[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-43]
FISCAL YEAR 2022 DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE
POSTURE HEARING
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 11, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-740 WASHINGTON : 2022
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
FILEMON VELA, Texas DON BACON, Nebraska
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
Chair
Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations.... 2
WITNESSES
Berrier, LTG Scott D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 6
Moultrie, Ronald S., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Security, U.S. Department of Defense....................... 4
Nakasone, GEN Paul M., USA, Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service, and Commander, U.S. Cyber
Command........................................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Moultrie, Ronald S., joint with GEN Paul M. Nakasone and LTG
Scott D. Berrier........................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Franklin................................................. 47
Mr. Graves................................................... 47
.
FISCAL YEAR 2022 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE POSTURE HEARING
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
Washington, DC, Friday, June 11, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. Ruben Gallego (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Gallego. The committee will come to order.
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Finally, I've designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
Good morning. I'd like to welcome today's witnesses: Mr.
Ronald Moultrie, Under Secretary for Defense of Intelligence
and Security; General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National
Security Agency, Chief of Central Security Services, and
Commander of U.S. CYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command]; and
Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency.
I'm pleased to see each of you today.
Though much of the defense intelligence community work is
conducted behind closed doors, this hearing provides the
subcommittee with an opportunity to inform the American people
about the myriad threats facing the country and to hear about
the role of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise [in] defending
the Nation.
The complex threat environment requires our defense
intelligence communities to change to meet not only traditional
threats but also transitional threats from pandemics to climate
change, to threats from chemical weapons and information
warfare.
Within the past year, the most catastrophic impacts to our
national security resulted from a deadly virus and debilitating
cyber attacks.
China and Russia had different capabilities and intentions,
but both seek to challenge and disrupt the liberal democratic
order. The challenges these two nations present cut across all
domains of warfare.
Russia wages vast propaganda and disinformation campaigns,
conducts sophisticated cyber attacks, and sanctions provocative
military buildups using irregular forces.
China is heavily investing in the modernization of its
military while leveraging global interconnectedness to
undermine and subvert, coerce and influence. China seeks to
dominate the world economically, militarily, and with
technology through whatever means necessary.
In the throes of perhaps the most challenging security
environment in decades, the defense intelligence community is
at the epicenter of the Department's [Department of Defense's]
efforts to secure the information environment.
We at the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee
are prepared to work with you to ensure you have the resources
and authorities you need to succeed to meet these threats.
I'm particularly interested in understanding any capability
gaps as well as how the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
postured to support defense operations and efforts to counter,
deter, or defeat these threats, especially those in the cyber
domain and the information environment.
This discussion is crucial as we shape and develop the
fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.
With that, let me thank our witnesses for appearing before
us today. I also now recognize Ranking Member Kelly for opening
remarks--any opening remarks he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your opening remarks
and your leadership in organizing this morning's posture
hearing.
Today, we'll hear from three leaders across the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise. In particular, I would like to welcome
Mr. Moultrie and congratulate him on his recent confirmation.
Today's threat landscape continues to grow in scope and
complexity. Our intelligence enterprise professionals are
tasked with yeoman's work on a daily basis to help our Nation
prepare, defend, and react to these threats.
Recent high-visibility cyber attacks have shown just how
vulnerable both our government and commercial sectors are to
this type of offensive operations. From SolarWinds to Colonial
Pipeline to JBS, this threat continues to grow at an alarming
rate.
Earlier this year in mid-March, this subcommittee conducted
a hearing on disinformation in the gray zone. These aggressive
tactics encompassing offensive actions just below the threshold
of armed conflict and sometimes maybe above the threshold of
armed conflict are utilized by adversaries like China, Russia,
and Iran to discredit and destabilize American interests. A
memo signed last year by nine combatant commanders drives home
just how important this issue is.
Recognizing the need for increased support from the
intelligence community to combat this threat, they note
malicious efforts by Russia and China across the information
domain to seed discontent, weaken trust, and undermine
alliances.
Maybe most pressing of all the threats right now is how the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to continue
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan with the impending
redeployment of our troops.
As we know, the Biden administration has ordered all troops
out of the country by September 11th of this year, and recent
reporting has indicated that the Department is well ahead of
this deadline.
The conversation as to whether we should or should not
withdraw is not for today's hearing. However, the way in which
we plan to keep an eye on the security situation in Afghanistan
post-withdrawal is very much germane to today's discussion.
The Biden administration has stressed there will be over-
the-horizon capability to maintain situational awareness of
Afghanistan. But to my knowledge, this plan remains a work in
progress.
I am deeply concerned about our intelligence collection
capabilities with our military forces being redeployed. I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses today on all these topics
in addition to this year's budget request and what each
organization's priorities are for fiscal year 2022.
I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time
today. I look forward to continuing to work with our Defense
Intelligence Enterprise leaders during the 117th Congress to
ensure that we are appropriately postured to meet and defeat
the threats posed by our adversaries.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
We will now hear from our witnesses, then move into a
question-and-answer session.
I'd like to now recognize Mr. Moultrie.
STATEMENT OF RONALD S. MOULTRIE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Chairman Gallego.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify in support of the President's budget request for fiscal
year 2022, alongside Generals Nakasone and Berrier.
The intelligence professionals at the Department of Defense
work every day to address the current and future threats facing
the United States of America. On their behalf, I wish to thank
the members of this subcommittee for your continued support and
partnership.
The President's $715 billion defense budget request for
fiscal year 2022 includes $23.3 billion for the Military
Intelligence Program.
The Department develops the Military Intelligence Program,
or MIP, in a coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence to align intelligence capabilities between defense
and national priorities while avoiding unintentional
duplication.
The MIP reflects Secretary Austin's guidance for defense
intelligence providing the necessary capability to support the
Department's three key priorities: defending the Nation, taking
care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork.
As this subcommittee well knows, the United States faces a
period of rapid, profound, and dynamic change in the
international landscape. The expansion of the competitive space
beyond traditional military domains and geographic boundaries
increases and complicates demands for defense intelligence
collection, analysis, and planning.
Challenges from strategic competitors, rogue states,
violent extremists require the Defense Intelligence Enterprise
to invest in the ability to seamlessly share and fuse
information, synchronize capabilities, and expand partnerships
with other government agencies, the private sector, academia,
and partner nations.
To address these challenges, the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise is focused on the following priorities: the pacing
challenge of China; advanced and persistent threats from
Russia, North Korea, and Iran; understanding and harnessing
rapid technological advancements; and countering adversarial
nonstate actors.
Although we have established a strong foundation to
strengthen our national defense, the Department risks losing
its competitive advantage to our rivals and adversaries without
the much-needed continued investments in critical areas
including our intelligence and security portfolios.
To address our adversaries' widespread use of
disinformation for malign influence, the Department is taking a
whole-of-government approach which includes reviewing
classification processes, pursuing wider dissemination of
classified information through our broad alliances and
partnerships, and the thoughtful release to the public of
certain unclassified information to support U.S. interests.
In addition to meeting the Department's intelligence needs,
improving DOD [Department of Defense] security is critical to
protect DOD personnel, installations, technologies, and
information.
Enhanced security protects against the compromise of our
supply chain, the theft of critical technologies, and threats
posed by foreign intelligence services, trusted insiders, and
violent extremists both foreign and domestic.
Our security efforts strengthen the vetting of DOD
personnel, counter foreign adversary efforts targeting our
critical information, technologies, supply chains, and to
protect our installations, capabilities, and workforce from
various threats.
Most important to our continued intelligence advantage will
be building and retaining a diverse workforce capable of
meeting the new challenges of the 21st century. It must have
digital literacy and advanced skills to harness emerging
technologies and adapt to ever-changing threat environments.
It must be a workforce that is free of sexual harassment
and intolerant of violent extremism at any level. It must also
be equitable, inclusive, and one that reflects the nation it
serves.
In short, diversity is a mission imperative. The Defense
Intelligence Enterprise will continue to pivot towards
strategic competition, improved adaptability, and changing
intelligence needs.
We will continue our investment in artificial intelligence
and machine learning, as well as intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance resiliency, while creating efficiencies and
improvements in tasking, collection, processing, exploitation,
and simulation capabilities.
Lastly, the partnership between DOD and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence has never been more
important. Collectively, we will deliver the intelligence
readiness, resources, technologies, and solutions essential for
protecting and ensuring our U.S. national security.
