    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    .
                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-20]

                        NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND

                        U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE

                         GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 APRIL 20, 2021

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    47-210                     WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                        ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
    JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
        Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
    SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
    KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
    MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
    JIMMY PANETTA, California
    STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
    Vacancy

                         Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                    Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
                   Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
                          Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
    Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Dory, Amanda J., Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
      Department of Defense..........................................     4
    McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central
      Command........................................................     6
    Townsend, GEN Stephen J., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command....     8

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Dory, Amanda J...............................................    55
        McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr.................................    74
        Townsend, GEN Stephen J......................................    98

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Panetta..................................................   117

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Bacon....................................................   126
        Mr. Langevin.................................................   121
        Mrs. McClain.................................................   123
        Mr. Moore....................................................   123
        Mr. Morelle..................................................   124
        Mr. Moulton..................................................   124
        Mr. Scott....................................................   121

      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE
                              GREATER MIDDLE EAST

                                   AND AFRICA

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                               Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 20, 2021.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:00 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
           WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. We will call the meeting to order.
        I will put my glasses on, so I can read what we need to
    read here.
        This is the full committee hearing on National Security
    Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater Middle
    East and Africa. We have with us Ms. Amanda Dory, who is the
    Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General Kenneth
    McKenzie, who is the Commander of U.S. Central Command; and
    General Stephen Townsend, who is the Commander of U.S. Africa
    Command.
        As always, this is a hybrid hearing, so I will read the
    instructions for how to conduct a hybrid hearing, so we are all
    on the same page.
        Members who are joining remotely must be visible on screen
    for the purpose of identity verification, establishing and
    maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
    voting. Those members must continue to use the software
    platform's function while in attendance unless they experience
    connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
    them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences
    technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff
    for assistance.
        Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the
    room and via the television internet feeds. Members
    participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they
    are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
        Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
    the software platform video function on the entire time they
    attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the
    proceeding. But if members depart for a short while for reasons
    other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave
    the video function on. If members will be absent for a
    significant period or depart to join a different proceeding,
    they should exit the software platform entirely and rejoin it
    if they return.
        Members may use the software platform's chat feature to
    communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
    support issues only.
        Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
    necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
    inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.
        Thank you.
        As mentioned, we are here today to hear from our Central
    Command and Africa Command commanders, and there is, to put it
    mildly, a lot going on in both of your areas of responsibility,
    and we look forward to getting an update on those challenges.
    And certainly, the U.S. challenge has been central for a very
    long time in the region as we have dealt with ISIS [Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria] in the Middle East, you know, between
    Iraq and Syria and elsewhere, and then various affiliates of
    many different groups, including ISIS and al-Qaida, throughout
    Africa.
        I think educating members on exactly what is going on with
    the fights there will be very important because, you know, some
    of that is not on the front pages. But I know, for instance,
    what is going on in the Sahel and West Africa is very
    concerning. We are working with our partners in the European
    Command--sorry, with our partners in Europe who have interests
    there as well. I am very interested to hear how that is going
    and what we can do to be supportive of that.
        But also, as is previewed by the slides that General
    Townsend has passed out for us, both of these areas of
    responsibility are also part of the larger great power
    competition. I think that is very important to understand, that
    both Russia and China are particularly active in Africa, also
    obviously active in the Middle East.
        You know, how does our military play a role in those parts
    of the world with dealing with the great power competition that
    we are facing from both China and Russia? We will be very
    interested to hear that.
        And then, of course, there is the big issue of the moment
    and that is the President's decision to withdraw our troops
    from Afghanistan and NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization's] corresponding decision to also withdraw their
    troops by September.
        I think this is the right decision. There was no easy, good
    decision here. There was no win-win-win where everything was
    going to be fine no matter what we did. Afghanistan is a very
    difficult part of the world. But when you look at the maps in
    front of us, when you look at just these two areas of
    responsibility, much less the concerns that we have elsewhere
    in the world, certainly in Asia but increasingly in Latin
    America as we see the difficulties down there spilling across
    our border, we come to understand that the level of investment
    in Afghanistan does not meet where it currently falls in our
    national security objectives.
        We have accomplished much of what we set out to accomplish
    in terms of degrading al-Qaida. Certainly, we killed Osama bin
    Laden, and we have significantly reduced the ability of
    terrorist groups to operate out of that region. And at between
    $14- and $20 billion a year, I don't think that investment is
    justified at this point. I think the President made the right
    decision in terms of what our current defense priorities are.
        That is not to say that we are going to cease to have
    interests in the Afghanistan region. We will. But there are
    other, better ways to meet those interests that are more cost
    effective.
        And the final point I would make on this is, you know, we
    have been in a bit of a lull in terms of U.S. casualties over
    the course of the last year, since the preliminary--well,
    ``peace agreement'' is an overstatement--but the preliminary
    understanding was reached with the Taliban whereby they have
    not been attacking us. As we know, that expires on May 1, and
    at some point after that we would be back into a hot war, and
    we would, once again, be losing U.S. service members' lives in
    Afghanistan.
        Given the commitment and given where we are at in our
    national security needs, I think the President made the right
    call. The risk of staying outweighs the benefit at this point,
    but we will want to hear the details from General McKenzie and
    Ms. Dory on how we plan to execute that, what the risks are,
    and how we are going to mitigate those risks.
        With that, I just want to thank our witnesses again for
    being here, for their service, and I will turn it over to Mr.
    Rogers for his opening statement.

     STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
              RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our
    witnesses and express my appreciation for their service and
    their time to prepare for this hearing.
        In both AFRICOM [United States Africa Command] and CENTCOM
    [United States Central Command], we have made progress in
    combating terrorists, but they are not completely gone. Adding
    to the problem, many groups have spread out making them more
    difficult to locate. General Townsend, as we discussed last
    week, maintaining pressure on these terrorists' networks
    remains vitally important.
        But spending in AFRICOM comprises only three-tenths of a
    percent of our defense budget. Spreading those resources even
    further is the increased presence of Russia and China on the
    continent. Russia is entering into a disturbing number of arms
    sales and strategic agreements with African nations. China is
    using its Belt and Road Initiative to extract African national
    resources.
        The Chinese Communist Party is also building its first
    overseas military base on the strategically important Horn of
    Africa. Alarmingly, it is only a few miles away from our own
    base. Given the increased role China and Russia are playing in
    Africa--and its geostrategic importance--it is imperative that
    we continue to make investments there.
        I look forward to hearing from General Townsend about how
    we can maximize diplomatic and military efforts to eliminate
    terrorist footholds and counter Russia and China's global
    ambitions in Africa.
        In CENTCOM, General McKenzie is facing tremendous
    challenges from hardened terrorists and nations bent on our
    destruction. President Biden's decision to unconditionally
    withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021, will only complicate
    matters.
        I am very concerned that the Taliban will overrun the
    democratically elected government soon after we withdraw. When
    that happens, what assurance do we have that Afghanistan will
    not become another breeding ground for terrorists. I have yet
    to hear how the President intends to conduct counterterrorism
    operations without any U.S. troops in the region. There had
    better be a plan for that, and I expect the administration to
    explain it to us as soon as possible.
        I am also very concerned with the ongoing destabilizing
    actions of Iran. The Ayatollah continues to fund and equip
    terrorists targeting American troops. His cronies are
    prolonging a civil war and humanitarian crisis in Syria, and
    his regime is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. We
    absolutely cannot allow that to happen, and I am not convinced
    that reentering the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]
    will stop them.
        I look forward to hearing more about the administration's
    plan for ending the Ayatollah's quest for nuclear weapons and
    how they intend to deal with the rest of the regime's
    destabilizing actions.
        Finally, I want to express my deep frustration with the
    defense budget proposed by President Biden. Cutting defense
    spending below the rate of inflation will mean combatant
    commanders like General Townsend and General McKenzie will not
    have the resources and capabilities they need to do their jobs.
        I look forward to working with both Republicans and
    Democrats on this committee to pass a defense budget that
    adequately supports our servicemen and women.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. Dory, you are recognized for your opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF AMANDA J. DORY, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                   FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Dory. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers.
    Can you hear me okay?
        The Chairman. I believe so, yes.
        Ms. Dory. Okay. Very good. Thank you. And distinguished
    members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
    testify on our defense policy in the U.S. Africa Command and
    U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility alongside their
    commanders, General McKenzie and General Townsend, today.
        I would also like to express my appreciation for the strong
    support Congress provides the Department of Defense. As a
    career civilian in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I
    have seen firsthand how the executive and legislative branches
    work together to ensure our Armed Forces have the resources and
    authorities required to deter, and if necessary defeat, any
    foe.
        Secretary Austin has emphasized the need to match resources
    to strategy, strategy to policy, and policy to the will of the
    American people. The President's interim national security
    strategic guidance speaks to that approach by prioritizing the
    security of the American people, expansion of the economic
    prosperity and opportunity, and the defense of our democratic
    values.
        This requires Department of Defense to defend our people
    and economy, deter and prevent adversaries from threatening the
    United States, our allies, and partners, and support whole-of-
    government efforts to lead a stable and open international
    system.
        An early priority for the Secretary is to match our
    resources to strategy by rightsizing our posture investments.
    To that end, at the President's direction, the Department is
    undertaking a global posture review to balance operational
    requirements, risk, readiness, and international commitments.
        In Africa and the Middle East, DOD [Department of Defense]
    plays a supporting role to broader U.S. Government efforts in
    an acknowledgment that military force is not the answer to the
    challenges in these regions. Our policy objective is to
    increase stability and secure our interest by working by, with,
    and through our reinvigorated networks of allies and partners.
        Africa is a continent ripe with opportunities and
    challenges. In Africa, the interim national strategic guidance
    directs us to continue building our partnerships and to work
    toward bringing an end to the deadliest conflicts while
    preventing the onset of new ones. It also directs us to assist
    African nations to combat the threats posed by climate change
    and violent extremism.
        Undergirded by the investments and tools you have afforded
    the Department for building partnership capacity, and in close
    cooperation with our diplomatic and development colleagues, the
    resulting partnerships enable us to support conflict resolution
    efforts, combat the threats posed by violent extremism, improve
    defense institutions, and strengthen democratic norms and the
    rule of law.
        These modest investments play an outsized role in Africa
    and the Department's objectives across the continent. In the
    Middle East, DOD works to deter Iranian aggression, disrupt al-
    Qaida networks, prevent an ISIS resurgence, and protect vital
    interests such as freedom of navigation.
        We have made progress toward achieving the enduring defeat
    of ISIS and transitioned the focus of Operation Inherent
    Resolve to advising, equipping, and assisting partner forces to
    enable them to manage the ISIS threat independently.
        The State Department is leading diplomatic efforts to bring
    Iran's nuclear program back into compliance with the Joint
    Comprehensive Plan of Action while DOD focuses on deterring and
    defending against Iranian threats.
        In Yemen, we ended support to Saudi-led offensive
    operations but continue to demonstrate our commitment to the
    defense of Saudi Arabia by providing limited non-combat support
    to help our partners defend their territory from Houthi
    attacks.
        In Afghanistan, our mission has been preventing terrorist
    groups from using the country to threaten the interest and
    security of the United States, our allies, and partners. After
    two decades of U.S. and NATO military involvement in
    Afghanistan, we have accomplished that mission, and President
    Biden has decided to draw down the remaining U.S. troops from
    Afghanistan.
        In closing, I am confident in the Department's capacity to
    contend with the range of dynamic challenges facing the United
    States in Africa and in the Middle East. We retain many
    advantages, including our economic power, dynamism, democratic
    values, military capabilities, and global alliances.
        Thank you to the members of the committee for your
    continued support. I look forward to discussing the topics
    further in the rest of the hearing.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Dory can be found in the
    Appendix on page 55.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        General McKenzie.

      STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. McKENZIE, JR., USMC, COMMANDER,
                          U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

        General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I
    appear before you proudly representing the 70,000 men and women
    of United States Central Command. It is a great pleasure to be
    with you here today.
        It is my duty to testify, of course, but I have to say it
    is also a privilege to address this body, and all the greater
    honor to do so sitting beside the Acting Secretary of Defense,
    Ms. Dory, and the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, General
    Steve Townsend.
        Since my last testimony, the region has continued to
    evolve, and it remains as dynamic as ever. With the President's
    announcement last week, we are focused on working closely with
    the Afghan government and our NATO allies to responsibly
    conclude Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan. This is my
    main effort at present, but it is not my only responsibility.
    My prepared statement addresses our other missions in detail.
        The United States and our NATO allies sent forces to
    Afghanistan nearly 20 years ago, and the President has judged
    that now is the appropriate time to redeploy and reposition
    these forces, so that they are better arrayed to deter
    adversaries and respond to threats globally, including those in
    the Central Command region.
        Our singular purpose in Afghanistan has been to assure that
    al-Qaida and other violent extremist organizations could never
    again plot, prepare, and perpetrate attacks against the United
    States and our allies from the refuge of that country. The
    campaign has evolved considerably over the years from active
    combat operations with U.S. and NATO forces in the lead to
    advisory efforts designed to enhance the Afghan National
    Defense and Security Forces' ability to conduct their own
    campaigns against violent extremist organizations.
        That there has not been another 9/11 is not an accident; it
    is the cumulative product of these efforts. We will now
    conclude our Afghanistan-based advise and support mission. We
    are further planning now for continued counterterrorism
    operations from within the region, ensuring that the violent
    extremist organizations fighting for their existence in the
    hinterlands of Afghanistan remain under persistent surveillance
    and pressure.
        Ever since 12 September 2001 when our allies invoked
    Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we have done everything
    in Afghanistan within a partnership framework, and that will
    not change in the months ahead. We are planning collaboratively
    with our interagency and international partners and will take
    all measures to ensure the safe and orderly withdrawal of all
    of our forces and those of our partners from Afghanistan. This
    includes positioning significant combat power to guard against
    the possibility that the Taliban decide to interfere in any way
    with our orderly redeployment.
        I would now like to briefly summarize some other challenges
    in the region. While Iran has itself avoided state-on-state
    attacks on U.S. forces since last January's strikes on the Al
    Asad and Erbil airbases, it continues to menace regional
    partners and the free flow of commerce through the use of
    proxies and the proliferation of armed unmanned aerial systems
    and other munitions. Its pursuit of regional hegemony remains
    the greatest source of instability across the Middle East.
        Iraq and Syria, the campaign to eliminate the threat posed
    by ISIS has entered a new phase. In Iraq, we are engaged in a
    strategic dialogue with the Iraqi government to determine the
    nature of our security relationship. ISIS' so-called physical
    caliphate is no more, but its toxic ideology lives on. The
    problem is especially acute in communities ravaged by conflict
    and its sprawling camps for displaced persons where ISIS preys
    upon vulnerable populations.
        What has accelerated in the last year is the influence of
    China and Russia, which each in their own way are attempting to
    subvert the rules-based international order and to gain
    strategic influence in the Middle East. China's activity in the
    region takes the form of economic investment, arms sales, and
    other overtures.
        Russia has made an 18th century power play in Syria,
    propping up the murderous Asad regime. The Middle East remains
    key terrain, and I believe China and Russia will continue to
    expand their efforts to improve their position in the region
    and diminish U.S. standing wherever possible.
        The CENTCOM area of responsibility is the most cyber-
    contested theater in the world. It is also the proving ground
    for the proliferation and employment of unmanned weaponized
    systems, many emanating from Iran.
        This difficult and complex operational environment provides
    units inside CENTCOM opportunities to operate and to conduct
    realistic training within an environment that exists nowhere
    else in the world. I can state as a matter of fact that the
    units and ships assigned to CENTCOM are as ready as any in the
    joint force.
        The weeks and months ahead will see us execute a very
    complicated and demanding military operation to withdraw U.S.
    and NATO forces from Afghanistan. This is presently the main
    effort of my command, and we have the tools necessary to
    accomplish the task.
        With that, I look forward to answering your questions.
    Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General McKenzie can be found in
    the Appendix on page 74.]
        The Chairman. Thank you very much.
        General Townsend.

      STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
                             AFRICA COMMAND

        General Townsend. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
    and members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for
    the opportunity to appear here today.
        It is a privilege to represent America's exceptional men
    and women at U.S. Africa Command, who are dedicated to securing
    U.S. interest and preserving our strategic options on the
    African continent.
        This morning I am accompanied by one of my key staff
    advisors, Air Force Colonel Jacqueline Breeden. I am also here
    this morning with my colleagues and friends, Ms. Amanda Dory,
    our Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and General
    Frank McKenzie, the CENTCOM Commander, to discuss our shared
    challenges and opportunities and our areas of responsibility
    and the high return the American people get for their defense
    investments around the globe.
        Historically, America has not been penalized for
    underestimating the importance of Africa. Today we can no
    longer afford to underestimate the economic opportunity and
    strategic consequence Africa embodies and which competitors
    like China and Russia recognize.
        Africa is the crossroads of the globe. The recent blockage
    of the Suez Canal not only demonstrated the importance of
    critical sea lines of communication flowing through the
    Mediterranean and Red Seas but also around the Cape of Good
    Hope. Violent extremist organizations, competitor activities,
    and fragile states are among some of the threats to U.S.
    interests.
        Beyond geography, global population growth is largely
    African. By 2050, one in four people on the planet will live in
    Africa. Rapidly growing markets, 60 percent of the Earth's
    arable land, and vast untapped resources, including strategic
    rare earth minerals, provide tremendous economic potential.
    Thirteen of the world's 25 fastest-growing economies are in
    Africa.
        Africa's tremendous opportunities are offset by significant
    challenges, including climate change, food shortages, poverty,
    ungoverned spaces, historic grievances, and other factors that
    make the continent also home to 14 of the world's 20 most
    fragile countries.
        Our strategic competitors are very active in Africa. China
    has invested heavily in their second continent, or as some
    think tanks call it, China's fourth or fifth island chain.
        Russia seeks to exploit instability and fragility for their
    own gain and at U.S. expense. Iran is also increasingly active
    on the continent. African-based VEOs [violent extremist
    organizations], like al-Qaida, their affiliate, Al-Shabab, and
    ISIS, thrive in the continent's ungoverned spaces. They provide
    the greatest threat to many of our African partners and aspire
    to kill Americans in Africa as well as here at home.
        Across this diverse continent, USAFRICOM operates with .3
    percent of DOD's budget and .3 percent of DOD's manpower. This
    tiny investment pays enormous dividends as just under 6,000
    service members, civilians, and contractors work with our
    partners, both interagency and foreign, to counter malign
    actors and transnational threats, respond to crises, and
    strengthen security forces to advance U.S. interests and
    promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.
        AFRICOM works every day to protect America's security and
    advance our access and influence. We do this arm in arm with
    the U.S. interagency and through coordinated action with allies
    and partners.
        What AFRICOM accomplishes with a few people and a few
    dollars on a continent three and a half times the size of the
    continental United States is a bargain for the American
    taxpayer and a low-cost insurance policy for America.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thanks for your
    continued support to our Armed Forces. I looked forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in
    the Appendix on page 98.]
        The Chairman. Thank you all very much.
        I think something you said very interesting there about
    Africa and our investment there and DOD's investment there is a
    lot of bang for the buck. And as I look around the world, I
    think with the multiple challenges that we have that is sort of
    key to how we approach them is, you know, how can we make a
    difference and cover all of the areas we cover, and that--I
    know SOCOM [United States Special Operations Command] has been
    very involved in that, being present in countries, building
    partner capacity, working with other allies. Can you expand
    upon that a little bit and how that plays out in Africa as you
    deal with all of the various challenges that are spread out
    across the continent?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Chairman. So, first of all,
    everything we do is through partners. America, America's
    military, is not really in the lead for anything in Africa. We
    work first with our African partners. We work secondarily
    through other partners like Europeans, notably in West Africa
    the French, for example, but many countries actually.
        So everything we do--and our interagency partners, of
    course. So everything we do is through partners and, Chairman,
    U.S. Special Operations Command.
        A lot of the troops who have boots on the ground in Africa
    are U.S. special operating forces, not all of them. There are
    plenty of general purposes forces there as well.
        So we don't try to be all things to all people. We try to
    focus our efforts in priority areas. There are 53 countries in
    my area of operation. We don't have--we don't try to win in all
    53 countries, but we do try to focus our efforts where it
    matters the most for America's security.
        The Chairman. I will now ask you a question that is
    probably impossible to answer at this point, but I am curious
    what you think. As we pull out of Afghanistan--I mean, the
    budget in Afghanistan last year was $14 billion, 3,500 troops,
    a lot of what we have been doing has been about the rotations
    that are involved in sending our forces into Afghanistan.
        With that extra money and those extra forces, have you
    guys, you know, within the Pentagon started to think about how
    do we then distribute them? Do we bring them all home? Are
    there places in Africa or elsewhere where you could shore up
    your efforts? How do you see a benefit coming from, you know,
    reducing that expenditure by that amount?
        And, General McKenzie, it is your AOR's [area of
    responsibility's] starting point. So I would be curious what
    your thoughts are, and I know this is probably early on, but
    curious where you see that going.
        General McKenzie. Sir, I think there are--as our forces
    come out and we are able to reposture, I think first of all we
    have to look at what we define as the pacing threats for the
    Department. And I think we look to China, we look to Russia,
    and we have to look at those areas.
        I think some of the forces are going to remain in Central
    Command because we are going to look at offshore over-the-
    horizon options, and that is going to require us to do some
    things. Nothing on the scale of the expenditures that you are
    seeing now in Afghanistan, of course, but we will still need to
    do some things there as well.
        But I think broadly it is going to be a significant lever
    for the Department to apply against what I agree are the most
    significant challenges that we face today.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        With that, I will recognize Mr. Wilson, who I believe is
    with us virtually.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank our
    witnesses for being here today, and I am real grateful.
        General McKenzie, a question. I believe the U.S.-Israel
    relationship is of paramount importance to U.S. foreign policy.
    Given that Israel has now been moved into the purview of
    CENTCOM, I want to ensure that our cooperation with Israel
    continues to be a priority. In moving Israel to CENTCOM, it is
    important that we don't undermine the cooperation Israel has in
    Europe, particularly with NATO.
        The question would be, how are we ensuring this move does
    not undermine agreements and understandings that currently
    exist?
        General McKenzie. Sir, that is a great question about
    Israel. So today Israel does most of its operational business
    with U.S. Central Command. Their threats typically emanate from
    the east. Nonetheless, they have broad enduring cultural and
    other ties to the Europeans and to NATO.
        So as part of direction I have received from the Secretary
    of Defense, over the next several months we will work a careful
    plan to integrate Israel into the Central Command AOR while
    preserving their unique nature and their unique ties back into
    Western Europe.
        So we think we have a good plan to do that, but in many
    ways the movement into the Central Command AOR simply reflects
    an operational fact that has been in existence for some time.
    We work closely with them every day. Now we will have not a
    divided responsibility for it, but rather a single
    responsibility for it.
        But I will tell you that I will still be in very close
    touch with General Tod Wolters and U.S. European Command as we
    go forward. And I think that is an important relationship, as
    you note, but also it is going to be important for Israel to
    have the opportunity to develop normalized relationships with
    Arab nations. And that is one of the key things that will
    accrue from having them in the Central Command AOR.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much, and I appreciate
    that assurance to our friends of Israel.
        Secretary Dory, the U.S. defensive expeditionary operations
    are enabled by a network of American bases and facilities
    hosted in allied and partner countries, particularly in
    Afghanistan. Presuming that the withdrawal of all forces
    results in the loss of control of Bagram and Kandahar airbases,
    how does that complicate our ability to reenter Afghanistan to
    combat research and terrorist groups as we had to do in Iraq?
    What number of U.S. forces would be required to reenter
    Afghanistan without control of existing infrastructure?
        The attacks of 9/11 by Osama bin Laden were from the cave
    in Afghanistan in 2001. What assurance does the President have
    that future attacks will not come from caves of Afghanistan
    against the American public?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, thank you for the question about
    what our future posture will look like with respect to
    Afghanistan following the force drawdown. What I can say at
    this point is that work is underway to adapt to the adjusting
    security environment and consider how to continue to apply
    pressure with respect to potential CT [counterterrorism]
    threats emanating from Afghanistan, so looking throughout the
    region in terms of over-the-horizon opportunities. Of course,
    the surveillance intelligence component of that is fundamental
    to ensuring the type of scenario that you just laid out would
    not persist in the future with respect to individuals in caves
    who had threatened the U.S. homeland.
        But I can say from the decision process that the President
    led with his national security team is that there was
    consideration of a range of scenarios for the future of
    Afghanistan and our ability to continue to apply pressure, but
    the commitment is that there will not be threats emanating from
    Afghanistan against the U.S. homeland looking ahead in the
    future.
        Mr. Wilson. And additionally, Secretary, over the last
    several years of the conflict in Syria, Iran has entrenched
    itself deeply within Syrian territory. It has bases, factories,
    weapon storage facilities. These pose a threat to U.S. interest
    in the region, including our alliance with Israel as well as
    safety of the Syrian people who often are being used as human
    shields.
        Does the U.S. continue to support the freedom of action for
    Israel to address the Iranian threats emanating from Syria?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, our commitment to Israel remains
    ironclad. I think we have seen through the Secretary's initial
    visit to Israel last week, and in the dialogues that have been
    conducted with Israel already in this administration, including
    a rejuvenated effort led by the National Security Advisor, that
    the relationship remains robust and close, that there is a
    strong level of dialogue and commitment to one another.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Can you hear me okay, Mr.
    Chairman?
        The Chairman. Yes. We have got you. We will turn your
    volume up a little bit here, but you are good. Go ahead.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, good morning, and I want to
    thank our witnesses for your testimony today.
        So we have heard entities like Special Operations Command
    say that counter-VEO is a form of great power competition.
    General Townsend, do you agree that that statement is true?
    And, if so, why?
        General Townsend. Thank you, Congressman. I absolutely
    believe that statement is true. In fact, we say that often in
    Africa, and here is why. So what is--we don't use the term
    ``great power competition'' there. Our partners don't really
    like to hear that term, so we use ``global power competition''
    in Africa.
        What is the purpose of global power competition but to
    expand America's access and influence? So how do you get that?
    You get that by helping a partner with a problem that they
    have. And one of the significant problems that many of our
    African partners have is the scourge of terrorism. So by doing
    counter-VEO or counterterrorist operations supporting our
    African partners, we are gaining access and influence by doing
    that. Absolutely, in Africa, counterterrorism operations are a
    way of global power competition.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I personally also agree with that
    statement, and I think it is important that we look at these
    holistically because terrorism is not going away anytime soon,
    in my view.
        But what other forms of great power competition happen in
    Africa or global competition, as you talk about it? What role
    does the military play as China, particularly, makes diplomatic
    and economic inroads there?
        General Townsend. So China and Russia are very active in
    Africa. Russia is very active with arms sales, but most of
    their activity on the continent I judge to be self-interested
    and exploitative in nature. And I think though they may be a
    threat today, I think they are less of a threat tomorrow.
        China, however, is of great concern. They are literally
    everywhere on the continent. They are placing a lot of bets
    down. They are spending a lot of money. We know they use debt
    trap diplomacy, coercion, with corrupt politicians. They build
    a lot of critical infrastructure, and they--so most of their
    competition is through economic means, building infrastructure
    and trapping African countries in bad loans that give the
    Chinese access to that infrastructure after they build it.
        They are also--you know, their first overseas military
    base, their only one, is in Africa, and they have just expanded
    that by adding a significant pier that can support even their
    aircraft carriers in the future.
        Around the continent, they are looking for other basing
    opportunities. They are also doing cooperation in the
    intelligence realm that concerns me significantly. I would say
    that they have offered training and arms sales. Frequently that
    winds up working out okay for us because their quality of their
    equipment that they sell frequently is inferior and the
    Africans wind up being disappointed with both the equipment
    they get from China and the training they get from China. But
    China is a learning organization, and they are the concern for
    the future.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
        Let me turn to General McKenzie, if I could. General
    McKenzie, in your testimony, you list great power competition
    as your third priority behind containing Iran's reigning
    influence in CVEO [counter violent extremist organization]
    operations. What does great power competition look like in your
    AOR and what is your timeframe for shifting your priorities
    with great power competition?
        General McKenzie. Sir, so we see with Russia disruptive
    activities. You know, they seized a foothold in Syria that
    allows them to pursue an age-old dream of a warmwater port in
    the Eastern Mediterranean and basing in the Eastern
    Mediterranean, which also allows them a lily pad to go into
    Africa. So Russia is generally opportunistic weapons sales, as
    General Townsend noted.
        China is, as in Africa, playing a much deeper and a longer
    game, and it is principally an economic effort, although we
    believe they do aspire at some point to have basing in the
    theater, but that is still ahead of them. But right now we see
    China as principally economic.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you. Ms. Dory, as Mr. Langevin just
    mentioned, General McKenzie has in his comments the importance
    of deterring Iran, looking to how do we strengthen our allies,
    and the importance of intelligence to be able to respond to
    their malign activities.
        In your statement, throughout you reference the malign
    activities that Iran has done and has performed that is
    obviously of grave concern. Other than entering back into the
    JCPOA, which is a flawed agreement and which they have
    currently breached, what else do we need to be doing to deter
    Iran?
        Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. I would start off by
    saying the President has chosen to lead with respect to
    diplomacy when it comes to JCPOA and the nuclear file. That
    leaves an important role for DOD with respect to deterring
    malign activity in the other range of activities Iran engages
    in.
        And so there is a very important role for the Department to
    continue with respect to the range of allies and partners in
    the region, to backstop them to have forces on the ground
    working to advise, train, and assist with the different
    partners. Each partnership has its own character and quality,
    but the combination of the force presence, the ability to
    provide the President with options, in the event those are
    required, those are the fundamental roles of the Department at
    this point.
        Mr. Turner. General McKenzie, you mentioned ISR
    [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and the tools
    that are necessary to be able to deter Iran, specifically
    citing MQ-9. I know that you know that there is pressure on the
    committee for the purposes of diminishing the role of MQ-9 and
    other deployable ISR.
        I thought you might want to take an opportunity to give a
    commercial for the importance of that tool as you look to
    deterring Iran.
        General McKenzie. Well, sir, let me begin by saying I
    recognize that there is a global demand for ISR, and also we
    need to move beyond the MQ-9 system, which is the backbone
    system for U.S. Central Command. The future is going to demand
    bigger, better, different kinds of ISR, more sophisticated than
    what we have got now. However, right now for me the MQ-9 is a
    very good platform.
        And we have found that particularly against Iran, they do
    not like their activities to be exposed. In the summer of 2019,
    we believe we stopped several imminent attack streams from
    ships at sea simply by positioning MQ-9s overhead, so they
    could hear them operating. I am confident of that. The
    intelligence is very clear on that.
        So the intelligence, first of all--the platform, first of
    all, allows us to gather intelligence. But, second, we have an
    observed and reported-upon deterring effect on Iran by simply
    manipulating those platforms. So I use them, but I am not
    insensitive to the future of this platform and the fact that we
    have got to make some adjustments globally.
        Mr. Turner. Great. In your comments, you emphasize our need
    to work with our allies. Certainly, in working with those
    allies, we need to be strengthening their capabilities. The
    Trump administration had entered into a transaction to provide
    the F-35 to UAE [United Arab Emirates]. The Biden
    administration has confirmed its interest in continuing to do
    so.
        Could you speak for a moment about how important it is for
    us to have advanced tools and equipment like the F-35, and
    certainly weapons systems, in the hands of our allies that join
    with us in trying to deter Iran?
        General McKenzie. So one of the key aspects to deterring
    Iran is an international community that is devoted to that
    deterrence. Iran has no friends, so what we have is lots of
    friends, friends across the region and friends across the globe
    as well.
        But one of the things for supporting our friends in the
    region is to give them the best capability that we can afford
    to give them, consistent with the other requirements, such as
    reassurance of Israel, which is always in my mind when I give
    advice on these deals, but it is not a CENTCOM decision.
        But I think that is a good capability and it will stand us
    in good stead with our friends in UAE.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Townsend, I don't know if I need an answer. This
    won't be--it will be a comment, really. On this issue that Mr.
    Langevin brought up about CT [counterterrorism] and global
    power competition, my concern with your answer--as the concern
    I have expressed with SOCOM--is just that sometimes it should
    only be a CT mission and not creep into something else, and
    sometimes it should start out as a global power competition
    mission and not be necessarily be based in a CT mission.
        That may not be the case for everywhere on the continent of
    Africa for you, but do you have--I guess I do have a question.
    Do you have an example where a SOCOM mission that is operating
    under AFRICOM is just a global power competition mission?
        General Townsend. Yes, Congressman. I would prefer to
    discuss that in the----
        Mr. Larsen. Yes or no is fine with me, and you said yes. I
    appreciate that. I just want to make the point that sometimes
    they are related and sometimes they are not. And I don't need
    to--I don't want to keep hearing CT is GPC [global power
    competition] because it sounds like an excuse to keep CT all
    the time, and sometimes it is not appropriate and sometimes it
    is.
        And we are just trying to--I am trying to get SOCOM to
    think through this a little bit more than I think I am getting
    the impression that they are. So, but I have been clear to
    SOCOM folks about that as well.
        So let's stay on the continent, actually specific
    countries. And, Secretary Dory, 20 years ago I was in
    Afghanistan all the time when I got here. Just in the last 3
    weeks--I wouldn't have heard this 20 years ago--I have heard
    from Ugandan constituents, they are from--their country of
    origin is Uganda. I have heard from constituents from Tigray. I
    think I have got that pronounced correctly. I don't want to be
    disrespectful. About their respective problems in those
    countries.
        Wouldn't have heard that 20 years ago. My district is
    changing. The country is changing. We are a nation of
    immigrants and new immigrants. So can you--on those two areas,
    can you give us--give this committee or give me an update?
    Something I can tell my constituents who are both concerned
    about the elections in Uganda and my other constituents who are
    concerned about how their families are being treated in
    Northern Ethiopia.
        Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. In that period of time, I
    previously served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa.
    So for some of us, those were areas we were working on even
    before the recent renaissance, if you will.
        In terms of Uganda, what I would say there is the U.S.
    Government is very concerned at this point in terms of the
    quality, or lack thereof, of the election, the repression
    against the other candidates who contested the election, and
    the actions of the security services in Uganda in terms of
    repressing participation by citizens and their concerns in
    governments.
        So messages in particular via the State Department are
    robust with respect to our concerns. We do recognize the
    positive role that Uganda has played with respect to the AMISOM
    [African Union Mission in Somalia] mission in Somalia over
    many, many years, on the one hand, but that does not
    counterbalance the concerns in terms of the repression that is
    underway in Uganda proper.
        Similarly, with respect to Ethiopia and Tigray, intensive
    concerns on the part of the U.S. Government with respect to the
    conflict underway there, and concerns that it is fundamental to
    have a negotiated settlement to the conflict at this point. You
    have participation by regional players in addition to the
    different groups within Ethiopia and the way forward is through
    dialogue, and that is something that our Embassy on the ground
    and the State Department are leaning into robustly.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
        General Townsend, back to you. Can you comment on
    Mozambique--in the last 45 seconds--if we are--how you assess
    what is happening in Northern Mozambique and what does that
    mean for decisions and advice you are providing to the
    Department?
        General Townsend. Over the last 2 years, ISIS Mozambique
    has been an increasing threat in Northern Mozambique in the
    Cabo Delgado Province. As you saw a couple of weeks ago, they
    launched a 7- to 10-day siege on the town of Palma. It is not
    clear to me if they are actually more than just local groups
    flying an ISIS flag of convenience, but ISIS core has claimed
    them as their own.
        My view is that the African partners need to do more, and
    European partners need to do more before the United States does
