[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS:
GUIDING THE TRANSITION
TO A CIVIL CAPABILITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 12, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-329PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas, Chairwoman
ZOE LOFGREN, California FRANK LUCAS, Oklahoma,
SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon Ranking Member
AMI BERA, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
HALEY STEVENS, Michigan, BILL POSEY, Florida
Vice Chair RANDY WEBER, Texas
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey BRIAN BABIN, Texas
JAMAAL BOWMAN, New York ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
MELANIE A. STANSBURY, New Mexico MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
JERRY McNERNEY, California MIKE GARCIA, California
PAUL TONKO, New York STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
BILL FOSTER, Illinois YOUNG KIM, California
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa
DON BEYER, Virginia JAKE LaTURNER, Kansas
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois JAY OBERNOLTE, California
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania PETER MEIJER, Michigan
DEBORAH ROSS, North Carolina JAKE ELLZEY, TEXAS
GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin MIKE CAREY, OHIO
DAN KILDEE, Michigan
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. DON BEYER, Virginia, Chairman
ZOE LOFGREN, California BRIAN BABIN, Texas,
AMI BERA, California Ranking Member
BRAD SHERMAN, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado BILL POSEY, Florida
CHARLIE CRIST, Florida DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey YOUNG KIM, California
C O N T E N T S
May 12, 2022
Page
Hearing Charter.................................................. 2
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Don Beyer, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Written statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Chairwoman, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives....................................... 12
Written statement by Representative Frank Lucas, Ranking Member,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,................... 13
Witnesses:
Dr. Matthew Hejduk, Senior Project Leader, The Aerospace
Corporation
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 17
Dr. Moriba Jah, Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering and
Engineering Mechanics Department, Mrs. Pearlie Dashiell
Henderson Centennial Fellowship in Engineering, Oden Institute
for Computational Engineering and Sciences, The University of
Texas at Austin
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Mr. Andrew D'Uva, Senior Policy Advisor, Space Data Association
Oral Statement............................................... 78
Written Statement............................................ 80
Mr. Kevin M. O'Connell, Founder, Space Economy Rising, LLC
Oral Statement............................................... 87
Written Statement............................................ 89
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, Associate Professor, Sam Nunn School of
International Affairs, Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 97
Written Statement............................................ 99
Discussion....................................................... 109
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. Matthew Hejduk, Senior Project Leader, The Aerospace
Corporation.................................................... 128
Dr. Moriba Jah, Associate Professor, Aerospace Engineering and
Engineering Mechanics Department, Mrs. Pearlie Dashiell
Henderson Centennial Fellowship in Engineering, Oden Institute
for Computational Engineering and Sciences, The University of
Texas at Austin................................................ 167
Mr. Andrew D'Uva, Senior Policy Advisor, Space Data Association.. 174
Mr. Kevin M. O'Connell, Founder, Space Economy Rising, LLC....... 180
Dr. Mariel Borowitz, Associate Professor, Sam Nunn School of
International Affairs, Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts,
Georgia Institute of Technology................................ 182
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Letter submitted by Don Beyer, Chairman, Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives
Karina Drees, Commercial Spaceflight Federation.............. 188
Letter submitted by Mr. Kevin M. O'Connell, Founder, Space
Economy Rising, LLC
``Congress Needs to Act on Space Traffic Management,'' Dan
Dumbacher, Executive Director, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, et al........................ 192
SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS:
GUIDING THE TRANSITION
TO A CIVIL CAPABILITY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2022
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Beyer
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Beyer. This hearing will come to order. And
without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recess at
any time.
Before I deliver my opening remarks, I wanted to note that
the Committee is meeting both in person and virtually. A couple
of reminders for the Members about the conduct of this meeting.
First, Members and staff who are attending may choose to be
masked, but it is not a requirement. However, any individuals
with symptoms, a positive test, or exposure to someone with
COVID-19 should please wear a mask while present.
And Members who are attending virtually should keep their
video feed on as long as they are present in the hearing.
Members are responsible for their own microphones, and please
keep your microphones muted unless you are speaking. Finally,
if Members have documents they wish to submit for the record,
please email them to the Committee Clerk, whose email address
was circulated prior to the meeting.
So good morning, and welcome to today's hearing, ``Space
Situational Awareness: Guiding the Transition to a Civil
Capability.'' First, thank you to our distinguished panel of
witnesses for being here virtually today. I'm pleased that we
are finally able to handle this important hearing. Previously
scheduled hearing dates had to be postponed due to changes in
the House voting schedule and to a memorial service for a
former House Member.
But today, we're here and we're ready to discuss this
urgent issue: Space Situational Awareness, or SSA. SSA is the
ability to identify, understand, and predict the locations of
objects in space so that potential collision risks can be
calculated and this information shared with operators.
The growth in space activity has made SSA crucial. Space-
enabled services like communications, national security
activities, banking, weather forecasting, and Earth imaging all
depend on the ability of systems to operate safely in space.
However, safety is far from guaranteed. Mega constellations of
thousands of satellites are creating orbital congestion, and
the orbital debris left behind is compounding the risks of
operating in space. The sustainability of the space environment
is in peril if we don't act. Understanding and mitigating the
risks starts with SSA.
While the Department of Defense (DOD) has been providing
SSA services and information to space operators for decades,
the increasing complexity of the SSA function, the resources
required to manage it, and the need for ongoing improvements
are becoming an increasing burden. In 2018, Space Policy
Directive-3 (SPD-3) recognized the need for a civil agency to
carry out basic SSA capabilities so that DOD can focus on its
national security mission. I totally agree. But then how will a
transition from a DOD-based system to a fully operational,
civil SSA capability actually occur?
Some entities suggest that commercial companies can perform
the civil SSA function and already do so, if only on a smaller
scale, and others argue the problem has been studied to death
and we need to just get on with it. But first, we need to know
exactly what we're getting on with because the transition to
civil SSA remains unclear.
What functions and responsibilities should be transitioned?
What SSA data are needed, and who will provide it? What
services and information, and at what level, will the civil
capability provide? And what roles will the government have and
where should the commercial sector contribute?
The current approach to civil SSA is the Department of
Commerce's (DOC's) Office of Space Commerce (OSC) Open
Architecture Data Repository--OADR. In 2021, the Office
demonstrated its OADR prototype to enable SSA data sharing
among government and commercial space operators. For Fiscal
Year 2023, the Office is requesting a whopping 550 percent
increase in funding toward bringing the pilot to an operational
capability.
What the OADR is, what it would be required to do and how
it would evolve, however, are open questions. And the path
forward for civil SSA has not been defined, and it needs to be
to avoid the mistakes of past programs gone awry. DOD's own
attempts to upgrade its legacy SSA systems ended up in nearly a
billion dollars spent and a decade lost before the agency
canceled the JMS (Joint Space Operations Center Mission System
) program.
Today's hearing will examine the questions, actions, and
issues that must be addressed to enable an effective
transition. We need a plan to move quickly. And while SSA is an
essential first step, it is just one element of space safety.
We need aggressive actions to mitigate the further creation of
orbital debris. We need a framework to define who moves where
and when in space, so-called space traffic management or space
traffic coordination.
And while the United States has led the world in actionable
SSA services and information, other nations are quickly getting
into the game and developing advanced approaches to SSA and
space traffic coordination. We can't afford to lose our edge.
Because while space safety is a global issue that requires
spacefaring nations to work together, we must continue to lead
the way.
I'm pleased that the Biden-Harris Administration is doing
just that by taking initial steps on norms of responsible
behavior, which includes their new recent announcement of a new
commitment by the U.S. Government not to conduct anti-satellite
missile testing, and this is in stark contrast to behavior of
some of our global adversaries.
This Subcommittee and the Full Committee are taking very
seriously the establishment of a robust, evolvable civil SSA.
We're currently working on the draft Space Safety and
Situational Awareness Transition Act of 2022. Today's hearing
will inform that process, and I look forward to working with my
friend, the Ranking Member Dr. Brian Babin, all our Members,
and the broader stakeholder community as we advance legislation
to address this pressing issue.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Beyer follows:]
Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing, ``Space
Situational Awareness: Guiding the Transition to a Civil
Capability.'' I want to thank our distinguished panel of
witnesses for being here today.
I'm pleased that we are finally able to hold this important
hearing. Previously scheduled hearing dates had to be postponed
due changes to the House voting schedule and a memorial service
for a former House Member.
Today, we are here and ready to discuss this urgent issue-
Space Situational Awareness or SSA. SSA is the ability to
identify, understand, and predict the locations of objects in
space so that potential collision risks can be calculated and
shared with operators.
The growth in space activity has made SSA crucial. Space-
enabled services like communications, national security
activities, banking, weather forecasting, and Earth imaging
depend on the ability of systems to operate safely in space.
However, safety is far from guaranteed.
Mega constellations of thousands of satellites are creating
orbital congestion, and orbital debris from past missions-and
reckless anti-satellite tests-are compounding the risks of
operating in space. The sustainability of the space environment
is in peril if we don't act.
Understanding and mitigating the risks starts with SSA.
While the DOD has been providing SSA services and
information to space operators for decades, the increasing
complexity of the SSA function, the resources required to
manage it, and the need for ongoing improvements are becoming
an increasing burden.
In 2018, Space Policy Directive-3 recognized the need for a
civil agency to carry out basic SSA capabilities so that the
DOD can focus on its national security mission.
I couldn't agree more. How will a transition from a DOD-
based system to a fully operational, civil SSA capability
occur?
Some entities suggest that commercial companies can perform
the civil SSA function and already do so, albeit on a smaller
scale.
Others argue the problem has been studied to death and we
need to get on with it.
First, we need to know exactly what we're getting on with,
because the transition to civil SSA remains unclear.
What functions and responsibilities should be
transitioned?
What SSA data are needed and who will provide it?
What services and information, and at what level,
will the civil capability provide?
And what roles will the government have and where
should the commercial sector contribute?
The current approach to civil SSA is the Department of
Commerce's Office of Space Commerce open architecture data
repository-OADR. In 2021, the Office demonstrated its OADR
protype to enable SSA data sharing among government and
commercial space operators. For Fiscal Year 2023, the Office is
requesting a whopping 550 percent increase toward bringing the
pilot to an operational capability.
How the OADR would evolve, however, is an open question.
The path forward for civil SSA has not been defined, and it
needs to be to avoid the mistakes of past programs gone awry.
DOD's own attempts to upgrade its legacy SSA systems ended
up in nearly a billion dollars spent and a decade lost before
the agency cancelled the JMS program.
Today's hearing will examine the questions, actions, and
issues that must be addressed to enable an effective
transition.
For starters, it's clear we need a plan to move quickly.
And while SSA is an essential first step, it is just one
element of space safety.
We also need aggressive actions to mitigate the further
creation of orbital debris.
And we need a framework to define who moves where and when
in space-so-called space traffic management or space traffic
coordination.
While the U.S. has led the world in actionable SSA services
and information, other nations are quickly getting into the
game and developing advanced approaches to SSA and space
traffic coordination.
We can't afford to lose our edge. Because while space
safety is a global issue that requires spacefaring nations work
together, we must continue to lead the way. I'm pleased that
the Biden-Harris Administration is doing just that by taking
initial steps on norms of responsible behavior, which includes
their recent announcement of a new commitment by the U.S.
government not to conduct direct-ascent anti-satellite missile
testing, a stark contrast with the behavior of some of our
global adversaries.