Intelligence community partnerships support efforts across
the government and are strengthened by our allies and partners
who provide perspectives and capabilities to meet our Nation's
intelligence and security needs.
Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to talk about the
Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and we are grateful for your
support to the intelligence and security capabilities that the
Department of Defense relies on and to defend the United
States.
I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie, General
Nakasone, and General Berrier can be found in the Appendix on
page 37.]
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
And now we'll hear from General Nakasone. You are
recognized.
STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, AND COMMANDER,
U.S. CYBER COMMAND
General Nakasone. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly,
members of the committee, thank you for your enduring support
of the National Security Agency [NSA] and for the invitation to
testify today.
As director of the NSA, it's my great honor to lead the
women and men of NSA. We provide vital support to policymakers,
the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community. We
nurture talent, drive technology and innovation, and maintain a
competitive advantage over our adversaries.
Our focus is on two missions: signals intelligence and
cybersecurity. Through our signals intelligence mission, we
achieve access to our adversaries' network and data, which
provides the Nation with an information advantage in
competition, crisis, or conflict.
Our cybersecurity mission postures us to prevent and
eradicate cyber threats to U.S. national security systems and
critical infrastructure with a special emphasis on the defense
industrial base and the improvement of our weapons security.
Specifically, the NSA Military Intelligence Program
provides resources for vital cryptologic capabilities to
increase the ability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to
deliver accurate and timely intelligence to combatant
commanders and deployed forces.
NSA focuses on delivering comprehensive intelligence
support to enable DOD cyberspace advantage, providing technical
enhancement of service capability to ensure strategic
advantage, supporting deployed warfighters and combatant
commanders in a competitive and dangerous security environment.
NSA's access operations and collection capabilities
continue to evolve in response to the threat landscape and the
telecommunications complexity encountered in the strategic
environment.
Consistent with the Secretary's priorities and the interim
national security strategic guidance, near-peer competitors,
specifically China and Russia, are the principal priorities for
the Department and our agency, and NSA-led reinvestment in the
ability to exploit signals associated with advanced weapons in
space systems will improve warfighter weapons and space
readiness.
This initiative will enable real-time threat data
dissemination through the development of automated processes
and streaming of the intelligence mission data.
Maintaining the trust and confidence of our Nation's
leaders and the public remains a top focus, and we continue to
practice sound stewardship of the resources appropriated to us.
We look forward to working with this subcommittee and are truly
grateful for the support of Congress that has been given to our
agency.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
Lieutenant General Berrier, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF LTG SCOTT D. BERRIER, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Berrier. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking
Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to discuss threats facing this Nation and DIA's
[Defense Intelligence Agency's] support to the National Defense
Strategy.
The nature and scope of the national security environment
in which we operate is largely shaped by strategic competition,
a continuous push and pull among the United States, China, and
Russia for global strength and influence.
At DIA we are working to provide the U.S., along with our
allies, a decision advantage across all warfighting domains and
geographic boundaries with competitors who intend to challenge,
limit, or exceed our military capabilities.
Their capabilities include more lethal ballistic and cruise
missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles, and gray-zone measures
such as ambiguous unconventional forces, foreign proxies,
information manipulation, cyber attacks, and economic coercion.
China remains a long-term strategic competitor to the
United States. As a pacing threat, it poses a major security
challenge. Beijing uses multiple approaches including
diplomatic, economic, espionage, and military to achieve its
strategic gains.
China continues its decades-long military modernization to
build an incredibly lethal force that will almost certainly be
able to hold U.S. and allied forces at risk at greater
distances from the Chinese mainland.
The Russia--the Russian military poses an existential
threat to the United States. Russia has a growing ability to
project power with long-range precision cruise missiles.
Its investment in conventional forces, strategic nuclear
forces, and its strategic deterrent place the U.S. homeland at
risk.
Both China and Russia consider space integral to winning
wars and have recognized--reorganized their militaries to
integrate space operations and counter space capabilities.
In addition to these two state actors, we face other
pressing challenges with North Korea, Iran, and Afghanistan.
North Korea has tested dozens of missiles since mid-2019. Iran
challenges U.S. interests with its sophisticated military
capabilities, broad proxy and partner networks, and periodic
willingness to use force against U.S. and partner forces.
Violence in Afghanistan remains elevated as peace
negotiations have slowed since late 2020, and the Taliban
continues to apply military pressure on the Afghan government.
At the same time, the threat from terrorist organizations
will persist across the region. Although al-Qaida--although al-
Qaida's appeal to Salafi jihadists has waned, ISIS [Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria] remains the preeminent Salafi jihadist
group, sustaining more than a dozen insurgencies globally, is
expanding its African presence, and probably rebuilding its
ability to direct attacks in the West.
Transnational racially and ethnically motivated violent
extremists, or RMVE, organizations also operate across borders
and attract recruits and spread ideology online.
The United States will also face increasingly advanced,
persistent, and sophisticated cyber attacks from an array of
state and nonstate actors. Today's threat environment reflects
rapid significant technological change and adversarial
challenges in every operating domain.
I am committed to ensuring DIA is positioned to meet these
challenges by modernizing key capabilities across the top
secret IT [information technology] network, our foundational
military intelligence mission, and our ballistic missile
technical collection architecture.
I'm proud to lead DIA and its outstanding workforce. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answer
your questions.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Lieutenant General.
And now we'll move on to the question portion. Every member
will have 5 minutes to ask their question and I will begin with
my question, and then we shall move to Ranking Member Kelly.
Make sure I see the timer. Perfect.
Okay. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise is agile enough to adapt and meet the emerging
threats we see today, and is the enterprise postured in such a
way to be proactive rather than reactive?
Mr. Moultrie. Representative [Gallego], thank you for the
opportunity to speak once again. I believe the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise is currently capable of meeting many of
the challenges that we--that we face from the threats today.
But I believe that we have to continue to become more agile
and more adaptive. We know that our adversaries are using
nontraditional means and nontraditional tools to go after us.
They operate outside the laws that enable them to do things
that we must be able to counter.
There are also technological challenges that we are facing
that we have to be able to adapt to. So while I am--I believe
that today we are able to defend the Nation, we are able to
meet the threats that exist today, without significant changes
and significant adaptation, we may begin to fall behind.
So those will be the issues and those will be the
activities that we'll be focused on in the coming years.
Mr. Gallego. Just kind of follow up on your thought then.
What do you believe are our most significant capability gaps or
deficiencies to identify, track, and manage threats that cross
all domains of warfare.
Mr. Moultrie. So right now, in terms of the budget, we
are--we're trying to align what we have in the National
Intelligence Program, which is run by the Director of National
Intelligence, and what we have in our Military Intelligence
Program.
Once we have that fully aligned, we will be able to
better--to have a better sense of what those gaps are and then
would like the opportunity to come back to brief you more
specifically and the committee on some of those gaps, and some
of it, I think, will be better translated to a closed session
than an open session. But really look forward to coming back
after we have that NIP-MIP alignment to come back and talk to
you.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Mr.
Moultrie.
More than 18 months ago, nine combatant commanders
articulated enduring requirement for the intelligence community
to help combat the provocative dangers and destabilizing
actions of China and Russia in the public domain.
The Director of National Intelligence is establishing a
malign foreign influence response center that will lead a
coordination and integration of intelligence related to foreign
malign influence.
Mr. Moultrie, how will your office work across the defense
intelligence communities to ensure coordination of efforts in
this space?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
We have been working closely with the Director of National
Intelligence and the ODNI [Office of the Director of National
Intelligence] to ensure that we have a whole-of-government
approach, not just an intelligence community or a Defense
Intelligence Enterprise approach, but really a whole-of-
government approach to what this problem is, to understanding
what our adversaries are doing in this space and, more
importantly, how we need to get accurate.
We know that there are processes now that we need to put in
place. We need to revamp the training that we have today to
ensure that people are properly focused on this issue, and then
we need to make sure that we're using open source and other
available means to get this information out to our combatant
commanders.
It's a priority of ours, understanding these issues. I know
there's been a lot of discussion about whether or not
information can be declassified.
We're moving to declassify what we can declassify, and some
of that's been done, and I'd welcome General Nakasone and
General Berrier to comment in this area, too. But we're also
trying to protect those sensitive sources and methods.
So malign influence and activity in the gray zone,
understand it, and we're really focused on it. And within the
Enterprise, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, we're
revamping ourselves to be able to get after this problem.
