[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 STRENGTHENING THE U.S. TIES WITH SOUTHEAST 
                                     ASIA

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL ASIA, AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           September 28, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-78

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                         
                      
                      
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                  GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California		      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California		      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		      
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois              
                                   

                      Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director


                                 ------                                

 Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation

                    AMI BERA, California, Chairman,

BRAD SHERMAN, California             STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Ranking Member
DINA TITUS, Nevada	             SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
ANDY LEVIN. Michigan		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     KEN BUCK, Colorado
ANDY KIM, New Jersey		     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia	     MARK GREEN, Tennessee
TED LIEU, California		     ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     YOUNG KIM, California
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina                                

                      Jamie Morgan, Staff Director
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Shear, Honorable David B., Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins 
  School of Advanced International Studies, Former U.S. 
  Ambassador to Vietnam and Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.............................     7
Miller, Meredith, Former Deputy Director, Office of Economic 
  Policy, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. 
  Department of State............................................    18
Sobolik, Michael, Fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies, American 
  Foreign Policy Council.........................................    28

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    61
Hearing Minutes..................................................    62
Hearing Attendance...............................................    63

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    64

 
            STRENGTHENING THE U.S. TIES WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

                      Tuesday, September 28, 2021

                          House of Representatives,
  Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, 
                              and Nonproliferation,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., 
via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.
    Mr. Bera. Virtual gavel being banged, the Subcommittee on 
Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation will come 
to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point.
    And all members will have 5 days to submit statements, 
extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to 
the length limitation in the rules. To insert something into 
the record, please have your staff email the previously 
mentioned address or contact full committee staff.
    Please keep your video function on at all times, even when 
you are not recognized by the chair.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves, 
and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking. 
Consistent with remote committee proceedings of H. Res. 8, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when 
they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
    I see that we have a quorum and will now recognize myself 
for opening remarks.
    First, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today 
on this hearing focused on strengthening U.S. ties with 
Southeast Asia.
    Home to more than 662 million people and with a combined 
GDP of $3.2 trillion, the economic promise and strategic 
importance of Southeast Asia are hard to overState. I commend 
the Biden Administration for its continued prioritization of 
the region and the high-level visits from officials since the 
Administration came into office just 9 months ago.
    And, today, with this hearing, I want to make sure there 
are no doubts about the U.S. Government's and Congress's 
continued commitment to our Southeast Asian friends. The 
region's economic vibrancy, strategic location at the center of 
the world's maritime commerce, and demographic diversity 
vitally all make Southeast Asia a place of critical importance 
for the United States. I look forward to discussing existing 
areas of cooperation and where we can expand the U.S.-Southeast 
Asia partnership.
    As we hear from many of our allies and partners in 
Southeast Asia, what makes the region tick is the global 
commerce that courses through it. But many in the Southeast 
Asia region face challenges in maintaining economic 
independence, and, as close friends and partners, we must 
continue to develop support for Southeast Asian nations in 
developing diverse sources of investment and export markets so 
that they can stand up to any economic coercion.
    I was one of 28 House Democrats to vote for Trade Promotion 
Authority in 2015 and supported and continue to support and 
hold out hope 1 day for U.S. participation in the TPP, or what 
is now called ``CPTPP.''
    The United States should continue to lead in the region and 
think creatively on how to further integrate economically with 
Southeast Asia. This would include expanded digital 
infrastructure and connectivity across the region and setting 
the foundations for digital trade agreements that would harness 
Southeast Asia's immense potential.
    As a region dominated by the world's largest ocean, 
ensuring waterways remain free and open is a critical matter. 
Some countries seek to undermine maritime sovereignty through 
bullying and intimidation and by using gray-zone tactics that 
intentionally blur the line between military and commercial 
naval activity.
    To be clear, there have long been maritime territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. But the best way and safest 
way to resolve those disputes is by ensuring that all countries 
abide by international laws and norms aimed at resolving them. 
We must continue to reinforce those norms with our allies and 
partners.
    The United States has worked closely with regional actors 
to spotlight these challenges. And I particularly commend the 
Filipino Coast Guard for publishing photos earlier this year 
that clearly show what the PRC have been up to near Whitsun 
Reef.
    Our subcommittee also did a joint hearing with the House 
Armed Services Committee's Seapower Subcommittee on this 
important issue in April, and I will continue to work with our 
regional partners to defend the security in this vital region.
    The importance of Southeast Asia extends beyond the 
traditional security challenges and the promise of mutual 
economic prosperity that have been pillars of the U.S. 
relationship in the region. There are opportunities for broader 
cooperation and partnerships between the United States and 
Southeast Asian countries to address some of the most pressing 
threats today, including combating climate change, promoting 
global health security, and increasing supply chain resiliency. 
And President Biden's team has clearly seen this, as well, as 
evidenced by the concrete deliverables from high-level 
engagements.
    Obviously, the partnership between our countries is not 
without challenges. We do not always see eye-to-eye on every 
issue. But what unites us, including our shared commitment to 
promoting a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, 
is far greater than what separates us.
    Just last week, the Senate confirmed Daniel Kritenbrink, 
another former Ambassador to Vietnam, to be the Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. This committee looks forward to working with him to 
continue deepening U.S. engagement and ties with Southeast 
Asia. And I am confident the insights that our witnesses will 
share today will further shed light on opportunities for the 
United States to do just that.
    So, again, I want to thank my good friend, the ranking 
member, Mr. Chabot, for his partnership and understanding of 
the importance of the region.
    And, with that, let me yield 5 minutes to my friend from 
Ohio, the ranking member, Representative Steve Chabot.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Chairman Bera, for holding this 
hearing today. I really appreciate it. And I want to thank the 
panel, as well, for joining us today.
    As the former chair of this subcommittee and the co-chair 
of the U.S.-Philippines Friendship Caucus, along with my good 
friend Bobby Scott, as well as the Cambodia Caucus, I always 
appreciate giving Southeast Asia the time and attention that it 
deserves.
    Mr. Chairman, as those of us who have spent years engaging 
with the Indo-Pacific know all too well, the relationships we 
share with this critical region are too often overlooked in the 
foreign policy chatter inside the Beltway here. This is 
especially true today, as America has woken up to the reality 
that we are in a period of great-power competition.
    This reality is sharpening some paradoxical challenges to 
formulating an effective U.S. policy toward the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and its 10 member States.
    On the one hand, the United States and like-minded allies 
and partners are aggressively building an array of new 
plurilateral groups, like the Quad and the AUKUS, which are 
essential to mitigate threats to the Indo-Pacific. On the other 
hand, ASEAN centrality is and will remain a fundamental 
principle of the U.S.-Indo-Pacific strategy.
    A similar difficulty is that ASEAN nations seek 
relationships that are meaningful in their own right and 
justifiably resist being made into appendages or pawns of 
great-power maneuvering. But the most important issues for us 
to address with our ASEAN partners are those stemming from 
great-power competition, from trade rules to sea lanes and even 
the sanctity of their own sovereign territory.
    Likewise, ASEAN is essential to the future of the Indo-
Pacific and possibly the only practical multilateral structure 
for nations with such disparate cultures, languages, religions, 
governments, and population sizes, but the troubling reality is 
that ASEAN often proves incapable of addressing crises. Every 
year, the world waits with baited breath to see whether the 
ASEAN leaders' Statement will even mention the fact that the 
PRC is stealing its members' territory. And the January coup by 
Burma's military has once again thrown the limitations of ASEAN 
into sharp relief.
    Resolving these paradoxes will require following through on 
the increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific that the United 
States has promised over successive Administrations and has so 
far never fully delivered on. Over the last decade, the United 
States has concluded that the Indo-Pacific is our prevailing 
foreign policy priority. But the relative foreign assistance 
resources dedicated to this half of the globe have barely 
shifted and are still far outstripped by those dedicated to the 
Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
    We also need to do better to resolve the dissonance between 
the perception of U.S. disinterest and the reality of our 
partnership. The fact is, the United States remains ASEAN's 
most reliable and essential external partner. In addition to 
our bilateral assistance, the United States is, for example, 
the world's largest donor to COVAX. We are also the world's 
largest donor to the Rohingya crisis and Southeast Asia's 
primary source of foreign direct investment. And far too often, 
American sailors and airmen are the only people standing in the 
way of the PRC's constant attempts at territorial expansion.
    Going forward, it will be essential to articulate a 
compelling vision of what U.S. partnership offers to the 
nations of ASEAN. Successive U.S. Administrations have 
struggled to offer a credible theory of economic engagement 
with the region, and exploring new bilateral or sectoral 
agreements could help. Following through on our pandemic-era 
emergency assistance to create lasting public health 
cooperation could be another promising opportunity.
    And, along with our partners, we must demonstrate that 
arrangements like the Quad and AUKUS will not diminish ASEAN 
but elevate it and protect its members from the PRC's attempts 
at regional hegemony.
    With that in mind, I am looking forward to discussing the 
Biden Administration's recent high-level trips to the region 
and in reviewing their new version of the Indo-Pacific strategy 
when it comes out, which I hope will address these challenges 
and opportunities. The in-person engagement we have seen from 
the Cabinet and the Vice President so far this year is 
certainly something that our ASEAN partners will appreciate.
    So I look forward to continuing the conversation with our 
panelists, and I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Let me now introduce our witnesses.
    First, we have the Honorable David Shear, adjunct professor 
at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. 
He was U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 2011 to 2014, after 
which he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and 
Pacific Security Affairs from 2014 to 2016.
    Next, we have Ms. Meredith Miller, former Deputy Director 
of the Office of Economic Policy at the State Department Bureau 
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
    Last, but not least, is Mr. Michael Sobolik, fellow in 
Indo-Pacific studies at the American Foreign Policy Council.
    I thank you all for participating in today's hearing.
    I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes. Without 
objection, your prepared written statements will be made part 
of the record.
    I will first invite Ambassador Shear to share his 
testimony.

