[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE DYNAMIC TERRORISM LANDSCAPE AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-364 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Executive Director, Global Internet
Forum To Counter Terrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Jonathan Greenblatt, Chief Executive Officer, Anti-Defamation
League:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Ms. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, PhD, Professor, American University:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Mr. Bill Roggio, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Article, Washington Post....................................... 46
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Cynthia Miller-
Idriss......................................................... 87
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Nicholas J.
Rasmussen...................................................... 87
THE DYNAMIC TERRORISM LANDSCAPE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA
----------
Wednesday, February 2, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Correa, Slotkin, Green, Swalwell, Titus, Watson Coleman, Rice,
Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Malinowski, Torres, Katko,
Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Miller-Meeks, Harshbarger,
Clyde, Gimenez, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack, and Pfluger.
Chairman Thompson. The House Committee on Homeland Security
will be in order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to
declare the committee in recess at any point.
Today the committee is meeting to examine the dynamic
terrorism threat landscape and discuss why the threat is
dominated by domestic violent extremists, including White
supremacists. Almost 1 year ago, this committee held its first
hearing of the 117th Congress, examining the threat of domestic
terrorism in the wake of the January 6 Attack on the Capitol.
Since that hearing, I have taken on a new role, Chairman of the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th attack on the
U.S. Capitol, where I am working across the aisle to get the
bottom of that attack.
Here, on the Homeland Security Committee, our mandate is to
carry out broader oversight to better understand what DHS, the
FBI, and other Federal agencies must do, together with their
State and local and private-sector partners, to detect,
prevent, and respond to terrorism.
Too often our public spaces are subject to shootings or
hostage-taking or other violent plots that see grocery stores,
schools, houses of worship, or concerts become crime scenes. In
June 2015, a young man sought refuge in a Charleston church,
expressing what seemed to be genuine interest in their regular
bible study meeting. Motivated by a desire to start a race-
fueled civil war, he opened fire, killing 9 African American
members of the bible group that had just welcomed him in. Since
that tragic attack, there have been countless other acts of
terrorism and violence carried out by people with a variety of
extremist views.
The FBI director testified before this committee that last
year, his agency had the largest number of open domestic
terrorism cases ever. He went on to say that the majority of
those cases involve White supremacist extremists. He also
described how violent extremists are choosing aspects of
different ideologies that fit their unique grievance, as if
choosing individual items from a salad bar. Emergence of what
the FBI has come to call salad bar ideologies is a paradigm
shift of terrorism threats that have made it harder for law
enforcement to prevent attacks.
Over the past year, threats posed by converging violent
ideologies have increased as ideologies that once were thought
of as fringe have become more mainstream. I appreciate the
steps DHS and others have taken over the past year to try to
address this issue, especially after the previous
administration ignored it for 4 years. Certainly, the issuance
of the first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic
Terrorism last June was an important step forward.
I also appreciate the work many in the private sector and
civil society are doing to protect our communities and prevent
the internet from being used to spread disinformation,
radicalize people, or plan attacks. But much more must be done,
and we are eager to hear from our witnesses and solutions
today.
We must be clear-eyed about the threat from violent
extremists and focus our efforts on finding appropriate
solutions that improve our homeland security and allow people
to go about their lives. Just last month, a man flew from the
United Kingdom to the United States and made his way to a
synagogue in Texas, specifically targeting worshippers for
their Jewish faith. He pretended to be a homeless man seeking
shelter and appealed to their humanity. Like we saw in 2015, at
the Mother Emanuel Church in Charleston, the attacker preyed
upon kindness of people of faith to carry out his attack.
Thankfully, this time there was no loss of life.
Our job on this committee is to focus on security and keep
our fellow Americans safe. We must prioritize helping people
congregate in a manner that allow at-risk communities to live
their religious tenets and show kindness to those in need.
Today, we have an expert panel of witnesses that will
outline the dynamic terrorism threat landscape we face and
present their ideas about what we ought to do moving forward. I
look forward to their testimony and responses to our questions
so that we can find a path to keep us all secure. American
lives, our way of life, our very democracy are at stake.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
February 2, 2022
Today, the committee is meeting to examine the dynamic terrorism
threat landscape and discuss why the threat is dominated by domestic
violent extremists, including White supremacists. Almost exactly 1 year
ago, this committee held its first hearing of the 117th Congress,
examining the threat of domestic terrorism in the wake of the January 6
attack on the Capitol.
Since that hearing, I have taken on a new role--Chairman of the
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack--where I am
working across the aisle to get to the bottom of that attack. Here, on
the Homeland Security Committee, our mandate is to carry out broader
oversight to better understand what DHS, the FBI, and other Federal
agencies must do, together with their State and local and private-
sector partners, to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorism.
Too often our public spaces are subject to shootings or hostage
taking or other violent plots that see grocery stores, schools, houses
of worship, or concerts become crime scenes. In June 2015, a young man
sought refuge in a Charleston church, expressing what seemed to be
genuine interest in their regular Bible study meeting. Motivated by a
desire to start a race-fueled civil war, he opened fire, killing 9
African American members of the Bible group that had just welcomed him.
Since that tragic attack, there have been countless other acts of
terrorism and violence carried out by people with a variety of
extremist views.
The FBI director testified before this committee that last year
that his agency had the largest number of open Domestic Terrorism cases
ever. He went on to say that the majority of those cases involve White
supremacist extremists. He also described how violent extremists are
choosing aspects of different ideologies that fit their unique
grievance, as if choosing individual items from a ``salad bar.'' The
emergence of what the FBI has come to call ``salad bar'' ideologies is
a paradigm shift in terrorism threats that has made it harder for law
enforcement to prevent attacks. Over the past year, threats posed by
converging violent ideologies have increased, as ideologies that once
were thought of as ``fringe'' have become more mainstream.
I appreciate the steps DHS and others have taken over the past year
to try to address this issue, especially after the previous
administration ignoring it for four years. Certainly, the issuance of
the first-ever ``National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism''
last June was an important step forward.
I also appreciate the work many in the private sector and civil
society are doing to protect our communities and prevent the internet
from being used to spread disinformation, radicalize people, or plan
attacks. But much more must be done, and we are eager to hear about
potential solutions today.
We must be clear-eyed about the threat from violent extremists and
focus our efforts on finding appropriate solutions that improve our
homeland security and allow people to go about their lives. Just last
month, a man flew from the United Kingdom to the United States and made
his way to a synagogue in Texas--specifically targeting worshippers for
their Jewish faith. He pretended to be a homeless man seeking shelter
and appealed to their humanity. Like we saw in 2015 at the Mother
Emanuel Church in Charleston, the attacker preyed upon kindness of
people of faith to carry out his attack. Thankfully, this time there
was no loss of life.
Our job on this committee is to focus on security and keep our
fellow Americans safe. We must prioritize helping people congregate in
a manner that allows at-risk communities to live their religious tenets
and show kindness to those in need.
Today, we have a panel of expert witnesses that will outline the
dynamic terrorism threat landscape we face and present their ideas
about what we ought to do moving forward. I look forward to their
testimony and responses to our questions so we can find a path to keep
us all secure. American lives, our way of life, and our very democracy
are at stake.
Chairman Thompson. With that, I recognize the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, and I thank
the witnesses for being here as well. I anticipated that the
Chairman would speak to the domestic violent extremism that is
rampant in our country right now. So, I chose not to replow
that ground for the most part. But I do want to make sure that
the Chairman and everyone knows that I agree with your comments
and we need to mindful of that.
I want to talk more about what I see as kind-of the concern
in the arena of the international extremism coming home here
once again. So, our committee and the Department of Homeland
Security were created to address terrorist threats facing the
homeland. It is incumbent upon us to remember precipitating
events and warning signs which led to our existence.
In 1993, a van containing over 1,000 pounds of explosives
was detonated in a parking garage of the World Trade Center,
killing 6 people and injuring 15 others. Ramsey Yousef, one of
the plot's leaders and a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
later told the FBI he had hoped to topple one tower into the
other killing approximately 250,000 civilians. In 1998, 224
people died, including 12 Americans when nearly simultaneous
bombs blew up in front of the American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. Soon after, these attacks were linked to al-Qaeda.
In 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was refueling off the coast of
Yemen when suicide terrorists launched an attack killing 17
American sailors. U.S. Government investigation determined that
al-Qaeda was behind the bombing. Less than a year later, on a
Tuesday morning in September, America learned exactly what al-
Qaeda was capable of. Now, 20 years after 9/11, terrorist safe
havens still exist in locations spanning from West Africa to,
sadly, once again, Afghanistan.
I understand that Americans are exhausted by endless wars
but we must remember wars are two-sided. The terrorist threat
will not cease because we pick up and leave. We need to
recognize that while it is possible to degrade terrorist
operations when we utilize the power of American intelligence
and military enterprises, it is just as easy for terrorism to
reconstitute when it is given sanctuary. That is my concern
today.
The war on terror is not a war which is going to end with a
treaty signing and a ticker tape parade. It is not a war which
we have won or lost. In fact, it is not over and probably never
will be. However, the Biden administration has seemingly
disengaged to some extent. The Biden administration's botched
withdrawal from Afghanistan has cost the lives of 13 service
members and has reinvigorated terrorist networks in the region
and around the world. We must be clear-eyed about what is an
evolving threat landscape and admit the failures that happened
in Afghanistan.
There are two lessons we must learn from past experience.
The first is, given safe haven, terrorist networks will
undoubtedly utilize that time and space to plot attacks against
the homeland in a more intricate nature. The second lesson is
that we cannot ignore the signals foreign terrorist
organizations are now sending. Many of these warning signs are
seen internationally, but many are also seen here at home,
unfortunately. Just 2\1/2\ weeks ago, a British citizen named
Malik Faisal Akram barricaded himself along with several
hostages inside the Congregation Beth Israel synagogue in
Colleyville, Texas. Akram demanded the release of Aafia
Siddiqui, a terrorist, who has been tried and convicted of
attempting to kill U.S. officers in Afghanistan. As American
citizens, we are incredibly grateful to our brave Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agents for their actions
during this incident. But we cannot take this outcome for
granted.
Having experienced a Naval Air Station Pensacola shooting
just a couple of years ago, we know that these attacks can be
deadly. I am, to say the least, concerned about how Akram was
able to obtain clearance through the Visa Waiver Program. He
clearly had a troubled past and a very serious criminal record
and the British knew about that. At a minimum, this should have
triggered a heightened level of screening and vetting. Why it
did not is something we need to examine and discuss. These are
issues which I am addressing with the Department of Homeland
Security and their agency partners, but which we all should be
considering as we influence Homeland Security policy.
Additionally, the troubling lack of clear communication,
information sharing, and effectiveness displayed by Homeland
Security among its interagency partners and Congress during
recent events such as the one in Colleyville, gives me cause
for continuing concern. The terror threat is one that we face
on many fronts. We cannot ignore the battlefields in the Middle
East, Afghanistan, and Africa. We must be cognizant of the
growth of extremism in the West and work with our international
partners to identify and neutralize the threat there. We must
arm our Homeland Security colleagues with the tools they need
to recognize the threat at ports of entry and keep those actors
from making it to the interior of the United States.
Finally, we must combat the threat of terrorism whether
foreign-born, or home-grown as my colleague, Mr. Thompson,
pointed out, or domestic, which exists within our borders. If
we don't maintain a holistic approach to combatting this
threat, we will face more acts of terror on American soil. I
hope that we can work together in this committee in the
bipartisan manner we always do to get things done and continue
to attack these very difficult problems. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the committee is holding
this important hearing today. Our committee and the Department of
Homeland Security were created to address terrorist threats facing the
homeland, and it is incumbent upon us to remember precipitating events,
and warning signs, which led to our existence.
In 1993, a van containing over a thousand pounds of explosives was
detonated in the parking garage of the World Trade Center, killing 6
people and injuring 1,500 others. Ramzi Yousef, one of the plot's
leaders and the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, later told the FBI he
had hoped to topple one tower into the other, killing approximately
250,000 civilians.
In 1998, 224 people died, including 12 Americans, when nearly
simultaneous bombs blew up in front of the American embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania. Soon after, these attacks were linked to al-Qaeda.
In 2000, the U.S.S. Cole was refueling off the coast of Yemen when
suicide terrorists launched an attack killing 17 American sailors. The
U.S. Government investigation determined that al-Qaeda was behind the
bombing.
Less than a year later, on a Tuesday morning in September, America
learned exactly what al-Qaeda was capable of.
And now, 20 years after 9/11, terrorist safe havens still exist in
locations spanning from West Africa to, once again, Afghanistan.
I understand that as Americans we are exhausted by ``endless
wars,'' but we must remember--wars are two-sided. The terrorist threat
will not cease because we pick up and leave. We need to recognize that
while it is possible to degrade terrorist operations when we utilize
the power of the American intelligence and military enterprises, it is
just as easy for terrorism to reconstitute when it is given sanctuary.
The war on terror is not a war which is going to end with a treaty
signing and a ticker-tape parade. It's not a war which we have won or
lost. In fact, it's not over. However, the Biden administration has
seemingly disengaged.
The Biden administration's botched withdrawal from Afghanistan has
already cost the lives of 13 U.S. service members and has reinvigorated
terrorist networks in the region and around the world. We must be
clear-eyed about what is an evolving threat landscape.
There are two lessons we must learn from past experience. The first
is, given safe haven, terrorist networks will, undoubtedly, utilize
that time and space to plot attacks against the homeland. The second
lesson is that we cannot ignore the signals foreign terrorist
organizations are sending. Many of these warning signs are seen
internationally, but many are also seen here at home.
Just two-and-a-half weeks ago British citizen Malik Faisal Akram
barricaded himself, along with several hostages, inside the
Congregation Beth Israel Synagogue in Colleyville, Texas. Akram
demanded the release of Aafia Siddiqui, a terrorist who has been tried
and convicted of attempting to kill U.S. officers in Afghanistan. As
American citizens we are incredibly grateful to our brave Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agents for their actions during this
incident--actions which ensured that there were no casualties. But we
cannot take this outcome for granted. Having experienced the Naval Air
Station Pensacola shooting just a couple years ago, we know that these
attacks can be deadly.
I am, to say the least, concerned about how Akram was able to
obtain clearance through the Visa Waiver Program. He clearly had a
troubled past, including a criminal record. At a minimum this should
have triggered a heightened level of screening and vetting. These are
issues which I'm addressing with DHS and their agency partners, but
which we all should be considering as we influence homeland security
policy. Additionally, the troubling lack of clear communication,
information sharing, and effectiveness displayed by DHS among its
interagency partners and Congress during recent events such as the one
in Colleyville gives me great cause for concern.
The terror threat is one that we face on many fronts. We cannot
ignore the battlefields in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Africa. We
must be cognizant of the growth of extremism in the West and work with
our international partners to identify and neutralize the threat there.
We must arm our homeland security colleagues with the tools they need
to recognize the threat at ports of entry and keep those actors from
making it to the interior of the United States. And finally, we must
combat the threat of terrorism--whether foreign-born, home-grown, or
domestic--which exists within our borders. If we don't maintain a
holistic approach to combatting this threat, we will face more acts of
terror on American soil.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The gentleman
yields back. Other Members of the committee are reminded that
under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted
for the record. Members are also reminded that the committee
will operate according to the guidelines laid out by the
Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy
regarding remote procedures.
I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Mr.
Nicholas Rasmussen, executive director of the Global Internet
Forum to Counter Terrorism, or GIFCT. Mr. Rasmussen had held
senior counterterrorism positions at the White House and in the
U.S. intelligence community over the course of his 27-year
career, including his service as director of the National
Counterterrorism Center.
Our second witness is Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO and national
director of the ADL. Mr. Greenblatt brings extensive experience
from the private sector and Government. Under Mr. Greenblatt,
ADL has worked in new and innovative ways to counter and combat
extremism in all forms.
Our third witness is Dr. Cynthia Miller-Idriss, professor
at the American University. Dr. Miller-Idriss is a professor of
both School of Public Affairs and the School of Education at AU
and has studied the dynamics of violent extremism globally for
over 20 years.
Our final witness is Mr. Bill Roggio. I hope I didn't do
too much damage to you, Mr. Roggio. He is also a senior fellow
at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where his work
focuses on the global war on terrorism.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record. I now ask Mr. Rasmussen to summarize
his statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, GLOBAL
INTERNET FORUM TO COUNTER TERRORISM
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. Thank you
Ranking Member Katko and Members of the committee. It is,
indeed, my privilege to join this important hearing this
morning. As you said, Mr. Chairman, I am here today in my
capacity as the executive director of GIFCT, the Global
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. In that current role, my
focus is particularly on the on-line dimensions of the threat
landscape that both you and Mr. Katko outlined in your opening
statements, both here at home and around the world.
Of course, this is not my first appearance before this
committee. During my tenure as the director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, I had the honor to appear before you
and the committee on many occasions. I had countless other
informal conversations with Members during that time. I am
grateful for the support of the committee during my time at
NCTC.
GIFCT is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization with the
mission to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from
exploiting digital platforms. We offer a unique multi-
stakeholder setting to identify and solve the most complex
problems that sit at the intersection of technology and
terrorism. We were founded in 2016 by four major technology
companies, but we are now a nonprofit organization with our own
staff, professional staff, of terrorism and technology experts
working with our 18-member companies in a much wider global
stakeholder setting.
Before I highlight our key priorities and work streams, I
will touch just very briefly on a few elements of the current
landscape that both you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Katko,
highlighted in our opening remarks. The on-line dimension of
this landscape is a very dynamic environment. The community of
violent extremist and terrorist voices is becoming ever more
diverse and it represents an ever-wider array of violent
extremist ideologies. Groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to
exploit the on-line environment as do White supremacist and
neo-Nazi organizations around the globe, accelerationists,
ethnonationalists of various forms, violent extremists of the
incel movement and others who propagate conspiracy theories
that lead to violence.
The extremists and terrorists that operate today in the on-
line domain, are agile and adaptable. They migrate readily and
easily from one platform to another depending on their purpose.
Terrorists and violent extremists, as we know, have always
adapted themselves to the tactics that intelligence and law
enforcement services use to disrupt them. They, of course, do
the same when it comes to their use of modern technology. This
poses a challenge to those charged with enforcing platform
policies for tech companies.
The diversity and variety of violent extremist actors
operating on the internet is matched by an equally diverse and
varied set of platforms on which they operate. None of us, Mr.
Chairman, use just one platform or app on our phone today.
Violent extremists are the same and most often they use several
different services, including services that go well beyond
social media platforms.
Responding to this environment, of course, requires a
global and diverse response. For that reason, a top priority
for me and our GIFCT team this year is to expand our membership
to bring in a much wider and more diverse range of tech
companies. It is not enough for GIFCT to be focused on social
media or on Silicon Valley alone. The effort must extend
globally and it must involve companies and technologies of all
sort. In my written statement, I set forth in detail key
initiatives we are pursuing to achieve our mission to include
helping companies develop more useful definitional frameworks
that will help them respond to on-line terrorism and violent
extremism.
Another critical effort of our work is to strengthen the
capacity of member companies to respond in real time to a real-
world terrorism crisis. By facilitating real-time situational
awareness and information sharing among our member companies
during an attack, we identify any on-line dimensions so that
members can take swift action against content that a
perpetrator might be looking to pose to the on-line
environment.
The multistakeholder nature of our work is perhaps best
highlighted by our GIFCT working groups where we bring together
experts from very diverse stakeholder groups, geographies, and
disciplines to focus on discreet and specific challenges we are
facing. It is this attribute of multistakeholderism that makes
GIFCT unique, and I would argue, in many ways, an experiment.
It is a forum in which all of the relevant stakeholders who
share in the problem set are invited to participate. We have
certainly valued having participation from the U.S. Government
and from Federal law enforcement.
Solving these terrorism problems requires a whole-of-
society approach not just a whole-of-Government approach. As I
left Government service a few years ago, it was clear to me
that more of the work necessary to do this takes place outside
Government than perhaps I appreciated. This means collaboration
with the private sector, academia, and civil society. With the
continued support of this committee, Mr. Chairman, and that of
other critical stakeholders here in the United States, I am
optimistic we can make the on-line environment safer and
healthier for all of us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
attention this morning, for the invitation to appear, and I
look forward to the conversation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen
February 2, 2022
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, Members of the committee.
It is indeed a privilege for me to join you today for this important
hearing. I am here today in my capacity as executive director of the
Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, known by its acronym of
GIFCT. GIFCT is a 501(c)(3) organization with a membership of 18
technology companies and the mission to prevent terrorists and violent
extremists from exploiting digital platforms.
But as some Members may recall, this is not my first appearance
before this committee. During my tenure as director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), I had the honor to appear before you
several times along with other senior Government officials as the
committee addressed important issues of homeland security concern. It
is a pleasure to be back here with you virtually and I especially want
to thank former Chairman Mr. McCaul for the very positive and
constructive relationship that the committee had with NCTC during my
years of Government service, as well as the strong support he provided
personally to me as the NCTC director.
I am also pleased and honored to share the panel this morning with
other distinguished experts and voices who work on the complex and
challenging landscape of terrorism and violent extremism, both here in
the United States and around the world. I deeply admire their expertise
and I am eager to share my perspective from GIFCT with them and with
the Members of the committee.
In my prepared testimony, I will cover three things this morning:
First, I will offer a quick sketch of the on-line threat landscape,
as seen from our perspective at GIFCT, working with scholars and
technology companies around the world.
Second, I will share with the committee the various work streams
that GIFCT is pursuing to counter what terrorists and violent
extremists are doing in the on-line space and our ambition to generate
even more impact in the years ahead; and
Third, and last, I will speak to the specific way in which GIFCT is
pursuing our mission and our agenda, as a multistakeholder forum
committed to transparency and inclusivity across all of our work
streams.
GIFCT is a tech-led initiative offering a unique multi-stakeholder
setting to identify and solve the most important and complex global
challenges at the intersection of terrorism and technology. GIFCT's
mission is to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting
digital platforms. We also firmly believe that respect for universal
and fundamental human rights must be central to how we work to fulfill
this mission. Our vision is a world in which the technology sector
marshals its collective creativity and capacity to render terrorists
and violent extremists ineffective on-line.
It is with this mission and vision that we bring together key
stakeholders--from industry, Government, civil society, and academia--
to foster essential collaboration, deliver concrete progress, and
facilitate information sharing to counter terrorist and violent
extremist activity on-line. While multistakeholder work does not always
move at the desired pace and satisfy every individual or stakeholder
community on every occasion, this approach does mean that we can bring
all the actors and sectors who share a piece of this problem set
together and pursue well-informed, collaborative progress. It is clear
to me that the threat landscape we face today requires this whole-of-
society approach to effectively address its on-line and off-line
dynamics.
This brings me to my first area of focus this morning, the threat
landscape. On-line terrorism and violent extremism are cross-platform
and transnational by nature. No individual has just one app on their
phone or their computer, nor uses only one type of on-line service, and
bad actors are no different. The current threat landscape is growing
more dynamic every day with an increasingly diverse array of violent
extremist ideologies circulating in the on-line environment. We are not
in a place where we have the luxury to focus on only one set of
ideological actors who are exploiting the internet to advance their
violent agenda. ISIS or Daesh continues to find ways to exploit the on-
line environment to their benefit, as do White supremacist and/or neo-
Nazi organizations across the globe, accelerationists, ethno-
nationalists of various forms, and others who propagate violence-
inducing conspiracy theories. Even as our attention is drawn to
particular variants of violent extremism that may seem novel or new to
some, like those tied to the Incel movement, terrorist groups with long
histories of activity on-line continue to pose new challenges to both
companies and to law enforcement authorities.
The violent extremists and terrorists that operate today in the on-
line domain are often agile, adaptative, and savvy. They increasingly
understand where policy red lines have been drawn by mainstream
platforms and at what point policy enforcement is likely to drive them
off a particular platform or cause them to lose access. These extremist
actors migrate readily from one platform to another depending on the
purpose they are pursuing with on-line engagement. They know when to
take particularly sensitive topics, such as operational coordination,
off of more mainstream platforms and continue the engagement on more
permissive platforms. In many cases, they prepare in advance for loss
of access to a platform by having a bank of alternate accounts at the
ready. None of this should surprise us, as terrorists and violent
extremists have always adapted themselves to the tactics that
intelligence and law enforcement professionals use to disrupt them.
They operate in the same way when it comes to their use of modern
technology and communication tools, and this poses a significant
challenge to those charged with enforcing policies and terms of
service.
Countering terrorism and violent extremism on-line requires a
global and heterogenous response, a response that recognizes that
services developed and intended to be used by good actors seeking to
operate productively are also susceptible to abuse and exploitation by
bad actors seeking to cause harm. Indeed, even as digital platforms
empower people through tools to communicate, share information, run
businesses, and organize, the on-line environment that these platforms
comprise inevitably provides those same empowering tools for use by
terrorists and violent extremists. Technological innovation, over the
course of history and through to today's discussion of digital
platforms in 2022, unfortunately, can serve both as a force for good,
and as a potential accelerant to radicalization and mobilization to
violence. That is the unfortunate reality that we confront.
The second set of comments I wanted to offer today relates to what
GIFCT is doing in response to this threat picture and landscape. It is
with this understanding of the challenges and threats we face today
that GIFCT has set its strategic priorities, two of which I will
highlight here this morning.
The first key priority for GIFCT this year is to recruit and
welcome into GIFCT new member companies from around the world that
represent different kinds of technologies. If the work of our
organization is focused exclusively on social media platforms or on
companies based in Silicon Valley, we will have failed to realize
GIFCT's full potential and we will fall short of achieving the impact
that we seek. The effort must extend globally and must involve
companies and technologies of all sorts.
A second pressing priority guiding our work at GIFCT is to provide
greater thought leadership on the issues and challenges associated with
on-line terrorist and violent extremist activity. We do this in order
to support our member companies as they develop their own solutions for
content moderation and illicit user activity that fall within their own
policies and terms of service. Focused on on-line content and behavior
tied to off-line violence, we are taking steps this year to develop a
more useful definitional framework for identifying terrorist and
violent extremist activity on-line that GIFCT member companies can draw
upon to inform their on-going efforts to monitor, assess, and take
action against content and activity that violates their policies.
Both of these objectives--growing the scale and diversity of
technology platforms committed to our mission and providing forward-
looking thought leadership that our members can leverage to address the
corpus of activity they confront on their platforms--reflect, in part,
our role in addressing the on-line factors and behaviors that shape
today's challenging threat landscape. But it is imperative that I
emphasize that ignoring the off-line factors that contribute to that
same landscape will not take us very far. It is neither strategically
sound nor intellectually honest to view the on-line and off-line threat
landscapes as separate and distinct entities. The on-line ecosystem can
only play the role of facilitating greater communication, information
sharing, and organizing for terrorism and violent extremism when other
factors that contribute to this threat are present as well. On-line
consumption and exchange of information can surely be pointed to as an
accelerating factor to the process of radicalization. Yet it is also
clear that information drawn from other sources, including broadcast
news outlets and rhetoric employed by political leaders and public
figures, also plays a role in that pathway to extremist behavior.
A pressing example of this interplay between the on-line and off-
line space is the on-going COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic created a
set of conditions that seems almost tailor-made for violent extremists
seeking to advance their work. Between health restrictions, economic
impacts, social isolation, and increased political polarization, it is
clear that the pandemic has exacerbated existing cleavages and
anxieties across society. While many throughout the pandemic and its
lockdowns have found solace and positive community through on-line
engagements, other groups, smaller in size or number but higher in
terms of risk, also use on-line communities to perpetuate
misinformation and coordinate hate-based violence.
One consequence of this environment is increasing engagement and
interaction on-line among individuals who otherwise may adhere to
distinct and separate ideologies. Experts in our GIFCT academic
network, the Global Network on Extremism and Technology, continue to
see such on-line behavior and their conclusions very much align with
and reinforce the insights offered by my fellow witness Dr. Miller-
Idriss and others who have pointed to a post-organizational
transformation within the threat landscape and to new coalition
building as a result of disparate individuals and groups finding unity
in their understanding of major world events and in their preferred
solutions to societal problems.
It is with this clear-eyed understanding of today's current
counterterrorism challenges and threat landscape that I chose to accept
my role as the inaugural executive director of the Global Internet
Forum to Counter Terrorism. Having served as long as I had inside
Government, it was clear to me that Government alone could not solve
those challenges and manage that threat landscape in a way that would
keep us all safe from terrorists and violent extremists.
The current organization that is GIFCT, an independent non-profit
organization, is less than 2 years old but has been able to take the
early progress of its original establishment as a consortium of
technology companies to make meaningful contributions to addressing the
on-line threat landscape. GIFCT was originally founded in 2017 by
Microsoft, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, who then announced at the
United Nations General Assembly in 2019 that the consortium would
evolve into an independent organization. During the 3 years as a
consortium, in-house teams at GIFCT's member companies initially
focused on developing cross-platform tools such as the hash-sharing
database and establishing a forum where technology companies,
governments, academia, and civil society could discuss the state of the
on-line threat landscape, share insights, and produce solutions. During
this time, GIFCT's original membership criteria was established, our
on-going mentorship program with Tech Against Terrorism was created,
the first phase of a GIFCT-funded academic network was launched, and
GIFCT's first counterspeech campaign toolkit for practitioners in
partnership with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue was created.
After this initial progress, the transition to an independent non-
profit organization was pursued so that GIFCT could achieve more impact
for its member companies and do more to support efforts to fulfill the
nine-point action plan signed by technology companies in the
Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content
Online.
Today, GIFCT is a young and growing non-profit organization run by
its own team of counterterrorism and technology experts. Working with
our 18 technology company members, we embrace the task of moving the
industry forward on how to address threats posed by terrorism and
violent extremism and arm our members with cross-platform tools,
solutions, and resources to: Prevent further exploitation of their
platforms; strengthen how companies respond to terrorist and mass
violent attacks; and learn about new evolutions in the threat landscape
and approaches to combating them.
We do this work with a full commitment to remain diligent in
upholding the human rights and fundamental freedoms that terrorists so
often seek to undermine. We believe that counterterrorism and human
rights must be complementary and mutually-reinforcing goals. Preventing
terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms
enhances the protection, fulfillment, and realization of human rights.
But this requires on-going work to address and understand the human
dimension and impacts of our efforts with a focus on both the victims
of terrorism and violent extremism as well as those victims of efforts
to address terrorism and violent extremism. Even in the short time
GIFCT has been operating we have delivered real action to meet this
commitment, commissioning a non-profit entity called BSR (Business for
Social Responsibility) to conduct a human rights impact assessment of
the organization that now serves as a guide for all aspects of our work
from engaging stakeholders and technology companies across the globe,
to the tools and resources we develop.
At GIFCT we continue to pursue development of cross-platform tools,
such as the GIFCT hash-sharing database, so that a range of different
digital platforms can take information on known terrorist and violent
extremist content and activity and identify whether the same content
exists and requires action on their respective platform. GIFCT's
database is the safe and secure industry database of ``perceptual
hashes''--often understood as ``a digital fingerprint''--of known
terrorist content as defined by GIFCT's hash-sharing database taxonomy.
Content found by a member company is ``hashed'' ensuring there is no
link to any data from the original platform or user, including
personally identifiable information. Hashes appear as digital
signatures or numerical representations of the original content, which
means they cannot be easily reverse engineered to recreate the content.
Each company that is part of the hash-sharing database determines its
use of and engagement with the database, depending on their own terms
of service, how their platform operates, and how the threat of
terrorist and violent extremist exploitation may manifest for them.
This work also requires refined parameters and a definitional
framework for what constitutes terrorist and violent extremist content.
With multistakeholder input, we provide members with thought leadership
and resources as we continue to develop our taxonomy to address a more
diverse range of terrorist narratives and ideologies while avoiding the
use of overly broad definitions that pose risks of over-censorship.
This is why hashes of terrorist and violent extremist content that
qualify for the hash-sharing database must meet a taxonomy that
recognizes the original producers of the content as well as the type of
content and severity for harm.
