    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-36]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

        FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                  MAY 24, 2021

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
        Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                    Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                   Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                               Zach Taylor, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
    Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Cleveland, MG Charles H., USA, Associate Director of Operations,
      National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency........................     7
    Hill, John D., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
      Defense for Space Policy, U.S. Department of Defense...........     2
    Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security
      Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............     8
    Scolese, Christopher J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office     5
    Thompson, Gen David D., USSF, Vice Chief of Space Operations,
      United States Space Force......................................     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Cleveland, MG Charles H......................................    53
        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    29
        Hill, John D.................................................    32
        Ludwigson, Jon...............................................    59
        Scolese, Christopher J.......................................    47
        Thompson, Gen David D........................................    39
        Turner, Hon. Michael R.......................................    30

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Dr. DesJarlais...............................................    95
        Mr. Khanna...................................................    96
        Mr. Lamborn..................................................    94
        Mr. Langevin.................................................    87
        Mr. Morelle..................................................   101
        Mr. Turner...................................................    88
        FISCAL YEAR 2022 PRIORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                  Washington, DC, Monday, May 24, 2021.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:03 a.m., via
    Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
        This is a meeting of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.
    And I would like to thank the distinguished witnesses. First,
    performing the duties of Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Space Policy, Mr. John Hill; the Vice Chief of Space
    Operations, General David Thompson; the Director of the
    National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Christopher Scolese;
    Associate Director of Operations for the National Geospatial-
    Intelligence Agency, Major General Charles Cleveland; and GAO
    [Government Accountability Office] Director of Contracting and
    National Security Acquisitions, Mr. Jon Ludwigson.
        We are honored to have this level of expertise within the
    Department and intelligence community and to have them testify
    today at the hearing.
        It has been 2 years since this subcommittee has had a
    hearing on space acquisition, and, in my opinion, hardly any
    topic in DOD [Department of Defense] is more important than
    this one. We have seen the overdue establishment of Space
    Force, the reestablishment of Space Command, and public
    acknowledgement of the many threats we face from abroad. I am
    hopeful that the Department will use this opportunity to
    accelerate and improve space acquisition within the Space
    Force.
        General Hyten, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, has pointed out that the next generation of OPIR
    [Overhead Persistent Infrared] is still planning on giving us,
    as he calls it, quote, ``big, juicy targets'' to orbit, instead
    of the more distributed, less vulnerable architecture that we
    could be choosing. And he personally has encountered numerous
    obstacles from DOD to having new and improved architectures.
    So, if the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
    difficulties, I have difficulties. We have to make sure this
    works.
        I will turn now to my ranking member, Mr. Turner, for any
    opening remarks he has, but I would like to take a point of
    personal privilege. I am wearing my Predators tie. We won in
    double overtime last night. So it is an amazing thing for a
    Nashville-based hockey team to be doing so well again.
        Mr. Turner.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 29.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much, and thank you
    for holding this important hearing.
        I agree with you, this is one of the most important topics,
    perhaps besides nuclear modernization, that we are dealing
    with. We continually hear from General Raymond the issue of the
    provocative actions that China and Russia are taking in space,
    and we know that it is going to take not only our working
    defensively but also in the manner in which we deploy and
    design our architecture. I look forward to hearing from the
    witnesses today as to how they see that evolving.
        Also, since the Biden administration is delivering its
    budget late May, we are going to be dealing, most likely, with
    a CR [continuing resolution]. And I would love to hear from the
    witnesses as to how this may affect their operations, knowing
    that in space so many of the things that we do are single
    projects and that they may be more particularly impacted by CRs
    than other functions.
        With that, I will submit my written statement for the
    record, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
    Appendix on page 30.]
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's comments are well taken.
        Without objection, any opening statement is accepted for
    the record.
        Let's now hear from our first witness, Mr. Hill.

     STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT
       SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Mr. Hill. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
    testify before you today along with my distinguished
    colleagues.
        You have my written statement. I will summarize it and,
    with your permission, have it placed in the record.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Hill. Thank you.
        This subcommittee well understands the importance of space-
    based capabilities to our national security in this era of
    destabilizing challenges from Russia and undeniable strategic
    competition with China.
        The increasing threats to those capabilities are also well
    known. As Secretary Austin has testified, the growth of Chinese
    and Russian counterspace capabilities presents the most
    immediate and serious threats to U.S., allied, and partner
    space activities.
        Moreover, Russia and China view space as critical to modern
    warfare and consider the use of counterspace capabilities as
    both a means of reducing U.S. military effectiveness and
    winning future wars.
        As these developments portend, the United States must now
    be prepared for conflict to extend to or even originate in
    space. But, to be clear, such a conflict would not be a space
    war, distinct from terrestrial war, but would, rather,
    represent the extension of traditional armed conflict into the
    space domain of human endeavor.
        Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Space Policy, we are focused on the integration of strategy,
    policy, plans, and appropriate capabilities to develop a space
    posture that contributes to integrated cross-domain deterrence
    by conveying clearly to competitors and any potential adversary
    the inadvisability of military aggression, including attacks on
    U.S. space capabilities or those of our allies and partners.
        The 2020 Defense Space Strategy, which my office prepared,
    addresses these challenges of deterrence as well as the
    challenges of crisis de-escalation and warfare extending to
    space along four lines of effort.
        First, we are building comprehensive military advantages in
    space. Second, we are integrating space into national, joint,
    and combined operations. Third, we are shaping the strategy
    environment to enhance domain stability and reduce the
    potential for miscalculation. And, fourth, we are enhancing
    space cooperation with our international partners, our
    commercial entities, and our interagency partners.
        Finally, in support of the national security strategic
    guidelines, my office also leads DOD's participation in the
    U.S. Government's space diplomatic initiative, which currently
    center on establishing voluntary, nonbinding standards of
    responsible behavior and on exposing the disingenuous space
    arms control initiatives of Russia and China.
        Mr. Chairman, I am honored to have played a part in the
    collaborative and bipartisan efforts of the executive and
    legislative branches over the past several years to strengthen
    our national security space posture. I look forward to
    continuing to work with Congress, with our interagency
    colleagues, U.S. industry, and our international allies and
    partners to secure the advantages of space for our national
    interests.
        And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
    Appendix on page 32.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, sir.
        Now General Thompson.

     STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID D. THOMPSON, USSF, VICE CHIEF OF SPACE
                 OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE

        General Thompson. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner,
    and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    the opportunity to testify today in my capacity as Vice Chief
    of Space Operations, United States Space Force.
        On behalf of the Chief of Space Operations, General Jay
    Raymond, and joined by these outstanding national security
    space leaders on the panel, it is a pleasure to provide you
    details today on the stand-up of the newest U.S. military
    service and inform you of our plans for the coming year.
        I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to
    Congress for its bipartisan support in establishing the U.S.
    Space Force on December 20, 2019, and your leadership in
    addressing the threats and challenges the Nation faces in
    space.
        Year one of the Space Force's existence has been focused on
    standing up this new service. With purposeful outreach to and
    the collaboration of Congress, U.S. Space Force has made
    tremendous strides in the first year: establishing and
    resourcing the organizational blueprint for the service; moving
    aggressively in the areas of human capital, force design,
    acquisition integration; and providing the foundations to
    establish a truly digital service; all while executing our
    critical space missions around the clock and without fail.
        General Raymond's direction for year two is the integration
    of the Space Force into the joint force, the interagency, and
    with our allies and partners, even as we continue to build out
    the service.
        While we have completed the congressional requirement to
    establish a service within 18 months, build-out of the Space
    Force continues and will take several more years. We have
    established the first field command, Space Operations Command,
    and completed the organizational design of the remaining two,
    Space Systems Command and Space Training and Readiness Command,
    with anticipated stand-up of those two commands later this
    year.
        Space Operations Command is responsible for preparing and
    presenting forces to U.S. Space Command and other combatant
    commands. Space Systems Command will develop and field world-
    class space capabilities for our Space Forces and drive agility
    and speed into the acquisition process. And Space Training and
    Readiness Command will recruit, develop, and train guardians to
    protect the high ground of space.
        As part of year two's integration activities, the Space
    Force will place increasing emphasis on strengthening
    relationships with existing partners and establishing
    relationships with new partners. This starts with the
    organizations represented here today. It extends to the other
    services, combatant commands, and our allies and other
    international partners. The United States as a whole, and the
    U.S. Space Force in particular, are much stronger when these
    relationships are strong.
        Next, General Raymond and the entire leadership of the
    Department of the Air Force remain committed and adamant that
    we must increase the pace of space acquisition. Maintaining
    program delivery timelines of the recent past will not outpace
    the threat. We must go faster.
        The Space Force will continue to smartly leverage the 804
    authorities granted by Congress, and we will partner with
    industry and academia to leverage technology and innovation of
    the commercial sector. Our adversaries have recognized the
    importance of such an approach to the national security space.
    In my opinion, the creativity, ingenuity, and innovation of the
    American mind is one of our greatest assets. We must leverage
    that fully in this endeavor.
        Our people, our guardians, are critical to the success of
    the Space Force. We are adapting new and innovative human
    capital and talent management approaches for both civilians and
    military members alike under the authorities granted by
    Congress and with your assistance.
        In addition, the recent release of the ``Vision for a
    Digital Service'' seeks to build the fluency of that workforce
    and prepare and posture them and the service to be more agile
    and innovative in the future.
        Finally, the U.S. Space Force will continue to partner with
    other agencies in the executive branch and Congress to promote
    responsible behavior in space and a secure, stable domain
    accessible to all for peaceful purposes.
        Our service's inception is an unprecedented opportunity.
    Our success today could not have been possible without a
    passionate and energetic group of guardians, a fully committed
    partnership with the Departments of the Air Force and Defense,
    and the support of Congress.
        On behalf of General Raymond, thank you again for this
    opportunity, and I look forward to your questions and concerns
    today.
        [The prepared statement of General Thompson can be found in
    the Appendix on page 39.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General.
        Now we will hear from Dr. Scolese.

        STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
                         RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

        Dr. Scolese. Good morning, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
    Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am
    glad to be here with strong partners General ``DT'' Thompson,
    Mr. Hill, Major General Cleveland, and Mr. Ludwigson.
        It is a great honor to represent the people of the National
    Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. Our agency proudly develops,
    acquires, launches, and operates the Nation's reconnaissance
    satellites as a member of both the intelligence community and
    Department of Defense.
        Mr. Chairman, please allow me to share a reflection on our
    past year.
        While addressing the COVID health and safety protocols to
    protect our workforce and families, NRO ensured the mission
    continued to meet our commitments to intelligence analysts,
    warfighters, and policymakers. Due to the incredible efforts of
    our people and partners, I am pleased to report NRO systems
    maintained 100 percent of their capabilities throughout the
    pandemic.
        During a challenging time, we accomplished 6 successful
    launches, delivering 12 payloads to orbit, many with first-ever
    capabilities, the most NRO launches in a single year since
    1984.
        On the business side, we achieved our 12th consecutive
    clean financial audit, a feat of financial management
    excellence unrivaled in the IC [intelligence community]. Last
    year, we also began our NRO Cadre Internship Program,
    establishing a key recruitment element in our workforce
    strategy.
        Turning to today, we are bridging the innovative legacies
    of our past with cutting-edge vision for our future as we
    celebrate our 60th anniversary. Since its inception in 1961,
    NRO has taken quantum leaps in the evolution of overhead
    reconnaissance space and ground systems. Our success can be
    traced to NRO's end-to-end mission responsibility: developing,
    acquiring, launching, and operating mission systems.
        We are a streamlined, flat organization that has a diverse
    workforce with an exceptional mix of skills, perspectives, and
    backgrounds. This enables us to deliver on acquisitions while
    developing next-generation capabilities and systems.
        Adversaries are moving quickly, and so must we. NRO stays
    out front by developing advanced technologies, leveraging
    commercial solutions, strengthening government and
    international partnerships, adapting processes to innovate
    faster, and baking in resilience, from our assets on the ground
    to our systems on orbit.
        Our work with IC, DOD, civil, industry, and academic
    partners enables the U.S. to maintain strategic advantage. NRO
    sensors give analysts and policymakers insights about
    activities in hard-to-reach and denied areas and enable
    indications and warnings. We have close relationships with the
    National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and National Security
    Agency, who task our satellites to provide vital geospatial and
    signals intelligence that underpins the full spectrum of all-
    source analysis across the national and military intelligence
    communities.
        Since the stand-up of the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space
    Command, we have forged strong new relationships to mutually
    coordinate activities that assure that space-based systems that
    the Nation and our allies rely on can operate without
    disruption in an increasingly contested and congested space
    domain.
        Our relationships are important to us. For example, NRO
    Deputy Director Major General Michael Guetlein and I have just
    returned from a 2-week visit to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
    in Hawaii and U.S. Forces Korea in South Korea. We met with our
    embedded NRO field representatives in INDOPACOM, U.S. Forces
    Korea, and component command senior leaders to listen to and
    understand their needs, priorities, and requirements of our
    customers.
        During the trip, we gathered actionable feedback, watched
    how NRO data systems and tools are used in theater, and
    addressed future capabilities and collaborative opportunities.
    This engagement hit the mark, and we are already arranging
    follow-on directorate-level engagements.
        By far, NRO's most important asset is its people. Our
    people make all the difference and will lead us to a future
    where we can, as we like to say with a nod to one of our
    founders, Edwin Land, see it all, see it well, see it now, and
    innovate faster.
        Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss NRO's
    unique value and capabilities. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Scolese can be found in the
    Appendix on page 47.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Doctor.
        And we will hear from Major General Cleveland.

     STATEMENT OF MG CHARLES H. CLEVELAND, USA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
         OF OPERATIONS, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        General Cleveland. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
    Member Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    share a little bit about NGA's [National Geospatial-
    Intelligence Agency's] mission in the space domain.
        NGA and our predecessor organizations have a long history
    of supporting our Nation's space activities, and, as an
    organization reliant upon airborne and satellite imagery, we
    have always made a priority of being aware of activities in
    space and near-space.
        At NGA, our efforts are spurred by the same sense of
    urgency that spurred the stand-up of U.S. Space Command.
    Namely, the Earth's orbit is no longer a benign environment,
    and the threat to U.S. national security interests from foreign
    space powers is real and growing.
        Last year, we rolled out the moonshot initiative at NGA, a
    whole-of-agency effort to maintain and expand our GEOINT
    [geospatial intelligence] advantage in all realms, including
    space. We have developed a four-pillar strategy based on
    people, partnerships, and preparation for the missions of today
    and tomorrow.
        The first pillar is people. NGA's workforce has been
    thriving in the space domain for decades. In fact, we helped
    map the Moon for the NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration] Moon landings in the 1960s and the 1970s. To
    maintain a competitive edge, we are increasing our investments
    in developing our tradecraft and training our workforce for the
    space domain. And to support our people, we are training our
    officers in big data management and analysis and growing our
    artificial intelligence expertise. Over time, this will provide
    a cadre of experts who can execute the warfighter and IC
    requirements and develop the next generation of space GEOINT
    professionals.
        The second pillar is partnerships. NGA continues to
    strengthen our strategic partnerships while building new
    relationships with civilian components of government, with
    industry, and with our allied partners.
        Within the space domain, NRO is our lead partner in
    advancing space GEOINT capabilities, including new commercial
    sources. And our partnership with the U.S. Space Force is
    deepening every day through information-sharing and
    collaboration. We are working with these partners to ensure no
    duplication of effort and to create efficiencies.
        We also maintain embedded personnel through our NGA support
    teams, or NSTs, at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]
    headquarters, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center in
    Ohio, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Alabama.
    And, in 2019, NGA established a SPACECOM [United States Space
    Command] NST, and we are continuing to grow the NST as SPACECOM
    becomes fully operational.
        The third pillar is mission today. Space is vitally
    important to NGA's mission. It is the environment in which the
    sensors that provide most of our data operate. We recognize
    that our adversaries and near-peer competitors have the means
    to deny us that resource, and so NGA extends the same level of
    commitment to our warfighters in space, and the recently
    established SPACECOM NST has embedded NGA's unique capabilities
    in the command.
        The final pillar is mission tomorrow. Based on Earth and in
    space, one of the most critical missions NGA performs for the
    Nation is assured positioning, navigation, and timing, what we
    call Assured PNT. This is the foundation for our foundation.
    Everything that depends on knowing exactly where and when
    something is on or about the Earth uses this unique form of
    GEOINT.
        NGA is the global leader in providing the geosciences that
    enable the accuracy and precision of DOD weapons systems, of
    safety and navigation efforts, and of economic and civil
    applications that use capabilities like GPS [Global Positioning
    System] and precision timing. Assured PNT is a mission
    imperative for us, and NGA plans to invest additional resources
    to ensure the integrity and resiliency of these capabilities.
        Finally, I would like to say thanks to this committee for
    its support of NGA's safety of navigation mission. Your support
    helped modernize NGA's authorities and addressed our shift from
    paper to a digital and secure electronic delivery to support
    electronic-based navigation in all domains.
        In conclusion, NGA has reacted aggressively to support
    space and is making progress in the domain. We are realigning
    to protect U.S. national security interests in the space domain
    to deter, protect, and defeat our adversaries in space.
        Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Cleveland can be found
    in the Appendix on page 53.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, General.
        Now we will hear from Mr. Ludwigson.

    STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL
      SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Ludwigson. [Inaudible] I will summarize my written
    statement but submit it for the record.
        DOD's space systems are important to our national security,
    facilitating communications, providing real-time global
    visibility, as well as serving other key roles. For decades,
    these systems provided the U.S. with unparalleled advantages.
        Our past work has highlighted problems with DOD space
    acquisitions, including multibillion-dollar cost overruns,
    multiyear delays, and deferred capabilities. Fortunately, many
    of the programs that led us to these findings are now nearing
    completion. My written statement highlights the status of
    several programs. As you may have noted, many of the
    traditional programs are over budget and delayed, but some are
    not.
        Our recent report also provides some insight. For example,
    our GPS report earlier this year highlighted that, despite
    having satellites capable of broadcasting a jam-resistant GPS
    signal for military users since 2005, DOD remains years away
    from widespread use of it. Similar disconnects between space
    and non-space elements have happened for other space systems.
        I want to emphasize that, while DOD has already deployed
    numerous space-based systems, the space elements do not last
    forever, and systems require periodic updates to continue to
    meet mission needs.
        In addition, some potential adversaries now have the means
    and intentions of holding our space-based capabilities at risk.
    As a result, we face important questions about how to mitigate
    the risks to current space systems, recapitalize our existing
    capabilities, and potentially add new ones.
        Congress and DOD have taken steps aimed at improving
    acquisitions and oversight of space programs. In particular,
    there have been efforts to change acquisition authorities,
    including the creation of middle-tier acquisitions, which aim
    to produce a usable product within 5 years and provide
    administrative relief to do this.
        My written statement highlights five of these programs,
    including two in the next-gen OPIR effort, which we issued a
    nonpublic report on earlier this year.
        There are also efforts to provide acquisition authority
    specific to space programs. We shared our views on a draft Air
    Force proposal earlier this year and expect to do the same for
    a forthcoming DOD proposal.
        In addition, DOD has undertaken a dramatic restructuring
    aimed at consolidating space oversight. The creation of the
    Space Force has captured headlines, but the reorganization
    moved multiple organizations into the Space Force and created
    new ones. Key among these are the new Space Development Agency
    and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, both tasked with
    quickly developing new systems. Also, the stand-up of U.S.
    Space Command is designed to provide unified control over space
    operations.
        Looking ahead, DOD faces several broad challenges.
        First, the stand-up of the new Space Force and the related
    reorganization may streamline the DOD space enterprise and
    sharpen the focus on the development and operations of space
    systems but brings with it a variety of challenges. Only 2
    years ago, we reported that DOD was unsure how many acquisition
    staff were working on DOD space programs. Moving people and
    organizations and establishing new lines of authority may bring
    growing pains that could distract from their mission if not
    managed well.
        Second, paying for cost overruns for older systems while
    attempting to recapitalize and replace some or all of those
    systems could be challenging. Notably, DOD is developing or
    planning at least 10 space programs in nearly every mission
    area, including communications; missile warning; command and
    control; launch; and position, navigation, and timing.
        Finally, balancing efforts to enhance acquisition
    authorities with ensuring opportunities for effective oversight
    will be important. The record on DOD space acquisitions is
    replete with examples of cost overruns and missed schedules.
    Oftentimes, people point to the ubiquitous paperwork as the
    cause of the slow process. However, I urge the subcommittee to
    consider what I call the first principles behind the paperwork.
    I would argue that we need agreement on a few things. These are
    the first principles to build strong programs and the ability
    to oversee them.
        It is not a given that DOD will repeat its past mistakes.
    We have identified and shared leading practices to improve
    acquisition outcomes, including building strong oversights into
    programs, using data and demonstrable knowledge to anchor
    decisions, empowering program managers to make decisions but
    holding them accountable for their choices, and canceling
    unsuccessful programs. Adopting these leading practices could
    help DOD achieve faster delivery of new capabilities,
    especially if DOD balances new streamlined acquisition
    processes with sufficient oversight to help ensure program
    success.
        Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, this concludes my
    statement. I would be happy to answer any questions the
    subcommittee members may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in
    the Appendix on page 59.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much. It is always good to hear
    from GAO.
        We will now question the witnesses and try to limit every
    member to 5 minutes so that we can distribute the questions as
    much as possible.
        Let me begin with Mr. Ludwigson. I think it was in 2016,
    there was a report from GAO that said there were some 60 people
    within DOD who had the power to say ``no'' over then-Air Force
    space programs, and most members of the Armed Services
    Committee thought that was way too many naysayers and could be
    one reason for the delay.
        You mentioned that the new Space Force is somewhat
    streamlined. How many naysayers are there today? Are there
    still 60? Has the number gone up or down?
        Mr. Ludwigson. We haven't updated that work at this point.
    But, as you know, the stand-up of Space Force is an ongoing
    process. Components have been moved around. I am not sure that
    the Space Force itself is in its final form.
        As you may recall from that fragmentation report, there
    were a wide number of agencies who were involved in the
    decisionmaking process that went into space acquisitions, and
    not all of those have been moved into Space Force.
        Even if the entities who are not going to move into Space
    Force remain independent, it is going to be important for the
    entities to coordinate their activities, because space is so
    connected, as a couple of the speakers mentioned. Especially in
    the context of multidomain operations, so much of it is
    connected to one another, both at the service level and--Space
    Force and NRO, for example, that is a relationship that is
    going to have to remain very strong.
        Mr. Cooper. I think you and GAO have pointed out that there
    are some, what, 8,000 people involved, in 50 different
    organizations, and it has been kind of hard to even keep up
    with that part of things.
        But I think the overall thrust here is, we need to be able
    to field systems that work and field them faster. I personally
    would love to see them under budget, but it is even more
    important that they be working systems, not like the 2005
    disaster, where you have the capability we haven't been able to
    use, even though the satellite has been up there, ready to use
    it, all that time. Sometimes it is satellite, sometimes it is
    ground stations, sometimes it is--people don't even know what
    it is.
        But, in the effort to get things to move faster, I couldn't
    help but be impressed by the NRO's announcement, even during
    COVID, they were able to have 6 successful launches with 12
    major payloads. That is pretty impressive.
        And I know that is a mature organization, but that is the
    organization that I think most members of the Armed Services
    Committee had in mind when we were thinking about how the Space
    Force should be run--streamlined, flat, plenty of diversity,
    and gets the job done, oftentimes with little fanfare.
        So I know that General Raymond is working hard on this,
    General Thompson, others, but--and I know there are going to be
    inevitable birthing pains, but--and aren't there something like
    10 804 programs going on right now? And I hope they all yield
    great results, because I am certainly feeling the pressure from
    the foreign threats.
        Mr. Hill, your excellent report mentioned that you have
    come up with two theories of deterrence: deterrence by denial
    and also deterrence by cost. Could you flesh those out a little
    bit more? To me, it sounds like one is absolute deterrence, and
    the other is more like situational deterrence. How would you
    describe those?
        Mr. Hill. Chairman Cooper, yes, that was the report that we
    submitted last year to Congress.
        So longstanding deterrence theory, you have always had
    deterrence by denying the benefits of attack, as well as
    deterrence by the potential imposition of unacceptable costs.
        What we are describing in that report is, with respect to
    the space domain--and the focus of the report was supposed to
    be space deterrence--we said, in the space domain, the reliance
    of the United States on space means that adversaries see a
    potential benefit in attacking us in space. And so we have to
    very much focus on the mission assurance that will reduce the
    benefits of attack.
        And what you are focused on is deterring military
    aggression overall. You don't want your adversary to see
    military aggression as an option, as a viable option, for
    pursuing their political objectives.
        So we think that there may be cost imposition in other
    domains. There may certainly be reason to deny someone's use of
    a particularly threatening space capability. But, for the most
    part, the balance on deterrence with respect to space focuses
    on assuring our capabilities, which I think is exactly where
    you are going with your focus on getting our acquisition to
    move faster.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, it sounds like, in plain English, our
    first choice is deterrence by denial, and then, if we can't get
    that, then we impose cost. So that is second-best or third-best
    deterrence, when we might not necessarily be able to eliminate
    any benefit they might get.
        Mr. Hill. Yes. The point, though, I think, on imposing
    costs is, it is always there; it just might be in a different
    domain. This gets to the sense of the cross-domain and
    integrated deterrence.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, certainly, modern warfare reaches many
    domains, and it will certainly always include space, I guess.
        Let me turn now to the ranking member, see what questions
    he has.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to share your affinity for GAO. There has been a
    tremendous amount of important legislation and policy changes
    that have come out of GAO reports. I don't have a question for
    Mr. Ludwigson. I just want to comment that he had the best
    summation I have ever heard from GAO: They have some programs
    that are late and over budget; some are not. The good-news part
    of that was the ``some are not'' addition that I appreciated.
        So I have two questions for General Thompson and General
    Cleveland.
        I am going to start with you, General Thompson. General
    Cleveland states in his opening statement that Earth's orbit is
    no longer a benign environment. We have threats from foreign
    nations. It is basically an understanding that space is now
    becoming a warfighting domain.
        Now, Mr. Hill talked about deterrence, which, of course, is
    a more difficult thing to accomplish because, you know, it is
    not just operational that is affecting the assessment by your
    adversary.
        But will you talk about deterrence?
        We talked about redundancy; we talked about resiliency. We
    now see threats to space from the ground, threats to space in
    space. We see in the future maybe threats from the ground from
    space. So, clearly, we must change. We are looking to, you
    know, ways in which we can also rely on commercial access.
        What are the things that you think that we need to be doing
    immediately? And how fast, how quickly can we do them?
        General Thompson.
