[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-29]

          CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR RULES-BASED ORDER IN SPACE

                               __________

                             JOINT HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE

               SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

                 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL

                        CORPORATE SOCIAL IMPACT

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                          [Serial No. 117-32]

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 5, 2021

                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 





                       ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 46-721              WASHINGTON : 2022 

                                     
  

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
Vacancy

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
               Whitney Verrett, Professional Staff Member
                           Zach Taylor, Clerk
                                 ------                                

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
                   AND GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL IMPACT

                    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas, Chairman

CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania             NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, Florida, 
MIKE LEVIN, California                   Ranking Member
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York           AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, American 
MAX ROSE, New York                       Samoa
GIL CISNEROS, California             ANDY BARR, Kentucky
COLIN PETERSON, Minnesota            DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
                                     GREG STEUBE, Florida
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                    Brendon Shields, Staff Director
                    
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Castro, Hon. Joaquin, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on International Development, International 
  Organizations and Global Corporate Social Impact, Committee on 
  Foreign Affairs................................................     3
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services..     1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Subcommittee 
  on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services...............     2
Malliotakis, Hon. Nicole, a Representative from New York, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on International Development, 
  International Organizations and Global Corporate Social Impact, 
  Committee on Foreign Affairs...................................     5

                               WITNESSES

Hill, John D., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for Space Policy, U.S. Department of Defense...........     6
Moore, Jonathan M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau 
  of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of State..............................     9
Turner, Bruce I., Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Arms Control, 
  Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State..........    11
Whiting, Lt Gen Stephen N., USSF, Commander, Space Operations 
  Command, United States Space Force.............................     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    37
    Hill, John D.................................................    38
    Moore, Jonathan M............................................    51
    Turner, Bruce I..............................................    58
    Whiting, Lt Gen Stephen N....................................    44

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    United States of America National Submission to the United 
      Nations Secretary General Pursuant to UN General Assembly 
      Resolution 75/36, Reducing space threats through norms, 
      rules and principles of responsible behaviours.............    65

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Morelle..................................................    78
    Mr. Waltz....................................................    77


 
           CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR RULES-BASED ORDER IN SPACE

                              ----------                              

        House of Representatives, Committee on Armed 
            Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
            joint with the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
            Subcommittee on International Development, 
            International Organizations and Global 
            Corporate Social Impact, Washington, DC, 
            Wednesday, May 5, 2021.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:08 p.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
    TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 
                  COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
    I would like to start by thanking my colleagues, 
Representative Castro, the chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on International Development, 
International Organizations and Global Social Impact, as well 
as his ranking member, Representative Malliotakis. We thank 
them for joining the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of HASC 
[House Armed Services Committee] to discuss this incredibly 
important and timely topic. I welcome our distinguished panel 
of witnesses, both from the Departments of Defense and State, 
as we dive into the issues surrounding the lack of specific, 
verifiable international norms for behavior in space. First, we 
have Mr. John D. Hill, performing the duties of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Lieutenant [General] 
Stephen Whiting, Commander, Space Operations Command, United 
States Space Force; Mr. Jonathan M. Moore, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and Mr. 
Bruce Turner, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Arms Control, 
Verification and Compliance.
    Thank you all for participating in today's hearing, and I 
ask you as well as the members, including the chair and 
ranking, to keep your remarks brief and to no more than for 5 
minutes so that we can have ample time for the number of 
members who are on the call to ask questions.
    Space has captured human imagination since the beginning of 
time. But it is still a long, long way from being understood by 
our political leaders, diplomats, and lawyers, at least in a 
way that the many nations of Earth can agree upon. Now 
scientists have made great progress in helping us reach, 
explore, and even briefly inhabit the harsh domain above us, 
but the rest of us are much slower to follow or even understand 
where the scientists are enabling us to travel.
    Many nations and even some corporations are exploring high 
above the Earth's atmosphere, testing the infinite number of 
ways that mastering space can help the 7.6 billion of us who 
live down here on the Earth. The Space Age is about 70 years 
old, and the foundational Outer Space Treaty [OST] is just over 
50 years old. That should tell us something. Unfortunately, 
precious little has happened since the OST to organize human 
efforts in the inhuman space domain.
    Space is in danger of becoming the Wild Wild West, where 
every satellite, astronaut, cosmonaut, or taikonaut has to 
defend itself. From their testimony, I see that our State 
Department experts are giving up on the concept of a law-
abiding, rules-based space and settling for something less, 
like a suggestions-based space or probably even a hint-based 
space. Perhaps that is the best we can do, but I think that we 
should try harder for better. Can't we at least agree on 
agreements on space traffic management, on the size of safety 
zones around satellites or capsules, to ban debris at least 
from ASATs [anti-satellite weapons], or to have compatible 
docking latches? There must be a consensus somewhere on Earth 
for the sensible.
    I look forward to the discussion with our witnesses.
    And I turn to today's honorary Strategic Forces ranking 
member, Mr. Doug Lamborn, for any opening remarks that he may 
have. Doug.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
    Mr. Cooper. Yes.
    Mr. Lamborn. And I want to thank you, Chairman Castro and 
Ranking Member Malliotakis.
    Additionally, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us 
today to discuss this important issue.
    As this subcommittee has highlighted again and again, space 
is a vital component of our national security now more than 
ever. Not only that, but our global economy is totally 
dependent on access to space. Space, like the air and sea 
domains, is a common good that we all benefit from regardless 
of country of origin. But unlike those other domains, space is 
more likely to suffer a tragedy of the commons outcome as a 
result of bad actors.
    The physics of space leaves it susceptible to long-term 
damage from debris created by collisions, poorly conducted 
anti-satellite weapons and testing, and simply poor planning.
    The foundation of international laws and norms that we are 
currently operating under were developed under the cloud of 
Cold War when only the two great powers could access space. As 
a result, the Outer Space Treaty doesn't account for the 
congested operations of space we see today. This treaty was 
also written with very broad language and phrases that are open 
to wide interpretation by signatories to the agreement.
    I do not believe China and Russia are operating in good 
faith when it comes to their proposals as evidenced by the 
Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 
Space, sometimes referred to as the No First Placement Treaty. 
This treaty proposed to ban weapons in outer space but lacked 
any mechanism for verification and also was silent on space 
debris caused by ASAT testing and rendezvous and proximity 
operations.
    Most notably however, Russia and China are in many ways 
already weaponizing space, proposing a treaty upon which 
ratification they would already be in violation of. I was glad 
to see that the U.K. [United Kingdom] submitted a U.N. [United 
Nations] resolution to, quote, reduce space threats through 
norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors, unquote, 
to be considered by the U.N. General Assembly this summer in a 
drive to make space safer and more sustainable. What I don't 
want is another international treaty that would tie our hands 
while others blatantly ignore its limitations, like the late 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. I also don't want to 
see a treaty where the U.S. receives almost no benefits while 
our adversaries do, like the now dead Open Skies Treaty.
    So I appreciate the continued service that you all provide 
to the Nation. And I look forward to our discussion today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. Now I turn to Chairman 
Castro for his opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOAQUIN CASTRO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, 
     CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL IMPACT, 
                  COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    Mr. Castro. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 
all. It is an honor to be here today with my colleagues from 
both committees to discuss one of the long-term challenges we 
face, not just as a nation but as a species: space, 
specifically, the rules that will govern humanity's 
exploration, commerce, and other activity within space, both by 
the private sector and nation-states.
    I give special thanks to the chairman and Congressman Jim 
Cooper--he is chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 
which oversees many of our Nation's space programs--for working 
together with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and my staff 
on this important and historic joint hearing.
    In the long run, the peaceful exploration of space can be 
one of the most significant and unifying projects that our 
Nation and our world has ever undertaken. As President Kennedy 
said of the Moon mission, America's journeys to space, quote, 
will serve to organize and measure the best of our energy and 
skills. In short, space-faring can bring out the best in us, 
leading to cutting-edge technologies, creating new jobs, making 
significant scientific discoveries, and perhaps, above all, 
uniting our divided Nation behind a common purpose once more.
    I commend the Biden administration for pledging to continue 
ongoing plans to return Americans to the Moon and making clear 
part of this mission will be to land the first woman and person 
of color on the lunar surface, ensuring that this Moon landing 
will be seen by Americans and the world as an accomplishment on 
behalf of all Americans. Yet, despite the goal of peaceful 
coexistence among the stars, space is not immune to the 
realities of international relations at a time of rising 
authoritarian powers or the global trend of increased 
inequality and lack of corporate accountability. This hearing 
will serve to assess the current and future state of human 
activity in space and to inform a new American strategy for 
preserving the rule of law, peace, and international 
cooperation in the most hostile environment humanity inhabits.
    This is new territory of course for all of us. There has 
never been this many state and private actors all operating in 
space at once with multiple different priorities and growing 
risks of clashes, both intentional and not. In many ways the 
challenge in space is unlike any that humanity has faced 
before. It took centuries to shape the law of the sea, drawing 
upon thousands of years of human seafaring. We don't have 100 
years to set the rules for space, nor do we have traditions to 
draw upon that fall beyond living memory. The reality is that 
space is already critical to the military capabilities of the 
United States, our allies, our partners, and our adversaries. 
The question is how we and other states will respond and 
whether we will be able to develop a set of rules to manage 
disputes and develop a set of rules that will also work for all 
of us.
    The United States has engaged in these critical issues for 
decades at the United Nations and in other international 
organizations. The accelerating pace of human activities in 
space raises the urgency of re-engaging with our partners and 
establishing norms and rules.
    Earlier this week, the United States made a public 
declaration of what our Nation's interests are in space, what 
threats we face, and how we will engage with the international 
community to establish norms of behavior. This is a critical 
task. We rely on space for almost everything we do as a 
society, to include navigation, accurate timekeeping, global 
communications, and weather. The number of satellites in space, 
from both government and private actors, will increase nearly 
tenfold in the next decade. Countries, including China, are 
developing the capabilities to disable or destroy satellites in 
space through missiles, other satellites, cyber attacks, or 
electronic warfare. And as the United States plans our return 
to the Moon, that also raises the importance of minimizing the 
risk to astronauts in space. Congress must pay careful 
attention to all these issues and determine where the United 
States will stand on these crucial questions for space 
governance.
    This hearing will be one of the Foreign Affairs Committee's 
first significant opportunities to address these issues and 
hear directly from the administration on what we are doing to 
build an international rules-based order to govern space that 
can meet the challenges of humanity's second spacefaring 
century.
    With that, I yield back, Chair.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Chairman Castro. Now we turn 
to Ranking Member Malliotakis for her remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW 
      YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 
 DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL CORPORATE 
          SOCIAL IMPACT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. As we set out 
to contribute to the development of a framework of a rules-
based order in space that serves American interests, there are 
two primary areas I wish to explore with our panel of 
government witnesses from the Department of Defense and State.
    First, my distinguished colleagues have already made 
reference to the impact of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. But it 
is the common heritage of the humankind principle captured in 
the second preambular paragraph of the treaty, quote, 
recognizing the common interest of all humankind in the 
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for 
purposes, unquote, that I wish to highlight.
    This principle of international law holds that, just as we 
are to treat our seas on Earth, outer space should be free for 
exploration and use for the benefit of all and shall be the 
province of all humankind. Further, it means outer space should 
be free from exploitation from any nation-state or private 
corporation. I draw this out because we have seen this 
principle in practice under the U.N. Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, also known as UNCLOS.
    It was established to set out a comprehensive legal regime 
for the world's oceans. Despite being a party to this 
convention, China has acted without regard to its terms, even 
going so far as to ignore an international tribunal ruling that 
rejected the legality of China's maritime claims and behaviors 
from 2016. Yet, nearly 5 years later, there has been no 
punitive action taken against China, and so still China 
continues to act in contravention to the Law of the Sea 
Convention.
    Last month, the Office of Director of National Intelligence 
issued its annual report of worldwide threats to U.S. national 
security, which includes sections on the threat of Russia and 
China's space programs. This report reflects the collective 
insights of the U.S. intelligence community and focuses on the 
most direct, serious threats to the United States during the 
next year.
    The report identifies China and Russia's anti-satellite 
weapons programs and the threat these programs pose to U.S. 
terrestrial forces that rely on satellite-based communications. 
I share in the concerns conveyed by my Armed Services 
colleagues on threats posed by China's and Russia's space 
technology to the principle of common heritage of all 
humankind. Both nations' track records on the Earth's surface 
give more than sufficient reason to expect that their malign 
behavior will extend into orbit.
    The second aspect I wish to highlight is the commercial 
exploration of space. I marvel and join with my colleagues in 
enthusiastically supporting the participation between NASA 
[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] and commercial 
space exploration. The April 23rd launch of the SpaceX Falcon 9 
rocket from NASA's Kennedy Space Center, which propelled an 
international team of astronauts, Crew Dragon, in the Endeavor 
to the International Space Station, is a perfect illustration 
of just how far we have come in space exploration. As was the 
safe return of the Crew-1 astronauts on May 2nd.
    While the U.S. Government builds partnerships with private 
industry, for China and Russia there is no distinction between 
that which the state owns and that which is privately owned, as 
their respective space programs are all state-owned. By 
extension, their programs serve both civil and military 
purposes. We have seen this script before in the Pacific 
waterways, where commercial fishing vessels are also used by 
China as maritime militia.
    I am focused on these two areas, the principle of the 
common heritage of humankind and commercial space exploration, 
because, on the one hand, they offer up opportunities to 
abiding nation-states and future generations, but, on the 
other, they represent dangerous risks resulting from nation-
states unwilling to be bound by a rules-based order in pursuing 
space technologies that poses a direct threat to our Nation's 
security.
    In our discussion, we must not cast aside these realities. 
When world leaders negotiated the terms of the Outer Space 
Treaty in the days of the original Star Trek series, 
maintaining stasis was attainable. But, today, as our global 
leaders pursue international norms, rules, and principles of 
responsible behavior in outer space, stasis is now a fiction. 
The U.S. and other nation-states may abide by international 
norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior, but our 
competition acts with indifference to a rules-based order. This 
is our current operating environment, and we must pursue a 
space policy that brings together our interests but also 
addresses the challenges in space exploration.
    I welcome our esteemed panel of government experts and 
yield the remainder of my time. I suppose I ran out.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Representative Malliotakis.
    First, let me say that everyone should be muted except for 
the witnesses that I call on. So let me repeat: Everyone should 
be muted. There is way too much background noise here, so 
please mute yourself.
    Our first witness for his 5-minute statement will be Mr. 
John Hill.
    Now, Mr. Hill.

 STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT 
   SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member 
Lamborn, Chairman Castro, and Ranking Member Malliotakis, 
distinguished members of the subcommittees. It is an honor to 
testify before you today along with my distinguished 
colleagues. You have my full written statement. And, with your 
permission, I ask that it be included in the record. I will 
briefly summarize it.
    Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Hill. The U.S. Government's efforts to foster a rules-
based international order in outer space are focused on 
establishing voluntary, non-legally binding measures derived 
from current technical and operational best practices. As one 
of the world's most experienced space operators, the Department 
of Defense actively supports and partners with the Department 
of State in developing U.S. proposals within international 
venues in order to shape the strategic environment toward an 
agreed upon model for safe, responsible, and professional 
behavior.
    There are many benefits to having common guidelines for 
space operations. Among these are a safer, more sustainable, 
more stable, and more predictable space operating environment 
for all space operators. Importantly for DOD [Department of 
Defense], such an operating environment can also facilitate 
indications and warnings of hostile intentions and hostile 
acts. DOD policies and practices often serve as the basis for 
international measures. DOD models responsible behavior through 
our routine space operations. And DOD works carefully to ensure 
that our space operations are consistent with international 
measures the United States supports and with relevant domestic 
and international law, including the law of armed conflict and 
the inherent right of self-defense.
    For example, not only are DOD operations fully consistent 
with the 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United 
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, but DOD 
practices also served as a source of the more rigorous 
standards adopted in the November 2019 United States Government 
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. Likewise, for 10 
years, the Department of Defense provided one of the lead U.S. 
delegates to the negotiations on the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space that produced the 2019 guidelines for the 
long-term sustainability of outer space activities.
    This participation ensured consistency with DOD practices 
and greatly facilitated implementation of these guidelines. 
Most recently, DOD has supported the drafting of the United 
States national submission in response to the 2020 United 
Nations General Assembly resolution on reducing space threats 
through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors.
    From the DOD perspective, United States leadership and the 
development of a rules-based order for space activities reaps 
benefit for U.S. civil, commercial, scientific, and national 
security space operators. As space activities worldwide become 
more prolific and more varied, voluntary and nonbinding 
international norms, standards, and guidelines of responsible 
behavior can benefit U.S. national security and foster a 
conducive environment for growing global space activities.
    Thank you for your time and attention. And I look forward 
to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the 
Appendix on page 38.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Hill. I appreciate 
that.
    And I ask members one more time to please mute your 
microphones. There is still some background noise.
    Now we will hear from General Whiting.

STATEMENT OF LT GEN STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, COMMANDER, SPACE 
         OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE

    General Whiting. Chairman Cooper, Chairman Castro, Ranking 
Member Lamborn, Ranking Member Malliotakis, and members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today in my 
capacity as Commander, Space Operations Command, on the U.S. 
Space Force perspectives toward creating a framework for rules-
based order in space.
    I am honored today to join Mr. Hill and our partners at the 
State Department, Mr. Turner and Mr. Moore, whose leadership 
and insights greatly contribute toward ensuring the safety, 
security, stability, and long-term sustainability of U.S. space 
activities.
    I have the distinct privilege to lead and represent 
guardians and airmen of Space Operations Command, providing 
combat-ready, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance]-led cyber secure space and combat support 
forces to the joint force. It is from the perspective of our 
role to generate, present, and sustain these forces that I 
testify here before you today.
    Now aligned under our Nation's newest service, our mission 
is to protect America and our allies in, from, and to space now 
and into the future. As U.S. Space Command's Space Force 
service component, we accomplish this mission through our 
headquarters' generate, present, and sustain tasks, along with 
SpOC [Space Operations Command] West, a headquarters we present 
to U.S. Space Command at Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
California, who plan, integrate, conduct, and assess global 
space operations. Our mission execution benefits from decades 
of experience operating in space while demonstrating safe, 
professional, and responsible behavior. In fact, given our 
imperative to help keep the domain safe, our command, in 
partnership with what was our combatant command at the time, 
U.S. Strategic Command--and today is U.S. Space Command--has 
for many years, with the support of Congress, been providing 
orbital conjunction assessments to any space owner and operator 
around the global, while also making available Space-Track.Org 
to foster openness and transparency in the tracking of tens of 
thousands of objects on orbit.
    As more actors come to space, the domain is changing. With 
an increased risk of collisions, as well as miscalculations or 
misunderstandings, it is incumbent on the Department to 
continue space leadership through demonstrating and 
acknowledging responsible behavior in space, such as the 
widespread sharing of space situational awareness information.
    Today, we support the shift of nonmilitary space traffic 
management to the Department of Commerce, thus allowing the 
Department of Defense to focus on directed military functions 
in our protect and defend mission.
    Nevertheless, the U.S. Space Force will collaborate with 
the Department of Commerce by providing the authoritative space 
catalogue and in identifying and analyzing specific behaviors 
to ensure safe, professional, and sustainable operations on 
orbit while further enhancing trust with allies and 
establishing new bonds with emerging spacefaring nations.
    However, we have long understood that our Nation is 
strongest economically, militarily, and diplomatically when we 
have freedom of operation in a secure, stable, and accessible 
space domain. It is the position of the U.S. Space Force that 
the voluntary, non-legally binding transparency and confidence-
building measures, guidelines, and norms on responsible 
behavior, to include an understanding of what constitutes safe 
and professional conduct, would be immensely helpful toward our 
mission to protect the U.S. and our allies in, from, and to 
space.
    In concert with the Secretary of State's leadership of the 
whole-of-government approach to establish norms, the U.S. Space 
Force provides Department of Defense a capability to both model 
that behavior and promote internationally accepted standards.
    I thank you for your support. And I look forward to working 
with Congress as we continue to transform our national security 
space posture. Again, I am privileged to be here with my 
distinguished colleagues and look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Whiting can be found in 
the Appendix on page 44.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General Whiting.
    Now we will hear from Mr. Moore.

