[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                  SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER UNMANNED 
                  AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

=======================================================================

                             JOINT HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                         OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
                           AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                                AND THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 31, 2022

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-49

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     

       Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov/
       
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-767 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
          
                        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California           Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri            Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas                      Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California            Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York           Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida          Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California    Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
                       Hope Goins, Staff Director
                 Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
                          Natalie Nixon, Clerk
                                 ------                                

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

                  J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Peter Meijer, Michigan, Ranking 
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey         Member
Ritchie Torres, New York             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex  Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
    officio)                         John Katko, New York (ex officio)
                Lisa Canini, Subcommittee Staff Director
         Eric Heighberger, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                  Geremiah Lofton, Subcommittee Clerk
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

             Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey, Chairwoman
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, 
Dina Titus, Nevada                       Ranking Member
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex  Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
    officio)                         John Katko, New York (ex officio)
                Alex Marston, Subcomittee Staff Director
          Kathryn Maxwell, Minority Subcomittee Staff Director
                     Alice Hayes, Subcomittee Clerk
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     2
The Honorable Peter Meijer, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
  Oral Statement.................................................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5
The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of New Jersey, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     6
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     8
  Prepared Statement.............................................     9
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................    10

                               Witnesses

Ms. Samantha Vinograd, Acting Assistant Secretary for 
  Counterterrorism, Threat Prevention, and Law Enforcement, 
  Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    11
  Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    13
Rear Admiral Scott W. Clendenin, Assistant Commandant for 
  Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    19
  Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    13
Mr. Austin Gould, Acting Deputy Executive Assistant Administrator 
  for Operations Support, Transportation Security Administration, 
  U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    20
  Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    13
Mr. Dennis J. Michelini, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner 
  for Air & Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border 
  Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    22
  Joint Prepared Statement.......................................    13

                                Appendix

Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Samantha Vinograd.    45
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Samantha Vinograd......    45
Questions From Chairwoman Bonnie Watson Coleman for Samantha 
  Vinograd.......................................................    45
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Scott W. Clendenin.....    46
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Austin Gould...........    46
Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Dennis Michelini.......    46

 
  ASSESSING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER 
                       UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, March 31, 2022

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability, 
                                                    and the
      Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Luis Correa 
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and 
Accountability] presiding.
    Present from the Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and 
Accountability: Representatives Correa, Payne, Titus, Torres, 
Jackson Lee, Meijer, Bishop, and Harshbarger.
    Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation and 
Maritime Security: Representatives Watson Coleman, Gottheimer, 
Luria, Gimenez, Van Drew, Norman, Miller-Meeks, and Guest.
    Chairman Correa. The Subcommittees on Oversight, 
Management, and Accountability, and Transportation and Maritime 
Security will now come to order. Without objection, the Chair 
is authorized to declare the subcommittees in recess at any 
time.
    Let me start by thanking everyone for joining us today. I 
would like to thank Chairwoman Watson Coleman and Ranking 
Member Gimenez of the Transportation and Maritime Security 
Subcommittee for coming together with Ranking Member Meijer and 
me to hold this very important hearing.
    We are here today to discuss the Department of Homeland 
Security's use of its authority to mitigate threats posed by 
drones. This authority to counter unmanned aircraft systems, 
known as C-UAS authority, was granted by Congress to the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2018.
    Since then, drone use has only increased in popularity and 
skies above our country have never been more crowded. While 
many of these drones are operated by hobbyists, photographers, 
and journalists who pose no threat to the American people, the 
technology has also been used by malicious actors who seek to 
compromise homeland security in a number of ways.
    Most frequently, these threats have taken the form of 
surveillance, undermining law enforcement missions and the 
smuggling of narcotics and other illicit materials. There is 
also the potential for drones to carry an explosive payload to 
target either persons or facilities. Even drone operators who 
pose no malicious threat may inadvertently threaten or cause 
dangerous interference around airports, natural disaster sites, 
and sporting events.
    There is no denying that with the increasing availability 
and use of these unmanned aircraft systems, we must be able to 
respond quickly and effectively to any immediate security 
threat. However, with all missions the Department undertakes, 
the response to these threats must be Constitutionally 
protected, establishing and protecting for privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties.
    For example, civil liberties groups have raised concerns 
that freedom of the press may be at risk since DHS can limit 
journalists from flying drones above protests or natural 
disaster sites, areas that there is a strong public interest in 
providing information to our constituents. Additionally, the 
groups point out the conflicts with the right of due process. 
For example, if a drone hobbyist inadvertently crosses the 
invisible line that is restricted space, their private property 
can and will be seized without the approval of a judge.
    Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections are 
the cornerstone of our democracy. As DHS grapples with the very 
real threat posed by drones, we must be constantly on guard to 
make sure that civil rights, our democracy, is protected. It is 
a fine line for the Department to walk, and engagement from DHS 
Offices of Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to 
oversee the use of this authority is important in this process.
    Today, we look forward to hearing more about how the 
Department has worked with these offices and walks the line 
between mitigating threats and protecting the rights every 
American citizen has. With the Government's C-UAS authority set 
to expire in October, we have a tremendous opportunity, a great 
opportunity here to examine how DHS has used its authority and 
thus far what changes can be needed when the committee 
considers reauthorization.
    I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses 
today, who represent some of the Department components that are 
most actively engaged in C-UAS or drone activity.
    [The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman J. Luis Correa
                             March 31, 2022
    We're here to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's use of 
its authority to mitigate threats posed by drones. This authority to 
counter unmanned aircraft systems, known as C-UAS authority, was 
granted by Congress to the Department of Homeland Security, among 
others, in 2018.
    Since then, drone use has only increased in popularity and the 
skies above our country have never been more crowded. While many of 
these drones are operated by hobbyists, photographers, and journalists 
who pose no threat to the American people, the technology has also been 
used by malicious actors who seek to compromise homeland security in a 
variety of ways.
    Most frequently, these threats have taken the form of surveillance 
undermining a law enforcement mission, and the smuggling of narcotics 
and other illicit materials. There is also the potential for drones to 
carry an explosive payload to a targeted person or facility. Even drone 
operators who pose no malicious threat may inadvertently cause 
dangerous interference around airports, natural disaster sites, and 
sporting events.
    There can be no denying that with the increasing availability and 
use of these unmanned aircraft systems, DHS must be able to respond 
quickly and effectively to any immediate security threat. However, as 
with all missions the Department undertakes, the response to this 
threat must respect Constitutionally-established protections for 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
    For example, civil liberties groups have raised concerns that 
freedom of the press is at risk since DHS could limit journalists from 
flying drones above protests or natural disaster sites--areas where 
there is a strong interest in providing information to the public. 
Additionally, the groups point out conflicts with the right to due 
process. If a drone hobbyist, for example, inadvertently crosses an 
invisible line that is restricted airspace, their private property can 
be seized without approval from a judge.
    Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections are the 
cornerstone of our democracy. As the Department grapples with the very 
real threat posed by drones, there must be guardrails for those who 
mean no harm. It is a fine line for the Department to walk, and 
engagement from the DHS Offices of Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties to oversee the use of this authority is a vital part of the 
process.
    Today, I look forward to hearing more about how the Department has 
worked with these offices and walks the line between mitigating threats 
and protecting the rights every American citizen is afforded.
    With the Government's C-UAS authority set to expire in October, we 
have the opportunity to examine how DHS has used its authority thus far 
and what changes may be needed when the committee considers 
reauthorization.
    I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses today, who 
represent some of the Department components that are most actively 
engaged on C-UAS.

    Chairman Correa. With that, I thank all of you for joining 
us today. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of this 
committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for his 
opening comments.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson 
Coleman, and Ranking Gimenez for holding this hearing. I also 
want to thank our witnesses for joining us to talk about 
unmanned aircraft systems.
    Unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones, are 
becoming a ubiquitous part of our lives. Just like any other 
technology, they can be used for both good and bad ends. Just 
within the Department of Homeland Security, but along with 
other Government agencies, we use UAS to support firefighting 
and search-and-rescue operations, to support disaster relief, 
but also to help secure our borders.
    But as the commercial market for UAS continues to expand, 
there is an increased threat posed by these drones. Commercial 
drones, as we have seen, can threaten our airports, our 
critical infrastructure, and high-profile events, whether 
intentionally or accidentally. To address this growing threat 
Congress passed the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 to 
give DHS the authority to protect certain assets where there is 
a National security risk posed by drones.
    However, the authorities in this legislation do not cover 
such areas as large domestic airports. The bill also required 
DHS to assess current Federal, State, and local authorities to 
counter this threat.
    I have to point out that DHS's report, which the committee 
received just a few months ago, is 2\1/2\ years late. For an 
authority that was intensely negotiated among the interagency 
as well as various Congressional committees of jurisdiction, 
such delinquency is unacceptable.
    Nevertheless, the report found that State and local law 
enforcement entities are extremely limited in what they can do 
to counter the threats posed by UAS because of laws put in 
place to protect, importantly, citizens' privacy. Specifically, 
Federal laws such as the Wiretap Act of 1968 and the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, while still relevant and important 
in the fight to protect civil liberties, were passed long 
before drones were commonplace or even on the periphery of our 
imaginations. These laws effectively limit who can respond to 
UAS incident and how. Specifically, current statute makes it 
illegal for State and local law enforcement to intercept 
communications or access a computer without authorization. 
While these are necessary steps to take to counter a 
threatening drone, the existing restrictions on local law 
enforcement make it nearly impossible to track down the 
operator of such a drone.
    Furthermore, many of our critical infrastructure sites are 
privately owned and their owners are responsible for the 
protection of these facilities. The United States has 16 
critical infrastructure sectors whose assets and networks are 
so vital that any damage or destruction to them could have a 
debilitating effect on our National and economic security. 
Despite the importance of these facilities, their owners also 
lack legal authorities to buy and operate counter-drone 
technologies to protect against a threatening UAS.
    Today we need to examine carefully the restrictions caused 
by previous legislation in addition to the lack of clearly-
defined authorities which has resulted in a quagmire of laws 
that Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are at 
risk of violating if they attempt to interfere with a 
threatening drone.
    This problem is substantial when we consider that 
terrorists and criminals promote the use of drone technology 
for illicit means. These groups can buy commercial drones to 
carry and drop explosive payloads, smuggle drugs, and conduct 
surveillance.
    I know that just last week Chief Border Patrol Agent Brian 
Hastings used technology to counter-surveil drug smugglers. The 
smugglers were using a drone to scout areas for law enforcement 
before sending bundles of drugs across the border, so effective 
means of opposition ISR.
    Thanks to Border Patrol's ability to use counter-UAS 
technology they were able to seize over 600 pounds of 
marijuana. I am curious to hear how frequent this type of 
occurrence is and whether they have increased over the past 5 
years with the proliferation of off-the-shelf drones.
    Congress has put forward some legislation to address this 
threat. For example, to prevent terrorists from using drones 
for nefarious purposes I cosponsored with Representative 
McCaul, the Ranking Member on Foreign Affairs, the Stop Iranian 
Drones Act to prevent Iran and Iranian-aligned terrorist 
organizations and militia groups from buying commercial drones 
and parts to use in attacks against the United States and 
allied nations. This type of legislation is a step in the right 
direction, but there is far more to do.
    But I am looking forward to hearing today from all of you, 
specifically from DHS, on two things. First, I want to know 
what DHS is doing to work with other Federal agencies and State 
and local law enforcement partners to mitigate drones and how 
effective this coordination has been. Second, to hear what DHS 
needs based on the demonstrated experience with UAS, 
particularly on our Southern Border, to mitigate this threat 
more effectively.
    Given that the authorities granted in this act expire in 
October, we need now to decide how and to what extent we should 
move forward with these authorities. To that end I think DHS 
needs to make its case on whether Congress should renew these 
authorities, should modify them, extend them, because as of 
right now, I don't think we have made that case yet. But I am 
hopeful that DHS can provide clarity and can help us improve 
the handling of new authorities granted by Congress for 
evolving threats to homeland security.
    Thank you again to the Chairs, the Ranking Member, and the 
witnesses. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Meijer follows:]
                Statement of Ranking Member Peter Meijer
    Thank you, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson Coleman, and Ranking 
Member Gimenez, for holding this hearing. I also want to thank our 
witnesses for joining us to talk about unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly known as ``drones,'' are 
becoming a ubiquitous part of our lives. Just like any other 
technology, they can be used to good and bad ends. The Department of 
Homeland Security and other Government agencies use UAS to:
   support firefighting and search-and-rescue operations,
   to provide disaster relief, and
   to help secure our borders.
    But, as the commercial market for UAS continues to expand, there is 
an increased threat posed by drones. Commercial drones can threaten our 
airports, our critical infrastructure, and high-profile events, whether 
intentionally or accidentally.
    To address this growing threat, Congress passed the Preventing 
Emerging Threats Act of 2018. This Act gave DHS the authority to 
protect certain assets when there is a National security risk posed by 
drone. However, the authorities in this legislation did not cover such 
things as large, domestic airports.
    The bill also required DHS to assess current Federal, State, and 
local authorities to counter this threat. I have to point out that 
DHS's report, which the committee just received a few months ago, is 
2\1/2\ years late. For an authority that was intensely negotiated among 
the interagency, as well as various Congressional committees of 
jurisdiction, such delinquency is absolutely unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, the report found that State and local law enforcement 
entities are extremely limited in what they can do to counter threats 
posed by UAS because of laws that were put in place to protect 
citizens' privacy. Specifically, Federal laws such as the Wiretap Act 
of 1968 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, while still 
relevant, were passed long before drones were commonplace.
    These laws effectively limit who can respond to a UAS incident and 
how. Specifically, current statute makes it illegal for State and local 
law enforcement to intercept communications or access a computer 
without authorization. These are necessary steps to take to counter a 
threatening drone, yet the existing restrictions on local law 
enforcement make it nearly impossible to track down the operator of a 
drone.
    Furthermore, many of our critical infrastructure sites are 
privately owned, and their owners are responsible for protecting these 
facilities. The United States has 16 critical infrastructure sectors 
whose assets and networks are so vital that any damage or destruction 
to them could have a debilitating effect on our National and economic 
security. Despite the importance of these facilities, their owners also 
lack the legal authority to buy and operate counter drone technologies 
to protect against a threatening drone.
    Today, we need to examine carefully the restrictions caused by 
previous legislation in addition to the lack of clearly defined 
authorities that has resulted in a quagmire of laws that Federal, 
State, and local law enforcement agencies are at risk of breaking if 
they attempt to interfere with a drone.
    This problem is substantial when we consider that terrorists and 
criminals promote the use of drone technology for illicit means. These 
groups can buy commercial drones to carry and drop explosive payloads, 
smuggle drugs, and conduct surveillance. I know that just last week, 
Chief Border Patrol Agent Brian Hastings used technology to counter 
surveil drug smugglers. The smugglers were using a drone to scout areas 
for law enforcement before sending bundles of drugs across the border. 
Thanks to Border Patrol's ability to use counter UAS technology, it was 
able to seize over 600 lbs. of marijuana. I'm curious to hear how 
frequent this type of occurrence is and whether they have increased 
over the past 5 years.
    Congress has put forward some legislation to address this threat. 
For example, to prevent terrorists from using drones for nefarious 
purposes, I cosponsored Representative McCaul's Stop Iranian Drones 
Act. This bill will prevent Iran and Iranian-aligned terrorist and 
militia groups from buying commercial drones and parts that can be used 
in attacks against the United States and our partner nations.
    This type of legislation is a step in the right direction, but we 
need to do better.
    I'm looking forward to hearing from all of you on this. 
Specifically, I'd like to hear from DHS on 2 things:
   First, I want to know how DHS works with other Federal 
        agencies, and State and local law enforcement partners, to 
        mitigate drones and how effective this coordination is.
   Second, I want to hear what DHS needs, based on its 
        experience with drones, particularly at our Southern Border, to 
        mitigate them more effectively.
    Given that the authorities granted in the Act expire in October, we 
need to decide how--and to what extent--we should move forward with 
these authorities. To that end, I think DHS needs to make its case on 
whether Congress should renew these authorities. As of now, I don't 
think DHS has done so, but I am hopeful that DHS can provide us some 
clarity and can improve its handling of new authorities granted by 
Congress for evolving threats to homeland security.
    Thank you again, to the Chairs, the Ranking Member, and the 
witnesses, and I yield back.

