[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                       [H.A.S.C. No. 117-27]

                    REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                     STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

                     FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS

                    DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 4, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




                          ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
47-464               WASHINGTON : 2022 
                                     
  


          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman

RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  DON BACON, Nebraska
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice   C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    Chair

                Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
               Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     2

                               WITNESSES

Szymanski, VADM Timothy G., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special 
  Operations Command.............................................     6
Vann, Brandi C., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. 
  Department of Defense..........................................     5
Walsh, Hon. Jennifer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, U.S. 
  Department of Defense..........................................     3
Williams, Rhys, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 
  U.S. Department of Defense.....................................     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Gallego. Hon. Ruben..........................................    33
    Kelly, Hon. Trent............................................    34
    Szymanski, VADM Timothy G....................................    60
    Vann, Brandi C...............................................    45
    Walsh, Hon. Jennifer.........................................    35
    Williams, Rhys...............................................    70

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................    82
    Mr. Franklin.................................................    84
    Mr. Kelly....................................................    82
    Mr. Larsen...................................................    81
    Ms. Sherrill.................................................    85
    
               REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,

  POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2022

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                              Washington, DC, Tuesday, May 4, 2021.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Ruben Gallego (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
  ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. The committee will come to order. Members who 
are joining remotely must be visible on screen for the person's 
identity verification, establishing and maintaining a quorum, 
participating in the proceeding, and voting. Those members must 
continue to use the software platform as a video function while 
in attendance, unless they experience connectivity issues, or 
other technical problems that render them unable to participate 
on camera. If the member experiences technical difficulties, 
they should contact the committee staff for assistance. Video 
of members' participation [will be] broadcast in the room and 
via television/internet feeds. Members participating remotely 
must seek recognition verbally, and they are asked to mute 
their microphones when they are not speaking. Members who are 
participating remotely are reminded to keep their software 
platform's video function on the entire time they attend the 
proceedings. Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding.
    If members depart for a short while for reasons other than 
joining a different proceeding, they should leave the video 
function on. If members will be absent for a significant period 
to depart for a different proceeding, they should exit the 
software platform entirely and then rejoin if they return. 
Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
indicate with staff regarding technical or logistical support 
issues only.
    Finally, I designated committee staff members to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphone to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    Good morning. Today, we will be hearing the testimony 
regarding the current and projected state of the defense 
apparatus to counter weapons of mass destruction. The witnesses 
represent the Department of Defense's extensive infrastructure 
necessary to comprehensively plan for, track, and mitigate the 
growing threats which [comprise] weapons of mass destruction. 
Even with recent demonstrations by authoritarian regimes to 
deploy biological and chemical weapons against their own 
citizens, the threat of WMD is often understood as a high-yield 
nuclear nation killers.
    However, emerging biotechnologies and illicit narcotics 
could be weaponized and present existential threats to the 
country. Synthetic biology, pardon me, synthetic biological 
weapons increase the opportunity for less sophisticated 
adversaries to create chemical and biological weapons without 
requiring funding, infrastructure, or materielly historic--or 
anything that is materiel historically necessary.
    Further, the 2021 Annual Threat Assessment provided by the 
Director of National Intelligence highlights the growing threat 
from the development of chemical precursors to produce illicit 
narcotics such as fentanyl, which has already devastated 
segments of the U.S. population.
    The COVID-19 [coronavirus] pandemic has shown just how 
devastating biological threats can be. In this case, the novel 
coronavirus was not weaponized, but it could be.
    I am interested in hearing what we are doing to firmly 
detect and deter these amorphous threats. These threats are 
exacerbated by the rapid proliferation of accessible 
technologies, which are often easily accessible or commercially 
available, creating an omnipresent threat that must be 
considered strategically while preparing to confront the 
threats tactically.
    With that, let me introduce our four witnesses who are 
responsible for the modernization of the Department's CWMD 
[countering weapons of mass destruction] strategies, policies, 
and programs to reflect today's threat environment with the 
capability and the needs of tomorrow. We look forward to 
hearing their testimonies regarding this critical topic.
    The Honorable Jennifer Walsh, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; 
the Honorable Brandi C. Vann, Acting Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; 
and Vice Admiral Timothy Szymanski, Deputy Commander of U.S. 
Special Operations Command; and Dr. Rhys M. Williams, Acting 
Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
    Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. I look forward to your 
discussion and will now recognize Ranking Member Kelly for his 
opening remarks.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the 
Appendix on page 33.]

     STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND 
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS

    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your opening 
remarks and your leadership in organizing this morning's 
posture hearing. Today, we will hear from four experts across 
the countering weapons of mass destruction portfolio.
    There is a lot going on from the usual bad actors of China, 
Russia, Iran, North Korea, and various terrorist organizations 
that I look forward to hearing about during this session. The 
continued use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, 
poisoning of Alexei Navalny and Sergei Skripal by Russia, and 
research of biological weapons by China are just a few 
highlights of this threat.
    A growing concern brought to the forefront from the ongoing 
coronavirus pandemic is the threat of biological weapons 
directed at our military and private citizens. The risk of 
weaponized aerosol fentanyl is just one example of many 
alarming and growing threats.
    I am interested to hear from our witnesses today on what we 
are doing to not only identify these types of threats but also 
what we are doing to mitigate the threats both for our deployed 
troops and our citizens here in the homeland. I am also 
interested to hear our witnesses' views on the global threat 
posture, especially in the context of great power competition 
and potential for kinetic engagement with adversaries like 
China.
    Lastly, I am deeply concerned about how the Biden 
administration's budget will affect our overall counter weapons 
of mass destruction preparedness. The ongoing use of chemical 
threats, coupled with the effects seen from the coronavirus, 
illuminates the direness of this. And it seems like failing to 
properly invest in these resources will have grave 
consequences.
    I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time 
today. I look forward to continuing work with our counter-WMD 
experts during the 117th Congress to ensure we are 
appropriately postured to meet and defeat the threats shaped by 
weapons of mass destruction.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly can be found in the 
Appendix on page 34.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
    I greatly appreciate your comments and dealing with me. 
Next, thank you--now, we are going to move on to questions and 
hearing from our witnesses. We will start with Ms. Walsh. You 
are now recognized.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JENNIFER WALSH, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY, 
                   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Walsh. Thank you.
    Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the 
subcommittee, I am honored to testify on the Department of 
Defense's [DOD's] efforts related to countering weapons of mass 
destruction or CWMD. DOD's CWMD mission is to dissuade, deter, 
and, when necessary, defeat actors of concern who threaten or 
use WMD against the United States and our interests. I work 
alongside the members of this panel to develop the policies, 
strategies, capabilities, and expertise needed to accomplish 
this mission.
    My written statement describes the WMD threat landscape. 
And I want to emphasize that the Department continues to 
improve its ability to dissuade, deter, and defeat these 
threats while maintaining the ability to respond to and 
mitigate the effects of WMD use. We have taken action to meet 
WMD challenges, and as the nature of WMD threats is evolving, 
we know we have more work to do.
    The Department has three lines of effort to organize our 
work to counter WMD threats: prevent acquisition, contain and 
reduce threats, and respond to crises. To prevent acquisition 
or contain existing threats, the Department leverages its 
unique tools and expertise in support of a whole-of-government 
approach to mitigate the risk of global WMD proliferation and 
threat actors' pursuit of WMD advancements. Examples include 
supporting global norms under the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, or NPT; remaining postured to conduct WMD interdiction, 
and preparing partners to do so; and implementing United 
Nations sanctions to prevent North Korean illicit trade.
    Second, the Department leads the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction, or CTR, program, which works with partner nations to 
secure and eliminate WMD and WMD-related materials. The DOD CTR 
program is active in more than 30 countries and has helped a 
number of these to more rapidly identify and respond to COVID-
19. CTR is called the Nunn-Lugar program after the two 
visionary Senators who championed its creation. And I want to 
thank Congress for its continued support for CTR, which has 
made and continues to make valuable contributions to U.S. and 
global security.
    Third, we developed the capability and capacity of the 
joint force, allies, and partners to operate in a chemical, 
biological, radiological, or a nuclear, or CBRN, contaminated 
environment. As the Department increases focus on competition 
among great powers, developing the capabilities necessary for 
us to fight and win in a CBRN contested environment in those 
theaters becomes critical. The Department also works with our 
allies and partners to confirm that U.S. CBRN defense 
capabilities are interoperable and to encourage partner nations 
to share the burden of CBRN defense.
    Achieving effects across this mission space is a 
Department-wide effort, and we must make hard choices about how 
we prioritize our activities and investments. The DOD CWMD-
Unity of Effort Council brings together 20-plus stakeholders 
across the Department to collaborate on CWMD policy and 
strategic goals. In 2020, the council helped create inaugural 
Department-wide CWMD priorities approved by the Secretary of 
Defense. In 2021, we are conducting an implementation review to 
assess Department-wide alignment with these priorities and 
guidance.
    As administration officials direct and develop new national 
and departmental strategy reviews and guidance documents, DOD's 
CWMD stakeholders will be focused on addressing the dynamic 
CWMD threat and ensuring that it gets space in these documents, 
including posturing the Department to mitigate biological 
threats more effectively and improving readiness for CBRN 
changes in Europe and Asia.
    Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, 
and thank you for your continued support for the CWMD mission. 
I look forward to your discussion.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Walsh can be found in the 
Appendix on page 35.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ms. Walsh. Now, let's move to Dr. 
Vann.