Currently, our taxonomy addresses videos and images produced by
individuals and entities on the United Nations Security Council's
consolidated sanctions list as well as perpetrator-produced content
captured or livestreamed during an off-line violent attack. Material
that meets these criteria is subject to hashing and sharing within the
GIFCT framework. In the coming months, the taxonomy will expand to
include attacker manifestos in PDF form, terrorist and violent
extremist publications in PDF form, and URLs identified by our partner
Tech Against Terrorism and confirmed to link to terrorist content.
Member companies are then able to see if any hash may match to content
on their platform, thus providing a signal to identify where to focus
and prioritize their policy enforcement efforts and combat potential
terrorist and violent extremist activity on their platforms.
To give an example of how the hash-sharing database operates, when
a member company may identify a video produced by an entity on the
United Nations Security Council's consolidated sanctions list that
glorifies and celebrates a previous terrorist attack, that member can
create a hash of the video--the digital fingerprint of the content that
does not contain user data--and share it in GIFCT's database. This hash
is now available to the other members of the GIFCT hash-sharing
database who can then determine if the hash matches to content on their
respective platforms, thus identifying if the video has been shared on
their platform. If that is the case, the member can review the video
and the context it was shared within to determine what actions to take
in line with their policies and terms of service. Such a cross-platform
tool enables our members to share and leverage each other's on-going
efforts and expertise and increase our collective impact to prevent the
further exploitation of digital platforms when this video is shared.
This is an important part of our work to support our member companies
on an on-going basis, as well as during the especially urgent instances
in which a digital platform is being exploited as part of an off-line
violent attack.
A second critical mission for GIFCT is to improve the capacity of
member companies to respond in a real-world terrorism crisis that may
be playing out in the on-line environment. Through our Incident
Response Framework, we facilitate situational awareness and information
sharing across our members in real time during an off-line violent
event in order to identify any on-line dimensions. In the event of a
significant on-line dimension to the off-line attack, the framework
serves to strengthen the ability for our members to take swift action
against on-line content produced by the perpetrators as part of their
violence.
Since initially establishing this framework in the Spring of 2019,
we have continued to mature and develop it in partnership with our
members. To date, GIFCT and its member companies have initiated
communications in response to over 195 off-line violent events across
the globe in as close to real time as possible sharing situational
awareness and information in an effort to identify any on-line
dimension. In that time, the highest level of our Incident Response
Framework, the Content Incident Protocol (CIP), has been activated
twice in response to the perpetrators livestreaming their attacks and
the content being shared on a GIFCT member platform. When the Content
Incident Protocol is activated, GIFCT members can contribute hashes of
the perpetrator-produced content to the GIFCT hash-sharing database in
order to support all members in identifying the content on their
platforms and taking action in line with their respective policies and
terms of service.
The multistakeholder nature of our work is best highlighted through
the thematic GIFCT Working Groups we convene to focus on specific
challenges we see in our efforts to counter terrorism and violent
extremism on-line. GIFCT Working Groups bring together experts from
diverse stakeholder groups, geographies, and disciplines to collaborate
and produce output with practical value and utility on an annual basis.
This output is published on our website and is available to all. GIFCT
Working Groups are refreshed each year with updated themes and focus
areas with the opportunity for new participants to join and new
problems to be addressed. GIFCT's 2021 Working Groups convened more
than 200 experts and practitioners from across the world, holding more
than 55 meetings with representatives from 10 technology companies, 13
governments and international governing bodies, 26 civil society
organizations, and 41 research and academic institutions.
GIFCT's 2022 Working Groups are currently convening on a monthly
basis with participants from 35 countries across 6 continents, with 57
percent drawn from civil society, academia, or practitioners, 26
percent representing governments, and 17 percent from industry. These
groups have been meeting since August 2021 and are currently pursuing
substantive projects on key challenges to countering terrorism and
violent extremism on-line focused on: Technical approaches including
tooling, algorithms, and artificial intelligence; best practices and
implementation hurdles for transparency; crisis response protocols;
positive interventions and strategic communications on-line to support
disengagement and intervention campaigns; and assessing legal
frameworks. Last year's outputs from GIFCT Working Groups provided
proof of concept that through multistakeholderism, we can achieve
substantive results that offer practical analysis and well-informed
recommendations on where tech and other sectors, often including GIFCT
itself, can improve and the direction to take next.
I hope this brief summary gives committee Members and staff some
idea of the substantive work under way at GIFCT and the various
initiatives we are pursuing to limit the ability of terrorists and
violent extremists to operate successfully in the on-line environment.
That is the ``what'' of GIFCT's work and I am extremely proud of that
work. In my view, however, the manner in which our work is carried out
is equally important. How we do our work matters as much as what we do.
That is the third and final thought I want to leave with you today.
Several times in the course of this statement for the record, I
have referred to GIFCT's work as being multistakeholder. I would argue
that this attribute is in fact what makes GIFCT unique and in many
ways, an experiment. There are very few venues or fora, if any, that
offer the sort of multistakeholder platform for problem solving and
information sharing that we are working to build. It is a forum in
which the full set of relevant stakeholders is invited to participate.
We have appreciated having representation from the United States
Government and from Federal law enforcement within our Working Groups
and on our Independent Advisory Committee.
As I left Government service a few years ago, it was clear to me
that more and more of the work necessary to deal with our terrorism and
extremism challenges needed to take place outside of Government, rather
than within Government. That meant collaboration and cooperation with
the private sector, including technology companies, engagement with
academics who understand how information and technology are used to
radicalize individuals, and dialog with civil society organizations
that care deeply about the free and open circulation of information and
ideas in a context of full respect for the rights of others. Solving
our terrorism problems, and particularly our domestic terrorism
problems, requires a whole-of-society approach--not just a whole-of-
Government approach--and I was eager to join the effort from outside
Government to try and make some real gains in this area. What was
lacking was any sort of venue for helping organize and drive key work
streams involving all of these different stakeholders.
GIFCT offers us that opportunity. The chance to bring together
industry, Government, civil society, and academia in common cause to
make the on-line environment safer and healthier. That is what my
colleagues and I at GIFCT are working every day to do. I would be the
first to tell you that a tremendous amount of work to achieve that
objective lies ahead of us and that much more remains to be done for us
to realize the potential embodied in multistakeholder engagement of
this kind. We are not yet fully there. But there is real urgency to
what we are all here talking about today, because the threat
environment we are all confronting is only growing more challenging and
more dynamic every day. With the continued support of this committee,
and that of other critical stakeholders here in the United States and
around the world, I am optimistic that we can continue to deliver
genuine multistakeholder progress that makes the on-line environment a
safer and healthier place. Thank you for your attention this morning
and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Mr. Greenblatt, you
are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN GREENBLATT, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE
Mr. Greenblatt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Katko, Members of the committee, and my fellow panelists. Good
morning. I am Jonathan Greenblatt, CEO and national director of
the Anti-Defamation League, or ADL. ADL is the oldest anti-hate
organization in America. It is an honor to appear before you
this morning to address the threat of extremism and terror in
the homeland.
Since 1913, ADL has worked to stop the defamation of the
Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all.
We have a world-class team including analysts and experts and
investigators who track extremist threats and have been doing
so for decades, monitoring threats from all sides. But let's be
clear, violent domestic extremism is on the rise and it
threatens all of our communities. The Jewish community
continues to be a primary target of extremists across the
ideological spectrum. Just 2 weeks ago in Colleyville, Texas,
an Islamist-inspired terrorist fueled by anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories about Jewish power, traveled thousands of
miles to take 4 people hostage at gunpoint in a synagogue
during a Shabbat service in an attempt to free an al-Qaeda
operative who herself espoused incredibly hateful views about
Jews in her public trial.
The crisis in Colleyville was a painful reminder that the
threat to the Jewish community in America remains significant
and lethal. In fact, ADL has recorded a 115 percent increase in
anti-Semitic incidents from 2015 to 2020. That is an alarming
spike. But the data obscures the human toll. I am talking about
thousands of acts of hateful anti-Jewish harassment, of ugly
anti-Semitic vandalism on synagogues, on schools, on homes.
Hundreds of acts, brutal acts of assault against Jewish people
and at least 18 anti-Semitic murders that devastated families,
shattered communities, and stunned the country from Pittsburgh
to Poway to Orange County to Jersey City to Monsey, New York.
The human toll is considerable.
In a country riven by political differences, I am sad to
report that anti-Semitism knows no partisan bounds. As I have
told this committee in previous hearings, neither side of the
spectrum is exempt from intolerance, nor above anti-Semitism.
Politicizing the oldest hatred is a tool that we regrettably
see from politicians on both sides and it needs to stop. At
ADL, we are particularly troubled by the rise of domestic
violent extremism, including as Nick mentioned, White
supremacists, armed militia groups, accelerationists, QAnon
enthusiasts, sovereign citizens, and others who demonize the
Jewish people. Some of these actors, they trumpet the
replacement theory that posits that a cabal of Jews are seeking
to commit White genocide. It is frightening to think that this
concept has been mainstreamed in recent years, yet some
prominent conservative voices continue to make outlandish,
grotesque claims that suggest that Jewish philanthropists are
seeking to flood America with migrants, not true, or other
bewildering charges. From Charlottesville to Capitol Hill,
there is a through line and it is played out with deadly
results.
At ADL, we are also troubled by the rise of hateful anti-
Israel forces that demonize the only Jewish State in the world.
From pro-Iranian outlets spreading slanderous lies on social
media to self-described activists groups targeting Jews in
public places. To NGO's like Amnesty International issuing
reports making wild incendiary accusations against the Jewish
State accusing it of apartheid or genocide, deeming it
illegitimate.
It is frightening to think that these concepts also have
been mainstreamed in recent years. As some so-called
progressive voices make outlandish grotesque claims that
suggest that Zionists are seeking to enslave the Palestinian
people, not true. Or other bewildering charges from Time Square
to Colleyville, there is a through line and it is played out
with terrifying results. So, we can and we must do more to
prevent these kinds of tragedies from happening again.
When I had the honor of appearing before you last year, I
called for an all-in Government approach and a whole-of-society
strategy to combatting domestic extremism. We have made real
progress since then but much more needs to be done to meet the
moment. So, with that in mind, I again respectfully call on
Congress to take meaningful action to combat extremism in a
domestic context. This should start by adopting the principles
of PROTECT, ADL's comprehensive seven-point plan to mitigate
the threat posed by domestic terrorism while protecting civil
liberties and staying true to American freedoms and values. Our
recommendations include passing the bipartisan Domestic
Terrorism Prevention Act, ending the complicity of social media
services in facilitating extremism and hate, creating an
independent clearing house for on-line extremist content, and
doubling the funding for the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.
You see, people should not be risking their lives when they
choose to worship in a synagogue or shop in a kosher
supermarket or simply live openly as Jews in America. So, yes,
we need safety through security and DHS grants can help. But we
also need safety through solidarity. We can never build walls
that are high enough or secure our networks tightly enough to
ward out all evil. This is why we need all of you and public
figures to call out hate whenever it happens regardless of the
source and while we help other communities, we will stand with
the Jewish community as we have sought to rally by their side
in the face of racism and intolerance leveled in their
direction. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Greenblatt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan Greenblatt
February 2, 2022
introduction to adl
Since 1913, the mission of ADL (the Anti-Defamation League) has
been to ``stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure
justice and fair treatment to all.'' For decades, one of the most
important ways in which ADL has fought against bigotry and anti-
Semitism has been by investigating extremist threats across the
ideological spectrum, including White supremacists and other far-right
violent extremists, producing research to inform the public of the
scope of the threat, and working with law enforcement, educators, the
tech industry, and elected leaders to promote best practices that can
effectively address and counter these threats.
Domestic violent extremism has been on the rise in recent years.
The Jewish community continues to be a primary target of extremists,
regardless of ideology. Our hearts are with the Colleyville, Texas
community that was recently shaken by the trauma of being targeted by a
terrorist who took hostages at a local synagogue, one that thankfully
had security-related equipment and training--resources that many faith-
based communities Nation-wide do not have access to.
Without a doubt, right-wing extremist violence is currently the
greatest domestic terrorism threat to everyone in this country. From
Charleston to Charlottesville to Pittsburgh, to Poway and El Paso, we
have seen the deadly consequences of White supremacist extremism play
out all over this country. Moreover, at ADL we are tracking the
mainstreaming, normalizing, and localizing of the hate, disinformation,
and toxic conspiracy theories that animate this extremism. We cannot
afford to minimize this threat. We need a bipartisan ``whole-of-
Government approach''--indeed, a ``whole-of-society'' approach--to
counter it, and the work must start today.
current trends
Colleyville and Anti-Semitic Violence
Anti-Semitism is an on-going threat to the American Jewish
community. According to the FBI's annual data on hate crimes, defined
as criminal offenses which are motivated by bias, crimes targeting the
Jewish community consistently constitute over half of all religion-
based crimes. The number of hate crimes against Jews has ranged between
600 and 1,200 each year since the FBI began collecting data in the
1990's. There were 683 hate crimes against Jews in 2020, 963 in 2019
and 847 in 2018. The FBI's data is based on voluntary reporting by
local law enforcement and appropriate characterization of crimes as
also being hate crimes. For a variety of reasons, dozens of large
cities either underreport or do not report hate crime data at all. For
that reason, experts, including at ADL, know that the real figure for
crimes targeting Jews, as well as other minorities, is even higher than
the FBI reporting indicates.
A violent attack against the Jewish community occurred just
recently, on January 15, when a gunman entered Congregation Beth Israel
in Colleyville, Texas, during services, taking 3 congregants and the
rabbi as hostages. Though the stand-off ended with all hostages freed
and physically unharmed, the violent act reinforced the need to
forcefully address the threat of anti-Semitic violence--experienced by
the Colleyville community and far too many others. The fact that the
Colleyville attacker travelled from the United Kingdom underscores that
there can be foreign influences on domestic terrorism, either through
incitement, coordination, or direct participation.
Rising Anti-Semitism
ADL has recorded a 60 percent increase of anti-Semitic incidents
over the past 5 years. While anti-Semitism has commonalities with
racism, anti-Muslim bias, xenophobia, homophobia, transphobia,
misogyny, and other forms of hate and discrimination, it also has
certain unique characteristics as a specific set of ideologies about
Jews that has migrated across discourses--and across centuries. In
almost every part of our society, this hatred has been conjured and
adjusted to suit the values, beliefs, and fears of specific
demographics and contexts. The underlying conspiracy theories employing
Jew-hatred morph to fit the anxieties and upheavals of the time--for
example, that Jews were responsible for the Black Death in medieval
times and for ``inventing,'' spreading, or profiting from COVID in the
21st Century. Or that Jews exercise extraordinary power over
governments, media, and finance--from the charges of a conspiracy to
achieve world domination set forth in the Protocols of the Elders of
Zion and used by the Nazis, to thinly-veiled anti-Semitism blaming
``globalism'' and ``cosmopolitan'' elites for all the ills of the world
and for planning a ``new world order.''
We cannot fight anti-Semitism without understanding how it is both
intertwined with other forms of prejudice and how it is unique.
Each year, ADL's Center on Extremism tracks incidents of anti-
Semitic harassment, vandalism, and assault in the United States. Since
1979, we have published this information in an annual Audit of Anti-
Semitic Incidents. In 2020, ADL tabulated 2,024 reported anti-Semitic
incidents throughout the United States. This is a 4 percent decrease
from the 2,107 incidents recorded in 2019 but is still the third-
highest year on record since ADL began tracking anti-Semitic incidents
in 1979.
Known extremist groups or individuals inspired by extremist
ideology were responsible for 331 incidents in 2020, up from 270
incidents in 2019. This represents 16 percent of the total number of
incidents in 2020.
More recently, analysis from ADL's Center on Extremism reveals that
anti-Semitic incidents in the United States more than doubled during
the May 2021 military conflict between Israel and Hamas and its
immediate aftermath compared to the same time period in 2020. After
peaking during that period, incident levels gradually returned to a
baseline level.
Murder and Extremism: By the Numbers
In 2021, based on ADL's preliminary research, domestic extremists
killed at least 29 people in the United States, in 19 separate
incidents. This represents a modest increase from the 23 extremist-
related murders documented in 2020 but is far lower than the number of
murders committed in any of the 5 years prior (which ranged from 45 to
78). While this could be cause for optimism, more likely it is the
result of COVID lockdowns reducing mass gatherings and the increased
attention of law enforcement following the January 6, 2021
insurrection.
Most of the murders (26 of 29) were committed by right-wing
extremists, which for more than a decade in this country has been the
case.
White Supremacist Propaganda
ADL's Center on Extremism (COE) tracked a near-doubling of White
supremacist propaganda efforts in 2020, which included the distribution
of racist, anti-Semitic and anti-LGBTQ+ fliers, stickers, banners, and
posters. The 2020 data shows a huge increase of incidents from the
previous year, with a total of 5,125 cases reported to ADL (averaging
more than 14 incidents per day), compared to 2,724 in 2019. This is the
highest number of White supremacist propaganda incidents ADL has ever
recorded. The number of propaganda incidents on college campuses
dropped by more than half, perhaps due to COVID restrictions.
Propaganda gives White supremacists the ability to maximize media
and on-line attention, while limiting the risk of individual exposure,
negative media coverage, arrests, and public backlash that often
accompanies more public events. The barrage of propaganda, which
overwhelmingly features veiled White supremacist language with a
``patriotic'' slant, is an effort to normalize White supremacists'
message and bolster recruitment efforts while targeting marginalized
communities including Jews, Black people, Muslims, non-White
immigrants, and LGBTQ+ people.
Modern White Supremacy
Extremist White supremacist ideology is more than a collection of
prejudices: It is a complete ideology or worldview that can be as
deeply seated as strongly-held religious beliefs.
Different variations and versions of extremist White supremacist
ideology have evolved and expanded over time to include an emphasis on
anti-Semitism and nativism. These extremists themselves typically no
longer use the term ``White supremacist'', as they once proudly did,
but tend instead to prefer various euphemisms, ranging from ``White
nationalist'' to ``White separatist'' to ``race realist'' or
``identitarian.'' Even in the face of these complexities, it is still
possible to arrive at a useful working definition of the concept of
extremist White supremacy.
Through the Civil Rights era, White supremacist ideology focused on
the perceived need to maintain the dominance of the White race in the
United States. After the Civil Rights era, extremist White supremacists
realized that their views had become increasingly unpopular in American
society and their ideology adapted to this new reality.
Today, White supremacist ideology, no matter what version or
variation, tends to focus on the notion that the White race itself is
now threatened with imminent extinction, doomed--unless White people
take action--due to a rising tide of people of color who are being
controlled and manipulated by Jews. Extremist White supremacists
promote the concept of on-going or future ``White genocide'' in their
efforts to wake White people up to their supposedly dire racial future.
The popular White supremacist slogan known as the ``Fourteen
Words'' reflects these beliefs and holds center stage: ``We must secure
the existence of our people and a future for White children.'' Secure a
future, as White supremacists see it, in the face of their enemies'
efforts to destroy it.
This twisted and conspiratorial ideology was on display in 2017 in
Charlottesville as White supremacists marched with tiki torches
chanting ``Jews will not replace us,'' a rally that ended in the death
of counter-protester Heather Heyer. It was on display in 2019 during
the horrific mass shooting in El Paso. When a White supremacist opened
fire in a shopping center, killing 23 people, he was motivated by what
he called ``the Hispanic invasion of Texas.'' And when the mass shooter
at the Pittsburgh Tree of Life synagogue massacred 11 Jews on the
Jewish Sabbath, he shouted not only ``All Jews Must Die!'' but claimed
to be murdering Jews because they were helping to transport members of
the large groups of undocumented immigrants making their way north
toward the United States from Latin America.
Anti-Government Militias
The militia movement is a right-wing anti-Government extremist
movement that formed in 1993-94, primarily in reaction to Federal gun
control measures and to deadly stand-offs between civilians and Federal
agents. Much of the movement focuses on paramilitary activities.
Militia movement adherents have traditionally believed that the Federal
Government is collaborating with a shadowy conspiracy (the ``New World
Order'') to strip Americans of their rights, starting with their right
to keep and bear arms. Once rendered defenseless, Americans would be
absorbed into the tyrannical New World Order's one-world government.
The movement grew rapidly in the 1990's but suffered a serious decline
in the early 2000's. Beginning in 2008, however, the militia movement
enjoyed a major resurgence that attracted thousands of new, often
young, recruits. It has been quite active in the years since.
The 2016 election of Donald Trump changed the emphasis of the
militia movement, which strongly supported Trump's candidacy. After
Trump's election, the movement was less interested in opposing the
Federal Government and spent much of its energy looking for other
perceived enemies, such as Antifa and racial justice protesters
associated with the Black Lives Matter movement--particularly in the
wake of the May 2020 murder of George Floyd. In 2020, the militia
movement focused on opposition to State-level gun control measures,
State-level pandemic-related restrictions and Black Lives Matter
protests.
The militia movement has a long history of serious criminal
activity, including murders, armed stand-offs, terroristic threats
against public officials, illegal weapons or explosives, and terrorist
plots or acts. More information about various active militia groups--
and their participation in the January 6, 2021, insurrection--is
available below.
Online Hate
In recent years, extremists' on-line presence has reverberated
across a range of social media platforms. This extremist content is
intertwined with hate, racism, anti-Semitism, and misogyny--all also
through lines of White supremacist ideology. Such content is enmeshed
in conspiracy theories and explodes on platforms that are themselves
tuned to spread disinformation. We can look no further than the deadly
insurrection at our Capitol, which ADL has repeatedly called the most
predictable terror attack in American history, because it was planned
and promoted out in the open on mainstream platforms such as Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube, as well as fringe platforms such as
Parler, Gab, 4Chan, and Telegram. There is little doubt that fringe
platforms have helped radicalize users and normalize both on-line and
off-line extremist actions.
Fringe Social Media Platforms
Parler
In the weeks following the 2020 Presidential election, the social
media site Parler drew millions of new users--both ordinary users and
extremists, allowing for worrisome commingling. These newcomers were
frustrated with what they perceived to be ``anti-conservative'' bias
exhibited by mainstream social media platforms. For example, these
users thought that Twitter and Facebook were being ``anti-
conservative'' when they limited posts by President Trump and other
conservative influencers who violated terms of service prohibiting the
spread of misinformation.
Shortly after the Capitol insurrection, Amazon Web Services (AWS)
announced that Parler had violated AWS's terms of service and removed
the platform from its hosting service, taking it off-line. Apple and
Google similarly suspended Parler's app from their app stores. Parler
returned on-line in February 2021, after securing an alternative
hosting service. Proud Boys, QAnon adherents, anti-Government
extremists (Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and militia) and White
supremacists (from members of the alt right to accelerationists)
continue to openly promote their ideologies on Parler. Additionally,
Holocaust denial, anti-Semitism, racism, and other forms of bigotry are
easy to find. Today, Parler claims to have around 16 million active
users.
Gab
Gab serves as a forum where White supremacists and extremists
publish manifestos or gather to plan and organize hateful acts. In
October 2018, White supremacist Robert Bowers killed 11 people at the
Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh after posting anti-Semitic, anti-
immigrant rants on Gab. Two years later, the social media site gained
traction among right-wing extremists, including White supremacists. In
fact, 60 percent of the 47 right-wing extremist groups ADL has
identified on Gab were created in 2020.
In the wake of the Capitol insurrection, ADL called on the U.S.
Department of Justice and the FBI to launch a criminal investigation
into Gab and its CEO to determine whether the social media platform
intentionally aided or abetted individuals who carried out the January
6 attack on the Nation's Capitol.
4Chan, 8Chan, and 8Kun
4chan, one of the oldest and most popular imageboards, was launched
in 2003 and introduced viral memes (many of which still circulate
today). However, parts of 4chan--especially its Politically Incorrect
board, known as pol or /pol/--developed a reputation for offensive and
hateful posts and memes.
In March 2019, Brenton Tarrant, an Australian White supremacist,
allegedly posted a manifesto to 8chan before murdering 51 people at two
mosques in New Zealand. In April 2019, White supremacist John Earnest
opened fire inside a Chabad synagogue in Poway, California, killing 1
person and wounding 3 more before he surrendered. He posted a manifesto
to 8chan before his attack, which referred admiringly to Tarrant, and
to Robert Bowers, the mass shooter who murdered 11 people at a
Pittsburgh synagogue in October 2018 (referenced above).
8chan began as an offshoot of the imageboard 4chan. ``Imageboards''
are types of on-line discussion forums centered around posting images.
After 8chan shut down in August 2019--as a result of being deplatformed
by the web infrastructure and security company Cloudflare following the
extremist mass murder in El Paso, Texas--many users migrated over to
8kun.
These users are typically anonymous, with no screen names. That
anonymity allows people to post outrageous, disgusting, or hateful
photos and messages, ranging from hate speech to posts about
pedophilia.
Telegram
Telegram, an on-line social networking app with well over 200
million users, may not be a household name just yet, but it has a
significant audience. And it is gaining popularity. Telegram has become
a favored on-line gathering place for the international overtly White
supremacist community and other extremist groups who have been
displaced or banned from more popular platforms. The platform, which is
a cloud-based chat and group messaging app, was created in 2013 by the
same two Russian brothers who founded the Russian-based social
networking site VKontakte, or VK. VK is also known for its lack of
moderation of White supremacist content. At present, the various
platforms' leadership teams appear to be uninterested in addressing
this issue.
Mainstream Social Media Platforms
Fringe platforms, despite having relatively small user bases,
leverage Big Tech platforms like Twitter and Facebook to increase their
reach and influence. But Big Tech platforms are no longer unwitting
accomplices. In the case of Big Tech, White supremacist propaganda has
found its viral channel. It's a perfect storm. First, there is the
well-researched human propensity to engage with the most incendiary,
inciting, and hateful content. This in turn meets the business model of
Big Tech, which depends on increasing engagement of users to surveil
them and collect copious amounts of data about them--and their
associates and activities--all to sell as many hyper-targeted
advertisements as possible. The profit incentive demands engagement,
hate, and extremism delivers it, and then algorithms amplify that
hateful content to generate even more engagement. Toxic speech is thus
given reach and impact unparalleled in human history. For example, in
2020, a single ``Stop the Steal'' Facebook group gained more than
300,000 members within 24 hours. Thousands of newcomers a minute joined
this group and some of them openly advocated civil war.
Facebook
Facebook claims that it is addressing hate on its platforms. ADL
and others, however, continue to expose egregious examples of on-line
hate, misinformation, and extremism across the company's products. In
June 2020, Facebook announced that it took down hundreds of groups and
pages on its platform associated with the violent anti-Government
Boogaloo movement. Despite efforts by the Boogaloo movement to
camouflage itself to retain a Facebook foothold, the social media
company's efforts were largely effective, and after the de-platforming,
it became difficult to find large and active Boogaloo spaces on
Facebook.
Concerningly, however, additional Boogaloo pages have since emerged
on Facebook, hiding among libertarian groups and pages that also share
memes advocating for violence. Perhaps most worrying, Facebook
algorithms appear to be recommending these Boogaloo pages to like-
minded users, despite the company's June 2020 assertion that it would
no longer do so, followed by broader statements around not recommending
groups tied to violence in September 2020 and an even broader statement
in March 2021 stating that Facebook would be ending all recommendations
for ``civic and political groups, as well as newly created groups.''
TikTok
In less than 6 years, TikTok--the social media app that allows
users to create and share short videos--has amassed hundreds of
millions of users. It is particularly popular among young people. As
ADL documented in August 2020 and May 2021, while much of the content
on TikTok is lighthearted and fun, extremists have exploited the TikTok
to share hateful messages and recruit new adherents. Anti-Semitism
continues to percolate across the app, with posts perpetuating age-old
anti-Jewish tropes and conspiracy theories. Recordings of Louis
Farrakhan, Rick Wiles (of TruNews), and Stephen Anderson--all anti-
Semitic individuals whose bigotry has been thoroughly documented by
ADL--were readily available on TikTok in 2021. One such post, shared on
May 23, 2021, showed a clip of a TruNews segment in which Rick Wiles
states: ``And our leaders are lowlife scum that screw little girls so
the Jews can screw America . . . we've allowed Kabbalah practicing Jews
to defile the Nation.'' TruNews, a fundamentalist Christian streaming
news and opinion platform that produces anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist,
anti-LGBTQ+ and Islamophobic content, has been banned from YouTube and
Facebook for violating the platforms' content rules.
Twitter
Twitter has taken significant steps to decrease extremist
conspiracy theory content on its platform; however, policy enactment
and enforcement remain inconsistent. In July 2020, for example, Twitter
announced it would take further action on ``QAnon'' activity and
permanently suspend QAnon-affiliated accounts. The company subsequently
claimed that QAnon-related content dropped by more than 50 percent as a
result. The platform also announced additions to its coordinated
harmful activity policy. Unfortunately, there were many prominent
Twitter accounts, with significant reach, espousing QAnon content but
left untouched. It is evident that Twitter did not regularly enforce
its QAnon policy after the July 2020 announcement. Data collected
before and after the attack on the Capitol shows that leading up to
January 2021, Twitter's actions fell far short. By the time Twitter
finally started removing QAnon-supporting accounts on January 8, 2021,
the consequences of misinformation had already become frighteningly
real.
YouTube
YouTube, has remained under the radar for its role in spreading
disinformation and misinformation, compared to Facebook and Twitter.
YouTube waited more than a month after the 2020 Presidential election
to remove videos claiming electoral fraud--by then, millions of people
had been exposed to false information that eroded trust in our
democracy. Furthermore, ADL research shows YouTube continues to push
people into extremist content despite the company's claim that it has
overhauled its recommendation algorithms.
As our February 2021 Belfer Fellow report indicates, exposure to
videos from extremist or White supremacist channels on YouTube remains
disturbingly common. The report's authors conducted a study that
measured the browsing habits of a diverse National sample of
participants and found that approximately 1 in 10 participants viewed
at least 1 video from an extremist channel (9.2 percent) and
approximately 2 in 10 (22.1 percent) viewed at least one video from an
alternative channel. Moreover, participants often received and
sometimes followed YouTube recommendations for videos from alternative
and extremist channels. Overall, consumption of alternative and
extremist content was concentrated among highly engaged respondents,
most frequently among those with negative racial views. In total,
people with high racial resentment were responsible for more than 90
percent of views for videos from alternative and extremist channels.
Extremism in 2021
The January 6, 2021, siege on the Capitol was an assault on our
country and our democracy, incited in broad daylight by the former
President and many of his supporters. Many of those who were roused to
violence that day did so as the result of weeks and months and years of
similar incitement.
The ADL Center on Extremism (COE) has identified 544 of the roughly
800 individuals who are believed to have breached the U.S. Capitol. The
emerging snapshot of the insurrectionists shows a range of right-wing
extremists united by their fury with the perceived large-scale betrayal
by ``unprincipled'' Republican legislators.
Of the 544 individuals identified by COE, at least 127 (or 23
percent) have ties to known right-wing extremist groups, including Oath
Keepers (22 people), Proud Boys (42), Groypers and other White
supremacists (12) and the QAnon conspiracy theory (31). A number of
Proud Boys members and Oath Keepers have been charged with conspiracy
in connection with the January 6 insurrection. More information on
these extremist groups is provided below.
The remaining 77 percent of those identified by COE are considered
part of the new pro-Trump extremist movement, a decentralized but
enthusiastic faction made up of self-described ``patriots'' who
continue to pledge their fidelity to the former President and his false
assertions that he actually won the election and that it was stolen
from him by, among other things, massive voter fraud. This new breed of
extremist is foundationally animated by devotion to Trump, placing him
over party or country. They are living inside an ecosphere of
misinformation, disinformation, lies and conspiracy theories, one
fertilized by Alex Jones, QAnon, the former President and his enablers,
and many others.
Oath Keepers
The Oath Keepers are a large but loosely organized collection of
right-wing anti-Government extremists who are part of the militia
movement, which believes that the Federal Government has been co-opted
by a shadowy conspiracy that is trying to strip American citizens of
their rights. Though the Oath Keepers will accept anyone as members,
what differentiates them from other anti-Government extremist groups is
their explicit focus on recruiting current and former military, law
enforcement, and first responder personnel. While there is a formal
National leadership, on the local level many Oath Keepers are
essentially self-organized and form official, semi-official, or
informal groupings of Oath Keepers.
