[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                  
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-43]

                        FISCAL YEAR 2022 DEFENSE

                        INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE

                            POSTURE HEARING

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             JUNE 11, 2021

                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                             __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-740                      WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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            SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  DON BACON, Nebraska
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice   C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    Chair

                Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
               Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     2

                               WITNESSES

Berrier, LTG Scott D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency     6
Moultrie, Ronald S., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
  and Security, U.S. Department of Defense.......................     4
Nakasone, GEN Paul M., USA, Director, National Security Agency/
  Chief, Central Security Service, and Commander, U.S. Cyber 
  Command........................................................     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Moultrie, Ronald S., joint with GEN Paul M. Nakasone and LTG 
      Scott D. Berrier...........................................    37

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Franklin.................................................    47
    Mr. Graves...................................................    47
    
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    FISCAL YEAR 2022 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE POSTURE HEARING

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                             Washington, DC, Friday, June 11, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Ruben Gallego (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
  ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. The committee will come to order.
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communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I've designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
    Good morning. I'd like to welcome today's witnesses: Mr. 
Ronald Moultrie, Under Secretary for Defense of Intelligence 
and Security; General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National 
Security Agency, Chief of Central Security Services, and 
Commander of U.S. CYBERCOM [United States Cyber Command]; and 
Lieutenant General Scott D. Berrier, Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency.
    I'm pleased to see each of you today.
    Though much of the defense intelligence community work is 
conducted behind closed doors, this hearing provides the 
subcommittee with an opportunity to inform the American people 
about the myriad threats facing the country and to hear about 
the role of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise [in] defending 
the Nation.
    The complex threat environment requires our defense 
intelligence communities to change to meet not only traditional 
threats but also transitional threats from pandemics to climate 
change, to threats from chemical weapons and information 
warfare.
    Within the past year, the most catastrophic impacts to our 
national security resulted from a deadly virus and debilitating 
cyber attacks.
    China and Russia had different capabilities and intentions, 
but both seek to challenge and disrupt the liberal democratic 
order. The challenges these two nations present cut across all 
domains of warfare.
    Russia wages vast propaganda and disinformation campaigns, 
conducts sophisticated cyber attacks, and sanctions provocative 
military buildups using irregular forces.
    China is heavily investing in the modernization of its 
military while leveraging global interconnectedness to 
undermine and subvert, coerce and influence. China seeks to 
dominate the world economically, militarily, and with 
technology through whatever means necessary.
    In the throes of perhaps the most challenging security 
environment in decades, the defense intelligence community is 
at the epicenter of the Department's [Department of Defense's] 
efforts to secure the information environment.
    We at the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee 
are prepared to work with you to ensure you have the resources 
and authorities you need to succeed to meet these threats.
    I'm particularly interested in understanding any capability 
gaps as well as how the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is 
postured to support defense operations and efforts to counter, 
deter, or defeat these threats, especially those in the cyber 
domain and the information environment.
    This discussion is crucial as we shape and develop the 
fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.
    With that, let me thank our witnesses for appearing before 
us today. I also now recognize Ranking Member Kelly for opening 
remarks--any opening remarks he may have.

     STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS

    Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your opening remarks 
and your leadership in organizing this morning's posture 
hearing.
    Today, we'll hear from three leaders across the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise. In particular, I would like to welcome 
Mr. Moultrie and congratulate him on his recent confirmation.
    Today's threat landscape continues to grow in scope and 
complexity. Our intelligence enterprise professionals are 
tasked with yeoman's work on a daily basis to help our Nation 
prepare, defend, and react to these threats.
    Recent high-visibility cyber attacks have shown just how 
vulnerable both our government and commercial sectors are to 
this type of offensive operations. From SolarWinds to Colonial 
Pipeline to JBS, this threat continues to grow at an alarming 
rate.
    Earlier this year in mid-March, this subcommittee conducted 
a hearing on disinformation in the gray zone. These aggressive 
tactics encompassing offensive actions just below the threshold 
of armed conflict and sometimes maybe above the threshold of 
armed conflict are utilized by adversaries like China, Russia, 
and Iran to discredit and destabilize American interests. A 
memo signed last year by nine combatant commanders drives home 
just how important this issue is.
    Recognizing the need for increased support from the 
intelligence community to combat this threat, they note 
malicious efforts by Russia and China across the information 
domain to seed discontent, weaken trust, and undermine 
alliances.
    Maybe most pressing of all the threats right now is how the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to continue 
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan with the impending 
redeployment of our troops.
    As we know, the Biden administration has ordered all troops 
out of the country by September 11th of this year, and recent 
reporting has indicated that the Department is well ahead of 
this deadline.
    The conversation as to whether we should or should not 
withdraw is not for today's hearing. However, the way in which 
we plan to keep an eye on the security situation in Afghanistan 
post-withdrawal is very much germane to today's discussion.
    The Biden administration has stressed there will be over-
the-horizon capability to maintain situational awareness of 
Afghanistan. But to my knowledge, this plan remains a work in 
progress.
    I am deeply concerned about our intelligence collection 
capabilities with our military forces being redeployed. I look 
forward to hearing from our witnesses today on all these topics 
in addition to this year's budget request and what each 
organization's priorities are for fiscal year 2022.
    I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time 
today. I look forward to continuing to work with our Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise leaders during the 117th Congress to 
ensure that we are appropriately postured to meet and defeat 
the threats posed by our adversaries.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
    We will now hear from our witnesses, then move into a 
question-and-answer session.
    I'd like to now recognize Mr. Moultrie.

STATEMENT OF RONALD S. MOULTRIE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
     INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Chairman Gallego.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify in support of the President's budget request for fiscal 
year 2022, alongside Generals Nakasone and Berrier.
    The intelligence professionals at the Department of Defense 
work every day to address the current and future threats facing 
the United States of America. On their behalf, I wish to thank 
the members of this subcommittee for your continued support and 
partnership.
    The President's $715 billion defense budget request for 
fiscal year 2022 includes $23.3 billion for the Military 
Intelligence Program.
    The Department develops the Military Intelligence Program, 
or MIP, in a coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence to align intelligence capabilities between defense 
and national priorities while avoiding unintentional 
duplication.
    The MIP reflects Secretary Austin's guidance for defense 
intelligence providing the necessary capability to support the 
Department's three key priorities: defending the Nation, taking 
care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork.
    As this subcommittee well knows, the United States faces a 
period of rapid, profound, and dynamic change in the 
international landscape. The expansion of the competitive space 
beyond traditional military domains and geographic boundaries 
increases and complicates demands for defense intelligence 
collection, analysis, and planning.
    Challenges from strategic competitors, rogue states, 
violent extremists require the Defense Intelligence Enterprise 
to invest in the ability to seamlessly share and fuse 
information, synchronize capabilities, and expand partnerships 
with other government agencies, the private sector, academia, 
and partner nations.
    To address these challenges, the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise is focused on the following priorities: the pacing 
challenge of China; advanced and persistent threats from 
Russia, North Korea, and Iran; understanding and harnessing 
rapid technological advancements; and countering adversarial 
nonstate actors.
    Although we have established a strong foundation to 
strengthen our national defense, the Department risks losing 
its competitive advantage to our rivals and adversaries without 
the much-needed continued investments in critical areas 
including our intelligence and security portfolios.
    To address our adversaries' widespread use of 
disinformation for malign influence, the Department is taking a 
whole-of-government approach which includes reviewing 
classification processes, pursuing wider dissemination of 
classified information through our broad alliances and 
partnerships, and the thoughtful release to the public of 
certain unclassified information to support U.S. interests.
    In addition to meeting the Department's intelligence needs, 
improving DOD [Department of Defense] security is critical to 
protect DOD personnel, installations, technologies, and 
information.
    Enhanced security protects against the compromise of our 
supply chain, the theft of critical technologies, and threats 
posed by foreign intelligence services, trusted insiders, and 
violent extremists both foreign and domestic.
    Our security efforts strengthen the vetting of DOD 
personnel, counter foreign adversary efforts targeting our 
critical information, technologies, supply chains, and to 
protect our installations, capabilities, and workforce from 
various threats.
    Most important to our continued intelligence advantage will 
be building and retaining a diverse workforce capable of 
meeting the new challenges of the 21st century. It must have 
digital literacy and advanced skills to harness emerging 
technologies and adapt to ever-changing threat environments.
    It must be a workforce that is free of sexual harassment 
and intolerant of violent extremism at any level. It must also 
be equitable, inclusive, and one that reflects the nation it 
serves.
    In short, diversity is a mission imperative. The Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise will continue to pivot towards 
strategic competition, improved adaptability, and changing 
intelligence needs.
    We will continue our investment in artificial intelligence 
and machine learning, as well as intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance resiliency, while creating efficiencies and 
improvements in tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, 
and simulation capabilities.
    Lastly, the partnership between DOD and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence has never been more 
important. Collectively, we will deliver the intelligence 
readiness, resources, technologies, and solutions essential for 
protecting and ensuring our U.S. national security.
    Intelligence community partnerships support efforts across 
the government and are strengthened by our allies and partners 
who provide perspectives and capabilities to meet our Nation's 
intelligence and security needs.
    Thank you for allowing us the opportunity to talk about the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and we are grateful for your 
support to the intelligence and security capabilities that the 
Department of Defense relies on and to defend the United 
States.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie, General 
Nakasone, and General Berrier can be found in the Appendix on 
page 37.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    And now we'll hear from General Nakasone. You are 
recognized.

  STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, AND COMMANDER, 
                       U.S. CYBER COMMAND

    General Nakasone. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, 
members of the committee, thank you for your enduring support 
of the National Security Agency [NSA] and for the invitation to 
testify today.
    As director of the NSA, it's my great honor to lead the 
women and men of NSA. We provide vital support to policymakers, 
the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community. We 
nurture talent, drive technology and innovation, and maintain a 
competitive advantage over our adversaries.
    Our focus is on two missions: signals intelligence and 
cybersecurity. Through our signals intelligence mission, we 
achieve access to our adversaries' network and data, which 
provides the Nation with an information advantage in 
competition, crisis, or conflict.
    Our cybersecurity mission postures us to prevent and 
eradicate cyber threats to U.S. national security systems and 
critical infrastructure with a special emphasis on the defense 
industrial base and the improvement of our weapons security.
    Specifically, the NSA Military Intelligence Program 
provides resources for vital cryptologic capabilities to 
increase the ability of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to 
deliver accurate and timely intelligence to combatant 
commanders and deployed forces.
    NSA focuses on delivering comprehensive intelligence 
support to enable DOD cyberspace advantage, providing technical 
enhancement of service capability to ensure strategic 
advantage, supporting deployed warfighters and combatant 
commanders in a competitive and dangerous security environment.
    NSA's access operations and collection capabilities 
continue to evolve in response to the threat landscape and the 
telecommunications complexity encountered in the strategic 
environment.
    Consistent with the Secretary's priorities and the interim 
national security strategic guidance, near-peer competitors, 
specifically China and Russia, are the principal priorities for 
the Department and our agency, and NSA-led reinvestment in the 
ability to exploit signals associated with advanced weapons in 
space systems will improve warfighter weapons and space 
readiness.
    This initiative will enable real-time threat data 
dissemination through the development of automated processes 
and streaming of the intelligence mission data.
    Maintaining the trust and confidence of our Nation's 
leaders and the public remains a top focus, and we continue to 
practice sound stewardship of the resources appropriated to us. 
We look forward to working with this subcommittee and are truly 
grateful for the support of Congress that has been given to our 
agency.
    Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, General.
    Lieutenant General Berrier, you are now recognized.