  STATEMENT OF BRANDI C. VANN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, 
                   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Vann. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member 
Kelly, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is 
an honor and a privilege to testify before you today on behalf 
of the men and women of the Department of Defense that comprise 
the United States counter weapons of mass destruction 
enterprise. These dedicated Americans work tirelessly to defend 
our brave service members, the Nation, and our international 
partners and allies from the increasing threat posed by the 
most devastating weapons created.
    I would also like to thank my fellow witnesses for their 
dedication and commitment to our joint enterprise through which 
we are able to defend the Nation and our warfighters from WMD.
    The CWMD enterprise ensures that the United States 
maintains its enduring technological advantage when countering 
present and emerging threats. The NCB [Nuclear, Chemical, and 
Biological Defense Programs] office, including the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency, is responsible for ensuring the 
Department maintains the capability and readiness to counter 
WMD across the threat landscape. To that end, the NCB office is 
aligning ourselves to meet the direction given by the 
President's Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and 
the Secretary's three priorities. Our efforts will enable us to 
close today's gaps, rapidly mitigate vulnerabilities, 
anticipate emerging threats, and strengthen our domestic and 
international partnerships.
    But the pace of technology continues to move faster and 
faster, and as a result, the players on the world stage are 
shifting, the conflict landscape is changing, and so are the 
hazards that we all face, making our jobs ever more complex. 
Overcoming these changes and the emergence and reemergence of 
unique CBRN threats requires the Department first to understand 
that emerging threats landscape and then develop adaptive 
capabilities to respond to these threats as they arise. In 
doing so, we can assure that the joint force can fight and win 
in CBRN contested environments, prepare for surprise from 
emerging threats, and reduce the risk that they pose.
    To modernize the force, the Department will work closely 
with Congress as we shift emphasis from legacy systems to 
cutting-edge capabilities. We are moving to get ahead of the 
threat by anticipating and understanding the convergence of 
novel science and technological advances. And as a part of 
layered defense, we can deny the effects of WMD by developing 
and fielding a wide range of defensive equipment.
    Further, fields such as artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, additive manufacturing, and rapid medical 
countermeasure development all provide us an opportunity to 
adapt our defense capabilities quickly and effectively. We 
should embrace the technological revolution within the private 
sector, and lead game-changing technology advancements to 
ensure our warfighters are best prepared for the future threat.
    Finally, the NCB enterprise will expand our collaborations 
with our interagency and international partners, as well as the 
private sector, to spur innovation, deepen interoperability, 
and leverage best practices.
    Our strong relationships with our allies has brought us 
incredible value to our ability to protect, detect, and 
mitigate our forces against WMD threats, and have informed 
great strides in our ability to develop and acquire 
technologies for our force.
    The NCB enterprise remains focused on anticipating the 
future threat by closing capability gaps and ensuring the joint 
force prevails in a contaminated environment. We will continue 
to remain behind the warfighter and ahead of the threat to 
ensure our joint force's ability to survive, operate, and 
regenerate combat power in the future.
    On behalf of the NCB enterprise, I would like to thank the 
committee for its support and dedication to improving our 
capabilities to address the current and emerging threats base.
    Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, thank you again for 
the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Vann can be found in the 
Appendix on page 45.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Dr. Vann.
    Next, we will have Vice Admiral Szymanski.

STATEMENT OF VADM TIMOTHY G. SZYMANSKI, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, 
                U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

    Admiral Szymanski. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking 
Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 
the opportunity to represent the United States Special 
Operations Command [USSOCOM] today. On behalf of General 
Clarke, it is my privilege to join Ms. Walsh, Dr. Vann, and Dr. 
Williams at this hearing on how we work together to address 
some of the most critical national security challenges facing 
our country.
    The 2017 Unified Command Plan directed USSOCOM to 
coordinate the CWMD mission across the Department, and General 
Clarke has sustained that strategic course. The 2021 Unified 
Command Plan reiterates USSOCOM's responsibility for planning 
the Department's CWMD efforts as directed by the Secretary. We 
conduct strategic planning, assess the Department's execution 
of the CWMD campaign, make recommendations to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, and sustain 
the DOD-wide functional campaign plan that enables the joint 
force to improve coordination in countering transregional WMD 
threats.
    The landscape of nuclear, chemical, and biological threats 
has continued to evolve over this past year. We monitor and 
analyze progression of existing and over-the-horizon WMD 
programs closely, with essential support from the Defense 
Intelligence Agency. The classification level of this forum 
limits the detail I can provide from our vantage point, but 
news headlines are a good indicator of the complexity and the 
nature of the threat.
    We have seen norms against the use of chemical weapons 
continue to erode following Russia's attempted assassination of 
a former Russian intelligence officer with a Novichok nerve 
agent in the United Kingdom in 2018 and, more recently, the 
attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexei 
Navalny with another Novichok nerve agent in August 2020.
    China meanwhile is continuing the most rapid expansion of 
platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history, 
and it intends, as the Director of National Intelligence made 
clear in this year's Annual Threat Assessment, to at least 
double the size of its nuclear stockpile during the next decade 
and to field a nuclear triad.
    And, finally, COVID-19 pandemic is a stark reminder of our 
collective vulnerability to biological threats. Clearly, WMDs 
are complex, transregional challenges that demand the 
application of specialized expertise and authorities across our 
government as well as our foreign allies and partners.
    The Department of Defense plays a unique and critical 
supporting role to our interagency colleagues, especially at 
the Departments of Energy, State, Treasury, and Commerce, as 
well as our law enforcement entities, to prevent and contain 
WMD threats, even as we prepare to respond to WMD crises.
    We coordinate, therefore, across not only the Department of 
Defense, but also with interagency colleagues and foreign 
allies and partners, without whom achieving U.S. objectives 
would be exceedingly difficult. We also work closely with the 
Joint Staff, combatant commands, and services to regularly 
assess the Department's CWMD campaign and ensure the 
Department's plans appropriately address changes in the WMD 
threat environment.
    We strive to improve our methodology and ensure it provides 
timely, reliable, relevant, and actionable information to 
support senior Department decision making. Our aim is to better 
support senior leaders charged with employing our joint force 
today, developing and preparing it for tomorrow, and helping to 
design a military that is ready to fight and win against both 
current and future WMD threats.
    In closing, General Clarke and I would like to thank the 
members of this subcommittee for their support of this 
important national security mission. It is a privilege to work 
together with our colleagues to keep our country safe from the 
threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological threats. We look 
forward to our continued partnership with them, with Members of 
Congress, and with our interagency and international partners 
to ensure our safety now and into the future. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Szymanski can be found 
in the Appendix on page 60.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Admiral.
    And now we have Dr. Williams.