Mr. Gallego. General Nakasone and General Berrier, what
processes are being adjusted to help respond to combatant
commanders' urgent requests for assistance?
General Nakasone. Chairman, if I might, just to follow up
on Secretary Moultrie's comments, I think the areas that we're
working here at the National Security Agency begin with this
idea, how can we do this in a manner that is ensuring of speed
and agility against an adversary that has the same.
And so as the Secretary mentioned with regards to publicly
available information, open source capabilities, the right
tools, being able to bring all three of those together is
important.
We do begin with a lot of our work that is written for
release, and so while that can help, I don't think that's the
end-all. I think the end-all is as we take a look at that,
working with a specific combatant commander, looking at the
private sector, looking at the tools and the information
available, how do we do this in the quickest manner possible.
Mr. Gallego. General Berrier.
General Berrier. Sir, the DIA is really involved in a
number of fronts and it's really very, very important activity.
The first thing is to double down and emphasize to all of our
analysts that we have to write for release.
So if you start with a mindset that this product will be
released to the max level of audience or consumer, that's a
good start to get the analysts thinking about a different way
to do it.
The other piece is to focus our collectors on--when
they're--when they're collecting, focusing on sources, as they
develop those information reports to also write at the lowest
classification level possible when they can.
I think the last thing I would tell you, Chairman, is that
DIA is uniquely postured with our combatant commands. As you--
as you recall, DIA mans all of the J2 JIOCs [Joint Intelligence
Operations Centers] within the combatant commands, and so that
makes us uniquely positioned to understand combatant command
PIRs [priority intelligence requirements] to be able to
leverage the intelligence enterprise to meet their needs
rapidly.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. And last question for General
Nakasone. Given the recent cyber attacks and ransomware
attacks, what is NSA doing to identify relevant vulnerabilities
and threats and take action to prevent future intrusions to
critical national security systems and infrastructure?
General Nakasone. Chairman, our work at NSA has been
focused on the defense industrial base, and one of the areas
that we have expanded to with our cybersecurity directorate is
how do we do this in an unclassified manner.
And we have stood up the Cybersecurity Collaboration
Center, which is an unclassified center where we begin and
invite a series of partners to come and have discussions with
us.
I think also that the other piece that's really important
is that we are working with a series of partners to deliver
cybersecurity advisories, and why is that important?
Because being able to take our technical capability, our
knowledge of what the adversary is doing, and then writing that
at a means that it can be released broadly is almost like
providing inoculation to a number of areas where we know there
are vulnerabilities, and it comes with the stamp of approval of
the National Security Agency. So that's where our focus has
been, Chairman.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Representative Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairman Gallego.
Mr. Moultrie, you mentioned a budget number in your opening
statement. What was that budget number again?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, sir, Representative Kelly. It was $23.3
billion.
Mr. Kelly. Okay, and what is that compared to last year's
fiscal year in the same area?
Mr. Moultrie. It's down $75 million, from my understanding,
sir.
Mr. Kelly. Yeah, and that's something I really hope you
guys will help us with. I'm also on the Budget Committee, and
we keep throwing out this 715 [$715 billion] like we're getting
a raise in defense and the reality is it's actually a cut in
defense and that doesn't count the $600 billion that is going
to climate change, which I'm not opposed to. But it shouldn't
be out of defense. It should be above and beyond what we're
doing.
Do you have the necessary resources with those cuts to do
what we need to do in the Defense Enterprise--Defense
Intelligence Enterprise and what are you doing to mitigate
these cuts?
Mr. Moultrie. Ranking Member Kelly, we support the
President's budget. Our goal is to look at the resources that
we have and then focus those resources, really optimize those
resources, on the key priorities that are facing the
Department.
That comes from looking internally and making sure that our
priorities are aligned with the Director of National
Intelligence, and then working closely with the Director of
National Intelligence and the rest of the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise to ensure that we understand what the requirements
are, making sure our warfighters have what they need as
priorities, and then focusing on those top priority needs.
We're looking at that now, and our plan is to ensure that
we report back to you on where those gaps are and where we
think that we need heightened focus and emphasis for the
future.
Mr. Kelly. Yeah. And, Mr. Moultrie, just to all three of
y'all, I just--this is--this is a battle we can't lose whether
it's budgetary, economically, or intelligence-wise, and I will
just say when we're not properly resourced with the dollars
going to soldiers, sensors, and shooters, when we're not
properly resourced, that results in planes falling out of the
air, ships crashing, tanks rolling over, lack of training and
lack of resources.
So I hope--I hope we will be smart with our dollars, and if
you need more I hope you guys will stand up.
My next question. In my opening remarks, I'm concerned
about intelligence collection capabilities once we withdraw
from Afghanistan. Can you please articulate the plan for the
over-the-horizon intelligence collection strategy?
Mr. Moultrie. Ranking Member Kelly, I'll start and then
I'll pass to General Berrier for any comments that he may have.
So we're in the process now of looking at the over-horizon
architecture that we need to have. It's not going to be a
unilateral architecture.
We're going to have to work very closely with our partner
and allies to ensure that it's a robust architecture, that it
can protect the forces that we have in place, and that can
rapidly respond to issues and challenges that we may have.
Our number one priority is keeping our personnel safe
during the retrograde, and we have been having weekly, almost
daily discussions on how to do this and factoring a number of
different aspects into this.
Let me turn to General Berrier for his comments and
thoughts on this.
General Berrier. Ranking Member, the--as you know, over the
years of our operations in Afghanistan, DIA was able to build
out a very robust human intelligence network.
As the forces have downsized there and our bases have
collapsed, those operations were turned over to tactical units,
and as we--as we get them even smaller, the last--the last
platform we will really have there will be our attaches at the
embassy.
So from a human perspective, you know, we'll have to try to
manage some of that from over the horizon or through reachback,
and then for any other question I would ask General Nakasone
for his thoughts.
General Nakasone. Ranking Member, excellent question. I
think there are three elements that we will base over-the-
horizon collection on with the national security.
First of all is working with U.S. Central Command, U.S.
Special Operations Command. How do we leverage the tactical
collectors that remain within the area?
Second piece is how do we work with a series of partners,
among our closest partners internationally, to be able to
leverage their collection capabilities within the area.
And the third piece, very frankly, is being able to
leverage our national collection capabilities. It will be
different. It will be different than when we were in the
country of Afghanistan, but it is being mitigated based upon
those three factors.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you all. And just real quickly, Lieutenant
General Berrier, you mentioned the defense attaches, and I just
got back from Africa, UAE [United Arab Emirates], and Romania
and Italy.
Some of our allies are concerned that we're going to remove
some of these defense attaches. Can you guys commit that we're
going to keep the number and where we are in our defense
attaches, that we will continue to have those with our embassy
to do the great work that helps our State Department?
General Berrier. Ranking Member, I'm committed to keeping
the current number of attaches and attache platforms that we
have now. I know of no plans to cut any of those back. As you
know, it is a jewel in the crown for DIA and gives us great
presence and access and influence.
Mr. Kelly. And then my final question, with regard to the
36-star memo, can you guys describe what changes have been made
with the combatant commands, and carrying that a little
farther, you and the rest of the IC [intelligence community]
are going to have to do a greater job of working with our
partners and allies to make sure that we're sharing
intelligence.
Can you tell me what your plans are or what changes [have]
been made to support combatant commands and what changes we
made into working with our allies across the IC?
General Berrier. Sir, I can take that to start. Our
presence and access into the combatant commands allows us very
unique insight on the requirements for combatant commanders.
So I would say at speed we're able to turn those around as
quickly as I can. With any DIA reporting we can go very, very
rapidly to get that to the right level of classification that
they need for their operations.
In addition to that, I'll just reemphasize this whole
business of right for release. We have to emphasize that with
all of our analysts so that they know when they're dealing with
sensitive material we have to do our best to get it--to get it
to the lowest level that we possibly can.
In terms of our partners, as you know, we have a very, very
robust partnership with our key partners, who are Five Eyes,
but we also have partnerships with many others, and whether
those are through some, like, alliance frameworks or with
bilateral relationships, we're working very hard to make sure
that we keep those as robust as we can and that we can make
sure that we get something back when we give.
General Nakasone. Ranking Member, if I might just add to
General Berrier's excellent comments. I would add two things.
First of all, you know, how do you utilize tools that we
might have to be able to look at large amounts of data very
rapidly. That's one of the areas that we're exploring with the
combatant commands.
