[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENSURING EQUITABLE DELIVERY OF
DISASTER BENEFITS TO VULNERABLE
COMMUNITIES AND PEOPLES: AN
EXAMINATION OF GAO'S FINDINGS
ON THE CDBG-DR PROGRAM
=======================================================================
VIRTUAL HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 19, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services
Serial No. 117-65
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-103 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
MAXINE WATERS, California, Chairwoman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York PATRICK McHENRY, North Carolina,
NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ, New York Ranking Member
BRAD SHERMAN, California FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York BILL POSEY, Florida
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
AL GREEN, Texas BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado ANDY BARR, Kentucky
JIM A. HIMES, Connecticut ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas
BILL FOSTER, Illinois FRENCH HILL, Arkansas
JOYCE BEATTY, Ohio TOM EMMER, Minnesota
JUAN VARGAS, California LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
AL LAWSON, Florida WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
MICHAEL SAN NICOLAS, Guam TED BUDD, North Carolina
CINDY AXNE, Iowa DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
SEAN CASTEN, Illinois TREY HOLLINGSWORTH, Indiana
AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Ohio
RITCHIE TORRES, New York JOHN ROSE, Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin
ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina LANCE GOODEN, Texas
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina
MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania VAN TAYLOR, Texas
ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York PETE SESSIONS, Texas
JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
Charla Ouertatani, Staff Director
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
AL GREEN, Texas Chairman
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri TOM EMMER, Minnesota, Ranking
ALMA ADAMS, North Carolina Member
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia
JESUS ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois ALEXANDER X. MOONEY, West Virginia
SYLVIA GARCIA, Texas DAVID KUSTOFF, Tennessee
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia, Vice WILLIAM TIMMONS, South Carolina,
Chair Vice Ranking Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on:
January 19, 2022............................................. 1
Appendix:
January 19, 2022............................................. 31
WITNESSES
Wednesday, January 19, 2022
Begg, Stephen M., Deputy Inspector General, Office of Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 11
Calhoun-Palay, Chrishelle, Director, Houston Organizing Movement
for Equity (HOME) Coalition.................................... 8
Garcia-Diaz, Daniel, Managing Director, Financial Markets and
Community Investment, U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO).......................................................... 5
Morris, Andreanecia, Executive Director, HousingNOLA............. 10
Yentel, Diane, President and CEO, National Low Income Housing
Coalition (NLIHC).............................................. 6
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Begg, Stephen M.............................................. 32
Calhoun-Palay................................................ 47
Garcia-Diaz.................................................. 52
Morris, Andreanecia.......................................... 68
Yentel, Diane................................................ 79
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Green, Hon. Al:
GAO report GAO-22-104452, ``Disaster Recovery--Better Data
Are Needed to Ensure HUD Block Grant Funds Reach Vulnerable
Populations,'' dated November 2021......................... 99
Highlights summary of GAO report GAO-22-104452, ``Disaster
Recovery--Better Data Are Needed to Ensure HUD Block Grant
Funds Reach Vulnerable Populations,'' dated November 2021.. 164
H.R. 4707, the Reforming Disaster Recovery Act............... 165
HUD letter of disapproval for the Texas General Land Office's
(GLO's) State Community Development Block Grant Mitigation
Action Plan................................................ 217
ENSURING EQUITABLE DELIVERY
OF DISASTER BENEFITS TO
VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND
PEOPLES: AN EXAMINATION OF GAO'S
FINDINGS ON THE CDBG-DR PROGRAM
----------
Wednesday, January 19, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations,
Committee on Financial Services,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m.,
via Webex, Hon. Al Green [chairman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Members present: Representatives Green, Cleaver, Adams,
Tlaib, Garcia of Illinois, Garcia of Texas, Williams of
Georgia; Emmer, Loudermilk, Kustoff, and Timmons.
Chairman Green. The Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the subcommittee at any time. Also, without
objection, Members of the full Financial Services Committee who
are not Members of this subcommittee are authorized to
participate in today's hearing.
As a reminder, I ask all Members to keep themselves muted
when they are not being recognized by the Chair, to minimize
disturbances while Members are asking questions of our
witnesses. The staff has been instructed not to mute Members,
except when a Member is not being recognized by the Chair and
there is inadvertent background noise.
Members are reminded that all House rules related to order
and decorum apply to this remote hearing. Members are also
reminded that they may participate in only one remote
proceeding at a time. If you are participating in today's
hearing, please keep your camera on, and if you choose to
attend a different remote proceeding, please turn your camera
off. Members wishing to be recognized during the hearing,
please identify yourself by name to facilitate recognition by
the Chair.
Members are reminded that your questions and answers are
limited to 5 minutes. To elaborate just a bit, I do ask that
you please try to get your answer as well as your question in
within the 5 minutes. You should be able to see a timer on your
screen that will indicate how much time you have left, and a
chime will sound at the end of your time.
The title of today's hearing is, ``Ensuring Equitable
Delivery of Disaster Benefits to Vulnerable Communities and
Peoples: An Examination of GAO's Findings on the CDBG-DR
Program.''
I will now recognize myself for 3 minutes to give an
opening statement.
In 2020, Chairwoman Waters and I tasked the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), with assessing the degree to which
Federal disaster recovery resources were meeting the unique
needs and challenges of vulnerable populations in the wake of
natural disasters.
Vulnerable populations too often include high-poverty
areas, racial minorities, persons with limited English
proficiency, persons with disabilities, and the elderly.
In their report, the Government Accountability Office
recommends that, going forward, HUD should collect, analyze,
and publish demographic data from CDBG-DR grantees on
vulnerable populations who apply for assistance, as well as
those who receive it.
It is important to note that data collection necessitates
cooperation from grantees, such as the State of Texas. Texas
was awarded more than $4 billion for Hurricane Harvey relief,
with nearly half still unspent due to the State's action plan
being incomplete, as indicated in HUD's January 7, 2022, letter
to the Deputy Land Commissioner for the State of Texas.
In the 116th Congress, Congresswoman Ann Wagner and I
introduced legislation which not only addresses data
collection, but also codifies and streamlines the data
collection process as it relates to disaster relief. This
legislation passed the House in the 116th Congress, and the
latest iteration of the legislation is pending before the House
and the Senate.
This concludes my opening statement.
At this time, without objection, I would like to place the
following documents in the record: H.R. 4707, the Reforming
Disaster Recovery Act; the Department of Housing and Urban
Development letter of disapproval for the Texas GLO's State
Community Development Block Grant Mitigation Action Plan; GAO
Report Number GAO-22-104452 entitled, ``Disaster Recovery:
Better Data are Needed to Ensure HUD Block Grant Funds Reach
Vulnerable Populations''; and GAO highlights summary of report
GAO-22-104452, ``Disaster Recovery: Better Data are Needed to
Ensure HUD Block Grant Funds Reach Vulnerable Populations.''
I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Emmer, for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding this hearing today. And I thank our witnesses for
appearing before this subcommittee. I look forward to their
testimony.
The Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery
(CDBG-DR) Program is one of several ways that Congress and the
Federal Government assist in the local disaster recovery
process. It is supposed to swiftly meet the needs of our most
vulnerable communities and help small businesses recover from
the most severe natural disasters. It is also supposed to
provide targeted relief so that affected communities can
rebuild homes and infrastructure, and affected businesses can
reopen and support their communities.
But instead, the program has a history of waste, fraud, and
abuse. Time and time again, we see examples of grantees
misusing disaster recovery money for purposes outside the scope
of approved action plans, or we see bureaucratic gridlock in
distributing funds appropriately, or we even see appropriated
funds remaining unspent even decades after a disaster.
For these reasons, it has become apparent to this
subcommittee that the Community Development Block Grant
Disaster Recovery Program fails in its objective to address the
unmet needs of the most targeted vulnerable communities. That
is a problem.
Why is this the case? How can we eliminate waste, fraud,
and abuse within the Community Development Block Grant Disaster
Recovery Program so that funds reach those who need them most?
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and
investigating this topic today. And I applaud my colleagues,
Chairman Green and Representative Wagner, for their continued
work to protect this program from waste, fraud, and abuse.
When disasters strike, aid must be delivered as effectively
and efficiently as possible. This can only be achieved through
proper oversight of the program. I am proud that this committee
shares this priority.
However, some of my colleagues propose to fix the program
by appropriating money in advance of a disaster, rather than
waiting to see if there are unmet needs after agencies like the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers provide immediate relief. That is a bad
idea.
Natural disasters vary in size, severity, and occurrence.
For this reason, we should not subject the Community
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program to annual
congressional appropriations. This would be a less-than-
responsible and preemptive use of taxpayer dollars, and it
could result in a misjustice to the vulnerable communities that
the assistance is designed to support.
