transfer products that protect each stakeholder from climate and
natural disaster risks can play an important role.
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\30\ https://www.fema.gov/data-visualization/historical-flood-risk-
and-costs
\31\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/22/2018-
22884/notice-of-maximum-amount-of-assistance-under-the-individuals-and-
households-program; FEMA communication with RAA, 4/16/2021
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Reinsurance and Risk Transfer
Reinsurance. Reinsurance is essentially insurance for insurance
companies, federal programs, and state insurance programs. It is a risk
management tool for insurance companies and government programs to
reduce the volatility in their portfolios and improve their financial
performance and security.
Reinsurance also is the primary mechanism for spreading risk
globally, thereby accessing a greater pool of capital to pay for
inevitable catastrophic losses. Consistent with the intent of Congress,
reinsurers believe the private sector can and should assume more
federal government risk. Reinsurers are willing to offer reinsurance
options to a wide variety of government programs to help manage their
exposure to losses.
Reinsurance is extensively used by the private markets to diversify
risk and protect against future losses. Reinsurance is purchased for
essentially four reasons: (1) to limit liability on specific risks; (2)
to stabilize loss experience; (3) to protect against catastrophes; and
(4) to increase capacity. Depending on the purchaser's goals, different
types of reinsurance contracts are available to bring about the desired
result. For federal programs, purchasing reinsurance would mitigate the
financial impact of any large-scale future losses and help to prevent
any future funding lags as it is pre-arranged financing for losses.
Reinsurance also allows federal programs to gain financial flexibility
and not be forced to rely on emergency federal funding in the event of
defaults that could put programs in jeopardy.
Risk Transfer. Risk transfer, including reinsurance, is a
successful solution used by both the public and private sector
including (re)insurers, financial institutions, and government
programs. In addition to federal programs, which are described below,
risk transfer also has been used by state programs, including the
California Earthquake Authority, California Wildfire Fund, Florida
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, Florida Citizens Property Insurance
Corporation. Government risk can and should be transferred voluntarily
to the private market. The use of private capital will protect
consumers, taxpayers, and communities, while spreading risk throughout
the globe to insurers and other capital providers who are willing to
assume such risk. Risk transfer will strengthen government programs by
giving them the financial flexibility to ensure they continue to remain
viable in the long term.
Benefits of Risk Transfer. Risk transfer can help both government
agencies and private businesses analyze and manage risk by providing
financing stability and reducing the impact of future losses. For a
variety of federal programs and operations, the reinsurance market has
the capacity and interest to assist the government to appropriately
manage its risk. Opportunities exist for the federal government to
benefit from the competitive market's risk management services and risk
transfer capabilities to deleverage federal program balance sheets and
simultaneously increase protections for U.S. taxpayers. Expanded
utilization of (re)insurance would reduce systemic risk by further
diversifying insurance and credit risks and by transferring more of the
enormous exposure currently borne by taxpayers, such as the mortgage
default risk to the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) following a
major U.S. earthquake. Reinsurers are poised to work with the Congress
and the Administration to expand and maximize the federal government's
utilization of the private market to the extent the industry can write
the risk.
As noted above, reinsurance is routinely utilized by insurers and
government programs to provide a crucial safety net for low frequency,
high severity natural and man-made events that result in extreme
insured losses. Insurers rely on reinsurers to assume losses for a
single event or, in many cases, for an accumulation of losses from
hurricanes, earthquakes, winter storms, wildfires, or terrorist
attacks. Some historic events illustrate this. Hurricanes Katrina, Rita
and Wilma in 2005 caused over $92 billion in insured losses, and
reinsurers bore around 28% of the losses from those events.\32\
Reinsurers assumed 55% of $41 billion in insured losses from the
terrorist events of September 11.\33\ Superstorm Sandy caused $25
billion in insured losses with reinsurers taking 30% of those
losses.\34\ The pattern of risk transfer for catastrophe-exposed
property insurance to the reinsurance market applies across the global
insured landscape as well.
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\32\ Holborn Corporation, ``Holborn Perspectives, Looking Closer At
. . . SuperStorm Sandy,'' December 12, 2012
\33\ Holborn Corporation, ``Holborn Perspectives, Looking Closer At
. . . SuperStorm Sandy,'' December 12, 2012
\34\ Holborn Corporation, ``Holborn Perspectives, Looking Closer At
. . . SuperStorm Sandy,'' December 12, 2012
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Examples of Successful Federal Government Risk Transfer Programs
Several federal government agencies already have risk transfer
programs in place. These programs highlight the ways in which risk
transfer can succeed for government agencies.
NFIP. The best example of an ongoing federal risk transfer program
is the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) NFIP Reinsurance
Program. The NFIP Reinsurance Program enables the NFIP to utilize the
private market to help manage the financial burden of the NFIP's
catastrophic flood risk by providing financial backing for the
government's flood risk, protecting taxpayers, and helping the program
to be more resilient and pay claims. In 2016, FEMA, launched its NFIP
Reinsurance Program via a pilot and, in 2017, transferred $1.042
billion of the NFIP's financial risk to 25 reinsurers, offsetting some
of NFIP's risk to the private sector in lieu of U.S. taxpayers. In the
program's first year (2017), FEMA collected from the private
reinsurance sector the full $1.042 billion to help pay the cost of NFIP
losses and claims resulting from Hurricane Harvey. This 2017 coverage,
which also improved NFIP's financial viability and protected taxpayers,
cost $150 million, and the program successfully renewed the subsequent
year. This example is a true testament of successful private public
partnerships. Following the 2017 placement, the program was renewed and
currently has reinsurance coverage through 2025. For FEMA's traditional
reinsurance placements from 2017 through February 2022 and capital
market reinsurance placements from 2018 through February 2022, FEMA has
paid a total of $1.75 billion in premium to reinsurers and the capital
markets, received $1.042 billion from reinsurers as previously
mentioned, and has up to $2.664 billion available to collect after a
qualifying 2022 loss event.\35\ The initial 2017 purchase marked key
first steps towards helping the NFIP achieve long term resilience and
financial stability and was crucial in enabling the reinsurance program
to be a long-term project. (Please see below for more detailed comments
on the NFIP).
