[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
                        APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 HEARINGS

                                 BEFORE A

                           SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                       COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                     ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                              FIRST SESSION

                              ______________

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

              LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California, Chairwoman

  HENRY CUELLAR, Texas			CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee	
  LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois		STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
  DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina	JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida
  C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland	ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa
  MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
  PETE AGUILAR, California

  NOTE: Under committee rules, Ms. DeLauro, as chair of the full 
committee, and Ms. Granger, as ranking minority member of the full 
committee, are authorized to sit as members of all subcommittees.

         Darek Newby, Kris Mallard, Karyn Richmond, Bob Joachim,
                    Mike Herman, and Elizabeth Lapham
                            Subcommittee Staff

                                ____________

                                  PART 2
                                  
                       DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
                       
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       Printed for th euse of the Committee on Appropriations
       
                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                                ----------                              
                  ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut, Chair


  MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
  DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
  LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
  SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
  BARBARA LEE, California
  BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
  TIM RYAN, Ohio
  C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
  DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
  HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
  CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
  MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
  DEREK KILMER, Washington
  MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
  GRACE MENG, New York
  MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
  KATHERINE M. CLARK, Massachusetts
  PETE AGUILAR, California
  LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
  CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
  BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
  BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
  NORMA J. TORRES, California
  CHARLIE CRIST, Florida
  ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
  ED CASE, Hawaii
  ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
  JOSH HARDER, California
  JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
  DAVID J. TRONE, Maryland
  LAUREN UNDERWOOD, Illinois
  SUSIE LEE, Nevada

  KAY GRANGER, Texas
  HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
  ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
  MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
  JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
  KEN CALVERT, California
  TOM COLE, Oklahoma
  MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
  STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas
  JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
  CHUCK FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee
  JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington
  DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio
  ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
  MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
  CHRIS STEWART, Utah
  STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
  DAVID G. VALADAO, California
  DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
  JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
  JOHN H. RUTHERFORD, Florida
  BEN CLINE, Virginia
  GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
  MIKE GARCIA, California
  ASHLEY HINSON, Iowa
  TONY GONZALES, Texas

                 Robin Juliano, Clerk and Staff Director

                                   (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S

                               __________

                             Hearings Held

                                                                   Page

                             March 10, 2021

MODERNIZING THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN APPROACH TO CYBERSECURITY.......     1

                               Witnesses

Goldstein, Eric, executive assistant director for Cybersecurity, 
  CISA...........................................................     3
Wales, Brandon, acting director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
  Security Agency (CISA).........................................    12

                             March 16, 2021

THE ROLE OF FEMA AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN COVID-19 RESPONSE...    41

                               Witnesses

Brown, Curtis, State coordinator and co-founder, Virginia 
  Department of Emergency Management and Institute for Diversity 
  and Inclusion in Emergency Management..........................    84
Fenton, Bob, senior official performing the duties of FEMA 
  Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.............    43
Ghilarducci, Mark, director, California Governor's Office of 
  Emergency Services.............................................    70
McGowan, Kevin, director, Los Angeles County Office of Emergency 
  Management.....................................................    93
Sheehan, Patrick, director, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency    85

                             March 17, 2021

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES............   127

                               Witnesses

Cherthoff, Hon, Michael, former Secretary, Department of Homeland 
  Security.......................................................   129
Johnson, Hon. Jeh, former Secretary, Department of Homeland 
  Security.......................................................   136

                             March 24, 2021

TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION.......................   167

                               Witnesses

Aborn, Richard, president, Citizens Crime Commission of New Your 
  City...........................................................   208
Cohen, John, assistant secretary, Counterterrorism and Emerging 
  Threats, Department of Homeland Security.......................   175
Cote, Tyler, director and co-founder, Operation250...............   214
Picarelli, John, director, Office of Targeted Violence and 
  Terrorism Prevention, Department of Homeland Security..........   187
Rangel, Sammy, executive director and co-founder, Life After Hate   220

                             April 28, 2021

COAST GUARD READINESS............................................   253

                                Witness

Schultz, Admiral Karl L., commandant, U.S. Coast Guard...........   255

                              May 6, 2021

U.S. SECRET SERVICE FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST..............   303

                                Witness

Murray, James, director, U.S. Secret Service.....................   305

                              May 13, 2021

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND 
  OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES.........................................   331

                                Witness

Johnson, Tae D., acting director, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
  Enforcement....................................................   353

                              May 19, 2021

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND 
  OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES.........................................   397

                                Witness

Miller, Troy, senior official performing the duties of the 
  commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection...............   400

                              May 20, 2021

MEMBERS' DAY.....................................................   457

                               Witnesses

Fallon, Hon. Pat, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Texas..........................................................   463
Jackson Lee, Hon. Sheila, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Texas, submitted statement............................   467
Van Drew, Hon. Jefferson, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey............................................   458

                              May 26, 2021

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND 
  OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES.........................................   471

                                Witness

Mayorkas, Hon. Alejandro, Secretary, Department of Homeland 
  Security.......................................................

 
        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022

                              ----------                              

                                         Wednesday, March 10, 2021.

 MODERNIZING THE FEDERAL CIVILIAN APPROACH TO CYBERSECURITY DEPARTMENT 
              OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022

