[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-29]
CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR RULES-BASED ORDER IN SPACE
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL
CORPORATE SOCIAL IMPACT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
[Serial No. 117-32]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 5, 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-721 WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice MO BROOKS, Alabama
Chair ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
Vacancy
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Whitney Verrett, Professional Staff Member
Zach Taylor, Clerk
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL IMPACT
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas, Chairman
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, Florida,
MIKE LEVIN, California Ranking Member
ANTHONY BRINDISI, New York AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, American
MAX ROSE, New York Samoa
GIL CISNEROS, California ANDY BARR, Kentucky
COLIN PETERSON, Minnesota DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
GREG STEUBE, Florida
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
Brendon Shields, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Castro, Hon. Joaquin, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on International Development, International
Organizations and Global Corporate Social Impact, Committee on
Foreign Affairs................................................ 3
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services.. 1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services............... 2
Malliotakis, Hon. Nicole, a Representative from New York, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on International Development,
International Organizations and Global Corporate Social Impact,
Committee on Foreign Affairs................................... 5
WITNESSES
Hill, John D., Performing the Duties of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy, U.S. Department of Defense........... 6
Moore, Jonathan M., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 9
Turner, Bruce I., Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State.......... 11
Whiting, Lt Gen Stephen N., USSF, Commander, Space Operations
Command, United States Space Force............................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 37
Hill, John D................................................. 38
Moore, Jonathan M............................................ 51
Turner, Bruce I.............................................. 58
Whiting, Lt Gen Stephen N.................................... 44
Documents Submitted for the Record:
United States of America National Submission to the United
Nations Secretary General Pursuant to UN General Assembly
Resolution 75/36, Reducing space threats through norms,
rules and principles of responsible behaviours............. 65
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Morelle.................................................. 78
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 77
CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR RULES-BASED ORDER IN SPACE
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
joint with the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Development,
International Organizations and Global
Corporate Social Impact, Washington, DC,
Wednesday, May 5, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:08 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Jim Cooper (chairman of the Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Cooper. The hearing will come to order.
I would like to start by thanking my colleagues,
Representative Castro, the chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on International Development,
International Organizations and Global Social Impact, as well
as his ranking member, Representative Malliotakis. We thank
them for joining the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of HASC
[House Armed Services Committee] to discuss this incredibly
important and timely topic. I welcome our distinguished panel
of witnesses, both from the Departments of Defense and State,
as we dive into the issues surrounding the lack of specific,
verifiable international norms for behavior in space. First, we
have Mr. John D. Hill, performing the duties of Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Lieutenant [General]
Stephen Whiting, Commander, Space Operations Command, United
States Space Force; Mr. Jonathan M. Moore, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; and Mr.
Bruce Turner, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance.
Thank you all for participating in today's hearing, and I
ask you as well as the members, including the chair and
ranking, to keep your remarks brief and to no more than for 5
minutes so that we can have ample time for the number of
members who are on the call to ask questions.
Space has captured human imagination since the beginning of
time. But it is still a long, long way from being understood by
our political leaders, diplomats, and lawyers, at least in a
way that the many nations of Earth can agree upon. Now
scientists have made great progress in helping us reach,
explore, and even briefly inhabit the harsh domain above us,
but the rest of us are much slower to follow or even understand
where the scientists are enabling us to travel.
Many nations and even some corporations are exploring high
above the Earth's atmosphere, testing the infinite number of
ways that mastering space can help the 7.6 billion of us who
live down here on the Earth. The Space Age is about 70 years
old, and the foundational Outer Space Treaty [OST] is just over
50 years old. That should tell us something. Unfortunately,
precious little has happened since the OST to organize human
efforts in the inhuman space domain.
Space is in danger of becoming the Wild Wild West, where
every satellite, astronaut, cosmonaut, or taikonaut has to
defend itself. From their testimony, I see that our State
Department experts are giving up on the concept of a law-
abiding, rules-based space and settling for something less,
like a suggestions-based space or probably even a hint-based
space. Perhaps that is the best we can do, but I think that we
should try harder for better. Can't we at least agree on
agreements on space traffic management, on the size of safety
zones around satellites or capsules, to ban debris at least
from ASATs [anti-satellite weapons], or to have compatible
docking latches? There must be a consensus somewhere on Earth
for the sensible.
I look forward to the discussion with our witnesses.
And I turn to today's honorary Strategic Forces ranking
member, Mr. Doug Lamborn, for any opening remarks that he may
have. Doug.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
Mr. Lamborn. And I want to thank you, Chairman Castro and
Ranking Member Malliotakis.
Additionally, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us
today to discuss this important issue.
As this subcommittee has highlighted again and again, space
is a vital component of our national security now more than
ever. Not only that, but our global economy is totally
dependent on access to space. Space, like the air and sea
domains, is a common good that we all benefit from regardless
of country of origin. But unlike those other domains, space is
more likely to suffer a tragedy of the commons outcome as a
result of bad actors.
The physics of space leaves it susceptible to long-term
damage from debris created by collisions, poorly conducted
anti-satellite weapons and testing, and simply poor planning.
The foundation of international laws and norms that we are
currently operating under were developed under the cloud of
Cold War when only the two great powers could access space. As
a result, the Outer Space Treaty doesn't account for the
congested operations of space we see today. This treaty was
also written with very broad language and phrases that are open
to wide interpretation by signatories to the agreement.
I do not believe China and Russia are operating in good
faith when it comes to their proposals as evidenced by the
Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space, sometimes referred to as the No First Placement Treaty.
This treaty proposed to ban weapons in outer space but lacked
any mechanism for verification and also was silent on space
debris caused by ASAT testing and rendezvous and proximity
operations.
Most notably however, Russia and China are in many ways
already weaponizing space, proposing a treaty upon which
ratification they would already be in violation of. I was glad
to see that the U.K. [United Kingdom] submitted a U.N. [United
Nations] resolution to, quote, reduce space threats through
norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors, unquote,
to be considered by the U.N. General Assembly this summer in a
drive to make space safer and more sustainable. What I don't
want is another international treaty that would tie our hands
while others blatantly ignore its limitations, like the late
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. I also don't want to
see a treaty where the U.S. receives almost no benefits while
our adversaries do, like the now dead Open Skies Treaty.
So I appreciate the continued service that you all provide
to the Nation. And I look forward to our discussion today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. Now I turn to Chairman
Castro for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOAQUIN CASTRO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL CORPORATE SOCIAL IMPACT,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Castro. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
all. It is an honor to be here today with my colleagues from
both committees to discuss one of the long-term challenges we
face, not just as a nation but as a species: space,
specifically, the rules that will govern humanity's
exploration, commerce, and other activity within space, both by
the private sector and nation-states.
I give special thanks to the chairman and Congressman Jim
Cooper--he is chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
which oversees many of our Nation's space programs--for working
together with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and my staff
on this important and historic joint hearing.
In the long run, the peaceful exploration of space can be
one of the most significant and unifying projects that our
Nation and our world has ever undertaken. As President Kennedy
said of the Moon mission, America's journeys to space, quote,
will serve to organize and measure the best of our energy and
skills. In short, space-faring can bring out the best in us,
leading to cutting-edge technologies, creating new jobs, making
significant scientific discoveries, and perhaps, above all,
uniting our divided Nation behind a common purpose once more.
I commend the Biden administration for pledging to continue
ongoing plans to return Americans to the Moon and making clear
part of this mission will be to land the first woman and person
of color on the lunar surface, ensuring that this Moon landing
will be seen by Americans and the world as an accomplishment on
behalf of all Americans. Yet, despite the goal of peaceful
coexistence among the stars, space is not immune to the
realities of international relations at a time of rising
authoritarian powers or the global trend of increased
inequality and lack of corporate accountability. This hearing
will serve to assess the current and future state of human
activity in space and to inform a new American strategy for
preserving the rule of law, peace, and international
cooperation in the most hostile environment humanity inhabits.
This is new territory of course for all of us. There has
never been this many state and private actors all operating in
space at once with multiple different priorities and growing
risks of clashes, both intentional and not. In many ways the
challenge in space is unlike any that humanity has faced
before. It took centuries to shape the law of the sea, drawing
upon thousands of years of human seafaring. We don't have 100
years to set the rules for space, nor do we have traditions to
draw upon that fall beyond living memory. The reality is that
space is already critical to the military capabilities of the
United States, our allies, our partners, and our adversaries.
The question is how we and other states will respond and
whether we will be able to develop a set of rules to manage
disputes and develop a set of rules that will also work for all
of us.
The United States has engaged in these critical issues for
decades at the United Nations and in other international
organizations. The accelerating pace of human activities in
space raises the urgency of re-engaging with our partners and
establishing norms and rules.
Earlier this week, the United States made a public
declaration of what our Nation's interests are in space, what
threats we face, and how we will engage with the international
community to establish norms of behavior. This is a critical
task. We rely on space for almost everything we do as a
society, to include navigation, accurate timekeeping, global
communications, and weather. The number of satellites in space,
from both government and private actors, will increase nearly
tenfold in the next decade. Countries, including China, are
developing the capabilities to disable or destroy satellites in
space through missiles, other satellites, cyber attacks, or
electronic warfare. And as the United States plans our return
to the Moon, that also raises the importance of minimizing the
risk to astronauts in space. Congress must pay careful
attention to all these issues and determine where the United
States will stand on these crucial questions for space
governance.
This hearing will be one of the Foreign Affairs Committee's
first significant opportunities to address these issues and
hear directly from the administration on what we are doing to
build an international rules-based order to govern space that
can meet the challenges of humanity's second spacefaring
century.
With that, I yield back, Chair.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Chairman Castro. Now we turn
to Ranking Member Malliotakis for her remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
YORK, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL CORPORATE
SOCIAL IMPACT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. As we set out
to contribute to the development of a framework of a rules-
based order in space that serves American interests, there are
two primary areas I wish to explore with our panel of
government witnesses from the Department of Defense and State.
First, my distinguished colleagues have already made
reference to the impact of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. But it
is the common heritage of the humankind principle captured in
the second preambular paragraph of the treaty, quote,
recognizing the common interest of all humankind in the
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for
purposes, unquote, that I wish to highlight.
