[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-44]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                         FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                   ON

         DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             JUNE 15, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



                          ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
47-741             WASHINGTON : 2022 


                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
                Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                          Emma Morrison, Clerk
                          
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Berger, Gen David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.......     8
Gilday, ADM Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations...........     6
Harker, Hon. Thomas W., Acting Secretary of the Navy.............     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Berger, Gen David H..........................................   112
    Gilday, ADM Michael M........................................    93
    Harker, Hon. Thomas W........................................    69

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Acting Navy Secretary's Call to Cancel Sea-Launched Cruise 
      Missile....................................................   147

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................   153
    Mr. Brown....................................................   153
    Mr. Golden...................................................   153
    Mr. Johnson..................................................   154
    Mr. Kahele...................................................   154
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   155
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   153
    Mrs. Luria...................................................   154

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Carl.....................................................   174
    Mr. Courtney.................................................   160
    Mr. Gallagher................................................   167
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   175
    Ms. Houlahan.................................................   169
    Mr. Kelly....................................................   164
    Mr. Kim......................................................   175
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   159
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   176
    Ms. Speier...................................................   160
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   171
                         DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                    FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 15, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:02 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I call the committee to order.
    This is our first day under the new old rules, old new 
rules. The Architect of the Capitol or whoever it is who's in 
charge has told us that we can be back in the committee in 
person in full, members without masks or social distancing.
    That announcement just--yeah.
    [Applause.]
    The Chairman. I missed you, too. That announcement was just 
made last night. So, you know, we're scrambling around this 
morning to let people know that the new rules are here. So 
members will be drifting in.
    But from this point forward, you know, we will be in the 
committee hearing, no social distancing, do not have to wear a 
mask.
    Now there--people are still going to be allowed to 
participate remotely. There's a very long CDC [Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention] speech to explain that, which I 
won't get into. It makes sense.
    So, unfortunately, the one feature of the old rules that 
applies is you still get to hear me read this statement. So 
I'll try to do it as quickly as possible and we'll move on.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for purposes of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting. Those members must continue to use the software 
platform's video function while in attendance unless they 
experience connectivity issues or other technical problems that 
render them unable to participate on camera.
    If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should 
contact committee staff for assistance. Video of members' 
participation will be broadcast in the room and via the 
television/internet feeds.
    Members participating remotely must seek recognition 
verbally and they're asked to mute the microphones when they 
are not speaking. Members who are participating remotely are 
reminded to keep the software platform's video function on the 
entire time they attend the proceeding.
    Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If they depart 
for a short while for reasons other than joining a different 
proceeding, they should leave the video function on.
    If members will be absent for a significant period or 
depart to join a different proceeding, they should exit the 
software platform entirely and then rejoin it if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I've designated a committee staff member if 
necessary to mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel 
any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the 
proceedings.
    So we will continue to do that for a while to allow members 
to participate remotely if they so choose.
    So our hearing this morning is a full committee hearing on 
the Department of the Navy fiscal year 2022 budget request.
    We have the Honorable Thomas Harker, Acting Secretary of 
the Navy, with us this morning as well as Admiral Michael 
Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations, and General--so I got to 
slow down. I was in my--I was in my sort of, you know, get 
through that thing mode. Now it's like I just get--and General 
David Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
    And we thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We look 
forward to your testimony.
    These are very, very challenging times in our country for a 
variety of different reasons. But within the military, there's 
huge transformations going on and huge challenges going on at 
the same time.
    I've met and spoken with all three of you about your 
approach to that and at the outset, I just want to say, you 
know, thank you. I think you are doing an outstanding job of, 
you know, confronting those challenges, and it's not easy. You 
have to do so within a finite budget environment.
    Number one, we still have the complex threat environment 
that we have had for a while with Russia and China, with North 
Korea and Iran, and transnational terrorist groups, and trying 
to figure out how to manage our resources and meet all those 
threats and meet the needs of our national security continues 
to be a challenge.
    We are still working our way through COVID. Obviously, 
vaccination rates a little troublesome within the military. Got 
to get those up higher. And then, of course, we have the global 
challenges that come from the fact that much of the world does 
not have access to the vaccine and there are many places where 
it is spreading.
    But the transformation that I think is really interesting 
is what you've been working on in terms of building the force 
to meet the challenges of today and to meet the information 
warfare scene that we face.
    And the simplest way to explain this is, you know, mostly 
warfare is about massing as much firepower as possible and 
being able to get it to where you need to get it as quickly as 
possible, and that's still the case.
    But now information has become so key. The ability to 
access that information, the ability to find within the 
information exactly what you need, and then the ability to get 
it to the people who need it in real time so that, you know, 
your front line Marine, your, you know, ship captain, they have 
that information that they need about the adversary and about 
the environment and then to protect that information.
    As we have seen in recent days in many different ways, if 
adversaries can cut off our information, cut off our flow, 
attack us in a cyber way, that can really render all of that 
firepower useless. So how do we protect it?
    And then how do we make it survivable? The systems have to 
be survivable wherever they go, and that is a big change from 
the military that we built. So both--all three of you have 
wrestle with that.
    What systems do you continue to fund? What do we need to 
add funds to? It's a huge set of challenges that I know all 
three of you have confronted, and we're very anxious to hear 
today, you know, how the President's budget reflects that and 
what you think we need to do here on this committee to help 
enhance your efforts to make those changes.
    I guess the two big things that I would mention before I 
turn it over to Mr. Rogers, you know, one, on the 
infrastructure side, there's been a lot of focus on the Navy 
side on the shipyards and our maintenance requirements.
    As you well know, one of the big problems with having our 
assets available is hitting the maintenance schedules. You 
know, ships have to wait an extended period of time just to get 
access to a shipyard to get the maintenance they need to 
continue. What sort of upgrades do we need? What's the best way 
to go about doing those upgrades?
    And then on the Marine Corps side, I know, General Berger, 
you have made some big strong statements about how to transform 
the Marine Corps. The idea of massing and fighting on the 
battlefield is different now.
    You need different systems to support the mission that 
Marine Corps is going to face, fundamentally different than 
what you've been doing throughout most of your 200-plus year 
history. I know you've done a lot of work on that. We're 
anxious to hear about that.
    I guess the last comment I'd make is I mentioned that 200-
plus year history. Our staff sort of, I guess, messed up on the 
schedule because it's the Army's birthday today. But here we 
are.
    So we'll wish the Army birthday even though they're coming, 
I think, next week. So but we appreciate all of your service 
and all the hard work you're doing in these very difficult 
times.
    And with that, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Rogers 
for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
    And it's not just the Army's birthday today. I think the 
rest of the committee will join me in wishing the chairman a 
happy birthday and I hope it's your best year ever.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    [Applause.]
    The Chairman. We have to mention it is also Rick Larsen's 
birthday today.
    Mr. Rogers. All right.
    The Chairman. That is the little----
    Mr. Larsen. Applause.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. That is a little known fact. Yes, we got to--
we got to clap for you.
    Mr. Rogers. All right.
    [Applause.]
    The Chairman. Rick and I were actually born on the exact 
same day. We are the exact same age.
    Mr. Rogers. Washington State has some activity going on.
    The Chairman. I was born in DC but that's another story.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. The time is yours. I apologize. Go ahead.
    Mr. Rogers. I do want to thank the witnesses for being here 
and their time it took to prepare for this. I know it's a--it's 
a pain, but we really appreciate it and I appreciate your 
service to our Nation.
    At his confirmation hearing, Secretary Austin said that 
China presents the most significant threat, going forward, and 
that China should be viewed as our national security, quote, 
``pacing threat,'' closed quote.
    I wholeheartedly agree with that. I was optimistic that 
President--the President would hear that rhetoric from the 
Secretary and turn it into action.
    Unfortunately, I was being naive. Rather than keeping pace 
with the threat from China, the President's budget 
recommendation would let us lap them--let them lap us.
    We need not look much further than the request for the 
Department of the Navy. The President requests a paltry eight 
battle force ships, two of which are tugboats. At the same 
time, the President wants to retire 15 other battleships 
including 7 cruisers. Those seven cruisers provide more afloat 
missile capability than almost the entire British fleet.
    But the cuts don't end there. The budget would break a 
multi-year destroyer procurement, truncate key developmental 
programs like railgun, and pass on critical munition 
investments like Tomahawk missiles and heavyweight torpedoes.
    This budget is throwing the shipbuilding industrial base 
further into disarray. Shipbuilders are laying off workers 
because of the lack of Navy vision and chronic underfunding.
    Even strategies that save money beyond the ability of--or 
beyond the ability of this administration to support. Despite 
testimony that smart amphibious ship acquisition would lead to 
over $700 million in cost savings, the administration has 
elected to take a pass.
    While this administration dithers, China is rapidly growing 
and modernizing its navy. Our fleet of 296 ships has already 
been eclipsed by the Chinese fleet of over 350 ships and 
submarines.
    China has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic 
missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges 
between 200 and 2,000 miles. The United States currently fields 
just one type of conventional ground-launched ballistic missile 
with a range of 30 to 120 miles.
    I'm also concerned with the strike fighter gap. This budget 
fails to fund additional Super Hornets, F-35s, for the Navy. 
That leaves us with a critical capability gap in the near term 
that Congress will have to fill. Setting back our critical 
deterrent even further is Acting Secretary Harker's call to 
eliminate the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile.
    The DNI [Director of National Intelligence] recently 
reported that China is fielding a full nuclear triad and is 
expected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030. In light of this 
growing threat, the recommendation to end SLCM [Sea-Launched 
Cruise Missile] is both short-sighted and dangerous. It's 
almost as if the President developed this budget with little 
understanding of what is required to deter conflict, if 
necessary, to win a war.
    Quite simply, this budget has little to do with pacing 
China and I refuse to support it. We should be expanding and 
modernizing our naval capabilities as called for by the last 
administration. I am disappointed the Biden administration 
doesn't see the threat from China the same way.
    But I look forward to working with the majority to pass a 
real defense budget that supports modernization and ensures 
credible deterrence.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Harker.

  STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. HARKER, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE 
                              NAVY

    Mr. Harker. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your 
bipartisan efforts on behalf of the sailors, Marines, and 
civilians that make up our Department of the Navy.
    I'm honored to be here with General Berger and Admiral 
Gilday. I support their efforts to build a more integrated all-
domain naval force through the NAVPLAN [Navigation Plan] and 
Force Design 2030.
    The President's budget for fiscal year 2022 reflects a 
balanced approach to ensure we have the capabilities, capacity, 
and readiness needed to defend the nation and our interests.
    It demonstrates our resolve to stay ahead of the pacing 
threat of China and other global challenges, making hard 
choices to divest of less capable assets to invest in a 
superior future force.
    The top priority for each of us will always be to ensure 
our sailors, Marines, and civilians are prepared to execute the 
mission and return home safely to their families.
    We're prioritizing the mental health of our force, speaking 
out at the senior level about the benefits of counseling and 
the availability of counselors, chaplains, and other 
professionals. We appreciate this committee's attention to that 
vital issue and your support in providing additional mental 
health support to our sailors and Marines in forward 
operational units.
    We're fighting the scourge of sexual harassment and sexual 
assault through efforts like the Watch List, a tool that uses 
Navy and Marine Corps data to alert commanders to conditions in 
their units that may lead to these toxic behaviors.
    We also look forward to the findings of Secretary Austin's 
90-day Independent Review Commission and are committed to 
making meaningful and lasting progress on this issue.
    To ensure our resources reach the warfighters who need 
them, we're demanding rigorous self-assessment and responsive 
accountability through the Performance to Plan initiative.
    We are also on the right path towards obtaining an opinion, 
an audit opinion, for the Navy and Marine Corps general funds 
and the DON's [Department of the Navy's] working capital fund. 
We are the only military department that has fixed audit 
material weaknesses and are leading the way on this critical 
effort.
    We are also increasing our investment in the Department's 
oversight functions while maximizing our return on our 
investment in the performance audit process.
    Modernization of our information technology infrastructure 
is a critical warfighting priority for the Department. 
Effective use and management of data is key to our digital 
transformation and will change how we fight and win at every 
level.
    I have visited all four of our Navy shipyards as well as 
most of the private shipyards, and I'm fully committed to the 
shipyard infrastructure optimization program and other vital 
physical and IT [information technology] infrastructure 
investments.
    These will increase the capability and resiliency of these 
century-old installations, increasing the size and capability 
of our dry docks and equipping our 40,000-person workforce with 
the tools they need to maintain our new and more lethal assets.
    Around the world and around the clock, the sailors, 
Marines, and civilians of our integrated naval force stand the 
watch and execute the mission.
    On behalf of each of them, I thank you for your time and 
dedicated oversight and look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Harker can be found in the 
Appendix on page 69.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday.

    STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify this morning along with Secretary Harker 
and General Berger. We all are thankful for the enduring 
support that this committee provides the Navy and Marine Corps 
team.
    This hearing, I believe, comes at a critical time for our 
Nation. Competition on, under, and above the seas is 
intensifying. China and Russia are rapidly mobilizing their 
militaries, attempting to undermine our alliances and degrading 
the free and the open order.
    The People's Liberation Army Navy battle force is the 
largest in the world and it is growing. They command modern 
surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious 
assault ships, and next-generation fighters, and their maritime 
ambition is backed by a robust industrial base and the largest 
shipbuilding infrastructure in the world.
    Put simply, China has designed a blue water fleet to rival 
our own, and America's enduring advantage at sea is eroding. 
Make no mistake, our fleet can control the seas in conflict and 
project power ashore today. But we will be increasingly 
challenged to do so in the future unless hard choices are made.
    The Navy currently faces the task of recapitalizing our 
strategic nuclear deterrent, which we haven't done in 40 years. 
At the same time, we're making once in a century investment in 
our critical public shipyards, as the chairman mentioned, and 
at the same time we're trying to modernize our fleet for the 
potential future fight.
    At the same time, we have responsibility to our sailors and 
our nation to maximize readiness so the fleet can confidently 
operate forward and be relevant. Nearly 70 percent of the ships 
that we have today we'll have a decade from now. We have to 
take care of the ships that we have today, although the price 
tag on readiness is rising.
    Over the last 20 years, manpower, operations, and 
maintenance costs--60 percent of our budget--have grown at 2.4 
percent above the rate of inflation. Meanwhile, the buying 
power of our Navy is less than it was in 2010. Back then, we 
had 288 ships. Today, we have 296.
    As you all know, the results of analysis done over the past 
5 years, whether inside the Pentagon or outside, have been 
consistent and clear. America needs a larger, more capable 
fleet.
    Our latest future force naval structure assessment provided 
the headlights not only for the size of our future fleet but, 
importantly, for the composition of that fleet and the 
capabilities that it brings to the joint force.
    If the Navy's top line remains flat or goes down further, 
the size of our fleet will definitely shrink. Despite these 
fiscal challenges, we're determined to field a more capable, a 
more lethal, and a more ready Navy for the joint force.
    To do this, we are improving our maintenance in our 
shipyards and aviation depots. We are ensuring our ships are 
properly manned, that our magazines are filled with ammunition, 
and that we have our store rooms filled with spare parts, and 
that our sailors are getting the steaming days and flying hours 
that they need to hone their skills.
    We are working hard on a more robust resilient network 
infrastructure. We are investing in long-range precision fires 
like hypersonics and Tactical Tomahawk, and we're developing 
directed energy systems to improve fleet survivability.
    Our eye is on the larger hybrid fleet. The investments in 
our shipbuilding account reflect the rigorous analysis we 
conducted last year as well as the high demand from combatant 
commanders.
    We are determined to deliver the Columbia SSBN [ballistic 
missile submarine] on time as we build affordable capacity, 
which includes a deliberate approach to unmanned, and we're 
making sure that every sailor can outthink and outfight any 
adversary by scaling our efforts for ready relevant learning 
and live virtual constructive training.
    Committee, the average age of the Chinese fleet is 11 
years. Ours is 21. It's time to field the future Navy. We must 
modernize now for the looming competition ahead of us and 
maintain a forward posture that keeps America safe and 
prosperous.
    I am extremely proud of our sailors, our Navy civilians, 
and our families who have sustained historic high optempo 
[operations tempo] in the midst of a pandemic. They remain the 
source of our strength, as are the patriots in our shipyards 
and aircraft depots and our partners in industry, companies 
large and small who keep the production lines moving.
    Again, we are grateful for this committee's support to our 
Navy and Marine Corps team. I look forward to answering your 
questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday can be found in 
the Appendix on page 93.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Berger.

   STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE 
                          MARINE CORPS

