    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            [H.A.S.C. No. 117-42]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                        FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST

            FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 JUNE 10, 2021

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    46-865                     WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
        Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                   Grant Schneider, Professional Staff Member
                     Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                               Zach Taylor, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
    Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Dalton, Melissa, Acting Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans,
      and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense...................     2
    Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for
      Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force...     7
    Verdon, Charles P., Acting Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration........................................     4
    Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs, U.S. Navy............................................     6

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    33
        Dalton, Melissa..............................................    36
        Dawkins, Lt Gen James C., Jr.................................    70
        Turner, Hon. Michael R.......................................    34
        Verdon, Charles P............................................    46
        Wolfe, VADM Johnny R., Jr....................................    57

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Cheney...................................................    90
        Mr. Langevin.................................................    83
        Mr. Moulton..................................................    88
        Ms. Stefanik.................................................    89
        Mr. Turner...................................................    84

     FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR FORCES AND ATOMIC ENERGY
                               DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Washington, DC, Thursday, June 10, 2021.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m., via
    Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order. I would like to
    begin by thanking our distinguished panel of witnesses for
    testifying today. We look forward to hearing from each of you.
    First, Ms. Melissa Dalton, the Acting Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Dr. Charlie
    Verdon, the Acting NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] Administrator; Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe,
    Director of U.S. Navy Strategic Systems Programs; and
    Lieutenant General James Dawkins, U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief
    of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration.
        In reading through your testimonies, we are reminded that
    the work of this subcommittee is probably the most important,
    technical, and consequential of any committee in the House. I
    would also like to point out the astonishing continuity over
    recent years in funding and support of the triad and nuclear
    programs. Seldom do you see this level of bipartisanship in
    modern-day Washington, but I am glad that it is occurring in
    our number one defense priority.
        I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of my opening
    statement will be inserted in the record and I turn over the
    opening statement to my colleague, Ranking Member Mr. Turner.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 33.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    holding this hearing and I appreciate your bipartisan
    commitment to these topics. I too will ask that my statement be
    entered into the record, and I am going to summarize a few of
    the points.
        But, one, I know, obviously, we are under a great deal of
    pressure having gotten the budget so late, so I am very
    concerned about the effects of a CR [continuing resolution] and
    I am looking for the witnesses to discuss what that might be.
    Certainly, in the nuclear enterprise and the nuclear
    modernization, the effects of a CR are felt much more strongly.
    I also want to point out that Congress has the ability to
    change this, not just by getting our work done but because the
    fiscal year is statutory not constitutional. And we should
    probably change this. It could pick up at least 3 months a year
    for the Department of Defense if we made the fiscal year the
    calendar year.
        I am disappointed in the top line in the President's
    budget. It does not keep up with inflation as we look to those
    of our adversaries--China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran--that
    are modernizing. I think that there is a lot that we need to be
    focusing on and we are going to certainly be in a resources
    crunch. There has been a lot of bipartisan work as you have
    said, Mr. Chairman, on all the issues that fall under our
    committee.
        I am very concerned and I think we are all shocked to have
    heard the news of the Acting Secretary of the Navy appearing to
    take action to zero out the sea-launched cruise missile. This
    is something that is incredibly important. We just saw in the
    news also that the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff,
    apparently, were not informed. We know that the Nuclear Posture
    Review isn't underway, and yet we have the first steps towards
    actions that would be unilateral disarmament.
        And, of course, even for those who wish to reduce nuclear
    forces, the best way to accomplish that is through arms control
    and you can't achieve arms control if you unilaterally give
    away assets that could be both beneficial to deterrence and/or
    beneficial to negotiations. I am looking forward to our
    witnesses today to discuss their thoughts on that breaking
    news.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back and the rest of my
    statement will be entered into the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
    Appendix on page 34.]
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        The first witness, Ms. Dalton.

     STATEMENT OF MELISSA DALTON, ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
     STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Dalton. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today. May I request permission to
    submit my written statement for the record and provide brief
    opening remarks?
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you. As I described to the subcommittee
    in April, the United States today faces a complex global threat
    environment characterized by increasingly sophisticated and
    militarily capable strategic competitors, destabilizing
    regional dynamics, and accelerating technological changes that
    pose significant dangers.
        China is rapidly becoming more capable and assertive, and
    concerns regarding its nuclear modernization and expansion are
    increasing. Russia's comprehensive modernization of its nuclear
    capabilities, over 80 percent complete, includes the addition
    of new dual-capable systems that threaten the United States and
    its allies and partners. We are confronted with multifaceted
    deterrence challenges across domains from both competitors,
    which add increased escalation risks, all making deterrence
    more challenging. And strategic risks emanating from both North
    Korea and Iran add significant complications to the strategic
    threat picture.
        For these reasons, nuclear deterrence remains the
    Department's highest priority mission, but more is needed to
    confront these growing, multifaceted threats. That is why
    Secretary Austin has directed a National Defense Strategy
    focusing on integrated deterrence, an effort to address threats
    and opportunities across conventional, cyber, space, hybrid,
    information, and nuclear domains.
        With regard to nuclear deterrence, our nuclear forces
    remain essential to ensure no adversary believes it can ever
    employ nuclear weapons for any reason, under any circumstances,
    against the United States or our allies and partners without
    risking devastating consequences. That is why the nuclear triad
    remains the bedrock of our strategic deterrence, but we must
    modernize our aging capabilities to ensure a credible deterrent
    for the future.
        The President's fiscal year 2022 budget submission supports
    our efforts to modernize the nuclear triad. It funds all
    critical DOD [Department of Defense] nuclear modernization
    requirements, helping to ensure that modern replacements will
    be available before aging systems reach the end of their
    extended service lives. The fiscal year 2022 budget request for
    nuclear forces is $27.7 billion. This includes $15.6 billion to
    sustain and operate our current nuclear forces, and $12.1
    billion for recapitalization programs.
        This modernization effort is at a critical juncture given
    our aging platforms. As Secretary Austin has stated, U.S.
    nuclear weapons have been extended far beyond their original
    service lives and the tipping point where we must
    simultaneously overhaul these forces is now here. Updating and
    overhauling our Nation's nuclear forces is a critical national
    security priority. Even as we continue with nuclear
    modernization, we will continually review ongoing programs to
    assess their performance, schedule, risks, and projected costs.
    The Department will always seek to balance the best capability
    with the most cost-effective solution.
        Our pending review of nuclear policy and posture, which
    will be nested under the National Defense Strategy, will ensure
    that we have the right capabilities to meet our priorities now
    and in the future. The review will allow us to examine our
    nuclear posture and policy with an eye towards acting on
    direction in the administration's Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance that the United States takes steps to reduce
    the role of nuclear weapons in our National Security Strategy
    while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure,
    and effective, and that our extended deterrence commitments to
    our allies remains strong and credible.
        In so doing, our review will focus on the vital interests
    of the United States and our allies and partners. It will be
    informed by current and projected global security environment,
    trends, threats posed by potential adversaries and the
    capabilities of the United States and our allies and partners
    to address those threats; the roles of nuclear weapons; a
    strategy to reduce those roles and the impacts of policy,
    posture, and capabilities on strategic stability; and the risks
    of miscalculation.
        Consultation with allies will be a core component of this
    review and we have begun engaging with allies to ensure that
    their views are heard and understood before reaching any
    conclusions. Unique to this review and consistent with the
    interim guidance, preserving strategic stability will be a
    significant area of analysis in the review. Steps in this
    respect have already started with the extension of the New
    START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, and further analysis
    based on the President's priorities will occur as our strategic
    reviews proceed. We look forward to keeping Congress informed
    as we conduct these reviews.
        Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by thanking this subcommittee
    for its previous support for nuclear deterrence and the
    opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton can be found in the
    Appendix on page 36.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Ms. Dalton.
        Every witness statement will be inserted for the record by
    unanimous consent, so I will ask you gentlemen to limit your
    remarks, as Ms. Dalton did excellently, to about 5 minutes.
        The next witness will be Dr. Verdon.

    STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. VERDON, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
                    NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Dr. Verdon. Thank you.
        Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    On behalf of our entire national security enterprise workforce,
    I express our appreciation for this subcommittee's strong
    bipartisan support for NNSA's nuclear security missions as
    demonstrated most recently in fiscal year 2021 National Defense
    Authorization Act, and fiscal year 2021 budget for the
    Department of Energy.
        We meet today against the backdrop of a world marked by
    growing security challenges. China and Russia are modernizing
    their nuclear arsenal, investing significant resources in
    delivery platforms that have made clear that nuclear weapons
    will be a vital element to their statecraft. At the same time,
    the risk for proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons
    of mass destruction pose profound and existential dangers.
        Recognizing these global security challenges, the
    President's fiscal year 2022 budget request for $19.7 billion
    for NNSA reflects support for the three enduring missions for
    which Congress charged the NNSA in 2000: ensuring the safety,
    security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile;
    reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
    terrorism around the world; and providing nuclear propulsion
    for the U.S. Navy's fleet of aircraft carriers and submarines
    that is critical to the U.S. national security and our allies.
        [Inaudible.]
        Dr. Verdon. [continuing]. Stockpile. Our alignment and
    synchronization----
        [Inaudible.]
        Dr. Verdon. [continuing]. To improve. The fiscal year 2022
    budget request enables NNSA to execute its nuclear warhead and
    infrastructure modernization efforts begun under the Obama/
    Biden administration. The administration is beginning to
    undertake a formal review of efforts to modernize our nuclear
    deterrent to include DOD delivery platforms, the nuclear
    weapons required under those platforms, and the NNSA
    infrastructure needed to produce and maintain those weapons.
        Regardless of the review's specific findings, so long as we
    retain a nuclear arsenal we must have the infrastructure,
    science, technology, and engineering to produce and maintain
    the nuclear weapons stockpile. Unfortunately, the NNSA's
    production infrastructure has atrophied considerably, both in
    terms of the physical infrastructure and the capabilities
    needed within those facilities. Continued recapitalization is
    imperative. The potential impacts to the U.S. deterrent if not
    addressed are no longer over the horizon.
        Of particular importance is reestablishing the capability
    to manufacture plutonium pits. This capability is needed to
    address risks due to plutonium aging, degrading warhead
    performance, improve warhead safety and security, and provide
    the ability to respond to evolving threats to the U.S. nuclear
    deterrent. We fully recognize that the potential impacts of
    plutonium aging on warhead performance are uncertain at this
    time. Plutonium didn't exist--at least we didn't know about
    it--until, you know, before 1940, and simply has not been in
    existence on the planet long enough to have concrete data on
    how our pits will behave when they are approaching a century
    old.
        Given this, it is an assessment of our best technical
    experts in the weapons program, the three NNSA laboratory
    directors, and independent experts like the JASONs, that the
    risk is just too high not to have the capability to manufacture
    plutonium pits at a rate sufficient to refresh the stockpile's
    pits before they exceed 80 to 100 years in age.
        In addition to our mission to ensure the continued
    effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile, nonproliferation also
    remains an important and growing priority. The NNSA's Defense
    Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation is critical to implementing
    the President's call to lock down fissile material and
    radiological materials around the world. The fiscal year 2022
    budget request enables NNSA's Defense Office of Nuclear
    Nonproliferation to continue to work worldwide with our
    partners to prevent state and non-state actors from developing
    nuclear weapons or acquiring materials usable in nuclear
    weapons.
        With regards to our third mission of providing nuclear
    propulsion for the U.S. Navy, the Office of Naval Reactors
    remains at the forefront of technological developments in naval
    propulsion by advancing new technologies and improvements in
    naval reactor performance. This preeminence provides the U.S.
    Navy with a commanding edge in naval warfighting capabilities
    and the fiscal year 2022 budget request enables NNSA's Office
    of Naval Reactors to continue their programs which are so vital
    to the security of our Nation and the allies.