 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID B. SHEAR, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, 
JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FORMER 
 U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
             FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chabot, thanks for inviting me 
to appear before the subcommittee today. I will be summarizing 
remarks that I have already submitted.
    Thirty years from now, Southeast Asia will be a fulcrum of 
world geo-economic and geopolitical power. Countries most 
engaged economically in the region will write its rules and set 
its standards. Countries that wield effective influence, 
particularly with countries bordering the South China Sea, will 
hold tickets to regional eminence.
    To be a player in the future Southeast Asia, right now the 
United States will need to engage the region with a positive 
message that appeals directly to Southeast Asian aspirations. 
We will need to conduct a vigorous regional diplomacy, from the 
Presidential level down. We will need to devise a region-wide 
economic strategy, including support for infrastructure 
finance. We will need to deploy our military assets in ways 
that better deter aggression and best fit regional strategic 
realities. And we will have to increase pressure on the Burmese 
military regime and continue to seek improvements in democracy 
and human rights throughout the region.
    Southeast Asians want economic development, national 
autonomy, and a peaceful international environment. Our message 
should appeal to these aspirations.
    ASEAN leaders seek a regional balance of power that permits 
them maximum maneuverability. They know that they can't pursue 
these goals effectively without strong American regional 
engagement. They also know that they can't succeed if they are 
tied too tightly, either to the U.S. or to China.
    ASEAN peoples are deeply ambivalent about the rise of 
Chinese influence. On one hand, their interests compel them to 
pursue the big economic opportunities that China offers. On the 
other hand, the ASEANs chafe at Chinese diplomatic 
highhandedness and fear Chinese economic domination. We can 
exploit this ambivalence, but only to a point. ASEAN countries 
don't want to be considered merely as pawns in a Sino-American 
struggle for regional influence.
    Mr. Chairman, doing diplomacy with Southeast Asia is like 
eating tofu with chopsticks. If you squeeze too firmly, it 
falls apart. If you squeeze too softly, it slips away. But we 
have to squeeze. If we are going to do serious diplomacy with 
the Southeast Asians, we need American ambassadors at posts. We 
still don't have Ambassadors in multiple Asian capitals. Every 
day without an ambassador at post is a day of opportunities 
lost for American interests.
    We also should engage more fully in the region at the 
Presidential level. For the President to show up consistently 
in Southeast Asia is important, but even more important is the 
need for sustained Presidential attention to the task of 
shifting the resources necessary to make Southeast Asia a 
higher strategic priority.
    The Administration came out of the gate strongly with 
successful visits by the Vice President, Secretary of Defense 
Austin, and Deputy Secretary of State Sherman. The two Quad 
summits hosted by the President aggressively addressed the 
fight against COVID, climate change, cybersecurity technology 
cooperation, and people-to-people relations. This kind of 
effort appeals directly to regional aspirations.
    Members of Congress can demonstrate our interest in the 
region by visiting. You will find our hosts eager to engage, 
and you will find embassies eager to host you as well. We 
haven't had a Southeast Asian economic policy since 2016. From 
a strictly strategic point of view, our failure to join the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership was a blunder, and we should fix it 
by rejoining.
    We should also participate more fully in the Southeast 
Asian infrastructure build-out. We need to focus on 
infrastructure finance, local capacity-building, and project 
preparation. Increased funding earmarked for Southeast Asia 
from the Development Finance Corporation, the Treasury 
Department's Infrastructure Transaction Assistance Network, and 
the Trade Development Administration would go a long way.
    With regard to defense, strengthening conventional 
deterrence in Southeast Asia is a critical task. We must 
increase Joint Force lethality, enhance our posture, and 
strengthen allies and partners. And we will need to shift 
resources from other regions in East Asia in order do so. The 
establishment of AUKUS sent the entire region a strong message 
of American commitment. And with regard to shifting resources, 
we need to look at not only our forces but at the way in which 
we distribute security assistance globally.
    With regard to human rights, the tragic situation in Burma 
reflects some of the hard choices and limited options that U.S. 
policymakers sometimes face in engaging Southeast Asia. We must 
keep up the pressure on the regime while we do all that we can 
to stay on the side of the Burmese people.
    We should appoint a new special representative and policy 
coordinator for Burma. The position in the State Department has 
been vacant since 2012. We need to expand sanctions on trade 
and investment with entities owned or controlled by the 
military regime. And we need to seriously consider declaring 
the military's 2017 actions in Rakhine State genocide.
    Mr. Bera. Yes, Ambassador Shear, your time has expired, 
unfortunately. But we look forward to, you know, expanding on 
your opening Statement.
    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was almost done.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Shear follows:]

    
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. OK. Great.
    Let me now recognize Ms. Miller for her testimony.

STATEMENT OF MEREDITH MILLER, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 
ECONOMIC POLICY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 
                      DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Ms. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member 
Chabot, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective with you on 
this important topic, strengthening Southeast Asia-U.S. 
relations, particularly the economic dimension of that.
    The importance of that can't be underStated, and, in many 
respects, it is foundational to the topic of today's hearing. 
This is for a number of factors that are interrelated.
    First, as I detailed in my written testimony, Southeast 
Asia is of tremendous economic importance to the United States, 
and there is tremendous potential for future growth.
    Second, as Chairman Bera and Ranking Member Chabot noted in 
their opening remarks, China's economic investment influence in 
Southeast Asia is longstanding and is on an upward trajectory. 
It is in the interest of the United States to support our 
partners in the region and have a diversified economic 
relationship that allows for resilience against external shocks 
as well as strategic autonomy.
    This desire in Southeast Asia for economic diversity in 
relationships is also driving many new negotiations of 
preferential trading arrangements. CPTPP is one. ASEAN is also 
the leader behind the new RCEP agreement, which is the largest 
FTA in the world, and is actively negotiating an FTA with the 
European Union.
    The U.S. is not a party to any of these new frameworks, and 
this disadvantages our companies, over the medium and long term 
in particular, and also the United States as a destination for 
foreign direct investment. It also means that our voice at the 
table in developing new standards and norms in the region is 
weaker than it was before.
    It is also symbolically important. Many in the region are 
concerned that the U.S. has ceded leadership to China in this 
important economic arena. And, earlier this month, China 
announced that it had formally applied to join CPTPP, 
reinforcing this narrative in certain corridors.
    Additionally, and perhaps really importantly for the topic 
of the hearing, Southeast Asians overwhelmingly want more 
economic engagement from the United States. Economic 
engagement, commercial diplomacy, is at the heart of 
multilateralism in the region. It is the center of the mission 
of APEC and also core to the foundation and the activities of 
ASEAN.
    For leaders in emerging economies in the region right now, 
in particular, all of these issues have been thrown into even 
more acute relief by the devastation of COVID-19. The economic, 
health, and social consequences of the pandemic has put 
additional urgency on leaders to find new ways to stimulate 
economic growth and provide jobs, particularly for the very 
young population of the region.
    The Biden Administration has greatly enhanced its outreach 
to Southeast Asia in the second half of the year, which is a 
very welcome development. And Secretary of State Tony Blinken 
has announced that the Administration will soon share an Indo-
Pacific strategy. We can be fully confident that Southeast 
Asian leaders will be looking to that strategy in particular 
for the economic dimension, and, for it to be successful, we 
need to be responsive and engaged on that concern.
    In my written testimony, I included several recommendations 
for the committee's consideration on how we can boost our 
economic engagement in the region. Perhaps the most important 
and also the most challenging is for the U.S. to chart a path 
forward for joining CPTPP.
    There is no substitute for the United States, in both 
strategic and economic importance, for participating in that 
agreement as a way of ensuring our long-term competitive 
outlook and helping to provide additional developments of high 
standards in areas like labor, climate change, and other 
concerns for the United States.
    It is also welcome to hear growing momentum for sectoral 
agreement negotiations, particularly in the digital policy 
arena. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest-growing internet 
economies in the world and a large digital market.
    Third, it is important to note that the United States has 
many strong existing frameworks for economic diplomacy in the 
region but these could be usefully strengthened for enhanced 
impact. This includes resourcing our agencies that help to 
promote trade and investment, like the DFC and TDA; 
revitalizing our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
dialogs with ASEAN and bilaterally with key countries in the 
region; and pursuing Vice President Harris's welcome 
announcement that the U.S. would seek to host APEC in 2023.
    Importantly, Southeast Asia is also looking to the United 
States, and we could play a very important role in supporting 
the region in charting a path forward for equitable economic 
recovery from COVID-19. The devastation of the pandemic has hit 
vulnerable groups particularly hard, including women, the 
youth, and the poor.
    In the interest of time, I will stop my remarks here, and I 
very much look forward to continuing the discussion with the 
distinguished members of the committee.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Miller follows:]

    
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    Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Ms. Miller.
    And now let me recognize Mr. Sobolik for his testimony.

 STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SOBOLIK, FELLOW IN INDO-PACIFIC STUDIES, 
                AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL

    Mr. Sobolik. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chabot, distinguished members 
of the subcommittee, it is a privilege for me to appear before 
you today to discuss strengthening America's ties with 
Southeast Asian nations.
    The historical arc of U.S. policy in the region has given 
these governments ample reason to question America's 
reliability, commitments, and staying power. Their fears, 
moreover, have been made more acute in recent weeks by the 
precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and by a muting of 
the Biden Administration's early clarity about the need for 
long-term strategic competition with the People's Republic of 
China.
    When it comes to appreciating Asian perceptions of 
America's role in Southeast Asia specifically, three case 
studies merit examination.
    The first is America's withdrawal from Vietnam in the 
1970's. When the United States abruptly pulled out of Vietnam 
in 1975, ASEAN nations were shocked not that America had left 
but at the way in which it did so. America's bungled withdrawal 
led to hedging behavior by regional States. A year prior to the 
pullout, Malaysia established relations with China. After 
Saigon's fall, the Philippines followed suit. And Thailand 
reached a similar calculation shortly thereafter, normalizing 
relations with Beijing in a bid to have China's help to blunt 
Vietnam's advance into Southeast Asia.
    The second episode of note was Washington's response to the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. That year, currency values in 
Thailand and Indonesia tanked and regional growth halted. 
Washington, however, did not lend a helping hand to Thailand, 
despite having given Mexico similar aid under similar 
conditions in 1994. China, however, pledged financing and 
economic support to Bangkok.
    It was only after the situation in Southeast Asia worsened 
and the risk of contagion grew that the U.S. supported an 
Indonesian bailout fund. ASEAN member States, however, received 
the message clearly: The United States was an unpredictable 
partner in a crisis, perhaps even an unreliable one.
    The final episode revolves around America's passivity in 
response to the PRC's reclamation and militarization of the 
South China Sea in the 2010's. Beijing's fait accompli land 
reclamation presented serious problems to Vietnam, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, as well as Taiwan. While diplomats 
attempted to address the issue within ASEAN, Beijing exploited 
its close ties with Cambodia to scuttle any inclusion of the 
South China Sea in the resulting communique.
    Although subsequent U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations 
communicated our resolve to sail and patrol wherever necessary, 
China had succeeded in creating new facts on the ground that 
severely complicated the economic and military calculations of 
key ASEAN member States.
    This background, in turn, casts recent events in 
Afghanistan in a new and concerning light, both for Washington 
and especially for ASEAN. To the misfortune of Southeast Asian 
nations, Washington is doing now what it did 40 years ago when 
it exited Vietnam. The U.S. has once again haphazardly ended a 
war on the other side of the world and is relying on others, 
especially China, to pick up the pieces. This time, however, 
China is not an economic backwater or a military afterthought. 
It is the world's second-largest economy, and by some estimates 
the largest, and has the region's largest and most capable 
armed forces.
    There are, however, encouraging signs that Washington is 
beginning to learn from these mistakes--from the widely 
supported ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific'' concept, to the 
commendable Mekong-U.S. Partnership that was recently 
established.
    Looking forward, policymakers would do well to give 
attention to four matters. I go into these in detail in my 
submitted testimony. I will briefly touch on them now.
    The first is acknowledging this spotty record and 
committing in conversations with our partners in the region to 
learn from them.
    Second is to not performatively but substantively engage 
with high-level officials, which my other colleagues have 
talked about here. And the Administration has done well thus 
far.
    The third is, when appropriate, to integrate our partners 
in ASEAN into Quad and AUKUS activities publicly and privately.
    Finally--and I will stop here, given time--is to work with 
our partners to identify and respond to the partners inside of 
ASEAN that China exploits to its own benefit.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sobolik follows:]

