[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-4]
NEAR-PEER ADVANCEMENTS IN SPACE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 23, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-863 WASHINGTON : 2022
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice MO BROOKS, Alabama
Chair ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
Vacancy
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Kim Lehn, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
WITNESSES
Creedon, Madelyn R., Nonresident Fellow, The Brookings
Institution.................................................... 4
Harrison, Todd, Director, Aerospace Security Project, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 9
Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF (Ret.), Affiliate, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.... 6
Morrison, Tim, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute................... 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 35
Creedon, Madelyn R........................................... 36
Harrison, Todd............................................... 62
Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................ 49
Morrison, Tim................................................ 74
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 91
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 95
Mr. Morelle.................................................. 97
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 95
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 96
NEAR-PEER ADVANCEMENTS IN SPACE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 23, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. This hearing is called to order. Members who
are joining remotely must be visible on screen for the purposes
of identity verification, establishing and maintaining a
quorum, participating in the proceeding, and voting. Those
members must continue to use the software platform's video
function while in attendance, unless they experience
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them unable to participate on camera.
If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should
contact the committee staff for assistance.
Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the
room and via the television internet feeds. Members
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they
are asked to mute their microphones when they are not speaking.
Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep
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Members may use software platform's chat feature to
communicate with staff regarding technical or logistical
support issues only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
Now that we have handled that boilerplate, let me start by
thanking our excellent witnesses today at today's hearing.
Ms. Madelyn Creedon is here in person. She is a nonresident
fellow at The Brookings Institution here in Washington. General
(retired) Robert Kehler is affiliated with the Center for
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.
Mr. Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and, I
may add, the author of an exciting new study that I will refer
to later. And Mr. Tim Morrison, senior fellow at the Hudson
Institute.
Today's hearing concerns advances that Russia and China are
making in their space and nuclear weapons programs and how the
U.S. should respond to these advances.
Someone is not muted on the screen.
Discussions like this are usually held in secret, but both
my ranking member and I think that we should highlight these
issues for the public so that the public can be included in the
debate.
To give you a small example of what we are talking about,
decades ago the U.S. Air Force created the GPS [Global
Positioning System] navigation and timing system, not just for
itself but for the entire world. Yes, GPS is one of the
benefits of the U.S. military. Because the U.S. offered it
completely free, not even thinking of charging for the service,
GPS is one of the largest gifts in the history of diplomacy,
worth an estimated $1 trillion annually to all the nations of
the world.
This gift approaches the magnitude of freedom of the seas,
and even world peace, as benefits to the globe.
Enjoying such a gift, why would our potential adversaries,
and even some of our allies, choose to spend billions of
dollars to copy GPS with their own proprietary versions, and
then to develop technologies that could destroy our GPS
satellites? Is there an innocent explanation for this behavior?
Wouldn't they be worried if the roles were reversed?
Their actions seem to be much worse than ingratitude. They
are, in effect, looking at our gift horses in the mouth and
then going to the extraordinary trouble of breeding their own
stable horses while conspiring to possibly kill all of ours.
Friendly neighbors don't do that.
Similar examples can be found in countless other areas of
strategic competition. Why are our potential adversaries
spending so much time and trouble developing so many low-yield
nuclear weapons?
Why would Vladimir Putin, the dictator that President Trump
never criticized once during his term of office, have a showy
press conference where he delighted in describing virtually
every possible variety of nuclear weapons that Russia is
developing?
And why are the Chinese on a path to multiply their nuclear
arsenal after many years of stability?
These and other questions are the subject of this hearing.
I now turn to my ranking member, Mr. Turner, for any
opening remarks that he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing. This is incredibly important that we have a
public discussion about what our adversaries are doing. The
more that we learn from experts about Russia and China's
nuclear and space capabilities and how they threaten U.S. and
allied national security, I think it helps give us an
understanding of what we need to be doing.
I would like to give my thanks to all the witnesses who
will be participating today. I certainly want to recognize Tim
Morrison, who is a Strategic Forces alum. We appreciate him
being here.
To give some context of what our adversaries are doing in
Russia and China I am going to offer several quotes from others
about what they are doing. And I want to just open with one,
you know, aspect of I think where sometimes we fall short.
So many times when assessments are being done we look at
what our adversaries are doing and try to rationalize them,
assuming that they are taking actions based upon our actions,
that our actions have justified theirs. Clearly what they are,
what Russia and China is doing is not a response or result of
United States actions. However, when you look at the to-do list
of this subcommittee, our response has to be with an
understanding of what their actions are.
Here are some of the comments by our defense intelligence
and military leaders.
General Robert Ashley, then director for the Defense
Intelligence Agency, publicly stated in 2019, ``Russia's
stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, already large and
diverse, is being modernized with an eye towards greater
accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields, to suit their
potential warfighting role.''
Now, remember, warfighting is not deterrence, it is
warfighting.
``The U.S. has determined that Russia's actions have
strained key pillars of arms control architecture. The United
States believes that Russia probably is not adhering''--this is
his words again--``that Russia is probably not adhering to the
nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the zero
yield standard. And Russia is also pursuing novel nuclear
delivery systems,'' some which we will hear about today, ``that
create a strategic challenge for the U.S., and which are
difficult to manage under current arms control agreements.''
On China, according to General Ashley, ``China soon will
yield''--excuse me, ``China will soon field its own version of
a nuclear triad, demonstrating China's commitment to expanding
the role and centrality of nuclear forces in Beijing's military
aspirations. And like Russia, China is also working to field
nuclear theater range precision strike systems. While China's
overall arsenal is assessed to be much smaller than Russia's,
this does not make this trend any less concerning.''
Admiral Charles Richard, the commander of the U.S.
Strategic Command, this January publicly reinforced those
troubling trends by stating, ``More than a decade ago, Russia
began aggressively modernizing its nuclear forces, including
its non-treaty-accountable medium- and short-range systems.''
Russian nuclear ``modernization is about 70 percent
complete and on track to be fully realized in a few years.''
And on China he stated, ``China is also on a trajectory to
be a strategic peer, and should not be mistaken as a lesser
included case. China's nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to
double, if not triple, or quadruple over the next decade.''
Again, his words.
Russia and China have begun to aggressively challenge
international norms and global peace using instruments of power
and threats of force in ways not seen since the height of the
Cold War, and in many cases in ways not seen during the Cold
War such as cyberattacks and threats in space, according to
Admiral Richard.
General John Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, at a National Security Space Association event in
January said, ``Russia and China are building capabilities to
challenge us in space, because if they can challenge us in
space they understand, as dependent as we are in space they can
challenge us as a nation.''
The Defense Intelligence Agency has also reported that
China and Russia in particular have taken steps to challenge
the United States in space, and have developed military
doctrines that indicate that they view space as important to
modern warfare and view counterspace capabilities as a means to
reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness.
I believe that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Deputy
Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, based on their
confirmation hearings, recognize the strategic and existential
threats that Russia and China pose to the United States.
Secretary Austin endorsed the triad here in his testimony.
This year, failing to ensure that we have a credible
nuclear deterrent as well as a space and counterspace
capabilities will have a profound and incalculable impact on
our national security. This makes it even more critical that we
execute the modernization of all legs of the nuclear triad.
This is necessary for us to keep, as the chairman said, world
peace, to deter Russia and China from even considering
escalation of a conflict with the United States.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Turner. We will now turn
to our witnesses for their remarks. We will begin with Ms.
Creedon.
STATEMENT OF MADELYN R. CREEDON, NONRESIDENT FELLOW, THE
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Creedon. Good afternoon, Chairman Cooper, Ranking
Member Turner, and members of the subcommittee. It is always an
honor to appear before the House Armed Services Committee and
to be back in this room. Even if wearing a mask and socially
distanced, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to actually
be here in person.
First, I would like to make the normal disclosure
statements. I appear today in my personal capacity. I do not
represent or speak on behalf of any organization, entity, or
individual, and my thoughts are my own.
The topics today--U.S. national security space, and nuclear
deterrence--and the threats and challenges confronting each are
both important and difficult, and should be discussed more
often, particularly in an unclassified setting.
The current administration, similar to most previous
administrations, probably wants to avoid a costly arms race;
prevent the use of nuclear weapons; prevent a war, or, if one
starts, ensure that it is limited; enter into arms control or
other agreements if consistent with national security goals;
ensure transparency and stability with potential adversaries;
support and strengthen alliances; ensure the U.S. national
security structure is robust and military personnel are well-
trained, well-equipped, and ready to respond; all while
retaining a credible deterrent, including adequate nuclear
forces.
The challenge, of course, is to develop policies,
procedures, and forces relevant to our more chaotic and more
complex world, while not starting or expanding a nuclear arms
race, and not getting embroiled into a push for numerical
parity with Russia, or China, or both.
The United States will no doubt seek to maintain a
qualitative, if not quantitative, advantage to ensure
deterrence in all domains. How to do this and not break the
bank is the challenge.
Today's hearing is not an intelligence hearing. Certainly,
you all received the detailed classified briefings and are well
aware of what Russia and China are doing to each further their
own self-interests and respond to their own perceived threats.
Although there are areas of uncertainty, much has been written
openly about each country's modernization activities and
policies, and to varying degrees each country has provided
insight into their own long-term thinking.
China has rapidly expanded its conventional missile and air
defense capabilities, and is modernizing its naval and war--
naval and air systems. China's satellite fleet is second only
to the U.S. fleet, and it has plans to expand its manned space
program. It is developing a wide array of kinetic and non-
kinetic anti-satellite systems, ASATs, and has tested its
kinetic ASAT system in a very public way. In addition, it is
expanding its own on-orbit military capabilities.
