    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                     STRENGTHENING THE U.S. TIES WITH SOUTHEAST
                                         ASIA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

     SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL ASIA, AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               September 28, 2021

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 117-78

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                                docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    46-605 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                      GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California              MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	      STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    KAREN BASS, California		      SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	      DARRELL ISSA, California
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	      ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California		      LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas	              ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    DINA TITUS, Nevada		      BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California		      BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	      KEN BUCK, Colorado
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	      TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		      MARK GREEN, Tennessee
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas		      ANDY BARR, Kentucky
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		      GREG STEUBE, Florida
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	      DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	      AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	      PETER MEIJER, Michigan
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey	              NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
    SARA JACOBS, California		      RONNY JACKSON, Texas
    KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	      YOUNG KIM, California
    JIM COSTA, California		      MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
    JUAN VARGAS, California		      JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
    BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

                          Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
                   Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director

                                     ------

     Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation

                        AMI BERA, California, Chairman,

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Ranking Member
    DINA TITUS, Nevada	             SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    ANDY LEVIN. Michigan		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     KEN BUCK, Colorado
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey		     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia	     MARK GREEN, Tennessee
    TED LIEU, California		     ANDY BARR, Kentucky
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     YOUNG KIM, California
    KATHY MANNING, North Carolina

                          Jamie Morgan, Staff Director

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Shear, Honorable David B., Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins
      School of Advanced International Studies, Former U.S.
      Ambassador to Vietnam and Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.............................     7
    Miller, Meredith, Former Deputy Director, Office of Economic
      Policy, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.
      Department of State............................................    18
    Sobolik, Michael, Fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies, American
      Foreign Policy Council.........................................    28

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    61
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    62
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    63

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    64

                STRENGTHENING THE U.S. TIES WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

                          Tuesday, September 28, 2021

                              House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia,
                                  and Nonproliferation,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m.,
    via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.
        Mr. Bera. Virtual gavel being banged, the Subcommittee on
    Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation will come
    to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess of the committee at any point.
        And all members will have 5 days to submit statements,
    extraneous material, and questions for the record, subject to
    the length limitation in the rules. To insert something into
    the record, please have your staff email the previously
    mentioned address or contact full committee staff.
        Please keep your video function on at all times, even when
    you are not recognized by the chair.
        Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves,
    and please remember to mute yourself after you finish speaking.
    Consistent with remote committee proceedings of H. Res. 8,
    staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when
    they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
        I see that we have a quorum and will now recognize myself
    for opening remarks.
        First, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today
    on this hearing focused on strengthening U.S. ties with
    Southeast Asia.
        Home to more than 662 million people and with a combined
    GDP of $3.2 trillion, the economic promise and strategic
    importance of Southeast Asia are hard to overState. I commend
    the Biden Administration for its continued prioritization of
    the region and the high-level visits from officials since the
    Administration came into office just 9 months ago.
        And, today, with this hearing, I want to make sure there
    are no doubts about the U.S. Government's and Congress's
    continued commitment to our Southeast Asian friends. The
    region's economic vibrancy, strategic location at the center of
    the world's maritime commerce, and demographic diversity
    vitally all make Southeast Asia a place of critical importance
    for the United States. I look forward to discussing existing
    areas of cooperation and where we can expand the U.S.-Southeast
    Asia partnership.
        As we hear from many of our allies and partners in
    Southeast Asia, what makes the region tick is the global
    commerce that courses through it. But many in the Southeast
    Asia region face challenges in maintaining economic
    independence, and, as close friends and partners, we must
    continue to develop support for Southeast Asian nations in
    developing diverse sources of investment and export markets so
    that they can stand up to any economic coercion.
        I was one of 28 House Democrats to vote for Trade Promotion
    Authority in 2015 and supported and continue to support and
    hold out hope 1 day for U.S. participation in the TPP, or what
    is now called ``CPTPP.''
        The United States should continue to lead in the region and
    think creatively on how to further integrate economically with
    Southeast Asia. This would include expanded digital
    infrastructure and connectivity across the region and setting
    the foundations for digital trade agreements that would harness
    Southeast Asia's immense potential.
        As a region dominated by the world's largest ocean,
    ensuring waterways remain free and open is a critical matter.
    Some countries seek to undermine maritime sovereignty through
    bullying and intimidation and by using gray-zone tactics that
    intentionally blur the line between military and commercial
    naval activity.
        To be clear, there have long been maritime territorial
    disputes in the South China Sea. But the best way and safest
    way to resolve those disputes is by ensuring that all countries
    abide by international laws and norms aimed at resolving them.
    We must continue to reinforce those norms with our allies and
    partners.
        The United States has worked closely with regional actors
    to spotlight these challenges. And I particularly commend the
    Filipino Coast Guard for publishing photos earlier this year
    that clearly show what the PRC have been up to near Whitsun
    Reef.
        Our subcommittee also did a joint hearing with the House
    Armed Services Committee's Seapower Subcommittee on this
    important issue in April, and I will continue to work with our
    regional partners to defend the security in this vital region.
        The importance of Southeast Asia extends beyond the
    traditional security challenges and the promise of mutual
    economic prosperity that have been pillars of the U.S.
    relationship in the region. There are opportunities for broader
    cooperation and partnerships between the United States and
    Southeast Asian countries to address some of the most pressing
    threats today, including combating climate change, promoting
    global health security, and increasing supply chain resiliency.
    And President Biden's team has clearly seen this, as well, as
    evidenced by the concrete deliverables from high-level
    engagements.
        Obviously, the partnership between our countries is not
    without challenges. We do not always see eye-to-eye on every
    issue. But what unites us, including our shared commitment to
    promoting a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific,
    is far greater than what separates us.
        Just last week, the Senate confirmed Daniel Kritenbrink,
    another former Ambassador to Vietnam, to be the Assistant
    Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
    Affairs. This committee looks forward to working with him to
    continue deepening U.S. engagement and ties with Southeast
    Asia. And I am confident the insights that our witnesses will
    share today will further shed light on opportunities for the
    United States to do just that.
        So, again, I want to thank my good friend, the ranking
    member, Mr. Chabot, for his partnership and understanding of
    the importance of the region.
        And, with that, let me yield 5 minutes to my friend from
    Ohio, the ranking member, Representative Steve Chabot.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Chairman Bera, for holding this
    hearing today. I really appreciate it. And I want to thank the
    panel, as well, for joining us today.
        As the former chair of this subcommittee and the co-chair
    of the U.S.-Philippines Friendship Caucus, along with my good
    friend Bobby Scott, as well as the Cambodia Caucus, I always
    appreciate giving Southeast Asia the time and attention that it
    deserves.
        Mr. Chairman, as those of us who have spent years engaging
    with the Indo-Pacific know all too well, the relationships we
    share with this critical region are too often overlooked in the
    foreign policy chatter inside the Beltway here. This is
    especially true today, as America has woken up to the reality
    that we are in a period of great-power competition.
        This reality is sharpening some paradoxical challenges to
    formulating an effective U.S. policy toward the Association of
    Southeast Asian Nations and its 10 member States.
        On the one hand, the United States and like-minded allies
    and partners are aggressively building an array of new
    plurilateral groups, like the Quad and the AUKUS, which are
    essential to mitigate threats to the Indo-Pacific. On the other
    hand, ASEAN centrality is and will remain a fundamental
    principle of the U.S.-Indo-Pacific strategy.
        A similar difficulty is that ASEAN nations seek
    relationships that are meaningful in their own right and
    justifiably resist being made into appendages or pawns of
    great-power maneuvering. But the most important issues for us
    to address with our ASEAN partners are those stemming from
    great-power competition, from trade rules to sea lanes and even
    the sanctity of their own sovereign territory.
        Likewise, ASEAN is essential to the future of the Indo-
    Pacific and possibly the only practical multilateral structure
    for nations with such disparate cultures, languages, religions,
    governments, and population sizes, but the troubling reality is
    that ASEAN often proves incapable of addressing crises. Every
    year, the world waits with baited breath to see whether the
    ASEAN leaders' Statement will even mention the fact that the
    PRC is stealing its members' territory. And the January coup by
    Burma's military has once again thrown the limitations of ASEAN
    into sharp relief.
        Resolving these paradoxes will require following through on
    the increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific that the United
    States has promised over successive Administrations and has so
    far never fully delivered on. Over the last decade, the United
    States has concluded that the Indo-Pacific is our prevailing
    foreign policy priority. But the relative foreign assistance
    resources dedicated to this half of the globe have barely
    shifted and are still far outstripped by those dedicated to the
    Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
        We also need to do better to resolve the dissonance between
    the perception of U.S. disinterest and the reality of our
    partnership. The fact is, the United States remains ASEAN's
    most reliable and essential external partner. In addition to
    our bilateral assistance, the United States is, for example,
    the world's largest donor to COVAX. We are also the world's
    largest donor to the Rohingya crisis and Southeast Asia's
    primary source of foreign direct investment. And far too often,
    American sailors and airmen are the only people standing in the
    way of the PRC's constant attempts at territorial expansion.
        Going forward, it will be essential to articulate a
    compelling vision of what U.S. partnership offers to the
    nations of ASEAN. Successive U.S. Administrations have
    struggled to offer a credible theory of economic engagement
    with the region, and exploring new bilateral or sectoral
    agreements could help. Following through on our pandemic-era
    emergency assistance to create lasting public health
    cooperation could be another promising opportunity.
        And, along with our partners, we must demonstrate that
    arrangements like the Quad and AUKUS will not diminish ASEAN
    but elevate it and protect its members from the PRC's attempts
    at regional hegemony.
        With that in mind, I am looking forward to discussing the
    Biden Administration's recent high-level trips to the region
    and in reviewing their new version of the Indo-Pacific strategy
    when it comes out, which I hope will address these challenges
    and opportunities. The in-person engagement we have seen from
    the Cabinet and the Vice President so far this year is
    certainly something that our ASEAN partners will appreciate.
        So I look forward to continuing the conversation with our
    panelists, and I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        Let me now introduce our witnesses.
        First, we have the Honorable David Shear, adjunct professor
    at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
    He was U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam from 2011 to 2014, after
    which he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
    Pacific Security Affairs from 2014 to 2016.
        Next, we have Ms. Meredith Miller, former Deputy Director
    of the Office of Economic Policy at the State Department Bureau
    of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
        Last, but not least, is Mr. Michael Sobolik, fellow in
    Indo-Pacific studies at the American Foreign Policy Council.
        I thank you all for participating in today's hearing.
        I will now recognize each witness for 5 minutes. Without
    objection, your prepared written statements will be made part
    of the record.
        I will first invite Ambassador Shear to share his
    testimony.

     STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID B. SHEAR, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
    JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FORMER
     U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                 FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chabot, thanks for inviting me
    to appear before the subcommittee today. I will be summarizing
    remarks that I have already submitted.
        Thirty years from now, Southeast Asia will be a fulcrum of
    world geo-economic and geopolitical power. Countries most
    engaged economically in the region will write its rules and set
    its standards. Countries that wield effective influence,
    particularly with countries bordering the South China Sea, will
    hold tickets to regional eminence.
        To be a player in the future Southeast Asia, right now the
    United States will need to engage the region with a positive
    message that appeals directly to Southeast Asian aspirations.
    We will need to conduct a vigorous regional diplomacy, from the
    Presidential level down. We will need to devise a region-wide
    economic strategy, including support for infrastructure
    finance. We will need to deploy our military assets in ways
    that better deter aggression and best fit regional strategic
    realities. And we will have to increase pressure on the Burmese
    military regime and continue to seek improvements in democracy
    and human rights throughout the region.
        Southeast Asians want economic development, national
    autonomy, and a peaceful international environment. Our message
    should appeal to these aspirations.
        ASEAN leaders seek a regional balance of power that permits
    them maximum maneuverability. They know that they can't pursue
    these goals effectively without strong American regional
    engagement. They also know that they can't succeed if they are
    tied too tightly, either to the U.S. or to China.
        ASEAN peoples are deeply ambivalent about the rise of
    Chinese influence. On one hand, their interests compel them to
    pursue the big economic opportunities that China offers. On the
    other hand, the ASEANs chafe at Chinese diplomatic
    highhandedness and fear Chinese economic domination. We can
    exploit this ambivalence, but only to a point. ASEAN countries
    don't want to be considered merely as pawns in a Sino-American
    struggle for regional influence.
        Mr. Chairman, doing diplomacy with Southeast Asia is like
    eating tofu with chopsticks. If you squeeze too firmly, it
    falls apart. If you squeeze too softly, it slips away. But we
    have to squeeze. If we are going to do serious diplomacy with
    the Southeast Asians, we need American ambassadors at posts. We
    still don't have Ambassadors in multiple Asian capitals. Every
    day without an ambassador at post is a day of opportunities
    lost for American interests.
        We also should engage more fully in the region at the
    Presidential level. For the President to show up consistently
    in Southeast Asia is important, but even more important is the
    need for sustained Presidential attention to the task of
    shifting the resources necessary to make Southeast Asia a
    higher strategic priority.
        The Administration came out of the gate strongly with
    successful visits by the Vice President, Secretary of Defense
    Austin, and Deputy Secretary of State Sherman. The two Quad
    summits hosted by the President aggressively addressed the
    fight against COVID, climate change, cybersecurity technology
    cooperation, and people-to-people relations. This kind of
    effort appeals directly to regional aspirations.
        Members of Congress can demonstrate our interest in the
    region by visiting. You will find our hosts eager to engage,
    and you will find embassies eager to host you as well. We
    haven't had a Southeast Asian economic policy since 2016. From
    a strictly strategic point of view, our failure to join the
    Trans-Pacific Partnership was a blunder, and we should fix it
    by rejoining.
        We should also participate more fully in the Southeast
    Asian infrastructure build-out. We need to focus on
    infrastructure finance, local capacity-building, and project
    preparation. Increased funding earmarked for Southeast Asia
    from the Development Finance Corporation, the Treasury
    Department's Infrastructure Transaction Assistance Network, and
    the Trade Development Administration would go a long way.
        With regard to defense, strengthening conventional
    deterrence in Southeast Asia is a critical task. We must
    increase Joint Force lethality, enhance our posture, and
    strengthen allies and partners. And we will need to shift
    resources from other regions in East Asia in order do so. The
    establishment of AUKUS sent the entire region a strong message
    of American commitment. And with regard to shifting resources,
    we need to look at not only our forces but at the way in which
    we distribute security assistance globally.
        With regard to human rights, the tragic situation in Burma
    reflects some of the hard choices and limited options that U.S.
    policymakers sometimes face in engaging Southeast Asia. We must
    keep up the pressure on the regime while we do all that we can
    to stay on the side of the Burmese people.
        We should appoint a new special representative and policy
    coordinator for Burma. The position in the State Department has
    been vacant since 2012. We need to expand sanctions on trade
    and investment with entities owned or controlled by the
    military regime. And we need to seriously consider declaring
    the military's 2017 actions in Rakhine State genocide.
        Mr. Bera. Yes, Ambassador Shear, your time has expired,
    unfortunately. But we look forward to, you know, expanding on
    your opening Statement.
        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was almost done.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Shear follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. OK. Great.
        Let me now recognize Ms. Miller for her testimony.

    STATEMENT OF MEREDITH MILLER, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
    ECONOMIC POLICY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Ms. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member
    Chabot, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
    appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective with you on
    this important topic, strengthening Southeast Asia-U.S.
    relations, particularly the economic dimension of that.
        The importance of that can't be underStated, and, in many
    respects, it is foundational to the topic of today's hearing.
    This is for a number of factors that are interrelated.
        First, as I detailed in my written testimony, Southeast
    Asia is of tremendous economic importance to the United States,
    and there is tremendous potential for future growth.
        Second, as Chairman Bera and Ranking Member Chabot noted in
    their opening remarks, China's economic investment influence in
    Southeast Asia is longstanding and is on an upward trajectory.
    It is in the interest of the United States to support our
    partners in the region and have a diversified economic
    relationship that allows for resilience against external shocks
    as well as strategic autonomy.
        This desire in Southeast Asia for economic diversity in
    relationships is also driving many new negotiations of
    preferential trading arrangements. CPTPP is one. ASEAN is also
    the leader behind the new RCEP agreement, which is the largest
    FTA in the world, and is actively negotiating an FTA with the
    European Union.
        The U.S. is not a party to any of these new frameworks, and
    this disadvantages our companies, over the medium and long term
    in particular, and also the United States as a destination for
    foreign direct investment. It also means that our voice at the
    table in developing new standards and norms in the region is
    weaker than it was before.
        It is also symbolically important. Many in the region are
    concerned that the U.S. has ceded leadership to China in this
    important economic arena. And, earlier this month, China
    announced that it had formally applied to join CPTPP,
    reinforcing this narrative in certain corridors.
        Additionally, and perhaps really importantly for the topic
    of the hearing, Southeast Asians overwhelmingly want more
    economic engagement from the United States. Economic
    engagement, commercial diplomacy, is at the heart of
    multilateralism in the region. It is the center of the mission
    of APEC and also core to the foundation and the activities of
    ASEAN.
        For leaders in emerging economies in the region right now,
    in particular, all of these issues have been thrown into even
    more acute relief by the devastation of COVID-19. The economic,
    health, and social consequences of the pandemic has put
    additional urgency on leaders to find new ways to stimulate
    economic growth and provide jobs, particularly for the very
    young population of the region.
        The Biden Administration has greatly enhanced its outreach
    to Southeast Asia in the second half of the year, which is a
    very welcome development. And Secretary of State Tony Blinken
    has announced that the Administration will soon share an Indo-
    Pacific strategy. We can be fully confident that Southeast
    Asian leaders will be looking to that strategy in particular
    for the economic dimension, and, for it to be successful, we
    need to be responsive and engaged on that concern.
        In my written testimony, I included several recommendations
    for the committee's consideration on how we can boost our
    economic engagement in the region. Perhaps the most important
    and also the most challenging is for the U.S. to chart a path
    forward for joining CPTPP.
        There is no substitute for the United States, in both
    strategic and economic importance, for participating in that
    agreement as a way of ensuring our long-term competitive
    outlook and helping to provide additional developments of high
    standards in areas like labor, climate change, and other
    concerns for the United States.
        It is also welcome to hear growing momentum for sectoral
    agreement negotiations, particularly in the digital policy
    arena. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest-growing internet
    economies in the world and a large digital market.
        Third, it is important to note that the United States has
    many strong existing frameworks for economic diplomacy in the
    region but these could be usefully strengthened for enhanced
    impact. This includes resourcing our agencies that help to
    promote trade and investment, like the DFC and TDA;
    revitalizing our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
    dialogs with ASEAN and bilaterally with key countries in the
    region; and pursuing Vice President Harris's welcome
    announcement that the U.S. would seek to host APEC in 2023.
        Importantly, Southeast Asia is also looking to the United
    States, and we could play a very important role in supporting
    the region in charting a path forward for equitable economic
    recovery from COVID-19. The devastation of the pandemic has hit
    vulnerable groups particularly hard, including women, the
    youth, and the poor.
        In the interest of time, I will stop my remarks here, and I
    very much look forward to continuing the discussion with the
    distinguished members of the committee.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Miller follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Ms. Miller.
        And now let me recognize Mr. Sobolik for his testimony.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SOBOLIK, FELLOW IN INDO-PACIFIC STUDIES,
                    AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL

        Mr. Sobolik. Thank you, Chairman Bera.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chabot, distinguished members
    of the subcommittee, it is a privilege for me to appear before
    you today to discuss strengthening America's ties with
    Southeast Asian nations.
        The historical arc of U.S. policy in the region has given
    these governments ample reason to question America's
    reliability, commitments, and staying power. Their fears,
    moreover, have been made more acute in recent weeks by the
    precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and by a muting of
    the Biden Administration's early clarity about the need for
    long-term strategic competition with the People's Republic of
    China.
        When it comes to appreciating Asian perceptions of
    America's role in Southeast Asia specifically, three case
    studies merit examination.
        The first is America's withdrawal from Vietnam in the
    1970's. When the United States abruptly pulled out of Vietnam
    in 1975, ASEAN nations were shocked not that America had left
    but at the way in which it did so. America's bungled withdrawal
    led to hedging behavior by regional States. A year prior to the
    pullout, Malaysia established relations with China. After
    Saigon's fall, the Philippines followed suit. And Thailand
    reached a similar calculation shortly thereafter, normalizing
    relations with Beijing in a bid to have China's help to blunt
    Vietnam's advance into Southeast Asia.
        The second episode of note was Washington's response to the
    Asian financial crisis in 1997. That year, currency values in
    Thailand and Indonesia tanked and regional growth halted.
    Washington, however, did not lend a helping hand to Thailand,
    despite having given Mexico similar aid under similar
    conditions in 1994. China, however, pledged financing and
    economic support to Bangkok.
        It was only after the situation in Southeast Asia worsened
    and the risk of contagion grew that the U.S. supported an
    Indonesian bailout fund. ASEAN member States, however, received
    the message clearly: The United States was an unpredictable
    partner in a crisis, perhaps even an unreliable one.
        The final episode revolves around America's passivity in
    response to the PRC's reclamation and militarization of the
    South China Sea in the 2010's. Beijing's fait accompli land
    reclamation presented serious problems to Vietnam, Malaysia,
    and the Philippines, as well as Taiwan. While diplomats
    attempted to address the issue within ASEAN, Beijing exploited
    its close ties with Cambodia to scuttle any inclusion of the
    South China Sea in the resulting communique.
        Although subsequent U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations
    communicated our resolve to sail and patrol wherever necessary,
    China had succeeded in creating new facts on the ground that
    severely complicated the economic and military calculations of
    key ASEAN member States.
        This background, in turn, casts recent events in
    Afghanistan in a new and concerning light, both for Washington
    and especially for ASEAN. To the misfortune of Southeast Asian
    nations, Washington is doing now what it did 40 years ago when
    it exited Vietnam. The U.S. has once again haphazardly ended a
    war on the other side of the world and is relying on others,
    especially China, to pick up the pieces. This time, however,
    China is not an economic backwater or a military afterthought.
    It is the world's second-largest economy, and by some estimates
    the largest, and has the region's largest and most capable
    armed forces.
        There are, however, encouraging signs that Washington is
    beginning to learn from these mistakes--from the widely
    supported ``Free and Open Indo-Pacific'' concept, to the
    commendable Mekong-U.S. Partnership that was recently
    established.
        Looking forward, policymakers would do well to give
    attention to four matters. I go into these in detail in my
    submitted testimony. I will briefly touch on them now.
        The first is acknowledging this spotty record and
    committing in conversations with our partners in the region to
    learn from them.
        Second is to not performatively but substantively engage
    with high-level officials, which my other colleagues have
    talked about here. And the Administration has done well thus
    far.
        The third is, when appropriate, to integrate our partners
    in ASEAN into Quad and AUKUS activities publicly and privately.
        Finally--and I will stop here, given time--is to work with
    our partners to identify and respond to the partners inside of
    ASEAN that China exploits to its own benefit.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sobolik follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Sobolik.
        I will now recognize members for 5 minutes each. And,
    pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for the purposes
    of questioning our witnesses.
        Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I will
    recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between
    Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let
    our staff know, and we will circle back to you.
        If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone
    and address the chair verbally.
        I will start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Miller, you talked a bit about the importance of
    economic engagement. And, you know, certainly, as a supporter
    of TPP, you know, I do recognize the strategic blunder. That
    was much more a tool of both economic engagement but also
    geopolitical strategy.
        Maybe you can comment--you know, I think it may be a road
    too far, at this particular moment in time, in getting back
    into the CPTPP. But, you know, this is something that, you
    know, certainly I have talked to the ranking member about, and
    I do think there is some will in Congress in a bipartisan way
    and a bicameral way, especially if you look at the strong
    bipartisan vote on USMCA, where you actually had more Democrats
    in the House voting for that--196 Democrats, I believe 193
    Republicans. So there are opportunities to vote on something.
        The one area where we have focused a little bit at the
    subcommittee level is on the digital trade arena. You know,
    certainly, partners in the region--Singapore, New Zealand,
    others--have trade deals. You know, if you take the digital-
    trade chapter out of USMCA, there is a strong starting point
    there. If you look at the Trump Administration's executive
    actions in a bilateral way with Japan, there is a starting
    point there. So it is not as though we have to start from
    scratch.
        Maybe you can comment on, you know, if that is the right
    starting point. You know, there may be some opening with the
    Administration, you know, if you listen to some of the comments
    of Ambassador Tai, as well as the Administration, there might
    be some opportunities there. And that is something that I think
    we are thinking about as a subcommittee, potentially taking a
    lead and sending a signal in a bipartisan way to the
    Administration.
        So your thoughts on digital trade?
        Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Chairman Bera, for raising
    that important issue and also important opportunity for the
    United States.
        There does seem to be good momentum building for exploring
    a digital trade agreement in the Indo-Pacific, both among key
    stakeholders in the United States and also in the region.
        One, I think, particularly useful example to look at, in
    addition to building on the good provisions in the USMCA and
    the Japan-U.S. agreement, is the recently concluded Digital
    Economic Partnership Agreement which was announced by New
    Zealand, Singapore, and Chile as an agreement to help establish
    norms to facilitate trade, but, also, it has a particular
    emphasis on digital inclusion, SMEs, and was negotiated by
    smaller economies.
        Looking through the prism of engagement with ASEAN, I think
    DEPA is a very useful model for the Administration to consider
    engaging with going forward. It also has a modular approach to
    certain provisions, so countries can bite off pieces of the
    agreement at a particular time, which might make it more
    digestible and a stronger platform for engaging some of the
    less-developed ASEAN economies.
        It is worth noting in the context of our conversation about
    China that China has also expressed interest quite recently in
    potentially joining DEPA. And it is an area where I think it is
    important for the U.S. to demonstrate some leadership,
    particularly while we navigate our path forward on CPTPP, which
    you note, Chairman Bera, will be a difficult and probably long
    but very important process.
        Mr. Bera. Great.
        Maybe, Ambassador Shear, I could ask you a question,
    staying on the topic of economic engagement in the region. One
    area where we have had conversation with the Indonesians, with
    the Vietnamese, and others in the region is supply chain
    redundancy and resiliency. And we have talked to our Quad
    partners, as well, about strategically investing in the supply
    chain resiliency.
        Your thoughts on how important that would be, you know, and
    doing that in a strategic way?
        Mr. Shear. I think it is extremely important.
        Supply chains have been moving to Southeast Asia,
    particularly places like Vietnam and Indonesia, for some time.
    This trend accelerated with the COVID pandemic, and I expect it
    to continue in the future. So Southeast Asian countries like
    Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand will
    all become stronger exporters to the United States and more
    integrated members of critical supply chains.
        And I think engaging these countries in discussions on
    supply chain security not only speaks to their interest in
    economic development but speaks to both our sides' interest in
    increased supply chain security.
        This is a very strong way for us, I think, to interact with
    the Southeast Asians, and I think it is a strong way for us to
    interact with our like-minded partners and allies, like Japan
    and Australia. So I think that the stronger this item in our
    agenda is, the better.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
        And I notice I am out of time, so let me go to recognize
    the ranking member, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Sobolik, I will start with you. As I mentioned in my
    opening Statement, I am co-chair of the Philippines Friendship
    Caucus. And I would like to know what we could do to better
    support the Philippines, to help them push back on China's
    gray-zone aggression. Specifically, they face constant
    harassment from the so-called Maritime Militia.
        What security support or means can we use to help the
    Philippines with this challenge?
        Mr. Sobolik. Sir, thank you so much for that question.
        The crux of our response with the Philippines,
    specifically, has to be strengthening our Enhanced Defense
    Cooperation Agreement with Manila. This was established back in
    2014. Given the recent tensions surrounding human rights,
    Global Magnitsky sanctions that have targeted President
    Duterte's close associations, this agreement has been slow to
    come into actuality.
        But getting our troops and our assets rotating regularly in
    and out of pre-specified military bases throughout the
    Philippines gives us a presence beyond what we already have--a
    strengthened presence with the Philippines, and a cooperative
    one at that. And I think it not only sends an important signal
    to China, it is a material action.
        So, whatever we do to reinforce our commitment, that has to
    be the crux of it.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Let me go a little bit beyond the first question. I will
    stick with you, Mr. Sobolik, for the time being.
        China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea has been
    concerning for, you know, quite some time. You know, they have
    repeatedly sought to enforce their bogus sovereignty claims
    against Vietnam, Malaysia, and, as I mentioned, Philippines.
        What support, whether political, military, or otherwise,
    can we provide to help our partners uphold their rights against
    the PRC's bullying?
        Mr. Sobolik. It starts with, to an extent, doing what we
    are already doing, sir. The freedom-of-navigation operations
    are good; going beyond that, though, is important. Because it
    is clear, given recent pronouncements from China, not only that
    they are more fully engaging gray-zone tactics with their coast
    guard, they are also trying to reinforce their claims within
    their own nine-dash line, which of course we reject.
        I think one of the most creative and admittedly difficult
    but good things we could do is involve our own Coast Guard more
    in the South China Sea. If our goal is to deter adventurism
    without risking escalation, meeting capability for capability
    and service for service can be a good way to do this. And there
    is starting to be a little more research about this area coming
    out of integrating our Coast Guard assets more and more, and I
    think it is worth studying.
        Mr. Chabot. OK. Thank you.
        Professor Shear, let me turn to you now. I am a believer
    and I am glad that this Administration has entered into AUKUS,