    
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Sobolik.
    I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And, 
pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes 
of questioning our witnesses.
    Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I will 
recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between 
Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let 
our staff know, and we will circle back to you.
    If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone 
and address the chair verbally.
    I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Miller, you talked a bit about the importance of 
economic engagement. And, you know, certainly, as a supporter 
of TPP, you know, I do recognize the strategic blunder. That 
was much more a tool of both economic engagement but also 
geopolitical strategy.
    Maybe you can comment--you know, I think it may be a road 
too far, at this particular moment in time, in getting back 
into the CPTPP. But, you know, this is something that, you 
know, certainly I have talked to the ranking member about, and 
I do think there is some will in Congress in a bipartisan way 
and a bicameral way, especially if you look at the strong 
bipartisan vote on USMCA, where you actually had more Democrats 
in the House voting for that--196 Democrats, I believe 193 
Republicans. So there are opportunities to vote on something.
    The one area where we have focused a little bit at the 
subcommittee level is on the digital trade arena. You know, 
certainly, partners in the region--Singapore, New Zealand, 
others--have trade deals. You know, if you take the digital-
trade chapter out of USMCA, there is a strong starting point 
there. If you look at the Trump Administration's executive 
actions in a bilateral way with Japan, there is a starting 
point there. So it is not as though we have to start from 
scratch.
    Maybe you can comment on, you know, if that is the right 
starting point. You know, there may be some opening with the 
Administration, you know, if you listen to some of the comments 
of Ambassador Tai, as well as the Administration, there might 
be some opportunities there. And that is something that I think 
we are thinking about as a subcommittee, potentially taking a 
lead and sending a signal in a bipartisan way to the 
Administration.
    So your thoughts on digital trade?
    Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Chairman Bera, for raising 
that important issue and also important opportunity for the 
United States.
    There does seem to be good momentum building for exploring 
a digital trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific, both among key 
stakeholders in the United States and also in the region.
    One, I think, particularly useful example to look at, in 
addition to building on the good provisions in the USMCA and 
the Japan-U.S. agreement, is the recently concluded Digital 
Economic Partnership Agreement which was announced by New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Chile as an agreement to help establish 
norms to facilitate trade, but, also, it has a particular 
emphasis on digital inclusion, SMEs, and was negotiated by 
smaller economies.
    Looking through the prism of engagement with ASEAN, I think 
DEPA is a very useful model for the Administration to consider 
engaging with going forward. It also has a modular approach to 
certain provisions, so countries can bite off pieces of the 
agreement at a particular time, which might make it more 
digestible and a stronger platform for engaging some of the 
less-developed ASEAN economies.
    It is worth noting in the context of our conversation about 
China that China has also expressed interest quite recently in 
potentially joining DEPA. And it is an area where I think it is 
important for the U.S. to demonstrate some leadership, 
particularly while we navigate our path forward on CPTPP, which 
you note, Chairman Bera, will be a difficult and probably long 
but very important process.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    Maybe, Ambassador Shear, I could ask you a question, 
staying on the topic of economic engagement in the region. One 
area where we have had conversation with the Indonesians, with 
the Vietnamese, and others in the region is supply chain 
redundancy and resiliency. And we have talked to our Quad 
partners, as well, about strategically investing in the supply 
chain resiliency.
    Your thoughts on how important that would be, you know, and 
doing that in a strategic way?
    Mr. Shear. I think it is extremely important.
    Supply chains have been moving to Southeast Asia, 
particularly places like Vietnam and Indonesia, for some time. 
This trend accelerated with the COVID pandemic, and I expect it 
to continue in the future. So Southeast Asian countries like 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand will 
all become stronger exporters to the United States and more 
integrated members of critical supply chains.
    And I think engaging these countries in discussions on 
supply chain security not only speaks to their interest in 
economic development but speaks to both our sides' interest in 
increased supply chain security.
    This is a very strong way for us, I think, to interact with 
the Southeast Asians, and I think it is a strong way for us to 
interact with our like-minded partners and allies, like Japan 
and Australia. So I think that the stronger this item in our 
agenda is, the better.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    And I notice I am out of time, so let me go to recognize 
the ranking member, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Sobolik, I will start with you. As I mentioned in my 
opening Statement, I am co-chair of the Philippines Friendship 
Caucus. And I would like to know what we could do to better 
support the Philippines, to help them push back on China's 
gray-zone aggression. Specifically, they face constant 
harassment from the so-called Maritime Militia.
    What security support or means can we use to help the 
Philippines with this challenge?
    Mr. Sobolik. Sir, thank you so much for that question.
    The crux of our response with the Philippines, 
specifically, has to be strengthening our Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement with Manila. This was established back in 
2014. Given the recent tensions surrounding human rights, 
Global Magnitsky sanctions that have targeted President 
Duterte's close associations, this agreement has been slow to 
come into actuality.
    But getting our troops and our assets rotating regularly in 
and out of pre-specified military bases throughout the 
Philippines gives us a presence beyond what we already have--a 
strengthened presence with the Philippines, and a cooperative 
one at that. And I think it not only sends an important signal 
to China, it is a material action.
    So, whatever we do to reinforce our commitment, that has to 
be the crux of it.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
    Let me go a little bit beyond the first question. I will 
stick with you, Mr. Sobolik, for the time being.
    China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea has been 
concerning for, you know, quite some time. You know, they have 
repeatedly sought to enforce their bogus sovereignty claims 
against Vietnam, Malaysia, and, as I mentioned, Philippines.
    What support, whether political, military, or otherwise, 
can we provide to help our partners uphold their rights against 
the PRC's bullying?
    Mr. Sobolik. It starts with, to an extent, doing what we 
are already doing, sir. The freedom-of-navigation operations 
are good; going beyond that, though, is important. Because it 
is clear, given recent pronouncements from China, not only that 
they are more fully engaging gray-zone tactics with their coast 
guard, they are also trying to reinforce their claims within 
their own nine-dash line, which of course we reject.
    I think one of the most creative and admittedly difficult 
but good things we could do is involve our own Coast Guard more 
in the South China Sea. If our goal is to deter adventurism 
without risking escalation, meeting capability for capability 
and service for service can be a good way to do this. And there 
is starting to be a little more research about this area coming 
out of integrating our Coast Guard assets more and more, and I 
think it is worth studying.
    Mr. Chabot. OK. Thank you.
    Professor Shear, let me turn to you now. I am a believer 
and I am glad that this Administration has entered into AUKUS, 
the new partnership. I think it is an important idea. The 
reaction throughout the ASEAN countries has been a bit mixed, 
as you know.
    How could this partnership and also the Quad--how is that 
being viewed? And what can we do to strengthen both those 
partnerships?
    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman. That is an important 
question.
    Clearly, ASEAN centrality is an important theme in whatever 
ASEAN Statesmen and Stateswomen say about regional stability 
and security, and we need to respect ASEAN centrality.
    However, given ASEAN's divisiveness and lack of unity, we 
need to look for alternatives to bringing our influence to bear 
on the region. I think we need to do that bilaterally with 
important individual ASEAN partners, and we need to do it 
multilaterally, and I think the Quad and AUKUS are key tools 
for us to do that.
    As I said in my Statement, the AUKUS pronouncement sent a 
strong signal to the region about our commitment. The ASEANs, I 
think, given their devotion to ASEAN centrality, have to react 
in a lukewarm fashion publicly, but I think privately they will 
welcome the Quad, they will welcome the creation of AUKUS.
    This gives them more leverage vis-a-vis China. When the 
Southeast Asians know that the Americans and their allies and 
partners are strongly engaged in the region, this gives them 
the confidence they need to bring leverage to bear on the 
Chinese, to get what they want, and to pursue their interests 
in a free and open way.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but let me join with you 
and Ms. Miller relative to her TPP comments and just say that, 
when the leaders of our two parties back in 2016 both decided 
to oppose this, the term ``shooting ourselves in the foot'' 
comes to mind. And we put the PRC in a position where they are 
now trying to get in there and write the rules to replace the 
United States. And that is just--you know, that is just a 
boneheaded thing, for us to be in that position. And so I 
commend you for supporting it, as I did, Mr. Chairman.
    And sorry I didn't get around to you, Ms. Miller, but I 
agreed with your points on TPP.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Sherman, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
    It is appropriate that we are having a hearing on Southeast 
Asia. Naturally, we have Southeast Asia experts. What tends to 
happen, then, is that people who focus their lives on Southeast 
Asia push for a policy that is measured by, ``Does this help us 
in our relationships in Southeast Asia?'' When we talk about 
trade, we have to balance, ``Is this good for our relationships 
in Southeast Asia, but what effect does it have on small towns 
in Ohio?''
    And I know that one of our witnesses talked about how we 
can more effectively import from Southeast Asia. We have the 
largest trade deficit in the history of mammalian life on this 
planet, and I think it is important that we focus even more 
attention on how we can export to Southeast Asia.
    The value of the dollar as a worldwide reserve currency is 
certainly not helped by us having the charade we are having 
here about whether we will even pay our bills, nor is it helped 
by the trade deficit.
    Likewise, with regard to aid to countries in Southeast 
Asia, experts in Southeast Asia say, ``Well, help everybody, 
and then, if somebody does it wrong, maybe we will give them a 
little bit less.'' That gives us the most leverage if you are 
giving money to Southeast Asia. The more you give, the more 
leverage you have; you might take it away. But every dollar 
that we give to the Government of Myanmar/Burma is a dollar we 
are not spending on the truly needy in Africa, for example.
    And so I would like our witnesses to focus on the Rohingya. 
We were all, those of us who focused on human rights for 
decades--I met with Aung San Suu Kyi several times. We were all 
inspired by her. And now she is the apologist for a policy of 
ethnic cleansing, if not genocide. And, actually, I think it is 
genocide.
    I have suggested in this hearing that we ought to look at 
the international border, that the Government of Myanmar/Burma 
can't defend its own people. Now, that is a radical step, but 
there is only one change of international border that the 
United States has supported in this century, and that was the 
creation of South Sudan. And we did so as a result of acts of 
genocide, probably less in terms of the numbers of casualties 
and displaced people than what the Rohingya have seen.
    So I will ask Mr. Shear: Should we be providing aid--
obviously we should be providing aid to the refugees. But 
should we be providing aid that provides for the economic 
development of Burma/Myanmar at a time when it refuses to 
provide citizenship documents and protection for the Rohingya 
people?
    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman. That is a critical 
question. And I would like first to address the Rohingya issue.
    I think, as we move forward and increase the pressure on 
the military regime in Burma, the Tatmadaw, I think we need to 
continue providing assistance to the Rohingya. We need to 
continue focusing on their horrific condition in camps 
throughout the region. There are over 700,000 Rohingyas in 
Bangladesh alone, in Cox's Bazar.
    Mr. Sherman. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Shear. And we need to avoid the phenomenon of donor 
fatigue with the Rohingyas. So I think, as we----
    Mr. Sherman. The comment I would make is, the fact that we 
are still providing tens of millions of dollars to help the 
Government of Myanmar/Burma achieve its economic objectives is 
a stain on the morality of the United States. If a government 
is engaging in genocide and ethnic cleansing, to say, ``Well, 
we are giving them less money than we used to'' is an 
inadequate response.
    But go ahead.
    Mr. Shear. Well, I agree that we need to limit all the 
resources we can that go to the military regime. I think we 
need to be discriminating, though. As I said in my Statement, 
we need to keep the Burmese people on our side. We need to make 
sure that the measures we take to inflict pain on the military 
regime don't also excessively inflict pain on the Burmese 
