[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


     ARE FEMA'S ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ADEQUATELY DESIGNED TO ASSIST 
            COMMUNITIES BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER WILDFIRE?

=======================================================================

                                (117-30)

                             REMOTE HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
    ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 26, 2021

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]             


     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska                      District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York                 HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois                  SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California             JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas            FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   MARK DeSAULNIER, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
  Puerto Rico                        SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              GREG STANTON, Arizona
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota          COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi           JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York         CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California           CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
                                     KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
                                     MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
                                     NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
                                     MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
                                     TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
                               
                               ------                                7

      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and
                          Emergency Management

     DINA TITUS, Nevada, Chair
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky                District of Columbia
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
  Puerto Rico                        CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire, Vice 
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi           Chair
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)    TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
                                     PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex 
                                     Officio)

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Nevada, and Chair, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
  Buildings, and Emergency Management, opening statement.........     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 
  Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, 
  opening statement..............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, prepared statement.............................    83

                               WITNESSES

Andrew Phelps, Director, Oregon Office of Emergency Management, 
  on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association, 
  oral statement.................................................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
Kacey KC, State Forester and Firewarden, Nevada Division of 
  Forestry, oral statement.......................................    13
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
Rich Elliott, Deputy Fire Chief, Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue 
  (WA), on behalf of the International Association of Fire 
  Chiefs, oral statement.........................................    18
    Prepared statement...........................................    19
Casey Hatcher, Deputy, Chief Administrative Officer, Butte 
  County, California, oral statement.............................    23
    Prepared statement...........................................    25

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Article entitled, ``The Last Days Inside Trailer 83,'' by Hannah 
  Dreier, Washington Post, October 17, 2021, Submitted for the 
  Record by Hon. John Garamendi..................................    40
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Dina Titus:
    Statement of the National Low Income Housing Coalition.......    65
    Western Governors' Association's Policy Resolution 2021-06, 
      Disaster Preparedness and Response.........................    77
    Statement of the National Association of Mutual Insurance 
      Companies..................................................    83

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                            October 22, 2021

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
Buildings, and Emergency Management
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Are FEMA's Assistance 
Programs Adequately Designed to Assist Communities Before, 
During, and After Wildfire?''
_______________________________________________________________________


                                PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, 
and Emergency Management will meet on Tuesday, October 26, 
2021, at 10:00 a.m. in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and 
via Zoom to receive testimony. Members will receive testimony 
from witnesses with expertise and experience in emergency 
management, wildfire suppression, and federal disaster response 
and recovery programs. The Subcommittee will hear from Andrew 
Phelps, Director of the Oregon Office of Emergency Management, 
on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association; 
Rich Elliott, Deputy Chief of Kittitas Valley (WA) Fire & 
Rescue, on behalf of the International Association of Fire 
Chiefs; Kacey KC, State Forester and Firewarden of the Nevada 
Division of Forestry; and Casey Hatcher, Deputy Chief 
Administrative Officer for Butte County (CA).

                               BACKGROUND

    Wildfires in the western United States are burning hotter, 
more frequently, and causing an increasing and unprecedented 
amount of damage and destruction to the natural and built 
environment.\1\ Concurrently, the wildland urban interface 
(WUI)--or the areas where residences and other development meet 
or mix with undeveloped natural areas is growing.\2\ There 
exist multiple federal assistance programs--including several 
at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--for state, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments and individual 
survivors impacted by wildfire, dependent on whether the 
President grants an emergency declaration, a major disaster 
declaration, or a Fire Management Assistance Grant pursuant to 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Parks, S. A., & Abatzoglou, J. T. (2020). Warmer and drier fire 
seasons contribute to increases in area burned at high severity in 
western US forests from 1985 to 2017. Geophysical Research Letters, 47, 
e2020GL089858. Available at: https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs_journals/
2020/rmrs_2020_parks_s002.pdf.
    \2\ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. New analyses 
reveal WUI growth in the U.S. Available at: https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/
data/wui/.
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    For wildfires that receive a major disaster declaration, 
federal assistance exists for individuals under- or uninsured 
by private insurance who lose their homes to natural disasters 
such as wildfire. This includes FEMA's Individual Assistance 
(IA) programs and the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 
Disaster Loans program, which may provide immediate assistance 
directly to individuals following a major disaster.\3\ FEMA IA 
programs include the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), 
Mass Care and Emergency Assistance, the Crisis Counseling 
Assistance and Training Program, Disaster Unemployment 
Assistance, Disaster Legal Services, and Disaster Case 
Management. IHP is the primary FEMA program to assist disaster 
survivors; it covers housing needs such as home repair, limited 
property replacement, and rental assistance.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ University of Pennsylvania Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center. Wildfires and Recovery: FEMA's Individual Assistance 
Funding Provides Important Support--But Unfunded Damages Remain. April 
16, 2020. Available at: Wildfires and Recovery: FEMA's Individual 
Assistance funding provides important support--but unfunded damages 
remain--Risk Management and Decision Processes Center (upenn.edu).
    \4\ CRS. FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview (R46014). 
December 5, 2019. Available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/
R46014.pdf.
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    Rather than a major disaster declaration for federal 
assistance for wildfires, the president may grant a Fire 
Management Assistance Grant (FMAG, Stafford Sec. 420). FMAGs 
were established in the Disaster Management Act of 2000 (DMA2K, 
P.L. 106-390) to provide fire suppression assistance to states 
experiencing a wildfire at risk of becoming a major disaster. 
As with a major disaster declaration, there is a non-federal 
cost share requirement of 25 percent for FMAGs.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ CRS. Fire Management Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked 
Questions (R43738). August 17, 2021. Available at Fire Management 
Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked Questions (congress.gov)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FMAGs have successfully reduced the number of major 
disaster declarations for wildfire.\6\ From fiscal year (FY) 
2009 to FY 2018 FEMA awarded 374 FMAGs to states experiencing 
wildfire, totaling $952,318,049 in financial assistance.\7\ The 
statistics indicate that FMAGs are more common for wildfires as 
33 FMAGs have been granted thus far in 2021.\8\ Whereas, 
between FY 2009 and FY 2020, only 22 major disaster 
declarations were declared for wildfires.\9\ FMAGs provide 
states federal assistance when suppressing a fire, but the FMAG 
declaration does not include access to FEMA's IA or PA 
programs. For individuals impacted by FMAG-declared wildfires, 
residences not covered by private insurance that are damaged or 
destroyed by wildfire are not eligible for FEMA's IA or SBA's 
disaster loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ GAO. Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to 
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. October 2019. 
Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-5.pdf
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ FEMA. Declared Disasters. Available at: https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/declarations.
    \9\ Id.
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    The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Div. D of 
P.L. 115-254) included a significant enhancement to FMAG 
assistance, authorizing post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program (HMGP, Stafford Sec. 404) assistance to be made 
available for FMAG declarations. FEMA administers ``HMGP Post 
Fire'' assistance differently than traditional HMGP.\10\ The 
committee has informally heard from stakeholders in the 
emergency management community and local governments trying to 
recover from wildfires that HMGP Post-Fire is more challenging 
to utilize than traditional post-major disaster HMGP.\11\ That 
said, investments in wildfire mitigation in the WUI could 
significantly alleviate damage and destruction to private 
property and limit future impact of wildfire.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ FEMA. FEMA Policy: Hazard Mitigation Grant Program--Post Fire 
Policy #207-088-2. April 29, 2019. Available at: https://www.fema.gov/
sites/default/files/2020-04/SignedPolicyFEMA_HMGP_Post-Fire_policy_207-
088-2_apr292019.pdf.
    \11\ GAO. Disaster Resilience: FEMA Should Take Additional Steps to 
Streamline Hazard Mitigation Grants and Assess Program Effects. 
February 2021. Available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-140.pdf
    \12\ FEMA. Multiple Mitigation Measures Save Home From Wildfire. 
Available at: https://www.fema.gov/case-study/multiple-mitigation-
measures-save-home-wildfire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Wildfires that do result in a major disaster declaration 
are those that incur the greatest dollar amount of damage. 
California tops the list of approved declarations with nine 
major disasters due to wildfire between FY 2009 and FY 2020. 
Colorado and Oklahoma follow with three approved major disaster 
declarations during the same period.\13\ Major disaster 
declarations include some combination of FEMA's IA and PA 
programs, as well as access to the post-disaster HMGP and 
typically SBA loans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ FEMA. Declared Disasters. https://www.fema.gov/disaster/
declarations
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Wildfires that impact rural counties and which receive FMAG 
assistance typically incur a lower total dollar amount of 
damage when compared to fires that burn in more populated 
regions. However, fires impacting rural communities often burn 
a greater percentage of the region's total housing stock.\14\ A 
recent report published by CoreLogic found the total percentage 
of homes burned in Wyoming, a state with a small and 
predominately rural population, exceeds that of California.\15\ 
Fires that burn a high percentage of a region's property cause 
a shortage of housing stock and displace a greater number of 
residents.\16\ Wyoming has never received a major disaster 
declaration for wildfire, but has been granted several FMAGs--
leaving individual survivors without access to FEMA's IA 
assistance post-fire.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ E&E News. Wyoming Tops California for Wildfire Risk, Report 
Says. Sept 30, 2021. Available at: https://subscriber.politicopro.com/
article/eenews/2021/09/30/wyo-tops-calif-for-wildfire-risk-report-says-
281401.
    \15\ CoreLogic. 2021 Wildfire Report. September 29, 2021. Available 
at: https://www.corelogic.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/09/2021-
Wildfire-Final-Infographic.pdf
    \16\ E&E News. Wyoming Tops California for Wildfire Risk, Report 
Says. Sept 30, 2021. Available at: https://subscriber.politicopro.com/
article/eenews/2021/09/30/wyo-tops-calif-for-wildfire-risk-report-says-
281401.
    \17\ FEMA. Declared Disasters. Available at: https://www.fema.gov/
disaster/declarations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The map below depicts the historical distribution of FEMA's 
IHP program where non-western states are more likely to receive 
a major disaster declaration for hazards such as flooding, 
hurricanes, or severe storms.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Natural Hazards. Does Post-Disaster Aid Promote Community 
Resilience? Evidence from Federal Disaster Programs. June 1, 2021. 
Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-021-
04826-2


Figure 1. Distribution of cumulative IHP per capita by county 
(1992-2015) \19\
* Map includes major disaster declarations for all hazards, not 
just wildfire
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Id.

    While FEMA's IA programs are not intended to meet the full 
needs of disaster survivors, recent declared events have been a 
cause for concern regarding both denial rates for IA, as well 
as suspected fraudulent registrations for FEMA assistance.\20\ 
In May 2021, Chairs DeFazio and Titus, and Ranking Members 
Graves (MO) and Webster sent a letter to the FEMA Administrator 
expressing frustration that the approval rate for IHP 
applications has reached an all-time low.\21\ Following the 
September 2020 wildfires in Oregon, FEMA denied 70 percent of 
IHP assistance requests after it filtered out applicants that 
were potentially fraudulent.\22\ Following the 2017 and 2018 
fire seasons in California, 48,856 individuals applied for IHP 
and roughly only one-fifth received some amount of 
assistance.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ NPR. As Western Wildfires Worsen, FEMA is Denying Most People 
Who Ask for Help. July 1, 2021. Available at: As Climate Change Worsens 
Wildfires, FEMA Denies Most California, Oregon Claims : NPR
    \21\ T&I. Letter to FEMA Administrator. May 13, 2021. Available at: 
https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-leaders-
question-fema-after-approvals-for-disaster-survivor-aid-program-falls-
to-all-time-low.
    \22\ NPR. As Western Wildfires Worsen, FEMA is Denying Most People 
Who Ask for Help. July 1, 2021. Available at: As Climate Change Worsens 
Wildfires, FEMA Denies Most California, Oregon Claims : NPR
    \23\ University of Pennsylvania Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center. Wildfires and Recovery: FEMA's Individual Assistance 
Funding Provides Important Support--But Unfunded Damages Remain. April 
16, 2020. Available at: Wildfires and Recovery: FEMA's Individual 
Assistance funding provides important support--but unfunded damages 
remain--Risk Management and Decision Processes Center (upenn.edu)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Applicants approved for IHP assistance to repair or replace 
their homes often realize the grants do not cover full repair 
and replacement costs, as insurance might. The maximum amount 
of IHP assistance awarded for home replacement is $34,900. DRRA 
removed limits on the amount of rental and other needs 
assistance an applicant is eligible to receive in conjunction 
with property repair and replacement assistance; the maximum 
award for combined assistance is $72,000. Applicants deemed 
eligible for SBA loans are eligible for up to $200,000 of 
assistance via low-interest loans.\24\ All other costs of 
recovery tied to personal property are the responsibility of 
the survivors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The application process for IHP has repeatedly been 
described as overwhelming and confusing by disaster 
survivors.\25\ Applicants must navigate a series of steps 
before a decision is rendered on their application. For 
example, if an individual's home is deemed habitable after a 
disaster, they must apply and be denied an SBA loan before 
being made eligible for home repair through FEMA's IHP. It has 
been documented that this process is especially challenging for 
individuals whose identity documents were destroyed during the 
disaster, who are low-income, or who live in a mobile home on 
land they do not own.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ GAO. Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to 
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. October 2019. 
Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-5.pdf.
    \26\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yet challenges remain for survivors of wildfire major 
disasters who do get approved for assistance. Communities 
trying to recover from wildfires often face challenges finding 
available rental stock or siting temporary housing sites.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ See KEZI.com. FEMA denies request for some temporary housing 
options for wildfire survivors. December 1, 2020. Available at: https:/
/www.kezi.com/content/news/FEMA-denies-request-for-some-temporary-
housing-for-wildfire-survivors-573251461.html; Los Angeles Times. 
Californians moved to Oregon for affordable housing. Wildfires left 
them homeless. September 21, 2020. Available at: https://
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-09-21/oregon-fires-destroyed-
lost-homes-california-housing; NPR Planet Money. How A Blistering 
Housing Market Could Be Making Wildfires Even More Dangerous. September 
14, 2021. Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2021/09/14/
1036085807/how-a-blistering-housing-market-could-be-making-wildfires-
even-more-dangerous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               CONCLUSION

    Given the risk that wildfire poses to communities, it is 
critical to examine whether FEMA programs are meeting the needs 
of wildfire-prone areas. While FMAGs have effectively helped 
states cover fire suppression expenses, in an effort to fight 
fires before they may cause damage and destruction which could 
warrant a major disaster declaration, there are clear 
limitations for residents living in or near the WUI and 
communities trying to recover from these events.\28\ FEMA's IHP 
can help survivors of major disasters afford temporary housing, 
make some repairs, and begin to rebuild their homes,\29\ but 
there are challenges for addressing post-disaster housing needs 
for displaced survivors, especially those of lower-income or 
other historically vulnerable populations.\30\ The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has additionally reported that IHP 
is not meeting the needs of low-income renters and homeowners 
post-wildfire.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ GAO. Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to 
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. October 2019. 
Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-5.pdf.
    \29\ CRS. FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview 
(R46014). December 5, 2019. Available at: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/
homesec/R46014.pdf.
    \30\ GAO. Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to 
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. October 2019. 
Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-5.pdf.
    \31\ GAO. Wildfire Disasters: FEMA Could Take Additional Actions to 
Address Unique Response and Recovery Challenges. October 2019. 
Available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-5.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              WITNESS LIST

     LAndrew Phelps, Director, Oregon Office of 
Emergency Management, on behalf of the National Emergency 
Management Association
     LKacey KC, State Forester and Firewarden, Nevada 
Division of Forestry
     LRich Elliott, Deputy Chief, Kittitas Valley Fire 
& Rescue (WA), on behalf of the International Association of 
Fire Chiefs
     LCasey Hatcher, Deputy, Chief Administrative 
Officer, Butte County Administration (CA)

 
     ARE FEMA'S ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS ADEQUATELY DESIGNED TO ASSIST 
            COMMUNITIES BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER WILDFIRE?

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2021

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public 
               Buildings, and Emergency Management,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Dina 
Titus (Chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present in person: Ms. Titus, Mr. Garamendi, Mr. 
Webster, Miss Gonzalez-Colon, Mr. Guest, and Mr. LaMalfa.
    Members present remotely: Mr. DeFazio, Ms. Norton, Ms. 
Davids of Kansas, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr. Carter of Louisiana, Mr. 
Carbajal, Mr. Massie, and Mr. Gimenez.
    Ms. Titus. The subcommittee will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions if they feel like it.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As a reminder, please keep your microphone muted unless 
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I 
will request that the Member please mute their microphone.
    To insert a document into the record, please have your 
staff email it to [email protected].
    We will begin with an opening statement, and then I will 
pass it to our ranking member for his opening statement.
    I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing and 
thank our witnesses for joining us to discuss whether the 
Stafford Act and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's, or 
FEMA's, response, recovery, and mitigation programs that are 
designed to help our communities before, during, and following 
wildfire are working as they should be.
    While southern Nevada, which is my district, downtown Las 
Vegas, doesn't have the same magnitude of risk for wildfire as 
elsewhere, the State certainly had similar experiences further 
north as our neighbors in California, Oregon, and Washington.
    All Western States have seen record-setting wildfires in 
recent years. Drought conditions have resulted in forests that 
are just ready to explode, and it can be caused from a 
lightning bolt, a campfire spark, utility lines being 
interrupted by trees, or an arsonist's match. We have seen all 
of those.
    As our witnesses note in their testimony, wildfire season 
now starts earlier and lasts longer, finishes later. Fires burn 
hotter, larger, and longer due to climate change. Fall storms, 
like those bringing welcome precipitation to the West just this 
week, arrive later, and they are less helpful in extinguishing 
the still-raging forest fires.
    We see that FEMA is providing an unprecedented number of 
Fire Management Assistance Grants to States in order to provide 
much-needed Federal assistance for fire suppression costs.
    While I am sure our witnesses would rather not be experts 
in all things related to wildfires, they do represent States 
and communities that have been or currently are devastated by 
these destructive and sometimes deadly events. The subcommittee 
looks forward to hearing about their experiences, their 
successes, and their frustrations in responding to, recovering 
from, and mitigating against these firestorms.
    My hope is that today's hearing will provide a clearer 
picture as to whether FEMA's disaster and mitigation assistance 
programs are flexible enough to address the challenges 
currently faced by Western States.
    And I would mention that, while the West's monstrous fire 
complexes have received the largest amount of media attention 
in recent years, forested States in the Southeast are also 
experiencing wildfires with increased frequency.
    What changes may be necessary to ensure that Federal 
recovery programs, whether under FEMA or under HUD, meet the 
needs in the wake of these wildfires as they do for disasters 
such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods? We want to be sure 
that we recognize the severity of wildfires and that we are 
dealing with them accordingly.
    So, what does recovery look like 1, 2, or 5 years after a 
fire? How have survivors fared? Are housing needs being met in 
a timely way, or are they just picking up and leaving like one-
offs? Do individuals have access to crisis counseling and 
mental health services after they have experienced such deadly 
and threatening events?
    The mental health situation is often ignored, but we know 
that it can have long-term impacts on both the community and an 
individual. And I am proud to join our colleague, 
Representative Ayanna Pressley, in introducing her Post-
Disaster Mental Health Response Act, which is bipartisan 
legislation that expands access to FEMA's crisis counseling 
program for all emergencies, not just those declared major 
disasters.
    A consistent thread across all of our FEMA-related 
oversight seems to be--and we hear it from all of you--
burdensome bureaucracy and redtape. What might we cut with 
statutory changes that will make this situation better? What 
regulations or policies might FEMA need to revisit to be sure 
they are fully considering all of the post-fire needs? And are 
there any opportunities for a more united Federal, State, and 
local approach to recovery?
    The committee is scheduled to take up legislation tomorrow 
in a markup that will provide some additional relief for 
recipients of FMAGs, a bill to establish that 75 percent 
Federal share is the minimum and that FEMA must work to 
establish criteria for when the Federal share increases for 
fires of a certain magnitude.
    Additionally, in the Resilient AMERICA package introduced 
by Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Ranking Member 
Webster, and myself, there are provisions to boost resources 
for pre-disaster mitigation. And that includes providing 
assistance for communities interested in updating their 
building codes, establishing a pilot block grant program so 
States can assist residents in the wildland-urban interface in 
enhancing defensible space around their property, and also 
installing fire-resistant building materials to reduce risk.
    So, we have done a lot, but we have a lot to do, and we 
appreciate the advice and information from our expert 
witnesses. Thank you for joining us today. I look forward to 
the discussion.
    And I now yield the floor to Ranking Member Webster.
    [Ms. Titus' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Dina Titus, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Nevada, and Chair, Subcommittee on Economic 
        Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing and thank our 
witnesses for joining us to discuss whether the Stafford Act and the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) response, recovery, and 
mitigation programs are designed to help communities before, during, 
and following wildfire.
    While Southern Nevada doesn't have the same magnitude of risk for 
wildfire as elsewhere, the state has certainly had similar experiences 
further north as our neighbors in California, Oregon, and Washington.
    All Western states have seen record-setting wildfires in recent 
years. Drought conditions have resulted in forests ready to explode--
whether from a lightning bolt, errant campfire spark, utility lines 
being interrupted by trees, or an arsonist's match.
    As our witnesses note in their testimony, wildfire season starts 
earlier and finishes later. Fires burn hotter, larger, and longer.
    Fall storms--like those bringing welcome precipitation to the west 
this week--arrive later and are less helpful in extinguishing still 
raging infernos.
    And we see that FEMA is providing an unprecedented number of Fire 
Management Assistance Grants to states in order to provide much needed 
federal assistance for fire suppression costs.
    While I'm sure our witnesses would rather not be experts in all 
things related to wildfire, they represent states and communities that 
have been, or currently are, devastated by these destructive and often 
deadly events.
    The subcommittee looks forward to hearing about their experiences--
successes and frustrations--in responding to, recovering from, and 
mitigating against these firestorms.
    My hope is that today's hearing will provide a clearer picture as 
to whether FEMA's disaster and mitigation assistance programs are 
flexible enough to address the wildfire challenges currently faced by 
western states.
    While the west's monstrous fire complexes have received the largest 
amount of media attention in recent years, forested states in the 
southeast are experiencing wildfires with increasing frequency, as 
well.
    What changes may be necessary to ensure that federal recovery 
programs--whether they be under FEMA or the Housing and Urban 
Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery 
(CDBG-DR) program--meet the needs in the wake of wildfires as they do 
for other disasters such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes?
    What does recovery look like one, two, or three years post fire?
    How have survivors fared? Are housing needs being met in a timely 
way, or are they just picking up and leaving? Do they have access to 
the crisis counseling and mental health services they may need after 
experiencing their lives and livelihoods go up in smoke?
    A consistent thread across all of our FEMA-related oversight seems 
to be a burdensome bureaucracy. What red tape might Congress be able to 
cut with statutory changes? What regulations or policies might FEMA 
need to revisit to ensure it is fully considering needs of communities 
post-fire? Are there opportunities for a more unified federal approach 
to recovery?
    The committee is scheduled to take up legislation at mark-up 
tomorrow that will provide some additional relief for recipients of F-
MAGs: a bill to establish that 75 percent federal share is the minimum 
and that FEMA must work to establish criteria for when the federal 
share increases for fires of a certain magnitude.
    Additionally, in the Resilient AMERICA package introduced by myself 
along with Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, and Ranking Member 
Webster, there are provisions to boost resources for pre-disaster 
mitigation including: providing assistance for communities interested 
in updating their building codes to reflect the latest hazard resistant 
designs, establishing a pilot block grant program so that states 
interested in assisting residents in the wildland-urban interface 
enhance defensible space around their property, or installing fire-
resistant building materials to reduce risks.
    I once again thank our witnesses for joining us today to share 
their perspectives and experiences. I am grateful for your testimony 
and look forward to our discussion.

    Mr. Webster. Thank you, Chair Titus.
    And thank you for our witnesses who are here with us today.
    An all-hazards approach to disasters is critical to ensure 
the preparedness and clear direction in responding to all the 
disasters there are. However, each type of disaster has its own 
peculiarities and challenges. Wildfires are no different. And, 
unfortunately, wildfires have devastated communities across the 
States in recent years, and there have been lots to manage, 
lots to fight, lots to respond to.
    So, it is critical for us to ensure FEMA, the Government 
lead agency on disasters, is positioned to assist those 
communities to prepare for, mitigate against, and recover from 
wildfires.
    The most effective actions to prepare for or mitigate 
against wildfires may be very different than those actions 
needed for floods or hurricanes or the like. And after a 
disaster, whether it is a wildfire or hurricane, we need FEMA 
to act effectively and efficiently to get assistance to 
affected communities without costly delay and mountains of 
paperwork.
    We must find ways to make sure FEMA works for the 
communities hit by the disaster, not against them. That is why 
I am pleased we have witnesses here today who have firsthand 
knowledge of what is needed and how FEMA programs can 
effectively support efforts to prepare for and respond to 
wildfires. We may learn a thing or two that we can apply to 
other types of disasters as well.
    I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses 
today. And thank you, Chair Titus. I yield back.
    [Mr. Webster's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress 
from the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 
        Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management
    Thank you, Chair Titus, and thank you to our witnesses joining us 
today.
    An all-hazards approach to disasters is critical to ensuring 
preparedness and clear direction in responding to all disasters.
    However, each type of disaster is different and has its own unique 
challenges.
    Wildfires are no different.
    Unfortunately, wildfires have devastated communities across many 
States in recent years.
    There have been 114 fire management assistance declarations in 2020 
and 2021 and 8 major disaster declarations for wildfires.
    It is critical for us to ensure FEMA--the federal government's lead 
agency on disasters--is positioned to assist those communities to 
prepare for, mitigate against, and recover from wildfires--just as they 
do with other disasters.
    The most effective actions to prepare for or mitigate against 
wildfires may be very different than actions needed for floods or 
hurricanes. And after a disaster--whether wildfire or hurricane--we 
need FEMA to act effectively and efficiently--to get assistance to 
affected communities without costly delay and mountains of paperwork.
    We must find ways to make sure FEMA works for the communities hit 
by disaster, not against them.
    That is why I am pleased we have witnesses here with us today who 
have firsthand knowledge of what is needed and how FEMA programs can 
effectively support efforts to prepare for and respond to wildfires. We 
may learn a thing or two we can apply to other types of disasters as 
well.
    I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses today.
    Thank you, Chair Titus. I yield back.

    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Webster.
    I would now recognize Mr. DeFazio, chairman of the T&I 
Committee, and Mr. Graves, the ranking member, in that order, 
if they are present.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate that 
you're holding this important hearing.
    In particular, I would like to welcome Andrew Phelps, who 
is the director of the Oregon Office of Emergency Management, 
joining us as a witness. He has been critical in a number of 
natural disasters that have impacted Oregon in recent years, 
including last year's wildfires, which were the worst of at 
least recent recorded history--5,000 structures, 9 people lost 
their lives, tens of thousands evacuated, and it was 
extraordinary.
    And Oregon, working with FEMA, did, for the most part, a 
good job. There are some issues that we will delve into a 
little bit here regarding housing. Also, the whole issue, which 
has been raised in the testimony I read, about the problems of 
using HMGP funds for mitigation projects.
    I think there is kind of a slant in FEMA over the years 
that they really kind of got used to dealing with hurricanes 
and floods, and wildfires were not so large or prevalent of an 
issue until very recently. And I think a lot of the bureaucracy 
hasn't quite adjusted to that.
    In particular, mitigation prevention, but also mitigation 
after. I was reading something about how there are problems 
where there is no categorical exclusion for these recovery 
projects. I read in one of the testimonies that it can take up 
to 2 years to talk about putting in native plants and doing 
other things to prevent landslides afterwards and begin to 
recover.
    So, I think a good deal of work needs to be done here, and 
I am really looking forward to hearing from the witnesses.
    Also, along with Chair Titus and Ranking Members Graves and 
Webster, we raised questions earlier this year with FEMA 
regarding denial rates. And there are different reasons. I know 
we have to protect against fraud; I get that, totally get that. 
But the process shouldn't be so difficult for people to get the 
Individual Assistance they need.
    And the documentation sometimes--for instance, in Puerto 
Rico, you had to finally waive some of the documentation 
requirements because the courthouses were gone. So, people 
couldn't prove that that was their property or they had lived 
there for so long, and started accepting some self-attestation. 
And we have similar problems when it comes to the mobile home 
parks, I think, several of which were burned during the fire 
disasters in Oregon.
    So, anyway, I look forward to hearing all the testimony 
and, hopefully, looking at ways we can just make a few changes 
in the way FEMA does things. Generally, I am very appreciative 
of the Agency and its work, but I think we need a little 
adjustment when it comes to wildfires, wildfire mitigation, 
prevention, and recovery.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in 
      Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Titus, and thank you to our witnesses for being 
with us today. In particular, I'd like to thank Andrew Phelps, the 
Director of the Oregon Office of Emergency Management who is joining us 
as a witness. His leadership has been critical in responding to the 
growing number of natural disasters that have impacted the state of 
Oregon in recent years.
    The issues we'll be discussing are critical for states like mine 
that experience wildfires. Climate change and an expanding wildland-
urban interface are causing wildfires to inflict an unprecedented 
amount of damage to the natural and built environment.
    Oregon understands the gravity of this issue all too well. In 2020, 
Oregon experienced the most devastating wildfire season in our state's 
recent history. More than 5,000 structures across the state were 
damaged, including thousands of homes in low-income communities. Tens 
of thousands of Oregonians were forced to evacuate and, tragically, 
nine people lost their lives. I remain committed to helping Oregonians 
though the long recovery process in the wake of these fires.
    The recovery process in Oregon has highlighted the importance of 
FEMA's assistance programs and making sure they are designed to meet 
the needs of wildfire survivors. I am grateful for FEMA's tireless work 
in Oregon and across the U.S. to help disaster-impacted communities 
recover. However, the growing number and severity of wildfires and 
their impact, particularly in the West, makes it necessary to 
reevaluate whether FEMA's programs are doing enough to support local 
communities.
    In the last year alone, FEMA has provided assistance to states 
experiencing wildfires by issuing 33 Fire Management Assistance Grants 
or F-MAGs and 5 Major Disaster Declarations. F-MAGs provide wildfire 
suppression assistance to states so they can stop fires before they 
become Major Disasters.
    This high number of declarations causes us to ask the question, 
``what can we do to protect our communities from these fires?'' The 
answer is to invest in mitigation efforts. Mitigation is a commonsense 
way to save lives and property, and it's cost effective. That's why I 
strongly support finding ways to expand funding for mitigation projects 
at the local and individual level.
    After an F-MAG or Major Disaster Declaration, states are eligible 
for Hazard Mitigation Grants or HMGP. However, local stakeholders have 
told me that it is challenging to use HMGP funds for wildfire 
mitigation projects. As I said previously, mitigation is the key to 
reducing the devastating impact these disasters have upon communities. 
Investing in defensible space around a home can be the difference 
between a family's home being saved and being burned to the ground. We 
must make sure that HMGP and other federal mitigation grants are 
designed to accommodate the type of mitigation needed to protect 
communities from wildfires.
    As Chair Titus mentioned in her statement, I am pleased to have 
introduced the Resilient AMERICA package. The improvements to hazard 
mitigation that this legislation provides will help individuals and 
communities make the investments in mitigation that are needed to 
combat natural hazards.
    While mitigation efforts can reduce the impact of wildfires, they 
cannot eliminate it completely. That's why it is also vital that relief 
programs are meeting the needs of survivor's post-fire.
    In September of 2020, I was proud to pass the FEMA Assistance 
Relief Act. This bill reduces the financial burden on states and 
communities after natural disasters. I am eager to continue this work 
and evaluate the F-MAG program to consider how amendments may reduce 
the financial burden our communities face after a wildfire.
    In May of this year, myself, Chair Titus, Ranking Member Graves, 
and Ranking Member Webster sent a letter to FEMA raising concern 
regarding denial rates for FEMA's Individual Assistance program and 
increasing instances of fraud. I plan to work with FEMA to resolve 
these issues and safeguard qualifying applicant's access to assistance.
    Once again, thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. I look 
forward to hearing your testimony and learning from your local 
experience.

