[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF THE JANUARY 6TH CAPITOL ATTACK: ONGOING REVIEW OF THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE INSPECTOR GENERAL FLASH REPORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 17, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on the Internet:
http://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-administration
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-775 WASHINGTON : 2022
ZOE LOFGREN, California, Chairperson
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois,
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina Ranking Member
PETE AGUILAR, California BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
MARY GAY SCANLON, Pennsylvania BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin
TERESA LEGER FERNANDEZ, New Mexico
CONTENTS
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FEBRUARY 17, 2022
Page
Oversight of the January 6th Capitol Attack: Ongoing Review of
the United States Capitol Police Inspector General Flash
Reports........................................................ 1
OPENING STATEMENTS
Chairperson Zoe Lofgren.......................................... 1
Prepared statement of Chairperson Lofgren.................... 4
Hon. Rodney L. Davis, Ranking Member............................. 6
Prepared statement of Mr. Davis.............................. 8
WITNESSES
Hon. Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States Capitol
Police......................................................... 11
Prepared statement of Mr. Bolton............................. 14
Daniel Schuman, Policy Director, Demand Progress Education Fund.. 18
Prepared statement of Mr. Schuman............................ 20
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
Hon. Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States Capitol
Police, responses.............................................. 45
Daniel Schuman, Policy Director, Demand Progress Education Fund,
responses...................................................... 56
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
September 1, 2021, Ida A. Brudnick, Architect of the Capitol:
Evolution and Implementation of the Appointment Procedure,
submission..................................................... 63
February 11, 2021, Demand Progress, Recommendations for the
FY2022 Appropriations Security Supplemental, submission........ 81
February 2022, Government Accountability Office, The Capitol
Police Need Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive
Security Risk Assessment Process, submission................... 90
February 2017, Government Accountability Office, Fully
Incorporating Leading Governance Practices Would Help Enhance
Accountability, Transparency, and External Communication,
submission..................................................... 158
February 22, 2021, The Intercept, FBI Seized Congressional
Cellphone Records Related to Capitol Attack, submission........ 216
January 9, 2021, Washington Monthly, Daniel Schuman and Amelia
Strauss, A Primer on the Capitol Police: What We Know From Two
Years of Research, submission.................................. 221
December 9, 2021, Politico, Lawyer: Capitol Police whistleblowers
face retaliation, submission................................... 225
OVERSIGHT OF THE JANUARY 6TH CAPITOL ATTACK: ONGOING REVIEW OF THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE INSPECTOR GENERAL FLASH REPORTS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2022
House of Representatives,
Committee on House Administration,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Zoe Lofgren [Chairperson of the Committee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Lofgren, Raskin, Butterfield,
Aguilar, Scanlon, Leger Fernandez, Davis, Loudermilk, and
Steil.
Staff Present: Jamie Fleet, Democratic Staff Director;
Khalil Abboud, Deputy Democratic Staff Director; Sean Jones,
Legislative Clerk and Professional Staff; Peter Whippy,
Communications Director; Daniel Taylor, General Counsel; Eddie
Flaherty, Chief Clerk; Aaron LaSure, Professional Staff; Becky
Cornell, Chief of Staff, Rep. Aguilar; Tim Monahan, Minority
Staff Director; Caleb Hays, Minority General Counsel and Deputy
Staff Director; Gineen Bresso, Minority Special Counsel; Nick
Crocker, Minority Deputy Staff Director; and Rachel Collins,
Minority Professional Staff.
The Chairperson. The Committee on House Administration will
come to order, a quorum being present.
I want to say hello to everyone. As we begin, I want to
note that we are holding this hearing in compliance with the
regulations for Remote Committee Proceedings pursuant to House
Resolution 8.
Generally, we ask Committee Members and witnesses to keep
their microphones muted when not speaking to limit background
noise. Members will need to unmute themselves when seeking
recognition or when recognized for their five minutes of
questions. Witnesses also need to mute themselves and will have
to unmute when they give their testimony or answer questions.
The rules require that Members always keep their cameras on
at all times, and also the rules prohibit Members from
participating in more than one remote hearing at the same time.
At this time, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have
five legislative days in which to revise and extend their
remarks and have any written statements be made part of the
record and, without objection, that is so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent the chair be authorized to
declare a recess of the Committee at any point, and, without
objection, that is ordered.
Today's hearing represents both a culmination and a
continuation. First, this is a culmination of the admirable
work performed by Inspector General Michael Bolton and his team
regarding the U.S. Capitol Police Department's preparation for
and response to the January 6th Capitol attack.
The focus of today's hearing is the final four flash
reports in the series of eight flash reports released by
Inspector General Bolton. All eight of these flash reports
reveal systematic deficiencies throughout the U.S. Capitol
Police Department in the areas of training, planning, policies,
and procedures, intelligence, communication, and leadership,
and culture.
Three of the four flash reports that are the focus of
today's hearing reveal these same deficiencies across the
department's Command and Coordination Bureau, Hazardous
Incident Response Division, and K-9 Unit and Dignitary
Protection Division.
In these flash reports, we learn of the general lack of
coordination and communication between these units and the
Department's operational leadership, outdated and in some cases
nonexistent emergency management policies and procedures, and a
lack of personnel and equipment that made it difficult for
these units to accomplish their missions. We also learn of the
frustration officers within the Department feel with the lack
of direction from the Department's chain of command, a lack of
preparedness, and a lack of confidence in the Department's
command and control system, among other things.
The final flash report in this series is a comprehensive
review of the Department's progress in implementing the
recommendations put forth in the seven previous flash reports
and the 1-6 Task Force Capitol Security Review. From this flash
report, we learn the Department has only implemented 29 percent
of the recommendations made by the Department Inspector General
and only a portion of those made by the 1-6 Task Force.
In addition to being a culmination of the Inspector
General's first phase of work on this topic, this hearing is
also a continuation. The Inspector General and his team will
continue their work homing in to focus and follow up on issues
their flash reports have revealed.
Likewise, this Committee will continue its oversight of the
Capitol Police and its performance in response to the
catastrophic and traumatic events of January 6th. This hearing
will be the sixth that this Committee has held directly related
to January 6th, and that does not include the oversight hearing
we held on the Capitol Police Board.
This hearing offers an opportunity to not only consider
where we go from here but to reflect upon the falsehoods and
dangerous rhetoric that brought us here in the first place. We
can't forget that what we saw on January 6th was started by a
lie, a lie from a disgruntled former President and repeated by
many in the media and across the aisle, that the safest and
most secure election in American history was stolen and that
its results were illegitimate. Motivated by that lie, violent
insurrectionists wielding weapons and restraints stormed the
Capitol, intending to do harm to those who work in this place
and to disrupt, if not destroy, the democratic process.
Yes, the focus of today's hearing is the U.S. Capitol
Police and the many deficiencies that prevented the Department
from adequately planning for and responding to the violence
that occurred on January 6th. It is impossible to overstate the
importance of that discourse, and it is appropriate that this
Committee has taken the lead in facilitating that discourse.
However, a fire cannot start without a spark, and we would be
doing a disservice to ourselves and to the American people if
we do not here now and always acknowledge the spark that lit
the fire we witnessed on January 6th.
To be clear, as I have said at our previous hearings,
although today's focus is on the performance of the Capitol
Police before and during the attack, the attack was motivated
and carried out by others, and our important and necessary
review of the Department's performance as an institution and
its leadership does not diminish the courage and valor of the
men and women who fought so bravely to defend the Capitol and
the Constitution on that January 6th. More than 140 law
enforcement officers were injured that day, many grievously.