    the new partnership. I think it is an important idea. The
    reaction throughout the ASEAN countries has been a bit mixed,
    as you know.
        How could this partnership and also the Quad--how is that
    being viewed? And what can we do to strengthen both those
    partnerships?
        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman. That is an important
    question.
        Clearly, ASEAN centrality is an important theme in whatever
    ASEAN Statesmen and Stateswomen say about regional stability
    and security, and we need to respect ASEAN centrality.
        However, given ASEAN's divisiveness and lack of unity, we
    need to look for alternatives to bringing our influence to bear
    on the region. I think we need to do that bilaterally with
    important individual ASEAN partners, and we need to do it
    multilaterally, and I think the Quad and AUKUS are key tools
    for us to do that.
        As I said in my Statement, the AUKUS pronouncement sent a
    strong signal to the region about our commitment. The ASEANs, I
    think, given their devotion to ASEAN centrality, have to react
    in a lukewarm fashion publicly, but I think privately they will
    welcome the Quad, they will welcome the creation of AUKUS.
        This gives them more leverage vis-a-vis China. When the
    Southeast Asians know that the Americans and their allies and
    partners are strongly engaged in the region, this gives them
    the confidence they need to bring leverage to bear on the
    Chinese, to get what they want, and to pursue their interests
    in a free and open way.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, but let me join with you
    and Ms. Miller relative to her TPP comments and just say that,
    when the leaders of our two parties back in 2016 both decided
    to oppose this, the term ``shooting ourselves in the foot''
    comes to mind. And we put the PRC in a position where they are
    now trying to get in there and write the rules to replace the
    United States. And that is just--you know, that is just a
    boneheaded thing, for us to be in that position. And so I
    commend you for supporting it, as I did, Mr. Chairman.
        And sorry I didn't get around to you, Ms. Miller, but I
    agreed with your points on TPP.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Sherman, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        It is appropriate that we are having a hearing on Southeast
    Asia. Naturally, we have Southeast Asia experts. What tends to
    happen, then, is that people who focus their lives on Southeast
    Asia push for a policy that is measured by, ``Does this help us
    in our relationships in Southeast Asia?'' When we talk about
    trade, we have to balance, ``Is this good for our relationships
    in Southeast Asia, but what effect does it have on small towns
    in Ohio?''
        And I know that one of our witnesses talked about how we
    can more effectively import from Southeast Asia. We have the
    largest trade deficit in the history of mammalian life on this
    planet, and I think it is important that we focus even more
    attention on how we can export to Southeast Asia.
        The value of the dollar as a worldwide reserve currency is
    certainly not helped by us having the charade we are having
    here about whether we will even pay our bills, nor is it helped
    by the trade deficit.
        Likewise, with regard to aid to countries in Southeast
    Asia, experts in Southeast Asia say, ``Well, help everybody,
    and then, if somebody does it wrong, maybe we will give them a
    little bit less.'' That gives us the most leverage if you are
    giving money to Southeast Asia. The more you give, the more
    leverage you have; you might take it away. But every dollar
    that we give to the Government of Myanmar/Burma is a dollar we
    are not spending on the truly needy in Africa, for example.
        And so I would like our witnesses to focus on the Rohingya.
    We were all, those of us who focused on human rights for
    decades--I met with Aung San Suu Kyi several times. We were all
    inspired by her. And now she is the apologist for a policy of
    ethnic cleansing, if not genocide. And, actually, I think it is
    genocide.
        I have suggested in this hearing that we ought to look at
    the international border, that the Government of Myanmar/Burma
    can't defend its own people. Now, that is a radical step, but
    there is only one change of international border that the
    United States has supported in this century, and that was the
    creation of South Sudan. And we did so as a result of acts of
    genocide, probably less in terms of the numbers of casualties
    and displaced people than what the Rohingya have seen.
        So I will ask Mr. Shear: Should we be providing aid--
    obviously we should be providing aid to the refugees. But
    should we be providing aid that provides for the economic
    development of Burma/Myanmar at a time when it refuses to
    provide citizenship documents and protection for the Rohingya
    people?
        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman. That is a critical
    question. And I would like first to address the Rohingya issue.
        I think, as we move forward and increase the pressure on
    the military regime in Burma, the Tatmadaw, I think we need to
    continue providing assistance to the Rohingya. We need to
    continue focusing on their horrific condition in camps
    throughout the region. There are over 700,000 Rohingyas in
    Bangladesh alone, in Cox's Bazar.
        Mr. Sherman. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Shear. And we need to avoid the phenomenon of donor
    fatigue with the Rohingyas. So I think, as we----
        Mr. Sherman. The comment I would make is, the fact that we
    are still providing tens of millions of dollars to help the
    Government of Myanmar/Burma achieve its economic objectives is
    a stain on the morality of the United States. If a government
    is engaging in genocide and ethnic cleansing, to say, ``Well,
    we are giving them less money than we used to'' is an
    inadequate response.
        But go ahead.
        Mr. Shear. Well, I agree that we need to limit all the
    resources we can that go to the military regime. I think we
    need to be discriminating, though. As I said in my Statement,
    we need to keep the Burmese people on our side. We need to make
    sure that the measures we take to inflict pain on the military
    regime don't also excessively inflict pain on the Burmese
    people.
        Mr. Sherman. Every dollar that we spend helping improve the
    economy of Myanmar/Burma increases the power of the regime and
    is taken away from the poor people in other places in the
    world, particularly Africa.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. OK. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
    Perry, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And I guess my first question, at least, is going to go to
    Mr. Sobolik, and it is in regard to Duterte in the Philippines.
        He chose to terminate the visiting forces agreement some
    time ago but has recently, as I understand it, reinStated that.
    And I am just wondering if you can describe to us whether you
    think this, kind of, shift back toward the United States and
    away from the CCP is real or is just a small calculation, if it
    has any long-lasting endurance or if this is completely fragile
    and just a momentary decision on Duterte's part to, kind of,
    advance some leverage that he might perceive that he could have
    regarding the CCP.
        Mr. Sobolik. Congressman, thank you for that question. It
    is very important.
        President Duterte was highly opportunistic with his
    decision to hold the visiting forces agreement hostage. His
    threat to do so came shortly on the heels of human rights
    sanctions, as I mentioned earlier. And I and certainly several
    others interpreted his anger and his focus on the VFA as his
    response, not necessarily to pull the trigger on the agreement,
    but for domestic reasons and, frankly, for balancing regions
    against China to build some political space for himself. And it
    became pretty apparent in late 2020 that he was going to punt
    his decision on VFA into the Biden Administration. And shortly
    after the Biden Administration taking office, he signaled his
    complete support once again for the VFA.
        And I think, in some ways, Duterte's behavior, while he is
    certainly a unique individual, is not that unlike the
    calculations that many Southeast Asian countries will make from
    time to time, caught between two great powers, as they are.
        Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you.
        And then, you know, just expand on that a little bit before
    my next question. So, you know, it seems like he remains
    opportunistic and that he doesn't necessarily, in any way--
    maybe it is just based on who is in the White House at the time
    and how he perceives things, but he definitely can't be
    counted, in any meaningful way, in the camp of the United
    States or the West. Would that be a reasonable, kind of,
    overarching theme?
        Mr. Sobolik. I would certainly say that President Duterte
    himself does not fit into the mold you just described, but I
    would also say that the defense architecture within the
    Government of the Philippines is highly supportive of the
    defense cooperation they have with the United States. And
    putting the President aside for the moment, which I know can be
    a significant ask whenever addressing these things, but putting
    him aside for the moment, the relationship is quite strong, and
    there is a lot of ground to buildupon.
        And Duterte has proven himself to be pretty shrewd and
    cunning, and he will tilt toward America when it serves his
    interest, toward Beijing when it serves his interest. But the
    good news for us in the midst of that is, the underlying
    foundation of the relationship does not appear to be fragile.
        Mr. Perry. OK. Thank you.
        And then I am just curious, you know, from a regional
    standpoint, regarding the CCP and Taiwan--you know, the CCP, as
    they lose--no. There are obviously billions of people in China,
    but they are still going to suffer a loss of male workers, male
    people in industry and business, just based on demographics. Do
    you see that being a pressure point that Xi would seek to--it
    would force Xi into making a decision regarding Taiwan earlier?
        Or do you think that they literally feel like they can
    manage that and everything else that they are seeking to
    accomplish--you know, regional and international hegemony, et
    cetera? Do you think that they feel they can manage it, or do
    you think that they see that as something that is going to be
    very, very problematic by the end of the century?
        Mr. Sobolik. Congressman, that is the million-dollar
    question, is it not? I think you are right to bring up
    demographics as a long-leading indicator in PRC calculus. Not
    only unemployed males, but the gender disparity between men and
    women in China as well, which--I recognize your time is up, but
    it is a very important question to be asking, yes.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance.
        Mr. Bera. Great.
        Let me go and recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
    Titus.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to our witnesses. It is very interesting
    information.
        I would like to ask Ms. Miller, just kind of expanding on
    some of the things the U.S. can do to be helpful in the region,
    besides just economic trade agreements. One thing that we know
    is that Southeast Asia is one of the world's most heavily
    contaminated regions with deadly unexploded ordnance. U.S.
    legacy cluster munitions from the Vietnam War are in Laos and
    Cambodia and in Vietnam, and they continue to cause civilian
    deaths or casualties to this day, and they make some of the
    productive land potentially out of use.
        If you travel over there, especially in Cambodia, on the
    streets of the city, you see these little pickup vans of people
    missing limbs begging on the streets. They are all victims of
    these mines that haven't been eliminated.
        We have a de-mining program, and I think it serves as a
    positive example of our leadership and what good things we can
    do to support communities. Could you comment on how things like
    that can better help our relations in the area as we try to
    combat the, kind of, insidious influence of China?
        Ms. Miller. Congresswoman Titus, thank you for your
    leadership on this issue and for raising this question.
        I think it is an excellent example of a platform that has
    helped to facilitate our relationship in Cambodia but also,
    importantly, in Vietnam, which came from a very low bar when I
    first started working on Vietnam relations almost 20 years ago
    to where we are today, where we have a close relationship
    across a range of issues.
        And part of the success of the normalization of our
    relationship was based on trust-building exercises such as you
    described in terms of de-mining and finding the remains of
    American soldiers in the region and returning them to the
    United States.
        I think, importantly, your question also signals that we
    need to have a strategy that allows us to engage some
    communities and societies in these countries. Not only the
    elites in the government, but we need the American presence and
    our positive contributions to the region to be understood