I want to thank our witnesses again for being here and I
look forward to your testimony. Establishing a robust,
evolvable civil SSA capability is an essential part of space
safety and one the Subcommittee and Committee are taking very
seriously.
The Subcommittee is currently working on the ``Space Safety
and Situational Awareness Transition Act of 2022'' and today's
hearing will inform that process. I look forward to working
with Ranking Member Babin and Members of the Subcommittee and
Committee and the broader stakeholder community as we advance
legislation to address this pressing issue.
Chairman Beyer. And with that, let me now recognize our
Ranking Member, the good gentleman from Texas, Dr. Babin.
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Chairman Beyer. I really appreciate
your leadership.
This Committee has focused on Space Situational Awareness,
or SSA, for several years. We've held numerous hearings and
considered two significant pieces of legislation: the American
Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, which passed the House by
voice vote, and the American Space Situational Awareness and
Framework for Entity Management Act. These efforts by the
Committee informed the development of Space Policy Directive
No. 3, which called for the Department of Defense to transfer
its current responsibility to share SSA data to the Department
of Commerce.
The debris created by a recent Russian anti-satellite test
highlights why SSA remains an important issue. As I said at our
Subcommittee's hearing in 2020, near-misses in space attract
media attention and calls for draconian regulations, but
overreacting could be just as detrimental to our Nation's space
enterprise. There are, however, some important issues that I
think we can still all agree on.
First, we need better data. The information the government
and the private sector rely on to make sound decision
absolutely needs to be improved. Uncertainty is too high, which
could lead to unnecessary alerts and unpredicted conjunctions.
As a result, the private sector is stepping up to the plate.
They are developing cost-effective, timely, and accurate SSA
data and services, often relying on off-the-shelf and non-
military technologies. In some cases, commercial capabilities
are superior to DOD's. This is good news for America and for
the global community, and we should foster the growth of these
nascent industries.
Secondly, the Department of Commerce is the right agency
for the job. I am closely following Commerce's plans to stand
up this capability. They don't need to create a bloated
bureaucracy. Nor should they duplicate DOD's existing
architecture or reinvent the wheel by building new systems and
sensors. They should just be a commercial storefront that takes
the government's data, integrates it with any necessary
commercial and operator data, and makes that information
available to the public through commercial architectures. We
aren't ready for ``space traffic management'' or being a
``traffic cop in space.''
Instead, we should elevate the Office of Space Commerce out
of NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) so
that they can better coordinate across the Department and
throughout the government and internationally as well. Commerce
already houses several agencies that are relevant to space. I
will list a few: NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology), BIS (Bureau of Industry and Security), ITA
(International Trade Administration), NTIA (National
Telecommunications and Information Administration), and the
National Weather Service, and NOAA. Elevating the Office is key
to their long-term success.
Commerce also has a history of partnering with the private
sector to nurture emerging industries. Commerce stood up the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or ICANN,
through a contract with a non-profit organization. ICANN was
the organization responsible for developing policies,
coordinating best practices, and managing the processes that
led to a stable internet that we enjoy today.
We've already seen the space community adopt a similar
approach on their own. Several years ago, operators founded the
Space Data Association (SDA) to share information and improve
safety. The SDA demonstrates how the private sector can
collaborate and innovate. More recently, the Space Safety
Coalition was established to provide similar capabilities for
operators in low-Earth orbit (LEO).
The third issue we should all agree on is that we need to
develop better standards and practices. And rather than
imposing a top-down regulatory burden on an emerging sector, we
should adopt a crawl, walk, run approach. NASA (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration), while not a regulator,
has a long history of demonstrating responsible behavior and
researching orbital mechanics. NASA, along with academia and
the private sector, can play an important role in advancing our
understanding of the orbital domain, as well as facilitating
the development of non-binding consensus-based standards, best
practices, and customs.
This could be done similarly to how NASA developed internal
orbital debris mitigation standard practices that eventually
informed the international Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee's space debris mitigation guidelines.
These standards and best practices could also be augmented by
contributions from the insurance industry, similar to the role
that they played in the very early days of maritime shipping.
We have a lot to learn about how to operate in space, but I
am very optimistic. I believe that we can all work together to
ensure space remains a safe and prosperous domain without
smothering the private sector with burdensome regulations or
crowding out of commercial solutions.
So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to
an interesting panel of witnesses. And I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Babin follows:]
This Committee has focused on Space Situational Awareness,
or ``SSA,'' for several years. We've held numerous hearings and
considered two significant pieces of legislation: the American
Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act, which passed the House by
voice vote, and the American Space Situational Awareness and
Framework for Entity Management Act. These efforts by the
Committee informed the development of Space Policy Directive 3,
which called for the Department of Defense to transfer its
current responsibility to share SSA data to the Department of
Commerce.
The debris created by a recent Russian anti-satellite test
highlights why SSA remains an important issue. As I said at our
Subcommittee's hearing in 2020, near-misses in space attract
media attention and calls for draconian regulations, but
overreacting could be just as detrimental to our nation's space
enterprise. There are, however, some important issues I think
we can all still agree on.
First, we need better data. The information the government
and private sector rely on to make sound decisions needs to be
improved. Uncertainty is too high, which could lead to
unnecessary alerts and unpredicted conjunctions. As a result,
the private sector is stepping up to the plate. They are
developing cost-effective, timely, and accurate SSA data and
services, often relying on off-the-shelf and non-military
technologies. In some cases, commercial capabilities are
superior to DoD's. This is good news for America and for the
global community, and we should foster the growth of these
nascent industries.
Secondly, the Department of Commerce is the right agency
for the job. I am closely following Commerce's plans to stand
up this capability. They don't need to create a bloated
bureaucracy. Nor should they duplicate DoD's existing
architecture or reinvent the wheel by building new systems and
sensors. They should just be a ``commercial storefront'' that
takes the government's data, integrates it with any necessary
commercial and operator data, and makes that information
available to the public through commercial architectures. We
aren't ready for ``Space Traffic Management'' or a ``traffic
cop in space.''
Instead, we should elevate the Office of Space Commerce out
of NOAA so that they can better coordinate across the
Department, throughout the government, and internationally.
Commerce already houses several agencies that are relevant to
space - NIST, BIS, ITA, NTIA, the National Weather Service, and
NOAA. Elevating the Office is key to their long-term success.
Commerce also has a history of partnering with the private
sector to nurture emerging industries. Commerce stood up the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
through a contract with a non-profit organization. ICANN was
the organization responsible for developing policies,
coordinating best practices, and managing the processes that
led to a stable internet.
We've already seen the space community adopt a similar
approach on their own. Several years ago, operators founded the
Space Data Association to share information and improve safety.
The SDA demonstrates how the private sector can collaborate and
innovate.More recently, the Space Safety Coalition was
established to provide similar capabilities for operators in
low Earth orbit.
The third issue we should all agree on is that we need to
develop better standards and practices. Rather than imposing a
top-down regulatory burden on an emerging sector, we should
adopt a crawl, walk, run approach. NASA, while not a regulator,
has a long history of demonstrating responsible behavior and
researching orbital mechanics.
NASA, along with academia and the private sector, can play
an important role in advancing our understanding of the orbital
domain as well as facilitating the development of non-binding
consensus-based standards, best practices, and customs.
This could be done similar to how NASA developed internal
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices that eventually
informed the international Inter-Agency Space Debris
Coordination Committee's Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines.
These standards and best practices could also be augmented by
contributions from the insurance industry, similar to the role
they played in the early days of maritime shipping.
We have a lot to learn about how to operate in space, but I
am optimistic. I believe we can all work together to ensure
space remains a safe and prosperous domain without smothering
the private sector with burdensome regulations or crowding-out
commercial solutions.
Thank you and I look forward to an interesting panel.
Chairman Beyer. Dr. Babin, thank you very much.
I'd now like to ask for unanimous consent to enter into the
record a written statement from the Commercial Spaceflight
Federation. If there's no objection from Dr. Babin----
Mr. Babin. No objection.
Chairman Beyer. And if there are Members who wish to submit
additional opening statements, your statements will be added to
the record at this point or at any point during the hearing.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Johnson follows:]
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Beyer, for holding
today's hearing on space situational awareness, and thank you
to each of our witnesses for testifying today on this important
topic.
Some of you may recall that this Subcommittee has
previously held a hearing on the role of space situational
awareness - or SSA - in the sustainability of the overall space
environment. SSA involves collecting location data on space
objects, processing that data to understand how those space
objects move in space, and developing information to support
spacecraft operators so they can avoid collisions in space.
As the amount of space debris and number of satellites
orbiting the Earth have exponentially increased in recent
years, SSA is critically important to maintaining space safety
and ensuring that we continue to reap benefits on Earth from
monitoring, operating, and living in space.
Currently the Department of Defense has the authority to
publicly provide basic SSA information and notify space
operators of potential collisions. Transitioning some of these
services to a civilian authority is not a trivial task and
there are important questions that must be answered.
We need to ensure that a clear path is in place.
The role of a strong SSA civil capability to our future in
space is too important to risk limping along through a
transition. We need a plan to do this responsibly.
The civil SSA system is the foundation on which we will
build toward space traffic coordination. Our capability must
consider international engagement to ensure space safety and
sustainability in the years to come. The global community will
not watch and wait for the United States to take action. The
time is now.
I want to commend Chairman Beyer and Ranking Member Babin
for holding today's hearing. This Subcommittee has been working
hard on this topic and I look forward to the testimony and
discussion on the considerations for transitioning to a civil
space situational awareness capability.
Thank you, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lucas follows:]
Thank you, Chairman Beyer. Today's hearing on space
situational awareness is an important one. Russia's anti-
satellite launch this fall brought the issue of space debris
once again into mainstream discussion.
Fortunately, there were no collisions with the
International Space Station as some worried would happen, but
it did highlight the need for effective monitoring and
coordination of space objects and debris.
In the two years since we last held a hearing on this
topic, the commercial space situational awareness industry has
continued to expand. The market is predicted to grow to a $1.8
billion industry by 2026.
That growth is due to the innovation and effectiveness of
our commercial satellite operators and space data providers.
If we are to achieve our goal of effectively coordinating
space objects, accurately tracking space debris, and advancing
space safety, then we need to be sure we don't constrain the
commercial industry with poorly considered regulations.
The Department of Defense has been providing the lion's
share of space situational awareness information, but the
private sector has emerged as a valuable partner with
innovative solutions and services.
With the responsibility for sharing this data being
transferred to the Department of Commerce following Space
Policy Directive 3, it's more important that ever to encourage
private sector growth. This industry can fill critical gaps in
existing data, providing services, sensor data, and situational
awareness.
There is an ever-growing need for these services as more
and more industries discover its value.
So it's important that we don't take a heavy-handed
regulatory approach that will stifle this growing industry. If
the Department of Commerce adopts a clearinghouse approach,
then the government can partner with the private sector and
international community to share data and establish consensus-
based best practices and standards.
This will improve data availability and utility and allow
for better information and better services. I'm hopeful that
the Department of Commerce will take a pragmatic approach that
prioritizes growth and innovation rather than stifling
commercial development.
