[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
POWER STRUGGLE: EXAMINING THE 2021 TEXAS
GRID FAILURE
=======================================================================
VIRTUAL HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-17
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-582PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
ANNA G. ESHOO, California Ranking Member
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado FRED UPTON, Michigan
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
KATHY CASTOR, Florida DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
JERRY McNERNEY, California H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
PAUL TONKO, New York BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York BILLY LONG, Missouri
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
TONY CARDENAS, California MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
RAUL RUIZ, California RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
SCOTT H. PETERS, California TIM WALBERG, Michigan
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Vice NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
Chair JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California DEBBBIE LESKO, Arizona
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia GREG PENCE, Indiana
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware DAN CRENSHAW, Texas
DARREN SOTO, Florida JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
KIM SCHRIER, Washington
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
------
Professional Staff
JEFFREY C. CARROLL, Staff Director
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Deputy Staff Director
NATE HODSON, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
Chair
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York Ranking Member
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
PAUL TONKO, New York DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
RAUL RUIZ, California BILLY LONG, Missouri
SCOTT H. PETERS, California, Vice NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
Chair JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
KIM SCHRIER, Washington GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona (ex officio)
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Colorado, opening statement................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Virginia, opening statement.................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, prepared statement............................. 7
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Marc A. Veasey, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Texas, prepared statement................................... 9
Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Washington, opening statement..................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Witnesses
Sylvester Turner, Mayor, City of Houston......................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Answers to submitted questions............................... 189
Bill Magness, President and Chief Executive Officer, Electric
Reliability Council of Texas................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Answers to submitted questions \1\
Christi Craddick, Chairman, Railroad Commission of Texas......... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Answers to submitted questions............................... 192
Michael D. Shellenberger, Founder and President, Environmental
Progress....................................................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Answers to submitted questions............................... 197
James B. Robb, President and Chief Executive Officer, North
American Electric Reliability Corporation...................... 44
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Answers to submitted questions............................... 199
Submitted Material
Letter of March 4, 2021, from Mr. Pallone, et al., to Bill
Magness, President and Chief Executive Officer, Electric
Reliability Council of Texas, submitted by Ms. DeGette......... 95
Letter of March 18, 2021, from Bill Magness, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, to
Mr. Pallone, et al., submitted by Ms. DeGette.................. 99
Letter of February 19 2021,from Mr. Pallone, et al., to Governor
Greg Abbott, submitted by Ms. DeGette.......................... 116
Letter of March 19, from Luis Saenz, Chief of Staff, Office of
the Governor, to Mr. Pallone, et al., submitted by Ms. DeGette. 121
----------
\1\ Mr. Magness' response to submitted questions for the record has
been retained in committee files and is available at https://
docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20210324/111365/HHRG-117-IF02-Wstate-
MagnessB-20210324-SD004.pdf.
Report, ``Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event--
ERCOT Presentation,'' by Bill Magness, President and Chief
Executive Officer, ERCOT, submitted by Ms. DeGette............. 132
Chart, ``Supply Side: ERCOT Energy Sources in 2020,'' ERCOT,
submitted by Ms. DeGette....................................... 155
Report, ERCOT Charts by Prof. Mack Grady and Dr. Andrew Mattei,
Texas Synchorphasor Network, Baylor University, submitted by
Mr. Griffith................................................... 156
Article of March 18, 2021, ``Texas power crisis prompts Texas
House panel to advance several bills, including one requiring
plants to prep for extreme weather,'' by Erin Douglas, Texas
Tribune, submitted by Mr. Burgess.............................. 157
Texas House Bill No. 10, submitted by Mr. Burgess................ 160
Texas House Bill No. 11, submitted by Mr. Burgess................ 164
Texas House Bill No. 12, submitted by Mr. Burgess................ 167
Texas House Bill No. 13, submitted by Mr. Burgess................ 173
Texas House Bill No. 16, submitted by Mr. Burgess................ 177
Texas House Bill No. 17, submitted by Mr. Burgess................ 178
Commentary of March 19, 2021, ``Texas' Blackouts Blew In on the
Wind,'' by Wayne Christian, Wall Street Journal, submitted by
Mr. Joyce...................................................... 180
Blog post of September 30, 2020, ``Clean Energy Is Canceling Gas
Plants,'' by Molly Keleher, et al., RMI, submitted by Mr.
Crenshaw....................................................... 183
POWER STRUGGLE: EXAMINING THE 2021 TEXAS GRID FAILURE
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2021
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., via
Cisco Webex online video conferencing, Hon. Diana DeGette
(chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives DeGette, Kuster, Rice,
Schakowsky, Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, Schrier, Trahan, O'Halleran,
Pallone (ex officio), Griffith (subcommittee ranking member),
Burgess, McKinley, Long, Dunn, Joyce, Palmer, and Rodgers (ex
officio).
Also present: Representatives Castor, Fletcher, Veasey, and
Crenshaw.
Staff present: Mohammad Aslami, Counsel; Kevin Barstow,
Chief Oversight Counsel; Jeffrey C. Carroll, Staff Director;
Austin Flack, Policy Analyst; Waverly Gordon, General Counsel;
Tiffany Guarascio, Deputy Staff Director; Perry Hamilton,
Clerk; Judy Harvey, Counsel; Anne Marie Hirschberger, FERC
Detailee; Chris Knauer, Oversight Staff Director; Mackenzie
Kuhl, Digital Assistant; Jon Monger, Counsel; Elysa Montfort,
Press Secretary; Kaitlyn Peel, Digital Director; Peter Rechter,
Counsel; Chloe Rodriguez, Clerk; Nikki Roy, Policy Coordinator;
Benjamin Tabor, Junior Professional Staff Member; Sarah Burke,
Minority Deputy Staff Director; Diane Cutler, Minority
Detailee, Oversight and Investigations; Theresa Gambo, Minority
Financial and Office Administrator; Marissa Gervasi, Minority
Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Brittany Havens,
Minority Professional Staff Member, Oversight and
Investigations; Nate Hodson, Minority Staff Director; Peter
Kielty, Minority General Counsel; Emily King, Minority Member
Services Director; Bijan Koohmaraie, Minority Chief Counsel;
Clare Paoletta, Minority Policy Analyst, Health; Olivia
Shields, Minority Communications Director; Alan Slobodin,
Minority Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight and
Investigations; Michael Taggert, Minority Policy Director; and
Everett Winnick, Minority Director of Information Technology.
Ms. DeGette. The Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations hearing will now come to order.
Today the committee is holding a hearing entitled, ``Power
Struggle: Examining the 2021 Texas Grid Failure.'' Today's
hearing will examine the causes and consequences of Texas'
electric grid failure last month due to severe winter weather.
Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, today's
hearing is being held remotely. All Members, witnesses, and
staff will be participating via video conferencing. And as part
of our proceeding, microphones will be set on mute for the
purpose of eliminating inadvertent background noise.
Members and witnesses, as we've seen already in the
presession, will need to unmute your microphone every time you
want to speak. And if at any time during the hearing I'm unable
to chair the hearing, the vice chair of the subcommittee, Mr.
Peters, will serve as chair until I return.
Documents for the record can be sent to Austin Flack at the
email address we've provided to your staff. All documents will
be entered into the record at the conclusion of the hearing,
and the Chair now recognizes herself for the purposes of an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO
Last month an extreme weather event in Texas triggered a
crisis of an enormous scale and took a staggering toll on the
State. While State and local and Federal officials are trying
to decide exactly why the electric grid failed, some of the
contributing factors are already becoming clear. For instance,
we know that the power sources were not adequately winterized.
This caused the power supply to falter just as constituents
were demanding more electricity to counter the cold as the
storm swept across Texas.
To preserve the stability of the system, the grid's
operator initiated power outages to reduce energy demand,
reportedly avoiding a cascading blackout by mere minutes.
[Audio malfunction] unfortunately lasted for 5 days.
As many as 4 million customers lost power, and many more
struggled to get food or access to safe drinking water. At one
point an estimated 14 million people were under boil water
notices. Even hospitals had to make do with limited water and
power. Tragically, people resorted to dangerous and sometimes
fatal methods to stay warm.
At least 57 Texans lost their lives, some dying from carbon
monoxide poisoning or hypothermia in their own homes. And,
though power has been restored, life has not returned to normal
for many in the State. Many Texans are now confronting the
extensive damage caused by water pipes that froze, ruptured,
and flooded homes and businesses.
Adding further misery, the crisis also wreaked havoc on the
price of electricity, with prices soaring to the maximum
permitted under State law. This left many Texans with sky-high
power bills, some totaling in the thousands just for a few days
of power.
And while the storm impacted millions, this event appears
to have been particularly harmful to low-income individuals.
Sadly, people with the least are often hit the hardest by
disasters, as many even lack basic financial safety nets to
endure the events that they ever can recover from.
The massive scope of economic harm to Texas, while still
coming into focus, could be as high as nearly $300 billion,
which is more than Hurricanes Harvey and Ike combined.
Unfortunately, weather events like this are no longer a
surprise. Every year we seem to break new climate records and
see more frequent extreme weather events. Catastrophic storms,
floods, and fires, once considered rare, have now become the
norm. The Houston region, as Mayor Turner will tell us, has
faced multiple catastrophic weather events over a very short
period of time, including Hurricane Harvey, which inundated the
city with more than 51 inches of rain.
In the Mountain West, wildfires are larger, and the
wildfire season goes even longer. In California, wildfires have
resulted in widespread power outages, a topic on which this
committee held a hearing in January 2020. In Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017
caused unprecedented devastation and the longest electricity
blackout in U.S. history.
Mr. Griffith and I traveled to that region, along with Mr.
Pallone and many of our other colleagues, to examine the impact
that those storms had on the islands' healthcare system and
electricity grid, an issue that this subcommittee held a
hearing on in April of 2018. These are just some of the most
recent extreme weather events.
As the Energy and Commerce Committee, it's our duty to
examine crises like these and to try to explore ways that we
can prevent the massive damage they're causing. Hearings like
that we're having today are essential if we're going to learn
to adapt to a changing climate and to increase the resiliency
of our Nation's grid.
What happened in Texas makes clear that extreme weather
events can affect all forms of energy, including coal, wind,
natural gas, and even nuclear. And while the focus today is
greatly on Texas, the testimony we will hear will also provide
insights applicable to reliability risk in all parts of our
country.
Which brings me to my broadest point. The key lesson from
what happened in Texas is that extreme weather events are
devastating and happening more frequently. We need to accept
this fact and prepare. We need to stop kicking the can down the
road.
Adapting and confronting to a changing climate will not
come cheap, and it will not come easily. But if we don't do
anything, we will continue to incur huge losses in human lives,
property damages, and threats to our power supply. Climate
change is here, and we need to recognize this reality by taking
action to ensure our electric grids are designed with the
resiliency and reliability that we need in a climate-changed
world.
So I want to conclude by thanking our witnesses for being
here, because I know all of you are just up to your eyeballs in
dealing with this crisis, and it means a lot to this committee
that you took the time.
I also want to thank the leadership of two of our
colleagues, Representatives Fletcher and Veasey, who have been
tireless advocates for their constituents in this time of
crisis.
I'm looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Diana DeGette
Last month's extreme weather event in Texas triggered a
crisis of an enormous scale and took a staggering toll on
Texans.
While State and Federal officials are working to determine
exactly why the electric grid failed, some of the contributing
factors are already becoming clear.
For instance, we know that power sources were not
adequately winterized. This caused the power supply to falter
just as consumers were demanding more electricity to counter
the cold as the storm swept across Texas.
To preserve the stability of the system, the grid's
operator initiated power outages to reduce energy demand--
reportedly avoiding a cascading blackout by mere minutes.
Outages that were supposed to be temporary ended up lasting for
days.
As many as 4 million customers lost power, and many more
struggled to get food or access to safe drinking water. At one
point, as estimated 14 million people were under boil water
notices. Even hospitals had to make do with limited water and
power.
Tragically, people resorted to dangerous and sometimes
fatal methods to stay warm. At least 57 Texans lost their
lives--some dying from carbon monoxide poisoning or hypothermia
in their own homes.
And though power has been restored, life has not returned
to normal for many in the State. Many Texans are now
confronting the extensive damage caused by water pipes that
froze, ruptured, and flooded homes and businesses.
Adding further misery, the crisis also wreaked havoc on the
price of electricity, with prices soaring to the maximum
permitted under State law. This left many Texans with sky-high
power bills, some totaling in the thousands for a few days of
power.
And while the storm impacted millions, this event appears
to have been particularly harmful to many low-income
individuals. Those without resources are often hit hardest by
disasters, as many lack even a basic financial safety net to
endure the event or recover.
The massive scope of economic harm to Texas, while still
coming into focus, could be as high as nearly $300 billion,
which is more than Hurricanes Harvey and Ike combined.
Unfortunately, weather events like this are no longer a
surprise.
Each year, we seem to break new climate records and see
more frequent extreme weather events. Catastrophic storms,
floods, and fires, once considered rare, have become routine.
The Houston region--as Mayor Turner will tell us--has faced
multiple catastrophic weather events over a very short period,
including Hurricane Harvey, which inundated the city with more
than 51 inches of rain.
In the Mountain West, wildfires are larger, and the
wildfire season goes longer.
In California, wildfires have resulted in widespread power
outages, a topic on which we held a hearing in January 2020.
In Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, Hurricanes Irma
and Maria in 2017 caused unprecedented devastation and the
longest electricity blackout in U.S. history.
Mr. Griffith and I traveled to that region with many of our
colleagues to examine the impacts those storms had on the
islands' healthcare system and electricity grid--an issue we
held a hearing on in April of 2018.
These are just some of the more recent extreme weather
events. As the Energy and Commerce Committee, it is our duty to
examine crises like these and explore ways to prevent the
massive damages they are causing.
Hearings like we are having today are crucial if we are
going to learn to adapt to a changing climate and increase the
resiliency of our Nation's power grid. What happened in Texas
makes clear that extreme weather events can affect all forms of
energy, including coal, wind, natural gas, and even nuclear.
And while our focus today is rightfully on Texas, the
testimony we will hear will also provide insights applicable to
reliability risks in other parts of the country.
Which brings me to my broadest point. The key lesson from
what happened in Texas is that extreme weather events are
devastating--and happening more frequently. We need to accept
this fact and prepare.
We must quit kicking this can down the road.
Adapting and confronting a changing climate will not come
cheap or come easy. But if we do nothing, we will only continue
to incur huge losses in human lives, property damage, and
threats to our power supply.
Climate change is here, and we need to recognize this
reality by taking action to ensure our electric grids are
designed with the resiliency and reliability needed in a
climate-changed world.
So, let me conclude by thanking our witnesses for being
here today. Let me also take a moment to recognize the
leadership of two of my colleagues, Representative Fletcher and
Representative Veasey, who have been tireless advocates for
their constituents throughout this crisis.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. Thank
you.
Ms. DeGette. And with that, I'm pleased to recognize our
ranking member, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes for purposes of an
opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. H.MORGAN GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Chairwoman DeGette.
And I would be remiss if I didn't recognize our Texans on
the committee. We have Dr. Burgess, who I'll yield to in a few
minutes, and Dan Crenshaw, who are going to participate in
today's hearing. And they have been working very hard for the
people of Texas in this disaster situation as well.
I appreciate you holding this hearing on the challenges
that we're facing in our power grid, both in Texas and
nationally. I also want to thank the witnesses for taking the
time to join us today, and I want to extend my condolences to
all those who have suffered or died due to last month's tragic
winter storm.
Given the recent extreme weather event in Texas, it is
critical for us to examine the problems and discuss solutions
to prevent another crisis. However, it would be a mistake to
focus only on Texas when electric grids across the country have
shown vulnerability to a variety of issues and hazards.
First, other States have been and continue to be threatened
by widespread power outages due to extreme weather. The extreme
cold that brought blackouts to Texas also brought them to
Oregon, Oklahoma, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Louisiana around
the same time. These outages followed the extreme heat of last
summer, which led to rolling brownouts in California.
Valuable perspectives would be gained by studying these
types of failures across the country, especially as we discuss
weatherization and other ways to make our grid more resilient.
I believe the lessons to be drawn from these examples may be
numerous, which is why we should be inclusive in looking at
them.
Texas' problems occurred, despite the State's leadership in
achieving a diversified, all-of-the-above energy mix, which
includes coal, natural gas, nuclear, renewables, and storage
and indicates a need for better weatherization. The need for
proper planning and preparation of all hazards emphasizes the
need to broaden our scope to vulnerabilities affecting the grid
nationally and stemming from other causes, such as cyber
attacks or even physical attacks.
Our colleague Representative Soto mentioned at one of our
hearings earlier this week that a cyber attack targeted a
Florida water system in his district. And that could happen to
any of our necessary utilities.
These are all issues we should be looking into, and I know
we will. As more events occur across the country, the
importance of grid resilience is further highlighted. We must
address the energy emergencies that millions of Americans have
faced across our country, not just those in Texas.
I hope that we can look for solutions in a bipartisan way
to prevent blackouts for all Americans, since these energy
resource interdependency issues are not unique to Texas.
I now yield the rest of my time to Dr. Burgess from the
great State of Texas.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. H. Morgan Griffith
Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette, for holding this hearing on
the challenges facing our power grid, both in Texas and
nationally. I also want to thank the witnesses for taking the
time to join us today, and I want to extend my condolences to
all of those who have suffered due to last month's tragic
winter storm.
Given the recent extreme weather event in Texas, it is
crucial to examine the problems and discuss solutions to
prevent another crisis. However, it would be a mistake to focus
only on Texas when electric grids across the country have shown
vulnerability to a variety of issues and hazards.
First, other States have been and continue to be threatened
by widespread power outages due to extreme weather. The extreme
cold that brought blackouts to Texas also brought them to
Oregon, Oklahoma, Kentucky, West Virginia, and Louisiana around
the same time. These outages followed the extreme heat of last
summer which led to rolling brownouts in California. Valuable
perspectives would be gained by studying these types of
failures across the country, especially as we discuss
weatherization and other ways to make our grid more resilient.
I believe the lessons to be drawn from these examples may
be numerous, which is why we should be inclusive in looking at
them. Texas' problems occurred despite the State's leadership
in achieving a diversified, all-of-the-above energy mix which
includes coal, natural gas, nuclear, renewables, and storage,
and indicates a need for better weatherization.
The need for proper planning and preparation of all hazards
emphasizes the need to broaden our scope to vulnerabilities
affecting the grid nationally and stemming from other causes
such as cyber attacks or even physical attacks. Our colleague
Representative Soto mentioned at one of our hearings just
earlier this week the cyber attack targeted at a Florida water
system in his district that could happen to any of our
necessary utilities. These are all issues we should be looking
into.