    General Berger. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
members of the committee, over the past 2 years since becoming 
Commandant, I've come to better understand and appreciate the 
bipartisan support of this committee, which is really critical 
to creating the force that we have today but also the force 
that we're going to need for the future.
    I realize there's competing national priorities you have to 
wrestle with and that's going to put pressure on defense 
budgets. But I'm also confident that you all appreciate the 
severity of the security environment around the world.
    As the global competition with China and Russia increases 
and accelerates, I would argue your military will need to have 
more advanced capabilities in order to effectively compete to 
reassure our allies and partners and to deter war.
    Force Design 2030 is the Marine Corps answer to creating 
the cutting-edge capabilities and the ready forces that will 
better enable the fleet and the joint force to deter, to 
compete, and to respond with ready forces to any crisis 
anywhere on the globe.
    To be clear, Force Design is the centerpiece of a broader, 
more systemic modernization effort across your Corps, one that 
improves more than just our equipment and our warfighting 
formations but also our personnel systems, our training, and 
our family programs as well.
    We're, roughly, 2 years into that modernization program and 
I feel I owe this committee an update. And while we don't have 
sufficient time this morning to go into all the details, I do 
want to highlight three key areas of progress.
    First, we have increased the operational reach and the 
efficacy of our naval expeditionary forces to include our 
Marine Expeditionary Units, our MEUs, which remain the crown 
jewel of our force.
    Beginning last year, we started our transition to a mixed 
capability of long-range ship- and ground-based unmanned aerial 
systems, UASes, including the MQ-9 Reaper.
    This will significantly expand our ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities and it will 
enable us to better support the fleet and the joint operational 
commander, including anti-submarine warfare.
    We have also initiated a partnership with industry to 
develop a future autonomous long-range unmanned surface vessel 
that will extend the reach of our MEUs.
    That vessel will give us a new tool for maritime gray zone 
competition. It will help thicken what we call the C5 [command, 
control, computers, communications, cyber] ISR network. It will 
add to our conventional naval deterrent using loitering 
munitions.
    Lastly, we're aggressively pursuing organic precision fires 
for our infantry. Those also have loitering munitions. And 
we're on track to make a decision on the vendor--a final 
decision this year.
    Second, we have made significant advancements across our 
training and our education enterprise. In the last 16 months, 
we have released our first new doctrine in 20 years. Actually, 
we released two, one on learning, one on competing.
    We have also significantly advanced the intellectual 
framework for some of our future operational concepts. Earlier 
this year, we published a tentative manual for expeditionary 
advanced base operations and we will use that to inform our 
training, our wargaming and our exercises.
    We substantially increased the resources we have dedicated 
to wargaming and to experimentation. Last month, we broke 
ground on a new state-of-the-art wargaming center here in 
Quantico, Virginia.
    And finally, we dramatically enhanced both the quality and 
the duration of infantry training. Infantry training for us is 
now 50 percent longer than it was before and we have added new 
modules to increase lethality.
    Third, we have taken some important steps to improve our 
personnel systems and our policies. To continue attracting the 
highest quality men and women for your Marine Corps, we raised 
the AFQT [Armed Forces Qualification Test] standards to enlist 
and we raised the ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery] requirements for infantry.
    Our enlisted performance evaluation system in the Marine 
Corps was antiquated, it was subjective, and it was completely 
manual. We just replaced that old system with a cloud-based 
system where, for the first time, Marines are evaluated based 
on clearly defined objective standards that they have control 
over.
    We revised our retention policies so that qualified Marines 
can now reenlist a year earlier than they could before, and 
I've delegated to commanders the authority to enlist Marines on 
the spot.
    Recognizing the strong connection between the health of our 
force and the support of our families, we revised our parental 
leave policies. They now include both adoptive and same-sex 
parents, and I'll continue to push for expanded maternity leave 
for our Marines.
    And while it may seem like a modest accomplishment, 
perhaps, to some, this year we updated our maternity uniforms 
to improve both their utility and their professional 
appearance.
    So, overall, while I'm encouraged by our progress on Force 
Design and the other modernization initiatives, I'm not 
satisfied with the pace of change. We have to move faster.
    To accelerate our program, we, as a service, will need to 
do a better job of explaining the details of Force Design 2030 
to members and to your staffs, and that's my responsibility as 
your Commandant.
    To that end, I'm prepared to testify before the full 
committee and the Appropriations Committee if committee chairs 
would find such a hearing useful.
    I think it's critical that we develop a shared 
understanding about where your Marine Corps is headed and why, 
and how your support is absolutely essential to our success.
    Equally important is explaining how we plan to pay for it 
all. As Chairman Smith recently noted, we can and must make 
better choices to be better stewards of taxpayer dollars and I 
couldn't agree more.
    This is part of the reason for the past 2 years we have 
pursued a cost neutral approach to force design, from the 
beginning self-funding our modernization, not asking for any 
more funds.
    To ensure the success of that approach, I will need to ask 
for your support in reducing the total procurement of some 
platforms commensurate with the recent reductions in our end 
strength.
    The fact is today's Marine Corps is significantly smaller 
than it was 10 to 12 years ago, about 24,000 Marines smaller. 
We simply won't need as many ground vehicles.
    We won't need as many aircraft as we thought we did when we 
made those procurement decisions 20 years ago. It's just simple 
math.
    With the reductions outlined in our force design report 
this spring, I believe we will have sufficient resources to 
create the modern capabilities required for competition, for 
deterrence, and for crisis response without a further reduction 
in our end strength.
    So I welcome the opportunity to work with this committee 
and I look forward to your questions, both in this hearing and 
in the weeks to follow.
    Thank you, sir.
    [The prepared statement of General Berger can be found in 
the Appendix on page 112.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, how is the vaccination issue going? What 
percentage of the force has been vaccinated? How is that 
affecting your ability to get everybody back up and running as 
normal?
    Mr. Harker. We have made progress on vaccinations. The Navy 
and Marine Corps have both issued----
    The Chairman. I'm sorry. We're having a hard time hearing. 
I don't know if it's because you're too far back or----
    Mr. Harker. Sorry, sir. We have made progress on 
vaccinations. Both the Navy and Marine Corps have issued 
policies that have increased the ability of sailors and Marines 
to have liberty in foreign ports or to do different----
    The Chairman. Do you have numbers on that progress aside? 
Do you know what percentage of your--of the Navy and Marine 
Corps have been vaccinated?
    Mr. Harker. Do you have the----
    Admiral Gilday. Seventy-five percent for the Navy right 
now, sir.
    The Chairman. That's great. Marine Corps now?
    General Berger. We're at 50 percent for fully vaccinized--
fully immunized.
    The Chairman. And would you support, once the FDA [Food and 
Drug Administration] fully approves the vaccine, making it 
mandatory for service members?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, we're looking at that right now at the OSD 
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] level. They're coming up 
with guidance. I believe the Secretary is considering making 
that decision to do so. But it's not something that he has 
announced to us yet.
    The Chairman. Okay. The only other question I have is on 
the unmanned systems, and, General Berger, you alluded to it, 
but I'd like both of you to respond.
    You know, I know we're making a big investment, going 
forward, in developing unmanned systems. It's not--it's still 
not 100 percent clear to me what the Navy's vision of how 
unmanned systems will help you in your mission.
    Could you just quickly sort of give us what that vision is, 
Admiral Gilday?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We intend to use our fleet in a 
distributed manner, and so these unmanned, obviously, give us--
give us volume, give us more ships that allow us to come at, 
let's say, China or Russia, at many vectors across many 
domains.
    We'll be leveraging space and cyber as well. The two 
biggest challenges that we're getting after on unmanned are, 
one, reliability. So the engineering plants have to be reliable 
so they can operate months at a time unattended.
    The second is command and control, and we feel like we're 
on a good path on both. But we have not--we don't have any 
intentions of scaling any of these efforts until we get to a 
place where we're comfortable with both of those aspects.
    If I could just say briefly, sir, in the last month we have 
had three big steps forward. One, we have had the largest 
unmanned exercise in our history on the west coast with 
unmanned under the surface, on the surface, and in the air with 
the Zumwalt-class destroyer and LCS [littoral combat ship] 
ships.
    And so this conceptually is helping us understand how we're 
going to use those unmanned platforms in conjunction with our--
the manned ships that we have today.
    Separately, last Friday we had our first successful 
refueling of an F/A-18 Super Hornet from an MQ-25 drone. That's 
going to be a carrier-based capability that will be IOC 
[initial operational capability] in 2025.
    And lastly, we had a surface unmanned mega transit, a 
4,000-plus-mile transit from the gulf coast through the Panama 
Canal up to the Port Hueneme, the third ship--third ship that's 
done so, 98 percent of it done autonomously.
    And so we are making strides. I do think it's a big step, 
though. I think it's going to be phased with respect to minimal 
manning before we ever get to a point where we're using 
unmanned completely unattended.
    The Chairman. Thanks.
    General Berger, do you have anything to add?
    General Berger. I think you expect the Marine Corps to be 
your forward force, your stand-in force, Chairman. I'd have to 
say the role of UAS, the vision you're talking about, probably 
four different parts.
    One, intelligence collection and moving that information 
back to the fleet and to joint force.
    Second, I would say logistics. The ability to move, to 
distribute itself, and sustain that we're going to need 
unmanned platforms to do that.
    Third, I would say lethality. And some of these are multi-
platform kind of aircraft. But third, certainly, is the 
lethality, and fourth would be the command and control aspect, 
the ability to fuse and move information laterally and back to 
the joint force.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers, you're recognized.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, you painted a pretty ugly picture for the future 
of the Navy. Given that fact, do you feel like this budget is 
adequate to help you take on those challenges?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think it's important to understand 
that the base and the top line that we have that we can afford 
a Navy of about 300 ships. What we're trying to do with our 
investment strategy is to--is to balance those investments 
across the readiness of the fleet today, the modernization with 
new technologies, and that's reflected, as an example, with a 
12 percent increase in R&D [research and development] with an 
emphasis on hypersonics in the offensive and laser technology 
on the defensive to protect the fleet.
    The third piece is capacity, and so we're growing the Navy 
at an affordable rate, although that is really a key----
    Mr. Rogers. You said you're growing the Navy? From what I'm 
reading you're--the Navy is shrinking under this budget.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, for the 2022 budget itself, the Navy--
the Navy's numbers are declining. That's correct.
    Mr. Rogers. So how do you take on your challenges with a 
budget that's diminishing?
    Admiral Gilday. So as I stated, sir, in my opening 
comments, the last several studies that have been done going 
back 5 years call for a larger, more capable fleet.
    Mr. Rogers. And this budget doesn't get you there.
    Admiral Gilday. No, sir. It does not.
    Mr. Rogers. Let me ask this.
    Admiral Davidson, the recent PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command] commander, indicated that he expects a conflict with 
China in the next 6 years. In your best professional military 
judgment, do you agree with Admiral Davidson's assessment?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think the key word that he used 
there was ``could,'' and I think that that potential always 
exists and I think we have to be ready any given day for 
anything.
    Mr. Rogers. Well, you know, if you agree it could happen, I 
just don't know why we would agree with anything that would 
reduce the force structure and induce a near-term risk with 
China.
    Recently, we have heard from General Hyten at STRATCOM 
[U.S. Strategic Command] that the SLCM is needed to increase 
deterrence. Do you agree with Admiral Richard and General Hyten 
that the SLCM fulfills a critical capability gap for the Navy 
and would increase deterrence?
    Admiral Gilday. I agree with that comment. I think it's 
consistent with the new posture review that was done 
previously.
    Mr. Rogers. In recent years, the nonpartisan--the 
bipartisan Commission on National Security Defense recommended 
a 3 to 5 percent increase in defense spending each year over 
inflation for the foreseeable future as we try to modernize our 
services.
    Do you agree with that recommendation by that commission?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I think if you take a look at all 
the services' unfunded requests together, they come up to about 
3 to 5 percent.
    Mr. Rogers. Great.
    Secretary Harker, has the administration completed its 
Nuclear Posture Review?
    Mr. Harker. So the Nuclear Posture Review that is 
forthcoming has not been done yet. The----
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Has the administration completed his 
analysis of alternatives for the SLCM?
    Mr. Harker. No, sir.
    Mr. Rogers. So before the posture review and the analysis 
of alternatives is complete, why are you canceling the program 
that our best military minds on deterrence tell us that we need 
to deter Russia and China?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, I'm not canceling the program. That 
program is in our fiscal year 2022 budget. As we're starting 
the planning process for fiscal year 2023, we have a process 
that we go through inside the Navy and Marine Corps where we go 
in and determine which items to put in our budget.
    My initial guidance was based on the fact that that posture 
review, the overall posture review, and the National Defense 
Strategy update have not been completed.
    So I didn't want anyone to assume that that would be in 
until we had further guidance from the Nuclear Posture Review. 
Once that guidance comes, we will adjust accordingly, sir.
    Mr. Rogers. General Berger, you submitted a list of Marine 
Corps unfunded priorities that total over $3 billion. Without 
funding these research and procurement priorities in fiscal 
year 2022, will the Marine Corps be able to modernize in time 
to counter the pacing threat of China in the near term?
    General Berger. Sir, the items on the unfunded priority 
list will allow us to move faster. The answer to your question 
is really difficult because in a pacing environment like we're 
in right now, it's tough to forecast whether or not China will 
move faster or on the same scale or on the same glide slope 
they're on.
    We're self-funding our modernization, as I explained. Those 
items on the unfunded priority list would reduce the risk. It 
would allow us to move faster.
    Mr. Rogers. So you need them?
    General Berger. If we're going to stay in front of China 
with a margin of advantage, then I think everything that we can 
do in the Department of Defense to buy down that risk is in our 
favor.
    Mr. Rogers. I understand the pressure y'all are under to 
support this President's budget recommendation. But we count on 
your best military judgment, and the fact is these UFRs 
[unfunded requirements] are necessary and we need to fund them.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Langevin is recognized.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for their testimony today.
    Let me start with this question. I'm really pleased that 
both the Columbia- and Virginia-class submarine programs 
received full funding.
    Secretary Harker----
    The Chairman. Hey, Jim, could you get closer to the 
microphone? I don't know if that's possible or not. You're a 
little light. We'll try to turn it up here as well.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. I hope that's a little better. That's 
about as close as I can get, I think.
    I just wanted to start off by saying that I'm pleased that 
both the Columbia- and Virginia-class submarine programs 
received full funding.
    Secretary Harker, do you have any concerns with the 
Columbia- or Virginia-class programs, given that there is no 
room for a schedule to slip with the Columbia, given the fact 
that the Ohios will be retiring and taking--be taken out of 
service relatively soon?
    Mr. Harker. No, sir. Funding the Columbia- and the 
Virginia-class submarines was one of our number-one priorities 
and we made sure that they were fully funded in this budget.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday, thank you for the phone call the other day. 
I'm sorry it got cut short but, hopefully we'll be able to 
circle back.
    But, Admiral, I want to applaud you with how 
enthusiastically the Navy has embraced directed energy 
technology. Your navigation plan included directed energy 
considerations for the next destroyer and I'm excited to get 
the directed energy campaign plan in the near future.
    How do directed energy weapons fit into the 2030 or 2040 
ship fleet and does every ship in this future fleet have a 
directed energy capability?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I can say with a high degree of 
confidence that those ships that have excess power generation 
capability--the Ford-class aircraft carriers, as an example--
generate three times the power of the Nimitz class.
    Our new DDG(X) [Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer] 
destroyer should have excess power generation capacity. The 
Zumwalt-class destroyers have excess power capacity. And so 
those would be the first candidates for directed energy system 
on a manned ship with high-powered systems, and the key here is 
we want systems that can knock down missiles.
    We need an anti-ballistic missile defense capability. 
That's a lot cheaper than the missile defense capabilities that 
we have today.
    I do think that if we're optimistic about unmanned that we 
could look at a medium- or large-sized unmanned vessel that 
could also have laser technology, perhaps with--networked with 
other ships, and that could also provide for fleet defense.
    I think if we--if we're going to--if we're going to defend 
the fleet in the future, a potentially larger fleet that's 
dispersed, we're going to have to look at directed energy as a 
potential--as a potential solution set.
    And as I mentioned earlier, it remains, on the defensive 
side, our top priority with respect to research and 
development, and that is proceeding at pace with industry.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
    Let me turn to another emerging technology that I've been 
following for quite some time. I'm concerned that the Navy is 
trying to shelf the railgun. I view the weapon as an air 
defense capability that will be vital in the area--in the era 
of great power competition.
    It has a cost per shot advantage and it will deepen a 
ship's magazine and it helps alleviate Navy's vertical launch 
cell shortage. Why is Navy giving up on the railgun and gun-
based air defense capabilities?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, we have been chasing railgun for 
almost 30 years now and we just have not been able to develop 
the system--develop a system that you can easily get aboard a 
ship that would provide the kind of probability of kill that 
you speak to that we aspired to when we started doing the 
research years ago.
    I do have more confidence in the high-velocity projectile 
that was used with the railgun that we think we can use in 
other guns that we have to provide us a layered defense along 
with some of the other kinetic systems we have now plus laser 
technology in the future.
    I'd also say that the hypersonic missile technology and the 
standoff ranges that both we and our potential adversaries face 
begin to make the railgun a less attractive option, just with 
respect to range.
    Mr. Langevin. That's something else we're going to have to 
continue to follow, Admiral.
    Last question. The degree to which you have high confidence 
on cybersecurity for the fleet and in our weapon systems?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. You know, I always say that I 
never wake up in the morning completely confident that we don't 
have somebody in one of our systems that we have to get after.
    And so I will tell you that we are making a move at pace to 
cloud--to the cloud for all--across all----
    The Chairman. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired. So the rest of that answer would have to be for the 
record if he wants to follow up.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    And I will try to keep us at 5 minutes because there's a 
lot of members to get in today.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for the 
witnesses being here today. It's so inspiring to see such 
competent and capable people to represent our country and work 
with our service members.
    For Admiral Gilday, in a prior hearing on the Indo-Pacific 
theater posture, Admiral Phil Davidson testified to the 
appreciated American territory of Guam's significance as a 
deepwater strategic port, fuel and munition logistical depot, 
and it's home to 170,000 patriotic American citizens and 
service members.
    He recommended deploying the Aegis Ashore missile defense 
facility to counter the Chinese missile threat, which would 
free up three Navy destroyers.
    In your assessment, how could we improve Guam's defense 
strategy to limit its impact on strike power resources, which 
are already severely impacted by decommissioning plans?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, there's a lot of work that's behind 
Admiral Davidson's requirement for missile defense of Guam. I 
think it's a valid requirement.
    The only thing I'd add is, based on the last discussion I 
had, I think that we also ought to look at laser technology. I 
think it's even easier if it's shore based rather than ship 
based. The real key is the power generation source. I think 
you're talking about a much more affordable system.
    I'm not saying that you would have that in lieu of missile 
defense, but probably additive in some type of defense in-depth 
construct. That's the only thing I'd add with respect to that 
requirement.
    Mr. Wilson. And, Admiral, as you look at that we need to 
always remember that the people of Guam have the highest 
percentage of participation in the American military of any 
State or territory, and the people are so patriotic and so 
grateful for the liberation by the Marines.
    Previously, Admiral, I was fortunate to represent the 
Marine Corps Air Station in Beaufort, which is home to four 
Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet attack squadrons and two F-35B fleet 
replacement squadrons.
    The budget request for the Navy does not include any 
funding for continued procurement of F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 
aircraft.
    How does the Navy plan to manage tactical aircraft 
inventory risk and reduce the current strike fighter inventory 
shortfall without increased procurement quantities of the F-35C 
above plans and noting that the next-generation air dominance 
program has just begun efforts to define aircraft requirements 
and develop concepts?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, simply, we have procured as many F/A-
18 Super Hornets as we need. We have over 500 now. When our--
when our deliveries are complete, we'll have about 640 Super 
Hornets. Many of those will be Block III Super Hornets, which 
are the latest generation of Super Hornet capability.
    Our goal is to combine the latest F/A-18 Super Hornets with 
the F-35s to give us a mix of fourth- and fifth-generation 
fighters in our carrier air wings. What we found from extensive 
analysis, the conclusions that we have seen in wargames and in 
exercises have demonstrated that we benefit from a mix of 
fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft.
    And so we are at the twilight of our fourth-generation 
purchase. We are still picking up the pace with fifth gen 
[generation], and by 2025 we will close the current strike 
fighter shortfall that we have of 42 aircraft and if we remain 
apace with respect to funding and get that fourth-/fifth-gen 
mix that we think we need.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And, Secretary Harker, the budget request proposes to cut 
200 civilians from the Naval Audit Service and dramatically 
reduce its mission and scope. What rationale is driving this 
reduction and why should the Naval Audit Service be a quarter 
of the size of other services' audit agencies?
    Mr. Harker. Thank you, sir.
    As a former certified public accountant, I believe in 
strong oversight, and we have six different organizations that 
provide oversight of the Navy and Marine Corps. Our overall 
budget request for that--those six oversight organizations has 
gone up by over $125 million from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal 
year 2022.
    So we strongly believe in oversight. The Naval Audit 
Service is one element of that. We are not eliminating those 
jobs or getting rid of those people. We're simply moving them 
to other elements within our oversight organization, sir.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I appreciate everyone 
coming out today. So this is for, I think, Secretary Harker.
    We got a really nice shiny new building at Naval Air 
Station Whidbey Island built for the Triton and it's got that 
new car smell and no one's in it.
    So the question is about the time line for the Triton and 
getting that, not just getting it operational beyond the two 
that are out there and the budget, again, delays that for a 
year. So can you give us an update on when the timing is--what 
the timing is for the Triton? And if you can't I'll have 
Admiral Gilday.
    Mr. Harker. Sir, I'd have to get back with you on that one. 
Do you know?
    Mr. Larsen. Admiral Gilday.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, just so that I understand you 
correctly, you're talking about the new Columbia-class that 
we're bringing online in 2027?
    Mr. Larsen. No. The unmanned aircraft. At Naval Air Station 
Whidbey Island----
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Larsen [continuing]. There's a building built, MQ-4.
    Admiral Gilday. Ah, the MQ-4.
    Mr. Larsen. MQ-4.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, right now--yes, sir?
    Mr. Larsen. By the way, thank you, Representative Courtney.
    [Laughter.]
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. As you know, our MQ-4s right now 
are deployed to Guam, and so we will be--we will be bringing 
them back at some point and rotating them in and out.
    Mr. Larsen. But that's just two of them. I'm talking about 
the operators. You got a building built for the operators and 
it's empty. So the VQ-1 squadron is moving in there before 
their decommissioning, but that's just a matter of 
happenstance.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I know----
    Mr. Larsen. It's built, ready to go.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We have our----
    Mr. Larsen. And we're not going to be using it for 3 years?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'll have to get back on the time line 
for that transition with more details.
    Mr. Larsen. Soon, please. When are we going to get these 
strategic laydown documents, which were supposed to be here by 
the end of June 11th?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, our documents are being informed by 
the ongoing Global Posture Review. So the OSD just finished 
their Task Force China. They're finishing up their Global 
Posture Review next month, and that'll inform the laydown for 
the services.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Larsen. All right.
    The Navy analysis plan to homeport 12 new frigates at 
Naval--in Naval Station Everett in my district, the first 2, I 
think, by 2025 or 2026, if I recall that right.
    How are you--how is the Navy approaching the MILCON 
[military construction] budget to support that? Because all 
we--all we know now is the frigates, but we assume there'll be 
something that's support for that.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We're in the planning stages 
right now for that. As you know, we just recently settled on 
Washington as the homeport, and so that planning will begin to 
get funded and begin to be underway within the next year. I'll 
get you more specifics on that time line as well.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And then, Secretary, can you give us the 
status of the Department of Navy's Arctic strategy? I'm trying 
to put the pieces of this together between the services and so 
far I don't really have a broad view of how the Pentagon sees 
this. So I've got to pick at each of the services to piece it 
together.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. We have worked with the Coast Guard, 
the Navy and the Marine Corps to come forward with an Arctic 
Posture Review and that was completed over the winter, and 
there's ongoing work to fine tune that and look at what other 
elements will be included.
    I know the Coast Guard's moving forward with our polar 
security cutter and then we have all of our submarines up 
there, and then we also do operations up in Alaska as well.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Well, I look forward to some more 
detail on that.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to just take the last bit of my time 
to as well wish you a happy birthday, and I think I speak for 
all of us right now when I say who the heck are all you people.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Larsen. I haven't seen you all for 15 months. It's good 
to be back in the--back in the Armed Services room.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Yes, it'll be--will be good to get back to 
normal here very, very soon. Looking forward to it.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Harker, you've testified before Congress before, 
correct?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. You're aware of your obligations in testifying 
before Congress, that it's not a press conference, that you 
have an obligation for truthfulness and completeness in your 
answer?
    Mr. Harker. Yes.
    Mr. Turner. Great. Your background, as you testified, is 
you're a CPA [certified public accountant].
    Mr. Harker. I was a CPA. I let my license lapse recently 
because of the other work that----
    Mr. Turner. You achieved the level of a CPA. Your 
background is accounting.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. Okay. I have your June 4th memo, which I'd like 
to enter into the record, where you direct defund sea-launched 
cruise missile nuclear development effort.
    The Chairman. Just one second. If I could enter that into 
the record with--you know, I ask unanimous consent the form you 
just said be entered into the record. Hearing no objection, so 
ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 148.]
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    The line says, defund sea-launched cruise missile nuclear 
development efforts. You said that's not canceling. Dictionary 
says that defund is to prevent from continuing to receive 
funds. Seems to be a conflict.
    Mr. Harker, there are a lot of people on this committee who 
are staunch advocates against unilateral disarmament, 
unilateral meaning alone and disarmament mean where we 
eliminate a weapons system. We're big fans of arms control 
negotiations where we actually get something for what we're 
doing.
    Now, I'm very concerned about this memo because your 
background is accounting. Now, Secretary of Defense Austin, 
Chairman Milley, and Admiral Richard, and I'm going to guess 
with a question here, Admiral Gilday, were you consulted on 
this defunding of this missile?
    Admiral Gilday. No, sir.
    Mr. Turner. No, sir.
    So Secretary Austin has that experience. Chairman Milley 
has that experience. Admiral Richard has that experience. 
Admiral Gilday has the experience, and you do not.
    Congress and two administrations, including this budget, 
funded it. Do you have the expertise to conduct the assessment 
of--the analysis of alternatives to the sea-based launched 
cruise missile other than financial?
    Mr. Harker. No, sir, I do not.
    Mr. Turner. Do you have the expertise to conduct the 
Nuclear Posture Review?
    Mr. Harker. No, sir. I do not.
    Mr. Turner. So but yet you have the expertise, apparently, 
to direct the defunding of a cruise missile. Now, you said it 
was because you didn't want anybody to assume it was in because 
the Nuclear Posture Review hadn't been conducted.
    Why not all nukes, Mr. Harker? Why didn't you direct them 
to defund all nukes? How did you choose--and remember your 
obligations before Congress--how did you choose defund the sea-
launched cruise missile?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, because of where we are in the budget 
process. We have about 8 months before the President's budget 
is finalized and----
    Mr. Turner. So but, Mr. Harker, you had to specifically 
choose something. This is not a number that's in this. This is 
a weapons system.
    Mr. Harker, I'm going to ask you who did you discuss this 
with? Since you've already indicated you don't have the 
expertise to being able to make strategic nuclear weapons 
decisions, who in the Pentagon did you discuss this with before 
you put in your memo signed by you defund the sea-launched 
nuclear cruise missile? Who?
    Mr. Harker. Nobody.
    Mr. Turner. No one alone? So, again, you're under--you 
know, you're under your obligations of testifying before 
Congress. You spoke to no one in your decision to defund the 
sea-launched cruise missile?
    Mr. Harker. It was preliminary guidance and it was my 
decision and I took it based on----
    Mr. Turner. Mr. Harker, I'm going to ask you to deliver to 
this committee all communications concerning the deliberations, 
advice, review, directions, and analysis that were undertaken--
it's not classified, it's budget materials--that went into this 
item. Do you agree to deliver those to me?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. Excellent. Are you aware as you were drafting 
this memo that the President of the United States is sitting 
down with Vladimir Putin this very month, and that as all the 
headlines today, because our President just landed in Geneva, 
indicate that arms control negotiations is one of those subject 
matters?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. Do you realize the extent to which you have 
undermined President Biden and the United States in indicating 
that a weapons system that is nuclear is going to be 
unilaterally defunded without any negotiations or without 
receiving any concessions from Russia?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, it was a preliminary internal document.
    Mr. Turner. Are you aware of the extent to which your 
actions--because I want this to be clear. It may be your own 
undertaking and it may be just that you have uninformed to do 
this--undertaken this.
    But everyone at the Pentagon needs to understand the 
severity of the actions that you've taken and its implications 
on the United States for arms control negotiations, and the 
impact on the President of the United States.
    This is not an accounting decision, Mr. Harker. Do you know 
the extent to which you have undermined the President of the 
United States in his arms control negotiations by undertaking 
what can only be described as a unilateral, you alone having 
done it, disarmament recommendation?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Turner. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Courtney is recognized.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 
the witnesses who--and the Seapower Subcommittee. We work 
together a lot and I'm looking forward. I think we are going to 
have more work to do.
    You know, one just sort of comment I want to make and then 
I want to ask Admiral Gilday a couple questions is that, you 
know, unfortunately, when a budget comes over without a FYDP 
[Future Years Defense Program] and without a 30-year 
shipbuilding plan, it, frankly, makes your job a lot harder 
because in terms of trying to explain decisions, particularly 
on shipbuilding, which is a long game, I think, as you all 
know, it's a 1-year window, or headlights. It's just not 
sufficient to sort of see the direction where we're going.
    So, hopefully, it's my understanding that some of those 
documents and analysis may be on its way over here, and I, 
frankly, think that's going to help everybody in terms of 
trying to get the right balance this year.
    Admiral, on page 13 of your testimony you state that our 
future fleet places a premium on expanding our undersea 
advantage. During conflict, sea control and sea denial from 
beneath the waves are among the Navy's core advantages. We 
cannot afford to yield any ground to our competitors.
    Again, this budget, unlike last year's budget, fully funds 
that undersea advantage with construction of two Virginia-class 
submarines, payload modules that will go with that, as well as 
R&D for the next version of our attack submarine fleet, as well 
as our nuclear deterrence with full funding for the Columbia 
program, which carries 70 percent of our nuclear warheads.
    And could you just sort of talk about that priority in the 
context of China's threat that you mentioned at the outset of 
your testimony?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I think that with respect to our 
most survivable strike platform--and again, this goes right 
back to why we have a Navy. This is about sea control and power 
projection, the ability to project power ashore. The submarines 
give us that greatest advantage.
    That overmatch that we have right now against China we are 
unwilling to budge on. And so as we take a look at our 
investment strategy and where we put our next dollar with 
respect to lethality, our mind always goes to the undersea, 
including the unmanned undersea.
    With respect to--with respect to Columbia, this year 
Columbia is about--just over 20 percent of our shipbuilding 
budget. And so in the future, it'll be over a third of our 
shipbuilding budget. It's a huge commitment.
    But it has to be fenced off and we have to deliver that in 
2027.
    Mr. Courtney. Great, and I would encourage my colleagues to 
come up to Rhode Island and Connecticut to see the eye-watering 
infrastructure that is being built right now.
    Secretary Marty Walsh was up and, again, as the building 
trades he, again, was speechless when he saw the magnitude of 
the project that's going on up there. I mean, there was--this 
is really happening. This isn't just sort of talk that's going 
on.
    This is about the fourth or fifth year since I've been--or 
fourth or fifth time since I've been on Seapower that a pretty 
aggressive decommissioning proposal has come in on the cruisers 
and there's--as I think you all know, Congress has sort of 
pushed back in past years in terms of trying to preserve that 
air defense command capacity as well as the missile tube 
capacity.