  STATEMENT OF JONATHAN M. MOORE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
          SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Moore. Thank you very much, Chairman Cooper, Ranking 
Member Lamborn, Chairman Castro, and Ranking Member 
Malliotakis, distinguished members of the subcommittees. I am 
very honored to join you and my colleagues from the Pentagon's 
Space Command and the State Department to discuss American 
leadership in outer space.
    You have my full written testimony, which I would ask if 
you would kindly submit for the record. And, of course, I will 
keep my remarks to less than 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
    So thank you very much for the impressive senior bipartisan 
interest in this vastly important issue. As we all know and 
many of you have noted, human activity in outer space is 
changing rapidly and is of both interest and importance to the 
American people.
    In 1990, only about 20 countries were active in space. 
Today it is more than 70. The United States leads the world in 
new commercial space ventures. For the first time in nearly a 
decade--and this is a tremendous and inspiring success and 
thanks to the private sector--Americans are traveling to the 
International Space Station on American-made space launch 
vehicles. The success of our national space program 
increasingly depends on international engagement and therefore 
depends on diplomacy.
    The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs [OES], together with the Bureau of Arms 
Control, Verification, and Compliance, conducts diplomatic 
efforts to ensure that the behavior across all space sectors is 
consistent with U.S. policy and practice, as well as with the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty, which a number of you have cited, and 
associated conventions and agreements.
    The Biden-Harris administration has charged us to explore 
and use outer space to the benefit of humanity and ensure the 
safety, stability, and security of outer space activities. This 
includes expanding and leveling the global playing field for 
the American space industry. We work directly with partners and 
through U.N. bodies and other multilateral fora to advance 
these principles. Key among these are the U.N. Committee for 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, mentioned before, COPUOS, as 
well as the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs. For over 60 
years, we have worked through those organizations to build 
support for the United States space policies as well as for our 
vision to expand human presence in space and promote the 
responsible use of space.
    As Chairman Castro noted, in February the Biden 
administration endorsed NASA's Artemis program, an ambitious 
effort to land the first woman and first person of color on the 
Moon and establish a long-term human presence there, as well as 
develop and demonstrate new technologies, capabilities, and 
business approaches needed for future exploration activities, 
and go on to Mars.
    Decades ago, the Apollo missions galvanized world 
attention, but the costs were borne by the American taxpayer. 
Now, through cooperation with international partners and 
private industry, we share both the burden and the rewards.
    The Artemis Accords created by the Department of State and 
NASA in consultation with some of our close spacefaring partner 
nations are this generation's recommitment to the principles of 
the Outer Space Treaty, envisioning a safe and transparent, 
peaceful and prosperous environment which facilitates 
exploration, science, and commercial activities in space.
    As my fellow panelists have testified, there will be major 
geopolitical challenges as other countries advance their own 
space exploration objectives. Some countries will work with us 
to establish and adhere to standards of safe and responsible 
behavior; others will not.
    Our bureau, OES, keeps a very close eye on Russian and 
Chinese space activities. Together with the interagency, we 
engage directly with them on space flight safety and 
responsible behavior while countering actions inconsistent with 
those principles. U.S. cooperation with Russia is based on a 
governmental agreement on cooperation in the exploration and 
use of outer space for peaceful purposes, which was recently 
extended through December 31, 2030. This arrangement provides a 
legal framework for cooperation on the International Space 
Station and limited space, science, and robotics space 
exploration missions.
    With regard to China, we maintain our engagement through a 
variety of means in order to understand their space, science, 
and exploration programs, and encourage mutually beneficial 
open exchange of scientific data from civil space missions. 
Please just let me underline: American diplomatic leadership is 
establishing international frameworks and facilitating norms of 
behavior based on United States policy and practice. Advancing 
peaceful norms and responsible behaviors in outer space is 
critical to protecting American national security, commercial, 
and research interests.
    The Department of State, in coordination with the 
interagency and National Space Council as well as in close 
consultation with Congress, will continue to utilize 
multilateral venues, initiatives such as the Artemis Accords, 
as well as bilateral consultations to support U.S. interests in 
commercial space activity, responsible behavior in outer space, 
and space exploration.
    Thank you again for inviting us to testify. I welcome your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Moore can be found in the 
Appendix on page 51.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.
    And now Mr. Turner.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE I. TURNER, SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL, BUREAU OF 
 ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                             STATE