Some have not been able to return to full duty because of their
injuries. We have a responsibility to those brave officers and
to the public to conduct thorough oversight to ensure that they
have the right training, equipment, leadership to do their jobs
safely and to return to their families each day.
With that, I would now like to recognize our Ranking
Member, Mr. Davis, for any comments he may like to make.
[The statement of The Chairperson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
Thanks to our witnesses, Mr. Bolton, and Mr. Schuman, for
joining us today. I look forward to continuing our past
hearings' discussions on the dire need for the increased
transparency and accountability by Speaker Pelosi, the Capitol
Police Board, leadership, and Capitol security overall.
Mr. Bolton, this week you received a letter from Republican
Members of this Committee addressing numerous concerns that
Members have that we have raised regarding practices and clear
breaches of trust by Capitol Police leadership: the
magnetometers outside of the Chamber that serve no security
purpose and address no known internal threat, the incident in
November when officers entered a Member's office, took photos
of legislative planning materials, and subsequently opened an
investigation into that office's legislative work, and others.
Even beyond the increased scrutiny of Members, Politico
reported last month that the Capitol Police's Intelligence
Division is now conducting extensive background checks on
Americans visiting their Representatives. Capitol Police's
leadership and their response to these instances of gross
misconduct and clear threats on American civil liberties, as
well as the Department's leadership failure to implement the
majority of the Inspector General's recommendations, have done
little to rebuild trust within the congressional community.
It is imperative that the Inspector General's Office
continue to investigate the intelligence failures in the
buildup to January 6th. Over the past year, it has become clear
that Democratic leadership has abdicated its security oversight
responsibilities, choosing not to learn lessons from the 1998
attack, the tragic 2011 shooting in Arizona, or the attack on
my friends and I at a baseball field down the road from here in
2017.
Mr. Bolton's office has made numerous recommendations to
Capitol Police leadership to improve the security posture at
the Capitol. It is imperative that the full number of security
recommendations be implemented quickly and with the cooperation
of both Capitol Police leadership and the Capitol Police Board.
Just today, the Government Accountability Office released a
report on lack of security preparedness by Capitol Police
leadership and the Capitol Police Board on January 6th, for
which I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record, Madam
Chairperson.
The Chairperson. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Davis. The GAO found that the U.S. Capitol Police's
planning for January 6, 2021, did not reflect the potential for
extreme violence aimed at the Capitol and did not include
contingencies for support from other agencies.
Of course, the Republican Members of this Committee have
been driving home this point for over a year now. Why was the
Capitol security apparatus so unprepared? Part of the answer to
that question is also addressed by the GAO, which explains that
the Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police.
As we know, the Capitol Police Board is made up of
political appointees answerable to congressional leadership,
including Speaker Pelosi, no matter how many times she tries to
duck her responsibility in the press. GAO's report tells us
that while the Capitol Police make security recommendations, it
does not have the authority to implement them without Board
approval, and the Board has no process in place to do review
and approve such recommendations.
The GAO concludes, without a comprehensive documented
process to assess and mitigate risks, there is no assurance
that the Capitol Police and the Board are not overlooking
potential security risks. In other words, even after decades of
attacks, the Capitol is no better prepared today than it was on
January 6th. And that failure rests squarely on the shoulders
of Speaker Pelosi, Capitol Police leadership, and the Capitol
Police Board.
I am thankful that the Chairperson has called this
important hearing because Americans and Members alike deserve
answers. I hope today provides an opportunity for Mr. Bolton to
give assurances that his office will investigate these matters
vigorously.
Our men and women who are in the Capitol Police, they place
their lives on the line every day, as the protectors of
Congress. Their mission is vital for Congress to continue
functioning on behalf of the American people. But that mission
is undermined when the leadership of the Capitol security
apparatus chooses to enact policies that are potentially
politically motivated or infringe on the civil liberties of
those who work in and visit our Nation's Capitol.
Let me remind everyone on this call and on this hearing
today that neither Mr. Loudermilk nor I would likely be here
alive without the brave Capitol Police officers who ran toward
gunfire so that we could run away from gunfire. We owe those
heroes our lives. It is the leadership that needs to be held
accountable for the decisions that they must follow and live
with in their daily operations and their daily workday.
I hope Mr. Bolton understands the gravity of the situation
at hand. I know he works directly for the Capitol Police Board,
but, Mr. Bolton, we hope you will commit to keeping all Members
of this Committee informed of your investigations as they
unfold.
Madam Chairperson, I yield back.
[The statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
I just, before recognizing our Inspector General, would
note for the record that, on January 6, 2020, the Capitol
Police Board was made up of the Sergeant at Arms of the House
and Senate and the Architect of the Capitol; the Architect
appointed by President Trump, the Sergeant in the Senate by
Mitch McConnell, and the Sergeant in the House by John Boehner.
The leadership of the Senate was Mitch McConnell and, of
course, Speaker Pelosi in the House.
I now have the immense pleasure of introducing our
witnesses. Inspector General Michael A. Bolton, of course, is
no stranger to this Committee, having testified before us
several times about his office's previous flash reports.
Inspector General Bolton assumed this role in January 2019.
Prior to this role, he served as Acting Inspector General and
Assistant Inspector General for investigations, beginning in
August 2006. We are grateful to Inspector General Bolton for
his presence here today and for his long career in public
service.
Inspector General Bolton is joined by Daniel Schuman of
Demand Progress, an organization that advocates for government
transparency, accountability, ethics, and reform. Among other
topics, Mr. Schuman has studied and written about the U.S.
Capitol Police for several years, including before the January
6th attack.
He also created the First Branch Forecast, a website that
contains in-depth research on Congress and produces a weekly
newsletter. Mr. Schuman has testified before Congress several
times, but this is the first time he is testifying before this
Committee. We welcome him and thank him for his shared interest
in improving the Legislative Branch.
I will remind the witnesses that their entire written
statements will be made part of the record and that the record
will remain open for at least five additional days for material
to be submitted. We ask that you summarize your testimony in
five minutes.
Inspector General Bolton, it is my pleasure to recognize
you first for your testimony.
STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL A. BOLTON, INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED
STATES CAPITOL POLICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND DANIEL SCHUMAN,
POLICY DIRECTOR, DEMAND PROGRESS EDUCATION FUND.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. BOLTON
Mr. Bolton. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairperson Lofgren,
Ranking Member Davis, and distinguished Members of the
Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you,
the Committee on House Administration, to discuss our review of
events in regard to the Capitol Police Department operation,
programs, policies that were in effect during January 6, 2021.
I would like to extend my appreciation to the Committee for
holding this hearing and the important work that this Committee
continues to do to make the Capitol complex safe and secure.
I would also like to take the time to extend and recognize
the outstanding efforts and work done by my staff in the Office
of the Inspector General. Through their collective efforts and
skills, we have produced eight flash reports outlining areas of
improvement for the Department, resulting in 104
recommendations. Our last and final flash report is a summary
of the status of the recommendations we have made and security
improvements that the Department has made since January 6th.
Although the Department has addressed some of our
recommendations and has made security improvements throughout
the Capitol complex, much work still needs to be addressed in
relation to training, intelligence, cultural change, and
operational planning. We have issued that final flash report
outlining the status of our recommendations.
During my testimony with the Senate Rules Committee on
December 7th of 2021, I stated that the Department had closed
30 of my recommendations. Since that time, the Department has
closed an additional nine recommendations, for a total of 39.
During--from my last hearing, we have issued three
additional flash reports, not including the final one. Those
included areas of the department such as Command and
Coordination Bureau, Hazardous Incident Response Division, K-9
Unit, and, finally, Dignitary Protection Division and Human
Capital.