                               WITNESSES

ERIC GOLDSTEIN, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR CYBERSECURITY, CISA
BRANDON WALES, ACTING DIRECTOR, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
    SECURITY AGENCY (CISA)
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order.
     As this hearing is being conducted virtually, we must 
address a few housekeeping matters. Members are responsible for 
muting and unmuting themselves. When you are recognized to 
speak, if I notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will 
ask you if you would like the staff to unmute you. If you 
indicate approval by nodding, staff will unmute your 
microphone. To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair or 
staff designated by the chair may mute participants' 
microphones when they are not recognized to speak.
     I remind all members and witnesses that the 5-minute clock 
still applies.
     If there is a technology issue during a member's speaking 
time, we will move to the next member until the issue is 
resolved, and you will retain the balance of your time.
     You will notice a clock on your screen showing your 
remaining time. At 1 minute remaining, the clock will turn 
yellow. At 30 seconds remaining, I will gently tap the gavel to 
remind the member speaking that their time is almost expired. 
When your time has expired, the clock will turn red and I will 
begin to recognize the next member.
     We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules beginning with the chair and ranking member, followed by 
members present at the time the hearing is called to order, in 
order of seniority, and we will alternate by party. Next, we 
will go to members who were not present when the hearing was 
called to order until every member present has had a first 
round.
     Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email address to which members can submit information 
in writing at any of our hearings or markups. That email 
address has been provided in advance to your staff.
     Now, with that business out of the way, I will welcome 
everyone to the first Department of Homeland Security 
Subcommittee hearing of the 117th Congress. I particularly want 
to welcome our new members: Ms. Underwood, Mr. Quigley, and 
Mrs. Hinson.
     Welcome also to today's witnesses, Acting Director Wales 
and Executive Assistant Director Goldstein of the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency.
     I will make my opening statement brief to maximize time 
for questions.
     Acting Director Wales, you have been asked to step into an 
interim role as acting director, and we very much appreciate 
your service in this capacity. We have spoken about some of the 
recent challenges you and CISA face, and I want to reaffirm my 
commitment to helping you address them.
     The SolarWinds incident, a water treatment facility 
attacked in Florida, and, most recently, the compromise of 
Microsoft Exchange servers demonstrate that cybersecurity 
breaches are no longer isolated incidents. Networks are an 
emerging battlefield for both the public and private sectors.
     In the case of the SolarWinds incident, it took far too 
long to become aware that a foreign adversary had infiltrated 
Federal civilian agency networks, and, if infiltrated, 
sensitive data. I am deeply concerned about how long it will 
take to learn the full extent of that compromise, and we are 
just beginning to learn about the impact of the Microsoft 
Exchange Server intrusion.
     It is also unnerving how easy it was for a hacker to 
manipulate the control systems of the Florida treatment plant, 
increasing the amount of lye to levels that could have led to 
tragedy if a watchful supervisor at the plant hadn't noticed it 
in time.
     It is clear that we need to be investing much more in 
preventing, mitigating, and responding to cyber intrusions and 
attacks. The $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan includes 
significant funding to quickly improve the Federal civilian 
cybersecurity posture, including $650 million for CISA.
     I look forward to hearing more from you on that topic 
today and on CISA's overall vision for modernizing our approach 
to cybersecurity.
     I would now like to turn to the distinguished gentleman 
from Tennessee, Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening 
comments.
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair. And as always, it 
is a pleasure to work with you and yours in this subcommittee, 
and on the full committee as well.
     Welcome, Acting Director Wales and Executive Assistant 
Director Goldstein, and thank you for joining us today as we 
look into ways to help modernize Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency.
     First off, I know that we are here to identify problems, 
and, hopefully, to come to an agreement on some recommended 
areas for improvement in the government's protection of and 
response to cyber attacks.
     But first, let me take this opportunity to address that 
the scope of this hearing is not just to critique the work that 
you and the men and women at CISA have done to this point. With 
limited resources at your disposal, you have done a tremendous 
job, and I thank you.
     It is unfortunate that the world of cybersecurity is 
almost a thankless job where, in a best-case scenario, all of 
your work allows government operations and agencies to continue 
unhindered, and that all of your hard work goes almost 
completely unnoticed, and, at worst, only your shortcomings are 
brought up after a major attack occurs. So please pass on our 
thanks to your workforce and let them know that we appreciate 
their efforts.
     Unfortunately, despite our best efforts, Nation State 
actors with access to significant funds and resources have 
found a way to thwart our best protections and exploit our 
vulnerabilities as we have seen from the Russian-backed 
SolarWinds attack, and the much more recent China attack based 
on Microsoft Exchange servers.
     We have learned from these attacks that our adversaries 
are not only aware of our capabilities, but they are shrewd and 
cunning enough to go around them, exploiting our weaknesses and 
taking advantage of our vulnerabilities in real time almost 
completely undetected.
     The cyber world is certainly a challenging one whose 
vulnerabilities and shortcomings are not always readily 
apparent. Given the speed at which technology advances and the 
skills and abilities of bad actors with it, we must ensure that 
we are doing everything we can to keep up with new 
advancements, allowing ourselves the ability to both better 
recognize our shortcomings, and better protect, identify, and 
respond to any future attacks.
     I look forward to your testimony on CISA's recommendations 
for improvements, and ensuing conversation on how to best 
protect our cyber infrastructure moving forward.
     Thank you for being here. I look forward to your 
testimony.
     Madam Chair, I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Acting Director Wales, we will submit 
the full text of your official statement for the hearing 
record.
     Please begin your oral summary.
     Mr. Wales. Thank you.
     And good morning, Chairman DeLauro, Chairwoman Roybal-
Allard, and Ranking Member Fleischmann, and members of the 
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today 
regarding the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency's perspectives on modernizing the Federal civilian 
approach to cybersecurity.
     If we needed any reminder of the significance of the cyber 
threats we face to our national and economic security, the last 
3 months, and, indeed, the last week, should serve as a 
warning. We must invest in and focus on modernizing our 
cybersecurity network infrastructure in order to truly defend 
today and secure tomorrow.
     CISA leads the Nation's efforts to advance the 
cybersecurity, physical security, and resilience of our 
critical infrastructure. We share information and enable 
operational collaboration between the Federal Government, State 
and local governments, the private sector, international 
partners, and law enforcement, intelligence, and defense 
communities. This role has proven invaluable in managing recent 
cyber incidents, and I cannot understate how important 
collective defense is for cybersecurity; but we also know that 
there is a lot more work that needs to be done.
     Today, we will focus on two recent significant 
cybersecurity incidents: first, the exploitation of Microsoft 
Exchange vulnerabilities disclosed last week and, second, the 
supply chain compromise the Federal Government was alerted to 
in December of 2020.
     Starting with the Exchange vulnerabilities. On March 2, 
CISA, the NSA, Microsoft, and Volexity disclosed previously 
unknown vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange products. Through 
CISA's coordinated vulnerability disclosure process, our 
organization helped all partners ensure that vulnerability 
information and mitigation actions were quickly shared broadly.
     On March 3, CISA issued Executive Emergency Directive 21-
02 requiring Federal civilian departments and agencies to 
investigate, patch, and, if necessary, disconnect vulnerable 
products from their network. This directive reflects our 
determination that these vulnerabilities pose unacceptable 
risks to Federal networks and require emergency action.
     CISA is already aware of widespread exploitation of the 
vulnerabilities, and trusted partners have observed malicious 
actors using these vulnerabilities to gain access to targeted 
organizations in the United States and globally. Importantly, 
once an adversary gains access to a Microsoft Exchange Server, 
they can access and control an enterprise network, even after 
the vulnerabilities are patched. A malicious exploitation could 
be conducted by actors with various motivations, from stealing 
information to executing ransomware attacks, or physically 
damaging connected infrastructure.
     CISA has stood up, CISA.gov/ed21-02, as a consolidated 
resource and a mechanism for all of our information on this 
vulnerability, and we are using all of our forums to share this 
information quickly and broadly with our partners.
     Switching to the supply chain compromise, late last year 
CISA became aware of a broad cyber intrusion campaign largely 
associated with the supply chain compromise of SolarWinds Orion 
Network Management software. Nearly 18,000 entities were 
potentially exposed to the malicious SolarWinds software. CISA 
estimates that a much smaller number were compromised when the 
threat actor activated a malicious backdoor they had installed 
in the SolarWinds product and moved into an exposed network. 
Once inside the network, the actor was able to use their 
privileged access to abuse the authentication mechanisms, the 
systems that control trust and manage identities, ultimately 
allowing them to access and exfiltrate email and other data 
from compromised networks and Microsoft Office 365 cloud 
environments.
     The primary objective of the threat actor in this campaign 
appears to be gaining access to sensitive unclassified 
communications and to identify additional opportunities to 
compromise IT supply chains.
     CISA's work, in response to this campaign, falls under 
four primary lines of effort: one, scoping the campaign; two, 
sharing information and detections; three, supporting short-
term remediation; and, four, providing guidance and assistance 
in long-term network recovery. These lines of effort are the 
framework around which we think about our response to any cyber 
incident.
     We continue to work this campaign aggressively. Just 
yesterday, we rolled out a new website that consolidates 
information and resources on best practices for remediating 
compromised systems, and preparing Federal departments and 
agencies for long-term actions to build more secure, resilient 
networks.
     Before I close, I want to address a more fundamental 
question: What does this all mean? Both the Microsoft Exchange 
vulnerabilities and the SolarWinds campaign highlight the 
lengths to which sophisticated adversaries will go to 
compromise our networks. They will use never seen before 
techniques, exquisite trade craft, zero-trust vulnerabilities 
to defeat our current cybersecurity architecture. Knowing that, 
we must raise our game. We need modern cybersecurity governance 
and capabilities. We need cybersecurity tools and services that 
provide us a better chance of detecting the most sophisticated 
attacks, and we need to rethink our approach to managing 
cybersecurity across 101 Federal civilian executive branch 
agencies.
     Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify on this 
important subject, and I will now turn the discussion over to 
CISA's newly appointed Cybersecurity Division Executive 
Assistant Director, Eric Goldstein, to talk about the direction 
we are headed, the capabilities we urgently need, and what you 
can do to help.
     [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
     Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Acting Director.
     Chairman DeLauro, Chairman Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member 
Fleischmann, thank you for the chance to speak with you and the 
committee today. This is my first hearing before the committee 
in my new capacity as Executive Assistant Director for 
Cybersecurity within CISA. I would like to commend the 
committee, first and foremost, for focusing on this urgent 
national security threat. I look forward to partnering with the 
committee to ensure that our Nation has the capabilities and 
resources to address rapidly increasing cybersecurity risks.
     Acting Director Wales provided an overview of recent 
incidents affecting public and private entities of all types. 
These incidents reflect a need to strengthen our Nation's cyber 
defenses, invest in new capabilities, and begin to 
fundamentally change how we think about cybersecurity. Even as 
CISA responds to and mitigates the impact of these immediate 
incidents, we are looking ahead to ensure that CISA is 
appropriately postured to defend today and secure tomorrow.
     To this end, we are focused on urgent improvements across 
four areas of strategic growth:
     First, we must increase CISA's visibility into 
cybersecurity risks across the Federal civilian executive 
branch, and, where feasible, across non Federal entities.
     Second, we must expand CISA's incident response capacity.
     Third, we must improve our ability to analyze large 
volumes of cybersecurity information to rapidly identify 
emerging threats and direct timely mitigation.
     And, fourth, but perhaps strategically most importantly, 
we must drive adoption of defensible networks, including 
progressing towards zero-trust environments, where we assume 
that networks are compromised and we focus on protecting the 
users and assets therein.
     Turning to our key priority of operational visibility, we 
must increase and improve our insight into Federal agency's 
cloud environments, and to end points, the servers and 
computers that agencies use to conduct their daily business. 
This is critically important during COVID-19, as the Federal 
workforce has moved to increase remote work, a trend that we 
expect to continue and concomitant increase in the use of cloud 
computers. To achieve this goal, we must provide agencies with 
detection tools and build our ability to analyze data deriving 
therefrom.
     While no organization can prevent every cyber intrusion, 
increased visibility will let us detect and respond to 
incidents more quickly, thereby limiting harm to victim 
organizations.
     As we expand our visibility, we will also inherently 
detect more cybersecurity incidents. To this end, we must 
further develop our incident response capacity, to hunt for 
threats on Federal networks, and provide urgent assistance to 
compromised entities. While we are effectively responding to 
incidents today, our resources must be fortified to ensure that 
we can meet demand in the future.
     Going forward, we must shift to a persistent threat 
hunting model in which CISA continuously searches for malicious 
activity across partner networks as authorized by the fiscal 
year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.
     In addition to increasing our incident response capacity, 
we must also develop and refine our analytic capabilities so 
that we can analyze cybersecurity data and more rapidly 
identify risks across the executive branch.
     And, lastly, over the long term, we must facilitate 
adoption of more defensible networks, including by offering 
shared services to Federal agencies, to raise the baseline of 
cybersecurity across the executive branch, and providing 
agencies with tools and guidance to move to zero-trust 
principles where, again, we presume that network perimeters can 
be compromised and we focus on protecting the critical assets 
within each network.
     We deeply appreciate Congress' consideration of additional 
funding to address these priorities, which are urgently needed 
for CISA to provide foundational capabilities across the 
Federal civilian executive branch. These investments critically 
should be considered a downpayment for the sustained effort 
required to improve and modernize Federal civilian 
cybersecurity over the long term. It is now more critical than 
ever to urgently focus on securing the Federal civilian 
government and responding quickly when a compromise occurs. By 
enhancing our visibility into agency networks, moving towards a 
posture of proactive hunting, and deploying more defensible 
network architectures, we can most effectively ensure that the 
Federal Government can provide the critical services upon which 
the American people depend.
     Thank you, again, for the chance to speak with you. We 
look forward to taking your questions.
     [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
     Before we go to questions, I understand that the 
chairwoman of the full committee is here, and would like to ask 
if she has any opening comments that she would like to make 
before we go to questions.
     The Chair. What I will do, Madam Chair, thank you very, 
very much, but I will submit my opening remarks for the record, 
and then we will move to questions. But thank you, thank you 
very, very much for the opportunity. I appreciate it.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. So SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange 
servers is what I would like to talk about right now. It has 
been 3 months since we first learned about the significant 
supply chain cyber incident involving SolarWinds Orion 
software, but many questions still remain. And I know that you 
and your team have been working tirelessly to address this 
problem and that you share this responsibility with the FBI, 
ODNI, the NSA, USCYBERCOM, and your private sector partners and 
the impacted agencies and companies.
     Unfortunately, as was mentioned, just last week, we 
learned about another set of compromises associated with 
vulnerabilities in on-premises Microsoft Exchange servers. In 
the case of SolarWinds incident, please describe how the 
adversary was able to access our networks and infiltrate data 
and information for months, if not longer, without being 
detected. And also, what information was removed from Federal 
civilian networks? And do we know whether the adversary did 
anything other than steal information, attempt to manipulate or 
delete information, or otherwise alter our systems and 
networks?
     Mr. Wales. Sure. Thank you, Chairwoman.
     What I would say is that the actor in this case used 
extremely sophisticated techniques to bypass the security that 
is in place at agencies, as well as the significant number of 
private sector companies that were compromised as part of the 
campaign.
     By executing a supply chain attack, by compromising the 
SolarWinds product, and putting the backdoor inside of one of 
their legitimate patches, that bypasses all of the normal, 
traditional perimeter security that is deployed to protect 
agencies. And so, it was a trusted patch. It was installed by 
network operators. And because of the nature of SolarWinds' 
products, that they have broad administrative rights, they 
usually are configured to have broad administrative rights, the 
networks, that gave the actor access to the network and allowed 
them to escalate their privileges in ways that we could not 
see.
     I think that, as Eric highlighted, this really--this 
highlights the need for us to have better insights and 
visibility inside of networks. Conducting security at the edge 
on the perimeter increasingly lacks the ability to detect the 
more sophisticated types of attacks, which are only going to 
take place on individual workstations, on individual servers. 
And that is why we are pushing for this increase in visibility 
down inside of networks.
     But to your larger question on what they stole and whether 
they did anything else, we continue to believe this was largely 
an espionage operation where they were collecting information, 
largely based on Microsoft Office 365 email for agency 
personnel. In many cases, that was extremely targeted. There 
was usually only a couple of dozen individuals at an agency 
that were targeted as part of this campaign, and we have no 
evidence at this time that the actor did anything except steal 
information.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. In the case of the more recent 
Microsoft Exchange Server compromises, were Federal agencies 
compromised? And, if so, what is the impact, and what steps is 
CISA taking to help agencies recover?
     Mr. Goldstein. So we are still in the early days of the 
investigation of exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Server. As 
the Acting Director noted, CISA issued an emergency directive 
which required all Federal civilian agencies to both analyze 
their networks or indications of compromise, and to immediately 
patch. We have seen outstanding responses to that directive; 
and now, the vast majority of Microsoft Exchange servers have 
been mitigated across the Federal civilian executive branch. We 
are working with individual agencies to assess the results of 
their forensic analysis.
     At this point in time, there are no Federal civilian 
agencies that are confirmed to be compromised by this campaign. 
However, CISA is working with individual agencies to assess the 
results of their analysis, and this is an evolving campaign 
with new information coming in by the hour.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I also wanted 
to acknowledge and thank the full committee chair, Chair 
DeLauro, for joining us today. Thank you, Madam Chair, for 
being with us today as well.
     In the supply chain attack by Russian state actors, we 
first learned about the compromise in early December, but have 
since determined that the compromise itself began many months 
prior to that. Without getting into why it took so long for us 
to learn what we had compromised, I want to get to another 
underlying issue.
     Two questions: Assuming we knew that a supply chain attack 
was a significant vulnerability, how long have we known this, 
and what was done previously, if anything, to address this 
concern?
     And my other question would be, more importantly, how can 
we better understand where our vulnerabilities are, and, once 
identified, ensure we are addressing them?
     Thank you.
     Mr. Wales. Sure. Thank you, Ranking Member.
     I will take the first part of that question and then allow 
Executive Assistant Director Goldstein to take on the second.
     I would say that there was a substantial amount of work 
done on supply chain security over the last several years, 
including several executive orders focused on improving 
information and communication technology, supply chains. There 
was the passage of the Federal Acquisition Security, the FASC, 
that was stood up for Federal agencies at the civilian in the 
national security systems, in the intelligence community to 
work together to assess supply chain risks and take action to 
remove supply chain--potential dangerous supply chains out of 
Federal networks.
     But there is still more work to be done, and I think the 
SolarWinds campaign highlights where trusted patches from 
otherwise companies that have a strong business are in need 
of--we need different approaches to work with them. How do we 
ensure that when the Federal Government takes on software from 
a supplier, that that software is free of malicious backdoors? 
And that is going to take more work.
     It is also, as EAD Goldstein said, one of the key 
principles we need to put in place is the zero-trust mindset, 
where even if something comes into your network that might be 
compromised, you have built enough protections around it, you 
have segmented your network properly, where the introduction of 
that piece of compromised code will have minimal impacts.
     So, we are working this on a number of fronts, but supply 
chain attacks are one of the most challenging to address, and 
it is going to take a lot more creative thinking to fully solve 
it.
     Eric.
     Mr. Goldstein. Thank you.
     And I would just add to that very thorough answer, we need 
to confront this challenge on any number of fronts, and so, the 
supply chain compromise that we saw with the SolarWinds 
incident is one way that we know that sophisticated adversaries 
can compromise victim networks, and we need to urgently work 
through entities, like the Federal Acquisition Security Council 
that I think the Director mentioned, to make sure we are 
raising the bar for software assurance and supply chain 
integrity across the civilian executive branch, and there is 
more work that we can surely do there.
     At the same time, it is important to appreciate that, as 
the Acting Director noted, this was truly an exquisite attack 
perpetrated by a sophisticated actor that took significant 
amounts of time and resources. And, so, we need to adopt a 
principle that in cybersecurity is called the kill chain, in 
which we are trying to prevent an intrusion at multiple phases. 
So even if we are unable to prevent the supply chain 
compromise, we are detecting the lateral movement across the 
network, or we are detecting the escalation of privileges where 
the adversary attempts to compromise the authentication systems 
that are used to gain access to different assets within a 
network, and on down the line.
     And, so, we need robust layers of defense within each 
Federal civilian executive branch network with data from those 
layers coming back to CISA, so we can identify and correlate 
security trends across the executive branch and identify these 
sorts of deeply mature intrusions before they are able to 
endure for months on end and cause lasting damage.
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, gentlemen.
     Mindful of my limited time, I will be brief with this and 
ask for a brief response.
     In regards to the existing vulnerabilities and finding 
ways to mitigate them, can you describe, in layman's terms, the 
vulnerabilities of the Microsoft Exchange attack along with how 
long we have known about this weakness? Very quickly. Thank 
you.
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. I will do my best to move 
quickly.
     So CISA was made aware of this vulnerability, along with 
Microsoft, on March 2, last Tuesday. As noted, we moved 
urgently to issue a directive and direct remediation of the 
vulnerability. This was a previously unknown flaw in Microsoft 
Exchange Server that allows an adversary to use a combination 
of vulnerabilities to gain remote access to the server, and 
execute remote commands, potentially exfiltrate data. We are 
now seeing adversaries deploy what are known as web shells, 
which is a very small bit of code that the adversary can use 
the vulnerability to deploy on a Microsoft Exchange Server. 
These web shells can be very hard to detect and allow the 
adversary to execute additional commands, or take further 
actions to steal information or launch more destructive types 
of attacks. So this was a previously unknown flaw in Microsoft 
Exchange Server that was identified to CISA and to Microsoft 
last week, and urgently directed to be remediated immediately 
thereafter.
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Director Goldstein. And I 
yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Chair DeLauro.
     The Chair. Thank you very much.
     A great deal of effort and resources have gone into 
developing the National Cyber Security Protection System, also 
known as Einstein. This is perimeter defense tool for Federal 
civilian networks. Yet, our adversaries do not appear to be 
deterred by it. Why is Einstein not more effective at keeping 
our adversaries off of Federal networks?
     And a follow-up question would be, with the changing 
technology landscape, and the increasing sophistication of our 
adversaries' techniques, how does CISA cybersecurity strategy 
need to change, and what particularly does the future of 
Einstein look like? Why is it not more effective at keeping our 
adversaries off the Federal networks?
     Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, ma'am, for that question. It is 
a very important one.
     It is a truism of cybersecurity that our defensive 
technologies need to adapt as the threat environment changes 
and the way that we use technology changes. Einstein was 
originally designed, as the Acting Director noted, as a 
perimeter defense program, meaning that it provides intrusion 
detection and prevention at the point where agency networks 
meet the open internet. Over time, what we have found is 
largely because of the increased use of encryption for traffic 
entering and exiting Federal networks, which, of course, has 
its own privacy and security benefits, the Einstein technology 
that was reasonably designed to address risks in technology a 
decade ago has grown somewhat stale over time, and now does not 
provide the visibility that CISA needs.
     For this reason, CISA is urgently moving our detecting 
capabilities from that perimeter layer into agency networks to 
focus on these end points, the servers and workstations where 
we are seeing adversary activity today. This is consistent with 
leading trends in the cybersecurity industry, as adopted by 
public and private organizations of all types. We already have 
pilots in place to precipitate this important transition, and 
with funding under consideration by Congress will rapidly 
accelerate this transition from a perimeter defense construct 
to a construct where we are, in real time, identifying threat 
activity within agency networks, which is where the lack 
visibility still remains.
     The Chair. What is your timing on this transition?
     Mr. Goldstein. So the transition is underway now. We 
have--these tools are called end points detection and response. 
We have pilots underway with certain agencies at this point. 
With funding requested from Congress, we will be able to 
rapidly accelerate those pilots and deploy this kind of 
internal detection and prevention tooling with the agency 
network in a much faster time frame.
     The Chair. Well, but what I am saying, is it a year? Is it 
2 years? Is it 6 months? Is it--do you know?
     Mr. Goldstein. So it will be iterative. We will be 
deployed over time. Certainly, each month that goes by, we will 
cover more agencies. We can certainly come back with a 
conclusory date of when we think we will have full coverage, 
but this is a scalable process where every month that goes by, 
there will be more agencies protected, which is, of course, why 
this funding is so urgent so we can get started on this 
acceleration today.
     Mr. Wales. Let me just add that the $650 million that is 
currently under consideration in the relief package is a 
downpayment. It accelerates some of these efforts. But this is 
going to require sustained investment for both CISA, as well as 
the agencies themselves. We want to ensure that as we increase 
this visibility, it is going to provide increased visibility to 
CISA to look across the entire .gov, and it will also increase 
the visibility for the agencies themselves, and those agencies 
themselves are going to need additional resources to make sure 
they can fully leverage the improved capabilities that we will 
be deploying.
     We want to make sure that their cybersecurity posture 
increases with ours so that the layers of defense that Eric 
talked about are solid.
     The Chair. Well, it is going to be important for us to 
know what the overall--you know, I understand the relief 
package; but when you talk about sustained investment, it would 
be very good to get to the committee, to the chair, the ranking 
member, et cetera. What you anticipate is the cost for this? 
And, again, how quickly? Because every month that goes by, we 
are at risk for, you know, like the last two events that we are 
talking about. One is March 2 of last week, so it is 
imperative.
     Maybe I can ask a quick question here. This is about the 
impact of election security on Federal cybersecurity, because 
there has been some conversation about this election security 
in 2020 may have distracted the agency's focus away from 
cybersecurity.
     Did CISA's election security efforts and focus contribute 
to a lack of resources or situational awareness that made us 
more vulnerable to cybersecurity breaches? Were those efforts a 
factor in allowing the SolarWinds' intrusion to go undetected 
for so long?
     My time ran out. Madam Chair, if I could beg your 
indulgence for this.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Madam Chair, you can take all the time 
you want.
     The Chair. Thank you.
     Mr. Wales. Let me address that first by saying that the 
work that we did in concert with our interagency partners to 
protect our Democratic institutions is not a distraction. It is 
a core mission of the agency, a priority work, work that 
continues to this day.
     And let me address it, secondly, by saying our agency has 
a broad mission. As I covered in my opening remarks, we work 
across cyber physical communications. We are building 
resilience and heightening and enhancing security. We have to 
have the ability to work multiple problems.
     Even in the midst of the election season, we were still 
dealing with other cybersecurity incidents in the Federal 
Government, at State and local governments, in the private 
sector.
     I do not believe that the election distracted us. If 
anything, it has further honed our capabilities, it has 
improved our coordination within the interagency, and it has 
made the U.S. Government cybersecurity mission more efficient 
and more effective. And we are just going to try to build on 
that going forward.
     The Chairwoman. Thank you. Thank you, and I yield back, 
and I thank the gentlewoman for indulging the time. Appreciate 
it.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
     Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
     Director Wales, the Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation 
program, which is a government-wide, cybersecurity program, 
aims to provide capability to identify cybersecurity risks, 
prioritize those risks based upon potential impact, and to 
mitigate the most significant problems.
     Now, the program was designed for phases, as I understand. 
Phase 1 was basically asset management; phase 2 was to identify 
and assess that management, access management; and then phase 3 
was, let's see, a data protection phase, and then phase 4 was 
agencies were going to be--different agencies were going to be 
synthesized to adopt CDM capabilities, which we would fund for 
up to--DHS would fund a base year and then one optional year. 
And CISA said that this was foundational. Now, that tells me it 
is pretty darn important.
     Can you tell me how many agencies are now actively moving 
through the Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation Program? How 
many are phase 1 and how many are requesting phase 1 level?
     Mr. Wales. So I will give you a little bit of a high-level 
answer, and then I am going to ask Eric to talk about kind of 
how we envision the program moving forward since CDM is going 
to be critical for a number of the capabilities that EAD 
Goldstein outlined we will be deploying, including the end 
point detection and response tools.
     CDM provides, and every agency is currently--every Federal 
civilian executive branch agency is participating in CDM, and 
has--and I would say phase 1 is almost fully deployed. There is 
a couple of parts of a couple of agencies that continue to 
deploy asset management tools, but we need that--agencies need 
to understand what is on their network. They need to understand 
who is on their network. They need to understand what is the 
current patch level, where are current vulnerabilities in their 
network, because the more sophisticated techniques, the end 
point detection, the zero-trust architectures, assume you have 
a comprehensive understanding of what your network looks like, 
and the potential vulnerabilities on it. So we could not move 
to these more sophisticated tools and capabilities without 
getting that foundation in place.
     CDM has built that foundation. The reason why agencies 
today can respond so quickly to our emergency directives is 
that CDM has provided them that level of insight into their 
network, and the ability to look at the individual objects on 
their network and know where they are, what patch level they 
are, and where they need to take remediative action.
     So I would ask Eric to just give you a little bit of 
highlight about what the next steps are there as we move into 
phases 3 and 4.
     Mr. Rutherford. OK. So--but if I could, so, Director, you 
are telling me that all executive branch agencies are in CDM at 
least to phase 2? Is that correct?
     Mr. Wales. I would say that every agency has largely 
completed phase 1. Like I said, there is a couple of places. 
Most agencies are in phase 2, or completing phase 2, and then 
we are actually--some of the funding for fiscal year 2022 and 
2023 begin to fund phase 3 and phase 4 efforts across the 
civilian executive branch.
     Mr. Rutherford. OK. I would like to hear from Eric.
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir, of course. We sort of think of 
CDM as providing three foundational capabilities for Federal 
civilian cybersecurity. The first is it is a mechanism for CISA 
to provide fundamental security tools to all Federal civilian 
agencies. And as the Acting Director noted, as we moved to 
provision of the next generation of cybersecurity tools, 
including end point detection and response tools, including 
tools that allow adoption of these zero-trust principles that 
focus on--
     Mr. Rutherford. OK. Can I interrupt you just 1 minute?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
     Mr. Rutherford. So these fundamental detection tools, are 
these also those--you know, we mentioned Einstein is kind of a 
border security. The interior security tools to look inside the 
systems, not at the portals, not at the intrusion points, are 
those tools--have they been developed, and is CDM moving that 
forward?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. So they have absolutely been 
developed. And I do think it is useful to think of the National 
Cybersecurity Protection System, or Einstein, and the CDM 
program not as separate offerings, but really as part of CISA's 
cohesive and holistic strategy to protect Federal civilian 
agencies.
     So NCPS and CDM really work hand in glove to protect all 
levels of the network against cybersecurity risks. And, again, 
both of those programs must transition to address changes in 
the risk and technology environment.
     Now, moving to CDM for a moment, along with providing the 
mechanism to provide agencies with many of these modern 
security tools that we need for layered defense, CDM is also 
the mechanism through which agencies are able to get visibility 
into their own risks, which is critically important for agency 
CIOs to understand their environment and the risks they are in, 
and then for CISA to get cross-government visibility into risk 
trends which will then--the emergency directive that we just 
issued is a canonical example, when we issue these kinds of 
directives, CDM, particularly as it matures, gives us the 
ability to look into agency networks and understand the 
pervasiveness of the given risk, and then drive very focused 
timely remediation.
     Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. Very good answer.
     With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. OK. Mr. Ruppersberger.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
     The first thing I want to talk about is just a macro 
issue, and that is where we are in cybersecurity. When I was on 
the Intelligence Committee, and I represent NSA also, so I 
focused a lot in cybersecurity. And NSA is very good as it 
relates to Russia, China, and those issues. But we moved to 
CISA. I think CISA has been given a task that they just can't 
do the job that they need to do because of lack of resources, 
and lack of personnel. But I do want to say this: The personnel 
that is there is doing a great job, and they just can't do it 
all. And I really was upset when you had a small team that was 
working well, and our former President fired Chris Krebs, the 
director, because he spoke truth to power. We can't have any 
politics involved in this issue. It is very serious.
     I authored section 1745 of the fiscal year 2021 National 
Defense Authorization Act, and that requires CISA to conduct a 
force structure assessment, very important. This assessment is, 
in part, intended to address whether CISA has the personnel, 
materiel, and facilities to achieve its mission. I strongly 
support this review, which is particularly timely as press 
reports highlight the cyber defenders are stretched thin to 
deal with the combination of the SolarWinds-related malware and 
the newly released Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerabilities.
     I am deeply disturbed that when I hear that State and 
local governments, school systems, even hospitals, may have had 
bad actors on their networks for months as they wait for a 
scarce incident response team to help them clean up the 
networks.
     Now, other than nuclear weapons, I believe that the cyber 
issue is going to really be maybe the next war, if we have one, 
that and space, and I think it is time that we really have this 
assessment and that we have to really look at where we are and 
what we are doing.
     Now, NSA is very good, but we are all concerned about the 
defense issues that have occurred. And because NSA has no 
jurisdiction in the United States, and there are a lot of 
privacy issues, which we need to adhere to, but I think we have 
to look at the whole big picture about what we are going to do 
to protect our country from the cyber attacks that we have had 
now, and this is going to continue. It is going to get worse 
before it gets better.
     And it is unfortunate. I think in this area of 
cybersecurity, there are maybe 15 members that I know that 
really focus on cybersecurity. That is a lot.
     So, I really hope we can make this a priority with the 
help of our leadership in the Appropriations Committee to move 
forward with this assessment, and decide where we need to go, 
give the money to where we need to go, because the people that 
exist in leadership right now on this committee, Mr. Goldstein, 
I mean, Mr. Wales, they are working hard, but they sure need a 
lot of help and a lot of resources.
     Two real quick questions. Do you believe there is a need 
for more inherent incident response capability at CISA to 
assist Federal and State and local partners?
     And the second question, how does the American Rescue Plan 
request support expanding this capability?
     Mr. Wales. Sure. So let me just say at the outset that 
this agency has benefited tremendously from strong support in 
Congress, both parties, both Houses, and we want to make sure 
that we maintain that support by our openness, our 
transparency, and the work of our agency.
     I would say, without a doubt, to accomplish the scale of 
the mission that we have, we need more resources. As EAD 
Goldstein laid out during his opening, we are asking for it, in 
particular in the area of expanding our incident response 
capabilities, to allow us to offer more persistent hunt 
capabilities for the .gov and free up our incident response 
resources to deal with the wide array of cyber incidents that 
we face on a routine basis. But the money in the ARA is, again, 
a downpayment on the scale of capabilities, tools, and 
resources we need.
     Sir, the workforce assessment is already underway, and we 
look forward to briefing you later this year on the outcomes of 
that.
     Eric, anything else you want to add?
     Mr. Goldstein. No. I would just reiterate that we do see 
the need for incident response capacity again in those two 
areas, both to meet demand from Federal and non Federal 
partners, and also critically to move to this model where we 
are not only reactively responding to that that already 
occurred, but moving into this more persistent threat hunting 
model where we continuously search for adversaries that may 
have compromised American networks.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. Yield back. Thank you.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson.
     Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, 
Director Wales and Executive Assistant Director Goldstein, both 
of you for joining us today. I appreciate the opportunity to 
ask you a few questions about this as a new member to the 
committee.
     So as we look at this, you have used words like this was 
an exquisite attack, an espionage operation. How confident are 
you that you understand the trade craft and what was actually 
employed in this attack, this cyber attack on us, and how we 
can use that for work for preventing future attacks? That would 
be my first question then.
     The second is, you referenced specifically the patching 
procedure and how they were able to access data even after 
patched. Are you confident--does that data have any 
vulnerability now? Can it still be accessed or can we patch 
that on our end so we can make sure that vulnerability no 
longer exists?
     Mr. Wales. Sure. So, I will take the first question, and 
then I will let Eric handle the portion on the Microsoft 
Exchange.
     So for SolarWinds, we understand the tactics that the 
adversary used to compromise most networks. Part of what CISA 
does is it takes information in, it looks to identify the 
tactics and the techniques that the adversary used. We then 
push out that information, either in the form of alerts so that 
broader cybersecurity can look for that activity. In some 
cases, we deploy tools that actually allow--that agencies or 
private companies can use to look for evidence on their 
networks.
     We had our cloud forensics team working on Christmas Eve 
to deploy a tool to look for evidence of a compromise of the 
Microsoft cloud environment. Just this week, we released a new 
tool starting with Federal agencies to look through evidence in 
the SolarWinds compromise of the adversary moving laterally off 
of the SolarWinds device into the network.
     So we are constantly looking for ways in which we can push 
out that kind of detection techniques to the benefit of all 
network defenders, and that is a learning process. Every new 
incident we see could be a slightly new tactic that the 
adversary uses, but we have multiple ways of getting that 
information out. All of the current tactics and techniques that 
we are aware of have been shared broadly with our public and 
private sector partners.
     Eric, do you want to talk about the exchange?
     Mr. Goldstein. Certainly. As to the second question 
regarding the Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerability, we are 
driving urgent progress across the Federal civilian agencies to 
patch that vulnerability. As noted, nearly 90 percent of said 
instances have already been mitigated. Microsoft has also 
helpfully released a tool that allows victim organizations to 
assess if they have been compromised as part of this campaign, 
and we have put out accompanying alerts and guidance for 
network defenders to understand their risks, identify if they 
have been both exposed and compromised, and then take urgent 
remediation action as necessary.
     We are further providing ongoing consultative assistance 
to agencies to help them understand their risks and make sure 
they have taken the appropriate steps to minimize their 
vulnerability to this campaign.
     Mrs. Hinson. And then one other question I would have as a 
follow-up to that. You talked about our adversaries, and in 
this case, you keep mentioning the actor. Who is the actor that 
is responsible for this attack, if you can say that for the 
record? Because, obviously, when we are talking about a major 
espionage operation and preventing them in the future, these 
bad actors all over the world are not going to pause. They 
continue to assault us every day. So who is this actor that we 
are referring to?
     Mr. Wales. So in the SolarWinds case, the U.S. Government 
has said that this campaign is likely of Russian origin, but 
the U.S. Government continues to assess that situation and will 
provide additional information to Congress and the American 
people soon.
     On the Microsoft Exchange vulnerability, the U.S. 
Government has not attributed that to an actor yet. Microsoft 
did, in its blog, tie it back to Chinese State actors. That 
being said, we are already seeing multiple actors now utilize 
those vulnerabilities, so it is no longer just a single actor 
exploiting the Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities. There are 
multiple threat actors who are going to use that vulnerability 
to steal information or conduct more significant and 
potentially damaging and disruptive cyber incidents.
     And so, we are at a race against that threat actor 
community to make sure that we patch and secure as many systems 
as possible before more disruptive attacks begin to emerge.
     Mrs. Hinson. And you talk about the persistent threat 
model in going forward and dealing with these. Can you 
elaborate just very quickly--I know I am running out of time, 
but just on what that is going to look like, you know, as you 
are planning, you know, for the next year, the next 3 to 5 
years? Just a quick perspective on that would be great.
     Mr. Goldstein. Sure, absolutely. So, the way that incident 
response threat hunting works historically is that we would 
begin the response hunting phase only when triggered by a 
compromise, by a possible breach. What we want to move to is a 
paradigm where CISA is able to continuously assess security 
data from agencies on an ongoing basis for evidence of 
compromise, utilizing both known and potential indicators of 
compromise, including advanced analytic techniques, so that we 
can get ahead of the adversary, and the moment that they 
intrude, we have a higher likelihood of catching them versus 
waiting until, for example, the adversary makes a mistake, and 
then we trigger it in response. So our goal is to move left 
ward in our ability to rapidly detect intrusions that do occur.
     Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
     Ms. Underwood. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
for calling today's hearing on this important topic.
     The vulnerabilities in our networks, our Federal networks 
that we have been discussing today are urgent, and I am 
grateful that the President has prioritized funding for CISA to 
address these and other pressing needs through the American 
Rescue Plan. But our State and local governments have also been 
targeted by attackers who have only grown bolder during the 
pandemic, and they lack the expertise and resources of Federal 
agencies.
     Like my colleague, Mr. Price, and perhaps others on this 
committee, I represent constituents who have been directly 
impacted by such attacks on more than one occasion. In 2016, 
the personal information of 76,000 Illinoisans was accessed by 
Russian hackers who targeted the State's election 
infrastructure. And just last year, a school district in 
Crystal Lake, Illinois, was hit by a ransomware attack.
     Mr. Wales, can you elaborate on how the funding included 
in the American Rescue Plan will expand CISA's capacity to 
support organizations outside of the Federal Government, and 
particularly, how State and local governments will benefit from 
these investments?
     Mr. Wales. Sure. So the majority of the funding in the 
American Rescue Act is focused on improving Federal 
cybersecurity. That being said, the expansion in incident 
response resources for CISA will free up necessary capabilities 
to allow us to support more State, local, and private sector 
entities that are coming to us for support, and I think that 
that is critical.
     I would just add two other quick points. We completely 
agree with you, State and locals absolutely need more support. 
Secretary Mayorkas has talked about this. We need more 
investment in State and local cybersecurity, and we are eager 
to work with Congress on the right way of ensuring that kind of 
continued investment to bring State and locals up to a stronger 
baseline.
     I know from our work over the last 4 years on election 
security that we can make a lot of progress with the focused 
effort from the Federal Government, with our State and local 
partners, and I think with congressional support, we will be 
able to have that level of impact more broadly on State and 
local information infrastructure.
     Ms. Underwood. Great. Thank you.
     Are the lessons--I am sorry, did you have something else?
     Mr. Wales. No.
     Ms. Underwood. OK. One of the lessons I took away from the 
attack on the Illinois Board of Elections is that when our 
Federal, State, and local infrastructure is so interconnected, 
we are only as strong as our weakest link. And that is why I 
think it is important to take a whole of government approach to 
modernizing our Nation's cybersecurity.
     Mr. Wales, as we continue advancing and strengthening our 
Federal network security, what steps should Congress take to 
ensure that our State and local governments don't get left 
behind?
     Mr. Wales. Yes. You know what, I don't think we have a 
specific proposal today. Already, the Department has taken 
action, for example, increasing the amount of money, the 
percentage of our homeland security grants that need to go to 
cybersecurity investments for our States and State and local 
communities. CISA is working closely with FEMA on the 
implementation of that.
     But, in addition, we think that we need to identify 
additional mechanisms by which we can provide that level of 
support. And, again, we are eager to work with Congress. We 
know there are proposals and drafts of legislation that we have 
seen that focus on that, including by provisioning grants or 
others, and we are eager to work with you on what that looks 
like.
     Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
     I want to shift gears and discuss how CISA is modernizing 
not only its work, but its workforce. We need the best and 
brightest minds tackling challenges facing our Nation, and our 
success is going to rest on the ability to attract top talent 
who can bring diverse experiences and perspectives to bear on 
our biggest and toughest security problems.
     Mr. Wales, what percentage of CISA employees are women?
     Mr. Wales. I believe, currently, roughly, 35 percent of 
our workforce is women.
     Ms. Underwood. And what percentage of your employees 
identify as Black, indigenous, or people of color?
     Mr. Wales. I do not actually have that statistic off the 
top of my head.
     Ms. Underwood. Can you get back to me?
     Mr. Wales. Yes, absolutely, I will get back to you on 
that.
     Ms. Underwood. And what steps are you taking to diversify 
the agency workforce and what resources do you need to do that?
     Mr. Wales. Sure. This was a major focus of our deputy 
director during 2020, which we had dubbed our kind of year of 
diversity and inclusion. And we are looking at--we have taken a 
number of steps to increase our ability to recruit a diverse--a 
diverse workforce. This includes expanding recruitment in high 
schools, in minority-serving institutions, women-focused 
events, and other groups where we thought we could increase our 
capacity to hire a diverse workforce. COVID introduced some 
challenges to that and slowed down our hiring across the board, 
but we are hoping, as we move into 2021, with the ending of the 
pandemic, that we will be able to accelerate a number of these 
efforts, and really look forward to working with you on that.
     I think we are happy to come and provide a more detailed 
briefing on our workforce recruitment efforts, including our 
efforts on improving diversity.
     Mr. Goldstein. Ma'am, if I may just add briefly add, as 
the newly-appointed head of cybersecurity, this is 
unequivocally one of my top priorities. Diversity inclusion is 
a national security issue, and it is an urgent imperative for 
us to have a cyber security workforce that reflects diversity 
of this country. And you have my commitment that this will be 
one of my top priorities in the months and years to come.
     Ms. Underwood. Well, thank you both. Recruiting, 
retaining, and advancing diverse talent, all three are 
critically important. Thank you, Madam Chair, I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
     Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. It is great to 
be back to doing the people's business. I think the Homeland 
Security Subcommittee is one of the most important committees 
out of the full committee. We are tasked with protecting our 
homeland. There is many missions, there is many functions, 
there is many agencies that we have to deal with.
     Before coming to Approps, I had the pleasure and 
opportunity to serve on the House Armed Services Committee. You 
know, we had commandants, generals, Secretaries of Defense, and 
so on. And a popular question we always would ask them would 
be, You know, what keeps you up at night? You know, what allows 
a four-star general not to be able to sleep because he is 
worried about what is next? What is that next threat? Where is 
it going to come from? And how are we going to defend America?
     And, you know, we have heard varying responses over the 
years. With China, it has been one that is pretty consistent, 
and, obviously, that is not going away. Russia, ISIS. Even 
cyber, you know, cyber is very important to the defense of our 
homeland and the protection of our troops abroad. But the one 
thing that really stood out, and this was Admiral Mullens. He 
said our national debt. He said the greatest threat to America 
is our national debt. And as appropriators, I think we need to 
take that to heart, and we need to take that very seriously, 
because we have limited resources but unlimited wants.
     And the threats to America, they are not diminishing, they 
are growing. And they are getting bolder, because they see in 
America, and American people, that is fighting amongst 
ourselves. And they only have to watch C-SPAN or the nightly 
news to see that we are putting politics over the American 
people, over the defense of our homeland, and our national 
security, and over sound and solid policies. So, I will stop 
with that. I just wanted to--and that was on my heart this 
morning.
     But to Mr. Wales and Mr. Goldstein, the number of 
attacks--if you can address, what are the number of attacks or 
engagements that we are seeing, especially in regards to 
critical infrastructure, for either state or non-state actors, 
and to whatever amount you can reveal in an unclassified 
setting?
     Mr. Goldstein. So, it is a challenging question to answer, 
sir, because we know that our adversaries, nation states, and 
criminal groups are continuously attempting to compromise 
public and private entities of all types. What we have seen 
over the past few days, and report in the media, around this 
Microsoft Exchange Server campaign is an exemplar to this, 
where as soon as the vulnerability was revealed, we saw 
countless adversaries, sophisticated and not, attempting to 
compromise vulnerable entities.
     And, so, our focus really needs to be raising the bar of 
cybersecurity across this country, and then doing that in a 
risk-based way where additional protections are deployed based 
upon the criticality of a given organization.
     So at CISA, we are deeply focused on ensuring that all 
organizations understand the basic protections they should 
adopt, and those were critical organizations, whether Federal 
agencies or private companies understand that they are at 
increased risk, and need to adopt a higher bar for 
cybersecurity controls.
     Mr. Wales. Let me just add one point to that. One of the 
challenges in answering your question with more specificity,  
is that we are entirely dependent upon the private sector of 
voluntarily sharing information with us about compromises, or 
potential compromises, or attempts to compromise their 
networks. And I think we can see in the SolarWinds campaign, in 
the Microsoft Exchange vulnerability exploitation campaign, we 
don't know that at scale. We don't get that kind of information 
provided to us in a comprehensive way where we can see the 
picture of what the cyber risk we are facing.
     And in order for us to be as effective as possible, it 
requires us to understand what the adversary is doing, so that 
we can protect everyone by sharing that information, by 
providing detections, by providing information on what the 
adversary's tactics are.
     And so, the more that information is held by compromised 
private sector entities, the less we are able to protect 
everyone else. And so, I think that is something that we are 
eager to work with Congress to see how that can be addressed.
     Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, both. I see my time is 
ticking down fairly quick. I do want to just leave with--and I 
agree with Dutch. I think any external threat that we are going 
to be witnessing in the future is going to be precluded by 
cyber, and possibly something happening in our space domain, 
and then, just maybe a little more conventional, probably not 
on the homeland, but where our allies and where our interests 
reside abroad.
     So listen, I appreciate the both of you. Tell your staff 
we appreciate them. You have a huge responsibility to be a part 
of a group protecting our homeland, and continue to let us know 
how we can source you to make sure that you are efficient and 
effective.
     And, lastly, Madam Chair, if we could, maybe in the near 
future and maybe do a follow-up in a classified setting. I 
think that would be very beneficial, and eye-opening for our 
members. So thank you both. Keep up the great work.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price?
     Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for 
holding this hearing. I appreciate the Assistant Director for 
appearing today. I appreciate the good work you are doing. You 
have led the Nation through the most secure election in 
American history. You are continuing to respond to the 
SolarWinds' incident with multiple--on multiple government 
fronts, and you are collaborating with government and private 
sector partners who are experiencing more and more frequent 
malicious activity.
     I want to ask you something about your intra homeland 
security department efforts with FEMA, with their expanded 
responsibilities to this area. But I first want to quickly 
revisit the topic my colleague, Ms. Underwood, raised, because 
North Carolina, too, has been home to some shocking intrusions 
of--at the local government level, something we have not 
experienced and didn't expect to experience.
     Chatham County, in my district, was hit with the 
ransomware attack that encrypted much of the county's network 
infrastructure, associated business systems, an ongoing 
problem.
     Just a few weeks ago, the county discovered sensitive 
files posted on the dark web, including employee personnel 
records, eviction notices, law enforcement investigative 
documents. A pretty serious breach, and quite serious, quite 
sensitive information. Chatham County is admirably working 
through this attack. But as you indicated, many State and local 
governments don't have anything like the resources they need to 
deal with this.
     So, if you could just elaborate on your answer to Ms. 
Underwood, what kind of assistance do you perceive is most 
important for government at this level? What kind of resources, 
technical assistance, help in assessing the security situation? 
And are there specific funding implications for this aspect of 
your mission?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, we, again, deeply recognize the grave 
risk that we are facing. Our State, local, Tribal governments 
suffer from cybersecurity threats. Particularly, ransomware, as 
you notice, sir, is an epidemic currently affecting far too 
many municipalities and other jurisdictions in this country. So 
we initially initiated a ransomware awareness campaign to drive 
adoption of best practices among public and private 
organizations to reduce the risk of ransomware-affecting 
entities. And we encourage all organizations to look at the 
ransomware materials on the CISA.gov web page, and avail 
themselves of the recommendations therein.
     It is also the case that CISA is available to provide 
assessment, guidance, consulative assistance, and as-needed 
incident response services to State, local, Tribal territorial 
entities who are impacted by a damaging cyber attack. I would 
encourage any such entities to contact CISA and acquire both 
about our proactive resources to help assess an organization's 
capacity and maturity. And, then, if an incident does occur, to 
request help then as well.
     And I would just note that CISA also has regional 
personnel with cybersecurity expertise deployed across the 
country who are available to assist our State, local, Tribal, 
and territorial partners onsite to work through concerns and 
help figure out how those organizations can be more secure.
     Mr. Price. Good. Thank you. That is very helpful. Let me 
move to the FEMA question. We are going to follow this State 
and local support situation very closely. Let me move to the 
Secretary's announcement last month, that the required minimum 
spend on cybersecurity for FEMA grant awards will increase from 
5 to 7.5 percent. That is a $25 million increase, a crucial 
step toward accelerating improvements in State and local 
cybersecurity.
     Can you detail the support you plan to give, that you are 
being asked to give, and that you will give to FEMA as they 
increase their cyber portfolio? In his announcement, the 
Secretary also announced that the syncing of implementing a new 
grant program in CISA to support state and local governments, 
including to combat the epidemic of ransomware, what about 
those possible new grant opportunities?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes. The first question on CISA today 
provides robust subject-matter expertise to FEMA to support the 
evaluation of grant proposals for cybersecurity expenditures. 
We were delighted by the Secretary's decision to expand the 
mandatory cost allocation to cybersecurity investments. I think 
that the $25 million that will result from that decision will 
significantly improve cybersecurity maturity across recipient 
organizations. And CISA will continue serving in our subject-
matter expert role to ensure that grant applicants are making 
best use of those resources to improve their cybersecurity 
maturity.
     As to the second question, I would certainly agree, sir, 
both with you and Ms. Underwood, that the level of investment 
in cybersecurity across our State and local entities must 
improve. And I look forward to working with this committee and 
others on determining how CISA can help provide that much 
needed investment going forward.
     Mr. Price. Thank you. Thank you. Madam Chairman.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
     Mr. Aguilar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, and I 
appreciate the opportunity to be here. And I want to thank both 
gentlemen for their testimony.
     Assistant Director Goldstein, in your testimony, you talk 
a little bit about NDAA authorities and the visibility issue. 
Section 1705 of the fiscal year 2021 NDAA allows CISA to threat 
hunt on other agency networks. In other words, it empowers to 
CISA to proactively search through security logs and other data 
for evidence of compromise by sophisticated actors. While I 
support this authority and understand it, I know that there is 
other approaches to implementing this language. CISA can either 
use an instrument on networks of sister agencies to collect the 
data, or the departments can give CISA the access, as you 
indicated, on those logs.
     Can you talk a little bit about the approach that CISA is 
considering to implement this language? And of the approaches 
mentioned, which one would CISA prefer and why?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. You 
know, we--we deeply appreciate this authority provided in the 
NDAA with just the reason you note. That it gives CISA the 
flexibility in execution to determine which model makes the 
most sense for Federal cybersecurity, or even which combination 
of models makes the most sense for Federal cybersecurity. And 
so, we are not seeing this as an either/or proposition, but 
exactly as you noted, we are planning to deploy additional end 
point detection and response tools on Federal networks that 
will allow us to continuously analyze for further activity.
     We are also working with our Federal partners to encourage 
agencies to aggregate security information in such a way that 
CISA is able to conduct continuous analytics on that sort of 
log data derived both from on premises and cloud environments.
     And so, our goal with this authority is to interpret it in 
the way that best advances our cybersecurity goal across the 
Federal civilian enterprise. As noted, several of the other 
members, our execution model of this authority will likely 
change over time as technology changes and as risks change. And 
so, our goal is to be able to detect adversary activity 
wherever it occurs. The model that we do so will undoubtedly 
change as required.
     Mr. Aguilar. How would the funding requests for each of 
these approaches differ as you talk through that evolution and 
how it could change? What should we be mindful of when it comes 
to the funding requests that we could receive?
     Mr. Goldstein. So, I think there are three variables in 
the funding requests along these lines that I think are applied 
to each of these models, but may differ in degree.
     So, the first will be the people, the trained expert 
security practitioners who understand the practice of threat 
hunting, which is a very specific expert discipline.
     And CISA has an extraordinary group of individuals who do 
this work today, and we need more of those individuals. The 
second will be the tooling. The provision of tools and sensors 
to agencies that will allow us to collect this data, wherever 
it may be, whether it is at the endpoint or in the cloud. And 
the third will be the analytic infrastructure to allow CISA to 
either run queries on data at the agency level, or analyze that 
data, wherever it may be, and derive learning therefrom that 
allow us to do the support and work of identifying adversary 
activity. And, so, I think those three areas of investment 
[inaudible].
     Mr. Aguilar. Thank you so much, gentlemen. I appreciate 
that. Building off of Ms. Underwood and Mr. Price, in their 
discussion about local coordination as well, can you just, you 
know, elaborate a little bit on that coordination level, you 
know, with FEMA? What could we--what could we--I understand 
that subject-matter experts and, you know, being available to 
localities, but how can we embed some of that coordination 
between--between you folks and FEMA?
     Mr. Wales. Let me just clarify, when we talk about subject 
matter experts are part of the review, it is not kind of ad 
hoc, it is a part of the review process. So all of the 
cybersecurity investment justifications that were submitted by 
States to support the cybersecurity under cybersecurity 
investment umbrella were reviewed by subject-matter experts 
within CISA in concert with FEMA to make sure that that was a 
true partnership to review the investments in the cybersecurity 
domain. But in addition, we also put out information upfront 
and worked with a number of States who wanted our assistance, 
as they were initially thinking through and beginning to craft 
investment justifications that were going to be submitted to 
FEMA as part of the grants process. That since we are now in 
year two of the cycle with these cybersecurity investment 
requirements, that process is getting even stronger with our 
embedded field-based personnel in States and cities across the 
country providing that assistance to state administrative 
agencies and other cybersecurity experts at the State and local 
level who are involved in the investment justification grant-
writing process.
     Mr. Aguilar. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thank you, Madam 
Chair, I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe we have time to have a round 
two. So, I would like to begin by going back to our funding 
response to SolarWinds. As been mentioned, the American Rescue 
Plan includes a substantial funding infusion or Federal IT team 
of modernization in cybersecurity, including the $650 million 
for CISA.
     One of the things that is concerning to me is that many 
Federal Office 365 email accounts have only the most 
rudimentary security logging capabilities, which is necessary 
for cybersecurity defenders to track malicious activity. It is 
also concerning that a significant portion of CISA's American 
Rescue Plan at funding is slated to go to upgrading these 
licenses. Why isn't advanced security logging enabled by 
default on any of the Federal cloud accounts that the 
government procures, and how much of that $650 million 
supplemental funding is currently planned for licensed upgrades 
to support logging?
     And I just want to add one more point to that question. 
Will CISA be issuing a directive to require agencies to procure 
licenses that require advanced security logging on cloud 
contracts, and if not, how do we fix this problem?
     Mr. Goldstein. So CISA's strategic goal broadly, and with 
this funding, is to ensure that agency IT environments, whether 
on premises or in the cloud, have the security built in that 
the American people would expect of their Federal Government. 
Now, in aspect to that, ma'am, as you note, is ensuring that 
cloud computing environments have logging retention and 
security controls that can reasonably be expected to detect 
adversary activity, and that CISA can use to understand events 
when they do occur and respond accordingly.
     As part of our funding request, we do intend to develop a 
process to improve the level of cloud security across the 
Federal Government. One option that could be considered is the 
improvement of licenses with existing vendors. There are other 
options that could achieve a similar goal.
     So, our goal is strategically to ensure that Federal 
agency data is secure wherever it sets on prem and in the 
cloud, and we are planning to take any possible course of 
action to achieve that goal, working, of course, with our 
partners and each agency designated in a budget and other 
entities across government.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. I guess my next question has to do with 
is, how is CISA working to ensure that emergency funding is not 
needed for something as basic as logging?
     Mr. Goldstein. So it is important to think of security 
funding, ma'am, along two paths. The first is the funding that 
CISA needs to provide a foundation of security across the 
executive branch, and a second is the funding that each agency 
requests to modernize and further mature their old IT 
structures. And so, certainly as Executive Director mentioned, 
we do consider the funding in the ARA to be a downpayment to 
modernize Federal cybersecurity and drive further progress. It 
is reasonable to anticipate that other Federal agencies will 
request similar investments to improve their own enterprise 
cybersecurity.
     Now, certainly, we do hope that these sorts of investments 
will be built into baseline requests going forward, but we do 
recognize that this will be a long journey.
     It will be a long path to get Federal cybersecurity to the 
point where it needs to be. Given the sophistication of the 
adversaries targeting our networks, I will look forward to 
working with your committee in a deeper transparent way to 
understand that funding path and the end state that we are 
trying to collectively reach.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. OK. One of the major features of the 
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program has been to 
improve visibility into agency networks. Yet, we continue to 
rely on data calls with agencies to answer the most basic 
questions, such as which agencies are still using Microsoft 
Exchange servers? How do we address this problem if the current 
CDM suite of tools does not provide enough visibility? Do we 
need to change our strategy, and will any of the $650 million 
on its way to CISA be used, at least in part, to improve this 
visibility?
     Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, ma'am. So you will recall from a 
prior question that CDM provides transparency at two levels: At 
the agency level, and at the level of CISA. Even where we issue 
a directive, or a data call today, agencies are still able to 
use their CDM tools and the transparency that they get at the 
agency level to respond to CISA.
     We are working with individual agencies to improve the 
fidelity of information that CISA is able to derive. And, 
ma'am, to the second part of your question, investments through 
the ARA request will additionally improve both the coverage of 
more advanced tools through the CDM program and an additional 
infrastructure to help CISA analyze CDM data and derive 
information that we can use to get better fidelity into 
cybersecurity risks across Federal civilian agencies.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you. Mr. Fleischmann?
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, gentlemen, 
thank you for a very insightful hearing. This has been 
extremely helpful to me, and I know to the other members of the 
subcommittee.
     With the impending passage of the next COVID relief bill, 
$1 billion is carved out for cybersecurity, with $650 million 
of that going towards CISA to help advance cyber protections. 
Do you feel this will have a demonstrable impact, or are we 
just barely buying down the risk? Or put another way, how much 
of a funding deficit are we in with respect to cyber 
protections, and what percentage of that is addressed with the 
supplemental funding? Thank you.
     Mr. Goldstein. This investment will absolutely make a 
demonstrable impact in Federal cybersecurity. At the same time, 
it is an incremental step. This will be a multiyear process, 
assuredly, across the 101 agencies in the Federal civilian 
executive branch, to ensure that we are able to provide the 
level of security that the American people expect.
     Now, CISA, of course, plays a core role in this, not only 
in detecting and responding to incidents, but, also, in 
providing shared services that agencies can increasingly use to 
raise their baseline of cybersecurity. And, again, this will be 
a journey, both for CISA, and for the other 100 Federal 
civilian agencies to move to a model where we are more quickly 
detecting adversary events, and where we are moving to a more 
shared service, even centralized model where CISA is raising 
the baseline across the Federal civilian executive branch.
     I look forward to the ongoing dialogue with this committee 
to understand that long-term funding profile over time.
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you for that answer. By the way, 
Mr. Goldstein, I am also a former Fighting Illini. I see you 
went to Urbana-Champaign. I am a lot older than you. I 
graduated in 1983. I just noticed that your credentials. So I 
thank you.
     The SolarWinds attack exploited a supply chain 
vulnerability, but what else do you currently see as the 
biggest risk, or vulnerability, to cybersecurity? And as a 
follow-up, what are the specific tactics or resources that CISA 
needs to have at its disposal to best combat this particular 
risk?
     Mr. Goldstein. Sure. So, I think the gravest risk that 
CISA sees from a national standpoint is the risk of an 
adversary compromising industrial control system that could 
cause life-safety impact. You know, it is--it is deeply 
damaging and concerning when an adversary steals data, or 
exposes the privacy of Americans or Federal agencies. That is, 
of course, a grave concern, but it is a different degree of 
concern when an adversary could compromise the control system 
that could actually cause loss of life for our fellow 
Americans.
     The chairwoman mentioned in her opening statement the 
intrusion to a water facility in Oldsmar, Florida. I think that 
incident, although not resulting in immediate harm, should be a 
clarion call for this country for the risk that can we face 
from cyber intrusions in these critical systems.
     And CISA, in our role as the Nation's lead agency for 
cybersecurity, are deeply focused on working with the 
industrial control system security to ensure--community, pardon 
me, to ensure that we are both understanding vulnerabilities in 
that community. Where applicable, we are helping the ICS 
community identify sophisticated threats, including CISA's 
cyber century program, and we are working to incentivize, 
increasing the baseline of cybersecurity across industrial 
control systems' owners and operators so that we are seeing the 
use of modern technology to reasonably protect these critical 
systems.
     Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you very much. And again, Acting 
Director Wales and Director Goldstein, thank you for your 
testimony today. Madam Chair, thank you for holding this 
hearing. With that, I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford? Oh, I am sorry. Mr. 
Ruppersberger.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. Two names like that.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. OK.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. OK. I just didn't have a chance to ask 
my question about the incident--how does the American Rescue 
Plan request supporting spanning the capability of what you 
need to do? Basically, bottom line, that is short-term. You 
said that all the way through. What, in more detail, if you 
can, where is the money, the $650 million? Where is that going 
to be used by you? What is your priority to take that money 
forward? Because I believe this, very strongly, that this is a 
serious issue of lack of funding and resources, and what you 
all do. And you can't do it all, and we are going to--it is 
going to get worse instead of better. We.
     Have to accept the fact that cybersecurity is a major 
issue. And we, other than people who specialize and work in it, 
don't understand that. And there is no question. We have got 
to--we have got to deal with the issue of COVID. We still have 
to move forward.
     So what are you going to do with the short-term money 
where you are probably going to go? And what ideas do you have 
as far as moving forward in this big massive issue you that you 
are going to try to work with, but you just don't have the 
resources?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. So 
there are four key areas that we will be able to make real 
progress in with the money requested in the ARA. The first is 
the deployment of detection sensors within Federal agencies to 
increase our visibility into cybersecurity threats with the 
agency environments, and figure out adversary activity much 
quicker to minimize these kind of prolonged compromises that we 
have recently seen. The second, sir, to your point, is 
expanding ourcapacity for incident response and threat hunting, 
including moving to that proactive hunting model that I 
mentioned previously.
     The third is improving our capacity to conduct analysis of 
cybersecurity information coming into CISA to understand risk 
and threats across the executive branch. And then the fourth 
and the longest-term imperative, is progressing Federal 
agencies to a more defensive network architecture, for example, 
using these zero-trust principals where we are assuming that 
the network is permeable and focusing on protecting assets and 
accounts therein. Now, that is a longer-term effort.
     To your broader question, sir, none of these activities 
will be fully actualized by the money in the ARA. So we are 
going to need longer-term investment, both by CISA and by 
individual agencies across all four of these paths, as well as 
continuously reevaluating the risk and technology environment 
to make sure that our ongoing resources are commensurate with 
critical changes. As you noted, sir, it is a deep and complex 
space.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you have a dollar amount there?
     Mr. Goldstein. Sir, it is--it is highly [inaudible] To 
estimate the final dollar amount for just the reason that you 
know.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. And that amount will knock our socks 
off, there is no question.
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. And the last thing, I still have a 
little time. I believe that we really have to look at 
cybersecurity as even maybe independent of this committee, and 
have a direct line to the President. This is so serious. Just 
like we did with the new space force. But the threat we have, 
and it is--what happened is indicative of what is going to 
happen in the future with Russia and China, and we have Iran, 
and we have had attacks with North Korea. And if we don't start 
taking this seriously, we are going to put all of our citizens 
in this country at severe risk. And so far, it has just been 
stealing information.
     But if we have a destructive attack, which is starting to 
happen, and the threats, you know, of shutting us down, we are 
going to be in a bad position, as far as national security in 
our country, especially as it relates to the countries that are 
more involved in cybersecurity.
     Mr. Wales. Sir, let me just add on that, and following up 
on Eric's point. We want to make sure that CISA and the entire 
whole of Nation is prepared for significant cyber incidents. In 
many respects, the fact that the SolarWinds campaign targeted 
Federal agencies, and larger, more well-capitalized private 
sector companies, you know, generally, was somewhat beneficial. 
If this had been a broad campaign targeting State and local 
governments, or small and medium-sized businesses, like the 
Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities we are facing, the 
challenges of them being able to sufficiently have the 
resources, skills, and abilities to remediate these problems 
would be magnified.
     So we need to look at additional ideas for how we provide 
support to State and local governments and small businesses as 
they look to recover from significant cyber incidents. There 
are ideas out there like those pushed by the Cyber Solarium 
Commission for cyber response and recovery fund. But we need 
additional approaches to make sure that whole of Nation can 
come together around significant cyber incidents and ensure we 
have the right capabilities in the right places to take the 
mitigative steps and build back networks even stronger.
     Mr. Ruppersberger. Excellent point. I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford?
     Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have to tell 
you, Director, that was exactly where I wanted to go was this 
whole of Nation aspect that you were just speaking of. And to 
follow up on my colleague, Mr. Ruppersberger's point about--and 
your response concern being the industrial control systems, 
that is where I see something--the greatest potential for loss 
of life.
     We have loss of security through some of the Federal 
systems. And one of the things that kind of--I understand your 
priority is going to be the Federal agency's. And that is why 
when you answered concerning the $650 million in RAR, American 
Rescue Act--ARA, I should say--when you answered, you focused 
on all the Federal responses in, like, detection systems, 
expanding the response capabilities, the analytics. So--and I 
understand that.
     But I would really like to know, currently, what is the--
the requests that are coming to CISA from State, local, and 
private industry, those industrial control systems that we 
spoke of, because that is where I see the greatest threat to 
loss of life. You know, dropping planes out of the sky, running 
trains into each other, poisoning water systems like we saw in 
Oldsmar. Those are the kind of things that, that equally 
concern--I don't want to say one is more important than the 
other, but they equally concern me.
     And, and I wonder, you know, Dutch said it so well. I 
wonder how many people back home understand what he just said. 
That is what concerns me. And so, are they reaching out for 
that assistance?
     Now, I can tell you, I just spoke with a Florida League of 
Cities yesterday, and this Oldsmar water plant was primary--
well, not primary, but it was one of the major topics on their 
list to discuss. And we talked about community development 
block grants, and those sorts of things. That because they 
understand now that they need to tighten up these, these cyber 
systems. Can you tell me that we have as much focus on what 
Dutch just spoke about as we do the Federal side as well?
     Mr. Wales. Yes, sir. Let me just answer a high level, and 
I will turn it over to Eric to give you some of the details. So 
CISA has a lot of authority and responsibility to protect the 
Federal civilian executive branch. And, so, SolarWinds has 
highlighted key gaps and vulnerabilities in our 
cybersecurity.gov, and we needed to take aggressive action to 
address that.
     And that is why the ARA has dedicated funding to make sure 
that we enhance our capacity to deal with vulnerabilities in an 
area where we have substantial responsibilities and 
authorities. That being said, we have a broad mission in 
cybersecurity, and industrial control systems is among our 
highest priorities for our broad cybersecurity mission. We 
released our strategic plan for addressing ICS cybersecurity 
last year, a unified plan that we worked across the interagency 
with. And this is certainly a significant thrust of our effort. 
It is also a significant competency.
     We have a lot of deep expertise in the industrial control 
system cybersecurity, which is a rare and precious talent that 
we have developed over time. But I want Eric to talk a little 
bit about some of the initiatives and ideas we have in this 
space.
     Mr. Rutherford. OK. Mr. Wales, if you could tell me, does 
that plan have a name? You mentioned it.
     Mr. Wales. Oh, it was called, like, the no--I think it was 
Industrial Control System Cybersecurity Unified Initiative, I 
believe, is the title of the plan.
     Mr. Rutherford. OK. Thank you.
     Mr. Goldstein. And I would just add, just to reiterate the 
core point, CISA is the most critical national cybersecurity 
risk. And it is unequivocally the case that risks through the 
control systems are paramount among our concerns. And, so, 
there are really two main thrusts there that I would offer. The 
first is how CISA can directly support the community of 
entities that own and operate control systems. And this is 
through service aids like vulnerability assessment, proactive 
guidance, incident response, or even, in some cases, the 
deployment of active-sensing technologies across control 
systems to understand adversary threats.
     The second area, though, under one where we hope to work 
with your committee and others, is how the U.S. Government can 
help raise the baseline of cybersecurity across entities that 
own and operate control systems, recognizing that many control 
systems may be operated by municipalities, or public utilities, 
that may not be able to afford the best in class cybersecurity 
solutions that other private companies can.
     Mr. Goldstein. And we also want to think creatively, 
working with Congress, on how we can collectively raise the bar 
for ICS cyber security across this country.
     Mr. Rutherford. So I look forward to working with you on 
those efforts. And thank you for all you all do. With that, 
Madam Chair, I see my time has run out. I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
     Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Let me ask our 
guests to turn our focus to healthcare. In 2003, the Federal 
Government established the healthcare and public health sector 
as one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the U.S., 
recognizing that its security is essential to the economy, the 
national security public health and safety of the country.
     As our healthcare systems become more digitized from 
electronic health records to connected medical devices, we have 
seen hacking and IT security incidents on the rise in 
healthcare as in other sectors. It is particularly worrisome 
during a pandemic, of course. Much of our healthcare--and 
healthcare information has been shifted online, including 
vaccine distribution management and other critical functions.
     So healthcare organizations, like lots of others, are 
struggling to defend their networks from data breaches. And I 
wonder if you could give us some--give us an update on your 
assessment of this sector, and your efforts in this regard? 
Could you elaborate on some of the work that DHS, or for that 
matter, other partners are doing to secure the healthcare 
system? How are you keeping up with numerous emerging 
technologies in the medical sector? And then can you give us an 
estimate of the degree to which best practices and procedures 
are now known, publicized in place, or insurance plans, 
healthcare providers payers to review the best--to review how 
to best protect patient data? Are best practices--what degree 
is there, a consensus to what degree is a publicly available 
and easily accessible to these--
     Mr. Wales. Sure. So I will start, and I will say without 
question, over the past year, since the early days of COVID, we 
very quickly recognized the importance of surging resources to 
the healthcare sector and related parts of the economy, because 
of the criticality and fragility of these infrastructures in 
the midst of a global pandemic. We actually brought together a 
team, used some of the hiring authority in one of the early 
COVID supplemental packages to bring on additional capacity, 
additional expertise in the healthcare industry, and sent them 
to work to improve the uptake on the cyber security service 
that we offer and to come at them and offer all the capability 
that CISA has to bring, whether it is in our cyber domain, 
physical security, supply chain security, and so on.
     We have worked hard over the past year to increase the 
cyber security profile of this industry. We have seen, through 
our efforts, the speed at which this sector is patching 
vulnerabilities that we can see through external scans improve 
dramatically last year. And beginning--when Operation Warp 
Speed stood up, we began to work very closely with that 
organization to provide the cyber security services that we 
have to the companies involved in the manufacture and 
distribution of the vaccine supply chain.
     That work continues today. We are still working. We are 
doing assessments. We are providing sensors on networks. We are 
providing overwatch of their IT space, working with the 
intelligence community. There is a lot of work designed to help 
provide an increased security posture around the healthcare 
sector. We think that this will pay long-term dividends beyond 
the pandemic in forming our relationship with the sector, their 
ability to utilize our resources, and their overall cyber 
security baseline. That being said, the healthcare industry is 
large, it is diverse. You have got small municipal hospitals 
that are not as well-capitalized, and we are trying to find 
additional resources that can be provided.
     One good example, the organization that operates what we 
call the multistate ISAC that helps provide support to state 
and local governments. It operates on a cooperative grant from 
CISA. It operates on a cooperative grant from CISA. It operates 
a sensor network similar to our Einstein system for State and 
locals who sign up for it. But they made available for free to 
critical healthcare companies, usually for municipal 
authorities, to provide malicious domain-blocking service 
quickly to companies at risk, and because of their criticality 
as a part of the COVID response.
     And so, we think there is a whole community effort to 
address this problem, but it is one that is going to take a lot 
of work over a lot of years, given its size, its complexity, 
and the amount of help they may require.
     Mr. Price. What would you say about that whole community 
concept, the extent to which some of these smaller, and maybe 
less connected healthcare institutions, practitioners are fully 
aware of it? Can we at least say now that the wake-up call has 
occurred, there is a fuller awareness, a desire to adopt best 
practices, or do we still have some distance to go in that 
regard?
     Mr. Wales. I would say that given the number of ransomware 
attacks that have hit hospitals, even in the midst of the 
pandemic, which is a deplorable--which is just deplorable on 
the case of these criminal organizations has been a wake-up 
call. That being said, if you are a small hospital, and you are 
not as well-capitalized, you may not have the option, you may 
not have the resources to invest in the dedicated cybersecurity 
team and information security practices that are required for 
the threat that you may face.
     And, so, we need to think creativity about how do we give 
them the tools and capabilities they require to provide the 
level of security that is needed when you are protecting 
America's health and safety.
     Mr. Price. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
     Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair, and again, I just 
want to thank you for all the work that you do on this 
committee, as well as Ranking Member Fleischmann. This is the 
one committee that I enjoy attending and participating in. 
Well, and my other one, my [inaudible]. The two best committees 
out of the Appropriations Committee.
     But again, I just wanted to thank Chairman Wales and Mr. 
Goldstein for being on today. There is so much to talk about. 
And I wanted to ask them, because I didn't and I should have, 
you know, I talked about what keeps up, you know, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, 
what--what causes you to have sleepless nights? Gentlemen, if 
you don't mind sharing, if you can share a scenario, or an 
example of a sleepless night because of a threat facing the 
homeland?
     Mr. Goldstein. So I will just turn back to a line that we 
were just on which is the possibility of a cyber attack 
impacting a critical service or function that results in loss 
of life, or harm to the American people. This could be via 
control system, it could be a ransomware attack to a hospital 
that results in the unavailability of critical services, as we 
have seen in other countries. And, so, it is really this 
transition of cyber attacks moving from a focus on stealing or 
accessing data, which is deeply concerning, but towards a cyber 
attack impacting the provision of a critical service: water, 
electricity, healthcare, upon which people depend. It is that 
transition that is deeply concerning and presents an urgent and 
emerging national risk.
     Mr. Palazzo. So, basically, you described what happened in 
Texas and other cities in and around the Midwest because of 
weather last week. But what we are talking about instead of 
weather and natural disaster-type scenario that we have no 
control over at all. There is probably a bad actor out there 
that could hit a keyboard and make something like this happen, 
or could make something like this happen if we don't safeguard 
and firewall our critical infrastructure.
     Mr. Goldstein. That is certainly the risk that we must act 
urgently to address, correct.
     Mr. Palazzo. And you kind of tie that in with not only the 
cyber intrusions, but the stuff that is happening in the space 
domain where, a lot of our, you know, let's say, economically, 
we compete, but there are also possibly our adversaries in 
space creating a bunch of ASAT technologies. And we know we are 
becoming even more dependent upon, you know, satellites for our 
day-in and day-out life, our financial systems, our phones, 
everything.
     Do you work with those other agencies to--to, I mean, map 
out a plan? Because, you know, if you go to the bank and you 
have no bank in your account, money in your account and your 
phone doesn't work, I mean, we have seen--we have seen over 
time that, you know, your fear and paranoia, it could cause a 
lot of trouble here in America.
     Are you--are you concerned about something like that 
happening? How--how are we--how are we, I guess, jointly 
working together, not having silos as we have had in the past 
in Federal agencies, but sharing communication that protect, 
you know, protect all of us?
     Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. So, certainly, CISA works very 
closely with the Defense Department, private industry, other 
government partners on issues like space-based technologies, 
that as you note, are inherently reliant upon networking and 
the integrity of communication and present an increasingly 
fundamental dependency to all manner of critical 
infrastructure. And so, certainly, we are deeply attuned to 
these sort of technological trends that are either emerging, or 
have already been affected, how those technologies can be 
undermined by cyber intrusion, and, then, working with the 
companies that developing, manufacturing, and deploying these 
technologies, making sure that wherever possible, securities 
built in by design on the front end.
     Mr. Wales. And, so, let me just add, we have been meeting 
with the newly-formed Space ISAC, so it is our conglomeration 
of companies involved in the space industry have formed 
information-sharing analysis center as a means to share 
critical information related to cyber security threats that 
could impact space systems or their related ground-based 
infrastructure. That is, as I say, a new focus area. The last 
administration kicked it off. They had a space cyber security 
effort. And we think that it is, it is critical that we 
continue to focus on these additional functions, that we 
recognize are both vulnerability, but absolutely essential to 
our way of life. And we have a lot of work, historical work in 
the GPS and PNT world that we will call upon as we embark upon 
additional activities to support the companies involved in the 
space-based industry.
     Mr. Palazzo. Thank you for that. I know my time is ticking 
down. Again, I just want to say I appreciate everything you are 
talking about. And I know instead just as we have been focused 
in space, instead of having one big satellite that could be 
taken out, we are trying to deaggregate our space footprint, so 
we have multiple satellites. I am assuming there are some 
conversations about that on how we do our electrical grids and 
things in the aftermath of our winter storm.
     But I will just leave with this. One of my colleagues 
mentioned, like, you know, why aren't we taking this seriously? 
Obviously, this committee and the members on this committee are 
taking cyber very seriously. And I think a large number of the 
American people, if they weren't so distracted by the 
shenanigans and the games that, basically, their politicians 
are doing, you know, how can we expect them to take, you know, 
this seriously when they don't even take us seriously? And I 
think that starts with other members of Congress, you know, 
putting politics aside and focusing on the American people. 
And, again, we have unlimited wants and unlimited resources. 
And this committee has a big responsibility. Thank you, 
gentlemen. And thank you, team, for the work that you do. Madam 
Chair, I yield back.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. OK. Thank you. I just want to make a 
point with regards to the industrial systems. Now, CISA really 
does need to put together a very comprehensive strategy fund 
estimates and schedules to help the Nation address the ICS 
risk, because we really would like to move very quickly in 
addressing this issue. So I just want to make that, make that 
point.
     And I just have one more question that I would like to 
ask. The reconciliation bill also includes funding to help 
address Federal agency IT modernization efforts through the 
General Services Administration's Technology Modernizing Fund, 
or TMF. As a member of the TMF board, CISA will play a role in 
overseeing the execution of those funds. Can you speak to the 
current state of the Federal Government IT infrastructure and 
how it impacts our cyber security capabilities?
     Mr. Goldstein. Certainly. Modernization and security are 
inherently interlinked, but they--that must be intentional. And 
so CISA plays a key role on the Technology Modernization Fund 
to ensure that critical new investments to ensure that Federal 
IT is state of the art are conducted with security top of line. 
So even as the Federal enterprise modernizes technology to make 
sure that the Federal workforce and the American people have 
access to the technology that they expect for the critical 
services delivered by each of our Federal agencies, that those 
modernization efforts are conducted with security built in to 
some of the prior questions to ensure that years from now, we 
don't look back and realize that we invested in technology that 
didn't have the appropriate security control, or the 
appropriate logging on down the line, although to make sure 
that as we modernize, we modernize securely so we are building 
in defenses from the ground up.
     Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you. I believe there are no more 
questions. So we are going to conclude this hearing. Acting 
Director Wales and Executive Assistant Director Goldstein, 
thank you so very much for your time and helping us to think 
through these very, very difficult challenges. And we certainly 
appreciate your agency's transparency in working with the 
subcommittee, and the interagency cooperation of the Cyber 
Unified Coordination Group. This has been a very, very 
informative hearing. I very much appreciate your being here. 
The Subcommittee on Homeland Security now stands adjourned. 
RPTR WARREN EDTR ROSEN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022 Tuesday, March 16, 2021 THE ROLE OF 
FEMA AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN COVID-19 RESPONSE DEPARTMENT 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022 Tuesday, March 16, 
2021 THE ROLE OF FEMA AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN COVID-19 
RESPONSE WITNESSES CURTIS BROWN, STATE COORDINATOR AND CO-
FOUNDER, VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND 
INSTITUTE FOR DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
BOB FENTON, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF FEMA 
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY MARK 
GHILARDUCCI, DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMERGENCY SERVICES KEVIN MCGOWAN, DIRECTOR, LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PATRICK SHEEHAN, DIRECTOR, 
TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order.
    As this hearing is being conducted virtually, we must 
address a few housekeeping matters.
    Members are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. 
When you are recognized to speak, if I notice that you have not 
unmuted yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to 
unmute you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will 
unmute your microphone. To avoid inadvertent background noise, 
the chair or staff designated by the chair may mute participant 
microphones when they are not recognized to speak.
    We will be using the 5-minute clock, but if there is a 
technology issue during a member's speaking time, we will move 
to the next member until the issue is resolved, and you will 
retain the balance of your time. You will notice a clock on 
your screen showing your remaining time. At 1 minute remaining, 
the clock will turn yellow. At 30 seconds remaining, I will 
gently tap the gavel to remind the member speaking that their 
time has almost expired. When your time has expired, the clock 
will turn red. I will begin to recognize the next member.
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules, beginning with the chair and ranking member, followed by 
members present at the time the hearing is called to order in 
order of seniority, and we will alternate by party. Next, we 
will go to members who were not present when the hearing was 
called to order until every member present has had a first 
round.
    Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email address to which members can submit information 
in writing at any of our hearings or markups. That email 
address has been provided in advance to your staffs.
    Now, with the business at hand, I welcome everyone to 
today's hearing, particularly our witnesses. One hearing will 
consist of two panels. The first panel will be with Bob Fenton, 
the Acting Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. Our second panel will be include representatives from 
State and local emergency management agencies, who I will 
introduce later.
    Today's hearing can be summed up in the answer to one 
question: What must emergency managers do to effectively 
respond to an emergency and pandemic? Since about the middle of 
the last century, we have called upon emergency managers when 
our Nation faces a critical or complex humanitarian crisis--a 
natural disaster, power outages, pandemics, or the need for 
civil defense. These roles are codified in Federal law, policy, 
and doctrine, such as the national response framework.
    A year ago at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, my 
staff and I asked FEMA what response role it would play. The 
expectation was that FEMA and its partners, at all levels of 
government, would play a large and visible role. However, 
inconsistent with people's historical and statutory role, it 
was not given a role because the pandemic was seen by the 
previous administration as strictly a public health emergency, 
and not an event requiring emergency management. The last 
administration's stance eventually changed as it became clear 
that responding to public health crises required emergency 
management expertise.
    The administration finally called on FEMA and its State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial partners, to help deploy 
hospital ships, get critical supplies into the United States, 
and to establish field hospitals and other operations for 
overwhelmed medical systems including setting up testing and 
vaccination sites around the country.
    The intent of today's hearing is to look towards the future 
using the valuable lessons learned during the pandemic to help 
us to better be prepared for the next emergency or disaster. 
Today's witnesses represent emergency management personnel at 
the local, State, and Federal levels, who, for more than a 
year, have worked tirelessly under difficult conditions to 
defeat the pandemic.
    We, the Members of Congress, and our constituents, are 
extremely grateful for your efforts. Please extend our most 
sincere gratitude to your colleagues across the country.
    I now turn to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    It is a pleasure to be back to work with you and the 
committee's business this morning. I would like to welcome our 
new members, Ms. Underwood and Mrs. Hinson, to our 
subcommittee. I look forward to working with you and the 
veterans of this subcommittee on some of the hardest issues we 
face in government.
    Acting Administrator Fenton, welcome, and thank you for 
being here today. I am a huge fan of former Administrator 
Gaynor. We worked well together. I know you and the chairwoman 
have worked together a lot in California, and I, too, am 
looking forward to working with you.
    This has been a year like no other. In fact, about 1 year 
ago today it was that the committee moved to a virtual work 
format from home due to the COVID pandemic. And, unfortunately, 
sir, FEMA's job was just getting started as the floods, 
tornadoes, fires, and hurricanes came on top of COVID.
    I offer my sincere gratitude to the people at FEMA, who 
have been on the job in some of the worst of times. We saw FEMA 
teams in my own State responding after deadly and record-
setting tornadoes, helping the COVID response coordination, and 
being there to help pick up the pieces after a bombing in 
downtown Nashville. Thank you to everyone at FEMA for their 
amazing work and cooperation with our States.
    To date, FEMA has obligated $63.8 billion from the Disaster 
Relief Fund in support of COVID efforts, in addition to 
hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to firefighters, 
emergency managers, and emergency food and shelter programs. I 
am hopeful that with successful vaccine programs, we will be 
able to turn the corner on this terrible pandemic.
    I will keep my opening statement short this morning, as we 
have two panels, and I thank all of the witnesses in that 
regard. I thank you, and I look forward to your testimony.
    Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I thank you.
    Mr. Fenton, welcome to the subcommittee. I know you from 
your day job as the administrator for FEMA Region 9, which 
includes my home State of California. Since January, however, 
you have been the senior official, performing the duties of the 
FEMA administrator. I look forward to hearing your perspective 
from your experiences in both roles. We will submit the full 
text of your official statement for the hearing record. Please 
begin your oral summary which I would ask you keep to 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Fenton. Thank you, and good morning, Chairwoman Roybal-
Allard, Ranking Member Fleischmann, and members of the 
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and 
discuss FEMA's role in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    This is an unprecedented challenge that has claimed the 
lives of over 540,000 of our neighbors, friends, family members 
across the country, and has caused grave damage to the global 
economy and put a spotlight on inequities through our Nation.
    I began my career in FEMA 25 years ago as a Reservist. From 
the first deployment in 1996 to my current role as the acting 
administrator, I have the honor of helping people across the 
country before, during, and after disasters. During my tenure, 
I have learned that FEMA and, therefore, the Nation, succeeds 
when our State partners are in the lead. Emergency management 
at its best is a coalition between Federal, State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial governments, the private sector and 
nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and individual 
Americans.
    At FEMA, we are committed to ensuring that everyone has 
access to a vaccination. This is our highest priority, and 
success is dependent upon the whole committee being unified to 
achieve this goal. Our current work can be grouped into three 
broad categories in support of the President's strategy to 
respond to COVID-19 and ensure everyone is vaccinated.
    First, at the President's direction, FEMA is reimbursing 
100 percent of the cost for Title 32 National Guard forces, as 
well as 100 percent of eligible emergency protective measures 
incurred by State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners in 
response to COVID-19. This includes reimbursement for 
vaccination efforts, COVID-19 screening, and personal 
protective equipment.
    Further, on February 2, the President directed FEMA to make 
reimbursements for expenses incurred retroactive to the 
beginning of the disaster. Taken together, these measures 
represent a substantial increase in assistance to our partners.
    Second, FEMA is working to support State, local, Tribal, 
and territory-led Community Vaccination Centers, also known as 
CVCs, through the development and deployment of Federal 
personnel, the provision of equipment, supplies, and technical 
assistance in awarding expedited financial assistance.
    Third, FEMA has teamed up with the Health and Human 
Services, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to 
establish State-led, federally-supported community vaccination 
centers. These pilot sites are stood up in partnership with 
State and local authorities to better reach underserved and 
historically marginalized communities. These federally 
supported CVC sites come with an additional vaccine allotment 
that is above and beyond the normal State allocation, and can 
administer up to 6,000 vaccines a day.
    As of March 14, FEMA has obligated more than $4.42 billion 
for CVCs at 100 percent Federal cost share. That has also been 
834 federally supported vaccination sites, including 18 pilot 
community vaccine centers with 29 mobile units attached to 
them. As of March 14, 107.1 million vaccine doses have been 
administered across the country, with nearly 90 million of 
those taking place since President Biden was inaugurated.
    Furthermore, the administration is able to provide States 
and territories with a 3-week vaccine supply allocation. As of 
now, this week, the allocations up to 15.8 million doses, which 
is an 84 percent increase since the President took office.
    In everything we are doing, we are striving to ensure 
equity. President Biden has made it a cornerstone of this 
administration's efforts. In FEMA, we established a civil 
rights advisory group that is incorporated into all these 
activities. Since its inception in January, the civil rights 
advisory group has supported the development and the 
methodology used to determine CVC site selections, and also, 
worked with the 10 FEMA regions to collect and analyze 
demographic data, identify underserved communities, and 
collaborate with community-based organizations.
    FEMA is working with other Federal agencies and our 
partners to ensure that vaccinations can proceed quickly as 
increased supplies allow, so that everyone who wants a vaccine 
can get one.
    Before I conclude, Madam Chairwoman, I would be remiss if I 
didn't acknowledge the Herculean efforts of my friends and 
colleagues from our mutual home of the State of California. As 
you know, two initial pilot community vaccination centers were 
set up in Oakland and Los Angeles last month, and currently 
vaccinated 6,000 Californians at each site each day. We have a 
long way to go, especially with reaching underserved 
communities, but our success to date is due the efforts of the 
men and women like Mark Ghilarducci, the Director of the 
Governor's Office of Emergency Services, and Kevin McGowan, the 
Director of the Los Angeles County Office of Emergency 
Management and, most of all, the people whom they lead.
    I know Mark and Kevin are appearing before your 
subcommittee later this morning, alongside several other State 
and local emergency management professionals. As I said in the 
beginning of my testimony, FEMA succeeds when the whole 
community succeeds. Professionals like Mark and Kevin make that 
possible.
    In closing, we greatly appreciate the subcommittee's 
steadfast support for FEMA's efforts throughout the COVID 
pandemic, and for appropriating the resources our agency has 
needed to meet these historic mission requirements.
    Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I look forward 
to answering your questions today.
    [The information follows:] ******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Before I begin questions, I would like to turn to the 
chairwoman of the full Appropriations Committee, Rosa DeLauro.
    The Chairwoman. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    I will be brief. I know we want to get on to questions, and 
there is also a second panel. So, I want to say a thank you to 
you and Ranking Member Fleischmann for holding what is a very 
important hearing. Thanks to all of our witnesses for 
testifying.
    Since the Federal Emergency Management Agency's formation 
in 1979, the hardworking and dedicated FEMA staff have helped 
our Nation prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters 
and emergencies of all kinds. They have answered the call to 
serve, working under the most difficult circumstances, and 
facing daunting logistical challenges, to provide assistance 
and support those who are most in need.
    When our Nation descended into the worst public health 
crisis in generations, the men and women of FEMA came rushing 
to the rescue. They have provided much-needed medical supplies, 
personal protective equipment, and COVID-19 tests to our 
communities. They have set up field hospitals, testing and 
vaccination sites, and put their own health and safety in 
jeopardy to help those in crisis.
    Responding to this pandemic has not been easy for anyone. 
It would have been so much more difficult without the 
assistance and the support of FEMA. Now, the agency is facing 
new and increasing challenges on multiple fronts, such as the 
growing potential crisis at the United States-Mexican border, 
where COVID-19 social distancing practices have increased the 
need for more beds, as the chairwoman of the committee knows. 
That is why it is more important than ever that we work to 
ensure the agency is properly equipped with the funding and the 
resources that it needs.
    I am grateful that the American Rescue Plan provides $50 
billion for the Disaster Relief Fund, as well as $510 million 
for FEMA's Emergency Food and Shelter Program, another $200 
million for staffing for adequate fire and emergency response 
grants, as well as $100 million for assistance to firefighter 
grants, and another $100 million for Emergency Management 
Performance Grants.
    Now that the money is getting out the door, we need to take 
a look at the--a long-term look at the crisis that FEMA will 
face in the future, understand how the agency can become more 
proactive to future challenges.
    Under the previous administration, FEMA had considerable 
