[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-36]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 24, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice MO BROOKS, Alabama
Chair ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Cleveland, MG Charles H., USA, Associate Director of Operations,
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency........................ 7
Hill, John D., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy, U.S. Department of Defense........... 2
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security
Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............ 8
Scolese, Christopher J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office 5
Thompson, Gen David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations,
United States Space Force...................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cleveland, MG Charles H...................................... 53
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 29
Hill, John D................................................. 32
Ludwigson, Jon............................................... 59
Scolese, Christopher J....................................... 47
Thompson, Gen David D........................................ 39
Turner, Hon. Michael R....................................... 30
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. DesJarlais............................................... 95
Mr. Khanna................................................... 96
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 94
Mr. Langevin................................................. 87
Mr. Morelle.................................................. 101
Mr. Turner................................................... 88
FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Monday, May 24, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
This is a meeting of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
And I would like to thank the distinguished witnesses. First,
performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy, Mr. John Hill; the Vice Chief of Space
Operations, General David Thompson; the Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Christopher Scolese;
Associate Director of Operations for the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, Major General Charles Cleveland; and GAO
[Government Accountability Office] Director of Contracting and
National Security Acquisitions, Mr. Jon Ludwigson.
We are honored to have this level of expertise within the
Department and intelligence community and to have them testify
today at the hearing.
It has been 2 years since this subcommittee has had a
hearing on space acquisition, and, in my opinion, hardly any
topic in DOD [Department of Defense] is more important than
this one. We have seen the overdue establishment of Space
Force, the reestablishment of Space Command, and public
acknowledgement of the many threats we face from abroad. I am
hopeful that the Department will use this opportunity to
accelerate and improve space acquisition within the Space
Force.
General Hyten, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has pointed out that the next generation of OPIR
[Overhead Persistent Infrared] is still planning on giving us,
as he calls it, quote, ``big, juicy targets'' to orbit, instead
of the more distributed, less vulnerable architecture that we
could be choosing. And he personally has encountered numerous
obstacles from DOD to having new and improved architectures.
So, if the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
difficulties, I have difficulties. We have to make sure this
works.
I will turn now to my ranking member, Mr. Turner, for any
opening remarks he has, but I would like to take a point of
personal privilege. I am wearing my Predators tie. We won in
double overtime last night. So it is an amazing thing for a
Nashville-based hockey team to be doing so well again.
Mr. Turner.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much, and thank you
for holding this important hearing.
I agree with you, this is one of the most important topics,
perhaps besides nuclear modernization, that we are dealing
with. We continually hear from General Raymond the issue of the
provocative actions that China and Russia are taking in space,
and we know that it is going to take not only our working
defensively but also in the manner in which we deploy and
design our architecture. I look forward to hearing from the
witnesses today as to how they see that evolving.
Also, since the Biden administration is delivering its
budget late May, we are going to be dealing, most likely, with
a CR [continuing resolution]. And I would love to hear from the
witnesses as to how this may affect their operations, knowing
that in space so many of the things that we do are single
projects and that they may be more particularly impacted by CRs
than other functions.
With that, I will submit my written statement for the
record, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's comments are well taken.
Without objection, any opening statement is accepted for
the record.
Let's now hear from our first witness, Mr. Hill.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Hill. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
testify before you today along with my distinguished
colleagues.
You have my written statement. I will summarize it and,
with your permission, have it placed in the record.
Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Hill. Thank you.
This subcommittee well understands the importance of space-
based capabilities to our national security in this era of
destabilizing challenges from Russia and undeniable strategic
competition with China.
The increasing threats to those capabilities are also well
known. As Secretary Austin has testified, the growth of Chinese
and Russian counterspace capabilities presents the most
immediate and serious threats to U.S., allied, and partner
space activities.
Moreover, Russia and China view space as critical to modern
warfare and consider the use of counterspace capabilities as
both a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness and
winning future wars.
As these developments portend, the United States must now
be prepared for conflict to extend to or even originate in
space. But, to be clear, such a conflict would not be a space
war, distinct from terrestrial war, but would, rather,
represent the extension of traditional armed conflict into the
space domain of human endeavor.
Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Space Policy, we are focused on the integration of strategy,
policy, plans, and appropriate capabilities to develop a space
posture that contributes to integrated cross-domain deterrence
by conveying clearly to competitors and any potential adversary
the inadvisability of military aggression, including attacks on
U.S. space capabilities or those of our allies and partners.
The 2020 Defense Space Strategy, which my office prepared,
addresses these challenges of deterrence as well as the
challenges of crisis de-escalation and warfare extending to
space along four lines of effort.
First, we are building comprehensive military advantages in
space. Second, we are integrating space into national, joint,
and combined operations. Third, we are shaping the strategy
environment to enhance domain stability and reduce the
potential for miscalculation. And, fourth, we are enhancing
space cooperation with our international partners, our
commercial entities, and our interagency partners.
Finally, in support of the national security strategic
guidelines, my office also leads DOD's participation in the
U.S. Government's space diplomatic initiative, which currently
center on establishing voluntary, nonbinding standards of
responsible behavior and on exposing the disingenuous space
arms control initiatives of Russia and China.
Mr. Chairman, I am honored to have played a part in the
collaborative and bipartisan efforts of the executive and
legislative branches over the past several years to strengthen
our national security space posture. I look forward to
continuing to work with Congress, with our interagency
colleagues, U.S. industry, and our international allies and
partners to secure the advantages of space for our national
interests.
And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, sir.
Now General Thompson.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
General Thompson. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today in my capacity as Vice Chief
of Space Operations, United States Space Force.
On behalf of the Chief of Space Operations, General Jay
Raymond, and joined by these outstanding national security
space leaders on the panel, it is a pleasure to provide you
details today on the stand-up of the newest U.S. military
service and inform you of our plans for the coming year.
I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to
Congress for its bipartisan support in establishing the U.S.
Space Force on December 20, 2019, and your leadership in
addressing the threats and challenges the Nation faces in
space.
Year one of the Space Force's existence has been focused on
standing up this new service. With purposeful outreach to and
the collaboration of Congress, U.S. Space Force has made
tremendous strides in the first year: establishing and
resourcing the organizational blueprint for the service; moving
aggressively in the areas of human capital, force design,
acquisition integration; and providing the foundations to
establish a truly digital service; all while executing our
critical space missions around the clock and without fail.
General Raymond's direction for year two is the integration
of the Space Force into the joint force, the interagency, and
with our allies and partners, even as we continue to build out
the service.
While we have completed the congressional requirement to
establish a service within 18 months, build-out of the Space
Force continues and will take several more years. We have
established the first field command, Space Operations Command,
and completed the organizational design of the remaining two,
Space Systems Command and Space Training and Readiness Command,
with anticipated stand-up of those two commands later this
year.
Space Operations Command is responsible for preparing and
presenting forces to U.S. Space Command and other combatant
commands. Space Systems Command will develop and field world-
class space capabilities for our Space Forces and drive agility
and speed into the acquisition process. And Space Training and
Readiness Command will recruit, develop, and train guardians to
protect the high ground of space.
As part of year two's integration activities, the Space
Force will place increasing emphasis on strengthening
relationships with existing partners and establishing
relationships with new partners. This starts with the
organizations represented here today. It extends to the other
services, combatant commands, and our allies and other
international partners. The United States as a whole, and the
U.S. Space Force in particular, are much stronger when these
relationships are strong.
Next, General Raymond and the entire leadership of the
Department of the Air Force remain committed and adamant that
we must increase the pace of space acquisition. Maintaining
program delivery timelines of the recent past will not outpace
the threat. We must go faster.
The Space Force will continue to smartly leverage the 804
authorities granted by Congress, and we will partner with
industry and academia to leverage technology and innovation of
the commercial sector. Our adversaries have recognized the
importance of such an approach to the national security space.
In my opinion, the creativity, ingenuity, and innovation of the
American mind is one of our greatest assets. We must leverage
that fully in this endeavor.
Our people, our guardians, are critical to the success of
the Space Force. We are adapting new and innovative human
capital and talent management approaches for both civilians and
military members alike under the authorities granted by
Congress and with your assistance.
In addition, the recent release of the ``Vision for a
Digital Service'' seeks to build the fluency of that workforce
and prepare and posture them and the service to be more agile
and innovative in the future.
Finally, the U.S. Space Force will continue to partner with
other agencies in the executive branch and Congress to promote
responsible behavior in space and a secure, stable domain
accessible to all for peaceful purposes.
Our service's inception is an unprecedented opportunity.
Our success today could not have been possible without a
passionate and energetic group of guardians, a fully committed
partnership with the Departments of the Air Force and Defense,
and the support of Congress.
On behalf of General Raymond, thank you again for this
opportunity, and I look forward to your questions and concerns
today.
[The prepared statement of General Thompson can be found in
the Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General.
Now we will hear from Dr. Scolese.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
Dr. Scolese. Good morning, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am
glad to be here with strong partners General ``DT'' Thompson,
Mr. Hill, Major General Cleveland, and Mr. Ludwigson.
It is a great honor to represent the people of the National
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. Our agency proudly develops,
acquires, launches, and operates the Nation's reconnaissance
satellites as a member of both the intelligence community and
Department of Defense.
Mr. Chairman, please allow me to share a reflection on our
past year.
While addressing the COVID health and safety protocols to
protect our workforce and families, NRO ensured the mission
continued to meet our commitments to intelligence analysts,
warfighters, and policymakers. Due to the incredible efforts of
our people and partners, I am pleased to report NRO systems
maintained 100 percent of their capabilities throughout the
pandemic.
During a challenging time, we accomplished 6 successful
launches, delivering 12 payloads to orbit, many with first-ever
capabilities, the most NRO launches in a single year since
1984.
On the business side, we achieved our 12th consecutive
clean financial audit, a feat of financial management
excellence unrivaled in the IC [intelligence community]. Last
year, we also began our NRO Cadre Internship Program,
establishing a key recruitment element in our workforce
strategy.
Turning to today, we are bridging the innovative legacies
of our past with cutting-edge vision for our future as we
celebrate our 60th anniversary. Since its inception in 1961,
NRO has taken quantum leaps in the evolution of overhead
reconnaissance space and ground systems. Our success can be
traced to NRO's end-to-end mission responsibility: developing,
acquiring, launching, and operating mission systems.
We are a streamlined, flat organization that has a diverse
workforce with an exceptional mix of skills, perspectives, and
backgrounds. This enables us to deliver on acquisitions while
developing next-generation capabilities and systems.
Adversaries are moving quickly, and so must we. NRO stays
out front by developing advanced technologies, leveraging
commercial solutions, strengthening government and
international partnerships, adapting processes to innovate
faster, and baking in resilience, from our assets on the ground
to our systems on orbit.
Our work with IC, DOD, civil, industry, and academic
partners enables the U.S. to maintain strategic advantage. NRO
sensors give analysts and policymakers insights about
activities in hard-to-reach and denied areas and enable
indications and warnings. We have close relationships with the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and National Security
Agency, who task our satellites to provide vital geospatial and
signals intelligence that underpins the full spectrum of all-
source analysis across the national and military intelligence
communities.
Since the stand-up of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space
Command, we have forged strong new relationships to mutually
coordinate activities that assure that space-based systems that
the Nation and our allies rely on can operate without
disruption in an increasingly contested and congested space
domain.
Our relationships are important to us. For example, NRO
Deputy Director Major General Michael Guetlein and I have just
returned from a 2-week visit to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
in Hawaii and U.S. Forces Korea in South Korea. We met with our
embedded NRO field representatives in INDOPACOM, U.S. Forces
Korea, and component command senior leaders to listen to and
understand their needs, priorities, and requirements of our
customers.
During the trip, we gathered actionable feedback, watched
how NRO data systems and tools are used in theater, and
addressed future capabilities and collaborative opportunities.
This engagement hit the mark, and we are already arranging
follow-on directorate-level engagements.