Our fifth flash report is designed to communicate
deficiencies within the Department's Command and Coordination
Bureau. Additionally, to gain a perspective on department-wide
command and control challenges on January 6th, we contacted 86
Capitol Police officers and completed interviews with 36 of
them, who agreed to be interviewed. We also reviewed 49 after-
action reports by the officers and employees that were
completed.
Based on our interviews with the officers and review of the
after-action reports, we identified department-wide command and
control deficiencies related to information sharing, chain-of-
command directions, communication, preparedness, training,
leadership development, emergency response procedures, and law
enforcement coordination.
Our sixth flash report was designed to communicate
deficiencies within the department's Hazardous Incident
Response Division and the K-9 Unit. Deficiencies include a lack
of adequate department guidance for both the Incident Response
Division and the K-9 Unit. The Department did not always comply
with guidance related to K-9 operations or training, did not
always ensure K-9 policies and procedures were up to date. A
lack of K-9-related training or operational experience required
for officials and formal guidance for emergency procedures, as
well as inadequate hazardous device response guidance, could
have hampered the efficiency of the K-9 Unit.
Our seventh flash report was designed to communicate any
deficiencies within the Department's Dignitary Protection
Division and Human Capital. The Dignitary Protection Division
contributed toward the Department's mission through proper
planning and successfully evacuating individuals under its
protection during the events of January 6th. However, DPD
incurred authorization issues with staging evacuation vehicles.
Additionally, DPD's training program lacked a dedicated
training staff, facilities, and weapon systems training
integration.
Capitol Police could not provide documentation supporting
that it implemented department-wide leave restrictions or
cancellations or that it issued department-wide messages for
recalls to duty.
Our eighth and final flash report is a summary of the
status of 104 recommendations and security improvements made by
the Department. Although the Department did make several
changes updating their policy and procedures, additional
training for CDU units and the hiring of a subject matter
expert in the planning and coordination of large events or
high-profile demonstrations, the Department still has more work
to achieve the goal of making the Capitol complex safe and
secure. Out of the 200 security enhancements that the
Department has provided to the OIG, only 61 of those items have
supporting documentation to support those enhancements that
have occurred. Some other security enhancements the Department
has instituted has been additional intelligence briefings
provided to the rank-and-file as well as to the Department
leadership.
The Department still lacks an overall training
infrastructure to meet the needs of the Department, the level
of intelligence gathering and expertise needed and an overall
cultural change needed to move the Department into a protective
agency as opposed to a traditional police Department.
In conclusion, the Department is comprised of extraordinary
men and women who are dedicated to protecting our democracy,
putting their own lives in harm's way in order for Congress to
exercise their constitutional duties in a safe and open manner.
It is our duty to honor those officers who have given their
lives but also ensuring the safety for all those working and
visiting the Capitol complex by making hard changes within the
Department.
Finally, I would like to thank not only this Committee but
the Senate Rules Committee and the Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack for their continuing support
of my office and the work they have done in protecting
democracy so that events such as January 6th never happen
again.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today,
and I will be very happy to answer any questions the Committee
may have at this time.
[The statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairperson. Thank you so much, Mr. Bolton.
We will now ask Mr. Schuman to give his testimony to us in
five minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL SCHUMAN
Mr. Schuman. Thank you. Chairperson Lofgren, Ranking Member
Davis, and Members of the Committee on House Administration,
thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Over the last fourteen months, the Capitol Police Inspector
General has provided its expert analysis of the Capitol
Police's operations, programs, and policies in effect on
January 6th. My intent is to draw your attention to two things
not addressed in the IG's flash reports: First, the structural
limitations that narrow and limit the scope of the IG's
findings; and second, the structural flaws that undermine
oversight of the Capitol Police itself.
The Office of the Inspector General should be fully
independent of the Capitol Police chief and of the Capitol
Police Board. It is not. The Capitol Police Board appoints the
IG. The Board includes the Capitol Police chief as an ex
officio member. The Board exercises general oversight over the
IG. The Board is not subject to investigation by the IG, and
the Board operates in near total secrecy.
Let me illustrate how this is a problem. The Board
reportedly has directed the Inspector General in a nonpublic
letter to never publish IG reports. By comparison, it is
routine practice for Federal IGs to publish their reports
because this empowers accountability to Congress, civil
society, and the public. The Board reportedly acts unanimously,
so any member can secretly block a change in policy that would
permit the release of IG reports.
In addition to full independence, the IG should be
empowered to investigate the Board and to publicly report its
findings to Members and to the public. We can only wonder
whether there are preexisting IG recommendations unheeded by
the Capitol Police that could have made a difference on January
6th.
Disclosure policy should go beyond IG reports. The Capitol
Police should routinely disclose the agency's budget
justifications, semiannual statement of disbursements, arrest
data, prosecution rate for threats against Members, Office of
Professional Responsibility discipline data and minutes from
its board meetings.
In addition, there should be a civilian oversight board
composed of stakeholders from across Capitol Hill, and there
should be a process by which the public can request Capitol
Police records. These structural limitations narrow the range
of information available to the IG and to overseers and limit
the IG's ability to make recommendations to you.
Let me now address the structural limitations that
undermine oversight of the Capitol Police. I say this, of
course, right as my computer monitor has decided to stop
functioning. Here we go. Sorry about that.
Only a short while ago, the former acting Capitol Police
chief testified that she reported to leadership, not to the
committees of jurisdiction. In addition, recently one member of
the Capitol Police Board who was appointed by one Chamber
declined to testify in person in hearings conducted by the
other.
These examples illustrate a fundamental problem with the
Capitol Police leadership. They do not fully respect the
jurisdiction of the oversight committees. The GAO shared these
concerns in its 2017 report. I wish I had, but I don't have a
clever recommendation on how to address this problem.
Certainly, all members of the Capitol Police Board, should you
choose to retain such a body, must routinely testify as a group
before the Oversight and Appropriations Committees. Their
understanding of their roles and duty to report must be
adjusted accordingly.
We recommend the hiring of full-time congressional staff
with law enforcement expertise to help oversee the Capitol
Police. Such personnel should be provided as Committee staff to
overseers and appropriators and funded out of the Capitol
Police budget. The majority of House Administration already has
implemented this recommendation.
Each day increases the likelihood of another attack on the
Capitol, and yet recent proposals made by the Capitol Police
and members of its Board regarding new security programs raise
important civil liberties concerns without addressing the
fundamental Capitol security questions.
We are not comfortable with new surveillance activities
without real reform at the top that can keep police activities
within appropriate boundaries. Our government must be open to
the people and safe for conducting the business of democracy.
For that to happen, we must address the structural failures
inherent in oversight of the Capitol Police.
Thank you so much for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Schuman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairperson. Thank you, Mr. Schuman, and Inspector
General Bolton. We appreciate your testimony.
Now is the time when Members can ask their questions. I
will turn first to the Ranking Member, Mr. Davis, for questions
that he may have.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
My first question, Mr. Bolton--again, thanks for being here
today. I want to start by thanking you and your team for the
hard work you put into these reports. We have now had numerous
hearings and meetings to speak about these reports, and your
office has always been responsive to our questions and
concerns.
I want to ask you a few quick questions because we only
have five minutes. So short answers or I am going to ask to
reclaim my time.
In your testimony, you explain that you asked over eighty
officers to speak with your office about January 6th, but only
about 36 of them have completed an interview. Now, these
officers weren't obligated to speak with you, but would you
consider that to be a normal response rate for an
investigation?
Mr. Bolton. For police officers, I would say that is about
a normal rate. They are under no obligation because they
weren't a subject of an investigation. We were just soliciting
their information. Some just may not have had the time to be
able to speak with us or for whatever reason, but they weren't
compelled to talk to us.