   STATEMENT OF LTG SCOTT D. BERRIER, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 
                      INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    General Berrier. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking 
Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
the opportunity to discuss threats facing this Nation and DIA's 
[Defense Intelligence Agency's] support to the National Defense 
Strategy.
    The nature and scope of the national security environment 
in which we operate is largely shaped by strategic competition, 
a continuous push and pull among the United States, China, and 
Russia for global strength and influence.
    At DIA we are working to provide the U.S., along with our 
allies, a decision advantage across all warfighting domains and 
geographic boundaries with competitors who intend to challenge, 
limit, or exceed our military capabilities.
    Their capabilities include more lethal ballistic and cruise 
missiles, growing nuclear stockpiles, and gray-zone measures 
such as ambiguous unconventional forces, foreign proxies, 
information manipulation, cyber attacks, and economic coercion.
    China remains a long-term strategic competitor to the 
United States. As a pacing threat, it poses a major security 
challenge. Beijing uses multiple approaches including 
diplomatic, economic, espionage, and military to achieve its 
strategic gains.
    China continues its decades-long military modernization to 
build an incredibly lethal force that will almost certainly be 
able to hold U.S. and allied forces at risk at greater 
distances from the Chinese mainland.
    The Russia--the Russian military poses an existential 
threat to the United States. Russia has a growing ability to 
project power with long-range precision cruise missiles.
    Its investment in conventional forces, strategic nuclear 
forces, and its strategic deterrent place the U.S. homeland at 
risk.
    Both China and Russia consider space integral to winning 
wars and have recognized--reorganized their militaries to 
integrate space operations and counter space capabilities.
    In addition to these two state actors, we face other 
pressing challenges with North Korea, Iran, and Afghanistan. 
North Korea has tested dozens of missiles since mid-2019. Iran 
challenges U.S. interests with its sophisticated military 
capabilities, broad proxy and partner networks, and periodic 
willingness to use force against U.S. and partner forces.
    Violence in Afghanistan remains elevated as peace 
negotiations have slowed since late 2020, and the Taliban 
continues to apply military pressure on the Afghan government.
    At the same time, the threat from terrorist organizations 
will persist across the region. Although al-Qaida--although al-
Qaida's appeal to Salafi jihadists has waned, ISIS [Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria] remains the preeminent Salafi jihadist 
group, sustaining more than a dozen insurgencies globally, is 
expanding its African presence, and probably rebuilding its 
ability to direct attacks in the West.
    Transnational racially and ethnically motivated violent 
extremists, or RMVE, organizations also operate across borders 
and attract recruits and spread ideology online.
    The United States will also face increasingly advanced, 
persistent, and sophisticated cyber attacks from an array of 
state and nonstate actors. Today's threat environment reflects 
rapid significant technological change and adversarial 
challenges in every operating domain.
    I am committed to ensuring DIA is positioned to meet these 
challenges by modernizing key capabilities across the top 
secret IT [information technology] network, our foundational 
military intelligence mission, and our ballistic missile 
technical collection architecture.
    I'm proud to lead DIA and its outstanding workforce. Thank 
you for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to answer 
your questions.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Lieutenant General.
    And now we'll move on to the question portion. Every member 
will have 5 minutes to ask their question and I will begin with 
my question, and then we shall move to Ranking Member Kelly.
    Make sure I see the timer. Perfect.
    Okay. Mr. Moultrie, do you believe the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise is agile enough to adapt and meet the emerging 
threats we see today, and is the enterprise postured in such a 
way to be proactive rather than reactive?
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative [Gallego], thank you for the 
opportunity to speak once again. I believe the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise is currently capable of meeting many of 
the challenges that we--that we face from the threats today.
    But I believe that we have to continue to become more agile 
and more adaptive. We know that our adversaries are using 
nontraditional means and nontraditional tools to go after us. 
They operate outside the laws that enable them to do things 
that we must be able to counter.
    There are also technological challenges that we are facing 
that we have to be able to adapt to. So while I am--I believe 
that today we are able to defend the Nation, we are able to 
meet the threats that exist today, without significant changes 
and significant adaptation, we may begin to fall behind.
    So those will be the issues and those will be the 
activities that we'll be focused on in the coming years.
    Mr. Gallego. Just kind of follow up on your thought then. 
What do you believe are our most significant capability gaps or 
deficiencies to identify, track, and manage threats that cross 
all domains of warfare.
    Mr. Moultrie. So right now, in terms of the budget, we 
are--we're trying to align what we have in the National 
Intelligence Program, which is run by the Director of National 
Intelligence, and what we have in our Military Intelligence 
Program.
    Once we have that fully aligned, we will be able to 
better--to have a better sense of what those gaps are and then 
would like the opportunity to come back to brief you more 
specifically and the committee on some of those gaps, and some 
of it, I think, will be better translated to a closed session 
than an open session. But really look forward to coming back 
after we have that NIP-MIP alignment to come back and talk to 
you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Mr. 
Moultrie.
    More than 18 months ago, nine combatant commanders 
articulated enduring requirement for the intelligence community 
to help combat the provocative dangers and destabilizing 
actions of China and Russia in the public domain.
    The Director of National Intelligence is establishing a 
malign foreign influence response center that will lead a 
coordination and integration of intelligence related to foreign 
malign influence.
    Mr. Moultrie, how will your office work across the defense 
intelligence communities to ensure coordination of efforts in 
this space?
    Mr. Moultrie. Yes, thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
    We have been working closely with the Director of National 
Intelligence and the ODNI [Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence] to ensure that we have a whole-of-government 
approach, not just an intelligence community or a Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise approach, but really a whole-of-
government approach to what this problem is, to understanding 
what our adversaries are doing in this space and, more 
importantly, how we need to get accurate.
    We know that there are processes now that we need to put in 
place. We need to revamp the training that we have today to 
ensure that people are properly focused on this issue, and then 
we need to make sure that we're using open source and other 
available means to get this information out to our combatant 
commanders.
    It's a priority of ours, understanding these issues. I know 
there's been a lot of discussion about whether or not 
information can be declassified.
    We're moving to declassify what we can declassify, and some 
of that's been done, and I'd welcome General Nakasone and 
General Berrier to comment in this area, too. But we're also 
trying to protect those sensitive sources and methods.
    So malign influence and activity in the gray zone, 
understand it, and we're really focused on it. And within the 
Enterprise, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, we're 
revamping ourselves to be able to get after this problem.
    Mr. Gallego. General Nakasone and General Berrier, what 
processes are being adjusted to help respond to combatant 
commanders' urgent requests for assistance?
    General Nakasone. Chairman, if I might, just to follow up 
on Secretary Moultrie's comments, I think the areas that we're 
working here at the National Security Agency begin with this 
idea, how can we do this in a manner that is ensuring of speed 
and agility against an adversary that has the same.
    And so as the Secretary mentioned with regards to publicly 
available information, open source capabilities, the right 
tools, being able to bring all three of those together is 
important.
    We do begin with a lot of our work that is written for 
release, and so while that can help, I don't think that's the 
end-all. I think the end-all is as we take a look at that, 
working with a specific combatant commander, looking at the 
private sector, looking at the tools and the information 
available, how do we do this in the quickest manner possible.
    Mr. Gallego. General Berrier.
    General Berrier. Sir, the DIA is really involved in a 
number of fronts and it's really very, very important activity. 
The first thing is to double down and emphasize to all of our 
analysts that we have to write for release.
    So if you start with a mindset that this product will be 
released to the max level of audience or consumer, that's a 
good start to get the analysts thinking about a different way 
to do it.
    The other piece is to focus our collectors on--when 
they're--when they're collecting, focusing on sources, as they 
develop those information reports to also write at the lowest 
classification level possible when they can.
    I think the last thing I would tell you, Chairman, is that 
DIA is uniquely postured with our combatant commands. As you--
as you recall, DIA mans all of the J2 JIOCs [Joint Intelligence 
Operations Centers] within the combatant commands, and so that 
makes us uniquely positioned to understand combatant command 
PIRs [priority intelligence requirements] to be able to 
leverage the intelligence enterprise to meet their needs 
rapidly.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. And last question for General 
Nakasone. Given the recent cyber attacks and ransomware 
attacks, what is NSA doing to identify relevant vulnerabilities 
and threats and take action to prevent future intrusions to 
critical national security systems and infrastructure?
    General Nakasone. Chairman, our work at NSA has been 
focused on the defense industrial base, and one of the areas 
that we have expanded to with our cybersecurity directorate is 
how do we do this in an unclassified manner.
    And we have stood up the Cybersecurity Collaboration 
Center, which is an unclassified center where we begin and 
invite a series of partners to come and have discussions with 
us.
    I think also that the other piece that's really important 
is that we are working with a series of partners to deliver 
cybersecurity advisories, and why is that important?
    Because being able to take our technical capability, our 
knowledge of what the adversary is doing, and then writing that 
at a means that it can be released broadly is almost like 
providing inoculation to a number of areas where we know there 
are vulnerabilities, and it comes with the stamp of approval of 
the National Security Agency. So that's where our focus has 
been, Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Representative Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairman Gallego.
    Mr. Moultrie, you mentioned a budget number in your opening 
statement. What was that budget number again?
    Mr. Moultrie. Yes, sir, Representative Kelly. It was $23.3 
billion.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay, and what is that compared to last year's 
fiscal year in the same area?
    Mr. Moultrie. It's down $75 million, from my understanding, 
sir.
    Mr. Kelly. Yeah, and that's something I really hope you 
guys will help us with. I'm also on the Budget Committee, and 
we keep throwing out this 715 [$715 billion] like we're getting 
a raise in defense and the reality is it's actually a cut in 
defense and that doesn't count the $600 billion that is going 
to climate change, which I'm not opposed to. But it shouldn't 
be out of defense. It should be above and beyond what we're 
doing.
    Do you have the necessary resources with those cuts to do 