    more there.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you. The ranking member is recognized.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McKenzie, in your 2020 posture statement, you noted
    that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS had the
    potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria. I am interested in
    your thoughts in your 2021 posture statement about that, as
    well as ISIS blossoming under a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan
    after we leave.
        General McKenzie. Sir, in Iraq and Syria, we have completed
    the physical destruction of what was the so-called ISIS
    caliphate. ISIS remnants still remain in Syria and some in Iraq
    as well. They find it difficult, if not impossible, to hold
    ground. They can still conduct small-scale terror attacks, and
    they do that. But largely in Iraq and Syria, in Iraq, the Iraqi
    security forces are generally able to handle that problem.
        We are not patrolling with the Iraqis on the ground. The
    Iraqis are doing it. Now, we provide them enabling support. We
    provide them high-level advice and assist, but generally the
    Iraqis are doing that themselves.
        In Syria, it is sort of the same thing. Our SEF [Syrian
    elite forces] partners there are conducting those operations
    with our back-in-the-rear advice and support for them. So those
    operations are continuing.
        Now, the future in Iraq and Syria is not going to be
    bloodless. ISIS is not going to go away. It is going to remain.
    But our objective there is to enable local security forces that
    we have trained and enabled to be able to handle the problem at
    a local level without significant external assistance from
    either us or our European allies.
        The other component of that is you want to prevent those
    elements from being able to develop global connective tissue to
    reach out to other entities. And that is not only a physical
    fight on the ground there but also a fight in cyber, and we
    conducted in all of those domains.
        So that is the way I read the picture right now. Continued
    pressure is still necessary. The trends are moving the right
    way, and the strategic dialogue with our Iraqi partners is just
    one example of that moving forward. As we go forward, we will
    be able to look to reexamine the posture we have in Iraq, and
    that will be something we will take a look at here in the
    future with our Iraqi partners.
        In Afghanistan, as you noted, the principal reason that,
    you know, we see that ISIS and al-Qaida have been so
    significantly degraded has been the significant CT pressure
    that we have been able to put on them over the past several
    years. ISIS is very small in Afghanistan, probably several
    hundred fighters, ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-
    Khorasan] a little bigger but still disaggregated. They have
    not been able to hold ground successfully in the East. They
    look to--you know, they look to reassert themselves if they
    can, but pressure is the important component of that.
        And I see that I am out of time there.
        Mr. Rogers. So if we are gone and the coalition forces are
    gone and Taliban does take a more prominent role in
    Afghanistan, is it a concern of yours that they may increase
    their presence, so without us there to push back?
        General McKenzie. So the Taliban has undertaken to agree to
    not allow that to happen. With the Taliban, I have learned to
    not listen to what they say, but rather to watch what they do.
    So we will watch closely what they do.
        Mr. Rogers. Great.
        General Townsend, given the massive size of your AOR, I
    would like to hear more about your additional--any additional
    resources or capabilities you need, particularly in the
    southern part of the continent, in the western part, to carry
    out your mission. Are you adequately resourced in that part of
    the continent?
        General Townsend. Ranking Member, as you noted, you know,
    Africa is three and a half times the size of the continent of
    the United States, and we have about 6,000 total troops spread
    over that area. We don't have a significant footprint from
    about the equator south, and I am not sure that we need that.
        I would say that, you know, our force posture is under
    review as part of this global posture review, so I don't really
    want to get ahead of my civilian leaders on describing what we
    might need or might not need. However, there are some perennial
    things that are always on the razor's edge of, are we going to
    get that or are we not going to get that?
        One of them is the ISR that General McKenzie has already
    mentioned. The simple fact of the matter is we do not have
    enough to do what we assess we need to do in Africa. Realize
    there is pressure on it across the entire Department.
        And then our warfighter recovery network, which is
    providing timely casualty evacuation and medical care to our
    troops, that is a fairly--we do most of that through
    contracted. We don't actually need to put pressure on low-
    density, high-demand units like military Medevac and personnel
    recovery assets.
        We can do most of our work through contracted sources. That
    takes money, and we are always waiting to get that money to
    make sure our troops have what they need. Those are probably
    two things right off the top of my head.
        Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And, again, General McKenzie, thank you for reminding us
    just a moment ago that there actually was an agreement in place
    that the sitting government of this country entered into in the
    last administration. And in many respects, the announcement
    that President Biden made was really to try and make that
    agreement more logistically executable, so that we are not in a
    situation like Saigon 1975.
        So Ms. Dory sort of alluded a moment ago to the fact that
    we are still going to retain over-the-horizon capability to
    make sure that a counterterrorism effort can continue and
    protect the homeland. Can you describe just a little bit more
    in detail what that looks like? Because that is I think the
    real heartburn that I certainly pick up from my constituents
    about the decision.
        Is it going to be at sea? Is it going to be in neighboring
    countries where we, again, have the ability to deploy assets
    to, again, respond to a terrorist threat?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I am actually conducting detailed
    planning by direction of the Secretary to look at those options
    right now, and I will report back to him by the end of the
    month with some alternatives. But I can broadly state, if you
    leave Afghanistan and you want to go back in to conduct these
    kinds of operations, there are three things you need to do. You
    need to find the target, you need to fix the target, and you
    need to be able to finish the target.
        So those three things all--the first two require heavy
    intelligence support. And if you are out of the country and you
    don't have the ecosystem that we have there now, it will be
    harder to do that. It is not impossible to do that. It will
    just be harder to do it.
        You will have to base your overhead ISR, if we are no
    longer within Afghanistan, where an MQ-9 can take off and be
    over its target in a matter of minutes, to perhaps much further
    away.
        We will look at all of the countries in the region. Our
    diplomats will reach out, and we will talk about places where
    we could base those resources. Some of them may be very far
    away, and then there would be a significant bill for those
    types of resources because you would have to cycle a lot of
    them in and out.
        That is all doable, however. So there are ways to get to
    the find and the fix part. The fix part is very important,
    though, because if we are going to strike something, we are
    going to strike it in concert with the law of armed conflict
    and the American way of war. We are going to minimize
    collateral damage. We are going to make sure we have a precise
    target and that we are going to be able to control what happens
    there.
        It is difficult to do that at range. It is not impossible
    to do that at range. And so you have a variety of ways that you
    could actually strike the target if you chose to do that. You
    could do it with long-range precision fires. You could do it
    with manned raids. All of those are inherently dangerous, but
    you could still do it.
        You could do it with manned aircraft. There are problems
    with all three of those options, but there is also
    opportunities with all three of those options.
        So I don't want to make light of it. I don't want to put on
    rose-colored glasses and say it is going to be easy to do. I
    can tell you that the U.S. military can do just about anything,
    and we are examining this problem with all of our resources
    right now to find a way to do it, you know, in the most
    intelligent, risk-free manner that we can.
        Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you for that answer. Again, I
    think it is important to, you know, remember that we are not in
    the same mind-set we were at the time of 9/11. I mean, I think,
    you know, certainly it sounds like, again, you are very focused
    in terms of making sure that a threat like what occurred back
    then is going to be planned for and, again, addressed as the
    case may be.
        General Townsend, in the last NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act], there probably were at least two or three
    provisions regarding critical minerals and rare earth minerals,
    which I have been on this committee a while, that was pretty
    unique. But, again, I think from a security standpoint I think
    there is now a pretty widespread recognition that China has
    been very methodical and successful in terms of cornering the
    market, in terms of critical minerals. And Africa I think is
    clearly a part of the world that they have succeeded at that.
        Again, your map on economic activity I realize was kind of
    a global view, but is that something that AFRICOM is watching
    and at least being able to help, if nothing else, educate us
    back here about the fact that, you know, we have got to pay
    attention to this, because they have a stranglehold--let's face
    it--in terms of things like antimony and cobalt, lithium, all
    of these minerals that go into everything from our cell phones
    to platforms that we need for our national defense.
        General Townsend. Congressman, you said it great. So the
    Russians are looking--to me, they are looking at exploiting and
    short-term gain. The Chinese have a much longer term view that
    is more concerning to me. And so they are not only mining rare
    earth minerals in Africa for their own use, they are cornering
    the market on these concerns in Africa to have them under
    control for a rainy day in the future. That should be of
    concern to us.
        As you look at the list of rare earth minerals--and you
    named a few of them--a couple of others, tantalum, and I was
    just looking at these today----
        The Chairman. I am sorry. General, I do apologize. The
    gentleman's time has expired. I want to try to get the other
    folks here.
        General Townsend. Sure.
        The Chairman. Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am concerned because, as Robert Gates said famously
    regarding--when Joe Biden was a Senator, and then Vice
    President, he seemed to be on the wrong side of foreign policy
    decisions at almost every turn.
        You could go back to the 1980s when the nuclear freeze was
    being discussed and that would have frozen a permanent
    advantage into Russia's favor, or Soviet Union's favor, to as
    Vice President promoting the withdrawal of troops out of Iraq
    that let ISIS come to the fore or counseling against the strike
    against Osama bin Laden, and on and on and on.
        And I am just concerned that we are seeing this bad
    decision-making today with Afghanistan and Iran.
        So on Afghanistan, General McKenzie, are you able to tell
    us whether or not you advised the President to unilaterally
    withdraw by September 11 all U.S. forces, or are you able to
    not--are you not able to discuss that?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I can tell you that I had multiple
    opportunities to have a detailed conversation with the
    President and give my advice. He heard my advice. I am not
    going to be able to share it with you here this morning, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Regarding the Taliban, we have talked a
    little bit about that. The ranking member had some questions.
    Are they a reliable partner in negotiations?
        General McKenzie. I have grave doubts about the Taliban's
    reliability. I have expressed those publicly going back for a
    long period of time, but we need to see what they are going to
    do here.
        The fact of the matter is, if let's say we leave, if they
    want any form of future international recognition for
    Afghanistan, if they want any form of international support,
    they are going to have to keep the agreements that they have
    made. We will be able to observe that and see it very clearly
    and directly, whether or not they are able to do it.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am happy to hear that we are going to
    be watching them closely, but my concern is that we have been
    watching them closely, and they have been pretty much uniformly
    unreliable.
        Ms. Dory, I would like to ask you about Iran. Recently,
    they made the announcement that they were going to upgrade
    their highly-enriched uranium to 60 percent, and that pretty
    much goes against everything that we want them to be doing or
    peace-loving people in the world want them to be doing. So what
    is the Biden administration going to do about that?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, I think what we see with that
    announcement is playing out in terms of the public nature of
    the announcement is the jockeying for leverage with respect to
    the negotiations that are underway in Vienna right now.
        So it is important what is happening in public. It is also
    important what is happening behind closed doors and whether we
    are getting closer through the talks that are underway to a
    resumption of compliance on the part of Iran with the
    agreement.
        Mr. Lamborn. Would you agree that upgrading their HEU
    [highly enriched uranium] to 60 percent is unacceptable?
        Ms. Dory. Absolutely.
        Mr. Lamborn. And how close does that get them to weapons-
    grade-capable HEU, highly enriched uranium?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, it puts them farther along that
    path. You know, the 90 percent level and above is where you
    would need to be in terms of weapons-grade uranium.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I have just got a lot of concerns.
    Like you, General McKenzie, I am going to be watching closely.
    Oh, I do have one last question for you, General McKenzie, my
    last minute. And this is a concern I have that--where we are
    not taking advantage of a capability that we have.
        We have purchased some Iron Dome batteries from Israel, and
    we know that these are highly-capable units shooting down
    incoming rockets and missiles. Are there places in CENTCOM
    where we could be using these Iron Dome batteries? And my
    understanding is we are not using them at all. I hope I am
    wrong on that. But if we are not using them at all, aren't
    there places where they could be put to good use?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I would prefer to talk to that a
    little more directly in a closed session a little bit later
    this afternoon. But I will just tell you this: we looked
    globally at the management of our air defense assets. CENTCOM
    has requirements.
        There are other places in the world that have requirements
    as well, and we just need to bear that in mind, that I can go
    in and fight for the resources for CENTCOM, but there are in
    fact other places in the world that need air defense assets as
    well. And so I need--I do recognize that.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. But let's continue that discussion later
    today.
        General McKenzie. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you all for being here, and I yield
    back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General McKenzie, is it true that President Trump reduced
    the number of troops from 10,000 to 2,500 via a tweet last
    year, and then via another tweet decided that we would leave by
    May, early May, all troops out of Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I believe he tweeted it, but my
    orders came through the chain of command resultantly from the
    President to the Secretary, written orders. And in the
    Department of Defense, we move troops based on executed orders.
        So he may have tweeted that at the beginning. I am not
    exactly aware of the time when he did or didn't do it. But the
    chain of command, which the President sits at the top of, is
    what directs us to move forces.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So it was President Trump that said
    all troops would be out by May of this year.
        General McKenzie. Conditions-based.
        Mr. Garamendi. Conditions-based. Okay. Just a slight
    clarification there of the way in which we now find ourselves
    with troops leaving in September.
        My question is to the countries surrounding Afghanistan.
    What is your assessment, Ms. Dory, first, and then General
    McKenzie, about the role of the surrounding countries--
    Pakistan, India, China, Russia, others--how are they going to
    respond to the departure of NATO and U.S. troops?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, I think you will see an array of
    hedging behaviors as the U.S. and coalition forces begin to
    depart. And as we focus in on a diplomatic first presence in
    the country, you will see behaviors in terms of--already we see
    it with Pakistan where Pakistan is applying pressure to an
    extent with respect to the Taliban out of concern for the
    impact on Pakistan should civil war break out again, and
    refugee flows affect their country.
        I think that same dynamic is true with the other neighbors
    as well where each is looking at the situation now to assess
    for themselves what are the risks, what are the threats, and
    how will we posture ourselves going forward.
        Mr. Garamendi. General.
        General McKenzie. Sir, I think Ms. Dory captured it pretty
    clearly. I think the country that is going to be the most
    affected, frankly, is going to be Pakistan because of the
    possibility of unconstrained refugee flow because of the
    possibility of renewed terrorist attacks in Pakistan that could
    ramp up as a result of this. All of those things are certainly
    very possible.
        I think we should also--the countries to the north of
    Afghanistan will also be concerned--Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz
    Republic, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan--those countries up there
    because they are going to be worried about refugee flow and the
    flow of fighters perhaps to the north as well.
        So I think all of them are going--we will see what happens
    when we leave. They will look at how we posture after we go,
    and then they will have to decide, you know, the way they are
    going to go forward with that. It is going to be--they are
    going to face some very tough choices, though.
        Mr. Garamendi. So they may or may not be encouraging or
    engaging in what could be a civil war. You just don't know.
        General McKenzie. I think they will all be keenly aware of
    the probable--should a civil war occur, they will be very aware
    of the population flow, the violence that will certainly spill
    over from Afghanistan if that is the case.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
        Let's turn to Africa. General Townsend, climate change, the
    Sahel, how is climate change likely to affect at least the
    Sahel area and, if we have time, beyond?
        General Townsend. Well, first of all, I think AFRICOM's
    role is to support the State Department and USAID [United
    States Agency for International Development] in this area of
    climate change. But we see clear evidence of that on the
    African continent and probably--you mentioned the Sahel. The
    biggest issue we see there is water shortages and
    desertification of the farmland there. And that spreading
    southward of the Sahara Desert is probably one of our biggest
    concerns, and that sparks all kinds of conflict between herders
    and farmers, for example.
        I think the ways--the Department of Defense is looking at a
    lot of ways we have been charged by the President and Secretary
    of Defense to look at ways we can contribute to helping
    mitigate the climate change problem. Some of those ways are
    with unique energy solutions, and those kind of projects are
    starting to unfold in Africa.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman is recognized by 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
    our witnesses for joining us today.
        General McKenzie, I would like to begin with you. You know,
    there is a concern that I have about the tension between our
    service branch chiefs and our combatant commanders, as your
    demand signal is before you with the global force management
    allocation plan and generating readiness today, and the service
    branch chiefs focus on making sure that there is not only
    readiness today but there is modernization and we will call it
    revitalization for meeting the future demand significant.
        Let me ask to begin here, when we look at the GFMAP [global
    force management allocation plan] today, and we see in many
    circumstances the increased number of RFFs, request for forces,
    does that reflect that the continuity of what is happening is
    changing, or is the GFMAP maybe a little bit outdated and we
    need to look at that? Give me your perspective on where that
    dynamic is today from your thoughts.
        General McKenzie. Certainly, sir. Thank you. So my last job
    before I was the Commander of U.S. Central Command, I was the
    director of the joint staff. And before that, I was the J5 of
    the U.S. Joint Staff, so I was at the very core of the GFMAP
    process. I would consider myself an expert on the GFMAP
    process.
        And so there is always going to be a natural tension
    between those who raise and maintain forces and those who
    employ forces. That is natural. It goes back as long as we have
    had joint chiefs and combatant commanders.
        So that is just a natural byproduct of that. It is not new,
    and those tensions are adjudicated by really only one person
    and that is the Secretary of Defense. And the process to do
    that adjudication is actually quite good.
        Now, the GFMAP is actually a design for the future. And
    like any design for the future, it is based on a set of
    assumptions, that the GFMAP is as good as the assumptions that
    were made. I would argue that over the last couple of years the
    GFMAP has not completely incorporated the rise of Iran in the
    White House's thinking and importance. So there were a lot of
    tensions as a result of that.
        Should tensions with Iran go down, or should we adopt a new
    policy, then you could have a GFMAP that would be more aligned
    to that. But, again, the key thing is, the GFMAP is simply a
    plan. Any plan is based on assumptions. If the assumptions
    change, you have to change the plan.
        So I am not particularly--when I was the director, I wasn't
    particularly concerned by it. Now that I am a COCOM [combatant
    commander], I am not particularly concerned by it. I ask what
    forces I need based on the tasks I am given. It is the
    Secretary, advised by the joint staff and by his civilian
    leadership in the Department, to determine if they can fix that
    by either changing the task they have given me, giving me more
    forces, or accepting the risk, and then that is a risk that we
    all know and understand.
        So I would argue, frankly, the process works pretty good.
    We might not like the answers from the process, but it is a
    pretty good process.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure. Yeah. That is a constant dynamic is
    mitigating risk today versus risk in the future, and how much
    risk can we take today to make sure we mitigate in the future.
    Unfortunately, it seems like history looks at us in a not-so-
    kind way and that many times we have not estimated well what
    the future risk is, and we focus too much on what is front of
    us today.
        So hopefully as we look at what is out there--and I am glad
    you mentioned the dynamic element of the environment--and how
    we are looking at that future versus today in generation of
    force and readiness.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thanks.
        General Townsend, let me point to you. I know that in your
    AOR you see that Russia is looking to increase influence there.
    You see their effort in the agreement with Sudan for
    essentially putting a naval base there for the next 25 years.
    My concern is, again, you see the Chinese presence in Djibouti,
    now you see Russian presence in Sudan, you see them trying to
    expand their influence in those areas.
        Are there concerns that this development or this placement
    of hardware there could go to other areas? Could it go to areas
    like South Sudan and areas in the Tigray region of Ethiopia?
    Are we going to see an expansion of Russian influence in that
    area? What are your perspectives in what we see with Russian
    activity?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I am concerned about
    what Russia is doing on the continent. First, their influence
    in Libya, that seems to be maybe trending in a positive
    direction. Next concern I have, as you just pointed out, is
    Sudan and their efforts to place a naval base there. That
    project has been a little fraught with some friction for them,
    but they seem to be trying to push that forward.
        First of all, I would say that there are two types of naval
    bases, so here I am an Army infantryman talking about naval
    bases. But my naval component commander has educated me a
    little bit. There is two types. The one type where you can stop