China's nuclear modernization appears to be largely
consistent with its longstanding doctrine. Historically, China
has taken the view that it will sustain a minimal deterrence
capability and maintain a no-first-use posture. Consistent with
no-first-use, China maintains an assured second-strike,
retaliatory capability which, according to Chinese doctrine
should prevent nuclear attack or coercion.
In many respects, China's modernization program is
responding to threats to its assured second-strike capability,
such as for missile defense, and is simply reinforcing its
assuredness. On the other hand, because China is increasing the
size of its nuclear arsenal, possibly doubling it to around 600
warheads, and developing a true triad, some have questioned
whether the modernization program may signal a future change in
China's policy of minimum nuclear deterrence.
But the real contrast, however, particularly in regards to
U.S. modernization, is Russia's approach to nuclear
modernization. Russia has used its once decrepit and now robust
infrastructure to manufacture new warheads with new military
capabilities, while the U.S. has gone to great lengths to avoid
any new capabilities, rebuilding existing warheads and
preserving existing military characteristics.
Russia has prioritized its nuclear modernization programs
while the U.S. agonizes annually over the programs and funding.
Russia has significantly modified its nuclear posture to
integrate nuclear and conventional planning, thus, at least
theoretically, increasing the possibility that a nuclear weapon
would be used in a warfighting scenario, while the U.S. has
gone to great lengths to reduce the role of U.S. nuclear
weapons and improve conventional capabilities and deterrence.
I should note that Russia as well has also developed an
anti-satellite capability and is expanding its ability to take
away U.S. advantage in space while improving its own on-orbit
capabilities.
So, the question is, what does the U.S. do?
So, I would like to offer five suggestions to the new
administration as it conducts its various security, strategy,
and posture reviews.
First, understand the threats and the drivers for Chinese
and Russian policies and programs. Pay attention to the
intelligence, including the uncertainties.
Second, have extensive and serious consultations with
allies and partners, and work with them whenever possible.
Don't just inform them of decisions already made and mistake
foreign military sales for cooperation.
Third, to the maximum extent practical--practicable, share
some of this thinking publicly, including having discussions
with academics and think tanks.
Fourth, don't take anything off the table at the outset of
the review. Be guided by the analysis and understanding gained
during the review to shape policy, postures, and programs.
And, fifth, reestablish substantive discussions on
strategic stability with Russia, China, and our allies. Explore
options and topics for transparency, explore mutual
misunderstandings, don't dismiss arguments out of hand, and
seek agreements, if possible, that ensure stability.
So, thank you very much, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Ms. Creedon.
Now General Kehler.
STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.), AFFILIATE,
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member
Turner, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored
to join with you today. Pleased to offer my personal
perspective on near-peer advancements in space and nuclear
weapons.
Let me say at the outset that I am going to present the
viewpoint of a former senior commander, but not an intelligence
analyst; but I am representing my own views here today, not the
official policy or position of the Strategic Command, or the
Department of Defense, or the United States Government. So, I
am mindful of your time. Let me make four quick points to you
for your consideration.
First, China and Russia continue to invest in decades-long
military modernization programs. And those programs are
delivering highly capable weapons systems. While both countries
are pursuing different grand strategies, both are on pathways
to field modern forces that can employ integrated nuclear and
non-nuclear capabilities across domains to hold valuable
targets in the U.S., in our allied homelands, and in our
territories at risk, while they are also deploying other
capabilities to disrupt or deny our ability to project power
and conduct military campaigns.
In a significant departure from the Cold War, these modern
strategic capabilities allow them to threaten our homeland
below the nuclear threshold with long-range conventional and
cyber weapons, while holding nuclear weapons as the ultimate
threat. In essence, they can now credibly hold us at risk
without having to be concerned about crossing the nuclear
threshold, and use that to leverage our decision-making.
In both of the minds of the Chinese and the Russians, this
credible strategic threat is going to raise the risks and costs
of our intervention in regional affairs, and enable more
assertive foreign policies and aggressive behaviors on their
part.
Second point, nuclear and space modernization efforts have
received particular attention in both countries, as has the
development of cyberspace capabilities, not a subject for this
hearing directly today, but I think something that should
always be at the front of our conversation. The nuclear threat
clearly remains the worst-case threat. And as far into the
future as I can see, we are going to have to deter the actual
or coercive use of nuclear weapons against us by any nuclear-
armed adversaries, particularly Russia and China.
The Russian and Chinese nuclear programs are different, but
both are ambitious, and production is well underway in both
countries to deliver new ballistic missiles, cruise missiles,
and launch platforms to include new ballistic missile
submarines, which is a first for the Chinese.
Despite delivery and other problems, according to President
Putin modern equipment now makes up 82 percent of Russia's
nuclear triad. President Putin has also announced his country's
intent to pursue what some are calling novel nuclear
capabilities, some of which are not accountable within the New
START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty and its extension.
Chinese nuclear modernization is also impressive, and
includes new road-mobile ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic
missiles] and new submarine-launched ballistic missile systems.
My third point, China and Russia have backed their
impressive programmatic progress with updated strategies and
doctrine, new organizations, and aggressive and realistic
training. Some of the results of their modernization and this
new doctrine and organizational structure and training have
been demonstrated very capably in contingencies, for example
the Russian invasion of the Ukraine, and certainly what we see
out of Russia and China on the cyber front.
So, I agree with those who point out that over the last
decade Russia has come to rely more on nuclear weapons in its
military and national security strategy. And it looks like
Russian doctrine goes beyond basic deterrence and into regional
warfighting, a point that I believe is validated by their
introduction of low-yield weapons.
While China still professes a no-first-use policy, some
interpret Chinese nuclear ambitions and their emerging
capabilities to represent a pathway to a more responsive or
perhaps a first strike capability. We will have to wait and
see. But any declaratory policy can be quickly abandoned if it
is in China's best interests to do so.
I believe it is important for you to remember that either
Russia, or to a lesser extent China, can unleash large-scale
nuclear attacks against the United States and our allies. And
as unlikely as it might be, Russia still retains the ability to
destroy the United States with a massive nuclear strike with
little or no warning.
My final point deals with space, where China and Russia are
both making determined investments to exploit our
vulnerabilities and threaten our most important national
security space capabilities. While some of their advances have
been impressive, I am most concerned about what both countries
are doing in space.
Both have practiced orbital rendezvous and inspection.
Both have launched satellites and have gotten close to our
important national security satellites and performed what
looked like intelligence gathering or rehearsals to attack them
in some way.
And as an aside, while again it is not a specific subject
of this hearing, I am even more concerned about the cyber
threat to our satellites, our industry, our infrastructure, and
our networks and the data that flows through them.
Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, I can't recall a
time during my professional career when potential threats to
our security were more varied or pronounced than they are
today. These threats go well beyond Russia and China and
nuclear and space. I recognize you are facing critical
decisions about an unprecedented set of competing national
priorities, but the United States cannot defer or delay the
bipartisan strategic modernization program that was laid out
well over a decade ago.
To preserve deterrence and underwrite the security of the
United States and our allies and partners, we must modernize
all three legs of our nuclear triad and improve the resilience
and performance of the critical nuclear command, control, and
communications system. We must follow your bold steps to create
a separate United States Space Force by adding investment in
sensible growth, in resilient space capabilities, and in the
means to deny an adversary's use of space should that become
necessary.
And we must invest in non-kinetic capabilities to address
the growing threats through cyberspace.
As always, supporting the men and women who serve in and
lead our military is the highest priority or all.
Thanks again for your continued focus on these critical
issues and for inviting me to participate today. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General. I appreciate that.
Before we get to Mr. Harrison, let me promote his new
report from CSIS [Center for Strategic and International
Studies]. If the definition of politics is putting the cookies
on a low shelf, it is really hard to imagine a nuclear weapons
space report that quotes Harry Potter figures such as Albus
Dumbledore so extensively. I was reassured that although Mr.
Harrison claims to have been a resident of Gryffindor House, I
am glad that he is aided by Kaitlyn Johnson, who apparently is
a Slytherin, much more familiar with the dark arts.
So, this is a remarkable new report and should do a lot to
help the general public understand the issues that we are
dealing with.
So, without further ado, Mr. Harrison.
STATEMENT OF TODD HARRISON, DIRECTOR, AEROSPACE SECURITY
PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Harrison. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
Turner, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I just
want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Space has traditionally been viewed by many as the domain
of science, commerce, and exploration. While that continues to
be true, it is also a warfighting domain. Since the beginning
of the Space Age, satellites have provided important military
capabilities for warfighters on Earth. And as soon as the
military potential of space became apparent, nations started
developing ways to attack space systems.
History provides some hard truths that many in the space
community and national security enterprise may find difficult
to accept. Space was never really a sanctuary; space was
militarized from the beginning. And if one considers a
satellite that can attack other satellites a space weapon, then
space has already been weaponized as well.
The choice facing the United States today in space is not
whether we should militarize or weaponize space. That has
already happened. Our decision is how to respond to the threats
we face in the domain.
In our annual CSIS Space Threat Assessment, we document
publicly available information on the counterspace capabilities
of other nations. While China has conducted a widely condemned
anti-satellite test back in 2007, what is less known is that
China continued testing its direct-ascent ASAT weapons at a
pace of about once each year.
Russia has been testing similar direct-ascent ASAT weapons
with its most recent test in December of 2020, and it has
revived its co-orbital ASAT capabilities that date back to the
1960s.
Last summer, the Russian Cosmos 2543 satellite maneuvered
near another Russian satellite and fired what was believed to
be a projectile. While kinetic forms of attacks such as these
often receive the most attention, there are many other types of
counterspace weapons being developed and proliferated by
Russia, China, and others, to include lasers that can dazzle or
blind the sensors on satellites; electronic warfare systems
that can jam or spoof the signals going to or from satellites;
and cyberattacks against the ground systems that control
satellites.