By far, NRO's most important asset is its people. Our
people make all the difference and will lead us to a future
where we can, as we like to say with a nod to one of our
founders, Edwin Land, see it all, see it well, see it now, and
innovate faster.
Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss NRO's
unique value and capabilities. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Scolese can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Doctor.
And we will hear from Major General Cleveland.
STATEMENT OF MG CHARLES H. CLEVELAND, USA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONS, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Cleveland. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
share a little bit about NGA's [National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency's] mission in the space domain.
NGA and our predecessor organizations have a long history
of supporting our Nation's space activities, and, as an
organization reliant upon airborne and satellite imagery, we
have always made a priority of being aware of activities in
space and near-space.
At NGA, our efforts are spurred by the same sense of
urgency that spurred the stand-up of U.S. Space Command.
Namely, the Earth's orbit is no longer a benign environment,
and the threat to U.S. national security interests from foreign
space powers is real and growing.
Last year, we rolled out the moonshot initiative at NGA, a
whole-of-agency effort to maintain and expand our GEOINT
[geospatial intelligence] advantage in all realms, including
space. We have developed a four-pillar strategy based on
people, partnerships, and preparation for the missions of today
and tomorrow.
The first pillar is people. NGA's workforce has been
thriving in the space domain for decades. In fact, we helped
map the Moon for the NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration] Moon landings in the 1960s and the 1970s. To
maintain a competitive edge, we are increasing our investments
in developing our tradecraft and training our workforce for the
space domain. And to support our people, we are training our
officers in big data management and analysis and growing our
artificial intelligence expertise. Over time, this will provide
a cadre of experts who can execute the warfighter and IC
requirements and develop the next generation of space GEOINT
professionals.
The second pillar is partnerships. NGA continues to
strengthen our strategic partnerships while building new
relationships with civilian components of government, with
industry, and with our allied partners.
Within the space domain, NRO is our lead partner in
advancing space GEOINT capabilities, including new commercial
sources. And our partnership with the U.S. Space Force is
deepening every day through information-sharing and
collaboration. We are working with these partners to ensure no
duplication of effort and to create efficiencies.
We also maintain embedded personnel through our NGA support
teams, or NSTs, at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]
headquarters, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center in
Ohio, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Alabama.
And, in 2019, NGA established a SPACECOM [United States Space
Command] NST, and we are continuing to grow the NST as SPACECOM
becomes fully operational.
The third pillar is mission today. Space is vitally
important to NGA's mission. It is the environment in which the
sensors that provide most of our data operate. We recognize
that our adversaries and near-peer competitors have the means
to deny us that resource, and so NGA extends the same level of
commitment to our warfighters in space, and the recently
established SPACECOM NST has embedded NGA's unique capabilities
in the command.
The final pillar is mission tomorrow. Based on Earth and in
space, one of the most critical missions NGA performs for the
Nation is assured positioning, navigation, and timing, what we
call Assured PNT. This is the foundation for our foundation.
Everything that depends on knowing exactly where and when
something is on or about the Earth uses this unique form of
GEOINT.
NGA is the global leader in providing the geosciences that
enable the accuracy and precision of DOD weapons systems, of
safety and navigation efforts, and of economic and civil
applications that use capabilities like GPS [Global Positioning
System] and precision timing. Assured PNT is a mission
imperative for us, and NGA plans to invest additional resources
to ensure the integrity and resiliency of these capabilities.
Finally, I would like to say thanks to this committee for
its support of NGA's safety of navigation mission. Your support
helped modernize NGA's authorities and addressed our shift from
paper to a digital and secure electronic delivery to support
electronic-based navigation in all domains.
In conclusion, NGA has reacted aggressively to support
space and is making progress in the domain. We are realigning
to protect U.S. national security interests in the space domain
to deter, protect, and defeat our adversaries in space.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cleveland can be found
in the Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General.
Now we will hear from Mr. Ludwigson.
STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL
SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Ludwigson. [Inaudible] I will summarize my written
statement but submit it for the record.
DOD's space systems are important to our national security,
facilitating communications, providing real-time global
visibility, as well as serving other key roles. For decades,
these systems provided the U.S. with unparalleled advantages.
Our past work has highlighted problems with DOD space
acquisitions, including multibillion-dollar cost overruns,
multiyear delays, and deferred capabilities. Fortunately, many
of the programs that led us to these findings are now nearing
completion. My written statement highlights the status of
several programs. As you may have noted, many of the
traditional programs are over budget and delayed, but some are
not.
Our recent report also provides some insight. For example,
our GPS report earlier this year highlighted that, despite
having satellites capable of broadcasting a jam-resistant GPS
signal for military users since 2005, DOD remains years away
from widespread use of it. Similar disconnects between space
and non-space elements have happened for other space systems.
I want to emphasize that, while DOD has already deployed
numerous space-based systems, the space elements do not last
forever, and systems require periodic updates to continue to
meet mission needs.
In addition, some potential adversaries now have the means
and intentions of holding our space-based capabilities at risk.
As a result, we face important questions about how to mitigate
the risks to current space systems, recapitalize our existing
capabilities, and potentially add new ones.
Congress and DOD have taken steps aimed at improving
acquisitions and oversight of space programs. In particular,
there have been efforts to change acquisition authorities,
including the creation of middle-tier acquisitions, which aim
to produce a usable product within 5 years and provide
administrative relief to do this.
My written statement highlights five of these programs,
including two in the next-gen OPIR effort, which we issued a
nonpublic report on earlier this year.
There are also efforts to provide acquisition authority
specific to space programs. We shared our views on a draft Air
Force proposal earlier this year and expect to do the same for
a forthcoming DOD proposal.
In addition, DOD has undertaken a dramatic restructuring
aimed at consolidating space oversight. The creation of the
Space Force has captured headlines, but the reorganization
moved multiple organizations into the Space Force and created
new ones. Key among these are the new Space Development Agency
and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, both tasked with
quickly developing new systems. Also, the stand-up of U.S.
Space Command is designed to provide unified control over space
operations.
Looking ahead, DOD faces several broad challenges.
First, the stand-up of the new Space Force and the related
reorganization may streamline the DOD space enterprise and
sharpen the focus on the development and operations of space
systems but brings with it a variety of challenges. Only 2
years ago, we reported that DOD was unsure how many acquisition
staff were working on DOD space programs. Moving people and
organizations and establishing new lines of authority may bring
growing pains that could distract from their mission if not
managed well.
Second, paying for cost overruns for older systems while
attempting to recapitalize and replace some or all of those
systems could be challenging. Notably, DOD is developing or
planning at least 10 space programs in nearly every mission
area, including communications; missile warning; command and
control; launch; and position, navigation, and timing.
Finally, balancing efforts to enhance acquisition
authorities with ensuring opportunities for effective oversight
will be important. The record on DOD space acquisitions is
replete with examples of cost overruns and missed schedules.
Oftentimes, people point to the ubiquitous paperwork as the
cause of the slow process. However, I urge the subcommittee to
consider what I call the first principles behind the paperwork.
I would argue that we need agreement on a few things. These are
the first principles to build strong programs and the ability
to oversee them.
It is not a given that DOD will repeat its past mistakes.
We have identified and shared leading practices to improve
acquisition outcomes, including building strong oversights into
programs, using data and demonstrable knowledge to anchor
decisions, empowering program managers to make decisions but
holding them accountable for their choices, and canceling
unsuccessful programs. Adopting these leading practices could
help DOD achieve faster delivery of new capabilities,
especially if DOD balances new streamlined acquisition
processes with sufficient oversight to help ensure program
success.
Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, this concludes my
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions the
subcommittee members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in
the Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much. It is always good to hear
from GAO.
We will now question the witnesses and try to limit every
member to 5 minutes so that we can distribute the questions as
much as possible.
Let me begin with Mr. Ludwigson. I think it was in 2016,
there was a report from GAO that said there were some 60 people
within DOD who had the power to say ``no'' over then-Air Force
space programs, and most members of the Armed Services
Committee thought that was way too many naysayers and could be
one reason for the delay.
You mentioned that the new Space Force is somewhat
streamlined. How many naysayers are there today? Are there
still 60? Has the number gone up or down?
Mr. Ludwigson. We haven't updated that work at this point.
But, as you know, the stand-up of Space Force is an ongoing
process. Components have been moved around. I am not sure that
the Space Force itself is in its final form.
As you may recall from that fragmentation report, there
were a wide number of agencies who were involved in the
decisionmaking process that went into space acquisitions, and
not all of those have been moved into Space Force.
Even if the entities who are not going to move into Space
Force remain independent, it is going to be important for the
entities to coordinate their activities, because space is so
connected, as a couple of the speakers mentioned. Especially in
the context of multidomain operations, so much of it is
connected to one another, both at the service level and--Space
Force and NRO, for example, that is a relationship that is
going to have to remain very strong.
Mr. Cooper. I think you and GAO have pointed out that there
are some, what, 8,000 people involved, in 50 different
organizations, and it has been kind of hard to even keep up
with that part of things.
But I think the overall thrust here is, we need to be able
to field systems that work and field them faster. I personally
would love to see them under budget, but it is even more
important that they be working systems, not like the 2005
disaster, where you have the capability we haven't been able to
use, even though the satellite has been up there, ready to use
it, all that time. Sometimes it is satellite, sometimes it is
ground stations, sometimes it is--people don't even know what
it is.
But, in the effort to get things to move faster, I couldn't
help but be impressed by the NRO's announcement, even during
COVID, they were able to have 6 successful launches with 12
major payloads. That is pretty impressive.
And I know that is a mature organization, but that is the
organization that I think most members of the Armed Services
Committee had in mind when we were thinking about how the Space
Force should be run--streamlined, flat, plenty of diversity,
and gets the job done, oftentimes with little fanfare.
So I know that General Raymond is working hard on this,
General Thompson, others, but--and I know there are going to be
inevitable birthing pains, but--and aren't there something like
10 804 programs going on right now? And I hope they all yield
great results, because I am certainly feeling the pressure from
the foreign threats.
Mr. Hill, your excellent report mentioned that you have
come up with two theories of deterrence: deterrence by denial
and also deterrence by cost. Could you flesh those out a little
bit more? To me, it sounds like one is absolute deterrence, and
the other is more like situational deterrence. How would you
describe those?
Mr. Hill. Chairman Cooper, yes, that was the report that we
submitted last year to Congress.
So longstanding deterrence theory, you have always had
deterrence by denying the benefits of attack, as well as
deterrence by the potential imposition of unacceptable costs.
What we are describing in that report is, with respect to
the space domain--and the focus of the report was supposed to
be space deterrence--we said, in the space domain, the reliance
of the United States on space means that adversaries see a
potential benefit in attacking us in space. And so we have to
very much focus on the mission assurance that will reduce the
benefits of attack.
And what you are focused on is deterring military
aggression overall. You don't want your adversary to see
military aggression as an option, as a viable option, for
pursuing their political objectives.
So we think that there may be cost imposition in other
domains. There may certainly be reason to deny someone's use of
a particularly threatening space capability. But, for the most
part, the balance on deterrence with respect to space focuses
on assuring our capabilities, which I think is exactly where
you are going with your focus on getting our acquisition to
move faster.
Mr. Cooper. Well, it sounds like, in plain English, our
first choice is deterrence by denial, and then, if we can't get
that, then we impose cost. So that is second-best or third-best
deterrence, when we might not necessarily be able to eliminate
any benefit they might get.
Mr. Hill. Yes. The point, though, I think, on imposing
costs is, it is always there; it just might be in a different
domain. This gets to the sense of the cross-domain and
integrated deterrence.
Mr. Cooper. Well, certainly, modern warfare reaches many
domains, and it will certainly always include space, I guess.
Let me turn now to the ranking member, see what questions
he has.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to share your affinity for GAO. There has been a
tremendous amount of important legislation and policy changes
that have come out of GAO reports. I don't have a question for
Mr. Ludwigson. I just want to comment that he had the best
summation I have ever heard from GAO: They have some programs
that are late and over budget; some are not. The good-news part
of that was the ``some are not'' addition that I appreciated.
