[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






 
      RUSSIAN SEAFOOD BAN IMPLEMENTATION AND SEAFOOD TRACEABILITY

=======================================================================

                           OVERSIGHT HEARING

                               before the

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER, OCEANS, AND WILDLIFE

                                 of the

                     COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                        Thursday, April 7, 2022

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-18

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources       
       
       
       
 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]      
       
       
       
       


        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
                                   or
          Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov
          
          
          
          
          
          
                            ______                       


             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 47-308 PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022          
          
          
          
                     COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

                      RAUL M. GRIJALVA, AZ, Chair
                JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, IL, Vice Chair
   GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN, CNMI, Vice Chair, Insular Affairs
                  BRUCE WESTERMAN, AR, Ranking Member

Grace F. Napolitano, CA              Louie Gohmert, TX
Jim Costa, CA                        Doug Lamborn, CO
Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan,      Robert J. Wittman, VA
    CNMI                             Tom McClintock, CA
Jared Huffman, CA                    Garret Graves, LA
Alan S. Lowenthal, CA                Jody B. Hice, GA
Ruben Gallego, AZ                    Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, AS
Joe Neguse, CO                       Daniel Webster, FL
Mike Levin, CA                       Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, PR
Katie Porter, CA                     Russ Fulcher, ID
Teresa Leger Fernandez, NM           Pete Stauber, MN
Melanie A. Stansbury, NM             Thomas P. Tiffany, WI
Nydia M. Velazquez, NY               Jerry L. Carl, AL
Diana DeGette, CO                    Matthew M. Rosendale, Sr., MT
Julia Brownley, CA                   Blake D. Moore, UT
Debbie Dingell, MI                   Yvette Herrell, NM
A. Donald McEachin, VA               Lauren Boebert, CO
Darren Soto, FL                      Jay Obernolte, CA
Michael F. Q. San Nicolas, GU        Cliff Bentz, OR
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, IL         Vacancy
Ed Case, HI                          Vacancy
Betty McCollum, MN
Steve Cohen, TN
Paul Tonko, NY
Rashida Tlaib, MI
Lori Trahan, MA

                     David Watkins, Staff Director
                       Luis Urbina, Chief Counsel
               Vivian Moeglein, Republican Staff Director
                   http://naturalresources.house.gov
                                 ------                                

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER, OCEANS, AND WILDLIFE

                        JARED HUFFMAN, CA, Chair
                    CLIFF BENTZ, OR, Ranking Member

Grace F. Napolitano, CA              Jerry L. Carl, AL
Jim Costa, CA                        Robert J. Wittman, VA
Mike Levin, CA                       Tom McClintock, CA
Julia Brownley, CA                   Garret Graves, LA
Debbie Dingell, MI                   Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, AS
Ed Case, HI                          Daniel Webster, FL
Alan S. Lowenthal, CA                Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, PR
Steve Cohen, TN                      Russ Fulcher, ID
Darren Soto, FL                      Lauren Boebert, CO
Raul M. Grijalva, AZ                 Vacancy
Nydia M. Velazquez, NY               Bruce Westerman, AR, ex officio
Melanie A. Stansbury, NM

                                 ------                                
                                CONTENTS

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Hearing held on Thursday, April 7, 2022..........................     1

Statement of Members:

    Bentz, Hon. Cliff, a Representative in Congress from the 
      State of Oregon............................................     5
        Prepared statement of....................................     7

    Huffman, Hon. Jared, a Representative in Congress from the 
      State of California........................................     2
        Prepared statement of....................................     4

Statement of Witnesses:

    Brush, Austin, Senior Analyst, The Center for Advanced 
      Defense Studies, Washington, DC............................    25
        Prepared statement of....................................    27
        Questions submitted for the record.......................    29

    Lahar, Mike, Chair, Regulatory Agencies Committee, National 
      Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America, 
      Silver Spring, Maryland....................................    31
        Prepared statement of....................................    32
        Questions submitted for the record.......................    35

    Mallory, Tabitha Grace, Founder and CEO, The China Ocean 
      Institute, Seattle, Washington.............................    18
        Prepared statement of....................................    20

    Yozell, Sally, Senior Fellow and Director of Environmental 
      Security, Stimson Center, Washington, DC...................     8
        Prepared statement of....................................    10
        Questions submitted for the record.......................    16

Additional Materials Submitted for the Record:

    Submissions for the Record by Representative Huffman

        Customs and Border Protection, Statement for the Record..    50

        Business Insider, Article dated April 5, 2022............    51




 OVERSIGHT HEARING ON ``RUSSIAN SEAFOOD BAN IMPLEMENTATION AND SEAFOOD 
                             TRACEABILITY''

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, April 7, 2022

                     U.S. House of Representatives

              Subcommittee on Water, Oceans, and Wildlife

                     Committee on Natural Resources

                             Washington, DC

                              ----------                              

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:02 p.m., in 
room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Jared Huffman 
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Huffman, Case, Soto; Bentz, 
Graves, Radewagen, Gonzalez-Colon, and Fulcher.

    Mr. Huffman. Good afternoon, everyone. The Subcommittee on 
Water, Oceans, and Wildlife will come to order. We are meeting 
today to discuss the execution of the President's Executive 
Order banning Russian seafood imports.
    Under Committee Rule 4(f), any oral opening statements at 
hearings are limited to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority 
Member, or their designees. This allows us to hear from our 
witnesses sooner, and keeps Members on schedule. Therefore, I 
ask unanimous consent that all other Members' opening 
statements be made part of the hearing record if they are 
submitted to the Subcommittee by 5 p.m. today, or the close of 
the hearing, whichever comes first.
    Hearing no objection, that is so ordered.
    Without objection, the Chair may also declare a recess at 
the call of the Chair.
    As described in the notice, statements, documents, or 
motions must be submitted to the electronic repository at 
[email protected]. Members physically present should 
provide a hard copy for staff to distribute by email.
    Please note that Members are responsible for their own 
microphones. As with our fully in-person hearings, Members can 
be muted by staff only to avoid inadvertent background noise.
    And, finally, Members or witnesses experiencing technical 
problems should inform Committee staff immediately.
    We are going to just hold off for one moment to wait for 
Ranking Member Bentz before we go any further. So, if everyone 
can just bear with me, we will get going as soon as Ranking 
Member Bentz joins us.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Huffman. Do we have any indication for when Ranking 
Member Bentz will be with us?
    Voice. Congressman, this is Lora. He is voting right now, 
so it is going to be a few minutes.
    Mr. Huffman. OK, good. Well, we are just going to recess 
then for whatever time it takes for Mr. Bentz to join us, and 
we will resume when he gets here.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Huffman. Good afternoon, everyone. The Water, Oceans, 
and Wildlife Subcommittee is back in session.
    Ranking Member Bentz, I apologize that we had some 
confusion in the hearing room and on my remote video. We 
weren't clear that you were not with us, so we started the 
hearing and then recessed. But I understand that we are ready 
to go. I won't repeat all of the prefatory statements I made to 
begin the hearing. I will just recognize myself for 5 minutes 
for an opening statement, and I want to thank everyone for 
joining us today.

   STATEMENT OF THE HON. JARED HUFFMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
             CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

    Mr. Huffman. Last month, President Biden issued an 
Executive Order banning the import of Russian seafood, one of 
many sanctions we have put in place in response to the 
unprovoked, unjustified aggression, war crimes, and atrocities 
of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine.
    The United States imported more than $1.2 billion of crab, 
cod, and other fish from Russia in 2021. Banning those imports 
is intended to ensure that American consumers are not funding 
Putin's war machine.
    While I fully support the President's goal, I regret to 
inform the President and all of you that this well-intentioned 
ban won't work, not under current laws and policies, not under 
the less-than-watchful eye of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA. And here is why----
    As we have heard repeatedly in this Committee, NOAA only 
requires transparency and traceability for 13 species groups 
through its Seafood Import Monitoring Program, or SIMP, 
representing only about 40 percent of the species imported into 
the United States. SIMP requires importers to track fish from 
the initial catch, throughout the supply chain, and to their 
entry into the United States.
    There is no requirement for traceability for the remaining 
60 percent of the species entering our markets, which includes 
most of the seafood originating in Russia, including pollock. 
So, while the Executive Order, in theory, is supposed to block 
seafood imported directly from Russia, how will it actually 
work if most of that seafood is not required to be tracked 
under SIMP?
    It actually gets even more complicated. Russia sends a 
significant amount of seafood to China for processing, hiding 
the true origins. In fact, 26 percent of the fish caught in 
Russia is already sent to other countries for processing, 
making it a product of the other country. Unless that fish is 
one of the 13 species that happened to be covered by SIMP--and 
we know most of them are not--the Russian origins of this 
seafood is untraceable, and the ban is impossible to enforce.
    But if NOAA required SIMP for all species, we could ban all 
seafood imports from Russia. Until that happens, Russian 
seafood will continue to line grocery store shelves in the 
United States, and American consumers will continue unwittingly 
supporting Putin's war machine.
    The ineffectiveness of the Russian seafood ban is just one 
example of the many reasons why I and others have long 
advocated for NOAA expanding SIMP to cover all species imported 
into the United States. In fact, when NOAA first developed the 
SIMP program to address illegal fishing, seafood fraud, and 
slave labor in the seafood supply chain, they explicitly stated 
in the final rule that they planned to expand the program to 
cover all species. Since then, story after story demonstrates 
the need to expand, but NOAA consistently refuses to do so.
    Even more disappointing, NOAA refused to testify at this 
hearing today. They won't act, and apparently they don't want 
to talk to Congress about why they won't act.
    During my tenure as Chair of this Subcommittee, we have had 
several hearings highlighting the need for full transparency 
and traceability of all seafood entering the United States to 
make sure that it is not resulting from IUU fishing, from 
fraud, or slave labor in the supply chain, and it is not being 
sold in our supermarkets and restaurants, undercutting American 
fishermen.
    The bill I introduced alongside Congressman Graves, H.R. 
3075, would do just that. The America COMPETES Act includes 
critical components of our bill, and it must be enacted, 
especially given NOAA's resistance to acting and their blatant 
disregard for appropriately dealing with these issues, despite 
everything that we have learned over the years.
    At one of our hearings we heard from Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist Ian Urbina, who told us about a Cambodian migrant 
who was held captive on a trawler at sea for 3 years, shackled 
by the neck and forced to catch fish destined for American 
shelves. NOAA was at that hearing. They heard it, and yet they 
have done nothing.
    We have learned about the deadly secret of China's fishing 
vessels illegally fishing in North Korean waters, violently 
displacing smaller North Korean boats, killing fishermen, 
catalyzing a more than 70 percent crash in the once abundant 
squid stocks. Squid, of course, is one of the species that NOAA 
does not include in the SIMP program. So, we continue to import 
all of this through China, and yet NOAA has not acted.
    We have learned that the Department of Labor identified 68 
seafood species produced by slave or child labor that we 
continue to import into the United States. But SIMP only covers 
12 of those seafood species. And still, NOAA has not acted.
    We have learned that SIMP covers only 29 percent of seafood 
imports from China, China being a notorious bad actor. Almost 
60 percent of offenses in the industrial fishing sector are 
related to Chinese-owned vessels, according to a new study. But 
despite pressure from both sides of the aisle to be tougher on 
China, NOAA has not acted.
    Finally, we learned that SIMP doesn't cover many Russian 
seafood products like pollock and salmon, even though Russia is 
engaged in IUU fishing. Government reports estimate that over 
16 percent of seafood imports from Russia were obtained through 
illegal fishing. But I think you know--and I am starting to 
sound like a broken record here--NOAA has not acted.
    Seafood traceability is imperative for preventing the 
illegal importation of Russian-derived, often IUU-related, 
seafood into the United States. NOAA must immediately take 
steps to expand SIMP so that we can keep slave-caught, illegal, 
and Russian seafood out of this country and stop funding 
Putin's atrocities.
    I am eager to discuss this critical and timely topic, and I 
look forward to the invaluable testimony of our invited 
witnesses.
    As noted, it is regrettable that NOAA chose not to appear 
before the Committee today, but I do appreciate those of you 
who care enough about this issue to join us in this hearing.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Huffman follows:]
   Prepared Statement of the Hon. Jared Huffman, a Representative in 
                 Congress from the State of California

    Thank you all for joining us today.

    Last month, President Biden issued an Executive Order banning the 
import of Russian seafood--one of many sanctions put in place in 
response to the unprovoked and unjustified aggressions of Vladamir 
Putin that are wreaking havoc on the lives of millions of innocent 
people in Ukraine.
    The United States imported more than $1.2 billion of crab, cod, and 
other fish from Russia in 2021, and banning those imports is intended 
to ensure that U.S. consumers are not funding Putin's atrocities. While 
I fully support the President's goal, I regret to inform him that his 
well-intentioned ban, under current laws and policies, and under the 
less than watchful eye of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), will not have the desired effect.

    Here's why:

    As we have heard repeatedly in this Committee, NOAA only requires 
transparency and traceability for 13 species groups through its Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program, or SIMP, representing only about 40 percent 
of the species imported into the United States. SIMP requires importers 
to track fish from the initial catch, throughout the supply chain, to 
their entry into the United States.
    There is no requirement for traceability for the remaining 60 
percent of the species entering our markets, which includes most of the 
seafood originating in Russia--like pollock. So, while the Executive 
Order, in theory, is supposed to block seafood imported directly from 
Russia, how will it actually work if most of that seafood is not 
required to be tracked under SIMP? But it gets even more complicated.
    Russia sends a significant amount of seafood to China for 
processing, hiding the true origins. In fact, 26 percent of the fish 
caught in Russia is sent to other countries for processing, making it a 
product of the other country. Unless that fish is one of the 13 species 
currently covered by SIMP--and we know most of it is not--the Russian 
origins are not traceable, and the ban impossible to enforce.
    But, if NOAA required SIMP for all species, we could ban ALL 
seafood imports from Russia. Until that happens, Russian seafood will 
continue to line grocery store shelves in the United States, and U.S. 
consumers will continue to unwittingly support Putin's madness.
    The ineffectiveness of the Russian seafood ban is just one example 
of the many reasons I have and many others have long advocated for NOAA 
to expand SIMP to cover all seafood imported to the United States.
    In fact, when NOAA first developed the SIMP program to address 
illegal fishing, seafood fraud, and slave labor in the seafood supply 
chain, they explicitly stated in the final rule that they planned to 
expand the program to cover all species. Since then, story after story 
demonstrates the need to expand, but NOAA consistently refuses to do 
so. And, even more disappointing, NOAA refused to testify at this 
hearing today.
    During my tenure as Chair of this Subcommittee, we have held 
several hearings highlighting the need for full transparency and 
traceability of all seafood entering the U.S. to ensure that seafood 
resulting from IUU fishing, fraud, or slave labor in the supply chain 
is not being sold in our supermarkets and restaurants.
    The bill I introduced alongside Congressman Graves, H.R. 3075, the 
Illegal Fishing and Forced Labor Prevention Act, would do just that. 
The America COMPETES Act includes critical components of our bill and 
must be enacted--especially given NOAA's resistance to act and blatant 
disregard for appropriately dealing with these issues despite what we 
have learned over the years.
    We heard from Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Ian Urbina who told 
us about a Cambodian migrant, held captive on a trawler at sea for 3 
years and shackled by the neck, catching fish destined for American 
shelves. NOAA was actually at that hearing, but has not acted.
    We have learned about the deadly secret of China's fishing vessels 
illegally fishing in North Korean waters, violently displacing smaller 
North Korean boats, killing fishermen, and catalyzing a more than 70 
percent decline in once-abundant squid stocks. Squid is also not 
covered by SIMP, and we continue to import it from China. And yet, NOAA 
has not acted.
    We have learned that the Department of Labor identified 68 seafood 
species produced by slave or child labor that we import into the United 
States, but SIMP only covers 12 of these seafood species. And still, 
NOAA has not acted.
    We have learned that SIMP only covers 29 percent of seafood imports 
from China, a notoriously bad actor--almost 60 percent of offenses in 
the industrial fishing sector are related to Chinese-owned vessels, 
according to a new study. But, despite pressure from both sides of the 
aisle to be tougher on China--NOAA has not acted.
    Finally, we have learned that SIMP doesn't cover many Russian 
seafood products, like pollock and salmon even though Russia is engaged 
in IUU Fishing. Government reports estimate that over 16 percent of 
seafood imports from Russia were obtained through IUU fishing. But, I 
think you know by now that NOAA has not acted.
    Seafood traceability is imperative for preventing the illegal 
importation of Russian-derived, often IUU-related, seafood into the 
United States. NOAA must immediately take steps to expand SIMP so that 
we can keep slave-caught, illegal, and Russian seafood out of this 
country and stop funding Putin's horrific war.
    I am eager to discuss this critical and timely topic and look 
forward to the invaluable testimony of our invited witnesses. As noted, 
it is regrettable that NOAA chose not to appear before the Committee 
today, but I appreciate those of you who made the time to be with us.