        General Thompson. So, Representative Turner, thanks so much
    for that. There are a whole host of answers to that question,
    but, certainly, in the interest of time, I will just limit
    myself to two.
        The first is--and probably the most significant gaps and
    limitations we have had are specifically related to the fact
    that space has only recently become a warfighting domain.
        The first is, we don't have a truly operational
    intelligence enterprise for space. We have, for years, done
    great work foundationally. The National Air and Space
    Intelligence Center is one of those centers that is set up
    foundationally, but extending that to our tactical units, our
    operational units, a deep understanding of the capabilities of
    our adversaries in the domain, what their tactics are.
        Training intelligence professionals in that regard to be
    able to do that, that is one of the limitations we have. But we
    are moving out very rapidly.
        I think as you are aware, here in January, we became the
    18th member of the intelligence community. We have put together
    a plan to establish a national space intelligence center. We
    are rapidly building the capability to train our own space-
    focused intelligence professionals. And so we are moving out
    aggressively in that regard, but we have a lot of ground to
    cover.
        The second area I will talk about is what I will call the
    test and evaluation enterprise. And that is, we know how to
    test our systems to operate effectively in space against
    natural hazards and for a long period of time. We have never
    had to design and field and operate them in the face of
    threats.
        And so building out a test and evaluation enterprise that
    allows us to, both in modeling and simulation and other means,
    understand that our systems will perform effectively and
    respond effectively in the face of attack and threat is another
    area that we have to move out and quickly. And I think we have
    work to do now and in the future.
        Mr. Turner. Well, General Thompson, I have had this
    conversation with General Raymond. As you indicated, intel
    being one of the most important aspects. One of the things that
    we don't want to do is cannibalize our existing systems. As we
    expand our operations, our capabilities and expertise, we
    certainly don't want to weaken those that we have.
        So I am very concerned at the opportunity for stovepiping
    that might come as we expand those intel operations. So I will
    certainly be looking at that very closely and having that
    conversation with you.
        General Thompson and General Cleveland, General Raymond has
    done a great job in making certain that the information that we
    do have about what our adversaries are doing is declassified.
    This is incredibly important for policymakers to be able to
    have open discussion but also so the general public and our
    allies can see what our adversaries are doing.
        I always point out that our allies' legislative bodies do
    not have access to intelligence information or even a
    Congressional Research Service like we do. Getting information
    out in the public domain actually puts information in the hands
    of those parliaments and legislators.
        I would like each of you to talk about the importance of
    making certain that we declassify this information. We are
    always so worried about means, methods, and techniques, but I
    think we also need to worry about ends, and that is, what are
    our adversaries attempting to do. And by identifying that, we
    can then empower you to fashion responses.
        General Thompson, General Cleveland, if you could talk
    about the issue of declassification.
        General Thompson. Representative Turner, just a few
    comments, and then I will pass it to General Cleveland.
        You are absolutely right in that regard. I think our over-
    classification and tendency to over-classify is still a little
    bit of the vestige of the Cold War mindset and the fact that we
    had such incredible and exquisite capabilities that others
    didn't.
        Because of the fact that we now need to operate more
    broadly in coalitions and we need to make sure that our leaders
    and the public are aware of our capabilities, our threats, and
    what we are doing about it, it really does drive the need to
    declassify.
        I will also say that we have made some significant steps in
    that regard; more to go. But I would also say that both the
    National Air and Space Intelligence Center and DIA recently
    published some very, very good unclassified products on the
    threats we face. And they have been more forthcoming in those
    products than we have seen in many years. And I would start
    there as a great means to [inaudible] our friends, our allies,
    the public, and others in terms of the threats that we face.
        I will pass to General Cleveland.
        General Cleveland. Sir, good morning again, and thank you
    for the question. I absolutely agree with the need to be
    publishing at an unclassified level or being prepared to
    declassify as needed.
        I think, whether it is in space or whether it is in the
    broader efforts that we are doing as an agency, it is clear
    that we are, as a Nation, competing in the information
    environment on a daily basis. And we think that at NGA we have
    a huge role and quite a bit to contribute to that.
        In some instances, I think it is an effort to declassify,
    but I think we also need to be focused on how can we publish at
    a level that can be released immediately and enable both
    policymakers and decisionmakers to share that information as
    needed.
        In terms of our partners, of course, we maintain good,
    strong relationships with a number of allied partners. And the
    vast majority of the production that we provide is at a
    releasable level, at our Five Eyes level and at some of the
    other levels.
        And so every step we take is a recognition that we are
    competing in the information environment, and we think that we
    do have a huge role in not only being prepared to declassify as
    needed but also to produce and to collect at an unclassified
    level to support our policymakers.
        Mr. Turner. Last question. Continuing resolutions have a
    tremendous effect on DOD and all of our operations across our
    agencies. Sadly, the fiscal year is statutorily set. Congress
    could move it to December 31, which I think every year would
    save DOD about 3 months of backlog. I have been an advocate for
    that.
        I just wanted to take an opportunity--because I think that
    the area of space is probably even more particularly impacted
    by continuing resolutions--to give anyone who is on our panel
    an opportunity to chime in and to give us some additional
    thought around the evils and the effects to your operations and
    your area of continuing resolutions.
        General Thompson. Representative Turner, General Thompson.
        Just briefly, I would say, from the aspect of space and
    primarily speaking for the Space Force, there is an additional
    effect, for a couple of reasons.
        One is, there has been mention of some of the programs we
    have ongoing, the authorities we are using, but, also, we are
    in the process of starting new programs. I will tell you that,
    while certainly we want folks to maintain their oversight of
    those programs, right now we are in pretty good stead in terms
    of the performance of the programs.
        But because we are trying to start new programs with new
    capabilities specifically focused on defending and protecting
    and other things and because, in fact, some of the changes we
    need to make, some of the mission transfers and some of the
    establishment of new authorities, do require passage of law, we
    are probably more affected than others in a general sense, just
    because of the critical need to begin those programs focused on
    the shortfall of defending and protecting and because we need
    to continue to build out the organizations and the capabilities
    required to act as a service focused on the warfighting domain
    of space.
        Mr. Turner. Anyone else?
        Dr. Scolese. Yeah, I would add to what General Thompson
    said, in saying that it does delay the start of new programs,
    but it also has an impact on what we are doing with continuing
    programs that may delay, also, some of our ability to continue
    those programs on the pace that we had and may require some
    degree of reprogramming before we can go forward.
        Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I saw Mr. Hill reach for the
    microphone. I don't know if we have any time remaining.
        Mr. Hill. Just to underscore what General Thompson said and
    what, really, Ranking Member Turner, what you said as well
    about the problems of continuing resolutions.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the ranking member. Points well taken.
        Before I yield to, first, Mr. Carbajal, then Mr. Wilson,
    Mr. Horsford, and Mr. Lamborn, let me point out the obvious,
    that all the growing pains of the Space Force, the various
    tasks that need to be done, were apparently things that the Air
    Force was not doing when they were in charge of this domain. So
    I am thankful that Space Force is doing it, but I am sorry that
    we are having to rebuild what probably should have been built
    before.
        Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And good morning to everyone. At least it is ``good
    morning'' in California; I know it is about to be lunch out
    there.
        General Thompson, Vandenberg Air Force Base is located in
    my district. In the fiscal year 2021 National Defense
    Authorization Act, I requested a report outlining the
    requirements for sustaining and improving the physical
    infrastructure of space launch ranges.
        The report noted that the diversity of launch providers,
    payload, customers, and weapons-systems testers are at an all-
    time high, which often requires infrastructure modifications,
    enhancements, and modernization to meet the mission needs of
    the customers.
        My office has been trying to get additional information
    from the Space Force on a point in the report that states, ``A
    challenge the ranges face is the limitation of commercial
    investment of mutually beneficial projects.'' The report says
    that the Space Force is seeking to address this challenge
    through changes to the commercial space launch cooperation
    statute.
        Can you elaborate, what changes are you considering in this
    area?
        General Thompson. Representative Carbajal, yes, I can. And,
    sir, if I may make a minor point of correction for you. As of
    May 14, Vandenberg Space Force Base is now a part of your
    district. We were able to rename that base on the 14th of May.
        Yes, sir, as you stated--so we believe that launch and,
    absolutely, I think most believe that launch is a national
    security asset, but it is not just a matter of a national
    security asset for launching national security payloads; the
    economic and commercial aspects of launch also have important
    national security implications.
        But the launch enterprise, as we understand it today, is in
    a period of growth and evolution, and we need to adapt some of
    our policies and procedures and processes to adjust.
        Among them is what we call our Range of the Future
    initiative. And what we are doing in that regard is working
    hard to ensure that our Space Force processes for safety, for
    range operations, for support, to protect the public, are not
    inhibitors, first, in the way that launch providers need to
    provide their operations and, also, to reduce the costs that
    they incur when they come to our national launch ranges.
        So the launch Range of the Future initiative seeks to do
    that. And, as you said, part of that effort is to find ways to
    be able to partner with those commercial activities to share
    the cost and, also, if they have specific desires and needs, to
    help upgrade the infrastructure to let them do that.
        We will work with your office and with the OSD [Office of
    the Secretary of Defense] staff to provide you additional
    details in that regard. But it is a request to make some
    adjustments to the way costs are shared, costs are incurred,
    and investments are allowed with the commercial sector.
        Mr. Carbajal. Great. I would appreciate it if your team can
    follow up with my staff.
        General Thompson, just to continue, building off my
    previous question, I understand that ranges annually compete
    for facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization
    funds to sustain, repair, and construct projects.
        The focus on these efforts is to sustain existing
    infrastructure, rather than growing capability to meet the
    diverse user base of the launch ranges. To the extent the focus
    is to growing capabilities in addition to sustainment, does the
    Space Force require additional funds, or would it require a
    policy change?
        General Thompson. Representative, I think I would refer
    back to the previous question.
        Certainly, modernization and sustainment of our
    infrastructure is a challenge not just on the ranges but across
    the space enterprise. We have 134 locations worldwide, all with
    their own unique challenges. We seek to budget sustainment
    funds at the appropriate level to cover all and attack those
    challenges where the priorities lie.
        As with all activities, more resources to help us work on
    those infrastructure challenges never hurt. I would say,
    adequate resourcing exists, but additional resourcing is
    never--there is always use for additional resources. But that,
    coupled with some of the potential policy changes we talked
    about in the last question, would definitely be helpful.
        Mr. Carbajal. Great.
        And, lastly, no response is needed, but I would be remiss
    if I didn't take this opportunity to urge you to consider
    Vandenberg Space Force Base to be the future home of STARCOM
    [Space Training and Readiness Command].
        So, with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Now Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Jim Cooper and Ranking
    Member Mike Turner, for coordinating this very important
    hearing today.
        And we are so grateful as to the dedicated personnel that
    we hear who are speaking, and thank you so much for your
    service to our country.
        As a 31-year veteran of the Army National Guard myself and
    a grateful dad of three members of the National Guard, I
    strongly support a Space Force National Guard. And I am
    encouraged by reports that the force is working toward this
    creation. National Guard units have conducted space operations
    for the past 25 years and can provide the same sort of support
    to our space operations that it does to other domains.
        With that, General Thompson, the fiscal year 2021 National
    Defense Authorization Act requires the Department to submit a
    draft plan to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
    What is the status of the plan? And what do you need from this
    committee?
        General Thompson. Representative, thanks so much for that
    question.
        I will tell you that, today, before we even talk about the
    future, in the past and today, both the Air National Guard and
    the Air Force Reserve have been critical members and a critical
    part of the space mission for decades, as you noted. Without
    them, we could not execute our full suite of missions today.
    They are an incredibly valuable partner.
        We have taken this opportunity, however, to look at the
    Guard, Reserve, and regular construct and assess whether or not
    there is an approach that we could take that adjusts that for
    the future. We have been working closely with the Office of
    Secretary of Defense. I think we are close to approval of that
    report from the Secretary of Defense and submission to
    Congress.
        I think it does two things. First of all, it relies on
    tried and true and proven capabilities that we have used in the
    past and structures that we have used in the past to great
    effect and we believe will be useful in the future. There is
    also an aspect of it, I think you will see, that increases our
    flexibility, increases our permeability, and allows us to both
    address force structure issues for the Space Force but the
    needs of our guardians over time as well.
        That report is in final stage of coordination and, I
    believe, close to delivery, and we will look forward to working
    with Congress on the implementation of that report when it is
    delivered.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General. And, again, the
    capabilities of citizen soldiers can be so positive, as you
    know.
        And then, General, you highlight the importance of
    multinational space war games in creating innovative deterrence
    and identifying how our capabilities complement those of our
    allies and vice versa. These exercises, common in other
    warfighting domains, require partners with developed
    operational concepts and commitment to force designs for their
    own space forces.
        What is the current maturity of our allies' space
    capabilities? And are we doing everything we can to coordinate
    them in wargaming and experimentation?
        General Thompson. Yes, sir. So, over the last--I am going
    to say over the last decade, our allies and partners have made
    tremendous gains, tremendous progress.
        One of the things that we have done is, the Schriever
    Wargame that has been in place since around the turn of the
    century, around 2000, we have greatly expanded to include ally
    participation. We include participation at the policy level, at
    the ministerial level, and also in terms of operational
    capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
        That has done a tremendous amount for them to open up their
    eyes in terms of the threats, in terms of the challenges, and
    specifically the capabilities that they need to provide and
    bring to the table to help us operate more effectively as a
    coalition and a set of nations.