people.
    Mr. Sherman. Every dollar that we spend helping improve the 
economy of Myanmar/Burma increases the power of the regime and 
is taken away from the poor people in other places in the 
world, particularly Africa.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. OK. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 
Perry, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I guess my first question, at least, is going to go to 
Mr. Sobolik, and it is in regard to Duterte in the Philippines.
    He chose to terminate the visiting forces agreement some 
time ago but has recently, as I understand it, reinStated that. 
And I am just wondering if you can describe to us whether you 
think this, kind of, shift back toward the United States and 
away from the CCP is real or is just a small calculation, if it 
has any long-lasting endurance or if this is completely fragile 
and just a momentary decision on Duterte's part to, kind of, 
advance some leverage that he might perceive that he could have 
regarding the CCP.
    Mr. Sobolik. Congressman, thank you for that question. It 
is very important.
    President Duterte was highly opportunistic with his 
decision to hold the visiting forces agreement hostage. His 
threat to do so came shortly on the heels of human rights 
sanctions, as I mentioned earlier. And I and certainly several 
others interpreted his anger and his focus on the VFA as his 
response, not necessarily to pull the trigger on the agreement, 
but for domestic reasons and, frankly, for balancing regions 
against China to build some political space for himself. And it 
became pretty apparent in late 2020 that he was going to punt 
his decision on VFA into the Biden Administration. And shortly 
after the Biden Administration taking office, he signaled his 
complete support once again for the VFA.
    And I think, in some ways, Duterte's behavior, while he is 
certainly a unique individual, is not that unlike the 
calculations that many Southeast Asian countries will make from 
time to time, caught between two great powers, as they are.
    Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you.
    And then, you know, just expand on that a little bit before 
my next question. So, you know, it seems like he remains 
opportunistic and that he doesn't necessarily, in any way--
maybe it is just based on who is in the White House at the time 
and how he perceives things, but he definitely can't be 
counted, in any meaningful way, in the camp of the United 
States or the West. Would that be a reasonable, kind of, 
overarching theme?
    Mr. Sobolik. I would certainly say that President Duterte 
himself does not fit into the mold you just described, but I 
would also say that the defense architecture within the 
Government of the Philippines is highly supportive of the 
defense cooperation they have with the United States. And 
putting the President aside for the moment, which I know can be 
a significant ask whenever addressing these things, but putting 
him aside for the moment, the relationship is quite strong, and 
there is a lot of ground to buildupon.
    And Duterte has proven himself to be pretty shrewd and 
cunning, and he will tilt toward America when it serves his 
interest, toward Beijing when it serves his interest. But the 
good news for us in the midst of that is, the underlying 
foundation of the relationship does not appear to be fragile.
    Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you.
    And then I am just curious, you know, from a regional 
standpoint, regarding the CCP and Taiwan--you know, the CCP, as 
they lose--no. There are obviously billions of people in China, 
but they are still going to suffer a loss of male workers, male 
people in industry and business, just based on demographics. Do 
you see that being a pressure point that Xi would seek to--it 
would force Xi into making a decision regarding Taiwan earlier?
    Or do you think that they literally feel like they can 
manage that and everything else that they are seeking to 
accomplish--you know, regional and international hegemony, et 
cetera? Do you think that they feel they can manage it, or do 
you think that they see that as something that is going to be 
very, very problematic by the end of the century?
    Mr. Sobolik. Congressman, that is the million-dollar 
question, is it not? I think you are right to bring up 
demographics as a long-leading indicator in PRC calculus. Not 
only unemployed males, but the gender disparity between men and 
women in China as well, which--I recognize your time is up, but 
it is a very important question to be asking, yes.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance.
    Mr. Bera. Great.
    Let me go and recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. 
Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to our witnesses. It is very interesting 
information.
    I would like to ask Ms. Miller, just kind of expanding on 
some of the things the U.S. can do to be helpful in the region, 
besides just economic trade agreements. One thing that we know 
is that Southeast Asia is one of the world's most heavily 
contaminated regions with deadly unexploded ordnance. U.S. 
legacy cluster munitions from the Vietnam War are in Laos and 
Cambodia and in Vietnam, and they continue to cause civilian 
deaths or casualties to this day, and they make some of the 
productive land potentially out of use.
    If you travel over there, especially in Cambodia, on the 
streets of the city, you see these little pickup vans of people 
missing limbs begging on the streets. They are all victims of 
these mines that haven't been eliminated.
    We have a de-mining program, and I think it serves as a 
positive example of our leadership and what good things we can 
do to support communities. Could you comment on how things like 
that can better help our relations in the area as we try to 
combat the, kind of, insidious influence of China?
    Ms. Miller. Congresswoman Titus, thank you for your 
leadership on this issue and for raising this question.
    I think it is an excellent example of a platform that has 
helped to facilitate our relationship in Cambodia but also, 
importantly, in Vietnam, which came from a very low bar when I 
first started working on Vietnam relations almost 20 years ago 
to where we are today, where we have a close relationship 
across a range of issues.
    And part of the success of the normalization of our 
relationship was based on trust-building exercises such as you 
described in terms of de-mining and finding the remains of 
American soldiers in the region and returning them to the 
United States.
    I think, importantly, your question also signals that we 
need to have a strategy that allows us to engage some 
communities and societies in these countries. Not only the 
elites in the government, but we need the American presence and 
our positive contributions to the region to be understood 
broadly throughout civil society in Southeast Asia. And these 
kinds of programs are an excellent example of that.
    There are many others that I would commend to the 
committee's consideration for further enhancement, including 
YSEALI. The Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative programs, 
particularly to engage young people, I think, are very 
important for our standing and our relationships in the region 
going forward.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that. I hope 
we can put some support behind NDI, IRI, those kinds of 
programs that could come from that side of our, kind of, soft 
diplomacy.
    One other thing I think that we could be doing better is on 
climate change. With the new relationship--the, kind of, redone 
Global Climate Risk Index shows that some of these countries 
are the worst in the world from being affected by climate 
change. I think it is called the Mekong River Commission that 
is composed of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Is that 
not another way that we can better collaborate and cooperate 
with some of these countries on issues that affect the planet 
but affect their economies as well?
    Ms. Miller. Thank you, Congresswoman. I absolutely agree 
with that Statement and know from conversations with Southeast 
Asian leaders and civil society and environmental groups that 
the threat of climate change is top of mind for countries 
throughout the region.
    There have been several studies issued, as you note, that 
identify Southeast Asia as one of the parts of the world that 
will be most critically affected due to rising sea levels and 
flooding, particularly in the Mekong region. U.S. participation 
in the Lower Mekong Initiative is a really important part of 
our engagement in the region.
    And there is room to do more, I think, on climate change. I 
know Secretary Kerry has dedicated much of his career to 
normalizing the U.S. relationship with Vietnam. He knows that 
part of the world very well. And I think there is a lot of 
scope for enhanced engagement and interest on both sides in 
deepening that part of our cooperation, both in terms of 
mitigation, but, also, adaptation is going to be very important 
to the region's economic prospects going forward.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Miller.
    Mr. Chairman, maybe we can pursue that as something this 
committee could take up and look into further, perhaps help 
with. I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you very much. And we will take that under 
consideration, because obviously it is very important to the 
region.
    Let me now go and recognize the gentlelady from Missouri, 
Mrs. Wagner, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing the 
hearing to examine the strategically critical relationship 
between the United States and Southeast Asia.
    As co-chair of the congressional Caucus on the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, I strongly believe we 
have a national interest in sustaining U.S. leadership in 
Southeast Asia, supporting human rights and respect for 
democratic freedom, and articulating our strategic priorities.
    We will find willing partners in our many friends and 
allies in the region who share our grave concerns regarding the 
belligerence and the growing power of the People's Republic of 
China.
    Yet the PRC, eager to undermine U.S. interests in the key 
region, is aggressively working to expand its influence in 
Southeast Asia. It seeks to exploit its predatory investment, 
development, and trade policies, illegal military installations 
in the South China Sea, and disinformation campaigns to coerce 
countries to accept its agenda.
    Nowhere are the high stakes of the competition between 
China and the United States clearer than in Southeast Asia, 
where the Chinese Communist Party is fostering a resurgence in 
authoritarianism and oppression. It is imperative that the 
United States show strong and consistent leadership in 
Southeast Asia to secure a future in which the rule of law, 
free and fair trade, and democracy underpin relations among 
Indo-Pacific States.
    Beijing allows its State-owned enterprises, or SOEs, to 
borrow at an extremely low interest rate from public financial 
institutions. And, as a result, these SOEs have dominated 
project bids in Southeast Asia, a primary target of the Belt 
and Road Initiative. I am deeply concerned that these policies 
are designed to draw Southeast Asian countries into Beijing's 
sphere of influence.
    And, Ms. Miller, how should the United States work with 
Southeast Asian countries to prevent SOEs from boxing out more 
responsible, let's say, investors?
    Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Wagner, for 
your question and also your leadership of the U.S.-ASEAN 
Caucus. It is a really important conduit for engagement with 
the region.
    And you asked a really important and complicated question. 
Oftentimes, the United States is compared to China's activities 
in the region in an apples-to-oranges way, when, in reality, 
our economies are fundamentally different, and how we organize 
ourselves around our economic engagement and commercial 
diplomacy is very different.
    In the light of the tremendous amount of resources that 
China has allocated to the region for these projects, I think 
it is really important for the United States to prepare and to 
be an alternative; to work with our partners in the Quad, which 
has infrastructure as a focus area, and our partners in ASEAN 
to help countries improve their capacity to negotiate 
infrastructure deals that are transparent and adhere to 
international standards; and for the United States to work with 
our partners to provide alternative means of financing some of 
these infrastructure projects.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
    Ms. Miller. Southeast Asia--oh. Thanks.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you so much, but I have limited time 
here.
    The United States, Japan, Australia, and India are joining 
forces, frankly, in an unprecedented degree, to promote a free 
and open Indo-Pacific region. I believe we should welcome this, 
kind of, revitalized Quad partnership. However, I understand 
why Southeast Asian countries may feel that the recent focus on 
the Quad leaves them vulnerable to China's influence 
operations.
    Mr. Sobolik, what role should ASEAN countries play in the 
United States' Indo-Pacific strategy?
    Mr. Sobolik. Representative Wagner, thank you so much for 
that question.
    I think you are right to bring up potential tensions 
between the Quad and ASEAN. I think one way to potentially 
square that is to begin, behind closed doors at first, to back-
channel upcoming Quad actions, not only with ASEAN member 
States bilaterally but through ASEAN specifically, and begin to 
communicate very intentionally that we see no tradeoff between 
our engagement with ASEAN and our engagements with the Quad.
    And I think that is going to be a very important message 
for ASEAN and for ASEAN member States to receive from us.
    Mrs. Wagner. I think you are absolutely right.
    My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, so I am going to yield 
back. I have several more questions, but I shall submit them 
for the record.
    Mrs. Wagner. Thank you all for being here.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Levin, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Levin. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman, for your great 
leadership of this subcommittee and having another important 
hearing.
    I want to try to get to COVID-19 and climate change. So, 
starting with COVID-19, Southeast Asia continues to struggle 
with containing the pandemic and particularly with the spread 
of the Delta variant.
    So let me start with you, Ambassador Shear; others may 
weigh in.