        In closing, despite the challenges posed by COVID
    [coronavirus] pandemic, I am pleased to report that the NNSA
    did not miss a single major milestone or DOD requirement. This
    achievement is a testament to the professionalism in NNSA's
    world-class workforce, the leadership of our sites, and their
    commitment to national security. In fact, I am happy to report
    that as we speak today, the system first production unit for
    the W88 Alt [Alteration] 370 is being assembled at Pantex. So I
    thank you again for the strong support of this committee and
    the opportunity to testify before you today and I stand ready
    to answer any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Verdon can be found in the
    Appendix on page 46.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Dr. Verdon. Now we will
    hear from Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe.

        STATEMENT OF VADM JOHNNY R. WOLFE, JR., USN, DIRECTOR,
                 STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY

        Admiral Wolfe. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify. I would like to thank this subcommittee
    for its continued support of the Navy's nuclear deterrent
    mission. As you heard from Admiral Richard, Commander, U.S.
    Strategic Command, nuclear deterrence underwrites every U.S.
    military operation and capability on the globe and serves as
    the backstop for both our national defense and the defense of
    our allies.
        The Nation's nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic
    missiles, strategic bombers, and ballistic missile submarines
    serves as the bedrock of our ability to deter major power
    conflict, assure our allies and partners, achieve U.S.
    objectives should deterrence fail, and hedge against an
    uncertain future. The Navy has provided unwavering and singular
    mission-focused support to the sea-based leg of the triad for
    over six decades.
        We must sustain today's deterrent while modernizing for the
    future. This falls into four concurrent lines of effort. First,
    we must maintain the current D5LE [D5 Life Extension] missile
    inventory and provide the necessary operational support to
    sustain Ohio-class submarines through their service lives. This
    is being accomplished through an update to all of our
    subsystems. All of our life extension efforts remain on track
    and our current program will support the deployment of all
    existing warheads. We must also recapitalize our strategic
    weapons facilities to continue to support and sustain SSP
    [Strategic Systems Programs] and operations that enable our
    continuous at-sea presence.
        Second, we must continue to work with our partners at PEO
    [Program Executive Office] Columbia to ensure that the
    transition between Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines
    stays on schedule. For SSP, this requires a seamless transition
    of the current D5LE weapons system and missile inventory onto
    the new Columbia class. During this time of transition, we will
    ensure that the Navy's portion of the nuclear triad remains
    credible by introducing the W93 Mark 7 to rebalance the
    stockpile of W76 and W88s and meet STRATCOM [United States
    Strategic Command] requirements.
        Third, it is imperative that we start the work on a future
    missile and corresponding weapons systems now. This next
    generation of the current D5LE missile, a missile in service
    since 1989 and boasting a remarkable history of 182 successful
    flight tests is called D5LE2. D5LE2 will yield multiple
    benefits in missile performance to include extending its
    service life. D5LE2 is required to completely outload our
    Columbia-class SSBNs and ensure that Trident remains credible
    in the face of a dynamic threat environment. A D5LE2 missile
    must be developed, tested, and produced with a lead time
    sufficient to deploy on Columbia-class Hull 9 in fiscal year
    2039. It will then be backfitted for the first eight hulls of
    the class.
        Lastly, one of the greatest advantages the United States
    has is its alliances and partnerships. As the U.S. project
    officer for the Polaris Sales Agreement, I will continue to
    support the U.K.'s [United Kingdom's] sovereign deterrent for
    today's Vanguard-class submarines and their successor, the
    Dreadnought-class. For decades, U.S. policy has recognized that
    the independent British nuclear deterrent adds to global
    stability. Under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and the 1962
    Polaris Sales Agreement, the United States has provided
    assistance and material consistent with international law to
    the U.K. deterrent program. Without this assistance, the cost
    and schedule risk to maintain the U.K.'s independent deterrent
    would rise significantly, thus creating additional challenges
    for the U.K. in sustaining its nuclear contribution to NATO
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alongside the U.S.
        None of these four lines of effort are possible without
    investment in our people, our infrastructure, and our
    industrial base. Military, civilian, government, and
    contractor, the men and women of SSP are working hard to
    deliver a safe, secure, and effective strategic weapons system
    today that will serve us well into the latter half of the
    century. They remain my number one priority in order to ensure
    continued program success. Nuclear modernization will take time
    to complete, so work towards these ends must start now and
    cannot be delayed. It is only through your continued support
    that the Department's top modernization priorities can be
    achieved.
        As the 14th director, it is my highest honor to represent
    the men and women of SSP comprising approximately of 1,700
    sailors, 1,000 Marines, 300 coastguardsmen, and over 1,300
    civilians and over 2,000 contractor personnel. It is my most
    critical goal to ensure they are poised to execute the mission
    with the same well of success, passion, and rigor both today
    and tomorrow as they have since our program inception in 1955.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of
    the men and women who make deterrence of major power conflict
    their life's work. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Wolfe can be found in
    the Appendix on page 57.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral Wolfe. And now we will hear
    from Lieutenant General James Dawkins.

     STATEMENT OF LT GEN JAMES C. DAWKINS, JR., USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF
    OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S.
                               AIR FORCE

        General Dawkins. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    inviting me to appear before you today to represent the
    dedicated men and women of the Air Force's nuclear enterprise.
    Along with my teammates here at the table, the airmen of the
    United States Air Force remain committed and work tirelessly to
    continuously provide the Nation a safe, secure, effective, and
    credible nuclear deterrent. This commitment has become even
    more significant given the age of our systems and the nature of
    the current security environment.
        The first time in our Nation's history we are on a
    trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer
    adversaries. Russia has multiple types of nonstrategic nuclear
    weapons deployed or in research and development including
    short- and close-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
    anti-ship missiles. Three of Russia's novel strategic systems
    and its nonstrategic nuclear weapons are not subject to the New
    START treaty's limits or verification regime. The People's
    Republic of China [PRC], as our principal pacing threat, is
    nearing completion of its own nuclear triad and will likely at
    least double their nuclear stockpile this decade. The pace of
    the PRC's weapons development is very concerning.
        The U.S. nuclear triad remains the primary military means
    by which the Department of Defense provides deterrence against
    existential threats to our homeland and allies. The triad has
    remained the force posture of choice for each President and
    Congress since the 1960s. The flexible options it provides the
    President complicates an adversary's decision calculus should
    they wish to pursue aggression against the United States or our
    allies. However, the triad is showing its age as many of its
    weapon systems and infrastructure date back to the early 1960s.
    The President's fiscal year 2022 budget fully funds our
    modernization efforts to provide the necessary improvements to
    counter our potential adversaries' increasing capabilities.
        The Air Force continues to achieve significant progress in
    our modernization programs to include the Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent [GBSD], Long-Range Standoff Weapon [LRSO],
    and B-21 Raider. The GBSD is leveraging cutting-edge digital
    engineering and has met every major milestone of the past 5
    years. The Long-Range Standoff cruise missile and the B-21 are
    also on schedule. The B-52 modernization efforts are on track
    ensuring the aircraft remains relevant through the 2050s. In
    partnership with the United States Space Force, our nuclear
    command, control, and communication system remains secure and
    effective as we modernize capabilities ensuring future
    connectivity for leadership and strategic forces in an
    increasingly challenging cyber environment.
        The Air Force is committed to providing stable requirements
    and delivering these modernized weapons system programs on time
    and on budget. However, we can't do this alone and we ask for
    the continued support of the Congress to give stable
    authorization and appropriation across both the Department of
    Defense and the National Nuclear Security Administration
    enterprise. We owe this not only to our Nation, but also to our
    airmen who are in some cases manning the same missile sites and
    flying the same aircraft as their grandparents did. Yet we
    demand and, in fact, depend on our success against threats that
    are far more lethal and sophisticated than their grandparents
    could have imagined to accomplish a mission that is vital to
    our Nation's security and survival. I thank the committee for
    your advocacy and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Dawkins can be found in
    the Appendix on page 70.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General Dawkins. I appreciate the
    testimony of all the witnesses. I am grateful for your
    expertise and your patriotism.
        All members will be limited to 5 minutes in questioning to
    more evenly distribute the questioning, and if there is time
    perhaps, we can do a second round. I will start off and have a
    question or two for Ms. Dalton.
        You characterize in your testimony that Russia has already
    80 percent recapitalized their nuclear forces. What percentage
    of completion or recapitalization would you put on our--
    America?
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, again for
    having the opportunity to testify. On balance, I would have to
    get back to you in terms of relative percentage of the U.S.
    program, but I can tell you that as the Secretary has stated,
    we are at a critical point of being relatively behind and the
    need to modernize and recapitalize across all three legs of the
    triad.
        So the investments that are made in the fiscal year 2022
    budget submission do seek to modernize for the GBSD or the
    Columbia-class and for LRSO, and these are critical
    capabilities to ensure that we can keep pace with the
    challenges before us, principally China. And your question
    pivoted directly off of Russia, but I think, you know, the
    intelligence records suggest that China's nuclear modernization
    is accelerating at a very concerning rate. So as we proceed
    with our Nuclear Posture Review, we are going to be closely
    looking at both of those threat factors to help inform upcoming
    programmatic decisions.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I was about to turn to China, which
    seems to be, what, doubling or more their nuclear capabilities,
    plus they have road-mobile or underground or other advantages
    that we lack. And I believe they are not constrained by any
    treaty, right? We at least have the New START extension with
    Russia but that does not apply to China.
        General Dawkins, you mentioned that there are three novel
    Russian nuclear systems that are not covered by New START.
    Could you remind us what those are?
        General Dawkins. Yes, sir. There is the underwater--the
    submarine with a nuclear-armed torpedo, a very large system
    there meant as, I guess, a weapon of vengeance to come up on
    our coast and detonate. Very hard to defend against, of course.
    There is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile that
    they have that again, not to have--they are under development
    on these systems, I am sorry. Under development on these
    systems that they would be able to use and, of course, they
    could certainly deliver, and then--and they are very difficult
    to defend against those cruise missiles.
        And the third one is--I am failing to remember. I can take
    that for the record. But I know they have got a host of other
    systems they are using and the small nuclear weapons that they
    have put on some of their air defenses and other things, sir.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you. Those are my questions. I will turn
    it over now to the ranking member.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my opening
    statement, I referenced the news making of the Acting Secretary
    of the Navy with respect to taking a step for the cancellation
    of the sea-launched cruise missile, a missile that both General
    Hyten and Admiral Richard have openly spoken as fans of. We
    know that Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Staff have both
    reported in the news that they were unaware of this action and
    were not consulted. Admiral Richard said that he heard about it
    on the news.
        Admiral Wolfe, can you tell me what you know of this action
    and if you could also then in your answer, in addition to what
    is happening over at the Pentagon with the sea-launched cruise
    missile that has had this subcommittee and committee's support,
    can you tell us about, you know, what Russia's programs are and
    what their sea-launched cruise missiles are capable of? Because
    certainly we need to take into consideration what our
    adversaries are doing whenever we take a step to review our own
    commitment to our own systems. Admiral.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question, sir.
    So I had read the SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] memo. I had
    not--I was not privy to it before it was actually signed. But
    my understanding is for the SECNAV it was part of a deliberate
    process to start the dialogue for building the next POM
    [Program Objective Memorandum]. I would point out, however,
    sir, nuclear modernization for the program of record for D5LE2,
    for Columbia, for TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out], for our
    portion of the air is solid and it will continue and should
    continue to be fully funded to all of the estimates. I would
    also point out that in starting that dialogue, he does point
    out that it is not a decision. It is meant to get the dialogue
    started. And, of course----
        Mr. Turner. Well, I have got to tell you just to insert, it
    is a hell of a way to start a dialogue is to call for the
    canceling. But go ahead. You were going to talk about our
    adversaries, because I do have limited time.
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Understand. Yes, and from an
    adversary perspective, I think what General Dawkins talked
    about and what we all know is as Russia continues to look at
    how they can build some of these what they call tactical
    nuclear capabilities, certainly cruise missiles are a big part
    of that. Because I believe that they look at that as an
    advantage that they can even in some of their dialogue on
    escalating to deescalating that provides a significant
    advantage to them.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Ms. Dalton, you know, this announcement in the news comes
    just on the precursor of the President sitting down with Putin.