As we will explore in this hearing, communities are
currently left without a clear understanding of where to turn
and how to properly access the Community Development Block
Grant Disaster Recovery funds. If responsibly codified, this
program will establish a clear, streamlined structure so that
all parties involved in distributing relief to communities
understand the process and the guidelines.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of
Inspector General has spent years conducting audits and
investigations of this program, revealing the potential for
mismanagement and the possibility of waste, fraud, and abuse.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently completed a
report investigating this program's effectiveness at reaching
the most vulnerable populations.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony so we can
further our efforts to protect vulnerable communities in times
of disaster, increase transparency, and establish the proper
structure and oversight so that funds can be swiftly
distributed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the remainder of
my time.
Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Emmer, for your very kind
words. And the gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the Vice Chair of the
subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Georgia, Ms. Williams, for 1
minute.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you so much, Chairman Green.
My home City of Atlanta, unfortunately, has the largest
racial wealth gap in the country. On this committee, a big part
of our job is making investments that help close that racial
wealth gap. At the same time, though, it is our responsibility
to guard those most-marginalized against shocks that could
further widen the racial wealth gap. That is why today, I look
forward to the conversation about ensuring that disaster relief
is accessible to members of vulnerable populations.
For my district, natural disasters aren't just an abstract
concern. My home county, Fulton County, is currently tied for
first place as the most tornado-prone county in the State of
Georgia.
I will especially never forget the half-billion dollars'
worth of damage a 2008 tornado did to metropolitan Atlanta. And
I will never forget the 500-year flood in 2009 that resulted in
10 deaths and another half-billion dollars in damage.
My constituents have seen, and will see again, natural
disasters. It is our job to make sure that our government is
prepared to help all of the people get back on their feet, and
that no disaster takes us backwards when it comes to closing
the racial wealth gap.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Chairman Green. Thank you, Madam Vice Chair. The
gentlelady's time has expired.
I will now welcome each of our witnesses, and I am pleased
to introduce our panel.
Daniel Garcia-Diaz is the Managing Director for Financial
Markets and Community Investment at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Welcome.
Diane Yentel is the President and CEO of the National Low
Income Housing Coalition. Welcome.
Chrishelle Calhoun-Palay is the Director of the Texas-based
HOME Coalition. Welcome to you, as well.
Andreanecia Morris is the Executive Director of
HousingNOLA. Welcome.
And Stephen Begg is the Deputy Inspector General of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of
Inspector General. Welcome to you, as well.
I welcome all of you.
Witnesses are reminded that your oral testimony will be
limited to 5 minutes. You should be able to see a timer on your
screen that indicates how much time you have left, and a chime
will go off at the end of your time. I would ask that you be
mindful of the timer, and quickly wrap up your testimony if you
hear the chime, so that we can be respectful of both the
witnesses' and the subcommittee members' time.
And without objection, your written statements will be made
a part of the record.
Once the witnesses finish their testimony, each Member will
have 5 minutes to ask questions.
Mr. Garcia-Diaz, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to
give an oral presentation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL GARCIA-DIAZ, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Thank you.
Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on GAO's
recent report on how CDBG-DR serves vulnerable populations.
Our work confirms that certain populations face steep
challenges in accessing help. CDBG-DR is focused on those who
are poor or of modest means, but some populations face
additional hurdles in getting help, for example, the elderly or
disabled may need transportation or reasonable accommodations.
Disaster victims may not have access to the internet or may not
be proficient in English to understand available resources.
From an agency perspective, even identifying people in need can
be challenging.
Now, once disaster victims have been located or seek help,
extensive documentation requirements can be difficult to comply
with. One of the tricky parts of this work was settling on a
definition of, ``vulnerable population.'' HUD has not always
been clear about the term. We examined Federal Register notices
since 2013, and the term has been evolving throughout that
time.
Our recent report describes efforts by grantees to develop
outreach plans for such populations and offer special services.
However, many that we spoke with at all levels expressed
concerns about the lack of clarity around the term. In response
to our report, HUD pledged to better define this in future
Federal Register notices. This would certainly be a step in the
right direction. And we certainly hope that the CDBG office
includes its Office of Fair Housing as well as other critical
stakeholders in its deliberations.
However, even if vulnerable populations are better defined
in the future, we remain concerned that HUD does not currently
collect the data that it needs to fully assess how well the
program is addressing unmet needs. For instance, HUD only
requires that grantees report on those who receive assistance,
not those who apply, even though the grantees collect the
information on both applicants and recipients.
We recommended that HUD gather, analyze, and make public
additional data on both applicants and recipients across a
range of demographic characteristics. HUD stated that it would
work on this recommendations as part of an ongoing effort being
led by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to improve the
Federal Government's ability to assess whether programs have
full and equal participation by all eligible individuals.
In its response to our report, HUD also noted that such
changes could require resources/investments as well as
consideration of privacy concerns, although its response did
not detail what resources would be needed.
We urge HUD to take steps to implement our recommendation,
given the size and importance of the program and disaster
recovery.
Mr. Chairman, while the focus of this hearing is on how
CDBG-DR serves vulnerable populations, we think the issues we
found in our recent report are indicative of the bigger
challenge with the Federal approach to disaster recovery. After
each disaster, individual Federal Register notices have been
developed and grantee action plans must be submitted and
reviewed. This is time-consuming and paperwork-intensive, and
it can also incentivize grantees to be more reactive rather
than proactive in their disaster planning.
GAO has previously recommended that Congress consider
permanently authorizing the CDBG-DR Program or some similar
program to address the needs unmet by FEMA, insurance, or other
resources, rather than continue to authorize it as a series of
supplemental appropriations that HUD administers through ad hoc
notices.
As you know, the current structure of CDBG-DR has
contributed to delays in making funding available. Further,
grantee capacity challenges in administering extraordinary
large grant amounts have added to the delays.
We must keep in mind that these funding delays and grantee
capacity issues directly and disproportionately affect
vulnerable populations. A permanent program could help
meaningfully speed up the front end of this process and
encourage more pre-disaster planning to prevent back-end
delays.
As potential reform options of CDBG-DR are weighed, three
critical questions need to be considered. First, how does CDBG-
DR fit into the broader set of Federal programs? HUD's efforts
don't exist in a vacuum. The current structure creates too many
layers and too many players and creates confusion for
applicants.
Second, and unrelated, what is the underlying purpose of
CDBG-DR? This is where Congress could give specific guidance
and introduce accountability and transparency so that no part
of disaster-affected communities is overlooked by CDBG-DR.
And third, how will the capacity challenges in
administering the program be addressed at the Federal, State,
and local levels? Funneling money into organizations is risky
if they do not have the capacity to manage it well. Building
capacity at the grantee level, especially prior to a major
disaster, is essential.
Mr. Chairman, we at GAO have work underway to help the
Congress understand these fundamental challenges, and we look
forward to assisting the committee in its oversight and reform
efforts going forward.
This concludes my remarks, and I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia-Diaz can be found on
page 52 of the appendix.]
Chairman Green. Thank you, Mr. Garcia-Diaz.
Ms. Yentel, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give an
oral presentation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DIANE YENTEL, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NATIONAL LOW
INCOME HOUSING COALITION (NLIHC)
Ms. Yentel. Thank you.
Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
ways to ensure that our nation's disaster rebuilding and
mitigation efforts address the unique and often overlooked
needs of the lowest-income and most-marginalized survivors,
including people of color, people with disabilities, people
experiencing homelessness, and others.
NLIHC has worked on disaster housing recovery issues for
nearly 2 decades, and from this experience we have found that
America's disaster housing recovery system is fundamentally
broken and in need of major reform. It is a system that does
not address the unique needs of the lowest-income and most-
marginalized people and the communities in which they live, and
as a result, it consistently leaves them behind in recovery and
rebuilding efforts and makes their communities less resilient
to future disasters.
The CDBG-DR and CDBG mitigation programs are vital recovery
tools that provide States and communities with flexible, long-
term recovery and mitigation resources needed to rebuild
affordable housing and infrastructure after a disaster and to
prevent future harm. Too often, however, these resources reach
communities much too slowly, and they are diverted away from
the people and communities with the greatest needs, for whom
the programs were designed to serve.
My written testimony provides multiple examples from
disaster after disaster of how CDBG-DR recovery efforts tend to
prioritize homeowners, who are more likely to be White, over
renters, who are predominantly Black and Brown. In doing so,
disaster recovery exacerbates racial wealth disparities and
pushes more low-income renters of color into long-term housing
instability and, in worst cases, homelessness.
While Black and Brown communities are often located in
areas at higher risk of disaster with less resilient
infrastructure to protect residents from harm, long-term
recovery resources tend to go to White communities that face
fewer risks. Rather than dismantling racial segregation that is
the direct result of intentional Federal, State, and local
policy, rebuilding efforts tend to entrench racial disparities
and inequities.