    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Meijer. The Chair now 
recognizes the Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Transportation 
and Maritime Security, the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Mrs. 
Watson Coleman, for her opening statement.
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman. Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us 
today for this critical and timely discussion.
    In 2018, Congress granted DHS and DOJ unlimited authority 
to mitigate drones posing critical threats to specific 
facilities or, in other words, to engage in what we call C-UAS. 
This authority expires in the fall and it falls to Congress to 
determine whether to reauthorize, eliminate, or reform it. As 
October approaches, it is imperative that we open up this 
important conversation to the public, and privacy and civil 
liberties stakeholders in particular, through forums such as 
this hearing.
    For years DHS, together with DOJ and FAA, has briefed this 
committee on the threats that militias and unauthorized drones 
pose to the homeland. Though we can't discuss everything we 
have learned in this setting, we know the threats are real.
    Drones are cheap to produce and purchase. Operators, 
whether malicious or unwitting, can cause major problems when 
they fly drones into restricted airspaces.
    Drones wreaked havoc upon Gatwick Airport in London for a 
few days in 2018, causing thousands of flight cancellations. In 
my home State of New Jersey, air traffic at the Newark Liberty 
International Airport was shut down for an hour-and-a-half when 
drones breached its protect airspace in 2019.
    We have seen drones interrupt sporting events and cause 
disruption. One could imagine drones facilitating more serious 
harm to our Nation's security, whether through hostile 
surveillance of sensitive Government facilities or critical 
infrastructure or even used in kinetic attacks.
    As drones become more ubiquitous and more advanced, these 
risks are only going to grow. According to the FAA, there are 
currently 850,000 registered drones in the United States, 
including 300,000 commercial drones and 500,000 recreational 
drones.
    To be clear, drones provide many benefits to society. 
Journalists are using drones to cover the news. Hobbyists are 
using drones to enjoy their weekends. Businesses and 
governments are using them to inspect infrastructure, survey 
land, and monitor crops.
    As with all new technologies, we can't focus just on the 
risks or the benefits. We need to balance both. In this spirit, 
I do have some questions about Section 124n, the Government's 
C-UAS authority as it is currently constructed.
    When we create limited exceptions to laws like the wiretap, 
as this authority does, we must consider fundamental 
principles, like privacy and due process. When we place limits 
on the use of a technology, like drones that journalists use 
every day to cover protests, natural disasters, and other 
matters of core public interest, as this authority does, we 
must consider the First Amendment of the Constitution and the 
freedom of the press.
    That means that we need a clear understanding of how DHS is 
interpreting key terms in the statute and ensuring the 
statute's First and Fourth Amendment protections are held. We 
must ask ourselves as we look forward what more can we do to 
ensure privacy and civil liberty unions' protections are baked 
in at every level of DHS's C-UAS planning and operations?
    While I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses 
about the real threats posed by drones as well as DHS's 
response to these threats, I am equally eager to learn about 
the Department's approach on questions of privacy and civil 
liberties.
    Homeland security may be about protecting our Nation's 
critical assets, but there is no asset more critical than our 
values. I look forward to engaging in this public conversation 
as we work to determine an appropriate path forward on these 
issues.
    I want to thank our witnesses for joining us as well as for 
their efforts to ensure our Nation is prepared for the long 
list of drone-related threats that we may face.
    I yield back.
    [The statement of Chairwoman Watson Coleman follows:]
             Statement of Chairwoman Bonnie Watson Coleman
                             March 31, 2022
    In 2018, Congress granted DHS and DOJ a limited authority to 
mitigate drones posing critical threats to specific facilities. Or in 
other words, to engage in what we call C-UAS. This authority expires in 
the fall--and it falls to Congress to determine whether to reauthorize, 
eliminate, or reform it. As October approaches, it is imperative that 
we open up this important conversation to the public--and privacy and 
civil liberties stakeholders in particular--through forums such as this 
hearing.
    For years, DHS, together with DOJ and FAA, has briefed this 
committee on the threats that malicious and unauthorized drones pose to 
the homeland. Though we can't discuss everything we've learned in this 
setting, we know the threats are real. Drones are cheap to produce and 
purchase, and operators, whether malicious or unwitting, can cause 
major problems when they fly drones into restricted airspaces.
    Drones wreaked havoc upon Gatwick Airport in London for a few days 
in 2018, causing thousands of flight cancellations, and in my home 
State of New Jersey, air traffic at Newark Liberty International 
Airport was shut down for an hour-and-a-half when drones breached its 
protected airspace in 2019.
    We've seen drones interrupt sporting events and cause disruption. 
And one could imagine drones facilitating more serious harm to our 
Nation's security, whether through hostile surveillance of sensitive 
Government facilities or critical infrastructure, or even use in 
kinetic attacks.
    As drones become more ubiquitous and more advanced, these risks are 
only going to grow. According to the FAA, there are currently 850,000 
registered drones in the United States, including 300,000 commercial 
drones and 500,000 recreational drones. To be clear, drones provide 
many benefits to society. Journalists are using drones to cover the 
news. Hobbyists are using drones to enjoy their weekends. Businesses 
and governments are using them to inspect infrastructure, survey land, 
and monitor crops.
    As with all new technologies, we can't focus just on the risks or 
the benefits. We need to balance both. In this spirit, I do have some 
questions about Section 124n--the Government's C-UAS authority--as it 
is currently constructed. When we create limited exceptions to laws 
like the Wiretap Act--as this authority does--we must consider 
fundamental principles like privacy and due process.
    When we place limits on the use of a technology like drones that 
journalists use every day to cover protests, natural disasters, and 
other matters of core public interest--as this authority does--we must 
consider the First Amendment of the Constitution and the freedom of the 
press.
    That means we need a clear understanding of how DHS is interpreting 
key terms in the statute and ensuring the statute's First and Fourth 
Amendment protections are upheld. And we must ask ourselves, as we look 
forward: What more can we do to ensure privacy and civil liberties 
protections are baked-in at every level of DHS's C-UAS planning and 
operations?
    While I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses about the 
real threats posed by drones, as well as DHS's response to these 
threats, I am equally eager to learn about the Department's approach on 
questions of privacy and civil liberties. Homeland security may be 
about protecting our Nation's critical assets, but there is no asset 
more critical than our values.
    I look forward to engaging in this public conversation as we work 
to determine an appropriate path forward on these issues. I want to 
thank our witnesses for joining us, as well as for their efforts to 
ensure our Nation is prepared for the long list of drone-related 
threats we face.

    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Madam Chair. The Chair now 
recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Maritime Security, the gentleman from 
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for an opening statement. Welcome, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Correa, 
Chairwoman Watson Coleman, and Ranking Member Meijer for 
holding this hearing today.
    The number of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as 
drones, in our Nation's airspace is increasing. Their technical 
capabilities are continually improving. The evolving threat of 
drones used by unknown or maligned actors present a challenge 
in keeping our country's transportation systems, critical 
infrastructure, and borders secure.
    In 2018, reports of drone sightings near the runways of 
London's Gatwick Airport caused the cancellation of 1,000 
flights over the Christmas holidays, negatively impacting about 
140,000 passengers and resulting in a significant economic 
impact. In the United States this year, there have already been 
two commercial flights whose pilots were forced to take evasive 
action to avoid collision with a drone.
    DHS is currently testing technology to detect and track and 
identify drones entering restricted airspace. Last year I was 
pleased to visit the TSA test bed at my home airport of Miami 
International. I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses 
on how security and surveillance technology can be used at 
airports and surface transportation sites Nation-wide to 
protect the traveling public.
    The number and sophistication of drones at the Southwest 
Border has also increased over the last several years. I am 
particularly concerned that transnational criminal 
organizations are using drones to move migrants and narcotics 
across the border and conduct surveillance on Customs and 
Border Protection personnel. It appears that the use of drones 
for illicit border activity is wide-spread and it is a critical 
element of these groups' operations.
    I thank the witnesses for being here today to discuss what 
capabilities DHS is using to counter drones through the 
authorities Congress gave them in the Preventing Emerging 
Threats Act of 2018. Thank you, Chairman and Madam Chairwoman, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Gimenez follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Carlos Gimenez
    Thank you, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson Coleman, and Ranking 
Member Meijer for holding this hearing today.
    The number of unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones, 
in our Nation's air space is increasing and their technical 
capabilities are continuously improving. The evolving threat of drones 
used by unknown or malign actors present a challenge in keeping our 
country's transportation systems, critical infrastructure, and borders 
secure.
    In 2018, reports of drone sightings near the runway at London's 
Gatwick airport caused the cancellation of 1,000 flights over the 
Christmas holiday, negatively impacting 140,000 passengers and 
resulting in a significant economic impact. In the United States this 
year, there have already been two commercial flights whose pilots were 
forced to take evasive action to avoid collision with a drone.
    DHS is currently testing technology to detect, track, and identify 
drones entering restricted airspace. Last year, I was pleased to visit 
the TSA test bed at my home airport of Miami International. I look 
forward to hearing from today's witnesses on how security and 
surveillance technology can be used at airports and surface 
transportation sites Nation-wide to protect the traveling public.
    The number and sophistication of drones at the Southwest Border has 
also increased over the last several years. I'm particularly concerned 
that transnational criminal organizations are using drones to move 
migrants and narcotics across the border and conduct surveillance of 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel. It appears that the use 
of drones for illicit cross border activity is wide-spread and a 
critical element of these groups' operations.
    I thank the witnesses for being here today to discuss what 
capabilities DHS is using to counter drones through the authorities 
Congress gave them in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018.
    Thank you, Chairman and Madame Chairwoman, and I yield back the 
balance of my time.

    Chairman Correa. Members are reminded that the committee 
will operate according to the guidelines laid out by the 
Chairman and Ranking Member in their February 3 colloquy 
regarding remote procedures. Without objection, Members on the 
subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question the 
witnesses. Additional Member statements may be submitted for 
the record.
    [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
                             March 31, 2022
    In 2018, Congress granted the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Justice limited authority to counter the threat posed 
by unmanned aircraft systems. That authority is set to expire this 
October, leaving this committee responsible for assessing how DHS has 
conducted its C-UAS mission and what changes may be needed before 
Congress reauthorizes or reforms that authority.
    Drones are more affordable and accessible than ever. From families 
capturing vacation memories to journalists covering major National news 
events, millions of Americans operate drones responsibly and safely 
each year. But, when used nefariously, drones can pose a great threat 
to public safety and National security.
    Malicious actors have used drones to smuggle illicit materials 
across borders and into prisons and have disrupted air travel and law 
enforcement activities. Some drone operators just fail to understand 
the rules and may disrupt major public events, transportation systems, 
or other sensitive locations simply by accident. Whether the operator 
is flying innocently or maliciously, the Department must be able to 
respond quickly, assess the threat, and ensure any actions to mitigate 
a drone uphold Americans' Constitutional rights to privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties.
    It is essential that we continue to protect the freedom of the 
press, including when journalists use drones to capture images of major 
news stories, whether it be destruction following a natural disaster or 
large protest gatherings. We must also ensure that drone operators, 
many of whom are merely backyard hobbyists, do not have their private 
property seized and destroyed by the Government for minor, accidental 
infractions. With that in mind, I am particularly interested in hearing 
from our witnesses on how, specifically, a drone threat is mitigated 
and what steps are taken to preserve the rights of Americans against 
unnecessary search and seizure.
    The upcoming sunset of the Department's C-UAS authority provides 
Congress with an opportunity to conduct a stringent assessment of the 
current authority, its strengths, and its shortcomings, before choosing 
whether and how to reauthorize counter-drone activities.
    I look forward to learning more from our witnesses, each with their 
own perspective on how the Department has used its C-UAS authority, 
about how they have grappled with responding efficiently to threats 
while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

    Chairman Correa. Now I would like to welcome our panelists. 
Our first witness is Ms. Samantha Vinograd, the acting 
assistant secretary for Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention 
at the Department of Homeland Security. She began her career as 
a deputy U.S. Treasury attache to Iraq; subsequently served on 
the National Security Council. She was previously a CNN 
national security analyst, a senior advisor at the Biden 
Institute, and a visiting fellow at the University of Chicago 
Institute for Politics.
    Our second witness, Rear Admiral Scott Clendenin. He served 
as then-U.S. Coast Guard assistant commandant for response 
policy. He is responsible for the U.S. Coast Guard policy in 7 
operational mission areas, including defense operations and law 
enforcement. Before that, he served afloat for 14 years at sea 
on Coast Guard cutters conducting multi-mission patrols in the 
Atlantic, Pacific, and throughout the Caribbean.
    Our third witness is Austin Gould, the acting deputy 
executive assistant administrator for operation support at the 
Transportation Security Administration. He is responsible for 
strengthening TSA's operational capabilities and driving 
mission performance through analysis and innovation. Prior to 
joining TSA, Mr. Gould served as a captain in the U.S. Coast 
Guard. During his 30-year Coast Guard career he worked in a 
variety of operational and acquisition management positions.
    Our final witness, Mr. Dennis Michelini, deputy executive 
assistant commissioner of air and marine operations at Customs 
and Border Protection. He began his Federal law enforcement 
career in 1995 as a U.S. Border Patrol agent. In 2000, he 
became an aircraft pilot and joined AMO. From 2013 to 2016, he 
served as director of air operations, where he was responsible 
for UAS operations and the employment of new UAS technologies 
throughout the CBP environment.
    Deep breath. Without objection, the witnesses' full 
statements will be inserted into the record. Now I am going to 
ask each witness to summarize their statements for 5 minutes, 
beginning with Ms. Samantha Vinograd. Welcome, ma'am.