Mr. Davis. Okay. Well, fewer than fifty percent of officers
responding raises concerns that the Department has a broader
cultural issue of reluctance to speak up. Are officers
concerned that speaking with your office might lead to
retaliation?
Mr. Bolton. They shouldn't whatsoever. We always make sure
that they have the understanding that they would be protected.
And, basically, and especially in this type of review, we don't
utilize their names in our report. It is just as an officer. We
don't even identify where they are, whether it be Senate
division, House division, or wherever.
Mr. Davis. Okay. Well, thank you, sir. Thanks again for
your work and the work of your entire team there at the IG's
office.
Mr. Schuman, thanks for joining us here today, especially
on such short notice. As you are aware, we are here to discuss
the oversight of the Capitol Police. We also know that the
Inspector General's role is limited to only Capitol Police. As
he mentioned repeatedly during our hearings last year, he does
not have oversight authority of the Capitol Police Board. The
Capitol Police Board, as you mentioned and as we mentioned, is
made up of three political appointees and the chief of police
as an ex officio member. The Board holds an unusual amount of
responsibility for campus security decisions.
Can you help us to understand why this structure hinders
transparency? Go a little bit beyond your opening comments.
Mr. Schuman. So, there are a number of factors, some of
which are already in the record. One, of course, is people have
a lot of confusion about who is making the decision. Is it the
board? Is it the chief? Sometimes the chief is in the board
meetings as an ex officio member.
There is not the release of the minutes of the proceedings
before the board. The GAO has indicated that folks who served
on the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police chief are
confused about who they report to, who their overseers are, and
that the staff for the relevant committees of jurisdiction
didn't feel like they were being kept in the loop with respect
to decisions being made by the Capitol Police Board.
The Architect of the Capitol in his testimony I think back
in May said that there needs to be more transparency and
accountability in the board, that things are overclassified,
that they are not made available, and conversations can't
happen with other folks, including staff and elsewhere, that
there is a lack of dedicated staff. GAO has faulted the board
for who has access to the Board's manual procedures, that it
wasn't routinely being provided to members of the committees of
jurisdiction.
And, ultimately, the Capitol Police and the Capitol Police
Board are not taking Congress' direction. Congress has said to
the IG or requested of the IG that the report should be made
publicly available and told the Capitol Police to create a
FOIA-like process. There have been other directives regarding
arrest information, and the Capitol Police has not implemented
those recommendations. All of this suggests that the Capitol
Police is not able to listen in the way that it needs to the
directions coming from Congress.
There are also other structural problems in the way that
not all members of the Capitol Police Board adequately report
to all Members of Congress. We saw that in what I referenced
before with respect to the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate being
unwilling to testify in person before the House. I could go on,
but I don't want to take up all your time. So, I am happy to
keep talking about this.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
Madam Chairperson, I ask unanimous consent to insert into
the record the 2017 GAO report on the Capitol Police Board.
The Chairperson. Without objection so ordered.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Schuman, you know, I know you are familiar
with this report, and just do you consider the Capitol Police
Board to be accountable and transparent? I think we know your
answer.
Mr. Schuman. No. Not only they are not accountable and
transparent, but I also think they are the least accountable
and transparent body that I have ever run across in the Federal
Government. I have worked a lot with the national intelligence
agencies, so that says a lot.
Mr. Davis. Well, I appreciate your comments today.
I know that I am running out of time so, Madam Chairperson,
I am going to end by asking unanimous consent to insert into
the record a Washington Monthly article written by Mr. Schuman
and Amelia Strauss from January 9, 2021, titled ``A Primer on
the Capitol Police: What We Know From Two Years of Research.''
The Chairperson. Without objection, that will be entered
into the record.
Mr. Davis. Thank you. I yield back, and thanks to the
witnesses.
The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Raskin is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.
Mr. Bolton, was the Department able to provide
documentation to you that personnel at the rank of Sergeant
through Inspector and the civilians in a supporting role
attended periodic in-service training coordinated by the
Command and Coordination Bureau, as is required by a directive
of the Department?
Mr. Bolton. No. That was one of the issues that they could
not provide us with the documentation on, many of the training.
And that will end up being brought up again in our Training
Services Bureau review, which you all will be getting sometime
in mid-March.
Mr. Raskin. So, who has been responsible for the training
of the Department's sworn and civilian personnel, both before
and after January 6th?
Mr. Bolton. Well, on paper, technically, that would be the
Chief's responsibility, obviously, being the Chief. But that
would come under whoever is in charge of the Training Services
Bureau. But, again, my report or review is going to show you
that it is so disconnected, there is no one source to track all
this training and to ensure that it is being done.
Mr. Raskin. So, just to follow through on that point, was
it the Capitol Police Board that was ultimately responsible, or
would you say it was so fragmented and fractured that nobody
was responsible?
Mr. Bolton. It is fragmented, but certainly it would be the
Chief of Police, not the board. It would certainly be the
Chief's responsibility to make sure that all training is being
completed.
Mr. Raskin. Okay. In your review of the K-9 Unit, you found
that in fiscal year 2018 through 2020, K-9 officers failed to
complete either basic radiation pager training or the refresher
radiation pager training. In 2019, 10 K-9 officers did not
complete their radiation pager training, and one officer did
not complete any training at all between fiscal year 2018 and
fiscal year 2020.
Does the failure to train K-9 officers affect the security
of the Capitol complex, and how severe--was that a factor on
January 6th?
Mr. Bolton. I wouldn't say it was a factor on January 6th,
but it certainly could be a factor on the overall security and
posture for the Capitol and providing the security within the
Capitol complex. We can't make the link saying that that was a
factor in January 6th, but certainly, as the overall day-to-day
operations, it can become a factor.
Mr. Raskin. Who is ultimately responsible for making sure
that the mandatory K-9 training takes place?
Mr. Bolton. Ultimately, again, it would come down, being
the chief as the head of the agency, it would be ultimately his
responsibility.
Mr. Raskin. You found that the monthly sixteeen hours of
maintenance training required for K-9 officers were not being
completed. Specifically, you found that, quote, none of the K-9
officers had completed all sixteen hours of monthly maintenance
training during the sample month of December 2020.
Could this failure to train result in a K-9 Unit failing to
be able to detect a possible IED or other hazardous material
being brought onto the Capitol complex?
Mr. Bolton. It certainly could provide that vulnerability,
not being able to properly detect those devices or even a vapor
weight dog. So, certainly, it could degrade your level of
confidence.
Mr. Raskin. Okay. You also found the Department's Dignitary
Protection Division training program is self-managed and
comprised of instructors with collateral duties as active DPD
officers.
What are the deficiencies and dangers of having a self-
managed training program, and how does that compare to the best
practice standard?
Mr. Bolton. The best practice standard is completely
separate, that that training would be conducted by
nonoperational individuals, although they have a subject matter
expertise in it.
But, by allowing your own internal folks in the sense of
operational, one, training can slip through because they have
other duties that they are going to be completing. So training
is not going to be a top priority for them completing because
they are doing the other duties.
And it doesn't allow for that separation of duties where
you are assured that that training is being completed and it is
correct, and it is mission-driven.
Mr. Raskin. Okay. Now, the big picture, Mr. Bolton, because
all of us as Members and I think a lot of the staff know
members of the Capitol Police force. We are impressed by their
heroism, their sacrifice, both of which were demonstrated on
January 6th, when they literally put their lives on to save--
put their lives on the line to save our lives, to save
Congress, the Vice President's life, the peaceful transfer of
power. And yet there is a disconnect between their commitment
and passion and a number of these problems in the management of
the force.