So I have two questions for General Thompson and General
Cleveland.
I am going to start with you, General Thompson. General
Cleveland states in his opening statement that Earth's orbit is
no longer a benign environment. We have threats from foreign
nations. It is basically an understanding that space is now
becoming a warfighting domain.
Now, Mr. Hill talked about deterrence, which, of course, is
a more difficult thing to accomplish because, you know, it is
not just operational that is affecting the assessment by your
adversary.
But will you talk about deterrence?
We talked about redundancy; we talked about resiliency. We
now see threats to space from the ground, threats to space in
space. We see in the future maybe threats from the ground from
space. So, clearly, we must change. We are looking to, you
know, ways in which we can also rely on commercial access.
What are the things that you think that we need to be doing
immediately? And how fast, how quickly can we do them?
General Thompson.
General Thompson. So, Representative Turner, thanks so much
for that. There are a whole host of answers to that question,
but, certainly, in the interest of time, I will just limit
myself to two.
The first is--and probably the most significant gaps and
limitations we have had are specifically related to the fact
that space has only recently become a warfighting domain.
The first is, we don't have a truly operational
intelligence enterprise for space. We have, for years, done
great work foundationally. The National Air and Space
Intelligence Center is one of those centers that is set up
foundationally, but extending that to our tactical units, our
operational units, a deep understanding of the capabilities of
our adversaries in the domain, what their tactics are.
Training intelligence professionals in that regard to be
able to do that, that is one of the limitations we have. But we
are moving out very rapidly.
I think as you are aware, here in January, we became the
18th member of the intelligence community. We have put together
a plan to establish a national space intelligence center. We
are rapidly building the capability to train our own space-
focused intelligence professionals. And so we are moving out
aggressively in that regard, but we have a lot of ground to
cover.
The second area I will talk about is what I will call the
test and evaluation enterprise. And that is, we know how to
test our systems to operate effectively in space against
natural hazards and for a long period of time. We have never
had to design and field and operate them in the face of
threats.
And so building out a test and evaluation enterprise that
allows us to, both in modeling and simulation and other means,
understand that our systems will perform effectively and
respond effectively in the face of attack and threat is another
area that we have to move out and quickly. And I think we have
work to do now and in the future.
Mr. Turner. Well, General Thompson, I have had this
conversation with General Raymond. As you indicated, intel
being one of the most important aspects. One of the things that
we don't want to do is cannibalize our existing systems. As we
expand our operations, our capabilities and expertise, we
certainly don't want to weaken those that we have.
So I am very concerned at the opportunity for stovepiping
that might come as we expand those intel operations. So I will
certainly be looking at that very closely and having that
conversation with you.
General Thompson and General Cleveland, General Raymond has
done a great job in making certain that the information that we
do have about what our adversaries are doing is declassified.
This is incredibly important for policymakers to be able to
have open discussion but also so the general public and our
allies can see what our adversaries are doing.
I always point out that our allies' legislative bodies do
not have access to intelligence information or even a
Congressional Research Service like we do. Getting information
out in the public domain actually puts information in the hands
of those parliaments and legislators.
I would like each of you to talk about the importance of
making certain that we declassify this information. We are
always so worried about means, methods, and techniques, but I
think we also need to worry about ends, and that is, what are
our adversaries attempting to do. And by identifying that, we
can then empower you to fashion responses.
General Thompson, General Cleveland, if you could talk
about the issue of declassification.
General Thompson. Representative Turner, just a few
comments, and then I will pass it to General Cleveland.
You are absolutely right in that regard. I think our over-
classification and tendency to over-classify is still a little
bit of the vestige of the Cold War mindset and the fact that we
had such incredible and exquisite capabilities that others
didn't.
Because of the fact that we now need to operate more
broadly in coalitions and we need to make sure that our leaders
and the public are aware of our capabilities, our threats, and
what we are doing about it, it really does drive the need to
declassify.
I will also say that we have made some significant steps in
that regard; more to go. But I would also say that both the
National Air and Space Intelligence Center and DIA recently
published some very, very good unclassified products on the
threats we face. And they have been more forthcoming in those
products than we have seen in many years. And I would start
there as a great means to [inaudible] our friends, our allies,
the public, and others in terms of the threats that we face.
I will pass to General Cleveland.
General Cleveland. Sir, good morning again, and thank you
for the question. I absolutely agree with the need to be
publishing at an unclassified level or being prepared to
declassify as needed.
I think, whether it is in space or whether it is in the
broader efforts that we are doing as an agency, it is clear
that we are, as a Nation, competing in the information
environment on a daily basis. And we think that at NGA we have
a huge role and quite a bit to contribute to that.
In some instances, I think it is an effort to declassify,
but I think we also need to be focused on how can we publish at
a level that can be released immediately and enable both
policymakers and decisionmakers to share that information as
needed.
In terms of our partners, of course, we maintain good,
strong relationships with a number of allied partners. And the
vast majority of the production that we provide is at a
releasable level, at our Five Eyes level and at some of the
other levels.
And so every step we take is a recognition that we are
competing in the information environment, and we think that we
do have a huge role in not only being prepared to declassify as
needed but also to produce and to collect at an unclassified
level to support our policymakers.
Mr. Turner. Last question. Continuing resolutions have a
tremendous effect on DOD and all of our operations across our
agencies. Sadly, the fiscal year is statutorily set. Congress
could move it to December 31, which I think every year would
save DOD about 3 months of backlog. I have been an advocate for
that.
I just wanted to take an opportunity--because I think that
the area of space is probably even more particularly impacted
by continuing resolutions--to give anyone who is on our panel
an opportunity to chime in and to give us some additional
thought around the evils and the effects to your operations and
your area of continuing resolutions.
General Thompson. Representative Turner, General Thompson.
Just briefly, I would say, from the aspect of space and
primarily speaking for the Space Force, there is an additional
effect, for a couple of reasons.
One is, there has been mention of some of the programs we
have ongoing, the authorities we are using, but, also, we are
in the process of starting new programs. I will tell you that,
while certainly we want folks to maintain their oversight of
those programs, right now we are in pretty good stead in terms
of the performance of the programs.
But because we are trying to start new programs with new
capabilities specifically focused on defending and protecting
and other things and because, in fact, some of the changes we
need to make, some of the mission transfers and some of the
establishment of new authorities, do require passage of law, we
are probably more affected than others in a general sense, just
because of the critical need to begin those programs focused on
the shortfall of defending and protecting and because we need
to continue to build out the organizations and the capabilities
required to act as a service focused on the warfighting domain
of space.
Mr. Turner. Anyone else?
Dr. Scolese. Yeah, I would add to what General Thompson
said, in saying that it does delay the start of new programs,
but it also has an impact on what we are doing with continuing
programs that may delay, also, some of our ability to continue
those programs on the pace that we had and may require some
degree of reprogramming before we can go forward.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I saw Mr. Hill reach for the
microphone. I don't know if we have any time remaining.
Mr. Hill. Just to underscore what General Thompson said and
what, really, Ranking Member Turner, what you said as well
about the problems of continuing resolutions.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the ranking member. Points well taken.
Before I yield to, first, Mr. Carbajal, then Mr. Wilson,
Mr. Horsford, and Mr. Lamborn, let me point out the obvious,
that all the growing pains of the Space Force, the various
tasks that need to be done, were apparently things that the Air
Force was not doing when they were in charge of this domain. So
I am thankful that Space Force is doing it, but I am sorry that
we are having to rebuild what probably should have been built
before.
Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And good morning to everyone. At least it is ``good
morning'' in California; I know it is about to be lunch out
there.
General Thompson, Vandenberg Air Force Base is located in
my district. In the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
Authorization Act, I requested a report outlining the
requirements for sustaining and improving the physical
infrastructure of space launch ranges.
The report noted that the diversity of launch providers,
payload, customers, and weapons-systems testers are at an all-
time high, which often requires infrastructure modifications,
enhancements, and modernization to meet the mission needs of
the customers.
My office has been trying to get additional information
from the Space Force on a point in the report that states, ``A
challenge the ranges face is the limitation of commercial
investment of mutually beneficial projects.'' The report says
that the Space Force is seeking to address this challenge
through changes to the commercial space launch cooperation
statute.
Can you elaborate, what changes are you considering in this
area?
General Thompson. Representative Carbajal, yes, I can. And,
sir, if I may make a minor point of correction for you. As of
May 14, Vandenberg Space Force Base is now a part of your
district. We were able to rename that base on the 14th of May.
Yes, sir, as you stated--so we believe that launch and,
absolutely, I think most believe that launch is a national
security asset, but it is not just a matter of a national
security asset for launching national security payloads; the
economic and commercial aspects of launch also have important
national security implications.
But the launch enterprise, as we understand it today, is in
a period of growth and evolution, and we need to adapt some of
our policies and procedures and processes to adjust.
Among them is what we call our Range of the Future
initiative. And what we are doing in that regard is working
hard to ensure that our Space Force processes for safety, for
range operations, for support, to protect the public, are not
inhibitors, first, in the way that launch providers need to
provide their operations and, also, to reduce the costs that
they incur when they come to our national launch ranges.
So the launch Range of the Future initiative seeks to do
that. And, as you said, part of that effort is to find ways to
be able to partner with those commercial activities to share
the cost and, also, if they have specific desires and needs, to
help upgrade the infrastructure to let them do that.
We will work with your office and with the OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] staff to provide you additional
details in that regard. But it is a request to make some
adjustments to the way costs are shared, costs are incurred,
and investments are allowed with the commercial sector.
Mr. Carbajal. Great. I would appreciate it if your team can
follow up with my staff.
General Thompson, just to continue, building off my
previous question, I understand that ranges annually compete
for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization
funds to sustain, repair, and construct projects.
The focus on these efforts is to sustain existing
infrastructure, rather than growing capability to meet the
diverse user base of the launch ranges. To the extent the focus
is to growing capabilities in addition to sustainment, does the
Space Force require additional funds, or would it require a
policy change?
General Thompson. Representative, I think I would refer
back to the previous question.
Certainly, modernization and sustainment of our
infrastructure is a challenge not just on the ranges but across
the space enterprise. We have 134 locations worldwide, all with
their own unique challenges. We seek to budget sustainment
funds at the appropriate level to cover all and attack those
challenges where the priorities lie.
As with all activities, more resources to help us work on
those infrastructure challenges never hurt. I would say,
adequate resourcing exists, but additional resourcing is
never--there is always use for additional resources. But that,
coupled with some of the potential policy changes we talked
about in the last question, would definitely be helpful.
Mr. Carbajal. Great.
And, lastly, no response is needed, but I would be remiss
if I didn't take this opportunity to urge you to consider
Vandenberg Space Force Base to be the future home of STARCOM
[Space Training and Readiness Command].
So, with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
Now Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper and Ranking
Member Mike Turner, for coordinating this very important
hearing today.
And we are so grateful as to the dedicated personnel that
we hear who are speaking, and thank you so much for your
service to our country.
As a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard myself and
a grateful dad of three members of the National Guard, I
strongly support a Space Force National Guard. And I am
encouraged by reports that the force is working toward this
creation. National Guard units have conducted space operations
for the past 25 years and can provide the same sort of support
to our space operations that it does to other domains.
With that, General Thompson, the fiscal year 2021 National
Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to submit a
draft plan to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
What is the status of the plan? And what do you need from this
committee?
General Thompson. Representative, thanks so much for that
question.
I will tell you that, today, before we even talk about the
future, in the past and today, both the Air National Guard and
the Air Force Reserve have been critical members and a critical
part of the space mission for decades, as you noted. Without
them, we could not execute our full suite of missions today.
They are an incredibly valuable partner.
We have taken this opportunity, however, to look at the
Guard, Reserve, and regular construct and assess whether or not
there is an approach that we could take that adjusts that for
the future. We have been working closely with the Office of
Secretary of Defense. I think we are close to approval of that
report from the Secretary of Defense and submission to
Congress.