STATEMENT OF SAMANTHA VINOGRAD, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
   COUNTERTERRORISM, THREAT PREVENTION, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, 
   OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY

    Ms. Vinograd. Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson Coleman, 
Ranking Member Gimenez, Ranking Member Meijer, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you for 
inviting the Department of Homeland Security to be with you 
today.
    I began my Government service under the Bush administration 
in 2007 as a civil servant at Treasury both in Iraq and 
Washington, DC. I subsequently served on the National Security 
Council in a variety of roles. I was honored to rejoin 
Government service last February at the Department of Homeland 
Security as senior counselor and later as acting assistant 
secretary for counterterrorism, threat prevention, and law 
enforcement. It has been an honor to serve bipartisan 
administrations on critical National security and homeland 
security issues affecting our country.
    Let me be very clear at the outset. The Department of 
Homeland Security considers our C-UAS mission to be twofold: We 
are focused on using our authority to mitigate credible 
threats; No. 2, the safety and security of DHS missions. At the 
same time, in doing so, we are just as focused as protecting 
privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. I look forward to 
sharing with you how we are accomplishing both aspects of our 
C-UAS mission.
    DHS is judiciously implementing the authorities that 
Congress granted in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 
to conduct C-UAS operations. These operations respond to the 
evolving and dynamic UAS threat environment and ensure that 
privacy and civil rights and civil liberties are protected. The 
Department exercises this authority to protect National 
security and public safety while minimizing the impact to the 
National airspace system.
    Technological advances have accelerated UAS capabilities 
across commercial and recreational applications. Their compact 
size and often low cost make them suitable for performing a 
variety of beneficial mission sets. UAS play a transformative 
role in fields such as transport and delivery, emergency 
response, critical infrastructure management, agriculture, and 
more.
    DHS supports the lawful use of UAS. We are only concerned 
with malicious or illicit use by threat actors. We do know that 
the scale and scope of UAS threats are increasing. We are 
deeply concerned about UAS weaponization, smuggling, 
surveillance, disruption, and the fostering of other illicit 
activities, particularly at airports and in border regions. My 
colleagues today will provide additional details on what we are 
seeing from a threat perspective and how DHS is responding.
    We also know that as we look toward the future, emerging 
technologies will expand the boundaries of what is possible for 
threat actors. We are positioning ourselves to remain ahead of 
technology curve through dedicated research, testing, training, 
and evaluation efforts.
    The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 grants DHS and 
the Department of Justice relief from several Federal criminal 
statutes when performing C-UAS actions identified in the act, 
which allows us to engaging in very specific electronic 
detection and electronic mitigation through intercepting the 
communications between a control device--a command device and 
the UAV itself. This authority explicitly enables the 
protection of designated-covered facilities or assets from 
credible UAS threats that relate to specific DHS mission sets. 
The act also authorizes DHS and DOJ to protect NSSE and SEAR 
events, a provision of support to State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial law enforcement upon the request of the chief 
executive officer of the respective State or territory for mass 
gathering that are limited to a specific time frame and 
location, as well as the protection of an active Federal law 
enforcement investigation.
    DHS successfully coordinated over 250 operational C-UAS 
deployments and 30 research, testing, training, and evaluation 
events since the authorities were granted, consistent with the 
requirements outlined in the act. In those deployments, DHS has 
never caused undue interference with the National airspace. 
Importantly, our Privacy Office has seen no cause to implement 
a privacy compliance review or to engage in another form of a 
privacy investigation since the authority was granted.
    To ensure consistent application of C-UAS authorities 
across the Department, DHS established a C-UAS Program 
Management Office. This office manages and supports C-UAS 
activities to ensure component alignment, DHS is a large 
organization, with departmental strategy and policy guidance.
    This is especially important, for example, for our 
coordination with the FAA. The PMO has worked closely with the 
FAA to develop objective standards that define critical 
elements of coordination at the Department. Moreover, the 
Secretary issued DHS-wide policy guidance which requires 
components to establish their own internal C-UAS policies. The 
policy guidance establishes formal processes for components to 
obtain deployment authorizations.
    Chairman Correa. Ms. Vinograd, I am going to ask you to 
summarize and conclude your statement.
    Ms. Vinograd. Certainly. DHS applies a multi-layered 
approach to promoting privacy and civil rights and civil 
liberties, which I will articulate today, both at the 
Department-wide level and the component level. We also are 
focused on ensuring transparency and promoting First Amendment-
protected activities when we do work with the FAA to implement 
temporary flight restriction.
    I am very honored to be with you here today and look 
forward to answering your questions with respect to gaps in our 
authorities and the way forward with respect to the threat 
landscape. Thank you, sir.
    [The joint prepared statement of Ms. Vinograd, Mr. 
Clendenin, Mr. Gould, and Mr. Michelini follows:]
  Joint Prepared Statement of Samantha Vinograd, Scott W. Clendenin, 
                 Austin Gould, and Dennis J. Michelini
                        Thursday, March 31, 2022
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Gimenez, 
Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, 
thank you for inviting us to testify regarding emerging threats posed 
by the malicious use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS \1\ or 
``drones''\2\) in the United States and the missions of the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) to counter such threats. DHS continues to 
judiciously implement the authorities Congress granted through 
enactment of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 (the ``Act''), 
codified at 6 U.S.C.  124n, to conduct UAS detection and counter-
unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS)\3\ activities in response to the 
evolving and dynamic threat environment, while ensuring the protection 
of privacy and civil rights and civil liberties. The Department takes 
implementation of its C-UAS authorities seriously, exercising them to 
protect National security and public safety while preserving the rights 
of the public and working with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) to minimize impact to the National airspace system (NAS).
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    \1\ The term ``unmanned aircraft system'' means an unmanned 
aircraft and associated elements (including communication links and the 
components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for 
the operator to operate safely and efficiently in the National airspace 
system. See 49 U.S.C.  44801.
    \2\ For the purposes of this statement, ``drone'' refers to the 
aircraft portion of a UAS.
    \3\ The term ``counter-UAS system'' means a system or device 
capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing 
control of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. See 49 
U.S.C.  44801. Although this term, as defined in statute, does not 
encompass UAS detection, references to ``C-UAS'' activities throughout 
this testimony are intended to include both UAS detection and 
mitigation activities.
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    Technological advances have accelerated UAS capabilities across a 
variety of commercial and recreational applications. Their compact size 
and often low cost make them suitable for many beneficial applications, 
performing critical tasks with minimal risk and expense. A wide 
spectrum of domestic users--including industry, private citizens, and 
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments--are using 
or expect to use UAS, which may play a transformative role in fields 
such as transport and delivery, critical infrastructure management, 
agriculture, search and rescue, disaster response, public safety, 
coastal security, military training, and others. Estimates suggest that 
rapidly advancing UAS technology and integration of drones into the NAS 
will result in new innovations and generate economic growth and 
opportunity for businesses and private citizens. DHS supports the 
lawful use of UAS, including by commercial and recreational users. Like 
all technology, however, UAS can be exploited for malicious use by 
threat actors, threatening National security and public safety, which 
is the major concern of DHS.
    Our joint testimony today describes threats to the U.S. homeland 
posed by the malicious use of drones and how we use our authorities to 
protect against these threats. We explain our tiered approach to 
implementation and governance of C-UAS authorities, including 
compliance with existing laws and regulations, issuing Department and 
component-level policy guidance, and specific privacy, civil rights, 
and civil liberties documentation that surpasses statutory 
requirements. Our testimony underscores the processes required to gain 
Departmental approval and authorization to conduct C-UAS activities, 
which are designed to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil 
liberties, safeguard aviation safety, and ensure leadership review of 
every deployment. Additionally, we will provide examples of DHS 
components' C-UAS activities, including testing and operational 
deployments by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Finally, 
we highlight gaps in the Department's current authorities that sunset 
on October 5, 2022--as noted in the DHS C-UAS Assessment delivered to 
Congress in December 2021--and we indicate the Department's intention 
to request reauthorization and expansion of its C-UAS authorities to 
remedy such gaps to address dynamic and evolving threats.
       threats to the u.s. homeland from the malicious use of uas
    The malicious use of UAS is increasing and diversifying in the 
United States and abroad. The threat can take several forms, including 
kinetic attacks with payloads of firearms, explosives, or weapons of 
mass destruction; the illicit trafficking of narcotics or contraband; 
surveillance against law enforcement; cyber attacks against wireless 
devices or networks; foreign intelligence; and corporate espionage or 
theft of intellectual property. The availability of highly-capable, 
low-cost UAS has led to expanded use by threat actors. This has 
required DHS to grow its domain awareness and response capability 
efforts to identify and counter smaller, more agile, and less 
attributable threats across its mission spaces.
    We are most concerned with UAS weaponization, smuggling, 
surveillance, disruption, and the fostering of other illicit activity, 
particularly in venues where DHS already conducts its missions 
including airports, border regions, protective operations, National 
Special Security Events (NSSE), Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) 
events, and mass gatherings. Throughout border regions, CBP personnel 
have observed UAS used to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance of 
their operations and have identified a multitude of unmanned aircraft 
that were deemed as credible threats \4\ or enabling other criminal 
activity such as smuggling, trafficking, and conveyance of illicit 
materials. At critical infrastructure, key resource sites, sensitive 
Government facilities, and Federal properties Nation-wide, CBP and 
Federal Protective Service (FPS) personnel have observed UAS operations 
that appear to conduct intelligence gathering, physical security 
observation, and strategic reserves assessments on behalf of threat 
actors. U.S. Secret Service (USSS) officers have identified UAS 
violating temporary flight restrictions put in place by the FAA to 
protect the President and other Government leaders, the type of threats 
exemplified by the assassination attempt on Venezuelan President Maduro 
utilizing explosives-laden drones in 2018. TSA and the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) continue to engage with 
transportation sector and critical infrastructure partners to improve 
stakeholder response capabilities and reaction times to UAS threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Defined by the Secretary of Homeland Security as, ``The 
reasonable likelihood that a UAS or unmanned aircraft activity, if 
unabated, would: (i) Inflict or otherwise cause physical harm to a 
person; (ii) inflict or otherwise cause damage or harm to assets, 
facilities or systems; (iii) interfere with the operational mission, 
including movement, security, and protection, of a covered facility or 
asset; (iv) facilitate unlawful activity; (v) conduct unauthorized 
surveillance or reconnaissance; or (vi) result in unauthorized access 
to, or disclosure of, classified, sensitive or otherwise lawfully 
protected information.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As we look toward the future, emerging technologies will expand the 
boundaries of what is possible for threat actors. Capabilities such as 
controlling multiple drones with one remote, autonomous flight plans, 
obstacle avoidance, extended communications ranges, and prolonged 
battery life require constant reevaluation of the Department's 
prevention and response tactics. Remaining adaptive and proactive in 
countering UAS threats as they evolve is critical to DHS in executing 
its missions. Through research, testing, training, and evaluation 
efforts (RTTE), spearheaded by the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) 
Directorate, and as recurring innovation and simulation efforts across 
the interagency mature, we are positioning ourselves to remain ahead of 
the technology curve.
                current dhs c-uas authority and its use
    The Act grants DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) relief from 
several Federal criminal statutes, namely from provisions of Titles 18 
and 49 that generally prohibit aircraft sabotage, computer fraud and 
abuse, interference with the operation of a satellite, wiretapping, and 
use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, to take certain 
actions to detect and defeat UAS posing a credible threat. The actions 
authorized in the Act include electronic detection, electronic 
mitigation through communications signal intercept and interruption, 
kinetic/physical mitigation, and device seizure. This authority 
expressly enables the protection of designated ``covered facilities or 
assets''\5\ from credible UAS threats that relate to specific DHS 
mission sets, including those covered by CBP, FPS, USCG, and USSS. The 
Act also authorizes protection of shared DHS and DOJ mission sets 
including protection of NSSE and SEAR events, a provision for support 
to State, local, territorial, or Tribal law enforcement (upon request 
of the chief executive officer of the respective State or territory) 
for mass gatherings that are limited to a specific time frame and 
location, and the protection of an active Federal law enforcement 
investigation, emergency response, or a security function that is 
limited to a specified time frame and location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Defined in the Preventing Emerging Threats Act as any facility 
asset that is identified as high-risk and a potential target for 
unlawful unmanned aircraft activity by the Secretary or the Attorney 
General, in coordination with the Secretary of Transportation with 
respect to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based 
assessment; is located within the United States; and directly relates 
to an authorized DHS mission, or authorized joint DHS or DOJ mission, 
See 6 U.S.C.  124n(k)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Consistent with requirements outlined in the Act and in 
coordination with the FAA, DHS successfully coordinated 246 operational 
C-UAS deployments and 30 RTTE events since the authorities were 
granted. We continue to collaborate closely with the FAA on each 
deployment to minimize potential impact to the NAS. By partnering with 
interagency colleagues such as DOJ, Department of Defense (DOD) Joint 
C-UAS Office (JCO), and North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD), our understanding of UAS activity across all domestic 
environments is maturing, enhancing our ability to differentiate 
malicious activity from authorized flights, counter credible UAS 
threats, and share relevant information and data. We see these 
collaborations and open communication channels as a foundation of 
shared success to protect the homeland.
      policy and guidance governing dhs's use of c-uas authorities
    To ensure consistent application of C-UAS authorities across all 
components, DHS established a C-UAS Program Management Office (PMO) 
within the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY). The PMO 
manages and supports C-UAS activities to ensure component alignment 
with Departmental strategy and policy guidance and serves as a single 
point of contact for interagency partners.
    This is especially true for coordination with the FAA. The PMO has 
worked closely with the FAA to develop an agreed-upon set of objective 
standards that define critical elements of coordination at the 
Department level, component level, and operational deployment level. 
Due to the sensitivities of deploying and operating C-UAS equipment and 
legal implications associated with relief from provisions of Titles 18 
and 49 through the Act, it is imperative to have formal and streamlined 
C-UAS governance and communication structures in place. Objective 
standards ensure DHS maintains compliance with existing laws and 
regulations.
    We recognize the critical importance of maintaining the safety and 
security of the NAS and coordinate with the FAA to develop repeatable 
processes for safe and efficient deployments of C-UAS technology. The 
resulting objective standards create consistency across all DHS 
components by establishing common definitions, guidelines for 
conducting risk-based assessments, including coordination with the FAA 
for assessments of the impact to nearby airport communications and 
aircraft navigation devices, reporting protocols when C-UAS equipment 
is ``activated'' or ``transmitting,'' data retention standards and 
assessment of the need for other airspace protections, such as flight 
restrictions.
    In addition to these agreed-upon objective standards, the Secretary 
issued the DHS C-UAS Policy Guidance on September 10, 2019 requiring 
DHS components to establish their own internal C-UAS policies, conduct 
assessments to document the protection of privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties, and develop operational plans for each unique C-UAS 
deployment, among other requirements.
          process for authorizing the use of c-uas authorities
    Recognizing the complexity and nuances associated with deploying C-
UAS equipment domestically, the DHS Secretary's C-UAS Policy Guidance 
establishes formal processes for obtaining C-UAS deployment 
authorizations. Major process steps include DHS components identifying 
a ``covered facility or asset'' to be designated, coordinating with FAA 
so they may assess potential impacts to the NAS and evaluate the need 
and regulatory basis for establishing flight restrictions, and 
receiving authorization from the Secretary to conduct C-UAS activities 
pursuant to the Act.
    All deployments require components to conduct a risk-based 
assessment prior to requesting the statutorily required designation of 
a ``covered facility or asset'' from the Secretary. This assessment 
includes an evaluation of traditional risk elements such as threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence but also considers collateral risk that 
C-UAS systems pose to the NAS. DHS provides the FAA with C-UAS 
equipment operating frequencies so the FAA may evaluate potential 
interference with nearby airport communications or aircraft avionics 
(radio frequency spectrum deconfliction). When deconfliction is 
complete and the FAA has reviewed the operating plan, DHS and the FAA 
sign a coordination memorandum indicating required coordination steps 
are complete. The Secretary then designates the requested facility or 
asset as a ``covered facility or asset'' and authorizes the component 
to take C-UAS actions pursuant to the Act.
    DHS and FAA coordinated these processes to enable the FAA to ensure 
deployments do not negatively impact the NAS, to provide details on how 
authorities are used, and to ensure senior leadership visibility and 
concurrence with operations. We work collaboratively with the FAA to 
successfully protect a wide range of areas, events, and mass gatherings 
from UAS threats and continuously review our processes and protocols to 
streamline tasks where possible.
 how privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected during c-
                             uas activities
    DHS is committed to protecting the security of the Nation and its 
values. Those values include respecting the civil rights, civil 
liberties, and personal privacy of its citizens and visitors, as well 
as conducting operations with openness and accountability.
    Understanding how C-UAS equipment works is essential to considering 
the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties implications of its use. 
While drones generally operate on the same frequencies used by publicly 
available communication networks such as cellular, Bluetooth, and wi-
fi, they use an individual network created between the drone and a 
controller. Some C-UAS equipment DHS uses identifies those 
communication networks and determines that the link is between a drone 
and its controller. DHS is unable to access other content on the 
operator's phone or device if it is being used to control the drone.
    In general, the term ``mitigation'' involves an interruption of the 
signal from the drone operator's controller to the drone itself. An 
interruption causes the drone to enter into its pre-programmed recovery 
protocol, which is often to fly to its pre-designated ``home'' location 
or to simply hover in place. In cases where sending a drone ``home'' 
does not decrease the threat, some C-UAS equipment emulates a 
controller, thereby overpowering the signals from the operator's 
controller and allowing the C-UAS equipment operator to send the drone 
to a new ``home'' location or a DHS-preferred render safe location. Of 
import, C-UAS equipment is not constantly transmitting in the radio 
frequency spectrum; rather, it is generally only transmitting for 
seconds at a time, and only on the rare occasion when a mitigation 
action is under way.
    The Act includes strong privacy protections. Authorized DHS 
components may intercept or acquire command and control (C2) 
communications to or from a UAS, as an exercise of DHS C-UAS authority, 
but only to the extent necessary to support C-UAS actions authorized by 
the Secretary. DHS components may only intercept, acquire, access, 
maintain, or use communications to or from a UAS in a manner consistent 
with the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution and other 
applicable Federal laws and Department policies. In addition to those 
privacy protections in the Act, the Department applies Section 222 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as amended) to require all component 
C-UAS programs to submit a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) and 
obtain Privacy Office approval prior to deploying C-UAS technology. The 
Privacy Office uses the PTA to determine the need for a Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA), which includes measures to mitigate privacy risks. 
DHS published multiple C-UAS PIAs for public consumption consistent 
with requirements outlined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    We continue to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
by ensuring that RTTE activities collect only information authorized by 
law and needed to identify and address UAS threats. Component policies 
include measures to respect the lawful use of UAS without compromising 
the protection of a ``covered facility or asset.'' Additionally, we 
developed procedures and incorporated them into Departmental and 
component-level policy guidance and operational plans to ensure 
consistency in C-UAS information handling. PLCY issued detailed 
guidance for developing UAS communication collection, retention, and 
sharing procedures, as well as addressing privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties considerations to components as an annex to the DHS 
Secretary's C-UAS Policy Guidance. These policies are currently 
undergoing review and revision consistent with lessons learned.
    The FAA is a great partner for DHS, supporting the Department's 
efforts to protect ``covered facilities or assets'' while preserving 
access to the airspace for those operating UAS compliantly. When DHS 
requests temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) to accompany C-UAS 
activities, the FAA notifies the public of restrictions and provides 
the means to request a waiver should they have a legitimate need to 
participate in protected First Amendment activities. Additionally, by 
collaborating with the FAA to determine if temporary flight 
restrictions are needed, coordinate waiver requests within the flight 
restricted area, and issue notices to the public, we ensure those 
operating UAS compliantly in the area understand the limitations and 
potential actions that can be taken should they violate airspace 
restrictions.
examples of dhs components' c-uas activities, testing, and operational 
                            deployments \6\
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    \6\ The USSS and FPS have also conducted C-UAS deployments, but 
those deployments are not summarized in this written testimony.
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United States Coast Guard (USCG)
    The USCG has safeguarded the American people and promoted National 
security, border security, and economic prosperity in a complex and 
evolving threat environment for over 230 years. As the principal 
Federal agency responsible for maritime safety and security in U.S. 
ports and inland waterways and along more than 95,000 miles of U.S. 
coastline, the USCG works collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to 
combat threats to the homeland and critical infrastructure, and the 
novel threats posed by UAS are increasingly concerning to USCG leaders.
    From 2017 through 2021, the USCG observed a significant increase in 
suspicious UAS sightings over/near maritime assets and facilities, such 
as refineries and ferry/cruise ship terminals. Over the same period, 
UAS interfered with or crashed into USCG assets, ferries, cruise ships, 
and commercial vessels over 80 times. Since the enactment of the Act, 
the USCG conducted 26 separate C-UAS events requiring FAA approval, 
including 2 NSSEs and 5 SEAR events.
    Currently, there are no flight restrictions over commercial 
maritime critical infrastructure, and owners and operators at those 
facilities consistently express their concern about threats posed to 
facilities by UAS. The USCG views the ability for these critical 
infrastructure facilities to obtain flight restrictions as an important 
step in securing the airspace in the maritime and port environments and 
is working with the FAA to address these concerns.
    In preparation for C-UAS operations, the USCG conducts an event-
specific review of privacy documentation, including any relevant PIAs, 
to measure the sufficiency of protocols to ensure civil liberties and 
privacy rights of those individuals affected by C-UAS operations. The 
USCG also collaborates closely with the FAA so the FAA may assess 
potential impacts on the NAS and the need for a temporary flight 
restriction and potentially issue public notices advising UAS operators 
and the public of the location and time period when restrictions are in 
place.
    In addition, the USCG coordinates all C-UAS activities with the 
FAA, the C-UAS PMO, and other relevant law enforcement stakeholders to 
ensure appropriate frequency and spectrum management protocols are 
followed.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    Since its creation following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the 
TSA has dedicated itself to strengthening our Nation's transportation 
systems while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce. 
Drones are one of the latest threats to TSA's mission, and developing 
ways to deter and prevent potential harm from malicious activity to 
aviation and other transportation system sectors is one of TSA's top 
priorities.
    In December 2018, reports of UAS sightings close to the runway at 
London's Gatwick Airport caused the cancellation of 1,000 flights over 
the Christmas holiday, adversely affecting approximately 140,000 
passengers and resulting in severe economic impacts. The UAS operators 
were never apprehended and the resulting 36 hours of halted commercial 
air traffic and cascading international aviation system impacts 
illustrates the significant effects an unauthorized UAS can have on the 
surrounding airspace. Since the Gatwick incident, the number of UAS 
sightings reported increased every year, with the TSA receiving almost 
1,900 reports of drones operating near airports in 2021, more than 
double the amount reported in 2020. Already this year, two commercial 
pilots took evasive action to avoid a drone collision: Air France 
Flight 007 departing New York for Paris and Sunset Aviation Flight 283 
arriving in Atlanta from Orlando.
    While TSA's mission is not explicitly called out in the Act, DHS, 
including TSA, is prepared to protect airports pursuant to the Act's 
authority to use C-UAS for the protection of an active Federal law 
enforcement investigation, emergency response, or security function, 
that is limited to a specified time frame and location. TSA requires 
every airport Federal Security Director (FSD) to develop and update a 
Tactical Response Plan (TRP) to support detection, tracking, 
identification, and in the event of a persistent threat and upon the 
emergency direction of the Secretary, mitigation of UAS threats at 
airports. The TRP documents TSA's preparation and response measures to 
address both errant and malicious UAS activity at and around the 
airport. FSDs conduct annual C-UAS exercises to test these plans with 
participation from State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners 
including airport authorities and other Federal agencies, such as the 
FAA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
    TSA also established a UAS Threat and Vulnerability Assessments 
Unit to conduct comprehensive UAS-specific Joint Vulnerability 
Assessments (JVAs) at airports most at risk from errant or malicious 
UAS incidents. TSA uses these UAS JVAs to refine TRPs, define site-
specific response plans, work with airport authorities and law 
enforcement partners to improve information-sharing procedures, and 
recommend courses of action for the future. Since February 2021, TSA 
conducted 17 full UAS-specific JVAs.
    Looking to the future, TSA established technology test beds at 
Miami International Airport and Los Angeles International Airport and 
is evaluating UAS detection technology for operational effectiveness in 
the airport environment, in coordination with DHS S&T and the FAA. TSA 
tests a range of technologies at the sites, including radar, thermal 
imaging, and electro-optical cameras. TSA uses a continuous technology 
testing cycle in its UAS test beds to keep up with the rapidly-evolving 
UAS technology market and meet the needs of the interagency, 
transportation facilities, and industry.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
    CBP continues to experience high numbers of incidents involving 
illicit use of unmanned aircraft systems to facilitate unlawful 
movement of people and narcotics across the Southwest Border. 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and possibly Foreign State 
Actors use UAS to conduct unauthorized surveillance of CBP personnel 
and operations to pass information to contacts on the ground on where 
to guide noncitizens or transport illegal drugs to circumvent law 
enforcement. Sensor records, pilot and agent sightings, and other 
sources of information also indicate the increasing use of drones to 
transport illegal drugs and other contraband across the border. This 
illicit activity threatens the safety of our front-line personnel, 
poses a collision risk to our aircraft, and adversely affects our 
border security operations.
    Over a recent 5-month period, CBP sensors captured more than 30,500 
drone flights within close proximity of the Southwest Border, of which 
4,458 took place during nighttime hours. Additionally, more than 14,000 
of these flights exceeded the FAA-regulated altitude of 400 feet, some 
nearly reaching altitudes of 4,000 feet. Among all these flights, there 
were only about 4,300 unique drone IDs, indicating that use of drones 
for illicit cross-border activity is not only wide-spread, but also 
organized and an integrated element of TCO operations.
    The Act has enabled CBP to begin taking responsible C-UAS actions 
against systems that pose a credible threat to covered facilities or 
assets along the Southwest Border. Consistent with the Act and the DHS 
Secretary's Policy Guidance, CBP implemented a C-UAS policy and 
subsequent operations plan in July 2020 after extensive discussion and 
review to ensure lawful and efficient operational implementation. The 
overall volume of UAS traffic rapidly expanded in the past few years, 
and CBP is committed to identifying and targeting illicit activity 
while protecting lawful commercial and recreational use.
    Currently, CBP operates C-UAS devices at select, high-risk 
locations along the Southwest Border. Operations target specific 
credible threats and do not involve persistent surveillance of all the 
border regions. Authorization for CBP C-UAS operations requires a 
credible threat determination that involves extensive analysis and 
evidence of the threat, including reports of visual observations and 
correlation with actionable information and other law enforcement 
information. All C-UAS operations adhere to authorized statutory and 
policy parameters to ensure operational integrity and compliance with 
all legal restrictions and privacy protections.
    C-UAS operations are an essential capability to address evolving 
UAS threats and CBP implemented its risk-based C-UAS approach within a 
framework that ensures rigorous analysis and clear documentation of a 
credible threat to identify and target nefarious operators and devices 
amongst the increasing amount of drone traffic. Since CBP's 
implementation of C-UAS operations in July 2020, there were five 
credible UAS threats mitigated, affirmation of CBP's deliberate, 
targeted, and diligent application of its C-UAS authority.
    C-UAS authorities will become even more critical as the UAS threat 
evolves. Less than a year ago, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel 
attacked Mexican law enforcement and a rival cartel with explosives 
deployed from drones. These incidents, along with indications that TCOs 
are pursuing the use of larger drones with more maneuverability, more 
payload capacity, and greater capability--to fly longer, higher, and 
further--are concerning trends. CBP needs these critical authorities to 
continue efforts to counter rapidly evolving threats and expand its 
risk-based implementation of C-UAS operations to additional locations 
along the Southwest and Northern Borders.
                     gaps in current dhs authority
    On December 21, 2021, DHS submitted the interagency coordinated and 
statutorily-required DHS C-UAS Assessment to evaluate drone threats to 
domestic critical infrastructure and airports, evaluate current 
Federal, State, local, territorial, or Tribal (SLTT) law enforcement 
authorities to counter drone threats, and identify additional 
improvements needed for security. The assessment notes the accelerated 
technological evolution of drone capabilities across a variety of 
commercial and recreational applications. As UAS capabilities advance, 
technologies to detect, identify, monitor, and track UAS must also 
advance.
    The assessment also explains how current legal authorities do not 
expressly authorize DHS to conduct certain persistent UAS detection and 
mitigation activities, leaving our Nation's large hub airports and 
critical infrastructure vulnerable to intentional UAS threats and 
unintentional hazards. Additionally, the assessment identified gaps in 
existing authorities that limit the abilities of SLTT law enforcement 
to effectively deter unauthorized activities, respond to incidents, and 
enforce laws and regulations. Specific authority for protecting 
airports and transportation systems combined with a community-based 
approach to UAS detection would help set both the stage for improved 
air domain awareness and foundation for threat discrimination and 
mitigation efforts. These concerns are detailed in the Assessment.
    DHS has been working closely with the administration and 
interagency partners on a legislative proposal to request 
reauthorization of our current C-UAS authorities. The Department's 
approach to reauthorization is grounded in its assessment of the 
evolving threat landscape as well as addressing key gaps and 
vulnerabilities that we have identified. We look forward to engaging 
with you, your staff, and other key stakeholders on those authorities.
                               conclusion
    DHS is committed to countering the threat of malicious UAS activity 
facing the homeland. We are grateful for the continued support of 
Congress and to our fellow departments and agencies for their support 
and contributions in this effort. Together we can raise the domestic 
UAS security baseline, disrupt attacks, and hold accountable those who 
perpetrate these acts. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify 
today and we look forward to your questions.