The best way to ensure this is by taking the Office of
Space Commerce out of NOAA and returning it to where it is
authorized - at the Department of Commerce. That will allow
them to provide better coordination and make full use of the
Department's resources.
I'm encouraged by the continued growth of the commercial
space industry and I'm hopeful that we can continue to
encourage that while improving our space situational awareness.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses today, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Beyer. At this time, I'd like to introduce our
witnesses, who are with us virtually. Dr. Matthew Hejduk is a
Senior Project Leader at the Aerospace Corporation and
currently serves as the Chief Engineer of the NASA Satellite
Conjunction Analysis Risk Assessment, or CARA, program. His
research interests include satellite conjunction assessment
techniques, satellite radar and optical signature modeling and
analysis, estimation theory, and Space Surveillance Network
modeling and simulation.
Dr. Moriba Jah is the Director of the Computational
Astronautical Sciences and Technologies Group at the University
of Texas (UT) at Austin where he is also an Associate Professor
of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics. His
research focuses on the convergence of policy, technology, and
security related to space traffic management and space
situational awareness. Prior to being at UT Austin, Dr. Jah
worked at the University of Arizona, the Air Force Research
Laboratory, and NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
Dr. Andrew D'Uva serves as the Strategy and Policy Advisor
of the Space Data Association, or SDA, a nonprofit space
traffic management organization. Mr. D'Uva led efforts to
create the legal and data-sharing frameworks of the SDA and has
supported international commercial satellite and
telecommunications businesses for more than two decades with
the present emphasis on government services, space
sustainability, and cybersecurity.
Mr. Kevin O'Connell is the Founder and CEO (Chief Executive
Officer) of Space Economy Rising, LLC, and has over 35 years of
experience in the U.S. Government and research organizations
and is an entrepreneur and business leader. His prior U.S.
Government assignments include positions at DOD, the Department
of State, and the National Security Council, the Office of the
Vice President, the Office of the Director of Central
Intelligence, and, most recently, as the Director of the Office
of Space Commerce within the Department of Commerce.
Dr. Mariel Borowitz is an Associate Professor in the Sam
Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech. Her
research deals with international space policy issues,
including international cooperation, Earth-observing
satellites, and satellite data-sharing policies. She also
focuses on strategies and developments in space security and
space situational awareness.
As our witnesses should know, you will each have five
minutes for your spoken testimony. Your written testimony,
which could be significantly longer, is--will be included in
the record for the hearing. And when you've all completed your
spoken testimony, we will begin with Member questions. Each
Member will have five minutes to question the panel.
So we will start with Dr. Matthew Hejduk. Dr. Hejduk, the
floor or the Zoom is yours.
TESTIMONY OF DR. MATTHEW HEJDUK,
SENIOR PROJECT LEADER, THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION
Dr. Hejduk. Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member Babin,
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to join this discussion. I'm on the staff of the
Aerospace Corporation, a nonprofit, federally funded research
and development center (FFRDC) whose purpose is to provide
advice to the government on all aspects of the Nation's space
enterprise. The full 33 years of my career in the aerospace
discipline have been dedicated to space situational awareness,
the last decade of which as a subject matter expert for the
orbital safety mission for NASA. It is a great pleasure to give
testimony today on the subject that has constituted my life's
work.
The very title of this hearing testifies to the consensus,
both on the part of the government and within industry, of the
need to transition the U.S. Government's support of the civil
and commercial orbital safety mission, which is the principal
nonmilitary use of space situational awareness to a civil
agency. The remaining question is the best way to do this that
provides needed capability while promoting a healthy synergy of
government and private industrial roles.
The orbital safety mission, which is the process of keeping
active spacecraft from colliding with space debris and with
each other, is divided into three parts: satellite conjunction
screenings, which look several days into the future to
determine which satellites will come within close proximity of
each other; conjunction risk assessment, which determines which
of these close approaches actually presents a high risk of
collision; and conjunction mitigation planning, which plans a
satellite maneuver to avoid the high-risk close approach.
In support of civil and commercial space, the DOD actually
performs only the first part. These satellite owner-operators
presently look to their own resources to perform the latter two
parts. The first transition steps should thus be simply to
transfer what the DOD is doing presently for civil and
commercial operators to the new civil agency using the DOD
precision space catalog and the existing DOD algorithm for
conjunction screening modified slightly to accommodate a modern
computer architecture with a modern and automated user
interface.
This part of the process is the most basic and would
benefit least from innovation, will serve as a good confidence-
building measure among owner-operators, and relies entirely on
technology proven over decades. The regular export of the
declassified version of the DOD precision catalog for use
elsewhere in the U.S. Government is already an established and
proven procedure.
Once this first step is established and working, the latter
two parts of the orbital safety process can be considered.
These tasks are, for many owner-operators, performed either
internally or by private industry. This is an excellent
opportunity to continue to encourage the SSA industrial sector
by allowing such companies to use the civil agency's automated
user interface and receive data directly for their owner-
operator customers.
An additional industrial opportunity hosted as part of the
user interface could be to provide the basic conjunction
screening service but with more flexibility and extremely low
time latency. The basic free service modeled after the DOD
would thus continue, but owner-operators who would benefit from
advanced services can obtain them from private industry
facilitated by the civil agency.
One worrisome gap in the current process is its inability
to accommodate satellites that perform autonomous flight
control, including autonomous orbital safety actions without
any necessary contact with their ground systems. The SpaceX
Starlink constellation operates this way, and it will
undoubtedly become a favored mechanism for large
constellations. Special orbital safety solutions are needed for
autonomous systems, and the civil agency can take the lead
perhaps through a government-industry partnership to develop
and implement a durable solution.
The availability of commercial SSA data offers exciting
opportunities to improve the orbital safety mission through
increased data availability, and these opportunities should
definitely be embraced. The acquisition of commercial SSA data
should, however, be targeted. Not all orbit regimes or objects
will benefit appreciably from additional SSA data, and only
certain narrow orbital safety objectives will be advanced by an
expanded space catalog that contains additional small objects.
Finally, while the transition of the execution of the
orbital safety mission is important, overshadowing this is the
great need to establish standards, guidelines, and norms of
behavior for safe satellite operation. The lack of a
reasonable, analytically grounded set of such norms, integrated
with the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) and FCC (Federal
Communications Commission) licensing process, is the
circumstance perhaps doing the most injury to orbital safety at
present. Progress in this area cannot wait for the transition
of the orbital safety mission execution to complete. It must be
pursued immediately.
This concludes my prepared remarks, and I'm happy to
entertain any questions the Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hejduk follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much, Doctor.
And we now recognize Dr. Moriba Jah for his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF DR. MORIBA JAH,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, AEROSPACE ENGINEERING
AND ENGINEERING MECHANICS DEPARTMENT,
MRS. PEARLIE DASHIELL HENDERSON
CENTENNIAL FELLOWSHIP IN ENGINEERING,
ODEN INSTITUTE FOR COMPUTATIONAL ENGINEERING
AND SCIENCES, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Dr. Jah. Thank you very much, Mr. Subcommittee Chairman
Beyer, Mr. Ranking Member Babin. It's good to see you again and
hear your voice today, other Members of this Subcommittee.
Thank you so much for the invitation to appear before you today
live in from the Space Object Situation Room here at the
University of Texas at Austin.
And, you know, I've testified a couple of times. I'm glad
to see that we're finally able to do this today. And I love all
the people here that are also witnesses with me. I know them
personally and professionally, so it's great to be with them.
Let's talk about a couple of things. Look, we started
launching things in 1957. We track, you know, 30,000-plus
objects ranging in size from cell phone all the way to the
space station. The number of operational satellites that we had
just 2 years ago has doubled in the last like 2 years. So
basically it's like if you look at all the operational
satellites that we had, you know, somewhere around this time in
2020 and the number of operational satellites now, that's
almost doubled in just 2 years. That's not a bad thing. That's
good. We got some global internet. We've seen some of this--the
benefits of that actually to support folks in the war in
Ukraine and these sorts of things, so there's positive aspects
of increasing space traffic for sure. And we're not going to
stop launching satellites.
We see people going and taking suborbital flights. We see
commercial entities now rendezvousing with the space station,
that sort of stuff, more activity. People that have lots of
resources going up to space, that's a great sign. We need to
see more of that.
What are the not-so-good things? Oh, I don't know, you
know, people like Russia blowing up their own satellite and
basically causing all this debris that now is a hazard to human
spaceflight. I've heard that the Starlink satellites that fall
under the United States SpaceX have had to maneuver--I think
since the Russians blew up this stuff in November, almost 2,000
times these things have had to get out of the way. That's not
so good.
When people talk about conjunctions and possible
collisions, all these great commercial capabilities, they're
awesome but, you know, they're all opinions. So the thing is
when one commercial entity says, hey, get out of the way, the
DOD might say, oh, that's really, you know, a nothing burger.
You know, those aren't the droids you're looking for. That's
not a problem. Somebody else says, well, it's kind of a problem
but not so much, so there's lots of ambiguity. There's lots of
opinions. There are disparate sources of evidence. There's not
a combined, aggregated pool of evidence by which to draw
consistent interpretations or opinions about what's going on in
space.
We see the Chinese saying, oh, you know, to the United
Nations, well, you know, basically Starlinks were a hazard,
U.S. saying, oh, based on our evidence, not so much. I think
you kind of get the point. We see astronomers negatively
impacted by space traffic and actually discovering natural
phenomenon that really were satellites that were glinting at
the time. I don't know, I looked at this movie, you know, Don't
Look Up, I'm kind of worried about near-Earth asteroids
because, you know, I'm allergic to things like hitting the
Earth and ending all life. And our ability to detect these
things is now hindered by more and more things that are
reflecting sunlight getting in the way and confusing stuff.
This is all to say transitioning this to a civil entity is
critical if we want to be able to sustain our way of life, if
we want to be able to support space commerce, if we want to be
able to support space exploration. And so one of the main goals
of this transition has to be measurably making space more
transparent. What's up there, who does it belong to, what can
it do, making space more predictable, where are things going to
be, and given any situation between two entities, can we
predict how they'll behave and what they'll do with the
information provided to them? And then last but not least, can
we develop a body of evidence that's consistent, that is
accurate, that's timely, that can be used to help people be
safe, more secure, and more sustainable and hold them
accountable for their behaviors in space?
That's what we need this civil entity to do. That's what we
need the Office of Space Commerce to do. And that is my hope
that, you know, from this gathering that we have here today and
talking about these things, that we're able to advance that in
a way that is very credible. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jah follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Beyer. Dr. Jah, thank you very much. And thank you
for the graphs in your testimony, fascinating.
We'll next hear from Mr. D'Uva for his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. ANDREW D'UVA,
SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR, SPACE DATA ASSOCIATION
Mr. D'Uva. Thank you. Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member Babin,
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you on this important topic
for the United States and for the people worldwide.
Space systems are now undeniably essential to our way of
life. For example, U.S. private sector capabilities effectively
and affordably deliver crew and cargo to the ISS for NASA.
Global public communications and remote imagery depends on
commercial satellites. More than 100,000 new spacecraft
applications have been filed through 2029, and 32 percent of
all payloads since 1957 have been launched within the past 4
years.