    I guess if you could just sort of talk about the fact that 
whether or not, you know, this plan is trying to sort of sift 
out the platforms that are salvageable versus not, and also how 
the decision to cut a DDG [guided missile destroyer], which is, 
in my opinion, Flight III are going to be the replacement of 
that air defense command.
    I mean, that's where I think there's the biggest sort of 
heartburn on this side of the room.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think the first thing I'd frame it 
with kind of big picture is where are we headed. So if I take a 
look at 2025, the questions came out earlier about Admiral 
Davidson's testimony about 6 years of potential conflict with 
China. So what do we plan to deliver in 2025 and 2026.
    So if I take a look at the undersea we'll have delivered 
all of our Block III Virginias. We'll have delivered all of our 
Block IV Virginias. We'll be on the cusp of delivering Block 
Vs, and we'll have a longer range, more lethal undersea weapon.
    On the surface, we'll be delivering the Constellation-class 
frigate. We'll be--we'll be building DDG(X). We'll be putting 
more Flight III DDGs in the water. We have--by 2025 our plan is 
to have hypersonics and the Zumwalt-class destroyers.
    We're making continued investments in weapons with range 
and speed. Think Tactical Tomahawk. If I look at aviation, I 
talked about the fourth and fifth gen mix a few minutes ago 
that bring--that we'll have that in half of our air wings, six 
of our air wings--more than half our air wings--by 2025 with 
longer range weapons, with speed.
    And so that----
    The Chairman. Thank you. I, again, apologize. The 
gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And General Berger, in a minute I'm going to ask you about 
some armaments that are on the unfunded priority list.
    But, Admiral Gilday, I have to ask you about something 
first that I'm concerned about, many people are, and a lot of 
people in the civilian world.
    I sent you a letter with two dozen people on it concerned 
that you had recently added several books to the Navy's 
professional reading list promoting Critical Race Theory and 
one of these books is Ibram X. Kendi's ``How to Be an Anti-
Racist,'' and it argues that the entire American system is 
corrupted from top to bottom by racial prejudices, which 
account for all differences and outcomes in our society.
    And one sentence out of that book says ``the only remedy to 
past discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy 
to present discrimination is future discrimination.''
    Now, I understand that this is a voluntary reading list, 
but how does exposing our sailors to the idea that they are 
either oppressors or oppressed, and that we must actively 
discriminate to make up for past discrimination improve our 
Navy's readiness and lethality for great power competition?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, initially you mentioned Critical Race 
Theory. I'm not a theorist. I'm the Chief of Naval Operations.
    What I can tell you is factually based on a substantial 
amount of time talking to sailors in the fleet there's racism 
in the Navy just like there's racism in our country, and the 
way we're going to get after it is to be honest about it, not 
to sweep it under the rug, and to talk about it and that's what 
we're doing.
    And that's one of the reasons that book is on the list. It 
doesn't mean I have any expectation that anybody believe or 
support everything that Mr. Kendi states in his book. I don't 
support everything that Kendi says.
    But the key point here is the sailors in our Navy have to 
be able to think critically. They have to be able to look 
outwardly at China and Russia and they have to understand what 
those societies--why those societies are a potential danger to 
the United States.
    Inwardly, we have to understand ourselves and we have to 
understand critically that we value diversity. And I think----
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Admiral, I agree that we should have a 
robust and great discussion, and any racism should be uprooted 
and taken away. I absolutely agree and I endorse that.
    But should we have future discrimination? You don't endorse 
that particular statement, do you?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I have to look at the context of it. 
I'm not trying to be evasive. But I don't--as I mentioned, I 
don't support everything that Kendi asserts. I don't believe 
everything I read. I think that----
    Mr. Lamborn. I hope--thank you.
    Admiral Gilday. I think that everybody has to be in a 
position to weigh fact from fiction, even our sailors. They're 
bombarded every day by misinformation. Much of it comes from 
China and Russia on this issue that's getting at our national 
psyche. I'm trying to get after it in the Navy.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I hope that's one statement you 
don't--you don't endorse and maybe we can follow up on that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 155.]
    Admiral--excuse me, General Berger, the number one and 
number three items on your unfunded priority list are Naval 
Strike Missiles and Tactical Tomahawks. If you don't have 
those, what's that going to do to the buildup of your plan for 
the Indo-Pacific?
    General Berger. Sir, those two are in the top for a reason, 
as you highlight. That's going to allow us to control straits, 
to control pieces of littoral areas from either ship or from 
shore in a--in an expeditionary and a light manner because it's 
really a JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] with a missile on 
the back of it that can--that can hold at bay, can hold at risk 
an adversary's naval vessels.
    Without it, we just allow them to maneuver with some 
freedom that we don't want them to have. So it's important for 
distributed maritime operations. It's important for our future 
role.
    Mr. Lamborn. Well, I'll try to help you work on getting 
that funded. I yield the rest of my time to the gentleman, Mr. 
Wittman.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
    Acting Secretary of the Navy Harker, I want to ask this. I 
could ask you about the Navy's plan for negative seven ships. I 
could ask you about them taking out a DDG. I could ask them 
about absolutely blowing up the multi-ship procurement for 
amphibious ships.
    But what I want to focus on is where we are in the fork of 
the road, I believe, with modernization versus generating 
current readiness. And as Yogi Berra once said, when you get to 
the fork in the road, take it.
    I want to know, what's the Navy's future plan and how do 
they make sure that we're pursuing the necessary modernization 
elements, especially in light of a budget that seems to me to 
be completely abandoning any sort of future modernization 
efforts.
    Mr. Harker. Sir, we try to focus on modernization and to 
balance that with the need for current readiness and it made 
very difficult decisions for us.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And first, I want to start by just thanking Admiral Gilday 
for defending basic American values of free and critical 
thought, which I think are one of the most important weapons we 
hold against adversaries like China.
    General Berger, to start with you, last year, I asked you 
about the CH-53K requirement. I regret using the word 
requirement as you responded that you need 200 aircraft per the 
established program of record.
    Less than 30 days after you testified, you released your 
force design report and stated that you needed fewer heavy-lift 
helicopters, that in March of this year you said that you do 
not need at least two full squadrons of heavy-lift helicopters 
compared to your previous plans.
    Thirty-two fewer aircraft creates a potential savings for 
the American taxpayer or for the Marine Corps of $4.4 billion. 
So if you were allowed to change the acquisition plan and 
recover those funds, can you please state how you would use 
those savings and why?
    General Berger. I think--I agree with the premise and I 
tried to address it in my opening comments. I think you look at 
us--you look to us to buy what we need, nothing more. So we 
need to match the vertical lift capability to the size of the 
Marine Corps and the tasks we're going to have in the future.
    I think the program of record is--I know it's larger than 
we're going to need. I think we're going to learn as we go 
through experimentation through wargaming just how many we'll 
need to reduce. But that initial program of record was based on 
a much larger Marine Corps.
    Where would I redirect those funds? On things like the 
unfunded priority list that would help us accelerate force 
design, get us a bigger margin of strategic advantage over the 
PLA [People's Liberation Army] and faster.
    Mr. Moulton. So I want to make sure the ranking member and 
other members of this--other colleagues of mine on this 
committee hear this, which is that we need to listen to you in 
your requirements.
    If we want to fund unfunded requirements, we should start 
by saving money on things that you don't need. I think that's 
really critical.
    Admiral Gilday, how are you addressing this same question? 
What is the Navy doing to make these important tradeoffs 
between old and new capabilities? Because we simply don't have 
the luxury of keeping all our older systems while also 
investing in new ones.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. And so as I mentioned earlier, we 
need--we need the Navy forward to be relevant, and as Admiral 
Davidson testified, as Admiral Aquilino testified, China is 
becoming increasingly a concern with respect to Taiwan. We need 
to be out there.
    And so I continue to fund the readiness of an aging fleet 
that, as I mentioned, is 21 years old. It's expensive, but 
that's the Navy that I believe the Nation needs out there on 
point.
    We're investing heavily in new technologies, hypersonics as 
an example, directed energy in the defensive side as an 
example. As opposed to years ago, we are actually doing the 
maintenance on our ships.
    We're getting better at doing that maintenance on time. 
We're not deferring the maintenance. We're not kicking it down 
the road because we know that 70 percent of the force we have 
today we're going to have in the future.
    Sir, it is a balance between being ready today and making 
those investments for a force just around the corner that we 
may need tomorrow. It's based--it's a risk issue and it also 
takes into account the industrial base.
    Mr. Moulton. One of the clear conclusions of our bipartisan 
future defense task force report is that we have to make these 
tradeoffs, but also that many of these new technologies and 
capabilities are actually less expensive than some of the big 
old heavy weapons systems that we are working so hard to 
maintain right now.
    Just look at China for an example, and we can see the kind 
of tradeoffs we can make and that's why our bipartisan task 
force was also able to recommend spending more money on 
fundamental investments in our national security like basic 
scientific research and STEM [science, technology, engineering, 
and math] education of our youth.
    Commandant, it sounds like this question of modernization 
and tradeoffs is critical. Would you benefit from having a 
separate hearing to discuss this before the committee?
    General Berger. If it's useful to the members and your 
staff, yes, I would agree with that, and I think the way that 
the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] and you and others have 
characterized it, I've heard Congressman Wittman and a couple 
of other members the same. On the one hand, you have combatant 
commanders who have a risk right now this----
    Mr. Moulton. We're just short on time.
    General Berger. Very well.
    Mr. Moulton. General, Secretary Harker, Admiral Gilday, 
would you agree to such a hearing?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Moulton. General Berger, is it a problem that we lost 
the USS Bonhomme Richard for your China strategy?
    General Berger. It's a strategic problem.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Gilday, we need to see the report on 
this. We need to see the report and we need to have a clear 
plan to replace this ship if it's critical for our China 
strategy, all the more so if the rumors are true that one of 
your sailors burned it down.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I commit to providing the full 
report to the Congress and make the report public.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wittman is recognized.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses again.
    General Berger, thank you again for all the work that 
you're doing with Force Design 2030 for the Marine Corps. Very 
forward thinking, the exact direction I believe we need to go 
to make sure the Marine Corps is, indeed, that lethal fighting 
force or the tip of the spear that protects this nation at a 
moment's notice and deters our adversaries around the world.
    As we look at the things that are necessary in Force Design 
2030, there's a lot there. There is a lot of modernization that 
needs to take place. There is a lot of divestiture in existing 
platforms.
    There is a lot of transition to new platforms, to new 
capability. All those things, I think, are incredibly 
important.
    The thing that I'm concerned about, though, is that 
Congress, in looking at that, gets lulled into a sense that the 
Marine Corps can do this by just in and of itself retiring 
legacy systems and then taking those resources and putting them 
forward to modernization.
    But as we know, you have to do the transition properly. You 
can't just get rid of everything and then have this giant gap 
in capability and say, well, now, years from now things are 
going to happen.
    I always tell folks, I said, you know, the dreams of our 
Nation's defense always happen outside the FYDP, and I want to 
make sure that doesn't happen in this particular case. And what 
I want to make sure, too, is that we understand that we're not 
taking on unacceptable risk in that transition. In other words, 
going through that bathtub.
    Can you give me your perspective? Because it seems like to 
me that the Marine Corps has always been noted for doing more 
with less.
    Seems like to me that as we modernize, we may be at a point 
of doing less with less if we don't look at the funding 
perspectives as you modernize, in addition to savings that you 
accrue by retiring legacy systems.
    General Berger. Sir, in my assessment, we have wrung just 
about everything we can out of the Marine Corps internally. 
We're at the limits of the risk that you address. We have 
reduced end strength. We have divested of legacy systems.
    We have taken every measure we can to include a 15 percent 
cut in our headquarters. We have wrung it dry. We're driven by 
a pacing threat, as several of you all have highlighted today, 
that we don't control the pace at which they go.
    And neither me nor the CNO want to transfer our risk onto 
the backs of a combatant commander because we--as others have 
pointed out, we have a perfect record of getting--guessing 
where the next conflict is going to happen. We got it wrong 
every time.
    Mr. Wittman. Yeah.
    General Berger. We have to be ready every day every week, 
and the best insurance policy we have is a naval expeditionary 
force that's forward. We're at the--we're at the limits of what 
I can do internally right now.
    Mr. Wittman. So would it be correct to say then that you--
in order to get where you need to be with Force Design 2030, 
you would not only need the resources that you get from 
retiring older systems but also some additional resources to 
make sure we're on track so we don't take that unacceptable 
risk with the Marine Corps as you modernize?
    General Berger. I think that's accurate. My only other 
option is to reduce the end strength of your Marine Corps even 
further, and I think that's unacceptable risk.
    Mr. Wittman. I agree.
    Admiral Gilday, let me--let me ask about the tension 
between the COCOMs [combatant commands] and what the chiefs are 
asked to provide, specifically, the Navy-Marine Corps team, as 
that demand signal continues to come in.
    As you look at the plans that our combatant commanders have 
and then the request for forces, so it's always what are we 
doing for today's risk. And I understand the combatant 
commanders' quandary there.
    But it seems like to me, historically, we have seen 
recently a significant increase in those RFFs [request for 
forces]. So I think the question becomes is the system broken.
    If all we're doing now is seeing this constant procession 
of RFFs, is the system broken and should we maybe go back to 
the beginning and say, what's the real scope of threats and how 
do we do a better job to make sure that we're not consuming so 
much resources today to generate readiness today that we can't 
do the modernization we need for years to come?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think, in short, I think the process 
needs more rigor, and so those 15 requests for forces that 
extended 4 carriers in Central Command for almost a year came 
at a cost of over a quarter of a billion dollars that we can't 
invest in modernization.
    If there's a reason to keep the carrier there, then keep it 
there. But if there's not, use another element of the joint 
force to do the job and move things dynamically around.
    I think the current Secretary of Defense recognizes that. 
He's bringing the Eisenhower home. He's swinging--he's swinging 
the Reagan from the Western Pacific. That is not an easy 
decision to make.
    But on any given day, today, the Navy is putting a hundred 
players on the field. The Secretary of Defense gets to decide 
how those players are used, and I just try to advise the 
judicious use of those forces so that we preserve precious 
resources.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Wittman. Thank 
you, Admiral.
    Next up is Mr. Brown, who's joining us remotely.
    Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
    Mr. Courtney. We can hear you now.
    Mr. Brown. Great. Thank you.
    And my question is for the secretary. I'd like to ask you 
not about, you know, procurement and platforms but about, I 
think, you know, our most important asset and that's, you know, 
our people, our sailors and our Marines.
    In last year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], 
Congress directed the Department of Defense, working with the 
service--with the services to establish a mentoring and career 
enhancing program with the aim to increase the diversity of the 
officer corps to better reflect our Nation by fostering a more 
diverse leadership pipeline.
    I think mentoring is critical when you have 43 percent of 
the men and women in the total joint force are black and brown 
but there are zero four-star admirals, one four-star general in 
the Air Force and one in the Army.
    I think mentoring is really important. Can you update us, 
Secretary Harker, on the Navy's effort to establish that 
mentoring program?
    Mr. Harker. Sorry, sir, I'm hard of hearing and I couldn't 
hear the entire question. The CNO is going to help me with this 
one.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think the first thing I'd say is 
that I think this--I think that I'm speaking for the secretary 
when I say that he agrees that a Navy that looks like its 
citizens is a Navy that is truly representative of who we 
strive to be as a nation.
    And so coming out of Task Force Navy was about a 6-month 
effort where we--where we went out to the fleet, we talked to 
sailors, and we got a better understanding of issues related to 
racism with respect to gender discrimination, with respect to 
ethnic issues, and we came back with a number of 
recommendations.
    To your point, sir, one of the key things that we're doing 
is we're trying to do a better job at talent management so that 
we can put people in a position to be promoted so that we can 
make them admirals or make them--make them generals.
    And so in the Navy, we have 17 officer committees and they 
have just now started to brief me individually on what they're 
doing at the lieutenant and lieutenant commander level so that 
we not--so that we develop leaders that are going to be 
competitive with their peers and are going to promote at a rate 
equal to their peers so that we can have that more diverse 
leadership flag wardroom in the future.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. And I'd just--and I'd just like to 
emphasize that that mentoring also needs to occur, and you and 
I have had this conversation, at the precommissioning, training 
schooling, ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps], and the 
academies.
    I'd like to ask the secretary another question. Last year 
in the defense authorization we directed each service secretary 
to establish a senior advisor for diversity and inclusion.
    In fact, we worked across the aisle in the services to 
ensure that we didn't call that person a chief diversity 
officer, but a senior advisor and their qualifications are that 
they have a background in management in diversity, equity, and 
inclusion issues, and personnel.
    What is the status of the appointment of the senior advisor 
for diversity and inclusion in the Navy, this senior advisor 
who reports directly to the service secretary?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, we have hired a senior advisor to report 
to us on diversity, equity, and inclusion and that person just 
started recently.
    He is looking at the existing policies that are department-
wide and then also what's in the Navy and the Marine Corps in 
order to come forward and make sure that we are aligned with 
the direction of the administration on this effort.
    Mr. Brown. Well, I appreciate that and if you, you know, 
take for the record--I don't know if that's the right language 
we use or to request--but if we could get the background--the 
publicly available information about the senior advisor I'd 
appreciate it.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Brown, for bringing that up.
    Again, that was a very strong bipartisan priority last year 
in the NDAA and I think we would definitely welcome that 
followup.
    Next up is Mr. Scott from Georgia.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Harker, before I move to the issue of readiness, 
I want to mention something to you and ask for your support in 
one thing.
    Four graduates from service academies have been allowed to 
forego their service commitment this year and play in the NFL 
[National Football League]. The Navy has a gentleman who I've 
never met named Cameron Kinley, who asked for the same 
accommodation.
    The others are from the different academies, Air Force and 
Army. But Malcolm Perry from the--is a Naval Academy grad and 
he was granted a request last year to forego his service 
briefly to play in the NFL.
    Cameron Kinley, to the best of what I've seen in my 
reading, is the only person that has been denied that request. 
He was president of his class. He signed with the Tampa Bay 
Buccaneers, and then not only was he denied the request, he was 
denied the right to appeal, and my question gets back to the 
appeal.
    I would appreciate it if you would allow him to appeal the 
decision and listen to the merits of his case, and if he's able 
to make his case then allow him to pursue both of his dreams to 
be a naval officer and play in the NFL.
    So that is my specific request is to--is to listen to his--
allow him to appeal and listen to it.
    And the other statement I would make is that I'm not--I 
don't know if it's right or wrong, but I do know that there 
should be a uniform standard. And if it is an accommodation 
that's granted to--that's going to be granted to West Point and 
Air Force Academy grads then it needs to be accommodated to 
Naval Academy grads as well, in my opinion, and there needs to 
be consistency with the requests.
    So that's a general statement. But I would appreciate if 
you would hear his--allow him to appeal the decision and listen 
to his appeal on the merits.
    Mr. Harker. Sir, I understand there have been different 
laws at different points in time as well as different policies, 
some of them at the OSD level.
    Mr. Scott. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Harker. I looked at this case. I looked at the 
significant investment that taxpayers make in every midshipman 
and our expectation and their expectation is that midshipmen 
will graduate and be commissioned with the Navy and Marine 
Corps.
    So talked with the CNO, talked with the Commandant and 
looked for their military advice and we went forward. I made 
the decision to deny his request.
    Mr. Scott. The accommodation was made for Malcolm Perry. 
The accommodation has been made for four additional people.
    Why is--it seems to me that his is the only accommodation 
that has not been made. Why is he different? Why should he be 
given less of an accommodation than others have been?
    Mr. Harker. I can't speak for what the Army and Air Force 
secretaries decided. I did not have a conversation with them 
about this. But, you know, looking at the two most famous Naval 
Academy graduates that played in professional sports----
    Mr. Scott. Roger Staubach.
    Mr. Harker [continuing]. They both served first.
    Mr. Scott. Roger Staubach served first?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Scott. I didn't know--that was a long time ago, though.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. But, I mean, that's--the legislation 
allows us to make exceptions when it's a significant benefit to 
the service, and for us, David Robinson and Roger Staubach, 
they both served first and they were recognized as graduates 
who had served in the military, and that added value to us.
    Mr. Scott. Well, I've spent more time on this than I 
intended to, but I would suggest to you that if you have an 
all-American athlete that comes into our offices and is trying 
to decide which academy they want to go to, then it would be a 
mistake for us to recommend that they go to the Naval Academy 
if the Air Force and the Army are going to accommodate or be 
more accommodating to them.
    Either way, I think there should be a uniform standard 
across the academies. And so obviously, you know, I'll tell you 
I'll speak with Lloyd Austin about it as well. But I think 
there needs to be a uniform standard.
    Admiral, I'll move quickly on this. On the CNO's unfunded 
priority list, you've got readiness shortfalls including 
aviation depot maintenance, ship depot maintenance, and flying 
hour programs.
    Could you speak to the issue of the balance between growing 
the Navy and sustaining the current Navy, and what it does for 
readiness today?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Current readiness has been and 
will be my number one priority. We need a Navy that needs to be 
forward and is ready to fight tonight, and so I'm not backing 
off at all on our requirement, I believe, that serves our 
sailors well.
    And now, General Berger mentioned this a few minutes ago. 
When we start--when we start cutting away at current readiness, 
we begin to push that risk on the backs of commanders out there 
at sea and the people that work for them.
    When we begin to man ships with less people because it's 
always easy to take away people--that's money in your pocket 
right off the bat--or we put less ammunition in magazines or 
less spare parts in supply storerooms or we cut back on 
training, then you have a Navy that begins to become irrelevant 
and that's not a place where we want to be.
    The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Garamendi is recognized.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me. I was stuck on Roger Staubach, 
with whom I had the privilege of playing against him twice 
during his career. So memories.
    Mr. Secretary, you made the right decision.
    Moving on. Admiral Gilday, where's the 5-year ship plan?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, the 30-year shipbuilding plan or----
    Mr. Garamendi. The ship--the shipyard improvement plan.
    Admiral Gilday. Oh, the shipyard improvement plan? Yes, 
sir. We'll have that by the end of the month.
    Mr. Garamendi. Good. Then we'll have a hearing shortly 
thereafter. Thank you very much. Appreciate that.
    Commandant Berger, could you in 4 minutes explain the 
Marine Corps of the future and what we need to know to prepare 
for that in this year's NDAA?
    General Berger. Sir, I offered in a separate hearing to lay 
it out in detail in 4 minutes or less.
    First, you need a Marine Corps today, and until that point 
that's ready that can respond now. We can't take it off the 
field, as a couple of you have said, come back on the field 3 
or 4 years later with the force we're going to need.
    We have to be ready every week. We will. We are ready 
today. The force that you need in the future, I think the best 
case you have for deterrence against somebody like the PLAN 
[People's Liberation Army Navy] or Russia is to have a very 
strong forward force that's expeditionary, that has the ability 
to collect against, to deter, to compete every day, every week, 
that have the ability to work with allies and partners to build 
a network that will have the best chance of success of denying 
the--to preventing the next conflict from ever happening.
    But if it does, to be already forward so that they can 
respond quickly and decisively. That means we have to be 
lighter. That means we have to be less of a land force like we 
have been for the past 20 years, supporting the operations in 
the Middle East, and more of a naval force.
    You need us--expeditionary you need us lighter, you need us 
able to sustain that force in a really distributed fashion, 
plugged into a naval and joint architecture that can move 
information rapidly, make decisions quickly.
    It's the best chance you have of deterring and, frankly, if 
a crisis happens responding quickly.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, all that in 2 minutes. Well done.
    I do agree with you we need to have a full hearing on it. 
Of particular interest to my subcommittee is the sustainment 
issues as well as locations from which you need to operate. So 
thank you for that.
    Also, I understand that--and this may have been asked 
earlier during my absence. If so, my apologies. The AAV 
[Amphibious Assault Vehicle] incident off the coast of 
California, the loss of nine--of eight Marines, one sailor, I 
understand that an additional action has been taken in the last 
week with regard to the command structure.
    Has that been--could you please sort of tell us where--what 
actions have been taken with regard to the command?
    General Berger. Once I reviewed the results of two 
investigations, the one safety investigation and then the first 
legal investigation--once it was clear to me what we knew about 
the event itself and that day, there were still unanswered 
questions.
    So we directed a follow-on investigation to look back 6 
months to find out how was this unit formed and who made what 
decisions. When that investigation came to me, it was pretty 
clear that the division commander at that time failed to uphold 
what we expect of a commander to do and provide in a trained 
ready force.
    I pulled him out of his IG [inspector general] position, 
and since that time, I've administratively counseled him--
formally counseled him. That's a permanent part of his record.
    Mr. Garamendi. Which means what?
    General Berger. Most likely--it's difficult for an officer 
or general to move forward with that in their record as a 
permanent basis.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good. I appreciate your ongoing effort 
to deal with this tragedy and the necessary command. As I've 
said and others have said in the hearings in which we conducted 
on this, a culture of safety must be part of the Marine Corps 
ethics.
    Could you--well, you won't comment in the next 7 seconds 
but I'll let that hang there, and appreciate your efforts. 
Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Dr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Harker, last year the Department deployed the 
W76-2 low-yield nuclear warhead on some American [inaudible] 
submarines. I believe the utility [inaudible] something that 
deserves more attention [inaudible]. First, can you provide 
some context for what [inaudible] important [inaudible] 
escalate-to-win strategy?
    The Chairman. I'm sorry. We have lost Dr. DesJarlais. We 
cannot hear you. It's getting cut off.
    Dr. DesJarlais. You can't hear audio?
    The Chairman. I'm hearing that. But you were, like, 
breaking up in between. So give it--give it one more try.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, let's--we're talking about low-yield 
W76-2 missiles, Secretary Harker. As you know that they were 
placed on submarines. Can you explain why that's important in 
the Putin escalate-to-win strategy? So if you could give us 
some context to why it's important that we have this.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. The low-yield nuclear weapons was 
something that was done previously, the--different from the 
sea-launched cruise missile nuclear that was discussed a little 
while ago.
    From the warfighting value of that, I think the CNO is 
probably the best capable person to discuss the value of the 
low-yield nuclear weapons.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Low-yield is based on the 
findings of the Nuclear Posture Review, and the stated purpose 
of the low-yield weapons was to close a deterrence gap against 
the Russians and the Chinese.
    And so there is a--there's a capability that the Russians 
in particular have and the NPR's [Nuclear Posture Review's] 
intent was to ensure that we could close that gap so that the 
Russians didn't feel like they were in a position of advantage 
with respect to weapons with that kind of yield.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Do you feel that our current strategy is 
adequate?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think as we come up on this new 
Nuclear Posture Review, one of the things that I always find 
reassuring about these reviews is from administration to 
administration they've been squarely focused on national 
security.
    The recommendations track very consistently from 
administration to administration. And so I think taking a 
deeper look right now is a good opportunity and I think--I'm 
not trying to be evasive with your question. I just think that 
the NPR will shed some more light in terms of where we need to 
go and why.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I think it's very possible that 
the next nuclear blast we see is likely to be a low-yield and 
we have to have an adequate response, and I don't think that 
would be us making that first move.
    But I think it is an important deterrent. Admiral Richards' 
assessment certainly feels that it would make conflict less 
likely. Do you agree with that?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I do.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And then the current system we have, 
of course, we can do it air launched. We have submarine 
launched from a missile, but this could also be something that 
was used on the sea-launched cruise missile. That would be 
another method that now may not be an option. Could that 
possibly take away a strategic tool that's very important?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I think--technically, I think 
that would be feasible.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Considering what Putin has with Skyfall and 
other weapons, as Mr. Turner pointed out earlier in the 
hearing, I think that that's something that needs another look 
because, obviously, it's easier--for the Russians it's probably 
easier to intercept a ballistic missile and, certainly, some 
low yield that was delivered or attempted to be delivered by 
plane may also be less effective than a cruise missile that's 
launched from a submarine. Would you agree with that?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think--I think at a higher 
classification, I think it would be worth a deeper discussion 
on that particular issue.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, and just for clarification, the yield 
of these W76-2, how does it compare to, say, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in terms of kilotons?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, again, I think that that particular--
those particular numbers exceed the classification of this 
hearing.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I mean, you can Google it and read it 
on Wikipedia. So it may be for this hearing or not. I 
understand that's different. But there's been some argument 
made that our low-yield----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Apologize.
    Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, 
gentlemen, for joining us today. I am going to try and 
accomplish something which is within 5 minutes to talk about 
the future of defense and also childcare. So I'm hoping I'll be 
able to have time.
    I want to start by reading an abridged version--a version 
of an article by Christian Brose, who's a former McCain 
staffer, and he says, ``Many defense experts believe that the 
U.S. military abetted and even encouraged by Congress continues 
to be focused on too many resources preparing for yesterday's 
battles rather than the conflicts most likely to be seen in the 
future.
    ``While aircraft carriers, heavy tanks, fighter jets, and 
nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in defending the 
homeland, many believe that the United States must shift its 
focus away from old wars and legacy weapons systems and focus 
more on asymmetrical threats such as biosecurity, 
cybersecurity, pandemics, and even disinformation.
    ``If a conflict occurred today, U.S. satellites would 
likely immediately be disabled and American ships would be 
rendered useless since they would be too vulnerable to precise 
hypersonic missiles.
    ``So, consequently, the U.S. should follow the Chinese, 
experts argue, pointing to cheap unmanned weapons and cheap 
unmanned underwater drones.''
    With that in mind, my question for Acting Secretary Harker 
and Admiral Gilday is I wanted to follow up on Mr. Wittman and 
Mr. Moulton's lines of question.
    I was really grateful to be part of that bipartisan Future 
of Defense Task Force and I'm grateful that you all are willing 
to have another conversation about this.
    But it doesn't appear that the Navy has conducted yet an 
analysis that looks simultaneously at the political ambitions 
of our two chief rivals, which are China and Russia, and at 
emerging technologies for warfare above all--I'm sorry, above, 
at, and below sea level and at the ability of the American and 
our allied industrial base to develop and put into production 
those affordable systems that are necessary for our allies and 
we to prevail at sea, both in peace and at wartime.
    So is it fair to say that there really hasn't been a study 
or an analysis of the way that you all think about that path, 
the fork to take? And if so, how, short of a hearing, can we 
ask for an understanding and insight into how you think through 
these really important decisions?
    Mr. Harker. Thank you, ma'am. We have actually done a lot 
of work around the unmanned systems and how to integrate those 
in with our force.
    As the CNO mentioned earlier, there was a significant 
exercise off the coast of San Diego last month. There was also 
then a lot of work with getting the F/A-18 in order to be able 
to do that refueling with the MQ-25.
    So we have done a lot to bring that technology into our 
doctrine and warfighting capabilities. There's still room to 
grow. I know both this committee and the Senate Armed Services 
Committee have concerns with how fast we're going. Some people 
think we're not moving fast enough.
    Others think we're moving too fast, and we're trying to 
balance that with, you know, the requirements that we have and 
the budget we have.
    Ms. Houlahan. And, Admiral Gilday, can I ask you as well 
for your reflections on that?
    Admiral Gilday. So, ma'am, our distributed maritime 
operations concept, in conjunction with the Marine Corps and 
how we believe we're going to fight, was the underpinning of 
the two latest assessments that actually heavily considered 
unmanned vehicles in the air, on the sea, under the sea.
    Our investment strategy leads us to a hybrid fleet in the 
2030s. As I mentioned earlier, we want to make sure that we get 
the technology correct before we come to--we come to the 
Secretary and ask him and make a proposal to scale.
    But we believe that about a third of the fleet would be 
unmanned by the mid-2030s if we stay on pace, and by the late 
2030s, about 40 percent of our air wings at sea would be 
unmanned. So we are moving in that direction. It's critical 
that we do so.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, and I look forward to further 
conversations on this. And with my minute left that I would 
like very much to talk about childcare.
    You have asked for a very modest increase in family 