    broadly throughout civil society in Southeast Asia. And these
    kinds of programs are an excellent example of that.
        There are many others that I would commend to the
    committee's consideration for further enhancement, including
    YSEALI. The Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative programs,
    particularly to engage young people, I think, are very
    important for our standing and our relationships in the region
    going forward.
        Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that. I hope
    we can put some support behind NDI, IRI, those kinds of
    programs that could come from that side of our, kind of, soft
    diplomacy.
        One other thing I think that we could be doing better is on
    climate change. With the new relationship--the, kind of, redone
    Global Climate Risk Index shows that some of these countries
    are the worst in the world from being affected by climate
    change. I think it is called the Mekong River Commission that
    is composed of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Is that
    not another way that we can better collaborate and cooperate
    with some of these countries on issues that affect the planet
    but affect their economies as well?
        Ms. Miller. Thank you, Congresswoman. I absolutely agree
    with that Statement and know from conversations with Southeast
    Asian leaders and civil society and environmental groups that
    the threat of climate change is top of mind for countries
    throughout the region.
        There have been several studies issued, as you note, that
    identify Southeast Asia as one of the parts of the world that
    will be most critically affected due to rising sea levels and
    flooding, particularly in the Mekong region. U.S. participation
    in the Lower Mekong Initiative is a really important part of
    our engagement in the region.
        And there is room to do more, I think, on climate change. I
    know Secretary Kerry has dedicated much of his career to
    normalizing the U.S. relationship with Vietnam. He knows that
    part of the world very well. And I think there is a lot of
    scope for enhanced engagement and interest on both sides in
    deepening that part of our cooperation, both in terms of
    mitigation, but, also, adaptation is going to be very important
    to the region's economic prospects going forward.
        Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Miller.
        Mr. Chairman, maybe we can pursue that as something this
    committee could take up and look into further, perhaps help
    with. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you very much. And we will take that under
    consideration, because obviously it is very important to the
    region.
        Let me now go and recognize the gentlelady from Missouri,
    Mrs. Wagner, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing the
    hearing to examine the strategically critical relationship
    between the United States and Southeast Asia.
        As co-chair of the congressional Caucus on the Association
    of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, I strongly believe we
    have a national interest in sustaining U.S. leadership in
    Southeast Asia, supporting human rights and respect for
    democratic freedom, and articulating our strategic priorities.
        We will find willing partners in our many friends and
    allies in the region who share our grave concerns regarding the
    belligerence and the growing power of the People's Republic of
    China.
        Yet the PRC, eager to undermine U.S. interests in the key
    region, is aggressively working to expand its influence in
    Southeast Asia. It seeks to exploit its predatory investment,
    development, and trade policies, illegal military installations
    in the South China Sea, and disinformation campaigns to coerce
    countries to accept its agenda.
        Nowhere are the high stakes of the competition between
    China and the United States clearer than in Southeast Asia,
    where the Chinese Communist Party is fostering a resurgence in
    authoritarianism and oppression. It is imperative that the
    United States show strong and consistent leadership in
    Southeast Asia to secure a future in which the rule of law,
    free and fair trade, and democracy underpin relations among
    Indo-Pacific States.
        Beijing allows its State-owned enterprises, or SOEs, to
    borrow at an extremely low interest rate from public financial
    institutions. And, as a result, these SOEs have dominated
    project bids in Southeast Asia, a primary target of the Belt
    and Road Initiative. I am deeply concerned that these policies
    are designed to draw Southeast Asian countries into Beijing's
    sphere of influence.
        And, Ms. Miller, how should the United States work with
    Southeast Asian countries to prevent SOEs from boxing out more
    responsible, let's say, investors?
        Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Wagner, for
    your question and also your leadership of the U.S.-ASEAN
    Caucus. It is a really important conduit for engagement with
    the region.
        And you asked a really important and complicated question.
    Oftentimes, the United States is compared to China's activities
    in the region in an apples-to-oranges way, when, in reality,
    our economies are fundamentally different, and how we organize
    ourselves around our economic engagement and commercial
    diplomacy is very different.
        In the light of the tremendous amount of resources that
    China has allocated to the region for these projects, I think
    it is really important for the United States to prepare and to
    be an alternative; to work with our partners in the Quad, which
    has infrastructure as a focus area, and our partners in ASEAN
    to help countries improve their capacity to negotiate
    infrastructure deals that are transparent and adhere to
    international standards; and for the United States to work with
    our partners to provide alternative means of financing some of
    these infrastructure projects.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you.
        Ms. Miller. Southeast Asia--oh. Thanks.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you so much, but I have limited time
    here.
        The United States, Japan, Australia, and India are joining
    forces, frankly, in an unprecedented degree, to promote a free
    and open Indo-Pacific region. I believe we should welcome this,
    kind of, revitalized Quad partnership. However, I understand
    why Southeast Asian countries may feel that the recent focus on
    the Quad leaves them vulnerable to China's influence
    operations.
        Mr. Sobolik, what role should ASEAN countries play in the
    United States' Indo-Pacific strategy?
        Mr. Sobolik. Representative Wagner, thank you so much for
    that question.
        I think you are right to bring up potential tensions
    between the Quad and ASEAN. I think one way to potentially
    square that is to begin, behind closed doors at first, to back-
    channel upcoming Quad actions, not only with ASEAN member
    States bilaterally but through ASEAN specifically, and begin to
    communicate very intentionally that we see no tradeoff between
    our engagement with ASEAN and our engagements with the Quad.
        And I think that is going to be a very important message
    for ASEAN and for ASEAN member States to receive from us.
        Mrs. Wagner. I think you are absolutely right.
        My time has expired, Mr. Chairman, so I am going to yield
    back. I have several more questions, but I shall submit them
    for the record.
        Mrs. Wagner. Thank you all for being here.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
        Let me now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
    Levin, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Levin. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman, for your great
    leadership of this subcommittee and having another important
    hearing.
        I want to try to get to COVID-19 and climate change. So,
    starting with COVID-19, Southeast Asia continues to struggle
    with containing the pandemic and particularly with the spread
    of the Delta variant.
        So let me start with you, Ambassador Shear; others may
    weigh in.
        Have certain countries been more successful in their
    approaches to COVID? And if yes, what has been the key or keys
    to their success? And could those steps or systems be
    replicated elsewhere?
        And then, beyond additional vaccine donations, what are
    some ways that the U.S. can support Southeast Asian countries
    in their fight against COVID?
        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman Levin, for that very
    important question.
        I think the country that is known to have done among the
    best in Southeast Asia in combating the pandemic is Vietnam.
    And they implemented some very rigorous and, some might think,
    rigid ways of containing the virus. They promoted lockdowns.
    They banned travel to and from the country, as many others
    have. They require testing, to the extent that they have been
    able to provide test kits, and rigorous contact tracing.
        So the Vietnamese have been very zealous in the way in
    which they have limited social contact and, some might say,
    sacrificed civil liberties in order to contain this virus.
        Mr. Levin. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Shear. And I think what the Vietnamese experience
    demonstrates for us is the importance of social cohesion. All
    of the methods they may have used might not be applicable,
    certainly, in the United States. But, certainly, the high level
    of social cohesion in Vietnam certainly contributed to their
    relatively successful management of the virus.
        Now, they have been hit more strongly by the Delta variant.
    They have had an uptick of cases. I think the Vice President's
    trip recently, her stop in Vietnam, resulted in important
    increasing cooperation between Vietnam and the United States.
    She donated another million doses of the vaccine to the
    Vietnamese, which brought our contribution to Vietnam, I
    believe, up to 5 million doses.
        And, for the long term, more importantly, we established a
    CDC center in Vietnam, which will assist the Vietnamese and the
    region not only in combating the pandemic but hopefully
    preventing future pandemics as well.
        Mr. Levin. OK. Thank you very much.
        Let me try to hit my climate-change question. Maybe I will
    give Ms. Miller the first shot at this.
        Obviously, climate change is really a huge issue for
    Southeast Asian nations. It is one of the regions that is most
    vulnerable to the harmful effects of climate change. So what
    can the U.S. do to support regional actors in addressing
    climate-change challenges that threaten their economies,
    particularly maritime Southeast Asian nations?
        And, you know, I have been on this kick about--I hear so
    much talk about Belt and Road, and I feel like a lot of the
    talk about it is very anxious and defensive, when I think we
    should have a big-hearted, broad-shouldered American response
    where we don't react but we say, ``Wow, these countries need to
    change--we all do--everything about how we get our power,
    transportation, everything,'' and that we ought to get in there
    and partner with them to create a lot of jobs by deploying mass
    amounts of offshore wind, solar, and so forth.
        So thoughts on that? I didn't leave you a lot of time, but
    I would like to hear your thoughts on it. Maybe the chairman
    will be a little indulgent. Go ahead.
        Ms. Miller. Thank you, Congressman Levin, for your question
    and your interest in that issue, which is very important to
    Southeast Asians.
        I think there are a lot of things that the U.S. can do,
    particularly working with our private sector. As you note,
    there is a tremendous need in the region for infrastructure
    development, especially to deal with the impact of climate
    change, and for technologies to help with having urbanization
    that doesn't, you know, rapidly increase the region's emissions
    profile.
        Southeast Asia's middle class is targeted to double between
    now and 2030, which will have a huge impact on consumption, and
    the U.S. has a lot of technology and a lot of innovations that
    can be deployed to help manage that challenge. And I think it
    is definitely an area that warrants further investment on both
    sides.
        Mr. Levin. OK.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks.
        And I don't see Dr. Green on camera, so let me go next to
    the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr.
        Mr. Barr. Thank you, Chairman Bera. I appreciate this
    hearing. Very excellent hearing. And I very much appreciate--
    can you hear me OK?
        Mr. Bera. I can. I am going to recognize Mark Green because
    he just----
        Mr. Barr. Oh, is he back? I am sorry. OK.
        Mr. Bera [continuing]. Since you just started.
        So let me go ahead and recognize the gentleman from
    Tennessee, Dr. Green, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Green. My apologies, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, my
    apologies to my colleague from Kentucky.
        It is interesting; I went to West Point in 1982, only 7
    years after the fall of Saigon, and a lot of the guys who
    taught basic training for me had fought in the Vietnam War. The
    United States military has this tendency to become really,
    really good at and study really, really well the last war we