As more events occur across the country, the importance of
grid resilience is further highlighted. We must address the
energy emergencies that millions of Americans have faced across
our country--not just those in Texas. I hope that we can look
for solutions in a bipartisan way to prevent blackouts for all
Americans since these energy resource interdependency issues
are not unique to Texas.
Thank you, Chair, and I yield the rest of my time to Dr.
Burgess from the great State of Texas.
Ms. DeGette. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Griffith, and a special thanks
to our Texans who've agreed to be on the panel today. I know
this is not an easy task and certainly want to welcome Mayor
Turner, as well as Bill Magness from the Electric Reliability
Council of Texas and Commissioner Christi Craddick who made a
special effort to be here today, and look forward to hearing
from all of you.
So our crisis in Texas--although it was nationwide, in
Texas it was tragic. There were blackouts. And it impacted over
5 million Americans across Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and
other States. Lives were lost, livelihoods were ruined, and our
faith in the electric system was shaken. Americans, Texans, are
angry and deserve answers.
Unfortunately, we cannot overlook the fact that this is
only the latest in a number of tragedies. In recent years
similar events have occurred in California and the Northeast
and indeed Texas. While the causes of each blackout are unique,
the results are the same: suffering and economic disruption.
This committee has direct jurisdiction over much of the energy
sector and has a responsibility to address many of the
shortcomings in the electrical system.
I would like to express my support and appreciation for the
work done at the State level of Texas. This is our first
hearing. The events occurred 5 weeks ago, but the State House
in Texas, the State Senate in Texas has been very active in
that timeframe. Significant criticism has been levied against
Texas, criticism against the grid operator, Public Utility
Commission. But the State legislature has already held no less
than six hearings to find answers and to bring accountability
and to make the necessary reforms.
Texans can and will solve the problem within its borders.
Let me say that again: Texans can and will solve this problem
within their borders.
Finally, I'd like to voice my strong concern about the
politicization of this crisis. No one single policy, no one
single energy source caused this crisis, and no one policy
could have prevented it. I ask my colleagues to use this
hearing to study the crisis in full. The reliability of our
country's electric supply is not a partisan priority. It is a
national priority.
Thank you for that, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess
Thank you, Ranking Member Griffith. Last month's crisis in
Texas and the surrounding region was utterly tragic. The worst
winter storm in nearly one hundred years caused blackouts that
impacted over 5 million Americans across Texas, Oklahoma, and
Louisiana, among other States. Lives were lost, livelihoods
were ruined, and our faith in our electric system was shaken.
Americans are angry and deserve answers.
Unfortunately, we cannot overlook the fact that this is
only the latest such tragedy. In recent years similar events
have occurred in California and the Northeast. While the causes
of each blackout are unique, the results are the same:
unnecessary suffering and economic disruption. This committee
has direct jurisdiction over much of the energy sector and has
a responsibility to address many shortcomings of our electric
system.
I'd also like to express my support and appreciation for
the work at the State level in Texas. Significant criticism has
been levied against my State, the grid operator, and the public
utility commission. The State legislature has already held no
less than six hearings to find answers, bring accountability,
and make necessary reforms. Texans can and will solve this
problem within its borders.
Finally, I'd like to voice my strong concern about the
politicization of this crisis. No one policy caused this crisis
and no one policy could have prevented it. I implore my
colleagues to use this hearing to study the crisis in full. The
reliability of our country's electric supply is not a partisan
priority, it's a national priority.
Thank you and I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman, and I agree with you
too.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
Today we are examining the causes of the recent widespread
power outages in Texas and how to fortify the electrical grid
against extreme weather events and climate change.
The enormity of this disaster and its aftermath can't be
overstated. At one point almost half of the generation capacity
of Texas' electricity grid was lost, causing more than 4
million homes and businesses to lose electricity. And Texans
struggled to get food, medical treatments, and safe drinking
water.
This storm resulted in extensive property damage,
unprecedented energy bills, and, most tragically, loss of life.
And the challenges brought on by this storm were particularly
acute for low-income communities which often lack the resources
to prepare for or quickly recover from the effects of extreme
weather disasters.
So today I look forward to hearing from our witnesses,
particularly from the president and CEO of the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas, or ERCOT, which functions as the
air traffic controller of the Texas energy grid, about what
went wrong and why it happened and also look forward to hearing
from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, or
NERC, on why its recommendations to weatherize the Texas grid
were not sufficiently implemented following another major storm
there 10 years ago and how we should prepare nationwide for
extreme weather events.
Indeed, these extreme weather events are becoming more and
more frequent. They're unmistakable signs that the climate is
changing and creating extreme risks. Life-threatening weather
events are happening more frequently, and we can no longer
afford to delay action. Much of today's discussion will be
about what went wrong in Texas and how to make the grid more
resilient, but we need to go one step further and tackle the
climate crisis. We need to really get our arms around these
catastrophic events.
And that's why I recently introduced the CLEAN Future Act,
comprehensive climate legislation, which would achieve net-zero
greenhouse gas pollution no later than 2050. The bill also
empowers American workers and creates millions of homegrown
jobs in a climate-resilient economy. The CLEAN Future Act,
along with our LIFT America Act, will modernize our electric
grid for the future. On Monday we held a full committee hearing
on the LIFT America Act, and this afternoon our Energy
Subcommittee will hold a legislative hearing on the CLEAN
Future Act, and these hearings, along with this oversight
hearing, are critical as we discuss solutions to help make the
grid more reliable and resilient.
And with that, I'd like to yield the remainder of my time
to two of my colleagues from Texas who have been leading from
the front lines on this--during this crisis, 1 minute each or
maybe even a little more to Representative Veasey and
Representative Fletcher. And I'll start with Marc Veasey.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Today, we are examining the causes of the recent widespread
power outages in Texas and how to fortify the electrical grid
against extreme weather events and climate change.
The enormity of this disaster and its aftermath cannot be
overstated. At one point, almost half of the generation
capacity of Texas' electric grid was lost, causing more than 4
million homes and businesses to lose electricity. Texans
struggled to get food, medical treatments, and safe drinking
water. This storm resulted in extensive property damage,
unprecedented energy bills, and, most tragically, loss of life.
The challenges brought on by this storm were particularly
acute for low-income communities, which often lack the
resources to prepare for or quickly recover from the effects of
extreme weather disasters.
Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses,
particularly from the president and CEO of the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)--which functions as the
air traffic controller of the Texas energy grid--about what
went wrong and why it happened. I also look forward to hearing
from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
on why its recommendations to weatherize the Texas grid were
not sufficiently implemented following another major storm
there 10 years ago, and how we should prepare nationwide for
extreme weather events.
Indeed, these extreme weather events are becoming more and
more frequent. They are unmistakable signals that the climate
is changing and creating extreme risks. Life-threatening
weather events are happening more frequently, and we can no
longer afford to delay action.
While much of today's discussion will be about what went
wrong in Texas and how to make the grid more resilient, we need
to go one step further and tackle the climate crisis if we are
going to really get our arms around these catastrophic events.
That's why I recently introduced the CLEAN Future Act,
comprehensive climate legislation which would achieve net-zero
greenhouse gas pollution no later than 2050. This legislation
also empowers American workers and creates millions of
homegrown jobs in a climate-resilient economy.
The CLEAN Future Act, along with our LIFT America Act, will
modernize our electric grid for the future. On Monday, we held
a full committee hearing on the LIFT America Act and this
afternoon, our Energy Subcommittee will hold a legislative
hearing on the CLEAN Future Act. These hearings, along with
this oversight hearing, are critical as we discuss solutions to
help make the grid more reliable and resilient.
Mr. Pallone. I yield to you, Marc.
Ms. DeGette. The gentleman's recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Veasey. Madam Chair, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for yielding some of your time to
me.
I want to talk with you today about something that was very
serious and just want to remind everyone that we were literally
5 minutes--less than 5 minutes--away from the entire grid
crashing. I want you to think about that, 25 to 30 million
people, the second most populous State in our Union without any
power, and how it could have been so much worse had certain
actions not been taken.
We had people that were literally sleeping inside of their
kitchens next to their stoves so they could stay warm, people
that were trying to sleep inside of their cars. We had a record
number of individuals that had to be checked into hospitals
across the State. People died because of carbon monoxide
poisoning. It was serious.
And this happened because of the neglect that the
Republicans in Austin have shown towards the grid for a very
long time now. The lack of oversight, the lack of planning,
just the approach on how this entire system is run has been
neglected for far too long.
Look, we have 57 people that died, including a little boy
that got to see snow for the first time in his life and he
wanted to go outside and play, and 24 hours later he was dead.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Veasey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marc A. Veasey
Last month, 57 Texans lost their lives and millions across
the State were left without power.
We were just seconds--yes, SECONDS--away from our entire
State's power grid from completely imploding. This could have
left me and my fellow Texans in the dark and cold for months.
Madame Chair, I want to thank you for holding today's
hearing about last month's catastrophic winter storm in Texas,
because a massive failure cannot happen again.
Last month, families across Texas were huddled under
blankets in freezing houses, hospitals struggled to keep their
lights on to help patients, Texans had limited access to water,
and shelves were barren in grocery stores.
The scenes were apocalyptic and happened because
Republicans turned their back for years on the fact that Texas'
power grid was not prepared to handle these cold temperatures.
Their lack of oversight, planning and a lack of taking a
multifaceted approach in diversifying our energy sector led to
this crisis.
Today's hearing is critical because it will examine why
this happened and call on leaders across our State to come up
with commonsense solutions so this does not happen again.
Mr. Pallone. Marc, I've got to----
Mr. Veasey. We have to do something about this, Mr.
Chairman. I apologize for going on so long.
Mr. Pallone. We have just got 30 seconds left. We want to
go to Lizzie Fletcher. Thank you, Marc.
Mrs. Fletcher. Well, thank you so much, Chairman Pallone,
for yielding to me, and Chairman DeGette and Ranking Member
Griffith for holding this hearing today.
As one of the members of this committee who lived through
the Texas winter storm without power and water, like millions
across our State, I cannot overstate the seriousness of the
cascading failures before and during this event, from the
physical markets to the financial markets, from communications
to legislation, or lack thereof, and nor can I overstate the
importance of making sure that we don't fail to respond now.
I agree with my colleague Mr. Veasey. You know, the
scientists have told us repeatedly that severe weather events
will continue to occur more frequently and more intensely in
our changing climate. And we have to be prepared. As Mr. Veasey
noted, you know, there was a little boy not far from where I
live who froze to death in his own bed. We have to learn
exactly what happened, why it happened, and what we need to do
to make sure it doesn't happen again in Texas or anywhere else.
So I thank you for holding this hearing, and I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Chair DeGette, Leader Griffith for
this hearing to examine the power failures in Texas from the
winter storm last month. I want to join in thanking the
witnesses for bringing your expertise, your advice. I want to
express my sorrow to all the families and friends who lost
loved ones during this terrible event.
It's my hope that we will focus on solutions today so that
this tragedy never happens again, not just in Texas but in
other States with dangerous energy-reliable problems too. There
should be a full accounting of what went wrong with Texas' grid
failures. We have a good idea generally of what went wrong, but
we still lack the specifics of what caused the failures.
The freezing conditions and record winter power demand in
Texas and the South Central U.S. were extremely rare. For the
sake of the Nation's energy security, the subcommittee should
be looking at what happened in Texas and, more broadly, at all
issues that threaten the resiliency of the energy grid.
Recent trends show a transition away from coal and nuclear
power plants designed to function as baseload capacity toward
variable renewable energy sources with just-in-time natural gas
backup. States like California that rely more on weather-
dependent renewables experience energy failures on a regular
basis. Indeed, California residents experience blackouts on an
ongoing annual basis as the State fails to manage summer
electricity demands and wildfire risk. These events suggest
that replacing nuclear plants with variable renewable energy
sources could make energy grids less resilient. Policies that
drive renewables at the expense of firm baseload put lives at
risk.
People are suffering, not just from power loss but
devastating storms. The frequent public safety power shutoffs
to prevent wildfires from being started by electrical equipment
during strong winds and dry weather impact people on a regular
basis. Power failures interrupt healthcare, transportation,
public safety, and the welfare of individuals, especially
seniors and those with disabilities.
We should review these events across the country with unity
and urgency on what this committee can do to strengthen the
power grid reliability and resilience. The recent crisis in
Texas is a wake-up call. While our country moves towards
integrating renewables, integration must be achieved through
diverse energy sources that include nuclear, hydropower,
natural gas, clean coal, and wind and solar.
A resilient power grid is not a one-size-fits-all
operation, and it shouldn't be imposed by DC. Texas has the
most integrated renewable energy sources of any State, but it
still didn't prevent the power failure.
The United States of America has reduced our greenhouse gas
emissions more than any other country in the last 20 years, but
this progress and the resiliency of our power grid will be put
at risk without assuring the bulk energy supply and not
overestimating the contribution of weather-dependent
renewables.
With that, I look forward to today's testimony. As a part
of the Securing Cleaner American Energy Agenda, I'm leading on
hydropower clean energy. And I've introduced legislation that
would expand this clean, renewable, reliable, and affordable
production of hydropower in America. It's part of the solution.
We could double hydropower and save billions in avoided
greenhouse emissions.
This is just one part of a diverse energy mix that we need
in the United States of America to keep the lights on and keep
our citizens safe.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Rodgers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers
INTRO
Thank you, Chair DeGette and Leader Griffith, for holding
today's hearing to examine the impact of the recent power
failure in Texas from the winter storm last month.
Thank you to the witnesses for bringing your expertise and
advice towards solutions to this ongoing problem of weather-
related power failures.
We hope no American will ever suffer harm, especially
death, because of power failures.
I want to express my sorrow to all the families and friends
who lost loved ones during this terrible event.
LOOKING BROADLY AT GRID RESILIENCY
There should be a full accounting of what went wrong with
Texas's grid failures.
We have a good idea of generally what went wrong.
But we still lack the specifics of what caused the
failures.
The freezing conditions and record winter power demand seen
throughout Texas and the south-central U.S. were extremely
rare.
For the sake of the Nation's energy security, the
subcommittee should be looking at what happened in Texas, and
more broadly at all issues that threaten the resiliency of the
energy grid.
Recent trends show a transition away from coal and nuclear
power plants, designed to function as baseload capacity, toward
variable renewable energy sources with just-in-time natural gas
back-up.
States like California that rely more on weather-dependent
renewables, regularly experience energy failures.
Indeed, California residents experience blackouts on an
ongoing, annual basis as the State fails to manage summer
electricity demand and wildfire risks.
These events suggest that attempting to replace nuclear
plants with variable renewable energy sources could make
electricity grids less resilient.
Policies that drive renewables at the expense of firm
baseload put lives at risk.
People are suffering not just from power loss from
devastating storms but from frequent ``public safety power
shutoffs'' to prevent wildfires from being started by
electrical equipment during strong winds and dry weather.
Power failures interrupt healthcare, transportation, and
impact public safety and the welfare of individuals, especially
senior citizens and those with disabilities.
We should review events across the country with a sense of
what our committee can do to support an all-hazards approach to
power grid reliability and resilience.
DIVERSE ENERGY BASE
The recent crisis in Texas is a wake-up call.
While our country moves towards integrating renewables,
integration must be achieved through diverse energy sources
that include nuclear, hydropower, natural gas, clean coal, and
wind and solar.
A resilient power grid is not a one-size-fits-all operation
imposed by Washington . . . nor should it be.
Texas has the most integrated renewable energy sources of
any State, but that still did not prevent the power failure.
The U.S. has reduced more greenhouse gas emissions than any
other country over the last twenty years.
But this progress and the resiliency of our power grid will
be put at risk without assuring the bulk energy supply and not
overestimating the contribution of weather-dependent
renewables.
Now some want to argue that Texas power failed in part
because it runs its own power grid for about 85 percent of the
State without being part of one of the two major interstate
interconnections.
However, east Texas and other States that were part of an
interconnection lost power anyway. It is not clear at all that
the interconnections would have had much power to spare to
curtail the Texas power failure.
HYDROPOWER CLEAN ENERGY FUTURE ACT
With that, I look forward to today's testimony and
continuing the conversation with my colleagues about some
legislative solutions.
As part of our Securing Cleaner American Energy Agenda, I
have reintroduced the Hydropower Clean Energy Future Act to
expand clean, renewable, reliable, and affordable hydropower
production in America, as well as to promote the innovation of
the next generation of hydroelectric technology.
If the U.S grows hydropower production from 101 gigawatts
to nearly 150 gigawatts by the year 2050, that growth could
save $209 billion in avoided greenhouse emissions according to
the Department of Energy.
Reforms in the Hydropower Clean Energy Future Act will help
the country achieve this goal and will create good-paying jobs
that can ensure our transition to a cleaner energy future.
But hydropower is only one very important part of the total
diverse energy mix that the United States must have to keep the
lights on and keep our citizens safe.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Rodgers. With that, I'd like to yield to another Texan
on our committee, Dan Crenshaw.
Ms. DeGette. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Mrs. Rodgers. Greatly appreciate
it. Greatly appreciate everyone for allowing me to be a special
guest on this hearing.
And, look, I live in an apartment here in Houston. We had
to go scoop water out of the community pool to get water for a
few days. It was a little rough. Luckily I'm used to cold
water.
Look, I hope that this will be an informed and objective
conversation about what problems we need to fix. So far I've
heard some extremely partisan rhetoric, for instance, Mr.
Veasey. That's not helpful. It's also not smart. And we're
going to spend the rest of this, what, next couple of hours, I
think, debunking some of the myths. Look, there was a baseload
problem here in Texas.
I hear about environmental justice a lot. I think we should
also talk about energy justice and reliability for that energy.
The only way you get that reliability is through baseload
energy--coal, gas, and nuclear.
Now, we can make that cleaner. We can look at carbon
capture. We could invest in nuclear, and yet none of those
investments are in any of the bills that we've seen or debated
in the last couple weeks. We're on the same page when it comes
to reducing carbon emissions and I hope everybody here
understands that, but we also need to talk about energy
justice. And I think that's a lot of points that get missed
sometimes in these discussions.
Thank you for having me on. I look forward to the
discussion.
Mrs. Rodgers. I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman and the gentlelady.
The Chair now asks unanimous consent that the Members'
written opening statements be made part of the record, and
without objection, so ordered.
I now want to introduce our witnesses for today's hearing.