    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Is Ranking Member Graves with us? No?
    All right. I guess not, so we will go ahead and hear from 
our witnesses. I would like to introduce them and welcome them.
    Mr. Andrew Phelps has already been introduced by Chairman 
DeFazio; he is the director of the Oregon Office of Emergency 
Management, and he is here on behalf of the National Emergency 
Management Association.
    Ms. Kacey KC, who is a State forester and firewarden in the 
Nevada Division of Forestry; Mr. Rich Elliott, deputy fire 
chief, Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue, on behalf of the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs; and Ms. Casey 
Hatcher, deputy, chief administrative officer at Butte County 
Administration.
    So thank you all for being here. We look forward to hearing 
your testimony.
    Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be 
included in the record.
    Since your written testimony has been made a part of the 
record, the committee would request that you limit your oral 
testimony to 5 minutes.
    So now we will proceed with our witnesses.
    Mr. Phelps?

    TESTIMONY OF ANDREW PHELPS, DIRECTOR, OREGON OFFICE OF 
   EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY 
     MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; KACEY KC, STATE FORESTER AND 
 FIREWARDEN, NEVADA DIVISION OF FORESTRY; RICH ELLIOTT, DEPUTY 
FIRE CHIEF, KITTITAS VALLEY FIRE AND RESCUE (WA), ON BEHALF OF 
    THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS; AND CASEY 
 HATCHER, DEPUTY, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, BUTTE COUNTY, 
                           CALIFORNIA

    Mr. Phelps. Thank you so much, Chairman DeFazio, for the 
introduction, Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and 
distinguished members of the committee, for allowing me to 
testify today.
    I am proud to provide testimony on behalf of NEMA, the 
National Emergency Management Association, representing the 
State emergency management directors of all 50 States, 
Territories, and the District of Columbia.
    The phrase ``spreading like wildfire'' is no longer just an 
idiom. It is becoming an all-too-frequent reality for emergency 
managers, first responders, and the communities we serve, as 
the threat of wildfire continues to expand beyond Western 
States, with devastating fires impacting our friends in the 
Southeastern U.S. and along the east coast.
    Managing the impacts from wildland fire is challenging and 
unique. Given the high percentage of Federal land in Western 
States and the checkerboard of land ownership, many wildland 
fires originate on Federal lands before impacting local 
communities. As a result, what begins as a Federal incident 
often leads to costs to State and local governments.
    Unfortunately, Federal disaster response and recovery 
assistance has been delivered through the lens of floods and 
hurricanes. Unlike those hazards, wildfires are no-notice 
events, can burn for months, and often combine with one another 
to create large, complex incidents.
    We saw this repeatedly in Oregon last year. The 2020 
firestorm was a worst-case fire scenario come to life for us in 
Oregon as we fought fire while also battling a global pandemic. 
Oregon's wildfire activity steadily increased over the past 
decade, with more fires burning hotter in areas that 
historically haven't burned and with fire season becoming a 12-
month event.
    The September 2020 fires, however, were unlike anything we 
had ever seen. Over the span of 2 days, dozens of new fires 
ignited as what could be considered hurricane-force winds 
whipped across our State, rapidly driving existing fires past 
containment lines, overwhelming already-strained resource and 
response systems, and torching homes, businesses, and critical 
infrastructure in dozens of communities across Oregon. My heart 
breaks for those who lost so much, and especially the nine 
Oregonians who lost their lives.
    Now, 14 months after the fires, we find strength and hope 
as we continue to heal, grieve, and recover. Nearly every 
destroyed home site has been cleared of hazardous materials and 
other debris left behind by the flames. Hundreds of new homes 
are being built, as long-term recovery groups help survivors 
access necessary resources to help them write their own 
recovery stories.
    Through partnerships with Federal and State agencies, 
philanthropic and nonprofit organizations, and the private 
sector and local governments, neighborhoods, cities, and 
natural spaces are showing signs of recovery. Oregon and her 
people and communities are strong.
    Our experience in Oregon, however, highlights the need for 
changes in how we, as a Nation, apply existing emergency 
programs and structures at the Federal level to these 
disasters. Now, this hearing is slightly ahead of the ongoing 
policy review process with my colleagues at NEMA, but I can 
give you a sense of the issues we are examining to determine 
recommendations.
    FEMA should be the lead coordinating agency for all 
incidents requiring Federal assistance to ensure coordination 
and continuity between disaster response and recovery. They 
must exercise leadership to ensure programs such as Public and 
Individual Assistance adequately address the wildfire threat. 
They should update incident period and declaration criteria and 
include post-fire emergency work that is eligible under PA.
    The predeployment of equipment through Fire Management 
Assistance Grants, or FMAGs, is currently limited to out-of-
State resources. We should utilize this grant for prestaging 
firefighting resources within the State to prevent fires from 
reaching more severe levels of destruction.
    FEMA policies for mitigation programs currently limit 
mitigation activities on Federal land. Unfortunately, it is 
often the impacts of fires on Federal land that lead directly 
to the need for additional firefighting and mitigation on State 
and private land. Creativity will be required to ensure 
mitigation programs can assist in managing these events 
holistically.
    I also want to acknowledge our partners from FEMA who have 
been assisting us in Oregon throughout our wildfire recovery. 
Many of the innovative solutions to challenges we have 
experienced should be memorialized in policy, because 
disasters, after all, are policy issues. They are a result of 
how we build, where we build, and the investments we choose or 
do not choose to make.
    Extreme weather, prolonged drought, and the devastating 
fires we have experienced in Oregon are not anomalies or 
outliers; they are indicators of what is to come. We must 
ensure Federal programs can adequately support State and local 
governments in response and recovery efforts and properly 
evolve with this threat.
    We at NEMA look forward to working with you in addressing 
these challenges. And, once testimony is concluded, I am happy 
to take any questions the committee may have. Thank you.
    [Mr. Phelps' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Andrew Phelps, Director, Oregon Office of 
 Emergency Management, on behalf of the National Emergency Management 
                              Association
    Thank you, Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and 
distinguished members of the Committee for allowing me to testify 
today.
    I am proud to testify today on behalf of the National Emergency 
Management Association (NEMA). NEMA represents the state emergency 
management directors of all 50 states, territories, and the District of 
Columbia. As Director of the Oregon Emergency Management Agency and on 
behalf of my colleagues in state emergency management, we thank you for 
holding this discussion on how programs of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) aid in the mitigation, response, and recovery 
to wildfires.
                               Background
    The mounting impacts of past fire suppression policies, 
environmental and ecological alterations, disease outbreaks, and the 
development growth within or adjacent to fire-prone ecosystems creates 
the perfect storm for areas to be more susceptible to larger and vastly 
destructive wildfires. As of October 12, 2021, nine states reported 45 
large fires currently burning around the country. These fires have 
burned a total of nearly 6.5 million acres of land across the country. 
This is coming off the second-worst year in recent history, with over 
10.1 million acres burned in 2020. This translates into enormous costs 
for all levels of government, communities, businesses, and homeowners. 
The average annual federal firefighting costs for the last five years 
is $2.35 billion, more than $400 million higher than the ten-year 
average of $1.9 billion. Not only are fires becoming more dangerous and 
burning faster and further, but they are also increasingly costly in 
suppression costs.
    According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service, 
recent increased fire activity is a result of increasingly hot and dry 
summers; stronger winds; insect and disaster infestations; and human 
population growth in the Wildland Urban Interface. The risk of wildfire 
impacts to lives, infrastructure, property, and natural resources is a 
growing crisis that demands action in a comprehensive approach for 
community protection and forest management. These recommendations are 
the beginning of that comprehensive approach.
    Managing the state and local emergency management impacts from 
wildland fire is challenging and unique. Given the high percentage of 
federal land in western states, many wildland fires originate on 
federal lands before impacting local communities. As a result, the 
federal incident results in costs to local communities for actions such 
as structure protection, evacuation, and pre-positioning of resources. 
Often these incidents also result in loss of homes, infrastructure, 
resources, and sometimes cost lives. Post-fire effects from federal 
incidents impact local communities when landslides, debris flows, and 
flooding result and become local issues to resolve.
    Leveraging federal grants for response or mitigation efforts 
becomes problematic when they do not have adequate allowances for some 
of the unique needs of fighting wildfires. In the long-term approach, 
state and local land managers can be proactive in lessening threats to 
communities, while federal land managers struggle to implement 
meaningful fuels reduction projects near communities. In total, there 
would be great benefit to federal agencies taking a more active role in 
protecting communities before, during and after wildland fires 
originating on federal lands. Throughout this statement I will 
highlight some additional examples and remedies.
                          The Impact in Oregon
    The 2020 firestorm was a worst-case fire scenario come to life for 
us in Oregon, when Oregonians were already reeling from the impacts and 
uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic. Oregon saw an increase in 
wildfire activity over the past decade, with increasing frequency, 
intensity, and duration of fire seasons. The September 2020 fires, 
however, were unlike anything ever seen in the state. At the peak of 
fire season, in a matter of days, dozens of fires ignited as hurricane-
force winds whipped across our state, driving existing fires past 
containment lines, overwhelming already strained response systems, 
torching homes, businesses, and critical infrastructure in dozens of 
communities across Oregon.
    We issued statewide warnings for wildfire in the days leading up to 
the fires. Pre-event messaging and evacuation notices, community 
planning, the quick actions of law enforcement and firefighters, and 
the culture of preparedness built in Oregon, undoubtedly saved lives. 
Despite the selfless and heroic work of first responders, nine 
Oregonians tragically lost their lives. Where infrastructure still 
allowed, local, state, and federal agencies issued alerts and warnings 
and media partners amplified those messages. Despite our best effort, 
tens of thousands were temporarily displaced and 4,500 homes were 
destroyed, leaving thousands more without a home. Businesses were 
burned to the ground, leaving workers jobless in an already struggling 
economy. Toxic smoke blanketed the entire state, impacting the health 
of every Oregonian, with Oregon's air quality listed as the worst in 
the world for days on end.
    Words like ``unprecedented'' fail to convey the devastation left 
behind by these fires, and ``resilient'' and ``inspiring'' seem 
inadequate descriptors of how Oregonians responded to the worst 
wildfire disaster in the history of the state. Even as the state works 
to grieve, heal, and recover, we continue responding to new wildfires, 
leaving traumatized families and communities terrified they may be 
next, and forcing those who lost their homes in the infernos wondering 
how to navigate the complexities of an overly bureaucratic recovery 
system.
    Nearly 14 months after the fires, we find strength and hope. Nearly 
every destroyed homesite has been cleared of hazardous materials and 
other debris left behind by the flames. Hundreds of new homes are being 
built, as long-term community recovery groups help survivors access 
necessary resources to help them write their own recovery stories. 
Through partnerships with federal and state agencies, philanthropic and 
non-profit organizations, the private sector and local governments, 
neighborhoods, cities, and natural spaces show signs of recovery. 
Oregon and her people and communities are strong.
    The devastating wildfires experienced over the past several years 
in Oregon, along with historic ice storms, severe flooding, and record-
setting heat waves that have cost dozens of lives are not anomalies or 
outliers. They are indicators of a changing hazard profile and point to 
the types of emergencies and disasters Oregon and others will continue 
to face. We must change how we views these emergencies. They are not 
natural disasters, because disasters are not natural; disasters are 
policy issues. They are a result of how we build, where we build, and 
the investments we choose, or do not choose, to make.
              Opportunities for Programmatic Improvements
    As an association, NEMA is still working through the development of 
specific policy and legislative recommendations. What I can share with 
you today is the universe of issues we will examine to determine next 
steps like adjustments to policy, Stafford Act amendments, or 
regulatory changes. Overall, however, the most pressing issue is 
leadership and a better understanding of the threat at the federal 
level.
    Wildfires can no longer be viewed as merely a fire service problem 
or function of first responders. As these fires continue spreading and 
having broader impacts, they become a whole-of-government hazard which 
must be treated as such to include robust prevention activities. 
Furthermore, to understand wildfires, one must first understand forest 
management, drought, and the interplay with existing FEMA programs. 
While NEMA would not recommend creating new, hazard-specific programs, 
we believe existing programs could be tailored somewhat to meet the 
evolving and continuing wildfire threat.
    Clarify the Federal Role. FEMA should be the lead coordinating 
agency for all multi-agency incidents across all phases of a wildfire, 
including recovery. This will include ensuring FEMA's capacity to 
successfully achieve interagency coordination through appropriate 
resourcing, staffing (including wildfire subject matter expertise), and 
authorities. Furthermore, FEMA must exercise leadership with its own 
policies and ensure the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide 
(PAPPG) clarifies available assistance and reduces the amount of on-
the-fly policy interpretation currently being done within disparate 
FEMA regions. Given the large amount of US Forest Service and Bureau of 
Land Management lands that are continually impacted by wildfires, 
coordination and land use agreements should be put in place prior to 
wildfire season to ensure there are no delays in recovery due to 
ownership issues. In many States across the Country, these federal 
lands have trees that when burned, fall onto local, state, and private 
property.
    Prepositioning Deployments. When preparing to fight wildfires, one 
of the most valuable capabilities is that of prepositioning 
firefighting assets. Currently, eligible pre-deployment costs through 
the Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAG) are limited to out-of-
state resources. Allowing the state to utilize FMAG assistance for the 
prepositioning of in-state resources would be a logical interim step to 
requiring us to look outside our borders first. Consideration should 
also be given to allow for funding the pre-staging of firefighting 
resources to prevent fires from reaching the severity where an FMAG is 
needed, much as we do for hurricanes or floods.
    Definition of Incident Period and Declaration Criteria. Unlike a 
hurricane that is predictive and leaves a specific trail of destruction 
in its wake, wildfires are unpredictable and often overlapping. In some 
cases, four or five fires start at different times in different 
locations and merge to form one massive event. Current policies 
dictating the establishment of an incident period are not conducive to 
this type of event across multiple jurisdictions and authorities. There 
are one of two ways in which this could be resolved. First, the initial 
attack of a wildfire could qualify for emergency protective measure 
once the National Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC) and the 
National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) reach Preparedness Level (PL) 
5. Secondly, instead of considering only localized impacts of fires, 
declaration criteria could be based on statewide impacts to include 
ongoing firefighting incidents. Furthermore, the declaration criteria 
used for Individual and Public Assistance disasters are not well-suited 
for informing fire declaration decisions as they do not consider the 
full range of impacts of large fires on local, and especially rural, 
communities and states.
    Emergency Work Eligibility. Large fires expose burn scars to 
erosion from wind and soil saturation. This often leads to landslides 
and mudslides. The federal firefighting services recognize this hazard 
and take emergency protective measures to protect property within their 
jurisdiction under the Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) and 
Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation (ESR) programs. Similar 
emergency stabilization measures taken by state and local governments 
are eligible Category B measures under FEMA PA declarations. In 
managing and FMAG, however, emergency protective measures outside the 
FMAG incident period are ineligible, putting additional strain on state 
and local resources. FMAG program guidance should mirror the same 
eligibilities and time frames for emergency work as those found in the 
PA program.
    Mitigation & Wildfires. FEMA policies for mitigation programs 
currently limit the execution of mitigation activities on federal land. 
Unfortunately, it is often the impacts of fires on those federal lands 
that lead directly to the need for additional firefighting and 
mitigation on state and private land. This dichotomy could be resolved 
by allowing states to conduct mitigation activities not only on state 
land, but also those federal lands whose land and forest management 
practices may directly impact wildfire-prone communities. Empower FEMA 
to ensure other federal agencies are ``at the table'' for assessment, 
recovery, and mitigation processes beforehand. Such an allowance, 
coupled with FEMA having the authority to compel other federal agencies 
to convene as necessary would greatly reduce the impact of wildfires on 
both federal and non-federal land.
    Wildfires dramatically alter the terrain and ground conditions of 
the affected area. Communities impacted by wildfire may be at an even 
greater risk of flooding and mudslides. Thus, the Disaster Recovery 
Reform Act (DRRA) made clear that post wildfire mitigation efforts to 
avoid future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering in any area affected 
by a wildfire (like activities that avoid flooding and landslides) are 
eligible for funding. FEMA should utilize the flexibility afforded in 
the DRRA to the maximum amount possible and apply the same criteria 
used by other federal agencies for approving soil stabilization and 
reseeding projects on non-federal land when post-fire mitigation funds 
are used.
    Environment and History Preservation (EHP) Reviews. Managing EHP 
reviews remains an issue both pre- and post-wildfire. By nature of the 
environment in which wildfires occur, environmental reviews represent 
an integral part of the preparedness and recovery to these events. EHP 
reviews are cumbersome for wildfire recovery and mitigation proposals. 
The lengthy timeline is often due to the lack of applicable Categorical 
Exclusions under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This 
leads to requirements for full environmental assessments which can take 
a year or more to complete. This process may lead to the result of 
simple targeted pruning and thinning in rural-residential 
neighborhoods; or planting native samplings on a burned hillside. These 
administrative delays impact these communities that need simple 
mitigation tactics quickly. Such reviews should allow creative 
approaches and flexibility in the grant application timeframe, 
particularly for disadvantaged communities. Many of these concerns can 
be improved by developing Programmatic Biological Opinions (BO) with 
other federal regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and National Marine Fisheries Service for wildfire response, 
recovery, and mitigation activities. These BO's can pave the way for 
federal agencies to streamline approval of these activities via pre-
determined avoidance and minimization measures.
    Recovery Policies. Many FEMA programs are built through the lens of 
hurricanes and flood but could be properly adjusted to meet the ever-
growing wildfire threat with some modest adjustments. The PAPPG should 
be updated to ensure the inclusion of wildfire-specific challenges 
around debris removal and eligibility as well as the lingering toxicity 
and contaminants once a wildfire has moved through a community. It 
could also be amended to include a specific wildland fire disaster 
indicator to recognize expenses related to an initial and extended 
attack (IEA) indicator.
                               Conclusion
    As emergency managers look to help our communities adapt to our 
changing climate and take steps to reduce our shared risk, we must take 
an intentional and deliberate approach to ensuring our disaster risk 
reduction strategies and programs do not simply account for the 
disasters we have faced before, but what we are certain to face 
tomorrow. We must prepare our communities in a way that is equitable, 
inclusive, and accessible as disasters have the greatest impacts on 
those who can least afford them.
    Wildfires are unique from other disasters such as hurricanes and 
storms because they have the capability of decimating entire 
communities to the point where nothing is left standing. The threat has 
also moved from a fire season to a year-round persistent danger across 
most of the Western United States and is no longer exclusive to this 
region. Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and other states east of 
the Mississippi River have also experienced large wildfires in recent 
years. We are seeing increasingly large and severe wildfires; drought 
conditions, low reservoir levels, and parched landscapes; and stress on 
the electric grid due to extreme heat throughout the West. These 
challenges are interconnected and cannot be looked at, or responded to, 
in isolation, and FEMA's policies and response strategies need to 
evolve with the threat. These policy gaps can be resolved by a 
recognition of the unique threat posed by wildfires, the need for 
adaptive policies, and a whole-of-government approach to finding 
solutions. The state emergency managers, through NEMA, stand ready to 
work with Congress and FEMA in identifying and implementing the 
necessary changes to better respond to this dynamic threat.

    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Phelps. We appreciate that.
    Our next witness is from the State of Nevada. We are 
delighted she is here. Ms. KC first joined the Nevada Division 
of Forestry in 2002 and has served as State forester since 
April of 2017.
    Ms. KC has more than 15 years of professional experience in 
forest management and natural resource conservation, including 
her tenure as Nevada Division of Forestry deputy administrator 
and as the program manager of Nevada's Sagebrush Ecosystem 
Program.
    She holds a degree in forestry resource and conservation 
from the University of Montana. She is a native of 
Gardnerville, Nevada. And she is the first female State 
forester to head the Nevada Division of Forestry.
    Congratulations on that. Welcome to the hearing, and we 
look forward to your testimony.
    Ms. KC. Thank you for the introduction.
    Good morning, Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and 
members of the committee. Again, my name is Kacey KC, State 
forester/firewarden for the Nevada Division of Forestry. I 
appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today and submit 
my written testimony as the subcommittee examines FEMA's 
wildfire assistance programs.
    Climate change conditions, dangerous fuel accumulations, 
and increased development in the wildland-urban interface have 
caused significant increases in catastrophic loss of life, 
property, and ecosystems across the United States, but, as you 
have also heard this morning, most dramatically in the Western 
United States.
    These changes have increased burdens on insurance companies 
and national programs like those managed by FEMA to assist with 
the increase in the cost of not only wildfire suppression but 
the losses suffered to homes and business owners.
    In the last 21 years, Nevada has burned close to 10 million 
acres, which averages to just over 470,000 acres per year. This 
is more than double the previous 20-year period in Nevada. Of 
note, within this 21-year period, Nevada has burned close to or 
over 1 million acres annually in 6 different years--which, in 
the previous 20 years, there was only 1 year, which was an 
anomaly in that 20-year period.
    The increase in fire frequency and intensity is requiring 
more active ecosystem management to prevent catastrophic loss 
prior to wildfires starting. In 2020, NDF, along with our 
Federal and local government partners, treated over 182,000 
acres, which was a 48-percent increase from 2019, despite 
challenges related to the pandemic and workforce issues. This 
year, we have collectively treated over 257,000 acres so far, 
which is, for the first time ever probably, more than we have 
burned in the State this year so far.
    The Nevada Division of Forestry is designated as the 
Governor's authorized representative for the application of 
Fire Management Assistance Grants, or FMAGs, in Nevada. FEMA's 
FMAG program is critical, and we very much appreciate the 
support for State and local and Tribal governments because of 
the 75-percent reimbursement rate afforded to those partners 
for non-Federal wildfire suppression cost.
    NDF applies for FMAGs on behalf of all local government 
fire departments under contract in the State of Nevada, which 
equates to 98 percent of the fire departments within the State. 
FMAG eligibility is based on these primary criteria: threats to 
human lives and property, availability of State and local 
government firefighting resources, high fire danger conditions, 
and the potential for major economic impact.
    Although population size for threatened communities is not 
explicitly identified in FEMA's guidance to States on FMAG 
applications, it appears to be widely used when determining 
eligibility. This has continuously ruled out many of Nevada's 
largest and most affected areas for wildfire loss, which is our 
rural areas, who do suffer severe economic loss to landowners, 
to rural economies, to agricultural enterprises, mines, 
tourism, and local and State governments.
    In 2018, FEMA allocated Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, or 
HMGP, funds for wildfire mitigation to those FMAG communities. 
Since 2016, NDF has been awarded 17 FMAGs, and subsequently 
over $10.7 million in HMGP funds, to those communities.
    Of the $10.7 million, close to $8 million has been awarded 
for wildfire mitigation projects, yet none of those funds have 
been implemented on the ground due to a lengthy application and 
environmental review process. The funds that were allocated for 
equipment purchases have been executed and completed.
    A portion of these HMGP funds is needed for emergency 
stabilization measures immediately to ensure that there is no 
further loss to lives and properties due to flooding or 
landslides following rain or snow events after wildfires. FEMA 
should create a program to advance the necessary portion of 
these HMGP funds to recipients immediately upon approval so 
that emergency stabilization measures can be put in place.
    With lengthy delays of funding availability, we find 
ourselves in a much more costly and time-consuming restoration 
project due to ongoing erosion, sedimentation, and invasion of 
nonnative fuels.
    FEMA programs for floods and earthquake mitigation are very 
well-established, with precalculated benefits and average costs 
for certain projects to expedite review and approval. A similar 
project should be developed for wildfire emergency 
stabilization measures and mitigation projects for wildfires to 
streamline the process and ensure that the actions can hit the 
ground immediately.
    Thank you for allowing me time to speak on this issue. 
Following testimony, I, too, will be available for questions.
    [Ms. KC's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Kacey KC, State Forester and Firewarden, Nevada 
                          Division of Forestry
    Good morning, Chairwoman Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and Members 
of the Committee. My name is Kacey KC, State Forester/Firewarden for 
the Nevada Division of Forestry. I appreciate the opportunity to speak 
with you today and submit my written testimony as the Subcommittee 
examines FEMA's wildfire assistance programs.
                               Background
    Climate change, dangerous fuel accumulations, and increased 
development in the wildland urban interface has caused a significant 
increase in catastrophic loss of life, property, and ecosystems across 
the United States, most dramatically in the Western U.S. Fire seasons 
have expanded to year-round wildfire occurrence and fire intensity has 
increased, leaving little surviving native vegetation post-wildfire. 
These fire frequencies have been shortened to lengths that only allow 
short-lived, weedy, and flammable species to remain on our landscapes. 
In many Western States, these changes are causing increased burdens on 
insurance and national programs like those managed by FEMA to assist 
with the increase in the costs of wildfire suppression and the losses 
suffered to home and business owners.
    Nevada's wildland fire occurrences have followed this same 
trajectory. During the 20-year period between 1980 and 1999, Nevada 
burned 4,160,929 acres. This is an average of 208,046 acres burned per 
year. This 20-year period included the most devastating year on record, 
1999, in which over 1.7 million acres burned (see graph below). The 
wildfire events of 1999 were an anomaly within that period, as Nevada 
had never experienced anywhere near 1 million acres burned since the 
inception of wildfire data collection. In the next 21 years, from 2000 
to 2020, Nevada burned 9,959,185 acres, which is an average of 474,247 
acres burned per year, more than double the previous 20-year period. Of 
note, within this latter 21-year period, Nevada has burned close to or 
over 1 million acres annually in 6 different years. This is directly 
correlated to climate in years of extended drought interrupted by a 
year or two of above average precipitation and warmer overall 
temperatures.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Table: Annual wildfire acreage burned in Nevada overlaid with Humboldt 
  River flows, which is indicative of most Nevada watershed response 
showing Nevada's largest fire seasons by acres burned are the 2-3 years 
                      following high water flows.

    Between 2005 and 2020, wildfires have destroyed more than 89,000 
structures, including homes and businesses in the United States. The 
most damaging wildfires have occurred in the last few years, accounting 
for 62 percent of the structures lost over the last 15 years 
(Headwaters Economics, 2020). The following list shows significant 
losses due to wildfires in the United States over the last decade 
(NIFC, 2021).
      2011: Texas--5,900 structures damaged or destroyed
      2012: Colorado--3 civilian fatalities and 605 homes lost
      2013: Arizona--19 firefighter fatalities and 129 
structures destroyed
      2014: California--341 residences destroyed;
            Washington--342 residences destroyed
      2015: Washington--3 firefighter fatalities and 342 
residences destroyed
      2016: Tennessee--14 fatalities, 2121 residences destroyed
      2017: California--7,778 residences destroyed;
            Florida--44 residences destroyed
      2018: California--88 civilian and firefighter fatalities 
and over 18,800 structures lost
      2019: California--315 residences destroyed;
            Alaska--57 residences destroyed
      2020: Oregon--11 civilian and firefighter fatalities and 
over 3000 structures destroyed;
            California--10,500 structures destroyed and 33 civilian and 
firefighter fatalities

    The increased loss in structures, lives and ecosystems and further 
damage from subsequent floods is requiring a significant increase in 
the need for active ecosystem management across Nevada, better 
coordination and participation among multiple partners, and increased 
funding from multiple sources to address the threat of catastrophic 
wildland fire loss.
                  Nevada's Use of FEMA Wildfire Funds
    The Nevada Division of Forestry (NDF) is designated as the 
Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) for the application of Fire 
Management Assistance Grants (FMAG) in Nevada. FEMA's FMAG program is 
critical for state, local, and tribal government agencies because of 
the 75% reimbursement rate afforded to these partners for wildfire 
suppression costs of non-federal response assets. To be accepted, an 
FMAG must be submitted when the threat of wildfire impact is imminent. 
During the active response of suppression assets, the program assesses 
the following criteria for eligibility: threats to human lives and 
property, including critical infrastructure and watersheds; 
availability of state and local government firefighting resources; high 
fire danger conditions; and the potential for major economic impact. 
NDF's on-call duty officers work with FEMA's regional officials and a 
Forest Service Technical Advisor to submit a timely application that 
meets the program's qualifying criteria, if they are present.
    There are two primary issues NDF has identified with the FMAG 
approval process:
    1)  Although population size for a threatened community is not 
explicitly identified in FEMA's guidance to States on FMAG 
applications, it appears size is widely used when determining 
eligibility. This has continuously ruled out many of Nevada's rural 
fires that have caused severe economic loss to landowners, rural 
economies, agricultural enterprises, mines, tourism, and local and 
state governments. This was brought to light when the FMAG request for 
the South Sugarloaf Fire, a fire that burned over 364 square miles, was 
denied originally and then again when appealed by NDF.
    2)  Eligibility for the same community varies year to year, even 
when eligibility criteria remain the same and are consistently met. 
This was evident in the FMAG request for the Nevada side of the 
Tamarack Fire this year, which was originally denied; however, the same 
community had received two FMAGs in previous years. This causes 
confusion for GARs when supplying information to FEMA in the FMAG 
process.