And then the second piece is, how do we take some of our
sensitive intelligence and be able to have a discussion with
the combatant commands to say, hey, is there a commercial
capability or is there open source that might lead someone
there?
Again, back to Secretary Moultrie's point of being able to
protect our sources and methods. These are the discussions that
are taking place. I think this is generated by the needs that
the combatant commanders have expressed balanced by the needs
of our intelligence community to protect our most sensitive
accesses.
Mr. Moultrie. If I can just add on top of my distinguished
colleague's comments, which were spot on.
I think we have to work across the intelligence enterprise,
which includes with DNI [Director of National Intelligence].
It's a whole-of-government effort. There's so much information
that's out there, things that we're learning, and the open
source arena is not just the purview of the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise or the intelligence community.
So working as a whole of government, making sure we have
the right policies in place and that we are leaning forward in
this space, Ranking Member.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you. And again, congratulations, Mr.
Moultrie.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gallego. I now recognize Representative Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The first question I have is for Mr. Moultrie.
A 2020 GAO [Government Accountability Office] report showed
certain demographic groups experienced disparities and
challenges within the intel community. So I want to know if you
can be specific about what your plans are for recruiting and
retaining first- and second-generation Americans, especially
women and people of color, in the intel community.
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Larsen, thank you very much.
This is--this is--I mentioned in my opening remarks it's a
mission imperative for us. As you know, the demographics of our
country are changing.
We have to recruit our best, our brightest. We have to
recruit those individuals who bring different perspectives and
we have to be inclusive in all that we do.
We also have to be able to work globally, and to be able to
work globally we have to look, in many instances, like
individuals around the globe. So our goal is to really
emphasize this.
The Secretary has made this one of his priorities and he
talks about it in the same terms that the President has talked
about. We want to ensure that we have that workforce that not
only mirrors what America looks like, but can help us do the
things that we need to do.
I plan to focus on this. It'll be one of my priorities.
What I will do is make myself visible but also hold individuals
accountable. So what we have found throughout the years is what
gets measured gets done.
So we set the standard and then we hold individuals
accountable. We work with them to say, here's what we're
looking at. Here's what we need.
Tell us why we are falling short, and we will do so. We
have already started these discussions and you have my
commitment that I will continue to make this an emphasis and a
focus area.
Mr. Gallego. Representative Larsen, do you have other
questions?
Mr. Larsen. Sorry. I muted myself to answer to the--to
listen to the answer. I apologize.
General Nakasone and General Berrier, do you have specific
actions you're taking within your agencies on the same issue?
Start with General Berrier.
General Berrier. Representative, we do. In fact, if you
look across the DIA workforce, we're about on par with
percentage of minorities and disability officers there and
female officers.
We're doing okay, but we can do better. And so we're doing
a couple of things right now to increase diversity in what I
would call our mission space analysis and collection, and
really conducting a barrier analysis to determine what's
keeping our diversified workforce from attaining higher rank in
those career fields.
We're also--since March of 2020 we have visited 45
historically Black colleges and universities and attempting to
reach out in greater numbers, and for all of the
representatives on this committee I would have one ask.
Each year you put one young man or woman into a military
academy, but you probably have hundreds of applications. If you
would put those applications to us, we would take advantage of
that diverse talent that almost made it into an academy but did
not.
I think it's a great opportunity for us to start giving
opportunities to that representative force inside the
intelligence agencies.
And I'll turn it over to General Nakasone.
Mr. Larsen. General.
General Nakasone. Congressman, I'd offer a couple areas
that we're very focused on.
First of all, as you're well aware, NSA has over 340
centers of academic excellence throughout the United States. We
are headquartered on the east coast, and so we need to be much
more visible and much more involved in places outside of the
National Capital Region.
That's what we have done to begin with. And so places like
NSA Hawaii, NSA Texas, NSA Alaska, are all opportunities for us
to be able to broaden our reach.
The second piece speaks to Secretary Moultrie's comments
with regards to accountability. I hold all 500 Senior Executive
Service members of NSA accountable for our diversity, equality,
and inclusion.
They're rated every single year, and so they understand
that this is a priority for our agency. It's a priority for its
director.
And then the final piece is that we have to have a series
of abilities for us to develop a workforce. It's one thing to
recruit the workforce. But then how do we develop that
workforce?
So the workforce is representative of the demographics of
our Nation, not only when we hire them but when we get to our
senior levels as well.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you very much. I'll just offer as
well or ask as well, I had a question about the China Task
Force recommendations that came out this week, and perhaps in a
classified brief later we can address that.
And now that we can maybe travel again, General Nakasone, I
will, again, ask--invite you out to Whatcom Community College
to visit your program at Whatcom Community College in
Bellingham.
General Nakasone. Thank you, Congressman. I look forward to
it.
Mr. Larsen. Good. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
I now turn to Representative Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman, and gentlemen, thanks for
joining us. I know when we talk about cyber, we're typically
thinking of more of a near-peer type competitor, I guess, or
something coming from a little further away from home than
Central and South America.
My question is specific to SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command]
and with regard to the budget, it seems to me that SOUTHCOM is
the one that anytime there's a budget reduction always--
SOUTHCOM is the one that always takes that reduction.
What do you anticipate with regard to SOUTHCOM? The
transnational criminal organizations are responsible for
killing more people in America than any other organizations
are. How do you anticipate the budget reductions to affect
SOUTHCOM?
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Scott, my understanding is
that there is actually a slight increase in the budget for
SOUTHCOM. We understand the transnational threat that's posed
by the criminal organizations that operate and operate across
the border. Working with the Department of Homeland Security to
ensure that we have a whole-of-government approach to this will
be very important.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my comments, we want to
ensure that we have the opportunity to really have alignment
between the National Intelligence and Military Intelligence
Programs.
Once we have that, we'll be able to come back and talk to
you, probably better in closed session, about some of the
things that we're doing and some of the capabilities that we'll
be employing and working with DHS [Department of Homeland
Security] on.
Mr. Scott. Just to be clear, I think we should be using
every asset the United States has to shut down the
transnational criminal organizations. They have killed more
people than al-Qaida has in this country and they do it on a
monthly basis. And so I appreciate your comments there.
And my next question is for General Nakasone. Admiral
Stavridis, if I have that correct, said, ``Trump got a Space
Force. Biden should get a Cyber Force. The administration
should create a full-fledged Cyber Force. We're overdue for an
elite independent branch of the Armed Forces in which all the
personnel wake up every morning thinking about defending the
Nation's cyberspace.''
Do you agree or disagree with that, General? Should we--
should we establish a Cyber Force? I mean, Fort Gordon is in my
State, not too far from where I live. And just open to
suggestions with that, and I'm open--I'm open to the creation
of a Cyber Force, if that helps us better carry out the
mission.
General Nakasone. Congressman, thank you for that question,
and I appreciate Admiral Stavridis' thoughts on that. Here's
what I've experienced over 10 years working within cyber.
Our focus right now is developing the 133 teams that U.S.
Cyber Command has. As the NSA director and the commander of
U.S. Cyber Command, the most important thing we can do is to
continue to have outcomes--positive outcomes that we have seen
with forces like Army Cyber, which I used to command, that's
headquartered at Fort Gordon.
My concern with moving towards a Cyber Force right now is
the infrastructure, the other elements that take away from what
we want. We want the best cyber operators working mission every
single day. And I think we have that, based upon the
experiences that I've had and also the outcomes that we have
seen in the past two elections.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Well, I guess, what--can you--you said the
past two elections. What are you alluding to with that?
General Nakasone. Yes. In 2018, one of the things that we
took on across both NSA and U.S. Cyber Command was to come
together into an organization that I called the Russia Small
Group that was focused on ensuring we would not have influence
or interference in our midterm elections.
We took the same approach in 2020, and so being able to
ensure that adversaries operating outside the United States
could not impact through influence and operations was one of
the things that was, clearly, what we focused on. We had great
success in both elections.
Mr. Scott. Okay. All right. I'll leave it at that, Mr.
Chairman, and yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
We now move to Representative Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you so much. I really appreciate all of
you coming today. I want to thank you for your service as well
as to extend my appreciation to all the members of the Defense
Intelligence Enterprise, both military and civilian, for their
selfless service to our country.
The victories of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise aren't
always known to our fellow citizens. But your efforts play a
critical and often unsung role in our Nation's security and
stability.