And to introduce our first witness, I'd like to yield to my
colleague, Representative Fletcher, who represents Texas' 7th
Congressional District.
Mrs. Fletcher. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman.
I am proud to welcome and introduce my mayor, Mayor
Sylvester Turner, a lifelong Houstonian, a graduate of the
University of Houston--go Cougs--and Harvard Law School. Mayor
Turner has put his passion for our hometown and his skills as a
leader to work for Houstonians for decades, first in the Texas
legislature for more than 25 years and now as our mayor.
He has led our city through some of the greatest challenges
we've ever faced, from Hurricane Harvey to Winter Storm Uri
and, of course, the coronavirus pandemic. His experience with
both the legislative and regulatory matters, as well as the on-
the-ground impacts of this power disaster, make his insights
particularly useful today. And I'm so glad to welcome him to
this hearing and to introduce him to all of you.
Thank you so much. I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Congresswoman.
Our additional witnesses for today's hearing are Bill
Magness, the president and chief executive officer of the
Electric Reliability Council of Texas, ERCOT; the Honorable
Christi Craddick, Chairman of the Railroad Commission of Texas;
Michael Shellenberger, founder and president of Environmental
Progress; and James Robb, the president and chief executive
officer of North American Electric Reliability Corporation, or
NERC.
I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing before the
subcommittee today and I know you're all aware the committee is
holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so we've had
the practice of taking testimony under oath.
Does anyone here object to testifying under oath?
Let the record reflect the witnesses have responded no.
The Chair then advises you that, under the rules of the
House and the rules of the committee, you're entitled to be
accompanied by counsel.
Does anyone wish to accompanied by counsel today?
Let the record reflect the witnesses have responded no.
And so if you would, please, raise your right hand so I may
swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Let the record reflect the witnesses responded
affirmatively. And you're now under oath and subject to the
penalties set forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United
States Code.
The Chair will now recognize our witnesses for 5-minute
summaries of their written statements. As you can see, there's
a timer on your screen that counts down the time, and it turns
red when your 5 minutes have expired. And so now I will turn
first to Mayor Turner.
Mayor, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENTS OF SYLVESTER TURNER, MAYOR, CITY OF HOUSTON; BILL
MAGNESS, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS; CHRISTI CRADDICK, CHAIRMAN,
RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS; MICHAEL D. SHELLENBERGER, FOUNDER
AND PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS; AND JAMES B. ROBB,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY CORPORATION
STATEMENT OF SYLVESTER TURNER
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chair, and members of the
Energy and Commerce Committee, and thank you, Congresswoman
Fletcher, for your introduction.
In the last 6 years Houston has faced four 500-year storms
and an unprecedented winter storm. Without question, these
extreme weather events are coming with greater frequency and
greater intensity, with rising costs in damages and the loss of
life.
After the winter storm of 2011, I filed House Bill 1986
that specifically would have authorized the Public Utility
Commission to mandate ERCOT have sufficient reserves to prevent
blackouts like what occurred in 2011 and 2021. That bill was
not given a hearing. I also wrote a letter to the PUC in 2011,
specifically saying that allowing power generators to increase
their charges from a few hundred dollars per megawatt to $9,000
per megawatt when demand exceeded supply would be very costly
to the entire system.
The Texas grid was designed and constructed for the summer
heat, and policymakers bet on the belief that what happened in
2011 was an anomaly. ERCOT, the PUC, and the State leadership
intentionally chose to be dismissive of climate change and the
science associated with it. As a result, in February 2021 there
was massive statewide system failure. There was no power for
several days. Local water systems, specifically water pressure
like Houston, fell below the regulatory requirement. Boil water
notices were required. The combination of no power and low
water pressure affected hospitals, police stations, dialysis
clinics, people with special needs, and the ability of
firefighters to fight fires.
When power was restored and water pressure started to
return, we estimate 50,000 homes and 400 apartment complexes in
Houston had busted water pipes. Fifty-seven people in Texas
died from hypothermia, carbon monoxide poisoning. Some people
faced very high electricity bills.
Madam Chair and Members, the magnitude of the damages was
foreseeable and preventable. The Texas grid must be designed
with a full appreciation that climate change is real and
extreme weather events can occur throughout the year. We must
build a system that is resilient and sustainable. The current
infrastructure is outdated, and any claim that this systemwide
failure was caused primarily by the use of renewables is
blatantly false
If the Texas grid covering 90 percent of the State remains
closed, then Texas must take the necessary steps to ensure the
availability of power in times of peak demand to have a
reliable system with affordable prices to the end user, the
consumers.
On the local level, Hurricane Harvey was a game changer
that impacted the energy capital of the world, our refineries,
the Port of Houston, and our families. Putting things back
where they were would have been a failed plan. We chose a
forward-looking strategy.
In February 2020, the city adopted its Resilient Houston
plan, underwritten by Shell: 18 goals, 62 action items. On
Earth Day 2020, the city announced the Houston Climate Action
Plan and formally adopted it in December with the support of
community leaders, environmentalists, and some in the energy
sector like BP, NRG, Shell, and CenterPoint.
We are not trying to move away from the energy industry,
but we are working with them to move the energy industry
forward and for Houston to be the world leader in energy
transition. A part of the plan is to create 50 new clean energy
2.0 companies by 2025. And we are well on our way, working
directly with Greentown Labs, the Nation's largest climate-tech
incubator.
Working with NRG as of July 1st, 2020, all of the city's
facilities are 100 percent powered by renewables. And the city
is the largest municipal purchaser of renewables in the
country.
During the 1930s the city of Houston placed a 240-acre
landfill in the middle of Sunnyside, one of our oldest African-
American communities. The landfill closed in 1970, leaving a
toxic hole in the heart of Sunnyside. Working with energy
partners, there are plans to turn the former landfill into the
largest urban solar farm in the United States, estimated to
generate 50 megawatts of power, enough to power 5,000 homes,
offset 120 million pounds of carbon emissions annually, create
green jobs, and revitalize the neighborhood.
And to minimize any future blackouts, the city is adding
even more redundancy to its water and wastewater systems,
priority assets, and exploiting pilot initiatives using micro
grids, which tie in directly to the Texas grid and stays on 24/
7, never turns off.
Local governments are on the front lines, but we must have
action by all levels of government in order to address our
shared challenges or we risk being overwhelmed.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mayor.
I'm now very pleased to recognize Mr. Magness for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF BILL MAGNESS
Mr. Magness. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette, Ranking Member
Griffith, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. My
name is Bill Magness. I'm currently president and chief
executive officer of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas,
commonly known as ERCOT.
Last month's winter storms had a devastating affect on
Texas. The extended disruption of electric service to millions
of Texans during this extreme cold weather event resulted in
impacts to health and safety of many. Texans suffered
enormously during the winter storm. We can't afford for it to
happen again, and ERCOT is committed to working on solutions to
the problems we identify that led to the February outages.
Let met give you a bit of background to explain ERCOT's
role in the provision of electric power in Texas. We manage the
flow of electric power to more than 26 million Texas customers.
That's about 90 percent of the State's electric load and about
75 percent of the land mass of Texas. ERCOT does not own power
plants. We do not own poles and wires. We are the grid
operator, like air traffic control for the grid. We're also the
settlement agent for the market. We do the bookkeeping and
billing. We don't participate in the financial side of our
market. Our number-one job is to see that supply and demand on
the grid are in balance at all times.
As the independent system operator for the region, ERCOT
schedules power on their electric grid that connects more than
46,500 miles of transmission lines and over 680 generating
units. It also performs financial settlement for the
competitive wholesale bulk power market and administers retail
switching for 8 million premises in the competitive areas at
ERCOT. We are a membership-based 501(c)(4) nonprofit
corporation, governed by a board of directors and subject to
oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the
Texas legislature.
Our members include consumers, cooperatives, generators,
power marketers, retail electric providers, investor-owned
electric utilities, transmission and distribution providers,
and municipally owned electric utility.
ERCOT's not a policymaking body. We implement the policies
adopted by the Public Utility Commission and the Texas
legislature, and we operate under reliability rules adopted by
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, or NERC.
Generators produce power from a variety of sources in ERCOT
such as gas, coal, wind, solar, and nuclear. These are private
and public entities, subject to regulation by various State and
Federal agencies. Transmission and distribution providers own
the wires and transport the power to consumers, subject to
their own sets of Federal and State regulation.
Twenty-four hours a day, 7 days a week, ERCOT monitors the
entirety of the system to make sure that, when transmission
lines go down, we can work around them. We talk to generators,
instructing them to bring load onto the system or to back it
down as needed. We oversee the scheduling of maintenance and
more.
The work is done with one purpose, to maintain the 60 hertz
frequency that's needed to ensure the stability of the grid.
It's a constant balancing act to manage the supply and demand
to ensure a stable frequency.
During the week of February 15, the Texas electric market
experienced more demand than available supply. At its worst,
the storm took out 48.6 percent of the generation available to
ERCOT to balance the grid. We always keep reserves. But when
you lose nearly half your generation, you're going to have a
problem. As supply quickly diminished, the frequency of the
grid dipped perilously low. Many generators stayed off for
days, and this left the system unable to serve that high
demand. We used the last tool in our toolkit, planned outages,
calling for load shed to manage the stability of the grid.
This crisis required ERCOT using procedures established for
emergencies like this to call on transmission providers to use
controlled load shedding to balance the system and prevent a
devastating blackout for the entire grid. Avoiding a complete
backout is critical. Were it to occur, the Texas grid could be
down for several days or weeks while the damage to the
electrical grid was repaired and the power was stored in a
phased and highly controlled process. The cost of restoration
of the system, the economic loss for Texas, and the personal
cost to the well-being of Texas citizens would be unfathomable.
As terrible as the consequences of the controlled outages
in February were, if we had not stopped the blackout, power
could have been out for over 90 percent of Texans for weeks.
The steps we took were difficult, but they had to be taken, and
when power was able to be fully restored, the Texas electric
delivery system immediately returned to its preemergency
conditions.
That's why, when demand for power exceeds supply, ERCOT
must issue directives to all electric transmission providers to
shed load, to take those measures to reduce power consumption.
In severe cases these brief directives result in outages. The
rotating outages that we managed by the trans--managed by the
transmission providers are managed according to plans and
protocols determined by the transmission providers themselves
who know their local areas much better than ERCOT ever could.
ERCOT issues the directive to reduce power consumption under a
predetermined formula necessary to maintain the integrity of
the grid and avoid a catastrophic blackout. Based on their
plans and protocols, it is the transmission providers who
decide whose power stays on and who's interrupted during the
outages.
And the Texas legislature and our Public Utility Commission
are currently engaged in an effort to determine what changes in
law and regulations are needed in order to avoid a repeat of
the events in the week of February 15. Bills are moving in the
Texas House and Senate under an emergency declaration from
Governor Abbott that takes on key issues--winter preparedness,
public safety communications, and the various grid and market
issues brought to life by the storm.
We at ERCOT are working day and night to provide
policymakers with the information they need to ensure that
Texas electric supplies remain sufficient going into the
future. Within the next few days we anticipate completion of a
survey sent to all power generators and end suppliers
requesting information on when, where, and why the power supply
failed during the week of February 15. This information will be
helpful to the Texas legislature and policymakers in seeking
solutions.
We look forward to working with our stakeholders, State
leaders, and with you to implement improvements to Texas' grid
resiliency and the ERCOT wholesale market.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Magness follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Magness.
I'm now pleased to recognize Chairman Craddick for 5
minutes.
You're recognized.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTI CRADDICK
Ms. Craddick. Chairwoman DeGette, Leader Griffith, and
Members, thank you for having me here today. For the record, my
name is Christi Craddick, and I'm the chairman of the Railroad
Commission of Texas and--excuse me. West Texas dirt has blown
into Austin, so it's caught my allergies today.
The Railroad Commission has primary regulatory jurisdiction
over oil and natural gas production, pipelines, natural gas
utilities, alternative fuels such as propane, and coal and
uranium mining activity. The Railroad Commission does not have
any regulatory jurisdiction over electricity.
In February, as we learned of the severity of the winter
storm that was heading our way, my fellow commissioners and I
convened an emergency meeting to prioritize human needs
customers above all else for natural gas delivery. Safety is
our number-one priority at the commission. So homes, hospitals,
schools, and churches were granted priority status under our
emergency amendment to the gas curtailment order.
As the situation developed and further need was identified,
we waived transport requirements for out-of-State alternative
fuel haulers to allow expedited access for Texans, should our
State supply need to be supplemented. We authorized local
distribution companies, or LDCs, to track and account for
extraordinary expenses as a result of the storm, including but
not limited to gas costs and transportation costs.
This agency is committed to preventing undue financial
burden on LDC customers, and this instruction will allow us to
collect the data we need to help prevent that from happening,
and we provided alternative options for saltwater disposal
companies while maintaining our environmental safety standards
to prevent wastewater from becoming a hazard in the freezing
weather.
The commission continues to communicate with both operators
and legislators. We are working with stakeholders to collect
and analyze data in an effort to prevent high consumer gas
bills. We've been in constant communication with legislators at
the State capital to offer reasonable and responsible
recommendations.
These include, first, formalizing TERC, the Texas Energy
Reliability Council, an ad hoc group made up of industry
professionals, agency leaders, and key agency staff. The
council's purpose is to streamline communication during an
event, and this organization should be formalized.
Second, the Railroad Commission has proposed a mapping
committee to overlay critical natural gas production
infrastructure with the ERCOT and PUC grid to ensure that power
is not cut off at critical facilities.
Third, the Railroad Commission will hold a hearing to
update the 1972 natural gas curtailment order to reflect the
modern-day needs of the State.
The final recommendation would require natural gas-fired
power plants to secure firm gas contracts from their suppliers.
When reliability is crucial, allowing interruptible supply
contracts at power-producing facilities should be reevaluated
by the legislature. The Texas legislature's currently
deliberating these proposals, among many others.
As the storm sat over Texas, wind, solar, coal, nuclear,
oil, and natural gas all experienced challenges. Through
numerous conversations with the oil and gas industry and
operators, we learned of frozen roadways preventing crews from
accessing the fields. But the number-one problem we heard
reported from operators was the lack of power at the production
sites.
As outages spread across the State, operators were unable
to keep their systems functioning as power was cut. Some
operators did need to preemptively shutter their wells for
safety and well integrity purposes prior to the storm beginning
as early as February 9.
Starting on Tuesday, February 16, as it was safe to return
to the oil fields, crews arrived to find that their facilities
were experiencing electricity outages. The oil fields simply
cannot run without power, making electricity the best
winterization tool.
Working along with industry partners, we were able to
directly communicate with the chairwoman of the PUC as well as
electric transmission and distribution companies and provide
specific coordinates for areas and facilities to have power
restored and get gas flowing again. As operators got back
online, storage capacity across the State was depleted to keep
supply up. Continuous communication with our partners at TERC
served to expedite solutions. Daily communications between
regulators, operators, and providers was critical to
understanding storage withdrawals, supply needs, and
infrastructure capabilities.
And for just one moment I'd like to highlight the overall
success of our LDCs, our local distribution companies. They are
the companies that provide gas directly to residential
customers. If you have a gas-powered stove, fireplace furnace,
heat, you're an LDC customer. As millions of homes lost
electricity in Texas, only 2,153 LDC customers experienced
service disruption. That means that 99.95 percent of all
customers did not lose gas. Four point six million households
in Texas utilized natural gas in their homes, representing
about 13 million Texans. And these families were able to
continue to heat their home.
We look forward to continuing to work with the Texas
legislature as we find real solutions to the challenges, and
thank you for having me here today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Craddick follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair's now pleased to recognize Mr. Shellenberger for
5 minutes.
Mr. Shellenberger, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. SHELLENBERGER
Mr. Shellenberger. Thank you and good morning, Chairperson
DeGette, Leader Griffith, and members of the committee. I'm
grateful to the committee for inviting my testimony.
In the past, some have argued that variable renewable
energies would make electricity service more reliable. This
argument was that the distributed and localized production of
renewable energy, the build-out of additional required
transmission networks, and increased storage to smooth out
fluctuating production would all make electricity service more
reliable than depending on a small number of large, centralized
power plants connected by a few major transmission lines.
But the recent power outages in Texas and California have
challenged that argument. Adding more weather-dependent sources
to electricity grids, all else being equal, might not in itself
make electricity less reliable. But all else is not equal.
The significant integration of variable energies has led to
the loss of traditional power plants and the construction of
new transmission lines to weather-dependent energy projects
that are unreliable in extreme weather events.
The policy interventions required to ensure friendly
investment conditions for variable renewable energies--
including the lowering of acceptable reserve margins or the
counting of average contributions, even if reduced from
variable renewals--are interfering with grid resiliency. The
roughly $50 billion spent on wind energy by Texans is 50
billion that did not go to winterizing equipment.
Weather dependency matters. When a continent-sized mass of
freezing air moved all the way into Texas in February and
remained there for several days, different energy sources
performed differently, both absolutely and against
expectations.
Consider the average performance for the different fuel
types over all 4 days of the blackouts in Texas. During the 4
days of emergency operations during the cold snap from early
February 15 to midnight, February 18, output levels of nuclear,
natural gas, coal, and wind to the grid were 79 percent, 47
percent, 52 percent, and 14 percent, respectively, of winter-
rated total installed capacity.
ERCOT in its prewinter 2020 report on winter power
availability for the 2020/2021 season expected some of the coal
and gas fleet to experience winter outages, along with the loss
of some capacity in normal winter high-demand periods, with
further losses in extreme weather. ERCOT also expected during
peak demand events in winter to have power from wind represent
about 27 percent of installed capacity. In its most severe
appraisal of the loss of wind capacity, ERCOT expected 8
percent of wind power compared to capacity.
Therefore, here's the performance of nuclear, gas, coal,
and wind over 4 days of emergency as compared to normal
expected winter peak conditions: Nuclear, 79 percent; gas, 54
percent; coal, 58 percent; and wind, 50 percent. When examined
this way, the issue of low wind and solar output during many
hours of the emergency becomes more severe than previously
reported. If ERCOT actually modeled simultaneous extreme loss
of thermal generation along with extreme low wind, it did not
add the scenario to its winter adequacy report.
For nuclear, the lowest hourly value of production was 73
percent output compared to installed capacity, which is also 73
percent of expected based on winter adequacy reporting. For
coal, it was 41 percent of total, or 46 percent of winter
adequacy expectations. For natural gas, it was 40 percent, or
46 percent based on winter adequacy expectations. For wind, it
was 2 percent, or 9 percent of winter adequacy expectations.