    Have certain countries been more successful in their 
approaches to COVID? And if yes, what has been the key or keys 
to their success? And could those steps or systems be 
replicated elsewhere?
    And then, beyond additional vaccine donations, what are 
some ways that the U.S. can support Southeast Asian countries 
in their fight against COVID?
    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman Levin, for that very 
important question.
    I think the country that is known to have done among the 
best in Southeast Asia in combating the pandemic is Vietnam. 
And they implemented some very rigorous and, some might think, 
rigid ways of containing the virus. They promoted lockdowns. 
They banned travel to and from the country, as many others 
have. They require testing, to the extent that they have been 
able to provide test kits, and rigorous contact tracing.
    So the Vietnamese have been very zealous in the way in 
which they have limited social contact and, some might say, 
sacrificed civil liberties in order to contain this virus.
    Mr. Levin. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Shear. And I think what the Vietnamese experience 
demonstrates for us is the importance of social cohesion. All 
of the methods they may have used might not be applicable, 
certainly, in the United States. But, certainly, the high level 
of social cohesion in Vietnam certainly contributed to their 
relatively successful management of the virus.
    Now, they have been hit more strongly by the Delta variant. 
They have had an uptick of cases. I think the Vice President's 
trip recently, her stop in Vietnam, resulted in important 
increasing cooperation between Vietnam and the United States. 
She donated another million doses of the vaccine to the 
Vietnamese, which brought our contribution to Vietnam, I 
believe, up to 5 million doses.
    And, for the long term, more importantly, we established a 
CDC center in Vietnam, which will assist the Vietnamese and the 
region not only in combating the pandemic but hopefully 
preventing future pandemics as well.
    Mr. Levin. OK. Thank you very much.
    Let me try to hit my climate-change question. Maybe I will 
give Ms. Miller the first shot at this.
    Obviously, climate change is really a huge issue for 
Southeast Asian nations. It is one of the regions that is most 
vulnerable to the harmful effects of climate change. So what 
can the U.S. do to support regional actors in addressing 
climate-change challenges that threaten their economies, 
particularly maritime Southeast Asian nations?
    And, you know, I have been on this kick about--I hear so 
much talk about Belt and Road, and I feel like a lot of the 
talk about it is very anxious and defensive, when I think we 
should have a big-hearted, broad-shouldered American response 
where we don't react but we say, ``Wow, these countries need to 
change--we all do--everything about how we get our power, 
transportation, everything,'' and that we ought to get in there 
and partner with them to create a lot of jobs by deploying mass 
amounts of offshore wind, solar, and so forth.
    So thoughts on that? I didn't leave you a lot of time, but 
I would like to hear your thoughts on it. Maybe the chairman 
will be a little indulgent. Go ahead.
    Ms. Miller. Thank you, Congressman Levin, for your question 
and your interest in that issue, which is very important to 
Southeast Asians.
    I think there are a lot of things that the U.S. can do, 
particularly working with our private sector. As you note, 
there is a tremendous need in the region for infrastructure 
development, especially to deal with the impact of climate 
change, and for technologies to help with having urbanization 
that doesn't, you know, rapidly increase the region's emissions 
profile.
    Southeast Asia's middle class is targeted to double between 
now and 2030, which will have a huge impact on consumption, and 
the U.S. has a lot of technology and a lot of innovations that 
can be deployed to help manage that challenge. And I think it 
is definitely an area that warrants further investment on both 
sides.
    Mr. Levin. OK.
    Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks.
    And I don't see Dr. Green on camera, so let me go next to 
the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Chairman Bera. I appreciate this 
hearing. Very excellent hearing. And I very much appreciate--
can you hear me OK?
    Mr. Bera. I can. I am going to recognize Mark Green because 
he just----
    Mr. Barr. Oh, is he back? I am sorry. OK.
    Mr. Bera [continuing]. Since you just started.
    So let me go ahead and recognize the gentleman from 
Tennessee, Dr. Green, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Green. My apologies, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, my 
apologies to my colleague from Kentucky.
    It is interesting; I went to West Point in 1982, only 7 
years after the fall of Saigon, and a lot of the guys who 
taught basic training for me had fought in the Vietnam War. The 
United States military has this tendency to become really, 
really good at and study really, really well the last war we 
fought. And it is something we need to be better about, 
obviously. I think we are trying our best to be better at that.
    But I say that to say, when I was at the academy, I mean, 
we were studying Vietnam, we were studying the people, we were 
studying how the war was fought there, the mistakes that the 
United States made, and it created for me a real heart for the 
people.
    My West Point classmate actually served in the MIA 
Commission and traveled all over Laos and Vietnam trying to 
find the Americans that we were not able to bring home.
    Again, just have a huge heart for that part of the world. 
And when I was a young lieutenant, I took some master's 
programs in developing nations with a focus on Southeast Asia. 
So this conference, Mr. Chairman--or this committee hearing is 
fantastic, and I really appreciate it.
    My questions are, of course, much like everybody else's, 
you know, China and near-shoring and all the things that are 
impacting our relationship with Southeast Asia.
    My first question, to Mr. Sobolik: There is no doubt that 
America's supply chain is overly reliant on China. With regards 
to reshoring and near-shoring efforts, how can we reduce our 
reliance on China with minimal impact and disruption, with this 
massive shift that has been going on for some time to Vietnam 
and to other countries in Southeast Asia?
    Mr. Sobolik. Representative Green, thanks so much for 
asking that question. It is one of the most important ones not 
just economically but geopolitically right now.
    I think the reality is, at some level, there is going to be 
some uncomfortable disruption. And I think one of the 
complicating factors of that is, it is difficult to say for 
certain which countries and which interest groups are going to 
get the brunt of that.
    But I think a few things are important as we talk about 
reshoring and near-shoring, as you put it.
    The first one is going to be a consistent message to our 
Southeast Asian partners that, of course, fair trade matters a 
great deal to the American people, as successive elections have 
demonstrated, but the United States still does believe in free 
trade. And I think the reality is that our friends, allies, 
partners in Southeast Asia are going to be the greatest victors 
of free trade moving forward, or at least one of the greatest 
victors, and reap the benefits of free trade. And it is to our 
strategic benefit that we near-shore a lot of the manufacturing 
we have relied on from China to our friends, allies, and 
partners there.
    And it goes to this fundamental tension that we have been 
discussing directly and indirectly during this whole hearing, 
which is ASEAN's economic reliance on China on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, their security dependence on us. And we 
obviously need to play both sides of that equation, not just 
reasserting our dependability with defense but easing their 
economic dependence on China however we can.
    Mr. Green. You know, the questions that I have--because, 
clearly, we want some near-shoring to happen. We see, you know, 
China's commodity boom created a run on the currencies in Latin 
America. And I am the ranking Republican on Western Hemisphere, 
so this is, sort of, my area. And, in so doing, they made 
manufacturing in Latin America much more expensive relative to 
Chinese manufactured goods.
    And so the manufacturing sector in Latin America took a 
massive hit in this desire for--I think a bipartisan desire. I 
just made a trip with Albio Ceres to the Dominican Republic. 
And so there is this bipartisan desire to see some 
manufacturing come back to Latin America.
    One of the big concerns is, you know, the supply chain for 
parts when something is assembled. And I would be interested in 
understanding a little better how particularly the Southeast 
Asian countries are going to feel about, and what their 
thoughts are going to be in support of, being the initial, sort 
of, parts manufacturer that then get reassembled in Latin 
America, as opposed to reassembled in China--what impact and 
how they are going to look at us after we try to pull that off.
    Mr. Sobolik. Sir, that is a fantastic question. In full 
transparency, it is one I haven't given a whole lot of time to. 
So, in respect to you, if you are OK, sir, I would rather take 
some time and circle back with your office and give you a 
better answer than try to give you something now.
    Mr. Green. Very much so. Appreciate it.
    And I yield, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    Let me recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms. 
Houlahan, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And just confirming 
that you can hear me?
    Mr. Bera. We can.
    Ms. Houlahan. Perfect.
    And thank you so much to everyone for joining us today.
    My questions are going to focus largely on Vietnam, and I 
will also likely run out of time, so I would like to submit the 
rest that I am not able to get to for the record.
    I am, as many others have talked about, really concerned 
about supply chains and our dependency on China. Specifically, 
I am going to focus on rare earth elements.
    For the Ambassador, sir, Vietnam is one of the top 10 
largest sources of rare earth elements in the world, and we 
really need to figure out a way to overcome China's near-
monopoly on rare earth elements. And Vietnam and Japan 
apparently co-launched a joint research center in Hanoi to 
improve extraction and processing of these materials.
    I was wondering if you might know what impact the Rare 
Earth Research and Technology Transfer Centre has been having 
in Vietnam and Japan in terms of diversifying their supply of 
rare earth elements away from China and if there are any 
pathways for the U.S. And the economies of Southeast Asia to 
reduce their reliance on Chinese rare earth elements in the 
supply chains.
    And, last--I know I have a lot of questions, but this is 
just one of them--how can we as the U.S. effectively support 
research efforts across the region and particularly in Vietnam 
to identify substitutes or to develop approaches to reduce the 
amount of these elements that are required or to recycle, 
reduce, and reuse them?
    Mr. Bera. Ambassador Shear, you might be on mute.
    Mr. Shear. Congresswoman, thank you for that important 
question. It is, of course, a question that touches on the 
supply of all electronic parts globally, since rare earths are 
critical components of electronic parts. And the world has been 
looking for alternatives to the Chinese supply since they 
slapped an embargo on the export of rare earth elements to 
Japan, I believe in 2010.
    The Vietnamese certainly are eager to help fill the demand. 
As you say, they have generous endowments of rare earth 
minerals. I think they would welcome investments in that 
industry not just from Japan but from the United States as 
well.
    When I was in Vietnam, I encouraged Vietnam-Japan 
cooperation across the board, including on rare earth minerals. 
And I think it offers us an opportunity to expand the supply, 
move at least portions of the supply away from China. I think 
we need to be doing that globally as well as just with Vietnam.
    Ms. Houlahan. And, Ms. Miller, you also spoke a little bit 
about Vietnam in your opening remarks. Do you have anything 
further to add in the area, specifically, of rare earth 
elements and reducing our dependence and, frankly, Vietnam's 
dependence on China in the pathways to process and develop 
these critical materials?
    Ms. Miller. Thank you, Representative, for your question. 
Perhaps I will just briefly add on to what Ambassador Shear 
said, in that Vietnam, as a matter of strategic priority, is 
interested in decreasing its dependence on China, and I think 
any opportunities to work with the United States and Japan in 
this area would be very welcomed on the Vietnamese side.
    Ms. Houlahan. Could I ask you to be specific on what kind 
of options you see for us to be able to help Vietnam move up 
the value chain and to diversify and to not be so dependent?
    My impression is that there is a lot of cross-border supply 
chain issues going on--origin of China, maybe processing in 
Vietnam, and then maybe going backward into China for further 
manufacturing. Is there anything that we can be doing 
specifically to be more helpful to be able to advance 
Vietnam's, kind of, standing on the supply chain ladder?
    Ms. Miller. Representative Houlahan, on the rare earth 
side, let me come back to you with a more detailed explanation, 
as I am not following that issue very closely.
    But I think, in terms of overall supply chain 
diversification, the relationship between Vietnam and China is 
very close, particularly as many industries have moved into 
Vietnam from southern China as their costs have risen and, in 
some cases, to access other markets.
    There is an opportunity, I think, for the U.S. to continue 
to strengthen our trade relationship with Vietnam. It has 
become increasingly important for a number of our manufacturers 
who are seeking to diversify their own supply chains out of 
China. And a big piece of that is working to help improve the 
overall business environment and the trade relationship between 
our two countries.
    Ms. Houlahan. And I thank you all, and I know I have nearly 
run out of time. I would like to submit the balance of my 
questions for the record. And I would specifically really like 
to find out some better information on the Rare Earth Research 
and Technology Transfer Centre and see if we might be able to 
suss out how effective or ineffective that is.
    Ms. Houlahan. And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Well, thanks again, Mr. Chairman, for holding 