The data is clear: both China and Russia pose serious
threats to commercial, civil, and military space systems. But
the lack of public discourse about how to defend against space
threats may have led some to mistakenly conclude that space is
not defendable and should not be relied upon by the military.
The fact that space is contested just means that the United
States will have to fight to protect its ability to operate in
this domain, just as it does in the air, land, and maritime
domains.
A wide array of defenses are available to improve the
protection of space systems from counterspace weapons. These
include passive defenses that make space systems more difficult
to attack, and active defenses that target the threats
themselves.
In the CSIS report that Chairman Cooper referenced, we
detail a broad range of these space defenses, and make seven
recommendations for investment priorities, actions, and
additional analysis to improve U.S. space defense capabilities.
I want to highlight four of these recommendations for the
subcommittee today.
First, a priority should be placed on improving space
domain awareness capabilities to include more space-based
sensors, better integration with commercial and friendly
foreign government space surveillance networks, and the use of
artificial intelligence to analyze data and form a better
understanding of adversary capabilities and intentions.
Second, new space architectures are needed. They use a
combination of distribution, proliferation, and diversification
of orbits. These new architectures do not necessarily need to
replace legacy architectures, but rather should be used to
supplement and diversify existing space capabilities.
Third, non-kinetic active defenses such as onboard jamming
and lasing systems are needed to protect high-value satellites
from kinetic attacks. DOD [Department of Defense] should also
explore a physical seizure capability that can grab
uncooperative satellites that pose a threat to critical
military capabilities or the space environment itself.
And, fourth, new options should be considered to improve
DOD's integration with commercial space operators, such as
creating a program like the Civil Reserve Air Fleet with
commercial space companies.
Progress is being made in some but not all of these areas.
Investments in space defenses are especially important now
because the U.S. military is in the process of modernizing many
of its key satellite constellations. The decisions made over
the coming months and years about what types of space
architectures to build, and which defenses to incorporate, will
have repercussions for the life of these systems.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrison can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Mr. Harrison.
And now we will hear from Mr. Morrison.
STATEMENT OF TIM MORRISON, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Mr. Morrison. Sorry about that.
Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Turner, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today and
for holding a public hearing on this most important topic. I
would like to recap a few important points from my prepared
statement, which I submitted yesterday.
There is an arms race underway. Today the U.S. is sitting
on the sidelines.
I would never try to sit in your shoes, Madelyn.
We have long known about Russia's reliance on its nuclear
forces. Russia is a failing state, a declining power. To
paraphrase former Senator John McCain, Russia is a Mafia-run
gas station with nuclear weapons. Its nuclear forces are just
another example of Putin's need to cheaply create relevance for
a formerly great power he is steering into the ground at an
increasing rate of speed.
More recently, the activities of the Chinese Communist
Party, including with respect to its nuclear forces, have
become increasingly alarming. The People's Republic of China
has been growing its nuclear forces behind what the then-
Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, Ambassador
Marshall Billingslea, called The Great Wall of Secrecy.
That General Secretary Xi Jinping would do this should not
be surprising. It has been clear since he took power in 2012
that he was a Chinese leader who was done with the practice of
previous Chinese Party leadership to ``hide and bide.'' General
Secretary Xi promises the ``eventual demise of capitalism.'' He
promises that Chinese socialism will ``win the initiative and
have the dominant position.''
This is not a promise of peaceful coexistence between
competing world views. We have not heard such rhetoric since
Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev warned the West, ``We
will bury you.''
With respect to Russia's nuclear program, a decade after
New START was ratified, Russia's accomplishment was clear:
Putin had managed to exempt from arms control the bulk of his
nuclear modernization program. Then-Secretary of State Pompeo
stated, and I quote, ``Only 45 percent of Russia's nuclear
arsenal is subject to numerical limits. Meanwhile, that
agreement restricts 92 percent of America's arsenal.''
It is the simple fact that virtually every nuclear weapons
delivery vehicle the U.S. can deploy, and every type of nuclear
weapon we deploy is limited by arms control. That simply is not
the case with the Russian Federation.
We have recently seen the Biden administration pursue the
5-year extension of the New START Treaty. We have locked in
these Russian advantages for 5 more years.
Now, Secretary--excuse me, now-Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``I agree
that nuclear deterrence is the department's highest priority
mission, and that updating and overhauling our nation's nuclear
forces is a critical national security priority.'' He joins a
long line of our nation's senior national security leaders,
military and civilian, who have stated that nuclear deterrence
is the top priority for the Department of Defense.
What this subcommittee should do to counter the
aforementioned threats is recommit to the bipartisan Obama-
Trump nuclear modernization program. This bipartisan plan means
modernizing the complementary three-legged stool of nuclear
weapons delivery systems. I would be surprised if anyone in
this room owns a car as old as any one of these delivery
systems, all of which are beyond their design life.
A classic 1964 Ford Mustang would be the exception to the
rule, and I would be quite jealous, but I doubt that is the car
you depend on. Also, that 1964 Mustang is probably younger than
some of the B-52s we operate today.
This bipartisan modernization program also includes
Manhattan Project era complex nuclear weapons production
facilities. A modernized plutonium pit production and uranium
manufacturing capability were integral elements of the
bipartisan Obama-Trump nuclear deterrent modernization program.
I urge you to continue to support this bipartisan national
security policy.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. And happy
birthday, Maria.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrison can be found in the
Appendix on page 74.]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, could we take a moment so they
could figure out the microphones for a moment and address it?
Mr. Cooper. Sure.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. You upstaged me. I didn't know it was Maria's
birthday today. That's a significant national security event.
[Laughter.]
[Pause.]
Mr. Cooper. We will now move to member questions. I am
going to restrain myself and just ask one. But before I do
that, I would like to ask unanimous consent that the ranking
member of the full committee, when he joins us, Mr. Rogers,
will be able to be inserted into the lineup here because we
have a long list of folks who want to ask questions already.
So, without objection, so ordered.
I would like to ask Ms. Creedon, you make a couple of very
salient points in your testimony. One, that for the last 25
years virtually every expectation that U.S. policymakers have
had regarding China has led to disappointment in terms of their
refusal to join the world order. And then you point out that
somehow we must figure out a way to compete with China without
isolating it.
And I am wondering, in your testimony I think you refer to
the need to have a whole-of-government approach, things like
that. And it reminds me that we have enough difficulty here
even having interagency approach, must less a whole-of-
government approach. And China doesn't always succeed, but they
try to pull off whole-of-society approaches which, at least
since World War II, has been extremely difficult for us to pull
off.
So, are we at a systematic disadvantage when it comes to
these mega-challenges vis-a-vis a state capitalist system like
the Chinese one?
Ms. Creedon. Fundamentally, I would say no. But I think
where we might have a disadvantage is we just haven't exercised
the whole-of-government approach in a meaningful and consistent
way. I think we are getting a little bit better. But, as the
new administration begins to conduct its various reviews, it at
least has said that it wants to do a more holistic review.
So, even though there will be, in my mind, chapters, if you
will, on space, and nuclear, and all the other things that line
up in a national defense or national security strategy, the
thinking is that these will be substantially less stovepiped
and that we will also look at how our other tools of
government, so, diplomatic, including sanctions, but other
diplomatic will also come into play.
So, we're not at a fundamental disadvantage, but we are
going to have to learn, I think, how to do better on the whole-
of-government approach.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
I will now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I want to note to our virtual
participants, I will be getting to you. I don't want to show
that I am having a preference for those who are here, but my
preference is actually I have two lawyers here, and so we'll be
getting to you guys in just a minute.
Ms. Creedon, first off, thank you for your service. You
read your resume and it is extraordinary in the amount of both
your expertise and the service in which you have provided.
Thank you for that. So, and your continued contribution to the
dialog and discussion is incredibly important as a result of
that wealth of knowledge that you have.
You said something in your opening presentation I would
like for you to return to and elaborate for a moment. And you
said we need to work--as you were giving us a numerical list of
what we should be doing--you said we need to work with our
allies.
I want to tell you something anecdotal and then I want to
ask for your advice on it.
So, you would be familiar with the RAND [Corporation] study
when it came out and looked at the Baltics, and said that
basically they are not defendable and it could result in
nuclear war and/or loss if Russia should take actions against
them. I had some parliamentarians from NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] allies together at the Library of Congress
where we did a tabletop exercise with RAND.
And I was so surprised at how little the parliamentarians
knew about their own neighborhood. They did not know what was
there. So many times, as the chairman has made the point when
he opened this hearing, we are reticent to tell the story of
what the adversaries are doing, so much so that our allies even
are uninformed.
Ms. Creedon, what could we do, what should we do to make
certain that our allies know what the real threat is from
Russia and China?
Ms. Creedon. First, thank you very much, Mr. Turner for
those kind words. As you well know, these topics are quite near
and dear to my heart.
So, one of the things that I have always thought
interesting is General Raymond, who is the first commander of
the new U.S. Space Command, for many years has said that we
suffer from extensive over-classification of almost everything.
It is certainly true in space, and it is true in things
nuclear.
It is a delicate balance as to how we protect secrets that
need to be protected, and yet at the same time convey both what
our adversaries are doing and what we have the capabilities to
do in response.
That said, there is a tremendous amount of information that
is publicly available. And we just need to have those
discussions publicly. So, not only is the recommendation to
work with allies, but the other rec--one of the other
recommendations is to do things more publicly: have hearings
like this, have the administration comment more publicly on
their thinking, have them meet with various groups, and think
tanks, and academics. But somehow we have to get this
understanding more in the public domain.
