[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                     
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-20]

                    NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND

                    U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE

                     GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 20, 2021


                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________
 
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-210                     WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
Vacancy

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
               Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
                      Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Dory, Amanda J., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
  Department of Defense..........................................     4
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central 
  Command........................................................     6
Townsend, GEN Stephen J., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command....     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Dory, Amanda J...............................................    55
    McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr.................................    74
    Townsend, GEN Stephen J......................................    98

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Panetta..................................................   117

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................   126
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   121
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   123
    Mr. Moore....................................................   123
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   124
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   124
    Mr. Scott....................................................   121
  
  
  NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE 
                          GREATER MIDDLE EAST

                               AND AFRICA

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                           Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 20, 2021.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. We will call the meeting to order.
    I will put my glasses on, so I can read what we need to 
read here.
    This is the full committee hearing on National Security 
Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle 
East and Africa. We have with us Ms. Amanda Dory, who is the 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kenneth 
McKenzie, who is the Commander of U.S. Central Command; and 
General Stephen Townsend, who is the Commander of U.S. Africa 
Command.
    As always, this is a hybrid hearing, so I will read the 
instructions for how to conduct a hybrid hearing, so we are all 
on the same page.
    Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen 
for the purpose of identity verification, establishing and 
maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and 
voting. Those members must continue to use the software 
platform's function while in attendance unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room and via the television internet feeds. Members 
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they 
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding. But if members depart for a short while for reasons 
other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave 
the video function on. If members will be absent for a 
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, 
they should exit the software platform entirely and rejoin it 
if they return.
    Members may use the software platform's chat feature to 
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical 
support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
    Thank you.
    As mentioned, we are here today to hear from our Central 
Command and Africa Command commanders, and there is, to put it 
mildly, a lot going on in both of your areas of responsibility, 
and we look forward to getting an update on those challenges. 
And certainly, the U.S. challenge has been central for a very 
long time in the region as we have dealt with ISIS [Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria] in the Middle East, you know, between 
Iraq and Syria and elsewhere, and then various affiliates of 
many different groups, including ISIS and al-Qaida, throughout 
Africa.
    I think educating members on exactly what is going on with 
the fights there will be very important because, you know, some 
of that is not on the front pages. But I know, for instance, 
what is going on in the Sahel and West Africa is very 
concerning. We are working with our partners in the European 
Command--sorry, with our partners in Europe who have interests 
there as well. I am very interested to hear how that is going 
and what we can do to be supportive of that.
    But also, as is previewed by the slides that General 
Townsend has passed out for us, both of these areas of 
responsibility are also part of the larger great power 
competition. I think that is very important to understand, that 
both Russia and China are particularly active in Africa, also 
obviously active in the Middle East.
    You know, how does our military play a role in those parts 
of the world with dealing with the great power competition that 
we are facing from both China and Russia? We will be very 
interested to hear that.
    And then, of course, there is the big issue of the moment 
and that is the President's decision to withdraw our troops 
from Afghanistan and NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization's] corresponding decision to also withdraw their 
troops by September.
    I think this is the right decision. There was no easy, good 
decision here. There was no win-win-win where everything was 
going to be fine no matter what we did. Afghanistan is a very 
difficult part of the world. But when you look at the maps in 
front of us, when you look at just these two areas of 
responsibility, much less the concerns that we have elsewhere 
in the world, certainly in Asia but increasingly in Latin 
America as we see the difficulties down there spilling across 
our border, we come to understand that the level of investment 
in Afghanistan does not meet where it currently falls in our 
national security objectives.
    We have accomplished much of what we set out to accomplish 
in terms of degrading al-Qaida. Certainly, we killed Osama bin 
Laden, and we have significantly reduced the ability of 
terrorist groups to operate out of that region. And at between 
$14- and $20 billion a year, I don't think that investment is 
justified at this point. I think the President made the right 
decision in terms of what our current defense priorities are.
    That is not to say that we are going to cease to have 
interests in the Afghanistan region. We will. But there are 
other, better ways to meet those interests that are more cost 
effective.
    And the final point I would make on this is, you know, we 
have been in a bit of a lull in terms of U.S. casualties over 
the course of the last year, since the preliminary--well, 
``peace agreement'' is an overstatement--but the preliminary 
understanding was reached with the Taliban whereby they have 
not been attacking us. As we know, that expires on May 1, and 
at some point after that we would be back into a hot war, and 
we would, once again, be losing U.S. service members' lives in 
Afghanistan.
    Given the commitment and given where we are at in our 
national security needs, I think the President made the right 
call. The risk of staying outweighs the benefit at this point, 
but we will want to hear the details from General McKenzie and 
Ms. Dory on how we plan to execute that, what the risks are, 
and how we are going to mitigate those risks.
    With that, I just want to thank our witnesses again for 
being here, for their service, and I will turn it over to Mr. 
Rogers for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our 
witnesses and express my appreciation for their service and 
their time to prepare for this hearing.
    In both AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] and CENTCOM 
[United States Central Command], we have made progress in 
combating terrorists, but they are not completely gone. Adding 
to the problem, many groups have spread out making them more 
difficult to locate. General Townsend, as we discussed last 
week, maintaining pressure on these terrorists' networks 
remains vitally important.
    But spending in AFRICOM comprises only three-tenths of a 
percent of our defense budget. Spreading those resources even 
further is the increased presence of Russia and China on the 
continent. Russia is entering into a disturbing number of arms 
sales and strategic agreements with African nations. China is 
using its Belt and Road Initiative to extract African national 
resources.
    The Chinese Communist Party is also building its first 
overseas military base on the strategically important Horn of 
Africa. Alarmingly, it is only a few miles away from our own 
base. Given the increased role China and Russia are playing in 
Africa--and its geostrategic importance--it is imperative that 
we continue to make investments there.
    I look forward to hearing from General Townsend about how 
we can maximize diplomatic and military efforts to eliminate 
terrorist footholds and counter Russia and China's global 
ambitions in Africa.
    In CENTCOM, General McKenzie is facing tremendous 
challenges from hardened terrorists and nations bent on our 
destruction. President Biden's decision to unconditionally 
withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021, will only complicate 
matters.
    I am very concerned that the Taliban will overrun the 
democratically elected government soon after we withdraw. When 
that happens, what assurance do we have that Afghanistan will 
not become another breeding ground for terrorists. I have yet 
to hear how the President intends to conduct counterterrorism 
operations without any U.S. troops in the region. There had 
better be a plan for that, and I expect the administration to 
explain it to us as soon as possible.
    I am also very concerned with the ongoing destabilizing 
actions of Iran. The Ayatollah continues to fund and equip 
terrorists targeting American troops. His cronies are 
prolonging a civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria, and 
his regime is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. We 
absolutely cannot allow that to happen, and I am not convinced 
that reentering the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] 
will stop them.
    I look forward to hearing more about the administration's 
plan for ending the Ayatollah's quest for nuclear weapons and 
how they intend to deal with the rest of the regime's 
destabilizing actions.
    Finally, I want to express my deep frustration with the 
defense budget proposed by President Biden. Cutting defense 
spending below the rate of inflation will mean combatant 
commanders like General Townsend and General McKenzie will not 
have the resources and capabilities they need to do their jobs.
    I look forward to working with both Republicans and 
Democrats on this committee to pass a defense budget that 
adequately supports our servicemen and women.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Dory, you are recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF AMANDA J. DORY, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
               FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Dory. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers. 
Can you hear me okay?
    The Chairman. I believe so, yes.
    Ms. Dory. Okay. Very good. Thank you. And distinguished 
members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to 
testify on our defense policy in the U.S. Africa Command and 
U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility alongside their 
commanders, General McKenzie and General Townsend, today.
    I would also like to express my appreciation for the strong 
support Congress provides the Department of Defense. As a 
career civilian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I 
have seen firsthand how the executive and legislative branches 
work together to ensure our Armed Forces have the resources and 
authorities required to deter, and if necessary defeat, any 
foe.
    Secretary Austin has emphasized the need to match resources 
to strategy, strategy to policy, and policy to the will of the 
American people. The President's interim national security 
strategic guidance speaks to that approach by prioritizing the 
security of the American people, expansion of the economic 
prosperity and opportunity, and the defense of our democratic 
values.
    This requires Department of Defense to defend our people 
and economy, deter and prevent adversaries from threatening the 
United States, our allies, and partners, and support whole-of-
government efforts to lead a stable and open international 
system.
    An early priority for the Secretary is to match our 
resources to strategy by rightsizing our posture investments. 
To that end, at the President's direction, the Department is 
undertaking a global posture review to balance operational 
requirements, risk, readiness, and international commitments.
    In Africa and the Middle East, DOD [Department of Defense] 
plays a supporting role to broader U.S. Government efforts in 
an acknowledgment that military force is not the answer to the 
challenges in these regions. Our policy objective is to 
increase stability and secure our interest by working by, with, 
and through our reinvigorated networks of allies and partners.
    Africa is a continent ripe with opportunities and 
challenges. In Africa, the interim national strategic guidance 
directs us to continue building our partnerships and to work 
toward bringing an end to the deadliest conflicts while 
preventing the onset of new ones. It also directs us to assist 
African nations to combat the threats posed by climate change 
and violent extremism.
    Undergirded by the investments and tools you have afforded 
the Department for building partnership capacity, and in close 
cooperation with our diplomatic and development colleagues, the 
resulting partnerships enable us to support conflict resolution 
efforts, combat the threats posed by violent extremism, improve 
defense institutions, and strengthen democratic norms and the 
rule of law.
    These modest investments play an outsized role in Africa 
and the Department's objectives across the continent. In the 
Middle East, DOD works to deter Iranian aggression, disrupt al-
Qaida networks, prevent an ISIS resurgence, and protect vital 
interests such as freedom of navigation.
    We have made progress toward achieving the enduring defeat 
of ISIS and transitioned the focus of Operation Inherent 
Resolve to advising, equipping, and assisting partner forces to 
enable them to manage the ISIS threat independently.
    The State Department is leading diplomatic efforts to bring 
Iran's nuclear program back into compliance with the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action while DOD focuses on deterring and 
defending against Iranian threats.
    In Yemen, we ended support to Saudi-led offensive 
operations but continue to demonstrate our commitment to the 
defense of Saudi Arabia by providing limited non-combat support 
to help our partners defend their territory from Houthi 
attacks.
    In Afghanistan, our mission has been preventing terrorist 
groups from using the country to threaten the interest and 
security of the United States, our allies, and partners. After 
two decades of U.S. and NATO military involvement in 
Afghanistan, we have accomplished that mission, and President 
Biden has decided to draw down the remaining U.S. troops from 
Afghanistan.
    In closing, I am confident in the Department's capacity to 
contend with the range of dynamic challenges facing the United 
States in Africa and in the Middle East. We retain many 
advantages, including our economic power, dynamism, democratic 
values, military capabilities, and global alliances.
    Thank you to the members of the committee for your 
continued support. I look forward to discussing the topics 
further in the rest of the hearing.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Dory can be found in the 
Appendix on page 55.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General McKenzie.

  STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, 
                      U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

    General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I 
appear before you proudly representing the 70,000 men and women 
of United States Central Command. It is a great pleasure to be 
with you here today.
    It is my duty to testify, of course, but I have to say it 
is also a privilege to address this body, and all the greater 
honor to do so sitting beside the Acting Secretary of Defense, 
Ms. Dory, and the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, General 
Steve Townsend.
    Since my last testimony, the region has continued to 
evolve, and it remains as dynamic as ever. With the President's 
announcement last week, we are focused on working closely with 
the Afghan government and our NATO allies to responsibly 
conclude Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan. This is my 
main effort at present, but it is not my only responsibility. 
My prepared statement addresses our other missions in detail.
    The United States and our NATO allies sent forces to 
Afghanistan nearly 20 years ago, and the President has judged 
that now is the appropriate time to redeploy and reposition 
these forces, so that they are better arrayed to deter 
adversaries and respond to threats globally, including those in 
the Central Command region.
    Our singular purpose in Afghanistan has been to assure that 
al-Qaida and other violent extremist organizations could never 
again plot, prepare, and perpetrate attacks against the United 
States and our allies from the refuge of that country. The 
campaign has evolved considerably over the years from active 
combat operations with U.S. and NATO forces in the lead to 
advisory efforts designed to enhance the Afghan National 
Defense and Security Forces' ability to conduct their own 
campaigns against violent extremist organizations.
    That there has not been another 9/11 is not an accident; it 
is the cumulative product of these efforts. We will now 
conclude our Afghanistan-based advise and support mission. We 
are further planning now for continued counterterrorism 
operations from within the region, ensuring that the violent 
extremist organizations fighting for their existence in the 
hinterlands of Afghanistan remain under persistent surveillance 
and pressure.
    Ever since 12 September 2001 when our allies invoked 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we have done everything 
in Afghanistan within a partnership framework, and that will 
not change in the months ahead. We are planning collaboratively 
with our interagency and international partners and will take 
all measures to ensure the safe and orderly withdrawal of all 
of our forces and those of our partners from Afghanistan. This 
includes positioning significant combat power to guard against 
the possibility that the Taliban decide to interfere in any way 
with our orderly redeployment.
    I would now like to briefly summarize some other challenges 
in the region. While Iran has itself avoided state-on-state 
attacks on U.S. forces since last January's strikes on the Al 
Asad and Erbil airbases, it continues to menace regional 
partners and the free flow of commerce through the use of 
proxies and the proliferation of armed unmanned aerial systems 
and other munitions. Its pursuit of regional hegemony remains 
the greatest source of instability across the Middle East.
    Iraq and Syria, the campaign to eliminate the threat posed 
by ISIS has entered a new phase. In Iraq, we are engaged in a 
strategic dialogue with the Iraqi government to determine the 
nature of our security relationship. ISIS' so-called physical 
caliphate is no more, but its toxic ideology lives on. The 
problem is especially acute in communities ravaged by conflict 
and its sprawling camps for displaced persons where ISIS preys 
upon vulnerable populations.
    What has accelerated in the last year is the influence of 
China and Russia, which each in their own way are attempting to 
subvert the rules-based international order and to gain 
strategic influence in the Middle East. China's activity in the 
region takes the form of economic investment, arms sales, and 
other overtures.
    Russia has made an 18th century power play in Syria, 
propping up the murderous Asad regime. The Middle East remains 
key terrain, and I believe China and Russia will continue to 
expand their efforts to improve their position in the region 
and diminish U.S. standing wherever possible.
    The CENTCOM area of responsibility is the most cyber-
contested theater in the world. It is also the proving ground 
for the proliferation and employment of unmanned weaponized 
systems, many emanating from Iran.
    This difficult and complex operational environment provides 
units inside CENTCOM opportunities to operate and to conduct 
realistic training within an environment that exists nowhere 
else in the world. I can state as a matter of fact that the 
units and ships assigned to CENTCOM are as ready as any in the 
joint force.
    The weeks and months ahead will see us execute a very 
complicated and demanding military operation to withdraw U.S. 
and NATO forces from Afghanistan. This is presently the main 
effort of my command, and we have the tools necessary to 
accomplish the task.
    With that, I look forward to answering your questions. 
Thank you, sir.
    [The prepared statement of General McKenzie can be found in 
the Appendix on page 74.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    General Townsend.

  STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. 
                         AFRICA COMMAND

    General Townsend. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
and members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for 
the opportunity to appear here today.
    It is a privilege to represent America's exceptional men 
and women at U.S. Africa Command, who are dedicated to securing 
U.S. interest and preserving our strategic options on the 
African continent.
    This morning I am accompanied by one of my key staff 
advisors, Air Force Colonel Jacqueline Breeden. I am also here 
this morning with my colleagues and friends, Ms. Amanda Dory, 
our Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and General 
Frank McKenzie, the CENTCOM Commander, to discuss our shared 
challenges and opportunities and our areas of responsibility 
and the high return the American people get for their defense 
investments around the globe.
    Historically, America has not been penalized for 
underestimating the importance of Africa. Today we can no 
longer afford to underestimate the economic opportunity and 
strategic consequence Africa embodies and which competitors 
like China and Russia recognize.
    Africa is the crossroads of the globe. The recent blockage 
of the Suez Canal not only demonstrated the importance of 
critical sea lines of communication flowing through the 
Mediterranean and Red Seas but also around the Cape of Good 
Hope. Violent extremist organizations, competitor activities, 
and fragile states are among some of the threats to U.S. 
interests.
    Beyond geography, global population growth is largely 
African. By 2050, one in four people on the planet will live in 
Africa. Rapidly growing markets, 60 percent of the Earth's 
arable land, and vast untapped resources, including strategic 
rare earth minerals, provide tremendous economic potential. 
Thirteen of the world's 25 fastest-growing economies are in 
Africa.
    Africa's tremendous opportunities are offset by significant 
challenges, including climate change, food shortages, poverty, 
ungoverned spaces, historic grievances, and other factors that 
make the continent also home to 14 of the world's 20 most 
fragile countries.
    Our strategic competitors are very active in Africa. China 
has invested heavily in their second continent, or as some 
think tanks call it, China's fourth or fifth island chain.
    Russia seeks to exploit instability and fragility for their 
own gain and at U.S. expense. Iran is also increasingly active 
on the continent. African-based VEOs [violent extremist 
organizations], like al-Qaida, their affiliate, Al-Shabab, and 
ISIS, thrive in the continent's ungoverned spaces. They provide 
the greatest threat to many of our African partners and aspire 
to kill Americans in Africa as well as here at home.
    Across this diverse continent, USAFRICOM operates with .3 
percent of DOD's budget and .3 percent of DOD's manpower. This 
tiny investment pays enormous dividends as just under 6,000 
service members, civilians, and contractors work with our 
partners, both interagency and foreign, to counter malign 
actors and transnational threats, respond to crises, and 
strengthen security forces to advance U.S. interests and 
promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.
    AFRICOM works every day to protect America's security and 
advance our access and influence. We do this arm in arm with 
the U.S. interagency and through coordinated action with allies 
and partners.
    What AFRICOM accomplishes with a few people and a few 
dollars on a continent three and a half times the size of the 
continental United States is a bargain for the American 
taxpayer and a low-cost insurance policy for America.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thanks for your 
continued support to our Armed Forces. I looked forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in 
the Appendix on page 98.]
    The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
    I think something you said very interesting there about 
Africa and our investment there and DOD's investment there is a 
lot of bang for the buck. And as I look around the world, I 
think with the multiple challenges that we have that is sort of 
key to how we approach them is, you know, how can we make a 
difference and cover all of the areas we cover, and that--I 
know SOCOM [United States Special Operations Command] has been 
very involved in that, being present in countries, building 
partner capacity, working with other allies. Can you expand 
upon that a little bit and how that plays out in Africa as you 
deal with all of the various challenges that are spread out 
across the continent?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Chairman. So, first of all, 
everything we do is through partners. America, America's 
military, is not really in the lead for anything in Africa. We 
work first with our African partners. We work secondarily 
through other partners like Europeans, notably in West Africa 
the French, for example, but many countries actually.
    So everything we do--and our interagency partners, of 
course. So everything we do is through partners and, Chairman, 
U.S. Special Operations Command.
    A lot of the troops who have boots on the ground in Africa 
are U.S. special operating forces, not all of them. There are 
plenty of general purposes forces there as well.
    So we don't try to be all things to all people. We try to 
focus our efforts in priority areas. There are 53 countries in 
my area of operation. We don't have--we don't try to win in all 
53 countries, but we do try to focus our efforts where it 
matters the most for America's security.
    The Chairman. I will now ask you a question that is 
probably impossible to answer at this point, but I am curious 
what you think. As we pull out of Afghanistan--I mean, the 
budget in Afghanistan last year was $14 billion, 3,500 troops, 
a lot of what we have been doing has been about the rotations 
that are involved in sending our forces into Afghanistan.
    With that extra money and those extra forces, have you 
guys, you know, within the Pentagon started to think about how 
do we then distribute them? Do we bring them all home? Are 
there places in Africa or elsewhere where you could shore up 
your efforts? How do you see a benefit coming from, you know, 
reducing that expenditure by that amount?
    And, General McKenzie, it is your AOR's [area of 
responsibility's] starting point. So I would be curious what 
your thoughts are, and I know this is probably early on, but 
curious where you see that going.
    General McKenzie. Sir, I think there are--as our forces 
come out and we are able to reposture, I think first of all we 
have to look at what we define as the pacing threats for the 
Department. And I think we look to China, we look to Russia, 
and we have to look at those areas.
    I think some of the forces are going to remain in Central 
Command because we are going to look at offshore over-the-
horizon options, and that is going to require us to do some 
things. Nothing on the scale of the expenditures that you are 
seeing now in Afghanistan, of course, but we will still need to 
do some things there as well.
    But I think broadly it is going to be a significant lever 
for the Department to apply against what I agree are the most 
significant challenges that we face today.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    With that, I will recognize Mr. Wilson, who I believe is 
with us virtually.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our 
witnesses for being here today, and I am real grateful.
    General McKenzie, a question. I believe the U.S.-Israel 
relationship is of paramount importance to U.S. foreign policy. 
Given that Israel has now been moved into the purview of 
CENTCOM, I want to ensure that our cooperation with Israel 
continues to be a priority. In moving Israel to CENTCOM, it is 
important that we don't undermine the cooperation Israel has in 
Europe, particularly with NATO.
    The question would be, how are we ensuring this move does 
not undermine agreements and understandings that currently 
exist?
    General McKenzie. Sir, that is a great question about 
Israel. So today Israel does most of its operational business 
with U.S. Central Command. Their threats typically emanate from 
the east. Nonetheless, they have broad enduring cultural and 
other ties to the Europeans and to NATO.
    So as part of direction I have received from the Secretary 
of Defense, over the next several months we will work a careful 
plan to integrate Israel into the Central Command AOR while 
preserving their unique nature and their unique ties back into 
Western Europe.
    So we think we have a good plan to do that, but in many 
ways the movement into the Central Command AOR simply reflects 
an operational fact that has been in existence for some time. 
We work closely with them every day. Now we will have not a 
divided responsibility for it, but rather a single 
responsibility for it.
    But I will tell you that I will still be in very close 
touch with General Tod Wolters and U.S. European Command as we 
go forward. And I think that is an important relationship, as 
you note, but also it is going to be important for Israel to 
have the opportunity to develop normalized relationships with 
Arab nations. And that is one of the key things that will 
accrue from having them in the Central Command AOR.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much, and I appreciate 
that assurance to our friends of Israel.
    Secretary Dory, the U.S. defensive expeditionary operations 
are enabled by a network of American bases and facilities 
hosted in allied and partner countries, particularly in 
Afghanistan. Presuming that the withdrawal of all forces 
results in the loss of control of Bagram and Kandahar airbases, 
how does that complicate our ability to reenter Afghanistan to 
combat research and terrorist groups as we had to do in Iraq? 
What number of U.S. forces would be required to reenter 
Afghanistan without control of existing infrastructure?
    The attacks of 9/11 by Osama bin Laden were from the cave 
in Afghanistan in 2001. What assurance does the President have 
that future attacks will not come from caves of Afghanistan 
against the American public?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, thank you for the question about 
what our future posture will look like with respect to 
Afghanistan following the force drawdown. What I can say at 
this point is that work is underway to adapt to the adjusting 
security environment and consider how to continue to apply 
pressure with respect to potential CT [counterterrorism] 
threats emanating from Afghanistan, so looking throughout the 
region in terms of over-the-horizon opportunities. Of course, 
the surveillance intelligence component of that is fundamental 
to ensuring the type of scenario that you just laid out would 
not persist in the future with respect to individuals in caves 
who had threatened the U.S. homeland.
    But I can say from the decision process that the President 
led with his national security team is that there was 
consideration of a range of scenarios for the future of 
Afghanistan and our ability to continue to apply pressure, but 
the commitment is that there will not be threats emanating from 
Afghanistan against the U.S. homeland looking ahead in the 
future.
    Mr. Wilson. And additionally, Secretary, over the last 
several years of the conflict in Syria, Iran has entrenched 
itself deeply within Syrian territory. It has bases, factories, 
weapon storage facilities. These pose a threat to U.S. interest 
in the region, including our alliance with Israel as well as 
safety of the Syrian people who often are being used as human 
shields.
    Does the U.S. continue to support the freedom of action for 
Israel to address the Iranian threats emanating from Syria?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, our commitment to Israel remains 
ironclad. I think we have seen through the Secretary's initial 
visit to Israel last week, and in the dialogues that have been 
conducted with Israel already in this administration, including 
a rejuvenated effort led by the National Security Advisor, that 
the relationship remains robust and close, that there is a 
strong level of dialogue and commitment to one another.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good. Can you hear me okay, Mr. 
Chairman?
    The Chairman. Yes. We have got you. We will turn your 
volume up a little bit here, but you are good. Go ahead.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, good morning, and I want to 
thank our witnesses for your testimony today.
    So we have heard entities like Special Operations Command 
say that counter-VEO is a form of great power competition. 
General Townsend, do you agree that that statement is true? 
And, if so, why?
    General Townsend. Thank you, Congressman. I absolutely 
believe that statement is true. In fact, we say that often in 
Africa, and here is why. So what is--we don't use the term 
``great power competition'' there. Our partners don't really 
like to hear that term, so we use ``global power competition'' 
in Africa.
    What is the purpose of global power competition but to 
expand America's access and influence? So how do you get that? 
You get that by helping a partner with a problem that they 
have. And one of the significant problems that many of our 
African partners have is the scourge of terrorism. So by doing 
counter-VEO or counterterrorist operations supporting our 
African partners, we are gaining access and influence by doing 
that. Absolutely, in Africa, counterterrorism operations are a 
way of global power competition.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I personally also agree with that 
statement, and I think it is important that we look at these 
holistically because terrorism is not going away anytime soon, 
in my view.
    But what other forms of great power competition happen in 
Africa or global competition, as you talk about it? What role 
does the military play as China, particularly, makes diplomatic 
and economic inroads there?
    General Townsend. So China and Russia are very active in 
Africa. Russia is very active with arms sales, but most of 
their activity on the continent I judge to be self-interested 
and exploitative in nature. And I think though they may be a 
threat today, I think they are less of a threat tomorrow.
    China, however, is of great concern. They are literally 
everywhere on the continent. They are placing a lot of bets 
down. They are spending a lot of money. We know they use debt 
trap diplomacy, coercion, with corrupt politicians. They build 
a lot of critical infrastructure, and they--so most of their 
competition is through economic means, building infrastructure 
and trapping African countries in bad loans that give the 
Chinese access to that infrastructure after they build it.
    They are also--you know, their first overseas military 
base, their only one, is in Africa, and they have just expanded 
that by adding a significant pier that can support even their 
aircraft carriers in the future.
    Around the continent, they are looking for other basing 
opportunities. They are also doing cooperation in the 
intelligence realm that concerns me significantly. I would say 
that they have offered training and arms sales. Frequently that 
winds up working out okay for us because their quality of their 
equipment that they sell frequently is inferior and the 
Africans wind up being disappointed with both the equipment 
they get from China and the training they get from China. But 
China is a learning organization, and they are the concern for 
the future.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
    Let me turn to General McKenzie, if I could. General 
McKenzie, in your testimony, you list great power competition 
as your third priority behind containing Iran's reigning 
influence in CVEO [counter violent extremist organization] 
operations. What does great power competition look like in your 
AOR and what is your timeframe for shifting your priorities 
with great power competition?
    General McKenzie. Sir, so we see with Russia disruptive 
activities. You know, they seized a foothold in Syria that 
allows them to pursue an age-old dream of a warmwater port in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and basing in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, which also allows them a lily pad to go into 
Africa. So Russia is generally opportunistic weapons sales, as 
General Townsend noted.
    China is, as in Africa, playing a much deeper and a longer 
game, and it is principally an economic effort, although we 
believe they do aspire at some point to have basing in the 
theater, but that is still ahead of them. But right now we see 
China as principally economic.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you. Ms. Dory, as Mr. Langevin just 
mentioned, General McKenzie has in his comments the importance 
of deterring Iran, looking to how do we strengthen our allies, 
and the importance of intelligence to be able to respond to 
their malign activities.
    In your statement, throughout you reference the malign 
activities that Iran has done and has performed that is 
obviously of grave concern. Other than entering back into the 
JCPOA, which is a flawed agreement and which they have 
currently breached, what else do we need to be doing to deter 
Iran?
    Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. I would start off by 
saying the President has chosen to lead with respect to 
diplomacy when it comes to JCPOA and the nuclear file. That 
leaves an important role for DOD with respect to deterring 
malign activity in the other range of activities Iran engages 
in.
    And so there is a very important role for the Department to 
continue with respect to the range of allies and partners in 
the region, to backstop them to have forces on the ground 
working to advise, train, and assist with the different 
partners. Each partnership has its own character and quality, 
but the combination of the force presence, the ability to 
provide the President with options, in the event those are 
required, those are the fundamental roles of the Department at 
this point.
    Mr. Turner. General McKenzie, you mentioned ISR 
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and the tools 
that are necessary to be able to deter Iran, specifically 
citing MQ-9. I know that you know that there is pressure on the 
committee for the purposes of diminishing the role of MQ-9 and 
other deployable ISR.
    I thought you might want to take an opportunity to give a 
commercial for the importance of that tool as you look to 
deterring Iran.
    General McKenzie. Well, sir, let me begin by saying I 
recognize that there is a global demand for ISR, and also we 
need to move beyond the MQ-9 system, which is the backbone 
system for U.S. Central Command. The future is going to demand 
bigger, better, different kinds of ISR, more sophisticated than 
what we have got now. However, right now for me the MQ-9 is a 
very good platform.
    And we have found that particularly against Iran, they do 
not like their activities to be exposed. In the summer of 2019, 
we believe we stopped several imminent attack streams from 
ships at sea simply by positioning MQ-9s overhead, so they 
could hear them operating. I am confident of that. The 
intelligence is very clear on that.
    So the intelligence, first of all--the platform, first of 
all, allows us to gather intelligence. But, second, we have an 
observed and reported-upon deterring effect on Iran by simply 
manipulating those platforms. So I use them, but I am not 
insensitive to the future of this platform and the fact that we 
have got to make some adjustments globally.
    Mr. Turner. Great. In your comments, you emphasize our need 
to work with our allies. Certainly, in working with those 
allies, we need to be strengthening their capabilities. The 
Trump administration had entered into a transaction to provide 
the F-35 to UAE [United Arab Emirates]. The Biden 
administration has confirmed its interest in continuing to do 
so.
    Could you speak for a moment about how important it is for 
us to have advanced tools and equipment like the F-35, and 
certainly weapons systems, in the hands of our allies that join 
with us in trying to deter Iran?
    General McKenzie. So one of the key aspects to deterring 
Iran is an international community that is devoted to that 
deterrence. Iran has no friends, so what we have is lots of 
friends, friends across the region and friends across the globe 
as well.
    But one of the things for supporting our friends in the 
region is to give them the best capability that we can afford 
to give them, consistent with the other requirements, such as 
reassurance of Israel, which is always in my mind when I give 
advice on these deals, but it is not a CENTCOM decision.
    But I think that is a good capability and it will stand us 
in good stead with our friends in UAE.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General Townsend, I don't know if I need an answer. This 
won't be--it will be a comment, really. On this issue that Mr. 
Langevin brought up about CT [counterterrorism] and global 
power competition, my concern with your answer--as the concern 
I have expressed with SOCOM--is just that sometimes it should 
only be a CT mission and not creep into something else, and 
sometimes it should start out as a global power competition 
mission and not be necessarily be based in a CT mission.
    That may not be the case for everywhere on the continent of 
Africa for you, but do you have--I guess I do have a question. 
Do you have an example where a SOCOM mission that is operating 
under AFRICOM is just a global power competition mission?
    General Townsend. Yes, Congressman. I would prefer to 
discuss that in the----
    Mr. Larsen. Yes or no is fine with me, and you said yes. I 
appreciate that. I just want to make the point that sometimes 
they are related and sometimes they are not. And I don't need 
to--I don't want to keep hearing CT is GPC [global power 
competition] because it sounds like an excuse to keep CT all 
the time, and sometimes it is not appropriate and sometimes it 
is.
    And we are just trying to--I am trying to get SOCOM to 
think through this a little bit more than I think I am getting 
the impression that they are. So, but I have been clear to 
SOCOM folks about that as well.
    So let's stay on the continent, actually specific 
countries. And, Secretary Dory, 20 years ago I was in 
Afghanistan all the time when I got here. Just in the last 3 
weeks--I wouldn't have heard this 20 years ago--I have heard 
from Ugandan constituents, they are from--their country of 
origin is Uganda. I have heard from constituents from Tigray. I 
think I have got that pronounced correctly. I don't want to be 
disrespectful. About their respective problems in those 
countries.
    Wouldn't have heard that 20 years ago. My district is 
changing. The country is changing. We are a nation of 
immigrants and new immigrants. So can you--on those two areas, 
can you give us--give this committee or give me an update? 
Something I can tell my constituents who are both concerned 
about the elections in Uganda and my other constituents who are 
concerned about how their families are being treated in 
Northern Ethiopia.
    Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. In that period of time, I 
previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa. 
So for some of us, those were areas we were working on even 
before the recent renaissance, if you will.
    In terms of Uganda, what I would say there is the U.S. 
Government is very concerned at this point in terms of the 
quality, or lack thereof, of the election, the repression 
against the other candidates who contested the election, and 
the actions of the security services in Uganda in terms of 
repressing participation by citizens and their concerns in 
governments.
    So messages in particular via the State Department are 
robust with respect to our concerns. We do recognize the 
positive role that Uganda has played with respect to the AMISOM 
[African Union Mission in Somalia] mission in Somalia over 
many, many years, on the one hand, but that does not 
counterbalance the concerns in terms of the repression that is 
underway in Uganda proper.
    Similarly, with respect to Ethiopia and Tigray, intensive 
concerns on the part of the U.S. Government with respect to the 
conflict underway there, and concerns that it is fundamental to 
have a negotiated settlement to the conflict at this point. You 
have participation by regional players in addition to the 
different groups within Ethiopia and the way forward is through 
dialogue, and that is something that our Embassy on the ground 
and the State Department are leaning into robustly.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    General Townsend, back to you. Can you comment on 
Mozambique--in the last 45 seconds--if we are--how you assess 
what is happening in Northern Mozambique and what does that 
mean for decisions and advice you are providing to the 
Department?
    General Townsend. Over the last 2 years, ISIS Mozambique 
has been an increasing threat in Northern Mozambique in the 
Cabo Delgado Province. As you saw a couple of weeks ago, they 
launched a 7- to 10-day siege on the town of Palma. It is not 
clear to me if they are actually more than just local groups 
flying an ISIS flag of convenience, but ISIS core has claimed 
them as their own.
    My view is that the African partners need to do more, and 
European partners need to do more before the United States does 