this very important hearing and to our excellent witnesses. 
Very insightful testimony.
    Let me start with Mr. Sobolik about your written testimony 
related to Afghanistan and the impact that our withdrawal from 
Afghanistan has had in exacerbating this point of testimony 
that you have that, quote, ``the United States has proven 
itself a fickle and unsteady ally.''
    This is concerning to me with regard to U.S. efforts to 
bring ASEAN countries closer to the United States and drive a 
wedge between us and the People's Republic of China. I think 
your point is that geographic proximity is not the only problem 
here. And in the wake of the United States' retreat from 
Afghanistan, we have seen the CCP capitalize on fears that the 
United States would not honor our obligations to protect our 
allies and partners. You cite the historical example of the 
withdrawal from Vietnam as another problem.
    But how has the Afghanistan debacle affected our 
credibility with partner nations in the region? And do these 
ASEAN countries, particularly the Philippines, who have to 
regularly combat incursions in the South China Sea by China--
how do they still view the United States as a legitimate and 
trustworthy security partner in light of Afghanistan?
    Mr. Sobolik. Representative Barr, thank you very much for 
that question. I will dive into parts of my testimony, in 
responding to you, that I wasn't able to share with the full 
committee earlier on.
    The fundamental problem that the United States has with our 
withdrawal from Afghanistan is that we are now largely 
dependent on China, and to an extent Russia as well, to police 
the Taliban and to lean on them to crack down on terror groups 
operating inside of Afghanistan. And to put a really fine point 
on it, we are relying on other great powers who are adversarial 
toward to us to prevent the next big terrorist attack inside of 
America, which then imposes significant limitations on our 
ability to compete effectively with the Chinese Communist 
Party.
    And we are seeing some of these dynamics come to fruition 
not just because of the lost leverage we have with Afghanistan 
but because of this Administration's understandable desire to 
cooperate with the PRC on specific issues like climate change 
or others.
    The reality, though, which I believe is becoming clearer, 
especially in the wake of the United Nations General Assembly 
speeches, Xi Jinping's commitment to not fund coal 
manufacturing anymore, how that was a product of John Kerry's 
negotiations, we are starting to see some give-and-take and 
some breaking ground between Washington and Beijing. And my 
fear is that the cooperative agenda is starting to overtake the 
competitive one.
    Now, what this means, potentially, is, even though we have 
great defense agreements like AUKUS, we have great things like 
the Quad on the defense side, on the human-rights side and, 
frankly, the counterterrorism side, we are losing leverage to 
the Chinese Communist Party, which makes it difficult for us in 
the gray zone to actually be active and proactive in defending 
our Southeast Asian partners day to day.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you for that.
    In my remaining time, let me just reclaim my time and ask 
specifically about Singapore to any of our witnesses.
    As you know, we do have a strong relationship, especially 
in the economic relationship with Singapore. They are the 
wealthiest ASEAN member, accounting for 80 percent of the U.S. 
ASEAN FDI. And the majority of U.S. services exports to and 
imports from ASEAN countries is Singapore.
    But it is troubling to hear the Singapore Foreign Minister 
talk about, ``Viewing China purely as an adversary to be 
contained will not work in the long term.''
    What can we do? Are there specific areas that the United 
States can bring Singapore further into the orbit of the United 
States? How are we seeing Beijing attempt to undermine our 
relationship? What do we need to do to further integrate our 
economies to, again, bring them closer to us as opposed to 
China?
    How about, Ambassador, could you answer that?
    Mr. Shear. I would like to take that on, Congressman, 
because I think it is a fundamentally important question.
    Our relationship with Singapore is very strong. When we 
pulled out of Philippines, the Singaporeans very adroitly, I 
think, offered us facilities in Singapore to station some of 
our forces. We continue to have rotational forces in Singapore. 
Singapore also hosts a Navy logistics command.
    I think we need to encourage Singapore to cooperate more 
closely, possibly to host more rotational forces, while 
recognizing the limitation that Singapore's instinct to balance 
the U.S. and China is. I think we need to push the envelope, 
but we don't know how far we can go yet.
    Mr. Barr. Which ASEAN country is most likely to be a 
candidate in the future to join the Quad?
    Mr. Shear. With regards to partnership with the Quad, I 
think we should put priority on the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Singapore, and Indonesia. In fact, I think we should put 
priority on those four countries in all of our approaches to 
ASEAN and Southeast Asia.
    I think the Philippines may be more likely, in the long 
run, perhaps after President Duterte leaves, to cooperate with 
the Quad. I think we can elicit gradual, incremental 
cooperation from Vietnam and Singapore.
    But we are going to have to be patient, we are going to 
have to settle for incremental steps, and we are going to have 
to be adept in the way in which we propose these activities to 
the Southeast Asians----
    Mr. Bera. I was just going to say, the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    Mr. Bera. I appreciate the Ambassador's thoughts.
    And let me recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. 
Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
having this hearing.
    And thank you to our witnesses, all thoughtful.
    Mr. Sobolik, just real quickly, you said there were three 
major events that, sort of, influenced the attitude toward the 
United States in the Southeast Asia region. The first was our 
withdrawal from Vietnam after that costly war. Remind us what 
the other two were.
    Mr. Sobolik. With pleasure, Congressman. Thank you so much 
for asking. The other two were the Asian financial crisis in 
1997----
    Mr. Connolly. Yep.
    Mr. Sobolik [continuing]. And our delayed response to 
China's reclamation and militarization of fake islands in the 
South China Sea.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    So I guess I would say--and I am going to ask Ambassador 
Shear and Ms. Miller to respond--that I find that list, while 
certainly important--to me, one of the most pivotal decisions 
that has affected in recent time our relations throughout this 
region was the, to me, catastrophic decision to renounce our 
own negotiated trade agreement, the TPP, which would have 
undergirded 40 percent of the world's economic trade and would 
have anchored these countries in a relationship with the United 
States.
    By renouncing it, we basically left them to the tender, 
loving mercies of China, which quickly filled the vacuum. And I 
think that is one of the most consequential decisions of the 
previous President, which is going to have huge ramifications 
going forward.
    Ambassador Shear, your reaction and your analysis of the 
fallout from the renouncement of our own treaty, the TPP?
    Ambassador Shear, you are muted.
    Ambassador Shear, we can't hear you. And you need to----
    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman.
    Mr. Connolly. Ambassador Shear, you need to speak up.
    Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman. Can you hear me now?
    Mr. Connolly. Yes.
    Mr. Shear. I agree that withdrawal from the TPP was a 
mistake. As I said in my Statement, I think it was a blunder. I 
can say that with great confidence, I think, from the strategic 
perspective. I am not an economist, but I know that the 
strategic argument had great appeal to the Southeast Asians. It 
had great appeal particularly to the Vietnamese.
    I made the strategic argument to the Vietnamese when I was 
Ambassador as they were considering whether or not they would 
join the TPP. I think it had a decisive effect on the 
Vietnamese decision to join the TPP, in addition to all of the 
economic benefits that they would reap from the agreement.
    So, when we pulled out of the TPP, the Vietnamese felt like 
they had had the rug pulled out from under them. And they made 
that pretty clear to me, who had borne so much responsibility 
for getting them in in the first place.
    Mr. Connolly. And Ms. Miller?
    Ms. Miller. Thank you, Congressman Connolly.
    I agree with everything that Ambassador Shear said. I 
think, particularly in the case of Vietnam, a fair amount of 
political capital was expended domestically to come up to the 
standards of the TPP agreement, particularly on labor, and the 
U.S. withdrawal was seen as a real blow.
    Malaysia has also not yet ratified CPTPP. I think the 
withdrawal of the United States was also something that caused 
them to reevaluate their participation, and also the commitment 
of the United States in the trade arena.
    So, just very briefly, I think that is one of the obstacles 
that we would have to getting back in. First is getting our 
domestic house in order and building political will here. But, 
second, you know, we would have some challenges, I think, in 
convincing our partners in the region that we are serious, if 
and when we decide to return to the table.
    Mr. Connolly. Mr. Sobolik, I know you want to comment.
    Mr. Sobolik. Congressman Connolly, thank you so much.
    I echo the sentiments and concerns of Ambassador Shear and 
Ms. Miller. I think it was a sad message that we sent to our 
friends, allies, and partners, who, as my colleagues have said, 
put a lot on the line to get an agreement of that magnitude to 
the level that it reached. And then to pull out when we did did 
not send a good message at all, strategically.
    Mr. Connolly. And do you think it is fair, Mr. Sobolik, to 
say the Chinese have been able to exploit the vacuum we created 
by that renouncement?
    Mr. Sobolik. They have certainly tried, and I think that 
they have had some success in trying. China has proven itself 
to be very adept at stepping in when we shoot ourselves in the 
foot, particularly in Southeast Asia, and they have certainly 
done it here.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentlelady from California, 
Congresswoman Kim.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman Bera, and I 
also would like to thank our Ranking Member Chabot.
    And thank you, our witnesses, for joining us today.
    You know, given the rising challenges and threats posed by 
competition with the People's Republic of China and our shift 
toward prioritizing focus on the Indo-Pacific, our 
relationships with the nations of Southeast Asia are crucial 
toward securing regional stability and economic prosperity.
    And, to that end, I appreciate the witnesses' comments that 
it is a strategic benefit to the United States to trade with 
Asian partners and strengthen security alliance and assurance 
to our partners by easing their trade reliance on PRC. I 
couldn't agree more. The U.S. should seek to strengthen its 
bilateral and multilateral trade relationships with Southeast 
Asian nations to pave the way for future regional cooperation.
    Furthermore, I believe our country must revisit the CPTPP 
trade agreement and opportunities for the U.S. to rejoin the 
framework, which passed Administrations both Republican-and 
Democrat-led in negotiating.
    So let me pose the question to Mr. Sobolik. Would you 
advocate an effort for the United States to rejoin or join 
CPTPP? And how should we view China's request to join the 
agreement versus Taiwan's?
    And, further--let me just throw it all in here--could you 
please compare and contrast the benefits of a potential digital 
trade agreement to U.S. involvement in this CPTPP? And to what 
extent would such an agreement be enforceable and easier to 
accomplish than a more comprehensive trade agreement such as 
CPTPP?
    Mr. Sobolik. Representative Kim, thank you so much for 
those highly important questions.
    First off, I will preface with saying I am not a practicing 
economist, but, strategically, I think there would have been 
immense value to join what was then TPP. It alleviated--or 
could have alleviated one of the greatest strategic challenges 
that ASEAN and its member States had, and, strategically, it 
was quite sad that we walked away from the agreement.
    Again, purely on strategic merits, I think that there is a 
lot of justification for reviewing and reassessing that 
decision. I am not saying that as an economist, necessarily, 
but, strategically, ample, ample reason to revisit.
    On your question of Taiwan, yet again we are seeing Beijing 
box out Taipei. They have done it at the World Health 
Organization to great effect. They have done it at 
international aviation institutions. They are doing it here yet 
again. And this has to be one of the biggest priorities we 
have, to not look at Taiwan just as an East Asian problem but 
to recognize the overlaps that our interests with Taiwan have 
in Southeast Asia too.
    Your question on digital, admittedly, because I am not a 
practicing economist, I don't want to purport to get too deep 
into that, but I am happy to do some research and circle back 
with you if that would be helpful.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Sure. Thanks for your perspectives.
    You know, let me next move on to our approach to human 
rights versus trade and security interests in Southeast Asia.
    Mr. Sobolik, the question to you again: How big an obstacle 
are current human-rights conditions in Southeast Asia to 
broadening the U.S. economic and security engagement with the 
region? And how large a priority are human rights to current 
U.S. policy in Southeast Asia? And what are the implications of 
Burma's February 1st coup d'etat for broader U.S.-Southeast 
Asia relations?
    Mr. Sobolik. Representative Kim, not just a good question 
but an important one.
    In Southeast Asia, we have to approach economic interests 
and human-rights concerns, both hands, simultaneously. I think 
the Administration is wrong to do that with China, which I see 
as fundamentally an adversary, but with friends and partners in 
Southeast Asia, I think there is a lot of room to discuss and 
work on both of those issues at the same time, which I think is 
going to be necessary.
    Burma, we have to send a stronger message than we have, 
though good steps have been taken by the Administration. And I 