In my written testimony, I outline key barriers to
equitable and comprehensive disaster housing recovery and our
recommendations on how to reform CDBG-DR, to ensure that these
resources are deployed quickly, equitably, and effectively.
Many of our recommendations are aligned with those made by
the GAO in its recent report. NLIHC agrees with the GAO's
recommendations related to increasing data transparency and
equity. To better assess whether CDBG-DR funds are effectively
reaching survivors with the greatest needs, HUD and grantees
must collect, analyze, and make public key demographic data on
the race, ethnicity, disability status, language preference,
and other characteristics of program applicants and
beneficiaries. Data transparency and an increased focus on
equity must be central to any efforts to reform the CDBG-DR
Program, and HUD should implement these changes immediately.
NLIHC also supports GAO's recommendation that Congress
permanently authorize the CDBG-DR Program. The Reforming
Disaster Recovery Act would provide important safeguards and
tools to help ensure that Federal disaster recovery efforts
reach all impacted households, including the lowest-income and
most-marginalized people.
The bill would quickly target resources to those with the
greatest needs by requiring funds to be spent proportionally
between homeowners and renters, based on need, and by keeping
in place the requirement that at least 70 percent of funds
benefit low- and moderate-income survivors.
The bill would prioritize data transparency and oversight
by requiring HUD to create a public-facing dashboard
summarizing how funds are being spent, requiring public input,
and directing grantees to provide more details on how they
would use the funds to serve the lowest-income survivors.
The bill would protect civil rights and fair housing by
requiring that the funds be administered in compliance with
fair housing and civil rights laws, and requiring HUD to
release information publicly regarding disaster recovery
efforts, disaggregated by race, geography, and all protected
classes. And the bill would encourage mitigation and
resiliency.
Our country must reform existing disaster housing recovery
systems to ensure that affordable housing investments and
Federal disaster recovery resources reach all impacted
households. The Reforming Disaster Recovery Act would allow for
important progress towards these goals and should be advanced
and quickly enacted by Congress.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yentel can be found on page
79 of the appendix.]
Chairman Green. Thank you very much, Ms. Yentel.
Ms. Calhoun-Palay, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to
give an oral presentation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHRISHELLE CALHOUN-PALAY, DIRECTOR, HOUSTON
ORGANIZING MOVEMENT FOR EQUITY (HOME) COALITION
Ms. Calhoun-Palay. Good morning. On behalf of the Houston
Organizing Movement for Equity (HOME), thank you, Chairman
Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members of the subcommittee,
for the opportunity to testify today.
I am Chrishelle Calhoun-Palay, Coalition Director of HOME,
which was created in response to Hurricane Harvey in Houston,
Texas. HOME is a coalition of organizations that advocate for a
just and equitable recovery.
It has been 4 years since Hurricane Harvey, and the HOME
Coalition continues working on behalf of families who still
have not recovered. Harvey may have been natural in its
formation, but even after the water dried up and the volunteers
were fatigued, its aftermath continues to linger for people
with fewer resources.
And I don't speak rhetorically or anecdotally. Not only
have I been involved in disaster recovery advocacy for over 10
years, but I also reside and am raising a family in one of the
most flood-prone and disaster-impacted neighborhoods in
Houston: Kashmere Gardens.
Low-income survivors are forced to navigate complicated
recovery assistance programs like FEMA, HUD, and SBA. And while
each agency offers assistance programs open to everyone, no
single agency has the sole responsibility and mission to assist
low-income survivors.
Households who are dependent on assistance must exercise
extreme patience and remain in hazardous living conditions as
they await a long approval process for program design and
implementation. Households are also urged to apply for FEMA
assistance, but fewer than half of applicants were granted
assistance after Hurricane Harvey. And families have the
ability to appeal the denials, but this just adds to the wait
time for help. Those with financial means to cover immediate
costs will be well on their way to recovery, while those
without may be stuck for months or even years.
Some homeowners who apply for home repairs through the
city, county, or State are also still waiting. Following the
State takeover of the program, those who applied for assistance
from the city or the county were given the option to transfer
to the State repair program. Some applicants were instructed to
reapply while others were assured that they had been approved.
And almost a year since the transition, many homeowners today
still don't have clear answers.
Tenants have also had their fair share of challenges in
receiving adequate assistance in response to Hurricane Harvey.
They have largely been left out of the funding allocation or
programming.
A dedicated single agency must be established to address
the needs of low-income survivors through the entire course of
disaster response and recovery. The City of Houston spent only
1.8 percent of its $1.2 billion suballocation, causing massive
delays in assistance for community members who needed it most,
and this fact alone demonstrates the need for intentional
agency collaboration and reliance on the lessons learned to
inform program planning and ensure that preexisting capacity
exists.
There is no reason that all recovery efforts should start
from scratch every single time. A shift in a positive direction
is possible, with the consideration of the following
recommendations: take an immediate first step by holding a
joint hearing with witnesses from both FEMA and HUD to explore
gaps and opportunities for coordination between agencies to
serve low-income and marginalized communities; require grantees
to prioritize racial and social equity, using a metric focused
on the number of people or housing units protected, instead of
the current cost-benefit analysis; and adopt general standards
to guide disaster recovery and mitigation efforts that center
on a community's basic human rights.
Storm survivors should have the right to stay and return
home to neighborhoods that have adequate storm protection. They
should have the right to choose whether and where they want to
relocate. They should have the right to equal treatment. Every
neighborhood, regardless of race, ethnicity, economic status,
or disability, must be provided equitable levels of quality
flood protection and equal access to essential public
infrastructure. And they should have a right to have a say;
survivors must help design the recovery, know where they are in
the process, and be empowered to speak and be heard in the
language that best suits them.
For a complete list of recommendations and observations, I
encourage you to refer to my written testimony.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
look forward to your questions and working with you to address
these longstanding issues of equitable delivery of disaster
benefits.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Calhoun-Palay can be found
on page 47 of the appendix.]
Chairman Green. Thank you, Ms. Calhoun-Palay.
Ms. Morris, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give an
oral presentation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ANDREANECIA MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
HOUSINGNOLA
Ms. Morris. Good morning, Chairman Green. Thank you. Thank
you all for having me here today and inviting me to this
hearing to speak on this issue that drives so much of the work
of the organization that I have been a part of over the last 16
years.
Unfortunately, we in Louisiana are experts on these
programs, as we far too often find ourselves in the path of a
storm, both literal and figurative. And it feels as if we are
constantly recovering from a natural disaster, yet we never
seem to reach full recovery before the next disaster strikes.
New Orleans, in particular, has long struggled with the
challenges to provide for its most vulnerable residents,
especially when attention turns towards the next disaster.
Hurricane Katrina's floodwaters 16 years ago required
billions of private and public dollars to make the City
livable. Redevelopment efforts increased the amount of quality
housing, but also drove up prices and dramatically increased
housing insecurity.
Is displacement an inevitable byproduct of this kind of
investment? Do the necessary and needed changes and
improvements after a major catastrophe have to increase
instability? I do not believe that needs to be the case. Still,
the failure to plan for these outcomes and aggressively
mitigate these issues is a pattern we are doomed to repeat
again and again.
In New Orleans, we are continuing to struggle to secure
safe, decent, and affordable housing for all, while dealing
with the confounding contradiction that there are thousands of
overpriced vacant homes, thousands of blighted, unused
properties, and vacant and underdeveloped land.
While housing insecurity and the lack of stable housing or
shelter was a challenge before the most recent crisis, the
pandemic, it is now a key issue that is going to make COVID
recovery even harder to accomplish.
The connection between housing and community were lessons I
thought we had learned during Hurricane Katrina, but those
lessons have not been incorporated in our response to crisis
after crisis.
The resources pour in and billions are used to rebuild a
community, but the programs often fail to account for the needs
of the vulnerable and the most hard hit after that crisis. In
New Orleans, this has led to homeowners, African-American
homeowners in particular, being unable to build wealth, and now
finding themselves 33 percent of the community cost burden,
renters struggling to remain within housing limits, while
housing costs continue to rise and wages are stagnant.
After Hurricane Katrina, the City lost 100,000 African
Americans who have not been able to return. This kind of
systemic displacement is the result of a lack of living-wage
jobs and our City's failure to center on the needs of the most
vulnerable.
Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic and Hurricane Ida have
once again tested the resilience of our City systems and
exposed ongoing challenges to our housing stock, our economy,
and our infrastructure. In hindsight, it is clear that recovery
efforts need to center on the needs of the most vulnerable, not
the squeakiest wheel.
Yet, we do not meet the real needs of our communities using
clear and quantifiable metrics that assess the needs of the
most vulnerable. This pattern of behavior has left us with
weakened infrastructure and little capacity to actually become
resilient. Instead, the people of Louisiana exist in a forced
reality of living with less, simply because State and local
governments don't center on the needs of its people.