This principle of international law holds that, just as we
are to treat our seas on Earth, outer space should be free for
exploration and use for the benefit of all and shall be the
province of all humankind. Further, it means outer space should
be free from exploitation from any nation-state or private
corporation. I draw this out because we have seen this
principle in practice under the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, also known as UNCLOS.
It was established to set out a comprehensive legal regime
for the world's oceans. Despite being a party to this
convention, China has acted without regard to its terms, even
going so far as to ignore an international tribunal ruling that
rejected the legality of China's maritime claims and behaviors
from 2016. Yet, nearly 5 years later, there has been no
punitive action taken against China, and so still China
continues to act in contravention to the Law of the Sea
Convention.
Last month, the Office of Director of National Intelligence
issued its annual report of worldwide threats to U.S. national
security, which includes sections on the threat of Russia and
China's space programs. This report reflects the collective
insights of the U.S. intelligence community and focuses on the
most direct, serious threats to the United States during the
next year.
The report identifies China and Russia's anti-satellite
weapons programs and the threat these programs pose to U.S.
terrestrial forces that rely on satellite-based communications.
I share in the concerns conveyed by my Armed Services
colleagues on threats posed by China's and Russia's space
technology to the principle of common heritage of all
humankind. Both nations' track records on the Earth's surface
give more than sufficient reason to expect that their malign
behavior will extend into orbit.
The second aspect I wish to highlight is the commercial
exploration of space. I marvel and join with my colleagues in
enthusiastically supporting the participation between NASA
[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] and commercial
space exploration. The April 23rd launch of the SpaceX Falcon 9
rocket from NASA's Kennedy Space Center, which propelled an
international team of astronauts, Crew Dragon, in the Endeavor
to the International Space Station, is a perfect illustration
of just how far we have come in space exploration. As was the
safe return of the Crew-1 astronauts on May 2nd.
While the U.S. Government builds partnerships with private
industry, for China and Russia there is no distinction between
that which the state owns and that which is privately owned, as
their respective space programs are all state-owned. By
extension, their programs serve both civil and military
purposes. We have seen this script before in the Pacific
waterways, where commercial fishing vessels are also used by
China as maritime militia.
I am focused on these two areas, the principle of the
common heritage of humankind and commercial space exploration,
because, on the one hand, they offer up opportunities to
abiding nation-states and future generations, but, on the
other, they represent dangerous risks resulting from nation-
states unwilling to be bound by a rules-based order in pursuing
space technologies that poses a direct threat to our Nation's
security.
In our discussion, we must not cast aside these realities.
When world leaders negotiated the terms of the Outer Space
Treaty in the days of the original Star Trek series,
maintaining stasis was attainable. But, today, as our global
leaders pursue international norms, rules, and principles of
responsible behavior in outer space, stasis is now a fiction.
The U.S. and other nation-states may abide by international
norms, rules, and principles of responsible behavior, but our
competition acts with indifference to a rules-based order. This
is our current operating environment, and we must pursue a
space policy that brings together our interests but also
addresses the challenges in space exploration.
I welcome our esteemed panel of government experts and
yield the remainder of my time. I suppose I ran out.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, Representative Malliotakis.
First, let me say that everyone should be muted except for
the witnesses that I call on. So let me repeat: Everyone should
be muted. There is way too much background noise here, so
please mute yourself.
Our first witness for his 5-minute statement will be Mr.
John Hill.
Now, Mr. Hill.
STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HILL, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
Lamborn, Chairman Castro, and Ranking Member Malliotakis,
distinguished members of the subcommittees. It is an honor to
testify before you today along with my distinguished
colleagues. You have my full written statement. And, with your
permission, I ask that it be included in the record. I will
briefly summarize it.
Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Hill. The U.S. Government's efforts to foster a rules-
based international order in outer space are focused on
establishing voluntary, non-legally binding measures derived
from current technical and operational best practices. As one
of the world's most experienced space operators, the Department
of Defense actively supports and partners with the Department
of State in developing U.S. proposals within international
venues in order to shape the strategic environment toward an
agreed upon model for safe, responsible, and professional
behavior.
There are many benefits to having common guidelines for
space operations. Among these are a safer, more sustainable,
more stable, and more predictable space operating environment
for all space operators. Importantly for DOD [Department of
Defense], such an operating environment can also facilitate
indications and warnings of hostile intentions and hostile
acts. DOD policies and practices often serve as the basis for
international measures. DOD models responsible behavior through
our routine space operations. And DOD works carefully to ensure
that our space operations are consistent with international
measures the United States supports and with relevant domestic
and international law, including the law of armed conflict and
the inherent right of self-defense.
For example, not only are DOD operations fully consistent
with the 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, but DOD
practices also served as a source of the more rigorous
standards adopted in the November 2019 United States Government
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices. Likewise, for 10
years, the Department of Defense provided one of the lead U.S.
delegates to the negotiations on the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space that produced the 2019 guidelines for the
long-term sustainability of outer space activities.
This participation ensured consistency with DOD practices
and greatly facilitated implementation of these guidelines.
Most recently, DOD has supported the drafting of the United
States national submission in response to the 2020 United
Nations General Assembly resolution on reducing space threats
through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviors.
From the DOD perspective, United States leadership and the
development of a rules-based order for space activities reaps
benefit for U.S. civil, commercial, scientific, and national
security space operators. As space activities worldwide become
more prolific and more varied, voluntary and nonbinding
international norms, standards, and guidelines of responsible
behavior can benefit U.S. national security and foster a
conducive environment for growing global space activities.
Thank you for your time and attention. And I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Hill. I appreciate
that.
And I ask members one more time to please mute your
microphones. There is still some background noise.
Now we will hear from General Whiting.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN STEPHEN N. WHITING, USSF, COMMANDER, SPACE
OPERATIONS COMMAND, UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE
General Whiting. Chairman Cooper, Chairman Castro, Ranking
Member Lamborn, Ranking Member Malliotakis, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today in my
capacity as Commander, Space Operations Command, on the U.S.
Space Force perspectives toward creating a framework for rules-
based order in space.
I am honored today to join Mr. Hill and our partners at the
State Department, Mr. Turner and Mr. Moore, whose leadership
and insights greatly contribute toward ensuring the safety,
security, stability, and long-term sustainability of U.S. space
activities.
I have the distinct privilege to lead and represent
guardians and airmen of Space Operations Command, providing
combat-ready, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance]-led cyber secure space and combat support
forces to the joint force. It is from the perspective of our
role to generate, present, and sustain these forces that I
testify here before you today.
Now aligned under our Nation's newest service, our mission
is to protect America and our allies in, from, and to space now
and into the future. As U.S. Space Command's Space Force
service component, we accomplish this mission through our
headquarters' generate, present, and sustain tasks, along with
SpOC [Space Operations Command] West, a headquarters we present
to U.S. Space Command at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California, who plan, integrate, conduct, and assess global
space operations. Our mission execution benefits from decades
of experience operating in space while demonstrating safe,
professional, and responsible behavior. In fact, given our
imperative to help keep the domain safe, our command, in
partnership with what was our combatant command at the time,
U.S. Strategic Command--and today is U.S. Space Command--has
for many years, with the support of Congress, been providing
orbital conjunction assessments to any space owner and operator
around the global, while also making available Space-Track.Org
to foster openness and transparency in the tracking of tens of
thousands of objects on orbit.
As more actors come to space, the domain is changing. With
an increased risk of collisions, as well as miscalculations or
misunderstandings, it is incumbent on the Department to
continue space leadership through demonstrating and
acknowledging responsible behavior in space, such as the
widespread sharing of space situational awareness information.
Today, we support the shift of nonmilitary space traffic
management to the Department of Commerce, thus allowing the
Department of Defense to focus on directed military functions
in our protect and defend mission.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Space Force will collaborate with
the Department of Commerce by providing the authoritative space
catalogue and in identifying and analyzing specific behaviors
to ensure safe, professional, and sustainable operations on
orbit while further enhancing trust with allies and
establishing new bonds with emerging spacefaring nations.
However, we have long understood that our Nation is
strongest economically, militarily, and diplomatically when we
have freedom of operation in a secure, stable, and accessible
space domain. It is the position of the U.S. Space Force that
the voluntary, non-legally binding transparency and confidence-
building measures, guidelines, and norms on responsible
behavior, to include an understanding of what constitutes safe
and professional conduct, would be immensely helpful toward our
mission to protect the U.S. and our allies in, from, and to
space.
In concert with the Secretary of State's leadership of the
whole-of-government approach to establish norms, the U.S. Space
Force provides Department of Defense a capability to both model
that behavior and promote internationally accepted standards.
I thank you for your support. And I look forward to working
with Congress as we continue to transform our national security
space posture. Again, I am privileged to be here with my
distinguished colleagues and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Whiting can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you so much, General Whiting.
Now we will hear from Mr. Moore.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN M. MOORE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Moore. Thank you very much, Chairman Cooper, Ranking
Member Lamborn, Chairman Castro, and Ranking Member
Malliotakis, distinguished members of the subcommittees. I am
very honored to join you and my colleagues from the Pentagon's
Space Command and the State Department to discuss American
leadership in outer space.
You have my full written testimony, which I would ask if
you would kindly submit for the record. And, of course, I will
keep my remarks to less than 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Moore. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
So thank you very much for the impressive senior bipartisan
interest in this vastly important issue. As we all know and
many of you have noted, human activity in outer space is
changing rapidly and is of both interest and importance to the
American people.
In 1990, only about 20 countries were active in space.
Today it is more than 70. The United States leads the world in
new commercial space ventures. For the first time in nearly a
decade--and this is a tremendous and inspiring success and
thanks to the private sector--Americans are traveling to the
International Space Station on American-made space launch
vehicles. The success of our national space program
increasingly depends on international engagement and therefore
depends on diplomacy.
The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs [OES], together with the Bureau of Arms
Control, Verification, and Compliance, conducts diplomatic
efforts to ensure that the behavior across all space sectors is
consistent with U.S. policy and practice, as well as with the
1967 Outer Space Treaty, which a number of you have cited, and
associated conventions and agreements.