As all of you are aware, over the past few years there's
been an increase in incidents targeting the United States, its
people, and its infrastructure from a number of adversaries to
include China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
These gray-zone tactics use--include cyber attacks,
misinformation, and providing safe haven to those who target
the foundations of our democracy. So it's no secret that some
of the first tools the U.S. leverages in response to this
aggression are economic or financial in nature, in part due to
the direct effort economic sanctions have on the kleptocratic
leaders in China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Economic
sanctions hit them where it hurts.
So the DOD has under its authority half of all the
intelligence community agencies that could gather intelligence
to support these aims.
Does the Defense Intelligence Enterprise prioritize the
acquisition and dissemination of foreign government financial
data to the Departments of State and Treasury to support,
really, the all-of-government sanctions response to these
adversaries?
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Sherrill, I'll start and then
I'll turn to my colleagues, who will also have some input in
this area.
So we have a very robust--and I'm using the space on my
past history and roles that I've served in the intelligence
community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise--we have a
very robust mechanism in place to understand what's happening
in the financial realm, economic sanctions, the potential
thwarting of economic sanctions, and we have great exchange
with the various interagency partners that rely on this
information to inform not only their activities but also to
help inform their policies.
Our goal is to continue to do that. We know that we can't
operate in a vacuum. We see these activities occurring. We
incur these hits on our system and our infrastructure.
We know the President sets the policy and we enact those
policies. But we also put in place those mechanisms to help the
government really evaluate the effectiveness of their policies
and how we should do things.
So my understanding is we have done that. Of course, we
will continue to do that. Let me turn to General Nakasone and
General Berrier to add any comments that they have in this
space.
Ms. Sherrill. That would be great, and if you could also
provide some data on how you--or some information on how you
provide that data to the Departments of State or Treasury or
allied nations for enforcement of economic measures. Thanks.
Mr. Moultrie. Sure, Representative. Without going into
great specifics, I'll let General Nakasone talk to this because
his organization has a very robust way of providing this
information in real time and to getting feedback and also has
individuals who are integrated to help them understand this
information.
So, General Nakasone, can I pass this to you, sir?
General Nakasone. Thank you, Secretary. I appreciate it.
Congresswoman, I would add to Secretary Moultrie's
comments. How do we measure this, and I think your question is
spot on and your characterization of the competitive
environment is exactly what we face today. This is how we
measure it.
First of all is the reporting, and we can certainly provide
the--you know, the reporting that we do with a series of
different partners to include both our interagency partners and
our international partners.
But here's what really gives us gravity in this space, and
that's our talent. That's being able to have people that are at
Treasury, that are at State, that are at FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], that are at Energy, that are able to provide
the expertise and the wherewithal to say, this is what we're
seeing and this is what is impactful.
The feedback loop is so critical, as you pointed out, to be
able to understand the utility of what's being tried. And so
this is something that we have done for many years and we can
certainly follow up with those type of metrics.
Ms. Sherrill. That would be great. Thank you very much.
Really quickly, I just have a few seconds here, but I
wanted to really quickly ask about the GAO study on
accountability.
What role did all of you think the extensive reliance on
temporary personnel, which as of mid-2020, I believe, it
represented 70 percent of the OUSD(I&S) [Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security] workforce,
as well as contractors who I think represent about 51 percent
of the office's workforce, plays in the shortcomings noted in
the GAO study.
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Sherrill, I haven't had the
opportunity yet to really delve into that. I'm aware of it and
I think it's a challenge.
One of the things that we have already highlighted this
morning is it really is in the talent of our people and the
continuity of their expertise that really enables us to get
things done.
So if we're having to rely on temporary talent or talent
that may be somewhat transitory, that impacts us. So what we
want to do is to look at the cadre that we have, to look at how
we're augmenting that cadre today, how we capture information.
So there are tools that can help us capture knowledge and
capture information, and then how do we have that knowledge
repeatable so that regardless of who's here, we need a core but
we can also continue to do those valuable things that we
continue doing.
So this is a problem. It's not--it's been a problem for
quite some time. I think it's a growing problem around the
community as we have people go in and out. So we'll look at
that and we'll come back and report to you, Representative, on
this issue.
Ms. Sherrill. I look forward to it. Thank you for the
chairman's indulgence. I'm over time. I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Sherrill.
We now turn to Representative Franklin.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your time here this morning with us.
I, along with a number of other folks, last week got to sit
in on a briefing on the final report from the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence.
I'm not sure if you all have had a chance to see that
fascinating 750-page report. So it's not light bedtime reading,
but a lot of great recommendations in there and one of the key
findings that they landed on was the need for us to establish
AI [artificial intelligence] readiness by 2025.
A closing window. We have got an advantage, but our
adversaries are closing that rapidly and they feel that we need
to make some significant investment in those areas.
I know that we have, as an intelligence community, things
like Project Maven and MARS [Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-
Repository System]. I know we're working to capitalize on
artificial intelligence and machine learning.
You know, one of the findings they said was the
intelligence community will benefit from AI more than any other
national security mission. But then further, when we talked a
little bit about talent they said the talent deficit in DOD and
the intelligence community represents the greatest impediment
to our achieving that AI readiness by 2025.
General Berrier, I was really intrigued with your
recommendation there about the service academy candidates,
because I feel the same way.
Every year we have a tremendous talent pool there and in
all these hearings and even across departments with other
agencies in the government it's just this need for talent that
we're all fighting, and particularly in the area of the digital
world.
We talked a little bit about Digital Service Academy in
other meetings. I'd be curious for your-all's thoughts on
whether you think there's--maybe there's a time for a new
service academy, a Digital Service Academy. Would you support
that and what are your thoughts?
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Franklin, I'll just start and
quickly turn to my colleagues. AI/ML [machine learning], it's
going to be a game changer. It already is a game changer, and
it's an area where our adversaries are--they really understand
it.
They understand that data is power and being able to
harness that data is really where your power will be in the
future.
And so getting after this, as you know, in the USD(I&S) we
have--the Project Maven is something that we prototyped, if you
will, and now ensuring that we can get that out so that we can
actually spread that throughout the intelligence enterprise is
going to be key.
So we're focused on this. Haven't thought about the Digital
Academy piece. Know that we need to have a better way of
actually coalescing around this. But your comment is spot on to
where we need to be and I know my colleagues have been thinking
about it.
So let me pass it to Generals Berrier and Nakasone for
their comments.
General Berrier. Congressman, that's a great comment about
AI and that's everything for DIA right now. As we move from the
legacy database called MIDB [Modernized Integrated Database],
think of it as everything we know about the world but in
analog.
Think of Excel spreadsheets. Think of stubby pencils. Think
about analyst time on a target folder, if you will, to an
automated AI/ML-infused product that is much richer in this day
and age and will be a foundation for the Department as we move
into our joint warfighting concept.
So it is everything to us and we would like to invite you
and your other committee members down to take a look at that.
On the Digital Academy, I would just say that we need folks
who are data literate and understand the science because right
now they're hard to find. If it took a Digital Academy, that
would be an interesting way to put a bunch of those folks into
the workforce very, very rapidly and it's a--it's a very
intriguing idea.
General Nakasone. Congressman, I've had the opportunity to
take the out-brief on the National Commission. In fact, they
out-briefed me just this week.
I couldn't agree more with you with regards to the talent
piece of it. We have a tremendous amount of talent here at the
National Security Agency with regards to AI and ML and data
science.
What I would tell you is that it's not necessarily always
the recruitment piece that is the critical element of it. It's
the ability to ensure that someone that comes into the National
Security Agency on day one doesn't leave us in 5 years or 6
years.
It's the ability to grow that person in a series of
different jobs at the same time, you know, being able to
understand that that person is being recruited by the best of
private industry and government.
And I think this really does speak to what Secretary
Moultrie I know is very interested in taking on, which is a
look at how do we ensure our best talent stays within the
defense intelligence establishment, and that's something that
we're going to have to do collectively.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. Yeah, they had cited specifically 2025
as a kind of a marker out there for when we need to be ready.
Do you all feel that we are making the proper investments to
maintain the advantage we have over our near-peer adversaries?
And if not, what do we need to do to ensure that we keep that
advantage?
Mr. Moultrie. I'll start, Representative Franklin. I think
we're--we understand what the priorities are in this space and
we understand the things that we need to do.