    and get gas and groceries, that is useful for port calls and
    steaming around the world, but for war you need a militarily
    useful naval base and the ability to rearm and repair ships. So
    it is not clear to me that they--they are just on the ground
    stages of trying to get an agreement solidified to get. So we
    have got some time to work this.
        I am concerned about what they are doing, and you have
    mentioned that they connect all the way, that Russian activity
    connects all the way to the----
        The Chairman. I apologize, General. The gentleman's time
    has expired. My bad.
        Mr. Brown is recognized.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Is that my
    echo? Mr. Chairman, can you come back to me and maybe tech can
    help me with this, or am I okay?
        The Chairman. We are hearing you just fine. Are you hearing
    an echo?
        Mr. Brown. Yeah. I am hearing an echo. Are you?
        The Chairman. No. We have got you loud and clear. We are
    okay.
        Mr. Brown. Okay. Could I just ask, then, that my clock be
    reset to 5 minutes? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Absolutely. We will reset and start now. Go
    ahead.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. I appreciate it. And thank you to our
    panelists.
        General Townsend, a question for you. Acting Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa Affairs, Mr. Meyers,
    recently said that U.S. engagement with the nations of the
    continent is crucial for peace, democracy, and development.
    Could you describe what additional security resources, military
    assistance, and capabilities that you need to mitigate the
    risks and support the various diplomatic, disaster assistance,
    and humanitarian efforts across the continent?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I would like to
    defer my conversation about--my answer about forces, as we are
    engaging in this global posture review. And I haven't presented
    our plans yet or recommendations yet to the Secretary of
    Defense about forces. But other capabilities I would like to
    address, those are foreign military sales, foreign military
    financing, section 333 support, IMET [International Military
    Education and Training]. Those types of security assistance are
    absolutely vital to our ability to get our mission accomplished
    in Africa.
        And AFRICOM has seen significant reductions in those types
    of security assistance over the last couple of years, and one
    of them, IMET, is of great concern, but also 333 funding. So it
    is those types of things that I am willing to talk about, now
    short of actually talking about forces. Over.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. Can you describe how terrorists and
    extremist activity interferes with the humanitarian missions
    and how it stalls economic development across the continent? I
    witnessed that on a CODEL [congressional delegation]. I spoke
    with, you know, representatives from USAID and the Embassy,
    they said they just can't do their work in a secure enough
    environment because of terrorist and extremist activities.
        Can you share a little bit--put a little bit of meat on
    that bone?
        General Townsend. Sure, Congressman. Thank you. So there is
    a symbiotic relationship between those 3Ds--diplomacy,
    development, and defense. And one of the ways we assist those
    two other Ds in getting their work done is providing a secure
    environment. So our work with the security forces of an African
    country is critical to allowing the USAID do development work
    and the Department of State do their diplomatic work.
        And that symbiotic relationship is very evident in Africa,
    and because of it, generally, you know, and security--and
    status of the security environment there, the Department of
    Defense's assistance is regularly needed. Over.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you. And just in what little time we have
    left, for General McKenzie and General Townsend, if you could
    take 30 seconds or so each. Can you please describe the
    programs and initiatives within your command that you use to
    foster a culture of inclusion, diversity, and equity within our
    ranks in your command? General McKenzie.
        General Townsend. Yeah. Go ahead, Frank.
        General McKenzie. Yes, sir. So there are a variety of
    programs, but I would say what is absolutely most important is
    what leaders do by--if you go into the front office of a
    leader, who is in the outer office, who do leaders pick as
    principal staff officers, who--people see those things. And
    while the programs are very important, we have a variety of
    those programs that are underway, I think for a high-level
    leader the most important thing you have to do is act, because
    I think that is what actually people see.
        And I will pause there, sir.
        Mr. Brown. General Townsend.
        General Townsend. Congressman, I think General McKenzie
    said it very well. The only thing I might add is at AFRICOM we
    have a gender advisor on our staff to help us with that. But
    that gets back to what General McKenzie said. It is about what
    leaders do.
        Mr. Brown. And I agree with you that people that you have
    in place and the commitment of leaders to diversity, equity,
    inclusion, are extremely important. I will point out that in
    the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, this committee, along with our
    colleagues in the Senate, collectively Congress, directed the
    Secretary of Defense to establish a mentor program, among many
    other things we have asked him to do regarding diversity,
    equity, and inclusion, but a mentor program to encourage
    greater diversity among more career fields and throughout the
    rank structure.
        So I know you are doing a lot of good things. We are
    probably going to want you to do--step it up even a little bit
    more.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Scott is recognized.
        Mr. Scott. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Townsend, thank you for your support of CODEL
    Panetta in August of 2019. Mr. Brown, Mr. Panetta, Mr.
    Hutchinson, and I had a great trip, learned a lot, and could
    not have learned what we did had it not been for your support.
        At that time, we visited the U.N. [United Nations] Mission
    at Mali, and many of the people in the meeting that we had
    discussed China's activity and expressed concerns that China's
    activity was going to lead to civil war in many of the
    countries on the continent of Africa.
        Yesterday--I am sorry--last week, Admiral Faller, head of
    SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command], testified, and I
    will quote him, ``Our interagency partners in the United States
    pointed out to us, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation],
    and others that Chinese money laundering is the number one
    underwriting source for transnational criminal organizations.''
        In your testimony, you mention on page 12 that illegal,
    unreported, and unregulated fishing by the Communist Chinese is
    the primary contributor to a growing food crisis that will
    further drive instability in West Africa, and obviously food
    crisis and instability have historically led to civil wars.
        My question for you is, how do we stop this activity from
    China, short of absolute war?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. I think the solution
    there is competition, right? We want to compete before war
    comes, and competition is a forever task, because you are
    always trying to stay short of war.
        So with China, we have to compete, and we don't have to
    compete with them in all 53 countries of the AFRICOM AOR
    equally, but we have to pick and choose where we are going to
    compete. And one of the ways we do that is just simply by
    calling out their activity on the continent.
        You mentioned illegal fishing, and they are probably--my
    assessment is they are probably the number one offender in
    illegal fishing. And it is commercial, but we all know that
    China has a command economy. So calling that out has helped us
    a lot.
        Another example is helping countries avoid getting the bad
    deals with China, and this is an example where our Department
    of State does something. I am aware of it, but we offer a free
    service to evaluate the contracts of any of our African
    partners before they enter, sign a contract with China, or a
    Chinese entity.
        The U.S. Embassy will review that contract and point out
    the inconsistencies and the potential pitfalls in that contract
    and advise the African partners, so they can make smart
    decisions.
        Mr. Scott. General, I appreciate your question. I will tell
    you, I also think we need the support of corporate America and
    the American consumer in that while I recognize that our
    manufacturing base has become contingent upon Asia, there are a
    lot of other countries that share our interests and share our
    values outside of China.
        And it bothers me when I walk into a store to buy a power
    tool that virtually every power tool that is available on the
    shelves in America is manufactured in China. And so we have got
    to have some help from corporate America to source our products
    from countries outside of China.
        One of the other things I want to mention is that on that
    CODEL we got to witness the ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha]
    missions and the training missions, and this is something that,
    Ms. Dory, may be more for you. But we bring these young men in
    from Africa, they are 18 or so, they have at best a mid-school,
    sixth, seventh, eighth grade education. We have them onsite for
    24 months, 7 days a week, and they leave with that seventh or
    eighth grade education after we have trained them to fight.
        And my concern is that without an education that they
    become the people that, you know, leave and their ability to
    fight is their greatest asset. So I would encourage you to work
    with your counterparts. This is more of a State Department
    mission, and then maybe more of a mission for the French in the
    area.
        But while we have those young men on our bases, our bases
    where we are training them, I do think it would be worthwhile
    to look at what it would take to educate those men and try to
    move them from that mid-school education closer to a high
    school graduate education.
        With that said, I look forward to the classified hearing.
    My time is up. Thank you. Thank you all for everything you do
    for our country.
        I yield.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Crow is recognized.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for coming
    in here today.
        My first question is to Ms. Dory. Ms. Dory, last NDAA
    process this Congress passed a provision, section 1215, that
    would ensure that any administration--at that time, the Trump
    administration--would actually engage with Congress on the
    issue of Afghanistan. Specifically, 1215 requires that the
    administration make assessments regarding the impeding of
    counterterrorism missions, because we saw what happened with
    the insurgence of ISIS after our withdrawal in Iraq.
        It talks about the risk posed to U.S. personnel because
    these are obviously the men and women that we represent in our
    communities. It talks about the issue of Afghanistan becoming a
    terrorist safe haven and the assessments that are required
    there.
        And, of course, the impact on our partners, allies, and the
    humanitarian conditions on the ground because we have made
    substantial investments and capacity-building investments in
    humanitarian aid, and the men and women and children in
    vulnerable populations in Afghanistan.
        So, with that said, and the fact that this is America's
    war, not any one administration's war, and it is Federal law
    that the administration provide that assessment to Congress in
    advance of a withdrawal from Afghanistan, is it the
    administration's intent to comply with that law and provide
    those assessments to the United States Congress?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, it is my understanding that the
    administration will comply with the law. My understanding,
    further, the briefings that will be provided later today are a
    down payment in some respects with respect to section 1215.
        Mr. Crow. Well, just so you know, I don't expect a briefing
    would satisfy those requirements. And when I say ``comply with
    the law,'' the last administration, the Trump administration,
    basically provided a certification invoking an emergency to
    bypass the intent of the law, not actually provide those
    assessments. And we would expect this administration to comply
    in good faith with the intent of that law, and that is to have
    written and comprehensive assessments.
        Can you provide any insight into which approach the
    administration is going to take here?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, all I can say right now based on
    just the evolving nature of the decision-making process, is the
    decision just happened and we are now moving into
    implementation. But I fully expect compliance with the law in a
    manner that is intended by the Congress.
        Mr. Crow. Okay. Thanks, Ms. Dory.
        General McKenzie, over to you. One of my biggest concerns
    is force protection. Obviously, retrograde operations are some
    of the riskiest things we do. You had testified earlier as to a
    surge of combat power into Afghanistan to set the conditions
    for the withdrawal. But I am gravely concerned as our footprint
    gets smaller what the QRF [quick reaction force] capacity looks
    like in the event the security situation dissolves much faster
    than our assessments might indicate.
        Can you speak to what forces, regional forces, would be
    available and how we are going to ensure that the last
    remaining units in Afghanistan have assistance available to
    them?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I would prefer to talk to specific
    tactical details in the closed session this afternoon, but I
    will be happy to do that in that session.
        I would tell you that I spent a lot of time looking at
    force protection in Afghanistan, but withdrawals such as we are
    doing is based off three components. One is the equipment
    extraction, what you are going to do with it. The other is
    turning over the bases and the infrastructure. And third, and
    the most important, is the force protection itself for our
    forces.
        General Miller and I talk every day about force protection
    in Afghanistan, and I am confident that we will have the forces
    necessary to protect our forces should the Taliban decide to
    begin attacking us on 1 May or at any other date. And I will be
    happy to provide the details to you in a classified forum.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you. Look forward to having that discussion
    this afternoon.
        And, General Townsend, very briefly, I represent one of the
    Nation's largest communities of Ethiopians and Ethiopian
    diaspora. And I am extremely concerned for the security
    situation, particularly the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
    project. Could you provide some insight as to our efforts to
    ensure that that project does not result in regional armed
    conflict?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. With the remaining
    30 seconds, I might want to give some to Ms. Dory on this. We
    are watching the situation with the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,
    and we are trying to keep people informed. I think this is
    mostly a diplomatic-led effort, and I will turn it over to Ms.
    Dory.
        Ms. Dory. I agree fully with General Townsend. There is a
    big diplomatic push at this point with respect to the GERD
    [Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam] concerns.
        Mr. Crow. Okay. Thank you, all of you. Appreciate the
    testimony very much.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I want to make sure members know--
    I did not announce this up front--we have a hard stop at 1:30
    for this portion, and then we will be reconvening at 3:00, in
    this room actually, for the classified hearing. So I want to
    emphasize that point, because normally we do it in the CVC
    [Capitol Visitor Center], but the CVC is occupied today by
    extended discussions about Afghanistan.
        So 1:30 hard stop, and then 3:00 back here for that. I will
    be departing shortly, and turning the committee over to the
    capable hands of Mr. Larsen, to go up and do one of the CVC
    briefings. But I just wanted to make sure everyone had that
    scheduling update.
        And with that, Mr. DesJarlais is recognized.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman Smith.
        General McKenzie, which state actor in your area of
    responsibility do you believe to be the United States' greatest
    geostrategic foe?
        General McKenzie. I consider Iran to be the greatest threat
    to regional stability in the Middle East.
        Dr. DesJarlais. And with Israel moving from EUCOM [United
    States European Command] to CENTCOM later this year, do you
    believe that they will be your closest partner in the AOR?
        General McKenzie. We have a lot of close partners in the
    AOR. Israel will certainly join the line of dependable
    friendships and partnerships that we have in the region. We
    have a unique and old relationship with Israel, but I wouldn't
    further characterize it.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. When you have the political
    leadership of our greatest foe in the region--Iran--threatening
    our closest ally, Israel, and stating that its mission of the
    Islamic Republic of Iran is to erase Israel from the map of the
    region, do you believe that one of our top priorities should be
    keeping a nuclear weapon out of Iran's hands?
        General McKenzie. I believe the President has stated that
    is a high priority. I also believe that one of the things
    Central Command does on a daily basis is deter Iran from acting
    against us and against our partners and friends in the region.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. If Iran were to develop nuclear
    weapons, what do you believe would be the response from some of
    our allies in the region? And do you believe such a move could
    have the potential to set off an arms race?
        General McKenzie. I would prefer not to speculate about
    future contingencies. I can tell you that it would be very
    concerning to us if Iran possessed a nuclear weapon, it was
    able to possess a nuclear weapon. And it is the aim of United
    States' policy to prevent that condition from occurring.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. You mentioned in your opening
    statement that as a result of the challenges faced with UAS
    [unmanned aerial systems] detection and interdiction that
    United States is for the first time since the Korean War
    operating without complete air superiority. What would we--what
    should we be doing to address this gap in our capabilities and
    retain the advantage against Iranian forces?
        General McKenzie. Sir, I think the--I think, first of all,
    the Department of Defense has moved out very aggressively to
    address this problem. The Army is the executive agent for
    close-in protection against these small UAS systems that are
    most concerning to me. But I think we still have a ways to go
    to get on the right side of the curve with this, because right
    now you can go out and buy one at Walmart or some other
    location. You can weaponize it very readily. Sometimes it is
    very difficult for us to detect them until it is too late.
        We have a variety of systems that we are testing now in a
    free market competition to find the best and most integrated
    capabilities. We are not there yet, and it remains a very
    concerning priority of mine.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Can you spell out the implications of
    China's 25-year agreement with Iran, which includes expanding
    military cooperation?
        General McKenzie. Sure, sir. You know, China has had an
    existing military agreement with Iran for a period of time. I
    am not certain that this is going to produce anything new or
    different. Again, we will watch to see what it does with oil
    exports, and I am probably not the best person to talk about
    that right now.
        But a number of sanctions could still come in place against
    Chinese companies should they elect to do business with Iran.
    So, again, I am probably not the best guy to give you an answer
    on that, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. The annual threat assessment issued
    earlier this month by the Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence, they highlighted Iraq as the key battleground for
    Iran's influence this year and during the next several years.
    Do you agree with this assessment?
        General McKenzie. I completely agree with that, and I would
    go further to say that in the year 2020 Iran's plan was to
    gain, through political action, the ejection of the United
    States from the region and principally from Iraq. They failed
    in doing that.
        And as a result, we are beginning to see attacks ramp up
    from their Shia groups in the region, and I think that is going
    to continue.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. So you kind of partly answered that,
    but what would be the net effect if the U.S. were to drawn down
    or completely withdraw troops from Iraq?
        General McKenzie. Well, that move is not contemplated. If
    there is--one of the good news stories in the region is I
    believe we have a good relationship with the government of
    Iraq, just recently completed strategic dialogue, is going to
    provide a framework for us to decide what our forces are going
    to look like going forward.
        So I don't think there is--I don't see us withdrawing
    completely from Iraq in the future.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, thank you, General, both
    Generals, for your service, and, Ms. Dory.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all of
    the witnesses here today.
        Ms. Dory, I welcome this administration's decision to
    strategically withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan by
    September 11, 2021. I must say, though, that the difference
    between this administration and the previous administration is
    that it seems that we are doing it with our allies, and we are
    doing it in close coordination and collaboration instead of
    hearing about a tweet and our commanders not really being in
    the loop. So I appreciate that.
        But, still, the question that stays as a significant issue
    is, well, what is our plan? That was my criticism before with
    the previous administration, and that is--I am looking to
    better understand, what is the plan as we leave Afghanistan?
        So if you could answer that, and then help me understand
    what President Biden meant when he said, ``We will reorganize
    our counterterrorism capabilities and the substantial assets in
    the region to prevent reemergence of terrorism.'' Can you
    elaborate on that statement?
        Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. This administration has
    reinvigorated a focus on alliances and partnerships, and I
    think you see it in the work that has been underway to support
    taking a decision with respect to the future of the U.S. force
    posture in Afghanistan, so the intensive engagement that we saw
    most recently with NATO and coalition partners with respect to
    the decision to draw down in Afghanistan.
        In the very near term, there is detailed planning underway,
    as you heard General McKenzie refer to a few moments ago, with
    respect to how the force drawdown will proceed in conjunction
    with the allies and partners' separate planning underway with
    respect to what the counterterrorism footprint will look like
    going forward, given the focus in Afghanistan, the primary
    vital interest that has sustained us over time being to ensure
    that there are no attacks emanating from Afghanistan with
    respect to the U.S. homeland.
        And we will have--in the classified briefings later today,
    we will be able to get into that, into a lot more detail.
        Mr. Carbajal. Okay. Does that include what our footprint
    will look like moving forward?
        Ms. Dory. Well, I think what we understand is from here and
    to September, that we will have--we will not have combat
    forces, U.S. or coalition combat forces there, and we will
    transition to a diplomatically oriented footprint with the U.S.
    Embassy.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Can you provide us with an update
    on where the intra-Afghan peace talks are at at this point?
        Ms. Dory. I think Ambassador Khalilzad will be one of the
    panelists in the briefings later this afternoon, and will be
    well-postured to give a just--just a fresh update on those
    talks.
        Mr. Carbajal. Great. Thank you.
        General McKenzie, in your testimony, you comment that
    CENTCOM is committed to working with interagency partners to
    develop mechanisms that ensure continued oversight of and
    accountability of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. What
    oversight tools do we currently use that will be important to
    continue after the withdrawal? How will our oversight adapt to
    having a limited presence on the ground?
        General McKenzie. The principal tool that we use to manage
    the oversight of the disbursement of those funds and the proper
    use of it are the people on the ground that see what happens to
    it and monitor that. As we draw down, that is going to become
    our principal challenge. How do we do that from a remote
    location?
        A lot will depend on the size of the U.S. Embassy that
    remains, and we have not yet finally determined that, and that
    is something that we are talking about planning right now. The
    smaller the Embassy is, the more difficult it will become to
    manage the ASFF [Afghan Security Forces Fund] as we go forward.
    We are keenly aware of that. That is right at the centerpiece
    of our planning, and we are working very closely with the