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\35\ https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20220223/fema-expands-its-
reinsurance-program-transfers-450-million-flood-risk; https://
www.fema.gov/flood-insurance/work-with-nfip/reinsurance; https://
www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_fy-2021-q4-
watermark.pdf;
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/
FIMA_Watermark_FY19Q4.pdf;
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/fima-watermark-
2018-q4.pdf
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EXIM. The Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM) also executed a
reinsurance pilot program. In 2016, EXIM solicited risk management
analytical services regarding risk sharing structures to assess
transferring some of the risks in EXIM's portfolio to the private
market. In March 2018, EXIM announced its reinsurance pilot program,
which provided for $1 billion in loss coverage for a significant
portion of EXIM's existing portfolio of large commercial aircraft
financing transactions. EXIM stated that it was the largest public-
private risk-sharing arrangement for a U.S. government credit agency
and minimized EXIM and U.S. taxpayers' liability for potential future
losses without requiring additional funding. This purchase of
reinsurance gives EXIM protection from future losses and financial
flexibility for the future.\36\ In 2021, EXIM announced an expansion of
its risk-sharing program.\37\
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\36\ https://www.exim.gov/news/exim-bank-announces-landmark-risk-
sharing-program-private-sector-reinsurers
\37\ https://www.exim.gov/news/exim-increases-taxpayer-protections-
announcement-new-broker-partnership-aon-reinsure-portfolio
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FHFA. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) also has a credit
risk transfer program for the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs),
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in support of the U.S. housing market. FHFA
launched its credit risk transfer initiative in 2012 (when the GSEs
were in their fourth year of conservatorship) to enlist the private
sector to reduce taxpayer exposure to the GSEs' mortgage risk. In 2013,
the GSEs initiated their pilot $77 million credit risk transfer
transaction, and it has grown since then. Over 50 (re)insurers have
participated in FHFA's credit risk transfer programs and assumed U.S.
mortgage risk. From the program's 2013 inception through the fourth
quarter of 2021, the GSEs have transferred roughly $157.1 billion of
credit risk on unpaid balances of more than $5.15 trillion of single-
family mortgages through the capital markets, reinsurance, and front-
end reinsurance transactions.\38\ The GSEs purchased insurance
primarily from diversified reinsurers. These partially collateralized
transactions spread across many different reinsurers reduce risk in a
variety of ways.
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\38\ Aon plc; https://clarity.freddiemac.com/; https://
capitalmarkets.fanniemae.com/tools-applications/data-dynamics
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National Flood Insurance Program
The RAA greatly appreciates the leadership of Members of Congress
for starting a formal conversation on reauthorization of the NFIP. The
RAA has urged Congress to reauthorize NFIP and to enact flood insurance
and mitigation-related reforms. The RAA supports a long-term
reauthorization of the NFIP and reforms that:
Continue to strengthen NFIP's financial framework and
resiliency so that it can pay claims, particularly after catastrophic
events;
Remove impediments to consumer choice and confirm
consumer protections; and
Modernize the statute to give FEMA additional tools to
encourage additional private market participation, including capital,
in NFIP to benefit consumers and taxpayers.
The RAA supports the SmarterSafer and BuildStrong coalitions'
reform proposals. The RAA also supports the ``State Flood Mitigation
Revolving Fund Act'' (S.2192/H.R.1610--116th) as described in the
letter in Appendix B of this testimony.\39\
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\39\ https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/03/state-flood-
mitigation-revolving-fund-supporters-draft-3-11-2019.pdf
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Confirm Consumer Protections. Flood insurance uncertainty for
consumers, as it relates to continuous coverage and potential rate
increases by the NFIP, is an impediment to consumers buying private
flood insurance and limits consumers' choices. Insurance agents and
brokers have stated that `` . . . the risk of a substantial NFIP rate
increase should the consumer later wish to return to the NFIP often
makes insurance agents and brokers hesitant to recommend private flood
insurance policies.'' \40\ It is important that Congress and FEMA
provide consumers with clarity about continuous coverage compliance so
that current and future NFIP policyholders are confident that they have
complied with the law's continuous coverage requirements by having an
NFIP or private flood insurance policy. For example, if a consumer
leaves the NFIP to secure a private flood policy with better coverage
and a better price and later re-assumes an NFIP policy, so long as the
consumer had continuous coverage, that NFIP policy should be at the
same rate and terms as if the consumer had continuously maintained an
NFIP policy.
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\40\ https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-116-
ba00-wstate-heidrickc-20190313.pdf
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The RAA supports H.R. 4699 introduced by Representatives Kathy
Castor (D-FL) and Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO) to amend the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA) to ``consider any period during which a
property was continuously covered by private flood insurance to be a
period of continuous coverage, including for the purposes of NFIP
subsidies.'' \41\ In two previous Congresses, similar legislation had
broad bipartisan support. In 2016, by a vote of 419-0, the House passed
a similar provision as part of H.R. 2901 and, in 2017, by a vote of 58-
0, the House Financial Services Committee passed a similar provision as
part of H.R. 1422.
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\41\ https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4699/
text?q=%7B%22search
%22%3A%5B%22%22%5D%7D&r=7&s=1
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Support NFIP Reinsurance Program. The RAA supports FEMA's NFIP
Reinsurance Program and requests that it be preserved in NFIP
reauthorization and reform legislation.\42\ The RAA has long advocated
for the NFIP to utilize the private market to help manage the financial
burden of the NFIP's catastrophic flood risk by providing financial
backing for the government's flood risk, protecting taxpayers, and
helping the program to be more resilient and pay claims. In 2022, for
the sixth consecutive year, FEMA has successfully administered its NFIP
Reinsurance Program that transfers risk from the NFIP to the capital
markets, specifically through reinsurance placements and catastrophe
bond issuances.
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\42\ https://www.fema.gov/flood-insurance/work-with-nfip/
reinsurance
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Modernize 1968 NFIA Part A Authority. When enacted in 1968, over 50
years ago, the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) incorporated two
approaches to providing consumers with flood insurance, Part A and Part
B. The NFIP operates under Part B with the federal government assuming
the full underwriting risk subject to the risk transfer program
mentioned above. Congress should modernize Part A of the NFIA and
clarify that FEMA can use its authorities simultaneously with the Part
B program. Re-purposing and modernizing the statutory language in Part
A would give FEMA additional tools to partner with private insurers,
facilitate the participation of private insurers in NFIP on a risk-
sharing basis, further improve NFIP's viability, increase the NFIP's
resources to pay claims, and increase flood insurance opportunities for
consumers. Part A reforms also can lead to a stronger public-private
partnership, give private insurers experience in underwriting flood
risk, and help close the flood insurance coverage gap.