                                 ______
                                 

    Mr. Huffman. With that, I will turn it over to the Ranking 
Member for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CLIFF BENTZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 
                    FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

    Mr. Bentz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for your 
understanding of the challenges in getting votes done in what 
appears to be a fly out day.
    The main focus of today's hearing is on President Biden's 
Executive Order that sought to stop Russian seafood imports as 
one of the many consequences of its invasion of Ukraine. The 
Executive Order, however, allows Russian-caught seafood to be 
imported into the United States if it is processed in another 
country.
    The late Dean of the House, Don Young, introduced 
legislation aimed at ending this processing allowance and, 
unfortunately, that legislation is stuck in the Ways and Means 
Committee. While the Russian seafood ban is subject to trade 
laws and another committee's jurisdiction, this hearing is 
being used as a means to justify the proposed legislative 
expansion of the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, otherwise 
called SIMP.
    SIMP is a risk-based traceability program aimed at 
discouraging illegal, unreported, and unregulated, or IUU, 
seafood and misrepresented seafood from entering the U.S. 
market. Like Russian seafood or Chinese processed Russian 
seafood, I don't know anyone here who supports illegal fishing, 
fraudulent seafood, or seafood produced through forced labor. 
But the question is whether expanding SIMP is the right way to 
stop these kinds of practices.
    NOAA has conceded, ``SIMP does not prevent or stop IUU fish 
and fish products from entering U.S. commerce.'' Unfortunately, 
we are unable to hear from the agency, NMFS, about this since 
NMFS declined to participate today. I join the Chair in 
expressing my dissatisfaction with their refusal to show up.
    One witness here today, Mr. Mike Lahar, who is testifying 
on behalf of the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders 
Association of America, also questions the effectiveness and 
efficiency of expanding SIMP. As a custom broker, he knows 
firsthand about how this program is being carried out, and will 
focus his testimony on the extensive and incredibly burdensome 
documentation process created by SIMP. He will also say that 
SIMP will not have an impact on the Russian seafood ban.
    We have also heard from inland aquaculture producers that 
SIMP expansion will impact them through WTO sufficiency 
requirements brought on by added SIMP requirements.
    Lastly, our former colleague from Alaska, the late Mr. 
Young, also opposed this, saying, and I quote, ``Although I 
have long supported the goal of fighting IUU fishing in foreign 
fisheries and leveling the playing field for U.S. seafood 
producers, SIMP is not up to the task. This program should be 
reformed, not expanded.''
    With the state of Alaska producing 60 percent of this 
nation's seafood, we should be careful about passing such 
measures while we await the arrival of Mr. Young's successor.
    It seems to me that one of the goals here is to know the 
country of harvest. With all the issues that we have heard and 
will hear today with SIMP expansion, we need to look at how 
finding country of harvest can be done without undue burdens.
    I am told that the Department of State's turtle excluder 
program requires importers to certify that shrimp shipments 
come from countries that have committed to using turtle 
excluder devices. Importers must identify the country of 
harvest in their paperwork, regardless of where their product 
was processed. So, we ought to be looking at examples such as 
this.
    Mr. Chairman, when we import at least 85 percent of our 
seafood, and we have a looming food crisis because of the 
unholy combination of the Russian-Ukrainian war, drought, and 
restrictions on too-narrow allowances of the use of Federal 
water policies, we need to clearly produce more food in our 
country. We need to unleash both aquaculture and agriculture 
producers, not handcuff them. But that is, sadly, what is 
happening.
    Take, for example, what is now pending in the Klamath 
Basin, where the Bureau of Reclamation could release water for 
over 170,000 acres for farmers, but has yet to make a choice 
about delivering water to farmers or holding it back for higher 
lake levels.
    Food independence is a part of our essential national 
security program and is something that we all must support. We 
just have to work together to figure out how to achieve that 
goal.
    With that, I yield back and welcome today's witnesses.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bentz follows:]
    Prepared Statement of the Hon. Cliff Bentz, a Representative in 
                   Congress from the State of Oregon

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The main focus of today's hearing is on President Biden's Executive 
Order that sought to stop Russian seafood imports as one of many 
consequences of its invasion of Ukraine. The Executive Order, however, 
allows Russian-caught seafood to be imported into the United States if 
it is processed in another country. The late Dean of the House, Don 
Young, introduced legislation aimed at ending this processing allowance 
and that legislation rests with the Ways and Means Committee.
    While the Russian seafood ban is subject to trade laws and another 
Committee's jurisdiction, this hearing is being used as a means to 
justify the proposed legislative expansion of the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program, otherwise called SIMP.
    SIMP is a risk-based traceability program aimed at discouraging 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated--or IUU--seafood and 
misrepresented seafood from entering the U.S. market. Like Russian 
seafood or Chinese-processed Russian seafood, I don't know anyone here 
who supports illegal fishing, fraudulent seafood or seafood produced 
through forced labor.
    But the question is whether expanding SIMP is the right way to do 
it.
    The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has 
conceded that ``SIMP does not prevent or stop IUU fish and fish 
products from entering U.S. commerce.'' \1\ Unfortunately, we are 
unable to hear from the agency about this since it declined to 
participate today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Nat'l Oceanic and Atmosphere. Admin., Report on the 
Implementation of the U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program, page 6, 
https://media.fisheries.noaa.gov/2021-05/SIMP%20 
Implementation%20Report%202021.pdf?null.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One witness here today, Mr. Mike Lahar, who is testifying on behalf 
of the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America, 
also questions the effectiveness and efficiency of expanding SIMP. As a 
customs broker, he knows firsthand about how this program is being 
carried out and will focus his testimony on the extensive and 
incredibly burdensome documentation process created by SIMP. He will 
also say that SIMP will not have an impact on the Russian seafood ban.
    We have also heard from inland aquaculture producers that SIMP 
expansion will impact them through WTO sufficiency requirements brought 
on by added SIMP requirements.
    Lastly, our former colleague from Alaska, the late Mr. Young, also 
opposed this saying--and I quote--``Although I have long supported the 
goal of fighting IUU ot up to the task. This program should be 
reformed, not expanded.''
    With the State of Alaska producing 60 percent of this Nation's 
seafood, we should be careful about passing such measures while we 
await the arrival of Mr. Young's successor.
    It seems to me that one of the goals here is to know the country of 
harvest. With all of the issues that we have heard--and will hear 
today--with SIMP expansion, we need to look at how finding country of 
harvest without undue burdens.
    I'm told that the Department of State's turtle excluder program 
requires importers to certify that shrimp shipments come from countries 
that have committed to using turtle excluder devices. Importers must 
identify the country of harvest in their paperwork, regardless of where 
the product was processed. So, we ought to be looking at examples such 
as this.
    Mr. Chairman, when we import at least 85 percent of our seafood and 
we have a looming food crisis because of the unholy combination of the 
Russia/Ukraine war, drought, and restrictive, narrow Federal water 
policies, we need to clearly produce more food in our country. We need 
to unleash both aquaculture and agriculture producers, not handcuff 
them but that's what's happening.
    Take, for example, what's now pending in the Klamath basin, where 
the Bureau of Reclamation could release water for over 170,000 acres 
for farmers but has yet to make a choice about delivering water to 
farmers or holding it back for higher lake levels that the science says 
does not help the sucker fish. The longer they wait, the more life 
saving food production we lose.
    Food independence is part of an essential national security 
strategy and something we all must support. We just need to have to 
work together toward that goal. With that, I yield back and welcome 
today's witnesses.

                                 ______
                                 

    Mr. Huffman. I thank the Ranking Member. We will now hear 
testimony from our witnesses.
    Let me remind the witnesses that, under Committee rules, 
you should limit your oral statements to 5 minutes, but your 
entire written statement will be entered into the hearing 
record.
    When you begin, the timer will start counting down. It 
turns orange when you have 1 minute remaining. I recommend that 
Members and witnesses joining remotely lock the timer so that 
it remains visible.
    I will remind non-Administration witnesses that you are 
encouraged to participate in the Witness Diversity Survey we 
have created through the Congressional Office of Diversity and 
Inclusion. Witnesses may refer to your hearing invitation for 
more information about that.
    After your testimony is complete, please do remember to 
mute yourself to avoid inadvertent background noise.
    I will also allow the entire panel to testify before we 
bring it back to the Members for questions.
    We will hear first from Ms. Sally Yozell, Senior Fellow and 
Director of Environmental Security at the Stimson Center. The 
Chair now recognizes Ms. Yozell for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF SALLY YOZELL, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF 
     ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY, STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Yozell. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
Subcommittee. My name, as you said, is Sally Yozell, and I am 
the Director of the Environmental Security Program at the 
Stimson Center, a non-partisan research organization in 
Washington, DC.
    First, let me commend Congressman Huffman and the 
Subcommittee for holding this emergency hearing on seafood 
traceability and the ban of Russian seafood, and for your 
continued leadership on these important issues.
    Today is day 43 of the devastating Russian war on Ukraine. 
We have all witnessed the unspeakable atrocities taking place 
daily, causing the greatest humanitarian crisis in Europe since 
World War II. President Biden has rallied nations around the 
globe to impose sanctions on Putin for his egregious actions. 
In the United States, a whole-of-government effort is underway 
to impose import bans on energy products, technology, Russian 
vodka, and diamonds. And as Secretary Yellen said last week, we 
will continue to target Putin's war machine with sanctions from 
every angle until this senseless war of choice is over.
    In March, the President signed an Executive Order banning 
the importation of Russian seafood, which I expect will be with 
us for quite some time. Unfortunately, this plan to strike an 
economic blow to Russia via seafood sanctions to the United 
States won't be successful if we don't close the loopholes that 
exist across the seafood supply chain.
    To ensure sanctions are successful, we need full seafood 
traceability with real information on the origin of catch, and 
NOAA has an opportunity to be a leader in that effort.
    Since 2014, Russian seafood exports to the United States 
have grown by 173 percent. Last year, Russia exported $1.2 
billion worth of crab, cod, pollock, salmon, and other fish to 
the United States. However, the full extent of seafood caught 
by Russian vessels and sent to U.S. markets goes well beyond 
those products imported directly from Russia.
    Under the U.S. Country of Labeling Act, or COOL, seafood 
products harvested in one country and then processed in another 
are labeled as a product of the country where the processing 
occurs. This means Russian seafood processed in China and sent 
on to America is labeled as Chinese product, not Russian.
    The United States imports about 85 percent of its seafood, 
and roughly 35 percent of U.S. seafood consumed is initially 
caught in U.S. waters, exported to Asia for processing, and 
then re-imported back into the United States. Russian catch is 
processed alongside the U.S. fish, where it is co-mingled 
together and processed into fish blocks, fish sticks, canned 
salmon, or frozen filets, and then sent back to grocery stores 
and restaurants here.
    In fact, according to the ITC, one-third of processed, 
wild-caught fish imported to the United States from China in 
2019 was actually caught by Russian ships, vessels. This 
includes 69 percent of Atlantic cod imports and 50 percent of 
Alaskan pollock. So, don't let that name fool you.
    A recent paper out of the University of Florida found that 
39 percent of the processed salmon imported from China came 
from Russia.
    When it comes to rebranded Russian catch, American 
consumers do not want to buy it, and chefs do not want to serve 
it. Fortunately, stopping the importation of Putin's pollock is 
an easy fix. NOAA has the ability to impose traceability 
requirements which track all seafood through the supply chain 
before it enters our country.
    In 2016, the IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud Task Force 
created the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, known as SIMP, 
which is managed by NOAA. As a former co-chair of the task 
force, I can state with certainty that while the program 
initially targeted 13 species groups considered at highest risk 
of being IUU fish, the intention was always to expand SIMP to 
cover all species and prevent illegally harvested seafood from 
entering U.S. markets.
    If properly implemented and enforced, SIMP would provide 
the tools to identify and track the origin of seafood imports, 
including imports that may have been caught by Russian vessels. 
Yet, after 4 to 5 years, SIMP covers only about 40 percent of 
U.S. seafood imports, and does not cover several Russian-caught 
species like pollock, salmon, and halibut. So, when fish is 
processed in China, we really have no idea if it is Russian or 
not.
    But Chinese processors can accommodate these full 
traceability requirements. They already separate out seafood to 
comply with the European Union's Catch Certification Scheme. 
And with Europe's proposed ban announced yesterday, they will 
be able to comply.
    There are many options to expand SIMP to all species 
immediately: the President could issue an Executive Order 
tomorrow; NOAA could show its leadership and propose an 
emergency rule; or Congress could pass the bipartisan SIMP 
provisions included in the House America COMPETES Act and 
appropriate the funding needed for NOAA to adequately implement 
a robust SIMP.
    In closing, if SIMP were expanded to cover all species, the 
ban on Russian seafood imposed by the President could be 
implemented effectively and stop Putin's pollock from entering 
the United States.
    It could also provide consumers, retailers, and restaurants 
with the confidence that the seafood they buy is not supporting 
the horrific war in Ukraine, and give American importers the 
certainty they need to ensure they are not culpable of 
importing banned Russian products.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members, for your commitment on 
this issue, and I look forward to answering any questions.

    [The prepared statement of Ms. Yozell follows:]
 Prepared Statement of Sally Yozell, Director, Environmental Security 
                        Program, Stimson Center
    My name is Sally Yozell, and I am the Director of the Environmental 
Security program at the Stimson Center, a non-partisan research 
organization in Washington, DC. Our program conducts research that 
examines the suite of environmental and climate threats that have the 
potential to undermine global security. Expanding seafood traceability 
and combatting IUU fishing are a central focus of our program.

    I appreciate your leadership on combatting IUU fishing, expanding 
transparency in the seafood supply chain, and protecting our precious 
marine resources. I commend you and your colleagues on the House 
Natural Resources Subcommittee on Water, Oceans, and Wildlife for your 
work to date on these issues. I am grateful for the opportunity to 
provide written commentary in support of my verbal testimony on seafood 
traceability and implementing the ban on Russian seafood.

The Executive Order and Ban on Russian Seafood

    Today is day 43 of the devastating Russian war on Ukraine. We have 
all witnessed the unspeakable atrocities taking place daily, causing 
the greatest humanitarian crisis in Europe since World War II.

    President Biden has rallied nations around the globe to impose 
sanctions on Putin for his egregious actions. In the U.S., a whole of 
government effort is underway to impose import bans on energy products, 
technology, Russian vodka, and diamonds. As Secretary Yellen said last 
week, ``We will continue to target Putin's war machine with sanctions 
from every angle, until this senseless war of choice is over.''

    On March 11, President Biden signed Executive Order 14068, on 
Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment with Respect 
to Continued Russian Federation Aggression. This Executive Order banned 
the importation of Russian ``fish, seafood, and preparations thereof,'' 
among other products, into the United States, and aims to strike 
another economic blow to Russia in response to their unprovoked 
invasion of Ukraine. The seafood ban is set to take effect on June 23, 
2022, and I suspect it will be with us for many years moving forward.

    Despite the good intentions to strike an economic blow to Russia 
after its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, this ban will not work 
without full seafood traceability, and real information on the origin 
of the catch. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) has an opportunity to be a leader in that effort.

    A lack of transparency exists throughout the global seafood supply 
chain, but the U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program, or SIMP, 
provides the tools which can allow NOAA and Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) to more effectively identify imports that may have 
been caught by Russian vessels. Full traceability across all seafood 
imports will allow the U.S. to track the chain of custody of the 
seafood that ends up in our restaurants, grocery stores, and markets.

    In order to ensure the effective implementation of the ban, the 
U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program, or SIMP, should be expanded to 
cover all seafood imports. This would ensure traceability from Russian 
vessels to when it enters U.S. commerce and that the catch is not 
laundered in another country or fraudulently mislabeled.

    Numerous recent polls show that American consumers increasingly 
demand to know how and where their seafood was caught.\1\ A new poll 
conducted by the Walton Family Foundation found that 80 percent of 
consumers expect their restaurants and stores to ensure that the 
seafood sold is not the product of IUU fishing and not caught with 
forced labor or human rights violations.\2\ And now given Russia's 
continued aggression toward Ukraine, consumers have been supportive of 
efforts by major chain restaurants to remove Russian seafood from their 
menus and supply chains.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See: Emma Desrochers. ``New poll finds US voters want 
assurances merchants are selling legally caught seafood.'' Seafood 
Source. March 25, 2022, https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-
sustainability/new-poll-finds-us-voters-want-assurances-merchants-are-
selling-legally-caught-seafood (Accessed April 5, 2022); Oceana. 
``American Voters Want to End Illegal Fishing & Seafood Fraud.'' 
January 2021, https://usa.oceana.org/american-voters-want-end-illegal-
fishing-seafood-fraud/ (Accessed April 5, 2022); Chris Clark, NRDC. 
``Chefs Urge Congress: End Illegal Fishing & Labor Violations.'' 
October 20, 2021, https://www.nrdc.org/experts/chris-clark/chefs-urge-
congress-end-illegal-fishing-labor-violations (Accessed April 5, 2022).
    \2\ Desrochers, ``New poll finds US voters want assurances 
merchants are selling legally caught seafood.''
    \3\ Christine Blank. ``Major US restaurant chains cease buying 
Russian seafood.'' Seafood Source. March 8. 2022, https://
www.seafoodsource.com/news/foodservice-retail/major-us-restaurants-
chains-cease-buying-russian-seafood (Accessed April 5, 2022).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.-Russia Seafood Trade and Chinese Ramifications

    By banning Russian seafood imports, the Executive Order will also 
redress the imbalanced seafood trade that has grown between the U.S. 
and Russia over the last few years.

    Russia banned U.S. seafood in 2014 following U.S. sanctions levied 
after Russia's invasion of Crimea.\4\ However, since 2014, Russian 
seafood imports have grown by 173 percent.\5\ In 2021, Russia was the 
eighth-largest exporter of seafood to the U.S., with $1.2 billion worth 
of crab, cod, pollock, and other fish,\6\ including $900 million in 
king crab alone.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Jordan Andrews. ``Maine seafood industry expects indirect hit 
from Russian invasion.'' Portland Press Herald, February 25, 2022. 
https://www.pressherald.com/2022/02/25/maine-seafood-industry-expects-
indirect-hit-from-russian-invasion/ (Accessed April 5, 2022).
    \5\ Lane Welch.'' Alaska lawmakers take up seafood trade deficit.'' 
National Fisherman. January 31, 2022, https://
www.nationalfisherman.com/alaska/alaska-lawmakers-take-up-seafood-
trade-deficit (Accessed April 5, 2022).
    \6\ Laine Welch. ``Ban on US purchases of Russian seafood opposed 
by some national food marketers.'' Anchorage Daily News. March 1, 2022, 
https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2022/02/28/ban-on-us-purchases-of-
russian-seafood-opposed-by-some-national-food-marketers/ (Accessed 
April 5, 2022).
    \7\ Rachel Sapin. ``US seafood industry backs Russia seafood ban, 
but says clarity is needed on its impact.'' IntraFish. March 11, 2022, 
https://www.intrafish.com/opinion/us-seafood-industry-backs-russia-
seafood-ban-but-says-clarity-is-needed-on-its-impact/2-1-1183613 
(Accessed April 5, 2022).

    While the Executive Order bans seafood whose country of origin is 
Russia, the ban does not cover Russian-caught fish shipped for 
processing to other countries like China, where most of the world's 
seafood is processed.\8\ Russian catch is sent to China for processing, 
and is comingled with catch from the U.S. and other countries, some of 
it illegal, and processed into fish sticks, canned salmon, or crab with 
its origin masked. The National Fisheries Institute, or NFI, a trade 
group representing some U.S. seafood processors, sent a note to its 
members after the signing of the Executive Order to clarify that 
Russian catch processed in China and imported into the U.S. would not 
be subject to the import ban.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Tom Seaman. ``NFI: Russian fish processed in China shouldn't be 
subject to import ban.'' Undercurrent News. March 14, 2022, https://
www.undercurrentnews.com/2022/03/14/nfi-russian-fish-processed-in-
china-shouldnt-be-subject-to-import-ban (Accessed April 5, 2022).
    \9\ Ibid. (Accessed April 5, 2022).

    This is a significant loophole given the large amounts of Russian 
and U.S. seafood processed in China, and the large percentages 
originating from Russian vessels. According to a study by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC), in 2019, the U.S. imported almost 
$2 billion of seafood from China. Roughly one-third of China's wild 
caught seafood imports into the U.S. were caught by Russian ships, 
including 50 percent of Alaskan pollock.\10\ And a recent paper out of 
the University of Florida found that 39 percent of the processed salmon 
imported from China came from Russia.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ U.S. International Trade Commission. ``Seafood Obtained via 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic 
Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries.'' February 2021, https://
www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5168.pdf, p. 148 (Accessed April 5, 
2022) (``ITC Report'').
    \11\ Frank Asche, et al. ``China's seafood imports--Not for 
domestic consumption?'' Science. January 27, 2022. 375: 6579, 386-388, 
https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abl4756 (Accessed April 5, 
2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. is a major seafood importer, and from 1998 to 2018 U.S. 
seafood imports doubled from 1.5 million tons to 3 million tons.\12\ As 
of 2021, the U.S. is the second-largest market for seafood imports in 
the world after the European Union. The U.S. imports up to 85 percent 
of the seafood consumed,\13\ but a third of those imports are comprised 
of fish originally caught by U.S. vessels that is sent to China for 
processing before being reexported back into the U.S.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Eric Abaidoo, Max Melstrom & Trey Malone. ``The Growth of 
Imports in U.S. Seafood Markets.'' Choices, https://
www.choicesmagazine.org/choices-magazine/theme-articles/the-economics-
of-us-aquaculture/the-growth-of-imports-in-us-seafood-markets (Accessed 
April 5, 2022).
    \13\ Oceana. ``U.S. Seafood Demand Drives Illegal Fishing Around 
the World, Says Oceana Report.'' February 1, 2022, https://
usa.oceana.org/press-releases/u-s-seafood-demand-drives-illegal-
fishing-around-the-world-says-oceana-report/ (Accessed April 5, 2022).
    \14\ Jessica A. Gephart, Hally E. Froelich & Trevor A. Branch. ``To 
create sustainable seafood industries, the United States needs a better 
accounting of imports and exports.'' PNAS. May 7, 2019. 116 (19) 9142-
9146, https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1905650116 (Accessed April 
5, 2022).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Limitations of Existing Regulations on the Ban

    The U.S. Country of Origin Labeling (or COOL) law, implemented by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, requires retailers to notify 
customers with information on the source of certain food products, 
including wild caught and aquaculture seafood.\15\ COOL unfortunately 
exempts seafood that is processed in another country and re-exported. 
So Russian seafood is disguised when processed through China and re-
exported to the U.S. with the country of origin a product from China, 
not Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ USDA. ``Country of Origin Labeling (COOL).'' https://
www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/cool (Accessed April 5, 2022).