    I believe that unilateral disarmament is certainly, you know,
    as a policy, idiotic because we don't have a support for our
    deterrence and certainly we have no bargaining chips when we
    meet with our adversaries. Doesn't this weaken President Biden
    as he goes to sit down with Putin and say, ``Hey, we should
    start more arms control negotiations,'' where his own staff are
    talking about unilaterally stopping programs that are both
    important to our deterrence and may be the subject of arms
    control negotiations?
        Ms. Dalton.
        Ms. Dalton. Representative Turner, in the President's
    budget request for fiscal year 2022 from a policy perspective,
    the Department had intended to provide a modest amount of
    funding for SLCM [sea-launched cruise missile] and plans to
    revalidate that requirement in the course of the Nuclear
    Posture Review [NPR]. That is still our intent to look closely
    at this program in the NPR. And I would say in terms of the
    administration's approach to our arms control negotiations we
    do not support unilateral disarmament, but we----
        Mr. Turner. Well, this point that you made here, so the
    Nuclear Posture Review, has it commenced?
        Ms. Dalton. It is on the cusp of commencing, sir, so it
    is----
        Mr. Turner. It hasn't even commenced, but yet you have
    people in the chain of the administration already targeting
    systems for canceling. Isn't that--I mean isn't the Nuclear
    Posture Review supposed to be like adversary risks-driven,
    capabilities-driven? How is it that one system could be singled
    out when you haven't even begun the Nuclear Posture Review?
        Ms. Dalton. Sir, it is our intent to look closely at the
    SLCM program within the context of the Nuclear Posture Review
    and make programmatic decisions for fiscal year 2023 based upon
    that objective analysis.
        Mr. Turner. Ms. Dalton, when you were before us before, the
    last time, we were talking about there were some proposals that
    people had tried to latch onto for Minuteman life extension
    programs that were--it was known as like the ``best 200.'' You
    said that you don't have an ongoing study, you are just
    updating previous studies. We don't have a copy of the previous
    best 200 study that was completed at the end of the Obama
    administration. Would you commit to providing that to the
    committee?
        Ms. Dalton. Happy to follow up with that, sir.
        Mr. Turner. Okay. If you could get that to us this week, we
    would appreciate it. We are coming back next week, as you know,
    and it would be very timely for us to be able to look at it.
        General Dawkins, you have indicated that the Ground-Based
    Strategic Deterrent is $38 billion less than the Minuteman III
    life extension program. Could you elaborate on that? It keeps
    coming up as a discussion item. Not only are we gaining with
    the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent additional capabilities,
    but it is clear from your understanding that it is both the
    most cost-effective path, correct?
        General Dawkins. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. And
    that is true, sir. The GBSD, from the minute that--or from the
    time we did the analysis of alternatives back in 2014, it was
    shown to be more cost effective than life-extending the
    Minuteman III over the course of the entire weapons system out
    to 2075. That $5 billion difference back then in 2014 has since
    grown to $38 billion now. So again, it is $38 billion more
    expensive to life-extend the Minuteman III. This is primarily--
    yes, sir.
        Mr. Turner. No, I was going to jump to my last question to
    go to Dr. Verdon. Real quickly, you have given us in classified
    session the justification for ensuring that we needed both Los
    Alamos and Savannah River in order to be able to hit our 80
    plutonium pits. What can you tell us in open session of the
    need for the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility?
        Dr. Verdon. So again, we would say all of our analysis
    still indicates that the two-site solution that we identified
    is the most susceptive in terms of both capacity, schedule, and
    cost way for us to implement and meet the 80 pits per year.
    When we look at the schedule, when we look at the cost, it
    still comes out to be the most effective way for us to
    implement and to achieve that requirement is to take advantage
    of both the existing facilities at Los Alamos and at Savannah
    River to implement pit production.
        Mr. Turner. And you are not able to just do it all at Los
    Alamos, correct?
        Dr. Verdon. Doing it, no. It would require building a whole
    new facility at Los Alamos to be able to do it. PF-4 is not
    large enough.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. The next questioner will
    be Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
    witnesses for their testimony today. Let me begin with this.
    The President's budget request included an additional $700
    million for the Columbia above the expected fiscal year 2021
    estimates due to an updated cost estimate assessment and a
    program evaluation review.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe, do you believe this assessment is
    accurate and that the funding in the budget is adequate?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. Thanks for the question. So I did
    talk to Admiral Pappano from PEO Columbia and yes, sir, based
    on the CAPE [Director of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation] estimate that was completed in August of 2020,
    which is what the new estimate and the reason for the increase
    in request for this fiscal year, it is consistent with
    everything that the Navy has seen that what the CAPE has done
    and we have funded to that CAPE estimate. So yes, sir. We
    believe it is accurate.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you.
        Dr. Verdon, so I have been interested for some time now in
    developing low-enriched uranium fuel for submarine propulsion.
    In doing so would prevent us from having to restart production
    of weapons-grade uranium and it also can't be stolen for that
    purpose. I wanted to ask for the record, will NNSA continue to
    support effort to study the viability of this critical
    nonproliferation effort should additional funding be made
    available?
        Dr. Verdon. We are committed to this and continue to look
    at that. We are still working with the administration to
    balance the requirements of both the nonproliferation
    requirements and also the Navy's operational requirements. So
    that still continues to be a study but we are continuing to
    look at what are the technical feasibilities of doing it, but
    the broader administration is taking a hard look also at the
    balance of the nonproliferation goals against the Navy's
    operational requirements as well.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you.
        Vice Admiral Wolfe, in your testimony you mentioned that we
    can no longer wait to invest in critical workforce skills and
    in complex technologies. What types of programs should Congress
    be encouraging?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. I think with what we do with our
    workforce, looking at the critical technologies, things like
    rad-hard [radiation hardening] and those that are very unique
    to what General Dawkins' organization and what we do, I think
    we very much put a premium on education and programs that
    encourage our folks to continue their education as well as to
    hone their skills for these critical programs.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I--again, we need to focus heavily
    on a workforce development especially where we have significant
    gaps. It is in our national interest to address those gaps
    sooner rather than later.
        The final question I had for General Dawkins. Are your NC3
    [nuclear command, control, and communication] modernization
    efforts meeting their scheduled performance and budget metrics?
        General Dawkins. Yes, sir. For the most part they are. We
    have got--I could go into an acronym soup here, but some of the
    new systems to replace our current systems that provide
    advanced high-frequency capability to our missile sites and
    several other upgrades are again on time and tracking well.
    There have been some systems that are producing the learning of
    the crew force, if you will, that we are getting our
    requirements correct and ensuring that those are going to be on
    track for the future. But for the most part, sir, we feel that
    we are in a good place but this will take renewed focus or a
    constant focus to ensure that we don't get behind.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. Well, this is something that we are
    going to continue to track. We look forward to staying in touch
    with you on that topic. Those are the questions I had for this
    point. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
        Now, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper and Ranking
    Member Mike Turner, for the bipartisan cooperation on putting
    together this very important hearing and we appreciate each one
    of the witnesses.
        And Administrator Verdon, according to the President's
    budget, the Critical Decision 1 [CD1], the Savannah River
    Plutonium Processing Facility is expected to be released
    sometime this month of June. And is that timeline still
    accurate, and if so, will that create the first credible cost
    and schedule baseline and does the President's budget match
    what was revealed through the NNSA's initial review of the
    paperwork?
        Dr. Verdon. So yes, sir. We are still on track to
    accomplish the CD1 approval requests before the Deputy
    Secretary and by the middle of this month. And, indeed, the
    fiscal year 2022 budget request has the funding in there
    necessary that if we get the approval to do the work to
    progress towards Critical Decision 2 to continue to mature the
    design.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much. And as you well
    know, NNSA is so well thought of at Savannah River Site. We
    wish you the best of success.
        Additionally, Administrator, I appreciate your opening
    comments. I appreciate the very pithy and positive statements
    by Congressman Mike Turner all the way from Dayton, Ohio. And
    the questioning and restating of the Department of Energy
    Secretary Jennifer Granholm; the NNSA nominee, Jill Hrugy; U.S.
    Strategic Command commander Admiral Charles Richard--all are on
    record supporting the two-sites solution. This shows clear
    bipartisan support from among the administrations.
        Moving forward, what do you see is the biggest risk to
    delay in achieving 80 pits per year by 2030? Is it the funding?
    Should this be addressed in future budget requests?
        Dr. Verdon. It will be--yes. It will be, what the funding
    that will be required will be, you know, one of the key
    factors, and then it is also how we manage the supply chain
    getting the critical equipment in, in a timely fashion. And we
    are beginning to work that issue as we speak to work with
    vendors to try to make sure we can optimize that between both
    the Savannah River requirements and the Los Alamos
    requirements. But certainly identifying the right funding
    profile that will--that can be, you know, afforded by the
    Nation will be one of the key factors.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
        And, General Dawkins, numerous studies have shown a one-
    site pit production solution is cost prohibitive and does not
    provide the basic resiliency necessary for our nuclear
    infrastructure which is so crucial as we have discussed to have
    the deterrence to maintain peace through strength. From a
    defense perspective, what are the consequences to the
    credibility of our nuclear deterrence limiting pit production
    to one site production?
        General Dawkins. Sir, thank you for the question. And
    having served at NNSA several years ago, I know that they are
    challenged with the infrastructure that they have. We work very
    closely. We work also with the Nuclear Weapons Council within
    NNSA to ensure that the plans that we have are executable. I
    think we would--and across the Department, speaking for the
    Department--would be challenged to continue with all of our
    modernization programs out into the future. It would be
    difficult with a single site. Again, I am not the expert on
    that. Dr. Verdon, I could defer. I will defer to him, but I
    know that our Nation needs to be able to produce pits and
    having everything in one location might be, you know, it might
    be more strategically valuable to have a couple.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, we actually--Savannah River Site looks
    forward to working collaboratively with Los Alamos and to
    achieve pit production which is so critical since many of the
    pits are 60 years or older. And so we have got to modernize,
    and I want to back you up and work with Chairman Cooper and
    Ranking Member Turner.
        And, finally, a question for Secretary Dalton, and that is
    the Biden administration has expressed its intent to develop
    its own Nuclear Posture Review indicating a change in U.S.
    nuclear policy. What parts of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    does the administration plan to change and what is the timeline
    for delivery?
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question. So we are just
    beginning the Nuclear Posture Review and we will be conducting
    that as I noted nested within the National Defense Strategy.
    Statutorily, we are required to deliver to Congress the NDS in
    January of 2022, so we are aiming for a similar timeline for
    the completion of the NPR. But as noted in my last honor to
    testify before you all, I am happy to come up and brief you on
    some of our emergent findings of the NPR as we proceed this
    summer.
        And in terms of the review of declaratory policy, that is
    obviously a Presidential-level decision. And so even as the
    Department progresses in its work on specific DOD aspects of
    nuclear posture, we will also be engaged in an interagency
    process to review the nuclear policy implications. But our
    North Star, to begin with, is the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance which indicates that this administration
    will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our
    National Security Strategy while upholding our extended
    deterrence commitments to allies and partners and ensuring a
    safe, effective, and secure nuclear deterrent.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, we look forward to working with you. I am
    confident about our Savannah. I now yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Now Mr. Moulton is recognized.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    everybody for coming here today and participating in this
    discussion and my colleagues on the committee because this
    couldn't be a more important topic.
        Secretary Dalton, I would like to start with you.
    Hypersonic weapons, we have talked a lot about them recently,
    and they have the potential to be highly destabilizing,
    particularly if we pursue them blindly in a tit-for-tat with
    PRC or Russian development without carefully developing the
    operational concepts for their use. On the other hand,
    conventional hypersonic missiles could certainly change our
    adversaries' calculus in a way that reduces our reliance on
    nuclear weapons for strategic stability.
        So, Ms. Dalton, do you believe we have a clear vision for
    how we integrate hypersonic capabilities into the U.S. arsenal
    in a way that deters rather than potentially increases the risk
    of a nuclear response?
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Representative Moulton. It is a
    great question and I think this is why the Secretary has
    encouraged us in the course of the NDS to look at,
    holistically, at an integrated deterrence so we are not looking
    at any one domain or system in a silo. So, you know, to take
    the specific mention of hypersonic missiles, this
    administration is proceeding with investments in that
    capability because we think it is important to be able to keep
    pace with key challengers such as China and Russia to be able
    to respond with speed and at distance.