what we need to do in the Defense Enterprise--Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise and what are you doing to mitigate 
these cuts?
    Mr. Moultrie. Ranking Member Kelly, we support the 
President's budget. Our goal is to look at the resources that 
we have and then focus those resources, really optimize those 
resources, on the key priorities that are facing the 
Department.
    That comes from looking internally and making sure that our 
priorities are aligned with the Director of National 
Intelligence, and then working closely with the Director of 
National Intelligence and the rest of the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise to ensure that we understand what the requirements 
are, making sure our warfighters have what they need as 
priorities, and then focusing on those top priority needs.
    We're looking at that now, and our plan is to ensure that 
we report back to you on where those gaps are and where we 
think that we need heightened focus and emphasis for the 
future.
    Mr. Kelly. Yeah. And, Mr. Moultrie, just to all three of 
y'all, I just--this is--this is a battle we can't lose whether 
it's budgetary, economically, or intelligence-wise, and I will 
just say when we're not properly resourced with the dollars 
going to soldiers, sensors, and shooters, when we're not 
properly resourced, that results in planes falling out of the 
air, ships crashing, tanks rolling over, lack of training and 
lack of resources.
    So I hope--I hope we will be smart with our dollars, and if 
you need more I hope you guys will stand up.
    My next question. In my opening remarks, I'm concerned 
about intelligence collection capabilities once we withdraw 
from Afghanistan. Can you please articulate the plan for the 
over-the-horizon intelligence collection strategy?
    Mr. Moultrie. Ranking Member Kelly, I'll start and then 
I'll pass to General Berrier for any comments that he may have.
    So we're in the process now of looking at the over-horizon 
architecture that we need to have. It's not going to be a 
unilateral architecture.
    We're going to have to work very closely with our partner 
and allies to ensure that it's a robust architecture, that it 
can protect the forces that we have in place, and that can 
rapidly respond to issues and challenges that we may have.
    Our number one priority is keeping our personnel safe 
during the retrograde, and we have been having weekly, almost 
daily discussions on how to do this and factoring a number of 
different aspects into this.
    Let me turn to General Berrier for his comments and 
thoughts on this.
    General Berrier. Ranking Member, the--as you know, over the 
years of our operations in Afghanistan, DIA was able to build 
out a very robust human intelligence network.
    As the forces have downsized there and our bases have 
collapsed, those operations were turned over to tactical units, 
and as we--as we get them even smaller, the last--the last 
platform we will really have there will be our attaches at the 
embassy.
    So from a human perspective, you know, we'll have to try to 
manage some of that from over the horizon or through reachback, 
and then for any other question I would ask General Nakasone 
for his thoughts.
    General Nakasone. Ranking Member, excellent question. I 
think there are three elements that we will base over-the-
horizon collection on with the national security.
    First of all is working with U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
Special Operations Command. How do we leverage the tactical 
collectors that remain within the area?
    Second piece is how do we work with a series of partners, 
among our closest partners internationally, to be able to 
leverage their collection capabilities within the area.
    And the third piece, very frankly, is being able to 
leverage our national collection capabilities. It will be 
different. It will be different than when we were in the 
country of Afghanistan, but it is being mitigated based upon 
those three factors.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you all. And just real quickly, Lieutenant 
General Berrier, you mentioned the defense attaches, and I just 
got back from Africa, UAE [United Arab Emirates], and Romania 
and Italy.
    Some of our allies are concerned that we're going to remove 
some of these defense attaches. Can you guys commit that we're 
going to keep the number and where we are in our defense 
attaches, that we will continue to have those with our embassy 
to do the great work that helps our State Department?
    General Berrier. Ranking Member, I'm committed to keeping 
the current number of attaches and attache platforms that we 
have now. I know of no plans to cut any of those back. As you 
know, it is a jewel in the crown for DIA and gives us great 
presence and access and influence.
    Mr. Kelly. And then my final question, with regard to the 
36-star memo, can you guys describe what changes have been made 
with the combatant commands, and carrying that a little 
farther, you and the rest of the IC [intelligence community] 
are going to have to do a greater job of working with our 
partners and allies to make sure that we're sharing 
intelligence.
    Can you tell me what your plans are or what changes [have] 
been made to support combatant commands and what changes we 
made into working with our allies across the IC?
    General Berrier. Sir, I can take that to start. Our 
presence and access into the combatant commands allows us very 
unique insight on the requirements for combatant commanders.
    So I would say at speed we're able to turn those around as 
quickly as I can. With any DIA reporting we can go very, very 
rapidly to get that to the right level of classification that 
they need for their operations.
    In addition to that, I'll just reemphasize this whole 
business of right for release. We have to emphasize that with 
all of our analysts so that they know when they're dealing with 
sensitive material we have to do our best to get it--to get it 
to the lowest level that we possibly can.
    In terms of our partners, as you know, we have a very, very 
robust partnership with our key partners, who are Five Eyes, 
but we also have partnerships with many others, and whether 
those are through some, like, alliance frameworks or with 
bilateral relationships, we're working very hard to make sure 
that we keep those as robust as we can and that we can make 
sure that we get something back when we give.
    General Nakasone. Ranking Member, if I might just add to 
General Berrier's excellent comments. I would add two things.
    First of all, you know, how do you utilize tools that we 
might have to be able to look at large amounts of data very 
rapidly. That's one of the areas that we're exploring with the 
combatant commands.
    And then the second piece is, how do we take some of our 
sensitive intelligence and be able to have a discussion with 
the combatant commands to say, hey, is there a commercial 
capability or is there open source that might lead someone 
there?
    Again, back to Secretary Moultrie's point of being able to 
protect our sources and methods. These are the discussions that 
are taking place. I think this is generated by the needs that 
the combatant commanders have expressed balanced by the needs 
of our intelligence community to protect our most sensitive 
accesses.
    Mr. Moultrie. If I can just add on top of my distinguished 
colleague's comments, which were spot on.
    I think we have to work across the intelligence enterprise, 
which includes with DNI [Director of National Intelligence]. 
It's a whole-of-government effort. There's so much information 
that's out there, things that we're learning, and the open 
source arena is not just the purview of the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise or the intelligence community.
    So working as a whole of government, making sure we have 
the right policies in place and that we are leaning forward in 
this space, Ranking Member.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you. And again, congratulations, Mr. 
Moultrie.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Gallego. I now recognize Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The first question I have is for Mr. Moultrie.
    A 2020 GAO [Government Accountability Office] report showed 
certain demographic groups experienced disparities and 
challenges within the intel community. So I want to know if you 
can be specific about what your plans are for recruiting and 
retaining first- and second-generation Americans, especially 
women and people of color, in the intel community.
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Larsen, thank you very much.
    This is--this is--I mentioned in my opening remarks it's a 
mission imperative for us. As you know, the demographics of our 
country are changing.
    We have to recruit our best, our brightest. We have to 
recruit those individuals who bring different perspectives and 
we have to be inclusive in all that we do.
    We also have to be able to work globally, and to be able to 
work globally we have to look, in many instances, like 
individuals around the globe. So our goal is to really 
emphasize this.
    The Secretary has made this one of his priorities and he 
talks about it in the same terms that the President has talked 
about. We want to ensure that we have that workforce that not 
only mirrors what America looks like, but can help us do the 
things that we need to do.
    I plan to focus on this. It'll be one of my priorities. 
What I will do is make myself visible but also hold individuals 
accountable. So what we have found throughout the years is what 
gets measured gets done.
    So we set the standard and then we hold individuals 
accountable. We work with them to say, here's what we're 
looking at. Here's what we need.
    Tell us why we are falling short, and we will do so. We 
have already started these discussions and you have my 
commitment that I will continue to make this an emphasis and a 
focus area.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Larsen, do you have other 
questions?
    Mr. Larsen. Sorry. I muted myself to answer to the--to 
listen to the answer. I apologize.
    General Nakasone and General Berrier, do you have specific 
actions you're taking within your agencies on the same issue?
    Start with General Berrier.
    General Berrier. Representative, we do. In fact, if you 
look across the DIA workforce, we're about on par with 
percentage of minorities and disability officers there and 
female officers.
    We're doing okay, but we can do better. And so we're doing 
a couple of things right now to increase diversity in what I 
would call our mission space analysis and collection, and 
really conducting a barrier analysis to determine what's 
keeping our diversified workforce from attaining higher rank in 
those career fields.
    We're also--since March of 2020 we have visited 45 
historically Black colleges and universities and attempting to 
reach out in greater numbers, and for all of the 
representatives on this committee I would have one ask.
    Each year you put one young man or woman into a military 
academy, but you probably have hundreds of applications. If you 
would put those applications to us, we would take advantage of 
that diverse talent that almost made it into an academy but did 
not.
    I think it's a great opportunity for us to start giving 
opportunities to that representative force inside the 
intelligence agencies.
    And I'll turn it over to General Nakasone.
    Mr. Larsen. General.
    General Nakasone. Congressman, I'd offer a couple areas 
that we're very focused on.
    First of all, as you're well aware, NSA has over 340 
centers of academic excellence throughout the United States. We 
are headquartered on the east coast, and so we need to be much 
more visible and much more involved in places outside of the 
National Capital Region.
    That's what we have done to begin with. And so places like 
NSA Hawaii, NSA Texas, NSA Alaska, are all opportunities for us 
to be able to broaden our reach.
    The second piece speaks to Secretary Moultrie's comments 
with regards to accountability. I hold all 500 Senior Executive 
Service members of NSA accountable for our diversity, equality, 
and inclusion.
    They're rated every single year, and so they understand 
that this is a priority for our agency. It's a priority for its 
director.
    And then the final piece is that we have to have a series 
of abilities for us to develop a workforce. It's one thing to 
recruit the workforce. But then how do we develop that 
workforce?
    So the workforce is representative of the demographics of 
our Nation, not only when we hire them but when we get to our 
senior levels as well.
    Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you very much. I'll just offer as 
well or ask as well, I had a question about the China Task 
Force recommendations that came out this week, and perhaps in a 
classified brief later we can address that.