    When it comes to rebranded Russian catch, American consumers do not 
want to buy it, and chefs do not want to serve it. Fortunately, 
stopping the importation of ``Putin's pollock'' is an easy fix. NOAA 
has the ability to impose traceability requirements which track all 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
seafood through the supply chain before it enters the country.

    In 2016, the IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud Task Force created the 
Seafood Import Monitoring Program, known as SIMP which is managed by 
NOAA. As a former co-chair of the Task Force, I can state with 
certainty that while the program initially targeted 13 species groups 
considered at highest risk of being IUU fish, the intention was always 
to expand SIMP to cover all species and prevent Illegally harvested 
seafood from entering U.S. markets.

    This is clearly outlined in our original 2016 Action Plan. 
Recommendation 15 of the Action Plan, which directed the Task Force to 
establish a risk-based seafood traceability program, which ultimately 
became SIMP, noted that this was to be the ``first phase'' of a risk-
based traceability program. The Action Plan mentions that the program 
will apply ``initially'' to products of particular concern, either 
subject to significant seafood fraud or a species significantly at-risk 
of IUU fishing. Further, the program was to be reevaluated and use 
lessons learned to eventually expand the program to include all seafood 
entering the U.S. The Task Force also directed that the program be 
``evaluated regularly'' to see how it's meeting objectives and how it 
can be expanded. This is also detailed in the final SIMP regulation.

    In operation since 2018, SIMP was designed to prevent illegally 
harvested seafood from entering U.S. markets but it only covers 40 
percent of U.S. seafood imports.\16\ SIMP does not cover many key 
species caught by Russian vessels, like pollock, salmon, and halibut. 
Further, even for covered species, SIMP has an exemption for ``highly 
processed seafood products.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Oceana. ``Loopholes put illegally caught seafood on Americans' 
Plates. February 2022, https://usa.oceana.org/reports/loopholes-put-
illegally-caught-seafood-on-americans-plates/ (Accessed April 5, 2022).
    \17\ NOAA. ``Compliance Guide: U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring 
Program. June 2019, https://www.iuufishing.noaa.gov/Portals/33/
SIMPComplianceGuide_June2019.pdf?ver=2019-05-28-134131-697 (Accessed 
April 5, 2022).

    To fully implement the ban, SIMP needs its traceability 
requirements to apply to all seafood imports. With all species covered, 
consumers will have greater confidence that the seafood they buy was 
not harvested by Russia or comingled with Russian catch if processed 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
elsewhere.

    Chinese processors can accommodate these traceability requirements. 
The EU's Catch Certification Scheme applies to all wild-caught EU 
seafood imports, and Chinese processors are able to separate out catch 
to comply. The level of enforcement in Chinese processing facilities is 
not fully understood but if SIMP was to cover all U.S. seafood imports, 
the Chinese processors would be able treat U.S.-bound fish with the 
same catch documentation as fish going to the EU.

    SIMP was created to Keep IUU fish from entering the U.S. seafood 
market and undercutting domestic U.S. catch. IUU fishing (IUU) fishing 
is one of the biggest threats to sustainable fisheries around the 
world, comprising 20 to 50 percent of all global seafood catch and 
generating an estimated $36 billion a year in illicit revenue. IUU 
fishing contributes to food and economic insecurity, perpetuates unsafe 
labor conditions on vessels, and has the potential to increase 
instability in coastal communities who rely on fisheries for their 
livelihood. With three billion people around the world dependent on 
fish as a primary source of protein, this has significant economic and 
security implications for U.S. interests. The U.S. ITC report estimated 
that the U.S. imports $2.4 billion worth of IUU catch seafood derived 
from IUU fishing in 2019, amounting to 11 percent of total U.S. seafood 
imports.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ ITC Report, p. 11.

    Expanding SIMP to all species would also provide greater 
transparency into Chinese seafood imports to the U.S. as SIMP only 
covers 29 percent of all seafood imports from China.\19\ The good news 
is that the expectation is for the U.S. fishing industry to be able to 
make up the difference by increasing U.S. caught seafood in our 
markets, which would in turn increase domestic revenues to the benefit 
of our fishing communities, growing jobs and economic opportunity at 
home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Marti Flacks, Jacqueline Lewis & David McKean. ``Reeling In 
Abuse: How Conservation Tools Can Help Combat Forced Labor Imports in 
the Seafood Industry.'' February 15, 2022, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/reeling-abuse (Accessed April 5, 2022).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Next Steps Needed

    President Biden's Executive Order to ban Russian seafood has 
widespread support on Capitol Hill and in the U.S. seafood industry. 
Now we need to close the loopholes and ensure its success.

    NOAA recently assessed its SIMP program and recognized there is 
room for improvement. This is a pivotal time for the program. They are 
considering adding new species, increasing use of electronic catch 
documentation and catch verification, applying artificial intelligence, 
and expanding enforcement and auditing. As NOAA continues to advance 
changes to SIMP, they should continue to work closely with the research 
community, industry (like my colleague here from the National Brokers), 
NGOs, and the international community, to improve the SIMP process by 
holding public meetings and roundtable discussions, work with foreign 
governments and conduct international training and capacity building, 
improve program transparency, and seek to improve the program's 
effectiveness. They should also support and work with other federal 
agencies and share seafood trade data to minimize reporting redundancy 
and effort and further focus on the magnitude of risks associated with 
IUU fishing. An annual evaluation and reporting on the SIMP program 
should also be made public.

    NOAA should also provide detailed budget information to Congress in 
terms of what specific resources are needed to successfully implement 
an expanded SIMP to covers all seafood imports. And they should report 
annually to Congress on the progress of the SIMP program.

    Today there are many options to expand SIMP to all species 
immediately, stop Putin's pollock from entering U.S. commerce, and meet 
the urgency of the war in Ukraine:

     The President could issue an executive order tomorrow;

     NOAA could show leadership and propose an emergency rule; 
            or

     Congress could pass the bipartisan SIMP provisions 
            included in the America COMPETES Act and appropriate the 
            funding needed for NOAA to adequately implement a robust 
            SIMP.
    The Russian seafood ban is likely to stay in place for many years 
to come, and if properly implemented and enforced, it will provide a 
powerful sanction for Russia's invasion and heinous acts on the 
Ukrainian people and infrastructure.

    With Russian seafood removed from the market, U.S. seafood can make 
up the difference. Illegal fishing depresses the revenues for honest 
U.S. fishermen, and it gives a disadvantage to legal U.S. catch in the 
marketplace. American consumers support the ban on Russian seafood and 
do not want to buy seafood that was caught illegally or with labor or 
human rights violations.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Desrochers, ``New poll finds US voters want assurances 
merchants are selling legally caught seafood''; Oceana, ``American 
Voters Want to End Illegal Fishing & Seafood Fraud''; and Clark, 
``Chefs Urge Congress: End Illegal Fishing & Labor Violations.''

Attachment: Op-ed by Sally Yozell & Jean Flemma. ``Are you sure the 
seafood you just bought isn't Russian? '' Seattle Times. March 17, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2022.

                                 *****

                               ATTACHMENT

Are you sure the seafood you just bought isn't Russian?

The Seattle Times, March 16, 2022 (Updated March 17, 2022 at 12:20 
p.m.)

by Sally Yozell and Jean Flemma


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    .epsA worker packs salmon caviar in cans in the Russian Far East 
village of Kitovy. In escalating the U.S. drive to squeeze Russia's 
economy . . . (AP Photo / Sergei Krasnoukhov, File)

After the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, countries and companies 
around the globe rightly announced plans to stop doing business with 
Russia. Just last week, the U.S. issued its latest restrictions: An 
executive order banning a number of iconic Russian products, including 
vodka and seafood. While Russia may be better known as a purveyor of 
the infamous liquor, the U.S. buys significantly more seafood from the 
country--importing more than $1.2 billion in crab, cod and other fish 
in 2021.

The ban on seafood could pack a significant blow to Russia's economy. 
It is meaningless, however, without tools to help the U.S. trace the 
origins of the food that ends up in restaurants, grocery stores and 
seafood markets. The U.S. government has already gone to great lengths 
to ban the import of Russian oil, liquefied natural gas and coal, and 
the same steps should be taken with seafood.

Seafood is one of the most traded food commodities in the world, but a 
lack of transparency and traceability exists across the seafood supply 
chain. Currently, Russian-caught fish can easily be shipped to another 
country, such as China, where much of the global seafood is processed, 
and then shipped to the U.S. masking its origins. In fact, an industry 
trade association reportedly told its members that Russian fish 
processed in China would not be impacted, effectively giving the green 
light to continue to import Russian seafood into the U.S., where it can 
be masked in breaded fish sticks, canned salmon and crab.

Instead of taking steps to evade the ban, the industry should work with 
the U.S. government to take the steps necessary to implement it. This 
reinforces why we need a strong, effective seafood traceability program 
that requires fish to be tracked from the boat to when it enters the 
U.S. Only through such a system can the government truly prevent 
Russian fish from coming into our markets and ending up on the plates 
of unwitting American consumers.

The U.S. government has a program to track seafood known as the Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program (SIMP). Operating since 2018, SIMP was 
designed to prevent illegally harvested seafood from entering U.S. 
markets but, unfortunately, only focuses on 13 species, and it does not 
require traceability for many Russian products entering U.S. markets, 
including pollock, salmon and halibut.

To be effective, SIMP must be extended to all fish stocks, ensuring 
Russia seafood cannot be laundered halfway around the world, through 
another market or disguised under another label. This will provide 
greater confidence to consumers that the seafood they buy was not 
harvested by Russian ships, processed in Russian facilities or co-
mingled with Russian catch.

The good news is that the U.S. fishing industry would be able to make 
up the difference by increasing U.S. caught seafood in our markets, 
increasing domestic revenues, benefiting our fishing communities, and 
growing jobs and economic opportunity at home.

The decision by President Joe Biden to ban Russian seafood has 
widespread support on Capitol Hill and in the U.S. seafood industry, 
but to ensure this ban is effective, strong traceability provisions 
must be adopted either legislatively or through further executive 
action.

Congress could pass the America COMPETES Act (H.R. 4521), which 
includes provisions that would allow for full traceability for all 
seafood imports, including banned Russian products. And the Biden 
administration could complement its executive order and ensure the ban 
will have meaning by also announcing an expanded traceability system 
under SIMP.

We have a big opportunity before us, which merits thoughtful solutions. 
A successful ban on Russian seafood requires an effective seafood 
tracking system, and Congress and the administration both have the 
power to make that system a reality. Denying Russia a market for more 
than $1 billion worth of their seafood products is another way to stand 
with Ukraine that is needed now more than ever.

                                 ______
                                 

     Questions Submitted for the Record to Sally Yozell, Director, 
             Environmental Security Program, Stimson Center

             Questions Submitted by Representative Huffman

    Question 1. The United States imports millions of dollars' worth 
(and tens of thousands of MT) of AK pollock, as well as prepared fish 
sticks with AK pollock as the main ingredient, from China every year. 
How does the United States know what the origin of this fish is--
whether it is from Russian sources of US--if no information on the 
origin is reported when imported?

    Answer. The short answer is that it is very difficult to discern 
the country of harvest for imported seafood that is processed and 
exported from any intermediary nation, including pollock from China.
    Pollock, as we discussed during the hearing, is not one of the 
species covered by the U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP). 
An importer of products covered under SIMP must provide specific 
information at the time of import on the harvest and chain of custody 
of the seafood imports, including: the vessel ID, vessel country (flag 
state), location of harvest, method of harvest (gear type), place of 
first off-load, responsible entity receiving the fish, and other as 
well as other critical pieces of information. Pollock is not a SIMP 
species, so importers of pollock currently provide none of these 
detailed pieces of information on the chain of custody to the 
government.
    Pollock imports are covered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA)'s Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) standards, which cover all 
imported wild caught and farmed fish and shellfish, among other 
imports, unless the imported shipment falls under an exception. COOL 
standards require covered products to be labeled with their ``country 
of origin'' to inform consumers, but this term can be misleading if 
processing occurred in country where the fish was not harvested.
    In the case of pollock, under COOL requirements any pollock 
imported directly from Russia would be labeled with its country of 
origin as Russia. However, any pollock that is sent to China for 
processing would now bear China as its country of origin, regardless of 
where the fish was originally caught. So pollock that is caught in 
Russian waters or by Russian vessels, or by U.S. vessels, has its 
``country of origin'' changed to China when it is sent for processing. 
And COOL requirements allow for commingling of catch in processing 
across different harvests, allowing for U.S. and Russian catch to be 
combined as well as the potential fraudulent inclusion of other cheaper 
fish species.

    This is because COOL labeling requirements contain an exception 
that applies to much of the pollock imported into the U.S. The 
exception provides that fish that is processed into or as part of a 
``processed food item'' is exempt from COOL labeling requirements. The 
exception is potentially a large one, as in 2019, approximately 62.4 
percent of all U.S. imported seafood by value entered in a processed 
form.\1\ The COOL Act defines a processed food item and details methods 
of production that are covered under this exception:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. International Trade Commission. ``Seafood Obtained via 
Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic 
Impact on U.S. Commercial Fisheries.'' February 2021, https://
www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5168.pdf, p. 83 (Accessed April 28, 
2022) (``ITC Report'').

        Processed food item means a retail item derived from a covered 
        commodity that has undergone specific processing resulting in a 
        change in the character of the covered commodity, or that has 
        been combined with at least one other covered commodity or 
        other substantive food component (e.g., chocolate, breading, 
        tomato sauce) . . . Specific processing that results in a 
        change in the character of the covered commodity includes 
        cooking (e.g., frying, broiling, grilling, boiling, steaming, 
        baking, roasting), curing (e.g., salt curing, sugar curing, 
        drying), smoking (hot or cold), and restructuring (e.g., 
        emulsifying and extruding). Examples of items excluded include 
        roasted peanuts, breaded chicken tenders, and fruit medley.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 7 CFR Sec. 65.220.

    Much of the pollock that is processed in China and imported into 
the U.S. has undergone processing that falls under this broad exception 
of ``a change in the character of the covered commodity.'' Pollock is 
commonly imported as breaded fish sticks or fried fillets, and 
ultimately purchased and eaten as such by U.S. consumers and diners in 
retail grocery stores or restaurants.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ITC report, p. 259.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For imported pollock from China, exempted from SIMP and processed 
to be exempted from COOL labeling, it can be challenging to impossible 
for the U.S. government or U.S. consumers to discern the true origin of 
the catch.
    As we discussed during the hearing, the easiest way to learn the 
true origin of the imported pollock is to extend SIMP to cover pollock. 
That can be done through an Executive Order or by NOAA issuing an 
emergency rule tomorrow, or through the passage of the America COMPETES 
Act containing the bipartisan SIMP provisions included in the version 
that passed the House and then appropriate the funding needed for NOAA 
to adequately implement a robust SIMP. To ensure that the Russian 
seafood ban is fully implemented, SIMP needs its traceability 
requirements to apply to all seafood imports, not just pollock. With 
all species covered, consumers will have greater confidence that the 
seafood they buy was not harvested by Russia or commingled with Russian 
catch or mystery species if processed in China or elsewhere.

    Question 2. While the percentages reported appear small, in 
reality, the volumes and values of AK pollock product that are moving 
between the United States and China is substantial--in 2021 alone, the 
United States imported more than $70 million worth of AK pollock 
(24,558 MT) and exported more than $40 million worth of AK pollock 
(18,539 MT). (Source: NOAA Fisheries Foreign Trade Statistics). These 
figures don't even include the large amounts of fish stick or other 
prepared meals--the secondary processing--imported from China using AK 
pollock ($22 million of fish sticks were imported from China in 2021.) 
Don't U.S. consumers deserve more clarity when purchasing, that they 
are in fact buying American-caught seafood?

    Answer. Yes, we absolutely agree. The global seafood supply chain 
is opaque and rife with opportunities for illegality and fraud in the 
harvest, transshipment, processing, and marketing of seafood that can 
enter U.S. markets. U.S. consumers deserve greater transparency about 
all the seafood they purchase, and that clarity is particularly 
necessary if that fish was caught in foreign waters or caught 
domestically and sent for processing to China or elsewhere overseas and 
then reimported.
    The U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program, or SIMP, provides the 
tools which can allow NOAA and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to 
more effectively identify imports that may have been caught in Russia 
and/or by Russian vessels. In order to ensure the effective 
implementation of the U.S. ban on Russian seafood, the U.S. Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program, or SIMP, should be expanded to cover all 
seafood imports--which would of course include all pollock processed in 
China. SIMP applies to 157 specific HTS codes that indicate inclusion 
of a species group(s) that it covers. If an importer uses an HTS code 
not covered by SIMP or claims to import a species not covered under 
SIMP when using any of the covered HTS codes, SIMP harvest and landing 
data is not required to clear customs.\4\ An expansion to all seafood 
would allow the U.S. to effectively and efficiently prevent all Russian 
seafood entering the U.S., whether it was processed and exported by 
Russia, China, or any other nation. This would ensure traceability from 
Russian vessels to when it enters U.S. commerce and that the catch is 
not laundered in another country or fraudulently mislabeled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See NOAA Fisheries, ``Harmonized Tariff Codes for Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program,'' March 11, 2019, https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/form/harmonized-tariff-codes-seafood-
import-monitoring-program (Accessed April 28, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Full traceability across all seafood imports will allow the U.S. to 
track the chain of custody of the seafood that ends up in our 
restaurants, grocery stores, and markets, and provide U.S. consumers 
the greatest clarity in their seafood purchasing decisions.

    Question 3. While there may be restrictions on what can be marketed 
as ``AK pollock'' to end-consumers at retail, isn't the same species 
being imported under the name ``AK pollock'' as a result of HTS codes 
for those products? How does a retailer distinguish then when they are 
sourcing from imported products?

    Answer. Assignment of a Harmonized tariff schedule (HTS) code is 
used to assign duties to commercial scale imports, and for that reason 
can vary greatly in their specificity. HTS codes are not typically 
carried forward in domestic sourcing or consumer-facing product 
labeling. While there are HTS codes specifically for importing Alaskan 
pollock, there is no regulatory connection between the HTS codes and 
the tariff regime, on the one hand, and the end-consumer retail 
requirement for catch to be labeled ``Alaska Seafood'' or ``Alaska 
Pollock'' on the other. More research could be done to look into 
Alaskan pollock sourcing, chain of custody requirements, and brand 
protection, to see how their labeled product is maintained separately 
from other pollock in the U.S. seafood supply chain. More broadly, we 
would be happy to conduct further research on private sector retail 
sourcing decisions and processes and share our understanding of these 
dynamics.
    We would also appreciate an opportunity to discuss the U.S. 
government's purchasing power through the USDA Section 32 Program. The 
USDA has the authority to ask if seafood it procures under Section 32 
contracts was caught in the U.S. NOAA Fisheries would benefit from 
receiving more funding under the Section 32 distribution, and for 
having those funds able to be used to address illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated (IUU) imports in order to support a level playing field for 
American fishers, producers, and consumers. U.S. seafood producers 
should not have to compete against disguised foreign imports and 
consumers deserve greater clarity on the origin of their seafood.