  STATEMENT OF RHYS WILLIAMS, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT 
          REDUCTION AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Williams. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your 
continued support of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, or 
DTRA. On behalf of the nearly 2,200 members at DTRA, I am proud 
to appear today alongside my fellow witnesses to talk about our 
unique role enabling the Department of Defense, U.S. 
interagency, and our many international partners to counter and 
deter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats.
    The Department of Defense established DTRA to integrate and 
focus the Department's expertise against the real and ever-
evolving threat of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass 
destruction, or WMD. Under national and departmental policy and 
guidance and through close collaboration across the Department, 
interagency, and our international partners and allies, DTRA 
delivers innovative capabilities that ensure a strong, 
protected, and prepared joint force.
    Part of DTRA's unique value stems from our roles as a 
defense agency and a combat support agency. In our defense 
agency role, we respond to requirements from the services as 
well as from the DOD offices, including the Under Secretaries 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Policy, and 
Research and Engineering. These lines of authority give us 
strategic roles in the counter-WMD fight through nuclear 
mission assurance, treaty verification, building partnership 
capacity, and cooperative threat reduction, among many key 
programs.
    In our combat support agency role, DTRA responds to the 
combatant commands and Joint Staff requirements, offering 
subject-matter expertise, operational analysis, and material 
and nonmaterial solution sets in support of counter-WMD 
planning and operations. These roles, on behalf of both 
national security policy and the warfighter, enable us to 
integrate efforts such that, at home and abroad, we deliver 
mission success to detect, deter, and defeat WMD and emerging 
threats.
    I cannot overstate that people are DTRA's most valuable 
resource. Our staff includes world-class scientists developing 
therapeutics for emerging pathogens, chemical threats; 
technical linguists that help find common ground in complex 
international engagements; tactical specialists securing 
dangerous weapons and materials; and subject-matter experts on 
call 24/7 to provide real-time expertise and decision support 
analysis to all levels of government.
    DTRA's military personnel ensure that we maintain a close 
alignment with warfighter requirements. And our capabilities 
are further amplified by our forward presence at the combatant 
commands, within task forces, and at key interagency locales.
    In addition to its unparalleled workforce, DTRA is an 
agency characterized by partnerships and collaboration. The 
Center of Excellence for global counter-WMD expertise, DTRA 
works closely with technical peers in academia and in industry. 
We team with interagency partners like the Departments of 
State, Energy, Homeland Security, and Health and Human 
Services, and engage equally well with international partners. 
This network, spanning the breadth of the counter-WMD and 
emerging threats enterprise, allows DTRA to use its unique 
expertise to wide-ranging effect, providing integrated 
solutions across the spectrum of competition and conflict.
    There are few greater challenges to U.S. national security 
than those posed by WMD and emerging threats. As the globalized 
threat landscape evolves, DTRA's uniquely skilled workforce and 
robust collaborative network of partners are ready to evolve 
with it, continuing to safeguard the lives and interests of the 
U.S. and our allies abroad.
    Thank you for your time and invitation to participate 
today, and I look toward to your questions
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Williams can be found in the 
Appendix on page 70.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Dr. Williams.
    And thank you for hosting us a couple of weeks back.
    We are going to now move on to the question period. Each 
member will have 5 minutes to ask questions. We will alternate 
between minority and majority, and I will take the first 
question.
    We can only defeat the threats from weapons of mass 
destruction with collective action in concert with our allies, 
partners, as well as international bodies. I am concerned that 
we are not working as closely as we should with countries such 
as South Korea, India, and Japan.
    How close are we working with South Korea to succeed in the 
CWMD mission? And is there anything preventing you from 
sharing, collaborating with our friends in South Korea? And 
then, lastly, how prepared--well, we will just go to that. 
Let's just start with those two questions. And can we start 
with Dr. Vann, and then, Ms. Walsh, if you can answer my first 
two questions. And if you need me to repeat them, please just 
ask.
    Dr. Vann. Yes, thank you, Chairman Gallego, for that 
question. I think that it is important to say that when we are 
developing technologies with our joint force, we do work with 
our allies and partners, significantly, excuse me, in order to 
assess and test equipment and integrate our forces.
    Specific to Republic of Korea, we have active in-country 
engagements with our allies in Korea that is seeking to not 
only partner in our readiness but also in reviews of our 
capabilities with our Korean counterparts. The rest of it I 
guess I will defer to Ms. Walsh, her response.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Doctor.
    Ms. Walsh.
    Ms. Walsh. Thank you very much. With any of our bilateral 
defense relationships, the issues that we raise and the 
capability or capacity development that we work together, it is 
a bilateral process. And so it is not just about the U.S. 
offering; it is about another country being a willing partner.
    With respect to the Republic of Korea, we have very close 
bilateral relationships, mil to mil, across the chemical, 
biological, and nuclear cooperation. The Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program has activities across the chem, bio, and 
nuclear space. We are working with our Republic of Korea allies 
to ensure that we are ready for a WMD contingency. Regardless 
of what the threat is, the Koreans bear responsibility, we bear 
responsibility, to ensure that what we have committed to each 
other is on track and that we can deliver those capabilities. 
We meet annually in a CWMD bilateral forum with our Republic of 
Korea counterparts so that we can ensure that we have trust and 
confidence. And then, obviously, U.S. Forces Korea has daily 
contact with their Korean counterparts. These issues are 
definitely top of the list of concerns and threats, and, 
therefore, these get attention to be sure that we are prepared 
to work with them. With--I am sorry?
    Mr. Gallego. No, go ahead. I am sorry. I apologize.
    Ms. Walsh. You had also asked about Japan.
    With Japan, discussions about WMD are handled through our 
bilateral relationship channels. The Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program is not active in Japan. But I can assure you 
that we speak regularly about ensuring that through extended 
deterrence and U.S. capabilities, that these conversations do 
happen on a bilateral basis with our Japanese counterparts.
    With respect to India, we through--in addressing biological 
threats, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program facilitates a 
Track 2 biosecurity dialogue. And then through the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program, with respect to nuclear issues, we 
have a--we support a Track 1.5 dialogue with our Indian 
counterparts. Dr. Williams is probably in a better position to 
speak to the details since he has oversight of CTR 
implementation.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, ma'am.
    Dr. Williams, please.
    Dr. Williams. The only thing I would add, sir, is as far as 
the Republic of Korea goes, to amplify what both Dr. Vann and 
Ms. Walsh said, we have very close contact with our colleagues 
both on the R&D [research and development] side of the house as 
well as in the cooperative threat reduction space, so much so 
that we recently, last year, just prior to COVID, hosted the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for the Republic of Korea at DTRA 
for a full day of discussion in cooperative agreements. And 
then we routinely have teams going back and forth. And we also 
have an embedded team, as was said, at U.S. Forces Korea that 
has constant communication with our allies that are in Korea.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Dr. Williams.
    And, Dr. Vann, how prepared are U.S. Forces in Korea for 
CWMD situations? And how prepared are South Korean troops? I 
forget who I was talking to yesterday, like my WMD experience 
was, you know, on the way to the Syrian border basically 
getting handed atropine and being told to just put this in my 
lung in case something goes bad, which is not good.
    Dr. Vann. Yes, sir. Yes, not optimal, for sure. So our 
forces that are currently in Korea--well, first, let me say, 
what we do to focus our programs is we actually have a service 
board that sits on--sits with us as we develop RDA,--research, 
development, and acquisition--capabilities for the joint force 
structure. We use that service board to help identify 
capability requirements for the joint force as well as help 
integrate into the--and across the larger force modernization 
efforts.
    So, in terms of our capabilities for the joint force for 
chemical and biological defense, we have rapidly developing 
capabilities we are developing every single day. Last year, we 
developed over a million pieces of protective and detection 
equipment for our forces. We have layered defense approaches as 
well, so that goes from everything from detection, both remote 
and point, as well as diagnostic gear, physiological 
monitoring, personal protective equipment, as well as 
mitigation capabilities for disinfection or decontamination of 
any of our equipment and personnel.
    In addition to that, we are continuing to invest in medical 
countermeasures for CBRN threats to get ahead of the atropine 
and to make both vaccination or pretreatments as well as post-
exposure therapeutics more easily adaptable to new and emerging 
threats as well as more effective in its pursuit to mitigate 
the effects of chemical and biological weapons.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Dr. Vann.
    Admiral, earlier, we were talking about working with our 
allies. Is there something in our classification process right 
now that doesn't make it optimal for us to be able to share 
information with our allies or even across the service in order 
for us to, basically, be ready for the CWMD threats of the 
future?
    Admiral Szymanski. Chairman, thanks for the question. I 
think, over the years that SOCOM [Special Operations Command] 
has had the coordinating authority, we have really tried to 
break down the barriers to sharing information. I know just in 
the conferences that we coordinate through the year, we always 
have whatever NDS [National Defense Strategy] WMD threat 
challenge that we are examining that year, we try to have the 
partners, we have a day--it is usually a 2- or 3-day 
conference--and we usually have a day where our foreign 
partners are asked to join and participate in the conference.
    Now, there always are security classification challenges 
that we continue to try to overcome. I think a good example is 
really what we have been doing to help NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization] both in their biological and chemical 
preparedness and response as well as their allied tactical 
publication that allows for more information sharing.
    But information sharing outside of WMD has always been one 
of those obstacles to collaboration that really needs to be 
examined in the moment for the problem that you are trying to 
solve at hand.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Thank you. I yield to Ranking Member 
Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses for being here.
    Mr. Gallego. Ranking Member Kelly, I think I went way more 
than 5 minutes, so please take whatever time you may need.
    Mr. Kelly. [Inaudible] talk about the [inaudible].
    Mr. Gallego. Ranking Member Kelly, one second, is it just 
my connection, but you are breaking up.
    Mr. Kelly. Can you hear me?
    Voice. It is hard to hear Ranking Member Kelly, here in the 
HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing room.
    Mr. Kelly. How about now?
    Mr. Gallego. Yeah. That is better.
    Mr. Kelly. All right. As the Department balances the shift 
in resources between C-VEO [countering violent extremist 
organizations] with GPC [great power competition], what are the 
most significant capability or resource vulnerabilities to the 
countering weapons of mass destruction mission? And I will 
start with you, Vice Admiral, and then the others can chime in.
    Admiral Szymanski. So the resource and challenges, I think, 
in General Clarke's statement a few weeks back, he talked about 
the balance between readiness and modernization as we shift to 
take on strategic competition. The CWMD problem set, the way we 
look at the CWMD problem set, it is robust, it is complex, and 
it is transregional. And there is really--as we think about 
balance of those resources across all of the threat vectors, 
from the most--the VEO with the most rudimentary applications 
or developments of CWMD problem, to the strategic competitors 
who have advanced capabilities across the biological, chemical, 
and nuclear threats spectrum.
    So, from a SOCOM perspective and from a, I think, from the 
Department's perspective, we look at the CWMD challenge, but it 
doesn't really shift across--we have to still look at that 
challenge across all those threat vectors. So the shift did not 
really--hasn't really changed the way we attack or go after or 
try to fight the challenge of the CWMD problem set. Over.
    Mr. Kelly. Anyone else want to add?
    Ms. Walsh. I would like to join in and add that one of the 
reasons that the Unity of Effort Council undertook a DOD-wide 
CWMD prioritization effort was because we recognized this 
spectrum of threats is crowded and that resources are always 
going to be more limited than the threats will bear. And so, by 
prioritizing the greatest WMD threats and associating those 
with where the Department of Defense has the exclusive mission 
to counter, so a leading versus a supporting other U.S. 
Government departments and agencies, it is going to help all of 
our CWMD stakeholder components focus their investments, 
activities, and efforts toward those priorities. It does not 
mean that we are taking our eye off the entirety of the threat 
spectrum, but it is helping us make smart investments. And one 
of the things that we continue to look at is where we can get 
multiple returns on the same investments, whether it is 
nuclear, chemical, or biological threats that we are 
countering. Thank you.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you. And I spoke with three of the four of 
you yesterday, and one of my biggest concerns is that, as we 
shift to global power or competition, that this is a zero-sum, 
zero-sum game when we talk about this arena. And it is 