    And now that we can maybe travel again, General Nakasone, I 
will, again, ask--invite you out to Whatcom Community College 
to visit your program at Whatcom Community College in 
Bellingham.
    General Nakasone. Thank you, Congressman. I look forward to 
it.
    Mr. Larsen. Good. Thanks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
    I now turn to Representative Scott.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman, and gentlemen, thanks for 
joining us. I know when we talk about cyber, we're typically 
thinking of more of a near-peer type competitor, I guess, or 
something coming from a little further away from home than 
Central and South America.
    My question is specific to SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] 
and with regard to the budget, it seems to me that SOUTHCOM is 
the one that anytime there's a budget reduction always--
SOUTHCOM is the one that always takes that reduction.
    What do you anticipate with regard to SOUTHCOM? The 
transnational criminal organizations are responsible for 
killing more people in America than any other organizations 
are. How do you anticipate the budget reductions to affect 
SOUTHCOM?
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Scott, my understanding is 
that there is actually a slight increase in the budget for 
SOUTHCOM. We understand the transnational threat that's posed 
by the criminal organizations that operate and operate across 
the border. Working with the Department of Homeland Security to 
ensure that we have a whole-of-government approach to this will 
be very important.
    As I mentioned at the beginning of my comments, we want to 
ensure that we have the opportunity to really have alignment 
between the National Intelligence and Military Intelligence 
Programs.
    Once we have that, we'll be able to come back and talk to 
you, probably better in closed session, about some of the 
things that we're doing and some of the capabilities that we'll 
be employing and working with DHS [Department of Homeland 
Security] on.
    Mr. Scott. Just to be clear, I think we should be using 
every asset the United States has to shut down the 
transnational criminal organizations. They have killed more 
people than al-Qaida has in this country and they do it on a 
monthly basis. And so I appreciate your comments there.
    And my next question is for General Nakasone. Admiral 
Stavridis, if I have that correct, said, ``Trump got a Space 
Force. Biden should get a Cyber Force. The administration 
should create a full-fledged Cyber Force. We're overdue for an 
elite independent branch of the Armed Forces in which all the 
personnel wake up every morning thinking about defending the 
Nation's cyberspace.''
    Do you agree or disagree with that, General? Should we--
should we establish a Cyber Force? I mean, Fort Gordon is in my 
State, not too far from where I live. And just open to 
suggestions with that, and I'm open--I'm open to the creation 
of a Cyber Force, if that helps us better carry out the 
mission.
    General Nakasone. Congressman, thank you for that question, 
and I appreciate Admiral Stavridis' thoughts on that. Here's 
what I've experienced over 10 years working within cyber.
    Our focus right now is developing the 133 teams that U.S. 
Cyber Command has. As the NSA director and the commander of 
U.S. Cyber Command, the most important thing we can do is to 
continue to have outcomes--positive outcomes that we have seen 
with forces like Army Cyber, which I used to command, that's 
headquartered at Fort Gordon.
    My concern with moving towards a Cyber Force right now is 
the infrastructure, the other elements that take away from what 
we want. We want the best cyber operators working mission every 
single day. And I think we have that, based upon the 
experiences that I've had and also the outcomes that we have 
seen in the past two elections.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. Well, I guess, what--can you--you said the 
past two elections. What are you alluding to with that?
    General Nakasone. Yes. In 2018, one of the things that we 
took on across both NSA and U.S. Cyber Command was to come 
together into an organization that I called the Russia Small 
Group that was focused on ensuring we would not have influence 
or interference in our midterm elections.
    We took the same approach in 2020, and so being able to 
ensure that adversaries operating outside the United States 
could not impact through influence and operations was one of 
the things that was, clearly, what we focused on. We had great 
success in both elections.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. All right. I'll leave it at that, Mr. 
Chairman, and yield the remainder of my time.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
    We now move to Representative Sherrill.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you so much. I really appreciate all of 
you coming today. I want to thank you for your service as well 
as to extend my appreciation to all the members of the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise, both military and civilian, for their 
selfless service to our country.
    The victories of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise aren't 
always known to our fellow citizens. But your efforts play a 
critical and often unsung role in our Nation's security and 
stability.
    As all of you are aware, over the past few years there's 
been an increase in incidents targeting the United States, its 
people, and its infrastructure from a number of adversaries to 
include China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
    These gray-zone tactics use--include cyber attacks, 
misinformation, and providing safe haven to those who target 
the foundations of our democracy. So it's no secret that some 
of the first tools the U.S. leverages in response to this 
aggression are economic or financial in nature, in part due to 
the direct effort economic sanctions have on the kleptocratic 
leaders in China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Economic 
sanctions hit them where it hurts.
    So the DOD has under its authority half of all the 
intelligence community agencies that could gather intelligence 
to support these aims.
    Does the Defense Intelligence Enterprise prioritize the 
acquisition and dissemination of foreign government financial 
data to the Departments of State and Treasury to support, 
really, the all-of-government sanctions response to these 
adversaries?
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Sherrill, I'll start and then 
I'll turn to my colleagues, who will also have some input in 
this area.
    So we have a very robust--and I'm using the space on my 
past history and roles that I've served in the intelligence 
community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise--we have a 
very robust mechanism in place to understand what's happening 
in the financial realm, economic sanctions, the potential 
thwarting of economic sanctions, and we have great exchange 
with the various interagency partners that rely on this 
information to inform not only their activities but also to 
help inform their policies.
    Our goal is to continue to do that. We know that we can't 
operate in a vacuum. We see these activities occurring. We 
incur these hits on our system and our infrastructure.
    We know the President sets the policy and we enact those 
policies. But we also put in place those mechanisms to help the 
government really evaluate the effectiveness of their policies 
and how we should do things.
    So my understanding is we have done that. Of course, we 
will continue to do that. Let me turn to General Nakasone and 
General Berrier to add any comments that they have in this 
space.
    Ms. Sherrill. That would be great, and if you could also 
provide some data on how you--or some information on how you 
provide that data to the Departments of State or Treasury or 
allied nations for enforcement of economic measures. Thanks.
    Mr. Moultrie. Sure, Representative. Without going into 
great specifics, I'll let General Nakasone talk to this because 
his organization has a very robust way of providing this 
information in real time and to getting feedback and also has 
individuals who are integrated to help them understand this 
information.
    So, General Nakasone, can I pass this to you, sir?
    General Nakasone. Thank you, Secretary. I appreciate it.
    Congresswoman, I would add to Secretary Moultrie's 
comments. How do we measure this, and I think your question is 
spot on and your characterization of the competitive 
environment is exactly what we face today. This is how we 
measure it.
    First of all is the reporting, and we can certainly provide 
the--you know, the reporting that we do with a series of 
different partners to include both our interagency partners and 
our international partners.
    But here's what really gives us gravity in this space, and 
that's our talent. That's being able to have people that are at 
Treasury, that are at State, that are at FBI [Federal Bureau of 
Investigation], that are at Energy, that are able to provide 
the expertise and the wherewithal to say, this is what we're 
seeing and this is what is impactful.
    The feedback loop is so critical, as you pointed out, to be 
able to understand the utility of what's being tried. And so 
this is something that we have done for many years and we can 
certainly follow up with those type of metrics.
    Ms. Sherrill. That would be great. Thank you very much.
    Really quickly, I just have a few seconds here, but I 
wanted to really quickly ask about the GAO study on 
accountability.
    What role did all of you think the extensive reliance on 
temporary personnel, which as of mid-2020, I believe, it 
represented 70 percent of the OUSD(I&S) [Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security] workforce, 
as well as contractors who I think represent about 51 percent 
of the office's workforce, plays in the shortcomings noted in 
the GAO study.
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Sherrill, I haven't had the 
opportunity yet to really delve into that. I'm aware of it and 
I think it's a challenge.
    One of the things that we have already highlighted this 
morning is it really is in the talent of our people and the 
continuity of their expertise that really enables us to get 
things done.
    So if we're having to rely on temporary talent or talent 
that may be somewhat transitory, that impacts us. So what we 
want to do is to look at the cadre that we have, to look at how 
we're augmenting that cadre today, how we capture information.
    So there are tools that can help us capture knowledge and 
capture information, and then how do we have that knowledge 
repeatable so that regardless of who's here, we need a core but 
we can also continue to do those valuable things that we 
continue doing.
    So this is a problem. It's not--it's been a problem for 
quite some time. I think it's a growing problem around the 
community as we have people go in and out. So we'll look at 
that and we'll come back and report to you, Representative, on 
this issue.
    Ms. Sherrill. I look forward to it. Thank you for the 
chairman's indulgence. I'm over time. I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Sherrill.
    We now turn to Representative Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
gentlemen, for your time here this morning with us.
    I, along with a number of other folks, last week got to sit 
in on a briefing on the final report from the National Security 
Commission on Artificial Intelligence.
    I'm not sure if you all have had a chance to see that 
fascinating 750-page report. So it's not light bedtime reading, 
but a lot of great recommendations in there and one of the key 
findings that they landed on was the need for us to establish 
AI [artificial intelligence] readiness by 2025.
    A closing window. We have got an advantage, but our 
adversaries are closing that rapidly and they feel that we need 
to make some significant investment in those areas.
    I know that we have, as an intelligence community, things 
like Project Maven and MARS [Machine-Assisted Analytic Rapid-
Repository System]. I know we're working to capitalize on 
artificial intelligence and machine learning.
    You know, one of the findings they said was the 
intelligence community will benefit from AI more than any other 
national security mission. But then further, when we talked a 
little bit about talent they said the talent deficit in DOD and 
the intelligence community represents the greatest impediment 
to our achieving that AI readiness by 2025.
    General Berrier, I was really intrigued with your 
recommendation there about the service academy candidates, 
because I feel the same way.
    Every year we have a tremendous talent pool there and in 
all these hearings and even across departments with other 
agencies in the government it's just this need for talent that 
we're all fighting, and particularly in the area of the digital 