                                 ______
                                 

    Mr. Huffman. Thank you very much, Ms. Yozell.
    We will hear next from Dr. Tabitha Grace Mallory, Founder 
and CEO of the China Ocean Institute. The Chair recognizes Dr. 
Mallory to testify for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF TABITHA GRACE MALLORY, FOUNDER AND CEO, THE CHINA 
              OCEAN INSTITUTE, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

    Dr. Mallory. Thank you. Chairman Huffman, Ranking Member 
Bentz, and members of the House Natural Resources Subcommittee 
on Water, Oceans, and Wildlife, thank you very much for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    My name is Tabitha Mallory. I run a consulting firm that 
conducts research on Chinese ocean and fisheries policy, and I 
am also part-time at the University of Washington. I appear 
before you today to address banning Russian seafood imports 
into the United States, and the role that China plays in this 
trade, and how the United States can best respond in terms of 
improving seafood traceability.
    The ban is important not only because of the unjust Russian 
invasion of Ukraine, but also for stopping flows of 
unsustainable seafood from Russia into the United States. 
However, the United States still imports seafood from China 
that is of Russian origin, but passed through China for 
processing.
    The goal of seafood traceability is to improve the 
sustainability and legality of catch and to mitigate 
criminality and fraud. Seafood traceability is an important 
tool for stopping IUU fishing, which causes up to an estimated 
$50 billion annually in losses.
    Ultimately, we are going to need a fully electronic, 
globally interoperable seafood traceability system that uses 
blockchain technology, because seafood trade is so global in 
nature. But for now, the United States is still likely 
importing IUU catch.
    According to one index, in 2021, China scored the highest 
in the world on measures of IUU fishing, and Russia scored the 
second highest. And the same year, the United States imported 
$1.76 billion in seafood from China and $1.21 billion in 
seafood from Russia.
    SIMP requires information about only 13 types of fish. 
Russia is a good example of the challenge here. In 2021, the 
United States imported 50 million kilograms of seafood from 
Russia. Approximately 91 percent of those imports by value were 
crab. Of the crab imports, 62 percent of them were not covered 
by SIMP. And then, of the remaining imports, none of those 
species were covered by SIMP either, including groundfish such 
as pollock. Russia and the United States account for 94 percent 
of global pollock production, and pollock sourced from Russia 
is much more likely to be of illegal and unreported origin.
    About 89 percent of Chinese imports of pollock are raw 
material coming from Russia to be processed. China does not 
have any pollock fishing of its own. And the United States also 
sends pollock raw material to China for processing, and then 
those final products are imported back into the United States. 
So, if we analyze the U.S. trade data using mandated yield 
ratios--this is the percentage of material retained after 
processing--raw imports of pollock caught by the U.S. fleet 
cannot account for all of the processed pollock that is re-
imported back to the United States. So, depending on the year, 
anywhere between 30 and 65 percent of pollock imports into the 
United States from China are actually from Russia.
    So, even though the United States has stopped buying 
pollock directly from Russia, we are still buying it indirectly 
through China. And it is currently impossible to know whether 
the processed pollock was caught by the U.S. or the Russian 
fishing fleets, because country of origin labeling is not 
required. Labels of processed pollock frequently state that the 
fish is a product of China, even though the fish was not caught 
by the Chinese fleet.
    Salmon is a similar case. I won't go into it, but it is 
very similar in terms of the processing yields. But another 
challenge with salmon is that there is not harmonized customs 
categorization across all countries. So, countries record 
species on product forms differently. Russia, China, Japan, and 
the United States all code the various species of salmon 
differently.
    So, in terms of policy recommendations, I agree expanding 
SIMP to include all aquatic species, starting with the ones 
that feature prominently in the U.S. processing and re-export 
trade with China is great, and this will also help stop IUU 
seafood imports from places like North Korea.
    We also need to make it mandatory to include country of 
origin labeling for seafood products, as distinguished from 
country of consignment for processing purposes, so that we know 
which country actually caught the fish.
    And we also need to increase transparency. The U.S. seafood 
traceability system and trade data are optimized for regulatory 
traceability and compliance, but not for consumer or civil 
society information.
    U.S. seafood trade data should also account for the raw 
material that is sent to China for processing and then re-
imported, so this trade can be better tracked and monitored for 
IUU fishing risks. A couple of people just in this hearing have 
said that the United States imports 85 percent of its seafood, 
but the truth is we don't really know how much of that fish was 
actually caught by the U.S. fleet.
    And then, we also need to work to standardize the customs 
code for seafood across countries and to increase the 
granularity to the species level so we can match this 
information up better, too.
    Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Dr. Mallory follows:]
           Prepared Statement of Tabitha Grace Mallory, Ph.D.
                       CEO, China Ocean Institute
                                  and
     Affiliate Professor, Jackson School of International Studies,
                        University of Washington
    Chairman Huffman, Ranking Member Bentz, and members of the House 
Natural Resources Subcommittee on Water, Oceans and Wildlife, thank you 
very much for the opportunity to testify before you today.
    My name is Tabitha Mallory, I run a consulting firm that conducts 
research on Chinese ocean and fisheries policy using primary language 
sources, and I am also an affiliate professor at the University of 
Washington. I appear before you today to address the executive order 
banning Russian seafood imports into the United States, the role that 
China plays in this trade, and how the United States can best respond 
in terms of improving seafood traceability.
    On 11 March 2022, President Biden issued an executive order 
prohibiting the importation into the United States fish, seafood, and 
preparations thereof that are of Russian Federation origin. This action 
is important not only for ending trade that provides indirect U.S. 
support for the unjust Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also for 
mitigating flows of unsustainable seafood from Russia into the United 
States. However, fully implementing the ban on Russian seafood imports 
will require additional steps, given the nature of the trade. Even 
though the United States imports seafood directly from Russia, it also 
imports seafood from China that is of Russian origin but processed in 
China.
    In my remarks, I will first briefly explain the importance of 
seafood traceability, discuss the seafood trade involving Russia and 
China, and conclude with some policy recommendations.
Seafood Traceability

    Traceability is defined as ``the ability to access any or all 
information relating to that which is under consideration, throughout 
its entire life cycle, by means of recorded identifications.'' \1\ 
Traceability improves global seafood governance by addressing issues of 
sustainability and legality of catch, as well as issues such as 
criminality and fraud.\2\ Seafood traceability is an important tool for 
stopping illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which 
causes estimated losses of $26-50 billion annually.\3\ As much as one-
fifth of global catch is IUU. In addition to economic losses, 
governments around the world lose an estimated $2-4 billion annually in 
tax revenue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Olsen, P. and Borit, M. (2013). How to Define Traceability. 
Trends in Food Science and Technology. 2013-02, Vol. 29 (2), p.142-150.
    \2\ Moe, T., ``Perspectives on Traceability in Food Manufacture,'' 
Trends in Food Science & Technology, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1998, pp. 211-
214; Garcia-Torres, Sofia, Albareda, Laura, et al., ``Traceability for 
Sustainability--Literature Review and Conceptual Framework,'' Supply 
Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, 14 January 
2019, pp. 85-106.
    \3\ Sumaila, R. et al., ``Illicit trade in marine fish catch and 
its effects on ecosystems and people worldwide,'' Science Advances 6, 
2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    U.S. seafood imports may contribute to IUU fishing. According to 
one index, in 2021, China scored the highest in the world on measures 
of IUU fishing, and Russia scored the second highest.\4\ In the same 
year, the United States imported $1.76 billion in seafood from China 
and $1.21 billion in seafood from Russia.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ IUU Fishing Index, https://iuufishingindex.net/ranking.
    \5\ NOAA Fisheries, Foreign Fishery Trade Data, Foreign Trade 
Division of U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/commercial-fishing/foreign-
fishery-trade-data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Efforts to create a global seafood traceability system are based on 
a framework of critical tracking events (CTEs) and key data elements 
(KDEs).\6\ CTEs are points along the supply chain--such as harvest, 
landing, processing, distribution, and market--at which the product is 
moved between locations, changed, or otherwise requires a capture of 
data to ensure traceability. KDEs are the data components--such as 
vessel identification, time and location of catch, landing, 
distribution, and market entrance--necessary to maintain traceability 
throughout the CTEs. A fully electronic, globally interoperable system 
using blockchain technology is key to the success of seafood 
traceability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Global Dialogue on Seafood Traceability, https://traceability-
dialogue.org/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 2018, the U.S. Government launched the U.S. Seafood 
Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) to prevent IUU fish imports.\7\ In its 
initial phase, the United States requires information about the 
provenance of 13 species of fish. However, as the United States imports 
a majority of its seafood, and a number of species are not covered by 
SIMP, the United States is likely still importing IUU catch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ NOAA Fisheries, Compliance Guide: U.S. Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program, 11 March 2019, https://www.iuufishing.noaa.gov/
Portals/33/SIMPComplianceGuide2017.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another significant challenge to seafood traceability is the lack 
of customs granularity and proper customs categorization. In some 
cases, harmonized system (HS) codes are not standardized at the genus- 
or species-level, and in other cases HS codes are not standardized 
across countries at the eight- or ten-digit level, making it impossible 
to preserve traceability across borders.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Cawthorn, Donna-Maree and Mariani, Stefano, ``Global trade 
statistics lack granularity to inform traceability and management of 
diverse and high-value fishes,'' Nature Scientific Reports, Vol. 7, No. 
12852, 2017, pp. 1-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Imports of Russian Seafood

    In 2021, the United States imported from Russia 50 million kg of 
seafood worth $1.21 billion. Approximately 91 percent of these imports 
by value are crab--including snow crab, red king crab, and blue king 
crab. Of the crab imports, 62 percent were not covered by SIMP.
    Of the remaining seafood imports, none of those species were 
covered by SIMP either, including groundfish such as pollock. Together, 
Russia and the United States account for 94 percent of global pollock 
production, with Russia providing 50 percent and the United States 44 
percent.\9\ Pollock sourced from Russia is more likely to be of illegal 
and unreported (IU) origin than that from the United States. U.S.-
sourced pollock raw material generally originates from a well-regulated 
U.S. fishery, though occasionally with exception.\10\ The Russian 
Pollock Association obtained MSC certification for pollock from the Sea 
of Okhostk in 2013, accounting for 43 percent of Russia's pollock 
catch.\11\ However, the remainder of Russian catch--nearly 60 percent--
does not conform to any sustainability standards. Outside of the MSC-
certified portion, the Russian pollock industry faces problems with 
illegal fishing, bycatch and ecosystem impacts.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ FAO, Wild and Aquaculture Capture Production, 2018.
    \10\ Hilborn, Ray, et al., ``Pramod et al. methods to estimate IUU 
are not credible,'' Marine Policy, Vol. 108, 2019, https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103632; Pramod, Ganapathiraju and Pitcher, Tony 
J., ``In defence of seafood import analysis: Credulity bamboozled by 
supply chain laundering,'' Marine Policy, Vol. 108, 2019, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103651; Blank, Christine, ``American 
Seafoods settles scale-tampering cases,'' SeafoodSource, 15 October 
2014, https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/american-
seafoods-settles-scale-tampering-cases.
    \11\ Marine Stewardship Council, https://fisheries.msc.org/en/
fisheries/.
    \12\ Seafood Watch, Walleye Pollock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Aside from direct imports of pollock from Russia, the United States 
also imports Russian pollock indirectly through China, where it is sent 
for processing. The Chinese fishing fleet does not engage in pollock 
fishing, so does not contribute raw material to the processing 
industry. Instead, about 89 percent of Chinese imports of pollock raw 
material comes from Russia. After processing, over 75 percent of 
Chinese pollock exports are destined for EU and U.S. markets.
    The United States also sends pollock raw material to China for 
processing, and final products are then re-exported back to the United 
States. About 10 percent of China's pollock imports in 2018 were from 
the United States. An analysis of these 2018 trade flows using mandated 
yield ratios (the percentage of material retained after processing) 
indicates that raw inputs of U.S. pollock could only account for 68-70 
percent of the pollock fillet outputs that were re-exported to the 
United States. Almost all of the non-U.S. material inputs would have to 
come from Russia, given that 99 percent of Chinese pollock imports are 
from either Russia or the United States. In some years, the amount 
could be even higher depending on trade fluctuations--U.S. pollock 
inputs only accounted for 34-35 percent of outputs in 2017.

  China Pollock Fillet Exports versus Predicted Exports to the United 
 States under Import and Contract Processing, by weight in tons, 2017 
                                and 2018

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    .epsEven though now the United States forbids the use of the name 
``Alaska pollock'' if the fish does not originate from Alaskan waters, 
it is impossible to know the source of processed pollock in the United 
States because country-of-origin labeling is not required. Labels of 
processed pollock frequently state that the fish is a ``product of 
China'' even though the fish was not caught by the Chinese fleet, but 
only processed in China. Current regulations mean that we do not know 
whether the fish was caught by the U.S. or Russian fishing fleet.
    Cross-border trade between Russia and China also makes it easier 
for the supply chains to intersect. In China, there are 21 HACCP-
certified fishery processing plants licensed to export pollock to the 
United States, and 17 of them are located near Russia in the Chinese 
northeast provinces of Shandong, Liaoning, and Jilin.\13\ China's 
General Administration of Customs has a different import classification 
for border trade, allowing imports across the border to receive fewer 
tariffs in an effort to encourage the local economy--such imports are 
intended for local consumers. However, it has been anecdotally reported 
that some of these border trade imports are used for processing inputs 
for export purposes.\14\ While China requires catch certificates from 
Russia for pollock imports, these certificates are taken at face-value, 
and no inspection of the legitimacy of Russian catch certificates 
occurs in China.\15\ Sometimes catch certificates are issued after the 
product has left Russian territory, and some products transit through 
South Korea, where oversight of catch certificate integrity may be 
spotty.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ The latest List of Approved HACCP Verified Fishery Processing 
Plants Intended to Export to U.S. released by China GAC (http://
www.customs.gov.cn/customs/jyjy/qyzzgl/dtxx5/hgwjwzcdspscqymd/2295439/
index.html).
    \14\ Interview with Chinese processing company.
    \15\ In accordance with the 2012 ``Cooperation Agreement between 
the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of 
the Russian Federation on the Prevention, Prohibition and Elimination 
of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Living Marine 
Resources,'' as of 1 November 2014, China requires a ``Certificate of 
Legal Wild-Capture Fishery Products for Customs Clearance'' for some 
fish species imported from Russia. Interview with Chinese processing 
company [Xinhua News Agency], ``[Sino-Russian Prime Minister's 
Seventeenth Regular Meeting Joint Communique],'' [People's Daily], 7 
December 2012, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/1207/c1024-
19818361.html; [Ministry of Agriculture] and [General Administration of 
Customs], ``2146 [General Administration of Customs and the Ministry of 
Agriculture Notice No. 2146],'' 29 September 2014, http://
jiuban.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/tzgg/gg/201409/t20140929_4069117.htm.
    \16\ Clarke, ``Traceability, Legal Provenance, and the EU IUU 
Regulation.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Salmon is a similar case. The United States imports salmon directly 
from Russia, but also likely indirectly through China because of the 
processing industry. None of the salmon species are covered by SIMP. 
China does not have its own large-scale salmon capture industry. The 
United States, Russia and Chile are the top three suppliers of salmon 
to China. Nearly all of U.S. and Russian exports to China are wild, raw 
pacific salmon species that are sent for processing and then re-
exported. The United States is the top importer of Chinese salmon 
exports. Despite Russia being one of the top two raw salmon suppliers 
to China, Russia is not one of the top ten importers of Chinese salmon. 
Analysis of the 2018 trade flows using yield ratios indicates that, 
given the volume U.S. raw material inputs, predicted exports were 56 
percent smaller than actual exports. Processed salmon fillet exports to 
the United States cannot be fully accounted for by imports of salmon 
raw materials from the United States, and salmon raw materials imported 
from other countries account for the gap--Russia likely fills much of 
this gap given the high volume of Russian raw material sent to China.
    Estimates for IUU salmon in the Russian Far East as a percentage of 
legal catch have ranged from 40 percent to as high as 90 percent.\17\ 
One study used sockeye salmon trade data from Russia, China, Japan and 
South Korea to estimate that true catch in Russia was 60-90 percent 
higher than reported catch.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ The Wild Salmon Center, A Review of IUU Salmon Fishing and 
Potential Conservation Strategies in the Russian Far East, May 2009, 
https://www.wildsalmoncenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
WSC_IUU_paper_v3.pdf.
    \18\ Clarke, Shelley et al., ``Estimating Legal and Illegal Catches 
of Russian Sockeye Salmon Using Trade and Market Data,'' ICES Journal 
of Marine Science, Vol. 66, Issue 3, April 2009, pp. 532-545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

China Imports of Raw Pacific Salmon from the United States, Russia and 
                            Chile, 2015-2018

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


 .epsComparison of Actual and Predicted China Salmon Fillet Exports to 
   the United States under Import and Contract Processing, 2017-2018

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    .epsAnother challenge to salmon traceability is proper customs 
categorization--countries record species on product forms differently. 
Compared to Atlantic salmon, a single species that is mostly farm-
raised, accurate tracing of the six different Pacific salmon species 
along supply chains is much more difficult. Russian customs data 
records sockeye salmon but groups together all other Pacific salmon 
species, while Japanese import statistics differentiate sockeye and 
coho from all other salmon. China only differentiates sockeye salmon 
from all other Pacific salmon species. U.S. customs data differentiates 
each type of Pacific salmon except for Masu salmon.
Policy Recommendations

    Expand SIMP to include all aquatic species, starting with the ones 
that feature prominently in the U.S. processing and re-export trade 
with China, such as pollock and salmon. A more robust U.S. traceability 
program would decrease the chances that the U.S. is importing seafood 
that originates not only from places like Russia, but also from IUU 
fishing activity in places like, North Korea, Indonesia, some South 
American countries, and on the high seas as well.
    Make it mandatory to include country-of-origin labeling for seafood 
products, as distinguished from the country of consignment for 
processing purposes. This is the only way to know which country caught 
the fish.
    Increasing transparency is critically important in addressing these 
issues. The U.S. seafood traceability system and trade data are 
optimized for regulatory traceability and compliance, but not for 
consumer or civil-society information demands, and thus lack 
transparency.\19\ U.S. seafood trade data should also account for raw 
material that is sent to China for processing and then re-imported so 
that this trade can be better tracked and monitored for IUU fishing 
risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ He, J., ``From country-of-origin labelling (COOL) to seafood 
import monitoring program (SIMP): How far can seafood traceability 
rules go?'' Marine Policy 96, 2018, pp. 163-174; Bailey et al., ``The 
role of traceability in transforming seafood governance in the global 
South,'' Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 18, 2016, pp. 
25-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Work to standardize customs codes for seafood across countries and 
to increase granularity to the species level.
    Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