more there.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The ranking member is recognized.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie, in your 2020 posture statement, you noted 
that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS had the 
potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria. I am interested in 
your thoughts in your 2021 posture statement about that, as 
well as ISIS blossoming under a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan 
after we leave.
    General McKenzie. Sir, in Iraq and Syria, we have completed 
the physical destruction of what was the so-called ISIS 
caliphate. ISIS remnants still remain in Syria and some in Iraq 
as well. They find it difficult, if not impossible, to hold 
ground. They can still conduct small-scale terror attacks, and 
they do that. But largely in Iraq and Syria, in Iraq, the Iraqi 
security forces are generally able to handle that problem.
    We are not patrolling with the Iraqis on the ground. The 
Iraqis are doing it. Now, we provide them enabling support. We 
provide them high-level advice and assist, but generally the 
Iraqis are doing that themselves.
    In Syria, it is sort of the same thing. Our SEF [Syrian 
elite forces] partners there are conducting those operations 
with our back-in-the-rear advice and support for them. So those 
operations are continuing.
    Now, the future in Iraq and Syria is not going to be 
bloodless. ISIS is not going to go away. It is going to remain. 
But our objective there is to enable local security forces that 
we have trained and enabled to be able to handle the problem at 
a local level without significant external assistance from 
either us or our European allies.
    The other component of that is you want to prevent those 
elements from being able to develop global connective tissue to 
reach out to other entities. And that is not only a physical 
fight on the ground there but also a fight in cyber, and we 
conducted in all of those domains.
    So that is the way I read the picture right now. Continued 
pressure is still necessary. The trends are moving the right 
way, and the strategic dialogue with our Iraqi partners is just 
one example of that moving forward. As we go forward, we will 
be able to look to reexamine the posture we have in Iraq, and 
that will be something we will take a look at here in the 
future with our Iraqi partners.
    In Afghanistan, as you noted, the principal reason that, 
you know, we see that ISIS and al-Qaida have been so 
significantly degraded has been the significant CT pressure 
that we have been able to put on them over the past several 
years. ISIS is very small in Afghanistan, probably several 
hundred fighters, ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-
Khorasan] a little bigger but still disaggregated. They have 
not been able to hold ground successfully in the East. They 
look to--you know, they look to reassert themselves if they 
can, but pressure is the important component of that.
    And I see that I am out of time there.
    Mr. Rogers. So if we are gone and the coalition forces are 
gone and Taliban does take a more prominent role in 
Afghanistan, is it a concern of yours that they may increase 
their presence, so without us there to push back?
    General McKenzie. So the Taliban has undertaken to agree to 
not allow that to happen. With the Taliban, I have learned to 
not listen to what they say, but rather to watch what they do. 
So we will watch closely what they do.
    Mr. Rogers. Great.
    General Townsend, given the massive size of your AOR, I 
would like to hear more about your additional--any additional 
resources or capabilities you need, particularly in the 
southern part of the continent, in the western part, to carry 
out your mission. Are you adequately resourced in that part of 
the continent?
    General Townsend. Ranking Member, as you noted, you know, 
Africa is three and a half times the size of the continent of 
the United States, and we have about 6,000 total troops spread 
over that area. We don't have a significant footprint from 
about the equator south, and I am not sure that we need that.
    I would say that, you know, our force posture is under 
review as part of this global posture review, so I don't really 
want to get ahead of my civilian leaders on describing what we 
might need or might not need. However, there are some perennial 
things that are always on the razor's edge of, are we going to 
get that or are we not going to get that?
    One of them is the ISR that General McKenzie has already 
mentioned. The simple fact of the matter is we do not have 
enough to do what we assess we need to do in Africa. Realize 
there is pressure on it across the entire Department.
    And then our warfighter recovery network, which is 
providing timely casualty evacuation and medical care to our 
troops, that is a fairly--we do most of that through 
contracted. We don't actually need to put pressure on low-
density, high-demand units like military Medevac and personnel 
recovery assets.
    We can do most of our work through contracted sources. That 
takes money, and we are always waiting to get that money to 
make sure our troops have what they need. Those are probably 
two things right off the top of my head.
    Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, again, General McKenzie, thank you for reminding us 
just a moment ago that there actually was an agreement in place 
that the sitting government of this country entered into in the 
last administration. And in many respects, the announcement 
that President Biden made was really to try and make that 
agreement more logistically executable, so that we are not in a 
situation like Saigon 1975.
    So Ms. Dory sort of alluded a moment ago to the fact that 
we are still going to retain over-the-horizon capability to 
make sure that a counterterrorism effort can continue and 
protect the homeland. Can you describe just a little bit more 
in detail what that looks like? Because that is I think the 
real heartburn that I certainly pick up from my constituents 
about the decision.
    Is it going to be at sea? Is it going to be in neighboring 
countries where we, again, have the ability to deploy assets 
to, again, respond to a terrorist threat?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I am actually conducting detailed 
planning by direction of the Secretary to look at those options 
right now, and I will report back to him by the end of the 
month with some alternatives. But I can broadly state, if you 
leave Afghanistan and you want to go back in to conduct these 
kinds of operations, there are three things you need to do. You 
need to find the target, you need to fix the target, and you 
need to be able to finish the target.
    So those three things all--the first two require heavy 
intelligence support. And if you are out of the country and you 
don't have the ecosystem that we have there now, it will be 
harder to do that. It is not impossible to do that. It will 
just be harder to do it.
    You will have to base your overhead ISR, if we are no 
longer within Afghanistan, where an MQ-9 can take off and be 
over its target in a matter of minutes, to perhaps much further 
away.
    We will look at all of the countries in the region. Our 
diplomats will reach out, and we will talk about places where 
we could base those resources. Some of them may be very far 
away, and then there would be a significant bill for those 
types of resources because you would have to cycle a lot of 
them in and out.
    That is all doable, however. So there are ways to get to 
the find and the fix part. The fix part is very important, 
though, because if we are going to strike something, we are 
going to strike it in concert with the law of armed conflict 
and the American way of war. We are going to minimize 
collateral damage. We are going to make sure we have a precise 
target and that we are going to be able to control what happens 
there.
    It is difficult to do that at range. It is not impossible 
to do that at range. And so you have a variety of ways that you 
could actually strike the target if you chose to do that. You 
could do it with long-range precision fires. You could do it 
with manned raids. All of those are inherently dangerous, but 
you could still do it.
    You could do it with manned aircraft. There are problems 
with all three of those options, but there is also 
opportunities with all three of those options.
    So I don't want to make light of it. I don't want to put on 
rose-colored glasses and say it is going to be easy to do. I 
can tell you that the U.S. military can do just about anything, 
and we are examining this problem with all of our resources 
right now to find a way to do it, you know, in the most 
intelligent, risk-free manner that we can.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for that answer. Again, I 
think it is important to, you know, remember that we are not in 
the same mind-set we were at the time of 9/11. I mean, I think, 
you know, certainly it sounds like, again, you are very focused 
in terms of making sure that a threat like what occurred back 
then is going to be planned for and, again, addressed as the 
case may be.
    General Townsend, in the last NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act], there probably were at least two or three 
provisions regarding critical minerals and rare earth minerals, 
which I have been on this committee a while, that was pretty 
unique. But, again, I think from a security standpoint I think 
there is now a pretty widespread recognition that China has 
been very methodical and successful in terms of cornering the 
market, in terms of critical minerals. And Africa I think is 
clearly a part of the world that they have succeeded at that.
    Again, your map on economic activity I realize was kind of 
a global view, but is that something that AFRICOM is watching 
and at least being able to help, if nothing else, educate us 
back here about the fact that, you know, we have got to pay 
attention to this, because they have a stranglehold--let's face 
it--in terms of things like antimony and cobalt, lithium, all 
of these minerals that go into everything from our cell phones 
to platforms that we need for our national defense.
    General Townsend. Congressman, you said it great. So the 
Russians are looking--to me, they are looking at exploiting and 
short-term gain. The Chinese have a much longer term view that 
is more concerning to me. And so they are not only mining rare 
earth minerals in Africa for their own use, they are cornering 
the market on these concerns in Africa to have them under 
control for a rainy day in the future. That should be of 
concern to us.
    As you look at the list of rare earth minerals--and you 
named a few of them--a couple of others, tantalum, and I was 
just looking at these today----
    The Chairman. I am sorry. General, I do apologize. The 
gentleman's time has expired. I want to try to get the other 
folks here.
    General Townsend. Sure.
    The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am concerned because, as Robert Gates said famously 
regarding--when Joe Biden was a Senator, and then Vice 
President, he seemed to be on the wrong side of foreign policy 
decisions at almost every turn.
    You could go back to the 1980s when the nuclear freeze was 
being discussed and that would have frozen a permanent 
advantage into Russia's favor, or Soviet Union's favor, to as 
Vice President promoting the withdrawal of troops out of Iraq 
that let ISIS come to the fore or counseling against the strike 
against Osama bin Laden, and on and on and on.
    And I am just concerned that we are seeing this bad 
decision-making today with Afghanistan and Iran.
    So on Afghanistan, General McKenzie, are you able to tell 
us whether or not you advised the President to unilaterally 
withdraw by September 11 all U.S. forces, or are you able to 
not--are you not able to discuss that?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I can tell you that I had multiple 
opportunities to have a detailed conversation with the 
President and give my advice. He heard my advice. I am not 
going to be able to share it with you here this morning, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Regarding the Taliban, we have talked a 
little bit about that. The ranking member had some questions. 
Are they a reliable partner in negotiations?
    General McKenzie. I have grave doubts about the Taliban's 
reliability. I have expressed those publicly going back for a 
long period of time, but we need to see what they are going to 
do here.
    The fact of the matter is, if let's say we leave, if they 
want any form of future international recognition for 
Afghanistan, if they want any form of international support, 
they are going to have to keep the agreements that they have 
made. We will be able to observe that and see it very clearly 
and directly, whether or not they are able to do it.
    Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am happy to hear that we are going to 
be watching them closely, but my concern is that we have been 
watching them closely, and they have been pretty much uniformly 
unreliable.
    Ms. Dory, I would like to ask you about Iran. Recently, 
they made the announcement that they were going to upgrade 
their highly-enriched uranium to 60 percent, and that pretty 
much goes against everything that we want them to be doing or 
peace-loving people in the world want them to be doing. So what 
is the Biden administration going to do about that?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, I think what we see with that 
announcement is playing out in terms of the public nature of 
the announcement is the jockeying for leverage with respect to 
the negotiations that are underway in Vienna right now.
    So it is important what is happening in public. It is also 
important what is happening behind closed doors and whether we 
are getting closer through the talks that are underway to a 
resumption of compliance on the part of Iran with the 
agreement.
    Mr. Lamborn. Would you agree that upgrading their HEU 
[highly enriched uranium] to 60 percent is unacceptable?
    Ms. Dory. Absolutely.
    Mr. Lamborn. And how close does that get them to weapons-
grade-capable HEU, highly enriched uranium?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, it puts them farther along that 
path. You know, the 90 percent level and above is where you 
would need to be in terms of weapons-grade uranium.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I have just got a lot of concerns. 
Like you, General McKenzie, I am going to be watching closely. 
Oh, I do have one last question for you, General McKenzie, my 
last minute. And this is a concern I have that--where we are 
not taking advantage of a capability that we have.
    We have purchased some Iron Dome batteries from Israel, and 
we know that these are highly-capable units shooting down 
incoming rockets and missiles. Are there places in CENTCOM 
where we could be using these Iron Dome batteries? And my 
understanding is we are not using them at all. I hope I am 
wrong on that. But if we are not using them at all, aren't 
there places where they could be put to good use?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would prefer to talk to that a 
little more directly in a closed session a little bit later 
this afternoon. But I will just tell you this: we looked 
globally at the management of our air defense assets. CENTCOM 
has requirements.
    There are other places in the world that have requirements 
as well, and we just need to bear that in mind, that I can go 
in and fight for the resources for CENTCOM, but there are in 
fact other places in the world that need air defense assets as 
well. And so I need--I do recognize that.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. But let's continue that discussion later 
today.
    General McKenzie. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you all for being here, and I yield 
back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie, is it true that President Trump reduced 
the number of troops from 10,000 to 2,500 via a tweet last 
year, and then via another tweet decided that we would leave by 
May, early May, all troops out of Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I believe he tweeted it, but my 
orders came through the chain of command resultantly from the 
President to the Secretary, written orders. And in the 
Department of Defense, we move troops based on executed orders.
    So he may have tweeted that at the beginning. I am not 
exactly aware of the time when he did or didn't do it. But the 
chain of command, which the President sits at the top of, is 
what directs us to move forces.
    Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So it was President Trump that said 
all troops would be out by May of this year.
    General McKenzie. Conditions-based.
    Mr. Garamendi. Conditions-based. Okay. Just a slight 
clarification there of the way in which we now find ourselves 
with troops leaving in September.
    My question is to the countries surrounding Afghanistan. 
What is your assessment, Ms. Dory, first, and then General 
McKenzie, about the role of the surrounding countries--
Pakistan, India, China, Russia, others--how are they going to 
respond to the departure of NATO and U.S. troops?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, I think you will see an array of 
hedging behaviors as the U.S. and coalition forces begin to 
depart. And as we focus in on a diplomatic first presence in 
the country, you will see behaviors in terms of--already we see 
it with Pakistan where Pakistan is applying pressure to an 
extent with respect to the Taliban out of concern for the 
impact on Pakistan should civil war break out again, and 
refugee flows affect their country.
    I think that same dynamic is true with the other neighbors 
as well where each is looking at the situation now to assess 
for themselves what are the risks, what are the threats, and 
how will we posture ourselves going forward.
    Mr. Garamendi. General.
    General McKenzie. Sir, I think Ms. Dory captured it pretty 
clearly. I think the country that is going to be the most 
affected, frankly, is going to be Pakistan because of the 
possibility of unconstrained refugee flow because of the 
possibility of renewed terrorist attacks in Pakistan that could 
ramp up as a result of this. All of those things are certainly 
very possible.
    I think we should also--the countries to the north of 
Afghanistan will also be concerned--Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan--those countries up there 
because they are going to be worried about refugee flow and the 
flow of fighters perhaps to the north as well.
    So I think all of them are going--we will see what happens 
when we leave. They will look at how we posture after we go, 
and then they will have to decide, you know, the way they are 
going to go forward with that. It is going to be--they are 
going to face some very tough choices, though.
    Mr. Garamendi. So they may or may not be encouraging or 
engaging in what could be a civil war. You just don't know.
    General McKenzie. I think they will all be keenly aware of 
the probable--should a civil war occur, they will be very aware 
of the population flow, the violence that will certainly spill 
over from Afghanistan if that is the case.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    Let's turn to Africa. General Townsend, climate change, the 
Sahel, how is climate change likely to affect at least the 
Sahel area and, if we have time, beyond?
    General Townsend. Well, first of all, I think AFRICOM's 
role is to support the State Department and USAID [United 
States Agency for International Development] in this area of 
climate change. But we see clear evidence of that on the 
African continent and probably--you mentioned the Sahel. The 
biggest issue we see there is water shortages and 
desertification of the farmland there. And that spreading 
southward of the Sahara Desert is probably one of our biggest 
concerns, and that sparks all kinds of conflict between herders 
and farmers, for example.
    I think the ways--the Department of Defense is looking at a 
lot of ways we have been charged by the President and Secretary 
of Defense to look at ways we can contribute to helping 
mitigate the climate change problem. Some of those ways are 
with unique energy solutions, and those kind of projects are 
starting to unfold in Africa.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman is recognized by 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 
our witnesses for joining us today.
    General McKenzie, I would like to begin with you. You know, 
there is a concern that I have about the tension between our 
service branch chiefs and our combatant commanders, as your 
demand signal is before you with the global force management 
allocation plan and generating readiness today, and the service 
branch chiefs focus on making sure that there is not only 
readiness today but there is modernization and we will call it 
revitalization for meeting the future demand significant.
    Let me ask to begin here, when we look at the GFMAP [global 
force management allocation plan] today, and we see in many 
circumstances the increased number of RFFs, request for forces, 
does that reflect that the continuity of what is happening is 
changing, or is the GFMAP maybe a little bit outdated and we 
need to look at that? Give me your perspective on where that 
dynamic is today from your thoughts.
    General McKenzie. Certainly, sir. Thank you. So my last job 
before I was the Commander of U.S. Central Command, I was the 
director of the joint staff. And before that, I was the J5 of 
the U.S. Joint Staff, so I was at the very core of the GFMAP 
process. I would consider myself an expert on the GFMAP 
process.
    And so there is always going to be a natural tension 
between those who raise and maintain forces and those who 
employ forces. That is natural. It goes back as long as we have 
had joint chiefs and combatant commanders.
    So that is just a natural byproduct of that. It is not new, 
and those tensions are adjudicated by really only one person 
and that is the Secretary of Defense. And the process to do 
that adjudication is actually quite good.
    Now, the GFMAP is actually a design for the future. And 
like any design for the future, it is based on a set of 
assumptions, that the GFMAP is as good as the assumptions that 
were made. I would argue that over the last couple of years the 
GFMAP has not completely incorporated the rise of Iran in the 
White House's thinking and importance. So there were a lot of 
tensions as a result of that.
    Should tensions with Iran go down, or should we adopt a new 
policy, then you could have a GFMAP that would be more aligned 
to that. But, again, the key thing is, the GFMAP is simply a 
plan. Any plan is based on assumptions. If the assumptions 
change, you have to change the plan.
    So I am not particularly--when I was the director, I wasn't 
particularly concerned by it. Now that I am a COCOM [combatant 
commander], I am not particularly concerned by it. I ask what 
forces I need based on the tasks I am given. It is the 
Secretary, advised by the joint staff and by his civilian 
leadership in the Department, to determine if they can fix that 
by either changing the task they have given me, giving me more 
forces, or accepting the risk, and then that is a risk that we 
all know and understand.
    So I would argue, frankly, the process works pretty good. 
We might not like the answers from the process, but it is a 
pretty good process.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure. Yeah. That is a constant dynamic is 
mitigating risk today versus risk in the future, and how much 
risk can we take today to make sure we mitigate in the future. 
Unfortunately, it seems like history looks at us in a not-so-
kind way and that many times we have not estimated well what 
the future risk is, and we focus too much on what is front of 
us today.
    So hopefully as we look at what is out there--and I am glad 
you mentioned the dynamic element of the environment--and how 
we are looking at that future versus today in generation of 
force and readiness.
    Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thanks.
    General Townsend, let me point to you. I know that in your 
AOR you see that Russia is looking to increase influence there. 
You see their effort in the agreement with Sudan for 
essentially putting a naval base there for the next 25 years. 
My concern is, again, you see the Chinese presence in Djibouti, 
now you see Russian presence in Sudan, you see them trying to 
expand their influence in those areas.
    Are there concerns that this development or this placement 
of hardware there could go to other areas? Could it go to areas 
like South Sudan and areas in the Tigray region of Ethiopia? 
Are we going to see an expansion of Russian influence in that 
area? What are your perspectives in what we see with Russian 
activity?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I am concerned about 
what Russia is doing on the continent. First, their influence 
in Libya, that seems to be maybe trending in a positive 
direction. Next concern I have, as you just pointed out, is 
Sudan and their efforts to place a naval base there. That 
project has been a little fraught with some friction for them, 
but they seem to be trying to push that forward.
    First of all, I would say that there are two types of naval 
bases, so here I am an Army infantryman talking about naval 
bases. But my naval component commander has educated me a 
little bit. There is two types. The one type where you can stop 
and get gas and groceries, that is useful for port calls and 