    Chairman Correa. Thank you very much, ma'am. I recognize 
Rear Admiral Clendenin to summarize his statement in 5 minutes 
as well. Welcome, sir.

   STATEMENT OF SCOTT W. CLENDENIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR 
RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
                            SECURITY

    Admiral Clendenin. Good morning, sir. Chairwoman Coleman, 
Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Gimenez, Ranking Member Meijer, 
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's capabilities to 
counter the emerging threats posed by the malicious use of 
unmanned aircraft systems in the United States.
    As the principal Federal agency responsible for the safety 
and security of U.S. ports, inland waterways, and along more 
than 95,000 miles of coastline, the Coast Guard works 
collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to combat threats in 
the Nation and maritime critical infrastructure and key 
resources. The novel threats posed by UASes are increasingly 
concerning as a proliferation of small UAS continues to 
increase in the maritime domain.
    Over the last 4 years, the Coast Guard observed significant 
increases in UAS activity in the maritime domain as well as an 
acceleration in the rate of suspicious UAS sightings over or 
near maritime assets or facilities, such as ferries and cruise 
ship terminals and refineries. Over the same period, UAS 
interfered with or crashed into Coast Guard assets, ferries, 
cruise ships, and other commercial vessels over 80 times. These 
numbers, which are concerning, only represent the events that 
were formally reported, verified, and analyzed.
    UAS usage in the maritime domain requires additional risk 
consideration as a part of the operational planning cycle. This 
is important because there are no flight restrictions or 
commercial maritime critical infrastructure and key resources. 
And the owners and operators of those facilities have 
consistently expressed their concern about the threats posed to 
their facilities by UAS.
    The Coast Guard views the ability for maritime critical 
infrastructure and key resources, facilities owners and 
operators to obtain flight restrictions as an important step in 
securing the airspace over the maritime environment, and is 
working with the Federal Aviation Administration to address 
these concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard coordinates all 
counter-UAS activities with the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the Department's Counter-UAS Program, and other 
relevant law enforcement stakeholders to ensure appropriate 
frequency and spectrum management protocols are followed to 
mitigate National airspace system impacts.
    Since the enactment of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act 
the Coast Guard has conducted 26 separate counter-UAS events 
requiring Federal Aviation Administration coordination, 
including 5 special event assessment rating and 2 National 
special security events. Before deploying its counter-UAS 
capabilities for these types of events, the Coast Guard 
conducts a thorough review to ensure the appropriate protection 
of civil liberties and privacy rights for those individuals who 
could be impacted by counter-UAS operations.
    The Coast Guard also closely collaborates with the Federal 
Aviation Administration for the generation and release of 
public notices advising UAS operators and the public of the 
location and time period when the Coast Guard will be 
conducting those operations. We take our responsibility to 
protect the maritime critical infrastructure and key resources 
and events with the maritime nexus seriously and we look 
forward to the renewal of the counter-UAS authorities granted 
by the Preventing Emerging Threats Act, which enabled counter-
UAS operations in support of the Nation.
    Thank you for your enduring support to the Coast Guard and 
your interest in this growing mission area. I look forward to 
your questions.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you very much for your testimony. I 
now recognize Mr. Gould to summarize his statement for 5 
minutes.