The main implication of this reality has been left unsaid.
Efforts to expand transmission for the purpose of increasing
the use of variable renewable energy cannot be justified as a
means of preventing power outages like the ones that occurred
in Texas and California.
In a conference call with reporters last August that I was
a part of, the main grid operator, the CEO of California's grid
operator, said very clearly that the shortfall of power was due
to lack of reliable power sources. It was not due to inadequate
transmission or batteries. In fact, the grid operator said very
clearly that those were not--those would not have solved the
problem.
So there's--I think this is an issue that, Chairperson and
members of the committee, that has been the victim of a lot of
mystification over many years. There is no emergent resiliency
or reliability after making more parts of the system less
reliable or less resilient.
More unreliable parts makes for a less reliable system.
There is no--nothing magical occurs from adding all of that
variable renewable energy to having a reliable system.
So with that, I would thank the committee again for the
time and for the opportunity to offer some of these, I hope,
new facts into the conversation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shellenberger follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much.
The Chair now is pleased to recognize Mr. Robb for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES B. ROBB
Mr. Robb. Good morning, Chair DeGette, Ranking Member
Griffith, and members of the committee.
And, Chair DeGette, I want to send my company's heartfelt
condolences on the senseless events in Boulder earlier this
week.
The recent tragic loss of lives and human suffering in
Texas and the middle south States starkly demonstrate the
essentiality of a reliable electric system. I appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to put the recent events in Texas
in a broader context.
Insufficient and inadequately weatherized generation in
Texas and the middle south States has been a growing concern
for us since 2012. After a cold weather event caused load
shedding for 3 million customers in Texas in 2011, we developed
a winter preparation guideline to focus industry on best
practices and started conducting significant outreach on winter
preparedness. We monitored performance, noted performance
improvements, and made further recommendations after the 2014
polar vortex.
However, after another cold snap in the middle south
resulted in unplanned load shedding in 2018, we concluded that
severe cold in the south could no longer be treated as rare and
that a mandatory and auditable approach to weatherization was
required. As a result, NERC began the process of adding
mandatory weatherization requirements into our mandatory
reliability standards.
As you know, the FERC chairman and I have initiated a joint
inquiry into the root causes of this most recent event. We're
committed to quickly getting to the facts as to what actually
happened, implementing appropriate measures within our
authority, and communicating other implied actions to
policymakers in industry.
Extreme weather, coupled with the growing reliance on
variable and just-in-time resources, is stressing the electric
system in new and different ways. As a result, we are
developing more advanced ways to study energy supply risks.
NERC's reliability assessments are one important way we
evaluate the performance of the grid, identify reliability
trends, anticipate challenges, and provide a technical platform
for important policy discussion. Along with Texas, our
assessments consistently identify California and New England as
regions particularly exposed to these dynamics.
Last August, a massive heat wave across the west caused an
energy supply shortage in California in the early evening.
Solar energy was ramping down, and the grid operator was unable
to import power as planned due to high demand throughout the
west. CAISO was forced to cut power to approximately 800,000
customers. This event reaffirms the increasing need for
reliable ramping resources to balance variable generation and
improve decimation of resource availability when the system is
under stress.
In New England, cold weather exacerbates its dependence on
limited pipeline capacity in a handful of critical fuel assets.
An early January cold snap in 2018 led to natural gas
shortages, and fuel oil was burned to preserve reliability. Had
that cold snap not abated when it did, the fuel oil inventory
would eventually have been exhausted. And ISO New England
almost certainly would have needed to shed load. It was a
classic near-miss event.
These issues that we've seen in Texas, California, and New
England are the result of three major trends that are
transforming the electricity industry.
First, the system is decarbonizing rapidly. And this
evolution is altering the operational characteristics of the
grid.
Policies, economics, and market designs are resulting in
significant retirements of traditional generation. New
investment is increasingly focused on developing carbon-free
generation with variable production profiles. And in this
resource mix, natural gas-fired generation is becoming ever
more critical, both for bulk energy to be able to serve load as
well as balancing energy to support the integration of variable
resources.
Second, the grid is becoming more distributed. The improved
economics of solar is the key driver of this dynamic. And grid
operators need more control of and visibility into these
resources than they have today.
And, third, the system is becoming increasingly digitized
through smart meters and advanced control systems. These
investments greatly enhance operational awareness and
efficiency but at the cost of heightened exposure to
cybersecurity risk.
In addition to the weatherization requirements that NERC is
now proposing, I would like to leave this subcommittee with
four main points to consider.
First, more investment in transmission and gas
infrastructure is going to be needed to improve the resilience
of the grid.
Next, the regulatory structure and oversight of natural gas
supply for the purposes of electric generation needs to be
rethought. The natural gas system was not built and operated
with electric reliability first in mind. Policy action and
legislation will likely be needed to assure reliable fuel
supply for power generation. And as the critical balancing
resource, gas is the fuel that keeps the lights on.
Third, the electric and natural gas systems need to plan
for and be better prepared for extreme weather conditions,
which are, frankly, becoming more routine. Regulatory and
market structures need to support this planning and a necessary
investment to assure reliability.
And then, finally, investment in energy storage or
alternative technology needs to be supported to have a viable
alternative to natural gas for balancing variable resources. A
technology which can be deployed cost-effectively and at
massive scale with adequate duration to deal with supply
disruptions that could last for days, rather than hours, will
be required.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robb follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Robb. I appreciate your
testimony.
And I want to again thank all of the witnesses for being
with us today.
It's now time for Members to ask questions of our panel,
and the Chair will recognize herself first for 5 minutes.
I did appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses and
also the comments of our colleagues on both sides of the dais
this morning. This is a complex issue and, as is often the
tendency when something like this happens, people look at one
thing to blame and I saw in the press a lot of people were
blaming only renewable energy. But it's clear from the
testimony today and the evidence as it's coming out this is a
very complex issue.
And I want to start with you, Mr. Magness, because ERCOT
has stated publicly that the recent extreme weather in Texas,
quote, ``caused many generating units across fuel types to trip
offline and become unavailable.'' Isn't it true that during the
extreme weather event natural gas, wind, coal, solar, and even
nuclear power were forced offline?
Mr. Magness. Yes, Chairman, we did see----
Ms. DeGette. Thanks.
Mr. Magness [continuing]. Time where each one of those
types of generation tripped offline.
Ms. DeGette. Thanks.
And, you know, as devastating as this was, I guess a lot of
people were surprised because, Mayor, you were in the Texas
legislature for more than 25 years and you said in your written
testimony the magnitude--and also today--the magnitude of
damages was foreseeable and preventable. The Texas grid must be
designed--that with the full appreciation that climate change
is real and extreme weather events can occur throughout the
year.
Is it your view that Texas ignored these warnings and
missed several opportunities to fortify the grid against the
threat of extreme weather?
Mr. Turner. Madam Chair, the answer is yes. I was in the
legislature when the winter storm occurred in 2011. In fact, I
filed House Bill 1986 that specifically would mandate the
Public Utility Commission to have ERCOT have a sufficient
reserve to prevent blackouts. That was in 2011. The bill was
not----
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Robb, I understand that NERC has issued a series of
recommendations in recent years warning about reliability risks
to the Texas grid, including after the same storm that hit
Texas in 2011. Now I know NERC's inquiry is ongoing. But based
on the information you have, did Texas winterize its power
infrastructure to the degree NERC had recommended after the
2011 storm?
Mr. Robb. Well, the inquiry will affirm this. But evidence
would suggest absolutely not.
Ms. DeGette. Absolutely not.
Now, Mayor Turner, what do you think Texas needs to do
going forward to make sure that it's prepared for the
inevitable next storm?
Mr. Turner. It must build in resilience. I do agree, for
example, infrastructure needs to be improved. It is outdated. I
do agree we need to rely more on technology, and I do agree we
need to have energy storage. But you have to factor into the
equation that the storms are coming with greater frequency and
greater intensity.
Ms. DeGette. Well, and, you know, that's my next question:
What do cities need to do to--and communities need to do--to
sort of harden their preparation for these coming storms?
Mr. Turner. And I will tell you we're not just relying on
generators. We had a number of generators at water waste
facilities. When the grid failed, some of those generators
didn't kick in. What we are doing now is looking at piloting
microgrids that actually tie into the Texas grid, and they're
always on. They never turn off. They're on 24/7. And so we are
looking at power, utilizing that for our key infrastructure
projects within the city facilities as well as the low-income
communities in the city.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
And, finally, back to you, Mr. Robb. As extreme weather
events become more common, the energy market is in the midst of
a significant transition to cleaner and more renewable energy
sources. I think several of the witnesses mentioned that. So,
recognizing that reality, how can we account for the
transition, particularly the increased use of renewables, as we
consider how to make the grid more reliable and resilient going
forward?
Mr. Robb. Well, the key to integrating large amounts of
renewable resource is the balancing resource that picks up
generation when the renewable resources can't perform because
of weather conditions or what have you. And to date, the only
real resource we have that can do that would either be hydro,
as was mentioned earlier, or natural gas. And natural gas of
those fuels is the most easily transported to where it is
needed, so gas is the answer to making this transition work.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
And, you know, for all of you, we've experienced some of
the same issues here in Colorado, and as several people said,
we've had them in California and many other places. It's a
national issue with the grid that I'm hoping, as we develop an
infrastructure bill, we can start to think about how we can
harden the grid because we know the weather is getting more
extreme.
With that, I'm delighted to recognize the ranking member,
Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes for his questioning.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Shellenberger, in your testimony you highlight that
significantly expanding variable renewables requires
significantly expanding the size and complexity of the grid to
make up for both variable energy supply and low-power density.
You also note that the National Academies of Sciences has
clearly and repeatedly said that complexity will make
electricity grids less resilient, all else being equal, than
simpler grids. How can we maintain grid resiliency while also
building a diverse energy supply?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, thank you for the question,
Congressman. I think the first obvious thing is that we need a
diversity of supply. I think it would be very risky and radical
to depend entirely on natural gas and variable renewable energy
sources. You know, the final comment I made was that, at their
lowest, wind was 2 percent of Texas' electricity grid. Not all
energy sources are the same. The fact that there was some
failures among power plants is not the same as the essential
weather dependence of some energy sources.
And I interviewed the authors of the three National
Academies of Sciences reports. They stressed emphatically that
complexity reduces resiliency, adding microgrids reduces
resiliency, that these things have consequences. The more
complex the grid, the more people are involved, the higher the
costs.
I just will also mention, this talk, this idea that there
is some inevitability to a transition towards variable
renewable energy sources is incorrect. It is not shared by most
energy experts. It is a consequence of policy choices. And if
we want to have affordable, reliable, resilient electricity
sources, we need reliable sources of electricity produced in
large, efficient power plants, whether nuclear, natural gas, or
coal.
And if we want sustainability, I think it's clear too that
you need to have nuclear because, every time we shut down a
nuclear plant, it's replaced by natural gas, carbon emissions
go up, prices go up. This has been proven now in California.
It's been proven around the world. And now we have many nuclear
plants across the United States that are at risk of shutting
down prematurely and being replaced by natural gas, which would
reduce resiliency and reliability, reduce affordability. And,
in fact, I think this push to just continue to expand variable
renewable energy sources would accelerate the premature and
unnecessary closure of those power plants.
Mr. Griffith. All right. I appreciate that.
Madam Chair, I would like to insert into the record at the
end of the hearing a chart on renewable generation in Texas
from March 2021 from the Texas Synchrophasor Network created by
Professor Mack Grady and Dr. Andrew Mattei--if I spelled that
correctly--at Baylor University.
This chart shows how renewables in ERCOT can swing from 10
to 60 percent of the total electricity generation. This huge
variation exemplifies the challenge of integrating renewables
onto the grid. One of the major issues that contributed in both
California and Texas are blackouts.
Given, Dr. Shellenberger--or Mr. Shellenberger--given that
more States are continuing to increase the percentage of
renewable energy sources in their power grid systems, can you
discuss the predictably--unreliable--the predictably unreliable
properties of some renewables, especially during extreme
weather?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, sure. I mean, we saw in the power
outage in California last summer, part of the reason it was
such high demand for electricity was because it was so hot, and
demand for air-conditioning was so high. Those were the same
conditions that meant the wind was not blowing. So we did not
have wind energy resources available during that heat wave, and
that means that more transmission lines to more wind farms
would not have made any difference whatsoever.
Similar story in Texas, those very--you have to look at the
lowest output levels because that's the levels at which you are
ultimately dependent on to avoid the cascading failures that
everybody fears. So we saw in Texas, it reached 2 percent of
its capacity whereas nuclear only went down to 73 percent. And
the only reason we lost one of those reactors is because they
had a sensor that was unnecessarily triggered by cold water and
could actually be prevented in the future whereas the weather-
dependent nature of wind, meaning it only produces electricity
when the wind is blowing, is not fixable. You can weatherize
the turbines, but they still depend on the wind energy.
Mr. Griffith. Yes, I appreciate that. I read your book over
the weekend. I was doing it o audio. I loved it so much I
bought the hardback. And I appreciate you being here to testify
today, and I look forward to chatting with you in the future.
And I yield back, Madam Chair.
Mr. Shellenberger. Thank you, sir.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Chairman Pallone for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm going to try to get in three quick questions to three
of you, but I wanted to say that, while it's clear that the
Texas electric grid was unprepared for the extreme winter storm
last month, it's also evident that Texans were not adequately
warned about the storm's potential impacts and were dangerously
vulnerable to the storm's effects. I just got a text from
Sheila Jackson Lee, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, mentioning how
her low-income constituents are still suffering.
So, if I could ask, Mr. Magness, Texas Governor Abbott
contends that ERCOT failed to adequately sound the alarm about
the potential seriousness of the storm and how it might impact
the public's power supply. You told the Texas legislature, and
I quote, ``We weren't talking enough to those impacted by the
outages.''
So, Mr. Magness, what could ERCOT have done to better
communicate with the public, and how can communication be
improved in future extreme weather events? You've got about a
minute to answer that.
Mr. Magness. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think, you
know, ERCOT communicates at, I'd say, three levels every day
we're talking, whether through our control room or through
other mechanisms with the generators, with the transmission
owners where we're doing the air traffic control. There was
certainly a lot of communication going on with the industry
about expectations, getting ready for the storm, knowing what
we needed to do.
The second level is sort of more public communications from
ERCOT the company. And we issued a press release the Thursday,
I believe, about the 11th or--the 11th, regarding the storm,
calling out that it was, you know, looked like it was going to
be one of the most powerful winter storms we've seen in years
and the concerns we had for the system.
We worked with the Governor's Office and the State
Operations Center, appeared at the press conference with the
Governor the Saturday before the storm came in, so the warning
that we were starting to see supply get outstripped by demand.
And we issued a conservation notice the following day to try to
urge Texans and, you know, amplify that as much as we could to
conserve.
Now, the third level, I think, is the real challenge for us
and where we need to see some change, which is when this became
a public safety issue, when--once the outages happened and then
it became clear that we were not going to be able to get that
generation back up as quickly as we'd anticipated, as quickly
as it's always happened when we'd have these kind of rotating
outages, understanding that there was a strong need to get a
public safety communication out very, very broadly to Texans to
understand that this could go on for a while, and that's
something that, you know, frankly, we're going to need to work
and the legislature has--the House I know and Senate have filed
bills in Texas to have some sort of weather amber alert or
other, you know, broad notification when this becomes a public
safety issue.
Because that's sort of well beyond the communications
capabilities this company has, and it's a system that we think
would be wise to set up so, if we have these kind of weather
emergencies in the future, that public safety word can get out
a lot faster to supplement everything we're doing along with
the company and with the media.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you.
Let me go to Mr. Robb. I know you recommend in your
testimony rethinking how we regulate and oversee natural gas
use for electric generation, and is this even more important in
light of what we saw recently in Texas? In a minute or less.
Mr. Robb. No, I think so. The natural gas system is
designed primarily to meet the LDC load, as Commissioner
Craddick mentioned, and it does that incredibly well. Natural--
power generation is not its first priority, or has not been its
first priority. Yet, at this point, the power generation is the
fuel that keeps the lights on, as I have said.
There are multiple policies at multiple levels that need to
be rethought. For example, when gas gets scarce, power
generation is typically the first load to get interrupted to,
again, to protect the LDC customer. The gas system is designed
primarily to focus on high utilization of its assets, whereas
the electric industry needs tremendous flexibility to meet
increasingly rapid power plant ramp rates to accommodate
generation.
Environmental policies typically preclude dual fuel use to
have an onsite fuel to make up for any shortfall that the gas
system can't deliver. Siting is really difficult. And we see
places like New England, which desperately needs more pipeline
or pipeline infrastructure, they can't be built, they can't be
sited, and they can't--the public resistance is too great.
And the operational planning between the electric and gas
system is not coordinated. For example, it's surprising that
the TDSPs in Texas didn't know that they were shutting off
power to compressor stations, if that indeed happened. Again,
we'll find that out through our inquiry, but these are the
examples of coordination that needs to happen because the
systems are so inextricably intertwined at this point.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Rodgers for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
NERC's written testimony examines bulk power system
reliability through the lenses of recent extreme weather
events, including a central U.S. cold weather event and the
Western heat wave event of August 2020. Mr. Robb, why is it
important to examine bulk power system reliability through the
lenses of recent extreme weather----
Mr. Pallone. I knew we weren't going to get to the mayor.
There was no way.
Mrs. Rodgers. Mr. Chairman?
Ms. DeGette. He's on mute now.
Mrs. Rodgers. OK. And--so just why is it important to
examine that bulk power system reliability through the lens of
recent extreme weather events and not just the Texas power
failure?
Mr. Robb. Well, because I think this is a broader issue
than just Texas. Texas may be the most dramatic recent example
of extreme weather overwhelming the system, but these extreme
weather events are happening more frequently and more regularly
and across the country. As you said, we've seen them in the
middle South, we've seen them in the Northeast, we've seen them
in Texas--or in California.
And we need to expand our--the range of scenarios that we
plan for and operate to because, you know, as we found out in
Texas, right, when the power is out for an extended period of
time, that's a really bad period of time for the people who
live there.
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. Yes.
Recent articles on the Texas power grid crisis point to
insufficient weatherization across the entire energy systems
supply, and this wasn't just a Texas problem. It's happening in
neighboring States. Everything froze up, from the wind turbines
to natural gas to the compressor stations. It seems there needs
to be a discussion around what types of energy equipment are
weatherized and to what extent. We have to balance the cost and
reliability and to take into consideration all the potential
hazards and operating conditions.