        But as we are developing these capabilities, as you
    mentioned the importance of concepts of operations, we are
    doing a lot of leg work behind the scenes in classified
    channels to ensure that as we are developing out this
    capability we are doing so responsibly, and at present are only
    making investments in a conventional capability when it comes
    to hypersonic missiles. But this will be among the capabilities
    that we are looking at through this frame of integrated
    deterrence so that we can account for potential escalation
    risks as we look across different scenarios involving,
    particularly, China and Russia.
        Mr. Moulton. Madam Secretary, if I may say, integrated
    deterrence and some other things you have said are music to my
    ears and hopefully to the ears of others on the committee. But
    in a lot of ways you have succeeded in saying a lot of good
    things without answering the question. It seems pretty clear
    that we don't have a strategy. And while it must be developed
    in classified terms, I understand that, it also needs to be
    clearly communicated to our adversaries which can't be entirely
    classified. So I look forward to hearing more about how you
    develop this. We have to have these operational concepts made
    clear before we spend billions of dollars on taxpayer money to
    develop weapons that we may not need or could actually make our
    strategic situation worse.
        Let me move, if I may, to General Dawkins and Admiral
    Wolfe. Thank you both very much for your calls. We discussed on
    the phone in our extended conversations the importance of not
    only developing a highly technically qualified workforce, but
    retaining them. And I am anxious to hear how you measure your
    progress. What we are doing today is clearly not adequate. We
    are losing too much talent and it is going out the door quicker
    than we can count. How are you actually measuring your progress
    in better training, retaining, attracting, and retaining
    personnel?
        General Dawkins. Representative, thank you for that
    question. And that is something that is foremost on our mind
    particularly as we get, or going into the bow wave of
    modernization where all of these programs are ramping up.
    Whether it is finding workforce inside the Air Force itself or
    out in the industrial complex, that is something that OSD
    [Office of the Secretary of Defense] tracks closely that we
    track in the Nuclear Weapons Council and the Air Force is
    focused on that as well.
        The way we track that is we do keep track of where--of our
    ability to hire. That is, you know, at times challenging
    because of the nature of the work we do and security
    clearances, but we do work with local universities. For
    instance, out with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence out at
    Utah, they work with local universities and other places to
    recruit these folks and bring them in and then offer the
    incentives that they can to actually retain them. And the
    broader Air Force----
        Mr. Moulton. I am afraid I am just about out of time and
    Chairman Cooper is quite strict with us as he should be. But if
    you could just take this for the record and share with us some
    of the statistics, the ways that you actually track this so we
    can see measurable progress on these fronts that would be very
    helpful.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
        Mr. Cooper. Yes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
        Admiral Wolfe, I have a question for you, a background
    question about the sea-launched cruise missile, but first I
    just want to make a comment about the Acting Secretary's
    unilateral decision. It appears to me that he has gone rogue
    and I don't say that lightly. It appears to me that he has gone
    rogue because the people above him and the people below him are
    denying any knowledge of this decision and seem to be
    disavowing the decision. And, secondly, it comes at a horrible
    time. It really does damage to President Biden's position vis-
    a-vis Mr. Putin and these upcoming discussions, so the timing
    could not be any worse.
        But back to you, Admiral Wolfe. For background, what kind
    of capability does it give the United States and our strategic
    posture to be able to have the capability and flexibility that
    a sea-launched cruise missile provides?
        Admiral Wolfe. Sir, at a very high level I can answer that.
    I really believe that Admiral Richard could really give you in
    a classified setting what the real capabilities. But what I
    would tell you is, it gives--if you think about deterrence, it
    gives you another decision tool for the President and for
    STRATCOM. And what it really does is it causes yet another
    calculus thought that the adversary has to have before they
    think that we would have to use something bigger than a sea-
    launched cruise missile. So it does provide many options to
    continue this deterrent thought process.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you so much.
        General Dawkins, I have a couple of questions for you. I am
    going to focus in on the MILCON [military construction]
    projects that are intended to be accomplished out at Vandenberg
    Air Force Base and for software at Hill Air Force Base in
    support of GBSD. If those MILCON projects were not funded in
    this year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and
    appropriation bills, how much would that set back the GBSD
    program and how detrimental would that be?
        General Dawkins. Sir, thank you for the question. And as
    you are aware, the Vandenberg Space Base, Space Force Base is
    where we do our testing. We typically do four, what we call a
    ``Glory Trip,'' ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]
    launch testings each year. As we transition to GBSD, our first
    test, our first flight for the GBSD missile will be 1 December
    of 2023. I know that they need to get to start that work out
    there at Vandenberg in order to facilitate this test. I would
    like to take it for the record though to get you the exact
    impacts if we do not get the full funding in the MILCON or it
    slips. But I do know there will be impacts, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. And those would be negative impacts.
        General Dawkins. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
        Changing gears, General Dawkins, I would like to hear you
    respond to something that Admiral Richard pointed out. He said
    that if we ever reduce the number of ICBMs or, God forbid,
    remove the leg of that triad completely that that would,
    ``solve a critical problem for China.'' So could you elaborate
    on what he was referring to about China's calculus if we
    degrade the ability of our land-based leg of the triad?
        General Dawkins. Yes, sir. So without ICBMs, we quickly
    will turn China into a peer adversary. And so when we look at
    how the ICBM force is a ready and responsive force and most
    responsive of the legs of the triad, it provides a pretty--it
    enhances strategic stability by providing a great deterrent
    against an adversary, because they know that if they were to do
    us, mean to do us harm as a nation, it would have to be a
    fairly large attack for them to do that.
        And, in fact, they would be attacking the homeland and that
    would--that in and of itself enhances deterrence and will make
    them or any central adversary perhaps take a step back and go,
    ``do we really want to commit to a large-scale attack against
    the United States homeland?''
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And how serious of a problem is it
    for us to not have any kind of treaty or any kind of
    verification or knowledge of what China is doing with its
    tunnel system, with its ability combined with mobile launchers
    to hide the existence of and the number of ICBMs that they
    might have?
        General Dawkins. So, sir, I am a big believer in arms
    control treaties that are verifiable and executable or
    enforceable. You know, a lot of our treaties are based on
    simply numbers and I think it is important also to look to
    capabilities as an important part of that as well.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Panetta.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    understanding in getting me in to ask questions.
        Just real quick, Ms. Dalton, obviously, thanks. Thanks to
    all the witnesses for being here and thank you for your
    service. But, Ms. Dalton, when does the administration plan to
    complete its Nuclear Posture Review and when will it begin and
    what exactly will it entail going forward?
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Representative Panetta, for the
    question. So as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the NPR will
    be nested within the National Defense Strategy and we are just
    commencing the NPR leg, if you will, of the strategic reviews.
    We plan to structure it in such a way that there will be
    decision off-ramps as we get into the end of the POM build and
    into the PBR [President's budget request] season such that, you
    know, the objective analysis that we do in the NPR can feed
    into programmatic decisions that are relevant for the fiscal
    year 2023-27 FYDP [Future Years Defense Program].
        In terms of what we plan to cover in the NPR, as noted
    earlier there will be a look at declaratory policy which we
    will do in concert with the interagency. There will be a
    thorough assessment of the security environment. Many things
    have changed since the last time there was a Democratic
    administration in power that we will need to be cognizant of
    and we will look to define based on the integrated deterrence
    frame, which I know is still in development and, you know, we
    will be able to say more on as we move forward how that relates
    to thinking about the use of strategic forces like nuclear
    weapons in that deterrence construct. And then as I noted, the
    specific implications then for programs and modernization. So
    in brief, those are the areas for examination.
        Mr. Panetta. Okay. In regards to that and in regards to the
    nuclear command and control modernization, do you believe that
    there will be a review in regards to the sole launch authority
    of the President?
        Ms. Dalton. So I know that that is a question that has come
    up in some of the early consultations that we have had with
    outside groups and we are committed to taking input from all
    stakeholders across the nuclear committee to help inform our
    review.
        Mr. Panetta. And that will include this subcommittee right
    here?
        Ms. Dalton. Yes, absolutely.
        Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Great. Thank you. I appreciate
    that and look forward to working with you.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
    thank you. Thank you to all of our witnesses.
        General Dawkins, yes, I think there is kind of a common
    criticism or belief out there that ICBMs are on a ``hair
    trigger alert.'' Can you tell us about the redundancies built
    into the launch system as well as how they are actually
    targeted out in the open ocean and how those are built in to
    assuage some of those concerns?
        General Dawkins. Yes, Representative, thank you for the
    question. So that is a misnomer. While the ICBMs are ready and
    responsive and we do have crew members, two crew members down
    there in the launch control centers awaiting a Presidential
    order, it requires an order from the President to be
    transmitted through our NC3 systems down to the crew members
    and for them to decode any of those orders they get, ensure
    that they are verifiably from the President and otherwise.
        As far as the process goes, the President, if necessary, if
    we are under attack of some sort, the President has--we have a
    means to bring the President into a conference, the Department
    of Defense does, and Joint Staff, to ensure, and he can also
    bring all of his senior advisors across the national security
    complex, and any ones that he wants into this conference to
    discuss how to respond. It is a very measured process. And then
    the President can decide whether he wants to respond with
    nuclear weapons or choose something else.
        The great thing about the triad is the President does not
    have to use the ICBMs because we have a survivable leg in the
    submarine-launched ballistic missile capability. So that is an
    example of the great attributes that the triad brings. So the
    President does not have to launch on attack or launch on
    warning, he can wait and gather more information before he has
    to make a decision, because he has a submarine force.
        Mr. Waltz. Great, thank you. And that leads me to my next
    question. This committee heard testimony from Admiral Richard
    that if the ICBM leg of the triad was allowed to atrophy
    further that he would need to put bombers and refuelers back on
    alert. Do you have a sense--and this is for any of the
    witnesses--of how much that would cost? And is it safe to
    assume that this cost was not factored into the $38 billion in
    savings by choosing the GBSD over Minuteman III life extension?
        General Dawkins. Representative, that was not a factor in
    the cost of any of the studies in analysis. We don't have an
    analysis right now that says how much extra that cost will be.
    I call it a transfer cost. If you do something with one leg of
    the triad, you may have transfer costs associated with it if
    you transfer other missions to the remaining two legs. With the
    bomber force, because we have not been on alert since the early
    1990s when we were pulled off of alert and we had hundreds and
    hundreds of bombers, actually, you know, able to be on alert,
    we would have to do a couple of things. We would have to buy
    more bombers, we believe, buy more tankers. We would have to
    get more infrastructure and, of course, bring in more people to
    be able to sustain that capability, the alert capability.
        Just as concerning is how we would--if we didn't have that
    extra capability, we would detract from our ability to do our
    conventional missions with these dual-role bombers, the B-1 and
    the B-52 and soon to be the B-21 and the B-52. So again, it
    would be a drain on resources that we would also use, or we
    also use today for other combatant commanders.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you. And I don't know, does anyone else
    have anything to add on that if we allowed the ICBM to atrophy,
    the burden that that puts on the other two legs, cost and
    impact on readiness?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, sir. This is Admiral Wolfe. So I would
    tell you from a Navy perspective, as Admiral Richard looks at
    what he needs to achieve in support of the President, there is
    a possibility that that could call on the Navy to pick up more
    of that mission. And I would tell you today, with the platforms
    that we have got and the assets we have got, that would be
    almost impossible. In the future, that would potentially
    require you to build more Columbia-class submarines. That would
    potentially cause us to build more assets and look at how we
    could work with our partners at NNSA to then provide the
    adequate number of warheads that would go on there. So I would
    say there would be a huge downstream impact even to the United
    States Navy.
        Mr. Waltz. So less ICBMs, more bombers, more subs. Is that
    just--not to oversimplify, but that is essentially what we
    would be facing to keep the same capability, the same deterrent
    capability.
        Admiral Wolfe. I would just add the word ``potentially,''
    sir. Potentially that could be the outcome.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Khanna.
        Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
    everyone here for your service and testifying.