The Proud Boys
The Proud Boys represent an unconventional strain of American
right-wing extremism. While the group can be described as violent,
nationalistic, Islamophobic, transphobic, and misogynistic, its members
represent a range of ethnic and racial backgrounds, and its leaders
vehemently protest any allegations of racism. Their founder, Gavin
McInnes, went so far as to file a defamation lawsuit against the
Southern Poverty Law Center when the SPLC designated the Proud Boys as
a hate group.
In McInnes' own words, the Proud Boys are a ``pro-Western
fraternity,'' essentially a drinking club dedicated to male bonding,
socializing, and the celebration of all things related to Western
culture. In reality, the Proud Boys is an extremist group that bears
many of the hallmarks of a gang, and its members have taken part in
multiple acts of brutal violence and intimidation. While the Proud Boys
insist that they only act in self-defense, several incidents--including
one in which 2 members of the group were convicted of attempted gang
assault, attempted assault, and riot--belie their self-professed
peaceful nature. Indeed, many members have criminal records for violent
behavior and the organization actively pursues violence against their
perceived enemies. Ideologically, members subscribe to a scattershot
array of libertarian and Nationalist tropes, referring to themselves as
anti-communist and anti-political correctness, but in favor of free
speech and free markets.
In recent years the Proud Boys have established themselves as a
dominant force within what has been referred to as the alt lite. Often
easily recognizable thanks to their black and yellow Fred Perry polo
shirts and red Make America Great Again baseball caps, members are
regulars at far-right demonstrations and Trump rallies. After several
years of forging alliances with members of the Republican political
establishment, the Proud Boys have carved out a niche for themselves as
both a right-wing fight club and a volunteer security force for the
GOP. Despite their associations with mainstream politicians, Proud
Boys' actions and statements repeatedly land them in the company of
White supremacists and right-wing extremists. Jason Kessler, the
primary organizer of the deadly 2017 Unite the Right Rally in
Charlottesville, is a former Proud Boy. (Indeed, the Federal civil
rights case brought against the neo-Nazis who organized that rally is
entitled Sines v. Kessler. The case, for which ADL provided expert and
financial support, was a historic win for the plaintiffs in November
2021.) Several members attended the violent August 12, 2017,
demonstration that ended in the death of counter-protester Heather
Heyer.
During an October 2018 brawl outside the Metropolitan Republican
Club in Manhattan, for which 2 Proud Boys members were convicted and
sentenced to substantial prison terms, and 7 others pled guilty, the
Proud Boys were joined by 211 Bootboys, an ultra-nationalist and
violent skinhead gang based in New York City. In October 2019, members
of the Denver chapter of the Proud Boys marched with members of Patriot
Front and former members of the now-defunct neo-Nazi group
Traditionalist Worker Party. These relationships show the Proud Boys to
be less a pro-Western drinking club and instead an extremist, right-
wing gang.
In 2020, the Proud Boys solidified their status as the most visible
and most active right-wing extremist group in the country. As the
Nation grappled with the pandemic, members of the Proud Boys became a
regular sight at anti-lockdown protests, using the demonstrations not
only to raise their profile, but as recruitment opportunities. The
group is not unique in this sense--Boogaloo bois and militia members
were also frequent participants at these rallies. Another key factor in
the Proud Boys 2020 activity was their embrace of the #Saveourchildren
campaign, alongside QAnon adherents. The new links with QAnon allowed
the Proud Boys access to untapped segments of the pro-Trump extremist
movement.
Events held in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd allowed
the Proud Boys to brand themselves as a ``law and order'' counterpoint
to Black Lives Matter protesters, although the Proud Boys themselves
generally precipitated the most egregious acts of violence and
intimidation against protesters. This dynamic produced some of the most
brutal clashes between Proud Boys and their adversaries, particularly
in Portland, Oregon, which saw over 100 days of continuous unrest.
There were violent and armed clashes on August 22, and a MAGA convoy on
August 29 led to the death of Aaron ``Jay'' Danielson, a member of the
right-wing group Patriot Prayer, a frequent ally of the Proud Boys.
The Proud Boys' profile was given an additional boost when
President Trump, in his September 29, 2020 debate against Joe Biden,
instructed the Proud Boys to ``stand back, and stand by.'' Emboldened
by the attention from the President, the Proud Boys rallied for Trump
twice in Washington, DC following his election loss. The first rally
took place on November 14, 2020 and the second on December 12, 2020,
with the second rally ending with 4 members of the Proud Boys suffering
stab wounds from a brawl.
During that same rally, Proud Boys members allegedly set fire to a
BLM banner they stole from Asbury United Methodist Church, a
historically Black church. Proud Boys leader, Enrique Tarrio, took
responsibility for the incident and was later charged with destruction
of property. He was arrested, carrying 2 extended gun magazines, on the
eve of the January 6, 2021, rally that led to the storming of the U.S.
Capitol. As a condition of his release, a judge barred Tarrio from
attending the January 6 protest. Tarrio ultimately pleaded guilty to
destruction of property and attempting to possess a high-capacity gun
magazine, both misdemeanors. A civil case brought by the Church against
the Proud Boys and Tarrio last April resulted in a default judgment
against the Proud Boys.
In December 2021, ADL joined District Attorney General Karl Racine
and other pro bono counsel in bringing a civil lawsuit arising out of
the January 6 insurrection on behalf of the District against the Proud
Boys, Oath Keepers, and individuals associated with both groups. The
case, which brings allegations under the Reconstruction Era KKK Act,
among other laws, seeks to hold accountable the groups and affiliated
individuals for their role in planning and executing the attack on the
Capitol in an attempt to overturn a lawful Presidential election.
Groypers/Groyper Army
The so-called ``Groyper army'' (the term ``Groyper'' is explained
below) is a White supremacist group, led by Nick Fuentes, that presents
its ideology as more nuanced than that of other groups in the White
supremacist sphere. While the group and its leadership's views align
with those held by the White supremacist alt right, Groypers attempt to
normalize their ideology by aligning themselves with ``Christianity''
and ``traditional values'' ostensibly championed by the church,
including marriage and family.
Like the alt right and other White supremacists, Groypers believe
they are working to defend against demographic and cultural changes
that are destroying the ``true America''--a White, Christian nation.
However, Groypers differ in a number of ways from the alt right. They
identify themselves as ``American nationalists'' who are part of the
``America First'' movement. To the Groypers, ``America First'' means
that the United States should close its borders, bar immigrants, oppose
globalism and promote ``traditional'' values like Christianity and
oppose ``liberal'' values such as feminism and LGBTQ+ rights. They
claim not to be racist or anti-Semitic and see their bigoted views as
``normal'' and necessary to preserve White, European-American identity
and culture. However, some members have expressed racist and anti-
Semitic views on multiple occasions. They believe their views are
shared by the majority of White people.
QAnon and Other Conspiracy Theories
QAnon is a global, wide-reaching, and remarkably elaborate
conspiracy theory that has taken root within some parts of the pro-
Trump movement. It is an amalgam of both novel and well-established
theories, with marked undertones of anti-Semitism and xenophobia.
Fundamentally, the theory claims that almost every President in recent
U.S. history up until Donald Trump has been a puppet put in place by a
global elite of power brokers hell-bent on enriching themselves and
maintaining their Satanic child-murdering sex cult. Q is a reference to
``Q clearance'' or ``Q access authorization,'' terms used to describe a
top-secret clearance level within the Department of Energy.
According to QAnon lore, this global elite, known as ``The Deep
State'' or ``The Cabal,'' control not just world governments, but the
banking system, the Catholic church, the agricultural and
pharmaceutical industries, the media, and entertainment industry--all
working around the clock to keep the people of the world poor,
ignorant, and enslaved.
Conspiracy theories, rampant in the United States, have an unusual
power to motivate people to action. Some conspiracy theories are
associated with various right-wing or left-wing ideologies, while
others transcend ideology, like those surrounding the 9/11 attacks or
the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Under the right circumstances,
such theories can motivate people to violence, especially if the
conspiracy theories single out specific people or organizations as the
villains.
Most extremist movements develop or depend on conspiracy theories
to some degree. In the United States, extreme right-wing movements have
a particularly close relationship to conspiracy theories. Anti-Muslim
extremists promote ``Sharia law'' conspiracy theories, for example, to
increase anti-Muslim animus, while anti-immigrant border vigilantes
justify their patrols with conspiracy theories about Mexican drug
cartels waging a secret invasion of the United States.
For some right-wing extremist movements, conspiracy theories lie at
the heart of their extreme worldviews. The modern White supremacist
movement, for example, centers its beliefs on the notion that the White
race is in danger of extinction from growing numbers of people of color
who are controlled and manipulated by a nefarious Jewish conspiracy.
Anti-Government extremist movements, such as the militia movement and
the sovereign citizen movement, are based on conspiracy theories that
focus on the Federal Government.
As a result, much of the violence stemming from extremist White
supremacists and anti-Government extremists can be attributed, directly
or indirectly, to such conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories often
sharpen anger that extremists already feel to the point where they
become willing to take violent action.
In 2021, disparate groups of QAnon adherents, election fraud
promoters, and anti-vaccine activists organized events around the
country to promote their causes. This phenomenon underscores the extent
to which the line separating the mainstream from the extreme has
blurred, and how mainstream efforts to undermine our democratic
institutions are bolstered by extremist and conspiratorial narratives
and their supporters.
These narratives include:
That the 2020 Presidential election was stolen by the
Democrats (touted at the Health and Freedom events organized by
right-wing entrepreneur Clay Clark);
That a global cabal of pedophiles (including Democrats) who
are kidnapping children for their blood will be executed when
Donald Trump is reinstated as President (popular at The Patriot
Voice: For God and Country conference, organized by QAnon
influencer John Sabal, a/k/a ``QAnon John,'' and at the We the
People Patriots Day event and the OKC Freedom conference);
That the coronavirus was co-created in a lab by director of
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Dr.
Anthony Fauci and Microsoft founder Bill Gates;
That the coronavirus vaccine contains dangerous ingredients
that change your DNA and make vaccinated people ``shed''
dangerous toxins;
That Satanic socialists are attempting to take over the
country; and
That if Democrats and ``the left'' remain in power, a
confrontation, potentially violent, will be necessary to
``reclaim'' the country.
These narratives go well beyond the mainstream into extreme
territory.
Long-Term Trends: The Growing Threat of Domestic Terrorism
While it is impossible to say with absolute certainty what lies
ahead, we know that White supremacists and some other extremists,
including anti-Muslim extremists, anti-immigrant extremists, and anti-
Semites, are driven by conspiracy theories as well as manufactured
fears around demographic change, which some extremists fear will only
accelerate as the Biden administration is perceived by them to enact
more humane policies toward immigrants and refugees who are people of
color. Extremists equate those policies to ``White genocide.''
Militia and other anti-Government groups may also be very active in
the next few years. The militia movement has historically derived much
of its energy and vitality from its rage toward the Federal Government.
However, the movement's support of President Trump during his
administration dulled that anger. As it progresses, the Biden
administration's existence may give militias an excuse to return to
their foundational grievances: the belief that a tyrannical government
in league with a globalist conspiracy is coming to enslave them by
taking first their guns and then the remainder of their rights.
Finally, anti-Semitism will likely continue to be a central part of
the conspiratorial views that fuel right-wing violence, as it has been
for so long. It is crucial to recognize not only the threat to Jews and
Jewish institutions this poses, but also both the foundational and
animating impetus it gives violent White extremism, whatever its
targets. It is also vitally important to understand the role that anti-
Semitic conspiracies play in the wider threat to our democracy. Anti-
Semitism isn't just bigotry directed toward Jews; it uses that hatred
and bigotry against the Jewish community to undermine democratic
practices by framing democracy as a conspiracy, as Eric Ward of the
Western States Center notes, ``rather than as a tool of empowerment or
a functional tool of governance. In other words, the more people buy
into anti-Semitism and its understanding of the world, the more they
lose faith in democracy.''
policy recommendations
We need a whole-of-Government approach to address the threat. ADL
strongly recommends urgent action to prevent and counter domestic
violent extremism. The framework that ADL has created--the PROTECT
plan--is a comprehensive, 7-part plan to mitigate the threat posed by
domestic extremism and domestic terrorism while protecting civil rights
and civil liberties. Together, focusing on these 7 categories can have
an immediate and deeply significant impact in preventing and countering
domestic terrorism--more so than any one action, policy, or law--and
can do so while protecting civil rights and liberties and ensuring that
Government overreach does not harm the same vulnerable people and
communities that these extremists target. Our suggestions come under
these 7 areas:
P--Prioritize Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism
R--Resource According to the Threat
O--Oppose Extremists in Government Service
T--Take Public Health and Other Domestic Terrorism Prevention
Measures
E--End the Complicity of Social Media in Facilitating Extremism
C--Create an Independent Clearinghouse for On-line Extremist
Content
T--Target Foreign White Supremacist Terrorist Groups for Sanctions
Prioritize Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism
First, we urge Congress to adopt a whole-of-Government and whole-
of-society approach to preventing and countering domestic terrorism.
In mid-June 2021, the Biden-Harris administration released
the first-ever National Strategy to Counter Domestic Terrorism.
The strategy is laudable, and a step in the right direction.
However, many critical details were left unaddressed. Congress
must press for further details into how the plan will be
implemented, and the steps that will be taken to ensure
protection for civil rights and civil liberties. Further,
Departments and agencies must create their own implementation
plans for the Strategy.
The Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack
on the United States Capitol must be allowed to operate in good
faith, absent politicization of its important work. The
American public needs a careful review of the brazen and lethal
attack on the very seat of our democracy. We urge Congress to
search for answers, publicly release information whenever
possible, and to issue bipartisan recommendations to ensure
that no attack like that on January 6, 2021, can take place
again.
As Congress considers appropriations bills, resources to
prevent and counter domestic terrorism are critical to
mitigating the threat. ADL urges committee Members to consider
supporting significant increases for these necessary resources
across the Government in the Commerce, Justice, and Science;
Homeland Security; Defense; State and Foreign Operations;
Interior; and Labor, Health, and Human Services appropriations
processes. As one example, the Nonprofit Security Grant Program
(NSGP) is woefully under-funded and should be doubled to $360
million total.
Resource According to the Threat
We must ensure that the authorities and resources the Government
uses to address violent threats are proportionate to the risk of the
lethality of those threats. In other words, allocation of resources
must never be politicized but rather based on transparent and objective
security concerns.
Congress should immediately pass the Domestic Terrorism
Prevention Act (DTPA) to enhance the Federal Government's
efforts to prevent domestic terrorism by formally authorizing
offices to address domestic terrorism and requiring law
enforcement agencies to regularly report on domestic terrorist
threats. Congress must ensure that those offices have the
resources they need and can deploy those resources in a manner
proportionate to existing threats. Further, the transparency
that comes with regular reporting is crucial for civil society,
Congress, and the public writ large to help oversee the
National security process and hold leaders accountable.
Congress must exercise careful oversight to ensure that no
resources are expended on counterterrorism efforts targeting
protected political speech or association. Investigations and
other efforts to mitigate the threat should be data-driven and
proportionate to the violent threat posed by violent extremist
movements.
Oppose Extremists in Government Service
It is essential that we recognize the potential for harm when
extremists gain positions of power, including in Government, law
enforcement, and the military.
To the extent permitted by law and consistent with
Constitutional protections, take steps to ensure that
individuals engaged in violent extremist activity or associated
with violent extremist movements, including violent White
supremacist and unlawful militia movements, are deemed
unsuitable for employment at the Federal, State, and local
levels--including in law enforcement. Appropriate steps must be
taken to address any current employees, who, upon review, match
these criteria.
To the extent permitted by law and consistent with
Constitutional protections, take steps to ensure that
individuals engaged in violent extremist activity or associated
with violent extremist movements, including violent White
supremacist and unlawful militia movements, are not given
security clearances or other sensitive law enforcement
credentials. Appropriate steps must be taken to address any
current employees, who, upon review, match these criteria. Law
enforcement agencies Nation-wide should explore options for
preventing extremists from being among their ranks.
The Department of Defense (DoD) released its internal
extremist threat review on December 20, 2021. While the review
represents significant progress, we need more information to
truly determine the threat posed by extremists within the
ranks. DoD should provide further detail on how it will
evaluate White supremacists and related threats, as well as how
commanders' ability to adjudicate extremism-related guidelines
will be overseen.
Similarly, DHS announced that it will be vetting employees
for extremist sympathies. ADL applauds this effort and welcomes
any details on how the implementation of this vetting will take
place, as well as any findings from the review.
ADL has worked with law enforcement experts to provide tools
for identifying and weeding out extremists in the recruitment
process as well as within law enforcement ranks. While there is
no evidence that White supremacist extremists have large
numbers in our law enforcement agencies, we have seen that even
a few can undermine the effectiveness and trust that is so
essential. We have provided resources to LE agencies with
guidance on approaches that do not violate First Amendment
concerns.
Take Domestic Terrorism Prevention Measures
We must not wait until after someone has become an extremist or a
terrorist attack has happened to act. Effective and promising
prevention measures exist, which should be scaled.
Congress can provide funding to civil society and academic
programs that have expertise in addressing recruitment to
extremist causes and radicalization, whether on-line or off-
line. By providing funding for prevention activities, including
education, counseling, and off-ramping, Congress can help
empower public health and civil society actors to prevent and
intervene in the radicalization process and undermine extremist
narratives, particularly those that spread rapidly on the
internet.
These initiatives must be accompanied by an assurance of
careful oversight with civil rights and civil liberties
safeguards. They must also meaningfully engage the communities
that have been targeted by domestic terrorism and the civil
society organizations already existing within them, and those
communities which have been unfairly targeted when prior anti-
terrorism authorities have been misused and/or abused. These
initiatives must be transparent, responsive to community
concerns, publicly demonstrate careful oversight, and ensure
that they do not stigmatize communities. Further, DHS should
not be the only agency working on prevention; ADL urges the
Department to partner with Health and Human Services and other
non-security departments whenever possible.
While Congress has funded a small grant program for
prevention measures domestically, the program is too small to
have an impact at scale. Now that the administration has
launched the Center for Prevention Programming and Partnerships
within DHS, Congress should significantly scale its grant
program; ADL has recommended a $150 million annual grant level.
End the Complicity of Social Media in Facilitating Extremism
Congress must prioritize countering on-line extremism and ensuring
that perpetrators who engage in unlawful activity on-line can be held
accountable. On-line platforms often lack adequate policies to mitigate
extremism and hate equitably and at scale. Federal and State laws and
policies require significant updating to hold on-line platforms and
individual perpetrators accountable for enabling hate, racism, and
extremist violence across the internet. In March 2021, ADL announced
the REPAIR Plan, which offers a comprehensive framework for platforms
and policy makers to take meaningful action to decrease on-line hate
and extremism. Like ADL's PROTECT Plan, REPAIR focuses on domestic
extremism and terrorism but goes beyond these issues to address other
manifestations and harms of on-line hate, including on-line harassment,
anti-Semitism, racism, and disinformation.
Congress has an important role in reducing on-line hate and
extremism. Further, officials at all levels of Government can
use their bully pulpits to call for better enforcement of
technology companies' policies.
Congress can work with independent extremism experts to
protect vulnerable targets from becoming either victim of abuse
or perpetrators of violence. Legislation from the 116th
Congress like the National Commission on Online Platforms and
Homeland Security Act, for example, would establish a
commission to investigate how on-line content implicates
certain National security threats, such as targeted violence.
We also need to provide better recourse for victims and
targets of on-line hate and harassment. In the 115th Congress,
Representative Katherine Clark (D-MA) introduced and led H.R.
3067, the Online Safety Modernization Act, which, among other
things, would have provided Federal protections against doxing
and swatting. It is time to pass laws that cover these types of
harms. It is crucial that such legislation provide private
rights of action.
To adequately address the threat, the Government must direct
its resources to understand and mitigate the consequences of
hate on-line. To do so, all levels of Government should
consider designating funding, to ensure that law enforcement
personnel are trained to recognize and to effectively
investigate criminal on-line incidents and have the necessary
capacity to do that work.
Beyond the Federal Government, businesses have a critical
role to play. We need to compel the social media companies to
enforce their own terms of service specifically around hate and
misinformation--or face repercussions for failing to do so. The
firms should go further and fix the algorithms that amplify
this noxious content to drive clicks and increase engagement.
There is no moral reason to lift up content that brings people
down. The companies themselves should commit to ending
algorithmic amplification of hate, full stop.
Congress must carefully but considerably amend Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act to make tech companies
legally accountable for their role when they enable stalking,
facilitate violence and civil rights violations, or incite
domestic terrorism. Self-regulation simply has failed on this
score. The platforms have been far too laissez-faire for
decades, hiding behind Section 230 which immunizes them from
legal accountability for even egregious and otherwise unlawful
content and actions. They have failed to abide by the basic
behaviors that govern nearly all other businesses in every
other sector of our economy. We need a drastic reconsideration
of Section 230 that enables a free flow of user-generated
content but disables the kind of extremism and hate that has
festered across social media platforms.
We urge lawmakers to seriously consider Section 230 reform
proposals that prioritize equity and justice for users and bar
immunity when platforms place profit over people. This could
include enacting measures such as the Protecting Americans from
Dangerous Algorithms Act, which would address the previously-
mentioned issue of algorithmic amplification of discriminatory
content or to aid and abet terrorism.
Create an Independent Clearinghouse for On-line Extremist Content
Congress should work with the Biden-Harris administration to create
a publicly-funded, independent nonprofit center to track on-line
extremist threat information in real time and make referrals to social
media companies and law enforcement agencies when appropriate.
This approach is needed because those empowered with law
enforcement and intelligence capabilities must not be tasked
with new investigative and other powers that could infringe
upon civil liberties--for example, through broad internet
surveillance. Scouring on-line sources through an independent
organization will act as a buffer, but will not prevent the
nonprofit center from assisting law enforcement in cases where
criminal behavior is suspected. This wall of separation,
modeled in part on the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC), will help streamline National
security tips and resources while preserving civil liberties.
Target Foreign White Supremacist Terrorist Groups
Congress must recognize that White supremacist extremism is a major
global threat of our era and mobilize with that mindset.
To date, no White supremacist organization operating
overseas has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization. Only one has been designated as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Congress should review how
these designation decisions are made, whether any additional
racially- or ethnically-motivated extremist groups outside the
United States, particularly White supremacist groups, have
reached the threshold for either designation, and whether such
designations would help advance U.S. National interests.
The Department of State was required to develop a strategy
to counter global White supremacist extremism and to add White
supremacist terrorism to annual Country Reports on Terrorism.
That State has implemented the Country Reports guidance is
laudable, and State may have created the strategy. However, the
strategy has not been released publicly, making it impossible
to evaluate. We urge more transparency from State in this
process and for Congress to seek accountability for any gaps in
the strategy, and to provide resources to implement it.
The Department of State must mobilize a multilateral effort
to address the threat of White supremacy globally. Multilateral
best-practice institutions, such as the Global Counterterrorism
Forum, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, and
the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law, may be
helpful mechanisms through which to channel some efforts.
Moreover, the Global Engagement Center should be charged with
undermining the propaganda of violent extremist groups--not
just designated terrorist organizations, but overseas White
supremacist violent extremists as well. DHS should participate
in these efforts, supporting overseas exchanges, partnerships,
and best practices sharing to engage in learning from other
countries and sharing U.S. best practices, where applicable.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this august body
and for calling a hearing on this urgent topic. ADL data clearly and
decisively illustrate that the impact of hate is rising across the
United States, and that domestic extremism and terrorism will continue
to pose a grave threat. It is long past time to acknowledge that these
threats overwhelmingly come from right-wing extremists, especially
White supremacists, and allocate our resources to address the threat
accordingly. We must also address these threats holistically rather
than piecemeal. This is precisely what ADL's PROTECT plan does,
applying a whole-of-Government and whole-of-society approach to the
fight against hate and extremism. On behalf of ADL, we look forward to
working with you as you continue to devote your attention to this
critical issue.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Dr.
Miller-Idriss to summarize her statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA MILLER-IDRISS, PH D, PROFESSOR, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Thank you, Chairman. Chairman Thompson,
Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the committee, I would
like to thank you for calling attention to the critical issue
of changing trends in global and domestic terrorism. I am
honored to be here with you and with my fellow esteemed
panelists as well. I am a researcher and an academic, but I am
also an applied scholar who directs a research lab at American
University called the Polarization and Extremism Research and
Innovation Lab, or PERIL, which designs and tests early
interventions and preventative tools to disrupt and prevent
violent extremism across the ideological spectrum.
Domestic violent extremism and terrorism has escalated
rapidly across the West and now significantly outpaces other
forms of terrorism in the United States, including terrorism
from far-left movements and from individuals inspired by the
Islamic State and al-Qaeda, with right-wing attacks and plots
accounting for the majority of all terrorist incidents in the
United States since 1994, according to data from the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. This does not mean that
the threat from Jihadi terrorism has abated either in the
United States or abroad. But it does mean that we are seeing
growth across the West at 250 percent over the last 5 years in
the domestic violent and far-right terrorist spectrum in ways
that pose an escalating and serious threat.
Historically, counterterrorism officials across the world
have organized their work around clearly identifiable groups
and movements, which were considered ideologically distinct
from one another. But today, as the Chairman pointed out
earlier, there is growing blurriness across previously distinct
ideologies in on-line extremist networks. A new report issued
just last week from the U.K.-based International Center for the
Study of Radicalization traces convergence between neo-fascist
accelerationists and Salafi-Jihadists that includes shared
support for anti-Semitism, belief in a natural hierarchy,
racial and cultural supremacism, anti-modernism,
heteronormativity and support for traditional family
structures, and anti-Government sentiment.
Both domestic and international terrorist groups and
movements, in other words, are united by an overlapping set of
beliefs involving supremacist hierarchies and anti-Government
beliefs. These extremist ideologies often also share
fantastical ideas about restoration, whether it is the
Caliphate or a White ethnostate, and desire a post-apocalyptic,
post-race-war civilization, in which violence is a solution to
accelerate the end times.
The muddling of ideological rationales, what some call
salad bar terrorism, is partly a result of the way that people
encounter extremist content and propaganda on-line, largely
outside the boundaries of organized groups, not just in
manifestos, but also in memes across a large and broad
ecosystem of video, audio, and text-based platforms.
Recommendation algorithms and hyperlinks mean that everyone is
just a few clicks away from an ever-expanding series of rabbit
holes that offer up entire worlds of disinformation,
propaganda, and hate that they increasingly piece together in
fragmented ways.
Counterextremism tools designed to address threats from
bounded fringe groups, as they currently exist, cannot
meaningfully confront the evolved threats that we face today
without a broader multisectoral, whole-of-society, and
community-based commitment to prevention and early intervention
that can reduce the fertile ground in which anti-democratic and
violent extremist ideologies thrive. To do this, Congress
should take immediate steps to invest in a public health
approach to preventing violent extremism. This includes
investments in digital and media literacy and other scalable
interventions to reduce people's vulnerability to on-line
propaganda and conspiracy theories. It includes broadening
tested inoculation interventions to make people less likely to
be persuaded by extremist content and manipulative tactics from
extremist groups. It calls for a reinvestment in civic
education and other efforts to strengthen democratic norms and
values that could reduce high rates of polarization and the
kinds of moral disengagement and dehumanization that are
demonstrated precursors to political violence.
These kinds of interventions are not an immediate fix to
the growing problem of extremist violence in terrorism, rather
they reflect a need for investments across the short, medium,
and long terms. It is important to note that these are not
options that involve censorship or teaching ideological beliefs
in any way. After all, no one wants the Federal Government to
be involved in policing people's beliefs. But the narrow
definition of prevention of violence and our conventional
counterterrorism tools are unable to address the unchecked
spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories and other
precursors to violence. We need to broaden our efforts and
adapt counterterrorism frameworks to address these evolving
threats with preventative approaches that can address
radicalization while still protecting freedoms of speech and
expression. Understanding the nature of the evolving threat is
a central first step toward these goals and to reducing these
persistent and changing threats to our Nation's democracy and
stability. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Miller-Idriss follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia Miller-Idriss
February 2, 2022
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee: I would like to thank you for your service to our country
and for calling attention to the critical issue of changing trends in
global terrorism. I am honored to be here. My name is Cynthia Miller-
Idriss, and I am a professor in the School of Public Affairs and the
School of Education at the American University in Washington, DC, where
I also direct the Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation
Lab (PERIL). I have been studying the dynamics of violent extremism
globally for over 20 years. I am the author of Hate in the Homeland:
The New Global Far Right, along with two books focused on extremism in
Germany (Blood and Culture and The Extreme Gone Mainstream). I want to
acknowledge the support of my research team at PERIL, whose assistance
was invaluable in preparing my testimony today.\1\
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\1\ With gratitude to researchers and staff at American
University's Polarization and Extremism Research and Innovation Lab
(PERIL) who helped prepare this written testimony: Sarah Bartholomew,
Emily Caldwell, Meili Criezis, Pasha Dashtgard, Brian Hughes,
Jacqueline Belletomasini Kosz, Emily Pressman, Wyatt Russell, Katie
Spann, Sarah Ruth Thorne, JJ West, and Kesa White.
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scope and scale
Today's terrorism landscape includes a diverse ideological range of
international and domestic movements and groups. There is no
agreement--even across agencies within the U.S. Government, but also
internationally--on terms or definitions across the terrorism and
extremism spectrum. Violent extremist movements that use terrorism (the
use of violence in order to intimidate or coerce civilians or influence
the policy of a government) as a tactic are motivated by a range of
supremacist, anti-government, anti-establishment, and anti-democratic
ideologies that take a variety of organizational forms both within the
United States and globally.\2\ This includes groups advocating for
attacking Western governments and societies, overthrowing the U.S.
Government, calling for race wars or a White ethnostate, and seeking to
collapse economic and social systems. In the domestic violent extremism
(DVE) spectrum, the organizational forms of these movements include
unlawful militias, violent anarchists, sovereign citizens, White
supremacist extremists such as neo-Nazis, violent environmental and
animal rights extremists, some single-issue extremist groups like
violent anti-abortion groups, as well as violent male supremacists and
violent involuntary celibates (incels). In this testimony, I follow the
terminology from research and reports being cited, though it is
important to note that these terms are not fully interchangeable.
Domestic violent extremism (DVE), for example, includes extremism from
across the ideological spectrum. I use the terms ``far left'' or ``far
right'' to refer to parts of the DVE spectrum when citing sources that
use those terms, like the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). I also use
terms like racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE),
right-wing extremism, and White supremacist extremism (WSE) when citing
reports or studies from U.S. and global agencies and experts that use
those terms.
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\2\ See the U.S. definitions of international and domestic
terrorism at https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/
part1/chapter113B&edition=prelim.
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Trends in the U.S. terrorism landscape have changed rapidly over
the past several years. While Islamist terror has been the historical
focus of U.S. and global counterterrorism efforts in the post-9/11 era,
and continues to have the greatest lethality globally,\3\ far-right
terrorism has escalated rapidly across the West. Far-right terrorism
now significantly outpaces other forms of terrorism in the United
States, including terrorism from far-left movements and from
individuals inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, according to a
recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS). That report notes that ``right-wing attacks and plots account
for the majority of all terrorist incidents in the United States since
1994.''\4\ Within the DVE landscape, the most pressing threats to
civilians and elected officials--in terms of lethality, plots foiled,
recruitment, and the circulation of propaganda, as documented in
multiple threat assessments issued by the U.S. Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) over the past 2 years \5\--comes from White supremacist extremist
and anti-Government extremism movements and groups, which sometimes
overlap and mutually reinforce one another.\6\ These trends are
reflected in law enforcement investigations. As of September 2021, the
FBI reported it had 2,700 open investigations into domestic violent
extremism, which is more than double the number open in the summer of
2017.\7\ Also in 2020, authorities Nation-wide arrested nearly 3 times
as many White supremacists as they did in 2017.
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\3\ Institute for Economics & Peace. ``Global terrorism index 2020:
Measuring the impact of terrorism'' (November, 2020). National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.
Available at: https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/
GTI-2020-web-1.pdf.
\4\ Jones, Seth and Catrina Doxsee. ``The escalating terrorism
problem in the United States.'' June 17, 2020. Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/
escalating-terrorism-problem-united-states.