Ms. Craddick, the Federal Government has no role over
energy production on State and private land. That's the
responsibility of the Texas Railroad Commission. Given your
jurisdiction over natural gas supply, what did you hear from
those companies about the difficulties in weatherizing the
production wells and processing equipment?
Ms. Craddick. Well, the bottom line has been when the power
went off, it is difficult to weatherize, right. We've heard
about putting a heat strip on. OK, a heat strip requires
electricity to run. We've heard about compressors being off in
the field. You require electricity for those compressors.
So we had a whole conversation, and I think that was where
the challenge has been for our State and where we as an agency
believe and already have a lot of the system online available
that mapping so people will know where critical infrastructure
is would be very helpful.
We had a conversation with ERCOT and PUC on the 16th in a
phone call that they said they didn't realize how integrated we
all were, and that they didn't know they needed to turn back on
the oil fields for us to flow gas.
So I think that's a--something we've learned that is going
to be very important long term for us to make sure that we've
identified better critical infrastructure, even ERCOT's form
that nobody knew to fill out, that we didn't know until that
Tuesday, Wednesday, did not put oil fields and specs
specifically precluded oil fields and oil from being in the--
and natural gas fields from being on that list. So hopefully
they're----
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
Ms. Craddick [continuing]. Going to prioritize. Thank you.
Mrs. Rodgers. Good. Would you speak to how energy producers
coordinate with the gas power plants, and what's the role of
the Railroad Commission?
Ms. Craddick. Actually, we--it's a private contract, so we
do not--don't have those conversations between a power producer
versus our gas operators. Those are private contracts.
Mrs. Rodgers. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Shellenberger, with all the new capacity being added in
Texas, do you believe it makes it easier or harder to prevent
blackouts?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, unfortunately, it will make it
harder because we're just--Texas is just planning on adding
more variable renewable energy sources and natural gas, so it
increases--anytime you increase your overreliance on a single
fuel, which is what you're effectively doing when you rely on
gas, because we saw wind and when it goes to 2 percent of
capacity, it's effectively unavailable at the time that you
need it most.
So that is what concerns me about the situation, is just
the inadequate amount of reliable baseload capacity and this
just growing reliance on unreliable sources of energy, which
you can compensate for, but the only way to compensate for it
is by keeping around baseload power plants. So the reason that
Germany has been able to keep its electricity reliable is
just--while it's doing a lot of renewables--is just by keeping
its coal plants operating.
Mrs. Rodgers. And what about the impact on nuclear plants
in Texas?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, we're very concerned about all
nuclear plants because they don't get the heavy production
subsidies that renewables get.
Mrs. Rodgers. OK. Thank you.
Thank you, everyone. I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Kuster for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
holding this important oversight hearing. Excuse me. Oh, dear.
My apologies. Oh, I'm sorry, Madam Chair. I am going to have to
pull up my remarks, I apologize. If you'd like to go to the
next person, Madam Chair, I'll come back. I apologize.
Ms. DeGette. OK. Miss Rice, are you prepared?
Miss Rice. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. DeGette. OK. We'll recognize you for 5 minutes.
Miss Rice. OK. Extreme weather events pose significant
challenges across the country, not just in Texas. But in the
case of Texas, what's particularly troubling to me is the fact
that warning signs were missed, and there were opportunities to
avoid the worst effects of the recent catastrophe.
Mr. Robb, in 2011, we talked about a prior severe winter
storm that hit Texas which caused extensive power disruptions.
And after that, NERC and FERC issued a report offering
recommendations on cold weather preparedness, including
winterization best practices. It was notable that the report
concluded the single largest problem during the cold weather
event was the freezing of instrumentation and equipment.
So, Mr. Robb, it sounds like this same problem may have
persisted 10 years later in this most recent storm that we're
talking about. So did Texas miss opportunities to make its grid
more resilient to extreme winter weather?
Mr. Robb. Yes, I think the answer is yes. The report that
we put out in 2011 called for very clear freeze protection on
the generating plants and raised the issue as to whether that
should extend into the natural gas supply as well. And what I
understand Texas did was to put in place legislation that
required weatherization but not to a specific level, and it was
not an aggressively enforced standard. I think it was spot
checked, and enforcement against that was relatively modest, is
my understanding.
Miss Rice. Is there----
Mr. Robb. That's one of the reason why we're--I'm sorry.
Miss Rice. No, no, go ahead.
Mr. Robb. No, I said that's one of the reasons why, after
the 2018 event, we concluded that we needed to move to a
mandatory freeze protection standard for equipment and to have
that be monitored and enforced by us.
Miss Rice. Well, had they made those--taken those
recommendations, the specific ones that were recommended post-
2011, would that have--what would that impact have been last
February, this past February?
Mr. Robb. It's hard to say. I think it clearly would have
mitigated what we would've seen in Texas, but our inquiry will
shed some light as to, again, why wasn't the generation there,
and had it been winterized to the level that we had talked
about in 2011, would it have been? That's the core question
that we need to answer in this inquiry.
Miss Rice. OK.
Mr. Magness, in its most recent winter reliability
assessment, NERC warned of the potential for extreme generation
resource outages in ERCOT due to severe winter weather, which
is precisely what happened last month when nearly 50 percent of
Texas' power generation was forced offline at one point. In
light of these warnings, what more could ERCOT have done to
prepare?
Mr. Magness. Well, certainly, every winter we have--we
undertake efforts, and some of these are based on the
recommendations in the 2011 NERC report. While the mandatory
winterization was not authorized by our legislature, as has
been pointed out, a number of the actions that ERCOT has taken,
that our market has taken--including having winterization
workshops, having spot checks for winterization issues at power
plants and, you know, making recommendations for things they
can be doing, including changes that we made internally to make
sure that everyone is trained for emergencies in the winter
context, changes in our ancillary services and other sort of
technical components, making sure that the temperature limits
on units are baked into our models--a lot of these things have
been undertaken, as well as looking at severe weather scenarios
in our seasonal assessment of resource adequacy.
So a number of steps are taken each winter to get ready.
One of the things is, our meteorologists reported in November
we expected to see at some point in the winter a very harsh
storm. We couldn't predict exactly the nature of what it would
be. But, certainly, the activities that generators have
undertaken over the past few years, based a lot on performing
many of the recommendations of the 2011 report, have shown some
progress.
For example, the second-coldest day after February 2nd of
2011 in Texas was in December of 2018. I think Mr. Robb
mentioned the 2018 South Central event. And we saw outages,
forced outages dramatically lower than we had seen in 2011.
Similarly, in 2014, when the polar vortex hit Texas to some
extent, we saw dramatically lower outages. So there appeared to
be some evidence that these winterization efforts were, you
know, taking effect and having an impact.
Now, that said, we did not anticipate and we certain--the
generators who told us what to plan to have available in mid-
February did not anticipate the kind of outages that we saw.
And as Mr. Robb said, that merits, you know, very deep
investigation into what happened. And if the things that we
have done on winterization so far have not had the impacts that
are needed, I think that's why our legislature is looking at
something else, some other approach that can ensure that we
don't see this sort of impact again.
Miss Rice. Let's hope that that can be done in a
nonpartisan way because this is an issue that must be
addressed, and we all have to put the politics aside. I'm over
my time, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you very much.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Burgess for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you. And just to--this is a nonpartisan
issue because deregulation of the electricity market in Texas
actually was passed by the State legislature in 1999, when
Democrats were in control of that body.
Mr. Magness, you've actually just answered most of the
questions that I had for you that basically were the question
of, what--did weatherization occur following the 2011
blackouts? I think the evidence is that more can be done, more
should be done, but we mustn't forget that in Texas most of our
extreme weather is summer weather. It's hot weather. In fact,
most of us don't move to Texas because of the cold weather. We
move to get away from the cold weather.
I remember very well in August of 2006, there was a high
demand period at the end of April. It was kind of early in the
summer season, and that put an extreme strain upon ERCOT to the
point where Governor Perry at the time recommended building, I
forget the number, but it was a substantial number of new,
modern coal-fired power plants, and of course he was rebuffed
in that effort.
Mayor Miller of Dallas--Mayor Bill White of Houston, Mr.
Turner's predecessor--strongly objected to the creation of any
more coal-fired power plants in Texas. But it's just that
diversification and that resiliency that Mr. Shellenberger has
talked so much about that I think might have prevented some of
the problems that we encountered. You know, you can only
winterize so much and for so many storms.
Madam Chair, I am going to ask unanimous consent to insert
into the record a Texas Tribune article that outlines the work
being done in Texas in the legislature, along with several
bills that would address this crisis at the State level.
Ms. DeGette. As the ranking member said, we will consider
all of these requests at the end of the hearing.
Mr. Burgess. Very well. And let me just ask, Mr. Robb, do
the Federal grid reliability standards apply to ERCOT?
Mr. Robb. They do.
Mr. Burgess. And would more interconnection between ERCOT
and the eastern or western grids have prevented the problems
that we saw last month?
Mr. Robb. That question is complicated and would require a
fair amount of study. What I can say is what I understand, is
that the interties between the--the small interties between
Texas and the eastern and western grid were closed with--very
little power was flowing over them. But I think Mr. Magness can
probably confirm that view.
Mr. Burgess. Well, in fact, I do recall Mr. Magness'
organization putting on a statement on Saturday--this crisis,
of course, began at 1 o'clock in the morning on Monday--but on
Saturday that ERCOT was purchasing power from the Southwest
Power Pool as well as some power from northern Mexico. The
problem is those areas got extremely cold as well Sunday night,
and as a consequence I imagine that there was no further power
available for purchase. Is that basically correct, Mr. Magness?
Mr. Magness. Yes, Dr. Burgess. We had some minor imports
from Mexico and from the eastern interconnection, but you're
connect, the other grid operators that operate in Texas, the
Southwest Power Pool and the Midcontinent Independent System
Operator, both ended up experiencing rotating outages during
some point of the winter storms.
So there was just--that storm was of a size and scope that
there was just no available power to be imported or exported
during that time. So, for this particular one, both Mexico and
the U.S. grids, there wasn't a lot of relief available.
Mr. Burgess. Right.
And, Mr. Robb, let me just ask you as a final question, are
there any electric grids around the country that are
invulnerable to extreme weather events, whether hot or cold?
Mr. Robb. I would say no.
Mr. Burgess. Yes, I think that's right. So--and maybe this
is a question for Mr. Shellenberger. You know, we talked about
this being an unprecedented event, but in fact we had a very
bad event, cold weather event, in 2011, one in 1983. We had the
hot weather event that I referenced in 2006. And, in fact,
going back and looking at some of the writings of
meteorologists, there was actually a very similar occurrence in
Texas in the 1890s. So it's not new that it gets that cold in
Texas. What's different is we have so many more people living
in Texas and so many more people depending upon the grid. But
could you speak to that, Mr. Shellenberger?
Mr. Shellenberger. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. You know,
of course, if there had been bigger connections between Texas
and those other places, all of that cheap Texas wind and that
solar would have ended up undermining the economics of those
plants during the good times that would've been needed in the
emergency. Important to understand that, I think.
But, yes, exactly, your point is well taken. I don't think
we know whether or not climate change played a role in these
extreme events. There's just so few of them. No good scientist
would look at an N of 3 or an N of 4 and try to suggest a
trend.
Mr. Burgess. Excellent answer. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now goes back to Ms. Kuster for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kuster. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I
apologize. Great to be with you. This is an important hearing
about the Texas grid failure, a tragic event resulting in the
death of over 40--30 fellow Americans.
The blackouts that occurred across Texas and much of South
Central United States were extreme in many ways, most notably
because they were entirely preventable if precautions and
preparation had been prioritized. The power didn't just go out.
It went out for days during one of the coldest weeks of the
year. When millions of people go this long without power in
subfreezing temperatures, there's no disputing that things went
seriously wrong.
In New Hampshire, we had more than our fair share of
subfreezing days in the winter, and, yes, the power does go out
from time to time when there's high wind or ice storms. But the
failure of Texas' deregulated energy grid poses serious
questions that the subcommittee must examine going forward. I
think I speak for many people when I say simply, how could this
have happened in the United States of America?
So, Mr. Magness, 5 days before the storm began hammering
Texas, ERCOT held a board meeting during which you stated, and
I quote, ``We're ready for the several days of pretty frigid
temperatures to come our way.'' But, clearly, Texas was not
ready. Why were ERCOT and the State's power generators so
unprepared for this storm?
Mr. Magness. From ERCOT's perspective, we were beginning a
process on the 8th, actually, the day before that board
meeting, of talking with the generators, talking with the
transmission providers to make sure as much as we could that
they knew this storm was coming and to be ready. And by the
time the storm came in, they certainly did.
Sunday night we had the highest winter peak we had ever
had, breaking a prior peak by a few thousand megawatts, and the
system was there to serve it. We had told everyone to
anticipate--and I mean at, you know, at our State Operations
Center and elsewhere--to anticipate there could be rotating
outages Monday morning and Tuesday morning based on the demand
we saw and the supply we expected to have.
But what we saw later in the evening, after we got over
that peak and served more power in Texas in the winter than we
ever have, was an enormous drop in generation as the storm came
into Texas. So the root causes of why that generation came off
and stayed off for as long as it did are the subject of some
data that we're gathering that we hope to be able to finalize
the data-gathering effort and get it out to the public
hopefully next week.
To answer that why question, because these were power units
that told ERCOT we're going to be there for the highest load
that you expect. There may have to be some rotating outages but
not the kind of loss of almost half the generation fleet that
we saw. So it's an analysis of that root cause of why the
problem was as large as it was that we need to investigate.
But, certainly, coming into the storm we saw that we were
facing something like we had never seen, and it may cause
shortages that would require some outages, just nothing like
the loss of generation that we experienced.
Ms. Kuster. And can we ask that you provide that to this
subcommittee as well for our further investigation?
Mr. Magness. I certainly will, yes.
Ms. Kuster. Mr. Turner, Mayor Turner, I understand you were
in the command center during the winter storm. Can you describe
for us what issues you were seeing in the command center and
exactly what went wrong?
Mr. Turner. And let me just say what we were told even on
Sunday, we were told that there would be rolling blackouts that
would last no more than 1 to 2 hours. And at a press conference
at 5 p.m. on Sunday, that's what we told the people in the
Houston region. That information was provided to us from the
power companies: rolling blackouts, 1 to 2 hours.
On Monday morning at 2 o'clock, when the power went out,
for most Houstonians they thought it was only going to be out
for 1 to 2 hours. These were not rolling blackouts. These were
power outages that lasted for 3 to 4 days. You cannot prepare
for this sort of winter storm in 5 days. The State of Texas
failed to do it over 10 years.
And the system that we have in Texas is a market-driven
system, and they were hoping that, by allowing the power
generators to increase their charges per megawatt over the last
10 years, that they would have built in resilience into their
system. That did not happen. There was not enough supply, and
in Texas it's ERCOT. It's--90 percent of our Texas grid is a
closed system. The only city in a sense that didn't experience
what the rest of us experienced in Texas was El Paso because
they upgraded their system, and they were able to pull power
from another source.
And last thing--and I have to say this, because I oversaw
the electric utility market in the State of Texas for 23 of my
27 years in the legislature--OK, your natural gas plant, your
coal-fired plants, and your nuclear plants went offline. That
represents well about 65 to 67 percent of your electricity
market, your power. You cannot blame this on renewables. You
absolutely cannot. That's a false issue.
Ms. Kuster. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Mayor. I've gone
over time, and I yield back to the chair.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. McKinley for 5 minutes.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And to, Mr. Shellenberger, I'm going to address my
questions to you, but I wanted you to know upfront: I just
ordered your book this week. I've heard some great raves about
that, so I wanted to see what's in this.
So, listen, my point is to lead in the questions is that
these recent extreme weather events across Texas and the
Midwest have highlighted this need to focus on grid reliability
and resilience. But keep in mind, other areas of the country
share these same concerns, so this is not--we want to take what
we learned from Texas and apply that elsewhere.
Keep in mind, one, a 2020 National Security Council memo
stated that secure, onsite fuel supply, specifically coal and
nuclear, are essential to the Nation's critical energy
infrastructure. A 2018 report from the National Energy and
Technology Laboratory, NETL: without the resilience of coal,
the eastern U.S. would have suffered widespread blackouts
during the 2018 bomb cycle. And ISO New England said their most
significant--the most significant resiliene challenge is fuel
security, and coal and nuclear power plants are needed to
maintain reliability.
So trying to apply this lesson we have seen in Texas, and
all these other reports I want to go down because there is a
statement that has been--there's a general consensus that we
can't get to net zero in this country without having carbon
capture.
So my question to you, Mr. Shellenberger: Do you expect
that we'll get carbon capture by 2030 in a commercial-grade
technology?
Mr. Shellenberger. Thank you, Congressman, for the
questions. You're absolutely spot on. You must have fuel
availability. This is essential for any kind of disaster and
resilience, which is recovery from power outages and extreme
events. You know, if you're going to shut down all of our--if
we're going to shut down all of our nuclear plants, which are
20 percent of our electricity, then we better keep our coal
plants around. And I say this as somebody that has long
advocated the transition from coal to natural gas and nuclear,
but nonetheless, when----
Mr. McKinley. Thank you. I've got a couple more questions
to you on this thing.
Mr. Shellenberger. Sorry.
Mr. McKinley. So, obviously, you understand the 80 percent
by 2030 and 100 percent by 2035. So the power that was
generated, that coal provided during the cold snap, that saved
Texas. I think in your testimony you said the electricity that
coal provided during the cold snap saved Texas from more
widespread blackouts and lowered fatalities. I thank you for
that.
So, if we don't have carbon capture by 2030 and the
Democrats and President Biden are successful in decarbonizing
our power grid by then, could America be experiencing--should
we experience more--plan to experience more blackouts and
fatalities?
Mr. Shellenberger. Yes. I mean, the risk of becoming
overdependent on natural gas, I think, is very real. That's
what would be occurring if we phased out our nuclear and coal
plants, so yes, that would be a significant concern.
Mr. McKinley. OK.
Mr. Shellenberger. The alternative is much more expensive
electricity.
Mr. McKinley. The RTOs, the regional transportation
organizations, that are enduring all these severe weathers are
becoming increasingly more using coal during these--like in
2019, MISO increased its use of coal by 50 percent, PJM by 40
percent. In 2018, coal increased in MISO by 51 percent, PJM by
40. So how are they going to respond if we don't have--if these
coal-fired power plants are shuttered and the nuclear plants
are no longer available? How are RTOs going to respond?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, what they're saying is that
they're going to--they're encouraging a significant purchase of
batteries, but most people don't think that that's going to
provide any significant quantity of seasonal storage, so it
just means we're becoming more dependent on gas.