As noted in my testimony, nations and operators each have
reasons to avoid collisions in Earth orbit. Space situational
awareness, or SSA, capabilities are foundational to managing
this shared risk. In 2009, following the Iridium-Cosmos
collision and lack of adequate SSA support from government
agencies, commercial satellite operators established the Space
Data Association, or SDA. The SDA is an open, nonprofit, risk-
management entity dedicated to safety of flight and space
sustainability. SDA's 30 stakeholder participants include
leading fiercely competitive commercial and civil satellite
communications, weather, and imagery operators.
Since 2011, SDA has offered the world's first private
cooperative space traffic coordination service operating our
Space Data Center, or SDC, at 99.99 percent reliability. I must
stress it was developed without any government funds. The SDC
now protects 769 spacecraft in multiple orbital regimes with
over 50 percent of the GEO (geostationary) active spacecraft
and 423 LEO and MEO (medium-Earth orbit) spacecraft
participated. Operators contribute data, enabling the SDC to
generate actionable, forward-looking collision warnings,
deconflict plan maneuvers, and securely share SSA information.
In my testimony I note that SDA pioneered many traits that
are now widely accepted as modern SSA system baselines. In
fact, SDA's processes and products augmented and improved on
DOD's products to the extent that NOAA and NASA became early
and continuing SDA subscribers. SDA probably collaborates with
and contributes operator data daily to the DOD's CSpOC
(Combined Space Operations Center).
We achieve results using only U.S. commercial entities and
technologies, including the foundational SSA analytics engine
that fuses, normalizes, and transforms disparate data into
usable knowledge. As further described in my testimony, new
space operational paradigms seriously challenge legacy flight
safety capabilities. Safety requires DOC to qualitatively
improve on legacy DOD products for SSA in conjunction to
assessment. SDA helped conceive and conduct the data fusion
exercise through Space Coordination Traffic and Management in
September 2020, including NOAA for participation, which
indisputably demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of
U.S. private sector analytic capabilities in partnership with
government.
Accordingly, SDA is disappointed that since early 2021 the
Office of Space Commerce's work, informed by the strategic plan
which was endorsed by the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) and Congress in 2020, appears to have
been shelved, perpetuating unavoidable--excuse me, avoidable
risks and delays. Speaking from SDA's operator support
perspective, DOC have not conducted satellite operator industry
days, stated how they intend to incorporate satellite operator
data, and improve on DOD's products. Instead, they turned
inward, taking a government system development approach with
Federal research and development centers.
Developing new government systems is too risky and slow,
and it's unnecessary. The DOC's prior commercial partnership
vision responded to specific commercial and civil satellite
needs for timely and actionable SSA data and space traffic
management services. These services are essential to securing
space-safe operations, preserving U.S. leadership, and enabling
increased use of space.
Let me suggest three actions we take. First, we should
establish a clear 1-, 5-, and 10-year vision for DOC's delivery
of space traffic coordination capabilities, including fee-free
based--basic services and data. Require DOC to promote not
compete with U.S. private sector SSA data and analytics
providers. DOC should contract existing technically mature,
validated commercial capabilities to provide services, not try
to develop them. We cannot risk waiting for U.S. Government
development, and international competition is fierce.
Second, require DOC to qualitatively improve on today's DOD
products to ensure DOC products are sufficient for safety and
sustainability. For example, Congress could require DOC to use
validated U.S. commercial technology to reprocess observational
data from government SSA sensors such as the Space Surveillance
Network and adjust operator data to drive timely and actionable
information. This will leverage over $1 billion being spent
annually.
And third, Congress should curtail public investments to
redevelop or study needs for near-or midterm government SSA
data and STM processing capabilities where private sector
capabilities exist.
Thank you very much for your attention, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Uva follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Beyer. Thank you, sir, very much.
We'll now hear from Mr. O'Connell for his testimony.
TESTIMONY OF MR. KEVIN M. O'CONNELL,
FOUNDER, SPACE ECONOMY RISING, LLC
Mr. O'Connell. Good morning, Chairman Beyer and Ranking
Member Babin. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before--
again before the Committee to talk about U.S. leadership in
space safety and sustainability.
Today, while I'm representing my own views on this topic,
I'm also a member of a group of experts organized by the
American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics or AIAA.
AIAA sent a letter to the Committee last October, and I have
resubmitted it along with my prepared testimony.
Mr. Chairman, the need for the United States to create a
civil SSA capability is as urgent and as compelling as ever. As
part of it, there's a need to fully leverage commercial
providers in the interest of making rapid progress, ensuring
compatibility with space operators and allies, and the ability
to leverage massive private investments in information
technology and other areas. Safety is fundamental to all space
operations and is the key enabler of the extraordinary
opportunities we expect in the space economy. One of the most
important benefits, as you've already mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
is that it will free up the U.S. Space Force to focus further
on its national security missions.
The Biden Administration has reaffirmed the principles in
Space Policy Directive 3, which acknowledged the urgency of the
problem, mandated a whole-of-government approach to mitigating
it, and recognized the critical importance of working with
industry and international partners.
I would like to emphasize two key points on the shift to a
civil SSA system. First, it's often thought that the mission
given to the Department of Commerce and SPD 3 was to replicate
or simply shift the DOD system over to a civil agency. While
some linkages do need to be incorporated, a civil SSA system
will have to be adaptive enough to accommodate rapid changes in
space over the next few years such as the projections of
100,000 satellites and new complex missions like satellite
servicing. It will have to be a state-of-the-art system in
order to accomplish this.
Second, there's sometimes a perception that the ultimate
goal is improving conjunction warnings. While it is certainly
the most immediate goal, accomplishing that will actually
enable wholly new services related to space sustainability. For
example, the historic decision to unlock the military GPS
(Global Positioning System) signal fueled the development of
commercial services that we use dozens of times every single
day. Another natural beneficiary of a civil and commercial SSA
system would be the space insurance industry, as more open data
will inform their risk models and improve all of our
understanding about risk in space.
Aside from U.S. debris mitigation policy, national space
policy not only directs U.S. leadership in commercial space
activities, but the Federal agencies play a key role in
encouraging it. Hardly a week goes by without a major report or
expert opinion expressing concern that the government is not
moving fast enough to leverage commercial capabilities.
In my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman, I've highlighted
almost 30 years of observations on commercial satellite
imagery, which I might describe as a long and challenging path
to government adoption. The problem is many see it on space
debris is that we're out of time. We don't have 30 years to
deal with this problem, and we don't want to have this
conversation in the wake of a terrible accident in space.
The United States has a diverse and impressive group of
companies focused on SSA and related capabilities. Some are
focused on unique sensing of the space environment from Earth,
and they'll soon be joined by space-based sensors to detect,
track, and provide insights into the behavior of debris and
other space objects. These companies are staffed with world-
class talent, and all are leveraging world-class capabilities
in data management, analytics, and other areas that form the
basis for critical decisions in healthcare, finance, and other
areas. Some are already under contract to NOAA and the Space
Force. We can leverage these capabilities immediately.
International cooperation is key. Because of the growing
concern about the space debris challenge, our allies in the
United Kingdom and Europe and Japan are moving independently,
including leveraging of and encouraging their commercial
organizations. Russia and China on the other hand are advancing
their own initiatives as they sense an opportunity to challenge
decades of unquestioned American leadership in this area.
As we create a new civil SSA capability, simply making
token commercial purchases will not be enough. There's nothing
wrong with the government being a first customer so long as
it's not the only customer. The large, slow, traditional
government approach will not work here mainly because of the
speed at which the space-based debris problem is changing.
Worse, it could wind up stifling exactly the broad-based
innovation that we need urgently right now.
A civil SSA system constructed with these ideas in mind
will support key U.S. Government missions while also
encouraging the growth of a new and important commercial--as
part of this commercial space industry. At a time of great
concern about America's ability to compete against our
adversaries while still being able to unlock the tremendous
opportunity of space, we need a new outlook and new ways to
harness the speed, agility, and anticipation of the private
sector.
Congress has not been silent on these issues. In the past,
Congress has been pivotal in telling the executive branch not
to build what it can buy in the market. This is--as I
understand it, this is being discussed right now in conference
as part of U.S. Innovation and Competition Act. I would urge
Congress to fund, demand expediency, and oversee proper
execution of a civil SSA capability on--that capitalizes on the
themes that I've highlighted in my testimony today.
Thank you again for the invitation to participate, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connell follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Mr. O'Connell, very much.
And finally, we'll hear from Dr. Mariel Borowitz. Dr.
Borowitz?
TESTIMONY OF DR. MARIEL BOROWITZ,
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, SAM NUNN SCHOOL
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
IVAN ALLEN COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS,
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Borowitz. Thank you. Chairman Beyer, Ranking Member
Babin, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I want to
thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on this
important topic.
Space assets are critical to the global and U.S. economy,
as well as U.S. national security, and one of the most
fundamental missions for ensuring safety, security, and
sustainability of space is space situational awareness, or SSA.
Right now, the U.S. Department of Defense operates the most
advanced SSA system in the world. With the rapid growth of
activity in space and particularly commercial activity, there's
been a recognition that some components of the SSA mission
should be transitioned to a civil agency. However, as we've
heard, there are still a number of important decisions to be
made in relation to this transition. So in my testimony I want
to focus on two key issues: mission definition and commercial
engagement.
So with respect to mission definition, a decision needs to
be made about which elements of the SSA mission will be taken
on by a civil agency. SSA requires collection of raw data, data
processing and fusion to create a catalog of space objects,
analysis to identify potential collisions in space and
determine their likelihood, and the provision of the resulting
warnings to space operators around the world. At the very
least, a civil agency would need to take on that last part of
the mission. A civil agency would be the main point of contact
and the prime interface for U.S. SSA capabilities for the
world.
However, there are benefits to having a civil agency do
more. A civil agency that generates its own raw data from civil
or commercial sensors, generates its own independent space
object catalog, and generates its own conjunction warnings can
be much more open and transparent about these activities than
the U.S. military. When the United States is transparent about
the data and algorithms it uses, this facilitates trust and
encourages international partners and commercial satellite
operators to rely on U.S. data, strengthening U.S. influence
and leadership in this area.
Openness and transparency also allow the United States to
better leverage the commercial and academic communities. When
government data is freely available, entrepreneurs can use the
data as building blocks to create new and innovative products
and services. Similarly, researchers with access to SSA data
and algorithms can carry out research that improves U.S. space
situational awareness capabilities overall. We've seen this
open data model work well in weather and in remote sensing
where we have open data sharing by the government and thriving
commercial sectors. And it applies in the case of SSA as well.
The second issue I want to touch on is commercial
engagement. A civil agency will be well-suited to leverage the
strengths of the commercial SSA sector. However, it must
determine how best to do so, which function, products, and
services should be provided by the government and what should
be done by the commercial sector. I would argue that the
government should focus on providing timely, precise, and
accurate conjunction warnings to all space operators globally,
as well as open access to underlying data and analysis to the
greatest extent possible. Some of the data needed to support
these efforts should be purchased from commercial entities.
Commercial entities should also provide tailored SSA services
directly to customers. This division of responsibilities would
best contribute to the long-term safety and sustainability of
space. It would serve U.S. national interests, maximize overall
socioeconomic benefits, and promote innovative--innovation in
the commercial sector.