                                 ______
                                 

    Mr. Huffman. Thank you very much, Dr. Mallory.
    We will next hear from Mr. Austin Brush, Senior Analyst at 
the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. The Chair recognizes 
Mr. Brush for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF AUSTIN BRUSH, SENIOR ANALYST, THE CENTER FOR 
            ADVANCED DEFENSE STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Brush. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to provide testimony 
in today's hearing. My name is Austin Brush, and I am a Senior 
Analyst with the Natural Resources Program at C4ADS, a non-
profit organization dedicated to providing data-driven analysis 
and evidence-based reporting on global conflict and 
transnational security issues. It is a privilege to represent 
our work on this topic.
    I appear before you today to discuss the importance of 
traceability and transparency in global seafood supply chains. 
Our research suggests that improvements are needed to ensure 
the United States does not inadvertently import seafood linked 
to IUU fishing, fraud, or other illicit activity.
    More specifically, I would like to discuss two main points: 
how improving traceability in seafood supply chains is 
essential to understanding where seafood originates and is 
processed; and the need for greater transparency in relation to 
vessel and corporate ownership, in order to understand who 
ultimately profits from the harvest, processing, and sale of 
seafood.
    My goal is to illustrate how enhanced transparency and 
traceability in seafood supply chains can help ensure that 
American consumers are not unwittingly supporting the Russian 
economy by purchasing Russian seafood.
    To my first point, traceability in seafood supply chains is 
critical for understanding where seafood products originate. 
This is especially important in the United States, which 
imports much of the seafood it consumes. In the absence of 
enhanced transparency and traceability measures, it remains 
challenging for American businesses to avoid trading in 
untraceable or illegal seafood products.
    In the context of our discussion today about the Russian 
seafood ban, this question of traceability is of the utmost 
importance. For example, C4ADS recently analyzed the trade of 
specific groundfish species between the United States and China 
that are not covered by the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, 
or SIMP. We discovered that nearly a third of the Chinese 
companies exporting groundfish products to the United States 
were simultaneously importing groundfish products from Russia. 
This raises questions about the true origins of Chinese 
groundfish exports and re-exports entering the United States.
    In the United States, existing traceability measures, such 
as SIMP, are intended to prevent the importation of seafood 
linked to forced labor and other crimes by requiring enhanced 
reporting for seafood products. However, the gaps in SIMP's 
coverage leaves the United States vulnerable to importing 
seafood products, thanks to a variety of illicit or non-
compliant activities.
    SIMP should, therefore, be expanded to encompass all 
seafood entering the United States, as well as chain of custody 
data, such as information pertaining to all processing 
facilities and trading companies that interact with the seafood 
product. These improved requirements would help illuminate 
seafood supply chains in their entirety, from the point of 
catch to import. In doing so, American seafood companies and 
government authorities would be able to prevent Russian seafood 
from entering the U.S. market with a higher degree of 
confidence.
    To my second point, lacking transparency and beneficial 
ownership disclosure requirements in the seafood industry mean 
that the people and companies behind key industrial fishing 
fleets remain relatively unknown. Companies are able to hide 
their true ownership using complex cross-jurisdictional 
corporate structures, secrecy jurisdictions, and the use of 
shell companies. These methods can be used to shield the 
individuals and companies ultimately profiting from illegal 
fishing and other violations from meaningful repercussions.
    In order to ensure compliance with the Russian seafood ban, 
it will be critical to understand who owns industrial fishing 
vessels and seafood companies around the world. This is 
particularly relevant for Russian seafood companies, which are 
frequently linked to politically exposed persons and 
potentially sanctioned oligarchs.
    We are currently screening for potential sanctions risk 
linked to Russian companies, and have already found a number of 
examples of connections to Russian oligarchs or politicians. 
For example, we identified a major Russian seafood company that 
was owned by the son-in-law of a Russian individual who had 
been sanctioned since 2014. The son-in-law was then sanctioned 
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on March 24, 2022. In 
response, he sold his ownership stakes in and resigned from at 
least two major Russian fishing companies.
    Although increasing the transparency of beneficial 
ownership data is a critical step to ensure true traceability 
and accountability in the seafood industry, disclosing 
beneficial ownership is not currently required of most fishing 
vessels or seafood companies. Just as the Corporate 
Transparency Act established beneficial ownership reporting 
requirements for certain businesses, U.S. policymakers should 
expand SIMP to include beneficial ownership reporting 
requirements. Without this information, it can be difficult to 
know which vessels and companies are ultimately owned by 
Russian individuals.
    Furthermore, detailed beneficial ownership information is 
needed to hold the beneficiaries of illicit activity in the 
seafood industry accountable.
    And then, finally, any beneficial ownership information 
should be made publicly available in order to support enhanced 
industry and civil society due diligence within seafood supply 
chains.
    To conclude, lacking transparency and traceability is a 
major obstacle to the successful implementation of the Russian 
seafood import ban. The expansion of SIMP to encompass all 
seafood species, chain of custody data, and beneficial 
ownership reporting is critical to ensuring that Russian 
seafood cannot enter the United States. As a major importer of 
seafood, and a leader in effective fisheries management, the 
United States has an opportunity to set the gold standard for 
transparency and traceability in the seafood industry by 
implementing these changes.
    Thank you for the time to speak, and I look forward to your 
questions.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Brush follows:]
   Prepared Statement of Austin Brush, Senior Analyst on the Natural 
                        Resources Program, C4ADS
    Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank 
you for the invitation to provide testimony in today's hearing. It is a 
privilege to represent our work at C4ADS on this topic. My name is 
Austin Brush, and I am a Senior Analyst with the Natural Resources 
Program at C4ADS, a nonprofit organization dedicated to providing data-
driven analysis and evidence-based reporting on global conflict and 
transnational security issues.

    I appear before you today to discuss the importance of traceability 
and transparency in global seafood supply chains. Our research suggests 
that improvements are needed to ensure the United States does not 
inadvertently import seafood linked to IUU fishing, fraud, or other 
illicit activity. More specifically, I would like to discuss two main 
points:

  1.  How improving traceability in seafood supply chains is essential 
            to understanding where catch originates from and where it 
            passes through prior to its consumption; and

  2.  The need for greater transparency in relation to vessel and 
            corporate ownership in order to understand who ultimately 
            profits from the harvest, processing, and sale of seafood.

    My goal is to illustrate how improved transparency and traceability 
in seafood supply chains can ensure the effective implementation of 
sanctions, trade restrictions, and import bans designed to ensure that 
American consumers are not unwittingly supporting the Russian economy 
by purchasing Russian seafood.\1\ The U.S. should build off recent 
corporate transparency efforts and require the seafood industry to 
provide more thorough ownership and supply chain disclosures. Existing 
regulations should also be expanded to ensure enhanced traceability 
under the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP) and other 
legislation. Combined, these efforts will help ensure true supply chain 
traceability in the fishing industry, and will help prevent Russian 
seafood products from entering the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Yozell, S. and Flemma, J. (March 16, 2022). ``Are you sure the 
seafood you just bought isn't Russian?'' Seattle Times. Retrieved from: 
https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/russian-seafood-ban-is-
meaningless-without-real-traceability/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Traceability in US Seafood Supply Chains

    Traceability in seafood supply chains is critical for understanding 
where seafood products originate. This is especially important in the 
United States, which is one of the largest importers of seafood in the 
world. According to certain estimates, the U.S. imports between 85% and 
90% of the seafood it consumes.\2\,\3\ In the absence of 
enhanced transparency and traceability measures, it remains challenging 
for American and foreign businesses to avoid trading in untraceable or 
illegal seafood products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``USA fisheries statistics: production, consumption and 
trade.'' Food and Agriculture Administration. http://www.fao.org/in-
action/globefish/countries/countries/usa/usa-trade/en/
?page=7&ipp=5&tx_dynalist_pi1%5Bpar%5D=YToxOntzOjE6IkwiO3M6MToiNSI7fQ%3D
%3D.
    \3\ ``Global Wild Fisheries.'' Fish Watch. https://
www.fishwatch.gov/sustainable-seafood/the-global-picture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the context of our discussion today about the recent Executive 
Order banning the import of Russian seafood products, this question of 
traceability is of the utmost importance. For example, C4ADS recently 
analyzed the trade of specific groundfish species between the United 
States and China that are not covered by SIMP. We discovered that a 
number of Chinese companies exporting groundfish products to the United 
States were simultaneously importing groundfish products from Russia in 
2018. In fact, nearly a third of the Chinese companies we identified 
exporting groundfish to the US were also importing the same species 
from Russia. This raises questions about the true origins of Chinese 
groundfish exports and re-exports entering the United States.
    This scenario, in which seafood products pass through multiple 
countries before arriving in destination markets, is common in the 
seafood industry. Tracing their movements across several different 
jurisdictions becomes extremely difficult given varying regulations and 
reporting requirements from country to country. In order to address 
this, there would ideally be a comprehensive global standard for 
transparency and reporting in seafood supply chains. In the meantime, 
enhanced traceability disclosure requirements in destination countries 
would make a significant difference.
    In the United States, existing traceability measures, such as SIMP, 
are intended to prevent the importation of seafood linked to forced 
labor and other crimes by requiring enhanced reporting for seafood 
products.\4\ However, SIMP only applies to 13 species, which account 
for less than 40% of U.S. fishery imports.\5\ The gaps in SIMP's 
coverage leaves the United States vulnerable to importing seafood 
products linked to IUU fishing, forced labor, seafood fraud, and other 
crimes. For example, according to a recent study by the United States 
International Trade Commission (ITC), it is estimated that the United 
States imported an estimated $2.4 billion of seafood products derived 
from IUU fishing.\6\ Of the major US import source countries, Russia 
was estimated to be one of the major exporters of IUU-linked seafood 
products to the United States.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ ``U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program.'' National Ocean 
Council Committee on IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud. Retrieved from: 
https://www.iuufishing.noaa.gov/RecommendationsandActions/
RECOMMENDATION1415/FinalRuleTraceability.aspx.
    \5\ ``Re: NOAA Seafood Import Monitoring Program--Robust 
Implementation and Expansion.'' https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/
files/noaa-simp-expansion-and-implementation-letter-20190429.pdf.
    \6\ ``Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
Fishing: U.S. Imports and Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial 
Fisheries'' (February 2021). United States International Trade 
Commission. Retrieved from: https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
pub5168.pdf.
    \7\ Ibid.

    SIMP should therefore be expanded to encompass all seafood entering 
the United States as well as chain of custody data, such as information 
pertaining to all processing facilities and trading companies that 
interact with a seafood product. These improved requirements would help 
illuminate seafood supply chains in their entirety, from the point of 
catch to processing, export, and import. In doing so, American seafood 
companies and government authorities would, with a much higher degree 
of confidence than is currently possible, be able to prevent Russian 
seafood from entering the U.S. market.
Vessel and Corporate Ownership Transparency

    Lacking transparency and beneficial ownership disclosure 
requirements in the seafood industry mean that the people and companies 
behind key industrial fishing fleets remain relatively unknown.\8\ 
Companies are able to hide their true ownership using complex, cross-
jurisdictional corporate structures; secrecy jurisdictions; and the use 
of shell or front companies.\9\ These methods can be used to separate a 
range of illegal fishing and other violations, including illegal access 
to fishing quotas and vessel authorizations, document forgery, vessel 
identity fraud, forced labor, crew labor abuses, and tax evasion, from 
the individuals ultimately profiting from that activity.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Who Controls the Distant Water Squid Fishing Fleet?'' (March, 
2022). C4ADS. Retrieved from: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/6227b37c99c1485717 2166b4/1646769046233/
Squid+Fleet_Brief.pdf.
    \9\ ``Spotlight on the Exploitation of Company Structures by 
Illegal Fishing Operators.'' Trygg Mat Tracking and C4ADS. Retrieved 
from: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/
t/5fd21567ce71ee580fb1cb72/1607603565040/TMT-C4ADS_ 
Spotlight+on+Transparency.pdf.
    \10\ ``The Role of Beneficial Ownership in Combating IUU Fishing.'' 
Rusi, Trygg Mat Tracking, and C4ADS. Retrieved from: https://c4ads.org/
blogposts/2021/6/4/the-role-of-beneficial-ownership-in-combating-iuu-
fishing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Complex and opaque ownership structures in the seafood industry 
also enable the laundering of illicit or untraceable catch into global 
seafood supply chains, meaning American companies and consumers may be 
unknowingly supporting these activities. Furthermore, research has also 
shown that the use of `open' vessel registries, which have particularly 
low requirements for registration and are open to foreign vessels, can 
further obscure the identity of beneficial owners of fishing vessels. 
The practice of flagging out to flags of convenience can further 
disguise the true beneficiary of a vessel and its activities at sea. 
This practice is not limited to fishing vessels--it is also frequently 
employed by vessels attempting to evade sanctions or engage in other 
illicit trades, such as North Korea sanctions evasion activities.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ For registries that are often classified as providing flags of 
convenience, and see vessel registration as a source of revenue rather 
than a utility that the government provides for the registration of 
vessels with tangible links to the state, investing further resources 
to raise its regulatory standards not only cuts into their bottom line, 
but also renders them less attractive to vessel operators seeking low 
regulation environments. See: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/613b9610b3cdba196d524b8b/1631294997128/
Unmasked+-+North+Korea+Vessel+Identity+Laundering.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to ensure compliance with the Executive Order banning 
Russian seafood from entering the United States, it will be critical to 
understand who owns industrial fishing vessels and seafood companies 
around the world. This is particularly relevant for Russian seafood 
companies, which are frequently linked to politically exposed persons 
(PEPs) and potentially sanctioned oligarchs. We have spent the past 
couple weeks screening for potential sanctions risk linked to Russian 
seafood companies, and have already found a number of examples of 
connections between these companies and Russian oligarchs or 
politicians. For example, we discovered that one major Russian seafood 
company was owned by the son-in-law of a Russian individual who has 
been sanctioned since 2014. The son-in-law was sanctioned by the US 
Department of the Treasury on March 24, 2022.\12\ In response, he sold 
all of his stakes and resigned from management from at least two major 
Russian fishing companies.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ ``Russia-related Designations; Publication of new Frequently 
Asked Questions'' (March 24, 2022). US Department of the Treasury. 
Retrieved from: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-
sanctions/recent-actions/20220324.
    \13\ Chase, C. (March 28, 2022). ``Gleb Frank sells Russian Fishery 
Company and Russian Crab as sanctions hit''. Seafood Source. Retrieved 
from: https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/business-finance/gleb-frank-
sells-russian-fishery-company-and-russian-crab-as-sanctions-hit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although increasing the transparency of beneficial ownership data 
is a critical step to ensure true traceability and accountability in 
the seafood industry, disclosing beneficial ownership is not currently 
required of most fishing vessels and seafood companies. Just as the 
Corporate Transparency Act established beneficial ownership reporting 
requirements for certain businesses, U.S. policymakers should expand 
SIMP to include beneficial ownership reporting requirements for fishing 
vessels and seafood companies. Without this information, it can be 
difficult to know which vessels and companies are ultimately owned by 
Russian individuals. Furthermore, detailed beneficial ownership 
information is needed to hold the beneficiaries of illegal and illicit 
activity in the seafood industry accountable. Any beneficial ownership 
information should be made publicly available in order to support 
enhanced industry due diligence and civil society research focused on 
the continued improvement of transparency in seafood supply chains.
Conclusion

    Lacking transparency and traceability is a major obstacle to the 
successful implementation of Russian sanctions and the recent seafood 
import ban. The expansion of SIMP to encompass all seafood species 
entering the United States, chain of custody data, and beneficial 
ownership reporting is critical to ensuring that Russian seafood cannot 
enter the United States. As a major importer of seafood and a leader in 
effective fisheries management, the United States has an opportunity to 
set the gold standard for transparency and traceability in the seafood 
industry by implementing these changes.
    More broadly, the effective implementation of sanctions requires 
broader transparency initiatives to help elucidate the offshoring of 
wealth and use of low transparency jurisdictions to hide ownership. The 
methods used to obfuscate ultimate beneficial ownership by other actors 
engaging in illegal activities are not drastically different from IUU 
vessel owners. The same data gaps and low transparency that undermine 
traceability in seafood supply chains also enable countries and 
individuals to hide wealth through assets like property, ships, and 
companies all over the world.

                                 ______
                                 

Questions Submitted for the Record to Austin Brush, Senior Analyst, the 
                  Center for Advanced Defense Studies
             Questions Submitted by Representative Huffman
    Question 1. The United States imports millions of dollars' worth 
(and tens of thousands of MT) of AK pollock, as well as prepared fish 
sticks with AK pollock as the main ingredient, from China every year. 
How does the United States know what the origin of this fish is--
whether it is from Russian sources of United States--if no information 
on the origin is reported when imported?

    Answer. The origin of seafood products that enter the United States 
from China can be difficult to confirm with absolute certainty due to 
lacking traceability or transparency requirements. This is made more 
complicated by the fact that seafood can pass through several countries 
before entering the United States. Without catch documentation and 
other traceability requirements, it can be difficult or impossible to 
trace these products to their true point of origin.
    In the case of pollock, Chinese companies often import pollock from 
Russia, the United States, or Japan. In 2018, Russia was the origin of 
90% of the frozen pollock imports into China. In our own research into 
the groundfish trade, we identified Chinese companies that were 
simultaneously purchasing Russian seafood and exporting seafood 
products to companies in the United States. US regulations should be 
updated to combat this and similar practices so that seafood shipments 
can easily and consistently be traced back to their true origins.
    Enhanced regulations could include reporting requirements for 
information related to beneficial ownership, both for the vessels 
linked to the harvest of seafood as well as for commercial entities 
exporting seafood to the United States. Additionally, information 
pertaining to the custodians of seafood products throughout the supply 
chain, such as processing facilities and trading companies, would help 
illuminate each supply chain in its entirety. Expanding SIMP to require 
data, such as chain of custody reporting and catch documentation, is 
critical to establish traceability of seafood products from point of 
catch to sale and prevent the entry of untraceable seafood products 
into the United States.

    Question 2. While the percentages reported appear small, in 
reality, the volumes and values of AK pollock product that are moving 
between the United States and China is substantial--in 2021 alone, the 
United States imported more than $70 million worth of AK pollock 
(24,558 MT) and exported more than $40 million worth of AK pollock 
(18,539 MT). (Source: NOAA Fisheries Foreign Trade Statistics). These 
figures don't even include the large amounts of fish stick or other 
prepared meals--the secondary processing--imported from China using AK 
pollock ($22 million of fish sticks were imported from China in 2021.) 
Don't U.S. consumers deserve more clarity when purchasing, that they 
are in fact buying American-caught seafood?

    Answer. We believe that US consumers deserve more clarity when 
purchasing seafood and as a result there needs to be improvements to 
existing traceability mechanisms like SIMP. In research we conducted 
looking at the trade of groundfish species between the US and China, we 
identified several instances of risk or traceability concerns, 
including exposure to potential seafood fraud, safety infractions, and 
unclear sourcing. This suggests that US groundfish imports are 
currently exposed to risk that could be mitigated by requiring enhanced 
traceability measures for more seafood species.
    Since enhanced reporting standards and traceability measures 
already exist within the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, a tenable 
solution could be to expand SIMP to cover more seafood species 
frequently imported into the United States. Our past research clearly 
indicates that seafood supply chains remain relatively opaque, and are 
therefore exposed to risk. The US government should prioritize the 
expansion of SIMP to limit the US seafood market and US consumers' 
exposure to illegally harvested fish or to Russian seafood imports.

    Question 3. While there may be restrictions on what can be marketed 
as ``AK pollock'' to end-consumers at retail, isn't the same species 
being imported under the name ``AK pollock'' as a result of HTS codes 
for those products? How does a retailer distinguish then when they are 
sourcing from imported products?

    Answer. We haven't examined this aspect of Alaskan pollock supply 
chains in detail, but without thorough catch documentation and chain of 
custody reporting, a retailer would struggle to differentiate between 
different products marketed as ``AK pollock.''