        On April 3rd, 2019, Lieutenant General Richard Clark, who I
    know you know, then the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for
    Strategic Deterrence, noted that we have one more opportunity
    to extend Minuteman III. I would like to understand why that
    option of extending it one more time is not a good option and
    why that hasn't been explored.
        General Dawkins. Thank you, Representative Khanna, and
    thank you for the question. So I am familiar with the statement
    from 2 years ago. I think it is important whenever we discuss
    life-extending the system or GBSD, we understand that we are
    talking about a total system replacement. General Clark was
    talking about a subcomponent of just the missile itself, and
    the missile itself has several key subcomponents. There is 330-
    plus parts in it, but there are about 4 subcomponents that
    actually have to be modernized or life-extended as well, and we
    needed to have made those decisions on some of those key ones
    several years ago back in 2015.
        Now what he was talking about was just a single-stage
    booster and it has three, and he said there would be--that we
    might be able to repour the propellant one more time. What we
    have found whenever we have repoured the propellant, and
    basically you take the booster and you ream the propeller out,
    bring it out, you extend the wall of the booster--result in a
    50 percent rate. So just doing that we would not have enough
    boosters to even contribute to the other stages of the missile
    that would have to be replaced at great expense. One example is
    the propulsion system rocket engine. We needed to have started
    that program back in 2016. That was roughly almost a $7 billion
    project back then, and I don't know what it is grown to now.
        Mr. Khanna. I respect that as your service and your
    expertise. I guess my question is, has there been a
    comprehensive study on how much it would cost and what it would
    require to extend Minuteman in a cost-benefit analysis between
    that choice and the GBSD system?
        General Dawkins. Yes, sir. There have been several studies
    and the foundation of one is the analysis of alternatives from
    2014. It looked at life-extending Minuteman III versus GBSD and
    a few other options as well, and it was determined that at the
    time, the Obama administration, that we would forego life
    extension because it was more expensive. At the time, $5
    billion more expensive over the lifetime of a system to do a
    Minuteman III life extension versus going with a system
    replacement.
        Mr. Khanna. Now that was premised, I know there was
    something that you submitted premised on 400 deployed ICBMs by
    2075. President Reagan would probably roll over in his grave if
    he thought we would have that many ICBMs by then when his
    vision was to end the nuclear arms race. How was 400 chosen?
        General Dawkins. 400 was again decided under the New START
    treaty. When we signed up to the New START treaty back in 2010,
    the Obama administration, at the time, determined the best way
    to meet the requirements of the treaty was to reduce from 450
    to 400 ICBMs and then----
        Mr. Khanna. I understood that, but how do we know that we
    are going to need that many? And I guess, getting to
    Representative Waltz's question, isn't it true just
    strategically that the ICBMs are a much easier target for an
    adversary to take out than the submarine for the Air Force, and
    so has there been an analysis whether strategically--we may be
    better off, actually, having more submarine than Air Force
    capacity going in the future.
        Ms. Dalton. Representative Khanna, thank you so much for
    all of these excellent questions. In the course of the NPR, we
    are going to be taking a hard look at what is required to
    maintain a safe, effective, and secure nuclear deterrent while
    also attempting to be fiscally responsible given the cost of
    these programs. So based on the analysis that General Dawkins
    has referenced, we will be interrogating that analysis with the
    types of questions that you are asking to ensure that we have
    the right balance across the triad.
        Mr. Khanna. Well, I think it just is very important. And
    also, you know, I know you have talked about the capacity being
    improved by the GBSD as opposed to Minuteman, but it is not
    clear. What is the vulnerability of the Minuteman? Are there
    things that we couldn't do right now? Are we vulnerable in ways
    that would be improved by the GBSD or, because they say it
    gives us better targeting?
        The other question and, frankly, being from Silicon Valley
    with cyberattacks is whether we would be better off being in an
    analog system than going to a digital system. I mean couldn't
    the digital system make us more at risk to an adversary in an
    age of cyber warfare? You know, I obviously have deep
    admiration and respect for all of your patriotism. I know you
    are trying to do what is right for our country. I would just
    ask that, you know, if we could have more of an analysis on
    some of these questions as alternatives it will help better
    understand and help us make more informed decisions.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to talk
    about infrastructure for just a minute.
        Mr. Verdon, Y-12 National Security Complex is one of the
    most important national security assets not only in Chairman
    Cooper and my home State of Tennessee, but in the entire
    country. However, if you were to look at the state of disrepair
    at some of the facilities, you wouldn't know it. We cannot
    modernize our nuclear arsenal without having the necessary
    infrastructure in place to undertake those programs.
        In the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, my colleagues and I worked in
    this committee to help address this issue by creating the
    Infrastructure Modernization Initiative as well as broader
    minor construction authorities to help remedy these problems at
    NNSA. While both appear to have been successful in making some
    progress, it is abundantly clear that more work still needs to
    be done not only at Y-12 but across the nuclear security
    enterprise.
        So my question for you, is the $20 million minor
    construction threshold that you are all operating with adequate
    to accomplish desired modernization efforts or does that number
    deserve a second look in light of the inflation and increased
    construction costs?
        Dr. Verdon. So I would say that based on those last points
    you brought up that we should take a look at it again, because
    certainly when you did give us an increase it was beneficial,
    but because of all those things you just cited that benefit is
    being eroded relatively quickly. So looking at increasing that
    would certainly be a benefit for us.
        Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Any idea on what kind of number?
        Dr. Verdon. So we were looking at something on the order of
    even going up to 30 or up to 40, for that would be for the
    types of projects that we would like to be able to move out and
    address quickly, based on what we are seeing for costs of
    increased labor and concrete and lumber and steel would be the
    kind of the range we would be looking at.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, thank you.
        For General Dawkins and perhaps Ms. Dalton, if we have time
    for both of you both to answer on this next question. Many on
    this committee, myself included, have concerns about the Biden
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review and what it may look
    like particularly as it pertains to a sole purpose policy. In
    the past, President Biden has expressed support for a sole
    purpose doctrine and I am concerned that he may turn his
    personal stance into U.S. policy. Those concerns are also
    shared by many of our allies like Poland, Japan, the Republic
    of Korea who rely heavily on our extended deterrence and
    assurance. Admiral Richards, commander of our strategic forces,
    has stated that the sole purpose doctrine would be detrimental
    to our alliances and our goal of nuclear nonproliferation.
        So, first, will this administration consult with our allies
    before making such consequential change to U.S. policy? And
    second, in your discussions with the decision makers on this
    issue, do you believe that they are fully aware of the
    consequences the adoption of a sole purpose policy would have
    on our alliances and our nuclear nonproliferation?
        Ms. Dalton. Thank you for the question. We are absolutely
    committed to robust, early and often, consultations with our
    allies and partners as we embark on these strategic reviews. In
    fact, we have already begun those consultations. I will say
    that with the release of the Interim National Security
    Strategic Guidance that also prompted a number of questions
    from allies and partners in terms of the line on reducing the
    role, or taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
    But, of course, the next part of that is while upholding our
    extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners.
        It is one of the top priorities of this administration to
    revitalize our alliances and partnerships. So as we move
    forward, we will be working in lockstep with our allies and
    partners to understand their threat perceptions, their
    asymmetry of interests when it comes to China and Russia, what
    their comparative advantages are when looking more broadly at
    deterrence to include where they may also be making nuclear
    contributions, but also as that relates to conventional means
    as well in cyber and space. And so we are absolutely committed
    to working this in lockstep and that will be a key priority in
    determining the way forward on our declaratory policy.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. General Dawkins, about 40 seconds
    left to chime in.
        General Dawkins. Sir, I defer to what Ms. Dalton said that
    I believe that all this will be looked at in the NPR, and I
    know that the allies want to be involved in the process as well
    and that what we provide for extended deterrence is the reason.
    And so again, I think the review will address all of those
    things. Thank you.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I thank all of our witnesses
    today. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Let's see. Now we will hear from--who is next? Mr. Morelle.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
    to be here and thank you to all our witnesses. In particular
    it's been good to have conversations with both Admiral Wilson
    and General Dawkins and I appreciate that. But I also hope
    that, Dr. Verdon, that you still have many friends in the
    Rochester area.
        I want to just talk a little bit about my district which is
    home, in Rochester, New York, which is home to the Laboratory
    for Laser Energetics at the University of Rochester. It is a
    key part of NNSA's inertial confinement fusion [ICF] program,
    which is a critical component of the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program, to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear
    deterrent. And I am glad to have the opportunity right now to
    just discuss the fiscal year 2022 budget and, Dr. Verdon, maybe
    I can start with you.
        For nearly two decades, we have not seen major
    infrastructure investment in any of the three complementary ICF
    facilities. Meanwhile, China and Russia are building modern
    facilities intended to rival or exceed U.S. capabilities. So
    can you share, does NNSA have a plan to address research
    infrastructure using the ICF sites?
        Dr. Verdon. So we are indeed beginning to--we have just
    started to look at that. And part of the reviews we had for
    2020 in the JASON's review was to begin to lay the foundation
    of how we should move forward into the future in the area, the
    very important area of inertial confinement fusion, and part of
    that was with the focus on helping us identify what potential
    future facilities in those areas might look like or what they
    should be. So that is certainly, you know, it is in our
    process. We are starting that process now and, but the goal
    will be to identify what are the future capabilities or
    upgrades that would be needed in those areas.
        Mr. Morelle. That is encouraging. Do you have a sense of
    what the timeline will be for that, Doctor?
        Dr. Verdon. So the reports, we are just digesting some of
    the conclusions of the reports now so it would probably be--it
    is probably going to still be, you know, a few years before we
    kind of go through it in quite a bit of detail, but we are
    beginning to gather information, as I say, about what people
    are thinking. But we are also trying to push the system to make
    sure we are not just thinking near term but as you say looking
    for the future--what do we really need for the long term?
        Mr. Morelle. Right. Aside from the facilities question, the
    ICF research is a critical component to the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program. So both the NNSA's ICF 2020 report and the
    review by the JASON Defense Advisory Panel provide specific
    recommendations to strengthen the capability. Are the current
    requested funding levels by the administration sufficient to
    fully implement these recommendations?
        Dr. Verdon. We assess that they are, you know, that we are
    supporting the program that we need to conduct in this area.
    And so we believe that particularly the 2022 budget does
    support what we need to do in this area.
        Mr. Morelle. Well, recent budgets have focused on a NNSA
    production complex, yet I think it is NNSA science and
    technology and engineering capabilities and the associated
    expert workforce that underpin our confidence in the safety,
    security, and reliability of the nuclear deterrence. So do you
    agree that NNSA needs to maintain world lead in scientific
    capabilities and workforce, and again does the budget request,
    which contains significant cuts to several ST&E [science,
    technology, and engineering] areas from fiscal year 2021
    levels, sufficiently prioritize those needs?
        Dr. Verdon. It is always a risk-benefit, you know, calculus
    that we are constantly doing, but we believe that the funding
    that we put forward for 2022 supports the highest priority
    programs in that area. And, you know, we are even upgrading
    some additional capabilities in the science area to include
    exascale computing and enhanced capabilities of some critical
    experiments in Nevada. So we are doing--adding new capabilities
    to address existing gaps.
        So again, we are trying to make sure we balance, you know,
    all the requirements across the entire Stewardship Program, but
    we certainly support that the science area remains key. It
    underpins just about every decision we make.
        Mr. Morelle. Well, I appreciate that. I am obviously going
    to be a fierce advocate for this in our conversations over the
    next several weeks.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the time and the
    opportunity to have this conversation and I yield back the
    balance of my time.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Morelle. I appreciate
    that.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        We seem to be having technical difficulties.
        Mr. Garamendi. To say the least.
        Mr. Cooper. Now we can hear you. Now we can hear you.
        Mr. Garamendi. Okay. I am late to the meeting. I am having
    trouble with AT&T with whom I seem to be carrying on a long,
    long in duration fight. But thank you very much.
        I want to follow up on questions that Mr. Khanna had posed
    to General Dawkins. Specifically, what I want to get into is
    the Minuteman III, the life extension of it. General Dawkins,
    under the present plan, it appears as though the Minuteman III
    will remain as one of the two ICBM systems for the next minimum
    of 15 years, probably closer to 20 years. Is that true that
    there will be actually two types of missiles being used over
    the next 20 years?