The Biden-Harris administration has charged us to explore
and use outer space to the benefit of humanity and ensure the
safety, stability, and security of outer space activities. This
includes expanding and leveling the global playing field for
the American space industry. We work directly with partners and
through U.N. bodies and other multilateral fora to advance
these principles. Key among these are the U.N. Committee for
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, mentioned before, COPUOS, as
well as the U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs. For over 60
years, we have worked through those organizations to build
support for the United States space policies as well as for our
vision to expand human presence in space and promote the
responsible use of space.
As Chairman Castro noted, in February the Biden
administration endorsed NASA's Artemis program, an ambitious
effort to land the first woman and first person of color on the
Moon and establish a long-term human presence there, as well as
develop and demonstrate new technologies, capabilities, and
business approaches needed for future exploration activities,
and go on to Mars.
Decades ago, the Apollo missions galvanized world
attention, but the costs were borne by the American taxpayer.
Now, through cooperation with international partners and
private industry, we share both the burden and the rewards.
The Artemis Accords created by the Department of State and
NASA in consultation with some of our close spacefaring partner
nations are this generation's recommitment to the principles of
the Outer Space Treaty, envisioning a safe and transparent,
peaceful and prosperous environment which facilitates
exploration, science, and commercial activities in space.
As my fellow panelists have testified, there will be major
geopolitical challenges as other countries advance their own
space exploration objectives. Some countries will work with us
to establish and adhere to standards of safe and responsible
behavior; others will not.
Our bureau, OES, keeps a very close eye on Russian and
Chinese space activities. Together with the interagency, we
engage directly with them on space flight safety and
responsible behavior while countering actions inconsistent with
those principles. U.S. cooperation with Russia is based on a
governmental agreement on cooperation in the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes, which was recently
extended through December 31, 2030. This arrangement provides a
legal framework for cooperation on the International Space
Station and limited space, science, and robotics space
exploration missions.
With regard to China, we maintain our engagement through a
variety of means in order to understand their space, science,
and exploration programs, and encourage mutually beneficial
open exchange of scientific data from civil space missions.
Please just let me underline: American diplomatic leadership is
establishing international frameworks and facilitating norms of
behavior based on United States policy and practice. Advancing
peaceful norms and responsible behaviors in outer space is
critical to protecting American national security, commercial,
and research interests.
The Department of State, in coordination with the
interagency and National Space Council as well as in close
consultation with Congress, will continue to utilize
multilateral venues, initiatives such as the Artemis Accords,
as well as bilateral consultations to support U.S. interests in
commercial space activity, responsible behavior in outer space,
and space exploration.
Thank you again for inviting us to testify. I welcome your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.
And now Mr. Turner.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE I. TURNER, SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL, BUREAU OF
ARMS CONTROL, VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Turner. Chairman Castro, Chairman Cooper, Ranking
Member Malliotakis, and Ranking Member Lamborn, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on the rules-based space
order.
I am grateful for the opportunity to testify along John
Hill, Lieutenant General Stephen Whiting, Jonathan Moore. Like
others, I have submitted a longer statement for the record.
It is incredibly appropriate that we are meeting on May
5th, the 60th anniversary of astronaut Alan Shepard's flight on
Freedom 7. This suborbital flight was the first step that
gradually led to American astronauts orbiting the Earth,
landing on the Moon, and today traveling in continuous orbit
around our planet. This flight took place in a time when there
were only two countries placing satellites and humans in orbit.
It also took place in a time when the legal regime regarding
outer space was just beginning to be developed.
The development and implementation of arms control
agreements is one of the main concerns of the State
Department's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance, known as AVC, which I am representing today. In
that capacity, along with our State and DOD colleagues, we are
leading efforts for the development and implementation of
voluntary, non-legally binding measures to enhance the safety
and security of outer space.
In general, consistent with longstanding bipartisan policy
and as reflected most recently in the 2020 National Space
Policy, the United States will consider proposals and concepts
for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively
verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United
States and its allies.
Unfortunately, for many years, the international community
has been focused on a number of flawed, legally binding arms
control proposals, including most recently the 2014 Russo-
Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force
Against Outer Space Objects, known as PPWT.
The draft PPWT fails the test laid out in the U.S. National
Space Policy, and the State Department has a long record of
enumerating its many flaws. In light of these shortcomings, the
2020 National Space Policy directs the United States
Government, and I quote, to lead the enhancement of safety,
stability, security, and long-term sustainability in space by
promoting a framework for responsible behavior in outer space,
including the pursuit and effective implementation of best
practices, standards, and norms of behavior, end quote.
President Biden's 2021 Interim Strategic National Security
Guidance also affirms that the United States will lead in
promoting shared norms and in forging new agreements in outer
space. The United States believes that the development and
implementation of norms of behavior can reduce risks to
international security and stability through increasing
predictability, enhancing operational safety, and reducing
risks of misperceptions, thereby contributing to the prevention
of conflict. That is why, in 2020, the United States worked
with our close allies to advance a new United Nations General
Assembly resolution titled ``Reducing Space Threats through
Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behaviors.'' We
believe this resolution can serve as the first step of a
process to describe the threats to space systems, to develop
ideas for responsible behaviors designed to manage perceived
threats and risks to space systems, and to consider the
establishment of channels for direct communications to manage
perceptions. As such, it provides a pragmatic alternative to
flawed Russian and Chinese arms control proposals, and many
agree with that approach.
The resolution was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
this last fall with 164 votes for and only 12 against, among
them Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Cuba, and
Venezuela. On May 3, 2021, pursuant to the resolution's call
for reports on proposed next steps, the State Department
submitted our government's views to the U.N. Secretary General.
Mr. Chairman, for many years the international community
has been focused on flawed legally binding space arms control
proposals at a time when the outer space environment has grown
in complexity and become contested. It is time for a new
approach, primarily focused, at least for now, upon voluntary,
non-legally binding norms, rules, and principles of responsible
behavior in space. Developing and implementing these sorts of
measures help create a safer, more stable, and predictable
space environment for all space actors.
Thank you very much. And I look forward to the committee's
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. I would like
to thank all the witnesses.
And now we will turn to member questions. I will begin with
myself, but I only have two questions. And I would encourage
all members to keep this as brief as possible because we have a
large number of members on the Webex call today.
First question, you ended your statement, Mr. Turner, but
all the witnesses seconded this theme of voluntary, non-legally
binding efforts in this regard. So it seems like we have given
up the idea of ropes or any punishment, but we are just going
for spider webs instead. So is that the best we can do? Is that
a way to get people to be in a more cooperative frame of mind?
Or do we need more than that?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, sir, for that question. I think we
are trying to make the best out of what is possible at this
given moment in time. Certainly we do not exclude the
possibility of legally binding treaties down the road, but that
is not where we are, given the kinds of competition posed by
Russia and China, as has been discussed by some of the
speakers. So we are starting with the approach where you can
maybe start building with like-minded countries to develop
these norms, get them to practice these norms, create peer
pressure so that these norms will also be respected by others,
and maybe over time develop more far-reaching measures. Thank
you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
My next question will be for General Whiting. We have
talked about transferring space traffic management out of the
Air Force for some time. It seems to have taken years. I am
hopeful that the Space Force will get it done on a more timely
basis because I don't want the spacefaring nations to turn to
other nations for their clear guidance on possible collisions
that might take place. So how quickly can we get the Department
of Commerce to pick up this ball and run with it?
General Whiting. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
Of course, we are eager to work with the Department of
Commerce. And we have found them to be an organization that is
eager to take this work on. And so we are working diligently to
do that because we do care deeply about the safety and security
of the domain, which is why we made Space-Track.Org available,
as we have over the years.
So my understanding is now that they have received
resources to work toward this goal, we are working with them
over the next couple of years to transfer that work. They have
been partnered with us at our operating location, such as at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, and we look forward to continuing
that. I can't speak to exactly what their timeline is, but we
are eager to get this transferred in the next couple of years.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much.
I will now turn to Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hill--excuse me Mr. Whiting, in your opinion, has space
already been weaponized by countries like China and Japan? And
what do you make of the satellites that reportedly shadow other
satellites?
General Whiting. Congressman Lamborn, yes, we have seen a
weaponization of space from China and Russia. If we point back
to 2007, really the inflection point in the 21st century where,
from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the
Soviet Union around 1990 until 2007, many of those threats that
had come up in space in the Cold War had gone fallow. But in
2007, we saw the Chinese conduct a very irresponsible test. We
continue to have about 3,000 pieces of debris on orbit that we
continue to track. That is about 10 percent of the total amount
of objects that we track on orbit still from that test 14 years
ago.
We continue to see the Chinese building satellites like the
Shijian 17, which is a Chinese satellite with a robotic arm
that could be used to grapple U.S. or allied satellites. We
know they have multiple ground laser systems which could blind
or damage our satellite systems. In addition, Russia has
several ground-based lasers that could jam or blind our
satellites, and it is probable they will field more later this
decade. We know the Russians have probable prototype anti-
satellite weapons on board, including our own orbit--pardon me,
including Cosmos 2519, which is a Russian on-orbit weapon
system which has birthed out a subsequent inspector satellite.
And then we have seen a subsequent third--or second object, so
three total come out of that Cosmos 2519. And we believe that
second object is a projectile. And then we saw Cosmos 2542,
which was launched in late 2019, which appears to be a similar
prototype weapon to Cosmos 2519, which was synchronized in its
orbit with the United States Government satellite. And when the
United States Government moved our satellite, the Russian
Cosmos 2542 resynchronized its orbit.
Russia is a sophisticated space actor, so they must have
known what they were doing. And, obviously, we do not support
weapons tests near our satellites.
And then, finally, Russia has a Nudol ground-based missile
designed to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. But let me
be clear: Even with this weaponization of space, we do not want
a war to extend into space, and we want to do everything
possible to deter that.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I appreciate that, General Whiting.