 STATEMENT OF AUSTIN GOULD, ACTING DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 
 ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS SUPPORT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
      ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Gould. Good morning, Chairman Correa, Chairwoman Watson 
Coleman, Ranking Member Meijer, Ranking Member Gimenez, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittees. Thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss TSA's counter-unmanned aircraft systems, 
or C-UAS, activities.
    From its creation in the aftermath of 9/11, TSA has 
dedicated itself to strengthening the security of our Nation's 
transportation systems while ensuring the freedom of movement 
of people and commerce. Unmanned aircraft systems represent a 
recent challenge to this security.
    As you may recall, in December 2018, London's Gatwick 
Airport was shut down for 33 hours following drone sightings 
over the airport. This was a wake-up call for the aviation 
sector. The result of the shutdown was the cancellation or 
delay of over 1,000 flights, disrupted travel plans for around 
140,000 passengers, and economic losses estimated in the tens 
of millions of dollars.
    The United States has also seen instances where aviation 
operations were disrupted by drones. In January 2019, 1 month 
after the Gatwick incident, Newark Liberty International 
Airport in New Jersey was closed for over an hour after a drone 
sighting. In March 2021, the Greensboro/High Point Airport in 
North Carolina closed for 2\1/2\ hours due to drone sightings.
    TSA has seen a steady increase in UAS events reported near 
transportation systems. For calendar year 2021, nearly 2,000 
UAS events were reported to TSA. This was a 110 percent 
increase over the previous year. Of those events, about 1,500 
occurred near airports, including 686 near major or Core 30 
airports. While most of these events did not impact air 
operations, I want to highlight that since the beginning of 
2021, 49 of these events required an aircraft to take evasive 
action and 5 of these were commercial flights.
    In October 2018, Congress passed the Preventing Emerging 
Threats Act, providing DHS and DOJ the authority to use 
counter-UAS systems to protect certain covered facilities and 
assets as determined by the Secretary and the Attorney General. 
While TSA was not provided specific authority in the act, the 
law provides limited authority for DHS to carry out activities 
related to the protection of an active Federal law enforcement 
investigation, emergency response, or security function that is 
limited to a specific time frame and location. To that end, 
response to a persistent drone at an airport constitutes such 
an emergency response.
    After the Gatwick event, Federal agencies, including the 
Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Federal Aviation 
Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security drafted 
a Concept of Operations outlining how the Federal Government 
would carry out actions to mitigate a similar event at one of 
the Core 30 U.S. airports. This CONOPS designated TSA as the 
lead Federal agency for such a response. Any use of TSA's 
authority for response to a threat would include Secretary 
approval and close coordination with the Federal Aviation 
Administration.
    Since the passage of the act and signature of the CONOPS, 
TSA is prepared to protect airports and threats posed by UAS. 
TSA maintains a team of Federal air marshals to execute DHS-
authorized UAS response at covered facilities or assets. TSA 
also uses this team to conduct UAS-specific joint vulnerability 
assessments, or JVAs. Since February 2021, TSA has conducted 
these JVAs at 17 of the Core 30 airports and will complete the 
remaining by the end of 2022.
    TSA also requires the Federal security director, or FSD, at 
every airport to develop a tactical response plan which 
outlines roles and responsibilities during a UAS event. Federal 
security directors conduct annual tabletop exercises of these 
plans with local stakeholders, including airport authorities, 
local law enforcement, the Federal Aviation Administration, and 
other Federal agencies.
    Last, to support the development of C-UAS capability in 
airports TSA has established a technology test bed at the Miami 
International Airport where TSA, in coordination with DHS S&T 
and the Federal Aviation Administration, evaluates, detect, 
track, and identify technology, including radar, thermal 
imaging, and electro-optical cameras. These tests do not 
currently involve counter or mitigating capability and are 
intended to assess the performance of tracking technology in an 
airport and ensure that technology complies with DHS outlined 
privacy measures. The results will help us understand which 
technologies are effective in actual airport environments.
    Thanks to your support TSA has the funding it needs to 
establish a second test bed at Los Angeles International 
Airport, one of the top airports for reported sightings. This 
funding will help us determine what equipment is best suited to 
identify threats.
    I appreciate the committee's interest in this important 
issue. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, sir. Now I recognize Mr. 
Michelini to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. Welcome, 
sir.