    Mr. Turner. Chairman Castro, Chairman Cooper, Ranking 
Member Malliotakis, and Ranking Member Lamborn, thank you for 
the opportunity to testify today on the rules-based space 
order.
    I am grateful for the opportunity to testify along John 
Hill, Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting, Jonathan Moore. Like 
others, I have submitted a longer statement for the record.
    It is incredibly appropriate that we are meeting on May 
5th, the 60th anniversary of astronaut Alan Shepard's flight on 
Freedom 7. This suborbital flight was the first step that 
gradually led to American astronauts orbiting the Earth, 
landing on the Moon, and today traveling in continuous orbit 
around our planet. This flight took place in a time when there 
were only two countries placing satellites and humans in orbit. 
It also took place in a time when the legal regime regarding 
outer space was just beginning to be developed.
    The development and implementation of arms control 
agreements is one of the main concerns of the State 
Department's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and 
Compliance, known as AVC, which I am representing today. In 
that capacity, along with our State and DOD colleagues, we are 
leading efforts for the development and implementation of 
voluntary, non-legally binding measures to enhance the safety 
and security of outer space.
    In general, consistent with longstanding bipartisan policy 
and as reflected most recently in the 2020 National Space 
Policy, the United States will consider proposals and concepts 
for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively 
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United 
States and its allies.
    Unfortunately, for many years, the international community 
has been focused on a number of flawed, legally binding arms 
control proposals, including most recently the 2014 Russo-
Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force 
Against Outer Space Objects, known as PPWT.
    The draft PPWT fails the test laid out in the U.S. National 
Space Policy, and the State Department has a long record of 
enumerating its many flaws. In light of these shortcomings, the 
2020 National Space Policy directs the United States 
Government, and I quote, to lead the enhancement of safety, 
stability, security, and long-term sustainability in space by 
promoting a framework for responsible behavior in outer space, 
including the pursuit and effective implementation of best 
practices, standards, and norms of behavior, end quote.
    President Biden's 2021 Interim Strategic National Security 
Guidance also affirms that the United States will lead in 
promoting shared norms and in forging new agreements in outer 
space. The United States believes that the development and 
implementation of norms of behavior can reduce risks to 
international security and stability through increasing 
predictability, enhancing operational safety, and reducing 
risks of misperceptions, thereby contributing to the prevention 
of conflict. That is why, in 2020, the United States worked 
with our close allies to advance a new United Nations General 
Assembly resolution titled ``Reducing Space Threats through 
Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behaviors.'' We 
believe this resolution can serve as the first step of a 
process to describe the threats to space systems, to develop 
ideas for responsible behaviors designed to manage perceived 
threats and risks to space systems, and to consider the 
establishment of channels for direct communications to manage 
perceptions. As such, it provides a pragmatic alternative to 
flawed Russian and Chinese arms control proposals, and many 
agree with that approach.
    The resolution was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 
this last fall with 164 votes for and only 12 against, among 
them Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, and 
Venezuela. On May 3, 2021, pursuant to the resolution's call 
for reports on proposed next steps, the State Department 
submitted our government's views to the U.N. Secretary General.
    Mr. Chairman, for many years the international community 
has been focused on flawed legally binding space arms control 
proposals at a time when the outer space environment has grown 
in complexity and become contested. It is time for a new 
approach, primarily focused, at least for now, upon voluntary, 
non-legally binding norms, rules, and principles of responsible 
behavior in space. Developing and implementing these sorts of 
measures help create a safer, more stable, and predictable 
space environment for all space actors.
    Thank you very much. And I look forward to the committee's 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the 
Appendix on page 58.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. I would like 
to thank all the witnesses.
    And now we will turn to member questions. I will begin with 
myself, but I only have two questions. And I would encourage 
all members to keep this as brief as possible because we have a 
large number of members on the Webex call today.
    First question, you ended your statement, Mr. Turner, but 
all the witnesses seconded this theme of voluntary, non-legally 
binding efforts in this regard. So it seems like we have given 
up the idea of ropes or any punishment, but we are just going 
for spider webs instead. So is that the best we can do? Is that 
a way to get people to be in a more cooperative frame of mind? 
Or do we need more than that?
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, sir, for that question. I think we 
are trying to make the best out of what is possible at this 
given moment in time. Certainly we do not exclude the 
possibility of legally binding treaties down the road, but that 
is not where we are, given the kinds of competition posed by 
Russia and China, as has been discussed by some of the 
speakers. So we are starting with the approach where you can 
maybe start building with like-minded countries to develop 
these norms, get them to practice these norms, create peer 
pressure so that these norms will also be respected by others, 
and maybe over time develop more far-reaching measures. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    My next question will be for General Whiting. We have 
talked about transferring space traffic management out of the 
Air Force for some time. It seems to have taken years. I am 
hopeful that the Space Force will get it done on a more timely 
basis because I don't want the spacefaring nations to turn to 
other nations for their clear guidance on possible collisions 
that might take place. So how quickly can we get the Department 
of Commerce to pick up this ball and run with it?
    General Whiting. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. 
Of course, we are eager to work with the Department of 
Commerce. And we have found them to be an organization that is 
eager to take this work on. And so we are working diligently to 
do that because we do care deeply about the safety and security 
of the domain, which is why we made Space-Track.Org available, 
as we have over the years.
    So my understanding is now that they have received 
resources to work toward this goal, we are working with them 
over the next couple of years to transfer that work. They have 
been partnered with us at our operating location, such as at 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, and we look forward to continuing 
that. I can't speak to exactly what their timeline is, but we 
are eager to get this transferred in the next couple of years.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much.
    I will now turn to Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Hill--excuse me Mr. Whiting, in your opinion, has space 
already been weaponized by countries like China and Japan? And 
what do you make of the satellites that reportedly shadow other 
satellites?
    General Whiting. Congressman Lamborn, yes, we have seen a 
weaponization of space from China and Russia. If we point back 
to 2007, really the inflection point in the 21st century where, 
from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union around 1990 until 2007, many of those threats that 
had come up in space in the Cold War had gone fallow. But in 
2007, we saw the Chinese conduct a very irresponsible test. We 
continue to have about 3,000 pieces of debris on orbit that we 
continue to track. That is about 10 percent of the total amount 
of objects that we track on orbit still from that test 14 years 
ago.
    We continue to see the Chinese building satellites like the 
Shijian 17, which is a Chinese satellite with a robotic arm 
that could be used to grapple U.S. or allied satellites. We 
know they have multiple ground laser systems which could blind 
or damage our satellite systems. In addition, Russia has 
several ground-based lasers that could jam or blind our 
satellites, and it is probable they will field more later this 
decade. We know the Russians have probable prototype anti-
satellite weapons on board, including our own orbit--pardon me, 
including Cosmos 2519, which is a Russian on-orbit weapon 
system which has birthed out a subsequent inspector satellite. 
And then we have seen a subsequent third--or second object, so 
three total come out of that Cosmos 2519. And we believe that 
second object is a projectile. And then we saw Cosmos 2542, 
which was launched in late 2019, which appears to be a similar 
prototype weapon to Cosmos 2519, which was synchronized in its 
orbit with the United States Government satellite. And when the 
United States Government moved our satellite, the Russian 
Cosmos 2542 resynchronized its orbit.
    Russia is a sophisticated space actor, so they must have 
known what they were doing. And, obviously, we do not support 
weapons tests near our satellites.
    And then, finally, Russia has a Nudol ground-based missile 
designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. But let me 
be clear: Even with this weaponization of space, we do not want 
a war to extend into space, and we want to do everything 
possible to deter that.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I appreciate that, General Whiting.
    Mr. Turner, I am going to finish with you. In late 2019--
and we have already touched on this--Russia launched a 
satellite that then deployed a sub-satellite that proceeded to 
synchronize its orbit with a U.S. Government satellite. And it 
is not the first time the Russians have done this. Have the 
Russians been told that this behavior is unacceptable? And if 
so, what was their response?
    Mr. Turner.
    Mr. Turner. Yes, sorry. It took me a second to turn my 
sound button on.
    Yes, we have met with the Russians about some of these 
issues. Most of the discussions we have are less than 
satisfactory. Sometimes the Russians do not even want to 
acknowledge that certain activities are indeed taking place. We 
have done our best to bring experts, our military and 
diplomatic experts, to some of these meetings to discuss these 
issues, but, thus far, the Russians really have not engaged in 
a satisfactory way.
    Mr. Lamborn. Finally, have there been any other 
international discussions with the Russians and Chinese or 
others defining standards of behavior for rendezvous and 
proximity operations?
    Mr. Turner.
    Mr. Turner. I don't--no, not to my knowledge actually. I 
mean, as we were saying, all of us I think in our statements, 
we are just at the beginning of this process to start to define 
what some of these norms of behavior are, which would, we hope, 
define such things as how much space to leave between bodies 
out in space and how one might approach them. There would be 
communications. There would be notifications, a number of 
things like that. But we are just at the beginning of this 
process now.
    Mr. Lamborn. So no direct communication with the Chinese on 
this, even though there have been some preliminary discussions 
with the Russians.
    Mr. Turner. I would urge you to--I think our DOD colleagues 
would have a better fix on that kind of a question, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. General Whiting, very quickly, my time is 
almost gone.
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, I am not aware of any 
discussion with the Chinese, but I certainly would defer to Mr. 
Hill.
    Mr. Hill. Congressman, if you like, we do not in the 
Department of Defense have direct engagements with China 
regarding space. There are some very clear statutory 
limitations on DOD's interaction with China, as with Russia 
these days.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Moore. I apologize. This is Jonathan Moore at State. I 
have a bit more of an answer for the ranking member, if I may 
offer it, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay. Go ahead.
    Mr. Moore. We do engage with China on outer space through 
both bilateral and multilateral channels. Our primary goal is 
to ensure space flight safety and responsible behavior in outer 
space. We have been working to try to encourage China to 
improve communications between our respective satellite 
operators to avoid potential collisions in orbit. As an example 
of this, we have been coordinating with China to ensure that 
their navigation satellite system, BeiDou, does not cause radio 
frequency interference with our GPS [Global Positioning System] 
satellites. And we are trying to encourage interoperability for 
several users.
    We do have discussions. China is not part of the Artemis 
Accords. We do, however, expect them to follow the norms and 
standards. We have been clear with them about that, as has been 
referred to in a different context by my colleague Bruce 
Turner. The results have certainly not been consistent or 
satisfactory.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Moore. Now Chairman Castro.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
    I have a question about the Artemis Accords for the panel. 
The Artemis Accords negotiated by the last administration and 
endorsed by the Biden administration represent a significant 
step forward in shaping norms of behavior in space and then 
bringing our allies and partners to work with us on the return 
to the Moon. It is also the first time since the Apollo 
programs where a new administration maintained the goals of the 
previous administration, a sign of continuity that raises the 
chances the Artemis program succeeds.
    So are the accords intended to exceed preexisting 
agreements and treaties? In practicality, what is the binding 
effect of these accords for their signatories? What role would 
the Artemis Accords play as a vehicle for establishing norms 
for behavior in space? And then, finally, so far, nine 
countries have signed the Artemis Accords, including Canada, 
the U.K., Australia, Japan, Italy, Ukraine, and the UAE [United 
Arab Emirates]. Do you expect other countries to join? And what 
steps is the administration taking to expand support for the 
accords?
    Mr. Moore. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that 
question. When we first started working with our colleagues in 
NASA and in the previous administration on the concept of 
Artemis Accords, there was some discussion about making them 
legally binding. As that discussion continued, particularly 
with our spacefaring partners, it became clear that legally 
binding arrangements would also require parliamentary 
ratification and could take an extremely long time to 
negotiate. So the Artemis Accords, instead, as previously drawn 
up and very much endorsed by the Biden-Harris administration, 
as you have stated, are not legally binding. They are mutual 
statements of values and vision for cooperation in space, are 
neither legally binding nor for that matter do they have direct 
financial implications.
    With regard to who has signed on to the Artemis Accords, 