I know we ignored it for many, many years, but it has
changed. And it has changed remarkably in really the last 10
years. So, I know we always talk about sort of the end of the
Cold War, and that is all well and good. But we are in
something that it is not a new Cold War, it is not a post-Cold
War, it is its own thing, and it is really different from where
we have been before. And having those discussions about what it
is, is really important.
So, I totally support this hearing and anything that this
committee can do.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Well, with the fall of Crimea it is
a hot war, not a cold war.
Mr. Morrison, with both China and Russia developing
hypersonics; with Russia doing their tests on Skyfall, their
nuclear-powered, orbiting missile; with Poseidon, with their
development of a underwater, unmanned, pop-up nuclear weapon,
you see in their portfolio and in China's portfolio an attempt
at the element of surprise. Well, surprise tends to bend itself
toward first strike. First strike bends itself to instability.
And it certainly gets us past the issue of deterrence.
As you look to what our adversaries are currently doing, do
you worry about the United States having vulnerability of our
adversaries attacking us without warning, and without there
being an ongoing conflict when you cast that in light of the
capabilities that they are seeking?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, thank you. I do, but maybe not
in the same way as, as some others.
I think we, we talk about modernizing the triad. We talk
about modernizing the production and infrastructure of the NNSA
[National Nuclear Security Administration]. The nuclear command
and control system is an urgent priority to make sure that the
President always maintains his positive control of our nuclear
force so that you maintain both the assured first-strike
capability, if needed, but also an assured second strike. That
is the advantage of the complementariness of the triad, the
large ICBM force that would take a significant incoming strike
to try to, to try to knock out.
And I think this is also where you have to look at some of
the proposals that have been offered that could risk upsetting
the current stability that exists between the U.S. and Russia,
the U.S. and China, at some point maybe the U.S. versus Russia
and China together. And that is ideas like no first use, like
de-alerting. These are ideas that risk upsetting stability by
giving an adversary an idea that maybe they could go first and
succeed in preventing a second strike.
And I think we have to be very careful about some of these
nice-sounding ideas that could actually wind up creating some
pretty grave consequences that weren't intended.
Mr. Turner. So, you would say that the modernization that
we have undertaken is absolutely essential in order to avoid
that vulnerability?
Mr. Morrison. Sir, more--yes. And more important than my
opinion is the opinion of the current Secretary of Defense, the
last four Secretaries of Defense of both administrations, the
current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the recent Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, the serious national security consensus that
exists among Republican officials and Democrat officials, this
program is important and must be preserved.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, you have an unbelievable legacy
of working on actual plans to defend the United States, looking
at what our adversaries might do, and looking to the needs of
modernization. Let's go back, let's go back 10 years from now
and then take a look forward as to what you see.
Would you have been surprised that we are where we are?
Would you be surprised that modernization had not yet happened?
And would you have been surprised by the moves that our
adversaries have made? Or, do you think that the signals have
been there all along?
General Kehler. Congressman, I think the signals have been
there for quite some time. I think we went through a time
period in the United States where we were distracted from this
set of issues. And I think that showed. It showed in, I think,
in a reduction in confidence in the people who are in the
nuclear forces that resulted in some very unfortunate issues of
discipline and those kind of things that we had to deal with.
But most importantly, I think we were a little bit like the
5-year-old soccer players who all run to the ball. And it is
understandable why we did that. But the ball that was thrown
onto the field on 9/11 of 2001 diverted us in a pathway for
well over a decade.
And so, I think for a while it was very difficult for some
of us to continue to be that kid banging the highchair with a
spoon and saying, but look, these other things are going on.
There's a strategic set of issues here that the country needs
to be mindful of.
And even while I certainly supported the focus that we had
to put on that single issue about counterterrorism and those
matters that, by the way, still haven't gone away either, there
still has to be a balancing act done here. But we took a
holiday, I believe, from looking at these matters for far too
long. And I think that holiday is over.
It doesn't surprise me that Russia and China have
progressed. It disappoints me a little bit that we are still
having somewhat of maybe an argument/conversation about what we
should do about it. I think, like you have heard my colleagues
say, there was a bipartisan agreement about how to go forward.
I do think that some of those priorities have shifted. I think
that we need to pay far more attention than we were giving lip
service to for nuclear command, control, and communications. I
think that has certainly risen, in my view, given the cyber
threats and some other things that we are now facing.
So, I guess I am a little surprised by the way the cyber
threat has unfolded, the pace with which and the boldness that
Russia and China have been using to employ cyber capabilities.
But it is time for us to stop discussing what we should do next
and go do it. And I think that that will be a big
disappointment to me and I think a threat to the country if we
don't.
Mr. Turner. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Turner.
Before we proceed to member questioning, I would like to
urge our colleagues, at least in my opinion, when we use the
term ``modernization'' for our nuclear weapons that leads to
the possibility of false equivalency, like we are modernizing,
Russians are modernizing. But it is a qualitative and
quantitative difference of incredible magnitude.
So often we are, as the members know, using life extension
programs which really is kind of the weakest form of
modernization. We are doing no new testing. We are not even
sure if these other nations, as Mr. Morrison points out in his
testimony, are even complying with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
or the chemical weapons treaties. And here we are putting our
weapons on Geritol and Ensure, trying to let them eke out a few
more years. That is the weakest form of modernization.
So I just think, as we consider this, we are doing, like,
the minimum possible to keep what we had, you know, many
decades ago. These other nations, when you mention words like
``Skyfall,'' we know what that means, but to have orbiting
nuclear weapons, or nuclear airplanes with nuclear weapons,
like, forever, and even approaching us from the south, to have
perpetual nuclear torpedoes, these are unthinkable sorts of
things. So, we are not even approaching that level of
devilment. So, we have to keep things in perspective.
The first question would be to Mr. Langevin, who is with us
on Webex.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Well, good afternoon. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon. Thank you to our witnesses
here today, in particular General Kehler. Great to see you
again. And thank you all for your testimony. I particularly
enjoyed that last exchange there with General Kehler with
respect to the questions from Mr. Turner.
If I could, I will start with Mr. Morrison. As you know,
automation in the NC3 [nuclear command, control, and
communications] systems is not new. Yet, new AI [artificial
intelligence] techniques could accelerate decision-making or
dangerously lead to false positives. Are China and Russia
integrating deep learning and other AI tools? And should the
U.S. integrate deep learning and other AI tools into its
nuclear systems? And what are the unique risks that
policymakers should consider?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, thank you very much. So, based
on public reporting there is evidence to show that Russia, for
example, has automated nuclear command and control systems, the
so-called Dead Hand or Perimeter system. You could find
references to this in General Ashley's statement that has been
referenced here a couple times from his May 2019 speech to the
Hudson Institute.
China has set out to undertake a significant artificial
intelligence program to displace the U.S. as the world's leader
in artificial intelligence. I am not aware of public reporting
about how they are using their artificial intelligence
capabilities, but I think it is safe to assume that they will
include them across their military complex.
And for the U.S., there is automation at various levels of
our system, primarily early warning. But we always keep the man
in the loop and the President always has positive control of
nuclear weapons. And that is the way it should be.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. If I could, the next question, for
General Kehler, the People's Liberation Army considers cyber
capabilities to be an integral part of strategic and nuclear
deterrence. They could use cyber strikes on military or
economic targets to intimidate and deter future action, or they
could constrain adversaries' response options by hitting
communications systems.
General Kehler, do we expect our nation's NC3
infrastructure to be one of these targets in the deterrence
phase? And how could compromises to non-NC3 systems potentially
distort decision-making by lowering trust in the NC3 proper,
even if those systems are not, in fact, compromised?
General Kehler. Congressman, good to see you again as well,
and thanks for the question. I am very concerned about the
cyber threat that has grown, really, in significant ways. And
we see that demonstrated often. Unfortunately, we see it
demonstrated from nation-states and from other sophisticated
actors, criminals and others. I do think that certainly our
critical nuclear command and control will be a target. We
expect that it would be a kinetic target; we expect it would be
a nuclear target; there is no reason to expect it would not be
a cyber target, particularly in advance of any kind of other
activity.
I have long believed that if we ever get into a conflict
with a China or a Russia, that that conflict will begin in
cyberspace and may not go kinetic for quite some time. I think
space and cyberspace will be early areas of conflict in some
future war.
And it leads to, as we think about modernizing our nuclear
command and control system and we recognize that in the future
it is going to be very hard to determine what networks serve
what pieces of our military establishment, cloud operations and
other things, I think drawing a bright line around that in the
future is going to be increasingly difficult to do.
I think there are some things we could always point to and
say that is clearly part of our nuclear command and control and
we have special sensitivity about that. But I think that for us
to try to differentiate, if you will, in the future is going to
be very difficult to do.
I am told by cyber experts that some of the ways that we
can retain confidence in our systems as we go forward is to
share systems, that we have resilient pathways, and that it
will be difficult for an adversary to determine where to
attack.
So, I think that our notions in the past about drawing a
line around those things that are related to nuclear command
and control, particularly saying those 5 things, or 6 things,
or 12 things, whatever it is, are part of our nuclear thin
line, I think that as we share the capabilities that commercial
space brings to the fight, for example, as they are being made
part of the architectures that we use for resilience, I think
this is going to be a tougher problem for us to try to address.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you for that answer. I
appreciate that. Thanks again for your service to the nation,
General.
With that, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, so I yield
back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we have our
sympathy to you, Mr. Chairman, on the loss of your wife Martha.
And you are both so well thought of here in Congress. God bless
you.