        General Dawkins. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    And I am not tracking two missiles, I am only tracking the
    single Minuteman III missile. There are two warheads though
    that go on top of the missile, the W87-0, right now, for the
    Minuteman III, as well as the 78.
        Mr. Garamendi. That is a good piece of information, but I
    was actually talking about your present plan is to have the
    Minuteman III in the silos, operative, as well as the GBSD as
    the transition takes place. If that is correct then the
    Minuteman III is good for at least the next 15, probably closer
    to 20 years, as the GBSD comes on line. Therefore, the argument
    that the Minuteman III cannot be extended seems to be, to be
    incorrect.
        Also with regard to the cost, the cost differential that
    you spoke to a few moments ago is really based on the next 75
    years and extending the Minuteman III over and over again
    during that period of time, while the GBSD would be--the
    Minuteman III would be in place, as I just suggested, with the
    GBSD during the transition period, and then the GBSD would go
    forward and it too would have to be life-extended over that 75-
    year period of time. Is that correct?
        General Dawkins. Congressman, we have to keep the Minuteman
    III going until the last GBSD is put in place. So the plan
    right now is in 2027 to field the first GBSD. As that first one
    goes in, a Minuteman III system comes out and we will harvest
    the parts from that Minuteman III as well as all the
    infrastructure that supports it to feed back into the supply
    system to continue the remaining missiles to keep them on line
    until 2036 when we will have the final GBSD in place. So it is
    a just-in-time--go ahead, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, so the fact is that the Minuteman III
    is being life-extended. You are using the harvesting technique,
    which is one way of doing it; the other is to acquire the
    necessary parts and pieces to keep the Minuteman III in place.
        My second series of questions go to the cost. The current
    estimate of the cost of the GBSD system over the next decade,
    that is the decade of the 2020s, is somewhere north of $80
    billion. What is the anticipated cost in the next decade, that
    is the decade of the 2030s?
        General Dawkins. Sir, I don't have that broken down by
    decade. I do know that over the life of the GBSD program, it is
    right now that is out from 2026, if you will, out to 2075, that
    was the timeframe that we were using, out to 2075, that it is
    somewhere in the number of $264 billion for the total lifetime
    cost, that is, of GBSD.
        Mr. Garamendi. I think it is very interesting and
    questionable of whether you use a 55-year time horizon here to
    estimate cost in the system. I will let that go at that point.
        I want to turn very quickly to--well, we don't have time
    for that. The issue of command and control and the analog
    versus digital needs very, very careful attention. I will be
    out of time here. I am going to pursue this issue more
    completely to completely understand this phase-in, phase-out
    just-in-time and the fact that the Minuteman III is actually
    going to be life-extended for at least the next, probably the
    next 15, more likely the next 20 years. So with that, I yield
    back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank all the
    members for participating. These remote hearings are not always
    easy, but I appreciate your participation especially when there
    are technical issues. I would like to close the hearing with
    this final question for Dr. Verdon.
        Dr. Verdon, based on current estimates and planning, will
    the NNSA be able to meet the 80 pit requirement by 2030 as
    required by law?
        Dr. Verdon. So based on our latest information, we assess
    that meeting the 2030, particularly at Savannah River, is not
    going to be achievable. It will be, right now, our estimate
    will be between 2032 and 2035 based on our current conceptual--
    our Critical Decision 1 information.
        Mr. Cooper. So that is even using Los Alamos and Savannah
    River?
        Dr. Verdon. Los Alamos we still have high confidence of
    achieving 30 pits a year by 2026. It is what we learned in
    putting the, you know, 30 percent design complete on Savannah
    River and being able to work closely with the vendors and
    starting to engage them on the details of the design that we
    identified that the Savannah River, getting Savannah River to
    produce more reserve pits by 2030 just doesn't look achievable
    at this time.
        Mr. Cooper. Is there any other way to do it faster?
        Dr. Verdon. Not that we have identified, because again a
    lot of what we are starting to see is the long poles in the
    tent is just ordering the long-lead equipment through the
    vendors and then also just the amount of dollars that you can
    execute in any given year is also limited. That you could, you
    know, you could postulate you could do it, but the amount of
    dollars would be a difficult program. So that is why we are
    thinking we are trying to work out both technically and just
    what we can execute at.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        Does the ranking member have a final question at all?
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. No. I think we have
    covered it all and I appreciate the information we have
    received today. It is certainly very helpful.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank our distinguished witnesses. The
    hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 June 10, 2021

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 June 10, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 June 10, 2021

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. In your testimony regarding LEU research, you
    indicated that the NNSA is continuing to look at the viability of LEU.
    However, you also said that one of the main hurdles will be balancing
    non-proliferation requirements with the Navy's operational requirements
    while you work with the administration on this issue. If in the end,
    the R&D program does not validate acceptable LEU fuel density and
    higher assay fuel must be substituted to achieve a life-of-ship core,
    what is the technical and performance risk of designing next-generation
    vessels to accept a core sized for an aggressive LEU design?
        Dr. Verdon. The technical and performance risk of designing next-
    generation vessels to accept a core sized for an aggressive low-
    enriched uranium (LEU) design is high. As discussed in DOE/NNSA's 2016
    report to Congress, Conceptual Research and Development Plan for Low-
    Enriched Uranium Naval Fuel, naval reactor plants must be compact to be
    cost-effective. The size of a submarine directly affects the power
    required to propel the ship. The reactor core must fit within the space
    and weight constraints of a warship, leaving room for weapons and crew,
    while still being powerful enough to drive the ship at tactical speeds
    for engagement or rapid transit to an operating area while carrying
    sufficient fuel to last for decades. Decades of technological
    advancements with highly enriched uranium (HEU) have enabled life-of-
    ship cores for Navy submarines, including the COLUMBIA-Class, each of
    which will serve in excess of 40 years without the need for refueling.
    The replacement of HEU with LEU reduces the energy in the uranium fuel
    by more than a factor of four. Implementation of LEU is a major
    technical challenge, and is expected to result in ships that are less
    capable militarily, more expensive, and that require at least one
    refueling over the life of the first ship class to use LEU fuel,
    regardless of reactor size. If refueling were reintroduced, force
    structure requirements and costs would increase. An example of the
    costs associated with refueling impacts on force structure requirements
    can be shown with the COLUMBIA Class SSBN. This submarine will not
    require a mid-life refueling because it is designed with a 40-year
    life-of-ship core. Introducing such a need for mid-life refueling in
    the COLUMBIA Class would require the strategic deterrent mission to be
    accomplished with more ships (14 versus 12), significantly increasing
    acquisition and lifecycle costs by over $40 billion dollars. We do not
    deem it practical to work on designs of naval vessels around an
    unproven advanced LEU fuel concept, nor to accurately project the
    effects of an advanced LEU fuel, because neither the ship performance
    requirements nor the fuel technology needed are established. However,
    even without working on a design, we assess that attempting to design a
    ship to accommodate sufficient LEU for potential life-of-ship operation
    would lead to a larger submarine diameter and/or length. Developing a
    new ship capable of later acceptance of an LEU reactor core would
    involve insertion of substantial margin--resulting in increased hull
    size--that would be difficult to estimate and costly to implement.
        Mr. Langevin. For both the carrier and submarine applications, what
    is the estimated impact on the vessel performance and dimensions of
    using LEU fuel, assuming a full power core sized for life-of-ship,
    under range of plausible LEU fuel densities that might be validated by
    an aggressive R&D program? At what point in the Navy's planning process
    must these decisions be made?
        Dr. Verdon. As discussed in DOE/NNSA's 2016 report to Congress,
    Conceptual Research and Development Plan for Low-Enriched Uranium Naval
    Fuel, an advanced LEU fuel system concept might satisfy performance
    requirements for an aircraft carrier without affecting the number of
    refuelings (current NIMITZ and FORD class carriers require one mid-life
    refueling), though at higher acquisition cost. The conceptual plan for
    an advanced LEU fuel design would include manufacturing and testing
    that would span 15 years and, based on cost estimates in the 2016
    Report to Congress, require at least $1 billion in fiscal year (FY)
    2016 dollars to establish whether the fuel is viable for use in a naval
    reactor design. Subsequent funding would be needed to mature this
    conceptual plan and bring it to reality. Assuming successful fuel
    system validation and aggressive parallel engineering and manufacturing
    development, the estimated cost to deploy an advanced LEU fuel system
    in submarines and aircraft carriers is in excess of $20 billion. Not
    included in this estimate are additional significant costs associated
    with (1) additional operating and support costs at shipyard facilities,
    (2) increases in manufacturing costs of advanced fuel, and (3) the
    increase in force structure that may be required to offset the loss in
    operational availability of submarines undergoing refueling overhauls.
    For submarines, the reactor plant must be very compact to be militarily
    effective. The reactor core must fit within the space and weight
    constraints of a warship, leave room for weapons and crew, be powerful
    enough to drive the ship at tactical speeds for engagement or rapid
    transit, and carry sufficient fuel to last for decades. An LEU-based
    fuel capable of meeting modern U.S. Navy submarine requirements has not
    been established, and, therefore we do not deem it practical to work on
    designs of naval vessels around an unproven advanced LEU fuel concept.
    The Navy would not consider a newly-designed reactor core using LEU
    until a new fuel system could be developed and shown to be effective in
    a prototypical environment. Decades of technological advancements with
    HEU have enabled life-of-ship cores for Navy submarines, including the
    COLUMBIA-Class, each of which will serve in excess of 40 years. The
    replacement of HEU with LEU reduces the energy in the uranium fuel by
    more than a factor of four. Implementation of LEU is a major technical
    challenge, and is expected to result in ships that are less capable
    militarily, more expensive, and that require at least one refueling
    over the life of the first ship class to use LEU fuel, regardless of
    reactor size. If refueling were reintroduced, force structure
    requirements and costs would increase. For example, introducing such a
    need for mid-life refueling in the COLUMBIA Class would require the
    strategic deterrent mission to be accomplished with more ships (14
    versus 12), significantly increasing acquisition and lifecycle costs by
    over $40 billion dollars.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
        Mr. Turner. When can we expect to see the SLCM-N AOA? Despite the
    Acting SECNAV memo on the FY2023 PRB the committee requests to be
    briefed on the AOA at the earliest possible date.
        Ms. Dalton. The Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) was conducted by the
    U.S. Navy and is now complete. I will refer you to our Navy colleagues
    who I understand are prepared to brief the Committee on the classified
    results of the AOA in the near future. While we are aware of the Acting
    Secretary of the Navy memo you reference, the submarine-launched cruise
    missile--nuclear (SLCM-N) program will be examined during the upcoming
    review of U.S. nuclear posture and policy.
        Mr. Turner. When you provided testimony before the SASC last month,
    it was stated that GBSD will be $38 billion less than a Minuteman III
    LEP. Could you please specifically outline what went into those numbers
    and what was excluded, so that the committee can have confidence it was
    an apples-to-apples comparison?
        General Dawkins. The Department of the Air Force estimated the cost
    of a Minuteman III (MM III) Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to
    2075 as $302B. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment
    and Program Evaluation estimated in their Milestone B Independent Cost
    Assessment for the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) that GBSD
    will cost $264B to 2075, $38B less than the MM III SLEP estimate. The
    MM III SLEP estimate includes replacement efforts for booster,
    guidance, post-boost, ground system, and command and control elements.
    Both estimates include required Research, Development, Test and
    Evaluation; Procurement; Military Construction; Military Personnel; and
    Operation and Sustainment costs. Neither estimate includes any fuze or
    warhead modernization; including this cost would add $24B to each
    estimate. Finally, neither the MM III SLEP estimate nor the GBSD
    estimate include costs for the deactivation, demilitarization, and
    disposal of the MM III.
        Mr. Turner. Earlier this year this committee heard testimony from
    Admiral Richard that if the ICBM leg of the triad is allowed to atrophy
    further, he'll need to put bombers and refuelers back on alert. How
    much would this cost?