    In 2018, FEMA allocated Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) 
funds for wildfire mitigation, rehabilitation, emergency stabilization, 
and restoration to the community/county/state that was awarded an FMAG. 
This first allocation in 2019 counted all successful FMAGs awarded from 
2016-2018, then was allocated each year thereafter based on those years 
approved FMAGs. Nevada was deemed an area of high wildfire threat and 
was awarded the maximum amount of funding per FMAG through this HMGP 
allocation. The allocated HMGP amount in Nevada started at $566,677 per 
FMAG and has increased every year. Currently, Nevada receives $778,778 
per FMAG. Since 2016, NDF has been awarded 17 FMAGs and subsequently 
over $10.7 million in HMGP wildfire mitigation funds have been 
allocated. Each year, FEMA and the State of Nevada's Division of 
Emergency Management have solicited grant proposals for funds allocated 
to Nevada. The State of Nevada, along with its local fire protection 
organizations have applied and been selected for awards of the HMGP 
Grants. Of that $10.7 million, close to $8 million has been awarded to 
wildfire mitigation projects or equipment, approximately $1.5 million 
went to mitigate other hazards and over $2.2 million was returned to 
FEMA due to withdrawn applications. The complicated application process 
and the length of time to award has caused many applicants, 
particularly local government fire departments who do not have the 
capacity to deal with this, to turn down these FEMA funds. NDF has 
tried to apply on behalf of these jurisdictions to keep the funding in 
Nevada, however, has also had difficulty navigating the process, which 
averages two to three years to complete. Applications for equipment 
purchases move through the FEMA application process with ease; however, 
mitigation, fuel reduction, rehabilitation, and home hardening 
processes all experience substantial delays.
    The Nevada Division of Emergency Management (NDEM) is the recipient 
of all HMGP funds in the State of Nevada, including wildfire 
mitigation, as those funds are tied to the State of Nevada Enhanced 
Hazard Mitigation Plan. NDEM works diligently with FEMA on behalf of 
NDF and local government entities to ensure these wildfire mitigation 
HMGP funds are used for wildfire mitigation in the most critical and 
high-risk areas. Ecosystem management, cultural resource clearances, 
and wildfire mitigation, however, are not NDEM's area of expertise, 
which has caused delays in applicant receipt of funding and the funding 
of projects that are not of the highest priority. State Forestry 
Agencies like NDF have State Forest and Resource Management Action 
Plans as well as Shared Stewardship Plans, created with state, federal, 
and local government partners which identify the areas of highest 
wildfire risk in need of treatments.
    NDF has applied for, and been awarded, funds for five projects to 
date through NDEM and the wildfire mitigation HMGP funds. The 
application process is more challenging than most other sources of 
mitigation funding but is manageable. Once selected, the environmental 
clearance process is extensive and has taken over three years so far, 
as we have not yet made it through any of those processes and received 
funds for implementation. Much of this funding is necessary to assist 
the affected county with immediate emergency stabilization measures to 
ensure that when the first rain or snow falls following the fire, there 
is no further damage to lives and property due to flooding or 
landslides. If three years have passed before funding can be allocated, 
then NDF and our partners have not been able to mitigate the post-
wildfire impacts to lives and property. We and our local partners find 
ourselves in a much more costly and time-consuming restoration project 
due to the ongoing erosion, sedimentation, and runoff processes that 
tend to follow wildfires, particularly when known issues are not 
managed in a timely manner following the wildfire occurrence. In 
addition, the longer the time between the fire and the restoration 
activities, the harder it is to avoid highly competitive non-native, 
noxious species out competing native vegetation following fire and 
contributing to the loss of water supplies for communities, habitat for 
wildlife, and other economic activities tied to healthy ecosystems.
     Suggestions to Ensure Successful Implementation of FEMA Funds
    1)  Ensure that FMAG eligibility criteria are equally applied 
across all states and do not favor highly populated areas over more 
rural areas, as loss of livelihoods and economic impacts are critical 
regardless of overall human population.
    2)  Ensure FMAG eligibility criteria are clearly written and 
understood by FEMA staff and applicants.
    3)  Have FEMA work directly with State Forestry agencies, like NDF, 
and/or other federal land management agencies, who have been 
implementing wildfire mitigation projects for over 100 years and have 
current plans and strategies depicting the highest risk areas from 
wildfire needing treatment, to ensure that wildfire mitigation (HMGP) 
funds go to the highest priority risk reduction areas when they are not 
being used solely for rehabilitation of the awarded FMAG fire. The GAR 
for the wildfire HMGP funds should be the same as that for the FMAG 
process and should align with the State Forestry agencies that manage 
natural resources and wildfire risk reduction in the State.
    4)  Have FEMA and DEM receiving agencies establish agreements with 
State Forestry agencies to expedite cultural resource reviews to ensure 
expeditious application of wildfire mitigation HMGP funds on critical 
risk reduction projects.
    5)  Allow an advance of a portion of the FMAG-related HMGP funds to 
be awarded to allowable recipients immediately upon approval so that 
emergency stabilization measures can be put in place for the protection 
of lives, properties, and remaining natural and cultural resources.
    6)  FEMA programs for flood and earthquake are very well 
established with set projects to expedite review and approval. Develop 
a similar process for wildfire emergency stabilization measures and 
mitigation projects to streamline the process of application review, 
approval, and award to ensure that timely actions can be applied on the 
ground.
    7)  Many States in the Western U.S. have identified wildfire as a 
top priority in their Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plans. Funding for active 
fuel management has traditionally gone directly to Department of 
Interior and Department of Agriculture agencies, which then pass down 
to states, local governments, and tribal entities. Traditional funding 
streams should be continued and increased to address growing wildfire 
occurrences. If FEMA is going to have a role in fuel management, it 
should be clearly defined, and the process should mimic those of DOA 
and DOI agencies.
    8)  FEMA grants require extensive Benefit Cost Analysis (BCA) 
reports for submittal. The current criteria should be evaluated to 
ensure it covers wildfire issues in addition to other funded disasters 
equally. Also, pre-calculated benefits for wildfire mitigation should 
be designed for common projects to expedite the application process.

    Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Ms. KC.
    We will now go to Mr. Elliott.
    Mr. Elliott. Good morning, Chair Titus, Ranking Member 
Webster, and members of the subcommittee. I am Deputy Fire 
Chief Rich Elliott with Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue, which 
is in central Washington State.
    Today, I am representing the International Association of 
Fire Chiefs as the chair of the Wildland Policy Committee. I 
thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing.
    The wildland fire problem is a national problem. Every 
State in the Union faces the threat of wildfires burning 
through their communities. We must take comprehensive action to 
address this problem. It will require cooperation between 
Federal, State, Tribal, Territorial, and local governments as 
well as the private sector and the general public.
    FEMA programs can be used to address this wildland fire 
problem. They can fund mitigation, preparedness, response and 
recovery activities. Most importantly, they bring stakeholders 
together to plan and cooperate before the fire occurs.
    One example, FEMA's BRIC program, which is Building 
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities, is an opportunity to 
engage everyone to mitigate the cost of wildland fires. BRIC 
grants can promote the use of building codes, such as the 
International Wildland-Urban Interface Code, and fire-resistant 
materials to reduce fire damage. They also can fund the removal 
of hazardous fuels and protect community lifelines.
    However, we must also use these grants to build capacity 
for mitigation projects. Local jurisdictions require technical 
assistance to educate the public about the importance of 
activities like prescribed fire. Also, we need help in 
navigating the environmental reviews and the litigation that 
are part of the mitigation process. The Nation must also 
develop an experienced workforce to handle a surge in 
mitigation projects.
    Due to budget shortfalls and COVID-19, fire departments 
across the Nation are facing staffing shortages and challenges 
procuring equipment. An example would be the semiconductor 
shortage, which is delaying the delivery of brush trucks to 
fight wildland fires.
    Many fire departments must train their firefighters to 
respond to wildland fires. Volunteer fire departments are 
facing problems recruiting and retaining personnel due to 
COVID-19 restrictions. Even career and combination fire 
departments are unable to induct recruit classes at a rate they 
require.
    FEMA's grants, the Fire, SAFER, and EMPG programs, can help 
with these challenges. Fire and SAFER provide matching grants 
directly to local fire departments for training, equipment, and 
staffing. The EMPG program can be used for planning for the 
response to wildfires. And I thank you for the support of these 
programs.
    The FMAG program, mentioned before, is a tool for funding 
the response to major wildland fires. It brings together 
Federal, State, Tribal, Territorial, and local authorities to 
work in a collaborative manner. However, there is room for 
improvement.
    We recommend that the committee consider the Wildfire 
Recovery Act, H.R. 1066. This bill would allow FEMA to set 
thresholds for raising the Federal match for FMAGs. This would 
help communities devastated by wildfires to recover faster.
    We also ask that FEMA use the FMAG to fund the full 
footprint of the wildfire regardless of whether it crosses 
jurisdictional boundaries. This will promote cross-border 
cooperation during wildland fires.
    FEMA can also take steps to improve mutual aid response. 
The reimbursement process can take years to resolve between 
FEMA and the States; the local fire department can be left 
holding the bill. FEMA could make the reimbursement process 
more transparent so that the local fire department can 
determine when they will be reimbursed. In addition, FEMA could 
standardize the reimbursement cost of common resources, like 
volunteer firefighters.
    FEMA could also adopt tools that complement the EMAC 
system. For example, the National Mutual Aid System makes it 
easier for fire chiefs to identify and request the closest 
resources during a wildland fire. This program can support both 
intrastate and interstate mutual aid.
    The IAFC urges FEMA to promote community preparedness 
efforts like Ready, Set, Go! which promote local preparedness 
and planning. They educate homeowners about how to protect 
their property and safely evacuate when necessary.
    I thank this committee for its leadership in creating the 
HMGP Post-Fire program. This allows affected areas to prevent 
flooding after fires and create erosion barriers, reseeding, 
and other activities.
    After a fire, FEMA could provide additional technical 
assistance to help communities recover and rebuild. In some 
cases, latitude may be required so that a fire station could be 
rebuilt in a safer location.
    As I conclude, I emphasize the importance of action. In 
2020, we had 59,000 fires burn across more than 10.1 million 
acres. The Federal cost alone has increased from $240 million 
in 1985 to $2.3 billion in 2020. Without aggressive action, we 
can expect to see the severity of these fires increase as well 
as the cost to lives and property.
    The IAFC stands as a partner to local and State agencies, 
and I will be available for questions after.
    [Mr. Elliott's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Rich Elliott, Deputy Fire Chief, Kittitas Valley 
  Fire and Rescue (WA), on behalf of the International Association of 
                              Fire Chiefs
    Good morning, Chair Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and members of 
the subcommittee. I am Deputy Fire Chief Rich Elliott of the Kittitas 
Valley (Washington) Fire and Rescue department and chair of the 
Wildland Fire Policy Committee of the International Association of Fire 
Chiefs. I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the assistance 
programs of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and how they 
help communities before, during, and after wildland fires.
    The IAFC represents the leadership of firefighters and emergency 
responders worldwide. IAFC members are leading experts in firefighting, 
emergency medical services, terrorism response, hazardous materials 
incidents, wildland fire suppression, natural disasters, search and 
rescue, and public-safety policy. Since 1873, the IAFC has provided a 
forum for its members to exchange ideas, develop best practices, 
participate in executive training, and discover diverse products and 
services available to first responders.
    America's fire and emergency services are the only organized group 
of individuals who are locally situated, staffed, trained, and equipped 
to respond to all types of emergencies. There are approximately 1.1 
million men and women in the fire and emergency service--consisting of 
approximately 300,000 career firefighters and 800,000 volunteer 
firefighters--serving in over 30,000 fire departments around the 
nation. They are trained to respond to all hazards ranging from 
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods to acts of terrorism, 
hazardous materials incidents, technical rescues, fire, and medical 
emergencies. America's fire and EMS personnel usually are the first on-
scene at an incident and the last to leave.
    Every state in the nation can face the destruction and loss of a 
major wildland fire. The year 2020 was one of the worst wildfire years 
on record. Approximately 59,000 fires burned more than 10.1 million 
acres. Overall, the cost of wildland fire suppression for the American 
taxpayer continues to increase. In 1985, the U.S. Forest Service and 
U.S. Department of Interior spent approximately $240 million on 
wildland fire suppression. By 2020, these costs had escalated to 
approximately $2.3 billion. These figures leave out state, tribal, 
territorial, and local firefighting costs and the tragic loss of life 
and private property caused by wildland fires.
    The nation must focus on addressing the wildland fire problem, 
especially for communities in the wildland-urban interface (WUI). This 
task will require collaboration between federal, state, tribal, 
territorial, and local governments along with the private sector and 
the general public. Because of its support for states and local 
communities through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 100-707), FEMA is an important partner 
in the effort to address the wildland fire problem. FEMA specifically 
can play a major role in mitigating wildland fires, preparing for 
future fires, responding to these fires, and helping communities to 
recover from them.
                FEMA's Role in Mitigating Wildland Fires
    FEMA's mitigation programs can play an important role in helping 
communities prevent damage from wildland fires. To mitigate their risk, 
communities must promote building codes to make structures fire 
resistant; use prescribed burns and other forestry strategies and 
remove hazardous fuels. FEMA's Building Resilient Infrastructure and 
Communities (BRIC) program represents a $1 billion opportunity to 
mitigate natural hazards, such as wildland fires. The BRIC program 
funds efforts to adopt building codes and implement mitigation projects 
that protect community lifelines. BRIC grantees are states, U.S. 
territories, federally recognized tribal governments and Washington, 
D.C., but local governments can be subapplicants. The BRIC grants have 
supported programs to reduce the biomass and hazardous fuels in the WUI 
and use it for electricity generation. In addition, it has funded 
projects to support partnerships between local fire departments and 
builders to adopt codes and guidelines to use fire-resistant materials 
in designing roofs, exterior siding, doors, windows, decks, and other 
housing components. By including a large amount of federal funding with 
an opportunity for federal, state, local and private partners to work 
together, the BRIC program represents a major new tool for mitigating 
the threat of wildland fires. The IAFC thanks the subcommittee for its 
leadership in creating the BRIC program.
    There are challenges to mitigation that need to be addressed. 
Legislation like the INVEST in America Act (H.R. 3684) and the Build 
Back Better Act (H.R. 5376) would increase funding for the BRIC program 
and forest management programs. However, there is a need to ensure that 
proper planning is done on these projects. With the new focus on 
mitigation, there is a need for greater technical assistance to address 
issues like the National Environmental Policy Act review and associated 
litigation. In addition, the national workforce shortage may create a 
problem as jurisdictions across the nation all ramp up mitigation 
projects at the same time.
    To address these challenges, the nation must invest in building 
capacity for mitigation efforts. It is important to educate the public 
about mitigation practices and standardized practices. Also, the nation 
must focus on continuing and maintaining projects in the WUI, not just 
starting them. The IAFC also urges Congress to focus on using 
collaboration between local fire departments; state and private 
foresters; federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local elected 
officials; the private sector and the public to build support for 
mitigation as a discipline and longstanding effort to prevent wildland 
fires.
                      FEMA's Role in Preparedness
    FEMA's grant programs help local fire departments prepare for 
wildland fires. Fire departments face several challenges in preparing 
to respond to wildland fires. According to the National Fire Protection 
Association's Fourth Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, 63% of 
the surveyed fire departments provide wildland firefighting but have 
not formally trained all of their personnel involved in wildland 
firefighting.\1\ In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has created 
shortages of fire and EMS personnel and wildland fire training 
opportunities. This problem especially affects the volunteer fire 
service, where COVID-19 has restricted recruitment activities and 
fundraising events. Volunteer fire departments are facing personnel 
shortages due to COVID-19 because their volunteers may be in at-risk 
categories, may be concerned about exposing their families to COVID-19, 
or may be concerned that they will lose their jobs if they become ill. 
Even career and combination fire departments have been unable to induct 
new recruit classes into fire academies at the rate they need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Fourth Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, National Fire 
Protection Association, November 2016, p. ix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, fire departments are facing challenges with mutual aid 
and COVID-19. To combat a wildland fire, it is important to get 
firefighting resources on-scene as quickly as possible. Fire 
departments rely upon their neighbors and intrastate--and even 
interstate--resources to combat wildland fires. However, as COVID-19 
has infected fire departments, fire personnel are unable to work due to 
illness or quarantine. This reduces resources available for mutual aid. 
In addition, some jurisdictions are unable to send resources in 
response to mutual aid requests because they want to maintain staffing 
at home in case of COVID-19 surges or they are concerned that their 
personnel will be exposed to COVID-19 during mutual aid deployments. In 
addition, the wildland fire year and hurricane season can both become 
more severe at the end of summer and early in the fall, which means 
that fire capabilities otherwise available for wildland fires may be 
deployed for hurricane response. Federal wildland firefighters face 
additional challenges like a pay cap that limits the time that they can 
spend fighting fires in a year.
    FEMA has important programs to help fire departments address these 
challenges. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) program and 
Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) grants 
provide peer-reviewed matching grants directly to local fire 
departments. The AFG grants fund equipment, training, and fire 
prevention programs which all can be used to prepare for wildland 
fires. The SAFER grant program includes matching grants to hire career 
firefighters and also funds recruitment and retention programs for 
volunteer firefighters. We appreciate Congressional support for the AFG 
and SAFER program during the pandemic, especially for including $100 
million for the AFG program in the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136), and an 
additional $200 million for the SAFER program and $100 million for the 
AFG program in American Rescue Plan Act (P.L. 117-2). In addition, the 
Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) can be used to help 
communities fund planning for wildland fires, including developing 
evacuation plans.
    The AFG's Fire Prevention and Safety grants also can fund community 
preparedness programs. Local communities should take steps to mitigate 
the risk of fires by removing hazardous fuels, promoting protective 
areas around buildings, using fire-resistant building materials, and 
planning for evacuations if necessary. The IAFC's Ready, Set, Go! 
program provides a model program for community preparedness. The 
program is a partnership with the U.S. Forest Service that promotes 
wildfire awareness and preparedness in local communities; helps local 
homeowners protect their homes and prepare for evacuation; and then 
ensures that the local population can leave in time when a wildland 
fire threatens. I ask that FEMA support programs like Ready, Set, Go! 
in local communities.
    FEMA also can take steps to improve mutual aid for local fire 
departments. One of the greatest challenges that fire departments face 
is the delayed reimbursement for interstate mutual aid deployments. The 
reimbursement process can take a long time as the states and FEMA 
negotiate reimbursement. Then the reimbursement must travel from the 
state receiving FEMA assistance to the state that sent the fire 
departments' resources, and then on to the local fire department. In 
the interim, a local jurisdiction can wait years for reimbursement for 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in costs from the mutual aid 
deployment. The reimbursement process must be streamlined and more 
transparent. The process should be fixed so that fire chiefs and local 
jurisdictions can track their reimbursement requests through the 
bureaucracy. In addition, basic costs should be standardized, including 
the costs of common resources like volunteer firefighters.
    In order to help order and track resources, the IAFC developed the 
National Mutual Aid System (NMAS) as a proposed complement to the 
national Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). NMAS will 
allow a fire chief or state fire agency to identify required 
firefighting resources within a state or in neighboring states, order 
them, and then track them as they travel to the scene of the wildland 
fire. This system will build surge capacity by making it easier to 
identify and deploy the closest and most appropriate resources to a 
wildland fire and get assets on-scene in a timely manner. A time-
effective response can bring a wildland fire under control faster and 
reduce casualties and property damage.
    The Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) program is an important 
tool that FEMA has for fighting wildland fires. The FMAG program funds 
wildland firefighting activities with the purpose of preventing them 
from becoming major disaster declarations. The FMAGs also promote 
coordination between local authorities, state foresters and FEMA 
regions to control a fire and reduce the damage that it can cause.
    While FMAGs are important tools, there are opportunities to improve 
them. The IAFC supports Representative Joe Neguse's Wildfire Recovery 
Act (H.R. 1066), which would allow FEMA to set thresholds for raising 
the federal cost-share for FMAGs. As we have seen recently, wildland 
fires can destroy small towns in the WUI, which makes it difficult for 
them to meet a 25% federal cost-share. If the federal government can 
absorb more of the cost of the FMAG, it will allow those communities to 
get back on their feet and start providing basic services to their 
communities.
    In addition, we ask that declared FMAGs be designed to cover the 
footprint of the wildland fire. In 2020, the Evans Canyon Fire burned 
into fire districts in both Kittitas County and its neighbor, Yakima 
County. Unfortunately, FEMA determined that the fire damage in only 
Yakima County warranted an FMAG declaration, which meant that agencies 
like Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue were not reimbursed for their 
expenses. We ask that when an FMAG-declared fire covers more than one 
jurisdiction, all affected jurisdictions be eligible to apply for 
reimbursement.
                     FEMA's Resources for Recovery
    After wildland fires strike, FEMA has several programs to help 
local communities recover. Programs like the Individual Assistance and 
Public Assistance programs help individual homeowners and local 
governments survive and rebuild after a disaster. One program that I 
would like to highlight is FEMA's Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) Post Fire. This program allows a state or territory to apply for 
assistance after the first FMAG declaration of the fiscal year and the 
opportunity closes six months after the close of that fiscal year. This 
funding is extremely helpful for communities as they recover from 
wildland fires. The post-fire grants allow communities to build erosion 
barriers, re-seed land, and take other steps to prevent flooding after 
wildland fires. The program also supports reforestation programs so 
that areas burned by the fire can be rehabilitated to prevent further 
damage. I thank the committee for creating this program.
    I would like to highlight the need for FEMA to provide technical 
assistance to communities as they navigate the Public Assistance 
process. A small rural community in the WUI may not have the capability 
to meet the paperwork requirements for requesting, managing, and 
reporting on Public Assistance funding. In addition, there needs to be 
some latitude in some of the Public Assistance requirements. For 
example, it may not make sense to rebuild a fire station in the exact 
same location where it was gutted by a wildland fire.
    I thank the committee for allowing me to discuss FEMA programs' 
roles in addressing the nation's wildland fire problem. The threat of 
wildland fires is growing across the nation and the costs of responding 
to these fires in dollars, property lost, and casualties is increasing. 
FEMA is a vital partner in addressing the threat of meeting this 
challenge. FEMA programs like the BRIC program can be used to mitigate 
the threat of fires. The AFG, SAFER, and EMPG grants can help 
communities prepare for wildland fires by developing training and 
planning and paying for equipment and staffing. The FMAG program is a 
helpful tool in funding wildland fire response and promoting 
coordination between federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local 
partners. Finally, FEMA's recovery programs, like the HMGP Post Fire, 
can help communities prevent further damage and start to rebuild after 
a wildland fire. It is important that federal, state, tribal, 
territorial, and local governments work with the private sector and 
general public to address this growing threat. The IAFC looks forward 
to working with the committee to improve this collaboration.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Elliott.
    Our last witness is Ms. Hatcher, and I understand Mr. 
LaMalfa would like to introduce Ms. Hatcher.
    You will be recognized. Thank you.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Madam Chair Titus.
    We are delighted to have today with us Casey Hatcher, who 
has the opportunity to speak with us today about the various 
issues she has run into as the deputy, chief administrative 
officer for Butte County in my district in northern California.
    She joined Butte County in 2011 as a member of the Economic 
Development Unit, has worked in some shape or form on disaster 
recovery since the 2008 California wildfires, including the 
county's Emergency Operation Center and the disasters that 
affected Butte County since the 2017 Oroville Dam spillway 
incident; the 2017 Wall fire, Ponderosa fire, LaPorte fire, and 
Cherokee fire; the 2018 Camp fire; the 2020 North Complex fire; 
and, most recently, the million-acre 2021 Dixie fire.
    She has a wealth of knowledge about these wildfires and 
their response needs and how they impact county governments, 
and I know she is eager to speak with all of us about this 
today. And she has been a delight to work with and effective in 
helping the recovery for all these disasters that we face in 
northern California. I appreciate her insight today.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. LaMalfa.
    Ms. Hatcher, you can go ahead.
    Ms. Hatcher. Good morning, Chair Titus and Ranking Member 
Webster and members of the subcommittee.
    And thank you, Congressman LaMalfa, for the introduction.
    I appreciate your time today.
    As deputy, chief administrative officer, as Congressman 
LaMalfa mentioned, I serve as the Camp fire recovery director 
for Butte County. Butte is a suburban county in northern 
California with just under 210,000 residents. We are located 
west of the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range, and a significant 
portion of our county is in areas at risk for wildfires.
    As Congressman LaMalfa mentioned, we are no stranger to 
disasters. In just the last 5 years, we have experienced 12 
disasters. Seven have Federal declaration. This includes the 
2018 Camp fire, the most deadly and destructive wildfire in 
California history.
    Our county knows that FEMA assistance is critical for local 
governments when recovering from disasters. We simply could not 
do it alone. But it appears that the Stafford Act and FEMA are 
designed more to serve areas prone to disasters like 
hurricanes, storms, and floods than wildfires. But as the 
severity and frequency of wildfires increases, the Stafford Act 
and FEMA must change to better address these types of 
disasters.
    I will walk through a few examples today that highlight 
what we have seen in recent wildfires in our county.
    Housing is critical after a wildfire. Homes are destroyed, 
and then residents cannot live back in the burn area until 
debris removal is complete. Butte County lost 14 percent of its 
housing stock in the 2018 Camp fire.
    FEMA approved direct housing assistance, but it took 9 
months before an official FEMA housing group site was ready 
with manufactured housing units. In the meantime, fire 
survivors lived in hotels, tents, trailers, slept in parks, or 
moved from place to place. So much time lapsed that many people 
waiting for FEMA housing moved from the area and resettled 
permanently.
    FEMA tried to place housing units back on individual 
properties, which could have been a little faster. But, by its 
own requirements, no one could live temporarily on the property 
until the toxic debris was removed, which took about a year.
    Additionally, the units didn't meet the building code to be 
placed in the wildland-urban interface--you have talked about 
this as the ``WUI''--because they didn't meet fire standards. 
This also prevented the 600-plus manufactured housing units 
that ultimately ended up in the FEMA group sites from being 
sold to fire survivors as permanent housing solutions.
    It appears the housing units FEMA has are most often used 
in areas after storms and floods, and when we asked about 
getting WUI-compliant units, we were told they simply didn't 
have any in the system.
    Moving on to debris removal, this is a critical step after 
a wildfire because it literally clears the way for rebuilding. 
Butte County advocated for almost a year for a debris removal 
program for burnt hazardous trees. The program was ultimately 
approved. It included trees that could fall into the roadway 
and harm the public but not trees that pose an increased risk 
to become fuel for future fires. Standing burnt trees can make 
future fires worse and should be eligible for debris removal.
    A unique factor of wildfires is they often burn on national 
forest land. However, Forest Service land cannot be included in 
debris removal programs funded by FEMA, and sometimes the 
Forest Service is uninterested or unable to remove the debris 
or trees on its own. This leaves burnt hazardous trees along 
the roadway as fuel for future fires.
    This happened in the Camp fire. This happened in the 2020 
North Complex fire in Butte County. But it will be a more 
significant issue for the 2021 fires, like the Caldor fire that 
burned near Lake Tahoe in California.
    Debris removal efforts after fires in our county put 
hundreds of heavily loaded trucks on roads not constructed for 
that type of traffic. FEMA was reluctant to approve permanent 
work for road repairs and wanted to shift those costs to the 
contractors who performed debris removal or to the private 
utility companies that had been in the area restoring services 
after the fire. This really left Butte County fighting for 
assistance to repair crumbled roads.
    After the 2020 North Complex fires, we estimate $35 million 
is needed to pay the local share of costs for road repairs and 
repairs that were denied by FEMA. And that is on top of $47 
million in unmet road repair needs after the 2018 Camp fire 
just 2 years earlier. This is more than our typical annual road 
budget in total.
    Local governments lack adequate funds for infrastructure 
normally and cannot stretch those local funds to repair roads 
after a major disaster.
    I highlighted a few examples for you today, but there are 
many more in the written testimony. And I am happy to answer 
any questions from the subcommittee. Thank you for your time, 
and thank you for considering the topic today and your focus on 
emergency management.
    [Ms. Hatcher's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Casey Hatcher, Deputy, Chief Administrative 
                   Officer, Butte County, California
    Chair Titus, Ranking Member Webster, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to share Butte County's observations 
and experiences working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and its programs on natural disasters and events related to 
wildfires. Butte County is located in northern California approximately 
90 miles north of Sacramento with a western boundary of the Sacramento 
River and an eastern boundary of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The 
majority of the County's approximately 209,000 residents live in five 
incorporated towns or cities. The rest of our citizens live in small, 
unincorporated rural communities. The County encompasses 1,636 square 
miles of terrain with an elevation that spans from 90 to 7,800 feet 
above sea level, making our geography incredibly diverse. Over half the 
County's land is within a moderate, high, or very high fire severity 
zone as designated by the State of California. The eastern-most 
portions of the County are within the Plumas and Lassen National 
Forests.
    Unfortunately, Butte County is no stranger to disasters. In the 
last five years alone, the County experienced twelve natural disasters, 
including seven federally declared disasters. Currently, Butte County 
is actively managing four disasters including three with federal 
declarations.
    In 2018, the Camp Fire struck Butte County and became the most 
deadly and devastating wildfire in California's history, burning for 17 
days, destroying 154,000 acres of public and private property, over 
14,000 homes, and 5,000 businesses and other structures. The fire 
forced the evacuation of more than 52,000 residents, injured 17 people 
including 5 firefighters, and claimed 85 lives.
    In 2020, California experienced its worst fire season on record as 
fires burned across the entire State. Again, Butte County was the site 
of the most deadly and destructive fire of the season, the North 
Complex Fire. The fire started in Plumas County and burned into Butte 
County more than three weeks later destroying 2,300 structures, 
including over 1,500 homes, burning approximately 125,000 acres in 
Butte County, and claiming 16 lives.
    In 2021, the historic Dixie Fire, which started in Butte County, 
burned into four other counties destroying 1,329 structures and 
claiming one life. The Dixie Fire burned nearly one million acres 
across northern California to become the largest single wildfire in 
California's history.
    These wildfires, along with other federally declared disasters 
pertaining to drought and flooding, have tested the limits of disaster 
response not only at the local County level, but at the state, and 
federal level as well.
    I have experience in Butte County's Emergency Operations Center in 
response to numerous wildfires over the last decade. I currently 
function as the Camp Fire Recovery Director and have been in this role 
since shortly after the 2018 Camp Fire. The County still maintains a 
Disaster Recovery Operation structure in response to the 2018 Camp Fire 
and I work directly with FEMA staff in the ongoing recovery effort. My 
testimony is focused on disaster recovery after the 2018 Camp Fire and 
the 2020 North Complex Fire in Butte County as that is my recent, 
direct experience with disaster response and recovery related to 
wildfires.
    FEMA assistance is critical for local governments in response and 
recovery from disasters. The assistance provided to California counties 
by the State of California through its Governor's Office of Emergency 
Services and other State agencies is also vital. Butte County simply 
cannot support the response and recovery from recent wildfires without 
the support of the State of California and the federal government 
through FEMA and other federal agencies.
    The Stafford Act and FEMA are intended to assist areas prone to 
disasters, in particular disasters related to hurricanes, storms, and 
floods. However, as the severity of wildfire disasters increases, there 
is tremendous opportunity for the Stafford Act, FEMA, and other federal 
agencies to change in a way that better serves the specific needs of 
communities before and after wildfires. I have outlined some of those 
opportunities in this testimony, including changes to FEMA Individual 
Assistance and Public Assistance. Now is the time to learn from recent 
wildfire disasters and update the federal approach to disaster 
prevention, response, and recovery in wildfire-prone communities.
                 Individual Assistance After a Wildfire
1. Eligibility for Individual Assistance
    Disaster survivors must document residency to be eligible for 
Individual Assistance from FEMA. However, prior to a disaster, some 
residents can be precariously housed, nearly homeless, or living in 
non-traditional household settings, such as multiple families living 
together. Residents who were living with family or friends but not on 
the official lease, or families living in homes left by deceased family 
members who never officially completed the property transfer, could not 
prove residency after being displaced by the 2018 Camp. These 
individuals and families were left homeless after the fire. These 
families and individuals often have the greatest need for resources 
after a disaster. Yet they cannot qualify for assistance because they 
cannot prove residency in the disaster area. The Stafford Act should be 
amended to clarify eligibility for FEMA Individual Assistance to 
disaster survivors who lack clear documentation of residency. This 
would create an opportunity to assist individuals who are often the 
most desperate after a disaster, preventing disaster homelessness and 
creating a path toward recovery for underserved families and 
individuals.
2. Direct Housing Assistance after a Wildfire
    FEMA provides direct housing assistance to eligible disaster 
survivors through its Individuals and Households Program. The 2018 Camp 
Fire burned nearly 14,000 residences, approximately 14 percent of the 
County's entire housing stock. FEMA approved direct housing assistance 
including the construction of FEMA group sites where fire survivors 
lived in manufactured housing units or travel trailers. Yet, it took 
more than nine months after the Camp Fire before the first official 
group site was ready for fire survivors. In the meantime, fire 
survivors lived in hotels, tents and trailers, or moved from place to 
place. So much time lapsed before FEMA group sites were available that 
the 1,200 eligible households indicating a need for housing dropped to 
680 as people moved from the area and many resettled permanently. FEMA 
has an opportunity to work with states and local governments to 
identify ways to construct temporary housing sites more quickly after a 
wildfire.
    The FEMA manufactured housing units can be set up on individual 
properties to eliminate the need for large group sites. However, the 
housing units used for the 2018 Camp Fire survivors did not meet the 
California building codes for fire safety and could not be placed into 
the Camp Fire burn scar, which is located in the Wildland Urban 
Interface (WUI). This also prevented the units occupied by Camp Fire 
survivors at the FEMA group sites from being sold to those families as 
a permanent housing solution. At the time, County staff inquired about 
getting WUI compliant units and were told they did not exist within the 
FEMA system. It appears the FEMA housing model is directed more toward 
flood-prone areas and not areas prone to wildfires. Providing 
manufactured housing units that comply with fire safety measures that 
can be placed temporarily and permanently in the WUI is critical to 
providing housing assistance after a wildfire.
3. Disaster Case Management after a Wildfire
    Immediate Disaster Case Management (IDCM) may be approved by FEMA 
to assist disaster survivors. IDCM was approved after the 2018 Camp 
Fire for 90 days, but this short period did not meet the needs of fire 
survivors. Wildfires can have a long response period. Fires may burn 
for weeks and communities may be under evacuation even longer while 
areas are made safe to repopulate. For example, areas burned by the 
2018 Camp Fire were evacuated for over a month. Additionally, owners 
with debris from burned structures cannot return to the property to 
live in temporary housing until the debris is removed and the property 
is certified clean. The California Governor's Office of Emergency 
Services completed the structural debris removal approximately one year 
after the Camp Fire, which eventually created an opportunity for owners 
to return to their properties to live in temporary housing while 
rebuilding. IDCM is needed while fire survivors navigate the near-term 
steps in recovery. Ideally, a smooth transition would exist between 
IDCM and the Disaster Case Management Program (DCMP). Unfortunately, 
what occurred after the 2018 Camp Fire was an abrupt gap in case 
management support for fire survivors with no transition and then a 
wait for another case manager through the DCMP. Wildfire disasters 
often lead to hurried, traumatic evacuation experiences followed by the 
complete destruction of a home. This layered trauma is exacerbated when 
recovery services like IDCM and the DCMP are difficult to navigate.
    The formula for determining how many case managers are needed for a 
DCMP does not appear to adequately serve disaster survivors after a 
wildfire. Just over 8,300 households requested support in their 
recovery after the 2018 Camp Fire, yet the County was allotted only 15 
DCMP case managers. Eventually, an additional eight case managers were 
approved to serve fire survivors, but the caseloads still remained 
overwhelming. Butte County eventually entered into an agreement using 
AmeriCorps volunteers who served 1,200 Camp Fire survivors who had been 
on a waiting list for over one year. The County's program added an 
additional 52 case managers to meet the demand for recovery support.
    Navigating disaster recovery is challenging even for resilient 
survivors with financial resources. Wildfires often burn through rural, 
disadvantaged communities where many fire survivors need additional 
support for recovery. Providing reliable, coordinated case management 
for wildfire survivors is critical to rebuilding these rural 
communities. FEMA has an opportunity to coordinate with State and local 
governments to understand the types of communities most often 
devastated by wildfires and design case management programs to support 
for those disaster survivors.
                   Public Assistance After a Wildfire
1. Reimbursement for Consecutive Disasters
    When communities, such as Butte County, experience consecutive 
major natural disasters, resources become strained, not only within the 
local government, but within the community at large. This limits the 
ability to respond to and recover from the immediate disasters as well 
as any future disasters. Congress has an opportunity to amend the 
Stafford Act to increase the federal reimbursement rate to 90 percent 
for disasters occurring to the same region in consecutive years. This 
additional reimbursement substantially increases the ability of the 
local government and the community to respond and recover from all the 
disasters.
2. Timelines for Submitting Claims for Reimbursement
    Rural and suburban local governments often have limited emergency 
management staff to navigate the sophisticated process of receiving 
FEMA public assistance for emergency and permanent work. Local 
governments typically divert existing staff from their work serving 
local residents or hire temporary disaster workers to document and 
submit expenses for reimbursement. For example, Butte County had just 
90 days from its scoping meeting to complete this work for the 
emergency protective measures after the 2020 North Complex Fire. FEMA 
has an opportunity to amend the Public Assistance Program and Policy 
Guide to account for the unique nature of wildfires, which may burn for 
weeks, causing lengthy evacuations and requiring mutual aid resources 
from hundreds of jurisdictions as areas are made safe for repopulation 
and recovery.
3. Debris Removal after a Wildfire
    Debris removal activities, such as clearance, removal, and 
disposal, are eligible activities according to FEMA's Public Assistance 
Program and Policy Guide. Debris removal is critical after a wildfire 
because the debris from burned structures contains toxic materials and 
must be removed and properly disposed. Additionally, burnt hazardous 
trees pose a risk of falling and becoming fuel for future fires. The 
removal of burnt hazardous trees was not initially included in the 
authorized debris removal activities after the 2018 Camp Fire. It took 
nearly one year after the fire for FEMA to approve a program to remove 
burnt hazardous trees. Now, removal or structural ash and debris, along 
with burnt hazardous trees, are often approved together for wildfires. 
It is encouraging to see FEMA learn the unique needs of wildfire 
disasters in this case.
    Another opportunity to address debris removal after a wildfire 
disaster is to make eligible the removal of burnt hazardous trees that 
pose an increased risk to become fuel for future fires. Standing burnt 
trees exacerbate future fires by precipitating spotting where segments 
of branches can break off and fly into the convection column and cast 
embers, essentially making the trees act like Roman Candle. The embers 
from the standing burnt trees can be carried miles away, which is 
exactly what happened in the 2018 Camp Fire. The heavy fuel loading of 
fallen, dead trees can lead to extreme fire behavior in future fires as 
grass, brush, and conifer reproduction begins to grow in between the 
fallen, dead trees.
    Debris removal is often a critical first step toward recovery for 
local residents and communities. FEMA requires debris removal be in the 
public's interest to be eligible for reimbursement. A Health Officer 
must declare a local health emergency finding that debris removal is 
necessary to reduce a threat to public health and safety. This 
emergency must stay in place while debris removal activities are 
completed. Debris removal after a wildfire can take months, yet the 
local health emergency must be renewed every 30 days. If the local 
health emergency lapses, debris removal activities become ineligible. 
This timing can be difficult for small jurisdictions where governing 
bodies often do not meet every week or even every two weeks. FEMA has 
an opportunity to assist local governments by reducing administrative 
hurdles and increasing the timeframe for renewing the local health 
emergency.
4. Debris Removal in National Forests
    A local health emergency finding that debris removal is necessary 
to reduce a threat to public health and safety becomes the basis for a 
local ordinance requiring private property owners to properly remove 
and dispose of debris after a wildfire. Local ordinances apply to 
privately owned property, but do not apply to state and federally owned 
land including National Forests. Significant opportunities exist for 
FEMA and the United States Forest Service to coordinate and ensure 
burnt hazardous trees in National Forests are removed so they do not 
present a danger to the public. Unfortunately, FEMA does not currently 
allow USFS property to be eligible for debris removal activities even 
when the trees are in a local government right-of-way. Land in National 
Forests burned in both the 2018 Camp Fire and the 2020 North Complex 
Fire in Butte County, leaving thousands of burnt hazardous trees along 
the roadways. Numerous fires in 2021 including the Dixie and Caldor 
Fires burned in National Forests as well and will face the same issue 
if it is not resolved.
5. Permanent Work
    Public infrastructure may be damaged or destroyed in a wildfire and 
is eligible for permanent repairs funded by FEMA Public Assistance. 
While building back a public facility destroyed in a fire may be 
relatively straight forward, recovering other types of infrastructure 
is more challenging. Specifically, permanent infrastructure, such as 
roads and bridges, can be further damaged during portions of the 
recovery and restoration effort, and for extended periods of time, even 
years. Debris removal efforts after the 2018 Camp Fire and the 2020 
North Complex Fire put hundreds of heavily loaded trucks on roads not 
constructed for that type of truck traffic over a sustained about of 
time. Debris removal after a wildfire often takes place during the wet 
winter and spring months that follow fire season, which exacerbates the 
damaged causes by heavy truck traffic. Roads simply crumble under these 
circumstances. Additionally, private utilities traveled through the 
area restoring power, telecommunications, and water service to 
destroyed areas. The damages from these routine recovery efforts for 
debris removal should be considered when FEMA assesses a road for 
permanent recovery work so the road can be returned to pre-disaster 
conditions.
    After the 2020 North Complex Fire, FEMA was reluctant to approve 
permanent work for road repairs and wanted to shift those costs to the 
contractors who performed debris removal or to the private utility 
companies restoring services to the area. This left Butte County 
fighting for assistance to repair crumbled roads. Butte County 
estimates $35.5 million is needed to pay the local share of costs for 
road repairs and for repairs that were denied by FEMA. That $35.5 is on 
top of $46.6 million in unmet road repair needs or local costs after 
the 2018 Camp Fire. Disaster upon disaster in Butte County is creating 
an infrastructure repair problem that could take decades to address 
even with adequate funding. If roads are left in disrepair after a 
disaster, it causes generational impacts to the infrastructure as local 
governments lack the adequate local funds for road repair and 
maintenance to address the disaster and recovery repairs while still 
maintaining the rest of the road system throughout the jurisdictions. 
Traditional infrastructure funding is not designed to fix disaster 
damage. FEMA should fund permanent work to return infrastructure to 
pre-disaster conditions.
    I have outlined numerous opportunities to update the Stafford Act 
and FEMA's Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide to more fully 
address wildfires as these types of national disasters increase in 
frequency and severity. State and local governments are a partner to 
FEMA in this effort and together we can frame the best practice 
guidelines for assisting communities before and after wildfires.
    Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Ms. Hatcher.
    This testimony has been very helpful.
    We will now move on to Members' questions. Each Member will 
be recognized for 5 minutes. And I will start by recognizing 
the full committee chair, Mr. DeFazio.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Madam Chair.
    There is a pattern here, and particularly, I mean, first 
raised by Andrew Phelps, about how FEMA really looks at these 
disasters, as he says, ``through the lens of hurricanes and 
floods but could be properly adjusted to meet the ever-growing 
wildfire threat with some modest adjustments.'' And that is a 
theme. We heard about housing units that weren't fireproof, et 
cetera, et cetera.
    So, if everybody could come up with one or two things that 
you think--and state it briefly--that should be changed that 
would orient FEMA more toward fires, fire recovery, and 
mitigation of pre-fire, that would be helpful to me.
    I am trying to kind of--this agency must have more acronyms 
than any other agency in the Federal Government, so I have no 
idea how to keep up with them. But if you can be specific, that 
will be great.
    Andrew, why don't we start with you.
    Mr. Phelps. Thank you, Chairwoman Titus, Chairman DeFazio.
    Well, let's call out maybe some of the references in the 
PAPPG, another acronym, the Public Assistance Program and 
Policy Guidance. I would recommend, a quick change or a really 
impactful change would be how we view hazard trees.
    By FEMA's definition, hazard trees are those that have a 
split trunk, broken canopy, or are leaning at an angle of over 
30 degrees. That is not the kind of damage you see to trees in 
wildfires. Very often, wildfire trees will look perfectly 
healthy on the outside and take a skilled arborist to make that 
determination as to whether or not a tree can survive for 
months or years after a fire.
    Looking at how we handle private-property debris or 
commercial debris removal, what constitutes a damaged concrete 
slab--there are some nuances that we find after a fire burns 
through an area that cause damage that may be repairable after 
a hurricane or may be more obvious after a hurricane or a flood 
but just needs much greater consideration following a wildfire.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK.
    Kacey, do you have some thoughts on this? I----
    Ms. KC. Yes.
    Mr. DeFazio [continuing]. Saw you nodding your head.
    Ms. KC. Thank you.
    I think the first one that pops up for me--this was a great 
discussion. I think one of the big ones is working with 
experts. It requires that local government, State government, 
Federal Government, all of us, work together--emergency 
managers, State forestry agencies.
    Restoration and reparation after fires--in communities, it 
looks very similar to other issues, other floods and other 
disasters in some ways. In some ways, it doesn't. And so, we 
need to set the standards to make sure that wildfire criteria 
are looked at, those things that happen after fires.
    But when you are looking at ecosystems, too, we have to 
timely remove those trees if we are going to get any funding--
or get any money back from, say, the timber that could be sold. 
We have to have markets to sell that timber. The current rate 
of wildfire destruction in the Western United States, we don't 
have a market for the timber that is coming off for normal 
projects, let alone the mega-fires and giga-fires, or whatever 
they are calling them today, that we are seeing.
    And so, we need to work together to look at all the 
criteria on how all these funds would be applied for wildfire 
mitigation and precalculated benefits so that we can get this 
money out there quickly to the ground.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK.
    Anybody else want to volunteer on this?
    Mr. Elliott. Yeah. This is Rich Elliott on behalf of the 
IAFC.
    I would say the reimbursement process. We view the IAFC 
members and local governments as a surge capacity, working with 
the States and the Federal partners on medium-size incidents. 
And if we can do this correctly, a lot of times we can keep 
those small or medium-size incidents from becoming these large, 
complex fires with multimillion-dollar price tags attached to 
them.
    And whether it is through the NMAS process or just 
transparency or just a guarantee that, hey, this is when the 
payments will come out, it would make the local governments a 
little bit more willing to, sort of, lean forward and help the 
neighbors, and, overall, the suppression cost would be reduced.
    So, thank you.
    Mr. DeFazio. Great.
    Ms. Hatcher?
    Ms. Hatcher. Thank you, Chair DeFazio, for the question.
    I concur with everything that was mentioned by the other 
witnesses and would just add that it is important to focus on 
the people affected by wildfires and displaced by these large 
disasters that are now occurring, and a focus on housing and 
looking at the eligibility of people who can receive housing, 
which I mention in my written testimony, and the type of 
housing units and the way they are deployed. Unlike areas 
affected by floods and storms, it is very difficult to deploy 
large housing sites in wildfire areas, particularly close to 
burn scars.
    So, a focus on housing, I think, is really critical.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK. Yeah. I saw that, in your county, they 
brought in these units that cost $325,000 each. I don't know, 
they must have been pretty nice. But they didn't have the 
proper siding or any kind of fireproofing, right?
    Ms. Hatcher. I think it is just not typical that they are 
deployed for wildfires. I think they are used for floods and 
hurricanes and storms. And so, what was so unfortunate is they 
couldn't be placed inside the burn scar. So, they couldn't go 
back on lots as temporary housing to be there for any number of 
fire seasons, and then they couldn't be placed there 
permanently.
    I think that seems like a pretty simple fix, potentially, 
understanding the diversity in States for building codes and 
the ability to make them hardier against wildfires if that is 
where they are going to be placed, either temporarily or 
permanently.
    Mr. DeFazio. Yes. That is definitely something we are going 
to have to follow up on. The committee will need to follow up 
with the leadership at FEMA in terms of developing units that 
are suitable for areas that are fire-prone versus flood- or 
hurricane-prone. Very different kinds of needs.
    And I just--the price tag seems to me a bit exorbitant, 
knowing we make very nice manufactured homes in Oregon, and 
also I think we need to delve into that too. It seems very 
high, particularly for one that isn't suitable for replacement 
in that area.
    So, thanks, everybody. I appreciate your suggestions and 
look forward to working with you on that.
    With that, I yield back the balance of my time, Madam 
Chair.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I now recognize Mr. Webster, our ranking member.
    Mr. Webster. Thank you, Chair Titus.
    Deputy Hatcher, you highlight challenges of FEMA's 
deadlines for submitting for reimbursement and so forth. We 
have run into that in hurricanes too. We have had some problems 
with the timeline being too short or sometimes being too long 
and things happening in the occurrence of those events that--
actually, in some cases, flooding. The flood doesn't come until 
maybe 30 days after the event because the water is building.
    So, anyway, how does that impact your ability to respond to 
recovery activities and balance that with paperwork?
    Ms. Hatcher. Thank you for the question, Ranking Member 
Webster. I suspect this is not just a problem for wildfires 
but, as you mentioned, in a State like yours, is also an issue 
with storms, floods, and hurricanes.
    The unique factor that wildfires have is that the length of 
the fire can be prolonged, and then the area can be evacuated 
for a significant period of time. After the Camp fire, the area 
was evacuated for over a month before people could even go back 
to view properties, get in to have FEMA do inspections, have 
their insurance companies do inspections. So, the timelines for 
those types of disasters can be quite different.
    I think the PAPPG, as Mr. Phelps mentioned, the guidelines 
that FEMA follows to operationalize these programs, should take 
into consideration the uniqueness of the disaster when 
establishing the administrative timelines, essentially, for 
submitting for reimbursement.
    And we had a very short timeline after the 2020 North 
Complex fire. Luckily, we were a bit of a well-oiled machine 
because we had just done it for the 2018 Camp fire. Otherwise, 
we simply would not have been able to meet that timeline and 
would have compromised local reimbursement.
    We have a lot of experience, unfortunately, but I am 
thinking of other rural communities who might experience a 
wildfire and not be prepared with administrative staff or that 
type of opportunity to meet those deadlines. So, I think FEMA 
really needs to look at them more on a disaster-by-disaster 
basis.
    Mr. Webster. OK. So, do you think it should be a more 
flexible timeframe that is permitted under each of these 
scenarios, the ones you talked about, the one I talked about?
    Ms. Hatcher. Yes. I think that, while they want to put in 
place a standard, not every disaster is the same, so something 
more flexible would help local communities respond.
    Mr. Webster. You also mentioned in your testimony about 
heavy equipment, trucks, I think, and other things to move, 
probably to move things out of the way or whatever needs to be 
done, but the roads that are there aren't designed to take the 
heavy load.
    Give a little bit more about what complicates that when you 
go for reimbursement and so forth when maybe somebody is trying 
to charge you for those damages?
    Ms. Hatcher. When a fire burns through an area, it can 
often scorch the pavement and damage the road, and those 
repairs need to be made. But what often exacerbates the damage 
to the roads is the emergency response and then the recovery 
associated with debris removal from structures, debris removal 
from trees, restoration of utilities in the area, the 
firefight. There is a lot of damage on these local roads that 
really are not rated for that type of truck traffic.
    And we saw this really significantly in the 2020 North 
Complex fire, where FEMA pushed back significantly on those 
road repairs. They wanted to shift that responsibility 
elsewhere. And the county simply doesn't have a mechanism to 
collect those funds from other places for road repairs. You 
know, FEMA's Public Assistance funding is designed for this 
permanent type of work, for road repairs.
    And we found ourselves really in a constant battle with 
FEMA over this issue. And you kind of are left in this 
adversarial relationship with FEMA that feels like they don't 
understand the community and that maybe you are going to be 
left with generational damages to your roads, because there 
simply aren't local funds to fix them.
    Mr. Webster. Yes. So, were they trying to charge you, or 
were they trying to charge maybe a contractor that was hired to 
do some of the heavy equipment movement of materials and so 
forth? What was going on?
    Ms. Hatcher. That is right. They indicated that we should 
have it in the contracts with the debris removal contractors 
that they should restore the roads. But that was not included 
in the contracts the State had with the contractors, and there 
was really no mechanism for them to repair the roads.
    That is not a situation we have ever seen before. Perhaps 
that has worked in other disasters, but not any that we have 
heard of. So, they were trying to essentially transfer the 
responsibility with no real ability to do it, which essentially 
means that the road doesn't get repaired.
    Mr. Webster. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Ms. Norton? I recognize Ms. Norton.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    My first question is for Mr. Phelps of the Oregon Office of 
Emergency Management.
    Mr. Phelps, disaster survivors have found that the so-
called IHP application--Individuals and Households Program--
which is FEMA's primary program for home repair, property 
displacement, and rental assistance--they found this 
application to be overwhelming and even confusing.
    This process is especially inaccessible to low-income 
individuals and those who live in mobile homes or on land they 
do not own.
    What recommendation would you propose for streamlining the 
IHP application process and ensuring that low-income survivors 
can obtain access to disaster relief?
    Mr. Phelps. Thank you for that, Representative. As we have 
heard a little bit this morning, disaster recovery really needs 
to be survivor-centric.
    FEMA has made some improvements based on lessons they have 
observed on our wildfire disasters. They have lowered some of 
the barriers to proving residency or home ownership 
documentation, going down to as far as self-attestation. That 
is a great step in the right direction.
    But we need to step away from this notion that, when we are 
trying to offer assistance to survivors, the first thing we are 
trying to do is prevent fraud, the second thing we are trying 
to do is prevent an IG investigation, and then the third thing 
we are trying to do is help survivors. Survivors and helping 
survivors needs to be at the front end of every decision that 
is being made.
    One of the other successes that we had here in Oregon was a 
reengagement with disaster survivors. Those folks that received 
a denial letter early on, several months later FEMA came back 
and met with those folks and said, OK, what were the barriers, 
why were you denied, and what can we provide in terms of 
assistance to help you navigate these processes?
    That resulted in many millions of dollars that disaster 
survivors in Oregon were entitled to being paid out that 
wouldn't have otherwise been paid out had they not done that 
reengagement.
    So, the second bite at the apple, as it were, for disaster 
survivors is important, but we need to ensure that FEMA is 
proactively leaning forward, working with the States and local 
communities to provide that assistance.
    Anything that we can do to lower barriers to assistance 
must be done. There are many Federal programs that offer 
various assistance to folks during disasters, during blue-sky 
days. We should do an audit of all of those programs, see what 
those lowest barriers are to assistance, and apply those to 
disaster scenarios, because this is a time when folks can least 
afford to navigate complex bureaucracies and when they need the 
help the most.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you.
    Ms. KC, your testimony notes that FMAG eligibility will 
vary for the same community from year to year, even though the 
community is experiencing the same threats to human lives and 
property.
    Could you describe the impact to your State's emergency 
management planning as a result of the fluctuation in FMAG 
eligibility?
    Ms. KC. Thank you for the question, Ms. Norton. This is 
Kacey KC again.
    Yes, it tends to vary. I am not sure--we look at the 
criteria for a qualifying FMAG experience. I am sure that there 
are limited funds. Obviously, all of us--and when we are 
competing with, let's say, California or Oregon in 2019, in 
those years where there is devastation and large fires 
everywhere, with a lot of homes and properties being threatened 
and/or lost, that might be part of the reason. But that upfront 
would help us to understand when we are applying.
    This particular instance we are talking about is a 
community within Nevada that has been impacted by wildfire and 
evacuated for wildfire 3 of the last 5 years and has seen loss 
to both homes and structures and infrastructure in the 
community.
    I think it is really critically important--Chairwoman Titus 
brought it up earlier--that we remember, too, when we are 
looking at the increase to these fires across the State, there 
are huge impacts to the mental health of the people who are 
continuously being evacuated. This is the third time those 
folks have been evacuated, and this continues to impact them in 
different ways.
    So, we need to look at how this is applied, because, again, 
going back to the FMAG for the payment--you know, the whole 
purpose of an FMAG in general is to help assist local 
government and State government response to these fires. It is 
critical. The States and local governments don't have the 
funding for the increased fires across our lands. And we do 
have to ensure that we have the closest available resources 
available to fire, regardless of the patch or the type of fire 
department we work for.
    So, I think those things are critical. And maybe just 
understanding right upfront--the criteria are out there for 
FMAG applications, but when they are in times of crunch or 
there is a high need for the FMAG, what are they then looking 
at to rank the States and the projects that are being applied 
for.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you.
    My time has expired.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    We will now go to Mr. Gimenez.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Chief Elliott, I don't know if you know, but I was a 
former fire chief for the city of Miami, so we are both 
firefighters. And I know that the best way to deal with fires 
is to prevent them, right, not even have them. So, I know that 
FEMA has issues with reimbursement and the housing stock and 
all that, and other people are going to be talking about that. 
I am going to be talking about how to prevent these devastating 
forest fires.
    And so, fire needs three things: It needs an ignition 
source, and it needs oxygen, and it needs fuel. The ignition 
source, sometimes we can control it, sometimes we can't. 
Oxygen, it is in the air, nothing you can do about that. But 
the fuel you can do something about.
    Are there some restrictions on the ability--and this also 
could be answered by Ms. KC--on the ability to manage forests 
and the fuel load of those forests so that, once a fire 
actually starts, the severity of those fires can be diminished? 
Are there some restrictions on your ability to do that?
    Mr. Elliott. Absolutely. And some of them have been 
referenced both directly and indirectly.
    The ability to sort of process the biomass on our public 
and private lands doesn't exist in a lot of communities. And I 
would defer--I have been down to the State of Florida and the 
State of Georgia and watched their--they have very active land 
management programs, and their forests are generally healthy 
and somewhat resistant to very complex and damaging fires. You 
come up to the Northwest, where you think there would be 
forests, and we don't do the job that we should be doing.
    And I think that is true in a lot of communities, in a lot 
of States, that, for a lot of different reasons, probably from 
a whole bunch of different perspectives, we have degraded our 
ability to manage the lands in a way that is healthy for the 
next generation.
    And that leads to clogged fuels. Whether it is prescribed 
fire, whether it is some grazing, appropriate logging, those 
type of things, a lot of those activities have been curtailed 
or made very difficult. And, therefore, the land is ripe for a 
very catastrophic fire that does a lot of damage.
    Mr. Gimenez. So, would you say that that is a lack of 
resources, money? Or is it regulations that kind of tie your 
hands?
    Mr. Elliott. In my experience, it is a combination of both 
of those. And, yes, the regulations make it difficult and maybe 
are driving the fact that there isn't infrastructure in terms 
of private industry and a business to process those products 
coming off the land. And so, I think it is probably a 
combination of both of those.
    And we need to look holistically at the health of our--it 
is not only the forests. It is the grasslands; it is the 
shrubsteppe. We have done some things wrong for 110 years, very 
well-intentioned, and we probably need to change the narrative 
a little bit over the next couple of decades.
    Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough.
    Would it be fair to say that, if we actually invested more 
money in prevention, we could be saving a heck of a lot of 
money in after-the-fact mitigation and all the money that we 
have to spend after the big forest fire? Is that fair to say? 
Is that an accurate statement?
    Mr. Elliott. I think preparedness, mitigation, and 
prevention all end up saving you money on the backside, yes, 
absolutely.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes. In relation to what you said about 
Florida, Georgia, et cetera, I know that, in Florida, we had 
over 1 million acres of controlled burns, you know, the last 
year, and yet in the entire State of California, I think they 
had maybe 30,000. And the forest in California is a heck of a 
lot bigger than and a lot more area than the ones in Florida.
    We learned our lesson from the big fires that we had about 
10, 15 years ago, and so we manage our wild areas, our forest, 
I think a heck of a lot better. And so, I think as a 
Government, I would like to see us more focused in on 
regulations and also the way to actually manage the forest a 
lot better and then we can prevent these large fires.
    Ms. KC, would you say that that is accurate, that is an 
accurate statement, or do you have a difference of opinion?
    Ms. KC. Thank you for the question. No, I think that is a 
very accurate statement. That is why I did highlight the fact 
that we are working very closely together, State, Federal, 
local government, in our State. We have created a shared 
stewardship agreement under the Governor of the State of Nevada 
to bring together all State, local government, Federal agencies 
who have land management responsibilities to, one, we do have 
limited resources, limited funding, and so we have to 
prioritize our projects in the highest risk areas. And so, we 
are looking at those areas. We have identified 13 in the State 
of Nevada are actively working in all of them to address that 
risk.
    And just to give an example, this is a California fire 
example, but the Caldor fire that came through Lake Tahoe, we 
have been working collaboratively in the Lake Tahoe Basin for 
decades. We learned early on that jurisdictional patches didn't 
matter when fires came through, nor when bugs and insect and 
disease come through, so we had to look at mitigation and 
suppression the same way.
    So, we implemented a tactic like the mutual aid tactic 
spoken of earlier for fire suppression, for mitigating fuels in 
the basin. And when you saw that fire come through the Tahoe 
Basin, we had no single loss of structure, not any in that 
basin. And it wasn't by chance. It was because of the 89,000 
acres we had treated collectively in high-risk areas that gave 
firefighters a safe place to defend those homes from.
    And so, I think that that is so critical, making sure that 
we are working together, addressing those highest risk areas, 
and making sure that all of the management actions we are 
taking are collaborative and really have an impact on what is 
happening on the ground.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you so much. My time is up, and I will 
yield back, but I hope to be working with both of you to 
develop some legislation too for mitigation purposes. Thank 
you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I now recognize Mrs. Napolitano.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Hatcher, you state that trauma from wildfires can be 
exacerbated [inaudible] FEMA's Immediate Disaster Case 
Management and the Disaster Case Management Program. FEMA's 
Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program play a role 
[inaudible] especially in mental health. Is that true?
    Ms. Hatcher. There is significant trauma that is 
experienced by wildfire survivors, and that, I think, is 
somewhat unique--although, to be fair, I don't want to take 
anything away from other disasters--because they often can 
occur quickly, evacuations have to happen immediately, and 
there can be the trauma of a very hurried evacuation followed 
by the loss of your house and all of your things.
    And the Disaster Case Management we found after the 2018 
Camp fire just simply wasn't adequate to address the needs from 
a time perspective and the scope of the services for fire 
survivors.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much. Well, that involves 
also the housing. The temporary housing was inadequate because 
it was built for floods and hurricanes. Maybe we could find the 
less costly and better built in the future.
    And, also, I am concerned about the fact that they don't 
expedite the funds. Is there an issue with the paperwork or 
with the turnaround time that you are faced with, anybody?
    Ms. Hatcher. I can speak to that. We did receive some 
expedited funds after the Camp fire because it was such a large 
incident, and the amount of paperwork associated with just that 
expedited claim activity is so substantial that we have had to 
bring on additional staff just to help with those claims.
    I want to be fair to FEMA and recognize the need to follow 
the Stafford Act and to meet the policy guidelines, but it 
feels like there is lots of opportunity to reduce the burden on 
local governments who are so strapped for resources when 
responding from wildfires.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Would you be kind enough to recommend some 
of those comments to us in the committee so we can benefit 
further, ma'am? It would be greatly appreciated.
    But it seems like we are not gearing for climate change for 
any of the agencies. The paperwork for citizens, how do they 
know what to apply for? If they are turned down, do they know 
they can apply for the next batch? Or how long it takes between 
them. Would somebody be able to answer that?
    Mr. Phelps. This is Andrew from Oregon, Representative 
Napolitano. Happy to speak to that issue.
    Navigating a complex web of Federal programs, assistance 
programs after you have lost everything--your home, your job, 
and in some cases, family members--does nothing to alleviate 
the trauma that folks have experienced during a disaster. I 
applaud FEMA's efforts to assist with Disaster Case Management. 
Finding ways to match folks in the community, getting 
multicultural, multilingual folks out in the community to serve 
as caseworkers and help folks navigate these complex problems, 
those are all steps in the right direction.
    But, again, we need to make sure that we are erring on the 
side of helping survivors. Does fraud exist? It does exist. We 
have got documentation of that here in Oregon from our 
disasters. But when someone has been living in a hotel or a 
motel or in their car for weeks and weeks and weeks after they 
have lost their home in a fire, it is pretty easy to determine 
that those folks are not trying to commit fraud; they are just 
trying to rebuild their lives.
    So, anything that we can do to lessen the burden, provide 
that real almost social work case management approach to 
disaster survivors, and understand that folks need to be met 
where they are after a disaster. I am fortunate. If I was 
impacted by a disaster, I could take a week off of work and 
work through the process. A lot of folks aren't in that 
position, and we need to make sure that those that are most 
marginalized and disadvantaged in our communities are the ones 
that get the most assistance.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Especially the ones that have less income 
and are minorities.
    For all the witnesses, the GAO has stated that FEMA's 
Individuals and Households Program is not meeting the needs of 
low-income renters and homeowners post wildfire. In your 
experience, what has been the most pressing obstacle in aid to 
these populations, so that we can try to address that sooner 
rather than later?
    Casey?
    Ms. Hatcher. This is Casey Hatcher, and I would echo what 
Mr. Phelps had to say about needing to focus on the fire 
survivor first and not the assumption of fraud or worrying 
about an audit. I think this is what really prevents us from 
individually assisting each person through their scenario.
    We could reduce the barriers for eligibility for that 
Individual Assistance and look to help people with their 
individual scenario. Maybe they were multiple families living 
in a household together and are having trouble proving 
residency. Maybe they simply want assistance to live 
temporarily outside of the county while they figure out their 
rebuild. Maybe they need mental health resources.
    But we saw, after the 2018 Camp fire, that the case 
management assistance that came forward and the mental health 
assistance just wasn't enough to address the magnitude of the 
need from our fire survivors.
    Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you very much. Provide those 
comments to the committee, please.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I now recognize Miss Gonzalez-Colon.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have got one 
question, and I want to yield to Mr. LaMalfa. My question will 
be to Mr. Phelps. We manage some different things from FEMA, 
one of the agencies that types--what types of categorical 
exclusions must be helpful in your case. You highlight how the 
environmental and historic preservation reviews can be 
cumbersome and a challenge with the lack of categorical 
exclusions that can help speed up the process. If you can point 
out what specifically you are saying about this?
    Mr. Phelps. Thank you, Representative. I would say when we 
look at something like the EHP requirements, the environmental 
and historical preservation requirements, very often when we 
are looking at things like emergency protective measures, the 
process of going back and recreating whether or not 
considerations were made for environmental and historical 
preservation, as we are trying to stop a wall of flames from 
moving into a county and destroying thousands of homes and 
taking lives, I think that is an unrealistic expectation.
    So, we need to be a little bit more flexible, understand 
the dynamic nature of wildfires in particular, and exercise 
that flexibility to ensure that when our firefighters are out 
there working in the heat, the smoke for days on end, they are 
doing the best they can to both be good environmental stewards 
but also save lives, protect the property, and also do what 
they can to protect the environment.
    Going back and trying to re-create some of that 
documentation after the fact is overly cumbersome and places a 
greater liability and strain on resources that are already 
tapped to save lives and property.
    Miss Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Mr. Phelps.
    I want to yield the rest of my time to Mr. LaMalfa.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, my colleague from Puerto Rico. I 
appreciate the time and also working with you previously on 
dealing with Puerto Rico's disasters and hurricanes. So, I hope 
things are improving for you there as well. Thank you.
    I will be speaking with Casey Hatcher here a little bit 
from my home county of Butte. Obviously, we have faced a lot in 
the last few years in northern California and in Butte County, 
dating to the spillway disaster at Oroville Dam that has been 
rebuilt well now.
    And I want to say right upfront too that FEMA's response 
has been very good, by and large, with what we have tried to 
accomplish in all these disasters, and working with the State 
and Cal OES, and just trying to break through what would have 
been normal, you know, the bureaucracy that might happen, we 
got some pretty rapid response on that.
    But as Casey lined out here, there are things that maybe 
are unnecessarily still bureaucratic in nature that we need to 
work through, and just to get quick response, getting people 
back in homes and things like that, or the FEMA trailers.
    And I do share Chairman DeFazio's concern that if these 
units are really costing $325,000 for a portable home, portable 
building like that--I would envision it being $90,000 to 
$120,000, $140,000. I don't know why something has to cost so 
much just because Government is the one involved purchasing it. 
So, we need to take a closer look at that.
    But, Ms. Hatcher, would you elaborate a little bit on the 
cost of repeated disasters. You talk about the roadways. Here, 
right here, over my shoulder [indicating photo poster], this is 
actually the front page of the Wall Street Journal--yesterday, 
I believe it was--Highway 70, just across from Butte County in 
Plumas County. I guess, Butte County is off the hook on that 
one, so to speak, but this is just an example of post fire with 
the amount of erosion. And we talked about this in a previous 
hearing with Chief Randy Moore, can we do things to get on the 
post-fire erosion and dangers we have there?
    Anyway, Ms. Hatcher, please elaborate on the disaster post-
fire costs and the challenges the county faces on roads. We had 
that with Oroville Dam and others.
    Ms. Hatcher. Thank you, Congressman LaMalfa. That picture 
is a really great example of exactly what happened. That is in 
a burn scar, and that slide is what can happen after a fire 
disaster. And when you are a small county like we are, and you 
have a fire followed by a slide and a flood followed by a fire, 
there is so much impact that strains your local resources to be 
able to respond, that we would like to see changes to the level 
of assistance that is provided to communities that have 
consecutive disasters in some period of time, because there is 
an inability to pay that local share of costs again and again 
to address these varied types of disasters.
    After a wildfire, the land needs time to restore itself, 
and becomes more susceptible to slides and floods and things of 
that nature, and you can see that type of consecutive disaster 
happen.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Yes. As I noted, your parents are in the U.S. 
Forest Service as well, and we know that that land doesn't 
restore itself. We have got to get back out and do the work on 
that for restoration for all these hundreds of thousands of 
acres. So, thank you, and I yield back my time.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. LaMalfa. We will come back to you 
when it is your turn.
    Now it is Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Madam Chair. I might like to 
start here with asking for unanimous consent to enter into the 
record a recent article in the Washington Post by Hannah Dreier 
about the Erickson family who lost their home in the Camp fire. 
So, I would like to have that entered into the record.
    Ms. Titus. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
   Article entitled, ``The Last Days Inside Trailer 83,'' by Hannah 
Dreier, Washington Post, October 17, 2021, Submitted for the Record by 
                          Hon. John Garamendi
                    The Last Days Inside Trailer 83
As climate disasters increase, a last-gasp FEMA camp for wildfire 
        survivors tests the government's obligations to the displaced.
by Hannah Dreier