 STATEMENT OF DENNIS J. MICHELINI, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 
  COMMISSIONER FOR AIR & MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
    BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Michelini. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairs Correa, 
Watson Coleman, and Ranking Members Gimenez and Meijer. It is 
an honor to be here today on behalf of the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection to discuss CBP's counter-UAS operations.
    I started my career in border security more than 27 years 
ago, first with the U.S. Border Patrol and then transitioning 
to Air and Marine Operations. Nearly 10 years of my law 
enforcement career have been dedicated to UAS activities and I 
have witnessed first-hand the evolution of the UAS threat at 
our borders.
    There are three areas I would like to highlight: The 
current threat of UASes at and near the border; how the 
critical authorities granted by the Preventing Emerging Threats 
Act enables us to respond; and the importance of improving 
domain awareness to identify, deconflict, and mitigate credible 
threats.
    Transnational criminal organizations use drones to conduct 
unauthorized surveillance of law enforcement personnel and 
their activities. This results in organized criminals on the 
ground becoming acutely aware of law enforcement's location. 
With that information criminals and smugglers are then able to 
evade detection by law enforcement and facilitate the unlawful 
movement of people and illegal drugs into the country.
    Additionally, drones transport goods. Although they have 
limited payload capacities, the potential risk is significant. 
For example, a hobby drone can manage about 4\1/2\ pounds of 
payload. If that 4\1/2\ pounds was strictly fentanyl with a 10 
percent purity, that single drone would be transporting 80,000 
legal doses into the United States. That is one drone.
    The overall volume of UAS traffic, both for legitimate 
recreational and commercial purposes and criminal intent, has 
rapidly expanded in the past few years. Over a recent 5-month 
period, CBP sensors captured more than 30,000 drone flights 
within close proximity of the Southwest Border. Nearly 15 
percent of those occurred at night, which is in violation of 
FAA daytime operational regulations, and nearly half exceeded 
the FAA regulated altitude of 400 feet, some reaching altitudes 
of 4,000 feet. However, among these more than 30,000 flights, 
there were only about 4,300 unique drone IDs, indicating repeat 
violations by the same UAS operators.
    This illicit use of UAS threatens the safety of CBP's 
front-line personnel, poses a risk to our aircraft, and 
adversely affects our border security operations. However, 
thanks to Congress' passage of the Preventing Emerging Threats 
Act, CBP has been enabled to take targeted and deliberate 
counter-UAS actions.
    Consistent with the act and DHS policy, CBP implemented a 
counter-UAS policy and subsequent operation plans in July 2020 
to ensure efficient and appropriate application of this 
authority. As authorized by DHS Secretary, CBP operates 
counter-UAS devices at select active locations on the Southwest 
Border and targets specific threats to covered facilities or 
assets while ensuring the protection of civil rights and civil 
liberties.
    Authorization for counter-UAS operations is a methodical 
and thoughtful process. It requires a credible threat 
determination based on extensive analysis and evidence.
    Since CBP's implementation of the counter-UAS operations 
there have been a number of credible UAS threats mitigated. As 
operations expand we will continue to apply our counter-UAS 
authority with the same prudent and targeted application to 
effectively identify nefarious operators and devices amongst 
the expansive amount of legitimate drone traffic.
    As technology evolves, counter-UAS authorities will become 
even more critical. We have seen evidence of TCOs pursuing the 
use of larger drones with more maneuverability, more payload 
capacity, and greater capability to fly longer, higher, and 
further. This means that we will require a continued commitment 
to achieving persistent domain awareness.
    Having the ability to fully understand the environment in 
which a threat is operating is critical to protecting lives and 
countering criminal organizations. With your continued support 
CBP will further efforts to counter this rapidly-evolving 
threat and expand our risk-based, data-driven implementation of 
counter-UAS operations.
    I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and look 
forward to your questions.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, sir, for your statement. I want 
to thank all the witnesses today. I will remind the 
subcommittee that we will each have 5 minutes to question the 
panel and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
    I will start out by, Mr. Michelini, if I may, I was 
disturbed by your statement because it shows the emerging 
threat of these drones in many ways. That is the defense side. 
What about the offensive side? Are you looking at using--are we 
using drones at the Northern and Southern Border to make sure 
that we are looking, observing those things that are going on 
at our borders?
    Mr. Michelini. Absolutely. Small UAS and drones, both 
rather large up at altitude, or small UAS as deployed by both 
USBP and OFO, are used extensively. But in the context of 
counter-UAS it is that environment where you can understand who 
is the players on each side. That gets very, very complicated 
without the sophistication of a domain awareness technology out 
there.
    But to go back to your opening statement, absolutely, both 
law enforcement and, of course, the cartels are using small UAS 
for their benefit.
    Chairman Correa. So, if I may ask, clearly when we develop 
policy we coordinate with Federal, local, State agencies to 
make sure that we are all on the same page. Do we do that also 
dealing with the Canadian authorities or the Mexican 
authorities and other nations that we may have to coordinate 
when it comes to drone activity?
    Mr. Michelini. We absolutely do. Within the United States 
we coordinate, of course, with the FAA and State and local for 
any kind of work we are doing along the Southwest Border. There 
is a lot of coordination that has to get done between manned 
and unmanned, these small UASes, in the environment of the 
Southwest Border on the U.S. side. When dealing with, for 
instance, Mexico, there are resource restraints on either side, 
and so while we can be mitigating threats from small UASes 
crossing the border back and forth, and through further 
investigations, both us and the Mexican law enforcement can 
work together.
    But I would have to say is on a case-by-case basis with 
just----
    Chairman Correa. When you say you can work together, what 
do you need to actually work together between consistently?
    Mr. Michelini. Well, yes, at the ground level the 
relationships are fantastic, again, with resources available. 
There is a lot of moving parts on the Southwest Border.
    On the northern side, for the detection that we employ, 
that is done by just us on the U.S. side. That is I am not 
aware of any mitigation capabilities or domain awareness for 
small UAS on the southern side.
    Chairman Correa. Mr. Michelini, my questions are really 
directed at trying to anticipate this area that is already a 
very threatening emerging challenge. We would love to, as 
policy makers, get ahead of it, so that as we move forward we 
were there instead of what we should have, could have. Let us 
get ahead of this threat.
    Second of all, let me move in my last 2 minutes to Ms. 
Vinograd. To what extent has the Department of Homeland 
Security included the Office of Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Office in developing your guidelines and 
policies?
    Ms. Vinograd. Chairman, thank you for such an important 
question. As I mentioned, the Department's C-UAS mission is to 
mitigate credible threats to the safety and security of DHS 
missions and to do so in a way that is consistent with privacy 
and civil rights and civil liberties. DHS conducts every single 
C-UAS operation consistent with the privacy provisions and 
civil rights and civil liberty provisions in the act as well as 
the First and Fourth Amendment and other relevant Federal 
statutes.
    The Department does have DHS-wide policy guidance that has 
a specific annex on privacy and civil rights and civil 
liberties, developed in close coordination with our chief 
privacy officer and civil rights and civil liberties officer. 
Further, every component that engages in C-UAS operations has 
component-specific privacy and civil rights and civil liberties 
guidance. Every authorized individual within the Department 
that engages in C-UAS operations is required to receive 
training specifically on the act and the existing privacy and 
civil rights and civil liberties provisions.
    Finally, sir, the Department has published a public privacy 
impact assessment. Every component program, in coordination 
with our privacy officer, every component program must be 
accompanied by a privacy threshold assessment and, where 
needed, a specific privacy impact assessment.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you very much for your comments. It 
seems that I am out of time. I will now recognize the Ranking 
Member of the committee, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes of 
questions.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to get a little 
bit more into the authorities, Mr. Michelini. Since CBP started 
using the authorities in the act in late 2021, you mentioned 
several of the UAS incidents had been mitigated and the drug 
seizures that have resulted and the arrests that have followed 
from those. How is CBP looking at continued use of the 
authorities and what is the alternative if there is an 
expiration of these authorities in October?
    Mr. Michelini. Well, the authorities are essential for both 
domain awareness, seeing the threat environment, and mitigating 
the nonparticipant actors that you want to. It would be very 
hard to go forward in an environment where the authorities ere 
not established. It is--I am sorry, sir.
    Mr. Meijer. Please.
    Mr. Michelini. It is a tidal change what is happening with 
small UAS strategically on the interplay between what is going 
on on the Southwest Border. I think you are going to hear it 
from any of the members here today and the panelists, the 
change is--we have had 5 near misses with small UAS in the last 
year and a half. In an environment, in a helicopter like I used 
to fly where there is not supposed to be a lot of players 
around, that is pretty staggering. We have had just in the last 
year-and-a-half thousands of crossers of small UAS. It is a 
subject that has to get addressed and I believe the Department 
is doing an excellent job of moving forward in a thorough and 
methodical fashion to get this done.
    Mr. Meijer. Rear Admiral Clendenin, kind-of a similar 
question on your side. You know, obviously, CBP, there is a 
little bit more flexibility when we are talking about an 
international border and some of the restrictions and implicit 
authorities there. But within kind-of Coast Guard's broader 
domain or just homeland security in general, what is your view 
on how--what restrictions would we put in place or what 
opportunities that we currently have to protect the homeland, 
to protect against, you know, counter-UAS if these authorities 
were to expire in October?
    Admiral Clendenin. Ranking Member, in short, we would not 
be able to conduct these operations without the provisions of 
the Preventing Emerging Threats Act. Right now the provisions 
are sufficient for our operations as we run them, but we also 
share the concern of the proliferation of the use of UAS around 
secure facilities and assets. So we would look forward to the 
continuation of the PETA act, sir.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you. Shifting a little bit to Mr. Gould, 
can you explain TSA's role in protecting against UAS around 
commercial airports? I know you mentioned kind-of those top 30 
airports, but does TSA need additional authority to be able to 
successfully protect, you know, a broader array of airports? I 
represent Grand Rapids, Michigan, and we are not a top 30 
airport, you know, we are top 100. What does the expansion of 
that counter-UAS capability look like? As I mentioned, is there 
additional authorities needed to protect a broader array of 
civil aviation assets?
    Mr. Gould. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for that question. 
The authority we have right now allows us to, as you said, 
conduct counter-UAS operations in Core 30 airports subject to 
the approval of the Secretary. That omits airports like you 
mentioned, your home airport.
    Right now we are involved in doing joint vulnerability 
assessments of these larger airports, which identify drone 
launching sites, potential areas for surveillance where a drone 
operator can cause an issue at an airport. We also do our 
tactical response plans and our exercises annually. We are 
radically advancing our knowledge of UAS activity around 
airports through our test bed in Miami.
    However, our ability to respond is purely reactive at this 
point. I believe that authorities that would allow us to be 
more proactive, particularly in terms to detect, track, and 
identify, to assess when there is a threat, where it is coming 
from, and respond accordingly will be essential moving forward. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you. No, and I think, you know, obviously 
we are looking at both the accidental and the intentional use 
of UAS to cause harm. You know, Mr. Michelini, as you 
mentioned, you wouldn't expect border airspace at lower 
altitudes to be congested, but when you have rotary wing assets 
that are going through and potentially running into these, you 
know, it is only a matter of time before we lose the alliance 
of some of our brave folks who are guarding down there.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you very much. I now recognize 
Chairwoman Watson Coleman for 5 minutes of questions.
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for sharing your 
information. I want to start with a question to Secretary 
Vinograd. How frequently or regularly does DHS interact with 
and collaborate with the civil rights and civil liberties 
entities that expressed concern about this bill and this 
authority?
    Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, thank you. The Department of 
Homeland Security is working through the Office--our chief 
privacy officer and the Office of Privacy as well as our Office 
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties does engage with members of 
the communities that you have mentioned.
    Further, as we look forward and as we acknowledge the 
escalating threat environment as well as the need to 
judiciously apply any authorities that DHS currently has or may 
be granted going forward, DHS is committed to continuing 
engagement with members of the communities that you described 
to ensure that we understand the concerns.
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you, Assistant Secretary. 
I want to get a handle on understanding how regularly you 
interact, get feedback from, and give information to these 
organizations and entities because they have serious concerns. 
I get it that drones can be really a real threat, those that 
are intentionally malicious and those that are innocent. But 
what I want to know is, how--to what degree are we respecting 
those concerns of those agencies or entities? So, how regularly 
does your Department, whatever office it is, interact with 
them?
    Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman----
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. If at all.
    Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, thank you. I can tell you today 
that we regularly interact with members of those communities. I 
am happy to follow up with you after this hearing with more 
specific information and details on those interactions.
    I will say this----
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Thank you.
    Ms. Vinograd [continuing]. The C-UAS program at DHS is not 
a surveillance program. It is used to mitigate credible 
threats. The C-UAS program is also deeply focused on 
transparency.
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. I am there with you. I am there 
with you. I really appreciate your willingness to get to me 
after the fact. I specifically would like to know what DHS's 
policy is and actually what it has done as it relates to 
consistent, dependable interaction and collaboration with these 
groups. So, through the Chairman of this subcommittee meeting, 
I would like to ask that information be sent to us.
    Again, I would like to ask you what data precisely is 
captured during a UAS mitigation? Do you believe DHS could 
under the current statute capture additional data or are there 
existing statutory protections against capturing more data than 
is strictly necessary to mitigate the UAS?
    Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, thank you. Under the provisions 
of the act DHS currently only collects data on the signal 
between the control device and the UAV. That includes, for 
example, telemetry and location information. Currently, the 
Department of Homeland Security does not collect and is not 
able to access, for example, call logs or text messages or the 
contents, let us say, of what the control device actually is.
    Further, consistent with the act, DHS only retains that 
data for under 180 days. Again, it is not the intent of any C-
UAS operations to collect any personal information that may be 
related to the control device or the UAV. DHS has judiciously 
respected these provisions in the act and will continue to do 
so going forward.
    Chairwoman Watson Coleman. Listen, I did have another 
question, but I really don't have enough time, so let me just 
share this. I am someone that believes that drones are a 
potential threat, that they are a real threat, and that we do 
need to have protection of our safety and security. I also 
believe very, very intently that our values are mightily 
important to protect as well, and that is our privacy, our due 
process, and things of that nature.
    So, I am very much interested at some point in just hearing 
what you think is missing, what you think you all need more of, 
how you respond to some of the areas that we think there needs 
to be a clarity in understanding exactly what you can engage in 
and how you can engage in and how you can act when you issue 
warrants, et cetera.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield, but there are 
so many more questions that we do have with regard to the 
implementation, the appropriate implementation, of legislation 
of this nature. I yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Mrs. Watson Coleman, I couldn't agree with 
you more. So many more questions. Thank you very much for 
those.
    I would like to recognize now the Ranking Member of the 
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, the 
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes of 
questions. Welcome, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Chairman Correa. I also couldn't 
agree more with Chairwoman Watson Coleman about not only is it 
a threat, the coming threat, we have a threat now, but I think 
it is actually going to get worse. So I have a series of 
questions.
    First, I want to relay something that happened to me in 
like around 2017. I had the privilege of going to Israel as the 
mayor of Miami-Dade to look at technology. I can tell you that 
the Israelis were extremely concerned about drones, especially 
around the airport, Ben Gurion Airport. That is why really at 
MIA we have a pilot program right now because of that concern 
that came out of that trip to Israel.
    There are two concerns that I have. The current technology 
is piloted unmanned air systems, but I am actually more 
concerned about future technology, or maybe current technology, 
which is unpiloted unmanned aircraft systems, basically a 
system where you can actually tell it what to do and it goes 
off. Right now we have lot of capability in intercepting and 
interfering with communications with piloted, you know, 
unmanned air systems. I don't believe we have any capability 
about unpiloted because they are not being piloted by anybody. 
They are basically intelligent.
    Going back, though, to the border, Mr. Michelini, you see 
thousands of unmanned air systems flying around all the time at 
the Southern Border. You see them, you detect them, you know 
what they're doing and all that. What can you do about them?
    Mr. Michelini. The commanded and non-commanded, those are 
complicated subjects that I think in a--there are some options 
out there, but I think we should maybe talk about that in a 
closed hearing for that.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough.
    Mr. Michelini. But for the piloted one, it is not just what 
you see, it is the preponderance of what you don't see. I had a 
story I can remember hearing like a year-and-a-half ago is one 
of the first times we put--we turned on these devices, they saw 
40 or 45--and by the way, these are not--the ranges of what 
they see are not very far. They saw 40 targets that nobody was 
aware of. Both counter drone on the--it was counter, counter 
for the--on the Mexican side, and also, small UASs crossing the 
border. So, the amount out there is really staggering. This 
authorization, though, is the foundation to how we are going to 
address our domain awareness gaps on the Southwest Border. It 
is essential to keep this running.
    Mr. Gimenez. Do you have the authority to take them down if 
they are considered to be a threat?
    Mr. Michelini. We do mitigate. We do mitigate small UAS. It 
is a methodical process. We set up an area that we have a high 
risk and we walk through a process that is built to trickle 
down from the DHS policy straight to CBP. So, we do have that 
authority.
    Mr. Gimenez. Now, Mr. Gould, I still have a concern, a 
major concern of we can see them, we can interrupt them, 
interrupt their capabilities once they get into a--there is a 
zone, right? There is a barrier. There is like a fence, right? 
Those piloted unmanned aerial systems we could do something 
about, or many of them. It is the unpiloted aerial systems that 
really concern me and the capabilities that they may have in 
the future, especially carrying destructive payloads, OK, into 
an airport. Do you have the authority now to take these down if 
they cross over into restricted air space?
    Mr. Gould. Sir, DHS has the authority to mitigate counter-
UAS in accordance with an emergency response or a security 
incident like I discussed in my opening statement. As a lead 
Federal agency, TSA is--TSA is the lead Federal agency under 
that authority. In terms of having the capability to actually 
do that today, we do not.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough.
    Mr. Gould. We are focused on detect, track, and identify. I 
would like to highlight your concern. I met with the Center for 
the Protection of National Infrastructure, which is the United 
Kingdom's version of infrastructure protection, prior to this 
hearing to discuss the Gatwick incident. They believe that at 
least on some of those flights, when Gatwick shut down it was a 
drone operating exactly as you said. No connection to a ground 
control station, purely by GPS waypoints. Difficult to detect, 
difficult to interdict.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I think that we need 
to probe further into this about what we are doing about are we 
funding sufficient research in order to obtain offensive 
capability, a defensive capability which is offensive in 
nature, we are basically taking them down. Because I really do 
believe that it is a matter of when, not if, some--a major 
event is going to be happening either at the border, or is 
going to be happening at one of our airports, or one of our 
transportation hubs through the use of these unmanned systems. 
Thank you, and I yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Mr. Gimenez, I couldn't agree with you 
more. What I would like to do is follow up with a closed 
discussion with Mr. Michelini on some of these issues at the 
border and these drones. So, I would like to have the staff try 
to schedule that. Thank you very much. Now, I would like to 
recognize Mr. Payne for 5 minutes of questions. Welcome, sir.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Correa. Welcome.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir. Mr. Gould, several unmanned 
aircraft systems incursions have been reported at airports and 
the one you mentioned at Newark Liberty International in 
January 2019, where planes were altered and diverted for over 
an hour as you stated. Would you briefly discus the ability of 
drones to disrupt airport operations and what impact this has 
on travelers and airport employees. Are there measures Congress 
can take to support Transportation Security Administration to 
address this threat?
    Mr. Gould. Thank you very much for the question, sir. With 
respect to the incident, New York Liberty--or New Jersey--
Newark Liberty International Airport, the drone actually was 
not that close to Newark. It was flying at 35,000 feet over 
Teterboro Airport, which is a municipal airport sort-of 
adjacent to Newark.
    Mr. Payne. Yes.
    Mr. Gould. But it was in a flight path for Newark 
International Airport. Thirty-five hundred feet is far above 
the altitude that a drone operator is allowed to fly. They are 
limited to 400 feet. It was high enough to interfere with a 
flight path. That interference at an airport is--has an 
exceptional, exceptional effect. Flights need to be diverted. 
They need to be rerouted. Airports sometimes are large enough 
where you can just use a different runway. However, the drones 
are mobile. If it was someone who was determined to really 
cause a disruption to the air space, they could just relocate 
the drone to the new air space that is being used.
    So, it is a significant problem with a cascading effect of 
airport delays, inconvenience to travelers, disruption of 
airport workers, disruption of security. It is a very, very 
significant event.
    Sir, I am not sure if you had more than that that you 
asked. I couldn't quite hear the end of your question.
    Mr. Payne. I asked what could Congress do to help you along 
the way in addressing, you know, to support the TSA in 
addressing the threat?
    Mr. Gould. Sir, thank you very much for that. I think, like 
the other witnesses, I think renewal of this authorization is 
essential. From TSA's perspective, not only to Mr. Meier's 
question earlier about would we go beyond the core 30 airports, 
which increased authorities would allow us to do, it would also 
allow us to protect other modes of transportation because this 
is not unique to the airport environment. Pipelines, 
refineries, railroads are all subject to unmanned aerial 
systems incursions that right now we do not any authority to 
respond to. Thank you.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, in light of the 
size of the committee today, I will yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Now, I recognize Mr. 
Bishop for 5 minutes of questions. Welcome, sir.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Chairman Correa. Mr. Michelini, as I 
am listening and I understand there is this authority needs to 
be renewed. I don't know the details in the confines of the 
authority, but what I think I heard you say or it comes out in 
the testimony in the memos I have looked at, is there is a lot 
of--there are a lot of drones flying back and forth across the 
U.S.-Mexico border. Is that correct?
    Mr. Michelini. That is correct.
    Mr. Bishop. I don't think your microphone came on. But that 
is correct.
    Mr. Michelini. Correct.
    Mr. Bishop. OK. You gave a couple figures. I don't know 
whether they include both things that are drones just on the 
U.S. side and those going back and forth, but you mentioned 
4,300 unique IDs. In other words, 4,300 different drones up in 
the air and 30,000 flights in the last 6 months. Is that what 
you said?
    Mr. Michelini. That were recorded, correct.
    Mr. Bishop. That you recorded. You know, so, anyway we get 
new terms, you know. We got UAS and then we got C-UAS, counter-
USOs, I would say anti-drone mechanisms, that you got 
available. Sounds like they are surveillance things so you can 
pick out more of them. Is that right? You can find them. You 
can see them.
    Mr. Michelini. So, with the counter-UAS technology we have, 
it--I want you to think of it as both, you know, to detect and 
mitigate. Typical radar that is used in the manned aviation 
environment, they are not really picking this up. So, when we 
started down this process of counter-UAS, it was both the 
technologies to detect and then the technologies with the 
authorities to mitigate.
    Mr. Bishop. So, mitigate, if I read the memo or it was 
maybe a summary of the memo correctly, it sounds like you can 
maybe jam a transmitter and force the thing to land or 
something. Is that sort-of the right idea?
    Mr. Michelini. Right. There is communication between--not 
to go down that other line--but there is communication between 
the operator and the small UAS or drone. When the communication 
is just interrupted, usually what happens is, whether you own a 
small UAS or not, it will have a return to home or some sort of 
land function to it.
    Mr. Bishop. OK. So, I get it. I get mitigation sounds 
pretty timid and so does that when I hear it described. I mean, 
Mr. Gimenez asked a question, do you have the authority to take 
them down? I can't understand. Maybe you could just help me 
understand. Are there legitimate reasons for cross-border drone 
flights? Because we don't allow anybody--I mean, well, we are 
not supposed to allow anybody to come into the United States. 
Unfortunately, in the current state of affairs, we allow tons 
of people to come into the United States illegally. But I don't 
understand the reason that we would allow drones to come into 
the United States. Why don't we shoot them down?
    Mr. Michelini. Well, in a kinetic response like that, we 
don't--we haven't--CBP is mitigating by bringing them out of 
the sky. They are returning to the ground, but we have not done 
kinetic responses like that.
    Mr. Bishop. Yes, I guess I am asking as a policy matter if 
you are able to speak to it. Maybe not, I will get Ms. 
Vinograd, but--if that is the right pronunciation of your name. 
Forgive me, I didn't catch that earlier. But what is the policy 
reason? I am just thinking about it from the perspective of 
Americans watching this hearing that may say, well, why would 
we allow? Staff had a notation in the memo that one drone has 
had 1,500 flights across the border. I don't understand why we 
permit that.
    Mr. Michelini. Well, it is not for not trying, sir. This is 
a brand-new technology that we are forwarding to the Southwest 
Border. What we look for are specific areas that there is a 
high risk, multiple crossers, and then we set up with what 
technology we have, and we begin a, you know, a con op, an 
operation in that location. But it has, like I said, there is a 
lot going on right now that this Act is helping us finally 
target and address.
    Mr. Bishop. I hear you. I am concerned about whether the 
Act goes far enough, I guess, is what I am trying to ask about.
    Mr. Michelini. Understood.
    Mr. Bishop. So, I get that you said that the drones are 
used by Mexican cartels, both to detect your movements and 
locations so that they can facilitate smuggling with it. I 
think you said they are flying in drugs. We know what a small 
quantity of fentanyl will do.
    Mr. Michelini. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Bishop. So, they can fly drugs into the United States.
    Mr. Michelini. Yes, in small amounts. But again, just the 
idea of being overhead to help move a group that might be 
backpackers with drugs, which could be even more, is a 
fantastic strategic tool by the cartels. So, both are very 
nefarious and very dangerous.
    Mr. Bishop. Yes. Yes, how do I pronounce your name?
    Ms. Vinograd. My last name is Vinograd.
    Mr. Bishop. Vinograd.
    Ms. Vinograd. Indeed.
    Mr. Bishop. I beg your pardon. Ms. Vinograd, you are the 
policy person here.
    Ms. Vinograd. Yes.
    Mr. Bishop. Why are we content to let Mexican cartels 
operate drones to cross the United States border? Why don't we 
take them down? Why isn't that a threat to the United States 
National security? We wouldn't allow airplanes to fly in, would 
we?
    Ms. Vinograd. We would not. Let me assure you, sir, that 
the Department does not believe that it is appropriate or 
acceptable for cartels or transnational criminal organizations, 
more generally, to bring illicit substances across the border. 
Currently, the Secretary has designated parts of the Southwest 
Border as a covered facility or asset, which gives my CBP 
colleagues the authority to track--excuse me--to detect, 
identify, track, and mitigate C-UAS that pose a credible threat 
to DHS mission sets.
    At this juncture, CBP, and I will defer to my CBP 
colleague, feels confident that they have the appropriate 
authorities as well as operational plan to mitigate these 