\5\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence. ``Annual
threat assessment of the US intelligence community'' (April, 2021).
Available at: https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-
2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
\6\ Department of Homeland Security. ``Homeland threat assessment''
(August, 2020). Available at: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf.
\7\ Wolfe, J. ``U.S. domestic terrorism investigations have more
than doubled-FBI director.'' Reuters (September 21, 2021). Available
at: https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-domestic-terrorism-
investigations-have-more-than-doubled-fbi-director-2021-09-21/; Also
see Miller, M. (2021). September 21). Wray says FBI Domestic Terrorism
Caseload has `exploded' since last year. The Hill. Available at:
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/573285-wray-says-fbi-domestic-
terrorism-caseload-has-exploded-since-last-year.
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This does not mean the threat from jihadi terrorism has fully
abated, either in the United States or abroad. In Europe, jihadi
terrorism still outpaces far-right terror as the most critical
threat,\8\ but far-right terrorism and extremism are growing rapidly
there as well. The top British counterterrorism official, Neil Basu,
recently described right-wing extremism as the United Kingdom's
``fastest-growing threat,'' and in Germany, violent crimes motivated by
right-wing extremism rose by 10 percent from 2019 to 2020.\9\ Across
the West (Australia, New Zealand, Western Europe, and North America),
far-right terrorist incidents have increased globally by 250 percent
over the past 5 years and were responsible for 82 percent of deaths
from terror in 2019, according to the most recent Global Terrorism
Index report.\10\
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\8\ Europol. ``European Union terrorism situation and trend report
2021'' (2021). Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/
default/files/documents/tesat_2021_0.pdf.
\9\ Miller-Idriss, C. ``From 9/11 to 1/6: The War on Terror
Supercharged the Far Right.'' Foreign Affairs (September/October,
2021). Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
States/2021-08-24/war-on-terror-911-jan6.
\10\ Institute for Economics & Peace. ``Global terrorism index
2020: Measuring the impact of terrorism'' (November, 2020).
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The United States has witnessed increases in the pace, scope, and
scale of far-right violence and the normalization of the extremist
ideas that drive it. 2019 was the most lethal year for domestic
terrorism in the United States since 1995--48 people were killed in
attacks carried out by domestic violent extremists, 39 of which were
carried out by White supremacists. In 2020, the number of domestic
terrorist plots and attacks in the United States reached its highest
level since 1994; two-thirds of those were attributable to White
supremacists and other far-right extremists. And last year, reports to
the Anti-Defamation League of White supremacist propaganda--in the form
of fliers, posters, banners, and stickers posted in locations such as
parks or college campuses--hit an all-time high of more than 5,000,
nearly twice the number reported in the previous year. Traditional
counterterrorism tools in the United States foiled only 21 of the 110
known domestic terrorist attacks and plots \11\ in 2020, according to
the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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\11\ Jones, S.G. et al. ``The military, police, and the rise of
terrorism in the United States'' Center for Strategic and International
Studies (April, 2021). Available at: The Military, Police, and the Rise
of Terrorism in the United States/Center for Strategic and
International Studies (csis.org).
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trends and ideological convergence
Historically, counterterrorism officials across the world have
organized their work around clearly identifiable groups and movements,
which were considered ideologically distinct from one another. Today,
however, there is growing convergence across previously disparate
ideologies in on-line extremist networks,\12\ including across far-
right accelerationist and Salafi-Jihadi extremist groups.\13\ A new
report from the UK-based International Center for the Study of
Radicalization (ICSR) traces convergence in common beliefs and
frameworks between neo-fascist accelerationists and Salafi-Jihadists
that includes shared support for anti-Semitism, belief in a natural
hierarchy, racial and cultural supremacism, anti-modernism,
heteronormativity and traditional family structures, and anti-
Government sentiment. There is cross-movement admiration, especially
from far-right accelerationists toward Salafi-Jihadists, whose
``militant successes'' they see as clear evidence for the possibility
of the success of committed traditional goals and violent tactics
against Western governments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Criezis, M. and Hughes, B. ``Erstwhile allies and community
convergence: a preliminary study of online interactions between Salafi-
Jihadists and white supremacists'' Global Network on Extremism &
Technology (August 31, 2021). Available at: https://gnet-research.org/
2021/08/31/erstwhile-allies-and-community-convergence-a-preliminary-
study-of-online-interactions-between-salafi-jihadists-and-white-
supremacists/.
\13\ International Center for the Study of Radicalization. `` `One
struggle': examining narrative syncretism between Salafi-Jihadists''
(January 26, 2022). Available at: https://icsr.info/2022/01/26/one-
struggle-examining-narrative-syncretism-between-accelerationists-and-
salafi%E2%- 80%91jihadists/.
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Both DVE and international terrorist groups, in other words, are
united by an overlapping set of beliefs involving supremacist
hierarchies that falsely claim inferiority and superiority between
groups of people and promote anti-democratic beliefs that support
authoritarianism, refuse to protect minority rights, or reject other
core tenets of democracy (like freedoms of speech and press or the rule
of law). They share commitments to misogyny and male supremacism, anti-
Semitic conspiracy theories, xenophobia, and anti-Government beliefs.
These extremist ideologies are also often rooted in conspiratorial and
fantastical beliefs about calls for restoration (of the Caliphate or a
White ethnostate) and a desire for a post-apocalyptic, post-race-war
civilization. This vision includes an obligation to use violence as a
solution to accelerate the end times through the collapse of social,
political, and economic systems that will precede the Phoenix-like
rebirth of a new civilization.
The increasing blurriness of divisions across previously separate
ideological movements--as well as actual coalitions that are emerging
in spontaneous and planned ways across distinct groups and movements--
challenge traditional counterterrorism approaches that that rely on
distinct groups that can be infiltrated, surveilled, and monitored over
time.\14\ Ideologically, this kind of hybridization and blurriness is
being revealed in many ways. For example, recently far-right extremists
have simultaneously valorized the Unabomber \15\ and praised the
Taliban.\16\ A re-launched White supremacist group announced a new
``Bolshevik focus''\17\ calling for the liquidation of the capitalist
class. A burgeoning ecofascist youth subculture--spread largely through
social media imageboard accounts and commercial merchandise--celebrates
nature worship and rootedness within a physical homeland while calling
for a White ethnostate. Some anti-Government ``Boogaloo'' (code for
civil war) adherents who advocate a new civil war marched alongside
2020 racial injustice protesters because of shared anger at law
enforcement.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ This section of testimony adapts recent work covered in
Miller-Idriss, C. and Hughes, B. ``Blurry ideologies and strange
coalitions: the landscape of domestic extremism'' Lawfare (December 19,
2021) Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/blurry-ideologies-and-
strange-coalitions-evolving-landscape-domestic-extremism.
\15\ Christ, K. ``Why right-wing extremists love the Unabomber''
Lawfare (October 17, 2021). Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.com/
why-right-wing-extremists-love-unabomber.
\16\ Sands, G. ``White supremacist praise of the Taliban takeover
concerns US officials,'' CNN (September 1, 2022). Available at: https:/
/www.cnn.com/2021/09/01/politics/far-right-groups-praise-taliban-
takeover/index.html.
\17\ The Soufan Center ``IntelBrief: salad bar redux: is Heimbach's
extremism emblematic of the current threat landscape?'' (July 29,
2021). Available at: https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-july-
29/.
\18\ Bellingcat ``The Boogaloo movement is not what you think''
(May 27, 2020) Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/
27/the-boogaloo-movement-is-not-what-you-think/.
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In many ways, the phenomenon is nothing new. Extremist scenes and
movements have experienced internal fissures, infighting and
fragmentation for years due to differences in beliefs about tactics
(such as the use of violence), conflicting views on parts of their
ideology (such as about Jews and Whiteness) or restrictions on who can
be members (such as women). Increasingly, this conflict is occurring
not just across relatively bounded groups but among a broad muddling of
ideological beliefs within domestic and international extremist scenes,
movements, and individuals.\19\ These trends are different from
previous iterations of extremist fracture and reformation. We are
seeing a fragmentation and reassembling of groups and movements that
are willing to unite for specific reasons even when their overall
objectives do not align. The transformation is taking place both
organizationally and in ad hoc, or ``post-organizational'' forms.\20\
On the organizational side, political violence is emerging from a loose
new coalition that spans the extremist spectrum in ways that confuse
the ideological basis typically understood to be at the root of
terrorist and extremist violence. On the post-organizational side,
exposure to extremist content on-line and radicalization to ideologies
and violence outside the boundaries of organized groups is
increasing.\21\ Through on-line encounters with propaganda,
disinformation and extremist ideas, individuals are increasingly able
to access extremist content and become radicalized without needing
group membership or interaction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Hughes, B. ``A long wolf in the hypertext: radicalization
online'' University of California: Santa Barbara global-e (August 10,
2017) Available at: https://globalejournal.org/global-e/august-2017/
lone-wolf-hypertext-radicalization-online.
\20\ Ghul, J. and Davey, J. ``A safe space to hate: white
supremacist mobilisation on Telegram'' Institute for Strategic Dialogue
(February 16, 2021) Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/A-Safe-Space-to-Hate.pdf.
\21\ Comerford, M. ``Confronting the challenge of `post-
organisational' extremism'' Observer Research Foundation (August 19,
2020) available at: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/confronting-
the-challenge-of-post-organisational-extremism/.
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There are at least 4 reasons for the increased muddling of
ideological rationales:
the increasing ability of cross-ideological concepts to
mobilize violence
rising event-driven violence
tactical convergence and cross-group learning around
accelerationism, and transformations in communication
infrastructure (e.g. on-line ecosystems).
Mobilizing concepts refer to ideas that have a simultaneous call to
action.\22\ They are different from traditional ideological frameworks,
which are rooted in more clearly articulated beliefs or theories about
how political or economic systems should work, such as anarchism,
communism, or fascism. Mobilizing concepts, on the contrary, can be
applied to a wide range of ideological frames or justifications. They
include the notion of the ``Boogaloo'' (a code word for a second civil
war), the concept of the ``three percenters'' (based on the false claim
that it took only 3 percent of colonists to rise up against the
British), and the idea of a threat to ``Western values.'' All three
justifications have the potential to mobilize significant cross-
ideological support around a concept, rather than an ideology. These
kinds of concepts can draw people together into violent action even
when they do not agree on specific ideological beliefs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Miller-Idriss, C. and Hughes, B. Lawfare (December 19, 2021)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Event-driven political violence and extremism refers to relatively
spontaneous coalitions across ideological groups and movements that
emerge around a common protest or demonstration. State and National
protests related to coronavirus mandates or second Amendment protests
are examples, as is the Jan. 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. Event-
driven ideological coalitions emerge based on opportunities to assemble
larger groups of people by focusing on the lowest common denominator
that unites them, thereby creating a temporary convergence across
different extremist ideologies and groups.
It's not only concepts and events that lead to cross-ideological
muddiness and coalition building. There has also been increasing
strategic and tactical convergence across ideologies, especially around
the idea of accelerationism.\23\ Accelerationism is a goal and a tactic
drawn on by a variety of movements that are united around the objective
of overthrowing the country's prevailing political and social
order.\24\ Anarchists may promote the tactic to accelerate violence
against capitalism or law enforcement, while anti-Government extremists
may use it to target elected officials or Government buildings.
Accelerationist objectives converge around the idea of inspiration;
their promoters see their goals not as mere terrorist retaliation or
intimidation but, rather, as focused on inspiring others to undertake
similar violence and accelerate the collapse of systems that extremists
believe must be demolished and reconstructed. As a strategic
orientation, the tactic has been growing across the political and
ideological spectrum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Miller-Idriss, C. and Hughes, B. ``Uniting for total collapse:
the January 6 boost to accelerationism'' CTC Sentinel 14(4) (April/May,
2021). Available at: https://ctc.usma.edu/uniting-for-total-collapse-
the-january-6-boost-to-accelerationism/.
\24\ Hughes, B. `` `Pine tree Twitter' and the shifting ideological
foundations of eco-extremism'' Interventionen (14) (2019) Available at:
Interventionen--14-2019.pdf (violence-prevention-network.de).
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Fourth and finally, the new information infrastructure has also
helped muddle ideological rationales. Today, extremist content is
readily available on-line, in the form of manifestos, memes, videos,
and audio that anyone can produce and share. Everyone is just a few
clicks away from an ever-expanding series of rabbit holes that offer up
whole worlds of disinformation and hate. Digital media shapes how
people encounter and share ideological content, propaganda, and
disinformation that can mobilize to violence.\25\ For example, the
broad use of hyperlinks, algorithmic recommendation systems, and other
features of on-line technology make it much easier for someone with a
grievance to leapfrog from left-wing environmental extremism to
conspiracy theories to anti-civilizational deep ecology \26\ to far-
right ``National anarchism''\27\ to the ``Boogaloo movement'' and
beyond. Increasingly, ideological motivations for terrorist and
extremist violence follow a `choose-your-own-adventure' approach in
which individuals accumulate an ever-evolving set of fragmented
ideological commitments, extremist identities, and conspiracy beliefs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Hughes, B. ``The storm and the web: communication technology
and the ecumenical far right'' University of Oslo C-REX--Center for
Research on Extremism (January 26, 2021) Available at: https://
www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2020/the-storm-
and-the-web.html.
\26\ Institute for Social Ecology ``Theses on social ecology and
deep ecology'' (August 1, 1995) Available at: https://social-
ecology.org/wp/1995/08/theses-on-social-ecology-and-deep-ecology/.
\27\ Macklin, G. ``Co-opting the counter culture: Troy Southgate
and the National Revolutionary Faction'' Patterns of Prejudice 39(3)
(September, 2005).
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In addition to these overarching trends, it is worth noting that
global conflicts--as always--also play a role in these kinds of
spontaneous and evolving mobilizations. The escalating conflict between
Ukraine and Russia, for example, is being actively discussed in
encrypted White supremacist extremist channels on-line in ways that
raise concerns. Like other global geopolitical conflicts, the Ukraine-
Russia situation creates an opportunity for extremists to leverage
momentum to recruit White supremacist foreign fighters who seek
training to use ``back home.'' These foreign fighters want to meet one
another and network, to mobilize and recruit others, and otherwise
intensify their engagement to the cause. The looming conflict has
created an opportunity for extremists to spread anti-Semitic
conspiracies about a so-called Jewish plot against Russia or a ``Jewish
war'' that pits Whites against Whites. We should be alert to other
potential ripple effects for extremist groups, particularly given the
transnational nature of on-line communication across White supremacist
extremist groups.
policy recommendations
The rapid transformations in on-line extremist communications and
the on-going fragmentation and blurriness across various ideologies
challenge current counter-extremism approaches. As violence becomes
more spontaneous, less organized, and more tied to on-line
radicalization, terrorist acts become harder to prevent with strategies
that rely on countering organized plots and identifying formal group
hierarchies. Counterextremism tools designed to address threats from
fringe groups--as they currently exist--cannot meaningfully confront
the evolved threats we face today without a broader, multisectoral,
whole-of-society commitment to prevention and early intervention.
Our country requires serious investment in strategies to reduce the
fertile ground in which anti-democratic and violent extremist
ideologies thrive--through what are known as public health approaches
to preventing violent extremism.\28\ In the medical world, experts have
learned that it is not sufficient to only treat the symptoms of
diseases like diabetes or cardiac disease once they appear--rather,
communities work to educate everyone through public health classes and
campaigns that teach the behavioral and attitudinal choices people can
make about diet and exercise that can reduce their vulnerability to
diseases. The same is true for prevention of terrorism. We can build
more resilient communities that recognize and reject disinformation,
propaganda, and reduce the fertile ground in which violent extremism
thrives. To do this, Congress must take immediate steps to build multi-
agency and multi-sectoral initiatives that work to prevent
radicalization to violence and intervene by creating early off-ramps in
radicalization processes. This includes investments in proven
inoculation strategies that reduce people's vulnerability to both the
ideologies and the persuasive tactics of extremist groups and
movements. We need scalable interventions to reduce people's
vulnerability to on-line propaganda, anti-Semitic and other conspiracy
theories, and other forms of on-line manipulation, including through
digital and media literacy training. We also need to work to reduce
high rates of polarization and the kinds of moral disengagement and
dehumanization that are demonstrated precursors to political violence.
Federal, State, and local governments should be funding serious and
sustained educational and community prevention and intervention
programming, along with a reinvestment in civic education and other
efforts to strengthen democratic norms and values. We also need to
commit to trans-Atlantic and global collaboration and mutual learning
on these shared challenges, by regularly communicating not only about
law enforcement and intelligence strategies, but also about prevention
and intervention approaches. There are good lessons from the multi-
agency, multi-sectoral, whole-of-Government and whole-of-society
approaches that our allies have taken, especially in New Zealand,
Germany, and Norway, from which we can learn as we create and adapt
strategies of our own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Miller-Idriss, C. ``America's most urgent threat now comes
from within'' New York Times (January 5, 2022) Available at: https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/opinion/jan-6-domestic-extremism.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These kinds of interventions are not an immediate fix to the
growing problem of extremist violence and terrorism--rather, they
reflect a need for investments across the short, medium, and longer
terms. And it is important to note that these are not options that
involve censorship or teaching ideological beliefs in any way--after
all, no one wants the Federal Government to be engaged in policing
people's beliefs. But the U.S. Government's focus on using conventional
counterterrorism tools alone fails to account for the current,
unchecked spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories, propaganda
targeting racial and religious minorities and the increasing
dehumanization of those with whom one disagrees.\29\ Such precursors to
violence need to be addressed by modernized counterterrorism tools and
frameworks created specifically to address the threats to this Nation
laid out in this testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Miller-Idriss, C. ``White supremacist extremism and the far
right in the U.S.'' Gale (2021). Available at: https://www.gale.com/
intl/essays/cynthia-miller-idriss-white-supremacist-extremism-far-
right-us.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
In sum, there is clear convergence across the extremist and
terrorist spectrum in supremacist and anti-Government beliefs, along
with cross-ideological commitments to anti-Semitism, misogyny, and
xenophobia. These areas of convergence are part of what fuel
increasingly blurry ideologies and the emergence of strange coalitions
across previously distinct groups, as more and more people encounter
fragmented bits of ideologies on-line and mobilize around common
grievances and events where spontaneous and planned violence can occur.
Policy makers will not be able to solve today--or tomorrow's--
extremism with the surveillance and securitized tools honed in
yesterday's battles. We must refocus those tools and broaden our
efforts to include early prevention of--and intervention in--pressing
extremist threats, with direct investments that work to reduce such
threats to democracy in the first place. Understanding the nature of
the evolving problem is an essential first step toward those goals.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I now ask Mr.
Roggio to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. I hope I
didn't do you too much harm in my pronunciation.
STATEMENT OF BILL ROGGIO, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE
OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Roggio. Thank you, sir. No, it is just fine. It is
Roggio. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and
distinguished Members of this committee, and my fellow panel
members, thank you for this invitation to speak on this very
important issue. In addition to being a senior fellow at
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I also edit the FDD's
Long War Journal. This is where we document and track the war
on terror, not just Jihadist groups and their operations, but
what state sponsors and terrorists are doing.
One of the things you all are probably very familiar with
my work even though you don't know it. If you were watching
Afghanistan over the summer and all of the news outlets were
running a map, that was something I created beginning in 2014,
because I saw the flawed U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and
Afghan counterinsurgency strategy. They were ceding ground to
the Taliban, which allowed them to build their insurgency. So,
when our leadership stands up and they tell this to Congress
and they have said, we couldn't have foreseen the failure in
Afghanistan, no one knew it was happening. That is untrue. That
is false. My colleague Thomas Jocelyn and I, we understood
exactly what was happening. We predicted the failure in
negotiations. We documented the ties between the Taliban and
al-Qaeda, and the support for Pakistan and Iran in the
Taliban's operations. You know, we did this over the course of
time. So, this is where I base a lot of my work from.
The threat posed by international terrorist organizations
has increased over the past year as the U.S. continues to
disengage from multiple theatres. Nowhere is this more visible
than in Afghanistan, where the United States precipitously
pulled out. Afghanistan is now a terrorist safe haven. The
withdrawal from Afghanistan was disastrous on many levels. The
United States now has virtually no capabilities. I will call it
very limited capabilities to strike our enemies there, as well
as enemies that were in Pakistan. We should all remember the
U.S.-inserted drone campaign under the Bush and Obama
administrations that targeted top al-Qaeda leaders. Al-Qaeda is
still in Pakistan and it has never left Afghanistan and we have
virtually no ability to strike them there.
Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's emir, who was the deputy emir
on 9/11, 20 years after 9/11, he is still alive and he is
somewhere between Afghanistan and Pakistan and we have limited
ability to target him. The Taliban and al-Qaeda they have
withstood 20 years of war against the superpower and they have
come out on top. The withdrawal has given al-Qaeda and its
allies a massive propaganda victory. The Islamic-Emirate of
Afghanistan, that is the name the Taliban call--that is what
the Taliban called itself up to the day of 9/11 until the
United States rejected it, it has been restored. That was the
goal of the Taliban all the time and we refused to recognize
this.
The Taliban are not our ``partners'', and I use partners in
quotes, as CENTCOM Commander General Frank McKenzie has
referred to them. The Taliban remain closely allied with al-
Qaeda. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the deputy emir of the Taliban and
its current interior minister, he was described by the United
Nations early to mid-last year as an al-Qaeda leader. This is
the deputy emir of the Taliban and it is the head of its
interior ministry. He is an al-Qaeda leader as the United
Nations calls him. The links between the Taliban and al-Qaeda
run deep. Those links aren't just with the Haqqanis. There are
other key Taliban subgroups that have close ties to al-Qaeda.
The Islamic State, it appears to be making a comeback in
Iraq and Syria. We all witnessed this over the last 2 weeks
with the al-Sina'a prison break. This should open our eyes to
the rising threat. Al-Qaeda prior to the Islamic State, it was
part of al-Qaeda and in Iraq, and it replenished its ranks
using very similar operations after the U.S. surge ended in
2011. So, after the United States exited Iraq, the Islamic
State or al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, began targeting prisons
inside of Iraq. They have been conducting operations just like
we saw in al-Sina'a. They replenished the ranks and within 3
years they were in control of a territory in Iraq and Syria the
size of Britain.
Iran and Pakistan, the world's two largest state sponsors
of terrorism, even though Pakistan isn't officially called
that, they should be. It should be. They have won in
Afghanistan. Pakistan support through the Taliban is well-
known. Iran is less so. I recently testified in Federal court
in a trial where U.S. service members who were wounded or
family members of those killed sued Iran for its support for
the Taliban. I can tell you that support is significant. Iran
provided the Taliban safe havens, weapons, finances, and
training. Both countries remain the world's premier state
sponsor of terrorism. This is something we ignore at our own
peril.
I have a graphic that shows Iran how it shelters top al-
Qaeda leaders. This graphic is from U.S. designations that
began during the Obama administration and continued under the
Trump administration. These leaders have been designated by
State and Treasury Department. Also, I believe it was the
Treasury Department detailed a--this is a direct quote: ``A
secret deal'' between Iran and the Taliban that allowed--I'm
sorry--Iran and al-Qaeda that allowed al-Qaeda to operate
inside of Iran in exchange for al-Qaeda not targeting Iranian
interests.
This agreement remains in effect to today. It is mentioned
in the 2021 State Department's country reports on terrorism.
Again, this isn't something that just came from the Trump
administration or the Bush administration. It was detailed
under the Obama administration and that report was issued by
the Biden administration.
Somalia and Mali are in danger of becoming the next
Afghanistan. Jihad in the Western Sub-Saharan Africa is
blossoming. Meanwhile, we are rudderless and devoid of
leadership in this war. The desire to end these so-called
endless wars has spanned three administrations. When your No. 1
goal is to disengage, your enemy has the initiative. We have
lost the initiative for years. We have pretended our enemies
aren't our enemies, such as the Taliban. We have refused to
recognize links between our enemies because it was politically
expedient to do so. Twenty years after 9/11, we still can't
properly define our enemies or recognize our enemies' goals and
objectives. Afghanistan is case in point here. We wanted to
leave Afghanistan. The desired policy was to leave. We
pretended the Taliban wasn't our enemy. We pretended that the
Taliban wasn't linked to al-Qaeda, and then we witnessed that
horrific withdrawal over the summer. The Taliban is now back in
control. Al-Qaeda now has safe haven.
We must have accountability especially from our military
and intelligence leadership. Again, Afghanistan case in point.
There is numerous incidences where the U.S. military has failed
and not a single commander has paid a price for this. Until we
have accountability, we will not be able to succeed in this
war. If you think that what happened in Afghanistan remains in
Afghanistan, you haven't been paying attention. Our military
leadership, our intelligence leadership, they are going to have
to deal with threats such as China and Russia and the lessons
they have learned over the last 2 decades is that
accountability is not an issue for them. These are the people
that may have to deal with crisis in the Ukraine or China. We
should all be worried about that. Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roggio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Roggio
introduction
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and other Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me here today to speak about the
dynamic terrorism landscape and what it means for America.
As the American foreign policy establishment has shifted its focus
from international terror organizations to great power competition with
China and Russia, the terrorism threat has not receded. In some cases,
it has intensified. To be clear, the challenges created by America's
enemies and adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea
must be addressed. However, we turn our back on the dangers posed by
Islamic terror groups at our peril.
Make no mistake, withdrawing from conflicts against terrorist
groups has not ended what has been wrongly called the ``endless wars.''
Disengaging from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and other countries
has strengthened our enemies. Our withdrawal has given our enemies new
life. Our enemies are waging an endless jihad, one where they seek to
overthrow existing Muslim governments and establish emirates, with the
ultimate goal of imposing a reborn Islamic caliphate. These emirates
would be extremely hostile to America and would give terror groups safe
haven, which the 9/11 Commission identified as a key element that
allowed al-Qaeda to execute its deadly attack against the American
homeland. Today, al-Qaeda has safe havens in several countries,
including Afghanistan, Somalia, and Mali. And al-Qaeda continues to
benefit from state sponsorship of terrorism, with Iran and Pakistan
topping the list.
As wrong and counterproductive as the ``endless war'' narrative is,
the desire to end the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia,
and elsewhere is understandable, as America has spent an enormous
amount of blood, treasure, and political capital since al-Qaeda
attacked us on September 11, 2001, and killed nearly 3,000 of our
countrymen. Poor political, military, and intelligence leadership,
compounded by bad strategy and weak allies and partners, has led to
exhaustion amongst our political class. Since 2009, the primary impulse
among three successive administrations was to disengage from these so-
called endless wars. Victory, they believed, or even holding the line
against our jihadist enemies, is no longer feasible.
We can argue the merits of overthrowing Saddam Hussein, ousting the
Taliban and standing up a now-defunct Afghan government, or supporting
the weak Somali government. But once engaged in these conflicts, it was
in America's interests to see them through and not to abandon partners,
as imperfect as they are, to satisfy political expediency.
negotiating with the taliban and the withdrawal from afghanistan
The Trump's administration's decision to negotiate with the
Taliban, and the Biden administration's decision to quickly withdraw
U.S. forces without giving the Afghan government ample time to prepare,
was disastrous. Both decisions directly led to the collapse of the
Afghan government and military and the loss of a key partner in the
region.
President Trump's negotiations with the Taliban, which excluded the
Afghan government, legitimized the Taliban in the international
community. The negotiations also delegitimized the Afghan government
both at home and abroad. These negotiations were predicated on the
ideas that the Taliban would negotiate in good faith and join an Afghan
government, respect its constitution, and preserve women's rights, all
while acting as a reliable counterterrorism partner against al-Qaeda
and other international terror groups. As we all witnessed last summer,
these assumptions were false. The Taliban always sought to regain full
control of Afghanistan and re-establish its emirate. It achieved these
goals with the help of al-Qaeda and allied terror groups, all who
played a key role in the Taliban's summer offensive.
President Biden doubled down on President Trump's misguided deal
with the Taliban by following through on it. Biden hastily withdrew
U.S. forces as the Taliban launched its offensive to seize the country.
The Afghan government was not prepared--it just did not believe America
would abandon it after 20 years of commitment--and was routed within 4
months from the day Biden announced the withdrawal. An unknown number
of American citizens and residents--hundreds, if not thousands--and
tens of thousands of Afghans who helped America's efforts to establish
a democracy remain trapped in Afghanistan, at the mercy of the Taliban.
They are essentially hostages.
The United States withdrawal from Afghanistan led to the immediate
collapse of the Afghan government and military and the swift return to
power of the Taliban, which calls its government the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan. This is the same name the Taliban used for its previous
regime, under which al-Qaeda plotted and executed the 9/11 attacks from
Afghan soil. The Taliban's alliance with al-Qaeda has not been broken,
but in fact has strengthened as it was forged in 20 years of war
against the United States and its allies. Afghanistan is again a safe
haven for al-Qaeda.
Setting aside the very serious issues of Taliban control of
Afghanistan and al-Qaeda's safe haven there, America's abandonment of
Afghanistan has had second- and third-order effects on America's
allies, adversaries, and enemies. American's adversaries and enemies
now sense weakness and are seeking to drive wedges between America and
her allies. The desire to end the so-called endless war in Afghanistan
has called into question America's commitment to its allies and its
leadership on the global stage.
al-qaeda
More than 20 years after 9/11, al-Qaeda possesses a potent global
network. It maintains branches in the Arabian Peninsula, the Middle
East, Africa, and Central Asia, and its network remains embedded in
many other countries. Al-Qaeda continues to maintain effective
insurgencies in multiple countries, while using these bases to plot
attacks against our homeland and our allies. The Taliban's victory in
Afghanistan has been a boon for al-Qaeda. The next generation of al-
Qaeda leaders, military commanders, and operatives are taking the field
while key elements of the old guard remain to guide them. Despite a
concerted manhunt of over 20 years, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was Osama
bin Laden's deputy on September 11, 2001, and took control of al-Qaeda
after bin Laden's death in May 2011, remains alive and in control of
al-Qaeda's global network.
While much of the attention in the press and in counterterrorism
circles remains focused on the Islamic State due to the group's
exceptional brutality, al-Qaeda is ultimately the more dangerous enemy.
The Islamic State's demand of absolute fealty to its emir and its
organization, along with the group's unwillingness to work with State
sponsors of terror, limits its ability to expand. Al-Qaeda's patient
approach and willingness to compromise have allowed its top leaders to
operate from Iran and facilitated the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan.
In addition to Afghanistan, al-Qaeda maintains safe havens in
several countries. Syria's Idlib province hosts both Hurras al-Din, an
al-Qaeda branch, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, a jihadist faction allied
with al-Qaeda. The U.S. military occasionally targets al-Qaeda leaders
and commanders in Idlib province.
In Yemen, al-Qaeda's local branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, or AQAP, controls rural areas of the country. AQAP has
plotted several attacks against the U.S. homeland over the past two
decades. Most recently, it claimed credit for a December 6, 2019,
shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed 3 people.
In Somalia, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda's branch in East Africa, controls
significant portions of southern and central Somalia. The U.S.
Government withdrew its forces from Somalia in January 2021 and is
conducting ``over-the-horizon'' operations to keep al-Shabaab at bay.
Military operations by the United States, Kenya, and the African Union,
the latter of which is losing its will to fight in Somalia, are all
that is keeping al-Shabaab from controlling all of southern and central
Somalia, as it did between 2008 and 2011. In Mali, the French are close
to withdrawing their forces, putting the already fragile security
situation in central Mali in peril.
These terrorist successes put our homeland at increased risk. With
safe havens and the ability to draw on local resources to fund its
operations, it is only a matter of time before al-Qaeda and the Islamic
State use these advantages to attempt to execute another deadly attack
against the U.S. homeland or American interests across the globe.
the islamic state of iraq and syria
In Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State, or ISIS, as it is more
commonly known, is making a comeback after losing overt control of its
last town in Syria in 2019. Insurgent attacks in both countries have
increased over the past year as ISIS regenerates its strength. Lest
this be dismissed, we have seen this happen before, between early 2012
after the United States withdrew from Iraq, and mid-2013, when ISIS,
which was then still part of al-Qaeda, stepped up its operations
following setbacks during the American ``surge'' in Iraq. To increase
its combat power, the group attacked prisons to free thousands of its
fighters. We just witnessed this happen at the al-Sina prison in
northeastern Syria. Hundreds of ISIS fighters assaulted the prison,
seized nearby neighborhoods, sprung an unknown number of prisoners, and
fought the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces for over a week.