difficulty responding in a timely and effective manner to the 
rising COVID-19 pandemic. That is why I and others wrote to 
Administrator Gaynor and others on several occasions to voice 
our concerns about the state of the Strategic National 
Stockpile, and the need to increase the number of ventilators, 
N95 masks, surgical masks, and other medical supplies.
    Unfortunately, the response I received can only be 
described as inadequate, which is why I thank Chairwoman 
Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member Fleischmann, again, for holding 
this crucial hearing, and why I am hopeful that under the 
Biden-Harris administration, we can move forward, incorporate 
the lessons we have learned from the pandemic, and 
comprehensively prepare for the future with the consultation 
with FEMA.
    With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Fenton, through legislation and advocacy, many of my 
colleagues and I pushed the last administration to increase the 
Federal cost share for FEMA public assistance for COVID and to 
broaden the scope of what was eligible for reimbursement. We 
were pleased when President Biden announced he would 
administratively make those changes.
    Can you explain how FEMA has implemented these changes with 
a particular focus on the expansion of reimbursement 
eligibility?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, so we have done two things so far. One, 
we have gone back. Everything that happened prior to January 
20, the President made 100 percent so we could assist those 
with funding. Then going forward, we are now working with 
States and local governments to draft a policy that 
incorporates the expansion of our public assistance program to 
include assistance to help with school reopening, to help with 
transportation, to help with increased testing, and other 
areas. So what we will do is work with them. We are about to 
publish the expanded policy. In addition to that, the new 
legislation also allows us to increase funeral benefits to 
additional people through the next year.
    So we are working on both of those, and, hopefully, the 
policy will be out with that. Right now, we focus on going to 
100 percent on the previous disaster, and working with State 
and local governments to identify those costs and adjust our 
system to calculate those new costs.
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. In H.R. 1319, the American Rescue Plan, 
provides $50 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund. Would that 
infusion of supplemental funding, do you think the DRF is 
sufficiently resourced through the end of the fiscal year?
    Mr. Fenton. Well, we have what we need right now to 
operate. We have provided $4 billion out already to vaccine 
centers. As schools start to reopen, we will get a better idea 
of the cost to reopen schools to include providing protective 
equipment supplies, and to provide testing, but also, when we 
work with transportation, public transportation organizations, 
mass transit, on how we assist them. So we have enough to 
operate now. We project those costs to be sufficient through 
the end of the year, but we will communicate based on needs 
throughout the United States if that changes.
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. After the last administration refused to 
provide funeral assistance to families who suffered a loss due 
to COVID, Congress connected legislation in December, mandating 
FEMA to provide assistance at 100 percent Federal cost share 
for pandemic deaths occurring before the end of last year. The 
American Rescue Plan continues this assistance into 2021.
    Could you please explain what specific assistance FEMA 
intends to provide? How it will be provided? And if the 
assistance is not yet reaching families, when can you expect it 
to begin?
    Mr. Fenton. Thank you for that question.
    Right now, our focus is empathy when we talk about 
individuals that have lost loved ones. We want to make sure 
that we do it in an empathetic way. While we have done funeral 
assistance in disasters, we have never done anything at this 
scale or scope.
    So, the first thing we have got to do is bring in 
additional resources to be able to meet the needs. The second 
thing we have done is done a lot of listening sessions with 
different organizations, funeral associations, and others and 
then reach out to many different organizations to talk about 
culturally unique needs for funerals, and to make sure that the 
policy we develop for this and how we assist it covers to the 
greatest need of those that have lost loved ones.
    FEMA is on track to implement and start the funeral 
assistance program in early April. We are currently focused on 
training our call center staff and finalizing our policy. We 
will do this through a 1-800 number versus doing it on an 
online registration. We think that, again, with empathy being 
the priority, we want to be able to case manage and have that 
human-to-human interaction as we do this, and make sure that we 
do it in a way that supports everyone's needs. So early April 
is when we look to start the program.
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, again, Madam Chair, and 
Director Fenton.
    I also want to welcome the full committee chair, Ms. 
DeLauro. Thank you for joining us today. I know you have got 12 
subcommittees. It means a lot that you are on with us today. 
Thank you.
    I mentioned in my opening statement the incredible 
challenges this year has been for FEMA employees. Not only did 
we have the natural disasters that battered our States, but 
FEMA had to roll out operations to support COVID declarations 
in every State, plus territories and Tribes. On top of that, 
the personal stressors of the school-age children learning from 
home, or families struggling with job losses or illnesses, have 
challenged almost everyone.
    My question to you, sir, is: How is the morale at FEMA? How 
is your workforce holding up, sir?
    Mr. Fenton. I appreciate the question, Congressman.
    I get the opportunity to lead the greatest group of civil 
servants I know with the great mission to be able to help 
people before, during, and after disasters. We have over 20,000 
employees, about 20,000 employees at FEMA that have a wealth of 
disaster experience, and, as you said, can be called upon at a 
moment's notice to deploy and help in disasters.
    Right now, about 75 percent of those that we send to 
disasters, there is roughly just under 14,000 are deployed 
right now to events across the country in response to COVID, 
the disasters from the Texas freeze that has happened, plus 
helping with the unaccompanied children issue and supporting 
HHS.
    We are doing well. I think our employees enjoy the work, 
quite frankly. I just got a Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey 
that shows a dramatic improvement with regard to morale, one of 
the highest increases in the last 10 years. I think when our 
employees are helping Americans, they are most satisfied. They 
get to do what they came to FEMA to do, and they enjoy doing 
that mission.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir. A couple of other questions. I 
will ask both of them, because I want to make sure you have 
time to answer. Have you been able to avoid major COVID 
outbreaks, despite the constant in-person work requirements? 
And then to follow this up, are you worried or concerned about 
an increase in employee attrition as we go into the next cycle 
of storms and weather that could impact FEMA's response 
capabilities, sir?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, so we take safety of our employees very 
seriously. We have taken a number of precautionary measures to 
do that. Like most of America, we have done a lot of stuff 
remote, using Zoom and Teams and other chat functions to do 
that. But as you said, part of our business requires us to be 
in person.
    So we have done that in a way that we have made sure that 
people have the right protective equipment, that we do social 
distancing, that we do testing, to limit the impact to our 
workforce, and have been pretty successful in doing that. In 
addition to that, we have started to vaccinate our workforce, 
especially those that are out at the Community Vaccine Centers, 
assisting Americans through those sites.
    With regard to concerns about attrition, since 2017, we 
brought on 3,000 employees at FEMA. My experience is in these 
big events, whether it be Katrinas, the 9/11s, the Sandys, the 
Marias, it is a great opportunity to bring on local hires. We 
are hiring those right now at those community vaccine centers 
in the hundreds. So as we do that, that will be an opportunity 
for them to join our organization full-time. We usually see a 
big uptake after these big events of people that join FEMA 
because of being part of this mission.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    In the interest of time, Madam Chair, I will yield back. 
Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. DeLauro.
    The Chairwoman. Thank you very much.
    And thank you, Administrator. These questions come from 
Connecticut, and I will ask them quickly so that you can 
respond. You discussed the 100 percent cost share. Now some--by 
the time President Biden took office, we were 10 months into 
the pandemic. My understanding is that some of the States had 
already used their Treasury coronavirus relief funds to cover 
the non-Federal share of FEMA assistance. How will this work? 
Will these States be reimbursed? That is a question.
    Let me also ask you: In the prior administration, FEMA 
issued the guidance that limited disinfection to facilities 
where eligible emergency workers performed PPE to emergency 
protective activities. Can you tell us what the new policy will 
be for PPE, and when States and communities will see new 
written guidance?
    And just lastly, oftentimes, it is hard to understand the 
roadmap seeking help from FEMA that States and communities have 
to navigate what assistance is eligible, if you can talk very 
briefly about the right sequence of asking for that assistance. 
And can FEMA take on the task or direct us to the agency that 
will?
    Mr. Fenton. I appreciate the question, Congresswoman Rosa 
DeLauro.
    As far as--let me start with, first, the CARES Act. So they 
will be able to--States that went ahead and used their CARES 
Act funding for the 25 cost share, will be able to repurpose 
that funding and use it for something else. In fact, Treasury 
has extended the deadline to the end of 2021 to December 31, 
2021, to allow them to repurpose and use that funding, since 
now they won't have to use it for the cost share.
    As far as written guidance and the public assistance 
program, we are in the process of working with many different 
organizations to incorporate the President's direction going 
forward, and increasing the public assistance program to help 
with the vaccination, to help with opening schools, to help 
with transportation systems, and in other areas. I suspect that 
those policies will be released very soon. In fact, one is 
going out today with regard to medical care facilities. So, we 
will be putting those out hopefully this month as we finish 
those sessions and incorporate comments from our stakeholders.
    With regard to the roadmap we are asking for, you know, not 
only assistance through FEMA, but other Federal agencies, there 
is a couple of things that we are doing. One is we are making 
sure that--and we have had more new applicants than any 
disaster ever for our public assistance program, applicants 
that we normally don't service in disasters, especially for the 
medical community.
    So what we are doing is, we have brought in a bunch of 
assistance from other Federal agencies in the private sector to 
help us expedite the processing. And we are working within our 
regions, to States and locals, to bring in long-term recovery 
functions and other Federal authorities that are available, to 
make sure that States understand the resources that are 
available to them, and that we partner together from a funding 
perspective and a roadmap perspective, to fund what we can 
underneath our authority for the emergency protective measure, 
so that we integrate that with other funding, like the 
Department of Education and HHS and CDC, to link those together 
so that they have a roadmap of what we will cover versus what 
is available through other Federal agencies.
    The Chairwoman. And you will be sending out guidelines with 
regard to that effort?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, we will. For example, in Region 9, where I 
am from, we actually keep a document that is available on the 
internet to our State and local governments where we put in 
those new funding resources and keep a compendium of what those 
all are, so that States can go in there and look for them. Then 
we try to, specifically if it is allocated by State, let them 
know what the balance is within those States as they are 
available.
    The Chairwoman. Now when you say repurpose, help me for a 
second. Are we going to reimburse the costs that the States 
incurred in those 10 months that the 25 percent match was 
still--so that is going to be reimbursed. I just want to be 
clear.
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, ma'am.
    The Chairwoman. Because, you know, my State of Connecticut 
is going to be asking. I am sure California is and other States 
as well, and, again, just to be clear. So it is a much broader 
range of disinfection, if you will, and protective services 
beyond only where emergency work is being performed.
    Mr. Fenton. So going back, it is the policy that was in 
place going back now at 100 percent. So, we will pay all 100 
percent of the costs going back. Going forward, the President's 
direction going forward, it allows for a more expansive public 
assistance program.
    The Chairwoman. Fabulous. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Fenton, first, let me say as a 12-year sheriff and a 
41-year law enforcement officer, I really appreciate all the 
work that FEMA has done for our State and local law enforcement 
and others in our response. I am from north Florida, 
Jacksonville, and, you know, I represent three coastal 
counties, and I can tell you that you are a Godsend for us. So 
pass that on to your folks. I really appreciate all you-all do, 
and look forward to continue to work with you, as your mission 
continues to grow, obviously.
    So one of the questions that I have, Mr. Fenton, is we have 
now got, I think, five different packages, about $700 billion 
in discretionary money that has been, since the first, you 
know, coronavirus preparedness response supplemental, CARES 
Act, first came out. We wrote a letter recently to Mr. 
Fairweather, the Acting Director at OMB, that would be asking: 
Where are the--you know, how have these dollars been expended, 
that $700 billion? Can you tell us a little bit about how much 
of that money has been expended and how much is left?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, I can speak to FEMA's funding that we 
received so far. I can't speak to other Federal agencies.
    Mr. Rutherford. Sure.
    Mr. Fenton. But with regard to our funding, the majority of 
it has been provided to State and local governments through a 
number of programs, either our public assistance program, or 
funding directly, Federal resources, like military or HHS that 
sends doctors to hospitals or funding masks, protective 
equipment. So we provided a significant amount of funding to do 
those kind of activities.
    Including that, we funded the program to help individuals 
with regard to lost wages, and provide a significant amount of 
money on lost wages.
    Right now, prior to the supplemental that we received with 
$50 billion, we had about $10 billion left from the funding 
that has been provided to FEMA for disaster relief fund to 
date.
    Mr. Rutherford. I am sorry. There is about $10 billion left 
now?
    Mr. Fenton. We have about $10 billion dollars now prior to 
the $50 billion we received from the current authority.
    I project that, you know, as we go forward, that we will 
use funding for the funeral program, both going backwards, you 
know, for those who have passed away and those who 
unfortunately will pass away going forwards. We will provide 
funding for more PPE and testing to open our schools. We will 
provide funding for vaccinated Americans, the $4 billion we 
have already provided, plus there will be more as we continue 
to vaccinate, especially as we expand that capability.
    So I anticipate, between those and opening transportation 
corridors and getting America and the economy going back, we 
will heavily use our funding. Plus, as we all know, as we get 
to the summer, we will be into hurricane and fire season. We 
will have the normal activity that we will have to fund in 
addition to those.
    Mr. Rutherford. Let me ask you this, Mr. Fenton: We may 
need to help you out with this, but I think one of the things 
that we need to look at is the processing time for these claims 
by State and local governments take so long that they 
accumulate huge amounts of interest. So, we are giving them 
millions of dollars, and then they are having to pay millions 
of dollars in interest. I think we ought to include that 
interest as part of their cost. If we are going to continue to 
drag this out in response to paying these bills, the State and 
local government shouldn't be held over the barrel for this 
interest. What do you think about that?
    Mr. Fenton. Well, we talked about what we have had to do at 
FEMA. We have tried to reimburse people as quick as possible. 
This is a unique event where we haven't had to do this type of 
work, especially with medical costs, and new applicants, 
especially the number of nonprofits that have entered 
eligibility through our public assistance program. So this is 
unique.
    What I would say is, for example, in the community 
vaccination center program, which we put out $4.4 billion, that 
is less than 45 days. One of the things we are doing is 
expediting that funding at 50 percent of the cost up front on 
projected costs, and then as those come in, finalizing that.
    So, I think there is a little bit of work to do on both 
sides as far as having ready bills, but also things we are 
doing to project the cost in front and give half of that up 
front to offset some of those immediate requirements, so that 
we can work together and reimburse the final cost at the back 
end.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Mr. Fenton. I believe my time 
has expired.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
for calling today's hearing on the ongoing pandemic response.
    During the first year of this pandemic, we all witnessed a 
colossal failure of leadership with fatal consequences. But in 
the past few months we finally rounded a corner. With the 
passage of the American Rescue Plan, help is on the way. And 
after a year of grim milestones, including half a million dead, 
we finally have some new milestones worth celebrating, 
including over 100 million vaccine doses administered in the 
United States. These developments are promising, but we are not 
out of the woods yet. One of the most important and 
logistically challenging steps on our path to normalcy is 
vaccination. We have a long road ahead before we reach herd 
immunity. I would like to ask a few questions about FEMA's road 
in helping us get there.
    Mr. Fenton, can you explain how FEMA plans to use funding 
from the American Rescue Plan to accelerate COVID vaccine 
rollout, and gets shots in arms?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, so we are doing a number of things to 
help with that. While CDC and the operation are funding the 
vaccine supply, what we are doing is funding State and local 
governments' capability to administer a vaccine. So the $4.4 
billion we have already provided out in the last 50 days is 
part of that. The second thing we are doing is we are sending 
Federal personnel out there to help State and local 
governments, so actually, people to administer vaccines. To 
date, we have deployed roughly about 6,000 people out to help 
in that mission, whether it is the Department of Defense, HHS, 
FEMA, the Forest Service, you name the Federal agency; we have 
them lined up to help us in that mission, including DHS as a 
large is helping us out.
    Then, lastly, what we are doing is setting up specific 
sites to provide large amounts of vaccine in large population 
areas where there is high social vulnerabilities to help to 
ensure equity, and those most at risk are vaccinated.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
    I am hearing from my constituents every day that there is 
just not enough vaccine available in our community. I am 
interested in seeing this change as quickly as possible. So I 
am glad this administration has taken an all-hands-on-deck 
approach. One component of FEMA's vaccine rollout support is 
the operation of mass vaccination sites like the one at the 
United Center in Chicago.
    Mr. Fenton, what factors does FEMA consider, and what 
stakeholders are consulted when selecting a site for mass 
vaccination centers like this one?
    Mr. Fenton. Well, we work very closely with CDC to look at 
their Social Vulnerability Index score that looks at each 
county. What we are looking at is a large population area. If 
you take, for example, Illinois and Chicago specifically, the 
number of--we are looking at the number of people within the 
Chicago area, the social vulnerabilities there, but also 
recognizing that Black and Brown people are being impacted by 
COVID three times as much, hospitalized two times as much 
death, and to ensure that we are working with faith-based 
organizations, community-based organizations, and the State and 
local governments, to target those areas and those individuals 
to ensure that we vaccinate them first.
    If you kind of look at Illinois's area, about 40 percent of 
the people that have been COVID positive and been hospitalized 
are from the Chicago area. About 45 percent that have died are 
from the Chicago area. So, therefore, we are focused in on that 
area, and trying to build relationships to the community to 
ensure that if there is any vaccine hesitancy, we get them 
vaccinated.
    Ms. Underwood. There is a lot of confusion surrounding the 
opening of the United Center vaccination site last week. The 
site was originally supposed to open for all Illinois 
residents, and then it was later restricted to Chicago 
residents only. State, county, and local officials in Illinois 
reported that this decision was made based on updated guidance 
from FEMA. Can you briefly explain to the committee what 
guidance you originally provided on eligibility for sites, and 
what changed in your updated guidance?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, so in all 18 sites that we have open 
right now across the country, each one of them are focused only 
on that county. The State gets an allocation for the whole 
State, and we are focused just on the vulnerable populations 
within each county.
    What had happened in Illinois is the State started going 
ahead and accepting registrations for the whole State. The 
first 40,000 opened, and 87 percent of them were White, 
Caucasians. It was not the focus and the intention of why we 
set up that site. The site was set up for socially vulnerable 
populations within the Chicago area to help those that have 
been most at risk. So what we did is we stopped taking 
registrations for that system and we got everyone together and 
said, you know, let's focus on the most socially vulnerable, 
the most at-risk populations, and let's come up with a way to 
go ahead and do that.
    The intent of that site has always been--and all 18 sites 
we set up specifically for that--are for those vulnerable 
populations, those people most at risk.
    Ms. Underwood. Listen, I am a nurse. I cofounded the Black 
Maternal Health Caucus. I am very concerned about deadly 
disparities. Obviously, I am focused on doing a work with an 
emphasis with equity. However, we need to be clear about who is 
eligible for vaccine appointments at the outset, and the 
availability of those appointments, and we shouldn't have 
people facing unnecessary confusion as they try to get their 
families vaccinated.
    I certainly hope that we can work together to make sure 
that folks in my district, which is suburban and rural, and 
elsewhere have access to lifesaving vaccines, including from 
FEMA-supported sites.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair. Can you hear me okay?
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Fenton, for coming before us 
today to answer our questions and hear from us. In your 
testimony, you aptly discuss, of course, FEMA's roles in 
supporting our heroes, the National Guard, expanding vaccine 
access. And these are, no doubt, some very important parts of 
the work that you are doing. However, I am incredibly 
disappointed that Iowa has yet again been forgotten in all of 
this. There is no mention of the 2020 derecho that wiped out 
much of my district. Your testimony specifically States, 
"operating in overlapping disaster environments creates 
additional challenges with an already complex mission 
requirement."
    So, in my mind, surely the massive weather event that 
devastated Iowa in the middle of a pandemic deserves your 
attention as well. The same farmers who were keeping our 
country fed and fueled, keeping our domestic supply chains 
operational during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic were 
severely harmed by the derecho. It was like a one-two punch for 
my district. Yet my constituents have nothing but difficulty in 
getting FEMA's assistance.
    In particular, when they, for example, asked for extensions 
for relief applications, theyhave been denied, denied a simple 
extension by a bureaucrat in the middle of their lives being 
literally ripped apart. So it is incredibly insulting to the 
people in my district. It is insulting to Iowans that you would 
come before us today and claim that the agency responded 
successfully to each of these natural disasters. You don't 
mention the derecho. This is after my team informed yours that 
I would be questioning you on that subject today.
    So for scale, NOAA's, NOAA's official report which, Madam 
Chairman, I would like to enter into the record.
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. So be it.
    [The information follows:] ******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Mrs. Hinson. NOAA's report States that approximately an 
estimated 90 percent of structures in Cedar Rapids sustained 
some sort of damage from the storm, and more than 1,000 homes 
were destroyed. So it is in that report. And Iowans found 
themselves quarantined during this public health crisis with 
houses without power. They had holes in their roofs, no access 
to medicine or local pharmacies. It was terrible and it is 
still terrible, and Iowans need support during this pandemic. 
They need it doubly so in the wake of the derecho. My district 
still needs serious assistance and, again, this is all on top 
of the strife brought by the pandemic, job losses, isolation, 
extreme mental health stress and our kids included in that.
    So now, many families are having to deal with deciding 
whether or not they are going to put food on their family 
tables, removing hazardous trees, or repairing their roofs. So 
at this point, I see that to be completely unacceptable for my 
district.
    My first question to you, Mr. Fenton: Will you commit to me 
today to stop forgetting Iowans and prioritize this relief for 
my constituents back in Iowa?
    Mr. Fenton. Thank you for that question, Congresswoman 
Hinson.
    Yeah, I think my testimony was focused at the time that I 
had been Acting Administrator of FEMA, which was then a short 
period. But I am glad to get with you and your team and look 
into that event, and look at what else assistance we can 
provide that we haven't provided. I know that we provided about 
$47 million in individual assistance and public assistance so 
far there, plus significant more money from the COVID disaster 
that we funded. But I am glad to work with you and see what 
areas, what gaps may exist.
    Mrs. Hinson. I am glad to hear you are getting on board 
with prioritizing relief for Iowans. The other thing I would 
ask you here today is: Will you help commit to granting much-
needed extensions for Iowa's local governments on derecho 
relief applications? As I mentioned, this is a one-two punch, 
and we really need to make sure that they have the time 
necessary, compounded by the pandemic in the middle of a 
natural disaster. So will you commit to granting extensions for 
our local governments?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, I am committed to work with you and all 
States that need assistance to disasters. We want to help 
everyone equitably. So, I would need to see what the issues 
are. I don't know specifically what grant application 
extensions you are talking about. I am glad right after this to 
work with you on those.
    Mrs. Hinson. All right. Our office will be following up, 
and thank you, again, for coming before us and the work that 
you are doing.
    I do want to note, as well, that many of the FEMA workers 
on the ground have done an incredible job. You know, we talked 
a little bit about morale earlier, and they have done an 
incredible job on the ground. I think the frustration comes 
from when our constituents are looking to Washington for 
answers and they are not getting them from here. So I would ask 
you to commit to that. Thank you so much for your time, Mr. 
Fenton.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to commend you 
and the committee leadership for hitting the ground running 
this session with some outstanding hearings, including this 
one. We do, I think, benefit from this kind of look across the 
whole DHS landscape. So thank you for the making this 
opportunity available.
    And thank you, Mr. Fenton, for appearing, for the work are 
you are doing, picking up in a tough situation, carrying the 
work of FEMA forward. I speak as a Representative from a State 
that knows FEMA all too well for many, many years past with 
disaster after disaster. We do, of course, value the agency. We 
also want to see the agency perform at full strength. So this 
is a new challenge, and you have done a good job today lining 
out some of the ways you are dealing with it.
    A lot of news about the vaccination centers and the big 
push to get max vaccinations done, and to ensure equity and 
outreach with underserved populations in that process. I 
appreciate that perspective.
    Like other Members, I have reached out to people in my 
State who are responsible for vaccinations and other healthcare 
functions, and finding some confusion and some uncertainty 
about what is going to change. I want to invite you to say 
whatever you want to say briefly for the record today about 
that, particularly with respect to hospitals. We, of course, 
will welcome more explicit guidance as to what these providers 
can expect. I also want to ask you about the use of the FEMA 
Corps and what use you might make of the national service 
expansion, the AmeriCorps expansion that is in the pandemic 
relief bill.
    So those are my two subjects, if you could respond. The 
hospitals, of course, wonder what kind of reimbursement they 
are going to be subject to, vaccination efforts, other efforts, 
what is going to change for them. What is the reimbursement 
policy going to be going forward? Again, if you would just 
briefly signal that.
    But then, with the FEMA Corps and national service, you 
have these vaccination centers. You have lots of public 
outreach to do. You are going to need all hands on deck and 
then some.
    So I wonder what use the FEMA Corps might be and 
implementing this? This is a fairly recent innovation to have a 
branch of AmeriCorps devoted to disaster relief and recovery 
activities. And then we have, in this bill, potential expansion 
of AmeriCorps, and we are exploring what kind of pandemic-
related functions these new volunteers might perform. I wonder 
if there is anything along those lines you have been thinking 
about?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, I appreciate the question, Congressman.
    Let me start with reimbursement to hospitals. So for cost 
related to assisting those with COVID, whether it is expanding 
capacity or protective equipment that are uninsured costs, they 
could go ahead and submit those to FEMA for reimbursement if it 
is a eligible nonprofit hospital. Hospitals fall into a number 
of areas. So it would be eligible nonprofits. It would also be 
public hospitals that fall into those eligibility criteria. You 
will be able to submit those costs to FEMA for reimbursement.
    We will continue to expand and clarify our policy to help 
hospitals. We just provided an update today for hospitals to 
assist them with that.
    We have also brought in a number of individuals to help us 
with the insurance part as medical insurance is very complex, 
and what we want to make sure is that we fund things that are 
not already covered by medical insurance. So we are working 
very closely and brought in a big team to help us get through 
those issues.
    Then with regard to FEMA Corps, AmeriCorps, I was actually 
one of the individuals, when I worked in D.C. from 2009 to 
2015, to help start FEMA Corps and it has been not only a great 
effort to bring 18- to 24-year-olds into, start them in 
emergency management, but their ideas, their thoughts are 
invaluable. So they have also gone not only from FEMA Corps, 
but a large amount of them have actually gone into FEMA. So it 
helps to feed also into our organization to create new 
employees for the future of FEMA that have service as part of 
their core values.
    So we will continue to grow FEMA Corps. We leverage 
AmeriCorps already through agreements we have with them during 
disasters. Right now, we are using them at the vaccine centers 
to help register people, to help some of the logistics issues 
in line. But we use them all over the place from people to do 
logistics, to do IT, to do GIS mapping. So, we have brought 
them in, in a number of various ways to our organization to not 
only get them to help but to help them with skills for the 
future as they go on in life.
    Mr. Price. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Then we will move on to Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Madam Chairman, first, thank you.
    And Mr. Fenton, I do want to acknowledge your mission and 
your presence today. FEMA is a unique operation that our 
country needs on a regular basis. We can't control a lot of 
issues, the storms that we face. The most important thing is to 
have good people and have people that are prepared. There will 
be times when we are frustrated because of events that have 
occurred, and all the more reason why it is so important that 
Federal, State, and local work together.
    Now, President Biden has set the goal of about 100 million 
doses of the COVID-19 vaccination in the first 100 days of his 
administration. This is a tall task, and I am glad to see FEMA 
is now taking an expanded role. You are going to make a 
difference.
    Now, Mr. Fenton, we are pleased, were pleased when the 
President quickly reversed some policies of the previous 
administration including expanding the scope of what is 
eligible for reimbursement for the COVID disaster declarations. 
Now related to that, I have a question from a county in my home 
State of Maryland. The question is: Is the cost of contact 
tracing by State or local governments eligible under FEMA's 
policy? And if not, is there another Federal agency who 
provides funds for the cost of contact tracing?
    Mr. Fenton. Let me go ahead and look at our--we are 
expanding our policy right now, and I don't want to, you know, 
give you an answer that is incorrect. So let me take that for 
return and make sure I get that to you.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah.
    Mr. Fenton. I would be happy to get back with an answer.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. If you could do that sometime maybe 
today, I would appreciate it. That way we can stay on top of 
it. There is a lot of issues going on. Okay.
    Secondly, we need to make sure vaccines are distributed 
equitably. We are facing some issues in Baltimore City. I 
applaud FEMA taking an active role in the disaster response in 
establishing pilot Community Vaccination Centers. Now how does 
FEMA determine where to stand these up?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah, we have--well, first let me just say that 
we have already funded, provided resources, equipment, or 
personnel to over 700 sites across the United States. Then when 
we talk about specifically the CVC sites, we have used 
population and literally walked down the population numbers 
from the largest population State and have set up 18 sites, and 
will continue to do that, working down population.
    As I said earlier, we are using the Socially Vulnerable 
Index score for counties to drive where to focus those sites 
at. So we are looking for a high population area of about 1 
million people for a type 1 site, with a high social 
vulnerability index score of .7 or greater.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Then who determines where mobile 
vaccination centers are placed?
    Mr. Fenton. We do that in coordination with the State and 
local government, and working with faith-based organizations 
and community-based organizations, so that we focus in on 
equity. And one of the things that we have seen is, by using 
mobile sites, people that have vaccine hesitancy are more 
willing to go to those sites than maybe the larger sites.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. We are appropriators for Homeland 
Security. We have a lot of different missions. You have a lot 
of missions helping people, and we really need your help. We 
need to work together, as I said before, as a team. What would 
you like our committee to focus on as it relates to your 
mission in helping our citizens?
    Mr. Fenton. Well, you provide us the resources that we 
need.
    But I think that just being in this business for 25 years, 
we continue to see the risks and our mission grow as you have 
alluded to. And, so, focus on programs that reduce risk, 
whether that is through our flood insurance program or through 
building resiliency, whether it is our mitigation program or 
our new BRIC program that focuses on hardening, making more 
resilient infrastructure is, really, I think, as we go forward 
in the future, is looking at that risk and how to lessen that 
risk and build smarter and build more resilient and go back and 
harden infrastructure that needs to be hardened.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. You know, our President has stated a 
goal of where he wants to be with our country. It is a type of 
goal we need to move forward to save people's lives and bring 
our country out of this terrible pandemic that we are in right 
now. Now with that new strategy, it is putting a lot more 
pressure on you and your team. So it is important in order to 
make your goal and the President's goal that if it looks like 
you need more resources, you have got to let us know.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Fenton. I appreciate it. We are well-resourced, and 
that is my priority right now is vaccinating everyone American.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. I yield back. RPTR MARTIN EDTR HUMKE 
[11:00 a.m.]
    Mr. Fenton. I appreciate it.
    We are well resourced, and that is my priority right now is 
vaccinating every American.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe we have a little bit more time 
for a second round.
    Mr. Fenton, in addition to the funding for disaster relief, 
the American Rescue Plan provides $510 million for the 
emergency food and shelter program, including $110 for 
humanitarian assistance to individuals and families released 
from DHS custody, $100 million for assistance to firefighter 
grants, $200 million for safer grants, and $100 million for 
Emergency Management Performance Grants.
    Can you tell us when FEMA expects those funds to be 
obligated and dispersed to grant recipients?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes. Right now we are working through the 
process. As far as the emergency food and shelter programs, we 
have $4 million that is left over that is not part of this 
appropriation that the NOFO is going out today. As far as the 
remaining $400 million, plus $110 million specifically for the 
border, they are building the NOFOs for that in the next 30 
days. Those will go out, and then the money will be provided in 
probably the next 60 to 90 days.
    As far as the other programs, we are looking at either 
leveraging the existing notice of funding opportunity that is 
out there and using that to incorporate the additional funding 
or looking at whether we need to do something specific, and we 
will work through each one of those to make that quick 
decision.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. One final question.
    What lessons have you learned during this pandemic that 
will be useful in future disasters?
    Mr. Fenton. Well, I think we have learned a lot more about 
other Federal agencies' authorities and resources during this 
event, and we have also learned a lot about the missions need 
to be enduring, and we have learned a lot from technology and 
data from this event. The data we have been able to leverage in 
this event to make decisions and better make decisions has been 
invaluable.
    I give you one of the examples that we have learned from 
this event that has already improved what we do. Just like 
everyone else, we have been leveraging now Zoom and other 
mobile platforms to work remotely. We actually used those in 
Texas following the storm to do remote inspections of people's 
houses.
    So what took us 25 days before to get the first funds out, 
we were able to do in 5 days following the freeze down there by 
using a lot of remote platforms.
    So I think technology and other Federal agencies' 
capabilities that we don't traditionally work with and their 
resources, we have learned a lot from that and will be able to 
help Americans in future pandemics and also in future disasters 
from that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Fenton, and to 
all of our members. This has been a very insightful and helpful 
hearing, so I appreciate round two.
    I read with interest in your testimony, sir, the 
information about mobile vaccination units. I think that is a 
great way to reach populations who are unable to get to a 
stationary vaccine site. I can't help but think about some DHS 
frontline employees who are still struggling to get vaccinated 
through their own State programs. I am thinking of TSA 
officers, Border Patrol agents, Customs officers, for example.
    I know DHS is trying to work with the Department of Veteran 
Affairs to get these public-facing employees vaccinated; but I 
am wondering, is there a way that FEMA could help. Are you in a 
position, sir, to work with frontline DHS employees to help get 
them vaccinated in a timelier manner?
    Thank you.
    Mr. Fenton. Yes. Thank you for the question.
    And we are working with DHS. I sent one of my teams up to 
DHS to help them with vaccinating the whole DHS workforce, so 
they are working with the Department, and right now I am doing 
that.
    Another thing that I did is we have opened up these 18 CVC 
sites. What we do is the first day, before we open live, we 
bring through the Federal workforce and first responders, and 
so what I am doing is vaccinating parts of the Department. So I 
have vaccinated--for example, when I opened up the one in 
California, I vaccinated some people from TSA and other Federal 
personnel, plus the personnel working there at that site.
    So I am looking at opportunities to expedite vaccinating 
those DHS employees. I have also written a letter that gives 
prioritization to all of the FEMA employees to be able to use 
that to get vaccinated within the correct level within their 
States. So there is a number of mechanisms, including work with 
the VA, that we are doing.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    As part of the community vaccination centers are being 
established in States, there is a requirement to distribute 
them in jurisdictions with high Social Vulnerability Index 
scores, SVI scores.
    Did the Federal Government apply SVI in determining vaccine 
allocations to the States or was a simple per capita allocation 
used?
    Mr. Fenton. Yeah. The CDC, I believe, is using a simple per 
capita allocation in the State vaccination-- vaccinations that 
will be provided to States. So that is the 15--over 15 million 
doses per week that is being provided. Plus, there are another 
couple million doses that are going to pharmacies across the 
United States, 10,000 pharmacies.
    In addition to that, we are vaccinating direct to skilled 
nursing facilities and elderly care facilities. And then the 
only place that I am aware of that we use the Social 
Vulnerability Index score is the 18 sites that we have set up 
to focus specifically on the equity issue.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Would it be more cost effective, sir, and 
efficient to support the State vaccination efforts by providing 
an increase in dose allocations and personnel to support their 
existing vaccination operations?
    Mr. Fenton. I am sorry. Could you say that one more time, 
sir?
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir. Would it be more cost effective 
and efficient to support State vaccination efforts by providing 
an increase in dose allocations and personnel support to their 
existing vaccination operations?
    Mr. Fenton. So I think what they are doing now is 
maximizing-- general product and the operation of the CDC are 
maximizing the vaccine as it becomes available using the 
Defense Production Act and everything else to make it available 
and providing that out to States and basically what they have 
available. And we have been able to give them a 3-week claim 
factor that will go no less than that number, and so that gives 
them confidence to be able to set up sites and to quickly 
vaccinate.
    I think as we go forward, continuing to use States' 
capability, whether it be doctors, pharmacies, State vaccine 
centers, will allow a sufficient throughput as vaccine 
increases, and it will only increase as we go into April and 
May.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Yeah. What was the question?
    Yeah. Hello? Can you hear me now?
    Mr. Ruppersberger. I can hear you, sir.
    Okay. Did you ask me a question? I didn't hear.
    Mr. Fenton. No. You are going to ask me the questions, sir. 
I will stand by.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Well, first thing, are we having 
another round? I might save the question for another round.
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, you are in another round right now, sir.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. The second round now, okay.
    Getting shots in arms and crushing the virus requires a 
tremendous amount of coordination with countless stakeholders 
and ultimately county and municipal governments are where the 
rubber meets the road.
    Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, sir, totally agree.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Now, my question for the entire 
panel, are what challenges are State emergency management 
agencies facing when communicating with local governments? Are 
there recommendations that we could relay to local officials in 
our districts regarding how to improve synergy, from your 
perspective?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes. I would just say that I don't believe 
that, you know, there is any issues with communication or 
coordination. We have now staff that work in every State 
emergency management office across the country from each 
regional office, so there is dedicated staff that are there 24/
7 every day of the week, whether there is a disaster or not, 
working with them. We interact with our States and local 
governments through planning and operations in a bunch of 
different ways and continue to do that.
    I think this is a dynamic and a complex event, and this has 
changed over time, and we need to be agile and we need to stay 
in front of this event and be able to leverage State and local 
government, as you said, to the fullest extent possible, to get 
shots in the arms.
    They are most connected to the populations they serve, and 
we need to be able to support them in that.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Thank you.
    Yield back.
    Mr. Fenton. Hey, sir, one last thing. I did get an answer. 
HHS can fund the contact tracing. FEMA funds cannot be used for 
contact tracing because it is in HHS's authority.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. So any recommendations where to go?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes. I am going to go ahead and give you that 
to your team, specifically what part of HHS can fund that out. 
I will send that to your team.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Thank you for that.
    I Yield back.
    Mr. Fenton. Yes.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford?
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Fenton, in Florida, the second most populous State in 
the country now, we have made some pretty great progress in our 
vaccine distribution under the great leadership of Governor Ron 
DeSantis. And so far, in fact, over 4 million Floridians have 
received at least one dose, including 60 percent of our seniors 
over the age of 65, and that is significant, as you know, in 
the mortality rates.
    In northeast Florida, we have a FEMA-supported vaccine site 
at Gateway Mall. This site is to vaccinate residents who are 60 
years up, long-term care facility staff and residents, the 
medically vulnerable, those you mentioned earlier, the 
medically vulnerable, those you mentioned earlier, as well as 
teachers and first responders.
    You mentioned in your statement that these sites have the 
capacity for 6,000 vaccines a day above and beyond the State 
allocation. Is that correct? Did I hear that right?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, sir. What we did is when we went around 
and looked at each State and the population of the county, we 
adjusted the site to meet the need of those who are socially 
vulnerable. And in Florida, rather than do two type 1, which is 
6,000 a day, they elected for four type 2 and did Tampa, 
Jackson, Miami-Dade, and Tampa.
    So they each do 3,000 a day, plus they did mobiles from 
there, so like a spoke-and-hub concept, and I think each one 
has two mobiles that are going out to community based 
organizations and targeting specific populations at risk.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. So it can you tell me, for the site 
at Gateway Mall, what is is their target?
    Mr. Fenton. Their target is 3,000 per day. That is the one 
in--is that the one in Hillsborough? Is that what that--
    Mr. Rutherford. Jacksonville.
    Mr. Fenton. Jacksonville. So I will have to look and see if 
that is one of ours or not. I am looking at my list of the four 
that I have, and it is Orange, Miami-Dade, Hillsborough, and 
Duval are the four counties--
    Mr. Rutherford. That is Duval.
    Mr. Fenton. Yes. So the requirement is supposed to be 3,000 
a day, and they also have a number of mobile sites go in there. 
It looks like yesterday they did--I don't have the numbers from 
yesterday, but it is supposed to be 3,000 a day. They did a 
thousand at the mobile sites yesterday, I know that.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. What is the average distribution bid 
on that 3,000 a day?
    Mr. Fenton. The average distribution?
    Mr. Rutherford. Yes. They are allocated 3,000. How many are 
they actually getting into arms every day?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, I will get you the specific numbers. I 
do--it looks like Duval is a little bit less than the other 
couple in the State of Florida, so it is a little less; but I 
will get the numbers and get them over to your staff.
    Mr. Rutherford. Yes, I am a little concerned about how we 
get that information out to who is eligible.
    But let me jump real quick to the border because we have a 
humanitarian mess at the border, which is why FEMA is being 
sent down there. And this administration has got to step up and 
start addressing this, and I guess they are by sending FEMA. 
Last month alone we had over a hundred thousand people try to 
cross the border and 9,500 of those were unaccompanied minors.
    So my question, what is being done to test immigrants or 
migrants to isolate those with COVID-19? I know this has got to 
be a massive challenge for you guys.
    Mr. Fenton. Yes. So in all four States that are along the 
border and, for that matter, anywhere in the United States, 
anyone that is at risk can be tested by local or State 
government and FEMA will reimburse those costs a hundred 
percent.
    In some cases we have sent teams down there from HHS to 
assist with testing. I know that California has a very good 
plan. I know that we are working with Arizona, and they have a 
pretty good plan. Texas has actually sent testing kits that we 
have given down to the border, 40,000 of them. So there is 
testing happening. What we are seeing is less than 6 percent 
positive right now coming across the border--
    Mr. Rutherford. That was what I wanted to know. So it is 6 
percent, less than 6 percent. I appreciate that.
    And I have to tell you, I think the Stay in Mexico policy 
needs to be reinstituted so that we can do this in a humane and 
positive way to help these folks.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back. I see my time is 
up.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you again, 
Mr. Fenton.
    So I just wanted to go back to something actually that 
Congresswoman Underwood mentioned earlier about the vaccine 
distribution site in Chicago, we heard about that, and some 
challenges facing some of the big sites even. But, ultimately, 
when it comes to a State like Iowa, big sites aren't really 
accessible to millions of Americans living in rural 
communities.
    And so I guess my question would be, specifically, what is 
FEMA doing to ensure that rural Americans, like my constituents 
in Iowa, are given that same level of access and support by 
FEMA as folks in big cities?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, and I appreciate that question.
    And so across the country, in places like Iowa and other 
rural areas, we are providing support to over 700 sites since 
January 20. The $4.42 billion we provided to State and local 
governments to help create capacity and support where there is 
contracts, mutual aid, they are all forces to vaccinate is what 
we have done.
    But I think it is bigger than just the vaccine supply going 
to the State. It is using the pharmacies. It is using also 
other capabilities through going direct to skilled nursing 
facilities and long-term care facilities to vaccinate those 
most at risk. So we are doing that everywhere across the United 
States.
    In 18 locations, we targeted these large population cities 
because we have seen such high COVID among different groups and 
wanted to focus on those with these 18 sites. We will continue 
to expand that; but I am providing people, personnel, 
equipment, and supplies to all States, including Iowa.
    Mrs. Hinson. Okay. So could you give some specific 
examples? You mentioned, obviously, pharmacies and getting out 
to that level. How are you really targeting down to that local 
level? Is it community leader based? Is it the local public 
health entities, local emergency management? How are you 
getting that granular, so to speak, on the local level with 
rural populations?
    Mr. Fenton. Yes, communications. There is a national 
strategy, a national communications that is going out, 
especially with regard to vaccine hesitancy right now, to urge 
individuals to get vaccinated; but we are supporting State and 
local plans. They know their communities best. They know the 
best way to reach them, to interact with them. Where to 
vaccinate them, and we are really following that in providing 
them the right resources. And there is a bunch of different 
Federal agencies doing that.
    So if it is a rural area and it is a small area, it may be 
using a mobile capability to go there and maybe set up a 1-day 
site. We have mobile capability, VA has mobile capability, and 
there are other Federal agencies that have mobile capability.
    So lending that capability with people that can vaccinate 
your State may be one solution. They may have mobile capability 
that we are funding.
    And so everything is on the table. This is our biggest 
priority. When they tell us what their plan is, what their 
strategy is, we are supporting that with either people, 
funding, equipment, or supplies.
    Mrs. Hinson. So for a mobile aspect, for example, so for a 
State like Iowa, you get an additional vaccine allotment for 
the mobile distribution or would it be included in the State 
vaccine distribution?
    Mr. Fenton. It is in the State vaccine distribution, so 
there is no additional for the mobile. The only additional 
vaccine we provided was the pilot 18 sites that have been 
turned on so far; but there is no additional vaccine. But the 
pharmacy is additional vaccine, so the vaccine going directly 
to pharmacies, the over 2 million to 10,000 pharmacies across 
the United States is an addition. And then there may be--there 
is vaccine going to VA. So if there is a VA location in your 
State that is vaccinating veterans, that is an addition too, 
and then there may be other Federal agencies vaccinating 
Federal employees within your State. And so that would be in 
addition to the State allocation.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Mr. Fenton.
    And Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. It is now time for our next panel. 
Administrator Fenton, thank you again for your time, and please 
stay in touch with us and our staff about how we can be helpful 
in your efforts to respond to COVID and other emergencies and 
disasters. And, again, please extend our most sincere gratitude 
to your colleagues across the country.
    We will now recess to prepare for our next panel, and we 
will return shortly.
    Mr. Fenton. I just wanted to thank everyone for the 
opportunity today, and we will definitely work with your 
offices as we go forward in the future, so thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. We will now go to the second hearing 
panel, which includes Mark Ghilarducci, the director of the 
California Governor's Office of Emergency Services; Curtis 
Brown, the State coordinator for the Virginia Department of 
Emergency Management and also the cofounder of the Institute 
for Diversity and Inclusion in Emergency Management; Patrick 
Sheehan, the director of Tennessee Emergency Management Agency; 
and Kevin McGowan, the director of the Los Angeles County 
Office of Emergency Management.
    Gentlemen, we will submit the full text of your official 
statements for the hearing record, and I would ask you each to 
keep your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
    Director Ghilarducci, let's begin with you.
    Mr. Ghilarducci. --impacted California. As of March 11, the 
State had a cumulative total of over 3.5 million cases and over 
54,800 COVID-related deaths. Essential workers risked their 
lives to keep our vital systems working while the majority of 
the population were confined to their homes. Government and 
businesses in California fundamentally changed the way they had 
to operate.
    This change extended to emergency management. The cascading 
impacts of this virus forced us to pivot to reevaluate 
standards, operating procedures, and to address shortages, and 
lifesaving commodities and resources, and to implement plans to 
respond to later surges, all the while managing concurrent 
disasters that we were facing.
    Since the beginning of the pandemic, Cal OES has led the 
State's response and coordination with our Health and Human 
Services agency, our Department of Public Health, many other 
State agencies and local governments and departments, and our 
great partners at FEMA. This collaboration ensured for the 
State's response efforts to remain centralized and unified 
through the State Operation Center.
    By applying our well-established emergency response 
framework and adapting it to fit the pandemic, California 
effected tremendous progress in flattening the curve and 
limiting the spread of the virus. However, we faced 
unprecedented challenges while also enduring multiple 
multifaceted, multi-incident all hazard disaster response 
operations amid the pandemic.
    Additionally, COVID-19 further worsened the equity gaps and 
disproportionately affected individuals. These extraordinary 
challenges and new disasters led to unparalleled strategies 
focused on achieving the equitable distribution of information, 
resources, commodities, and vaccine administration.
    While facing these challenges, California worked in close 
partnership with FEMA to develop and implement a multitude of 
innovative public assistance programs in the area of PPE, 
emergency feeding, emergency housing, alternate care sites, and 
medical/surg capability, testing, mega vaccination sites, and 
mobile vaccination clinics.
    In fact, California was the first in the Nation to develop 
and implement specific programs, in partnership with FEMA, to 
assist impacted populations, such as the Great Plates Delivered 
program, which provides prepared meals through participating 
restaurants for adults 65 and older and adults 60 to 64 who are 
at high risk and unable to prepare meals or access food 
resources while staying at home.
    In addition, this program also supported local restaurants, 
other food providers, agriculture workers, and food service 
providers who have closed or who are struggling to remain open 
during COVID-19.
    Project Room Key, which provides safe isolation capacity 
for tens of thousands of Californians experiencing 
homelessness; Housing for the Harvest, which provides temporary 
emergency noncongregate shelters for agriculture and field 
workers and have played an essential role enduring the 
continuity of our food supply.
    Project Hope, which provides isolation and quarantine 
housing for recently released inmates on parole and probation; 
and Hotel for Healthcare Workers, which kept California 
healthcare workers and other public personnel safe and healthy 
by providing free or discounted hotel rooms for those working 
to care for COVID patients, reducing the risk of them bringing 
the virus home to their families.
    And, lastly, Hospital Training Academy serving the 
community, which used FEMA dollars in conjunction with UNITE 
Here Local 11 in L.A. County and L.A. City to provide meals 
prepared in industrial kitchens to homebound seniors and others 
affected in the pandemic.
    Lastly--or most recently, as of February 16, in partnership 
with FEMA, California stood up two first in the Nation pilot 
mass vaccination sites, part of President Biden's hundred sites 
across the Nation. Focusing on underserved, high COVID risk 
populations, these two sites were established in Oakland and 
East Los Angeles. In addition to these two fixed sites and with 
the focus on equity, each site working with community-based 
organizations, faith-based organizations, and community 
leaders, also deployed three mobile vaccination clinics to 
penetrate into and better serve the community. To date over 
350,000 vaccinations have been delivered through these two mega 
sites with a metric representing over 60 percent people of 
color or underserved.
    As the State of this pandemic continues to evolve, so do 
our efforts, in partnership with FEMA and under the leadership 
of Bob Fenton both here as the regional administrator and now 
as the acting FEMA administrator, which has been just an 
incredible amount of leadership and partnership, to help 
mitigate its effects to ensure that all Californians have the 
resources needed to fight this pandemic.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today, 
and thank you for your commitment to ensure a strong appearance 
and response to this pandemic. We will look forward to 
answering any of your questions.
    [The statement of Mr. Ghilarducci follows:] ******** 
COMMITTEE INSERT ********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. State Coordinator Brown.
    Mr. Brown. Good morning. And thank you, Madam Chairwoman 
and Ranking Member and members of the subcommittee.
    As the State coordinator of emergency management at the 
Virginia Department of Emergency Management and cofounder of 
the Institute for Diversity and Inclusion in Emergency 
Management, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the role of 
FEMA in the emergency management community and the ongoing 
response to COVID-19, including opportunities to address the 
disproportionate impact of disasters on marginalized and 
frontline communities.
    As we have recently passed the 1-year mark in this 
historically long response, we pause to recognize those who 
have been lost from this disaster.
    We also recognize the hard work and the resilience of 
frontline essential workers, nurses, doctors, public health and 
public safety community, including emergency managers, who have 
been quite fiscally responding to this disaster. Those who have 
been lost serve as our motivation to improve our response in 
real-time and in preparation for future disasters.
    In emergency management we try to learn lessons in order to 
improve for the next disaster. Due to this long event, it is 
important that we not wait until the end of this response but 
have critical conversations and evaluations now. Three thousand 
lives were lost during the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks, over 
1,800 deaths during Hurricane Katrina, and close to 4,000 
deaths during the 2017 hurricane season. All of that lead to 
new legislation, new policy changes, and additional resources 
to support emergency management.
    The historic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted 
in over 500,000 American deaths, including 10,000 Virginians 
which requires us to commit to taking bold and innovative 
action to vastly improve our performance for the next pandemic 
and disasters.
    It is important to note that on top of the response to 
COVID-19, FEMA, State, and local emergency management has also 
responded to numerous other events over the last year, 
including major flooding, storms, protests, hurricanes, which 
have stressed resources.
    So how do we learn from this catastrophic event and move 
forward? We have seen, once again, the disportionate impact of 
COVID-19 on communities of color, people with disabilities, and 
marginalized communities, which require the urgent integration 
of equity into emergency management.
    This event has also demonstrated the important role of FEMA 
and emergency management as a profession for coordinating 
responses to disasters. Leveraging emergency management's all 
hazards expertise and logistics, coordination and capacity 
building is needed to move with speed to ensure a whole of 
government response. Early in this response, FEMA was not fully 
leveraged and empowered to do that. It hurt our response and 
negatively impacted us working on the State level.
    Improving our coordinated response to disasters will 
require streamline processes, eliminating complexities, 
prioritizing equity to support communities most at risk, and 
increasing and diversifying staffing. We also need to build 
diversity management capacity at the State and local level, 
recognizing the new normal, more frequent and impactful 
disasters and the growing impacts of climate change.
    Despite the challenges of this response and issues to 
address moving forward, I am hopeful, due to recent actions of 
Congress and the Biden administration to support States and our 
communities, new tools, and resources provided by Congress and 
President Biden is enabling us to move forward with our 
Vaccinate Virginia Campaign, while continuing to test, contact 
trace, get our schools open, and support vulnerable Virginians.
    We are working closely with FEMA to leverage funding and in 
other resources to equitably open community vaccination centers 
in our hardest hit communities. I am appreciative for Congress 
passing and President Biden for signing the American Rescue 
Plan which includes numerous support for emergency management, 
including $100 million for the Emergency Management Performance 
Grant program.
    Having strong leadership at FEMA is essential to ensuring 
the agency moves forward. That is why I look forward to working 
with administrator nominee, Deanne Criswell, to further 
resilience ability and address these issues. Administrator 
Criswell is a topnotch and well respected emergency manager who 
will bring a wealth of knowledge and bringing this to the 
position and appreciate the leadership of interim 
administrator, Mr. Fenton.
    In closing, thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for convening this 
important hearing and providing an opportunity for emergency 
managers to offer recommendations. I am happy to answer any 
questions from the subcommittee.
    Thank you.
    [The statement of Mr. Brown follows:] ******** COMMITTEE 
INSERT ********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Next we will go to Director Sheehan.
    Mr. Sheehan. Thank you.
    Good morning, Chairwoman Roybal-Allard and Ranking Member 
Fleischmann and distinguished members of the committee. My name 
is Patrick Sheehan. I am the director of the Tennessee 
Emergency Management Agency. I am grateful for the invitation 
and this opportunity to speak with you today.
    First, I want to acknowledge the loss of more than 11,000 
Tennesseeans and 530,000 Americans to this virus. Our hearts 
join in mourning the too soon loss of life of so many 
Tennesseeans and Americans, and nearly all of us have 
experienced the loss of a friend or a loved one, and our hearts 
ache with our fellow Americans at that loss.
    Second, I want to express my sincere gratitude for my 
teammates, for the Tennessee Department of Health, medical 
personnel across Tennessee and across our Nation for the 
dedicated work they have continued to do for more than a year 
now. I want to express my gratitude for our local responders, 
our local emergency managers, the Tennessee National Guard, for 
FEMA, and emergency managers everywhere for the work that they 
have continued to do in these challenging times.
    This pandemic has challenged those in ways that few 
expected. Time and time again over the last year, they have 
stepped up and served. It is awe inspiring to see the 
commitment of our public health partners and our agencies that 
serve their neighbors and humbling to work shoulder to shoulder 
with them.
    In Tennessee in 2020, we have been tested over and over 
again. Starting in January of 2020, the Tennessee Department of 
Health, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, and the 
Governor's office, and a number of other departments, convened 
to examine the situation that was developing in China and the 
reports that were coming in from Europe on the spread of a 
novel coronavirus. We used that opportunity to examine our 
plan, protocols, and to try to prepare for the road that was 
ahead of us.
    Shortly after we began convening those, we were struck on 
March 3 by a series of deadly tornadoes, the largest of which 
had a 60-mile track, and it hit Nashville and tracked almost 
due east, taking 25 lives and destroying hundreds of homes and 
damaged millions of dollars' worth of infrastructure.
    And Tennessee is the nighttime tornado capital of the 
United States. We have more nighttime tornadoes than any other 
State in the Union and, unfortunately, at that time also the 
deadliest.
    I am incredibly grateful for the quick work of FEMA 
following that disaster. I am also incredibly grateful for the 
work of our county emergency managers and partners. What I 
think we showed is that the investment over the last 5 years 
that we have made in working together and collaborating and 
building a collaborative emergency management enterprise in 
Tennessee paid dividends. We had--while that disaster, the 
tornado, was widespread and sudden and struck in the middle of 
the night, what we found was that our system worked 
collaboratively, we had good communications and very, very--
    It was also heartwarming to see the outpouring of the 
volunteer spirit, Tennessee being the Volunteer State, as 
thousands of Tennesseeans and neighbors from other States 
poured in to help with the immediate response and recovery from 
that disaster.
    Then on March 5, Tennessee had its first confirmed COVID 
case. A physician who had attended a conference in 
Massachusetts was confirmed by our superb Tennessee Department 
of Health, public health lab as being the first COVID case in 
the State of Tennessee, the first of more than 660,000 cases 
that we would have here. Tennessee has also conducted more than 
7 million COVID tests since that time.
    On April 12 and 13 then, another series of storms and 
tornadoes hit the Eastern Grand Division of Tennessee, and that 
disaster, coupled then with the derecho in Waco in May, and 
then a Christmas bombing, just has brought a lot of destruction 
to Tennessee. Policies, FEMA has done some things incredibly 
well. Emergency management has really pulled together to help 
address our needs. Tennessee's vaccination plan has been lauded 
for choosing equity and buying down risk as quickly as 
possible.
    And I will just flag too that equitable distribution of 
vaccine or aid takes time and patience and persistence, and for 
a myriad of reasons, from access, to lack of transportation, to 
lack of trust in the government programs, if we are going to 
have equitable allocation of vaccine, it is going to take us 
being patient and persistent and working with communities that 
are most at risk.
    If we are going to continue to have data-informed, risk-
based allocation of vaccine, in some ways we are going to have 
to be patient. We have to make vaccine available, but in 
Tennessee's model we have held out allocations specifically to 
ensure that we don't leave out communities that have been most 
impacted.
    And as my colleague, Chris Brown, indicated, we know that 
the African-American community has been disproportionately been 
impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, both in terms of cases and 
hospitalizations and deaths. And we are able to see that and 
act on that, and I would encourage whatever we do with 
vaccinations moving forward that we continue to be patient in 
ways that are meaningful.
    I just want to thank you again for the opportunity to be 
here and talk a little bit about what challenges Tennessee has 
faced, and I look forward to answering any questions that you 
might have.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    [The statement of Mr. Sheehan follows:] ******** COMMITTEE 
INSERT ********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    And last, but certainly not least, Director McGowan, please 
begin your testimony.
    Mr. McGowan. Good morning, Chairwoman Roybal-Allard. It is 
nice to see you. Last time we were together here in the 
Emergency Operation Center.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Yes.
    Mr. McGowan. Ranking Member Fleischmann and honorable 
members of the subcommittee. My name is Ken McGowan, and I 
serve as the director for Los Angeles County's office of 
emergency management. Thanks for this opportunity to discuss 
the county's response to COVID-19 and our partnership with 
FEMA.
    First, I would like to acknowledge the incredible toll that 
COVID-19 has taken across our county and the country and 
throughout the world. In Los Angeles County alone, COVID-19 has 
caused more than 22,000 deaths and infected over 1.2 million 
people.
    I also want to extend my deepest thanks and appreciation to 
the hundreds of thousands of Los Angeles County healthcare 
workers, emergency responders, disaster service workers for 
their commitment and steadfast resolve in day in and day out 
answering the call to service. They truly represent the full 
measure of public service.
    By virtue of our size, Los Angeles County faces numerous 
challenges during natural disasters, human-caused disasters, 
and technological disasters. In 2020's National Risk Index, 
FEMA identified Los Angeles County as having the highest risk 
index of all our counties in the country.
    This underscores the critical importance of Los Angeles 
County to continue to build our emergency management 
capabilities and mitigate the national risks of natural 
disasters and similarly address our response to disasters like 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
    On March 4, 2020, Los Angeles County proclaimed a local 
emergency due to COVID-19. The county's emergency operation 
center immediately activated, and from day one our initial 
emergency management actions were to coordinate and support the 
county's public health efforts in mitigating the effects of 
this global pandemic.
    The subsequent activities resulted in uninterrupted 
continuation of our county's essential services, while also 
allowing for the distribution of tens of millions of critical 
pieces of personal protective equipment, the administration of 
millions of COVID-19 tests, millions of doses of vaccination, 
the distribution of millions of meals and other essential goods 
to our communities.
    The safe sheltering of thousands of individuals to prevent 
the spread of COVID-19, and the local financial and 
programmatic management of hundreds of millions of dollars in 
FEMA's public assistance program.
    The unity of effort with our Federal, State, and community 
partners has been the cornerstone of our response. In Los 
Angeles County, it has truly been a whole community response. 
The county's emergency management mission requires this, and it 
is ever present in our strong organizational partnerships with 
FEMA and the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services 
and my personal professional relationship with Mr. Fenton and 
Mr. Ghilarducci.
    No one governmental organization can do this job alone. 
With this whole community partnership, we have leveraged our 
strengths, capabilities, and resources to respond to this 
pandemic. There have been numerous positive results from this 
partnership. The first was FEMA's rapid approval of expedited 
projects, which provided a lifeline of critical financial 
resources to the county and supported our ability to continue 
to provide these critical services and response functions to 
our community.
    The second was FEMA's support for non-congregate sheltering 
which resulted in Project Room Key, a collaborative effort with 
the State, the county, and the Los Angeles Homeless Services 
Authority to secure hotel and motel rooms for vulnerable people 
experiencing homelessness in our county.
    Project Room Key not only helps protect high-risk 
individuals but also helps prevent the spread of the virus in 
our communities and has the added value of bringing capacity 
and protecting our hospitals and healthcare system.
    The third, FEMA's efforts to support the distribution of 
vaccines to residents from communities who have been 
disproportionately impacted by the pandemic.
    FEMA's partnership with Cal OES and the California State 
University of Los Angeles has resulted in the administration of 
hundreds of thousands of vaccination doses in some of our 
county's hardest hit communities. And I will reference Bob's 
earlier comment about the hub-and-spoke model where the Cal 
State L.A. Site serves as the hub, but then we have multiple 
sites that spoke off of that.
    Finally, I want to express the county's appreciation and 
support for President Biden's executive actions in January 
2021, directing FEMA to provide 100 percent reimbursement of 
eligible costs for public assistance programs retroactively to 
the start of the emergency, as well as prospectively. This 
action greatly reduces the financial stress of the widespread 
pandemic-related costs which have been borne significantly by 
local jurisdictions, including Los Angeles County.
    The pandemic is not over, and we understand there is a long 
road ahead. We appreciate our partnership with FEMA and hope to 
continue to identify ways to improve effectiveness and 
efficiencies in our response and recovery efforts. In 
particular, I recommend exploring more integration with FEMA 
response capabilities at the State and local organizational 
level, streamlining the administration of public assistance 
programs, including the minimizing of administrative burdens on 
local jurisdictions.
    And then, three, revising grant methodologies and 
requirements for performance periods for grant programs like 
the Emergency Management Performance Grant and the Building 
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities Grant, and all of 
those under the consideration of the new National Risk Index 
which shows that Los Angeles County has a significant path 
ahead.
    Additionally, the county is hopeful that an additional 
upfront commitment from Federal financial resources can be 
obtained to continue our important initiatives that we have 
already invested in and are underway.
    Thank you so much for this opportunity to appear before 
this subcommittee, and I look forward to any questions you may 
have.
    [The statement of Mr. McGowan follows:] ******** COMMITTEE 
INSERT ********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Director Ghilarducci, I understand that 
during the pandemic the State of California worked with FEMA, 
local governments, and the restaurant industry to develop a 
program called Great Plates, which has also been adopted 
elsewhere in the country.
    Can you explain what Great Plates is, how it has worked, 
and if you believe it is a model for providing food assistance 
during and after other kinds of disasters?
    Mr. Ghilarducci. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    So Great Plates was an idea launched in April of 2020. It 
is a program that aims to provide meals, again, to adults 65 
and older and adults 60 to 64 who are at high risk, designated 
by CDC guidelines, and who are eligible to assess free meals 
while staying at home or are ineligible for other nutrition 
programs. The program also supports local restaurants and other 
food providers and agriculture workers who have closed or are 
struggling to remain open during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    To date, the program has served over 28 million meals to 
older Californians since the program's launch in April. Using 
the Emergency Feeding Program framework approved by FEMA, OES, 
in partnership with our California Health and Human Services, 
worked directly with local governments to implement the 
program. The program is locally led with a designated local 
government leader responsible for program administration and 
operations, including all fiscal data requirements, reporting 
participant food provider enrollment and delivery services.
    OES provides technical assistance, engages directly to make 
sure that the program runs smoothly, provides any additional 
clarification or resources to make the program supportive, and 
has a website, covid19.ca.gov which allows local governments to 
participate in the program.
    Overall the program has been very successful. Obviously, 
with the number of meals that have been served, it really is a 
model for providing food assistance that work well for 
populations seeking, in this particular circumstances as in the 
pandemic, but does, we believe, have merit in other kinds of 
disasters where we have communities that have been impacted, 
mobility has been decreased, and the ability for people who 
have limited either access in functional needs or for seniors 
who have the inability to get out and be able to get the 
assistance that they need.
    So we believe that as time goes on, Congresswoman, this is 
a program that can be a model in emergency management and be 
utilized across the country.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Can you elaborate on some of the other 
innovative programs that California has developed in response 
to the pandemic?
    Mr. Ghilarducci. Sure. So some of the other interesting 
programs, obviously, this Project Room Key, which was the 
ability to identify hotel rooms, working with the hotel 
industry, and the idea was to provide safe isolation capacity 
for tens of thousands of Californians experiencing 
homelessness. This was an idea to get homelessness--people who 
are homeless off the streets, out of congregate shelters, into 
safe and secure hotel rooms where they can be monitored and 
supported both with meals, with testing, with contact tracing, 
and keep them as safe as possible.
    That program has been working very well and been very, very 
successful, as well as a very similar program, Housing for the 
Harvest, which provides temporary, non-congregate shelter for 
agriculture and farm workers. And as you know, many of our farm 
worker communities within the State are migrant workers.
    They come in. Their general culture is to congregate as a 
family. We were seeing a high degree of COVID spread in these 
family congregation units, and so we had to work with them to 
be able to establish these housing opportunities, again much 
like a hoteling program, and be able to get them to uptake. And 
we saw then, we started dropping the number of cases that we 
saw in the spread.
    And so, again, the Housing for the Harvest we used in the 
Central Valley, hard hit Central Valley, hard hit Imperial 
Valley, along the Monterey coastline, and down in Ventura 
County. These are all areas where we see a lot of our 
agriculture industry, and the program proved relatively 
successful for that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Ghilarducci. Those are couple of key programs that we 
implemented that had a great uptake and were very successful.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair. And to all of the 
witnesses, I appreciate you participating and your patience 
being in the second panel.
    Madam Chair, I want to specifically welcome Mr. Patrick 
Sheehan. This gentleman I have worked with extensively in the 
great State of Tennessee in his capacity, and we have been 
through disasters together; but he and I have both worked very 
well with FEMA, so its great to have Patrick and all of our 
guests with us.
    And I am going to, in the interests of time, move forward 
with my first question. I will direct it to Mr. Sheehan first, 
but I am solicitous of all of the other witnesses to get their 
thoughts as well, to get varying perspectives.
    Last year, the Governor's office contacted me about FEMA 
and was proposing--these were changes that were proposed 
regarding reimbursement for PPE in terms of classifying PPE as 
increased operating costs for emergency protective measures. 
This change in classification could have huge impacts on State 
budgets with damaging public health results.
    Have you--my question is in two parts. Have you run into 
challenges with inconsistent classifications? And, secondly, 
what would be the budgetary impact of absorbing increased 
operating costs into your State and local budgets?
    Mr. Sheehan. Thanks, Congressman, for the question.
    So from January 2021, moving forward, the kinds of actions 
that we took to provide PPE and sanitizing materials to schools 
it considered eligible. But those actions that we took in 
Tennessee to help provide PPE and sanitizing materials, 
cleansing materials, cleaning goods to classrooms so that we 
could have a safe reopening of schools last year, so the 
actions in Tennessee that we undertook in July and August, 
those were considered or determined to be increased operating 
costs as opposed to an emergency protective measure.
    I disagree with that estimation or the way that that was 
determined. I think if FEMA now says that those are indeed 
emergency protective measures, that those should be 
consistently classified as emergency protective measures. You 
know, we undertook those actions then not as an increased 
operating cost but as a way to safeguard the well-being of 
teachers and students and faculty and staff in schools.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
    Who would like to jump in and participate further? I will 
open it up.
    Mr. Brown. Congressman, Curtis Brown from Virginia.
    I agree with Director Sheehan. These are protective 
measures and life safety goods for our citizens and essential 
workers. And as I stated in my written testimony, having all of 
the tools, including the full support of the Federal Government 
in terms of providing these funding and 100 percent 
reimbursement, is essential for our ability to respond.
    And so providing us on a State and local level with that 
funding frees up other resources to support other essential 
government functions that are outside the emergency 
declaration.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Would anyone else care to respond?
    Mr. Ghilarducci. Congressman, this is Mark Ghilarducci in 
California.
    First of all, let me just say that, you know, we have been 
absolutely so appreciative of our FEMA partners, and they have 
been right with us in being able to try to find innovative ways 
to be able to cover any costs of all of these things.
    I think early on in the pandemic, you know, we all believed 
that the items that were brought up by my colleagues from 
Virginia and Tennessee are eligible emergency protective 
measures, and they are things that, you know, whether it is PPE 
or ventilators, you know, there was a lot of requirement upon 
the States to have to go out and procure much of this 
equipment.
    At the time that the Federal Government wasn't providing 
the resources. The strategic national stockpile was not 
operating efficiently or effectively. We weren't getting the 
resources that were needed. So it was really incumbent on the 
States to go out and procure this equipment.
    And, you know, for schools, for opening schools, for 
keeping teachers safe, to making sure our transportation 
workers, our frontline workers have the PPE when necessary, 
these were all things that really would be something that need 
to be eligible under emergency protective measures.
    And even if we hadn't used all of the PPE at the time we 
needed it, you know, you don't know that, as well as the number 
of surges that were going to be recurring. Now we are--most of 
the States in are in a place where we have resources in our 
warehouse, we are ready to deal with a surge and be prepared 
for that.
    And, again, these are all things that have a direct nexus 
and correlation to the response to COVID and really should be a 
reimbursable item.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    And with that, I will yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    You know, gentlemen, as a first responder myself for many 
years and kind of enjoying the Federalist idealogy that the 
individual States and localities control their own destiny, 
that is one of the areas that I think is most interesting in 
this pandemic.
    And the reason I say that, I know in Florida--and maybe it 
is because of our familiarity with emergency management as a 
result of hurricanes coming through every year, which is never 
fun, but also the development of the National Incident 
Management System, I don't believe there is any agency, local, 
State, within Florida that is not NIMS compliant at the highest 
levels.
    So my question is this: One of the challenges that I see 
with COVID-19 was the fact that, you know, normally when you 
have a disaster, you get resources that come in from outside 
your State to assist.
    That clearly didn't happen here because the disaster was, 
in fact, nationwide. And I know States like--Mr. Brown, you 
mentioned VEST there in Virginia. How much more difficulty was 
created by, number one, the fact that assistance couldn't come 
from outside the State, except at the national level, and then 
the issue of dealing with the pandemic and lockdown and your 
own people, you know, being impacted by this and having to do 
everything sort of virtually, I guess? Can you talk a little 
bit about your experience with that?
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Congressman.
    Yes, very difficult within this virtual, mostly virtual 
environment. We want to follow health and safety protocols 
within emergency management. Through the National Emergency 
Management Association, we have our Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact that we leverage each other when we have a 
tornado or a hurricane to send staff to support.
    Clearly, that capability was limited because everyone was 
dealing with their emergency at home. And so we have tried to 
scale up resources here within the State, through our 
Department of Health, working with our Medical Reserve Corps, 
to leverage retired medical professionals, doctors, and nurses.
    We have definitely leveraged the funding from Federal 
Government to leverage contractors and pull in all of our State 
agencies as well. Right now for our Vaccinate Virginia 
Campaign, we have a goal of a thousand State employees to 
support at our vaccination centers, et cetera.
    So it has been a very difficult response environment, but 
we have been very creative. We also appreciate the support of 
the private sector who have changed their operations. We had a 
couple of places that used to make beer and wine, changed their 
operations to making hand sanitizer in mass and things of that 
sort.
    So we have been able to innovate and create in real-time. I 
would also recognize the faith-based community, our nonprofit 
organizations, who are most directly connected to our 
communities of color and marginalized communities. So it has 
really been an all-hands-on-deck response given the scale and 
the impact of the disaster. RPTR WARREN EDTR ROSEN [12:01 p.m.]
    Mr. Rutherford. Mr. McGowan, in response, what singular--
well, I don't want to say "singular," because I am sure there 
is many. What is the most important change going forward for 
emergency management on a statewide level are you are dealing 
with now?
    Mr. McGowan. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
    So I think, you know, COVID-19 has provided this evolution 
of response phases. In Los Angeles County, we have endured 
multiple other incidents that have occurred while COVID-19 
pandemic response has occurred. And one thing, I think, that is 
highlighted for us is our ability to continue to build out 
capabilities in capacity with the use of--in the State of 
California, we have disaster service workers, which empower 
local governments, and then, also, the State government to, you 
know, have county or city municipal employees be tasked to do 
work towards disasters, and, really, leverage all of these 
things and learn from those lessons so that we can apply them 
to future disasters, such as an earthquake, and really see what 
our true exposure risk is. And then, all the while, you know, 
be creative, like Mr. Brown has said, Mr. Ghilarducci, Mr. 
Sheehan about leveraging new things that we have never 
leveraged before, partnerships with the private sector.
    I think the story is probably consistent across the entire 
country about partnerships with creating hand sanitizer and 
masks. One thing that I think has been very unique about this 
is, we have strained every resource. Every resource has been 
scarce across the country because everyone needed it, whether 
it was personal protective equipment, hand sanitizer, 
sanitation equipment. And, so, to really be creative at the 
local level to figure out how to solve those problems was a 
good lesson learned.
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    And we can't depend on China to supply what we need either.
    I think my final moment, Madam Chair.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you very much.
    I have several questions that I would like to ask. I see 
that we are running out of time, but I would like to, at least, 
ask the following questions for the whole panel.
    What lessons have you all learned from this pandemic that 
will assist you in responding to future disasters? And if we 
could just start with Ghilarducci, and then go on down the line 
with Coordinator Brown, Sheehan, and then McGowan.
    Mr. Ghilarducci. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    So, I think, beyond anything, I think this particular event 
really amplifies the whole issue about coordination and 
relationship building, the ability to work together at a time 
when resources are stretched thin. We learned that we need 
capacity in this country. There should no reason, none in the 
United States of America, that State and local emergency 
managers and the Federal Government are straining for resources 
of this style, of this type when we have such a critical crisis 
on our hands.
    The whole issue of information, misinformation, the ability 
to make sure that we are all rowing in the same direction 
through a communications plan that is adopted at the local, 
State, and Federal levels. These are people's lives we are 
talking about. And we were very disjointed. We had commodities 
that were old; they are not operational.
    You know, we talked about, the Congress Member talked about 
NIMS, the National Incident Management System. I couldn't be 
more relieved when FEMA came on the scene to help to coordinate 
U.S. HHS. That is an organization that would have a big role 
here, but they don't know ICS. They don't understand the role 
of how to implement and what is going on on the ground. It is a 
very much top-down organization. If you don't have good 
situational awareness on the ground, you are never going to 
know what really your needs are going to be, and you are going 
to be late to need. So these are just real key lessons learned.
    I would just close by saying the Stafford Act maybe needs 
to be re-looked at, maybe broadened to address the issues of 
pandemic. I think there was a lot of workarounds in the ability 
to try to stretch the Stafford Act in a big way. You know, when 
you look at other agencies and what they can bring to the 
table, if there are less, I would just say, bureaucratic and 
more thinking about what the immediate need is, they may be 
able to have, under their own authorities, the ability to 
leverage resources in a much more expedited fashion.
    And then, of course, giving us an expedited cost recovery, 
which will help local governments in particular stay afloat, 
when we are dealing with this long-term kind of year-long 
disaster where we need those funds immediately.
    Those are some of the things, Madam chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Mr. Brown.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    I second everything that Director Ghilarducci just 
mentioned. I would probably highlight the importance of equity 
and disproportionate impacts in disasters. Time and time again, 
with every disaster, we see that the folks who suffer the most 
are communities of color, marginalized communities, people with 
disabilities who, again, suffer, whether it is a flood or a 
hurricane or a natural disaster. So how do we change our 
programs and policies to prioritize them and to build 
resilience ahead of time, and to work with speed to mitigate 
the loss of life and those negative impacts?
    Equity has been a core part of our response here in 
Virginia. We have a health equity working group and a task 
force as part of our unified commands that really guides our 
resource allocation, our planning, our prioritization. Working 
with FEMA and the funding provided by Congress for our 
community vaccination centers, we used a strategic approach to 
identify those areas that are most vulnerable and that have 
been hardest hit by COVID-19, large number of vulnerable 
populations and impoverished communities.
    I am here in Danville, Virginia, in Southside, Virginia 
where our first CVC opened up yesterday and very appreciative 
from the community. We are vaccinating those who are most at 
risk and vulnerable, our seniors, communities of color, and 
equity is guiding our whole response.
    So as we move forward, looking at FEMA policies, the 
Stafford Act, programs, grant programs like the BRIC program, I 
think equity needs to guide what we do. It is going to take a 
lot of work and intentional action. But if we are able to be 
successful for future disasters, we will protect those who need 
the most support and those who are most at risk.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Director Sheehan.
    Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Chairwoman.
    So, I think the first thing--and it kind of touches on the 
supply chain issue, and it is included in my remarks, but our 
domestic manufacturing capability needs to be reevaluated and 
perhaps along the lines of the defense industrial base where we 
examine what kind of capacities we need here, domestically to 
ensure the safety and well-being of all Americans.
    More centered toward emergency management, I think we can 
build to more policy and program predictability and 
consistency, both just across the disaster management programs 
within FEMA and across regions. My counterparts and I often 
talk about how FEMA policies are applied, or interpreted 
differently, from region to region.
    I think I echo what Director Ghilarducci said. The Stafford 
Act really needs a comprehensive review and probably an 
overhaul. It is 35 years old, I think, at this point, almost 35 
years old. It is just time for--we have learned a lot about 
emergency management in the last 35 years. We really need a 
peacetime look at this where we are not being forced by just 
some event to fix certain parts of it, but really, 
comprehensively disaster management, emergency management in 
the United States needs a comprehensive overhaul.
    The last thing I will just say is--and this is something 
that I tried to share with my team pretty often--is that, if 
something can happen, it is going to happen. If something has 
happened, it will happen again. We are going to have additional 
pandemics in the future. We are going to continue to have 
disasters while we are facing public health crises, and we need 
to face it--face these crises, face these disasters with that 
lens, because our memories as human beings are very short when 
it comes to disaster events. And emergency managers, whether it 
is FEMA for the State of Tennessee, at a county level, we need 
to take a long, holistic view about what we can do to buy down 
our risks and make our Nation more resilient, make our 
communities more resilient. We have just got to keep that in 
mind.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Director McGowan?
    Mr. McGowan. This is the beauty of going last. So I echo 
everything that everyone said. I will keep my remarks really 
quick.
    An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, my grandma 
always used to tell me. And I think it is the investment on the 
front side. So building off of what everyone else said but 
adding to it, you know, the BRIC program, you know, we have 
seen the pandemic do what most of the other catastrophic 
disasters have done, which is, they exacerbate the already 
preexisting issues within society. So whether it is health 
equity, a variety of other types of things, food insecurity, to 
name a few, we should be investing in those.
    So I know we have, you know, talked a lot about emergency 
management but a big part of this pandemic has been just the 
structural and systemwide challenges that we face, and the 
pandemic has exacerbated those problems and an earthquake is 
going to do the same thing; wildfires do the same thing.
    So, to continue to invest resources in programs, like the 
BRIC program, is going to be critical to make sure that in 
future disasters, you know, the society and systems that 
support society are resilient and robust enough to weather 
these through those storms.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I have another question dealing with the 
Emergency Management Performance Grants.
    Both the CARES Act and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 
provide funds for the Emergency Management Performance Grant 
program. Can you tell us how EMPG has been of assistance during 
the pandemic, and how your State and its communities have used 
EMPG? This, again, is a question for the entire panel.
    But I can start with you, Mr. McGowan, since you have been 
last all the time.
    Mr. McGowan. Okay. Yes, so I will start off actually with 
the way that we can improve the EMPG, which I think is the 
Emergency Management Performance Grant has some administrative 
burdens and timelines associated with it that don't make it the 
most effective grant at leveraging towards what I call, like, 
the big problems. So, a lot of programs I think use the 
Emergency Management Performance Grant to tackle things that 
are kind of low-hanging fruit.
    So, in general, most of our Emergency Management 
Performance Grants are geared towards purchasing, or a 
maintenance of efforts or critical supplies within our 
emergency operation centers, for example. We also use them to 
develop critical plans like our emergency operation plans. Then 
sometimes, you know, organizations, including Los Angeles 
County, use them for critical staffing positions.
    So there is different kind of buckets that the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant goes towards, but I think it would 
be a much more effective grant if we could leverage it over a 
longer period of time with kind of some less restrictions or 
less administrative burdens on it that then we could really 
target it towards really more substantial challenges.
    So, with that, I will hand it over to the rest of the 
group.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. I am going in reverse order this 
time.
    Director Sheehan.
    Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Chairwoman.
    I think Mr. McGowan was touching on this. But, you know, in 
some ways, the EMPG has already become a little more complex. 
They added some administrative burdens to it. It has made it 
more difficult. That being said, EMPG is the primary 
preparedness funding mechanism for emergency management in the 
United States of America. Yet, we find that no matter who is 
President, that program is on the chopping block, or faces 
reductions that have to be--that Congress, regardless, again, 
of party, ends up restoring the full amount which is needed.
    We rely on EMPG at the county level; we rely on it on the 
State level. It fills the capacities that we use to manage 
disasters. When Tennessee sends first responders via the 
Emergency Management System's contact to Florida or the Virgin 
Islands or Puerto Rico or the Carolinas, a lot of those 
capabilities have been funded and bolstered by the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant program. And it really needs 
stability and predictability, and I think Mr. McGowan also 
talked about just the need for a longer time horizon, and I 
certainly agree with that.
    We have opportunities here, I think, to bolster these 
capabilities over time, but they take time and they take 
predictability so that we budget for them.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Brown.
    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And I agree with my colleagues. EMPG is essential to our 
ability to respond and build capacity on the State and local 
level.
    We do need to eliminate any complexities with that and also 
look at, again, what does emergency management look like in the 
21st century, and add additional funding and resources to 
support building capacity on the local and State level. Last 
year, we were dealing with three simultaneous statewide 
disasters, including COVID-19.
    We dealt with our busiest hurricane season, and, so, we are 
looking strategically at how can we build capability on the 
local level? There are a couple of my local emergency managers 
who are one person, or part-time staff. They are supported 
through EMPG, but building that capability so they are able to 
manage the full responsibilities of preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and recovery, given the impacts of climate change, 
and more frequent impactful disasters, is going to be 
important.
    So I hope that we could, collectively, as a profession, 
along with Congress and the administration, look at how to 
recognize the innovation and the advances and the more frequent 
disasters and ensure we have the resources needed to face these 
challenges that we are facing today.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Director Ghilarducci.
    Mr. Ghilarducci. Well, Madam Chair, you have such 
exceptional emergency managers on this panel, they are really 
hitting it off on all cylinders.
    You know, and I have said this before, and publicly said 
this before: Look, EMPG is underfunded. When you think about 
the fact that we are seen more complex by scope, by scale, by 
type of events, the diversity, the impact on our communities, 
the frequency of these kinds of events; you amplify that by 
climate change, by biohazards, by pandemics. The emergency 
management community needs to have resiliency. They need to 
have that resiliency built in, baked in.
    The Emergency Management Performance Grants across the 
country at $350 million or so, is nothing really by comparison 
at what needs to be invested into that to help local and State 
emergency managers be able to build that capacity, that 
sustainability to deal with all hazards.
    As you have heard, multiple directors here today, including 
myself, we dealt with, as you know, Congresswoman, the worst 
wildfire season. We had civil unrest. We had an earthquake, we 
had pandemic, we had power outages, all at the same time. That 
takes a lot of capacity, training, and ability to be able to 
navigate that and ultimately serve the public.
    So we are asking more of emergency management than we ever 
have in the history of our country. And I think that that has 
to be reflected, more importantly, by the funding level, first. 
But, secondly, as stated, it has too many--it is still built on 
an old-school format. It needs to be reevaluated and opened up 
and broadened to make the most flexibility so that State and 
locals can utilize that in the most effective way possible.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. And I have just one more question.
    And this is for you, Director, and Director McGowan. And 
this has to do with the issue in Los Angeles, which is one of 
the cities that was impacted by the--most impacted by the 
pandemic, particularly in my district of East Los Angeles, 
which has suffered, as you know, very high rates of infection 
and mortality rates, and yet, rates are lagging there compared 
to other parts of city and California as a whole.
    I know that this has been touched on somewhat, but can you 
further address the challenges that you face in assisting these 
communities and the steps that you are taking to address those 
challenges, particularly as they pertain to the vaccinations?
    Mr. McGowan. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question.
    So health equity and the distribution of the vaccines in an 
equitable fashion has been a top priority. I think every board 
of supervisors meeting, we address this prioritization of 
effort. Our Department of Public Health, you know, consistently 
is looking at the different metrics to evaluate the areas that 
are hardest impacted and then really work with the greater 
framework to make sure that we are pushing through the 
vaccination dosages in the areas that we can have the most 
impact in those heavily underserved and impacted areas. We have 
over 400 providers as a part of the L.A. County network that 
can distribute doses of vaccination.
    And then I also want to highlight the great partnership 
with Mark and Bob as it relates to the Cal OES and FEMA site 
that was set up at Cal State, Los Angeles, and the day-to-day 
support that goes into that site and reaching into our 
communities, our faith-based and community-based organizations 
to set up mobile vac sites.
    I think, Congresswoman, we are seeing the trend going in 
the right direction as far as getting vaccination in the areas 
that are most impacted, and every day, I feel--I don't feel--
every day I see marked increases in those impacts. I think one 
thing we have observed over time, over the last month, and 2 
months of time, is that mobile vaccine sites, even though they 
are capacity and throughput, might be on a day-to-day total 
smaller than the mega-sites, really gets to those communities 
in a more effective manner.
    So it is really a three-prong strategy. We have to use big 
vaccination sites for big throughput, and make sure we can keep 
up with the supply that is being provided. We need to use our 
public-private partnerships with pharmacies and health clinics, 
FQHCs, our Federally Qualified Health Centers, and our 
hospitals. And then, thirdly, we need to use these mobile 
vaccine sites to get to these impacted areas.
    And I will close it out to say this: When we talk about 
vaccine hesitancy, one thing we have noticed when we have gone 
to a bunch of the mobile sites and we have talked with people 
going there is there is a really good word-of-mouth story that 
is being told now in these communities. And they really trust 
their community members more than they are going to trust, you 
know, the government public information officers putting out 
information. And we are seeing that snowball starting to occur, 
where the community is talking with the community. They trust 
their community-based organizations and their faith-based 
organizations, and it is building the momentum in the right 
direction.
    With that, I will hand it over to Mark, if he wants to add 
anything.
    Mr. Ghilarducci. No, you hit the nail on the head.
    Look, right in the beginning, as I said, it is all about 
relationships. So this has been a one-team/one-fight effort. 
Kevin, the county, you know, the partners in the communities 
within L.A. County, you know, FEMA and OES, our Health and 
Human Services agency, all working together to try to address, 
looking at the county as a whole. We, you know, are identifying 
what we call vaccine deserts, areas where they are underserved 
and communities of color.
    Kevin was exactly right. The mega-site, I mean, we chose 
Cal State, L.A. In east Los Angeles strategically to address 
and put that mega-site smack dab in the middle of the most 
underserved parts of the county of Los Angeles. But then, it is 
those mobile clinics, sort of the hub and spoke, where those 
mobile clinics have gone out into the community could not be 
successful without building relationships with faith-based 
leaders, community-based leaders and the community leaders at 
large. It has taken a little bit to build the trust.
    There is a lot of misinformation, disinformation about the 
vaccines out there, but putting those mobile clinics in the 
right location. We now have, you know, mobile clinics stationed 
in South Central Los Angeles, in parts of East L.A., outside of 
and around the mega-site. And those sites have just really, we 
have really been able to penetrate.
    And Kevin is right. We are now at almost 70 percent of 
people of color and underserved being served by vaccine within 
the FEMA State site, now, speaking about what we are 
controlling and, you know, less than about 30 percent of non-
people of color. This flipped. It was the other way around when 
we started, and that is a good trend.
    The Governor, of course, has made a metric in place for all 
vaccines. The first have to be 40 percent underserved to meet 
that equity metric for all vaccines that are going to be pushed 
out by all counties in the State.
    So, from the State perspective as a whole, the leadership 
perspective of the Governor, you know, equity and making sure 
that the underserved, underprivileged and people who have the 
hardest time getting the vaccine, but have also been hugely 
impacted by the virus, are the ones that get the vaccine first 
and that we take care of those folks.
    So, you know, Congresswoman, it is continuing to work well, 
but it cannot be done, and it is one of those ones where you 
can't take your foot off the gas pedal. It has to be, continued 
working with the community because, once you build the level of 
trust, you have to maintain that level of trust and it is very, 
very critical that we can do that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Absolutely.
    Well, as we have discussed, the past year has been 
challenging for our country and, in fact, for the entire world. 
With infections declining and vaccinations increasing, there is 
light at the end of the tunnel. I hope that we are never again 
faced with a pandemic of these proportions. If we are, I know 
we can count on FEMA and emergency managers at every level to 
help us see us through it.
    I want to extend my sincere thanks to our witnesses for 
their testimony and for your service.
    And since there are no more questions, the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]RPTR MERTENSEDTR ROSENDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, March 17, 2021DHS 
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, March 17, 2021DHS MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGESWITNESSESMICHAEL CHERTOFF, FORMER SECRETARY, 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;AND JEH JOHNSON, FORMER 
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order. As this hearing is being conducted 
virtually, we must address a few housekeeping matters. Members 
are responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. When you 
are recognized to speak, if I notice that you have not unmuted 
yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to unmute 
you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will unmute 
your microphone. To avoid inadvertent background noise, the 
chair or staff designated by the chair may mute participants' 
microphones when they are not recognized to speak.
    I remind all members and witnesses that the 5-minute clock 
still applies. If there is a technology issue during a member's 
speaking time, we will move to the next member until the issue 
is resolved, and you will retain the balance of your time. You 
will notice the clock on your screen showing your remaining 
time. At 1 minute remaining, the clock will turn yellow. At 30 
seconds remaining, I will gently tap the gavel to remind the 
member speaking that their time has almost expired. When your 
time has expired, the clock will turn red, and I will begin to 
recognize the next member.
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules beginning with the chair and ranking member, followed by 
members present at the time the hearing is called to order in 
order of seniority, and we will alternate by party. Next, we 
will go to members who were not present when the hearing was 
called to order until every member present has had a first 
round.
    Finally, House rules require me to remind you that we have 
set up an email address to which members can submit information 
in writing at any of our hearings or markups. The email address 
has been provided in advance to your staff.
    Now, let's begin. I welcome everyone to this morning's 
hearing on Management Challenges at the Department of Homeland 
Security. As we approach the 20th anniversary of 9/11, the 
event that precipitated the formation of the DHS, and after 18 
year since Congress created the Department, it continues to 
struggle with longstanding and new management challenges.
    These challenges span from the management of federated 
component agencies, employee morale, and the evolving nature of 
new threats to the security of our country. This past year 
dramatically exemplifies these constantly emerging and daunting 
threats. When nearly 3,000 Americans were killed on U.S. soil 
on 9/11, DHS was founded to counter the threat of terrorism 
from abroad. However, over the course of this year, we 
experienced weeks in which the daily number of Americans who 
died of COVID-19 surpassed the tragedy of 9/11.
    While the threat of foreign-based terrorism continues to be 
a serious threat, recent events have highlighted the real and 
growing danger posed by domestic violent extremists. As was 
discussed during a subcommittee hearing last week, we are also 
extremely concerned about the very real hazards posed by our 
vulnerabilities to ever-evolving cybersecurity threats which 
were not easily foreseen 20 years ago.
    Joining us to share their expertise and recommendations on 
these critical issues, I am pleased to welcome two very 
distinguished and experienced witnesses. Secretary Michael 
Chertoff headed the Department from 2005 to 2009. He continues 
to play a role in securing the Nation as the co-founder and 
executive chairman of Chertoff Associates. He is also senior of 
counsel at the law firm Covington & Burling. Before his service 
as DHS Secretary, he served for more than a decade as a Federal 
prosecutor, and then a Federal judge.
    Secretary Jeh Johnson led the Department from 2013 to 2017, 
and serves as a partner in the litigation department of Paul, 
Weiss law firm. Prior to leading DHS, his accomplishments 
included both private sector legal work, and public sector 
senior leadership roles at the Departments of Justice and 
Defense. Each of these men led the vast 22-component agency, 
230-employee Department. Both have contributed significantly to 
the development of the Department's management functions.
    As we approach the end of the DHS' second decade in 
existence, I look forward to hearing their thoughts on what 
they see as the Department's most pressing management 
challenges and major obstacles, and how best to address them. 
We greatly appreciate you both agreeing to appear before our 
subcommittee this morning.
    I would now like to turn to the distinguished gentleman, 
Mr. Palazzo, for opening remarks, if he has any.
    Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Mr. 
Chertoff and Mr. Johnson, for coming today to speak with us 
regarding management issues within your former departments.
    Since its inception post 9/11, this Department has taken on 
the crucial task of protecting our homeland and ensuring the 
safety of the American people. I would say both of you have 
been successful in that mission, and I thank you for your 
service to our country.
    Over the last decade, you have had the firsthand experience 