    fought. And it is something we need to be better about,
    obviously. I think we are trying our best to be better at that.
        But I say that to say, when I was at the academy, I mean,
    we were studying Vietnam, we were studying the people, we were
    studying how the war was fought there, the mistakes that the
    United States made, and it created for me a real heart for the
    people.
        My West Point classmate actually served in the MIA
    Commission and traveled all over Laos and Vietnam trying to
    find the Americans that we were not able to bring home.
        Again, just have a huge heart for that part of the world.
    And when I was a young lieutenant, I took some master's
    programs in developing nations with a focus on Southeast Asia.
    So this conference, Mr. Chairman--or this committee hearing is
    fantastic, and I really appreciate it.
        My questions are, of course, much like everybody else's,
    you know, China and near-shoring and all the things that are
    impacting our relationship with Southeast Asia.
        My first question, to Mr. Sobolik: There is no doubt that
    America's supply chain is overly reliant on China. With regards
    to reshoring and near-shoring efforts, how can we reduce our
    reliance on China with minimal impact and disruption, with this
    massive shift that has been going on for some time to Vietnam
    and to other countries in Southeast Asia?
        Mr. Sobolik. Representative Green, thanks so much for
    asking that question. It is one of the most important ones not
    just economically but geopolitically right now.
        I think the reality is, at some level, there is going to be
    some uncomfortable disruption. And I think one of the
    complicating factors of that is, it is difficult to say for
    certain which countries and which interest groups are going to
    get the brunt of that.
        But I think a few things are important as we talk about
    reshoring and near-shoring, as you put it.
        The first one is going to be a consistent message to our
    Southeast Asian partners that, of course, fair trade matters a
    great deal to the American people, as successive elections have
    demonstrated, but the United States still does believe in free
    trade. And I think the reality is that our friends, allies,
    partners in Southeast Asia are going to be the greatest victors
    of free trade moving forward, or at least one of the greatest
    victors, and reap the benefits of free trade. And it is to our
    strategic benefit that we near-shore a lot of the manufacturing
    we have relied on from China to our friends, allies, and
    partners there.
        And it goes to this fundamental tension that we have been
    discussing directly and indirectly during this whole hearing,
    which is ASEAN's economic reliance on China on the one hand
    and, on the other hand, their security dependence on us. And we
    obviously need to play both sides of that equation, not just
    reasserting our dependability with defense but easing their
    economic dependence on China however we can.
        Mr. Green. You know, the questions that I have--because,
    clearly, we want some near-shoring to happen. We see, you know,
    China's commodity boom created a run on the currencies in Latin
    America. And I am the ranking Republican on Western Hemisphere,
    so this is, sort of, my area. And, in so doing, they made
    manufacturing in Latin America much more expensive relative to
    Chinese manufactured goods.
        And so the manufacturing sector in Latin America took a
    massive hit in this desire for--I think a bipartisan desire. I
    just made a trip with Albio Ceres to the Dominican Republic.
    And so there is this bipartisan desire to see some
    manufacturing come back to Latin America.
        One of the big concerns is, you know, the supply chain for
    parts when something is assembled. And I would be interested in
    understanding a little better how particularly the Southeast
    Asian countries are going to feel about, and what their
    thoughts are going to be in support of, being the initial, sort
    of, parts manufacturer that then get reassembled in Latin
    America, as opposed to reassembled in China--what impact and
    how they are going to look at us after we try to pull that off.
        Mr. Sobolik. Sir, that is a fantastic question. In full
    transparency, it is one I haven't given a whole lot of time to.
    So, in respect to you, if you are OK, sir, I would rather take
    some time and circle back with your office and give you a
    better answer than try to give you something now.
        Mr. Green. Very much so. Appreciate it.
        And I yield, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
        Let me recognize the gentlelady from Pennsylvania, Ms.
    Houlahan, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And just confirming
    that you can hear me?
        Mr. Bera. We can.
        Ms. Houlahan. Perfect.
        And thank you so much to everyone for joining us today.
        My questions are going to focus largely on Vietnam, and I
    will also likely run out of time, so I would like to submit the
    rest that I am not able to get to for the record.
        I am, as many others have talked about, really concerned
    about supply chains and our dependency on China. Specifically,
    I am going to focus on rare earth elements.
        For the Ambassador, sir, Vietnam is one of the top 10
    largest sources of rare earth elements in the world, and we
    really need to figure out a way to overcome China's near-
    monopoly on rare earth elements. And Vietnam and Japan
    apparently co-launched a joint research center in Hanoi to
    improve extraction and processing of these materials.
        I was wondering if you might know what impact the Rare
    Earth Research and Technology Transfer Centre has been having
    in Vietnam and Japan in terms of diversifying their supply of
    rare earth elements away from China and if there are any
    pathways for the U.S. And the economies of Southeast Asia to
    reduce their reliance on Chinese rare earth elements in the
    supply chains.
        And, last--I know I have a lot of questions, but this is
    just one of them--how can we as the U.S. effectively support
    research efforts across the region and particularly in Vietnam
    to identify substitutes or to develop approaches to reduce the
    amount of these elements that are required or to recycle,
    reduce, and reuse them?
        Mr. Bera. Ambassador Shear, you might be on mute.
        Mr. Shear. Congresswoman, thank you for that important
    question. It is, of course, a question that touches on the
    supply of all electronic parts globally, since rare earths are
    critical components of electronic parts. And the world has been
    looking for alternatives to the Chinese supply since they
    slapped an embargo on the export of rare earth elements to
    Japan, I believe in 2010.
        The Vietnamese certainly are eager to help fill the demand.
    As you say, they have generous endowments of rare earth
    minerals. I think they would welcome investments in that
    industry not just from Japan but from the United States as
    well.
        When I was in Vietnam, I encouraged Vietnam-Japan
    cooperation across the board, including on rare earth minerals.
    And I think it offers us an opportunity to expand the supply,
    move at least portions of the supply away from China. I think
    we need to be doing that globally as well as just with Vietnam.
        Ms. Houlahan. And, Ms. Miller, you also spoke a little bit
    about Vietnam in your opening remarks. Do you have anything
    further to add in the area, specifically, of rare earth
    elements and reducing our dependence and, frankly, Vietnam's
    dependence on China in the pathways to process and develop
    these critical materials?
        Ms. Miller. Thank you, Representative, for your question.
    Perhaps I will just briefly add on to what Ambassador Shear
    said, in that Vietnam, as a matter of strategic priority, is
    interested in decreasing its dependence on China, and I think
    any opportunities to work with the United States and Japan in
    this area would be very welcomed on the Vietnamese side.
        Ms. Houlahan. Could I ask you to be specific on what kind
    of options you see for us to be able to help Vietnam move up
    the value chain and to diversify and to not be so dependent?
        My impression is that there is a lot of cross-border supply
    chain issues going on--origin of China, maybe processing in
    Vietnam, and then maybe going backward into China for further
    manufacturing. Is there anything that we can be doing
    specifically to be more helpful to be able to advance
    Vietnam's, kind of, standing on the supply chain ladder?
        Ms. Miller. Representative Houlahan, on the rare earth
    side, let me come back to you with a more detailed explanation,
    as I am not following that issue very closely.
        But I think, in terms of overall supply chain
    diversification, the relationship between Vietnam and China is
    very close, particularly as many industries have moved into
    Vietnam from southern China as their costs have risen and, in
    some cases, to access other markets.
        There is an opportunity, I think, for the U.S. to continue
    to strengthen our trade relationship with Vietnam. It has
    become increasingly important for a number of our manufacturers
    who are seeking to diversify their own supply chains out of
    China. And a big piece of that is working to help improve the
    overall business environment and the trade relationship between
    our two countries.
        Ms. Houlahan. And I thank you all, and I know I have nearly
    run out of time. I would like to submit the balance of my
    questions for the record. And I would specifically really like
    to find out some better information on the Rare Earth Research
    and Technology Transfer Centre and see if we might be able to
    suss out how effective or ineffective that is.
        Ms. Houlahan. And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr.
    Chair.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Barr.
        Mr. Barr. Well, thanks again, Mr. Chairman, for holding
    this very important hearing and to our excellent witnesses.
    Very insightful testimony.
        Let me start with Mr. Sobolik about your written testimony
    related to Afghanistan and the impact that our withdrawal from
    Afghanistan has had in exacerbating this point of testimony
    that you have that, quote, ``the United States has proven
    itself a fickle and unsteady ally.''
        This is concerning to me with regard to U.S. efforts to
    bring ASEAN countries closer to the United States and drive a
    wedge between us and the People's Republic of China. I think
    your point is that geographic proximity is not the only problem
    here. And in the wake of the United States' retreat from
    Afghanistan, we have seen the CCP capitalize on fears that the
    United States would not honor our obligations to protect our
    allies and partners. You cite the historical example of the
    withdrawal from Vietnam as another problem.
        But how has the Afghanistan debacle affected our
    credibility with partner nations in the region? And do these
    ASEAN countries, particularly the Philippines, who have to
    regularly combat incursions in the South China Sea by China--
    how do they still view the United States as a legitimate and
    trustworthy security partner in light of Afghanistan?
        Mr. Sobolik. Representative Barr, thank you very much for
    that question. I will dive into parts of my testimony, in
    responding to you, that I wasn't able to share with the full
    committee earlier on.
        The fundamental problem that the United States has with our
    withdrawal from Afghanistan is that we are now largely
    dependent on China, and to an extent Russia as well, to police
    the Taliban and to lean on them to crack down on terror groups
    operating inside of Afghanistan. And to put a really fine point
    on it, we are relying on other great powers who are adversarial
    toward to us to prevent the next big terrorist attack inside of
    America, which then imposes significant limitations on our
    ability to compete effectively with the Chinese Communist
    Party.
        And we are seeing some of these dynamics come to fruition
    not just because of the lost leverage we have with Afghanistan
    but because of this Administration's understandable desire to
    cooperate with the PRC on specific issues like climate change
    or others.
        The reality, though, which I believe is becoming clearer,
    especially in the wake of the United Nations General Assembly
    speeches, Xi Jinping's commitment to not fund coal
    manufacturing anymore, how that was a product of John Kerry's
    negotiations, we are starting to see some give-and-take and
    some breaking ground between Washington and Beijing. And my
    fear is that the cooperative agenda is starting to overtake the
    competitive one.
        Now, what this means, potentially, is, even though we have
    great defense agreements like AUKUS, we have great things like
    the Quad on the defense side, on the human-rights side and,
    frankly, the counterterrorism side, we are losing leverage to
    the Chinese Communist Party, which makes it difficult for us in
    the gray zone to actually be active and proactive in defending
    our Southeast Asian partners day to day.
        Mr. Barr. Thank you for that.
        In my remaining time, let me just reclaim my time and ask
    specifically about Singapore to any of our witnesses.