                                 ______
                                 

    Mr. Huffman. Thank you very much, Mr. Brush.
    Finally, we will hear from Mr. Mike Lahar--Lahar, I 
believe--Chair of the Regulatory Agencies Committee for the 
National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America. 
The Chair recognizes Mr. Lahar to testify for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MIKE LAHAR, CHAIR, REGULATORY AGENCIES COMMITTEE, 
NATIONAL CUSTOMS BROKERS AND FORWARDERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, 
                    SILVER SPRING, MARYLAND

    Mr. Lahar. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I wish 
to thank you for this opportunity to present testimony on 
behalf of the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders 
Association of America (NCBFAA). My name is Mike Lahar. I am a 
licensed customs house broker working for A.N. Deringer, a 
customs brokerage firm with over 30 offices based out of Saint 
Albans, Vermont.
    I ask that my full written comments be considered, as I am 
summarizing my points with this testimony.
    The NCBFAA represents over 1,100 licensed customs brokerage 
firms filing over 95 percent of all customs entries and at the 
front line for merchandise entering the United States.
    The NCBFAA wholeheartedly supports the ban on Russian 
seafood and sees it as an important measure to demonstrate our 
solidarity with the Ukrainian people. We are working closely 
with our clients to ensure full compliance with the ban.
    We are surprised and concerned, however, that some of the 
witnesses are using this occasion to call for the immediate and 
significant expansion of the Seafood Import Monitoring Program, 
SIMP, a provision contained in H.R. 4521, the America COMPETES 
Act. They boldly claim that the Russian ban is meaningless 
unless the SIMP program is immediately expanded. Yet, the SIMP 
expansion would take years to implement. It would ultimately 
have no impact on the Russian ban.
    As customs brokers, we also understand how supply chains 
work, and we know it is critical to the well-being of the U.S. 
economy and individual consumers that supply chains are 
efficient and reliable.
    Any discussion of seafood trade must recognize that seafood 
supply chains are long. They are complex. Many are a maze of 
cross-border movements and interdependencies designed to 
achieve maximum efficiencies. These supply chains flow in all 
directions. It is routine and common for seafood caught and 
landed in one country to be shipped to a third country for 
processing. In fact, that is the case for many U.S.-caught 
seafood.
    The International Trade Commission estimates that 11 
percent of imported seafood consists of IUU seafood. This means 
that 89 percent of seafood imports are compliant. The challenge 
for regulators is this: how to stop the 11 percent without 
disrupting the vast majority of legal compliant imports.
    We need effective enforcement, as well as efficient 
enforcement, yet NOAA already collects more data at entry than 
just about any other agency. The 15 required data elements may 
not seem like a big deal until you consider the complexity of 
seafood supply chains and the reality of the entry process.
    So, shall we consider what this means in the commercial 
world? When a typical shipment of canned seafood arrives in the 
United States, it may consist of 20 ocean containers holding 
60,000 tins. The seafood in these products may have easily 
originated from 10 or 12 different vessels, catching the fish 
from over 100 different locations. So, for this one typical 
customs entry, 15 additional data elements explodes into 
thousands of data elements at entry, as all of these variations 
are accounted for. That equates to 18,000 discrete data 
elements, each of which must be manually entered and 
transmitted to NOAA via the CBPA system.
    Now, the America COMPETES legislation doubles down on this 
approach, calling for a significant expansion of SIMP by 
requiring 72 hours in advance of entry complete chain of 
custody data with verification and certification by a competent 
third party of all major transfer points.
    The bill also expands the scope of SIMP by including all 
species of seafood and seafood products and widens NOAA's 
mission by requiring data on labor conditions in the harvest 
and processing of seafood products.
    The other witnesses deem this legislation as essential for 
enforcing the Russian ban and apparently envision this 
legislation, if passed, taking effect immediately. Yet, many, 
if not most of these provisions, would be impossible to 
implement for years, at best.
    Ultimately, smarter use of 21st century technology will 
provide for more streamlined, effective results than relying on 
voluminous data entry on a shipment-by-shipment basis at the 
time of entry. Artificial intelligence, predictive analytics, 
and blockchain all offer exciting and innovative opportunities 
that should be explored. The NCBFAA stands ready to help in 
this effort.
    Thank you again for allowing me to present the NCBFAA's 
perspectives on this matter. I look forward to your questions.

    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lahar follows:]
    Prepared Statement of Mike Lahar, National Customs Brokers and 
                   Forwarders Association of America
    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee--I wish to thank you for 
this opportunity to present testimony on behalf of the National Customs 
Brokers and Forwarders Association of America (NCBFAA).I am Mike Lahar, 
a customs broker from A.N. Deringer in Vermont. I ask that my full 
written comments be considered as I am summarizing my points in this 
testimony.
    NCBFAA represents over 1,100 licensed customs brokers, filing over 
95% of all customs entries and are at the frontlines for merchandise 
entering the US. Licensed by CBP, customs brokers provide the important 
and unique perspective of intermediaries who serve as the interface 
between importers, CBP and other government agencies.
    NCBFAA wholeheartedly supports the ban on Russian seafood and see 
it as an important measure to demonstrate our solidarity with the 
Ukrainian people following the unprovoked attack on Ukraine sovereignty 
by Russia. We are working closely with our clients, U.S. seafood 
importers, to ensure full compliance with the ban.
    We are surprised and concerned, however, that some of the other 
witnesses are using this occasion to call for the immediate and 
significant expansion of the Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP)--
a provision contained in H.R. 4521, the America COMPETES Act. They 
boldly claim the Russian ban is meaningless unless the SIMP program is 
immediately expanded. Yet, SIMP expansion would take years to 
implement. It would have no impact on the Russian ban. And, before 
rushing headlong into SIMP expansion, we need to ask: is the H.R. 4521 
SIMP provision really the best way forward to deter Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated (IUU) seafood imports?
    No one wants illegal or fraudulent seafood, or seafood produced by 
forced labor, to enter U.S. commerce. Certainly, our industry is 
strongly committed to safe and legally compliant supply chains. 
Compliance is what we do. SIMP expansion is not the answer to 
effectively ban Russian seafood.
    As customs brokers, we also understand how supply chains work. And, 
we know it is critical to the well-being of the U.S. economy and 
individual consumers that supply chains are efficient and reliable.
    Any discussion of seafood trade must recognize that seafood supply 
chains are long. They are complex. Many are a maze of cross-border 
movements and interdependencies designed to achieve maximum 
efficiencies. These supply chains flow in all directions. It is routine 
and common for seafood caught and landed in one country to be shipped 
to a third country for processing. In fact, this is the case for U.S.-
caught seafood. Large quantities (an estimated $695 million by value) 
of seafood harvested in the U.S. by U.S. commercial fisheries are 
exported to foreign countries for further processing before being 
imported back into the U.S. market.\1\ This is the way supply chains 
work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See USITC, Seafood Obtained via Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing: U.S.Imports and Economic Impact on U.S. Commercial 
Fisheries, Inv. 332-575, Publ. 5168 (February 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The International Trade Commission estimates that 11% of imported 
seafood consists of IUU seafood. This means 89% of the seafood imports 
are compliant. The challenge for regulators is: how to stop the 11% 
without disrupting the vast majority of legal, compliant imports. We 
need effective enforcement. But we also need efficient enforcement.
    And that is where the current Seafood Import Monitoring Program 
falls short. It is a well-intentioned program to deter IUU seafood 
imports. Yet, SIMP already collects more data at entry than just about 
any other agency. For 1,100 species of seafood, we provide the vessel 
name, the vessel country flag, the location of the harvest, the gear 
used, the place of first off-load and the entity receiving the fish, 
among other details. The 15 required data elements may not seem like a 
big deal--until you consider the complexity of seafood supply chains 
and the reality of the entry process.
    Consider what this means in the commercial world. A single fishing 
vessel may be out at sea for six to eight weeks at a time catching up 
to 350 tons of fish from 20 to 30 different locations. When a typical 
shipment of canned seafood arrives in the U.S., it may consist of 20 
containers holding 60,000 tins. The seafood in these products may 
easily have originated from 10 or 12 different vessels catching fish 
from over a hundred different locations. So, for this one typical 
customs entry, 15 additional data elements explode into thousands of 
data elements at entry, as all these variations are accounted for.
    Every one of these 1,000+ data elements must be manually keyed in 
by a customs broker, making this is a labor intensive and costly 
process for the trade. But perhaps even worse, all this work and all 
this data does not necessarily lead to compliant supply chains. 
Tracking supply chain data on a shipment-by-shipment basis is the least 
efficient and effective means to identify products that use forced 
labor or violate IUU fishing laws.
    Now, the America COMPETES legislation doubles down on this 
approach, calling for a significant expansion of SIMP by requiring 72 
hours in advance of entry complete chain of custody data, with 
verification/certification by a competent third party of all major 
transfer points. The bill also expands the scope of SIMP by including 
all species of seafood and seafood products and widens NOAA's mission 
by requiring data on labor conditions in the harvest and processing of 
seafood products.
    The other witnesses deem this legislation as essential for 
enforcing the Russian ban and apparently envision this legislation, if 
passed, taking effect immediately. Yet, many if not most of these 
provisions would be impossible to implement for years, at best. For 
example, they call for certification of all parties in a seafood supply 
chain. Yet, no country has such a certification program in place. 
Designing and implementing a meaningful certification program with 
controls in place to prevent fraud is difficult. It is never an 
overnight process. Nor has any thought been given to how those multiple 
certifications per supply chains would move through the supply chain. 
Are we talking dozens of paper certificates accompanying each shipment? 
Or will there be electronic certificates? And what system would be used 
and how would each government system interconnect globally?
    Just to give you an idea of the challenges in devising an import 
certificate, consider that the US Department of Agriculture has been 
working on an electronic Organics certificate for several years and 
only now is moving toward implementation in another year or so. And 
that is only after working diligently with the organics industry and 
brokers and importers for over a year to develop a process that can 
actually work in the real world.
    NCBFAA encourages you to step back and reconsider the options 
before going forward with SIMP expansion. It will not impact 
implementation of the Russian ban on seafood. Nor is it the best way to 
deter IUU fishing. We offer the following perspectives:

     You cannot ``data'' your way out of IUU fishing. Another 
            10, 20 or 50 data elements per seafood provider at entry 
            will not lead to more compliant seafood chains or enable 
            NOAA to stop illegal imports--especially if the data is not 
            put to good use. The existing data requirements at entry 
            are already detailed and demanding. More is not necessarily 
            better. Greater targeted use of existing data elements is 
            essential.

     SIMP Envisioned A Balanced Approach: SIMP was designed to 
            balance IUU fishing deterrence while limiting the burden on 
            lawful trade. The aim was to minimize the impact on 
            legitimate trade. The SIMP Expansion Act runs directly 
            contrary to this goal.

     The SIMP Expansion Reflects a Poor Understanding of Supply 
            Chains: The additional data will be crushing to the entry 
            process. Complete supply chain information, with 
            certifications for each and every entry, provided 72 hours 
            before entry is wildly unrealistic. And it is without 
            precedent. Other agencies, such as the Food and Drug 
            Administration (FDA), require importers to establish food 
            supplier verification programs for imported food products--
            the detailed data on the food supply chain is not provided 
            as part of the entry process. Most of the detailed supply 
            chain records are reviewed post-entry through regular 
            audits.

     The Limits of ACE: The Automated Commercial Environment 
            (ACE) is a sophisticated system with robust capabilities 
            but is not capable of accepting all this additional data, 
            it is not a magic wand. The data for each shipment that 
            arrives at the border must be manually keyed in at entry. 
            And, because no two shipments are exactly alike, this 
            process must be repeated for each and every entry (and for 
            each line in an entry). Given the complexity of a typical 
            seafood shipment, there is a cost, in time and money, 
            associated with every data collection requirement--both in 
            gathering the necessary data and manually entering each 
            keystroke.

      ACE cannot handle such massive amounts of data. There is already 
            a limitation on the number of ``records'' that can be 
            reported per entry. And the system shuts down for 
            maintenance all too frequently. For these very reasons, CBP 
            is looking at ACE 2.0 because the current system cannot 
            function as originally designed in today's trade 
            environment. The system cannot handle the data requested.

     Avoid Duplication of Effort: There are numerous 
            overlapping initiatives in this space. NOAA alone has four 
            separate import programs (including SIMP), requiring the 
            very same data to be input separately at entry for certain 
            species of fish. In addition, the Food and Drug 
            Administration is conducting innovative pilots involving 
            Artificial Intelligence to target unsafe seafood products 
            and looking at ways to trace food through the supply chain. 
            Also, CBP has launched a robust program to combat forced 
            labor, with a focus on forced labor in the seafood 
            industry. Other agencies are already addressing issues such 
            as forced labor. Before adding a new SIMP program, we need 
            to take stock of existing resources.

     Single Window Not Intended To Be A Data Dump: ACE/ITDS was 
            never meant to serve as the conduit for a massive data dump 
            from the trade. As the various Partner Government Agencies 
            have implemented ACE requirements, each agency has 
            carefully weighed what are the most critical data elements 
            for enforcement, often paring down an initial ``wish list'' 
            to a handful of key data elements (with the rest available 
            as part of post-entry audits).

     Lessons Learned From Other Agencies: Other agencies with 
            stringent import requirements have mastered this process, 
            requiring a limited number of data elements and effectively 
            utilizing that data to target problem shipments works 
            better. Enforcement is strong, yet efficient. This includes 
            the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental 
            Protection Agency, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
            Service, the Fish & Wildlife Service, among others. Many of 
            these agencies relied on NCBFAA members to help them 
            overcome challenges in designing and implementing their 
            programs to ensure they were realistic, efficient and 
            effective. We are willing to do the same with NOAA.

     Assess the Current SIMP: Before expanding or changing 
            SIMP, we need to better evaluate the operation of the 
            existing program:

          +   Confusing SIMP Forms: The format for SIMP forms is 
        confusing and lacks clear guidelines. For example, the SIMP 
        forms apply to ocean caught fish, but do not reflect the 
        circumstances for aquaculture moving from the pond to the 
        processing plant. This leads to confused, nonresponsive data at 
        entry.

          +   SIMP Audits--Form Over Substance: SIMP audits tend to be 
        overly focused on minor non-substantive errors and are beset 
        with a ``gotcha'' mentality. For example, an auditor cited an 
        importer for noncompliance when an ``a'' was substituted for an 
        ``i'' in ``Khatulistiwa'' on entry documents. This fixation on 
        minutiae detracts from the overall goal of identifying the 
        producers and supply chains responsible for IUU abuses.

          +   NOAA Report: A recent report from NOAA reveals that 
        nearly 60% of audited shipments were compliant. Of the 40% 
        noncompliant shipments that only a small number warranted 
        enforcement action. Most ``noncompliant'' involved inadvertent 
        misspellings or similar errors.

    Ultimately, smarter use of 21st century technology will provide far 
more streamlined, effective results than relying on voluminous data 
entry on a shipment-by-shipment basis at the time of entry. Artificial 
Intelligence, predictive analytics, blockchain--all offer exciting and 
innovative opportunities that should be explored. Rather than expanding 
the current ineffective process, Congress should encourage regulators, 
industry and NGOs to reimagine the process with a tech-enabled 
approach.

    NCBFAA stands ready to help in this effort. Thank you again for 
allowing me to present NCBFAA's perspectives.

                                 ______
                                 

  Questions Submitted for the Record to Mike Lahar, National Customs 
             Brokers and Forwarders Association of America
              Questions Submitted by Representative Bentz
    Question 1. One witness testified that the FDA is working on a food 
traceability rule that may include seafood. If FDA can do this, why do 
you say the proposed SIMP expansion requirements are ``wildly 
unrealistic'' for NOAA to implement?

    Answer. Unlike the SIMP expansion legislation, the FDA supply chain 
tracking proposal does NOT require the supply chain data and records to 
be reported as part of the entry process. The FDA proposal establishes 
a standardized approach to traceability recordkeeping, requiring the 
first entity that both purchases and takes physical possession of the 
food to maintain and pass on Key Data Elements to the next party in the 
supply chain. The proposal is meant to pave the way for industry to 
adopt, harmonize and leverage more digital traceability systems in the 
future. This data moves as part of the supply chain--but it 
specifically does NOT propose that all this data be entered as part of 
the customs entry process. So, yes, the SIMP expansion proposal, with 
its massive manual data entry requirements, is indeed ``wildly 
unrealistic.''
    We should also add that the FDA has been working on this concept of 
full traceability for a decade, with the first pilots conducted in 
2012, only last year was a proposed rule published in the Federal 
Register.
    In the meantime, FDA has had a supplier verification program in 
place for several years. Under this Foreign Supplier Verification 
Program (FSVP), the FDA requires as part of the entry process the name 
and contact person for a U.S. person who has the records to verify that 
the overseas supplier of the food product maintains the preventative 
controls to produce a safe product. As you can imagine for food-borne 
illnesses, this tracking mechanism is very important to get to the 
source, but it is not a requirement for entry of the goods. The 
requirements include onsite audits of the supplier or a certification 
by a 3rd-party certifier. The FDA later audits these records. An entity 
who fails to verify the supplier's controls can lose the ability to 
import the product into the U.S.
    Unlike NOAA, the FDA is a border enforcement agency with over 100 
years of experience in developing systems which give them the necessary 
information to pinpoint critical supply chain issues while not 
impacting our economy and the government with unnecessary duplicate 
data collection.
    We should also be asking, if FDA will be implementing traceability 
of seafood supply chains, why are we attempting to duplicate that 
effort with NOAA? Why not leverage what other enforcement agencies are 
already doing?

    Question 2. Ms. Sally Yozell testified that if the SIMP expansion 
legislation were implemented, that ``Chinese processors can accommodate 
these traceability requirements.'' Do you see the Chinese processors as 
a reliable mechanism for tracing the origin?

    Answer. No, in our experience, the Chinese producers cannot be 
relied upon as a resource for accurate data on the origin of the 
seafood. That is a pipe dream that will only lead to unreliable data. 
They have no incentive to keep track of the origin, nor are they 
accountable to U.S. enforcement authorities. They will merely provide 
whatever information is asked for, rather than take steps to ascertain 
accurate origin data.
    The responsibility for data accuracy should be a shared 
responsibility between the parties who have a financial interest in the 
importation. Again, we look at the approach taken by the FDA with a 
third-party certification that the supplier has the controls in place 
to ensure US requirements are met, with the importer responsible for 
auditing to ensure data is correct.

    Question 3. The ban on Russian seafood is the most urgent concern 
right now. You stated that SIMP expansion would not prevent Russian 
seafood from entering the United States since it would take years to 
implement. Do you have any suggestions for how we could prevent Russian 
origin seafood from entering the United States?

    Answer. We already do this in other situations, such as 
antidumping--where the original source of raw materials must be tracked 
for products processed in a 3rd country. In these circumstances, an MID 
(Manufacturers Identification Number) code is provided by the U.S. 
importer/customs broker to identify the exporter as well as an MID for 
the original manufacturer/country of manufacture.
    In the context of seafood and the Russian ban, a similar approach 
could be taken requiring only minimal changes in ACE, whereby the 
importer would provide the identity of the exporter (as they do now) 
AND the identity of the country/entity where the seafood was harvested 
or first landed.
    This method could provide a more immediate and straightforward 
solution to enforce the Russian ban, rather than hastily enacting a 
drastic and questionable expansion of SIMP that would take years to 
accomplish.

    Question 4. You mention leveraging the use of technology, such as 
blockchain and AI, to improve seafood supply chain transparency. How do 
you envision this working? And, is the SIMP expansion legislation 
compatible or incompatible with this approach?