How would you explain to somebody just looking at this from
the outside what has gone wrong here?
Mr. Bolton. I think it goes back to initially my first
hearing before this Committee, it is a cultural change where we
need to quit thinking of ourselves as a police department, that
we are going out and policing, that we are a protective agency,
that our number one duty and our mission in all training, no
matter what it is, is going to be driven by that mission of
protection. And that way, what little hours we get in training,
because those are difficult--operational needs are extreme
right now--but that training must be mission-driven
specifically.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you. I yield back, Madam Chairperson.
The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Georgia is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Loudermilk. Well, thank you, Madam Chairperson.
I am going to start my questions today with Mr. Schuman.
Mr. Schuman, I am sure you are aware, as most everyone is,
that one of our colleagues in the House of Representatives has
raised serious concerns about Capitol Police officers recently
improperly entering his office and taking photos of legislative
planning material and then launching an investigation into his
staff because of that.
Now, this Member is a former sheriff, and understanding he
comes from the law enforcement community and being a sheriff,
he would understand lawful and unlawful search and seizure. He
has also been an outspoken critic of the Capitol Police
leadership.
Now, while Mr. Bolton and his team are investigating this
matter, can you describe for this Committee some of the
abnormal and unexpected behavior of security officials toward
the Capitol Hill community?
Mr. Schuman. Thank you, sir. So, I can't speak, obviously,
to this particular matter, but there have been a number of
other circumstances of unusual behavior by the Capitol Police.
For example, in 2019, there was an officer who left his gun
unattended in the men's room. This had happened three times
previously I think in 2017. There was reporting of police
officers shoving reporters in the Senate basement and trying to
stop reporters from talking to and walking alongside Senators.
In our research, we have identified--so Inspector General
Bolton was talking to sort of a protective approach like that
newer model, but the Capitol Police spend a lot of time
arresting people for things like smoking pot on their porch
five blocks from the Capitol or going to Union Station and
helping to move unhoused people from Union Station, which is
not something that one would expect of the security force
focused on protecting the Capitol.
There was the incident two years ago I think now where
there was--they couldn't determine whether a plane was heading
to the Capitol Building, and they kept everything on an orange
lockdown or whatever the color is for half an hour.
There were reports that the Capitol Police had killed
reporters. And then, of course, there have been more recent
circumstances. I think one officer was accused of keeping a
copy of the ``Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' at his post,
which is an anti-Semitic tract created by Czarist Russians at
the beginning of the last century. And, of course, there was
the police officer who recently tried to help one of the folks
involved on January 6th avoid arrest. These are all
inappropriate behaviors that we have seen from the Capitol
Police that suggest significant problems inside.
Mr. Loudermilk. Now, in any of those instances, was there
ever accountability for their actions?
Mr. Schuman. So, in a couple of them. I believe that the
officer who helped one of the people who attacked on January
6th, I think he was fired. I think he was ultimately
terminated. He may have just been suspended. I think there was
a consequence for the person who had the ``Protocols of the
Elders of Zion.''
In the other circumstances, we know that there was
retaliation against officers who, for example, shared
information about the police officer, one of the police
officers who left his gun in the men's room, but I am not aware
of other steps that would be taken. That information is not
routinely released to the public, so it is difficult to discern
what, if any, remedial actions have occurred.
I should add, though, that when you read the ongoing
litigation brought by Capitol Police officers and when you talk
to the Capitol Police union chief, they seem to suggest that
there is a real distinction between the folks at the senior end
of the leadership and the rank and file, in terms of how they
are treated and how discipline is meted out.
It is difficult to discern what that looks like from where
I sit, unfortunately, without access to those records.
Mr. Loudermilk. So how can we better hold the Capitol
Police leadership accountable in these types of situations or
to assure they are not abusing their power like has been
recently alleged?
Mr. Schuman. So, I think there are a couple things you
could do. One is you can increase the oversight of the Capitol
Police Inspector General and to make him and his office fully
independent in all the ways that my written testimony describes
at voluminous length that I am sure was great fun to read.
I would also suggest that the Capitol Police Board and the
Capitol Police chief structure don't make any sense. The lack
of transparency and accountability to you, to the press, the
public, to the people on Capitol Hill all indicate significant
problems with the way things are managed.
As far as we can tell, there seems to be, you know, a
network of a handful of folks at the top of the Capitol Police
leadership who kind of protect each other. And this is
something that we can't have if we want to protect the
Congress. I can--sorry, sir. I will let you go ahead.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. One last quick question: It may not
be quick but answer however you can. But, you know, when it
comes to January 6th, we have been told that the executive
branch had sought to get certain data from Members of Congress,
cell phone data, metadata, et cetera. This is concerning as
well. I think you have raised concerns about that data.
Can you touch on those concerns here for the record?
Mr. Schuman. Yes. I will be brief, considering the time.
So, to go and gather the information about Members of Congress
and other folks on Capitol Hill on January 6th, it seems likely
that a warrant was applied for and obtained.
The question that I have is, how did they screen out the
people who were not connected to this? Did they go and sort of
do a dragnet look on a previous date as a way of filtering out
these individuals? That is one possibility. Did they do so
through a warrant? These folks were not connected to what went
on.
So, there are questions about how that was done. Were they
gathering cell phone and other metadata about the individuals,
the journalists, the visitors, the lobbyists, the family
members, and the Members of Congress with their personal
devices? How that was done, the mechanism that this filtering
happened is concerning.
Now, it could be that they purchased this information and
basically did an end run around the Fourth Amendment, which is
why there is legislation to address that sort of issue, but we
can't tell.
We know there is a long history of the executive branch
keeping an eye on the general public and Members of Congress.
We saw that with the CIA and the Torture Memo on the Senate
side. So, it is concerning. More information needs to be
disclosed here about what happened.
Mr. Loudermilk. All right. Thank you, Mr. Schuman. I am out
of time.
Madam Chairperson, as I yield, I ask unanimous consent to
insert in the record a February 22, 2021, article from The
Intercept titled ``FBI Seized Congressional Cell Phone Records
Related to Capitol Attack.''
The Chairperson. Without objection, that will be entered
into the record.
Mr. Loudermilk. I yield back.
The Chairperson. Mr. Butterfield is now recognized for five
minutes.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Madam Chairperson, for
convening this very important hearing this afternoon.
And thank you to the two witnesses for your testimony. It
is good to see all my colleagues today, and I hope all of you
are well.
Let me just continue with Mr. Schuman just for a second if
I can.
Mr. Schuman, you may recall, you may know this, you may not
know it, but prior to January 6th, there was erected down at
Independence and Washington Street a huge tower. It looked like
some type of cellular tower. Are you familiar with that? Is
this information that you can share with us if you know what
that tower was intended to do?
Mr. Schuman. No, sir, I don't know.
Mr. Butterfield. All right. Well, let me stay with the
intelligence line of questioning.
Mr. Bolton, what is the importance of Department personnel
understanding what intelligence is and how to act on
information appropriately? In other words, what is the
importance of understanding intelligence information?
Mr. Bolton. First and foremost, you need a well-trained
force to understand intelligence and to be able to compile that
intelligence to look at your potential threat assessment.
Given the fact there are so many protectees, based on we
call all Members both on the House and Senate side as a
protectee. Whenever you go off this campus, there is a gap in
security because you are not going to have an individual detail
on you.
So, it is incumbent upon the Capitol Police to be able to
reach out to their resources, whether it be local authorities,
the local congressional staff in that district, and try to be
able to assess what are the threats out there.
Generally, if you look at, especially with some of the
recent ones, whether it be the ball field shooting that Mr.