And so we are--we're going to align ourselves to ensure
that we maintain that advantage. I call it a decision
advantage. Some people call it an information advantage.
We have to have the tactical and military advantages too,
but we know where we need to invest to actually get better and
more agile and more capable.
We'll get there. We just need to make sure that we have the
interaction collaboration across the interagency and across the
IC with DNI to do that.
Let me pass it to my colleagues for their comments.
General Berrier. Congressman, I would say that for--go
ahead, sir.
Mr. Franklin. Sorry, General Berrier. Yeah, if you can make
a quick summary.
General Berrier. Yes, Chairman.
So for DIA, investment in this space is critical for us. So
I would say this is the number one tie between MARS and the AI
and ML programs that we have there along with JWICS [Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System] IT and the top
secret--the top secret network running through the Department.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, sir.
Now we move on to Representative Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kelly.
Mr. Moultrie, you know, I'm lucky that my digital footprint
really didn't start until I got into office. However, as you
know, there are a lot of young men and women these days who are
coming into the services and have a huge digital footprint well
before they signed up.
So I guess my question to you is, how can special
operations forces who require--some do, most--some do--a
significant amount do--require undercover identities maintain
the same level of digital anonymity as intelligence operatives
when they initially enter the Armed Forces and are selected for
special operations units with none of the same secrecy or
precautions as those other agencies?
And also, you know, are DOD and DIA, are they looking at
ways to reduce the digital footprint of those who initially
enter into the Armed Forces to protect the potential future of
Tier 1 special operators from identification?
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Panetta, that's a fantastic
question and it's one that we're focused on. We understand that
the digital footprint, which used to begin when you were a
teenager, now starts when you're about 3 or 4 years old.
So individuals get their first tablet device or their first
cell phone at a very young age, and they take selfies and all
these other things.
So all that provides this footprint, and when you're trying
to do counterintelligence or countersurveillance operations,
you are not only putting your footprint out there for the
adversary, you are enabling them to undermine some of the
things that we're doing.
So we understand this. This is a problem that DIA truly
understands. In discussions with them this week, we walked
through this. We talked through this.
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] understands this problem.
You probably have heard the term ubiquitous technical
surveillance. If not, I welcome the opportunity to come talk to
you about it.
But with all the things that are out there, we have to
focus on this. If not, we are going--we're not going to be able
to conduct our missions in the most efficient way.
And we also need to understand how it also may impact us
and some of the things that we need to be able to do OCONUS,
outside the continental United States.
So it's a two-sided coin, Congressman. We're focused on it
and I welcome the opportunity to come back and brief you on it.
Mr. Panetta. Yeah, that'd be great. And is--and I guess,
General Berrier, I'll kind of pivot to you, General Berrier.
Are you seeing the DIA cooperate with CIA and FBI in order
to share the best practices [inaudible] modernization?
General Berrier. Congressman Panetta, absolutely. We are in
the middle of a modernization effort, although we can't go into
the details on this particular network.
But we'd be happy to share all that with you and where
we're going with our partners. This is really an important
effort and we have to get on with it and do it quickly.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. Understood. Thank you.
Mr. Moultrie, back to you. As you know, the recent annual
threat assessment from the IC highlighted threats that China,
Russia, Iran, North Korea, as we all understand, pose to--what
they pose to our national interest.
But what actions are you taking to ensure that the DIE
[Defense Intelligence Enterprise] is producing the intelligence
on those threats that policymakers and warfighters alike can
use to make informed decisions?
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Panetta, we look at this as an
end-to-end problem. So we know that activities that we have
done over the last 20 years have really eroded our foundational
military intelligence and our technical intelligence
capabilities.
So we know we have to get back to rebuilding those.
More importantly, looking at end-to-end, we have to be able
to ensure that we understand the requirements, that we have the
requirements in place, and that we have the dissemination
mechanisms that will allow policymakers to understand what's
occurring in this space.
So that's our--it's going to be our priority. It already
has started and we're going to focus on that over the next
several years, how do we understand that.
You understand that that includes not just technical
things, but also language capabilities and making sure we have
the language capabilities to help us understand the processes.
It'll be a focused area and I welcome the opportunity to
come back and brief you on that.
Mr. Panetta. Great. And I appreciate that, and I saved this
last question purposefully within my limited time I have left.
Are there any items that went unfunded in the fiscal year
2022 budget that you'd like to highlight for the committee?
Mr. Moultrie. Not at this time from the USD(I&S)
perspective. We're continuing to look at that and we'll come
back and brief you on those in a closed hearing if we identify
or we identify any of those.
Mr. Panetta. Sounds good. Thank you, everybody. Thanks to
all the witnesses for your time, for your service, for being
here today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
I now recognize Representative Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And just to echo Mr. Panetta's questions, I think a number
of others--if I could request of you and Ranking Member Kelly
to do our best to schedule a closed session so that we can have
some of these more in-depth conversations in a classified
setting. I think that would be enormously useful.
I'm not sure who to ask this question of because I'm not
sure of the answer. But in kind of building on Ranking Member
Kelly's questions about the Afghan withdrawal, from my time
there over the last couple of decades and from multiple
intelligence briefings, there is a strong likelihood that we
may have to go back, that al-Qaida will resurge in the wake of
Taliban gains, does intend to attack the United States again if
given the opportunity.
So my question is, where is the 20 years of operational and
intelligence data going? What repository is there? How is it
structured, searchable, and accessible to that future Ranger
platoon leader who's going to be ordered to go back into a
valley where we were--may have been 5, 7, 10 years ago, who we
talked to, what the operations were like, what happened years
ago, so that we don't repeat the same mistakes, we don't lose
future lives?
I understand that you can't--probably can't speak to where
the data from the 101st Airborne, one of the Marine Corps MEUs
[Marine expeditionary units]. I know the Special Operations
Command is doing this. They're pulling terabytes out and
working to make it structural and searchable.
But within the intel--with the 18 intelligence agencies,
who's doing--is there an effort and who has the lead?
Mr. Moultrie. I'll just start very quickly.
So, Representative Waltz, your question is exactly where we
have thought about it and where we think we need to be. There's
been so much that's happened. So we're retrograding in almost
the same way that we went in, starting in Kabul and then moving
onward.
So understanding what were all those things that we had to
put in place, once again, gets back to the foundational things
that we put in place that enabled us to build out that network
and all the lessons learned, and being able to capture that. A
number of those people have walked out the door.
Fortunately, we have had some very good people who have
come in in the interim years. I know that General Berrier and
DIA is really focused on this and I'll pass to him if you want
to get more. But we can come back and brief in more detail on
this.
Mr. Waltz. I understand we're thinking about it. We need to
be doing it. We, actually, frankly, should have been doing it
years ago so that we can recontact those sources.
It needs--I want to be clear this isn't for historians.
This is to be usable, accessible, and we need to learn from the
mistakes because it wasn't done when we withdrew from Iraq, and
we all know how we had to go back in.
And I'm really looking for action now while we can. Does
anyone have the lead? Is this being done or is this something
we need to mandate through the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] process?
I can't hear you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Moultrie. From USD(I&S) perspective, we--we're taking
the lead to ensure that Defense Intelligence Enterprise is
focused on this. You can hold us accountable for working across
the Department with others to ensure that the intelligence
capture piece is there and we'll work closely with the rest of
the combat support agency enterprises to make sure you have
this information.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Thank you. And I'll absolutely do
that because I think future lives are going to depend on it.
General Nakasone, how do we establish deterrence? I know
you've thought and spoken a lot about this. How do we establish
deterrence in the--in the cyberspace?
I just--I am not convinced that we can play perfect defense
across not just the military enterprise but the private sector,
and I know DHS has a big piece of that.
But from your perspective, how do we--how do we raise costs
on our adversaries so that this gets--these attacks get down to
a manageable level?
General Nakasone. Congressman, I think there are really
three different parts of this that have to be established. One
is the idea that policies and authorities are, clearly, in
place that address adversaries, whether or not it's criminal
behavior or whether it's nation-state behavior.
The second piece is that a level of resilience has to--has
to come up, and I think the executive order that was released
by the administration is important. This is--you know, this is
about our critical infrastructure in terms of what's most
vulnerable right now.
And the last piece is we need to think of this in not only
cyber against an adversary but, you know, what are we going to
bring as a government. Our experience defending the elections
in 2018 and 2020, we can have an effective cyber attack that
lasts this long.