Mr. Cooper. You are very kind. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. And we appreciate very much the witnesses here
today, your insight. Dr. Creedon, congratulations on your years
of dedicated service to our nuclear security enterprise,
including your recent tenure as the principal deputy
administrator at the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Most U.S. nuclear systems have been extended far beyond
their intended life cycles and require significant, consistent
investment over the next two decades to maintain the expert
workforce and the necessary facilities to sustain them, while
we lose more critical capabilities. For example, the United
States is the only nuclear weapons state that cannot currently
develop a plutonium pit for deployment.
This committee sought to address this in the bipartisan
fiscal year 2021 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] by
directing the modernization of our plutonium pits, including
production of 80 pits per year at 2 sites by 2030.
My question: How does our uncertain funding cycle threaten
the credibility of our nuclear deterrence against Russia and
China, who are building or updating their own triads? Where
should our modernization priorities be focused, both in the
short term and the long term?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you very much, sir, for the kind words
and also for the question.
I do think this is incredibly important. One of the things
that I mentioned in my opening statement was there is a very
stark contrast between Russia, which has prioritized its
nuclear modernization, and the U.S., which has significant
debates every year about whether the nuclear modernization
should move forward.
But, fundamental to any modernization is the infrastructure
and also the people. And particularly challenging is the
infrastructure at the NNSA, the National Nuclear Security
Administration. The science infrastructure is in pretty good
shape, but we can't keep our--we can't take our eyes off that
ball. We have to continue to support the science that underpins
our ability to modernize and to make changes, which are going
to be inevitable in the future.
But, most importantly, the production complex has really
suffered from many years of neglect. There are some significant
advances. There is a new uranium storage facility. The uranium
processing facility is well underway; it is on schedule and on
budget. Knock on wood that it stays that way. But we do not
have the ability to make plutonium pits. This is a key element
of modernization. Even the life extension programs are going to
require new pits, newly manufactured pits, and we have to get
on with this.
Now, I know there is lots of debate about how many we need
and where we build them and all that. Let's have that debate.
But we truly have to get on with modernizing this
infrastructure at all levels.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Doctor. And thank you for
your promoting that very positive statement.
And, Mr. Morrison, thank you for your 17 years of service
on Capitol Hill, including as the staff director of this very
subcommittee. You have made a very positive difference.
In regard to arms control, China's lack of transparency on
its nuclear policies, disposition, and development of
hypersonic nuclear systems indicates it is moving away from its
longstanding minimalist force structure in a direction that
undermines regional and global instability.
Based on China's recent nuclear modernization and
preparations to operate its test site year-round, how accurate
is the assessment of their nuclear ambitions? Given that trust
is a precondition of any nuclear arms treaty, how is the
outlook for reasonable, verifiable nuclear arms control with
China, given their lack of transparency?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman Wilson, thank you for your kind
words. Yeah, I agree that these are very difficult
circumstances. The Chinese--transparency is anathema to the
Chinese Communist Party's hold on power. And so, you know,
that, I think, was one of the things that the previous
administration was trying to accomplish by bringing China into
the discussion as soon as possible. And it wasn't about
bringing China into the New START Treaty, it was about bringing
China to the table. They want to be a big boy. Big boys do what
serious powers do; they negotiate arms control, they adhere to
their Article 6 obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
And one of my concerns is the extent to which China views
the extension of New START as a 5-year reprieve for their
inclusion in arms control. And I will just--I will leave it at
that.
Mr. Wilson. Appreciate your insight. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this extremely
important hearing and for the testimony that has been
presented, as well as the comments of my colleagues.
Stepping back from all of this for just a moment, we are
really, it seems to me, talking about a new and refurbished
bomb, some by us and some by our adversaries; new delivery
systems which are designed to not be observed; an increased
dependence on space, which is increasingly vulnerable; and
overarching cyber. It appears from the testimony that both
Russia and China are busily addressing all of these issues, as
are we.
Now, we can argue whether we are ahead or behind or equal,
or whatever, but it seems to me that we are in the midst not of
the first quarter, but certainly towards the end of the first
half of a new nuclear arms race. It has been going on for at
least a decade, maybe longer.
So, what to do? Build new bombs? Create more sophisticated,
unobservable delivery systems? Figure out how to defend
ourselves in space or to attack others in space? And, of
course, overarching, which nobody has yet figured out, how to
be cyber secure?
My question to the four witnesses: Is it time to do what
Reagan did, and Bush 1 and Bush 2, and Clinton, and Obama? Is
it time for us to engage fully in arms control negotiations on
all of these issues, on the delivery systems, on space, on
cyber, and on the bombs themselves?
Let's start with Ms. Creedon.
Ms. Creedon. So, the simple answer to that is yes. But we
have to do this from a basis of strength. And I think we also
have to do it from a basis of knowledge. And we have to do it
from a basis of willing to have serious discussions.
In so many of these discussions we tend to take issues off
the table peremptorily. I think we really need to listen to
what is driving Russia, China, others, into their nuclear
modernization, and have real discussions about what the threats
are to them that they perceive. And, conversely, we need to
have discussions about what the threats are to us that we
perceive.
And it isn't just the three of us. Somewhere along the line
we also have to bring in everybody else. We have to bring in
India and Pakistan and North Korea, and even the U.K. [United
Kingdom] and France, and figure out, you know, how we truly
engage in some sort of multinational arms control, if possible.
But, in the meantime, we really have to talk to Russia first,
because between the two of us we still have the bulk of the
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
General Kehler.
General Kehler. Congressman, thank you. I agree, and I
favor talking to Russia and China and others. But I also think
that we have to--we are not in equal starting points right now.
And I think we have got to commit ourselves to an upgrade and a
modernization of our own deterrent.
I think that there are some things--and you mentioned
President Reagan. I was a young officer when President Reagan
was proposing his strategic modernization program and a way to
deal with the Russians, et cetera. And in those calculations
what I recall was that the idea was that the United States
should deal from a position, if not equality or strength,
certainly not in a position where we were starting behind. And
I think that we have deferred our modernization to the extent
that if President Putin says that 82 percent of his triad is
modern weapons, and ours is not, I don't think that is a good
place for us to be negotiating from.
So I would encourage us, I think we can do more than one
thing at a time. I don't think it is either modernize or talk;
I think that we can do both of these things. But I think that
we need to proceed in a way that, in fact, puts our deterrent
in the place that it needs to be. Because, at the end of the
day, this is really about deterrence. We don't want to fight a
war with Russia. We don't want to fight a war with China. We
don't want to fight a war with anyone. And our deterrent has
successfully prevented that for now 70-some years.
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, General. You don't have a clock
in front of you; I have a clock in front of me, and we are out
of time.
So, I will yield back, but first say that your answer is
how we perpetuate an arms race: we will negotiate when we are
at least as strong, if not stronger.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. I appreciate your
sensitivity to the time.
Now we need a drum roll because Doug Lamborn has made it
officially on the committee. And that means that he is no
longer the dead last questioner. He is claiming his rightful
place according to arrival at the committee.
So, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is an
honor to be here. And these are critical issues.
Mr. Harrison, I am just going to jump right in and talk
about an issue that is, unfortunately, becoming divisive, and
we have got to work through it. You have been outspoken and
critical of the Air Force's decision to move SPACECOM [United
States Space Command] to Huntsville, Alabama. You said, ``It
reeks of being politically motivated.'' You said that you don't
see how relocating the headquarters, building new facilities,
and moving all those people improves our national security and
space capabilities. And you said it will be a colossal waste of
money. Why do you believe this decision adversely impacts and
delays our national security?
Mr. Harrison. Thank you, Representative Lamborn. And, yes,
I believe that is not a wise decision. I don't think that they
should have engaged in a basing analysis to begin with.
The job of U.S. Space Command, the core function, which
used to be part of U.S. Strategic Command, has always been done
out of Colorado, out of the Colorado Springs area. I don't see
any reason why it needs to move. Will some of the facilities in
Colorado Springs possibly need to be expanded and be upgraded
over time? Absolutely. But I think it is important that we
provide stability and continuity for the workforce of civilian
employees that perform this important mission, and have done so
for many years, for the military service members who support
this mission, and for all of the private sector companies that
support Space Command operations that are located out in the
Colorado area. I just don't see any reason why we should be
moving it at this time.
Building a new headquarters essentially out of scratch in
Huntsville, Alabama, is going to cost, you know, upwards of
possibly a billion dollars, similar to what the new
headquarters at U.S. Strategic Command cost. And so I just
think that that is an unforced error.
The way that it was announced, just before the previous
administration left office, you know, the optics of that are
not good. If this was a credible, you know, decision that was
arrived at purely by the merits, without political influence,
they could have easily handed that decision over, and a week
later the new administration could have reviewed it and made
the announcement. But that is not what happened. So I think it
is unfortunate timing, and I think it has, you know, created a
distraction, quite frankly, for U.S. Space Command.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Harrison, building on your answer, if
right now the command people and the warfighters are working
side-by-side to get the job done, does it help things
operationally to split them apart and put one 1,000 miles away
from the other?
Mr. Harrison. Well, I think it is, you know, very valuable
right now that, you know, the commander of Space Command is co-
located with the Space Force's Space Operations Center, the
SPOC. You know, that is a critical alignment that we need to
have to make sure that we can operate and have, you know,
insight and visibility in what is going on in the space domain
in a crisis situation.
I think, you know, if they split those two functions apart
geographically, that would be a big mistake and it could
potentially degrade our space capabilities in the future.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. Changing gears, Mr. Morrison,
our allies are more concerned about our lagging modernization
efforts than some of the arms control folks seem to be. How are
our allies viewing the dynamics of Russia and Chinese
modernization versus our deferring modernization to try to,
some people say, reduce provocation and save money?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, warily. They watch these
debates. They hear the nation's senior military and civilian
leaders come up here year after year and talk about programs
needing to be accomplished, programs needing to be accomplished
by certain dates or capabilities will be lost. And they see us
miss those dates and they begin to ask how confident can we be
in the continuation of the extended deterrent umbrella that we
have extended over them for years and decades.