        We continue that activity today. And we are looking at
    increased investment from our Five Eyes partners--the U.K.
    [United Kingdom], Canada, Australia, New Zealand--but also the
    French, the Germans, the Japanese. All are looking to increase
    their investment and capability.
        Mr. Wilson. And that is really encouraging. Also, Korea.
        And, Secretary Hill, commercial satellite companies like
    SpaceX and Blue Origin are poised to introduce thousands of new
    satellites over the next decade. Ensuring appropriate oversight
    of the partnerships with our innovative private industry is a
    careful consideration of the committee.
        What is the Department doing to reduce costs by embracing
    the military-commercial and public-private hybrid acquisition
    approaches to national space security challenges?
        Mr. Hill. Thank you, Congressman.
        Both in the Defense Department and, I think, our colleagues
    from the intelligence community would say is that we are
    focusing on using both the services, the new services that
    commercial space provides, launch area, space-based Earth
    imaging, satellite communications, and, of course, the
    broadband capabilities that you spoke about some of the people
    providing.
        And we are also seeing so much innovation in the way they
    design their architectures. And that is being brought into the
    way we think about how to design our own architectures, giving
    a lot of new opportunities to diversify, add resilience, and
    reduce costs.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Horsford.
        Mr. Horsford. Well, thank you, Chairman Cooper. It is great
    to be here. This is my first meeting for the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee. And as one of the newest members on HASC [House
    Armed Services Committee], I am looking forward to working with
    all of my colleagues on these important issues.
        Thank you also to our witnesses for testifying today.
        As we know, the purpose of today's hearing is to explore
    national security space activities for the Department of
    Defense, including within the U.S. Space Force.
        I actually had the honor of joining Acting Secretary of the
    Air Force John Roth 2 months ago when he visited Nellis Air
    Force Base, located in my district. During Secretary Roth's
    visit, we were both briefed on our Nation's defense and
    training capabilities, including the Advanced Battle Management
    System [ABMS] and Red Flag exercises.
        Warfighters at Nellis Air Force Base are helping the Air
    Force build a more integrated and lethal force through Advanced
    Battle Management System development, the Air Force's network
    solution to enable rapid decisionmaking that powers Joint All-
    Domain Command and Control.
        So, as we modernize our Air Force, we must also find ways
    to process and share data faster than our adversaries. ABMS
    will allow the Air Force to transition its legacy command and
    control infrastructure into joint virtual systems that enable
    all equipment to communicate seamlessly, creating more agile
    and mobile warfighters.
        So, General Thompson, you stated in your testimony that the
    Joint All-Domain Command and Control and ABMS are the most
    important efforts for the joint force to undertake to prepare
    for future conflicts. Can you elaborate on that for us just
    briefly for a moment?
        General Thompson. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
        And, as you described, the future of conflict, we believe,
    is the ability to sense rapidly, take the data that you need,
    formulate it, collate it, fuse it, put it in the proper place
    and format so that, either through machine learning and
    artificial intelligence or the decision of commanders and
    warfighters, that the appropriate action can be taken.
        And we need to be able to do that rapidly, on the matter of
    seconds and minutes. And we need to be able to do it from
    sensors that are in space, in the air, at sea, and on the
    ground, and then apply the appropriate action, whether it
    includes weapons or other capabilities that the joint force
    brings to bear.
        And, as you said, the foundational capability to do that is
    the connectivity between all of those sensors and shooters, the
    ability to share data, the ability to understand what the data
    is and understand who is using it. And, as you said, ABMS is a
    key part of that. A large part of that relay will need to occur
    through space.
        And, in addition, as part of our contribution to both ABMS
    and Joint All-Domain Command and Control, the Space Force's
    primary contribution at this point is through our Unified Data
    Library. That is the data repository that will be the access
    point and the distribution point and the availability point of
    that sensor data, the ability connected to those shooters, and
    then apply machine learning, artificial intelligence, and human
    intervention to connect the information with the right
    decisionmaker, the right action arm, at the right time.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much.
        Also, I just wanted to ask briefly about the DOD space
    acquisition workforce.
        Mr. Ludwigson, you noted that the GAO, which issued a
    report in 2019, examined the acquisition workforce, focused on
    space programs, and there were some troubling findings. Can you
    elaborate on that?
        And, Mr. Hill or General Thompson, what steps has the DOD
    taken to identify the number of acquisition personnel that are
    needed for Space Force?
        Thank you.
        Mr. Ludwigson. We did that work--we actually initiated that
    work before the stand-up of Space Force was formalized and
    planned. And we did it to understand whether the Department
    understood the range of locations and numbers of personnel
    working on space acquisitions.
        As you noted, the findings were that there wasn't good
    understanding of all of the locations and all of the personnel.
    In fact, the Department wasn't able to provide that answer. We
    developed our own methodology and came up with the number of, I
    believe it was 8,100, a couple more. And that was probably a
    low estimate.
        I think it was very helpful that we had done that work.
    With the stand-up of Space Force, it became important to--as
    they start to pull together the personnel, they need to make
    decisions. And so hopefully our work was helpful to the
    Department as they move down that path.
        General Thompson. Yes, sir. It is General Thompson. I will
    add to that.
        Absolutely, the work done by the GAO and Mr. Ludwigson
    regarding identifying some of those factors and concerns has
    helped, first of all, in our design of the acquisition
    organizations and the acquisition approach to Space Force;
    also, in ensuring that we have adequately captured our resource
    needs as we complete the build-out associated with that design.
        The second thing I will add is, not just in terms of the
    acquisition workforce framework that the overall Department of
    Defense is using to increase the flexibility of managing its
    workforce today, we have already also applied some of the
    special authorities of Congress through the acquisition
    demonstration program that is longstanding to adjust the means
    by which we manage that workforce.
        We have found, both in terms of our own analysis but
    others, that the members that are under this management program
    find that it is more rewarding. They feel like they are more
    appropriately recognized for their work and their attitudes
    toward the work they do in the organization area and are
    stronger than others across the force.
        So all of those have combined, I think, to build us a good
    foundation for our acquisition organizations and our
    acquisition workforce going forward.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. We welcome the gentleman to the subcommittee
    and to the full committee. Appreciate your excellent questions.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn. I think you are muted.
        Mr. Lamborn. There. Is that better? Okay. Thank you.
        Thanks for having this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    say, if both of our hockey teams, the Colorado Avalanche and
    the Predators, continue to advance, we might have to place a
    bet on the outcome if they face each other.
        And, Dr. Scolese, I want to congratulate NRO on its 60th
    birthday. NRO has come a long way in 60 years, from dropping
    film from a satellite to be caught by a parachute by an
    airplane. You have come a long way since those days.
        My first question, Dr. Scolese, is: We have heard concerns
    about the number of delivery-on-orbit and delivery-in-orbit
    launches that the NRO has purchased outside of the National
    Security Space Launch program. Can you walk us through why that
    is?
        Dr. Scolese. Yes, sir.
        We typically and principally use the national launch
    services as our principal means of going into space. And
    whenever we don't, we coordinate with the Air Force and now the
    Space Force to determine what the best means for delivery is.
        Typically, when we have not used the national launch
    services, it is because it is typically a small research
    payload that we want to get up either in a unique orbit or on a
    short timeframe. But, as you will look and see, principally we
    use the national launch services for our missions.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
        Changing gears, Dr. Scolese, there is a tremendous natural
    symmetry which exists in Colorado Springs between Space Command
    and our uniformed space warfighters on the one hand and the
    many intelligence and three-letter agencies on the other hand.
        This is particularly true in the National Space Defense
    Center [NSDC] there in Colorado Springs, where the Joint Task
    Force-Space Defense conducts can't-fill missions 24 hours a
    day, 7 days a week. And NRO has an even greater presence on
    Buckley Air Force Base, which is an hour away by car.
        So we know from the previous Missile Defense Agency's
    relocation from the capital region to Alabama that it suffered
    an 80 percent attrition from individuals who did not want to
    make that move.
        Will NRO be requiring any of its employees to move if the
    Space Command relocation proceeds to Alabama? And, if so, what
    would an 80 percent attrition do to your workforce and your
    mission?
        Dr. Scolese. Sir, we are located, as you said, on Buckley
    Air Force Base, which is an aero facility there that I wouldn't
    expect to be impacted. I would have to see what the changes
    would be. We do co-staff the NSDC, as you said. But I would
    have to see what that impact would be.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. We will follow up on that.
        General Thompson, we know that China is pursuing
    counterspace technologies such as satellite jammers, directed-
    energy and direct-ascent kinetic weapons. These developments
    will certainly further facilitate the militarization of space
    and could deny the U.S. and our allies access to space during a
    conflict or crisis.
        So, from an organize, train, and equip perspective, General
    Thompson, where should investments be made to our space-based
    capabilities to ensure that we can prevail in a conflict
    against China?
        General Thompson. Representative Lamborn, three quick
    answers to that question, first of all.
        The first is, we have tremendous capabilities up there
    today. In many cases, they weren't designed to operate in a
    contested environment under threat like this. But we are in the
    process now, we have had a multiyear effort now, to build into
    them a limited set of features that allow them to be
    defensible, to help in their own defense. But, also, we are in
    the process right now of developing capabilities to be able to
    defend them against these threats. And that is what I will call
    step number one.
        Step number two is, as we move forward, both as part of our
    design activity, the force design activity we are establishing
    under our new Space Warfighting and Analysis Center, is, by the
    design of the architectures and the integration of those
    systems and capabilities, make them more resilient, make them
    more robust, make them less susceptible to attack and single-
    axis attack and make it less of an interesting target for the
    adversary in China to pursue.
        And then the third piece of that and the foundational
    piece, really, in both cases is a much deeper understanding of
    the capabilities of those adversaries in the domain, where they
    are, what their capabilities are, what their tactics are, and,
    both in terms of active defensive capabilities and design, how
    do we best approach them to make sure they are ineffective in
    response.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a very bad
    connection here, so I am going to turn my video off, and
    hopefully it will be better. Okay?
        Gentlemen, thank you very much. Appreciate your work and
    the complexity of the issues before us.
        I want to go to an area which has been much talked about,
    and that is the utilization of commercial satellites of many
    different kinds, how those commercial operations might be
    integrated into the work that you do. In this discussion,
    please consider both the classified and the unclassified work.
        So let's start with General Thompson, and we will go from
    there.
        General Thompson. Representative Garamendi, two answers to
    that question, if I may.
        The first is, we need to understand the services and
    capabilities that commercial providers can give to them, in and
    of themselves, whether it is communications, data relay, or
    remote sensing, and understand how we can most effectively use
    those services and the data they provide.
        We have a commercial partnership office today at both Los
    Angeles Air Force Base as part of the Space and Missile Systems
    Center, soon to be Space Systems Command, as well as a
    commercial SATCOM [satellite communication] office at Fort
    Meade in Maryland. They are expanding their scope not just to
    look at satellite communications but all commercial services.
    And so using that and incorporating that into our force design
    activities is step one.
        Step two is understanding the technologies of those
    commercial companies and how we might adapt them to the
    specific military needs and constellations of the future.
        Now, one of the best approaches and techniques in using
    that is through the Space Development Agency, as they pursue
    their initial capabilities to provide a layer that does space
    data transport associated with the Advanced Battle Management
    System, as they do that for tracking, working with an
    integrated missile warning/missile tracking layer. They take
    military missions, look at these new commercial capabilities,
    the technologies, and operating concepts, and see how we can
    adapt the technology and the approach to specific military
    purposes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
        Mr. Scolese.
        Dr. Scolese. Certainly. In addition to what General
    Thompson said, I would say that the NRO architecture already
    incorporates the commercial capabilities into it. It is either
    replace capabilities so that we can focus on those things that
    only the government can or should do, or it supplements those
    capabilities to provide additional resilience and coverage.
        Further, as General Thompson said, we found great value in
    the commercial capabilities to speed the delivery of systems,
    as they have developed some very capable spacecraft that we can
    go off and use and perhaps adapt to the needs that we may have.
        And then, finally, as was mentioned earlier, they have
    played an incredible role in communications and launch for us.
        So commercial is baked into our current architecture, and
    it is a fundamental portion of our future architecture. And to
    assure that, we continue to work with the commercial providers
    across all domains to see how we can work together. We do that
    in cooperation with our partners, NGA, NSA [National Security
    Agency], the Space Force, to assure that we are working
    together.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
        General Cleveland.
        General Cleveland. Sir, good morning.
        We really do view commercial imagery, as well as services,
    as absolutely critical to the future of the agency as we move
    forward. We work that, of course, very closely with NRO and
    Director Scolese's team.
        But we really believe right now that this explosion in
    commercial capability, first off, really provides us access
    that we may not otherwise have, so it allows us to look at more
    areas.
        It also does provide, to some large degree, resiliency as
    well. In the event there are issues or challenges, oftentimes
    we can revert to a commercial capability.
        We think it will provide us more persistence. Again, as we
    are able to work with the commercial industry to have more of
    these capabilities up, we think that we will be able to have
    persistence over a broader number of targets.
        And then, finally, that drives for us speed and the ability
    to rapidly get that information into the hands of our
    decisionmakers as well as our warfighters.
        And so, as we look at the broader fabric of sources of
    information and data really coming into our agency, we do think
    that commercial is going to play a significant role and it
    already does play a significant role for us today.
        Mr. Garamendi. Very good.
        My final comment would be for GAO to investigate this and
    make sure that we have all of the opportunities available to
    us.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
        And I thank all the members for participating. I know these
    Zoom conferences are not the easiest things to arrange.