Despite this pattern, the unprecedented influx of
investment in our State that is pending could afford us another
opportunity, another chance to make improvements, but we must
heed the testimony of my fellow panelists today and make
necessary improvements to these programs.
A disaster, unfortunately, provides one more opportunity
for traditionally marginalized participants to gain access to
policymakers and advocate for policy proposals. Here in
Louisiana, we have done that, and we have attempted to redefine
the resiliency and quantify the needs of the people of
Louisiana and demand that their issues be made front and
center.
The time is now for public partners and private entities to
work together to make strategic investments. Our communities
cannot continue to survive this way. The standard for success
is simple: It must be whether or not a community is made
better.
Thank you for having me today on this incredibly timely
topic, and I look forward to further conversations about this.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Morris can be found on page
68 of the appendix.]
Chairman Green. Thank you very much, Ms. Morris.
Mr. Begg, you are now recognized for 5 minutes to give an
oral presentation of your testimony.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. BEGG, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT (HUD)
Mr. Begg. Chairman Green, Ranking Member Emmer, and members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
about our disaster oversight work. It is my honor to represent
the dedicated professionals of the HUD Office of Inspector
General (OIG).
I would like to take a moment to express, on behalf of the
entire OIG staff, our deepest condolences for the tragic loss
of life caused by the recent fires in Philadelphia and in New
York City. We are keeping the families affected in both Cities
in our hearts and prayers, and our office is closely monitoring
the developments in those incidents.
We appreciate the chance to assist this subcommittee in its
oversight of HUD's disaster programs as it examines GAO's
recent report assessing HUD's delivery of disaster recovery
assistance to vulnerable populations.
Our office has identified several key opportunities to
improve HUD's disaster programs, most notably through
codification. Both the OIG and the GAO have recommended for
several years that the CDBG-DR Program be codified to provide a
more consistent framework for administering disaster
assistance. We thank this subcommittee and its staff for its
bipartisan efforts to advance legislation in that regard.
Codification will not eliminate the challenges HUD and its
grantees face, but we believe that it would help disaster
assistance reach victims sooner and produce better outcomes for
them. HUD's current process of establishing program
requirements through Federal Register notices takes months and,
in extreme cases, years.
Establishing a permanent framework of requirements would
reduce the time it takes HUD to make funding available to
grantees. It would also provide clarity and consistency for
grantees about core requirements, which would allow them to
plan and design programs more quickly and efficiently after a
disaster occurs.
We have also found that disagreements between grantees and
their subrecipients over program requirements can delay the
offering of assistance to victims. As the GAO report notes,
funding delays often mean vulnerable populations with limited
resources continue living in damaged or compromised homes while
waiting for an opportunity to request assistance.
Streamlining HUD's process and standardizing requirements
could also help grantees build capacity to administer disaster
grants that are massive in size and scope. Our work has
identified that grantees can become overwhelmed early in the
process, as they lack the staff needed to stand up systems,
design programs, and develop the policies needed to administer
grants in accordance with HUD's requirements.
These challenges increase the risk that grantees will not
make the best use of funding. Capacity limitations can result
in grantees being slow to gain approval to implement and offer
programs to victims, and to complete projects.
The GAO report highlighted that capacity limitations often
result in grantees struggling to reach the most vulnerable
members of communities. Additionally, grantees with limited
capacity are more likely to use funds for ineligible activities
or to be unable to detect and prevent fraud. Losing dollars to
fraud or waste reduces the number of disaster victims that
HUD's programs can assist.
HUD must also remain vigilant in helping its grantees
overcome spending challenges and holding them accountable. We
recently reported that HUD had several tools available to
identify and track slow-spending disaster grantees. We found,
however, that HUD does not require grantees to address their
slow spending pace or resolve compliance issues until the time
the grant is closed.
We recommended that HUD require its grantees to resolve
these issues in a more timely manner. It is important that HUD
and its grantees take action earlier in the grant cycle to
prevent important disaster assistance funding from being left
on the table at the time of grant closeout.
For several years, we have stressed the need for HUD to
continue building its own capacity to oversee disaster
grantees, and we commend HUD's recent efforts to increase staff
dedicated to disaster oversight. It is important that HUD
staffing and technology keep pace with increases in the amount
of disaster funding and the number of grantees it oversees.
Looking forward, our office remains committed to helping
HUD achieve its strategic objective to support effectiveness
and accountability in long-term disaster recovery. We believe
codification is an important step towards achieving that
objective.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our disaster
oversight work today. I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Begg can be found on page 32
of the appendix.
Chairman Green. Thank you for your testimony.
At this time, the gentlewoman from North Carolina, Ms.
Adams, is recognized for 5 minutes for questions.
Ms. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank Chairwoman
Waters for holding this hearing. And to our witnesses, thank
you for your testimony.
When we discussed the need for Congress to finally codify
CDBG back in July of last year, our witnesses painted a
compelling picture. We heard about how States couldn't
adequately prepare for disaster recovery, because they didn't
know how much emergency funding would flow to them. We heard
that it took longer than it otherwise would have for HUD to get
time-sensitive dollars out the door to communities in need. And
we heard that different communities were not treated equitably,
all because we haven't acted proactively.
Ms. Yentel, in your testimony you describe the impact that
disasters have on a region's housing stock. Can you share those
findings with us now, and can you explain why it is critical
that CDBG-DR dollars are used to support affordable housing?
Ms. Yentel. Yes, Congresswoman. Thank you for the question.
Most communities have a severe shortage of homes that are
affordable to the lowest-income people even before disaster
strikes. Nationally, for every 10 of the lowest-income renter
households, there are fewer than 4 apartments that are
affordable and available to them.
Then, the disasters exacerbate these already-severe
shortages of affordable rental homes. And it has devastating
consequences for the lowest-income people, puts them at risk of
displacement, evictions, and a worst case is homelessness.
One of the consequences after disasters is that the price
for rent often increases dramatically. It is from a combination
of the rapid loss in available housing stock due to the
disaster itself, and, at the same time, the increased demand,
because displaced renters and homeowners need new apartments.
And sometimes, it is simply price gouging by local landlords.
For example, there were some ZIP Codes in Houston where
rents increased by 50 percent after Hurricane Harvey, and these
kind of rapid increases, clearly, the lowest-income people
can't afford and they end up being displaced as a result.
And also, affordable and accessible homes are most often
located in areas that are most vulnerable to disasters, and the
housing itself is more vulnerable. It is older. It is in poor
condition. It is located in flood zones, and it is less likely
to be rebuilt after the disaster strikes.
Ms. Adams. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. I have another question
for you. I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO's report, since
it confirms so many of the recommendations made by your
organization.
Can you discuss how Chairman Green's legislation, H.R.
4707, would help eliminate the barriers that prevent the most-
impacted and lowest-income survivors of disasters from
achieving an equitable recovery?
Ms. Yentel. Yes. There are many ways that the Reforming
Disaster Recovery Act could make recovery more equitable and
prioritize and center the needs of the lowest-income and the
most-marginalized survivors.
First off, just permanently authorizing the program would
have a tremendous positive impact in that the money could get
out faster. Congress and HUD wouldn't have to rewrite the rule
every time a disaster strikes, so the money could get to
communities faster.
Communities would be required to prioritize the use of the
funds for the lowest-income people. They would be required to
prioritize the needs of people with the most severe needs. They
would be required to have proportionality, in other words, to
ensure that the funds go equally to affordable housing, to
economic revitalization, and to infrastructure. Very often,
communities prioritize infrastructure or economic
revitalization over affordable housing, despite housing needs
being the clearest and the most severe.
It would also require really robust public consultation, so
that local communities could have a say in how these resources
are used and how they get prioritized. And it would make some
important changes to prevent displacement and prevent
relocation, wherever possible.
Ms. Adams. Thank you very much.
I think I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, so I yield back.
Ms. Yentel. Thank you.
Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time had not expired. You
had about 15 seconds left.
Ms. Adams. Oh, okay. Well, I am going to yield back to you
the 15 seconds. Thank you. And thank you to our witnesses.
Chairman Green. Thank you.
At this time, the Chair will recognize the ranking member
of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Emmer,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Inspector
General has identified and referred for prosecution several
cases of fraud and abuse in the Community Development Block
Grant Disaster Recovery Program, including public corruption,
embezzlement, bid rigging, bribery, and kickback schemes. More
broadly, there is a rich history of States using CDBG-DR funds
for purposes that have no nexus to the original disaster.
Mr. Begg, I understand your office has made a number of
criminal referrals for fraud related to the CDBG-DR funds over
the years. Can you share with us generally how those tend to be
uncovered and prosecuted?
Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member Emmer.