of the many challenges our men and women in the Department 
face. As we sit here, our country faces a serious issue at our 
southern border, cyber threats from our adversaries, and 
pressure from China near our territories and interests. I look 
forward to your answers and comments on how we can improve our 
Homeland Security and work together on helping the American 
people.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Secretaries Johnson and Chertoff, we will submit the full 
text of your official statements for the record. Please begin 
your oral summary which I would ask you to keep to 5 minutes. 
We will proceed in chronological order of service with 
Secretary Chertoff going first.
    Secretary Chertoff, please begin.
    Mr. Chertoff. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Representative 
Palazzo, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here virtually, 
even if not physically. Let me try to sum up my views in the 
following statements:
    First, DHS was founded to deal with all hazards, and to 
protect the United States against all hazards. And that 
remains, I think, at the core of the mission. Although 
terrorism was the immediate instigating cause of the 
Department's foundation, there was a clear decision to look at 
natural disasters and pandemics and other kinds of national 
systemic threats as part of the mission set for DHS.
    A second critical element of DHS, which I know both 
Secretary Johnson and I worked very hard to implement, was the 
idea of unity of effort, bringing together the various 
capabilities of the components in a single, unified program to 
respond to particular threats. We saw that in natural disasters 
where we were able to use FEMA, supplemented with, for example, 
Customs and Border Protection and the Coast Guard, and other 
components to respond to emergencies.
    More recently, as we have seen an elevation in 
cybersecurity, I want to emphasize that physical security and 
cybersecurity must go hand in hand and that often what we see 
in threats in the cyber sphere have a physical element that is 
part of the attack vector.
    That is one of the reasons I want to say, for the record, I 
believe it would be a very serious mistake to honor the 
suggestion of some people that the Secret Service be removed 
from DHS. The Secret Service plays a critical role in securing 
the physical environment of our national special security 
events and other kinds of critical infrastructure, and they 
work hand in hand with CISA and other cyber components to do 
that, and that unity of effort should be preserved.
    I will acknowledge in the past couple of years, there has 
been a sense of the drift, and I think it is attributable to a 
number of things, but two in particular. One is, there has been 
an unbelievable leadership turnover at the Department. What 
that has done is rob the Department of confirmed leadership 
that will be stable, that is able to identify and implement the 
strategy, and that has the credibility with the workforce to 
execute on that strategy. Having people rotating through the 
Secretary's job with temporary appointments that may or may not 
actually be authorized is designed to undercut the ability of 
the Department to operate as a single unified effort.
    I would also say that there was, while understandably a 
focus on the border as an important issue, it was treated, in 
many ways, as the only issue. And some of the capabilities of 
other parts of the Department were shifted over or subordinated 
to the border mission, and that, ultimately, robbed our ability 
to continue to plan and build capabilities that are cross-
cutting, and would deal with many of the issues we have now.
    So I would suggest that moving forward, we need to do the 
following: First, Congress needs to make sure there is clarity 
in the law about succession in the event of vacancies and 
confirmed positions, and not allow situations where a future 
President, not the current one, would decide to use vacancies 
as a way of simply populating the Department with people who 
will be nothing more than agents to do bidding on particular 
weeks.
    Second, I think Congress needs to articulate the 
significance of unity of effort, joint planning, and joint 
execution. At the heart of the Department's mission, we have a 
national incident management system. That is supposed to be a 
cross-cutting way to guarantee that all of the elements, not 
only of DHS, but of other Federal agencies and State agencies, 
can work together in coordinated fashion. That has to be 
[inaudible] And reinvigorated.
    Third, we need to broaden the focus on the new set of 
hazards which have arisen. Some of these are now factors, 
whether it be pandemics or disasters caused by climate change. 
I think we have seen more of these natural impact and natural 
hazards in the last couple of years that I remember seeing in 
the last 20 years, and this is only going to continue to get 
worse. So again, the ability to plan, equip, and train to deal 
with these things must be a priority.
    And I know Secretary Johnson will remember that both under 
his tenure and in my tenure, we worked very hard in building 
and exercising pandemic response plans. But unfortunately, they 
were allowed to lapse.
    Finally, I would argue there are three new threats that, 
again, fall within the domain of DHS that have to be funded and 
have to be emphasized. One, as the chair said, is domestic 
terrorism, which is now, in terms of casualties in the U.S., 
causing more death than global jihadism that we dealt with 20 
years ago. That problem is not going away. And in conjunction 
with the FBI and State and local law enforcement, we have to be 
prepared to address it.
    Second. As demonstrated by solar winds and other attacks, 
including an attack on our water system in Florida, cyber 
attacks are becoming more and more dangerous, more and more 
frequent, and the scale is increasing. An adequate refunding 
and giving authorities to CISA, working with the Secret Service 
to respond to those attacks is probably the number one hazard 
that requires urgent action.
    And, finally, both foreign adversaries and domestic actors 
are engaging in disinformation campaigns and attacks on our 
democracy. And while our physical security is obviously 
critical, the security of our Constitution and our 
constitutional values is also, in my view, part of the 
responsibility of DHS.
    So there is plenty to do, but I will leave by saying I 
still believe that the vast majority of people who work at the 
agency are committed to the mission, if given proper leadership 
and direction and support, will happily execute that mission, 
and all of us depend upon the ability of the Department to do 
its work.
    So with that, I thank you very much, and I look forward to 
answering questions.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Secretary Johnson, please begin.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much. Let me begin by 
apologizing for the darkness in my office here. It is a little 
hard to see me, but at least you get a panoramic view of 
midtown Manhattan. I am sitting in my law office in New York 
City.
    Madam Chair, Ranking Member Palazzo, it is good to see so 
many friends of mine on the subcommittee. As a matter of 
reflect, so I have been in private life for 4 years now. When 
the appropriators call, I still respond. I welcome the 
opportunity to testify at this hearing concerning management 
challenges at DHS. I also welcome the opportunity to testify 
alongside my good friend and predecessor, Mike Chertoff. Though 
we served administrations of different parties, Mike and I have 
often collaborated on a number of projects and events.
    As you know, DHS is the third largest cabinet department of 
our government. It is a fraction of the size of the Department 
of Defense, where I served as general counsel from 2009 to 
2012. But in many respects, it feels much larger. Without a 
doubt, DHS is the most decentralized cabinet department with 
the most diffuse set of missions and workplace cultures, all 
under the umbrella of Homeland Security, ranging from CISA, 
TSA, the Coast Guard, where my son serves, and the United 
States Secret Service.
    No matter whether you regard DHS as too big or too small, 
the reality, however, is that DHS' current structure is 
outdated to meet all current homeland security threats. DHS was 
created in the wake of 9/11, as you well know, ostensibly for 
the counterterrorism mission.
    In 2002, terrorism was regarded primarily as an 
extraterritorial threat. The view then was that the 
consolidation into one cabinet level department of the 
regulation of all the different ways a person can enter our 
homeland, land, sea, or air, is the effective way to 
counterterrorism. Now, almost 20 years later, we know that the 
principal terrorist threats to our homeland are domestic-based. 
In recent years, most attacks have been committed by domestic 
groups or individuals, not by those directed or inspired by 
foreign terrorist organizations.
    Beyond that are the other serious threats to our Homeland 
Security, namely, COVID-19, cybersecurity, climate change, and 
other things. The Department of Homeland Security must meet all 
these challenges, plus administer and enforce our immigration 
laws. But DHS has, in recent years, been under constant siege 
and in constant crisis, while suffering from management 
upheaval and leadership vacancies.
    Over the last 50 months, there have been nine, nine people, 
including myself and the incumbent, to occupy the role of 
Secretary of Homeland Security, four Senate-confirmed, and five 
acting. Over the last 4 years of the Trump administration, 
there was no Senate-confirmed director of ICE at all.
    There have been public calls, as you know, for the 
elimination of certain components of DHS, or the casting off of 
certain components of DHS, and even the elimination of DHS in 
its entirety. In the current environment, it is easy to forget 
that DHS is responsible for the vital missions of protecting 
the American people and their homeland from land, sea, and air, 
and in cyberspace. The Coast Guard performs the vital maritime 
safety, national security law enforcement, and counter drug 
functions. The Secret Service protects the President and 
others. TSA provides basic aviation security to Americans every 
day. FEMA is the Nation's disaster response agency. CISA is the 
U.S. Government's primary information exchange hub for the 
Nation's cybersecurity.
    These are matters in which politics should play a little 
role, and around which there should be bipartisan consensus and 
support.
    You have my extended prepared statement in which I put 
forth a number of observations and recommendations, places 
where I think DHS has improved and where it still has a 
challenge. I look forward to answering your questions in our 
discussion. Thank you.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Secretary Johnson, there has been a longstanding criticism 
about how DHS was created and structured by combining multiple, 
somewhat disparate agencies into a new department without 
giving its leadership sufficient authority to exert effective 
control over components which too often operated independently. 
You attempted to address this with your unity of effort 
initiative. Unfortunately, much of the progress that you made 
seems to have been lost since your departure.
    Both you and Secretary Chertoff served as senior advisors 
or board co-chairs of the Atlantic Council Future of DHS 
project which issued a number of recommendations in December, 
including ones focused on internal challenges. Importantly, it 
recommended that policy and budget officials work more closely 
together.
    Do you agree that a power imbalance exists between 
headquarters and the components, and if so, what reforms are 
needed, either statutorily or administratively, to address the 
problem?
    Mr. Johnson. I do agree with that statement. When I got to 
DHS in 2013, frankly, I was surprised to find out that the 
budget process was still very stovepiped. The acquisition 
process lacked maturity. We, in my 3 years, revised the budget-
making process to focus more on missions than components, and 
told the components to bring forth budgets that took account of 
overlap. Let's focus on the mission.
    As you probably know, and I know Henry knows, we created 
joint task forces for border security on our southern border. 
Congress in the NDAA one year actually codified joint task 
forces into law. Regrettably, it is my understanding that they 
have been disbanded or not used.
    I think the answer to your question is that there has to be 
a commitment across several administrations to keep in place 
certain things to give the Department-wide more authority over 
the components. It is simply not enough time for one Cabinet 
secretary over one 3- or 4-year period to try to change all of 
this. There has to be a multi-administration commitment to 
doing so, and I think the answer there is Congress. Congress 
can take care, through codification of a lot of this, that 
multiple administrations pay attention to reforming the 
Department and making it function better.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Secretary Chertoff, it has been several 
years now since you left the Department. How would you rate the 
Department's management progress over the years, and what would 
you recommend as the top management reform for the current 
Secretary?
    Mr. Chertoff. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. I agree with 
what Secretary Johnson, my friend and successor, said. I 
certainly think we have slipped back over the last 4 years. And 
as I indicated, I think one of the critical reasons is that 
there was such churn in the leadership that the message went 
out to some of the component heads that they didn't really need 
to pay attention to what the Secretary said because that job is 
going to change in about 10 minutes.
    So I do think having consistency in leadership is critical, 
but I would also agree that we ought to codify the need for 
having coordinated unity of effort within the Department. And, 
frankly, one of the reasons we had a problem with that is there 
are so many different authorizing committees which exert 
jurisdiction over the Department, which give some of the 
components the feeling that if they don't succeed with one 
committee, they can run to another committee and get support 
there. I think combining the authorization to a single 
oversight committee for Homeland Security would be a big step 
forward in getting this unity of effort.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And just to follow up on what Secretary Chertoff just 
mentioned, I believe what he just described, if we could codify 
the authorizing committees under one committee of jurisdiction, 
it would save a lot of the problems. That is also one of the 
last 9/11 Commission findings that has not been implemented, if 
I recall that from my time on the Homeland Security Authorizing 
Committee. So, Secretary Chertoff, thank you for bringing that 
up.
    You know, I have been very focused on two borders: the 
maritime border and the southern border. And, you know, when we 
focus on the southern border, we have a tendency to not focus 
on the maritime border. And we know those who are trying to 
find their way into our country, whether it is to work, smuggle 
in hard narcotics, foreign nationals, or human trafficking, 
they are going to find a way. So we have got to be cognizant of 
all of our borders.
    And I love the way you described the air, the land, the 
sea, and space as an important mission. And as Secretaries, 
both of you, I mean, you had a huge, monumental task, you know, 
under the Homeland Security Department, because it covers so 
many various responsibilities, but I would like to just direct 
my questions to Secretary Johnson.
    You know, you are probably familiar with the National 
Security Cutter, you know, and it is crazy that in Homeland, 
you deal with flood insurance. You get a question on flood 
insurance under FEMA. The next day, you get a shipbuilding 
question from the Coast Guard. Can you tell me how beneficial 
the National Security Cutter has been filling in the gaps for 
the United States Navy, but also fighting the war on drugs? I 
mean, sometimes they are the only American presence in South 
and Central America, and they have stopped and prohibited tons 
of cocaine and hard narcotics from finding its way into 
America. So can you take a moment and just, you know, share 
your thoughts on the National Security Cutter program?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. I have been aboard several NSCs. It is a 
wonderful vessel. The first time I was on the Stratton in 2015 
which is in Alameda, California, I wanted to meet the master 
helmsman of the ship, this 400-foot cutter, and they brought 
her up for me. She was 19 years old. She had just finished high 
school the year before, but she had demonstrated her acumen on 
the bridge, and they made her the master helmsman. It was a 
wonderful testament to what someone can do in a short period of 
time.
    Sir, I will tell you this: I know that the Coast Guard is 
very busy in the Pacific Ocean with drug interdiction. The 
cartels are active to this day. One Coast Guard unit of eight 
people on board the Gabrielle Giffords, a littoral combat ship, 
seized $290 million worth of cocaine. That is public 
information. They were very busy.
    As you probably know, the Coast Guard serves in the Persian 
Gulf as well, supporting the Navy, supporting the security for 
the Navy, which over the last year or so, was a particularly 
intense mission.
    When I came into office, I learned that the Coast Guard has 
the oldest fleet of vessels of any Navy in the world, and we 
need to recapitalize. We need to continue that effort. When I 
was Secretary, there were efforts to try to cut back on NSCs, 
on the OPCs, the midsize cutter. I think we need to keep at 
this.
    People forget. The Coast Guard is not just maritime 
security, pulling somebody out of the water when their jet ski 
capsizes. It is a vital national security mission on the 1-yard 
line, not the 30-yard line, not the 50-yard line, but on the 1-
yard line. So I could not agree more with the spirit of your 
question, sir.
    Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, Secretary Johnson, for 
sharing that. You know, the National Security Cutters--and we 
have seen this. They pay for themselves. Just in the drugs that 
they take off the ocean before they find their way into 
America's backyards, destroying families, destroying 
communities, they pay for themselves. And we still have the 
same issues with OMB, and people not requesting them in their 
budget, because they know Congress will find a way to fund the 
Coast Guard shipbuilding program. But I wish, you know, the 
fact that the Coast Guard currently is actually deploying to 
counter China in the areas of our country, it is just amazing 
what they have done. And so, again, thank you, and I will save 
my questions for the second round. Thank you.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I also want to 
thank both Secretaries. It is always a pleasure.
    I think both of you understood the balance between security 
and letting legitimate goods and people into the United States, 
so I appreciate both of y'all understanding that balance 
because there are a tendency that people push too much to one 
side and not understand that.
    As the chairwoman said a few minutes ago, and Secretary 
Johnson, actually, my first question has to do with the unity 
of effort. And along with that, as you mentioned, if we don't 
do that, as you know, there are several overarching Homeland 
Security missions. And, especially if you are talking about 
security, border security, how do you go ahead and put all of 
that together?
    You are right. I got calls back in November, December that 
they were dissolving the Joint Task Force West, and I thought 
it was a mistake, but as you know, it was something that got 
done by the prior administration.
    So my question, I would ask you, and Secretary Chertoff, if 
you want to add on this, you know, should we put back the joint 
task force again? I assume both of you will say yes and tell us 
why that is important. Question number one.
    And then question number two for both of us, for both of 
y'all, temporary travel restrictions. The balance between 
letting people in, and how do we secure the border. As you 
know, this March, in about a week, we will have 1 year of not 
letting the legal visa holders from Canada and from Mexico come 
into the United States. They can fly in from Mexico, but they 
cannot drive or cross.
    And I am talking about what they call non-essential, which 
is, in my opinion, very important because before the pandemic, 
Mexicans would spend--18 million Mexicans would come over and 
spend over $19 billion. Laredo, about 45, 50 percent of all 
their retail is made by Mexican shoppers.
    So there has got to be a way that we can safely let people 
in, into the United States, and still help our economy. So I 
don't know if y'all are familiar with that particular border 
restrictions, but if y'all want to answer both questions. And 
thank you for--both of y'all, for being on board with us.
    Mr. Johnson. I will start, if I could. The first time I 
went to the southern border of Texas was in 2014, early 2014, 
and I met in a large conference room at the Border Patrol 
station with everybody who was devoted to the effort on the 
southern border at that moment. You had Border Patrol; you had 
air and marine; in the brown uniforms, you had the Customs; in 
the blue uniforms, we had FEMA; we had USCIS. We had ICE ERO. 
We had, like, 30 different people from 10 different components 
of DHS.
    And the oddity that struck me was that I was the only 
person in their chain of command that they had in common; me, 
the person at the very top of that organization. We were way 
too stovepiped, and, so, we created joint task forces modeled 
after a pilot program in Arizona that was working well, and 
modeled, frankly, after my experience in the Department of 
Defense with joint command structures.
    I thought it made a tremendous amount of sense, but when 
something is new, you are always going to have bureaucratic 
resistance to change. And, so, unless there is a sustained 
commitment to getting used to things in a new manner, it is 
going to fall apart. And that is exactly what happened over the 
last 4 years to the detriment, in my view, of border security.
    On the travel restrictions, the one thing I will add there 
is it is not an all-or-nothing proposition. You can have travel 
restrictions that are very targeted, very nuanced, like, for 
example, instead of just banning all travel from a certain 
country, you can funnel people into certain airports. The 
Secretary of Homeland Security actually has the authority to 
require that passengers coming from a particular country only 
land at two or three airports in this country where they might 
receive a heightened health screening. That is what we did 
during the Ebola crisis in 2014. And so, travel needs not--it 
need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. Over to Mike.
    Mr. Chertoff. I agree with what has been said. Let me just, 
on the travel point, make the observation that as we get more 
vaccinated people, having some kind of a travel document, or 
even electronic travel record that indicates that you are 
vaccinated could be an important element in allowing for your 
travel.
    I would also say you need to look at this issue, which kind 
of is--I am not quite sure it has been implemented, but it has 
been discussed, which is a rule that would say that even U.S. 
citizens, or permanent residents, returning from overseas, 
can't board the plane or can't come in unless they are tested. 
And if they test positive, they have to stay in the foreign 
country until they test negative.
    And I have to say, now putting on my hat as a former judge, 
I am wondering at the legality of saying over an extended 
period of time to Americans, not that they have to quarantine 
themselves, but that they have to quarantine themselves outside 
the U.S.
    So, again, having a consistent policy that doesn't 
overreact, I think, is going to be very important as we 
hopefully emerge from this.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I apologize profusely to you and the members of the 
subcommittee. Madam Chair, I was working on an issue that you 
and I have discussed before, and so my profuse apologies.
    To Secretary Chertoff, thank you very much for your 
outstanding service to our country. I did not have the pleasure 
to serve with you. I thank you for being here today.
    Secretary Johnson, I want to specifically and profusely 
thank you. I had the privilege of serving on this subcommittee 
with you, and I also want to thank you for giving back. Even 
during the last administration, you were always very kind with 
your time and advice, and I appreciate your great dedication to 
not only to this issue, but to our Nation, sir, and I thank 
you.
    I will start with some questions. As you know, the 
situation at the southwest border is escalating to be a crisis 
greater than we saw in 2019. I was there just this weekend. It 
is--it is scary. Think of any negative adjective, and it is 
there. Should there be a set of criteria that triggers action 
like FEMA, Stafford Act declaration that gets put into motion 
when apprehensions reach a certain number, or time in custody 
measures exceed thresholds, or intel about activities in 
Central America and Mexico alert that caravans are enroute? And 
I will defer to both gentlemen.
    Mr. Chertoff. I can begin. I think, Representative 
Fleischmann, yes. The short answer is that I know FEMA has now 
been mobilized. The challenge is how do you deal when you have 
an expansion of particularly unaccompanied minors, and you need 
to have humane and secure facilities in which they can be kept 
while they are being processed.
    Now, I understand from what Secretary Mayorkas said the 
other day that there are, for adults and families, people 
simply being expelled and being sent back, either into Mexico 
or their home countries, but it is not always possible to do 
that. And particularly with a pandemic, having safe and secure 
facilities becomes important, and they have to be humane. So I 
think there is a challenge in scaling up, and part of the 
planning process which I talked about earlier is you have got 
to have standby plans for dealing with these kinds of surges, 
much as we do in hurricane season when we understand we may 
have to do evacuations on a large scale. So I would agree, this 
ought to be part of this unity of effort we have been talking 
about.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Secretary Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson. Congressman, nice to see you again. I was just 
in your home State a couple of weeks ago. My father passed 
away, and we buried him in his hometown of Nashville, so I had 
an opportunity to visit your State just recently, though it was 
a sad occasion.
    As I listened to your question, it occurred to me that it 
is appropriate to have, in place, mechanisms to deal with a 
border surge like invoking FEMA, like invoking Title 42, public 
healthcare laws. I would not adopt specific triggers for those 
measures. I would leave it to the discretion of the Secretary 
of DHS to invoke them, depending upon circumstances.
    For example, 2 years ago, if we had tried to develop 
specific benchmarks for when we would invoke FEMA or doing 
other things, I suspect very few of us would have anticipated a 
global pandemic like the one we are facing now. And, so, I 
would leave it discretionary in terms of when emergency 
authorities are invoked. Of course, always with the oversight 
of Congress.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir. And in the interest of 
time, I will yield back with our condolences, Mr. Secretary, on 
the passing of your father.
    Madam Chair, I will yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for calling 
today's hearing.
    As the Department of Homeland Security nears the end of its 
second decade, I look forward to working with the committee and 
the administration to help the Department mature its mission 
and organization. I think it is important to know exactly what 
we are talking about when we refer to the Department's mission.
    Mr. Johnson, you oversaw an update to the Department's 
mission statement in consultation with Mr. Chertoff and the 
other former Secretaries. That mission, which is still in 
effect today, is, quote, "With honor and integrity, we will 
safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values." 
And I am interested in hearing more about how the Department's 
work at the border fits into that mission.
    When you served as Secretary, you testified to Congress 
that DHS was committed to providing for migrant safety, 
security, and medical needs, and to treating all individuals 
with dignity and respect. Mr. Johnson, can you elaborate on why 
basic medical care is such a critical part of the mission of 
safeguarding both our values and our safety?
    Mr. Johnson. I agree with that statement. People under our 
care and custody, and we are most often talking about families 
and children, deserve, in my opinion, as a matter of basic 
humanity, healthcare. They deserve a certain level of 
healthcare. We are facing COVID-19 right now. I cannot begin to 
comprehend the complexity of dealing with a border surge on top 
of COVID-19.
    I believe that the question you raise requires further 
study. I believe that Congress should consider calling upon DHS 
to address exactly what levels of healthcare should be provided 
to migrants who have been apprehended at the border, 
particularly when you are dealing with a situation like the one 
we have right now.
    Ms. Underwood. And can you briefly explain what the 
function of the Chief Medical Officer is and how that office 
fits into the Department's mission of safeguarding our values?
    Mr. Johnson. I dealt most often with the Chief Medical 
Officer during the Ebola crisis of 2014. She was in my office 
every day and was critical in terms of the advice she provided 
to me and to our components wrestling with the issue. We had 
many medical experts across the Federal Government and in HHS, 
including Dr. Fauci, who was at the table in 2014 in the 
Situation Room. But it was good to have in a public health 
challenge like the one we had in 2014, our own in-house Chief 
Medical Officer and advisor.
    Ms. Underwood. Right. So how did that person help you in 
terms of safeguarding the values?
    Mr. Johnson. In terms of safeguarding the values, I would 
say that it goes very much to the honor and integrity of those 
who work at DHS. Honor and integrity includes treating people 
humanely, in my judgment. Incidentally, I wrote that statement, 
and I am glad it is still part of DHS' mission.
    Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir. Thank you. I am also conscious of 
the medical needs of DHS staff whose work often puts them on 
the front lines of the pandemic. Mr. Johnson, as a former 
leader of the DHS workforce, would you agree that vaccinating 
its own frontline workers should be a top priority of the 
Department right now?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes.
    Ms. Underwood. And do you have any explanation about why 
that might be so important?
    Mr. Johnson. For the reasons you just stated. They are on 
the front lines. They are on the front lines dealing with vast 
numbers of people at the ports, the land borders, and they are 
essential government workers. I don't know why they wouldn't be 
a priority.
    Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir. It is certainly, at the front of 
my mind, as I think about how DHS' medical leadership could be 
strengthened and empowered to support ongoing efforts to care 
for both department staff and the migrants they encounter. This 
issue is more urgent than ever as we look to the current 
situation at the southern border. The damage done to our 
immigration system by the previous administration was profound, 
and it will take time to rebuild the capacity to process 
migrants in a humane way at the scale currently required.
    Providing appropriate medical care to these migrants is an 
essential part of humane treatment, and it is key to our 
national security. If we fail to meet migrants' basic health 
needs, especially during a pandemic, that threatens public 
health and makes Americans, including the DHS officials and law 
enforcement officers who interact with them, it makes our 
country less safe.
    Each component within the Department has a different 
mission and interacts with migrants in different ways, so 
"appropriate care" can mean different things. In some cases, it 
means initial medical screenings. In others, it means influenza 
vaccinations, or COVID testing. I think it is time to assess 
how medical care is managed department-wide, and consider 
whether the current organizational structure is adequate to 
protect public health along our border, and achieve the mission 
of safeguarding our values. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank 
you to our witnesses for being with us today. I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome to our two 
former Secretaries, both of whom I have fond memories of 
working with, very cooperatively, when I was chair and ranking 
member of this subcommittee.
    Both of you have referred in your statements to the 
preoccupation of the last administration with immigration, and 
you have portrayed that as working to the detriment of other 
departmental priorities and functions. I am presuming you mean 
by that not just the degree of attention given to immigration, 
but also major changes in policy. After all, it hasn't been 
that long since Secretary Chertoff was the leader of a 
Republican administration's efforts to achieve comprehensive 
immigration reform. We are certainly a long way from that now.
    And on The Hill here, we have seen Homeland Security, this 
subcommittee, go from being the least controversial of our 
appropriations bills to the most controversial, and the reason 
for that is solely immigration.
    Now, we are moving back to a more balanced view of 
immigration at the top of the administration, but there are 
many reminders of the divisiveness and the toxicity of the 
Trump policy, many reminders on the ground, many reminders in 
this body, and many reminders at DHS, and that is what I want 
to ask you both about.
    In the culture of DHS, you have seen the troubling reports 
of punitive attitudes and behavior trickling down to the front 
lines of DHS agencies. You know the controversies about what 
kind of restraints are honored, what kind of norms are with 
respected with respect to the treatment of desperate people, 
for example, the separation of families. There is a question of 
the agency's discretion, the Department's discretion, and there 
are lots of discretion that is exercised, as both of you very 
well know, in setting priorities, for example, for enforcement 
and deportation, in dealing with local law enforcement, how to 
deal with local law enforcement and so on.
    So it has been a traumatic 4 years. And my question to you, 
in terms of management challenges, is what do those challenges 
look like as a result in the immigration area? Particularly, we 
are talking about the culture of the Department. We are talking 
about the level of morale. We are talking about the discipline 
within the Department. We are talking about the sense of the 
Department's mission. We are talking about its legitimacy in 
the society. It looks to be like a long list of challenges, and 
I would very much value your reflections on them.
    Mr. Johnson. Mike, do you want to go ahead?
    Mr. Chertoff. Congressman, it is good to be dealing with 
you again, and I do have fond memories of doing that. And I 
think you have hit the nail on the head. I think this is very 
challenging. It is like turning a big ship around. It is not 
going to happen on a dime, and I know Secretary Mayorkas 
recognizes this. I mean, I saw that not only in his statements 
but in conversations I have had with him.
    So let me be blunt. The prior administration treated wanton 
cruelty and disdain as actually policy tools in what I think 
was a deeply misguided effort to discourage unauthorized 
migration and also, frankly, to clamp down on legal migration, 
including visas and similar types of legal mechanisms. And 
there was a manifest hostility that was articulated from the 
very top of the administration.
    So, the first thing that needs to happen is there needs to 
be a reframing of the narrative, an understanding that we still 
need to have borders that we secure. We need to make a decision 
who gets admitted and who doesn't, but we also honor our 
obligations to refugees and to asylum. We recognize that there 
are some important reasons to have immigrants come in, either 
on a temporary basis, or even, ultimately, to be on a permanent 
basis, and we need to express that in word and deed in a way 
that is not unduly encouraging people to think it is open 
borders, because that is not helpful either.
    If the smugglers all of a sudden get the opportunity to 
smuggle, you know, vastly more people to the border and make 
money off of it, and then there is people who are getting sent 
back, the only winners are the smugglers. So this is a daunting 
challenge to calibrate the message to be clear and balanced.
    And at the same time, I think we need to look more 
generally at the system as a whole. And this is an issue that 
Congress visited multiple times. When I was Secretary, 
President Bush was very interested in pushing this. It has got 
to be some combination of legal mechanisms for people who are 
filling employment needs in the U.S., or have other 
humanitarian reasons to come in, but also to enforce the rules 
so that it doesn't just become willy-nilly, you know, everybody 
comes in when they feel like it.
    And I think this is going to require an all-hands-on-deck 
approach at the Department. As I said earlier, migration is not 
the only mission, but is certainly will be, at least for the 
foreseeable future, one of the things that is on the front 
burner.
    Mr. Johnson. Good morning, David. I am going to answer your 
question with two comments. First, in my experience, you talked 
about the culture of the Border Patrol, and others. In my 
experience, working at DHS, in November 2014, we adopted new 
priorities for deportation, for enforcement. They were very 
clear. They were very concise. Before I even issued them, I 
spent hours with our enforcement personnel, with ICRO, with the 
border patrol leadership, CBP leadership, as well as people 
advising me who reflected more so the viewpoints on the left, 
and we collaborated on those priorities.
    And people like Tom Homan will say--and Tom was the head of 
ICRO when I was there. He is now a Fox commentator. He will 
say, and he has said publicly that not everything he advocated 
made it into our enforcement priorities, but he was very 
comfortable adopting them, implementing them, supporting them, 
and explaining them to his workforce.
    So, in answer to the first part of your question, my 
experience, if you have a leadership style that is 
collaborative, inclusive, and people feel like they have been 
heard, they are prepared to support what you do, even though it 
is not exactly what they would do.
    Big picture on the issue of immigration, on the issue of 
our southern border. In my experience--and part of this I 
learned from just listening to Michael Chertoff and his advice. 
In my experience, the things you could do at our southern 
border to heighten enforcement, heighten border security that 
may have an effect in the short term, but as long as the 
conditions in Central America and in Mexico persist long term, 
we are going to be dealing with illegal migration, because 
people in that region of the country are making the very basic 
choice to flee a burning building, and there is no amount of 
deterrence, border security, or a wall that will stop them.
    We have to address the problems in Central America. We 
began that effort in 2016 with an appropriation of $750 
million. I am told by experts that that money, though it was a 
drop in the bucket, was beginning to make a difference, and I 
think we need to stay that course. We have to give people in 
Central America a reason to want to stay. And that is the only 
way, in my observation, we are going to deal with this problem 
long term.
    Mr. Price. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Let me first say, I agree completely with Mr. Johnson's 
last soliloquy about Central America, South America, and our 
need to address their social issues. And I think we have had 
some good success in those countries, like Colombia, Honduras, 
but more needs to be done. And, in fact, I think Secretary 
Mattis, when he was talking about the military, he said it best 
of all. He said, If you are going to cut the State Department 
budget which is where these funds would come from to assist 
down there, if you are going to cut the State Department 
budget, buy me more bullets, because I think he understood that 
we have got to be about winning the hearts and minds of people 
around the world and lifting people out of poverty.
    The fact of the matter is capitalism has lifted more people 
out of poverty than any other economic system in the world, 
and, so, that is one reason we need to keep our economy strong.
    But I can tell you as a lifelong police officer, what 
concerns me and what I see at the border going on, this 
policy--you know, Mr. Chertoff, you were talking about a policy 
that was inhumane, I will paraphrase, in that it discouraged 
people from coming. I think it is inhumane that we have a 
policy now that is encouraging people to come into desperate 
situations.
    And so, as a law enforcement officer, my greatest concern 
with DHS and CBP is what are we doing? After 9/11, DHS--and we 
have to remember this. After 9/11, DHS was formed because we 
had all these agencies that were working in silos. And the 
challenge within law enforcement is not lack of information, it 
is turning that information into intelligence through good 
analytical tools.
    And so, we missed a lot. And so I am afraid with this mass 
of humanity that is coming across the border down there right 
now, that is a crisis that is completely policy-driven; we need 
to know that, you know, everybody is sharing information 
because we just captured four folks off the terrorist watchlist 
coming across down there.
    I am very familiar with the opioids. My hometown, 
Jacksonville, Florida, has the highest opioid death rate from 
Fentanyl and opioids back just a year ago. And, so, I know a 
little bit about these drugs and the cartels that are bringing 
them and children across our border.
    So my question is what system does DHS have in place to 
help communicate with State and local partners? And how are 
they making sure that we are not going back to those pre-9/11 
silos of information? And, Mr. Johnson, if you would like to 
start. RPTR BRYANTEDTR ZAMORA[11:14 a.m.]
    Mr. Johnson. Sure thing. Yes. The principal objective of 
the Intelligence and Analysis Directorate is vertical 
information sharing. When I was ramping up for my job, I asked, 
what does DHS need with an intelligence directorate, and I was 
told vertical information sharing with State and local law 
enforcement. So if they are failing in that mission, they are 
failing in their principal mission.
    But I want to go back to something you said about 
intelligence from Central America, which really rings a bell 
with me. When I was in office, I used to urge our intelligence 
community, can you please devote some of your resources to 
helping me in Central America. It wouldn't be that hard to find 
out what the coyotes are saying on the streets of Guatemala to 
people about why they should come to the United States. That 
way I know what is coming before it shows up on our front door 
in Texas or Arizona, to put the resources from the intelligence 
community so that we can see these waves before they show up.
    And I would urge Congress to urge the intelligence 
community to do the same thing. It shouldn't be that first sign 
of a wave of 100,000 people in a month is when they show up at 
the holding stations in McAllen or Brownsville or El Paso.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. The only thing I would say to 
that is, we have seen the caravan coming for quite some time. 
But you are right. The genesis of it is what I would like to 
see us get down to. So thank you, Mr. Johnson.
    And I see, Madam Chair, my time has run out, so I yield 
back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, first I want to thank you all for 
your service in the past. The Department of Homeland Security 
really was stood up after 9/11 and a lot of different agencies 
and different missions. And then, thank God, we had the Coast 
Guard, which was a well-managed operation that kind of led the 
charge. And then when you all came into leadership, I think you 
both, based on your past experience, just did a lot to build on 
where we needed to go.
    As far as when I came to this subcommittee, one of my tasks 
was to equip and resource the Department properly so we could 
meet the moment on the Federal Government cybersecurity 
challenges and coordinate better with State and local 
governments and private sector.
    Now, I have to give a great deal of credit to the 
leadership of this subcommittee now and in the past and the 
full committee. I think we have taken CISA from around $1.5 
billion to now well over $2.2 billion. And we just gave them an 
additional $650 million in the American Rescue Plan passed last 
week.
    One of my questions to CISA last week was, when can we 
expect them to submit their posture review, as required by the 
fiscal year 2021 NDAA, so this subcommittee can have a better 
idea of resource planning well into the future.
    And I think what I am really concerned about is that the 
mission that CISA has, as far as Homeland Security and 
cybersecurity, is massive.
    I happen to represent NSA. They are in my district, and I 
was one time ranking on the Intel Committee. And I think NSA, 
until recently, was right on their game as it related to Russia 
and China. I am a little concerned about the attacks, the 
Russia attacks, now the Chinese, as far as our defense is 
concerned, and I think we have a little bit more to do in that 
regard.
    But what do you think of the future of CISA? How well do 
you think they are managed internally in the Department? How do 
we see their ability to take on, Federal Government, the 
cybersecurity mission? And it increasingly grows larger and 
more complex. And, hopefully, we would never have a another 
world war, but I see a lot of it in the cyberspace and in the 
space, space itself.
    Now, how should we approach--approach is my question--to 
the final line of giving CISA the tools to do the job, but not 
directly competing with the robust U.S. cybersecurity service 
market, that sector, private sector?
    And the one thing that I would put on the table is that I 
feel that the cybersecurity issue is so large, and we just 
created a Space Force, I think there is a need to have 
cybersecurity set out in maybe another area with a direct line 
to the administration, because of all the areas and issues that 
we are going to deal with in the future. We keep growing, 
growing, and we are getting attacked now on a regular basis.
    So if you can just give me your opinion on that, the 
possibility of taking cybersecurity into another level. And 
start, I guess, with Mr. Johnson and then Mr. Chertoff.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you for that question, Congressman. 
First of all, regrettably, the executive branch often does not 
take congressional deadlines seriously. The last QHSR was--it 
was supposed to be every 5 years, but the last one was the one 
that I helped write in 2014. And going through the exercise of 
delivering to Congress a report on the future is a worthwhile 
exercise, because it forces us to focus on that as an agency or 
as a Department.
    My general assessment of CISA is that it is going in the 
right direction. I am pleased that Congress approved 
reorganizing from NPPD, which was a cumbersome directorate, to 
an agency devoted to cybersecurity and infrastructure 
protection. I think Chris Krebs did a good job. I think that 
CISA did a good job preparing us for the 2020 election, in 
terms of election infrastructure. They worked effectively with 
State and local election officials on that.
    The report that was declassified yesterday indicates that 
there was no attack on our election infrastructure per se, but 
there is still a lot of work to do. The SolarWinds attack was, 
in my observation, the most devastating cyber attack on our 
Nation perhaps in history.
    The big challenge that I see for DHS--and I would not 
rewicker the structure right now. I would give the current 
alignment time to stabilize. The biggest challenge that DHS has 
is talent, as you suggested. Just on my watch, some of our best 
cybersecurity people were stolen away by the financial services 
sector, who could pay them two or three times what the 
government pays them.
    And my approach has been come and serve your country for 
just a couple of years. Give us your expertise for just a 
couple of years before you go off and work at Goldman Sachs or 
Citigroup or the defense industry, and learn from working for 
our country the insights there. But recruiting and retaining 
talent, in my judgment, in cybersecurity is our biggest 
challenge.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. And an example, Chris Krebs, though, I 
think did an excellent job. He moved forward. And because he 
made the comment that he felt that the election was secure, 
which is not what Trump was putting out for whatever reason, he 
got fired. And that inconsistency of leadership is not good 
either.
    So I agree with all of your comments, and we are losing 
good people. We just need some smart people in the cyber field 
to stay 3 or 4 years.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe that ends our first round, and 
we do have some time for a second round.
    So I would like to talk a little bit about employee morale. 
Each year since the creation of DHS, based on the Federal 
Employee Viewpoint Survey conducted by the Office of Personnel 
Management, employee morale has consistently ranked among the 
worst in the Federal Government.
    I know that you, Secretary Johnson, and Secretary Chertoff, 
have worked very hard to address this issue during your tenure, 
but the problem still persists.
    Secretary Johnson, what responsibility does the 
departmental management have in addressing this issue? And what 
steps should be taken by today's leaders within the Department 
to address the systemic low morale, and is there anything that 
Congress can do to help?
    Mr. Johnson. When I came into office, I was beaten over the 
head by Congress during my confirmation process about improving 
morale. It was at the bottom of the list in terms of Cabinet 
departments, and I was going to raise morale if it killed me.
    Our third year, my third year in office, according to FEVS, 
the morale within DHS, which is no small lift because you are 
talking about multiple components, went up a whole 3 percentage 
points. Interestingly, the most dramatic increase was in ICE my 
last year of office, 7 whole percentage points.
    And morale is not just a general indicator of whether the 
workforce believes in their mission, but it also was the 
recruitment tool. It also reflects directly on the prestige of 
the agency. And morale, according to, if you look at FEVS from 
2016, we bottomed out in 2016, and it has increased steadily 
ever since.
    It has to be a focused, sustained commitment to paying 
attention to this issue. I believe that the current human 
capital officer, Angie Bailey, has done an excellent job. She 
was hired in 2015 or 2016. I think she is doing an excellent 
job.
    In terms of what Congress can do, I will tell you one 
episode. I came to work one morning and I read in The 
Washington Post that a subcommittee--I can't remember which one 
it was--was holding a hearing on worst places to work in the 
Federal Government. And one of my people had been called to 
testify, because Congress was going to highlight that DHS was 
one of the worst places to work in the Federal Government.
    And I said to my staff, let's not send so-and-so, I will 
go. And I got lots of pushback from my staff, but I went 
anyway. And I said to the chair of the subcommittee at the 
time, Mr. Meadows, would you please stop holding hearings 
telling people how terrible it is to work at DHS. That doesn't 
help me. Help me.
    And so I am glad that we were able to finally turn the 
corner. It is a sustained effort, and it is a very, very big 
agency. And leadership on this must have a cascading effect. 
You have got to get the component leaders to focus on it, their 
subordinates and their subordinates, and it has to trickle down 
through the organization.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Secretary Chertoff, do you have any 
recommendations?
    Mr. Chertoff. No. I agree it does require sustained effort 
and appreciation being shown, not just by the leadership of the 
Department, but by the leadership of the administration.
    I recognize that one of the challenges is that the people 
at some of the components are interacting with the public under 
circumstances in which the public is usually a little bit 
grumpy. For example, TSA, nobody really likes the experience at 
the airport, and TSA is really right on the front lines of 
that. Like our CBP, you know, the border inspectors run up 
against people who are tired and a little bit cranky.
    So we need to recognize that, maybe with the possible 
exception of IRS, there is no Federal agency that has as much 
direct, repeated, and sometimes challenging contact with the 
public as does DHS.
    But with that, I agree, emphasizing and celebrating the 
importance of the mission and highlighting where the mission 
has made a difference in a positive way is one thing I would 
like to see as a response to this challenge.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. DHS has gone through a number of 
reorganizations since it was first established. And there have 
been various suggestions made, such as I think, Secretary 
Chertoff, you mentioned the fact that there was discussion 
about moving the Secret Service. And there have been also calls 
to dissolve the Department and move its operations to other 
departments and agencies.
    What is the argument for maintaining DHS as a Federal 
department, and are additional organizational changes needed to 
ensure its success?
    Mr. Chertoff. I will try to be very succinct. First, I 
think the Department, if it is being led properly, does foster 
unity of effort among a number of the components that 
complement each other. For example, some of the capabilities 
and tools TSA has are shared with CBP and vice versa, and that 
means that we are able to both strengthen our border for air 
travelers and our aircraft and airplane security for our air 
travelers.
    As I said earlier, the Secret Service and its capabilities 
in the area of personal protection and physical security mesh 
very well with other missions of the Department at CISA that 
are also focused on the issue of critical infrastructure.
    If you separate these out, you are not going to make the 
mission disappear, you are just going to make it very difficult 
to coordinate and everybody is going to pursue their own thing. 
So I think it would be a tragic mistake to go back to the old 
days when we actually promoted stovepipes and separation.
    Finally, I would say, as a general matter, reorganizations 
cost time, money, and always set us back in progress. So I 
don't know that I would do any significant reorganizing even 
within the Department. What is needed now is consistency of 
leadership, strategic vision, clear communication, and 
attention to execution.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I see that my time is up, but I would 
like to ask Secretary Johnson if he has any thoughts on this 
subject.
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. Well, first of all, on the subject of 
morale, I think the single best thing I did was one day--I 
don't know if you can see this--one day I went to BWI and I 
literally put on a TSA uniform and worked the line. I played 
undercover boss. And all the TSA officers loved it, and I think 
it was a good shot for morale.
    From where I sat as Secretary, I thought it made a 
tremendous amount of sense for one person to have eyes and ears 
on all the different ways somebody can enter our country--land, 
sea, and air. And there is a very practical benefit to having 
Secret Service and his and all these other components in one 
place.
    When you have large national security events, like a papal 
visit or a U.N. General Assembly, the Secret Service has the 
lead, but it draws upon all these other DHS components to 
augment the security mission, which would be very difficult if 
they are spread across multiple Cabinet departments.
    So that is the one thing I would like to add to what 
Michael said. Michael and I, we coauthored an op-ed about 
keeping the Secret Service within DHS, and I am glad that in 
Congress that effort seems to have been set aside for the time 
being.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you again, Madam Chair.
    Components submit their annual budget requests to DHS 
headquarters budget office and ultimately through OMB. 
Unfortunately, due to the highly politicized environment we 
currently live in, the priorities of an individual agency may 
get shelved in favor of the highest priorities of the 
Department or the executive branch.
    Currently, only one DHS agency provides a list of 
priorities that were not included in the budget justifications. 
The Coast Guard submits an unfunded priority list that helps 
the committee undertake our own evaluation of needs and 
investments.
    But we have cybersecurity investments at CISA that can't 
always be accommodated, or technology and infrastructure 
improvements we should be investing in at the borders. And we 
are not always given information about those needs through the 
budget process if we can't see what tradeoffs were made during 
formulation.
    While the Coast Guard has significantly higher capital and 
infrastructure investment needs than many of the other 
agencies, do you feel it would be advantageous and in the 
interest of greater transparency for other agencies within DHS 
to submit a similar report to Congress? For example, CISA and 
CBP. And I would like both gentlemen's response, please.
    Mr. Johnson. Can I start?
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Johnson. My answer is no.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Okay.
    Mr. Johnson. From where I sit--from where I sat as the 
Secretary and from where I sat in DOD leadership, I think that 
unfunded priorities list mean the Secretary and OMB lose 
control of the process. I am being very blunt here.
    This originated in the Department of Defense. And somebody 
has got to have--somebody has got to look at the big picture in 
terms of budget priorities. As you know better than I do, as an 
appropriator, you simply can't fund everything that somebody 
wants to pay for.
    And so, at the very least, if we are to have unfunded 
priorities list, the Secretary should have eyes and ears on the 
process and have an opportunity to comment on the process. 
Because the components, whether it is a military service, God 
bless them, or any other agency, don't always have the big 
picture perspective in terms of overlap with other departments 
and other missions.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Secretary Chertoff.
    Mr. Chertoff. I am in strong agreement. In fact, as we 
talked about earlier, you know, one of the challenges with the 
Department has been the sense that there has not been enough 
central coordination and unity of effort across the Department, 
particularly when you have individual agencies essentially end-
running around the leadership of the Department.
    So I think having individual agencies kind of go themselves 
and try to promote their agenda over the Department's agenda 
would really undercut the ability of leadership to have a 
coordinated, strategic approach.
    Now, it may be that the Secretary and the Department as a 
whole ought to submit a list of priorities that have not been 
funded, but it ought to be done as a unified effort and not as 
a fragmented effort.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you. Both Secretaries, I want to 
thank you all for your testimony today.
    Madam Chair, thank you for holding this very helpful 
hearing to us all. With the interest of time, I will yield 
back, but my sincere thanks.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I have a quick question for both of you. There are three 
messages that people in Latin America are hearing right now. 
One is from the administration says, don't come now, come 
later.
    The second message is what I call the friends, family, 
neighbors message. Hey, Pedro, I just came across. You can come 
over. Come on over at this moment. And they see images on 
televisions in Latin America showing people crossing the border 
into the United States.
    And the third message is the criminal organizations that 
target, that target, aggressively market their services, 
because they make a lot of money. For example, in February, we 
had a little bit over 100,000, and the narcos charge them--and 
it varies, I have numbers here--$4,000 if you are Mexican. If 
you are an unaccompanied kid from Latin America, it might go up 
to $7,500. So let's say an average of $6,000. So that means 
that on just the--not the getaways, but just the ones that they 
encounter, they made over $600 million for the month of 
February.
    So that message--there are three messages. And I know--you 
know, I think you all know this--they are listening to message 
number two and number three.
    My question is, what should be the message from the 
administration? Because, in my opinion, when they say, don't 
come now, come later, that is a horrible message.
    And, Secretary Johnson, I know you and I worked on visuals, 
you know, when we return people, showing them being returned, 
because otherwise, they are just seeing people coming over. And 
you were very good at that under the Obama administration when 
we had the surge in 2014-2015.
    So my question is, what should be, from the opinion of both 
of you all, should be the message, the counter-message number 
two and number three from the administration?
    Mr. Johnson. Don't come here illegally, period. I have had 
to go to Central America. This is awkward. I have had to go to 
Central America, stand next to the President of the country and 
tell his people, don't come to my country, which is an awkward 
message to deliver, but it is an unambiguous one.
    And you are right that the smugglers, for their own 
economic benefit, take whatever policy statements come from the 
United States and they distort them. They exaggerate them. They 
extrapolate from them for their own benefit.
    And so in 2014, for example, when I would talk to the kids 
on the border at the Border Patrol stations, I would ask them, 
why did you come here? And they would tell me, because the 
coyotes told me that the Border Patrol are giving out 
"permisos," free passes, if you come to the border. And then 
when I would press them and say, well, what are you talking 
about, they would say, well, I was handed a piece of paper. It 
turned out the piece of paper was a notice to appear in a 
deportation proceeding.
    So a clear and unambiguous message has to be sent, 
accompanied by incentives or disincentives to make the 
dangerous journey. You know, processing in place, for example, 
which was something we tried to begin in the Obama 
administration, allowing people to apply for asylum in place, 
in country, rather than make the dangerous journey. And as I 
said earlier, addressing the reasons why people flee in the 
first place. But messaging clearly does have an impact and an 
effect.
    Mr. Chertoff. Yeah, this is not a new problem. We dealt 
with this issue back, you know, when I was in office. And I 
would agree, I think it is important to be clear and 
straightforward in your message that there are legal ways you 
may be able to come, but don't come without legal permission, 
whether that be asylum--and I agree with processing in place--
or if you can get a temporary work visa. And as I think I have 
said previously, expanding some of the lawful ways people can 
come actually relieves some of that pressure to cross 
illegally.
    But I would say two other things. We do need to look at 
root causes. And, you know, if there is violence or disorder in 
the Northern Triangle, people are going to flee a burning 
building. So we need to work on that.
    We also need to work with our counterparts in other 
countries in Latin America. I read a news story today that says 
Mexico may start to now reinforce its southern border against 
migrants. So a cooperative approach with a consistency of 
message can be very helpful here.
    And, finally, we need to go after the gangs, because they 
create all kinds of problems with not just human smuggling, but 
drug smuggling and disorder in places like Mexico.
    Mr. Johnson. If I could add to that, one of the ways we 
dealt with the 2014 surge was we got the Mexican Government to 
help us on their southern border. They don't have a lot of 
border security, border patrol on the border between Mexico and 
Central America, but they stepped it up and it made a 
difference.
    Mr. Cuellar. And here is the article that you all are 
talking about Mexico doing this. In fact, in 2014, Madam Chair, 
we added about $14 million to help Mexico secure the southern 
border. And at one time, they were actually stopping more 
people than Border Patrol was at their southern border.
    Thank you very much, both of you all.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And I think what Congressman Cuellar was mentioning was we 
have had these conversations in Homeland Security. You know, 
the Mexican southern border is a lot smaller than the American-
Mexican border. And it just makes sense to push resources there 
and help our allies and our partners address this problem 
before it even makes its way to the Mexican border, the 
southern Mexican border, or the American southern border.
    Real quick, you know, again, Secretary Johnson, you know, 
when I get stuck on an issue, I kind of keep beating it up. 
Right here, this is from JIATF South home page. Real quick, 
Coast Guard cutters offload 7,500 pounds of cocaine and 
marijuana, estimated cost $126 million; Coast Guard transfers 
three smugglers, over $5.6 million in seized cocaine near the 
U.S. Virgin Islands; Coast Guard seizes $156 million of cocaine 
by Coast Guard Pacific; Atlantic area-based Coast Guard cutters 
offload more than $330 million worth of illegal narcotics; 
Coast Guard, Navy offload $211 million worth of cocaine, 
marijuana.
    This is all in the first 2-1/2 months of the year. Just 
what I am seeing--and there is probably more that hasn't been 
reported--that is $829 million in hard narcotics that was taken 
off the ocean before it finds its way into our schools, our 
backyards, and devastating our communities.
    And I wish the OMB and others would take this seriously. We 
need more National Security Cutters, more Offshore Patrol 
Cutters for the Coast Guard, not less. And so an NSC costs, on 
average, $670 million. It paid for itself in the first 2-1/2 
months.
    Madam Chair, I hope as we go through, we can take a hard 
look at maybe trying to find at least a one-for-one replacement 
in the National Security Cutters that replaced the heavy 
endurance cutters. Right now, we are one shy. But, look, we 
could use it. I think we need it.
    And so, shifting gears real quick, you know, I am looking 
at press releases and hearings from 2014, Secretary Johnson, 
and to me, it feels like a lot of this is dj vu, dj vu all over 
again. You know, you cold almost fill in the blank. You know, 
President so-and-so sent a clear message of disregard to the 
U.S. Congress, the American people, when he enacted so-and-so 
like provisions by executive order.
    And, you know, there is a crisis on our border. We cannot 
ignore that. And we have to be compassionate, right? I mean, I 
hear that word tossed around. But we also need to make sure 
there are certain deterrents down there.
    And I have been a huge proponent of the National Guard. I 
think some of our hearings when I was on Homeland, the other 
Homeland committee, we talked about utilizing the National 
Guard.
    And now, while the Border Patrol are becoming babysitters, 
taxicab drivers, nurses, you know, whatever they are doing, 
they are not doing their core job. And to me, that could 
demoralize people. They weren't hired for those positions, but 
we have thrust them into those areas of responsibility. They 
want to be out--they want to be in the canyons. They want to be 
chasing those coming over illegal, smuggling drugs, people, 
foreign nationals and things of that nature.
    And, Secretary Chertoff too, I know you are no stranger, 
because, you know, several Presidents in the past have utilized 
the National Guard. I know they kind of fill in for the Border 
Patrol, but can we expand their mission on the border? And I 
will give both of you an opportunity to address it.
    Mr. Johnson. Let me start, if I could. First of all, this 
problem always looks simpler from the comfort of a law office 
in midtown Manhattan than it did when I owned the problem for 3 
years and the complexity. I suspect that the dynamic has 
changed over the last 7 years, so it may be a little different 
than how I saw it in 2014, 2015, 2016.
    We have to always remember that the National Guard, the 
U.S. military is limited by our laws againstthe posse 
comitatus. Congressman, I know you know that. There can be a 
role during surges, during emergencies for the Guard.
    Bottom line, the most compassionate thing we can do is 
address the reasons why people are leaving Central America in 
the first place. And I don't believe that it is an 
insurmountable task. We have done this before with, say, a Plan 
Colombia.
    It is just up to Congress to keep up a sustained effort at 
this. If we really want to address illegal migration on our 
southern border, I am convinced that is the answer. We can talk 
about the Guard, we can talk about more surveillance, more 
Border Patrol agents, changing our asylum laws, but so long as 
the problem continues to exist in Central America, we are going 
to continue to be banging our head against the wall trying to 
find answers.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
    Mr. Palazzo. Real quick, if you don't mind. Secretary 
Johnson and Madam Chair, I think you will find there is a lot 
of agreement with many of the members on the committee that 
would agree we have to address the root causes, but we also 
have to address the immediate surge and problems that it is 
causing for, you know, putting Americans in danger currently.
    So I think you will find some common ground if we could 
just get past the politics and put the American people and good 
policy ahead of those politics.
    So, thank you, Secretary Johnson, for you being here, and 
Secretary Chertoff.
    Madam Chair, I am sorry, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes. First, I agree with my friend Steve 
about the Coast Guard. A fantastic organization, and they have 
limited resources, but they do the job.
    I also want to acknowledge, as I did before, I think the 
leadership of both Secretary Johnson and Chertoff, to stand up 
an operation, any department, and with all the missions you 
have, I think you really guided this ship very well in your 
leadership.
    I want to get into the issue of ports. I think right now, I 
think since the Department was set up in 2002, Customs and 
Border Protection have made great strides in securing our 
southwest border. They have a lot more work to do. The Coast 
Guard, I said, has protected our waterways, and TSA has made 
flying safer.
    However, I am not fully convinced that the Department of 
Homeland Security has ever truly emphasized the need to secure 
our seaports. The Port of Baltimore, which I represent, is an 
economic powerhouse, generating over 33,000 jobs--33,900 jobs, 
in fact--and $2.2 billion in regional business revenue. It 
might not be Long Beach or Newark, but we had a banner year of 
43.6 million tons in 2020, and this number includes well over 1 
million 20-foot equivalent units. That is 1 million containers 
so far.
    But so far, CBP has a lot of work to do. As some officers 
admitted when I visited the port, opioids, including Fentanyl 
and cocaine, is flowing through our seaports, because Baltimore 
is simply ill-equipped. It is not that the work ethic isn't 
there at CBP, but it is just ill-equipped, don't have the 
resources.
    So my question for both of you is, how can DHS better 
position itself to intercept drugs and other contraband at our 
seaports? And is it simply more personnel, installation of 
nonintrusive inspection technology, or a change in policy and 
philosophy? Both of you.
    Mr. Chertoff. I will step up first. I think some of it is 
technology. I think noninvasive technologies that operate at 
scale and at speed can be helpful, but I think a lot of it is 
intelligence. And we talked about this earlier. It is 
collecting intelligence, both analytics about the nature of 
what is coming in, what are higher risk shipments that need to 
be looked at, but also intelligence collection from the source 
points that indicate where there might be particular vessels or 
particular types of freight entities that are more likely to be 
used by smugglers.
    So I think it is a combination of these things. We use 
these techniques at the land borders as well as kind of an all-
of-the-above approach.
    Mr. Johnson. I agree with Michael. I think that continued 
investments in technology, surveillance, and I believe also 
that there is a definite role for the Coast Guard in the port 
security mission. Over.
    Mr. Ruppersberger. Good answers. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Secretary Johnson and Secretary Chertoff, first let me say 
thank you both for what you accomplished while you were in 
office. I think you all did really a yeoman's job.
    Let me ask you about--and, Secretary Johnson, I agree 
completely about having to fix the environment in Central 
America if we are really going to stop these migrants from 
coming. And part of what concerns me--and I think we found some 
headway.
    I think, Secretary Chertoff, you mentioned I think Colombia 
and some of the successes that we have had. I know in Honduras, 
for example, when we went in and assisted with the purge of the 
Honduran National Police, the acceptance of their law 
enforcement went from like 20 percent up to 60 percent.
    They were going through the same purge--well, sort of the 
same enhancement process with their courts and prosecution with 
MACCIH probably 5 years ago. So there are some good things 
going on to help bring justice and democracy to these 
countries.
    What concerns me is when I travel to Suriname and Guyana in 
South America, and I see where the--and the Chinese have 
already been there. And the Chinese are in Ecuador. They now 
have a 160-vessel fleet in the Galapagos Islands.
    My question is, during your time, did you see the 
beginnings of this Chinese move into the Western/Southwestern 
Hemisphere?
    Mr. Chertoff. Let me start. I mean, this was not a big 
issue when I was in office, but I have been involved in 
watching this ever since. And what we have seen the Chinese do, 
particularly under Xi, Xi Jinping, who has not really made much 
of a secret about it, is they have attempted to extend their 
tentacles all around the Southern Hemisphere.
    They have done it in the Indian Ocean. They have done it in 
Africa, and now they are doing it also in Latin America. And 
they do it with a combination of using funding for certain 
kinds of projects, helping particularly authoritarian 
governments build capabilities to oppress their population, and 
then trying to post their assets in other parts of the world.
    So this is part of a larger conversation, and it will 
obviously have [inaudible] Right now, talking about the need to 
pull together our allies in the region to counterbalance the 
Chinese. But this, I think, is, to my mind, maybe the largest 
geopolitical challenge we face strategically over the next 4 
years.
    Mr. Rutherford. Secretary Johnson, would you like to add to 
that?
    Mr. Johnson. I agree with what Michael said. I would give 
the same answer from my perspective from the time I served.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you. And, listen, I would recommend 
to folks there is a great report out. It is a report about 13 
different countries and where the Chinese have gone in and 
through what they call a process of elite capture. The name of 
the report is the malign Chinese influence and the dissolving 
of democracy, and it is by the International Republican 
Institute.
    I can tell you that is a game plan. It shows exactly what 
the Chinese are trying to do, and they are in our backyard 
fulfilling that. And I think a lot of the problems that are 
being exacerbated down there with the drug cartels and the 
transnational organizations is a direct result of what is going 
on with the Chinese.
    But I see my time is just about up. So thank you both very 
much.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Time is almost up, but I do have one more question that I 
would like to ask. And it has to do with acquisitions.
    Major acquisitions have been a challenge for DHS. GAO has 
cited numerous times how the Department has failed to meet 
scheduled and cost projections. Other challenges include 
systemic stovepipes within each component that can lead to 
duplicative programs and a failure to leverage capabilities 
that exist in other components.
    Secretary Johnson, how can DHS better integrate 
acquisitions to head off duplicative programs and leverage 
component programs and capabilities across the Department? And 
how should we be reviewing these program requirements at the 
DHS level to ensure components are not pursuing stovepipe 
programs?
    Mr. Secretary, I think you are muted.
    Mr. Johnson. Sorry, sorry.
    I will make two points. In my opening statement, I noted 
the fact that over the last 50 months, there have been nine 
people who have occupied the job of Secretary of Homeland 
Security. Obviously, in that kind of circumstance, no one 
Secretary or no one Under Secretary for Management has the time 
to devote to addressing the answer to your question, which is a 
difficult one. We need a more mature acquisition process in 
DHS.
    The reality is, with big government contracts, big 
acquisitions, what looks like a good idea in year one, which 
then takes 10 years to implement, by the time you get to year 
seven or eight, somebody says, I can build a better bicycle. 
And programs will often outdate themselves, given the life of 
the time it takes to put them in place.
    So I think across the Federal Government, we know how to do 
this if DHS could learn how to embrace best practices. I 
suspect that the process has not improved much since 5, 6 years 
ago when I was there, simply because there have not been people 
in place that have had the time and the attention span to deal 
with it.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Secretary Chertoff, do you have any 
thoughts on this?
    Mr. Chertoff. I agree with what Jeh said. And I think, you 
know, part of the issue is you have got to have empowerment by 
the Secretary of the chief acquisition officer of the 
Department to play a role with respect to all the components, 
and that some of that may require some tweaks in legislation, 
but some of it requires consistent leadership and strategic 
vision.
    And I know when I was in office, you know, there were times 
I had to call everybody in and make it clear, on a regular 
basis, that there needed to be exchange of information, cross-
cutting collaboration, and ultimately a unified position on 
some of these issues.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe that finishes the second 
round. And I would just like to say to Secretary Chertoff, 
Secretary Johnson, thank you so very much for your time for 
helping us to think through these challenges. Your insights and 
your recommendations have truly been invaluable.
    If there is no further business, the Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
RPTR GIORDANOEDTR SECKMANDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, March 24, 
2021TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, March 24, 
2021TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTIONWITNESSESJOHN 
COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM AND EMERGING 
THREATS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYJOHN PICARELLI, 
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 
PREVENTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYRICHARD ABORN, 
PRESIDENT, CITIZENS CRIME COMMISSION OF NEW YORK CITYTYLER 
COTE, DIRECTOR AND CO-FOUNDER, OPERATION250SAMMY RANGEL, 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND CO-FOUNDER, LIFE AFTER HATE
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. The Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order.
    This hearing is being conducted virtually. So I want to 
remind members that they are responsible for muting and 
unmuting themselves. When you are recognized to speak, if I 
notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will ask you if 
you would like the staff to unmute you. If you indicate 
approval by nodding, staff will unmute your microphone.
    To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair or staff 
designated by the chair may mute participant microphones when 
they are not recognized to speak.
    We will be operating under the 5-minute rule. If there is a 
technology issue during a member's speaking time, I will move 
to the next member until the issue is resolved, but you will 
retain the balance of your time.
    The timer on the screen will turn yellow with one minute 
remaining, and will turn red when a member's time has expired.
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules, beginning with the chair and the ranking member, 
followed by members present at the time of the hearing is 
called to order in order of seniority, and we will alternate by 
party. Next, we will go to members who were not present when 
the hearing was called to order until every member present has 
had a first round.
    Members can submit written information for any of our 
hearings or markups via an email address that has been provided 
to your staff.
    Now let's begin.
    I want to welcome everyone to this important hearing on the 
growing problem of targeted violence and terrorism, 
particularly domestic violent extremism.
    We will have two panels this morning.
    The witnesses for our first panel are John Cohen, the 
Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats 
at the Department of Homeland Security; and John Picarelli, the 
Director of the Department's Office of Targeted Violence and 
Terrorism Prevention.
    Thank you both for joining us this morning.
    The second panel will feature representatives from 
organizations that have been awarded grant funding from the 
Department to develop and model strategies for preventing 
targeted violence and terrorism.
    January 6 was a wake-up call for many people, but we have 
seen evidence of a growing problem of targeted violence and 
domestic violent extremism over the last several years. Former 
Secretary Johnson was an early advocate of investing in this 
area, and we worked with him late in the fiscal year 2016 
funding cycle to establish a grant program focused on 
countering violent extremism.
    Unfortunately, the focus of the program took a wrong turn 
at the beginning of the last administration, focusing 
insufficiently on countering domestic extremism with the result 
that no additional funding was appropriated for the grants 
between fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2019.
    I am glad that this effort seems to have righted itself in 
the last couple of years resulting in an appropriation of $10 
million in fiscal year 2020 for TVTP grants and $20 million for 
fiscal year 2021.
    Overall, our fiscal year 2021 bill included more than $80 
million for TVTP activities across the Department, an increase 
of $61 million, including a total of $16.5 million for the 
Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention.
    This morning, we want to find out more about the 
Department's role in countering violent extremism of every 
kind, what you are learning about the causes of radicalization 
that leads to violence, and how communities can help prevent 
it.
    Our hearing is particularly timely given the release last 
week of a report by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence entitled "Domestic Violent Extremism Poses 
Heightened Threat in 2021."
    Unfortunately, it is also highly pertinent in light of the 
murder of eight people at Asian-American businesses in Georgia 
last week and the targeted killing of ten people at a grocery 
store in Colorado this week.
    I would like now to turn to the distinguished gentleman 
from Tennessee, Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening 
remarks.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I really 
appreciate your holding this subcommittee hearing at this 
difficult time in our history and on this very sensitive and 
difficult subject matter.
    It is truly a somber and serious issue that is affecting 
many in our country and our communities and, for some, even 
within our families. This issue hits home for me. For some of 
my new colleagues, you may not know, but, on a beautiful day in 
June a few years ago, my colleagues and I were shot at and 
nearly assassinated on a baseball field in Virginia by a lone 
shooter driven by hate.
    Almost 4 years later, I still feel blessed to have walked 
off that field that day basically physically unharmed. I got a 
little bit bloodied in my hands and my knees running from the 
shooter and diving in the dugout, but thank God I was not shot. 
Others were, including some of our Capitol Police and Members.
    But I am saddened that, at this time, the same type of 
extremism and hate is driving more people to commit acts of 
violence. Even more alarming is that violence is coming from 
our fellow Americans.
    Let me say this: It is wonderful to have ideas for passions 
or a cause. It moves people to lead or help others. We are in 
this hearing, obviously felt a passion to run for office to 
represent people in our districts and serve this great country. 
We don't always agree. We debate.
    However, it is a very different and dangerous situation 
when a passion for ideas and civil discourse in the face of 
disagreement instead turns into extremism and violence. I 
support the investments that this committee has made to try to 
turn that tide for the safety of all people.
    I thank all the witnesses today, Assistant Secretary Cohen 
and Director Picarelli with the Department of Homeland 
Security, and everyone on the second panel who run some of the 
organizations that have received DHS grants to work to defuse 
the violence or the potential for violence.
    I am eager to hear how DHS and these nonprofits are working 
to identify ways to mitigate these threats. I look forward to 
your testimony.
    Again, Madam Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing, 
and I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. I would now like to turn to the chair 
of the full Appropriations Committee, Ms. DeLauro.
    The  Chair. Thank you very, very much, Chairwoman Roybal-
Allard, and I thank you and Ranking Member Fleischmann for 
holding this hearing this morning, and I want to say a thank 
you to our witnesses for testifying.
    Quote, "Enough is enough, thoughts and prayers, not one 
more, quote, "nevermore." Does anyone else feel like the 
speaker from Edgar Allan Poe's poem, "The Raven," as he 
ponders, quote, "weak and weary at the tapping, constant 
rapping heard at his chamber's door"? Like the specter of 
death, the Raven comes again and again, recalling the memory of 
a loved one lost, and again and again the Raven repeats the 
unchanging, slightly irritating, almost infuriating refrain, 
quote, "nevermore."
    It reminds me of the words we hear following each new 
incident of targeted violence in this country: Enough is 
enough, thoughts and prayers, not one more, nevermore.
    Never more will the 10 families in Boulder, Colorado, see 
their loved ones smile again. Never more will the six families 
in Atlanta, Georgia, embrace their mothers, their sisters, 
their wives. Never more will children in our schools and 
shoppers in our stores, and even Members, the Congress and 
staff in our Capitol, feel safe, unless we stop the spread of 
violence and domestic terrorism.
    We must stop our ceaseless yapping. We must stop the 
constant tapping. We must stop the endless rapping at our 
chamber's door. There is no question why this keeps occurring. 
We already know the cause. Domestic violent terrorism and 
extremism has been growing in this country for years. Fueled by 
the rise of social media and the internet, extremist, violent, 
toxic ideologies have spread and contributed to a growing 
domestic threat from violent extremists, particularly White 
supremacists.
    To be clear, these attacks are certainly not all fueled by 
White supremacy, but racism and far-right extremism have led to 
three times as many targeted attacks on U.S. soil as Islamic 
terrorism. Since 2018, White supremacist groups have been 
responsible for more deaths than any other domestic extremist 
group.
    And, while there is certainly many contributing factors 
that lead to these instances of violence and hate, often there 
is a common invariable refrain: young men, young men with guns, 
young men with guns radicalized by extremist ideologies filled 
with hate. It was true in Atlanta. It was true in 
Charlottesville. It was true at the Walmart in El Paso.
    With the COVID-19 pandemic, we have been talking a lot this 
past year about how we can get back to normal, but, as I have 
said before, going back to normal is not good enough. This new 
normal is not normal. Violence, especially domestic terrorism, 
is a disease, a disease that has been taking the lives of 
innocent Americans long before this COVID-19 pandemic.
    So what are we going to do about it? How are we going to 
stop the tapping? How are we going to stop the rapping? How are 
we going to stop the continual return of death? We are already 
developing the tools to help communities, States, and local 
governments understand what leads to radicalization. We already 
have the tools to develop strategies and prevent frameworks for 
off-ramping individuals from violent extremism.
    The Congress has a duty to ensure our Department of 
Homeland Security is armed with these important tools and 
equipped with the funding and the resources it needs to stop 
this never-ending violence. And we must also summon the will to 
act to stop the widespread availability of weapons of war on 
our streets.
    The background check bills which passed the House last week 
are a good start, but not nearly enough to keep our families 
and our communities safe. And we owe it to every person in this 
country who has felt the pain of targeted violence or domestic 
terrorism to ensure that no more lives are lost to gun 
violence. Nevermore.
    And, with that, I thank the chairwoman and the ranking 
member, and I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Assistant Secretary Cohen and Director 
Picarelli, we will submit the full text of your official 
statements for the hearing record.
    Assistant Secretary Cohen, please begin your oral summary, 
which I would ask that you keep to 5 minutes.
    Mr.  Cohen. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Fleischmann, 
members of the committee, thank you very much for the 
opportunity to be here with you today.
    I appreciate that you invited us to attend this important 
and timely hearing. Based on the events of the last 8 days, the 
two tragic, horrible shootings in the Atlanta area and in 
Boulder, Colorado, the timing of this hearing could not be more 
prescient.
    Over the past 8 days, the Nation has experienced two 
separate mass casualty attacks. I would like to say these 
events were unusual or these events were uncommon or they were 
anomalies, but, sadly, for the reasons stated by both of you 
and Chairwoman DeLauro, I can't. These types of targeted 
attacks have become way too common in our country.
    And, while I appear before you today as the top coordinator 
for counterterrorism and Assistant Secretary for 
Counterterrorism and Emerging Threats at the Department of 
Homeland Security, the perspectives I will share with you today 
come from not only my current responsibilities but also the 
work I have been engaged in over the past 10 years, both at the 
Department and also outside of the Department, examining mass-
casualty attacks, acts of targeted violence, and domestic 
extremism in the United States and Europe.
    So, while the motives behind the two attacks referenced 
earlier in the Atlanta area and Boulder, Colorado, are still 
under investigation and while the motives have yet to be 
thoroughly identified, we do know already that there are 
striking similarities between both of those incidents and 
incidents that have been experienced across the country in the 
past.
    And I will use my time to share a little bit of perspective 
on the emerging--on the current threat environment and some 
things that the Department has initiated since January 20th to 
address that threat.
    But we often hear from people after these types of 
incidents that they can't be prevented. They are difficult. I 
will tell you, as somebody who has spent over 35 years in law 
enforcement and homeland security, that is just simply not 
true. These types of attacks can be prevented. There are things 
that we can do to make them less frequent.
    There are actually examples around the country where 
targeted attacks directed at schools, houses of worship have 
been prevented. In some cases, they have been prevented by the 
actions of a joint terrorism task force or another law 
enforcement investigation and prosecution, but there are a 
growing number of cases that have been prevented or incidents 
that have been prevented by the actions of organizations such 
as those who are going to be appearing before you later today.
    They have been--these incidents have been prevented by the 
actions of mental health professionals, community groups, faith 
leaders. And it is those types of prevention activities that, 
through the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism 
Prevention, we are seeking to expand upon.
    So, over the past several years, the United States has 
experienced a number of targeted attacks by angry, disaffected 
individuals. In some cases, these individuals have been 
motivated by extremist ideologies or ideologies of foreign 
terrorist organizations. In other cases, they have been 
motivated by some form of personal grievance.
    In every case, these individuals have spent inordinate 
amount of time online viewing extremist, violent materials, 
engaging with likeminded individuals, and ultimately 
communicating online their intent to commit some type of 
violent act.
    In many cases, these individuals are inspired by conspiracy 
theories or extremist narratives that are spread online by a 
variety of foreign adversaries or domestic thought leaders. 
These attacks have targeted a cross-section of our society. 
People and facilities have been targeted because of their 
faith, their race, their gender, or ethnicity. They have 
targeted government facilities, law enforcement, Members of 
Congress, as Ranking Member Fleischmann referred to. They have 
also targeted simply places where people gather.
    Addressing this threat is complicated. It requires a 
multidimensional approach, and the Department has taken a 
number of steps to expand our ability, working with the rest of 
the administration, our State and local partners in the private 
sector and nongovernment entities. We are conducting a 60-day 
review of our posture. We are expanding our intelligence and 
analysis.
    We issued a bulletin under the National Terrorism Advisory 
System. We have expanded and prioritized domestic violent 
extremism in our FEMA grants. And, just today, we issued a 
notice of funding opportunity for prevention grants that will 
be awarded by the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism 
Prevention.
    So I look forward to answering your questions, and thank 
you again for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you.
    Director Picarelli, please begin your 5-minute statement.
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you, Chairwoman Roybal-Allard, 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittee, and thank you for holding today's hearing about 
the Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, or 
OTVTP, and this incredibly important topic.
    My name is John Picarelli, and I am the Director of the 
office. I have served the office since December 2016 and have 
worked in the prevention space or over a decade.
    Prior to joining DHS, I established research and evaluation 
grant portfolios that focused on radicalization of violent 
extremism, trafficking in persons, and transnational organized 
crime at the Department of Justice. Much of that work focused 
on prevention.
    All forms of terrorism and targeted violence, as we have 
already heard, weaken the fabric of our society. They inject 
trauma, fear, mistrust, and despair into the body politic. 
OTVTP seeks a resilient America where communities are united 
and empowered to bring an end to the tragedies of targeted 
violence and terrorism.
    Building from you generous support in the last two budget 
cycles, OTVTP is poised to bring and scale prevention efforts 
nationally. But this will require continued congressional 
engagement and support.
    The office focuses on local prevention frameworks. Rooted 
in the public health approach to violence prevention, these 
frameworks address societal conditions promoting targeted 
violence and terrorism while offering help to individuals 
before they commit a crime or violence.
    Research shows time and again that these individuals often 
exhibit behavioral indicators that are best understood by those 
closest to the individual, such as peers, family, and friends.
    So OTVTP consists of five teams that support these local 
prevention frameworks. The regional prevention coordinators of 
our field operations team cultivate trusted partnerships among 
the many local stakeholders that are needed to build 
multidisciplinary teams that form the backbone of these local 
prevention frameworks.
    Our first and most developed local prevention effort is in 
Colorado, where our coordinator in Denver has worked alongside 
colleagues from Federal agencies and numerous State and local 
partners to build frameworks that now blanket the State.
    Another team oversees the Targeted Violence and Terrorism 
Prevention Grant Program, which invests in local prevention 
frameworks, in specific programs that support these frameworks, 
and in innovative projects that craft future prevention 
approaches.
    Last year, we worked with our partners at the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency to award the full $10 million to 29 
grantees in 15 States, and that included financial support for 
10 new local prevention frameworks. This year, thanks to the 
support of this subcommittee, our office will double that 
investment in these programs to $20 million, and, as Secretary 
Cohen--Assistant Secretary Cohen--sorry--noted earlier, we just 
released the notice of funding opportunity for this year's 
competitive grant program just this morning.
    My office also has a team that educates society about 
prevention. This education team is developing a curriculum that 
supports the full knowledge requirements of our local partners. 
It is also updating our courses to better reflect the public 
health approach I described earlier, while also capturing the 
evolving threat landscape that we face today.
    The fourth team in our office engages national 
representatives of prevention stakeholders. We do this so that 
they understand, validate, support, and champion local 
prevention efforts. For example, this team enhances awareness 
of harmful online activity, increases digital literacy, and 
offers a platform for innovative approaches in the digital 
space by hosting digital forums on targeted violence and 
terrorism prevention.
    Another important effort we are working on is to ensure the 
public has easy access to prevention-related materials and 
resources. For example, the fifth team in my office is drafting 
comprehensive baseline capabilities that outline the 
recommended and necessary minimum functional requirements for 
effective local prevention frameworks. We will also launch a 
nationwide public outreach campaign designed to provide 
practical information on how to participate in local prevention 
efforts later this year.
    My office understands that prevention efforts have the 
potential to impinge on protected speech or on other civil 
rights and civil liberties. We are now establishing an ongoing 
community engagement process to further address this topic with 
the CRCL community, and we continue to work closely with the 
DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to ensure all 
programs consider the potential impact on such rights and 
liberties prior to implementation.
    Our office has made significant progress towards bringing 
prevention to scale, yet our goal of ensuring that all 
communities have access to prevention frameworks will take more 
time, effort, and resources. We look forward to continuing this 
work with you and other Members of Congress to ensure we 
properly resource and implement this critical effort.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. [inaudible] Extremism in particular, 
violent White supremacism--is one of the most prevalent and 
abhorrent of these anti-American ideologies. There is no moral 
ambiguity on this issue, end quote.
    The ODNI report released last week confirms that ethnically 
motivated violent extremists and militia violent extremists 
present the most lethal threat of mass-casualty attacks against 
civilians and government entities, respectively.
    Can you please elaborate on what the intelligence is 
telling us about the domestic extremist threat, what is 
motivating it, and what leads someone to take that last step 
from alienation to violence?
    Mr.  Cohen. Thank you for your question, Madam Chairwoman.
    As I stated earlier, what we have experienced in this 
country is a growing level of violence by lone offenders or 
small groups of people who are inspired and motivated to 
violence by extremist ideologies or a combination of ideologies 
or some type of personal grievance.
    Essentially, the way it has been described to me in the 
past by members of the intelligence and law enforcement 
community is we have angry, disaffected individuals in this 
country who are seeking an excuse to use violence as a way to 
express that anger, and they will spend time online consuming 
large amounts of extremist material, material about past 
violent acts. They will become susceptible to being influenced 
by disinformation and conspiracy theories.
    They ultimately will self-connect with an extremist 
ideological cause or formulate in their mind a personal 
grievance or a combination of both and use that as the 
justification for going out and committing mass murder.
    In that total population of those who have committed acts 
of violence motivated by extremist ideologies over the past 
several years, the most significant number of those attackers 
have been motivated by White supremacist, antigovernment 
militia, or a combination of both of those extremist 
ideologies. So, from a lethal attack perspective, the 
overwhelming majority of people who have committed lethal 
attacks have been inspired by those extremist ideologies.
    What is driving this, in large part, is two factors. One, 
the angry polarized nature of our society, coupled with the 
fact that social media and other online platforms provide the 
opportunity for these disaffected, angry people to consume and 
come in contact with a large amount of information that 
ultimately serves as the source of inspiration for their act of 
violence.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. This question is both for Secretary 
Cohen and Director Picarelli.
    And, Secretary, I think you have just touched on this a 
little bit.
    The ODNI report indicates that, quote, "domestic violent 
extremist attackers, often radicalized independently by 
consuming," as you have said, "violent extremist material 
online and mobilizing without direction from a violent 
extremist organization, making detection and disruption 
difficult," end quote.
    So, given the centrality of the internet for spreading 
extremist ideology, are you working with social media companies 
to reduce the amount of radicalizing content, and what do you 
think they can--the role that they can play in countering the 
extremist narratives?
    Mr.  Cohen. Yes. I will answer real quickly and then turn 
it over to Director Picarelli.
    Yes, this is a major part of our efforts, Madam Chairwoman. 
We are engaging with the tech industry, with academia, with 
other nongovernment organizations who are doing extensive 
amount of research into narratives, the toxicity of these 
narratives, how those narratives influence violence.
    And some of the analysis that we are looking to be able to 
do more effectively at the Department is to work with those 
outside entities, understand the narratives that are emerging, 
whether they are being introduced into the ecosystem by a 
foreign intelligence service, an international terrorist 
organization, or a domestic extremist group, and then assess 
which of those narratives are most likely to result in violent 
activity, and then the potential targets of that violent 
activity so we can work with the communities to take steps to 
mitigate that risk.
    I will turn it over to my colleague, Director Picarelli, 
for additional.
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you. I will be brief and echo what 
Assistant Secretary Cohen said.
    In my office, we are working on this issue with significant 
focus. And I will give you four brief examples of the breadth 
by which we approach this issue.
    First, we are looking to use our innovative grant portfolio 
to focus on it. And, last year, we funded projects, one or two 
of which you will hear later today, but another one at American 
University that has been in the public eye of late focuses on 
inoculation theory, trying to get as early as possible to reach 
folks who may consume this online hate and inoculate them 
towards it. So that is one approach.
    Another approach was one I mentioned, and that is the 
Digital Forums for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention. 
Our most repeat digital forum was held earlier this month. We 
had over 350 participants for 4 days who focused on how the 
gaming industry and eSports can work with local community 
partners to better understand how radicalization to violence 
could be occurring through those platforms but also to empower 
local community partners to use those platforms in order to 
enhance digital literacy and to be more proactive about being 
safe online.
    We are also about to launch, as I mentioned, new digital 
literacy campaign materials. And we also, just earlier this 
year, launched a program to fund a competitive approach among 
college-age students at 25 universities and colleges across the 
country to tap their innovative spirit and have them help us 
think about new ways we might be able to address this online 
space through this competition.
    So we will look forward to keeping you informed of all of 
these as we proceed forward.
    Thank you.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann?
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Assistant Secretary Cohen and Director Picarelli, I want to 
thank you again for your testimony today and for your serious 
attention to this issue that is facing our country.
    I have a few questions.
    In your written statement, I note with interest that 
combating domestic violent extremism is a national priority 
area for fiscal year 2021 State Homeland Security Grants and 
the Urban Area Security Grants.
    How are you working with States and localities to best 
identify practices or effective and competent groups to partner 
with in order to craft a successful grant application, and, 
more importantly, implement a successful program with the grant 
funds?
    I am going to ask you a followup if I may. How many States 
already have established systems or organizational structures 
to address domestic violence extremism in their States or 
assist localities to address these issues?
    And I will wait for both of your responses.
    Mr.  Cohen. Thank you, Ranking Member, for the question.
    On the first question, we are working closely, meaning my 
broader office of counterterrorism and emerging threats, and 
also Director Picarelli's office are working closely with FEMA 
and therefore through FEMA with the State grant administrative 
agencies, law enforcement, the State and local fusion centers 
to help them better identify programs and resources that are 
potentially available to support those needs.
    One of the areas we are very interested in providing 
greater support for is training, technical assistance in the 
area of threat assessment, investigations, and threat-
management strategies. These are capabilities that have been 
used for decades by the Secret Service and by the Behavioral 
Analysis Unit of the FBI, where they combine mental health 
expertise with law enforcement expertise to evaluate the risk 
posed by an individual who comes to their attention.
    As we have learned from a number of these attacks, these 
potential attackers don't always fit into a neat definitional 
box when they first come to the attention of law enforcement, 
so understanding whether this person represents a risk of 
violence is critically important.
    So expanding those opportunities for State and local is a 
major part of our priority.
    I will turn it over to Director Picarelli to address the 
other parts of your question.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Mr.  Picarelli. So thank you for the questions. They are 
great ones.
    In terms of the grants, I will keep my answer brief. One of 
the concerns that we always have when it comes to grant 
programs is ensuring that the barriers to entry are as low as 
possible. So, in that regard, we are working through a number 
of mechanisms, by regional prevention coordinators, by grants 
teams. We are using webinars to provide assistance to 
applicants to ensure that we get as large and robust and rich 
of an application group as we possibly can.
    This is a competitive grant program that we have run, so 
more competition is better. And so, last year, I think we had 
close to 100 applications. We are hoping to see a significant 
increase on that this year. A hundred applications, given we 
had been paused for at least 3 years, was a great number to see 
last year, and it is a good foundation, and we hope to be 
continue to drive that number up this year through all of our 
efforts.
    In terms of your other question, which is, again, another 
great question, I did mention, through grants, we have funded 
programs in 15 States. We also, through one of those grants, 
are working up a better picture of what kinds of capabilities 
do State and local partners have for what Assistant Secretary 
Cohen mentioned? What are the existing resources that we can 
build off of and supplement through our regional prevention 
coordinators and through our grants? That is something that is 
underway.
    So it is certainly something that I think would be great 
for us to continue to get you that information to your staff as 
we proceed so that you have a more comprehensive picture of 
just, where are the capability gaps and how is my office 
addressing those in the future?
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you for your comprehensive answers, 
gentlemen. Very helpful.
    I will be brief. My time is ticking down, so I will just 
ask one question.
    In your testimony, you mentioned that you are working with 
science and technology offices on metrics and a method for 
evaluating the effectiveness of grants. When do you hope to 
roll out an evaluation?
    Mr.  Picarelli. Sir, I believe that question was for me.
    We are currently running those evaluations right now. We 
are finalizing and updating a more comprehensive plan for 
evaluations as we speak, but we have already started working 
with the Directorate of Science and Technology to start 
selecting grantees from last year's competition, and will again 
this year, to do thorough impact evaluations on those awards.
    We also will be rolling out more robust measures to assess 
the entirety of the grant program to ensure that we are doing 
the best job possible in order to get those grants out to the 
folks that need them and that we are building the right 
programs.
    So, again, we will be continuing that throughout the year 
and in the years to come because impact evaluations is 
something that is very, very important to me and is exactly how 
we can come back to you in the future and tell you what is 
working and what is not and why.
    Thank you.
    Mr.  Cohen. And, Ranking Member, if I can just add very, 
very quickly, that--
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Certainly.
    Mr.  Cohen. --this is such an important issue because what 
our goal is to take the lessons learned from last year's 
grants, this year's grants, and then take that knowledge and 
feed it into the broader grant program so we can replicate 
those programs that work in communities across the country.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, gentlemen.
    I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    Ms. DeLauro?
    The  Chair. Thank you. I thank the chair, and I want to 
thank the witnesses, Secretary Cohen, Director Picarelli.
    Let me just--and, first of all, I just want to get more 
information and knowledge about the grant programs in terms of 
intervention and prevention, I think which is very helpful. But 
let me just ask you--and this first question is kind of, if you 
will, a yes or no. Do you agree that this country has a problem 
with or danger, if you will, from private unauthorized militia 
groups? Yes or no?
    Mr.  Picarelli. Yes.
    Mr.  Cohen. Yes.
    The  Chair. Director? I can't hear you, Director.
    Mr.  Picarelli. My apologies. Yes.
    The  Chair. Thank you. Okay.
    Now, it is also my understanding that, under Federal law, 
there is no criminal or civil statute that prohibits the 
existence of private militia groups. Should we have a law that 
prohibits unauthorized private militia groups? There is now no 
Federal law, no criminal or civil statute with regard to 
private--unauthorized private militia groups.
    Can I get each of you to comment on that, please?
    Mr.  Cohen. I will. I will start, Madam Chairwoman.
    Your question actually hits at a core issue because part of 
the challenge in addressing domestic violent extremism is being 
able to distinguish between behavior that may be 
constitutionally protected under free speech and assembly 
rights and that behavior which is tied to violence, to illicit 
activity.
    And so simply joining a group may not be unconstitutional 
or illegal, but joining a group that has the intent to commit 
violent acts is. And what we have to do is make sure that we 
have the information, the intelligence capabilities, the 
investigative abilities, to be able to distinguish between an 
individual or group's actions that may be constitutionally 
protected speech and when that transition to be illegal or 
violent behavior. And, as it relates to militia groups, that is 
exactly the point.
    The  Chair. Uh-huh. And do you believe that--just further 
question here now, and I want to hear from the Director. Do you 
believe we have the tools, the intel analysis, or what we need 
to be able to identify the nature of the group that proclaims 
they are patriots or whatever they are, and then they--you 
know, anyway, I am just trying to get at that core issue. Do we 
have the capability to be able to discern with these groups?
    Mr.  Cohen. This is exactly the question that I have been 
asked to answer within the context of the Department of 
Homeland Security by the Secretary. My sense is that we have a 
lot of the tools, but we need--
    The  Chair. Okay.
    Mr.  Cohen. --to be ready to use them differently.
    The  Chair. Okay. Okay. I want to then--and what do you 
mean about using them differently?
    Mr.  Cohen. So one example includes how we monitor and 
evaluate online content. We, across the Federal Government, 
multiple Federal agencies operating under different 
authorities, have the ability to monitor what occurs in the 
online space.
    The  Chair. Uh-huh.
    Mr.  Cohen. However, it is not the same as collecting 
intelligence between two foreign terrorists who are 
communicating with each other on forums or encrypted platforms 
or through other communications devices because a lot of the 
speech or a lot of the activity that occurs on those online 
forums, even domestic--even forums that are known to be 
locations where domestic violent extremists congregate, much of 
that speech is constitutionally protected free speech.
    So providing our analysts the training so they can 
distinguish between speech that is simply somebody expressing 
their anger or their disagreement with the government, or 
whether it is a threat-related activity is important.
    The  Chair. Okay. Thank you, because I want to get to 
Director Picarelli. My time is running out.
    So, if we had--looking at the tools and the training and 
what we need, should we have a law that prohibits unauthorized 
private militia groups, in your learned opinion?
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you for the question.
    The  Chair. Well, let me get--Director, let me get the 
Secretary to answer the question outright first, and then I 
will move to you.
    Mr.  Cohen. Any group that engages in illegal activity and 
violent activity should be a group that is in violation of the 
law. Depending on your question--I mean, based on your question 
specifically, it very much would depend on what the language of 
the law is.
    The  Chair. Yes. Got it. Okay.
    Director Picarelli?
    Mr.  Picarelli. Sorry for stepping on the Assistant 
Secretary.
    The  Chair. No. It is okay.
    Mr.  Picarelli. I will just add that, in the prevention 
space, ma'am, everything that the Assistant Secretary just said 
is true. What we are most concerned about are behavioral 
indicators that we can provide to family and friends of 
individuals so they understand when someone may be radicalizing 
to violence.
    The  Chair. Okay. I am sorry, because my time has expired, 
and the chair is going to, you know--
    Mr.  Picarelli. I understand.
    The  Chair. --call me out of order here.
    But, again, given what you have said, what the Secretary 
has said about the training, the law, should we have a law, 
carefully crafted, carefully written, dealing with what the 
nuances of that prohibit unauthorized private militia groups?
    Mr.  Picarelli. I believe the Assistant Secretary already 
answered that, so I will defer to him in case he has any 
additional comments.
    The  Chair. This is yes or no in terms of making laws, 
which is what our responsibility is in this body and in this 
subcommittee, to protect the people of this country.
    Mr. Secretary, do you want to venture a yay or nay answer 
on this?
    Mr.  Cohen. Yeah, Madam Chairwoman, I am not trying to be 
evasive. I think I operate in a very concrete world. I am a law 
enforcement professional, and I certainly think that, if there 
is interest on the Hill, on Capitol Hill--
    The  Chair. Gotcha.
    Mr.  Cohen. --in establishing that type of law, we would 
work closely with you to do so.
    The  Chair. Fine. You have answered my question, and I say 
that to you, Director, as well. I think it falls within the 
purview of the Congress, of our looking at this in a new and 
different way, with a new tool that deals with unauthorized 
private militias who are engaged not in free speech but in 
violent activity vis-a-vis whether it is the Congress of the 
United States in a January 6th insurrection or whether it is 
what was going on in this country for the last number of years 
and puts families in jeopardy and in fear of their lives.
    Madam Chair, I yield back. I apologize for going over the 
allotted time. Thank you.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford?
    Mr.  Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Listen, first, I want to thank Secretary Cohen and Director 
Picarelli.
    And I would like to address very quickly the issue that 
Chairwoman DeLauro just brought up about these unauthorized 
violent militias. In fact, gentlemen, I want to ask both of 
you--we have laws against that. We have RICO statutes, 
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations. We have gang 
statutes.
    Now, I want to say this to both of you as well before I 
make any other comments, and that is: I want to congratulate 
you on the great job you are doing because people don't realize 
it is hard to talk about what doesn't occur, but when I see the 
efforts through 15 States, $10 million, over a hundred people 
who have been identified as having, you know, this bizarre 
behavior that could lead them into mass violence, that is a 
pretty good--that is a pretty good number.
    Now, I have the same situation in Jacksonville. When I was 
sheriff there running a very large organization, I knew how 
many incidents we prevented through our initiatives like Eye 
Watch, through SARs reports that--Suspicious Activity Reports--
that were coming through from citizens.
    And what I wanted to ask was: Are those initiatives, like 
SARs, like Eye Watch, which drives those SARs reports, going to 