        But I most of all want to thank our distinguished witnesses
    and the important work you are doing for our national security.
    I know space isn't sometimes easy to understand or to explain,
    but it is absolutely vital to our national security. So I am
    grateful for your patriotism.
        Thank you, Ranking Member. Appreciate the opportunity to
    work with you. Let's try to keep the committee focused on these
    important issues, and hopefully we can have improved space
    acquisition. That would be a great thing.
        Unless there is another urgent question from members that
    they are unable to submit in writing for the record, then this
    hearing is about to be adjourned. But I don't want to cut
    anybody off who can't signal me any other way other than the
    video screen that they have an urgent question.
        It looks like we are fine, so the hearing is adjourned.
    Thanks.
        [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                  May 24, 2021

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                  May 24, 2021

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    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                  May 24, 2021

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. The Department is currently undertaking a number of
    initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps pathfinder
    efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. What is the
    status of these OSD and Space Force pilot efforts?
        Mr. Hill. The Department of Defense is pursuing a number of
    initiatives to achieve more rapid software acquisition. The DOD
    developed the Software Acquisition Pathway, approved in September 2020,
    as a tailor-made pathway enabling modern software development best
    practices within the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The USSF is
    executing the Space Command and Control (C2) program as a ``DevSecOps
    Pathfinder'' and is now transitioning the program to utilize the
    Software Acquisition Pathway. By using this agile-based delivery model,
    the program can iteratively plan and deliver cyber-resilient
    warfighting capabilities quickly. Thus far, the program has delivered
    nine operationally-accepted applications to the Combined Space
    Operations Center and National Space Defense Center in just over two
    years. The Space C2 program is on track to meet its highest priority
    requirement: the replacement of all Space Defense Operations Center
    functions by the end of FY22.
        Mr. Langevin. I'm extremely excited about the Space Force's focus
    on upskilling its workforce and prioritizing digital literacy through
    the establishment of the Digital University. General Thompson, how does
    the Space Force plan to incentivize Guardians to complete these courses
    and how do you plan to keep Digital University content updated with the
    latest developments in these fast-moving fields?
        General Thompson. In line with our Vision for a Digital Service,
    the U.S. Space Force (USSF) has created a foundational set of courses
    through Digital University that will become a mandatory training
    requirement to establish digital fluency for every Guardian, as well as
    specialty training in coding, networking, software development and
    product management, and other related areas. The specialty training
    will be required for certain duty positions, but available for any and
    all Guardians who wish to pursue increased knowledge and expertise for
    personal or professional reasons. Further incentives derive from
    achievement of commercial badging, certificates, and academic degrees
    earned through Digital University. These achievements will tie into
    personnel systems and can be leveraged by Guardians when pursuing
    positions and unique opportunities like elite software development
    teams.
        In order to keep content current and relevant, Digital University
    partners with world-class commercial vendors and academic institutions.
    Because there are external incentives for these entities to provide up-
    to-date and quality educational materials, the USSF takes on the role
    of evaluator and curator instead of content creator. We work closely
    with these entities to inject material more relevant to the USSF into
    already built courses, such as including projects that use data
    collected by space mission units. Any organic material can then be
    focused toward topics specific to USSF needs that can't be found
    elsewhere, making it much more manageable.
        Mr. Langevin. How does the Space Force plan to incorporate directed
    energy weapons in its force design and employment concepts?
        General Thompson. The National Space Policy makes clear that
    unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space remains a vital
    national interest. It further provides that the U.S. Space Force will
    present forces to enable prompt and sustained offensive and defensive
    space operations to defend U.S. national interests. These operations
    can take any number of forms and include all elements of military and
    national power; the Space Force is pursuing multiple approaches and I
    welcome the opportunity to brief you on them at the appropriate level
    of classification. Potential adversaries should be on notice that the
    United States will be ready to respond to any purposeful interference
    with or attacks on U.S. or allied space systems at the chosen time,
    place, manner and domain.
        Mr. Langevin. The Department is currently undertaking a number of
    initiatives, including Agile pilot programs and DevSecOps pathfinder
    efforts, to achieve more rapid acquisition of DOD software. What is the
    status of these OSD and Space Force pilot efforts?
        General Thompson. The Department is pursuing a number of
    initiatives to rapidly deliver more software acquisitions. The DOD
    developed the Software Acquisition Pathway, approved in September 2020,
    as a tailor-made pathway enabling modern software development best
    practices within the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The USSF is
    executing the Space Command and Control (C2) program, also called
    Kobayashi Maru, as an OSD ``DevSecOps Pathfinder'' and is preparing the
    program to transition to the Software Acquisition Pathway. By using
    this agile-based delivery model, the program can iteratively plan and
    quickly deliver cyber-resilient joint warfighting capabilities; so far,
    the program has delivered nine operationally-accepted applications to
    the Combined Space Operations Center and National Space Defense Center
    in just over 2 years. The ability for the Space C2 program to rapidly
    ingest lessons learned and incorporate changes to processes and
    development priorities are a critical asset to meet the program's
    highest priority requirement of replacing Space Defense Operations
    Center functions.
        Mr. Langevin. I'm concerned about the cybersecurity and
    functionality of our ground stations. Two major projects, GPS and OPIR,
    have ground segments that are behind schedule and over cost. Delaying
    these systems means delaying needed cybersecurity and anti-jamming
    capabilities. As we continue to expand and upgrade our space
    architecture, what is the Space Force doing differently to ensure these
    systems are on schedule and secure?
        General Thompson. GPS and OPIR provide critical mission
    capabilities for the Space Force and the nation. We strive to meet cost
    and schedule expectations to continue to meet warfighter needs and
    remain responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars for these programs. The
    Defensive Cyber Operations for Space (DCO-S) capabilities to detect,
    identify, respond/recover, and protect are ``baked in'' to current
    ground segments such as Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution
    (FORGE), Enterprise Ground Services (EGS), and the Next Generation
    Operational Control System (OCX). These ground segment system
    architectures are being designed to operate in a cyber-contested
    environment with modern protection technologies, tools, processes,
    functions, and cyber best practices.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
        Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
    Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
    believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
    seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
    technologies?
        How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
    space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
    properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
    there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
    provide to support development?
        The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
    develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
    know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
    facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
    field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
    these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
    cooperation?
        Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
    occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
    partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
    restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
    collaboration?
        Mr. Hill. Hypersonic applications straddle the air and space
    domains. For example, our ability to reconstitute critical space-based
    assets rapidly is constrained, in part, by a limited number of rockets
    operating from a limited number of launch sites. A notional future
    hypersonic aircraft could serve as the first stage of a two-stage-to-
    orbit launch system to deliver up to 20,000 pounds of payload to low
    Earth orbit. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would allow for
    flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort capability, and
    improved airspace integration. High-speed and hypersonic aircraft could
    also support replenishment of space-based assets and mission assurance
    efforts in more lethal, non-permissive future environments.
    Additionally, a number of contractors are now providing flexible sub-
    sonic air launch options for small and medium satellite payloads to low
    Earth orbit.
        While OSD Policy does not represent the IC, we recognize that, the
    ability to perform penetrating, responsive collection with a highly
    survivable platform could fill key gaps. Those gaps primarily reflect
    ISR needs. Penetrating hypersonic aircraft serving as on-demand
    collection platforms could provide an unpredictable, survivable, and
    responsive alternative or adjunct to more traditional ISR capabilities.
    Additionally, a hypersonic aircraft acting as the first-stage of a two-
    stage-to-orbit launch system could provide a responsive space
    reconstitution capability.
        The primary effort, which is currently in the development
    community, encompasses goals and objectives for future DOD and
    Intelligence Community missions, and includes Intelligence Community
    input. While OSD Policy does not represent the IC, we nevertheless look
    forward to continued DOD-IC collaboration as the focus shifts over the
    next decade to operational considerations.
        The Department of Defense does not have requirements for high Mach
    platforms in the tactically responsive space mission. However, as the
    Department identifies space requirements for responsive launch,
    acquisition of these capabilities may have greater significance and
    will be appropriately reflected in the Department's overall space
    strategy and budget. A notional future hypersonic aircraft could serve
    as the first stage of a two-stage-to-orbit launch system to deliver up
    to 20,000 pounds of payload to low earth orbit, though high Mach or
    hypersonic capability is not necessarily required for an air-launched
    capability. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would allow for
    flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort capability, and
    improved airspace integration. High-speed and hypersonic aircraft would
    be reusable, supporting replenishment of space-based assets and mission
    assurance efforts in more lethal, non-permissive future environments.
        DOD has developed and regularly updates a technology roadmap for
    reusable systems in collaboration with the National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration (NASA). The roadmap includes an ambitious goal of
    developing and demonstrating a reusable hypersonic aircraft by the
    early- to mid-2030's. The basic elements of that roadmap are currently
    funded.
        Recently, there has been a renewed interest in both the public and
    private sector on the utility of hypersonic aircraft for responsive
    point-to-point transportation. Per the national hypersonics roadmap,
    the Department of the Air Force collaborates with the Office of the
    Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with NASA
    to develop dual-use technologies for High Mach and Hypersonic Aircraft.
    This strategy includes pursuing key enabling technologies that will
    provide for both commercial and military application of future
    hypersonic reusable systems.
        There are no restrictions that currently limit DOD and NASA
    collaboration on future reusable hypersonic aircraft and the level of
    technology development applicable to both military and civilian
    application. There are limitations on the application of NASA human and
    fiscal capital directly to development of DOD systems; however, those
    limitations do not pose any impediment on either agency to meeting our
    respective needs.
        Governments and industries in many countries are investing in
    research and development to enable future reusable hypersonic aircraft.
    Some of those countries are allies and some are not. DOD is working to
    make sure we fully understand the scope of that work to identify areas
    of mutual benefit and interest with our allied partners and to assess
    the risks of the efforts of our potential adversaries. As we pursue our
    roadmap we are looking for collaborative opportunities with our allies,
    with propulsion being a key area that has potential.
        No, DOD has the necessary authorities to pursue collaboration when
    we determine it is the best approach. Collaborative research,
    development, and production can add programmatic complexity,
    particularly associated with requirements regarding information
    security, intellectual property protection, and claims. However,
    collaboration can also leverage diverse sources of expertise, promote
    common standards and interoperability, and generate net savings as
    partners pool requirements and share fiscal burdens. Over a long
    history of successful collaboration with partners, DOD has shown we are
    able to leverage our authorities and overcome the complexities to
    deliver mutually beneficial outcomes.
        Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
    Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
    believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
    seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
    technologies?
        How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
    space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
    properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
    there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
    provide to support development?
        The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
    develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
    know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
    facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
    field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
    these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
    cooperation?
        Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
    occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
    partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
    restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
    collaboration?
        General Thompson. The Department of the Air Force, from a military
    service perspective, is unable to answer on behalf of specific
    Intelligence Community (IC) agencies on unique equities for ISR
    collection or space launch on high Mach platforms. The Office of the
    Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) would be best positioned to
    facilitate discussion and insight from IC agencies tasked with
    monitoring and assessing foreign high Mach platforms.
        While I cannot speak authoritatively for the IC or IC agencies, it
    is possible there may not be any structural changes required to ensure
    involvement in the development and planning for operational use of high
    Mach platforms. The current research and development process for high
    Mach platforms is examining multiple mission areas and is already
    facilitating collaboration between engineers, fielding and testing
    organizations, and the intelligence community.
        There has been renewed interest in both the public and private
    sectors for responsive launch; there are many concepts under
    consideration, to include use of hypersonic aircraft as the first stage
    of a two-stage system. The benefits of an aircraft-based space launcher
    include flexible basing and launching locations, and less restrictive
    public safety requirements. The Space Force's Rapid/Agile Launch
    Initiative is currently investigating more responsive launch options.
        I am not able to speak for the IC and their equities, but with
    regard to tactical responsive spacelift--there are many concepts under
    consideration, to include use of hypersonic aircraft as the first stage
    of a two-stage system. While there is no formal program to use
    hypersonics for this purpose, we continue analysis on the costs and
    benefits of such an approach and are working with OSD (R&E) and NASA to
    develop a national strategy for hypersonics. This effort could provide
    technologies to enable the aircraft-based hypersonic space launch by
    2040, should analysis warrant.
        We currently do not need additional resources for hypersonics in
    FY22.
        The Department of the Air Force (DAF) and NASA have worked together
    for many years successfully especially in the science and technology
    arena. There are various ways the DOD and NASA are partnering to
    leverage hypersonics, as was recently detailed in a March 26, 2021
    article in Air Force magazine titled, ``Catching Up on Hypersonics.''
    These include: Experimenting with a concept called SkyRange, which uses
    unmanned aircraft to clear the hypersonic test space and relay
    telemetry in an effort to accomplish more with the range space already
    available. For high Mach numbers coupled with intense heat, there is
    only one tunnel--a NASA asset--that can create the environment. Also,
    DAF is bringing NASA into Vector Prime, a hypersonic aircraft effort.
    The collaboration with NASA includes sharing facilities and models. On
    the facility side, DAF is bringing in NASA and industry in on a MILCON
    study for national R&D facility specifically for early technology
    readiness level (TRL) needs.
        With the standup of Space Systems Command, the U.S. Space Force
    will be postured to take advantage of commercial developments in
    hypersonic technologies to quickly deliver capabilities. We will seek
    every opportunity to collaborate with private and public partners,
    while also working through appropriate legal and ethical standards of
    conduct. I am not aware of any current restrictions that limit
    cooperation as we move forward. If any restrictions do arise, I will
    work with the Department of the Air Force to ensure we have the
    necessary authorities to enhance cooperation.