Our office relies on whistleblowers frequently to uncover
instances of fraud, waste, and abuse, and we receive many of
the leads on those cases through our hotline. And we also work
closely with HUD's Office of Community Planning and
Development, and grantees, to train them on ways that they can
identify and detect fraud, waste, and abuse and ways that they
can train their staff to make referrals to us of allegations of
fraud.
We generally rely on program participants and the general
public to help us identify those cases, and we work with our
partners at the Department of Justice to see that they are
appropriately prosecuted.
Mr. Emmer. Excellent. Thank you.
Billions of dollars appropriated for prior disasters remain
unspent today, including money appropriated for the 9/11
attacks, for Superstorm Sandy in 2012, and for storm damage in
Mississippi back in 2008. But the data is clear: CDBG-DR funds
tend to remain unspent for years and years after HUD sends the
funds to States.
Mr. Begg, do you think having a pot of Federal money
sitting there for years and years is an invitation for fraud?
Mr. Begg. Yes. The longer that money remains available, the
more likely it is that it is going to be used for ineligible
activities and it is susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse.
That is why it is important for HUD to remain diligent in
its oversight and monitoring of slow-spender grantees. And as
we reported earlier this month, it is important for HUD to work
with them to help them resolve their capacity issues and the
root causes of why they are not spending funds more timely, so
that money is not left on the table towards the end of the
grant cycle, when it is susceptible to rushed expenditures that
may be indicative of waste or fraudulent activity.
Mr. Emmer. Right. For example, the money from way back in
the early years of this century. As a State becomes further
removed from the original disaster in terms of time, and these
large sums of money remain unspent, does it become more
difficult for your office--and maybe not even your office.
Let's concentrate on those that the money has been delivered to
in the specific States. Does it become more difficult for even
them to identify legitimate purposes for the money?
Mr. Begg. That is certainly possible. Another issue that we
have identified is that those seeking assistance may also be
confused as you get further and further away from a disaster
event as to how to navigate HUD's programs in seeking
assistance.
For example, we recently identified that Texas disaster
recipients did not know or may have been unaware of the fact
that they were eligible for money from Hurricane Ike and
Hurricane Harvey. So, the further away you get from a disaster,
and the longer it takes for those in need to request
assistance, the more likely it is that they will be unclear as
to what is available to them.
Mr. Emmer. Thank you, Mr. Begg. I know we just have a few
seconds left. If you can--and maybe I will follow up with you
after this hearing--can you describe how codifying the program
and including some guardrails and some oversight mechanisms
might address some of these vulnerabilities your office has
identified?
Mr. Begg. Absolutely. The main benefit that we see to
codification is two-pronged: increasing the timeliness of the
funding reaching grantees and then those in need--I see the
time has expired.
Mr. Emmer. I will follow up with you. Thank you, Mr. Begg.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Begg. Thank you.
Chairman Green. Thank you. The gentleman's time has
expired.
The Chair will now recognize the gentlewoman from Texas,
Ms. Garcia, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
so much for bringing forth this hearing and these great
witnesses. And I especially, of course, want to welcome Ms.
Calhoun-Palay from Houston to the United States Congress.
Mr. Chairman, this grant program provides essential
assistance for communities deeply hurt by natural disaster,
especially as noted in our Houston area, which I represent.
In the case of natural disasters, timing is critical. The
previous witness mentioned that timing is critical, how quickly
we can get the help to the people who need it. Every day
following a catastrophic event is a day that families go
without food, without water, without shelter, without
transportation, and without their basic livelihood.
What is concerning to me is that, currently, the Community
Development Block Grant Program is not fully authorized in
statute, so it is subject to the changing tides of local
politics. It is not held to a consistent standard at the
national level and, thus, it is vulnerable to changes in
rulemaking in grantee action plans.
Although grantees are expected to comport with CDBG
national objectives, this can differ by year and by the
rulemaking put into place. As a result, there are
vulnerabilities that result from basic turnover in Government
Administrations that can allow grantees' programs to falter in
carrying out their duties.
It is critical that we support and reinforce this program
through permanent authorization and full enforcement of data
collection, so that we can accurately perceive how these funds
are being used.
In Houston, for example, following the 2015 flooding, the
Disaster Recovery Program provided the City of Houston with a
direct allocation funding that did not have to go through our
State Government. As a result, the funding was allocated
swiftly to projects rebuilding the Houston communities that
were hit the hardest.
In contrast, the newly-created Disaster Mitigation Fund,
which was created in direct response to Hurricane Harvey, was
not a direct allocation to our area that was hit by the
hurricane. Instead, the funding went through the State, which
has not yet to provide any of that $4.3 billion in Federal
taxpayer money to either the City of Houston or Harris County.
In addition to allocating the funds to multiple other
jurisdictions while excluding the 2 largest communities hit by
the hurricane, the State used the maximum allowable funds of 5
percent for administrative costs--5 percent--which resulted in
$215 million going to the State government. Now, this $215
million, Mr. Chairman, is more than the entire payroll of the
Houston Astros. That is how much the State kept.
I highlight this because it is profoundly concerning that
these programs are not reaching the intended recipients who
were most impacted by the hurricanes. We must find a way to get
the money to those intended, those most in need swiftly,
because people do suffer. Poor people become poorer.
Additionally, there is never enough data collected at the
Federal level, so it is always difficult to assess what has
really happened. So, we must codify the disaster relief
programs, but we must also work with HUD to access the
communities that these programs were designed to work for.
My first question is for Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Mr. Garcia-Diaz,
in your testimony, you provided several cases for how this
program can better target underserved populations, including
data collection. You stated that while grantees can and do
collect data, we are not collecting the data of those who
apply, only of those who receive.
Can you elaborate, please, on this point, and what else we
should be doing so that we can get better information on the
cultural and language barriers related to vulnerable
populations, especially those with limited English?
Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Thank you for your question, Congresswoman
Garcia.
That is absolutely right. Data, especially if you are
dealing with vulnerable populations, you need to know something
about who they are and what their situation is like. And
particularly, if you want to make sure that the program is
addressing their needs, you need good data both--and we
emphasize this in the report--on the applicant side as well as
the beneficiary side.
And the reason we emphasize applicant data, which is
something HUD does not collect at all, is that you need to know
who is making it through and who is not making it through. And
that is a critical part of holding the grantees and HUD itself
accountable that they are delivering assistance to the neediest
population. And data is fundamental to that.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you.
Very quickly, and I know I am running out of time, Ms.
Yentel, could you elaborate any more on how we can better reach
our limited English proficiency applicants?
Ms. Yentel. Sure. Yes, if I have the time I would be happy
to.
For limited English proficiency applicants, HUD guidance
directs grantees to ensure that disaster recovery activities
meet language access requirements, but often communities don't.
Puerto Rico is one of the most egregious examples after
Hurricane Maria, where Spanish is the predominant language on
the island, but the CDBG-DR materials were in English, and only
after significant pushback were they translated to Spanish, and
there were multiple errors within it.
HUD requires that there be language access, but they could
do more in terms of oversight and ensuring that actually
happens. And HUD could also learn a lot from Treasury and the
implementation of the emergency rental assistance programs,
where successful grantees partnered with community-based
organizations to reach marginalized communities, including
those for whom English is their second language.
Ms. Garcia of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
I have run out of time.
Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has long since
expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Loudermilk, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me kind of continue on with what Mr. Emmer had
started to ask about, and that is the absence of a permanent
law or permanent statute for the CDBG-DR Program.
The absence of a permanent law governing the program means
that when Congress activates the program after a natural
disaster, which we have had plenty of recently, the parameters
of the program have to be established on an ad hoc basis, and
HUD must continue rulemaking every time new funds are
allocated. Of course, this is going to lead to inefficiencies
and delays with getting the funds distributed.
Mr. Begg, you had started to touch on some of these issues
but, unfortunately, ran out of time. Can you describe the
problems that result from the lack of a permanent statute with
this program, and how enacting a statute to govern the program
would help address those problems, and anything else that you
would like to discuss that Mr. Emmer had asked?
Mr. Begg. Certainly. Thank you for the question.
As I mentioned previously, codification of the program
could help streamline HUD's allocation process. We reported in
April of 2021 that HUD engaged in lengthy negotiations with the
Office of Management and Budget about program requirements that
would be included in the Federal Register notices for the 2017
disasters, which produced significant delays in making the
announcements in the Federal Register notice which, in turn,
prevented grantees from finalizing and submitting action plans.
And that, in turn, delayed HUD and the grantees from entering
into grant agreements which would give them access to the
funding.