steaming around the world, but for war you need a militarily 
useful naval base and the ability to rearm and repair ships. So 
it is not clear to me that they--they are just on the ground 
stages of trying to get an agreement solidified to get. So we 
have got some time to work this.
    I am concerned about what they are doing, and you have 
mentioned that they connect all the way, that Russian activity 
connects all the way to the----
    The Chairman. I apologize, General. The gentleman's time 
has expired. My bad.
    Mr. Brown is recognized.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Is that my 
echo? Mr. Chairman, can you come back to me and maybe tech can 
help me with this, or am I okay?
    The Chairman. We are hearing you just fine. Are you hearing 
an echo?
    Mr. Brown. Yeah. I am hearing an echo. Are you?
    The Chairman. No. We have got you loud and clear. We are 
okay.
    Mr. Brown. Okay. Could I just ask, then, that my clock be 
reset to 5 minutes? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Absolutely. We will reset and start now. Go 
ahead.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. I appreciate it. And thank you to our 
panelists.
    General Townsend, a question for you. Acting Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Affairs, Mr. Meyers, 
recently said that U.S. engagement with the nations of the 
continent is crucial for peace, democracy, and development. 
Could you describe what additional security resources, military 
assistance, and capabilities that you need to mitigate the 
risks and support the various diplomatic, disaster assistance, 
and humanitarian efforts across the continent?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I would like to 
defer my conversation about--my answer about forces, as we are 
engaging in this global posture review. And I haven't presented 
our plans yet or recommendations yet to the Secretary of 
Defense about forces. But other capabilities I would like to 
address, those are foreign military sales, foreign military 
financing, section 333 support, IMET [International Military 
Education and Training]. Those types of security assistance are 
absolutely vital to our ability to get our mission accomplished 
in Africa.
    And AFRICOM has seen significant reductions in those types 
of security assistance over the last couple of years, and one 
of them, IMET, is of great concern, but also 333 funding. So it 
is those types of things that I am willing to talk about, now 
short of actually talking about forces. Over.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. Can you describe how terrorists and 
extremist activity interferes with the humanitarian missions 
and how it stalls economic development across the continent? I 
witnessed that on a CODEL [congressional delegation]. I spoke 
with, you know, representatives from USAID and the Embassy, 
they said they just can't do their work in a secure enough 
environment because of terrorist and extremist activities.
    Can you share a little bit--put a little bit of meat on 
that bone?
    General Townsend. Sure, Congressman. Thank you. So there is 
a symbiotic relationship between those 3Ds--diplomacy, 
development, and defense. And one of the ways we assist those 
two other Ds in getting their work done is providing a secure 
environment. So our work with the security forces of an African 
country is critical to allowing the USAID do development work 
and the Department of State do their diplomatic work.
    And that symbiotic relationship is very evident in Africa, 
and because of it, generally, you know, and security--and 
status of the security environment there, the Department of 
Defense's assistance is regularly needed. Over.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you. And just in what little time we have 
left, for General McKenzie and General Townsend, if you could 
take 30 seconds or so each. Can you please describe the 
programs and initiatives within your command that you use to 
foster a culture of inclusion, diversity, and equity within our 
ranks in your command? General McKenzie.
    General Townsend. Yeah. Go ahead, Frank.
    General McKenzie. Yes, sir. So there are a variety of 
programs, but I would say what is absolutely most important is 
what leaders do by--if you go into the front office of a 
leader, who is in the outer office, who do leaders pick as 
principal staff officers, who--people see those things. And 
while the programs are very important, we have a variety of 
those programs that are underway, I think for a high-level 
leader the most important thing you have to do is act, because 
I think that is what actually people see.
    And I will pause there, sir.
    Mr. Brown. General Townsend.
    General Townsend. Congressman, I think General McKenzie 
said it very well. The only thing I might add is at AFRICOM we 
have a gender advisor on our staff to help us with that. But 
that gets back to what General McKenzie said. It is about what 
leaders do.
    Mr. Brown. And I agree with you that people that you have 
in place and the commitment of leaders to diversity, equity, 
inclusion, are extremely important. I will point out that in 
the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, this committee, along with our 
colleagues in the Senate, collectively Congress, directed the 
Secretary of Defense to establish a mentor program, among many 
other things we have asked him to do regarding diversity, 
equity, and inclusion, but a mentor program to encourage 
greater diversity among more career fields and throughout the 
rank structure.
    So I know you are doing a lot of good things. We are 
probably going to want you to do--step it up even a little bit 
more.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Scott is recognized.
    Mr. Scott. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Townsend, thank you for your support of CODEL 
Panetta in August of 2019. Mr. Brown, Mr. Panetta, Mr. 
Hutchinson, and I had a great trip, learned a lot, and could 
not have learned what we did had it not been for your support.
    At that time, we visited the U.N. [United Nations] Mission 
at Mali, and many of the people in the meeting that we had 
discussed China's activity and expressed concerns that China's 
activity was going to lead to civil war in many of the 
countries on the continent of Africa.
    Yesterday--I am sorry--last week, Admiral Faller, head of 
SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command], testified, and I 
will quote him, ``Our interagency partners in the United States 
pointed out to us, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], 
and others that Chinese money laundering is the number one 
underwriting source for transnational criminal organizations.''
    In your testimony, you mention on page 12 that illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing by the Communist Chinese is 
the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that will 
further drive instability in West Africa, and obviously food 
crisis and instability have historically led to civil wars.
    My question for you is, how do we stop this activity from 
China, short of absolute war?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I think the solution 
there is competition, right? We want to compete before war 
comes, and competition is a forever task, because you are 
always trying to stay short of war.
    So with China, we have to compete, and we don't have to 
compete with them in all 53 countries of the AFRICOM AOR 
equally, but we have to pick and choose where we are going to 
compete. And one of the ways we do that is just simply by 
calling out their activity on the continent.
    You mentioned illegal fishing, and they are probably--my 
assessment is they are probably the number one offender in 
illegal fishing. And it is commercial, but we all know that 
China has a command economy. So calling that out has helped us 
a lot.
    Another example is helping countries avoid getting the bad 
deals with China, and this is an example where our Department 
of State does something. I am aware of it, but we offer a free 
service to evaluate the contracts of any of our African 
partners before they enter, sign a contract with China, or a 
Chinese entity.
    The U.S. Embassy will review that contract and point out 
the inconsistencies and the potential pitfalls in that contract 
and advise the African partners, so they can make smart 
decisions.
    Mr. Scott. General, I appreciate your question. I will tell 
you, I also think we need the support of corporate America and 
the American consumer in that while I recognize that our 
manufacturing base has become contingent upon Asia, there are a 
lot of other countries that share our interests and share our 
values outside of China.
    And it bothers me when I walk into a store to buy a power 
tool that virtually every power tool that is available on the 
shelves in America is manufactured in China. And so we have got 
to have some help from corporate America to source our products 
from countries outside of China.
    One of the other things I want to mention is that on that 
CODEL we got to witness the ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha] 
missions and the training missions, and this is something that, 
Ms. Dory, may be more for you. But we bring these young men in 
from Africa, they are 18 or so, they have at best a mid-school, 
sixth, seventh, eighth grade education. We have them onsite for 
24 months, 7 days a week, and they leave with that seventh or 
eighth grade education after we have trained them to fight.
    And my concern is that without an education that they 
become the people that, you know, leave and their ability to 
fight is their greatest asset. So I would encourage you to work 
with your counterparts. This is more of a State Department 
mission, and then maybe more of a mission for the French in the 
area.
    But while we have those young men on our bases, our bases 
where we are training them, I do think it would be worthwhile 
to look at what it would take to educate those men and try to 
move them from that mid-school education closer to a high 
school graduate education.
    With that said, I look forward to the classified hearing. 
My time is up. Thank you. Thank you all for everything you do 
for our country.
    I yield.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Crow is recognized.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for coming 
in here today.
    My first question is to Ms. Dory. Ms. Dory, last NDAA 
process this Congress passed a provision, section 1215, that 
would ensure that any administration--at that time, the Trump 
administration--would actually engage with Congress on the 
issue of Afghanistan. Specifically, 1215 requires that the 
administration make assessments regarding the impeding of 
counterterrorism missions, because we saw what happened with 
the insurgence of ISIS after our withdrawal in Iraq.
    It talks about the risk posed to U.S. personnel because 
these are obviously the men and women that we represent in our 
communities. It talks about the issue of Afghanistan becoming a 
terrorist safe haven and the assessments that are required 
there.
    And, of course, the impact on our partners, allies, and the 
humanitarian conditions on the ground because we have made 
substantial investments and capacity-building investments in 
humanitarian aid, and the men and women and children in 
vulnerable populations in Afghanistan.
    So, with that said, and the fact that this is America's 
war, not any one administration's war, and it is Federal law 
that the administration provide that assessment to Congress in 
advance of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, is it the 
administration's intent to comply with that law and provide 
those assessments to the United States Congress?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, it is my understanding that the 
administration will comply with the law. My understanding, 
further, the briefings that will be provided later today are a 
down payment in some respects with respect to section 1215.
    Mr. Crow. Well, just so you know, I don't expect a briefing 
would satisfy those requirements. And when I say ``comply with 
the law,'' the last administration, the Trump administration, 
basically provided a certification invoking an emergency to 
bypass the intent of the law, not actually provide those 
assessments. And we would expect this administration to comply 
in good faith with the intent of that law, and that is to have 
written and comprehensive assessments.
    Can you provide any insight into which approach the 
administration is going to take here?
    Ms. Dory. Congressman, all I can say right now based on 
just the evolving nature of the decision-making process, is the 
decision just happened and we are now moving into 
implementation. But I fully expect compliance with the law in a 
manner that is intended by the Congress.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. Thanks, Ms. Dory.
    General McKenzie, over to you. One of my biggest concerns 
is force protection. Obviously, retrograde operations are some 
of the riskiest things we do. You had testified earlier as to a 
surge of combat power into Afghanistan to set the conditions 
for the withdrawal. But I am gravely concerned as our footprint 
gets smaller what the QRF [quick reaction force] capacity looks 
like in the event the security situation dissolves much faster 
than our assessments might indicate.
    Can you speak to what forces, regional forces, would be 
available and how we are going to ensure that the last 
remaining units in Afghanistan have assistance available to 
them?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would prefer to talk to specific 
tactical details in the closed session this afternoon, but I 
will be happy to do that in that session.
    I would tell you that I spent a lot of time looking at 
force protection in Afghanistan, but withdrawals such as we are 
doing is based off three components. One is the equipment 
extraction, what you are going to do with it. The other is 
turning over the bases and the infrastructure. And third, and 
the most important, is the force protection itself for our 
forces.
    General Miller and I talk every day about force protection 
in Afghanistan, and I am confident that we will have the forces 
necessary to protect our forces should the Taliban decide to 
begin attacking us on 1 May or at any other date. And I will be 
happy to provide the details to you in a classified forum.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you. Look forward to having that discussion 
this afternoon.
    And, General Townsend, very briefly, I represent one of the 
Nation's largest communities of Ethiopians and Ethiopian 
diaspora. And I am extremely concerned for the security 
situation, particularly the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
project. Could you provide some insight as to our efforts to 
ensure that that project does not result in regional armed 
conflict?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. With the remaining 
30 seconds, I might want to give some to Ms. Dory on this. We 
are watching the situation with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, 
and we are trying to keep people informed. I think this is 
mostly a diplomatic-led effort, and I will turn it over to Ms. 
Dory.
    Ms. Dory. I agree fully with General Townsend. There is a 
big diplomatic push at this point with respect to the GERD 
[Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam] concerns.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. Thank you, all of you. Appreciate the 
testimony very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I want to make sure members know--
I did not announce this up front--we have a hard stop at 1:30 
for this portion, and then we will be reconvening at 3:00, in 
this room actually, for the classified hearing. So I want to 
emphasize that point, because normally we do it in the CVC 
[Capitol Visitor Center], but the CVC is occupied today by 
extended discussions about Afghanistan.
    So 1:30 hard stop, and then 3:00 back here for that. I will 
be departing shortly, and turning the committee over to the 
capable hands of Mr. Larsen, to go up and do one of the CVC 
briefings. But I just wanted to make sure everyone had that 
scheduling update.
    And with that, Mr. DesJarlais is recognized.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
    General McKenzie, which state actor in your area of 
responsibility do you believe to be the United States' greatest 
geostrategic foe?
    General McKenzie. I consider Iran to be the greatest threat 
to regional stability in the Middle East.
    Dr. DesJarlais. And with Israel moving from EUCOM [United 
States European Command] to CENTCOM later this year, do you 
believe that they will be your closest partner in the AOR?
    General McKenzie. We have a lot of close partners in the 
AOR. Israel will certainly join the line of dependable 
friendships and partnerships that we have in the region. We 
have a unique and old relationship with Israel, but I wouldn't 
further characterize it.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. When you have the political 
leadership of our greatest foe in the region--Iran--threatening 
our closest ally, Israel, and stating that its mission of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is to erase Israel from the map of the 
region, do you believe that one of our top priorities should be 
keeping a nuclear weapon out of Iran's hands?
    General McKenzie. I believe the President has stated that 
is a high priority. I also believe that one of the things 
Central Command does on a daily basis is deter Iran from acting 
against us and against our partners and friends in the region.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. If Iran were to develop nuclear 
weapons, what do you believe would be the response from some of 
our allies in the region? And do you believe such a move could 
have the potential to set off an arms race?
    General McKenzie. I would prefer not to speculate about 
future contingencies. I can tell you that it would be very 
concerning to us if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, it was 
able to possess a nuclear weapon. And it is the aim of United 
States' policy to prevent that condition from occurring.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. You mentioned in your opening 
statement that as a result of the challenges faced with UAS 
[unmanned aerial systems] detection and interdiction that 
United States is for the first time since the Korean War 
operating without complete air superiority. What would we--what 
should we be doing to address this gap in our capabilities and 
retain the advantage against Iranian forces?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I think the--I think, first of all, 
the Department of Defense has moved out very aggressively to 
address this problem. The Army is the executive agent for 
close-in protection against these small UAS systems that are 
most concerning to me. But I think we still have a ways to go 
to get on the right side of the curve with this, because right 
now you can go out and buy one at Walmart or some other 
location. You can weaponize it very readily. Sometimes it is 
very difficult for us to detect them until it is too late.
    We have a variety of systems that we are testing now in a 
free market competition to find the best and most integrated 
capabilities. We are not there yet, and it remains a very 
concerning priority of mine.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Can you spell out the implications of 
China's 25-year agreement with Iran, which includes expanding 
military cooperation?
    General McKenzie. Sure, sir. You know, China has had an 
existing military agreement with Iran for a period of time. I 
am not certain that this is going to produce anything new or 
different. Again, we will watch to see what it does with oil 
exports, and I am probably not the best person to talk about 
that right now.
    But a number of sanctions could still come in place against 
Chinese companies should they elect to do business with Iran. 
So, again, I am probably not the best guy to give you an answer 
on that, sir.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. The annual threat assessment issued 
earlier this month by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, they highlighted Iraq as the key battleground for 
Iran's influence this year and during the next several years. 
Do you agree with this assessment?
    General McKenzie. I completely agree with that, and I would 
go further to say that in the year 2020 Iran's plan was to 
gain, through political action, the ejection of the United 
States from the region and principally from Iraq. They failed 
in doing that.
    And as a result, we are beginning to see attacks ramp up 
from their Shia groups in the region, and I think that is going 
to continue.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So you kind of partly answered that, 
but what would be the net effect if the U.S. were to drawn down 
or completely withdraw troops from Iraq?
    General McKenzie. Well, that move is not contemplated. If 
there is--one of the good news stories in the region is I 
believe we have a good relationship with the government of 
Iraq, just recently completed strategic dialogue, is going to 
provide a framework for us to decide what our forces are going 
to look like going forward.
    So I don't think there is--I don't see us withdrawing 
completely from Iraq in the future.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, thank you, General, both 
Generals, for your service, and, Ms. Dory.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of 
the witnesses here today.
    Ms. Dory, I welcome this administration's decision to 
strategically withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 
September 11, 2021. I must say, though, that the difference 
between this administration and the previous administration is 
that it seems that we are doing it with our allies, and we are 
doing it in close coordination and collaboration instead of 
hearing about a tweet and our commanders not really being in 
the loop. So I appreciate that.
    But, still, the question that stays as a significant issue 
is, well, what is our plan? That was my criticism before with 
the previous administration, and that is--I am looking to 
better understand, what is the plan as we leave Afghanistan?
    So if you could answer that, and then help me understand 
what President Biden meant when he said, ``We will reorganize 
our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in 
the region to prevent reemergence of terrorism.'' Can you 
elaborate on that statement?
    Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. This administration has 
reinvigorated a focus on alliances and partnerships, and I 
think you see it in the work that has been underway to support 
taking a decision with respect to the future of the U.S. force 
posture in Afghanistan, so the intensive engagement that we saw 
most recently with NATO and coalition partners with respect to 
the decision to draw down in Afghanistan.
    In the very near term, there is detailed planning underway, 
as you heard General McKenzie refer to a few moments ago, with 
respect to how the force drawdown will proceed in conjunction 
with the allies and partners' separate planning underway with 
respect to what the counterterrorism footprint will look like 
going forward, given the focus in Afghanistan, the primary 
vital interest that has sustained us over time being to ensure 
that there are no attacks emanating from Afghanistan with 
respect to the U.S. homeland.
    And we will have--in the classified briefings later today, 
we will be able to get into that, into a lot more detail.
    Mr. Carbajal. Okay. Does that include what our footprint 
will look like moving forward?
    Ms. Dory. Well, I think what we understand is from here and 
to September, that we will have--we will not have combat 
forces, U.S. or coalition combat forces there, and we will 
transition to a diplomatically oriented footprint with the U.S. 
Embassy.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Can you provide us with an update 
on where the intra-Afghan peace talks are at at this point?
    Ms. Dory. I think Ambassador Khalilzad will be one of the 
panelists in the briefings later this afternoon, and will be 
well-postured to give a just--just a fresh update on those 
talks.
    Mr. Carbajal. Great. Thank you.
    General McKenzie, in your testimony, you comment that 
CENTCOM is committed to working with interagency partners to 
develop mechanisms that ensure continued oversight of and 
accountability of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. What 
oversight tools do we currently use that will be important to 
continue after the withdrawal? How will our oversight adapt to 
having a limited presence on the ground?
    General McKenzie. The principal tool that we use to manage 
the oversight of the disbursement of those funds and the proper 
use of it are the people on the ground that see what happens to 
it and monitor that. As we draw down, that is going to become 
our principal challenge. How do we do that from a remote 
location?
    A lot will depend on the size of the U.S. Embassy that 
remains, and we have not yet finally determined that, and that 
is something that we are talking about planning right now. The 
smaller the Embassy is, the more difficult it will become to 
manage the ASFF [Afghan Security Forces Fund] as we go forward. 
We are keenly aware of that. That is right at the centerpiece 
of our planning, and we are working very closely with the 