Davis alluded to and the Arizona with Ms. Giffords, there were
signs that were missed. There were social media signs that were
missed that we could have--again, it is Monday morning
quarterbacking, but those are the type of things that we need
to be aware of to properly protect the Members of Congress.
Mr. Butterfield. Since January 6th, has the Department
initiated any intelligence training, even just basic
intelligence training to educate the sworn personnel?
Mr. Bolton. They have made strides. They have hired
additional analysts. Some of them I believe are still in
training. They should be finished up this month. They have been
conducting intelligence briefings more at the roll calls for
the individual officers. So, there is an educational process. I
would like to see more of it as far as teaching more in the
basic school on what the officers should be looking for and to
be able to understand what the intelligence means.
Mr. Butterfield. What are the benefits of mandating
personnel to be able to obtain and maintain a security
clearance, from a security perspective?
Mr. Bolton. Well, first, what you are doing when you are
making your force--now, I am strictly talking about the Capitol
Police, sworn and civilian, if you are sworn with top secret
clearance and you are civilian with at least a minimum of a
secret clearance.
You are elevating and raising the bar of your expectation
of your employees on and off duty. They recognize that there
are certain expectations, whether it be here on campus--you
must be apolitical on and off duty--that is simply as it is--as
a Capitol Police officer.
It also provides a layer of protection against insider
threat within the Capitol Police. Just recently, I think there
was an article about a lieutenant within the Metropolitan
Police with certain allegiance that are causing--raising
questions.
So, it is very important to have that, but also allows the
officers to move about from one position to another without
having to, whether it be the SCIF or some other position within
the Capitol Police, if everybody has a top secret clearance.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Steil is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Steil. Thank you very much, Chairperson Lofgren.
Speaker Pelosi has politicized and centralized control of
the security in the United States Capitol. This can be seen
through the implementation of fines for not wearing a mask on
the House Floor. It can be seen through metal detectors to
enter the House Chamber. It can be seen through the extended
closure to the public of the United States Capitol and the
People's House.
Unfortunately, it appears that this trend of politicization
is getting worse. This isn't about the rank-and-file members of
the Capitol Police, who we all support. This is about
leadership. There have been concerning reports from the Capitol
Police Intelligence Division investigating members of the
public who are meeting with their elected Representatives.
There are also allegations that USCP is even investigating a
lawmaker and photographing their office. It was discussed
earlier.
Let me be clear: I support the men and women of the Capitol
Police, but many are feeling that Speaker Pelosi is using the
Capitol Police as just another political tool in Washington. We
cannot let this stand. It cannot continue.
Mr. Bolton, in Chief Manger's reply to my letter regarding
the published report about Capitol Police reviewing citizens
meeting with their Members of Congress, she requested you to
investigate the reports, as it relates to the Intelligence
Division.
Have you begun this investigation, and do you have any
updates for us at this time?
Mr. Bolton. I wouldn't be--yes, we have begun on both
counts of the open-source review as well as Congressman Nehls'
request.
I can't give you an update at this time. It is ongoing. So,
I will hold any information until we have completed our
investigation. But they are a top priority for my office, and
we are working diligently to get those reviews completed.
Mr. Steil. I appreciate your efforts in this regard. Maybe
you can answer this question: Let me break them down. One as it
regards the oversight of citizens meeting with their Members of
Congress. Are you receiving full cooperation or are you meeting
any resistance?
Mr. Bolton. We are receiving full cooperation from the
Department.
Mr. Steil. Okay. And then as it relates to the
investigation of a Member of Congress who has alleged that
individuals from Capitol Police came in, photographed evidence,
that investigation you noted is ongoing.
Are you receiving any resistance during that investigation,
or are you receiving cooperation?
Mr. Bolton. We are receiving full cooperation at this time.
Mr. Steil. That is positive to hear. I, along with my
colleagues, look forward to reviewing your full report and hope
that we can have a hearing when those reports become available.
Let me continue with you, Mr. Bolton. One of the new
policies put in place during the extended closure of the
People's House, the United States Capitol, is that if a group
of people or group of individuals want to meet with a lawmaker,
the office must send their names in ahead of time so that they
can enter the building.
Mr. Bolton, in your opinion, is there a security purpose or
need for this type of closure?
Mr. Bolton. Well, it depends on what you are speaking. I
think--now, that may be outside of my immediate purview, that
those names are being submitted to the House Sergeant at Arms.
So that is not within my purview of that.
And that probably will be captured, at least we will have a
better understanding to answer your question once we have
completed our review of the open-source issue. So that right
now, I wouldn't be able to answer that completely for you.
Mr. Steil. Understood. Mr. Schuman, do you believe that
such a procedure would chill free speech and limit individuals'
opportunities to meet and speak with their Member of Congress?
Mr. Schuman. Well, it sounds like the underlying question
is whether the Capitol complex should be closed, which you are
raising as--am I understanding you correctly, sir?
Mr. Steil. Yes. The fact that for a citizen to meet with
their Member of Congress in a congressional office, the name of
that individual needs to be submitted and recorded by Capitol
Security.
Mr. Schuman. So, I would suspect that that probably has a
chilling effect on some folks who would wish to come and meet
in person in the Capitol, although there are alternate venues
that are available to do so. I think that----
Mr. Steil. Only because we are limited on time here, Mr.
Schuman, let me continue with you.
The Sergeant at Arms, Mr. Walker, has mentioned in recent
testimony that he is exploring implementing an insider threat
program. Are you aware of any similar type of program ever
being implemented before in the United States Capitol?
Mr. Schuman. Not in the Capitol, no, sir.
Mr. Steil. Are there particular concerns with such an
implementation that you would have in the United States
Capitol, in the Legislative Branch?
Mr. Schuman. Yes. If implemented badly, like we saw, for
example, recently with the Department of Commerce, an insider
threat program could basically spin out of control. The
concern----
Mr. Steil. I appreciate your concern. You highlight my
concern.
So, Madam Chairperson, here is my concern: The security
apparatus of the United States Capitol I think is continuing to
be politicized by Speaker Pelosi. There are a lot of questions.
We are having a good conversation here. All of us support the
men and women of the Capitol Police, but we are challenged by
some of the leadership decisions we are seeing here in the
United States Capitol.
I appreciate you holding today's hearing. I hope we have
more of these in the near future.
The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Aguilar is recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Madam Chairperson.
Thanks to our witnesses for being here and for
participating.
Let me try to get--you are being asked a lot of questions
outside of your topic, Mr. Bolton. Let me try to get us back on
topic.
You talk about in your testimony the 104 recommendations
that you provided and where they are within the queue.
Specifically, I guess, you know, from a top level, what is
needed to implement those recommendations? Do we need more
time? Do we need more leadership? Do we need a change in policy
direction?
You know, what do you feel to go from thirty to fifty, from
fifty to seventy, ultimately to get to all 109 recommendations,
what is going to be the most effective tool that we can use?
Mr. Bolton. Now, some of the recommendations are long term.
For instance, training. What we are recommending and what you
will see in our subsequent report is an investment in training.
It is going to be a large investment. It is going to take the
committees, appropriations, and also a will for the Department
to make this type of change.
Some of the changes we could still be making now, like I
said, in the cultural change, focusing on the type of training
that we can do now. We need a system, and we are going to
recommend some of these, that any and all training has got to
be mission-directed. It has got to be set forth of, why you are
doing that training? In other words, you have a lesson plan;
you have objectives; and you have your expected results or
outcomes for that training.
We just don't do training for the sake of saying, oh, we
are doing training. We also need to make sure that training is
a continuous form. Now, in other words, we are just going to
satisfy the IG and the Committee, and we are going to conduct
this training X, and as soon as everybody is happy with that,
then we are going to go back to not doing the training.