I think it does two things. First of all, it relies on
tried and true and proven capabilities that we have used in the
past and structures that we have used in the past to great
effect and we believe will be useful in the future. There is
also an aspect of it, I think you will see, that increases our
flexibility, increases our permeability, and allows us to both
address force structure issues for the Space Force but the
needs of our guardians over time as well.
That report is in final stage of coordination and, I
believe, close to delivery, and we will look forward to working
with Congress on the implementation of that report when it is
delivered.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General. And, again, the
capabilities of citizen soldiers can be so positive, as you
know.
And then, General, you highlight the importance of
multinational space war games in creating innovative deterrence
and identifying how our capabilities complement those of our
allies and vice versa. These exercises, common in other
warfighting domains, require partners with developed
operational concepts and commitment to force designs for their
own space forces.
What is the current maturity of our allies' space
capabilities? And are we doing everything we can to coordinate
them in wargaming and experimentation?
General Thompson. Yes, sir. So, over the last--I am going
to say over the last decade, our allies and partners have made
tremendous gains, tremendous progress.
One of the things that we have done is, the Schriever
Wargame that has been in place since around the turn of the
century, around 2000, we have greatly expanded to include ally
participation. We include participation at the policy level, at
the ministerial level, and also in terms of operational
capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
That has done a tremendous amount for them to open up their
eyes in terms of the threats, in terms of the challenges, and
specifically the capabilities that they need to provide and
bring to the table to help us operate more effectively as a
coalition and a set of nations.
We continue that activity today. And we are looking at
increased investment from our Five Eyes partners--the U.K.
[United Kingdom], Canada, Australia, New Zealand--but also the
French, the Germans, the Japanese. All are looking to increase
their investment and capability.
Mr. Wilson. And that is really encouraging. Also, Korea.
And, Secretary Hill, commercial satellite companies like
SpaceX and Blue Origin are poised to introduce thousands of new
satellites over the next decade. Ensuring appropriate oversight
of the partnerships with our innovative private industry is a
careful consideration of the committee.
What is the Department doing to reduce costs by embracing
the military-commercial and public-private hybrid acquisition
approaches to national space security challenges?
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Congressman.
Both in the Defense Department and, I think, our colleagues
from the intelligence community would say is that we are
focusing on using both the services, the new services that
commercial space provides, launch area, space-based Earth
imaging, satellite communications, and, of course, the
broadband capabilities that you spoke about some of the people
providing.
And we are also seeing so much innovation in the way they
design their architectures. And that is being brought into the
way we think about how to design our own architectures, giving
a lot of new opportunities to diversify, add resilience, and
reduce costs.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Horsford.
Mr. Horsford. Well, thank you, Chairman Cooper. It is great
to be here. This is my first meeting for the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee. And as one of the newest members on HASC [House
Armed Services Committee], I am looking forward to working with
all of my colleagues on these important issues.
Thank you also to our witnesses for testifying today.
As we know, the purpose of today's hearing is to explore
national security space activities for the Department of
Defense, including within the U.S. Space Force.
I actually had the honor of joining Acting Secretary of the
Air Force John Roth 2 months ago when he visited Nellis Air
Force Base, located in my district. During Secretary Roth's
visit, we were both briefed on our Nation's defense and
training capabilities, including the Advanced Battle Management
System [ABMS] and Red Flag exercises.
Warfighters at Nellis Air Force Base are helping the Air
Force build a more integrated and lethal force through Advanced
Battle Management System development, the Air Force's network
solution to enable rapid decisionmaking that powers Joint All-
Domain Command and Control.
So, as we modernize our Air Force, we must also find ways
to process and share data faster than our adversaries. ABMS
will allow the Air Force to transition its legacy command and
control infrastructure into joint virtual systems that enable
all equipment to communicate seamlessly, creating more agile
and mobile warfighters.
So, General Thompson, you stated in your testimony that the
Joint All-Domain Command and Control and ABMS are the most
important efforts for the joint force to undertake to prepare
for future conflicts. Can you elaborate on that for us just
briefly for a moment?
General Thompson. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
And, as you described, the future of conflict, we believe,
is the ability to sense rapidly, take the data that you need,
formulate it, collate it, fuse it, put it in the proper place
and format so that, either through machine learning and
artificial intelligence or the decision of commanders and
warfighters, that the appropriate action can be taken.
And we need to be able to do that rapidly, on the matter of
seconds and minutes. And we need to be able to do it from
sensors that are in space, in the air, at sea, and on the
ground, and then apply the appropriate action, whether it
includes weapons or other capabilities that the joint force
brings to bear.
And, as you said, the foundational capability to do that is
the connectivity between all of those sensors and shooters, the
ability to share data, the ability to understand what the data
is and understand who is using it. And, as you said, ABMS is a
key part of that. A large part of that relay will need to occur
through space.
And, in addition, as part of our contribution to both ABMS
and Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Space Force's
primary contribution at this point is through our Unified Data
Library. That is the data repository that will be the access
point and the distribution point and the availability point of
that sensor data, the ability connected to those shooters, and
then apply machine learning, artificial intelligence, and human
intervention to connect the information with the right
decisionmaker, the right action arm, at the right time.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much.
Also, I just wanted to ask briefly about the DOD space
acquisition workforce.
Mr. Ludwigson, you noted that the GAO, which issued a
report in 2019, examined the acquisition workforce, focused on
space programs, and there were some troubling findings. Can you
elaborate on that?
And, Mr. Hill or General Thompson, what steps has the DOD
taken to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are
needed for Space Force?
Thank you.
Mr. Ludwigson. We did that work--we actually initiated that
work before the stand-up of Space Force was formalized and
planned. And we did it to understand whether the Department
understood the range of locations and numbers of personnel
working on space acquisitions.
As you noted, the findings were that there wasn't good
understanding of all of the locations and all of the personnel.
In fact, the Department wasn't able to provide that answer. We
developed our own methodology and came up with the number of, I
believe it was 8,100, a couple more. And that was probably a
low estimate.
I think it was very helpful that we had done that work.
With the stand-up of Space Force, it became important to--as
they start to pull together the personnel, they need to make
decisions. And so hopefully our work was helpful to the
Department as they move down that path.
General Thompson. Yes, sir. It is General Thompson. I will
add to that.
Absolutely, the work done by the GAO and Mr. Ludwigson
regarding identifying some of those factors and concerns has
helped, first of all, in our design of the acquisition
organizations and the acquisition approach to Space Force;
also, in ensuring that we have adequately captured our resource
needs as we complete the build-out associated with that design.
The second thing I will add is, not just in terms of the
acquisition workforce framework that the overall Department of
Defense is using to increase the flexibility of managing its
workforce today, we have already also applied some of the
special authorities of Congress through the acquisition
demonstration program that is longstanding to adjust the means
by which we manage that workforce.
We have found, both in terms of our own analysis but
others, that the members that are under this management program
find that it is more rewarding. They feel like they are more
appropriately recognized for their work and their attitudes
toward the work they do in the organization area and are
stronger than others across the force.
So all of those have combined, I think, to build us a good
foundation for our acquisition organizations and our
acquisition workforce going forward.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. We welcome the gentleman to the subcommittee
and to the full committee. Appreciate your excellent questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. I think you are muted.
Mr. Lamborn. There. Is that better? Okay. Thank you.
Thanks for having this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I want to
say, if both of our hockey teams, the Colorado Avalanche and
the Predators, continue to advance, we might have to place a
bet on the outcome if they face each other.
And, Dr. Scolese, I want to congratulate NRO on its 60th
birthday. NRO has come a long way in 60 years, from dropping
film from a satellite to be caught by a parachute by an
airplane. You have come a long way since those days.
My first question, Dr. Scolese, is: We have heard concerns
about the number of delivery-on-orbit and delivery-in-orbit
launches that the NRO has purchased outside of the National
Security Space Launch program. Can you walk us through why that
is?
Dr. Scolese. Yes, sir.
We typically and principally use the national launch
services as our principal means of going into space. And
whenever we don't, we coordinate with the Air Force and now the
Space Force to determine what the best means for delivery is.
Typically, when we have not used the national launch
services, it is because it is typically a small research
payload that we want to get up either in a unique orbit or on a
short timeframe. But, as you will look and see, principally we
use the national launch services for our missions.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Changing gears, Dr. Scolese, there is a tremendous natural
symmetry which exists in Colorado Springs between Space Command
and our uniformed space warfighters on the one hand and the
many intelligence and three-letter agencies on the other hand.
This is particularly true in the National Space Defense
Center [NSDC] there in Colorado Springs, where the Joint Task
Force-Space Defense conducts can't-fill missions 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. And NRO has an even greater presence on
Buckley Air Force Base, which is an hour away by car.
So we know from the previous Missile Defense Agency's
relocation from the capital region to Alabama that it suffered
an 80 percent attrition from individuals who did not want to
make that move.
Will NRO be requiring any of its employees to move if the
Space Command relocation proceeds to Alabama? And, if so, what
would an 80 percent attrition do to your workforce and your
mission?
Dr. Scolese. Sir, we are located, as you said, on Buckley
Air Force Base, which is an aero facility there that I wouldn't
expect to be impacted. I would have to see what the changes
would be. We do co-staff the NSDC, as you said. But I would
have to see what that impact would be.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. We will follow up on that.
General Thompson, we know that China is pursuing
counterspace technologies such as satellite jammers, directed-
energy and direct-ascent kinetic weapons. These developments
will certainly further facilitate the militarization of space
and could deny the U.S. and our allies access to space during a
conflict or crisis.
So, from an organize, train, and equip perspective, General
Thompson, where should investments be made to our space-based
capabilities to ensure that we can prevail in a conflict
against China?
General Thompson. Representative Lamborn, three quick
answers to that question, first of all.
The first is, we have tremendous capabilities up there
today. In many cases, they weren't designed to operate in a
contested environment under threat like this. But we are in the
process now, we have had a multiyear effort now, to build into
them a limited set of features that allow them to be
defensible, to help in their own defense. But, also, we are in
the process right now of developing capabilities to be able to
defend them against these threats. And that is what I will call
step number one.
Step number two is, as we move forward, both as part of our
design activity, the force design activity we are establishing
under our new Space Warfighting and Analysis Center, is, by the
design of the architectures and the integration of those
systems and capabilities, make them more resilient, make them
more robust, make them less susceptible to attack and single-
axis attack and make it less of an interesting target for the
adversary in China to pursue.
And then the third piece of that and the foundational
piece, really, in both cases is a much deeper understanding of
the capabilities of those adversaries in the domain, where they
are, what their capabilities are, what their tactics are, and,
both in terms of active defensive capabilities and design, how
do we best approach them to make sure they are ineffective in
response.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very bad
connection here, so I am going to turn my video off, and
hopefully it will be better. Okay?
Gentlemen, thank you very much. Appreciate your work and
the complexity of the issues before us.
I want to go to an area which has been much talked about,
and that is the utilization of commercial satellites of many
different kinds, how those commercial operations might be
integrated into the work that you do. In this discussion,
please consider both the classified and the unclassified work.
So let's start with General Thompson, and we will go from
there.
General Thompson. Representative Garamendi, two answers to
that question, if I may.
The first is, we need to understand the services and
capabilities that commercial providers can give to them, in and
of themselves, whether it is communications, data relay, or
remote sensing, and understand how we can most effectively use
those services and the data they provide.
We have a commercial partnership office today at both Los
Angeles Air Force Base as part of the Space and Missile Systems
Center, soon to be Space Systems Command, as well as a
commercial SATCOM [satellite communication] office at Fort
Meade in Maryland. They are expanding their scope not just to
look at satellite communications but all commercial services.
And so using that and incorporating that into our force design
activities is step one.
Step two is understanding the technologies of those
commercial companies and how we might adapt them to the
specific military needs and constellations of the future.
Now, one of the best approaches and techniques in using
that is through the Space Development Agency, as they pursue
their initial capabilities to provide a layer that does space
data transport associated with the Advanced Battle Management
System, as they do that for tracking, working with an
integrated missile warning/missile tracking layer. They take
military missions, look at these new commercial capabilities,
the technologies, and operating concepts, and see how we can
adapt the technology and the approach to specific military
purposes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Mr. Scolese.