The Part A statutory language currently authorizes the FEMA
Administrator to facilitate and assist the creation of a pool of
insurers on a risk sharing basis with the federal government to provide
flood insurance through their network of agents and policyholder
relationships. Under the statute, the Administrator defines the
qualifications of insurers for the pool and risk capital to be
provided. The Administrator is authorized to enter into a contractual
relationship with the pool defining the insured risk to be retained and
the government's risk through its reinsurance of the pool. Pursuant to
the statute, the financial arrangement recognizes that the NFIP
provides subsidies to certain policyholders.
The RAA specifically recommends that NFIP reauthorization
legislation include the amendment offered to the ``National Flood
Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2019'' and withdrawn by
Representative Blaine Luetkemeyer (R-MO) during the House Financial
Services Committee's June 11-12, 2019, mark up.\43\ The amendment
language would: (1) Require FEMA to solicit ideas for risk-sharing
demonstration programs; (2) Provide FEMA with authority, but not
require it, to conduct risk-sharing demonstration programs; and (3)
Make technical amendments to the NFIA Part A authority, which FEMA can
use for risk-sharing demonstration programs.
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\43\ https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=407747;
https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=403829
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The above-mentioned reforms can further facilitate the development
of a private flood insurance market and improve the viability of NFIP.
The reinsurance market is interested and has the capacity to underwrite
flood insurance risk, including extreme flood risk, in the public NFIP
program, private market, and any future public-private flood insurance
partnerships. Actions taken in recent years by some states, such as
Florida, have demonstrated the interest and benefits of private
insurers assuming a broad cross-section of risk, and the same would
result from the above flood insurance reforms. Reinsurers stand ready
to partner with both the private- and public-sectors as the flood
market transitions.
Conclusion
The RAA looks forward to continuing to work with Chairman DeFazio,
Ranking Member Graves, Subcommittee Chair Titus, Subcommittee Ranking
Member Webster, and other members of the Committee on legislation to
improve America's infrastructure, housing, and community resilience in
the face of climate and natural disaster risks by prioritizing and
directing public and private sector resources to communities that are
the most in need and most at risk from natural disaster(s), closing the
insurance protection gap, and enacting a long-term reauthorization of
the NFIP and flood insurance reforms that facilitate the development of
a private flood insurance market. Thank you for your consideration of
our views and recommendations in this statement for the record. The RAA
and its members welcome the opportunity to meet with you about our
views and recommendations, work with you to develop CDRZ legislation,
or answer any questions you may have.
__________
Appendix A
RAA Climate Change Policy
[RAA Climate Change Policy is retained in committee files and is
available online at https://www.reinsurance.org/Advocacy/
RAA_Climate_Change_Policy/]
Appendix B
National Support for the State Flood Mitigation Revolving Fund:
as of march 8, 2019
[The document is retained in committee files and is available
online at https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/03/state-flood-
mitigation-revolving-fund-supporters-draft-3-11-2019.pdf]
Statement of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Dina Titus
On behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists' (UCS) more than
500,000 members and supporters, we are pleased to provide our
reflections on critical issues that FEMA ought to prioritize for 2022.
We thank Chairwoman Dina Titus and Ranking Member Daniel Webster and
other members of the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings and Emergency Management for allowing guest testimony on this
important topic.
Recently, UCS provided extensive comments to FEMA on a variety of
topics including minimum standards for the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP), climate and equity, the technical mapping advisory
committee (TMAC), and the BRIC and PA programs.\1\
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\1\ UCS comments on FEMA's RFI on the National Flood Insurance
Program's Floodplain Management Standards for Land Management and Use,
and an Assessment of the Program's Impact on Threatened and Endangered
Species and Their Habitats. January 27, 2022--Docket ID: FEMA-2021-
2024. www.regulations.gov/comment/FEMA-2021-0024-0357; RFI on FEMA
Programs, Regulations, and Policies, July 22, 2021. Docket ID FEMA-
2021-0011-0254. www.regulations.gov/comment/FEMA-2021-0011-0254; FEMA's
Technical Mapping Advisory Committee (TMAC) https://blog.ucsusa.org/
shana-udvardy/femas-can-now-actually-say-climate-change/; BRIC
www.regulations.gov/comment/FEMA-2019-0018-0084 and PA
www.regulations.gov/comment/FEMA-2020-0038-0089 comments.
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Those extensive comments helped to inform the nine key issues that
we believe FEMA should prioritize for 2022. These priority areas
include: 1) climate change; 2) equity and Justice40; 3) NFIP minimum
standards; 4) flood risk mapping; 5) flood risk disclosure; 6)
implementation of the Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS);
7) FEMA grant programs; 8) NFIP affordability program; and 9) federal
oversight and enforcement.
1) Climate change: Ensure the latest climate change science informs all
aspects of FEMA's portfolio especially as it relates to equity,
investments in climate resilience and disaster aid, flood risk
disclosure, mapping and NFIP minimum standards.
The second goal listed in FEMA's recently released strategic plan
is to ``Lead Whole of Community in Climate Resilience'' and the tasks
include increasing climate literacy among emergency managers, building
a climate resilient nation and empowering risk-informed decision
making.\2\ It will take a considerable amount of investment and effort
to advance each of these goals. Congress can help to ensure FEMA has
the resources and legal guidance to advance these efforts as the cost
and human toll of disasters continues to grow in response to climate-
driven increases in the frequency and/or severity of extreme weather
events and slow-onset disasters like sea level rise.
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\2\ 2022-2026 FEMA Strategic Plan: Building the FEMA our nation
needs and deserves. www.fema.gov/about/strategic-plan
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In 2021, there were twenty severe weather and climate change-
related disasters costing $1 billion or more each.\3\ The hurricanes,
tropical storms and other events caused flooding across the country,
including: $1.2 billion in damages from an atmospheric river in
California, during which 15 inches of rainfall fell in some places; up
to one foot of rainfall that swamped parts of Louisiana at a cost of
$1.4 billion; two tropical storms, Elsa and Fred, which caused a total
of $2.5 billion in damages; and two hurricanes, Ida and Nicholas, which
caused a total of $76 billion in damages.\4\
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\3\ See www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/ also see 2021 summary
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events/US/2021
\4\ NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) U.S.
Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters (2022). www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
billions/.
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The Western wildfires also were quite severe in 2021 in which more
than 58,000 wildfires burned more than 7 million acres that totaled
$10.6 billion in damages.\5\ Meanwhile, ongoing, smaller disasters or
slow-moving changes--such as sea level rise--are also worsening
climate-related risks and are not in the purview of the billion-dollar-
plus report.\6\
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\5\ National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) Wildland Fire
Summary and Statistics Annual Report 2021.
www.predictiveservices.nifc.gov/intelligence/2021_statssumm/intro_
summary21.pdf also see www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events/US/2021
\6\ Note that NOAA NCEI combines the Western drought and heatwave
and finds that together the cost totaled $8.9 billion in damages and
caused 229 deaths. NOAA NCEI notes that the deaths are associated with
the heatwave and that not all droughts are associated with heatwaves.
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events/US/2021
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Over the last few years, multiple studies have provided new data
that show how the climate change-driven trend of more frequent and
extreme precipitation events can lead to more flooding of communities
in many regions of the U.S. For example, a recent Stanford University
study found that increases in extreme rainfall in the U.S. caused $73
billion in flood damages over the last 30 years, a full third of total
flood damage costs during that timeframe and consistent with global
warming predictions.15 Anthropogenic sea level rise was also found to
have worsened flooding and added roughly $8 billion in damages to the
costs of Hurricane Sandy and extended the flood area affected to
include 71,000 additional people.\7\
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\7\ Economic damages from Hurricane Sandy attributable to sea level
rise caused by anthropogenic climate change. www.nature.com/articles/
s41467-021-22838-1
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Most of the eastern and northern parts of the U.S. have seen
increases in extreme precipitation over the last century and this trend
is projected to continue with significant increases in the frequency
and intensity of precipitation events in the winter and spring. These
trends will become even more challenging in urban areas that are
already vulnerable to flooding during heavy rainfall events given the
lack of capacity of sewer and stormwater systems that were designed
decades ago.\8\
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\8\ Maxwell, K., S. Julius, A. Grambsch, A. Kosmal, L. Larson, and
N. Sonti, 2018: Built Environment, Urban Systems, and Cities. In
Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National
Climate Assessment, Volume II [Reidmiller, D.R., C.W. Avery, D.R.
Easterling, K.E. Kunkel, K.L.M. Lewis, T.K. Maycock, and B.C. Stewart
(eds.)]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA, pp.
438-478. doi: 10.7930/NCA4.2018.CH11.
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NOAA's data on new climate normals also shows that relative to the
20th century average, much of the U.S. has experienced an increase in
total annual precipitation in recent decades. According to NOAA, `At
least some of that wetness relative to the 20th-century average is
linked to the overall climate warming and ``wetting'' of the atmosphere
that's occurred as rising temperatures cause more water to evaporate
from the ocean and land surface.\9\
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\9\ NOAA. 2021. The new U.S. Climate Normals are here. What do they
tell us about climate change? www.noaa.gov/news/new-us-climate-normals-
are-here-what-do-they-tell-us-about-climate-change
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In addition, with rising sea levels, high-tide floods are becoming
more frequent and reaching farther inland. Hundreds of U.S. coastal
communities face growing risks of chronic, disruptive flooding that
directly affects people's homes and lives, critical infrastructure, and
the economy. More than 300,000 of today's coastal homes, with a
collective market value of about $117.5 billion in 2018, are at risk of
chronic inundation in 2045--a timeframe that falls within the lifespan
of a 30-year mortgage issued today.\10\ Approximately 14,000 coastal
commercial properties, assessed at a value of roughly $18.5 billion,
are also at risk during that timeframe. The properties at risk by 2045
house 550,000 people and contribute nearly $1.5 billion toward property
tax base. While all coastal states face risks, those with the most
homes at risk by the end of the century include Florida, with about 1
million homes (more than 10% of the state's current residential
properties); New Jersey, with 250,000 homes; and New York with 143,000
homes.
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\10\ Union of Concerned Scientists. 2018. Underwater: Rising Seas,
Chronic Floods, and the Implications for US Coastal Real Estate.
www.ucsusa.org/resources/underwater
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According to the First Street Foundation there are nearly 4.3
million homes across the U.S., inland and coastal, with substantial
flood risk today that would result in financial loss. The analysis
indicates that if these homes were to be insured against flood risk
through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the rates would
need to increase 4.5 times to cover the risk today, and that the cost
of expected annual loss of properties in the next 30 years will grow by
as much as 61% due to climate change.\11\
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\11\ https://firststreet.org/press/aal_launch/
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FEMA must work aggressively to incorporate the best available
climate change science agency-wide. A bill was introduced last year
that would establish a climate change subcommittee under the National
Advisory Council to help provide support to FEMA.\12\ FEMA should
establish a climate change council under its own authority. In
coordination with the Technical Mapping Advisory Committee (TMAC) and
FEMA's National Advisory Committee,\13\ FEMA should direct the Council
to report on FEMA's existing gaps when it comes to climate change and
opportunities to incorporate climate change throughout its initiatives.
In addition to the gap analysis, FEMA ought to direct the Climate
Change Council to: 1) develop a climate adaptation handbook; 2)
establish a subcommittee on managed retreat and relocation; 3) draft
recommendations on how FEMA can address compound and cascading risks;
4) draft recommendations on how to overcome maladaptation and barriers
to adaptation; \14\ and 5) establish a subcommittee to address how FEMA
can better help local government entities plan for climate change in a
strategic, resource efficient, and comprehensive fashion.\15\
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\12\ H.R.744 and S.280 FEMA Climate Change Preparedness Act.