the fusion centers or the JTTFs, do--are you guys beefing that 
up? I mean, I saw where you are talking about adding $20 
million to these initiatives next year, and I think this is the 
key. On prevention and intervention, it goes to intelligence.
    Intelligence is always the challenge, and it is usually not 
that police don't have enough information. They usually have so 
much information that the real intelligence gets lost in all 
the mega data. And so are you guys working on tools to give you 
an analysis versus just data dumps because there is a big 
difference between data and intelligence.
    So can you comment on that, please?
    Mr.  Cohen. Yes. Congressman, thank you for that question. 
A very important point, and I am not surprised, being a former 
sheriff, that you would raise this issue.
    In addition to--in the current grant guidance for UASI and 
State Homeland Security Grant, in addition to prioritizing 
domestic violent extremism, Secretary Mayorkas also prioritized 
intelligence and information sharing specifically for the 
reasons that you said.
    We have spoken to fusion centers, police departments, major 
county sheriffs, you know, small--small county sheriffs, and 
they all say the same thing that you do, is that, if we are 
going to be more effective in preventing these acts of 
violence, we need to do--we need to have more tools so we are 
better able to identify those individuals who are experiencing 
the warning signs, exhibiting the suspicious activities, 
whether they appear online or in the community.
    We need to make sure our officers and analysts are trained 
to recognize and place those behaviors into context. We need to 
have more tools at the local level so, once we identified 
someone who is high risk, we may not have enough to arrest that 
person, but we still need to address the risk that they pose, 
so whether it is mental health services or other programs.
    So this is a core part of the Department's efforts--
    Mr.  Rutherford. And I will tell you very quickly, too, 
that, after the Parkland shooting, I had a piece of legislation 
that was the STOP School Violence Act that we were able to get 
signed into law. It really is about collecting this information 
that you just mentioned.
    You know, after almost every one of these shootings, 
including Parkland, after these shootings, people said: You 
know, I always thought something like this. But, you know, 
there is always those telltale signs that they knew about.
    Now, in Parkland, it went way beyond telltale signs. Law 
enforcement down there dropped the ball, local law enforcement 
to begin with. And it was a chain all the way up to the FBI.
    But the point is--and I think you just touched on it--once 
we identify these individuals, we have got to have laws that 
allow us to help these people until they are ready to go back 
to society because I tell you, it is just like sexual 
predators. You know, it is not what they do; it is who they 
are. You know, robbers rob banks, but that is not who they are. 
These guys, it is who they are because it is--they inculcate 
this stuff so much.
    So can you talk a little bit about how can we, number one, 
slow down this indoctrination that is going on online? And I 
also throw out our jails and prisons.
    Mr.  Cohen. So, Congressman, a great question again.
    A number of police departments and sheriffs' offices around 
the country have put in place threat management units. They are 
working closely with their communities to make community 
members aware of sort of the warning signs that may be 
exhibited. You know, one of the things that I have found 
personally frustrating being a former police officer is the 
number of stories I have heard from members of the community 
who said: I picked up the phone and called my local police 
department. I expressed concerns about, you know, my son or my 
brother or my friend, and they said: Well, if they haven't 
committed a crime, there is nothing we can do.
    There are things we can do. So we have a big responsibility 
to make sure not only the community is aware and the community 
has confidence and trust in the police agency or law 
enforcement agency to make that call, but that the law 
enforcement agency is working with the right disciplines and 
know what to do.
    As far as the indoctrination, another extraordinarily key 
point. And, in fact, it is actually the tech industry that is 
beginning to do quite a bit of work and research in figuring 
out how individuals who are susceptible to being influenced by 
toxic narratives, things that can be done to prevent that.
    So a big part of this is social media literacy, having 
parents understand that their kids are spending way too much 
time online and they are consuming violent material. It is 
establishing programs in our schools, and it is working with 
the tech sector and others to make sure that they use their 
skills to reduce the potential of this indoctrination, as you 
call it.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Great answer. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
    And I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    Ms. Underwood?
    Ms.  Underwood. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
for calling today's hearing.
    I know that the threat of violent extremism has received 
renewed attention in the wake of the January 6th insurrection, 
but those of us who have long been sounding the alarm about 
this problem are eager to finally see it be taken seriously.
    Domestic violent extremists, and particularly violent White 
supremacists, pose a deadly threat to our homeland. To save 
lives, Federal law enforcement and their partners must seize on 
opportunities to intervene before violence begins in ways that 
preserve civil rights and civil liberties.
    Mr. Picarelli, can you briefly explain to the committee why 
the grant programs and other work supported by the Office of 
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention are a good 
investment of Federal resources and how they fit into the 
Department's efforts to counter domestic terrorism in 
particular?
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you for the question. It is an 
excellent one. And I will hit a lot of points very quickly.
    So, in 2019, the RAND Corporation published a study where 
they looked at this comprehensively, how to proceed with 
prevention. And their two key findings were that, first, they 
saw great value in building local programs through financial 
assistance, through educational assistance, through technical 
assistance.
    The other was to urge the government to invest in local 
field staff to be there with communities to help them through 
the challenges as they stood up these programs.
    As you have heard already today, this is a very complex 
situation that is fraught with potential for overstepping 
boundaries of privacy or civil rights and civil liberties. 
Having staff there present with these programs to then harness 
this education and financial assistance was the key.
    So the prevention efforts like ours are really the first 
opportunity to dissuade someone from committing targeted 
violence and terrorism. And, when fully functional, it reduces 
the number of individuals progressing to violence. It eases the 
burden on the protection efforts that have gone into hardening 
houses of worship or schools, or reduces the workload that is 
already there for counterterrorism and investigation resources.
    And, in an era, as you have heard, where individuals are 
mixing personal grievances with the tropes of domestic 
terrorism, often seen online, our programs are usually the 
first and only chance these individuals have to hear about an 
alternative to using violence to find some significance in 
their lives.
    That is where we exist. We are the very first point of 
contact for these individuals. And, if we are doing our jobs 
right, everything that follows us that we have talked about 
here today has less work to do and will result in less 
violence.
    Ms.  Underwood. Thank you. I agree that the TVTP grants are 
a good investment in the safety of our communities. And, in our 
second panel, we are going to hear even more about the 
critically important work that some of these grant recipients 
are doing.
    But, as I am sure you are both aware, some communities are 
wary of engaging with DHS at all, particularly those who 
already receive a disproportionate amount of negative attention 
from law enforcement.
    Mr. Cohen, what civil liberties protections are currently 
in place as part of the Department's counterterrorism work, and 
what additional steps is the new administration taking to 
strengthen those protections?
    Mr.  Cohen. Good. Thank you, Congresswoman. A very 
critically important question.
    I mean, you know, after 35 years in law enforcement and 
homeland security, I know that we can't do our job to protect 
our communities if the communities don't trust us. And, if I am 
just going to be candid, I would have to say that, at the same 
time we are experiencing this diverse and dynamic threat, there 
are a number of communities, particularly communities of color, 
that simply do not trust local government, do not trust the 
Federal Government.
    So we have to change that. And the way we change that is by 
establishing lines of communication, by engaging, by listening 
to people and taking what they say seriously, by understanding 
that there are decades--sometimes decades of experiences that 
are influencing their attitudes toward us.
    During our transition period, we met with a variety of 
community groups, faith-based groups, you know, and other 
community-based organizations. And, since January 20th, we 
have--I have already personally met with a broad representation 
of community, immigrant, and faith-based representatives.
    Ms.  Underwood. Mr. Cohen?
    Mr.  Cohen. Yes.
    Ms.  Underwood. My time is expiring.
    I just want to emphasize that we want to encourage the 
administration to pursue new options. Those sound like existing 
outreach opportunities, which are important, but we know that 
this is not going to--this problem will not be solved by doing 
the same things we have always done.
    I am particularly concerned about this issue because the 
same communities of color who have been historically targeted 
by DHS are now targeted by actual terrorists, and the 
Department has repeatedly been sued for subjecting Muslims to 
unwarranted surveillance. And, just last year, DHS agents 
participated in the appropriately militaristic Federal response 
led to--or Federal response to protests led by Black activists.
    And we have seen Secretary Mayorkas in a Washington Post 
op-ed say that domestic violent extremism poses the most lethal 
and persistent terrorist threat to our country today. And the 
FBI Director reiterated that.
    And I just want to remind everybody that DHS has a mission 
to protect Americans from that threat, but it has been made 
more difficult by the Department's past abuses of the public's 
trust.
    And, with that, I yield back.
    Thank you.  RPTR DEANEDTR ROSEN[11:00 a.m.]
    Mr.  Cohen. Congresswoman or Madam Chair, if I could just 
respond very quickly to the Congresswoman.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Sure.
    Mr.  Cohen. Everything we do in my world at DHS, whether it 
is OTVTP or anything we are doing from a counterterrorism 
perspective, we are working closely with our civil rights and 
civil liberties office, and we are working closely with our 
office of privacy. We take the concerns of the community 
seriously. And I will say on a personal level I am the 
brother--my sister is a civil rights lawyer, her husband is a 
civil rights lawyer, they would not allow me to do anything 
different than to respect the issues that you have just raised.
    So, this is a top concern for the Secretary. It is a top 
concern for me. And I can guarantee you that any operational 
actions we take are going to take the concerns you raised into 
mind.
    Ms.  Underwood. Thank you.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs.  Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate you 
holding this very important hearing today on an issue that I 
think we clearly can work together to improve here as a 
committee.
    My first question this morning is for you, Assistant 
Secretary, Mr. Cohen. Thank you for coming before us today. I 
went to point out that in your opening testimony, you really 
gave us hope for prevention of many of the things we have 
talked about through your office and the hardworking law 
enforcement officers around the country, putting their lives on 
the line every day. So thank you for coming before us today.
    I want to start off by asking you about prevention 
activities of our Border Patrol agents. And I want to reference 
today a recent Axios report, which I would like to enter into 
the record with your permission, Madam Chairwoman.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Certainly. So be it.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Mrs.  Hinson. Thank you. Customs and Border Patrol and 
Protections, which falls under DHS, arrested four people on the 
terrorist watchlist attempting to cross our southern border.
    In your expert opinion, would you agree that it is a threat 
for several of these who are on the FBI terror screening 
database to come into our country that way?
    Mr.  Cohen. So, thank you for your question, Congresswoman. 
So, I have to tell you, after September 11, in my earlier days 
in the Department of Homeland Security and when I worked in the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence during the Bush 
administration, I assumed that we would see a large influx of 
terrorists coming in from south of the border, and seek to 
enter the country through the southern border. And we developed 
over the course of years extensive measures to be able to track 
individuals who are coming from terrorist safe havens, who are 
coming into Latin and South America, and to be able to identify 
when they were trying to cross the border.
    What we found is, it just wasn't happening as much as we 
thought it would. In fact, it was happening very rarely. So on 
the one hand, we haven't seen the development of that threat to 
the degree that we anticipated. And secondarily, we couldn't 
[inaudible] Extensive security measures to be able to detect 
any potential terrorist who would enter that region, and seek 
to enter the United States through the southern border.
    Mrs.  Hinson. Well, I would say, though, that four getting 
across the border is a threat, and those people were clearly on 
the watchlist for a reason. So what would you say we should be 
doing then to address the emerging threat, because all it takes 
is one, as you know?
    Mr.  Cohen. Absolutely. And I would be happy to provide you 
additional it details in a more secure setting. But what I can 
tell you the derogatory information associated with those four 
individuals may not have been as significant to cause a high 
degree of concern.
    People are on the watchlist for a variety of reasons. Some 
of it is that they may have had contact with someone who is 
potentially a known or suspected terrorist. In other cases, it 
may be that they are actively involved. We use the watchlist to 
provide a broad range of potential actions, ranging from simply 
tracking someone's travel, to putting more scrutiny on them as 
they are traveling, to no-flying those people. Simply being on 
the watchlist does not mean the person is a terrorist.
    Mrs.  Hinson. Understood. Well, I think we definitely need 
to take all of it very, very seriously, as we are aware of 
whether it is homegrown or out of this country, it is still 
definitely a threat to our national security.
    My next question is for you, Mr. Picarelli, according to 
your website, obviously, you support mandates beyond extreme 
terrorism to include targeted violence. I would ask that you 
may share some examples of targeted violence which could be 
based on some of the ideology we have heard today, just so my 
constituents have a clear example of what you are targeting.
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you for the question. And I am having 
some technical difficulties, so I believe [inaudible.] examples 
of targeted [inaudible]. What [inaudible] According to 
excellent example is the shooting that we saw a year or so in 
[inaudible].
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. I think we lost connection with Mr. 
Picarelli.
    Mrs.  Hinson. Okay. I will submit some questions for 
follow-up then, so we can make sure we can get some backup and 
have a chance to ask questions, too. But I think we need to be 
very targeted. I wanted to ask questions about reconnecting 
with communities [inaudible] Where procedures are happening 
[inaudible].
    Mr.  Picarelli. [inaudible].
    Mrs.  Hinson. So I will follow up, but we need to make sure 
we are targeting our resources to rural communities as well.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. And we will get your questions to him 
and he will be able to answer them.
    Mrs.  Hinson. Thank you.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr.  Price. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thanks to our 
witnesses today for some useful, very useful information about 
efforts that are underway, and what might be in prospect.
    I want to explore, if we might, the connection between 
these White nationalists and other extremist groups and 
weaponry, both as organizations and at the individual level. I 
guess partly this would be a question of what kind of 
coordination you have with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms and other relevant agencies in terms of what kind of 
weaponry these groups are assembling? What they--what kind of 
checks, if any, they are subject to? What kind of enforcement 
efforts are indicated, or new laws are indicated with respect 
to the arming of these groups, and what they might do with 
those arms?
    And I think there is also a question at the individual 
level. I will give you a quick example. We had a hate crime in 
my district 6 years ago with three Muslim university students 
were killed by a neighbor of theirs. And in retrospect, there 
were plenty of signs of trouble with that neighbor. He had an 
arsenal in his apartment, and he had been engaged in menacing 
behavior.
    On the face of it looks like a situation where a red flag 
law, for example, might well have prevented that tragedy. But, 
of course, there was no red flag law, and no attempt to prevent 
him from assembling that arsenal.
    So I ask you to explore, this is obviously an important 
connection. It is on our minds right now for obvious reasons. 
What is the nexus between violent extremism and weaponry? And 
what kind of mechanisms do we have to enforce present laws? And 
what kind of new laws might be indicated? And I am asking this 
at both the collective and the individual level.
    Mr.  Cohen. Congressman, thank you for the question. It is 
a very relevant question. So part of the dynamics of the 
current threat is that these individuals, and I think it was 
the chairwoman who brought this up, these individuals, who once 
they have connected with an ideological cause, may go from 
anger to violent--to mobilization to violence in a relatively 
quick time period.
    For those individuals who follow that progression to 
violence, they will typically acquire a weapon that is easy to 
acquire. If they don't already own a gun, or a knife, or a car, 
or a vehicle that they are going to use at the attack, they 
will go out and acquire a weapon that is easily accessible. And 
if they are not on the--if they are not precluded from buying a 
firearm, they can walk into a gun store, and essentially, as 
long as they don't have an adjudicated mental health case, or a 
felony criminal record, they can purchase the gun.
    In the cases where we have groups of individuals who have 
adopted an extremist ideological belief, they tend to have more 
sophisticated weaponry. They have been meeting for a period of 
time. They may have military or law enforcement background, or 
at least they are wannabe military and law enforcement types, 
they do their research. They may--we have seen them in 
possession of high-powered weapons, large capacity clips, some 
even obtaining silencers.
    So the question of what type of weaponry are they using 
varies into what part of the threat environment they fall into. 
Are they an individual who is upset who connects and moves 
rapidly to violence? They may have a pistol or some other type 
of weapon of convenience. If they are an organized group that 
has been planning for a significant period of time, they may 
have more sophisticated weaponry.
    Mr.  Price. My question is about the adequacy, I guess, of 
the present information that you have, and also, of present 
enforcement. Is anything happening to prevent the amassing of 
these arsenals by these groups, if not by you or by other 
agencies?
    Mr.  Cohen. So we work closely with the FBI, with ATF, with 
others. Part of the challenge is that unless those individuals 
fall within one the specific categories under law that preclude 
them from being able to acquire a gun, it is very difficult to 
prevent them, unless we have an articulable reason why they 
shouldn't be able to get a gun.
    As far as your point about the red flag law, I am a huge 
fan of red flag laws, not because of my current position, but 
because of my background in law enforcement. I have actually 
seen those laws leveraged by local law enforcement, and local 
communities on multiple occasions to prevent acts of violence. 
I know that there have been some concerns raised by some at a 
local level about red flag laws, but as a law enforcement 
professional, I think they are one of the most important tools 
we can use as part of a multidisciplinary threat management 
strategy.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Quigley.
    Mr.  Quigley. Good morning, thank for being here. Thanks 
for your service. As you know, I serve on the Intel Committee 
as well. I would like your perspective, maybe give us a report 
card. You reference that there are multiple agencies that 
monitor activity, including online activity. What is your 
assessment of how we are doing sharing that information within 
agencies, across agencies that is, and with local governments?
    Mr.  Cohen. I think there is an area of improvement. The 
Secretary has asked us to take a hard look at how various 
elements of the Department are engaged in assessing online 
activity. We have some organizations within the Department that 
conduct that type of work within their law enforcement 
authorities; others that do it under their screening and 
vetting authorities; and then elements of the Department, like 
intelligence and analysis, which do it under their intelligence 
responsibilities.
    So, we are looking at, are there more effective ways for us 
to leverage all of that lawfully gathered data to conduct 
analysis. And what are the challenge--how do we overcome the 
challenges about sharing that information with State, and 
locals, and others, particularly when we are talking about some 
information that may be constitutionally protected speech.
    We have to make sure that in that analysis we are very, 
very careful about distinguishing between constitutionally 
protected speech, and threat-related activity in the online 
environment.
    Mr.  Quigley. How can you distinguish? I mean, something 
can be constitutionally protected speech, but at the same time, 
to be vital information piecing things together to understand a 
threat?
    Mr.  Cohen. Absolutely. And it is that piecing things 
together, which, I think, we need to do a better job on. So 
just because someone posts something online doesn't necessarily 
give you the complete picture. You have to look at other 
indicators, other pieces of information that relate to that 
post in order to assess whether it is potentially a threat-
related activity.
    Mr.  Quigley. No. And again, how it pieces with something 
else that some other agency or local government may have that 
makes something make more sense and constitutes an overall 
threat.
    Mr.  Cohen. Absolutely. And the Secretary has given 
directions for us to look at three things: One, how can we do a 
better job sharing within DHS and use the information we gather 
at DHS to conduct analysis; second, how do we connect with what 
is going on across the Federal Government; and then third, 
working with outside the Federal Government, State and locals, 
there is a lot of work going on in fusion centers across the 
country where they are looking at online activity. And there is 
a lot of work going on in the nongovernment sector as well. I 
have been directed to look the all of that and come up with a 
strategy very quickly on how we are going to do a better job in 
assessing that type of information.
    Mr.  Quigley. If you could pass that on to the committee to 
share, I would certainly appreciate it. And, finally, in the 2 
minutes I have left, I think, the report also talks about lone 
wolf, the lone offenders. You touched on that through answering 
some of the other questions, but just a little bit deeper dive 
on how you are addressing that and the unique threat that it 
poses?
    Mr.  Cohen. Yes. So just real quickly, what we have found 
is the majority of these attacks are individuals who don't 
necessarily have longstanding relationships with an ideological 
cause, or an ideological group, but these are people who 
exhibit certain consistent behavioral characteristics, and they 
spend a lot of time online. And as their anger at society 
increases, they ultimately self-connect with some ideology, and 
they conduct an attack on behalf of that ideology.
    In some cases, it may be an individual who decides they are 
associated with ISIS. In another case, it may be somebody who 
has decided they are now a White supremacist, or antigovernment 
militia, or they believe that the government is illegitimate, 
or that they are upset because they are self-proclaimed 
involuntarily celibate, or sometimes it is a combination of all 
of those.
    But the point is, if they spend time online, they consume 
lots of material, they consume material about past attacks, 
they ultimately decide what ideological, or group of 
ideological causes, they are going to use to justify their act 
of violence. The issue here, though, is that while these people 
may not engage in activities consistent with past terrorists, 
people who are associated with terrorist groups, they aren't 
under the radar. They exhibit behaviors that other people 
observe, whether in the community, their family, or local law 
enforcement, or even other people online. So the challenge here 
is being able to gather and assess all that information and 
identify those people who are high risk, even if they are not 
engaging in what I would call traditional terrorism-related 
activity. They are not in contact with a foreign terrorist 
organization, or a known or suspected terrorist. They are not 
traveling to training sites. They are not engaging in 
terrorist-type travel. They aren't receiving materials, or 
supplies, or resources from terrorists, financiers, or 
terrorist suppliers. They are different, but their behaviors 
can be detected and their violence can be mitigated.
    Mr.  Quigley. Thank you. I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Before I go to Mr. Aguilar, I 
understand that Director Picarelli's technical problems have 
been fixed, so I would like to give him a minute to answer Ms. 
Hinson's question. Ms. Hinson, do you want to repeat the 
question?
    Mrs.  Hinson. Absolutely. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
Basically, my question, Mr. Picarelli, was specific to--I heard 
you reference, you know, having those conversations with 
community partners and sharing information. So, I am just 
wanting to know how you are looking at targeting specifically 
in rural areas where our law enforcement agencies may not have 
the major infrastructure in place as some of our major cities 
in the 1st District in Iowa. For example, Cedar Rapids is a 
major police department, right? They are big. They can handle a 
lot of this versus smaller communities, like Belle Plaine might 
not be able do. So I just would be interested on your take on 
that.
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you because that is an excellent 
question. And I apologize that the internet decided not to 
cooperate when you asked it earlier. So, the approach we take 
is to call it a local prevention framework, but we base that on 
the type of infrastructures that are present. And so, we have 
done a lot of work actually to look at how to expand local 
prevention framework, so that they are as applicable to an 
urban neighborhood, to a suburban town, to a rural county, or 
whatever is the method of organization.
    And where I come to this is, when you look at law 
enforcement, in 19,000 State law enforcement agencies across 
the country, you have some with an incredibly small 
geographical footprint with a large law enforcement presence, 
and, then, you have counties that are incredibly large and they 
are a sheriff's office with four or five sworn officers 
covering that.
    We need our prevention programs to scale just to that 
infrastructure. So we are working through our regional 
prevention coordinators in rural areas to understand and map 
out how are behavioral help services provided? How are schools 
provided? And working within those infrastructures to have 
prevention overlay them.
    We also did a grant with the Nebraska Emergency Management 
Agency in 2016 to look at this very question, asking them how 
to take this idea, and now, let's look at it in different rural 
contexts. And in last year's awards, we actually pushed that 
even further, so now we are looking at Tribal authorities. And 
so, we are looking at how does this work in Indian Country, 
which is yet another challenge from our perspective in terms of 
a different jurisdiction, a different sense of sovereignty and 
so forth.
    So we are definitely trying to ensure that whatever we 
establish isn't tied to geography, it has to be scalable.
    Mrs.  Hinson. And I appreciate that. I have Iwaki Tribe as 
well in my district as well, so I appreciate the reference to 
Tribal as well. So I look forward to following up with you and 
working with you on these issues. Thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr.  Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Director Picarelli, since my district was targeted, just 
like Mr. Price had mentioned, so many of our districts have 
gone through similar circumstances. Mine was an act of domestic 
terror in December of 2015. And I have been committed to 
looking at ways that we can continue to work with local 
governments to give them the tools necessary to prevent this 
type of tragedy.
    This year, I introduced the PREVENT Act, Preventing Radical 
Extremist, Violent Endeavors Now and Tomorrow, that would 
require DHS to provide trainings to State and local governments 
to learn how to counter the threats of terrorism, violent 
extremism, and White nationalism. This type of work falls 
within the line of the mission of your office, and DHS' 
strategic framework for countering terrorism and targeted 
violence.
    Director, how has the Office--how has OTVTP, the Prevention 
Office, worked with their field offices and adapted that 
outreach, kind of building off of the last answer that you were 
talking about, to ensure that we were including these 
radicalized domestic actors as well?
    Mr.  Picarelli. Thank you. It is a great question. We 
focused first and foremost on ensuring that all of our 
educational products that we push out through our regional 
prevention coordinators and other methods of technical 
assistance, adopt accurate behavioral indicators that captures 
much of the targeted violence terrorism prevention space as 
possible. Many of these are aspecific, they will be applicable 
to all forms of targeted violence and terrorism, but some are 
very specific to incel violent extremism, or violent White 
supremacy. So we build that in as well.
    We then, of course, use all-of-society approach. We are 
trying to ensure that we bring all partners to the table that 
we get this information to the entirety of the locality, so 
that we can then work with and get access to behavior threat 
analysis and management from anyone who wishes to access it.
    Mr.  Aguilar. Gentlemen, building off of Ms. Underwood's 
questions as well about civil liberties, and how we ensure that 
folks receive the proper information and aren't excluded, but 
these are the same communities in the past that have hesitancy 
toward working with DHS. You talked about this a little bit, 
Mr. Cohen. And could you elaborate on the new strategies that 
we could employ to ensure that civil rights were front and 
center of what we are doing?
    Mr.  Cohen. Thanks, Congressman. We--while I realize that 
this may sound similar to what was done in the past, I think 
part of what I have learned is that there is never too much 
collaboration and partnership, and communication with these 
groups. And it is not just simply holding meetings, and us 
telling them what we are doing, and how we need them to help 
us, but it is engaging with those groups on a regular basis, 
those communities and groups and organizations, on a regular 
basis, and using their input, their observations, their 
insights into the development of programs, into the way we talk 
about programs, in the language that we use, and in the way 
that we will allow programs.
    Separate and aside from that, I can meet with groups all 
day long, but if they have an encounter with a CBP officer, or 
an ICE agent, or a TSA agent, or somebody else that is 
negative, then that will potentially undermine any good words 
of any good interaction that I have.
    So, in large part, part of the change and part of our 
ability to be able to more effectively work with communities, 
particularly those communities who feel that they have a 
negative view towards DHS, or they feel like they have been 
targeted by DHS, is, in part, based on how the Department is 
changing the way it deals with these communities. It is what 
all of us do. And that comes from the culture at the top.
    And the Secretary has made it very clear that no matter 
what we do, whether it is an interaction at an airport 
checkpoint, or it is the way that ICE and CBP behave in the 
field and conduct operations, it will be done in a respectful 
way; it will be done in a way that recognizes the humanity and 
the moral issues associated with these activities, and it will 
be done in a way that absolutely is consistent with the 
Constitution and law.
    Mr.  Aguilar. Thanks, Assistant Secretary. Director?
    Mr.  Picarelli. I would just add that one of the concerns 
that I have had, and I have started working with our Office of 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties on, in fact, we have a detail 
from their office with us right now to work on this and a 
number of other issues, is, because of the distributed nature 
of what we are establishing, we are relying on State and local 
partners to implement prevention.
    I want to ensure that there is always a way that anyone who 
feels that there is an infringement on civil rights or civil 
liberties has a way to contact us, or a neutral third party, to 
ensure that that is identified and corrected as soon as 
possible. And we will continue to use that and other mechanisms 
to ensure that our actions meet our words when we say, We put 
civil rights and civil liberties at the forefront of everything 
we do in the office. Thank you.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. I want to thank the two gentlemen, Mr. 
Cohen, Mr. Picarelli--is that the correct pronunciation? 
Whatever, with a name like Ruppersberger, I try to get it 
right.
    First thing, over the last decade, a few decades, White 
supremacists and other far right extremists have made almost 
three times as many targeted attacks on U.S. soil as Islamic 
terrorists. Since 2018, the White supremacist groups have been 
responsible for more deaths than any other domestic extremist 
groups.
    Now, I was recently on a call with the leadership in the 
Baltimore FBI office, field office, and talking about what 
happened on January 6. And during this discussion, they spoke 
at length about the storming of the Capitol, including what 
went wrong, how to prevent it from ever happening again. One of 
challenges that they highlighted was the increased tendency for 
bad actors to use the dark web to communicate with 
coconspirators.
    When I was a prosecutor investigating crime organizations, 
it was easier than it is now, we secured a warrant and got to 
work. Now, those who wish to harm can fly under the radar 
completely invisible to law enforcement.
    Now, with encrypted messaging applications, virtual private 
networks, and anonymous browsers such as Tor, they are able to 
be downloaded within minutes. I fear that we will only see more 
communications being pushed to the underbelly of the internet.
    Now, my question is to either Mr. Cohen or Mr. Picarelli, 
is Federal law enforcement technologically and statutorily 
capable of tracking domestic terrorists on the dark web, or 
does the trail immediately go cold? Now, also, with the 
temporary closure of the social media website Parler, by the 
way, are you familiar with these names that I am giving to you?
    Mr.  Cohen. Yes.
    Mr.  Picarelli. Yes, sir, Congressman.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. Oh, okay. --which some have dubbed the 
right-wing Twitter, have you seen more malcontents and 
dissidents move underground to the dark web? And basically that 
is my first question.
    Mr.  Cohen. The short answer is yes, while there is a large 
level of activity that occurs on public facing sites, and that 
is actually an element of the playbook that these extremists 
thought leaders and terrorist groups, and foreign intelligence 
services use to incite violence by people, what we have found 
is that as more and more law enforcement activities have 
focused on scrutinizing that activity, these extremist groups 
who are engaging in operational planning are moving to 
encrypted sites in particular, and using encrypted applications 
such as the ones you described. It is very difficult for law 
enforcement to monitor those conversations on those encrypted 
sites.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. What are we going to do about that? 
Because it seems that is where they are going now, and we are 
dealing in this new world of technology. And if we don't find a 
way and we have [inaudible] pursuant to our Constitution, our 
laws in the United States. What are your recommendations going 
to be to go forward?
    Mr.  Cohen. So Congressman, not to date myself, but I think 
you and I began having these conversations back in the 1990s. 
And I think that is the million-dollar question. I know that 
the Justice Department is developing a series of 
recommendations. We are working closely with them on how to 
best address this issue. But you identify a real problem, and 
it is something that is not only impeding our ability to deal 
with domestic extremism, but other areas of criminal activity, 
the use of these platforms. The easily acquired, encrypted 
applications make the monitoring of communications very 
difficult.
    I mean, I used to be concerned when drug traffickers were 
using pay phones. The environment today is so much more 
complicated because of the ease of access and use of these 
encrypted platforms. So we looked forward to working with you 
in trying to figure out a solution to that.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. And the one thing you need here is 
teamwork, Federal, State, and local. I think, looking back in 
my days years ago in law enforcement, that the JTTF probably 
was the best team where you had Federal, State, and local; not 
only did you receive intelligence, collect intelligence, but 
you had intelligence analyzed. And if you don't have that 
moving forward, and this is--I see my time is running out, but 
we also have to talk about how, from a constitutional way, that 
we can get more from NSA to help you all, because they have no 
jurisdiction in the United States. So that is something we are 
going have to investigate and look at. So thank you and I yield 
back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Can this concludes our first panel. 
Assistant Secretary Cohen and Director Picarelli, thank you 
very much for your time this morning. You have provided us with 
some very valuable insights and important information. And we 
want to continue to work with you to better address and prevent 
radicalization that leads to violence.
    We will now take a short recess to make sure that the 
second panel is ready to begin. Thank you, again, Secretary 
Cohen and Director Picarelli.
    [Recess.]
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. The subcommittee will now come to 
order. We will now go to the second hearing panel, which 
includes Richard Aborn, the president of the Citizens Crime 
Commission of New York City; Tyler Cote, director and cofounder 
of Operation250, and Sammy Rangel, executive director and 
cofounder of Life After Hate. We appreciate your joining us 
this morning to discuss how each of your organizations is using 
DHS grant funding to counter radicalization that leads to 
violence. We will submit the full text of your official 
statements for the hearing record.
    Mr. Aborn, please begin your oral summary which I ask that 
you keep to for 5 minutes.
    Mr.  Aborn. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman. And thank 
you for not only calling this hearing, but for all members of 
panel for attending, it is a very important topic, and we 
really appreciate your attention.
    My name is Richard Aborn. By way of background, I am a 
former violent crime and homicide prosecutor from the Manhattan 
D.A.'s office, and I have also done an enormous amount of work 
on the illegal gun issue in the United States, including having 
had the privilege leading Jim and Sarah Brady's gun control 
group at the time, called Handgun Control, now called the Brady 
Center, and led, at the time, during the legislative fights 
over the Brady bill, the ban on assault weapons, and the ban on 
large magazines. In that context, permit me a moment to offer 
my deepest condolences to the victims of the families--the 
survivors, sorry--of Atlanta and Boulder. It is a terrible 
tragedy and I particularly want to point out the heroism of 
Police Officer Eric Talley. Eric Talley embodies the best of 
the American police officer who gives him and herself 
selflessly every day to protect us in our communities.
    In the Crime Commission, which I now run, we practice 
something called precision prevention. That is, we try to 
identify those who are most likely to commit acts of violence, 
and try to intervene in those acts before they actually happen. 
Our mandate is to develop innovative ideas around the most 
vexatious forms of violence. So in that context, we work on 
gangs, high-risk gang members, illegal guns, illegal gun 
trafficking, kids and guns, and, of course, domestic and 
international terrorism.
    The way we got involved in this program that I am going to 
describe now was that we received a phone call from the head of 
the national security division in the Eastern District of New 
York who asked a rather straightforward question. He conveyed 
that he had adequate tools to respond to serious acts of 
terror, both domestic and foreign.
    However, what he lacked were tools to help intervene with 
those cases that might not rise to the level of meeting a 
terrorism charge, or if a terrorism charge was required, not 
requiring a lengthy jail sentence or any jail sentence at all. 
He literally did not know what to do. So we was very worried 
about those cases not receiving attention.
    In response to that, we looked at the intervention we do 
around gang work. We intervened with gang members, and looked 
to see whether or not we could adapt that work into the 
terrorism space. And it turned out that we could. We spent well 
over a year studying the behaviors associated with 
mobilization. We spent well over a year understanding those 
emotional drivers that could be moving somebody to engage in 
this sort of ideologically driven violence, and developed a 
program which we call DEEP, which is the subject of this grant, 
which is now a custom-tailored program that tries to understand 
and identify those emotional drivers that may be moving 
somebody to mobilize towards ideologically driven violence.
    What we are not is a deradicalization program. By that I 
mean we believe that people in America are entitled to their 
beliefs, we may not agree with the beliefs, but we believe 
people are entitled to their beliefs. However, we do not 
believe that people are entitled to engage in violence based on 
those beliefs, and that is where we come in. We look at the 
pathway to mobilization and try and stop the mobilization. And 
we do that through a multi-tiered process.
    So the way the operation works is the prosecutors, we work 
with the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of 
New York, Manhattan District Attorney's office, and the 
Brooklyn District Attorney's office, as well as the FBI, and 
NYPD intel. They will refer matters to us. These matters can be 
either prearrest; postarrest; they can be preconviction; post 
conviction; it can even individuals who have done short amount 
of time in prison.
    They will be released to us, they come into our program and 
we engage them with a therapist who has been trained in this 
specialized methodology, which we call DEEP. That methodology 
is applied in a therapeutic session for as long as 9 to 12 to 
18 months, if need be.
    Assuming that person successfully completes the therapeutic 
interventions, we then pass that person along to a role we call 
a transitional specialist. That transitional specialist helps 
the person understand and actualize the lessons that they have 
learned in the therapy and get back into their normal lives.
    We then have a specialized job-training unit, which helps 
place high-risk individuals--and these can be high-risk 
individuals, they also do that in the gang space--into jobs.
    Now, we have just launched this. We are just getting off 
the ground; we are just taking our first cases. But that is the 
plan that we intend to implement with the assistance of this 
grant. We will be evaluating as we go along.
    The DEEP program, in my mind, and frankly all of the work 
that is being done around this issue very nicely incorporates 
both the issues of understanding of the intersection between 
mental health, and potential criminal offending, which is a 
critical component to any sort of crime-fighting apparatus in 
the United States. We must focus on the mental health piece. 
And it also very nicely ties in a public health approach. So in 
government, government's very fond of saying we have a whole-
of-government approach, this really is, as John Picarelli said, 
a whole-of-society approach. And it is really a critical way to 
try to respond to this growing threat we face in the United 
States.
    There is no doubt that this will need to stay in funding. 
And I am very pleased to see that DHS, just today, has 
introduced another round the funding. And I hope Congress will 
continue to fund this very critical work. It is not easy work. 
It is not something that with have years and years and years of 
experience doing. We are all learning in some ways as we go 
along. But there is an enormous amount of skill can I applied 
to this, now which is very, very good for the future, because I 
think as we build out across the country, a framework, to use 
DHS's term, that allows citizens to turn to various individuals 
who understand the mental health side of this issue, we will 
begin to build more and more resiliency across the country, 
which is obviously very important.
    Before I conclude, I do want to mention three people in 
particular: I want to mention Seth DuCharme, who was the U.S. 
attorney in the Eastern District, who actually helped us get 
this program off the ground. It was very good of Seth to 
understand the role of prevention in terrorism. That was a big 
step, and it was an important step, and I think it is going to 
pay off, and pay off very handsomely.
    And I really have to mention John Picarelli and his unit at 
DHS. Long before Congress began thinking about these grants, as 
far as I know, John and his group were there supporting us, 
helping us making connection for us, acting a sounding board. 
They simply could not have been more support, and we are really 
indebted. And I am, frankly, very indebted to Congress for 
putting up this money, because we could not operate without 
this support. Thank you.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
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    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cote.
    Mr.  Cote. Chairman Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member 
Fleischmann, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
inviting me to testify on the Office of Targeted Violence and 
Terrorism Prevention's grant program today. I am Tyler Cote, 
cofounder and director of the nonprofit organization, 
Operation250, and I am honored to appear before you.
    Operation250 is a preventative, educational organization, 
headquartered in Massachusetts that works with students and 
educators with the ultimate goal of keeping it safe from 
threatening materials and individuals while online.
    Our work is through a series of educational workshops and 
training with students, ranging from the age of 9 to 18, and 
with educators from elementary, middle and high schools. The 
pillars of our programming are focused on using online safety, 
antihate and antiextremism, and problem-solving education, to 
impact the threat and the level in online materials and 
individuals compose on youth.
    Starting in 2016, as part of the Department of Homeland 
Security and Adventure Partners, peer-to-peer challenging 
extremism innovation program, myself and my colleagues 
developed Operation250. Upon the completion of that program, 
which we finished third in the country, we formed a partnership 
with the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health to begin the 
process of evaluating our curriculum. Then, starting in 2019, 
the University of Massachusetts Lowell, researching Georgia 
State University and researching Harvard T.H. Chan School 
Public Health and Op250, received funding from the National 
Institute of Justice to evaluation the Operation250 student 
workshop models efficacy.
    Such workshops are original research-based lessons designed 
and delivered by the Operation250 team that combine two skilled 
acquisitions lessons with one skilled application activity for 
the students to engage with. The goals of these workshops are 
for the students to acquire skills about recognizing unsafe 
online behaviors, the psychology of online decisionmaking, 
enhancing their understanding about hate and hostile out-group 
attitudes online, and identifying risks and threats when they 
are on an online space.
    These skills have been applied by the students in an 
activity at identifying how these issues might impact their own 
community, their own school, and their own friend groups, and 
for them to develop potential solution ideas that they can all 
then participate in.
    Over the course of these evaluations, we have found that 
our student workshop programming has shown significant 
improvements in students' ability to identify online 
disinhibited behaviors, and the effects of them, which is a key 
element of our online safety education. Toxic online 
disinhibition is the phenomenon of when an individual loosens 
up, and feels more comfortable because they are online, causing 
them to be more willing to engage and participate in more 
hostile and toxic material on the online space.
    The ongoing evaluation also has shown they are approaching 
significance in student's ability to correctly identify risks 
while online. Organizationally, we find measuring and fully 
understanding the impact of our educational programming has to 
be critical in our effort. In 2020, we were awarded the funding 
from the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Targeted 
Violence and Terrorism Prevention to replicate our student 
workshop, student lecture, and educator training programs. This 
funding offers us the opportunity to replicate this program, 
and throughout Massachusetts, and to extend into new school 
systems in New Hampshire. The funding will allow us to reach an 
estimated 930 students through our workshop; another 1,000 
through our lecture series; in addition to being able to 
deliver teacher training to approximately 630 educators, school 
administrators, and school counselors as well.
    This funding will also allow us to grow our team by 
training more educational program trainers who will be able to 
deliver the variety of operations for program offerings for the 
organizations to communities and schools.
    Since 2017, Op250 has delivered programming to 
approximately 1,100 students, and over 1,000 educators in 
Massachusetts through our workshops, lectures, and trainings. 
With the funds granted by the OTVTP, our organization has the 
opportunity of doubling our reach, and ultimately expanding our 
impact to new communities and schools.
    With our focus of online safety, we are able to offer 
prevention education to communities. As a nonprofit in the 
space, this funding grants us the opportunity to work with, and 
be flexible to communities and schools to ensure that our 
programming uniquely suits the audience it is working with, and 
to be a preventative in ongoing efforts against terrorism and 
extremism, such of that as White supremacy online.
    This grant program offers organizations, like Op250, the 
opportunity of being a preventative solution. Prevention is 
about readiness, preparedness, and acting ahead before 
something happens.
    In striving to improve youth online safety and digital 
literacy skills, and educators' confidence and understanding, 
and teaching strategies, and improving youth online behavior, 
youth will be better equipped to critically think, analyze, and 
ultimately be protected from malevolent influences online.
    Thank you for affording me the opportunity to speak today. 
And I look forward to questions the subcommittee may have.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Thank you. Mr. Rangel.
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you, Chairwoman Roybal-Allard, Ranking 
Member Fleischmann, and members of the subcommittee, thank you 
for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss how 
the Department of Homeland Security is supporting our work, 
disrupting the threat of White supremacist violent extremism.
    My name is Sammy Rangel, and I am the cofounder and 
executive director of Life After Hate, the first nonprofit in 
the U.S. dedicated to helping men and women leave the violent 
far right. Our vision is a world that allows people to change, 
and contribute to society without violence. We extend our 
condolences to Atlanta and Boulder.
    Life After Hate's story begins in 2011, when a group of 
formers, that is the term we use to describe former violent 
extremists, came together knowing two things: We had each gone 
through the complicated work of exiting violent extremism 
without peer or professional support. And we were committed to 
making sure that anyone wanting to exit would never have to do 
it alone.
    Four years later, we have launched ExitUSA, the 
intervention program of Life After Hate. Last year, ExitUSA 
managed more than 220 new cases, a sharp increase over the 
previous 2 years. We expect this trend to continue during the 
current grant program and beyond.
    Life After Hate is built on the belief that anyone taking 
steps towards accountability for their journey creates the 
possibility for redemption. I want to share a story of one of 
our colleagues, Thomas Engelmann, an example of the potential 
strength of this program, as well as the obstacles formers 
face. Thomas overcame great odds to become the person he was. 
He spent much of life engaged in violent White supremacy, and 
it nearly cost him his life at the hands of his group when he 
left.
    Sadly, Thomas passed away unexpectedly in August 2020. He 
lived the ideals of compassion, and he continues to inspire us. 
Thomas once said, I really want to help people. The fact that I 
survived getting shot in the face is my motivation. I am doing 
my best to dedicate the rest of my life to becoming the person 
I should have been all along.
    How the world viewed Thomas after he changed his life was 
not the same as how Thomas viewed himself. That is important 
because when formers attempt to make amends and reintegrate 
into society, they face many obstacles.
    In addition to violence, death, and incarceration, formers 
face many emotional obstacles to exiting, including shame, 
guilt, and a loss of identity. These are the problems that our 
organization was founded to solve, easing the sense of 
loneliness and mending disconnection from society. We have 
learned is that individuals are more likely to disengage and 
begin the process of deradicalization, if there is a community 
waiting for them with support to help them through the process.
    We have identified three key areas of focus to achieve our 
mission and vision: ExitUSA intervention aftercare services; 
training and capacity building; and community engagement. These 
three areas are supported in part by the Department of Homeland 
Security's 2-year grant.
    Our first focus is to expand ExitUSA by hiring additional 
staff, as well as enhancing existing roles. Second, we 
recognize that alone, we cannot assist every person who wants 
to exit, every family concern about a loved one, or every 
professional struggling to work with formers.
    In response, we developed an initiative with ExitUSA to 
train and support local capacity, and develop cultural 
competency for government and civic organizations. This grant 
will promise to scale that training.
    Finally, community engagement is a critical component of 
Exit. Communities that are informed and engaged are more likely 
to support formers, and, in turn, to promote disengagement and 
exit as a viable option. This grant will give us the resources 
we need to optimize existing, and introduce new outreach 
strategies to raise awareness and drive more at-risk 
individuals to ExitUSA.
    Many of these men and women will, at times, experience a 
flicker of disillusionment when their expectations about the 
ideology clash with reality. Some White supremacists cycle out 
without confronting their involvement. Without guidance, where 
does that leave them, and where do they go from there? If we 
are not in the position to offer them the support they need to 
recover, we have missed a critical opportunity.
    Through the support of the Department of Homeland Security, 
we are better positioned to scale our mission and contribute to 
the whole-of-society approach to make our country healthy and 
safer. Thomas escaped White supremacy barely clinging to life. 
He could have stayed away, but he came back to help others find 
a way out. This is the ultimate expression of our ideals, and 
that is the work we continue today.
    Thank you.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.
    My first question is for Mr. Aborn. In your opening 
statement, you covered a lot of what I was going to ask with 
regards to the DEEP program. But by the time a participant is 
placed into the program, as I understand, they are already 
engaged with law enforcement and may have already been 
convicted of a crime. And although your testimony indicates 
that community outreach and referrals could be part of the 
future program phases, how much more difficult is it to help a 
participant demobilize after they have already crossed into the 
line of criminal activity? And how long do you anticipate it 
will take to see results from the program's intervention with 
participants?
    Mr.  Aborn. Thank you for that question. It is clearly more 
difficult once a person has crossed the line into committing 
actual criminal acts, but they are not by no means beyond 
redemption. We know from lots of experience in traditional 
crime space that people who have committed even violent acts, 
can be treated, can be helped to understand why they have done 
what they have done. They can be given the skills to not repeat 
that conduct, and to reenter a more, for lack of a better term, 
normal life.
    So we are very optimistic about this program. We have done 
an enormous amount of research. We have consulted with some of 
the top forensic psychologists and general psychologists in the 
country, as well as people throughout law enforcement, to 
understand the behaviors. We believe we have a very good 
understanding now of what those behaviors are that drive this 
ideological-driven violence. And this program is deemed, it is 
designed to address precisely those.
    Our next phase, which we are now contemplating, trying to 
figure out how to do, is to reach out into the community. But I 
want to make sure that when we do that, we don't commit any of 
the past mistakes that have occurred in this area. And I am 
also, because we do a lot of work in the police reform space, I 
am very mindful of some of the distrust that now exists between 
communities of color, and law enforcement. So I want to make 
sure that when we do this, we do this in a way that is received 
well by the community.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rangel, Life After Hate's approach 
is focused on helping individuals who, at some level, may have 
already begun to be illusioned, or disillusioned, with a path 
that they are on. Are there common factors, either in 
personality or experience, that help predict which people will 
be more open to exiting violent extremism, and when they might 
be more open to it?
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you for the question. We do know that 
for each person that is coming to us, they have a unique set of 
circumstances, and a unique set of outcomes. And each of them 
do require a different set of assistance skills, or direction, 
or focus. So it is difficult to say that there is a singular, 
or even just a common thread. But we do see, across different 
populations, that some cases, there are issues where they need 
needs met, and so we try to pair them with mental health 
professionals that are within our own service's ability to 
provide for them, or we refer them out.
    But it is difficult to say whether or not there is a 
straight line, it is not a straight line. And often, we have to 
spend some time trying to understand all the different 
variables that each of those unique individuals bring with 
them.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Well, you have mentioned that there is 
a degree of correlation between violent extremism and past 
drama, mental health problems, and addiction. For those who 
don't have those factors, either in the past or present, what 
seems to drive people to extremist violence in those cases?
    Mr.  Rangel. One of the things that has really stood out to 
us since we have started doing this work is that it doesn't 
always start with the ideology. I think that is often what 
surprises us most. A lot of times, there are real or perceived 
grievances, that are real or perceived fears. And I think there 
are groups that are out there who are ready to exploit those 
vulnerabilities through a number of ways. But one of those ways 
is making a message that seems relatable to them, and then 
drawing those individuals further in and eventually leading 
towards a path of adopting those types of violent extremist 
beliefs.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cote, Operation250 approaches the 
problem of violent extremism from a different vantage point, 
before it has a chance to take hold. What factors, in your 
experience, make you particularly vulnerable to extremists, and 
towards--particularly online?
    Mr.  Cote. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman. So what 
we see and what we focus on in our work is predominantly focus 
on kind of those online behavior and online decisionmaking in 
youth. So, in terms of vulnerabilities as I understand your 
question of what maybe--may happen, or what youth may come 
across, and what we are seeing is just general exposure to hate 
messages online can come with--come at great risk.
    It could be something as though youth are--it will 
reinforce discriminatory views that individuals may already 
have. And it also, one example that we have used in classrooms 
is visiting a hate website; that type of behavior is correlated 
with, or connected to, potentially serious violent behavior as 
well.
    So, we really try and focus on some of those online 
decisions that youth are making, recognizing what it is that 
maybe they are more willing to take a risk online than they 
would be offline, and recognizing when that happens, and then 
how to stay clear of making those types of decisions.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair, and to all of the 
witnesses. Thank you very much for addressing this situation 
that needs our attention, I think in all of our communities, at 
all levels of government, and a very, very good hearing.
    I want to say that your written testimonies have been very 
compelling, and I thank you all for your hard work and 
commitment.
    Mr. Cote, you state in your testimony that 57 percent of 
students come across online hate messages in the past 2 months. 
This is a frightening statistic. What can parents do to protect 
their kids from being exposed to hate online, especially since 
they are spending more and more time online until the schools 
go back?
    Mr.  Cote. That is a phenomenal question, and thank you for 
asking it. It is one thing, and some of the research that we 
have been included in with some of the research partners that I 
had mentioned in my testimony, is we are seeing that some of--
one big correlation is the time the youth are spending online 
increases their likelihood of coming across something online. 
Of course, during the COVID-19 pandemic, youth are online at a 
rate higher than we have probably ever seen before, and it was 
already quite high before the COVID-19 pandemic as well.
    For parents, I know that what we have seen in some research 
is that the more their parents are involved in youth online 
behavior, trying to be some sort of ally, and trying to 
understand what it is that they are looking at online, trying 
to be as much of a help in terms of if they have any questions, 
to be able to come to them, to be that, because that can really 
make a difference in terms of youths becoming susceptible to 
hate messages online.
    The hate messages may coming across just normal social 
media platforms, or places where a lot of young individuals may 
be spending time online. So, it is becoming more and more 
challenging to keep them safe from becoming exposed to such 
content. But for parents, the more that they can attempt to be 
involved to try and be as much of a help to their youth, in 
having conversations with them, we are seeing that that can 
definitely play a helpful role.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you. And please continue to get it 
this message out. Thank you so much, sir.
    My next question is for the panel in the time remaining, 
and time is winning, but what have you all been able to 
accomplish with the DHS grant funds that you were not able to 
do before? And how has your program become more effective and 
reached more people? And let me address that to the entire 
panel, please.
    Mr.  Aborn. Well, I am certainly happy to start, 
Congressman, thank you. We, frankly, would not be able to 
operate without this funding. It is very, very hard for a not-
for-profit to raise money to do this kind of work with the 
criminal justice system, and without support from the 
government, frankly now and probably going forward we would not 
be able to do it.
    We have launched a program essentially 3 weeks ago now, we 
already have three participants in. I received just another 
email while this hearing has been going on. So I expect that 
number to grow. We now have evaluation methods in place. And as 
we build a greater body in number of cases, we will be able to 
give you some real feedback on how well this is working.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Next.
    Mr.  Cote. I am happy to take it next. As I mentioned in my 
testimony, we are going to--with the DHS funding, we are going 
to be able to nearly double our reach in terms of the 
individuals that will be able to--over double our reach, in 
terms of the individuals that will be able to run online 
programing with, so it certainly helps with our online safety 
programming. So it certainly helps with our scalability, and 
being able to fund our time, and effort, and planning, and 
prep, and everything that gets involved with that to be able to 
deliver that programming to schools.  RPTR GIORDANOEDTR 
SECKMAN[12:03 p.m.]
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Rangel, do you want to take a shot at it?
    Mr.  Rangel. Yes. Thank you.
    I think one of the things we do know is that we anticipate, 
like, our online campaigns developed with Moonshot will lead to 
additional cases coming to us and which is why we have 
increased staffing in the grant year to assure appropriate 
caseload coverage, so that we have the right capacity there to 
respond.
    We are also looking forward to developing counter narrative 
video campaigns. I think we are going to do at least five under 
this grant to help direct new at-risk individuals and concerned 
family and friends to ExitUSA. And then, in part, the support, 
you know, is part of what we are trying to do is extend our 
referrals through avenues like through our toll-free telephone 
number and the help phone that we have located on our website 
to direct people towards us.
    So those are just some of the things that we might be able 
to do, that we will be doing under this grant.
    Mr.  Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    And, gentlemen, thanks again for your very important 
testimonies.
    Madam Chair, I will yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. Ms. Underwood?
    Ms.  Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to 
our witnesses for sharing their expertise with us.
    I am particularly pleased that my colleagues had the 
opportunity to hear from Mr. Sammy Rangel about the work he is 
doing with Life After Hate, a leading national organization 
based in the great State of Illinois.
    It is so good to see you again, and I hope the next time, 
it can be in person.
    Mr. Rangel, your organization has brought healing and peace 
to many families in Illinois and across the country. How will 
you use the Federal resources that you are receiving through 
the TVTP grant program to scale up your work so that you can 
reach even more people?
    And if you can quantify it--I know that you just responded 
to Mr. Fleischmann similarly, but with a quantification, it 
would be helpful.
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you. And it is good to see you again, 
too.
    Well, the grant helps us in three ways. First, we are able 
to hire additional staff. We are building the capacity to do 
that. I mean, immediately upon receiving the grant, we started 
to develop that capacity and--so that we could adequately staff 
for what we know is an increased number of people that we see 
coming to us, and those numbers have continued to increase over 
the years, as I mentioned in my opening statement.
    Second, we are going to expand individual and community 
outreach to reach more at-risk individuals. We have to get the 
message out. There are people who are unaware that services 
like this exist, and, as I heard one of our panelists answering 
a question earlier, before 2017, families didn't know we were a 
resource. Today, they make up half of our caseload. They are 
reaching out to us.
    And, finally, we are going to train co-responder and local 
prevention networks to help us scale our work beyond. One of 
the things I recognized right away when coming on as the 
executive director is that, while we wanted to make referrals, 
not many of the professionals that we could refer to knew 
anything about this space. And so scaling that work, scaling 
our education and what our approach--what successes we are 
having with our approach becomes critical to this point.
    Ms.  Underwood. Thank you. I am so glad to hear that you 
are working to expand your reach at this important time.
    The FBI identified violent White supremacy in particular as 
a leading threat, and I have heard from my own constituents 
they are concerned about the rise of so-called militias and 
other extremist groups in our communities.
    Mr. Rangel, do you have the resources you need to meet this 
high-level demand for the type of services you provide? And, if 
not, what additional resources would be helpful?
    Mr.  Rangel. The short answer is, no, we aren't fully 
resourced. Intervention is resource-intensive, and it is so 
intense with the--intensive with the person-to-person component 
and also knowing that these services, as we have heard from 
other panelists, can take months and years.
    Ms.  Underwood. Uh-huh.
    Mr.  Rangel. And, because we are serving at a national 
level, we have to be able to provide those services wherever 
those people are at.
    I think, in addition to hiring more social workers and 
mental health practitioners, which I will make a note that 
there aren't very many of us in this space just yet.
    Ms.  Underwood. Right.
    Mr.  Rangel. I am often alone in rooms where we are having 
these same discussions. We also need to invest in activities 
that fall outside the current scope of the grant, including 
research that informs our work.
    Outside the grant, we are working on developing a risk 
assessment tool for this population because there currently 
isn't one that has been validated in the U.S. context. Those 
are just a couple of things I would say to that answer.
    Ms.  Underwood. Thank you. And, Mr. Rangel, Life After Hate 
has established a partnership with Facebook to redirect users 
who search for extremist content towards information that can 
help them disengage from violent groups and ideologies.
    What remains to be done to intervene in online 
radicalization, and how would additional Federal resources help 
you to advance your work in this area?
    Mr.  Rangel. I think one of the primary points I would like 
to make here is that content moderation alone does not work. 
The power of social media in particular is to connect people 
who need help with resources that they need.
    Radicalization to violence may occur, in part, online, but 
the violence is real. We know this. We are here to help with 
that off-ramping part of the process.
    So part of that process then becomes costly to scale. It is 
having--we need resources and programs to support those 
disengaging from violent extremism and also create a meaningful 
relevant content that speaks to their specific needs.
    We are also working with Moonshot CVE through this grant. 
We will be able to use their redirect model to reach at-risk 
individuals. One of the most--one of Moonshot's cofounders, 
Vidhya Ramalingam, is often talking about leveraging the same 
ad technology that big brands use to sell people to reach these 
groups online.
    And we have a similar challenge creating persuasive content 
to sell people on the idea that White supremacist violent 
extremism does not support their well-being or meet their 
personal needs. That content is both the message that gets them 
to ExitUSA, but also it is the program itself.
    Ms.  Underwood. Well, I certainly am so grateful for your 
leadership in this space and your dedication to helping folks, 
you know, recover and reengage in our community in healthy 
peaceful ways, and I certainly look forward to continuing to 
work with you in the days to come.
    With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford?
    Mr.  Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And I want to thank the panel. You all are involved in what 
I think are the most important segments of what I call the PIE 
for fighting crime or protecting communities. And that is 
prevention, intervention, and then enforcement comes third. And 
you all are out there doing the yeoman's work on prevention and 
intervention.
    And I want to ask Tyler about Operation250. You know, in 
2018, as I mentioned in the former panel, we passed the STOP 
School Violence Act of 2018, and there is grant money available 
there to help teach students how to recognize not the focus of 
online threats and dangers but the dangers of the student that 
might be sitting in the classroom with them.
    And, actually, it also provides dollars for schools' mental 
health providers and law enforcement that come together to 
create a network so that, when these students see this kind of 
behavior, they actually have somewhere to report it and 
something gets done about it.
    So my question, Mr. Tyler, is number one, did you know 
about the STOP School Violence Act, and have you accessed any 
of the dollars that are available there because it seems like 
it would plug right into your program?
    Mr.  Cote. Thank you for your question, Congressman.
    Yes. So, actually, this is very timely as well. Recently, 
over the last--forgive me. I forget the exact timeline, but 
over the--pretty recently, over the last handful of months, we 
have received funding as a subaward, as a small part of a 
larger grant to a school system up in Massachusetts that they 
received funding through the STOP School Violence Program, and 
we will be running teacher trainings to kind of help educators.
    So what we are seeing in our--in some of the research and--
the research that isn't connected to us, but wider research, is 
that educators are not prepared to talk about online safety in 
the classroom. If they are not prepared, they are just not 
comfortable talking about it in the classroom.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Right.
    Mr.  Cote. So what we are aiming to do with that project is 
to work with the health teachers of that school district to run 
training programs on, you know, these are some of the 
strategies that we have seen and research that worked with 
online safety education. These are a lot of the topics that we 
as an organization focus on and that we have seen impacts in 
student behavior, and then these are some of the strategies 
that, importantly, have shown not to work in terms of actually 
educating about online safety.
    So that is something--STOP School Violence funding is 
something that we are aware of, and it is something that we are 
obviously going to be participating on projects over the next 
few years.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Good. Great to hear that.
    Listen, Sammy, you are--Sammy, you are in an entirely 
different place in this chain, this progression of people being 
indoctrinated, people moving into extreme violent--domestic 
violence entities and then coming out.
    What I would like to ask you, Sammy, in the Life After Hate 
work and the work that you do with people to leave these 
communities of violence, based on your work, you mentioned 
earlier that it is not linear, this radicalization, and I think 
it is important--you mentioned how to do those risk assessments 
and that sometimes you are the only person in the room.
    You know, I will tell you DOJ has some great risk-
assessment tools that were developed, you know, by the--
developed--I think the Domestic Violence Intervention Program 
way back, but there is some great risk assessment tools there 
that you could look at.
    But my question is for you: What are you--what forum do you 
see most people being radicalized in? I know it is not linear, 
but what proves to be the most dangerous forum for them to be 
radicalized?
    Mr.  Rangel. That is a question that makes me try to 
reflect on what it is that we are seeing. I think what your 
question makes me think of is the state that they are in when 
they come to us, and the state that seems to be leading to this 
idea that they need to maybe reflect and reconsider their 
choices is that it is when they hit a point of disillusionment 
where what they thought they were getting into, what they 
thought they were following or subscribing to at some point 
doesn't match up with the reality of the situation they now 
found themselves in.
    After these large events, they are often questioning 
themselves as to whether or not that is what they really signed 
up for. And I think we even saw in more recent times people 
questioning how did they end up in the predicament that they 
are now in because that is not who they originally saw 
themselves as.
    And I think that--
    Mr.  Rutherford. More importantly, I guess, how did they 
get out of it?
    And, Madam Speaker, I see my time has run out.
    But, Sammy, thank you again for everything you all are 
doing. God bless you.
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you, sir.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. I have several questions. We are almost 
out of time, but I would like to try and get some of these in.
    Mr. Rangel, I understand that the Department is increasing 
the number of cases that it takes--that you take to expand your 
outreach. How much demand is there for what you are actually 
doing at this time?
    Mr.  Rangel. Well, since our profile increased in 2017, our 
numbers have--annually have grown exponentially. We continue to 
meet new heights. I think, within the last couple of years, we 
have actually surpassed what we did in all the years prior to 
those couple of years.
    And, as I mentioned before, after 2017 events, families 
became aware of our program, and those numbers went from zero 
to half of our caseload where they are looking for assistance 
and guidance on what to do with--about the person that they are 
concerned with, that they are close to or loved ones, so it is 
exponential. And what we do--as I mentioned earlier, we do 
predict that those numbers will continue to increase monthly, 
annually.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. You talked about the importance 
of a sense of community. What is it about community that can 
make the difference between a path of violence and one of 
reconciliation?
    And, also, you also talked about--and I was struck by the 
fact that you talked about compassion and empathy in helping 
people exit from violent extremism. Given all the public anger 
toward hate groups and extremists, what challenges do you have 
convincing the public that yours is the right approach?
    Mr.  Rangel. I think, as long as we also include 
accountability with compassion and empathy, it can help the 
community understand what we are trying to do. The sense of 
community, I believe, is innate to all human beings. We all 
want to belong. But what has happened is that oftentimes we 
have to consider what we belong to and what those groups that 
we belong to profess or want.
    And, oftentimes, I think, through our work, right, we are 
using motivational interviewing and trauma-informed care as the 
basis of our theory around what is effective, and those 
theories are really rooted in understanding that the person in 
front of us is not broken beyond repair, is not incorrigible or 
disposable. And, although they might need an enormous amount of 
help, they are worthy of that enormous amount of help.
    But it also supports this idea that, when it comes to 
public safety, we are all better served if we have alternatives 
other than condemnation for someone who has committed violent 
acts.
    I think our founders are prime examples of that, including 
myself, where that redemption is possible, but it can be made 
more possible when the community is there to receive them when 
working through their issues and their concerns with support.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. I see that Mr. Rutherford--no. 
Mr. Ruppersberger has returned. Mr. Rutherford, you had another 
question. I can go to you before I go to Mr. Ruppersberger.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Okay, Madam Chair. Thank you.
    I will follow up on--one of the things that we discussed 
during the last panel was a report that was outlining some of 
the violent extremist groups--antigovernment, antiauthority, 
violent extremism; racially, ethnically motivated violent 
extremism; even animal rights and environmental rights violent 
extremism; abortion-related extremism.
    Sammy, during your time in trying to get--help individuals 
who are extricating themselves from these violent extremist 
groups, is there one of these that seems more dangerous to you 
now than the others?
    Mr.  Rangel. Well, our cofounders are particularly tuned in 
based on their own personal experiences to violent White 
supremacy extremism, sir. And I think a lot of the partners on 
this call would support the fact that most of the data points 
towards perhaps the single most threat that we all face is 
coming from these violent White supremacist extremist groups.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Yeah.
    Mr.  Rangel. And so that is where we choose to try to 
leverage our experiences and our methods to make the biggest 
impact for our country.
    Mr.  Rutherford. So, to follow up on that, Sammy, so do you 
see this population, then, as somehow being--you know, when you 
look at the fact that it is not linear, as you mentioned 
earlier, but it is a combination of things that occur to them--
sexual violence, family violence, those kind of things--are you 
seeing more of that in these White supremacist--the 
environments they are coming out of?
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you for that.
    I do think certainly that is a part of what we see, but we 
also see people who have very real or perceived grievances and/
or fears. And, to be honest, while listening to some of the 
grievances or fears that these men and women share with us, 
some of them appear to have valid basis, and so it is not all 
as if they have no actual grievance or actual fear to be 
concerned about.
    What we do try to focus and redirect our attentions to is, 
how do we address that through prosocial methods? How do we 
take into account that there are other ways, peaceful ways, to 
address those issues without having to condemn a group or use 
violence?
    Mr.  Rutherford. And so, Sammy, let me ask you this: Is 
that kind of an indictment, then, of a system where someone 
is--for example, these--the antigovernment folks, White 
supremacists who are against, you know, government, the 
sovereign citizens, that sort of thing, are these--do you find 
a lot of these folks are people who have a grievance that has 
not been properly addressed after they raised it, and then they 
have kind of hit this dead end in the system, and then they 
decide to go outside the system?
    Is that a pretty common occurrence?
    Mr.  Rangel. I would say that I relate to what you are 
asking there in the sense that, in the days before my change, I 
felt violence was the only voice I had, and I think that that 
is oftentimes the end result of feeling you are not being 
heard, that you are perhaps being dismissed or discounted or 
invalidated or not taken seriously.
    And, of course, there are many other factors, but I do 
suspect that--and our experience in listening shows us that 
many times it--the one thing that we are doing that is working, 
if I may start over, is listening, which is an uncommon 
occurrence today, especially to these populations.
    And so I do believe that is the basis for a lot of the 
success that we are having, is that we find that listening is a 
part of the validation that they have been screaming for and a 
part of the process towards developing a meaningful 
relationship that will allow us to engage with them in a 
meaningful way.
    Mr.  Rutherford. Thank you. And I appreciate that answer. 
And I tell you, that is why I think--coming from the law 
enforcement community particularly, which often creates some of 
these grievances, I think it is so important that individuals 
have a way to address those grievances with those agencies 
where it has occurred. And that was one of my main concerns 
when I was a sheriff, was making sure that people knew they 
were being treated fairly and that they had that voice.
    So thank you for all you are doing.
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you, sir.
    Mr.  Rutherford. And, Madam Chair, I see my time has run 
out. I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    Mr. Ruppersberger?
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Executive Director Rangel, I have to admit that, before 
this hearing, I was unfamiliar with your organization. However, 
after reading about your programs, I am already a huge 
supporter.
    Your work is quite similar to groups in my district like--
or my State, like ROCA, R-O-C-A; Safe Streets in Baltimore; and 
the Violence Intervention Program at the Maryland--University 
of Maryland Shock Trauma, by the way, which is rated one of the 
top trauma systems in the world.
    I believe mental health counseling and support groups go a 
long way, especially if it is being led by those who were once 
victims of trauma and indoctrination themselves.
    In fact, I trust your strategy so much that I introduced a 
bipartisan bill with Representative Adam Kinzinger to establish 
grant funding to hospital-based violence intervention programs.
    Now, these operations offer wraparound services to victims 
of violent crime while they are recuperating on hospital beds, 
effectively making them a captive audience. Now, patients are 
offered counseling and support that can include substance abuse 
treatment; job training to help find--really find them jobs; 
and, finally, affordable housing, which really would--if they 
can get to that level, would take them out of the environment 
where they came from.
    Now, at Shock Trauma program, that program I just talked 
about, the participants have shown an 83-percent decrease in 
rehospitalization due to intentional violent injury and a 75-
percent reduction in criminal activity and an 82-percent 
increase in employment. And those are pretty good numbers.
    Now, while the demographical groups may be different, the 
experiences are quite similar. Most individuals are a product 
of their environment. And my question for you is something that 
I want to take back to the groups I just mentioned.
    How do you make the initial connection and build trust with 
individuals who have been radicalized? And then, also, to what 
extent is socioeconomic conditions a factor in who gets wrapped 
up in hateful and violent groups?
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you for that.
    You know, I want to make sure I understand the first part 
of your question. Could you please repeat that?
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. Yeah. Sure. I wanted to take back to 
these groups, okay, that I mentioned in my area or my State, 
how do you make the initial connection and build trust with 
individuals who have been radicalized?
    Mr.  Rangel. Sure. Part of the experience that I am 
leveraging here at Life After Hate comes from a planning and 
implementation grant I participated with in reentry, working 
with some of the groups like the--that you mentioned. And what 
we learned there is that the approach that any organization or 
agency uses is often a bigger predictor of outcomes than the 
actual ability of the person to change.
    So basically--and that is one of the reasons we are using 
MI. So, while MI works with clients, it also informs those of 
us at--you know, leading the charge into helping--how to 
approach these spaces, so how do--that approach is what is 
effectively establishing the relationship that you are asking 
about.
    So it comes from respecting the person regardless of what 
they have done and demonstrating that respect through your 
policies, through your administration, through your 
partnerships, through the advocacy work that you are doing. 
They need to see that not only are you addressing risks and 
needs that they have but also barriers that exist in the 
community. That is a major part of our model right now.
    Aside from that, once they are talking with us, as I 
mentioned earlier, that listening--the onset of listening for 
them is often enough to kind of shake through their defenses, 
because they are prepared for a fight. What they are not 
necessarily used to getting is acceptance and that acceptance 
of them as a human being who is still worthy of assistance, not 
necessarily anything that they have done or said.
    And I think, when you can preserve that part of the 
interaction with an individual, then they start to trust you 
enough to open up and start sharing the parts that you actually 
need to work on with them.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. That is why this is so important.
    The other thing is that to what extent is socioeconomic 
conditions a factor in who gets wrapped up in hateful and 
violent groups?
    Mr.  Rangel. I do think it is a factor that we should take 
in, but, even as of late, and maybe even perhaps since 2017, we 
recognized that not all of these men and women fit that older 
model of broken homes and separated families or poverty or lack 
of education because quite a few of these men and women were 
coming from wealthy families that were intact, who have college 
degrees, or who have professional careers.
    And so I think there are many factors that we need to be 
taking in, and some that maybe we haven't historically 
considered before.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. Well, thank you for what you are doing. 
It is needed, and it is necessary. Thank you.
    Mr.  Rangel. Thank you.
    Mr.  Ruppersberger. I yield back.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. I have a question, and, in the 
interest of time, I have a question for Mr. Cote, and I am 
going to put them all together.
    Is there a particular age at which young people are 
particularly vulnerable to extremist influence, and is there a 
case for developing appropriate programming for kids younger 
than nine, and what kind of reception are you getting from 
school administrators and educators?
    Mr.  Cote. Thank you, Chairwoman, for the question.
    We--so, in our work, we haven't come across--there--just in 
the work we have done specifically, we haven't come across 
anything that would suggest a certain age is the most 
susceptible.
    Now, of course, as I had mentioned in a previous question, 
the more individual--the more time individuals are spending 
online, the more likely that they are to become exposed to 
potentially harmful material.
    So, with that understanding, the idea--the older you get, 
the more attention that you may want to start paying to--in 
terms of the types of questions that we have run, we talk about 
the time that youth are spending online, their relationship 
with their technology and such.
    Now, in terms of developing workshops and some sort of 
toolkit with--for younger than nine, we ran a--it is the only 
time we have ever run programming with youth younger than the 
age of nine. It was a part of a Girl Scouts Cybersecurity Day 
with students as young as, I believe, seven and eight.
    And we ran programming just specifically on online 
disinhibition, and the way that we did it was we gave all of 
the Girl Scouts 3D glasses, and we said: Well, if you have 
these 3D glasses, it is as if you are indivisible, or 
invisible--pardon me--and, if you are invisible, what are you 
more likely to do?
    And so you have all the students coming out or all the 
girls coming out with things: Well, I am going to sneak 
downstairs when I am not supposed to. I am going to be doing 
things, you know, taking a few more risks.
    And then we lent that back to, when we go online--and it 
may not be something that they are all doing right now, but it 
may be something that they do in the future--they may end up 
feeling more comfortable to do something online than they would 
offline, just like they would if they were invisible in the 
real world. So trying to work with them to try and identify 
when they have that feeling.
    So that is our experience with working with youth younger 
age. Now, youth are coming into contact with technology quicker 
than they were really at any other point in human history, I 
would say. So I definitely think that there needs to be age-
appropriate programs and workshops and toolkits, anything of 
sort to really sort of help youth be introduced into technology 
in a very healthy way, something that we would love to do 
moving forward.
    Unfortunately, we don't have the resources to be able to do 
everything, but it is something that definitely would be 
helpful for youth of a younger age, even younger than nine.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. And what kind of reception are 
you getting from school administrators and educators?
    Mr.  Cote. Oh, right. So apologies for missing that 
question.
    So the reception that we have been receiving, of course 
during COVID-19, it has been a challenge. School districts are 
trying to maneuver on the virtual or hybrid platforms and 
classroom management. So that has been a challenge in terms of 
actually being able to work with as many schools as we would 
like to, of course.
    Now, in the past, with the partnerships that we have had 
with schools, very receptive, very interested in online safety 
programming. Of course, like I had mentioned, a lot of research 
is showing that teachers aren't feeling as comfortable talking 
about online safety in the classrooms, so whenever they can 
have individuals--of course, our team is a team of young 
individuals, so being able to come in and connect with the 
youth to talk about online safety is something that a lot of 
schools have expressed a lot of interest in and they are fans 
of, yes.
    Ms.  Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    And my final question is for Mr. Aborn and any of the other 
panelists that may want to chime in, and I don't mean to put 
anybody on the spot, but what recommendations do you have for 
the Department in terms of how it is implementing the grant 
programs? And what recommendations do you have for this 
committee as we think about how to prioritize funding for the 
coming fiscal year?
    Mr.  Aborn. Well, I think that is probably the critical 
question for this hearing and certainly is a complicated one 
because there are so many factors at play here.
    Obviously, scalability is something you are going to hear 
over and over and over again. There are lots of good programs 
out in the country, but they struggle, frankly, to maintain 
their day-to-day existence and to expand to meet the need.
    In our own particular case, as soon as we get our 
evaluations in, I know there is interest in just--in the 
Department of Justice and districts across the country, 
prosecution districts, to do this work there as well.
    We have to be very mindful of the fact that we know from 
the traditional crime space that recidivism is a big issue. The 
last thing in the world we want is recidivism in the terrorist 
space. So we need to confront that head-on.
    So we need to be thinking about evaluations, as the 
Department is doing; target populations; and also building 
interlocking circles of support out there so that the members 
of our society know they have resources to go to when they 
confront the particular problem.
    There are--we want to reach out to families and loved ones 
of people who are known to be mobilizing, particularly when 
those family members will not necessarily pick up the phone and 
call the FBI or call the NYPD or any other local law 
enforcement agency. We need to make sure they have access to 
the kinds of services that can help stop that mobilization 
process.
    And that is the key, and that is why I say we want to focus 
on precision prevention. We want to understand who those 
individuals are who are beginning to mobilize towards violence 
and break that cycle. That, to us, is the challenge.
    Mr.  Roybal-Allard. Okay. I have just been told that our 
Webex time has run out, so I apologize to the other two 
panelists. If you have some suggestions, please submit them to 
the subcommittee.
    And, with that, I want to thank the witnesses for joining 
us today, and I look forward to hearing about further progress 
on your TVTP programs. And the best of luck to all of you for 
the work that you are doing.
    The Subcommittee on Homeland Security stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]RPTR WARRENEDTR ZAMORADEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, April 28, 2021COAST 
GUARD READINESSDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS 
FOR 2022Wednesday, April 28, 2021COAST GUARD 
READINESSWITNESSESADMIRAL KARL L. SCHULTZ, COMMANDANT OF THE 
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order.
    As this hearing is being conducted virtually, I want to 
remind members that you are responsible for muting and unmuting 
yourselves. When you are recognized to speak, if I notice you 
have not unmuted yourself, I will ask if you would like the 
staff to unmute you. If you indicate approval by nodding, the 
staff will unmute your microphone.
    To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair or staff 
designated by the chair may mute participant microphones when 
they are not recognized to speak. If there is a technology 
issue during a member's speaking time, we will move to the next 
member until the issue is resolved, and you will retain the 
balance of your time.
    We will be operating under the 5-minute rule. When you have 
1 minute remaining, the clock on your screen will turn yellow. 
When your time has expired, the clock will turn red, and it 
will be time for me to recognize the next member.
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules, beginning with the chair and ranking member, followed by 
members present at the time the hearing is called to order, in 
order from seniority, and we will alternate by party. Next, we 
will go to members who were not present when the hearing was 
called to order until every member present has had a first 
round.
    As a reminder, members can submit information in writing 
for any of our hearings or markups to the email address that 
was provided in advance to your staffs.
    Now let's begin.
    I welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on Coast Guard 
readiness.
    Admiral Schultz, we are pleased to have you testify before 
us today. I would like to start by extending my gratitude to 
you and all the men and women of the Coast Guard for your 
service to our Nation.
    This past year has been difficult for so many. The Coast 
Guard in particular has shown once and again to be a resilient 
force in protecting our Nation. The Coast Guard has been a 
critical Federal asset in response to the COVID pandemic.
    From the early days of the COVID virus, the Coast Guard was 
at the forefront of disembarking nearly 300,000 cruise ship 
passengers and crew, coordinating the deployment of medical 
staff and supplies, as well as safe medivac, and later, 
delivering vaccine to communities in Alaska. The Coast Guard's 
role is one that only can be performed and built by this 
incredible service organization.
    The COVID pandemic also required the Coast Guard to pivot 
from its everyday operational requirements. In some cases, to 
maintain safety protocols, ship crews had to forego port calls 
and multiple times isolate for 2-week periods. The Coast Guard 
also endured distressing events such as fires on the national 
security Waesche and the icebreaker Healy. In both cases, the 
crews mitigated damage to the cutters and quickly began 
repairing the fire damage. The Healy also required moving a 
100-ton motor from Baltimore to California and installing it 
onto the ship. This was no small feat.
    In addition to its normal workload and these extraordinary 
challenges, the Coast Guard was also faced with responding to 
the largest number of named tropical storms and hurricanes 
ever.
    I am pleased the subcommittee was able to maintain our 
commitment to support the men and women of the Coast Guard by 
providing over $12.8 billion in our fiscal year 2021 funding 
bill. This amount was above the request and included funding 
for an extensive number of items on the Coast Guard's unfunded 
priorities list. Many of these items directly support the well-
being and readiness of the men and women of the Coast Guard.
    I am also pleased we were able to fund important 
investments to recapitalize the Coast Guard's air and marine 
fleets. This includes four additional fast-response cutters to 
finish the FRC's program of record, an additional HC-130J 
aircraft, additional MH-60T helicopters, and continued support 
for the offshore patrol cutter and Polar Security Cutter 
programs.
    Unfortunately, the preliminary budget document for fiscal 
year 2022 makes no mention of the Coast Guard. We can only 
glean from this that the request is unlikely to include any 
substantive enhancements for the service. I hope next month 
when we get the full budget request this will not be the case.
    Admiral Schultz, we look forward to your testimony and how 
you are executing current funding. We are also interested in 
hearing your thoughts on the future of Coast Guard readiness. 
While some of our questions may be oriented toward activities 
anticipated for the coming fiscal year, we understand at this 
time you are not at liberty to specifically address most 2022 
budget requests.
    Thank you again for joining us, and I look forward to your 
discussion.
    I now turn to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Admiral Schultz, I want to begin with a sincere and 
strong thank you to you. I have always had a great, warm 
relationship with the Coast Guard, but, sir, your service and 
outreach to me with your staff has been nothing short of 
exemplary, and I appreciate that. It has allowed me to get to 
know more about the Coast Guard, and your veterans are so proud 
of what you are doing, but thank you. Your work has allowed me 
to do my job in a much better fashion, sir.
    I would like to extend a warm welcome to all of our Coast 
Guard folks. It is always a pleasure to hear about the many 
successes of the Coast Guard and the many important mission 
areas covered by the men and women of the service, all with the 
goal of protecting our country and her people.
    I am hopeful that your people are well, considering the 
challenges and demands of fulfilling the mission of operating 
during a pandemic. It is a credit to the Coast Guard men and 
women and their families for the resilience they have shown in 
their service.
    Normally this time of year, we would be discussing the 
budget request for the next fiscal year, and it is unfortunate 
that we are unable to have that discussion in this hearing. I 
believe there is value in hearing directly from the agencies 
about the initiatives and investments that are proposed for the 
coming year.
    For the Coast Guard, the budget request is often centered 
on readiness. Looking back at your written testimony, sir, over 
the past few years, readiness is in the front and center in the 
message you deliver to the Congress about your goals for the 
Coast Guard, from the people to the planes.
    I recommend--or I commend you for looking across the 
service to identify what your workforce needs, how they can be 
successful and representative of the people in our Nation, as 
well as looking at the assets and infrastructure to ensure that 
the Coast Guard remains a modern military and law enforcement 
force, first responder, and maritime steward. I am hopeful that 
we, the subcommittee, can continue to be partners in these 
endeavors.
    I am going to apologize. I will be briefly stepping out. I 
am going to stay with this committee, leave, because we have 
got another subcommittee hearing going on concurrently, but 
then I am going to come right back after my questioning. And 
during that time, I am going to ask my dear friend and 
colleague, Mr. Palazzo, to serve as the ranking member in my 
absence, but I will be back.
    But again, Admiral Schultz, thank you, sir, for your 
service to our country, to your service to the great United 
States Coast Guard. I look forward to your testimony, sir.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Mr. Fleischmann.
    To ensure everyone has ample opportunity to ask questions, 
I ask each member to keep their turn to the allotted 5-minute 
per round.
    Admiral Schultz, we will submit the full text of your 
official statement for the record. Please proceed with your 
oral testimony.
    Admiral Schultz. Well, thank you. And good morning, 
Chairwoman Roybal-Allard and Ranking Member Fleischmann and 
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to 
testify before you today, and I appreciate my written testimony 
being entered for the record.
    Let me begin by thanking you for your unwavering support of 
the United States Coast Guard. The fiscal year 2021 
appropriation provides critical momentum for Coast Guard 
service and aviation fleet recapitalization, it injects much 
needed funding to improve our aging shore infrastructure and 
information technology, and makes essential investments in our 
most critical asset, our people, our workforce.
    With your assistance, we must sustain momentum in our 
efforts to restore readiness, and we must continue to transform 
into a 21st century Coast Guard, one that stands ready to meet 
an increasing demand for our services and is able to operate in 
an increasingly complex, interconnected, and technologically 
advanced maritime domain.
    Readiness is not achievable without deliberate action. With 
your support, we continue efforts to build the Nation's first 
new heavy polar icebreakers in nearly a half century. The 
engineering casualty, our medium-endurance--excuse me--medium 
icebreaker Healy last summer highlights the lack of resilience 
in the U.S. icebreaker fleet and reinforces the importance of 
our ongoing polar security cutter acquisition efforts.
    Additionally, the funding provided in fiscal year 2021 
appropriations allows us to continue our offshore patrol cutter 
acquisition. Continued progress on this program is essential to 
recapitalizing the capability provided by our fleet of 210- and 
270-foot medium-endurance cutters, some of which have over 55 
years of service under their belts. Despite extraordinary 
effort, our medium-endurance cutter fleet has lost nearly 500 
annual patrol days over the last 2 years due to unplanned 
maintenance and repairs. Replacing this fleet is absolutely 
essential for the Coast Guard to effectively carry out its 
missions in the future.
    Any effort to address readiness must also include the Coast 
Guard's aviation fleet. Our fleet of MH-65 Dolphin helicopters 
is increasingly difficult to maintain, and the rapidly 
declining availability of parts for these aircraft is affecting 
our ability to field this capability. Accordingly, the Coast 
Guard must take immediate actions to begin transitioning our 
rotary wing fleet towards a single airframe comprised of MH-60 
Jayhawk helicopters.
    Additionally, I want to thank you for the $110 million 
provided in fiscal 2021 for the purchase of our 18th HC-130J 
Hercules long-range surveillance aircraft. This highly-capable 
modern aircraft improves our interoperability with the Navy, 
Marine Corps, and Customs and Border Protection, and allows for 
real-time sharing of critical mission-related data, enhancing 
maritime domain awareness and mission effectiveness.
    To improve our readiness, we must continue targeted 
investments in our shore infrastructure and our information 
technology systems. We greatly appreciate the $363 million 
provided for critical shore facility and housing projects in 
2021. Our shore facilities serve as the basis for all of our 
operations, and these investments provide modern facilities 
that enhance the resilience of our shore infrastructure 
portfolio against both natural hazards and climate change.
    Moreover, the $185 million provided between the CARES Act 
and the fiscal 2021 appropriations have allowed us to begin 
vital technology upgrades to our network, hardware, and 
software that serve as the first investments in our technology 
revolution initiatives.
    Technology enables every facet of Coast Guard operations, 
and improving technological readiness is an imperative for 
successful mission execution and our ability to recruit and 
retain a capable, talented workforce, moving into the future.
    While cutters, aircraft, and infrastructure are mission 
enablers, the Coast Guard workforce engages in essential 
people-to-people interaction at the local, national, and global 
levels. Readiness requires empowering this workforce with the 
information, knowledge, skills, and support systems that allows 
them to excel across the full spectrum of Coast Guard 
operations. And I am incredibly grateful to the Congress for 
your tremendous support of our people.
    As the pool of Americans eligible to serve in the Armed 
Forces become smaller, the Coast Guard must provide parity with 
the other military services. Readiness is also about the 
attractiveness of our service in a highly competitive job 
market. This includes bonuses and retention pay, modernized 
training, expanded educational benefits such as tuition 
assistance, and access to reliable childcare.
    In closing, I would like to thank you again for all that 
you do for the Coast Guard. Your unwavering support is 
essential for the building and supporting the Coast Guard our 
Nation needs and enabling our dedicated workforce to remain 
Semper Paratus, "always ready."
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning, and 
I welcome your questions.
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    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Admiral.
    I would like to begin on one of the things that you 
addressed in your opening statement, and that has to do with 
readiness and diversity.
    As you know, the subcommittee has a history of investing in 
recruitment and retention aimed at increasing diversity, and we 
have discussed many of your efforts to encourage a more female 
and family-friendly environment and there is no better way to 
encourage diversity than by modeling it.
    So I want to congratulate the Coast Guard for recently 
announcing the President's intent to nominate Admiral Linda 
Fagan to be the first commandant. If confirmed, she will be the 
first woman four-star admiral in the history of the Coast 
Guard.
    So could you please spend a few minutes to discuss the 
outcomes of your diversity initiatives and investments and your 
ideas on how you can continue the progress in this area?
    Admiral Schultz. Chairwoman, thank you for the question. 
And we are excited for Vice Admiral Linda Fagan's nomination to 
be our first four-star female officer and future vice 
commandant, 32nd vice commandant. She is a fantastic officer, 
and we are excited for that to move forward in the Senate.
    Ma'am, to answer your question, you know, so my goal--and 
you know that since day one, 1 June 2018--is a Coast Guard more 
reflective of the Nation we serve, and we operate in a very 
competitive environment for talent. I am looking for about 
4,000 young enlisted men and women on an annual basis and about 
500 officers, and we compete with the other Department of 
Defense Armed Force services that are out there, looking for 
about 1,000 folks every few days.
    And for us there is--I have 54 recruiting officers across 
the Nation. We scoped that down in the sequestration period of 
2013 from 104. We have got 320 or so recruiters. You know, on a 
comparative basis, the Marine Corps recruits about 30,000 
recruits a year. We recruit 4,000. Our recruiters average about 
12.5 recruits, the Marines about 7.5, and they do it with a 
workforce that is exponentially bigger than ours and they have, 
you know, about 48 recruiting offices, but then they have 
depot-level sub-offices in the hundreds.
    So we are working hard there, ma'am. I think our progress 
is that, you know, we commissioned a RAND study, holistic 
study, to look at women and retention issues a couple of years 
back. We have actioned that. We are waiting for our RAND study 
that looked at underrepresented minorities in the service, and 
I will take receipt of that report in July. I think what we 
have worked hard to do is knock down those inhibiters, you 
know. When we were retaining women, somewhere between 5 and 10 
percent, depending on what point, you looked into the career 
trajectories at a lower rate than their male counterparts and 
we are addressing some of those things. We have initiated 
programs where we bring in reservists. So first-time moms or 
people that had additional members of their family, they can 
maximize the available leave to them, maternity leave, which is 
up to 84 days.
    But if you are in a small operational unit, stepping out 
when you are in a left and right forward or starboard rotation 
is very difficult for 84 days, but we have brought in a 
reservist to sit in the seat, to run the boats those 90 days so 
our people can maximize those programs and understand what 
first-time parenting or an additional person to your family 
looks like.
    We have made a commitment where we have many of our female 
colleagues also have spouses that serve in the Coast Guard or 
other Armed Forces, and we made a commitment when we assign 
them places. Sometimes in the past, one member would have a 4-
year assignment, one would have a 2-year assignment. How do you 
reconcile that in your decisions for living, your decisions for 
childcare? We have aligned those on the front side for E-6 and 
below and lieutenant and below. We try to do that for folks 
senior to those ranks where we make a guarantee for folks in 
those more junior ranks. So we are looking at more stability in 
areas.
    We put out a diversity inclusion action plan the summer of 
2020 as a build-out of our efforts that have been, you know, 24 
months leading up to that. And we have about 20 of 125 what we 
call diversity inclusion action plan change agents that will 
finish up their training in June. The remaining 105 will be 
done by the end of September, and these individuals will deploy 
across the Coast Guard. They will plug in at the Leadership 
Diversity Advisory Councils. They will have the conversations 
to elevate at the field level just how important being a more 
inclusive Coast Guard is, and they have the training. They have 
the skills to engage in the difficult conversations.
    We have also brought on board--and I am winding down, 
ma'am. We brought on board five new officer recruiters that 
will be linked to minority-serving institutions, Historically 
Black Colleges and Universities. And they will be in Atlanta. 
They will be in Norfolk, Virgina; New Orleans and Hampton 
Roads, and one programatically in Washington. I think this is 
the start of an increasing footprint there.
    But we are trying to take our recruiting efforts to parts 
of America that will allow us to grow the ranks. You know, one 
good news story: In an organization that is 15 percent women, 
our academy graduating class this spring will be about 40 
percent women. And then it is not just bringing them to the 
accession points, getting them through the training; it is how 
do we retain them in the service.
    I think holistically, Madam Chair, we are looking across 
all that and I think we are making progress, but it is slow. If 
I did nothing but bring women into Cape May, 4,000 a year for 
the next 4 years, and every single woman I brought in stayed in 
the service, we would only move 15 percent to probably 18 
percent. And I can't go find 4,000 women right now at that 
pace, but our goal is 25 percent women, 35 percent 
underrepresented minorities.
    So as we go out and recruit that difficult space, we are 
getting those targets up. So I think we are on a good 
trajectory, ma'am, but this is going to be a little bit of long 
ball to really see the movement. But I think we win when we can 
retain members and they see themselves rising to whatever level 
success looks like in the service to them as individuals.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. My time is up. But I do--I believe 
you did mention it, but I am certainly pretty sure that our 
investments also in expanding childcare for the Coasties has 
also been a very positive factor in being able to retain the 
women in the Coast Guard.
    Admiral Schultz. Madam Chair, we have 10 child development 
centers. You have been to some. The childcare subsidy and you 
amplifying that dollar amount is where we went. That has been 
fantastic, and that has made a difference. We are located in 
major metropolitan areas--Seattles, Miamis, L.A., San 
Francisco, New York City--all high-cost areas, and we don't 
have childcare centers other than in those 10 locations. That 
is how we win and retain our families, ma'am. So thank you very 
much to you and the committee for that critical injection.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Good morning again, Admiral Schultz.
    In your testimony, sir, you referenced many of the 
investments, including in the fiscal 2021 Appropriation Act, to 
recapitalize assets across the board for surface, air, and 
shore facilities. Some of these assets, like the refurbishment 
of helicopters and new icebreakers and the replacement of older 
cutters with the new OPC, are very important to readiness and 
response, especially since the delivery timeline for some of 
the new assets are racing against the usable life and age of 
the older equipment.
    Sir, how has COVID impacted your acquisition timelines? And 
have you had to adjust any schedules to reflect the challenges 
of the past year?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Ranking Member Fleischmann, thank 
you for the question. I think the good news story is our major 
acquisitions programs are on track, on schedule. The U.S. 
shipbuilding industry, like many other, most other U.S. 
industries had some impact. We have not adjusted any 
contractual dates yet on any of our shipbuilding programs. We 
have--list some of those challenges here down at Elizabeth City 
where we do overhaul people of the maintenance on our 
helicopters and we found some learned--some resiliency lessons. 
Some places we are one or two employees deep. And when we had 
some folks that we had to quarantine or tapped out for COVID, 
we had to shut some product lines.
    So we have done some internal learning on our own 