Dr. Scolese. Certainly. In addition to what General
Thompson said, I would say that the NRO architecture already
incorporates the commercial capabilities into it. It is either
replace capabilities so that we can focus on those things that
only the government can or should do, or it supplements those
capabilities to provide additional resilience and coverage.
Further, as General Thompson said, we found great value in
the commercial capabilities to speed the delivery of systems,
as they have developed some very capable spacecraft that we can
go off and use and perhaps adapt to the needs that we may have.
And then, finally, as was mentioned earlier, they have
played an incredible role in communications and launch for us.
So commercial is baked into our current architecture, and
it is a fundamental portion of our future architecture. And to
assure that, we continue to work with the commercial providers
across all domains to see how we can work together. We do that
in cooperation with our partners, NGA, NSA [National Security
Agency], the Space Force, to assure that we are working
together.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
General Cleveland.
General Cleveland. Sir, good morning.
We really do view commercial imagery, as well as services,
as absolutely critical to the future of the agency as we move
forward. We work that, of course, very closely with NRO and
Director Scolese's team.
But we really believe right now that this explosion in
commercial capability, first off, really provides us access
that we may not otherwise have, so it allows us to look at more
areas.
It also does provide, to some large degree, resiliency as
well. In the event there are issues or challenges, oftentimes
we can revert to a commercial capability.
We think it will provide us more persistence. Again, as we
are able to work with the commercial industry to have more of
these capabilities up, we think that we will be able to have
persistence over a broader number of targets.
And then, finally, that drives for us speed and the ability
to rapidly get that information into the hands of our
decisionmakers as well as our warfighters.
And so, as we look at the broader fabric of sources of
information and data really coming into our agency, we do think
that commercial is going to play a significant role and it
already does play a significant role for us today.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
My final comment would be for GAO to investigate this and
make sure that we have all of the opportunities available to
us.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
And I thank all the members for participating. I know these
Zoom conferences are not the easiest things to arrange.
But I most of all want to thank our distinguished witnesses
and the important work you are doing for our national security.
I know space isn't sometimes easy to understand or to explain,
but it is absolutely vital to our national security. So I am
grateful for your patriotism.
Thank you, Ranking Member. Appreciate the opportunity to
work with you. Let's try to keep the committee focused on these
important issues, and hopefully we can have improved space
acquisition. That would be a great thing.
Unless there is another urgent question from members that
they are unable to submit in writing for the record, then this
hearing is about to be adjourned. But I don't want to cut
anybody off who can't signal me any other way other than the
video screen that they have an urgent question.
It looks like we are fine, so the hearing is adjourned.
Thanks.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 24, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 24, 2021
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 24, 2021
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. The Department is currently undertaking a number of
initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps pathfinder
efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. What is the
status of these OSD and Space Force pilot efforts?
Mr. Hill. The Department of Defense is pursuing a number of
initiatives to achieve more rapid software acquisition. The DOD
developed the Software Acquisition Pathway, approved in September 2020,
as a tailor-made pathway enabling modern software development best
practices within the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The USSF is
executing the Space Command and Control (C2) program as a ``DevSecOps
Pathfinder'' and is now transitioning the program to utilize the
Software Acquisition Pathway. By using this agile-based delivery model,
the program can iteratively plan and deliver cyber-resilient
warfighting capabilities quickly. Thus far, the program has delivered
nine operationally-accepted applications to the Combined Space
Operations Center and National Space Defense Center in just over two
years. The Space C2 program is on track to meet its highest priority
requirement: the replacement of all Space Defense Operations Center
functions by the end of FY22.
Mr. Langevin. I'm extremely excited about the Space Force's focus
on upskilling its workforce and prioritizing digital literacy through
the establishment of the Digital University. General Thompson, how does
the Space Force plan to incentivize Guardians to complete these courses
and how do you plan to keep Digital University content updated with the
latest developments in these fast-moving fields?
General Thompson. In line with our Vision for a Digital Service,
the U.S. Space Force (USSF) has created a foundational set of courses
through Digital University that will become a mandatory training
requirement to establish digital fluency for every Guardian, as well as
specialty training in coding, networking, software development and
product management, and other related areas. The specialty training
will be required for certain duty positions, but available for any and
all Guardians who wish to pursue increased knowledge and expertise for
personal or professional reasons. Further incentives derive from
achievement of commercial badging, certificates, and academic degrees
earned through Digital University. These achievements will tie into
personnel systems and can be leveraged by Guardians when pursuing
positions and unique opportunities like elite software development
teams.
In order to keep content current and relevant, Digital University
partners with world-class commercial vendors and academic institutions.
Because there are external incentives for these entities to provide up-
to-date and quality educational materials, the USSF takes on the role
of evaluator and curator instead of content creator. We work closely
with these entities to inject material more relevant to the USSF into
already built courses, such as including projects that use data
collected by space mission units. Any organic material can then be
focused toward topics specific to USSF needs that can't be found
elsewhere, making it much more manageable.
Mr. Langevin. How does the Space Force plan to incorporate directed
energy weapons in its force design and employment concepts?
General Thompson. The National Space Policy makes clear that
unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space remains a vital
national interest. It further provides that the U.S. Space Force will
present forces to enable prompt and sustained offensive and defensive
space operations to defend U.S. national interests. These operations
can take any number of forms and include all elements of military and
national power; the Space Force is pursuing multiple approaches and I
welcome the opportunity to brief you on them at the appropriate level
of classification. Potential adversaries should be on notice that the
United States will be ready to respond to any purposeful interference
with or attacks on U.S. or allied space systems at the chosen time,
place, manner and domain.
Mr. Langevin. The Department is currently undertaking a number of
initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps pathfinder
efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. What is the
status of these OSD and Space Force pilot efforts?
General Thompson. The Department is pursuing a number of
initiatives to rapidly deliver more software acquisitions. The DOD
developed the Software Acquisition Pathway, approved in September 2020,
as a tailor-made pathway enabling modern software development best
practices within the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The USSF is
executing the Space Command and Control (C2) program, also called
Kobayashi Maru, as an OSD ``DevSecOps Pathfinder'' and is preparing the
program to transition to the Software Acquisition Pathway. By using
this agile-based delivery model, the program can iteratively plan and
quickly deliver cyber-resilient joint warfighting capabilities; so far,
the program has delivered nine operationally-accepted applications to
the Combined Space Operations Center and National Space Defense Center
in just over 2 years. The ability for the Space C2 program to rapidly
ingest lessons learned and incorporate changes to processes and
development priorities are a critical asset to meet the program's
highest priority requirement of replacing Space Defense Operations
Center functions.
Mr. Langevin. I'm concerned about the cybersecurity and
functionality of our ground stations. Two major projects, GPS and OPIR,
have ground segments that are behind schedule and over cost. Delaying
these systems means delaying needed cybersecurity and anti-jamming
capabilities. As we continue to expand and upgrade our space
architecture, what is the Space Force doing differently to ensure these
systems are on schedule and secure?
General Thompson. GPS and OPIR provide critical mission
capabilities for the Space Force and the nation. We strive to meet cost
and schedule expectations to continue to meet warfighter needs and
remain responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars for these programs. The
Defensive Cyber Operations for Space (DCO-S) capabilities to detect,
identify, respond/recover, and protect are ``baked in'' to current
ground segments such as Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution
(FORGE), Enterprise Ground Services (EGS), and the Next Generation
Operational Control System (OCX). These ground segment system
architectures are being designed to operate in a cyber-contested
environment with modern protection technologies, tools, processes,
functions, and cyber best practices.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
technologies?
How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
provide to support development?
The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
cooperation?
Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
collaboration?
Mr. Hill. Hypersonic applications straddle the air and space
domains. For example, our ability to reconstitute critical space-based
assets rapidly is constrained, in part, by a limited number of rockets
operating from a limited number of launch sites. A notional future
hypersonic aircraft could serve as the first stage of a two-stage-to-
orbit launch system to deliver up to 20,000 pounds of payload to low
Earth orbit. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would allow for
flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort capability, and
improved airspace integration. High-speed and hypersonic aircraft could
also support replenishment of space-based assets and mission assurance
efforts in more lethal, non-permissive future environments.
Additionally, a number of contractors are now providing flexible sub-
sonic air launch options for small and medium satellite payloads to low
Earth orbit.
While OSD Policy does not represent the IC, we recognize that, the
ability to perform penetrating, responsive collection with a highly
survivable platform could fill key gaps. Those gaps primarily reflect
ISR needs. Penetrating hypersonic aircraft serving as on-demand
collection platforms could provide an unpredictable, survivable, and
responsive alternative or adjunct to more traditional ISR capabilities.
Additionally, a hypersonic aircraft acting as the first-stage of a two-
stage-to-orbit launch system could provide a responsive space
reconstitution capability.
The primary effort, which is currently in the development
community, encompasses goals and objectives for future DOD and
Intelligence Community missions, and includes Intelligence Community
input. While OSD Policy does not represent the IC, we nevertheless look
forward to continued DOD-IC collaboration as the focus shifts over the
next decade to operational considerations.
The Department of Defense does not have requirements for high Mach
platforms in the tactically responsive space mission. However, as the
Department identifies space requirements for responsive launch,
acquisition of these capabilities may have greater significance and
will be appropriately reflected in the Department's overall space
strategy and budget. A notional future hypersonic aircraft could serve
as the first stage of a two-stage-to-orbit launch system to deliver up
to 20,000 pounds of payload to low earth orbit, though high Mach or
hypersonic capability is not necessarily required for an air-launched
capability. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would allow for
flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort capability, and
improved airspace integration. High-speed and hypersonic aircraft would
be reusable, supporting replenishment of space-based assets and mission
assurance efforts in more lethal, non-permissive future environments.
DOD has developed and regularly updates a technology roadmap for
reusable systems in collaboration with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). The roadmap includes an ambitious goal of
developing and demonstrating a reusable hypersonic aircraft by the
early- to mid-2030's. The basic elements of that roadmap are currently
funded.
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in both the public and
private sector on the utility of hypersonic aircraft for responsive
point-to-point transportation. Per the national hypersonics roadmap,
the Department of the Air Force collaborates with the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with NASA
to develop dual-use technologies for High Mach and Hypersonic Aircraft.
This strategy includes pursuing key enabling technologies that will
provide for both commercial and military application of future
hypersonic reusable systems.
There are no restrictions that currently limit DOD and NASA
collaboration on future reusable hypersonic aircraft and the level of
technology development applicable to both military and civilian
application. There are limitations on the application of NASA human and
fiscal capital directly to development of DOD systems; however, those
limitations do not pose any impediment on either agency to meeting our
respective needs.
Governments and industries in many countries are investing in
research and development to enable future reusable hypersonic aircraft.
Some of those countries are allies and some are not. DOD is working to
make sure we fully understand the scope of that work to identify areas
of mutual benefit and interest with our allied partners and to assess
the risks of the efforts of our potential adversaries. As we pursue our
roadmap we are looking for collaborative opportunities with our allies,
with propulsion being a key area that has potential.
No, DOD has the necessary authorities to pursue collaboration when
we determine it is the best approach. Collaborative research,
development, and production can add programmatic complexity,
particularly associated with requirements regarding information
security, intellectual property protection, and claims. However,
collaboration can also leverage diverse sources of expertise, promote
common standards and interoperability, and generate net savings as
partners pool requirements and share fiscal burdens. Over a long
history of successful collaboration with partners, DOD has shown we are
able to leverage our authorities and overcome the complexities to
deliver mutually beneficial outcomes.
Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
technologies?
How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
provide to support development?
The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
cooperation?
Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
collaboration?
General Thompson. The Department of the Air Force, from a military
service perspective, is unable to answer on behalf of specific
Intelligence Community (IC) agencies on unique equities for ISR
collection or space launch on high Mach platforms. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) would be best positioned to
facilitate discussion and insight from IC agencies tasked with
monitoring and assessing foreign high Mach platforms.