world.
    We talked a little bit about Digital Service Academy in 
other meetings. I'd be curious for your-all's thoughts on 
whether you think there's--maybe there's a time for a new 
service academy, a Digital Service Academy. Would you support 
that and what are your thoughts?
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Franklin, I'll just start and 
quickly turn to my colleagues. AI/ML [machine learning], it's 
going to be a game changer. It already is a game changer, and 
it's an area where our adversaries are--they really understand 
it.
    They understand that data is power and being able to 
harness that data is really where your power will be in the 
future.
    And so getting after this, as you know, in the USD(I&S) we 
have--the Project Maven is something that we prototyped, if you 
will, and now ensuring that we can get that out so that we can 
actually spread that throughout the intelligence enterprise is 
going to be key.
    So we're focused on this. Haven't thought about the Digital 
Academy piece. Know that we need to have a better way of 
actually coalescing around this. But your comment is spot on to 
where we need to be and I know my colleagues have been thinking 
about it.
    So let me pass it to Generals Berrier and Nakasone for 
their comments.
    General Berrier. Congressman, that's a great comment about 
AI and that's everything for DIA right now. As we move from the 
legacy database called MIDB [Modernized Integrated Database], 
think of it as everything we know about the world but in 
analog.
    Think of Excel spreadsheets. Think of stubby pencils. Think 
about analyst time on a target folder, if you will, to an 
automated AI/ML-infused product that is much richer in this day 
and age and will be a foundation for the Department as we move 
into our joint warfighting concept.
    So it is everything to us and we would like to invite you 
and your other committee members down to take a look at that.
    On the Digital Academy, I would just say that we need folks 
who are data literate and understand the science because right 
now they're hard to find. If it took a Digital Academy, that 
would be an interesting way to put a bunch of those folks into 
the workforce very, very rapidly and it's a--it's a very 
intriguing idea.
    General Nakasone. Congressman, I've had the opportunity to 
take the out-brief on the National Commission. In fact, they 
out-briefed me just this week.
    I couldn't agree more with you with regards to the talent 
piece of it. We have a tremendous amount of talent here at the 
National Security Agency with regards to AI and ML and data 
science.
    What I would tell you is that it's not necessarily always 
the recruitment piece that is the critical element of it. It's 
the ability to ensure that someone that comes into the National 
Security Agency on day one doesn't leave us in 5 years or 6 
years.
    It's the ability to grow that person in a series of 
different jobs at the same time, you know, being able to 
understand that that person is being recruited by the best of 
private industry and government.
    And I think this really does speak to what Secretary 
Moultrie I know is very interested in taking on, which is a 
look at how do we ensure our best talent stays within the 
defense intelligence establishment, and that's something that 
we're going to have to do collectively.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. Yeah, they had cited specifically 2025 
as a kind of a marker out there for when we need to be ready. 
Do you all feel that we are making the proper investments to 
maintain the advantage we have over our near-peer adversaries? 
And if not, what do we need to do to ensure that we keep that 
advantage?
    Mr. Moultrie. I'll start, Representative Franklin. I think 
we're--we understand what the priorities are in this space and 
we understand the things that we need to do.
    And so we are--we're going to align ourselves to ensure 
that we maintain that advantage. I call it a decision 
advantage. Some people call it an information advantage.
    We have to have the tactical and military advantages too, 
but we know where we need to invest to actually get better and 
more agile and more capable.
    We'll get there. We just need to make sure that we have the 
interaction collaboration across the interagency and across the 
IC with DNI to do that.
    Let me pass it to my colleagues for their comments.
    General Berrier. Congressman, I would say that for--go 
ahead, sir.
    Mr. Franklin. Sorry, General Berrier. Yeah, if you can make 
a quick summary.
    General Berrier. Yes, Chairman.
    So for DIA, investment in this space is critical for us. So 
I would say this is the number one tie between MARS and the AI 
and ML programs that we have there along with JWICS [Joint 
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System] IT and the top 
secret--the top secret network running through the Department.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, sir.
    Now we move on to Representative Panetta.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kelly.
    Mr. Moultrie, you know, I'm lucky that my digital footprint 
really didn't start until I got into office. However, as you 
know, there are a lot of young men and women these days who are 
coming into the services and have a huge digital footprint well 
before they signed up.
    So I guess my question to you is, how can special 
operations forces who require--some do, most--some do--a 
significant amount do--require undercover identities maintain 
the same level of digital anonymity as intelligence operatives 
when they initially enter the Armed Forces and are selected for 
special operations units with none of the same secrecy or 
precautions as those other agencies?
    And also, you know, are DOD and DIA, are they looking at 
ways to reduce the digital footprint of those who initially 
enter into the Armed Forces to protect the potential future of 
Tier 1 special operators from identification?
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Panetta, that's a fantastic 
question and it's one that we're focused on. We understand that 
the digital footprint, which used to begin when you were a 
teenager, now starts when you're about 3 or 4 years old.
    So individuals get their first tablet device or their first 
cell phone at a very young age, and they take selfies and all 
these other things.
    So all that provides this footprint, and when you're trying 
to do counterintelligence or countersurveillance operations, 
you are not only putting your footprint out there for the 
adversary, you are enabling them to undermine some of the 
things that we're doing.
    So we understand this. This is a problem that DIA truly 
understands. In discussions with them this week, we walked 
through this. We talked through this.
    CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] understands this problem. 
You probably have heard the term ubiquitous technical 
surveillance. If not, I welcome the opportunity to come talk to 
you about it.
    But with all the things that are out there, we have to 
focus on this. If not, we are going--we're not going to be able 
to conduct our missions in the most efficient way.
    And we also need to understand how it also may impact us 
and some of the things that we need to be able to do OCONUS, 
outside the continental United States.
    So it's a two-sided coin, Congressman. We're focused on it 
and I welcome the opportunity to come back and brief you on it.
    Mr. Panetta. Yeah, that'd be great. And is--and I guess, 
General Berrier, I'll kind of pivot to you, General Berrier.
    Are you seeing the DIA cooperate with CIA and FBI in order 
to share the best practices [inaudible] modernization?
    General Berrier. Congressman Panetta, absolutely. We are in 
the middle of a modernization effort, although we can't go into 
the details on this particular network.
    But we'd be happy to share all that with you and where 
we're going with our partners. This is really an important 
effort and we have to get on with it and do it quickly.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood. Understood. Thank you.
    Mr. Moultrie, back to you. As you know, the recent annual 
threat assessment from the IC highlighted threats that China, 
Russia, Iran, North Korea, as we all understand, pose to--what 
they pose to our national interest.
    But what actions are you taking to ensure that the DIE 
[Defense Intelligence Enterprise] is producing the intelligence 
on those threats that policymakers and warfighters alike can 
use to make informed decisions?
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Panetta, we look at this as an 
end-to-end problem. So we know that activities that we have 
done over the last 20 years have really eroded our foundational 
military intelligence and our technical intelligence 
capabilities.
    So we know we have to get back to rebuilding those.
    More importantly, looking at end-to-end, we have to be able 
to ensure that we understand the requirements, that we have the 
requirements in place, and that we have the dissemination 
mechanisms that will allow policymakers to understand what's 
occurring in this space.
    So that's our--it's going to be our priority. It already 
has started and we're going to focus on that over the next 
several years, how do we understand that.
    You understand that that includes not just technical 
things, but also language capabilities and making sure we have 
the language capabilities to help us understand the processes.
    It'll be a focused area and I welcome the opportunity to 
come back and brief you on that.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. And I appreciate that, and I saved this 
last question purposefully within my limited time I have left.
    Are there any items that went unfunded in the fiscal year 
2022 budget that you'd like to highlight for the committee?
    Mr. Moultrie. Not at this time from the USD(I&S) 
perspective. We're continuing to look at that and we'll come 
back and brief you on those in a closed hearing if we identify 
or we identify any of those.
    Mr. Panetta. Sounds good. Thank you, everybody. Thanks to 
all the witnesses for your time, for your service, for being 
here today.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
    I now recognize Representative Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And just to echo Mr. Panetta's questions, I think a number 
of others--if I could request of you and Ranking Member Kelly 
to do our best to schedule a closed session so that we can have 
some of these more in-depth conversations in a classified 
setting. I think that would be enormously useful.
    I'm not sure who to ask this question of because I'm not 
sure of the answer. But in kind of building on Ranking Member 
Kelly's questions about the Afghan withdrawal, from my time 
there over the last couple of decades and from multiple 
intelligence briefings, there is a strong likelihood that we 
may have to go back, that al-Qaida will resurge in the wake of 
Taliban gains, does intend to attack the United States again if 
given the opportunity.
    So my question is, where is the 20 years of operational and 
intelligence data going? What repository is there? How is it 
structured, searchable, and accessible to that future Ranger 
platoon leader who's going to be ordered to go back into a 
valley where we were--may have been 5, 7, 10 years ago, who we 
talked to, what the operations were like, what happened years 
ago, so that we don't repeat the same mistakes, we don't lose 
future lives?
    I understand that you can't--probably can't speak to where 
the data from the 101st Airborne, one of the Marine Corps MEUs 
[Marine expeditionary units]. I know the Special Operations 
Command is doing this. They're pulling terabytes out and 
working to make it structural and searchable.
    But within the intel--with the 18 intelligence agencies, 
who's doing--is there an effort and who has the lead?
    Mr. Moultrie. I'll just start very quickly.
    So, Representative Waltz, your question is exactly where we 
have thought about it and where we think we need to be. There's 
been so much that's happened. So we're retrograding in almost 
the same way that we went in, starting in Kabul and then moving 
onward.
    So understanding what were all those things that we had to 
put in place, once again, gets back to the foundational things 
that we put in place that enabled us to build out that network 
and all the lessons learned, and being able to capture that. A 
number of those people have walked out the door.
    Fortunately, we have had some very good people who have 
come in in the interim years. I know that General Berrier and 
DIA is really focused on this and I'll pass to him if you want 
to get more. But we can come back and brief in more detail on 
this.
    Mr. Waltz. I understand we're thinking about it. We need to 
be doing it. We, actually, frankly, should have been doing it 