childcare homes. But the request for child development centers 
remains, largely, unchanged from year to year and neither of 
these requests have come close to the fiscal year 2020 funding 
level.
    Can you give me some insight and context into the decision 
making of why childcare portions of the Navy and Marine Corps 
budget requests are where they are when we have 7,000 children 
who still are on wait lists?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am. There was a significant increase in 
funding for childcare last year. We had a MILCON project that's 
going to increase and do repairs to the child facility in 
Kitsap.
    We also had five planning and design projects for $11 
million, which we're executing this year as we look at how can 
we go forward with the MILCON necessary to continue to expand 
our childcare capability.
    At the same time, we're also working to increase our 
childcare in ways that don't require MILCON. So we have got a 
public-private partnership. We're working with the Coronado 
Unified School District in San Diego to try to use some of 
their schools for after school care so that we can free up 
space in our child development centers and be able to 
accommodate additional students.
    This is definitely something we take seriously and we're 
trying to handle that.
    Ms. Houlahan. I look forward to working with you on that.
    And with that, gentlemen, I yield back and thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Kelly is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kelly. Mr. Secretary, what is the top line budget this 
year as opposed to last year, just the dollar number?
    Mr. Harker. This year's top line budget for the Department 
of Defense is----
    Mr. Kelly. Not for the Department of Defense. For the 
Department of the Navy.
    Mr. Harker. $211 million.
    Mr. Kelly. What was that?
    Mr. Harker. $211 million, sir.
    Mr. Kelly. And what was it last year?
    Mr. Harker. $206 million.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. And so my next question would be is----
    The Chairman. I think you mean billion. Okay.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. Billion.
    The Chairman. Go ahead.
    Mr. Kelly. All right. And my next question would be is of 
that how much is allocated to things other than building ships 
or doing personnel? How much of that is to climate change?
    How much of that is to renewable fuels? How much of those 
dollars of your budget are allocated to something other than 
building ships or training sailors or Marines?
    Mr. Harker. The majority of our budget is focused on 
personnel----
    Mr. Kelly. I know the majority, but how much of it is not 
focused on that?
    Mr. Harker. We have not previously tagged our budget for 
those things, and so we're going through the process of 
identifying what those specific dollars are right now, sir.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. And there's a $2 billion cut in 
shipbuilding next year, right? Two billion cut in the 
shipbuilding budget. Is that correct?
    Mr. Harker. Versus what we had planned in fiscal year 2021, 
yes, sir.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. And then so when do we expect the 
shipbuilding plan?
    Mr. Harker. Shipbuilding plan is going through the 
clearance process right now--I hope to get it to you as soon as 
possible. I'd wanted to get it to you before this hearing and 
was unable to get the----
    Mr. Kelly. That was one of the only questions I asked 
Secretary Austin, would he commit to doing that since we did 
not get one last year. You understand that we can't do our jobs 
if we don't get that product from y'all?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. I understand. We have committed to 
get it to you and we will get it to you. Could not get it done 
by----
    Mr. Kelly. It's a little late now, though. We're talking 
about the budget now. And you understand that you're asking us 
to trust your judgment into the future and your management of 
risk throughout all departments while at the same time failing 
to provide us any insight into what the future looks like. It's 
one of those ``trust me.''
    Mr. Harker. Sir, the shipbuilding plan is something that is 
typically not delivered in the first year of a new 
administration. This year it is required and we----
    Mr. Kelly. But it's the requirement under law, correct?
    Mr. Harker. Pardon me, sir?
    Mr. Kelly. It's a requirement under law to provide that to 
us, correct?
    Mr. Harker. Yes [inaudible] does and we are going to 
deliver that.
    Mr. Kelly. And you do understand that in Mississippi, you 
know, we build ships there, and you've visited there and I 
thank you for that. That shows that you are on the spot doing 
the things that you're supposed to do, and I really appreciate 
that, Mr. Secretary.
    But my question is, in this budget we're asking to cut out 
one DDG.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Kelly. Yet, we had already committed in this plan to 
build two. So we're asking to cut one of those. So what do we 
tell those shipbuilders? What do we tell those employers?
    What do we do with that labor force? And when we have to 
build that DDG later, how much more will it cost the taxpayers 
because we didn't do what we as a government agreed to do?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, that's--that was our biggest regret in 
this budget. I wish we could have fit that DDG into this 
budget, and we are committed to building that next year. We're 
also committed to doing a multi----
    Mr. Kelly. And those laid-off workers--will it cost more 
once we lay off workers that aren't able to do what they were 
committed to do? You understand our industrial base.
    When we have to lay off workers or they don't have 
something to do, they have to be laid off, and you understand 
then that costs us, the American taxpayers, much more dollars 
to build the exact same thing because we have to regen a 
workforce?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. I understand, and I was impressed 
with what you're doing down in Mississippi with the partnership 
with the local high schools and with your community colleges to 
bring on a workforce and to maintain that workforce, and we 
believe that we can continue forward with providing the support 
for that industrial base.
    Mr. Kelly. Here's all I'll tell you is we're getting a 
defense cut. We're getting a haircut this year. You can call it 
whatever you want, but it's a haircut and it's a significant 
haircut across the board.
    And I remember when we had ships crashing into each other, 
commanders being relieved, captains of ships or commanders at 
all levels, aircraft falling out of the air, vehicle turnovers 
that were killing Marines and Army kids.
    All these things happened because we had an inadequate 
budget in order to do the things that are necessary today. And 
I will argue if we're not really, really careful, guys, we're 
going to start having sailors crashing ships, airplanes falling 
out of the sky because of maintenance errors, untrained leaders 
who are not enforcing standards that should be, and I will just 
tell you, you guys need to really push back.
    This budget is not capable of doing what we need to do to 
protect the nation today or in 2030 or 2035. And I'd just 
asked, guys, that's what we pay you big dollars for.
    Please push back and let them know it's not enough. You're 
great leaders. You owe that to this nation. Thank you, and I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yes. Thank you for being here. I know we have 
had a lot of discussion about the top-line budget, about 
equipment, about hardware, about numbers of ships. But we have 
also heard in pretty much every one of our hearings, especially 
those of us on the bipartisan defense task force, that it's not 
just about hardware.
    It's about our ability to quickly and efficiently acquire 
new technology, take the best from Silicon Valley, and 
incorporate it into the Department of Defense. And I know, as 
I'm sure you do, that it's a laborious process to go from great 
idea to new weapons.
    China has no such problem. They have no such problem, no 
such 3-year string, and while we can have a debate about the 
top-line budget and the hardware, I want to know what you all 
are doing to change the culture and climate around acquisition 
to make sure our smallest companies who have some of the best 
ideas are actually able to get the attention of the Department 
of Defense.
    And as we have heard, this valley of death, that you can 
get money for a prototype but you can't actually turn it into a 
program of record.
    So can I hear from both OSD as well as Admiral Gilday on 
this, please? Briefly.
    Mr. Harker. Yes, ma'am. This is something that we 
definitely are working to improve. We stood up an organization 
called NavalX [Naval Expeditions Agility Office], which is 
focused on trying to identify those requirements and partner 
with industry in order to come up with quick rapid ways of 
meeting those requirements.
    That's something that's been stood up in the last couple of 
years that is a really powerful capability that we have 
established both here in the DC area and then out at all the 
various fleet concentration areas, and we're working within the 
acquisition community as well as within the operational Navy 
and Marine Corps to try to facilitate a quick dialogue so that 
we can go from requirement to delivery as quickly as we can.
    You're absolutely right that there is a long valley of 
death in the current acquisition process, and this is something 
that needs to change.
    When you look at all of the different acquisition 
requirements, we have put in requirements and controls in place 
to prevent fraud, prevent waste, prevent abuse, but all of 
those requirements come at a cost and they slow things down, 
and we need to figure out how to maintain control over waste, 
abuse, those types of things, while enabling our acquisition 
community to work as quickly as they can.
    Ms. Slotkin. Admiral.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. I'd like to thank the Congress 
for the--for the authorities that we have to accelerate buys in 
the acquisition process.
    I'll give you a couple of examples. We have a new deck 
crawler kind of machine that cleans the hulls of submarines 
when they go into dry dock. A year ago, that would take us 4 
weeks to clean the outside of the hull. It takes us two--it 
takes two shifts to complete that work.
    We have headsets now that allow us to map a space on a ship 
digitally so that a job that we give a shipyard worker to do is 
much more accurate in terms of its measurements, in terms of 
its 3D [three dimensional] capability. Those were turned very, 
very quickly. Just a couple of examples.
    But another one is laser technology, and so we're trying to 
leverage small businesses as much as we can because of the 
power and the innovation that out there. But I'm not at all 
under the impression that we have completely solved this, and 
there are companies that still can't get to us. And so----
    Ms. Slotkin. Yeah. I would say we're pretty far from 
solving it since, literally, every hearing we have heard from 
these companies has talked about how difficult it is.
    And I would note that we did give you guys the authority, 
actually, even before I got here. This SBIR [Small Business 
Innovation Research] authority allows you to do this rapid 
acquisition, and it's less than 2.5 percent of your acquisition 
budget was through that program in 2021.
    So I would just flag it's also a cultural thing hearing 
from you all that people can try things and fail, and 
Department of Defense doesn't usually like that kind of thing.
    My second question is myself and Representative Gallagher 
have been running a supply chain task force here on HASC [House 
Armed Services Committee]. It's been a very bipartisan process.
    We all learned through the past year of COVID how difficult 
it is to have transparency on our supply chains, but how 
important it is so we don't get caught with our pants down if 
we're sole source buying things from China.
    Do you, Admiral Gilday, have transparency on supply chain 
that is needed for the Navy? If not, what is your plan to get 
that transparency?
    Admiral Gilday. So I would say that one of the silver 
linings to COVID has been the lifting of that opaque curtain on 
395 between Crystal City and the Pentagon.
    We have much more visibility into the fragility of those 
supply chains, those single-source overseas suppliers, because 
industry understands the risk both to them and to us if we 
can't solve those problems quickly.
    We're in a better place now and I--my hat's off to industry 
and to our Under Secretary Geurts for making the effort to keep 
those communications on a weekly basis during the pandemic.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
    Commandant Berger, do you share the concerns expressed by 
Admiral Davidson about a potential PRC [People's Republic of 
China] action against Taiwan within the next 6 years?
    General Berger. I do, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. CNO, same question to you.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. I think this gets to the fundamental dilemma 
that you're hearing expressed on both sides with regards to the 
overall budget. We seem to be punting our--a larger Navy into 
the future on a 2045 time line when really we need to be 
planning around a 2025 time line, and we need to be resourcing 
it accordingly.
    And that's--to the extent you're hearing frustration, I 
think that is the frustration or at least--I don't speak for 
other members. That's the frustration and sense of urgency I 
feel.
    There may be small ways we can start to get at it as we 
haggle over the bigger budgetary picture.
    Commandant, for example, last year this committee supported 
at least part of your requests for ground-based anti-ship 
missiles and long-range fires. In a bipartisan manner, we 
endorsed your overall force design initiatives.
    Regrettably, the appropriators cut your funding for GBASM 
[Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile] and zeroed out long-range 
fires. Can you briefly describe the impact of that cut and the 
importance of those programs.
    General Berger. It reduced what we'll have in the field in 
2023. It'll delay the fielding of the capability. It's a proven 
technology. It set us back in time, which equals--for a 
combatant commander it equals risk.
    Mr. Gallagher. And then a bit more of the initial program, 
you also identified artificial intelligence-enabled force 
protection as a capability for prioritized investment in your 
most recent force design guidance.
    Yet, it's not resourced in the fiscal year 2022 budget 
submission. This was funded and developed by the Small Business 
Innovation Research program, which is highly competitive, 
subject to multi-phase competition, very difficult to get to 
phase three.
    In light of that, the design budget, how does the Marine 
Corps plan to leverage this SBIR investment and resource and 
deploy this AI [artificial intelligence]-enabled force 
protection capability?
    General Berger. At our bases and stations, in my opinion, 
and I'm very familiar with the technology, it can actually 
reduce the number of military police, security--civilian 
security that we hire right now.
    It's also the kind of technology that will allow you to use 
it into the future. It won't be obsolete 2 or 3 years from now. 
Baked into it is the ability to update the software inside it.
    For perimeter security, for monitoring the security of our 
installations, I think it will be a helpful capability, and I 
think this year we'll make a--we'll make a decision on 
procurement and where to field it, because we have already used 
it at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar and it's proven its 
effectiveness.
    Mr. Gallagher. That's good to hear, and I hope members of 
the committee will work to give you the resources you need 
there.
    Admiral Gilday, we--I think we all agree we want the 
Constellation-class frigate to be a success. We want it on 
time, on budget. Sort of the logic of that was it was a proven 
design. I think that's what put Fincantieri in an advantageous 
position.
    I understand the need for combat systems changes on that 
ship. But will you commit to--you know, with the with the 
lessons of the LCS in mind commit to minimizing changes to 
existing hull and machinery?
    I mean, why make any changes in light of just the urgency 
of fielding this platform on time and on budget?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I agree with you. When I went up to 
the shipyard to visit that's one of the things I committed to, 
that we would minimize any perturbations.
    We got a lot done what we want to put in that ship and go 
after it instead of, as you as you allude to, kind of drag it 
out over time and add uncertainty and risk to the--to the 
build.
    Mr. Gallagher. And I get that the--just to sort of step 
back here in what time I have remaining, I get that a lot of 
the decisions that need to be made are, in some ways, even 
above your paygrade.
    In other words, any tradeoff between the services would 
have to be reconciled by the Secretary of Defense and the 
President for the budget. You know, their overall tradeoff 
between nondefense discretionary spending verse defense 
spending is, certainly, something that only the White House can 
resolve.
    But given that the commitment to a 355-ship Navy is a 
statutory commitment, I mean, what top line would you need in 
order to advance towards that objective more expeditiously?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. The shipbuilding plan that we 
submitted last year that was predicated on 4.1 percent growth 
to get us to 355 in 10 years. And so that was, to Mr. 
Courtney's point, a clear set of headlights not only for the 
Congress but for industry.
    When EB [General Dynamics Electric Boat] puts millions of 
dollars into infrastructure because they're counting on 
building that Columbia for the next 15 years, that's the kind 
of predictability and--predictability that we really need.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, I support the 10-year time horizon as 
unrealistic, as some may suggest, and just in light of these 
warnings about something happening within the next 5 or 6 
years, I think we all need to act with a greater sense of 
urgency.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Golden is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday, during your recent visit to Bath Iron 
Works, you said that, ``One of the most important reasons I'm 
in Maine today is to ensure that every person here knows their 
work is critically important to our Navy.
    ``DDGs are the workhorse of our fleet and, simply put, you 
can't get to the fight if you don't have ships to sail there. 
To the entire workforce here at Bath Iron Works, who are 
responsible for helping us generate warfighting readiness, you 
have my profound thanks.''
    A few weeks later, the Navy delivered a budget request that 
would cut a DDG that's already under contract. This proposed 
cut would result in about 500 laid off DDG shipbuilders, and 
those are likely to be the youngest shipbuilders.
    It takes about 7 years to get fully proficient. So those 
are your future shipbuilders. Those are your DDG(X) 
shipbuilders.
    You mentioned the DDG is critically important to the Navy. 
It's the most versatile ship in the fleet. It's the principal 
for ballistic missile defense. It provides anti-submarine, 
anti-surface, and anti-air capabilities in a single platform.
    Since I became a member of this committee, when asked not 
one member of the Navy has failed to stress the importance of 
getting the Flight III out to sea.
    Now when we're prepared to deliver the Navy this new 
capability it's proposed to reduce it. In front of the Senate 
last week, Admiral Kilby said the Navy needs the Flight III 
capability.
    Same hearing, Mr. Stefany says that the Navy absolutely 
wants to do another multi-year procurement from 2023 to 2027. 
But we're looking at a cut in fiscal year 2022.
    This just doesn't add up to me. The budget would take seven 
cruisers offline, the tradeoff generally understood that we 
replace them with a new DDG Flight III, which has less missiles 
in the magazine but great new capabilities with the SPY-6 
radar. But the proposal would reduce both at the same time.
    So where does the Navy plan to get the capabilities that 
the Flight III provides? You're decommissioning cruisers. The 
new frigate can't deliver the full capability of the DDG Flight 
II-A let alone the Flight III.
    The DDG-51 is the most consistent and stable surface 
combatant program in the Navy right now. Compared to many of 
the Navy's recent surface combatant programs, it's a huge 
success. We can deliver on budget, on time, and the Flight III 
coming online now is the most superior destroyer ever built.
    Last year, Congress expressed strong support for increased 
procurement of Flight III by including $130 million in the 
fiscal year 2021 defense bills to support the procurement of an 
additional DDG in fiscal year 2022. In other words, we told you 
to procure three DDG ships this year, and instead, the Navy has 
come back and requested one.
    Congress bears the responsibility to provide and maintain a 
Navy and Congress gave the Navy direction last year that isn't 
reflected at all in this budget proposal, essentially, a two-
ship reduction from the existing law, which Congress agreed to 
this past December.
    Admiral, you talked about fiscal year 2025 and 2026 and the 
fleet that you envision having out there and ready for the 
combatant commander. You won't be building DDG(X) in 2025. That 
is slated for fiscal year 2028 at the earliest.
    You know, essentially, I think what you're looking at is 
you'll still be building DDG-51 Flight IIIs. I think that the 
last contracted one will be delivered in fiscal year 2027 for a 
total of only 14 ships, roughly speaking.
    So in 2025, thinking about that potential threat from China 
that everyone has been talking about, you're going to have the 
Flight III, you're going to have the Zumwalt, and you're going 
to have the frigate.
    That's what you're going to have out there. I hope that by 
that time we might have successfully equipped the Zumwalt with 
a hypersonic missile capability, and I know that you have a 
March 18th solicitation on how to reconfigure the Zumwalt-class 
to host larger hypersonic missiles in the new vertical launch 
system.
    As you're looking at the DDG(X) out in the future, I've 
seen Admiral Galinis talking about how it's probably going to 
look maybe a little bit more like a Zumwalt than the Arleigh 
Burke in a desire to get the DDG-51 Flight III capabilities 
alongside the DDG 1000 integrated power system.
    So given this concern about fiscal years 2025 and 2026, why 
aren't we looking to focus on getting that Zumwalt equipped 
with the hypersonic, learning the lessons about how to blend 
the 51 with the 1000, pumping the brakes a little bit, like 
Congress said in the last Congress quite clearly with the 
budget that it delivered, essentially saying let's slow down 
the DDG(X) and let's focus on the acquisition of the Flight III 
capability?
    With my remaining time, and I look forward to the Navy's 
responses on, you know, on the record after the fact, Secretary 
Harker, you have a June 4th memo where you talk about using 
existing authority such as multi-year procurements in order to 
be efficient with taxpayer dollars and provide stability to the 
industrial tax base.
    That's something that this committee and the Appropriations 
Committee in the last Congress has already endorsed.
    I look forward to working with you in that. And, you know, 
as disappointed as I am with this budget request, you have a 
friend in trying to work with the Navy to get you your top 
priority for the UPL [unfunded priority list].
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thanks for your 
leadership.
    I agree with the ranking member, Mike Rogers, and Senator 
Inhofe concerning the President's defense budget request. The 
budget falls short of providing the resources, equipment, and 
training that our service members require to confront threats 
like China.
    And we have heard today that China is our pacing threat. We 
have heard that China has the largest navy in the world. We 
have heard today that our Navy's buying power is less than it 
was in 2010. These are compelling words.
    Yet, while the nondefense budget from this administration 
is increasing by 16 percent, the defense budget is being cut 
when inflation is factored in. The Navy's shipbuilding budget 
is being cut by 3 percent. The Navy's aviation budget is being 
cut by 15 percent.
    That's reality. Those are--those are the actions by the 
administration and they don't match the words. That's my--
really, my main point here. The actions are not matching the 
words from the administration. It's cognitive dissonance 
personified.
    And we're not fooled by some good-sounding words from the 
administration that China is the pacing threat, yet the defense 
budget is being cut at the same time. So I just want to make 
those opening comments.
    My first question is to Admiral Gilday and General Berger. 
I've been a leading proponent of compelling the Department of 
Defense to establish not only EMS [electromagnetic spectrum] 
strategy but an implementation plan as well. It's a priority. 
We have fallen behind in this area in electronic magnetic 
spectrum.
    Have the Navy and Marine Corps published electronic 
magnetic spectrum warfare strategy, and if not, when could we 
see it? Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'll have to get back to you on that 
specific strategy. I know that we have detailed concepts of 
operation in terms of how we use the systems tactically, 
particularly in the Growler, and how we combine those with 
other joint assets in order--in order to increase our 
effectiveness out there in the Western Pacific. But I'll get 
back to you on the--on the strategy piece, sir.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    Mr. Bacon. I would just point out, after serving 30 years 
and being an electronic warfare guy myself, the Navy has led 
the way in this since the 1990s. So we appreciate it.
    But we do need a good strategy. We need a Joint Staff 
strategy that guides it.
    General Berger.
    General Berger. I understand the question and I agree with 
the priority on it. It's an area of warfare, especially vis-a-
vis Russia/PLAN that we have got to maintain an advantage in.
    I'll ask you if I can check--I don't know of a written 
Marine Corps strategy that we published in the past 24 months. 
It may exist, but not that I'm familiar with.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I've just--I've been studying this 
for a while. We fell behind in the 1990s. We didn't have the 
right leadership at DOD [Department of Defense] and the Joint 
Staff on electronic warfare--electromagnetic spectrum 
operations, as it is called now.
    We need to play catch-up and it starts with the DOD and 
Joint Staff level, but we surely need the services to be a 
strong part of that.
    Secretary Harker, do you support the funding of the 
Columbia-class submarine out of the National Sea-Based 
Deterrence Fund?
    Mr. Harker. Sir, that's one that you've given us the 
authority to do that, and then the appropriators appropriated 
into SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy]. So we go ahead 
and we transfer the money from SCN into the National Sea-Based 
Deterrence Fund. And so that's a process that we currently do 
in order to comply with the law.
    Mr. Bacon. Are you--are you confident that we're going to 
be fielding the Columbia class on time with our current budget 
and are things going as you would like?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. We are moving forward with Columbia. 
It's our number one priority. We have put additional funds into 
this year's budget for risk reduction on Columbia, and so that 
was one of the areas where we invested funds and that is our 
number one priority and it will remain that way.
    Mr. Bacon. Question for Admiral Gilday. If the Navy didn't 
request funding for continued procurement of the F/A-18 Super 
Hornet and has not increased the buy for the F-35, are we 
putting ourselves at risk here with our tactical fighter 
inventory?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, right now we're short 42 fighters. We 
believe the path that we're on gets this--resolves that by 
2025.
    So each year as we continue to upgrade our existing F/A-18 
Super Hornet, so Block IIs to Block IIIs, and then procure F-
35s at pace from 15 to 20 a year, we'll get to where we need to 
be with about 5 to 6 wings by 2025 that have that fourth/fifth 
gen integration.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, and just a closing request for Mr. 
Harker. I sent you a letter last month. We had a World War II 
hero, Petty Officer Charles French, an African-American sailor. 
He was on a ship that was sunk off the Solomon Islands in 1942.
    He rescued 15 sailors from capture and probable being 
killed by the Japanese at the time, and he didn't get an award. 
This would mean something for Omaha. He's a favorite son of 
Omaha, and his family. If you would look at that, I would be 
grateful.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Harker. Thank you, sir. Be glad to look at it.
    Ms. Speier [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentlelady from Virginia, Mrs. Luria, is recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And, Admiral Gilday, in the interest of time, I'm going to 
ask some yes, no, or short answer questions. And you've already 
had the opportunity several times during today's hearing to 
state that you agree with Admiral Davidson and Admiral 
Aquilino's comments about the urgency of a potential attack by 
the Chinese on Taiwan.
    I wanted to point out, in your statement you write that the 
Navy has studied, identified, and prioritized the future 
capabilities we need to execute our evolving warfighting 
concepts and maintain a credible deterrent with respect to the 
PRC.
    So what year do you expect to have the majority of those 
capabilities available operating and deployed to counter that 
threat?
    Admiral Gilday. I think hypersonics offensively by--
initially by 2025. That program itself is----
    Mrs. Luria. So hypersonics. You're talking about one thing.
    So I mean, this future fleet that you're envisioning by 
2025 you think that we're going to have all of those 
capabilities?
    Admiral Gilday. No. No. No. No, I don't, ma'am.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay.
    Admiral Gilday. So, specifically, I mean, there, are a 
number of different capabilities we're talking about including 
the networks we need to fight on.
    Mrs. Luria. Further out, like, not within the next 5 to 6 
years, in that time frame?
    Admiral Gilday. Not by--not by--the majority of those 
systems not by 2025.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. So and if the PACOM commanders are 
correct, and I believe them to be--I think in your professional 
opinion as a surface warfare officer, you also, you know, 
believe that it's not prudent to decommission 15 ships in the 
next year when China could invade Taiwan in the very near term.
    So I understand you were given a pretty shitty top line by 
the administration and, specifically, the Pentagon. So you 
didn't have a lot of good choices. But you did have choices.
    And so I was looking at the words you used, and you said 
that this budget is going to divest to invest. So that's your 
strategy you're using.
    And I look back over the last 20 years of budgets and saw 
that that was a very familiar term, especially in the 2004 
budget where the Navy used that same divest to invest strategy 
in its 21st Century Sea Power 21.
    So that was defined by Sea Shield, Sea Strike, and Sea 
Basing, all tied together by this network called FORCENet.
    And so if we fast forward to today and we look at that 
future strategy at the time, it was based on DDG-1000, LCS, and 
FORCENet. So with the DDG-1000, just a quick question. How many 
DDG-1000s at that point in time did we intend to build?
    Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, I'd have to get back to you on the 
exact number. I know it's fluctuated over time. But----
    Mrs. Luria. Around 30?
    Admiral Gilday. Many. Yes, about 30.
    Mrs. Luria. Yes, and we have built three.
    Admiral Gilday. Right.
    Mrs. Luria. What was the plan procurement totals for the 
LCS?
    Admiral Gilday. I don't know off----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 154.]
    Mrs. Luria. Higher than what we have built, obviously, with 
these modular capabilities that we haven't developed.
    And what is the current status of FORCENet? Is that a 
mature system that we're operating today?
    Admiral Gilday. No.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Because I'm thinking Project Overmatch as 
I'm looking at ForceNet, going back.
    Admiral Gilday. Right. Right. Right.
    Mrs. Luria. So I think that we're, you know, in a similar 
crossroads, the divest to invest strategy and, you know, as 
I've said many times, as many of my colleagues have echoed 
today, you know, we're looking at this Battle Force 2045, a 
plan that's far off, a 355-ship goal that we're never going to 
get to when we decommission more ships every year than we 
actually build.
    And it causes a great concern because I think there's an 
urgency. I mean, what are we going to do in 2025 to counter 
this threat? And, you know, you very correctly stated--you 
know, spent a lot of time in your statement talking about how 
the United States is a maritime nation and how that's been 
important since the founding of this nation, and the Navy has 
allowed us to maintain our role on the global stage as a global 
power to maintain free trade, and some very good comments in 
there.
    But I don't see what the Navy is doing today to accomplish 
that when we're continuing to shrink and we're continuing to 
divest to invest with strategies and capabilities that are just 
a hope for the future.
    You know, and the obvious thing is that, you know, we're 
looking to develop a large unmanned surface vessel, which 
theoretically would have 16 VLS [vertical launching system] 
cells.
    We're going to decommission 7 cruisers that each have 2 VLS 
launchers with 122 cells each. You know, when you're looking at 
that problem writ large, you know, we are reducing our 
capability to counter the threat that we have today.
    And so, you know, I would just close by saying that, you 
know, I feel this budget is, you know, focused on a future hope 
for technology that we will have in order to counter a threat 
that might happen way out in the future, and I think that many 
of us in this room here and during this hearing have reflected 
on the fact that we need that capability today.
    The one thing we can build with reliability on schedule is 
the DDG, and we cut one this year and we'd even planned to 
potentially build three. And then, you know, I think that the--
what I would consider a modest current investment in 
modernizing the cruisers to operate for several more years with 
their sizable capability is something that we should maintain.
    So, you know, I think that we're creating a gap and I am 
really concerned that the Chinese will actually find a way to 
exploit that gap.
    And so I yield back my remaining time.
    Ms. Speier. The gentlewoman yields back.
    I recommend everyone read the Texas National Security 
Review commentary that Ms. Luria presented yesterday. It was 
very impressive.
    We are now going to recognize the gentleman from Indiana, 
Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you Madam Chair.
    Admiral Gilday, I was glad to hear Congressman Lamborn 
asked you about your decision to include Ibram X. Kendi's ``How 
to Be an Anti-Racist'' in your recommended reading list.
    I was also relieved to hear you say that you disagree with 
Kendi and you do not support racial discrimination.
    That being said, the Navy recently completed a one-day 
stand down to remove extremism from the ranks. The Chief of 
Naval Personnel explained, quote, ``We will not tolerate 
extremist ideologies that go against our oath to the 
Constitution.''
    In my view, Kendi has espoused extremist beliefs that, 
clearly, violate the oath to the Constitution that I took when 
I served in the Navy.
    Ibram Kendi, by the way, labeled Amy Coney Barrett a, 
quote, ``white colonizer'' and criticized her for, quote, 
``cutting the biological parents of these children out,'' end 
quote, because she adopted two children from Haiti.
    Yes or no, Admiral, do you personally consider opposition 
to interracial adoption an extremist belief?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, what I said to correct the record 
[inaudible] I said that I did not--I did not support everything 
that Kendi says in his book.
    Mr. Banks. I just asked you do you consider opposition to 
interracial adoption an extremist belief? It's a simple 
question.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'm not going to answer that question. 
I'll go back----
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Kendi's book states that--Admiral, Kendi's 
book states that capitalism is essentially racist.
    Ms. Speier. Admiral, your microphone isn't on, I believe. 
Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks. Kendi's book states that capitalism is 
essentially racist, and Kendi is clear that racism must be 
eliminated. So yes or no, do you personally consider advocating 
for the destruction of American capitalism to be extremist?
    Admiral Gilday. Here's what I know, Congressman.
    Mr. Banks. It's a yes or no question, Admiral.
    Admiral Gilday. There is racism in the United States Navy. 
I have an obligation----
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, you recommended every sailor in the 
United States Navy read this book. It's a yes or no question.
    Admiral Gilday. I'm not forcing anybody to read the book. 
It's on a recommended reading list.
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, did you read the book?
    Admiral Gilday. I did.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. In college, Kendi stated that white people 
are a different breed of humans and are responsible for the 
AIDS [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome] virus. Yes or no, do 
you personally consider the conspiracy that white people 
started AIDS to be an extremist belief?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'd have to understand the context the 
statements were made----
    Mr. Banks. That is a simple question.
    Admiral Gilday. I'm not going to--I'm not going to sit 
here--I'm not going to sit here, sir, and defend cherry-
picked----
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, this is a book that you recommended 
every sailor in the United States Navy read.
    Admiral Gilday [continuing]. Quotes from somebody's book. 
I'm not going to do that. This is a bigger issue than Kendi's 
book.
    What this is really about is trying to paint the United 
States military--in this case, the United States Navy--as weak, 
as woke, and we have had sailors that spent 341 days at sea 
last year with minimal port visits, the longest deployments 
we've ever----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, I've met you. I respect you.
    Admiral Gilday. We are not weak.
    Mr. Banks. I remain astonished----
    Admiral Gilday. We are strong and are----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, I remain astonished that you put this 
book on a reading list and recommended that every sailor in the 
United States Navy read it.
    I'm also surprised that you said you've read it. But I'm 
glad you brought up those points.
    Admiral Gilday. Why does it surprise you, sir?
    Mr. Banks. The Department of Defense--Admiral, the 
Department of Defense undertook the stand down because they 
understand that extremism detracts from military readiness.
    So if sailors accept Kendi's argument that America and the 
United States Navy are fundamentally racist, as you've 
encouraged them to do, do you expect that to increase or 
decrease morale and cohesion or even recruiting into the United 
States Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. I do know this. Our strength is in our 
diversity, and our sailors understand that. Race is a very--
racism in the United States is a very complex issue. What we 
benefit from is an open discussion about those issues, that we 
don't try to ignore it or rewrite it, but we actually have a 
discussion about it.
    And there will be various views and I trust sailors will 
come and--to an understanding of hopefully separating fact from 
fiction, agreeing or disagreeing with Kendi in this case and 
come to, hopefully, very useful conclusions about how we ought 
to treat each other in the United States.
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, why did you put this book on the 
reading list and recommended that every single United States 