    Answer. The focus of any SIMP legislation should be on how current 
and emerging technologies can be utilized to target violative seafood 
shipments and to enhance the visibility of seafood supply chains. We do 
not yet know exactly what this will entail, but we do know the 
opportunities are promising. For example, the FDA is in its 3rd phase 
of a pilot using Artificial Intelligence to identify unsafe seafood 
shipments. Without sharing details of their methods, the agency tells 
us that the pilot is proving to be a huge success in interdicting 
unsafe seafood before it enters the country. I can't help but think 
there must be an overlap between ``unsafe'' seafood and IUU seafood 
shipments. Can the seafood AI program be expanded to include IUU? Or, 
at the very least, can NOAA learn from FDA's experience with AI and 
seafood?
    Of even greater significance, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
is in the early stages of an acquisition process to enable the 
development of a new system to replace the Automated Commercial 
Environment (ACE)--which is the current platform connecting CBP, the 
Partner Government Agencies (including NOAA) and the private sector for 
the submission and processing of entry data.
    Called ACE 2.0, this is a transformative effort to completely 
reimagine the entry process. ACE 2.0 will embrace 21st century 
processes and emerging technologies to achieve greater supply chain 
transparency and a completely automated supply chain. It would allow 
interoperability with blockchain and other future systems and 
incorporate the concept of ``the digital twin''--where the physical 
movement of goods is reflected digitally. More information is available 
at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2022-Mar/
NGF%20ACE%202.0%20Issue%20Paper.pdf.
    Achieving transparency in the seafood supply chain should be part 
of this effort. Instead, the SIMP expansion legislation is an overly 
prescriptive solution grounded in yesterday's technology. It builds 
upon the current plodding inefficient process, relying on vast amounts 
of manual data input, with no clear vision of how this data will be 
used to actually improve the visibility and legality of seafood supply 
chains.
    The goals of the SIMP expansion are solid. The means to achieve 
those goals are not. The SIMP legislation, with its elaborate 
certification scheme and massive data input requirements, gets ahead of 
itself. Never once does it ask: is this the right approach? Can the 
private sector even do this? How will the government utilize this data? 
How can we better leverage technology? There are no pilots to test out 
the feasibility of this plan. There is no engagement with the private 
sector. We, therefore, urge Congress to rethink the SIMP legislation.

                                 ______
                                 

    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Lahar.
    We will now bring it back to the Members for questions. I 
will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lahar, just to pick up where we left off, do you agree 
that if you are unable to identify the origin of these seafood 
products, especially products that may have been processed in 
other countries, it is really not possible for you to enforce 
this nominal ban on Russian seafood right now?
    Mr. Lahar. The ban, as it stands, is based upon declaration 
of the country of origin of the goods as imported, correct?
    Mr. Huffman. Yes. So, since these products are processed 
through China and come through as a Chinese product, wouldn't 
you agree that, right now, if we are pretending to ban Russian 
seafood, you can't do that?
    Mr. Lahar. The customs laws, the way they work----
    Mr. Huffman. Yes or no. Just yes or no, sir, I have limited 
time.
    Mr. Lahar. No, I disagree that this would limit the ability 
to track.
    Mr. Huffman. But you can, with the tools you have right 
now, ban Russian seafood.
    Mr. Lahar. I am not here to debate economic sanctions. I am 
here----
    Mr. Huffman. All right, I am going to reclaim my time and 
move on to other witnesses.
    I heard some interesting testimony from Mr. Lahar 
suggesting that only 11 percent of the seafood imported into 
the United States is actually the product of IUU fishing. I 
have heard dramatically different data from other experts and 
studies over the years. So, let me just ask our other witnesses 
if they agree with that statement, that we only have an 11 
percent problem when it comes to IUU fishing products being 
imported into this country.
    Ms. Yozell. Mr. Chairman, this is Sally. I would have to 
say that I do not agree with only 11 percent, because, as 
Tabitha just said, and I am sure she can elaborate more, we 
just don't know. When seafood is mixed and co-mingled alongside 
Russian catch, and as well as Chinese catch, we do not know.
    And also, we do not know if labor and human rights 
violations are narrowed also to that small window. I mean, as 
pointed out, Russia and China are--China is probably the No. 1 
on IUU, as well as Russia comes right behind, as well as for 
labor and human rights abuses.
    So, we do not know when seafood is processed overseas and 
comes back. It is just an unknown quantity.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Ms. Yozell. And you have testified 
unequivocally, as someone who was there at the initiation of 
the SIMP program, the clear intent was to expand it to all 
species imported into the United States.
    Mr. Lahar just testified that this would take years to 
happen, that it wouldn't make a difference in terms of 
preventing Russian seafood from entering our markets, and that 
it is just too hard and complex to really do this.
    Look, I have a bunch of my own thoughts about that. I think 
if we only asked Federal agencies to do easy things, we would 
have a lot less Federal agencies with much smaller budgets. 
Sometimes we need them to do the hard stuff.
    And I also note that all of these seemingly impossible 
tracing and tracking things seem to have been accomplished when 
it comes to seafood entering the European Union. Do they just 
have better systems than us? Do they have better math? Do they 
have better agencies?
    Let me invite both Dr. Mallory and Ms. Yozell to answer 
that question. Is it just too hard? Can we just not get there 
from here?
    Dr. Mallory. I will go ahead and say something, Mr. 
Chairman. This is Tabitha Mallory.
    I think I am actually one of the people that didn't say 
that we need to, just tomorrow, expand SIMP to all the aquatic 
species. I think that should be our ultimate goal. But I do 
think there are bureaucratic challenges, and we could start 
with the major species that the United States imports, so 
pollock, salmon, squid. And these are species that we know have 
problems also with labor abuses.
    And another part of this is the transparency in our data. A 
lot of this data actually exists, but it is not released to the 
public. So, it is up to people like me to essentially reverse-
engineer using yield ratios and just estimating what the actual 
volumes of trade are, what percentage would be IUU catch. So, I 
think, with a combination of increasing transparency and 
expanding the program, we can get the program in place and get 
to a place where we want in terms of our knowledge.
    Mr. Huffman. So, you would start, though, with expanding 
SIMP to the targeted species, then develop these other 
traceability tools, as I understand from your testimony, right?
    Dr. Mallory. Yes. I think that is a perfectly good way to 
handle it. I mean, that is what SIMP did already. They started 
with 11 species and expanded it to a couple more. And I assumed 
that they were going to keep expanding to more species 
gradually.
    Mr. Huffman. Right. And Ms. Yozell, you said China already 
separates seafood to comply with European Union rules, right?
    Ms. Yozell. That is correct.
    Mr. Huffman. So, if----
    Ms. Yozell. Yes, I mean----
    Mr. Huffman. Go ahead, please.
    Ms. Yozell. No, what I was going to say is, with regard to 
the length of time Mr. Lahar noted, I mean, we heard from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff yesterday, General Milley, that this war 
could go on for a very long time.
    And also, let us not forget that I expect the seafood ban 
to go on for even longer, much longer. I mean, Russia has 
banned U.S. seafood for 8 years now. I would think, at a very 
minimum, that is what we should do to at least try to level the 
playing field with our own fishing community and our own 
fishers.
    But on the point you mentioned, yes, I agree with Tabitha. 
We need to let NOAA walk before it can run. But it has now been 
4\1/2\ years. Rome was not built in a day, but it is time for 
them to have a program that is operational.
    In addition, there is a lot of great technology. We need to 
enhance technology: barcodes, QR codes, and blockchain, all of 
which can be implemented and NOAA is working in that direction. 
But we should at least get it happening now.
    We need to be able to track seafood from when it is caught 
all the way through the seafood supply chain, and we are only 
going to be able to do that if we move away from paper-based 
documentation, which can be falsified, to electronic catch 
documentation, and expand those key data elements required 
under SIMP to include trans-shipment data, beneficial ownership 
data, vessel tracking, and forced labor data, all of which are 
noted in your bill, Mr. Chairman, the America COMPETES Act, in 
the House-passed version.
    I think we need to also expand enforcement and improve 
SIMP's programmatic staffing, grow training programs with the 
brokers and others around the world, so that people like Mr. 
Lahar and others in other countries have training and 
understanding of what the SIMP program needs.
    And lastly, I would like to note that SIMP is aligned with 
the EU Catch Certification Scheme, and Japan now has a new 
program. So, as we move forward, we need to have all of these 
countries aligned, because many more are coming on. I would 
urge NOAA to work, as I know they are, with other countries to 
align programs around the world, so it is less burdensome to 
the brokers and to fishers.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Ms. Yozell. I am going to hand it 
over to the Ranking Member with apologies.
    I owe you some time, Mr. Bentz, but let me just conclude 
that Mr. Brush, in his testimony, reminds us that oligarchs are 
very likely the beneficial owners of a bunch of these Russian 
seafood companies. In so many other ways, we see other Federal 
agencies finding creative ways to track down these oligarch 
funds, to seize yachts, and just to bring a can-do approach to 
sanctions. It would be great to see that same can-do approach 
when it comes to Russian seafood.
    With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member and recognize 
him.
    Mr. Bentz. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And near as I can tell 
from my clock, I have an additional 3 minutes, is that correct, 
on top of my 5?
    Mr. Huffman. Take whatever you need, Mr. Bentz. I took 
great liberties with the clock a moment ago.
    Mr. Bentz. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And Mr. Lahar, we have a number of situations in the 
forestry space, where we ask for bureaucracy--Forest Service, 
Bureau of Land Management--to do the impossible. It generally 
takes them years. And sometimes we ask them to do the possible 
and it takes years. So, all the time that we are waiting for 
these good things to happen, the folks that we place these 
impossible tasks before struggle to try to actually get things 
done. And in the meantime, the goal that we are trying to 
achieve remains unresolved.
    You mentioned how difficult it would be to make this 
happen. It was asserted that Europe has somehow taken care of 
it. Do you agree?
    Mr. Lahar. Thank you, Representative Bentz. I agree in the 
way that they do have a program, and it is functioning.
    But the legislation, as it stands before the House of 
Representatives in Bill 4521, requires the certification of 
major points of transfer of the product back to the harvesters 
or the growers. And there currently is no program set to allow 
for that. So, just the development and the implementation of 
setting up the certifying bodies would take years. We just 
don't have the infrastructure in place to allow us to do that 
currently.
    I do agree with Ms. Yozell about the use of new 
technologies. That is a very interesting subject, and the 
NCBFAA really is supportive of that. The current ACE system is 
limited in the amount of data that it can take, and adding all 
of this data into the current data flow could literally take 
the system down. It comes down two or three times a week 
currently. It is not designed to do that, but it is just 
receiving so much data currently that every time it exceeds its 
capabilities it goes down, and that leaves our ports of entry 
open. So, while that system is down, we have goods flowing into 
our country without good results. It is not able to be vetted 
by customs vetting center, so that leaves us open to terrorism 
and a lot of other things that could happen.
    But ACE 2.0, which Customs is working on, leverages these 
new technologies, and would be the ideal opportunity to use 
things like a blockchain in order to make this a much more 
robust program.
    Mr. Bentz. So, let me ask you again, Mr. Lahar, as it 
relates to achieving this outcome, you suggested that the SIMP 
approach is too burdensome, too time consuming, and not 
manageable. Do you have some alternatives that would achieve 
the outcome desired, which appears to be that we would address 
the pollock issue, at least the salmon issue, at least perhaps 
the squid?
    Do you have something in mind that we could do that would 
allow us to stop Russia from benefiting from the export of 
these types of commodities?
    Mr. Lahar. It is interesting that Representative Huffman 
mentioned the turtle excluder program. That is one of the ideas 
that has been mentioned. It is a fairly simple form that 
importers complete, and it would allow us to address some of 
these problems without having to immediately address issues 
like the certifying bodies.
    There are other programs, like FDA's Food Safety 
Verification Program, where U.S. importers are required to 
monitor their supply chains.
    If we could model a system on the turtle excluder or the 
FSVP program, these are examples that are already out there, 
they are already working. I would suggest that we may want to 
look at those before we go ahead and take further action on the 
SIMP legislation.
    Mr. Bentz. So, the question, Mr. Lahar, is what can we do 
right now to effect damage, hurt in some way, respond to what 
Russia is doing, which is so wrong? What can we do now? Because 
it appears that the suggestion that we use the SIMP program 
wouldn't result in an immediate impact. Do you have something 
in mind that we could do quickly?
    Mr. Lahar. Like I said, the turtle excluder program is a 
great example. We have the technology in place right now to 
require those certificates and to get them into the entry 
system, and stop the importation of Russian-originating 
seafood.
    Mr. Bentz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield 
back.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Ranking Member Bentz.
    I am not sure--let me ask staff to tell me the next Member 
in order for questions, please.
    Voice. Mr. Case.
    Mr. Huffman. Mr. Case, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Case. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Yozell, I think there have been allusions to other 
efforts throughout government that seem to have a better 
overall understanding of how to pull this off, whether it be 
the FDA, general traceability, or some of President Biden's 
efforts on just supply chain, tracking. I mean, this is not the 
only example where somebody tries to circumvent our rules by 
routing something through another country. So, this isn't new 
stuff.
    And, certainly, it seems to me that we have been down this 
road before. So, what are the lessons to be learned?
    If I understand the testimony here correctly--and I don't, 
frankly, know what to make of NOAA's absence here. I think it 
is unfortunate. I think, for me, it is uncharacteristic. And I 
don't know whether NOAA just doesn't have an answer right now 
or doesn't want to go down this road to start with. But sooner 
or later, we need to hear from NOAA.
    And the bottom line is that there are other approaches out 
there. So, what is your comment along those lines? Who is doing 
this right within our government, and how do they answer the 
concerns, and how can they be instructive to NOAA, who I am 
sure is listening?
    Ms. Yozell. Yes, thank you, Mr. Case.
    First, you are absolutely right. This is not the first time 
anyone has had to try to track or trace a commodity in our U.S. 
system. I mean, timber is an example that has been tracked for 
years. Oil and gas is traced. You may recall when we were even 
considering about nutrition labeling, the industry said that 
was going to kill them. The timber industry said that was going 
to kill them. Oil and gas said that was going to kill them. 
Well, guess what? They all seem to be thriving pretty well. So, 
I think the seafood industry does have a chance to be able to 
take on the lessons learned from some of these previous 
tracking and tracing programs.
    But I would also say the FDA has proposed a rule that 
requires supply chain actors to maintain traceability records 
for almost all seafood products. So, importers and their supply 
chains will soon have a place where traceability systems for 
almost all seafood products works. And this should make the 
expansion of SIMP actually easier, because industry will 
already be required to do a significant amount more than they 
are currently doing on the chain of custody.
    And it is for health and safety reasons. I mean, we know 
also, if I could just add, tuna. Tuna is tracked from where it 
is harvested all the way into the can, with a barcode that you 
and I can look up online to see all of the elements.
    Mr. Case. Let me just ask you a basic question there. If 
the FDA is busy doing this right now, then what is the 
relationship of the FDA's proposed rule applicable to seafood 
to whether NOAA does or doesn't proceed on this?
    Ms. Yozell. Yes, that is a great question. It focuses on 
health and safety. It doesn't look at all the other risk issues 
that perhaps the SIMP program does----
    Mr. Case. I see. So, they are not factoring in IUU, or 
forced labor, or for that matter, just a broader----
    Ms. Yozell. They aren't, although we are urging them to do 
so.
    Mr. Case. But, I mean, it is a model that you can easily 
just apply over, right?
    Ms. Yozell. Exactly.
    Mr. Case. OK.
    Ms. Yozell. And I would also add, too, that FDA and NOAA 
are working together. I mean, we do have an all-of-government 
approach, and I would urge them to continue to do so----
    Mr. Case. OK. I am going to move on, just because I have 
limited time.
    Ms. Yozell. Sure.
    Mr. Case. Mr. Brush, Mr. Lahar says that--first of all, Mr. 
Lahar says he fully supports the ban on Russian imports, and he 
is all into it, and his industry, and I take him at his word on 
that. We all want to do that. But he says this program is not 
the right way to do it.
    So, the question was, well, if this isn't the right way to 
do it, then what is?
    And he says the turtle monitoring program. What do you say 
to that?
    Mr. Brush. I don't have quite as much familiarity with that 
specific program, but I would still fundamentally believe that 
for an effective implementation of the ban, you do need that 
chain of custody data to be able to follow where those 
shipments might have come, whether they originate in Russia and 
then went through China, to get them to the United States.
    Mr. Case. OK. So, if I understand you correctly, you are 
saying the turtle monitoring program offers half of the 
solution, or some of the solution, but it is not a complete 
solution?
    Mr. Brush. Yes, I think there is a little bit more 
information required in these reporting on shipments and----
    Mr. Case. OK. And then the same basic question to you. Is 
this the right program to go after the basic goal of avoiding 
circumvention of our ban of Russian seafood?
    I mean, is there another approach that we can take, or is 
this just the avenue we should be going down, period?
    Mr. Brush. I mean, from my perspective, I would say yes. I 
think the data elements are some of the more key angles that I 
can focus on, the need for chain of custody data, the need for 
beneficial ownership information.
    These are critical pieces of data in any kind of 
investigation, or regulatory work looking at shipments to 
confirm where they came from and their legality. So, that 
element of it, that collection of data is where, I think, it is 
the most critical, and where this program would be able to 
collect that data.
    Mr. Case. OK, great. Thank you very much.
    I yield back, Chair.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Case. The Chair now recognizes 
Mr. Graves for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me?
    Mr. Huffman. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Graves. OK, great. Thank you.
    So, hey, first of all, thank you all for being here. I want 
to thank the Chair for working with us on this important----
    [Audio malfunction.]
    Mr. Graves [continuing]. Support for the goals of the bill 
that we co-sponsored with Don Young to ban imports of Russian 
seafood. But I also want to be clear that this IUU bill is 
separate from the Don Young Russian seafood ban bill. And this 
IUU bill was introduced before all of the Ukraine mess and 
before Don Young had introduced his bill. So, there is the Don 
Young bill that we are a co-sponsor of on Russian seafood being 
banned, and then there is the IUU bill that we have co-
sponsored with the Chair.
    I just wanted to distinguish the two. Our IUU bill was 
introduced--and I don't claim, as you stated in your testimony, 
that the Russian ban is meaningless unless the SIMP program is 
immediately expanded. I think they are separate, but they are 
important pieces of legislation.
    The goal is to combat slave labor, prevent human rights 
abuses, protect our resources, and, I think, provide consumers 
with a choice. Like, that is really what the objective is 
there. But in order for them to have a choice, you have to be 
able to distinguish. So, the SIMP helps to distinguish what 
their choices are, and you have to provide that information to 
consumers.
    Mr. Lahar, similar to what is required of our domestic 
seafood producers, your testimony points out that additional 
overhead would be incurred as a result of compliance with 
traceability and with transparency. We did, with Mr. Huffman, 
try to make a concerted effort to improve and automate the 
process. But I will tell you, I am all ears in regard to other 
ideas or feedback on how we can maintain traceability, 
transparency, and accountability, while streamlining it. I 
would love to hear if you have any thoughts or reaction on 
that.
    Mr. Lahar. I thank you very much, Representative. I think 
that is the point. We are rushing forward with this legislation 
to address the conflict in Ukraine. But this concept is 
something that has been chugging along, and the NCBFAA has been 
working with NOAA, and suggesting that they talk to the Food 
and Drug Administration, and giving them examples of ways that 
this could be addressed: blockchain, artificial intelligence. 
The Food and Drug Administration is doing some wonderful things 
with artificial intelligence. We have ACE 2.0 that is coming up 
from Customs that is going to revolutionize the way that we 
file entries.
    So, I think the key is to look at all of these different 
things that could be leveraged to do this. But if we rush this 
legislation through, it may be too late to take some of those 
actions. My chief concern is that we pass a bill that would be 
imperfect on a program that has already been admittedly 
described as imperfect, when we could make this a much, much 
better program, much more robust, and stop goods from coming 
into this country illegally.
    Mr. Graves. OK. So, just a couple of things. No. 1, let's 
keep in mind--I mean, you talk about rushing through. The bill 
has largely already passed the House through COMPETES and Coast 
Guard.
    But also, this bill was introduced--Mr. Huffman, I want to 
say spring of last year, right?
    Mr. Huffman. You are correct.
    Mr. Graves. OK. So, nobody looks at Congress as the model 
of efficiency. But it has certainly been around for a while. 
And I don't know that there is any rushing going on.
    I will tell you again I am all ears in regard to ideas that 
you may have to help to streamline or prevent additional costs, 
but still achieving the objective of the traceability, the 
accountability, the transparency that is there. I don't speak 
for Mr. Huffman, but I think those are our real objectives 
here. And it also helps to provide the consumers choice. And 
the only way they have the choice is if we know some of those 
facts and are able to communicate to consumers.
    Look, last, I just want to say that the objective of this 
bill--we are one of the largest seafood producers in the United 
States. The objective of this bill, of holding countries like 
China and Russia accountable that have some of the worst 
illegal fishing fleets in the world, that is unfair 
competition, it is overfishing, it is lack of sustainable 
practices, and these are objectives that we should all be 
sharing.
    I want to thank Mr. Huffman again and yield back.
    Mr. Huffman. Thanks very much, Representative Graves, I 
appreciate it.
    And just a reminder, there actually is some urgency in 
doing something about the importation of Russian seafood. We 
have other Federal agencies finding ways to very quickly seize 
assets, including yachts. And we need to bring that same sense 
of urgency to the problem of how our seafood import system is 
actually funding the Russian war machine.
    With that, are there any other Members in the hearing room 
that would like to be recognized?
    Mrs. Radewagen. Radewagen.
    Mr. Huffman. Mrs. Radewagen, sorry about that. You are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Chairman Huffman and Ranking 
Member Bentz, for holding this hearing on Russian seafood and 
actions we can take.
    Thank you both for testifying today, the panel here.
    My concern with Russian seafood goes back to the end of the 
cold war, when I seem to recall Mikhail Gorbachev announcing 
from Vladivostok that the Soviet Union was a Pacific nation.
    Mr. Lahar, my questions are for you. As it relates to 
Russian-caught seafood that is processed in other countries, 
are there any examples of other programs--I think this was 
asked earlier--currently in place that track country of harvest 
without the burdensome requirements of SIMP? You mentioned the 
turtle excluder program.
    Mr. Lahar. Yes, the turtle excluder program, as it stands 
now, could be modified in order to fit in with the desire to 
limit the importation of seafood originating in Russia.
    Also, the Food and Drug Administration's FSVP program, 
which requires importers to monitor the supply chain back to 
the originators, would be another model that would allow the 
implementation of a policy to exclude Russian seafood from 
being imported into the United States.
    Mrs. Radewagen. So, as a followup, how would SIMP expansion 
penalize compliant parties in the seafood supply chain?
    Mr. Lahar. Well, the ITC study, which is a federally funded 
study, finds that 89 percent of seafood imported into the 
United States is compliant. So, we are looking for the 11 
percent of the seafood imports that are coming from bad actors. 
We are looking at penalizing those 89 percent of the importers 
bringing in legitimate and compliant product into the United 
States to go after those 11 percent. And it can be quite costly 
to importers to do that. So, it ultimately can go back to the 
consumer, and they will foot the bill for this program.
    Mrs. Radewagen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Huffman. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Soto, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you, Chairman. In Florida, fish is a big 
part of our diet, as well as our way of life, with the red 
snapper, grouper, mahi mahi, and other major types of fish from 
our area, Florida lobster. But we also love our salmon, 
pollock, crab, and canned tuna.
    The New York Times reported that the fish most likely to 
slip through our import ban is, in fact, pollock, and that the 
increase in crab demand has pushed a lot of Russian crab into 
the market, fish caught by Russian ships and Russian seas. This 
is at a time when we are seeing Russia unjustifiably and 
violently invade Ukraine, and we are all inspired by the 
Ukrainian soldiers fighting for freedom. And I am proud to be 
part of that $14 billion in relief that we are helping to 
support them. But thousands are dead, and war crimes have been 
committed, so we need to make sure, as we are doing our part 
with bans on imports like fishing bans, that the least we can 
do is make our fish stick supply chain more secure to enforce 
against the Russian fishing ban.
    I do want to mention first that we also are concerned about 
Russia's blockade of U.S. fishing rights in the South Georgia 
Patagonian fishery, which is a key source of Chilean sea bass 
that we will take up with Commerce. But for today, we know we 
are looking at traceability.
    Ms. Yozell, if NOAA made the decision to require all 
species to be covered under the SIMP program, what would that 
process look like?
    Ms. Yozell. Thank you, Mr. Soto, for that question. NOAA 
could do this immediately through an emergency regulation. And 
as I said earlier, the White House could pass and execute an 
Executive Order, and Congress could pass the America COMPETES 
Act--of course, the House version.
    So, again, just to reiterate, NOAA has been working hard to 
get the program right. They have been working to improve SIMP 
implementation by focusing on technology improvements, using 
data analytics, increasing audits, adding new species, reducing 
human trafficking. And these are just a few of the things that 
they have been doing.
    However, while they are doing that, they can expand to all 
species. They have already been doing it for 13 species groups. 
It is not a huge lift to go to all species.
    And, again, it could be an emergency rule, and it could be 
an emergency rule to focus on, first, salmon and pollock, and 
then it could expand to others in the near term. But to effect 
the----
    Mr. Soto. Thank you, Ms. Yozell.
    Dr. Mallory, can you walk through just a little bit for my 
constituents of China's role in processing seafood that are 
from Russian waters, Russian fishermen?
    Dr. Mallory. For any species, or one in particular?
    Mr. Soto. For just generally speaking--actually, let's talk 
about pollock, since that is the most likely one slipping 
through right now.
    Dr. Mallory. OK, so it is different, depending on if it is 
Russian raw material or U.S. raw material.
    Russia generally sends its raw material to China for 
processing, and then that process product ends up on, usually, 
the European and U.S. markets. It doesn't re-import a lot of 
the processed material. The United States is different. In the 
United States, we have a big pollock fleet. We send our raw 
material to China for processing and then re-import it.
    So, one easy way to actually solve this is--China knows the 
difference between the pollock that is of Russian origin versus 
Chinese origin. Actually, China requires--they have a bilateral 
documentation scheme--they require catch certificates from 
Russia. So, if we just want to do this fast, and require the 
fish that is caught by the U.S. fleet--which, you know, the 
consumer should have a choice, we want Americans buying our 
seafood--let's just ask China. Let's have our seafood labeled. 
And China knows the difference. There are some challenges with 
enforcement because we are not actually there, but that is how 
the system works.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you, Dr. Mallory.
    And Mr. Lahar, I am intrigued by your suggestion about 
using blockchain. I passed amendments first identifying through 
the budget, then requiring reporting, and now a pilot program 
utilizing blockchain for food traceability. And that pilot 
program that just was utilized is for romaine lettuce outbreak, 
which we were able to help solve. So, feel free to send my 
office more information on your suggestion on that.
    We are now going to go into a much bigger program through 
USDA, getting into this next 2023 budget.
    Thanks so much, and I yield back.
    Mr. Huffman. Thanks, Mr. Soto. Miss Gonzalez-Colon, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for 
the witnesses that we do have today. I think this is a very 
important issue, and loopholes should not be a part of that 
Executive Order. And in that case, I would love to make a 
question to Ms. Sally Yozell.
    You said in your written testimony, and pointed out that 
the Executive Order banning the importation of Russian seafood 
contains a major loophole. And we have been talking about that. 
It does not cover Russian-caught fish shipped for processing in 
other countries like China. My question will be, can you 
discuss the implication of this loophole?
    And more than that, why is it so important that we ensure 
that the ban is expanded to include Russian seafood processed 
in other countries?
    And if you can also discuss what available policies or 
proposals we need to have to achieve this. For instance, does 
the Administration currently have any--the necessary 
authorities to expand an Executive Order to include Russian-
caught seafood processed or substantially transformed in other 
countries? Or do they need legislation to achieve this?
    I know there are many questions, so feel free to jump on 
all of them.
    Ms. Yozell. Thank you. Yes, as we have said already, 
Russian exports to the United States have grown by 173 percent 
since 2014. And Russia is the eighth largest exporter of 
seafood to the United States.
    So, in order to really figure out how to stop the Russian 
pollock and the Russian salmon from entering the United States, 
we really need to be able to have electronic catch verification 
that tracks seafood all along the supply chain. And that is 
what, again, they are doing with the European Union. And then, 
when it happens in China, when they are processing, they can 
literally segregate that.
    So, we have an opportunity and an ability, because it is 
already being done, to learn from the European Union and how 
they process seafood overseas so that it reaches those catch 
verification requirements by the EU.
    I have to say, I spoke yesterday with a Seattle-based 
catcher-processor who catches crab and cod, and he said that it 
is easy for us to be able to track seafood, that we do it with 
tuna, we do it with other species, SIMP is doing it. It is not 
a heavy lift. And he also suggested that I urge folks to not 
over engineer this, do not overthink this, make it simple, and 
it is very viable to do.
    But the key is having it electronically verifiable, and the 
technology exists. Whether you are a small-scale fisher with a 
handheld device, or a larger scale, you can track your seafood 
from where it is caught, as it moves through the supply chain, 
to when it is shipped, to when it is processed, and back into 
the United States. That is what technology has offered us 
today. Twenty years ago maybe we didn't have it. We have it 
today, and we should be doing it.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. But a question--in order to achieve 
this policy that has been used in the European Union, do we 
need, I mean, does the executive power here, the President have 
the power to ban it and amend the Executive Order to include 
this? Or do you believe that we need to have Congress step up 
and legislate this?
    Ms. Yozell. Well, we have the power, as the President 
issued his Executive Order, to ban Russian seafood.
    However, to get to the specific details, we either need to 
have an emergency rule from NOAA; we need Congress to pass, for 
example, the American COMPETES Act, which would cover that; or 
third, we need a new Executive Order that specifically targets 
pollock and salmon and says that it should be required under 
SIMP.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. So, you understand that issue to be 
addressed two ways: legislation to give more power and be 
specific in the terms of how the fish is caught, and amending 
the Executive Order to close that loophole.
    Thank you, Ms. Yozell, and I yield back.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Miss Gonzalez-Colon. If there are 
no other Members seeking to be recognized, I will begin a 
second round of questions and start by recognizing myself for 5 
minutes.
    So, just to be clear, Ms. Yozell, I am hearing the 
suggestion that keeps creeping up that we have to either have 
SIMP or use all of these fancy technologies that can help us 
trace seafood through the processing and supply chain.
    As I understand it, SIMP is agnostic as to the data and the 
tools that are used to help us carry out these safeguards. Am I 
misunderstanding something, or could SIMP use blockchain and 
all of these other fancy data tools to achieve our policy 
objective?
    Ms. Yozell. Mr. Huffman, you are absolutely correct. SIMP 
is agnostic and could use many of these new technologies--or 
not-so-new technologies--that have been used. And, in fact, 
they are looking at it. But we need to urge them along to look 
at it and move forward more quickly.
    I think, as an example, you have authorized in your 
legislation $20 million a year for NOAA to implement SIMP. That 
is the kind of funds that, in my understanding, would be 
needed. I mean, they could do it now, but I think the kind of 
funds you provided, they can't say that it is burdensome, they 
don't have the funding, they don't have the staff, and blah, 
blah, blah. They can move this forward, and I think your 
America COMPETES Act will really help them do that.
    Mr. Huffman. Great. I think we are going to have to zero in 
on pollock a little more, and I appreciate the witnesses who 
have done that because it seems to me that one of the reasons 
they haven't used SIMP is that we have a huge American pollock 
fleet that relies on China for processing, where all of this 
fish that gets re-imported into the United States gets 
commingled with a bunch of other pollock and other fish, and it 
is burdensome and inconvenient, I suppose--or we are told--to 
segregate it and trace it.
    But Ms. Yozell, I missed the exact figure. You are 
suggesting that there is a significant percentage of what is 
represented as Alaskan pollock in the American seafood market 
that is actually Russian pollock. Would you remind me what 
percentage that is?
    Ms. Yozell. Yes. And while I am just making sure I have the 
right number, let me also urge that, Mr. Chairman, you might 
want to reach out again to this catcher-processor in Seattle, 
who told me yesterday that much of the pollock industry that is 
processed--where they have their processing overseas--could be 
done in the United States. He said it is not a heavy lift. They 
do it and that we should bring those jobs back. Because 
technology has advanced so far, it is not like cutters, like it 
used to be in the old days. We have technologies that could 
provide good-paying jobs in America for people to process fish 
here. We don't have to send it overseas for low-cost labor and 
human rights violations and what not----
    Mr. Huffman. I appreciate that. While you are looking for 
that statistic, though----
    Ms. Yozell. I found the number, I am sorry.
    Mr. Huffman. Yes, go ahead.
    Ms. Yozell. It is 50 percent, roughly 50 percent of Alaska 
pollock comes from Russian ships.
    Mr. Huffman. That is just mind-boggling.
    Ms. Yozell. And as I said, Alaskan pollock.
    Mr. Huffman. Yes, thank you for that.
    Ms. Mallory, can you demystify this a little bit? Is it 
possible for us to avoid punishing the American pollock fleet, 
which we support and we want to be successful, while still 
having some commonplace protocols in place to prevent 
importation of Russian pollock and other seafood?
    Dr. Mallory. Yes. I think it would actually be in our 
interest to differentiate. I mean, already now we require, or 
we actually don't allow Russians to call their Alaskan pollock. 
So, if we are able to do that, I think we just need to ask that 
we have the product differentiated, have it labeled.
    If you have ever tried just to go online, on Amazon even, 
to buy pollock and you want it from the U.S. fleet, a lot of 
the sales on there, it doesn't indicate what country it comes 
from.
    And the volume switches from year to year. The amount of 
pollock that ends up in the United States that is from Russia, 
it fluctuates based on how much was produced.
    Mr. Huffman. Do you agree, Dr. Mallory, that using the SIMP 
program and using blockchain and other technologies that you 
have alluded to are not mutually exclusive, they can go 
together? You can expand the number of species covered and use 
cutting-edge tools to feed the data into the program, is that 
correct?
    Dr. Mallory. Yes, I agree. I think we just have to ask for 
what we want.
    Mr. Huffman. Thanks very much. I yield back, and I will 
recognize Ranking Member Bentz for 5 minutes.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Huffman. If the Ranking Member is unavailable, let me 
see if there are any other Members that would like to be 
recognized at this point.
    And seeing none, we are done. So, let me thank our 
witnesses very much, and thank the Members for really 
thoughtful questions. This is an important hearing, and I think 
we have shed some light on a subject that absolutely deserves 
and requires it. So, my thanks to all of you.
    The members of the Subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses. We will ask you to respond to 
those in writing. Under Committee Rule 3(o), members of the 
Committee must submit witness questions within 3 business days 
following the hearing, and we will keep the record open for 10 
business days to allow for responses to those questions.
    If there is no further business, and without objection, the 
Subcommittee stands adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