So we got to make sure we put into place the policies,
procedures, the continuing business practice of conducting that
training and making these other changes that are going to be
different. Some are long term, some are short term, but the
department is making some strides, and they have formed some
committees within the working groups--I should call them
working groups--to address the recommendations.
Mr. Aguilar. Do those working groups have deliverables,
timetables, milestones that they are under?
Mr. Bolton. That would be something that you would have to
ask the chief. I don't set--I wouldn't be able to set those
timetables for them. It is really whatever the chief has set
for those folks.
Mr. Aguilar. You talked about the chief ultimately being
responsible, the Training Bureau underneath the chief. It seems
like within the training category, the most basic thing you can
do is to just track who is being trained in what. You note that
there are some deficiencies there.
Specifically, did you identify a critical deficiency with
the Department failing to have a mandatory leadership and
development training program?
Mr. Bolton. Well, incidentally, some of the portion, we
have also entered a review of career progression and rotational
policy for the department. So we will be having that report to
you forthcoming as well within the next month or so.
So we are looking into that career progression. That has
been an issue, at least what we felt, that you are not training
your future leaders. And part of that is not having a
rotational policy. That is basically nonexistent within this
department. We are going to be recommending that they do have a
rotational policy.
Mr. Aguilar. Can you talk a little bit more about what that
would look like? What do you mean by rotational policy?
Mr. Bolton. Whenever in any of these specialty units,
whether it be K-9, CERT, DPD, Dignitary Protection Division,
you cannot have an individual officer spending fifteen years
out of their eighteen years in that particular field. You are
doing a disservice to the officer, and you are doing a
disservice to the Department, which is the most important thing
is what is best for the Department.
You need to have that skill set that they have enhanced
training, whether it be CERT, K-9, DPD, back into the field.
One, you have a more experienced, a higher trained level
individual back into the field, and you are giving your
opportunity for your younger officers to have that opportunity
to get into that specialized training.
So now you are building a leadership, that they have these
different skills throughout the Department. You need--they
can't spend their entire career sitting in the SCIF or in the
House division or in the Senate division. You need to have a
mandatory training. The Department can come up with four years,
five years, whatever. They can model after certain other
Federal agencies, where you are given one dog, and once that
dog is retired then you are moved out of that K-9 section and
another individual will take your place and get that kind of
training. So you are building your leaders as well, because
they have that knowledge, skills, and abilities.
Mr. Aguilar. The balance to that is not losing that
institutional knowledge, right? So having the good framework,
having the good program, moving people through to experience
different skill sets while having that institutional knowledge
to make the group run, because the downside is, if someone just
walks into a system and it is a broken unit, that doesn't do
them service as well.
So I appreciate it. Thanks for the conversation, Director
Bolton, and we look forward to continuing to read those
records.
I yield back, Madam Chairperson.
The Chairperson. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Scanlon is recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Scanlon. Thank you, Chairperson Lofgren.
You know, throughout our oversight series here with the
IG's investigation, we have had several specific disturbing
trends that have been identified--lack of training, inadequate
resources, planning, and leadership, absence of clear
communication by that leadership to rank-and-file officers.
They are all deeply troubling patterns that seem to impact most
of the department's agencies and divisions.
Most worrying to me is the lack of an acceptable
centralized and dedicated plan for the January 6 events and the
absence of a process for developing similar plans for future
events.
It is particularly concerning with some of our Republican
colleagues continuing to embrace falsehoods and conspiracy
theories to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 2020 election
and other such colleagues encouraging far-right extremists to
bring more antigovernment protests to the Capitol. So it is
obvious that the Capitol Police must have the capacity to
prepare and execute plans of action to meet ongoing threats of
violence and disruption of government functions on or near the
Capitol complex.
So, Inspector General Bolton, I found your July 30 report
very troubling with respect to what appear to be gross
deficiencies in command and coordination, which seriously
impacted the ability of the Capitol Police to plan for and meet
large-scale events.
Can you provide us with, you know, kind of a state-of-today
assessment of whether that ability has improved? And what are
the most important tasks that need to be accomplished to meet
the next large-event challenge?
Mr. Bolton. I think if we look at the two most recent
large-scale events that the Capitol Police encountered: The
previous one that happened in September, they were very well-
planned. As you probably have read, they did go out and hire a
subject matter expert that was very well-trained and versed in
large-event planning. You saw the big difference by the
planning with the--our Federal law enforcement partners, as
well as our local and State, as well as also with the National
Guard.
So you--we have seen that, and it has happened twice now
where they have had large events, and they have gone out--they
have shown their ability to be able to plan for those large
events.
The only thing I would, you know, caution is let's make
sure it doesn't go by the wayside, it continues, like I said it
before--and people are probably tired of me hearing or hearing
me say it--a continuous business practice. It is, regardless of
who is the chief, regardless of who is the Deputy Chief, these
are the steps that we are going to take. If we lose the
individuals that they hired and he or she decides to retire,
the next person can step right into their shoes and continue on
with the process, so we are not reinventing the wheel.
Again, that kind of goes back to having that cultural
change and having a strong foundation of training, a Training
Services Bureau that is strong. Basically, as I have said
before, that is your train, and they are pulling the Department
along. So, as long as you have a strong train, that is your
foundation and your main engine train, it is going to pull the
Department along and keep them up to date and keep them moving
forward.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay. I just wanted to inquire a little bit
into your report on dignitary protection and human capital. And
you quite rightly noted that the folks who are on the Floor in
the Capitol, you know, despite the lack of resources and
training, et cetera, really just performed heroically. I wasn't
there in the Capitol that day. I was in my office across the
street.
Who is responsible for ensuring protection of the officers
across the street? Is that the Dignitary Protection Division,
or is that someone else?
Mr. Bolton. If it is in your office, that is going be the
individual officers that are assigned to that building, whether
they are here in Longworth or the other, Cannon, or any other.
Those are the officers. They now also they should be
incorporating, making sure your staff and yourself know in case
of an emergency what you are going to do and communicate, well,
maybe you just need to stay in place, shelter in place. There
needs to be that communication with the individual officers
that are assigned to that building.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay. We had a little bit of a flip on this
conversation, you know, some criticism about the practice of
identifying visitors to the Capitol. Do you know--you have been
with the Secret Service. Right? Are visitors to the White House
identified?
Mr. Bolton. Well, that--you know, coming from the Secret
Service, yes.
Ms. Scanlon. Okay.
Mr. Bolton. The Secret Service does a complete background
check and everything before someone comes to visit.
Ms. Scanlon. I mean, in fact, that is in a way to chill
those who might want to visit for violence or other nefarious
purposes. Right?
Mr. Bolton. Well, it is to make sure we know exactly who is
coming to visit the President or Vice President, that we are
aware. You can also--sometimes it is situational awareness as
well.
Ms. Scanlon. I submit that it is basically the practice in
every major office building in this country at this point. So,
I don't see a problem with us having to identify who comes into
congressional offices.
I see my time has expired. I would yield back. Thank you.
The Chairperson. The gentlelady from New Mexico is
recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Leger Fernandez. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson
Lofgren. And, once again, thank you for holding this important
hearing.
Inspector General Bolton, it is nice to see you again. You
noted that the Department has only closed--your written
testimony was 39 of the inspector general's recommendations,
and you said they have closed some additional ones. But of the
outstanding recommendations, what do you believe is among the
most critical and urgent?
Mr. Bolton. That is a tough one. They are all critical in a
sense. I think it is the moving, beefing up our intelligence
capabilities, having a solid Training Services Bureau. It also
is that cultural change. Those are the important things,
although you will say, well, I didn't see the ``cultural
change'' in any recommendation. I think the recommendations, if
you look at them at a whole, you will see us pushing the
department into that direction.