While I cannot speak authoritatively for the IC or IC agencies, it
is possible there may not be any structural changes required to ensure
involvement in the development and planning for operational use of high
Mach platforms. The current research and development process for high
Mach platforms is examining multiple mission areas and is already
facilitating collaboration between engineers, fielding and testing
organizations, and the intelligence community.
There has been renewed interest in both the public and private
sectors for responsive launch; there are many concepts under
consideration, to include use of hypersonic aircraft as the first stage
of a two-stage system. The benefits of an aircraft-based space launcher
include flexible basing and launching locations, and less restrictive
public safety requirements. The Space Force's Rapid/Agile Launch
Initiative is currently investigating more responsive launch options.
I am not able to speak for the IC and their equities, but with
regard to tactical responsive spacelift--there are many concepts under
consideration, to include use of hypersonic aircraft as the first stage
of a two-stage system. While there is no formal program to use
hypersonics for this purpose, we continue analysis on the costs and
benefits of such an approach and are working with OSD (R&E) and NASA to
develop a national strategy for hypersonics. This effort could provide
technologies to enable the aircraft-based hypersonic space launch by
2040, should analysis warrant.
We currently do not need additional resources for hypersonics in
FY22.
The Department of the Air Force (DAF) and NASA have worked together
for many years successfully especially in the science and technology
arena. There are various ways the DOD and NASA are partnering to
leverage hypersonics, as was recently detailed in a March 26, 2021
article in Air Force magazine titled, ``Catching Up on Hypersonics.''
These include: Experimenting with a concept called SkyRange, which uses
unmanned aircraft to clear the hypersonic test space and relay
telemetry in an effort to accomplish more with the range space already
available. For high Mach numbers coupled with intense heat, there is
only one tunnel--a NASA asset--that can create the environment. Also,
DAF is bringing NASA into Vector Prime, a hypersonic aircraft effort.
The collaboration with NASA includes sharing facilities and models. On
the facility side, DAF is bringing in NASA and industry in on a MILCON
study for national R&D facility specifically for early technology
readiness level (TRL) needs.
With the standup of Space Systems Command, the U.S. Space Force
will be postured to take advantage of commercial developments in
hypersonic technologies to quickly deliver capabilities. We will seek
every opportunity to collaborate with private and public partners,
while also working through appropriate legal and ethical standards of
conduct. I am not aware of any current restrictions that limit
cooperation as we move forward. If any restrictions do arise, I will
work with the Department of the Air Force to ensure we have the
necessary authorities to enhance cooperation.
The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is committed to exploring
opportunities in bilateral and multilateral forums to increase
development of hypersonic technologies with Allies and international
partners. For example, the DAF has over a 15-year relationship with the
Australian Department of Defense developing and testing hypersonic
technologies, and we recently began a new project to develop and test
air-launched, air-breathing flight test vehicles capable of cruising at
hypersonic speeds. The DAF is also currently discussing potential
collaboration in hypersonic technologies with other Allies.
We must continue to follow International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, and comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, but
I am not aware of any instances where these regulations impose
significant limitations on our existing or planned collaboration on
hypersonics with allies and partners.
Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
technologies?
How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
provide to support development?
The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
cooperation?
Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
collaboration?
Dr. Scolese. We will continue to work closely with the DOD to
explore future opportunities to utilize numerous emerging technologies
to meet our objectives. In addition to advancements in our traditional
launch methods, hypersonics may provide additional methods for
responsive transport to the space domain.
Speaking for the NRO, we are interested in any technologies that
may further our collection mission or launch of our systems. Our end-
to-end functional capabilities have us positioned to develop, based on
our requirements and the requirements of our customers, innovative
solutions to customer needs.
The NRO does not foresee any need to restructure to respond to new
technologies.
We continue to work closely with our DOD partners to find
opportunities to address their warfighting challenges, including
building a tactically-responsive space architecture. Space launch
options using hypersonics hold opportunities to meet this and other
needs. The NRO works closely with our partners to prioritize
initiatives to meet our broad customer's needs and mission
requirements.
We are interested in any technologies that may further our
collection mission or launch of our systems. Our end-to-end functional
capabilities have us positioned to develop, based on our requirements
and the requirements of our customers, innovative solutions to customer
needs.
While not currently pursuing collaboration with regard to high-Mach
flight with our allies, the NRO seeks collaborative development where
possible to further capabilities of all participant while still
protecting sensitive technologies.
Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is
greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that
reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO
FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line
with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally,
it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What
is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to
the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
Dr. Scolese. The NRO is committed to providing high-quality and
high-capacity GEOINT support to hundreds of thousands of users,
including COCOMs and Services. As the quality and volume of commercial
providers of GEOINT continue to increase, the NRO will ensure that we
are continually leveraging our domestic providers. The NRO's next
generation of commercial imagery contracts is responsive to
requirements from the COCOMs and Services to the extent that they were
included in the GEOINT Functional Manager's (NGA's) draft Statement of
Capabilities (SOC) for Commercial Imagery. We expect that the SOC will
be validated this summer by both the Intelligence Community and
Department of Defense, at a level that fully meets users' needs. We
also expect that the Independent Cost Estimate and budget will be
sufficient to satisfy those requirements.
With regard to the flow of commercial imagery to warfighters, NGA
is responsible for dissemination via various mechanisms; from a
contractual standpoint, however, NRO confirms that there will not be
any gap in support as we transition from the current operational
contracts to the new commercial imagery contracts. Current contracts
will be extended, as required, until the new contracts are in place.
Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
technologies?
How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
provide to support development?
The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
cooperation?
Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
collaboration?
General Cleveland. NGA's role in space ISR involves tasking,
processing, exploiting, and disseminating data collected from NRO
satellites. NGA has the authorities it needs to meet challenges in the
space domain. We are closely tied with the NRO and likewise leverage
the Geospatial Intelligence Committee (GEOCOM) executive steering
structure to coordinate Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) needs across
the interagency, the Intelligence Community (IC), and Combatant
Commands. NGA works closely with our commercial, interagency, IC, and
DOD partners to meet the needs of the warfighter. For space launch and
space operations, NGA defers to NRO for research, development,
acquisition, launch, and the operation of imagery intelligence
satellites. NGA's FY22 budget request and current authorities meet the
Agency's needs as the GEOINT functional manager. Although NGA does not
have any equities related to fielding aircraft, we are partnered with
NASA on a range of technologies, most recently focused on potential
lunar and cislunar operations, and Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS). At this time, there are no restrictions limiting cooperation
between NGA and NASA.
Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is
greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that
reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO
FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line
with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally,
it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What
is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to
the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
General Cleveland. NGA continues to coordinate closely with NRO to
inform commercial procurement. NGA is thoroughly committed to providing
uninterrupted, real-time support to the warfighter and leverages all
available sources to accomplish this, including commercial imagery. NGA
works with both commercial imagery providers and military customers to
ensure that warfighter requirements are clearly understood and
delivered to meet the needs and specifications of the military user.
Our paramount goal is to support warfighters at the tactical edge in as
effective and timely a manner as possible, while ensuring that the
highest priority operational requests take precedence.
Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
technologies?
How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
provide to support development?
The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
cooperation?
Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
collaboration?
Mr. Ludwigson. We have not assessed DOD's short or long-term
hypersonic strategy, including activities related to reusable
hypersonic flight, transport, ISR and strike, and responsive space
access, outside of identifying the breadth and scope of their current
efforts in the past and the next few years into the future. DOD has
initially focused most resources on developing and proving offensive
weapon prototypes. Most of the estimated $15 billion for hypersonic
weapons and related technologies from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal
year 2024 has been used or is planned to be spent on offensive weapons
that will potentially turn into programs of record. Future efforts that
may influence reusable hypersonic flight, ISR, and defense applications
are at earlier stages of development. If successful, they have the
potential to evolve into future programs that may shape DOD's portfolio
and hypersonic strategy and open up the types of platforms that can
carry hypersonic weapons or utilize the technology. Given the breadth
of these activities and their potential expansion to include additional
organizations within DOD, formalizing coordination for effective
achievement of DOD's objectives will be important.
For our report examining hypersonics, we obtained information on
acknowledged research efforts and formal programs, but did not
explicitly seek to identify others. However, to the extent IC agencies
have equities in hypersonic platforms, it might be important for them
to be included in efforts to formalize coordination in hypersonic
weapons development efforts.
We have not done work to assess the relationships of high Mach
platforms with the space mission to understand resource requirements
needed to support published timelines or to inform authorities this
committee may consider.
DOD and NASA have agreements in place that support DOD using NASA
testing facilities. NASA shares subject matter expertise in hypersonic
technology, such as at NASA Langley. DOD, in some cases, reimburses
NASA for use of its wind tunnels. In some instances NASA officials said
that NASA waives the reimbursement costs because it is able to acquire
data from testing it would not be able to obtain on its own because it
would be too expensive. We have not done work to assess whether there
are any current restrictions that limit cooperation.
Our report on efforts to develop hypersonic weapons and related
technologies included information on some partnership efforts between
DOD and allied countries. However, we have not done comprehensive work
to assess the extent to which work on hypersonic flight is occurring in
allied countries, steps DOD has taken to explore partnership
opportunities, or export controls that may be inhibiting collaboration.
Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is
greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that
reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO
FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line
with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally,
it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What
is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to
the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
Mr. Ludwigson. We have begun a review of the National
Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Commercial Systems Program Office (CSPO)
in response to a provision in the House report accompanying a bill for
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 and a
subsequent letter from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence. CSPO is the office in NRO responsible
for purchasing commercial satellite imagery on behalf of DOD and the
Intelligence Community. Our review is looking into how NRO is
leveraging commercial imagery for DOD and the Intelligence Community,
including how they are meeting Congressional direction to engage the
commercial satellite remote sensing industry to the maximum extent
practicable. While the scope of our review focuses on CSPO, it will
also include information from stakeholders throughout DOD and the IC,
including combatant commands and military services. We anticipate
providing a draft report to DOD and the IC for comment in early 2022.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Recently, China and Russia recently announced that
they have entered into a MOU on establishing a lunar International
Research Station. Although this was publicized as a scientific effort,
some perceive this as a thin veil for military cooperation on the moon.
Currently, NASA is the only government organization tasked with
establishing a presence on the lunar surface with the Artemis program.
Is the DOD taking any actions to look ahead at potential military
needs and capabilities beyond our traditional orbits and near the lunar
region?
Mr. Hill. Whether in traditional orbits or beyond, DOD operations
in space are and will remain fully compliant with U.S. obligations
under international law, including the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and
with U.S. law and policy. In this regard, DOD does not intend to
establish military bases, installations, or fortifications, test any
type of weapons, or conduct military maneuvers on the Moon or on other
celestial bodies.
This approach remains consistent with our longstanding national
security interests, and does not prevent DOD from pursuing emerging
national security interests beyond traditional orbits or from extending
our space situational awareness and other activities to the lunar
regime. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) is developing the Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar
Operations (DRACO) to demonstrate a nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP)
system above low Earth orbit in 2025. The system would demonstrate
rapid maneuver capability in cislunar space, which can be important in
various national security space applications.
Mr. Lamborn. Follow-up on the question: 'From an ``organize, train
and equip'' perspective, where should investments be made to our space-
based capabilities, to ensure we can prevail in a conflict against
China?'
In addition to the answer you provided (upgrading/modifying
existing systems, making things ``less interesting'' in the design
phase, and developing a deeper understanding of adversary
capabilities), can you discuss which specific programs or capabilities
the DOD or Space Force currently have or are developing to fill those
roles or meet that criteria?
General Thompson. Key to prevailing in a conflict against China and
other potential adversaries is our ability to modernize our
capabilities to protect what we have on orbit today, evolve to more
resilient architectures, develop warfighting capability, and grow new
space missions. Most of the important details in each of these areas is
classified; I welcome the opportunity to brief you on all of them at
the appropriate classification level.