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/744/text?r=8&s=1
\13\ www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/risk-management/risk-
capability-assessment
\14\ The recent United Nations IPCC report noted a few barriers for
adaptation in the US including reword; ``misinformation and
politicization of climate change science has created polarization in
public and policy domains in North America Resultant public
misperception of climate risks and polarized public support for climate
actions is delaying urgent adaptation planning and implementation (high
confidence). (ES-Ch14)'' https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/
IPCC_AR6_WGII_FactSheet_NorthAmerica.pdf
\15\ The recent United Nations IPCC report noted ``Fragmented
responsibility for planning, disaster management, and mitigation and
adaptation actions hinders the development of integrated and equitable
policies (high confidence) and their implementation. While community-
level planning tailors adaptation to the local context, misalignment of
policies within and between levels of government can prevent
implementation. Coordination, planning, and national support are needed
as well as sufficient financial resources to implement climate-
resilient policies and infrastructure (high confidence). (14.7.2)''
https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGII_
FactSheet_NorthAmerica.pdf
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A climate change council under FEMA is critical given that
``Climate change impacts and risks are becoming increasingly complex
and more difficult to manage.'' The complexity encompasses multiple
geographical and governmental levels but at the forefront are the
issues around compound and cascading climate impacts. The latest IPCC
report gives particular attention to how ``multiple climate hazards
will occur simultaneously, and multiple climatic and non-climatic risks
will interact, resulting in compounding overall risk and risks
cascading across sectors and regions. Some responses to climate change
result in new impacts and risks.'' \16\
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\16\ See SPM.B.5 in IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [H.-O.
Portner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A.
Alegria, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem
(eds.)]. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Portner,
D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegria,
M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Loschke, V. Moller, A. Okem, B. Rama
(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press. https://report.ipcc.ch/
ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGII_Summary
ForPolicymakers.pdf
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2) Equity and Justice40: Advance equity and Justice40 goals across all
aspects of FEMA's portfolio.
We were pleased to see that FEMA's first goal in its 2022-2026
strategic plan is to ``Instill Equity as a Foundation of Emergency
Management.'' We know that climate change disproportionately affects
disadvantaged and marginalized communities, in part because of the
racism and discrimination long embedded in our economic, political, and
social systems.\17\ Studies find that White Americans and those with
more wealth often receive more federal dollars after a disaster than do
minorities and those with less wealth \18\ and that disaster relief in
the U.S. worsens the growing gap between White and Black wealth.\19\
President Biden's Executive Order (EO) 14008 on ``Tackling the Climate
Crisis at Home and Abroad'' notified federal agencies to better address
the needs of low-income, communities of color, and historically
disadvantaged communities to ensure an equitable economic future.\20\
The EO also tasked the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) with
developing the Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool (CEJST),
recently released in beta form. A well-designed tool supported by high-
quality data and informed by the perspectives of EJ communities will be
an excellent resource for FEMA to help ensure that 40 percent of
overall benefits of Federal investments, including FEMA investments,
are targeted towards disadvantaged communities.\21\ FEMA will need to
work creatively and swiftly to utilize the CEJST and its own Risk Index
to implement Justice40 and respond proactively to climate and other
hazards.
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\17\ See Miyuki Hino, M. and E. Nance. 2021. Five ways to ensure
flood-risk: research helps the most vulnerable, https://
media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-021-01750-0/d41586-
021-01750-0.pdf
\18\ How Federal Disaster Money Favors the Rich. www.npr.org/2019/
03/05/688786177/how-federal-disaster-money-favors-the-rich
\19\ As Disaster Costs Rise, So Does Inequality. Junia Howell,
James R. Elliott. December 4, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/
2378023118816795
\20\ Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and
Abroad, www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/02/01/2021-02177/
tackling-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad
\21\ See The Equitable and Just National Climate Platform's
February 18, 2022 press release, https://ajustclimate.org/
pressrelease.html?pId=1025
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FEMA's Flood Mitigation Assistance Program is one of the pilot
programs selected to undertake an initial implementation of the
Justice40 Interim Implementation Guidance to maximize the benefits that
are directed to disadvantaged communities.\22\ The results of this
pilot program should be made publicly available, and the lessons
learned should be applied agency wide.
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\22\ www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/M-21-28.pdf.
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FEMA must integrate its equity goals with other objectives such as
updating the minimum NFIP standards to ensure that more protective
floodplain management standards do not reinforce or exacerbate existing
challenges with safe and affordable housing, displacement and
gentrification. Raising minimum floodplain standards can leave low-
income homeowners with few options if they are unable to afford the
investments needed to mitigate flood risks. Further, our nation's
history of mortgage redlining and other forms of structural racism has
left communities of color at higher risk of being exposed to flood
risks and/or with less public investment in measures to protect against
flooding.\23\ FEMA must direct resources to these disadvantaged and
marginalized homeowners and communities based on need and in line with
Justice40 commitments, rather than relying on metrics that prioritize
the market value of properties, which tend to reinforce existing
inequities and channel investments to wealthier communities. It should
also collect and track demographic information over time to monitor
trends and ensure that Justice40 goals are being met. FEMA should work
together with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to
evaluate the impact of floodplain management measures on public housing
as well.
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\23\ Redfin. 2021. A Racist Past, a Flooded Future: www.redfin.com/
news/redlining-flood-risk/
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Finally, FEMA must also work to implement the recommendations
included in FEMA's National Advisory Committee (NAC) report on
equity.\24\ The NAC makes a critical point that FEMA provides federal
disaster assistance based on the amount of damages and not on need that
is not on those communities who have the least amount of access to
information, technology and resources making grant programs often
inaccessible to these communities. The NAC recommends that FEMA create
an equity standard by which FEMA could better assess whether the grants
increase or decrease equity over time. Another salient recommendation
by the NAC is for FEMA to establish a Native American Working Group
staffed with experts from Tribal and Indigenous communities that could
better inform FEMA on the emergency management capacity in tribal
nations. We respectfully ask that Congress follow up on FEMA's progress
on implementing the NAC recommendations and encourage FEMA to release a
NAC equity report annually.
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\24\ FEMA NAC report www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_nac-report_11-2020.pdf
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3) NFIP minimum standards: \25\ FEMA must advance the best, science-
based minimum standards to reduce flood risk while also
ensuring that these standards are informed by communities that
are hit first and worst.