Mr. McKinley. Well, let my chat on that. So the battery
storage, we're going to be relying on battery storage for our
utilities, but yet we're also trying to move over to electric
vehicles by 2035. We're trying to get to all our cars are being
driven by batteries.
So my question, if we've got these two competing forces,
the auto manufacturers trying to find the critical
ingredients--the lithium, cobalt, lead, nickel--that's needed
in the battery and the utilities are trying to find it, isn't
that going to drive up the price of batteries in this country?
So, for car owners, they're going to pay more for it, or
utilities are going to pay more for utilities?
Isn't that going to put competition between the two for the
higher price? So didn't we learn anything from PPE when we were
competing for the plastics?
Mr. Shellenberger. Absolutely, sir. I mean, I think most
experts agree that significantly increasing electric vehicle
and battery consumption would significantly impact materials,
demand, and prices. And, of course, if we do move either to
fuel-cell vehicles or electric vehicles, we're talking about
something close to a doubling of total electricity demand.
Mr. McKinley. And that opens up a whole other can of worms.
So I thank you for that, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Peters [presiding]. Madam Chair, are you----
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, I could call on myself.
Mr. Peters. I'll recognize, as vice chair, Ms. Schakowsky
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chair. I appreciate it.
So, Mayor Turner, I just want to express how sorry I am
that your city is once again reeling from an extreme weather
event, and it looks like, as you said, that it's almost every
year over the last 5 years. And it appears that this one was
entirely foreseeable and preventable if action had been taken
earlier.
So I want to ask you, in the time that has elapsed--which
is only really a little over a month now, but yet only 11
months until next winter or even earlier next winter--that
problems are going to occur, and I want to know what you are
hoping to see between now and next winter. And what are the
things that are happening now, right now, and what needs to be
happening right now, and tell us if it is?
Mr. Turner. Well, one thing, and I think--and Mr. Magness I
know will agree, and that is the Texas grid is designed for the
summer heat. It is not designed for winter storms. And I am
hopeful that, before the Texas legislature ends, that unlike
2011 and the years in between, that there will be substantive
reform made to our system, that we will build in resilience.
Having said that, what we are doing locally is that we are
focusing on resilience and redundancy, that just in case this
should happen, a winter storm comes again, that on the local
level we're making sure that we protect our water and
wastewater treatment facilities, our police stations, that we
make sure that we maintain water pressure so that our
firefighters can fight fires.
And in this particular storm what I do want to note, there
were hospitals throughout the city of Houston that did not even
have enough water for their chillers to keep their patients
warm. Our fire departments were having to take waters to the
hospitals just to keep the patients warm in the hospitals.
So we are building in redundancy within all of our major
facilities. And then at the same time, in our communities that
are very at risk and vulnerable, we want to make sure that we
are doing everything we can to build some redundancy into those
key assets in these communities. We're doing that now.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you so much.
Mr. Magness, in recent testimony that you had before the
Texas legislature, you suggested that you didn't think you
would have done anything different during the crisis. And so
I'm asking now that you've had more time to reflect, do you
think there is anything that ERCOT could have done differently,
and what lessons have you learned on how to do better in a
similar situation?
Mr. Magness. Thank you, Congresswoman.
And I regret if I didn't mention this to the Texas
legislature, but I think the communication during that time--
and Mayor Turner mentioned it--when it became clear that these
outages could not rotate because they were so large and so
extensive, the communication and the understanding that that's
the situation people are going to be in and the public safety
communication that could've come from that is something that I
think will be critical in the future, and something that I, as
I look back, those times when we saw how large this would be
and began to understand how long it would last, the
communications around that I think we certainly could've done
better and hope to advance that in the future.
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, I thank you for that and that you do
find some things that could be done better.
Chairman Craddick--Craddick, I'm sorry--in your testimony
you contend that natural gas production and the frozen
transmission pipes, quote, ``were not the problem that was
caused.'' Do you still think that, that there was no problem
with that?
Ms. Craddick. I believe that transmission pipes are in the
ground, and that's natural insulation. Where we do have some
challenges when you had the electricity roll off into fields
and across the State, then we did have problems with
compressors that are electric compressors and/or natural gas
compressors. Look, you can't move stuff in a pipe if you've
got--in a compressor without electricity, so, but the pipes
themselves did not freeze, and I think that's been a
miscommunication across the--when you've looked at the press
communication.
Ms. Schakowsky. But there were some problems. And I just
wanted to end with this in saying I think everyone has to fess
up to the ways that it can be done better and to get to work
right now to make sure that we don't have another situation
next year.
And I thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
Ms. DeGette [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady. And I'm
back too. Thanks for carrying on without me.
I'm now going to recognize Mr. Long for 5 minutes.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you all for being here today. I don't know how
many of you the name Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts means anything,
but Mr. Turner said earlier--my question is for Mr.
Shellenberger, but Mr. Turner said a while ago that you cannot
prepare for an event like this in 5 days. You might have been
able to prepare for it in 14 years, though, and that's kind of
my question today, Mr. Shellenberger.
In your testimony, you emphasized that efforts to expand
transmission for the purposes of increasing use of variable
renewable energy cannot be justified as a means of preventing
power outages like the ones that occurred in Texas and
California.
Take you back to 2007. Texas Pacific and Kohlberg, Kravis &
Roberts, the famous KKR, purchased Texas Utility Corporation
and agreed to terminate 8 of 11 proposed coal-fired power
plants. And I bet a lot of folks in Texas would have loved to
have those extra 8 coal-fired power plants on during this
latest event that you were not able to prepare for within 5
days. But they did that in Texas due to pressure from
environmental groups. The agreement also included the company's
pledge to double the purchase of wind power.
How effective are wind and solar resources during storms
like we've seen in Texas and California, Mr. Shellenberger?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the
question. I think it's a very important one. I think we're
hearing--I heard from the mayor of Texas--the mayor of Houston,
rather--that they're focused on deploying solar and wind but
also very concerned about power outages. Well, you can't have
it both ways. You can't--we can't rely on solar and wind.
We saw that at its lowest level--and this effort to
conflate weather-dependent energies and nonweather-dependent
energies I think is deeply misleading and troubling and creates
risks. At its lowest level, wind was producing 2 percent of its
installed capacity. At nuclear's lowest level it was producing
73 percent, and that's due to the nonexistence of wind.
So, yes, to your point, sir, I mean obviously, you know,
weatherization and winterization needed to occur with all of
the power plants. But this essential question of the weather-
dependent nature of these technologies cannot be waved away.
This idea that they're sort of--it's like a minor thing or
something, or the idea that there's some sort of--that it's a
matter of quantity rather than of quality, that's not a view
shared by any major energy experts. The essential variability
is what makes it so dangerous to rely on those energy
technologies alone.
Mr. Long. Before I got on this Zoom hearing I was on a Zoom
call with our Missouri utility co-ops, and they did not have
any blackouts, brownouts here in Missouri in our utility co-
ops, and we got down to 13 to 15 below. One report said 13, one
said 15. I know that it was colder than anything I've
experienced in my 65 years in southwest Missouri. Some of our
city utilities, municipal-owned utilities, did have rolling
blackouts.
And, Mr. Shellenberger, with you again, I spoke with a lot
of my utilities in my district over the last couple weeks
because the storms also brought, as I mentioned, the 13-below
temperatures here at our State. They said on a normal day they
receive 25 percent of their energy from renewable resources,
but during the cold streak that number went from 25 percent to
3 percent. How did the wind power generation in Texas compare
to that of baseload generation like nuclear and coal during the
storm?
Mr. Shellenberger. Thank you, Congressman. It's absolutely
right. You know, I pointed out that, as compared to normal
expected winter peak conditions, nuclear performed at 79
percent, coal at 58 percent, and wind at 50 percent, but you
have to look at the lowest hourly output, the lowest output,
because if you don't look at that number, then you're not
paying attention to the major issue, which is that you just
lacked sufficient supply. And so the lowest level, what wind
went to, was 2 percent of its total capacity, 9 percent of
winter adequacy expectations. Nuclear was at 73, coal was at
40, natural gas was at 40 or 46 under winter adequacy.
So I think this is what--I mean, I--civilization depends on
reliable electricity. I think everybody agrees with that, but
then you need--people need to explain how it is that variable
renewable energy sources, which are weather dependent, are--
somehow add up to being reliable and resilient at grid levels.
They don't. It actually just adds up to less reliability and
less resilience, all else being equal.
Mr. Long. I have no doubt that someday we'll get there with
all the renewables, but today is not the day. And like I say, I
think the folks in Texas would have loved having eight extra
coal-fired power plants on during the latest event.
And, Madam Chair, I'm a few minutes--few seconds over my
time, and I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Tonko for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
One factor frequently cited by experts for why the recent
storm was so devastating is the lack of winterization of the
Texas power plants, natural gas pipelines, and other power
infrastructure. Winterizing these assets would better protect
them from potentially failing during extreme cold weather and
would make the grid in Texas more resilient overall. The
Governor of Texas has now called on the State legislature to
mandate the winterization of its power system.
So, Mr. Robb, NERC has long recognized the risk that
inadequate weatherization can pose to grid reliability. NERC is
currently developing nationwide standards for addressing cold
weather events. So why did NERC choose to develop mandatory
reliability standards for cold weather events rather than issue
voluntary guidelines, which had been NERC's previous approach?
Mr. Robb. Yes, I think it became clear to us after the 2018
event--which is also in this part of the country, more in the
Arkansas, Louisiana area, and east Texas--when we peeled that
event apart in a joint inquiry with FERC, we concluded that
many of the precepts of the voluntary guidelines that we had in
place were not being adhered to, and that's what motivated us
to pivot to a mandatory structure.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
And, Mayor Turner, there are different estimates of what it
would cost to fully weatherize the grid and energy sources, but
failing to invest in the protection of these systems would also
be costly. In fact, an early economic analysis projected that
the total cost of this storm alone could be as high as $295
billion, more than Hurricanes Harvey and Ike combined.
So, Mr. Mayor, do you agree that it's long past time to
make the necessary investments to better weatherize Texas--the
Texas grid?
Mr. Turner. Absolutely. And I will tell you that, when you
track all of these storms--we've talked about the storm in
2011, the one in 2018, and now the one last month in 2021, and
I do have to emphasize again, it is important to weatherize the
grid, the system, because when you look at the plants that went
offline, your natural gas plants went offline, your coal-fired
plants went offline, and your nuclear plants went offline. As
much--we can talk about renewables. That's a red herring. But
if everything was coal-fired and natural gas, they went
offline.
Mr. Tonko. Well, that's an interesting point. Thank you.
Chairman Craddick, in your testimony, you assert that
natural gas producers, and I quote, ``were not the problem
behind the power shortages.'' However, multiple natural gas
producers reported to State authorities that their own
equipment failed during the storm because of cold temperatures.
So, Madam Chair, given the devastation we've seen in Texas,
isn't weatherization something that natural gas generators and
operators need to at least consider?
Ms. Craddick. Well, we don't get involved with the
generators, natural gas generators, so you'll have to ask NERC,
I think would be the appropriate person to ask as far as
generators. Natural gas operators have advised us 82 percent of
the people we have received information back from as we
continue to analyze data--82 percent of the operators who are
drilling and work in the field with natural gas tell us that
their biggest problem for not--for going offline was no
electricity in the field.
Mr. Tonko. Well, to protect the grid, we can and I believe
we must ensure that our power infrastructure can withstand all
types of extreme weather, including winter storms.
So, Mr. Magness, you recently said that Texas legislature
should consider weatherization mandates and called the Texas
Governor's decision to add that item to the emergency
legislative session a good idea. So do you agree that it's
finally time to better prepare the grid of Texas and energy
infrastructure for severe cold weather conditions?
Mr. Magness. Yes, and there are bills going through the
Texas House and I believe the Texas Senate currently that
include increased weatherization mandates, and I think they
certainly took up the Governor's call and are looking at that
right now.
Mr. Tonko. But do you agree that it's finally time to
better prepare the grid?
Mr. Magness. I think that the steps that have been taken so
far, we saw progress in previous winter storms. But certainly
what we saw this time as we learn what the causes are, taking
stronger steps to make sure those causes don't create
additional problems in the future, yes, that would certainly
help the grid reliability.
Mr. Tonko. So there is a need for better steps going
forward?
Mr. Magness. I believe there are, yes.
Mr. Tonko. OK. Well, I thank you.
And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Palmer for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palmer, we can't hear you.
We still can't hear you. Mr. Palmer. I'm going to go to Mr.
Dunn, and then we'll come back to you. OK.
Mr. Dunn, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dunn. Thank you very much, Chairwoman DeGette.
The Texas energy crisis should certainly serve as an
important example for policymakers for years to come. In this
hearing, we've spent time already focusing on what didn't work,
and there is certainly plenty of material to work on there. I'd
like to talk about one thing that largely did work, and that's
nuclear energy.
During this crisis, three out of four nuclear reactors in
Texas were able to remain online the entire time running at 100
percent capacity. And, ultimately, the problem that caused the
one unit to fail was identified, solved, and it too was able to
get back up and running while the freeze was still ongoing.
Further, during the historic 2011 freeze, none of the
reactors experienced any interruption. We should all note how
much worse these events would have been without the presence of
nuclear energy in Texas. A firm and resilient baseload energy
generation must be a priority for every State in the Union. We
need to make it easier to keep our existing nuclear reactors
online as well as construct new ones.
Mr. Shellenberger, briefly, can you explain how much worse
this crisis could have been had Texas not had the benefit of
its fleet of nuclear reactors?
Mr. Shellenberger. Thank you, Congressman, and you are
absolutely correct.
And just to correct the mayor of Houston, no nuclear plant
failed. A single reactor at one of Texas's nuclear plants
tripped.
And I would add something important I think for
policymakers to understand, is that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has in its power to change the regulation so that
that automatic tripping does not occur during such cold weather
events, that it was a sensor that was triggered by cold water
in tubing. It needs to be changed so that there would be a
human to investigate whether there's a real problem or whether
it was just unnecessarily tripped.
Each of these reactors provides electricity for somewhere
around 1 million, 1.5 million Texans. So, if you consider
having lost all four reactors, you're talking somewhere between
4 million to 6 million people additionally without power, and
that would have obviously been catastrophic.
So I do think that you're right to point out that there is
a significant difference here between weather-dependent energy
sources and energy sources that are fundamentally not weather
dependent. You can weatherize----
Mr. Dunn. Thank you for clarifying----
Mr. Shellenberger [continuing]. A wind turbine, but you
can't make the wind blow.
Mr. Dunn. I want to thank you for clarifying what happened
there. I actually was--that was a little fuzzy to me. I knew
there was a sensor problem. I didn't know exactly what it was.
Thank you for that.
Are you aware of any energy source that is more resilient
than nuclear, particularly in the face of extreme weather
events?
Mr. Shellenberger. No, sir. Coal obviously could be made
weather--much more weather resilient. But nuclear overall is by
far our most sufficient source of energy. It's----
Mr. Dunn. We're going to run out of time, so I'm going to
keep asking you questions if I could. As States begin to shift
their energy portfolios to favor renewables, do you think that
goal can be met without a strong presence of nuclear energy
generation, particularly if you're concerned about carbon
emissions?
And let me say, I count nuclear as a renewable too. I mean,
we have massive quantities of nuclear waste that could and
should be reprocessed and used for fuel as well as massive
untapped radioactive minerals, not to mention the steam that's
the principal product of the heat produced is renewable.
Mr. Shellenberger?
Mr. Shellenberger. Yes, that's absolutely right.
If we lose 20 percent of our nuclear electricity, we're
going to suffer affordability, reliability, sustainability. And
also our national security will suffer.
So I think it's urgent. I think it's very risky to be--for
the--to do legislation that would accelerate the closure of
those plants, which is what some legislation proposed in the
House would do, by so heavily favoring variable renewable
energy sources.
So I think there's serious risks that could actually be
exacerbated towards national security, affordability,
reliability, and resiliency if some of this headlong push
without a lot of thinking in advance continues towards greater
weather-dependent energy sources.
Mr. Dunn. I can't tell you how much I enjoy you choosing
that term, ``weather dependent'' and ``weather independent.''
That actually gets to the bottom line of our discussion on
resiliency and security and, you know, baseload energy
production. So thank you for your comments.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Vice Chair Peters for 5 minutes.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I wanted to direct questions to Mr. Robb. You know, in
California we have seen a rash of devastating wildfires. And
this year the committee held an important hearing on how these
wildfires affect our power sector.
According to the most recent National Climate Assessment,
the primary cause of power outages in the U.S. is extreme
weather--wildfires, hurricanes, intense cold periods--and many
of the events are expected to become more intense and frequent
due to changes in our climate.
The Texas energy market has received a lot of praise for
its deregulation, the simplicity of its reliance on price
singles in competition to provide power cost effectively, but
those market mechanisms never accounted for the possibility
that the pipelines would freeze, and it's pretty clear that
market incentives didn't generate the investment needed to
provide the necessary resiliency.
Mr. Robb, you indicated in response to Mr. Tonko's
questions that you agree that there's a need for government to
impose basic standards for resiliency on the electric and gas
providers since the market forces themselves don't induce it.
Can you tell us what actions utilities and regional
transmission organizations need to take to address climate
change? Can you flesh that out a little bit for us?
Mr. Robb. Well, I--sorry. Yes, I guess I would say from a
grid operations perspective is to have a very broad view as to
the range of climate scenarios that you have to be prepared to
serve, whether that's extreme hot weather in the summer,
extreme cold weather in the winter, making sure that you have
the resources lined up to be able to serve your customers
during that period of time. That's where the main--that would
be the main thing I would focus on.
Mr. Peters. And any specific one or two things that Texas
should have done in advance of a cold weather snap?
Mr. Robb. Well, I think the weatherization that we've
talked about, both of the entire fleet of resources, because
every resource had issues. Even the coal plants had issues with
frozen coal piles. So coal is not the only way out of this box.
What I'm very concerned about, though, is the fuel side of
this equation. One of the things that I think we've come to
learn is that resources as we thought about them traditionally,
we think about capacity being required. We haven't spent as
much time thinking about the fuel behind them and the energy
that they can produce.
I think one of the things that the grid operators need to
start shifting their operating paradigm to is to starting to
think about, you know, seasonal energy planning and operating
planning that takes into account fuel variability and fuel
availability as well.