Department of State to make those determinations.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Thank you, Representative Carbajal.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Gaetz of Florida 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about 
Chad. General Townsend, it appears in the last several hours 
the President of Chad was killed, engaged in front line 
fighting against rebels who had based in Libya and have crossed 
the border. What do you know currently about the situation in 
Chad, and particularly any change to the counterterrorism 
cooperation that we have been able to rely on from that 
government?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. As you know, that is 
sort of a breaking news story, as I walked in here this 
morning, we learned about the reported and confirmed death of 
President Deby. He is a retired general, and he has in the past 
gone to the front where there was action. And we don't know 
exactly how he got killed, but the report is he was killed in 
action up there facing off with a column of rebels that are not 
terrorists. They are not ISIS. They are not al-Qaida. They 
are--they were actually anti-regime in Chad.
    They were based in southern Libya. They mounted up in 
several hundred vehicles, and they transited a long way across 
the Chadian desert towards the south. The Chadian government 
forces started engaging them. They were supported by the 
French. We observed this, and then President--it looked like 
that the column had made the decision to withdraw.
    This has happened before. They were about to withdraw, we 
think, and then the news of President Deby's death became 
known. It is unclear what this means for our relationship 
there. His son, President Deby's son, former intel 
[intelligence] chief, has been appointed as the interim 
president.
    We expect that he is inclined towards good relationships 
with France and the United States. We think that will continue. 
There could be some potential for violence, and we are working 
closely with our country team there.
    Our Embassy did a precautionary drawdown of personnel to a 
minimum staff, and we also have some military folks there 
working with the French and the Embassy. So we are watching 
this very closely to keep Americans safe while this becomes a 
little more clear.
    Mr. Gaetz. It seems tactically significant that these 
rebels were able to base in southern Libya, but they were able 
to traverse such a distance, and then execute this mission. It 
might suggest that the situation in Libya is getting worse as 
well with a failed state following the Gaddafi regime.
    With this transition council that has President Deby's son 
now in some position of leadership, I guess the position of 
leadership in the country, what do we expect from the French? I 
know that they were very supportive of the regime. Is there 
anything that we would expect as a change from--regarding their 
involvement with the country?
    General Townsend. On our point about the situation in 
Libya, we know that the Chadian government had been supportive, 
and there were also factions in Chad that supported various 
factions in Libya regarding the future with this interim 
president, the son of President Deby, the interim President 
Deby.
    Right now I anticipate that it will--he will be favorable 
to good relations with France, and France I anticipate will 
continue to do what they have been doing up to this point, 
supporting the government of Chad. But I have to be honest with 
you: this is breaking news, and it is not clear.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah. It sort of seems when a president who took 
power through a military coup then dies in a battle against 
political rebels, not religious extremists, and then gives rise 
to his son being selected by the national council, that it is 
not the strongest case for emerging democracy in Africa. It 
seems to suggest more of a move toward authoritarianism, and I 
think that is something we should all watch carefully.
    I thank the chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The chair recognizes Representative Slotkin of Michigan for 
5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am happy to see all three of you here, some of our really 
foremost experts on the Middle East and Africa that we have in 
our government.
    My questions are going to be primarily for General McKenzie 
on Afghanistan. You know, I think for the most part most of us 
feel, at least I feel from my constituents, that they want to 
be out of Afghanistan. We have fathers who are sending off 
their sons to fight in the same war they fought in.
    But what holds people back is this fear that the exact 
reason we went in--you know, a threat of terrorist attacks 
against our homeland and our allies--could creep back up again.
    So help us understand. I understand we will talk more of 
the classified stuff in a separate session. But, General 
McKenzie, help reassure my constituents that by pulling out we 
won't be going right back in because we have a threat that 
impacts us here on the homeland.
    General McKenzie. Thanks, ma'am, for that, and I appreciate 
the concern of your constituents. Like them, I sent my son 
twice to Afghanistan, so I am very much aware of those 
concerns.
    As we have talked a little bit before, we are going to go 
to zero in Afghanistan. That means there will be no U.S. forces 
on the ground there. We will use a variety of means to monitor 
al-Qaida and ISIS in Afghanistan. The intelligence will 
decline. The Director of National--or the CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency] Director has said that, but we will still 
be able to see into Afghanistan. There still will be ways to do 
that.
    Much of that will depend on the Embassy platform that 
remains, and that is yet undetermined. But that will be helpful 
if we maintain an Embassy there. But we are going to be able to 
continue to look into Afghanistan. And I think the President 
has been very clear: we are not going to reenter to reoccupy 
Afghanistan under any conceivable circumstances.
    What we will retain the ability to do is to find and fix 
those people who plan attacks against us that we can detect. 
And then, when appropriate, we will be able to strike them. I 
don't want to make that sound easy because it is not easy. It 
is going to be extremely difficult to do it, but it is not 
impossible to do it.
    Ms. Slotkin. So I am deeply impacted by our experience on 
Iraq as someone who grew up as an Iraq specialist and who 
didn't agree with the decision to go to zero in Iraq, and then 
watched in the years after we had pulled out how difficult it 
was to get Washington to pay attention to what was then a 
growing threat of ISIS.
    We couldn't get the intelligence support. We couldn't get 
the overhead imagery support. We couldn't get the attention of 
folks when we saw things creeping back in the wrong direction. 
Please help me understand how this will be different.
    General McKenzie. Well, speaking to the future, I don't 
know, but I will certainly be a relentless advocate to keep the 
focus on Afghanistan. We are going to shift assets out of 
Central Command. That is a given. That is going to happen.
    At the same time, we need to balance against what we know 
the known aspiration of these groups to launch attacks against 
the United States. That hasn't gone away, and it is there right 
now. They are depressed. They have very little ability to do 
that. Certainly, it is possible they could reestablish 
themselves in the future.
    It is also possible the Taliban will do some of the things 
that they have said they are going to do. I will just watch 
that very closely to see that it happens. I think that is a 
reasonable concern, and I share that concern, frankly.
    Ms. Slotkin. And I know that, you know, we have learned in 
the past 20 years that our best attempts in these wars is 
through coalitions, through alliances, doing things with 
partners and allies. So I am heartened that we are having the 
conversation with them, but is there anything planned on the 
regional security architecture? A formal plan with our allies 
and partners to have a conversation not just about how to end 
the war but how to contain the situation after the war has 
ended.
    General McKenzie. So I defer to Ms. Dory for some of that. 
But I would say what has been very impressive to me has been 
the complete and comprehensive degree of consultation that went 
into this decision, and the execution of this decision, both 
with our NATO partners, our other coalition partners on the 
ground, and in fact regional partners.
    So I think that set the stage for some form of regional 
architecture, but I defer to Ms. Dory for further comments on 
that.
    Ms. Slotkin. I will go to Ms. Dory in just a second. But 
just to finish out, you are one of our most seasoned, 
experienced four-star generals with experience on the ground in 
the Middle East, tour after tour. Do you feel confident that 
the American people will stay safe and not be attacked again 
emanating out of Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. The key thing that is different in 2021 
from 2001 is not only what is going on in the theater, but our 
ability to harden the country here. The steps we have taken 
here to protect ourselves, it is a very different country in 
terms of ability to enter and operate in the United States than 
it was in the fall of 2001.
    So, you know, we work very hard to ensure that attacks 
aren't going to come from Afghanistan or from Africa or from 
any other place. It begins on the ground there, but there is 
also a broad, in-depth defense that is in place that was not in 
place before.
    Ms. Slotkin. And in my last remaining 20 seconds, do you 
know of any discussions with the Afghanis about--the Afghans, 
excuse me, on a status of forces agreement or a diplomatic 
security agreement for our Embassy?
    General McKenzie. I know that is actively being worked now, 
but I don't have any details beyond that.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, General. Appreciate it.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
    The chair recognizes Representative Waltz of Florida for 5 
minutes. Representative Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make--can you 
hear me okay?
    Mr. Larsen. You are good.
    Mr. Waltz. All right. Thank you. General, I just want to 
pick up on Ms. Slotkin's questions. I certainly share her 
concerns, and it was good to spend some time with you a few 
weeks ago. Can you talk to me, what about--or, Ms. Dory--what 
basing agreements do we have from any of the Stans--Tajikistan, 
where obviously we no longer--where we have no basing; 
Kyrgyzstan, where we no longer have Manas; Uzbekistan, where we 
no longer have K2, what agreements do we have with any of the 
neighboring countries to be able to base our forces and conduct 
lethal strikes or even surveillance back into Afghanistan? Do 
we have any currently?
    General McKenzie. At this time, we have no--we have none of 
those agreements in place.
    Mr. Waltz. General, do you think it would have been optimal 
to have those agreements before we announced to the world that 
we are going to zero in a few months?
    General McKenzie. I can't speak to that. I will tell you 
that right now we are engaged in a significant effort to 
evaluate where we want to put potential CT forces, where they 
would be best optimized from geography, and also the diplomatic 
angle of it, as we go forward.
    Mr. Waltz. I think it is--we need to be clear with the 
American people that when the military goes, our intelligence 
assets go, the agency is--the Central Intelligence Agency and 
other agencies are dependent on that military backbone and 
basing, and also our contracts and our contractors go, with 
estimates of 15- to 20,000 currently there providing logistics, 
maintenance, and other critical support of the Afghan security 
forces.
    What is the plan for the continuing presence of those 
critical contract support services?
    General McKenzie. So right now, most of the contractors are 
going to leave. Certainly, the U.S. contractors are going to 
leave. We will try to develop ways to do distant contracting 
where we can. Clearly, there are going to be some things that 
we are not going to be able to do anymore as the contractors 
leave. And I don't want to minimize that.
    Mr. Waltz. And it is important for everyone to understand 
that those contractors were providing maintenance, for example, 
for the Black Hawks that we provided to the Afghan security 
forces, to the limited close-air support capabilities that they 
have, and, again, critical logistic and advisory functions.
    All of that is going to be gone in the next few months, and 
both the--a number of reports, both think tank, intelligence 
community, and even the Afghans themselves, have cast real 
doubt on the ability of the Afghan security forces to continue 
to hold without that support.
    So I fear, to add on to Ms. Slotkin's questions, if the 
Taliban does take over, or we do even have a power-sharing 
agreement with the Taliban, we will now be reliant on them for 
any basing over flight or any type of authorities that we need 
to go after al-Qaida, assuming that they will give them. Is 
that--do I have that wrong?
    General McKenzie. Sir, that is a lot of future 
hypotheticals that I am probably not the best person to talk 
about. I will tell you right now, though, that there is still a 
possibility of intra-Afghan dialogue. That could still 
continue. We can have our own assessment about the probability 
of that reaching success, but that still continues.
    Mr. Waltz. Well, but, General, I want to be clear with 
everyone that it is not a hypothetical that the State 
Department has introduced a draft power sharing agreement into 
the dialogue where the Afghan government would dissolve as it 
currently stands and share power with the Taliban. So I don't 
think it is a leap to say we would then have to negotiate them 
for any ability to return and go after al-Qaida.
    But my question is: what military--so assume they have the 
will to turn on and conduct operations against al-Qaida? What 
military capability does the Taliban have that a 300,000-man 
Afghan army and 42 coalition nations have struggled in terms of 
containing al-Qaida? What military capability does the Afghans 
have?
    General McKenzie. So the Afghans would have significant 
residual capability. It would depend on if the nation is whole, 
if the nation is fractured, if there is a civil war. There are 
a variety of future contingents that would directly affect the 
ability of the Afghan--whatever, whoever is leading the Afghan 
government, in whatever state it is, their ability to actually 
concentrate combat power.
    Some of those scenarios you have outlined, it would be a 
fractured state. They would not be able to do it. Other 
scenarios, they might be able to do it.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, General. And just in the time I have 
remaining, would Bagram Air Base be valuable to you being where 
it is located geographically west of China, south of Russia, 
east of Iran, in great power contingencies?
    General McKenzie. Bagram is key terrain tactically in 
Afghanistan, operationally and strategically. It is the 
definition of key terrain.
    Mr. Waltz. And it is notable that we are about to just give 
that away with nothing in return.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The chair recognizes Representative Houlahan of 
Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    My questions, first to General McKenzie and General 
Townsend, have to do with China, which has obviously 
significantly invested in Pakistan and parts of Africa as part 
of their Belt and Road Initiative. And I was wondering if you 
could tell me a little bit, if you have any concerns about them 
in terms of national security in the region, and also if you 
might be able to tell us if you have heard any whisperings of 
the fact that they are maybe interested in sending a 
peacekeeping troop to Afghanistan if we indeed do leave the 
region.
    General McKenzie. I will begin and briefly just talk about 
the Central Command before handing over to General Townsend. So 
we see China operating in Central Command principally from an 
economic perspective. They offer a number of apparently 
seductive and attractive infrastructure and other development 
loans and projects to countries in the region, which then have 
a significant--on the back end of that are not such--don't 
appear to be such a good deal after all.
    They want access to the region. They would, I think, 
eventually want to seek naval basing in the region because they 
do import a significant amount of their hydrocarbons through 
the Strait of Hormuz and out of the region. But for now, for 
the short term to the medium term, it is principally economic 
engagement going forward.
    And you are right; we see it in Pakistan but also in some 
of the Gulf states. It is significantly concerning to me they 
are playing a very long game, and they are playing it with vast 
amounts of resources.
    Ms. Houlahan. And, sir, do you see any concerns or 
significant concerns as a result of that?
    General McKenzie. I am very concerned about where we are 
going to be in a few years with China in the region. I believe 
that some of the nation-states in the region are also waking up 
to this and are becoming aware of it because they see what is 
happening in Africa, they see what is happening in South 
America and other parts of the globe.
    And as you know, there are nations in the region that 
actually do have significant resourcing themselves, so they 
don't need to fall into the debt trap with China. Others are 
susceptible to that predatory diplomacy.
    Ms. Houlahan. And, General Townsend, do you have anything 
as well?
    General Townsend. I would say our concerns are very similar 
to those expressed by General McKenzie. I don't know if you 
received the placemats. We handed out placemats here in the 
room, and I am told we distributed them electronically as well. 
One of them is on----
    Mr. Larsen. General, we do have those placemats.
    General Townsend. Thank you. What China is doing in Africa, 
and that kind of gives you an idea. I think the only thing I 
would add to what General McKenzie said is they very much have 
intent to establish additional overseas bases in Africa. 
Whether that be on the Atlantic coast of Africa or the Indian 
Ocean coast of Africa, they are working hard to establish naval 
bases and/or airbases, and that is of great concern to AFRICOM.
    Ms. Houlahan. And so with regard to, you know, a potential 
buildup of China, do you anticipate, General Townsend, with the 
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan that we might increase 
our troops in AFRICOM? Given that there is, as we know, is a 
constant threat of extremism, how will we possibly do that, if 
indeed that is our plan, do you think?
    General Townsend. Congresswoman, I don't--as an economy of 
force effort for the Department of Defense, I don't anticipate 
a significant uplift of resources to AFRICOM, despite the 
drawdown in Afghanistan. So I am not anticipating that, but we 
are going to undergo this global posture review and we are 
going to work through all of those questions.
    Ms. Houlahan. I look forward to that. I do have concerns. I 
know I don't--I am not alone in sharing those concerns with 
that particular part of the world. Africa seems to be a rising 
opportunity for terrorists to land there in the absence of 
other places around the world that they could land, and I just 
want to make sure that we are keeping our eye on the region.
    I appreciate your time, gentlemen, and I will yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Bice of Oklahoma 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 
here this afternoon.
    My first question revolves around China and Russia and 
their continued reach into the AFRICOM region. One of the 
things that I have learned in my very short time here is that 
rare earth minerals are becoming a very big concern, and the 
Chinese and Russians are tapping into the African region to try 
to mine those.
    Is the DOD taking any steps to facilitate access to those 
rare earth minerals for domestic use?
    General Townsend. Thanks for your question, Congresswoman. 
On the topic of rare earth minerals, both countries, as you 
have pointed out, are seeking to exploit those on the African 
continent. The Russians are sort of near-term exploiters, and 
the Chinese are more strategic exploiters in my view. They are 
very carefully seeking out mineral deposits that they want to 
lock down for the future.
    The Department of Defense is supporting the USAID and the 
Department of State in this effort. We don't have a particular 
effort directed at securing rare earth minerals on the DOD 
side. But we are supporting our interagency partners in that 
regard.
    Mrs. Bice. Do you feel like that is being effective?
    General Townsend. I know that it has the energy of this 
administration. It is of great concern to this administration. 
I think it is a legitimate concern.
    Mrs. Bice. Turning just a bit here, you know, we have also 
heard a lot about technology and the use of technology across 
the region. How are CENTCOM and AFRICOM addressing the emerging 
threat of drones and drone swarm tactics? And that can really 
sort of apply to, yeah, CENTCOM or AFRICOM.
    General Townsend. Sure. I will answer it and hand it off to 
General McKenzie. And my first encounter with drone-delivered 
munitions was in the battle of Mosul in Iraq 2 or 3 years ago. 
So this is an area of great concern to us. We haven't seen a 
significant employment of weaponized drones in Africa yet, but 
we are working very hard to be ready for that and to head that 
off.
    The Department of Defense--as General McKenzie explained 
earlier, the Department of Defense has a great program focused 
on that threat. I am concerned about the small armed drones, as 
well as the larger one-way attack drones that we have seen 
employed in the region.
    So I think we are focused on it, and we are employing as 
much technology as we can to prepare for that.
    General McKenzie.
    General McKenzie. Thanks. So small commercially available 
drones are one of the most persistent and dangerous threats 
that we see in the Central Command AOR. I am very concerned 
about it. We have ways to deal with the larger land attack 
cruise missiles. They are equally--they are concerning, but we 
can deal with them as an air defense problem. It is a lot 
harder to deal with something that is small, perhaps 
commercially off-the-shelf bought, modified, and we are on the 
wrong side of the cost imposition curve when it comes to these 
systems.
    So a lot of great work is being done in the Department. We 
are not there yet.
    Mrs. Bice. And that sort of leads to my next question which 
was the factors that are limiting your ability to deploy 
counter UAS systems within CENTCOM and AFRICOM.
    General McKenzie. So within CENTCOM, there are a variety of 
systems out there. I take any system and employ it immediately. 
What we--where we need to go is an integrated system, because 
the system--an integrated system would give you early warning 
of launch perhaps through a variety of means. It would give you 
an idea of where they are coming and their altitude. Then it 
would give you an ability to engage them kinetically and non-
kinetically.
    We do not yet have a single system that can do all of that. 
What we have are a variety of systems that all do part of this, 
and that is part of the problem. We are not integrated. So we 
pushed very hard to get an integrated system, but one that is 
not delivered late, behind need. That is the problem when you 
push for an integrated system.
    Mrs. Bice. Ms. Dory, do you have any comments on that?
    Ms. Dory. I would just add to that, Congresswoman, that the 
issue of counter UAS is something not just within the 
Department at this point but has a profile in terms of the 
interagency discussions on how to deter and defeat that threat.
    So within the Department of Defense, there is the joint 
effort underway that the Generals have referred to, but there 
is also a broader whole of government approach that is recently 
initiated.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Ms. Dory, General McKenzie, and 
General Townsend, for your time.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Before I go to the next questioner, 
I do want to just stop and as well thank General McKenzie for 
his hospitality 2 weeks ago at CENTCOM. Appreciate that, and I 
did not take that opportunity earlier. I wanted to thank you 
for that.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Luria of Virginia 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, gentlemen, and Ms. Dory, for 
your testimony today. I would like to first address the issue 
with General McKenzie of mine warfare in the CENTCOM AOR. 
Iranian mining capability is obviously a vulnerability for U.S. 
and allied military forces within the region as well as for 
commercial shipping and free trade. And the Navy plans to soon 
decommission its remaining four MCM [mine countermeasures] 
platforms stationed in the Gulf in Bahrain.
    And as we know, the material condition and capabilities of 
these aging MCMs has been severely degraded over time. However, 
the Navy's planned replacement of the mine warfare capability 
through the mission modules on the LCS [littoral combat ship] 
class of ships is neither fully developed nor has it been 
successfully deployed from the LCS.
    However, testing at the MCM platforms--on platforms of 