sailor read it?
    Admiral Gilday. Because I think it's really important to 
consider a variety of views particularly on a complex----
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, you said you read this book. What part 
of this book is redeeming and qualifies as something that every 
sailor in the United States Navy should read it?
    Admiral Gilday. I think Kendi is self-critical about his 
own journey as an African American in this country, what he's 
experienced----
    Mr. Banks. Let me ask you again, Admiral. Do you expect 
that after sailors read this book that says that the United 
States Navy is racist that we will increase or decrease morale, 
cohesion, and recruiting rates into the United States Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. I think we'll be a better Navy from having 
open honest conversations about racism.
    Mr. Banks. My time has expired.
    Ms. Speier. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Kahele, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Aloha and mahalo, Madam Chair, and aloha to our 
witnesses for your testimony today.
    My question--I have two questions I hope to get in, one for 
the Marines, one for the Navy. My first one is for the Marines.
    General Berger, my question is related to your testimony on 
page 8 regarding the F-35 and the current and future shortage 
of Marine and Navy pilots and maintainers.
    Specifically, you're concerned that if we do not remedy 
these shortfalls that we're going to have a problem, that we're 
going to have a superior fifth-generation aircraft that the 
American people have purchased critical to our agility and 
tactical supremacy of the MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] 
and the future expeditionary missions of the Marine Corps 
without any pilots to fly them.
    So my question is what has the Marines done since last 
year's budget request and this year's budget request to conduct 
a reassessment of its aviation plans, specifically, the F-35 
capacity requirements of the future force in regards to 
staffing, recruiting, training, and retention of that aviator 
force based on the approximately 420 F-35s the service intends 
to buy at full buildout?
    General Berger. Sir, we conducted a--actually we contracted 
an external study to look at what we thought our requirements 
were capacity-wise, which is the heart of your question--is it 
420 some or what is it?
    The second part of that, which you highlighted, is our 
ability to recruit, retain, train the people who can maintain 
and fly those aircraft.
    On the first, the capacity part, I think, clear for the 
capacity part--first, the F-35 is a very capable aircraft and 
meets what we need it to do. The number of aircraft has to 
match what the Navy and Marine Corps team is going to need to 
do in the future.
    My expectation is, my belief is, it won't be the entire 
program of record. I don't know how many less until we do more 
wargaming, more experimenting, more learning. But it'll be less 
than the program of record.
    On the pilot and maintainer aspect, there were technical 
problems with trainer aircraft and some other issues that 
caused a backlog of training pilots at Pensacola. That's, 
largely, been rectified. But there is, clearly, a backlog, a 
gap now that we must make up.
    What we can't do is accelerate and get somewhere fast in 
the wrong way. We also have to retain the ones that we have 
trained already.
    Here, competition is fierce, as you're well aware, some 
from the airline industry but some from other places that make 
it a real challenge for the services to hold on to the captain 
and major that has a couple of deployments under their belt, a 
lot of time away from family, and we need them to stay in.
    We have to work harder there. We have to--on retention side 
we have to approach it in a different manner.
    Mr. Kahele. All right. Thank you, sir.
    Question for Admiral Gilday in regards to BARSTUR [Barking 
Sands Tactical Underwater Range] and the critical undersea 
training ranges, specifically, the one that exists in Hawaii at 
the Pacific Missile Range Facility out at Barking Sands.
    I'll cut right to the chase. The President's budget 
provided only $33.56 million to commence fully restoring those 
range capabilities. I don't believe that funding is sufficient 
to restore full capability to our ranges.
    The Barking Sands Tactical Underwater Range is past its 
design life and needs to be replaced. Its sensors are 
inoperable, aging infrastructure resulting in reduced tracking 
coverage.
    Would you support replacing BARSTUR sooner and maybe talk 
about how an accelerated time line would actually save money 
while allowing more efficient ordinal materials and potential 
savings in level of effort costs.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I agree with you on the value of the 
range. I owe you more details with respect to the phasing and 
the money that we're putting against it, and if it's okay I'd 
like to get back to you with those details, including what 
acceleration might look like.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. You bet. Thank you. And I'll yield my 
time. Mahalo.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 154.]
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. I will point out to 
members we have a hard stop at 2:00 o'clock. I think we're 
going to get there. We're making good progress.
    So, Mr. Franklin, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, early in the testimony today, you painted a pretty 
stark picture of the threat we're facing from China, the things 
we need to do to get there.
    In your exchange with Ranking Member Rogers, it sounds 
like, you know, your assessment of this current year budget 
doesn't cut it, and if extrapolated over a number of years we'd 
have a hard time meeting that threat that we're facing. Is that 
a fair assessment?
    Admiral Gilday. I think this is a critical decade for us to 
close gaps against China, or in those areas where we have 
overmatch to create distance against China, and so I think that 
if we don't do it in this decade I think we're fooling 
ourselves, based on the momentum, that it's going to happen in 
the future.
    That's why we need to get after it and that's why we need 
to make these risk-informed decisions about modernization 
versus keeping legacy platforms.
    Mr. Franklin. Right. Thanks.
    General, from the Marine Corps perspective, would you agree 
with that? Is this current year budget what you'd need?
    I know there are things on there that you want that we're 
not getting, but if this is extrapolated over a number of years 
is that going to impact your ability to get to the Corps that 
you feel we need to face the China threat?
    General Berger. If our budgets don't even match inflation, 
then the risk is high, correct, that at some point in the 
future we're overmatched, and that's not what you want us to--
that's not a place we want to be in.
    Mr. Franklin. Very good.
    Admiral, specifically on P-8s, the Neptunes, the risk-
informed warfighting requirement was for 138. With the 9 
Congress added last year, we're at 128 if there's no funding 
for this year. Has the assessment changed or is this an example 
of we don't have enough money to do the things we think we need 
to do?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I think the assessment has changed. We 
don't think we need as many as we initially estimated.
    So we have had some good runtime with the P-8. They're a 
heavily sought after aircraft. We're using them--we're using 
them in the Eastern Med [Mediterranean]. We're using them in 
the high north. We're using them in the Pacific with a great 
degree of effectiveness.
    So we know how to use the platform better than we did 
initially when we first procured it, and so it's led to a 
decrease--slight decrease in overall numbers.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay.
    General Berger talked about the pilot shortage and some of 
the things the Marines are looking at. But, Admiral, from your 
perspective, what are the things we're going to need to do?
    And as he alluded to, and I've seen in my own experience, 
it's not just the pilot being produced right out of flight 
school. It's that second tour of JO [junior officer] with a 
couple of cruises under their belt that's strike lead 
qualified.
    That doesn't happen overnight. We ran into that deficiency 
in the 1990s with the T-notch and by the late 1990s you just 
can't--you can't produce them at the snap of a finger. What are 
we doing to ensure we don't get there?
    Admiral Gilday. I tell you we're monitoring it really 
closely. And so in terms of incentives for those pilots, I'll 
just mention a couple.
    One of them is the career intermission break where they can 
go off and study if they need to, or they can--they can take 
the time off to begin a family if they need to.
    We're trying to work with them on an individual basis so 
that we can retain them, at the same time keep their skills 
proficient. There are also, as you would--as you would imagine, 
there are monetary considerations there. We do have--we do have 
some incentives that we have offered pilots.
    We have created a separate now track for a professional 
flight instructor and so that avenue exists as well. And so 
what we're trying to do is, in a very--in a competitive 
environment with respect to the commercial aviation sector, 
we're trying to remain competitive with ourselves--competitive 
ourselves in terms of making naval aviation the best place to 
work.
    Mr. Franklin. I'm glad to hear that about the professional 
instructor. That was an idea kicked around a long time ago and 
I knew a lot of people that would have loved to have stayed in 
the cockpit. Didn't have aspirations for stars like you all.
    Admiral Gilday. Right. Right.
    Mr. Franklin. That's great to hear.
    And then finally, Mr. Harker, this is really more just 
editorial for me. This is my first pass through on the budget 
here. It's not what--from a bipartisan response you're hearing 
here today it's not enough.
    You've got professionals who we have entrusted to come to 
you with the advice of what's needed to get the job done. But 
they're also military, and at the end of the day they're going 
to snap to and salute and get the job done with what you give 
them, and it's not enough.
    In peacetime, that's going to lead to low morale, lack of 
readiness, and it's going to kill people. It's going to kill 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen in a wartime footing.
    In the future that we're headed towards it's our very 
national security at risk. We have got to do better. This is 
not going to be an acceptable posture, going forward.
    And I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Panetta is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, gentlemen, thank 
you very much for your time today as well as--and, of course, 
your service.
    I'm going to focus on Mr. Harker as well in talking about 
the professional--naval professional development education and 
the funding behind it.
    Obviously, many of you know--well, I come from the Central 
Coast of California. Very proud of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, which has plenty of naval professional development 
education, and so it's very important to me. It's very 
important to my district and I do believe it's very important 
to the United States Navy.
    That's why I was pretty surprised and absolutely 
disappointed to see that the Navy has requested a cut of nearly 
$32 million in the fiscal year 2022 budget request when it 
comes to naval professional development education.
    I just think one of the most cost effective, highest 
returns on investment you can get is the education of our 
future leaders.
    And so, Mr. Harker, can you describe the rationale behind 
this top-line cut and the programs--specifically, the programs 
that you feel will be impacted by this?
    Mr. Harker. Thank you, sir.
    The decisions we faced when going through this budget were 
very challenging. We had a lot of competing demands for very 
limited resources, as has been pointed out before, and looking 
at making cuts to the naval education program is not something 
we took lightly.
    I've been out to the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. 
I've met with Admiral Rondeau, the president there, and I 
understand that what they're doing and I believe that they're 
doing great work, and it was a big challenge for us to go ahead 
and make those cuts. But we had to make everything balance at 
the end.
    Mr. Panetta. Well, I completely agree with you. They are 
doing great work and, hopefully, you saw that and will use 
that, going forward, and have that same attitude going forward 
when it comes to the budget.
    How do you plan to mitigate any long-term risk of cutting 
these types of investments in education of our current and 
future leaders?
    Mr. Harker. We have other opportunities for education. 
We're trying to make sure we meet the minimums with 
professional military education as well as with, you know, all 
of the various capabilities, both at NPS [Naval Postgraduate 
School] as well as getting people out to the Naval War College. 
But this was, unfortunately, a challenge where we had to draw 
back on that area.
    Mr. Panetta. And are there any particular areas that you're 
looking to eliminate? Any specific educational programs you're 
looking to eliminate right now?
    Mr. Harker. No, sir. No specific programs we want to 
eliminate.
    Mr. Panetta. Okay. Well, just know that, obviously, we, out 
in the Central Coast of California, especially at the Navy 
Postgraduate School, and I can tell you, President Rondeau's 
doing one hell of a job and will continue to fight for our fair 
share because we know how important it is, not just to the U.S. 
Navy but to our country to have the education that has been 
provided and, hopefully, will be provided, going forward.
    So I appreciate and look forward to working with you, and I 
yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Dr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Rogers, for holding this hearing today. I do appreciate the 
bipartisan leadership of this committee as we look forward to 
the nonpartisan topic of our national security and passing this 
year's NDAA.
    Mr. Harker, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger, thank you 
all for being here today as well. Appreciate your time. The 
last year and a half have presented some unique set of 
challenges for all organizations. But the Department of the 
Navy is one team that had a mission that had to continue 
regardless of the circumstances.
    We faced uncertainty and unrest at home and abroad as we 
dealt with the pandemic, but the Navy's mission had to remain--
had to remain undeterred.
    When reviewing the budget request this year, I noticed that 
we had decreased the number of V-22s the Department of Navy 
would procure relative to what last year's Future Years Defense 
Program had laid out.
    Last year's budget request showed that we were planning to 
procure 13 V-22s to support the Department of the Navy. 
However, I'm only seeing eight requested this year.
    Mr. Harker, is this a program that has seen a decrease 
because of the proposed overall budget decrease that is not in 
line with the National Defense Strategy, and can you tell us 
what has changed regarding the new request or requirement and 
what are the potential consequences of the reduced number of 
aircraft?
    Mr. Harker. Thank you, sir. That's a good question.
    I think one of the things that we haven't really talked 
about is the growth in operations and maintenance costs over 
time. Our maintenance costs have increased by more than 2.5 
percent above inflation.
    Our personnel costs have also increased above inflation. So 
that as we look at our overall budget, we had to squeeze 
certain things out. The V-22 is a program that we believe in 
strongly and it is not something we wanted to cut.
    But that cut was forced upon us by the growth in the cost 
of ship depot maintenance as well as the other costs that are 
growing greater than inflation.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I'll do my part to make sure 
that we make up that gap because I think that's an important 
program.
    Next, I'd like to shift the remainder of my time to the 
nuclear triad. The Navy is the most survivable leg of the 
nuclear triad, which is why I'm so proud to have all of the 
U.S. nuclear warheads that go out to the fleet assembled at the 
Pantex plant in my home district of Texas 13.
    For decades, we have underfunded the National Nuclear 
Security Administration and there is too many single points of 
failure in the NNSA infrastructure. I would like to hear a bit 
about the importance of the NNSA budget to the United States 
Navy.
    Admiral Gilday, can you highlight the importance of the 
NNSA budget to the Navy and can you explain the coordination 
between the Navy and the NNSA on the F-22 budget request, 
particularly with respect to the W-88 and the W-93 programs?
    What steps are being taken to ensure that these vital 
programs are staying on time and on budget, and what message 
have you received from our U.K. [United Kingdom] counterparts 
on the W-93 and the importance of them keeping the program on 
time?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question.
    We are in lockstep with NNSA and work with them very 
closely, both our Office of Strategic Programs as well as 
nuclear reactors, and what we're trying to do with respect to 
the next--potentially, the next generation or the update to 
the--to the D-5 weapon is to make sure that we have that weapon 
on track and in place by about the ninth Columbia submarine. 
Right now, that's our estimation.
    As you mentioned, we're also in lockstep with the Brits. 
That's a very special relationship that we share with respect 
to some of those systems.
    But I would say that we are--we are a heavy proponent of 
NNSA's budget that it remain intact so that we can--we can 
field the systems that we need to field to conduct--to sustain 
that strategic deterrent that we need.
    Dr. Jackson. Yes, sir. Thank you.
    Well, thank you--thank you all for your responses. In my 
opinion, we're losing to China in the Indo-Pacific and, 
candidly, on the global stage.
    I think we really have to ensure that we don't lose focus 
on the threat posed by China, that we continue to invest 
heavily in our military so that America can remain the greatest 
global force for good.
    I look forward to working with each of you and with my 
colleagues here on the committee to address these concerns so 
that we can provide our young men and women the training and 
the resources they need to accomplish their mission.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield back my time. 
Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Horsford is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking 
member, as well as to our witnesses for testifying today.
    General Berger, I've been very encouraged by many of your 
statements [inaudible] teams down the squad and platoon level 
are more lethal, effective, and survivable. And while I'm 
confident that you share that understanding, I do remain 
concerned about the lack of diversity both in race and gender 
in the upper ranks of the Marine Corps.
    In your written testimony today, you highlighted the long-
term impacts of a lack of diversity in service academy 
nominations. As [inaudible]----
    Mr. Rogers. Mr. Horsford, you're breaking up. Can you hear 
us? Mr. Horsford, can you hear us?
    We have completely lost you. I don't think he can hear us 
either.
    Mr. Horsford, can you hear us?
    We have lost all audio with Mr. Horsford. We'll come back 
to him. Oh, there you are.
    The Chairman. Yeah, sorry. My bad. Mr. Horsford, I 
apologize, but your audio thing is not working. We cannot hear 
you. Doesn't look like you can hear us, either.
    Mr. Horsford. Just----
    The Chairman. Yeah. Mr. Horsford, we don't have you. So if 
we could suspend that, and in lieu of we'll recognize Mr. Carl 
for 5 minutes, and we'll try to get Horsford back.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member Rogers, 
thank you, sir. I'd like to thank our witnesses for being here. 
Thank you for your service to this country, where we're first 
in all categories. We're there for a reason and I appreciate 
that.
    Mr. Harker, you talked about our schools down in 
Mississippi. I would add those schools are in Alabama also. I 
know you know that. But we take great pride in that.
    I've spent the last 10 years helping to recruit those young 
folks to get in those skills. It is so important we keep these 
shipyards moving and keep them busy. It's easy to recruit when 
jobs are needed. It's hard to keep their attention when the 
jobs aren't needed.
    So I would appreciate your attention towards that. But I 
appreciate you pointing that out because it made 10 years of my 
life worthwhile all of a sudden when I heard you say it. So 
thank you.
    Like many of the members on the committee here, I'm deeply 
concerned about the Navy's shipbuilding budget for the fiscal 
year 2022, and I know I'm going to repeat a lot of this, 
Admiral.
    Specifically, I would like to highlight something from the 
Navy's report to Congress on the annual long-range plan for 
construction of Navy vessels that was published in December.
    The report stated shipbuilding and supporting a vendor's 
base constitutes a national security and we must steadily 
support and grow to maintain these--this skillful workforce--
basically, what we were talking about with the schools.
    This budget doesn't request--does not come close to 
supporting our industry base. I'm sorry I'm stumbling here. I 
just ran back over from the other building.
    This is of particular concern to me on the gulf coast and 
its playing a role for the Navy. Also in the December report it 
emphasizes the threat posed by the ever-growing Chinese navy.
    So my question to you, Admiral, is very simple. The 
December report called for 12 ships in 2022. However, this 
budget requires--request calls for only eight ships of which 
four are warships.
    This is--only serves harm to the institutional base, but 
also falls--fails to maintain the growth and the need for the 
10 ships per year to reach the 355.
    What are the changes? Why did we go from one number to the 
other here within just a few months?
    Admiral Gilday. So they were developing a budget 
[inaudible]----
    The Chairman. You're drifting a little way away from the 
microphone there, Admiral. Sorry, we're losing you a little 
bit. Go ahead. Actually, I don't think your microphone is on.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, did you get my first comment of----
    Mr. Carl. I did.
    Admiral Gilday. Okay. The current direction we have is 
eight ships in this--in this plan, and so four of them are 
combatants and four are support ships.
    But those support ships are ships that we can't wait on any 
longer, and so the two salvage ships, as an example, which some 
referred to as tugboats, those are desperately needed in 
combat.
    I was on a combat-damaged ship in the Gulf War that 
actually was towed by one of those ships out of a minefield. So 
if we're not using a salvage ship to do that job, we're going 
to use another destroyer or we're going to use a littoral 
combat ship.
    So there is a valid requirement. As you can imagine, the 
oiler that's on the--that's in the shipbuilding plan, we're 
short on those in order to fight as a distributed force. We 
need that sustainability to put--to put gas in the ships out at 
sea.
    And, lastly, the T-AGOS ship is actually a ship with a very 
unique capability to do wide area search for submarines. If I 
look at Russia these days--well, not so long ago, Russia only 
operated their submarines during a certain period of the year. 
Now they're a pretty persistent threat against the east coast 
of the United States.
    And so those kinds of capabilities become more and more 
important, and as I said a few minutes ago, this is the decade 
that we have to move on capabilities like this and we can't 
wait.
    So there are tradeoffs in that--among those eight ships 
that we're--that we're requesting from the Congress to fund in 
this particular budget. But I think that every single one of 
them serves a valid purpose.
    Mr. Carl. Okay. One more quick question for you. The Navy 
is making strides to meet the demands on maintenance of the 
fleet.
    Given the large institution basis that we have based 
decisions that we're having--I'm messing this all up and I do 
apologize--has the Navy explored using more private companies 
versus using their own forces to repair and keep these ships 
maintained?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We absolutely are. We do all of 
our work on nuclear vessels in a public----
    The Chairman. I'm sorry. The gentleman's time has expired.
    And I have a couple questions. I will turn it back over. I 
think we have Mr. Horsford back, but we'll get that in a 
second.
    A lot of talk about the top line, and I know there's a lot 
of pressure on you. I will say that this is my, I think, 25th 
budget.
    The entire time I've been here there has never been a 
budget, there has never been a time, when there was a single 
solitary person over at the Pentagon who didn't want more 
money. Okay.
    I cannot recall a time whenever they came in, we're good. 
In fact, we can give you back $10 billion. It's okay.
    There is, literally, no number that any President can put 
out there that the Pentagon wouldn't all hustle around and say, 
gosh, they're killing us. Okay.
    So we need to have that as a backdrop. It's also worth 
noting that last year's budget under President Trump was 
flatlined. It was less of an increase than this was and, you 
know, we didn't hear much of a hue and cry about that.
    So there are a number of factors in there. But the part 
that I think is important in terms of how we approach this 
comes from the gentleman's comment about the NNSA and how 
critically underfunded the NNSA is.
    I'm a little bitter about that because I've been fighting 
with them. A, they still have $8 billion in uncosted balances. 
I want to live in a life where I have a personal budget that 
has something called uncosted balances. It's pretty good life. 
The Pentagon has a ton of that. Okay.
    B, there's a little thing called the MOX [mixed-oxide] 
facility down in South Carolina that over the course of a dozen 
years, maybe a little more, they wasted $7 billion on a project 
that everyone knew wasn't going anywhere.
    Now, part of that, I will grant you, was congressional 
pressure from certain people trying to make sure they 
maintained that program. We also have, as was alluded to, the 
DDG-1000, the Zumwalt.
    That didn't work out particularly well. We have three of 
them. They wound up way over budget. They don't fit the mission 
for a variety of different reasons.
    We have the littoral combat ship in this--in this 
breathless desire to get to this artificial number like having 
300--we could have 355 rowboats. Okay. It wouldn't help us. 
Capability is the issue.
    So there is concern, and part of the reason I know that 
President Biden gave such a tight number is we're tired of 
wasting money. I talked about the F-35 quite a bit and its per 
unit cost and all that goes into that.
    So rant aside, the question is--and I want to thank General 
Berger, by the way, when your comment about how you want to 
fund the future by--out of your own budget. Basically, find the 
savings to fund the future. Okay.
    And that's not some sort of profound personal sacrifice. 
That's smart, okay, because no matter what you're doing, 
there's no doubt that there's money in there that's being 
wasted, that isn't being used properly.
    So yes, we could just give you another $30 billion, another 
40, another 50, another 100. Okay. The question is, what are 
you doing right now that you don't need to be doing. It is 
absolutely certain that there is stuff in there, and some of 
that, I know, is driven by us. The 355-ship number didn't come 
from you. It came from us. Not from me, but it came from the 
broader committee.
    So as you're looking at this budget and as we're, you know, 
bashing away at you for everything that you're not funding, 
what are you doing in your department right now that you look 
at and you go, we don't need to do that--we could save money on 
that?
    Open to all three of you.
    Admiral Gilday. I'll start off with Aegis Ashore in places 
like Poland, Romania, and soon to be Guam. We have got sailors 
protecting dirt. That's not what we do. And so that's a 
mission. So those--that's an expenditure for the Navy that I 
believe ought to be owned by another service, as an example.
    We're trying to decommission those 15 ships, sir, akin to 
what--to what General Berger is doing. We are trying to find 
modernization from the inside.
    The Chairman. And let me drill down on one point on that. 
One of those cruisers that we're trying to decommission it's 
incredibly expensive just to keep those things afloat, right.
    So we--you know, we sent a cruiser out just recently. As I 
understand it, it got a little ways out and said, yeah, it's 
not seaworthy. We got to send it back.
    So we're--it's costing us money to keep trying to use these 
things that are past their useful life.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, the cruisers right now in the 
modernization are running 175 to 200 percent above estimated 
cost. Hundreds of days' delay. These ships were intended to 
have a 30-year service life. We're out to 35.
    We are trying to--they're not easy decisions to make and I 
accept the counterargument that we should keep these ships 
based on Admiral Davidson's comments.
    But at some point, we need to--we need to turn and----
    The Chairman. Thank you. I've taken more time than I 
should. I apologize. But you get the point. I want to get back 
to other members. But we can find savings in here and we're not 
doing our job if we just come in here and say, gosh, we need 
more money.
    We all need more money. You can go to HHS [Department of 
Health and Human Services]. You can go to the Department of 
Education. I doubt you'd find a single person in any one of 
those buildings who didn't say they need more money. We got to 
do better than that.
    Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry, I couldn't 
find the unmute.
    Secretary Harker, my colleague, Steve Scalise, and I remain 
very interested in the Navy's plans for the Joint Reserve Base 
in New Orleans, specifically, with respect to VFA-204, and I 
understand the Navy is in the process of divesting legacy 
Hornets currently being flown by the VFA-204 and replacing them 
with the F-5 aircraft.
    Although the Navy has been recapitalizing the Reserve 
fleet, concerns remain that the continued use of legacy 
aircraft will jeopardize this mission in the long term.
    So the first question is, how will the Navy ensure that our 
Reserve squadrons continue to fly and are resourced with the 
most capable aircraft to fulfill its mission for the long term?
    That's for Mr. Harker.
    Mr. Harker. Sir, sorry, I'm trying to understand the 
question.
    So the F/A-18s we have been doing a lot to increase our 
readiness on those, and I'm not familiar with divestment of any 
of those. Is that----
    Admiral Gilday. I think he's talking about the single--the 
older Hornets is what he's talking about, divesting of the 
older Hornets, particularly, due to cost to own.
    And so there is a plan, sir, to begin to have our Reserve 
squadrons transition to the Super Hornets.
    Mr. Johnson. We're--obviously, our parochial concern is 
what the Navy is going to do to preserve the VFA-204's mission 
at Belle Chasse in the long term after the F-5s are no longer 
able to fly. Do you have any comment on that?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'd have to get back to you with more 
specifics on that--on that transition plan. I want to do that. 
I don't have those details at this time.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 154.]
    Mr. Johnson. I'd appreciate that, the quick followup.
    Obviously, the folks in that area are very concerned about 
that. I'm also interested in the Navy's successful 
implementation of key force structure changes in the coming 
years and it's my understanding the Navy intends to change the 
fleet architecture to reflect a more distributed fleet mix.
    So we're talking about a smaller proportion of larger ships 
and a larger proportion of smaller ships, and that seems to 
make sense.
    It seems the Coast Guard is going to be integral to the 
effort, and as you know, the Coast Guard's role as part of the 
naval service has expanded over the years to support a more 
global presence, notably, operating the 5th Fleet AOR [area of 
responsibility].
    So do you believe the successes of the Coast Guard in the 
CENTCOM [United States Central Command] AOR can be carried over 
into the INDOPACOM [United States Indo-Pacific Command] AOR?
    Mr. Harker. Yes, sir. That's something where we have had a 
large degree of integration between the Coast Guard and the 
Navy, especially in the INDOPACOM AOR.
    There were a couple of their new Legend-class national 
security cutters out there working with INDOPACOM over the last 
several years. They've done freedom of navigation operations, 
and we believe that working together with them is a great value 
add.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, could I add something on that?
    We just finished an exercise this week with two cutters out 
in the Pacific and three DDGs. They're the newest cutters that 
the Coast Guard have, as the secretary mentioned, our home port 
in Hawaii working very closely with the Coast Guard, sir.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you for that. In transitioning to a 
force structure of a greater number of smaller sized vessels, 
has the Navy considered the capabilities of the Coast Guard's 
Sentinel-class fast response cutter that could provide--it 
could provide to the fleet and the concept of operations and 
associated requirements that would support acquisition of those 
vessels?
    Mr. Harker. We work closely with the Coast Guard in 
integrating that into our joint maritime force. Both the CNO, 
the Commandant--my predecessor and the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard worked together to come up the tri-maritime agreement 
last winter, and CNO?
    Mr. Johnson. I got about a minute left. Just upon that 
subject again--go ahead.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, on that particular hull we ended up--
we ended up settling with a different hull form for the next 
frigate. But we did consider the Coast Guard--the Coast Guard 
cutter.
    Mr. Johnson. What smaller manned ships are being considered 
for potential inclusion in the fleet mix? I mean, when you say 
a different hull, could you give me a little more detail on 
that?
    Admiral Gilday. So the frigate that I've referred to that 
we're just starting to build now it'll deliver in fiscal year 
2026. It's a Constellation-class frigate, sir. It's an Italian 
design.
    So what we're doing with this particular vessel is we're 
taking a U.S. weapons systems and putting them on a known hull.
    We have done this before with our transition from Spruance-
class destroyers to Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and we have 
actually taken the weapons system on our cruisers and moved it 
to DDGs.
    And so this is a technique that we used in the past pretty 
successfully, and we have high hopes that the FFG-62 is going 
to be a great ship.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I'm out of time. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I am told that we have Mr. Horsford.
    Mr. Horsford, are you with us?
    Mr. Horsford. I am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 
patience.
    The Chairman. You're recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking 
member and to our witnesses.
    General Berger, I've been very encouraged by many of your 
past statements and actions regarding the importance of 
diversity in the Marine Corps. We know that integrated diverse 
teams down the squad and platoon level are more lethal, 
effective, and survivable.
    And while I'm confident that you share that understanding, 
I do remain concerned about the lack of diversity both in race 
and gender in the upper ranks of the Marine Corps.
    In your written testimony, you highlighted the long-term 
impacts of a lack of diversity in service academy nominations.
    As this is, largely, a congressional issue, I'm committed 
to working with my colleagues and the Department to address it 
so we don't continue to face the same lack of diverse talent 20 
or 30 years from now.
    Last September, you spoke about your concerns related to 
women and people of color officers opting out of consideration 
for command positions and the impact that has on diversity in 
command and senior leadership positions.
    So, General Berger, what have you learned since last year 
about the underlying causes of this issue and what steps has 
the Corps taken to address it?
    General Berger. One of the reasons would be intuitive, that 
from 2004 to a decade and 12, 14 years later and that--the 
speed, the tempo of deployments was so high that family 
pressures caused people to leave.
    But that's, largely, behind us. Some of the members of this 
committee know the gentlemen who we're hiring we have hired for 
the past 2 months to look at the question that you raise.
    What is it about everything from recruiting to retention to 
assignments that--within the military, and specifically within 
the Marine Corps, that we should look at differently.
    And this is Charlie Bolden, and I asked Charlie because a 
couple years ago in a discussion and then last year in a deeper 
discussion, he highlighted a couple things for me in a 
perspective I didn't have.
    So for 3 months he's going to look at us from beginning 
from very--from the very beginning of recruiting all the way 
through general officer level to tell us maybe how we might do 
it differently.
    And I would agree with the CNO. Some of this is on the 
front end, but some of it has to do with the career paths, the 
management of their careers, the mentoring along the way, the 
key decision points where they're at a fork in the road, and we 
have to manage that actively. It can't be passively.
    But I think in another 2, 3 weeks, Mr. Bolden, from what he 
learned as a Marine and what he learned at NASA [National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration], I think he's going to 
help the Marine Corps see this in a different light.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday, on a related note, the Department of the 
Navy's Task Force One Navy released a report in January 
highlighting 57 recommendations to improve diversity in the 
force.
    Can you describe your progress in implementing Task Force 
One Navy's recommendations? Are there any recommendations that 
the Navy does not intend to implement that we should be aware 
of?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, to your last question, there are no 
recommendations that I intend--I intend to implement every 
single one of those 57 recommendations, and we're moving out on 
that.
    We do have a--we do have a framework, which we call the 
culture of excellence, and one of the lines of operation in 
that culture of excellence is diversity, equity, and inclusion.
    So the intent in the Navy is not to just leave off--you 
know, put the--put the results of the task force on the shelf, 
but to actually hold ourselves accountable with measurable 
metrics against all of those recommendations.
    We are moving out, sir, at pace. I'm happy to have a deeper 
conversation with you maybe to update you in a couple of months 
on where we stand.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Admiral. And I'll take this 
question offline, but I did want to talk about the issue of the 
manpower requirements and identifying the personnel cost 
implications.
    So I'll submit that question and take your response 
offline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. This is all the people we have 
lined up. I have said my pieces as a closing thing.
    Mr. Rogers, do you have anything for the good of the order?
    Mr. Rogers. I do not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I want to thank all three of you. Three hours. Appreciate 
your stamina is the word I'm looking for, and your work. It's--
you know, a lot to do within a limited budget and I appreciate 
that effort and we'll definitely continue to work with you as 
we go through the rest of the process this year.
    You know, just close by saying we have to pass some 
appropriations bill. We do not want a continuing resolution. We 
want to get you an appropriations bill as close to October 1 as 
possible and get you an authorizing bill within that time frame 
as well, and we will do our best to get there.
    With that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             June 15, 2021