Mr. Peter. It's pretty clear to me that leaving that to the
market alone isn't going to generate the incentive to give
those investments. That's got to be--that's got to come from
some industry and government consensus, correct?
Mr. Robb. I would leave it to market design experts to
decide whether the markets could invent that kind of planning
on their own.
Mr. Peters. Well, it's been 10 years and the market hasn't
done it, despite knowing that this was coming.
Let me turn to Mayor Turner. The severe storm in Texas
can't be classified as once in a century, and you've led
Houston through multiple major storms, including Hurricane
Harvey in 2017. In your statement you say, quote, ``The Texas
grid must be designed with the full appreciation that the
climate change is real and extreme weather events can occur
throughout the year.''
Mayor, what investments do you see that are necessary to
improve Texas grid resiliency in the face of a changing
climate? And when we think about investing in good resiliency
more broadly, are there lessons all of us can learn from Texas?
Mr. Turner. And when I was in the Texas House back in 2011,
what I said to the Public Utility Commission and to ERCOT and
to our State leaders, I said, if we--Texas was going to hold on
to its closed grid, then we had to make sure that we had an
adequate reserve, an adequate power to meet these extreme
weather events.
I agree with you, over the last 10 years Texas simply
relied on market incentives. There were no mandates. The hope
was that the market incentives would incentivize the power
generators to weatherize their system.
At this point the system--the mandate must come in place.
The system has to be weatherized, and then we have to make sure
to do everything we can to build in as much redundancy
throughout our power generators all the way to the end users,
and that's what we're doing even on the local level. We have to
make sure that we build in redundancy at the local end as well
as from the State end.
Mr. Peters. And I agree. Mayor, I want to say I think that
the Texas market, I like the way their market--I understand
their markets allocate resources in an efficient way and I
think it's terrific that Texas has employed that power, but
that's only as far as it goes. And it hasn't--it hasn't built
in the need to do this resiliency investment and then----
Mr. Turner. And one other thing is that the hope was there
was market incentive, the power generators would do it. But
they're not going to produce power that people are not going to
pay for. They're not going to do it, and that was the hope and
it did not happen.
Mr. Peters. Right. I agree.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Palmer, let's try you again for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palmer. Am I on?
Ms. DeGette. Yes. Thanks.
Mr. Palmer. Great. I don't know what happened with my
technology. It's not working. It's kind of like the Texas power
grid.
Mr. Shellenberger, some of my Democratic colleagues argue,
if we don't convert to 100 percent renewables to get to zero
CO2 emissions, that we're going to face a worldwide
climate catastrophe in 10 years. Is there any reasonable
expectation that we can replace power generation in that--and
go completely to renewables in that timeframe?
Mr. Shellenberger. Absolutely not.
Mr. Palmer. Is there any reasonable expectation that--is
the fact that there's 1 billion people with little to no access
to reliable power--and that numerous people back that up--could
these people have a reasonable expectation that they will one
day soon have access to reliable power generated entirely by
renewables?
Mr. Shellenberger. No, sir.
Mr. Palmer. So they wouldn't have a reasonable expectation
that they could only----
Mr. Shellenberger. In fact, the process of human
development is moving from unreliable renewables mainly in the
form of wood but also some amount of wind and water towards
reliable energy sources. That's what the industrial revolution
was all about.
Mr. Palmer. I'm not totally--for the record, I'm not
against renewables. I just want to make the point from an
engineering and technological perspective that it's not
possible to provide all of our energy through renewables. I
agree with Bill Gates that our best solution is through
nuclear.
We had a hearing--I think it was yesterday, it may have
been the day before yesterday. Former Secretary of Energy
Ernest Moniz talked about the need to expedite our permiting
for new construction. I pointed out that Pennsylvania's trying
to build a new rapid transit system, and it took them 8 years
just to do the paperwork. Well, according to the climate
catastrophe folks, that's 2 years short of the worldwide
calamity just to do the paperwork.
I'd also like to point out, in regard to a number of people
who attribute the polar vortex to climate change, it is a form
of climate change. But this is not new. This was actually
predicted in early January, as has been pointed out, but it--
the prediction was based on observation of atmospheric
conditions that were very similar to the last major polar
vortex on this magnitude that occurred in 1929.
There was one that occurred in 1887 in which the
temperature in Lafayette, Louisiana--Indiana; Lafayette,
Indiana--went down to 33 below. It was first designated a polar
vortex in 1843 and showed up in an English magazine, Household
Words, which one of the editors was Charles Dickens, in 1853.
These are not new.
You know, prior to coming to Congress and running a think
tank, prior to that I worked for two engineering companies. And
when we would--when our structural engineers did engineering,
for instance, they took into account earthquakes, for instance,
or hurricanes and they designed the buildings to withstand
certain seismic events or wind events. That's just part of
understanding the history of weather, the history of natural
disasters.
And we get into these brand new deal type things that
really don't make a lot of sense in terms of, first of all,
mitigating against the climate change that we know is going to
occur without doing irreparable harm to the economy.
I'd like for you to comment on that, Mr. Shellenberger.
Mr. Shellenberger. Yes, absolutely correct. May I point out
Texas spent $50 billion on renewables rather than weatherizing
its power generation sources. California spent $80 billion
rather than clearing the brush from around the electrical
wires, which is the main cause of power blackouts in 2019. And
in 2020 it was energy shortfall.
So if you--if we really think that extreme weather events
are becoming more frequent, then why would we be moving towards
weather--more weather-dependent energy sources and shutting
down our most efficient forms of energy, including nuclear,
which also happens to be our largest source of zero-carbon
power?
So I think if we're going to be consistent here and if
we're saying that we're committed to action on climate change,
then you can't have it both ways. You can't be shutting down
our nuclear plants and also preventing the building of new
ones.
Mr. Palmer. I thank the gentleman for your work.
And, Chairman DeGette, I appreciate your indulgence with my
technical difficulties.
I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. We're all having them today. So no worries.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schrier for 5 minutes.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
First, based on my colleagues' recent comments, I just feel
compelled to clarify for the record that we Democrats do
understand the importance of baseload for which hydropower and
nuclear are critical. And it is misinformation to state
otherwise. However, it is also misinformation to suggest that
wind energy was primarily to blame for the outages.
So, Mayor Turner, your testimony makes clear that blaming
renewables for the failure is blatantly false. Mayor Turner,
isn't it true that all--during storms all types of power
generation underperformed in Texas?
Mr. Turner. Absolutely. Natural gas, coal-fired, what is
it, nuke tripped? It didn't provide power. You can call its
failure tripping, it doesn't matter. And renewables in Texas
account for only about 30 percent of our total energy
portfolio.
Ms. Schrier. That's right. And during the winter, even less
than that. Thank you very much for that clarification.
Mr. Robb, in your testimony you explained the
diversification of our energy grids with more reliance on
natural gas as we introduce additional renewable resources. And
I know that in States like my State, Washington, we have been
proactively thinking about weatherization and energy
reliability requirements as we aim toward net zero by 2045.
You also highlight that extreme weather events are no
longer rare, and they're no longer just in one area, they're
everywhere. So it is clear that Texas will continue to
experience cold snaps, hurricanes, and other extreme weather
events. We should expect this everywhere in the country.
And so, as efforts are made to fortify our grid in the face
of increasing extreme weather events, we have to be cognizant
of our diverse and changing energy mix. Contingency plans
currently in place like load shedding are not really
sustainable as evidenced and don't ensure sustainable, diverse
electric grids.
So, Mr. Robb, can you elaborate on the impact of this
energy transition on grids' resiliency and reliability and also
the importance of I'll call them beefy transmission lines that
connect to States and what role NERC will play as Texas and our
country fortify our energy grid?
Mr. Robb. Well, there's a lot in there. I'll step back and
say that at NERC we are resource--agnostic's not the right word
but, you know, we don't select resources and we don't own
assets. We don't own--site transmissions and so forth. So our
main focus is making sure that as this new mix of energy
resources and transmission lines get developed that the system
works, integrates well, maintains frequency, maintains voltage,
and has the energy and the capacity to be able to serve load.
That's where our focus is going to remain, on the technical
operability of the system.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you very much.
Now, Mayor Turner, Houston is known as the energy capital
of the world and is also leading in the transition to cleaner
energy. So, Mr. Turner, Mayor Turner, Mr. Shellenberger seems
to imply that renewables only make the grid more unreliable,
and yet Texas has made a significant investment in renewables,
getting nearly a quarter of its supply from that class of power
generation, looking forward, understanding the future, knowing
what we need to do and thinking about decarbonizing.
Do you agree with Mr. Shellenberger's assertion that
renewables only make for a less reliable grid?
Mr. Turner. I disagree. Let me cite to you Houston is the
fourth-largest city in the country. One hundred percent of our
city facilities are powered by renewables, 100 percent. We
purchase more renewables than any other city in the United
States.
We are the energy capital of the world and we're proud of
it, and we are seeking to lead in energy transition and we are
working with our energy industry partners like BP and Shell and
NRG and CenterPoint. They underwrote our Resilient Houston
plan, as well as our climate action plan.
Now we're focusing on climate tact and climate energy.
Renewables are the way to get us to net zero. And bear in mind,
the planet is getting warmer. The science is clear that these
storms are going to continue to come unless we take proactive
steps.
Ms. Schrier. I appreciate your comments there, because
industry sees this as well. And they are getting in on this and
understanding that we need an energy mix.
So given that, Mr. Magness, given the changing energy mix,
what is ERCOT doing to ensure that Texas' power generation
assets are reliable and can perform under extreme weather
conditions? And then could you just comment on whether some
power sources are easier or cheaper to weatherize?
Ms. DeGette. If you can be brief, sir, because the
gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Schrier. Apologies.
Mr. Magness. Sure. I guess the key thing for resilience I
would say is having a diverse mix. The market in Texas has
attracted a lot of wind, a lot of solar. But we have a lot of
gas. We're led by gas. We have nuclear and coal. And I think
overall having a mixture that can deliver in different types of
weather situations, in different kinds of grid situations is
the most important factor.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you.
And apologize for that indulgence.
I yield.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Joyce for 5 minutes.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for
convening this important hearing today.
Mr. Shellenberger, the recent event in Texas highlights the
importance of natural gas for the grid. For example, certain
renewables like wind power are not necessarily going to be
there when you need them the most. And, while I personally
support clean energy on every level, given how much of the
baseload is comprised of fossil fuels, because you can call on
it whenever you need it, would you agree that we cannot
transition away from fossil fuels without reliable backup
power?
Mr. Shellenberger. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, absolutely I would agree. And just to correct
something: If Houston were 100 percent reliable on solar and
wind, then there would have been mass power outages, deaths,
loss of hospitals, everything during that period. So the only
way--I'm not sure what that even refers to, but the only way
you can have solar and wind is if you have significant
quantities of hydro, natural gas, or some other source of
firming power.
Mr. Joyce. And continuing with natural gas production: If
natural gas production was to drastically be reduced in the
next several years, based on what you've personally seen in
California, would you please describe the impact that you
estimate that this would have on utility prices?
Mr. Shellenberger. Well, we've seen what's happened in
California. And it's the same thing that's happened in Germany
and everywhere else in the world that has done a significant
deployment of weather-dependent energies. Our electricity
prices went up 8 times more than the rest of the United States
since 2011. We spent about $80 billion on renewables and all of
the accompanying equipment and personnel, rather than doing the
work to reduce the risk of fire hazard and the risks of extreme
weather events.
You know, obviously, you see the same thing in Texas. If
you don't have sufficient amount of baseload-reliable front
power supply, you're going to have power outages. In
California, we shut down our nuclear plant, which was about
2,200 megawatts. It was about that amount of electricity that
we had to load shed in California in order to avoid the
cascading failures.
Mr. Joyce. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that a
recent article in the Wall Street Journal entitled ``Texas
Blackouts Blew in on the Wind'' be included for the record.
Ms. DeGette. And, as with the other submissions, we will
consider it at the end of the hearing.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you.
According to this article, during the storm in Texas,
energy generated from wind and solar decreased 52 percent,
while the electricity generated from natural gas increased by
72 percent. Given this information, Mr. Shellenberger, would
the situation in Texas have been prevented if the State solely
relied on renewable sources?
Mr. Shellenberger. Absolutely not. I think the two numbers
you have to keep in mind is, at the lowest levels of production
wind produced 2 percent of its capacity in Texas, nuclear
produced 73 percent. This is not just a difference of quantity.
This is a difference of quality. These are qualitatively
different power sources.
One depends on when the wind is blowing or the sun is
shining. The other one simply depends on weatherized equipment.
If you weatherize all the wind turbines in Texas and the wind
still doesn't blow, you don't have wind energy.
This has been mystified, I think, by some ideas that
somehow you can find solar and wind somewhere at some point.
It's not true. It's also been mystified by the idea of
batteries. They do not provide seasonal storage, which is what
Texas needed in order to get through the crisis.
So on the fundamental questions of the need for nonweather-
dependent energies, there's no debate. I mean, nobody--there's
nobody that--of major energy analytical significance who denies
that.
Mr. Joyce. Could you summarize finally for the take-home
message: Is the variability that we are reaching for in energy
supplies, at this point in time does that variability lack
reliability?
Mr. Shellenberger. It does. And I did want to mention that
there is a way to maintain the grid's resilience and
reliability while adding a lot of variable renewable energy
sources. And it's to do with what Germany has done, which is to
keep their coal power plants online, in part so they don't
become overly dependent on imported Russian natural gas.
So you don't have to have an increasingly unreliable grid
when you add a lot of weather-dependent renewables, but it
seems you have to keep some of the source baseload power on,
and if it's not going to be nuclear, then it has to be coal and
natural gas.
And I think it's just obvious to everybody that becoming
overdependent on natural gas is extremely risky and very
radical when it comes to the direction of electricity
production.
Mr. Joyce. I see my time has expired. I thank you.
Madam Chair, I yield.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Trahan for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Trahan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Many Texans have indicated that they were unprepared for
this storm and the resulting disruptions in part because they
were not adequately warned of what was coming their way.
Mayor Turner, even as ERCOT was telling the public to
conserve energy in a statement released hours before the
outages began, ERCOT was still maintained. It had, quote, ``the
tools and procedures in place to maintain a reliable electric
particular system,'' end quote.
I'm worried this statement may have provided a false sense
of reassurance. So Mayor Turner, can you describe just how
unprepared your constituents were for the storm? Do you think
they were adequately warned about what to expect?
Mr. Turner. And the answer is no.
Let me just give you a personal example. OK. We were told
by our transmission distribution company that to expect rolling
blackouts anywhere from 1 hour to 2 hours maximum. That's what
we were told. When the power at my house went out at 2:00 a.m.
in the morning, I assumed this was going to take place and in
an hour or two the power would be restored. I didn't even worry
about it. But at 4:00, 5:00, and 6:00 when the power didn't
return, I was on the phone asking my transmission distribution
company what is the problem. They were not rolling blackouts.
They were power outages that lasted 3 and 4 days. No, they were
not prepared. And we were not forewarned.
Mrs. Trahan. That's helpful.
You know, I'm duly concerned that communication between
those responsible for the grid's reliability came up woefully
short. You know, as I know from what is happening in New
England, many parts of our country are relying more on natural
gas to generate electricity, making coordination between the
natural gas and electricity systems even more necessary during
extreme weather events.
Chairman Craddick, you testified before the Texas
legislature that there was, quote, ``a lack of communication
from ERCOT.'' You further testified that ERCOT, quote, ``didn't
understand that they needed a continuous gas flow to be able to
put gas into power plants.''
So, Chairman Craddick, nearly half of the electricity
generated on ERCOT's grid comes from natural gas, which you
regulate. Why didn't you communicate with ERCOT proactively to
ensure they were aware of this issue and could plan
accordingly?
Ms. Craddick. So we had not been involved with their
planning about natural gas, but what we did do and were asked
to do on the Thursday before, so the 11th, by the Public
Utility Commission was prioritize natural gas for gas-fired
power plants, which we did. They became the second in priority.
We did an emergency order February 12 at 6:30 at night
based on questions and recommendations from the Public Utility
Commission to prioritize those natural gas power plants. Before
that, we had not had a conversation about that at all. We'd
always focused on summertime weather.
So that has become a priority for us to again go back and
relook at our curtailment orders for natural gas, which we will
do, and see where the priorities need to continue to be.
Mrs. Trahan. All right. So with my remaining time, Mayor
Turner, you also chaired both the Resilient Cities Network and
Climate Mayors organization. And under your leadership Houston
developed an ambitious plan to mitigate climate change.
Can you explain how climate adaptation and mitigation
efforts go hand in hand and why we must do both to reduce
future climate catastrophes? You know, what role does renewable
energy play in trying to achieve that goal?
Mr. Turner. It plays a vital role in order to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and I will tell you that many of our
energy companies recognize that. We recognize--and just from a
factual point of view for myself, becoming mayor, I faced a
500-year storm. That was in 2016.
Twenty seventeen was Hurricane Harvey, 2019 was Tropical
Storm Imelda. Last month was this winter storm. They're coming
with greater frequency and greater intensity. Unless we take
steps to mitigate our risk, unless we take steps in order to
bring down greenhouse gas emissions, it's only going to get
worse, more frequency, and greater loss of life.
Fifty-seven people--and I want to underscore that--57
people died in Texas from this winter storm, hypothermia,
carbon monoxide poisoning. Hospitals, police stations, dialysis
clinics. So the system failed, and it was a systemwide failure.
By addressing resilience and also by putting in place
renewables, we can make this a better situation for our
businesses, for our energy companies, for moms and dads, you
name it, across the board. And we can get to net zero. And the
city of Houston, its facilities are 100 percent renewable, its
facilities and we're moving forward and I think we're heading
in the right direction.
Ms. Trahan. Couldn't have said it better myself.
Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
We're now pleased to have several members of the full
committee join us, and I am delighted first to recognize the
chair of the Select Committee on Climate Change, Ms. Castor,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Castor. Well, thank you very much, Chairwoman DeGette,
for focusing our attention on the energy system failures and
the catastrophe in Texas.
Mayor Turner, it's very good to see you again. Thank you
very much for your insightful testimony.
You know, climate change will continue to fuel these
unpredictable and costly events. So we all have a
responsibility to act now to make our communities more
resilient and incorporate modern American-led innovations into
our energy systems.
I think, Mayor Turner, I've heard you loud and clear.
You've been very direct that Texas failed to address this issue
after a similar event in 2011.