        As you know, we do have a strong relationship, especially
    in the economic relationship with Singapore. They are the
    wealthiest ASEAN member, accounting for 80 percent of the U.S.
    ASEAN FDI. And the majority of U.S. services exports to and
    imports from ASEAN countries is Singapore.
        But it is troubling to hear the Singapore Foreign Minister
    talk about, ``Viewing China purely as an adversary to be
    contained will not work in the long term.''
        What can we do? Are there specific areas that the United
    States can bring Singapore further into the orbit of the United
    States? How are we seeing Beijing attempt to undermine our
    relationship? What do we need to do to further integrate our
    economies to, again, bring them closer to us as opposed to
    China?
        How about, Ambassador, could you answer that?
        Mr. Shear. I would like to take that on, Congressman,
    because I think it is a fundamentally important question.
        Our relationship with Singapore is very strong. When we
    pulled out of Philippines, the Singaporeans very adroitly, I
    think, offered us facilities in Singapore to station some of
    our forces. We continue to have rotational forces in Singapore.
    Singapore also hosts a Navy logistics command.
        I think we need to encourage Singapore to cooperate more
    closely, possibly to host more rotational forces, while
    recognizing the limitation that Singapore's instinct to balance
    the U.S. and China is. I think we need to push the envelope,
    but we don't know how far we can go yet.
        Mr. Barr. Which ASEAN country is most likely to be a
    candidate in the future to join the Quad?
        Mr. Shear. With regards to partnership with the Quad, I
    think we should put priority on the Philippines, Vietnam,
    Singapore, and Indonesia. In fact, I think we should put
    priority on those four countries in all of our approaches to
    ASEAN and Southeast Asia.
        I think the Philippines may be more likely, in the long
    run, perhaps after President Duterte leaves, to cooperate with
    the Quad. I think we can elicit gradual, incremental
    cooperation from Vietnam and Singapore.
        But we are going to have to be patient, we are going to
    have to settle for incremental steps, and we are going to have
    to be adept in the way in which we propose these activities to
    the Southeast Asians----
        Mr. Bera. I was just going to say, the gentleman's time has
    expired.
        Mr. Barr. Thank you.
        Mr. Bera. I appreciate the Ambassador's thoughts.
        And let me recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    having this hearing.
        And thank you to our witnesses, all thoughtful.
        Mr. Sobolik, just real quickly, you said there were three
    major events that, sort of, influenced the attitude toward the
    United States in the Southeast Asia region. The first was our
    withdrawal from Vietnam after that costly war. Remind us what
    the other two were.
        Mr. Sobolik. With pleasure, Congressman. Thank you so much
    for asking. The other two were the Asian financial crisis in
    1997----
        Mr. Connolly. Yep.
        Mr. Sobolik [continuing]. And our delayed response to
    China's reclamation and militarization of fake islands in the
    South China Sea.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
        So I guess I would say--and I am going to ask Ambassador
    Shear and Ms. Miller to respond--that I find that list, while
    certainly important--to me, one of the most pivotal decisions
    that has affected in recent time our relations throughout this
    region was the, to me, catastrophic decision to renounce our
    own negotiated trade agreement, the TPP, which would have
    undergirded 40 percent of the world's economic trade and would
    have anchored these countries in a relationship with the United
    States.
        By renouncing it, we basically left them to the tender,
    loving mercies of China, which quickly filled the vacuum. And I
    think that is one of the most consequential decisions of the
    previous President, which is going to have huge ramifications
    going forward.
        Ambassador Shear, your reaction and your analysis of the
    fallout from the renouncement of our own treaty, the TPP?
        Ambassador Shear, you are muted.
        Ambassador Shear, we can't hear you. And you need to----
        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr. Connolly. Ambassador Shear, you need to speak up.
        Mr. Shear. Thank you, Congressman. Can you hear me now?
        Mr. Connolly. Yes.
        Mr. Shear. I agree that withdrawal from the TPP was a
    mistake. As I said in my Statement, I think it was a blunder. I
    can say that with great confidence, I think, from the strategic
    perspective. I am not an economist, but I know that the
    strategic argument had great appeal to the Southeast Asians. It
    had great appeal particularly to the Vietnamese.
        I made the strategic argument to the Vietnamese when I was
    Ambassador as they were considering whether or not they would
    join the TPP. I think it had a decisive effect on the
    Vietnamese decision to join the TPP, in addition to all of the
    economic benefits that they would reap from the agreement.
        So, when we pulled out of the TPP, the Vietnamese felt like
    they had had the rug pulled out from under them. And they made
    that pretty clear to me, who had borne so much responsibility
    for getting them in in the first place.
        Mr. Connolly. And Ms. Miller?
        Ms. Miller. Thank you, Congressman Connolly.
        I agree with everything that Ambassador Shear said. I
    think, particularly in the case of Vietnam, a fair amount of
    political capital was expended domestically to come up to the
    standards of the TPP agreement, particularly on labor, and the
    U.S. withdrawal was seen as a real blow.
        Malaysia has also not yet ratified CPTPP. I think the
    withdrawal of the United States was also something that caused
    them to reevaluate their participation, and also the commitment
    of the United States in the trade arena.
        So, just very briefly, I think that is one of the obstacles
    that we would have to getting back in. First is getting our
    domestic house in order and building political will here. But,
    second, you know, we would have some challenges, I think, in
    convincing our partners in the region that we are serious, if
    and when we decide to return to the table.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Sobolik, I know you want to comment.
        Mr. Sobolik. Congressman Connolly, thank you so much.
        I echo the sentiments and concerns of Ambassador Shear and
    Ms. Miller. I think it was a sad message that we sent to our
    friends, allies, and partners, who, as my colleagues have said,
    put a lot on the line to get an agreement of that magnitude to
    the level that it reached. And then to pull out when we did did
    not send a good message at all, strategically.
        Mr. Connolly. And do you think it is fair, Mr. Sobolik, to
    say the Chinese have been able to exploit the vacuum we created
    by that renouncement?
        Mr. Sobolik. They have certainly tried, and I think that
    they have had some success in trying. China has proven itself
    to be very adept at stepping in when we shoot ourselves in the
    foot, particularly in Southeast Asia, and they have certainly
    done it here.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentlelady from California,
    Congresswoman Kim.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman Bera, and I
    also would like to thank our Ranking Member Chabot.
        And thank you, our witnesses, for joining us today.
        You know, given the rising challenges and threats posed by
    competition with the People's Republic of China and our shift
    toward prioritizing focus on the Indo-Pacific, our
    relationships with the nations of Southeast Asia are crucial
    toward securing regional stability and economic prosperity.
        And, to that end, I appreciate the witnesses' comments that
    it is a strategic benefit to the United States to trade with
    Asian partners and strengthen security alliance and assurance
    to our partners by easing their trade reliance on PRC. I
    couldn't agree more. The U.S. should seek to strengthen its
    bilateral and multilateral trade relationships with Southeast
    Asian nations to pave the way for future regional cooperation.
        Furthermore, I believe our country must revisit the CPTPP
    trade agreement and opportunities for the U.S. to rejoin the
    framework, which passed Administrations both Republican-and
    Democrat-led in negotiating.
        So let me pose the question to Mr. Sobolik. Would you
    advocate an effort for the United States to rejoin or join
    CPTPP? And how should we view China's request to join the
    agreement versus Taiwan's?
        And, further--let me just throw it all in here--could you
    please compare and contrast the benefits of a potential digital
    trade agreement to U.S. involvement in this CPTPP? And to what
    extent would such an agreement be enforceable and easier to
    accomplish than a more comprehensive trade agreement such as
    CPTPP?
        Mr. Sobolik. Representative Kim, thank you so much for
    those highly important questions.
        First off, I will preface with saying I am not a practicing
    economist, but, strategically, I think there would have been
    immense value to join what was then TPP. It alleviated--or
    could have alleviated one of the greatest strategic challenges
    that ASEAN and its member States had, and, strategically, it
    was quite sad that we walked away from the agreement.
        Again, purely on strategic merits, I think that there is a
    lot of justification for reviewing and reassessing that
    decision. I am not saying that as an economist, necessarily,
    but, strategically, ample, ample reason to revisit.
        On your question of Taiwan, yet again we are seeing Beijing
    box out Taipei. They have done it at the World Health
    Organization to great effect. They have done it at
    international aviation institutions. They are doing it here yet
    again. And this has to be one of the biggest priorities we
    have, to not look at Taiwan just as an East Asian problem but
    to recognize the overlaps that our interests with Taiwan have
    in Southeast Asia too.
        Your question on digital, admittedly, because I am not a
    practicing economist, I don't want to purport to get too deep
    into that, but I am happy to do some research and circle back
    with you if that would be helpful.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Sure. Thanks for your perspectives.
        You know, let me next move on to our approach to human
    rights versus trade and security interests in Southeast Asia.
        Mr. Sobolik, the question to you again: How big an obstacle
    are current human-rights conditions in Southeast Asia to
    broadening the U.S. economic and security engagement with the
    region? And how large a priority are human rights to current
    U.S. policy in Southeast Asia? And what are the implications of
    Burma's February 1st coup d'etat for broader U.S.-Southeast
    Asia relations?
        Mr. Sobolik. Representative Kim, not just a good question
    but an important one.
        In Southeast Asia, we have to approach economic interests
    and human-rights concerns, both hands, simultaneously. I think
    the Administration is wrong to do that with China, which I see
    as fundamentally an adversary, but with friends and partners in
    Southeast Asia, I think there is a lot of room to discuss and
    work on both of those issues at the same time, which I think is
    going to be necessary.
        Burma, we have to send a stronger message than we have,
    though good steps have been taken by the Administration. And I
    know Congress is considering legislation on this effort as
    well. We need to make it difficult for the Tatmadaw to access
    their dollarized accounts anywhere with banks in the world. We
    have to get tougher on sanctions, and we have to do it fast.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
        Oops. I am running out of time, so I will yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentlelady from Virginia,
    Congresswoman Spanberger, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        I really appreciate our witnesses' being with us here
    today.
        And, Ambassador Shear, I would like to focus my questions
    toward you at first, you know, recognizing that to realize so
    many of the opportunities that we have talked about today, to
    build the resilience against the challenges we face, whether
    from foreign countries or threats like climate change, we, the
    United States, need a strong American diplomatic presence in
    Southeast Asia. And, in addition to speaking local languages
    and really understanding local culture, it is also very
    important for our diplomats to have the right tools.
        So, Mr. Ambassador, I want to first thank you for your
    service in our diplomatic corps. And I would like to open the
    question up with, how do you think the State Department should
    or could or ought to update and/or bolster the Department's
    capacities and capabilities in Southeast Asia, particularly
    given some of the challenges that my colleagues have discussed
    with you all, the challenges and the opportunities that exist
    at this day and age?
        Mr. Shear. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Spanberger.
    And, as a retired Foreign Service officer, I agree that that is
    a very topical and important question.