Let me tell--explain a little bit more about why I think
that's the case. So nearly half of all operational objects in
space are owned by the United States. The United States is the
most reliant on space objects for its economy and national
security, and therefore, providing these high-quality warnings
that help satellite operators avoid collisions and ensure the
long-term sustainability of space is really in the U.S.
national interest.
Safety is also an important government mission. An example
from the weather sector is useful here. The United States has a
thriving commercial weather sector that's capable of producing
a wide variety of products and services, and yet the government
provides forecasts, severe weather watches and warnings for
free. If tornado warnings had to be purchased from the private
sector, surely there's lots of people that would buy them.
However, the National Weather Service continues to provide the
highest quality warnings free of charge. And this is because
the government has a responsibility to ensure that all people
have access to this critical safety information. And the same
is true for SSA.
Third, and discussed earlier, open data and open science
allow the United States to unleash the entrepreneurial and
research communities, and that helps to maximize socioeconomic
benefits. In this framework, commercial entities have a
significant role to play. Commercial entities provide those
tailored SSA services similar to what's done in the value-added
weather center. They may also sell data to the government that
can be incorporated into government SSA capabilities. And this
would ensure that the U.S. Government can benefit from the
innovation occurring in that sector and that that strategic
sector will continue to flourish in the United States.
The transition of an SSA capability to a civil agency can
enable the United States to strengthen its global leadership in
this area and more effectively leverage its commercial and
research communities. With an organized, efficient, and
transparent civil SSA system, the United States will be able to
lay the path for a safe and sustainable space environment.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify on this
important topic, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Borowitz follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Beyer. Dr. Borowitz, thank you very much.
This concludes our five presentations, and we will begin
our round of questions. Let me start with Dr. Borowitz.
It's pretty clear from these five testimonies that the
primary, conflict is probably too strong a word perhaps, but
the thicket to work our way through is what should be the
Department of Space Commerce's responsibility and what can be
drawn from the private sector, the commercial thing. You
mentioned that it doesn't make a lot of sense to have two U.S.
agencies conducting that very similar missions. What role do
you see for Department of Space Commerce or whatever civil
agency ends up with the responsibility to conduct its own
analysis when there apparently are a number of private sector
entities capable of doing the analysis instead?
Dr. Borowitz. Sure. Thank you for the question. So I think
that there are a lot of ways that the United States can
structure the way it builds that system. And I think certainly
we should be leveraging the commercial sector. The key thing is
the product that comes out of it, those conjunction warnings,
those need to be freely available to the operators, right?
Those need to be provided without any service fee. And the
other thing that I think is important to focus on is the amount
of transparency that we can provide. So while I think we should
leverage the commercial sector and potentially even for some
elements of the analysis, I think we want to be careful about
having a completely opaque system. So if it's done by a
commercial entity that then can't share any of the underlying
data or algorithms or things they do, that would really limit
some of the benefits I think we get from moving to a civil
system and being able to be more open and transparent than what
we had with the military.
Chairman Beyer. Great. Thank you. Let me pivot to Mr. D'Uva
on essentially the same issue. You've talked about the--what--
the civilian SSA capability and how your Space Data Center has
put together, you know, a great U.S. space catalog and you're
willing to share this. How would you respond to the issue of
the openness of the data? And I know this is a Committee where
in a very bipartisan way we like as much open data as possible.
And also on the fees, is there not a structure in which the
Federal Government could be paying in some cases the commercial
sector to develop this and then make it free to the American
public?
Mr. D'Uva. Yes, thank you for the question. I think that
there--it's important that the Federal Government, Department
of Commerce, Office of Space Commerce be seen as the provider
of the capability, right, and that underlying capability can be
provided commercially and transparently. We've seen this in the
SDC where we have a lot of discussion and dialog with the
users, with the satellite operators. They want to know how the
processes work and how that--you know, how those warnings are
derived. They also want to ensure that when they are--we are
forward-looking in the SDA. We're not just looking at the sky
and saying, well, what might happen. Operators also contribute
maneuver data, so we can forecast what will happen based on
operator intentions. And that doesn't happen anywhere else. So
that's an important capability and why there needs to be a
single fusion center.
But transparency and openness are critical, and it's one of
the reasons that DOD needs to keep doing what it's doing with
its own capabilities and the civil and commercial capability
and data center has to be built from a lot of the same inputs
but with more transparency while respecting national security
equities.
Chairman Beyer. And, Dr. D'Uva--or Mr. D'Uva, under this
responsibility, who's got the responsibility for safety issues?
Is it the commercial entity that's providing the data or is the
government, Department of Commerce, as the one transmitting it
to the public and to the various users?
Mr. D'Uva. I believe that it should be the government
itself that takes on the responsibility of ensuring that there
are quality products available globally to users in space. And
that derives from the fact that the United States has
liability, as other nation-states do, under the relevant treaty
frameworks for actions undertaken by their private-sector
operators in space. It's just in the U.S. interest to ensure
the highest quality safety products are made available as
broadly as possible.
Chairman Beyer. Dr. Jah, you talked about accuracy is not
enough, you also need to have precision. And the precision has
to deal with uncertainty around how accurate things are. Is
there a specific recommendation coming from this insight that's
relevant to this discussion?
Dr. Jah. Absolutely. You know, there are these things
called dimensions of data quality. It's a formalism, along
with, again, accuracy, validity, completeness, uniqueness of
the data. I think these are the things that Office of Space
Commerce needs to be able to do, and it's inherently
governmental, just like, you know, Andrew, you know, just said
in terms of, you know, helping ensure the best quality products
out there. It's not so good to just give opinions about where
stuff is in space and how things might behave but there's
ambiguity. And every single decision is actually made based on
this ambiguity, based on this notion of uncertainty because we
don't know the truth. Error is the difference between what we
predict and reality, we don't necessarily know what reality is
because our sources of information are biased, they're corrupt,
they're incomplete.
And so I think this is really the importance of--you know,
this civil SSA capability is to aggregate all these different
opinions and sources of information from this aggregated set.
Use this to actually remove ignorance and ambiguity so that the
precision can actually converge on something that's usable in a
very meaningful way.
Chairman Beyer. Great. Thank you, Dr. Jah, very much.
Let me now recognize the Congressman from Florida, Mr.
Posey, for his questions, making the leap of faith that Mr.
Posey is with us virtually.
OK. Let me now then turn to the other Congressman from
Florida, Mr. Webster, for his questions.
Mr. Webster. Thank you, Chair.
I don't know enough about this to ask a question, but I'd
like to focus in, Dr. Borowitz, the--what's the specific
research priorities that the Federal Government should invest
in to advance SAA capabilities?
Dr. Borowitz. Sure. Thank you for the question. So I think
there are a number of things that we can do. I think there were
mentions in a number of the testimonies of some of the
technical areas where we can improve the types of data, look at
which types of data are most useful, look at the algorithms
we're doing--using to do that data fusion, look at the
algorithms we do to see if collisions are going to happen,
improve, as Moriba said, both the accuracy and the precision,
other kind of elements of that data. So I think there's a lot
of work still that we can do there.
As someone coming from a school of international affairs, I
think there's also work we can do on the social science side
that will be important to look at how we organize this system
both within the United States and how we engage in
international cooperation in this area. It really is an
inherently international issue, and it's something we want to
be on the same page with other nations about, so I think
there's work in both areas.
Mr. Webster. So how do we ensure that this doesn't do any
harm to the commercial opportunities?
Dr. Borowitz. Sure. So I think, you know, the United States
has this really impressive SSA commercial industry already. And
we certainly want to acknowledge that and build on that. So I
think as this moves forward, you know, working closely with
that industry, making sure we understand what the opportunities
are for the industry is going to be important.
I think we do have models for doing this in a productive
way. I mentioned the weather industry and remote sensing where
we have the government playing a really important role. The
government collects weather data, it analyzes weather data, it
puts out forecasts, it puts out warnings, and yet we have a
huge commercial weather industry in the United States, very
successful and growing. And they work closely together, the
commercial industry and the government. And so I think there is
good precedent for that. It can be done. I think it should be
done, you know, very purposefully and carefully, but I think we
have some good models for that.
Mr. Webster. Yes. So we had a--we've had a hearing on just
the weather issue. It was pretty impressive. So can these items
be separated out and--or do they have to work with other
things, not necessarily related to weather, to make sure this
all works?
Dr. Borowitz. Sure. So I think, you know, the SSA industry
is going to be separate from the weather industry but just can
have some lessons learned from the way things have been
structured there. But in terms of coordinating what are the
roles of the government versus commercial, I think the key
thing is for the government to continue to provide the
conjunction warnings, those warnings of potential collisions,
to global users free of charge. And like I said in my
testimony, that's in the U.S. national interest. We really
don't want to have debris created in space. We won't don't want
to have those collisions, so we want to make sure people have
that information.
And I think beyond that, you know, tailored services, if
somebody wants information very specific to that--their
satellites, something maybe they're planning in the future,
that's a great place to go to commercial. If the government
wants to bring in more data, I think certainly we should be
taking advantage of this commercial data that's out there.
That's another opportunity. So I think there's lots of places
that commercial entities can still play a role, and I'm sure
they'll think of more ideas as well and continue to innovate in
that area. And it's really this core kind of safety product the
government should do--should provide, as well as kind of
general openness and transparency as much as possible.
Mr. Webster. Thank you very much. I yield back. Go Jackets,
by the way.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Congressman, very much. Now, let
me recognize the senior leader of the congressional Science
Committee CODEL (congressional delegation) to Colorado, Mr.
Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Yes. He says that because he didn't join us
in Colorado, but that's OK. You broke my heart.
So I--first, I want to thank the Chairman for putting this
draft together because I think this is a very urgent matter,
both understanding where the objects are, where the debris
might be, where different things are, as well as providing a
civilian context to really start policing, if you will, or at
least cleaning and being aware of what's up there so we avoid
the accidents, we avoid collisions, we avoid, you know, bad
outcomes.
And so, you know, I've been supportive of moving things to
the Office of Space Commerce out of the Defense Department.
Maybe some of the responsibilities of NASA all reside there so
that they can then develop the regulations for both commercial,
as well as keep an eye on the stuff that we have up there that
is just floating around as potentially dangerous.
So let me ask, to all our witnesses, what are the most
critical actions that need to be taken to ensure an effective
transition to a civil space situational awareness capability?
And, to go along with that, what do you think Congress can do
to affect a smooth transition? Anybody? Bueller, anybody?
Dr. Jah. Right, well, I'll go. Look, I think this really
has to be worked as a matrixed organization, meaning
recognizing that, you know, the Office of Space Commerce isn't
the Lord of the Rings, is one entity to rule them all that
knows how to do all this stuff. Other parts of government need
to come together, coalesce to help this be successful,
everything from policy and regulatory aspects to the scientific
and technological that could be led by organizations such as
NASA. And I think really lending an ear to the community to try
to address the community needs instead of just saying, hey, how
do we just take what's currently being done and give it another
like storefront? That's not going to do it. We have needs that
go way beyond what's currently being done. So I think----
Mr. Perlmutter. Like what?