Washington Post, October 17, 2021, at 9:00 a.m. EDT
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/10/17/disaster-survivors-
fema-housing-trailer/
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT

 Mike and Crystal Erickson's trailer at the FEMA park in Chico, Calif. 
                   (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)

    CHICO, Calif.--Mike Erickson had been living in the trailer park 
for 341 days when he saw the new sign. It was unmissable, a blue 
billboard at the entrance to what had become a place of last resort for 
families made homeless by the worst wildfire in California history. Its 
message was unmissable, too. In 12 days, the site would be closing and 
everyone would have to be out.
    Mike knew who had put it there. The same agency that had carved 
this trailer park from nothing after the 2018 fire, transforming a 13-
acre field between a cemetery and a set of train tracks into a haven 
for survivors to start rebuilding their lives: the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.
    Nearly a hundred families lived at the site at one point, but one 
by one they had been moving away until on this day in September only a 
handful were left. Mike's trailer was at the farthest end. There were 
no streets here and no addresses, just small numbers glued to the sides 
of trailers. His was 83.
    He trudged back through the gravel, wondering what to tell his 
wife. ``I thought by now we'd have something figured out,'' he said.
    Sixty years old, Mike had arrived at this moment because of a FEMA 
program intended to be among its most merciful, but which has become 
fraught with challenges in a time when whole communities are being 
wiped out by unprecedented wildfires and storms.
    When survivors are left with nowhere to go, the government sends 
FEMA to give them free housing, typically for up to 18 months after the 
date of the disaster. The agency has provided emergency trailers to 
nearly 200,000 families over the past 15 years. But now, with disasters 
and the needs that follow them increasing, the government finds itself 
trying to decide what it owes the displaced. How long is truly long 
enough to shelter the most vulnerable? Is it sufficient to give them 
housing or do they need social services, too? And should an emergency 
management agency really be playing landlord for years at a time in the 
first place?
    For Mike, the looming question was more urgent: What would happen 
after these 12 days?
    Inside the trailer, his wife, Crystal Erickson, 60, was lying in a 
hospital bed that took up most of the small living room. Partially 
paralyzed from a stroke and unable to navigate through the gravel with 
her wheelchair, this is where she spent all her time.
    ``What's up, honey?'' she asked.
    ``FEMA came by. Same thing as always,'' he said, trying to sound 
relaxed. But after 35 years together, she knew when something was 
wrong.
    Mike took her hand, patted it and let go. ``Just trust me,'' he 
said.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

   Inside, Mike helps his wife eat in her hospital bed. Crystal has 
   stroke-related mobility issues. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Sons Jacob and Ronald flank Mike, third from left, as he and Crystal, 
   left, pose for a family vacation photo in 2008. (Melina Mara/The 
                            Washington Post)

* * *

    Mike and Crystal were in this park because their home had been 
destroyed by the kind of wildfire that was once unheard of in the 
United States but that now, after so many others--the Dixie Fire, the 
Caldor Fire--seems almost routine. Known as the Camp Fire, it had 
started before dawn in November 2018, raced through terrain made 
tinder-dry by drought, burned down almost every house in the mountain 
town of Paradise, and killed 85 people and displaced 50,000, including 
Mike and Crystal. They were among the last to evacuate and had driven 
through thick black smoke listening to the pop of propane tanks 
exploding.
    Afterward, FEMA had to decide what to do with the people like the 
Ericksons had just become--survivors without insurance, without means, 
who had never been homeless before but were now.
    It wasn't clear at first that the government would build a trailer 
park. FEMA had turned away from those after the Hurricane Katrina 
recovery effort, when families lingered in flimsy, formaldehyde-tainted 
mobile homes. The agency experimented instead with making emergency 
repairs directly to survivors' homes. It also partnered with the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to give families rental 
subsidies and mandatory case management to connect them with social 
services.
    By 2013, the FEMA trailer park had gone almost extinct. But under 
the Trump administration, the agency returned to building entire 
communities of trailers from scratch, saying the alternatives were 
costly and inefficient. The Government Accountability Office later 
found it was impossible to evaluate this claim because FEMA doesn't 
systematically track costs or outcomes for its housing programs. The 
national council set up by Congress to advise the agency immediately 
called on FEMA to resurrect its direct repair program, and elected 
leaders from hard-hit states asked FEMA to bring back its HUD 
partnership.
    But FEMA continued to see trailer parks as the best option, at 
least for the time being, saying in a statement: ``FEMA is evolving. We 
are not the same agency from 10 years ago, and we will not be the same 
agency in 10 years from now.'' As a result, thousands of families were 
soon living in trailers again, including at the Chico site, which cost 
more than $300,000 per trailer to set up. Mike and Crystal moved there 
in September 2020. Before that, Crystal had spent six months in the 
hospital, while Mike had bounced between motels and campsites. They 
also lived temporarily at a different FEMA site. But Trailer 83 seemed 
to offer a kind of stability they hadn't experienced since before the 
fire.
    The place came with rules, one of which said tenants had to submit 
proof every fifteen days that they had applied for at least one 
permanent housing option. Every fifteen days, Mike turned that in, 
along with the results: nothing. Rental vacancies had fallen to less 
than half of 1 percent in Chico as 20,000 fire survivors crammed into a 
city of 90,000. Mike wrote personal letters to landlords of wheelchair-
accessible apartments but didn't hear back. When he went to sign up for 
affordable housing, he learned that the waiting list was three years 
long and closed to new applicants.
    Now, with 11 days left before the deadline to move out, Mike 
flipped through a notebook where he'd written down the names and 
numbers of every official he had spoken with since the fire. As he 
began making calls, he fidgeted with his hair, which he used to wear in 
a buzz-cut but had grown out into tangled curls.
    The first person he reached was a young woman at a social services 
agency. He told her about who he had once been: a man who had coached 
his son's Little League team, held a steady job, owned a home and had 
lost that home in 2016, buried in medical debt after his wife's stroke. 
He said they moved to a rental with their 18-year-old son, who helped 
care for Crystal while he worked. He explained their son had initially 
moved to Trailer 83, too, but FEMA had said he couldn't stay because he 
wasn't on his parents' paperwork, and that with no one to help Crystal 
during the day, Mike couldn't work, and so they were living on her 
disability payments of $2,800 a month--$1,799.31 of which FEMA was now 
billing them for because a few months earlier, overwhelmed, he had 
missed turning in proof of his fruitless rental searches.
    By the time he got around to telling the woman that they were about 
to be evicted, she was letting him know that she couldn't help. ``We 
don't really have room for new cases,'' she said, but offered to 
connect him with another nonprofit.
    ``Okay, I sure appreciate it. Thank you,'' Mike said.
    After a while, Crystal fell asleep and Mike slipped out for a walk. 
There was no greenery at the site, no shade, and no color aside from 
the green trash bins outside each home. He walked past Trailer 46, 
where a small woman who liked to keep to herself peeked through the 
blinds. Past Trailer 11, where a father, preparing to move out, was 
trying to scrape off the glow-in-the-dark stars he'd put up for his 
kids. Past Trailer 7, where a FEMA eviction notice fluttered on the 
door, warning, ``We have not been able to contact you by telephone and 
must speak with you right away.'' Mike knew that the man who lived 
inside had a hole in his trachea and couldn't talk.
    When he reached Trailer 32, a snarling German shepherd ran at him. 
The dog had bitten him twice, but Mike liked visiting with its owner, 
Jay Rose, who was stacking boxes in the truck he used for his job 
hauling portable toilets.
    ``You mind if I ask if you found a place to go?'' Mike asked.
    ``No, just putting stuff in storage,'' Jay said. ``I'm gonna be the 
last one in here.''
    Mike told Jay about his efforts to find a place. ``I'm so fried 
now, it's hard to even make contact,'' he said.
    He didn't want to stay too long. He'd left his phone charging and 
worried about missing a call from someone with a lead. He hurried back, 
climbed the steps and checked his phone in his bedroom. No calls.


  Jay Rose, left, one of the last people still living in the trailer 
    park, says goodbye to Mike while packing up to meet a move-out 
              deadline. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

An overwhelmed Crystal is comforted by her son Jacob. (Melina Mara/The 
                            Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Mike hits some golf balls in the gravel outside the trailer. (Melina 
                       Mara/The Washington Post)

* * *

    Mornings in the trailer often started the same way: With Crystal 
hearing tires rolling on gravel and Mike looking out to see if it was 
FEMA. With nine days to go, Crystal heard that crunch as Mike was 
making coffee and braced herself, but it was only a garbage truck. 
``I'm surprised they're still taking the trash away,'' Mike said, and 
dropped the curtain.
    But there was someone from FEMA there, on the other side of the 
park. Housing task force leader Sharon Rodarte had come to check on the 
last tenants. These were always the hardest cases--the families who 
left behind wrecked appliances, or walls full of holes, or towering 
piles of junk and trash, or in one case a dead dog. ``Some people 
aren't grateful,'' she said when she walked up to Trailer 7 and 
discovered that the man who couldn't speak had moved away overnight, 
leaving behind a broken pipe that was gushing water beneath the unit.
    Now she headed toward Trailer 83. Crystal heard the crush of tires 
and a knock at the door. Rodarte explained that she was there because 
she had a phone number for the Ericksons to call--``our housing 
navigator for trying to find homes for people who are going to be 
homeless.''
    Mike grabbed his notebook and stepped outside, closing the door 
behind him. He had written the word ``deficient'' in it, and he looked 
down and read from the page. ``You know this place is deficient for 
us,'' he said.
    ``Okay, I don't want to get into this,'' Rodarte said.
    But Mike was off now, listing the things that had made life so 
difficult in the trailer. No roll-in shower. No way to cool the place 
below 78 degrees. No washer or dryer, even though it wasn't safe to 
leave Crystal alone to go to a laundromat, which was why there were 
five garbage bags of laundry sitting by the door.
    ``I'm gonna go,'' Rodarte said. ``Just give the man a call.''
    ``Okay, just walk away,'' Mike called after her. ``Thank you for 
being so courteous and respectful.''
    Back inside, Mike regretted getting mad. ``I'm exploding over 
nothing lately,'' he told Crystal, who instantly blamed herself. She 
had been more emotional since the stroke, cycling through feelings of 
calm, fear, anger, grief, and now another emotion took hold, this time 
making her cry. ``I'm sorry, honey. I'm so sorry,'' she said.
    ``It's not your fault, you know that. You didn't start that fire,'' 
Mike said. He turned on the television for her and gave her a sippy 
cup, the kind a child might use, with two shots of brandy.
    When he called the housing navigator, he got an automated message 
saying that the phone system was down. Mike hung up and looked out 
across the park. He wondered, how have so many people figured this out?
    That evening, there was another knock at the door. This time it was 
their daughter, Rita. She'd lost her home in the fire, too, and, like 
their son, was barred from the extra trailer bedroom. She lived a few 
blocks away, in a tent under an oak tree. Paradise fire survivors make 
up about a third of Chico's growing homeless population, and many had 
moved into the 100-person encampment where Rita was staying. Rita 
didn't talk about all that went on there, like the man who had been 
stabbed to death in a fight a few weeks earlier as she watched with 
horror, prompting her to start carrying a hunting knife in her bra and 
another in her backpack.
    When she walked in, Crystal's mood changed again. ``Give me a 
kiss,'' she called.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Mike and Crystal's daughter, Rita, sits in a rickety beach chair at a 
    homeless encampment in Chico. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Using a net attached to a lifting machine, Mike helps Crystal out of 
   bed so she can use the bathroom. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Mike soothes Crystal's bed sores while she is lifted. (Melina Mara/The 
                            Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Mike splashes his face with some water while packing up the family's 
             belongings. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)

* * *

    There were tasks Rita did almost immediately whenever she visited. 
She combed Crystal's hair, trimmed her fingernails, gave her sponge 
baths.
    Mike did everything else. He checked Crystal's blood sugar five 
times a day. He made her meals and helped feed her. He put fresh 
bandages on the bedsores she'd been developing. And sometimes he left 
her alone, as he did one morning with seven days left before the 
deadline. He tried to get out every day to clear his head, even if it 
was just to hit a few golf balls and watch them skip across the gravel.
    Before he left, Crystal asked him to straighten her in bed so she 
could breathe better. ``I think I'm a little cockeyed today,'' she 
said.
    ``You've been cockeyed for years,'' he said, teasing.
    Some things Crystal only let herself think about when she was 
alone, like how badly she'd deteriorated since the fire. After her 
stroke, she had still been able to sit up on her own. But with no 
physical therapy in more than two years, she'd grown weak and rigid. 
The only person who had come out was a nurse who monitored her blood-
thinning medication for a while, then said she had to stop because the 
gravel was damaging her car.
    Crystal had worked in nursing homes, and made Mike promise that he 
would never put her in one. It was an easy promise for Mike to keep. 
He'd grown up with distant parents--an alcoholic father and a strict 
mother--and had wanted his own family to be close and loving. But 
people with disabilities are often unnecessarily institutionalized 
after natural disasters, especially if they are poor, according to a 
2019 report from the National Council on Disability. Crystal didn't 
think she could avoid long-term care much longer. Lately, she was 
sleeping with the overhead light on because of a dream she'd been 
having in which she had been sent to hell for being a burden on her 
family.
    When Mike got back from the store, she told him about how she was 
longing to see trees and grass. ``I feel stupid for wanting that,'' she 
said.
    ``It's not stupid,'' Mike said, and proposed they at least go out 
to the porch. It was a 10-minute process to get her out of bed by 
himself. He rolled her back and forth to get her into a net, which he 
then attached to a lifting machine. He began pumping a lever to lift 
the net into the air. When Crystal was suspended, he maneuvered her 
toward a wheelchair, and then hit the lever again to lower her until 
she could sit.
    Outside, the air was dry and full of ash from two wildfires burning 
nearby. Minutes passed. She was smiling. Then she looked uncertain. 
Then she was in pain from her bedsores and started crying. Then she was 
calling out for Mike, who had gone inside to do the dishes.
    He rushed her back in and hoisted her in the net as her crying 
turned to screaming. ``Oh God, just do it,'' she screamed, suspended 
now above the bed. But Mike was afraid of letting her fall and was so 
focused that he didn't hear the crunch of approaching cars.
    It wasn't until someone was knocking that he looked out and saw two 
FEMA security guards and two women who were strangers. ``Give me a 
minute,'' he yelled. But the knocking got louder and so Mike paused and 
threw the door open, revealing Crystal suspended in the net, clothed in 
only a T-shirt.
    ``You might as well get a front-row seat,'' Mike said to the group. 
The guards looked aghast and took a step back. ``You want to know why 
we haven't gotten out of here? I'm doing this all day long.'' Mike 
slammed the door. ``You're doing good,'' he said to Crystal as he 
lowered her into bed and pulled up her sheet.
    When he opened the door again, the guards had retreated to their 
cars and only the two women remained. They said they were from a 
disaster case management program and wanted to help Mike apply for a 
subsidized apartment. ``FEMA just reached out to us, with the site 
closing in a week,'' one of the women said. ``We're here to support 
you.''
    Mike felt a flood of relief. He invited them in, apologizing.
    ``Please do not apologize,'' the woman said. ``My heart is feeling 
for you right now.''
    She helped Mike fill out an application and said she would get them 
signed up for food stamps, too. She suggested the Ericksons might be 
able to buy their trailer and move it somewhere permanent, because FEMA 
generally auctions them off at the end of housing programs, with bids 
sometimes starting at a few hundred dollars.
    Another mood shift for Crystal, as she thought of a trailer park 
near her son and how nice it would be to see him more often.
    The sense of hope the women brought with them carried over into the 
next day, and the day after, five days to go now, as the Ericksons 
waited to hear about the housing application and another stranger 
arrived at their door. Word had started spreading among Paradise 
survivors about their case. The visitor said he'd heard that Crystal 
lived in a hospital bed and couldn't even shower. He had come over on 
his own with a large rubber tub for her.
    He and Mike wrestled the tub inside, moving bags of laundry to make 
it fit. Soon, the trailer was filled with steam from hot water and the 
comforting smell of bath soap.
    ``Oh, that feels good,'' Crystal said after Mike had put her in the 
net and maneuvered her into the tub. She waved her arms beneath the 
surface of the water, transfixed. She could feel her hands and legs 
unclenching. She started splashing. ``Do I get to stay here forever? 
Till they move us out?'' she asked. Mike smiled. ``Soak as long as you 
want,'' he said.
    They went to bed feeling better than they had in 349 nights. And 
then came the next day, four days left, when the good feeling began to 
drain away.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

   Crystal gets her first real bath in a year, thanks to a concerned 
 wildfire survivor's gift of a rubber tub. (Melina Mara/The Washington 
                                 Post)

* * *

    How is hope dashed? In three conversations.
    First, the women came back and explained that the Ericksons 
couldn't buy their trailer because FEMA wasn't selling them to 
survivors who had failed to provide regular proof of rental searches.
    Then, another case manager stopped by and told them that they 
hadn't qualified for the apartment. Their income was too low. And there 
was nothing else to apply for. ``Trust me--we have looked everywhere, 
in every town. We are in a housing crisis in this county and we have 
literally tried everything,'' she said.
    And then a FEMA supervisor called to say that if the Ericksons were 
not out by the deadline, they would be trespassing and he would call 
the police. ``I'm sorry about it, but that's the way it goes,'' he 
said. ``We're at the end of the game. It's really in your best 
interests to move on.''
    Mike felt his temper rising, but spoke softly so Crystal would not 
hear. ``We'd love to move on,'' he said. ``We're not here because we 
love to be here. You know that, right?''
    ``Well, we have done everything we can under federal law, as FEMA, 
to help you out,'' the supervisor said.
    Two days left to go now, and FEMA workers were showing up to 
collect keys from the remaining tenants, including Jay Rose, the man 
who had predicted he would be the last one left in the park.
    The inspector who completed his walk-through waited with her finger 
on the circuit breaker until he microwaved a last frozen breakfast 
sandwich. ``Good luck,'' she said as she flipped off the power. He had 
10 days paid at a motel, and then would be sleeping in his truck.
    Away went Jay. Away went his snarling dog. Away went everyone else, 
and by that evening, the only trailer left in the park with anyone 
still home was the one where Crystal was in her hospital bed and Mike 
was on the porch when a truck pulled up.
    The man who got out had dozens of colorful tattoos over his arms 
and legs, and he handed Mike a business card that said ``Stephen 
Murray: Camp Fire Survivor/Supporter.'' He explained that he had helped 
others facing eviction from FEMA parks and had heard from a friend of a 
friend that the Ericksons were about to be put on the street. ``I'm 
going to at least try to get you in a hotel for a few nights,'' he said 
before he left.
    What an unbelievable place this is, Mike thought as he leaned with 
his elbows on the porch railing. Created out of nothing. About to be 
nothing again. And his last version of hope coming down to a man who 
had the slogan ``Stephen Murray Spreading Love'' tattooed on his biceps 
and etched into a rubber bracelet, which he had slipped off his wrist 
and onto Crystal's.
    For three years now, it had been one strange and heart-rending 
thing after another, going back to those first weeks after the fire 
when Mike was living at a campground and had seen people clutching 
blankets and struggling to speak coherently.
    ``I used to look down on them and think, `Can't you pull yourself 
out of that?' But now I can't pull myself out of it, either,'' he said.
    Mike needed to go in and check on Crystal, but he kept staring at 
the moon, which was glowing red through the fire smog.
    ``I don't condemn them anymore,'' he said. ``I didn't understand 
how far you can go down, I guess.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Stephen Murray, whose business card says ``Camp Fire Survivor/
  Supporter,'' tells Crystal and Mike that he will help them find at 
   least a temporary place to stay. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

   Mike stops to regain his composure while moving boxes out of the 
               trailer. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Case managers tell Crystal and Mike that they have not qualified for 
the apartment they had applied for a few days earlier. (Melina Mara/The 
                            Washington Post)

* * *

    One day left now, and when Mike woke up, he was struck by how quiet 
the park had become. In that silence, his phone rang.
    ``Finding a handicap hotel room in California is hard,'' Stephen 
said. ``But I've got one.''
    And just like that, the Ericksons had a place lined up. It would be 
for a week. Stephen said he would pay for it. He had also rented a 
storage unit and would send someone for the hospital bed.
    ``Thank you,'' Mike said, and then told Crystal that they had a 
place to go.
    ``It's got sidewalks, right?'' she asked.
    ``Yes,'' Mike said.
    She tried to picture it. ``I'm so excited to get out of here,'' she 
said.
    Mike had some boxes saved, and he started taping them together. He 
didn't need many. There wasn't much to pack, mostly donated clothes and 
kitchen supplies.
    ``You're always so organized,'' Crystal said, watching Mike fold up 
her blankets.
    ``Not this time,'' he said.
    He taped together a new box and tossed in a pair of pliers that 
were among the only things they'd saved from the fire, a self-help book 
about managing stress and the notebook with his FEMA information.
    It didn't take long. An hour and 14 small boxes. Now that they had 
a destination, Mike arranged for a paratransit bus to come.
    He rolled the lifting machine through the trailer for a last time, 
swung Crystal in the net and lowered her in the wheelchair. A few more 
minutes and he had the bed stripped and disassembled. Nothing more to 
do but sit and wait.
    ``Way too quiet in here,'' Mike said, and unpacked the radio so he 
could listen to music.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Mike and Crystal, accompanied by Jacob, arrive at their hotel after 
 leaving the trailer on move-out day. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Her sons Ronald, left, and Jacob spend some time with Crystal at the 
                hotel. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

In a moment of relief, Mike jumps into the hotel pool. (Melina Mara/The 
                            Washington Post)

* * *

    At last, there was the sound of tires on gravel, and a friend of 
Stephen's took the boxes and the bed. Another rumble and the bus 
arrived.
    Mike followed Crystal down the ramp, leaving the trailer door open. 
He helped strap her in and paid their fare. As the bus began rolling 
away, Mike looked out the window, taking everything in one last time, 
while Crystal squeezed her eyes shut.
    ``I don't want to look around. I can't stand this place,'' she 
said.
    Mike was remembering the early days when they first moved in, 
before their son left. ``The kids not being able to stay with us, that 
just tore our family apart,'' he said.
    As they approached the entrance, Crystal glanced back at the lot. 
``I liked it better when there were all those trailers,'' she said.
    ``It made a great driving range to hit the golf balls,'' Mike said, 
and with that, the bus passed through the fence and turned right, and 
the Ericksons were gone, except for a few things they had left behind. 
A lawn chair, a fan, a mirror, a mop. All of it noted by a FEMA 
inspector who came later that day. ``Okey-doke,'' he said. ``I've seen 
a lot worse.'' The deadbolt didn't work, so he pulled the front door 
shut and pronounced it good enough. ``We're finished,'' he said, and 
hours later, as night settled in, Trailer 83 was a shadow in a dark 
corner of an empty lot. There was nothing to break the silence as 
midnight came and then went and the park was officially closed. The 
housing program was over. FEMA had fulfilled its obligations to the 
displaced.
    At the motel across town, Crystal was asleep and Mike, who had been 
so excited when they arrived that he jumped into the pool with a whoop, 
lay awake in bed. They'd ordered pizza and watched a movie, and when 
they got tired, Crystal had asked Mike to leave the overhead lights on. 
Now, as she slept, he stared up at them, thinking that they couldn't 
afford to stay beyond the week Stephen had booked.
    They would need to find somewhere to go. He had six days left to 
figure it out.