And, for some of these countries, they have a choice. They
have a capability to go nuclear if they choose. We have to keep
them assured that that is not a decision that they ultimately
have to make.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The global space
industry is expected to generate revenue of more than $1
trillion by 2040, up from $350 billion currently. While the
United States historically has been a leader in space, and
continues to be, China is rapidly growing its space industry
and has been aggressively capturing space services market share
in developing nations and attracting international partners
that are allied with the United States.
General Kehler, what are the national security implications
as China continues to grow its space industry and develop these
international partnerships? And, certainly, other witnesses can
chime in, as well, afterwards.
General Kehler. Congressman, those are significant
implications for our national security. I think today I would
still offer that our space capabilities are the leading space
capabilities, particularly national security. And I think our
commercial industry has done amazing, amazing things related to
space, whether it's a SpaceX [audio interference].
So I wouldn't trade where we stand today as the United
States. I wouldn't trade with what we're doing in orbit, as
well. I think our capabilities are pretty significant. But, I
think that the risk is that that goes away behind a determined
effort, by the Chinese in particular, to take our place. And I
think that is their grand global strategy, that they want to
take the place of the United States as the world's leading
superpower and the superpower that people should turn to. And
space is one of those critical areas where they are trying to
do that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Any other witness?
Mr. Harrison. If I could comment, as well. I think that,
you know, while China is definitely making advances in their
space capabilities, you know, as General Kehler said, I
wouldn't want to change places with them. I think what is more
concerning, though, is that China is making advances in its
counterspace weapons faster than we are making advances in our
defenses against those counterspace weapons.
And so, in that respect, they are closing the gap because
we have vulnerabilities that we are not addressing quickly
enough. And I think ultimately, you know, that is a trend that
we have to reverse.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Mr. Harrison, does the United
States have a sufficient whole-of-government strategy to ensure
space superiority in the next decade?
Mr. Harrison. I think we have the beginnings of a whole-of-
government space strategy in the National Security Space
Strategy, but I think its progress towards, you know, achieving
that has been slow and uneven. And so I think it is something
that requires the continued focus of the new administration to
make sure that they don't let, you know, different government
departments and agencies start to go in different directions.
So, I think it requires ongoing, close coordination among
the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the
State Department, NASA [National Aeronautics and Space
Administration], and the Department of Commerce, in particular.
And, you know, I think one of the areas where we could do
better as a whole-of-government approach is in trying to reach
internal agreement within the U.S. Government about norms of
behavior in space. What type of conduct, what type of
activities do we think are okay, acceptable, and what do we
think is unacceptable?
And until we can reach an internal agreement on what we
think is unacceptable and should be banned, we are not going to
have any hope of progress reaching broader international
agreements, even with our allies and partners, to start to
establish a consensus about norms of behavior in space.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Kehler. Congressman, if I could add just one
comment to this, I would agree. I think the answer to your
question is: not yet. There are lots of ingredients out there.
This is like a recipe to produce something that is an end food
product. The ingredients are there; the question is whether or
not we can pull all those pieces together to make that sort of
a comprehensive space capability that we know we need to have
for the future.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am going to truncate my last
question. How should we go about engaging China? Should the
United States engage China? And what incentives would be most
useful in beginning those discussions?
Actually, I am out of time. And due to respecting of our
time, I am going to yield my time. And if I could get those
answers submitted for the record, that would be great.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 91.]
Mr. Cooper. Without objection, those questions will be
submitted for the record. Any member is entitled to submit
written questions to the witnesses.
I would like to thank the vice chair, the new vice chair of
the committee, Mr. Carbajal. I appreciate your deference to the
chair and to the clock.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Cooper. These are excellent qualities in a vice chair.
Excellent. That is right, the clock rules all.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start with
Mr. Morrison. If we have time, I may have others comment, as
well.
I think it is clear from your statement that you are no big
fan of the decision to extend the New START Treaty, but it
looks like that is what we are dealing with through the next 5
years. And so, I will try to weave this maybe two questions
into one.
What would a more prudent arms control framework look like?
But I also want you to touch as heavily as you can on Russia
and China's penchants, it seems, for low-yield nuclear weapons
and what that means to the United States. How might these
weapons be deployed, such as the DF-26 in China, or other
weapons that Russia has developed? And what does that mean for
the U.S. and its allies? And what should we be doing about it?
Mr. Morrison. So, Congressman, you are correct. I was not a
fan of the decision to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years.
I thought it gave up leverage that the Biden administration had
to try to negotiate a better deal or a more comprehensive deal.
I mentioned in my statement Secretary Pompeo's comment
about how much of our stockpile is limited by arms control
versus how much of the Russian stockpile. I think the Biden
administration should have taken some time, should have picked
up where the previous administration had left off and pursued a
shorter-term extension and not given up that leverage. Because
I think we are at a point now where, you know, Russian leaders
have already talked about they--you know, we blinked and they
won in the decision to extend. And we have nothing to give up
now to bring the Russians back to the table before 2026. So I
think they are just going to sit back and they are going to
wait to see what we offer. And I think that was a mistake.
But could I ask you, sir, to repeat your second question? I
want to make sure I get it right.
Dr. DesJarlais. I just wanted you to talk a minute about
how you feel about what Russia and China have been doing in
terms of pursuit of low-yield nuclear weapons and developing
weapons with dual capabilities in terms of delivery systems.
You know, China has the DF-26. How might these weapons be
deployed and what does it mean for the U.S. and our allies
moving forward?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, thank you. I think it shows, to
some extent, an alarming shift in how the powers think about
nuclear weapons. We think about nuclear weapons as a deterrent.
Russia clearly thinks about nuclear weapons as warfighting
tools. They have blurred the lines between the conventional and
the nuclear threshold. And I fear that China may be following
suit. It is early to tell.
You know, we have narrowly responded by creating a more
credible option for a President to choose to employ: the low-
yield D-5, which the previous administration deployed, largely
at the urging of the military to close a gap in deterrence. And
I think one of the things we have to look at: Are there other
things that we need to do, similarly, to send a message to the
Russians and the Chinese that we have a credible option to
deter any of these lower-yield weapons that they may choose to
use?
For example, the previous administration proposed a sea-
launched cruise missile. That is an important option to keep on
the table, to keep in deployment as this new administration
decides how it might adjust our nuclear force and posture.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thanks. Do any of our other witnesses have
any comments, just overview on low-yield nuclear weapons and
how much that keeps you up at night?
General Kehler. Congressman, I would only add that, again,
the objective is deterrence. And so I think in our declaratory
policy we need to continue to make it clear that we would
choose to respond to someone crossing the nuclear threshold in
a way that may not match what it is that they just did. And I
think dissuading or deterring the use of nuclear weapons is
about risks and costs. And I think that we need to make it
clear that there is no deterrent sanctuary, if you will, for an
adversary to operate in. And I think you do that by deploying a
similar capability in limited numbers, and I also think we do
that through the way we declare what our policies would be.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. My time is short. I would like to
talk more about that in the future, but appreciate all your
attendance and contributions today. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. DesJarlais.
Now Mr. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this,
appreciate this hearing, appreciate being on the committee.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Morrison, welcome back. And let me kind of throw you a
softball, if I may. Obviously, Russia says that it has a 10-
year state armament plan to invest, what, 330, I think,
billion--or million, I'm sorry about that. Or a significant
amount into advancing its delivery systems. But, you know, you
quoted John McCain as calling Russia a Mafia-run gas station.
And the other day I read The Economist, they called it ``an
economic pygmy.''
In your opinion, will Russia be able to find the money to
invest and to field these types of delivery systems based on
their domestic situation? Or are these statements just a
distraction from its domestic issues?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, thank you for the question. I
guess I will start by answering, judging by how much it cost me
to fill up my car last weekend, the price of oil is going up.
That will take a lot of stress off the Russian budget. But I
think the Russians look at their nuclear force--it is a cheap
option. They can't afford to compete with a large conventional
military. They are not having enough babies. They can't meet
their conscription quotas. Nuclear weapons are a cheap way for
them to stay at the great power table.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. Understood. So, obviously, with
that goal in mind, how will that impact the United States and
NATO's missile defense architecture?
Mr. Morrison. Well, sir, I don't know whether the new
administration will undertake a ballistic missile defense
review. The last administration did. It largely chose to
maintain the longtime Cold War posture of not seeking to use
our missile defense to deter a Russian strategic attack. That
is a choice that the new administration may or may not choose
to make.
I think one of the things we have to understand is, as the
North Korean threat continues to develop, they talk about
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, any number of
capabilities, as we continue to try to pace the North Korean
capability, that capability will begin to have an impact on
China's force and Russia's force.
So, we are going to have to come to a conclusion here of
how do we expect to continue to have this idea of a missile
defense capability that is only capable against a North Korean
or an Iranian threat, but not a Russian or a Chinese threat? It
is not going to be tenable as the North Korean threat continues
to develop and the Iranian threat develops.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. Thank you. Moving on. General
Kehler, in regards to our command and control system,
obviously, you mentioned earlier about some of the cyber risks
and threats that it can pose to our command and control system
that allows our President to have unilateral authority. And, in
2017, you also mentioned in front of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the decision time for these types of
decisions are much longer.
And I was wondering, based on the current environment
today, do you have any thoughts on how our nuclear command and
control could be reformed to reduce these types of risks
associated with the President having unilateral authority?
General Kehler. Well, sir, that is a little bit of an
apples and oranges question. So, let me try it this way.