Streamlining HUD's process through codification, we think
is an important step in speeding up disbursement of disaster
recovery, but providing permanent authorization for the program
would also clarify requirements for grantees so that they can
plan earlier and for future disasters so that they can
implement programs disaster over disaster rather than waiting
for HUD to announce specific waivers that really kind of keep
them in gridlock while they are trying to figure out how to
design programs for their communities in need.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. So, we could still implement a
codified law giving guidance, but leave flexibility for the
uniqueness of the disaster in a particular area?
Mr. Begg. That is correct. There is always going to be a
need for flexibility at the local level, and our office
understands what we have identified as the need for clarity and
consistency up front so that grantees and HUD can be in step on
the plans, and then the actions and milestones needed to result
in getting money down to the ground level at the local level
where the flexibility can really be designed to benefit the
individuals and vulnerable populations in need.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia-Diaz, could you also comment on the problems of
not having this program codified or the lack of legislation on
it and what could be resolved if we had it?
Mr. Garcia-Diaz. Yes. Thank you for the question. I think
codification helps make CDBG-DR a real program, subject to all
of the requirements that all programs are expected to follow,
including the requirements regarding fraud risk management.
Of course, DR is subject to those requirements as is, but
the more that the program is permanent, the more that everyone
knows what the expectations are going forward and after a
disaster. That is going to allow for preparation to occur not
only at HUD, but also at the grantee level, because they know
what to expect, and they know that there is enough stability in
the program that they can start thinking ahead about the future
disasters and what they need to do to be positioned to best
distribute those funds efficiently and effectively to these
populations who sorely need the help, but also protect taxpayer
interests here, and ensure that the right people are getting
the funding and eligible people are getting the funding.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you. And while I have you, as you
know, we need to balance the need to reduce waste with the need
to distribute funds quickly. In the short amount of time I
have, what changes do we need to make to ensure that funds are
used for the intended purpose but are also distributed timely?
Mr. Garcia-Diaz. I think we have to build capacity both at
HUD and at the grantee level to accomplish that. Speed and
proper use of funds don't overlap completely. They can often
diverge. And so, there is that risk, and we want to manage that
and we need [inaudible] to do that.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Green. Your time has expired. Thank you.
The gentlewoman from Michigan, Ms. Tlaib, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. Tlaib. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate us
holding this hearing. I have seen firsthand how disasters like
flooding can devastate our communities and the inequities in
how those communities access and qualify for disaster relief.
We can continue to fund various programs, but implementation is
so critically important, especially in communities like mine.
One of the most immediate and devastating impacts of
disaster is always housing affordability for low-income
residents.
Ms. Yentel, the organization you work for has been really
critical in exposing some of the broken systems that are in
place and some of the needs and policy changes to make sure we
address those. You testified that recovery and mitigation
efforts typically favor higher-income, predominantly White
communities. And markets across our country are already
squeezed because of a lack of housing supply. Disasters often
cause dramatic spikes in rental prices, leading to
displacements, evictions, and homelessness.
We also know that nearly one-third of federally-assisted
housing stock is located in areas with a relatively high risk
of negative impacts from natural hazards and so forth. Many of
us call these front-line communities of the climate crisis.
Ms. Yentel, can you describe how natural disasters and
inadequate disaster relief can displace low-income communities
and communities of color, and really talk about what we can do
as a legislative body to address that?
Ms. Yentel. Sure. You touched on some very important issues
around how low-income people are most likely to live in
communities that are hardest hit by disasters, and they are
most likely to live in housing that isn't built to withstand
the storm itself, so they are vulnerable in multiple layers
from the disasters.
They are least likely to have the resources needed to
evacuate prior to the disaster, they are least likely to have
the resources or the social network to help them recover during
the disaster, and they are most likely to be left behind in the
recovery unless there is very focused advocacy and legislation
that requires the prioritization of their needs in recovery.
When affordable housing stock is lost in disasters, it is
virtually never recovered to the same degree that it was pre-
disaster. And as I shared earlier, pre-disaster, most
communities have a severe shortage of homes that are affordable
to the lowest-income people. So, when we are losing affordable
housing stock that is affordable to those lowest-income people,
and communities are not prioritizing the repair and
reconstruction of those affordable homes, then there is
permanent displacement of the lowest-income people, who are
predominantly people of color, Black and Brown people.
And one way this plays out as well is how these disaster
resources are targeted. Time after time, disaster after
disaster, we see that limited resources that Congress
appropriates to communities after disasters are targeted
towards higher-income homeowners who are predominantly White,
at the expense of lower-income renters who are predominantly
Black.
Ms. Tlaib. Ms. Yentel, I do want to have some time, because
I want to get to some specifics around this, because flooding
was a huge, huge issue. Some of my residents' homes were
flooded up to 4 times.
This is to all of the witnesses on the panel. I am curious
to hear this. As flood plains have shifted with climate change,
and extreme weather events become more common, should funding
and authorization of CDBG-DR also include updated flood
mapping?
The other question is, how should localities balance the
need to build communities in more resilient, less flood-prone
areas without disbursing the full of affordable housing? I want
to hear from everyone on the panel about this.
Again, flood mapping is something that has been on my mind
and wanting to see if we should be really laser-focused on that
to try to shift some of those resources, again, to those
impacted the most. Is there anybody on the panel who can talk
about that?
Mr. Garcia-Diaz. I can. Just quickly, GAO has done some
work, and we can get back to you with more details on FEMA's
progress in improving their mapping capabilities. That is an
area that has been of concern for us, and it has a lot of
knock-on effect on every other program that seeks to either
build affordable housing or recover it after a disaster.
So, we can share some information there, but government
decisions on funding should be based on the best available data
and analysis in FEMA, and particularly the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), which is responsible for that.
Ms. Tlaib. I am so sorry we didn't have a chance to hear
from the others. Thank you so much. And if you do have an
answer and want to submit it to the committee, I would welcome
that.
Thank you.
Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired, and the
Chair will ask the witnesses to respond to the gentlelady's
questions in writing.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee,
Mr. Kustoff, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kustoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
ranking member for calling today's hearing, and I also thank
all of the witnesses who are appearing virtually today.
Mr. Begg, can you talk about the waiver process or the
CDBG-DR grantees? How are waivers granted, if you will? And, I
guess, and without asking this as a leading question, are the
waivers granted on an inconsistent basis?
Mr. Begg. Thank you for that question. In general, waivers
are granted for--HUD has the authority to grant waivers from
the traditional CDBG framework, which generally applies to
CDBG-DR and CDBG funding.
And the Secretary has discretion, when appropriate, to
waive requirements or create alternative requirements that
would benefit particular funding streams. And, in certain
instances, grantees have the authority to make certain waivers
of their own program requirements.
We haven't examined the consistency of those waivers across
the portfolio, necessarily, but one thing that we have seen is
that the waivers can create confusion at times and lack of
clarity for grantees.
In one instance recently, we identified a scenario where
the City of Houston was seeking a waiver of program
requirements from the Texas General Land Office (GLO) regarding
the rebuilding specifications for homes. And GLO ultimately
denied the waiver, but they spent a lot of time disagreeing
with the City of Houston about whether it was appropriate,
because if they granted that waiver to the City of Houston, it
might produce an inequitable result for other cities and
counties across their State in the distribution of the
Hurricane Harvey relief funds.
So, the waiver process is designed to get at the
flexibility issue we discussed earlier, but it does come with
risks and it needs to be managed and assessed.
Mr. Kustoff. I do appreciate that answer. And I think what
you just said, that regardless of who the HUD Secretary is,
whomever he or she is, if a waiver is granted, there are no
clear guidelines as to the parameters of the waiver or waivers.
Is that right?
Mr. Begg. There are certain aspects of the program that
can't be waived, like fair housing and environmental reviews,
but in large part, there are many options for waivers
consistent with what you said.
Mr. Kustoff. Yes. During your questioning or the
questioning of everybody this morning, there has been a great
deal of talk about codification that Chairman Green and
Congresswoman Wagner have worked on, and others. Does the
waiver process beg for some direction in terms of codification?
In other words, should there be codifications about what lanes,
avenues, directions the waivers can be granted by the HUD
Secretary?
Mr. Begg. Waivers ultimately are a policy call for Congress
and the HUD Secretary and leadership to make. Our office's role
is generally to look at whether the waivers and the program
execution is achieving goals effectively and efficiently.
And so, to the extent that waivers continue to be part of
the process for CDBG-DR program execution, what we would focus
on is looking at ensuring that those waivers work, and they
produce the intended effective outcomes for the individuals in
need.
Mr. Kustoff. If there was abuse in the waivers, somewhere
in the process or after the waiver was granted, your office
would investigate, right?
Mr. Begg. Absolutely.
Mr. Kustoff. In terms of making your work easier, if you
were waving a magic wand and were working on codification, what
are some of the parameters that you would look to codify?