Outside of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State maintains a robust
network, particularly in Africa, where it has subsumed elements of al-
Qaeda's network, such as in Nigeria, Mozambique, the Sahel, and Sub-
Saharan Africa. One year ago, the Islamic State's branch in Mozambique
took control of the city of Palma and held it for 10 days. In 2017, the
Islamic State battled Filipino security forces for 5 months for control
for the city of Mawari. The Islamic State also has a presence in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but it is dwarfed by the Afghan and Pakistani
Taliban as well as by al-Qaeda and allied groups. America's focus on
the Islamic State's network in Afghanistan as its primary enemy
contributed to the Taliban's victory.
state sponsors of terrorism
Like safe havens, state sponsorship of terrorism is a key factor
that allows terror groups to survive and thrive. Iran and Pakistan are
the world's two leading state sponsors of terrorism.
Iran's support for Islamist terrorists, both Sunni and Shiite,
continues unabated. Iran continues to shelter top al-Qaeda leaders,
including the group's deputy emir. Since 2011, the U.S. Government has
highlighted the ``secret deal'' that has allowed Iran ``to funnel funds
and operatives [to al-Qaeda] through its territory.'' With this deal in
effect, al-Qaeda continues to use Iran as a regional hub while being
sheltered from U.S. reprisal. The agreement, according to the U.S.
Treasury Department, specified that al-Qaeda
``must refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory
and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities
informed of their activities. In return, the government of Iran gave
the Iran-based al-Qa'ida network freedom of operation and uninhibited
ability to travel for extremists and their families. Al-Qa'ida members
who violate these terms run the risk of being detained by Iranian
authorities.''
Multiple al-Qaeda leaders who have operated or continue to operate
from Iran have been designated as global terrorists. The U.S. State
Department, in its 2021 Country Reports on Terrorism, noted that the
Iran-al-Qaeda deal remains in effect to this day.
Direct evidence of the Iran-al-Qaeda deal was on full display on
August 7, 2020, when Israeli operatives killed Abu Mohammad al-Masri in
Tehran. Masri was wanted by the U.S. Government for the past 3 decades
for his role in the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings. Masri was
not an ordinary al-Qaeda leader: He was the terror group's second in
command and likely successor to Ayman al-Zawahiri. While in Tehran,
Masri ``had been living freely in the Pasdaran district of Tehran, an
upscale suburb, since at least 2015,'' according to The New York Times.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps provided him with security.
Iran also played a significant role in the Taliban's takeover of
Afghanistan. In October 2021, I was an expert witness in Cabrera v.
Iran and detailed how Iran provided safe haven, weapons, financial
support, and training to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. In Cabrera v.
Iran, the families of American soldiers and civilians who were killed
or wounded by the Taliban sued the Iranian government for supporting
Taliban and al-Qaeda violence in Afghanistan.
Iran also continues to support a bevy of Shiite militias and terror
groups throughout the Middle East. Lebanese Hezbollah, which directly
threatens Israel and U.S. interests throughout the Middle East, remains
Iran's premier terror proxy. In Iraq, Tehran supports a multitude of
militias, including the Hezbollah Brigades and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which
are both listed by the U.S. Government as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations and are collectively responsible for killing more than
600 U.S. soldiers. One day, these Iraqi militias will likely eclipse
Hezbollah. The Houthis in Yemen control half of the country with the
help of the Iranians and are responsible for one of the world's worst
humanitarian crises.
Pakistan, which has played a double game with the United States and
was complicit in the killing of thousands of American and allied
soldiers in Afghanistan, played a key role in the Taliban's takeover of
the country. While Iran played a crucial role in aiding the Taliban,
Pakistan's use of the Taliban as its proxy was decisive. Pakistan
provided the Taliban with safe haven, weapons, financial support,
training, and other key forms of aid. Taliban leaders and their
families, as well as Taliban military commanders and fighters, lived in
Pakistan with the knowledge and support of the Pakistani state. While
political reasons have prevented the U.S. Government from listing the
Pakistani government as a state sponsor of terrorism, Pakistan meets
all of the requirements to be listed as such.
Pakistan myopically supports a host of terrorist groups on its own
territory as well as in Afghanistan and India to further its goals in
the region. Pakistan backs these groups even though they are allied
with and aid the very terrorist groups that fight the Pakistani state.
In addition, many of the jihadist groups sponsored by Pakistan are
allied with al-Qaeda. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harakat-ul-
Mujahideen, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which wage jihad in Afghanistan and
India, continue to receive support from the Pakistani state.
Pakistan's victory in Afghanistan is worrying. The lesson that
Pakistan has learned is that supporting terror groups to advance its
foreign-policy goals pays well. The United States delivered to Pakistan
more than $30 billion in military and economic aid since 9/11 even as
Pakistan sponsored our enemies. Pakistan used some of these funds to
finance the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan.
u.s. efforts to defeat terror groups have failed
After 2 decades of war, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
actions, sanctions, policing, and legal proceedings, America and her
allies have failed to defeat al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other
terror groups that threaten us. The threat posed by jihadist groups has
expanded, not contracted. Al-Qaeda's geographic footprint across the
globe has increased dramatically since 9/11, while its bastard child,
the Islamic State, vies for leadership of the global jihad and expands
into countries previously untouched by the fighting. Meanwhile, state
sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Pakistan have paid little to no
price for their continuing support of jihadist groups.
Regime change, democracy promotion, counterinsurgency, and support
of local partners, once hailed as the solution to our problems, have
failed spectacularly. The Taliban regained control of Afghanistan less
than 20 years after the U.S. invasion. Iraqi security forces collapsed
under the weight of the al-Qaeda and Islamic State offensive, which
opened the door for Iran to enter the war and regain significant
influence in Iraq. In Syria, the United States had so few options that
it was forced to back the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party,
or PKK, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. To hide this
fact, the United States relabeled the group the ``Syrian Democratic
Forces.'' The Marxist PKK is anything but democratic. The U.S.-backed
Somali government is in danger of falling to al-Qaeda's regional
branch.
The United States has had limited tactical success in conducting
counterterrorism operations. Occasionally, key leaders are killed in
airstrikes or limited raids. However, counterterrorism operations are a
tactic, not a strategy. As our enemies gain more ground and we pull
back, our ability to conduct these operations is diminished, in some
cases significantly. The U.S. military and the CIA were able to execute
the raid to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, because they
had a presence in Afghanistan. Numerous top al-Qaeda leaders were
killed in drone strikes inside Pakistan and in raids in Afghanistan.
With the United States no longer in Afghanistan, our ability to target
al-Qaeda's leadership has dropped to nearly zero. Al-Qaeda emir Ayman
al-Zawahiri is undoubtedly operating in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Other
top al-Qaeda leaders also continue to operate from the region.
Perhaps more importantly, the United States has failed on two other
fronts: We have failed to understand the nature of our enemies, and we
have refused to wage an ideological war against them. Again,
Afghanistan is case in point. Carter Malkasian, who served as a key
adviser both to General Joseph Dunford when he was chairman of Joint
Chiefs of Staff and to General Austin Miller when he was commander of
Operation Resolute Support and U.S. Forces Afghanistan, penned an
article last summer wherein he admitted that he and the U.S. military
leadership failed to understand the Taliban harbored deeply-held
religious motivations that drove its strategy and objectives. It is no
wonder the U.S. Government was keen to negotiate with the Taliban and
trusted it to be an effective counterterrorism partner. It is no wonder
why we lost Afghanistan.
This refusal to acknowledge our enemies' religious motivations has
led us to neglect the ideological component of counterterrorism,
leaving that playing field almost entirely to our adversaries. The U.S.
Government and military are fearful of recognizing our enemies'
religious motivations, lest they be branded as ``Islamophobes.'' This
has allowed al-Qaeda, the Islamic Front, and other terror groups to
dominate the narrative and effectively recruit and indoctrinate
fighters.
America has the lost will to prosecute the fight. Our leaders are
no longer accountable for their failures. This has particularly
disturbing repercussions for our military. Not a single general was
held to account for the massive tactical and strategic failures that we
witnessed last spring and summer in Afghanistan. Our current and next
generations of military leaders have learned that failure will not be
punished. This is toxic and will have negative implications in future
fights, perhaps with more serious and dangerous enemies such as Russia
or China.
a path forward
Without a major attack on the U.S. homeland to refocus our minds, I
am highly pessimistic about our ability to correct course in what used
to be known as the War on Terror. But if we are to regain our footing,
we must, at the minimum, do the following:
Place facts and objective assessments over desired policy
outcomes. Unfortunately, in Washington, the desire to end the
so-called endless wars has driven our policy, and the facts
about our enemies were modified to achieve desired policy
goals.
Refocus our efforts to analyze and understand our enemies
and their objectives, strategy, tactics, and relationships.
This analysis must be based on facts, not on preferred
narratives.
Hold leaders in the military and intelligence services
accountable. After 9/11, not a single intelligence official
resigned or was fired. Instead, they were rewarded. Fast
forward 20 years, and U.S. military and intelligence leaders
got a pass for the obvious tactical and strategic failures in
Afghanistan. This must change if we are to have a chance to
succeed.
There are other issues that must be addressed if we are regain the
initiative in fighting global jihadists. We must develop a strategy
that balances the demands of competition with China and potential
conflict with Russia with the need to maintain the persistent fight
against our jihadist enemies. We must learn to identify and more
productively engage with regional partners in key battlefields in the
Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The military and intelligence services
must be properly resourced to sustain the fight. And the military must
re-evaluate and revamp its training programs for foreign forces.
Despite billions of dollars spent to stand up the Afghan and Iraqi
security forces, they wilted quickly when forced to stand on their own.
But these issues are secondary to the 3 identified previously. If we
are to have success, we must first be able to objectively analyze the
threat, properly define our enemies, and hold our leaders accountable
for their failures.
Our enemies continue to seek to hurt us. As they continue to rack
up wins, it is only a matter of time before they muster the strength
and capabilities to strike us here in the homeland. Our enemies are
committed and resourceful, and they believe we are weak. We must
refocus our efforts if we hope to avoid another devastating attack.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I thank the
witnesses for their testimony. I remind each Member that he or
she will have 5 minutes to question the witnesses. I will now
recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Greenblatt, the United States faces increasingly
complex and dynamic threat landscape where misinformation like
QAnon or anti-Semitic conspiracies have stoked violent acts and
spread at lightning speed through social media. What
obligations, if any, do you believe on-line platforms have to
minimize the spread of disinformation and misinformation that
has homeland or National security implications?
Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question.
If we are trying to understand why is the threat environment so
different today than in previous years or decades or even
generations, I would posit that some of what the prior panelist
was talking about, the exogenous environment has something to
do with that. I would also get back to what Professor Idriss-
Miller talked about in terms of the rise of these domestic
extremists for various reasons.
But make no mistake, the social media services have been a
superhighway for extremists and hateful organizations. They
have allowed them to move, Mr. Chairman, with lightning speed
from the margins to the mainstream. Literally, extremists
promoting hateful ideas about African Americans, about American
Jews, about Muslims, about immigrants, Latinos, LGBTQ, I could
go on and on and on, have exploited the lack of any liability
at these companies. Leveraged their platforms to push out the
kind of hate that could never find its way on any mainstream
media platforms.
The loophole in the law created by Section 230, and the
lack of any moral leadership from these businesses, has helped
to create this problem. Now, Mr. Chairman, it is both a matter
that--is an issue that matters to Americans on an individual
basis and on a systemic basis. On an individual basis, ADL
tracks hate and harassment on-line every year. Every year, we
see in our latest survey, which came out in 2021, roughly 41
percent of users of social media report being harassed on-line
and 28 percent report being victimized by serial, sustained
harassment.
Mr. Chairman, these are children who often find themselves
deluged with White supremacist content. It is not just
happening on the social media service, the gaming platforms are
a problem. I got to tell you, as Facebook, which is the place
where it happens the most, Mr. Chairman, moves into the
metaverse, they seem to be unwilling to do the basics on their
current platform, which means you can better believe the
metaverse will be filled with even worse issues than what we
see right now. Mr. Chairman, if you did one thing as a
committee, one thing, focus on the social media companies. Hold
them accountable for what they are doing. That will be a
gamechanger to mitigate the rise of extremism in America and
really, around the world.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Speaking of platforms, Mr.
Rasmussen, you talked a little bit about it and can you, in
short order, and I know this is a challenge, tell us what these
companies ought to be doing to help us identify this content.
Mr. Rasmussen. Sure, Mr. Chairman. Again, in my role at
GIFCT, I work with the companies to bring them together to try
to develop cross-platform solutions. Because the environment
that Jonathan described is one in which material or these
hateful ideologies can migrate and spread across multiple
platforms and create much greater impact and reach and it is
just very difficult to contain once those kinds of toxic
ideologies are spreading through that environment. So, one of
the things we are trying to do at GIFCT is to find ways for the
companies to cooperate with each other. To share information
across their platforms so that when something appears on one of
them that is of concern to others of them, that they can act on
it more quickly, particularly in a crisis management or crisis
response scenario such as we saw with Colleyville 2 weekends
ago.
Each of the companies has their own platform rules, terms
of service, policies if that they enforce. They should be
engaged on those policies, rules, in terms of service on their
terms as companies. We don't at GIFCT set those rules,
policies, or terms of service. What we do try to do is together
make us more effective as an industry in managing this on-line
environment and to trying to better identify when it is that
this on-line activity actually translates into real-world harm.
Because at the end of the day this is, as your committee knows,
about keeping Americans safe. So, we have got to find better
ways to figure out when it is that this activity on-line
actually goes further and takes the next step, which is actual
violence.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair
recognizes the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was having technical
difficulties unmuting myself and some of you probably would
wish that I would stay muted. But I appreciate, Mr. Greenblatt,
right off the bat, I got to tell you, your passion is exactly
what your organization needs. I have worked with groups all my
years as a prosecutor because of the anti-Semitic violence. I
just want to make a quick observation that everything you said
I agree with and what the testimony the Chairman elicited from
you I agree with.
I also think one of the components that we have in this
country now is absolutely irresponsible rhetoric from leaders
in politics and leaders in communities and even people such as
celebrities like we have now seen in the last couple of days. I
think all that helps contribute to this ignorance and
misinformation, which then fuels bad acts. So, I think it is
incumbent upon us to have that holistic discussion at some
point as well, you know?
But I do applaud what you are doing and the only thing I
could tell you is keep going. Because when I was a prosecutor
back in Syracuse, one of my best friends I went to law school
with was of Jewish heritage was inspired to get involved in law
enforcement because of a fire bombing of a mosque, I mean,--a
mosque--excuse me--a temple in Syracuse. So, it is a long
problem but my concern is it is on the rise and everything you
said we got to think about. But we have got to really hammer
people when they engage in irresponsible rhetoric because I
think it is really important.
Mr. Greenblatt. I would just respond, Mr. Katko, Mr.
Congressman, by saying No. 1, how much we appreciate your
service, your work as a prosecutor in up-State New York, and
your service in Congress. I regret that you are retiring
because you have been such an important moral voice in so many
ways. I will also thank you for the kind words.
Look, I mean, we have to be passionate. I once had a social
media executive say to me, why are you so emotional about this
issue? My response was, why are you not more emotional about it
this issue? Like and I just need to clarify something that my
very good friend Nick said just a moment before me and I want
all of you to hear this. There is a clear causal relationship,
and I could show you the screenshots where we have seen White
supremacists groups, you know, radical Islamists groups,
organizing on these platforms, whether it is in public places
like Facebook groups or private services like Telegram and
Signal, or even in the dark web making threats and then it
turns into real-world violence.
I could tell you about how the shooter in Pittsburgh posted
a manifesto and he was communicating on, I think, it was Gab or
Discord and said I am going in and then he shot and killed 11
people in a synagogue. Or the manifesto that the guy in Poway
posted.
So, this is real and Mr. Chairman and Congressman Katko,
please do not let the social media companies tell you they just
can't get their arms around this. These are the most
profitable, most innovative, most technologically capable
companies in the United States or the world. Like Facebook has
built the most sophisticated advertising platform in the
history of capitalism. It is hard to build a business that
generates $100 billion a year. You know what is not so hard,
knocking off the Nazis. So, it like it literally is treating us
like dummies to say that they don't have the means to deal with
this.
Mr. Katko. I agree with that. Thank you very much. I may be
leaving but I am too much of a loudmouth to shut up the rest of
my life. I will be in politics the rest of my life. That I
promise you.
Mr. Roggio, I wanted to speak with you for a moment and I
appreciate your testimony as well. I am vitally concerned about
Afghanistan and the vacuum that has been back there. So, from
an intel, surveillance, and reconnaissance standpoint, have
there been significant shortfalls since we left Afghanistan?
Talk about that and talk about the Over the Horizon, which I
think is a, you know, failure to admit the lack of intel. You
know, what is going on with respect to Afghanistan? What does
it mean for the homeland?
Mr. Roggio. Yes, sir. Thank you. It is a pertinent question
and it is one of the most important questions to be asked here
today when on the international aspect, the Jihadist aspect of
this. In mid-December, General McKenzie was quoted as saying
that the U.S. capabilities, ISR, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities inside Afghanistan was reduced
to 1 to 2 percent of its previous capabilities when the United
States was in-country.
Keep in mind that when the military says something like
this, they are giving the most optimistic perspective on this.
So, what we are talking about here is that ISR capabilities
have been reduced to nearly zero.
So, what that means in layman's terms is we can't find and
observe terrorists who are operating in, not just in
Afghanistan, this also applies to Pakistan as well. Keep in
mind the raid to kill Osama bin Laden was launched from
Afghanistan. Intelligence was gathered largely from units that
were operating inside of Afghanistan across the border.
So, the idea that we can conduct Over the Horizon strikes
and effectively target al-Qaeda and allied groups as well as
the Islamic State, which really is a tertiary threat in the
region. The Islamic State has been overhyped and al-Qaeda has
been underrepresented when it comes to how the threat has
metastasized in the region. The reason being is that al-Qaeda
and the Taliban are in bed together. They are virtually
indistinguishable in some regards. Al-Qaeda gives--or the
Taliban gives al-Qaeda safe haven.
So, if we don't have the ability to observe what they are
doing, it becomes increasingly difficult to conduct those so-
called Over the Horizon strikes. The ability to carry out Over
the Horizon strikes, I actually call it Over the Horizon's
horizon. We don't have bases in any countries to conduct such
strikes. The Stans, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
aren't going to base the United States. I mean, if you are
them, why would you base U.S. forces in your country after the
United States abandoned Afghanistan? Iran, obviously, isn't
going to do it. Pakistan, they played that game and they don't
want to do this any longer. So, the United States would have to
launch these strikes from carriers or long-range bombers or
drones that were flown from outside. So, you have poor
intelligence, right? That takes time to gather. You can't keep
eyes on your target. Then the platform that you are going to
launch your strike from is coming from a long distance. It is a
recipe for failure.
We saw failure of intelligence in Kabul on August 29 when
the United States launched that strike against the purported
Islamic State planner who had wound up being a civilian. That
is what happened when we were in-country. These mistakes
happen. Think of the mistakes that could happen when you have,
at best, 1 to 2 percent visibility and the platforms you are
using to launch the strikes are far outside the borders of
Afghanistan.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Roggio. I appreciate
it. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your indulgence.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Ranking Member.
That was a professional courtesy you received.
Mr. Katko. I know.
Chairman Thompson. It will not be extended to any other
Member. We will adhere to the 5-minute time. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for this hearing along with the Ranking Member. Let me
quickly go into my line of questioning by first of all saying
to Mr. Rasmussen, that I have the passion and the Members of
this committee and our Chairman and Ranking Member have the
passion and we are very grateful for your testimony.
I want to emphasize where we are today by referring to the
FBI's comment about the salad bowl. I want to offer my deepest
sympathy, again, for my friends in Colleyville, that horrific
terrorist act. I am glad that the FBI corrected its language.
It was domestic terrorism. It was terrorism. Of course, January
6 and the big lie and the Boogaloo movement, along with the
enormity of domestic terrorists or are growing every day. You
are right, it is being fueled by social media. Although, I want
to emphasize, as well, a First Amendment protection.
So, social media ran ads in the last 2 months, pretty ads
introducing their content people and saying we want the Federal
Government to give us our directions, our guidance, our laws.
Can you be specific as it relates to these mega sites as to
what you would like us to do, very quickly? Thank you.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you, ma'am. Actually, I am not sure I
can be specific because I don't speak for tech companies in
terms of what they would want to see from a new legislative
framework. Each of the companies will have their own view on
the wisdom of particular pieces of legislation. We don't take
an organizational view in that regard.
I will say, though, that when companies in the past have
been dealing with issues like terrorism and violent extremism
on-line, they benefit from clarity when it comes from
definitional frameworks or prescribing of groups so that they
know clearly and unambiguously what content can be deemed
illegal by the Federal Government, for example. In the case of
the GIFCT, we operate with our house-sharing database using a
U.N. list of global terrorists and global terrorist
organizations. That is a way for us to rely on a framework that
is transparent, visible to all, and doesn't involve kind-of
random decision making inside companies. So,----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rasmussen [continuing]. Ma'am, I am not sure I can give
you more than that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Mr. Greenblatt, let me ask you
the same question in how we can be effective on helping to
ensure that there is responsiveness. Let me comment on my
desire as I sit on the Judiciary Committee and Homeland works
very carefully overlapping on some of these issues, frankly,
believe the FBI should become more intense. There should be
more funding. There should be a larger section dealing with
domestic terrorism. As well, having a component that deals with
what is happening on these sites. Mr. Greenblatt, would you
respond, please?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, for the
question. What the ADL has said time and time again, that the
social media companies are fully aware of what is going on. So,
I will--and they know. One of the outcomes or the insights from
the whistleblower, her revelations last summer, Madam
Congresswoman, was that we learned that Facebook was tracking
everything. Frankly, Madam Congresswoman, they knew more. It
was worse than we thought and they knew it all along. So, I
would credit the Algorithmic Justice in Online Transparency Act
that would prevent or at least prohibit harmful and
discriminatory algorithms, among other measures. I mean, we
need legislation like that and others to address on-line hate
immediately. Because the big--we have to keep in mind, big
tech's business model optimizes for engagement and hateful,
racist, anti-Semitic content is highly engaging. Therefore, it
is, you know, amplified by the algorithms.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Greenblatt. While we deeply believe in freedom of
speech, Congresswoman, let's keep in mind, freedom of speech is
not freedom of reach. So, the companies are making a decision
when they privilege that information. They don't have to
publish it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You can't cry fire in a crowded theatre. I
am truly with you. I want to----
Mr. Greenblatt. Exactly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will accept your challenge and will be
working with you. Mr. Chairman, I want to add into the record
an article from the Washington Post that indicates the heinous
acts of bomb threats to historically Black colleges. I ask
unanimous consent and I would like to read it into the record.
Rust College, Tougaloo College, Jackson State, Alcorn,
Mississippi Valley State, Fort Valley University, Spelman,
Morgan State, Coppin State University, Harris-Stowe State
University in Missouri, Kentucky State, Xavier, Philander
Smith, Edward Waters, Howard University, which is having a bomb
threat right now.
[The information follows:]
Article From the Washington Post
fear, anxiety follow third wave of bomb threats targeting hbcus
By Lauren Lumpkin and Susan Svrluga, February 1, 2022 at 7:33 p.m. EST
For the third time in just a month, Howard University warned its
campus on Tuesday of a bomb threat. Each time, a law enforcement search
found no sign of the threatened explosives.
But as students spilled out of academic buildings and headed to
their next classes, or lined up for burritos at a nearby Chipotle, the
campus was still on edge.
``Most of us are feeling anxiety,'' said Troix McClendon, a 19-
year-old freshman. ``There's not really a lot of information.''
The bomb threats at Howard are part of a wave to hit historically
Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) this year. On Jan. 4, at least
eight HBCUs were threatened. On Monday, at least six were.
Tuesday's threats, most coming early in the morning on the first
day of Black History Month, broadened and deepened the sense of unease:
At least 16 universities closed or swept their campuses. In all, more
than two dozen have faced similar threats this year.
No bombs were found, and law enforcement agencies did not identify
possible motives. But the threats weigh heavily on many, particularly
given the emotional attachment and deep loyalty many students, faculty,
staff and alumni feel for the campuses--a haven, a calling, a family.
``February 1st, it's a moment when we usually celebrate the
innovation and the resilience of our people, and now to be faced with
an issue of this kind at our HBCUs nationwide, we want our community to
know that we're standing together,'' said Tashni-Ann Dubroy, Howard's
executive vice president and chief operating officer.
The university in the District has increased the police presence on
campus, reminded students of the safety resources on campus and offered
support, Dubroy said.
The FBI has said it is working with law enforcement partners to
address potential threats, according to the agency, and it asked the
public to report anything suspicious to law enforcement immediately.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives also is
aware of bomb threats received by some HBCUs, Carolyn Gwathmey, a
spokeswoman for the agency, said in a written statement. ``We take all
potential threats seriously and we regularly work with our law
enforcement partners to determine the threat credibility.''
She said it could not comment on the specific details at this time
because it is a fluid situation with ongoing investigations.
The threats in the past month have touched some of the country's
most iconic schools, such as Howard and Spelman College, as well as
regional institutions all across the country, triggering cancellations,
lockdowns and fear.
On Tuesday, the schools targeted included: Rust College, Tougaloo
College, Jackson State University and Alcorn State University in
Mississippi, as well as Mississippi Valley State University; Fort
Valley State University and Spelman College in Georgia; Morgan State
University and Coppin State University in Maryland; Harris-Stowe State
University in Missouri; Kentucky State University; Xavier University of
Louisiana; Philander Smith College in Arkansas; Edward Waters
University in Florida; Howard University and the University of the
District of Columbia.
``We stand in solidarity with our historically Black
institutions,'' Jay A. Perman, chancellor of the University System of
Maryland--which includes Coppin State and Bowie State, another school
targeted by a threat this week--said Tuesday in a written statement.
He added: ``Knowing that their strength is our strength, and that
their power--on display like never before--will not be diminished by
cowardly acts meant to menace and harm and intimidate. If the intent of
these threats was to restrict access to our historically Black
institutions--to restrict access to higher education itself--it will
fail. If it was meant to sow division, it will fail. If it was meant to
terrorize students and communities of color, it will fail.''
At the University of the District of Columbia on Tuesday, officials
cleared a threat placed about 3:20 a.m. and opened the campus.
Xavier University of Louisiana evacuated the area of the threat and
issued a shelter-in-place order for students living on campus,
according to Patrice Bell, the school's vice president and chief of
staff, until it was cleared to reopen by law-enforcement officials.
Tougaloo College, one of several HBCUs threatened Tuesday in
Mississippi, received a call about 4:20 a.m. that brought FBI and other
law enforcement to sweep campuses. Even after the threat was found to
be unsubstantiated, the campus remained in virtual mode for students,
faculty and staff on Tuesday, with college officials pledging to remain
vigilant. Mississippi Valley State University locked down after a
threat was received through its guardhouse.
Philander Smith College, in Arkansas, lifted its lockdown and
resumed classes and operations at noon Tuesday. Kentucky State
University issued an all-clear Tuesday and planned to resume normal
operations and classes Wednesday.
Morgan State University was also targeted. Leaders received the
threat around 4:50 a.m. and issued a shelter-in-place order. Classes
went virtual and employees were told to work from home.
``My main concern is my students' mental health. As college
students, we already have so much mentally to deal with,'' said Jamera
Forbes, a senior at Morgan State and student body president. ``We've
tried to push through and overcome so much with covid over the years,
and we're just trying to get back to a norm.''
At Howard, freshman Jalen McKinney, 18, said the threats are making
him worried, but some on campus seem less concerned.
``People are kind of brushing it off because it didn't happen,''
McKinney said. D.C. and university police performed a sweep after the
threat was made about 2:55 a.m. ``But at the same time, it could
happen.''
An expert in campus security was reassuring about the potential
danger.
``I've always subscribed to the theory that bombers bomb and
threateners threaten,'' said Robert Mueck, director of public safety at
St. John's College and a member of the International Association of
Campus Law Enforcement Administrators' Domestic Preparedness Committee.
Calling in a bomb threat is ``more of a nuisance crime,'' he said,
``like back in high school, kids pulling a fire alarm to get out of an
exam.''
Of course, he said, officials cannot ignore it--they must ensure
there is no explosive.
But Mueck cautioned against overreactions by college officials,
because the warnings, building closures and lockdowns are disruptive
and alarming.
These particular threats are troubling, though, he said, because
they appear to be targeting HBCUs, and might be motivated by bias. The
menace is there: ``It's almost like reaching out and saying, `We can
get you,' '' he said.
While law enforcement have not identified suspects or named their
motives, the recent threats evoked the long history of intimidation and
violence against Black schools, said Greg E. Carr, chair of Howard's
Afro-American studies department and associate professor of Africana
studies.
``There is this deep-seated racial insecurity that has historically
come from segments of White populations that feel that somehow the
self-improvement of Black folks will cost them something, either in
prestige or social position,'' Carr said. ``Whether any of these
threats would manifest into anything tangible or not, it's just the
idea that `Ya'll are a little too big for your britches.' ''
As officials continue to monitor the situation, students and
faculty are hoping to get back to business.
``Our response has been, historically, to simply redouble our
efforts,'' Carr said. ``The intimidation never works.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is a crisis and I want to join with
my colleagues for legislation dealing with our social media,
but as well, I am going to ask that the officials from Homeland
Security in collaboration with the FBI develop a deeper dive, a
much more intense area of focus on domestic terrorism. We have
to stop it. Lives are being lost. It is absolutely untenable
for this to continue. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking
Member as well for holding this hearing. Mr. Chairman, I am
going to abandon my planned line of questioning because I have
been quite startled by some of the testimony here today. Dr.
Cynthia Miller-Idriss. Am I pronouncing your last name
properly, ma'am, Idriss?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. It is Idriss, but it is fine either way.
Mr. Higgins. Idriss.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, ma'am. Well, the right way is the right
way. So, Dr. Idriss, respectfully, I listened to your
testimony. I felt that you painted quite a dystopian image of
America's future. It seems like you were promoting positions
that are quite contrary to the fundamental values that have
made America great. I say this respectfully. I am sincerely
curious as to your response. Do you believe that Americans
should live free of Government oppression?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Of course I believe. I mean, I believe
very much in the--thank you for the question, of course, Mr.
Higgins. I do believe that, you know, our fundamental rights
and protections, including freedom of speech and assembly. I
mean, what I am talking about is equipping people with skills
to make decisions that lead them to be less manipulated by bad
actors.
Mr. Higgins. OK. Let's engage a little bit about this.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Sure.
Mr. Higgins. Because to me you presented a future of
America with a great deal of big brother-type Government
surveillance. You used the term that I had to look up. You
called heteronormativity. Do you believe heteronormativity is a
threat?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. That term is----
Mr. Higgins. It is a legitimate question.
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. From a research report that
is talking about the beliefs of Salafi-Jihadists and
accelerationists, neo-Nazis and neo-fascists, so----
Mr. Higgins. Well, as it----
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. It is a----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. As it----
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. It is a research.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Relates--as it relates to
American Government interaction in the lives of the citizenry
that we serve that Americans we intend to live free. We intend
to communicate freely. We intend to communicate freely across
any platforms. We intend to travel the land freely.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Of course. Of course.
Mr. Higgins. Some of us believe in American exceptionalism
and America first policy. Do you believe, doctor, that American
exceptionalism as a core belief, do you think that is a threat?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. No, I----
Mr. Higgins. Do you find it threatening?
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. Think that when I was
talking about those components of the salad bar or the blurred
ideologies, what I am talking about are ideas that are
inspiring hateful and terrorist acts interact.
Mr. Higgins. Hateful as determined by----
Ms. Miller-Idriss. But not from the Government.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. By whom?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. By Salafi-Jihadists and neo-fascists.