We can have a cyber attack, information operations,
negotiations in terms of diplomatic sanctions, and then
Treasury sanctions that last this long. This is--this is the
way that we get after our adversaries.
Mr. Waltz. No, I think that's fantastic. I'm really focused
on the first piece and where we can be helpful, and where I'd
appreciate an answer for the record, as I'm over my time, is it
reminds me of the terrorism problem in the 1990s when it was
viewed as a criminal issue and we couldn't apply title 10 and
military assets to that. And I'm air-quoting criminal issue.
After 9/11, obviously, we changed our view. It seems to me
that we may need to do the same, that these are kind of dual-
use criminal entities that blend over into intelligence and
other--you know, our allies don't see the clear lines. I mean,
excuse me, our adversaries don't see the clear lines that our
authorities do.
So if you could come back to me with what legislatively or
what from authority standpoint to go after criminal groups with
your assets if that's what we need to do, I'd appreciate it.
General Nakasone. I look forward to it. And I will just say
I do see a role for title 10 in the space that you're talking
about.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Right now, Representative Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for your testimony.
You know, Mr. Moultrie, I've been long concerned about our
adversaries' ability to compromise our national security and
our democracy by, basically, spreading disinformation through
hyperrealistic but forged videos and audios known as deepfakes.
And in late 2019, Congress approved a bill that I authored
to require the intelligence community to prepare an assessment
on how foreign countries are using or could use deepfake
technology to harm our interests, and then also to explain how
the intelligence community is working to develop appropriate
countermeasures.
You know, it's the first time that Congress ever passed
legislation on this emerging threat. I was wondering if you
could update us a bit on the nature of this threat and how the
IC is postured to combat it.
Mr. Moultrie. Representative Murphy, thank you for the
question. Deepfakes are extremely concerning to us and it'll be
a priority. It has been a priority of ours to understand them,
to be able to have the tools to quickly discern what's real,
what's not real.
I haven't been briefed on specific programs. I'm 11 days
into the job. And so, you know, I will--this is a question that
I also took during my confirmation hearing and I--at that time,
I gave my word to really understand this.
I've seen this in the private sector and the capabilities
that can be thrown at us, and I believe that they already are
being thrown at us.
And it becomes very important for command and control, as
you know, and other things that are important to the Department
of Defense and just the continuity of government of the United
States.
So you have my commitment to delve into this, to find out
exactly where we are and to come back and talk you through,
walk you through, where we are with getting on with this and to
give you my assessment of what we need to do better in this
space.
Mrs. Murphy. Well, both my congratulations for your new
job, but also my sympathies that you're appearing before
Congress 11 days into it.
And I'm going to follow up on another issue that is of
interest to me for you, and it's, basically, our effort to
combat our adversaries' use of disinformation.
You know, the joint written testimony, basically, states
that American interests may be served by sharing classified
information with our trusted allies and partners, sharing
declassified and unclassified information with the American
public, which you all have talked a bit about in this hearing
about trying to make sure that you classify at the appropriate
level.
But I think, you know, as Winston Churchill famously said,
a lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a
chance to put its pants on, and he said that way before the
advent of the digital age and I think that is even more true
today than ever before.
And knowing that we're engaged in information warfare, I
think, you know, the best defense against disinformation is
accurate information. To the greatest extent possible, we
should probably arm our citizens with information about the
threats they face and the lies that they confront.
And, you know, can you talk a little bit about how exactly
the intelligence community is overcoming its sort of natural
propensity for secrecy and declassifying accurate information
to be able to share with the American people to kind of rebut
this disinformation, at the same time still protecting
intelligence sources and methods?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Representative Murphy, our goal is to
ensure that we're classifying at the right level and not
overclassifying, especially in this space where there's so much
disinformation out there.
Just ensuring that we can work with others across the
government to ensure that they understand, I think, first, we
have to start, as you rightly said, within the intelligence
community to ensure that we are declassifying what we need to
declassify, then working with other government agencies who
have responsibilities for disseminating to our population what
the real threats are, working with Homeland Security and others
to ensure that they understand.
We have integrators who help us do that, but then
approaching it holistically. Our allies and partners play a key
role in this. They understand what's happening in their space.
Many times things have happened in their space before they
happen in our space.
So working to ensure that we have a global view of this, a
global message that we have, and then that we message our
populations at the same time. Because as you said, if for some
reason there's a propensity, and maybe it's a cultural thing,
for people to want to believe something that may be inaccurate
instead of believing what may be true and good.
And so there is--there is a culturalization piece that has
to occur here. There are experts in the government that are
outside the intelligence community.
Working closely with them, working closely with you and
your constituents to understand what their concerns are, I
think that's really important that you have the constituent
piece we don't and then using that whole-of-government approach
will be important to us. You have our commitment to do that.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you so much, and I will yield
back the remainder of my time. Thank you.
Mr. Moultrie. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Murphy.
I think we're done with our normal rank order questions.
Let me see if there's any other member that has any other
questions with the remaining time.
I certainly don't as the chairman. I'm thinking Ranking
Member Kelly does not.
You're recognized, Representative Murphy. Go ahead.
Mrs. Murphy. I did have one more question and I wanted to
make sure I had time for the response.
You know, General Nakasone and Lieutenant General Berrier,
I'm really focused on making sure that the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise is recruiting and retaining native speakers of key
foreign languages and training nonnative speakers to high
levels of proficiency.
You all have already talked about in this hearing about the
need to have your--the people represent kind of the diversity
of the country but also the need to have folks who are able to
be able to blend in foreign situations.
And in the SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] context,
you know, I'm focused on the SOFTS [Special Operations Forces
Teletraining System] language school and, basically, all the
benefits that come with training civilian service members,
contractors, et cetera, with foreign language capabilities.
And I saw some amazing things when I went to see the Joint
MISO [Military Information Support Operations] WebOps Center,
or the JMWC, where they had people who were native speakers or
folks who had been trained to native level of language
proficiency.
Can you talk a little bit more about what specific efforts
you're making on this front and how they're going?
General Nakasone. So, Congressman, I'll begin and then,
certainly, I'm sure General Berrier has a few thoughts.
So we're doing it every single day. I have over 6,000
linguists here at the National Security Agency. We drive a
series of different language development efforts.
In terms of the work that's being done with military
information support operations and military deception
operations, that's done in partnership between the National
Security Agency and Cyber Command.
I would offer anytime you'd like to see that at the highest
level in terms of what we're able to do against adversaries
that are truly nation-state adversaries, and I think that would
be of great interest to you.
But it begins with being able to drive the standards.
That's the most important thing that I can do as director of
NSA is ensure that what's coming out of the military pipeline,
what's coming out of our National Cryptologic School, is
meeting the needs for us and what we need to be able to do
language-wise. And that, as you indicated, is really the
signature of success.
General Berrier.
General Berrier. Thanks, sir.
Representative Murphy, our language program isn't as robust
as the NSA language program for a variety of reasons, as you
can imagine, but it is no less important. And so we need our
collectors in language. We need our analysts in language. All
of our attaches go to--go to language--extensive language
training before we send them out to the field.
So it's an important program for us, and the more hard
languages we can get--Chinese, Russian, Arabic--I mean, that
really is the future for us as we move in great power
competition.
And so, you know, with our--with our footprint in the
combatant commands, having analysts that understand and know
the language as they're doing their intelligence analysis is so
much more powerful.
So thank you for that question.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, and I look forward to setting up a
time to come visit. Thank you for the invitation. I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Representative Franklin.
Mr. Franklin. Yeah, just one quick question for General
Nakasone.
Sir, with your pulse on all the threats that we face out
there as a country, what would you consider to be the United
States top security threat or the top couple?
General Nakasone. So, Congressman, I think the--both the
International Security Strategy and Secretary of Defense's
guidance to us has been pretty clear. China is the pacing
competitor for us. This is what we looked at in terms of where
we're at today.
I would also offer, particularly for myself and General
Berrier who've been in the service for quite some time, it's a
return to a near-peer adversary.
But the difference is the fact that this near-peer
adversary is not only growing militarily but informationally,
technologically, economically, diplomatically, areas that China
has that, obviously, has our focus and, certainly, the focus of
the Department.
Mr. Franklin. Great. Thank you. That's all I had, Chairman.
Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Representative Sherrill and then Representative Waltz.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you so much.