Mr. Turner, I am going to finish with you. In late 2019--
and we have already touched on this--Russia launched a
satellite that then deployed a sub-satellite that proceeded to
synchronize its orbit with a U.S. Government satellite. And it
is not the first time the Russians have done this. Have the
Russians been told that this behavior is unacceptable? And if
so, what was their response?
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Yes, sorry. It took me a second to turn my
sound button on.
Yes, we have met with the Russians about some of these
issues. Most of the discussions we have are less than
satisfactory. Sometimes the Russians do not even want to
acknowledge that certain activities are indeed taking place. We
have done our best to bring experts, our military and
diplomatic experts, to some of these meetings to discuss these
issues, but, thus far, the Russians really have not engaged in
a satisfactory way.
Mr. Lamborn. Finally, have there been any other
international discussions with the Russians and Chinese or
others defining standards of behavior for rendezvous and
proximity operations?
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. I don't--no, not to my knowledge actually. I
mean, as we were saying, all of us I think in our statements,
we are just at the beginning of this process to start to define
what some of these norms of behavior are, which would, we hope,
define such things as how much space to leave between bodies
out in space and how one might approach them. There would be
communications. There would be notifications, a number of
things like that. But we are just at the beginning of this
process now.
Mr. Lamborn. So no direct communication with the Chinese on
this, even though there have been some preliminary discussions
with the Russians.
Mr. Turner. I would urge you to--I think our DOD colleagues
would have a better fix on that kind of a question, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. General Whiting, very quickly, my time is
almost gone.
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, I am not aware of any
discussion with the Chinese, but I certainly would defer to Mr.
Hill.
Mr. Hill. Congressman, if you like, we do not in the
Department of Defense have direct engagements with China
regarding space. There are some very clear statutory
limitations on DOD's interaction with China, as with Russia
these days.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Moore. I apologize. This is Jonathan Moore at State. I
have a bit more of an answer for the ranking member, if I may
offer it, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. Go ahead.
Mr. Moore. We do engage with China on outer space through
both bilateral and multilateral channels. Our primary goal is
to ensure space flight safety and responsible behavior in outer
space. We have been working to try to encourage China to
improve communications between our respective satellite
operators to avoid potential collisions in orbit. As an example
of this, we have been coordinating with China to ensure that
their navigation satellite system, BeiDou, does not cause radio
frequency interference with our GPS [Global Positioning System]
satellites. And we are trying to encourage interoperability for
several users.
We do have discussions. China is not part of the Artemis
Accords. We do, however, expect them to follow the norms and
standards. We have been clear with them about that, as has been
referred to in a different context by my colleague Bruce
Turner. The results have certainly not been consistent or
satisfactory.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Moore. Now Chairman Castro.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
I have a question about the Artemis Accords for the panel.
The Artemis Accords negotiated by the last administration and
endorsed by the Biden administration represent a significant
step forward in shaping norms of behavior in space and then
bringing our allies and partners to work with us on the return
to the Moon. It is also the first time since the Apollo
programs where a new administration maintained the goals of the
previous administration, a sign of continuity that raises the
chances the Artemis program succeeds.
So are the accords intended to exceed preexisting
agreements and treaties? In practicality, what is the binding
effect of these accords for their signatories? What role would
the Artemis Accords play as a vehicle for establishing norms
for behavior in space? And then, finally, so far, nine
countries have signed the Artemis Accords, including Canada,
the U.K., Australia, Japan, Italy, Ukraine, and the UAE [United
Arab Emirates]. Do you expect other countries to join? And what
steps is the administration taking to expand support for the
accords?
Mr. Moore. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that
question. When we first started working with our colleagues in
NASA and in the previous administration on the concept of
Artemis Accords, there was some discussion about making them
legally binding. As that discussion continued, particularly
with our spacefaring partners, it became clear that legally
binding arrangements would also require parliamentary
ratification and could take an extremely long time to
negotiate. So the Artemis Accords, instead, as previously drawn
up and very much endorsed by the Biden-Harris administration,
as you have stated, are not legally binding. They are mutual
statements of values and vision for cooperation in space, are
neither legally binding nor for that matter do they have direct
financial implications.
With regard to who has signed on to the Artemis Accords,
you are exactly right, Mr. Chairman, nine countries have signed
on to them so far. We are engaged in active discussions with a
number of other countries that are quite interested in signing
on throughout the world. This is a project that in fact every
continent where there are populations, many countries, whether
they are long-term allies or new friends and partners, are very
interested in joining us in a transparent effort to set values
and standards in space.
Mr. Castro. All right. Anyone else? No? Okay.
I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Chairman.
Ranking Member Malliotakis.
Ms. Malliotakis. Thank very much.
I have a more general question. I am just curious to know
how the State Department and Department of Defense coordinate
on space-related activities, particularly when it relates to
our partners, allies, and adversaries. It is more of a broad
question, but I was just looking for more insight.
Mr. Turner. I don't mind starting this ball rolling. You
know, of course the State Department has the lead role in
basically in foreign policy outreach. In the case of the AVC
Bureau, we are very active in a number of multilateral
organizations where we will present our views because we have
to do that competitively with others, for instance in the U.N.
framework or in the Conference on Disarmament or any number of
other fora. And we have of course regular consultations with
our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, with our
Asian allies. And this is what our job is basically about, is
to go around and talk to people and build support for the way
we want to do things.
And the United States is very fortunate to have a very
broad network of allies, which allows us to leverage our
efforts and multiply them in a way that is generally not
available to countries such as Russia and China. So that is
where the United States has a distinct advantage. And that is
where consulting with our allies and building support for
everything we do is really one of the most effective ways that
the United States can achieve the kinds of goals that we have
been talking about today.
And, of course, every step we take is, even though we may
have the lead on these foreign policy issues, the only other
thing that I would like to say is that all of these activities,
especially involving arms control and some of these issues,
security issues, are what we do is the result of a very
intensive interagency process that brings in all the different
players--the intelligence community, Joint Staffs, OSD [Office
of the Secretary of Defense], et cetera, NASA--depending on
what is being discussed and what is at stake. So it is quite an
intensive process.
Ms. Malliotakis. And the Department of Defense end?
Mr. Hill. Yes, Representative Malliotakis. I will be glad
to give you some concrete examples of how DOD really--we are
typically supporting State Department in these cases because we
are talking here mainly about diplomacy of the Nation, and that
is State Department's lead. But, for example, Mr. Turner
mentioned the talks, the civil space talks that his office has
with China, and he mentioned the example of the Global
Positioning System. So we will provide a DOD technical expert
to support them because, of course, the Department of Defense
operates the Global Positioning System. And we will provide
that technical expert to support talks related to spectrum and
deconfliction and so forth in that respect.
Another example would be last summer the United States and
Russia met in Vienna in the context of a space security
exchange there. This was related to some other talks that were
going on. Of course, the State Department led and organized it,
but the Department of Defense, we sent one of General Whiting's
colleagues; General Shaw was there from the operational side. I
participated from the policy side. And we were able to present
Defense perspectives and State diplomatic perspectives relative
to the positions Russia was taking and some of the Russian
behavior that we find problematic.
Third example would be this United Kingdom resolution that
passed in the General Assembly and the United States response
to it. Again, we cooperated very closely in how the United
States would put together the position. So State Department can
be confident that what they were carrying forward was something
that was good for national security from our perspective here,
as well as good from the broader perspectives that they have to
represent across the breadth of the government.
Ms. Malliotakis. Great. I am running out of time, but if
you can fit it in, I am just curious, any thoughts the Russia
and China announcing their intentions to jointly develop a
research station on the Moon and any concerns that Congress
should be aware of on that end?
Mr. Hill. I will comment that we will keep a close eye on
that. And that is probably the most I can comment at this
point. Thank you.
Ms. Malliotakis. Understood. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has almost expired.
Ms. Malliotakis. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
The order of questioning for the next four members will be
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Garamendi, and Mr. Issa.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for testifying today. I
appreciate your contributions to the discussion.
Let me begin, several think tanks have already noted that
cyber, electric magnetic spectrum, and directed energy attacks
are growing threats for space-based assets.
Mr. Turner and Mr. Moore, to what extent have these topics
been discussed regarding standards of responsible space-based
behaviors?
Mr. Turner, I will start with you.
Mr. Turner. What we have done in the report that we just
sent to the United Nations, some of the issues--no, that is not
it--we have listed a number of the different kinds of threats
that--to space. And to date, there are no standards for those
threats at all. I mean, these systems are being developed.
There are no international rules to govern them. But as part of
our contribution, we had a whole section describing the kinds
of threats that are out there, you know, ground to space, space
to space, ground to ground, space to ground. And we talked
about radio frequency interference; directed energy weapons;
cyber threats to command and control; attacks on terrestrial
space infrastructure; ASAT missiles, which were discussed
earlier; robotics; et cetera. So we are at the stage of the
process where we are identifying the kinds of threats that are
out there. And then, eventually, this will lead then to
principles of behavior for how nations should behave in space.
But there are no formal agreements covering a number of these
issues.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Moore, any comment from you? You are on
mute, I think.
Mr. Moore. Thank you, Congressman Langevin. Bruce Turner's
team in AVC focuses more on the security side. We focus more on
the civilian side of trying to set the standards and enforce
U.S. interests. So I apologize. I do not have more for you on
that.
Mr. Langevin. Well, let me ask you this, with respect to
cyber, we already have norms related to the targeting of
critical infrastructure. I would be curious to hear quickly
from all of the witnesses, would you support designating space
as a critical infrastructure sector? And I ask this because DHS
[Department of Homeland Security] is currently doing a
congressionally mandated review of critical infrastructure
sectors.
Mr. Hill. I could step in here briefly. And, first, I would
like to clean up something I said previously. I referenced the
civil talks; that is Mr. Moore's office, of course, not Mr.
Turner's. I misspoke previously.
On this one, with respect to the critical infrastructure
question, my understanding is that space has been included as a
critical infrastructure in the homeland security context. There
are individual defense assets that may be also included as
defense critical infrastructure.
Mr. Langevin. I wasn't aware of that designation, but we
will take that one and double-check on.
Mr. Hill. We will too.
Mr. Langevin. I think it certainly should be designated as
critical infrastructure.