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\25\ See UCS comments on FEMA's RFI on the National Flood Insurance
Program's Floodplain Management Standards for Land Management and Use,
and an Assessment of the Program's Impact on Threatened and Endangered
Species and Their Habitats. January 27, 2022--Docket ID: FEMA-2021-
2024. www.regulations.gov/comment/FEMA-2021-0024-0357
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With the establishment of NFIP in 1968, the intent of Congress was
to ensure that minimum floodplain standards incentivize local and state
governments to reduce flood risk by making science-informed decisions
about how and where they build. There are 22,000 communities in NFIP
with a total of 5 million policies that bring in $4 billion dollars in
annual revenue.\26\ While roughly 1,500 communities have adopted higher
standards through the Community Rating System (CRS),\27\ assessments of
NFIP have found that, nationwide, there is a 70% to 85% rate of
community compliance with the standards and 58% to 70% of buildings are
built in full compliance with the standards.\28\ While these
percentages are less than reassuring, the bigger picture is that the
NFIP minimum standards are inadequate to ``stop and reverse the long-
term trend toward increasing flood damage'' for several reasons that
the Association of State Floodplain Managers' (ASFPM) No Adverse Impact
(NAI) report summarizes.\29\
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\26\ See CRS. 2021. Introduction to the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP). https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R44593.pdf
\27\ See FEMA. N.D. Community Rating System. www.fema.gov/
floodplain-management/community-rating-system
\28\ Ibid at 3. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R44593.pdf
\29\ ASFPM. 2017. NAI How-to Guide for Floodplain Mapping How-to
Guide for No Adverse Impact Hazard Identification and Floodplain
Mapping. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/asfpm-library/FSC/NAI/
NAI_Hazard_ID_Mapping_2017.pdf
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These poor compliance rates are for minimum floodplain management
standards that haven't been updated for over four decades.\30\ The
delay in updating these minimum standards that only have an average
grade for compliance has only exacerbated risky land use in our
nation's floodplains.
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\30\ See Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 194, Tuesday, October 12,
2021. www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-10-12/pdf/2021-22152.pdf
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Meanwhile, human-caused climate change and long-standing
socioeconomic inequities are worsening flood risks for many
communities. We only need look at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) annual billion-dollar disasters report to know
that the nation is failing at reducing flood risk.\31\ These statistics
are not happening in a vacuum: Since FEMA first drafted the minimum
standards, the climate has changed tremendously due to anthropogenic
global warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels. Part of the
challenge is that climate change is fueling more extreme events \32\
that continue to establish new climate ``normals''.\33\ This fact only
underscores the urgency and need for FEMA to swiftly advance the best,
science-based minimum standards to reduce flood risk while also
ensuring that such standards are informed by those communities that are
hit first and worst.
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\31\ NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI)
U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters (2022).
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions
\32\ IPCC, 2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of
1.5 +C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5
+C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response
to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts
to eradicate poverty [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Portner, D.
Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-Okia, C. Pean, R.
Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E.
Lonnoy, T. Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. World
Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 32 pp. www.ipcc.ch/
sr15/chapter/spm/.
\33\ Dahl, K. 2021. New NOAA Data Shows Just How Abnormal Our
Climate Has Become https://blog.ucsusa.org/kristy-dahl/new-noaa-data-
shows-just-how-abnormal-our-climate-has-become/ and NOAA: The new U.S.
Climate Normals are here. What do they tell us about climate change?
May 4, 2021. www.noaa.gov/news/new-us-climate-normals-are-here-what-do-
they-tell-us-about-climate-change
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In addition, given the outsized role that floodplains, waterways,
and adjacent areas play in the maintenance of ecosystem services such
as water filtration, flood protection, and maintenance of biodiversity,
FEMA must work to provide regulatory and nonregulatory incentives to
protect these areas. Moreover, many of those areas act as buffers from
climate change impacts such as increasing temperatures and spatial
deterioration, protecting essential habitat and ecosystem structure and
function, and species themselves--including those that are not
threatened or endangered, and should remain so. To ensure the
continuity of ecosystem services, the protection of species and
biodiversity, and the maintenance of existing wildlife habitat, FEMA
must take action to prevent negative impacts on natural processes.
4) Flood Risk Mapping: FEMA must advance regulatory and nonregulatory
mapping that is informed by the latest climate science.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that, while FEMA
has increased the development of its regulatory Flood Insurance Rate
Maps (FIRMs) and other non-regulatory flood risk products through its
Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program, it has many
hurdles to ensure that these products ``reflect current and future
flood hazards.'' \34\ GAO notes that the flood risk products fail to
include heavy rainfall and the best available climate science, and that
FEMA does not have an updated plan to meet the new timeframes, goals,
and performance measures. It's been ten years since the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 that directed FEMA, with the
assistance of the Technical Mapping Advisory Committee (TMAC), to use
the best available climate science to update the FIRMs, including an
assessment of the impact of future changes in sea levels, precipitation
and intensity of hurricanes, and of future development on flood
risk.\35\
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\34\ GAO. 2021. FEMA Flood Maps: Better Planning and Analysis
Needed to Address Current and Future Flood Hazards. www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-22-104079.pdf
\35\ Ibid.
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FEMA must provide regulatory and nonregulatory/advisory map
products that are based on the latest climate change science and future
conditions, so that communities, homeowners, and potential home buyers
understand their actual current and future flood risk and so that local
governments have the support from the federal government in
implementing higher minimum NFIP standards. While we recognize that
mapping future conditions for riverine areas will be more challenging
than for coastal communities, FEMA has abundant resources to advance
this process including its own Technical Mapping Advisory Committee
(TMAC), other federal agency data and staff through the Flood
Resilience Interagency Working Group (IWG), and other methodologies and
models in the public and private sectors.\36\
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\36\ UVM. 2022. Vermont Flood Costs Could Exceed $5.2 Billion.
www.uvm.edu/news/gund/vermont-flood-costs-could-exceed-52-billion also
see https://firststreet.org/flood-factor/
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In 2019 FEMA established the Future of Flood Risk Data (FFRD)
program to help provide more flood risk data than what is in the FIRMs
and to transition towards a mapping product that shows graduated risk
instead of their dated binary approach.\37\ FEMA must use this new FFRD
program to swiftly advance GAO's recommendations as well as provide
advisory layers that reflect future flooding based on climate change
projections for both coastal and riverine areas as feasible.
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\37\ GAO. 2021. FEMA Flood Maps: Better Planning and Analysis
Needed to Address Current and Future Flood Hazards. www.gao.gov/assets/
gao-22-104079.pdf
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Regarding TMAC, FEMA and Congress must ensure that this technical
expert group is incentivized to be bold in its recommendations when it
comes to the committee's work on future conditions. As mentioned above,
the nation is already reeling from back-to-back disasters and extreme
weather events, many of which include flooding. TMAC must lean in on
climate science and on the work by the U.S. Global Change Research
Program's (USGCRP) National Climate Assessments (NCA). Specifically,
TMAC must be encouraged to advance its work on future conditions of
riverine flooding and on developing and advancing equity as a key goal.