You know, I think Representative Franklin brought up MARS a
bit, and I understand that part of the goals of MARS--part of
the goal is to automate elements of intelligence, discovery, or
analysis, basically, to connect the dots and notice trends
through machine-learning, automation, in some cases artificial
intelligence.
So how are you dealing now with the different compartments
and classifications and special access programs when you want
the machine-enabled process to connect those dots, General
Berrier?
General Berrier. Representative, it's a great question and
when we bring you down for an overview of the program you'll
see it in rich detail. But really talking about MARS, using all
of those sort of standards, kind of intelligence sources that
we have had for years, whether that's through national
technical means or others, that doesn't change in MARS.
I think the difference with MARS now is we're adding so
much more richer context with all of the publicly available
information that is out there that allows us to enrich each and
every single file.
And so you'll go from hundreds of thousands of data bits to
millions of data bits across the entire program, and so it's
happening at speed. The tools that we're using right now are
really enriching everything that we're doing, and we do look
forward to showing you that.
Ms. Sherrill. I look forward to it. I was also curious,
it's my understanding that MARS is a replacement for the MIDB
architecture, which is over 20 years old.
So what previous efforts have you made to upgrade MIDB or
develop other analytic systems, and do you have any lessons
learned from--that you're now applying to the MARS system?
General Berrier. Right. So if you think about MIDB, it's
actually older than 20 years old, and so it comes from another
age. And so, you know, we have had to modify and adapt MIDB to
the post-9/11 and post-ODNI world.
And so, you know, the database itself has been somewhat
automated. But I would call it, you know, it's a clunky Ford.
It is not a--it is not a Lamborghini by any stretch of the
imagination. It still requires a lot of manual interface.
Primarily, the lessons that we have learned from this are
really sharing with our partners, how we ingest their data and
how we're able to share with them and then third parties. And
when you do get the overview, we'll be happy to run you through
the details of that.
Ms. Sherrill. Thanks. And just a final question. A 2020 GAO
study noted some concerns related to the MARS development and a
lack of a strategic plan to engage with stakeholders.
So it sounds like you've sort of been thinking along those
lines on how to do that. What changes have you made to ensure
that they're appropriately engaged?
General Berrier. First off, Representative, I would say
it's a program of record, and so by just designated it as a
Department of Defense and DNI program of record, we have kind
of put it on the map as a thing and now we have a number of
road shows that we're talking to the services about.
It's involved in all of our meetings about the joint
warfighting concept with the DOD, and so I think there's a much
greater awareness right now about what MARS will do. If you
have--if you have a JWICS account, you will be able to tap into
MARS and use it effectively.
Ms. Sherrill. That sounds great. Thank you, and I yield
back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Sherrill.
And now we have Representative Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Yeah, thank you.
General Nakasone, I just wanted to continue with your
thoughts on what title 10 authorities, how and what gaps you
have to apply to, you know, again, using kind of the terrorism
from the 1990s versus the 2000s analogy that you can or would
like to apply to these.
And I'm putting kind of air quotes around criminal groups
because, from my understanding, many of them are dual-hatted
with a number of our adversaries' official government
organizations.
General Nakasone. Congressman, in terms of where we're at
right now, I think I have all the authorities I need to be able
to prosecute intelligence-wise against these adversaries
outside of the United States.
That's where we, obviously, have our--remit our
authorities, and I think that, as the director of NSA, that's
not a challenge. I think the question becomes, you know, as we
take a look, and I think you're referring specifically to
ransomware, how do we bring this all together, right.
So how do we do what we're doing outside the United States,
being able to share that with the FBI, DHS, private sector, to
be able to get after adversaries that are targeting our
critical infrastructure like we have seen over the past several
months.
This is the area right now that the administration is
working towards in terms of understanding who's going to have
the lead and how are we going to deal with this.
Mr. Waltz. Yeah. So I think you're getting at precisely
what I'm questioning, and it's that dynamic of who has the lead
within the U.S. Government, right, and whether this is a
criminal activity or whether this is--whether this is an attack
on the United States.
I don't think many American people see a big distinction if
the interface or the control center for a pipeline is taken out
from a missile, sabotage, or cyber, and really who's on the
other end of it if it's coming from a foreign actor, many of
whom moonlight as criminals but are also intelligence officers
or even have military affiliations or could be surrogates.
So I think what I'm probably asking is a bigger policy
question. Should this be handed off if it's coming externally
and should you--do you believe you have the authority if we
have the political will, if you're given the instruction, to
take military action against these groups?
And, again, that was--that was a whole sea change
transition that we had to make against terrorist groups where
we were trying to arrest Osama bin Laden's inner circle around
the world rather than take action and target them militarily.
So I guess my question is do you--do you have the--do you
have the authority to take action militarily if given the order
and should we be? How do we establish--it seems to be until we
go on offense we will not be able to establish deterrence.
General Nakasone. So, again, let me make sure that I'm
answering this in the--in the role that's appropriate.
So as the director of NSA, as I mentioned, you know,
collecting intelligence outside the United States I have the
authorities. As the commander of U.S. Cyber Command operating
outside the United States with the policies and authorities
that have been established----
Mr. Waltz. Right.
General Nakasone [continuing]. I think I have all that I
need between National Security Policy Memorandum 13 and the
NDAA legislation of 2019 that said cyber is a traditional
military activity.
That's a very tactical answer to a broader question you
have policy-wise, which I'll defer, obviously, to the policy
experts. But this is, obviously, what's going on right now is
who will have the lead on that and, you know, DOD will
certainly have a role operating outside the United States, I
would imagine.
Mr. Waltz. Okay, great. No, thank you. You're confirming
for me that this is a matter of policy and political will to
take should we decide to, as a country--should the
administration decide to take military action against what some
are classifying as criminal actors. Is that--is that an
accurate kind of resuscitation?
General Nakasone. I think so.
Mr. Waltz. I'm a big believer in the briefback, right, to
make sure I understand.
General Nakasone. Again, sir, I think what you're
identifying is a broader policy question in terms of who is
going to lead, who is going to--and what type of activities are
going to take place.
My role is, obviously, as the commander of U.S. Cyber
Command, is provide a series of options, just like any other
combatant commander.
Mr. Waltz. Yes. Thank you. I appreciate that.
And final question. On the--on the recruitment and the
retention issue, do you have any data or do you have numbers on
how many of your cyber warriors that decide to leave Active
Duty transition into the Guard and Reserve and is that a
specific focus area for you?
It seems to me we could retain a lot of that talent. In
fact, we could probably improve the capabilities of the force
as they go out to the private sector but maintain that bridge
and that toe in the water back through the Guard and Reserve.
And then a related--we have also had a series of
authorities for Active Duty soldiers to go out into the private
sector but then come back in at the field-grade level for
officers and at the mid-NCO [non-commissioned officer].
How many--is that actually being exercised? How many are
going out, say, to big tech but then coming back in on the
Active Duty side?
And, you know, I know, with 25 years in the military, until
their peers see their colleagues doing that and still getting
promoted and still being successful that that probably won't be
as robust as we'd like it to be.
General Nakasone. Congressman, I think those are two
questions that I will take for the record because I do need to
get the data on that.
I can tell you, though, with regards to the Reserve
Component--National Guard, Reserve forces--tremendous role that
they play today, and both not only on the National Security
Agency side but also on the U.S. Cyber Command side, and
that's, again, information that I can include in the--in the
response.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield. Appreciate the
second round.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. And with that, if we have no other
questions, I appreciate everyone that came in and testified
before, General Berrier, General Nakasone, and, lastly, our--
actually, I apologize--newly sworn in Under Secretary of
Defense Moultrie.
Thank you, again for joining us, and we'll continue to have
this conversation. I look forward to further testimony.
Have a good one.
Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, committee.
[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 11, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 11, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 11, 2021
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRAVES
Mr. Graves. How will the capabilities Project Maven has driven be
operationalized so that the success of the program is not lost? I
understand NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] may be
responsible for part of Project Maven's scope in the future; what is
the plan for the transition of Project Maven from the DOD to NGA?
Mr. Moultrie. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKLIN
Mr. Franklin. To what extent, if any, does the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise see climate change to be a threat to National Security?
Mr. Moultrie. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Franklin. To what extent, if any, does the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise see climate change to be a threat to National Security?
General Nakasone. [No answer was available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Franklin. To what extent, if any, does the Defense Intelligence
Enterprise see climate change to be a threat to National Security?
General Berrier. [The information is classified and retained in the
subcommittee files.]
[all]