So understanding that you have to be able to adequately
monitor the environment to enforce responsible behavior,
General Whiting, how would you assess our space situational
awareness and attribution capabilities?
And, actually, before I go to that, do any of the witnesses
have other thoughts on designating space as critical
infrastructure? I would assume you would agree?
Mr. Moore. Congressman, if I may offer a view. That is
worth taking a more deeper look at. I am not certain that space
has been designated as a critical infrastructure sector.
Obviously, the question of cybersecurity is of paramount
interest to the Biden-Harris administration. And many of us at
the State Department are working on that, perhaps our bureau
somewhat more peripherally. But in terms of space as a critical
infrastructure sector, we would have to review that and get
back to you.
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough. I see my time is about to
expire. Anything else from the other witnesses on critical
infrastructure?
Mr. Hill. Mr. Congressman, nothing on the critical
infrastructure piece, but if you would like, I will briefly
talk about our space situational awareness or, as we call,
space domain awareness capabilities. We have the best in the
world. And that is why we make available so much of that
information through Space-Track.Org to promote a safe, stable,
and secure space domain.
But with the growing threats that I spoke to earlier, we
need to improve that domain awareness capability so that we
could help to know when any future norms are being violated and
certainly, from our perspective, watch for threats and give
good indications and warning of potential bad actors in space.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Jim Cooper and
Ranking Member Doug Lamborn, for coordinating this very
important joint hearing.
Additionally, I would like to thank the four witnesses.
Each one of you have come across as very impressive, and your
service to our country is very, very much appreciated.
In terms of questions, General Whiting, what progress has
been made in operationalizing our international space
partnerships through the Combined Space Operations Center?
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, thank you for that
question. We have made some substantial progress through the
Combined Space Operations Initiative. We now have allied
personnel across many of our formations to include the Combined
Space Operations Center [CSpOC] at Vandenberg.
And U.S. Space Command, our combatant command, in fact, now
has a named operation, Operation Olympic Defender, which some
of those countries have signed up to, which means we operate
day-to-day in space with them. And our CSpOC at Vandenberg
works with their national military operation--space operations
centers on a daily basis. So that unique pairing of countries
that we are blessed to have, that is really an advantage for
the United States, and we are excited about that progress.
Mr. Wilson. I share your view about being blessed. And in
regard to that, what are the leading countries that are
cooperating?
General Whiting. It is some of our closest allies, Mr.
Congressman, like Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
others.
Mr. Wilson. Well, again, best wishes on that.
And, Mr. Hill, expanding commercial space infrastructure is
a uniquely American solution to increasing our capability of
resilience. I am impressed with the ingenuity of the private
sector to augment government efforts to keep space accessible
and stable. What is the appropriate level of government
oversight necessary to ensure commercial entities are well
integrated into a comprehensive rules-based framework? How
should the administration incorporate them into a future
defense space strategy?
Mr. Hill. Thank you, Congressman Wilson. On the commercial
space, there is a number of [inaudible] going on. First of all,
with respect to--your question kind of touched on regulation in
one respect. And there is a major overhaul of commercial remote
sensing regulation that took place in the past year, which DOD
worked very closely to really bring us out of the 2006 era of
the old regulation into the 2020s era, where we have much more
prolific commercial capabilities, and we need to let that
competitive sector compete around the world. And the Defense
Department benefits from having that strong commercial sector,
so a big change in the philosophy there.
We also, of course, leverage U.S. commercial space
innovation. Our space launches off of commercial launch service
providers, for example. There is growing commercial space
situational awareness capabilities that we interlead with our
own capabilities. And so, depending on the sector, we use more
or less. There are some areas where commercial doesn't find a
great market, so we have to put more government investment.
Other places like satellite communications, tremendous
opportunity to leverage commercial.
Mr. Wilson. Well, it is exciting to see the mutual benefit.
And, Mr. Turner, the June 2020 Defense Space Strategy
includes several lines of effort, one of which is to better
inform international and public audiences of the growing
adversarial threats in space. What can Congress do to ensure
that our constituents understand the benefits of an accessible
stable space?
Mr. Turner. Sorry. I am sometimes a little--I forget to
unmute. Today's hearing is one such step, I think, because this
is available on live streaming, so presumably others besides
all of us can hear what is going on. I think Americans need to
be made aware of how much they actually depend on space for
their--not only for their security but also for their
prosperity.
We do a certain amount of outreach as well, which is very
effective in that regard. And, of course, I think one of the
things that ensures that this will reach the right audiences is
that, thus far, our efforts in space have been supported by a
bipartisan consensus in Congress, and it is sort of like, you
know, the old saying that domestic policy ends on America's
shores. I think it also needs to end where we start to leave
the atmosphere and get into outer space. So I will leave it at
that for right now.
Mr. Wilson. No, thank you very much. And, indeed, Chairman
Cooper is leading the bipartisanship.
I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman.
Now, Mr. Garamendi, are you still us with? Mr. Garamendi?
If not, Mr. Issa? Are you still with us?
We will----
Mr. Issa. I am with you.
Mr. Cooper. Okay.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Darrell, go for it.
Mr. Issa. I think I am going to continue pretty much with
the same line of questioning that we have been doing, but I
will change it up a little bit.
General, I think maybe you can handle this sort of as a
joint representative. In the domains that we have operated on
during your career--sea, land, air--we have international rules
and conventions, and they are broadly agreed to and signed on
by all the parties that we have mentioned here today. Would you
say that is fair to say?
General Whiting. Yes, sir, I would.
Mr. Issa. And as we sit here today, we will have today,
tomorrow, or certainly last week and in the next 3 weeks, we
will have Iranian gunboats that will enter our space and
endanger ships. We may or may not have another taking of our
maritime folks. And, of course, China is building islands and,
in complete violation of right-of-way for countries throughout
that region, is beginning to encroach or to not allow people to
have what has been hundreds of years of free travel.
So would you say that, as we look to space, is there any
special reason not to believe that all of the factors that
affect air, land, and sea around our hemisphere, that any of
those will be significantly different? In other words, can we
not expect at least similar activities as we have similar bad
actors or the same bad actors who are already in space, such as
China and Russia?
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, thank you for the
question. Certainly, I think those analogies are useful, but if
we push them too far, of course, analogies will start to break
down because there is sovereign maritime space. There is
sovereign airspace. There is no sovereign space-space in space,
and so there are some differences that we will work through.
But we certainly believe, in Space Force, that the
establishment of voluntary, non-legally binding norms of
responsible behavior will help us to identify when others are
acting outside of those norms and when they are acting
irresponsibly. Much like when we are on the interstate and
everyone is following the rules, you can quickly see those that
are dangerous and not following the rules. So we do think that
would be a very positive step for the space domain.
Mr. Issa. And I agree with you. And as a follow-up, and I
do agree that there is certainly sovereign space, but using the
2007, in which China demonstrated its ability to destroy a
satellite in deep space, albeit its own, but for the purpose of
showing us that there but for their good graces that could have
been one of our satellites or a number of them, that activity
certainly was outside of any reasonable interpretation of their
sovereign rights. Wouldn't you agree?
General Whiting. Well, certainly, it was irresponsible, Mr.
Congressman. With 3,000 pieces of debris left on orbit that we
continue to track 14 years after the fact, 10 percent of all
the trackable objects on orbit. I can't imagine what led them
to do that and to continue to pollute the domain and put us all
at risk.
Mr. Issa. So the history of our planet being at relative
peace for the last half of the last century was primarily
through a combination of, you know, international agreements
and a degree of enforcement that the United States and its
allies, notably NATO and others, enforced with a periodic
enforcement by the United Nations.
So, in my remaining time, if you could answer sort of one
of those great questions for all time, isn't it fair to say
that we must go forward and establish those international
rules, draw in as many convention signers, including potential
bad actors, as possible, but also form those alliances that
would mimic in space, if necessary, the same sort of alliances
that have, in fact, kept us relatively peaceful for the last
70-plus years?
Don't we sort of have to do all of them, produce the U.N.,
produce the agreements, but also build those alliances with the
expectation that, just as in the past, the future, there will
be those who will not respect the very agreements that they
have signed?
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, we have certainly seen
NATO recognize space as a warfighting domain in just the last
couple of years, and so we see many like-minded countries that
we operate with putting more and more interest and concern on
space. And that I think accrues to our benefit because we can
now coalesce around these norms of responsible behavior, and as
those begin to establish, then our State Department colleagues
can maybe work further agreements down the road. But I think it
is only goodness to bring more and more allies and partners
into these discussions.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time is expired.
I would like to give General Whiting the opportunity to
clarify something. I think you may have left the impression
that so far there is not much that is sovereign in space. I
mean, I would say that each individual nation's capsules or
astronauts are, in fact, sovereign entities even though they
are traveling through space.
General Whiting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was
specifically referring to the physical space itself, which is
in the outer space domain, not to manmade objects that are put
on space, so thank you for that clarification.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. Indeed, I stepped
away for a moment.
Clearly, we have a situation in which on the military side
of it, space is a domain for war, and, unfortunately, we are
all, not just the United States, China, and Russia, but others,
rapidly militarizing space with the anticipation that there
could be trouble in the future. And it happens to create an
extraordinary risk when all of our countries are depending upon
space for early knowledge of what the other may be doing.
I am going to leave that aside. Mr. Issa went into it in
some detail. I want to deal with the commercial side of it. We
have seen a very rapid evolution of commercial activity in
space for many different reasons, almost so that our military
no longer depends solely on itself for highly detailed photos
of what is going on in the world, weather reporting, and on and
on.
So let's talk about norms on the commercial side of the
activity, putting aside for a moment the military side, for
which I suspect the norm is he who is strongest will win at the
end of the process, and we will all be dead. But let's go ahead
for a moment on the commercial side. Start wherever you want.
Let's go with DOD. What is your interest in the commercial? And
then to the other two witnesses, ending up with the State
Department.