opportunity, such as provided by allied navies in 2019. The 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary's Mounts Bay successfully tested this, 
and then the ESB-4 [expeditionary sea base], Hershel ``Woody'' 
Williams, also in 2019, proved successful. And these ad hoc 
capabilities are not resident in the CENTCOM AOR, which is 
going to leave us a convenient gap in MCM capability once these 
ships are decommissioned.
    As the combatant commander, are you confident in the 
current and future mine warfare capabilities provided by the 
Navy in your AOR?
    General McKenzie. Thank you for the question. I am very 
concerned about Iranian mine warfare capabilities. I think it 
is one of their great asymmetric weapons, and they employ it in 
two areas, up in the Strait of Hormuz----
    Mr. Larsen. General McKenzie, I am sorry, could you just 
get that microphone pointed right at your chin.
    General McKenzie. How is that? Better?
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. A little better.
    General McKenzie. I am very concerned about Iranian mine 
warfare capabilities. It is a significant asymmetric threat 
that they possess, and they possess it not only up in the 
Strait of Hormuz, which is where we always think about it, but 
also down in the Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea. The ability to 
deploy a wide variety of thousands of mines is very concerning 
to me.
    Right now, we have very limited mine warfare capability in 
the theater. Our ships, as you have noted, and the ships of our 
British partners are also about all we have if we had to sweep 
and open the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital international 
passage. And it would take us an extended amount of time to do 
it with the resources that we have now.
    I, too, have noted the LCS and the problems that are 
attendant as a possible non-sweeping variant. Regardless, it is 
not going to be available in a reasonable amount of time for me 
in my requirements in U.S. Central Command.
    So I would share your concerns. We talk about this all the 
time. This is an area of Iranian capability that remains vexing 
and concerning to me.
    Mrs. Luria. So, General, since there was a successful test 
of these advanced mine warfare capabilities using the T-ESB 
platform, which is something that is already played in your 
theater, would that be a valuable addition in the CENTCOM AOR? 
Are you able to leverage that capability on the T-ESB?
    General McKenzie. CENTCOM would be happy to leverage any 
capability that is out there right now given the significant 
gap between our available resources and the scope and scale of 
the problem.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Thank you. And in the time remaining, 
General Townsend, I wanted to focus, as some of my colleagues 
already have, on the rapidly expanding Chinese influence on the 
African continent. We have already referenced the strategic 
location of the Chinese overseas base in Djibouti, adjacent to 
Bab al-Mandab and the entrance to the Red Sea.
    But more than a strategic positioning from the maritime 
perspective, I wanted to focus on some of the infrastructure 
and transportation investments that they are making, reaching 
into Ethiopia.
    It appears that the Chinese, who inarguably want to grow 
their position on the world stage, and in Africa, are engaging 
in their own version of modern day colonialism on the African 
continent as they venture, you know, to find cheaper labor 
markets and use infrastructure debt to leverage--as a leverage 
tool.
    Can you comment on the domestic and regional impact of the 
Chinese economic expansion into Ethiopia and then maybe a 
little bit, in the time remaining, on how the recent unrest in 
the Tigray region has changed any Chinese activity in the area.
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congresswoman. So you mentioned 
Chinese and an example of their investments on the African 
continent. Transportation and infrastructure is certainly one 
of those, seaports, airports, and rail lines in particular. And 
you see that with Ethiopia with rail lines running to the Red 
Sea from the country. You see that in Kenya as well.
    In some places, these investments have worked out okay. I 
haven't seen any of them that have worked out really well as 
the Chinese had hoped they would. Regarding your question about 
Tigray, we haven't--I haven't seen a connection to Tigray in 
China.
    Mr. Larsen. The Representative's time has expired. Thank 
you.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Franklin from 
Florida for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of 
time, I do have a couple of questions for General McKenzie. 
First, following up on Representative Waltz's dialogue earlier 
regarding basing in the region and the changes we are now going 
to face with Afghanistan not being there with physical presence 
the ground, I think back to just after 9/11 I was in Bahrain. 
We were planning some of those initial strikes into 
Afghanistan.
    The challenge we had was long distances to make those 
happen, and we had carrier pilots that were flying 8- to 10-
hour missions with multiple refuelings to get there. That is 
obviously going to be a challenge if we find ourselves having 
to go back in on that kind of scale in the future.
    But in your testimony you had mentioned pursuing 
opportunities to enhance expeditionary basing in less 
vulnerable areas of the AOR. Could you expand a little bit on 
those and where they may stand?
    General McKenzie. Certainly. When we talk about that, I am 
primarily talking about the Iran problem and the fact that our 
bases now, such as Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, Manama, Bahrain, as you 
noted, have the virtue of being close to the area you might 
want to fight. They also have a problem being very close to the 
Iranians.
    So what we would seek to do is examine alternative further 
to the west in the Arabian Peninsula that would make it more 
difficult for the Iranians to target our bases there. It would 
increase the range of many of their weapons. It would not 
actually have the range to reach out there and get to those 
bases. The problem would be the tanker bill that is associated 
with that.
    On the other hand, if the tanker can survive out to the 
west, it is probably better than it being close where it can be 
struck. So there is a tradeoff that we make, and we look to our 
partners to help us on this with these bases. And we have never 
looked to base permanently there. Rather, you would like to 
have the ability to go in there, as you noted, in an 
expeditionary manner in a time of crisis or in a time of war, 
just to make it harder for an opponent to threaten the force.
    Mr. Franklin. All right. Thank you. Switching gears to the 
displaced persons camps in northeast Syria, particularly Al-
Hol, I guess from your testimony, General, we talked about 
61,000 people there, 94 percent women and children, two-thirds 
under 18. I mean, in addition to the obvious humanitarian 
crisis, I know there is a big problem with the radicalization 
of a lot of these children.
    So this I guess would be a question for you, General 
McKenzie, and also Ms. Dory. What is the way ahead in that? How 
do we fix this problem? I know a lot of the countries that 
these people are coming from don't want them back. What is the 
end game for this?
    General McKenzie. Sure. So I will defer to Ms. Dory here in 
just a minute, but I will say it is not a military problem. But 
it will manifest itself in 5 to 10 years as a military problem 
unless we solve it now, because the children are going to grow 
up radicalized, and we are going to see them on battlefields 
fighting us.
    So it is an international problem. It requires 
repatriation. It requires nations to step up to the plate, 
claim their citizens, bring them home, reintegrate them back 
into their communities. And it demands de-radicalization, which 
is extremely difficult to do. It is best done and practiced by 
nations in the region who have a cultural affinity for the 
people that are largely in those camps.
    It is a tough problem. Our diplomats--the Department of 
State, USAID, and a lot of NGOs [non-governmental 
organizations]--are working at this very hard. It is one of the 
most pressing problems we have in the CENTCOM region right now.
    And with that, I will defer to Ms. Dory for anything she 
would like to add.
    Ms. Dory. I think General McKenzie put it beautifully. It 
is not a military problem. It is an interagency issue, and it 
is a question of political will in terms of host nations for 
the individuals who are in the camps.
    Mr. Franklin. So what pressure do we have that we can apply 
to get these folks to step up and accept these people? We can't 
leave them there in the desert forever.
    Ms. Dory. I think it depends on which countries you are 
talking about and the state of the dialogue with them, what 
forms of dialogue and leverage we have at our disposal to 
encourage stepping up to that responsibility.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Franklin.
    The chair recognizes Representative Strickland before 
just--the next questioner will be Representative Veasey. So, 
Representative Strickland, you are recognized--of Washington 
State, recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General Townsend, we heard in your testimony that AFRICOM 
supported U.S. efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance in 43 
countries, including the delivery of nearly 500 million in 
medical supplies. The United States is often at its best when 
it leads in crises as it did during the Ebola crisis.
    Can you tell me, please, how AFRICOM is working alongside 
whole of government efforts to respond to COVID-19? And 
specifically have we, along with USG [United States 
Government], started to develop a plan to distribute vaccines 
for COVID to partners on the continent?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congresswoman. So as you saw in 
the testimony there, there have been significant Department of 
Defense efforts, but those are small in comparison to the U.S. 
Government's COVID assistance on the African continent that has 
been led primarily by the USAID and the Department of State.
    So there are some military or DOD capabilities that we have 
employed to the maximum extent possible, things like medical 
supplies and mobile field hospitals that are being fielded to 
military partners that are being used by those partner 
countries to treat COVID.
    So that has all been part of the larger U.S. Government 
response, and it is a small part compared to what the State 
Department and USAID have done.
    On your question about vaccines, I will defer to Ms. Dory, 
but the U.S. Government is going to provide eventually vaccines 
internationally, and in Africa, but we are making sure we have 
taken care of the American population first. We have been asked 
for input, to provide that input to the Department of Defense 
and the Government for decisions about where vaccines might go 
first.
    Ms. Dory.
    Ms. Dory. Thank you, General Townsend. Just to add on that 
that with the state of vaccination at home in a much better 
place than it has been, plans are underway with respect to how 
the U.S. Government will be able to help overseas. Our USAID 
and State Department colleagues are at the forefront of those 
efforts, and I think we will see the results of those in the 
coming months.
    Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you. And then one more 
question. Ms. Dory, we will stay with you. The prior 
administration chose to close U.S. defense attache offices in 
several West African countries. Defense attache perform a vital 
role in representing the U.S. military, and removing them can 
send the wrong message to host governments about the importance 
that we put on the relationship and how much we value it.
    As you reviewed the decisions of the prior administration, 
can you tell me about the status of these defense attache 
offices?
    Ms. Dory. Congresswoman, I would be glad to, and I can 
imagine General Townsend might like to add on to this as well. 
Defense attaches are fundamental to the way the Department of 
Defense does business in the interagency context on the ground 
in our missions across the world.
    We have the continued challenges, as we see in every other 
type of personnel category, of supply and demand, and 
insufficient supply relative to demand has led to some 
difficult decisions with respect to how we are represented in 
different countries and whether individual attaches are 
responsible for more than one country at a time. I would very 
much like to see sufficient attaches to go around.
    General Townsend.
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congresswoman. So as you heard, 
Congresswoman, the last administration did make a decision to 
close six defense attache offices on the African continent. 
Some of those were a hub that did several smaller countries as 
well. That decision was overturned actually before the end of 
the--by the Acting Secretary of Defense Miller before the 
administration ended.
    I suspect it may get reviewed during the global posture 
review. The problem is between the initial decision to close 
those offices we had a personnel assignment cycle go by, so no 
backfills were identified. So now that the decision was 
overturned, we are going to probably have a gap potentially of 
a year or two in some of those defense attache offices.
    Anyway, that is the current state of that, and Ms. Dory 
covered very well the importance of defense attache offices in 
Africa.
    Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you. Thank you, both of you.
    I yield back my time, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Strickland.
    The chair now recognizes Representative Veasey of Texas for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chair, thank you very much.
    General Townsend, you testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in January 2020 and warned that VEOs were 
expanding at a very rapid rate across West Africa, noting that 
substantive external assistance from Western partners was 
critical to help our African partners make progress to contain 
these VEOs.
    At the end of September 2020, AFRICOM reported that VEOs in 
the Sahel were either degraded and--nor contained, were neither 
degraded nor contained, and that VEOs in West Africa continue 
to expand geographically, conduct attacks, and threaten people 
and other partners in the region.
    What do you believe were the driving factors behind the 
lack of progress over the past year? And how can we better 
leverage USG resources, specifically in Nigeria where violence 
threatens the prosperity of Africa's largest democracy and 
making sure that we keep Nigeria as stable as possible, because 
they are so important for the entire continent, quite frankly.
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. You are right. In my 
last testimony I said that the VEO threat in West Africa was 
expanding. I don't know if I used the analogy then, but it is 
appropriate like a wildfire coming south from Mali and Niger 
towards Burkina Faso and the littoral states. And I believe the 
reason for that is that the international efforts there by the 
African partners and foreign partners were both insufficient 
and uncoordinated.
    They might actually be sufficient if they were better 
coordinated, but it was impossible to tell because they were 
uncoordinated.
    Now, that advance has not progressed at the speed that I 
feared it would a year ago. That advance is still north, along 
the northern borders of the littoral states, which we have a 
great deal of concern about. I think that is partly because of 
a number of factors. One of them, though, is the European 
partners, led by the French, have initiated a couple of things 
to try to improve the coordination between all of the 
international efforts that are going in there.
    They are also doing much more effective advise and assist 
operations. Partnership for West Africa is one of these things 
to increase coordination. Task Force Takuba is an advise and 
assist organization the French have stood up. They have asked 
for European partners to join in that effort. They have joined 
in that effort, and it is starting to be more effective.
    So I think they have done some work to improve the 
coordination of the international effort. That has slowed that 
spread some. That said, that forest fire is dancing along the 
northern borders of all of those littoral states. And I am of 
the view that we need to do--I would like to--for once, I would 
like to do something to prevent the fire, prevent those 
littoral states from gaining--getting fully engulfed like Mali 
is, for example. And I think there are some fairly low impact 
things that could be done there in the littoral states that 
might do fire prevention there.
    So I think a fire break across the Sahel, which largely is 
with the resources we have there now, mostly African and 
European, and then some fire prevention efforts in the littoral 
states.
    Mr. Veasey. Let me also ask you, several years ago, myself 
and Representative Panetta and Mr. Scott from Georgia, we 
visited Camp Lemonnier and several other countries there in 
Africa. And one of the areas of concern was exactly where the 
Chinese base was being built. I don't know that there was--
strategically where it was at seemed to be a very good location 
for the Chinese in what they are trying to do to expand, you 
know, their naval operations and their presence on the 
continent.
    With the Chinese and the fact that, you know, they don't 
care about, you know, human rights violations, corruption, you 
know, they will fly, you know, prime ministers and presidents 
from the continent over to China, put them up in nice houses. 
What can we do to counter that as--you know, as more and more 
countries in Africa seek to be able to, you know, come into 
the--continue to grow economically and prosper as they want to, 
like any other nation does?
    General Townsend. Congressman, the African nations are not 
blind to what the Chinese are up to. They have fallen prey to 
some of these debt trap diplomacy traps. But they are not blind 
to it. They can see it. They believe they can--many of them 
believe they can manage it, and I think that is probably the 
biggest thing we can do is help them try to manage their 
interactions with the Chinese on the continent.
    Mr. Larsen. I thank the gentleman.
    Next up will be Representative Panetta, followed by 
Representative Speier. And so Representative Panetta from 
California is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen and 
ma'am, thank you for obviously your service, your time, your 
preparation, and for being here today, and your answers to our 
questions.
    As my colleague just mentioned, we did a CODEL--I forget 
when that was it, maybe 2018, summer of 2018--where we had--we 
definitely had one of the top CODELs I have been on in that we 
were based in Djibouti and obviously flew C-130s all around.
    One of the bases we went to was Manda Bay, and obviously, 
subsequent to that, you are very familiar with the attack that 
occurred in Manda Bay. Unfortunately, not just because of the 
attack, but unfortunately, we are trying to get the review of 
what happened in regards to the initial investigation, because 
of--obviously, I have been there, and obviously the tragedy 
that happened as well.
    But what is going on with the report? I know it has been 15 
months since the attack took place, and I know that Secretary 
Austin has ordered now another review of it. Can you give us 
some insight as to what is going on with that report and when 
you think we are going to get this report as to what the heck 
happened there?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. Your visit was in 
the summer of 2019, not 2018. It was my first CODEL after I 
took command at AFRICOM.
    Mr. Panetta. No. That was a different one. This was to 
Manda Bay. Manda Bay was before. We went to West Africa after 
that, another excellent CODEL facilitated by you, General, and 
I appreciate that. But before that, we were in--we went to the 
east side of Africa. That was the west side of Africa.
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. Correct. So Manda 
Bay report. So, first of all, let me reassure you and the other 
members that all of the steps that have been needed to take 
corrective action, immediate corrective action, have been taken 
long ago. Not only did we take those steps at Manda Bay; we 
took that report and applied those lessons learned at every 
base across Africa.
    Now, to answer your specific question about the status of 
the report, AFRICOM concluded its investigation in December of 
last year. Of course, the timing of that, trying to get that 
through the Department of Defense and released, became 
problematic because it was overlaid on top of the change of 
administration.
    The new Secretary of Defense came in. He received this 
report. He didn't have all of the depth of background on it, 
and so I think he very rightfully said, ``Okay. Thanks, 
AFRICOM. I think I would like to have a separate look at 
this.'' And AFRICOM supports that separate look.
    So the Secretary of Defense has appointed a disinterested 
four-star from the Army to look at the report of the 
investigation and give him advice on it.
    This is also necessary because many of the fixes pertain to 
other services and other COCOMs. So they weren't all within--
all of the recommendations and findings weren't within 
AFRICOM's purview to see through, so the Secretary of Defense 
has to do that. So that is the current status of it.
    I think he gave the Army a target of 90 days to report out, 
and I think that is the current situation.
    Mr. Panetta. Good. Outstanding. Great. Thank you for that 
very thorough answer, General. Appreciate that.
    Now going to the summer of 2019 when I did--when we did the 
CODEL to West Africa, which once again we completely appreciate 
you facilitating that.
    Let me read you something that really kind of summarizes 
what I came away with. An article in The Economist last month, 
2 months ago, basically talked about France's challenge there 
in that area. And it says basically France is challenged by 
others who have recently fought insurgencies in places such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq. It is that of trying to improve security, 
which is almost impossible to do without development, and also 
drive development, which cannot happen without better security.
    I think, you know, that was the impression I had coming 
away from that trip to West Africa. My question to you is: how 
do we get out of that catch-22? What can we do? Obviously, you 
gave an excellent answer to my colleague, Marc Veasey, about 
coordination and cooperation. Is there anything else that we 
can do in order to provide security and development as we go 
forward, especially in the Sahel?
    General Townsend. Congressman, I would say that the thing 
that is probably the easiest to solve is the security 
challenges, but they can't be solved without better 
development, as you pointed out, and better governance. That is 
the root of all of this.
    And as we have seen that from Afghanistan to Africa, the 
root cause is poor governance, insufficient development, which 
needs a secure environment to proceed. And I think probably----
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired. Sorry, 
General. You will have to finish up for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 117.]
    General Townsend. Thanks. The international efforts are 
really focused on security, unfortunately.
    Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, General.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. The chair recognizes Representative Speier from 
California for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 
great service.
    General McKenzie, let me start with you. I am very 
concerned that the May deadline is upon us, and I don't know 
that we have any assurances that the Taliban will not start 
attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Can you provide us any 
consolation regarding that?
    General McKenzie. I can tell you that we are prepared for 
those attacks should they occur and will be able to defend 
ourselves.
    Ms. Speier. But we don't have any subsequent agreement, 
then, it appears.
    General McKenzie. I have no--we have no agreement on that 
past 1 May. And I am not certain what decision-making is going 
on inside the Taliban pursuant to what actions they might or 
might not take. We are ready for whatever they choose to do.
    Ms. Speier. And do we have any intention to maintain 
defense contractors in Afghanistan after we depart?
    General McKenzie. Everyone will leave. All U.S. defense 
contractors will leave as part of the withdrawal.
    Ms. Speier. All right. I think that kind of answers my 
questions.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. The Representative yields back.
    Just a moment for everyone. I am just checking with staff 
on other members.
    Okay. It looks like we are all good. So I want to thank the 
panel for coming today. We will I think adjourn or recess until 
3:00 p.m. and meet back here at 3:00 p.m. for the classified 
portion of the hearing. It will give you all some time to have 
some lunch.
    So appreciate your patience with us and answers to our 
questions. Very much appreciate that.
    With that, we will stand in recess until 3:00 p.m. We will 
adjourn until 3:00 p.m. I apologize.
    [Whereupon, at 1:27 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 20, 2021