you are exactly right, Mr. Chairman, nine countries have signed 
on to them so far. We are engaged in active discussions with a 
number of other countries that are quite interested in signing 
on throughout the world. This is a project that in fact every 
continent where there are populations, many countries, whether 
they are long-term allies or new friends and partners, are very 
interested in joining us in a transparent effort to set values 
and standards in space.
    Mr. Castro. All right. Anyone else? No? Okay.
    I yield back, Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ranking Member Malliotakis.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Thank very much.
    I have a more general question. I am just curious to know 
how the State Department and Department of Defense coordinate 
on space-related activities, particularly when it relates to 
our partners, allies, and adversaries. It is more of a broad 
question, but I was just looking for more insight.
    Mr. Turner. I don't mind starting this ball rolling. You 
know, of course the State Department has the lead role in 
basically in foreign policy outreach. In the case of the AVC 
Bureau, we are very active in a number of multilateral 
organizations where we will present our views because we have 
to do that competitively with others, for instance in the U.N. 
framework or in the Conference on Disarmament or any number of 
other fora. And we have of course regular consultations with 
our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, with our 
Asian allies. And this is what our job is basically about, is 
to go around and talk to people and build support for the way 
we want to do things.
    And the United States is very fortunate to have a very 
broad network of allies, which allows us to leverage our 
efforts and multiply them in a way that is generally not 
available to countries such as Russia and China. So that is 
where the United States has a distinct advantage. And that is 
where consulting with our allies and building support for 
everything we do is really one of the most effective ways that 
the United States can achieve the kinds of goals that we have 
been talking about today.
    And, of course, every step we take is, even though we may 
have the lead on these foreign policy issues, the only other 
thing that I would like to say is that all of these activities, 
especially involving arms control and some of these issues, 
security issues, are what we do is the result of a very 
intensive interagency process that brings in all the different 
players--the intelligence community, Joint Staffs, OSD [Office 
of the Secretary of Defense], et cetera, NASA--depending on 
what is being discussed and what is at stake. So it is quite an 
intensive process.
    Ms. Malliotakis. And the Department of Defense end?
    Mr. Hill. Yes, Representative Malliotakis. I will be glad 
to give you some concrete examples of how DOD really--we are 
typically supporting State Department in these cases because we 
are talking here mainly about diplomacy of the Nation, and that 
is State Department's lead. But, for example, Mr. Turner 
mentioned the talks, the civil space talks that his office has 
with China, and he mentioned the example of the Global 
Positioning System. So we will provide a DOD technical expert 
to support them because, of course, the Department of Defense 
operates the Global Positioning System. And we will provide 
that technical expert to support talks related to spectrum and 
deconfliction and so forth in that respect.
    Another example would be last summer the United States and 
Russia met in Vienna in the context of a space security 
exchange there. This was related to some other talks that were 
going on. Of course, the State Department led and organized it, 
but the Department of Defense, we sent one of General Whiting's 
colleagues; General Shaw was there from the operational side. I 
participated from the policy side. And we were able to present 
Defense perspectives and State diplomatic perspectives relative 
to the positions Russia was taking and some of the Russian 
behavior that we find problematic.
    Third example would be this United Kingdom resolution that 
passed in the General Assembly and the United States response 
to it. Again, we cooperated very closely in how the United 
States would put together the position. So State Department can 
be confident that what they were carrying forward was something 
that was good for national security from our perspective here, 
as well as good from the broader perspectives that they have to 
represent across the breadth of the government.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Great. I am running out of time, but if 
you can fit it in, I am just curious, any thoughts the Russia 
and China announcing their intentions to jointly develop a 
research station on the Moon and any concerns that Congress 
should be aware of on that end?
    Mr. Hill. I will comment that we will keep a close eye on 
that. And that is probably the most I can comment at this 
point. Thank you.
    Ms. Malliotakis. Understood. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has almost expired.
    Ms. Malliotakis. I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    The order of questioning for the next four members will be 
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Garamendi, and Mr. Issa.
    Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for testifying today. I 
appreciate your contributions to the discussion.
    Let me begin, several think tanks have already noted that 
cyber, electric magnetic spectrum, and directed energy attacks 
are growing threats for space-based assets.
    Mr. Turner and Mr. Moore, to what extent have these topics 
been discussed regarding standards of responsible space-based 
behaviors?
    Mr. Turner, I will start with you.
    Mr. Turner. What we have done in the report that we just 
sent to the United Nations, some of the issues--no, that is not 
it--we have listed a number of the different kinds of threats 
that--to space. And to date, there are no standards for those 
threats at all. I mean, these systems are being developed. 
There are no international rules to govern them. But as part of 
our contribution, we had a whole section describing the kinds 
of threats that are out there, you know, ground to space, space 
to space, ground to ground, space to ground. And we talked 
about radio frequency interference; directed energy weapons; 
cyber threats to command and control; attacks on terrestrial 
space infrastructure; ASAT missiles, which were discussed 
earlier; robotics; et cetera. So we are at the stage of the 
process where we are identifying the kinds of threats that are 
out there. And then, eventually, this will lead then to 
principles of behavior for how nations should behave in space. 
But there are no formal agreements covering a number of these 
issues.
    Mr. Langevin. Mr. Moore, any comment from you? You are on 
mute, I think.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, Congressman Langevin. Bruce Turner's 
team in AVC focuses more on the security side. We focus more on 
the civilian side of trying to set the standards and enforce 
U.S. interests. So I apologize. I do not have more for you on 
that.
    Mr. Langevin. Well, let me ask you this, with respect to 
cyber, we already have norms related to the targeting of 
critical infrastructure. I would be curious to hear quickly 
from all of the witnesses, would you support designating space 
as a critical infrastructure sector? And I ask this because DHS 
[Department of Homeland Security] is currently doing a 
congressionally mandated review of critical infrastructure 
sectors.
    Mr. Hill. I could step in here briefly. And, first, I would 
like to clean up something I said previously. I referenced the 
civil talks; that is Mr. Moore's office, of course, not Mr. 
Turner's. I misspoke previously.
    On this one, with respect to the critical infrastructure 
question, my understanding is that space has been included as a 
critical infrastructure in the homeland security context. There 
are individual defense assets that may be also included as 
defense critical infrastructure.
    Mr. Langevin. I wasn't aware of that designation, but we 
will take that one and double-check on.
    Mr. Hill. We will too.
    Mr. Langevin. I think it certainly should be designated as 
critical infrastructure.
    So understanding that you have to be able to adequately 
monitor the environment to enforce responsible behavior, 
General Whiting, how would you assess our space situational 
awareness and attribution capabilities?
    And, actually, before I go to that, do any of the witnesses 
have other thoughts on designating space as critical 
infrastructure? I would assume you would agree?
    Mr. Moore. Congressman, if I may offer a view. That is 
worth taking a more deeper look at. I am not certain that space 
has been designated as a critical infrastructure sector. 
Obviously, the question of cybersecurity is of paramount 
interest to the Biden-Harris administration. And many of us at 
the State Department are working on that, perhaps our bureau 
somewhat more peripherally. But in terms of space as a critical 
infrastructure sector, we would have to review that and get 
back to you.
    Mr. Langevin. Fair enough. I see my time is about to 
expire. Anything else from the other witnesses on critical 
infrastructure?
    Mr. Hill. Mr. Congressman, nothing on the critical 
infrastructure piece, but if you would like, I will briefly 
talk about our space situational awareness or, as we call, 
space domain awareness capabilities. We have the best in the 
world. And that is why we make available so much of that 
information through Space-Track.Org to promote a safe, stable, 
and secure space domain.
    But with the growing threats that I spoke to earlier, we 
need to improve that domain awareness capability so that we 
could help to know when any future norms are being violated and 
certainly, from our perspective, watch for threats and give 
good indications and warning of potential bad actors in space.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Jim Cooper and 
Ranking Member Doug Lamborn, for coordinating this very 
important joint hearing.
    Additionally, I would like to thank the four witnesses. 
Each one of you have come across as very impressive, and your 
service to our country is very, very much appreciated.
    In terms of questions, General Whiting, what progress has 
been made in operationalizing our international space 
partnerships through the Combined Space Operations Center?
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, thank you for that 
question. We have made some substantial progress through the 
Combined Space Operations Initiative. We now have allied 
personnel across many of our formations to include the Combined 
Space Operations Center [CSpOC] at Vandenberg.
    And U.S. Space Command, our combatant command, in fact, now 
has a named operation, Operation Olympic Defender, which some 
of those countries have signed up to, which means we operate 
day-to-day in space with them. And our CSpOC at Vandenberg 
works with their national military operation--space operations 
centers on a daily basis. So that unique pairing of countries 
that we are blessed to have, that is really an advantage for 
the United States, and we are excited about that progress.
    Mr. Wilson. I share your view about being blessed. And in 
regard to that, what are the leading countries that are 
cooperating?
    General Whiting. It is some of our closest allies, Mr. 
Congressman, like Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
others.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, again, best wishes on that.
    And, Mr. Hill, expanding commercial space infrastructure is 
a uniquely American solution to increasing our capability of 
resilience. I am impressed with the ingenuity of the private 
sector to augment government efforts to keep space accessible 
and stable. What is the appropriate level of government 
oversight necessary to ensure commercial entities are well 
integrated into a comprehensive rules-based framework? How 
should the administration incorporate them into a future 
defense space strategy?
    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Congressman Wilson. On the commercial 
space, there is a number of [inaudible] going on. First of all, 
with respect to--your question kind of touched on regulation in 
one respect. And there is a major overhaul of commercial remote 
sensing regulation that took place in the past year, which DOD 
worked very closely to really bring us out of the 2006 era of 
the old regulation into the 2020s era, where we have much more 
prolific commercial capabilities, and we need to let that 
competitive sector compete around the world. And the Defense 
Department benefits from having that strong commercial sector, 
so a big change in the philosophy there.
    We also, of course, leverage U.S. commercial space 
innovation. Our space launches off of commercial launch service 
providers, for example. There is growing commercial space 
situational awareness capabilities that we interlead with our 
own capabilities. And so, depending on the sector, we use more 
or less. There are some areas where commercial doesn't find a 
great market, so we have to put more government investment. 
Other places like satellite communications, tremendous 
opportunity to leverage commercial.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, it is exciting to see the mutual benefit.
    And, Mr. Turner, the June 2020 Defense Space Strategy 
includes several lines of effort, one of which is to better 
inform international and public audiences of the growing 
adversarial threats in space. What can Congress do to ensure 
that our constituents understand the benefits of an accessible 
stable space?
    Mr. Turner. Sorry. I am sometimes a little--I forget to 
unmute. Today's hearing is one such step, I think, because this 
is available on live streaming, so presumably others besides 
all of us can hear what is going on. I think Americans need to 
be made aware of how much they actually depend on space for 
their--not only for their security but also for their 
prosperity.
    We do a certain amount of outreach as well, which is very 
effective in that regard. And, of course, I think one of the 
things that ensures that this will reach the right audiences is 
that, thus far, our efforts in space have been supported by a 
bipartisan consensus in Congress, and it is sort of like, you 
know, the old saying that domestic policy ends on America's 
shores. I think it also needs to end where we start to leave 
the atmosphere and get into outer space. So I will leave it at 
that for right now.
    Mr. Wilson. No, thank you very much. And, indeed, Chairman 
Cooper is leading the bipartisanship.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
    Now, Mr. Garamendi, are you still us with? Mr. Garamendi?
    If not, Mr. Issa? Are you still with us?
    We will----
    Mr. Issa. I am with you.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Darrell, go for it.
    Mr. Issa. I think I am going to continue pretty much with 
the same line of questioning that we have been doing, but I 
will change it up a little bit.
    General, I think maybe you can handle this sort of as a 
joint representative. In the domains that we have operated on 
during your career--sea, land, air--we have international rules 
and conventions, and they are broadly agreed to and signed on 
by all the parties that we have mentioned here today. Would you 
say that is fair to say?
    General Whiting. Yes, sir, I would.
    Mr. Issa. And as we sit here today, we will have today, 
tomorrow, or certainly last week and in the next 3 weeks, we 
will have Iranian gunboats that will enter our space and 