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                             June 15, 2021

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             June 15, 2021

=======================================================================

      

             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Admiral Gilday. The technology that makes up the cyber domain 
changes daily, and we can never have 100% confidence that we don't have 
somebody in one of our systems that we have to get after. I am 
confident that we're taking the necessary steps to harden our systems 
against cyber attacks and train our workforce to fight through any 
resulting system degradations. Navy is moving at pace to cloud--
starting with enterprise services used by our entire workforce. Our new 
unclassified Microsoft 365 cloud implements key aspects of Zero Trust 
security to better protect our data and infrastructure. The purpose-
built integrated cybersecurity capabilities we're using deliver tighter 
access control to and better insight into the activity on our network 
than we've ever had before.
    While the Navy acquisition process includes cybersecurity during 
design and development of our weapons systems, nearly 70% of the fleet 
we will have in 2030 is in service today. Defense in depth protection 
for systems that will not transition to the cloud, including weapons 
systems, remains a requirement. Navy developed the Defense-in-Depth 
(DiD) Functional Implementation Architecture (DFIA) to provide a tiered 
security architecture to detect, protect, react, and restore 
information systems in the event of cyber attacks. We leverage Joint 
and Navy solutions to deliver a secure architecture that is dynamic and 
adaptable.   [See page 15.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
    Mr. Harker. In accordance with SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5354.2, 
``Department of the Navy Equal Opportunity, Equal Employment 
Opportunity, and Diversity Oversight'' the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN (M&RA)) is designated as the 
DON official authorized and responsible for policy and oversight 
relating to Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DE&I). While our current 
policy addresses the overall intent of the legislation, we plan to 
update policy to meet new legislation and DOD policy to include 
specific designation of ASN (M&RA) as the Senior Advisor. Additionally, 
ASN (M&RA) hired a Highly Qualified Expert to lead a team to develop 
the DON strategic vision, governance, implementation strategy, measures 
of effectiveness and organizational structure for the DE&I Program. The 
focus is to create an enduring program linked to our naval culture.   
[See page 29.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
    Mr. Harker. The Navy has been using multi-year procurement (MYP) 
authority with the support of Congress to efficiently procure DDG-51 
destroyers in quantities that support stable production and a healthy 
industrial base. Over the course of the FY 2018-2022 MYP, the Navy will 
procure a total of 11 Flight III DDGs, more than the original ten ship 
procurement. The Navy continues to support the use of MYP contracts for 
procuring DDG-51 class ships.   [See page 43.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Admiral Gilday. In October 2020, DOD released its Electromagnetic 
Spectrum (EMS) Superiority Strategy. We are awaiting release of the DOD 
EMS Superiority Strategy Implementation Plan, which includes 123 
specified tasks for the Services and components of the Joint Staff. 
Upon release of the Implementation Plan, the Navy will prepare an 
impact estimate for DOD that will serve as the basis for follow-on 
tasks to develop a supporting Naval EMS strategy and governance 
structure. I intend to then develop and implement a tri-service EMS 
strategy with the Marine Corps and Coast Guard along with a governance 
structure for Navy use of the EMS.   [See page 44.]
    General Berger. The Marine Corps is drafting its Electromagnetic 
Spectrum Operations (EMSO) Service Strategy. The strategy will focus on 
the vision to ensure the Marine Corps is prepared to operate in the EMS 
throughout all domains in a contested, congested, and constrained 
environment against adversaries ranging from the pacing threat to non 
state actors and across the competition continuum. We anticipate the 
strategy will be completed and signed in fall 2021.
    The Marine Corps EMSO strategy identifies the need to compete 
within the EMS across all domains. Additionally, the strategy describes 
the critical enablers that will be required in order to achieve EMS 
superiority: EMS Battlespace Awareness, Assured Command and Control, 
Dynamic EMS Management, and EMS Maneuver. These enablers affect each of 
the warfighting functions and Marine Forces' ability to successfully 
execute operations. The Marine Corps must be capable of using the EMS 
as a maneuver space, just like the land, air, maritime, cyberspace, and 
space domains, seizing and maintain the initiative, and placing the 
enemy in a position of disadvantage. The strategy will identify clear 
lines of effort in order to achieve this objective.
    Additionally, the Marine Corps is supporting the DOD EMS 
Superiority Strategy's implementation plan, which is informing our EMSO 
strategy and the development of future requirements. Since the Marine 
Corps does not fight alone, we must be interoperable with Joint and 
other Services' electromagnetic battle management systems and tools 
that enable spectrum maneuver, agile operational functionality, and are 
capable of sharing EMS data supporting EMS awareness and understanding. 
  [See page 44.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
    Admiral Gilday. The Concept acquisition program baseline (APB) in 
1998 was for a quantity of 32 ships. The Development APB in 2005 was 
for a quantity of ten ships.   [See page 46.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy has prioritized the recapitalization of 
the Barking Sands Tactical Underwater Range (BARSTUR) and Barking Sands 
Underwater Range Expansion (BSURE). A full replacement of BARSTUR/
BSURE, at Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) was programmed into the 
PB18 OPN budget as part of the Undersea Warfare Training Range (USWTR) 
Program of Record (POR). Recapitalizing BARSTUR and BSURE concurrently, 
vice as two separate and distinct projects, is estimated to provide an 
overall program cost avoidance of approximately $20M. The $33.56M 
provided in the PB 22 budget represents the first year of funding of a 
multi-year effort. The Navy has reported the PB21 programmed budget in 
the Barking Sands Tactical Underwater Range (BARSTUR) and Barking Sands 
Undersea Range Expansion (BSURE) response to House Report 133 dated 4 
June 2021. The budget includes all planned funding through IOC.
    BARSTUR is past its design life, however 30 of 42 nodes remain 
operational. Three of the nonoperational nodes are located in close 
proximity to each other, which has created a gap in tracking coverage 
on the southwest corner of the range. This loss of coverage has not had 
a detrimental effect on fleet training operations or participant 
safety. Engineering analysis conducted by Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center, Newport indicates that the range will remain viable until 2025. 
Based on the program schedule, there is a narrow window of opportunity 
to accelerate the recapitalization of the BARSTUR/BSURE range. Should 
additional funding be provided, it may allow for the earlier 
procurement of long lead materials, possible acceleration of early 
program activities allowing compression of the schedule, and could 
support an earlier IOC, which would generate a savings in government 
labor and engineering support towards the end of the project.
    Acceleration opportunities would be dependent upon the amount and 
timing of additional funding appropriated. The Navy has an executable 
and resourced plan that will ensure the long-term viability of the 
BARSTUR/BSURE range, while limiting disruptions to USW training. The 
contract award is on track to award in early 4QFY21 with Initial 
Operating Capability (IOC) in FY25.   [See page 51.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
    Admiral Gilday. As the Navy Divests from Legacy F/A-18s within the 
Reserve Component, VFA-204's aircraft will be replaced with F-5N/F 
Tiger IIs as its mission is focused on providing Adversary support for 
Active Component Counter Air Training while providing the Navy with 
Strategic Depth in the form of a pool of highly trained and experienced 
aircrew. The Navy's current F-5 Fleet will have sufficient service life 
to last through the 2030s. Currently, the Navy is in the initial stages 
of market research into developing an Adversary variant of an advanced 
jet trainer, which may also consider similar USAF efforts. This jet 
trainer Adversary variant could begin to replace F-5N/F aircraft within 
the Navy's Adversary force in the early 2030s.   [See page 60.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Admiral Gilday. As the Navy Divests from Legacy F/A-18s within the 
Reserve Component, VFA204's aircraft will be replaced with F-5N/F Tiger 
IIs as its mission is focused on providing Adversary support for Active 
Component Counter Air Training while providing the Navy with Strategic 
Depth in the form of a pool of highly trained and experienced aircrew. 
The Navy's current F-5 Fleet will have sufficient service life to last 
through the 2030s. Currently, the Navy is in the initial stages of 
market research into developing an Adversary variant of an advanced jet 
trainer, which may also consider similar USAF efforts. This jet trainer 
Adversary variant could begin to replace F-5N/F aircraft within the 
Navy's Adversary force in the early 2030s.   [See page 23.]

?

      
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             June 15, 2021

=======================================================================

      