know Congress is considering legislation on this effort as 
well. We need to make it difficult for the Tatmadaw to access 
their dollarized accounts anywhere with banks in the world. We 
have to get tougher on sanctions, and we have to do it fast.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    Oops. I am running out of time, so I will yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentlelady from Virginia, 
Congresswoman Spanberger, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    I really appreciate our witnesses' being with us here 
today.
    And, Ambassador Shear, I would like to focus my questions 
toward you at first, you know, recognizing that to realize so 
many of the opportunities that we have talked about today, to 
build the resilience against the challenges we face, whether 
from foreign countries or threats like climate change, we, the 
United States, need a strong American diplomatic presence in 
Southeast Asia. And, in addition to speaking local languages 
and really understanding local culture, it is also very 
important for our diplomats to have the right tools.
    So, Mr. Ambassador, I want to first thank you for your 
service in our diplomatic corps. And I would like to open the 
question up with, how do you think the State Department should 
or could or ought to update and/or bolster the Department's 
capacities and capabilities in Southeast Asia, particularly 
given some of the challenges that my colleagues have discussed 
with you all, the challenges and the opportunities that exist 
at this day and age?
    Mr. Shear. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Spanberger. 
And, as a retired Foreign Service officer, I agree that that is 
a very topical and important question.
    First of all, as I Stated in my Statement, we need to get 
our Ambassadors out there. Ambassadors are the people on the 
ground who are in the best place to identify opportunities and 
to cooperate with like-minded partner and allied embassies in 
pursuing those opportunities. I did that as Ambassador with 
Vietnam, particularly with the Australian and Japanese 
embassies, well before the overall trilateral relationship 
among us started to develop, well before we revived the Quad.
    So Ambassadors are critical in getting us to identify the 
opportunities and coordinating interagency as well. It is much 
easier to coordinate the interagency in an embassy than it is 
in Washington. So I think Ambassadors can be very agile, and 
they need to be encouraged to do so by the State Department.
    Second----
    Ms. Spanberger. Mr. Ambassador, if I could just interrupt 
you right there. So I am a former CIA case officer, so I am 
very familiar with what you mean by ``the interagency.'' Could 
you just give a little bit of an explanation in terms of, 
particularly given the challenges that exist in Southeast Asia, 
the real value of having all the folks at the embassy, who they 
are, the color and the flavor, why that matters so much, to 
have the Ambassador leading those discussions?
    Mr. Shear. Because the Ambassador is the representative 
of--the personal representative of the President in that 
country, and the Ambassador is really the best person to do 
what is necessary to encourage separate agencies housed in the 
embassy to work together to cooperate, to do what we need to do 
to come together as a country team and get done what we need to 
get done.
    And I think that we did that in getting the Vietnamese to--
when I was in Vietnam, getting the Vietnamese to agree to join 
TPP talks. We did it in encouraging the Vietnamese to expand 
military-to-military cooperation. And we did it with the 
Vietnamese in conjunction with AID and our CDC office in Hanoi 
to increase Vietnamese capability to respond to pandemics, for 
example--in my case, H5N1.
    But all of these are--and pursue commercial opportunities 
as well. We did that with GE. We did it with Boeing. We did it 
with Dow Chemical.
    All of those require whole-of-embassy efforts, and, as I 
say, it is a lot easier to coordinate in an embassy than it is 
in Washington.
    Ms. Spanberger. Sure.
    Mr. Shear. It is a lot easier to take initiatives as well.
    Ms. Spanberger. And you have served at the Department of 
Defense as well. And I think, arguably, the U.S. military has a 
stronger track record for really investing and training its 
personnel. And, certainly, that also--Congress is involved in 
those decisionmakings as they relate to funding.
    But, I think, what would be your comments related to, if 
the Department were more consistently able to invest in the 
training of its foreign and civil service officers, how would 
that better enable stronger diplomatic engagement in regions 
across the world but particularly in Southeast Asia?
    Mr. Shear. The Department has minimal training 
opportunities for midlevel and senior officers, and they need 
to be expanded.
    Foreign Service officers get most of their training on the 
job. Fortunately, there are dedicated, strong officers in the 
Foreign Service who are willing to mentor younger officers, but 
that is not--that is significant, but it is not sufficient.
    The State Department needs to establish a training--it 
needs to expand the number of personnel so that it can train 
people more effectively. And they need to do it not only in 
terms of language and area studies; they need to do it in terms 
of strategy. They need to give Foreign Service officers a good, 
strong background in American diplomatic history. We have a 
great tradition of diplomacy in this country, and our Foreign 
Service officers need to be more aware of it.
    Finally, I think we need--and this is a prominent issue--we 
need to strengthen diversity in the State Department. In 
Southeast Asia, we need to show our best face to the Southeast 
Asians, and that has to be a diverse mix.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Ambassador Shear.
    And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me run over with 
my time. I yield back. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    Let me now recognize the gentlelady from North Carolina, 
Congresswoman Manning, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you, Chairman Bera and Ranking Member 
Chabot, for holding this very important hearing.
    And thank you to all of our witnesses for appearing today.
    Clearly, Southeast Asia is critically important for the 
United States in light of the intense competition we are seeing 
with China.
    I want to go back to a topic that we have been discussing 
at great length, and that is the terrible blunder that it was 
for the Trump Administration to walk away from the TPP.
    And I wonder, Ambassador Shear, if you could talk to us 
about whether you think the admission of China--because we have 
talked about their application. Would the admission of China to 
the CPTPP weaken the ability of the CPTPP to accomplish many of 
the things that we were hoping to accomplish when the Obama 
Administration worked so hard to create the TPP?
    Ambassador Shear?
    Mr. Shear. Sorry, Congresswoman, you broke up on me a 
little, but I understand your question to be related to our 
rejoining of the TPP and the awkwardness the Chinese bid for 
membership in that has caused us.
    My sense is that Chinese application for membership in the 
TPP has placed particularly the Japanese in a tough spot. And 
my guess is that, given the likely lack of consensus within the 
TPP itself on Chinese membership, that the Japanese will delay 
a decision on that. That should give us a window of opportunity 
for trying to restore the prestige and the authority we have 
lost on this process and consider rejoining the TPP.
    Ms. Manning. Great. Thank you.
    I want to ask about a different area. And, Ambassador 
Shear, this is for you also. I hope you can still hear me.
    Many countries in the region, including Indonesia and the 
Philippines, have faced significant challenges from the spread 
of religious extremism and terrorism. What level of threat to 
the region and to the United States does this constitute? And 
how is the United States cooperating with our partners to 
reduce extremism in Southeast Asia and any attendant risk?
    Mr. Shear. Well, I think terrorism continues to represent a 
serious threat throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. We have 
established strong cooperative relationships with each of these 
countries, both within the intelligence community and with DOD 
and the State Department. And I am sure that, even as our 
strategic priorities shift, that we will continue close 
cooperation on counterterrorism with these countries.
    I was in Kuala Lumpur from 2005 to 2008, and I have to say 
that the two closest elements of our relationship with Malaysia 
were the trade relationship and the counterterror relationship. 
So I am confident we can carry through.
    And, of course, we have had a presence in the Philippines 
conducting counterterror operations in the past, and I think 
that has strongly enhanced our say in Manila on the need to 
preserve this relationship, not only in terms of 
counterterrorism but across the board, particularly in defense 
relations.
    Ms. Manning. Thank you.
    Ms. Miller, I want to talk a little bit about the supply 
chain issue. Actually, I want to talk about the companies that 
are moving out of China due to trade instability, sanctions, or 
other geopolitical concerns.
    How have our partners in Southeast Asia benefited from this 
development? And what can we in the United States do to 
encourage more companies and industries to move out of China to 
some of the other countries we have been talking about?
    Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Representative Manning, 
for your question.
    Southeast Asian countries have benefited from supply chain 
shifts, some countries more than others. Vietnam, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and, to a certain degree, Indonesia have become 
attractive destinations.
    All of these countries, to varying degrees, face challenges 
in building out their infrastructure to absorb some of the 
additional investment from U.S. companies, in building human 
capacity, and in strengthening their overall supply chain 
security measures to be fully integrated with the global 
economy.
    I think one of the ways that we could help with this is by 
reengaging, as we have been discussing, on CPTPP and helping to 
build strong business environments that provide good market 
access for U.S. companies and strong legal and investment 
frameworks.
    And we can also work with our partners in the region to 
engage them in some of the important conversations the Biden 
Administration is having about overall supply chain security in 
light of, in particular, some of the shocks to the system from 
COVID-19 as well as China's rise.
    Ms. Manning. Thanks so much.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Bera. Yes?
    Mr. Chabot. Yes, it is Mr. Chabot. As the ranking member of 
the committee, I just want to clarify for the record, the 
previous questioner accurately Stated that President Trump 
pulled out of TPP, but I would note for the record that both 
candidate Trump and candidate Hillary Clinton both said that is 
what they would have done if they won. Trump won. Hillary did 
not. So he pulled out. She would have done the same thing, 
according to her own Statement, just to set the record 
straight.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
    And I really do want to--let me take a moment to make a 
closing Statement. I certainly will give the ranking member a 
chance to make a closing Statement.
    I want to thank the witnesses for emphasizing the 
importance of Southeast Asia, the importance of ASEAN. Some of 
the leading countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, 
obviously Singapore. And we really do have some opportunities 
coming up with the ASEAN Summit this fall. I think the 
Administration can show leadership as they engage.
    And I think Congress has a real role here. I think one of 
the witnesses talked about the importance of Members traveling 
to the region. One of my last trips pre-pandemic was leading a 
codel to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. We had a 
chance to visit some of our special operators there. And, 
really, many of these countries, Malaysia in particular, rarely 
get codels, and the access we got from this young, struggling 
democracy, it is incredibly important.
    So it is my hope, as chair, hopefully sooner than later, to 
lead a codel to the region, to Indonesia, to Vietnam, and 
elsewhere in the region. Because, again, I think it is 
important at this particular moment in time for us to emphasize 
that the United States sees ASEAN, sees the region as just not 
a pawn in a power competition but as a real area of opportunity 
for growth and engagement.
    So, with that, again, I want to thank the witnesses who 
are, you know, emphasizing the region. And let me give the 
ranking member a moment to make any closing Statements.
    Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
    Going forward, getting our partnership with Southeast Asia 
right is going to be absolutely critical. Southeast Asia and 
the Indo-Pacific as a whole, really, are only going to grow in 
importance over the next generation, both in their own right--
it has over half the world's population there, as we know--and 
because China, obviously, is located there, our chief 
geopolitical competitor into the foreseeable future.
    With that in mind, I think this has been a very good 
hearing. I thought all three of the panelists were excellent 
and did a great job in answering our questions. And I think the 
discussion that we had shows that Congress, or at least this 
subcommittee, really does care about and is truly invested in 
our relationship with Southeast Asia.
    And that is important, because, as we seek to convince the 
region that America is a reliable and lasting partner--and that 
is particularly challenging in the wake of Afghanistan, which 
was, I think, a blunder of epic proportions--that it is 
substantive engagement like we have seen today that is going to 
really demonstrate that we mean what we say.
    So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and 
thank you to all three of our panelists, who, as I said, I 
thought did an excellent job. And I yield back.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you.
    And, again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating 
in this very important virtual hearing.
    With that, this hearing is adjourned and you have a virtual 
gavel banging down. So thank you, everyone.
    [Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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