        General Dawkins. Cost estimates to put bombers and tankers back on
    alert are not fully mature at this time, as this course of action is
    not necessary given the current nuclear triad construct. However,
    United States Strategic Command provided a rough cost estimate of
    returning bombers to alert in its April 2021 ``Potential Delays to
    Nuclear Modernization'' Report to Congress, to which the Air Force
    contributed. While this document is classified and cannot be quoted in
    this unclassified response, returning bombers to a continuous alert
    posture would require major infrastructure improvements, as well as
    increased security and manning requirements. Additionally, returning
    bombers and tankers to alert status would negatively impact
    conventional readiness by reducing the availability for Bomber Task
    Force missions, which are currently in high demand by Combatant
    Commanders. Finally, returning bombers to alert would likely drive
    requirements for additional new tanker and bomber aircraft and
    associated manning in order to support Strategic Command's deterrent
    mission requirements as well as other day-to-day conventional
    requirements.
        Mr. Turner. GBSD will not only be a cost saver but will also
    provide an upgraded capability over the MMIII. Can you please explain
    this upgraded capability and how it will better allow you to address
    the Russian and Chinese threat?
        General Dawkins. Our potential adversaries are rapidly advancing
    both their offensive and defensive capabilities. The currently fielded
    Minuteman III ICBM was designed in an era when the cyber-domain did not
    exist and anti-ballistic missile capabilities were in their infancy.
    The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) will not only provide an
    increase in survivability and accuracy, but will be safer, more secure,
    more reliable, and offer enhanced operational flexibility. GBSD
    utilizes model-based systems engineering, a Modular Open Systems
    Architecture and a modular system interface allowing technology
    insertions at a lower cost and implementation at the speed of
    relevance. These methodologies will enable the weapon system to quickly
    adapt to and counter new, emerging, and currently unforeseen threats
    while reducing operations and sustainment costs throughout its
    lifecycle. As a full system recapitalization effort, GBSD will address
    the complete spectrum of current and future threats in the realms of
    electronic, electromagnetic pulse, antiballistic missile, cyber, and
    nuclear pre/trans/post attack environments. The Air Force welcomes the
    opportunity to provide the Committee further details in a classified
    setting.
        Mr. Turner. Isn't it true that GBSD will have safety upgrades? Can
    you please explain what these are and why they're important?
        General Dawkins. Like the currently fielded Minuteman III (MM III),
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) will contain positive control
    measures to prevent the deliberate pre-arming, arming, launching, or
    release of nuclear weapons, except upon execution of the President's
    orders. Compared to MM III, GBSD will drastically reduce human
    proximity to the weapon by limiting the need to access and/or transport
    the missile for routine maintenance. GBSD missile components are being
    designed for greater time spans between routine maintenance, reducing
    exposure while increasing physical security, weapon surety, and safety.
    Additionally, GBSD will include positive physical measures against
    unauthorized access through a combination of enhanced entry and access
    measures, as well as administrative, technical, and cyber security
    provisions to protect access to sensitive areas and materials.
        Mr. Turner. The FY22 request included a modest increase in the
    request for LRSO. Can you please explain how this increase was arrived
    at and how it will be spent?
        General Dawkins. The FY22 increase in LRSO Research, Development,
    Test, and Evaluation from the FY21 President's Budget is primarily due
    to an accelerated Engineering and Manufacturing (EMD) contract award in
    July 2021 instead of February 2022. Pivoting to a sole source vendor
    enabled EMD acceleration based on Raytheon's maturity of design. The
    FY22 increase accounts for maintaining manning levels constant across
    all of FY22 in order to smooth the transition between the Technology
    Maturation and Risk Reduction phase and EMD ($30M/month x 5 months =
    $150M). Additionally, the increase accounts for procuring hardware for
    testing not originally planned in FY22, such as radiation hardening
    testing ($42M), and inclusion of performance incentive fees ($21.5M) as
    identified in the Acquisition Strategy (AS). Other prime contract cost
    drivers include updated costs for conducting flight tests ($5M) to
    begin clearing the B-52 envelope with a design of experiments approach,
    and an increase due to Digital Engineering efforts ($3M), which will
    provide greater insight into the design as required with the AS.
        Government costs include warhead hardware purchases ($18M) through
    the National Nuclear Security Administration, which are required to
    maintain the synchronization with the warhead development effort.
    Government costs also include range costs and survivability ground
    tests ($10.8M).
        Mr. Turner. Can you please articulate for the committee the
    capability LRSO will provide over the current ALCM?
        General Dawkins. The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) was
    first fielded in 1982 and was designed for a 10-year service life
    against air defenses of that era. Now 29 years past its designed
    service life, the LRSO is needed to replace the ALCM. The need for LRSO
    is partially driven by ALCM's over-extended service life, however, the
    true driver for LRSO is to ensure that a penetrating nuclear cruise
    missile capability is retained given the rapidly advancing adversary
    integrated air defense system capabilities. The LRSO will impose higher
    costs on adversaries' air defenses, requiring large investments and
    advances in detection, tracking, command-and-control, and area defenses
    to challenge each LRSO.
        The Air Force welcomes the opportunity to provide the Committee
    further details in a classified setting.
        Mr. Turner. Is there potential for the USN to leverage the USAF
    LRSO program for SLCM-N?
        General Dawkins. Yes, there is potential for the Navy to leverage
    the Air Force's Long Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) program for the Sea-
    Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear (SLCM-N). LRSO and its associated
    warhead are part of the Navy's SLCM-N Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).
    The Navy's TRIDENT II Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) and the Air Force's
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) programs have forged a strong
    relationship, using an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
    Sustainment Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and information is
    shared between the programs regularly. If SLCM-N becomes a program of
    record, the MOU construct developed for D5LE2 and GBSD could be
    utilized as a model to create a similar relationship for LRSO and SLCM-
    N.
        Mr. Turner. I'd like to express my appreciation that full funding
    was included to achieve the military requirement of producing 80
    plutonium pits per year by 2030. This is specifically $475 million for
    the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) and $350
    million for Los Alamos Plutonium Facility 4 (LAPF-4). Can you please
    describe in detail just how much more expensive it would be to do all
    80 pits per year at LANL?
        Dr. Verdon. Producing all 80 pits per year at Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL) would involve greater risks than NNSA's current two
    site strategy for plutonium pit production and would have higher
    acquisition costs. The additional acquisition expense of producing all
    pits at LANL is driven by the need to construct a new nuclear facility
    at Los Alamos, rather than repurposing a nuclear facility that already
    exists at the Savannah River Site. In terms of mission risk, a
    Congressionally-mandated independent study conducted by the Institute
    for Defense Analysis (IDA) concluded that producing 80 pits per year at
    LANL was a ``very high risk'' approach. Section 3120(c) of the Fiscal
    Year (FY) 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed NNSA
    to provide a detailed plan for designing and carrying out the entire 80
    pit per year (ppy) production mission at LANL. As part of the 2018
    Plutonium Pit Production Engineering Assessment (EA), a team of subject
    matter experts and Enterprise Construction Management Services
    contractors evaluated pre-conceptual design drawings for an option to
    achieve 80 ppy in LANL's Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4) in tandem with new
    production module construction. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the
    Department of Defense (DOD) affirmed the EA conclusion that a strategy
    to produce 80 ppy at LANL in PF-4 or newly constructed production
    modules had the highest risk of all options examined, and installation
    of additional equipment in PF-4 to achieve 80 ppy could disrupt ongoing
    operations to achieve 30 ppy. DOE/NNSA concurs with the risks
    identified by the EA and IDA studies regarding the use of PF-4 to
    achieve 80 ppy. In addition, PF-4 is currently the only U.S. facility
    capable of pit production and other missions, and the facility will
    reach its assumed 50-year design life before 2030. Although DOE/NNSA
    continues to invest in facility sustainment projects to extend the life
    of the facility and reduce public, safety, and operational risks, any
    long-term commitment to achieve and sustain 80 ppy at LANL would
    require additional production capacity in a new nuclear facility.
    Beyond the additional acquisition cost and risk associated with an
    investment to produce more than 30 ppy at LANL, there is a potential
    production risk associated with concentrating all pit production in a
    single location. Two geographically separated plutonium pit production
    facilities bolsters resilience from external threats and hazards and
    enables flexibility to mitigate impacts of shutdowns, incidents, or
    other factors that may suspend operations at a single site.
        Mr. Turner. Can you please outline NNSA's track record for meeting
    CD-1 cost estimates since 2012 with specific examples of projects that
    have come in both under and over budget from CD-1 to CD-4.
        Dr. Verdon. Since the beginning of Fiscal Year 2012, NNSA has
    approved Critical Decision (CD)-1 for and completed six (6) projects or
    subprojects. All projects were completed under budget (i.e. below their
    CD-2 baseline cost estimates). Comparing the CD-2 Total Project Cost
    (TPC) to the estimated cost at CD-4 (or final closeout cost where
    available), the 6 projects had a collective underrun of $159 million
    (27%). The table below includes information about the six projects,
    including the top end of the cost range approved at CD-1. It should be
    noted that the two projects that finished above the top end of their
    CD-1 range started as general plant projects (GPP) and as such were
    managed outside of the DOE O 413.3B process. They reached CD-1 and
    established their cost range before nearly all of the reforms in place
    today were initiated.
        Mr. Turner. Do you have everything you need in this budget to bring
    the W88, W80-4, W87-1, and the W93 in on-time and on-budget.
        Dr. Verdon. Yes, the FY 2022 President's Budget Request provides
    NNSA the necessary resources to meet the timelines and requirements
    associated with these programs.
        Mr. Turner. Some have argued that there are too many single points
    of failure in the NNSA complex. What are some single points of failure
    that give the you most concern?
        Dr. Verdon. While DOE/NNSA's priorities are modernizing the weapons
    complex and executing all programs of record, there are sub-tasks
    critical to meeting these requirements that are single points of
    failure. These sub-tasks are Canned Subassemblies and plutonium pit
    production; if we fail to manufacture or assemble these critical
    components we will be forced to implement mitigation strategies which
    challenge our ability to maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent while
    enhancing the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear
    weapons stockpile. Single-point infrastructure failures create undue
    mission risk. DOE/NNSA's aged, fragile production and testing
    facilities are reliant on safety systems and utilities that require
    increased maintenance and upgrades to avoid shutdowns. DOE/NNSA is in
    the process of replacing the Y-12 National Security Complex's obsolete
    Criticality Accident Alarm Systems and is preparing to install a
    secondary electrical feed at the Pantex Plant to provide backup power
    to the site's data nerve center. Sufficient manufacturing space at the
    Kansas City National Security Campus is a significant risk which we are
    addressing through short-term leases and longer-term real property
    acquisition. Investment is needed in PF-4's fire suppression water
    loop, which is a major safety system for pits, to eliminate a high-
    risk, single-point failure. Additionally, failing building systems must
    be replaced at Sandia National Laboratories' Building 894, which is the
    sole producer of power components for the enterprise, until the Power
    Sources Capability is operational. Fully funded maintenance and
    extended life programs help mitigate the risk of single-point failures,
    but even the best maintained systems require major replacement
    decisions every 15-20 years. For timely and unexpected infrastructure
    failures, minor construction projects are vital for a quick response.
    Additionally, aged, high-risk facilities carry significant risks to
    sites and surrounding populations. Aggressive risk reduction programs
    to prepare these facilities for demolition as soon as possible is
    extremely important to addressing some of our most concerning
    infrastructure challenges.
        Mr. Turner. Where in the NNSA FY2022 budget are we accepting the
    greatest risk.
        Dr. Verdon. By letter dated August 16, 2021, the Administrator
    certified that the FY 2022 President's Budget Request for NNSA of $19.7
    billion is sufficient, and there are no unfunded priorities that would
    preclude NNSA from meeting FY 2022 Department of Defense requirements
    or FY 2022 internal NNSA deliverables.
        Mr. Turner. We've heard Secretary Granholm and Dr. Hruby state that
    they fully support the two-site solution for pit production. Can you
    please articulate the importance of resiliency in the system? Has COVID
    played into your resiliency calculation?