endanger ships. We may or may not have another taking of our 
maritime folks. And, of course, China is building islands and, 
in complete violation of right-of-way for countries throughout 
that region, is beginning to encroach or to not allow people to 
have what has been hundreds of years of free travel.
    So would you say that, as we look to space, is there any 
special reason not to believe that all of the factors that 
affect air, land, and sea around our hemisphere, that any of 
those will be significantly different? In other words, can we 
not expect at least similar activities as we have similar bad 
actors or the same bad actors who are already in space, such as 
China and Russia?
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, thank you for the 
question. Certainly, I think those analogies are useful, but if 
we push them too far, of course, analogies will start to break 
down because there is sovereign maritime space. There is 
sovereign airspace. There is no sovereign space-space in space, 
and so there are some differences that we will work through.
    But we certainly believe, in Space Force, that the 
establishment of voluntary, non-legally binding norms of 
responsible behavior will help us to identify when others are 
acting outside of those norms and when they are acting 
irresponsibly. Much like when we are on the interstate and 
everyone is following the rules, you can quickly see those that 
are dangerous and not following the rules. So we do think that 
would be a very positive step for the space domain.
    Mr. Issa. And I agree with you. And as a follow-up, and I 
do agree that there is certainly sovereign space, but using the 
2007, in which China demonstrated its ability to destroy a 
satellite in deep space, albeit its own, but for the purpose of 
showing us that there but for their good graces that could have 
been one of our satellites or a number of them, that activity 
certainly was outside of any reasonable interpretation of their 
sovereign rights. Wouldn't you agree?
    General Whiting. Well, certainly, it was irresponsible, Mr. 
Congressman. With 3,000 pieces of debris left on orbit that we 
continue to track 14 years after the fact, 10 percent of all 
the trackable objects on orbit. I can't imagine what led them 
to do that and to continue to pollute the domain and put us all 
at risk.
    Mr. Issa. So the history of our planet being at relative 
peace for the last half of the last century was primarily 
through a combination of, you know, international agreements 
and a degree of enforcement that the United States and its 
allies, notably NATO and others, enforced with a periodic 
enforcement by the United Nations.
    So, in my remaining time, if you could answer sort of one 
of those great questions for all time, isn't it fair to say 
that we must go forward and establish those international 
rules, draw in as many convention signers, including potential 
bad actors, as possible, but also form those alliances that 
would mimic in space, if necessary, the same sort of alliances 
that have, in fact, kept us relatively peaceful for the last 
70-plus years?
    Don't we sort of have to do all of them, produce the U.N., 
produce the agreements, but also build those alliances with the 
expectation that, just as in the past, the future, there will 
be those who will not respect the very agreements that they 
have signed?
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, we have certainly seen 
NATO recognize space as a warfighting domain in just the last 
couple of years, and so we see many like-minded countries that 
we operate with putting more and more interest and concern on 
space. And that I think accrues to our benefit because we can 
now coalesce around these norms of responsible behavior, and as 
those begin to establish, then our State Department colleagues 
can maybe work further agreements down the road. But I think it 
is only goodness to bring more and more allies and partners 
into these discussions.
    Mr. Issa. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time is expired.
    I would like to give General Whiting the opportunity to 
clarify something. I think you may have left the impression 
that so far there is not much that is sovereign in space. I 
mean, I would say that each individual nation's capsules or 
astronauts are, in fact, sovereign entities even though they 
are traveling through space.
    General Whiting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was 
specifically referring to the physical space itself, which is 
in the outer space domain, not to manmade objects that are put 
on space, so thank you for that clarification.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Indeed, I stepped 
away for a moment.
    Clearly, we have a situation in which on the military side 
of it, space is a domain for war, and, unfortunately, we are 
all, not just the United States, China, and Russia, but others, 
rapidly militarizing space with the anticipation that there 
could be trouble in the future. And it happens to create an 
extraordinary risk when all of our countries are depending upon 
space for early knowledge of what the other may be doing.
    I am going to leave that aside. Mr. Issa went into it in 
some detail. I want to deal with the commercial side of it. We 
have seen a very rapid evolution of commercial activity in 
space for many different reasons, almost so that our military 
no longer depends solely on itself for highly detailed photos 
of what is going on in the world, weather reporting, and on and 
on.
    So let's talk about norms on the commercial side of the 
activity, putting aside for a moment the military side, for 
which I suspect the norm is he who is strongest will win at the 
end of the process, and we will all be dead. But let's go ahead 
for a moment on the commercial side. Start wherever you want. 
Let's go with DOD. What is your interest in the commercial? And 
then to the other two witnesses, ending up with the State 
Department.
    Mr. Hill. Congressman Garamendi, very much interested in 
that. I think a good example of DOD and the commercial 
community working with respect to norms has been the 
sponsorship that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
did with the group. The acronym was CONFERS [Consortium for 
Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations Program]. I am 
sorry; I forget the name of the acronym. But it described a 
body bringing together commercial people with government to 
talk about how to do on-orbit servicing and remote rendezvous 
and proximity operations and figuring out, what are the proper 
ways to do this? When do you need to have permission?
    It is a user community interest group. And if you think 
back, long time in history, the International 
Telecommunications Union kind of started out in that same way, 
community of interest coming together on it. I think it is sort 
of pulling off on its own. The commercial community will 
probably be taking more of the lead in that. But that is the 
kind of example where we will partner with the commercial 
community to figure out, how do we encourage the stakeholders 
to take on the public, the interest of the commons?
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Moore. Congresswoman Garamendi, if I may jump in as 
well----
    Mr. Garamendi. Please.
    Mr. Moore [continuing]. Just to say, as has been mentioned 
earlier in the hearing today, one of the difficulties we face 
is that, of course, with Russia and China, they really aren't 
commercial activities. They are state-run, state-supported 
activities.
    When it comes to the United States, where we have such 
amazing commercial partners like SpaceX and Blue Origin, 
exactly the ones that have allowed us to get to the ISS 
[International Space Station] without having to rely on Russia, 
they operate at very high standards, and we support those 
standards. They help set the standards for the rest of the 
world. And, of course, again, through the--Artemis Accords, 
working with those values, that vision, and those standards, 
other countries and their potential commercial space operators 
are very interested in joining part of that process.
    One of the problems with the COPUOS process is that there 
are over 90 countries in it, and it does all of its work by 
consensus. So, unless everyone agrees, nothing gets done. When 
it comes to commercial space operators, the United States sets 
the standard, and we are working very actively, bilaterally and 
in broader fora to make that the standard for the world.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Anybody else want to jump in on 
this?
    Mr. Turner. Just briefly. Again, this is Bruce Turner 
again. Just to say, building on what Jonathan Moore just said, 
I mean, there are opportunities there, of course. When our 
commercial sector leads, you start to set these standards. 
Those become the tacit standards for everyone, and then 
countries such as Russia and China are maybe forced to sort of 
deal with those standards as well and then would apply them to 
their own efforts. So that, again, is one of the advantages of 
developing these systems of norms.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will just end in 20 seconds. It 
seems to me that, on the military side, we are not going to get 
very far. It is always good to talk, and more talk is better. 
On the commercial side, building on what Mr. Issa said about 
allies on the military side, working to fuse our current 
leadership and develop a commercial set of standards and then 
allow the others to join would be very, very fruitful.
    Mr. Cooper, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The next four questioners will be Mr. Moulton, Mr. Waltz, 
Mr. Carbajal, and Mr. Brooks.
    So, now, Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    I want to continue on a consistent theme throughout this 
hearing, which is on effective enforcement. Without effective 
enforcement, rules and norms obviously limit our own activity 
in space but do nothing to impede malign activity by our 
adversaries.
    So let me be clear. I am not suggesting a rules-based order 
in space is not a goal worth pursuing, but I want to ensure 
that this is not an empty or symbolic endeavor. If we do not 
intend to enforce the, quote, voluntary, non-legally binding 
rules or expect our adversaries to abide by norms in space, 
what happens when they violate them?
    We see this issue in cyberspace. We have got international 
actors who are still emboldened to attack and hack into U.S. 
networks without any fear of an effective penalty or 
retribution. And so, yeah, we can name and shame to a certain 
extent, but what are the real consequences of setting down 
rules that are then going to be ignored, and how do we actually 
respond and deal with this more effectively?
    Mr. Turner. Those are some very good questions. It is 
always a very complicated issue, compliance with whether it is 
legally binding obligations in the case of treaties or whether 
you are talking about politically binding, non-legally binding 
commitments in other areas. Each one has its advantages and its 
disadvantages.
    The advantage of treaty is that it is a legal obligation so 
that, in some of the ways, you could argue that a violation is 
more straightforward, except if you have ever worked with a 
lawyer, you would know one of the things that you get into is 
you get into these very, very difficult and complicated 
interpretations of what the treaty actually says. And that can 
be also a very long process.
    One of the advantages of--just because it is not a legally 
binding norm does not mean that it is not a norm and does not 
mean that you cannot call somebody out for violating that norm, 
nor does it mean that you can't take potential action if an 
actor is not complying with that particular norm. In some 
cases, you may even have more flexibility to react in those 
kinds of situations precisely because it is not a legally 
binding agreement.
    And then, lastly, I would just add that with all of these 
kinds of norms, even when certain actors violate those norms 
they often pay a price for doing so. And in today's social 
media environment or media environment, whatever you want to 
call it, where so much depends on the narrative of who is doing 
the right thing and who is not doing the right thing, that can 
still be useful--a useful way to put diplomatic and public 
pressure on malign actors.
    Mr. Moulton. I mean, I am actually, Mr. Turner, one of the 
few Members of Congress who is not a lawyer, but it seems to me 
that this just has to be a lot more clear. And, you know, 
hoping that one of our adversaries will get shamed on social 
media does not seem like an effective strategy here.
    General, I have got a question for you on this same theme. 
So a rules-based order in any domain requires a certain level 
of transparency and trust, and I understand that there is a 
current effort by U.S. Space Force in space policy to review 
potential declassification of satellites and activity in space 
to be more transparent and to publicly communicate about our 
space operations more easily.
    How are you integrating with this effort to ensure that we 
have enough transparency to allow for verification of our own 
behavior while still protecting systems and activity that we 
are not prepared to share?
    General Whiting. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Congressman, for that 
question. Certainly, I would say that I think we are the most 
transparent country when it comes to our activities in space 
through the website that I mentioned earlier, Space-Track.Org, 
that we make available to the world because we care about 
preserving the domain for our long-term operations there.
    And we have had an effort ongoing for the last several 
years to continually even make more information available. Of 
course, just like in other domains we are not going to show 
exactly where our ships and airplanes are that are critical to 
the national defense----
    Mr. Moulton. General, if I may interrupt----
    General Whiting. Yep.
    Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Do you think we have that balance 
right, or are we still on the side of too much of it being 
classified to be effective at, you know, using the transparency 
we need to promote enforcement?
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, I would say it is not an 
end state; it is a journey. And so I think we are constantly 
working to get that balance exactly right. I think we made 
important strides and will continue to do those reviews to make 
as much information as possible to as many people as possible 
to ensure that domain is safe.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Waltz, are you with us? Mr. Waltz? Calling Mr. Waltz.
    If he is not, Mr. Carbajal?
    Mr. Carbajal. Here I am.
    Mr. Cooper. Now we can hear you.
    Mr. Carbajal. I am having glitches here. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman, and I apologize for the technical difficulties I was 
having.
    One of the most pressing issues to be addressed is 
obviously debris mitigation. The Space Force is tracking about 
30,000 pieces of debris with a half a million other objects in 
orbit too small to track. While the space debris mitigation 
guidelines of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space was endorsed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 2007, RAND [Corporation] recently reported that the 
voluntary guidelines lacked measures for accountability and 
that compliance with debris mitigation guidelines, and it is 
the biggest contributor to greater collision risk.
    General Whiting, based on the current level of space debris 
and voluntary international policies, will there be a point 
where there will be an unacceptable risk posed by space debris 
to the United States space assets, including both national 