Ms. Leger Fernandez. Right. Because it is like, as
everybody, as we have heard from the questioning, as they move
forward in terms of understanding the roles everybody else is
playing, as they understand, move from one position to another
and, therefore, understand that they are all working together
on this, for the security of the Capitol.
So it has been, you know, over a year since that harrowing
attack on our Capitol by Trump supporters seeking to stop the
constitutional counting of the electoral college votes. You
discussed earlier that there was good planning by the Capitol
Police for a large event last fall.
At this moment, though, are you confident that the Capitol
Police is prepared for an attack similar to what happened on
January 6? Is the planning sufficient at this time? If not,
what must we do to get there?
Mr. Bolton. I believe their planning is sufficient at this
time. There are so many factors in what could or couldn't
happen in that, but right now feel confident in that at least
they have the planning down. They had enough resources in the
last couple of large events that they have been able to handle.
So, again, it is--they are moving forward. So I am
confident at least in their planning stages and operational
plans and getting the word out to their officers. They are in a
much better position than they were over a year ago.
Ms. Leger Fernandez. Well, I am glad to hear there is
progress, even though there is so much work that we need to do.
Mr. Schuman, I really appreciated your remarks about the
importance of public access at the Capitol. You know, one of
the things that make the Legislative Branch special is that we
are always accessible, must be accessible to our constituents
and the public. As noted earlier, there are things that don't
necessarily stop us being accessible because we could always
meet elsewhere. And, identifying who you are meeting with is,
as noted, something that is done in almost every building you
go into after 9/11.
I wanted to follow up on your recommendation about making
the Capitol Police OIG independent of the Board. Are there
other authorities Congress should provide to the inspector
general to increase its effectiveness?
Mr. Schuman. That is an excellent question. So certainly
independence, the ability to get answers from the Capitol
Police Board and to inquire into its records would probably be
something that would make a lot of sense. There is probably a
number of documents that the Capitol Police, the Capitol Police
Board routinely manage that the IG can get if requested, but
there may be value in having them routinely made available to
facilitate access.
I would have to think more on it, but those--that is where
I would start.
Ms. Leger Fernandez. Right. If documents are being provided
on a regular basis, then there is an understanding that there
is going to be a review and that itself might improve.
If I have time, I wanted to quickly go back to you,
Inspector General Bolton. In one of the interviews on--
regarding command and coordination, one of the officers said
everyone forgot how to do their job. We should look at our
leaders. Do they have the skill set? If they don't have it,
they need to go get it.
Did your review identify a departmentwide codified
leadership training and development program that they are
getting now? Or is that one of the recommendations that still
needs to be worked on, the important recommendations?
Mr. Bolton. I think that is one of the things that they are
still working on. I will have--we are actually going back and,
as I mentioned earlier, that we are doing a career progression
and rotational policy review. We should--we are just about
wrapping that up ourselves. So we will be able to issue that
report soon. Then I will answer more of your questions. But
they still have work to do in that career progression and
training their future leaders.
Ms. Leger Fernandez. Well, thank you.
Madam Chair, my time is up. And I yield back.
The Chairperson. The gentlelady yields back.
I will recognize myself for just some final thoughts for
five minutes.
First, I wanted to just note the comments made by some
members that the Capitol Police had broken into Congressman
Nehls' office. This allegation, there is nothing more serious
than an allegation like that. Any Member of Congress would be
very concerned. I should note for the record the police chief
has denied it. I want to reassure myself, Mr. Bolton, that you
are investigating this so we can make sure that we know the
truth of what happened. Is that correct?
Mr. Bolton. That is correct, yes, ma'am.
The Chairperson. Okay. Good. We will look forward to that
report.
In terms of the insider threat program that has been
mentioned, in January, the House Sergeant at Arms testified
before the Leg Branch Committee on Appropriations that the
insider threat program was really for the House Sergeant at
Arms' office, not for a congressional community at large, not
Members. I understand you are looking at this as well. Is that
correct, Mr. Bolton?
Mr. Bolton. Not as in relation to the House Sergeant at
Arms. Our focus is on the open-source issue of utilizing any
type of databanks or----
The Chairperson. Okay.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. The like, those things, but
nothing as far as--not with the House Sergeant at Arms and his
insider threat program which would be for his staff only.
The Chairperson. All right. We will look forward to that
report as well.
I just wanted to note, in terms of the House buildings
being open, one of the issues that we have not mentioned which
is the pandemic. Throughout this entire pandemic, the House has
100 percent followed the guidance of the Attending Physician.
We continue to do so today. And that is an important element of
what is going on here.
Now, I have just a couple of quick questions if I may. Mr.
Bolton, you have made several recommendations, and you have
done good--you and your team have done good work, absolutely,
but not all of them have been implemented. And my question for
you is I am sure you are talking to the chief, doing
assessments on where they are and the like.
Have these recommendations not been accomplished because
the chief disagrees with them, because they don't have
resources, or because they just haven't gotten them done yet?
What is your judgment?
Mr. Bolton. I think it is a variety of reasons. Some,
obviously, some of our recommendations do require additional
resources, whether it be manpower or additional appropriated
funds. So there are those--those are what I would classify as
the long-term recommendations.
There are a few recommendations that I think the chief and
I are in discussions that he may not totally agree upon. We
continue--we have met twice since earlier this year. So we
continue to go through a dialogue so we have an open dialogue
and to work through those recommendations that they either have
questions about or not quite fully understanding where we are
trying to get to.
So, there is a variety of reasons for that, but they are at
least working towards getting those recommendations closed.
The Chairperson. Okay. Now the Department has stated
publicly that it has changed the way it processes intelligence.
And, for example, they have grown their intelligence staff from
14 to 32. They now require all staff to get and maintain top
secret clearance. They have implemented new performance
standards for intelligence analysts, new training, reorganize
the command structure, addressed increased threats to Members
by additional protection at offsite sites where Members are
frequently present during sessions. On the other hand, they
have yet to fill the intelligence and interagency coordination
Division Director's position with a qualified individual.
You say that we have 34 recommendations outlining
deficiencies. How do those recommendations relate to what they
have already accomplished?
Mr. Bolton. Some, like I said, some of the recommendations
that we did make is that hiring additional analysts, getting
those analysts trained, and continuous training. They have
implemented that. They have put those--they have updated their
policies and procedures.
I agree with you. I am hoping that they do hire a director
here soon.
Also, one of our recommendations was that--has been
implemented--was moving intelligence into a division level, as
opposed to the current bureau level. We want to see it as a
standalone within the department and elevated to a higher level
than what it is currently now.
The Chairperson. Okay.
You know, Mr. Bolton and Mr. Schuman, I really appreciate
your testimony today. As I mentioned at the beginning of this
hearing, we are going to keep this record open so that, if
Members may have additional questions, they are going to direct
them to you. We would ask that, in that case, you give us your
answers as soon as you possibly can.
I would note, Mr. Schuman, that it has been helpful to get
your testimony. We have thought a lot about how to structure
governance of the Capitol Police. We have had our GAO report
but, obviously, it takes consensus between the House and
Senate. I think the Board structure was--it has been in place
for quite some time. It was intended to prevent the
politicization of Capitol Police, which is an admirable goal
and yet has resulted in something that is not particularly
accountable to the public.
So, your thoughts and comments are greatly appreciated, as
is our Inspector General, who is always welcome here.
I would like to thank the witnesses. As I said, we will
keep the hearing record open. As we have all had a chance to
ask our questions, this hearing will now be without objection,
adjourned with thanks to all the Members and witnesses.
[Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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