important that we not only focus on global power, but we also 
look at violent and homegrown terrorist organizations, which 
can do us much, much damage.
    Second, this is for you, Dr. Williams. We have been 
tracking the SARS-COVID-2 origins and DOD and DTRA funding to 
the Wuhan Institute of Virology through its grant to EcoHealth 
Alliance. I am interested if and how each [inaudible] 
government agency given its ties to the PLA [People's 
Liberation Army]?
    Dr. Williams. Chairman, I am afraid you cut for the middle 
of that question, sir. If you could repeat it, please. Over.
    Mr. Kelly. I am talking about the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology and tracking the SARS-COVID-2, and I am wondering what 
kind of risk assessment or risk analysis we conducted and how 
the Wuhan Institute of Virology became the [inaudible] of 
choice for U.S. Government agencies, given its ties to the PLA.
    Dr. Williams. Sir, thank you for your question. Sir, as we 
have looked at this extensively, as you know, sir, there was a 
request from the Congress to the Department a year, 2 years ago 
to look at this funding level as well as again most recently. 
We have done a thorough look at all of our programmatic 
activities to ensure that at least the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency's funding to this NGO [nongovernmental organization] was 
not provided, to the best of our knowledge, into the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology.
    On top of it, sir, our expertise both on programmatics as 
well as kind of our technical expertise looks at all of our 
activities that we invest in for these types of NGOs to make 
sure that the risk for government funding is minimalized, and 
in keeping with the traditions and the boundaries of the 
Federal acquisition process, but, equally as importantly, 
policy as well. I think, Dr. Vann, did you want to add anything 
to this?
    Dr. Vann. I don't have much to add to that. I think that 
that is a good, you know, good review. But I would like to add 
that we also across the NCB did a thorough review to identify 
any potential access or investment into the Wuhan laboratory, 
and we have not identified any. It is something that we 
continue to watch to ensure that our investments are not going 
to places where they should not be.
    Mr. Kelly. Chairman, I am going to ask one last question, 
but I am going to ask that they submit for the record 
[inaudible] the hearing.
    I just want to ask how confident each of you are with the 
full appreciation of the chemical and biological capabilities 
of our adversaries. And if there are gaps, please in writing 
let us know what we can do to close some of those gaps.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    I now yield time to Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I hope your dog stays off 
you this time.
    So my question is really about legacy, and I might have 
difficulty asking this because I have legacy thinking myself. 
So I have to switch my brain a little bit in trying to craft 
this question. I think it is for Vice Admiral Szymanski and 
Director Williams.
    And given what we know and what you have testified to 
regarding synthetic biology, regarding 3D printing, advanced 
manufacturing, these different technologies that both have 
uses, good and evil, who is in charge in the Department for 
ensuring that the women and men in our military understand 
their uses of these technologies and--generally, and then 
understanding the uses of these technologies in the field? I 
can think of a--many 3D printing manufacturing, advanced 
manufacturing plant being deployed with a group of women and 
men in our military in the field for use for certain purposes. 
Who is in charge of educating and upscaling these women and men 
for the uses of these technologies?
    Admiral Szymanski. Thank you for the question, Congressman 
Larsen. So really there is a service requirement and 
responsibility largely for the force generation and how forces 
are equipped--manned, equipped, and trained. From a 
coordinating authority from SOCOM, our responsibility is really 
about the planning--helping the combatant--geographic combatant 
commands plan against how to counter WMD. Then, annually, we 
look and assess against that plan the changing conditions on 
the ground, the changing threat vectors, the changing 
situation, and assess if that campaign plan and that framework 
is adequate or needs to be adapted.
    But I think that the collaboration between what SOCOM does 
as the coordinating authority and then what DTRA does I think, 
more importantly to your question, is that DTRA really gets 
after the unique solution of those gaps that we identify in 
that plan against those changing conditions.
    For instance, we may see a new biological threat. Do we 
have the diagnostics? And I think Dr. Vann was pretty 
articulate in her opening statement about the kinds of things 
that they are doing across the spectrum of being prepared as 
well as to maintain consequence as well as protective equipment 
capabilities. But largely the man, train, and equipping aspects 
for our individuals, for our men and women, are a service 
responsibility; that is the geographical combatant commander's 
responsibility for how we incorporate the plan as it relates to 
the threat in their region.
    Mr. Larsen. So do we have to rely on the service then to 
generate that requirement if we see it otherwise? If we see 
that they aren't doing them?
    Admiral Szymanski. No, sir. Often we will help generate 
that requirement for that. In fact, this year is the first year 
that SOCOM has done a comprehensive--from a coordinating 
authority lens, has submitted a for--the requirements, broad-
based requirements piece for DOD to--and each of the 
geographical combatant commanders, to DTRA.
    Mr. Larsen. Dr. Williams.
    Dr. Williams. Sir, so as the admiral said, sir, yes, we 
ingest that requirements from the services as well as from the 
geographic combatant commanders on a routine basis. We actually 
get four-star requirements that come in, and we rack and stack 
those against the available resources, and, again, keeping with 
policy to make sure it is there. As the admiral just said, I 
literally sent last night to General Clarke an interim response 
on that requirements letter that came in earlier this spring.
    So what we end up doing is--also as part of our engagement 
with the services and their man, equip, and train aspect of 
things, we make sure we bring that cutting-edge technology 
knowledge back into their training courses. Again, a specific 
example of that, sir, we actually run the Defense Nuclear 
Weapons School, which trains all the nuclear aspects of that.
    Mr. Larsen. Dr. Williams, anything more, please for the 
record.
    And I will have questions for Dr. Vann and Ms. Walsh 
regarding your definition of legacy as well as more on the 
prioritization efforts of the Unity of Efforts Council. I think 
we are probably going to be interested in the outcomes of that. 
So, with that, I will [inaudible] that for the record, Mr. 
Chair, and I will yield back.
    I yield back none of the time I have in the time left.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Larsen.
    Now, we have Representative Scott next.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for being with us 
today. The topic kind of really better discussed, I think, 
behind closed doors, but I want to encourage my colleagues to 
get up to speed if you are not on the ABMS [Advanced Battle 
Management System] system and some of the potential gaps or--or 
not potential, but the very real gaps that we have in the 
ability to pick up weapons that could and would be used against 
the United States if they were, if we were to find ourselves in 
a conflict with Russia or China. The systems are smaller. They 
are significantly faster, and that means we have got to pick 
them up with systems that we use in space.
    And I will mention a couple of my concerns with that is 
that, a few years ago, we were dependent on rockets from Russia 
to actually launch satellites as the United States. And I am 
happy to use the private sector to help us launch satellites, 
but I do think that we need to be self-reliant and not 
dependent on the public sector to do that. And so that is one 
thing that I hope that the agency, the Defense Department will 
continue to look at is making sure that while publicly traded 
companies are fine to use during times when we are not in 
conflict, what would happen to our ability to launch if we were 
dependent on publicly traded companies during an all-out war 
with Russia and China.
    As we talk about ABMS versus the legacy systems, and, 
Admiral, this is predominantly for you because you have been 
one of the guys on the ground as a special operator. I am very 
concerned about the communications aspect of the new systems. 
And as we move into space, are you confident that we can handle 
the communications from space and not necessarily from aircraft 
for our special operators?
    Admiral Szymanski. Congressman, thank you for the question. 
Space and communications, as we think about strategic 
competition, I think it is a problem set we think about often. 
You are right, as special operations has historically been 
dependent on robust tactical communications, and a lot of that 
is based on space architecture. I would also say you are right 
that this would be a better discussion in another setting at 
another time. But let me say this: I think it is important that 
we run scenarios. In fact, we've just run a scenario down at 
SOCOM not related to CWMD on a day without comms 
[communications]. And so how do we plan for everything from our 
tactical to our strategic comms to take and survive a hit. In 
good military planning, as you know, we do most likely courses 
of action scenarios, and we do most dangerous.
    And so what do we need to--what are the gaps in things like 
comm computing, communications at the edge? And so we are kind 
of going through that analysis now. How resilient and how 
resilient does that comm infrastructure have to be? Obviously, 
our communications are--our space communications are important, 
and I think we are taking a hard look at how we won't be able 
to fight and win in a contested or denied comm environment.
    Mr. Scott. Space is going to be contested as well. And I 
understand their concept. I won't get too much into it. I 
actually like the concept. But I do want to make sure that, you 
know, if we did end up in a scenario where we needed to be 
doing a lot of launches, that we would not be totally dependent 
on publicly traded companies to do that. And we got ourselves 
in a bind a couple of years ago where we were dependent on 
Russian rockets to actually launch our satellites. And I hope 
that that is something that we just pay attention to. It is a 
mistake we made in the past, we don't need to make in the 
future.
    I will mention one last thing for my colleagues on the 
Democratic side. In the President's speech, he mentioned a 
DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]-like program 
in the National Institute of Health. I am not so sure that it 
would be better served to the general public if we did a 
National Institute of Health-type program under DARPA so that 
we did effectively the same thing the President is asking for. 
But the model and the leadership of DARPA seems to work very 
well, and I don't see why we can't increase that funding over 
there with a specific focus on health.
    With that, my time is up, as you just heard. And so I 
appreciate all of you, and I look forward to continuing the 
discussion.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott, and 
impressive that you keep your own timer.
    Now, let's move on to Representative Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thank our witnesses. Public reports, including a very 
recent one over the National Academy of Sciences, have detailed 
the threats behind directed radio frequency energy weapons, how 
that can be used. Are you doing any research or involvement in 
that in terms of the scope of your work----
    Ms. Walsh. I'm sorry, I had trouble hearing the question, 
understanding the question.
    Mr. Keating. I will try again. Public reports including the 
National Academy of Sciences, have talked about directed radio 
frequency, microwave [inaudible] weapons that were used. Are 
you [inaudible] with that subject matter [inaudible] what kind 
of research methodology do you have in terms of that?
    Ms. Walsh. Sir.
    Mr. Gallego. Were you able to understand that question?
    Ms. Walsh. I believe so. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay.
    Ms. Walsh. The Department of Defense is aware and 
supporting a whole-of-government effort looking into those 
issues. This is another topic that I would be happy to discuss 
in a different setting.
    Mr. Keating. There are, though, however, national 
publications done. For instance, the National Academy of 
Sciences. So can you just comment generally on whether they 
present a real danger?
    Ms. Walsh. What the National Academy of Sciences report 
assessed is definitely something that we are continuing to look 
at. It was directed at the request, I believe, of the 
Department of State. And so we are taking that report and its 
findings seriously. And it is part of what we are looking into 
in cooperation with the State Department and other parts of the 
U.S. Government.
    Mr. Keating. I realize that we probably will have to deal 
with more of this in a classified setting. But thank you very 
much.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Keating.
    And I now actually lost track of who is next. Give me one 
second please.
    Representative Bacon, you are up.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Thank you to all of our panelists. I appreciate your 
leadership. My first question is to Ms. Vann. Is Iran your 
number one threat for nuclear proliferation? Thank you.
    Dr. Vann. Actually, I think for that conversation, I would 
defer to my colleague from Policy.
    Ms. Walsh. Thank you very much. When it comes to 
proliferation, we have great concerns about China. China lacks 
export controls. It is not a country that exercises in great 
transparency in reporting to international bodies that it has 
signed up to report to, but also just being good stewards of 
public information sharing. So we do have concerns about China, 
the proliferation that could support WMD activities across the 
board of items coming out of China and China not responsibly 
monitoring what is going where.
    Obviously, we look at any number of proliferation concerns 
when it comes to nuclear. This could include just fissile 
material, radiological material. Iran is not my number one 
proliferation threat. Iran does not have a nuclear weapons 
program. But there are other nuclear weapons----
    Mr. Bacon. I think what I was trying to get to is--and I 
think you answered it--[inaudible] a threat, and Iran is I 
believe a very likely recipient of that proliferation. So that 
was the intent of my question.
    Framed that way, is that a concern, Iran working with 
China?
    Ms. Walsh. I would want to take that conversation into a 
classified conversation, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. So we do know in unclassified documents that 
China did help out Pakistan. Pakistan helped out North Korea. 
So I am concerned about what we are potentially seeing with 
Iran as well.