        Dr. Verdon. The need for a capability to produce 80 pits per year
    was identified by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy in 2008 and has
    been echoed through multiple administrations. Our Nation is at a point
    where we can no longer accept the risk of a single-point failure in the
    ability to produce pits needed to meet the military requirements.
    Having two geographically separated plutonium pit production facilities
    supports resilience from external threats and hazards and enables
    flexibility to mitigate impacts of shutdowns, incidents, or other
    factors that may suspend operations at a single site. These conclusions
    were supported by a Congressionally-mandated independent study
    conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), which found that
    using Los Alamos National Laboratory as the sole production site for
    the full 80 pits per year was a ``very high risk'' approach.
    Disruptions to global supply chains caused by the COVID pandemic both
    illustrated and underscored the need for robust and resilient
    manufacturing capabilities in vital production sectors. Plutonium pit
    production is a vital manufacturing sector for national security
    missions.
        Mr. Turner. How will LANL and SRS work together to ensure lessons
    learned at one site are shared at the other?
        Dr. Verdon. The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the
    Savannah River Site (SRS) have been actively sharing lessons learned
    since the Nuclear Weapons Council endorsed DOE/NNSA's two-site strategy
    for pit production in 2018. The Preliminary Project Execution Plans
    (PPEPs) for both the Los Alamos Pit Production Project (LAP4) and the
    Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) state that DOE/
    NNSA and DOE field offices--including the Los Alamos Field Office (NA-
    LA), Savannah River Field Office (NA-SR), Lawrence Livermore Field
    Office (NA-LL), and the Carlsbad Site Office--will provide inputs to
    the overall requirements and project execution activities. The SRPPF
    PPEP specifically states that: ``During conceptual design and CD-1
    development, the SRPPF team sought out and used all available lessons
    learned for similar nuclear projects, to ensure that decisions are made
    using knowledge gained from past projects and innovative approaches and
    good work practices can be incorporated into the SRPPF Project.'' This
    process will continue with the preliminary and final design and the CD-
    2 development, especially coordination with the LAP4. In addition,
    Senior Management Teams (SMTs) are led by NNSA's Office of Production
    Modernization and are comprised of Senior Executive Service members
    from NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project Management, NA-LA, NA-SR,
    and support offices, including but not limited to nuclear safety,
    security, and the Chief Information Officer for both projects. The SMTs
    for both the LAP4 and SRPPF projects provide another opportunity to
    ensure lessons learned at one site are shared at the other. LANL, the
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National
    Laboratories are collaborating to support SRPPF, with Integrated
    Project Teams (IPTs) that maintain a high level of awareness of the
    project to ensure integration between the work at each site. LANL has
    established a single associate lab director organization responsible
    for plutonium delivery which allows for a single point of coordination
    and integration. DOE/NNSA has also provided incentives in the Corporate
    Performance and Evaluation Plan for contractors at these sites to
    coordinate, integrate, and execute both projects at LANL and SRS in the
    most advantageous manner in support of the overall mission. In addition
    to routine collaboration on activities involving manufacturing process
    design, equipment selection, technology readiness assessments, nuclear
    and criticality safety strategies, and pit production workforce
    development initiatives, LANL and SRS have established a formal
    Knowledge Transfer Program. Under the auspices of the Knowledge
    Transfer Program, personnel from SRS relocate temporarily to work and
    train in LANL's Plutonium Facility-4, performing actual pit production
    operations. Continued expansion of the Knowledge Transfer Program is
    vital to the success of NNSA's two site strategy for plutonium pit
    production.
        Mr. Turner. Can you please sum up your understanding of Russian
    nuclear-capable SLCMs.
        Admiral Wolfe. Congressman, thanks very much for your interest in
    this area. I can't adequately answer your question in this venue, but I
    will work with your staff to provide you a more comprehensive response
    via classified channels.
        Mr. Turner. Is there potential for the USN to leverage the USAF
    LRSO program for SLCM-N?
        Admiral Wolfe. Yes, there is certainly potential for the USN to
    leverage the USAF LRSO program for SLCM-N. The USAF LRSO and its
    associated warhead are part of the SLCM-N Analysis of Alternatives
    (AoA). The USN's TRIDENT II Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) and the USAF's
    Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) programs have forged a strong
    relationship and we share information between the programs (technical
    exchanges, hardware, testing, etc) regularly.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
        Mr. Moulton. On the importance of recruiting, developing, and
    retaining a highly technical workforce, how do you measure your
    progress in recruiting and retention? We are losing too much talent
    today. Can you please share some of the statistics and the ways you
    track this so we can see measurable progress?
        General Dawkins. The Air Force carefully monitors recruiting goals
    and retention metrics to ensure we have a sufficient force of highly
    skilled and experienced Airmen to support the National Defense
    Strategy. Additionally, some of the additional authorities granted to
    my position as one of the six cross-functional authorities in the Air
    Force enable me to gain additional insight into all career fields
    supporting the Air Force nuclear enterprise and the ability to provide
    feedback into the overall Air Force process. Furthermore, the Air Force
    is developing a continuous assessment capability of the nuclear
    enterprise as part of the Nuclear Mission Assessment (NMA), which was
    established by the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act.
    The overall vision of the NMA is a continuous, comprehensive, data-
    driven assessment capability to provide insights and trend analysis of
    underlying issues within the nuclear enterprise to senior leaders and
    decision makers. The analysis model being developed with our
    partnership with Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory
    will incorporate human capital metrics such as retention rates to
    better address the health of those career fields within the nuclear
    enterprise. The Air Force as a whole achieved its FY20 recruiting goals
    of 26,398 regular component Enlisted (100% of goal) and regular
    Officers of 4,553 (100% of goal). We also met our Air National Guard
    combined officer and enlisted goal by recruiting 11,620 members (108%
    of goal), and our Reserve combined officer and enlisted goal of 7,000
    (100% of goal). Additionally, the Air Force is on target to reach our
    FY21 recruiting goals. While we are doing well in recruiting, we
    understand there is a growing competition for talent and expect the
    recruiting environment to become more challenging. As important as
    recruiting is, retention within our high-tech force is equally
    important. While the Air Force is experiencing unprecedented high
    retention rates in both the enlisted and officer corps, the aggregate
    success may hide areas with retention challenges. To help improve these
    retention challenges, the Air Force continues to offer targeted
    monetary incentives as well as non-monetary incentives focused on
    quality of life and quality of service programs.
        Mr. Moulton. On the importance of recruiting, developing, and
    retaining a highly technical workforce, how do you measure your
    progress in recruiting and retention? We are losing too much talent
    today. Can you please share some of the statistics and the ways you
    track this so we can see measurable progress?
        Admiral Wolfe. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
        Ms. Stefanik. The FY2022 President's Budget requests $640,684,000
    for Naval Reactors Development (NRD), which focuses on research and
    development to ensure the current and future fleet is the most
    advanced, well-maintained, and capable nuclear fleet in the world.
    Which technologies are NRD working on to maintain our nuclear force's
    capability overmatch over our great power adversaries in China and
    Russia?
        Dr. Verdon. Naval Reactors Development (NRD) funds the development
    of advances in the unique nuclear propulsion technical capability that
    the Navy relies on to operate, build, and maintain nuclear-powered
    ships. Included in this line is funding that enables the Naval Nuclear
    Propulsion Program to manage operations of the current fleet, perform
    analysis of current reactor performance, and support construction of
    nuclear-powered warships. The FY 2022 budget request also increases
    investment in the research and development of new technologies,
    including those intended to support the Navy timeline for SSN(X).
    Investment in mid- to long-term advanced research and development has
    been deferred over the past decade to support major recapitalization
    efforts across the Program. The increase in NRD in FY 2022 will support
    the following efforts:
          Performing cutting-edge research to develop new
    technologies and manufacturing methods that significantly improve the
    capability, effectiveness, performance, and cost of future naval
    nuclear propulsion plants to maintain our strategic maritime
    superiority. Examples include added focus on:
              Advanced instrumentation and control technology and
            equipment: Current digital control and power management
            equipment is becoming obsolete and will need to be replaced.
            Naval Reactors is working with commercial industry on
            replacements that take up less space, run cooler and with less
            power, enable more effective use of electrical power in the
            ship, are more secure against cyber-attack, costs less and can
            efficiently acquire and process a broad range of plant data.
              Plant Data and Automation: Advanced sensors,
            artificial intelligence, and data analytics are being pursued
            to automate current manual data collection, and process that
            data into information that gives the operator a clearer picture
            of plant status, with goals to simplify operation, enable
            confident condition-based maintenance, increase ship
            operational availability and ease the burden on our sailors.
              Core manufacturing development: Naval Reactors has
            started an effort to change how we manufacture reactor cores,
            with technology that promises to provide a more capable reactor
            for the next ship, while also allowing that reactor to be
            smaller and cost less. The new approach employs advanced, high
            precision robotics and machine learning methods for automated
            in-process inspection that can quickly find and correct
            potential production process issues much earlier than is
            possible today, reducing our fabrication costs and risks.
              Component manufacturing technologies: Naval Reactors
            sees practical potential for using certain advanced
            manufacturing approaches in building major plant components.
            These advanced capabilities include hot-isostatic pressing and
            metal additive manufacturing, and based on industry experience,
            promise to delivery propulsion plant components at reduced cost
            and schedule, in addition to enabling performance-enhancing
            designs with unique or complex geometries. These advanced
            manufacturing approaches can supplement, or in some cases
            replace, traditional forging and casting methods, some of which
            have changed little since World War II.
          Developing technology for reactor plant components that
    will provide substantial improvements in quieting capability and
    performance for future submarines. There is real potential to make a
    meaningful improvement to submarine stealth. Achieving an improvement
    involves work in reactor technology areas using existing specialized
    laboratory test facilities and state of the art flow and heat transfer
    computer methods, as well as targeted improvements to key reactor plant
    components.
          Recapitalizing facilities and equipment for inspecting
    and characterizing naval spent nuclear fuel; efforts that have the
    potential to provide increased operating capability of nuclear
    submarines and aircraft carriers.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. CHENEY
        Ms. Cheney. The nominee for NNSA Administrator recently testified
    in her confirmation hearing that it was longstanding U.S. policy that
    any enriched uranium used for national security applications, such as
    for NNSA's tritium program, must be fully ``unobligated''--that is,
    mined, converted, and enriched in the United States, using U.S.
    technologies. Do you agree with that position?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes. Under longstanding U.S. policy and international
    agreements, peaceful use obligations are imparted on uranium processed
    by certain foreign technologies or transferred under a 123 Agreement.
    DOE/NNSA maintains that these peaceful use obligations restrict the
    material from being used for tritium production and therefore
    unobligated material must be used for this mission.
        Ms. Cheney. While not a national security mission, the Office of
    Nuclear Energy is under a congressional mandate from Section 2001 of
    the Energy Act of 2020 to be able to provide a new type of nuclear
    fuel--high assay, low enriched uranium (HALEU)--to the commercial
    advanced reactor industry no later than 2026. Currently the only
    commercial producer of this specialty material is Russia. Shouldn't
    NNSA be working to support the Office of Nuclear Energy in meeting
    their commercial HALEU needs, so as to use American-produced HALEU
    rather than material imported from a strategic adversary?
        Dr. Verdon. Yes. DOE/NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation is working closely with the Office of Nuclear Energy
    to identify HALEU within the DOE complex that can be used to support
    near-term commercial advanced reactor industry needs. Some of these
    inventories will require processing into a form that can meet
    industry's needs. While there is not enough HALEU available within the
    DOE/NNSA complex to meet all of industry's anticipated near-term needs,
    NNSA is committed to making available as much HALEU as possible for
    advanced reactors without negatively impacting existing national
    security and nonproliferation programs.
        Ms. Cheney. Why did NNSA not include funding for the uranium
    reserve in its FY22 request?
        Dr. Verdon. NNSA did not request funding in FY 2022 for two
    reasons. First, the Uranium Reserve program was originally proposed as
    a program to support civilian nuclear industry and not defense needs.
    DOE/NNSA has sufficient quantities of unobligated uranium to sustain
    defense missions through the early 2040s. Second, funds appropriated in
    FY 2021 will be executed in FY 2022.

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