security and commercial operations?
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, thank you for the 
question. I certainly want to communicate that we are concerned 
about the growing congestion in space, but I think certainly 
over the next several years we have plans and processes in 
place to make sure that we can continue to safely operate. But 
we do support intergovernmental measures that will reduce 
debris, and I will defer to my colleague, Mr. Hill, maybe to 
speak more about what the Department of Defense is doing in 
that regard.
    Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Hill.
    Mr. Hill. Yes. Sorry, there is a little noise. So, in 2019, 
the United States Government updated our orbital debris 
mitigation standard practices. They actually go well beyond 
what the United Nations practices are, and, in fact, they drew 
from a lot of Department of Defense and existing regulations 
providing much clearer statements of the hazard risks, more 
options for how to get debris out of orbit, particularly from 
higher orbits over time.
    But there is absolutely, as General Whiting said, concern, 
and particularly in the low Earth orbit region where things get 
crowded in some of the polar orbits in particular, that debris 
mitigation is important. The emergence in the commercial sector 
and in some government support, some places of potentially 
active debris removal is encouraging, but I think there is a 
lot of work to be done in this respect.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
    General Whiting, in your testimony, you write that some 
discussions at the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] level can 
be challenging, but more often than not, there is agreement on 
what constitutes responsible behavior, the ability to 
demonstrate and message responsible behavior, and desire to 
call out irresponsible behavior. At the mil-to-mil level, what 
has been the biggest barrier to moving forward with creating an 
international accepted framework?
    General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, each of the countries 
that we have mil-to-mil discussions with, and these are allied 
countries, they all have their own legal frameworks. They have 
their own policy traditions. And we work through those in 
forums like the Schriever Wargame tabletop exercise that we 
conduct every year. But through that, we find there is a 
coalescing around some generally accepted ways of operating 
that are responsible, safe, professional, and so those are--we 
think, through dialogue, we can work through those kinds of 
issues.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Turner, Mr. Moore, commercial companies are heavily 
investing in satellites and launch services. Space technology 
these companies are developing has the propensity to be dual 
use, which creates new challenges. Is the Federal Government 
engaging with commercial actors as part of your discussions in 
developing rules and norms, and can you comment on how dual 
technology is being considered?
    Mr. Turner. I mean, I think I would defer to my colleague 
from OES on the commercial aspects of that. But, from a 
security standpoint, of course, this is one of the issues with 
developing rules of behavior. And one of the issues when you 
are talking about threats in space is we are very acutely aware 
of the fact that a number of things are dual use simply by 
nature, so they can either be--have benefits or they can 
potentially be used against satellites. So it is one of those 
issues that needs to be talked about and, again, why we are in 
favor of these rules of behavior.
    Mr. Hill. Yes, Congressman Carbajal, Bruce touched exactly 
on some of the aspects of dual use. We are very much trying to 
support the development of the commercial sector, and, again, 
this is a place where companies in the United States are 
leading the way and setting the standard, helping again to 
return us to ISS so that we are not dependent on other 
countries for that.
    But as part of the broader efforts, including through the 
Artemis Accords, to build partnerships and to share values and 
vision on space, again, we are very grateful for the strong 
endorsement of this administration for those goals--that is 
part of the discussion with the commercial sector.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I am out of time. Mr. 
Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman is, in fact, out of 
time.
    We tried to get Mr. Waltz earlier. He was not available. 
Mr. Brooks was next, and he has logged off. So I think the next 
questioner will be Mr. Lieu.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Chairman Cooper and Chairman Castro, 
for holding this important hearing.
    I am very thankful for the expertise from all the panelists 
today. I previously served in Active Duty in the Air Force, and 
now I do my Reserve Duty at the Space and Missile Systems 
Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base. And I am thrilled that 
the United States Space Command has chosen to locate Space 
Systems Command, one of three major commands under the Space 
Force, at Los Angeles Air Force Base. And with every passing 
day, space becomes more important.
    I also want to just clarify the critical infrastructure 
question that Congressman Langevin asked earlier. The reason 
there has been confusion is there is approximately 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors, such as the chemical sector, the 
communications sector, the energy sector. Space is not one of 
them.
    However, if there is, for example, a space communications 
satellite, that would arguably be captured within the 
communications sector. That has been designated as critical 
infrastructure. To alleviate this confusion and to capture 
everything in space, I am working on legislation that would, in 
fact, designate space as an infrastructure sector, and that 
goes in line with both the former administration's and this 
administration's focus on space.
    And so my first question is to Secretary Moore. I note, 
first of all, that you speak at least eight languages. I am 
super impressed by that. But I also note that your title 
doesn't include ``space'' anywhere in it. At the same time, the 
Department of Defense has created an entire Space Force 
dedicated just to space. Do you think it is a good idea, or 
shouldn't we have the State Department elevate space to a 
standalone bureau?
    Mr. Moore. Congresswoman Lieu, thank you very much for your 
service, both in uniform and in the House of Representatives, 
and thank you for an excellent question. I am very pleased to 
tell you that, across the list of endeavors in the Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
we have nine action offices. One is the Office of Space 
Affairs. It is staffed by a number of diplomats and 
professional experts with advanced degrees, including in 
astrophysics. It is the core team that coordinates diplomatic 
efforts on space with other countries in lockstep with the 
Pentagon, with Space Command, of course with NASA. And 
congratulations to Administrator Nelson on his recent 
confirmation.
    We have a very distinguished team. The word ``space'' may 
not appear in our title, but because of the tasks that we have 
here in the bureau, which has a fairly long name as it stands, 
I can assure you that space is front and center. For all of 
these reasons, we are grateful for the opportunity to testify 
today and respond to not just your questions today but to work 
with you and your staff as we have done in the past and with 
many offices in Congress to help explain and gain information 
and guidance from you.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I just request that you and others at 
State Department consider having space not just as an office 
but as a separate bureau.
    My next question goes to General Whiting. Thank you for 
your service as well, sir. So we have currently other 
countries, such as China and Russia, who don't necessarily 
follow norms, and as you know, China has done anti-satellite 
weapons tests. So we could have two possibilities: Either we 
allow all countries to do anti-satellite weapons testing or we 
allow no country to do it through a binding legal regime.
    Do you have any preference for that from a defense 
perspective? Do you think the U.S. should be allowed to do 
anti-satellite tests as other countries do, or should no 
country be allowed to do that as a legal matter?
    General Whiting. Thank you, Mr. Congressman, for the 
question. You know, from my perspective, the real danger with 
those tests--and we are talking about tests now--are the long-
lived debris like the Chinese ASAT debris that we continue to 
have to operate around today. I think we do absolutely want to 
establish a norm that no actions in space, no country's action 
in space should create long-lived debris.
    And, with that, sir, I would defer to Mr. Hill on questions 
of legality regarding ASAT tests.
    Mr. Hill. Mr. Lieu, to pick up on from what General Whiting 
just said, in terms of tests, you are correct. There is no 
prohibition today on anti-satellite tests. There is quite a bit 
of scorn to be earned, as China earned in 2007 with their test.
    The question, though, if you were to try and prohibit 
weapons in space, is what is the definition of a weapon, and 
when are these systems, which they are so inherently dual use--
lasers can be used for communications; lasers can be used as 
weapons. And it goes on from there. So it is the practicality. 
It is the verifiability, enforceability of that. And so what we 
really have to focus on in the long run is reducing the 
benefits that people might seek to derive from employing 
capabilities as weapons. That goes to resilience and to mission 
assurance, which is a longer topic.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I did not know that Mr. Moore was so multilingual, but I 
did notice from the video that he has the largest office of 
anyone on the call, so congratulations on that.
    Mr. Waltz is back. So now it is Mr. Waltz' turn.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, everyone.
    Mr. Hill, as an OSD alum, it is great to see you in this 
capacity. It has been a long time. I want to ask you about 
thinking through how we establish deterrence in space. And, you 
know, as many of you have said and many of my colleagues have 
said, you know, our entire modern economy could be greatly 
adversely impacted should some of these assets be taken down.
    As we are seeing the Chinese in particular increase their 
reliance as BeiDou comes online, their GPS system comes online, 
their military increasingly projects and is also becoming 
increasingly dependent, how do we establish deterrence in 
space?
    I know the vice chairman is working on a declassification 
effort, but, you know, I want them to know what we can do and 
what we can't do and what we are willing to do as a deterrent 
measure, and what efforts are there along those lines. Mr. 
Hill, I will go to you first, but, anyone, feel free to answer.
    Mr. Hill. Congresswoman Waltz, it is good to see you 
again----
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah.
    Mr. Hill [continuing]. After many years. So deterrence in 
space, we spend quite a bit of focus on this, and as I started 
to mention in my previous response, for a nation that is highly 
dependent on space, both in our civil life, our daily 
commercial life, private lives, as well as in our military 
life, it is fundamentally important. It should be a norm to 
have reliability, mission assurance of capabilities at a level 
commensurate to the level in which we rely on those 
capabilities.
    That was the case when we didn't have adversary threats in 
space and when systems were first designed. You had to design 
for the natural environment threats. You had to design for 
jamming, and you did that. But as these commercial--as these 
more modern conventional threats have emerged, we obviously 
have to transition our architectures, and this goes back to 
some of the commercial points earlier.
    Leveraging the innovation that is coming out of the 
commercial sector and the significant cost reductions that we 
see in both launch and in the space capabilities themselves 
allows us to do entirely different architectural approaches. It 
takes time to transition to that. So you have to protect what 
you have today, but you ultimately transition to architectures 
that are more inherently vulnerable. And, as in any other 
domain, you have the ability to accept and survive combat 
casualties.
    Mr. Waltz. Right.
    Mr. Hill. That is a key part of denying the benefit of 
attack.
    With respect to the other side of deterrence, the cost 
imposition side of things, that is one where you may be looking 
a lot more across domain types of activities. It may be that 
the place to impose costs on somebody for an unacceptable 
activity may not be in the space domain. It may be elsewhere.
    Mr. Waltz. Right.
    Mr. Hill. So those are some of the things to think about 
with respect to----
    Mr. Waltz. Well, what I am trying to get at, and maybe your 
State Department colleagues are better to answer this, is what 
are we communicating that we are willing and capable to do? 
Because if--that is how misjudgments, miscalculations happen, 
and so that is--you know, to your State Department colleagues, 
what are we communicating now in terms of our capability and 
our will?
    Mr. Turner. Yeah, this is Bruce Turner from AVC again. One 
of the reasons we had a meeting in July with the Russians about 
space issues was to communicate very clearly to them the kinds 
of concerns that we have about things that they are doing. And 
this is for the same reason the Biden administration is 
interested in beginning a strategic stability dialogue with the 
Russians that will cover, you know, nuclear and other issues as 
well.
    But the whole point is to explain very clearly to them, you 
know, what our concerns are, what we do not want them to do, 
and to try to iron out some of the rules of the road so that 
they know exactly what kinds of risks they are taking if they 
engage in certain kinds of behavior.
    Mr. Waltz. So, you know, one of the things that I am most 
concerned about is our nuclear command and control systems. 
And, you know, when we are talking about standards in terms of 
how close you can get, what types of activities you can do now 
that other countries are up in geosynchronous, I think we need 
to be very clear on our end but also make it clear on their end 
so we don't have those kind of catastrophic miscommunications.
    Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I yield. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. I appreciate the gentleman being so precise. 
Thank you.
    We have completed, I think, the first round of questioning, 
and I was going to cut it off. We have been in session for 
about an hour and 45 minutes.
    Are there any members who have a final question they would 
like to ask?
    If not, then I want to thank the witnesses for their 
excellent testimony. I want to thank the members for showing up 
and posing such good questions, and I want to thank the staff 
for assembling all this. So it is hard to have a remote 
hearing, but this went very well. And it is certainly an 
important and, you know, possibly historic hearing that we had 
today to get these efforts underway, so thank you for being 
part of this historic effort.
    Voice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. The hearing is now adjourned, with Chairman 
Castro's permission.
    Mr. Castor. Absolutely. Thank you, everyone.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay.
    Voice. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittees were 
adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 5, 2021