capabilities from a maintenance sustainment standpoint. But 
with industry, we have seen HII, Huntington Ingals Industries, 
down there maintain, you know, progress on the NSCs. Could 
there be some dates that we haven't, you know, fully understood 
and manifest yet? And these shipbuilding programs are long-
term, you know. The tenth and the eleventh NSCs, national 
security cutters, are under construction.
    We are imminent on the award of OPC production number three 
and long lead on four, and we will be--you know, we are in that 
process of communicating with the committees this week on that. 
So I think we are tracking there. Polar Security Cutter, we 
still hope to start cutting steel in the coming months.
    And you mentioned aviation, one of the things I had 
mentioned in my opening statement. We are really finding some 
challenges with our 98 Dolphin helicopters. Aerospatiale 
Airbus, the parent company, stopped making those aircraft in 
2018. We have the biggest fleet in the world at 98. And things 
like gearbox, it is very difficult to get the parts. So right 
now, we are flying them at about 70 percent of programmed hours 
just because none of the parts are supported, and we are going 
to have to make some tough decisions. We have got six on the 
beach right now that are down for lack of availability of parts 
but probably 10 by the end of June. And as the chairwoman 
mentioned, heading, you know, into the last year's hurricane 
season, this is the time of year come hurricane season that 
kicks off on 1 June. We really want every available asset ready 
in the barn or out doing other missions and ready for the fight 
on that front.
    So thank you, sir.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir.
    Creating a new type of cutter, Admiral, must always present 
challenges to the Coast Guard and the shipbuilders as you bring 
the next generation of cutters to the sea. The offshore patrol 
cutter, however, has seen more than its fair share of 
challenges on the road to delivery. Can you please provide an 
update, sir, on how the delivery of the first hulls is coming 
along? Will we see delivery by 2022, sir?
    Admiral Schultz. Congressman, thanks for that question. And 
as I mentioned briefly, we anticipate announcement here this 
week on OPC number three and long lead time materials on number 
four. So that is a good story. OPC number one, the Argus, is 
more than 40 percent complete on her build. OPC number two, the 
Chase, is in the low teen digits on her build. So I think the 
2022 delivery, latter half of the calendar year, late part of 
2022, I think we are still tracked. There has been no 
contractual modifications to that.
    You alluded to some of the challenges. You know, we awarded 
a contract for the first build early on my watch in the fall of 
2018, and then within 10 days, Hurricane Michael, after the 
fact recategorized as a Category 5 hurricane, smashed through 
Panama City down there where Eastern Shipbuilding Group is 
located. And we did some work with the Department and oversight 
from the Hill, some extraordinary contractual relief, but I 
think that program is progressing forward very positively. And, 
you know, that contract was for up to four ships, and we have--
we will be looking at a potential re-award here with many 
different vendors in the coming months. So OPC, sir, I feel 
confident is in a good place.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Good morning, Admiral. We appreciate your testimony this 
morning and your leadership in so many ways. We appreciate your 
being here.
    I want to raise some questions initially about Coast Guard 
base Elizabeth City here in my home State of North Carolina. In 
2019, before the curtain, the pandemic curtain, fell, you and I 
were able to visit the base. It does contain, as you know, a 
joint civil- and military-use airport. The Coast Guard has done 
an outstanding job in that region, and I just want to 
acknowledge that. We have a prized HBCU, Elizabeth City State 
University, that has benefited greatly from the Coast Guard's 
presence and partnership, including being able to use the 
runways at the Coast Guard base for their flight training 
program. It is the only 4-year professional flight training 
program in the north--in the State of North Carolina, and it 
has grown by 50 percent over the last 2 years. So it is 
important to us.
    Unfortunately, the growth has been stymied by the need for 
an additional working runway at the air station. So that is 
what I wanted to just ask you how we are doing on that. Without 
a renovated runway, student pilots aren't going to be able to 
log the hours and earn the FAA licenses they need for their 
degrees.
    The December omnibus bill provided $25 million for the 
Coast Guard to renovate and recapitalize this runway, allowing 
the airport to provide better service to the Coast Guard, to 
university flight students, and to general aviation. Along with 
that $25 million, December's conference report encouraged the 
Coast Guard to work with the State and local partners, 
including institutions of higher learning, to mutually benefit 
the enhancements, to undertake mutually beneficial enhancement 
to this runway.
    So that is what I want to focus on here for a few minutes. 
Can you provide an update on these discussions, the plans for 
repairing this critical runway, including any cost estimates 
that we should know about, the estimated timeframe you have for 
completion, and any financial or operational partnerships, 
commitments that you have made?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Congressman Price, good to see you, 
sir, and I appreciate our chance to go down there. And as you 
noted, sir, the 2021 appropriation does have that $25 million 
for runway 119, and we are absolutely excited about that.
    You alluded to our strong strategic partnership with 
Elizabeth City, that university, and the aviation program 
there, the shared use of that runway. That runway has suffered, 
you know, crosswind challenges here. And that is a critically 
important runway for us, sir. So where we are, I think we are 
in the planning phase for that. I will have my team circle up 
with your staff to give you a more detailed location. I don't 
have fidelity on exact on that planning process. The 
appropriations, you know, rolled in a few short months ago. It 
takes us a while to spool up. There is many partnerships here 
at the county and local level, sir. But I will make sure we 
circle back and give your team the real fidelity on where we 
stand today and projected timelines. I have not heard anything 
to indicate the appropriated funds does not get us out of the 
gate where we need to be, Congressman.
    Mr. Price. All right. I will take you up on that. We would 
appreciate that kind of update, and we will--we need to take 
stock of this and see where we are and what might be required 
from our side going forward. So I appreciate that offer, and we 
will be conferring with you immediately on this. It is 
important to us, and I know you understand that.
    Admiral Schultz. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Price. In the time I have remaining in this round, I 
want to pick up on the chairwoman's line of questioning having 
to do with the workforce. I know this is a major focus of 
yours. It has also been a major focus of the subcommittee, and 
we have had some challenges because these items were flatlined 
for many years, but I know we have these investments underway 
now. The latest budget gave you the ability to address some 
workforce readiness issues, including childcare subsidies, 
recruiting initiatives.
    Let me just ask you to back away a bit and see if there are 
major needs you would identify. In fact, let me just ask you 
this way: What do you see as the greatest unmet need in your 
workforce?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Mr. Price, I appreciate that 
question. Just one last--circle back on just the last question. 
So E City State University, we use that as a feeder for our 
CSPI, our College Student Pre-Commissioning Initiative. That 
has been a great feeder program for that. So just really thank 
you for that partnership.
    In terms of our workforce, I think the way forward, sir, 
there, the committee picked up--there was many things in the 
budget and they picked up many key issues off the unfunded 
priority list, as Madam Chairwoman spoke to, and things--
behavioral health technicians, psychologists, sociologists--we 
have hired about 11 of 13 slots. We are still trying to make 
some final two hires up in Alaska where it is a little bit more 
challenging to find people to go to some of those remote areas, 
but that is a big deal.
    Training and course development, the $6.4 million there 
helps our workforce that is highly professional. They don't get 
a ton of training.
    Those key training interventions, we are doing blended 
training. Where we used to send somebody for a longer school, 
we are trying to figure out if we can shorten that up, keep 
them at their operational unit longer, do some training online 
to shorten the period. It is a little more targeted. Someone 
that is at a small boat station that goes to boatswain mate A 
school has already gotten many of the skills that the first few 
weeks of that training involve. So we are getting more 
strategic, smarter. Those funds have been helping there. 
Recruiting and retention, that was an unfunded priority list 
pickup to the tune of $6 million.
    I think the key part of that, Congressman, is sustaining 
momentum, you know. So these one-time injects are helpful. A 
couple of them got folded into the future-year budgets. The 
ones that come off the UPL, not all of them, get moved forward. 
So where we can get on a healthy trajectory of 3 to maybe 5 
percent annual growth, I think that is where we continue to win 
in the competitive space.
    And I will just go back to my comment about recruiting in a 
very difficult environment. You know, retention bonuses, we 
have given about 2,000--not retention--session bonus, about 
$2,000. The bleak season for bringing recruits into Cape May, 
New Jersey, is January, February, March. So we sweetened the 
pot. We actually went up to about $7,000 because it was hard to 
find young Americans to get on the bus and show up in Cape May 
this past winter in the COVID environment.
    We use it about $2,000. We cap out at $10,000 for, you 
know, certain skill sets. The Army starts that conversation at 
about $12,000. If you ship out in the first 30 days, it is a 
$12,000 bonus. If you ship out 31 to 60 days, it is a $5,000 
bonus. They go upwards of $40,000 to $60,000 for certain skill 
sets. The Marine Corps is most common to us. They are about 
3,000 recruits. They go up to about $12,000 for targeted skill 
sets.
    So it is about 27 percent of Americans viewed eligible to 
serve, 10 percent with a propensity, and we are in that 
difficult space. And I will tell you we don't have a big budget 
for marketing and you don't see a lot of Coast Guard big 
marketing during major sports events and the gaming 
conferences. So we have to be very targeted through those 54 
recruiting officers.
    I think it is steady, continued partnership on the 3 to 5 
percent growth. I think that is what puts us on the healthiest 
trajectory with respect to workforce, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking 
Member Fleischmann.
    Thank you, Admiral Schultz, for being here today to discuss 
the readiness of the Coast Guard and for your dedication to the 
men and women you lead within your agency. I believe you have 
done an extraordinary job with making sure the Coast Guard is 
ready for what the future has in store. I am proud to have 
worked with you and your team last year to ensure Coast Guard 
retirement benefits are protected from future government 
shutdowns. I am a huge fan of the Coast Guard. I believe that 
they are the jack of all trades within the Department of 
Homeland Security.
    And as many of my colleagues also know, I do not miss a 
chance to talk about the Coast Guard in their new and improved 
national security role. Today, the Coast Guard has taken on a 
bigger role than just securing ports in our maritime border. In 
fact, it now has a global mission. The Coast Guard's vessels 
and aircrafts are constantly deployed around the world to 
protect America's economic prosperity, national security, and 
borders, while also having a presence in cyber.
    One of the biggest missions of the Coast Guard is their 
role in the tri-service maritime strategy that focuses on the 
threats from China and Russia. Along with the Navy and Marine 
Corps, the Coast Guard's capabilities expand the options to 
joint force commanders for better cooperation and competition.
    The Coast Guard's mission profile also makes it the 
preferred maritime security partner for many nations, and at 
the cornerstone of this all is the national security cutter. 
Since the first commissioned cutter in 2008, the national 
security cutter has been a vital deepwater asset to the Coast 
Guard. They have partnered with numerous countries in fighting 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, which directly 
impacts my district's economy on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, as 
well as many other coastal communities.
    NSCs have seized billions of dollars, billions with a "B," 
in drugs. And most recently, in around December 2020, the NSC 
James offloaded $365 million worth of drugs that would have 
entered our country, our communities, and found a way to harm 
our kids.
    NSCs have also been tasked to northern waters to monitor 
Russian activities. The NSC Stone, the newest to the fleet, has 
been tasked to work with the Navy's Fifth Fleet and Central 
Command. One NSC has recently been deployed to the East China 
Sea, partnering with a Navy destroyer to enforce U.N. sanctions 
against North Korea. And just yesterday, the NSC Hamilton 
transited into the Black Sea in support of our NATO allies.
    Now, when it comes to a price tag, the national security 
cutter absolutely pays for itself within the first year of the 
deployment. And when it comes to capabilities, it is second to 
none, an extremely capable, multi-mission ship. Now I have said 
it many times before, but I won't hesitate to say it again: A 
further investment for a twelfth NSC would ensure our Coast 
Guard stays ahead of our adversaries and meets the military 
needs hoisted upon them.
    With that, Commandant, my first question for you today is: 
As the United States looks at our near-peer threats like Russia 
and China, what role do you think the Coast Guard will have 
deterring these new threats?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Congressman, thank you for the 
question, and thanks for highlighting, you know, sort of the 
global stage that the Coast Guard is finding itself 
increasingly a relevant instrument of national security upon. 
Our National Security Cutter Hamilton, as you mentioned, did 
enter the Black Sea, first time since 2008, and they got some 
very exciting partnerships with NATO allies in the region. That 
is an incredible class of ships.
    You know, I think the Coast Guard brings a unique--I look 
at the world of this flat table surface, you know, zero to 180 
degrees. You know, our continuum: We will cooperate, compete, 
and lethality. I think that zero to 150-degree arc is the 
cooperate and compete base. And then lethality, we are written 
into the war plans and we will support our DOD brethren and 
sisters here in the high-end flight with national security 
cutters, fast-response cutters, and port security capabilities.
    In that day-to-day world of competition and cooperation, I 
believe the Coast Guard, the world's best Coast Guard, can call 
out a nation-state like China that, you know, they use their 
Coast Guard, their people's maritime military militia to run 
down, you know, Philippine or other Malaysian fishermen that 
are in disputed regions. The world's best Coast Guard doesn't 
operate that way. We champion a rules-based order, maritime 
governance. I think our racing stripe, which you see replicated 
across the globe, it is iconic and it denotes, connotates, you 
know, rules-based order and adherence to all those right things 
about facilitating commerce in what are free and open parts of 
the ocean. So I think we bring an interesting voice.
    The Stone was off the East Coast of South America. First 
time we have been down there. We partnered with the Uruguayans, 
the Argentinians, the Brazilians on IUU, illegal, unregulated, 
and unreported, fishing. The largest--the largest deepwater 
fishing fleet in the world is under the China flag state. There 
was about 350 of them a year ago, and we are watching to see 
what shakes out this year on the East Coast or--excuse me--the 
West Coast of South America.
    350 of them are operating around the Galapagos Marine 
Reserve, a critically important maritime habitat. The 
Ecuadorians asked us to come in and help them understand what 
was going on. We sent the national security cutter there. In a 
short few days, we identified some portion of a couple of dozen 
vessels that seemed to be potentially spoofing their AIS's, 
which connotates illicit activity.
    So that deep water fleet is off the coast of Africa, East 
and West. It is off the eastern coast of South America, and 
there is no flag state oversight. So I think what we bring to 
that is I don't have enough cutters to be the world's fish 
police, but we can take a global leadership. We can integrate 
academia, nongovernmental organizations, and like-minded 
partners with their maritime capabilities and we can call out 
that behavior.
    So I think it is an increasing role. You mentioned sanction 
enforcement against the DPRK back in 2019. We had two national 
security cutters 5-month heel-to-toe deployments there. We just 
got back with the Kimball out in Oceania, working out with the 
Fijians and others.
    There is--I will stop with just saying there is four law 
enforcement detachments on Navy ships as we speak this morning, 
two in the Pacific, two in the Oceania and Maritime Security 
Initiative Patrols, and two in the Caribbean on that vector 
between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, Haiti. 
Hispaniola, there has been two drug interdictions in the last 
36 hours on that vector alone with airborne use of force, Navy 
helicopters employed by a Coast Guard precision marksman. And 
we are working closer than we ever have, sir. And you mentioned 
the Hamilton. And those two fast response cutters are on their 
way to Bahrain right now to join the Fifth Fleet, sir.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Commandant.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Quigley.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you.
    And that touched on an issue I was going to ask about, the 
illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing. I mean, as deep a 
dive as you want to take, I wouldn't mind--I don't know how 
close you are to where we can actually go out there and see how 
this work is going, just how this problem has grown, and what 
else we can be doing to help you.
    Admiral Schultz. Congressman, thank you. You know, I will 
turn the clock back to the fall of 2018. The Navy in Newport 
every other year has the International Seapower Symposium, and 
I went up to talk about the work of the Coast Guard to 
international partners. And many of the world's navies and 
maritime forces look a lot like the United States Coast Guard. 
So we have a connection there that just sort of forms 
naturally. I was ready to take a lot of questions on counter-
narcotics and other threats, violent extreme threats. What I 
heard the most about in 2018 was their concern with IUU 
fishing, and I think we have processed that. We have upped our 
game and put out a strategic outlook, a 10-year strategy this 
past fall that talks about an elevated role for the Coast 
Guard. Again--
    Mr. Quigley. If you could send that to us, to my office 
again. We have probably got it, but if you could send that to 
us again, I would appreciate it.
    Admiral Schultz. Congressman, we will send it up, and I 
would be happy to come up and if your team would like a 
briefing, offer that as well.
    Mr. Quigley. Absolutely.
    Admiral Schultz. Essentially, sir, it is a food sustainment 
issue. It is a maritime governance issue. What we see is these 
fishing states, these large states--you know, the IUU schema, 
China is the largest fishing water fleet. Taiwanese, number 
two. It is South Koreans, Japanese, Spain.
    What the downside is, a lot of legitimate fishing goes on, 
but the folks that are violating fishing norms, they come into 
areas. There is ecological damage. We have seen what has 
happened off the nearshore waters of China. Essentially, they 
have been forced to push their fleets further. Jinping said, 
hey, build bigger ships and go across the globe to find fish. 
About a third of the fish we consume in this country comes in 
through probably IUU-sourced fisheries.
    So it is an issue at home. It is a competitive 
disadvantage. We hold our American fishermen to standards. We 
are an active flag state. There is also, you know, when you 
look at the African Continent and you project out population 
growth, you know, 40 percent of the protein on that continent 
comes from the ocean. The Chinese are operating off the East 
and West Coasts. There is backroom deals with no transparency.
    Mr. Quigley. How close are they on those coasts?
    Admiral Schultz. Sir, they are--they should be working 
outside the exclusive economic zones of these nations, but 
these nations have very little organic capacity to patrol their 
waters. So, arguably, they are probably working as close to 
their shores as they are not visible, and those catches get put 
on processing ships and they go back to China. There is very 
little local benefit derived economically from these large-
scale fishing operations.
    Mr. Quigley. But how close to our shores are they?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, sir, our shores, we have an active 
presence. So we try to stymie, you know, illicit fishing inside 
our EZ. And we are pretty darn good at that. It is at the end 
of the day we have very few forum violations.
    Where we see some challenge is we have some illegal Mexican 
panga fisheries down in the Gulf of Mexico, and we thwart that. 
And there is some, you know, challenging things with 
neighboring partners and things that, you know, we are managing 
that. That caseload is up and we are working with our NOAA 
counterparts and State Department counterparts. But we are 
large, sir. This is large-scale, industrial fishing. It has a 
deleterious impact to the coastal state. It has a deleterious 
impact to legitimate fishermen that are doing things by the 
rules. And we would be happy to educate you and your staff, 
sir, if you would like to learn more on that.
    Mr. Quigley. Yeah, please do. And I am going to yield back. 
But if you could reach out to my office, they are aware that 
you will. We would like further briefings and try to see some 
of this firsthand.
    Admiral Schultz. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you so much.
    I yield back.
    Admiral Schultz. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you, Admiral Schultz, for being here with us 
today, talking about the men and women of the Coast Guard, and, 
you know, the important role and the growing role, I think, 
that the Coast Guard is going to play in our national security 
interests.
    And I want to echo too the comments that the chairwoman 
made earlier in her opening statements. I was really concerned 
when I didn't see any mention of the Coast Guard in the skinny 
budget, which is a little disconcerting to me when, you know, I 
know recently you mentioned that you need to see a 3 to 5 
percent growth to close the readiness gap over the next 5 
years. And so I am asking if the President's administration 
understands the importance of closing that gap and, I think, 
recognize the growing role that the Coast Guard is playing 
around the globe in our national security interests.
    And so I want to ask this, Admiral, because when you say 3 
to 5 percent over the next 5 years and we look at where we need 
to go, moving forward, I think with the growth of the mission, 
and then we also look at, you know, the fact that we already 
have, I think, a $2 billion backlog of infrastructure needs, 
shore infrastructure needs, is that--is that 3 to 5 percent, is 
that really going to be enough, Admiral? I just want to make 
sure you are not selling yourself short here. And what does 
that include? Does it include the Jayhawks? Does it include the 
$2 billion?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Congressman, thank you for the 
question and for your assessment of the landscape. I believe 
the demands on the Coast Guard are unprecedented at this point. 
There is a good news story in there, and there is a challenge 
in there.
    The good news story is I think people are seeing the unique 
capabilities of our people and our platforms and our new 
capabilities that we are building out with the support of the 
committee.
    On the infrastructure piece, I will start there, then I 
will backfill on sort of my forecast of the budget without, you 
know, crossing lines I shouldn't cross at this stage.
    You know, when you look at our infrastructure, the average 
age of our shore facilities is 38 years. Our housing average 
age is 45 years. You know, a healthy organization recapitalizes 
somewhere between 2 and 4 percent of their infrastructure on an 
annual basis. We are somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of 
that healthy rate in the Coast Guard, which, you know, if you 
kind of project that out, we would be recapitalizing our 
infrastructure every 267 years. So that is unsustainable, and 
we pull a huge backlog.
    With the help of the committee, we are making some 
progress. When I turn the hands of time back to the 2018 
budget, the former administration came in and identified 
challenges in the readiness of the Nation's Armed Forces. There 
was a 12 percent budget growth there. Outside of the 
Department, we didn't win in that space, but we have been on a 
much healthier trajectory with the support of this committee 
and your senatorial counterparts, and that is a, you know, a 
positive slope in the right direction. I think we need to 
continue that.
    You know, with the support of this committee, we have 
raised the narrative about Coast Guard readiness, and I had 
more conversations than I suspect many of my predecessors in 
the previous administration with the national security 
apparatus, and that has translated to the new administration. 
So we have--I have been in the room with the National Security 
Advisor and Jonathan Winer and subordinate elements, many phone 
calls. I think folks recognize the critical importance of the 
Coast Guard in the Arctic, to the Indo-Pacific. You know, 
cooperate, compete continuum I alluded to earlier in Mr. 
Palazzo's questions.
    Congressman, I am guardedly optimistic that we are, you 
know, pushing out a compelling narrative. And, obviously, till 
the budget reaches the Congress here, you know, I am 
sequestered on that, but we have had a chance to put our voice 
into that, more so than in the past, and this committee has 
been, you know, paramount to those efforts.
    So I remain guardedly optimistic that we are on a positive 
trajectory. You can certainly accelerate that. And you asked 
about the helicopters. That is a big, evolving need. We didn't 
anticipate that urgency and that is not a tomorrow urgency, but 
as we wait for future vertical lift coming out of DOD, you 
know, 15, 20 years down the road, we are going to have to press 
into that. And we have already got some help with replacement 
hulls, service-life extension hulls--yes, sir.
    Mr. Rutherford. So, Admiral, if I could ask specifically 
about the Jayhawks, so were they part of that 3 to 5 percent 
growth or is that on top of?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, sir, we had some funding in the 2020 
appropriation, the 2021 appropriation for new hull service-life 
extension program. We have the capability in Elizabeth City, 
Congressman Price's district, at the Aviation Logistics Center. 
We can take former Navy hulls. They take a 60 helicopter with 
$8,000, $10,000. They put it out to the boneyard.
    We can take the good hulls. There is about a 6 or 8 percent 
failure rate. But 92 percent of those hulls, we have got 
somewhere north of three, four dozen hulls on site now. We can 
reconfigure those hulls almost like the overhaul show, the car 
show. We can do some remarkable things. Now, there are only a 
few a year. Now there is a program Senator Shelby has been very 
much championing with some new hulls, new cabins, and I think 
between a blend of those sundowner former Navy hulls, some new 
hulls that have been appropriated in 2021, some running room 
ahead to still bring some more in and some maintenance for 
manpower, we can build that fleet out I think in the coming 
years. We owe more fidelity to the committee on that, but I 
think we are on the start of that but there is some additional 
funds to support that, sir.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. Admiral, thank you very much for that 
answer and clarifying that situation.
    My time has expired. I will yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks so much, Madam Chair.
    Good to see you, Admiral. Thanks for joining us.
    And just piggybacking off of those last comments, I 
appreciate that you feel you have more visibility into the 
budgeting process moving forward than you have in the past.
    I wanted to ask you, in your 2021 State of the Coast Guard 
address, you talked, just as you talked to Mr. Palazzo, about 
the national security threats and some of the tonnage that you 
have captured of illegal drugs over the last few years, 2.4 
million pounds of illegal drugs over the last 5 years this year 
alone. Coast Guard Cutters Bertholf and Munro seized 7,500 
pounds of cocaine in San Diego in March, and the Coast Guard 
and Navy jointly interdicted over 11,400 pounds of cocaine in 
February.
    It is clear that the U.S.'s efforts to fight drug 
trafficking and prevent these illicit drugs from reaching our 
soil are conducted mostly through the Coast Guard. What 
capabilities most assist you in these drug interdictions? And 
what additional capabilities or resources do you feel would 
ensure that you would continue to have effective counter-drug 
trafficking visibility into these transit zones?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Congressman, thank you for the 
question. And there is a lot of parts to that. But we 
historically have been averaging about 460,000 pounds, you 
know, about 200, 210 metric tons a year removed by Coast Guard 
forces. There is a good news story. As the work of U.S. 
Southern Command working through the Coast Guard flag-led Joint 
Interagency Task Force South, we see partner nations here in 
the Western Hemisphere contributing to about 65 percent of the 
cases. And about 40 percent of those cases, they are 
responsible for endgame. You know, it is below the tear line 
information provide those nations and their forces supported 
through the Department of State initiatives, Department of 
Defense initiatives. There is some places where you buy boats 
to support. You know, theState Department might buy a boat for 
the Guatemalan forces of Special Naval. Then SOUTHCOM can layer 
in some outboard engine repair, some communications 
capabilities, some Coast Guard training, maybe some special 
force training. Then those forces go out and they conduct law 
enforcement operations with good success.
    Where that hasn't matured is, as those forces go out and 
interdict, they don't have the same level of prosecutorial 
success. You know, we interdict folks at sea, high seas. We 
bring them back. We bring them into what we call the 
interdiction cycle. They go before a--you know, they go--turn 
them over to another agency. We detain them. They effect an 
arrest. They appear in the U.S. criminal justice system. You 
know, there is a deal copped, so they do a sentence. Then they 
turn some information. That feeds the interdiction cycle.
    Our operations, counter-narcotics operations, are 
increasingly informed by intelligence. So what are those key 
partnerships? It is national intelligence capability. We 
compete with, you know, the ongoing China pacing threat. We 
compete with the VEO threat, you know. So there is a finite 
amount of national intelligence capability, and we try to get 
some portion of that satellite-based information, et cetera.
    Our Navy colleagues, I mentioned the two law enforcement 
captions onboard Navy ships. We did have an enhanced counter-
narcotic operation last year with more naval presence. I am the 
last guy to say the Navy should or shouldn't be doing more 
counter-narcotics work. They have many competing demands, you 
know, with that increasingly aggressive Russia and the Med and 
the Black Sea where we are operating now with China pacing it.
    But when there is a Navy surface combatant, I will put a 
law enforcement detachment. I will put a precision marksman on 
their helicopter. We will expand our capacity. DOD contribution 
to maritime patrol aircraft, those P-8s, high demand across the 
globe. But when we get those P-8s in the SOUTHCOM region, the 
eastern Pacific, the Caribbean Western Center Security, those 
are the best detection platforms out there.
    Customs and Border Protection inside the DHS team fence 
line, they support a lot of the maritime patrol aircraft. So 
support for CBP Air and Marine, that is a key enabler. And we 
are looking to build out some more capability in our long land-
based unmanned aero systems. So right now, we are partnered 
with CBP on what we call the MQ-9 maritime Guardian. There is a 
bigger model out there that Insicha (ph) has and we would like 
to continue to partnership with DHS S&T, with CBP, with 
SOUTHCOM.
    And, sir, it is capacity game. You know, we are effective 
and, again, on target. We just got a finite amount of capacity 
to put against the challenge.
    Mr. Aguilar. The administration has talked about addressing 
the root cause of migration in Central and South America. Much 
of the instability is caused by gangs and other criminal 
organizations in that region.
    You talked a little bit about the coordination with Latin 
America partners, but what other roles can we expect the Coast 
Guard to play as the administration engages in Latin America?
    Admiral Schultz. Yeah, Congressman, I would tell you, you 
are spot on. I would tell you, you know, the Central American 
quarter, the Northern Triangle countries--Honduras, El 
Salvador, Guatemala--they are absolutely the corruption, the 
instability, the squalor that takes--you know, sends people to 
send their children north to try to cross the U.S. southwest 
land border is very much tied to the counter-narcotics work.
    I think where you see increasing roles is we will continue 
to partner. We will continue to build out that success of the 
partners in the region and their capabilities. I think when we 
can stop those drugs from making landfall in those areas, we 
can, you know, help drive down the instability. I pay keen 
attention to what is going on, you know, what the 
administration discussions are down there.
    Iota and Eta, the two hurricanes that, you know, ravaged 
the region, close proximity, close proximity on the calendar 
and geographically. You know, on occasion we have Coast Guard 
assets that will send helicopters in or support our southbound 
colleagues, to offer some immediate relief and, you know, 
immediate food, water, rescue type work. I think it will be 
capacity building, sir. It will be continued counter-narcotics 
work.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Admiral. My time is up. I am so sorry. 
Thanks, Admiral.
    Admiral Schultz. My apologies, sir. I was a little long on 
your time. My apologies.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. That completes the first round, and we 
do have time for another round in which, Admiral, you will be 
able to expand on many of the questions that have been asked.
    I know that there are several issues that have been touched 
on that I was going to ask some questions about, but I would 
like to talk a little bit about some of the items that were on 
the unfunded priorities list which we funded. And these items 
fall under the category that you designated as the technology 
revolution, and includes investments in cybersecurity readiness 
and the next generation underway in cutter connectivity.
    Could you describe some of the technology challenges the 
Coast Guard has faced and how these appropriated funds are 
making a difference? And, in addition, if you could please 
describe other investments that you would prioritize to 
continue modernizing the Coast Guard's technology 
infrastructure.RPTR MOLNAREDTR ZAMORA[11:01 a.m.]
    Admiral Schultz. Yes, Madam Chairwoman, thank you for that 
question. And the funding and the funding items off the 
unfunded priorities list have been usually impactful and 
helpful. Phone system monitorization at our 35 sectors--we have 
a antiquated phone system--this allows us to go to modern 
voice-over-internet protocol. So this is basic stuff, that we 
can't hear the mariner in distress and have a functional 
system, you know, we can't respond in a timely manner. And we 
are getting after that with the funding there, the $6.5 million 
in many of our sectors.
    And now as I have traveled the Coast Guard in the last 24 
months, a little less so the past year than I typically do, I 
have heard that in many sectors and we are actioning that as we 
sit here today.
    Next generation cutter underway connectivity, and that is 
to the tune of $15 million. So you think about those deployed 
ships that are down range, particularly in a COVID environment, 
the only liberty, time off, or port visit they see is to go in 
and get fuel and groceries. So our men and women have been at 
sea 185 days, you know, broken into 70-, 90-, 60-day chunks of 
that with no port call. So the ability to do their job, link 
back to mother Coast Guard and do their work, which is all 
computer-based today, it is enhanced by connectivity, to have 
some reach back to their families, when they, you know, can't 
get to a cell phone or pay phone or go shore, hugely impactful.
    Cutter connectivity allows us to optimize the productivity 
of our ships. It is the high-end information to do operations. 
It is the day-to-day business of the ships. So when a sailor is 
back at the dock, they can take some time off after, you know, 
an arduous 90-day patrol, get a 72-hour, 96-hour break, then 
come back to the workplace. They don't have to hold all that 
workload and batch load it at the dock here when they should be 
home spending time with families or with their interests.
    Cyber readiness, absolutely. We are building out our second 
cyber protection team with funding, our cyber--CMT, Cyber 
Mission Team. We are building that workforce out that is really 
going to allow us to excel as a regulatory net cyberspace. So 
our 365 or so ports, we fielded people at our two area commands 
in our nine districts this year that will interface on cyber, 
bring some expertise to the field because that increasingly 
complicated landscape--out in your State, ma'am, California, 40 
percent of all America's goods come from the ports of L.A. and 
L.B., the containerized traffic.
    And they come up through the rail system to the hard haul. 
You go about 72, 96 hours from some kind of a man-made cyber 
intrusion that shuts the port down, [inaudible] Back here a 
couple of years ago, you know, that can cripple that port, and 
we will feel that on the shelves of Walmart and Macy's and 
Target in less than a week. So there is a cyber element that 
the funding has helped us get after.
    Cyber retention. Those are bright young men and women. 
Bringing them in, keeping them in, we have got to think about 
different agility and permeability for that workforce. But, 
ma'am, those big data platform, I had a team in yesterday. We 
have our senior leaders holding a conference this week, and we 
need to inform our decisionmaking with that analytics.
    So we have, you know, followed data streams. We need to 
clean up our data. We need to get it into a clean data lake, 
and then we could start harnessing that data, that information, 
to really be a data-informed, agile, decisionmaking 
organization.
    So, ma'am, that tech revolution, as I sort of coined the 
term a couple years back, and the dollars against that have 
been hugely impactive. In our young workforce, we are fielding 
mobility. You know, those inspectors in Los Angeles, Long 
Beach, they go out and they spend 8-, 10-hour day, doing, you 
know, Act C (ph) inspections, regulatory inspections, for 
safety, environmental compliance, make sure if it is a cruise 
ship, that someone's aunt or grandparent goes out there, the 
crews is trained, the lifeboats are certified.
    They have to come back and fat-finger all that inspection 
work for hours at their desks. It is mobility that enables 
that. The inspect application just rolled out. We started with 
a mobility solution, about 600 iPads, and we didn't have the 
technology to really enable them.
    We have been talking about this for years. Now--it started 
off like a Kindle. They didn't have to bring a backpack of 
books. Now they actually have the inspect application, they are 
doing the data upload in the field. We are going to do that for 
our law enforcement team.
    So the funds, ma'am, have enabled us to really compete for 
the smart young minds and keep them in the Coast Guard because 
they don't have more mobility on their personal device than 
they have in the Coast Guard-provided solution set from a 
technology standpoint.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I am back. I 
want to thank Ranking Member Palazzo for sitting in for me 
while I asked my questions of the Labor Secretary.
    Commandant, you and I have gone up to the Arctic together, 
and I really appreciated that trip. We have seen over the past 
few years a rise in military activity by the Russians and the 
Chinese in the Arctic, sir.
    I know we talked about this at length with Admiral Bell 
when we were in Alaska almost 2 years ago, but recently, we are 
seeing news of greater activity and Russian military investment 
in the Arctic. How is the Coast Guard responding or preparing 
for this emerging threat? And are you getting support from the 
Department of Defense and through budget to get resources that 
you need to continue with your frontline position in the 
Arctic, sir?
    Admiral Schultz. Well, Congressman, you spoke to the 
increasing geostrategic importance of the Arctic, and that is 
absolutely critical. I just came back from Alaska this past 
weekend and had the privilege of meeting with Governor Dunleavy 
and the two Alaska Senators. We talked a lot about what is 
necessary in the Arctic.
    You know, I have used the phrase that presence equals 
influence in the high latitudes, both Antarctica and the 
Arctic. And we haven't had much presence up there. You know, we 
lost the Healy last summer, and that was unfortunate.
    But the Healy is back. We will send the Healy, working 
closely in collaboration with the Canadians across the 
Northwest Pass. So they will enter through the Bering, transit 
across North America. We will push the Healy out to the 
Atlantic, probably up to Greenland. I wish I could push her 
further, but the amount of available days--she will have 
scientists on board. We will have international partners. We 
will have Navy sailors on board. We will be building out our 
Arctic capabilities.
    What we saw last year--and this is open-source 
information--you know, China has an increasingly repetitive 
presence in the Arctic. Probably 6, 7 or the last 8, 9 years, 
they have been up there with one of their two research--they 
started with one Ukrainian-obtained research vessel, the Snow 
Dragon I. They built a second ship--
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Admiral? Admiral, I am going to have to 
ask you to stop. That phone call was that apparently we have 
lost our live stream, so we have to pause for a few minutes so 
it can be reset.
    Admiral Schultz. Yes, ma'am. We are holding here.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Palazzo. Madam Chair?
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Yes.
    Mr. Palazzo. Madam Chair, I am going to have to jump off at 
10:30, and I think it is 10:30 right now.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Right.
    Mr. Palazzo. I just wanted to--I wanted to thank you for 
the hearing, and also Ranking Member Fleischmann. I would like 
to say my colleagues had some outstanding questions and 
comments today. But I also would like to just thank the 
commandant for his service and commitment and dedication to our 
Nation. He is the right man--or the right person, you know, to 
be politically correct, for the job to lead the Coast Guard.
    And we look forward to the new vice commandant as well. I 
hope, you know, she will be making some Hill visits in the 
future after she is confirmed. But really, I just wanted to 
thank the commandant, and please tell your Coasties and their 
families how much we appreciate their service and sacrifice as 
well. But I have to go.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you, Congressman. And if 
there is any additional questions that you would like to 
submit, please do so.
    Mr. Palazzo. I sure will. There will be some questions for 
the record.
    Commandant, have a great day.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you.
    Admiral Schultz. Thank you, Congressman.
    Mr. Price. Madam Chair, I have got the same problem. I had 
a good question for the second round, but we will submit it for 
the record.
    Commandant, glad to see you. Appreciate everything. Hope we 
will be able to sit down in person before long.
    Admiral Schultz. Thank you, Congressman Price, sir. Good to 
see you, sir.
    Mr. Price. Yeah.
    Thanks, Lucille. Good hearing, though--
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. But--
    Mr. Price. --apart from the disruptions. What are they 
telling you about the--
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Apparently, it is systemwide. All the 
subcommittees that are in session right now are having the same 
problem.
    Mr. Price. My staff had told me that. They were monitoring 
two hearings and said that they both were out.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Yeah. So--
    Mr. Price. [inaudible.]
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. --I will just give it a few more 
minutes, and then if, you know, members have to leave, it is 
understandable. And we apologize, Admiral, for this.
    Mr. Price. Thanks, everyone.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thanks, David.
    Admiral Schultz. Madam Chair, I am on your schedule, ma'am. 
So we are completely flexible here, and we are standing by.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay, thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Aguilar. Chairwoman, I am going to have to go. I am 
sorry.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Can you just hold 1 second?
    Mr. Aguilar. Yeah.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    Mr. Fleischmann. While we are all waiting, I have got some 
happy news. I spoke with Director Murray the other day, and his 
daughter is heck-bent on attending the Coast Guard Academy and 
is going to spend, I think, a year at, I believe the Navy prep 
school. But she wants to go to the Coast Guard Academy, and I 
was just so tickled about that.
    And we had that talk the other day. We have him, Lucille, 
before us, I think, next week, I believe. But so glad to hear 
that she wants to be a Coast Guard officer. And admiral 
probably, commandant already probably knows that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. That is great.
    Chuck, I am calling you.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Oh, you are calling me? Okay.
    Admiral Schultz. Thanks for that word, Congressman. Jim 
Murray is a friend, and I am excited to hear his daughter is--
that extra year is committed to coming to join our ranks. That 
is fantastic, sir.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. So, Pete, yeah, unfortunately, they are 
not able to fix it, but I see that we have both you and 
Rutherford who stayed on. So if there is anything that you 
would like to ask of the admiral, even though we won't be, you 
know, streaming, I want to give you that opportunity. And I 
think we can thank the ranking member, Fleischmann,for that 
opportunity. That was the discussion we just had.
    Anything that you want to follow through with?
    Mr. Aguilar. Yeah. I would just say, Admiral, real fast, 
you know, just to kind of pull at that thread a little bit more 
about the transnational drug trafficking. You know, you talked 
a little bit about the Latin American, you know, posture and 
what we can do.
    You know, how can we kind of complement that on the mil-to-
mil side, you know, as well? You know, that was probably going 
to be my next question.
    Admiral Schultz. Yeah, Congressman, I think as I--you know, 
there is--the package that allows the Coast Guard to be most 
effective down there is a what we call a large cutter, a 
national security cutter or offshore patrol cutter, and some of 
the medium endurance-class cutters.
    We are doing some innovative things with the fast response 
cutters that the committee has been tremendously supportive. 
Funding in the 2021 actually built out the last four hulls. So 
58 domestic, four or six over in the Arabian Gulf.
    But they are complemented by maritime patrol aircraft. That 
DOD piece, we get a lot of support from them. So Customs and 
Border Protection are inside the DHS family, Coast Guard C-130 
airplanes, sometimes a CASA 235 is a little shorter range, 
those DOD P-8s, other capabilities.
    There is contract work, though, that SOUTHCOM does. It is a 
bunch of government-owned, contract-operated aircraft down 
there. All those things come together, sir.
    Really it is a capacity conversation. When we can put more 
in the fight, we have got intelligence to see 70, 80 percent--
    Mr. Aguilar. Yeah.
    Admiral Schultz. --of the activity. We don't have the 
capacity. But, again, I am cautious with all the demands on my 
Navy brethren here, you know, across the globe, to not sign 
them up for more. But I will enable a Navy ship with a law 
enforcement attachment which brings the ability to do law 
enforcement there.
    We will continue to work with the partner nations. I mean, 
we are good at that mission, sir. It is just the--
    Mr. Aguilar. Yeah.
    Admiral Schultz. --you could take the entire United States 
and kind of lay it in the eastern Pacific Ocean. And I make the 
analogy at times, like the handful of police operating from 
Columbus, Ohio, doing speeding across the whole Nation, 
checking the whole Nation. They got to bring them into the 
station when they catch them.
    So it is a vast area, but what we have done and do does 
matter, sir. It matters, as you said, in that Central American 
quarter, to the instability in that region that fuels the 
migration. It is all sort of interplayed, inter-tied there, 
sir.
    Mr. Aguilar. Okay. I appreciate it. Thanks, Admiral.
    Admiral Schultz. Thanks for your interest in that too.
    Mr. Aguilar. Of course.
    Mr. Rutherford. Madam Chair, if I could ask just one quick 
question--
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. That was another call. Actually, we are 
back on streaming, so, Pete, your question was live. Any other 
question that you want to ask? I know you have to run, and then 
I am going to turn to Mr. Rutherford.
    Okay, John? Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Admiral, thank you for being here with us even through 
the downtime.
    I want to go back to the issue of China, the challenges 
that we are going to face with China and are facing around the 
globe. And Coast Guard response, you mentioned earlier, for the 
Galapagos Islands and that 15 fleet that China has [inaudible.] 
You know, I am very concerned when I look at this whole Belt 
Road Initiative that China is really pushing their influence 
deep into hemisphere now. And we see that with Ecuador, we see 
that they have been in Guyana, they have been in Suriname. It 
is disconcerting to see these moves.
    The South China Sea is another area that I know you all are 
addressing as well. Can you talk a little bit about the future 
needs? You know, what can we do in Congress to help you with, 
really, this global national security aspect in pushing back on 
the Chinese?
    Admiral Schultz. Yeah, Congressman, thank you for the 
question. I would say, starting at the end with your question, 
I think where the Congress can be the most helpful is 
maintaining momentum on our major recapitalization program, so 
those initiatives that Madam Chairwoman has led the committee--
and Mr. Fleischmann--on people initiatives. I think people 
readiness, new capabilities that allows us to be the Coast 
Guard the Nation needs.
    I look out to the Oceania region--I mentioned there are a 
few law enforcement attachments on naval combatants today--
Oceania Maritime Security Initiative, doing that. We have got 
three fast response cutters that the committee has supported in 
Guam. I will be out there commissioning those ships in August.
    Those are tremendously capable. They are 154-foot length 
over the water, crewed by 24 Coast Guard men and women. They 
got about 10,000 miles of expeditionary range. I think we bring 
a people-to-people way to partner.
    You know, it is not as expedient as a checkbook, but I 
believe that region of the world, you date back to the history 
of the war and, you know, when we fought on the beaches of 
Guadalcanal and throughout the Solomon Islands and other 
places.
    I believe they value our Western--our lifestyle, our 
cultures, our democratic ideals. I think the Coast Guard is in 
that space on a people-to-people basis, sir. So I think that is 
important. Offshore Patrol Cutters will give us a further reach 
in that part of the world, sir.
    I think it is this IU fishing where we can call out those 
distant-water behaviors, funding to help us link up--the tech 
revolution ties to that--an enabled workforce, the ability to 
do data interlinks as we look into those increasingly 
complicated problem sets.
    And then I think there is a piece where we see, you know, 
nation states in the cyber domain. And I think, you know, we 
have seen--
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Admiral Schultz. --you know, the SolarWinds linking back to 
Russia. We need to protect the 95 percent of U.S. economic 
commerce that happens on the oceans. That is an increasingly 
complicated threat scape. And as we build out cyber 
capabilities, I think all those things are places, sir, where 
the United States Coast Guard, with that 3 to 5 percent 
growth--probably we will catch up--but if we stay on the 
trajectory that Congress has set us on, maybe a few infusions, 
continue to pick some things up, you pull above the President's 
budget. So I think we have the Coast Guard that pulls us into 
the 21st century, and we can be a real useful tool for the 
United States, writ large, as we compete in this great power 
paradigm we find ourselves.
    Mr. Rutherford. Exactly, Admiral. And that is going to 
require that you have the best training, the best prepared 
leadership possible. And so that is one reason I am very proud 
to serve on the Board of Visitors for the Coast Guard Academy. 
And I want to ask--you know, one of the things that I am trying 
to do is really make the Coast Guard Academy attractive to our 
military service academy applicants.
    Are there some things that you think we can help you with 
in achieving that mission of bringing those young men and women 
in? And I think the things that you talked about earlier with 
the chairwoman on, you know, this diversity of outreach and all 
is going to be very important in that success. Can you talk a 
little bit about that?
    Admiral Schultz. Sure, Congressman. I would tell you our 
flagship institution for officer development and commissioning 
officers, all our officer programs at the Academy, both the 
Officer Candidate School and the Coast Guard Academy, it is 
about a 50/50 split that we feed officers, even some direct-
commission officers maybe come in with law degrees. We bring 
them in as an 03, a lieutenant, in the Coast Guard.
    So that is our center of gravity, that 103 acres in 
Connecticut. I think what helps us is, a lot of aging, old 
infrastructure there, it is part of the infrastructure 
conversation I talked about with, you know, 38-year-old 
buildings, on average, and, you know, I think we just opened up 
a new modern fitness facility there.
    When you are competing with these bright young men and 
women with a lot of choices, other service academies, you know, 
other great academic institutions, it is a pretty high bar to 
get in. You know, they visit, they see old stuff, you know, 
maybe at the end of the day they might go elsewhere.
    So I think we are on that trajectory, sir, but I think 
there is a branding issue. I think some additional help and 
continued help on recruiting. I think those things help.
    I think, you know, broadening diversity, those 40 percent 
of women graduates seeing Vice Admiral Fagan as Admiral Fagan 
and then Vice Commandant, you know, bringing more women into 
our flag ranks, all those things are enabled by that steady, 
predictable funding, Congressman.
    So I think we are on a good trajectory. And I just was 
cautioning the committee earlier, say change doesn't come fast 
when the numbers are small. There is a certain sort of quality 
and quantity, as the Russians say, on how fast you move the 
service. But I think we are on a good trajectory, and this 
continued support, sir, I think, is the best way to get it 
there as quickly as we possibly can.
    Mr. Rutherford. Well, I am very proud to support the Coast 
Guard and everything that our Coasties are doing out there. So, 
with that, Admiral, thank you very much.
    And, Madam Chair, I see my time is up. I yield back.
    Admiral Schultz. Thanks for your participation as a Board 
of Visitors member at the Academy, Congressman. That is an 
important thing, and we are getting ready to sort of activate 
that again here given some of the COVID time-out we had to take 
this past 14 months or so, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I just want to say that I think another 
thing--and we have talked about this, Admiral--in attracting 
more young people to the Coast Guard, is actually helping them 
in terms of the information they get to understand what the 
mission is, the broad mission of the Coast Guard is, such as, 
you know, the drug interdiction, protecting our country, you 
know, up in the Alaska regions against, you know, Russians and 
the Chinese.
    I don't think that, in general, the public understands just 
the critical mission that you all have and how expansive it is. 
Very often it is just seen most of the time as, you know, 
rescuing someone, you know, who is drowning in the ocean.
    But when I have talked to young people and explained to 
them about the mission, the broad mission of the Coast Guard, 
there is a lot more interest in joining, as compared--because 
they know what the Marines do, they know, you know, what the 
Navy does. But I don't think there is a very good understanding 
of what the entire mission is of the Coast Guard.
    So I would say, work on the PR in helping, not just young 
people, but I think our country as a whole to understand just 
how critical the Coast Guard is to the security of our country.
    So I just want to add that as part of the answer, Mr. 
Rutherford. At least that has been my experience in talking 
with young people in the district when I have my Academy day. 
They really don't know just how important the Coast Guard is.
    Mr. Fleischmann, I know that you had a question and that 
the Admiral didn't have an opportunity to fully answer it. Is 
there anything that you want to add, Admiral, that you want to 
complete an answer to the question that was asked before you 
were cut off.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Well, I--
    Admiral Schultz. I would probably come back to you on the 
Academy things, but I would like to defer to the ranking 
member, and we will finish that conversation, then maybe just 
offer a couple just thoughts on what you brought up about our 
branding and those things. I think you are right on the mark.
    So, Congressman Fleischmann, I will defer to you, sir.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Well, Admiral, I think you adequately and 
very succinctly and very efficiently answered that question on 
the Russia and China threat in the Arctic. And I know you are 
involved in that, so I trust that that work will continue. But 
I am satisfied with the response.
    And, Madam Chair, whenever you decide to adjourn, I am 
willing to do that as well.
    And, Commandant, thank you. You and I are going to work 
together, as we always have, and I just appreciate everything 
you do for the Coast Guard and for our country, sir.
    Admiral Schultz. Thank you, Ranking Member Fleischmann. It 
is always an honor to work with the committee and yourself and 
Madam Chairwoman.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. So, Admiral, you said you had 
another response.
    Admiral Schultz. Yes, ma'am. I was just going to--Madam 
Chair, I was just going to comment, I think your assessment is 
right, and I think that is a recruiting piece where it is a 
very expensive market.
    I think this program we have with some new officer, 
recruiters, I have mentioned Norfolk, Atlanta, New Orleans, I 
would love to grow that from four, you know, one 
programatically here in Washington, the student office, and get 
some folks to your district, Southern California. There are 
places I can name right now, the next five or six.
    So I think we are rolling that out. The bodies are en route 
this summer. I think we will look to expand that. I think that 
will be part of that story. And I think pressing in a little 
bit on our recruiting budget--you know, I looked at the 
Marines, the Army. They are going to these video conferences--
or video-gaming conferences, you know, they are in those 
spaces. You see the NFL, they are there.
    They are expensive. I am not saying we jump there, but we 
absolutely have an organization with an incredible, you know, 
portfolio of 11 statutory missions. It is hard to roll it down 
to a three-byte elevator speech, but I think when we have 
people in the schools, when we can, you know, get a little bit 
more marketing in terms of national branding, I think that is 
where we reach folks.
    So that 40 or--is about a 52 recruiting officer reduction 
back in 2013 and 2014, the sequestration, that hurt. And I 
think strategically, maybe reopening in some places, really if 
we can do this with the tech revolution, some of the funds you 
gave us.
    Right now, a recruiter has to meet a young man or woman, 
they have to bring them back to the recruiting office to sign 
them up and to actually seal the deal with the paperwork and 
the Coast Guard. Doing that and the mobility--the two-in-one 
mobility solutions we have given them, that is going to be 
game-changing, and you have helped us on that trajectory.
    So I am encouraged that we are going to do better, but your 
assessment is spot on the mark, ma'am. You know, we have got to 
get--we have got a great brand, we have never been more 
relevant and impactful, but we got to be able to tell that 
story across America, in the schools and in the recruiting 
locations. So you have my commitment to continue to work on 
that, ma'am, and I will continue to be frank with you on our 
needs to better that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. That is very much appreciated. And 
since we have ran out of time, Admiral, I just want to say 
thank you for your time. Apologize for the delay.
    You know, I think just from the statements that have been 
made by the subcommittee, there is the realization of the 
critical role that you play in our national security, and I can 
assure you that to the best of our ability, that we will 
support its mission and its personal--personnel. So thank you 
again.
    And the committee now stands adjourned.
    Admiral Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    [Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]HUNT REPORTING COMPANYRPTS SOUZAHAP126.150THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Thursday, 
May 6, 2021UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICETHE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Thursday, May 6, 
2021UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICEWITNESSJAMES MURRAY, 
DIRECTORUNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order. During today's virtual hearing, members are 
responsible for muting and unmuting themselves. When you are 
recognized to speak, if I notice that you have not unmuted 
yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to unmute 
you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will unmute 
your microphone. To avoid inadvertent background noise, the 
chair or staff designated by the chair may mute participant 
microphones when they are not recognized to speak. If there is 
a technology issue during the member's speaking time, we will 
move to the next member until the issue is resolved, and you 
will retain the balance of your time. We will be following the 
five-minute rule. With one minute remaining in your time the 
clock on your screen will turn yellow. When your time has 
expired, the clock will turn red and it will be time to 
recognize the next member. We will follow the speaking order 
set forth in the House rules, beginning with the chair and 
ranking member, followed by members present at the time the 
hearing is called to order in order of seniority, and we will 
alternate by party. Next, we will go to members who were not 
present when the hearing was called to order until every member 
present has had a first round. Members can submit information 
in writing at any of our hearings or markups using the email 
address provided in advance to your staff. So let's begin. I 
welcome James Murray, Director of the United States Secret 
Service. This is the Director's first time to testify in front 
of the subcommittee, and he is here to discuss his agency's 
operations, particularly his protective security activities. 
Director Murray, you are charged with two primary missions: 
Protecting the President, key officials and foreign 
dignitaries; and investigating threats to our currency and 
financial systems and infrastructures. This presidential 
transition year, the Secret Service has a heavy protective 
workload that began with a completed presidential inauguration. 
There are also several major and national special security 
events tentatively planned, including high level submits and 
the UN General Assembly in New York City. In addition, the 
agency is protecting a comparatively large number of protectees 
beyond the President, Vice-President and their families. This 
includes some from the prior administration who have been 
temporarily extended protection. I hope you will use this 
hearing as an opportunity to provide us with a candid 
assessment of whether your current year funding is sufficient 
to carry out your protection responsibilities. We appropriated 
extra funding in our fiscal year 2021 bill in anticipation of 
these costs, but I am concerned about whether those resources 
are sufficient. We also want to hear details about your 
challenges related to cyber fraud, maintaining a workforce 
hiring pipeline and training capacity aligned with future 
staffing requirements and operations during the pandemic. While 
I know you are still limited in what you can say about the 
budget requests for the coming year, we will want to have a 
good discussion about what it will take to address all of these 
challenges, both now and in fiscal year 2022. I would now like 
to turn to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, Ranking 
Member Fleischmann, for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I 
appreciate your opening remarks and holding this hearing today. 
Director Murray, thank you very much for being with us here 
today as we discuss operational priorities for the Secret 
Service. I hope we get a chance at some point, sir, to discuss 
the fiscal year 2022 budget requests in the near future. I do 
want to say since we spoke recently about a week or so ago, I 
had the privilege of meeting with your local folks from the 
Nashville and Chattanooga offices as I do on a regular basis. 
They are truly, like yourself, sir, outstanding, but I wanted 
to convey that, that we had that meeting. As I have told you 
before, I have tremendous pride working with the Secret Service 
as the ranking member of this subcommittee. And it goes without 
saying that you and your agents have done an incredible job 
throughout this pandemic. You have successfully managed 
protective operations throughout a long and contentious 
election cycle under the threat of COVID and transitioned 
seamlessly from one administration to another, valiantly 
securing the increased number of protectees under the agency's 
watch. Additionally, you have also made significant strides in 
countering financial fraud and cybercrimes, a growing threat as 
government COVID assistance program are hit by fraudsters and 
criminals who have come out of the woodwork in an attempt to 
exploit programs intended to help support those individuals 
most in need during these difficult times. So thank you for 
protecting both the needy from these hoaxes as well as the 
integrity of our financial systems. Most impressively, all of 
this work was done in a pandemic in which you took the 
necessary and proactive steps to protect your frontline 
workforce, laying out a comprehensive plan that you briefed us 
on and then stuck to it. Through a number of your employees, or 
though a number of your employees have contracted the Corona 
virus to date, you have had zero casualties as a result of 
contracting the virus, which considering the day to day work 
your workforce conducts every day is a significant 
accomplishment. So thank you for a job well done. Though the 
world has changed tremendously over the past year, I know that 
many of the priorities of the Secret Service remain unchanged. 
But I also know that you are constantly looking to evolve with 
the threat landscape, ensuring that you stay ahead of any 
adversaries. So I look forward to our discussion today on how 
you see the Secret Service moving forward, the challenges you 
look to overcome, and the priorities you plan to put in place 
to meet them. Thank you again, Director Murray. I look forward 
to your testimony today, which I hope does not include any 
proposals to leave the Department of Homeland Security. I 
really enjoy working with the Secret Service. Madam Chair, I 
thank you and I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Director Murray, we will submit the full 
text of your official statement for the hearing record. Please 
begin your oral summary which I would ask you to keep to five 
minutes.
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am. Good morning, Chairwoman 
Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member Fleischmann, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to 
be here today to discuss operations, initiatives, and future 
planning that is ongoing here in the Secret Service. While I 
understand that discussions concerning the fiscal year 2022 
budget are being deferred, I am eager to share with you 
examples of the vital work being performed by the men and women 
of our agency. In a year beset by extraordinary challenges due 
to COVID-19, I am grateful for the resiliency and adaptability 
of our workforce, the active support of their families, and the 
unwavering commitment to protect our nations' leaders and 
safeguard our country's financial infrastructure. Despite the 
global health challenges and the dynamic operational tempo of 
the past year, the Secret Service continued to make progress in 
a number of critical areas. Thanks to your support, we 
completed work on security enhancements to E Street inside the 
White House zone, and made significant progress on constructing 
the permanent White House fence. We also strengthened 
partnerships with state and local law enforcement through our 
National Computer Forensics Institute, or NCFI, as well as 
through our network of cyber fraud task forces. From a hiring 
standpoint, we are actively working to achieve our fiscal year 
2021 goal of 7,900 positions, a historic number for our agency 
and one that moves us a step closer to our long-term capital 
goals. To achieve this level of growth, while keeping everyone 
safe, we did move many preemployment activities to a virtual 
environment. To further our goal of building and maintaining a 
diverse workforce, our recruitment branch conducted a number of 
recruiting events in conjunction with historically black 
colleges and universities, Hispanic serving institutions, 
tribal colleges and universities as well as a number of women's 
organizations and various branches of the military. With 
respect to retention, the various initiatives that this 
subcommittee has funded and supported over the past five years 
have resulted in a steady decline in attrition. The largest of 
these being the Uniform Division Group Retention program, which 
is notable for its high enrollment rate and a measurable 
decline in attrition over the past several years. Throughout 
the pandemic our men and women worked tirelessly to carry out 
our protected mission. While all campaign years present unique 
challenges, COVID-19 severely altered protectee patterns of 
life and required operational adjustments to keep everyone 
safe. What's more, our people successfully led the security 
planning for five National Special Security Events, or NSSEs. 
The foundation of success when it comes to NSSEs lies in our 
partnerships with agencies across all levels of the government 
and the extensive planning that goes into securing those 
events. While protection is inherently a no fail mission, the 
Secret Service criminal investigations also have an impact upon 
national and economic security. The sustained investigative 
focus by our agents and analysts on cyber-enabled financial 
crimes has resulted in the prevention of more than $9.5 billion 
in potential fraud loss over the past several years. The 
various COVID relief programs passed by Congress also 
unfortunately attracted criminal activity. The Secret Service 
continues to do our part to protect communities in this regard. 
Over the past year the agency has disrupted hundreds of online 
pandemic related scams, opened more than 750 COVID-related 
cases, and seized in excess of $800 million in COVID-related 
fraud. The success of our integrated mission is entirely 
reliant on the world class training provided at our Rowley 
Training Center. After a two-and-a-half month closure prompted 
by the pandemic, RTC opened its doors again in June of 2020, 
just the second federal law enforcement training facility to 
safely do so. I thank the members of this subcommittee for 
their support which has allowed the Secret Service to make 
smart infrastructure investments at our Rowley Training Center. 
I am committed to the pursuit of future projects so that our 
facilities best approximate environments that our agents and 
officers encounter while on duty. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking 
Member Fleischmann, and distinguished members of the 
subcommittee, I am grateful for your support of our people and 
our mission over the years. The targeted investments made by 
this subcommittee have amplified our success in many areas. 
With your support we have heavily invested in measures that 
have enhanced our protected methodologies and our capabilities. 
Moreover, your support and concern for the men and women of the 
Secret Service has been unwavering. On their behalf, I thank 
you and I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 
[The information follows:]********** COMMITTEE INSERT 
**********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Director Murray.
    Director Murray, it is always challenging for an agency to 
try to budget in advance for a fiscal year, but it is even 
harder to do when you cannot predict whether or not there will 
be a presidential transition.
    In addition to these presidential transition costs, the 
total number of additional protectees beyond the President and 
Vice-President is higher than it has been in the past.
    What have your obligations been like for protection 
activity so far, and do you anticipate your current budget 
keeping pace with your obligations or do you foresee budget 
problems as we move further into the fiscal year?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you for your question, ma'am.
    You are very much correct. It is always difficult inside 
and outside of a campaign year when it comes to the protective 
side of the house to predict how much protective travel there 
will be. And then when you compound that with a situation as 
you have described where this is the first one-term presidency 
in about 28 years, I believe, in order to plan for that it is 
also challenging. And then on top of that you have additional 
protectees that we did not participate before the end of the 
year.
    So those are all key considerations. While COVID has sort 
of tamped down the amount of protective travel, we are starting 
to see an uptick. And I think as COVID improves, we will see 
that continue. And I think we will also see a rise in travel by 
foreign heads of state and heads of government here to this 
country along with their spouses, which is also a Secret 
Service responsibility.
    So right now the tempo is not overwhelming. I do think as 
we go through the third quarter and into the fourth quarter it 
is going to be a challenge. And I think that is going to cause 
us to make some decisions. There are some critical needs large 
with regard to protection, one of those being some of the 
experiences we have had over the past year with regard to civil 
disturbance. We found that we did not have enough of our folks 
trained in civil disturbance. We did not have enough equipment 
in that regard.
    Likewise, with regard to our threat management efforts, our 
protective intelligence efforts, we are heavily invested in 
making sure that we are aware of any threats that exist out 
there in open source environment, and that requires a lot of 
equipment and technology which is always emerging. So those are 
some areas that I am concerned about before we get into the 
next fiscal year in terms of being fully funded.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Well, please keep us abreast of 
things as they happen.
    And you mentioned some of the other things that have 
happened that were unexpected, like the January 6 capital 
attack. How has that influenced the agency's security posture 
as it relates to staffing and resources?
    And I am going to ask the second part of that, has the 
January 6 capital attack led to a reevaluation of the process 
for national security on special security event designations 
and, if so, what out-year planning is taking place for future 
NSSEs?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, ma'am. I will try to answer that in order, 
but I am also mindful of your time. So please let me know if 
you need me to pause.
    So we are always looking to capitalize on lessons learned. 
And obviously what happened on January 6th was abhorrent. It 
was an attack on our democracy, and we in law enforcement 
public safety cannot let it happen again.
    But, again, whether it is something as significant as that 
or even something as we saw across the pond in the U.K. last 
week where there was an incident over in Manchester, we are 
always looking to capitalize on our own lessons learned and 
observe what happens with partner agencies.
    So certainly, definitely took those lessons learned and 
implement them into-- implemented into the security plan that 
we carried out two weeks later for the inaugural, and we will 
continue to do that.
    With respect to your question about National Special 
Security Events, as you know, ma'am, that is not something that 
the Secret Service designates. We serve as the lead operational 
agency for operational security. I would imagine that there 
will be conversations ongoing as to whether an event like the 
one we had on January 6th, and I say the event. I do not mean 
the incident. I mean the actual constitutional process, whether 
or not that should fall inside the confines of something like 
an NSSE. I welcome those conversations and I imagine those are 
forthcoming.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you.
    I am running out of time, so I am going to go Mr. 
Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
    Mr. Director, I know significant work has been done in 
replacing and improving much of the existing fencing on the 
White House grounds over the past few years, and this project 
will continue through fiscal year 2022.
    I also know that over the last year we have seen a 
significant amount of temporary fencing erected throughout D.C. 
as a result of civil unrest from the White House to the 
Capitol, which not only incurs significant cost for the 
installation and maintenance of these fences, but restricts 
Americans from the ability to visit and observe these sites, 
albeit from a significant distance away.
    Do you feel the level of permanent fencing and security 
measures currently in place are sufficient for the Secret 
Service to carry out their protective mission?
    And secondly, sir, do you believe there should be a more 
permanent solution in place to alleviate the need for the 
recurring installation of temporary anti-climb fencing around 
the White House and Capitol, sir?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, sir, for your question.
    First and foremost, thank you, sir, and Madam Chairwoman 
and this committee for your support because that new permanent 
White House fence, that is a gamechanger for us. We began 
construction on that going back to 2019. We recently finished 
up on the north side of the White House, soon expect to finish 
up the south side. And by this time next year that permanent 
White House fence will be fully installed.
    Again, that should afford not only the Secret Service to 
have some enhancements operationally, but it also should afford 
the opportunity for our citizenry to come back onto 
Pennsylvania Avenue and view the White House as they should.
    With respect to your second part of your question, that is 
a consideration with regard to whether or not there should be a 
secondary screening point or secondary barrier as we push out 
of the White House perimeter. It is something we do for NSSEs 
as you mentioned. It is something we are doing right now with 
the erection of the anti-scale fence that is up around the 
White House. And that is going to be something that we are 
going to have to take a hard look at and probably look to 
invest in in the future.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Based on the events of January 6th when the Secret Service 
was responsible for and successfully protected then Vice-
President Pence and Vice-President Elect Harris when they were 
in the Capitol as well as other civil unrest events throughout 
the year, the Secret Service has undoubtedly identified areas 
where they could make improvements to better prepare for and 
respond to similar types of events in the future, which all of 
us hope never happen, but know that we still must prepare for.
    Other than improved or additional fencing, which was 
already discussed, what areas do you feel, sir, the Secret 
Service could either make improvements to or use more resources 
to address preparations for and response to future events of 
this type, sir?
    Mr. Murray. Well, sir, I would like to talk about our 
training facility because that comes right to my mind as we 
talk about this.
    So the one thing that our agents and officers do not have 
at our training facility, and I should say we are extremely 
grateful. We are one of the few federal law enforcement 
agencies to have a training facility inside the National 
Capitol region. That is a blessing. But the one thing we do not 
have there is anything that replicates our permanent protected 
facilities, such as the White House.
    So if I can give you a clunky analogy. If everybody on this 
call, if we were all on a basketball team, but we did not have 
a gym to practice in and we did not have baskets, we had to go 
out onto a field and practice basketball, but when we played 
our games we went to a gym, how effective would our practice 
be.
    So long-term what I am looking to invest in is to create 
and construct venues that replicate the areas of operation that 
our officers and agents work in. I am looking to build things 
like White House training facilities, not only structurally, 
but also dimensionally. I think that is going to be something 
that is going to serve the security of this country and the 
Secret Service for many decades to come.
    Well, thank you, sir, for your responses. And as my time is 
waning, I know we have a lot of folks who want to answer 
questions. Thank you, sir.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I apologize. I am trying to find who is 
next in line here.
    Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair and Ranking Member. 
Thank you so much for holding this meeting.
    Director Murray, I also wanted to thank you for your 
service and what your men and women do.
    Before I ask my question about the National Computer 
Forensic Institute, I thought some years ago we were talking 
about appropriating monies for a White House replicate. I 
remember it was a pricey amount. Do you know what happened with 
that? I thought we had talked about this some years ago.
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir. I know there was a conversation about 
committing some funds to design plans, and I think there was 
perhaps other choices that had to be made within the Department 
and the Executive branch. I do not think we ever really got to 
move the ball down the field so to speak with regard to that. 
But we are eager to do so now.
    Mr. Cuellar. Yeah. Well, I mean, I certainly think we need 
to have that replica, at least of the White House, because you 
have to-- that is one of your missions of that. But, yeah, we 
will follow up on that because I know some years ago we talked 
about it. It was a pricey figure.
    But let me talk to you about your National Computer 
Forensic Institute. One of the things, as you know, I represent 
the border area and one of the areas-- you know, some of the 
dynamics you see is you see it on TV, the unaccompanied kids, 
the family units. But there is another dimension there, a 
darker side that, you know, you have got criminal 
organizations.
    So my question is, what can we do to work with--and I am on 
the road as you can tell in South Texas and I just made a call 
to some of the border sheriffs and asked them if they were 
familiar with the National Computer Forensic Institute, and 
they are not. And I would ask you, what can we do to improve or 
establish some of that partnership? And I know you are pulled 
all over the country, but I would like to work with your 
office, if you can assign somebody to work with the border 
sheriffs and the border law enforcement and with their 
counterparts across the river on the Mexican side so they can 
become not only local and state partners, but international 
partners as we have this very dynamic part of the country 
called the Southwest border on that.
    So I would like to see what you are doing and what we can 
do together and assign somebody that we can work with you.
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question and your 
interest and very eager for the sheriffs and our international 
partners to participate in the NCFI mission.
    As you know and the members of this subcommittee know, NCFI 
opened its doors back in 2008, and since that time we have 
trained more than 13,000 state, local, tribal, territorial law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges. So our doors have 
been opened for 13 years. But, candidly, they would not have 
been able to stay open without the active support of this 
subcommittee.
    And I am particularly grateful to not only the members, but 
also the senior staff on the subcommittee who have been highly 
encouraging of us to do better with regard to self-advocacy in 
this regard. And I am hopeful as we get into 2022 and beyond we 
will get even more budgetary consideration.
    But as you know, you know, one of the great success stories 
of NCFI is that we have trained all these folks from all 50 
states, several territories, covering more than 2,000 agencies. 
It is a give back because these are the same agencies that we 
rely on when we come into town for protective services. But at 
the same time, it is also symbiotic in that these same folks 
are coming back and participating in our cyber fraud task 
forces. So they are also enhancing the Secret Services' 
investigative mission.
    More importantly, we train them. We give them all the 
equipment and the technology they need to go back and support 
their own departments.
    Sir, as you mentioned, a lot of these local and county 
departments do not have the budget to go ahead and start their 
own cyber investigative units. So these folks that we trained 
go back into your communities and they investigate crimes that 
are important to your constituents, and the vast majority of 
the ones they do have to do with endangered persons and crimes 
against children.
    I am not sure if he froze.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. We may have lost Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Murray. Yeah.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. So I am going to go then to Ms. Hinson.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much. Thank you.
    Ms. Hinson. All right. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 
And I do appreciate you holding this hearing today so we can 
hear from Director Murray on the agency's needs and priorities 
going into the next fiscal year.
    And, Director Murray, thank you so much for your service as 
well and for appearing before us today.
    And I know many of the questions have already centered 
around a lot of the physical threats and what you do to combat 
those. But I wanted to kind of focus in on the work that the 
Secret Service does to protect taxpayers from financial crimes. 
Your testimony that you submitted mentions transnational 
cybercrimes and financial crimes specifically, things like ATM 
attacks.
    Can you share a little bit more about what international 
bad actors most concern you at the Secret Service in addition 
to the example you gave in your testimony of North Korea?
    Mr. Murray. Yes.
    So we are seeing--we recently, as you know, merged two 
long-standing task force operations. One was the long-standing 
Financial Crimes Task Force we have had in place since the 
1980s. The other one was what we called the Electronic Crimes 
Task Force that has been around since 1995.
    We realized that the great work they were all doing was 
sort of intendedly redundant, unintentionally redundant in a 
lot of ways and we were plowing down the same roads. So we 
decided, with your support and the support of the Department, 
to merge those and create this Cyber Fraud Task Force. We would 
have 44 of these across the country and some overseas as well.
    And the way we combat the kind of activity you are talking 
about is through that and through the NCFI as I have described. 
What we are seeing is, you know, most of the complex financial 
fraud that goes on right now in this country and around the 
world is digital in some nature. And the vast majority of the 
financial crime that we look at is cyber related and it is 
being perpetrated by transnational groups from abroad. They do 
exploit people here. Some people wittingly, some people 
otherwise. But as you mentioned, we are seeing what we call ATM 
cashouts. We are seeing a lot of ransomware issues.
    One thing we have seen an uptick in during COVID especially 
is something called business email compromise, which is where 
these bad actors, using social engineering or sometimes network 
intrusion, get into a system and they perpetrate that they are 
part of a legitimate business process within an organization 
and they effectuate wire transfers outside of an organization.
    And then what happens is all those ill-gotten funds are 
transmitted back to the transnational groups via 
cryptocurrency, which is a separate and unique challenge unto 
itself.
    Ms. Hinson. Right. So tracking it then becomes an extra 
challenge, obviously. Would you say in general, Director, that 
they are using these funds to undermine the safety of America 
and the security of our allies? For instance, obviously these 
are going to countries that are no friends of the United 
States.
    Mr. Murray. Absolutely. And that is a great question. I 
know that it is very easy to put these types of offenses in the 
bucket of white collar crime, and I understand why they do 
that. But when-- if we just take a look not so much at the 
corporations, but the public utilities, hospitals, schools, 
care centers. When those are attacked with something like 
ransomware and they are threatened with, you know, deletion of 
services, you are putting people's lives at risk.
    Ms. Hinson. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Murray. And, you know, it is candidly, from these 
transnational groups, it is all about the money. You know, they 
are not really concerned about the safety and security of our 
citizenry like you are and I am. But that is why we are so 
heavily invested in it.
    And I think a big part of the solution is education. I 
think up to this point very recently the public and private 
sector both had this idea that this is nice to have, nice to 
have these sort of redundancies and resiliencies and have a 
plan for continuity of operations. It is absolutely need to 
have nowadays.
    Ms. Hinson. Right. So I guess I would close out with the 
remaining time, what resources do you need to better prevent 
and respond to those kind of attacks? And then who are you most 
closely allied with in working with to help prevent these 
attacks?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you.
    So the one thing we always need continual reinvestment in 
is things like equipment, technology and obviously people. That 
is a best practice. It is a people process technology approach. 
And, you know, we kind of subscribe to the idea that the speed 
and capability of technology doubles every couple of years.
    So that is tough to keep up with when you are inside of a 
multi-year budget cycle, but we do our best and we appreciate 
the continued support of the committee.
    Obviously, a big challenge for us coming up will be 5G, the 
transition to 5G. That is going to have a direct impact on our 
mobile wireless investigations. That is something we conduct 
via our Cyber Fraud Task Forces. We conduct them in your 
communities. We started it out as a part of our threat 
management program. However, it is something that has 
proliferated to where we actively support police officers, 
police agencies in your districts with regard to locating 
digital devices that belong to missing persons, children who 
have been kidnapped, homicide suspects and so forth.
    So as we go to 5G, it is a challenge and an expensive 
proposition, but if we do not keep up with that technology we 
will not be able to continue to perform that task as well as we 
do.
    Ms. Hinson. All right.
    Mr. Murray. And lastly with regard to your question about 
who are we partnering with. We partner very much with CISA 
within the Department and also the FBI, and we have strong ties 
through our Cyber Fraud Task Forces with academia and the 
business sector.
    Ms. Hinson. All right. Well, thank you very much, Director, 
for answering those questions.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    [Pause]
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Director, thank you for the good work you do and for your 
testimony here today.
    I appreciated the overview that you gave of the COVID 
situation with respect to your personnel. And, of course, there 
is some alarming news about the levels of exposure, but also 
good news that in the vast majority of cases these were not 
serious cases.
    I want to ask you a little bit more about the lessons 
learned, though, and not that this is over, but we are 
hopefully past the worst of it. You are certainly past the 
point of the protection required in a presidential campaign.
    I wonder if you could reflect on that a bit. There were 
some incidents through the campaign period which we all 
remember. I guess the one that was the most obviously alarming 
was the President's decision to, when he was actually 
hospitalized with the COVID virus, the President's decision to 
take an automobile ride around to greet his supporters who had 
gathered out at Walter Reed, and clearly Secret Service had to 
protect him in that situation.
    But there were all kinds of campaign events where 
distancing and masking were not practiced and there were lots 
of questions, legitimate questions raised about these possibly 
being spreader events.
    Now I understand that the Secret Service has no choice but 
to salute and offer protection, whatever the circumstances. I 
appreciate that and, of course, that is part of the service and 
part of the sacrifice that we admire.
    On the other hand, there should be some advisory role, I 
would think, or some ability of the Secret Service to offer at 
least advice when such events are being planned and they 
inevitably are going to have to include protection. And there 
needs to be, I would think, in retrospect some assessment of 
the kind of dangers to which your agents were exposed and to 
what extent those just come with the territory and the extent 
to which there ought to be some kind of process for minimizing 
these dangers.
    What can you tell us about that? I think it is a, you know, 
it is a legitimate concern and there were particular problems, 
as we all know, with the past President and the past campaign. 
But it is, you know, it is not like-- it is not unlikely that 
these kinds of issues could arise in the future as well.
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir.
    If I may I will do my best to be succinct, but I would like 
to take you back to about February of 2020. That is when we 
started to realize that this thing called Corona virus, 
whatever it was, might have a negative impact on our campaign 
operations.
    The one thing we realized very quickly was that if we did 
get to a point where our workforce could not come to their 
primary places of work, we did not have the bandwidth for folks 
to work virtually. So we made some quick investments in that 
and solved that problem.
    At the same time, I don't know if we really knew what PPE 
was going to be, but we quite literally took stock of what we 
had in terms of gloves, masks, cleaning materials and we 
secured more thinking that might be a factor for us as well.
    Simultaneously, through our Chief Medical Officer, who 
ultimately was a key member of the Corona Virus Task Force and 
worked closely with NIH, we set up our own robust testing 
program right here, right next door, actually, in our 
headquarters that is still opened today where we test people 
sort of by design before and after protective travel. But I do 
want to make clear it was communicated by me and by my 
leadership team over and over again that the expectation was 
that we would follow CDC guidelines and then some with regard 
to PPE.
    As a matter of fact, if anything, if we were guilty of 
anything with regard to quarantining folks, we would go beyond 
the primary contacts. What we would do is we started staffing 
our operations, at least initially, in sort of a port and 
starboard approach where we would platoon people. We would send 
one group of people out. They would be on duty for a couple of 
weeks, then we replaced them with a fresh group. And if any of 
those were exposed, then everybody came off the line.
    So those were some of the measures that we took initially 
and we built on over time.
    With respect to your other questions about specific 
incidences, as you mentioned the Secret Service, it is 
inherently a dangerous job for sure. And we are in the business 
of making an assessment as to whether a particular operation 
can be achieved. We really do not get involved in whether it 
should or should not be achieved from an optical standpoint.
    But I appreciate your question.
    With regard to the matter at Walter Reed, which I think you 
were referring to, I will tell you this. There was extensive 
conversation about that with the medical professionals, the 
White House Medical Unit, and the medical professionals at 
Walter Reed.
    Ultimately, the decision was that it could be achieved, and 
the two individuals that were in the vehicle were wearing the 
same level of PPE and protective gear that not only the medical 
professionals at Walter Reed were wearing, but that the 
frontline health workers are wearing around the world every day 
since COVID started.
    Mr. Price. All right. Thank you. My time is expired.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Director, great to see you here this morning and thank 
you for your testimony here today.
    You know, as was mentioned earlier, I was a little 
concerned when I did not see the Secret Service in the skinny 
budget at all, even mentioned.
    So, Director, could you talk just a little bit about going 
into next year, what would you like to see in that budget when 
it comes out? What are the priorities for you moving forward 
next year? I know the recapitalization of the academy training 
center, Rowley Training Center. Can you talk about some of 
those needs that you see coming that we should be focused on 
here in Congress?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir.
    So very broadly, continued investment in our Cyber Fraud 
Task Forces and our field operations. Likewise, continued 
investment in the National Computer Forensics Institute, which 
I am happy to say I feel we were certainly heard this time 
around.
    With regard to staffing, obviously we are highly committed 
to our human capital strategic plan which gets the agency to 
somewhere around 95 95 by fiscal year 2026. And I thank you 
very much for your continued support with regard to that.
    And obviously continued investment in our retention 
methods, which are also thanks to you. Some of the programs we 
have like student loan repayment, tuition assistance, child 
subsidy care and the max out relief that we received for our 
employees who work overtime for protective services.
    On the protective side of the house I said earlier, but it 
bears repeating, we are looking for consideration with regard 
to our threat management efforts, our protective intelligence 
efforts with specific regard to our open source investigation 
capabilities. That means the ability to go out and identify 
that threatening behavior or activity might be-- or language 
might exist on the internet so to speak, whereas 25 years ago 
you might be at a restaurant and somebody says something that 
sounds like a threat against a president and you are reliant 
entirely on the good citizen reporting. Now it exists out there 
to be found by the Secret Service.
    And lastly, you know, continued investment in our 
protective efforts. As I mentioned earlier, we really need to 
improve with regard to our resourcing with readiness in terms 
of civil disturbance and training.
    Mr. Rutherford. What about your field communications? Is 
that still a challenge?
    Mr. Murray. It is. That is part of the initiatives of 
future planning I eluded to earlier. We are looking to continue 
with our communications upgrades and our IT upgrades in the 
future. Again, it is always-- I do not have to tell you, sir, 
but it is always difficult administering a budget. Sometimes 
you have to make difficult choices between the things you need 
and the things you want.
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Mr. Murray. But we are on a path and look forward to 
continuing the conversation with this committee about those 
things.
    Mr. Rutherford. Yeah. No, and I think you guys are doing a 
great job in moving down that road.
    Let me ask you this, Director. You mentioned briefly the 
earning caps. Have we sufficiently addressed that, particularly 
for, you know, election years where you have multiple, you 
know, particularly presidential where you have huge overtime 
issues that come up. Have we adequately addressed that for you 
all yet or is there still problems there?
    Mr. Murray. So the answer is, yes and thank you. But it is 
definitely a fix. It is not a long-term solution. I would 
suggest that as we continue to grow our work force, those 
demonstrable needs for excessive overtime should come down. I 
do not think we will ever have a Secret Service where there 
won't be overtime needs just because the operational tempo 
just--
    Mr. Rutherford. Sure.
    Mr. Murray. --is exponentially growing. But I do think 
that, you know, this relief from the pay cap is certainly, 
absolutely critically necessary. But I do not think it is 
sufficient just in terms of long-term appeal. This is a 
difficult job as you know, sir, having been in law enforcement. 
And--
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Mr. Murray. --you know, all these efforts certainly help 
with morale. But I do have concerns moving forward with regard 
to long-term retention as people are having to kind of work 
excessively because, you know, that cap does not remove the cap 
entirely. It just creates a new and better cap.
    Mr. Rutherford. Right.
    Well, listen, I look forward to working with you on that 
particular issue because I think that is something that we 
really need to address. If you are going to continue to be able 
to meet your operational tempo, particularly during these peak 
years, and then maintain your adequate staffing during those 
other off years, I think it is going to be critical that we 
address that.
    So thank you very much for your leadership over there. You 
know, I hear really good things from the rank and file.
    And, Madam Chair, I hear my--I see my time has run out. I 
will yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
for calling today's hearing.
    Mr. Murray, my first question is about the ATC's medical 
operations. Last year I heard from a constituent who was 
worried about her spouse, a Secret Service agent based in the 
Chicago field office because she felt that the agency's COVID 
precautions and testing regime was not sufficient to keep her 
family safe.
    Can you briefly detail what measures you have in place to 
protect your agents, and what are your testing protocols, and 
where are you on vaccinations?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your question.
    So, again, back early in 2020 during our COVID experience 
we were very clear that we needed to do a lot of things with 
regard to technology to be able to allow our workforce to work 
virtually. We were happy to accomplish that. We were happy to 
capitalize on some PPE opportunities that we had.
    But at the same time, we did work with our Chief Medical 
Officer as long as-- as well as other folks in the White House 
Medical Unit. And more importantly, we have a long-standing 
relationship with Johns Hopkins University Medical Center 
folks, and we work with them to develop our own testing 
protocol here in the National Capitol Region as well as 
developing policies and practices for folks out in the field, 
like the folks in Chicago you mentioned.
    So the testing is sort of by design. It is not like 
everybody comes in every day. If folks are on a continual 
protective assignment, they will get tested in a certain cycle. 
So let's say every 48 hours or every 72 hours.
    Along the same lines, if somebody is a field agent or a 
field officer, he or she would come in and get tested before 
they travel, and then in the appropriate time frame after they 
return from that protective travel.
    Thus far here we have tested more than 20,000 people-- 
conducted more than 20,000 tests right here in this building. 
That is probably about half of what we have done over at the 
White House Medical Unit. And then we have worked with our 
field offices to set up testing opportunities out in the field.
    Ms. Underwood. As you may know, I run an effort to require 
CBP to stand up an inner-operable electronic health record 
system, which is currently in progress. And the pandemic has 
only made the need for this system even more apparent.
    As a nurse, I know that implementing electronic health 
records can be beneficial, not only for ensuring appropriate 
care for people in GHS custody, but also for improving the 
health of the GHS workforce itself.
    Mr. Murray, do you agree that the Secret Service could 
benefit from standing up an electronic health records system?
    Mr. Murray. Definitely, ma'am. I would like to learn-- I 
cannot say I know a whole lot about that, but it definitely 
sounds like something that would enhance our operations.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay.
    Mr. Murray. I look forward to talking to you about it.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
    And with my remaining time I would like to hear about what 
steps you are taking to improve the agency's operational 
planning and preparation based on lessons learned over the past 
year?
    Like many Americans, I was shocked by the use of force by 
multiple federal agencies to disperse a peaceful protest in 
Lafayette Square last summer for a photo op. As you know, the 
Secret Service deployed pepper spray as part of that response.
    A few months later the Capitol was overrun by an armed 
insurrection chanting threats against the Vice-President. 
Despite the fact that this attack was plotted openly on 
publicly available websites, the federal response was much less 
robust.
    While the disparate responses to this event is a 
complicated issue that extends far beyond your agency, I am 
interested in what steps you are taking internally to improve 
the Secret Service's operations in the future and ensure that 
your agents are trained and prepared to protect our country's 
leaders and critical infrastructure from legitimate attacks.
    Mr. Murray, what has the Secret Service learned from these 
events and what changes have you implemented as a result?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am.
    Obviously, no matter where we go or what we do on the 
protective side of the house, we are always going to conduct an 
after action review. We did after the experiences we had late 
last May and early last June. We certainly did-- obviously on 
January 6th we started our day with a different event down at 
the ellipse, but we were up there with the Vice-President, 
Vice-President Pence at the time at the Capitol as well, so 
conducted an after action review there.
    You know, I could tell you that we definitely looked to 
improve on our processes at large with respect to what happened 
in Lafayette Park on June 1st. The Secret Service did have a 
supporting role. As you mentioned, there was an instance where 
our officers were assigned to secure an intersection so that 
other law enforcement could get out and perform their 
operations. And when they did go over a barrier, a couple of 
our officers were assaulted by folks and that is why they used 
the pepper spray as you mentioned.
    You are absolutely correct, ma'am. The vast majority of 
people that were out there, especially during the daylight 
hours, were out there expressing their First Amendment rights. 
And that is a critical part of our training and that is a huge 
consideration anywhere we go in this country conducting 
protective operations.
    But it is also true as the day has gone on and we got into 
the evening, other folks came in who were not only there to 
express their First Amendment rights and things did become 
violent. That is--
    Ms. Underwood. So, Director Murray, I thank you for your 
service, but that was not my question. We are all familiar 
about the events of that day. I asked what the Secret Service 
has learned and what you have changed operationally.
    Since my time has expired, Madam Chair, I would like to ask 
the Director to submit that information for the record in 
writing and hope that, you know, perhaps next time we can be 
more direct.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Next is Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member. I 
appreciate the opportunity to be a part of this hearing.
    Director Murray, thank you for your years of service. I 
also want to thank you for your service in the Army Reserves. I 
am also in the Army National Guard. So you have a career of 
service to our nation, so thank you for that.
    You know, the bad thing about going last or close to the 
end is almost all the questions have already been answered. I 
want to echo what Representative Hinson was talking about when 
it comes to, you know, the cyber crimes and financial crimes 
that are taking place.
    But if we could, could we dig a little deeper and could you 
identify some of the foreign actors that are actively engaged? 
I mean, we know we have external threats. I mean, we serve on 
the Homeland Security Committee and, you know, we know who the 
bad people are out there. But can you kind of identify them for 
us and, you know, how active and how entrenched are they?
    Mr. Murray. So, yes, sir. I will do my best. Obviously it 
is a little bit of a sensitive topic and I will try to address 
it broadly. I would be happy to come back up and discuss it in 
a more appropriate forum.
    But I will say this. When it comes to these transnational 
groups, you have people that are-- they are bright people and 
they are highly proficient when it comes to cyber. And when we 
are talking about something that is organically and solely a 
financial crime, more often than not they are working for 
themselves to fund their own efforts.
    But what we have found working with our partners, both in 
the intelligence community and in law enforcement here 
federally, that these same cyber actors sometimes are working 
on behalf of foreign governments and conducting state-sponsored 
operations as well.
    So that is why it is particularly concerning to, you know, 
broadly speaking federal law enforcement and why we try to 
focus in on those efforts and disrupt to the best of our 
ability.
    Mr. Palazzo. Yeah. And I know you probably cannot go into 
too much detail, but we would love to have an opportunity to 
chat more about that.
    Mr. Murray. Appreciate it.
    Mr. Palazzo. You know, and I want to thank you for setting 
up a Cyber Fraud Task Force in the State of Mississippi 
alongside of our Attorney General. That is extremely important.
    And I know you also, and Representative Rutherford brought 
this up. You were talking about, you know, recruitment and 
retention. And is there anything else you would like to share 
with us? I know with the private sector pay, you know, this is 
across the government, all agencies, it is kind of hard to 
compete now. It used to be it was the best job you could have 
would be working for the Secret Service or the FBI or another 
federal agency, probably not the IRS, right?
    [Laughter]
    Mr. Palazzo. But, you know, the other agencies.
    So is there anything else that you would like to bring up 
about how we can not only recruit the best and brightest, but 
also retain them?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir. Thanks very much for that question.
    And, again, the fact that we are able to better retain them 
is due in those small parts to the support of this committee.
    But I will say this. Law enforcement is a tough job. I am 
the son of a police officer. Federal law enforcement is a tough 
job. And I would, with the greatest respect to my partners in 
federal law enforcement, there is no tougher job than the 
Secret Service. It is extremely demanding. It is a rigorous 
lifestyle and it requires a lot, not just from the people who 
serve in the agency, but from the people who love and support 
us.
    So as you go through your career and you realize that and 
you realize that there might be other jobs that are similar, 
maybe not the same, that aren't as demanding, sometimes people 
have to make life choices and we respect that.
    So we are looking to incentivize folks to stay. Likewise, 
to your question, it is tough because right now, whether it is 
the Secret Service or the FBI or DEA or HIS, we are all going 
after the same applicant pool, right, the folks that are coming 
out of the military or college, wherever they are coming from, 
that want to come into federal law enforcement. They are all 
looking at all these different agencies. So we are doing our 
best to make ourselves the most attractive to them.
    Candidly, there is a little bit of a vocational element to 
being in the Secret Service. I always tell people it is the 
greatest job in the world because I want to be here. If I 
didn't want to be here, it might not be the greatest job in the 
world. So, you know, we are looking for those people who really 
kind of want to be part of something bigger than themselves 
and, you know, be a part of this sort of weird thing that we do 
here with this dual mission.
    But you are spot on. It always has been a challenge and it 
is something that we are trying to rise to.
    Mr. Palazzo. Well, Director, in this current climate and, 
you know, the things that we see on the news and the things 
that we hear, the defund the police movement and all that crazy 
nonsense that is coming out, obviously we support legitimate 
reforms. But, you know, I believe we should be funding our 
police more, not less, if we want them to have better training, 
attract better talent, even though here in South Mississippi we 
have got an awesome law enforcement community.
    So with that, I think my time has expired.
    Director Murray, please let your men and women know and 
their families that we appreciate their service and sacrifice, 
and thank you for all that you do.
    Mr. Murray. I will. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Quigley.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    I want to follow up with Mr. Palazzo's questions. You know, 
specifically if you could detail on a deeper dive a little bit 
more about what you are doing to recruit in non-traditional 
places. I know you talked about diversity at the opening in 
that vein. If you could give us a deeper dive in how you are 
trying to do that. To me it is also an additional way that you 
can, you know, increase the spicket of people coming in to your 
agency, but what else are you doing? And, specifically, what 
are the incentives that seem to work best to keep people in 
place?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, sir.
    So the one thing that we are doing that did not exist when 
I was an applicant many, many years ago was we are doing all we 
can to not only leverage, but to exploit social media 
opportunities. Obviously, most of our applicants are much 
younger than I am and they are very active online. So we are 
doing all we can to kind of reach out and create a level of 
engagement there. We are seeing some positive feedback.
    With respect to traditional recruiting, our folks are very 
active not only here in headquarters, but out there in your 
districts where our offices are. Folks are pounding the 
pavement not only talking to colleges, but we are reaching out 
to high schools trying to put the idea in folks' minds that, 
hey, the Secret Service might be the place that you want to go. 
And certainly during these times of COVID, we have done a lot 
of that virtually.
    The retention programs that exist are--it is a broad 
spectrum, and I am grateful for that because I think different 
programs appeal to different age groups and different employees 
of different job series.
    As I mentioned earlier, folks that might be closer to 
retirement, they may be motivated to stay a little longer 
because they know they are not hitting that pay cap and working 
for nothing so to speak. Quite literally before we had that 
option, you would get your pay statement every two weeks and 
you would look and you would see the money you made and then it 
would tell you, here is all the other money you also earned, 
but you are never going to get paid. So if you are close to 
retirement, it is kind of an easy choice, right?
    Conversely, for folks that are coming in at a younger age, 
they may have sizeable loans from school and we have the 
tuition reimbursement. They may have young families and with, 
you know, dual incomes, so there is the child subsidy efforts 
that we have been able to implement with your support.
    You know, the one thing that does concern me moving forward 
is this retirement bubble that we run into every once in a 
while and that is a result of sort of what used to be uneven 
hiring practices where we would hire on demand and then 20 
years later you would have a bunch of folks that were ready to 
retire.
    So we are coming up against one here in fiscal year 2022. 
We are doing all we can to appeal to those folks to, you know, 
reconsider and stay because, candidly, those are our most 
experienced people. And I know the question came up earlier, 
the max out is a great fix. It is not a long-term solution to 
address those retirement bubbles, and it is probably something, 
even though we have corrected the hiring practices, it will be 
something the agency endures for probably the next ten or 15 
years or more.
    Mr. Quigley. Yeah. And, look, I think it helps us for you 
to report back with what works best or what changes in the 
future might help you with retention. You have just described a 
couple of things that were not the case when you came in, and 
that is changing year by year.
    So I believe this committee and others would be receptive 
to doing what is necessary to help in retention. But we 
certainly appreciate this.
    I guess the last point, if you could in just the last 80 
seconds focus just a little more on the efforts to attract on a 
diversity basis.
    Mr. Murray. So, again, we invest a lot of time and energy 
and we have for quite a while, but redoubled our efforts into 
reaching out to, as I mentioned earlier, historically black 
colleges and universities, Hispanic serving institutions, 