threats. We are consistently reviewing the threat environment, 
both as it pertains to what parts of the border are designated 
as covered facilities or assets, and whether additional 
mitigation technologies are needed. In a closed hearing, sir, 
we would be glad to go into further details on what those 
mitigation techniques look like.
    Mr. Bishop. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you. I just wanted to follow up on 
your comments, which is I would love to, in a closed hearing, 
talk to Ms. Vinograd and Mr. Michelini about how many of those 
are actually real threats? How many of those are just people, 
knuckleheads, who don't understand that this toy is actually 
causing possible dangers to themselves and other people and 
other assets?
    You know, you go down to the local store, you buy one of 
these drones. You decide to fly it up. I just I am wondering if 
this is an educational issue where people don't understand this 
is not a toy in the context of its use. Anyway, we will talk 
about that in a closed session later on.
    Now, I would like to recognize Ms. Titus from Nevada for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just going back 
to Mr. Bishop's point about why don't we shoot them down? I 
don't think it is quite that simple. I don't think you start 
firing off rockets to shoot down drones in neighborhoods or 
along the border or along the river where people live and all. 
Could maybe Mr. Gould just address that? Some of the problems 
that would exist if we just start firing off rockets to shoot 
down these drones.
    Mr. Gould. Well, thank you for the question, ma'am. Right 
now, from a TSA perspective, we are focused solely on detect, 
track, and identify in the airport environment. Airports have a 
lot of ambient energy. Detection systems that might work in a 
very open area will be adversely affected by that ambient 
energy. Our ability to mitigate a drone event at an airport 
really is predicated on our ability to find it and ensure that 
it has some sort of nefarious intent or inadvertent 
encroachment on an air space.
    With respect to mitigation, like I said from a TSA 
perspective, we are not quite there yet. We do consider the 
communications link disruption that will bring the drone down 
to a safe landing either by the operator or in a predetermined 
location. In terms of actual kinetic responses like had been 
discussed, we are not really contemplating that yet.
    Ms. Titus. Well, and just to continue that conversation. I 
know that in Las Vegas a lot of people are using drones within 
that 5-mile parameter around McCarran Airport to try to take 
pictures of the Las Vegas Strip, which is right at the heart of 
my district. You know, they know they are not supposed to be 
there. I don't know if you consider taking pictures of the 
Strip nefarious or not, but certainly, they cause harm. Often 
they make a plane have to be diverted or can't take off or 
something like that. Could you talk a little bit more about 
what we could do as Members of Congress to help you deal with 
those kinds of threats?
    Mr. Gould. Well, right now, thank you very much to the 
Congress for funding our test bed----
    Ms. Titus. I am sorry, I can't hear you.
    Mr. Gould [continuing]. In Miami and soon to be Los Angles 
so we can do detect, track, and identify activities.
    Ms. Titus. Hello? I lost you. Reed? I lost him.
    Mr. Gould. Ma'am, are you there?
    Ms. Titus. Reed?
    Chairman Correa. Hello?
    Ms. Titus. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I can't--they just 
turned off.
    Chairman Correa. We are here. Can you hear us?
    Ms. Titus. I can't hear them.
    Chairman Correa. Ms. Titus, can you hear us? Hello?
    Ms. Titus. I didn't touch anything.
    Chairman Correa. A drone attack. Can you answer the 
question, if you can.
    Mr. Gould. Would you like me to finish the response?
    Chairman Correa. Yes, please.
    Mr. Gould. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am well 
aware of the drone situation in Las Vegas as well. The Las 
Vegas Strip is a very attractive location for people to film. 
There was a commercial aviation aircraft on final approach to 
Las Vegas that was actually tailed by a drone, photographing it 
not too, too long ago.
    So, back to our detect, track, and identify mission that we 
are testing out in Miami, I cannot emphasize the importance of 
that work enough. It allows us to quantify the problem in the 
airport environment and to expand it to other airports. In 
Miami, specifically, we had about 105 reports of UAS in the 
last year from a visual reporting perspective using technology 
down there that never exceeds 20,000. Now, these are not all 
near the airport. It is in the greater Miami area. But many of 
them are clustered around the airport. Pursuing our detect, 
track, and identify capability will help us address that 
problem. Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you. Well, Mr. Chairman, maybe we can work 
on some of that, it could be helpful to address this problem 
with TSA.
    Chairman Correa. Ms. Titus, you have a minute left.
    Ms. Titus. That is all right. I will yield back. That was 
mainly what I was concerned about. Thank you.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Titus. Now, I would like to 
recognize the gentlelady from Mrs. Harshbarger--the gentlelady 
from Tennessee, Mrs. Harshbarger. Ma'am.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a 
gentlelady. Thank you to the witnesses today. I do have some 
concerns and I would like to direct question to Mr. Michelini. 
You know, it was--you mentioned that these drones go from 400 
foot to 4,000 and, you know, it is the same offenders time 
after time. There are going to be larger drones used to 
increase the payload that they are carrying.
    You know, I have read reports that the drug cartels are 
using these drones to facilitate the movement of drugs, illegal 
drugs over the Southwest Border.
    I guess my question is, I know Mr. Gimenez was talking 
about taking these drones out, but from what I understand, you 
can render the software useless and you can cut those off. I am 
looking at a recent report about a U.S. provider, Vector 
Graphics, editing software who closed access to the services 
for those drones. Is that a possibility? Do you know the make 
and model and what type? You have listed that there has been 
4,300 drones identified because you do have to register those. 
But, you know, my question is what capabilities does CBP have 
to counter these transcriminal--transnational criminal and drug 
trafficking organizations on the border? Can we do that with 
that software?
    Mr. Michelini. We absolutely can. I mean, for the hardware 
and software that we utilize across the Southwest Border, we 
can--we use other metrics necessarily than just their ID 
number. It is a little complicated in that we are working very 
close with the FAA and that is how we deconflict what may be a 
rancher or somebody flying their small UAS and a nefarious 
character using a small UAS. It is not quite as easy as to do 
with a manned aircraft where it is on a radar target and you 
can see it. First you have to set up these counter-UAS devices 
and detect it.
    One of the problems, though, is you could buy a small UAS 
right now and it might have a ceiling. It might have a built-in 
ceiling of 400 feet. If you take it out and try to fly it, the 
software knows where it is. Well, when you hear these examples 
about them flying higher, either that was pre-software or 
people have gone around the software kind-of limits on their 
platforms. So, while you can, you know, this is just how crime 
works is while you can set software limits in a piece of 
machinery, once you buy it, though, things can be altered.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Well, that is crazy. You know, 4,000 
foot that is--that is BFR for a small aircraft, you know, a 
personal aircraft, personal pilot. So, you know, that is a 
little bit crazy. Do you know the models or which drones, I 
guess, you are confiscating more of? That is why I am asking. 
Or the make and model----
    Mr. Michelini. We do know----
    Mrs. Harshbarger [continuing]. Of those drones? Because, 
you know, DJI is a Chinese drone. I am just questioning what 
you are seeing.
    Mr. Michelini. Well, they command about 80 percent of the 
market. So, predominantly, we would see that company. I don't 
have on me right now the specifics of the companies that we are 
tracking or the few that we have interdicted but that is 
information I could get to you.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, that would be great. You know, and 
like you say, they can alter that software later on. It is 
terrible but we see the increase of drugs and the increase in 
the payload that they, you know, drop across the border is we 
already have problems. So, that is just going--it is not going 
to mitigate it all. It is just going to increase the problem 
with the drug flow. So, with that, Chairman, I thank you for 
your time and I yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, ma'am. Now, I would like to 
recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for 5 
minutes of questions.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 
Ranking Members of the respective Transportation and Oversight 
Committee. This is a continuous important issue and an issue 
that we should certainly focus on. Again, to the witnesses, let 
me express my appreciation.
    Let me just simply say this is really about saving lives. I 
guess I immediately think of, in addition to the other elements 
of this problem, is loss of life in a flying commercial 
airline. Let me ask Rear Admiral Clendenin, if I would, and Mr. 
Gould, what is it most of all that DHS or the Department would 
like to do in the future to be more protective or to really to 
cease or to bring down the potential damage with the use of 
drones by individuals and possibly terrorists?
    Admiral Clendenin. Thank you, Congresswoman. So, right now, 
we have the authorities and the capabilities we need to 
complete our pilot program. Once we complete our pilot program, 
we will move to what we call program of record, a more 
permanent both in the types of systems we acquire and the 
numbers that we need to support our maritime security 
operations. As we do that, we will communicate with the 
Department and with the administration and with Congress for 
any additional needs. But as we stand right now, we have what 
we need to complete the pilot as long as we can continue the 
PETA authorization.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Gould.
    Mr. Gould. Ma'am, thank you for the question as well. Right 
now, our authorities are--DHS's authorities are limited to the 
core 30 airports. They are very reactive and they are for a 
limited time, limited duration, for a very discrete event. In 
the future, I believe that additional authorities for other 
airport environments, as well as other modes of transportation, 
are essential. As I said before, pipelines, rail systems, major 
terminals, cruise ships, they are all subject to the same sort 
of nefarious drone activities we see at an airport. Being able 
to go beyond the core 30 airports to those other modes of 
transportation, I think, is very important. Thank you.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Gould, I am going to continue with you 
because I thank you for that openness. I don't think many 
Members, except for your testimony, realize that you have a 
limitation when we have over 300 million people and the land 
mass that we have here in the United States. Why don't you 
probe that a little bit more as to how dangerous it is to leave 
these other elements out of oversight and the authorization 
that you would need.
    Ms. Vinograd. Chairwoman, if I may just jump in for one 
moment. Thank you for articulating some of the gaps in existing 
DHS authorities. The administration will be in the very near 
future submitting a legislative proposal to Congress that 
articulates the gaps that we seek to address in the 
reauthorization process.
    I will note that in the statutory assessment that was 
provided to Congress in December, the administration did review 
and articulate gaps that we do see, which include the proactive 
and persistent protection of airports by DHS. DHS currently 
does not have the authority to engage in that proactive and 
persistent activity further.
    We have articulated that airports do not have the authority 
to, for example, purchase equipment to, unto themselves, engage 
in detection and mitigation of unmanned aircraft system 
threats. So, we look forward to submitting that legislative 
proposal to you and to addressing these gaps based on the 
escalating threat environment.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. I think I had posed the 
question to Mr. Gould as to the extent of the potential danger 
to TSA. Mr. Gould.
    Mr. Gould. Ma'am, I agree with my colleague from the 
Department on where we are at on this. Drones present a threat 
in the airport environment and the transportation environment 
writ large. It is a very challenging threat. It is a very 
dynamic threat. The proliferation of drones are growing 
significantly. Detecting them, identifying friend from foe, 
legitimate operations from perhaps malicious operators, is a 
true challenge in transportation venues. It is one that we need 
to address with the whole-of-Government solution. I am very 
pleased----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Mr. Gould [continuing]. With our emergency--oh, go ahead, 
ma'am, sorry.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. No, I just said thank you very much. Let 
me just get in a last question of how much are we fearful of 
terrorist utilization of these drones? Someone can quickly 
answer.
    Ms. Vinograd. We are deeply concerned by the potential use 
of malicious threat actors including terrorist organizations 
related to the use of unmanned aircraft systems.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I look forward to working with the 
committee and working with the administration for a very 
important issue. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. Mr. 
Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence. I yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Any other 
Members wish to ask questions under this first round of 
questioning? Seeing none, I would ask the committee if anybody 
would like a second run of questions? That is an affirmative. 
Ranking member.
    Mr. Gimenez. It is just not a question, really. I really 
want to push forward with this committee looking at what we are 
doing as a Nation to, you know, we can detect them. We know 
they are there. What can we do about it, OK? We need to do--we 
need to work on the capabilities of doing something about it 
sooner rather than later. So, I would hope that this committee 
can have a closed session on that in the near future. Thank 
you.
    Chairman Correa. Mr. Gimenez, I would just comment that I 
concur with you. Before we get there, I would like to have that 
closed session with some of these folks here to get a better 
picture of what we are facing and what action we need to at 
least to begin to address the emerging threats.
    Mr. Gimenez. If I could just make one more comment. We 
don't have to shoot missiles at them, OK? So, I mean, I want to 
get that off the table, OK? There are other ways that you can 
mitigate and have an offensive capability, a defensive 
capability against these without being missiles. I, you know, 
in the news, the Israelis are doing some stuff with this. 
Anyway, that is some of the things that we really need to look 
at.
    Chairman Correa. Mr. Gimenez, I totally agree with you 
because I think it starts out with education. Again, take care 
of the knucklehead factor, which are people just think it is 
cute to fly their drone into an airport area, which without 
understanding the implications after that. Then you got that 
criminal element. Then we go to the next level of action. Mr. 
Bishop, you had some questions, please.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Correa. Five minutes, go.
    Mr. Bishop. I am going to pursue the same avenue. I do 
think, to Ms. Titus' point, I certainly don't think we should 
be firing missiles at drones in Las Vegas. A lot of things 
happen in Las Vegas. I think that would be a bad modification. 
I see----
    Chairman Correa. Well, it would stay in Las Vegas, right?
    Mr. Bishop. It would stay in Las Vegas, I am not sure. I 
think we are conflating a couple pieces of this that require 
different responses. So, Mr. Gould, I am very sensitive to the 
difficulties of figuring out how to mitigate the problem of 
drones, both the nefarious ones and ones that are just sort-of 
idiots operating their drone around to take pictures around 
U.S. airports. I get that.
    I see a very different picture in terms of cross-border 
flights from Mexico. So, Mr. Michelini, I will sort-of return 
to you. It is funny, you know, I know it is--you guys are 
engaged in very sophisticated business. I appreciate that you 
are. But we always kind-of revert to language like we are going 
to mitigate the threat, which doesn't really tell me what the--
and then it turns out you are jamming their signal so they got 
to land their drone. That doesn't really seem to do it to me.
    So, to Mr. Gimenez' point, I don't even know what it 
requires. I don't profess to be a technical expert. But I want 
to ask again because you have said that there are cross-border 
flights to bring in drones, or at least that potential exists. 
You said there are cross-border flights, you know, in large 
numbers. I can't think of a legitimate reason for a cross-
border drone flight from Mexico. Now, if one goes from the 
United States over to that side, I really can't see why that 
would be either, unless they are yours.
    So, what is the reason that would be legitimate for there 
to be a cross-border drone flight? There appear to be lots of 
them. Why would it be, in your judgment, reasonable to limit 
our policy to, at best, the mitigation you have described, 
which is causing that drone to land? I can tell you that I 
don't think if you blew up a bunch of Mexican cartel drones, 
particularly the heavy ones you are talking about, I don't 
think they would keep doing it.
    Mr. Michelini. No. Well, first of all, you are absolutely 
correct that there should be no cross-border flights of small 
UASs, right? That is illegal. Part 107 does not allow that. The 
same before, you can't go above 400 feet without a waiver, and 
there are no cross-border flights. To use that word that you 
brought up, mitigation, that is what we do though. The aircraft 
will either flutter down to the ground where we are or return. 
But it is incapable then of--it is done. We have stopped that 
threat in that case.
    Mr. Bishop. Is it technically not possible to destroy them?
    Mr. Michelini. I can just tell you since I have been in 
this program, we haven't run down that corridor yet. So, it is 
just something that hasn't been explored.
    Chairman Correa. Is the answer to that question one under 
behind closed doors? I think we can discuss it.
    Mr. Michelini. Well, we can probably pursue. I am sure--
like I am sure DOD, who has authority to do this is in a 
different category than us. Like again, this is a brand-new 
authority for us. It is only a few years old. We have taken a 
very careful way to go forward with it. That is exactly where 
we are right now. We feel pretty comfortable with where we are, 
and in absolutely growing these capabilities. We just haven't 
entertained that one.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you. I am going to recognize Mrs. 
Harshbarger, who would like to----
    Mr. Bishop. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one more? I have 
still----
    Chairman Correa. Sure.
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Time still here.
    Chairman Correa. OK, go ahead. Go ahead.
    Mr. Bishop. Or it was before they clicked. Just one thing 
further. You know, I noticed that in September of last year, 
FAA issued a no-fly order for drones for a period of time 
because there were so many in the air. It was really 
triggered--I got the impression it was directed at news 
organizations because they were having this influx of Haitian 
migrants at the time. If you can do that, why couldn't you just 
follow the same course and issue--get an FAA order to have no 
flights across the border?
    Mr. Michelini. So the TFR, the temporary flight restriction 
that was set up, again, you have to appreciate that is just set 
up for people who are willing to participate, right? So, if you 
are a cartel member and you set up a no-fly zone somewhere, you 
wouldn't necessarily follow it. So, we are back to the category 
we were before where we have to detect them and mitigate the 
threat.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Now, again, Mrs. 
Harshbarger, you are recognized for 5 minutes of questions, 
ma'am.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one 
other question for Mr. Michelini. You stated that you keep 
seeing the same offenders over and over. Are these people not 
being prosecuted when you do find them and you know that they 
are accountable for these illegal drones and illegal drug 
smuggling or whatever they are doing? Or are they not being 
prosecuted? If not, why not?
    Mr. Michelini. They are absolutely being prosecuted. So, 
when we do identify a drone to mitigate or follow the response, 
there are a couple of actions we could take. We can run an 
investigation. Many times, we can track the drone and know 
where it is landing and taking off. Then, of course, both law 
enforcement on both sides of the border can act out legal 
proceedings. So, that is the case. We do respond and make 
arrests to illegal drone use.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. So, are they being allowed to be repeat 
offenders again then even if they are held accountable? I guess 
I don't understand that part.
    Mr. Michelini. No. So, the data point where we said there 
are some unique IDs that have flown--that have flown back and 
forth, that just means we haven't got to them yet. Once we do 
make arrests, then the court proceedings would go as they do.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. All right. Thank you for that. With 
that, I yield back, sir.
    Mr. Gimenez. Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Correa. Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is recognized for 5 
minutes of questions. Ms. Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. 
This is fascinating, overwhelming, and creating a sense of, I 
think, warranted fear. This may be a line of questioning that, 
Mr. Chairman, I join you in a Classified circumstance. But I 
would like someone to say, give me the sense of what is the 
depth of the problem. Meaning that is this a growing problem?
    With the proliferation of baby drones that 5-year-olds are 
getting for Christmas presents, which may not go up more than a 
certain amount, but who knows what level is purchased. What is 
the depth of the problem, if I can either get that from the 
Assistant Secretary for Counter Terrorism? As well, the depth 
of the problem around airports. I want to focus around the 
commercial flying industry and the potential for a catastrophic 
incident because of the proliferation of drones and whoever can 
take that question.
    Ms. Vinograd. Thank you. I agree with all the adjectives 
that you used and more. The threat environment is escalating 
both in terms of scale and the scope of the threats associated 
with unmanned aircraft systems. Because of technological 
advances, as well as the low cost of these UAVs, their 
maneuverability, the low risk to the operator, as well as the 
fact that many people think they are fun, these are becoming a 
platform and a tool of choice. To be clear, they serve a lot of 
beneficial purposes.
    We are very aware that because of the factors that I laid 
out, UAV traffic is increasing significantly. What that means 
is that just proportionally speaking, both unintentional 
hazards and maligned uses of UAVs are going to create more 
credible threats to DHS missions. That is why we are focused on 
addressing any gaps in our existing authorities. Congresswoman, 
you asked about airports. Thank you for asking this question. I 
will turn to my colleague from TSA in a moment. But we have 
significant data and unfortunately actual incidents that point 
to increasing threats to airports.
    As I previously mentioned, DHS currently doesn't have the 
authority to engage in proactive and persistent C-UAS 
operations at domestic hub large airports. That was indicated 
in the statutory assessment that we provided to you. So, in 
summary, because the threats are going to increase, that 
logically means that the threats in and around these airports 
are also going to increase. We, in the legislative proposal 
that the administration will soon provide to Congress, very 
much look forward to working with all of you in addressing 
these critical gaps.
    Mr. Gould. Ma'am, thank you also----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Mr. Gould [continuing]. From a TSA perspective for that 
question. I agree with my colleague from the Department. The 
airport environment is where unmanned aircraft systems and 
commercial aircraft can just come into contact. You know, 
airplanes are trying to land or take off. People are flying 
drones around. It just is inherently a high-risk operation.
    But it doesn't even have to be that close to the airport. 
Like I said before when Newark Liberty was shut down in 2019, 
the drone was at 3,500 feet over an adjacent airport, but it 
was high enough to interfere with a flight path for Newark 
Liberty. That creates issues with potential mid-air collisions. 
It creates problems when aircraft have to take evasive action, 
which happened 49 times in the past year involving 5 commercial 
flights as well.
    But it doesn't even have to be a mid-air collision that 
really causes a problem. A drone incursion on an airport that 
was somehow militarized could create a problem with an aircraft 
just sitting on the ground fully fueled or being fueled. Like I 
said earlier, the number of incidents that we see around 
airports is quite staggering. The visual reports that we get 
are just a tiny fraction of what technical data shows us is 
really occurring around the airport. It is a significant 
problem and one that we really do need to address.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will just 
simply say the witnesses have been excellent and a clarion call 
has been made and I look forward to working with the 
administration and our agencies on this. I am laser-focused, if 
I might, on the airports and surrounding areas. I think, Mr. 
Gould and Ms. Vinograd, you have given us a pictorial power 
story that should not be cited as over-exaggeration, but a call 
to action because that is our obligation, both Congress and the 
Executive. I thank you for the future offering of this 
legislation, which I hope to be a part of to be able to help 
solve this problem and secure America's skies, as well as the 
American people.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Gimenez, 
you had some thoughts.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes, thank you again. Some more comments. 
Look, we do have some capabilities against piloted unmanned 
aircraft. But my fear is that the capabilities of these 
unmanned aircraft is getting more and more sophisticated. 
Really for nefarious purposes, they can be unpiloted and just 
given a mission. The drone will carry out the mission, period. 
You can't knock it down because it is not being--it is not 
communicating to anybody. It is all internal.
    So, that is why I think we need to have something of a 
closed session and talk about these issues and then also the 
issues how do you actually--how can you actually, you know, 
knock them down? Because as you said, it is not about a mid-air 
collision. We can have a drone go into a--a militarized drone 
go into an airport and cause havoc and destruction and loss of 
life.
    So, it is a great danger. Something that has been 
identified for some years and it is going to happen. You know, 
I am telling you it is going to happen, OK? So, you know, we 
need to be prepared for it, and we need to stop it in any way 
possible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Gimenez. Any other Members 
wish to comment or question our witnesses? Seeing none, I just 
wanted to thank our witnesses here today. Just to remind folks 
that we are talking about 4,000 feet, 5,000 feet up in the air, 
but also another area that we should consider. That is, you 
know, 15 feet off the ground, back yards. More and more people 
at home are sitting at home Sunday afternoon in their back 
yards, then you have a drone come in to essentially observe 
what you are doing as a private citizen. These are privacy 
issues, and we need to address them as well.
    So, with that being said, I want to thank the witnesses for 
their valuable testimony, and the Members for their most 
important questions. Mrs. Miller-Meeks, did you want to ask 
some questions, 5 minutes?
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Yes, I would, if I can.
    Chairman Correa. Of course, please.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member 
Gimenez. Mr. Michelini, I have read reports and I have seen 
first-hand on trips to the border that drug cartels are using 
drones to facilitate movement of drugs and illegal migrants 
over the Southwest Border. I know you alluded to this in your 
testimony. Can you describe and if it happened during my 
absence, I apologize, what the CBP has seen and then what 
capabilities do you have to counter transnational criminal and 
drug trafficking organizations on the border?
    Mr. Michelini. So, what we have--so, as far as counter 
small UAS and what we have seen, I think you might have been 
out. But we had 5 near-misses just with our own aircraft and a 
small UAS in the last year-and-a-half. We have had 6,500 
illegally cross the border since August 2021, that we have 
seen. Again, this is really important to, just to go what Mr. 
Gould is saying, it is just what you see, right? Where you have 
your capabilities. Then 1,700 illegal crossings since January.
    The illegal crossings are just one category of it. The 
other category is just parking drones so you--so the cartels 
would create a sense of domain awareness of where they want to 
go. Whether that is how you cross via port of entry or how you 
cross between ports of entry, and then how law enforcement on 
the U.S. side is reacting to how you are crossing. So, it is a 
great tool for the cartels. You know, again, they don't have 
First or Fourth Amendment. They don't have any concerns, right? 
They are just operating at will.
    So, we have developed from DHS lead a con op on how we 
execute counter-UAS operations on the Southwest Border. 
Presently, we have 2 covered locations and we will intend to 
expand it. All within a judicial, you know, concise process to 
ensure we are doing this within our authorities. It is a 
process and we are moving forward and I think we have had some 
great successes and we have had a lot to learn. It is like 
every other person sitting here, it is an uphill battle right 
now. But, you know, in a moment like this, I think there is 
some clarity on where we need to go.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So, given the increased usage of 
unmanned aerial drones from both the CBP side, U.S. side, and 
from the cartels, and that we have supply chain issues, is 
there a supply chain problem that you are experiencing in 
relationship to getting the equipment that you need?
    Mr. Michelini. I am sorry, I wouldn't be aware if there is 
a supply chain problem on that. But I can look into that for 
you.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you. Ms. Vinograd, the authority 
that Congress granted to DHS to counter UAS in certain 
circumstances sunsets in October 2022. Can you speak--and if 
you already have, again, my apologies--about DHS's plan to seek 
an extension of that authority?
    Ms. Vinograd. Thank you. An expiration in DHS's authority 
to engage in protective measures against credible threats to 
the safety and security of DHS missions would result in 
significant risk to all of our homeland security. As such, DHS 
in partnership with other members of the administration, will 
in the very near future be providing to Congress a legislative 
proposal to seek reauthorization to address the elevating and 
escalating threat landscape.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you. I look forward to seeing that 
document. Thank you to our witnesses and thank you, Chair. I 
appreciate the opportunity to ask a question. I yield back.
    Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Anybody else 
want to jump in? Questions, thoughts? Seeing none, again, I 
thank the witnesses for their testimony, Members for their 
questions. Members of the subcommittee may have additional 
questions for the witnesses and we ask you to respond, the 
witnesses, expeditiously in writing to those questions.
    The Chair reminds Members that the committee's record will 
remain open for 10 business days. Without objection, this 
committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittees were 
adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

    Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Samantha Vinograd
    Question 1a. The counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) 
authorities provided by Congress to DHS allow the Department to 
``mitigate a credible threat that an unmanned aircraft system or 
unmanned aircraft poses to the safety or security of a covered facility 
or asset.''
    Please explain how DHS defines a ``credible threat,'' and how the 
Department assesses a credible threat?
    Question 1b. What is the process for identifying and designating a 
``covered facility or asset''?
    Question 1c. Once an unmanned aircraft system has been deemed a 
credible threat to a covered facility or asset, what additional 
approvals are needed to mitigate the threat?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Samantha Vinograd
    Question. I understand that DHS plans to establish uniform 
guidelines and policies for those in need of counter-unmanned aircraft 
systems (C-UAS) to request such assistance.
    How has DHS engaged with stakeholders, such as critical 
infrastructure owners and State, local, Tribal and territorial law 
enforcement while developing guidelines and policies for requesting C-
UAS assistance?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
 Questions From Chairwoman Bonnie Watson Coleman for Samantha Vinograd
    Question 1a. In September 2019, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
issued the DHS Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Policy 
Guidance, requiring DHS components to conduct assessments to document 
the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. We have 
heard concerns about the ways in which these authorities could impact 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, so I want to be very clear 
on how DHS has used its authorities.
    Please identify any instances in which DHS has used its C-UAS 
authorities against a drone owned or operated by a journalist or news-
gathering organization.
    Question 1b. Please identify any instances in which DHS has used 
its C-UAS authorities against a drone owned or operated by a non-
journalist nonetheless engaged in an activity closely associated with 
the First Amendment, such as a participant of a peaceful protest or 
demonstration.
    Question 1c. Has any individual or organization made a legal claim 
against DHS for utilizing C-UAS authorities in a manner that violates 
the Constitution, statutory or regulatory privacy or due process 
protections, or the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 itself? If 
so, please describe the circumstances.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2a. Counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) authorities 
allow DHS to seize or use reasonable force to destroy any drone that 
poses a credible threat to a ``covered facility or asset.'' Civil 
liberties groups have argued that the Preventing Emerging Threats Act 
of 2018 authorizes the Government to seize or destroy private property 
without adequate due process.
    What privacy and civil liberties stakeholders has DHS collaborated 
with since the enactment of this Act and how often has it engaged with 
these stakeholders?
    Question 2b. How does DHS typically mitigate drones? Does 
mitigation involve seizure or destruction? Please describe the 
mitigation process and what happens to the drone once it is on the 
ground.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 authorizes 
DHS to intercept, acquire, or access communications to or from unmanned 
aircraft systems (UAS) only in support of an authorized counter-
unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) action.
    Once a UAS has been intercepted and rendered safe, what is the 
process to gain additional information about the operator and their 
purpose? Has DHS sought a warrant to obtain additional information once 
a UAS is on the ground? If so, how many times?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Scott W. Clendenin
    Question. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there 
are currently 854,694 registered drones in the United States, including 
321,370 commercial drones and 529,820 recreational drones. Although 
most use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is lawful, such systems can 
be exploited for malicious use by bad actors, threatening security and 
public safety. The threat can take several forms, including kinetic 
attacks with payloads of explosives, surveillance against law 
enforcement, and foreign intelligence gathering, just to name a few.
    Has the UAS threat been particularly more present in a specific 
geographic area or with a certain type of infrastructure (e.g., ports, 
border, etc.)?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
         Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Austin Gould
    Question. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there 
are currently 854,694 registered drones in the United States, including 
321,370 commercial drones and 529,820 recreational drones. Although 
most use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is lawful, such systems can 
be exploited for malicious use by bad actors, threatening security and 
public safety. The threat can take several forms, including kinetic 
attacks with payloads of explosives, surveillance against law 
enforcement, and foreign intelligence gathering, just to name a few.
    Has the UAS threat been particularly more present in a specific 
geographic area or with a certain type of infrastructure (e.g., ports, 
border, etc.)?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
       Question From Chairman J. Luis Correa for Dennis Michelini
    Question. According to the Federal Aviation Administration, there 
are currently 854,694 registered drones in the United States, including 
321,370 commercial drones and 529,820 recreational drones. Although 
most use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is lawful, such systems can 
be exploited for malicious use by bad actors, threatening security and 
public safety. The threat can take several forms, including kinetic 
attacks with payloads of explosives, surveillance against law 
enforcement, and foreign intelligence gathering, just to name a few.
    Has the UAS threat been particularly more present in a specific 
geographic area or with a certain type of infrastructure (e.g., ports, 
border, etc.)?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

                                 [all]