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                              May 5, 2021

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                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 5, 2021

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

    Mr. Waltz. Do you agree that non-binding consensus-based standards 
and transparency and confidence building mechanisms are the ideal path 
to pursue a nascent field while also promoting responsible behavior?
    Mr. Hill. I agree it is important to pursue non-binding standards 
and transparency and confidence-building mechanisms to promote 
responsible behavior in space. This preferred approach is consistent 
with the March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and 
the December 2020 National Space Policy, the latter of which directs 
U.S. Government departments and agencies, in collaboration with the 
Secretary of State, to ``[l]ead the enhancement of safety, stability, 
security, and long-term sustainability in space by promoting a 
framework for responsible behavior in outer space, including the 
pursuit and effective implementation of best practices, standards, and 
norms of behavior.'' Department of Defense (DOD) policies and practices 
often serve as a basis for U.S. Government positions in international 
discussions, and DOD partners with the Department of State in efforts 
to develop voluntary, non-legally binding international standards and 
norms regarding safe, responsible, and professional behavior in space. 
U.S. proposals center upon voluntary, non-legally binding measures 
derived from current technical and operational best practices, and they 
provide practical, pragmatic, and inclusive opportunities to build 
shared interests among operators.
    Mr. Waltz. My understanding is DOD and State are authorized to 
enter into agreements that limit state action (i.e. weapons, ASAT, 
jamming/interference, proximity and rendezvous, and their own 
operations, etc) but not limitation on private activities. Do you agree 
that your respective agencies should only be talking about limitations 
on government activities and not the private sector?
    Mr. Hill. Rather than focusing on the use of formal agreements in 
an effort to limit outer space activities, the U.S. Government focuses 
on enabling safe and sustainable space operations by developing 
voluntary, non-legally binding standards, guidelines, norms, and best 
practices for responsible space activities. The U.S. Government often 
does this in partnership with commercial and other non-governmental 
space operators. For example, the U.S. Government engaged commercial 
sector experts in developing guidelines on debris mitigation and space 
sustainability. Looking forward, the U.S. Government will continue to 
work closely with industry in developing guidelines on new activities, 
such as through the Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and 
Servicing Operations (CONFERS) initiative, which advocates for 
voluntary, consensus-based technical and safety standards for on-orbit 
satellite maintenance, servicing, and rendezvous operations. DOD 
believes that a robust, innovative, and competitive commercial space 
sector is the source of continued progress and sustained American 
leadership in space. The United States remains committed to encouraging 
and facilitating the continued growth of a U.S. commercial space sector 
that supports U.S. interests, is globally competitive, and advances 
U.S. leadership in the generation of new markets and innovation-driven 
entrepreneurship.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you agree that non-binding consensus-based standards 
and transparency and confidence building mechanisms are the ideal path 
to pursue a nascent field while also promoting responsible behavior?
    Mr. Turner. U.S. policy is to promote a framework for responsible 
behavior in outer space, including the pursuit and effective 
implementation of best practices, standards, and norms of behavior. 
These processes may or may not be consensus-based. We are also pursuing 
bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building 
measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, 
outer space to strengthen the safety, stability, security, and long-
term sustainability of space activities, and to increase predictability 
and reduce the risk of misunderstanding and inadvertent conflict 
escalation.
    Mr. Waltz. My understanding is DOD and State are authorized to 
enter into agreements that limit state action (i.e. weapons, ASAT, 
jamming/interference, proximity and rendezvous, and their own 
operations, etc) but not limitation on private activities. Do you agree 
that your respective agencies should only be talking about limitations 
on government activities and not the private sector?
    Mr. Turner. U.S. policy is focused on promoting a framework for 
responsible behavior in outer space. Such efforts are primarily focused 
on influencing states' behavior, but it is also important to consider 
the activities of non-state actors in space as well, particularly given 
the sheer number of satellites operated by private entities. Article VI 
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty makes clear that ``[t]he activities of 
non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing 
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.'' The State 
Department works closely with other Departments and agencies, including 
those with regulatory authority, to ensure that this obligation to 
oversee the activities of our private sector space actors is met, and 
to ensure U.S. commercial space interests are taken into full account 
in the development of U.S. government policies.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of 
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international 
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and 
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging 
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms 
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted 
definitions?
    Mr. Hill. The increase in the number of spacefaring nations and the 
total number of space operators--whether foreign or domestic, 
commercial or governmental--has fostered a shared recognition of the 
importance of establishing best practices and standards of responsible 
behavior in space. The U.S. Government efforts in this regard include 
working closely with commercial operators and other non-governmental 
operators in addressing this need. For example, in 2019, at the 
conclusion of almost a decade of negotiations, the UN General Assembly 
welcomed the adoption of a preamble and 21 ``Guidelines for the Long-
Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities,'' the first-ever set of 
comprehensive international best practices for space safety and 
sustainability. Together with government and commercial operators from 
95 countries, the U.S. Government and U.S. commercial operators played 
active roles in these negotiations through the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, proposing many of the guidelines that the 
Committee adopted, and shaping the text of all guidelines for 
consistency with existing U.S. policy and practice. The UN General 
Assembly's December 16, 2020, adoption of a United Kingdom-sponsored 
resolution, ``Reducing space threats through norms, rules and 
principles of responsible behaviours,'' likewise reflected the growing 
international sense of the importance and value of this approach to 
establishing norms of conduct in space.
    Mr. Morelle. With the rise of satellite constellations numbering 
into the thousands and the tangible possibility of a significant 
Kessler syndrome occurring in LEO how active is the U.S. in ensuring 
collision avoidance? How important is verifiable and enforceable, 
international rules-based order to ensuring responsible parties are 
held accountable for satellite collision?
    Mr. Hill. The United States is very active in supporting the safety 
of flight for all space operators. We combine the world's best space 
situational awareness (SSA) capabilities with a commitment to the 
safety of spaceflight rooted in longstanding law and policy. DOD 
distributes U.S. SSA information through tools such as space-track.org 
and SSA sharing arrangements and agreements with more than 125 
commercial and international partners. However, the reality is that the 
more complex challenges of space traffic management--the issue at the 
heart of this question--should be addressed as a function of a civilian 
regulatory agency, rather than as a DOD function. With our civil agency 
counterparts in the Department of Commerce, DOD is prepared to work 
with Congress in addressing this important issue of space safety and 
sustainability for all space operators. With regard to accountability 
for satellite collisions, the United States is a State Party to the 
four core space treaties that form the framework of international space 
law. Those treaties include the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (``Outer Space Treaty'') 
and the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects (``Liability Convention''). Both of these foundational 
treaties would apply to most cases of satellite collisions, in terms of 
determining jurisdiction, responsibility, and liability. As the 
development and expansion of governmental and commercial SSA 
capabilities progress--and as their precision and accuracy improve--
these SSA capabilities may be able to provide valuable information that 
would help determine the facts in a collision, while international law 
would guide how to apportion obligations among the States Parties 
involved.
    Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of 
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international 
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and 
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging 
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms 
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted 
definitions?
    General Whiting. Space faring entities range from nation states, 
civil organizations, commercial entities--which often times are multi-
national in nature--to academic institutions. As the space environment 
becomes more congested and contested, our access to, and freedom of 
operation in space becomes increasingly threatened. Access barriers 
such as cost have fallen while risks are on the rise and nations such 
as China and Russia have increased their counterspace weapons 
development. Anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) tests have caused long-lived 
debris fields, and uncontrolled re-entries--like with China's Long 
March-5b vehicle--create uncertainty. These activities coupled with the 
increased risk of collisions, pose serious challenges to the stability 
and security of the space domain and increase the risk of 
miscalculations and misunderstandings. This is why securing an enduring 
advantage in space is a vital national interest--one that can no longer 
be taken for granted. The establishment of the U.S. Space Force as a 
separate Service has already provided greatly expanded opportunities 
for partnerships with civil and commercial space organizations. From a 
USSF perspective, the rise of commercial actors figure into this 
discourse as we work to expand cooperation with our partners. We 
integrate with allies and commercial partners through organizations 
such as the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) to discuss and 
review how we can align our operations in space to develop and 
promulgate concepts for responsible space operations. Space traffic 
management and collision avoidance are two important issues that may 
inform the shaping of voluntary, non-legally binding norms, standards, 
and guidelines of responsible behavior in space. Through the Department 
of Defense, we continue to work hand-in-hand with the Department of 
Commerce as they ramp up to take on basic space traffic management and 
basic space situational awareness tasks as called for by the National 
Space Council.
    Mr. Morelle. With the rise of satellite constellations numbering 
into the thousands and the tangible possibility of a significant 
Kessler syndrome occurring in LEO how active is the U.S. in ensuring 
collision avoidance? How important is verifiable and enforceable, 
international rules-based order to ensuring responsible parties are 
held accountable for satellite collision?
    General Whiting. Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is the cornerstone of 
all space operations and enhances all military operations. The 18th 
Space Control Squadron located at Vandenberg Space Force Base, 
California, performs conjunction assessment of all trackable objects 
and provides collision avoidance warning for all current active 
payloads. They are the only entity world-wide providing this service to 
every satellite owner/operator regardless of country of origin. Seeing 
a need to help keep space safe, the former Air Force Space Command (now 
U.S. Space Force) has partnered with U.S. Strategic Command (now U.S. 
Space Command), for many years, with the support of Congress, to 
provide orbital conjunction assessments to any space owner/operator 
around the globe who provides their contact information, while also 
maintaining the public website space-track.org to create transparency 
in the tracking of tens of thousands of objects on orbit. Today, we 
support the shift of non-military space traffic management to the 
Department of Commerce in the future, thus allowing the Department of 
Defense to focus on directed military functions in our protect and 
defend mission. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), makes States 
internationally responsible for national activities in space, whether 
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or non-
governmental entities. The Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects provide for 
liability for damage caused to space objects in outer space. It is the 
position of the U.S. Space Force that voluntary, non-legally binding 
norms, standards, and guidelines of responsible behavior in space would 
be immensely helpful toward our mission to protect the U.S. and our 
allies in, from, and to space.
    Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of 
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international 
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and 
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging 
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms 
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted 
definitions?
    Mr. Moore. The increasing utilization of space--including a 
significant increase in the volume and diversity of commercial 
activity--means all actors need to take responsibility for maintaining 
outer space as a stable, safe, and sustainable environment. In the 
first decades of the space age, with a membership of less than 20 
member states, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) played a key role in establishing the four core outer space 
treaties. Although the roster of the consensus-based COPUOS has grown 
to 95 members, the United States maintains its leadership role, 
including efforts to use COPUOS to develop non-legally binding 
guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, 
thereby reaffirming the value of the existing international legal 
regime and the importance of national-level implementation. We include 
industry representatives as private sector advisers to our delegation 
to COPUOS, and we consult with additional non-governmental stakeholders 
to gain a better understanding of their perspective on issues. This 
whole-of-government, whole-of-America approach helps ensure that the 
United States considers a broad range of equities as it advances our 
objectives.
    Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of 
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international 
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and 
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging 
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms 
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted 
definitions?
    Mr. Turner. The increasing utilization of space--including a 
significant increase in the volume and diversity of commercial 
activity--means all actors need to take responsibility for maintaining 
outer space as a stable, safe, and sustainable environment. In the 
first decades of the space age, with a membership of less than 20 
member states, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(COPUOS) played a key role in establishing the four core outer space 
treaties, and the United States was a leader in the development of 
those treaties. Today, although the roster of the consensus-based 
COPUOS has grown to 95 members, the United States maintains its 
leadership role, including its successful efforts in the 2010s to use 
COPUOS to develop non-legally binding guidelines for the Long-Term 
Sustainability of outer space activities. In so doing, we have 
reaffirmed the value of the existing international legal regime and the 
importance of national-level implementation, as opposed to ``top 
down,'' one-size-fits-all processes. Regarding commercial engagement 
within COPUOS, we include industry representatives as private sector 
advisers to our delegation, and we consult with additional non-
governmental stakeholders to gain a better understanding of their 
perspectives on issues under discussion. This whole-of-government, 
whole-of-America approach helps ensure that the United States takes 
into account a broad range of equities as it advances our objectives 
through COPUOS and its subcommittees.