tribal colleges and universities, and then we applied a 
particular focus on women's organizations. I think it is true 
that everybody in law enforcement likes the idea of hiring, you 
know, more women and more females. It is not a 50/50 
proposition in law enforcement at large. It is certainly not 
here.
    We have made great strides. When I graduated the academy 26 
years ago, I think about eight percent of our class was female, 
eight, 08. Last week I commissioned a class where more than 
half of the agents were female. So I am happy to report that we 
are making progress in that regard.
    But, you know, it is not a one and done type thing. It is 
something that we are invested in and we are going to continue 
to do over the months and years to come.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you for your service and thank you for 
being here.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thanks, Director Murray.
    I wanted to ask a little bit more about NSSE, the events 
that you talked about, the National Special Security Events, 
which have been defined, as you mentioned, by migration, 
general assembly, those types of special events, large sporting 
events.
    Following January 6th, members of Congress have suggested 
designating additional congressional activities is these types 
of events. In your testimony you talk a little bit about 
everything that you bring to the table when it comes to NSSEs.
    Can you talk a little bit about how those activities cannot 
be duplicated by other federal, state and local agencies? But, 
also, what resources would the Service need in order-- if we 
designated additional NSSEs in upcoming fiscal years?
    Mr. Murray. Sure. Thank you for the question.
    So as you know, sir, the NSSEs are something that were born 
out of the experience we had back in '96 with the Centennial 
Park bombing. President Clinton along with Congress wanted to 
address the fact that there was a gap in coordination between 
all levels of law enforcement and public safety. And they came 
up with this NSSE model where the FBI is the lead for crisis 
response. FEMA is the lead for consequence management, and the 
Secret Service serves as the lead for operational security, 
design, planning and execution.
    But the secret sauce, the true success of the NSSE process 
exists in the fact that it truly is a whole of government 
approach. It is where all these agencies come together well 
before an event is expected to happen and they conduct this 
long-term planning. And we use a series of committees and 
subcommittees, and we have had great success. We just completed 
the 68th, which was President Biden's address to the joint 
session just a couple of weeks back. And, you know, I do think 
that there are opportunities for other events to be considered 
NSSEs.
    As you know, neither the Secret Service nor the FBI nor 
FEMA are the ones who designate something as an NSSE. 
Typically, it is a request that comes from a governor. Here in 
D.C. it can come from the mayor or come through a couple of 
different ways. But there are also some events, such as UNGA, 
the conventions, the inauguration and so on that are pre-
designated.
    We do appreciate the funding we get of about 45 million per 
year. But, candidly, it is not enough and we, you know, we do 
need more to be able to do, you know, four or five of these a 
year as it happens. And certainly if the idea is to do even 
more NSSE events in the future, you know, we would be looking 
for more consideration from a budgetary standpoint.
    Mr. Aguilar. You just mentioned, you know, four or five, 
you know, additional. Let's use that in the fiscal year. What 
would be, you know, what would be necessary, you know, 
financially to meet that goal and operationally?
    Mr. Murray. Sir, candidly, I would have to get with my 
folks and kind of tally that up. I would love to come and talk 
to you further about that at some point if you have time.
    Mr. Aguilar. Understood.
    Back to some of the cybercrimes that you talked about 
before, the cyber-enabled financial crimes have changed. In 
your testimony you talked a little bit about that during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. How has the Secret Service been able to 
respond to those changes specific to what the pandemic has 
meant?
    Mr. Murray. So, sir, so along with taking efforts to 
protect our workforce and our protectees, the one thing we knew 
when this pandemic hit and we saw relief packages like the 
CARES Act, based on our prior experiences with things like 
Hurricane Katrina, we knew that as great as these opportunities 
were for citizens, it was also ripe with opportunity for people 
who wanted to commit fraud.
    So our initial effort, along with CISA and the FBI, was to 
get the word out there to the public and private sector to kind 
of be alert and make sure that they take the necessary 
preventative measures within their own organizations.
    At the same time, we dedicated a lot of our effort into 
just knocking down and disrupting the scams that we saw pop up 
early on. We weren't really concerned with building great cases 
initially.
    That being said, over the course of the past year we have 
opened more than 750 COVID-related cases, fraud cases. We have 
seized in excess of $800 million. We have probably made more 
than 120 arrests specific only to COVID fraud.
    It is something that we are proud to have been sort of 
ahead of the ball on, but we also recognize that this is not 
something that is going to go away. The size of these packages 
are so notable and the opportunities that exist are going to be 
persistent. We are going to be addressing COVID fraud for many 
years to come. And this is why it is so important that we want 
to keep investing in the modernization of our Cyber Fraud Task 
Forces.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks, Director Murray.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. That concludes the first round.
    And so we are now going to be starting with the second 
round. And as Mr. Palazzo said, practically every issue has 
already been covered.
    So, Director Murray, hopefully this will give you an 
opportunity also to elaborate more on some of the issues that 
have already been addressed.
    The increase in the variety and intensity of social media 
poses opportunities and challenges for you in terms of 
protective intelligence. What tools does the Secret Service use 
to gather protective intelligence online and through social 
media, and how are you adapting strategies and efforts to keep 
up with technology developments?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am.
    So several years back within our protective intelligence 
division, which is the group that leads our threat management 
efforts, based here in headquarters, but it coordinates all of 
our threat investigations around the globe, within that group 
we established an open source investigation unit, which is 
comprised of both agents and analysts. They use certain sorts 
of equipment and software in order to be able to go out and 
identify any sort of threatening language or ideation that 
might exist in an open source platform. This is not something 
that is on the dark web.
    So obviously as I mentioned earlier, this is something that 
we have made some significant investment in, and we are looking 
to continually invest in this thing because, you know, with 
regard to technology and equipment it is something that is 
always going to be advancing, probably at a rate faster than 
the multi-year budget permits us to address.
    Likewise, this is an area where we can really benefit from 
sort of targeted hiring, getting the right people in here to do 
this. It is not something that only an agent can do and there 
is a lot of folks out there that are going to school right now 
to do this type of thing, studying, you know, cyber security 
and so forth.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. One of the missions of the National 
Threat Assessment Center is to provide research and guidance to 
support public safety. What actionable guidance has the Secret 
Service developed through the Safe Schools Initiative to reduce 
the occurrence of violence and the loss of lives in schools?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am.
    So we are very proud of NTAC, of the National Threat 
Assessment Center. It is something that has been up and running 
for more than 20 years now. Although we actually started it to 
enhance our own protective mission, it was pretty clear after 
incidents like Columbine that there were opportunities for our 
agency to give back to communities and share quite literally 
the science and math of how we protect our own protectees.
    After Virginia Tech, the White House asked us to become 
involved in a more structured manner, and NTAC now not only 
focuses on schools, but they conduct research. And I should 
mention that NTAC is comprised of not just agents, but also 
analysts and social science research specialists. And their 
focus is to look historically at incidents that have taken 
place and conduct research on it and make recommendations.
    To date they have published about 35 different products. 
The most recent one is one we are particularly proud of and it 
had to do with averted school attacks that have taken place 
over the past decade. They looked at 67 different averted 
school attacks. That is where the folks there at the school or 
fellow students noticed that there might be something going on 
with the person who might commit this act, and they said 
something about it.
    And the takeaway there is that bystanders save lives. That 
was the point of that product, which was great because prior to 
that we would always encourage, whether it was law enforcement, 
public safety, schools that, you know, it is important to 
basically address the idea that somebody might be in trouble 
and might need help and not to ignore the warning signs.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. I would like you to elaborate a 
little bit more on the issue of financial and cybercrimes, and 
how the pandemic and increased reliance on the internet created 
opportunities for financial cybercrimes and the investigative 
challenges for the Secret Service.
    Mr. Murray. Yes, ma'am.
    Well, one thing we saw over the past 12 months especially 
as the entire world sort of went remotely was that there was an 
absence of a lot of checks and balances when it came to 
business processes.
    So if a company had somebody there who would either effect 
wire transfers at his or her desk or they would approve things 
manually, these things were all being done virtually and these 
transnational groups picked up on that early on and they 
exploited these lack of physical controls.
    And what they would do is they would either socially 
engineer their way or through intrusion they would get into 
these corporations and redirect those wire transfers to 
themselves, to what we call a money mule account where the 
recipient, the account holder is either a co-conspirator or 
they perhaps might be unwitting. And then they are instructed 
to take whatever that dollar amount is and then transmit it 
back to the transnational group, to the cyber actors via 
cryptocurrency.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Well, what is the role of the Cyber 
Fraud Task Force in mitigating and investigating cybercrimes 
that are related to network intrusions in the finance sector?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, ma'am.
    It is quite literally, it is our Cyber Fraud Task Forces 
who do combat that sort of activity. That is what their primary 
focus is on. And the Cyber Fraud Task Forces are comprised of 
not only the Secret Service, of course, but also federal, 
state, local partners who most of which are trained through our 
NCFI and they are looking to identify this sort of behavior, 
disrupt it, and prosecute it as well.
    And, you know, we have been very successful with seizure, 
but I think it is worth mentioning that the point of seizure of 
ill-gotten goods is not to turn it over to the agency. It is 
actually to-- it is restitution. It is to give it back to the 
victims. So we are very proud, and particularly with regard to 
the 800 million we have seen with credit COVID fraud, we have 
been very successful in getting that money back to the victim 
organizations and individuals.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. And what challenges exist with the 
increasing use of cryptocurrency for financial transactions, 
particularly on the dark web?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, ma'am.
    So it is a challenge. I think it is worth saying I have 
seen some reporting in the news about cryptocurrency. It is 
worth noting that cryptocurrency in and of itself is not 
inherently fraudulent. It is not designed for any illicit 
purpose. But the fact that it can be anonymized makes it a 
pretty good utility for somebody who wants to commit fraud.
    So what I mean by that is, you can actually be anonymous as 
a sender and anonymous as a receiver of cryptocurrency. The 
vast majority of cryptocurrencies are legitimate and they go 
through a legitimate and a valid exchange, and we know who the 
sender is and we know who the receiver is.
    The one thing that works for the Secret Service is that we 
are pretty adept at following the money. So while we might not 
necessarily at first know who the sender or receiver is, we can 
follow the digital footprints with regard to the cryptocurrency 
itself and then sort of reverse engineer our investigative 
efforts. And we have had a lot of success in that regard.
    And that is where, you know, the continual investment in 
not only the process, but the technology is going to help us in 
the months and years to come.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Director Murray, following up, I understand that the Secret 
Service has redoubled its efforts to ensure that in-service and 
specialized training are a fundamental part of your operations.
    This subcommittee agrees with these efforts and contributed 
an additional $14 million above the request to support 
improvements at the James Rowley Training Center.
    What is your assessment of current training operations at 
your Rowley Training Center, especially as it relates to the 
in-service and specialized training required to keep your 
agents and officers at peak performance?
    And an additional question, sir, how have you applied the 
additional funding and what are your priorities for ensuring 
the Rowley Training Center meets the agency's requirements in 
the future, sir?
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, sir.
    Well, first of all, thank you for your support in that 
regard. It was critical.
    We have made a lot of key investments with regard to in-
service training. It was something that was lacking and still 
needs continual improvement here in the Secret Service. I do 
think as we increase our staffing, that will also increase 
opportunity to expand opportunities for in-service training.
    Obviously COVID made things a little bit challenging, but 
we were, as a result of that investment we made in expanding 
our bandwidth and our capability, we were able to deliver many, 
many thousands of hours of virtual training to our workforce 
over the past 14 months or so.
    As we come out of COVID, I am very excited about the idea 
of not only inviting our workforce to come back into our Rowley 
Training Center here in the National Capitol Region, but also 
at the training center we have a group that exists for the sole 
purpose of going out to the field, whether it is here 
domestically or around the world to train not only our people, 
but all of our public safety and our law enforcement partners 
around the world who provide support to us for both protective 
and investigative measures.
    We have made a lot of infrastructure improvements. Again, 
thanks very much to this committee. Within the last 18 months 
we have opened up our brand new state of the art K-9 facility 
out there which is a huge benefit for our program. And I invite 
you and the rest of the members of the committee to come out 
there and not only visit the K-9 center, but also the entire 
training center.
    Long-term, as I mentioned earlier, I think there are some 
critical opportunities that exist with regard to construction 
out there at the training center. As you know, in the wake of a 
fence jumping incident we had about seven years ago, there was 
a panel that got together that made some recommendations as to 
how Secret Service can improve its operations. It was called 
the Protective Mission Panel. We have implemented pretty much 
all of those things, to include the White House fence.
    The one thing we have not done, the one recommendation we 
have not been able to act on just yet is the construction of a 
White House mockup or what we call the White House training 
facility. And I know I mentioned it earlier, but in the same 
way that the fence is going to be a gamechanger for us 
operationally, construction of a White House training facility 
would be a gamechanger for this agency and would also enhance 
national security across the board.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    You mentioned several positive indicators, sir, with regard 
to recruiting, retention and lower accession rates. But I want 
you to dive a little deeper into another aspect that is deeply 
entrenched in these metrics:
    Employee morale. Over the past few years you have reported 
increased levels of morale among your workforce. Would you like 
to share some of the efforts undertaken that have helped drive 
these particular metrics in a positive direction so far?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir. Thank you. And thanks for your 
support in that regard as well.
    So certainly happy with some of the markers that we have 
seen in terms of upward trends in employee morale. We do look 
at things like the federal employment viewpoint survey. It is 
certainly important to us. But as positive as some of those 
things might be, it also illuminates the fact that-- well, two 
things really. The fact that our engagement matters, and it 
also shines a light on the fact that there is a lot more work 
to do.
    So that is one thing we have done a lot more of over the 
last several years is continual engagement with our workforce. 
Even with regard to COVID, we are constantly sending out 
messages to our workforce. Early on we wanted to make sure we 
were addressing their concerns and their needs. We, you know, 
utilized surveys and conducted Town Halls on the matter and so 
on and so forth.
    Candidly, our employees seem to like to know about 
legislative affairs that are going on. So even hearings like 
this we put out there, and hopefully some of them are watching 
us right now.
    But, you know, I think the fact that there is engagement 
with the workforce across, you know, all job series seems to be 
received well and I want our workforce to know just how proud 
we are of them and I am of them. And it is an extremely 
difficult job. You know, some folks laugh when I say it, but I 
always joke when I say there is no Coke to our Pepsi. We are a 
very different kind of agency because of this dual mission. We 
are very much like an expeditionary force that goes out and 
never comes back, like a Navy ship that never comes back to 
port. And so that makes us highly reliant on each other.
    And I think, you know, like anybody else in life, it is the 
importance of being heard. So I think if there is any positive 
trends, it is hopefully because our workforce feels that they 
are being heard because they are.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the chance 
for a second round. I will use it to ask for clarification of a 
couple of earlier answers and, if time permits, to raise an 
additional area.
    Mr. Director, I appreciated your response to my earlier 
question about campaign events in particular, circumstances 
where protection might pose great risk to the protectors, to 
your agents and the chance you have to offer feedback in 
advance of such things.
    I just want to make sure I understand your answer on the 
Walter Reed automobile ride in particular because what you said 
was news to me, maybe not to others.
    I understood you to say that before the President, who was 
clearly hospitalized for COVID, that the Secret Service was 
given the opportunity to assess the possibility of protection 
if he took such a ride, and then that you granted that 
clearance, and then the agents who were in the car with him 
were given a degree of PPE or whatever protection that was 
equivalent to what the hospital workers had had.
    I had not heard that. Can you elaborate on that just a bit 
or at least confirm it?
    Mr. Murray. Yes, sir.
    So whether it is that instance or anywhere we take any of 
our protectees, we are going to do an advance. If we are going 
to do overseas, obviously that advance is going to be pretty 
extensive. If we find out tonight that one of our protectees 
wants to go to some location for dinner, we are going to do an 
advance, a protective advance is what I mean.
    And so we certainly did that. It is just, you know, 
intensive advance planning. Granted, I do not think that our 
agents had a whole lot of time to do it, but in order to 
determine whether or not it was achievable, they had to have 
conversations with the medical staff from the White House 
Medical Unit, the medical staff from Walter Reed, and then 
beyond that they had to make sure they could create a safe and 
secure environment for that motorcade ride or whatever it was.
    But to answer your other question, yes, sir. The two 
individuals in the vehicle were fully outfitted in PPE, if that 
is the right terminology.
    Mr. Price. Yes. And of course here the additional element 
in evaluation is whether this can be done in a way that is safe 
for the protectors, for your agents. That is, I would think, 
not a focus of most of these advance assessments in ordinary 
times.
    If I can circle back to January 6th to make sure I 
understand what you are saying. You are saying that January 6th 
was not determined to be a national security event; is that 
true?
    Mr. Murray. That is correct. It was not an NSSE on January 
6th. Correct.
    Mr. Price. And I do think it is a sad day in this country 
when a routine counting of the electoral votes ensuring the 
peaceful transfer of power has to be declared a national 
security event. But that does seem to be where we are.
    Can you offer some clarification as to what difference it 
would have made had such a declaration been in place in terms 
of your agency's role?
    Mr. Murray. Sure.
    So I will start by saying I think it was two days after 
January 6th it was determined by the then acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security that we would slide the designation date for 
the inauguration 12 days earlier to go ahead and make sure we 
were, you know, absolutely mission ready for the inauguration.
    So to answer your question, could we have--could it have 
been done to push it before January 6th? Conceivably, yes. But 
the real benefit of NSSE planning is to have a long lead time 
and to have the opportunity for all these agencies to sort of 
work together.
    We would not have had that. I do want to say, though, that 
I am aware that in mid to late December a lot of the agencies 
here, to include U.S. Capitol Police, Secret Service, 
Metropolitan Police Department, they were involved in pre-
coordination meetings about what could happen at the National 
Capitol Region on January 6th. I think there were more than 
half a dozen of those meetings.
    Obviously, I am aware that the former Chief, Steve Sund, 
testified not too long ago up there and I am also aware that 
one of the things he conveyed is that, you know, he would have 
preferred to have had more, more people, more resources, more 
fencing to be able to effectuate and push out his perimeter.
    And I could not agree more. And had it been established to 
be an NSSE, that is one of the things that you would have seen. 
You would have seen more people. You would have seen more 
perimeter fencing. You would have seen more resources.
    But to your point, sir, it does not need to be an NSSE to 
achieve that. You do not need to have the designation to have 
all those things.
    Mr. Price. Thank you. That is helpful.
    My time is about to expire. I do want to commend you on the 
agency's report on averting targeted school violence issued in 
March. I will have some questions for the record about the 
implications of that report.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Hinson.
    Ms. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the second round of 
questions.
    And thank you, Director Murray, for sticking it out as 
well.
    I just had one follow up based on kind of my earlier line 
of questioning. You talked a lot in just the past few minutes 
about preventative measures within organizations that you work 
with, disrupting the scams that are out there, and then some of 
the seizures and arrests that the Secret Service has made with 
fraud and financial crimes.
    So I guess, you know, obviously we know you are working on 
all of these things. What can Iowans and American citizens 
actually do to protect themselves against being the victims of 
these kinds of financial crimes that your organization is 
investigating?
    Mr. Murray. The first step is simple cyber hygiene. And it 
sounds silly, I know, but it is just making sure that we are, 
you know, always diligent with regard to our own personal 
devices and our own personal access to things that matter.
    From a organizational or a business standpoint, it is 
basically identifying somebody, and they do not have to be a 
subject matter expert, but identifying somebody to sort of be 
the marshal for all things that matter in terms of resiliency 
and continuity of operations for your organization. And that 
certainly includes cyber.
    As I mentioned earlier, I do think that we are all, as a 
society, guilty of up till very recently thinking of this as 
something as nice to have. But moving forward I think we need 
to realize in the public and private sector, this is something 
that we need to have.
    If I may give a quick example of a recent public utility 
that suspected that it might have been the subject of 
cybercrime. This public utility contacted one of our Cyber 
Fraud Task Forces. One of our agents and a local sheriff's 
officer who had been trained in NCFI, went out there and when 
they got there, they were advised that this public utility saw 
some anomalous activity in some of their gages. And they 
suspected that somebody might be controlling it remotely. And 
that is entirely possible.
    But here is the problem. That public utility had not 
implemented any controls whatsoever. So there was no way to 
tell what the baseline was, what was normal and what happened.
    And if I could give you a real life example, I know in a 
world of Ring doorbells things are different. But, you know, 
years ago if you came home to your house and you saw the window 
was broken and that is all you saw, you did not know whether 
somebody was trying to break into your house or if it was just 
some kids playing ball and the ball hit the house and they ran 
away.
    And that is effectively what that public utility had there 
in front of them. So they have to invest on the front end. They 
have to have, you know, some protective measures in place 
because when you don't, there are no digital footprints or 
fingerprints for investigators to trace.
    Ms. Hinson. Absolutely.
    All right. Well, thank you, Mr. Murray. I appreciate your 
time.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe there are no more questions to 
Mr. Murray.
    I am just doublechecking to see if--
    Mr. Fleischmann, are you signaling that you have another 
question?
    Mr. Fleischmann. I do not, Madam Chair. I just--
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Oh.
    Mr. Fleischmann. -- wanted to say thank you for another 
outstanding hearing. It was substantive and productive, and I 
wanted to thank the Director.
    Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Murray, I just want to remind you of the request by Ms. 
Underwood with regards to the use of force and your commitment 
to respond in writing to the committee with regards to her 
question.
    And also because we are ending a little bit early and have 
some time, and the fact that this subcommittee has a great deal 
of respect for the Secret Service and the men and women of the 
Secret Service, I just wanted to-- I don't want to put you on 
the spot, but I just want to give you an opportunity, if there 
is any issue or question that was not asked that you would like 
this subcommittee to perhaps have more information about, I 
would like to give you this opportunity to do that now.
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am.
    I hope it doesn't ring hollow, but I do--we really do 
appreciate the continued support of this subcommittee. We are 
highly reliant on you and we have a fantastic relationship with 
your senior staff for which we are very, very grateful. I 
appreciate the open lines of communication.
    I would like to, when the time is right and COVID permits, 
I would like to invite everybody to come out to the Rowley 
Training Center and down to the National Computer Forensics 
Institute to take a look at the good work that not only our 
people are doing, but with regard to NCFI the good work all the 
law enforcement officers in your communities are doing as well.
    But I thank you very much and I appreciate all you have 
done for us, and I appreciate the fact that you recognize the 
hard work of our employees.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you. And we will. We will be 
taking that visit.
    Mr. Murray. Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. So thank you, Mr. Murray, very much for 
being here.
    The Subcommittee on Homeland Security stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]HUNT REPORTING COMPANYRPTS HOFERHAP133150HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Thursday, May 13, 2021U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND 
OPERATIONAL PRIORITIESHOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
2022Thursday, May 13, 2021U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL 
PRIORITIESWITNESSTAE D. JOHNSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order.
    During today's virtual hearing, members are responsible for 
muting and un-muting themselves. When you are recognized to 
speak, If I notice that you have not un-muted yourself, I will 
ask you if you would like staff to un-mute you. If you indicate 
approval by nodding, staff will un-mute your microphone.
    To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair, or staff 
designated by the chair, may mute participant microphones when 
they are not recognized to speak.
    If there is a technology issue during a member's speaking 
time, we will move to the next member until the issue is 
resolved and you will retain the balance of your time.
    We will be following the 5-minute rule. With one minute in 
your time, the clock will turn yellow. When your time has 
expired, the clock will turn red and it will be time to 
recognize the next member
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules, beginning with the chair and ranking member, followed by 
members present at the time that the hearing is called to order 
in order of seniority, and we will alternate by party. Next we 
will go to the members who were not present when the hearing 
was called to order, until every member present has had a first 
round.
    Members can submit information in writing at any of our 
hearings or markups using the email address provided in advance 
to your staff.
    Now let's begin.
    Today, I welcome Tae Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He is here to discuss 
ICE's management of its resources and its operational 
priorities. Thank you for being here this morning.
    Acting Director Johnson, as a career civil servant, you 
have been asked to step into this interim role as ICE Director 
and we appreciate your service in this capacity. We have spoken 
about some of the recent challenges you and the Secretary face, 
and I want to reaffirm my commitment to help you both address 
them.
    We have seen many important retractions of the prior 
Administration's policies that abrogated the rights of asylum 
seekers and others. Those policies drove a wedge between us and 
many communities, particularly large migrant populations.
    There are significant disagreements about immigration 
policy in this country and among members of this subcommittee. 
My own view is that we should not simply accept approaches that 
divide us, but instead work together to find appropriate 
solutions to balance immigration enforcement with due process, 
and balance removals with humanitarian considerations.
    We have a lot of work left to do, but if we are truly to 
address the challenges of immigration it is critical that we 
fix our broken immigration system. That is why it is critical 
for Congress to pass the President's immigration reform bill, 
H.R. 1177, and other important legislation like the American 
Dream and Promise Act.
    One issue that I am particularly alarmed by is the 
increasingly high number of detainees in ICE custody. This 
increased number not only puts at risk the lives of detainees, 
including those who pose no threat to our communities, but it 
endangers the lives of ICE and detention facility personnel, 
and the communities in which they live. We have a public health 
imperative to find a way to address this issue.
    I am also concerned about ICE's relationships with 
communities around the country. ICE must find a better way to 
balance fulfilling its important mission and respecting the 
important mission of local law enforcement.
    It is unfortunate that the prior Administration's 
aggressive interior enforcement policies placed demands on many 
local law enforcement agencies that has compromised the trust 
they worked so hard to nurture in their communities.
    As you know, that trust is strained in many places by 
concerns about abusive law enforcement practices. We should not 
be adding to that erosion of trust with immigration enforcement 
pressures from ICE. Victims and witnesses to crimes must feel 
safe in coming forward.
    It is my hope ICE can find a way to work collaboratively 
with our local law enforcement agencies, and I look forward to 
working with you and this Administration to build that trust 
with communities and colleagues concerned about this issue. A 
good place to start is by increasing transparency and 
collaboration with non-profit community organizations which 
provide shelter, along with legal assistance, trauma 
counseling, and other services to migrants.
    Lastly, I would like to recognize the important work and 
accomplishments of the Homeland Security Investigations 
workforce. I especially commend them for their work in 
combating the criminal activity related to vaccines, personal 
protective equipment, and attempts to steal CARES Act funding 
meant for families and small businesses.
    It is now my pleasure to turn to the distinguished 
gentleman from Tennessee, Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his 
opening remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Acting Director Johnson, welcome, sir. I would first like 
to thank you for your decades of service protecting this 
country. Your commitment and leadership over the years with INS 
and now ICE are greatly appreciated. I would also like to thank 
you for stepping up to serve as the Acting Director before and 
during the presidential transition. This is a difficult job 
under the best of circumstances, but I know the agency and the 
men and women who serve with you are in good hands and, again, 
sir, I thank you.
    It is unfortunate that we don't have the fiscal year 2022 
budget at this time, at the time of this hearing. You may or 
may not know, but ICE funding, and especially detention bed 
funding, is usually one of the last details that gets worked 
out in our conference negotiations. And I would like to see 
what marker the President is putting down to show his 
commitment to a safe and orderly immigration system.
    ICE is a crucial component in our ability to enforce 
immigration, customs, and trade laws in our country. To try to 
limit or minimize the Nation's laws enacted to protect our 
country by withholding funds is simply irresponsible, and to 
demand that the agency responsible for enforcing those national 
security laws be dismantled is unconscionable. We need a 
strong, effective, transparent, and accountable ICE.
    I have consistently advocated for a funding level for ICE 
that enables ICE to fulfill its law enforcement mission, 
including funding detention facilities. I am dismayed that the 
President's order to no longer apprehend persons illegally in 
this country is linked to a scarcity of resources. I believe 
everyone on this subcommittee now has a responsibility to pass 
a bill that has adequate funds for ICE to perform its mission 
to enforce immigration laws on the books, not just three 
categories as arbitrarily determined by the President.
    I know that the officers and teams in Homeland Security 
Investigations, or HSI, do amazing work tackling some of the 
most heartbreaking cases and taking down some very bad actors. 
HSI funding is an example where we have agreements on both 
sides of the aisle. However, if we don't recognize that these 
very criminal organizations that we are investigating and 
pursuing are being fueled and funded by the waves of illegal 
migration we refuse to stop, I don't think we will ever be able 
to effectively shut down these transnational criminal 
enterprises. We need to act and I remain hopeful that we can 
work together to find a resolution to keep our nation safe.
    Thank you again, Mr. Johnson, for being with us this 
morning. I very much look forward to your testimony.
    Madam Chairwoman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Acting Director Johnson, we will submit 
the full text of your official statement for the hearing 
record. Please begin your opening statement, which I would ask 
you keep to 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Chairwoman Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member 
Fleischmann, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee of 
Homeland Security, it is an honor to appear before you today 
representing the 20,000 outstanding professionals of ICE.
    Because the fiscal year 2022 President's budget has not yet 
been submitted to Congress, I am unable to address any specific 
details at this time. That said, I will discuss our operational 
challenges, impacts of working in a COVID-19 environment, and 
our efforts to remain nimble and forward- leaning in response 
to changing operational needs.
    As you are well aware, we are continuing to experience a 
wave of families and unaccompanied children arriving along the 
Southwest border. At the border, our goal is to ensure border 
security while supporting an immigration system that is 
orderly, efficient, fair, and humane.
    Currently, the majority of those being apprehended along 
the Southwest border are single adults who are being expelled 
under Title 42. This has proven to be critical to ICE's efforts 
to ensure adequate space for social distancing and reduce the 
spread of COVID-19 in our detention facilities. ICE is 
concerned that the loss of Title 42 could create additional 
pressure on our immigration system.
    One other concern we face is Mexico's limited capacity. 
When Mexico's capacity is reached, we process the families and 
place them in proceedings in the United States. We have 
partnered with community-based organizations to test families 
and quarantine them under COVID-19 protocols. In some 
locations, the processing of families have strained our 
resources. This cannot be sustained unless we receive 
sufficient funding to keep these families safe after they cross 
the border.
    On February 18, I issued guidance that requires ICE staff 
to focus on three presumed priorities: national security, 
border security, and public safety. Although this guidance sets 
forth certain priorities, anyone in the U.S. illegally is still 
subject to arrest and removal.
    In the first two calendar months following the 
implementation of this guidance, arrests that meet the presumed 
priority criteria are up. For example, in March, there were 645 
arrests that meet these criteria and, in April, there were 
1552. This is higher than every preceding month going back to 
April 2020. Similarly, arrests for non- citizens who have 
committed certain serious crimes are up. In March, ICE arrested 
280 non-citizens whose most serious offense is assault; in 
April, ICE arrested 264. This is higher than all preceding 
months this fiscal year. The same is true for weapon offenses 
and DUIs.
    Consistent with this guidance, ICE will continue to focus 
on the most pressing national security, border security, and 
public safety threats. Through prioritization, we hope to 
achieve even greater success in this regard.
    Following the issuance of the interim guidance, ICE was 
able to quickly develop and deploy supporting technology and 
systems. ICE is working with CBP on the Unified Immigration 
Portal, a technical solution that will connect relevant data 
from across the immigration life cycle to enable more complete 
and understanding of one's immigration journey.
    Additionally, to better identify long-term needs and 
solutions, ICE has begun the development of a data 
modernization plan and roadmap that will allow us to properly 
assess the current and future data needs across all of ICE. 
This plan will allow ICE to identify forward-leaning solutions 
and identify the resources needed. I hope to work with this 
committee over the next few months as this plan is developed.
    Over the last two decades, transnational organized crime 
has transformed in size, scope, and impact, posing a 
significant threat to national and international security. 
ICE's strategy seeks to build, balance, and integrate 
sophisticated analytical tools and techniques to combat 
transnational crime and related threats to our national 
security, and urge our foreign partners to do the same.
    ICE continues to prioritize the investigation and 
disruption of TCOs that illicitly introduce fentanyl, heroin, 
and other dangerous opioids into the United States. Continued 
congressional support for ICE's criminal investigative mission 
is vitally important.
    In closing, I want to thank you again for inviting me to 
testify before you today. I am honored and extremely humbled to 
represent the dedicated employees of ICE as they continue to 
keep our borders secure, enforce our laws, and stay true to our 
values principles.
    [The information follows:]********** COMMITTEE INSERT 
**********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Director.
    Director Johnson, since you issued the Interim Guidance on 
Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities, arrest 
rates have gone down. And we know that cases involving 
individuals considered threats to national security or public 
safety often take more time and more resources.
    I heard you discuss in your opening statement, but I would 
ask if you could please further characterize what changes you 
have seen in the types of arrests being made since the 
implementation of the Interim Guidance. For example, have 
arrests of individuals with convictions for criminal sexual 
offenses or other serious convictions changed?
    Mr. Johnson. Sure. Just as you mentioned in your question, 
while the overall arrests have certainly gone down a bit, the 
arrests of folks that meet our presumed priorities have 
actually gone up. One category or a couple categories of folks 
where we have actually seen arrests increase are those 
convicted of domestic violence, sexual offenses, and DUIs, as 
another good example.
    So, I mean, I think you--you know, while the overall 
apprehensions are down, I think when you have officers focusing 
on what they believe are the worst of the worst, then they are 
actually much more able to make a more meaningful impact on 
public safety and I think that is what you are seeing.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Well, you know, as you work with 
the Secretary to develop the final guidance, it really is 
imperative to address the important context of mitigating 
factors in a way that clearly distinguishes between people with 
a criminal history who continue to pose a threat and those who 
don't. For example, a person who committed a low- level drug 
offense 20 years ago and has not engaged in any serious 
criminal activity since, and for whom there is no other 
aggravating circumstances, is unlikely to be a threat to public 
safety today.
    It is my understanding that ICE has not conducted an 
agency-wide, individualized assessment of each detainee in its 
custody to determine whether continued detention is appropriate 
under the interim guidance priorities. Currently, reviews of 
detainees are only carried out based on a specific request from 
or on behalf of the detainee, but it appears that those reviews 
do not weigh each detainee's circumstances against the interim 
guidance. Will ICE commit to doing this more thorough review, 
especially in light of the public health imperative, to address 
the unacceptably high number of COVID-positive cases in 
detention? And, if so, will that review be conducted by someone 
outside of the current field office workforce to ensure a truly 
independent review?
    Mr. Johnson. Thanks for that question. We continue to 
review the cases of those individuals that are detained. I 
think, you know, one of the most important pieces of that sort 
of analysis is just making sure you only put the right people 
in a detention bed at the onset. And I think that sort of had 
been the primary focus to start that if you are only putting 
the priority cases and those that pose the most significant 
public safety threats, then you know those are the individuals 
that are appropriate for a detention bed.
    We do continue to review the detained population and we 
certainly have plans to do a full review of those that are in 
our custody, and continue to review cases of those that are 
arrested and detained to make sure that they meet our 
priorities. So I will commit to that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Will that review be done from an 
independent, will it be an independent review, or will that 
review be done within ICE itself? Because I think that is an 
important thing that you need to consider.
    Mr. Johnson. And we have. The current process is the 
initial review is done at the local field office level, there 
is a secondary review that is done by someone outside of the 
field office, as you sort of described, and we are looking at 
some other sort of frameworks that might work as we look at 
other options to review these cases, but that work is still 
underway.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. And I may have some 
recommendations for you.
    And I see that my time is up, so now I am going to go to 
Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you again, Madam Chair.
    Director Johnson, sir, we saw almost 900,000 persons cross 
the Southwest border illegally during 2019 and we declared it a 
crisis. It was not possible for CBP and ICE to detain the sheer 
numbers of people appended at the border. I have got several 
questions.
    To begin, sir, for those migrants that entered in 2019, how 
many or what percentage were given a notice to appear when they 
were released from CBP or ICE custody, sir?
    Mr. Johnson. I believe, sir, that the answer to that is 
everyone that was arrested and apprehended by Border Patrol was 
issued a notice to appear, but I would want to confirm, but 
that is my understanding.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir. And of those given a notice to 
appear, what percentage never once checked in with the court or 
their ICE office?
    Mr. Johnson. Sir, I don't have that information in front of 
me. What I will say is typically, once those individuals report 
to court, that is when ICE is typically made aware. And 
obviously for those that we release on alternatives to 
detention, we have a much-- sort of much better way and 
effective way to track those folks through the immigration life 
cycle, but I would have to-- I would have to see if we can't 
pull that information about those that were apprehended in 2019 
and get back to you.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
    After almost 2 years, if you know, sir, what is the current 
compliance rate for those migrants who arrived in 2019?
    Mr. Johnson. We certainly don't have that information. What 
I can tell you is based on the number of individuals that we 
enrolled in alternatives to detention. In fiscal year 2020, we 
had about 11,000 individuals abscond from the program, and so 
far in fiscal year 2021 we have had about 3,000-- or 2700 
people, this is through March, abscond from the ATD program.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir.
    For those who are not compliant with the terms of their 
release or who have orders of removal, what is ICE doing to 
find those individuals and remove them from the U.S.? And, as a 
follow-up, is there room under President Biden's priorities to 
ensure that those people who are not in compliance are 
expelled, sir?
    Mr. Johnson. There certainly is room. As I mentioned in my 
opening remarks, you know, everyone that is here in the country 
illegally is subject to arrest and removal, so there is 
certainly some room there. In terms of what ICE is doing to 
sort of identify those that aren't compliant or that failed to 
comply with the court order, I mean, that is-- you know, it 
really comes down to a resource issue. As you know, we have 
6,000 ERO officers that have to cover, you know, 5,000 state, 
local, and county jails, and there are a lot of individuals on 
the non-detained docket. So they are only able to do but so 
much given the staffing levels, but they do make efforts to 
identify those that violate their terms of release.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir.
    One final question in this round. Are you able to quantify 
how many individuals are currently being admitted at each point 
of entry without receiving a notice to appear? If so, how are 
these individuals vetted and what conditions of release are 
being set for these individuals, sir?
    Mr. Johnson. Sir, I would have to defer that question to 
Border Patrol, they are the ones responsible for issuing the 
NTA. I do not have a whole lot of visibility on the actual 
numbers that are being released without issuance of an NTA.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your 
answering those questions.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar?
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Director Johnson, I appreciate your almost 30 years of 
experience and career, and I thank you for your service for 
everything you have done.
    I want to ask a couple questions, one dealing with staffing 
and then one dealing with the prosecutorial discretions.
    So let me ask you about staffing. I'm talking about the 
Homeland Security Investigations. We know what they do. I 
think, bipartisan, we agree that we need to do that. But one of 
the things that I am seeing on the border is that when you look 
at those HSI special agents, they spend about 88 percent, about 
eight percent, maybe nine percent of their time conducting 
long, complex investigations relating to narcotics and only 
about five percent of their time doing the long-term, complex 
investigations relating to human smuggling, which is what we 
are seeing at the border.
    I mean, you know, some people don't see the smuggling or 
the trafficking. They only see what happens when they cross 
border, but on the other side is the smuggling, plus some of 
that that happens on our U.S. side.
    I want to see if the committee agrees that we need to have 
more Homeland Security Investigation agents, but we need to 
have more IRS folks also. And by IRS, I am talking about, of 
course, the Investigation Research Specialists that right now, 
you know, the ratio is just not high enough for your agents.
    So tell me about that and tell me if you can also add more 
people to the border, because sometimes we tend to send them to 
nice places, other cities, but they need to be at the border, 
and we need to fill the staffing. For example, in the Laredo 
area, one third of the-- we still have about one third vacancy 
in the Laredo area and you can look at the border area of other 
areas.
    So tell us about that, and then tell us also about 
immigration attorneys, so the judges can do their job, the 
immigration judges. I know that Chairman Quigley is on, we are 
working with him to get more court spaces because right now we 
have more judges than court spaces, so the judges are just 
basically hanging around for an open space. And I know Chairman 
Quigley is helping us with that, but we also need those ICE 
attorneys.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Congressman.
    I think you are absolutely right, you know, our HSI 
investigators have a fairly broad sort of portfolio as it 
relates to the types of crimes that they investigate and just 
given, you know, their limited resources, they are typically 
only able to devote some percentage of their staff to the 
various different portfolios. So I certainly recognize the 
concern with only five percent of the staff being devoted to 
human smuggling. I can't say for sure that that is 100 percent 
accurate, I have not seen that stat, but we will confirm that.
    But just to your point, I mean, I think it really does just 
start with additional resources, at least from the smuggling 
context, you know. It is just not important to have the 
resources here domestically, but we need to really have 
sufficient resources abroad, which is where a lot of these 
investigations start with our sort of partnership and work that 
we have with the foreign partners overseas.
    So, you know, in terms of the Intel Research Specialists, 
which is also known as criminal analysts, you are absolutely 
right. We have a ratio of about one to ten. You know, there are 
7200 special agents and only about 750 criminal analysts. And 
we really do need to get that number up pretty significantly 
because our data seems to suggest that, you know, that any time 
you have a criminal analyst partnered with a special agent 
throughout the course of that investigation that you have a 30-
percent higher success rate in terms of a positive outcome in 
that investigation.
    So that is something that we continue to ask for the 
committee's support on and we think that will go a long way 
towards tackling this human trafficking and human smuggling 
issue that we have here in our country.
    As it relates to immigration attorneys, we only have 1300 
immigration attorneys today, that is compared to about 650 or 
so immigration judges, if I remember correctly, and, you know, 
that is just totally, woefully inadequate in terms of our 
attorneys being able to cover it out on all the courtrooms 
across the country.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much.
    Thank you, Chairwoman.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member 
Fleischmann, and thank you, Mr. Johnson, for your remarks.
    As ICE's senior law enforcement official, you have an 
extraordinarily difficult job. Please know that there are many 
of us who support your mission and believe in the integrity of 
you and those under your supervision.
    I also would like to extend my thanks and gratitude to the 
men and women of your agency who work every day and night to 
protect our citizens and to enforce our laws, because this is a 
nation of laws.
    In your opening statement, you mentioned that what is 
happening at our border is a humanitarian crisis, and I cannot 
agree with you more. Since January, we have seen an 
unprecedented number of individuals, families, and abandoned 
children come to our border. This invasion of migrants is 
overwhelming our border facilities and, because of the global 
pandemic, this furthered a health risk for our Border Patrol 
and ICE agents.
    Today, I hope this committee can have an open and honest 
discussion on ways to address and fix this ongoing crisis.
    As I mentioned, since the beginning of the Biden 
administration, our Southern border has seen an invasion of 
migrants trying to come into our country illegally. In March, 
Border Patrol told this committee that a large percentage of 
migrants crossing the border evaded law enforcement and entered 
the country. Border Patrol remains overwhelmed by the vast 
number of migrants they are detaining. We have heard their 
facilities quickly filled up, further making it a problem for 
agents to process illegal migrants.
    All that said, in April I read a report that ICE 
experienced a record low of deportations. So can you please 
explain why we are seeing lower deportation rates when the last 
few months we saw an increase in border crossings? And how do 
we push the Southern border further south, stopping dangerous 
individuals before they get to U.S. ports of entry?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Congressman.
    I guess my first response would be, like you have 
mentioned, there has been a significant surge of individuals 
along the Southwest border, but, you know, the overwhelming 
majority of those individuals have been single adults that we 
have been fortunately able to expel via Title 42. So those 
individuals have not made it into our detention network and, 
therefore, just weren't even, you know, in a position to 
remove.
    You know, the numbers of removals, as you mentioned, in 
April was much lower than-- lower, I wouldn't say much lower, 
than any-- you know, in the past, and there are a lot of 
factors that come into play with that. I mean, you know, ICE 
doesn't control the speed at which some of these cases make it 
through the process in terms of getting their cases adjudicated 
by judges, so that could have played a factor. And, as we 
mentioned, the arrests are down and sort of generally, although 
the priority arrests are up. So we think that may have also 
contributed to the lower number of removals.
    Mr. Palazzo. And my second part of the question was, can 
you-- you mentioned before, like how can we move, like, away 
from our Southern border and move that border further south?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes, that is a great question. Again, that 
just starts with just deploying more HSI staff abroad, so that 
they can, you know, work with our foreign partners to bring 
down these transnational criminal organizations right there 
before they reach our southern border. So that is a huge sort 
of priority for us and any additional resources we can get on 
that front to deploy additional staff overseas and enhance our 
Transnational Criminal Investigations unit would go a long way 
at attacking these smugglers and human traffickers.
    Mr. Palazzo. It seems that many elected officials in the 
United States believe they are above the law by creating 
sanctuary cities, counties, and states. Currently, there are 11 
states and 180 cities and counties that are listed as sanctuary 
cities. These sanctuary cities pride themselves on making it 
difficult for DHS agencies to do their jobs and create 
jurisdictions of amnesty for illegal aliens. No Mississippi 
cities currently act as sanctuary cities. In fact, in 2017 the 
Mississippi state legislature passed a law making sanctuary 
cities illegal in the state. The law prohibits towns, counties, 
and universities from purposefully defying federal immigration 
laws.
    A former Mississippi Governor said it best: ``Taxpayers 
expect their state and its political subdivisions to abide by 
federal immigration laws.''
    Can you tell me briefly, how do sanctuary cities affect 
your agents' ability to do their jobs, and do sanctuary cities 
create extra costs for your agency to enforce immigration?
    Mr. Johnson. Thanks, Congressman.
    I mean, to start, I would say that our relationships with 
the state and local community is absolutely vital in us being 
able to carry out our important mission. You know, without 
their support, it is very difficult for us to be efficient and 
effective. So when local jurisdictions do not cooperate, 
whether that is in terms of not honoring our detainers or not 
letting us in at their facilities, then it puts ICE in a 
situation where we actually have to go out into the communities 
to find individuals that in this case would meet our priority.
    So it is certainly not the most efficient process and it 
does put our officers in harm's way unnecessarily, in my view.
    Mr. Palazzo. I see my time has expired. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Johnson, thank you for appearing before us today. Thank 
you for your long service. We realize there are certain 
limitations on what you can say about next year's budget; on 
the other hand, you have long experience with the Department, 
which I hope will enable you to reflect on two interrelated 
challenges that I want to introduce.
    One is the targeting of enforcement actions, how the 
Department exercises its prosecutorial discretion, and the 
interrelated problem of the relations with local law 
enforcement.
    This subcommittee has a history, it goes back about 14 
years, of pushing for a more precise focus on dangerous 
individuals when it comes to ICE enforcement. We directed 
funding in that way and we assumed that in many, maybe most 
cases, deportation would occur as individuals emerged from the 
penal system. That led to the Secure Communities Program. As 
you know, it turned out to be far less targeted, I would say, 
on dangerous individuals than we had hoped. A good deal of 
discussion and agitation during the Obama administration and 
the Priority Enforcement Program replaced Secure Communities. 
But then Secure Communities was brought back with a vengeance 
by the Trump administration with a much less effective 
targeting strategy on people who posed a threat.
    The Trump administration also sought to weaponize the 
287(g) program. It sought to commandeer local law enforcement. 
They greatly increased 30 to 150 participating jurisdictions 
during the Trump administration. The Atlanta ICE director 
confirmed at one point that North Carolina raids were targeted 
at jurisdictions where sheriffs had withdrawn from the 287(g) 
program. Some provocative billboards were purchased by ICE 
across the country in areas where 287(g) was an issue. I mean, 
you know that history as well.
    So I want to register the hope and the belief that in the 
new Administration we are going to see some serious changes. We 
are going to see a renewed focus on targeted enforcement and we 
are going to see the reform, if not the elimination, of 287(g).
    I would appreciate your comments.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Congressman.
    First, just in terms of targeted enforcement actions, I 
think you are absolutely spot on. As I mentioned earlier when, 
you know, although our overall arrests are down, I think the 
data shows that the individuals with the highest level of 
criminality is up is somewhat reflective on, you know, the 
results that you get when people are somewhat hyper-focused on 
certain types of criminal elements, and we expect that trend to 
continue. And while our overall arrest numbers might not ever 
be as high as they were, I do expect that the number of, you 
know, violent offenders to increase because folks are spending 
their time working on those types of cases, which oftentimes 
are a little bit more difficult, as we all know.
    So as it relates to just the partnerships with 287(g) and 
other local officials, I mean, as I mentioned, I think there 
are some very-- there is some importance to keeping those 
relationships together. I think, you know, we cannot perform 
our jobs without the assistance of state and locals. And while 
we recognize that some, you know, local government agencies 
have elected to end their programs, there are other local 
governments that find the 287(g) program useful.
    So, you know, from our perspective, we are going to try to 
find some common ground and ways to encourage greater 
cooperation from state and locals and whatever that looks like. 
I mean, it doesn't have to be signing up for a 287(g) program, 
but we just want to keep those lines of communication open and 
find some areas of agreement because we think there are some-- 
there is lots of middle ground out there and we just need to 
figure out what it is, so that we can be effective at 
performing our mission.
    Mr. Price. I am sure you would acknowledge that if local 
law enforcement is seen, though, in the first instance as the 
long arm of ICE, that does have implications often for their 
ability to do their job in the local community.
    Mr. Johnson. Absolutely, sir, and I totally understand why 
people take the position that it is just not worth it. I mean, 
it stymies people from reporting crimes. Oftentimes, people who 
are subject to domestic violence won't pick up the phone 
because they are afraid of the ICE or immigration implications. 
So these are all valid and fair points, and I could certainly 
understand why those who choose not to participate make that 
decision.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Hinson.
    Ms. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you 
holding this hearing today. I did have the ability to speak 
with Acting Director Johnson earlier this week.
    So, thank you again for taking the time to meet with me 
earlier this week. My time today I am going to devote to 
follow-up questions from that conversation, as well as a few 
concerning issues that have been brought to my attention, 
specifically about ICE's activity or lack thereof in certain 
cases as well. These issues and a general lack of information 
are highly concerning to me and we are going to follow up with 
the Secretary when he is in in a few weeks, but these issues 
must be addressed by ICE leadership and the Administration. In 
my mind, it is part of our role to hold everybody accountable 
and make sure taxpayer dollars are spent effectively.
    So, Director Johnson, thank you again for your service and 
our frank conversation earlier this week. I also think it is 
important to note, when members of this committee reach out to 
ask for answers, we are doing that not to create more work for 
you, but because we are ultimately accountable to the American 
taxpayer and require those answers to be able to make truly 
informed decisions about how to spend those taxpayer dollars, 
their money.
    So thank you for the responses I have already received and 
I trust that you and your team are going to follow up on the 
other questions that we discussed in our call.
    We did talk about in our call the disconnect between ICE 
and Customs and Border Patrol, specifically when it comes to 
tracking illegal immigrants once they have been released into 
the United States. So today can you confirm for me the 
ability-- the inability, rather, for ICE to track illegal 
immigrants' location and then their activity within the 
homeland on that person level following their release by CBP?
    Mr. Johnson. Sure. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    As I mentioned in our call, there are certainly some gaps 
in our ability to track everyone that is released in the 
interior. For those individuals that are released on an 
alternative to detention, whether it is an ankle monitor or a 
smart link or telephonic reporting, we have, you know, much 
better success at keeping track of those, but for individuals 
that are just released with notification to report to ICE or to 
show up in court, then our ability to track those folks closely 
is much more limited. And--
    Ms. Hinson. So this gap you talk about, why is it so much 
more challenging to track individuals now than it was in 2019?
    Mr. Johnson. No, I don't think it was much more limited to 
track in 2019. The systems have been-- the same systems are in 
place and in 2019, when we were seeing a surge of family units 
that were being released, I mean, they were being released with 
a notice to appear and not-- you know, we couldn't enroll 
everyone on ATD because the numbers were high, just as they are 
now. So we were certainly running into those same issues in 
2019 as we are today, that has not changed.
    Ms. Hinson. Can you state for the record that you are not 
currently able to tell Iowans how many illegal immigrants are 
present in Iowa right now or how many CBP has released into the 
country with plans to be in Iowa?
    Mr. Johnson. That is correct. And, again, I would want to 
just-- that is my understanding, I would like to start with. I 
would like to go back to CBP and just clarify that they are 
unable to pull data by state, but that is my understanding that 
their system of record will not sort of product a report based 
on the states that the individuals that they are releasing are 
proposing to reside.
    Ms. Hinson. Right. And you say you want to go back to them 
obviously to confirm this, but do you believe that ICE should 
be able to provide this information? You know, obviously, we 
have got a gap here in communication if you can't and they 
can't. But do you believe Americans should know if illegal 
immigrants are in their neighborhood? Specifically, you talk 
about some of these risk categories, I think people deserve to 
know who is coming in.
    Mr. Johnson. I agree and, you know, it should be possible 
for that information to be transferred over to ICE's system of 
record in a way that would allow us to track folks down to the 
state and, quite frankly, the cities that these individuals are 
living in, we just don't have that capability or capacity 
currently.
    Ms. Hinson. Okay. So why is that? I mean, is it a lack of 
resources that you are not able to track individuals down to 
that in-person level at this point?
    Mr. Johnson. It is our--it is the two systems, the one 
system that CBP uses and the one that ICE uses, they just don't 
talk to each other in a meaningful way. So I do think it is, 
you know, getting some technology that will make the two 
systems talk would be extremely, you know, helpful, or maybe we 
will have to just scrap the two systems that are being used and 
start afresh with something that provides the sophistication 
that we need to track folks.
    Ms. Hinson. Well, Director Johnson, I appreciate those 
answers and I will probably have a few more questions in round 
two, but thank you.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the 
opportunity to dialogue here with the Acting Director. And 
thanks for our conversation earlier in the week, Acting 
Director.
    I wanted to bring up an issue that had some local impacts 
as well. And let me start by saying, in fiscal year 2021, this 
committee included report language that directs ICE to publish 
on a publicly-accessible website reports on arrests, detention, 
and removal of U.S. citizens that were citizens when they were 
detained or found to be citizens while in ICE custody. Can you 
tell me the status of the report that is being prepared and 
what can the committee expect to see-- when can the committee 
expect to see this information online?
    Mr. Johnson. So, Mr. Congressman, I do not know the 
background on the actual U.S. citizen report. I do remember 
clearing something related to U.S. citizens in ICE custody over 
the last week and it is my understanding that that is going to 
be sort of signed off on and submitted to the committee soon. I 
just don't know if that is the same report that is going to be 
posted-- that we are required to post on the web. So can I take 
that as a get-back and follow up with your staff?
    Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely. And I would just, you know, 
encourage you with an eye toward following the guidance of the 
report language to include this in a publicly-available format 
as well. I am happy to view the information, obviously, in the 
committee role, but I think that this deserves to be publicly 
available as well that ICE is-- the number of individuals and 
the manner in which ICE detains U.S. citizens, as some of my 
constituents have experienced.
    Acting Director, I wanted to talk specifically about the 
Adelanto facility in Southern California. There have been 
ongoing concerns with the facility and sometime around October 
of last year ICE began operating a new annex to increase their 
bed capacity near Adelanto, right next door. Can you tell me 
what the capacity of that facility is? And, if you can't, is 
that something that you can get back to us on?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. I mean, the capacity at Adelanto, if I 
remember correctly, is somewhere around 2,000 or thereabout, if 
I remember correctly, but I will confirm, and the annex is 
definitely much smaller. I think it is somewhere around 600 
beds total, maybe 800 at the annex, but I will get you those 
exact figures and, you know, following this meeting.
    I will say that our use of the annex right now has been 
limited largely to just the new intake and testing and 
quarantine of positive cases and we have not seen, you know, 
any sort of significant population there. Once those folks 
clear their quarantine, they are transferred over to Adelanto.
    Mr. Aguilar. So can you tell me then how many beds we pay 
for that aren't being utilized?
    Mr. Johnson. At both facilities, Adelanto and--
    Mr. Aguilar. Sure. And I bring this up in the context of 
there was a state bill that sought to limit for- profit 
prisons, and I know ICE entered into contracts with these 
facilities and with others around the country just, you know, 
prior to this bill taking effect. And so I just wanted to kind 
of get for the record, you know, what contracts do we have. If 
you said 2,000 at one facility, six to 800 at the annex, you 
know, what is the population there, and are we under contract 
and are we paying for bed space that we are not utilizing.
    Mr. Johnson. Copy that. We will certainly run down that 
information. I believe of the three or four facilities that we 
entered into sort of contracts with right there in that sort of 
midst of the new California legislation, I think that one 
facility near Adelanto is the only one that we actually 
activated, but I will confirm that to you, Congressman Aguilar, 
and let you know.
    Mr. Aguilar. But you agree that we are paying for bed space 
that we aren't utilizing?
    Mr. Johnson. For sure. Especially right now during this 
pandemic, I mean, that is the case across the country in a 
number of our facilities that we have these guaranteed 
minimums. And it is just because there has been so much 
uncertainty surrounding whether Title 42 is going to end or, 
you know, a host of litigation that is at play that could 
significantly turn things around and we would have needed all 
of these beds, but that is absolutely accurate that there are 
some beds being paid for.
    Mr. Aguilar. Yeah, I think that is just something 
critically that we need to look at as we keep an eye on the 
fiscal year 2022 budget. It is pretty clear that there is a lot 
of bed space that we are utilizing in many cases-- or that we 
are under-utilizing and we are paying companies for that, and I 
think that that is something we have to remedy and fix.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Director Johnson, great to see you, and please thank all 
your men and women for the job that they do. As a former law 
enforcement officer, I am particularly appreciative of the work 
that you and your office accomplish.
    If you would, Director, I want to talk a little bit about 
287(g) because I am hearing some rumors that this program may 
actually be in danger of being cut back or eliminated, and I 
really want this committee to hear how important this program 
is. I know as a sheriff this is one of the few programs that 
was a win-win-win. It is a win for the community because it 
makes-- it keeps our communities safer by getting rid of 
criminals, it keeps our officers safer by ICE officers come to 
the jail and pick these guys up for deportation and they don't 
have to find them on the street, and it is safer for them 
because they are found in those locations. And I would like 
you, if you would, Director, because I know as these numbers 
continue to go up on the interior of the country, a program 
like 287(g)-- and let me make this clear, I am only talking 
about the jail- based program, because the task force program 
that happens out on the street where you are actually going and 
looking for individuals, I never had that, I never did that, 
because I felt it drove people underground and I did not want 
to do that, but my jail had a very robust 287(g) program.
    And these are individuals who are in the interior of our 
country, committing crimes, getting arrested, and that is a 
prerequisite for 287(g), they have to go to jail under the JEM 
program, they go to jail and then they work on being deported.
    Can you talk about how important that program is to the 
safety of your officers and our communities?
    Mr. Johnson. Absolutely. Thanks, Mr. Congressman.
    You know, as you mentioned, this is a perfect of good 
cooperation between federal and state law enforcement. As I 
mentioned earlier, these relationships that we have are vital 
to ICE being able to sort of successfully perform its mission. 
The 287(g) program has the two types, the Task Force Model, 
which Jacksonville did not necessarily have, and then you have 
the Jail Enforcement Model, which you did have, which is 
basically sharing that, you know, information as you run in 
print with ICE and letting us know if there is an ICE- wanted 
and ICE warrant.
    So, as I mentioned, you know, there are a lot of 
jurisdictions that find the program useful, you know, and 
others who have decided for whatever reason that it is not as 
useful, it runs contrary to some of the other, you know, law 
enforcement obligations, which I understand. I have heard 
concerns from folks about them not wanting to report crime.
    But I do think that, you know, any time we can have our 
officers not have to go out into the communities and arrest 
people that are in local custody, whether it is a 287(g) 
program or it is whether the facility is honoring a detainer, 
it makes our officers safe.
    Mr. Rutherford. So, Director, I mean, look, you ran the ERO 
program for a long time, so can you talk about how there has 
been growth in the 287(g) program that has made it better for 
your officers, safer for your officers?
    Mr. Johnson. So I don't have the exact numbers. I mean, I 
do know that there is at least over 100 current agreements. 
Some of the agreements are fairly useful and then, you know, 
there are obviously some agreements that there is just not a 
whole lot of activity.
    So, look, any time our guys and gals don't have to go out 
and arrest someone in the communities and put themselves at 
risk, it is a good thing for folks. But, you know, I certainly 
recognize the sort of-- you know, the issues associated with 
some that think that it just results in certain folks being 
apprehended and potentially targeted, which is certainly 
something I don't think any of us want to see.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you very much.
    And I see my time has run out, Madam Chair. But I certainly 
hope, Director, this is a program that survives any cuts from 
the Biden administration.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Quigley.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Director, for being here. Sir, I was one of the 
founding members of the Transgender Equality Caucus, so I think 
justifiably concerned about their care under ICE detention. As 
of February 2019, ICE confirmed it was jailing more than 100 
transgender individuals in 20 different immigration jails 
across the U.S. Unfortunately, immigration detention is 
notoriously dangerous and harmful for transgender immigrants 
who are likely to be seeking asylum because of trans-phobic 
violence they have already faced or they fear and, because of 
such histories, they are likely to suffer from depression, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, and other mental health 
conditions.
    Additionally, in 2017, a congressional inquiry revealed 
that LGBTQ people in ICE custody are 97 times more likely to be 
sexually victimized than non-LGBT people in detention.
    Sir, do you know how many people are currently in ICE 
custody who identify as transgender and which facilities they 
are detained in?
    Mr. Johnson. Sir, I do not have that information in front 
of me, but it is certainly something I can run down.
    Mr. Quigley. Okay. Now, our advocates report that many 
transgender individuals in ICE, they don't reveal their 
identity because they fear they will be subject to segregation 
and other harms. Can you tell us a little bit about the 
training and protocols in place to ensure that individuals 
coming into custody are provided a safe and protected 
opportunity to reveal their gender and their orientation to 
ICE?
    Mr. Johnson. Absolutely. You know, upon intake, individuals 
are asked a series of questions and one of the questions is, 
you know, how they identify. So there are a number of 
opportunities along the way for individuals to sort of reveal 
their LGBTQ status to an officer at any point in the process. 
There is also the detention reporting and information line 
where, if they don't feel comfortable reporting it to the 
officer, they can report it to our hotline, or they can report 
it during their medical screening when they are in front of 
medical professionals and not officers.
    We have made some efforts on sort of, you know, improving 
our training and identifying specific facilities that would 
focus on housing these individuals in a less restrictive 
environment, but there is always more work we can do. I mean, 
we are looking at all aspects of our vulnerable population to 
include transgender and this is going to continue to be a 
priority for us as we move forward in assessing our detention 
framework.
    Mr. Quigley. And obviously there have been horrors told 
about transgender individuals being abused in these facilities. 
So it just seems obvious that training needs to be pretty 
dramatically expanded and altered to make sure that the culture 
understands that these abuses are not going to be tolerated and 
that, if anything, extra protection needs to be afforded those 
who identify to all of yours.
    Are there plans to expand what you are talking about even 
more?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes, definitely some work is underway to 
figure out, as I mentioned, how to deal with various segments 
of our vulnerable population to include transgender, you know, 
identifying other alternatives where that is possible. You 
know, as you may be aware, I mean, some individuals that are 
transgender have pretty serious criminal convictions and it 
is-- you know, that is one area where we are just trying to 
evaluate some of the mitigating factors that come with some of 
these cases like, you know, their special vulnerabilities 
compared to the public safety threat that they actually pose.
    But we are going to continue to sort of dig into that issue 
and see where we can make improvements.
    Mr. Quigley. Yes, if you could get back to us on that, as 
well as my initial question about the number of transgender 
individuals and where they are located, and any plans and how 
those plans coming moving forward for additional and improved 
training and care, I appreciate it.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for 
holding today's hearing.
    Mr. Johnson, as you know, vaccinating your detainees 
against COVID-19 is important not only for their own health, 
but also for the health in the communities where the detention 
facilities are located. I have a county jail in my district 
that contracts with ICE and, despite some initial confusion, I 
am pleased to report that everybody detained there was offered 
COVID-19 vaccines on March 10th. However, over the last few 
months, there have been broader communication breakdowns around 
ICE detainee vaccinations that need to be addressed.
    You stated in your testimony that COVID-19 vaccines for 
people in ICE's custody were included in the Federal 
Government's allocation for each state, and that the local and 
state public health departments are responsible for 
distributing them to the detainees. However, I understand that 
DHS is currently reevaluating its strategy for vaccinating 
people in custody.
    Can you please clarify for the committee what the current 
plan is for getting ICE's detainees vaccinated?
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    As things currently stand today, the allotment for vaccines 
for detainees across the entire country is part of the 
individual state's allotment--
    Ms. Underwood. Right, exactly.
    Mr. Johnson. --that is the current sort of plan. And, as 
you are probably aware, what priority level the inmates and ICE 
detainees are vary significantly by state. I mean, we have some 
states in the Ninth Circuit, for instance, California, Arizona, 
where people have already started to get their vaccines 
actually a few months ago, whereas in other states they are 
much lower on a priority list. So because of that sort of 
variance, we have been looking at working with CDC and HHS to 
just see if we can get our own batch of vaccines, so we can 
just deploy them across the country to the ICE detainee 
population.
    The problem with that is, if you have ten ICE detainees, 
like in your situation where, you know, the number of ICE 
detainees in your facility compared to the number of local 
inmates, is-- you know, it could be much, much lower. So for 
ten ICE-- if we bring vaccines for ten ICE detainees and there 
are 500 local inmates that don't get vaccinated, then that 
could create some problems.
    So that is one of the issues that we are going to have to 
work through if we deliver just the vaccine to the ICE 
population that is detained in these local facilities with U.S. 
citizen inmates.
    Ms. Underwood. So if ICE is dependent on state and local 
jurisdictions for vaccine allocations, what outreach have you 
done to convey that need to local partners?
    Mr. Johnson. Oh, the locals are aware. I mean, that was 
communicated in the original plan on how to deal with not just 
the ICE detainee population, but the U.S. Marshals Service 
population and many of the, you know, populations across the 
country, that it was going to be consistent with the individual 
states to vaccinate their inmate populations.
    Ms. Underwood. So what plans then do you have to ensure 
that all detainees at all facilities have access to any 
translation services that they may need to learn about the 
vaccination in a language that they understand, right? We are 
trying to make sure that everybody can get vaccinated and we 
don't want there to be barriers in place.
    Mr. Johnson. So we do have a fairly robust and 
comprehensive interpreter and translation services line. I also 
think we have already created some material that explains not 
only the importance of vaccinations, but some of the other 
educational materials surrounding COVID generally. So that is 
certainly a priority for us. But if there are-- you know, all 
of our facilities have access to our interpreters hotline and 
if there are any issues with communication and communicating 
the importance of the vaccine, then we will certainly, you 
know, make sure we focus on that. But it is a fair point and we 
will make sure we get something up to folks to remind them.
    Ms. Underwood. Great. And you stated in your testimony that 
ICE Health Service Corps will administer vaccines at facilities 
that they staff; however, the Health Service Corps staff is 
only 20 of the over 200 facilities that house ICE detainees. So 
who administers the vaccines at the other 90 percent? So that 
is different than the allocation.
    Mr. Johnson. The person who administers it is the health-- 
you know, it is the health authority that oversees that 
particular clinic. So I don' know if you are at or near 
McHenry, but--
    Ms. Underwood. Yes, I represent the McHenry ICE--or the 
McHenry County Jail.
    Mr. Johnson. Yes, so it is the health service administrator 
and that medical authority that would be responsible for not 
only just administering the test to the ICE inmates-- I mean, 
the ICE detainees, but also the McHenry County inmates as well.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Well, vaccination is so important. It 
is not just a moral obligation, but it is important to protect 
the public health of all Americans. I am looking forward to 
coming back in round two. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you. And that completes round one, 
and we do have time for a second round.
    Director Johnson, I want to go back to an issue that was 
raised by Congressman Aguilar. Beginning in fiscal year 2019, 
and then continuing over the course of the fiscal year 2020, 
ICE entered into contracts to increase its guaranteed minimum 
detention bed capacity by over 10,000 beds, without providing 
notification to Congress about how this would impact future 
appropriation requirements.
    While ICE has the responsibility to humanely enforce the 
laws of our country, we have a responsibility to oversee the 
agency's budget. Not disclosing this information obstructed our 
ability to do so, resulting in likely hundreds of millions of 
dollars going to pay for detention beds that have not been used 
during the pandemic, and while Title 42 public health order has 
dramatically reduced the need for detention beds for recent 
border crossers.
    My question is why didn't ICE engage with Congress and how 
the plan to expand guaranteed minimum detention capacity would 
tie this committee's hands when making funding questions.
    Mr. Johnson. Thanks, Chairwoman. I mean, I am fairly 
certain that ICE was in communication with the committee during 
2019 when we were sort of bring on all the 20,000 additional 
detention beds, and we were providing ramp-up plans, and 
explaining to folks our plan to relieve the overcrowding that 
we were faced with along the Southwest border.
    So there was certainly some visibility into all the beds, 
and efforts, and work that was underway to try to get those 
individuals out of the overcrowded border patrol stations. Now, 
maybe there was no specific discussion on how those contracts 
were going to be structured, and that some of them were going 
to have to include some guaranteed minimums.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I just want to make the point that you 
are right on that. The discussions that you are talking about 
were not about contracting, and the impression that was given 
that these were temporary. And now, we are in this situation 
where it is impacting our budget. So in light of the reduction 
in detention bed requirements related to Title 42, another part 
of the question that I had is why didn't ICE, at the very 
least, delay expanding its guaranteed minimum capacity until 
after the public health order could be lifted?
    Mr. Johnson. So I think in large part, we brought on all 
those beds well before March 2020. And as you may know, 
Chairwoman, we have been at risk of losing Title 42 it seems 
like at every month or every few weeks. So there was just so 
much uncertainty surrounding how long we would be able to keep 
expelling people, as well as there were other things that 
reduced the population prior to the new administration coming 
in, like MPP and some of the other stuff that was also the 
subject of significant litigation.
    So I think the only answer is that there was just so much 
uncertainty surrounding our detainee population, whereas you 
know, just overnight, we could start seeing 3,000 and 5,000 
people a day, and those beds could fill up, that there was just 
a lot of reticence to ending all of those contracts and 
agreements, and then finding ourselves back in a situation like 
we were in 2019, where border patrol had 15,000 people in 
custody, and no place for them to go.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I think what you are describing is a 
situation which highlights why it was important to actually 
work with the subcommittee, and to plan this out in a way that 
we wouldn't be in this situation now, where it is impacting our 
budget.
    One more question on that, what financial analysis was 
conducted to determine that ICE could absorb the cost 
associated with these substantial growth and its guaranteed 
minimum capacity?
    Mr. Johnson. So there was certainly some analysis by our 
budget folks. I mean, if I remember correctly, I mean, I think 
even for fiscal year 2021, even though-- I mean, we have gotten 
rid of some of the facilities with GMs. There is still a good 
number that exists. But I think for 2021, we were able to 
absorb the additional cost associated with some of those 
guaranteed minimum contracts, just based on our current burn 
rate, and the fact that we are not using a lot of other beds 
outside of those GM facilities.
    But I totally get your point. I mean, I will do a much 
better job in the future of making sure folks are aware of the 
various structures of any contracts that are being brought on 
that might impact funding in out years.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Does ICE have internal controls in 
place to ensure that it doesn't commit taxpayers to 
expenditures for which Congress does not provide funding?
    Mr. Johnson. We do. There are some various controls in 
place that ensure that we don't go above what was allotted by 
Congress.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. So Somehow there appears, then, to 
be a breakdown, because we are in this situation right now. And 
my time is up, but I do want to emphasize what Congressman 
Aguilar asked for, and that is the amount of funding that ICE 
has spent on empty beds in 2020 and so far this year. If you 
could provide that with us, I would appreciate it.
    Mr. Fleischmann?
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Director Johnson, the country is still operating under a 
Title 42 public health declaration because of the COVID 
pandemic, which allows ICE and CBP to repatriate and remove 
migrants who have crossed the border illegally, immediately 
after their apprehension, thus keeping the numbers of migrants 
who are released into the U.S. after crossing illegally down. 
But we get the sense that there are talks of revoking the Title 
42 declaration, which means the ability to swiftly repatriate 
and return migrants also goes away.
    I have several questions. What are the plans to lift the 
Title 42 declaration, sir?
    Mr. Johnson. So there is certainly a concern that we may 
use our Title 42 authority. I think it is all stemming from a 
number of lawsuits that are out there. I am not aware that it 
would be lifted sort of voluntarily, because again, with the 
large number of single adults that are being expelled, we think 
that in this COVID environment, that is extremely helpful. So I 
don't think it is a situation where it is going to just be 
lifted electively. We will be mandated through some sort of 
court order to lift it.
    Mr. Fleischmann. What would that mean for ICE operations, 
sir, and the population ICE is responsible for tracking through 
the court process?
    Mr. Johnson. Well, the biggest impact is just going to be 
the single adults that are coming across the southern border 
that are largely being expelled via Title 42. The last report I 
received was somewhere around 3,000 single adults per day. The 
impact of 3,000 people a day coming into ICE custody in the 
midst of a pandemic could significantly impact our operations.
    On the family unit front, we are only expelling about 25 
percent of the family units right now. So that will be a little 
bit of an impact, but nothing as significant as the impact as 
it would be for single adults.
    Mr. Fleischmann. For planning purposes, sir, how many 
people are you estimating will flood the border and into ICE's 
detention or responsibility, sir?
    Mr. Johnson. Very little visibility on what the impact 
might be in terms of additional people coming. What I can say, 
sir, is that we are expelling somewhere around 3,000 to 3,500 
single adults a day. So those would certainly be people that 
would be coming into our immigration system if T- 42 were to go 
away.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir. What plans does ICE have to meet 
the increased numbers, and can you meet the demand for services 
and detention within your current budget, sir?
    Mr. Johnson. In fiscal year 2021, perhaps. I mean, I would 
want to go back and confirm, just because our numbers have been 
so low. We may be able to absorb an increase for the next four, 
five months of this fiscal year. But you know, at 3,000 a day, 
it could very well exceed our-- first, our funding, as well as 
just our ability and capacity within our detention network. But 
I don't have anything other than that, sir.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Mr. Director. And Madam Chair, 
I am going to yield back. I think Mr. Palazzo is going to take 
the chair as ranking member. I have got a couple of questions 
to ask in Labor H. So Mr. Director, I think you, and Madam 
Chair, I will be back momentarily.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Mr. Cuellar?
    Mr. Cuellar. Madam Chair. Director, follow up on Title 42, 
I hope Title 42 doesn't go away. My understanding is that you 
get about 3,000 single adults per day, about 90 to 95 percent 
of those single adults are expelled back under this 1944 law. 
If you look at the Doreo area and you get Cubans, Haitians, and 
Venezuelans, mainly. Then you go to the Laredo area, and you 
get mainly Mexicans that are coming in, single adults. And then 
you go to the valley, that is where you get 15 percent are 
kids, 36, 37 percent are family units. But in the Loredo area, 
if you would release all those adults into our community, I 
will tell you my community would not be happy. And I know you 
have got to follow whatever the administration says, but just I 
can tell you my community would not want to have where most of 
the people coming in the Loredo area are single adults. And to 
be released in our area, my community would not be happy with 
that.
    But that is--I will ask you to comment on Title 42. But the 
other thing is, talk about prosecutorial discretion. In the 
valley, they have released 20,400 people on what I call the 
honor system. I know some of the folks in the administration 
have called this a notice to appear, but my understanding is a 
notice to appear is I862, I-82. The people that are being 
released are under an I385, which is an admission to release 
document.
    So under the 385 document, the remark there is that they 
are supposed to go to a local ICE office after final 
destination and report to you. My understanding is for you to 
do that, you have to do that manually. So you have to check 
manually 20,400 cases, and I think you need some sort of 
computer, where you would be able to connect with CBP, because 
I don't think you all are able to talk under those 
circumstances or check those 20,400 people that have been 
released on the honor system.
    And by the way, it is not only family units. I have single 
adults that have been released. Tell us a little bit about the 
points that I have just mentioned.
    Mr. Johnson. Thanks, Congressman. To your point, I mean, 
Title 42 is absolutely critical. Without it, we would have so 
many negative outcomes in our detention facilities, and I 
suspect that most of the intake would have been shut down based 
on significant numbers of quarantines and extremely high 
positivity rates at certain facilities.
    So the only way we have been able to survive and have so 
few COVID-related deaths in custody over the last 15 months has 
been because of Title 42.
    In terms of the 20,400 folks that are being released, you 
are absolutely correct. There is no automated method by which 
we can track those individuals. There is a requirement for them 
to show up at their closest ICE office and report. Once they 
report to an ICE office, they are put into our system of 
record. And at that point, we can track those folks at that 
time. But otherwise, we would just have to get a list from 
border patrol of the 20,000 cases and check them pretty 
regularly.
    Mr. Cuellar. So Mr. Director, so when they are released, 
they are not put in the system itself, and it is not a notice 
to appear before an immigration court. So in order for you to 
put them in the system, Mr. Director, you have to wait for them 
to show up, if they show up, so you can put them in the system, 
correct
    Mr. Johnson. That is when they get put into the ICE system 
of record. They are certainly in the border patrol system, 
because they process-- they make the encounter and they process 
the individual. But they typically don't get into the ICE 
system until they actually report. That is with the exception 
of those individuals what are being enrolled into ATD.
    Now, if you are enrolled in ATD, then obviously we have 
greater ability to track those folks, because we are taking 
their information, putting it in our system at the time that we 
are putting the GPS monitor or putting them in SmartLink.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Director. Real quickly, because 
my time is up, have there been any talks about creating 
additional immigration court dockets to deal with this surge? I 
know it is under Department of Justice, but any talks on that? 
Just a yes or no, sorry.
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. There are talks that are underway to 
create a much more accelerated process so that these folks 
could get adjudicated much more quickly than they do currently.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Director. Thank you, Madam 
Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair. This committee has 
already begun working on crafting the fiscal year 2022 budget 
legislation. And I know the acting director, you are limited as 
to what you can share before the president releases his budget 
in detail. But generally, what resources does ICE need, and 
with the flood of migrants coming into our country, I hope 
there is a better way to monitor these individuals before they 
find some way to disappear.
    So what resources does ICE need, and how can this committee 
help you and your agents do their jobs most effectively?
    Mr. Johnson. Thanks, Congressman. I mean, I would start 
with just the help we need on the data modernization effort. I 
mean, that is an area where we continue to struggle with our 
data analytics and reporting. It has certainly, I am sure, been 
a frustration for some of the committee members. So just 
funding along those efforts.
    Additional attorneys is certainly--as I mentioned before, 
we have 1,300 attorneys. There is over 600 judges. We need 
attorneys to represent and adjudicate these cases in courtrooms 
across the country.
    The other thing is the ERO case officers. We have nearly 
three million people on the non-detained docket, and if there 
is a real expectation if these cases are actually monitored, 
and we can sort of track them, and know when folks are showing 
up for court, then we need sufficient ERO case officers to 
track them.
    And then lastly, on the HSI side, we need more special 
agents. We need our criminal analysts at a more reflective, 
appropriate ratio so that they can provide the case support 
that these criminal investigations need. And we need to beef up 
our international footprint so that we can dismantle and tackle 
these TCOs right there before they make it to our border.
    Mr. Palazzo. With the contact media narrative, and just 
conversations, you hear people wanting to abolish ICE. There is 
this defund police movement, which just makes no sense in the 
world. Can you tell me, is this affecting your team's morale in 
any way or fashion? And how is recruitment, and how is 
retention? Because it has to be extremely tough when we are 
trying to ask you to do your jobs, enforce our Nation's laws, 
and at the same time, it feels like we are handcuffing you from 
being able to do those jobs, just like the border patrol. 
Instead of enforcing our laws on the border, I mean, they are 
picking up trash, changing diapers. They basically become 
babysitters, and that is not what they signed on for.
    And I know your agents, you all do great work. You are 
tasked with a monumental mission. As part of our overarching 
homeland security mission, can you just talk to the morale, the 
recruitment, and retention? And what can we do, as a committee, 
to-- I mean, obviously, words hurt, and when we say things, it 
could have an impact on your agency and other federal agencies 
as well.
    So if you don't mind just sharing your thoughts on that.
    Mr. Johnson. Sure. Again, it is certainly challenging when, 
you know, and I am sure some of the men and women are impacted 
when you hear statements like that. But look we realize that it 
was a-- we are going to get criticized for carrying out our 
job, no matter what job it is. I mean, ICE is the only agency 
where 50 percent of the people are going to be mad at us 100 
percent of the time. And our men and women are professionals. 
They will carry out the mission, and perform it with great 
professionalism and pride.
    In terms of recruitment and retention, I mean, I think we 
have a fairly specialized workforce, where people sign up for 
this job because they like the job, and they typically don't-- 
at least in the officer corps, the special agents and the 
deportation officers, obviously there is always going to be 
issues with attorneys, and support folks who can certainly find 
a better, less hectic place to work other than ICE.
    We struggle, to some respects, in those categories, but our 
law enforcement corps are here to stay, and they typically 
don't go until they retire.
    Mr. Palazzo. Well, Director Johnson, I appreciate your 
remarks. And thank you for your 30 plus years of service, and 
let the men and women under your supervision know how much 
America appreciates their work and commitment. Thank you.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Johnson, let me 
pursue a little further these intertwined issues of targeting 
enforcement on truly dangerous people, and the kind of 
relations you maintain with local law enforcement. Looking at 
figures-- and you cited this more generally, looking at the 
people in detention, and how many had serious records over the 
past administration, I am quoting here from the track reports 
at Syracuse University.
    ``The number of people in ICE detention rose from 41,163 in 
2016 to 49,396 in 2019. But at the same time, the number of 
those individuals who had serious level one criminal records 
declined from 7,475 in 2016 to 6,048 in 2019. The percentage of 
those detained with no criminal conviction at all rose from 57 
to 64 percent. In other words, ICE raids became both more 
frequent and less discriminating.''
    And I can tell you that both that increased frequency and 
that lesser discrimination, more random quality, was felt in 
immigrant communities throughout the country, including a lot 
that I saw in communities that I represent. Just a lot more 
anxiety and apprehension.
    So I wonder, do you have any kind of comparable--you said 
earlier in your earlier testimony that the percentage of those 
enforcement actions involving serious criminals had increased, 
and I don't know exactly the time frame you were referring to. 
But do you have figures you could supply that would document 
that?
    Mr. Johnson. I do. And what we have been--the period that I 
am referring to is after the release of our February 18 
guidance, where it made clear what the sort of priorities were, 
and where we wanted the officers out in the field to focus 
their efforts. So that is the period that we were able to 
compare the last two months or so, compare to the preceding 
months to see what the data looked like.
    Mr. Price. All right. If you could give us those precise 
numbers, that is, of course, the kind of direction we were 
looking for and hoping for with this new administration.
    Now, in the matter of local law enforcement, I was 
interested in the exchange with Mr. Rutherford earlier, who of 
course comes from a law enforcement background. As I understood 
it, he described a system based-- a jail-based system, based on 
the penal system, and of course, as I said earlier, this is 
what some of us had in mind when we were trying to reform this 
earlier. Secure communities turned out to be, I would say, less 
focused on serious criminals, more on people who were 
apprehended, sometimes for traffic violations, or whatever. It 
wasn't officially discriminating.
    And then, of course, these other models of the 287(g) 
program, the so-called taskforce model are less discriminating 
yet. So the question, I think, you and we are going to need to 
face is is this salvageable at all, or is this 287-- and then 
you add to that the weaponization of 287(g), just the 
absolutely reprehensible weaponization of this program during 
the last four years, I just wonder if it is salvageable?
    Mr. Johnson. No, that is a good question. Again, I think 
there is some that find usefulness in it, and others that don't 
want to touch it at all, because of some of the polarization, 
or just the impact that it has on local community.
    I mean, I think the question, at least as I see it, as long 
as we can all agree on, or come to some agreement on what types 
of cases that everyone feels comfortable targeting, whether it 
is in this 287(g) sort of framework, or whether it is just in 
honoring detainers, but just identifying what everyone is sort 
of in agreement with in terms of those folks should be on the 
table to be removed, because we don't them released into our 
communities.
    And I think if we start there, then I think there would be 
some opportunities to find some middle ground and actually 
potentially salvage it or come up with something, a new program 
that sort of addresses the issue that we are all trying to 
solve.
    Mr. Price. Yes, sir. That is possible--entirely possible, 
completely outside of a 287(g) framework, I would think. Thank 
you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Hinson?
    Ms. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the second round. 
And thank you, Acting Director Johnson, as well. You mentioned 
that communications break down between CBP and ICE in terms of 
your systems. And Congressman Cuellar was hitting on that as 
well in his line of questioning a little bit earlier.
    Our office stands ready to work with you to come up with 
solutions on that. Because ultimately, this is a breakdown on 
communication that is keeping you from fulfilling your mission. 
It is keeping CBP from fulfilling their mission. Ultimately, a 
barrier to keeping our community safe as well. So we are ready 
to work on that. I think a clear priority list there.
    I want to go to something you said about the number of 
arrests, the lower number of arrests. Basically, we know that 
is about a 50 percent reduction in arrests at this point, due 
to the priority changes laid out in the guidance memo from 
February. And Madam Chair, I would like to ask unanimous 
consent to enter the guidance memo from February 18th, 2021 
into the record.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. So granted.
    [The information follows:]********** COMMITTEE INSERT 
**********
    Ms. Hinson. Thank you. So, Director Johnson, were you aware 
that it would result in that 50 percent reduction based on 
these criteria laid out here? Do you believe the changes in 
this memo are impacting your ability to carry out your mission 
of enforcing all of our immigration laws to the fullest extent 
possible?
    Mr. Johnson. I suspected that there would be some reduction 
and the low level folks that we had taken into custody in terms 
of the prior administration. So absolutely, I did think that 
that was a possibility.
    Ms. Hinson. I mean, a fifty percent reduction is a 
significant reduction. Is it accurate right now that ICE is 
averaging one interior arrest for every two and a half months 
per officer? So that is on pace of about four to five arrests 
per year, per officer. Does that seem accurate to you?
    Mr. Johnson. I don't know. I have not looked at--
    Ms. Hinson. Okay. Well, it is definitely a low number, and 
in my mind, it keeps you from fulfilling your mission. And I 
think that is an important flag when you do that math. If 
arrests are down significantly and we are talking about 
eliminating Title 42, 3,000 adults coming in a day, 21,000 a 
week, over a million a year. This is a significant challenge, 
obviously, coming your way, and we want to make sure we are 
catching the worst of the worst, obviously. But this is your 
mission at its core.
    So I think we need to get back to prioritizing your 
mission. And obviously this committee stands to do that. I also 
wanted to flag, it is my understanding that a long time senior 
employee at the agency rang a warning bell about this and this 
process in an email to you and other senior officials as well.
    So based on your many years of service, and you are talking 
about approaching 30 years of service, you have got to have a 
professional well-honed opinion about this. Do you have 
concerns about the impact that this might have long term on the 
ability to carry out ICE's mission?
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Hinson, I think we have lost the 
connection with the director.
    Ms. Hinson. Okay. Well, I will follow up with him on our 
questions, for the record. But appreciate the second round, 
Madam Chair, and I would yield back until we get that sorted 
out.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Let me check on what the 
possibility is of getting him back.
    The report I have is that they are trying to reconnect the 
director. And we have a little bit of time, so Ms. Hinson, I 
will give you the time back so you can ask that final question 
or make that final point, if we get connected. Okay?
    Ms. Hinson. Yeah. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Director, can you hear us? I see him 
back on the screen, but I don't know if he can hear us or not.
    You may be on mute, Director.
    We will just recess just for a couple of minutes while they 
fix his audio. Apparently it is not working.
    Mr. Johnson. Can you hear me now?
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Yes, we can. Ms. Hinson?
    Ms. Hinson. Yes. And thank you, Madam Chair, for that 
flexibility, and thank you, Acting Director. I know 
technological challenges can be a problem for all of us.
    So I just wanted to go back. I am not sure where you heard 
my last question cut off, but I wanted to flag that we 
understood a long term senior employee actually flagged it for 
you in an email and to other senior officials about this 
guidance being a concern.
    So I just wanted to know from your professional opinion, 
you have got about 30 years of experience in this field, did 
you have concerns about the impact that this would have on the 
agency's ability to carry out its ultimate mission?
    Mr. Johnson. So what I would sort of respond, I guess, is 
that certainly no concerns from my perspective, if the goal if 
just keeping our communities safe, and making sure that 
individuals convicted of serious crimes, or those that pose the 
biggest public safety threats, or any public safety threat, 
quite frankly, as well as a national security threat are still 
sort of prime for immigration enforcement. So certainly no 
concerns on that front from my perspective.
    Ms. Hinson. I would real quick point to the category number 
three, which is public safety category, that says, `` A non-
citizen is presumed to be a public safety enforcement and 
removal priority if he or she poses a threat to public safety, 
and he or she has been convicted of an aggravated felony.''
    I think that is concerning to me when I read that, because 
I look at how much time that might take, and they are a danger 
to our community, and they are not meeting these three 
criteria, when it is your agency's mission to get these people 
into custody.
    So I think this narrows it beyond the scope of what 
actually is designed to keep our public safe. So that would be 
my main concern with this guidance at this point. And I think, 
again, our Iowans deserve to know who is in their communities, 
and it is your job to make sure that our communities are safe 
and we are protected from these goals.
    So Madam Chair, I understand my time is out and I yield 
back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar?
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Acting Director, I 
wanted to talk a little bit more about the Adelanto facility. 
And in November of 2020, there were inspections of the 
facility, specifically the ICE processing centers east and west 
Adelanto. Because of the pandemic, these inspections were 
conducted remotely, I understand. Staff sent photos and videos 
at the facility to the inspectors and conducted interviews by 
phone.
    In one instance, it was noted that there was mold in the 
shower. However, the pictures provided to the inspectors did 
not show mold. Can you walk me through the logistics of how ICE 
complied with these inspections, and how can we be confident 
that you are getting a true picture of the facilities, and that 
inspectors have an honest view of what is going on?
    Mr. Johnson. Again, this is all unprecedented territory. I 
mean, we have never been having to operate in the midst of a 
global pandemic. There was a lot of changes that we had to sort 
of implement as it relates to our facilities, and whether it is 
suspending visitation, really limiting the number of 
individuals that were actually showing up at the facility, 
because everyone that goes there is a potential threat at 
spreading the virus.
    So while it was certainly not ideal to go to a sort of 
virtual format for doing these inspections, and quite frankly 
not something that many of the inspectional components had sort 
of even developed a plan for, but we felt like we still needed 
to have some sort of oversight at these facilities during the 
pandemic. So I think that is sort of just where folks landed on 
trying to provide some sort of oversight of facilities during 
this unusual time. Is it preferred and ideal? Absolutely not. 
Is it possible that you don't get a true and accurate 
assessment as you would when you are actually on site? 
Certainly. But it is the best we have given the circumstances.
    Mr. Aguilar. Do you plan more inspections of this nature in 
the coming months? Or how can we remedy this, and what type of 
guidance can you give to the facilities to ensure that it is a 
more complete review?
    Mr. Johnson. So good question. I do think that as things 
stand currently, ODO is doing two of these inspections each 
year. So I mean, it really just depends on how long we are in 
the midst of this pandemic, sort of in terms of how long, 
whether or not we are going to do this-- have to do this at 
lease one more time before we are beyond this thing.
    But I certainly get your point that you have some concerns 
at how these are being done, and I will take that back, and get 
with a team, and see if there is anything we can do on our end 
to try to make sure that we get a good feel for conditions as 
they exist at the facilities, even if we are doing this 
remotely.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you. I appreciate it. Can I ask briefly 
about the Office of Detention Ombudsman, the Chairwoman's 
leadership and the committee's guidance created this office. 
Can you tell me how it is going, what the timelines and 
measurables are, and things that we need to know in order to 
make sure that that office is staffed up and ready to help?
    Mr. Johnson. Sure. I can tell you what little bit I know. 
That is an office that reports directly to the secretary. So it 
is not an office that is under ICE's purview. I know that they 
have been doing quite a bit of hiring to beef up their staff, 
and they have been working closely with a lot of the other 
inspectional entities, like CRCL and others that perform these 
audits, that just understand sort of what their role is going 
to be, and how they can sort of compliment the process and 
program.
    So outside of that, I would just have to defer to the 
department, since it reports to the secretary.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you. I appreciate it. I yield back, 
Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood?
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair. Okay. So Mr. 
Director, I wanted to continue on with my vaccine questions. 
What percentage of ICE detainees are fully vaccinated?
    Mr. Johnson. If I recall correctly, and don't quote me on 
this, I will certainly get you the precise numbers, but if I 
remember correctly, it is like 20 percent have had at least one 
shot. But let me confirm that that is the case--
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. You had testified that 1,229 detainees 
were fully vaccinated as of May 5th. We are just not sure what 
percentage of the total detainee population that is. And we, 
based on the numbers that we have access to, believe that that 
is around 7 percent. But we really do ask that you follow up 
promptly with that numbers.
    I am concerned, because at 7 percent, that would lag far 
behind both the nation as a whole, and at 20 percent, sir, 
because over one-third of American adults are fully vaccinated, 
and even the Federal Bureau of Prisons as one- third of their 
incarcerated people fully vaccinated.
    So can you speak about your plans, or the administration's 
plans to get more shots in arms as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Johnson. So I do know, like I said, that our chief 
medical officer at the department is in conversations with CDC 
to see if we can't just get our vaccines ourselves. In fact, I 
think there was just some email traffic maybe a day or so ago--
    Ms. Underwood. Perfect.
    Mr. Johnson. --about potentially getting 20,000 vaccines. 
So we will get you an update on that and circle back.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you. Now, Mr. Johnson, you testified 
that the administration's use of Title 42 is `` critical to 
your ability to implement social distancing in detention,'' and 
that your efforts-- and it is essential or critical to your 
efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and that they would 