years ago so that we can recontact those sources.
    It needs--I want to be clear this isn't for historians. 
This is to be usable, accessible, and we need to learn from the 
mistakes because it wasn't done when we withdrew from Iraq, and 
we all know how we had to go back in.
    And I'm really looking for action now while we can. Does 
anyone have the lead? Is this being done or is this something 
we need to mandate through the NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] process?
    I can't hear you, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr. Moultrie. From USD(I&S) perspective, we--we're taking 
the lead to ensure that Defense Intelligence Enterprise is 
focused on this. You can hold us accountable for working across 
the Department with others to ensure that the intelligence 
capture piece is there and we'll work closely with the rest of 
the combat support agency enterprises to make sure you have 
this information.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Thank you. And I'll absolutely do 
that because I think future lives are going to depend on it.
    General Nakasone, how do we establish deterrence? I know 
you've thought and spoken a lot about this. How do we establish 
deterrence in the--in the cyberspace?
    I just--I am not convinced that we can play perfect defense 
across not just the military enterprise but the private sector, 
and I know DHS has a big piece of that.
    But from your perspective, how do we--how do we raise costs 
on our adversaries so that this gets--these attacks get down to 
a manageable level?
    General Nakasone. Congressman, I think there are really 
three different parts of this that have to be established. One 
is the idea that policies and authorities are, clearly, in 
place that address adversaries, whether or not it's criminal 
behavior or whether it's nation-state behavior.
    The second piece is that a level of resilience has to--has 
to come up, and I think the executive order that was released 
by the administration is important. This is--you know, this is 
about our critical infrastructure in terms of what's most 
vulnerable right now.
    And the last piece is we need to think of this in not only 
cyber against an adversary but, you know, what are we going to 
bring as a government. Our experience defending the elections 
in 2018 and 2020, we can have an effective cyber attack that 
lasts this long.
    We can have a cyber attack, information operations, 
negotiations in terms of diplomatic sanctions, and then 
Treasury sanctions that last this long. This is--this is the 
way that we get after our adversaries.
    Mr. Waltz. No, I think that's fantastic. I'm really focused 
on the first piece and where we can be helpful, and where I'd 
appreciate an answer for the record, as I'm over my time, is it 
reminds me of the terrorism problem in the 1990s when it was 
viewed as a criminal issue and we couldn't apply title 10 and 
military assets to that. And I'm air-quoting criminal issue.
    After 9/11, obviously, we changed our view. It seems to me 
that we may need to do the same, that these are kind of dual-
use criminal entities that blend over into intelligence and 
other--you know, our allies don't see the clear lines. I mean, 
excuse me, our adversaries don't see the clear lines that our 
authorities do.
    So if you could come back to me with what legislatively or 
what from authority standpoint to go after criminal groups with 
your assets if that's what we need to do, I'd appreciate it.
    General Nakasone. I look forward to it. And I will just say 
I do see a role for title 10 in the space that you're talking 
about.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Right now, Representative Murphy.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for your testimony.
    You know, Mr. Moultrie, I've been long concerned about our 
adversaries' ability to compromise our national security and 
our democracy by, basically, spreading disinformation through 
hyperrealistic but forged videos and audios known as deepfakes.
    And in late 2019, Congress approved a bill that I authored 
to require the intelligence community to prepare an assessment 
on how foreign countries are using or could use deepfake 
technology to harm our interests, and then also to explain how 
the intelligence community is working to develop appropriate 
countermeasures.
    You know, it's the first time that Congress ever passed 
legislation on this emerging threat. I was wondering if you 
could update us a bit on the nature of this threat and how the 
IC is postured to combat it.
    Mr. Moultrie. Representative Murphy, thank you for the 
question. Deepfakes are extremely concerning to us and it'll be 
a priority. It has been a priority of ours to understand them, 
to be able to have the tools to quickly discern what's real, 
what's not real.
    I haven't been briefed on specific programs. I'm 11 days 
into the job. And so, you know, I will--this is a question that 
I also took during my confirmation hearing and I--at that time, 
I gave my word to really understand this.
    I've seen this in the private sector and the capabilities 
that can be thrown at us, and I believe that they already are 
being thrown at us.
    And it becomes very important for command and control, as 
you know, and other things that are important to the Department 
of Defense and just the continuity of government of the United 
States.
    So you have my commitment to delve into this, to find out 
exactly where we are and to come back and talk you through, 
walk you through, where we are with getting on with this and to 
give you my assessment of what we need to do better in this 
space.
    Mrs. Murphy. Well, both my congratulations for your new 
job, but also my sympathies that you're appearing before 
Congress 11 days into it.
    And I'm going to follow up on another issue that is of 
interest to me for you, and it's, basically, our effort to 
combat our adversaries' use of disinformation.
    You know, the joint written testimony, basically, states 
that American interests may be served by sharing classified 
information with our trusted allies and partners, sharing 
declassified and unclassified information with the American 
public, which you all have talked a bit about in this hearing 
about trying to make sure that you classify at the appropriate 
level.
    But I think, you know, as Winston Churchill famously said, 
a lie gets halfway around the world before the truth has a 
chance to put its pants on, and he said that way before the 
advent of the digital age and I think that is even more true 
today than ever before.
    And knowing that we're engaged in information warfare, I 
think, you know, the best defense against disinformation is 
accurate information. To the greatest extent possible, we 
should probably arm our citizens with information about the 
threats they face and the lies that they confront.
    And, you know, can you talk a little bit about how exactly 
the intelligence community is overcoming its sort of natural 
propensity for secrecy and declassifying accurate information 
to be able to share with the American people to kind of rebut 
this disinformation, at the same time still protecting 
intelligence sources and methods?
    Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Representative Murphy, our goal is to 
ensure that we're classifying at the right level and not 
overclassifying, especially in this space where there's so much 
disinformation out there.
    Just ensuring that we can work with others across the 
government to ensure that they understand, I think, first, we 
have to start, as you rightly said, within the intelligence 
community to ensure that we are declassifying what we need to 
declassify, then working with other government agencies who 
have responsibilities for disseminating to our population what 
the real threats are, working with Homeland Security and others 
to ensure that they understand.
    We have integrators who help us do that, but then 
approaching it holistically. Our allies and partners play a key 
role in this. They understand what's happening in their space. 
Many times things have happened in their space before they 
happen in our space.
    So working to ensure that we have a global view of this, a 
global message that we have, and then that we message our 
populations at the same time. Because as you said, if for some 
reason there's a propensity, and maybe it's a cultural thing, 
for people to want to believe something that may be inaccurate 
instead of believing what may be true and good.
    And so there is--there is a culturalization piece that has 
to occur here. There are experts in the government that are 
outside the intelligence community.
    Working closely with them, working closely with you and 
your constituents to understand what their concerns are, I 
think that's really important that you have the constituent 
piece we don't and then using that whole-of-government approach 
will be important to us. You have our commitment to do that.
    Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you so much, and I will yield 
back the remainder of my time. Thank you.
    Mr. Moultrie. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Murphy.
    I think we're done with our normal rank order questions. 
Let me see if there's any other member that has any other 
questions with the remaining time.
    I certainly don't as the chairman. I'm thinking Ranking 
Member Kelly does not.
    You're recognized, Representative Murphy. Go ahead.
    Mrs. Murphy. I did have one more question and I wanted to 
make sure I had time for the response.
    You know, General Nakasone and Lieutenant General Berrier, 
I'm really focused on making sure that the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise is recruiting and retaining native speakers of key 
foreign languages and training nonnative speakers to high 
levels of proficiency.
    You all have already talked about in this hearing about the 
need to have your--the people represent kind of the diversity 
of the country but also the need to have folks who are able to 
be able to blend in foreign situations.
    And in the SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] context, 
you know, I'm focused on the SOFTS [Special Operations Forces 
Teletraining System] language school and, basically, all the 
benefits that come with training civilian service members, 
contractors, et cetera, with foreign language capabilities.
    And I saw some amazing things when I went to see the Joint 
MISO [Military Information Support Operations] WebOps Center, 
or the JMWC, where they had people who were native speakers or 
folks who had been trained to native level of language 
proficiency.
    Can you talk a little bit more about what specific efforts 
you're making on this front and how they're going?
    General Nakasone. So, Congressman, I'll begin and then, 
certainly, I'm sure General Berrier has a few thoughts.
    So we're doing it every single day. I have over 6,000 
linguists here at the National Security Agency. We drive a 
series of different language development efforts.
    In terms of the work that's being done with military 
information support operations and military deception 
operations, that's done in partnership between the National 
Security Agency and Cyber Command.
    I would offer anytime you'd like to see that at the highest 
level in terms of what we're able to do against adversaries 
that are truly nation-state adversaries, and I think that would 
be of great interest to you.
    But it begins with being able to drive the standards. 
That's the most important thing that I can do as director of 
NSA is ensure that what's coming out of the military pipeline, 
what's coming out of our National Cryptologic School, is 
meeting the needs for us and what we need to be able to do 
language-wise. And that, as you indicated, is really the 
signature of success.
    General Berrier.
    General Berrier. Thanks, sir.
    Representative Murphy, our language program isn't as robust 
as the NSA language program for a variety of reasons, as you 
can imagine, but it is no less important. And so we need our 
collectors in language. We need our analysts in language. All 
of our attaches go to--go to language--extensive language 
training before we send them out to the field.
    So it's an important program for us, and the more hard 
languages we can get--Chinese, Russian, Arabic--I mean, that 
really is the future for us as we move in great power 
competition.
    And so, you know, with our--with our footprint in the 
combatant commands, having analysts that understand and know 
the language as they're doing their intelligence analysis is so 
much more powerful.
    So thank you for that question.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, and I look forward to setting up a 
time to come visit. Thank you for the invitation. I yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Representative Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Yeah, just one quick question for General 