        The Department of the Air Force (DAF) is committed to exploring
    opportunities in bilateral and multilateral forums to increase
    development of hypersonic technologies with Allies and international
    partners. For example, the DAF has over a 15-year relationship with the
    Australian Department of Defense developing and testing hypersonic
    technologies, and we recently began a new project to develop and test
    air-launched, air-breathing flight test vehicles capable of cruising at
    hypersonic speeds. The DAF is also currently discussing potential
    collaboration in hypersonic technologies with other Allies.
        We must continue to follow International Traffic in Arms
    Regulations, and comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime, but
    I am not aware of any instances where these regulations impose
    significant limitations on our existing or planned collaboration on
    hypersonics with allies and partners.
        Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
    Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
    believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
    seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
    technologies?
        How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
    space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
    properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
    there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
    provide to support development?
        The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
    develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
    know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
    facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
    field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
    these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
    cooperation?
        Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
    occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
    partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
    restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
    collaboration?
        Dr. Scolese. We will continue to work closely with the DOD to
    explore future opportunities to utilize numerous emerging technologies
    to meet our objectives. In addition to advancements in our traditional
    launch methods, hypersonics may provide additional methods for
    responsive transport to the space domain.
        Speaking for the NRO, we are interested in any technologies that
    may further our collection mission or launch of our systems. Our end-
    to-end functional capabilities have us positioned to develop, based on
    our requirements and the requirements of our customers, innovative
    solutions to customer needs.
        The NRO does not foresee any need to restructure to respond to new
    technologies.
        We continue to work closely with our DOD partners to find
    opportunities to address their warfighting challenges, including
    building a tactically-responsive space architecture. Space launch
    options using hypersonics hold opportunities to meet this and other
    needs. The NRO works closely with our partners to prioritize
    initiatives to meet our broad customer's needs and mission
    requirements.
        We are interested in any technologies that may further our
    collection mission or launch of our systems. Our end-to-end functional
    capabilities have us positioned to develop, based on our requirements
    and the requirements of our customers, innovative solutions to customer
    needs.
        While not currently pursuing collaboration with regard to high-Mach
    flight with our allies, the NRO seeks collaborative development where
    possible to further capabilities of all participant while still
    protecting sensitive technologies.
        Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is
    greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that
    reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO
    FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line
    with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally,
    it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What
    is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to
    the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
        Dr. Scolese. The NRO is committed to providing high-quality and
    high-capacity GEOINT support to hundreds of thousands of users,
    including COCOMs and Services. As the quality and volume of commercial
    providers of GEOINT continue to increase, the NRO will ensure that we
    are continually leveraging our domestic providers. The NRO's next
    generation of commercial imagery contracts is responsive to
    requirements from the COCOMs and Services to the extent that they were
    included in the GEOINT Functional Manager's (NGA's) draft Statement of
    Capabilities (SOC) for Commercial Imagery. We expect that the SOC will
    be validated this summer by both the Intelligence Community and
    Department of Defense, at a level that fully meets users' needs. We
    also expect that the Independent Cost Estimate and budget will be
    sufficient to satisfy those requirements.
        With regard to the flow of commercial imagery to warfighters, NGA
    is responsible for dissemination via various mechanisms; from a
    contractual standpoint, however, NRO confirms that there will not be
    any gap in support as we transition from the current operational
    contracts to the new commercial imagery contracts. Current contracts
    will be extended, as required, until the new contracts are in place.
        Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
    Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
    believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
    seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
    technologies?
        How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
    space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
    properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
    there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
    provide to support development?
        The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
    develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
    know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
    facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
    field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
    these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
    cooperation?
        Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
    occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
    partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
    restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
    collaboration?
        General Cleveland. NGA's role in space ISR involves tasking,
    processing, exploiting, and disseminating data collected from NRO
    satellites. NGA has the authorities it needs to meet challenges in the
    space domain. We are closely tied with the NRO and likewise leverage
    the Geospatial Intelligence Committee (GEOCOM) executive steering
    structure to coordinate Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) needs across
    the interagency, the Intelligence Community (IC), and Combatant
    Commands. NGA works closely with our commercial, interagency, IC, and
    DOD partners to meet the needs of the warfighter. For space launch and
    space operations, NGA defers to NRO for research, development,
    acquisition, launch, and the operation of imagery intelligence
    satellites. NGA's FY22 budget request and current authorities meet the
    Agency's needs as the GEOINT functional manager. Although NGA does not
    have any equities related to fielding aircraft, we are partnered with
    NASA on a range of technologies, most recently focused on potential
    lunar and cislunar operations, and Global Navigation Satellite System
    (GNSS). At this time, there are no restrictions limiting cooperation
    between NGA and NASA.
        Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is
    greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that
    reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO
    FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line
    with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally,
    it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What
    is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to
    the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
        General Cleveland. NGA continues to coordinate closely with NRO to
    inform commercial procurement. NGA is thoroughly committed to providing
    uninterrupted, real-time support to the warfighter and leverages all
    available sources to accomplish this, including commercial imagery. NGA
    works with both commercial imagery providers and military customers to
    ensure that warfighter requirements are clearly understood and
    delivered to meet the needs and specifications of the military user.
    Our paramount goal is to support warfighters at the tactical edge in as
    effective and timely a manner as possible, while ensuring that the
    highest priority operational requests take precedence.
        Mr. Turner. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities to
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspectives on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        What unique equities might IC agencies have when it comes to high
    Mach platforms--whether for ISR collection or for space launch? Do you
    believe any structural changes are needed to ensure that the IC has a
    seat the table in development and planning for operational use of these
    technologies?
        How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically responsive
    space mission? Do you believe your respective services and agencies are
    properly resourced to pursue development on published timelines? Are
    there any additional resources or authorities this committee might
    provide to support development?
        The commercial sector is currently making an ambitious push to
    develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030 timeframe. As you
    know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to materials to test
    facilities--are dual use and could significantly advance DOD efforts to
    field their own aircraft. How is DOD working with NASA to leverage
    these advances? Are there any current restrictions that limit
    cooperation?
        Much of the commercial and defense work on high Mach flight is
    occurring in allied countries. What steps have been taken to explore
    partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are there any
    restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting valuable
    collaboration?
        Mr. Ludwigson. We have not assessed DOD's short or long-term
    hypersonic strategy, including activities related to reusable
    hypersonic flight, transport, ISR and strike, and responsive space
    access, outside of identifying the breadth and scope of their current
    efforts in the past and the next few years into the future. DOD has
    initially focused most resources on developing and proving offensive
    weapon prototypes. Most of the estimated $15 billion for hypersonic
    weapons and related technologies from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal
    year 2024 has been used or is planned to be spent on offensive weapons
    that will potentially turn into programs of record. Future efforts that
    may influence reusable hypersonic flight, ISR, and defense applications
    are at earlier stages of development. If successful, they have the
    potential to evolve into future programs that may shape DOD's portfolio
    and hypersonic strategy and open up the types of platforms that can
    carry hypersonic weapons or utilize the technology. Given the breadth
    of these activities and their potential expansion to include additional
    organizations within DOD, formalizing coordination for effective
    achievement of DOD's objectives will be important.
        For our report examining hypersonics, we obtained information on
    acknowledged research efforts and formal programs, but did not
    explicitly seek to identify others. However, to the extent IC agencies
    have equities in hypersonic platforms, it might be important for them
    to be included in efforts to formalize coordination in hypersonic
    weapons development efforts.
        We have not done work to assess the relationships of high Mach
    platforms with the space mission to understand resource requirements
    needed to support published timelines or to inform authorities this
    committee may consider.
        DOD and NASA have agreements in place that support DOD using NASA
    testing facilities. NASA shares subject matter expertise in hypersonic
    technology, such as at NASA Langley. DOD, in some cases, reimburses
    NASA for use of its wind tunnels. In some instances NASA officials said
    that NASA waives the reimbursement costs because it is able to acquire
    data from testing it would not be able to obtain on its own because it
    would be too expensive. We have not done work to assess whether there
    are any current restrictions that limit cooperation.
        Our report on efforts to develop hypersonic weapons and related
    technologies included information on some partnership efforts between
    DOD and allied countries. However, we have not done comprehensive work
    to assess the extent to which work on hypersonic flight is occurring in
    allied countries, steps DOD has taken to explore partnership
    opportunities, or export controls that may be inhibiting collaboration.
        Mr. Turner. Demand for commercial imagery, data and services is
    greatly increasing and I understand that we will soon see that
    reflected in requirements from the COCOMs and Services. Will the NRO
    FY22 budget reflect a greater degree of commercial procurements in line
    with the advancements of the commercial space industry? Additionally,
    it's critical this imagery gets in the hands of our warfighters. What
    is your commitment to ensuring that the flow of Commercial Imagery to
    the Services and Combatant Commands is not interrupted?
        Mr. Ludwigson. We have begun a review of the National
    Reconnaissance Office's (NRO) Commercial Systems Program Office (CSPO)
    in response to a provision in the House report accompanying a bill for
    the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 and a
    subsequent letter from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate
    Select Committee on Intelligence. CSPO is the office in NRO responsible
    for purchasing commercial satellite imagery on behalf of DOD and the
    Intelligence Community. Our review is looking into how NRO is
    leveraging commercial imagery for DOD and the Intelligence Community,
    including how they are meeting Congressional direction to engage the
    commercial satellite remote sensing industry to the maximum extent
    practicable. While the scope of our review focuses on CSPO, it will
    also include information from stakeholders throughout DOD and the IC,
    including combatant commands and military services. We anticipate
    providing a draft report to DOD and the IC for comment in early 2022.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
        Mr. Lamborn. Recently, China and Russia recently announced that
    they have entered into a MOU on establishing a lunar International
    Research Station. Although this was publicized as a scientific effort,
    some perceive this as a thin veil for military cooperation on the moon.
    Currently, NASA is the only government organization tasked with
    establishing a presence on the lunar surface with the Artemis program.
        Is the DOD taking any actions to look ahead at potential military
    needs and capabilities beyond our traditional orbits and near the lunar
    region?
        Mr. Hill. Whether in traditional orbits or beyond, DOD operations
    in space are and will remain fully compliant with U.S. obligations
    under international law, including the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and
    with U.S. law and policy. In this regard, DOD does not intend to
    establish military bases, installations, or fortifications, test any
    type of weapons, or conduct military maneuvers on the Moon or on other
    celestial bodies.
        This approach remains consistent with our longstanding national
    security interests, and does not prevent DOD from pursuing emerging
    national security interests beyond traditional orbits or from extending
    our space situational awareness and other activities to the lunar
    regime. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
    (DARPA) is developing the Demonstration Rocket for Agile Cislunar
    Operations (DRACO) to demonstrate a nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP)
    system above low Earth orbit in 2025. The system would demonstrate
    rapid maneuver capability in cislunar space, which can be important in
    various national security space applications.
        Mr. Lamborn. Follow-up on the question: 'From an ``organize, train
    and equip'' perspective, where should investments be made to our space-
    based capabilities, to ensure we can prevail in a conflict against
    China?'
        In addition to the answer you provided (upgrading/modifying
    existing systems, making things ``less interesting'' in the design
    phase, and developing a deeper understanding of adversary
    capabilities), can you discuss which specific programs or capabilities
    the DOD or Space Force currently have or are developing to fill those
    roles or meet that criteria?
        General Thompson. Key to prevailing in a conflict against China and
    other potential adversaries is our ability to modernize our
    capabilities to protect what we have on orbit today, evolve to more
    resilient architectures, develop warfighting capability, and grow new
    space missions. Most of the important details in each of these areas is
    classified; I welcome the opportunity to brief you on all of them at
    the appropriate classification level.
        In addition to the categories above, we must also improve our
    ability to assess and understand our adversary's activity, which is
    accomplished through space domain awareness. The budget includes $127M
    for the Space Based Surveillance System (SBSS) follow-on known as
    SILENTBARKER which will provide timely detection and custody of on-
    orbit threats in order to protect U.S. high-value assets in space. The
    Unified Data Library investment facilitates universal data access for
    all-domain space domain awareness data sharing from all sensors to
    support space-focused battle management and command and control
    ($17.1M)
        The Ground Based Optical Sensor System (GBOSS) is an upgrade to the
    existing Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System
    (GEODSS) that enables monitoring of small, closely-spaced, and advanced
    threats in low, mid, high, and geostationary orbits ($56.2M). Finally,
    we are investing $123M on a Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept that will
    deliver radar sensors that can monitor satellites and space debris in
    geostationary orbits.
                                     ______

                     QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
        Dr. DesJarlais. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspective on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        Mr. Hill. Hypersonic flight offers solutions that straddle the air
    and space domains. For example, our ability to reconstitute critical
    space-based assets rapidly is constrained, in part, by a limited number
    of rockets operating from a limited number of launch sites. A notional
    future hypersonic aircraft could serve as the first stage of a two-
    stage-to-orbit launch system to deliver up to 20,000 pounds of payload
    to low Earth orbit. An aircraft-based approach to space launch would
    allow for flexible runway-reliant basing, safer launch abort
    capability, and improved airspace integration. High-speed and
    hypersonic aircraft could also support replenishment of space-based
    assets and mission assurance efforts in more lethal, non-permissive
    future environments.