First of all, the decision process, putting it in the hands
to release nuclear weapons, and that authority in the hands of
the nation's most senior elected official, I think is something
that evolved out of the Cold War. I think that was a national
choice to do. I think that is one of the hallmarks of our
nuclear command and control system. And I fully support that. I
think that this is all about positive control from the highest
official, the highest civilian official in the land.
I am confident in the current nuclear decision process and
the layers of safeguards that go with it. I am convinced that
the decision process would come to a stop and no orders would
be issued if there were legitimate issues of necessity or
legality that arose. And I understand the concerns that have
been voiced by some about how that authority string should
work.
That is separate and distinct from the command and control
system that would support decision-making. There, I think it is
important for us to continue to bring that up to 21st century
standards. And I think that means that it has to become more
resilient. And there are ways, I am told by experts, to make it
more resilient against cyber threat. Not to put a moat around
it, so to speak, a figurative moat, and protect it from
everything, but make sure that it can respond with high
confidence in the face of the threats that are going to come
along.
And one more point about decision time. I hope I didn't say
that there was no longer a scenario that was time-urgent. What
I hope I said was there are a lot more scenarios today that we
have to consider for the use of nuclear weapons. And the most
time-urgent, bolt-from-the-blue attack that we worried about in
the Cold War may be the least likely of those, but it is not
off the table.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you for the clarification and
distinction. I am out of time. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I am assuming there is
no more member interest in continuing this hearing, although it
has been excellent.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson, one last question?
Mr. Cooper. Okay. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Hey, how fortunate we are to get Tim Morrison
here. We could ask him questions and he has to answer.
Nuclear stockpiles. The DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]
estimates China's total warhead stockpile to be in the low
200s. But the then-DIA Director General Robert Ashley, in 2019,
stated he expected over the next decade China will likely at
least double the size of their nuclear stockpile. Admiral
Charles Richard, commander of the Strategic Forces Command,
just last month publicly wrote that he expected China's nuclear
weapons stockpile is expected to double, if not triple or
quadruple, over the next decade.
What do these numbers tell us about China's nuclear weapons
programs, its intention to expand their forces, and how should
we respond?
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, thank you very much for the kind
words, and I appreciate it. You know, I think one of the issues
here is China is still a hard target. I think the chairman
spoke at the outset about just how often we have been
disappointed when it comes to China. I think we have to worry
the extent to which some of these predictions, which are being
made at an unclassified level and may have, you know, a
different richness and depth to them at a classified level, the
extent to which these could also be wrong, as we have been
wrong about China for, I think the chairman correctly said,
approximately 25 years.
You know, I think one of the points that General Ashley
also made in those remarks was General Secretary Xi had given
direction for the Chinese military to become a first tier force
by 2050. Who are the first tier forces? The U.S., Russia has
many thousands of nuclear weapons. And I think we have to ask
ourselves not only what happens if China gets to that level,
but we are not just deterring China, we are deterring Russia,
as well. So we have to have a stockpile sized to deter Russian
misdeeds and Chinese misdeeds at the same time.
And it is not our view of what it takes to deter them; it
is what deters the Chinese, it is what we can hold at risk that
they don't want to lose. It is not always about what we think
does the job.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And, again, Mr. Chairman,
I want to thank you. I agree with you about our concerns about
China. And I had such high hopes. My father served there with
the Flying Tigers, and he had such a deep affection for the
people of China and hopes for their future. So, thank you again
for your efforts.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Now Mr. Garamendi would like the remaining two panelists to
be able to answer the question he had posed to all four
panelists. So, let's let Mr. Garamendi tee it up.
Mr. Garamendi. The question was about arms control. Should
we pursue arms control negotiations?
Mr. Cooper. Should be Mr. Harrison.
Mr. Garamendi. I guess, Mr. Harrison, you are up and then
followed by Mr. Morrison, just the order of presentation.
Mr. Harrison. Yes. Thank you, Representative Garamendi, for
the opportunity to answer this question. You know, when it
comes to space, I think arms control is not something that is
easy to verify, quite frankly. There are many disagreements
over basic terms and concepts and how they would apply to
space.
We have seen this play out over the past decade or so at
the United Nations, with Russia and China proposing a treaty
that, you know, they say would prevent the placement of weapons
in space, but actually it would ban some types of space weapons
but not others. And the ones it would not ban are the things
that they have in very large numbers that can hold our space
systems at risk.
So I think, you know, a better approach in space is to
actually start small, in two ways. One, of course, is a one-
sided vulnerability in space, you know, really invites
aggression and is ultimately destabilizing. So we need to
address our vulnerabilities in space and build better defenses
and defensive capabilities.
The other thing we need to do is work to build consensus
around a set of norms of behavior in space. And we can start
small: simple things like, you know, responsible nations in
space don't, you know, conduct anti-satellite tests that
produce debris. You know, start with some small measures like
that and gradually build up.
And, you know, as General Kehler I have heard say many
times before, you know, norms of behavior in space are kind of
like speed limits: they don't stop people from speeding; they
just let you identify who the speeders are. I think we need to
have these norms of behavior in space so that we can identify
and call out the bad actors that we see in space.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Harrison.
Mr. Morrison.
Mr. Morrison. Congressman, we do have arms control in the
nuclear domain with Russia. The previous administration tried
to get the Chinese to engage in arms control discussions, and
the Chinese held back. And I earnestly hope that the new
administration, the Biden administration, tries to bring the
Chinese to the table. You know, if not now, at whatever the
number is--do we want to wait till they get to 800 weapons, or
1,000 weapons, or 1,550 weapons? Now is the time to try to get
China to the table.
I agree with everything Todd said on space. Successive
administrations have found that the problem with space arms
control is it is not verifiable. There are too many dual-use
capabilities. The Russians long held that the space shuttle
could be an ASAT weapon. Our missile defenses are an ASAT
weapon.
It is worth talking to them. It is worth making sure that
they understand what happens if they touch SBIRS [Space-Based
Infrared System], or what happens if they touch GPS. But the
prospect of concluding truly effective arms control, which
depends upon its verifiability, it strikes me as elusive right
now. It is worth talking, but I think we should understand what
the likely outcome is.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one more
thing in this discussion for Mr. Garamendi?
Mr. Cooper. Sure. General, go ahead.
General Kehler. I think I left you with the wrong
impression of what I was trying to say earlier. My point is
that I don't think arms control and modernization are an
either/or kind of a proposition. In my view, we have benefited
from arms control agreements that have limited the numbers of
weapons that can be aimed at us and our allies. I think that
those, when they have been verifiable and we have had intrusive
ways to oversee those agreements, I think they have been
effective and I think that those agreements have made us more
secure.
But I think the other piece of that is, then you deter the
rest. And we need to invest to make sure that our deterrence
remains strong so that we can do that while we are going down
this road, hopefully, to reestablish some kind of talks, and
establish them to begin with with the Chinese.
Mr. Garamendi. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I want to refer to
our colleague Mr. Panetta's presentation, and specifically the
map he had behind him. It was a fine, fine map to argue for
gerrymandering. If that doesn't look like a dragon, I don't
know what is. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I was wondering what
that map was behind him.
Mr. Garamendi. That is his district.
Mr. Cooper. That is his district? It does look like a
dragon or a salamander or a gerrymander or something. Wow.
Mr. Garamendi. And that was developed by a commission.
Mr. Cooper. Well, we all know California is a complex
State.
I want to thank all the members of the subcommittee. But I
really want to thank the A-Team of witnesses that we have
today. This was an excellent discussion and a historic one
because it was not classified, it is in the public domain. So,
hopefully, more of the general public will pay attention to
these existential issues. I thank the witnesses.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:39 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 23, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 23, 2021
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 23, 2021
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Ms. Creedon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
[See page 24.]
General Kehler. The United States and Soviet Union developed mutual
understanding on many critical issues as a result of ongoing strategic
dialogue during the Cold War. That mutual understanding helped inform
our judgment, reduce risks, and contribute to stability. The lack of
such routine dialogue today complicates our relationship with
contemporary Russia and results in great uncertainties in our
relationship with China. As China continues to emerge as a nuclear-
armed global power, it is critical that we engage with them in
meaningful discussions that can contribute to understanding and
stability as it did with the Soviet Union. I believe military-to-
military discussions among professionals who have much in common even
when serving vastly different political systems is a sound place to
start. [See page 24.]
Mr. Harrison. It is possible to compete with China in some areas
while also cooperating and engaging with China in other areas. In
space, Chinese advancements in counterspace weapons indicate that we
are clearly competing with them militarily. But that competition should
not preclude the possibility of cooperating with China in space for
science and exploration missions, as we did with the Soviets throughout
the Cold War. Cooperation can open new channels of communication,
provide valuable insights into Chinese space programs and capabilities,
and create a foundation for confidence building and mutual
understanding. In the space domain, communication, transparency, and
mutual understanding would help establish norms for acceptable behavior
in space. To make this type of cooperation possible, Congress should
lift the limitations on NASA's ability to engage with China where our
two nations have shared scientific objectives, where partnering will be
mutual beneficial to achieving these goals, where the transfer of
technology or other sensitive data can be effectively prohibited, and
where it will not adversely affect our existing alliances and
partnerships. [See page 24.]
Mr. Morrison. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
[See page 24.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 23, 2021
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. What capabilities within space and hypersonics should
the U.S. incorporate into nonproliferation negotiations with Russia and
China?
Ms. Creedon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Langevin. How will nuclear-armed hypersonics affect current
deterrence relationships that the U.S. has with Russia and China? What
will keep these relationships stable as technology progresses?