      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 20, 2021

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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 20, 2021

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PANETTA

    General Townsend. Because security, development, and governance are 
mutually interdependent, we need to address them concurrently. Together 
with our international and interagency partners, we are reviewing our 
approach to strengthening all three areas. This approach places 
increased attention on strengthening governance institutions and basic 
service delivery. We see this as important in its own right and as a 
means of preventing VEO recruitment. Security is one of the basic 
services essential to this approach. Although interagency partners lead 
U.S. police professionalization efforts, AFRICOM can play a role in 
security sector reform efforts with West African militaries. Although 
AFRICOM has conducted security sector reform programs in West Africa in 
the past, they could be expanded. Security sector reform simultaneously 
helps counter VEOs and improves community-oriented service delivery. In 
order to do more, AFRICOM needs to be able to stand by its commitments 
and remain consistently engaged. Major reductions in AFRICOM security 
cooperation funding and exercise funding between 2018 and 2021created a 
perception that the U.S. and AFRICOM are walking away. AFRICOM's 
presence on the continent, especially in terms of: Defense Attache 
offices, posture (SFAB rotations), support to multilateral operations, 
exercises, and peace and security forums, must reinforce a sense of 
commitment that our allies and partners can count on. Another way in 
which AFRICOM can support this approach is by building the capacity of 
defense institutions. This contributes to improving governance by 
strengthening governance institutions within the security sector. 
AFRICOM has programmatic tools to help build the institutional capacity 
of partner militaries, and with the required permissions, could do the 
same for multilateral organizations, such as GS Sahel and ECOWAS.   
[See page 48.]