    Mr. Garamendi. The article speaks about the human element 
of the disaster and the long, long process that this particular 
family--and, unfortunately, it is not a unique situation, but 
it is one in which it exemplifies the complexity and the 
difficulty that occurs after a disaster such as the Camp fire.
    We are going to have to figure this out. The questions that 
have been asked and the answers that have been given are all 
most appropriate and begin to point out the nature of the 
problem. Part of the problem is it is by the book, and several 
of us have talked about maybe there ought to be a few efforts 
to move beyond the book, the rules and the regulations and 
flexibility there of those rules and regulations.
    The second issue really goes to one of the long-term 
housing needs, and that has been discussed here in some detail, 
about the time it takes to be able to return to a community 
that has been burned out. The other has to do with the housing 
itself, which is an ongoing problem for the State of 
California.
    I would like to go to Deputy Chief Hatcher, if I could. Do 
you think the answer is for FEMA to develop a mobile home park, 
or what would be--or what other alternatives are there? What 
would be the best solution, in your mind, in a case such as 
Camp or, say, half of a Camp situation?
    Ms. Hatcher. Thank you, Congressman Garamendi, for the 
question.
    We would like to see FEMA have solutions for temporary to 
permanent housing that addresses the needs of those with the 
fewest resources. You mentioned the Ericksons, which they were 
the last family left in FEMA's group housing site after the 
Camp fire.
    And I want to be clear that FEMA assisted many, many 
households, and we are incredibly thankful for the assistance 
that comes from the Federal Government, but there has to be a 
solution that looks to permanent help for folks as opposed to 
just a temporary solution. Because we lost 14 percent of our 
housing stock and less than 10 percent of that has been rebuilt 
nearly 3 years after the Camp fire. And there is just simply 
not an opportunity for those with few resources to quickly 
recover after a wildfire like this because of the prolonged 
nature of recovery.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, we have discussed the nature of the 
temporary housing being built in such a way as to meet current 
codes in California. That is one thing that may be able to deal 
with this.
    The other is the necessity for holistic support, and that 
has been discussed in different ways here. The role of the 
State of California is critical in this, because most of the 
support systems are either funded by or directed by the State 
that the county should carry out one or another of those 
programs.
    So I am really looking here for any one of you, and 
perhaps, Casey, you seem to be the go-to person here, but--and 
perhaps Mr. Phelps, how can we develop a solution in which all 
of the resources that exist from healthcare to social services 
to homeless programs of one sort or another, how can all of 
those be focused for the benefit of those individuals, such as 
the Ericksons and others whose homes have been destroyed in one 
or another of these disasters?
    Ms. Hatcher. I would say that we need to have a coordinated 
approach. There are a whole variety of agencies that bring 
resources to bear after a wildfire and they are often very 
beneficial resources but sometimes can lack coordination.
    And you are right that there is assistance coming from the 
State of California and from the Federal Government. And I 
mentioned earlier the Disaster Case Management. And we would 
really like to see the case managers from FEMA better 
coordinate with those that are in the local community from 
community-based organizations to really set individuals on 
their own path to recovery.
    It can be incredibly difficult to navigate all of the 
resources available after a disaster, and that could be a 
really key piece. It maybe is not within the purview of this 
committee, but other resources that come for housing assistance 
like Community Development Block Grant funding for disaster 
recovery that is overseen by HUD is kind of divorced from 
coordinating with FEMA, and those pieces need to tie together 
better.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. My time is expired. 
There is a lot more to be said here about this issue of 
coordination. I would point out that there is a major housing 
element in the reconciliation bill that we hope to get out of 
here soon.
    With that, I yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
    Back to Mr. LaMalfa.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you again, Madam Chair.
    We find a lot of parallel concerns here with what Mr. 
Garamendi was saying as well on the housing situation, I think. 
And we also have to step back a little bit and really ask the 
question, is it FEMA's long-term mission to be so far into 
housing? We had to work to get them to approve temporary 
housing for up to 2 years following the Camp fire for the folks 
like down in Gridley, et cetera.
    But is it really the proper role, so bringing up--is 
there--we have to look at a mechanism, maybe a smoother handoff 
to HUD longer term that would be for those folks that are 
underinsured or not insured that get burned out. We are talking 
in the Camp fire, Paradise, and others around Magalia, Yankee 
Hill, Concow. And then also the situation we had where we lost 
most of the town of Greenville up in Plumas County, and next 
door to that, Canyondam. And then we have a situation over in 
Lassen County, the town of Doyle.
    So, you have all these issues that are going to be long-
term situations, and since FEMA is an emergency management 
agency, we need to forge together a mechanism for a better 
handoff. So, FEMA is going to have to keep responding to other 
disasters, whether it is going to be the many fires that we are 
going to face in the future and hurricanes and who knows, 
earthquakes, whatever you are going to have in this country.
    And that is not to take away from FEMA. That is not to take 
away from need. I want to downplay that at all. The need is 
going to be very great until we, on the wildfire side, do much, 
much better at forest management and buffers we need around 
these communities.
    So, coming back to you again, Casey Hatcher--since we have 
two Caseys--let me talk about quickly the Beckwourth fire 
versus the Dixie fire. Beckwourth happened just before the 
Dixie fire farther up north, in Easton, California, basically 
about 10 days before Dixie.
    Ironically, as I was returning from being up there with the 
folks at the Beckwourth fire, I saw the Dixie fire had started 
just a couple hours before I came down the Feather River Canyon 
on 70, and there were fire folks on the scene already. But who 
knew at that moment that that was going to turn in months later 
to nearly 1 million acres.
    In this case here, what we see is Greenville in Plumas 
County versus Doyle up in Lassen County, you have two different 
types of disaster. One group of survivors basically is going to 
get assistance and one will not. And what we are talking about 
with the Lava fire and Salt fire in Shasta and Siskiyou 
Counties, you have--they are overstretched from disaster up 
there as well.
    So, you have issues where if those fires had happened 
closer together in time, that they would have been more 
eligible to make FEMA be able to draw all the fires into one 
big disaster, I guess. We have the situation--it has to cause a 
bigger threshold of disaster to have them become eligible for 
it, so you have to have more damage to unlock Federal 
assistance. So, if you can tie them together or--nobody wants a 
bigger number.
    So, Casey, given the record-setting fire seasons that we 
have seen in 3 of the past 4 years, we are looking at--with 
Butte County, but we know about your neighboring counties too, 
are we at the point where we are going to have to keep needing 
more and more resources to help fight these fires and begin the 
long-term recovery? What are we looking at? It is pretty 
discouraging.
    Ms. Hatcher. It does seem to be that the frequency and 
intensity is going up. And you mentioned a situation that we 
had in 2017. We had two fires in the summer that didn't qualify 
for a major disaster declaration from the Federal Government 
and one that happened to be part of the fires that happened in 
the North Bay in 2017 that did because it got grouped with it. 
And they received resources and benefits that similarly sized 
fires in our community didn't. But it is the consecutive nature 
of the disasters and the ability for the local government to 
operationalize assistance that really is at play.
    When you look at Plumas County, which is where I grew up, 
it is so small, and the resources that they need to help 
Greenville are significant because of the size and the need of 
their county. And those types of circumstances and the 
consecutive nature of the disasters need to be considered when 
we are taking a look at what type of assistance is provided to 
communities, because we are seeing an increasing need for this 
recovery and, as was mentioned earlier, an increasing need to 
mitigate these types of disasters.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you. Appreciate it. My time is expired.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I now recognize Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    A recent article in the Washington Post titled ``The Last 
Days Inside Trailer 83'' detailed the last few days of a family 
living in the Chico housing site. This article described the 
difficulties that many wildfire survivors have finding 
permanent housing after a disaster. It also describes how all 
the rules and requirements in our disaster recovery program 
actually affect people's everyday lives.
    This story stuck with me because I saw how difficult it was 
for the people in Louisiana after Katrina to get permanent 
housing. Sixteen years later, we find ourselves with the same 
situation with Ida. I also worry about the means for 
constituents of Louisiana's Second Congressional District who 
survived Ida.
    What this article showed me was that no matter what 
specific act of nature, whether it is a wildfire, heat wave, a 
freezing spell, an earthquake, or a hurricane, those of us who 
face any natural disaster face many of the same challenges 
afterwards.
    Mr. Phelps, any lessons learned that can be applicable to 
hurricanes, moving forward from the wildfires, in the 
experiences that you found yourself in?
    Mr. Phelps. Thank you for that, Representative Carter. And, 
first, happy birthday. I believe birthday wishes are in order 
for you today, sir.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Phelps. We talk a lot about the Federal assistance and 
the Federal family that comes to support you after a disaster. 
We heard a little bit already about HUD and some of the 
Community Disaster Block Grants that are available. That 
funding needs to come sooner. We haven't yet received CDBG-DR 
funding through HUD. We need to ensure that FEMA is in lockstep 
with their partners in HUD.
    I would recommend that they look at the model that we have 
adopted here in Oregon. Days after the fires began, we 
established a work group with emergency management, our Oregon 
Department of Human Services, which was responsible for mass 
care and the immediate sheltering needs, and the Oregon Housing 
and Community Services Department, which handles housing across 
the State. And we began charting out what our path would look 
like for permanent housing for disaster survivors.
    You don't have that same kind of relationship, I don't 
think, between FEMA and HUD. To see more engagement, 
interaction between those agencies earlier on in a disaster, it 
avoids even the need for a handoff, which was discussed 
earlier. These two agencies then are working in sync from the 
beginning to identify long-term permanent housing solutions as 
opposed to a stage gate process where folks are moving from 
temporary shelter to intermediate housing to long-term housing. 
The sooner we can get folks out of hotels, motels, or shelters 
and into permanent housing, the better off our survivors and 
the economic viability of our communities are going to be.
    So, that would be one recommendation, ensure much closer 
connectivity between FEMA and HUD early on in a disaster when 
we know that hundreds of thousands of homes have been lost.
    Mr. Carter. Any thoughts on how we can use the experiences 
that you guys have had to establish paths to permanent housing?
    Mr. Phelps. I think a lot of that is lowering some of the 
barriers to accessing Federal assistance that we have talked 
about already this morning and that is included in my written 
testimony, ensuring that we have got case managers who 
understand the complexities or the lack of affordable housing 
in communities and can work in partnership with community-based 
organizations, to think creatively and be innovative in how we 
are siting affordable homes.
    We keep putting these folks that have lost homes back into 
hazard zones, whether it is moving them out of the wildland-
urban interface and into flood plains. That has got to stop. We 
are just kicking the can down the road to the next disaster, 
and we are putting our most vulnerable at risk.
    Mr. Carter. And I think the Washington Post story really, 
really zeros in on the personal side, human effect of how this 
affects people when it becomes a matter of adding insult to 
injury. We know that when people go through these horrific 
natural disasters, they find themselves in a place where they 
never could have imagined they would be. And then add further 
insult to injury, when they seek help from Federal agencies, 
they are treated very differently in often cases, where people 
are made to have onerous requirements to prove who they are, 
what they lost.
    We know that fraud is a real case, but we should do things 
to make it easier, more accessible for people to get resources 
than to be treated like criminals when trying to get resources.
    What do you think about truncating or lessening the 
requirements to get these resources to people?
    Mr. Phelps. It is an absolutely critical piece of this 
puzzle. Again, I think FEMA has made great strides in the last 
couple of months by changing their Individual Assistance policy 
to reduce the barriers that folks have to show to prove home 
ownership or residency. We need to see that applied across 
other programs as well as folks try to access Federal 
assistance.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you very much. I yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Carter.
    Now Mr. Guest.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Chief Elliott, in your report that was issued prior to your 
testimony, on page 3, you talk about FEMA's role in mitigating 
wildland fires. You say, ``FEMA's mitigation programs can play 
an important role in helping communities prevent damage from 
wildland fires.'' You talk about things such as prescribed 
burns or removing hazardous fuels.
    You also reference the BRIC program, the Building Resilient 
Infrastructure and Communities program, and how that has the 
opportunity to mitigate natural hazards. And you go on to say 
that ``BRIC grants have supported programs to reduce the 
biomass and hazardous fuels in the WUI and use it for 
electricity generation.''
    It sounds to me what you are referring to there is 
generally just forest management, ways in which we can manage 
the forest so that we can better prevent wildfires before those 
fires begin, the old adage, ``An ounce of prevention is worth a 
pound of cure.''
    And so, I would ask, if you would, could you expand, Chief, 
on the BRIC program, and particularly expand on the use of 
things such as prescribed burns, and where you talk about the 
reduction of biomass and being able to use that to generate 
electricity?
    Mr. Elliott. Yes, sir, and thank you for the opportunity.
    So, what we are looking at from sort of a local perspective 
is developing an infrastructure that makes the Federal 
Government's and FEMA's efforts sustainable over the long term. 
Removing fuel or active land management or active forest 
management is an ongoing process, and so from our perspective, 
we see the key to this as developing technologies in industries 
and in some cases reinstalling industries in communities so 
that we can process that biomass, to some extent make that an 
economic contributor and take that liability and turn it into 
an asset. And, yes, this is entirely about active land 
management.
    And when we talk about programs like the BRIC program, 
really this goes back to the cohesive strategy, which two of 
the elements there are resilient fire-resistant landscapes and 
fire-adapted communities. And we have to accept the fact that 
there is a fire interval on most of our lands in this country. 
In other words, there is a cycle of fire that is going to come 
back, and the longer we put that off through artificial 
suppression, the more damaging that catastrophic fire is going 
to be when those weather conditions or the fuel conditions are 
bad.
    So, the mitigation and the prevention efforts are 
absolutely where we believe we should be focusing, because that 
is going to create for our grandkids less of an issue with 
wildland fire in the United States. We can't turn this around 
in a year. We are doing what we can for the recovery and the 
suppression, but we need to get ahead of this problem, and that 
is going to be through active land management, mitigation, and 
prevention.
    Mr. Guest. And these forest management programs, is it your 
opinion that, one, it would create a healthier forest, and then 
ultimately that, in the long run, as this program continues to 
play out, that we would have less damage, less destruction 
because of the wildfires that are regularly occurring?
    Mr. Elliott. Absolutely. All of those things done correctly 
will produce a more resilient ecosystem, more resilient 
landscape that we can use. And we also believe that, especially 
in many communities, that this can redevelop industries or 
create new technologies where those industries actually 
contribute to the local communities as well, that this isn't 
something we keep going back to the Federal Government for 
fuels mitigation.
    Mr. Guest. And when you talk about fuels mitigation, when 
you talk about reduction of biomass, would that include things 
such as thinning of forest land and things of that nature? If 
you would just kind of explain in a little more detail, when 
you are talking about those two categories more specifically, 
what are you referring to?
    Mr. Elliott. Yes. The caveat here is ``appropriate'': 
appropriate logging, whether it be commercial or just thinning 
projects, whether that be chipping projects, prescribed fire is 
absolutely part of the solution. And we also look at the 
reintroduction of grazing in certain lands. Again, all of this 
balanced against--done in the context of what is correct and 
what will actually contribute towards long-term forest health, 
and, again, we are talking about grasslands and shrubsteppe as 
well.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you. Madam Chair, I am out of time. I 
yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I now would recognize Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank all 
the witnesses that are here today participating in our hearing.
    Ms. Hatcher, in 2020, California experienced its worst fire 
season on record as fires burned across the entire State. The 
year 2021 is, again, proving that fire season is becoming year-
round, with over 2 million acres burned throughout California.
    In my district, we just had the Alisal fire break out a few 
days ago, on October 11. Thankfully, it is now 97 percent 
contained, and I want to extend my thanks and gratitude to all 
the firefighters and first responders that helped in this 
effort.
    While a lot of the focus centers around getting fires under 
control, other important aspects are pre-fire deployment of 
resources and post-fire response. From your experience in 
county government, how can FEMA better support counties in 
their post-fire response?
    And after meeting with first responders, many have raised 
the issue of the need to predeploy resources ahead of fire-
prone conditions. However, this places a cost burden on local 
governments. What has been your experience in Butte County?
    Ms. Hatcher. Thank you, Representative, for the question, 
and I am so glad to hear the fire is becoming contained in your 
community.
    The post-fire resources that--the need is significant after 
a wildfire, from everything to the cleanup to the housing to, 
as has been mentioned here, mental health services and Disaster 
Case Management support. I think one of the things that FEMA 
could really do, not just right after a disaster but on an 
ongoing basis, is to provide technical assistance and help 
local governments to build capacity.
    We had, before the Camp fire, one person in our office of 
emergency management locally. And we grew that capacity to be 
able to respond after the Camp fire and the 2020 North Complex 
fire, but many rural and suburban communities simply don't have 
those types of capacities. And I would recommend that there is 
a lot of technical assistance even before a disaster strikes 
that can be provided to local governments.
    You also mentioned the staging of resources, and we have 
seen this be an issue both before wildfires as well as other 
events, storms, floods, things of this nature. I think the 
flexibility of FEMA's mitigation assistance to recognize the 
type of need, whether it is the clearing of fuels to prevent 
disasters or whether it is the staging of resources to help to 
protect life when there is a disaster, they have pretty strict 
mitigation requirements that don't recognize some of those 
other types of community lifelines that are in need.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Ms. KC, the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 included a 
significant enhancement to FMAG assistance, authorizing post-
disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program assistance to help 
local communities recover. However, as I have experienced this 
firsthand in my district, there is an abundance of redtape that 
has made these Federal dollars hard to access in many cases.
    While my office was ultimately successful in working with 
FEMA to ensure that over $13 million in Federal dollars were 
awarded to the Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water 
Conservation District to help build a debris basin, the delays 
experienced were clearly unacceptable. How can FEMA be a better 
partner in helping alleviate the burden on local governments to 
be able to access these resources and funds?
    Ms. KC. Thank you for the question, Representative 
Carbajal. I think you have heard a lot of the same, so I am 
going to repeat what has been said maybe in a different way, 
maybe in the same way. I think a lot of it is preplanning and 
working together ahead of these disasters.
    We experienced and are experiencing the same delays. We are 
very thankful for those HMGP funds and the amount of funding 
that is flowing through FEMA to help us recover from a 
rehabilitation and revegetation side from wildfires in the 
State of Nevada. But we are also experiencing those delays, and 
I think part of that is the upfront planning with partners, not 
just looking at the State through our emergency management, our 
all-hazard mitigation plan, but State forestry agencies, local 
governments.
    We have plans for resource management. We know ahead of 
time where fires--we can't predict where human cause starts 
will happen, but we do know where fires are going to have the 
greatest impact in our State, because we look at historical 
data. We know where we are really dense in our forest, so we 
need to look at those areas and work collectively.
    We are very good at working together, land management 
agencies, emergency management agencies, health departments. It 
is probably time for us to expand that reach in the beginning 
to work together to make sure that we are prepared, and we know 
what plans are out there, and then FEMA could utilize those 
plans that have been vetted by partners and worked 
collaboratively to create for implementation, to expedite 
implementation.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I am out of time.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I have one question for anybody on the panel. We heard you 
say that we need to put the fire survivor first. We know from 
previous experience with evacuations, whether it is a hurricane 
or earthquake, that many times people won't evacuate if they 
can't take their animals with them, their pets. And nobody has 
mentioned pets or wildlife or livestock. How does this fit into 
FEMA's recovery plans? Or is it a housing problem?
    Ms. Hatcher. Chair Titus, you are absolutely correct that 
many times people will not evacuate unless they can take their 
animals. And in Butte County, we offer large and small animal 
shelters. And recently, our ag commissioner has developed a 
program that allows people back into the evacuated areas to 
feed commercial livestock in order to help promote the 
evacuation of these areas, so that first responder personnel 
can focus on fighting the wildfire instead of evacuating 
individuals.
    We are very pleased that FEMA reimburses this type of 
assistance, and we think that they can better help facilitate 
this by helping to share these types of best practices across 
communities where they are being effective. It is a challenge 
as shelters start to close and there aren't rental housing 
units or permanent housing units for people to go with pets. It 
is a challenge for getting people to move from shelters or 
temporary housing assistance, though, and that is an area where 
we could work with FEMA to develop some best practices.
    Ms. Titus. I think that would be great. We would appreciate 
that.
    Can you tell us how it works in Nevada, Ms. KC?
    Ms. KC. Yes. Thank you for the question, Chair Titus. It is 
very similar. We work with our emergency management agencies, 
our public health officials, so the response is very similar 
from an evacuation of people, their pets, their livestock. 
There is a lot of people that come together to ensure that 
things get moved into the right areas.
    One of the things that I would say upfront is when we talk 
about the three tiers, the active land management, building 
those resilient landscapes, fire-adapted communities, so that 
is the construction in and around, and then making sure that we 
have the proper suppression assets, that is the cohesive 
strategy, that is how we are going to address this.
    Some of FEMA's programs do address these issues. There are 
lots of other programs in the Federal Government that also 
address those. And so, coordination amongst those programs and 
who is the right party to take on those responsibilities, we 
need to make sure that that is part of our consideration as we 
are moving into these disasters.
    And just coordinating and planning ahead, you wouldn't 
think about this necessarily, but a lot of the fires that have 
been discussed today that happened in California had 
significant impacts into the State of Nevada, both from 
evacuees that came into the State of Nevada and have moved here 
permanently. So, our housing market has been affected.
    We have been building more and more houses into the 
wildland-urban interface, trying to create affordable housing 
where people can live, and so we are just kind of increasing 
our risk here. So that coordination needs to happen, not only 
within the State and amongst the State and Federal, local 
government agencies, but also across State lines where we are 
going to have impacts.
    Ms. Titus. Well, one of the things we have heard throughout 
the morning is this need for an all-of-Government approach. One 
group that is also involved when businesses are affected is the 
Small Business Administration. So, when we are looking at who 
we need to coordinate with and who needs to be at the table, 
and as we try to revise some of these provisions you all have 
suggested, we want to be sure that that is the case and we 
don't leave anybody out.
    I would argue that you also need to have some 
environmentalists at the table because that is where you are 
going to hear some of the opposition to some of the more 
extreme forest management issues, where it comes to endangered 
species, et cetera.
    Anybody want to comment on that?
    Mr. Elliott. This is Rich Elliott. Yes, we have been 
working to try and create some level of balance, because, 
obviously, the rules that exist today exist for reasons. And 
so, we need to take a more balanced approach when we talk about 
active land management and make sure that what we are doing to 
the land actually contributes to the long-term health of that 
ecosystem.
    If we can pair that with an economic benefit to the 
community in terms of specific kinds of logging, grazing, those 
types of things, that is an added benefit. But obviously this 
has to be about restoring balance to our ecosystem across the 
U.S.
    And what we are seeing is, maybe it is weather patterns 
but, you know, we certainly have a drought in the West, but our 
ecosystems are stressed. And when they are stressed, even if it 
is a traditionally more wet area, it only takes a few degrees 
over a few years or a few percentage points in RH and suddenly 
something will burn when it wouldn't normally burn.
    And those are the kinds of realities that we are facing. 
And, absolutely, this needs to be a very balanced approach, but 
it needs to--there is probably going to need to be some 
compromise on both sides. No logging, no grazing has not been a 
good policy. Putting out every fire has not been a good policy 
over the last 110 years, and we need to shift a little bit.
    And probably developing in certain areas hasn't been a good 
national policy, that we create risk in areas that we know are 
going to burn catastrophically just due to their topography and 
their vegetation, regardless of what kind of land management we 
do.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Chief.
    As we wind up this morning, I have heard some things 
repeated throughout all the questions and the answers. We need 
more coordination and cooperation, an all-of-Government 
approach. We need flexibility, one size doesn't fit all among 
the programs and relief. We need to review the needs and 
perhaps expand what services are available, and that includes 
everything from mental health to paying highway repair. We need 
mitigation and prevention, not just recovery efforts. And we 
need to do this quickly because the situation is getting worse, 
and it is becoming an existential issue.
    So, I thank all of you for your testimony. We really 
appreciate it.
    Mr. Webster, anything you want to add?
    Mr. Webster. I will just say, you summed it up well. All 
these things are more expansive than we would ever think. 
Floods are more than just water. It is all kinds of things. And 
the same with hurricanes, fires, and so forth. So, thank you 
for this hearing. It has really been great.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Webster.
    Also, I would ask unanimous consent to insert into the 
hearing record the statement from the National Low Income 
Housing Coalition. Without objection.
    And is there another one, you said?
    And also, I would like unanimous consent to insert into the 
hearing record a statement from the Western Governors' 
Association. That would include our Governor Sisolak.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
 Statement of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, Submitted for 
                     the Record by Hon. Dina Titus
    Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Subcommittee Chairwoman 
Titus, Subcommittee Ranking Member Webster, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit a statement for 
the record on ways to ensure that our nation's disaster housing 
recovery and response efforts address the unique and often overlooked 
needs of the lowest-income and most marginalized survivors, including 
people of color, people with disabilities, people experiencing 
homelessness and others.
    The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) is dedicated 
solely to achieving socially just public policy that ensures people 
with the lowest incomes in the United States have affordable and decent 
homes. NLIHC leads the Disaster Housing Recovery Coalition of more than 
850 national, state, and local organizations, including many working 
directly with disaster impacted communities and with first-hand 
experience recovering after disasters. We work to ensure that federal 
disaster recovery efforts prioritize the housing needs of the lowest-
income and most marginalized people in impacted areas.
    NLIHC has worked on disaster housing recovery since Hurricane 
Katrina, and from this experience, we have come to a simple conclusion: 
America's disaster housing recovery system is fundamentally broken and 
in need of major repair and reform. It is a system that was designed 
for middle-class people and communities--a system that never 
contemplated, and so does not address, the unique needs of the lowest-
income and most marginalized people. Because of this fundamental design 
flaw, these families are consistently left behind in recovery and 
rebuilding in disaster after disaster. The disaster recovery system not 
only ignores the needs of the lowest income people, but it exacerbates 
many of the challenges they faced prior to the storm: disaster response 
and recovery often worsens the housing crisis, solidifies segregation, 
and deepens inequality.
    When disasters strike, the lowest-income and most marginalized 
survivors are often hardest hit. They have the fewest resources and 
face the longest, steepest path to recovery. Despite the clear need, 
federal efforts frequently leave these survivors without the assistance 
needed to recover and leave their communities less resilient to future 
disasters. Without this critical assistance, many of the lowest-income 
and most marginalized survivors return to uninhabitable homes, sleep in 
cars or at shelters, double- or triple-up with other low-income 
families, or pay more than half of their limited incomes on rent, 
putting them at increased risk of displacement, eviction, and, in worst 
cases, homelessness.
    These barriers and opportunities are reflected in ``Fixing 
America's Broken Disaster Housing Recovery System,'' a two-part report 
published by NLIHC and Fair Share Housing Center of New Jersey.
    Our policy recommendations reflect nine core principles that should 
guide our country's disaster housing response and recovery:
    1.  Recovery must be centered on survivors with the greatest needs 
and ensure equity among survivors, especially for people of color, low-
income people, people with disabilities, immigrants, LGBTQ people, and 
other marginalized people and communities;
    2.  Everyone should be fairly assisted to fully and promptly 
recover through transparent and accountable programs and strict 
compliance with civil rights laws, with survivors directing the way 
assistance is provided;
    3.  Securing help from government must be accessible, 
understandable, and timely;
    4.  Everyone in need should receive safe, accessible shelter and 
temporary housing where they can reconnect with family and community;
    5.  Displaced people should have access to all the resources they 
need for as long as they need to safely and quickly recover housing, 
personal property and transportation;
    6.  Renters and anyone experiencing homelessness before the 
disaster must quickly get access to quality, affordable, accessible 
rental homes in safe, quality neighborhoods of their choice;
    7.  All homeowners should be able to quickly rebuild in safe, 
quality neighborhoods of their choice;
    8.  All neighborhoods should be free from environmental hazards, 
have equal quality and accessible public infrastructure, and be safe 
and resilient; and
    9.  Disaster rebuilding should result in local jobs and contracts 
for local businesses and workers.