    Department of State to make those determinations.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Thank you, Representative Carbajal.
        The chair now recognizes Representative Gaetz of Florida
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk about
    Chad. General Townsend, it appears in the last several hours
    the President of Chad was killed, engaged in front line
    fighting against rebels who had based in Libya and have crossed
    the border. What do you know currently about the situation in
    Chad, and particularly any change to the counterterrorism
    cooperation that we have been able to rely on from that
    government?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. As you know, that is
    sort of a breaking news story, as I walked in here this
    morning, we learned about the reported and confirmed death of
    President Deby. He is a retired general, and he has in the past
    gone to the front where there was action. And we don't know
    exactly how he got killed, but the report is he was killed in
    action up there facing off with a column of rebels that are not
    terrorists. They are not ISIS. They are not al-Qaida. They
    are--they were actually anti-regime in Chad.
        They were based in southern Libya. They mounted up in
    several hundred vehicles, and they transited a long way across
    the Chadian desert towards the south. The Chadian government
    forces started engaging them. They were supported by the
    French. We observed this, and then President--it looked like
    that the column had made the decision to withdraw.
        This has happened before. They were about to withdraw, we
    think, and then the news of President Deby's death became
    known. It is unclear what this means for our relationship
    there. His son, President Deby's son, former intel
    [intelligence] chief, has been appointed as the interim
    president.
        We expect that he is inclined towards good relationships
    with France and the United States. We think that will continue.
    There could be some potential for violence, and we are working
    closely with our country team there.
        Our Embassy did a precautionary drawdown of personnel to a
    minimum staff, and we also have some military folks there
    working with the French and the Embassy. So we are watching
    this very closely to keep Americans safe while this becomes a
    little more clear.
        Mr. Gaetz. It seems tactically significant that these
    rebels were able to base in southern Libya, but they were able
    to traverse such a distance, and then execute this mission. It
    might suggest that the situation in Libya is getting worse as
    well with a failed state following the Gaddafi regime.
        With this transition council that has President Deby's son
    now in some position of leadership, I guess the position of
    leadership in the country, what do we expect from the French? I
    know that they were very supportive of the regime. Is there
    anything that we would expect as a change from--regarding their
    involvement with the country?
        General Townsend. On our point about the situation in
    Libya, we know that the Chadian government had been supportive,
    and there were also factions in Chad that supported various
    factions in Libya regarding the future with this interim
    president, the son of President Deby, the interim President
    Deby.
        Right now I anticipate that it will--he will be favorable
    to good relations with France, and France I anticipate will
    continue to do what they have been doing up to this point,
    supporting the government of Chad. But I have to be honest with
    you: this is breaking news, and it is not clear.
        Mr. Gaetz. Yeah. It sort of seems when a president who took
    power through a military coup then dies in a battle against
    political rebels, not religious extremists, and then gives rise
    to his son being selected by the national council, that it is
    not the strongest case for emerging democracy in Africa. It
    seems to suggest more of a move toward authoritarianism, and I
    think that is something we should all watch carefully.
        I thank the chairman, and I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
        The chair recognizes Representative Slotkin of Michigan for
    5 minutes.
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am happy to see all three of you here, some of our really
    foremost experts on the Middle East and Africa that we have in
    our government.
        My questions are going to be primarily for General McKenzie
    on Afghanistan. You know, I think for the most part most of us
    feel, at least I feel from my constituents, that they want to
    be out of Afghanistan. We have fathers who are sending off
    their sons to fight in the same war they fought in.
        But what holds people back is this fear that the exact
    reason we went in--you know, a threat of terrorist attacks
    against our homeland and our allies--could creep back up again.
        So help us understand. I understand we will talk more of
    the classified stuff in a separate session. But, General
    McKenzie, help reassure my constituents that by pulling out we
    won't be going right back in because we have a threat that
    impacts us here on the homeland.
        General McKenzie. Thanks, ma'am, for that, and I appreciate
    the concern of your constituents. Like them, I sent my son
    twice to Afghanistan, so I am very much aware of those
    concerns.
        As we have talked a little bit before, we are going to go
    to zero in Afghanistan. That means there will be no U.S. forces
    on the ground there. We will use a variety of means to monitor
    al-Qaida and ISIS in Afghanistan. The intelligence will
    decline. The Director of National--or the CIA [Central
    Intelligence Agency] Director has said that, but we will still
    be able to see into Afghanistan. There still will be ways to do
    that.
        Much of that will depend on the Embassy platform that
    remains, and that is yet undetermined. But that will be helpful
    if we maintain an Embassy there. But we are going to be able to
    continue to look into Afghanistan. And I think the President
    has been very clear: we are not going to reenter to reoccupy
    Afghanistan under any conceivable circumstances.
        What we will retain the ability to do is to find and fix
    those people who plan attacks against us that we can detect.
    And then, when appropriate, we will be able to strike them. I
    don't want to make that sound easy because it is not easy. It
    is going to be extremely difficult to do it, but it is not
    impossible to do it.
        Ms. Slotkin. So I am deeply impacted by our experience on
    Iraq as someone who grew up as an Iraq specialist and who
    didn't agree with the decision to go to zero in Iraq, and then
    watched in the years after we had pulled out how difficult it
    was to get Washington to pay attention to what was then a
    growing threat of ISIS.
        We couldn't get the intelligence support. We couldn't get
    the overhead imagery support. We couldn't get the attention of
    folks when we saw things creeping back in the wrong direction.
    Please help me understand how this will be different.
        General McKenzie. Well, speaking to the future, I don't
    know, but I will certainly be a relentless advocate to keep the
    focus on Afghanistan. We are going to shift assets out of
    Central Command. That is a given. That is going to happen.
        At the same time, we need to balance against what we know
    the known aspiration of these groups to launch attacks against
    the United States. That hasn't gone away, and it is there right
    now. They are depressed. They have very little ability to do
    that. Certainly, it is possible they could reestablish
    themselves in the future.
        It is also possible the Taliban will do some of the things
    that they have said they are going to do. I will just watch
    that very closely to see that it happens. I think that is a
    reasonable concern, and I share that concern, frankly.
        Ms. Slotkin. And I know that, you know, we have learned in
    the past 20 years that our best attempts in these wars is
    through coalitions, through alliances, doing things with
    partners and allies. So I am heartened that we are having the
    conversation with them, but is there anything planned on the
    regional security architecture? A formal plan with our allies
    and partners to have a conversation not just about how to end
    the war but how to contain the situation after the war has
    ended.
        General McKenzie. So I defer to Ms. Dory for some of that.
    But I would say what has been very impressive to me has been
    the complete and comprehensive degree of consultation that went
    into this decision, and the execution of this decision, both
    with our NATO partners, our other coalition partners on the
    ground, and in fact regional partners.
        So I think that set the stage for some form of regional
    architecture, but I defer to Ms. Dory for further comments on
    that.
        Ms. Slotkin. I will go to Ms. Dory in just a second. But
    just to finish out, you are one of our most seasoned,
    experienced four-star generals with experience on the ground in
    the Middle East, tour after tour. Do you feel confident that
    the American people will stay safe and not be attacked again
    emanating out of Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. The key thing that is different in 2021
    from 2001 is not only what is going on in the theater, but our
    ability to harden the country here. The steps we have taken
    here to protect ourselves, it is a very different country in
    terms of ability to enter and operate in the United States than
    it was in the fall of 2001.
        So, you know, we work very hard to ensure that attacks
    aren't going to come from Afghanistan or from Africa or from
    any other place. It begins on the ground there, but there is
    also a broad, in-depth defense that is in place that was not in
    place before.
        Ms. Slotkin. And in my last remaining 20 seconds, do you
    know of any discussions with the Afghanis about--the Afghans,
    excuse me, on a status of forces agreement or a diplomatic
    security agreement for our Embassy?
        General McKenzie. I know that is actively being worked now,
    but I don't have any details beyond that.
        Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, General. Appreciate it.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
        The chair recognizes Representative Waltz of Florida for 5
    minutes. Representative Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make--can you
    hear me okay?
        Mr. Larsen. You are good.
        Mr. Waltz. All right. Thank you. General, I just want to
    pick up on Ms. Slotkin's questions. I certainly share her
    concerns, and it was good to spend some time with you a few
    weeks ago. Can you talk to me, what about--or, Ms. Dory--what
    basing agreements do we have from any of the Stans--Tajikistan,
    where obviously we no longer--where we have no basing;
    Kyrgyzstan, where we no longer have Manas; Uzbekistan, where we
    no longer have K2, what agreements do we have with any of the
    neighboring countries to be able to base our forces and conduct
    lethal strikes or even surveillance back into Afghanistan? Do
    we have any currently?
        General McKenzie. At this time, we have no--we have none of
    those agreements in place.
        Mr. Waltz. General, do you think it would have been optimal
    to have those agreements before we announced to the world that
    we are going to zero in a few months?
        General McKenzie. I can't speak to that. I will tell you
    that right now we are engaged in a significant effort to
    evaluate where we want to put potential CT forces, where they
    would be best optimized from geography, and also the diplomatic
    angle of it, as we go forward.
        Mr. Waltz. I think it is--we need to be clear with the
    American people that when the military goes, our intelligence
    assets go, the agency is--the Central Intelligence Agency and
    other agencies are dependent on that military backbone and
    basing, and also our contracts and our contractors go, with
    estimates of 15- to 20,000 currently there providing logistics,
    maintenance, and other critical support of the Afghan security
    forces.
        What is the plan for the continuing presence of those
    critical contract support services?
        General McKenzie. So right now, most of the contractors are
    going to leave. Certainly, the U.S. contractors are going to
    leave. We will try to develop ways to do distant contracting
    where we can. Clearly, there are going to be some things that
    we are not going to be able to do anymore as the contractors
    leave. And I don't want to minimize that.
        Mr. Waltz. And it is important for everyone to understand
    that those contractors were providing maintenance, for example,
    for the Black Hawks that we provided to the Afghan security
    forces, to the limited close-air support capabilities that they
    have, and, again, critical logistic and advisory functions.
        All of that is going to be gone in the next few months, and
    both the--a number of reports, both think tank, intelligence
    community, and even the Afghans themselves, have cast real
    doubt on the ability of the Afghan security forces to continue
    to hold without that support.
        So I fear, to add on to Ms. Slotkin's questions, if the
    Taliban does take over, or we do even have a power-sharing
    agreement with the Taliban, we will now be reliant on them for
    any basing over flight or any type of authorities that we need
    to go after al-Qaida, assuming that they will give them. Is
    that--do I have that wrong?
        General McKenzie. Sir, that is a lot of future
    hypotheticals that I am probably not the best person to talk
    about. I will tell you right now, though, that there is still a
    possibility of intra-Afghan dialogue. That could still
    continue. We can have our own assessment about the probability
    of that reaching success, but that still continues.
        Mr. Waltz. Well, but, General, I want to be clear with
    everyone that it is not a hypothetical that the State
    Department has introduced a draft power sharing agreement into
    the dialogue where the Afghan government would dissolve as it
    currently stands and share power with the Taliban. So I don't
    think it is a leap to say we would then have to negotiate them
    for any ability to return and go after al-Qaida.
        But my question is: what military--so assume they have the
    will to turn on and conduct operations against al-Qaida? What
    military capability does the Taliban have that a 300,000-man
    Afghan army and 42 coalition nations have struggled in terms of
    containing al-Qaida? What military capability does the Afghans
    have?
        General McKenzie. So the Afghans would have significant
    residual capability. It would depend on if the nation is whole,
    if the nation is fractured, if there is a civil war. There are
    a variety of future contingents that would directly affect the
    ability of the Afghan--whatever, whoever is leading the Afghan
    government, in whatever state it is, their ability to actually
    concentrate combat power.
        Some of those scenarios you have outlined, it would be a
    fractured state. They would not be able to do it. Other
    scenarios, they might be able to do it.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, General. And just in the time I have
    remaining, would Bagram Air Base be valuable to you being where
    it is located geographically west of China, south of Russia,
    east of Iran, in great power contingencies?
        General McKenzie. Bagram is key terrain tactically in
    Afghanistan, operationally and strategically. It is the
    definition of key terrain.
        Mr. Waltz. And it is notable that we are about to just give
    that away with nothing in return.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
        Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes Representative Houlahan of
    Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        My questions, first to General McKenzie and General
    Townsend, have to do with China, which has obviously
    significantly invested in Pakistan and parts of Africa as part
    of their Belt and Road Initiative. And I was wondering if you
    could tell me a little bit, if you have any concerns about them
    in terms of national security in the region, and also if you
    might be able to tell us if you have heard any whisperings of
    the fact that they are maybe interested in sending a
    peacekeeping troop to Afghanistan if we indeed do leave the
    region.
        General McKenzie. I will begin and briefly just talk about
    the Central Command before handing over to General Townsend. So
    we see China operating in Central Command principally from an
    economic perspective. They offer a number of apparently
    seductive and attractive infrastructure and other development
    loans and projects to countries in the region, which then have
    a significant--on the back end of that are not such--don't
    appear to be such a good deal after all.
        They want access to the region. They would, I think,
    eventually want to seek naval basing in the region because they
    do import a significant amount of their hydrocarbons through
    the Strait of Hormuz and out of the region. But for now, for
    the short term to the medium term, it is principally economic
    engagement going forward.
        And you are right; we see it in Pakistan but also in some
    of the Gulf states. It is significantly concerning to me they
    are playing a very long game, and they are playing it with vast
    amounts of resources.
        Ms. Houlahan. And, sir, do you see any concerns or
    significant concerns as a result of that?
        General McKenzie. I am very concerned about where we are
    going to be in a few years with China in the region. I believe
    that some of the nation-states in the region are also waking up
    to this and are becoming aware of it because they see what is
    happening in Africa, they see what is happening in South
    America and other parts of the globe.
        And as you know, there are nations in the region that
    actually do have significant resourcing themselves, so they
    don't need to fall into the debt trap with China. Others are
    susceptible to that predatory diplomacy.
        Ms. Houlahan. And, General Townsend, do you have anything
    as well?
        General Townsend. I would say our concerns are very similar
    to those expressed by General McKenzie. I don't know if you
    received the placemats. We handed out placemats here in the
    room, and I am told we distributed them electronically as well.
    One of them is on----
        Mr. Larsen. General, we do have those placemats.
        General Townsend. Thank you. What China is doing in Africa,
    and that kind of gives you an idea. I think the only thing I
    would add to what General McKenzie said is they very much have
    intent to establish additional overseas bases in Africa.
    Whether that be on the Atlantic coast of Africa or the Indian
    Ocean coast of Africa, they are working hard to establish naval
    bases and/or airbases, and that is of great concern to AFRICOM.
        Ms. Houlahan. And so with regard to, you know, a potential
    buildup of China, do you anticipate, General Townsend, with the
    withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan that we might increase
    our troops in AFRICOM? Given that there is, as we know, is a
    constant threat of extremism, how will we possibly do that, if
    indeed that is our plan, do you think?
        General Townsend. Congresswoman, I don't--as an economy of
    force effort for the Department of Defense, I don't anticipate
    a significant uplift of resources to AFRICOM, despite the
    drawdown in Afghanistan. So I am not anticipating that, but we
    are going to undergo this global posture review and we are
    going to work through all of those questions.
        Ms. Houlahan. I look forward to that. I do have concerns. I
    know I don't--I am not alone in sharing those concerns with
    that particular part of the world. Africa seems to be a rising
    opportunity for terrorists to land there in the absence of
    other places around the world that they could land, and I just
    want to make sure that we are keeping our eye on the region.
        I appreciate your time, gentlemen, and I will yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
        The chair now recognizes Representative Bice of Oklahoma
    for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
    here this afternoon.
        My first question revolves around China and Russia and
    their continued reach into the AFRICOM region. One of the
    things that I have learned in my very short time here is that
    rare earth minerals are becoming a very big concern, and the
    Chinese and Russians are tapping into the African region to try
    to mine those.
        Is the DOD taking any steps to facilitate access to those
    rare earth minerals for domestic use?
        General Townsend. Thanks for your question, Congresswoman.
    On the topic of rare earth minerals, both countries, as you
    have pointed out, are seeking to exploit those on the African
    continent. The Russians are sort of near-term exploiters, and
    the Chinese are more strategic exploiters in my view. They are
    very carefully seeking out mineral deposits that they want to
    lock down for the future.
        The Department of Defense is supporting the USAID and the
    Department of State in this effort. We don't have a particular
    effort directed at securing rare earth minerals on the DOD
    side. But we are supporting our interagency partners in that
    regard.
        Mrs. Bice. Do you feel like that is being effective?
        General Townsend. I know that it has the energy of this
    administration. It is of great concern to this administration.
    I think it is a legitimate concern.
        Mrs. Bice. Turning just a bit here, you know, we have also
    heard a lot about technology and the use of technology across
    the region. How are CENTCOM and AFRICOM addressing the emerging
    threat of drones and drone swarm tactics? And that can really
    sort of apply to, yeah, CENTCOM or AFRICOM.
        General Townsend. Sure. I will answer it and hand it off to
    General McKenzie. And my first encounter with drone-delivered
    munitions was in the battle of Mosul in Iraq 2 or 3 years ago.
    So this is an area of great concern to us. We haven't seen a
    significant employment of weaponized drones in Africa yet, but
    we are working very hard to be ready for that and to head that
    off.
        The Department of Defense--as General McKenzie explained
    earlier, the Department of Defense has a great program focused
    on that threat. I am concerned about the small armed drones, as
    well as the larger one-way attack drones that we have seen
    employed in the region.
        So I think we are focused on it, and we are employing as
    much technology as we can to prepare for that.
        General McKenzie.
        General McKenzie. Thanks. So small commercially available
    drones are one of the most persistent and dangerous threats
    that we see in the Central Command AOR. I am very concerned
    about it. We have ways to deal with the larger land attack
    cruise missiles. They are equally--they are concerning, but we
    can deal with them as an air defense problem. It is a lot
    harder to deal with something that is small, perhaps
    commercially off-the-shelf bought, modified, and we are on the
    wrong side of the cost imposition curve when it comes to these
    systems.
        So a lot of great work is being done in the Department. We
    are not there yet.
        Mrs. Bice. And that sort of leads to my next question which
    was the factors that are limiting your ability to deploy
    counter UAS systems within CENTCOM and AFRICOM.
        General McKenzie. So within CENTCOM, there are a variety of
    systems out there. I take any system and employ it immediately.
    What we--where we need to go is an integrated system, because
    the system--an integrated system would give you early warning
    of launch perhaps through a variety of means. It would give you
    an idea of where they are coming and their altitude. Then it
    would give you an ability to engage them kinetically and non-
    kinetically.
        We do not yet have a single system that can do all of that.
    What we have are a variety of systems that all do part of this,
    and that is part of the problem. We are not integrated. So we
    pushed very hard to get an integrated system, but one that is
    not delivered late, behind need. That is the problem when you
    push for an integrated system.
        Mrs. Bice. Ms. Dory, do you have any comments on that?
        Ms. Dory. I would just add to that, Congresswoman, that the
    issue of counter UAS is something not just within the
    Department at this point but has a profile in terms of the
    interagency discussions on how to deter and defeat that threat.
        So within the Department of Defense, there is the joint
    effort underway that the Generals have referred to, but there
    is also a broader whole of government approach that is recently
    initiated.
        Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Ms. Dory, General McKenzie, and
    General Townsend, for your time.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Before I go to the next questioner,
    I do want to just stop and as well thank General McKenzie for
    his hospitality 2 weeks ago at CENTCOM. Appreciate that, and I
    did not take that opportunity earlier. I wanted to thank you
    for that.
        The chair now recognizes Representative Luria of Virginia
    for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you, gentlemen, and Ms. Dory, for
    your testimony today. I would like to first address the issue
    with General McKenzie of mine warfare in the CENTCOM AOR.
    Iranian mining capability is obviously a vulnerability for U.S.
    and allied military forces within the region as well as for
    commercial shipping and free trade. And the Navy plans to soon
    decommission its remaining four MCM [mine countermeasures]
    platforms stationed in the Gulf in Bahrain.
        And as we know, the material condition and capabilities of
    these aging MCMs has been severely degraded over time. However,
    the Navy's planned replacement of the mine warfare capability
    through the mission modules on the LCS [littoral combat ship]
    class of ships is neither fully developed nor has it been
    successfully deployed from the LCS.