That is what that research was referring to by extremists and
terrorists groups. This is not about--those terms were not
referring to any components of legitimate mainstream
governments or policies. Those are referring to----
Mr. Higgins. OK.
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. The ideologies----
Mr. Higgins. So, you----
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. Of extremists groups, not--
so, just to be clear, sorry, citing that prior research.
Mr. Higgins. Well, yes, but extremists groups, Americans
are being identified as members of extremists groups on this
committee that is being openly discussed here today. Americans
expressing free thought are being categorized as hateful
Americans. It is incredible to me that language describing
international terrorists who have identified themselves as
contrary to the best interests of American citizens and
America's future, have sworn to bring us down and to either
convert us or destroy us. It is incredible to me that Americans
expressing free thought across any platforms could be
associated or equivocated with foreign national terrorists----
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Well, I think what----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. That work to destroy----
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. We are talking about
though----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Our country.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Sure, please.
Mr. Higgins. You also mentioned, I just wanted to ask you
this before my time is----
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Sure.
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Up. You mentioned early
interventions. Should the Government intervene in the life of
children being raised by parents in households that have
particular principles, religious principles, including
Christian principles?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. I do not believe the Government should
be involved in any of the ideological----
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. Beliefs of Americans.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate you clarifying
some of your statement. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank
you very much. I yield.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island for 5 minutes,
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses today for their very sobering testimony on a very
troubling, troubling issue. Anti-Semitism is something to be
taken extremely seriously. Today's testimony has really
underscored the alarming degree to which individuals can be
radicalized by misinformation, disinformation, and
malinformation, and motivated to commit extremist acts. I am
concerned that this burgeoning digital extremism along with the
increasing availability of hacking tools and malware as a
service, business models could together increase the
motivations and lower the technical threshold required for acts
of cyber-enabled terrorism and sabotage against U.S.
infrastructure.
I am also concerned about the prospects of organized
terrorist groups specifically recruiting to increase their
capacity for malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. persons,
communities, institutions, and infrastructure. So, if I can
start with Mr. Rasmussen, what capabilities in your opinion
exist for the Government and multistakeholder community to
analyze and share information about cyber-specific terrorist
threats to the United States? I also wanted to ask, have
observers identified pervasive on-line narratives or
coordinated misinformation campaigns intended to encourage
cyber attacks against U.S. persons, institutions, or
infrastructure?
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you for the question, Mr. Langevin. I
mean, we have long known that--this goes back actually more to
my time in Government service more than my current role. But we
have long known that terrorist organizations, including some of
the ones we have talked about in this hearing today, have the
aspiration to carry out aggressive cyber operations against
Western countries to include the United States. They have often
not matched that aspiration with genuine capability. So, I
think that is something our intelligence community who watches
and monitors very carefully to see when that intention might
translate into a real capability.
From the technology company perspective, the companies that
I work with, we work very closely with them to try to
understand adversarial shifts. When particular terrorist
organizations are moving in a particular direction so that
companies can be aware and then be on the front foot to act
against that activity. We lean into the academic world to help
us do that. Because, again, so much of this conversation among
extremists and terrorists takes place in the open-source world.
Why don't I stop there.
Mr. Langevin. OK, good, thank you. I wanted to ask, what
about efforts among established or burgeoning extremist groups
to recruit cyber talent to commit malicious cyber acts? Have
you seen anything at that degree which is of concern to the
committee?
Mr. Rasmussen. Again, I draw more on my Government
experience, when I was in the Classified world where that was a
real phenomenon, Mr. Langevin. Obviously, as the cadre of
violent extremists and terrorists becomes younger, they are, of
course, more digitally literate and more digitally savvy. So,
that kind of pool of recruits or adherence to those extremist
ideologies who are available for that kind of work on behalf of
a terrorist organization, is a bigger pool than perhaps we saw
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, for example. So, I would
imagine that is a growing concern for my colleagues in
Government.
Mr. Langevin. Before my time expires, let me ask maybe we
can answer this for all of our witnesses. How can Congress
support on-going multistakeholder efforts to better understand
and analyze the spread of radicalizing mis- and disinformation
and extremist ideologies? Likewise, what opportunities are
there for Congress to support on-going proposed initiatives to
promote societal resilience against mis- and disinformation? We
can start with one of our other witnesses and go until the time
runs out.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. I can weigh in----
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, I----
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Oh, go ahead, I'm sorry.
Mr. Greenblatt. No, please.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. I can weigh in very quickly just to
say--thank you for the question, Mr. Langevin. I think that
when we are talking about a multistakeholder needs, what we see
in other countries is often on these issues we have 9 to 12
agencies involved. We really need at the very minimum, some
sort of commission that brings in not just security and
intelligence experts, but also educational, social work, health
and human services, youth experts, people who really understand
what makes for this kind of vulnerability and how people become
susceptible to and can be dissuaded from those types of beliefs
in addition to tech experts, et cetera. I don't think we can
solve this just with the very important lens of law enforcement
and security.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you. I see my time's
expired. So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Greenblatt, your
policy recommendations in your testimony go under the rubric
PROTECT, an acronym for a number of suggestions. Included among
them is to oppose extremists in Government service. Then there
is detail on this point on page 14 that says the ban should be
extended to individuals engaged in violent extremist activity.
I would be surprised if anybody would disagree with that. Some
might want to be careful to limit that though to those who have
engaged in serious violence and not inadvertently extend it to,
for example, Scott Smith, arrested at the Loudon County School
Board meeting after officials denied from the podium that his
ninth-grade daughter had been raped and sodomized in a bathroom
at school. But first, do you say that someone like that, like
that example I just gave, should be barred from Federal, State,
or local public service?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, Mr. Congressman, thank you for the
question. I might just say to start this off, how much I
appreciate Dr. Miller-Idriss for her leadership and her
research on all of these issues. So, thank you, Dr. Miller-
Idriss. So, Mr. Congressman, I don't know the specifics of this
gentleman at the school board, but I absolutely think--I
absolutely think if you are involved in a White supremacist
group, if you are involved in a group that threatens to
overthrow the U.S. Government, you should not----
Mr. Bishop. I just asked you about that one incident.
Mr. Greenblatt [continuing]. You shouldn't serve in law
enforcement.
Mr. Bishop. Mr. Greenblatt, what about that? The one I just
gave the example of? Someone who was arrested for resisting
because he had something like that happen from a dais at a
public meeting.
Mr. Greenblatt. I just know--I don't know anything about
this person, Mr. Congressman, and his background.
Mr. Bishop. I understand. So, you are too----
Mr. Greenblatt. If your information----
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Confident here to say that person
should not be barred from Federal, State, or local service?
Mr. Greenblatt. Yes, I really don't know enough to say. But
the situation----
Mr. Bishop. OK.
Mr. Greenblatt [continuing]. With his daughter sounds
horrible.
Mr. Bishop. Beyond that, you recommend that those
associated with violent extremist movements should be barred.
You applaud the DHS announcement that it will vet employees for
``extremist sympathies.''
Mr. Greenblatt. Yes.
Mr. Bishop. So, you recommend barring not only the violent
or even those who sympathize with the violent, but those who
sympathize with movements that are associated with violence. Is
that right?
Mr. Greenblatt. Sure, if you have Nazi tattoos, or if you
have KKK tattoos, I think that should be a disqualifier. Yes, I
do believe that.
Mr. Bishop. OK. How do you propose it be decided what it
means for a movement to be associated with violence? Or whether
a person sympathizes with the violent acts of a movement as
opposed to its nonviolent views?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, Mr. Congressman, I would ask you if
you had an intern who showed up with Nazi tattoos on his neck,
would you think that person was qualified to represent you and
your office in the United States Congress?
Mr. Bishop. OK. Let me ask you something that maybe we can
find to make it a little bit tougher than that obvious example.
Mr. Greenblatt. OK.
Mr. Bishop. You take extremism, on your website it says it
is a concept used to describe religious, social, or political
belief systems that exist substantially outside of belief
systems more broadly accepted in society, i.e., mainstream
beliefs. So, it is something out of the mainstream. It goes on
beyond that. Then it comes to this sentence, which is
interesting. Not every extremist movement is bad. The
abolitionist movement is one example of an extreme movement
that had admirable goals. But most extremists movements exist
outside of the mainstream because may of their views or tactics
are objectionable.
All right, and here is another example, Mr. Greenblatt.
Women's suffrage too was an extremist movement at one time,
correct?
Mr. Greenblatt. I don't know if I would characterize it
that way, but it is certainly out of the mainstream in the----
Mr. Bishop. OK. Out of the mainstream. There were
proponents of it who used violence. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Greenblatt. No, I am not aware of that.
Mr. Bishop. OK. So, I was reading a book on Winston
Churchill. They threw bricks at him. There was a bombing or
two. This was in Europe. I don't know all the details of it
here. So, how would you--would you then say that anybody who is
associated with women's suffrage would be then barred from--or
sympathize with it, would be barred from Government service?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, I certainly think if you believe it
is appropriate to bomb Government buildings or to assault prime
ministers, you shouldn't be in Government service, yes. I don't
think----
Mr. Bishop. But I am asking you for something a little more
refined than that.
Mr. Greenblatt. OK.
Mr. Bishop. Someone who sympathizes with the women's
suffrage movement and then some people who are advocates of
women's suffrage or activists for it engaged in some violence.
Does that mean the person who sympathizes with the movement
should be barred from Government service?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, I most certainly think if you are
unable to disassociate yourself with movements that espouse
violence or supremacy of any group, yes, you should be barred
from Government service. You can support women's----
Mr. Bishop. I am not asking you to----
Mr. Greenblatt [continuing]. Suffrage and not support
harming Government officials.
Mr. Bishop. Sure. I think what you are posing is easy. What
is hard is how do you say that or who judges and by what
standard whether they have adequately disassociated themselves
with the violent acts of some extremists associated with the
movement, but not the broader goals of the movement?
Mr. Greenblatt. It is a fair question. So, again, I am--
like if we talk about al-Qaeda, we talk about ISIS, we talk
about some of the horrific anti-Israel people out there who say
the Jewish State is committing genocide. You know, Mr.
Congressman, I don't think they belong as interns in your
office or any public office for that matter. That is just I
feel very strongly about that. That kind of extremism should
have no place.
Mr. Bishop. I join you, sir. I think the problem is that
the margins, you have raised a lot of very difficult questions,
and you pose the possibility of imposing very significantly on
fundamental Constitutional freedoms. Your recommendation does
not include much of a road map in terms of how to separate that
out. My time has expired. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you help me, OK?
Can you hear me?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, we can.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and our
Ranking Member. In 2017, White nationalists marched in the
United the Right rally and flooded our television screens with
images of neo-Nazism and Klan paraphernalia. The result, one
person killed and 35 injured. Following the attack in
Charlottesville, I was the first Member of Congress to call for
action, to demand action. Any American lost whether here or
overseas is a tragedy. It is a crime. We have to act as
Congress and as a Nation.
We continue to have these issues over and over again in our
country. Today, this is an important issue because as much as
we want things to get better, I just don't feel in my heart and
my gut that this country is coming together. I know that we
continue to have hate speech, hate ideology, and social media
continues to be the breeding ground for this kind of thought.
So, my question to all the panelists today, when it comes to
social media, Section 230, immunity, responsibility, liability,
what are your thoughts? Mr. Roggio.
Chairman Thompson. Unmute yourself. You need to unmute
yourself.
Mr. Roggio. My apologies. It is a very good question. You
know, the question, we all know what the easy answer to hate
speech is. But what is the difference, what happens when
political speech that you disagree with becomes defined as hate
speech? Who defines what is hate speech? This is where I have
very grave concerns. I realize this is a little bit out of the
area of my expertise here. But I certainly have a very strong
opinion on this. I know this from looking at what Jihadist
groups are doing. You know, it is a fine line to say, you know,
I mean, here is an idea that I disagree with and this is
actually hate speech. Who gets to be the gatekeeper to define
what is and isn't hate speech?
Mr. Correa. But at the same time, we do need to make some
value judgments. Mr. Greenblatt, thoughts?
Mr. Greenblatt. Thank you for asking me the question. So,
publishers make these decisions every day, Mr. Congressman.
From the New York Times to Newsweek to NBC to every which way
because they have liability concerns. I am going to credit
Congressman Malinowski who I believe is on this committee and
Congresswoman Eshoo. Their Protecting Americans from Dangerous
Algorithms Act removes immunity from liability when the
algorithms amplify recommended content, OK?
So, there is just no question that you can say there has
always a lunatic fringe, Mr. Congressman. We just need to keep
them on the fringe. I think the Eshoo-Malinowski Act would go a
long way to removing liability when algorithms bring it out of
the fringe. Just make the companies play by the same rules that
every other media company in America plays by and that will
take care of the issue before this would occur.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Greenblatt, let me focus right now on that
specific question.
Mr. Greenblatt. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Correa. Separation, definition, at what point does that
freedom of speech essentially translate into yelling fire in a
crowded theatre? What point do you cross that line? How do you
see that?
Mr. Greenblatt. The way I see it is the companies have to
make decisions about what voices they choose to privilege and
publish, just like, you know, you are in Anaheim, I think. The
Anaheim Bee has to decide what articles it puts or what essay
they put in op-ed page. The decisions on what letters they
publish. They make those decisions every day, Mr. Congressman,
with great effectiveness. If you can't get your letter
published in the Anaheim Bee, then you can go do it somewhere
else. So, the same rules should apply here.
Mr. Correa. Let me say that I concur with you because you
know hate speech when you see it, so to speak. When you read an
op-ed, when you read something, write something that is clearly
designed to incite hate, anger, violence, you know it's wrong.
I am hoping we, as a legislative body, are able to come up with
some rules and a strong message to social media saying this
cannot be tolerated, respecting the First Amendment, but this
kind of hateful division that speaks and divides our Nation
cannot be tolerated.
Mr. Greenblatt. Just make them liable, Mr. Congressman.
Just make them liable and it will change overnight.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I am out of
time. I yield.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van Drew, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking
Member Katko. Thank you to the witnesses for testifying today.
Dr. Miller-Idriss, in your report, you go into great detail
about how far-right terrorism and violent extremism are
escalating rapidly across the United States and how they pose a
severe threat to our country's democracy. I read through your
entire 13-page testimony and could not help but notice that not
once, not one single time, did you mention Antifa, Black Lives
Matters, or any other leftist extremist organization or
movement and their contributions to political violence and
political unrest.
Your own definition of terrorism included in your written
testimony is, ``the use of violence in order to intimidate or
coerce civilians or influence the policies of Government.'' You
did not discuss these organizations. Coordinated efforts, which
led to the Federal courthouse damage in Portland, Oregon during
the summer of 2020, during which 18 rioters were arrested. Or
the $50 million worth of damage that left rioters cost to the
city of Kenosha, Wisconsin in the year 2020.
You also did not address the fact that the cofounder of
Black Lives Matters who is a self-proclaimed Marxist has
publicly called for the destruction of the nuclear family and
the structure of the nuclear family and the National defunding
of police. And has used the organization to promote its
policies using violence on multiple occasions. Can you please
help me understand what part of these groups' actions have been
unworthy of your attention? Can you explain to me and this
committee whether you think any of these examples constitute or
contribute to violent extremism?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Thank you, Mr. Van Drew, for the
question. I do think that we have to be concerned about rising
far-right--sorry--rising violence from the far left as well as
from the far right. I believe the FBI's testimony earlier last
year indicated that there were 800 investigations into criminal
activity related to the summer of 2020 protests and that there
have been 250 arrests. I think that those figures are
important. I think the CSIS data has also shown trending upward
violence coming from the far left that we should be pay
attention to given the history in which in the 1970's, of
course, far-right terrorism was the predominant form of
terrorism. We know that because of evolving trends, these
things can change at any time.
I focus on the far right in my testimony or these terms or
one of the terminology issues, I think, that Mr. Bishop raised
is that we don't really have a good universal definition of
extremism even across our own agencies. But one of the reasons
why I focus on the far right here is because both under the
Trump administration and the Department of Homeland Security
and then the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
after the January 6 events, declared that unlawful militia
movements and White supremacist extremists pose the most lethal
and pressing threat to the Nation from within the domestic
violent extremism spectrum. So, to the extent----
Mr. Van Drew. I understand you had----
Ms. Miller-Idriss [continuing]. That as long as that data
is there, that is where we have to focus our efforts on the
domestic side, of course.
Mr. Van Drew. I thank you for that. I would just maintain
that in general, that we be fair and even-handed at how we look
at this because there are problems on both sides. I am not
saying there aren't problems, but those problems exist on both
sides. I think we should deal with that in a fair and even-
handed way.
Mr. Greenblatt, something that comes to mind with me
because whenever Government steps in and takes a people's
rights away, it is a very tender and sensitive issue. It is
really difficult. It is not easy. Because our rights are so
very important. No, I wouldn't hire somebody with Nazi symbols
going down their neck or anything of that nature and either
would you. I think either would anybody on this panel. But the
real quick question I have for you is how about somebody who
really believes in Black Lives Matters or even in what Antifa
did, but otherwise has a good record, what would you do with
them?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, look, I got to be honest, you are
entirely correct, Mr. Congressman. Violence is not the sole
domain of any one extremist movement. It is an issue across the
spectrum. The people who would burn down stores and the people
who would deface Government buildings, the people who would
commit these acts, they need to be identified, arrested, and
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. No, I wouldn't
hire any Antifa, you know, enthusiast as an intern or as an
employee at ADL, to be perfectly honest with you. I don't know
that any have ever applied. But I certainly would not want
anyone espousing violence in my organization, period, end of
story.
Mr. Van Drew. OK. Thank you. I am glad to see that it seems
that hopefully maybe we are on a close to a same page on that.
I just would like equal attention given to both. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Van Drew. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Michigan, Ms. Slotkin, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for our witnesses
joining us. You know, I have been listening to the conversation
and as someone who is a former CIA analyst and Pentagon
official, I spent my time, you know, focusing on foreign
terrorist organizations, particularly from the Middle East,
including al-Qaeda. It just seems like when we are talking
about foreign terrorist organizations and the use of violence
against American citizens abroad or threatening our homeland,
there is significant agreement on the need to prevent that and
on, frankly, on the extreme work that continues to go on,
largely below the headline level by our intelligence community,
by our military, by a whole bunch of folks who have never taken
their eye off the ball. I am conscious that we haven't had
another major attack after 9/11, which still is kind-of amazing
to me.
But the minute we start talking about threats to American
citizens inside our own borders, it becomes deeply political. I
think the thing that, I guess, affects me as a CIA officer is
that we have to go by the data. While folks like Mr. Van Drew
are talking about an even-handed approach, I have no problem if
a group on the left is using violence, go after them. But the
data reflects, the data from like the director of the FBI, not
some group that is political, that the vast majority of those
cases of domestic terrorism are coming from the far right. They
are mixing, many of them, not all, many of them are mixing
their ideology with anti-Semitism and White supremacy.
So, I guess, I am concerned that it feels like such a hard
thing to talk about threats to American citizens because they
are Americans perpetrating the attacks. It is still a threat to
safety. According to the head of the FBI, it is a bigger threat
than foreign domestic terrorism right now. So, I just felt like
I needed to say that.
That said, the similarities between extremists and this
ladder of escalation that they climb from being kind-of regular
old Joe to feeling like they need to commit violence against
another group or another person is strikingly similar between
foreign terrorists and domestic terrorists, that ladder of
escalation. Social media like you said, I think, Jonathan, is
rocket fuel on that climb up that ladder.
My question is this, as someone who comes from a State with
a lot of militia problems, extremism problems, many who were
arrested participating in January 6. Has anyone seen anything
that works that deprograms people and takes someone who
threatens violence against another person or another group and
gets them from that to back to healthy American citizen in a
multiethnic place? I never saw it successfully done on the
foreign terrorism side. So, starting maybe with Mr. Rasmussen
and then going to Cynthia and Jonathan, please tell me is there
a model that works? Because this is like affecting our
communities at the grassroots level.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thanks, Congresswoman Slotkin, thank you. It
is great to see you and I am happy to try to contribute to this
conversation. When dealing with social media companies or
technology platforms, we always tend to focus on what they
should be stopping or taking down or preventing on their
platforms. Of course, that makes sense for all the reasons we
have been talking about. But some of the work we are doing at
GIFCT brings those same companies together to talk about how to
better structure positive interventions on-line to try to
intervene in that cycle, that radicalization process that you
just described. That needs to be to your point, a data-driven
effort because you can wing it and not necessarily know that
you are achieving results. So, one of the things we are trying
to do is bring companies together, bring the academic community
into that conversation, and begin with a research-driven agenda
that tells us, OK, what works? How can you redirect someone?
What kind of platform intervention? Is it an ad placed off the
side that says, if you need help call this number. Or if you
feel disenfranchised or at odds with the society you live in,
you know, reach out for help in this way. The prevention
architecture might be what we need to think about here.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes, and I am going--I know I went long, so, I
am going to ask that Mr. Greenblatt and Ms. Miller address,
just send me, if you have good data to send me because I am,
frankly, very interested in that. I just would say on the
social media companies, is it true that the more extreme the
article on the right or the left, the more clicks it gets?
Therefore, these companies do not want to take this content
down because it gets them more clicks and more engagement.
Mr. Greenblatt. It is----
Ms. Slotkin. Is that----
Mr. Greenblatt. I will volunteer. It is true. If it bleeds,
it leads, we learn from social media, right? So, the clicks are
driven, Congresswoman Slotkin, by the most sensationalist,
scary, terrifying content. It travels far and wide. Change the
business model, you would change the behavior. Make them liable
for what they promote, you would change the behavior.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. I know my time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has
expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi
for 5 minutes, Mr. Guest. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady
from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Unmute yourself.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I did. It just didn't unmute or clicked
too much and it remuted. But thank you very much, Chair
Thompson. Mr. Roggio, during the Biden administration's
incompetent disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, as a 24-
year military member, I don't know what else to call that, they
described the Taliban as a partner in its retreat. It came to
light that U.S. officials gave the Taliban a list of names of
American citizens, green card holders, and Afghan allies to
grant entry into the militant-controlled outer perimeter of
Kabul's airport, naively putting our allies and friends at the
mercy of a terrorist organization if they did not get into the
perimeter and get evacuated. What impact did this have on
Afghans who were left behind?
Mr. Roggio. Yes, this was a horrific decision amongst the
many horrific decisions. Yes, as a former military person and
every person in the military I have spoken to who was not
involved with the withdrawal, it was, indeed, has been
characterized a debacle. We can see it as the Taliban
immediately took control of the country and was taking control
of the country as we were drawing down. It was a direct
causation. We leave, the Taliban take control.
The decision to hand over names was horrific. I was
involved with helping American citizens get out of Afghanistan,
as well as Afghans who had helped us in-country. So, people who
were vetted who had the special immigration visa and things of
that nature, as it was happening. As a matter of fact, the day
after the withdrawal, I was helping an American family of 5
with 3 small children. They tried to get to the airport 4
times. It was on the fourth try that they were able to get out.
Think about dragging your 3 small children through the chaotic
streets of Kabul with the Taliban prowling the streets and
having to turn back from your own embassy.
But the people who were there, the people who had been
left, those names, the names of their family members, are out
there. The Taliban is currently hunting members of the military
and members of the government who supported the coalition, who
supported us. They are hunting our allies.
The United Nations recently issued a report saying about
100 former Afghan soldiers and officials have been killed. That
number is--that is the number they can confirm. I hear stories,
and hear, you know, from very credible sources that these
numbers is very likely in the thousands. So, when we gave the
names of Afghans who were working with us who we wanted to slip
past to the Taliban, the Taliban gets a registry. If they
didn't already know that there were individuals who were being
hunted, they have that information. These people are living in
fear 4+ months after the U.S. withdrawal. They will live in
fear of the Taliban coming and taking them away until either it
happens or they are able to leave the country.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Yes, and I think that underscores the
point you made about trying to conduct Over the Horizon
counterterrorism, what this does to our ability to do
intelligence gathering, or to do counterterrorist measures with
no eyes on Iran, Russia, or the Chinese Communist Party, and
then betraying our allies as well as our military and American
citizens and their families in Afghanistan by this botched
withdrawal and whether or not they can trust the United States
again and their word to be able to remove all of its citizens
and help our partners.
Myself and many other military members in a bipartisan way
had been pushing the administration since earlier in the year
in April to, you know, process SIVs, to begin that process of
trying to get Americans, their spouses, and family members and
our Afghan interpreter allies out of Afghanistan. So, I think
it very much underscores how we have hampered ourself going
forward in order to conduct counterterrorism, especially in the
Middle East. Mr. Rasmussen----
Mr. Roggio. If I may,--oh, I'm sorry.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. If I have time, Chair. Mr. Rasmussen, we
have seen unprecedented increases in migrant travel patterns at
the United States Southwest Border including migrants from all
over the world and known or suspected terrorists at a level we
have never seen before, quoting former border patrol chief. CBP
has encountered over 2 million migrants at the border in fiscal
year 2021, which is another record-breaking number for the
Biden administration. Courageous members of our Border Patrol
are stretched thin and criminals are taking advantage of the
situation to partake in human trafficking and drug smuggling
and we know and has been documented that also terrorist
organizations and transnational organizations are taking
advantage of the lax border efforts. Has GIFCT noticed any
correlation to digital activities by transnational criminal
organizations? When we make trips to the border, we have been
notified that criminal organizations are using TikTok and other
social media in order to recruit.
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you for the question. I am not sure I
can point to any clear trends that we have seen in the use of
on-line engagement by individuals or groups trying to cross the
Southern Border for nefarious purposes. But it is something we
can take up with our academic network, which tracks this very
closely, or tracks world-wide activity very closely. Again,
often the effort is to try to figure out platforms they are
operating on because, again, they know they are risk of
scrutiny from U.S. law enforcement when they operate on
mainstream platforms.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Am I audible?
Chairman Thompson. You are.
Mr. Green. Thank you very much. Mr. Greenblatt, I thought
of you this morning. I was reading an article on how the
Holocaust moved from concentration camps to Jewish victims. I
credit it was some time ago, but still relevant. But today, I
want to visit with you about this phenomenon known as the salad
bar. This salad bar concept has persons who have different
ideologies that would ordinarily be antithetical to each other,
they can find a way to put aside their differences and ideology
and work together for a common cause, a common evil cause, I
might add. This was expressed by the supremacists in the
adherence to some of these ideologies related to persons who
are about the country as they talked about what happened to
Jewish people. I am concerned about it and would like to get
your opinion as to how concerned are you with reference to this
and what is the impact of this? If you would, please.
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, look, I think when FBI Director Wray
talked about the salad bar concept in his testimony, he was
describing this very real phenomenon, Mr. Congressman, where in
the past people were, you know, curated in a specific movement
over a long period of time. But now, thanks to social media,
thanks to these different services, they can go and grab like
walking through a grocery store and take all these crazy ideas.
But there are some ideas, Mr. Congressman, that seem to be
permanent in these views.
No. 1, there is an anti-Semitism at the beating heart of
White supremacy, QAnon, accelerationism. All these other kind
of movements, believe that there is a cabal of Jews running the
world or they have overtaken the Government. No. 2, that
African Americans, Black Americans, are inferior to the White
race and a driver of White genocide. This is a widely-held view
amongst people on the far right. So, it may be that al-Qaeda
and the White supremacists share this hateful view of Jews, but
the racism of the White supremacists, Mr. Congressman, is
something that is diabolical and deeply frightening. These
ideas just boomerang off of one another. The third idea is that
migrants, immigrants from abroad, are coming here to somehow
change the country. Mexicans, Muslims, people from Asia, it
goes on and on.
So, these different ideas create a very toxic and explosive
mix that we have seen lead to the murder of people. You know,
again, I think about Texas. I think about El Paso. I think
about what almost happened in Colleyville. I think about what
you have had to endure in your community. You know what I am
talking about.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir, I do. It would seem to me that given
this phenomenon, that we have to make sure that we are
together. That we don't allow lines of division to exist among
people who have common enemies.
Mr. Greenblatt. Yes.
Mr. Green. I think that we can't silo. I can't decide that
I am just going to fight racism because that is what impacts
me. At some point, there has to be this reality, this
realization that the common enemy has to be addressed by people
who are being impacted with a common message. We all have to
have a similar message to deal with this enemy that we
confront.
Mr. Greenblatt. Absolutely, racism is not your problem as a
Black man. It is my problem too as a White man. Like anti-
Semitism isn't just my problem as a Jew. It is your problem too
as a non-Jew. So, you are right, we are all in this together.
Mr. Green. Well, I do thank you. If you get a chance, check
the article out, How the Holocaust Moved from Concentration
Camps to Jewish Victims' Homes.
Mr. Greenblatt. I will.
Mr. Green. Very powerful in the Washington Post. Thank you
very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi for 5 minutes, Mr.
Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Roggio, I want to
visit with you just a few moments on something that I heard you
mention in your opening statement. Something that was also
addressed a few moments ago by Dr. Meeks, which is the
withdrawal from Afghanistan. In your opening statement, I
believe you said that it was a major propaganda victory. I know
in the written testimony that you prepared you refer to it as
being disastrous. You go on to say that the U.S. withdrawal
from Afghanistan led to the immediate collapse of the Afghan
government and military and the swift return of power to the
Taliban. You then go on to say later that the Taliban alliance
with al-Qaeda has not been broken but, in fact, has been
strengthened as it forged in 20 years of war against the United
States and its allies. Afghanistan is again a safe haven for
al-Qaeda.
Then the following paragraph you talk about America's
abandonment of Afghanistan has created what you refer to as
second- and third-order effects on our allies, our adversaries,
and our enemies. You say America's adversaries and enemies now
sense weakness and they are seeking to divide to drive wedges
between America and her allies. The desire to end the so-called
endless war in Afghanistan has called into question America's
commitments to its allies and its leadership on the global
stage.
So, what I would like to ask you and give you a few minutes
to expand upon is first, the short- and the long-term impacts
that the Afghanistan withdrawal will have on threats to our
homeland. Then more in a broader stage, the impact that this
will have on America's leadership on the international stage.
Mr. Roggio. Sure. I am going to take the second question
first, the impact on the international stage. American allies
were deeply shaken by the U.S. withdrawal. We have, you know,
look, there has been news report after news report about how
our allies were upset and felt left in the dark by the United
States. It was a unilateral decision to withdraw. The reality
is that President Biden made the decision to leave Afghanistan
and NATO allies and other allies and partners who were in
Afghanistan they were not able to maintain a presence without
the United States. So, the United States made the decision and
they had no choice but to follow through. NATO and other
countries could not stay in Afghanistan without a U.S. presence
because we provided the bulk of the forces, the security, the
maintaining of the large air bases, things of that nature.
So, yes, this is an issue and we are seeing it develop in
the Ukraine issue. We are having allies speak to Russia sidebar
without the United States. In negotiations with Iran, the
European countries are talking to Iran directly and the United
States is sidelined. This is all a direct result of countries
being concerned about U.S. leadership.
As far as our adversaries and enemies go, immediately after
the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this was reported in the press
as well, they were--Russia and China were issuing whisper
campaigns to countries like North Korea and the Ukraine and
other allies and partners of the United States. Can you count
on the United States to be there for you? Look what they did to
their so-called partner in Afghanistan. This could be you next.
So, this is the second- and third-order effects that I was
referring to in my written testimony.
As far as the short- and medium- and long-term impact of
the Afghanistan being under control of the Taliban, again, the
key issue to me here is safe haven. Al-Qaeda was able to carry
out and execute 9/11 because of its safe haven in Afghanistan.
It was plotted, financed, and recruits were gathered. Many of
the recruits from 9/11, they were people who fought on
battlefields in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban who attended
al-Qaeda training camps. The 9/11 Commission Report is very
clear that safe haven is a key function. So, the greater the
safe haven that Jihadist groups have, the greater their ability
to plot and execute attacks against the U.S. homeland.
Afghanistan isn't just partially controlled by the Taliban
as it was pre-9/11. Remember you had the Northern Alliance
contesting about or controlling about 10 to 15 percent of the
country and in battle with the Taliban. So, the Taliban and al-
Qaeda had to devote resources to fighting the Northern
Alliance. That doesn't exist anymore. Now, al-Qaeda can devote
its resources to launch what is called external operations.