    Just this week, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] said that 
al-Qaida is being safeguarded in Iran in an unclassified report 
from DIA. Are we concerned about Iran colluding with al-Qaida 
in other forms of WMD?
    Ms. Walsh. Sir, we have great concerns about any number of 
WMD threat actors, from state-based through non-state actors 
and violent extremist organizations. We rely on the 
intelligence community, DIA a leading member of that, to help 
inform our policy considerations of where are the threats, who 
has the intent, and where these are colliding.
    So, while I can't speak specifically to the DIA report you 
are referencing, I can say that we are mindful of and watching 
where there are these alignments of VEOs and state actors of 
concern.
    Mr. Bacon. I think it is very concerning to read the DIA 
report this week. It said al-Qaida's leadership is in Iran, 
being protected by Iran, and that they are operationally 
controlling al-Qaida from Iran. That is a concern. I want to go 
with that.
    Maybe one follow-up question for Dr. Williams. It is a 
little off topic. What is the status of the Open Skies Treaty? 
The administration has given mixed signals on this. The OC-135 
aircraft are being taken to the boneyard, and yet the 
administration is saying that Open Skies may not be done. Over 
to you.
    Dr. Williams. Sir, thank you for that question. I would 
rather defer that one to Ms. Walsh, from a policy perspective, 
on the future of Open Skies.
    Ms. Walsh. Thank you. I think this is one that is under 
review right now. And so I am not in a position to speak to 
that, but I would be happy to consult with my colleagues who 
have the lead for the Open Skies Treaty and circle back with 
you and your team, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I will just close by saying if we are 
taking the aircraft over to the boneyard, it seems to be making 
a statement there. But then to say that you maybe have not 
abandoned Open Skies, it is mixed signals. I surely would like 
to know where we are going with that. So thank you very much, 
and I yield back.
    Mrs. Murphy [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bacon. And Chair 
Gallego had to step away for a moment, so I am standing in for 
him. And it just so happens I am next on the list, so I will 
yield to myself to ask some questions here.
    I just want to thank the witnesses. You know, the ODNI 
[Office of Director of National Intelligence] Annual Threat 
Assessment has said that China--and you all said it in your 
opening--that they are undertaking one of the most rapid 
expansions in platform diversification of its nuclear arsenal 
in history and has pretty much indicated they are not 
interested in any arms control agreements.
    Also, Ms. Walsh, you just mentioned that it has been 
difficult to work with them due to lack of transparency and 
other such things.
    While I recognize the conversation about their nuclear 
arsenal might be better suited for a classified setting, what I 
do want to ask about is an area where they exhibit some of the 
exact same behavior--lack of transparency, lack of 
cooperation--and that is in the area of their fentanyl 
production.
    And I just hosted a panel featuring witnesses from the DEA 
[Drug Enforcement Agency] and ONDCP [Office of National Drug 
Control Policy] regarding China's role in America's opioid 
crisis. They have been sending precursor chemicals to countries 
like Mexico, where they are made into fentanyl at labs and then 
mixed with other illicit drugs before they make their way to 
our homeland, where they kill Americans and are destroying 
communities all across this country.
    And I think the threat assessment also highlights that 
Mexico will certainly make progress this year producing high-
quality fentanyl using these very chemical precursors from 
China.
    So the question is to Ms. Walsh and Dr. Vann, you know, how 
is the Department modernizing its capabilities to track the 
production and shipment of such chemical precursors from Asia 
to the Western Hemisphere?
    Ms. Walsh. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. There are 
any number of communities across DOD that are looking at this 
issue, just from different perspectives. Our Counternarcotics 
and Global Threats organization. Even the DOD CWMD-Unity of 
Effort Council took up the issue of fentanyl, I believe it was 
2 years ago now.
    And so, across many threads, we are looking at what are the 
precursors, where are they coming from. We have bilateral 
conversations, multilateral conversations, to make sure that 
countries that are the source and origin of these are aware of 
what is going on underneath their nose, giving them the 
opportunity and trying to persuade them to take action to 
regulate, curtail, be more aware, if not cease entirely what it 
is doing.
    Part of the challenge is that there are very legitimate 
uses of fentanyl, and so this is the space between the 
legitimate and then the illicit use with fentanyl. I will defer 
to Dr. Vann, who is more of an expert on this.
    Dr. Vann. Yes. Thank you, ma'am.
    Fentanyl, as Ms. Walsh said, is an interesting space 
because it highlights some of the dual-use nature of and dual-
use dilemma that we now face, where we have a legitimate use as 
well as a potential for nefarious use.
    In terms of capability development that we have against 
things like the fentanyl classes, we have a very robust RDA 
[research, development, and acquisition] activity to ensure 
that our joint forces have the right detection equipment to 
both detect and identify any potential fentanyl in the 
environment, as well as a diagnostic capability so that you can 
see when there is a potential human exposure to classes of 
fentanyls, as well as personal protection equipment, as well as 
our ability to treat any potential exposure.
    So focusing specifically on delivering man-portable medical 
countermeasures that could be utilized by the force if exposed 
to those agents.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you.
    This is to the admiral. You know, it strikes me that when 
we talk about CWMD or countering violent extremists or 
countering transnational organizations that deal in sort of the 
illegal substances, there are a lot of similarities. Sometimes 
there are state actors nefariously involved. There are networks 
of people who are moving illegal money, drugs, and other 
illegal substances.
    Are there lessons that can be learned from our decades of 
working in counterterrorism that can be applied in CWMD or 
countering narcotics?
    Admiral Szymanski. Congresswoman, thanks for that question. 
Yes, there are absolutely lessons learned from countering 
violent extremist organizations and the things we have done to 
build networks to defeat a network.
    And I think what you have really just described is the 
basis of our functional campaign plan, which is about pathway 
defeat. It is a pathway whether it is--I am sorry, did you have 
a question?
    Mrs. Murphy. We are just out of time, and just to be 
mindful of everybody else's time. I am sorry to interrupt you. 
I would love to get your response through a question for the 
record, and that is a conversation I would like to continue at 
a different time.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mrs. Murphy. But, with that, I will yield to the next 
speaker, Mr. Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Yes. Thank you, Representative Murphy. I am 
on the road, and I apologize, but I do have some questions. I 
am just submitting those to the record. But I didn't want to 
drive and try to ask questions at the same time.
    Mrs. Murphy. Great. Well, travel safely, and we will look 
forward to your questions for the record.
    Next, I have Mr. Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Are we going back to a second round 
then, Chair?
    Mrs. Murphy. I think it appears that we must be.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. All right. Great.
    So I will circle back to some ideas for my questions for 
the record.
    But, for Ms. Walsh, can you speak more particularly to the 
prioritization efforts and the Unity of Effort Council?
    What can you share with us about which legacies you are 
looking at, which are going to survive, which aren't, and, 
honestly, what new technologies that we need to put more time 
into which would require us to not put time into other systems?
    Ms. Walsh. Our Department priorities started with an 
intelligence assessment of looking at what are the WMD threats 
to U.S. interests and the U.S. homeland in particular, where 
are those threats coming from.
    Looking at threat actors, who has the capability, who is 
trying to get more or different capability, who is modernizing 
whatever capabilities they already have.
    On top of the intelligence analysis, we looked at policy 
considerations as well. We blended these to assess whether the 
threat is more than a specific technology; it is about the 
threat actor because it is the actor who will use any given 
technology or capability, and that is what we have to counter.
    So, while I am not able in this environment to walk you 
through what those priorities are, we would certainly be happy 
to have a follow-up conversation with you and share those 
priorities.
    And they differentiate, because it could be that one actor 
has a--is further along in posing one type of WMD threat than 
another. And so we do look at these by WMD threat and actor, 
bring them together, and that is how we have come up with our 
priority list.
    Mr. Larsen. Can you answer the question in this environment 
about relative DOD or other agency investment? Is it going to 
require us to move money around to not spend as much on X to do 
Y or Z?
    Ms. Walsh. Our priority process did not tease out that 
level of decision. What I will expect is that, as we go through 
an implementation review this year of looking at how are our 
components applying these priorities into their particular 
areas of responsibility, I think that is where we will start to 
determine if we have more, fewer, or different investments to 
make. But this is also where we are going to look at, can we 
get multiple returns on similar or same investments?
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah, yeah. So I have a definition of legacy 
investments in the DOD, after 20 years in Congress. A legacy 
investment is something that the DOD doesn't want to do that 
Congress won't let them get rid of.
    So just a heads-up to, you know, maybe bring us along as 
you run this set of priorities so that we aren't surprised as, 
you know, oversight folks. That would just be my one little 
caution on this. I am open to the smart people at the DOD 
looking at this, obviously. It is just sometimes you run into 
the buzz saw called Congress because sometimes we don't want to 
get rid of something or sometimes we are surprised by the 
result.
    So I think it is just important that, especially if it 
comes down to making not just a priority choice but also then 
it gets to where does the money go to invest in that priority. 
I think just a word of advice on that.
    And, with that, Chair Murphy, I will yield back. Thank you.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    And next I yield to Ranking Member Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Chairwoman Murphy.
    Just on--given the increased use of chemical weapons in 
Syria and the [inaudible] use of [inaudible] Russia, what can 
we do to deter further use of chemical or biological weapons? 
What are we doing to ensure international norms against the use 
of these weapons is not eroded, or to develop new standards to 
deal with the emergent chem and bio threats?
    Ms. Walsh. If I don't get to all your question, please 
circle back. You did break up a little bit in there. But what I 
think I heard you say is you are interested in knowing what we 
are doing to help preserve international norms, prevent further 
erosion of them on the chemical and biological side.
    I will say it starts with our own behavior and being a 
leader through international fora and through bilateral 
relationships. In response to Russia's 2018 use of a Novichok, 
the United States, along with likeminded countries, worked 
through the OPCW [Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons] to add the Novichoks to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention schedule, or the list of prohibited items that 
signatories agree will not be used.
    We have continued to speak out when we have seen 
international norms either eroded or flagrantly violated. We do 
not want any nation to be able to think that they are going to 
get away with this. And so diplomacy is our first course of 
action.
    The Department of Defense stands in support of the 
Department of State. We work hard to maintain bilateral 
relationships so that other countries are speaking out when 
they are outraged by Russia and other nations' behavior as 
well.
    We continue to encourage bilateral and multilateral public 
dialogues about biological agents through biological 
surveillance, detection, investments that we are making in 
partner countries. We are helping to build others' capacity to 
not only be able to detect but also then to diagnose and 
contain biological outbreaks that are naturally occurring.
    We are asking and calling on our partners and likeminded 
allies to speak out on these issues. COVID has certainly put a 
premium on that in the last year, that we need to take this 
seriously. This is not a niche issue, and this is one that can 
have devastating consequences to security, economic, and just 
general public health as well.
    Mr. Kelly. Very quickly. I asked a question earlier, and I 
still would like more a in-depth. I think a lot of this is 
going to be classified, but I would like to follow up.
    How confident are we that we have the full appreciation of 
the chemical and biological capabilities of our adversaries?
    Ms. Walsh. At an unclassified level, I can tell you that we 
do have concerns because of Russia and China's lack of 
transparency in meeting its obligations to notify through the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons 
Convention.
    That lack of transparency, behavior we have observed over 
the last year of intentional misinformation about U.S. 
capabilities, U.S. investments, and partner nation biological 
laboratories that are serving public health and public good, 
but Russia and China continue to put out propaganda that is 
giving false information about what those facilities are and 
what our partner nations are doing.
    So I do not have trust and confidence that we know 
everything. They are not living up to their end of the bargain.
    Mr. Kelly. Very good. And just very very quickly--I am 
signing off after this. I want to thank you witnesses again for 
your testimony here today and for what you do every day to keep 
this Nation safe. With that, I am signing off.
    [Inaudible] status, but I am sure one of my Republican 
[inaudible].
    Mr. Gallego [presiding]. Thank you, Representative Kelly.
    And then assuming Representative Scott will act as ranking 
member after you leave. Okay, excellent.
    Next we have on my list--thank you for bearing with me. I 
actually jumped off to attend another hearing. Representative 
Keating I have next on my list.
    Mr. Keating. For the second round, Mr. Chairman, I will 
yield back.
    Mr. Gallego. Excellent. Then after that, we have 
Representative Scott.