Nakasone.
    Sir, with your pulse on all the threats that we face out 
there as a country, what would you consider to be the United 
States top security threat or the top couple?
    General Nakasone. So, Congressman, I think the--both the 
International Security Strategy and Secretary of Defense's 
guidance to us has been pretty clear. China is the pacing 
competitor for us. This is what we looked at in terms of where 
we're at today.
    I would also offer, particularly for myself and General 
Berrier who've been in the service for quite some time, it's a 
return to a near-peer adversary.
    But the difference is the fact that this near-peer 
adversary is not only growing militarily but informationally, 
technologically, economically, diplomatically, areas that China 
has that, obviously, has our focus and, certainly, the focus of 
the Department.
    Mr. Franklin. Great. Thank you. That's all I had, Chairman. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Representative Sherrill and then Representative Waltz.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you so much.
    You know, I think Representative Franklin brought up MARS a 
bit, and I understand that part of the goals of MARS--part of 
the goal is to automate elements of intelligence, discovery, or 
analysis, basically, to connect the dots and notice trends 
through machine-learning, automation, in some cases artificial 
intelligence.
    So how are you dealing now with the different compartments 
and classifications and special access programs when you want 
the machine-enabled process to connect those dots, General 
Berrier?
    General Berrier. Representative, it's a great question and 
when we bring you down for an overview of the program you'll 
see it in rich detail. But really talking about MARS, using all 
of those sort of standards, kind of intelligence sources that 
we have had for years, whether that's through national 
technical means or others, that doesn't change in MARS.
    I think the difference with MARS now is we're adding so 
much more richer context with all of the publicly available 
information that is out there that allows us to enrich each and 
every single file.
    And so you'll go from hundreds of thousands of data bits to 
millions of data bits across the entire program, and so it's 
happening at speed. The tools that we're using right now are 
really enriching everything that we're doing, and we do look 
forward to showing you that.
    Ms. Sherrill. I look forward to it. I was also curious, 
it's my understanding that MARS is a replacement for the MIDB 
architecture, which is over 20 years old.
    So what previous efforts have you made to upgrade MIDB or 
develop other analytic systems, and do you have any lessons 
learned from--that you're now applying to the MARS system?
    General Berrier. Right. So if you think about MIDB, it's 
actually older than 20 years old, and so it comes from another 
age. And so, you know, we have had to modify and adapt MIDB to 
the post-9/11 and post-ODNI world.
    And so, you know, the database itself has been somewhat 
automated. But I would call it, you know, it's a clunky Ford. 
It is not a--it is not a Lamborghini by any stretch of the 
imagination. It still requires a lot of manual interface.
    Primarily, the lessons that we have learned from this are 
really sharing with our partners, how we ingest their data and 
how we're able to share with them and then third parties. And 
when you do get the overview, we'll be happy to run you through 
the details of that.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thanks. And just a final question. A 2020 GAO 
study noted some concerns related to the MARS development and a 
lack of a strategic plan to engage with stakeholders.
    So it sounds like you've sort of been thinking along those 
lines on how to do that. What changes have you made to ensure 
that they're appropriately engaged?
    General Berrier. First off, Representative, I would say 
it's a program of record, and so by just designated it as a 
Department of Defense and DNI program of record, we have kind 
of put it on the map as a thing and now we have a number of 
road shows that we're talking to the services about.
    It's involved in all of our meetings about the joint 
warfighting concept with the DOD, and so I think there's a much 
greater awareness right now about what MARS will do. If you 
have--if you have a JWICS account, you will be able to tap into 
MARS and use it effectively.
    Ms. Sherrill. That sounds great. Thank you, and I yield 
back.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Sherrill.
    And now we have Representative Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah, thank you.
    General Nakasone, I just wanted to continue with your 
thoughts on what title 10 authorities, how and what gaps you 
have to apply to, you know, again, using kind of the terrorism 
from the 1990s versus the 2000s analogy that you can or would 
like to apply to these.
    And I'm putting kind of air quotes around criminal groups 
because, from my understanding, many of them are dual-hatted 
with a number of our adversaries' official government 
organizations.
    General Nakasone. Congressman, in terms of where we're at 
right now, I think I have all the authorities I need to be able 
to prosecute intelligence-wise against these adversaries 
outside of the United States.
    That's where we, obviously, have our--remit our 
authorities, and I think that, as the director of NSA, that's 
not a challenge. I think the question becomes, you know, as we 
take a look, and I think you're referring specifically to 
ransomware, how do we bring this all together, right.
    So how do we do what we're doing outside the United States, 
being able to share that with the FBI, DHS, private sector, to 
be able to get after adversaries that are targeting our 
critical infrastructure like we have seen over the past several 
months.
    This is the area right now that the administration is 
working towards in terms of understanding who's going to have 
the lead and how are we going to deal with this.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah. So I think you're getting at precisely 
what I'm questioning, and it's that dynamic of who has the lead 
within the U.S. Government, right, and whether this is a 
criminal activity or whether this is--whether this is an attack 
on the United States.
    I don't think many American people see a big distinction if 
the interface or the control center for a pipeline is taken out 
from a missile, sabotage, or cyber, and really who's on the 
other end of it if it's coming from a foreign actor, many of 
whom moonlight as criminals but are also intelligence officers 
or even have military affiliations or could be surrogates.
    So I think what I'm probably asking is a bigger policy 
question. Should this be handed off if it's coming externally 
and should you--do you believe you have the authority if we 
have the political will, if you're given the instruction, to 
take military action against these groups?
    And, again, that was--that was a whole sea change 
transition that we had to make against terrorist groups where 
we were trying to arrest Osama bin Laden's inner circle around 
the world rather than take action and target them militarily.
    So I guess my question is do you--do you have the--do you 
have the authority to take action militarily if given the order 
and should we be? How do we establish--it seems to be until we 
go on offense we will not be able to establish deterrence.
    General Nakasone. So, again, let me make sure that I'm 
answering this in the--in the role that's appropriate.
    So as the director of NSA, as I mentioned, you know, 
collecting intelligence outside the United States I have the 
authorities. As the commander of U.S. Cyber Command operating 
outside the United States with the policies and authorities 
that have been established----
    Mr. Waltz. Right.
    General Nakasone [continuing]. I think I have all that I 
need between National Security Policy Memorandum 13 and the 
NDAA legislation of 2019 that said cyber is a traditional 
military activity.
    That's a very tactical answer to a broader question you 
have policy-wise, which I'll defer, obviously, to the policy 
experts. But this is, obviously, what's going on right now is 
who will have the lead on that and, you know, DOD will 
certainly have a role operating outside the United States, I 
would imagine.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay, great. No, thank you. You're confirming 
for me that this is a matter of policy and political will to 
take should we decide to, as a country--should the 
administration decide to take military action against what some 
are classifying as criminal actors. Is that--is that an 
accurate kind of resuscitation?
    General Nakasone. I think so.
    Mr. Waltz. I'm a big believer in the briefback, right, to 
make sure I understand.
    General Nakasone. Again, sir, I think what you're 
identifying is a broader policy question in terms of who is 
going to lead, who is going to--and what type of activities are 
going to take place.
    My role is, obviously, as the commander of U.S. Cyber 
Command, is provide a series of options, just like any other 
combatant commander.
    Mr. Waltz. Yes. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    And final question. On the--on the recruitment and the 
retention issue, do you have any data or do you have numbers on 
how many of your cyber warriors that decide to leave Active 
Duty transition into the Guard and Reserve and is that a 
specific focus area for you?
    It seems to me we could retain a lot of that talent. In 
fact, we could probably improve the capabilities of the force 
as they go out to the private sector but maintain that bridge 
and that toe in the water back through the Guard and Reserve.
    And then a related--we have also had a series of 
authorities for Active Duty soldiers to go out into the private 
sector but then come back in at the field-grade level for 
officers and at the mid-NCO [non-commissioned officer].
    How many--is that actually being exercised? How many are 
going out, say, to big tech but then coming back in on the 
Active Duty side?
    And, you know, I know, with 25 years in the military, until 
their peers see their colleagues doing that and still getting 
promoted and still being successful that that probably won't be 
as robust as we'd like it to be.
    General Nakasone. Congressman, I think those are two 
questions that I will take for the record because I do need to 
get the data on that.
    I can tell you, though, with regards to the Reserve 
Component--National Guard, Reserve forces--tremendous role that 
they play today, and both not only on the National Security 
Agency side but also on the U.S. Cyber Command side, and 
that's, again, information that I can include in the--in the 
response.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield. Appreciate the 
second round.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. And with that, if we have no other 
questions, I appreciate everyone that came in and testified 
before, General Berrier, General Nakasone, and, lastly, our--
actually, I apologize--newly sworn in Under Secretary of 
Defense Moultrie.
    Thank you, again for joining us, and we'll continue to have 
this conversation. I look forward to further testimony.
    Have a good one.
    Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, committee.
    [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             June 11, 2021
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             June 11, 2021

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             June 11, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRAVES

    Mr. Graves. How will the capabilities Project Maven has driven be 
operationalized so that the success of the program is not lost? I 
understand NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] may be 
responsible for part of Project Maven's scope in the future; what is 
the plan for the transition of Project Maven from the DOD to NGA?
    Mr. Moultrie. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKLIN
    Mr. Franklin. To what extent, if any, does the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise see climate change to be a threat to National Security?
    Mr. Moultrie. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Franklin. To what extent, if any, does the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise see climate change to be a threat to National Security?
    General Nakasone. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Franklin. To what extent, if any, does the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise see climate change to be a threat to National Security?
    General Berrier. [The information is classified and retained in the 
subcommittee files.]

                                  [all]