Dr. Jah. Well, look, astronomy, right now, there's no
capability to help astronomers predict light pollution from
reflecting objects. There's nowhere to find that at this point
as a for instance. We have in-space servicing and
manufacturing. I just saw, you know, the White House put out
something on that. All these companies that want to go service
something else, the catalog that's currently maintained by the
DOD represents everything as if they were cannonballs,
everything's a sphere. Nothing actually looks like a satellite
in their catalog. So when people want to service something,
we're not interested in servicing spheres. We're interested in
servicing things that are satellites. Is it brittle? Where do I
grab this thing? How is it tumbling? Does my technology work
for it? We have no place to point people to to actually get
that information in a way that is effective and usable.
And I'll even say one more thing. From a liability
perspective if there is a satellite, let's say, operated by--
I'm just going to pick some African country--Ethiopia, right,
and they want it serviced by an American company, what if that
satellite from Ethiopia actually shares liability with China?
What does that U.S. company do? Do they just talk to the
Ethiopians and service it? What if China doesn't like that so
much? So----
Mr. Perlmutter. Yes, but here's my question to you. The--at
some point we've got to have somebody who's in charge of all
this. You can't have a bunch of different entities, but
somebody's got to be--and it--there--maybe they're not the Lord
of the Rings or the Lord of the Flies or whatever, but there's
got to be a place where this resides, particularly on the
commercial side of this.
And right now we've got different agencies, particularly
the Air Force, maybe NASA a little bit, but this is a
burgeoning area. You just mentioned two or three or four more
things that I certainly hadn't thought of. I mean, doesn't
somebody have to be in charge of this?
Dr. Jah. Yes, so just very quickly to let other people here
talk, when I worked at JPL, which is a matrix organization, I
had a project manager and a line manager. And I guess what I'm
saying is that it's fine for Commerce to be the project
manager, but all the line elements need to be other agencies.
That's what I'm trying to propose here.
Mr. Perlmutter. Got you. And I think that makes sense
because there are so many different potentials here. So I'll--
my time is about up. I'll yield back to the Chair, and thank
you for your answers.
Chairman Beyer. And, Mr. Perlmutter, Mr. Webster, we will
have time for another round or two or three if you so wish. So
let me move to round two.
Mr. Hejduk--Dr. Hejduk, you're a Senior Project Leader of
the Aerospace Corporation. It's pretty clear already that the
tension that we will have to work to overcome with setting up
this responsibility--actually, let me pause because--are you
ready to jump in for questions?
Mr. Babin. Yes. Yes, sir.
Chairman Beyer. Then I will--we'll go back to round one
with our Ranking Member back from solving the Conference
Committee between the Senate and the House on the COMPETES Act.
Thank you for doing that.
Mr. Babin. Yes, sir, just came back from the Senate side.
Chairman Beyer. And the time is yours.
Mr. Babin. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate
it. I want to say thank you to all of our expert witnesses and
our panelists here.
My questions would be, No. 1, to Mr. O'Connell. The
Department of Commerce's recent budget request proposes to
acquire a SSA capability similar to DOD's capability. Previous
testimony before this Committee highlighted that legacy
infrastructure and acquisition processes made it difficult for
the Department of Defense to employ commercial approaches to
modernize space situational awareness capabilities. For
example, the U.S. Air Force spent billions over the last 30
years but failed to modernize its systems and still uses
decades-old technology. Mr. O'Connell, what can Congress do to
ensure that Commerce does not have to reinvent the wheel or
adopt the same failed acquisition approach?
Mr. O'Connell. Congressman, nice to see you again. Thanks
for the question very much.
Mr. Babin. Yes, sir.
Mr. O'Connell. I think the first thing that we should say
is that Congress in this area, just as in other areas, should
really mandate maximum use of commercial capabilities, both to
take advantage of what I see as a playing field of commercial
companies that's really highly complementary when I look across
all the companies that I'm aware of, and so insisting that that
be a key element of this.
As I said in my testimony, we are not going to simply
replicate what DOD has. We really have to create a state-of-
the-art capability on the civil side for all the reasons that
we've all spoken about that can keep up as the space
environment changes very, very rapidly. This is going to move
very quickly. There need to be new ways--and this is a common
refrain in today's world--of new ways to think about
acquisition. How can we creatively, credibly, competitively get
money into the market in a way that we're comfortable for--on
behalf of the taxpayer? I think it's very much doable in this
area. The key is getting money into the market not only to use
and experiment with the capabilities that are in the market or
just about in the market but also to encourage this important
segment of the space industry.
Mr. Babin. Absolutely. Thank you very much. I appreciate
it. I appreciate your service, too.
Mr. O'Connell. Thank you.
Mr. Babin. Mr. D'Uva, the cloud-hosted Space Data Center
has evolved into one of the largest clearinghouses for
spacecraft operator data, which provides geographic diversity,
military-grade computational security, a legal framework, high
availability, ongoing forensics, data quality checks, and
comparative space situational awareness analyses. The space
safety coalition offers similar capabilities for low-Earth
orbit. What are some of the strengths of private sector
organizations in coordinating data sharing and developing best
practices, and what carrots can be provided to incentivize
operators to join such groups?
Mr. D'Uva. Thank you for the question. It's been an
interesting journey because the SDC capabilities that you
outlined were cutting-edge, but they rely on the U.S.
Government data for catalog. What we saw as the gap of data
capability was the lack of transparency because of national
security equities. So as we looked to improve the capabilities,
we investigated whether we would be able to build our own
catalog and essentially provide a basic flight safety service.
And that's where we discovered that in fact only some of
the satellite operators in space are interested in paying for
these services. Instead, many don't know the limitations of the
current--for example, the legacy DOD products that are
available publicly. And so what they don't know doesn't hurt
them until there's a problem. And even one problem in orbit is
too many in this area, so it's very important that we leverage
those commercial capabilities that exist to transparently
provide a capability under the auspices of the Department of
Commerce but available to everyone. And that--I think that's
what lies before us.
Mr. Babin. Yes, sir, thank you very much. And one last
question for Kevin O'Connell again. Liability significantly
influences how operators act in space. How can the government
leverage the insurance industry to influence safe operations
without regulations?
Mr. O'Connell. Thanks, Congressman. Great question, and
it's a topic you and I have talked about before. I think the
insurance industry is--and the space insurance industry
specifically is a key next user of the kinds of data that will
be available on the civil side. You know, the challenge that
the space insurance industry has had is that they do not have
enough data for many different new things in orbit to inform
their risk models. And so I think in the process they will
benefit from the data that's available in a civil system and be
able to characterize risk in a way that will help us all
understand different aspects of risk in space.
The second point just quickly is I think an earlier
question was about the kinds of research that is being done in
this area or that could be done. I still think that there is an
enormous amount of, if you will, economic and financial
research that needs to be done. When I look at discussions
about regulation, we really need to understand the economic and
financial aspects of that in addition to the technical aspects.
Mr. Babin. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. And I
just have one little announcement I'd like to make, a public
service if you will. I'd like to take just a moment, Mr.
Chairman, to recognize Jeff O'Neil from Representative
Perlmutter's office, who is here today. I've been told that
this is Jeff's last Committee hearing as a staffer. This is it.
Jeff has worked closely with my staff, great friends over the
years. And while we may not have agreed on everything, like
Jeff's boss and I, we agree on a lot. Our offices have
accomplished some fantastic things together, especially for the
space community, and so I want to say best of luck to you in
your future endeavors, Jeff. I wish you the best. Thank you for
your service and your boss's, too. God bless.
Chairman Beyer. OK. Thank you. And it's only appropriate
now to recognize Mr. Perlmutter for whatever----
Mr. Perlmutter. If I could have----
Chairman Beyer [continuing]. Disconcerting----
Mr. Perlmutter. If I could have a moment of personal
privilege.
Chairman Beyer. Granted.
Mr. Perlmutter. I'm embarrassed. Thank you, Dr. Babin, for
recognizing Jeff. Jeff has been instrumental in my office for a
dozen or more years now, particularly on the Science Committee
where he and I have this passion for outer space and our space
research and our space exploration and all of those kinds of
things. The two of us have been like twins, even though we're
not the same size, in terms of our love for this Committee and
our love for space exploration.
And Jeff obviously has done so much more. He's handled the
Rules Committee packet of things that I've got to do as well,
which is a pretty busy schedule. Our office is going to miss
him desperately. The constituents of the Seventh Congressional
District are going to miss him desperately.
I--I've never for a second had any concern that I wasn't
getting good information, that I wasn't prepared for this
Committee for different things we were going to do. He helped
with the Science Committee staff, and I should make a note of
this. We had a fantastic trip and I tried to get everybody--Don
can attest to this. We had a great trip to Colorado last week.
And Jeff, together with the staff, put together a visit that I
wish everybody had been part of just in terms of the science
that's going on in Colorado and the laboratories and the
aerospace and all that stuff.
But to my friend Jeff O'Neil, the Congress is going to miss
you. I know your future endeavor at Planet will be something
very exciting for you. And, you know, Brian sort of one-upped
me here, but his remarks are everything that I feel and
multiplied by about ten. Thank you.
Mr. Babin. Thank you.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you, Dr. Babin, Mr. Perlmutter. And,
Jeff, I know along with all the rest of us, we felt so betrayed
by Representative Perlmutter's announcement of retirement that
we had no choice. But we know you'll have a much better job in
the years to come at Planet, so----
Mr. Perlmutter. Than working for me.
Chairman Beyer. Yes, exactly.
Moving on to something less serious, now let me recognize
the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, for
his questions.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. And it's good to be in
the hearing room. After coming through COVID, this is literally
the first time I've stepped foot in here, and it's great to see
people back. So we're here to say goodbye to you, Mr.
Perlmutter, but it will not be the same, and certainly our trip
out West to see the assets that our country has really
reinforces why we are who we are. It's just--it was great.
But let's talk about the situational awareness and
something I've been focused on since my early days sitting on
the HASC (House Armed Services Committee) Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces where space was virtually the domain of the
Defense Department and NASA mixed in. And the idea that it is
now a commercial entity in addition to assets to defend
nations, literally around the world, and we're seeing what
Russia is doing with their space assets and Ukraine and
certainly China.
But as we start to move into this area of the commercial,
one of my biggest concerns--and I'd love to hear from the
witnesses on this--is about how do we ensure the accuracy of
the information on the commercial side, that difficult blend
between, not as much the United States but certainly some of
the non-friendly nations, to make sure we are being provided to
the commercial side that information that will accurately
indicate that there could be a potential collision or other
issues? So how do we ensure that based on a number of the
proposals that we see? And I would open that up to each of our
witnesses.
Dr. Jah. Can I--yes, thank you so much because I'm chomping
at the bit to kind of address this. So one of the things that I
guess I would ask to people there in the room is how do you
know that you have the world's most accurate clock? And the
answer is you have hundreds of them. That's how we tell time.
We have hundreds of atomic clocks around the globe, and the
United States is one entity that aggregates all these opinions
about time, finds the very center, the centroid, the mean of
all those opinions in a weighted sense, an ensemble of clocks
to come up with what the time actually is. And then accuracy is
based on the difference between that ensemble clock time and
what's on your wrist.