        Dr. DesJarlais. The commercial sector is currently making an
    ambitious push to develop and field high Mach aircraft in the 2030
    timeframe. As you know, many of these technologies--from propulsion to
    materials to test facilities--are dual use and could significantly
    advance DOD efforts to field their own aircraft. How is DOD working
    with NASA to leverage these advances? Are there any current
    restrictions that limit cooperation?
        Mr. Hill. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in both the
    public and private sector on the utility of hypersonic aircraft for
    responsive space launch and responsive point-to-point transportation.
    The Department of the Air Force is working with Office of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and with NASA to
    develop a national strategy for High Mach and Hypersonic Aircraft that
    will provide technologies for aircraft-based, responsive space launch
    by 2040. This strategy includes the key enabling technologies and sub-
    systems that will provide for both commercial and military application
    of future hypersonic reusable systems.
        There are no restrictions that currently limit DOD and NASA
    collaboration on future reusable hypersonic aircraft and the level of
    technology development applicable to both military and civilian
    application. There are limitations on the application of NASA human and
    fiscal capital directly to development of DOD systems; however, those
    limitations do not pose any impediment on either agency to meeting our
    respective needs.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Much of the commercial and defense work on high
    Mach flight is occurring in allied countries. What steps have been
    taken to explore partnership opportunities with allied nations? Are
    there any restrictions--such as export controls--that are limiting
    valuable collaboration?
        Mr. Hill. Governments and industries in many countries are
    investing in research and development to enable future reusable
    hypersonic aircraft. Some of those countries are allies and some are
    not. DOD is working to make sure we fully understand the scope of that
    work to identify areas of mutual benefit and interest with our allied
    partners and to assess the risks of the efforts of our potential
    adversaries. As we pursue our roadmap, we are looking for collaborative
    opportunities with our allies, with propulsion being a key area of
    potential cooperation. Export controls and other restrictions do not
    prevent DOD from using its authorities to pursue collaboration when we
    determine it is the best approach. Collaborative research, development,
    and production can add programmatic complexity, particularly associated
    with requirements regarding information security, intellectual property
    protection, and claims. However, collaboration can also leverage
    diverse sources of expertise, promote common standards and
    interoperability, and generate net savings as partners pool
    requirements and share fiscal burdens. Over a long history of
    successful collaboration with partners, DOD has shown we are able to
    leverage our authorities and overcome the complexities to deliver
    mutually beneficial outcomes.
        Dr. DesJarlais. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently
    released a hypersonics roadmap that covered a range of activities
    related to reusable hypersonic flight, including transport, ISR and
    strike, and responsive space access. According to OSD, these
    technologies are well into development and could reach initial
    operating capability (IOC) in the 2030s. I would like to get your
    perspective on how these high speed capabilities might be used to
    achieve your current objectives and how they might influence long-term
    changes in strategy.
        General Thompson. Hypersonics are a critical technology with broad
    impact across the national security landscape. There has been renewed
    interest in both the public and private sectors for responsive launch--
    there are many concepts under consideration, to include use of
    hypersonic aircraft as the first stage of a two-state system. The
    benefits of an aircraft-based space launcher include flexible basing
    and launching locations, and less restrictive public safety
    requirements. The Space Force's Rapid/Agile Launch Initiative is
    currently leveraging more responsive launch options. We are working
    with OSD (R&E) and NASA to develop a national strategy for High Mach
    and Hypersonic Aircraft that could provide technologies to enable the
    aircraft-based hypersonic space launch by 2040.
        One additional area where the Space Force has a role is in
    detecting and tracking hypersonic missiles. That mission is
    challenging. The Space Force is presently conducting analysis on new
    capabilities to provide hypersonic missile warning from space.
        Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically
    responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and
    agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published
    timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this
    committee might provide to support development?
        General Thompson. As the DOD identifies space requirements for
    responsive launch, acquisition of these capabilities will be
    appropriately budgeted for and reflected in our overall strategy for
    space. The current budget for U.S. space launch addresses the current
    requirements, but we anticipate the Department will request additional
    funding for these efforts as additional requirements are identified.
        Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically
    responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and
    agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published
    timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this
    committee might provide to support development?
        Dr. Scolese. We continue to work closely with our DOD partners to
    find opportunities to address their warfighting challenges, including
    building a tactically-responsive space architecture. Space launch
    options using hypersonics hold opportunities to meet this and other
    needs. The NRO supports the FY 2022 President's Budget.
        Dr. DesJarlais. How will high Mach platforms enhance the tactically
    responsive space mission? Do you believe your respective services and
    agencies are properly resourced to pursue development on published
    timelines? Are there any additional resources or authorities this
    committee might provide to support development?
        General Cleveland. NGA works closely with our commercial,
    interagency, Intelligence Community, and DOD partners to meet the needs
    of the warfighter. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
    capabilities. The NGA FY22 budget request and current authorities meet
    the Agency's needs as the GEOINT functional manager.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
        Mr. Khanna. How is the United States Space Force working to bring
    in new commercial capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, to
    support the goal of a dynamic and responsive launch capability? In your
    opinion, is the Space Force doing enough to increase the purchase of
    small launch providers to support and prove this requirement for
    responsive launch?
        Mr. Hill. Yes. The U.S. Space Force has a dedicated office for
    enhanced coordination with the U.S. commercial space launch industry
    and is actively pursuing opportunities to leverage innovation. DOD is
    exploring how to pair its requirements with cutting-edge domestic space
    technology--some of which may utilize responsive launch opportunities.
    The USSF currently has eight small launch providers on-contract through
    its SRP-4 and OSP-4 agreements, and is currently on-ramping other new
    providers. Space Force also expects to on-ramp new vendors every year
    to continue to leverage industry innovation.
        Mr. Khanna. What is your assessment of the report on the ``State of
    the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which concluded (among other things)
    that ````The very long schedules of many DOD space programs limit the
    opportunities for short design-build-test projects that stimulate
    interest and innovation within the U.S. workforce. Many new small
    launch vehicles are coming into service. An increased rate of space
    experiments and prototypes by DOD would enhance the viability of these
    small launchers providers.'' How is Space Force working with those in
    acquisition to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs and
    increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small launch?
    How are you supporting new U.S. satellite companies working to gain
    entry into the DOD market?
        Mr. Hill. DOD is engaging in a broad-based effort to leverage
    commercial technology for the fulfilment of its space requirements.
    This includes reducing the timelines that have been typical in
    traditional programs that meet military requirements not typically
    addressed in commercial space and diversifying acquisition approaches
    to leverage commercial innovations that can offer new solutions and new
    capabilities on much shorter timelines. From the Space Development
    Agency, to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, to the Space
    Rapid Capabilities Office, to the Air Force Research Laboratory, and to
    the Space and Missile Systems Center, DOD using rapid prototyping and
    other innovations in research, development, and acquisition programs
    that are providing opportunities to leverage the agility and
    flexibility of emerging commercial launch and satellite providers. The
    U.S. Space Force has also established a dedicated office for enhanced
    coordination and alignment to meet these growing needs for small launch
    and pair programs with the best launch opportunities.
        Mr. Khanna. With the DARPA launch challenge concluding without a
    winner, what other space related programs focusing on responsive launch
    is Space Force interested in? What is the Space Force's plans to engage
    with new launch companies going forward to develop a responsive launch
    capability?
        Mr. Hill. The U.S. Space Force has two programs dedicated to
    engaging launch companies. The National Security Space Launch program
    handles traditional launch vendors and supports new entrants into
    future phases. The Department's Rocket Systems Launch Program manages
    the Tactically Responsive Launch Program Element, which leverages three
    available contract strategies to utilize emerging small launch
    providers to support DOD space requirements. The Department has and is
    continually looking to utilize responsive launch capabilities, and
    explore opportunities to enhance DOD responsive space launch
    requirements.
        Mr. Khanna. How is the Space Force planning to utilize tools such
    as additive manufacturing, and would Space Force's mission benefit from
    the integration of new space companies utilizing new manufacturing
    techniques such as additive manufacturing--in order to meet the Space
    Force requirement to launch within 24 hours as part of the tactically
    responsive launch requirements?
        Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
        Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
    new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
    deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
    and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
    precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
    More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
    Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
    to the arsenal?
        Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
        Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
    Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
    companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
    discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
    utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
    constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
    scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
    capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
    How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
    the launch market as well?
        Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
        Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
    for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
    increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
    Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
    responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
    these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
    national security edge in space?
        Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
        Mr. Khanna. How is the United States Space Force working to bring
    in new commercial capabilities, to include additive manufacturing, to
    support the goal of a dynamic and responsive launch capability? In your
    opinion, is the Space Force doing enough to increase the purchase of
    small launch providers to support and prove this requirement for
    responsive launch?
        General Thompson. Yes. The U.S. Space Force (USSF) has a dedicated
    office for enhanced coordination with the U.S. commercial space launch
    industry. The DOD is exploring how to pair DOD requirements with
    cutting edge domestic space technology--some of which may use
    responsive launch opportunities. The USSF currently has eight small
    launch providers in our Orbital Services Program (OSP)-4 contract pool,
    and is currently on-ramping other new providers. We also plan to on-
    ramp new vendors every year to continue to leverage industry
    innovation. The Department already uses space launch services from U.S.
    space industrial base entities that use additive manufacturing, such as
    3D printing.
        Mr. Khanna. What is your assessment of the report on the ``State of
    the Space Industrial Base 2020'' which concluded (among other things)
    that ``The very long schedules of many DOD space programs limit the
    opportunities for short design-build-test projects that stimulate
    interest and innovation within the U.S. workforce. Many new small
    launch vehicles are coming into service. An increased rate of space
    experiments and prototypes by DOD would enhance the viability of these
    small launchers providers.'' How is Space Force working with those in
    acquisition to decrease the timelines for DOD space programs and
    increase the rate of space experiments and prototypes for small launch?
    How are you supporting new U.S. satellite companies working to gain
    entry into the DOD market?
        General Thompson. The DOD is engaging in a cohesive effort across
    responsive small satellites, ground systems, requirements, policy, and
    other critical aspects in the responsive space architecture to
    increasingly use commercial technologies that support space-to-
    terrestrial warfighting requirements. On the small satellite front,
    programs like Space Safari are enabling quick turn capabilities for
    operational use. Experiments and prototypes have a tailored board
    process to receive DOD sponsorship and ensure support, minimize
    timelines and leverage launch industry capabilities. Additionally,
    programs like Space System and Prototype Transition (SSPT) directly
    leverage commercially available technology and utilize non-traditional
    contracting approaches such as other transaction authorities to attract
    non-traditional vendors to accelerate acquisition timelines to deliver
    prototypes with residual operations capability. For example, Blackjack
    is integrating a military payload onto a commercially commoditized
    satellite bus. The U.S. Space Force utilizes the Mission Manifest
    Office (MMO) as the front door for all satellites leading to enhanced
    coordination and alignment across the DOD and mission partners. The
    Rocket Systems Launch Program (RSLP) procures small launch services and
    the MMO utilizes excess launch vehicle performance to maximize on-orbit
    capability, providing the U.S. Space Force the ability to employ
    multiple innovations to maintain responsiveness and assured access to
    space.
        Mr. Khanna. With the DARPA launch challenge concluding without a
    winner, what other space related programs focusing on responsive launch
    is Space Force interested in? What is the Space Force's plans to engage
    with new launch companies going forward to develop a responsive launch
    capability?
        General Thompson. The U.S. Space Force has two programs dedicated
    to engaging with launch companies. The National Security Space Launch
    program handles our traditional launch vendors and supports new
    entrants into future phases. The Department's Rocket Systems Launch
    Program (RSLP) manages the Tactically Responsive Launch Program
    Element, which leverages three available contract strategies to use
    emerging small launch providers to support DOD space requirements. RSLP
    has awarded 5 small space launch contracts to 6 different small launch
    providers; providing 19 small space launches and over 700 suborbital
    launches going back to 1972. RSLP's current primary launch contract
    mechanism has eight different providers, on-ramps new providers and
    procures launch services annually, and has procured one launch service
    to-date. The Department continues to look to use responsive launch
    capabilities and explore opportunities to enhance DOD responsive space
    launch requirements.
        Mr. Khanna. How is the Space Force planning to utilize tools such
    as additive manufacturing, and would Space Force's mission benefit from
    the integration of new space companies utilizing new manufacturing
    techniques such as additive manufacturing--in order to meet the Space
    Force requirement to launch within 24 hours as part of the tactically
    responsive launch requirements?
        General Thompson. The Department already uses space launch services
    from U.S. space industrial base entities that use additive
    manufacturing, such as 3D printing. Commercial innovation is a key
    component of ensuring U.S. preeminence in space, and the Department
    enthusiastically supports commercial efforts to rapidly develop
    reliable and responsive space capabilities.
        Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
    new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
    deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
    and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
    precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
    More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
    Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
    to the arsenal?
        General Thompson. The USSF Launch Enterprise is responsive to our
    customers' needs across the spectrum of small and large launch. For
    example, in 2019, we worked with our National Security Space Launch
    (NSSL)-class commercial partners to increase rocket performance less
    than 4 months before launch to provide more on-orbit resiliency. By
    using the NSSL Phase 2 contract, we can order and launch a mission in
    12 months. For small launch, we have contractual vehicles in-place that
    can rapidly award launches to eight different vendors currently,
    several of which can already launch within six months of award. Many of
    the small launch providers are non-traditional defense contractors. We
    also plan to on-ramp new vendors every year to continue to leverage
    industry innovation.
        Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
    Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
    companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
    discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
    utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
    constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
    scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
    capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
    How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
    the launch market as well?
        General Thompson. The Space Development Agency, in coordination
    with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
    Sustainment and Department of the Air Force, is still assessing launch
    requirements for the Tranche 1 series of satellites. The National
    Security Space Launch (NSSL) approach achieves the lowest overall costs
    to the government across the full spectrum of mission needs with
    commercial-like pricing for commercial-like launches. Further, the NSSL
    approach cuts the prices for the most demanding missions by over 50
    percent. However, the DOD may consider alternative launch options
    should it be beneficial to the Department, national security, and the
    U.S. taxpayer. Considering new providers, the DOD is interested in the
    capabilities of new NSSL class launchers as we prepare for our efforts
    beyond the Phase 2 contract for launch services procured in FY25.
    Additionally, we are already engaging in several efforts to use space
    launch providers who offer small and/or responsive launch capabilities.
    I am supportive of these efforts and believe the growth of the
    commercial space launch sector will directly support DOD's agility and
    strength in space. I am aware our counterparts in the NRO have procured
    launches outside the launch enterprise. However, the DOD coordinates
    closely with the IC to incorporate their requirements into our launch
    acquisition strategies, and we are committed to fostering competition
    in the industrial base.
        Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
    for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
    increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
    Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
    responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
    these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
    national security edge in space?
        General Thompson. As the Department of Defense identifies space
    requirements for responsive launch, acquisition of these capabilities
    will be appropriately budgeted for and reflected in the Department's
    overall strategy for space. I believe the current budget for U.S. space
    launch requirements addresses the current requirements, but anticipate
    the Department will request additional funding for these efforts as
    additional requirements are identified.
        Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
    new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
    deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
    and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
    precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
    More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
    Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
    to the arsenal?
        Dr. Scolese. For specific questions on the Space Force team's
    implementation of their Spacepower Doctrine, please contact USSF. The
    NRO predominantly utilizes Space Force's Launch Enterprise Directorate
    to procure our launch services and leverages their R&D investment in
    launch systems addressing Space Mobility and Logistics objectives
    described in the USSF doctrine. However, the NRO recently awarded a
    Streamlined Launch Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
    Contract (SLIC) for risk tolerant payloads, which leverages commercial
    processes and growing competition among emerging launch service
    providers. Maximizing commercial practices to the greatest extent
    possible can reduce both cost and timelines from contract award to
    launch.
        Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
    Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
    companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
    discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
    utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
    constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
    scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
    capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
    How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
    the launch market as well?
        Dr. Scolese. The NRO has broadened the scope of available launch
    providers and competition through our recently awarded Streamlined
    Launch Infinite Delivery Infinite/Quantity Contract (IDIQ). New
    entrants can onboard onto the contract and be eligible for award of a
    risk-tolerant launch service or rideshare, after one successful orbital
    launch.
        Many of our missions, however, require higher rocket performance,
    government insight and mission assurance, and are more complex from an
    integration and security perspective than commercial missions, driving
    additional costs. USSF and NRO share these costs so that National Space
    Security (NSS) unique costs do not encumber our domestic launch
    providers' commercial pricing. Adding more launch service providers to
    the National Security Space Launch Program (NSSLP) as it is currently
    structured, would increase fixed costs to the NRO and USSF.
        The NRO fully supports an open competition among all qualified
    launch service providers for NSSLP Phase 3. We are currently working
    with USSF to develop an appropriate acquisition strategy that reflects
    the diverse needs of NSS missions and the likely state of the launch
    industry in 2025 and beyond.
        Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
    for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
    increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
    Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
    responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
    these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
    national security edge in space?
        Dr. Scolese. While the NRO does not comment on other agencies'
    budgets, the NRO is leveraging innovative commercial industry to
    supplement and in applicable, warranted cases, replace certain
    government systems through commercial imagery, launch services and
    cloud computing service, which will allow a whole new range of
    technologies to help expand our supplier base, potentially lower the
    cost, and possibly shorten program timelines with increased
    flexibility.
        Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
    new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
    deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
    and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
    precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
    More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
    Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
    to the arsenal?
        General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
    capabilities.
        Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
    Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
    companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
    discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
    utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
    constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
    scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
    capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
    How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
    the launch market as well?
        General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
    capabilities
        Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
    for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
    increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
    Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
    responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
    these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
    national security edge in space?
        General Cleveland. NGA does not have or provide any space launch
    capabilities.
        Mr. Khanna. As SDA, DARPA, Space RCO and others continue to advance
    new capabilities within DOD, including satellite servicing and the
    deployment of satellite constellations, what is the strategy to engage
    and work with new launch partners who may be able to provide access to
    precise orbits at a lower cost point than traditional launch providers?
    More specifically, how is the Space Force team incorporating the
    Spacepower doctrine's call to provide ``dynamic and responsive'' launch
    to the arsenal?
        Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed efforts related to engaging
    with new launch partners or incorporating responsive launch into
    national security space programs.
        Mr. Khanna. The Director of the Space Development Agency, Dr. Derek
    Tournear has not yet made a decision about which launch company or
    companies will take on the Tranche 1 mission. During a recent
    discussion he stated that it was unclear if it would be feasible to
    utilize SMC or the National Security Space Launch program due to budget
    constraints. Would you and your team support efforts to broaden the
    scope of available launchers to include new responsive launch
    capabilities being developed by newer entrants into the launch market?
    How is the NRO and NGA working to engage and increase competition in
    the launch market as well?
        Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed agency efforts to broaden the
    scope of available launch providers or increase competition outside of
    or within the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program. In our
    August 2017 report on space launch coordination mechanisms, we found
    that federal agencies who acquire launch services--DOD, NRO, and NASA--
    spend over a billion dollars per year on space launch. While DOD and
    NASA use some of the same providers for their launches, each agency has
    separate acquisition processes and launch requirements. We found in the
    past that interagency coordination in space launch acquisitions has the
    potential to help leverage the governments buying power and eliminate
    the potential for redundancy and duplication. This past work found that
    coordination is important for operations and maintenance of launch
    ranges, scheduling launch missions, and government-wide strategic
    planning for launch. We found that opportunities exist for improving
    longer-term, government-wide planning for launch programs and for space
    programs in general. Acquiring launches outside of the current
    contract--the Phase 2 Launch Service Procurement--could sub-optimize
    the NSSL program's strategy to leverage the U.S. government's buying
    power to achieve the lowest overall cost of maintaining assured access
    to space. However, there are circumstances where using NSSL's larger
    launch vehicles (and associated costs) may not be justified, such as
    for experiments using small satellites.
        Mr. Khanna. The Air Force and Space Force have expressed support
    for new economic development to spur the space economy forward,
    increase launch cadences, and bring on new commercial capabilities.
    Both the rocket systems launch program for space and the tactically
    responsive space launch lines support this effort. Does the budget for
    these lines reflect the urgency of maintaining the U.S. commercial and
    national security edge in space?
        Mr. Ludwigson. We have not reviewed the extent to which the budget
    lines for the Rocket Systems Launch Program or Tactically Responsive
    Space Launch program support efforts to spur the space economy.
    However, in our May 2019 report on commercial space launch, we found
    that the industry was growing as U.S. launch providers capture a
    greater share of the global commercial market. We also found that the
    Federal Aviation Administration was expanding its workforce in
    anticipation of growth in the commercial launch industry but needed
    better information for long term planning. In our December 2020 report
    on options for supporting U.S. launch infrastructure, we examined FAA
    efforts to assess options to facilitate and promote greater investments
    in space transportation infrastructure. We found that FAA's assessment
    was limited and did not include a range of options that could better
    promote space transportation infrastructure to support national
    security, civil government, and commercial space customers at minimal
    cost to the federal government. We recommended that FAA examine a range
    of potential options to support space transportation infrastructure,
    including the necessary trade-offs of different potential approaches.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
        Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire
    their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How
    often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because
    of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL
    contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement
    plan?
        Mr. Hill. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
        Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire
    their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How
    often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because
    of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL
    contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement
    plan?
        General Thompson. There may be limited instances (security reasons
    as an example) where other factors override the significant impacts to
    NSSL Phase 2 and future Government buying power. Any of these limited
    instances should be evaluated for negative impacts to the larger
    enterprise even if there are isolated benefits to individual programs.
    Procuring missions outside NSSL reduces future buying power across the
    NSSL-class spectrum and will affect the ability to maintain or improve
    on Phase 2 pricing in future procurements, especially for higher
    performance requirements. National Security Space Launch (NSSL) has an
    unprecedented record of mission success with 87 consecutive successful
    launches. The NSSL approach achieves the lowest overall costs to the
    government across the full spectrum of mission needs, including assured
    access to space, demanding orbits, and complex satellites. NSSL Phase 2
    dramatically reduced launch prices over Phase 1 and provides cost
    effective launch services for unique government requirements. The
    Department encourages maximum use of the NSSL Phase 2 contract. The
    significant impacts in acquiring NSSL-class capability outside the NSSL
    contracts include forfeiting the NSSL provided Mission Assurance,
    limiting the flexibility provided by the Phase 2 contract (assured-
    access to space through two providers, up to 1-year mission
    acceleration, fixed-price mission unique capabilities), and reducing
    future Government buying power.
        Mr. Morelle. There are reportedly 32,000 objects on-orbit,
    including roughly 7,000 active and retired satellites. Does DOD have
    sufficient space situational awareness to monitor and assess risks to
    space systems and what are the risks of space congestion to DOD
    operations?
        General Thompson. The United States Space Force operates a variety
    of ground- and space-based sensors that track and characterize space
    objects. While this system of systems has been adequate to the track
    objects in the past, in an era of rapidly expanding space actors, from
    commercial actors to countries, we are seeing more satellites and
    associated debris than ever before. To ensure the Space Force is able
    to maintain our Space Domain Awareness (SDA) in a congested space
    environment, we are investing in new technologies and pursuing new data
    sources to enhance our capability to detect smaller objects and more of
    them. This includes incorporation of data from the rapidly expanding
    commercial SDA market and collaboration with Allies and partners to
    share information and sensors, as authorized, in a coalition approach
    to SDA.
        Mr. Morelle. For what reasons might organizations choose to acquire
    their own launches, rather than use the NSSL Phase 2 approach? How
    often has this happened? Is DOD paying more for NSSL launches because
    of programs seeking to launch their satellites outside of the NSSL
    contracts? How might this affect the Phase 2 launch service procurement
    plan?
        Dr. Scolese. In rare cases, the NRO has the ability to use
    alternative methods to procure launch services depending on the
    satellite program's objectives, and when doing so, will still seek
    input from the USSF. In selecting an NSS Launch Program (NSSLP) or non-
    NSSLP launch strategy, program objectives are balanced across all
    program factors including national security policy, cost, schedule, and
    performance objectives. NRO procured launch vehicles outside of the
    NSSL procurement were previously approved and not included in the
    procurement plan. We defer to USSF on the costs of NSSL launches and
    any potential to impact future pricing for Phase 3 launches.
        Mr. Morelle. There are reportedly 32,000 objects on-orbit,
    including roughly 7,000 active and retired satellites. Does DOD have
    sufficient space situational awareness to monitor and assess risks to
    space systems and what are the risks of space congestion to DOD
    operations?
        Mr. Ludwigson. GAO has not done work to verify the count of objects
    tracked on-orbit, nor has GAO specifically assessed the overall
    sufficiency of DOD's space situational awareness (SSA) systems. We have
    reviewed SSA programs for over a decade, including an in-depth review
    on SSA funding in 2015. Our past work has shown that SSA data are
    provided by a variety of sensors and systems from across the
    commercial, civil, military, and intelligence communities. As space
    continues to become more congested and contested, SSA systems are key
    to ensuring safe operation of space assets for the U.S. government. As
    such, DOD has made investments in SSA, such as the Space Fence radar
    system, which significantly increased the number of objects that the
    U.S. can track in space, and the Space Command and Control (Space C2)
    program, which is expected to significantly improve processing and
    dissemination of SSA data. U.S. Space Force documentation also
    emphasizes the importance of information on orbiting objects. For
    example, in its Space Power Space Capstone Publication, U.S. Space
    Force identifies Space Domain Awareness (SDA) as one of its five core
    competencies. The Capstone defines SDA as the effective identification,
    characterization and understanding of any factor associated with the
    space domain that could affect space operations and thereby impact the
    security, safety, economy, or environment of our Nation. It goes on to
    emphasize that to maintain awareness of spacecraft orbiting in the
    domain, space forces need to know not only orbital trajectory but also
    mission related details such as missions, intentions, system
    capabilities, patterns-of-life, and the status of consumables and
    expendables. Whether DOD's investments are sufficient to meet the needs
    of the rapidly-changing space paradigm is not something we have
    examined but the answer appears unclear at this time. For example, in
    2019, we found that DOD faced a number of challenges in developing new
    command and control capabilities under its Space C2 program, including
    management issues and technical complexity. We also found that the DOD
    faced limits in processing the increased amount of SSA sensor data with
    current data systems. DOD concurred with recommendations we made for
    addressing such challenges. We are continuing to monitor the
    development of SSA capabilities. Specifically, we are reviewing Space
    C2 program annual reports in response to a provision in the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. Additionally, beginning
    this year we plan to initiate a review of the National Space Defense
    Center's SSA needs and role in integrating SSA data in response to a
    provision in the House report to a bill for the Intelligence
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021.