            [ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD]

Submissions for the Record by Rep. Huffman

                        Statement for the Record
                   U.S. Customs and Border Protection
                  U.S. Department of Homeland Security

    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) submits this statement for 
the record regarding CBP's role in enforcing the March 11, 2022, 
Executive Order (EO) 14068, Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and 
New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression.

    CBP is committed to enforcing EO 14068 and prohibiting the entry of 
fish, seafood, and preparations thereof that are of Russian Federation 
origin, among other commodities, including alcoholic beverages and non-
industrial diamonds. CBP has a close working relationship with the 
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), and together we have collaborated to support the 
enforcement of EO 14068.

    EO 14068 and current OFAC guidance prohibit the importation of 
fish, seafood, and preparations thereof that are products of Russian 
Federation origin. The prohibition does not apply to goods extracted in 
the Russian Federation if such goods were incorporated or substantially 
transformed into a foreign-made product. Substantial transformation is 
a legal standard invoked in U.S. customs laws to determine the country 
of origin for goods imported into the United States (see, e.g., 19 
C.F.R. Sec. 134.1(b), (d)).

    Data related to the country of harvest are collected by CBP's 
Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) as part of the Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program (SIMP) for those species included in the SIMP. 
However, consistent with current OFAC guidance, country of harvest data 
is not used by CBP to enforce import sanctions under EO 14068.

    CBP is committed to our role of enforcing U.S. import laws and 
sanctions. We will continue to collaborate with our OFAC, USFWS, and 
NOAA partners to leverage each agency's capabilities and authorities to 
fulfill our critical trade enforcement missions.

                                 ______
                                 
Russian ships are ditching their flags and registering in the Marshall 
Islands and St. Kitts, a tactic that could be used to evade sanctions,

    Business Insider, April 5, 2022 by Hannah Towey

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
    

    .epsFollowing sanctions, French authorities intercepted a Russian-
owned commercial ship in the strait of Pas-de-Calais. Sylvain Lefevre/
Getty Images

     18 vessels ditched their Russian flags in March--more than 
            three times the normal rate.

     They're re-flagging under nations like the Marshall 
            Islands, according to Windward AI.

     The tactic--while legal--could allow businesses to hide 
            their connections with Russia.

An abnormally high number of ships ditched their Russian flags this 
March and re-registered to nations such as the Marshall Islands and St. 
Kitts, according to data provided by Windward AI, a maritime risk 
consultancy.

A total of 18 ships changed their Russian flag to a different 
nationality during the month of March. That's more than three times the 
normal rate of 5.8, Windward's data showed. Five of the vessels are 
linked to Russian ownership.

The tactic--while legal--could allow businesses to hide their 
connections to the Russian regime and ``deceive authorities'' in order 
to evade sanctions, Windward said in its monthly report.

``Right now, tracking a Russian vessel with a Russian flag is very 
easy,'' Windward CEO Ami Daniel said in an interview with Insider. ``If 
you build a shell company, you put a vessel in there with a new name . 
. . I think it's a different ball game.''

In the shipping industry, a vessel's flag signifies the nation it is 
registered in, which then has legal jurisdiction over the ship. In 
fact, in most cases, a vessel's flag is a different nationality from 
the business that actually owns it. About three-quarters of ships are 
registered in a country separate from where they're owned, according to 
the BBC.

Eleven of the Russian ships that changed their flags in March 
registered instead to the Marshall Islands, a nation with an ``open 
registry'' that allows the registration of all vessels, no matter their 
origin. Insider previously reported on the popular cost-saving 
loophole, also known as a ``flag of convenience.''

Several countries, including the US and the UK, have barred both 
Russian oil and Russian vessels from ports following the country's 
invasion of Ukraine. The sanctions against Russian oligarchs have led 
to a flurry of highly scrutinized ship movement as superyachts and 
their owners attempt to escape seizure.

But not all flag changes are necessarily an attempt to skirt sanctions. 
The trend could also include ``honest business people trying to 
continue trading as usual without the potential hurdles that a Russian 
flag could create for them,'' the report said.

The high number of Russian flag switches comes amid other abnormal 
activities, such as Russian tankers turning off their tracking systems. 
Both tactics are included in a US Treasury advisory from May 2020 that 
lists seven categories of deceptive shipping practices.

``Bad actors may falsify the flag of their vessels to mask illicit 
trade. They may also repeatedly register with new flag states (``flag 
hopping'') to avoid detection,'' the advisory warns.