Mr. Begg. As I mentioned earlier, streamlining HUD's
allocation process is a critical component. And in Chairman
Green's bill, one benefit we see is the enhanced deadlines that
are in place to ensure that HUD and its grantees are moving
through the various gates of announcing allocations, reviewing
and approving action plans, and then entering grant agreements.
Mr. Kustoff. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Garcia, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I
thank you and the ranking member for holding this important
hearing on the CDBG-DR program, and I thank our witnesses for
joining us today.
At a time when disasters seem more and more frequent, CDBG-
DR oversight is, unfortunately, an extremely important topic.
The devastating events that have taken place in Puerto Rico in
the last few years, from Hurricane Maria to the devastating
earthquakes, have affected me personally, along with many of my
constituents in Chicago. I traveled to the island to look at
recovery efforts, and I don't have to tell you that it has been
slow going. Challenges in the CDBG-DR allocation process are no
small part of it.
Ms. Yentel, in your testimony, you highlighted some of the
challenges that Puerto Ricans have faced with CDBG-DR funds
after Hurricane Maria. It is serious stuff. One CDBG-funded
program only released housing resources in English, only
translating them after protests. Many homeowners in flood
plains have not been able to get help at all, leaving them
vulnerable to displacement, and small, local construction
companies have been left out of contracts. And it feels like
Puerto Rico has been left behind time and time again.
Ms. Yentel, do you think that HUD is sensitive to the needs
of Puerto Rico and its recovery? And do you think that the
GAO's recommendations for the CDBG-DR program will meaningfully
improve disaster relief efforts on the island?
Ms. Yentel. I do think it will. It would make a significant
difference for people who were harmed by Hurricane Maria, and
for people who may be harmed by future disasters. Puerto Rico
is an especially egregious example of how disaster recovery and
rebuilding don't work for the lowest-income people when local
communities, especially, are often shut out of the conversation
about how these resources should be used.
Those local communities and impacted people should be
leading the conversations about how resources should be used,
about how questions of relocation should be considered. And,
certainly, at the very least, materials about available
resources should be made available in the relevant language to
the communities, and none of that has been true in Puerto Rico.
Advocates and impacted people have fought their way to the
table and have been able to make some improvements to the
programs, but it shouldn't be that hard. It shouldn't take that
level of effort. It should be automatically built into the
system that communities have a say in how these resources are
used.
And one of the improvements that this bill would do is to
require really robust community consultation, and especially
consultation with communities that are most impacted by the
disaster.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. For my first question, would that
be a yes or a no on the sensitivity of HUD to their needs?
Ms. Yentel. In terms of the sensitivity of HUD, yes.
Unfortunately, it has been a political question. The previous
Administration created many unnecessary obstacles and blocks to
even getting the money to the island. This Administration has a
different approach and is prioritizing the needs of Puerto
Ricans and being much more sensitive to their needs.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you for that.
Mr. Begg, the GAO's report found that vulnerable people
face obstacles to accessing relief through the CDBG-DR program.
That is troubling for my community, being hit by a natural
disaster, or for any community, but it is especially troubling
in Puerto Rico where English is not the primary language, and
the average incomes are lower than they are in the continental
U.S. and more people live in informal housing.
Can you discuss what steps HUD can take to deliver relief
to the people of Puerto Rico specifically?
Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question. The steps that HUD
can take to assist Puerto Rico are similar to the steps that it
can take to assist all grantees. Technical assistance and
oversight and monitoring of progress in the grant is critical
from the HUD perspective to ensure that when grantees are
facing challenges, either in reaching their communities or in
executing their programs or establishing them as a threshold
matter, it is important that HUD step in and do what it can
through technical assistance to make sure that the grantees
have everything they need from HUD to be successful.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Timmons, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to begin
by thanking you for your work with Congresswoman Wagner to
reform the CDBG-DR and ultimately help the communities across
our country who have suffered from natural disasters, whether
hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, or wildfires.
When these disasters strike, the communities that are least
able to properly recover often end up being the hardest hit.
When functioning properly, the CDBG-DR program can provide
invaluable support to low- and moderate-income communities
reeling from devastating natural disasters.
But knowing this, it is critical that this program be
transparent and accountable to ensure the taxpayer dollars that
fund this critical program are directed to the right people and
only spent on appropriate disaster recovery-related needs. And,
of course, the program must be quick and efficient in
responding to the various disasters that will inevitably come.
Mr. Begg, your report showed that fraud prevention is
something that needs to be addressed for CDBG-DR, and I know
that we have been discussing codification a lot today, but I am
curious, do you think that if Chairman Green and Congresswoman
Wagner's bill to codify the program were to become law, it
would be easier for HUD to identify and prevent fraud? And
would codifying the law help with the staffing capacity issue
identified in the report?
Mr. Begg. Thank you, Congressman, for that question. We
certainly believe that codification is an important step
towards eliminating opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse.
But as I mentioned in my opening statement, it is not a cure-
all for all of the problems that grantees and HUD face.
In successfully executing disaster recovery assistance
programs, preventing improper payments and reducing the
opportunities for fraud is something our office has stressed
over the years. In our recent top management challenges report,
we identified fraud risk management as a top challenge for HUD
across the Department, but specifically within disaster
recovery. And our colleagues at GAO last year published a
report examining the steps that HUD has taken to assess fraud
risks in the DR program specifically.
We believe that HUD's action on those recommendations from
the GAO to comprehensively assess fraud risk within the DR
program is a key step in identifying and understanding fraud
risk so that the Department and its grantees are in a position
to mitigate and prevent that fraud.
Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for that. Also, would a
streamlined rulemaking process help reduce fraud as well?
Mr. Begg. Yes. We think so. We think it could help,
certainly. As I mentioned earlier, the longer that funds sit
out there, and they are not spent to address unmet disaster
recovery needs, the more likely it is that they could be used
for ineligible purposes, and that opens the door to potential
fraud.
Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you. Lastly, I want to focus on
how this program needs to be streamlined and become more
efficient, which is obviously something codifying the program
would help with. When disaster strikes, this type of relief
needs to get out the door as quickly as possible while still
maintaining the security and integrity of the program.
Mr. Begg, again, where in the CDBG-DR program can we cut
red tape while still allowing the program to remain flexible so
it can successfully respond to the various natural disasters we
deal with in our country?
Mr. Begg. One area that we have highlighted frequently is
consistency around the core requirements of the programs.
Generally, the programs are designed to do a handful of things,
and by permanently authorizing the program statutes and
requiring HUD to establish permanent regulations outlining
program requirements, we think that will help grantees focus
and plan better so that they don't engage in endless
disagreement or endless pursuit of perfection in their program
design, and they can start implementing around the core
simplified requirements in the regulations.
Mr. Timmons. Sure. Thank you for that. I will end with, I
think the burdensome Federal Register notice process seems to
be a good place to start. It has to be really tough for
grantees when there are so many changes to the original
requirements, and we need to really make it very transparent,
what we are expecting from them, so we can be efficient with
this program.
I really appreciate you being here virtually, and with
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Green. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CDBG-DR is
extremely important, and I had to deal with it for about 20
years when I was in municipal government. And one of the
problems that we had in Missouri, in Kansas City, after a
couple of 500-year floods that occurred over about 3 years, the
whole--the issue of trying to get it dealt with when it is not
permanently authorized.
I am not sure what the historical reason is for not doing
the permanent authorization, but I am familiar with the fact
that we don't need delays in the midst of a disaster, where we
have to get Presidential or Congressional authorization. And it
just delays what the government can do, and it creates
frustration. And I am wondering if there is anyone who has any
reason why it should not be permanently authorized, because
otherwise, it is going to be very difficult for me to ever see
this as something that is okay. Anybody else? So, everybody
agrees with me that we need it to be permanently authorized?
Mr. Garcia-Diaz. GAO has made a recommendation to Congress
to consider making the program permanent. We think there are
very compelling reasons for doing so, and I don't think the
status quo is really acceptable going forward given the size,
scale, and frequencies of these disasters.
Mr. Cleaver. I wish I could go back in history to find out
why, and maybe even if we found out why, it still doesn't make
sense, but it is something that I am hoping we can do.
The Chair of the subcommittee, Chairman Green, and I have
had some discussions about this because we are taking a pretty
in-depth look at the CDBG program, period. And one of the
things that we have talked about is hopefully, we can get this
program, this CDBG which is not a very complicated piece of
legislation, including the DR program. So, I appreciate your
comments.
Are there any programs in the Federal Government that any
of you know of, that can respond quickly? What is the fastest
program we have to respond to a disaster? Anybody?
Ms. Morris. Obviously, those are the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) programs. Those programs are on the
ground immediately, and there has to be conversation about
integrating those programs with the CDBG-DR more effectively,
and more impactfully.