    These core principles and the following policy recommendations 
should serve as a guidepost for this committee and other federal 
policymakers as you work to reform our nation's disaster housing 
recovery framework.
               Barriers to an Equitable Housing Recovery
    After a disaster, including wildfires, displaced families must have 
a safe, accessible, and affordable place to live while they recover. 
FEMA programs can provide crucial assistance to help survivors recover 
from a disaster by providing temporary shelter and financial assistance 
and making basic structural repairs to homes. However, FEMA created 
unnecessary and often insurmountable barriers to accessing these 
programs, leaving many low-income survivors at increased risk of 
displacement, eviction, and, in worst cases, homelessness.
    FEMA programs are not designed to serve lower-income people with 
the greatest needs; these households are consistently denied 
assistance. For example, nearly 95% of applicants for recovery 
assistance after the 2020 wildfire season were denied assistance by 
FEMA.\1\ After the 2020 wildfire season in Oregon, FEMA had denied 70% 
of non-fraudulent claims.\2\ This effect occurs during other disasters 
as well. Applicants for assistance with the lowest incomes were denied 
FEMA Individual Assistance (IA) at very high rates after Hurricane 
Harvey. The vast majority of higher-income households were approved \3\ 
(see Figure 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ McMinn S. 2021. FEMA Rejected 95% of Aid Applicants During 
California's Last Wildfire Disaster. Why?. Retrieved from https://
www.npr.org/2021/07/02/1011877546/fema-rejected-95-of-aid-applicants-
during-californias-last-wildfire-disaster-why
    \2\ McMinn S. 2021. As Western Wildfires Worsen, FEMA is Denying 
Most People Who Ask for Help. Retrieved at: https://www.npr.org/2021/
07/01/1010897265/as-western-wildfires-worsen-fema-is-denying-most-
people-who-ask-for-help
    \3\ Adams, A. 2018. Low-income Households Disproportionately Denied 
by FEMA Is a Sign of a System that is Failing the Most Vulnerable. 
Retrieved from https://texashousers.org/2018/11/30/low-income-
householdsdisproportionately-denied-by-fema-is-a-sign-of-a-system-that-
is-failing-the-most-vulnerable/
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                               figure 1.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Although the early available data from FEMA's response to Hurricane 
Ida show an improvement in IA eligibility rates overall, data from 
other disasters in 2021 show similar denial rates to the past disaster 
responses. Further analysis and access to granular application 
information will be needed to determine if this trend holds for 
applications by lower-income disaster survivors.
FEMA's Failure to Address Housing Needs
    Despite the clear need, FEMA housing programs neglect the housing 
needs of America's lowest-income disaster survivors and exacerbate 
housing insecurity. Without the affordable and accessible homes 
survivors need, many return to uninhabitable homes, sleep in cars or 
tents, stay at shelters, double- or triple-up with other low-income 
families, or pay more than half of their limited incomes on rent, 
putting them at increased risk of eviction and, in worst cases, 
homelessness.
    Research from NLIHC demonstrates that disasters exacerbate the 
existing rental housing crisis for households with the lowest 
incomes.\4\ After Hurricane Sandy, households already dealing with 
housing instability were further destabilized through displacement and 
increased rents. Two years after Sandy, few new affordable homes had 
been completed yet survivors were no longer eligible for federal rental 
assistance.\5\
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    \4\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2019. Long-term Recovery 
of Rental Housing: A Case Study of Highly Impacted Communities in New 
Jersey after Superstorm Sandy. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/sites/
default/files/Sandy-Rental-Recovery-Report.pdf
    \5\ Fair Share Housing Center, Latino Action Network & NAACP New 
Jersey State Conference. 2015. The State of Sandy Recovery (Second 
Annual Report). Retrieved from http://fairsharehousing.org/images/
uploads/State_of_Sandy_English_2015.pdf
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    The impact of disasters on low-income people's housing needs is 
made worse by FEMA's continued refusal to activate the Disaster Housing 
Assistance Program (DHAP), rendering some survivors homeless.\6\ During 
past disasters, both Republican \7\ and Democratic \8\ \9\ 
administrations upheld DHAP as a best practice for disaster housing 
recovery. DHAP was created after hard-won lessons from Hurricane 
Katrina, and it has been used successfully in some major disasters 
since that time. Under DHAP, displaced families receive longer-term 
direct rental assistance and case management services provided by local 
housing professionals with extensive knowledge of the local housing 
market. This assistance helps families find permanent housing 
solutions, secure employment, and connect to public benefits as they 
rebuild their lives.\10\
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    \6\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2018. Setting the Record 
Straight: FEMA's Failure to Address LongTerm Housing Needs of 
Survivors. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/
FEMA_Setting-The-RecordFEMA-TSA.PDF
    \7\ Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. 2006. The Federal 
Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Retrieved from https://
permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps67263/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf
    \8\ Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2009. National Disaster 
Housing Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1819-25045-9288/ndhs_core.pdf
    \9\ Federal Emergency Management Agency. 2011. National Disaster 
Recovery Framework: Strengthening Disaster Recovery for the Nation. 
Retrieved from https://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf
    \10\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2017. Disaster Housing 
Assistance Program. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/sites/default/
files/DAHP-Program.pdf
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    After recent disasters, FEMA instead relied on its Temporary 
Shelter Assistance (TSA) program and other programs that are 
inaccessible to many low-income survivors. TSA is intended to reduce 
the number of survivors in congregate shelters by covering the cost of 
staying in an approved hotel or motel for an initial period of up to 14 
days. Once again, this is a program better suited to middle-class 
households than to low-income people.
    Low-income families are often unable to access TSA motels due to 
financial and other barriers, including the practice of motels charging 
daily ``resort'' fees and requiring security deposits or credit cards. 
Because TSA must be renewed every 14 days, those disaster survivors who 
are able to access the program face arbitrary deadlines that cause them 
to scramble to submit required paperwork or leave the motel before 
finding a permanent housing solution. While FEMA is authorized to 
provide TSA for at least 18 months, the Trump administration abruptly 
terminated \11\ the program for nearly 2,000 Puerto Rican families 
displaced to the mainland after Hurricane Maria, forcing them to find 
alternative housing or to return to their uninhabitable homes on the 
island with just a few hours' notice. Without DHAP, states that 
received large numbers of displaced Puerto Rican survivors--including 
Massachusetts and Connecticut--saw increased homelessness by 14 percent 
and 17 percent respectively.\12\ \13\
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    \11\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2018. NLIHC's Response 
to Court Ruling Allowing FEMA to Move Forward on Evicting Hurricane 
Maria Survivors. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/news/nlihcs-response-
courtruling-allowing-fema-move-forward-evicting-hurricane-maria-
survivors
    \12\ Martin, T. 2019. After a Long Road, Hurricane Maria Evacuees 
Settle in Massachusetts. Retrieved from https://www.wgbh.org/news/
local-news/2019/01/23/after-a-long-road-hurricane-maria-evacuees-
settle-in-massachusetts
    \13\ Skahill, P. 2018. Hurricane Maria Drives Up Connecticut's 
Homelessness Numbers. Retrieved from https://www.wnpr.org/post/
hurricane-maria-drives-connecticuts-homelessness-numbers
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    To date, the Biden administration has failed to activate DHAP for 
survivors of Hurricane Ida and other major disasters.
    FEMA's other temporary housing assistance programs--Rental 
Assistance and Direct Temporary Housing Assistance--are also 
problematic for low-income families. Through its Rental Assistance 
program, FEMA provides financial assistance to survivors to rent 
temporary housing. The amount of assistance provided to survivors is 
based on the impacted area's Fair Market Rent (FMR), which is often 
considerably less than rental costs in the area to which survivors have 
been displaced. Moreover, FEMA rental assistance covers rent and 
utilities for only two months at a time, which is too short a timeframe 
for many of the lowest-income survivors. Many landlords are often 
unwilling to enter into leases with survivors when only two months of 
rental assistance is assured.
    Under FEMA's Direct Lease program, FEMA enters into lease 
agreements with property owners to provide rent assistance for 
survivors. A similar program, the Multi-Family Lease and Repair 
program, allows FEMA to enter into lease agreements with multifamily 
housing property owners and to make repairs to provide temporary 
housing. Both programs, however, have extremely low rates of 
participation by property owners and are inadequate to meet post-
disaster rental needs.\14\
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    \14\ AP. 2020. FEMA Looks to Provide Hurricane Victims Temporary 
Housing. Retrieved from: https://apnews.com/article/louisiana-
9541dafbac6b890535bb21dc58844d29
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    After Hurricane Harvey, FEMA piloted a program where states take on 
the responsibility of implementing and managing temporary housing 
programs. These state-run disaster housing programs face significant 
delays and do not address the full scale of housing needs because FEMA 
continues to retain control over eligibility and the program-assignment 
process. According to FEMA, only a few hundred families were served 
under state-administered housing programs following Hurricanes Harvey 
and Irma, despite damage to or destruction of more than 307,000 homes 
in Texas \15\ and 65% of all homes in the Florida Keys.\16\ Other 
programs like Multifamily Lease and Repair were wholly unsuccessful 
because property owners declined to participate.
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    \15\ CBS News. 2019. We're Still Here: Volunteers Rebuilding Homes 
2 Years After Hurricane Harvey. Retrieved from https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/hurricane-harvey-houston-meet-the-volunteers-rebuilding-homes-all-
handshearts-2019-08-24/
    \16\ CNN. 2017. Florida Official: Death toll rises to 12 in state, 
Retrieved from: https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/12/us/irma-damage-
aftermath/index.html
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    A similar situation is currently occurring in Louisiana during the 
aftermath of Hurricane Ida. FEMA is reimbursing state-level agencies to 
provide travel trailers to disaster survivors to utilize prior to the 
deployment of FEMA Temporary Housing Units (THUs)--which typically take 
four months to deploy. While the state has procured hundreds of travel 
trailers, few families have received them as of this writing. In the 
meantime, disaster survivors are being encouraged to sleep in tents on 
their properties or utilize large tent encampments in several locations 
around Southeast Louisiana.\17\
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    \17\ Muller, W. 2021. As trailers trickle in, push for temporary 
housing continues 6 weeks after Hurricane Ida. Retrieved from https://
www.houmatoday.com/story/news/2021/10/16/trailers-trickle-in-push-
temporary-housing-continues-6-weeks-after-hurricane-ida/8468315002/
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    Due to the lack of housing assistance, one year after Hurricane 
Harvey nearly 20% of individuals experiencing homelessness in Houston 
reported that they became homeless as a result of the disaster.\18\ 
Without DHAP, homelessness increased in Houston by 18%.\19\ This is a 
colossal failure of the federal government's disaster recovery efforts.
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    \18\ Vigh, E. 2019. Hurricane Harvey Caused Homelessness Lingers in 
Harris County 2 Years Later. Community Impact. Retrieved from https://
bit.ly/3hEvKHW
    \19\ Ward, A. 2018. Homeless after Harvey: For Some, the Historic 
Flooding in Houston Washed Away Shelter and Security. Retrieved from 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houstonweather/hurricaneharvey/
article/Homeless-after-Harvey-For-some-the-historic-13171309.php
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    Due to the rural nature of many areas struck by wildfires, FEMA 
housing programs are even more disadvantaged. While areas suitable for 
THU deployments are abundant in such areas, the units must be hooked up 
to utilities and other infrastructure in order for them to be 
inhabitable. Creating or replacing such infrastructure is time-
consuming, leading to large delays in temporary housing assistance that 
allowed disaster survivors to become homeless. Five months after the 
Camp Fire destroyed 14,000 homes in Butte County California, FEMA had 
yet to set up THU's for disaster survivors.\20\ As a result, nearly 
19,000 Camp Fire survivors moved to Chico, California, overwhelming the 
city's social service systems and exacerbating the housing crisis 
across the region.\21\
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    \20\ Rittiman, B. 2019. FEMA `will not address all housing needs' 
for Camp Fire Survivors. Retrieved from: https://www.abc10.com/article/
news/local/wildfire/fema-will-not-address-all-housing-needs-for-camp-
fire-survivors/103-3a323e14-752e-4716-98eb-e7bfbf367120
    \21\ Wade, M. 2019. City of Chico `Overwhelmed' By Influx of Camp 
Fire Survivors. Retrieved from: https://www.abc10.com/article/news/
city-of-chico-overwhelmed-by-influx-of-camp-fire-survivors/103-
3bb43c11-124a-4742-8278-3b8b6af08648
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    During the current COVID-19 pandemic, FEMA should have activated 
DHAP to provide housing and shelter for people experiencing 
homelessness. DHAP could have been used to quickly move people out of 
congregate shelters or encampments and into affordable homes, where 
they can more easily keep themselves and their neighbors healthy. 
Instead, FEMA has worked with some states and localities under its 
Public Assistance program to place a very limited number of people 
experiencing homelessness into temporary motels for self-quarantine and 
self-isolation.
    Before Public Assistance funding for these motels end, FEMA should 
activate DHAP to help transition these individuals into permanent 
housing, rather than allowing individuals to be pushed back into 
homelessness as is already beginning to happen. For example, after 
funding for a hotel voucher program in Fort Lauderdale, Florida ran out 
on July 17, over 70 people experiencing homelessness who had been 
temporarily residing at a Rodeway Inn & Suites were forced to leave, 
even if they did not have a permanent housing plan.\22\
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    \22\ Kelley, E. 2020. Fort Lauderdale Ending Program to House 
Homeless in Hotels This Weekend. Retrieved from https://www.sun-
sentinel.com/coronavirus/fl-ne-fort-lauderdale-evicts-homeless-
20200717-h5vjhwlndnf6batks4rgegk3va-story.html
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FEMA Neglects the Needs of Marginalized Populations
            People Experiencing Homelessness
    People experiencing homelessness are often most at risk during a 
wildfire or other disaster and have the fewest resources to recover. 
People experiencing homelessness are unlikely to have the resources 
needed to adequately prepare for or evacuate prior to a disaster, and 
their unique needs are often overlooked by emergency managers when 
planning for disasters. During the recovery, homelessness resources are 
stretched thin to accommodate those households that became housing 
insecure as a result of the disaster and resources for pre-disaster 
homeless populations are deprioritized. Communities are often unable to 
return to the level of care provided to people experiencing 
homelessness before the disaster.
    Given the level of homelessness prevalent in many areas at risk of 
wildfires, the failure to integrate individuals experiencing 
homelessness within the disaster response and recovery framework is 
even more dangerous. In fact, individuals experiencing homelessness are 
often unjustly blamed for starting wildfires, placing them at even more 
risk of imprisonment and harassment.\23\
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    \23\ French, P. 2021. Banning the Homeless Won't Keep California 
From Burning. Retrieved From: https://newrepublic.com/article/163739/
los-angeles-homeless-encampments-wildfire
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    Despite the clear need, people experiencing homelessness are often 
excluded from or face additional barriers to FEMA resources, including 
mass shelters and individual assistance. Following Hurricane Irma, 
there were reports of people experiencing homelessness being forced to 
wear armbands and be separated from other disaster survivors.\24\ Pre-
disaster homeless populations are often denied FEMA assistance, even if 
all their belongings were destroyed in the disaster.\25\ These actions 
further stigmatize people experiencing homelessness and often prevent 
them from accessing the resources they need to stay safe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Dearen, J., & Kennedy, K. 2017. Yellow Wristbands, Segregation 
for Florida Homeless in Irma. Retrieved from https://www.usnews.com/
news/us/articles/2017-09-29/yellow-wristbands-segregation-for-florida-
homeless-in-irma
    \25\ Ehrlich, A. 2019. After Wildfires, Homeless People Left Out of 
Federal Disaster Aid Programs, Oregon Public Broadcasting. Retrieved 
from https://www.opb.org/news/article/fema-disaster-aid-wildfires-
homeless-people/
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    During the current COVID-19 pandemic, people experiencing 
homelessness are particularly at risk of severe illness and death from 
coronavirus, yet many of these individuals have been unable to access 
the assistance they need to self-isolate and self-quarantine.
    Narrow eligibility criteria for FEMA reimbursement, however, 
created significant barriers to moving people experiencing homelessness 
to safety in hotels and motels. In San Francisco, for example, people 
experiencing homelessness must be over the age of 60 or have documented 
underlying health conditions in order to be deemed eligible. This 
narrow interpretation of eligibility criteria has limited the 
efficiency of San Francisco's hotel program.\26\ Additionally, FEMA 
reimbursement of non-congregate shelter for people experiencing 
homelessness is only made available if a Governor requests it; people 
who are homeless in states with governors who do not prioritize their 
needs are left with no assistance.
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    \26\ Karlis, N. 2020. How Bureaucracy Kept the Bay Area from 
Housing the Houseless. Retrieved from https://www.salon.com/2020/06/21/
how-bureaucracy-kept-the-bay-area-from-housing-the-houseless/
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            Seniors and People with Disabilities
    People with disabilities face barriers to assistance. They are two 
to four times more likely to die or sustain a critical injury during a 
disaster than people without disabilities.\27\ Despite an increased 
risk of death and injury, many emergency plans do not address how local 
officials can reach those with disabilities during a disaster. People 
with disabilities are often diverted to ``special needs'' or ``medical 
shelters,'' even if they do not require the level of care provided 
there. This practice fosters forced institutionalization and places 
people with disabilities at greater risk of injury or death.
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    \27\ Timmons, P. ``Disaster Preparedness and Response: The Special 
Needs of Older Americans,'' Statement for the Record, Special Committee 
on Aging, U.S. Senate, September 20, 2017, available at https://
www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SCA_Timmons_09_20_17.pdf.
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    Individuals with disabilities struggle to evacuate from 
wildfires.\28\ One reason for this is that emergency notifications 
commonly lack accessibility for those with disabilities. Text-only or 
audio-only messages can often fail to be understood and failures to 
provide American Sign Language interpreters for emergency press 
conferences can leave many in the dark. Given the rapid nature of 
wildfires and the split-second evacuation needs, such messages should 
be uniform and provided with all accessibility measures necessary for 
individuals with disabilities to fully comprehend to such messages and 
react.
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    \28\ Morris, A. 2021. We Didn't Have a Plan: Disabled People 
Struggle to Evacuate from Wildfires. Retrieved from https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/us/wildfires-disabled-people-evacuation.html
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    The consequences of failure is clear from experiences during recent 
hurricanes. During Hurricane Harvey, elderly residents in a Galveston, 
Texas nursing home were photographed with floodwaters up to their 
waists,\29\ and 14 nursing home residents in the largely unregulated 
state nursing home industry died in 2017 from heat exhaustion when 
their facility lost power in Hurricane Irma.\30\ The COVID-19 pandemic 
has devastated people residing and working in nursing homes, 
psychiatric hospitals, and other congregate settings for people with 
disabilities. People living in these settings comprise less than 1% of 
the U.S. population, but nearly 50% of coronavirus deaths.\31\
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    \29\ Ferguson, J. W. 2017. Eighteen People Rescued from Flooded 
Assisted Living Facility. Retrieved from https://www.galvnews.com/news/
free/article_e1ffff8e-435d-5c78-ab46-57d6bc7dc6a5.html
    \30\ CNN. 2017. Husband and Wife Among 14 Dead After Florida 
Nursing Home Lost A/C. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/09/
health/florida-irma-nursing-home-deaths-wife/index.html
    \31\ Mizner, S. 2020. COVID-19 Deaths in Nursing Homes are not 
Unavoidable--They are the Result of Deadly Discrimination. Retrieved 
from https://www.aclu.org/news/disability-rights/covid-19-deaths-in-
nursing-homes-are-not-unavoidable-they-are-the-result-of-deadly-
discrimination/
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            Immigrants and People with Limited English Proficiency
    Individuals with limited English proficiency often face difficulty 
in accessing FEMA resources. For example, in Puerto Rico, FEMA 
struggled to find translators or provide basic information in Spanish, 
which is the predominant language on the island.\32\ While FEMA's 
regulations require that such documents are produced, advocates 
commonly express concern that the agency and its grantees regularly 
distribute forms only in English or with limited translated versions.
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    \32\ Davidson, J. 2020. How a lack of diversity at federal agencies 
can have serious consequences. Retrieved from https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-a-lack-of-diversity-at-federal-
agencies-can-have-serious-consequences/2020/02/29/ceec904e-5a65-11ea-
8753-73d96000faae_story.html
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    Given the agriculture nature of many areas that experience 
wildfires, immigrant agricultural workers commonly experience the brunt 
of such disasters. The failure of emergency response systems to include 
translated information on assistance, shelters, and other recovery 
information seriously precludes such households from accessing 
assistance. In addition, the continued persecution of such populations 
based on their immigration status often creates a culture of fear that 
prevents such households from calling for help and receiving emergency 
messaging even if it is translated. Many farmworkers are unaware of 
approaching wildfires with many only learning of the danger upon 
actively seeing the wildfire and fleeing.\33\
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    \33\ NPR. 2015. ``Farm Workers in Wildfire Areas Aren't Always 
Aware of Evacuation Plans.'' Retrieved from https://www.wkyufm.org/
post/farm-workers-wildfire-areas-arent-always-aware-evacuation-
plans#stream/0
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Onerous Title Documentation Requirements
    For decades, eligible applicants were wrongfully denied FEMA 
assistance due to inflexible and arbitrary requirements, rigid 
interpretations of rules, and confusing and bureaucratic processes.
    FEMA consistently requires disaster survivors to provide title 
documentation in order to prove eligibility for the agency's Individual 
Assistance (IA) \34\ program and other recovery aid, even though its 
own guidance on Individual and Household Assistance allows alternative 
documentation of ownership. Low-income homeowners, residents of 
manufactured housing, renters without written leases, and other 
individuals frequently lack such documentation or the ability to 
quickly procure proper documents. FEMA's rigid and unnecessary policy 
has harmed low-income disaster survivors since at least 1995.
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    \34\ Individual Assistance (IA) programs provide financial and 
program assistance directly to disaster survivors, as opposed to 
governments or eligible nonprofits. See: https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1565194429982-5674cd81399feaeb00cc72ab7fc4d84f/FACTSHEET
IndividualAssistanceProgram.pdf
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    After Hurricane Maria, FEMA denied assistance to at least 77,000 
survivors due to title documentation issues.\35\ For months, NLIHC's 
Disaster Housing Recovery Coalition pushed FEMA to remove this 
unnecessary obstacle to low-income Puerto Ricans receiving needed 
assistance. Finally, FEMA's Office of Chief Counsel engaged and worked 
with DHRC members Ayuda Legal Huracan Maria, Fundacion Fondo de Accesso 
a la Justicia, and Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico to prepare a 
``sworn statement'' that would allow Puerto Rican homeowners without 
title documents to prove ownership of their homes so that they can 
receive the assistance to which they are entitled. While FEMA allowed 
survivors to use this method to apply for assistance, FEMA refused to 
make the sworn statement available on its website or on social media.
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    \35\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2019. Impact of 
Hurricane Maria. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/
Hurricane-Impact-Maria.pdf
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    These same issues occurred in the continental U.S. In North 
Carolina and other parts of the American South, rural, historically 
African American communities often do not use title systems, instead 
implementing informal systems like those used in Puerto Rico. After 
Hurricane Katrina, thousands of poor Alabamians were denied assistance 
due to lack of formal title on their damaged homes. After Hurricane 
Michael, FEMA denied assistance to as many as 50% of applicants in 
certain parts of the panhandle largely due to elderly households and 
mobile homeowners lacking FEMA-required title documentation.\36\ After 
California's wildfires, FEMA denied assistance to 70% of applicants due 
to title issues.\37\ Those denied were predominantly rural mobile 
homeowners, many of them farmworkers or other low-income workers, who 
do not have title to their homes. In all cases, FEMA refused to modify 
its programs to accommodate the situation, choosing instead to deny 
eligible applicants needed assistance to which they were entitled.
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    \36\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2019. Impact of 
Hurricane Michael. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/sites/default/
files/Hurricane-Impact-Michael.pdf
    \37\ National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2019. Impact of the 
2018 California Wildfires. Retrieved from https://nlihc.org/sites/
default/files/Califonia-Wildfire-2018.pdf
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    Work to reform FEMA's harmful policy began with efforts by NLIHC, 
disaster survivors, and partners in Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi 
after Hurricane Katrina, and they were continued by the DHRC and 
advocates in Texas and Florida after Hurricanes Harvey and Michael, in 
California after several wildfires, and in Puerto Rico in the aftermath 
of Hurricane Maria.
    After sustained advocacy, FEMA issued substantial changes in 
September 2021 to how it conducts verification for occupancy and 
ownership of disaster damaged homes.\38\ Under FEMA's new policy, these 
survivors can now self-certify ownership of their homes when they do 
not have other documentation, overcoming a major hurdle to recovery. 
FEMA will also allow all survivors to submit a broader array of 
documents to prove occupancy and ownership of their homes. These 
changes are much needed and long overdue. In addition, attention must 
be given to the implementation of these rules, which anecdotally have 
not been applied evenly in the response to Hurricane Ida.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ NLIHC. 2021. FEMA Announces Major Improvements for Low-Income 
Disaster Survivors. Retrieved from: https://nlihc.org/resource/fema-
announces-major-improvements-low-income-disaster-survivors
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    Disincentives to apply for assistance like title documentation 
requirements and resulting high denial rates not only limit immediate 
assistance for low-income survivors, but also distort the entire 
disaster recovery process because IA application data is used to make 
funding determinations throughout the federal disaster recovery 
process.
FEMA's Systemic Lack of Transparency
    FEMA has consistently refused to clarify or make public important 
information about its aid application process. By not releasing this 
information, FEMA makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
who is eligible to receive assistance and why assistance is denied. A 
confusing appeals process leads to higher denial rates for low-income 
disaster survivors.
    While FEMA, SBA, and HUD offer assistance programs to disaster 
survivors, basic information on program eligibility is not made 
publicly available. Without such information, disaster survivors often 
apply to all programs with the hopes that at least some assistance will 
be provided. For low-income individuals who may lack internet or phone 
access or who may need special accommodations to allow them to apply, 
completing multiple applications can be especially problematic. As a 
result, many of the disaster survivors with the lowest incomes forgo 
applying for assistance all together, despite their need.
    FEMA has consistently refused to give survivors reasons upfront for 
denials or opportunities for applicants to correct errors or provide 
more information. Instead of receiving guidelines or clarification from 
FEMA, survivors and advocates must work through a lengthy 
administrative process in order to be given a reason for their denial. 
The lack of clarity makes it more difficult for assistance 
organizations attempting to inform and assist low-income survivors 
after a disaster. As a result, appeals take longer and are more costly.
    The FEMA appeals process is confusing and difficult. A denied 
applicant must first submit a form explaining the dispute and providing 
supporting documentation. FEMA denial letters, however, provide only 
very vague reasons for the initial denial of assistance. The denied 
applicant must refute all possible interpretations of the reason, or 
they will lose their appeal. As a result, low-income survivors with 
little access to legal representation or the money for a protracted 
legal fight simply do not appeal at all.
    It is extremely difficult to access basic data about FEMA programs 
and processes. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to FEMA often 
go months or years without being answered. NLIHC filed a FOIA request 
in December 2018 requesting basic materials, including FEMA's 
application for assistance, procedure manuals for determining 
eligibility, and data sharing agreements with HUD and other federal 
agencies. To date, FEMA has not provided these materials. In other 
cases, FEMA refuses to provide basic information, claiming grounds of 
privilege. In recent years, some progress has been made with the 
release of data after major disasters through FEMA's OpenFEMA portal. 
These changes, while a welcome development, are not enough and may not 
be continued.
FEMA's Inflexibility and Inability to Adjust to New Conditions
    Climate change means wildfires and other disasters are more 
destructive, more frequent, and impact a broader geographic scope, 
posing new challenges for FEMA and disaster recovery efforts. FEMA is 
not adapting its thinking or its programs to respond to these 
challenges, instead sticking to a rigid system of disaster aid and 
recovery based on responding to contained local disasters. FEMA has 
little capacity to effectively deal with both large, regional disasters 
and the unique circumstances and needs of a specific community impacted 
by a disaster.
    FEMA has a rigid allegiance to protocol over outcomes, a stubborn 
reliance on programs inaccessible to low-income survivors and 
repeatedly refuses to release important data on recovery outcomes. FEMA 
relies heavily on protocol written in Washington, D.C. and not on what 
the agency hears from advocates, survivors, FEMA employees in the 
field, and other stakeholders. FEMA systems are not designed to adapt 
to situations on the ground. As a result, predictable issues repeatedly 
arise after each disaster and go unaddressed by the agency, further 
harming low-income survivors.
    FEMA has consistently failed to learn larger lessons from past 
disasters and apply them to future disaster recovery efforts. FEMA's 
own internal watchdog, the Department of Homeland Security Office of 
the Inspector General, removed criticisms from reports on the agency's 
disaster response and replaced them with success stories, praising 
FEMA's work.\39\ As a result of this lack of internal critique and 
self-adjustment, FEMA repeats the same mistakes, and does similar harm, 
disaster after disaster.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Homeland 
Security. 2019. Special Report: Review Regarding DHS OIG's Retraction 
of Thirteen Reports Evaluating FEMA's Initial Response to Disasters. 
Retrieved from https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/oig-
reports/OIG-19-41-May19.pdf
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         Equitable Solutions Centered on the Needs of Survivors
    A reformed disaster housing recovery system that is centered on the 
needs of the lowest-income and most marginalized survivors and their 
communities must ensure opportunities for resident and public 
engagement, systemic transparency, full accountability and due process, 
robust equity and civil rights enforcement, fair mitigation practices, 
and a focus on increased local capacity and benefit. These priorities 
must be reflected in every stage of disaster recovery and response, 
from pre-disaster emergency planning through long-term recovery and 
post-recovery mitigation, to help address the systemic racism and 
classism that have resulted in our broken current disaster housing 
system.
Resident and Public Participation
    A reformed disaster housing recovery and response framework must 
ensure robust, ongoing, and timely opportunities for public engagement 
through structured collaboration with stakeholders beginning with 
emergency planning and response and continuing through the closeout of 
recovery and mitigation programs. Residents must be empowered to make 
decisions for themselves and their communities, and their input must be 
given substantial weight.
    Current disaster housing response and recovery efforts effectively 
limit opportunities for impacted residents to meaningfully engage and 
contribute to the rebuilding of their communities after a disaster. 
State officials are under enormous pressure to respond and rebuild as 
quickly as possible, often making any public input process rushed and 
ineffective. Engagement is often limited because residents are unaware 
of emergency response, rebuilding, and mitigation plans, whether 
because state officials fail to announce public meetings or because 
materials are provided only in English or in formats that are not 
accessible, including to people with disabilities. Moreover, plans 
often do not include essential information--including information about 
how funds will be spent and who will be eligible for which funds--that 
is needed for the public to engage effectively. Opportunities for 
engagement are limited, irregular, and occur too late in the process.
Systemic Transparency
    Basic, essential information about federal disaster response and 
recovery efforts must be made publicly available in a timely manner. 
This transparency must be systemized, so that it is not provided on an 
ad hoc basis. Data transparency is critical to ensuring informed public 
policy decisions, allowing greater public participation in disaster 
recovery efforts, and helping public and private entities better 
recognize gaps in services and identify reforms needed for future 
disaster recovery efforts.
    The current federal disaster response and recovery, however, 
suffers from a systemic lack of data transparency. After past 
disasters, this failure to provide basic transparency--ranging from 
damage assessments, determination of unmet needs, program design and 
implementation, grantee and subgrantee performance, and how federal 
dollars are spent--has hampered efforts to effectively target and 
distribute aid to those most in need.
Full Accountability and Due Process
    Accountability and due process must be central in any reformed 
disaster housing recovery and response framework. Federal efforts must 
ensure that all eligible survivors receive the assistance needed to get 
back on their feet.
    The daunting application process for disaster aid discourages 
survivors from applying for assistance. The application and appeals 
processes are confusing, time-consuming, and frustrating. As a result, 
low-income survivors--especially seniors, people with disabilities, and 
people with limited English proficiency, and other individuals--face 
high, unnecessary, and counterproductive barriers to receiving federal 
disaster housing recovery assistance and many forgo applying for 
assistance altogether. By not providing full accountability, 
transparency, and due process to applicants, the federal government has 
made it difficult--if not impossible--to determine who is eligible to 
receive assistance and why assistance was denied, leading to higher 
denial rates for low-income disaster survivors.
Robust Equity and Civil Rights Enforcement
    Equity must be a central and explicit goal of federal disaster 
housing response and recovery efforts, and each stage of the response 
and recovery must be examined and reformed to ensure that federal, 
state, and local efforts actively dismantle systems of oppression. All 
emergency response, long-term recovery, and mitigation actions must be 
designed and pursued in a manner that addresses and prioritizes the 
needs of the lowest-income survivors, people of color, seniors, people 
with disabilities, immigrants, and other protected classes. All such 
actions must also be explicitly anti-racist: analyzed to determine if 
they exacerbate, leave in place, or ameliorate existing or historic 
patterns of segregation and discrimination in housing and 
infrastructure, and remedied accordingly.
Fair Mitigation Practices
    All emergency response, long-term recovery, and mitigation efforts 
must be designed and pursued in a manner that provides survivors with 
the choice to relocate or rebuild their communities resiliently, 
minimizing displacement. As the climate changes, disasters will be both 
more frequent and more destructive. In response, local and state 
officials have begun to focus on mitigation and infrastructure 
improvement. Too often, such upgrades go to more affluent communities, 
while the needs of lower-income people and people of color are ignored. 
Moreover, federal, state, and local recovery efforts may actively 
contribute to displacement by failing to provide survivors with 
meaningful choices to rebuild resiliently, relocate, or improve 
infrastructure (such as storm drainage, floodplain management, and 
other common mitigation measures) in their disaster-affected 
communities. This effectively leaves low-income survivors at greater 
risk for future disasters than they were prior to the disaster.
Increased Local Capacity and Benefit
    All emergency response, long-term recovery and mitigation efforts 
must maximize the engagement of local contractors and workers and build 
the capacity of local community-based organizations, putting as much 
federal resources as possible into the impacted economy and impacted 
survivors.
    Local community-based organizations and networks are in the best 
position to engage with and have intimate awareness of the unique needs 
of the lowest-income survivors. These local organizations often do not 
receive the support needed to build capacity to scale up efforts 
quickly after a disaster. By relying on out-of-town contractors for 
everything from debris removal to repair of electrical grids, state and 
local governments miss an opportunity provide employment, job training, 
and contracting opportunities to low-income local workers and small- 
and minority-controlled businesses, who often are in severe need of 
work as a result of disasters' disruption to local business.
  First Steps to Fix America's Broken Disaster Housing Recovery System
    The ``Fixing America's Broken Disaster Housing Recovery System'' 
report provides specific policy recommendations to reimagine and 
redesign a new disaster housing recovery framework that is centered on 
the needs of the lowest-income and most marginalized survivors. This 
work will take many years. However, there are a number of actions 
Congress can take to immediately address some of the biggest challenges 
facing survivors.
Permanently Authorize and Automatically Activate the Disaster Housing 
        Assistance Program (DHAP)
    Congress should permanently authorize DHAP and automatically 
activate it after every major disaster to provide longer-term housing 
assistance and wrap-around services to low-income survivors. Such 
assistance should be provided to eligible survivors until the long-term 
housing recovery--including the rebuilding of affordable rental housing 
stock--is complete.
Enact the ``Housing Survivors of Major Disasters Act''
    Congress should enact the ``Housing Survivors of Major Disasters 
Act,'' (H.R. 3037) \40\ introduced by Representative Adriano Espaillat 
(D-NY) and Representative Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon (R-PR). The bill, 
which passed unanimously out of the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee in February 2020, contains critically needed 
reforms to ensure that the lowest-income and most marginalized 
survivors can access the housing assistance they need to rebuild their 
lives. We thank the Committee for its work on this bill and ask that 
you attach the legislation to any upcoming emergency disaster 
supplementals or appropriations language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ H.R. 3037, ``Housing Survivors of Major Disasters Act of 
2021.'' Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/
house-bill/3037/related-bills?r=38&s=1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Housing Survivors of Major Disasters Act'' would address the 
significant title-documentation challenges that have resulted in tens 
of thousands of eligible disaster survivors being wrongfully denied 
FEMA assistance. The bill would cement and expand upon recent FEMA 
application process reforms in statute while also extending the 
benefits of the new policy to those denied assistance in the past. It 
would provide a new framework to make it easier for disaster survivors 
to prove residency in disaster-impacted areas, either by completing a 
``declarative statement'' form or by submitting a broader range of 
acceptable documents such as utility bills, credit card statements, pay 
stubs, and school registration in lieu of a formal title to property or 
leases.
Ensure Equity is an Explicit Policy Goal
    Congress must ensure that equity is a central and explicit goal of 
federal disaster housing response and recovery efforts. Our current 
disaster housing recovery framework exacerbates and reinforces racial, 
income, and accessibility inequities at each stage of response and 
recovery. Survivors of color and communities of color are 
disproportionately harmed by the current disaster housing recovery 
system.
    Federal disaster housing response and recovery efforts must address 
and prioritize the needs of the lowest-income and most marginalized 
survivors, including people of color, people with disabilities, 
immigrants, and other protected classes. All actions must be explicitly 
anti-racist: analyzed to determine if they exacerbate, leave in place, 
or ameliorate existing or historic patterns of segregation and 
discrimination in housing and infrastructure and remedied accordingly.
    Congress must ensure that disaster housing recovery efforts undo 
the racial, income, and accessibility inequities embedded in our 
current disaster housing recovery framework. Disaster recovery 
efforts--which often include significant, robust funds--represent a 
unique opportunity to rebuild in a way that addresses, rather than 
entrenches, these disparities.
Require Full Transparency
    Congress should require that FEMA provide basic, essential 
information about federal disaster response and recovery efforts, 
including damage assessments, determination of unmet needs, program 
design and implementation, grantee and subgrantee performance, and how 
federal dollars are spent. Congress should require FEMA to provide full 
transparency on program eligibility, the aid application process, and 
reasons for denials of assistance. Data collected by the government 
must be open and accessible at the most granular and comprehensive 
level, while protecting personally identifiable information. This 
information must be made publicly available in a timely manner and this 
transparency must be systemized, so that it is not only provided on an 
ad hoc basis.
    Data transparency allows policymakers and advocates to be informed 
about program results and make policy improvements and incorporate best 
practices into future activities. Issues of equity clearly exist in the 
disaster recovery process, and Congress must require FEMA to implement 
better transparency practices so the problems can be identified and 
rectified.
Ensure Survivor-Centered Approaches to Assistance
    Congress must ensure that every survivor receives assistance to 
which they are entitled. FEMA maintains a culture of rigid allegiance 
to narrowly defined protocol over outcomes; as a result, many disaster 
survivors, including many of the lowest-income survivors, are 
wrongfully denied needed assistance. Congress should require FEMA to 
prioritize categorical eligibility, simplify the application and 
appeals process, and track and report on outcomes to ensure recovery 
aid reaches those in need.
    Rather than creating and implementing numerous categories of 
ineligibility, disaster assistance programs should employ broad-based 
categories of eligibility, with the aim that every survivor receives 
the recovery assistance to which they are entitled. Through the use of 
damage assessments, geographic information, and other data, a reformed 
federal disaster housing recovery system can provide categorical 
eligibility to survivors in disaster-impacted areas. With a shift in 
emphasis to categorical eligibility, many of the convoluted rules and 
requirements employed by recovery assistance programs will no longer be 
necessary, allowing for an easier, quicker, and more flexible 
application process.
    FEMA should allow for a flexible system of documentation for 
distributing disaster recovery assistance. Applying the least 
restrictive guidance regarding alternative documentation--and doing so 
consistently across all jurisdictions--would cut down on wasted time 
and confusion on the parts of both applicants and advocates alike. In 
order to employ full categorical eligibility, there must be a system in 
place that permits alternative documentation to ensure all survivors 
can receive assistance.
    Congress should also require FEMA, HUD, and other federal agencies 
involved in disaster recovery efforts to work together and create a 
single, universal application for aid to make the process easier, 
quicker, and more flexible, reducing the administrative burden and 
speeding the process.
Address the Unique Needs of People Experiencing Homelessness
    Congress should enact legislation to ensure equitable treatment of 
individuals experiencing homelessness through the response and recovery 
effort. Pre-disaster homeless populations are often denied FEMA 
assistance. Even if they lost all of their belongs in the disaster, 
FEMA will often deny survivors any benefits once their status as pre-
disaster homeless is established.\41\ With no resources to adequately 
prepare or recover from a disaster, people experiencing homelessness 
are among the most harmed disaster survivors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Ehrlich, A. 2019. After Wildfires, Homeless People Left Out of 
Federal Disaster Aid Programs, Oregon Public Broadcasting. Retrieved 
from https://www.opb.org/news/article/fema-disaster-aid-wildfires-
homeless-people/
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    FEMA has interpreted current law to deny assistance to people 
experiencing homelessness prior to a disaster, despite their 
exceptional needs. Congress should enact clarifying legislation to 
ensure that people experiencing homelessness prior to the disaster have 
access to the same emergency shelter and disaster relief assistance as 
other survivors, including rental assistance.
                               Conclusion
    Our country must develop a new disaster housing recovery system 
that centers the housing needs of the lowest-income survivors, 
including people of color, people with disabilities, and others. In 
addition to addressing immediate housing needs caused by the pandemic, 
Congress should address our nation's pervasive structural and racial 
inequities and reform federal disaster planning and response efforts to 
be inclusive and intersectional. We must reform existing programs by 
centering racial equity and equity for all historically marginalized 
people to ensure that affordable housing investments and federal 
disaster recovery resources reach all impacted households.