        First of all, as I Stated in my Statement, we need to get
    our Ambassadors out there. Ambassadors are the people on the
    ground who are in the best place to identify opportunities and
    to cooperate with like-minded partner and allied embassies in
    pursuing those opportunities. I did that as Ambassador with
    Vietnam, particularly with the Australian and Japanese
    embassies, well before the overall trilateral relationship
    among us started to develop, well before we revived the Quad.
        So Ambassadors are critical in getting us to identify the
    opportunities and coordinating interagency as well. It is much
    easier to coordinate the interagency in an embassy than it is
    in Washington. So I think Ambassadors can be very agile, and
    they need to be encouraged to do so by the State Department.
        Second----
        Ms. Spanberger. Mr. Ambassador, if I could just interrupt
    you right there. So I am a former CIA case officer, so I am
    very familiar with what you mean by ``the interagency.'' Could
    you just give a little bit of an explanation in terms of,
    particularly given the challenges that exist in Southeast Asia,
    the real value of having all the folks at the embassy, who they
    are, the color and the flavor, why that matters so much, to
    have the Ambassador leading those discussions?
        Mr. Shear. Because the Ambassador is the representative
    of--the personal representative of the President in that
    country, and the Ambassador is really the best person to do
    what is necessary to encourage separate agencies housed in the
    embassy to work together to cooperate, to do what we need to do
    to come together as a country team and get done what we need to
    get done.
        And I think that we did that in getting the Vietnamese to--
    when I was in Vietnam, getting the Vietnamese to agree to join
    TPP talks. We did it in encouraging the Vietnamese to expand
    military-to-military cooperation. And we did it with the
    Vietnamese in conjunction with AID and our CDC office in Hanoi
    to increase Vietnamese capability to respond to pandemics, for
    example--in my case, H5N1.
        But all of these are--and pursue commercial opportunities
    as well. We did that with GE. We did it with Boeing. We did it
    with Dow Chemical.
        All of those require whole-of-embassy efforts, and, as I
    say, it is a lot easier to coordinate in an embassy than it is
    in Washington.
        Ms. Spanberger. Sure.
        Mr. Shear. It is a lot easier to take initiatives as well.
        Ms. Spanberger. And you have served at the Department of
    Defense as well. And I think, arguably, the U.S. military has a
    stronger track record for really investing and training its
    personnel. And, certainly, that also--Congress is involved in
    those decisionmakings as they relate to funding.
        But, I think, what would be your comments related to, if
    the Department were more consistently able to invest in the
    training of its foreign and civil service officers, how would
    that better enable stronger diplomatic engagement in regions
    across the world but particularly in Southeast Asia?
        Mr. Shear. The Department has minimal training
    opportunities for midlevel and senior officers, and they need
    to be expanded.
        Foreign Service officers get most of their training on the
    job. Fortunately, there are dedicated, strong officers in the
    Foreign Service who are willing to mentor younger officers, but
    that is not--that is significant, but it is not sufficient.
        The State Department needs to establish a training--it
    needs to expand the number of personnel so that it can train
    people more effectively. And they need to do it not only in
    terms of language and area studies; they need to do it in terms
    of strategy. They need to give Foreign Service officers a good,
    strong background in American diplomatic history. We have a
    great tradition of diplomacy in this country, and our Foreign
    Service officers need to be more aware of it.
        Finally, I think we need--and this is a prominent issue--we
    need to strengthen diversity in the State Department. In
    Southeast Asia, we need to show our best face to the Southeast
    Asians, and that has to be a diverse mix.
        Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Ambassador Shear.
        And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me run over with
    my time. I yield back. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you.
        Let me now recognize the gentlelady from North Carolina,
    Congresswoman Manning, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Manning. Thank you, Chairman Bera and Ranking Member
    Chabot, for holding this very important hearing.
        And thank you to all of our witnesses for appearing today.
        Clearly, Southeast Asia is critically important for the
    United States in light of the intense competition we are seeing
    with China.
        I want to go back to a topic that we have been discussing
    at great length, and that is the terrible blunder that it was
    for the Trump Administration to walk away from the TPP.
        And I wonder, Ambassador Shear, if you could talk to us
    about whether you think the admission of China--because we have
    talked about their application. Would the admission of China to
    the CPTPP weaken the ability of the CPTPP to accomplish many of
    the things that we were hoping to accomplish when the Obama
    Administration worked so hard to create the TPP?
        Ambassador Shear?
        Mr. Shear. Sorry, Congresswoman, you broke up on me a
    little, but I understand your question to be related to our
    rejoining of the TPP and the awkwardness the Chinese bid for
    membership in that has caused us.
        My sense is that Chinese application for membership in the
    TPP has placed particularly the Japanese in a tough spot. And
    my guess is that, given the likely lack of consensus within the
    TPP itself on Chinese membership, that the Japanese will delay
    a decision on that. That should give us a window of opportunity
    for trying to restore the prestige and the authority we have
    lost on this process and consider rejoining the TPP.
        Ms. Manning. Great. Thank you.
        I want to ask about a different area. And, Ambassador
    Shear, this is for you also. I hope you can still hear me.
        Many countries in the region, including Indonesia and the
    Philippines, have faced significant challenges from the spread
    of religious extremism and terrorism. What level of threat to
    the region and to the United States does this constitute? And
    how is the United States cooperating with our partners to
    reduce extremism in Southeast Asia and any attendant risk?
        Mr. Shear. Well, I think terrorism continues to represent a
    serious threat throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in the
    Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. We have
    established strong cooperative relationships with each of these
    countries, both within the intelligence community and with DOD
    and the State Department. And I am sure that, even as our
    strategic priorities shift, that we will continue close
    cooperation on counterterrorism with these countries.
        I was in Kuala Lumpur from 2005 to 2008, and I have to say
    that the two closest elements of our relationship with Malaysia
    were the trade relationship and the counterterror relationship.
    So I am confident we can carry through.
        And, of course, we have had a presence in the Philippines
    conducting counterterror operations in the past, and I think
    that has strongly enhanced our say in Manila on the need to
    preserve this relationship, not only in terms of
    counterterrorism but across the board, particularly in defense
    relations.
        Ms. Manning. Thank you.
        Ms. Miller, I want to talk a little bit about the supply
    chain issue. Actually, I want to talk about the companies that
    are moving out of China due to trade instability, sanctions, or
    other geopolitical concerns.
        How have our partners in Southeast Asia benefited from this
    development? And what can we in the United States do to
    encourage more companies and industries to move out of China to
    some of the other countries we have been talking about?
        Ms. Miller. Thank you very much, Representative Manning,
    for your question.
        Southeast Asian countries have benefited from supply chain
    shifts, some countries more than others. Vietnam, Malaysia, the
    Philippines, and, to a certain degree, Indonesia have become
    attractive destinations.
        All of these countries, to varying degrees, face challenges
    in building out their infrastructure to absorb some of the
    additional investment from U.S. companies, in building human
    capacity, and in strengthening their overall supply chain
    security measures to be fully integrated with the global
    economy.
        I think one of the ways that we could help with this is by
    reengaging, as we have been discussing, on CPTPP and helping to
    build strong business environments that provide good market
    access for U.S. companies and strong legal and investment
    frameworks.
        And we can also work with our partners in the region to
    engage them in some of the important conversations the Biden
    Administration is having about overall supply chain security in
    light of, in particular, some of the shocks to the system from
    COVID-19 as well as China's rise.
        Ms. Manning. Thanks so much.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Bera. Yes?
        Mr. Chabot. Yes, it is Mr. Chabot. As the ranking member of
    the committee, I just want to clarify for the record, the
    previous questioner accurately Stated that President Trump
    pulled out of TPP, but I would note for the record that both
    candidate Trump and candidate Hillary Clinton both said that is
    what they would have done if they won. Trump won. Hillary did
    not. So he pulled out. She would have done the same thing,
    according to her own Statement, just to set the record
    straight.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
        And I really do want to--let me take a moment to make a
    closing Statement. I certainly will give the ranking member a
    chance to make a closing Statement.
        I want to thank the witnesses for emphasizing the
    importance of Southeast Asia, the importance of ASEAN. Some of
    the leading countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam,
    obviously Singapore. And we really do have some opportunities
    coming up with the ASEAN Summit this fall. I think the
    Administration can show leadership as they engage.
        And I think Congress has a real role here. I think one of
    the witnesses talked about the importance of Members traveling
    to the region. One of my last trips pre-pandemic was leading a
    codel to Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. We had a
    chance to visit some of our special operators there. And,
    really, many of these countries, Malaysia in particular, rarely
    get codels, and the access we got from this young, struggling
    democracy, it is incredibly important.
        So it is my hope, as chair, hopefully sooner than later, to
    lead a codel to the region, to Indonesia, to Vietnam, and
    elsewhere in the region. Because, again, I think it is
    important at this particular moment in time for us to emphasize
    that the United States sees ASEAN, sees the region as just not
    a pawn in a power competition but as a real area of opportunity
    for growth and engagement.
        So, with that, again, I want to thank the witnesses who
    are, you know, emphasizing the region. And let me give the
    ranking member a moment to make any closing Statements.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
        Going forward, getting our partnership with Southeast Asia
    right is going to be absolutely critical. Southeast Asia and
    the Indo-Pacific as a whole, really, are only going to grow in
    importance over the next generation, both in their own right--
    it has over half the world's population there, as we know--and
    because China, obviously, is located there, our chief
    geopolitical competitor into the foreseeable future.
        With that in mind, I think this has been a very good
    hearing. I thought all three of the panelists were excellent
    and did a great job in answering our questions. And I think the
    discussion that we had shows that Congress, or at least this
    subcommittee, really does care about and is truly invested in
    our relationship with Southeast Asia.
        And that is important, because, as we seek to convince the
    region that America is a reliable and lasting partner--and that
    is particularly challenging in the wake of Afghanistan, which
    was, I think, a blunder of epic proportions--that it is
    substantive engagement like we have seen today that is going to
    really demonstrate that we mean what we say.
        So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, and
    thank you to all three of our panelists, who, as I said, I
    thought did an excellent job. And I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you.
        And, again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating
    in this very important virtual hearing.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned and you have a virtual
    gavel banging down. So thank you, everyone.
        [Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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