        However, testing at the MCM platforms--on platforms of
    opportunity, such as provided by allied navies in 2019. The
    Royal Fleet Auxiliary's Mounts Bay successfully tested this,
    and then the ESB-4 [expeditionary sea base], Hershel ``Woody''
    Williams, also in 2019, proved successful. And these ad hoc
    capabilities are not resident in the CENTCOM AOR, which is
    going to leave us a convenient gap in MCM capability once these
    ships are decommissioned.
        As the combatant commander, are you confident in the
    current and future mine warfare capabilities provided by the
    Navy in your AOR?
        General McKenzie. Thank you for the question. I am very
    concerned about Iranian mine warfare capabilities. I think it
    is one of their great asymmetric weapons, and they employ it in
    two areas, up in the Strait of Hormuz----
        Mr. Larsen. General McKenzie, I am sorry, could you just
    get that microphone pointed right at your chin.
        General McKenzie. How is that? Better?
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah. A little better.
        General McKenzie. I am very concerned about Iranian mine
    warfare capabilities. It is a significant asymmetric threat
    that they possess, and they possess it not only up in the
    Strait of Hormuz, which is where we always think about it, but
    also down in the Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea. The ability to
    deploy a wide variety of thousands of mines is very concerning
    to me.
        Right now, we have very limited mine warfare capability in
    the theater. Our ships, as you have noted, and the ships of our
    British partners are also about all we have if we had to sweep
    and open the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital international
    passage. And it would take us an extended amount of time to do
    it with the resources that we have now.
        I, too, have noted the LCS and the problems that are
    attendant as a possible non-sweeping variant. Regardless, it is
    not going to be available in a reasonable amount of time for me
    in my requirements in U.S. Central Command.
        So I would share your concerns. We talk about this all the
    time. This is an area of Iranian capability that remains vexing
    and concerning to me.
        Mrs. Luria. So, General, since there was a successful test
    of these advanced mine warfare capabilities using the T-ESB
    platform, which is something that is already played in your
    theater, would that be a valuable addition in the CENTCOM AOR?
    Are you able to leverage that capability on the T-ESB?
        General McKenzie. CENTCOM would be happy to leverage any
    capability that is out there right now given the significant
    gap between our available resources and the scope and scale of
    the problem.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. Thank you. And in the time remaining,
    General Townsend, I wanted to focus, as some of my colleagues
    already have, on the rapidly expanding Chinese influence on the
    African continent. We have already referenced the strategic
    location of the Chinese overseas base in Djibouti, adjacent to
    Bab al-Mandab and the entrance to the Red Sea.
        But more than a strategic positioning from the maritime
    perspective, I wanted to focus on some of the infrastructure
    and transportation investments that they are making, reaching
    into Ethiopia.
        It appears that the Chinese, who inarguably want to grow
    their position on the world stage, and in Africa, are engaging
    in their own version of modern day colonialism on the African
    continent as they venture, you know, to find cheaper labor
    markets and use infrastructure debt to leverage--as a leverage
    tool.
        Can you comment on the domestic and regional impact of the
    Chinese economic expansion into Ethiopia and then maybe a
    little bit, in the time remaining, on how the recent unrest in
    the Tigray region has changed any Chinese activity in the area.
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congresswoman. So you mentioned
    Chinese and an example of their investments on the African
    continent. Transportation and infrastructure is certainly one
    of those, seaports, airports, and rail lines in particular. And
    you see that with Ethiopia with rail lines running to the Red
    Sea from the country. You see that in Kenya as well.
        In some places, these investments have worked out okay. I
    haven't seen any of them that have worked out really well as
    the Chinese had hoped they would. Regarding your question about
    Tigray, we haven't--I haven't seen a connection to Tigray in
    China.
        Mr. Larsen. The Representative's time has expired. Thank
    you.
        The chair now recognizes Representative Franklin from
    Florida for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
    time, I do have a couple of questions for General McKenzie.
    First, following up on Representative Waltz's dialogue earlier
    regarding basing in the region and the changes we are now going
    to face with Afghanistan not being there with physical presence
    the ground, I think back to just after 9/11 I was in Bahrain.
    We were planning some of those initial strikes into
    Afghanistan.
        The challenge we had was long distances to make those
    happen, and we had carrier pilots that were flying 8- to 10-
    hour missions with multiple refuelings to get there. That is
    obviously going to be a challenge if we find ourselves having
    to go back in on that kind of scale in the future.
        But in your testimony you had mentioned pursuing
    opportunities to enhance expeditionary basing in less
    vulnerable areas of the AOR. Could you expand a little bit on
    those and where they may stand?
        General McKenzie. Certainly. When we talk about that, I am
    primarily talking about the Iran problem and the fact that our
    bases now, such as Al Udeid, Al Dhafra, Manama, Bahrain, as you
    noted, have the virtue of being close to the area you might
    want to fight. They also have a problem being very close to the
    Iranians.
        So what we would seek to do is examine alternative further
    to the west in the Arabian Peninsula that would make it more
    difficult for the Iranians to target our bases there. It would
    increase the range of many of their weapons. It would not
    actually have the range to reach out there and get to those
    bases. The problem would be the tanker bill that is associated
    with that.
        On the other hand, if the tanker can survive out to the
    west, it is probably better than it being close where it can be
    struck. So there is a tradeoff that we make, and we look to our
    partners to help us on this with these bases. And we have never
    looked to base permanently there. Rather, you would like to
    have the ability to go in there, as you noted, in an
    expeditionary manner in a time of crisis or in a time of war,
    just to make it harder for an opponent to threaten the force.
        Mr. Franklin. All right. Thank you. Switching gears to the
    displaced persons camps in northeast Syria, particularly Al-
    Hol, I guess from your testimony, General, we talked about
    61,000 people there, 94 percent women and children, two-thirds
    under 18. I mean, in addition to the obvious humanitarian
    crisis, I know there is a big problem with the radicalization
    of a lot of these children.
        So this I guess would be a question for you, General
    McKenzie, and also Ms. Dory. What is the way ahead in that? How
    do we fix this problem? I know a lot of the countries that
    these people are coming from don't want them back. What is the
    end game for this?
        General McKenzie. Sure. So I will defer to Ms. Dory here in
    just a minute, but I will say it is not a military problem. But
    it will manifest itself in 5 to 10 years as a military problem
    unless we solve it now, because the children are going to grow
    up radicalized, and we are going to see them on battlefields
    fighting us.
        So it is an international problem. It requires
    repatriation. It requires nations to step up to the plate,
    claim their citizens, bring them home, reintegrate them back
    into their communities. And it demands de-radicalization, which
    is extremely difficult to do. It is best done and practiced by
    nations in the region who have a cultural affinity for the
    people that are largely in those camps.
        It is a tough problem. Our diplomats--the Department of
    State, USAID, and a lot of NGOs [non-governmental
    organizations]--are working at this very hard. It is one of the
    most pressing problems we have in the CENTCOM region right now.
        And with that, I will defer to Ms. Dory for anything she
    would like to add.
        Ms. Dory. I think General McKenzie put it beautifully. It
    is not a military problem. It is an interagency issue, and it
    is a question of political will in terms of host nations for
    the individuals who are in the camps.
        Mr. Franklin. So what pressure do we have that we can apply
    to get these folks to step up and accept these people? We can't
    leave them there in the desert forever.
        Ms. Dory. I think it depends on which countries you are
    talking about and the state of the dialogue with them, what
    forms of dialogue and leverage we have at our disposal to
    encourage stepping up to that responsibility.
        Mr. Franklin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Franklin.
        The chair recognizes Representative Strickland before
    just--the next questioner will be Representative Veasey. So,
    Representative Strickland, you are recognized--of Washington
    State, recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Townsend, we heard in your testimony that AFRICOM
    supported U.S. efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance in 43
    countries, including the delivery of nearly 500 million in
    medical supplies. The United States is often at its best when
    it leads in crises as it did during the Ebola crisis.
        Can you tell me, please, how AFRICOM is working alongside
    whole of government efforts to respond to COVID-19? And
    specifically have we, along with USG [United States
    Government], started to develop a plan to distribute vaccines
    for COVID to partners on the continent?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congresswoman. So as you saw in
    the testimony there, there have been significant Department of
    Defense efforts, but those are small in comparison to the U.S.
    Government's COVID assistance on the African continent that has
    been led primarily by the USAID and the Department of State.
        So there are some military or DOD capabilities that we have
    employed to the maximum extent possible, things like medical
    supplies and mobile field hospitals that are being fielded to
    military partners that are being used by those partner
    countries to treat COVID.
        So that has all been part of the larger U.S. Government
    response, and it is a small part compared to what the State
    Department and USAID have done.
        On your question about vaccines, I will defer to Ms. Dory,
    but the U.S. Government is going to provide eventually vaccines
    internationally, and in Africa, but we are making sure we have
    taken care of the American population first. We have been asked
    for input, to provide that input to the Department of Defense
    and the Government for decisions about where vaccines might go
    first.
        Ms. Dory.
        Ms. Dory. Thank you, General Townsend. Just to add on that
    that with the state of vaccination at home in a much better
    place than it has been, plans are underway with respect to how
    the U.S. Government will be able to help overseas. Our USAID
    and State Department colleagues are at the forefront of those
    efforts, and I think we will see the results of those in the
    coming months.
        Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you. And then one more
    question. Ms. Dory, we will stay with you. The prior
    administration chose to close U.S. defense attache offices in
    several West African countries. Defense attache perform a vital
    role in representing the U.S. military, and removing them can
    send the wrong message to host governments about the importance
    that we put on the relationship and how much we value it.
        As you reviewed the decisions of the prior administration,
    can you tell me about the status of these defense attache
    offices?
        Ms. Dory. Congresswoman, I would be glad to, and I can
    imagine General Townsend might like to add on to this as well.
    Defense attaches are fundamental to the way the Department of
    Defense does business in the interagency context on the ground
    in our missions across the world.
        We have the continued challenges, as we see in every other
    type of personnel category, of supply and demand, and
    insufficient supply relative to demand has led to some
    difficult decisions with respect to how we are represented in
    different countries and whether individual attaches are
    responsible for more than one country at a time. I would very
    much like to see sufficient attaches to go around.
        General Townsend.
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congresswoman. So as you heard,
    Congresswoman, the last administration did make a decision to
    close six defense attache offices on the African continent.
    Some of those were a hub that did several smaller countries as
    well. That decision was overturned actually before the end of
    the--by the Acting Secretary of Defense Miller before the
    administration ended.
        I suspect it may get reviewed during the global posture
    review. The problem is between the initial decision to close
    those offices we had a personnel assignment cycle go by, so no
    backfills were identified. So now that the decision was
    overturned, we are going to probably have a gap potentially of
    a year or two in some of those defense attache offices.
        Anyway, that is the current state of that, and Ms. Dory
    covered very well the importance of defense attache offices in
    Africa.
        Ms. Strickland. Great. Thank you. Thank you, both of you.
        I yield back my time, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Strickland.
        The chair now recognizes Representative Veasey of Texas for
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chair, thank you very much.
        General Townsend, you testified before the Senate Armed
    Services Committee in January 2020 and warned that VEOs were
    expanding at a very rapid rate across West Africa, noting that
    substantive external assistance from Western partners was
    critical to help our African partners make progress to contain
    these VEOs.
        At the end of September 2020, AFRICOM reported that VEOs in
    the Sahel were either degraded and--nor contained, were neither
    degraded nor contained, and that VEOs in West Africa continue
    to expand geographically, conduct attacks, and threaten people
    and other partners in the region.
        What do you believe were the driving factors behind the
    lack of progress over the past year? And how can we better
    leverage USG resources, specifically in Nigeria where violence
    threatens the prosperity of Africa's largest democracy and
    making sure that we keep Nigeria as stable as possible, because
    they are so important for the entire continent, quite frankly.
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. You are right. In my
    last testimony I said that the VEO threat in West Africa was
    expanding. I don't know if I used the analogy then, but it is
    appropriate like a wildfire coming south from Mali and Niger
    towards Burkina Faso and the littoral states. And I believe the
    reason for that is that the international efforts there by the
    African partners and foreign partners were both insufficient
    and uncoordinated.
        They might actually be sufficient if they were better
    coordinated, but it was impossible to tell because they were
    uncoordinated.
        Now, that advance has not progressed at the speed that I
    feared it would a year ago. That advance is still north, along
    the northern borders of the littoral states, which we have a
    great deal of concern about. I think that is partly because of
    a number of factors. One of them, though, is the European
    partners, led by the French, have initiated a couple of things
    to try to improve the coordination between all of the
    international efforts that are going in there.
        They are also doing much more effective advise and assist
    operations. Partnership for West Africa is one of these things
    to increase coordination. Task Force Takuba is an advise and
    assist organization the French have stood up. They have asked
    for European partners to join in that effort. They have joined
    in that effort, and it is starting to be more effective.
        So I think they have done some work to improve the
    coordination of the international effort. That has slowed that
    spread some. That said, that forest fire is dancing along the
    northern borders of all of those littoral states. And I am of
    the view that we need to do--I would like to--for once, I would
    like to do something to prevent the fire, prevent those
    littoral states from gaining--getting fully engulfed like Mali
    is, for example. And I think there are some fairly low impact
    things that could be done there in the littoral states that
    might do fire prevention there.
        So I think a fire break across the Sahel, which largely is
    with the resources we have there now, mostly African and
    European, and then some fire prevention efforts in the littoral
    states.
        Mr. Veasey. Let me also ask you, several years ago, myself
    and Representative Panetta and Mr. Scott from Georgia, we
    visited Camp Lemonnier and several other countries there in
    Africa. And one of the areas of concern was exactly where the
    Chinese base was being built. I don't know that there was--
    strategically where it was at seemed to be a very good location
    for the Chinese in what they are trying to do to expand, you
    know, their naval operations and their presence on the
    continent.
        With the Chinese and the fact that, you know, they don't
    care about, you know, human rights violations, corruption, you
    know, they will fly, you know, prime ministers and presidents
    from the continent over to China, put them up in nice houses.
    What can we do to counter that as--you know, as more and more
    countries in Africa seek to be able to, you know, come into
    the--continue to grow economically and prosper as they want to,
    like any other nation does?
        General Townsend. Congressman, the African nations are not
    blind to what the Chinese are up to. They have fallen prey to
    some of these debt trap diplomacy traps. But they are not blind
    to it. They can see it. They believe they can--many of them
    believe they can manage it, and I think that is probably the
    biggest thing we can do is help them try to manage their
    interactions with the Chinese on the continent.
        Mr. Larsen. I thank the gentleman.
        Next up will be Representative Panetta, followed by
    Representative Speier. And so Representative Panetta from
    California is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen and
    ma'am, thank you for obviously your service, your time, your
    preparation, and for being here today, and your answers to our
    questions.
        As my colleague just mentioned, we did a CODEL--I forget
    when that was it, maybe 2018, summer of 2018--where we had--we
    definitely had one of the top CODELs I have been on in that we
    were based in Djibouti and obviously flew C-130s all around.
        One of the bases we went to was Manda Bay, and obviously,
    subsequent to that, you are very familiar with the attack that
    occurred in Manda Bay. Unfortunately, not just because of the
    attack, but unfortunately, we are trying to get the review of
    what happened in regards to the initial investigation, because
    of--obviously, I have been there, and obviously the tragedy
    that happened as well.
        But what is going on with the report? I know it has been 15
    months since the attack took place, and I know that Secretary
    Austin has ordered now another review of it. Can you give us
    some insight as to what is going on with that report and when
    you think we are going to get this report as to what the heck
    happened there?
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. Your visit was in
    the summer of 2019, not 2018. It was my first CODEL after I
    took command at AFRICOM.
        Mr. Panetta. No. That was a different one. This was to
    Manda Bay. Manda Bay was before. We went to West Africa after
    that, another excellent CODEL facilitated by you, General, and
    I appreciate that. But before that, we were in--we went to the
    east side of Africa. That was the west side of Africa.
        General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman. Correct. So Manda
    Bay report. So, first of all, let me reassure you and the other
    members that all of the steps that have been needed to take
    corrective action, immediate corrective action, have been taken
    long ago. Not only did we take those steps at Manda Bay; we
    took that report and applied those lessons learned at every
    base across Africa.
        Now, to answer your specific question about the status of
    the report, AFRICOM concluded its investigation in December of
    last year. Of course, the timing of that, trying to get that
    through the Department of Defense and released, became
    problematic because it was overlaid on top of the change of
    administration.
        The new Secretary of Defense came in. He received this
    report. He didn't have all of the depth of background on it,
    and so I think he very rightfully said, ``Okay. Thanks,
    AFRICOM. I think I would like to have a separate look at
    this.'' And AFRICOM supports that separate look.
        So the Secretary of Defense has appointed a disinterested
    four-star from the Army to look at the report of the
    investigation and give him advice on it.
        This is also necessary because many of the fixes pertain to
    other services and other COCOMs. So they weren't all within--
    all of the recommendations and findings weren't within
    AFRICOM's purview to see through, so the Secretary of Defense
    has to do that. So that is the current status of it.
        I think he gave the Army a target of 90 days to report out,
    and I think that is the current situation.
        Mr. Panetta. Good. Outstanding. Great. Thank you for that
    very thorough answer, General. Appreciate that.
        Now going to the summer of 2019 when I did--when we did the
    CODEL to West Africa, which once again we completely appreciate
    you facilitating that.
        Let me read you something that really kind of summarizes
    what I came away with. An article in The Economist last month,
    2 months ago, basically talked about France's challenge there
    in that area. And it says basically France is challenged by
    others who have recently fought insurgencies in places such as
    Afghanistan and Iraq. It is that of trying to improve security,
    which is almost impossible to do without development, and also
    drive development, which cannot happen without better security.
        I think, you know, that was the impression I had coming
    away from that trip to West Africa. My question to you is: how
    do we get out of that catch-22? What can we do? Obviously, you
    gave an excellent answer to my colleague, Marc Veasey, about
    coordination and cooperation. Is there anything else that we
    can do in order to provide security and development as we go
    forward, especially in the Sahel?
        General Townsend. Congressman, I would say that the thing
    that is probably the easiest to solve is the security
    challenges, but they can't be solved without better
    development, as you pointed out, and better governance. That is
    the root of all of this.
        And as we have seen that from Afghanistan to Africa, the
    root cause is poor governance, insufficient development, which
    needs a secure environment to proceed. And I think probably----
        Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired. Sorry,
    General. You will have to finish up for the record.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 117.]
        General Townsend. Thanks. The international efforts are
    really focused on security, unfortunately.
        Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Larsen. The chair recognizes Representative Speier from
    California for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
    great service.
        General McKenzie, let me start with you. I am very
    concerned that the May deadline is upon us, and I don't know
    that we have any assurances that the Taliban will not start
    attacking U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Can you provide us any
    consolation regarding that?
        General McKenzie. I can tell you that we are prepared for
    those attacks should they occur and will be able to defend
    ourselves.
        Ms. Speier. But we don't have any subsequent agreement,
    then, it appears.
        General McKenzie. I have no--we have no agreement on that
    past 1 May. And I am not certain what decision-making is going
    on inside the Taliban pursuant to what actions they might or
    might not take. We are ready for whatever they choose to do.
        Ms. Speier. And do we have any intention to maintain
    defense contractors in Afghanistan after we depart?
        General McKenzie. Everyone will leave. All U.S. defense
    contractors will leave as part of the withdrawal.
        Ms. Speier. All right. I think that kind of answers my
    questions.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Larsen. The Representative yields back.
        Just a moment for everyone. I am just checking with staff
    on other members.
        Okay. It looks like we are all good. So I want to thank the
    panel for coming today. We will I think adjourn or recess until
    3:00 p.m. and meet back here at 3:00 p.m. for the classified
    portion of the hearing. It will give you all some time to have
    some lunch.
        So appreciate your patience with us and answers to our
    questions. Very much appreciate that.
        With that, we will stand in recess until 3:00 p.m. We will
    adjourn until 3:00 p.m. I apologize.
        [Whereupon, at 1:27 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 20, 2021