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. Vice Admiral Gilday, you mentioned that you had high 
confidence in hypervelocity projectiles, a railgun technology, as part 
of layered defense, but the Navy cut that program in this year's budget 
request. Why did you cut the program if you have a high confidence in 
it?
    Admiral Gilday. We have confidence in the capabilities of the HVP, 
which can be launched from both conventional and railguns, as a result 
of multiple successful demonstrations conducted by the Navy and the 
Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO). Those demonstrations include: 40+ 
successful flight tests of HVP in counter air and surface threat 
scenarios. (Feb 2018--Jun 2021) First round of a three-round salvo of 
HVPs intercepted a BQM-167A cruise missile target during US Air Force's 
Joint All-Domain Command and Control Advanced Battle Management System 
On-Ramp 2. (Sep 2020) Unguided HVP rounds were successfully integrated 
with the 5-inch Mk45 Mod 4 gun and fired at-sea from USS DEWEY (DDG 
105). (Jul 2018) Through these demonstrations, and a large body of 
other work, we have achieved the technology-development objectives of 
the original HVP project. We aren't cutting the project; we are 
bringing the technical-development activity to a successful close 
consistent with the approved project baseline.
    The Navy continues to assess multiple Terminal Defense and Ship 
Self Defense options, including HVP, to determine the best mix of 
capabilities that will optimize mission effectiveness, cost, speed to 
Fleet, and other criteria. Acquisition for Gun Launch Guided 
Projectiles (GLGP), of which HVP is a part, remains in consideration. 
In addition, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) is continuing to 
advance HVP-related technology by considering options for fire-control 
architectures that are more cost effective for Navy Combat System 
integration and are extensible to multiple weapons including existing 
5-inch Mk45 Mod 4 gun.
    Mr. Langevin. General Berger, how do you envision the Marine Corps 
using directed energy?
    General Berger. Directed energy has potential for use in the 
future, especially as large numbers of low-cost adversary weapons 
proliferate the battlefield. The Marine Corps currently employs 
directed energy through a program known as the Compact Laser Weapons 
System (CLaWS), which is a high energy laser system.
    The Marine Corps uses CLaWS for air defense to counter small 
unmanned aircraft systems as part of our fixed-site base defenses. 
Since 2018, the Marine Corps has deployed four systems that have had 
multiple successful engagements in theater. These systems have helped 
the Marine Corps draft policy challenges, learn how to best employ 
directed energy, and refine our tactics, techniques and procedures. 
CLaWS is the Marine Corps first step in this realm, and we are seeking 
to improve our capability and increase the variety of systems for use 
against the multitude of threats.
    Specifically, our first focus area is on countering the emergence 
of autonomous drone swarm threats. Significant challenges--and areas of 
research and development--involve reducing the size of these systems so 
that the systems can be employed by Marines in an expeditionary 
environment, and developing energy storage and power density needed to 
make such systems more viable for the Marine Corps. Directed energy 
involves not only high energy lasers, but also high power microwave and 
high power radio frequency systems.
    The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and Marine Corps Systems 
Command, in partnership with the DOD's research and development 
enterprise, are prototyping and evaluating other directed energy 
modalities that can provide capabilities that answer challenges across 
the range of military operations: from abilities to counter missiles 
and aircraft in an asymmetric manner that reduces the ``magazine 
depth'' challenge faced by traditional integrated air defense systems, 
to non-lethal effects applicable during non-combatant evacuation 
operations or installation defense where the Marine Corps desires to 
minimize collateral damage and avoid the use of lethal force.
    The Marine Corps efforts in the directed energy space are largely 
focused on giving commanders a greater number of options to choose 
from, building a capable and resilient force that reduces the costs 
curve, and providing asymmetric answers to the full spectrum of threats 
facing our Marines today and in the future.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
    Mr. Courtney. General Berger, would you agree that even if changes 
are made to the CH-53K program of record due to Force Design 2030, it 
remains critical that these aircraft remain affordable? Would you agree 
that it's important to keep the CH-53K production ramp moving upwards 
to reduce costs today for the Marine Corps, regardless of what the 
final program of record is?
    General Berger. Yes, I believe the CH-53K should remain an 
affordable aircraft. The Navy and Marine Corps are working closely with 
industry partners to reduce the cost of each aircraft, and the cost 
``trend line'' is moving in the right direction. In regards to the CH-
53K production ramp, the Marine Corps budgets for the capabilities it 
can afford. The Marine Corps evaluates its entire budget as a whole, 
seeking to build the best possible force that our Nation can afford. In 
terms of overall quantity, we have not yet determined what the final 
number of each aircraft will be. Regardless, we will continue to work 
with our industry partners to ensure costs remain affordable.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
    Ms. Speier. I am very concerned about the findings in GAO Report 
21-366 on Navy surface ship manning and fatigue management. GAO found 
that, as of September 2020, Navy surface ships were undermanned by 
about 15% below the number of sailors required for safe operation, and 
that the situation has worsened since 2016, when ships were 8% 
undermanned. Additionally, GAO found that the Navy is not enforcing its 
fatigue management policies, with sailors routinely working more than 
12 hours a day and receiving less than 5 hours of sleep. I have several 
questions about GAO's findings and what action the Navy is taking in 
response.
    The data in the GAO report on undermanning of the surface fleet 
shows no clear trend of improvement and that, in fact, things are 
getting worse. Why has the Navy failed to improve ship manning, as a 
percentage of required crew for safe operation, since 2017?
    Who is responsible for ensuring that Navy ships are crewed with the 
required number of sailors for safe operation?
    Why has the Navy failed to enforce its fatigue-management policies 
that were adopted after the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions in 2017?
    Who is responsible for implementing fatigue-management policies?
    Given these failures, how has the risk of a repeat of the McCain 
and Fitzgerald collisions changed?
    What are you doing now to ensure that ships have required manning 
and fatigue policies are enforced?
    Why has the Navy failed to request sufficient funds and end-
strength to fully crew surface ships at the required level for safe 
operation?
    Mr. Harker. Navy continues to increase the number of available 
personnel through aggressive personnel force management actions that 
increase recruiting, improve retention, and increase sailor sea duty 
readiness. Our continuous review and revision of manpower requirements, 
increased resourcing against these requirements, and a renewed 
commitment to robustly fund total ownership costs will result in 
increased manning at sea. For instance, the Arleigh Burke Class 
Destroyer (DDG) will average 285 enlisted requirements per ship in 
2023, up from an average of 268 enlisted requirements per ship in 2020. 
As the system responds to the increased demand signal, Navy expects a 
steady increase in sailors at sea. Overall, the number of sailors at 
sea is increasing from a low point in fiscal year 2016 and is expected 
to continue in a positive direction.
    The Chief of Naval Personnel, with input from Commander, United 
States Fleet Forces Command and Commander, United States Pacific Fleet, 
is responsible for ensuring Navy ships are crewed with the required 
number of sailors for safe operation.
    Navy continues to increase the number of available personnel 
through aggressive personnel force management actions that increase 
recruiting, improve retention, and increase sailor sea duty readiness. 
Our continuous review and revision of manpower requirements, increased 
resourcing against these requirements, and a renewed commitment to 
robustly fund total ownership costs will result in increased manning at 
sea.
    For instance, the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (DDG) will average 
285 enlisted requirements per ship in 2023, up from an average of 268 
enlisted requirements per ship in 2020. As the system responds to the 
increased demand signal, Navy expects a steady increase in sailors at 
sea. Overall, the number of sailors at sea is increasing from a low 
point in fiscal year 2016 and is expected to continue in a positive 
direction.
    Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) published the Comprehensive 
Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy in 2017 and updated it in 2020. 
Individual unit Commanding Officers (CO) are required to implement and 
enforce the Crew Endurance and Fatigue Management Program. The Surface 
Type Commanders ensure adherence by COs through regular Defense 
Organizational Climate Surveys, Force Afloat Safety Climate Assessment 
Surveys, Afloat Training Group assessments during the Basic Phase, 
self-assessments by ships during the other phases of the Optimized 
Fleet Response Plan, focus group discussions during Afloat Culture 
Workshops pierside, and direct observations by our post-major command 
CO Mentors during Afloat Bridge Resource Management Culture Workshops 
at sea.
    Additionally, CNSF is working with the Naval Health Research Center 
(NHRC), Naval War Command, industry, and academic partners to directly 
monitor crew fatigue in near real-time and enable development of 
appropriate interventions to ensure process improvement, consistency in 
application, and full policy implementation of fatigue management.
    Navy has requested and received sufficient funds and end-strength 
to man surface ships for safe operations. As background, from 2001-
2010, the Navy implemented a number of optimal manning initiatives. 
When the optimal manning era ended in 2010, DDGs had an average of 274 
total officer and enlisted billets. Manpower reviews of workload and 
watchstanding requirements were conducted in 2011, 2018 and 2019. Based 
on the results of those reviews, Navy has steadily increased the number 
of funded billets on DDGs.
    In FY21 Navy funded 314 DDG billets and the destroyer billet base 
is programmed to increase to 339 funded billets by FY24. Navy 
continually assesses all aspects of ship operations and sustainment--
manpower, maintenance, modernization, training and new construction 
funding--to optimize Surface Force lethality.
    Ms. Speier. The Navy's FY22 budget request cuts the Naval Audit 
Service budget in half and reduces the number of auditors by 200. The 
Navy has said that duplication of duties justify the cuts, but a recent 
information paper stated that the Naval Audit Service conducted 
performance audits that are not conducted by other entities. There is 
also a pending DOD commissioned study on service audit agencies 
providing independent assessment about potential duplication and 
performance improvement.
    Why is the Navy not waiting for the results of the DOD study of 
audit services before making such a large cut to the NAS?
    What other entity will assume responsibility for conducting 
performance audits for the Navy?
    To what positions is the Navy re-assigning the 200 personnel that 
are being cut from the NAS?
    Mr. Harker. The President's Budget request for fiscal year 2022 
proposes reshaping the Naval Audit Service (NAS) workforce while 
balancing resources across a multitude of work and functions across the 
Department of the Navy (DON). The DON determined that NAS right-sizing 
was appropriate, based on its planned audits, historical workloads of 
completed audits, and the assessing and realigning of resources to meet 
DON oversight requirements. However, in my July 9, 2021, letter to you, 
I have since confirmed that the DON will not undertake any involuntary 
placements of NAS employees or redirect funding from the NAS.
    In the Department of the Navy, performance audits will be conducted 
by a combination of NAS, DOD Office of Inspector General, and 
Government Accountability Office auditors.
    To date, no involuntary management directed reassignments of NAS 
personnel have taken place with respect to the proposed NAS budget 
reductions. As stated previously, the DON will not undertake any 
involuntary placements of NAS employees.
    Ms. Speier. Admiral Gilday, I am very concerned about the findings 
in GAO Report 21-366 on Navy surface ship manning and fatigue 
management. GAO found that, as of September 2020, Navy surface ships 
were undermanned by about 15% below the number of sailors required for 
safe operation, and that the situation has worsened since 2016, when 
ships were 8% undermanned. Additionally, GAO found that the Navy is not 
enforcing its fatigue management policies, with sailors routinely 
working more than 12 hours a day and receiving less than 5 hours of 
sleep. I have several questions about GAO's findings and what action 
the Navy is taking in response.
    The data in the GAO report on undermanning of the surface fleet 
shows no clear trend of improvement and that, in fact, things are 
getting worse. Why has the Navy failed to improve ship manning, as a 
percentage of required crew for safe operation, since 2017?
    Who is responsible for ensuring that Navy ships are crewed with the 
required number of sailors for safe operation?
    Why has the Navy failed to enforce its fatigue-management policies 
that were adopted after the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions in 2017?
    Who is responsible for implementing fatigue-management policies?
    Given these failures, how has the risk of a repeat of the McCain 
and Fitzgerald collisions changed?
    What are you doing now to ensure that ships have required manning 
and fatigue policies are enforced?
    Why has the Navy failed to request sufficient funds and end-
strength to fully crew surface ships at the required level for safe 
operation?
    Admiral Gilday. Navy continues to increase the number of available 
personnel through aggressive personnel force management actions that 
increase recruiting, improve retention, and increase sailor sea duty 
readiness. Our continuous review and revision of manpower requirements, 
increased resourcing against these requirements, and a renewed 
commitment to robustly fund total ownership costs will result in 
increased manning at sea. For instance, the Arleigh Burke Class 
Destroyer (DDG) will average 285 enlisted requirements per ship in 
2023, up from an average of 268 enlisted requirements per ship in 2020. 
As the system responds to the increased demand signal, Navy expects a 
steady increase in sailors at sea. Overall, the number of sailors at 
sea is increasing from a low point in fiscal year 2016 and is expected 
to continue in a positive direction.
    Who is responsible for ensuring that Navy ships are crewed with the 
required number of sailors for safe operation?
    The Chief of Naval Personnel, with input from Commander, United 
States Fleet Forces Command and Commander, United States Pacific Fleet, 
is responsible for ensuring Navy ships are crewed with the required 
number of sailors for safe operation.
    What are you doing now to ensure that ships have required manning 
and fatigue policies are enforced?
    Navy continues to increase the number of available personnel 
through aggressive personnel force management actions that increase 
recruiting, improve retention, and increase sailor sea duty readiness. 
Our continuous review and revision of manpower requirements, increased 
resourcing against these requirements, and a renewed commitment to 
robustly fund total ownership costs will result in increased manning at 
sea. For instance, the Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer (DDG) will average 
285 enlisted requirements per ship in 2023, up from an average of 268 
enlisted requirements per ship in 2020. As the system responds to the 
increased demand signal, Navy expects a steady increase in sailors at 
sea.
    Overall, the number of sailors at sea is increasing from a low 
point in fiscal year 2016 and is expected to continue in a positive 
direction. Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) published the 
Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy in 2017 and 
updated it in 2020. Individual unit Commanding Officers (CO) are 
required to implement and enforce the Crew Endurance and Fatigue 
Management Program. The Surface Type Commanders ensure adherence by COs 
through regular Defense Organizational Climate Surveys, Force Afloat 
Safety Climate Assessment Surveys, Afloat Training Group assessments 
during the Basic Phase, self-assessments by ships during the other 
phases of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, focus group discussions 
during Afloat Culture Workshops pierside, and direct observations by 
our post-major command CO Mentors during Afloat Bridge Resource 
Management Culture Workshops at sea.
    Additionally, CNSF is working with the Naval Health Research Center 
(NHRC), Naval War Command, industry, and academic partners to directly 
monitor crew fatigue in near real-time and enable development of 
appropriate interventions to ensure process improvement, consistency in 
application, and full policy implementation of fatigue management.
    Ms. Speier. Admiral Gilday, the Navy has said that each littoral 
combat ship (LCS) costs $50 million per year to operate and support, on 
average, and isn't performing many of the missions it was intended for. 
This strikes me as a disproportionately high cost, given that a much 
larger and more capable Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer costs about $80 
million per year to operate, and it has three times the crew. I have 
several questions about the high operational costs of the LCS.
    When the LCS program was approved, what was Navy's goal or target 
annual O&S cost for each LCS variant? What is the actual average O&S 
cost for each LCS variant?
    What accounts for the difference between the Navy's actual cost for 
LCS O&S and the original target O&S cost, for each LCS variant?
    What actions are you taking to decrease the O&S cost and increase 
the reliability of each LCS variant? What actions are you considering 
to decrease the O&S cost and increase the reliability of each LCS 
variant?
    How feasible would it be to move some LCS maintenance 
responsibilities from contractors to sailors, and what impact might 
this have on LCS O&S costs?
    How will the eventual full implementation of the mission packages 
affect O&S costs for each LCS variant?
    Admiral Gilday. When the LCS program was approved, what was Navy's 
goal or target annual O&S cost for each LCS variant? What is the actual 
average O&S cost for each LCS variant?
    The Navy did not develop an O&S estimate or O&S target cost when 
establishing the program in the 2004 Acquisition Program Baseline 
(APB), published 27 May 2004, as the initial program strategy used 
RDT&E prototype ships. The Navy provided the first O&S estimate in 
December 2010 within the Navy Service Cost Position and OSD Independent 
Cost Estimate, which was developed and approved in support of the 
February 2011 LCS Seaframe Milestone B decision. The current APB (April 
2011) includes O&S cost estimation from that source. O&S cost 
estimations did not differentiate between variant and did not include 
O&S costs associated with Mission Module and Mission Package 
embarkation. The LCS Seaframe O&S cost estimate in the Acquisition 
Program Baseline (approved April 2011) was $36.7 million per ship/per 
year in FY 2010 dollars and reported in the 2011 Selected Acquisition 
Record (SAR). The current LCS Seaframe O&S actuals are approximately 
$50 million per year in current year funds (adjusted to approximately 
$41.5 million per year in FY 2010 dollars, compared to the $36.7 
million per ship/per year APB estimate).
    What accounts for the difference between the Navy's actual cost for 
LCS O&S and the original target O&S cost, for each LCS variant?
    Multiple factors account for the difference between the current 
actual LCS Seaframe O&S cost and the original estimated LCS Seaframe 
O&S cost in the 2011 APB. These include changes to operational 
deployment cycles, increases to crew manning requirements to improve 
operational impacts and organic repair capabilities, maturation of 
maintenance requirements, unanticipated materiel design and fabrication 
issues, evolving operational employment concepts, and related ship 
mission profiles. These factors apply to both LCS variants.
    What actions are you taking to decrease the O&S cost and increase 
the reliability of each LCS variant? What actions are you considering 
to decrease the O&S cost and increase the reliability of each LCS 
variant?
    The Navy has begun to implement LCS reliability fixes through 
component upgrades, increasing organic maintenance self-sufficiency 
(decreasing reliance on fly-away contractor support), and improved 
provisioning on key systems such as water jets, main propulsion diesel 
engines, launch and recovery equipment, and electrical plant 
components. The Navy will base future actions on data analysis to 
prioritize fixes that continue to increase reliability. The Navy 
expects that reliability improvements will reduce costly, unplanned, 
and emergent repairs affecting O&S costs.
    How feasible would it be to move some LCS maintenance 
responsibilities from contractors to sailors, and what impact might 
this have on LCS O&S costs?
    The Navy has begun to establish Maintenance Execution Teams (METs) 
consisting of sailors to complete significant portions of required 
preventative maintenance tasks for LCS and execute proof-of-concept 
maintenance availabilities on deployed LCS. These sailor-led teams 
conduct maintenance previously completed by contractors. The Navy is 
evaluating the O&S costs impact from this initiative.
    How will the eventual full implementation of the mission packages 
affect O&S costs for each LCS variant?
    Full implementation of the mission packages should not affect LCS 
Seaframe O&S costs.
    Ms. Speier. Admiral Gilday, I am concerned that the Navy and Marine 
Corps only provides secondary caregivers--mostly new fathers--with 2 
weeks of caregiver leave, whereas the Army and the Air Force provide 3 
weeks, and Federal employees get 12 weeks. It's just as important for 
fathers and other secondary caregivers to bond with their newborns. 
Research shows that when fathers take paternity leave, new mothers have 
better health outcomes and higher labor force participation and wages; 
marriages are more stable; and children's educational attainment and 
emotional stability are improved.
    Why doesn't the Navy provide the full amount of secondary caregiver 
leave authorized by law--3 weeks--to sailors?
    Admiral Gilday. While the Department of the Navy recognizes the 
value of secondary caregiver leave, the expeditionary nature of our 
service requires us to balance any additional nonchargeable leave with 
maintaining operational readiness. With more than 17,000 sailors 
becoming a non-birth parent every year, expanding secondary caregiver 
leave from two weeks to three weeks would result in more than 325 work 
years of additional time off. Many of those lost work years would 
affect operational ships, submarines, and squadrons whose broad mission 
portfolios already stretch the capacity of their assigned crews. 
Similarly, approximately 10,000 Marines become a non-birth parent each 
year, equating to over 190 lost work years, primarily from operational 
units.
    Ms. Speier. General Berger, I understand that you testified that 
you want to expand maternity leave for Marines. Under current law, 
Marines and sailors who are primary caregivers get 6 weeks of caregiver 
leave, compared with 12 weeks for Federal employees. Birth mothers can 
get an additional 6 weeks of convalescent leave, but adoptive parents 
get no more than the 6 weeks of caregiver leave. I have introduced 
legislation (the Servicemember Parental Leave Equity Act, H.R. 3122) to 
expand caregiver leave for servicemembers to 12 weeks for both new 
mothers and fathers.
    Also, the Navy and Marine Corps only provide secondary caregivers 
with 2 weeks of caregiver leave, whereas the Army and the Air Force 
provide 3 weeks, and Federal employees get 12 weeks. It's just as 
important for fathers and other secondary caregivers to bond with their 
newborns. Research shows that when fathers take paternity leave, new 
mothers have better health outcomes and higher labor force 
participation and wages; marriages are more stable; and children's 
educational attainment and emotional stability are improved.
    How many weeks of caregiver leave would you propose that Congress 
authorize for primary caregivers?
    Why doesn't the Marine Corps provide the full amount of secondary 
caregiver leave authorized by law--3 weeks--to Marines?
    General Berger. We know for a Marine to be successful on the job 
and to remain on the job, they must feel secure, supported, and 
satisfied at home. Retaining Marines is critical to the combat 
effectiveness of the Marine Corps; many new parents are at a point in 
their career where they are highly trained and qualified. It is in the 
Marine Corps best interest to have the right policy to enable Marines 
to be the best parent and best Marine possible. Strong support to 
parents can have a positive influence on retention as we seek to retain 
the best talent.
    We are proactively focused on improving our support for families, 
although this must always be balanced with overall military readiness. 
As it stands today, a Marine, through use of multiple convalescence and 
other paid leave authorities, can take as much as 4\1/2\ months of paid 
leave and can do so in flexible increments. We continue to explore more 
avenues to provide support to all our Marines and look forward to 
soliciting insight from Congressional Members and staffers and work in 
close coordination with the Department of Defense to find the best ways 
to support our Marines. We are comfortable with the 14 days of 
secondary caregiver leave and believe the balance between providing 
support to Marine parents and maintain readiness is well struck.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
    Mr. Kelly. Peering into the future, if NGAD does continue to be 
delayed and the Super Hornet line has been forced to close--the F-35C 
will be the only game in town for nearly a decade. It costs over $100 
million to buy one of those aircraft and, today, the Navy's own data 
suggest that it costs $55,000 per hour to fly one. Additionally--GAO 
has recently concluded that the current 2027 goal for finalizing the 
$14 billion F-35 Block IV modernization is ``not achievable.'' Is the 
Navy's tactical aviation fleet on a sustainable path? Will you be able 
to maintain the operational tempo demanded by this security 
environment--by the Chinese threat in particular--if procurement and 
O&S costs rapidly escalate?
    Mr. Harker. In order to meet the operational tempo demanded by the 
current security environment--specifically regarding the challenges 
posed by peer competitors such as China--the Navy requires a mixture of 
4th/5th generation aircraft (details available at a higher 
classification) to meet both the capacity AND capability required to 
win in highly contested environments in the 2020s.
    Beginning in the 2030s, the Navy must transition to the Next 
Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) Family of Systems (FoS) in order to 
compete with advanced threats in support of the objectives of the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS). Continued investments in 4th 
generation aircraft (F/A-18E/F), in lieu of 5th generation platforms 
(F-35C) and the development of future technologies (NGAD FoS), would 
have a detrimental impact on the Navy's ability to support the 
objectives as outlined in the NDS--especially in the most stressing 
scenarios against advanced adversaries, such as China.
    The Navy remains on a sustainable path to meet 4th and 5th 
generation capacity and capability requirements in the 2020s while 
making critical investments in future technologies, such as the NGAD 
FoS, that will be required to win in the 2030s and beyond. With the 
impending delivery of 78 new production Block III F/A-18E/Fs and the 
ongoing Service Life Management (SLM) to extend airframe life at 
roughly 1/3 the cost of new procurement, the Navy has sufficient 
capacity of 4th generation aircraft to meet the needs of the security 
environment.
    Additional procurement of new F/A-18E/F Block III aircraft beyond 
FY21 is not required to mitigate near- or long-term strike-fighter 
shortfall (SFSF) risk, as these aircraft would not deliver until after 
the SFSF has been eliminated in FY25. The DoN assesses that new F/A-
18E/F procurement beyond FY21 would arrive late-to-need to address 
near-term SFSF challenges--which are actively being managed--and 
excess-to-need for 4th generation aircraft capacity to meet the demands 
of the NDS.
    The active F-35C production line and the F/A-18E/F SLM efforts are 
the risk mitigations for the Navy to manage strike-fighter inventory 
into the 2030s, ensuring the service maintains the capacity required to 
meet Global Force Management (GFM) demand while investing in the new 
technologies required to compete with peer adversaries.
    In order to deliver the 5th generation capabilities required to 
compete in the 2020s, the Navy remains committed to reducing the cost 
to procure and operate these platforms. Between FY16 (Lot 10) and FY20 
(Lot 14), the F-35C has realized a 22.2% reduction in per-unit 
recurring flyaway cost, driving the procurement of 5th generation 
capabilities to well below $100M per tail with expected further 
reductions in future contracts.
    Current predictions for FY21-23 sustainment contracts show a 
continued reduction in cost per flight hour (CPFH) across all three F-
35 variants. The F-35 Joint Program Office continues to prioritize and 
identify efficiencies to accelerate critical Block IV capabilities. 
These combined efforts demonstrate the Navy's path to deliver the right 
mix of 4th and 5th generation capabilities it requires to win in the 
2020s on a budget that is sustainable and affordable.
    The NGAD program is on schedule (concept refinement) and the Navy 
remains committed to accelerating the development of the NGAD FoS 
(details available at higher classification) to ensure it can continue 
to support the objectives of the NDS and compete with peer adversaries 
in the 2030s and beyond. Consistent, stable resourcing today will 
ensure the program remains on budget and on schedule, delivering 
critical warfighting capabilities that are required to win in future 
high intensity conflict in support of national security objectives.
    Mr. Kelly. The Navy says it needs two Block III Super Hornet 
squadrons per carrier air wing by 2027 (i.e., 20 squadrons) to meet 
operational requirements. Is this still on track, given the 
unanticipated challenges to SLM? What's the risk associated with that 
delay?
    Mr. Harker. [The information referred to was not available at the 
time of printing.]
    Mr. Kelly. The Super Hornet is being considered for purchase by a 
number of close U.S. allies as they replace aging fighter fleets. Can 
you talk about the benefits to the U.S. Navy and combat synergy when 
our allies operate the same systems?
    Mr. Harker. There are strategic, operational, financial, and 
logistical benefits and combat synergies associated with operating the 
same or similar major weapons system as our allies. Coalition forces 
operating common weapon systems allow joint interoperability, 
additional contingency support, and the ability to cost-share 
capability upgrades. Additionally, continued production of parts allows 
increased quantity in the supply system and the ability to combat 
obsolescence.
      Financial and Logistical Benefits--Reduction of cost to 
US for system sustainment and capability upgrades if shared by 
international partner
      Software development
      Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs)
      Obsolescence--USN benefits from a partner nation 
purchasing desired but unfunded capabilities
      AIM-9X Sidewinder on EA-18G Growler stations 2 and 10
      Non-recurring Engineering (NRE) of the Large Area Display 
(LAD) in the Advanced Cockpit in Super Hornet Block III and Growler--
Active FMS Production line reduces risk from Diminishing Manufacturing 
Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS)
      Increases quantity and demand of parts in supply system 
from manufacturer--Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) 
and other Third-Party agreements provide re-supply and repair 
opportunities increasing US logistics resilience worldwide
      Strategic and Operational Benefits and Combat Synergies--
Security Cooperation develops military capabilities for our partner 
nations for their self-defense and multinational operations providing 
US Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations--FMS 
partners support Coalition forces. Operating common systems 
significantly contributes to ``integration'' of partner nations into 
operations, increases chances of ``interoperability'', and is initial 
step toward being ``interchangeable''--Strategically, the threat actor 
must consider the partner nation has the same capability as the US 
platform so they can be used as a deterrent or ``threat-in-being''.
    Mr. Kelly. Over the last two years, we've seen the Air Force go 
all-in procuring new F-15EX jets, as they have clearly recognized the 
value of having more than one tactical fighter in production and 
reaping the benefits of a significantly lower cost-to-operate jet. 
We've seen F-35A unit cost come down in response. Do you have any 
concerns about what happens to F-35C pricing with no competitive 
pressure from the Super Hornet?
    Admiral Gilday. F-35C per unit costs have been coming down year 
over year for the past 5 years. The per unit cost for a Lot 10 (FY16) 
aircraft was $121M per aircraft compared to $94.4M per aircraft for Lot 
14 (FY20). The Navy has been reaping the benefits of per unit cost 
reduction initiatives such as the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) used to 
purchase the Lot 12-14 aircraft. The Lot 15-17 (FY21-23) procurement, 
still in negotiations, continue to point towards a reduction in URF 
cost. There are no indications that closure of the F/A-18 line will 
correlate to an increase in F-35C cost. The reduction in Cost per Tail 
(CPT) was driven, internal to the F-35 program, by EOQ, larger 
procurement numbers, and reductions in span time. In the future we can 
expect the program will hit a steady state but indicators continue to 
point at a reduction in CPT into Lot 17.
    Mr. Kelly. The Navy says it needs two Block III Super Hornet 
squadrons per carrier air wing by 2027 (i.e., 20 squadrons) to meet 
operational requirements. Is this still on track, given the 
unanticipated challenges to SLM? What's the risk associated with that 
delay?
    Admiral Gilday. [The information referred to was not available at 
the time of printing.]
    Mr. Kelly. The Super Hornet is being considered for purchase by a 
number of close U.S. allies as they replace aging fighter fleets. Can 
you talk about the benefits to the U.S. Navy and combat synergy when 
our allies operate the same systems?
    Admiral Gilday. There are strategic, operational, financial, and 
logistical benefits and combat synergies associated with operating the 
same or similar major weapons system as our allies. Coalition forces 
operating common weapon systems allow joint interoperability, 
additional contingency support, and the ability to cost-share 
capability upgrades. Additionally, continued production of parts allows 
increased quantity in the supply system and the ability to combat 
obsolescence.
      Financial and Logistical Benefits--Reduction of cost to 
US for system sustainment and capability upgrades if shared by 
international partner.
      Software development.
      Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs).
      Obsolescence--USN benefits from a partner nation 
purchasing desired but unfunded capabilities.
      AIM-9X Sidewinder on EA-18G Growler stations 2 and 10.
      Non-recurring Engineering (NRE) of the Large Area Display 
(LAD) in the Advanced Cockpit in Super Hornet Block III and Growler--
Active FMS Production line reduces risk from Diminishing Manufacturing 
Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS)
      Increases quantity and demand of parts in supply system 
from manufacturer--Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) 
and other Third-Party agreements provide re-supply and repair 
opportunities increasing US logistics resilience worldwide
      Strategic and Operational Benefits and Combat Synergies--
Security Cooperation develops military capabilities for our partner 
nations for their self-defense and multinational operations providing 
US Forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations--FMS 
partners support Coalition forces. Operating common systems 
significantly contributes to ``integration'' of partner nations into 
operations, increases chances of ``interoperability'', and is initial 
step toward being ``interchangeable''--Strategically, the threat actor 
must consider the partner nation has the same capability as the US 
platform so they can be used as a deterrent or ``threat-in-being''
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. On 5 February 2021, you signed a letter and 
submitted it to the Armed Service Committees on shipboard manning . . . 
that indicated ``there were 95 ships identified in the enclosed report 
that fell below the 87 percent fit/90 percent fill levels for Quarter 
1. This represents 35.1 percent of the covered ships in the Naval 
Vessel Register. Of those 95 ships, 52 ships are in the maintenance 
period and 30 ships are in the training and certification period. There 
are 13 operationally tasked ships below the 87/90 percent threshold, 
which is a slight decrease from 18 on the Quarter 4 report.'' When you 
consider this report with the Navy's FY22 budget request that seeks to 
decrease overall end-strength it seems we have a manning issue in the 
Navy. I'd like to understand how much risk the Navy is accepting by not 
fully manning its Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF) at the same time 
its planning to take a cut in end-strength?
    Mr. Harker. Until the Navy attains personnel inventory equal to 
100% of the manpower requirement plus friction, manning levels will 
always be less than 100% when measured against the validated 
requirement. The cut in end strength is pursuant to cuts in force 
structure and the use of unmanned platforms in the deterrence of 
Strategic Competition. Risk associated with reduced manning levels is 
difficult to measure and comes in various forms.
    Predominantly, risk can be categorized into: efficiency of 
maintenance and operations over the lifecycle of a platform; increased 
workload and workhours per sailor; unit cohesion; quality of life; and 
job satisfaction. To best prioritize manning for operational units, the 
Fleets, in coordination with the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) and 
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations OPNAV N1 as Manning Control 
Authority, allocate personnel resources to those units deployed, 
forward deployed, and preparing to deploy as the priority.
    Per the Joint Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander, 
U.S. Pacific Fleet notice from 12 February 2021, Navy prioritizes 
manning its FDNF and deployed units just below strategic nuclear forces 
and special operations forces. The manning target per this notice 
varies by platform and in most cases is 92 percent Fit and 95 percent 
Fill. Currently, FDNF units are manned at an average of 90.2% Fit and 
97.1% Fill, and operational sea duty units are manned at an average of 
89.1% Fit and 94.5% Fill.
    On efficiency of maintenance and operations over the lifecycle of a 
platform: In 2020, Navy began tracking crew-manning levels to both 
Billets Authorized (BA) and the full Ship Manpower Document (SMD) 
requirement in various senior level Navy forums. Tracking crew-manning 
levels to the full SMD requirement allows for a more comprehensive 
assessment of personnel readiness levels. As recommended by the recent 
U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Navy is developing crew 
manning thresholds based on analysis and assessment of risk. Current 
manning targets ensure safe operations and readiness, while increased 
manning to the full SMD ensures optimal performance over the lifecycle 
of the platform and multiple Optimized Fleet Response Plan cycles.
    Personnel manning actions sourced from units earlier in their force 
generation cycle as well as prioritizing fills for units closer to 
deployment to meet training and deployment goals results in units in 
depot maintenance and while operating, at sea, in the basic training 
phase in the 75-85% manning range.
    Analysis by the Surface Force show a corresponding effect of 
limited manpower during maintenance to on time completion performance. 
As of 10 June 2021, there are 7,829 operational gaps, and 15,154 all-
sea gaps (includes units in precommissioning and long-term maintenance) 
at sea.
    On increased workload and workhours per sailor: Not having the 
personnel requirements fully funded with the associated personnel 
onboard also results in increased workload for sailors aboard 
operational units. Using the DDG-51 class as an example, in FY-21 there 
are 287 BA for 318 SMD. Manning to the Fleet Commander directed floor 
of 95% fill target for deployment results in 272 current onboard.
    Since the Navy at sea work week is 67 hours or 7 days a week, this 
equates to an 18% increase in workload per sailor per week (an 
additional 11.7 hours per sailor per week) to meet watch standing, 
operational, maintenance, sanitation and training requirements. For our 
DDG example inport, manning in the maintenance phase is averaging 86% 
fill. At this level, the workload per sailor per week is an additional 
12.0 hours per sailor per week. This is based on an inport week of 40 
hour or 5 days a week, equating to a 30% increase in workload per 
sailor per week against 100% of the manpower requirement.
    On unit cohesion: Low distributable inventory results in missing 
manning date (M-date) targets which are designed to have the core crew 
onboard for the entire training cycle and deployment, typically one 
year before deployment. On average, M-Date is missed by 8 months. 
Missing M-Date results in increased personnel manning actions to fill 
gaps for operations and deployment occurring just before the final 
advanced training exercise just prior to deployment. The entire crew 
experiences challenges and some stress when incorporating sailors added 
at the end of the training cycle.
    On quality of life and job satisfaction: The Navy no longer has an 
exit survey (formerly, the Argus Survey captured quality of life and 
job satisfaction information). Absent hard data, common observations 
from the workforce and operational commanders reinforce that reduced 
manning levels detract from quality of life (longer hours) and job 
satisfaction (less predictability due to the potential for reassignment 
to deploying units). As the Navy continues to address fatigue and sleep 
concerns via implementation of circadian rhythm watchbills, this effort 
will continue to be hampered when funded billets are less than the 
full/validated manpower requirement.
    Progress is being made, but full personnel inventory plus friction 
cannot come fast enough. Overall, more sailors are on our ships today 
than just several years ago. The Navy is addressing the BA to SMD 
operating deficit through the Perform-to-Plan and Program Objective 
Memorandum processes. Using the DDG-51 class as an example: in 2020, 
the DDG-51 class average BA was funded to 90.1% of requirement and 
grows to 93.4% in FY-22, and up to 98% in FY-24; average DDG-51 manning 
has grown from 240 sailors onboard in FY-12, to 265 in FY-20 and is 
projected to be 285 by FY-23.
    Adding manpower will not happen overnight, and those new apprentice 
level sailors will take years to mature to the journeymen and 
supervisors we require at sea. Throughout, the Fleets, with the 
coordination with CNP and OPNAV N1 as Manning Control Authority will 
continue to manage scarcity and align manpower resources with those 
units deployed, forward deployed, and preparing to deploy as the 
priority. POC: My point of contact for this matter is CAPT Donald R. 
Wilkinson, N1 Deputy Director, COMM: (757)-836-5254, DSN: 836-5254, or 
e-mail: [email protected].
    Mr. Gallagher. President Biden's FY22 Defense Department budget 
indicates a decrease of 2,529 Navy servicemembers across the Active and 
Reserve Components from FY21 to FY22. This seems like a significant 
reduction in Navy personnel in a short period of time. What is Navy's 
plan for end strength across the FYDP (Future Year's Defense Program)?
    Admiral Gilday. Navy's end strength is driven by force structure 
and fluctuates year to year in response to overall force structure 
changes, such as decommissioning ships, the introduction of new 
platforms and capabilities, and an increase in billets authorized on 
our operational platforms. Navy will continue to fund operational 
readiness to ensure the Fleet is properly manned, with the right 
sailors, in the right place, at the right time, with the right 
training. Details on the Navy's end strength across the FYDP will be 
provided with the President's Budget for FY2023.
    Mr. Gallagher. Commandant Berger, the FY22 PB request includes the 
divestment of the Navy's Mark VI patrol boats. I think that those boats 
could provide the Marine Corps with an excellent opportunity to 
experiment in support of your force design efforts and further 
reinforce your role as the stand-in force within contested littorals, 
particularly if they were integrated with a loitering munition or anti-
ship missile capability. Would those platforms help with your force 
design efforts within the first island chain and other maritime spaces 
and would you support a transfer of those boats to the Marine Corps?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps is examining surface mobility and 
loitering munition capabilities for the contested littorals, and the 
Marine Corps current effort is the Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel. 
The Marine Corps III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) examined the MK 
VI and determined the platform is capable but expensive to own and 
operate. Moving forward, the Marine Corps seeks a balance between 
capability and affordability.
    Mr. Gallagher. CMC, I'm very supportive of your desire to develop 
an inventory of Light Amphibious Warships. While it is clear to me that 
the LAW is a critical requirement to your overall force design, I'm 
afraid not everyone understands the LAW or its function within your 
vision. Can you explain to us why the LAW is so important and what the 
consequences will be if we don't develop the LAW with a sense of 
urgency and in concert with forward-deployed Marine Littoral Regiments 
(MLRs)?
    General Berger. The Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) will provide the 
Marine Corps new Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) with a beachable ship 
to transport Marines within the Indo-Pacific region. As the Marine 
Corps undertakes a significant transformation to focus on countering 
peer adversaries, a vital element will be the establishment of three 
Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs). These new units will be task-
organized and dispersed across key maritime terrain in the Indo-Pacific 
region. The MLR capabilities will augment and reinforce a host nation's 
ability to monitor, expose, and challenge malign behavior, but the MLRs 
will also be fully capable of operating without host-nation support if 
required.
    Additionally, the MLRs will be highly mobile, constantly changing 
their positioning and posture to increase ambiguity and increase the 
adversary's challenge of monitoring and targeting MLR units, thus 
reducing an adversary's confidence and encouraging off-ramps from 
conflict.
    Critical to the MLR is the development and fielding of the LAW, 
which offers low-signature maneuverability, sustainment capacity, and 
the ability to provide tactical and intra-theater lift. The LAW will be 
complementary to traditional amphibious ships. Without the LAW, the 
Marine Corps will lack in its ability to maneuver and sustain itself 
within the global littorals.
    The Navy is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives and will then 
commence with Concept Studies and Preliminary Design. Studies will 
primarily focus on commercial designs tailored for military application 
to enable maneuver and mobility for our integrated naval forces 
conducting Distributed Maritime Operations. The Department is driving 
towards a lead ship contract award in FY 2023 that will support the 
Marine Corps future Marine Littoral Regiments in the Indo-Pacific 
region. The Light Amphibious Warship is complementary to traditional 
large amphibious ships; both types of ships are required to deliver 
Marine Corps forces to expeditionary locations.
    The current requirement, after a deliberate analysis process, is 35 
LAWs and would support three future Marine Littoral Regiments. Within 
the constraints of the current fiscal reality, we will work together 
with the Navy to prioritize the acquisition strategy to provide the 
Naval Expeditionary Force with the best value in platform capability 
and capacity.
    Mr. Gallagher. My understanding is that the Marine Corps overall 
pilot inventory is at 81% of your target inventory. By my calculations 
. . . that makes you short 730 pilots relative to the target 
inventory. How is the Marine Corps getting after this issue of pilot 
throughput and how are you mitigating this risk to your existing 
missions?
    General Berger. The Corps is focused on overcoming the current 
aviator inventory challenges. We seek to increase retention of high 
quality Marine aviators through the use of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives in order to fill personnel shortages. Aviation retention 
must be viewed holistically, and cannot be solved by bonuses alone. 
Monetary incentives influence an individual's decision to depart or 
remain in the service, but are not the only factor in such a decision.
    Pilot retention is also impacted by availability of flight hours, 
the opportunity to train and execute the mission, and other non-
monetary factors. We, as a service, are looking at monetary and non-
monetary incentives, improving aircraft readiness rates and flying 
hours, and increasing the production pipeline throughput, all of which 
will support increased operational readiness.
    For the FY21 Aviation Bonus, the Marine Corps is pursuing increased 
inventory stability across its entire aviation officer population. A 
stable inventory is critical while materiel readiness improvements 
positively influence the flight hours and readiness rates of both 
operational and training squadrons. The Marine Corps tailored the FY21 
Aviation Bonus through targeted obligation periods and monetary 
incentives compared to the FY20 Aviation Bonus due to each community's 
current and forecasted inventory health. FY21 Aviation bonuses:
      [F-35, F/A-18, AV-8B, KC-130] $35,000 per year in return 
for 5 or 6 years of obligated service, $25,000 per year for 4 years of 
obligated service, and $15,000 per year for 3 years of obligated 
service.
      [Osprey] $25,000 per year in return for 5 years of 
obligated service, $20,000 per year for 4 years of obligated service.
      [Rotary Wing] $15,000 per year in return for 5 years of 
obligated service; $10,000 per year for 4 years of obligated service.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
    Ms. Houlahan. Year after year, we see that demand for child care 
services in the military exceeds availability, seriously threatening 
readiness and retention. I appreciate that the Navy has made efforts to 
reduce the child care waitlist in recent years, yet your budget 
acknowledges that 7,000 children will still be forced to wait. I 
recognize you have asked for a modest increase for Family Child Care 
Homes, but the request for child development centers remains unchanged 
from last year, and neither of these requests come close to the FY 2020 
funding level.
    Can you provide some insights and context into the decision making 
behind the child care portions of the Navy and Marine Corps budget 
requests?
    Why do the Child Development Centers remain stagnant while a modest 
bump is requested for Family Child Care Homes? What will these 
proposals mean for military families?
    What more can Congress do to help you meet demand for child care 
services in the military?
    Mr. Harker. While Military Construction projects are necessary for 
expanding child care capacity, it is only one solution in meeting 
current and future childcare capacity demands. Navy continues to lean 
forward to better meet the high demand for child care through a 
multipronged approach and is working on several initiatives to expand 
capacity outside of traditional MILCON projects.
    In addition to the expansion efforts for Family Child Care, Navy is 
also pursuing expansion efforts through initiatives such as community 
partnerships (e.g., Armed Services YMCA), commercial leasing, 
repurposing of underutilized facilities, adding Mobile Learning Centers 
and increasing fee assistance spaces. Military Construction projects 
are being developed for consideration in future President's Budget 
requests. FY 2021 funded enacted for a Child Development Center in 
Bangor, Washington will provide 300 spaces to replace current 
inadequate facilities and add an additional 150 spaces to the 
inventory.
    Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate that the Navy's Budget request includes 
a modest increase for family housing, indicating it is the ``funding 
level necessary to provide safe and adequate housing either through the 
community or in government quarters.'' I serve on the Military 
Personnel Subcommittee where we have been closely examining the 
troubling allegations surrounding substandard conditions in privatized 
housing, from infestations to rodents and exposure to mold, and their 
impact to morale and readiness.
    Can you provide some specific details on how the Navy's proposed 
budget increase will improve living conditions for families living in 
privatized housing?
    Do you have any recommendations for Congressional consideration on 
how we can continue to help you make progress to ensure all our 
military families have access to livable housing?
    Mr. Harker. Can you provide some specific details on how the Navy's 
proposed budget increase will improve living conditions for families 
living in privatized housing?
    The proposed budget increase will allow the DON to maintain the 
increased housing personnel providing the necessary oversight for our 
privatized housing. The DON is also initiating the third party housing 
inspections required by Section 3051 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY 2020 NDAA) and continuing to 
conduct the annual Tenant Satisfaction Survey measuring the 
satisfaction of our residents residing in privatized housing.
    Do you have any recommendations for Congressional consideration on 
how we can continue to help you make progress to ensure all our 
military families have access to livable housing?
    The DON continues implementing the requirements provided in the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021. The 
DON has increased active leadership by installation, regional, and unit 
Commanders; improved oversight of project owner compliance with 
Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) agreements, and 
improved communications to regain resident trust. The DON is committed 
to providing safe, high-quality, well-maintained homes to its Service 
Members and their families.
    Ms. Houlahan. The Navy's FY2022 shipbuilding budget request appears 
relatively flat but with expected cost increases in shipbuilding 
programs, like in carrier construction and carrier re-fueling and 
overhauls--how have you accounted for the workforce needs in 
shipbuilding and repairs industry?
    Mr. Harker. ``The Department carefully balanced resources and 
requirements, weighing the effects of FY 2022 program decisions on the 
industrial base to ensure our nation maintains the skills, 
capabilities, and capacities critical to our national defense. In FY 
2022, the DON requested funding for eight battle force ships, keeping 
the shipbuilding industrial base loaded at an executable level that 
encourages industry investment in capital improvements, capital 
expansion, and a properly sized world-class workforce.''
    Ms. Houlahan. Year after year, we see that demand for child care 
services in the military exceeds availability, seriously threatening 
readiness and retention. I appreciate that the Navy has made efforts to 
reduce the child care waitlist in recent years, yet your budget 
acknowledges that 7,000 children will still be forced to wait. I 
recognize you have asked for a modest increase for Family Child Care 
Homes, but the request for child development centers remains unchanged 
from last year, and neither of these requests come close to the FY 2020 
funding level.
    Can you provide some insights and context into the decision making 
behind the child care portions of the Navy and Marine Corps budget 
requests?
    Why do the Child Development Centers remain stagnant while a modest 
bump is requested for Family Child Care Homes? What will these 
proposals mean for military families?
    What more can Congress do to help you meet demand for child care 
services in the military?
    General Berger. The adage ``we recruit Marines, we retain 
families'' remains as true today as ever. CDCs and other quality of 
life programs are a very important way to influence retention and 
readiness of our Marines and families. High-quality child care is a 
family-readiness priority for the Marine Corps. We appreciate the 
additional $20M provided in FY20 to update and repair our child care 
facilities, as well as the additional $26M provided this fiscal year to 
hire additional employees and increase hourly wages to maintain a 
professional workforce.
    In FY20, our child development programs served 42,000 children at 
14 installations. COVID-19 and the resulting protocols have 
significantly impacted our child care capacity. We understand the 
impact waitlists have on our families and have assessed that they are 
due to a shortage of qualified workers, high turnover/low pay, and 
lengthy hiring processes. Certainly, ongoing challenges with COVID-19 
have played a significant role in our ability to staff CDCs just like 
countless industries across America who face workforce shortfalls. 
There is a 47% annual employee turnover. We are addressing these issues 
through increased hiring and a non-competitive child care employee 
transfer program. We added additional funding in FY21 to hire more 
employees and will increase wages to help retain a professional 
workforce. We also added funding starting in FY22 to sustain these 
hiring efforts.
    Our fee assistance program helps provide child care and reduce 
child care waitlists. In FY20, the Marine Corps served 853 children in 
the Off-base Fee Assistance Program with a total of 436 providers. The 
usage rate is down in FY20 due to COVID-19; numerous community-based 
programs closed their doors reducing off-base child care spaces. Per 
ChildCare Aware of America, it is estimated that 30-50 percent of child 
care providers closed due to the pandemic. However, enrollment numbers 
have steadily risen since February 2021 signaling increased community 
based opportunities. We will also participate in an OSD-led pilot 
program in FY22 to provide in-home child career opportunities.
    Ms. Houlahan. I was pleased to see you highlight the importance of 
talent retention in STEM fields in the commandant's planning guide.
    While I agree its not solely a Marine Corps problem, but rather a 
joint force problem, I am curious about the ``precision options'' you 
noted in the guide to ensure you retain talented forces? I only see 
``critical skills retention bonuses'' listed in your budget documents, 
so can you also share what this looks like and what types of 
investments you have planned to retain these forces?
    What--if anything--can we in Congress do to help ensure you have 
sufficient tools to retain talent in STEM fields?
    General Berger. We are currently assessing our manpower model to 
maximize our ability to retain the right Marines for modern and future 
challenges, including members in STEM fields. The incentives-based 
model we are shaping will offer us the ability to target incentives to 
specific individuals the Service wants to retain to meet the manpower 
requirements associated with our Force Design concept. This includes 
increasing our skillset and capabilities to develop a ``new-collar'' 
workforce at our depots. Ensuring we have the right incentives to grow, 
develop, and retain modern skillsets in our industrial base is 
critical. We appreciate consistency in Congressional funding and 
avoiding continuing resolutions to allow us to appropriately forecast 
how we meet these requirements.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. In the 2020 China Military Power Report, DOD stated that 
``China is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage,'' 
adding that the country is currently striving to increase ``its 
shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes.'' China is 
building are cruisers, destroyers, and corvettes, which the Department 
of Defense says ``will significantly upgrade the PLAN's air defense, 
anti-ship, and antisubmarine capabilities.'' It worries me that many of 
our drydocks currently serving our Los Angeles-class attack submarines 
are wholly inadequate for their replacement. According to an analysis 
of the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) by the 
Heritage Foundation, even if everything went according to plan, the 
SIOP would still not sufficiently expand shipyard capacity to service 
the fleet we have now, let alone the fleet we plan to grow in the 
future. Furthermore, despite being only 3 years old, the 20 year SIOP 
is already behind schedule. Acting Secretary Harker, what do you 
attribute these delays to? Would installing a senior project leader, 
with full decision authority, help bring the SIOP back on schedule and 
prevent it from going further over budget?
    Mr. Harker. The Navy will submit a five-year plan to Congress 
regarding the feasibility of accelerating the Shipyard Infrastructure 
Optimization Program (SIOP) by September 2021. SIOP currently has a 
program manager who has all the authorities needed to properly execute 
the program's mission to optimize our public shipyards to sustain the 
fleet of the future.
    Mr. Waltz. The US Navy has continued to invest in anti-submarine 
warfare through a number of high-visibility and highly successful 
programs, among them the P-8A which uses deployable sonobuoys as the 
critical element of its combat system.
    I appreciate the large numbers of sonobuoys required to keep pace 
with the ever-evolving threat of our near-peers and adversaries. It's 
not lost on anyone that adversary submarines even operate right off our 
coast in the western Atlantic. Sonobuoys help the P-8A as well as ships 
and helicopters track these adversary submarines.
    The US Navy continues to request additional funds via the CNO's 
Unfunded Priority List for sonobuoys. This year's request is for an 
additional 54.4M, and I support that. In prior years the Unfunded 
Priority List has also included funding of roughly 50M additional 
dollars for sonobuoys, and I've supported those as well.
    Can you speak to the importance of sonobuoys and how you can work 
to include what is clearly a persistent need into the base budget going 
forward?
    Mr. Harker. Sonobuoys are a critical munition/sensor used by 
airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms to locate, track and 
hold at risk near-peer competitor submarines. A surge in foreign 
submarine Out of Area Deployments (OoAD) by the most technologically 
advanced attack (SSN) and guided missile (SSGN) submarines has 
significantly increased the Navy's reliance on sonobuoys and of the P-8 
mission to counter emerging threats. Most recently, sonobuoys have been 
successfully used to collect critical intelligence on the most 
advanced, new construction submarines.
    The Navy is especially grateful for the continued Congressional 
support and flexibility with the Unfunded Priority List (UPL) requests 
for additional sonobuoy procurement in the past. The additional funding 
was imperative in increasing the industrial base's production of 
sonobuoys needed to replenish stock recently expended against our 
nearpeer competitors. The FY22 UPL request is forwarded to replenish 
stock expended during recent Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and 
to help build inventory associated with the anticipated manufacturing 
slowdown before the joint-venture dissolution of the current sonobuoy 
manufacturer, ERAPSCO. The Navy has added funding to the base budget 
for sonobuoy procurement in the future to ensure we can continue to 
procure these critical munitions/sensors at the most economical rate.
    Mr. Waltz. It's my understanding that research and development 
efforts for sonobuoys has traditionally been borne by industry IRAD 
funding. Can you describe the US Navy's efforts to more appropriately 
share the costs of R&D for our more pressing operational needs such as 
encrypted communications, non-electrical automatic scuttling, and 
passive range, depth and bearing accuracy? I don't see US Navy R&D 
funding being applied to these fleet needs.
    Mr. Harker. Sonobuoy research and development efforts for improved 
sonobuoy capabilities have been furthered by both Navy and Industry 
investments. Industry has used some low level IRAD funding to 
contribute to these efforts, but historically less than 5% percent of 
the total development cost. The Navy budgeted to support sonobuoy 
improvements such as: GPS, drop vector technology, and encrypted 
communication linkage.
    Recently, the Navy spent R&D funding to develop a new Directional 
Frequency Analysis and Recording--Extended Range (ER-DIFAR) sonobuoy. 
This new sonobuoy will enable enhanced tactically relevant ranges 
through passive detection of very-quiet targets.
    Further, the Navy invested heavily in a new sonobuoy architecture, 
Volumetric Air Deployable Active Receiver (VADAR), a PB21 new start 
project that will exponentially enhance wide-area sonobuoy 
capabilities. Due to the dissolution of the production sonobuoy 
manufacturer ERAPSCO Industry is currently using IRAD funding for the 
development of sonobuoy designs. The Navy will then procure OPN funded 
test articles for qualification. These sonobuoy designs directly 
support future sonobuoy production contracts.
    Mr. Waltz. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) 
is intended to modernize our aging shipyards, completely refurbishing 
our shipbuilding and maintenance infrastructure to service our fleet. 
Our current facilities are obsolete, struggling to meet the needs of 
our technologically advanced Navy of today and of the future. This 
results in higher maintenance costs, schedule risks and reliability 
issues. In addition to being critical infrastructure, the viability of 
our shipyards are a national security issue, especially if we want to 
expand the size of our Navy, not only to build ships, but maintain them 
as well.
    However, I note that there is no mention of ``shipyards'' nor 
``shipbuilding'' in President Biden's $2 trillion infrastructure 
proposal. Did the interagency working group developing the President's 
infrastructure proposal consult with the Navy regarding shipyard 
infrastructure, and if not, why?
    Mr. Harker. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Waltz. The U.S. Navy has continued to invest in anti-submarine 
warfare through a number of high-visibility and highly successful 
programs, among them the P-8A which uses deployable sonobuoys as the 
critical element of its combat system.
    I appreciate the large numbers of sonobuoys required to keep pace 
with the ever-evolving threat of our near-peers and adversaries. It's 
not lost on anyone that adversary submarines even operate right off our 
coast in the western Atlantic. Sonobuoys help the P-8A as well as ships 
and helicopters track these adversary submarines.
    The U.S. Navy continues to request additional funds via the CNO's 
Unfunded Priority List for sonobuoys. This year's request is for an 
additional 54.4M, and I support that. In prior years the Unfunded 
Priority List has also included funding of roughly 50M additional 
dollars for sonobuoys, and I've supported those as well.
    Can you speak to the importance of sonobuoys and how you can work 
to include what is clearly a persistent need into the base budget going 
forward?
    Admiral Gilday. Sonobuoys are a critical munition/sensor used by 
airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms to locate, track and 
hold at risk near-peer competitor submarines. A surge in foreign 
submarine Out of Area Deployments (OoAD) by the most technologically 
advanced attack (SSN) and guided missile (SSGN) submarines has 
significantly increased the Navy's reliance on sonobuoys and of the P-8 
mission to counter emerging threats. Most recently, sonobuoys have been 
successfully used to collect critical intelligence on the most 
advanced, new construction submarines.
    The Navy is especially grateful for the continued Congressional 
support and flexibility with the Unfunded Priority List (UPL) requests 
for additional sonobuoy procurement in the past. The additional funding 
was imperative in increasing the industrial base's production of 
sonobuoys needed to replenish stock recently expended against our near-
peer competitors. The FY22 UPL request is forwarded to replenish stock 
expended during recent Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and to 
help build inventory associated with the anticipated manufacturing 
slowdown before the joint-venture dissolution of the current sonobuoy 
manufacturer, ERAPSCO. The Navy has added funding to the base budget 
for sonobuoy procurement in the future to ensure we can continue to 
procure these critical munitions/sensors at the most economical rate.
    Mr. Waltz. It's my understanding that research and development 
efforts for sonobuoys has traditionally been borne by industry IRAD 
funding. Can you describe the US Navy's efforts to more appropriately 
share the costs of R&D for our more pressing operational needs such as 
encrypted communications, non-electrical automatic scuttling, and 
passive range, depth and bearing accuracy? I don't see US Navy R&D 
funding being applied to these fleet needs.
    Admiral Gilday. Sonobuoy research and development efforts for 
improved sonobuoy capabilities have been furthered by both Navy and 
Industry investments. Industry has used some low level IRAD funding to 
contribute to these efforts, but historically less than 5% percent of 
the total development cost. The Navy budgeted to support sonobuoy 
improvements such as: GPS, drop vector technology, and encrypted 
communication linkage.
    Recently, the Navy spent R&D funding to develop a new Directional 
Frequency Analysis and Recording--Extended Range (ER-DIFAR) sonobuoy. 
This new sonobuoy will enable enhanced tactically relevant ranges 
through passive detection of very-quiet targets. Further, the Navy 
invested heavily in a new sonobuoy architecture, Volumetric Air 
Deployable Active Receiver (VADAR), a PB21 new start project that will 
exponentially enhance wide-area sonobuoy capabilities. Due to the 
dissolution of the production sonobuoy manufacturer ERAPSCO Industry is 
currently using IRAD funding for the development of sonobuoy designs. 
The Navy will then procure OPN funded test articles for qualification. 
These sonobuoy designs directly support future sonobuoy production 
contracts.
    Mr. Waltz. I'm pleased to see the US Navy embracing the concept of 
digital twins across platforms. Again, focusing on the importance of 
ASW in the larger sense, can you discuss the value of digital twin 
technology within the Columbia- and Virginia-class programs?
    Admiral Gilday. PEO Submarines (PEO SUBS) and PEO Columbia (PEO 
CLB) both conduct numerous digital twin efforts to support design, 
construction, and sustainment efforts. These tools help improve 
efficiencies and program execution. Some key examples include the 
following. PEO SUBS is using of digital twins to revamp the Submarine 
Warfare Federated Tactical Systems (SWFTS) test program as part of the 
SWFTS Transformation initiative to deliver capability to the Fleet at 
the speed of relevance.
    Specifically, digital twins are currently being used to accomplish 
select test requirements in a virtualized environment, freeing up 
tactical resources for fault tolerance and hardware specific testing, 
while facilitating workflow automation and parallelization of test 
efforts.
    PEO CLB invests in academic partnerships for the development of 
digital twin technology to reduce the risk of sustainment challenges 
resulting from the complex nature of nuclear submarines. PEO CLB is 
implementing advanced equipment Health Management System (HMS) 
technologies that enable a Condition Based Maintenance+ (CBM+) 
capability to reduce sustainment costs. CLB has demonstrated embedded 
on-platform Machine Learning (ML) and digital twin technologies that 
allow CBM+ and autonomic logistics for the submarine fleet.
    Two example systems include the Advanced Carbon dioxide Removal 
Unit (ACRU) and High Pressure Air Compressor (HPAC) systems. PEO CLB 
has also funded the development of Trident Refit Facilities (TRF) 
digital twins that enable dynamic simulations that capture variables 
such as workload, workforce and facility constraints to determine how 
work is accomplished to assess and forecast delivered performance. The 
simulations provide a quantitative capability to assess the CLB 
lifecycle, explicitly accounting for the ability of the TRFs and Naval 
Shipyards to execute the CLB maintenance requirements in the time 
frames required. Overall, PEO SUBS and PEO CLB expect to continue to 
expand the usage of digital twins to help improve efficiencies and 
execution.
    Mr. Waltz. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) 
is intended to modernize our aging shipyards, completely refurbishing 
our shipbuilding and maintenance infrastructure to service our fleet. 
Our current facilities are obsolete, struggling to meet the needs of 
our technologically advanced Navy of today and of the future. This 
results in higher maintenance costs, schedule risks and reliability 
issues. In addition to being critical infrastructure, the viability of 
our shipyards are a national security issue, especially if we want to 
expand the size of our Navy, not only to build ships, but maintain them 
as well.
    However, I note that there is no mention of ``shipyards'' nor 
``shipbuilding'' in President Biden's $2 trillion infrastructure 
proposal. Did the interagency working group developing the President's 
infrastructure proposal consult with the Navy regarding shipyard 
infrastructure, and if not, why?
    Admiral Gilday. The interagency working group did not consult with 
the Navy regarding shipyard infrastructure, however, the Department of 
the Navy (DON) Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) 
aligns with the American Jobs Plan in building world-class 
infrastructure; revitalizing manufacturing and small businesses; and 
training Americans for the jobs of the future.
    Investments improving America's shipyards by modernizing and 
upgrading their outdated facilities will provide immediate business 
opportunities, while transforming shipbuilding trades that will impact 
the local community for generations to come. SIOP meets the President's 
infrastructure priorities; projects are scoped and ``shovel ready'' to 
provide a clear return on investment to the tax payer through immediate 
job creation and opportunities for economic dividends for the next 
generation of skilled trades maintaining the Nation's Fleet. The SIOP 
projects are essential for expanding the Navy's capacity and 
capabilities to perform critical maintenance availabilities on our 
submarines and aircraft carriers, and are necessary due to the age and 
condition of existing shipyard infrastructure.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
    Mr. Carl. The Navy is making strides to meet the demands of 
maintenance for the fleet. Given the larger industrial base discussions 
we are having, isn't this also an opportunity to explore how the Navy 
can do more with the private sector shipyards where there is clearly 
the capacity and desire to do this much needed maintenance and repair 
work?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy is leveraging opportunities to work with 
private shipyards on our shared goal of meeting the maintenance demands 
of the fleet. Focus areas include engagement, collaboration, expansion, 
and modernization of the repair industrial base. With a focus on 
consistent and targeted discussions on both tactical and strategic 
priorities, the Navy and industry are improving the quality and 
frequency of engagements. Sharing ownership for the efforts, the Navy 
and industry are collaborating on workload & capacity reporting, 
``bestvalue'' proposal requirements, and contract change cycle time.
    Finally, the Navy is focused on responsible expansion of the 
industrial base, specifically promoting competition and increasing 
capacity while ensuring continued viability of the existing industrial 
base.
    Mr. Carl. The Navy is making strides to meet the demands of 
maintenance for the fleet. Given the larger industrial base discussions 
we are having, isn't this also an opportunity to explore how the Navy 
can do more with the private sector shipyards where there is clearly 
the capacity and desire to do this much needed maintenance and repair 
work?
    Mr. Harker. The Navy is leveraging opportunities to work with 
private shipyards on our shared goal of meeting the maintenance demands 
of the fleet. Focus areas include engagement, collaboration, and 
expansion of the repair industrial base. With a focus on consistent and 
targeted discussions on both tactical and strategic priorities, the 
Navy and industry are improving the quality and frequency of 
engagements. Sharing ownership for the efforts, the Navy and industry 
are collaborating on workload & capacity reporting, ``best-value'' 
proposal requirements, and contract change cycle time.
    Finally, the Navy is focused on responsible expansion of the 
industrial base, specifically promoting competition and increasing 
capacity while ensuring continued viability of the existing industrial 
base.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. In 2017, the Navy lost 17 sailors in two preventable 
collisions. The investigations into these accidents highlighted a lack 
of manning as a contributing factor. As the fleet continues to grow, I 
want to ensure that the Navy is appropriately updating its manpower 
requirements and identifying the personnel cost implications.
    A 2017 GAO report found that since the implementation of optimal 
manning, the Navy reduced crew sizes, which decreased the associated 
personnel costs for most ship classes. However, these reduced crew 
sizes had deadly results and still resulted in increased maintenance 
costs.
    At what point does the Navy intend to man ships to required levels 
as opposed to just funded levels? What specific steps has the Navy 
taken to make those two numbers match?
    Admiral Gilday. Navy mans funded billets according to the 
priorities presented by Fleet Commanders (U.S. Fleet Forces and 
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet). As more billets are funded, Fleet 
readiness and operational needs are prioritized. From 2001-2010, the 
Navy implemented a number of optimal manning initiatives. When the 
optimal manning era ended in 2010, DDGs had an average of 274 total 
officer and enlisted billets. Manpower reviews of workload and 
watchstanding requirements were conducted in 2011, 2018 and 2019.
    Based on the results of those reviews, Navy has steadily increased 
the number of funded billets on DDGs. In FY21 Navy funded 314 DDG 
billets and the destroyer billet base is programmed to increase to 339 
funded billets by FY24. Navy continually assesses all aspects of ship 
operations and sustainment--manpower, maintenance, modernization, 
training and new construction funding--to optimize Surface Force 
lethality.
                                 ______
                                 