And I want to thank Representative Rice and others who have
pointed out how Texas has dropped the ball. They've failed to
respond to make the grid more resilient after 2011, but the
testimony that I've heard today largely has been in defense of
the status quo, and that's a recipe for more climate-fueled
disasters, pollution, and loss of life.
Thermal power plants, the primary technology that went
offline, and wind and solar performed as well or better than
expected. Renewable resources are reliable. For example, at
times wind energy provides 60 percent or more of the total
electricity in the southwest power pool.
It's a system that includes parts of 14 States and
stretches from Texas to North Dakota. And when you look across
the globe, wind turbines function well in extreme cold, but
they have to be weatherized. And all technologies struggle in
the face of severe conditions, and we just have to prepare for
this.
So here are a few ways. Grid enhancements and expanded
transmission are going to be critical to preventing outages
like this in the future. And as we head into what is going to
be a very hot summer, we believe, we need to focus on
protecting people from the consequences of these outages.
And I want to thank Rep. Veasey, Rep. Fletcher for working
with me to implement a number of the recommendations from our
Climate Crisis Action Plan out of the Select Committee--one,
improving planning for the resilience of the bulk electric
system to climate impact and two, expanding the deployment of
distributed energy resources to provide backup power.
We recommend that FERC direct NERC to develop reliability
standards, anticipating climate impacts, with the understanding
that these threats will vary by region from wildfires to floods
to cold snaps and hurricanes. So Congress also needs to provide
the funding to DOE to evaluate climate threats to the grid and
help share that information widely.
So, Mayor Turner, thank you very much for your testimony
today and congratulations for your very forward-looking climate
action plan there in Houston. I'm sure many of the residents
who lost power would have loved to have had distributed energy
resources and microgrids and grid-connected storage.
Is this something that you envision as part of your climate
action plan, something that other communities around the
country should be considering?
Mr. Turner. Absolutely. We're looking at increasing
resilience, and we've done this within our city facilities but
as well as in our assets in these communities, because it
wasn't just the city that hurt in terms of the facilities.
But you have a number of people who have faced these
seasonal storms over and over again, operating on the margins
and we need to do everything we can to put them in a better
position so these climate action resilient strategies are
important for our at-risk and vulnerable communities even more
so.
Ms. Castor. Well, I think that's right. And that's one of
the reasons, as we move forward to Build Back Better, we want
to provide these kind of resources to communities on the front
lines.
Mr. Turner. Absolutely.
Ms. Castor. So I'm looking to you for your partnership and
your leadership. You come highly recommended from the Texas
delegation, and we're going to need all of us to work in a
bipartisan way.
Really making our electric grid more resilient should not
be a partisan endeavor. We know we've got to modernize it. It's
going to take all of us working together to do that.
So thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
And I'd like to welcome Mr. Crenshaw to our full committee
and to our subcommittee.
And you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I really
appreciate you letting me come on and talk about my home State
here.
I want to get a few things straight. OK. There's been a lot
of misconceptions in this hearing. First, the Texas market
design is deregulated just like California, just like New
Hampshire, just like many others. Our market design is more
similar to California than it is to Georgia.
Second, the Texas grid is not the Wild West. It is indeed
regulated by Texas.
Third, Texas energy market is not a free market. It's not
some Wild West free market, as many have insinuated. There's
actually enormous subsidies that have been eroding the market
for the last 30 years.
I'm going to submit an article for the record that talks
about the eroding effects of the PTC on natural gas investment,
for instance.
And really quick, Mr. Shellenberger, you're good at putting
out facts like this. By orders of magnitude, how much more does
wind and solar get in subsidies than, say, nuclear?
Mr. Shellenberger. The last estimate that was done I
believe by either Congressional Research Service or GAO was 98
times in the last year that they looked at it.
Mr. Crenshaw. And that's right. I think gas is probably
even more, and so by far not a free market.
OK. Next fact check. No, thermal power didn't fail the
most. OK. Because a lot of people simply refused to believe
that during the storm electricity generated from wind and solar
decreased by 52 percent, while the electricity generated from
natural gas increased 72 percent. It wasn't enough.
Everything failed to an extent, weatherization being a huge
part of that. We've heard that ad nauseam. But let's stop
building this straw man argument that Republicans are blaming
wind. We are not blaming wind. In fact, no one in this hearing
has said that, because you can't blame something that's
inherently unreliable. OK.
Next, next thing, Mr. Mayor, your city facilities are not
powered by renewables when the wind isn't blowing and the sun
isn't shining. They just aren't.
Now, during the storm, 20 percent of the city's generators
would not start. Mr. Mayor, why were these generators not
maintained? Do you think it's the Federal Government's
responsibility to maintain those, or can you take responsible
for that?
Mr. Turner. Well, Congressman, several things. I'm not
asking the Federal Government to assume responsibility for a
generator that did not perform. But what I will say to you is
that 100 percent of our city facilities are powered by
renewables. And number two--number three, what I would remind
you is that over 67 percent of the power in the State of Texas
is natural gas, coal-fired and nuclear. Renewables count for a
far smaller percentage of gas. And, fourth, I voted to
deregulate this market in 1999.
So generation is deregulated. Our retail electric providers
are deregulated. Transmission distribution is regulated.
I'm quite familiar with----
Mr. Crenshaw. Mr. Mayor, I've given you enough time there.
If you want to respond to me more, you can actually text me
back every once in a while. I've got a long list of
nonresponses from you on my phone.
But, no, again, it is not true that your city is getting
power from solar when there's no sun shining. OK. Now you buy
into a specific kind of market that allows you to pay a little
bit extra so that you can say you're buying those electrons,
but in reality they're not.
This is the point. When you're talking about a reliable
source of energy, you don't want your hospitals being powered
by just wind and solar, right? You have to have backups. And so
it would be good to look into those generators when 20 percent
of them failed, because that's when what we rely on when things
go bad.
Mr. Shellenberger, you know, there's this talk about storms
happening more and more. Can you talk about the data on that,
the frequency and intensity of storms?
Mr. Shellenberger. Yes, I mentioned--thank you,
Congressman. I mentioned before you joined us that the number
of these severe cold snaps is just too low for anybody to make
any claim about increasing frequency, and you don't need to. We
need to be resilient no matter what's happening.
Mr. Crenshaw. Right. And if we completely decarbonize the
grid, will this lead to zero extreme weather events? Is there
any evidence of that, or is the weather going to look like San
Diego?
Mr. Shellenberger. Of course not. And I would like to
correct something that was said earlier around hurricanes and
frequency and intensity. The best available science from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration finds,
concludes that the intensity of Atlantic hurricanes will rise 5
percent but their frequency will decline 25 percent. So
sometimes the data--sometimes the science doesn't go in one
direction.
Mr. Crenshaw. Interesting.
Ms. Craddick, this committee and these witnesses have
asserted time and time again that natural gas is key to the
reliable grid. But recent administrative and legislative
actions would indicate these words on the committee don't meet
the actions. Can you tell us some the impact of some of the
recent actions, the recent proposals on the production of this
very critical resource, natural gas?
Ms. Craddick. Well, if you look at where the Federal
Government is today, we're blessed to be in Texas and not in a
State that is--has Federal lands because there's no production
or lack of production or limiting production of natural gas,
first and foremost.
And the other thing that's happened in Texas that we now
recognize, when you're talking about compressors, we are now
moving to electric compressors because Texas is a nonattainment
State. We wanted to make sure in this State that we were
continuing to use natural gas for air emissions quality.
So those two things have led us to shift from natural gas
and to look at other opportunities, electricity being one of
them.
Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Fletcher for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
These issues are so important for Texans and for all of us
across the country, as this hearing has shown. And as we're
getting toward the end of the hearing, I just want to thank the
witnesses for their time and their testimony. This is a
conversation that will continue certainly in this Congress and
in my home State of Texas. There's simply not enough time for
me to ask all the questions that I have in these 5 minutes, but
I do hope to touch on a few things.
First of all, I think it's important to understand that all
of our sources of electricity supply underperformed at the same
time we had record demand. And that is just critically
important to understand that we have and need a diversity of
fuel sources.
But we also have to be prepared for both having variable
sources of energy and also having firm sources and being able
to come up with a plan to structure our power supply that way.
What we do know is that there are a lot of warnings that
this could happen, that it might happen, ample warnings from
FERC and NERC about how the Texas grid was vulnerable to winter
resilience issues. And those have been documented. So I want to
try to address a couple of things here quickly.
Mr. Magness, you testified earlier that the transmission
providers prepare plans and protocols to shed load and that
those decisions are made by the providers, not ERCOT. That's
correct, right?
Mr. Magness. Yes, it is.
Mrs. Fletcher. OK. And are those plans provided to ERCOT as
the transmission providers?
Mr. Magness. That's a good question, Congresswoman. I'm not
sure that we--we don't have any role in reviewing or improving
those plans. I can check and see if we received copies of them,
but essentially we issue the directive and say we need this
much load shed and then they implement those plans out of their
communities.
Mrs. Fletcher. Do you know--oh, I'm sorry. I lost audio.
Mr. Magness. Can you hear me?
Ms. DeGette. We can hear you.
Mrs. Fletcher. I can hear you now.
Mr. Magness. OK. OK.
Mrs. Fletcher. I think I caught most of that answer. So
that would be great if you could get back to us on that
question and whether in general, you know, they are provided
for review to any reviewing agency as more than our priority or
whether the PUC or any other Texas agency reviews those would
be very helpful. And if you could, if you have copies, if you
could provide those to this committee or let us know who can
provide those plans to this committee, that would be very
helpful.
Mr. Magness. We can get back to you.
Mrs. Fletcher. That'd be great. Thank you.
There's also some testimony earlier about requirements for
weatherization, and I just want to be clear. As I understand
it, neither Texas or ERCOT have requirements for weatherization
except in certain limited circumstances for the power
generators.
Instead, as I understood in a call during the storm with
ERCOT, the generators rely on best practices, industry
practices shared amongst themselves. Is that correct?
Mr. Magness. Yes. That's correct currently, yes.
Mrs. Fletcher. OK. So would you characterize the failure of
what we saw in this winter storm as one of market design?
Mr. Magness. I wouldn't characterize it as market design in
the sense that, when we saw the generation go off, it was
related directly to the winter storm. Now how much of that was
winterization or other impacts, we will find out.
But I think the actual loss of generation that caused the
outages was primarily had to do with the winter storm.
Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you, Mr. Magness. I appreciate that.
I want to ask my next few questions to Mr. Robb. Thank you
very much for your testimony today as well.
I want to follow up on the 2011 Texas winter storm report.
You made numerous recommendations for ERCOT how to be better
prepared going forward. To your knowledge, did ERCOT adopt
those?
Mr. Robb. I think most of our recommendations were aimed at
the generation and utility segment of the business, not to
ERCOT itself.
Mrs. Fletcher. OK.
Mr. Robb. So the one thing that I think is important that
I'd like to underscore is that what's really important for the
grid operator, for Mr. Magness and his organization, he needs
to know what the state of play is out on the grid. He needs to
know which resourses are going to be there or not.
And I think one of the problems here is that they were
counting on resources to show up that didn't, and that's a
communication failure that needs to be addressed.
Mrs. Fletcher. Yes. And I agree there are a lot of
communication failures, and I think that that's an important
part of the study across the board for everyone who's reviewing
this.
I have really limited time. So I'm going to submit a couple
more questions to you for the record at the conclusion. But I
do want to hear you talk briefly to this committee, while we
have time.
In your testimony you talked about how additional frontline
infrastructure, including gas storage, is needed for
reliability within the transmission system. Why are additional
pipeline systems so key to maintaining reliability?
Mr. Robb. Well, I think, as we've heard, right, the gas
system and the electric system are like this, now, right?
They're not two systems that can coexist separately with just,
you know, touch points, right? The gas reliability and electric
reliability are inherently connected.
One of the issues that we see--and we see this most clearly
in California, because we have the most solar build-out in
California--is the ability of the gas system to support very
rapid power plant ramps.
So in the--particularly in the afternoon when solar comes
off, the power demand continues to grow, and natural gas is
currently the only resource that can meet that peak. And the
amount of gas and the volume of gas that those power plants
suck out of the gas system is extraordinary. And storage turns
to be one of key assets to be able to maintain pressure in the
gas system in that scenario.
Mrs. Fletcher. Well, thank you so much for that. Five
minutes goes very quickly.
Chairwoman DeGette, thank you for giving them to me, plus a
little extra. I appreciate it.
And I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Veasey, are you--there are you. I recognize you now for
5 minutes.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
In last months's winter storm we had more than 4.5 million
Texans that didn't have power during one of the coldest weeks
really in our State's history. We are obviously blessed in
Texas with a lot of natural resources, but what we saw can
happen when proper steps aren't taken to prepare.
And so I want to start off and asking questions to my
former colleague and dear friend, the mayor of Houston,
Sylvester Turner. When we served together in the legislature,
this was--this area was Sylvester's wheelhouse. He knew the
area of power probably more than any other legislator that I've
served with.
And because you're known in this area and we know the
report from FERC and NERC that detailed the need for action
following the 2011 outages went largely ignored, in your
opinion, Mayor Turner, did the PUC do enough to address these
issues with the information that they had?
Mr. Turner. And the direct answer, Congressman Veasey, is
no. And these issues were discussed in 2011, in 2012, and
subsequent years. So the answer is no.
Mr. Veasey. What do you think the legislature needs to do
this session to prevent this from happening again? As you know,
we're getting closer and closer to sine die. It's going to be
the end of May before we know it. What do they need to do more
than anything else to prevent this from happening again?
Mr. Turner. I think, one, there needs to be a full
acknowledgement that climate change is real. And once you
acknowledge it, then you build it into your strategies.
Number two, you can no longer--we can no longer rely just
on a market incentive system. There will have to be
requirements to weatherize our system. That's a must. And if
we're going to continue to be a closed grid, ERCOT, 90 percent
covering the State of Texas, then we have to take every
necessary steps to make sure there's adequate energy supply in
peak demands.
Mr. Veasey. Yes. No, Mayor Turner, thank you very much.
We know it's possible to maintain reliability in much more
extreme weather conditions, but unfortunately no fuel source is
perfect during the storm. In the coming months we're going to
learn more about unweatherized wind turbines, unweatherized
thermal power plants, or frozen pipes.
One thing that we do know had a significant impact was the
inability to produce natural gas from frozen wellheads and a
loss of electricity at production and process and
infrastructure. After similar blackouts in 2011, 2014, 2018,
Federal investigators said that freezing of natural gas
pipelines and compressor stations was one of the causes for the
blackout. The Railroad Commission has failed to take action on
that.
We also know that many natural gas producers and processors
failed to file the necessary paperwork with the electric
utility to be listed as critical infrastructure. That meant
that, when we had rolling blackouts and when they were
initiated, these natural gas companies didn't have the
electricity necessary to pull gas from underground, which in
turn led to a natural gas shortage of power plants and created
a downward spiral of more blackouts.
Right now it's optional for these companies to file this
paperwork, but Charlie Geren, also from Fort Worth, he has a
bill, Commissioner Craddick, that he is going to file that will
answer some of these concerns that I just laid out. And I want
to ask you, Commissioner Craddick, should these energy
producers--who we all know are critical to keeping the lights
on so we won't have a repeat of what we saw--should they be
required to file this paperwork? And should it be included on
the electric utilities critical list?
Ms. Craddick. I think it's an important piece that,
frankly, my agency hadn't been communicated from ERCOT that
this existed. But, too, if you look at for these forms the
second--the time when we finally realized this form existed,
because it was based on summertime, not wintertime, but when we
realized that, we've now sent it from our agency, sent a letter
to every single operator that we regulate, suggesting that they
file this form.
Mr. Veasey. But you don't think it should be required?
Ms. Craddick. The challenge we still have though is ERCOT
today doesn't prioritize gas fields. It's only gas processing
plants forward. So we'd like to encourage ERCOT to remap the
system and understand that the whole system needs to be
included, not just part, because we had operators who told us
they would have been happy to file the form had, one, they
known about it and, two, had they been included in the form,
and they were not.
Mr. Veasey. And see, and Madam Chair, as I yield back my
time, as it has expired, that's the problem, is that we are
literally going to get to end of May and the Texas legislative
session will have begun, and Republicans just want this problem
to go away.
They don't want to deal with this. They don't want to
require anybody to have to do anything, which means we're going
to be sitting in the cold again, and that is--and that is the
problem. They're running out the clock. They are literally
running out the clock, as I am 40 seconds over my time.
Madam Chair, I give you back the gavel. Thank you so much.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman and our other members
from Texas for helping illuminate this, and I hope that this--
that this hearing will help bring some light and bring some
changes to Texas.
I also really want to thank every single one of our
witnesses today. As I said, particularly those of you who are
operating in Texas, your plates are full right now. And you
really gave us a great overview on what's happening and what we
need to do. We can use that as guidance as we look at national
policy. So I really want to thank you.
I will ask you, Mr. Griffith, do you have anything else?
Mr. Griffith. Well, Madam Chair, I would just say that it's
my understanding from the Texas delegation that there are six
bills that are moving through the process, and they're
bipartisan bills to try to make things better in the Texas
legislature, and I just wanted to make sure that was in the
record. I appreciate you----
Ms. DeGette. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. I thank the
gentleman.
The Chair will remind Members that, pursuant to committee
rules, they have 10 business days to submit additional
questions for the record to be answered by our witnesses who
have appeared today, and I hope that the witnesses will respond
promptly to any questions if you would receive any.
There have been a number of references to documents for the
record in this hearing, and at this point we will insert them
in the record by unanimous consent: A letter from
Representative Pallone and others to ERCOT, dated March 4,
2021; a letter from ERCOT responding to Representative Pallone
and others, dated March 18, 2021; a letter from Representative
Pallone and others to Governor Greg Abbott, dated February
19th, 2021; a letter from the office of the Governor of Texas
to Representative Pallone and others, dated March 19th, 2021; a
presentation from ERCOT reviewing the February 2021 extreme
cold weather event; a graphic detailing ERCOT's 2020 energy
generation mix.
Three charts showing ERCOT's grid frequency--all of those,
by the way, are offered by me--there's three charts showing
ERCOT's grid frequency, total generation, and generation source
between March 1 and March 18th, by Mr. Griffith.
An article from the Texas Tribune dated March 18, 2021,
Texas House Bill 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, and 17--all of those
documents are offered by Mr. Burgess. An op-ed from the Wall
Street Journal dated March 19th, 2021, offered by Mr. Joyce,
and an article from RMI dated September 30th, 2020.
Without objection, these documents are all ordered.
And, again, thanks to everybody. And with that, the
subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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