These operations may not just be directed at the U.S. homeland.
These can be directed at U.S. military bases overseas, U.S.
businesses overseas, or just civilians overseas. But
ultimately, al-Qaeda wants to establish a caliphate.
Afghanistan is the first of many emirates or States within its
caliphate. It is a massive blow to the United States in short-
term. You know, I think what we are seeing is al-Qaeda is
organizing and sort-of reaping the benefits. It is sort-of the
mid- and long-term that I really am concerned about the
Taliban's control of Afghanistan and al-Qaeda's role in that.
Mr. Guest. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Chairman. I actually agree with
Mr. Roggio that Afghanistan was an absolute disaster. If this
committee has time, we should have hearings on why Donald
Trump, the twice-impeached former President, released 5,000
Taliban troops and set such a public withdrawal date. So, he
and I are aligned there, Chairman.
But today we are here to talk about the evolving realities
of terrorist threats to the United States. I wanted to draw the
committee's attention and some of the witnesses to an article
that I published last year in the Harvard Journal on
Legislation, titled, ``Homeland Security 20 Years after
September 11 Addressing Evolving Threats.'' I laid out and
proposed that domestic terrorism has become a more complex,
more diverse, and more disbursed threat. I would ask Dr.
Cynthia Miller-Idriss, if you agree with the premise that
domestic terrorism is now the largest threat to the homeland?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Yes, I believe the data on that is very
clear, thank you.
Mr. Swalwell. I would also like your expertise in tracking
global terrorism on the internet and its overall effect on the
United States. Do you agree that we must adapt our National
security focus to address anti-Government extremism and White
supremacy violent groups?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Yes, I think that it is imperative that
we do so.
Mr. Swalwell. Mr. Rasmussen.
Mr. Rasmussen. Any ideologically-driven movement that would
result in violence or terrorist activity directed at innocent
populations is, of course, worthy of that level of scrutiny and
policy attention.
Mr. Swalwell. Dr. Miller-Idriss, given what is happening in
Ukraine and as Russia is amassing both cyber efforts and ground
troops for a potential invasion there, what can you share about
how this geopolitical conflict is being characterized by far-
right violent extremist groups?
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Thank you for the question. I think like
any other geopolitical conflict, we see that there are
potential ripple effects for terrorist actors and extremist
actors. In this case, on the White supremacist extremist side,
we have already been seeing quite a bit of chatter on-line
including dedicated chat rooms talking, spewing really, anti-
Semitic conspiracy theories about the conflict and about
Ukraine's leadership being Jewish. I think we can see the ways
in which it is fueling both recruitment efforts, invitations to
come train for White supremacists foreign fighters, and the
potential for further instability, in fact, in other parts of
the region.
So, it is very early. We don't know how that will all pan
out. I don't want to sound overly alarmist. But I think that it
is something that should be watched closely.
Mr. Swalwell. Mr. Greenblatt, is there value in America's
leaders in condemning violent rhetoric among different groups
in America that try and associate with one political party or
another?
Mr. Greenblatt. There is no question, Mr. Congressman, that
we need elected officials, policy makers, and public figures of
all sorts to call out extremism whenever it happens. In
particular, I will just say we need, you know, conservative
voices to call it out when it comes from the right. We need
progressive voices to call it out when it comes from the left.
We need Jewish voices to call it out when you hear Jewish
extremism. Muslim voices when we hear Islamist extremism. All
of us have a responsibility to do this.
Mr. Swalwell. I agree. It was suggested earlier that, you
know, there is not a condemnation of Antifa. Let make it clear
that I absolutely denounce Antifa. I denounce any violence used
in the name of any political movement that associates with
democratic politics. I would hope that my Republican colleagues
could denounce the Proud Boys and could denounce the Oath
Keepers and could denounce the whatever percenters group that
is out there. Also, could denounce this crazy idea that the
former President would give pardons to people who were at the
Capitol on January 6 carrying a confederate flag or were part
of group or mob that killed a police officer.
So, I do agree with you, Mr. Greenblatt, that it takes both
sides. I will make sure that you and others hold me accountable
when there are groups on the left who engage in violence or
violent rhetoric and make sure that we loudly condemn it. I
would just invite my colleagues across the aisle to do the same
because I think we will be safer as a country when that
happens. I will give you the last word.
Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Congressman, I will just give you a
data point. You know, at ADL we track extremist-related
murders. In the past decade we found one Antifa adherent was
involved in murder. That happened in 2020. Whereas right-wing
extremists have been involved in 75 percent of the 429, you
know, domestic extremist-related murders in the United States.
OK. Domestic Islamists extremists, 20 percent. So, just to put
it in perspective, like Antifa, sure is it a problem in theory,
but in practice the White nationalists, the armed militia
enthusiasts, the QAnon adherence, the accelerationists, et
cetera, these literally are a threat to the homeland in a way
that dwarfs anything else.
Mr. Swalwell. Well said. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, Mrs. Harshbarger, for
5 minutes.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses for being here today. I want to start with Mr.
Roggio. Throughout this Afghanistan evacuation and relocation
efforts, there has been major concerns that terrorists would
exploit this chaotic environment. Of course, they did. On
August 26, an ISIS-K affiliated suicide bomber, who was
released from a high security prison, killed 13 of our
servicemen and -women. I have a question. I do want to preface
that by telling you that the question is this: Do you have a
sense of where those individuals disbursed to? How many have
resumed their participation in terrorist plots around the
world? That question comes to you because in a recent hearing,
I asked Secretary Mayorkas whether or not he believed these
prisoners posed a threat at the Southern Border by illegally
crossing. He absolutely said, no, Congresswoman, I do not. So,
what are your thoughts of where these men have ended up?
Mr. Roggio. So, the answer to your question is we really
don't know where they have ended up. Again, our visibility in
Afghanistan has dropped to near zero. We have very little
information about where the prisoners who have escaped those
prisons have left.
I have seen things like Osama bin Laden's former security
chief who was not detained. He was hiding in Pakistan, return
to his home in a parade that was held by the Taliban. Now,
Osama bin Laden's security chief who defended him at the Battle
of Tora Bora. That is a very significant individual who is out
there now. Is he back involved in al-Qaeda's global operations?
We don't know the answer to that.
That is what is most frightening to me is that we don't
know what is happening in Afghanistan today. But we do know
that historically al-Qaeda has committed to--it said that it--
it is a very patient organization. I go back to Congressman
Katko in his opening statement, he talked about Ramzi bin al-
Shibh and after the attack, the first attack on the World Trade
Center, he was helicoptered past the World Trade Center. An FBI
agent, the story goes, the FBI agent said to him, look, those
towers are still standing. He said, yes, but we will try again.
They will be coming down. That happened what 7, 8 years later.
Al-Qaeda members don't retire. The Islamic State they fight and
rage Jihad until they are either killed or they are infirmed.
This is it. We know they are not going to stop plotting against
us.
What I believe has happened now is in the short term, they
are operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban is
consolidating its gains. Al-Qaeda is helping the Taliban with
that. Al-Qaeda is patient. It doesn't need to attack us today,
tomorrow, or next week, or even next year to be that threat.
That is what we--that was the lesson of 9/11. They tried to
take down the World Trade Center 8 years before it actually
happened. This is a patient organization. Our lack of
visibility into the situation inside of Afghanistan is a direct
threat to the U.S. homeland.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Well, you know, I am looking at this
briefing. It says, just a few weeks ago CNN reported that 5
detainees who had been held at Guantanamo for more than a
decade have been cleared for release. With these, 18 out of the
currently 39 detainees have been cleared for transfer and are
eligible for release pending diplomatic arrangements. The
diplomatic process is under way to work a transfer or
repatriate them as appropriate, said John Kirby, the DOD
spokesman. So, where is the accountability? How do we track
those individuals that will now be sent or repatriated? What
should we be looking for?
Mr. Roggio. There never have been accountability on this
issue. At one point in time, the Department of Defense put the
recidivism rate of Guantanamo detainee release back into the
wild at somewhere around 30 to 40 percent. Again, that is an
optimistic assessment that you are going to get from the
Department of Defense. The number is very much likely, is much
likely very higher. Former Gitmo detainees who were released,
members of the Taliban, immediately joined the group. They
became part of the negotiating team. Historically, the
recidivism rate among Guantanamo Bay detainees is quite high.
So, unless they are arrested into the countries that they are
released to, which very often does not happen, they will return
to wage Jihad at some point or another.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Roggio. Again, this is a part of the lack of visibility
on this. Many of these detainees are released and we don't know
what is happening. I have personal experience with one
Guantanamo detainee when I was embedded with the U.S. military
as a reporter in Iraq. A Guantanamo detainee who we released to
Kuwait became a suicide bomber at a base that I was at just 2
days prior. I was on scene there. It was one of the largest
suicide attacks in Iraq in its history. It left a massive
crater. It looked like the Kansas City bombings. That is what
happens to these Gitmo detainees in one way or another, they
wind up rejoining the fight.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, they never retire. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson
Coleman, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Hi. Can you hear me, Chairman? Thank
you. First of all, I want to thank you for this hearing. It has
been very illuminating. I want to thank all of the witnesses.
Mr. Roggio, I do want to agree with you about how we mishandled
the Afghanistan move. But I want us to get beyond that in this
discussion today because I think primarily we are concerned
about this convergence of extremism that seems to target
people, the same kind of people, the same anti-authority
issues, even if they don't share the same ideology. It is very
concerning to someone like me, a Black woman in America. I see
it from the school boards now. Whoever thought you would see
that kind of just abuse and potential violence at school boards
all the way up to the Capitol and beyond.
I am very concerned that since the January 5 to today,
which is the second day of celebrating Black History Month,
that there have been bomb threats at 15 HBCUs. I have no HBCU
in my district or in the State of New Jersey, but I have a lot
of students that go there because the majority of our Black
students that get educated from doctors, lawyers, to undergrads
go to the HBCUs.
Clearly, I am disappointed that I am not seeing enough
coverage of it. That it doesn't seem to take on the kind of
media interest that other situations have. That is very
disappointing. But Dr. Miller, I am certain that you all find
this very alarming. Mr. Rasmussen, I am sure that you all find
this very alarming and that you are paying attention to what is
happening on the various platforms of sharing information.
So, I would like to know to what extent we know anything
about sort-of any coordination, any similarities in who is
involved, and are we significantly recognizing this as the
terrorist threat it is the way we recognize, rightfully so,
anti-Semitic terrorist threats, terrorist threats against
Asians, terrorist threats against Muslims, terrorists threats
against African Americans. It is particularly disturbing and
disgusting that it is happening at the same month that we stand
apart and take note of all the contributions of African
Americans in making this country the great country it is. So, I
would love for you to respond, Dr. Miller and you, Mr.
Rasmussen.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Thank you for the question,
Congresswoman. It is especially abhorrent to see these bomb
threats coming in during Black History Month. I would say that
although right now we don't know and our definition of
terrorism in the country relies on intent. We don't know the
intent because of the accountability issue. Investigations are
still on-going.
But we know the impact is to terrorize people. We know that
the impact is to terrorize students and communities across the
country much like the Jewish community is terrorized every time
that there is an attack. Any Asian-American or any minority
community is terrorized by on-going attacks. So, I think we
have to focus not just on these accountability and
investigations and that part of it but look at how are we--what
are we doing to invest to prevent more of this rising what
appears to be coordinated. At least those phone calls came in
within minutes of each other either from the same person or
from some sort of coordinated attack. As we find out more about
the investigations, we will know more about the motive. But I
think it is really important to understand the impact and how
horrifying that is and how disruptive that is to the equitable
learning experiences of any young person at a Black college or
university.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Mr. Rasmussen, I know that
you all monitor sort-of internet platforms and internet
companies and what is happening there. What are you seeing as
it relates to these threats against the HBCUs and the threats
against just sort-of the Black communities wherever you find
them in general? Are you all tracking anything as it relates to
them?
Mr. Rasmussen. So, I will speak both generally and
specifically, ma'am, because I think broadly speaking, this
unfortunate set of threats this week to the HBCUs fits a
pattern we have long seen, and that is just a steady expansion
of the amount of racially and ethnically-motivated violent
extremist language and engagement in the on-line world. That is
why we are here in many ways today.
With respect to this specific case, Dr. Miller-Idriss
pointed out exactly what I would have, which is we are early
days in the investigation. I will be very curious to see what
law enforcement turns up by way of connections between the
individuals making these calls. Was there prior on-line
engagement? Were they gathering in communities of, you know,
fellow travelers sharing these ideological leanings, you know,
on the internet? We will learn more in the weeks ahead. But
unfortunately, I think it fits a pattern we have seen for quite
a while now growing in both size and scale.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, thank you. Mr. Greenblatt, I know
you----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Oh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. For those on the call, in a
briefing with the FBI yesterday, they indicated that these
threats that are being made to historically Black colleges has
risen to the top of their list in terms of priority. They will
give it whatever resource needed to come to some definition and
ultimate capture of the individual or individuals who have
started that. So, we look forward to hearing from them.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, because my
concern was going to be questioning about do we need additional
resources and what they might be. I thank you and I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes he gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My gentleman colleague
from California just a couple of Members ago seems to think
that Donald Trump was President last summer during the
disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. You know, personally, I
would have preferred if Donald Trump were the President last
summer. If he had been, if that had been the case, we would not
have had the disastrous withdrawal that we saw. But it was Joe
Biden who was the President. Joe Biden who is completely and
totally responsible for the crisis on the world stage known as
the Afghanistan disaster. President Biden showed weakness then
and he continues to show weakness and we all know that weakness
promotes aggression. Unlike Ronald Reagan's policy of peace
through strength, Joe Biden's weakness on the world stage has
promoted the current Ukraine crisis and the real possibility
that we may very soon see another war in Europe. Crisis after
crisis is the legacy of our current President Joe Biden.
Mr. Roggio, you know, the world watched in horror as the
Taliban's ragtag bunch of undisciplined fighters forced the
American military into a self-made and self-chosen corner at
Kabul airport last summer. Considering the optic of that
disastrous withdrawal, what impact do you believe it had on
foreign terrorist organizations?
Mr. Roggio. Thank you, sir. The foreign terrorist
organizations were buoyed by what happened after the Taliban
took control of the country. The United States was boxed into a
corner in Kabul. The images of that withdrawal, the videos of
this withdrawal were distributed widely by Jihadist--by
individuals. Jihadist sympathizers, members of the Taliban,
suspected Jihadists on social media platforms. I saw these
myself. They were crowing over the fact that the United States
which, you know, that they had beaten a superpower. We can't
deny this. What happened in Afghanistan was a defeat for the
United States. We wasted 20 years of blood and treasure,
whatever number you want to put to that, whether it is a
trillion, 2 trillion. I have seen all kinds of crazy estimates.
But the reality is we spent 20 years trying to stand up an
Afghan government and we failed. We failed because we left
precipitously.
We never gave the Afghan government an opportunity to
defend itself. The decision was we are leaving and we are
leaving in a short amount of time. It took 2 months to execute,
or 2\1/2\ months from the day that President Biden announced
the withdrawal. We left a small force behind. So, after the
United States left by July 4, within a month and a half, the
Taliban were in control of Afghanistan. We are forced to leave.
The propaganda boon for al-Qaeda, for the Taliban, and
other Jihadist groups that has come out of Afghanistan, Afghans
falling out, clinging to the wheels of planes, and falling from
the sky. The airport being overrun. U.S. soldiers holding
weapons pointing at Afghans. This is recorded material that
they are going to use both, you know, internationally to wage
their local Jihads, as well as to sponsor attacks against the
U.S. homeland.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I think we will see this time and
time again over your lifetime and my lifetime both. Thank you
for confirming that, indeed, it was President Biden who
announced the withdrawal from Afghanistan. It was not President
Trump who was President at the time. He did not have the
executive authority. He was not the commander in chief. It was
President Joe Biden who was the commander in chief who gave the
military the order and as a military officer myself, I fully
understand how the military operates. It was Joe Biden's order.
It was his directive that the military fulfill. Therefore, the
responsibility falls 100 percent at the feet of President Joe
Biden. It was a disaster then. It is a disaster now. It will
continue to be a disaster for years and years and years to come
because of how it will be exploited by terrorist organizations
and they will buoy their ranks with it and it will be a
detriment to the United States. With that, thank you, and I
yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. Members are
reminded to refrain from engaging in personalities toward the
President. We do have decorum and I encourage you to do so. The
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5
minutes. The gentlelady from Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Excuse me. I thought I had clicked it. Before I
ask my question about something related to my district in Las
Vegas, I would just point out that the deadline date for
withdrawing was set by President Trump. That Pompeo met with
the Taliban and when all of this was negotiated, it was
negotiated with the Taliban by the Trump administration and the
Afghan government was not even at the table. So, let's be sure
we get all our facts out there if we are going to talk what
happened with the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Now, my question that is related to Las Vegas has to do
with the fact that just about any time we see a terrorist
attack, there is some connection to my district. That was true
in Oklahoma City, some of the terrorists had been through
Nevada. Same was true in 9/11. Now, the latest was the mass
shooting on October 1, 2017, at a music concert when the
largest number of people were killed in that one incident.
Now, following that we had a large volume of hoaxes,
conspiracy theories, and misinformation that popped up all over
the internet about the identity of the gunman, what was his
religious affiliation. Some people even called this horrific
event a false flag. We have seen the same thing happen in
countless other tragedies of gun violence. So, I will ask all
the panelists, how do you separate gun violence from terrorism?
How do you respond to all the misinformation that comes out
that is used to radicalize people and recruit people in the
wake of some of these gun violent attacks?
Mr. Rasmussen. Maybe I will jump in there first, ma'am. I
think the distinguishing feature that we would look for in
defining something as terrorism versus gun violence or criminal
gun violence is the ideological motivation or the set of ideas,
beliefs, or views that is driving the person to take action. As
you know better than anybody from the case in Las Vegas, that
was the huge conundrum there for Federal law enforcement was
never able to put their hands around a specific set of reasons
why that horrific act took place.
So, when thinking about it, you can't really, in our world,
call that a terrorist attack in the same way that you might
when you are talking about someone who is motivated by
particularly hateful ideology. But I am sure Dr. Miller-Idriss
has a lot to say on the definitional piece of this as well.
This is her life's work in many ways.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Thank you for the question.
Ms. Titus. Even if it is not a terrorist attack though it
often motivates people the way a terrorist attack would.
Mr. Rasmussen. It can still inspire terror, no question.
Ms. Titus. Right.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. That is particularly true for
accelerationists who sometimes have taken advantage of those
types of mass shooting attacks to try to prompt additional
violence because violence is part of their ultimate goal and
not just a means to an end. I would just say that, you know, I
think one of the reasons why DHS and others have sometimes used
the words terrorism and targeted violence is because exactly of
this slippery problem. But also, because our definitions evolve
over time too.
So, we have come to recognize violent incel, involuntary
celibate terror, as a form of domestic extremism and terrorist
violence in some cases. But for many years, those attacks like
on a sorority in California and a yoga studio in Florida and
elsewhere, we have seen those as personality problems of the
individual actors until there was a recognition that a male
supremacist misogyny was at root of a targeted hateful violent
act against a group of people.
So, this is also part of the problem is that these things,
it is not just the salad bar and the blurring of the
ideologies, but sometimes our own understanding has to catch up
with the efforts as they happen on the part of violent actors.
Ms. Titus. I see.
Mr. Greenblatt. Congresswoman, I will just jump in and say
that firearms are far and away the weapon of choice for violent
extremists in this country. Regardless of your personal views
on firearm ownership or the Second Amendment, there is simply
no doubt based on the data that there are some common-sense
measures that could be taken to make it much harder for those
who seek to harm our communities with hateful extremist
backgrounds to have easy access to lethal weapons. I mean,
first and foremost we need to close the loophole that allows
guns to be sold without a criminal background check. That
doesn't make sense to me. The perpetrator in Colleyville never
should have been able to buy a gun as a foreign visitor to this
country. He was easily able to purchase the handgun used in the
attack 2 days prior on a street corner with no paperwork, no
questions asked. Adding insult to injury, the man who sold this
gun to Akram, you know, who was, again, this al-Qaeda
sympathizer, was himself prohibited from gun ownership because
of his own criminal history. So, he shouldn't have had one.
I mean, all of this is absurd. Requiring a criminal
background check prior to every gun sale is just common sense.
I would think there would be bipartisan interest in that to
make it harder for domestic terrorists, again, across the
spectrum, to get their hands on these weapons. I must say,
Congresswoman, like we have seen Boogaloo Bois, we had an
incident in Las Vegas, I think it was in 2020, where 3 people--
--
Ms. Titus. Yes.
Mr. Greenblatt [continuing]. Getting back to your question,
3 members of the U.S. military were arrested because they were
planning a plot and they were planning with the Boogaloo Bois.
I think last weekend we had an incident by the Goyim Defense
League with anti-Semitic flyering in Las Vegas and a bunch of
other cities across the country. So, we have extremism right
there in Nevada, right there in Las Vegas, like you said. Some
simple, easy bipartisan measures like requiring the criminal
background check would make all of our communities safer.
Ms. Titus. I would like----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Simple, easy,
bipartisan measures I couldn't agree more. On the committee
that was formed in the wake of 9/11, I have spent my entire
career in a post-9/11 military fighting in so many different
places. Mr. Greenblatt, do you know how many people voted for
an amendment on this committee, my colleagues across the aisle?
Not a single person voted on amendment to figure out the
country of origin, the terror affiliation, and any sort of
derogatory information in the Darwa detention facility at Pul-
e-Charkhi prison in the Afghanistan withdrawal. Not a single
person. So, these are, you know, what are we doing on a
committee for homeland security if we are not figuring out
where the terror threat is?
So, Mr. Roggio, as a FDD fellow myself, I will start with
you. Are you worried about those 5,000-plus people that were
released? Or did they just kind-of disappear back into their
normal lives and have no terror ambitions at all from this
point on?
Mr. Roggio. Oh, I am extremely worried. You know, one of
the things I keep detecting from this committee is that, well,
Afghanistan's Afghanistan and it is not a threat to the U.S.
homeland. But we had the largest terrorist attack occur on U.S.
soil because Afghanistan was a safe haven for terrorists.
However many were killed--have been killed in domestic terror
attacks, it is dwarfed by the 3,000 that have been killed by
al-Qaeda on 9/11, and subsequent attacks by al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State.
Yes, I am absolutely worried about those 5,000 prisoners
who were released. We don't know where they are. Some of them
were Islamic State and I am told, again, I can't confirm this,
but I have no doubt because of information we know about the
accounting network of the Islamic State. That some members of
the Islamic State were absorbed by the Taliban. Some members of
al-Qaeda have been returned, have gone back to their jobs. Some
members of the Islamic State rejoined the Islamic State and
that is the element that opposes the Taliban government.
None of that is good for security here on the U.S.
homeland. We have armies of terrorists, not just in
Afghanistan, but in Somalia, in Mali, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in
Syria, in Pakistan. I am talking tens of thousands of fighters
often in each place that can be recruited and pointed at the
United States to conduct attacks against the U.S. homeland.
This is one of their goals is to hit us here to make the price
for fighting them overseas too costly.
So, we should be concerned about every single individual
who left. Do we even know the names of all of them? I hope the
U.S. Government, the U.S. military, and intelligence services
was able to obtain that information of these individuals. With
the Taliban controlling passports, these people can leave the
country and enter other countries and possibly have access to
the United States. All of these things should be deeply
worrying to every Member of this committee. These are groups,
terror organizations that are committed to hurting us here in
the United States and to targeting U.S. interests overseas as
well.
Mr. Pfluger. So, what I am hearing is that they haven't
taken their eye off their mission, which is their desire to
attack Americans. We saw it with the 13 service members that
were killed in the tragic, yet very predictable, way that we
had in the botched withdrawal. I just think that, you know, we
are kidding ourselves. I do think that these are easy
bipartisan issues. For the life of me, I can't understand why
there would be any sort of disagreement on these. Luckily, that
amendment actually passed in the NDAA. But not a single person
on this committee on the other side of the aisle voted for that
amendment on this committee when presented.
Mr. Greenblatt, let me turn to you. Thanks, Mr. Roggio, for
your answer to that. I couldn't agree more, I mean, we have to
focus on terrorism. Any sort of extremism is wrong. Any
extremism is wrong. Let's look at it for what it is. But, Mr.
Greenblatt, you know, I live in Texas. My district is not a
border district per se geographically. Is it safe to say and do
you agree that there are people who want to enter this country
by all means? We saw the Colleyville attacker that entered with
a passport and we need to get to the bottom of that. But what
do you say about known or suspected terrorists entering our
country? Do they have a desire to enter our country? Should we
be worried about the Southern Border?
Mr. Greenblatt. Congressman Pfluger, first thing I want to
do is thank you for your service. I know you are a military----
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you.
Mr. Greenblatt [continuing]. Veteran and I served in the
air force. Second, I could not agree more with the fear of
foreign terrorists trying to get into America. If I might just
for a moment, I can't say the specifics about attempted entries
from the Southern Border because I am not familiar with that,
but we are very worried about the Islamic Republic of Iran. The
largest state sponsor in the world, which continues to try to
put people inside the United States. There was an FBI case last
year where they identified an Iranian dissident, Masih
Alinejad, who was being targeted for kidnapping and rendition
to Tehran by the Islamic Republic. Mr. Congressman, I would
implore you to look at the danger of Iran and their efforts
to--they have surveilled Jewish institutions like synagogues,
Chabad houses, JCCs. Their people have been arrested in
Chicago, in New York, in Los Angeles. I am deeply worried about
that and would be delighted to work with you to explore this
issue because it is a threat to all of us.
Mr. Pfluger. So, we should be worried any method of entry
and the 2 million people that have enter illegally, you know,
there is a chance that one or two of those might have terror
ties. There is a chance that one or two of those might have
popped on a known or suspected terror watch list. You know, our
eye is so far off the ball, we have not had a single hearing
yet on border security. So, I am kind-of wondering about that.
So, last question, Mr. Greenblatt. Do you believe that the
Houthis should be on the foreign terrorist organization
designated--should they be a designated terror organization?
Mr. Greenblatt. The Houthis, absolutely should be a foreign
designated terror organization. They have--they would--look, we
know they are bombing, trying to fire allies on our missiles in
Abu Dhabi. We know they are agitating and militating against
our ally Israel. We know they are anti-American propaganda is
extensive. They are a proxy state like Hezbollah and Syria of
the Iranian regime. They absolutely should be on the list. No
questions asked.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all the
witnesses for coming here today to talk about this very
important issue. A lot of what I have been hearing from the
witnesses is, you know, steps that you think that we can take
here as Members of Congress to address the issues of which we
speak. Last June, the Biden administration released the first-
ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which
was a comprehensive framework for how the Federal Government
can understand and respond to domestic terror threats and
attempt to cut them down at their roots. Mr. Rasmussen, Mr.
Greenblatt, you know, it has been more than 6 months since they
announced this framework. What did the White House get right in
this strategy? What did they not get right? What do we need to
focus on to supplement what I think everyone would agree was a
long-overdue National strategy? So, if I could start with you,
Mr. Rasmussen, and then go to Mr. Greenblatt.
Mr. Rasmussen. Sure, thank you Congresswoman Rise. I read
that document very closely when it came out and took note of
several features. One, I think was a clear recognition of the
need to kind-of be in a sense threat-agnostic. That the
domestic terrorism threat looks a lot of different ways. It
crosses the ideological spectrum. As Dr. Miller-Idriss points
out, the data suggests that there is far more to be worried
about in terms of volume on the far extreme right than in other
parts of the ideological spectrum.
I think the strategy also did well to make clear that this
needs to be a lot of work done outside of Government with
Government to get a better handle on this. That includes, of
course, cooperation with industry, the technology sector, the
group of colleagues I work with in that sector. That we aren't
going to necessarily make progress on this if we simply look to
Government programming alone.
Then the last piece I would point to is the call for
greater investment in the prevention architecture. A lot of
that work, of course, is done at the Department of Homeland
Security working with communities around the country. I think
there is a clear signal that the administration wants to lean
into that set of programs. I think that is encouraging.
Ms. Rice. Mr. Greenblatt, can you unmute?
Mr. Greenblatt. Madam Congresswoman, nice to see you. Thank
you for the question. You know, I used to work in the West
Wing, right? I used to develop strategies like this. So, I have
some particular views on it. I do think it was a landmark. We
have never seen a White House strategy on countering domestic
terrorism. So, it deserves, they deserve, rightly deserve
credit for that. I give them credit because it had a whole-of-
Government approach. That really matters and it draws a lot
from ADL's PROTECT plan, which I mentioned before. It
acknowledged systemic racism and these structural issues which
are again, part of the problem.
But there were things that it missed. So, No. 1, it was a
strategy. It is not an implementation plan. You should ask the
White House. You should ask, you know, the folks there. You
should ask the OMB. Like, so where are the budgets? So, what
are the implementation plans for every agency to act on this?
That should be No. 1, right?
No. 2, you should--I think it missed the big tech piece.
So, again, as I said before, social media is a information
superhighway for domestic extremists, for foreign agents from
places like the Islamic Republic of Iran and others. Like big
tech needs to be accountable on this, engaged and accountable.
So, my friend, Nick, I really appreciate what he is doing,
Congresswoman, at GICFT. Yet the companies need to do far more
on their own platforms.
Then No. 3, I think ultimately we need a whole-of-society
strategy. Not socially with the whole business community
involved and we need civil society involved. So, I would want
to see like a three-part process going forward so that we are
all working together. Because this threat threatens all of us,
Congresswoman. We all need to be engaged in it together.
Ms. Rice. Mr. Greenblatt, just along that note, I think,
you know, you can have a strategy, but if you don't understand
the trends and how they are----
Mr. Greenblatt. Mm-hmm.
Ms. Rice [continuing]. Overlapping, intersecting. Can you
just expound a little bit in the short time that we have left,
on the trends, you know, pointing to the growing--you point out
the growing connections between anti-Semitism and other violent
extremist ideologies. Can you just talk a little bit more about
that trend?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, there is no question that anti-
Semitism is at the beating heart of White supremacy. So, from
Charlottesville to Capitol Hill, it is not an accident that
these men were wearing t-shirts that said 6MWE or yelling Jews
will not replace us. Anti-semitism is at the beating heart of
radical Islamism. It is not an accident that the guy in
Colleyville was trying to get an al-Qaeda operative. An al-
Qaeda operative who was arrested, Congresswoman, because she
tried to kill American soldiers because she had--she was--had
information in her possession that suggested she was
surveilling American sites. She wanted to kill Americans. Yet
at her trial, she said that the jurists, or the potential
jurists should be DNA tested to see if they were Zionists. I
mean, it is lunatic.
So, radical Islamism, violent White supremacy, they have
this hatred of the Jews at their core. Even other groups that
we may think are less frightening like QAnon, espouse lunatic
theories about Jewish space lasers or other stuff. So, look, in
this moment, and I know you represent Long Island, we have seen
anti-Semitic flyering and harassment right in your district in
the broader New York area as well. When Jews are being attacked
in broad daylight on our streets, that should be a problem for
all of us.
Ms. Rice. Great, thank you. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. LaTurner, for 5
minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
Demings, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Demings. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to the Ranking Member and to all of our witnesses here
today who are engaging in this very important discussion. This
past weekend the day after we recognized International
Holocaust Remembrance Day, neo-Nazis held rallies in central
Florida. I represent Florida. They shouted anti-Semitic slurs,
waived agnostic flags, and chanted a Jew is the devil.
I have to say as a career law enforcement officer, I am
disappointed when homeland security has become such a political
partisan issue. Because I think that we can all do better.
Now, make no mistake, as a former law enforcement officer,
I am not unfamiliar with hate organizations. I have been in
their presence on numerous occasions. But let me be clear of
all the protections that our Constitution guarantees us in this
great Nation, violence is not one of those protections. The
group that broke the peace this weekend is not merely a half
dozen malcontents as some have categorized them. The group
leader was indicted in Arizona just days before for pointing a
gun at a group of Black men outside a hotel.