                     QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
    Mr. Kim. The Navy's Aegis ships are considered by many to be the 
work horse of the Navy fleet, being called upon for more and more 
missions around the globe. I am inspired by the strong partnership 
between the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency in the sea based IAMD 
mission and the role our current Aegis fleet, equipped with SPY-1 
arrays, play in this most important mission. I understand the SPY-1 
radar will be the foundation of the Aegis fleet for decades to come so 
I was pleased in seeing that the MDA has requested additional funding 
for SPY-1 upgrades on their unfunded priority list. Admiral, are you 
familiar with this request? What affordable initiatives and how much 
funding is the U.S. Navy investing in to refurbish and modernize your 
In-Service SPY-1 radars to ensure we keep pace with the ever critical 
missile defense threat?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy recognizes the criticality of maintaining 
the SPY-1 radar systems to support essential missions. Since FY 2011, 
the Navy has invested $143M in SPY-1 Reliability, Maintainability and 
Availability (RM&A) improvements to reduce cascading failures, mitigate 
obsolescence issues, and improve reliability in support of Anti-Air 
Warfare (AAW) and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missions.
    SPY-1 RM&A ORDALTs and Microwave Tube (MWT) Product Improvement 
Plan (PIP) initiatives were developed to address concerns called out in 
SPY Task Force. The MWT PIPs were developed to increase Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF) and are being fielded through attrition. Since 
2010 the Navy has invested $1.8 billion in modernizing the DDG-51 
Class's Aegis Weapon System. Since then, 15 DDG-51 Class ships have 
been upgraded to Aegis Baseline 9 capability, which enables a DDG to 
conduct Air Defense and Ballistic Missile Defense systems 
simultaneously to counter new threats during that period.
    In the PB22 Budget the Navy has invested $265M with plans to 
upgrade an additional 3 DDG-51 Class ships to the latest Aegis Weapon 
System. The SPY-1 Multi-Mission Signal Processor (MMSP) was fielded as 
an element of the Aegis modernization program. MMSP supports AAW and 
BMD mission areas, provides the capability to generate and process AN/
SPY-1D(V) waveforms to improve AN/SPY-1D radar performance in clutter, 
provides ballistic missile tracking and RF discrimination capability to 
defeat advanced ballistic missile threats.
    The next generation MMSP referred to as MMSP-R will start fielding 
in FY22 and it incorporates modern computing hardware updates for 
improved reliability and internal test functionality. The Navy is in 
close coordination with MDA and is familiar with the SPY-1 projects 
listed on their Unfunded Priority List. The Navy has teamed with MDA to 
execute the SPY-1 Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) program and provided a 
spare SPY-1 array for risk reduction assess the feasibility of the SPY-
1 Digital Low Noise Amplifier (dLNA) project.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. Secretary Harker, how does this budget request seek to 
provide greater economic stability and predictability for the defense 
industrial base and its suppliers? Are there further steps the Navy can 
take to tailor its strategy to maintain this network of critical 
infrastructure?
    Ms. Harker. The Department carefully balanced resources and 
requirements, weighing the effects of FY 2022 program decisions on the 
industrial base to ensure our nation maintains the skills, 
capabilities, and capacities critical to our national defense. In FY 
2022, the DON requested funding for eight battle force ships, keeping 
the shipbuilding industrial base loaded at an executable level that 
encourages industry investment in capital improvements, capital 
expansion, and a properly sized world-class workforce.
    For future budgets, the Navy is evaluating the use of acquisition 
authorities, such as Multi-Year Procurement, to drive workload 
stability and predictability for the shipbuilding industrial base. The 
FY 2022 budget also takes an approach to maintenance and modernization 
that provides stability to the industrial base, including contracting 
strategies that align workload with industrial base capacity.
    Navy has implemented a variety of contracting strategies that award 
multiple availabilities under a single solicitation, known as 
``grouping.'' Horizontal grouping extends the period of awarded work 
for a shipyard by grouping two serial availabilities into a single 
solicitation. Vertical grouping allows for a single solicitation to 
award multiple concurrent availabilities, allowing for streamlined 
contracting and the ability to effectively manage work within a port. 
Vertical grouping promotes competition, and enables full employment of 
dry dock capacity, which improves return on industry investment and 
reduces cost to the government.
    In total, 16 of 26 FY2021 availabilities will be grouped 
solicitations. The Navy is also seeing positive early results from the 
pilot program established by Congress in FY 2020 to fund private sector 
Pacific Fleet CNO Availabilities with multi-year Other Procurement, 
Navy (OPN) funding. The OPN Pilot allows the Navy to implement 
commercial best practices for ship maintenance and more efficiently use 
surface ship maintenance funding. Early indicators are showing benefits 
to efficiency, execution, and buying power, and the FY 2022 budget 
requests expansion of the OPN pilot to include U.S. Fleet Forces 
private sector CNO Availabilities.
    Mr. Morelle. General Berger, how does this budget request seek to 
provide greater economic stability and predictability for the defense 
industrial base and its suppliers? Are there further steps the Marine 
Corps can take to tailor its strategy to maintain this network of 
critical infrastructure?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps FY22 budget request provides 
consistent funding necessary to support readiness and to maintain our 
Organic Industrial Base infrastructure as well as ensuring stable 
workload for our defense industry partners. The Marine Corps will 
continue execution of the Organic Industrial Base facilities plan 
submitted to the Senate in September of 2019.
    For example, five facilities projects identified within the plan 
are complete or in construction, with others pending UPL or 
infrastructure bill outcomes. As indicated in the Senate report, we 
will balance OIB modernization within the overall Service portfolio and 
in consonance with the DOD/DoN fiscal environment. Our budget request 
also provides funding for critical capabilities that are produced and 
maintained by our industry partners. Consistency in budgets and 
resourcing enables our industry partners at all levels of the supply 
chain to plan, resource, and invest in their own facilities to maintain 
our current systems and develop essential new capabilities.
    Mr. Morelle. General Berger, how are right to repair restrictions 
inhibiting your Marines' combat readiness?
    General Berger. Right to repair restrictions inhibit Marines' 
combat readiness by creating an environment in which Marines cannot 
efficiently conduct equipment repair. This may be because Marines do 
not possess the appropriate technical repair manuals, special tools, 
diagnostic systems, or data to conduct the repair; the technical 
manuals they do possess do not provide the detail required to conduct 
the repair; or conducting the repairs may void the equipment's 
warranty. The purchase of technical manuals, special tools, and data 
rights must be balanced against other program requirements at the 
earliest stages of the lifecycle. If not addressed early, right to 
repair issues can be exacerbated in the later stages of equipment 
lifecycles and by the increased acquisition of more technologically 
advanced equipment.