In addition to the categories above, we must also improve our
ability to assess and understand our adversary's activity, which is
accomplished through space domain awareness. The budget includes $127M
for the Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) follow-on known as
SILENTBARKER which will provide timely detection and custody of on-
orbit threats in order to protect U.S. high-value assets in space. The
Unified Data Library investment facilitates universal data access for
all-domain space domain awareness data sharing from all sensors to
support space-focused battle management and command and control
($17.1M)
The Ground Based Optical Sensor System (GBOSS) is an upgrade to the
existing Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System
(GEODSS) that enables monitoring of small, closely-spaced, and advanced
threats in low, mid, high, and geostationary orbits ($56.2M). Finally,
we are investing $123M on a Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept that will
deliver radar sensors that can monitor satellites and space debris in
geostationary orbits.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
Dr. DesJarlais. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspective on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
Mr. Hill. Hypersonic flight offers solutions that straddle the air
and space domains. For example, our ability to reconstitute critical
space-based assets rapidly is constrained, in part, by a limited number
of rockets operating from a limited number of launch sites. A notional
future hypersonic aircraft could serve as the first stage of a two-
stage-to-orbit launch system to deliver up to 20,000 pounds of payload
to low Earth orbit. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would
allow for flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort
capability, and improved airspace integration. High-speed and
hypersonic aircraft could also support replenishment of space-based
assets and mission assurance efforts in more lethal, non-permissive
future environments.
Dr. DesJarlais. The commercial sector is currently making an
ambitious push to develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030
timeframe. As you know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to
materials to test facilities--are dual use and could significantly
advance DOD efforts to field their own aircraft. How is DOD working
with NASA to leverage these advances? Are there any current
restrictions that limit cooperation?
Mr. Hill. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in both the
public and private sector on the utility of hypersonic aircraft for
responsive space launch and responsive point-to-point transportation.
The Department of the Air Force is working with Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with NASA to
develop a national strategy for High Mach and Hypersonic Aircraft that
will provide technologies for aircraft-based, responsive space launch
by 2040. This strategy includes the key enabling technologies and sub-
systems that will provide for both commercial and military application
of future hypersonic reusable systems.
There are no restrictions that currently limit DOD and NASA
collaboration on future reusable hypersonic aircraft and the level of
technology development applicable to both military and civilian
application. There are limitations on the application of NASA human and
fiscal capital directly to development of DOD systems; however, those
limitations do not pose any impediment on either agency to meeting our
respective needs.
Dr. DesJarlais. Much of the commercial and defense work on high
Mach flight is occurring in allied countries. What steps have been
taken to explore partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are
there any restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting
valuable collaboration?
Mr. Hill. Governments and industries in many countries are
investing in research and development to enable future reusable
hypersonic aircraft. Some of those countries are allies and some are
not. DOD is working to make sure we fully understand the scope of that
work to identify areas of mutual benefit and interest with our allied
partners and to assess the risks of the efforts of our potential
adversaries. As we pursue our roadmap, we are looking for collaborative
opportunities with our allies, with propulsion being a key area of
potential cooperation. Export controls and other restrictions do not
prevent DOD from using its authorities to pursue collaboration when we
determine it is the best approach. Collaborative research, development,
and production can add programmatic complexity, particularly associated
with requirements regarding information security, intellectual property
protection, and claims. However, collaboration can also leverage
diverse sources of expertise, promote common standards and
interoperability, and generate net savings as partners pool
requirements and share fiscal burdens. Over a long history of
successful collaboration with partners, DOD has shown we are able to
leverage our authorities and overcome the complexities to deliver
mutually beneficial outcomes.
Dr. DesJarlais. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities
related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
technologies are well into development and could reach initial
operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
perspective on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
changes in strategy.
General Thompson. Hypersonics are a critical technology with broad
impact across the national security landscape. There has been renewed
interest in both the public and private sectors for responsive launch--
there are many concepts under consideration, to include use of
hypersonic aircraft as the first stage of a two-state system. The
benefits of an aircraft-based space launcher include flexible basing
and launching locations, and less restrictive public safety
requirements. The Space Force's Rapid/Agile Launch Initiative is
currently leveraging more responsive launch options. We are working
with OSD (R&E) and NASA to develop a national strategy for High Mach
and Hypersonic Aircraft that could provide technologies to enable the
aircraft-based hypersonic space launch by 2040.
One additional area where the Space Force has a role is in
detecting and tracking hypersonic missiles. That mission is
challenging. The Space Force is presently conducting analysis on new
capabilities to provide hypersonic missile warning from space.
Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically
responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and
agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published
timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this
committee might provide to support development?
General Thompson. As the DOD identifies space requirements for
responsive launch, acquisition of these capabilities will be
appropriately budgeted for and reflected in our overall strategy for
space. The current budget for U.S. space launch addresses the current
requirements, but we anticipate the Department will request additional
funding for these efforts as additional requirements are identified.
Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically
responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and
agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published
timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this
committee might provide to support development?
Dr. Scolese. We continue to work closely with our DOD partners to
find opportunities to address their warfighting challenges, including
building a tactically-responsive space architecture. Space launch
options using hypersonics hold opportunities to meet this and other
needs. The NRO supports the FY 2022 President's Budget.
Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically
responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and
agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published
timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this
committee might provide to support development?
General Cleveland. NGA works closely with our commercial,
interagency, Intelligence Community, and DOD partners to meet the needs
of the warfighter. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
capabilities. The NGA FY22 budget request and current authorities meet
the Agency's needs as the GEOINT functional manager.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
Mr. Khanna. How is the United States Space Force working to bring
in new commercial capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, to
support the goal of a dynamic and responsive launch capability? In your
opinion, is the Space Force doing enough to increase the purchase of
small launch providers to support and prove this requirement for
responsive launch?
Mr. Hill. Yes. The U.S. Space Force has a dedicated office for
enhanced coordination with the U.S. commercial space launch industry
and is actively pursuing opportunities to leverage innovation. DOD is
exploring how to pair its requirements with cutting-edge domestic space
technology--some of which may utilize responsive launch opportunities.
The USSF currently has eight small launch providers on-contract through
its SRP-4 and OSP-4 agreements, and is currently on-ramping other new
providers. Space Force also expects to on-ramp new vendors every year
to continue to leverage industry innovation.
Mr. Khanna. What is your assessment of the report on the ``State of
the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which concluded (among other things)
that ````The very long schedules of many DOD space programs limit the
opportunities for short design-build-test projects that stimulate
interest and innovation within the U.S. workforce. Many new small
launch vehicles are coming into service. An increased rate of space
experiments and prototypes by DOD would enhance the viability of these
small launchers providers.'' How is Space Force working with those in
acquisition to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs and
increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small launch?
How are you supporting new U.S. satellite companies working to gain
entry into the DOD market?
Mr. Hill. DOD is engaging in a broad-based effort to leverage
commercial technology for the fulfilment of its space requirements.
This includes reducing the timelines that have been typical in
traditional programs that meet military requirements not typically
addressed in commercial space and diversifying acquisition approaches
to leverage commercial innovations that can offer new solutions and new
capabilities on much shorter timelines. From the Space Development
Agency, to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to the Space
Rapid Capabilities Office, to the Air Force Research Laboratory, and to
the Space and Missile Systems Center, DOD using rapid prototyping and
other innovations in research, development, and acquisition programs
that are providing opportunities to leverage the agility and
flexibility of emerging commercial launch and satellite providers. The
U.S. Space Force has also established a dedicated office for enhanced
coordination and alignment to meet these growing needs for small launch
and pair programs with the best launch opportunities.
Mr. Khanna. With the DARPA launch challenge concluding without a
winner, what other space related programs focusing on responsive launch
is Space Force interested in? What is the Space Force's plans to engage
with new launch companies going forward to develop a responsive launch
capability?
Mr. Hill. The U.S. Space Force has two programs dedicated to
engaging launch companies. The National Security Space Launch program
handles traditional launch vendors and supports new entrants into
future phases. The Department's Rocket Systems Launch Program manages
the Tactically Responsive Launch Program Element, which leverages three
available contract strategies to utilize emerging small launch
providers to support DOD space requirements. The Department has and is
continually looking to utilize responsive launch capabilities, and
explore opportunities to enhance DOD responsive space launch
requirements.
Mr. Khanna. How is the Space Force planning to utilize tools such
as additive manufacturing, and would Space Force's mission benefit from
the integration of new space companies utilizing new manufacturing
techniques such as additive manufacturing--in order to meet the Space
Force requirement to launch within 24 hours as part of the tactically
responsive launch requirements?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
to the arsenal?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
the launch market as well?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
national security edge in space?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Khanna. How is the United States Space Force working to bring
in new commercial capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, to
support the goal of a dynamic and responsive launch capability? In your
opinion, is the Space Force doing enough to increase the purchase of
small launch providers to support and prove this requirement for
responsive launch?
General Thompson. Yes. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) has a dedicated
office for enhanced coordination with the U.S. commercial space launch
industry. The DOD is exploring how to pair DOD requirements with
cutting edge domestic space technology--some of which may use
responsive launch opportunities. The USSF currently has eight small
launch providers in our Orbital Services Program (OSP)-4 contract pool,
and is currently on-ramping other new providers. We also plan to on-
ramp new vendors every year to continue to leverage industry
innovation. The Department already uses space launch services from U.S.
space industrial base entities that use additive manufacturing, such as
3D printing.
Mr. Khanna. What is your assessment of the report on the ``State of
the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which concluded (among other things)
that ``The very long schedules of many DOD space programs limit the
opportunities for short design-build-test projects that stimulate
interest and innovation within the U.S. workforce. Many new small
launch vehicles are coming into service. An increased rate of space
experiments and prototypes by DOD would enhance the viability of these
small launchers providers.'' How is Space Force working with those in
acquisition to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs and
increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small launch?
How are you supporting new U.S. satellite companies working to gain
entry into the DOD market?
General Thompson. The DOD is engaging in a cohesive effort across
responsive small satellites, ground systems, requirements, policy, and
other critical aspects in the responsive space architecture to
increasingly use commercial technologies that support space-to-
terrestrial warfighting requirements. On the small satellite front,
programs like Space Safari are enabling quick turn capabilities for
operational use. Experiments and prototypes have a tailored board
process to receive DOD sponsorship and ensure support, minimize
timelines and leverage launch industry capabilities. Additionally,
programs like Space System and Prototype Transition (SSPT) directly
leverage commercially available technology and utilize non-traditional
contracting approaches such as other transaction authorities to attract
non-traditional vendors to accelerate acquisition timelines to deliver
prototypes with residual operations capability. For example, Blackjack
is integrating a military payload onto a commercially commoditized
satellite bus. The U.S. Space Force utilizes the Mission Manifest
Office (MMO) as the front door for all satellites leading to enhanced
coordination and alignment across the DOD and mission partners. The
Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP) procures small launch services and
the MMO utilizes excess launch vehicle performance to maximize on-orbit
capability, providing the U.S. Space Force the ability to employ
multiple innovations to maintain responsiveness and assured access to
space.
Mr. Khanna. With the DARPA launch challenge concluding without a
winner, what other space related programs focusing on responsive launch
is Space Force interested in? What is the Space Force's plans to engage
with new launch companies going forward to develop a responsive launch
capability?
General Thompson. The U.S. Space Force has two programs dedicated
to engaging with launch companies. The National Security Space Launch
program handles our traditional launch vendors and supports new
entrants into future phases. The Department's Rocket Systems Launch
Program (RSLP) manages the Tactically Responsive Launch Program
Element, which leverages three available contract strategies to use
emerging small launch providers to support DOD space requirements. RSLP
has awarded 5 small space launch contracts to 6 different small launch
providers; providing 19 small space launches and over 700 suborbital
launches going back to 1972. RSLP's current primary launch contract
mechanism has eight different providers, on-ramps new providers and
procures launch services annually, and has procured one launch service
to-date. The Department continues to look to use responsive launch
capabilities and explore opportunities to enhance DOD responsive space
launch requirements.