TMAC can better ensure its work is more equitable by expanding its
outreach to stakeholders by conducting webinars and other approaches.
We respectfully ask that Congress follow up on FEMA's progress on
their implementation of TMAC recommendations to ensure these important
advances in mapping are happening in a timely fashion and appropriate
ample funding to FEMA to rapidly advance its mapping efforts.
5) Flood risk disclosure: FEMA must improve the public's understanding
of flood risk by implementing regulatory and nonregulatory
flood risk disclosure measures so that potential buyers and
renters understand the risk they're buying into.
Congress and FEMA must work in concert to improve flood risk
disclosure. Ideally, a flood risk disclosure policy provision would be
included in the next reauthorization of the NFIP. Bills such as H.R.
5256, H.R. 5802 and previous NFIP reauthorization bills have flood risk
disclosure policies that could be advanced.\38\
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\38\ See H.R. 5256 www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5256/BILLS-
117hr5256ih.pdf at Section 1328. Disclosure of flood risk information
prior to transfer of property. Also see H.R.5802 (and companion bill
s.3128). www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5802/bills-117hr5802ih.pdf
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However, FEMA could also advance flood risk disclosure as it works
to update the decades old NFIP minimum standards. For example, FEMA
could:
establish flood risk disclosures for sellers and lessors
as a condition of participation in the NFIP. These flood risk
disclosures must include all past flooding events and damages
(including claims and disaster assistance data) from these events and
future projections of flooding due to climate change or planned
development. For coastal flooding, UCS developed the ``Know Your Risk''
guide for potential homebuyers that speaks to the many different
important questions one ought to ask before purchasing a home.\39\ The
unfortunate reality is that the FIRMs are out of date and do not
reflect actual risk, never mind the future risk due to climate change.
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\39\ UCS. 2018. Know Your Risk: A Home-Buyer's Guide to Asking
Smart Questions about Tidal Flooding. www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
files/attach/2018/06/know-your-risk-brochure-LDF.pdf
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establish flood risk disclosures for dams and levees.
People may be unaware that they live downstream of a dam or levee and
therefore do not understand the risk they face or the evacuation
procedures if either structure should fail. Future home and business
buyers looking to purchase a property below a dam or adjacent to a
levee have the right to know the risk they are buying into. Dams \40\
and levees have several things in common, including that they are aging
and are costly to fix, they are not adequately regulated, and climate
change is pushing the limits of the design life cycle of both. The
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 required that FEMA
coordinate with the Technical Mapping Advisory Committee (TMAC) to
incorporate ``residual risk'' of areas that are protected by levees,
dams, and other flood control structures, as well as the level of
protection provided by those structures, on NFIP flood maps. In TMAC's
2016 report, the authors provided an overview of the many challenges
and issues needing attention on this front, including the lack of
public access to dam failure inundation information.\41\ Not mapping
dam or levee failure inundation areas can have major consequences such
as more development downstream, thereby turning a once low hazard
structure into a high hazard structure and putting even more people at
risk. FEMA must ensure that all aspects of dam and levee safety data
are publicly available, including inspections, emergency action plans,
and perhaps most importantly, inundation maps.
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\40\ CRS. 2019. Dam Safety Overview and the Federal Role. https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45981
\41\ FEMA. 2016. Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC) Annual
Report. www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
fema_tmac_2016_annual_report.pdf
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6) Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS) implementation: FEMA
must implement the FFRMS throughout its programs.
President Biden's Executive Order 14008 reinstated the Federal
Flood Risk Management Standard, (FFRMS), which directs all agencies to
ensure that any federal taxpayer-funded activities be designed and
constructed to be protected from future-expected flood conditions. FEMA
must implement the FFRMS so that projects are designed with a higher
margin of safety against flooding. FEMA can look to the Flood
Resilience Interagency Working Group (IWG) for support on this
front.\42\
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\42\ White House. 2021. Readout of the First White House Flood
Resilience Interagency Working Group Meeting on Implementation of the
Federal Flood Risk Management Standard. www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/news-
updates/2021/08/27/readout-of-the-first-white-house-flood-resilience-
interagency-working-group-meeting-on-implementation-of-the-federal-
flood-risk-management-standard/.
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7) FEMA grant programs:
We thank the Transportation and Infrastructure (T&I) Committee for
introducing the bipartisan Resilient Assistance for Mitigation for
Environmentally Resilient Infrastructure and Construction by Americans
Act, (Resilient AMERICA Act) which will strengthen FEMA's disaster
mitigation and resilience programs. In particular, we are very
appreciative of the committee's leadership to increase the Disaster
Relief Fund (DRF) set aside from 6 percent to 15 percent.
Regarding the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities
(BRIC) program, we would like FEMA to incorporate additional criteria
that would better emphasize smaller flood resilience projects, target
resources to those communities that need it most, and increase
resources for technical assistance and planning.
Regarding wildfire assistance we look forward to FEMA efforts to
develop and update its policies, and training to improve response and
recovery from large-scale and severe wildfires in the future.\43\
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\43\ See GAO. 2022. FEMA Opportunities to Help Address Mission and
Management Challenges www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105786
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As mentioned earlier, FEMA can improve its grant programs by
ensuring they are more equitable, that is, that resources are targeted
to those communities who need it most. FEMA will need to work swiftly
to adopt the Justic40 goal. FEMA could adopt a two-fold process by
first using a screening tool to help identify communities and second by
targeting technical assistance to these communities to help them submit
eligible and successful BRIC applications for example. To help identify
communities, FEMA can use its own Resilience Analysis and Planning Tool
(RAPT) (which provides resilience indicators at three geographic
scales, county, census tract, and tribal territory) in concert with the
Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool.\44\
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\44\ Climate and Economic Justice Screening Tool https://
screeningtool.geoplatform.gov/en/
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Given FEMA's staff shortages and other challenges related to
endless disasters, we encourage Congress to provide FEMA with the
resources it needs to address the multiple recommendations by GAO.\45\
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\45\ GAO. 2022. FEMA Opportunities to Help Address Mission and
Management Challenges www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105786
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8) Flood insurance affordability: Congress must work in concert with
FEMA to establish a flood insurance affordability program.