We can do similar things for stuff in space. This is the
difference where the Office of Space Commerce can step in and
again aggregate all these opinions, commercial, international,
that sort of stuff, look at the statistical consistency of the
opinions, and then therefore be able to infer what is the best
fused answer out of all of these opinions and be able to then
judge how far off are other people from that centroid or very
center. That is something that we know how to do. It just needs
to be implemented.
Mr. Norcross. And certainly as you give me your answer, the
standards--and we were just in Boulder talking about the
standards of the world, which are so important. So for the rest
of the witnesses, incorporating those standards into the
accuracy.
Mr. O'Connell. Congressman, that's very, very important.
It's another reason why the Department of Commerce needs to
have a lead role in this area. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology is our national expert on standards,
and so to help evaluate standards, even ones that come from the
bottom up as we say out of the private sector, look at new
standards being evolved, that's a very important government
role. When new companies come into the market, there's a role
to validate the kinds of capabilities that they are saying they
are providing as part of an integrated system, as Dr. Jah just
said.
Mr. Norcross. Anyone----
Dr. Hejduk. Yes, let me make a couple of comments about
that. Validation is difficult. It takes experts, it takes time,
it takes a lot of test cases, it takes exposure.
And one of the greatest impediments, I think, to using
fused solutions and solutions from other entities is to go
through this validation exercise. It is considerably simplified
if the providing entity understands their own errors very well,
but you have to get them to a level of maturity where that
happens as well.
One of the reasons I've--I'm--look like the one dinosaur on
this Committee here proposing the transition of some basic DOD
capabilities first is because I think they represent a very
good foundational level that you have to show equivalence with
in order to be brought into the fold as a data provider. And we
can get past the idea of what data are good enough, which data
are not good enough. If you provide something of the same look
and feel and heuristic quality as the DOD, you can be admitted.
And that is a much easier standard to assess and certify than
absolute standards for accuracy and precision, which are much
more difficult to establish and then justify.
Mr. Norcross. I see my time has run out, but it's also
about cooperation. The United States obviously can lead the
way, but unless all nations participate, we are flying with one
eye closed. With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Norcross. And now
let me recognize virtually the Congressman from Florida, Mr.
Posey.
Mr. Posey. Thank you very much for having this hearing,
Chairman Beyer.
Mr. O'Connell and Dr. Jah, we all understand the
seriousness of space debris and the threat from the small
pieces of debris that are not tracked or are difficult to
track. And it seems like it's something that needs more data,
continually better data, and increased resources from low-Earth
and on orbit. Mr. O'Connell, how can the private sector provide
augmenting data to better improve space situational awareness?
Mr. O'Connell. Thanks, Congressman. Nice to see you again.
The--you know, this is a place where the private sector
continues to innovate. We are working right now with a couple
of organizations that are looking, for example, at how to use
high-altitude UASs (unmanned aircraft systems) of aircraft and
sensors that look up to try to deeply track and identify what
is known as the lethal non-trackable space debris. And so there
are a lot of people that recognize the gaps that exist in our
current coverage and things that need to be understood in a
much better way. The private sector is investing in those.
They're innovating in them, et cetera. So, you know, again,
it's another reason why we need to encourage the commercial
industry forward on this topic.
Mr. Posey. Thank you. Dr. Jah, I'm going to go back just a
little bit to your last discussion here about the gaps in R&D
(research and development) related to space situational
awareness and how NASA and the Department of the Defense can
engage or better engage with the academic community to fill
those gaps.
Dr. Jah. Well, thank you so much for that question,
Congressman. So, look, in terms of some technical gaps that
currently exist for SSA, for one, we do need to get better
measurements. If you want to know something, you have to
measure it. We don't have enough eyes on the sky as it were. We
certainly--the United States to this day still has no
commercial space-based SSA capability for a variety of reasons
that kind of maybe go beyond the scope of our conversation here
that we can talk offline about. But, you know, that needs to be
resolved because the United States would stand to benefit quite
a bit from having a commercial space-based SSA capability.
And in terms of how to engage with academia, I have to say
this is where you've hit a sore spot with me. I'm so frustrated
by the absence of funding for academia in this regard. You
know, the National Science Foundation doesn't consider this to
be basic enough research. Everybody says it's somebody else's
problem. Oh, this SSA space debris thing, it's not alluring
enough, it's not interesting enough, it's--you know, it's not
basic research. And so the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research and the Air Force Research Lab by and large seem to be
the only people that disparately kind of care about this
problem and funding it. So I think that there definitely needs
to be a very serious pool of funding to allow the DOD and other
entities to actually engage with academia.
And every year I'm turning away students that are U.S.
citizens that want to get involved because there's not enough
research support to actually get these people, you know,
through the system and delivering great on science and
technology. And the thing that is really the thing that really
upsets me is that a lot of these companies that we're talking
about helping them thrive, where's the work force coming from?
They're hurting. Every day I'm getting people emailing me
saying, hey, can you just send over like a dozen students? I'm
like, well, they're not growing on trees. Like where do I get
these students from? So this is a big problem that we need to
fix.
Mr. Posey. Yes. Where do you think we start? I mean, what
would your suggestion be?
Dr. Jah. Look, I think the academic community is actually
ready. It's begging. We actually--if we could have some
cooperative agreements, if we could actually--you know,
Congress could say this amount of money is dedicated to space
situational awareness, scientific and policy research, that
would be a great start. And the thing is there is no pool
identified uniquely to support the research.
Mr. Posey. Listen, thank you very much. I see my time is
about to expire. I thank all the witnesses for appearing today
and deeply appreciate your comments. I yield back.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Posey.
I will now go to a second round of questions. And let me
begin.
Dr. Hejduk, you're in this unique role as head of--you
know, Senior Project Leader at an FFRDC. If I wildly
oversimplified the conversation today, on one end of the bell-
shaped curve is the notion that we need to stand up a second--
you know, parallel to the DOD space situational awareness
within the Department of Commerce, hence, the 550 percent
increase in the budget and the like. On the other end of the
bell-shaped curve was the notion that our civil sector can do
it all. And of course no one's argued for either of those.
But, Dr. Hejduk, in the draft legislation we have, which
has not been introduced yet of course, we call for the--a
mandate for the maximum use of the civilian capabilities. How
do you figure we best balance that as opposed to standing up
our own Department of Commerce capability?
Dr. Hejduk. Yes, thank you for the question. In this
hearing even though it's titled transition to a civil
capability, we've actually talked a lot about end states and
haven't talked all that much about transition. I think when--in
my testimony earlier, comments when I talk about beginning with
the DOD capabilities, that's in order to establish a foundation
and give us a springboard from which we can move to an almost
entirely commercial end state in my view. If we try to meet the
timelines that are laid out in the draft legislation, we're
going to have to move very quickly.
The fastest thing we can do to build confidence in the
broader community is to be able to emulate what the DOD is
doing presently for the CDM, Conjunction Data Message
distribution. And then what we can do is run that in parallel
with other commercial proposals, some of which are actually
funded by the DOC, to show how they are performing against the
DOD baseline. And what that will do is provide the transparency
where owner-operators out in the field will then look forward
to the changeover from a DOD capability to a commercial one.
If you talk to owner-operators--and we talk to a lot of
them at NASA--they--if you propose changing information that
they have--well, don't change anything. We know what's there,
we like it, we know how to use it. If we were suddenly to knife
switch to a commercial capability, I don't think that would be
received very well by the owner-operators who have spent a
decade learning to use the DOD product and have written
software that uses it automatically. Instead, we need to phase
in these improvements.
So where am I on the bell curve? I'm well over on the
commercial side. I don't think that this needs to be an
indigenous, you know, government-produced acquisition product.
But I do think we need a much longer transition time, and we
need to show the improvements so it doesn't look like ``we're
from the government and here to help you.''
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much. Dr. Borowitz, a
parallel question. Do you see our potential legislations use of
the idea of mandating the maximum use of civilian capabilities
in any way to conflict with the concerns you had laid out in
your testimony?
Dr. Borowitz. Thank you for the question, Congressman. So I
think it just depends on exactly the way those partnerships are
set up. I think absolutely we want to leverage the commercial
industry and the strengths that already exist there, and there
are lots of different ways to structure those partnerships. If
it's done in such a way that, you know, all of that data and
those processes are seen as proprietary and becomes a black
box, then I think we lose some of the benefit of moving to a
civil agency.
And if it's done in a way, as I believe it can be, that
allows us to still have some open data, some transparency even
while we leverage those commercial entities, then I think we
still at the key benefits we want from that civil transition.
So I think, yes, it definitely is possible to leverage
commercial to a very large extent if those partnerships are
done in a way that still emphasize transparency.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much. And Mr. D'Uva, Dr. Jah
complained--that's probably too strong a word--but noted there
was no commercial space-based--underlying space-based SSA. Is
that coming from the NDC or others?
Mr. D'Uva. Probably not unless the Congress acts to fully
fund DOC activities because, as Kevin O'Connell mentioned, the
government might be a good first customer of such a sensor, you
know, that would cause the private sector to want to launch
space-based SSA sensors and then develop the capability, but
absent that, we can make pretty quick gains with just improving
on the existing DOD CDMs that were mentioned just by including
more data about them using a lot of the same sensor inputs that
are available today.
So I think we can get a long way toward improvement by
bringing modern analytics processing capabilities to some of
the data sets we already have and then augmenting those data
sets with, you know, ground-based SSA capabilities that are
commercial, perhaps space-based SSA capabilities, and other
sensor types, not just, you know, whether it's radar, electro-
optical, RF (remote frequency). There are other sensor types.
So it's a combination that brings us closer and closer to a
level of truth that actually becomes actionable for use by
operators. And that's the key. And so that needs to be done
transparently, as several of the witnesses have said. I
couldn't agree more.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much. Now, let me recognize
the Ranking Member from Texas, Dr. Babin.
Mr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've got a couple of
questions for you, Kevin O'Connell. I appreciate you being here
and all of you excellent witnesses, Dr. Jah, all of you. But,
Mr. O'Connell, on April the 15th, 2022, NOAA published a notice
of intent to issue a sole-source order for low-Earth orbit data
to LEOLabs. NOAA stated that our market research has determined
that LEOLabs is the only U.S. company that possesses the
necessary real-time LEO space surveillance tracking data that
meets OSC's requirements for its Open Architecture Data
Repository. Are you aware of OSC's requirements for its Open
Architecture Data Repository? And if so, are they publicly
available?
Mr. O'Connell. Thanks, Congressman. I appreciate the
question. So 16 months after having left the government, I'm
not specifically aware of the new requirements as they laid out
by NOAA. I suggest you hear from NOAA directly on that.
I think the thing that I would emphasize--and maybe I'm
going to tie a bow around some of the last couple of comments.
You know, I think was envisioned back in 2018 that as we began
this transition, that we would leave everything in place until
everyone was satisfied that there was technical competency on
the civil side. And so there will be some duplication if you
will of effort, redundancy while we do this.
And to go to Dr. Hejduk's comments a minute ago, you know,
if DOD is going to continue to provide this, then the extent to
which we can really experiment on the civil side with new
commercial capabilities, new services, there are in fact a
couple space-based SSA companies coming into the market, you
know, I think it gives us a real opportunity to experiment with
what's coming in the market and look at things a different way.