Mr. Khanna. How is the Space Force planning to utilize tools such
as additive manufacturing, and would Space Force's mission benefit from
the integration of new space companies utilizing new manufacturing
techniques such as additive manufacturing--in order to meet the Space
Force requirement to launch within 24 hours as part of the tactically
responsive launch requirements?
General Thompson. The Department already uses space launch services
from U.S. space industrial base entities that use additive
manufacturing, such as 3D printing. Commercial innovation is a key
component of ensuring U.S. preeminence in space, and the Department
enthusiastically supports commercial efforts to rapidly develop
reliable and responsive space capabilities.
Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
to the arsenal?
General Thompson. The USSF Launch Enterprise is responsive to our
customers' needs across the spectrum of small and large launch. For
example, in 2019, we worked with our National Security Space Launch
(NSSL)-class commercial partners to increase rocket performance less
than 4 months before launch to provide more on-orbit resiliency. By
using the NSSL Phase 2 contract, we can order and launch a mission in
12 months. For small launch, we have contractual vehicles in-place that
can rapidly award launches to eight different vendors currently,
several of which can already launch within six months of award. Many of
the small launch providers are non-traditional defense contractors. We
also plan to on-ramp new vendors every year to continue to leverage
industry innovation.
Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
the launch market as well?
General Thompson. The Space Development Agency, in coordination
with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Sustainment and Department of the Air Force, is still assessing launch
requirements for the Tranche 1 series of satellites. The National
Security Space Launch (NSSL) approach achieves the lowest overall costs
to the government across the full spectrum of mission needs with
commercial-like pricing for commercial-like launches. Further, the NSSL
approach cuts the prices for the most demanding missions by over 50
percent. However, the DOD may consider alternative launch options
should it be beneficial to the Department, national security, and the
U.S. taxpayer. Considering new providers, the DOD is interested in the
capabilities of new NSSL class launchers as we prepare for our efforts
beyond the Phase 2 contract for launch services procured in FY25.
Additionally, we are already engaging in several efforts to use space
launch providers who offer small and/or responsive launch capabilities.
I am supportive of these efforts and believe the growth of the
commercial space launch sector will directly support DOD's agility and
strength in space. I am aware our counterparts in the NRO have procured
launches outside the launch enterprise. However, the DOD coordinates
closely with the IC to incorporate their requirements into our launch
acquisition strategies, and we are committed to fostering competition
in the industrial base.
Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
national security edge in space?
General Thompson. As the Department of Defense identifies space
requirements for responsive launch, acquisition of these capabilities
will be appropriately budgeted for and reflected in the Department's
overall strategy for space. I believe the current budget for U.S. space
launch requirements addresses the current requirements, but anticipate
the Department will request additional funding for these efforts as
additional requirements are identified.
Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
to the arsenal?
Dr. Scolese. For specific questions on the Space Force team's
implementation of their Spacepower Doctrine, please contact USSF. The
NRO predominantly utilizes Space Force's Launch Enterprise Directorate
to procure our launch services and leverages their R&D investment in
launch systems addressing Space Mobility and Logistics objectives
described in the USSF doctrine. However, the NRO recently awarded a
Streamlined Launch Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
Contract (SLIC) for risk tolerant payloads, which leverages commercial
processes and growing competition among emerging launch service
providers. Maximizing commercial practices to the greatest extent
possible can reduce both cost and timelines from contract award to
launch.
Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
the launch market as well?
Dr. Scolese. The NRO has broadened the scope of available launch
providers and competition through our recently awarded Streamlined
Launch Infinite Delivery Infinite/Quantity Contract (IDIQ). New
entrants can onboard onto the contract and be eligible for award of a
risk-tolerant launch service or rideshare, after one successful orbital
launch.
Many of our missions, however, require higher rocket performance,
government insight and mission assurance, and are more complex from an
integration and security perspective than commercial missions, driving
additional costs. USSF and NRO share these costs so that National Space
Security (NSS) unique costs do not encumber our domestic launch
providers' commercial pricing. Adding more launch service providers to
the National Security Space Launch Program (NSSLP) as it is currently
structured, would increase fixed costs to the NRO and USSF.
The NRO fully supports an open competition among all qualified
launch service providers for NSSLP Phase 3. We are currently working
with USSF to develop an appropriate acquisition strategy that reflects
the diverse needs of NSS missions and the likely state of the launch
industry in 2025 and beyond.
Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
national security edge in space?
Dr. Scolese. While the NRO does not comment on other agencies'
budgets, the NRO is leveraging innovative commercial industry to
supplement and in applicable, warranted cases, replace certain
government systems through commercial imagery, launch services and
cloud computing service, which will allow a whole new range of
technologies to help expand our supplier base, potentially lower the
cost, and possibly shorten program timelines with increased
flexibility.
Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
to the arsenal?
General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
capabilities.
Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
the launch market as well?
General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
capabilities
Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
national security edge in space?
General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
capabilities.
Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
to the arsenal?
Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed efforts related to engaging
with new launch partners or incorporating responsive launch into
national security space programs.
Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
the launch market as well?
Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed agency efforts to broaden the
scope of available launch providers or increase competition outside of
or within the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program. In our
August 2017 report on space launch coordination mechanisms, we found
that federal agencies who acquire launch services--DOD, NRO, and NASA--
spend over a billion dollars per year on space launch. While DOD and
NASA use some of the same providers for their launches, each agency has
separate acquisition processes and launch requirements. We found in the
past that interagency coordination in space launch acquisitions has the
potential to help leverage the governments buying power and eliminate
the potential for redundancy and duplication. This past work found that
coordination is important for operations and maintenance of launch
ranges, scheduling launch missions, and government-wide strategic
planning for launch. We found that opportunities exist for improving
longer-term, government-wide planning for launch programs and for space
programs in general. Acquiring launches outside of the current
contract--the Phase 2 Launch Service Procurement--could sub-optimize
the NSSL program's strategy to leverage the U.S. government's buying
power to achieve the lowest overall cost of maintaining assured access
to space. However, there are circumstances where using NSSL's larger
launch vehicles (and associated costs) may not be justified, such as
for experiments using small satellites.
Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
national security edge in space?
Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed the extent to which the budget
lines for the Rocket Systems Launch Program or Tactically Responsive
Space Launch program support efforts to spur the space economy.
However, in our May 2019 report on commercial space launch, we found
that the industry was growing as U.S. launch providers capture a
greater share of the global commercial market. We also found that the
Federal Aviation Administration was expanding its workforce in
anticipation of growth in the commercial launch industry but needed
better information for long term planning. In our December 2020 report
on options for supporting U.S. launch infrastructure, we examined FAA
efforts to assess options to facilitate and promote greater investments
in space transportation infrastructure. We found that FAA's assessment
was limited and did not include a range of options that could better
promote space transportation infrastructure to support national
security, civil government, and commercial space customers at minimal
cost to the federal government. We recommended that FAA examine a range
of potential options to support space transportation infrastructure,
including the necessary trade-offs of different potential approaches.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire
their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How
often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because
of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL
contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement
plan?
Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire
their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How
often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because
of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL
contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement
plan?
General Thompson. There may be limited instances (security reasons
as an example) where other factors override the significant impacts to
NSSL Phase 2 and future Government buying power. Any of these limited
instances should be evaluated for negative impacts to the larger
enterprise even if there are isolated benefits to individual programs.
Procuring missions outside NSSL reduces future buying power across the
NSSL-class spectrum and will affect the ability to maintain or improve
on Phase 2 pricing in future procurements, especially for higher
performance requirements. National Security Space Launch (NSSL) has an
unprecedented record of mission success with 87 consecutive successful
launches. The NSSL approach achieves the lowest overall costs to the
government across the full spectrum of mission needs, including assured
access to space, demanding orbits, and complex satellites. NSSL Phase 2
dramatically reduced launch prices over Phase 1 and provides cost
effective launch services for unique government requirements. The
Department encourages maximum use of the NSSL Phase 2 contract. The
significant impacts in acquiring NSSL-class capability outside the NSSL
contracts include forfeiting the NSSL provided Mission Assurance,
limiting the flexibility provided by the Phase 2 contract (assured-
access to space through two providers, up to 1-year mission
acceleration, fixed-price mission unique capabilities), and reducing
future Government buying power.
Mr. Morelle. There are reportedly 32,000 objects on-orbit,
including roughly 7,000 active and retired satellites. Does DOD have
sufficient space situational awareness to monitor and assess risks to
space systems and what are the risks of space congestion to DOD
operations?
General Thompson. The United States Space Force operates a variety
of ground- and space-based sensors that track and characterize space
objects. While this system of systems has been adequate to the track
objects in the past, in an era of rapidly expanding space actors, from
commercial actors to countries, we are seeing more satellites and
associated debris than ever before. To ensure the Space Force is able
to maintain our Space Domain Awareness (SDA) in a congested space
environment, we are investing in new technologies and pursuing new data
sources to enhance our capability to detect smaller objects and more of
them. This includes incorporation of data from the rapidly expanding
commercial SDA market and collaboration with Allies and partners to
share information and sensors, as authorized, in a coalition approach
to SDA.
Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire
their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How
often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because
of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL
contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement
plan?
Dr. Scolese. In rare cases, the NRO has the ability to use
alternative methods to procure launch services depending on the
satellite program's objectives, and when doing so, will still seek
input from the USSF. In selecting an NSS Launch Program (NSSLP) or non-
NSSLP launch strategy, program objectives are balanced across all
program factors including national security policy, cost, schedule, and
performance objectives. NRO procured launch vehicles outside of the
NSSL procurement were previously approved and not included in the
procurement plan. We defer to USSF on the costs of NSSL launches and
any potential to impact future pricing for Phase 3 launches.
Mr. Morelle. There are reportedly 32,000 objects on-orbit,
including roughly 7,000 active and retired satellites. Does DOD have
sufficient space situational awareness to monitor and assess risks to
space systems and what are the risks of space congestion to DOD
operations?
Mr. Ludwigson. GAO has not done work to verify the count of objects
tracked on-orbit, nor has GAO specifically assessed the overall
sufficiency of DOD's space situational awareness (SSA) systems. We have
reviewed SSA programs for over a decade, including an in-depth review
on SSA funding in 2015. Our past work has shown that SSA data are
provided by a variety of sensors and systems from across the
commercial, civil, military, and intelligence communities. As space
continues to become more congested and contested, SSA systems are key
to ensuring safe operation of space assets for the U.S. government. As
such, DOD has made investments in SSA, such as the Space Fence radar
system, which significantly increased the number of objects that the
U.S. can track in space, and the Space Command and Control (Space C2)
program, which is expected to significantly improve processing and
dissemination of SSA data. U.S. Space Force documentation also
emphasizes the importance of information on orbiting objects. For
example, in its Space Power Space Capstone Publication, U.S. Space
Force identifies Space Domain Awareness (SDA) as one of its five core
competencies. The Capstone defines SDA as the effective identification,
characterization and understanding of any factor associated with the
space domain that could affect space operations and thereby impact the
security, safety, economy, or environment of our Nation. It goes on to
emphasize that to maintain awareness of spacecraft orbiting in the
domain, space forces need to know not only orbital trajectory but also
mission related details such as missions, intentions, system
capabilities, patterns-of-life, and the status of consumables and
expendables. Whether DOD's investments are sufficient to meet the needs
of the rapidly-changing space paradigm is not something we have
examined but the answer appears unclear at this time. For example, in
2019, we found that DOD faced a number of challenges in developing new
command and control capabilities under its Space C2 program, including
management issues and technical complexity. We also found that the DOD
faced limits in processing the increased amount of SSA sensor data with
current data systems. DOD concurred with recommendations we made for
addressing such challenges. We are continuing to monitor the
development of SSA capabilities. Specifically, we are reviewing Space
C2 program annual reports in response to a provision in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Additionally, beginning
this year we plan to initiate a review of the National Space Defense
Center's SSA needs and role in integrating SSA data in response to a
provision in the House report to a bill for the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.