     
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 20, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. What is the timeframe for shifting your priorities 
from C-VEO and Iranian containment to great power competition?
    General McKenzie. (U) C-VEO efforts, deterring Iran, and countering 
Iran's destabilizing activities are all challenges in the CENTCOM Area 
of Responsibility. We will continue to prioritize these threats while 
also implementing the Department's guidance for treating China as the 
pacing challenge.
    Mr. Langevin. The renewed focus on near-peer adversaries means 
reprioritizing assets between combatant commands. Is your command 
prepared to lose ISR allocation? How do you plan to monitor stability 
in fragile areas?
    General McKenzie. (U) Multi-layer and persistent intelligence, 
surveillance, and recognizance (ISR) are vital to my command. My forces 
are engaged in combat operations along with our allies and partner 
forces in multiple joint operating areas. In the past two years, we 
have experienced substantial reductions to our ISR allocation. While my 
staff and subordinate commanders have done well in effectively managing 
our allocated ISR and have developed creative ways to stretch our 
resources, our expected future ISR allocation will heavily impact our 
ability to conduct our missions. The constant reductions of persistent 
full motion video assets, coupled with the Big Wing ISR reduction to 
zero, will decrease my ability to monitor violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs); provide force protection overwatch; help to 
maintain a watchful eye against malign Iranian and proxy activity; and 
open seams for our enemies to operate unseen and unchecked within 
USCENTCOM. Insufficient ISR will ultimately result in a lack of ability 
to respond to events in a timely fashion and increases risk to our 
forces on the ground.
    Mr. Langevin. I am concerned that we will overly emphasize C-VEO 
because it most familiar to our force and that we have the muscle 
memory to keep doing it. How can we ensure that we're focused on all 
facets of great power competition without overly committing to C-VEO?
    General Townsend. The facets of competition in Africa span the DIME 
spectrum and require a whole of government effort. AFRICOM focuses on 
the military facet while supporting interagency partners leading other 
aspects of competition. AFRICOM maintains its focus on all facets of 
global power competition (GPC) through execution of its campaign plan, 
of which CVEO is only one of the four objectives. Our primary objective 
for addressing GPC is Objective 1: gain and maintain strategic access, 
recognizing a clear market for strategic access with competitors in 
China and Russia. AFRICOM structures its campaign around a prioritized 
list of countries, where geostrategic terrain is the primary 
consideration, not VEO threats. Our balanced approach of objectives and 
campaign design ensures that we do not over emphasize CVEO. VEOs are 
the primary concern of many of our partners in the Horn and the Sahel 
and can be significant concerns in other regions. In countries facing 
VEO threats, our VEO assistance serves to maintain these relationships 
and, as we have found is a form of GPC as well. In African countries 
where VEOs are not a concern, AFRICOM focuses on other shared threats, 
such as Russian PMCs or piracy. AFRICOM is engaged across the 
continent, and only supports CVEO operations in a relatively small 
number of countries. In these countries, we also reinforce our 
relationship through countering other transnational threats, monitoring 
and responding to malign activity, strengthening and professionalizing 
partner forces, and promoting regional security. What remains constant 
across the continent is that to maintain partnerships capable of 
standing up to Chinese coercion, AFRICOM must stand by our partners as 
they combat the primary threats to their security and ours.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, you noted last year that ISR assets 
are critical for deterrence in the AOR, stating that consistent ISR is 
necessary to identify changes that shape force posturing. Do you have 
the ISR resources necessary to achieve this aim?
    General McKenzie. (U) For Fiscal Year 21, we have enough ISR to 
fully support one operation. Within the USCENTCOM area of 
responsibility there are currently two ongoing major combat operations 
in Iraq/Syria and Afghanistan, terrorists in Yemen, Iranian security 
issues in the Arabian gulf and choke points such as the Strait of 
Hormuz and the Bab El Mandeb strait. This results in my need to 
continuously re-prioritize limited allocated ISR against the most 
urgent problem set and assume risk in the others. The demand for ISR is 
relatively stable in the Command though the Services are reducing their 
ISR offerings every year since 2015. In addition, USCENTCOM has no 
assigned forces, requiring allocation from Joint Staff every year which 
has been decreasing due to National Defense Strategy priorities and 
Service ISR reductions.
    Mr. Scott. In 2020, Congress responded to the combatant commanders' 
call for more ISR resources by appropriating $250M for the ISR transfer 
fund, which funded additional ISR activities in the CENTCOM AOR. How 
did you leverage these additional resources in 2020? For 2021, the 
Pentagon did not request any funds for the ISR transfer fund and 
Congress did not appropriate any additional funds. How will the lack of 
ISR transfer funds in 2021 impact your mission?
    General McKenzie. (U) The USCENTCOM Partner Integration Enterprise 
(CPIE) Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) Facility is the 
only direct USCENTCOM activity that is currently funded by ISR Transfer 
Fund dollars, and an alternate funding strategy has already been 
identified to ensure its continued operation. Therefore, impacts to 
USCENTCOM-specific activities is negligible with the departure of the 
ISR Transfer Fund for Fiscal Years 21 or 22. That said, USCENTCOM fully 
expects it will `feel' the absence of the ISR Transfer Fund from 
Service-provided/managed ISR capabilities. A key example is the U.S. 
Air Force's (USAF) Government Owned/Contractor Operated (GOCO) MQ-9s 
which are slated to terminate in June 2021 due to no available follow-
on funds to continue operation in the USCENTCOM battlespace. The USAF 
had contemplated, and USCENTCOM was going to support, pursuing Fiscal 
Year 21 ISR Transfer Fund dollars for at least a portion of the MQ-9 
GOCOs. With that funding not available, USAF reports no alternate 
funding strategy, which will result in full cessation of operations and 
only widen USCENTCOM/Components Full Motion Video shortfall (OIR 
projected to be 28,700 hours short in July 2021). USCENTCOM defers to 
the Services for a more detailed input regarding their respective 
equities that have been or were planned to be resourced via the ISR 
Transfer Fund.
    Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, your predecessor noted last year that 
ISR continued to experience significant shortfalls despite its critical 
role in the success of U.S. operations. How do you assess your current 
ISR gaps? Could you provide any specific examples in which ISR was 
critical to the success of an operation in your COCOM?
    General McKenzie. (U) The fissure between the operational demands 
for ISR and the available theater ISR platforms to meet those demands 
continues to widen in the USCENTCOM AOR. While USCENTCOM leverages 
other available capabilities, like national resources, airborne ISR 
undergirds USCENTCOM's layered, multi-Intelligence discipline 
collection strategy. Consequently, as theater airborne ISR decreases in 
the USCENTCOM AOR, its ISR gap will increase and result in a command 
better postured to react rather than one able to anticipate strategic 
developments.
    Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and 
Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps 
that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
    General McKenzie. (U) Until ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and 
Control are fully fielded and the Joint Staff determines how much will 
be allocated to USCENTCOM, it's a difficult question to answer. In its 
ISR role, JSTARS provided best of breed Moving Target Indicator (MTI) 
capability which directly resulted in taking many ISIS and AQ 
terrorists off the battlefield. MTI, like Full Motion Video (FMV), 
provides real time awareness of enemy actions, allowing me and my 
Commanders to act rapidly to get inside the adversaries' decision 
cycle. Without real-time ISR platforms such as JSTARS, we are reliant 
on time late intelligence from other non-airborne systems.
    Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and 
Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps 
that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
    General Townsend. USAFRICOM does not use JSTARS, but relies on 
other capabilities for ISR and situation awareness. The Air Force's 
Advanced Battle Management System and the Joint All Domain Command and 
Control are undergoing development and testing, with recent tests 
showing promise. The Joint All Domain Command and Control will enable 
Joint Force Commanders and warfighters to rapidly translate decisions 
into integrated and synchronized actions across all domains, multiple 
platforms, globally and with Mission Partners to achieve operational 
advantage in both competition and conflict.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. The House of Representatives has passed H.R. 1392, 
the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act, which would prevent arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia unless the President can certify Saudi Arabia isn't 
committing human rights violations.
    Is the administration concerned that our allies in the region, like 
Saudi Arabia, might turn towards our adversaries like Russia or China 
if we do not continue to provide military support?
    Could bills like H.R. 1392 signal to our allies that the United 
States is not committed to their defense and their counter-terrorism 
efforts?
    Ms. Dory. Our competitors, like China and Russia, seek to exploit 
gaps in the security sectors of our partners. Saudi Arabia buys arms 
and weapons from China and is reportedly discussing purchases from 
Russia. The Department of Defense continues to invest in the defense 
partnership with Saudi Arabia and is committed to ensuring the United 
States remains its partner of choice even as we work to elevate human 
rights as a central component of that relationship.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. Can you describe the impact on the ability to respond to 
Iranian regional aggression if the U.S. returns to the JCPOA?
    General McKenzie. (U) The administration is currently engaged in 
indirect talks with Iran on a mutual return to the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action. Regardless of the outcome of that process, the 
President has made clear that countering Iran's malign behavior in the 
region is a priority, including addressing Iran's ballistic missile 
program and support for terrorist groups and violent proxies in the 
region. The United States retains all of its capacities to push back 
against Iran's destabilizing behavior, and will not hesitate to defend 
U.S. personnel and vital interests. As the diplomatic process unfolds, 
I will continue to provide my best military advice to civilian 
leadership on how to best respond to any potential Iranian regional 
aggression and then implement as directed.
    Mr. Moore. The U.S. maintains a permanent military presence at 
various military installations throughout CENTCOM. In consideration of 
the Taliban's failure to adhere to the terms of the February 29th 
agreement and if wanted by the Afghan government, what utility would be 
served by maintaining a permanent military presence in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. (U) The President has directed that no U.S. 
military bases remain in Afghanistan. Planning is underway for a 
residual military presence in Afghanistan to provide security for the 
U.S. Embassy Kabul in support of Diplomatic missions. The 
administration understands the need to work with regional partners to 
disrupt terrorist networks, address humanitarian crises, and resolve 
armed conflicts responsibly.
    Mr. Moore. Africa will account for nearly half of global population 
growth over the next two decades and by 2100, five of the top 10 most 
populous countries in the world will be in Africa. For decades the DOD 
has maintained a presence and invested heavily throughout various 
combatant commands. What is your long-term view of U.S. presence, 
mission, and investment in Africa and what is the Department doing to 
build sustainable military partner capabilities?
    General Townsend. Strategic long-term trends shaping U.S. interests 
in Africa include expanding instability and violent opposition, fragile 
power transitions shaped by identity politics, democratic backsliding, 
and a growing number of autocracies. The United States represents an 
alternative future, where the decisive element is capable governance 
enabled by a stable security environment. The primary means of this 
stable security environment is a capable, professional military, 
partnered with AFRICOM to address future threats. Interagency partners 
will lead this effort, but AFRICOM also has a role. To do that, AFRICOM 
must continue to strengthen partner militaries through exercises, 
security cooperation, mil-to-mil engagements, and institutional 
capacity building while maintaining cost-efficient presence and 
posture. There is immense value in developing and maintaining long-term 
relationships with African nations, specifically the excellent work 
done within our State Partnership Program. This multi-tiered approach 
is sustainable over the long-term, currently using only 0.3% of DOD's 
Operations budget for an area three times the size of the United 
States. However, as Africa's population grows, these efforts may 
require additional resources to continue professionalizing and 
partnering with larger African militaries, police forces, and coast 
guards.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. Ms. Dory, what is your assessment of the goals of 
Russia in CENTCOM and AFRICOM, what do they gain by their interference, 
are they succeeding, and what measures can we use to limit their 
influence?
    Ms. Dory. Russia is pursuing partnerships to challenge U.S. 
influence, in both the Middle East, and in Africa. Moscow probably 
views expanding security and defense ties will facilitate greater 
influence over the governments and lead to developing broader 
partnerships in other spheres. Over the last 5 years, we have seen 
Moscow expand defense engagement through arms sales, training, 
technical or counterterrorism assistance, and intelligence sharing, all 
of which could complicate existing or future U.S. security 
arrangements. Russia is also aggressively pushing to increase its 
access to the region through simplified port visit agreements, through 
its expansion of existing facilities in Syria, and they may be nearing 
an agreement for a naval logistics facility in Sudan. Limiting their 
influence will require a practical, tailored interagency approach to 
ensure we are aligned not just in countering competitors, but also in 
meeting broader U.S. goals across the region. The Department's efforts 
should be aligned with our interagency partners to help our partners 
and allies build capacity, improve transparency, and develop 
institutions that support sustainable security solutions.
    Mr. Morelle. General Townsend, in what ways is China seeking to 
expand its influence in Africa? And, in areas where China's approach is 
troublesome, what is the U.S. strategy to provide an alternative to 
regional partners and what more can the U.S. be doing?
    General Townsend. Unlike Japan and our Western partners who 
recognize the value of coordinated approaches, China prefers separate, 
bilateral engagements in Africa. This allows China to push for opaque, 
back room deals, including military agreements. China uses bilateral 
intelligence sharing, technology transfers, arms sales and training to 
influence African militaries. For example, China shared drone 
intelligence with Nigeria and donated patrol boats to Ghana to combat 
piracy. This is noteworthy because China justified its first overseas 
base in Djibouti based on counterpiracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden 
and is now looking to expand its naval access along Africa's western 
coast. In addition to its preferred bilateral cooperation and 
engagement, China has recently stepped up its attempts to influence 
multilateral organizations in Africa as well. Chinese troops serve in 
six out of seven current U.N. peace operations and currently lead one 
U.N. mission. China also provides funding and equipment to the U.N., 
African Union, GS Sahel, and the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS). The AFRICOM Campaign Plan defends U.S. partnerships in 
Africa against malign Chinese activity through its competition 
framework and two lines of effort. The competition framework is based 
on a range of desired conditions supporting U.S. strategic and 
operational access. The two lines of effort are to ``Gain and Maintain 
Strategic Access & Influence'' and to ``Coordinate Action with Allies & 
Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives.'' In support of these 
efforts, AFRICOM closely monitors Chinese military activity, weighs the 
long term strategic implications of China's full spectrum of 
diplomatic, informational, military and economic activities, and works 
with our African and international partners to address shared threats 
together. In order to do more, AFRICOM needs to be able to stand by its 
commitments and remain consistently engaged. Major reductions in 
AFRICOM security cooperation funding and exercise funding between 2018 
and 2021 created a perception that the U.S. and AFRICOM are walking 
away. AFRICOM's presence on the continent, especially in terms of: 
Defense Attache offices, posture (SFAB rotations), support to 
multilateral operations, exercises, and peace and security forums, must 
reinforce a sense of commitment that our allies and partners can count 
on.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Mr. Moulton. As we draw down to zero combat troops in Afghanistan, 
it sounds like there are currently many options on the table for over-
the-horizon capabilities and that General McKenzie is relatively 
confident in the U.S. military's ability to conduct ``find, fix, and 
strike'' operations for counterterrorism in Afghanistan to ensure it 
does not yet again become a base for international terrorist 
operations. But our interests in Afghanistan extend beyond 
counterterrorism--our national interest is to have a relatively stable 
Afghanistan with a government that remains an ally of the United 
States. Ms. Dory and General McKenzie, what is your plan for ensuring 
that we can still provide support to the Afghan government, as well as 
security support to ensure a U.S. embassy and diplomatic presence in 
Afghanistan?
    Ms. Dory. The Department remains committed to continuing a close 
defense relationship with the Afghan Government focused on supporting 
the Afghan forces through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, which 
is critical to their ability to defend their country, and to 
maintaining a relatively stable Afghanistan whose government remains an 
ally of the United States. The United States will also maintain a 
counterterrorism capacity with military and intelligence assets in the 
region that can counter the re-emergence of terrorist threats in 
Afghanistan and deal with it if it does emerge. We will also hold the 
Taliban accountable if they are not doing what they have committed to 
do in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, particularly preventing 
any group or individual, including al-Qaeda, from using the soil of 
Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and our 
allies. The only remaining military presence in Afghanistan will be the 
force required to protect our diplomats. We have undertaken extensive 
planning of our own and have consulted with our allies and partners to 
ensure that our diplomats in Afghanistan will have what they need to 
fulfill their important and enduring mission.
    Mr. Moulton. Ms. Dory, you state the DOD is not the lead player in 
Africa, but provides support to other U.S. departments and agencies. As 
the CCP looks to gain footholds in African infrastructure through 
``debt trap diplomacy,'' are U.S. government efforts like the State 
Department's Blue Dot Network and USAID's Clear Choice sufficient to 
reduce or replace PRC influence in Africa? Are there additional tools 
you would like to see the Department or broader U.S. government provide 
to this effort to secure U.S. interests in Africa and ensure PRC 
influence does not become a larger security threat? How would you 
prioritize the use of these tools against other regions, such as 
eastern Europe and South America, where the PRC is expanding its reach 
and attempting to establish dominance in areas like 5G?
    Ms. Dory. DOD's partnerships with African governments and 
militaries play an important role in U.S. whole-of-government efforts 
to counter malign Chinese activities on the continent. By providing 
African partners with superior training and equipment that meet their 
security needs, and doing so transparently and responsibly, DOD offers 
African nations a preferred alternative to Chinese security wares. Key 
partnership tools employed by DOD that translate to strategic 
competition gains include senior leader engagements, joint exercises, 
port visits, personnel exchanges, the State Partnership Program, 
training events, and other security cooperation programs. These DOD 
tools help advance mutual security goals and enhance partner resilience 
to malign activities, especially in the maritime space as China expands 
its investments in critical port infrastructure. Professional military 
education, which is coordinated with the Department of State, is also 
essential as it enables longstanding ties between military leaders in 
the United States and in Africa. DOD employs these tools based on each 
partner nation's needs and capabilities and with a view to alignment 
with mutual security priorities.
    Mr. Moulton. I recently co-led a letter with Representative Wittman 
to Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks expressing concerns 
about the impact the current rate of additional Requests for Forces 
(RFFs) above the GFMAP has on overtaxing our forces and resources and 
delaying services' vital modernization efforts. General McKenzie, you 
state that this is a natural tension between those who provide forces 
and those who employ them, but my sense is that the Department in 
recent years has leaned too far in favor of the COCOMs, often 
USCENTCOM. By remaining overly focused on short-term risk, we are 
trading our readiness for great power competition. General McKenzie, 
how can you as a Combatant Commander better support this balance and 
assist the Secretary in making the choice to prioritize military 
modernization?
    General McKenzie. (U) Our Service Chiefs' role in military 
modernization is to seek future technologies and field new equipment 
necessary to out-pace our near-peer competitors, namely China and 
Russia. At times, the result of this long-term focus is a shortage of 
critical force element capabilities in the near-term. A combatant 
commander's (CCDR's) role is to identify required capabilities to meet 
directed operations and approved operational plans. These demand 
signals are registered, and if validated by the Joint Staff, proceed as 
force requests to the Services to source. However, sourcing our 
numerous CCDRs at once is not sustainable especially based on the 
existing Service capacity or inventory. To better seek a balance in the 
risk to force and risk to mission, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, as the Global Integrator, will make Best Military Advice 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense who will make final 
decisions. With a decision to not source, CCDRs will mitigate the lack 
of sourcing of near-term capabilities with potential reductions or 
changes in requested capabilities, identify suitable in-lieu-of 
capabilities, or revise their operational plans under supply-informed 
constraints. The CJCS and Secretary of Defense are ultimately the 
fulcrum in the balance of the Services' military modernization and the 
CCDRs' global campaign plans and regional directed operations. As 
stated in my testimony, the process works well to inform our senior 
military and civilian leadership so that they can determine their 
tolerance in accepting the near-term or long-term risks.
    Mr. Moulton. As we draw down to zero combat troops in Afghanistan, 
it sounds like there are currently many options on the table for over-
the-horizon capabilities and that General McKenzie is relatively 
confident in the U.S. military's ability to conduct ``find, fix, and 
strike'' operations for counterterrorism in Afghanistan to ensure it 
does not yet again become a base for international terrorist 
operations. But our interests in Afghanistan extend beyond 
counterterrorism--our national interest is to have a relatively stable 
Afghanistan with a government that remains an ally of the United 
States. Ms. Dory and General McKenzie, what is your plan for ensuring 
that we can still provide support to the Afghan government, as well as 
security support to ensure a U.S. embassy and diplomatic presence in 
Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. (U) First, I would like to be clear that while I 
believe we can conduct counterterrorism from over the horizon, it will 
not be easy. The United States will maintain a counterterrorism 
capacity with military and intelligence assets in the region that can 
counter the reemergence of terrorist threats in Afghanistan and deal 
with it if it does emerge. Second, USCENTCOM is developing plans to 
conduct management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, contracted 
logistic support, and end use monitoring from over-the-horizon. The 
Department of Defense is working with the Department of State to ensure 
the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan has the necessary security resources to 
protect U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities after the withdrawal 
of U.S. troops.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Mr. Bacon. The Kurdish Peshmerga have been key allies in our fight 
against ISIS in Iraq and critical to our efforts in promoting a stable 
Iraq. How does a professional, well-trained and properly equipped 
Peshmerga Forces support the national security interests of the United 
States and provide stability in the region? What role do you believe 
the Peshmerga can play to ensure future threats like ISIS do not re-
spawn?
    Ms. Dory. Working by, with, and through vetted partner forces, U.S. 
and Coalition forces are able to maintain pressure on ISIS and 
establish security conditions to address stabilization needs. The Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF), which includes the Ministry of Peshmerga 
Affairs, are the cornerstone of this approach in Iraq. Working within 
the ISF architecture and under the command of the Government of Iraq, 
the Peshmerga play a critical role in denying ISIS safe haven in the 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region and denying ISIS freedom of movement across the 
Iraq-Syria border. Further security engagement with Iraq--including 
with the Peshmerga--will continue to help the ISF's counterterrorism 
capabilities improve and contributes to U.S. national security 
objectives.
    Mr. Bacon. The UAE has been a key U.S. ally and has made monumental 
progress in its relationship with Israel through the Abraham Accords. 
It's been reported that the U.S. administration has recently approved a 
deal to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates. What do you see as the 
operational and strategic advantages to the United States of the UAE 
being equipped with F-35s? What concerns does DOD have the sale of the 
F-35 to UAE?
    Ms. Dory. As has been discussed with Congress, the administration 
intends to move forward with these arms sales to the UAE, even as we 
continue consulting with Emirati officials to ensure we have clear 
mutual understandings with respect to Emirati obligations and actions 
before, during, and after delivery. Implementation of these sales is an 
indication of the strength of our strategic partnership with the UAE 
and supports shared national security interests to counter regional 
threats and enhance interoperability with one of our most capable 
security partners in the region. This sale comes with the high 
expectation that U.S. technology and advanced weapons systems will be 
protected and used in accordance with all applicable laws, including 
the law of armed conflict. We anticipate a robust and sustained 
dialogue with the UAE to ensure that any arms transfers meet our mutual 
strategic objectives while protecting U.S. technology.
    Mr. Bacon. How can the US Congress best ensure that sufficient 
security assistance is provided to support the Pershmerga in 
counterterrorism operations and in maintaining general military 
readiness? Do you see CTEF program as the best way to support the 
Kurdish Pershmerga in the future? Do you see 333 security assistance 
authorities playing a key role in ensuring the readiness and 
sustainment of Pershmerga?
    Ms. Dory. The Department of Defense currently relies on Section 
1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2015, as amended, and the Counter-ISIS Train & Equip Fund (CTEF) to 
support operations to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
in Iraq. Section 1236 and CTEF remain essential to ensuring we can 
achieve this objective, working by, with, and through the Government of 
Iraq (GoI). The Ministry of Peshmerga is organizationally and 
doctrinally a part of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). It takes 
direction from the GOI and also receives funding and equipment from the 
GOI. The Peshmerga also coordinates regulations and doctrine with the 
Iraqi Armed Forces to establish commonality and interoperability. For 
example, the Peshmerga have the same radios as the Iraqi Army in order 
to improve their connectivity and ability to be interoperable. Further, 
Peshmerga units can be, and have been, deployed outside the Kurdistan 
region in support of other Iraqi missions. As a general matter, we 
understand that Peshmerga forces are under the command and control of 
the GoI. The Peshmerga's functional responsibilities include conducting 
counterterrorism and border security operations, which are supportable 
mission sets under 10 USC 333(a). This presents opportunities to 
develop traditional security cooperation and institutional capacity 
building mechanisms with the GoI gradually. Peshmerga eligibility for 
Section 333 assistance would be determined at the time a Section 333 
program is proposed.
    Mr. Bacon. The Kurdish Peshmerga have been key allies in our fight 
against ISIS in Iraq and critical to our efforts in promoting a stable 
Iraq. How does a professional, well-trained and properly equipped 
Peshmerga Forces support the national security interests of the United 
States and provide stability in the region? What role do you believe 
the Peshmerga can play to ensure future threats like ISIS do not re-
spawn?
    General McKenzie. (U) Professional and well-equipped Peshmerga 
Forces have been a valuable partner for the U.S. since 1991, and 
currently play a critical role in the ongoing fight against ISIS. A 
stable Iraqi Kurdistan enables all of Iraq's stability. Furthermore, 
professional and well-trained Peshmerga forces are a bulwark against a 
potential resurgence of ISIS. To maintain continued pressure against a 
resurgence of ISIS and other malign actors in and around the IKR, it 
may require a CTEF enabled Pesh Support commitment through, FY23 at a 
minimum. The concern is the ability of Government of Iraq to properly 
fund the KRG in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution given the 
difficulties in implementing the recently approved budget law, the 
COVID-19 impact on the IKR, and the current low market prices of energy 
resources.
    Mr. Bacon. The UAE has been a key U.S. ally and has made monumental 
progress in its relationship with Israel through the Abraham Accords. 
It's been reported that the U.S. administration has recently approved a 
deal to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates. What do you see as the 
operational and strategic advantages to the United States of the UAE 
being equipped with F-35s? What concerns does DOD have the sale of the 
F-35 to UAE?
    General McKenzie. (U) The UAE is among our most capable military 
partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and a major 
security partner. The sale of F-35s, MQ-9s, and relevant munitions--for 
which there are signed Letters of Offer and Acceptance, will provide 
the UAE credible defense capability and enable continued 
interoperability with U.S. forces. This equipment represents a 
significant increase in capability over current airframes in the UAE's 
inventory. I refer you to Ms. Dory's response to this same question 
regarding any concerns DOD has regarding the sale.
    Mr. Bacon. How can the US Congress best ensure that sufficient 
security assistance is provided to support the Peshmerga in 
counterterrorism operations and in maintaining general military 
readiness? Do you see CTEF program as the best way to support the 
Kurdish Peshmerga in the future? Do you see 333 security assistance 
authorities playing a key role in ensuring the readiness and 
sustainment to the Peshmerga?
    General McKenzie. (U) CTEF support to the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) remains essential to our ``by, with, and through'' approach to 
the counter-ISIS campaign. With respect to the Ministry of Peshmerga 
Affairs (MoPA), which is a component of the ISF, CTEF currently remains 
our best option to sustain an adequate level of counter-ISIS operations 
and general military readiness. CTEF addresses immediate tactical 
requirements (e.g., cash stipends and classes of supply) of vetted, 
unified, Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) personnel primarily assigned to 
Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs). There are opportunities to explore 
future security cooperation with the MoPA through Section 333, which 
could gradually improve the security assistance relationship by 
building specific capabilities aligned with long-term U.S. objectives 
with the Government of Iraq.

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