I did want to highlight, Congressman, I wanted to highlight
an activity known as the Sprint Advanced Training Concept--
Concept Training rather, or SACT as it's known, which has been
a venue that the Department of Defense and the Department of
Commerce have cosponsored since 2018, but it's been in
existence longer than that. And this is a venue within which
two things happen. When the United States works with it its
allies to actually understand how to transition SSA-related
information amongst allies, but more importantly to this
conversation it's been a place where there has been a
tremendous amount of experimentation with government
transitioning custody of space-based objects to the commercial
entities to see the comparative strengths and weaknesses of
companies that are in the market and participating in the
exercise obviously. And so that's a tremendous learning
opportunity that we already have beside--you know, with us to
take advantage of here.
So on the specific question of the sole-source contract, I
think I'd have to defer back to NOAA on that.
Mr. Babin. OK. Thank you. And one last question for you as
well. Fiscal year 2023 budget request from the Office of Space
Commerce asks for $88 million. Do you know how that funding
level was derived?
Mr. O'Connell. I don't, Congressman. You may recall that in
the NAPA report, I think it was page 82, we had our best budget
estimates just as I was going--as I was departing my role at
Commerce and as--if I recall correctly, we had proposed a
budget estimate of between about $40-60 million per year during
the transition. But again, I don't have any detailed knowledge
on the specific budget request for Fiscal Year 2023.
I would make one point that I do hope that in that budget
request, given the extent of the budget growth, I do hope
there's enough resources left for the other capabilities that
the office is required by law to undertake. You know, SSA is
the top mission, but obviously the advocacy and the regulatory
and other missions will also have to be tended to as well.
Mr. Babin. Yes, sir. And, you know, I think this just shows
that we need--there's some need to know on the part of Congress
about these requirements that I ask you about. And then also
how this office is deriving, you know, their budget request.
That's information that should be available to us. But anyway,
I thank you very much. I appreciate it. And I will yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Beyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Babin--Dr. Babin.
Let me now recognize the distinguished gentleman from
Colorado.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So I want to start with you, Mr. O'Connell. It's good to
see you again. Since 2018, 2019, has--where there has been some
initial transition, how have things been going in terms of
elevating the Office of Space Commerce, ensuring that it really
begins taking on this role, and is it capable of taking on kind
of--I don't want to go back to the Lord of the Rings or the
Lord of the Flies, but to take on a real management role with
respect to particularly commercial space but space situational
awareness?
Mr. O'Connell. So, Congressman, thank you. Good to see you
again. I did refer in my testimony to the long battle on
commercial imagery adoption. And I know you've been part of
that battle on the right side of things, and so thank you for
your leadership on that over the years.
In terms of the Office of Space Commerce, my views on this
are very well known. The job is as much about economic
development, job creation, innovation, and things like that,
which is the job of the Department of Commerce. The extent to
which the Office of Space Commerce sits within NOAA, at a
minimum it has to seamlessly be able to work with all other
aspects of the Department of Commerce and obviously have the
attention of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. We wish
Rich DalBello, the--you know, my successor in that role, wish
him the best in that regard.
It does have the ability--the office does have the ability
and it's an important ability to be the convener I think is the
word used in the NAPA report and apparently in a brand-new
report that's come out of NAPA to look at the issue of what the
role of the convener means for the Office of Space Commerce. It
does have that ability as long as it's able to tap into the
rest of the Department.
Mr. Perlmutter. So my next question, a little different,
but for you and for Dr. Borowitz, so I certainly want to see
Commerce and particularly commercial efforts continue to grow
in space, but I do share a concern that Dr. Borowitz brought
up, and that is on sort of the open source elements of this,
that we do make information available to as many people as
possible. And is there a tension, do you think, between sort of
developing more commercial assets up there to be aware of
things that are floating around or that need to be collected
and disposed of? Are we going to run into some proprietary
problems, or is it going to be open source?
Mr. O'Connell. So I think one of the questions--one of the
key questions that remains unanswered is something we were
working on just as I left Commerce was the distinction between
what SPD 3 called the basic service, in essence what the
government would provide available free of user fees as the
phrase is, and the commercial services. And I think the extent
to which the government can define exactly what it is going to
give away for free in the interest of national foreign policy,
you know, other things like that, to define that technically
would probably be a very important thing to enable the
commercial industry to know where its efforts can start. And
that's known as the advanced services in SPD 3.
I've thought about this a lot since I left the government.
And, you know, there are different ways to think about that
distinction whether in terms of the precision of the
information that the government would provide, in terms of
confidence levels that it has in the information, things like
that. There are ways to think about this, but it's still an
area where I think we need to do some work so that we can
actually give confidence to industry as to where it's, you
know, beginning point if you will for that emerging space
safety industry is starting.
Mr. Perlmutter. OK. Dr. Borowitz, can you share what your
concerns were----
Dr. Borowitz. Sure. So----
Mr. Perlmutter [continuing]. In terms of the open source?
Dr. Borowitz. Yes, absolutely. I think one of the most
important things when we're moving this to a civil agency is to
allow that--you know, first, the freely available conjunction
warnings, to make sure those are still there, but also
increasing the transparency and the availability of data. That
was something--there was a 2018 report by the Institute for
Defense Analysis that identified that lack of transparency as a
key issue for some of our allies and others using our
information. So I think that's something you can really address
moving to civil.
I think it can be done well with, you know, cooperating
really closely with the commercial sector but ensuring that we
still get some level of transparency and openness that's
sufficient. And I think Kevin's point about, you know, thinking
about what is that basic product that the government is
providing, I think that is a really important element. I think
it has to be a high-quality product that increases in quality
over time.
You know, the--in my written testimony I compare it to
tornado warnings, right? You need your tornado warning to be
accurate enough to have a low enough number of false warnings
that people listen to it, you know, so kind of an actionable
warning. And that's what you need in space as well. We're
getting too many warnings to operators or they're not accurate
enough and people aren't using them, aren't finding them
actionable, then that's not a high-quality enough product. So
when we think about that basic product is that needs to be
freely available and transparent, I think we need to make sure
it's actionable.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. My time is expired.
Chairman Beyer. I now recognize Mr. Posey from Florida for
a second round of questions. I'm hoping that Mr. Posey is on
board. I'll give him a minute. If not, then let me recognize--
--
Mr. Perlmutter. There he is.
Chairman Beyer. Oh, good.
Mr. Posey. I'm still here but I'm in listening mode. Thank
you.
Chairman Beyer. OK. You're in speaking mode now if you so
wish.
Mr. Posey. I'll pass, thank you.
Chairman Beyer. OK, great, thank you.
Then let me recognize Mr. Norcross to wrap us up for the
day.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you again, Chairman.
This is fascinating as we make a transition to what is
called commercial. And commercial by definition has a little
bit of latitude in it. The fact that there are players in the
private sector who have space situational awareness, whether
they are ground-based, space-based, or a combination of each.
This is something that has been around but obviously becoming
more and more important, particularly when investments are
going into space on the commercial side.
So the idea of always using the Department of Defense as a
validator I don't think is realistic long term because, A, we
don't need to give up all that information as a check and
balance. But when we start talking about the Office of Space
Commerce, we're making the tremendous investment in here. And
the idea of going up to $87 million, that major increase, it
takes time to ramp these things up.
So first to the questions, it's not as much the amount the
first year but are we able to adequately incorporate this in a
one-year timeframe to stand up, to start doing many of the
items that we talked about? So that would be question No. 1.
And when we start talking about open source or proprietary,
this is going on already. We have many things up there. But
when we start talking about those who want to use this
information, there's--my opinion-- needs to be certain ground
rules called a driver's license. If we look back to when
airplanes first started flying and what FAA has done, that was
certainly an American-based system, but the world also followed
and now we have standards.
It's a little different in space because the lines of who
owns what is clearly not there, so the enforcement of whatever
standards we create is really difficult. How do we punish
somebody who's not playing by the rules who says they're going
to do this? And that's access to markets. And this is where
commercial comes back in. If you want to use those assets to
gain access to our commercial market, you have to play by the
rules.
So the first question--and I would go to Dr. Borowitz--are
we able to use this amount--A, is it enough for this coming
year, the $87 million? And can we adequately put it into place
in the first year? And then would you talk about the
enforcement of any rules for space situational awareness?
Dr. Borowitz. Sure. So on the first question of the
funding, I haven't looked in detail about exactly how that $87
million is broken down. But I will say that there is a huge
community of people who have been thinking about this for
years, and so I think there is a real opportunity on this
issue--you know, you always have to ramp up, but there is a
real ability to hit the ground running and a real desire for
that around the community, so I think there is a lot that they
can do even in year 1 if they get the right resources.
On your second question about how do you sort of enforce
rules, so I think with space situational awareness, really
you're providing information. You're providing, you know,
people with a sense of where things are in space and where
they're going to be in the near future. So in terms of rules,
the only thing you might have is kind of the standards for
people who also want to provide that type of information, so
there's talk about, you know, if you're going to put out
conjunction warnings as a commercial entity or provide data, we
want to make sure you're meeting a certain standard of quality.
And that I think, as you mentioned, the government can ensure
that people are meeting that requirement when they work with
the government.
When we get to action in space, then we start talking about
space traffic coordination or space traffic management, and I
think enforcing action there is going to be hard, but I think
getting the SSA system in the United States organized and set
up the way that it's going to work efficiently is going to let
the United States take a leadership role in those activities.
And I think that's going to make a big difference in allowing
us to move forward internationally.
Mr. Norcross. Do any of the other witnesses have an opinion
on this?
Dr. Jah. Well, I think----
Mr. D'Uva. Yes, thank you, I do.
Dr. Jah. Go ahead, Andrew.
Mr. D'Uva. Thank you. Thank you, Moriba. It's very
interesting. Within the SDA context, in order to participate,
operators have to communicate their maneuvers in advance and
deconflict them, and the information system does this. This is
obviously a voluntary activity, but with a DOC-led capability,
you could actually verify that what operators say they're going
to do, for example, with these autonomously maneuvering
satellites, actually are doing it. So by bringing commercial
sensors into the mix, which are--which can be used
transparently, we start building the foundation for space
traffic coordination and management by first having a robust
foundational SSA capability that is driven by civil and
commercial data products and data sources.
Mr. Norcross. But what happens if they don't adhere to that
is sort of the followup question that has to be part of it?
Mr. D'Uva. I agree. What happens is that, first, we have to
understand that the international framework for operations in
space are such that we don't have a command-and-control
environment except through the nations that authorize the
launch of particular satellites. So within the United States it
might be an FCC-licensed satellite. The FCC would be the--you
know, for communication satellite would be the entity that
would govern that. But they need to have--as regulators, they
need to have actionable data on which to base those regulatory,
you know, decisions.
Internationally, I think we have to start from, you know,
bringing--defining what is normal, what is proper, what is
improper, and then just like in aviation, over time, freedom
led to well-understood norms, which eventually were codified
into rules of the road that later became binding. And so we're
on that same journey for space, but until we can measure and
understand what's happening in space, effective regulation will
be very difficult. So I think it's--there's a spectrum.
Mr. Perlmutter [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time
has expired.
The--before we bring the hearing to a close, I want to
thank our witnesses for testifying before the Committee today.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional
statements from the Members and for any additional questions
the Committee may ask of the witnesses.
The witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
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Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
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