    Mr. Scott. I don't have any further questions, Mr. 
Chairman. I just again would love to have the subcommittee come 
to Robins Air Force Base, look at the ABMS system and, you 
know, just making sure that we are--again, our dependency on 
foreign sources for rocket fuel and our dependency on the 
private sector, I just want to make sure that we work through 
those issues. And that while we can always count on the private 
sector in times of peace, you know, what would we do in a time 
of war with regard to our ability to launch.
    With that, I will yield, after thanking the members for 
their service--the panel for their service.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
    I have Representative Murphy next, if you have a second 
round.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Actually, I would just like to let the admiral finish the 
answer to the previous question I had regarding the lessons off 
of CT [counterterrorism] and whether or not we are applying 
them in this area of counternarcotics as well as counter-WMD.
    Admiral Szymanski. Congresswoman Murphy, we absolutely are 
applying those lessons. I think you are aware that SOCOM is 
also the coordinating authority for violent extremist 
organizations. We have been obviously in that fight for almost 
two decades.
    As I was saying, starting to say earlier, you know, all 
this is really about pathway defeat. And so, when we look at 
whether it is transnational criminal organizations, violent 
extremist organizations, other bad actors, all are dependent on 
certain pathways. And we call those the transregional enablers, 
so it is things like comms, finances, and those things.
    So understanding a network, regardless of what the illicit 
aspects of what is being transferred, there are absolutely 
lessons learned from what we have done over the years. And 
with, you know, great participation of our partners as well as 
the intelligence community on being able to understand 
networks, really then try to understand their activities on how 
they use those transregional enablers and how we get after 
those enablers to actually prevent and/or counter whatever the 
illicit cargo is or whatever the high-value leaders that we 
need to get after.
    Mrs. Murphy. So, as a Member who represents Florida, I am 
always very concerned with what is going on in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. And that is an area where there is quite a 
bit of transnational criminal organization activity.
    Are you aware of any traditional WMD threats to the United 
States from state or non-state actors emanating from Latin 
America or the Caribbean?
    Admiral Szymanski. Ma'am, thank you for the question. I 
would prefer to take that question for the record and do it in 
a more classified setting.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you. And then final question for 
you, Admiral. With the U.S. preparing to withdraw its troops 
from Afghanistan in September of this year, there are a lot of 
national security risks that are involved with this decision, 
as we all know. And I know you are working through a lot of 
those to mitigate and prepare for them.
    Can you discuss how you think withdrawal might affect 
America's counter-WMD efforts in Afghanistan and the 
neighboring countries, especially if the Taliban gains strength 
and if Afghanistan once again becomes a haven for terrorist 
groups that have an interest in using WMD.
    How can we and our allies combat this threat without a 
significant permanent force presence on the ground?
    Admiral Szymanski. Congresswoman, again, I would like to 
take that one for the record.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Admiral Szymanski. But I think there will be a significant 
partner and allied piece. There is a lot going into right now 
from the State Department, with diplomacy, with a number of the 
neighboring countries and the Gulf coalition countries.
    There are a couple recent intelligence assessments on after 
withdrawal, and I would prefer to talk about those in a 
classified setting. There is a lot of hope for also where the 
Taliban will be for wanting to be recognized as an 
international order.
    So we understand it is a very uncertain time, and at the 
moment we are really focused on the safe and deliberate 
retrograde of all the troops and all the other U.S. and foreign 
personnel that are currently deployed in Afghanistan.
    Mrs. Murphy. Great. I understand the need to move this 
conversation to a different classification level and look 
forward to the opportunity to do that.
    Thank you to the witnesses today, and I yield back my time. 
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Vice Chair Murphy.
    Now I would like to move to Representative Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would just like to associate myself with 
Representative Murphy's remarks and questions. Particularly in 
the wake of the withdrawal, I think one of the things that is 
being lost in the conversation is that even if all of our best 
hopes bear out and the Taliban has had a change of heart and 
decides to be a responsible international actor, no one has 
been able to explain to me to date, including General Miller, 
what capability they have to enforce any agreement against al-
Qaida and half the world's terrorist organizations, you know, 
what capability do they have that 300,000 Afghan Army soldiers 
and 40 Western nations have struggled to do over the last 40 
years?
    But along those lines--so I would certainly welcome if she 
would have me if we have a follow-on classified brief, I would 
certainly love to participate in that.
    My question is, operationally, when it comes to IEDs 
[improvised explosive devices], Dr. Williams, DTRA I think has 
done a great job over the years of training our Afghan 
partners, our partners in the Afghan Army, on counter-IED 
detection and defeat.
    My understanding is those trainers and those assets are 
being withdrawn. What leave-behind capability through the 
Afghan Security Forces Fund--whether it is IED detection kits, 
nitrate kits--what leave-behind capability are we providing the 
Afghan Security Forces through your programs?
    And I understand there is a State Department--I cosigned a 
letter for the State Department through its program to also 
provide funding so that we don't have to go back, which I sadly 
fear that we are going to have to do, but to bolster the Afghan 
Security Force's ability to deal with IEDs, which, by the 
statistics I am seeing, account for 75 percent of the 
casualties.
    Dr. Williams. Sir, thank you for your question. One point 
of clarification. As you know, sir, the former counter-IED 
activities that were done through the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency are actually transitioning at the end of this fiscal 
year into the Army for continuing use for that.
    In terms of your question about leave-behind, sir, as the 
admiral said, I think I would like to prefer to take that in a 
classified setting so we can have a little more fulsome 
discussion on that, sir.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. I will just say I hope that we are not 
taking that for the record because there is not really a plan 
yet. I know that I am sure you are working on it. And I 
struggle to understand why it is classified if we are handing 
it over to the Afghans. But that is fine. We will take that to 
a different setting.
    The other piece that I would like to talk to that I would 
imagine would be a setting is I know there are a number of 
classified programs dealing with Pakistan's nuclear program and 
assuring the security of those assets. So that I would like to 
request in a classified setting, and the status of those 
programs with no presence in Afghanistan.
    And then, finally, again, probably also classified--so, Mr. 
Chairman, my questions will be pretty brief--but I am 
incredibly concerned and have asked this question in the past: 
If we move to any type of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, I 
understand there are a number of programs with SOCOM, DTRA, and 
others, to secure North Korea's nuclear assets.
    My concern is what type of deconfliction, if any, that we 
have with China, who would obviously also want to assure that 
those assets are secured. So that would be I guess then three 
requests for you in a classified setting.
    And, Mr. Chair, if I could just--one more before I close. I 
am still not clear when we have that why a leave-behind 
capability with the Afghans so that they can detect IEDs, I am 
not sure why that would be classified. I mean, that should be, 
I think [inaudible]----
    Mr. Gallego. Would that be possible? Can you repeat 
yourself?
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. And so that we can assure everyone 
that they have that capability. But I will just take that for 
the record and I yield. Thank you, Chairman.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Waltz.
    And I believe it is my turn now. Yes, it is. Okay, great.
    The Department of Defense recently, in 2017, transferred 
the countering weapons of mass destruction mission lead from 
U.S. Strategic Command to U.S. Special Operations Command, 
signaling a shift in strategy that places greater emphasis on 
identifying and preventing threats before they metastasize into 
a crisis.
    In addition, the Department of Homeland Security 
established a CWMD office, consolidating numerous offices and 
functions across the Department.
    How does coordination work at the national level to ensure 
that CWMD activity, authority, policy, planning, and expertise 
are operating cohesively, effectively, and efficiently? And 
what progress has SOCOM made to develop the infrastructure, 
partnerships, expertise, strategy and tactics needed to address 
this mission successfully? Let's start with the admiral.
    Admiral Szymanski. Chairman, thank you for the question.
    So, for the years that SOCOM has had the function--or, 
excuse me, the coordinating authority for CWMD, really the 
basis of the whole effort is built on functional campaign plan 
and helping the combatant commanders with their campaign plans, 
the geographical combatant commanders, as I kind of mentioned 
in one of the opening questions, with the threat vectors and 
the threat actors in their regions, and how we put that plan 
together in coordination with the geographical combatant 
commander, how we assess that plan against the changes to the 
threat, against the changes to the actors as well as the 
environment, and then make recommendations on any material 
gaps, training deficiencies, et cetera.
    But what we do in the meantime back here in [Washington] DC 
or in CONUS [continental United States] is we hold a couple 
seminars a year, called our coordination seminars or senior 
leader seminars. We bring together a number of folks from 
partners and allies to interagency to many members, largely 
from the Unity of Effort Council across Joint Staff and DOD, 
and look at a very specific problem.
    And then we try to bring in a whole-of-government approach 
to how we might answer that, identify not only the gaps in the 
Department's, the Department of Defense's capabilities but also 
potentially think more use of what Department of Energy, 
Department of State, Department of Commerce could apply to that 
problem set.
    But from a SOCOM coordinating authority, that is really 
planning and assessing and recommending. I think I would defer 
to Ms. Walsh on the Unity of Effort Council and how they use 
the existing processes to pull the other things that you talked 
about at the beginning of your question.
    Ms. Walsh. Thank you very much, Admiral.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Ms. Walsh.
    Ms. Walsh. The Unity of Effort Council was created after we 
recognized that we had a lot of cooks in the kitchen, but we 
weren't working off of the same recipe. And so, through the 
Unity of Effort Council, we have convened 20 different 
stakeholder organizations across the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, various Joint Staff components, all of the services, 
SOCOM is our coordinating authority, and then all of our 
combatant commands so that we can raise awareness among these 
components of what their roles and missions are, what issues 
that have been stuck or are emerging, and where we need to work 
together to make sure that these issues can rise to the surface 
so that senior leaders are aware of threats, opportunities, 
capabilities we have but also areas where we need to develop 
further capabilities or make different investments.
    And over the course of the last several years, I would 
argue that we have built not just awareness, but we have built 
connective tissue that didn't exist previously. And so now we 
are--we have a phrase of consolidated buying power of the CWMD 
community and DOD is yielding benefits.
    Our plans, our strategy documents, our resource 
requirements, our understanding of threats, our understanding 
of where we can have cross-pollination but also our 
understanding that some components don't necessarily sit in all 
of the meetings where resource decisions are made or 
requirements are decided or prioritized and then where the 
strategy documents are.
    So, through the Unity of Effort Council, we have taken both 
a bottom-up but also a top-down approach in identifying what 
are those issues that do not get resolved in other existing DOD 
fora. And through this, we have given rise to a community that 
is now speaking--that is understanding more but is also 
speaking with more one voice.
    We expect that we will continue to see dividends from the 
Unity of Effort Council as the Department goes through the 
strategic review and guidance development efforts this year, 
whether it is the Global Posture Review, the next National 
Defense Strategy, and then any number of other reviews that the 
Department is conducting. I am confident that our Unity of 
Effort Council members will be able to bring WMD issues more 
into the forefront. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ms. Walsh.
    And just a general statement. You know, I feel like, across 
the Federal Government, there is really good unity and 
conversations happening about countering WMD measures. I worry 
when it needs to come across down to your local police and 
State government.
    One of the things I think we saw from 9/11 was that, you 
know, as much as the Federal Government is important, it is 
also your local government that is important, in terms of 
prevention and deterrence and even, unfortunately, maybe 
sometimes reaction. So I just want to kind of remind that we 
keep that in mind going into the future.
    I have on my list for second question if he wants it 
Representative Waltz.
    Is there anybody else that has another question they want 
to--Representative Scott, do you have any? Ranking Member, 
anybody from your side?
    Okay, great. Excellent.
    Well, thank you so much for your time to all of our 
presenters. You know, I did note that there were a lot of 
things that were said that we are going to have to give for the 
record or in a classified setting. Please make sure to follow 
up with our staff to actually, you know, fulfill that. I think 
there are a lot of things that we want to follow up, and there 
is no need for us to leave things hanging up in the air.
    Thank you for your time, and I hope to see you all soon.
    [Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 4, 2021