Mr. Hill. Congressman Garamendi, very much interested in
that. I think a good example of DOD and the commercial
community working with respect to norms has been the
sponsorship that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
did with the group. The acronym was CONFERS [Consortium for
Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations Program]. I am
sorry; I forget the name of the acronym. But it described a
body bringing together commercial people with government to
talk about how to do on-orbit servicing and remote rendezvous
and proximity operations and figuring out, what are the proper
ways to do this? When do you need to have permission?
It is a user community interest group. And if you think
back, long time in history, the International
Telecommunications Union kind of started out in that same way,
community of interest coming together on it. I think it is sort
of pulling off on its own. The commercial community will
probably be taking more of the lead in that. But that is the
kind of example where we will partner with the commercial
community to figure out, how do we encourage the stakeholders
to take on the public, the interest of the commons?
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moore. Congresswoman Garamendi, if I may jump in as
well----
Mr. Garamendi. Please.
Mr. Moore [continuing]. Just to say, as has been mentioned
earlier in the hearing today, one of the difficulties we face
is that, of course, with Russia and China, they really aren't
commercial activities. They are state-run, state-supported
activities.
When it comes to the United States, where we have such
amazing commercial partners like SpaceX and Blue Origin,
exactly the ones that have allowed us to get to the ISS
[International Space Station] without having to rely on Russia,
they operate at very high standards, and we support those
standards. They help set the standards for the rest of the
world. And, of course, again, through the--Artemis Accords,
working with those values, that vision, and those standards,
other countries and their potential commercial space operators
are very interested in joining part of that process.
One of the problems with the COPUOS process is that there
are over 90 countries in it, and it does all of its work by
consensus. So, unless everyone agrees, nothing gets done. When
it comes to commercial space operators, the United States sets
the standard, and we are working very actively, bilaterally and
in broader fora to make that the standard for the world.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Anybody else want to jump in on
this?
Mr. Turner. Just briefly. Again, this is Bruce Turner
again. Just to say, building on what Jonathan Moore just said,
I mean, there are opportunities there, of course. When our
commercial sector leads, you start to set these standards.
Those become the tacit standards for everyone, and then
countries such as Russia and China are maybe forced to sort of
deal with those standards as well and then would apply them to
their own efforts. So that, again, is one of the advantages of
developing these systems of norms.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I will just end in 20 seconds. It
seems to me that, on the military side, we are not going to get
very far. It is always good to talk, and more talk is better.
On the commercial side, building on what Mr. Issa said about
allies on the military side, working to fuse our current
leadership and develop a commercial set of standards and then
allow the others to join would be very, very fruitful.
Mr. Cooper, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The next four questioners will be Mr. Moulton, Mr. Waltz,
Mr. Carbajal, and Mr. Brooks.
So, now, Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I want to continue on a consistent theme throughout this
hearing, which is on effective enforcement. Without effective
enforcement, rules and norms obviously limit our own activity
in space but do nothing to impede malign activity by our
adversaries.
So let me be clear. I am not suggesting a rules-based order
in space is not a goal worth pursuing, but I want to ensure
that this is not an empty or symbolic endeavor. If we do not
intend to enforce the, quote, voluntary, non-legally binding
rules or expect our adversaries to abide by norms in space,
what happens when they violate them?
We see this issue in cyberspace. We have got international
actors who are still emboldened to attack and hack into U.S.
networks without any fear of an effective penalty or
retribution. And so, yeah, we can name and shame to a certain
extent, but what are the real consequences of setting down
rules that are then going to be ignored, and how do we actually
respond and deal with this more effectively?
Mr. Turner. Those are some very good questions. It is
always a very complicated issue, compliance with whether it is
legally binding obligations in the case of treaties or whether
you are talking about politically binding, non-legally binding
commitments in other areas. Each one has its advantages and its
disadvantages.
The advantage of treaty is that it is a legal obligation so
that, in some of the ways, you could argue that a violation is
more straightforward, except if you have ever worked with a
lawyer, you would know one of the things that you get into is
you get into these very, very difficult and complicated
interpretations of what the treaty actually says. And that can
be also a very long process.
One of the advantages of--just because it is not a legally
binding norm does not mean that it is not a norm and does not
mean that you cannot call somebody out for violating that norm,
nor does it mean that you can't take potential action if an
actor is not complying with that particular norm. In some
cases, you may even have more flexibility to react in those
kinds of situations precisely because it is not a legally
binding agreement.
And then, lastly, I would just add that with all of these
kinds of norms, even when certain actors violate those norms
they often pay a price for doing so. And in today's social
media environment or media environment, whatever you want to
call it, where so much depends on the narrative of who is doing
the right thing and who is not doing the right thing, that can
still be useful--a useful way to put diplomatic and public
pressure on malign actors.
Mr. Moulton. I mean, I am actually, Mr. Turner, one of the
few Members of Congress who is not a lawyer, but it seems to me
that this just has to be a lot more clear. And, you know,
hoping that one of our adversaries will get shamed on social
media does not seem like an effective strategy here.
General, I have got a question for you on this same theme.
So a rules-based order in any domain requires a certain level
of transparency and trust, and I understand that there is a
current effort by U.S. Space Force in space policy to review
potential declassification of satellites and activity in space
to be more transparent and to publicly communicate about our
space operations more easily.
How are you integrating with this effort to ensure that we
have enough transparency to allow for verification of our own
behavior while still protecting systems and activity that we
are not prepared to share?
General Whiting. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Congressman, for that
question. Certainly, I would say that I think we are the most
transparent country when it comes to our activities in space
through the website that I mentioned earlier, Space-Track.Org,
that we make available to the world because we care about
preserving the domain for our long-term operations there.
And we have had an effort ongoing for the last several
years to continually even make more information available. Of
course, just like in other domains we are not going to show
exactly where our ships and airplanes are that are critical to
the national defense----
Mr. Moulton. General, if I may interrupt----
General Whiting. Yep.
Mr. Moulton [continuing]. Do you think we have that balance
right, or are we still on the side of too much of it being
classified to be effective at, you know, using the transparency
we need to promote enforcement?
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, I would say it is not an
end state; it is a journey. And so I think we are constantly
working to get that balance exactly right. I think we made
important strides and will continue to do those reviews to make
as much information as possible to as many people as possible
to ensure that domain is safe.
Mr. Moulton. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Waltz, are you with us? Mr. Waltz? Calling Mr. Waltz.
If he is not, Mr. Carbajal?
Mr. Carbajal. Here I am.
Mr. Cooper. Now we can hear you.
Mr. Carbajal. I am having glitches here. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, and I apologize for the technical difficulties I was
having.
One of the most pressing issues to be addressed is
obviously debris mitigation. The Space Force is tracking about
30,000 pieces of debris with a half a million other objects in
orbit too small to track. While the space debris mitigation
guidelines of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space was endorsed by the United Nations General
Assembly in 2007, RAND [Corporation] recently reported that the
voluntary guidelines lacked measures for accountability and
that compliance with debris mitigation guidelines, and it is
the biggest contributor to greater collision risk.
General Whiting, based on the current level of space debris
and voluntary international policies, will there be a point
where there will be an unacceptable risk posed by space debris
to the United States space assets, including both national
security and commercial operations?
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, thank you for the
question. I certainly want to communicate that we are concerned
about the growing congestion in space, but I think certainly
over the next several years we have plans and processes in
place to make sure that we can continue to safely operate. But
we do support intergovernmental measures that will reduce
debris, and I will defer to my colleague, Mr. Hill, maybe to
speak more about what the Department of Defense is doing in
that regard.
Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Hill.
Mr. Hill. Yes. Sorry, there is a little noise. So, in 2019,
the United States Government updated our orbital debris
mitigation standard practices. They actually go well beyond
what the United Nations practices are, and, in fact, they drew
from a lot of Department of Defense and existing regulations
providing much clearer statements of the hazard risks, more
options for how to get debris out of orbit, particularly from
higher orbits over time.
But there is absolutely, as General Whiting said, concern,
and particularly in the low Earth orbit region where things get
crowded in some of the polar orbits in particular, that debris
mitigation is important. The emergence in the commercial sector
and in some government support, some places of potentially
active debris removal is encouraging, but I think there is a
lot of work to be done in this respect.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
General Whiting, in your testimony, you write that some
discussions at the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] level can
be challenging, but more often than not, there is agreement on
what constitutes responsible behavior, the ability to
demonstrate and message responsible behavior, and desire to
call out irresponsible behavior. At the mil-to-mil level, what
has been the biggest barrier to moving forward with creating an
international accepted framework?
General Whiting. Mr. Congressman, each of the countries
that we have mil-to-mil discussions with, and these are allied
countries, they all have their own legal frameworks. They have
their own policy traditions. And we work through those in
forums like the Schriever Wargame tabletop exercise that we
conduct every year. But through that, we find there is a
coalescing around some generally accepted ways of operating
that are responsible, safe, professional, and so those are--we
think, through dialogue, we can work through those kinds of
issues.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Turner, Mr. Moore, commercial companies are heavily
investing in satellites and launch services. Space technology
these companies are developing has the propensity to be dual
use, which creates new challenges. Is the Federal Government
engaging with commercial actors as part of your discussions in
developing rules and norms, and can you comment on how dual
technology is being considered?
Mr. Turner. I mean, I think I would defer to my colleague
from OES on the commercial aspects of that. But, from a
security standpoint, of course, this is one of the issues with
developing rules of behavior. And one of the issues when you
are talking about threats in space is we are very acutely aware
of the fact that a number of things are dual use simply by
nature, so they can either be--have benefits or they can
potentially be used against satellites. So it is one of those
issues that needs to be talked about and, again, why we are in
favor of these rules of behavior.
Mr. Hill. Yes, Congressman Carbajal, Bruce touched exactly
on some of the aspects of dual use. We are very much trying to
support the development of the commercial sector, and, again,
this is a place where companies in the United States are
leading the way and setting the standard, helping again to
return us to ISS so that we are not dependent on other
countries for that.
But as part of the broader efforts, including through the
Artemis Accords, to build partnerships and to share values and
vision on space, again, we are very grateful for the strong
endorsement of this administration for those goals--that is
part of the discussion with the commercial sector.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. I am out of time. Mr.
Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The gentleman is, in fact, out of
time.