FEMA's new Risk Rating 2.0 (RR 2.0) flood insurance pricing system
better reflects the actual flood risk of a specific property but will
mean that roughly 77% of policyholders will see increases in their
premiums as RR2.0 rolls out. People with low to moderate incomes living
in the nation's floodplains are less likely to be able to afford flood
insurance and those without flood insurance will have less resources to
recover after a disaster. President Biden proposed investing $358
million in fiscal year 2022 to help people with low incomes purchase
flood insurance and to increase risk mitigation measures to reduce
flood damages.\46\ FEMA and Congress must work to leverage options to
reduce the cost burden to policy holders, especially those who are
least able to afford the premiums. Among others, over the last few
years, studies by FEMA,\47\ the Government Accountability Office,\48\
the National Academy of Sciences,\49\ and, most recently, the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) \50\ have provided analysis on
different options for creating means-tested affordability program under
NFIP. Current and past bills also have policy provisions that could be
advanced in the next reauthorization of NFIP.\51\
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\46\ See Frank, T. 2021. Biden Budget Includes Plan to Help Poor
Buy Flood Insurance, www.scientificamerican.com/article/biden-budget-
includes-plan-to-help-poor-buy-flood-insurance/
\47\ www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1524056945852-
e8db76c696cf3b7f6209e1adc4211af4/Affordability.pdf
\48\ GAO. 2016. National Flood Insurance Program: Options for
providing affordability Assistance www.gao.gov/assets/680/675132.pdf
\49\ NAS Report 1: www.nap.edu/catalog/21709/affordability-of-
national-flood-insurance-program-premiums-report-1 and NAS Report 2:
www.nap.edu/catalog/21848/affordability-of-national-flood-insurance-
program-premiums-report-2
\50\ https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47000
\51\ See section 103. Targeted means-tested assistance in HR 5802
(and companion bill S.3128). www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr5802/BILLS-
117hr5802ih.pdf
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FEMA and Congress ought to move swiftly to advance the
establishment of a flood insurance affordability program to reduce the
cost burdens on those that are least able to afford flood insurance.
Such a program ought to incentivize mitigation measures as well to
further reduce the cost burden and increase resilience to the next
flood. Reducing the cost burden of flood insurance would have many
benefits to homeowners and community and federal governments, and would
help to meet the Administration's intent of the Justice40 goal.
9) Federal oversight and enforcement: FEMA must improve its enforcement
of NFIP minimum standards.
Over the years, analyses have shown that FEMA has been challenged
with ensuring communities' compliance with the minimum NFIP standards.
FEMA assesses a community's compliance through Community Assessment
Visits or ``CAVs.'' GAO's comprehensive study of FEMA's enforcement of
the minimum standards found that some high-risk communities were not
visited between 2008 and 2019 and that many were only visited one
time.\52\
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\52\ GAO. 2020. National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve
Community Oversight and Data Sharing. www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-396.
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A recent New York Times investigative report found that many local
governments continue to fail to enforce basic floodplain management
regulations. The report, based on an analysis by researchers at
University of California, Davis, shows that many local governments do
not appear to be meeting one of the basic minimum standards required to
maintain their NFIP status: that the ground floor of every new or
repaired building be at least as high as the maximum height expected of
a major flood.\53\ The study found that a quarter of a million
insurance policies in these communities are in violation of the NFIP
requirements and this breach in compliance over the last decade has
come at a $1 billion cost to federal taxpayers.
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\53\ NYT. 2021. ``Cities Are Flouting Flood Rules. The Cost: $1
Billion,'' by Christopher Flavelle and John Schwartz www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/09/climate/fema-flood-insurance.html
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Revised minimum standards will mean nothing if there is not
adequate federal oversight of FEMA and the agency's enforcement of
these standards.
FEMA will need to address the outstanding compliance issues in
multiple ways, including ensuring there are more trained staff and
resources to do the work, there is better data sharing between FEMA and
the communities, and that the CAVs are up to date and completed.\54\
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\54\ Ibid, at 44.
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In closing
Thank you for considering the nine issues we believe FEMA ought to
prioritize in 2022. As the subcommittee advances recommendations for
FEMA, UCS looks forward to being a resource. Please do not hesitate to
contact us with any questions the subcommittee may have by reaching out
to Shana Udvardy or Todd Wolf.
Statements from 10 Stakeholder Organizations, Submitted for the Record
by Hon. Dina Titus
Statements from the following 10 organizations are retained in
committee files and are available online at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/PW/PW13/20220216/114401/HHRG-117-PW13-20220216-SD002.pdf:
1. Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc.
2. BuildStrong Coalition
3. International Association of Fire Chiefs
4. National League of Cities
5. National Low Income Housing Coalition
6. Natural Resources Defense Council
7. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
8. The Pew Charitable Trusts
9. The Refuge Resource Group
10. SmarterSafer Coalition
Appendix
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Question from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Erica Bornemann, Director,
Vermont Emergency Management, on behalf of the National Emergency
Management Association
Question 1. How would you propose to streamline federal and state
emergency collaboration by using a state-by-state approach, while still
ensuring that FEMA grants achieve our racial equity goals?
Answer. This question relates to comments made during the hearing
and points made about giving states funding tools to be able to build
capacity in their recovery and mitigation programs. For example,
allowing for the rollover of management costs from disaster to disaster
will institute stability in the programs and allow them the room to
focus efforts on reaching populations historically underserved,
marginalized, or disadvantaged. Furthermore, outreach to these
communities is key to establishing trusting relationships that allow
greater access to programs meant to help survivors receive assistance
expeditiously. Such outreach, however, must be tailored within each
state as they know their populations best.
The emergency management profession is routinely asked to do more
with the same or less resources. If we want to promote progress in
addressing racial justice, marginalized, and underserved populations
with the issues those groups face in disaster response and recovery, we
must invest in programs with those specific goals in mind. Congress
should consider designating certain funding opportunities and expanding
eligibility for existing programs that will boost aid to address needs,
whether that be in the management rollover costs, or other grant funds.
Furthermore, processes should be simplified for programs such as the
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMPG) where long timelines exacerbate
impacts to communities that most need to break the cycles of disaster.
By making some of these modest adjustments, emergency managers will
have the tools to address populations that have been underserved,
marginalized, as well as affected by racial inequality. This is a more
equitable approach versus existing one-size-fits-all solutions.