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 4, 2021

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
      
 
      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 4, 2021

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

    Mr. Larsen. What is the Unity of Effort Council's plan on updating 
Congress on its prioritization deliberations and conclusions for legacy 
and emerging technology capabilities?
    Ms. Walsh. The DOD CWMD-Unity of Effort (UoE) Council co-Chairs and 
Vice Chair are prepared to provide a classified briefing to Congress on 
the DOD CWMD priorities. These priorities consider the current and 
emerging threat environment, including key actors and WMD capabilities, 
and provide guidance on how the Department must address these risks. 
The CWMD-UoE Council itself is not directly addressing U.S. legacy and 
emerging technology capabilities.
    Mr. Larsen. Are there specific examples of DOD's shift from legacy 
to new technologies? Is this shift a part of the Unity of Effort 
Council deliberations?
    Dr. Vann. The term ``legacy'' in part refers to technologies and 
weapons systems that are ill-suited against advanced threats or are no 
longer operationally effective in executing the mission for which they 
were originally intended. The Interim National Security Strategic 
Guidance directs DOD to shift resources away from such technologies or 
systems and to redirect investments to cutting-edge capabilities that 
will determine our advantage in the future. Furthermore, the Secretary 
has said equipment and weapon systems become obsolete when more 
capable, less expensive, or more efficient replacements become 
operational. While this isn't a specific topic being discussed within 
the CWMD Unity of Effort (UoE) Council, the ASD(NCB), as its vice 
chair, represents key equities related to advancing cutting-edge 
technologies and the needed RDT&E investments to support DOD's shifting 
focus to address emerging threats. This includes informing the UoE 
Council's ongoing CWMD prioritization effort and the planned strategic 
review and guidance development efforts in the coming year.
    In an effort to modernize capabilities and in many cases drive down 
costs, the Department of Defense has invested significantly in research 
and development efforts leveraging technologies developed by academia 
and top performers in the commercial sector. Specific technologies 
include:
      Organ-on-a-Chip. There is a need for alternative ways to 
model human diseases and accelerate development of new drugs. 
Traditional animal models (in vivo) do not accurately mimic human 
pathophysiology and are time consuming. Organ-on-a-chip technologies 
are cutting costs and drug development timelines while providing 
results comparable to or better than traditional animal methods. The 
DOD is leveraging organ-on-a-chip technology to evaluate and 
characterize emerging chemical and biological threats and to advance 
drug development.
      Medical Countermeasure Platforms. Platform technologies 
are ideal for producing new drugs against new threats and emerging 
pathogens as well as reducing the costs of drug development. They do 
this by employing a ``building block'' development approach, whereby 
various modular components are swapped in and out to construct a 
variety of therapeutics or prophylactics. The DOD is focused on 
optimizing existing monoclonal antibody platforms to enhance the 
identification of new targets for drug development as well as 
developing new platform technologies for DNA vaccines.
      Integrated Early Warning (IEW). Integrated Early Warning 
describes a set of materiel and non-materiel capabilities that provide 
awareness and understanding of CBRN threats and hazards. By investing 
in IEW, we will enhance a commander's ability to make decisions that 
enables the successful conduct of operations in CBRN environments. 
Accomplishment of this end state is enabled by capabilities that align 
across the Force Integration, Battlespace Awareness, Logistics, Command 
and Control, Communications and Computers, and Protection Joint 
Capability Areas. Rapid development of enabling technologies in 
information technology, algorithm development, sensors, diagnostics, 
and unmanned platforms has converged with novel non-materiel solutions, 
leading to a vast landscape of potential IEW solutions. Capitalizing on 
IEW materiel and non-materiel capabilities is a top priority of the 
Services and Combatant Commands in order to enhance Joint Force 
lethality.
    Mr. Larsen. You started to address how DTRA works to upskill 
service members to ensure they understand the uses of emerging 
technologies generally and in the field. Could you provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of this effort?
    Dr. Williams. DTRA works to ensure service members are able to 
understand the use of emerging technologies in several different 
capacities. One of the more foundational is the Defense Nuclear Weapons 
School (DNWS), from which we provide formal training on a wide variety 
of radiological, nuclear and CWMD topics to the Services and other 
Federal Agencies. We compliment this training with Technical Support 
Groups (TSGs), which work directly with specialized forces in the 
Combatant Commands. A third area we contribute is in providing threat 
analyses on enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing 
emerging threats on the battlefield. Additionally, as we work in 
research, development, test and evaluation of new (or rapid adaptation 
of existing) capabilities, we engage our close partnerships with the 
Combatant Commands to train and field-test those capabilities in the 
field.
    Finally, our work with the Services, Joint Staff, and the Combatant 
Commands in consulting, developing, and executing operations plans and 
exercises, as well as our 24/7 technical reachback capability, provide 
DTRA a continuous voice in ensuring service members plan and train as 
they will need to fight--with the best information on emerging threats 
we can provide.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
    Mr. Kelly. According to USA Spend, DTRA has provided EcoHealth 
Alliance grants for research to support its Biodefense mission. EHA in 
recent years has chosen the Wuhan Institute of Virology as a research 
partner in recent years through an NIH grant. As noted in the State 
Department Fact Sheet of 1/15/21, the Wuhan Institute of Virology has 
troubling links to the Chinese military. Is EHA still a grantee of 
DTRA? What type of risk analysis does DTRA do to ensure that its 
research dollars are wittingly or unwittingly funding a malign actor 
such as China? Has EHA's relationship with the WIV and China 
disqualified it as the partner of choice for DOD and DTRA?
    Ms. Walsh. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has not 
provided funding to EcoHealth Alliance (EHA) for work at the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology (WIV), or for any other activity in the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). EHA is a DTRA grantee on projects in other 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region. On behalf of the Chemical and 
Biological Defense Program, DTRA executes requirements-based DOD 
biodefense missions according to established program management 
practices. For each grant DOD awards, DTRA engages with applicants 
early in the project development process to confirm that only DOD-
authorized sub-recipients are considered. DTRA program managers, 
certified DOD acquisition professionals, review each grant proposal 
with an eye toward finding prohibited activities (technical or fiscal), 
according to established procedure. Additionally, DOD performs periodic 
oversight of all grants through required financial and technical 
reporting, meetings with stakeholders, and site visits to ensure that 
research is conducted only as authorized.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Mr. Bacon. For your respective organizations, what do you see as 
the most critical unresolved technical challenges in the countering 
weapons of mass destruction mission space?
    Dr. Vann. The most critical challenge is being able to rapidly 
recognize, characterize, and respond to emerging threats. The National 
Defense Strategy mandates that the Department focus the readiness of 
the future force against near peer adversaries, who are actively 
researching novel forms of chemicals that have been or could be 
weaponized. These malign states and actors are also viewing the 
accelerated advances in biology and genetic engineering as new 
mechanisms to develope new biological weapons. Anticipating and 
overcoming these increasingly complex threats requires renewed focus, 
innovative thinking, and clear priorities. The Department's CB defense 
capabilities are a key component of an integrated national effort to 
counter weapons of mass destruction and address traditional and 
emerging CB threats.
    Mr. Bacon. The University of Nebraska hosts a DOD University 
Affiliated Research Center, the National Strategic Research Institute, 
which is the only DOD UARC focused specifically on the CWMD mission 
area including Nuclear Detection and Forensics, Detection of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
and Consequence Management. What actions on currently underway to 
leverage this UARC in support of DOD's CWMD strategy and what more 
should be done to fully leverage this capability and investment?
    Dr. Vann. The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) works 
closely with a range of partners in industry and academia on science 
and technology (S&T) research and development (R&D) to stay ahead of 
complex and rapidly changing novel and emerging threats.
    University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) are key to driving 
innovation and expediting our R&D capabilities. In particular, the 
CBDP's Joint Science and Technology Office (JSTO) funds a number of 
ongoing efforts with the University of Nebraska's National Strategic 
Research Institute (NSRI) UARC. A recent example was testing and 
assessment of the Portable Biocontainment Care Module at the Joint Base 
Charleston, SC, to determine if there was a better option to transport 
COVID infected military service members as compared to the capability 
developed during the 2014 Ebola outbreak. In addition, the CBDP has 
leveraged the unique expertise NSRI provides to enable the development 
of novel capabilities for biological and chemical detection. In 
February 2019, NSRI supported the CBDP's Reactive-Chemistry Orthogonal 
Surface and Environmental Threat Ticket Array Program (ROSETTA) and its 
Compact Vapor Chemical Agent Detector (CVCAD) Program by partnering 
with the Joint Program Executive Office for CBRN Defense (JPEO-CBRND) 
to host a chemical detection vendor-user interaction day. The event 
brought together the Joint Services and technology vendors in industry 
and in academia for information exchange to support the development of 
innovative detection systems for these programs of record.
    JSTO leveraged NSRI in July 2019 to host a perimeter defense 
technology rodeo bringing together technology vendors and Joint Service 
members on the topic of autonomous biodetection systems. In February 
2020, JSTO and JPEO-CBRND partnered with NSRI to host a Proximal 
Chemical Agent Detector (PCAD) tabletop exercise (TTX) for combat 
developers and service members to discuss technology requirements for 