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 20, 2021

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    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 April 20, 2021

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                 RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PANETTA

        General Townsend. Because security, development, and governance are
    mutually interdependent, we need to address them concurrently. Together
    with our international and interagency partners, we are reviewing our
    approach to strengthening all three areas. This approach places
    increased attention on strengthening governance institutions and basic
    service delivery. We see this as important in its own right and as a
    means of preventing VEO recruitment. Security is one of the basic
    services essential to this approach. Although interagency partners lead
    U.S. police professionalization efforts, AFRICOM can play a role in
    security sector reform efforts with West African militaries. Although
    AFRICOM has conducted security sector reform programs in West Africa in
    the past, they could be expanded. Security sector reform simultaneously
    helps counter VEOs and improves community-oriented service delivery. In
    order to do more, AFRICOM needs to be able to stand by its commitments
    and remain consistently engaged. Major reductions in AFRICOM security
    cooperation funding and exercise funding between 2018 and 2021created a
    perception that the U.S. and AFRICOM are walking away. AFRICOM's
    presence on the continent, especially in terms of: Defense Attache
    offices, posture (SFAB rotations), support to multilateral operations,
    exercises, and peace and security forums, must reinforce a sense of
    commitment that our allies and partners can count on. Another way in
    which AFRICOM can support this approach is by building the capacity of
    defense institutions. This contributes to improving governance by
    strengthening governance institutions within the security sector.
    AFRICOM has programmatic tools to help build the institutional capacity
    of partner militaries, and with the required permissions, could do the
    same for multilateral organizations, such as GS Sahel and ECOWAS.
    [See page 48.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 20, 2021