Mr. Greenblatt, you have already talked about how important
it is to really speak up and speak out against this type of
behavior. So, I would really like to direct my question to the
other witnesses. If you could also tell us how important it is
for community leaders, faith-based, elected officials, to
identify and condemn, have zero tolerance for these type of
threats whether it is anti-Semitic, racist White nationalists,
or otherwise. Ms. Idriss, we will start with you.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Thank you. I thank you for the question,
Mrs. Demings. I think it is essential, as we have heard those
words from Jonathan Greenblatt so clearly. One of the things we
saw in Texas was the incredible solidarity from the interfaith
community, Catholic priests, and an Imam, and a minister,
evangelical minister sitting across the street in command
center throughout the, you know, throughout the hostage crisis
and really condemning that actively. We have seen some media
coverage of that. It is so important to see those interfaith
expressions condemning Islamophobia, condemning anti-Semitism,
to have anyone from, you know, across the political spectrum
condemn hate and violence when we see it to raise their voices
against what is happening in HBCUs. To really be clear, what
are the values that we all stand for as a community across
political lines, across our differences. Because we have to
start setting some of those norms and values in order for us to
begin to heal and move forward.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. I am going to move on for
the sake of time. Mr. Greenblatt, the Nation was horrified last
month as we have already talked about with an armed gunman held
congregants hostage at a Texas synagogue. As someone who has
been a life-long supporter of nonprofit security grants, I was
heartened that the Rabbi was able to put the security practices
he learned from training funded by those grants into action to
resolve this situation or at least without loss of life. How
should Congress be looking at the program, given the dynamic
threat landscape?
Mr. Greenblatt. So, Congresswoman Demings, first and
foremost, thank you for the question. Thank you for your
leadership in law enforcement for so many years. You know, ADL
partners with law enforcement in Orlando, in Florida, around
the country. We couldn't do our work to fight hate without that
cooperation. So, I am grateful for that.
To your question, and I would also say, we watched this
rally by these Nazis in your area over the weekend. It was
disgusting. To anyone who is confused about the threat of
right-wing extremism, listen to what the Congresswoman said.
Literally, please just listen. Google what happened.
It is shocking and stunning that anyone would not--would
simply dismiss these people as jackasses. They are not
jackasses. They are sinister, violent extremists with a lethal
agenda. I am sorry, I just had to get that out. Because I don't
think it is political to call out prejudice. I don't think it
is nuanced to say we should get rid of the Nazis.
That being said, as it relates specifically to what should
Congress do, double the funding for the nonprofit security
grant program, the DHS dollars that help provide security and
training for religious institutions. By the way, not just
synagogues, but mosques, Black churches, you know, Hindu
temples, Sikh Gurdwaras, et cetera. Last year, there were $400
million in applications alone. Yet, we only have a $180 million
program. I think the Government should fund at 90 percent of
that. So, if you could bring it from $180- to $360 million, as
we like to say, dayenu.
Mrs. Demings. To all of our witnesses, thank you so much. I
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Barragan. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, for
5 minutes, Mr. Torres.
Mr. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chair. More and more conspiracy
theories are circulating than ever before caused by threats
foreign and domestic. Foreign threats like Russian influence
operations and domestic threats like social media algorithms
that amplify disinformation. Those conspiracy theories are
spreading faster and faster than ever before and escalating
into more violence than ever before.
History tells us that a conspiracy theory can be a gateway
drug to anti-Semitism because anti-Semitism is itself a
conspiracy theory of its own. So, my first question is to Mr.
Greenblatt, do you worry as I do that the increasingly
conspiratorial politics of America has become a breeding ground
for violent anti-Semitism?
Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Congressman, thank you for the
question. I just want to thank you for your principled
leadership on these issues, which I know all of us in the
Jewish community so respect. Yes, I would suggest that
conspiratorial minds whether you demonize the Jewish people or
the Jewish State, it leads to violence. We saw that happen last
May, Mr. Congressman, when wild unhinged claims about the state
of Israel led to Jews being beaten up in broad daylight in
Midtown Manhattan, in Los Angeles, all over the United States.
So, again, when you have conspiracies in your head about
Jewish power or Jewish influence, it often leads to real-world
violence. All of us should unequivocally and singularly call
that out, right? Not qualify it with, well, there are complex
issues in the Middle East. I am sorry. You might not light what
happens in China, but that is no excuse to beat up Asian
Americans. You might not like what happens in Mexico, that is
no excuse to beat up Latinos. You might not like what happens
in the Middle East, that is no excuse to attack Jews, full
stop.
Mr. Torres. As you pointed out during the conflict in May
2021, if I remember correctly, the #hitlerwasright was
retweeted 18,000 times. Is that correct?
Mr. Greenblatt. More than that. More than that. Scores of
thousands of times. Which gets us back to why if big tech just
did their job they could have helped to mitigate this right
away.
Mr. Torres. You know, your organization has recorded that
since 2019, anti-Semitic incidents have risen to levels not
seen in 4 decades. The Tree of Life synagogue shooting in
Pittsburgh and the Congregation Beth Israel hostage crisis in
Colleyville, these events did not happen in a vacuum. These
events were part of a larger wave of violent anti-Semitism that
has taken hold in America. But there was a journalist who wrote
the following, which I found striking. She said, ``Ten years
ago, my synagogue and my kids' Jewish school had no armed
guards. Now, both have a near platoon of special forces guys.
In the last 5 years, my kids' Jewish camp and my kosher grocery
have hired armed guards because of threats. This is how Jews
live now. Americans should know.'' Mr. Greenblatt, do these
words reflect what you are observing on the ground?
Mr. Greenblatt. These words exactly reflect what I am
seeing on the ground, Mr. Congressman. Like Jews are concerned
that shopping in a kosher supermarket puts them in harm's way.
They are concerned that showing up for a Shabbat service is
putting your life at risk. They are concerned that like in
Brooklyn walking with your children in a stroller, they might
be spit at by someone who tells them they should have burned in
Auschwitz. I mean, it is astonishing to see the level of animus
that is out there.
Again, so we need--whether it is extremism from the right
or illiberalism from the left, or again, anti-Semitism from
Islamist radicals or whomever, I don't know--we can't afford
any politicians to politicize this or to weaponize it. That is
why I appreciate how you have spoken out again and again, Mr.
Congressman. I wish others would do the same.
Mr. Torres. I want to note for the record that I strongly
support a doubling of funding for the nonprofit security grant
program. It is a vital tool protecting vulnerable communities
from violent extremism, which includes protecting the Jewish
community from violent anti-Semitism.
My final question is for Mr. Rasmussen. If Russia invades
Ukraine, and if the United States severely sanctions Russia in
response, do you worry, as I do, that a Russian invasion of
Ukraine could trigger a sequence of events that could raise the
risk of cyberterrorism from Russia or from Russian state-
sponsored cyber actors? Is that a reasonable fear?
Mr. Rasmussen. Well, Mr. Torres, it certainly a reasonable
fear that if Russia is able to use these tools in the context
of aggression against Ukraine, it allows them to refine these
tools and potentially learn what works and doesn't work and
they can store that knowledge away for a future conflict,
including conflict that might involve the United States. We
already, of course, know the Russians are sophisticated actors
in this space. The Ukraine theatre right now simply allows them
to, in a sense, hone their tradecraft and hone their tactics in
ways that will certainly add to their capability over time in
ways that we are not going to find very comforting.
Mr. Torres. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. I look forward to
working with the Vice Chair on increasing the amount of the
nonprofit grant program from where it is now at $180 million.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. LaTurner,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rasmussen,
terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS have
historically harnessed modern technology to recruit and
invigorate their members, as you know well. Did GIFCT or its
partners notice any changes in on-line activity from terrorists
and extremist groups either during the withdrawal from
Afghanistan or in the months since?
Mr. Rasmussen. You are absolutely right, sir, that
established terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS have long
used the on-line domain as a way to generate recruits, you
know, spread their message, engage in even operational planning
and training. In response to the Afghanistan events, what we
have seen is that the narrative generated out of that is, of
course, being turned to advantage by terrorist groups. They are
using this as, in a sense, their proof that they have defeated
a superpower. That they have expelled the United States from
South Asia. That they have, in a sense, won.
That narrative, of course, serves as a powerful recruiting
tool for new adherence to their cause. Now, it is hard to kind-
of draw a linear connection between using that narrative on-
line and actually how does that manifest itself in real
terrorist capability. But there is no question that the
narrative serves their purpose.
Mr. LaTurner. Have you noticed, you talk about the
narrative and, obviously, you are correct about the narrative
being helpful. But do you have any way to quantify how helpful
it has been in an uptick over the last several months?
Mr. Rasmussen. I don't know that we do. It is maybe
something I can consult with our research network to try to
find a little more precision to put around that. Because what I
am offering is I know a bit more impressionistic and, perhaps,
not as data-driven as might be useful. So, let me take that one
and come back to you, sir.
Mr. LaTurner. I would appreciate that information. Thank
you. A follow-up for Mr. Roggio, could you please tell the
committee about how foreign terrorist organizations
traditionally recruit more members? How is their process likely
implicated as a result of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Mr. Roggio. Sure. Yes, thank you, sir. The traditional
recruitment, it occurs, obviously on-line. That is a big place.
That is where they try to reach, particularly try to reach
Westerners to get people in their home countries to attempt to
conduct attacks or join the organization. But a lot of the
recruiting is done locally in individual countries where they
have a presence. So, in Yemen, they will recruit from their
Tribes or families in Yemen. Same thing, Somalia.
This is why, again, I keep going back to the issue of safe
haven. When these groups are able to operate in the open, they
are able to more easily recruit, train, and indoctrinate local
fighters. Not all of them are going to be used to launch
attacks against the West. But as we saw with 9/11, only a small
fraction of--it is estimated that tens of thousands of al-Qaeda
fighters went through camps prior to 9/11 and were trained
through al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. They selected I believe
it was 17 of them were from Afghanistan camps. It may have been
all 19. That is all they needed to execute 9/11.
So, again, I know I keep going back to the issue of safe
haven. But that is the lifeblood for Jihadist groups to
organize, train, and project their power in order to conduct
attacks against the U.S. homeland or U.S. citizens, businesses,
military installations overseas.
Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that response and agree with it.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I yield back the remainder of my
time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Barragan.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start by
thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and Representative Bonnie Watson
Coleman for bringing up the issue of the bomb threats against
historically Black colleges and universities and other
minority-serving institutions to this committee. These threats
are disturbing. They should outrage us all. I believe we must
talk about them in the context of domestic extremism and the
potential for domestic terrorism. I know that several HBCUs in
your district, Mr. Chairman, were impacted as well a school in
my district, Charles Argue University, which is a historically
Black graduate institute and minority-serving institution where
the majority of medical and health care students are Black and
Latino have received a bomb threat as well. They have been
having to clear campuses, up late at night. This is just
something that shouldn't be happening. So, thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for immediately raising the seriousness of this
threat with the FBI and DHS and know that I am here to work
alongside you on this issue to address these acts on
intimidation and domestic terrorism rooted in racism and
bigotry.
I now want to turn my questions to the issue of
misinformation for all the witnesses. If you could, given the
short time, maybe respond with a yes or no. Does misinformation
and disinformation play a role in the active or past
recruitment of people into extremist groups or subcultures?
Anybody want to start?
Mr. Rasmussen. I would say, yes, it does, ma'am.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Greenblatt. Yes, it does.
Ms. Barragan. OK. I don't think I hear anybody disagreeing.
Have you seen the use of misinformation and disinformation
increase over the last several years? Would anybody say that it
has not?
Mr. Rasmussen. Absolutely.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. It has, for sure.
Mr. Greenblatt. There is no question that with social media
it just continues to increase and expand.
Ms. Barragan. Is there any evidence that any increase or in
the misuse, the misinformation or disinformation fueled by on-
line platforms, social media, and traditional media has led to
an increase in domestic extremism and the potential for
domestic terrorism?
Mr. Rasmussen. Yes.
Ms. Miller-Idriss. That is also very clear, yes.
Mr. Greenblatt. Yes.
Mr. Roggio. Yes.
Ms. Barragan. You know, I think this is just to highlight
the misinformation and what is happening and the role that
these on-line platforms have, I think, in addressing this. The
Congressional Hispanic Caucus is going to be holding a hearing
in conjunction with House admin in Miami upcoming on Monday to
address the issue of misinformation and what is happening. So,
this is something that we will continue to work on. I just
wanted to kind-of highlight that issue.
Moving on to another topic, this is also to all the
witnesses. In 2020 and early 2021, we saw violence at some
State capitals stemming from protests focused on COVID-19-
related restrictions. In the second half of 2021, school boards
and city council meetings have been the site of violence and
chaos related to COVID-19 restrictions and other local
measures. Can you describe why this violence has become so
localized? Is it wide-spread as it seems?
Mr. Rasmussen. I will answer first and then just welcome
comments from the other panelists. But I actually highlighted
this, ma'am, in my written testimony, the longer version. The
way in which during this COVID period, we have actually seen
groups or individuals with radically different ideological
takes on the world are uniting around issues related to COVID
or grabbing onto pieces of the COVID story that we have all
experienced over the last 2 years and using it to fuel their
own progression toward extremism. So, it has made for some very
strange bedfellows in that on-line environment who would
otherwise have very little in common but for their grabbing on
to a particular narrative about COVID, whether it is Government
overreach or vaccination conspiracy theories, et cetera. So, it
is an interesting phenomenon and one we are still trying very
hard to understand.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you. Mr. Greenblatt.
Mr. Greenblatt. Look, from the start of the COVID-19
pandemic, disinformation about the virus circulated widely on
social media. We had elected officials, mainstream media
outlets promoting lies including a theory that the vaccine was
an effort by the Government to control the population. As a
result of that you had conspiracy theorists, extremists,
members of the public targeting physicians, nurses, hospital
workers, public health officials, and scientists. Harassing
them, threatening them, assaulting them.
In 2021, we had public schools and school board meetings
where you saw extraordinary vitriol with outrage never seen
before around masking mandates and vaccines. Conspiracy around
CRT. Again, you can have strong feelings about what your kids
learn, but to think there is some plot to take over the system,
I don't agree with. We don't have the data at ADL that bears
that out. I think it is the disinformation being like fed
intravenously, Congresswoman, to communities today because of
the 24/7 nature of social media that has warped the way they
think. Turn these like localized extremism and turned, again,
these like the local, political process into a battleground.
Ms. Barragan. Well, thank you. I apologize to the rest of
the witnesses as I am out of time. But I also want to also join
with you, Mr. Greenblatt, in standing with you on anti-Semitism
and what is happening to our American Jewish community. So, I
will work closely with the committee on that issue as well.
Thank you. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't know we
would be talking about Afghanistan today, but since we are, I
just wanted to ask Mr. Roggio a couple of questions. Obviously,
the release of those prisoners in early September by the
Taliban was a very bad thing for all the reasons that have been
stated. But I just want to make sure that we are clear that the
United States did not ask for those prisoners to be released or
order those prisoners to be released. That was done arguably as
a consequence of our withdrawal, it was not something that we
intended to happen. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Roggio. That is correct. The release of the prisoners
happened because the Taliban overran those prisons.
Mr. Malinowski. Right. Has the U.S. Government ever asked
or ordered authorities in Afghanistan to release large numbers
of militants to the battlefield?
Mr. Roggio. That is correct. The Trump administration, as
part of its deal with the Taliban, requested that the Afghan
government release 5,000 prisoners in exchange for 1,000. I
want to be perfectly clear that the decision to negotiate with
the Taliban and to cut that deal with the Taliban to withdraw
was--I disagreed with that. I disagreed with the method of and
the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. Both were disastrous
policy.
Mr. Malinowski. Good, well, we agree then. I just want to
make sure we are fair that this was over two administrations.
Mr. Roggio. That is correct.
Mr. Malinowski. Back to the domestic threat. I think, you
know, it is striking from the testimony of all of our witnesses
that, you know, we are facing a very decentralized threat. I
think it is a fair assessment of your testimony. The idea that
most violent extremists are card-carrying members of a specific
organization that they take orders from a particular boss that
they have training camps, all these sort-of old images that we
associate with terrorist groups is not really the reality in
the United States today. Is that a fair statement? I put that
maybe to you, Mr. Rasmussen?
Mr. Rasmussen. Exactly right, Mr. Malinowski. The features
you have described are what makes navigating that environment
more challenging not only for law enforcement and intelligence
services operating in that environment, but for companies
trying to figure out, OK, how do we manage the on-line
environment when you don't have group affiliation?
Mr. Malinowski. So, back to the--I mean, I was heading
toward the on-line environment problem. I mean, it seems to be
that right now that the organizational structure of terrorism
is a Facebook group. The training camp is a YouTube channel. I
wanted to turn to you, Mr. Greenblatt, you covered a lot of
this in your testimony. I wanted to ask you to talk to us a bit
about the role that social media companies recommendation
algorithms play in drawing people to these groups, to these
ideas.
Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Congressman, there is no doubt. I mean,
these technology platforms are wired to optimize for user
engagement. They frequently amplify, you know, hate and bias-
motivated violence as a strategy to generate revenue. I am not
saying there are people doing it behind the scenes, but the
algorithms are engineered to amplify and increase virality. As
I said before, if it bleeds, it leads.
The tech community should not have blanket immunity from
liability when their algorithms contribute to civil rights
harms. When their algorithms promote violence. When their
algorithms facilitate how if you like a White supremacist group
or racist content, you will be recommended to Facebook groups
where to your point, these individuals, these organizations are
doing the kind of planning today they never could have done
before.
I will say one other thing and, Mr. Congressman, I direct
this to you, but particularly to the other Members on both
sides. ADL has done the surveying in the data. Nearly 80
percent of Americans think the laws need to be changed to hold
these companies responsible. That is not 80 percent Democrats.
That is not 80 percent of Republicans. Eighty percent of
Americans. So, there was never a better way that you could get
something that all Americans would agree to. I daresay, Mr.
Congressman, nothing you could do that would better secure our
society than making these companies accountable once and for
all.
Mr. Malinowski. Well, thank you. Of course, we have a bill
that does just that, which we hope will move this year,
Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act, which would
begin to hold them accountable not for the fact that there is
bad content on their websites, which is probably an insoluble
problem, but for the fact that their recommendation algorithms
are designed to introduce that content to the very people in
our society who are most susceptible to it. So, thank you so
much for highlighting that.
Mr. Greenblatt. Mr. Congressman, I just want to build, your
bill and that with Congresswoman Eshoo is so important. Imagine
if NBC news was programming content promoting suicide to
depressed teenagers. Imagine if a newspaper was delivering
content how to traffic human children to pedophiles. Like you
wouldn't allow it if it happened in those places. There is no
excuse. There is no world in which it is reasonable for
companies like Facebook to promote violent Islamism or White
supremacy to people who are prone to violence. They should be
responsible for that. Thank you for your legislation and
hopefully we will make them responsible for that.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, sir. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes another gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Gottheimer.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you. It is good to have a Jersey Day
here, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much for this important
hearing to discuss terrorist threats to our National security.
Whether it is from terrorist groups abroad or lone-wolf
terrorist attacks or domestic extremists, the threats to the
homeland are more pressing than ever. I was very proud to lead
a bipartisan effort in this committee to address lone-wolf
terrorists using trucks and other vehicles as weapons. This
legislation, which has passed the House and is now in the
Senate, is named in memory of New Milford resident Darren
Drake, a victim of the 2017 New York terror attack.
Mr. Roggio, if I can start with you. Many of the threats we
are seeing today in the homeland look like the ones I described
with Darren Drake, lone-wolf terrorist actors and senseless
acts of violence. What recommendations do you have for this
committee to best address the many Americans who are being
inspired by ISIS and other extreme terrorist groups abroad?
What more can be done to prevent this type of radicalization?
Mr. Roggio. Thank you, sir. As a fellow New Jerseysian, it
is good to be bookended by New Jersey Congressmen. Thank you.
Yes, to me the biggest component of this radicalization,
particularly of individuals in the West is on social media. It
is on Twitter. It is on, you know, Facebook. It is on all of
the social media platforms. This is a very--YouTube,
particularly. For instance, an American cleric, Anwar al-
Awlaki, his teachings are still available. He was a very
influential cleric, well-spoken, his family from Yemen. His
teachings he inspired the attack at Fort Hood and others as
well. His teachings are still on-line. I could follow the
Taliban's spokesmen for years, years and years at a time, they
are not taken off-line. It is obvious to everyone. We are not
talking about these are individuals that are just putting out
innocuous news like the Taliban spokesmen are promoting
violence. Promoting violent videos and things. There is a host
of Jihadists in a range of groups that have information that is
readily available to all and everyone knows who they are and
nothing is done about it.
I will say it makes my research a lot easier. But I would
much rather not see this information on-line and these
individuals out there who are able to reach people in the
United States or Europe or any country and inspire them to join
these terrorist groups. This is why a lot of Westerners
traveled to Iraq and to Syria when that was under Islamic State
control. They were seeing what was happening there via
recruitment videos or just information. They were told the
caliphate has been restored. As long as these individuals are
able to post this information on social media, you will have
individuals who are prone to being susceptible to this type of
information being offered by Jihadist organizations.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you. As part of Mr. Malinowski's
legislation and other legislation that I have been behind to
help stop that and to take on, frankly, a lot of our social
media companies that continue to allow handles from terrorist
organizations to be on-line. They take them down, they come
back up. They are not policed properly or monitored. They are
actually foreign terrorist organizations that are violating
State Department law and rules and I think we need to be very
aggressive against them.
I am going to turn now to Mr. Greenblatt. It is a great
honor to have you here today as a witness. Thank you for your
leadership and your thoughtfulness, especially in light of the
horrible threats and attacks against the Jewish community. This
month it is more important than ever to address anti-Semitism
head-on. So, thank you for your work.
As you mentioned in your opening remarks, Amnesty
International released a completely biased and wrong report
calling Israel an apartheid state. We know that Amnesty
International fails to recognize the Arab party and the
governing coalition or Arab-Israelis serving in the military,
amongst many other realities of civil society in Israel, and of
the impact of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. In fact,
this is the 208th report the group has issued about Israel
since the 1970's. They had only 40 reports on North Korea and
61 on Venezuela. Can you please talk about how this report may
lead to a rise in anti-Semitism and in increase in terror
attacks against the Jewish people and what do you think is
driving Amnesty International to take such an aggressive
stance?
Mr. Greenblatt. Well, first of all, let me just say, Mr.
Congressman, I realize following Mr. Malinowski and my fellow
panelists and you, like I am racing in the street in the
badlands of this New Jersey moment. So, I am going to try. I
think I am on fire here. But I am going to try to specifically
keep my remarks focused on this Amnesty report. Look, I mean, I
almost don't want to dignify it with time today. The problem is
that when you make wild aspersions and groundless accusations
against the Jewish State, it has an immediate knock-on effect
against the Jewish people. To release this report 6 months,
again, after Jews are being beaten and brutalized in broad
daylight, not by people wearing MAGA hats, and not by people
espousing White supremacy, but by people coming from anti-
Israel rallies is shocking. A report which doesn't call into
question, you know, other countries around the world which have
Christian principles or Muslim principles. It is only the
Jewish State that they seem to call out. It would be
interesting, I didn't know it was the 280th report. But what I
do know is I will be dealing with the cyberbullying targeting
Jewish activists on-line. I will be dealing with the Jewish
kids on colleges' campuses who are afraid to identify as being
Israeli or having any real--even showing up at Hillels because
of fear of being bullying and intimidation by anti-Israel
types. I think it is frightening. You know, so, I think it is a
terrible report. It is going to cause, I promise you, I predict
it, I will be back on this committee talking about threats
against Jews spawned by this kind of wild accusations.
Last, let me just say, I say this as someone,
Representative Gottheimer, who believes in a two-state
solution. Who believes we need dignity and equality for
Palestinians. But if you think demonizing and delegitimizing
the only Jewish State in the world is the way you are going to
achieve it, like the folks from Amnesty are as far from reality
as you could imagine. It may be Amnesty International, but it
is like reality somewhere else. Because I don't understand how
to make sense of it.
But, look, there will be no surrender to these people. They
may be in their glory days with all this hateful rhetoric, but
I think the brilliant disguise of them showing up as human
rights advocates will not work for the majority of, you know,
the good-thinking Americans who realize what they are doing.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, sir, and I yield back. Thank
you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. Let me thank
our witnesses for today. We don't have any other person
scheduled but, clearly, the length and involvement of Members
shows the importance of this topic. So, I want to thank you for
your testimony, as well as the Members for their questions. The
Members of the committee may have additional questions for the
witnesses and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing
to those questions.
The Chair reminds Members that the committee's record will
remain open for 10 business days. Without objection, the
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Cynthia Miller-Idriss
Question 1. To what extent have you seen Islamist or Jihadist
terrorist groups adopt the operational or aesthetic techniques or
tactics of far right-wing violent extremists in the United States or
elsewhere? What about the reciprocal direction?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The COVID States Project recently released a report
that found nearly 1 in 4 Americans polled said that violence was either
definitely or probably justifiable against the Government and nearly 1
in 10 said that it is justified right now. Normally this group
researches questions related to COVID, but given the trends we have
seen on the news, they also asked about violence related to COVID and
mis- or disinformation. Based on your research, can you describe the
trends you are seeing, and how mis- or disinformation related to COVID-
19 can contribute to large swaths of the American public thinking that
violence against the Government is justified?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. A recent Global Network on Extremism and Technology, or
GNET, report assessed misogyny as a ``gateway drug'' into the world of
violent extremism. Does your research reflect the same trends? What, in
your opinion, is the step that leads from misogynist thought to real-
world violence?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Bennie G. Thompson for Nicholas J. Rasmussen
Question 1. The U.N.-backed group that monitors terrorist abuse of
technology, TECH AGAINST TERRORISM, recently released a summary of
their work over the past year in which they found 198 websites that
they assessed to be operated by terrorist actors or other violent
extremists that pose a threat to society. Of those 198, they found 101
to be linked to violent, far-right groups or actors. These sites are
not on the dark web but are easily accessed through common search
engines. Does GIFCT engage domain hosting providers for GIFCT
membership to try to prevent these sites from spreading their terrorist
or violent content?
Answer. GIFCT regularly engages with domain hosting providers,
(notable members include Amazon and Microsoft). In addition to these
members, GIFCT is working with the I2 coalition, industry groups, and
other DNS providers to further support this part of the tech sector and
would welcome additional members that meet our membership criteria to
join our effort.
In addition to engaging with a range of digital platforms including
domain hosting providers to join GIFCT as members, we also work with
Tech Against Terrorism to provide information about such websites and
specific pages operated by terrorists and violent extremists to our
existing members. As we announced in July 2021, GIFCT is expanding the
taxonomy of our hash-sharing database to include hashes of the URLs
Tech Against Terrorism identifies. What this does is enable GIFCT
member companies to identify whether these URLs have been shared on
their own platforms and review that activity against their policies and
terms of reference. This is an important effort to address the
funneling and migration practices often seen by terrorists and violent
extremists who attempt to direct others to a specific on-line page by
sharing its URL with users on other digitial platforms.
Question 2. A Jigsaw research team recently released a report about
how harmful content traveled in clusters across different platforms. To
what extent does GIFCT work to track threats across platforms and not
just work with individual platforms to improve their content moderation
policies and practices?
Answer. As part of GIFCT's mission to prevent terrorists and
violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms, we actively work
alongside stakeholders from industry, Government, civil society, and
academia to track threats of terrorist and violent extremist
exploitation across the on-line ecosystem. While GIFCT does work with
individual member companies to improve some of their internal policies
and practices (i.e. content moderation, transparency, and human
rights), GIFCT takes a whole-of-sector approach to preventing and
mitigating harmful content on-line, across platforms. This includes
recruiting and welcoming into GIFCT new member companies from around
the world that represent different kinds of technologies.
Additional work GIFCT does to track and prevent terrorist and
violent extremist exploitation of digital platforms includes:
Funding action-oriented research from a global network of
experts who study a range of factors and influences to the
nexus of extremism and technology. For example, since 2019,
GIFCT has brought forward research mapping how violent
extremist groups migrate across platforms and for what
purposes.
Developing a more useful definitional framework for
identifying terrorist and violent extremist activity on-line
that GIFCT member companies can draw upon to inform their on-
going efforts to monitor, assess, and take action against
content and activity that violates their policies.
Building cross-platform tools, such as the GIFCT hash-
sharing database, so that a range of different digital
platforms can take information on known terrorist and violent
extremist content and activity and identify whether the same
content exists and requires action on their respective
platforms.
Question 3. Can you describe for us the rough composition of your
hash-sharing database with specificity on how much of it relates to
ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other Islamist terrorist groups and how much
relates to far-right violent extremists linked to White supremacist
movements?
Answer. Currently, the hash-sharing database taxonomy addresses
videos and images produced by individuals and entities on the United
Nations Security Council's (UNSC) consolidated sanctions list as well
as perpetrator-produced content captured or live-streamed during an
off-line mass violent attack. Historically, there has been a greater
composition of Islamist extremist entities on the United Nations
Security Council's consolidated sanctions list versus far-right violent
extremists; however, further expansions of our taxonomy have allowed us
to address far-right violent extremist and terrorist content including
the videos produced by the perpetrators of the Christchurch, NZ and
Halle, DE attacks in 2019 and the Glendale, Arizona attack in 2020. In
the coming months, the taxonomy will expand to include attacker
manifestos in PDF form, terrorist and violent extremist publications in
PDF form, and URLs identified by our partner Tech Against Terrorism and
confirmed to link to terrorist content. Member companies will then be
able to see if any hash may match to content on their platform, thus
providing a signal to identify where to focus and prioritize their
policy enforcement efforts and combat potential terrorist and violent
extremist activity. These new categories to our taxonomy enable us to
address a greater amount of content originating from far-right violent
extremist and White supremacist ideologies by including URLs and
publications from terrorist organizations on the Five Eyes government
designation lists, which include White supremacist terrorist groups,
and attacker manifestos, often from White supremacy-motivated
terrorists not previously on Government-maintained designation lists.
Question 4. Can you describe the extent to which your hash-sharing
database is applicable to content in the metaverse?
Answer. As technology has continued to change and advance, so too
have the ways in which terrorists and violent extremists have adapted
to exploiting on-line platforms. For that reason, GIFCT will continue
to devote research and develop solutions to address where and how
terrorists and violent extremists seek to exploit digital platforms.
When it comes to GIFCT's hash-sharing database, if users have the
ability to share user-generated content and or link to such content,
terrorist and violent extremists will inevitably try to use those
features and our hash-sharing database applies. That said, the exact
form that the metaverse will take is still emerging and the activities
that users will be able to engage in, and that terrorists seek to
exploit, will continue to evolve. As such, GIFCT is always looking to
support our members in their approach to safety by design when
developing new tools and technologies, while also improving and
developing new ways that we can enable cross-platform collaboration by
member companies to prevent and mitigate new attempts at exploitation
by terrorists and violent extremists.
Question 5. Have any other industries reached out to GIFCT in order
to try and replicate their model to mitigate other on-line threats such
as ransomware, child sexual exploitation on-line or financial crimes?
Answer. GIFCT routinely works alongside and expands engagements
with other tech-related industries that either have a nexus to
countering terrorist and violent extremist activity or who approach
other on-line harm types with similar needs for cross-platforming
tooling and information-sharing across technology companies. Examples
of these growing collaborations include active dialogs with Tech
Coalition, NCMEC, and cross harms groups like TSPA to further develop
models and methodologies to respond to and prevent harmful content and
activity on-line. In addition to these relationships, GIFCT is also
working alongside All Tech is Human, ForHumanity, ADSA, ISOC, and W3C
tech organizations and non-profits focused on building responsible
technology and associated policies for developers and consumers alike.
Relatedly, earlier this year, GIFCT in collaboration with IEEE
conducted an event on mitigating societal harms in social media by
bringing together policy makers and technologists to examine cutting-
edge solutions built on promising technologies such as AI and machine
learning. While GIFCT is open to working with new partners and other
organizations trying to mitigate on-line threats it is important to
note that harm types do significantly vary in their on-line
manifestations and therefore replicating efficient models (like the
hash-sharing database) to address one type of on-line harm does not
always lead to success in addressing another.
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