this program of record. More recently in March 2021, the CBPD invested 
again in NSRI's expertise to host a TTX focused on detection capability 
for emerging threats. Specifically, this TTX provided the opportunity 
for the Joint Services to discuss the Pharmaceutical Based Agents (PBA) 
threats and learn about existing PBA detection capabilities. The CBDP 
is also funding NSRI to develop innovative technologies for hazard 
mitigation, advanced detection and decontamination, advanced biological 
sampling, and bioaerosols detection. As threats continue to evolve and 
with it, the Joint Force's requirements, the Department will continue 
working with government, industry and academic partners, including the 
NSRI, for innovative solutions and capabilities to meet the 
Warfighter's needs.
    Mr. Bacon. For your respective organizations, what do you see as 
the most critical unresolved technical challenges in the countering 
weapons of mass destruction mission space?
    Admiral Szymanski. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Bacon. The University of Nebraska hosts a DOD University 
Affiliated Research Center, the National Strategic Research Institute, 
which is the only DOD UARC focused specifically on the CWMD mission 
area including Nuclear Detection and Forensics, Detection of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
and Consequence Management. What actions on currently underway to 
leverage this UARC in support of DOD's CWMD strategy and what more 
should be done to fully leverage this capability and investment?
    Admiral Szymanski. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Bacon. For your respective organizations, what do you see as 
the most critical unresolved technical challenges in the countering 
weapons of mass destruction mission space?
    Dr. Williams. In the countering WMD space, DTRA covers a broad 
spectrum of strategic and operational functions. Responsive to both DOD 
policy and validated requirements from the field, we engage in 
deterrence, treaty verification, interagency and international 
partnerships, and analysis, research, development, test and evaluation 
portfolios that allows us to spend time exploring threat and counter-
threat concepts we think will have relevance in the future.
    Widely-available commercial technologies have reduced barriers to 
entry, across a variety of technologies. For instance, both the 
synthetic biology and chemical threat space provide access and lower 
cost for malign actors. The convergence of computer science, synthetic 
biology, and related fields--previously separate disciplines--has also 
opened the door to the rapid prototyping of novel threat agents, new 
and difficult-to-trace delivery methods, and changes in adversary 
approach to warfare. Compounding these factors, the application of 
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and big data are 
transforming the nature (and potential impact) of current and future 
WMD; these ``layering technologies'' will create new opportunities for 
national states and transregional actors to enhance lethality and 
unpredictability, increasing the potential for strategic and tactical 
surprise.
    We are already in competition for agile and responsive 
understanding and use of these technologies; both Beijing and Moscow 
have unveiled long-term strategic plans to invest in key technologies 
like robotics and machine learning to offset perceived U.S. military 
advantage. Our ability to forecast and rapidly identify adversary 
applications of these technologies is critical to countering them. For 
DTRA, we will continue to mean integrating and harnessing our core 
functions: enabling strategic deterrence; supporting treaty inspection 
and verification; partnering--across the DOD, U.S. Government, and with 
international partners--to reduce threats; identifying vulnerabilities 
and mitigation strategies; and looking over the horizon to develop and 
deliver rapid capabilities.
    Mr. Bacon. The University of Nebraska hosts a DOD University 
Affiliated Research Center, the National Strategic Research Institute, 
which is the only DOD UARC focused specifically on the CWMD mission 
area including Nuclear Detection and Forensics, Detection of Chemical 
and Biological Weapons, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
and Consequence Management. What actions on currently underway to 
leverage this UARC in support of DOD's CWMD strategy and what more 
should be done to fully leverage this capability and investment?
    Dr. Williams. DTRA leverages a variety of acquisition strategies 
and performers including University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC) 
to efficiently and effectively meet DTRA's CWMD mission. With the 
National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) UARC, DTRA manages a post-
doctoral contract for subject matter expertise from various 
disciplines, including nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, 
radiochemistry, Natural Language Processing, and wargaming. NSRI also 
provides DTRA with solutions for advanced sensing systems designed to 
support the warfighter during hard target and battlefield surveillance 
and reconnaissance of WMD threats.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKLIN
    Mr. Franklin. Given the rising tensions with North Korea, what is 
our ability to operate through a contaminated environment? What are our 
greatest vulnerabilities to a chem/bio attack?
    Ms. Walsh. We have answered this question in a classified 
attachment.
    Mr. Franklin. Dr. Vann, does the U.S. currently possess the 
capabilities to adequately counter the biological threats posed by our 
adversaries? If not, how do we get there and what must we prioritize in 
order to be effectively postured?
    Dr. Vann. Advances in biotechnology and its convergence with other 
sciences and technologies is driving an unprecedented and rapidly 
evolving biological threat landscape which requires creativity, 
innovation, focus, and relentless prioritization. In the CWMD 
portfolio, not only must our defensive capabilities outpace the threat 
from our adversaries, but we must also develop a resilient response and 
recovery capability to ensure the Department and the Nation can 
continue to operate and thrive in the event of any future biological 
incident, whether maliciously directed or naturally occurring.
    The Department continues to collect and assess lessons learned from 
the COVID-19 pandemic in order to improve its biodefense posture and 
preparedness for the future. Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
Department must continue to support cutting-edge research and 
development with international, interagency, industry, and academic 
partners in order to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape. Our 
collaborative approach, working with partners at all echelons, breeds 
innovation and reduces enterprise risk as we work to develop effective 
medical and physical countermeasures against WMD threats. For example, 
the Chemical and Biological Defense Program is working to develop an 
agile threat characterization portfolio that leverages new and 
innovative technologies to efficiently identify and rapidly 
characterize novel and emerging threats, which supports our ability to 
develop novel medical countermeasures, detection and diagnostic 
capabilities, protective equipment, and mitigation capabilities. The 
development of such capabilities removes the strategic advantage that 
adversaries may see in using biological threats.
    Mr. Franklin. How much concern does the Department place on state 
or non-state actors weaponizing new or emerging infectious diseases 
such as COVID-19, and what is DOD doing to combat this potential 
threat?
    Dr. Vann. Congressman Franklin, thank you for the question. I 
respectfully request the opportunity respond in a classified setting to 
provide an answer.
    Mr. Franklin. Vice Admiral Szymanski, regarding emerging technology 
and given China's known desire to create biological weapons targeting 
certain genetic profiles, what national security implications do you 
see for individuals who send their DNA to commercial companies for DNA 
review?
    Admiral Szymanski. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Franklin. Vice Admiral Szymanski, what were the most 
significant findings from SOCOM's Annual CWMD Assessment?
    Admiral Szymanski. [No answer was available at the time of 
printing.]
    Mr. Franklin. Dr. Williams, what are the financial strains you 
foresee on CWMD programs as a result of COVID-19?
    Dr. Williams. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, DTRA has 
prioritized programs that advance our CWMD mission. By working closely 
with our academic and contract performers we have continued to deliver 
capabilities in support of the Joint Force. That being said, we have 
seen some lag from contract performers on non-COVID tasks, as they 
navigated the challenges of reduced staffing levels. This disruption 
was most prevalent in academia, as many universities shuttered research 
facilities during the height of the pandemic; many of them are just now 
getting back up and running. Delay in execution--and other practical 
matters, like cancelling travel--has lowered our execution rates this 
year. Our ability to shift some requirements to a virtual setting, and 
the flexibility of various multi-year appropriations, helped mitigate 
some of the financial impact.
    I am certain that our national (and international) experience with 
COVID will continue to lend salience to the need for robust CWMD 
programs.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
    Ms. Sherrill. What provisions are we aware of within other nuclear 
weapon-states that require their chief executive to consult with 
another deliberative or government body prior to undertaking a first or 
preemptive nuclear strike?
    What provisions exist requiring a future President of the United 
States to consult with Congress, other senior executive branch 
personnel, or any other government official or body prior to 
undertaking a first or preemptive nuclear strike?
    Dr. Vann. The President retains the sole authority to employ U.S. 
nuclear weapons. He exercises this authority in his Constitutional role 
as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. This existing command 
and control system for nuclear weapons provides for consultation with 
the President's senior national security and military advisors, 
particularly in a case that did not involve a pre-planned deliberative 
response. Any direction by the President to employ nuclear weapons 
would require the involvement of several layers of military personnel 
to execute the order (there is no mechanical ``button''), and U.S. 
military personnel are trained in the law of armed conflict and to 
comply only with lawful orders. Depending on the circumstances, 
consultation with or authorization by Congress could be necessary due 
to its constitutional responsibility to declare war. As with any 
decision regarding the use of force by the President and matters 
regarding his or her Constitutional authorities, the President would 
seek the advice or opinion of the Attorney General as the chief law 
officer of the Federal Government. Regarding provisions in other 
nuclear weapon states, we respectfully refer you to the intelligence 
community who can provide an in-depth answer to this question.