And one thing I would say, Congressman Cleaver, is that
while I certainly do not object to the notion of codification
of the CDBG-DR, I would like to add that we need to also see
reform, and we need to see reform that centers on the needs of
the most vulnerable. We have talked a lot today about fraud and
waste management, and what we seem to be losing the thread on
is the people who are left behind. If funds are misappropriated
by contractors and used for other things, that increases the
number of people who are left behind.
And the notion of fraud and waste management or
mismanagement is often used to disenfranchise the most
vulnerable. In the name of checking boxes and making sure that
all the Is are dotted and the Ts are crossed, the most
vulnerable are often ignored in these programs, and that is
something that must be said.
So, while I appreciate and agree wholeheartedly that these
funds must be managed appropriately, we must also be careful
about continuing to stigmatize the people who desperately need
these programs, when we say fraud and mismanagement permeates
these programs. We have to be clear that it is often by
administrators and contractors who are hired by grantees, not
the recipients themselves.
Mr. Cleaver. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Green. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair will now recognize the Vice Chair of the
subcommittee, Ms. Williams, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In Atlanta, there are only 29 affordable and available
housing units for every 100 extremely low-income renter
households. As we have already heard today, any disaster can
further stress the shortage that we have in my district and
across the country. Not only do we have to invest in our long-
term affordable rental housing stock now, but we also have to
be sure that we take the same approach when disaster strikes.
Ms. Yentel, in your testimony, you mentioned that HUD has
the authority to reject State action plans that favor
homeowners over renters. What else can HUD do proactively to
ensure that the plans that come to them equitably provide
disaster relief for renters?
Ms. Yentel. I would say one of the most important things
that they could do right now, that is part of the GAO's
recommendations to them, is to require of themselves and
grantees more data transparency, to collect information on who
is applying, and the demographics of who is applying, and who
is or is not getting resources, who is being accepted and who
is being denied.
I think just in having that kind of data transparency, it
will become very clear what people on the ground and people who
have been doing this work for a long time know, which is that
there are significant disparities in who receives resources,
disparities between lower- and higher-income people, and
disparities between people of color and communities of color
and White communities. So, that data transparency is really
essential.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Ms. Yentel, after a disaster,
rebuilding apartments and homes is critical to ensuring those
most impacted have a place to live and don't see their wealth
permanently impacted. As we make investments to rebuild
communities, we have the opportunity not only to prevent a
widening racial wealth gap but also to reinvest funds back into
impacted communities and people.
How can HUD make sure that the money invested in local
recovery more often goes to local businesses and creates local
jobs? How would this help ensure recovery efforts or credits to
closing the racial wealth gap in a place like Atlanta, which
leads the country?
Ms. Yentel. Yes. It is a very important point because a lot
of times, these resources go to contractors to run the
programs, and these contractors often are not grounded in the
communities that are impacted. They are out of State, they are
out of the city, and they are profiting from the administration
of these programs.
And many times, they are doing it well--sometimes, I will
say. There are also egregious examples where they are doing it
poorly, and yet, get rehired after future disasters. But most
importantly, it is not creating the local infrastructure to be
able to respond to disasters in the future.
These kinds of significant resources going to communities
can not only serve the primary purpose of rebuilding apartments
and making homes affordable for the lowest-income people where
homes have been destroyed, but they can also create local jobs
and create local expertise. Then, that community has more and
better capacity to respond to future disasters.
And that is a place where HUD can do more, and they have
been, of late, doing more in this Administration to really look
more closely at State and local action plans and how they are
using CDBG.
And as with the case in Texas, just recently, going back
and saying, we are not going to accept this action plan until
you do more to ensure that these resources are going to the
communities instead of the people who have the greatest needs.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. And, Ms. Yentel, I am sorry to
make it feel like you are in the hot seat, but in your
testimony, you also emphasized the importance of sharing data
on disaster recovery with academic and research institutions so
we can continue to understand equity issues in disaster
recovery and identify potential solutions, one of my priorities
here on this subcommittee.
What current barriers remain to working with colleges and
universities on this effort? And how can we prioritize
partnerships with institutions such as Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) that are well-positioned to
do this type of research?
Ms. Yentel. Again, yes, it is so important, and it comes
back to the importance of data transparency. And, certainly,
there is some data that can't be released publicly because of
concerns around privacy, but there are ways to mitigate those
concerns, especially when sharing data with academic
institutions.
And it is critically important. There is very little data
available nationally despite the number of disasters that are
occurring and despite the increased frequency. There is little
data that is available about who is impacted, how they are
harmed, how there are racial and other disparities, and who is
assisted and who is not, and that kind of data sharing is
essential.
There should be public transparency, and there should be
greater data shared with academic institutions to provide this
kind of analysis, and provide it to Members of Congress so that
we are ensuring that public policy meets local needs.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Ms. Yentel, and thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Green. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now yields himself 5 minutes for questions. Let
me start by thanking all of the Members, and I especially have
to thank Mrs. Wagner for her Herculean efforts in helping. Mrs.
Wagner, if you are listening, I want you to know that I
appreciate greatly all that you have done, as well as the Chair
of the Full Committee, Chairwoman Waters.
In Texas, we have what may be considered unique
circumstances. Hurricane Harvey hit Houston in 2017, and we
appropriated funds, and we still have funds that have not been
utilized. Someone spoke of slow-spenders earlier. Mr. Begg, I
am concerned about slow spending. I want to know from you, has
there ever been a clawback, or what typically is done when the
slow-spender becomes a no-spender. Mr. Begg, if you would,
please?
Mr. Begg. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I was
having a little difficulty hearing you, but I just want to
confirm that you were asking about what happens when slow-
spenders are identified as no-spenders in terms of clawing back
grant funding?
Chairman Green. Yes, sir. That is correct, and I am sorry
about the volume.
Mr. Begg. No problem.
In our recent review of HUD's oversight of slow-spending
disaster recovery grantees, what we have seen is that HUD
actually has metrics built into its disaster recovery grant
reporting system to identify at various stages of the grant
whether grantees are meeting their expenditure targets and
whether they are on pace to expend on a monthly basis the
dollars that they need to to exhaust the grant before closeout.
One concern we have is that when some of those red flags in
the system show that grantees are no-spenders for 6, 12, 24
months, HUD does not require the grantees to address those
flags until the time of grant closeout. The risk there, from
our perspective, is that a no-spending grantee could continue
not using funding until the grant closeout, and money would be
left on the table that HUD would then have to recapture, and it
wouldn't be available to go to the communities and individuals
in need.
Chairman Green. Thank you.
For the benefit of persons in Houston who may be tuning in,
let me ask Ms. Yentel, would you explain why we understand it
is important for us to spend timely? And I would also like to
get Ms. Calhoun-Palay to respond as well as Ms. Yentel. So, if
you would be brief, that would be helpful.
Ms. Yentel?
Ms. Yentel. I am so sorry, Congressman. I didn't quite hear
the question, but maybe Ms. Calhoun-Palay did, and she could
start off.
Chairman Green. I am speaking at my volume level higher
than I have been speaking. The question is explain, if you
would, why it is so important for the dollars to be spent
timely. People in Houston would like to know that we understand
this process and why it is so important.
We will start with you, Ms. Calhoun-Palay, if you would?
Ms. Calhoun-Palay. Sure. The importance of timely spending
of these funds is directly linked to the folks who are most in
need of repairs and recovery. So, what is happening on an
ongoing basis, and even to this day, is that as applicants are
waiting for responses, they are having to jump through hoops,
and there is an ongoing cycle of having to resubmit paperwork
before the actual application gets approved and gets funded.
What happens in the meantime is that homeowners are sitting
in black mold, continuing to sit in homes that have leaky
roofs, and are just waiting.
And in some cases, the guidance has been so ambiguous and
vague where some homeowners have started to try to recover on
their own. And then once they are approved, they are hearing
that they are approved, they are told that they must stop. They
must stop the ongoing construction in their homes or repairs in
their homes so that the city or whatever agency can come
forward and complete those repairs.
The waiting game has a hazardous impact on actual
homeowners who are just waiting. So, that is one of the reasons
why it is timely--or so important that spending timelines are
really quick.
Chairman Green. My time is about to expire. Thank you.
Let me just end with this. I am going to look at
legislation to see whether the funds can be [inaudible] the
State to perform the function of appropriating the funds within
the State.
Having said this, my time has expired. And, again, we would
like to thank each of the witnesses for their testimony and for
committing the time and resources to share their expertise with
the subcommittee. Their testimony today will help to advance
the important work of this subcommittee and of the Congress.
The Chair notes that some Members may have additional
questions for these witnesses, which they may wish to submit in
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open
for 5 legislative days for Members to submit written questions
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record.
Also, without objection, Members will have 5 legislative days
to submit extraneous materials to the Chair for inclusion in
the record.
This hearing is adjourned. Thank you, one and all.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
January 19, 2022
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