We tried to get Mr. Waltz earlier. He was not available.
Mr. Brooks was next, and he has logged off. So I think the next
questioner will be Mr. Lieu.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Chairman Cooper and Chairman Castro,
for holding this important hearing.
I am very thankful for the expertise from all the panelists
today. I previously served in Active Duty in the Air Force, and
now I do my Reserve Duty at the Space and Missile Systems
Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base. And I am thrilled that
the United States Space Command has chosen to locate Space
Systems Command, one of three major commands under the Space
Force, at Los Angeles Air Force Base. And with every passing
day, space becomes more important.
I also want to just clarify the critical infrastructure
question that Congressman Langevin asked earlier. The reason
there has been confusion is there is approximately 16 critical
infrastructure sectors, such as the chemical sector, the
communications sector, the energy sector. Space is not one of
them.
However, if there is, for example, a space communications
satellite, that would arguably be captured within the
communications sector. That has been designated as critical
infrastructure. To alleviate this confusion and to capture
everything in space, I am working on legislation that would, in
fact, designate space as an infrastructure sector, and that
goes in line with both the former administration's and this
administration's focus on space.
And so my first question is to Secretary Moore. I note,
first of all, that you speak at least eight languages. I am
super impressed by that. But I also note that your title
doesn't include ``space'' anywhere in it. At the same time, the
Department of Defense has created an entire Space Force
dedicated just to space. Do you think it is a good idea, or
shouldn't we have the State Department elevate space to a
standalone bureau?
Mr. Moore. Congresswoman Lieu, thank you very much for your
service, both in uniform and in the House of Representatives,
and thank you for an excellent question. I am very pleased to
tell you that, across the list of endeavors in the Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
we have nine action offices. One is the Office of Space
Affairs. It is staffed by a number of diplomats and
professional experts with advanced degrees, including in
astrophysics. It is the core team that coordinates diplomatic
efforts on space with other countries in lockstep with the
Pentagon, with Space Command, of course with NASA. And
congratulations to Administrator Nelson on his recent
confirmation.
We have a very distinguished team. The word ``space'' may
not appear in our title, but because of the tasks that we have
here in the bureau, which has a fairly long name as it stands,
I can assure you that space is front and center. For all of
these reasons, we are grateful for the opportunity to testify
today and respond to not just your questions today but to work
with you and your staff as we have done in the past and with
many offices in Congress to help explain and gain information
and guidance from you.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I just request that you and others at
State Department consider having space not just as an office
but as a separate bureau.
My next question goes to General Whiting. Thank you for
your service as well, sir. So we have currently other
countries, such as China and Russia, who don't necessarily
follow norms, and as you know, China has done anti-satellite
weapons tests. So we could have two possibilities: Either we
allow all countries to do anti-satellite weapons testing or we
allow no country to do it through a binding legal regime.
Do you have any preference for that from a defense
perspective? Do you think the U.S. should be allowed to do
anti-satellite tests as other countries do, or should no
country be allowed to do that as a legal matter?
General Whiting. Thank you, Mr. Congressman, for the
question. You know, from my perspective, the real danger with
those tests--and we are talking about tests now--are the long-
lived debris like the Chinese ASAT debris that we continue to
have to operate around today. I think we do absolutely want to
establish a norm that no actions in space, no country's action
in space should create long-lived debris.
And, with that, sir, I would defer to Mr. Hill on questions
of legality regarding ASAT tests.
Mr. Hill. Mr. Lieu, to pick up on from what General Whiting
just said, in terms of tests, you are correct. There is no
prohibition today on anti-satellite tests. There is quite a bit
of scorn to be earned, as China earned in 2007 with their test.
The question, though, if you were to try and prohibit
weapons in space, is what is the definition of a weapon, and
when are these systems, which they are so inherently dual use--
lasers can be used for communications; lasers can be used as
weapons. And it goes on from there. So it is the practicality.
It is the verifiability, enforceability of that. And so what we
really have to focus on in the long run is reducing the
benefits that people might seek to derive from employing
capabilities as weapons. That goes to resilience and to mission
assurance, which is a longer topic.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. The gentleman's time has expired.
I did not know that Mr. Moore was so multilingual, but I
did notice from the video that he has the largest office of
anyone on the call, so congratulations on that.
Mr. Waltz is back. So now it is Mr. Waltz' turn.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, everyone.
Mr. Hill, as an OSD alum, it is great to see you in this
capacity. It has been a long time. I want to ask you about
thinking through how we establish deterrence in space. And, you
know, as many of you have said and many of my colleagues have
said, you know, our entire modern economy could be greatly
adversely impacted should some of these assets be taken down.
As we are seeing the Chinese in particular increase their
reliance as BeiDou comes online, their GPS system comes online,
their military increasingly projects and is also becoming
increasingly dependent, how do we establish deterrence in
space?
I know the vice chairman is working on a declassification
effort, but, you know, I want them to know what we can do and
what we can't do and what we are willing to do as a deterrent
measure, and what efforts are there along those lines. Mr.
Hill, I will go to you first, but, anyone, feel free to answer.
Mr. Hill. Congresswoman Waltz, it is good to see you
again----
Mr. Waltz. Yeah.
Mr. Hill [continuing]. After many years. So deterrence in
space, we spend quite a bit of focus on this, and as I started
to mention in my previous response, for a nation that is highly
dependent on space, both in our civil life, our daily
commercial life, private lives, as well as in our military
life, it is fundamentally important. It should be a norm to
have reliability, mission assurance of capabilities at a level
commensurate to the level in which we rely on those
capabilities.
That was the case when we didn't have adversary threats in
space and when systems were first designed. You had to design
for the natural environment threats. You had to design for
jamming, and you did that. But as these commercial--as these
more modern conventional threats have emerged, we obviously
have to transition our architectures, and this goes back to
some of the commercial points earlier.
Leveraging the innovation that is coming out of the
commercial sector and the significant cost reductions that we
see in both launch and in the space capabilities themselves
allows us to do entirely different architectural approaches. It
takes time to transition to that. So you have to protect what
you have today, but you ultimately transition to architectures
that are more inherently vulnerable. And, as in any other
domain, you have the ability to accept and survive combat
casualties.
Mr. Waltz. Right.
Mr. Hill. That is a key part of denying the benefit of
attack.
With respect to the other side of deterrence, the cost
imposition side of things, that is one where you may be looking
a lot more across domain types of activities. It may be that
the place to impose costs on somebody for an unacceptable
activity may not be in the space domain. It may be elsewhere.
Mr. Waltz. Right.
Mr. Hill. So those are some of the things to think about
with respect to----
Mr. Waltz. Well, what I am trying to get at, and maybe your
State Department colleagues are better to answer this, is what
are we communicating that we are willing and capable to do?
Because if--that is how misjudgments, miscalculations happen,
and so that is--you know, to your State Department colleagues,
what are we communicating now in terms of our capability and
our will?
Mr. Turner. Yeah, this is Bruce Turner from AVC again. One
of the reasons we had a meeting in July with the Russians about
space issues was to communicate very clearly to them the kinds
of concerns that we have about things that they are doing. And
this is for the same reason the Biden administration is
interested in beginning a strategic stability dialogue with the
Russians that will cover, you know, nuclear and other issues as
well.
But the whole point is to explain very clearly to them, you
know, what our concerns are, what we do not want them to do,
and to try to iron out some of the rules of the road so that
they know exactly what kinds of risks they are taking if they
engage in certain kinds of behavior.
Mr. Waltz. So, you know, one of the things that I am most
concerned about is our nuclear command and control systems.
And, you know, when we are talking about standards in terms of
how close you can get, what types of activities you can do now
that other countries are up in geosynchronous, I think we need
to be very clear on our end but also make it clear on their end
so we don't have those kind of catastrophic miscommunications.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I yield. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. I appreciate the gentleman being so precise.
Thank you.
We have completed, I think, the first round of questioning,
and I was going to cut it off. We have been in session for
about an hour and 45 minutes.
Are there any members who have a final question they would
like to ask?
If not, then I want to thank the witnesses for their
excellent testimony. I want to thank the members for showing up
and posing such good questions, and I want to thank the staff
for assembling all this. So it is hard to have a remote
hearing, but this went very well. And it is certainly an
important and, you know, possibly historic hearing that we had
today to get these efforts underway, so thank you for being
part of this historic effort.
Voice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cooper. The hearing is now adjourned, with Chairman
Castro's permission.
Mr. Castor. Absolutely. Thank you, everyone.
Mr. Cooper. Okay.
Voice. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. Do you agree that non-binding consensus-based standards
and transparency and confidence building mechanisms are the ideal path
to pursue a nascent field while also promoting responsible behavior?
Mr. Hill. I agree it is important to pursue non-binding standards
and transparency and confidence-building mechanisms to promote
responsible behavior in space. This preferred approach is consistent
with the March 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and
the December 2020 National Space Policy, the latter of which directs
U.S. Government departments and agencies, in collaboration with the
Secretary of State, to ``[l]ead the enhancement of safety, stability,
security, and long-term sustainability in space by promoting a
framework for responsible behavior in outer space, including the
pursuit and effective implementation of best practices, standards, and
norms of behavior.'' Department of Defense (DOD) policies and practices
often serve as a basis for U.S. Government positions in international
discussions, and DOD partners with the Department of State in efforts
to develop voluntary, non-legally binding international standards and
norms regarding safe, responsible, and professional behavior in space.
U.S. proposals center upon voluntary, non-legally binding measures
derived from current technical and operational best practices, and they
provide practical, pragmatic, and inclusive opportunities to build
shared interests among operators.
Mr. Waltz. My understanding is DOD and State are authorized to
enter into agreements that limit state action (i.e. weapons, ASAT,
jamming/interference, proximity and rendezvous, and their own
operations, etc) but not limitation on private activities. Do you agree
that your respective agencies should only be talking about limitations
on government activities and not the private sector?