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. What is the timeframe for shifting your priorities
    from C-VEO and Iranian containment to great power competition?
        General McKenzie. (U) C-VEO efforts, deterring Iran, and countering
    Iran's destabilizing activities are all challenges in the CENTCOM Area
    of Responsibility. We will continue to prioritize these threats while
    also implementing the Department's guidance for treating China as the
    pacing challenge.
        Mr. Langevin. The renewed focus on near-peer adversaries means
    reprioritizing assets between combatant commands. Is your command
    prepared to lose ISR allocation? How do you plan to monitor stability
    in fragile areas?
        General McKenzie. (U) Multi-layer and persistent intelligence,
    surveillance, and recognizance (ISR) are vital to my command. My forces
    are engaged in combat operations along with our allies and partner
    forces in multiple joint operating areas. In the past two years, we
    have experienced substantial reductions to our ISR allocation. While my
    staff and subordinate commanders have done well in effectively managing
    our allocated ISR and have developed creative ways to stretch our
    resources, our expected future ISR allocation will heavily impact our
    ability to conduct our missions. The constant reductions of persistent
    full motion video assets, coupled with the Big Wing ISR reduction to
    zero, will decrease my ability to monitor violent extremist
    organizations (VEOs); provide force protection overwatch; help to
    maintain a watchful eye against malign Iranian and proxy activity; and
    open seams for our enemies to operate unseen and unchecked within
    USCENTCOM. Insufficient ISR will ultimately result in a lack of ability
    to respond to events in a timely fashion and increases risk to our
    forces on the ground.
        Mr. Langevin. I am concerned that we will overly emphasize C-VEO
    because it most familiar to our force and that we have the muscle
    memory to keep doing it. How can we ensure that we're focused on all
    facets of great power competition without overly committing to C-VEO?
        General Townsend. The facets of competition in Africa span the DIME
    spectrum and require a whole of government effort. AFRICOM focuses on
    the military facet while supporting interagency partners leading other
    aspects of competition. AFRICOM maintains its focus on all facets of
    global power competition (GPC) through execution of its campaign plan,
    of which CVEO is only one of the four objectives. Our primary objective
    for addressing GPC is Objective 1: gain and maintain strategic access,
    recognizing a clear market for strategic access with competitors in
    China and Russia. AFRICOM structures its campaign around a prioritized
    list of countries, where geostrategic terrain is the primary
    consideration, not VEO threats. Our balanced approach of objectives and
    campaign design ensures that we do not over emphasize CVEO. VEOs are
    the primary concern of many of our partners in the Horn and the Sahel
    and can be significant concerns in other regions. In countries facing
    VEO threats, our VEO assistance serves to maintain these relationships
    and, as we have found is a form of GPC as well. In African countries
    where VEOs are not a concern, AFRICOM focuses on other shared threats,
    such as Russian PMCs or piracy. AFRICOM is engaged across the
    continent, and only supports CVEO operations in a relatively small
    number of countries. In these countries, we also reinforce our
    relationship through countering other transnational threats, monitoring
    and responding to malign activity, strengthening and professionalizing
    partner forces, and promoting regional security. What remains constant
    across the continent is that to maintain partnerships capable of
    standing up to Chinese coercion, AFRICOM must stand by our partners as
    they combat the primary threats to their security and ours.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
        Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, you noted last year that ISR assets
    are critical for deterrence in the AOR, stating that consistent ISR is
    necessary to identify changes that shape force posturing. Do you have
    the ISR resources necessary to achieve this aim?
        General McKenzie. (U) For Fiscal Year 21, we have enough ISR to
    fully support one operation. Within the USCENTCOM area of
    responsibility there are currently two ongoing major combat operations
    in Iraq/Syria and Afghanistan, terrorists in Yemen, Iranian security
    issues in the Arabian gulf and choke points such as the Strait of
    Hormuz and the Bab El Mandeb strait. This results in my need to
    continuously re-prioritize limited allocated ISR against the most
    urgent problem set and assume risk in the others. The demand for ISR is
    relatively stable in the Command though the Services are reducing their
    ISR offerings every year since 2015. In addition, USCENTCOM has no
    assigned forces, requiring allocation from Joint Staff every year which
    has been decreasing due to National Defense Strategy priorities and
    Service ISR reductions.
        Mr. Scott. In 2020, Congress responded to the combatant commanders'
    call for more ISR resources by appropriating $250M for the ISR transfer
    fund, which funded additional ISR activities in the CENTCOM AOR. How
    did you leverage these additional resources in 2020? For 2021, the
    Pentagon did not request any funds for the ISR transfer fund and
    Congress did not appropriate any additional funds. How will the lack of
    ISR transfer funds in 2021 impact your mission?
        General McKenzie. (U) The USCENTCOM Partner Integration Enterprise
    (CPIE) Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination (PED) Facility is the
    only direct USCENTCOM activity that is currently funded by ISR Transfer
    Fund dollars, and an alternate funding strategy has already been
    identified to ensure its continued operation. Therefore, impacts to
    USCENTCOM-specific activities is negligible with the departure of the
    ISR Transfer Fund for Fiscal Years 21 or 22. That said, USCENTCOM fully
    expects it will `feel' the absence of the ISR Transfer Fund from
    Service-provided/managed ISR capabilities. A key example is the U.S.
    Air Force's (USAF) Government Owned/Contractor Operated (GOCO) MQ-9s
    which are slated to terminate in June 2021 due to no available follow-
    on funds to continue operation in the USCENTCOM battlespace. The USAF
    had contemplated, and USCENTCOM was going to support, pursuing Fiscal
    Year 21 ISR Transfer Fund dollars for at least a portion of the MQ-9
    GOCOs. With that funding not available, USAF reports no alternate
    funding strategy, which will result in full cessation of operations and
    only widen USCENTCOM/Components Full Motion Video shortfall (OIR
    projected to be 28,700 hours short in July 2021). USCENTCOM defers to
    the Services for a more detailed input regarding their respective
    equities that have been or were planned to be resourced via the ISR
    Transfer Fund.
        Mr. Scott. General McKenzie, your predecessor noted last year that
    ISR continued to experience significant shortfalls despite its critical
    role in the success of U.S. operations. How do you assess your current
    ISR gaps? Could you provide any specific examples in which ISR was
    critical to the success of an operation in your COCOM?
        General McKenzie. (U) The fissure between the operational demands
    for ISR and the available theater ISR platforms to meet those demands
    continues to widen in the USCENTCOM AOR. While USCENTCOM leverages
    other available capabilities, like national resources, airborne ISR
    undergirds USCENTCOM's layered, multi-Intelligence discipline
    collection strategy. Consequently, as theater airborne ISR decreases in
    the USCENTCOM AOR, its ISR gap will increase and result in a command
    better postured to react rather than one able to anticipate strategic
    developments.
        Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and
    Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps
    that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
        General McKenzie. (U) Until ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and
    Control are fully fielded and the Joint Staff determines how much will
    be allocated to USCENTCOM, it's a difficult question to answer. In its
    ISR role, JSTARS provided best of breed Moving Target Indicator (MTI)
    capability which directly resulted in taking many ISIS and AQ
    terrorists off the battlefield. MTI, like Full Motion Video (FMV),
    provides real time awareness of enemy actions, allowing me and my
    Commanders to act rapidly to get inside the adversaries' decision
    cycle. Without real-time ISR platforms such as JSTARS, we are reliant
    on time late intelligence from other non-airborne systems.
        Mr. Scott. Do you think ABMS and Joint All Domain Command and
    Control will have enough operational capability to fill the ISR gaps
    that JSTARS will not be able to fulfill once it is parked?
        General Townsend. USAFRICOM does not use JSTARS, but relies on
    other capabilities for ISR and situation awareness. The Air Force's
    Advanced Battle Management System and the Joint All Domain Command and
    Control are undergoing development and testing, with recent tests
    showing promise. The Joint All Domain Command and Control will enable
    Joint Force Commanders and warfighters to rapidly translate decisions
    into integrated and synchronized actions across all domains, multiple
    platforms, globally and with Mission Partners to achieve operational
    advantage in both competition and conflict.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
        Mrs. McClain. The House of Representatives has passed H.R. 1392,
    the Protection of Saudi Dissidents Act, which would prevent arms sales
    to Saudi Arabia unless the President can certify Saudi Arabia isn't
    committing human rights violations.
        Is the administration concerned that our allies in the region, like
    Saudi Arabia, might turn towards our adversaries like Russia or China
    if we do not continue to provide military support?
        Could bills like H.R. 1392 signal to our allies that the United
    States is not committed to their defense and their counter-terrorism
    efforts?
        Ms. Dory. Our competitors, like China and Russia, seek to exploit
    gaps in the security sectors of our partners. Saudi Arabia buys arms
    and weapons from China and is reportedly discussing purchases from
    Russia. The Department of Defense continues to invest in the defense
    partnership with Saudi Arabia and is committed to ensuring the United
    States remains its partner of choice even as we work to elevate human
    rights as a central component of that relationship.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
        Mr. Moore. Can you describe the impact on the ability to respond to
    Iranian regional aggression if the U.S. returns to the JCPOA?
        General McKenzie. (U) The administration is currently engaged in
    indirect talks with Iran on a mutual return to the Joint Comprehensive
    Plan of Action. Regardless of the outcome of that process, the
    President has made clear that countering Iran's malign behavior in the
    region is a priority, including addressing Iran's ballistic missile
    program and support for terrorist groups and violent proxies in the
    region. The United States retains all of its capacities to push back
    against Iran's destabilizing behavior, and will not hesitate to defend
    U.S. personnel and vital interests. As the diplomatic process unfolds,
    I will continue to provide my best military advice to civilian
    leadership on how to best respond to any potential Iranian regional
    aggression and then implement as directed.
        Mr. Moore. The U.S. maintains a permanent military presence at
    various military installations throughout CENTCOM. In consideration of
    the Taliban's failure to adhere to the terms of the February 29th
    agreement and if wanted by the Afghan government, what utility would be
    served by maintaining a permanent military presence in Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. (U) The President has directed that no U.S.
    military bases remain in Afghanistan. Planning is underway for a
    residual military presence in Afghanistan to provide security for the
    U.S. Embassy Kabul in support of Diplomatic missions. The
    administration understands the need to work with regional partners to
    disrupt terrorist networks, address humanitarian crises, and resolve
    armed conflicts responsibly.
        Mr. Moore. Africa will account for nearly half of global population
    growth over the next two decades and by 2100, five of the top 10 most
    populous countries in the world will be in Africa. For decades the DOD
    has maintained a presence and invested heavily throughout various
    combatant commands. What is your long-term view of U.S. presence,
    mission, and investment in Africa and what is the Department doing to
    build sustainable military partner capabilities?
        General Townsend. Strategic long-term trends shaping U.S. interests
    in Africa include expanding instability and violent opposition, fragile
    power transitions shaped by identity politics, democratic backsliding,
    and a growing number of autocracies. The United States represents an
    alternative future, where the decisive element is capable governance
    enabled by a stable security environment. The primary means of this
    stable security environment is a capable, professional military,
    partnered with AFRICOM to address future threats. Interagency partners
    will lead this effort, but AFRICOM also has a role. To do that, AFRICOM
    must continue to strengthen partner militaries through exercises,
    security cooperation, mil-to-mil engagements, and institutional
    capacity building while maintaining cost-efficient presence and
    posture. There is immense value in developing and maintaining long-term
    relationships with African nations, specifically the excellent work
    done within our State Partnership Program. This multi-tiered approach
    is sustainable over the long-term, currently using only 0.3% of DOD's
    Operations budget for an area three times the size of the United
    States. However, as Africa's population grows, these efforts may
    require additional resources to continue professionalizing and
    partnering with larger African militaries, police forces, and coast
    guards.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
        Mr. Morelle. Ms. Dory, what is your assessment of the goals of
    Russia in CENTCOM and AFRICOM, what do they gain by their interference,
    are they succeeding, and what measures can we use to limit their
    influence?
        Ms. Dory. Russia is pursuing partnerships to challenge U.S.
    influence, in both the Middle East, and in Africa. Moscow probably
    views expanding security and defense ties will facilitate greater
    influence over the governments and lead to developing broader
    partnerships in other spheres. Over the last 5 years, we have seen
    Moscow expand defense engagement through arms sales, training,
    technical or counterterrorism assistance, and intelligence sharing, all
    of which could complicate existing or future U.S. security
    arrangements. Russia is also aggressively pushing to increase its
    access to the region through simplified port visit agreements, through
    its expansion of existing facilities in Syria, and they may be nearing
    an agreement for a naval logistics facility in Sudan. Limiting their
    influence will require a practical, tailored interagency approach to
    ensure we are aligned not just in countering competitors, but also in
    meeting broader U.S. goals across the region. The Department's efforts
    should be aligned with our interagency partners to help our partners
    and allies build capacity, improve transparency, and develop
    institutions that support sustainable security solutions.
        Mr. Morelle. General Townsend, in what ways is China seeking to
    expand its influence in Africa? And, in areas where China's approach is
    troublesome, what is the U.S. strategy to provide an alternative to
    regional partners and what more can the U.S. be doing?
        General Townsend. Unlike Japan and our Western partners who
    recognize the value of coordinated approaches, China prefers separate,
    bilateral engagements in Africa. This allows China to push for opaque,
    back room deals, including military agreements. China uses bilateral
    intelligence sharing, technology transfers, arms sales and training to
    influence African militaries. For example, China shared drone
    intelligence with Nigeria and donated patrol boats to Ghana to combat
    piracy. This is noteworthy because China justified its first overseas
    base in Djibouti based on counterpiracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden
    and is now looking to expand its naval access along Africa's western
    coast. In addition to its preferred bilateral cooperation and
    engagement, China has recently stepped up its attempts to influence
    multilateral organizations in Africa as well. Chinese troops serve in
    six out of seven current U.N. peace operations and currently lead one
    U.N. mission. China also provides funding and equipment to the U.N.,
    African Union, GS Sahel, and the Economic Community of West African
    States (ECOWAS). The AFRICOM Campaign Plan defends U.S. partnerships in
    Africa against malign Chinese activity through its competition
    framework and two lines of effort. The competition framework is based
    on a range of desired conditions supporting U.S. strategic and
    operational access. The two lines of effort are to ``Gain and Maintain
    Strategic Access & Influence'' and to ``Coordinate Action with Allies &
    Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives.'' In support of these
    efforts, AFRICOM closely monitors Chinese military activity, weighs the
    long term strategic implications of China's full spectrum of
    diplomatic, informational, military and economic activities, and works
    with our African and international partners to address shared threats
    together. In order to do more, AFRICOM needs to be able to stand by its
    commitments and remain consistently engaged. Major reductions in
    AFRICOM security cooperation funding and exercise funding between 2018
    and 2021 created a perception that the U.S. and AFRICOM are walking
    away. AFRICOM's presence on the continent, especially in terms of:
    Defense Attache offices, posture (SFAB rotations), support to
    multilateral operations, exercises, and peace and security forums, must
    reinforce a sense of commitment that our allies and partners can count
    on.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
        Mr. Moulton. As we draw down to zero combat troops in Afghanistan,
    it sounds like there are currently many options on the table for over-
    the-horizon capabilities and that General McKenzie is relatively
    confident in the U.S. military's ability to conduct ``find, fix, and
    strike'' operations for counterterrorism in Afghanistan to ensure it
    does not yet again become a base for international terrorist
    operations. But our interests in Afghanistan extend beyond
    counterterrorism--our national interest is to have a relatively stable
    Afghanistan with a government that remains an ally of the United
    States. Ms. Dory and General McKenzie, what is your plan for ensuring
    that we can still provide support to the Afghan government, as well as
    security support to ensure a U.S. embassy and diplomatic presence in
    Afghanistan?
        Ms. Dory. The Department remains committed to continuing a close
    defense relationship with the Afghan Government focused on supporting
    the Afghan forces through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, which
    is critical to their ability to defend their country, and to
    maintaining a relatively stable Afghanistan whose government remains an
    ally of the United States. The United States will also maintain a
    counterterrorism capacity with military and intelligence assets in the
    region that can counter the re-emergence of terrorist threats in
    Afghanistan and deal with it if it does emerge. We will also hold the
    Taliban accountable if they are not doing what they have committed to
    do in the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, particularly preventing
    any group or individual, including al-Qaeda, from using the soil of
    Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and our
    allies. The only remaining military presence in Afghanistan will be the
    force required to protect our diplomats. We have undertaken extensive
    planning of our own and have consulted with our allies and partners to
    ensure that our diplomats in Afghanistan will have what they need to
    fulfill their important and enduring mission.
        Mr. Moulton. Ms. Dory, you state the DOD is not the lead player in
    Africa, but provides support to other U.S. departments and agencies. As
    the CCP looks to gain footholds in African infrastructure through
    ``debt trap diplomacy,'' are U.S. government efforts like the State
    Department's Blue Dot Network and USAID's Clear Choice sufficient to
    reduce or replace PRC influence in Africa? Are there additional tools
    you would like to see the Department or broader U.S. government provide
    to this effort to secure U.S. interests in Africa and ensure PRC
    influence does not become a larger security threat? How would you
    prioritize the use of these tools against other regions, such as
    eastern Europe and South America, where the PRC is expanding its reach
    and attempting to establish dominance in areas like 5G?
        Ms. Dory. DOD's partnerships with African governments and
    militaries play an important role in U.S. whole-of-government efforts
    to counter malign Chinese activities on the continent. By providing
    African partners with superior training and equipment that meet their
    security needs, and doing so transparently and responsibly, DOD offers
    African nations a preferred alternative to Chinese security wares. Key
    partnership tools employed by DOD that translate to strategic
    competition gains include senior leader engagements, joint exercises,
    port visits, personnel exchanges, the State Partnership Program,
    training events, and other security cooperation programs. These DOD
    tools help advance mutual security goals and enhance partner resilience
    to malign activities, especially in the maritime space as China expands
    its investments in critical port infrastructure. Professional military
    education, which is coordinated with the Department of State, is also
    essential as it enables longstanding ties between military leaders in
    the United States and in Africa. DOD employs these tools based on each
    partner nation's needs and capabilities and with a view to alignment
    with mutual security priorities.
        Mr. Moulton. I recently co-led a letter with Representative Wittman
    to Secretary Austin and Deputy Secretary Hicks expressing concerns
    about the impact the current rate of additional Requests for Forces
    (RFFs) above the GFMAP has on overtaxing our forces and resources and
    delaying services' vital modernization efforts. General McKenzie, you
    state that this is a natural tension between those who provide forces
    and those who employ them, but my sense is that the Department in
    recent years has leaned too far in favor of the COCOMs, often
    USCENTCOM. By remaining overly focused on short-term risk, we are
    trading our readiness for great power competition. General McKenzie,
    how can you as a Combatant Commander better support this balance and
    assist the Secretary in making the choice to prioritize military
    modernization?
        General McKenzie. (U) Our Service Chiefs' role in military
    modernization is to seek future technologies and field new equipment
    necessary to out-pace our near-peer competitors, namely China and
    Russia. At times, the result of this long-term focus is a shortage of
    critical force element capabilities in the near-term. A combatant
    commander's (CCDR's) role is to identify required capabilities to meet
    directed operations and approved operational plans. These demand
    signals are registered, and if validated by the Joint Staff, proceed as
    force requests to the Services to source. However, sourcing our
    numerous CCDRs at once is not sustainable especially based on the
    existing Service capacity or inventory. To better seek a balance in the
    risk to force and risk to mission, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, as the Global Integrator, will make Best Military Advice
    recommendations to the Secretary of Defense who will make final
    decisions. With a decision to not source, CCDRs will mitigate the lack
    of sourcing of near-term capabilities with potential reductions or
    changes in requested capabilities, identify suitable in-lieu-of
    capabilities, or revise their operational plans under supply-informed
    constraints. The CJCS and Secretary of Defense are ultimately the
    fulcrum in the balance of the Services' military modernization and the
    CCDRs' global campaign plans and regional directed operations. As
    stated in my testimony, the process works well to inform our senior
    military and civilian leadership so that they can determine their
    tolerance in accepting the near-term or long-term risks.
        Mr. Moulton. As we draw down to zero combat troops in Afghanistan,
    it sounds like there are currently many options on the table for over-
    the-horizon capabilities and that General McKenzie is relatively
    confident in the U.S. military's ability to conduct ``find, fix, and
    strike'' operations for counterterrorism in Afghanistan to ensure it
    does not yet again become a base for international terrorist
    operations. But our interests in Afghanistan extend beyond
    counterterrorism--our national interest is to have a relatively stable
    Afghanistan with a government that remains an ally of the United
    States. Ms. Dory and General McKenzie, what is your plan for ensuring
    that we can still provide support to the Afghan government, as well as
    security support to ensure a U.S. embassy and diplomatic presence in
    Afghanistan?
        General McKenzie. (U) First, I would like to be clear that while I
    believe we can conduct counterterrorism from over the horizon, it will
    not be easy. The United States will maintain a counterterrorism
    capacity with military and intelligence assets in the region that can
    counter the reemergence of terrorist threats in Afghanistan and deal
    with it if it does emerge. Second, USCENTCOM is developing plans to
    conduct management of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, contracted
    logistic support, and end use monitoring from over-the-horizon. The
    Department of Defense is working with the Department of State to ensure
    the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan has the necessary security resources to
    protect U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities after the withdrawal
    of U.S. troops.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
        Mr. Bacon. The Kurdish Peshmerga have been key allies in our fight
    against ISIS in Iraq and critical to our efforts in promoting a stable
    Iraq. How does a professional, well-trained and properly equipped
    Peshmerga Forces support the national security interests of the United
    States and provide stability in the region? What role do you believe
    the Peshmerga can play to ensure future threats like ISIS do not re-
    spawn?
        Ms. Dory. Working by, with, and through vetted partner forces, U.S.
    and Coalition forces are able to maintain pressure on ISIS and
    establish security conditions to address stabilization needs. The Iraqi
    Security Forces (ISF), which includes the Ministry of Peshmerga
    Affairs, are the cornerstone of this approach in Iraq. Working within
    the ISF architecture and under the command of the Government of Iraq,
    the Peshmerga play a critical role in denying ISIS safe haven in the
    Iraqi Kurdistan Region and denying ISIS freedom of movement across the
    Iraq-Syria border. Further security engagement with Iraq--including
    with the Peshmerga--will continue to help the ISF's counterterrorism
    capabilities improve and contributes to U.S. national security
    objectives.
        Mr. Bacon. The UAE has been a key U.S. ally and has made monumental
    progress in its relationship with Israel through the Abraham Accords.
    It's been reported that the U.S. administration has recently approved a
    deal to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates. What do you see as the
    operational and strategic advantages to the United States of the UAE
    being equipped with F-35s? What concerns does DOD have the sale of the
    F-35 to UAE?
        Ms. Dory. As has been discussed with Congress, the administration
    intends to move forward with these arms sales to the UAE, even as we
    continue consulting with Emirati officials to ensure we have clear
    mutual understandings with respect to Emirati obligations and actions
    before, during, and after delivery. Implementation of these sales is an
    indication of the strength of our strategic partnership with the UAE
    and supports shared national security interests to counter regional
    threats and enhance interoperability with one of our most capable
    security partners in the region. This sale comes with the high
    expectation that U.S. technology and advanced weapons systems will be
    protected and used in accordance with all applicable laws, including
    the law of armed conflict. We anticipate a robust and sustained
    dialogue with the UAE to ensure that any arms transfers meet our mutual
    strategic objectives while protecting U.S. technology.
        Mr. Bacon. How can the US Congress best ensure that sufficient
    security assistance is provided to support the Pershmerga in
    counterterrorism operations and in maintaining general military
    readiness? Do you see CTEF program as the best way to support the
    Kurdish Pershmerga in the future? Do you see 333 security assistance
    authorities playing a key role in ensuring the readiness and
    sustainment of Pershmerga?
        Ms. Dory. The Department of Defense currently relies on Section
    1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY)
    2015, as amended, and the Counter-ISIS Train & Equip Fund (CTEF) to
    support operations to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
    in Iraq. Section 1236 and CTEF remain essential to ensuring we can
    achieve this objective, working by, with, and through the Government of
    Iraq (GoI). The Ministry of Peshmerga is organizationally and
    doctrinally a part of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). It takes
    direction from the GOI and also receives funding and equipment from the
    GOI. The Peshmerga also coordinates regulations and doctrine with the
    Iraqi Armed Forces to establish commonality and interoperability. For
    example, the Peshmerga have the same radios as the Iraqi Army in order
    to improve their connectivity and ability to be interoperable. Further,
    Peshmerga units can be, and have been, deployed outside the Kurdistan
    region in support of other Iraqi missions. As a general matter, we
    understand that Peshmerga forces are under the command and control of
    the GoI. The Peshmerga's functional responsibilities include conducting
    counterterrorism and border security operations, which are supportable
    mission sets under 10 USC 333(a). This presents opportunities to
    develop traditional security cooperation and institutional capacity
    building mechanisms with the GoI gradually. Peshmerga eligibility for
    Section 333 assistance would be determined at the time a Section 333
    program is proposed.
        Mr. Bacon. The Kurdish Peshmerga have been key allies in our fight
    against ISIS in Iraq and critical to our efforts in promoting a stable
    Iraq. How does a professional, well-trained and properly equipped
    Peshmerga Forces support the national security interests of the United
    States and provide stability in the region? What role do you believe
    the Peshmerga can play to ensure future threats like ISIS do not re-
    spawn?
        General McKenzie. (U) Professional and well-equipped Peshmerga
    Forces have been a valuable partner for the U.S. since 1991, and
    currently play a critical role in the ongoing fight against ISIS. A
    stable Iraqi Kurdistan enables all of Iraq's stability. Furthermore,
    professional and well-trained Peshmerga forces are a bulwark against a
    potential resurgence of ISIS. To maintain continued pressure against a
    resurgence of ISIS and other malign actors in and around the IKR, it
    may require a CTEF enabled Pesh Support commitment through, FY23 at a
    minimum. The concern is the ability of Government of Iraq to properly
    fund the KRG in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution given the
    difficulties in implementing the recently approved budget law, the
    COVID-19 impact on the IKR, and the current low market prices of energy
    resources.
        Mr. Bacon. The UAE has been a key U.S. ally and has made monumental
    progress in its relationship with Israel through the Abraham Accords.
    It's been reported that the U.S. administration has recently approved a
    deal to sell F-35s to the United Arab Emirates. What do you see as the
    operational and strategic advantages to the United States of the UAE
    being equipped with F-35s? What concerns does DOD have the sale of the
    F-35 to UAE?
        General McKenzie. (U) The UAE is among our most capable military
    partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility and a major
    security partner. The sale of F-35s, MQ-9s, and relevant munitions--for
    which there are signed Letters of Offer and Acceptance, will provide
    the UAE credible defense capability and enable continued
    interoperability with U.S. forces. This equipment represents a
    significant increase in capability over current airframes in the UAE's
    inventory. I refer you to Ms. Dory's response to this same question
    regarding any concerns DOD has regarding the sale.
        Mr. Bacon. How can the US Congress best ensure that sufficient
    security assistance is provided to support the Peshmerga in
    counterterrorism operations and in maintaining general military
    readiness? Do you see CTEF program as the best way to support the
    Kurdish Peshmerga in the future? Do you see 333 security assistance
    authorities playing a key role in ensuring the readiness and
    sustainment to the Peshmerga?
        General McKenzie. (U) CTEF support to the Iraqi Security Forces
    (ISF) remains essential to our ``by, with, and through'' approach to
    the counter-ISIS campaign. With respect to the Ministry of Peshmerga
    Affairs (MoPA), which is a component of the ISF, CTEF currently remains
    our best option to sustain an adequate level of counter-ISIS operations
    and general military readiness. CTEF addresses immediate tactical
    requirements (e.g., cash stipends and classes of supply) of vetted,
    unified, Kurdish Security Forces (KSF) personnel primarily assigned to
    Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs). There are opportunities to explore
    future security cooperation with the MoPA through Section 333, which
    could gradually improve the security assistance relationship by
    building specific capabilities aligned with long-term U.S. objectives
    with the Government of Iraq.

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