General Kehler. The principles of deterrence remain the same
regardless of the weapons or delivery systems. An adversary must
believe that they cannot achieve their objectives by attacking the U.S.
and our allies, that they will suffer unacceptable consequences if they
try, or both. Nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons cannot provide any
adversary a perceived advantage in their decision calculations. While
the U.S. has faced ``hypersonic'' nuclear weapons in the form of
nuclear reentry vehicles delivered by ballistic missiles, the
introduction of modern hypersonic nuclear weapons in the form of cruise
missiles or other sea or air-delivered systems will complicate
detection, mask intent (whether the warhead is nuclear or non-nuclear
will be difficult to discern), and compress decision and reaction time.
These are challenges that can lead to instability and miscalculation.
The U.S. must clearly communicate to Russia and China that hypersonic
weapons (or, for that matter, other excursions like low-yield nuclear
weapons or long range underwater drones) will not provide them with a
decisive strategic or tactical advantage, and that crossing the nuclear
threshold with any type of delivery system will result in unacceptable
consequences. To reduce the chances for such miscalculations, I believe
it is vitally important for the U.S. and Russia and China to engage in
strategic dialogues as hypersonic weapons and other new technologies
emerge
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. I appreciate your comments on the need to exercise a
whole-of-government approach to address complex topics like Russian and
Chinese advancements in nuclear weapons and space, and how these
developments impact American security, policy, and investment
decisions. One of the recommendations in the Future of Defense Task
Force, which I co-led, calls for the U.S. to reconfigure and reimagine
the national security structure to partner the Department of State with
the Department of Defense, promoting diplomatic leadership and a whole
of government effort to thwart emerging threats and compete with
adversaries. Do you agree with these recommendations and do you think
this type of reconfiguration will help develop a comprehensive strategy
to address the challenges posed by China and Russia with their
developments in nuclear weapons and space?
Ms. Creedon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Moulton. The current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
Admiral Richards, was quoted by your fellow witnesses saying that
``China's nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not
triple or quadruple) over the next decade.'' Given the previous
administration's inability to make any deal which brought China to the
table on arms control, and leveraging your prior executive experience
in the Executive Branch with nuclear security, what steps can we take
now to guide China towards joining a future arms control treaty?
Ms. Creedon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Moulton. In your recent report on ``Protecting Space Systems
from Counterspace Weapons'', you describe a growing trend where major
military powers are viewing space less as a information domain for
remote sensing and communications and more as a physical domain with
emphasis on the application of force in or from space and the use of
space for transportation, logistics, and other physical support
functions. Can you please elaborate on how this gradual shift will
impact the types of defenses that we will have to prioritize and
develop?
Mr. Harrison. The gradual shift to viewing space as more of a
physical domain means that the United States will need to begin looking
more carefully at active defenses for the space domain. Specifically,
we will need defensive capabilities that can protect against adversary
attempts to limit or degrade our freedom of action in the space domain
and our ability to use space for transportation and logistics support
to forces on the ground. In particular, a physical seizure capability
may prove particularly useful because it would allow us to capture non-
cooperative objects in space that pose a physical threat to safety or
are otherwise interfering with space operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. Russia is modernizing all three legs of its strategic
deterrent capability, including new ICBMs (both silo and road-mobile),
new ballistic missile submarines, and new strategic bombers. These
modernization efforts, which began in the late 1990s, resulted in new
systems fielding in the 2010s and are ongoing today. Likewise China is
investing in modernizing its nuclear deterrent capabilities, including
several new variants of ICBMs, new ballistic missile submarines, and
air-launched nuclear missiles that will enable it to field a strategic
triad. While China is less open about its activities, it is believed
that China began investing significantly in its strategic deterrent
capabilities starting in the 2010s with a goal of surpassing America as
the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region by 2049. Meanwhile, the
U.S. deferred modernizing its strategic deterrent capabilities several
times, finally initiating programs in the mid-to-late 2010s. And these
modernization efforts, are criticized as being unneeded.
Do you believe that Russia and China and are watching whether the
U.S. executes its nuclear modernization programs? How might they view
any vulnerabilities if aspects of the U.S. nuclear triad are delayed or
degraded? What does the U.S. need to do to raise our deterrence value
and to reduce the risk that China and Russia may try to take advantage
of any U.S. vulnerabilities?
Ms. Creedon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Waltz. Russia is modernizing all three legs of its strategic
deterrent capability, including new ICBMs (both silo and road-mobile),
new ballistic missile submarines, and new strategic bombers. These
modernization efforts, which began in the late 1990s, resulted in new
systems fielding in the 2010s and are ongoing today. Likewise China is
investing in modernizing its nuclear deterrent capabilities, including
several new variants of ICBMs, new ballistic missile submarines, and
air-launched nuclear missiles that will enable it to field a strategic
triad. While China is less open about its activities, it is believed
that China began investing significantly in its strategic deterrent
capabilities starting in the 2010s with a goal of surpassing America as
the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region by 2049. Meanwhile, the
U.S. deferred modernizing its strategic deterrent capabilities several
times, finally initiating programs in the mid-to-late 2010s. And these
modernization efforts, are criticized as being unneeded.
Do you believe that Russia and China and are watching whether the
U.S. executes its nuclear modernization programs? How might they view
any vulnerabilities if aspects of the U.S. nuclear triad are delayed or
degraded? What does the U.S. need to do to raise our deterrence value
and to reduce the risk that China and Russia may try to take advantage
of any U.S. vulnerabilities?
General Kehler. Russia and China watch our strategic forces and
track our modernization efforts very carefully. The credibility of the
U.S. nuclear deterrent is based on demonstrated capabilities and the
willpower to use them in extreme circumstances when vital national
interests are at stake; both of which must be clearly communicated to
and understood by any potential adversary. Therefore, it is vitally
important for the U.S. to proceed with the bi-partisan strategic
modernization program that Congress has supported for well over a
decade. That program retains and modernizes the triad, upgrades the
critical nuclear C3 system, and ensures that the highly specialized
nuclear weapon laboratories and industrial base can ensure the weapons
remain safe, secure, and effective. Completing that comprehensive
modernization program is the most important step Congress can take to
ensure the credibility and value of our deterrent.
Mr. Waltz. Russia is modernizing all three legs of its strategic
deterrent capability, including new ICBMs (both silo and road-mobile),
new ballistic missile submarines, and new strategic bombers. These
modernization efforts, which began in the late 1990s, resulted in new
systems fielding in the 2010s and are ongoing today. Likewise China is
investing in modernizing its nuclear deterrent capabilities, including
several new variants of ICBMs, new ballistic missile submarines, and
air-launched nuclear missiles that will enable it to field a strategic
triad. While China is less open about its activities, it is believed
that China began investing significantly in its strategic deterrent
capabilities starting in the 2010s with a goal of surpassing America as
the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region by 2049. Meanwhile, the
U.S. deferred modernizing its strategic deterrent capabilities several
times, finally initiating programs in the mid-to-late 2010s. And these
modernization efforts, are criticized as being unneeded.
Do you believe that Russia and China and are watching whether the
U.S. executes its nuclear modernization programs? How might they view
any vulnerabilities if aspects of the U.S. nuclear triad are delayed or
degraded? What does the U.S. need to do to raise our deterrence value
and to reduce the risk that China and Russia may try to take advantage
of any U.S. vulnerabilities?
Mr. Harrison. I believe nuclear modernization is important to
maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent in the eyes of
adversaries. We have little schedule margin left in replacing our
existing Ohio-class submarines and Minuteman III ICBMs before they
reach the end of their useful life. Any delays in these programs,
whether due to technical challenges or budgetary issues, would likely
mean that the United States will not be able to field the full quantity
of delivery systems allowed under New START. Modernization of the
bomber leg of the triad through the B-21 program is a pressing concern
because of a lack of stealthy, long-range strike aircraft in the
inventory for both conventional and nuclear missions.
Besides keeping these three main modernization programs on track,
the United States needs to address vulnerabilities and shortfalls in
its nuclear command and control systems. Space systems that support NC2
are of particular concern because modernization of these programs have
been delayed and the space environment is less forgiving. A top
priority should be building more resilient architectures for protected
communications and missile warning that do not rely on small numbers
are ``juicy targets'' in geostationary orbit. These next-generation
systems should use dispersed, proliferated, and diversified
architectures to improve their resilience to attack and make them less
attractive targets for adversaries.
Mr. Waltz. Russia is modernizing all three legs of its strategic
deterrent capability, including new ICBMs (both silo and road-mobile),
new ballistic missile submarines, and new strategic bombers. These
modernization efforts, which began in the late 1990s, resulted in new
systems fielding in the 2010s and are ongoing today. Likewise China is
investing in modernizing its nuclear deterrent capabilities, including
several new variants of ICBMs, new ballistic missile submarines, and
air-launched nuclear missiles that will enable it to field a strategic
triad. While China is less open about its activities, it is believed
that China began investing significantly in its strategic deterrent
capabilities starting in the 2010s with a goal of surpassing America as
the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region by 2049. Meanwhile, the
U.S. deferred modernizing its strategic deterrent capabilities several
times, finally initiating programs in the mid-to-late 2010s. And these
modernization efforts, are criticized as being unneeded.
Do you believe that Russia and China and are watching whether the
U.S. executes its nuclear modernization programs? How might they view
any vulnerabilities if aspects of the U.S. nuclear triad are delayed or
degraded? What does the U.S. need to do to raise our deterrence value
and to reduce the risk that China and Russia may try to take advantage
of any U.S. vulnerabilities?
Mr. Morrison. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
Mr. Morelle. There has been much discussion recently on Chinese and
Russian activities regarding very low yield nuclear testing in
potential violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Given your
experience at the NNSA, do you see a need for the U.S. to return to
testing? Or are U.S. capabilities, such as the Omega Laser facility,
adequate?
Ms. Creedon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]