Mr. Hill. Rather than focusing on the use of formal agreements in
an effort to limit outer space activities, the U.S. Government focuses
on enabling safe and sustainable space operations by developing
voluntary, non-legally binding standards, guidelines, norms, and best
practices for responsible space activities. The U.S. Government often
does this in partnership with commercial and other non-governmental
space operators. For example, the U.S. Government engaged commercial
sector experts in developing guidelines on debris mitigation and space
sustainability. Looking forward, the U.S. Government will continue to
work closely with industry in developing guidelines on new activities,
such as through the Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and
Servicing Operations (CONFERS) initiative, which advocates for
voluntary, consensus-based technical and safety standards for on-orbit
satellite maintenance, servicing, and rendezvous operations. DOD
believes that a robust, innovative, and competitive commercial space
sector is the source of continued progress and sustained American
leadership in space. The United States remains committed to encouraging
and facilitating the continued growth of a U.S. commercial space sector
that supports U.S. interests, is globally competitive, and advances
U.S. leadership in the generation of new markets and innovation-driven
entrepreneurship.
Mr. Waltz. Do you agree that non-binding consensus-based standards
and transparency and confidence building mechanisms are the ideal path
to pursue a nascent field while also promoting responsible behavior?
Mr. Turner. U.S. policy is to promote a framework for responsible
behavior in outer space, including the pursuit and effective
implementation of best practices, standards, and norms of behavior.
These processes may or may not be consensus-based. We are also pursuing
bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building
measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of,
outer space to strengthen the safety, stability, security, and long-
term sustainability of space activities, and to increase predictability
and reduce the risk of misunderstanding and inadvertent conflict
escalation.
Mr. Waltz. My understanding is DOD and State are authorized to
enter into agreements that limit state action (i.e. weapons, ASAT,
jamming/interference, proximity and rendezvous, and their own
operations, etc) but not limitation on private activities. Do you agree
that your respective agencies should only be talking about limitations
on government activities and not the private sector?
Mr. Turner. U.S. policy is focused on promoting a framework for
responsible behavior in outer space. Such efforts are primarily focused
on influencing states' behavior, but it is also important to consider
the activities of non-state actors in space as well, particularly given
the sheer number of satellites operated by private entities. Article VI
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty makes clear that ``[t]he activities of
non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.'' The State
Department works closely with other Departments and agencies, including
those with regulatory authority, to ensure that this obligation to
oversee the activities of our private sector space actors is met, and
to ensure U.S. commercial space interests are taken into full account
in the development of U.S. government policies.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted
definitions?
Mr. Hill. The increase in the number of spacefaring nations and the
total number of space operators--whether foreign or domestic,
commercial or governmental--has fostered a shared recognition of the
importance of establishing best practices and standards of responsible
behavior in space. The U.S. Government efforts in this regard include
working closely with commercial operators and other non-governmental
operators in addressing this need. For example, in 2019, at the
conclusion of almost a decade of negotiations, the UN General Assembly
welcomed the adoption of a preamble and 21 ``Guidelines for the Long-
Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities,'' the first-ever set of
comprehensive international best practices for space safety and
sustainability. Together with government and commercial operators from
95 countries, the U.S. Government and U.S. commercial operators played
active roles in these negotiations through the UN Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, proposing many of the guidelines that the
Committee adopted, and shaping the text of all guidelines for
consistency with existing U.S. policy and practice. The UN General
Assembly's December 16, 2020, adoption of a United Kingdom-sponsored
resolution, ``Reducing space threats through norms, rules and
principles of responsible behaviours,'' likewise reflected the growing
international sense of the importance and value of this approach to
establishing norms of conduct in space.
Mr. Morelle. With the rise of satellite constellations numbering
into the thousands and the tangible possibility of a significant
Kessler syndrome occurring in LEO how active is the U.S. in ensuring
collision avoidance? How important is verifiable and enforceable,
international rules-based order to ensuring responsible parties are
held accountable for satellite collision?
Mr. Hill. The United States is very active in supporting the safety
of flight for all space operators. We combine the world's best space
situational awareness (SSA) capabilities with a commitment to the
safety of spaceflight rooted in longstanding law and policy. DOD
distributes U.S. SSA information through tools such as space-track.org
and SSA sharing arrangements and agreements with more than 125
commercial and international partners. However, the reality is that the
more complex challenges of space traffic management--the issue at the
heart of this question--should be addressed as a function of a civilian
regulatory agency, rather than as a DOD function. With our civil agency
counterparts in the Department of Commerce, DOD is prepared to work
with Congress in addressing this important issue of space safety and
sustainability for all space operators. With regard to accountability
for satellite collisions, the United States is a State Party to the
four core space treaties that form the framework of international space
law. Those treaties include the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (``Outer Space Treaty'')
and the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (``Liability Convention''). Both of these foundational
treaties would apply to most cases of satellite collisions, in terms of
determining jurisdiction, responsibility, and liability. As the
development and expansion of governmental and commercial SSA
capabilities progress--and as their precision and accuracy improve--
these SSA capabilities may be able to provide valuable information that
would help determine the facts in a collision, while international law
would guide how to apportion obligations among the States Parties
involved.
Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted
definitions?
General Whiting. Space faring entities range from nation states,
civil organizations, commercial entities--which often times are multi-
national in nature--to academic institutions. As the space environment
becomes more congested and contested, our access to, and freedom of
operation in space becomes increasingly threatened. Access barriers
such as cost have fallen while risks are on the rise and nations such
as China and Russia have increased their counterspace weapons
development. Anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) tests have caused long-lived
debris fields, and uncontrolled re-entries--like with China's Long
March-5b vehicle--create uncertainty. These activities coupled with the
increased risk of collisions, pose serious challenges to the stability
and security of the space domain and increase the risk of
miscalculations and misunderstandings. This is why securing an enduring
advantage in space is a vital national interest--one that can no longer
be taken for granted. The establishment of the U.S. Space Force as a
separate Service has already provided greatly expanded opportunities
for partnerships with civil and commercial space organizations. From a
USSF perspective, the rise of commercial actors figure into this
discourse as we work to expand cooperation with our partners. We
integrate with allies and commercial partners through organizations
such as the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) to discuss and
review how we can align our operations in space to develop and
promulgate concepts for responsible space operations. Space traffic
management and collision avoidance are two important issues that may
inform the shaping of voluntary, non-legally binding norms, standards,
and guidelines of responsible behavior in space. Through the Department
of Defense, we continue to work hand-in-hand with the Department of
Commerce as they ramp up to take on basic space traffic management and
basic space situational awareness tasks as called for by the National
Space Council.
Mr. Morelle. With the rise of satellite constellations numbering
into the thousands and the tangible possibility of a significant
Kessler syndrome occurring in LEO how active is the U.S. in ensuring
collision avoidance? How important is verifiable and enforceable,
international rules-based order to ensuring responsible parties are
held accountable for satellite collision?
General Whiting. Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is the cornerstone of
all space operations and enhances all military operations. The 18th
Space Control Squadron located at Vandenberg Space Force Base,
California, performs conjunction assessment of all trackable objects
and provides collision avoidance warning for all current active
payloads. They are the only entity world-wide providing this service to
every satellite owner/operator regardless of country of origin. Seeing
a need to help keep space safe, the former Air Force Space Command (now
U.S. Space Force) has partnered with U.S. Strategic Command (now U.S.
Space Command), for many years, with the support of Congress, to
provide orbital conjunction assessments to any space owner/operator
around the globe who provides their contact information, while also
maintaining the public website space-track.org to create transparency
in the tracking of tens of thousands of objects on orbit. Today, we
support the shift of non-military space traffic management to the
Department of Commerce in the future, thus allowing the Department of
Defense to focus on directed military functions in our protect and
defend mission. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), makes States
internationally responsible for national activities in space, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or non-
governmental entities. The Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects provide for
liability for damage caused to space objects in outer space. It is the
position of the U.S. Space Force that voluntary, non-legally binding
norms, standards, and guidelines of responsible behavior in space would
be immensely helpful toward our mission to protect the U.S. and our
allies in, from, and to space.
Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted
definitions?
Mr. Moore. The increasing utilization of space--including a
significant increase in the volume and diversity of commercial
activity--means all actors need to take responsibility for maintaining
outer space as a stable, safe, and sustainable environment. In the
first decades of the space age, with a membership of less than 20
member states, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) played a key role in establishing the four core outer space
treaties. Although the roster of the consensus-based COPUOS has grown
to 95 members, the United States maintains its leadership role,
including efforts to use COPUOS to develop non-legally binding
guidelines for the long-term sustainability of outer space activities,
thereby reaffirming the value of the existing international legal
regime and the importance of national-level implementation. We include
industry representatives as private sector advisers to our delegation
to COPUOS, and we consult with additional non-governmental stakeholders
to gain a better understanding of their perspective on issues. This
whole-of-government, whole-of-America approach helps ensure that the
United States considers a broad range of equities as it advances our
objectives.
Mr. Morelle. How has the sheer increase in the number of
spacefaring nations complicated efforts to establish international
rules-based order? How does the rise of commercial actors--foreign and
at home--figure into this discourse? Is the U.S. Government engaging
with commercial actors as the government assesses and redevelops norms
for conduct in space, works towards internationally accepted
definitions?
Mr. Turner. The increasing utilization of space--including a
significant increase in the volume and diversity of commercial
activity--means all actors need to take responsibility for maintaining
outer space as a stable, safe, and sustainable environment. In the
first decades of the space age, with a membership of less than 20
member states, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) played a key role in establishing the four core outer space
treaties, and the United States was a leader in the development of
those treaties. Today, although the roster of the consensus-based
COPUOS has grown to 95 members, the United States maintains its
leadership role, including its successful efforts in the 2010s to use
COPUOS to develop non-legally binding guidelines for the Long-Term
Sustainability of outer space activities. In so doing, we have
reaffirmed the value of the existing international legal regime and the
importance of national-level implementation, as opposed to ``top
down,'' one-size-fits-all processes. Regarding commercial engagement
within COPUOS, we include industry representatives as private sector
advisers to our delegation, and we consult with additional non-
governmental stakeholders to gain a better understanding of their
perspectives on issues under discussion. This whole-of-government,
whole-of-America approach helps ensure that the United States takes
into account a broad range of equities as it advances our objectives
through COPUOS and its subcommittees.