                                 
 Western Governors' Association's Policy Resolution 2021-06, Disaster 
 Preparedness and Response, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Dina Titus
                                                  October 25, 2021.
The Honorable Dina Titus,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 
        Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. 
        House of Representatives, 2165 Rayburn House Office Building, 
        Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Daniel Webster,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 
        Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
        House of Representatives, 2164 Rayburn House Office Building, 
        Washington, DC 20515.
    Dear Chairman Titus and Ranking Member Webster:
    In advance of the Subcommittee's October 26, 2021 hearing, ``Are 
FEMA's Assistance Programs Adequately Designed to Assist Communities 
Before, During, and After Wildfire?'', attached please find the Western 
Governors' Association (WGA) Policy Resolution 2021-06, Disaster 
Preparedness and Response.
    In the resolution, Western Governors address pre- and post-disaster 
challenges in the West, as well as the flexibility and inclusivity of 
federal disaster-related programs, standards and processes for program 
access, and the administration of assistance. The resolution also 
addresses issues related to risk reduction, intergovernmental 
communications, and funding to meet these challenges.
    I request that you include this document in the permanent record of 
the hearing, as it articulates Western Governors' policy positions and 
recommendations on this important issue.
    Please contact me if you have any questions or require further 
information. In the meantime, with warm regards and best wishes, I am
        Respectfully,
                                          James D. Ogsbury,
                Executive Director, Western Governors' Association.
                               attachment
                                 ______
                                 
                     Western Governors' Association
                       Policy Resolution 2021-06
                   Disaster Preparedness and Response
A. Background
    1.  Major disasters, emergencies and extreme weather events are 
devastating to the people, property, economy, and natural environment 
of the communities in which they occur. The outcomes of disasters and 
emergencies can often be far-reaching, with effects on the national 
economy, infrastructure, and the import and export of commodities.
    2.  In the United States, disasters and emergencies and their 
economic and public costs have increased significantly in recent years. 
Federal disaster declarations (including emergency declarations, major 
disaster declarations, and fire management assistance grants) have 
surged since they were first utilized in 1953. From 1953 to 1989, the 
average number of annual federal disaster declarations was 27.8. That 
number escalated to an annual average of 108.7 from 1990 to 2016. The 
year 2020 saw a record 308 disaster declarations by the federal 
government. Of these declarations, 230 were for emergencies or major 
disasters, surpassing the previous record of 128 dating back to 2011.
    3.  The federal government plays a critical role in disaster and 
emergency response and long-term recovery efforts. Accompanying the 
greater number of disasters has been an increasing level of federal 
disaster aid. From 1980 to 2009, the number of federally declared 
disasters which resulted in costs exceeding $1 billion averaged 
approximately 4.5, annually. That number has surged. From 2016 to 2020, 
the numbers rose with an average 16.2 disasters exceeding $1 billion in 
costs each year. In 2020, there were a record-setting 22 disasters that 
exceeded $1 billion in costs.
    4.  Proactive emergency management efforts, such as hazard 
mitigation and risk reduction activities, have an incredible return on 
investment. Research has shown that actions taken before a disaster to 
reduce hazards save, on average, six dollars in future response and 
recovery costs for every dollar spent on hazard mitigation. At a time 
when state budgets are struggling to keep up with more frequent and 
costly disasters, investing in hazard mitigation could have a 
profoundly positive effect on state and local budgets.
    5.  Certain types of disasters pose unique threats to western 
states and have occurred with greater frequency in recent decades. 
These include floods, droughts, tornadoes, mudslides, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and, particularly, wildfires. Wildfires consumed 
approximately three million acres nationwide in 1960. In three of the 
past six years, over ten million acres have burned annually. 2020 saw 
10.1 million acres affected by wildfire, of which nearly ninety-five 
percent were in western states. Federal agencies' wildfire suppression 
costs have increased from less than $240 million in 1985 to over $2.2 
billion in 2020. Experts project that wildfires will continue to 
worsen, in terms of acreage burned and in economic effects.
    6.  Disasters and emergencies have disproportionate effects on 
different populations and communities. Race and ethnicity, language, 
education and economic barriers, and immigration status can negatively 
affect the outcomes of those experiencing an emergency or disaster. 
These factors have effects beyond the initial response and extend to 
recovery, risk reduction, and preparedness program accessibility and 
equity.
    7.  The National Response Framework and National Disaster Recovery 
Framework describe how the federal government, states, territories, 
localities, tribes, and other public and private sector institutions 
should respond to and recover from disasters and emergencies. Local 
emergency agencies--police, firefighters, and medical teams--are to be 
the first responders in a disaster or emergency. State, territorial, 
local, and tribal governments have the lead roles in disaster response 
and recovery. Federal agencies can become involved in disaster and 
emergency response when resource capacity or effective emergency 
management is beyond the capabilities of a state, territory or tribe. 
These federal efforts are primarily directed through the Department of 
Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
    8.  Governors have a key role in managing emergency response. 
Governors typically are the state or territorial elected official 
responsible for making a state disaster declaration and directing 
disaster response in their jurisdiction. Governors are also responsible 
for deploying their state National Guard in emergency situations. 
Governors hold the sole authority to request federal assistance when a 
disaster overwhelms state and local capabilities, and are responsible 
for negotiating and implementing interstate mutual aid agreements.
    9.  Disaster and emergency response and long-term recovery create a 
significant financial burden. When authorized by FEMA, the Public 
Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation programs 
provide federal funding which can alleviate this strain. Affected 
homeowners may seek Individual Assistance; state and local governments 
may seek Public Assistance to reimburse for costs incurred from debris 
removal, emergency protective measures during the response, and 
permanent repair of damaged public infrastructure; and Hazard 
Mitigation funds can help communities rebuild and become more resilient 
against future disasters. Other federal agencies, such as the Small 
Business Administration, Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Federal Highway 
Administration also have programs designed to assist in disaster and 
emergency recovery efforts. For example, the USDA Natural Resource 
Conservation Service (NRCS) Emergency Watershed Protection Program is 
designed to protect people and properties from flooding that often 
follows wildfire events.
    10.  In recent years, some petitions for long-term federal recovery 
aid have been denied. This has been most apparent in petitions for 
Individual Assistance to counties affected by disasters and 
emergencies, but has also occurred in connection with state requests 
for Public Assistance. A denial of federal aid compounds problems for 
affected communities struggling to recover from the devastation of a 
disaster or emergency and slows recovery efforts in many western 
states.
    11.  While most disasters affect a specific local area, the COVID-
19 public health emergency was national in scope. The COVID-19 pandemic 
has highlighted the need for close coordination between federal, state, 
territorial, local and tribal governments in emergency management. The 
pandemic continues to cause significant disruption across the world, 
requiring ongoing attention from Governors and emergency management and 
public health officials, affecting the lives of all Americans, and 
complicating the flow of goods and services across international 
borders.
B. Governors' Policy Statement
    1.  Governors need maximum flexibility to respond to disaster and 
emergency circumstances that may evolve quickly over the course of a 
disaster through the initiation of recovery. Therefore, we should 
expeditiously remove any barriers limiting a Governor and their 
executive branch agencies' ability to save taxpayer money and expedite 
response and recovery efforts while safeguarding lives, property and 
the environment. Western Governors recognize that planning processes 
and disaster and emergency protocols are important aspects of emergency 
management, but that Governors also need significant freedom to adapt 
those plans to changing circumstances during the evolution of a 
disaster or emergency.
    2.  Federal, state, territorial and tribal efforts to prepare for, 
mitigate against, respond to, and recover from emergencies and 
disasters must ensure programs and response efforts are inclusive, 
equitable, and accessible and representative and reflective of the 
affected communities. Concepts of inclusivity, diversity, equity and 
accessibility must be included from initial development of programs, 
policies and procedures to reduce risk in our communities and address 
post-disaster survivor needs.
    3.  Western Governors recognize that community resilience is key to 
ameliorating the effect of many disasters and emergencies. Hazard 
mitigation and risk reduction are the most cost-effective ways to 
protect lives, property, infrastructure and the environment from the 
effects of natural and human-caused hazards. Effective risk reduction 
strategy development and implementation leverage broad stakeholder 
input across multiple disciplines, sectors and levels of government. 
Infrastructure planning should include consideration of risk reduction 
measures for known hazards as well as address the dynamic hazard 
profile created by a changing climate. We must plan for tomorrow, not 
yesterday.
    4.  Western Governors encourage Congress and federal agencies to 
reassess the structure of disaster mitigation grant programs, which can 
be too restrictive or narrowly tailored to address community needs. 
Additionally, establishing consistent administration standards for 
different federal grant programs, including the Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program, the State Homeland Security Program, and the Building 
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities and Emergency Management 
Performance Grant programs, would streamline application processes and 
eliminate confusion at the local level.
    5.  Federal agencies conducting disaster recovery and assistance, 
as well as the programs which they administer, should receive adequate 
and consistent funding and allow Governors and their designated 
executive branch agencies to have critical input on where those funds 
are needed most. The lack of speed, certainty and consistency in 
appropriation of federal disaster funding, such as HUD Community 
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds, are a 
hinderance to coordinated recovery efforts and effective utilization of 
public funds. For example, there is no current appropriation (or public 
consideration) of funding for the 2020 California wildfires, which 
occurred more than seven months ago. Additionally, the inconsistent 
incorporation of HUD mitigation resources (CDBG-MIT) is an obstacle to 
effective coordination of mitigation efforts across program areas.
    6.  Many rural western communities have less concentrated 
populations than eastern states, making it difficult for western states 
and territories to qualify for Individual Assistance and Public 
Assistance declarations. Additionally, certain criteria, such as 
considering Total Taxable Revenue of the entire state when evaluating 
whether to provide a major declaration for a localized event, makes it 
virtually impossible for large states to receive a declaration. Federal 
processes used to evaluate the need for access to disaster aid programs 
should be reconsidered. Federal agencies should reexamine the standards 
used to determine the provision of Individual Assistance to homeowners 
and the access to federal aid needed for recovery from disasters and 
emergencies that affect western states and territories. The 
historically underfunded USDA NRCS Emergency Watershed Protection 
Program should be revisited and strengthened.
    7.  Western Governors recognize that as the first responders to a 
disaster or emergency, states, territories, local governments, and 
tribes have better information about local conditions and needs in the 
response and immediate recovery phases of a disaster or emergency. FEMA 
and other applicable federal agencies should work directly with 
individual states and territories, through Governors or their 
designees, to jointly identify disaster risks and methods by which such 
risks may be addressed. In collaboration with Governors or their 
designees, federal agencies should reassess the administrative 
mechanisms to establish the most effective means to determine the 
necessity and provision of federal disaster assistance.
    8.  Federal agencies should provide state, territorial, local, and 
tribal government officials with accessible and clear information on 
available federal resources and programs and the most effective 
utilization of those resources in disaster recovery. WGA has worked 
with federal partners to improve interagency coordination on post-
wildfire restoration work, including a roadmap of assistance available 
to communities affected by wildfire and identification of 
``navigators'' to help communities prioritize post-wildfire restoration 
needs. Western Governors urge the federal government to prioritize the 
funding of these important efforts, as they should have a positive 
effect on maximizing the value of restoration work and, more 
importantly, addressing the needs of communities affected by wildfire.
    9.  Western Governors recognize that while aid may be provided 
following a disaster, the event itself could be avoided or minimized if 
resources were directed to pre-disaster mitigation efforts. Rebuilding 
is too-often provided in a delayed fashion or conducted without 
safeguards necessary to prevent future disaster-related damages. This 
compounds the vulnerability of western communities and resources in the 
face of disasters. Federal legislation should reconsider the important 
role of pre-disaster mitigation that reduces the risk and minimizes the 
effects of disasters and emergencies. When possible, pre-disaster 
mitigation should be incentivized at the state and local levels. 
Additionally, some western and midwestern states are at risk of 
catastrophic earthquake. Mitigation assistance beyond that currently 
administered by FEMA is needed. Finally, mitigation funds tied to Fire 
Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) declarations assist fire-ravaged 
communities. The FMAG and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) Post 
Fire Grant programs should be continued.
    10.  Western Governors encourage the Administration to consider 
actions to increase communication between and cohesion of federal 
agencies in disaster and emergency response. The Executive Branch 
should consider placing FEMA in the lead role to coordinate 
communication between and cohesion of federal agencies in disaster and 
emergency response. Strengthening federal emergency management 
processes to promote single, comprehensive points of contact would 
streamline state-federal coordination and help ensure states and 
territories can allocate resources where they are most needed. Western 
Governors support the consideration of a national emergency management 
strategy to provide consistent lines of communication between federal, 
state, territorial, local and tribal governments.
    11.  Federal agencies should seek to eliminate duplicative 
administrative processes to streamline post-disaster assistance. 
Multiple agencies requiring overlapping or duplicative reviews for 
post-disaster assistance adds time and cost to recovery efforts.
    12.  Western Governors recognize the need for clear, consistent, 
truthful and timely communication about the scope and scale of 
disasters and emergencies, both between all levels of governments and 
between governments and their constituents. Clearly articulating what 
is known, and what is not known, about a disaster or emergency is 
critical to developing and executing an effective response from 
governments, promoting public confidence in those response actions, and 
empowering citizens to make informed decisions about their safety and 
welfare.
C. Governors' Management Directive
    1.  The Governors direct WGA staff to work with Congressional 
committees of jurisdiction, the Executive Branch, and other entities, 
where appropriate, to achieve the objectives of this resolution.
    2.  Furthermore, the Governors direct WGA staff to consult with the 
Staff Advisory Council regarding its efforts to realize the objectives 
of this resolution and to keep the Governors apprised of its progress 
in this regard.

This resolution will expire in June 2024. Western Governors enact new 
policy resolutions and amend existing resolutions on a semiannual 
basis. Please consult http://www.westgov.org/resolutions for the most 
current copy of a resolution and a list of all current WGA policy 
resolutions.

    Ms. Titus. Well, that will conclude our hearing. I hope 
that these excellent witnesses will stay available to us and 
provide us with your wise counsel as we try to address some of 
these issues.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted now in writing. 
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 
days for any additional comments and information submitted by 
the Members or the witnesses so they can be included in the 
record of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    We now stand adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              

  Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Titus.
    Wildfires have impacted communities across the Nation.
    On a bipartisan basis, this committee has worked to improve FEMA 
and the federal government's emergency management system.
    The goal is to help communities prepare for, mitigate against, and 
respond and recover from disaster.
    Unfortunately, paperwork, red tape, and conflicting interpretations 
of law create hurdles for many communities hit by disaster.
    That is why I introduced bipartisan bills, including the Preventing 
Disaster Revictimization Act and, just last week, the SPEED Recovery 
Act, to help individuals and communities cut through the red tape in 
FEMA assistance.
    These bills will help communities--especially small and rural 
communities--to recover more quickly from all disasters, whether those 
are wildfires, floods or other events.
    But we know every disaster is different.
    I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on the unique 
challenges of wildfires and how FEMA can be best positioned to help.
    Thank you, Chair Titus. I yield back.

                                 
 Statement of the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, 
              Submitted for the Record by Hon. Dina Titus
    The National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) is 
pleased to provide comments to the United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 
Management on the topic of the threat of worsening natural disasters. 
As Americans around the nation continue to be impacted by and recover 
from severe natural catastrophes like wildfires, we thank Chairwoman 
Titus and Ranking Member Webster, as well as full committee Chairman 
Peter DeFazio and Ranking Member Sam Graves for holding today's hearing 
on such an important topic.
    NAMIC is the largest property/casualty insurance trade group with a 
diverse membership of more than 1,400 local, regional, and national 
member companies, including seven of the top 10 property/casualty 
insurers in the United States. NAMIC members lead the personal lines 
sector representing 66 percent of the homeowner's insurance market and 
53 percent of the auto market. Through our advocacy programs we promote 
public policy solutions that benefit NAMIC member companies and the 
policyholders they serve and foster greater understanding and 
recognition of the unique alignment of interests between management and 
policyholders of mutual companies.
                                 ______
                                 
 Unique Capability and Role of Insurance Industry in Managing Climate 
                                  Risk
    Despite an unprecedented level of natural disasters over the last 
decade, the U.S. property/casualty insurance industry always has been 
well positioned and fully capable to serve policyholders and play a 
critical role in the disaster mitigation and recovery process, standing 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the federal government and emergency 
responders to help victims recover and rebuild. With the U.S. expecting 
to face increasingly severe climate impacts in the years ahead, the 
property/casualty insurance industry looks forward to continuing 
fulfilling this critical role, but it is now more important than ever 
to consider the devastating impact of severe weather events. During 
this critical time, as the U.S. is affected by catastrophes in all 
corners of the nation, including devastating wildfires, we must ensure 
we are doing all we can to protect communities across the nation ahead 
of the next disaster.
    To put it simply, no industry has done more to advance real-world 
policies designed to combat climate risk than the property/casualty 
insurance industry, and insurers look forward to continuing to push for 
policies rooted in science to better protect homes and communities. 
NAMIC has been working to promote resiliency efforts in the U.S. for 
decades. In 2011, recognizing the growing number of severe climate 
events, NAMIC launched the BuildStrong Coalition, a group of insurers, 
architects, emergency managers, builders, contractors, fire fighters, 
and code officials all dedicated to building stronger in the face of 
the risks from a shifting climate. The Coalition launched one year 
after the industry funded construction of the Insurance Institute for 
Business and Home Safety Research Center, which conducts state-of-the-
art research into the how-to of resilient construction. While few 
organizations in Washington were talking about the need to make 
communities more resilient, NAMIC and the BuildStrong Coalition for 
years were working to educate Congress about the lifesaving power of 
stronger building codes and mitigation and the need to create a 
national mitigation investment strategy. In 2018, the landmark Disaster 
Recovery Reform Act (DRRA) was enacted into law. The DRRA is a 
transformational law that is making America's communities more 
resilient, including through the creation of a massive new pre-disaster 
mitigation fund, the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities 
(BRIC) Program. That program is already generating new resources for 
states and localities to implement and enforce resilient building 
codes.
     The Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Program
    Pursuant to the DRRA, an amount equal to 6 percent of disaster 
relief spending can automatically be deposited into the BRIC Program, 
which will award grants on an annual basis to states and communities 
all over the country in order to undertake projects and perform other 
risk reducing activities that are designed to mitigate. Because of the 
way the BRIC Program is structured, where funds are prioritized for 
states and communities that have stronger resiliency standards in 
place, communities are incentivized to actively understand where they 
stand on a national basis in terms of resilience, and are empowered to 
plan tangible actions that would amplify their to draw down the impacts 
of disaster hazards. The DRRA also ensures BRIC funds can be used 
ability for the enforcement of strong building codes and requires that 
construction performed using BRIC funds be built to modern codes.
    The first application period ran from Sept. 30, 2020 to Jan. 31, 
2021, and the application period for the next round of funding will 
open tomorrow, on Sept. 30, 2021. Demand for the first round of BRIC 
funding, in which BRIC is awarding $500 million to states and 
communities, was heavy. FEMA received nearly $5.5 billion in 
applications from 53 states and territories, with 8 states applying for 
projects totaling $200 million or more. On the heels of this high 
demand, President Biden announced on May 24 that the next round of 
funding for the BRIC Program in Fiscal Year 2021 will award $1 billion 
in funding. This represents the largest-ever funding level for risk-
reducing mitigation measures before disasters in the U.S. In a sign of 
how much the pre-disaster landscape has changed, as recently as 2015 
the federal government provided a total of $30 million to states and 
communities for pre-disaster mitigation efforts.
                The Path Forward--Resilient America Act
    Congress should continue to lead the way as we pursue the goal of 
enacting policies to provide incentives for ensuring our nation's 
communities--including underserved communities--are being fortified. As 
such, NAMIC commends Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, 
Chairwoman Titus, and Ranking Member Webster for the recent 
introduction of the bipartisan H.R. 5689, the Resilient America Act. 
The Resilient America Act is a critical piece of legislation that 
includes a host of important policies that will provide resources for 
communities to protect homeowners in the face of devastating 
catastrophes, including wildfires. The bill includes a number of 
important provisions that will increase state and local capacity for 
mitigation by significantly boosting BRIC funding levels, create new 
tools and incentives for the state and local adoption of modern 
building codes, as well as those that will help harden the nation's 
communities and lifeline infrastructure, including electric and energy 
grid. Importantly, the legislation would also ensure that a certain 
percentage of BRIC funds can be used towards building code enforcement, 
and critically, would help address aging structures by utilizing BRIC 
funds to provide resources and incentives to individuals and 
communities for the purpose of undertaking retrofits.
    NAMIC views the Resilient America Act as an important next step to 
follow the DRRA during this critical time where the nation is 
experiencing more and more severe weather events. We thank you for 
holding today's hearing and look forward to working together in an 
effort to advance the Resilient America Act and create a stronger, more 
resilient America.

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