be-- it would be undermined if the expulsions under Title 42 
ended.
    In light of this concern, what are you doing to prepare for 
the eventual lifting of Title 42 restrictions?
    Mr. Johnson. We are preparing as best we can. I mean, we 
are talking to our transportation vendors to make sure we have 
the resources, capability, and capacity to move much larger 
numbers. We are making sure we have the sufficient PPE so that 
if we do need to move people by bus or by plane, that folks 
have the proper PPE. We are also looking at whether or not 
there are some opportunities for us to move people to one 
location, just so that they can be tested and quarantined 
before sending them to a longer term facility.
    So there is a lot of ways, or a lot of things that we are 
looking at, just to figure out how best to deal with a huge 
number every single day, because it will be overwhelming and 
could put us in a tough spot really quickly.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you. While the pandemic is an 
extraordinary circumstance, we can't continue expelling people 
forever. So it is imperative that we have a plan for keeping 
people safe and healthy.
    Mr. Johnson, you testified that ``it is a requirement that 
ICE test 100 percent of those who come into ICE custody for 
COVID-19.'' Specifically, you explained that all detainees are 
tested within 12 hours of admission to a facility, and then 
again before release from quarantine if they had been exposed 
to the virus. Are you currently fulfilling that requirement and 
testing 100 percent of detainees within 12 hours of admission? 
Or are there cases where people are not tested within that 
timeframe?
    Mr. Johnson. I am not aware of any instances where people 
are not being tested at this point in the process. I know that 
six months ago, or nine months ago when we were early on, that 
there were still some capacity issues. But I think we have 
gotten past those hurdles at this point.
    Ms. Underwood. And how frequently are detainees tested 
after initial intake and quarantine?
    Mr. Johnson. It varies by facility. I know at our ICE-owned 
facilities, we try to test-- do saturation testing at least 
quarterly, if I remember correctly. But let me take that as a 
get back.
    As far as the state and local jails, I am sure it is all 
over the place, and there is very little inconsistency about 
how frequently they do saturation testing.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Well, detention centers aren't 
islands. The staffing contractors who come in and out every day 
can and do bring the virus with them. We know from the New York 
Times that they have linked numerous outbreaks within ICE 
detention centers to then having community spread in the 
surrounding area. So it is really important that guards are 
tested frequently, in addition to the detainees. And we will 
follow up with you about the guard testing.
    I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. That completes the second round. Before 
we adjourn, Director Johnson, I just want to bring your 
attention to the Unified Immigration Portal, which we funded, 
to enable agencies like ICE to get information about a 
migrant's release directly by CBP. Perhaps that could be 
helpful in giving you some of the information that you need 
based on the questions that were asked.
    If there are no more questions, Acting Director, thank you 
so much for your time and for helping us think through these 
challenges. One second, please.
    I have just been informed that Ms. Hinson would like to add 
something. Ms. Hinson.
    Ms. Hinson. And I will be quick. Thank you, Madam Chair. I 
just wanted to follow up, Director Johnson, on this memo 
specifically. Did you or your staff write this? And if not, who 
wrote it?
    Mr. Johnson. Are you referring to the February 18 memo?
    Ms. Hinson. Correct.
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. Me and my staff wrote it.
    Ms. Hinson. Did you and your experts at ICE go through it 
and look to make sure that it was either justified or 
conflicted with what your role is? I mean, did you find any 
conflicting-- you said you weren't worried, but was there any 
part of it in that guidance that you felt was conflicted with 
your mission?
    Mr. Johnson. So look, that memo was drafted following the 
January 21, at that time acting secretary, memo. So this was 
the guidance that was required to sort of come out as a result 
of that January 21 memo.
    Now, this is just interim, and we are working on our final 
guide. And so there is certainly some issues or some areas in 
this particular February 18 memo that I would change, and that 
we will change once we issue the final draft.
    But based on the timeline that we needed to get out our 
guidance, that is sort of where we landed, and it is interim, 
and I am sure it will be improved.
    Ms. Hinson. What is your timeframe for getting that final 
guidance? That is my last question, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Johnson. I mean, the discussions continue every day. We 
were hoping to get something out here within the next week or 
two, but it could be a month. It could be six weeks. I mean, 
that is my best guess right now.
    Ms. Hinson. All right. Thank you, Director. And I 
appreciate the extra time, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Underwood. Madam Chair, you are muted.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, for the 
additional time.
    Mr. Johnson, do you have the authority to require testing 
for guards and other staff at all detention facilities?
    Mr. Johnson. To require testing?
    Ms. Underwood. Yeah, COVID testing.
    Mr. Johnson. I can't require testing of detainees. So I 
don't know that I can require testing of the contract guard 
staff. So that is a question I will just need to run by our 
legal folks to know for sure, but for some reason, I don't 
think so.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Well, I am really concerned about that 
limitation, sir. If you would please provide the committee with 
a written explanation of the legal or contractual limitations 
that might prevent you from requiring COVID-19 tests for staff 
and contractors at the ICE detention facilities.
    Mr. Johnson. Will do.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Thank you. Testing is critical for 
protecting your workforce, and the people in your custody, and 
the communities where your facilities are located. I certainly 
look forward to working with you to fill this need. Thank you 
so much, Madam Chair, for the extra time, and I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Director, once again, thank you 
very much for your time. I will be submitting additional 
questions for the record, which I hope we will get a quick 
response on.
    The Subcommittee on Homeland Security now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]RPTR ZAMORAEDTR HOFSTADDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, May 19, 2021U.S. 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION RESOURCE MANAGEMENTAND 
OPERATIONAL PRIORITIESDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, May 19, 2021U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
BORDER PROTECTION RESOURCE MANAGEMENTAND OPERATIONAL 
PRIORITIESWITNESSTROY MILLER, SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE 
DUTIES OF THE COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order.
    During today's virtual hearing, members are responsible for 
muting and unmuting themselves. When you are recognized to 
speak, if I notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will 
ask you if you would like the staff to unmute you. If you 
indicate approval by nodding, staff will unmute your 
microphone.
    To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair or staff 
designated by the chair may mute participant microphones when 
they are not recognized to speak.
    If there is a technology issue during a member's speaking 
time, we will move to the next member until the issue is 
resolved, and you will retain the balance of your time.
    We will be following the 5-minute rule. With 1 minute 
remaining in your time, the clock on your screen will turn 
yellow. When your time has expired, the clock will turn red, 
and it will be time to recognize the next member.
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules, beginning with the chair and ranking member, followed by 
members present at the time the hearing is called to order in 
order of seniority, and we will alternate by party. Next, we 
will go to members who are not present when the hearing was 
called to order, until every member present has had the first 
round.
    Members can submit information in writing at any of our 
hearings or markups using the email address provided in advance 
to your staff.
    And let's begin.
    I would like to welcome Mr. Troy Miller, the senior 
official performing the duties of the Commissioner, who is here 
to discuss his agency's operations, particularly its activities 
along the southwest border. This is Mr. Miller's first time to 
testify in front of the subcommittee.
    So welcome, Mr. Miller.
    I recently visited the border with Secretary Mayorkas, and 
I want to commend the CBP personnel who have been working so 
hard over the last few months to manage an incredibly difficult 
challenge. Thank you for your efforts to impose order on what 
might otherwise have spiraled into an unmanageable situation.
    While challenges undoubtedly remain, I look forward to an 
update from you on the situation on the southern border and how 
you are working to ensure that migrants receive adequate 
shelter, culturally informed nutrition, trauma care, and due 
process while in CBP custody. These efforts are vital as we 
work towards a more humane, efficient immigration system.
    I continue to have concerns about the lack of child welfare 
professionals and caregivers in CBP facilities. The 
subcommittee has repeatedly asked CBP to quickly deploy such 
professionals into border facilities to provide child-centric 
care for kids who have already experienced significant trauma.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has also taken a toll on the morale 
of the CBP workforce, which has continued under most difficult 
circumstances to fulfill its mission of ensuring border 
security and the flow of international commerce. I understand 
that you have established peer support, medical resources, and 
caregiver support for the CBP workforce. Please let us know how 
we can help you with these initiatives.
    To help address the shortfall in CBP fee collections 
resulting from the pandemic-related reduction in international 
travel, we appropriated $840 million in supplemental funding in 
our fiscal year 2021 bill. It now seems unlikely the funding we 
appropriated will be sufficient to carry the agency through the 
end of the fiscal year. This morning, we will want your candid 
assessment about CBP's current fiscal posture.
    Also, while I know you are still limited in what you can 
say about the budget request for the coming year, we will want 
to have a good discussion about what it will take to address 
all of these challenges, both now and in fiscal year 2022.
    In conclusion, on behalf of the subcommittee, I convey our 
heartfelt condolences to the families and colleagues of those 
who have lost their lives in the line of duty. Tragically, 
since January 2020, CBP has seen 32 line-of-duty deaths, 30 of 
which were directly tied to COVID-19. I reaffirm our continued 
support for the health and well-being of your workforce and our 
appreciation for their service.
    I now turn to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Mr. Miller, I too want to welcome you to the subcommittee, 
sir. Thank you for being with us today as we discuss the 
operations of Customs and Border Protection. Your decades of 
service to protecting this country and your commitment and 
leadership with Customs and CBP are greatly appreciated.
    I would especially like to thank you for stepping into this 
role of Acting Commissioner during this transition. I know this 
position has taken you away from your home and family, but we 
all appreciate the stable and steady leadership you provide for 
the mission and the men and women at CBP, especially during 
this challenging year.
    I pass along my sincere and heartfelt condolences, as did 
our chair, to the families, friends, and colleagues of the 34 
CBP employees who lost their lives to COVID.
    The issues we are seeing at all of our borders and ports of 
entry are complex and made all the more challenging due to the 
pandemic and world's unsettled economies. We are seeing record 
numbers of migrants presented at our southern border, numbers 
we would not have imagined even in the busiest months of 2019, 
that threaten the safety of our Nation.
    We have heard about CBP identifying serious known criminals 
and even individuals matching to the terrorist watchlist within 
the many large groups apprehended at the border.
    Let me be clear: I am not saying that every migrant 
apprehended is a hardened criminal. I know that is not the 
case. However, the sheer volume of people makes it harder for 
CBP officers and agents to properly identify and screen 
everyone for threats and--that pose threats to our communities.
    Further, the seizure of drugs, weapons, and counterfeit 
goods have not slowed during the pandemic, indicating that the 
cartels and transnational criminal organizations are still 
targeting our borders and our communities to fuel their 
profits.
    I was really hoping we would have the fiscal 2022 budget at 
the time of this hearing, but it appears, Mr. Miller, timing is 
on your side and you will have avoided any questions about the 
upcoming budget year.
    But I will tell you, and you know, that the investments we 
make with CBP are so important to the mission. The funds we 
provide for people, training, technology, operations, and, yes, 
even the wall have shown to play a significant role in 
protecting our country. I have concerns that what I do know 
about the CBP budget I don't like.
    I am concerned that the fiscal 2022 budget does not contain 
any new funds for the border wall construction, even though 
work still exists. And when you consider the work left 
unfinished by the removal of DOD funds, DHS might need even 
more investment to complete those miles.
    Even more disturbing is the proposal to rescind funds at 
the end of the year. I don't know how the administration can 
make that math add up, when decisions on how to resume border 
wall construction or the cost to cancel contracts have not yet 
been made. I think it is foolish to back into a number when we 
haven't even reviewed the contracts and current needs.
    Further, I fear that, without adequate investment and 
without a strong message that we are actively enforcing all of 
our Nation's immigration laws, the numbers at the border will 
only grow and, consequently, will strain the resources across 
CBP's mission. I hope the parts of the budget I have not seen 
yet will shed some light on how we are going to resolve these 
challenges.
    Thank you again, Mr. Miller, for being with us this 
morning. I very much look forward to your testimony, sir.
    And, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Miller, we will submit the full text 
of your official statement for the hearing record. But I do 
want to note that we did not receive your testimony until late 
yesterday even though it was due to the committee 48 hours 
prior to the start of this hearing. This type of delay is 
unacceptable and hinders Congress's ability to conduct its 
oversight. And I certainly hope that this is not going to be a 
pattern as we continue to request important information for the 
subcommittee.
    Please begin your oral summary, which I ask that you keep 
to 5 minutes. Thank you.
    Mr. Miller. Chairwoman Roybal-Allard, Ranking Member 
Fleischmann, and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to 
testify before you today on behalf of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection.
    CBP proudly serves the American people, and we take very 
seriously our responsibility to protect the United States from 
terrorism and criminal activity while enabling thoughtful 
travel and trade.
    These responsibilities have been challenged by COVID-19. 
The pandemic has forced all of us to do things differently, and 
CBP is no exception. We have changed how we process, care for, 
and monitor those in our custody.
    CBP, along with our Federal, State, local, and 
nongovernmental partners, have implemented a robust, 
multilayered approach to ensure migrants are tested before 
continuing their immigration journey into the United States. 
Suspected COVID-19 cases are referred to local health systems 
for appropriate testing, diagnosis, and treatment. DHS is 
working to expand non-congregate sheltering for migrants who 
test positive or have potentially been exposed.
    Tragically, COVID-19 has claimed the lives of 34 CBP 
employees and 30 in the line of duty--34 lives among the more 
than 586,000 American lives the virus has claimed to date in 
this country. Services will be held today for an employee who 
lost his life in the line of duty. Since the pandemic started, 
over 8,700 CBP employees have tested positive.
    Even under the cloud of COVID-19, we are better prepared 
today to meet the demand placed on us during large-scale 
migrant surges, such as we are currently experiencing on the 
southwest border.
    In March, CBP encountered 172,000 migrants attempting to 
cross the southwest land border. That number increased 3 
percent in April to 178,000, with over 62 percent immediately 
expelled pursuant to title 42.
    Although fewer than 11 percent of encounters in March were 
unaccompanied children, or UCs, by the end of March, that 
population accounted for almost half of all the people in our 
custody. In response, we mobilized four soft-sided facilities 
in Arizona and Texas with a combined capacity of 2,500.
    To expedite UC transfers from CBP custody to Department of 
Health and Human Services custody, DHS stood up the Movement 
Coordination Cell with representatives from CBP, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, HHS Office of Refugee 
Resettlement, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
    This interagency approach has been remarkably successful in 
decreasing the average number of children in CBP custody. On 
May 11, there were just 455 children in our custody. The 
average time in custody has also dropped from 115 hours in 
March to just 28 hours in May.
    CBP faces other challenges at our Nation's ports of entry 
as well. In coordination with the Governments of Mexico and 
Canada, only essential trade and travel is allowed to cross our 
borders. These restrictions are reviewed monthly to protect 
public health without unnecessarily prolonging the 
restrictions. International air travel into the United States 
decreased by 95 percent in March 2020 and currently stands 70 
percent below pre-pandemic levels.
    Presidential proclamations remain in place limiting entry 
from China, Iran, the Schengen Area, the United Kingdom, the 
Republic of Ireland, Brazil, South Africa, and India. 
International travel to Mexico and the Caribbean have shown 
signs of rebounding, and CBP stands ready to secure and 
facilitate air travel as it returns to pre-pandemic levels.
    This sharp decline in volume directly impacts CBP's budget. 
International air passengers pay about 94 percent of CBP user 
fees, which, in turn, fund about 40 percent of CBP's Office of 
Field Operations salaries.
    Day after day, the men and women of CBP persistently 
safeguard America's economic and public health, ensuring 
travelers and goods move safely and efficiently across U.S. 
borders, that migrants and visitors are properly documented, 
and that trade laws, regulations, and related international 
agreements are enforced. We are absolutely committed to 
balancing border security, national security, properly caring 
for those in our custody, and keeping the American people and 
our workforce safe.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Miller, it is my understanding that 
CBP has recently implemented a form of prosecutorial 
discretion, to include the issuance of notices to report to 
ICE, also known as RTI or an I-385, to certain migrant families 
in the RGV sector of Texas due to severe overcrowding in CBP 
facilities.
    This began at a time when CBP had thousands of 
unaccompanied children in its custody and was also having to 
manage the impact of COVID-19. As CBP has worked with HHS to 
reduce the number of children in CBP custody, the number of 
such notices issued has gone down significantly.
    Notices to report to ICE have unfortunately been referred 
to as "catch and release," which I have always found to be 
extremely disrespectful to migrants, most of whom are fleeing 
desperate conditions. I believe that no one should be using a 
fishing term to refer to human beings.
    Mr. Miller, can you elaborate on the rationale for issuing 
such notices, including the impact of changes in ICE 
operations, and describe how you have worked to introduce more 
efficiency and accountability into the process?
    Mr. Miller. Chairwoman, thank you for the question.
    As you indicate, notice to report was initiated in the Rio 
Grande Valley, and only in the Rio Grande Valley, on March 19, 
2021. Let me be clear: This is not a decision we made lightly, 
but it was necessary, as you pointed out, given the capacity in 
our facilities and the need to decompress our facilities to 
keep not only the folks in our custody safe but to keep our 
agents and officers safe.
    The surge of family units began in RGV on January 23 when 
Tamaulipas stopped taking back Northern Triangle families with 
tender-age children under the age of 7. The situation on the 
ground, on March 19, we had encountered 2,439 migrants in 
between the ports of entry in RGV alone. We had over 2,600 
unaccompanied children, of which 1,943 unaccompanied children 
were held over 72 hours in our soft-sided facility. Pre-COVID, 
the capacity of our soft-sided facility was 1,000.
    What we did before initiating our notice to report is we 
moved 470 agents to the southwest border. We set up virtual 
processing. We increased overtime for our Border Patrol agents. 
We moved some of the migrants for processing laterally from RGV 
to other sectors. The DHS Volunteer Force was activated. HHS 
and ICE personnel were deployed to our facility in Donna.
    The notice-to-report process cuts the paperwork in half, 
but let me clear up some misconceptions about the notice to 
report. Agents perform the same national security and border 
security checks as they would with notice to appear. They will 
collect biometrics and facial recognition--or facial--for the 
I-385 when they complete the I-213. The migrants are also given 
a G-56, which tells them that they must report to an ICE 
location within 60 days. This is essentially the same process 
that we perform during the NTA--same checks collecting the same 
biographic and biometric information.
    Let me correct a common misrepresentation. Currently, DOJ 
time and date to determine--in the NTA, the time and date is 
marked as "to be determined." So we are not issuing a court 
date on an NTA today because of DOJ not having a non-detained 
docket.
    We are filling out five less forms, cutting the time in 
half. And the reason this continues in RGV, as you mentioned, 
to a limited extent, is we continue to see about 1,700 migrants 
a day, with a greater percentage of family units in RGV, 41 
percent versus 25 percent nationally, and a greater number of 
UCs, unaccompanied children, 14 percent versus 8 percent 
nationally.
    What we are doing to fix this: We are working with the DHS 
CIO, Chief Information Officer, ICE, CIS, EOIR to streamline 
and automate the A-File process.
    Thank you for your question.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. [Inaudible.]
    Mr. Miller. Chairwoman?
    Mr. Cuellar. We can't hear you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Oh. So CBP does conduct a security 
assessment on individuals before they are considered for 
release with a notice to report to ICE?
    Mr. Miller. They are.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. They are.
    And what responsibilities does a recipient of a notice to 
report to ICE have? And what are the consequences for failing 
to appear or report?
    Mr. Miller. Similar to the notice to appear, they are 
directed to report to an ICE office within 60 days. Within that 
60 days, when they report to the ICE office, they will have to 
complete the NTA paperwork and obtain a court date.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    And are there additional process forms that could address 
concerns such as ICE not being informed of when migrants with 
such notices are in certain locations?
    Mr. Miller. So we are fixing those process notifications 
now through--thank you for your continued assistance for the 
Unified Immigration Portal. That system brings all the data 
together for CBP, ICE, HHS. And, under the direction of the CIO 
from DHS, we continue to expand that program.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Miller.
    I just would like to point out that the issuance of a 
notice to report to ICE is not a misuse of prosecutorial 
discretion, as some have mischaracterized it. It is a tool for 
managing the immigration adjudication process when overcrowding 
in CBP holding facilities has become a threat to health and 
safety and ICE and HHS are unable to quickly assume custody of 
migrants.
    I now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Fleischmann, for his 
questions.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Miller, we have been waiting for the administration to 
release the results of border wall construction contract 
review. I am very concerned about reports that the 
administration is seeking to nullify the DHS appropriations 
that were the result of bipartisan, bicameral negotiations and 
rescind funds that were lawfully appropriated.
    Simply destroying the work that has already been done or 
that is under contract is foolish and contrary to what previous 
CBP Commissioners have requested prior to the Trump 
administration.
    I have a few questions, sir. I will start with three and 
then go from there.
    What is the status of the border wall contract review, and 
when do you anticipate that Congress will be briefed on those 
results? Can you tell us what criteria is being used to 
evaluate the existing contracts and pending work? And are 
frontline officers and agents being consulted, sir?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, thank you for the question.
    As you know, we have signed the exemption for RGV, the 
safety and welfare exemption for RGV, as well as San Diego, for 
the erosion issue that we had out in San Diego. The border wall 
plan currently sits with DHS and the administration, and we 
await the decisions, and we will implement once they are given 
to us.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Okay.
    A lot has changed over the past few years. Is there any 
effort underway to comprehensively evaluate the different 
layers of security--wall or barrier, technology, and law 
enforcement personnel--that are needed to maintain operational 
security effectively and efficiently at the land borders?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, yes, that is something that we are looking 
at very closely. As my predecessors used to call it, the three-
legged stool--the infrastructure, the technology, the 
personnel--we need all three for border security.
    Certainly, the Border Patrol continues to look at their 
version of a workload staffing model, which we hope to roll out 
by the end of this year. We are looking at our technology needs 
and our infrastructure needs as well. So 100 percent, sir.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you.
    Will this administration submit another Border Security 
Improvement Plan to the committee for review, sir?
    Mr. Miller. I will have to get back to you on that, sir.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Okay. We would appreciate that.
    Mr. Miller, I asked these questions to your colleague Mr. 
Johnson last week, but I would like to get your impression.
    Countries are still operating under a title 42 public 
health declaration because of the COVID pandemic. Under the 
title 42 authority, ICE and CBP have been repatriating and 
removing migrants who have crossed the border illegally near-
immediately after their apprehension, thus keeping the numbers 
of migrants who are released into the U.S. after crossing 
illegally down.
    But we get the sense that there are talks of revoking the 
title 42 declaration, which means the ability to swiftly 
repatriate and return migrants also goes away.
    For planning purposes, how many people are you estimating 
will flood the border into CBP's stations for processing? And 
what plans does CBP have to meet the increased numbers? And can 
you meet these processing demands within your current budget?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, thank you for the question.
    We continue--obviously, we are still under a global 
pandemic, and the CDC order will be lifted, you know, when the 
health professionals decide that it needs to be. But, as we 
look at the eventual and, we hope, soon lifting of title 42, to 
be honest with you, for the sake of our economy and the world, 
you know, we continue to assess our operations.
    Number one, the soft-sided facilities. We have stood up 
four soft-sided facilities. We are in the process of standing 
up a fifth soft-sided facility.
    We have moved additional resources downrange, Border Patrol 
agents.
    We have stood up what is called our Movement Coordination 
Cell, which has helped us move out--in coordination with HHS 
and ICE, which has helped us move children into the appropriate 
settings. We are also going to create a Movement Coordination 
Cell for single adults and family units that will be housed 
right here at the Ronald Reagan Building.
    We continue to look at all of our processes and procedures 
to automate them, like the automated A-File, working with the 
DHS CIO.
    And we continue to look at our projections going forward, 
but, right now, the majority of the encounters we see with 
migrants continue to be single adults, about 65 percent. And we 
believe we have the appropriate laws and policies in place to 
remove the single adults.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Mr. Miller, thank you for your responses, 
sir.
    Madam Chair, my time has expired, and I will yield back. 
Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar?
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Mr. Miller, thank you for being here with you. And I 
appreciate all the good folks that work for you up and down the 
border, northern border, coastal, and every part of the U.S.
    I want to talk about nonessential travel. As you know, it 
is something that I have been trying to do, been trying to open 
up since last year. Under the former Commissioner, Mark Morgan, 
we almost had something worked out where we could have a phase-
in, depending on the health of the communities. And CBP and the 
local communities would decide how to open the borders in a 
safe way.
    We are in a much better situation than we were last year, 
as you know. Vaccinations and cases in, you know, my hometown 
of Laredo and the Valley are extremely low and all that.
    You know, my problem are contradictions that we have. And I 
am not blaming you. But, you know, we let undocumented aliens 
into the U.S. and there is no health issue. We talk about 
bringing in legal Mexican visa holders that, before the 
pandemic, were spending over $19 billion for our restaurants, 
hotels, small businesses, not only the border, but, I mean, 
California, Texas, you know, Colorado, and all over that, but 
there is a health issue on that. They say it is a health issue, 
according to the Secretary.
    When you let a rich Mexican fly in, they can fly in, and it 
is not a health issue. You let a poor Mexican that wants to 
come over and spend $15, $20 or see a family member on the U.S. 
side, it is a health issue. So there are a lot of 
contradictions.
    In my area along the border, there are some businesses that 
depend on 40, 50, maybe even more, percent on Mexican shoppers. 
When I talked to the Secretary, he said it is a health issue, 
as I just mentioned, which I respectfully disagree with him, 
the way he put it, especially on the contradictions I just 
mentioned to you.
    So I talked to CDC. CDC basically--well, the Secretary 
said, "Talk to CDC. It is a health issue." I talked to CDC. 
They pushed it back to Homeland, and they said it is a Homeland 
Security issue.
    I have had very good talks with your Health Under 
Secretary, and he does a great job. And I am just trying to 
figure out, you know, when are we going to open this up? I 
mean, if there are so many contradictions--and I have 
businesses that have closed down not only because of the 
pandemic, but, on top of that, you lose 40, 50, 60 percent of 
your business. What do we need to do to get this open, in spite 
of all those contradictions I just laid out to you?
    And, you know, my businesses are so frustrated. My 
communities are so frustrated. I mean, I assume we are going to 
open up one of these days, but I am just trying to see if we 
can expedite this in a safe way. And I, you know, want to 
follow up with you after this call, if you don't mind--after 
this hearing, should I say.
    Mr. Miller. Congressman, you know, thank you so much. And, 
you know, first of all, thank you for recognizing the heroic 
work that the men and women of CBP continue to do under 
unprecedented times, under the most difficult situations.
    You know, first and foremost, as you know from the 
background of my career, I grew up in small communities on the 
northern border, and I understand the economic impact that this 
is having on the small communities and the communities on the 
southwest border.
    So, really, I am committed to working with you over the 
next 30 days or so to see what we can do in a more regional 
approach. And I look forward to working with you into the 
future so we can do that as well. And we will continue to 
consult with DHS, like you said, CWMD and CDC and CBP, to 
ensure that we have a clear path forward.
    And I thank you for the question.
    Mr. Cuellar. All right. And I would like to follow up on 
that, because I keep getting different signals on that.
    Just real quickly, I would ask you--because I am going to 
ask for another round of questioning if we have time--but I 
would ask you to look at the technology and some of the 
requests for proposals are set out to be 14 years of 
performance, and I am a little worried about that.
    We can follow up. I know my time is up. I have about 20 
seconds left. But I am just concerned that, if we go with some 
of the RFPs, we are going to see the same thing we saw with 
Boeing in 2008, and we are still in the same place with 
technology.
    So, anyway, I would like the follow up on that issue, on 
some of the RFPs that you put out for towers and instruments 
and communications along the border.
    My time is up, but I would like to follow up on that, Mr. 
Miller, and thank you for your time.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo?
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair, Ranking Member 
Fleischmann.
    Commissioner Miller, thank you for being here today. I 
appreciate everything you are doing. As you mentioned, you 
know, you all are operating under some unprecedented times and 
hardships. Big thanks goes out to all the CBP agents and their 
families underneath you that show up every day with their 
number-one goal of keeping Americans safe. And that should be 
the number-one goal of this committee. That should be the 
number-one goal of all Members in Congress. So I thank you for 
what you do.
    You know, I had an opportunity to go to the border in 2019 
as a part of the conferee on the Appropriations Committee. And, 
you know, we had a great host, Henry Cuellar. We went to 
Laredo. And Ranking Member Fleischmann was with us, and 
Chairman Granger at the time. And, you know, while we were at a 
point of entry, they seized 7 to 8 kilos of cocaine.
    And I know some of my colleagues are focused on, you know, 
this humanitarian crisis at the border, and, you know, we are 
focused on it as well. But I am wondering about the crisis and 
the dangers of, as our CBP agents and others are misdirected, 
taken off their core missions, to focus on, you know, other 
jobs, other things to help address the humanitarian crisis, we 
have huge gaping holes on our southern border, where we don't 
know what is coming over. We don't know the true amount of 
drugs.
    I mean, obviously from what you seized in 2020, the COVID 
epidemic obviously did not keep the cartels from working 
overtime--44,000 pounds of cocaine, 5,700 pounds of heroin, 
177,000 pounds of methamphetamine, and 4,700 pounds of 
fentanyl. Now, if I am correct in the back-of-my-napkin 
figures, 4,700 pounds is enough to kill every American two 
times over. And that is what you seized. And so what scares me 
is what we haven't seized.
    And so can you kind of address, you know, the type of 
people that you are apprehending, whether they are on the 
terrorist watchlist, whether they are sex offenders, 
murderers--and, again, those are the ones that we are catching, 
not the got-aways--and, also, your concerns with the hard 
narcotics that are coming across?
    And what technologies can we give you? I mean, obviously, 
Congress isn't committed to giving you all the barrier that you 
need. And we know it is effective. I mean, just look; we 
wrapped our Capitol around it with two rows of barrier.
    And, you know, so, between the boots, the barrier, and 
technology, what can be most effective to execute your job in 
keeping Americans safe?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, thank you. And thank you for 
acknowledging, as well, the incredible work the men and women 
are doing, because, ultimately, that is what they are hired to 
do, that is what they want to do, and that is what they are 
doing--border security, national security, keeping the American 
people safe.
    So just a little bit on the numbers, as we sit here today. 
Our fentanyl seizures are up 308 percent in fiscal year 2021; 
heroin, 14 percent; cocaine, 100 percent; and methamphetamines, 
up 20 percent. So the men and women continue to do a phenomenal 
job of keeping these dangerous narcotics off the streets.
    So a couple things on the technology. We have a pretty good 
plan going into 2024 to increase the vehicles being screened on 
the southwest border from less than 1 percent to around 40 
percent in fiscal year 2024. Thank you to Congress for those 
funds.
    We also have a plan to increase our screening technology 
for the commercial traffic on the southwest border up to 90 
percent by fiscal year 2024. And we are in the process of 
procuring that equipment as well.
    If you look at the fentanyl pandemic and where it started, 
it started at the mail facilities. And thanks to this 
committee, we received funds and have deployed some additional 
technology at our mail facilities in JFK, where my daytime job 
is, where I left on January 20. And that technology and the re-
imaging of the mail facilities and the ECCs is going to be 
hugely beneficial.
    On the Border Patrol side, we continue to look at 
technology such as AST, which have artificial intelligence 
embedded within it. And, you know, that should help to ensure 
that we are directing agents to the places they need to be to 
encounter the subjects we need to encounter.
    Mr. Palazzo. All right. Well, thank you, Commissioner 
Miller.
    I see my time has expired, and I look forward to having a 
second round of questions. Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price?
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And welcome, Commissioner. We appreciate your testimony and 
your service and that of your colleagues as well.
    I have some questions about the attempts to alter the so-
called "Remain in Mexico" policy, which I am sure other members 
will also be addressing.
    I want to start, though, with an aspect, a wrinkle in that 
policy that I encountered at the border. Like lots of Members, 
I have visited the border and have a lasting impression from 
those visits. And this one has to do with Matamoros and the 
practice of so-called metering.
    As you know, under the Trump administration, the CBP 
engaged in the practice of metering or regulating asylum-
seekers at our Nation's ports of entry, severely limiting the 
number of people who were able to even seek asylum.
    I remember going in the summer of 2019 to Matamoros. There 
were migrant, mainly, it appeared, families waiting outside the 
bridge, not even able to go on the bridge, in 102-degree heat, 
very insecure conditions, very deprived conditions. Some had 
waited months, 3 or 4 months, for their names to be called from 
a, kind of, vague, indeterminate list for the few slots that 
were available to even make application for asylum.
    And, of course, they knew that if their name did come up 
and they could make application, then they would need to spend 
time in overcrowded CBP holding facilities or, indeed, be sent 
back in to Mexico.
    Now, there was no CBP waiting list or official process that 
allowed migrants to wait in line. It was run by someone 
different at every Mexican border town. No transparency in how 
names appeared on the list, in what order. No transparency in 
terms of how the names came up, whether there might be people 
jumping the line. The list was taped to the window of a 
building in Matamoros and had 2,000 names on it. And the 
migrants told me that, at the time, no name had been called for 
some time--not one name.
    Now, this process created a huge backlog of asylum-seekers, 
who were denied even the chance to make application at our 
port. They, of course, sometimes concluded they had no choice 
but to attempt to cross the borders between our ports.
    So what can you tell me about that metering policy and 
whether you have officially ended the practice, or what is 
going on with this particular class of asylum-seekers? Given 
the history of metering and other troubling Trump policies, 
what have you done in this administration to improve the 
process for handling these applicants, this large backlog of 
applicants?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, thank you for your question.
    As you know, as our Nation's ports of entry, in particular 
on the southwest border, we have a difficult task of juggling 
legitimate trade and travel while doing things like 
intercepting fentanyl that is coming into our communities, 
whether it is a hard narcotic or bad people, bad things. And, 
really, you know, that is our major job, facilitating 
legitimate trade and travel.
    And, on top of that, when you layer in the situation we are 
currently seeing with the global pandemic, our facilities, as 
you know, were not built to hold migrants or anybody for long 
amounts of time.
    So I think, to answer your question, we have started, 
through the MPP process, or wind-down, and bringing those folks 
back into the country for their hearings, we have started a 
process where we are getting advance information in scheduling 
and doing the vetting in advance and scheduling times for them 
to arrive at our ports of entry and, thus, enabling us to 
process them in a very timely manner.
    So I think, as we move forward, when we talk about 
technology and innovation and some of those things, I think 
those are the processes that we need to look at so we are 
getting advance information and we are able to do the vetting 
in advance and we are able to ensure that we are processing 
appropriately when they arrive at our Nation's ports of entry 
so, at the same time, we can do our job of facilitating 
legitimate trade and travel.
    Mr. Price. So are these encampments still there? Or how has 
the situation changed for the asylum-seeker who previously was 
waiting in this, kind of, indeterminate situation?
    Mr. Miller. So for the folks that are remaining in Mexico, 
we are scheduling appointments. Matamoros, we have wound down 
that camp through the MPP process. But we still do, in places 
like San Ysidro, have large groups of folks south of our 
border.
    Mr. Price. But they do know when they can have an 
appointment? Or is that not right? Are they still waiting for 
days and waiting for some kind of list to be cleared? That is 
my question.
    Mr. Miller. I will have to get back to you on that 
question, but not at this time.
    Mr. Price. All right.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson?
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And good morning, everyone.
    I want to go back to kind of a line of questioning that we 
first started learning about at our hearing last week. We 
exposed some concerning issues on the communication challenges 
between CBP and ICE.
    So, Acting Commissioner Miller, I am going to focus on that 
today. I appreciate your service to our country. I think it is 
imperative that we acknowledge our gratitude for the men and 
women who are keeping our borders safe. And, again, I want to 
make sure we are prioritizing their morale. We are hearing 
about a lot of very challenging situations at the border they 
are obviously on the front lines of.
    Back in April, I had the chance to visit the southern 
border, myself, and see the current crisis. And your agents 
welcomed me there; they welcomed our delegation. We heard about 
all the time and energy they are devoting to their jobs to keep 
the country safe. And I am grateful to them. They are putting 
their lives in harm's way. Obviously, they catch those not only 
crossing into our country illegally, but they are also policing 
the human smugglers, the drug traffickers, the cartels. I think 
it has to be frustrating for them to then see those people 
sometimes released into the interior soon after.
    Several reports have come to my attention regarding notices 
to appear. Obviously, those are the official notices issued to 
illegal immigrants telling them that they are expected to 
report to a court proceeding or an immigration office. And I 
would like to follow up a little bit on the chairwoman's line 
of questioning. I appreciated her remarks about some of the 
discrepancies with the notices to appear.
    So my first question today is: Is the CBP currently 
providing one of these notices to appear to all individuals, 
families, unaccompanied minors who are released from CBP into 
the interior? And, if not, can you give me a specific ratio?
    Mr. Miller. So we are, yes, issuing--depending on the 
processing pathway. Obviously, unaccompanied children are 
processed a different way under title 8 and turned over to HHS. 
And single adults, if they are returned, again, will be 
processed under title 8.
    If we are talking about the family units, whether it is a 
notice to appear or notice to report, yes, we are issuing one 
or the other for all family units.
    Mrs. Hinson. Is there specific written guidance for how you 
issue those NTAs, who gets one, who does not?
    Mr. Miller. There is.
    Mrs. Hinson. Okay.
    Mr. Miller. We have policies and procedures across the 
southwest border--across the CBP.
    Mrs. Hinson. If you could make sure our office gets those, 
that would be much appreciated.
    And then is it possible at this point for CBP and ICE, or 
either agency independently, to track an individual who does 
not receive an NTA?
    Mr. Miller. We--I don't understand the question. We are 
giving them an NTA or an NTR. The folks that would not get one 
were not processed and we would not have encountered.
    Mrs. Hinson. So, if they are released without an NTA, there 
is no way to track them. Once you give them an NTA, is there a 
way to track them through either CBP when you release them or 
ICE at this point? Do you know?
    Mr. Miller. So we don't release them without an NTA or an 
NTR. However, if we do release them with an NTA or NTR, we do 
collect the 213 information, we do collect the I-385 
information, and we do collect the destination information if 
they give it to us. And, yes, we can pull that out, as well 
as--
    Mrs. Hinson. So you can collect the information, but can 
you actually track them? Can you find out if--you know, what is 
the process for actually ensuring that, after they get that NTA 
or NTR, they actually get to the place they said they were 
going to be? Do you have the ability to do that?
    Mr. Miller. We can pull the information from the forms or 
the information that we have in our systems, and we can tell if 
they have reported within the 60 days as they are supposed to.
    Mrs. Hinson. Okay.
    So the biggest concern I have is the breakdown in 
communication between CBP and ICE. Because, as we learned last 
week--and they did tell us that there is no way to track them 
once the NTA or NTR is given and they are out of our your 
custody until they either check in or, as we know, many times 
don't.
    So I would like to know what efforts you are taking as an 
organization to coordinate with ICE on tracking those people, 
making sure that your processes are more coordinated. Because, 
right now, frankly, it seems like one arm doesn't know what the 
other arm is doing.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you for that question. And I will say 
that our relationship with ICE today is 100 percent better, and 
it continues to get better. We talk every single day. We stood 
up a Movement Coordination Cell right here in the Ronald Reagan 
Building where I sit. ICE is present in the Movement 
Coordination Cell. And as we continue to look at single adults 
and family units, they are going to put additional people in 
that Movement Coordination Cell, which will allow us to ensure 
that we are seeing the same thing at the same time.
    Mrs. Hinson. Okay.
    Well, I look forward to a second round of questioning. 
Madam Chair, thank you very much, and I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood?
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding today's 
hearing.
    Mr. Miller, we know that vaccination remains a critical 
part of ending the COVID-19 pandemic and saving lives, so I am 
interested to hear about the vaccine rollout for both your 
workforce and the people in your custody.
    Let's start with your workforce. Mr. Miller, what 
percentage of CBP employees are fully vaccinated as of today or 
your most recent available data?
    Mr. Miller. So, Chairwoman--or excuse me, ma'am, thank you 
for your question.
    Ms. Underwood. Sure.
    Mr. Miller. I do not know the percentage of individuals in 
our workforce that have the vaccination. Obviously, there are 
privacy laws, and they can get the vaccination on their own or 
they can get the vaccination through the VA.
    I can tell you, though, we had a slow rollout of the 
vaccination to the workforce, but under the guise of our Chief 
Medical Officer and the Department, we have made significant 
progress. And, obviously, now the vaccines are available to all 
of those who want it.
    Ms. Underwood. Well, I did read in your testimony that 33 
percent of your eligible workforce were vaccinated at VA sites 
and the rest do have access to community sites. Do you know how 
many have actually taken advantage of that access and been 
vaccinated with your VA partnership?
    Mr. Miller. So those numbers are correct with the VA 
partnership. I do not know outside the VA partnership.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay.
    So I understand that CBP previously faced some vaccine 
supply challenges that slowed down workforce vaccination 
efforts. Now that vaccine production has caught up with demand, 
are you finding it easier to get more shots in arms? Or have 
vaccine confidence, you know, issues created challenges on the 
demand side?
    Mr. Miller. So, you know, certainly, on the demand side, 
you know, I think everybody that wants a vaccine can get the 
vaccine. And we are continuing to message to the workforce the 
benefits of the vaccine and, you know, encouraging them to get 
the vaccine, while not mandating it.
    Ms. Underwood. Yeah, this is a top concern for me, and it 
needs to be a proactive priority for the Department as well. 
Vaccine hesitancy in America is at an all-time high, and the 
stakes are literally life or death.
    I was devastated when I heard about Freddie Vasquez, the 
Border Patrol agent and father of four who lost his life to 
COVID earlier this month. His wife, a nurse, reports that he 
took every precaution to protect his family over the past year, 
but ultimately he had delayed getting vaccinated.
    What steps are you taking to proactively combat vaccine 
hesitancy and disinformation and to make sure your employees 
have accurate information about the safety, efficacy, and 
critical importance of the COVID-19 vaccine?
    Mr. Miller. So I myself, all the leadership in CBP, we 
continue to message it, we continue to muster it. We continue 
to message it at the local levels, the national levels, the 
sector levels, the station levels, the port levels. But, 
ultimately, it is a personal choice.
    So we are going to continue to message it in any way we 
can, and I am willing to work with you if you think you have 
some good ideas for us to how to continue to message the 
benefits of the vaccination for the workforce, because I, too, 
believe it is vitally important. And, frankly, stories like 
that break my heart.
    Ms. Underwood. Great. Thank you, sir.
    Vaccinating CBP employees is essential to not only 
protecting their own health but also ensuring that they don't 
expose migrants to the virus or bring it home from their 
workplace to their families and communities.
    Now that we have enough vaccines to go around, there is no 
excuse for vaccination rates across the country to be so low as 
they are, and especially for our own Federal workforce. I know, 
as you have said, you don't want to lose more agents like 
Freddie Vasquez any more than I do, so I do look forward to 
partnering with you and keeping informed about your plans to 
proactively address this crisis.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you.
    Ms. Underwood. Next, can you tell me about your plans for 
vaccinating migrants in CBP custody? I understand that DHS is 
reevaluating its vaccination strategy and that ICE will soon 
get a direct allocation. What changes can we expect to see at 
CBP?
    Mr. Miller. So, ma'am, I can tell you, as you pointed out, 
our first goal really was getting our own folks vaccinated, and 
it continues to be our number-one priority.
    Then our second goal was really to fix the overcrowding in 
our facilities, working with HHS, ICE, FEMA, and the like to 
ensure that we are getting children the proper care that they 
needed. And, right now, as we sit, the children's time in 
custody is about 20 hours, 21 hours, but it is under a day.
    And I have, as you know, continual conversations with the 
Chief Medical Officer at the Department. He has indicated that 
he is working with ICE, but we have not had those conversations 
with CBP as of yet.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Well, as you know, vaccinating 
migrants not only keeps them safe, but it also protects the 
communities that they may travel to after they leave your 
custody. The question that we face must be how, not if, we get 
vaccines to migrants. And so I really ask that you begin to 
make those plans and keep our committee updated on any resource 
needs that you have as you, you know, do the vaccine rollout.
    Now, Mr. Miller, as you know, the chairwoman and I pushed 
to include funding in the fiscal 2020 appropriations for an 
interoperable electronic health record system, or EHR, for 
Customs and Border Protection. And, as a nurse, I have seen 
firsthand how important good record-keeping is to good patient 
care.
    Obviously, continuity of care can be an even greater 
challenge for migrants who may be transferred from one Federal 
agency to another. And I witnessed this myself when I visited 
the border in 2019 and saw records being kept on paper, if they 
were kept at all.
    Which is why I am so glad that the funds we provided are 
already being put to use. I understand that you have nearly 
completed phase one of the EHR rollout. And so, very quickly, 
before my time is expired, we know phase one has begun along 
the southwest border. Have your officers begun using the new 
system to ensure that migrants are getting appropriate care, 
and has the rollout gone smoothly?
    Mr. Miller. Yes, we have. And, as you stated, this summer, 
we will complete rollout of phase one across the southwest 
border; and, quickly, phase two will be connecting to our other 
system, both the OFO and the Office of Border Patrol; and, 
thirdly, we will start working with the other government 
agencies.
    Ms. Underwood. Excellent.
    My time has expired. Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford?
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Commissioner Miller, thank you very much for your service. 
And please pass on to your men and women our condolences for 
those 34 officers who lost their lives this last year. I want 
to join with the chairwoman in offering those condolences, and 
also Freddie Vasquez's family, as well, who is sadly having a 
funeral today. We greatly, greatly appreciate and honor their 
service to this country.
    But, as you know, we do have a lot of crises that we are 
facing in this country right now, not just on the southern 
border. I mean, we are looking at an economic crisis. You know, 
lumber is skyrocketing, prices. Food costs are going up. We 
have an energy crisis. We have gas lines I haven't seen since 
the 1970s. And we have a national security issue with, you 
know, Israel and Hamas. And, you know, they have been 
emboldened, I think, by the perceived weakness of this 
administration.
    And now, you know, they finally admit that we have a crisis 
at the border that, quite frankly, Mr. Miller--or to Mr. 
Miller, you are going to have to deal with. And so I want to 
make sure that this committee is doing all we can to help you 
be successful. And I think some of what we need to do is talk 
plainly about some of these programs.
    The notice to appear is not a notice to appear; it is a 
notice to disappear--to disappear into the interior of this 
country. And I will let you share the numbers that actually 
show up when they are supposed to. And that is in addition to 
all of the other alternatives to detention that are utilized.
    So if you could talk a little bit about the NTA.
    And I would like an answer to this as well, Commissioner, 
because I am very concerned, and I think it is important that 
this committee know, the 287(g) program--and I am not talking 
about the program on the street, the task force effort. I am 
talking about the JEM, the jail piece of 287(g), where we take 
criminals who have already been arrested and help ICE get them 
out of the country.
    And I am hearing that the 287(g) program may be eliminated 
by the Biden-Harris administration. I hope that is not true, 
because I can tell you, having been a sheriff and run a 287(g) 
program, my community was much safer because I was able to get 
all of those criminal aliens out of the country.
    And so if you could talk a little bit about that as well, I 
would be curious to know where you see us going on 287(g) and 
the notice to disappear into the interior of the country 
program.RPTR SINKFIELDEDTR HUMKE[11:01 a.m.]
    Mr. Miller. Well, sir, thank you for your question. And 
really, I would defer both of those questions to ICE.
    Mr. Rutherford. Have you heard that discussion about doing 
away with 287(g)?
    Mr. Miller. I have not.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. Well, let me ask you this because 
this is an area I know that we can help you. As the points of 
entry--and you talked about the increase of folks coming 
between those points of entry crossing the borders, tunnels are 
a major, major factor. And sometimes I don't think we give them 
enough emphasis.
    And I really--and not faulting you, but I really do believe 
that the tunneling program has been insufficient at best. And 
what can we do to help you get a better tunneling detection 
program started?
    Mr. Miller. Well, sir, thank you for that question. You 
know, I think we have made progress in the Tunnel Detection 
Program. In the last couple of years we stood up regional teams 
in San Diego, California, Nogales, Arizona, El Paso, Texas, and 
McAllen, along with the tunnel task force that his runs.
    We have made additional--thanks to this committee's help--
we have made additional investments in persistent and mobile 
detection technologies. I just received a brief yesterday about 
the interagency collaboration that is going on--and I see that 
the time has expired--that is going on to address this problem 
area.
    And we will continue to work with you and your staff to 
ensure that we are getting the right technology to improve the 
program.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. And we may be able to talk about that 
a little more on a follow-up second round.
    Madam Chair, I see my time has expired. I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Quigley.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Welcome, sir. Good 
to talk to you the other day. As I mentioned, and I would like 
to go in a little more detail. On August 28, 2020, 20 dogs 
enters the U.S. on a flight from Jordan to Chicago's O'Hare 
International Airport. Due to improper vaccination 
certificates, 18 of these dogs were denied entry and were held 
by Alliance Ground International LLC, a customs and border 
patrol bonded warehouse where they awaited CDC and APHIS-
approved review.
    These animals were later found in small cages covered in 
feces and urine and had been without food or water for several 
days. Several of the dogs died. A clear and brazen violation of 
the Animal Welfare Act.
    During the pandemic, live animal imports as pets increased 
significantly. And there is concern this incident will repeat 
itself if CBD lacks adequate facilities and procedures to care 
for live animals at all the ports of entry.
    At this time, there is only one such facility known as ARK 
that is equipped to safely handle live animals during potential 
required quarantine. It is located in New York City, which 
obviously doesn't help everywhere else in the country.
    Why is there only one CBP-bonded warehouse facility in the 
U.S. that is well-equipped to care for live animals that are 
held for legally required quarantines? And can you commit to 
adding more facilities that will meet the standard for care for 
live animals at ports of entry? What resources do you need to 
do this?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, thank you for the question. And, you know, 
number one, we did work with our interagency partners in 
Chicago to address that issue, sent out what is called a trade 
pipeline to ensure something like that doesn't happen again.
    I really--there is multiple agencies involved whether it is 
the Center for Disease Control or was it USD-APHIS. As you 
mentioned, we do have a bonded warehouse in New York to cover 
such issues so. You know I committed to working with you and 
the interagency to figure out what we can do to continue to 
look at this issue and ensure that we have the proper care and 
even facilities at our other locations.
    Mr. Quigley. It is not that there aren't private sector 
facilities that can't do this. We need to locate them, certify 
them, and pay them for their services. You know, can we commit 
to doing this, especially at the major ports of entry in the 
United States to start?
    Mr. Miller. Again, you know, I have to talk to APHIS and 
CDC. And, you know, we will look at that and certainly get back 
to you.
    Mr. Quigley. All right. And there are currently no CBP 
practices in place to require everybody in the warehouse to 
maintain the standard of care for live animals that exceeds the 
basic requirements of the Animal Welfare Act. And as we saw in 
this incident in Chicago, it was a major fail. Will you commit 
to updating the practices to ensure the safety and welfare of 
live animals in custody and the bonded warehouses that contract 
with you?
    Mr. Miller. Yeah. Again, yes, we will work on that with our 
partners.
    Mr. Quigley. All right. We appreciate that. Rather than go 
into a series that will take much longer, Madam Chairwoman, I 
will yield back at this time. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. Sorry 
for my tardiness. Multiple committee hearings, as all of you 
know. Thank you so much. And I wanted to ask a little bit, 
acting commissioner, about your conversation you had with the 
ranking member.
    Looking forward to a world after Title 42, you mentioned 
coordination with ORR with respect to unaccompanied children. 
Does the CBP plan to coordinate with local NGOs and 
organization that support asylum seekers as part of the post 
Title 42 strategy as well.
    Mr. Miller. Yes, sir, we do, and we are coordinating. We 
actually have NGO coordinators across the Southwest border both 
in the Office of Border Patrol and the Office of Field 
Operations who are having almost daily conversations with the 
NGO. I myself have met with a good portion of the NGOs across 
the Southwest border.
    Mr. Aguilar. How many of those coordinators do you have? 
And with respect to their conversations, are you talking--is 
there a conversation about post Title 42 in that, or is it just 
we are all going to work together and keep the lines of 
communication open? I am asking specifically about post Title 
42.
    Mr. Miller. So there is a coordinator at each sector and at 
each field office. And you know we are talking, specifically, 
about the coordination that is going on between the NGOs and 
CBP, which is happening today. Are we talking, specifically, 
about post 42, the post 42 environment? I would have to get 
back to you on that.
    Mr. Aguilar. I would appreciate if you would. I also wanted 
to continue on the line of questioning that Representative 
Underwood asked about vaccinations and spend a little time 
focusing on how CBP's posture may change as they interact with 
more vaccinated individuals.
    Does CBP have a process to interact with individuals who 
state that they have received the vaccine when they present 
themselves at the border? And does CBP have a plan to validate 
if an individual has received a vaccine?
    Mr. Miller. So as of now, you know, we do have what is 
called our Job Hazard Analysis. That is something that we send 
out to our ports and our Border Patrol stations that dictate 
how we interact with the traveling public and the migrants and 
those folks we interact on a daily basis.
    We continually update the Job Hazard Analysis based on the 
conditions that we face. As of as of now, we are treating 
everybody we encounter as if they may have COVID. But as things 
change, we will continue to update that guidance.
    Mr. Aguilar. What type of strategies are your medical 
professionals talking about with respect to vaccinated 
individuals; an individual who presents themselves and states 
that they have been vaccinated? What guidance have they been 
giving you with respect to that? I understand that there is 
manuals, and I understand that things, policies get updated. I 
am asking specifically about this issue.
    Mr. Miller. Well, specifically, today, we are treating 
everybody as if they would still have COVID. We are still 
wearing our PPE. That is the most recent Job Hazard Analysis we 
put out there.
    CDC is the folks that dictate, you know, the vaccinated 
folks' vaccination or testing regimen and how they are entering 
the country. That is how we are treating them today as if they 
would had COVID.
    Mr. Aguilar. As you think through what that planning might 
look like, what resources or supplies would you need in order 
to ensure the safety of CBP personnel, migrants, asylum 
seekers, and the American public should the border reopen?
    Mr. Miller. So, sir, we continue to ensure that we have the 
appropriate stockpile of PPE, to ensure that we have the 
appropriate supplies for the migrants, for our officers and our 
agents. We continue to update the guidance. As the pandemic 
changes, you know, I think we have came an awful long ways 
during the pandemic in learning what and how we can do it, what 
supplies we need, ensuring that we have the appropriate 
stockpile. I would give the agency credit. We are one of the 
few agencies that had the appropriate stockpile going into the 
pandemic to deal with what we are dealing with today.
    Mr. Aguilar. And I want to give the agency credit for doing 
that. I just think that there is more that we can do when it 
comes to providing that discussion and the policies and looking 
past the next curve. I think we need to do a little bit more of 
a deep dive and look forward to the continued conversations. I 
yield back, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe that concludes the first 
round. So we are going to go into a second round of 
questioning.
    Mr. Miller, last week, you released data showing more than 
178,000 total encounters at the border in April. Can you talk 
more about the demographics that make up that number, the 
transport scene with regards to migrants coming from countries 
other than Mexico or the Northern Triangle countries, and talk 
about some of the push and pull factors for migrants in 
different demographics and for different originating countries.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, ma'am, for that question.
    So, really, right now, across the Southwest border, we are 
seeing about 65 percent, 65 percent single adults, somewhere in 
the neighborhood of 10 percent of unaccompanied children, and 
about 25 percent family units across the Southwest border. As I 
indicated in our first question, the family unit percentage is 
a little bit higher in the Rio Grande Valley.
    When we look at the demographics, we continue to see Mexico 
and the Northern Triangle be in the highest floor. Ecuador, 
Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela, Haiti; Nicaragua round out to top 10 
of the folks we are seeing. What we have seen on the Western 
plank is we have seen an increase of the Brazilians, which 
provide a unique challenge because of the Portuguese language, 
ensuring that we have the folks to communicate with them the 
right way. We continue to see a high amount of Cubans, I think, 
I mentioned, and Venezuelans as well.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. And some of the push and pull factors 
that you are seeing for these different demographics?
    Mr. Miller. So I think the push and pull factors are pretty 
much the same because the demographics--as you have seen the 
increase, you know, focus on Brazil a little bit. Brazil has 
had a real tough time with the pandemic. The economic 
insecurity, you know, the Northern Triangle, as you know, we 
have had, we have had droughts, we have had hurricanes, you 
know, unemployment, the crime, the corruption. So, you know, I 
think some of the factors that we have seen over time remain 
the same.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. And I want to ask a question, this 
has to do with encounters in March which totalled over 173,000, 
of which around 60,000 or 35 percent were so-called 
recidivists, meaning individuals who attempted to reenter the 
country after having been previously removed. Do you think that 
a relatively high recidivism rate is linked to the current 
reliance on Title 42's expulsion authority?
    Mr. Miller. I do. I think that Title 42 lends itself to a 
higher recidivism rate. However, that being said, we are able 
to process these folks and send them back relatively quickly, 
keeping them out of our facilities and keeping the facilities 
decompressed.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. I recently traveled with the 
Secretary to visit the temporary CBP facility in Donna, Texas. 
And while I noted a much-improved environment as compared to 
the surge in 2019, more procedures are still needed for how CBP 
cares for those in this custody, particularly, care for 
children and families.
    I understand that you are working closely with the DHS 
chief medical officer to address short, medium, and long-term 
issues to improve the care of children. What recommendations is 
the CMO making at this time?
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, ma'am. Just as a little background 
for everybody here, in 2016, we had no medical staff at our 
facilities. At the beginning of the current situation, we had 
around 700 medical staff. Now, today, as we sit here, we have 
850 across the Southwest border. We have hired additional 
caregivers. That is one of the short-term recommendations that 
the CMO made that we are acting on, additional caregivers.
    We have four behavioral health advisors that can be 
contacted by the caregivers on the ground. Some of the other 
recommendations that have been made of ensuring that the 
children are orientated, more orientation videos ensuring that 
they have frequent contact or ability to contact the relatives 
via phone.
    So we are implementing those. Keeping the kids active. 
Things like coloring books, getting outside, ensuring that we 
are getting them outside two or three times a day.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Miller, I am running short of time, 
but I did have a follow-up that I think is important and that 
is what the status is of establishing a child welfare 
professional program, and, you know, and increasing the number 
of nonmedical child caregivers, because that has been a top 
priority of mine and of this subcommittee. Can you give us a 
status report on that?
    Mr. Miller. Yeah, so, ma'am, we are in the process of 
hiring additional caregivers. We have 260 in the pipeline that 
are hired now, and we are getting those full-time jobs across 
the Southwest border.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. And what is the status of their 
training--
    Mr. Miller. The--
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. --of CBP personnel who come into contact 
with migrants who have you know trauma, what is their ongoing 
CBP officers with regard to working with these children that 
have trauma?
    Mr. Miller. So thank you for that question. And we are 
working with the CMO, and we will be training our Border Patrol 
agents along with the caregivers in trauma-informed training 
care.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
    Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Miller, 
continuing with my line of questioning about Title 42 servers, 
do you think people are waiting in Mexico in anticipation of 
the Title 42 declaration being lifted soon?
    Mr. Miller. I don't know that they are waiting in Mexico 
for the Title 42 to be lifted. I do know that we are preparing 
in the Customs and Border Protection for the eventuality of 
Title 42 to be lifted. And we discussed many of those things 
that we are doing to prepare for it.
    Mr. Fleischmann. I see in your written testimony, sir, that 
about 62 percent of total encounters resulted in a Title 42 
expulsion for the month of April. For the 38 percent of persons 
encountered--for the other 38 percent of the persons 
encountered, what was the ultimate result of their encounters 
with CBP, and what was it about this population that made them 
not eligible for Title 42 expulsion, sir?
    Mr. Miller. So Title 42 is mainly, the easiest way to say 
it is for Spanish-speaking nations. So some of the folks you 
are talking about would have been from other locations. Many of 
them would have been those family units with tender-aged 
children that we talked about. So those would be the two 
biggest groups.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you. Should or when Title 42 gets 
lifted, what percentage of that 62 percent will still be able 
to be quickly repatriated?
    Mr. Miller. So I think as we discussed before a large 
percentage who are seeing right now, about 65 percent of the 
folks we are seeing are single adults. And we will continue to 
work with ICE on Title 8 processing on those individuals.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you for that. Following up on that, 
are you getting the support you need from ICE and HHS to 
quickly remove migrants from the Border Patrol stations and 
land ports of entry, sir?
    Mr. Miller. So we have made significant progress with 
unaccompanied children, as we have mentioned, through the 
movement coordinations. The cell that set up here at the Ronald 
Reagan Building at CBP headquarters. We are literally sitting 
side by side, looking at the information every single day to 
make sure we are moving the children out within that mandated 
72 hours and really trying to do it within a day.
    We are taking the same approach with the single adults in 
the family units. And we are going to stand up a cell, an 
interagency cell with ICE and CBP to continue to look at the 
surges across the Southwest border, sector by sector, field 
office by field office, so we can respond timely to those 
situations.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, sir. And, finally, will COVID still 
be an operational challenge at the border even when public 
health declaration is lifted? If so, how will you need to adapt 
to keep your people safe?
    Mr. Miller. Well, thank you for that question, sir, 
because, the health and welfare of the workforce continues to 
be the number one priority here.
    So we are going to need to work very closely with the 
healthcare professionals with CDC, with everybody to ensure to 
the previous line of questioning from Congressman Aguilar on 
exactly what we are going to do to plan out for the eventuality 
of the Title 42 andTitle 19 go away.
    So those are ongoing discussions with the medical 
professionals. The professionals will be happy to update you as 
they come to conclusion
    Mr. Fleischmann. Mr. Miller, thank you for answering my 
questions and for your service in stepping up at this time.
    Madam Chair, I have some more time left, but in light of 
the fact that some of the members want to ask additional 
questions, I am going to yield back at this time.
    So thank you so much, and I appreciate your testimony.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Miller, again, we 
have already reached out to your office to sit down with you 
and CDC and your health, DHS health officer to talk about the 
border restrictions.
    As I mentioned, just to add one last point, I go home every 
day--I mean, every week, so I live at the border. I don't go 
visit. So I see things very differently from some of my 
colleagues, both the Democrats and the Republicans.
    And every time I fly over here in the morning, I ask the 
Border Patrol folks there, you know, how many families are 
there, how many people are there flying? There are families 
that fly every time I fly to D.C. on the plane, and again it is 
not a health issue I have those folks, but the legal visa 
holders from Mexico, that is a health issue. So I do want to 
follow up on that because I see that every time I go and go 
home to the border.
    I want to ask about the construction of the border wall. As 
you know, I am dead set against the wall, and I am glad that 
they rescind the money. One of the things is you all made a 
determination that my area, the Laredo sector needed a border 
wall. We don't want a border wall. What we want is everything 
but the border wall.
    So there was a $1.3 billion that was appropriated to the 
Laredo sector to build a wall. We don't want the wall. We want 
the roads. We want to eradicate the Carrizos. We want the 
technology. We want a new checkpoint for Border Patrol outside 
of Laredo.
    If that checkpoint was the port of entry, it would be the 
fourth largest port of entry in the country because the number 
of trucks that we have there. The World Trade Bridge is now at 
17,000 trucks a day. And, you know, most trucks will come 
through ports of entry and not in between.
    My question, and I know I had asked the chairwoman about 
this at the very beginning is will that $1.3 billion that got 
appropriated to the Laredo sector stay there for technology, 
roads, and all that? Or is this now a pot of money that 
Homeland is going to take out and put in other places of the 
area?
    The security questions are still there. I mean, you all 
thought that there was a need for a wall, which I disagree, but 
I still want the technology there. Will you all put the-- are 
you all looking at putting that money back in the Laredo 
sector, or are you going to take that somewhere else and say 
there is no need, there is no security issue in my sector?
    Mr. Miller. Well, sir, as I mentioned before, the final 
determination on the wall and the funding, you know, is with 
DHS and the administration as we speak. I certainly 
acknowledge, as we discussed previously, sir, the need for 
technology, infrastructure, and people to secure the Southwest 
border. And we are going to continue to look at what that 
calculus needs to be and ensure that we are getting the 
technology downrange to help the men and women of CBP and keep 
our community safe.
    Mr. Cuellar. Well, I would like to follow up on that 
because I am going to push for that money to stay there. One of 
the other things I see is the Del Rio sector has Brazilians--I 
mean has people from Cuba, Haitians, Venezuelans. The Valley 
gets some of the family units, as you mentioned the percentages 
of family and unaccompanied kids.
    So Laredo gets over 90 percent of the apprehensions or 
Mexicans. And we have stash houses. We got, you know, times 
that they put up 180 people in a trailer. Sip gangs (ph). As 
you know, sip gangs (ph) usually steal drugs from one another. 
I have videos where they are stealing a commodity, if I can use 
that term, which are people. They are stealing undocumented 
aliens from one gang to another gang. And if anybody wants to 
see that video, I would be happy to share with you.
    So we got that type of issue. And that is why I am saying 
if you are determined to put a wall, then I will ask you to 
also determine that we still have that security interest and 
keep that $1.3 billion in the Laredo area without a wall. So I 
would ask you to please take a look at that.
    Mr. Miller. You know, thank you, sir. And you know, I would 
just like to hit on one of the points that you raised. You 
know, and we can talk about with further questioning or 
offline, but Operation Sentinel is what we are doing to take 
down these transnational criminal organizations that really are 
profiting off the vulnerable. So I would be happy to further 
discuss those operations and what we are doing to attack these 
PCOs.
    Mr. Cuellar. Yes, and we will follow up with the moneys 
because most of the moneys for smuggling people in comes from 
the U.S. and not from other places. So I think you and I have 
to have a conversation. I would love to follow up on that. We 
have got to follow that money.
    With that, thank you so much, Mr. Miller.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair. Commissioner Miller, 
back in, I guess, 2012, 2013, when I was on the Homeland 
Security Authorization Committee, we would use a term or a 
metrics about operational control over the border. And back 
then I think we were around 43 percent operational control. 
That means at any given time, we know we have control over the 
border. And I know that may be outdated. Could you just comment 
on, you know, what in-houses do you all use now to kind of 
derive an operational control number for the border?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, that is something I will have to get back 
to you on. The exact in-houses, I don't want to misspeak on 
that, sir.
    Mr. Palazzo. Okay. Please do. Also, I know I have been a 
huge advocate, as some of my colleagues have been, since I have 
been in Congress to utilize the National Guard to help support 
your frontline people down there in the CBP and ICE and others. 
Can you tell us about the partnership with the National Guard, 
maybe share some successes, and some of the stories of what 
they actually do to support you and your men and women?
    Mr. Miller. Well, sir, thank you. I mean, there is no more 
important partnership on the Southwest border right now than 
the partnership with the National Guard. As you probably know 
that the RFA has got approved for next year as well.
    So a couple of things, the National Guard continues to 
provide us flight hours for the Border Patrol agents on the 
ground when our marine office is not able to provide those 
hours. They are out there every single day really looking, 
sitting on those surveillance cameras and through that 
surveillance equipment to tip off the Border Patrol agents when 
we have groups illegally entering between the ports of entry.
    And really I can't say enough about the continued service 
that they have, really, saving migrants' lives. I mean, I 
literally see a case every single week where [inaudible] 
Identified somebody that is in distress or has saved somebody 
that is in distress. So, yeah, the work they are doing every 
single day to not only help us with the security but the safety 
and welfare of those that we encounter is incredible.
    Mr. Palazzo. Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that. As a 
National Guardsman myself, I am glad they are being utilized, 
and I think it is a huge multiplying effort that helps you 
focus on your jobs, and they can pick up missions. They also 
get valuable training for them as well--
    Mr. Miller. They sure do.
    Mr. Palazzo. --they probably wouldn't be getting otherwise.
    And real quick, I know we talk a lot about the southern 
border. It is truly again a humanitarian crisis. It is an 
invasion. There is all kind of adjectives we can use to 
describe it. And we all have our own reasons why we think it is 
continuing to be a crisis.
    Can we pivot to the maritime border for a second? I know 
you mentioned in your testimony 95,000 miles of slide. So I 
will show you that we do, but I am more specific towards the 
Gulf of Mexico. So like it is a huge blind spot for us because 
our focus is like whether it is trying to interdict drugs on 
the high seas, we are in the Caribbean, and any area in South 
or Central America. What were some of the things that you could 
use or share with us, any issues that you have with the 
maritime border?
    Mr. Miller. So, again, as you pointed out, 95,000 miles is 
a lot of miles to patrol. But really the maritime border is 
much like the Southwest border. It really comes down to 
partnerships, right? We really need to be able to work with, 
and we do work with the United States Coast Guard very closely. 
You know, we also continue to work with the multiple 
interagency groups.
    We have a center down there in New Orleans where we are 
working with ICE, we are working with Coast Guard, the State 
and locals, air, and marine. You know it is about information 
sharing. And, you know, it is continuing to look at technology 
so we can see inside places like the Gulf. I think when you 
look at the shoreline down in Florida, it is a little bit more 
advanced, working with chiatta South or GTF east and the 
partnerships at down range with our partners, whether it be 
Panama, Guatemala, Honduras--Guatemala, Costa Rica, and some of 
those places. So it is very challenging, but it is all about 
partnerships and increasing our technology.
    Mr. Palazzo. Absolutely. Partnerships and relationships are 
extremely important.
    Commissioner Miller, thank you so much, my time is up.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Commissioner, I 
appreciate your offer at the last round of questioning to get 
back with them, more detailed account, for the record, of the 
metering policy that I described and where that stands at this 
point.
    I think it is important to know how individuals and 
families in those circumstances are now being dealt with and 
what remains, really, in terms of how we should be dealing with 
this and how we can deal with this in a responsible way so that 
people, people are able to make their application, and then 
pending the review are able to wait in intolerable 
circumstances.
    With that, let me turn to the Mexico policy itself, the 
Mexico policy itself. As you know, migrants make this 
treacherous journey, dangerous to the U.S. to seek legal 
refuge. They having applied the--often have had to wait in 
overcrowded CBP facilities much longer than the prescribed 
time. And then under the Trump administration, the policy was 
in many, if not most of these cases, to return these migrants 
to Mexico, to dangerous border towns, encampment situations 
under a program with no or little oversight.
    They faced extreme difficulties in Mexico, often just 
insecure--food insecure, dangerous situations. They have, of 
course, trouble getting legal counsel. They often had their 
cases closed in absentia because they were simply unable to 
return for their court hearings or even learn when those 
hearings were occurring in any kind of reliable way.
    So, thankfully, the Biden administration has now announced 
that it is ending this policy. Tens of thousands of people, 
including vulnerable populations who were forcibly returned to 
Mexico are now being processed or in the stage of beginning to 
be processed.
    So that is what I want to ask you to describe. What 
challenge is the agency encountering in trying to do this 
course correction or remedy this program. What additional 
resources or legislative changes do you need to regain our 
footing in the handling and processing of these individuals. 
And what kind of success have you had in processing the so-
called MPP migrants since the February change in policy?
    Mr. Miller. Sir, thank you for that question. And, really, 
I would like to highlight, you know, really the incredible work 
by the Office of Field Operations and their innovation, and the 
Office of Information Technology working with the partners in 
Mexico.
    The international organizations, we are able to collect 
advanced information through our CBP One app, and really vet 
those individuals in advance of arrival and schedule arrival 
times from Brownsville, Eagle Pass, El Paso, Hidalgo, Laredo, 
and San Diego to ensure that we are processing expeditiously 
but to ensure that we are also continuing to uphold border 
security and national security at the same time. So today we 
have processed over 10,000 of those individuals through our 
ports of entry.
    As far as challenges, you know, I know we are looking at 
some of the additional population what we call the Yellow 
population that was removed in absentia. So those folks we are 
working with EOIR and OPLA ICE OPLA to have those cases open 
back up, at which time we will begin doing that same process 
through the international organizations gathering information, 
vetting them, and scheduling the time in a humane and orderly 
process.
    Mr. Price. Well, thank you for that update here too. If you 
want to provide further information for the record, that would 
let us gauge the scale of this effort, the problem that is 
remaining, that would be helpful.
    We commend you for turning this around, and we know it is 
not easy, and these situations are inherently difficult. And so 
any further information you want to provide, we will be 
receptive.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you sir.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Mr. Price. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, again, 
Commissioner Miller, for going through round two and for 
staying to answer our questions today.
    I just wanted to focus the second round on something that I 
think people back in Iowa have told me they are concerned, I am 
certainly concerned about human trafficking across the Southern 
border, particularly, when minor children are involved.
    We have got several groups in Iowa uninterrupted and my 
district being one of them that are working to end human 
trafficking. So I just wanted to ask you some questions, 
specifically, about that. How does CBP verify the ages of 
individuals when they are apprehended at the border or when 
they are brought into custody, because, obviously, there can be 
some discrepancies there? So how is that process working?
    Mr. Miller. Well, you know, it is a difficult process to be 
perfectly honest with you.
    So as we encounter individuals, you know, whether they have 
documents, or what have you, who they are with, if we 
previously encountered them, questions, questions to them, 
questions to their family members.
    You know, obviously, the Border Patrol agents, Office of 
Field Operations officers are well-trained in this type of 
activity. We have a couple of different things we can if 
needed, we can fingerprint children, if needed. We work with 
ICE on the rapid DNA to determine their family members. So 
there is a number of things we can do to collectively to try to 
determine age, if those relationships are--relationships are 
legitimate. And we continue to look at knew innovative ways to 
do that.
    Mrs. Hinson. So if someone doesn't have an ID, let's say, 
they don't have survival documentation of their age, what does 
that step look like? Because, obviously, the biggest concern is 
that you have young girls posing as adult women and vice versa, 
adult women posing as young girls, or, you know, young men and 
young boys too. So what does that process look like if the 
information is not something that can be verified?
    Mr. Miller. Well, you know, first, and, again, you know, 
there are agents that deal with this every single day, so it 
is, you know, through questioning, it is through talking to 
family members, the folks that they are arriving with. But at 
the end of the day, if we are unable to determine age, we are 
going to err on the side of being an juvenile and putting them 
through that process.
    Mrs. Hinson. And can you just walk me briefly what does the 
process look like for someone, you know, just the verification 
who they are, that they are who they say they are, so to speak?
    Mr. Miller. So, again, well, the agents will encounter 
them. They will take them, obviously, to the station or the 
sector for processing. They will ask them their age. They will 
see if they have any identifiable information. They will talk 
to the folks that they are traveling with, if there are any 
family unit members, the folks that they were encountered with.
    You know, obviously, again, if the agents are talking to 
hundreds and hundreds of people so through that experience, 
they are able to determine or determine likely age. But at the 
end of the day, we are going to err on the side of that being a 
juvenile and coordinate with ICE and HHS, OR&R for the 
appropriate procedure.
    Mrs. Hinson. I think the biggest concern is we don't want 
kids getting on planes going to someplace when we don't go who 
they are going to, we don't know if they are who they initially 
say they are. I think the one thing I want, and the last thing 
I want is the government to be enabling human trafficking to 
happen.
    So if you can follow up with them from the interview 
processes that your agency used to verify those identities and 
especially when it comes to the children, I would certainly 
appreciate that on follow-up.
    Also, I just wanted to follow up on something Congressman 
Cuellar was talking about was using technology to help at the 
border. Can you talk a little bit about may be the use of like 
drones and technology, high-impact cameras, how those could be 
helpful to you in keeping agents safe and still fulfilling the 
goal of keeping our borders safe as well?
    Mr. Miller. Yeah, no, and thank you for that question. We 
have what is called the event team that works with really 
investments, venture back start-up companies, small businesses, 
so we can look at things like counter UAS, not only UAS, but 
counter UAS. And we have used those contracts to establish 
procurement of drones to help us.
    We continue to look at, you know, towers that have 
artificial intelligence embedded with them. So, you know, there 
is a number of different things we continue to look at along 
the Southwest border to continue. We continue to update our 
technology.
    Mrs. Hinson. Yeah, I have had a chance to see the 
autonomous surveillance towers, I think, is what you are 
referring to, the person in there. It is remarkable what we can 
do with that technology.
    And so I would encourage your conversation and continued 
conversations with us about the use of that technology, because 
I think that is something that is absolutely crucial. I am 
moving forward to keep us safe.
    So, commissioner, thank you so much for answering our 
questions today. I appreciate you coming before the committee.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Miller, I have 
some more questions. I want to pick up where we left off with 
the Electric Health Records System. As you look ahead to 
completing phase 2 of the her implementation and integrating 
that electronic health record with CBP's other systems, do you 
anticipate any challenges or need for additional resources in 
order to meet the timeline which is next year?
    Mr. Miller. I believe on the integration with our on 
systems, you know, I believe that we should be fine on the 
timeline. You know, I think we may have to come back at a 
future time is when we talk about integration with other 
government systems. But I think we are in pretty good shape for 
our own integration.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you. Well, please, keep my office 
updated as you continue rolling out this essential system.
    Now, Mr. Miller, we both know that a Border Patrol facility 
is no place for a child. But, obviously, when you encounter an 
unaccompanied child at the border, you can't just leave them to 
wander the streets or the desert unsupervised. So having kids 
temporarily in your custody is an unfortunate reality while you 
prepare to transfer them to a specialized HHS facility and 
ultimately to their families. I believe that the number of 
children in CBP custody has decreased from over 5,000 to under 
500 in the past 2 months, and that the average time that a 
child spends in custody has decreased from over 5 days to under 
24 hours. It is incredible progress, and I know that there is 
more that we can do to provide for both the physical and the 
psychosocial health of these children.
    I was glad to hear that you recently invited the chief 
medical officer to visit your facilities. Can you tell us more 
about what he found in his assessment?
    Mr. Miller. You know, first and foremost, and then again, I 
will take every opportunity to say thank you to men and women. 
Because the first thing that he did tell me was the incredible 
work that is going on down range and the incredible compassion 
that the Border Patrol agents mostly in this case they continue 
to have.
    And, you know, I think many of us, you know, myself having 
a 6-year-old are fathers, mothers, and again, it is a real 
tough situation for them. So some of the other things that I 
think we mentioned is having that connectivity to the 
behavioral health advisors, which we up for so are continuing 
to look at that. And, you know, continuing to look at those 
caregivers. We mentioned that. So we are upping the caregivers 
at the facilities. The training of our officers and agents is 
essential.
    So we are going to ensure that we get the proper training. 
The orientation he pointed out was really important, because 
often when the children travel these long distances they don't 
quite understand where they are or how they got there, to be 
perfectly honest.
    So updating our orientation videos is ensuring they are 
getting those on a timely basis. Keeping the children active, 
right? We have to keep the children active. So, you know, 
ensuring that they are getting outside, which frankly was 
difficult when we had over 3,000 in those in Nashville and--
    Ms. Underwood. Right.
    Mr. Miller. --Donna. So getting the children outside at 
least two times a day. Looking at those additional activities 
that we can have the children doing, whether it is coloring, 
all sorts of things, coloring books, you know a number of 
different things depending on the age of the children.
    Ms. Underwood. So if you had to have a timeline associated 
with fulfilling those recommendations, what would that expected 
timeline be, and what additional resources do you need from our 
committee to implement the full list of recommendations as 
quickly as possible?
    Mr. Miller. I don't have an exact timeline. I can say that 
we are moving out on most, if not all, of those issues as we 
speak here today, but I would be happy to fill you in on a 
timeline. Once--I really haven't got the formal recommendation 
yet, but I have asked for it and worked with a team to start 
implementing some.
    So once I get the formal recommendations and I have a 
formal plan, you know, I will circle back with you and let you 
know what we are doing.
    Ms. Underwood. So does that mean, like, a month, 2 months?
    Mr. Miller. So, it means that we are implementing now and, 
you know, I would think within the next week or until we can 
get back to you with a plan and what our plans are.
    Ms. Underwood. Fantastic. Thank you, Mr. Miller. I know 
that my constituents share my concern about the well-being of 
the children who made this difficult journey to our border.
    And I look forward to working with you to ensure that their 
stays are safe and as short as possible.
    Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, ma'am.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Miller--
Commissioner Miller, you know, one of the things I want to make 
sure is that many on this committee are doing all we can to 
help you be successful, particularly, on our Southern border. 
And I know when Congressman Palazzo asked about the 
operational--the percentage of operational control, I would 
like--I want that same information so that we can help you, but 
I would actually like to see it served by region.
    Because I know as you travel from San Diego all the way 
east of the Rio Grande Valley, there is a whole myriad of 
different types of enforcement taking place, and I think that 
would give us a good idea is--you know, because there is some 
areas as Mr. Cuellar said, that they don't want a wall. And you 
know what, every area doesn't need a wall. There are areas 
where surveillance technology, access roads, is maybe all they 
need. And so what I want to make sure is we are giving you what 
you need where you need it.
    And one of the things that I want to focus on, also, is I 
know, for example, in the Forwatooth (ph) area in Arizona, 
tremendous work going on there. And I would suspect that is 
probably one of highest control areas because we have local 
state and federal working together there, integrated through 
the big pipe. You have got the UAS going on there. So all of 
that, I think, works together.
    One of the things I want to make sure is as we tighten the 
Southern border, we are going to see more and more--people are 
either going to go over the wall, under the wall, which is why 
I want to help you with the tunneling--or they are going to 
want to go around. And when they go around it, they are going 
to go to the maritime corridors.
    And I have an AMO training center in my district in 
northeast Florida, and I want to make sure that we have got 
good throughput there for you to give you the men and women 
that you need for the air and maritime operations. I know there 
is some throughput issues at the training center there, and if 
you can let me know how we can help you with that, we would 
really like to step up on that as well as the tunneling 
technology that we talked about earlier.
    And so can you let he know, where do you think we are going 
with the AMO in northeast Florida, and is it going to be able 
to meet your needs? What do you need?
    Mr. Miller. So I am going to start by addressing your first 
request. And, yeah, 300 percent by region, we do track it by 
region. And, you know, I just want to ensure that we get the 
Office of Border Patrol up there briefing the folks on, you 
know, the exact criteria that we use.
    Mr. Rutherford. Yeah.
    Mr. Miller. I appreciate your support for air and marine 
and the continued support. You know, I believe that that the 
facility that we build are meeting our training needs, but I 
will certainly, if they are not, I will get back to you and let 
you know what additional we need. You know, we are making a lot 
of progress on modernizing our fleet and really standardizing 
our fleet.
    So, you know, I think we are making progress there as well. 
On the maritime issue--
    Mr. Rutherford. What I should add, commissioner, they have 
had some upgrades there, and they have been great. But I do 
believe there is some additional things that we can do. So I 
would appreciate you looking into that.
    Mr. Miller. Oh, no, I certainly will. And on the maritime 
front, we are already seeing that in San Diego. You know, we 
are working very closely. You know, obviously, Border Patrol, 
air, and marine, but also the U.S. Coast Guard, the state and 
locals to address that out there. So that is something we are 
seeing.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. Well, thank you. And Madam Chair, I 
see my time is just about out. I will yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thanks so much, Madam Chair. And acting 
commissioner, I wanted to pick up on a topic that the chair had 
mentioned. The President's Fiscal Year 2022 Discretionary 
Request states that requested funding for DHS will support the 
safe and humane treatment of migrants in CBP custody.
    I wanted to raise a proposal that my colleagues in the 
Hispanic Caucus have raised with the President and Vice 
President to support CBP when there are larger numbers of 
asylum seekers at our Southwest border. This proposal would 
create a humanitarian response team at the borders staffed by 
volunteers who have been trained to rapidly respond to the 
border to assist the supporting asylum seekers and accompanied 
children at the border.
    These humanitarian response teams would model existing 
disaster medical assistance teams, but would also include case 
workers, social workers, child welfare professionals. We 
believe that these teams will reduce the time that individuals 
remain in custody and ensure that all migrants are aware of 
immigration court dates and requirements and help with 
transportation and logistics as they are reunited with family 
members, working within the Homeland Security and the OOR 
process obviously to create these teams.
    Do you think this type of structure would be beneficial to 
assisting CBP in processing individuals at the border.
    Mr. Miller. You know, that is something I would have to 
look at. I know we are looking at obviously, you know--thanks 
to the committee for the funds for the Humanitarian Care Center 
somewhere in South Texas. But the humanitarian response teams 
isn't something that I have looked at, so I would love to see 
the proposal and give you feedback.
    Mr. Aguilar. Yeah, absolutely. And I would love for you to 
have a conversation with some of our colleagues in the Hispanic 
Caucus who have been fleshing out some of these ideas as well 
to see, you know, what technical support or advice or concerns 
you might have.
    Commissioner, I am also concerned about some of the 
language that was referenced earlier regarding individuals 
presenting themselves at the border with different names. The 
vast majority of children seeking asylum at the border are 
fleeing dangerous and often life-threatening circumstances, and 
we should be doing all that we can to ensure that they receive 
the appropriate protections and care while--as often as we can.
    Are you aware of widespread where migrant children are 
presenting themselves under different names?
    Mr. Miller. I am not at this point, no.
    Mr. Aguilar. Are you aware of government trafficking 
children as my colleague referenced?
    Mr. Miller. Excuse me? I didn't--you broke up.
    Mr. Aguilar. Are you aware of the government trafficking 
children as was referenced in an earlier question?
    Mr. Miller. We have, back in 2019, we did see quite a few 
cases with children being trafficked. And that is why we work 
with ICE to stand up to rapid DNA testing.
    Mr. Aguilar. But not by the government?
    Mr. Miller. Oh, not, not by the government, no. Excuse me. 
No. I am sorry. I wasn't listening to the question.
    Mr. Aguilar. Of course, of course. I just want to be 
cautious about the language that we use because some of those 
statements have consequences and are often based on little or 
no evidence. So I just think we need to be either thoughtful 
about, you know, how we talk about, you know, these incredibly 
issues especially when it includes children.
    So I appreciate you sticking around for a second round and 
thank the chair for the indulgence, and I yield back.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I don't believe there are anymore 
questions. However, Mr. Miller, in closing, I would like to ask 
one more question that I believe is on behalf of all the 
members of this subcommittee.
    As noted during the hearing, more than 31 agents, officers, 
and other personnel have tragically lost their lives in the 
line of duty since January of last year. In addition to these 
tragedies, every day CBP personnel interact with migrants who 
are fleeing desperate circumstances, and the toll on them 
cannot be discounted.
    How are you addressing the mental health needs of the CBP 
workforce as a result of COVID and current operation, and are 
those services available to the families of CBP personnel?
    Mr. Miller. Well, ma'am, thank you. Thank you for that 
question. As you know, the tragedy of the pandemic has 
obviously affected us all, but as you know, it has taken a toll 
on the workforce and along with the additional stresses that we 
see every single day.
    So as you know, we have a very robust peer support program. 
We have a very robust chaplaincy program. We have a very robust 
Employee Assistant System or EAP. We have an advocacy program 
for the survivors.
    So we are in continual contact with the survivors of those 
that we lose. But, frankly, I am worried about taking care of 
those who take care of us. In other words, those groups have 
had an incredible strain on them over the last, the last year.
    So one of the things that we are looking at is we are 
having some clinicians down on the Southwest border. We have 
three of them, one in El Paso, one in Del Rio, and one in RGB.
    I have had a chance to visit with the chiefs of the 
Southwest border in San Antonio just last week, and the three 
that had that program said it was very beneficial in that there 
was somebody onsite with them. It wasn't a call, it wasn't the 
EAP, it was somebody onsite with them that they could talk and 
really think that they have averted some unfortunate 
circumstances for our team members.
    So I think looking at that program, expanding that program 
to additional sectors and field offices across CBP would be 
beneficial. But, frankly, I am willing to work with anybody 
that I can to ensure that the men and women are getting the 
support they need.
    So I welcome any suggestions.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. As a follow-up, in calendar year 
2020, the deaths of 60 BP personnel were attributed to suicide, 
while there have been five such deaths already in 2021. What 
are you doing, specifically, to help CBP personnel who may be 
contemplating suicide, and how can we help you help your 
workforce?
    Mr. Miller. So, yeah, I think supporting the clinicians 
that we talked about, that, you know, we believe that tragedy 
has been averted because of that program.
    So expanding that program to ensure that there is folks 
onsite to talk to our personnel. Where the chief of Border 
Patrol, you know, he is the one that brought up taking care of 
those that take care of us.
    So we are out there, they are out there talking to our peer 
support, our chaplains, our advocacy groups every single day. 
They spend an awful lot of time in the field. We have what is 
called China like campaign going on right now where myself and 
the senior leadership are talking to folks about ensuring that 
they are getting the help they need, which is good. But, you 
know, I think that one-on-one communication talking to folks on 
the ground--I am trying to get out as much as I can to talk to 
the men and women to see what additional support they need.
    So it is really an all-in approach. But again, I am welcome 
to take any additional ideas from the professionals that--even 
we do consult with the professionals. But any additional ideas 
that the committee thinks would helpful, we are all ears.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Well, please let us know as new 
information comes up from the professionals that you talk to, 
any way that we can be helpful, please let us know.
    And with that, if there are no more questions, we will 
conclude today's hearing. Mr. Miller, thank you very much for 
your time, the subcommittee on Homeland Security stands 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]RPTR MOLNAREDTR SECKMANDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Thursday, May 20, 2021MEMBER 
DAYDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
2022Thursday, May 20, 2021MEMBER DAY
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order. During today's virtual hearing, we will be 
joined by House colleagues who will speak about priorities for 
their districts and communities. I look forward to hearing 
their perspectives on the issues facing the Department of 
Homeland Security's vital mission to protect our Nation.
    After each Member provides testimony, I will ask members of 
the subcommittee whether they have any questions or comments. 
If you are recognized to speak, if I notice that you have not 
unmuted yourself, I will ask you if you would like the staff to 
unmute you. If you indicate approval by nodding, staff will 
unmute your microphone.
    To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair or staff 
designated by the chair may mute participants' microphones when 
they are not recognized to speak.
    As a reminder, subcommittee members can submit information 
in writing at any of our hearings or markups, using the email 
address provided in advance to your staff.
    The testimony we hear today will provide important insight 
as we work to draft our appropriation bills for fiscal year 
2022. We appreciate our colleagues joining us this morning.
    I would now like to turn to the distinguished gentlemen 
from Tennessee, Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening 
remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Madam Chair, thank you again for chairing 
another very important hearing for the Homeland Security 
Subcommittee. Today is very important to both yourself and to 
me, where we hear from our colleagues who are going to make 
presentations for the needs of their district. So, with that, 
my comments will be brief.
    I am solicitous of all the Members from both sides of the 
aisle from across the Nation, and I do want to assure those who 
are joining us today for the first time that, despite some very 
contentious issues which face our Nation and our Conference and 
this subcommittee, the vast majority of the issues that we deal 
with, on both sides of the dais, there are large areas of 
agreement. So we will certainly listen to you all with an open 
mind today.
    And I really appreciate the fact that you have come before 
us today.
    So, with that, Madam Chair, I will yield back, and I thank 
you.
    And to those, again, to the Members who are going to make 
presentations today, we look forward to them. Thank you. I 
yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Our first witness is Congressman Van 
Drew from the Second District of New Jersey.
    Mr. Van Drew? Thursday, May 20, 2021THE HON. JEFFERSON VAN 
DREW, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
    Mr. Van Drew. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chair and 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, and thank you for providing this 
opportunity to testify before the Appropriations Subcommittee 
on Homeland Security. I am here today to advocate for an 
incredibly important and urgent project.
    I respectfully request that this committee provide $4.6 
million in Community Project Funding for the Lake Lenape Dam 
Rehabilitation Flood Mitigation Project. Through the Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Program account, this project is necessary, 
eligible, of merit, and has unparalleled community support.
    My testimony today will consist of three parts: the clear 
and present danger of flooding present by the dam, the 
eligibility of the project to receive funding through the PDM 
account, and the merits of this request for Community Project 
Funding.
    The Lake Lenape Dam located in Mays Landing, New Jersey, is 
a high hazard, class 1 dam, currently rated in poor condition 
in August 2020's inspections.
    The Lake Lenape Dam is in very real danger of total 
failure. Here is a flood map showing the potentially 
catastrophic results of such a failure, and you can look and 
see what it does to the surrounding communities. You have the 
very same flood map. It was supplied to you by my office, and 
it is very illustrative of the danger that is there.
    And immediately downstream from the dam is a dense 
residential and commercial development. As Mays Landing is the 
county seat, many key government offices are located within 
what would surely be a flood path created by a failure of this 
aged and deteriorated dam.
    In most catastrophic scenarios, a breach during a hundred-
year storm, the resulting flood would nearly inundate half of 
Mays Landing, resulting in almost certain fatalities, millions 
of dollars of property damage, and severe damage to critical 
infrastructure.
    The threat of failure of Lake Lenape Dam is imminent. The 
potential impacts are calamitous, and it is time to address 
this, and it is time to address it now.
    To achieve an effective remedy to flooding, the county's 
engineer has concluded that the spillway must be completely 
replaced with a modern solution. The county is prepared to 
receive any PDM grant funds in fiscal year 2022 that 
immediately obligate them to begin construction of the already 
developed designs.
    In the most recent BRIC funding round, one of the 
priorities was to increase funding to applicants that 
facilitate adoption and enforcement of the latest published 
Building Codes and dam safety standards.
    This proposed Lake Lenape Dam and associated infrastructure 
components have been engineered to the latest Building Code 
standards to rectify the current mitigation concerns of a 
structure that has exceeded its useful life.
    The Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program aims to categorically 
shift the Federal focus away from reactive disaster spending 
and towards research-supported, proactive investment in 
community resilience. The Lake Lenape Dam is such a project 
and, as such, would be eligible for BRIC. And it would be 
eligible for the funding as well.
    The sentiment is echoed by the New Jersey Office of 
Emergency Management. As elaborated by New Jersey's OEM's 
letter of endorsement, quote, this project's overall risk-
reduction goals are consistent with the goals and objectives of 
the New Jersey State Hazard Mitigation Plan, and the successful 
completion of the plan will result in a more resilient and 
viable community.
    In furtherance of the project's eligibility, it has been 
determined to have a positive cost-benefit ratio of 1.42, and 
this was calculated with the official FEMA benefit-cost 
calculator versus 6.00. This rating places it well within the 
range of viability.
    Finally, and most importantly, for Community Project 
Funding, this project has unparalleled community support. 
Nearly 2,000 residents of the local community have signed a 
petition in support of this project. Literally, everyone 
supports it.
    The project has letters of support from local governments, 
local businesses, and local residential organizations as well. 
The County Board of Commissioners unanimously has letters of 
support as well, and the board itself unanimously passed a 
resolution, and it supports providing a 25-percent standard 
match to completely fund the proposal.
    The project has total and passionate support from the 
community, and it is understandable why it does. This project 
has unparalleled community support, is eligible, and is 
meritorious of funding, and is critically needed.
    Chair, Ranking Member, I urge you to provide this grant 
funding so that the community can quickly and decisively 
address this existential threat. I thank you so much for your 
time, and I yield back.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    Thank you, Mr. Van Drew, for your testimony. And based on 
the information that we have, this seems like it is a good 
mitigation project and will hopefully meet all the criteria for 
the program.
    The total project cost is above the maximum amount that 
will likely be funded in this bill for mitigation projects, 
which is likely to be more like a million dollars. Do you know 
whether or not there are sufficient local resources available 
to cover the remainder cost of the project?
    Mr. Van Drew. There are. If we need to do it, we can, 
absolutely. There is so much concern about this dam and the 
need is so great, and the safety concerns are real, so whatever 
it takes.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay.
    Mr. Fleischmann, do you have any questions?
    Mr. Fleischmann. No. I just want to thank the gentleman 
from New Jersey for a very well-articulated presentation and 
for the education on that. Thank you. That is certainly going 
to help us in our decisionmaking process. So I thank the 
gentleman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Next, I would like to call on 
Congressman Pat Fallon from the Fourth District of Texas. 
Thursday, May 20, 2021THE HON. PAT FALLON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member 
Fleischmann, and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the 
opportunity to visit with you today. As we all know, we are 
currently facing a crisis at the southern border.
    While we can certainly debate what caused this crisis and 
what is the best way to handle the surge of immigrants crossing 
our border, the fact remains that we are currently 
underresourced and understaffed in this fight.
    With this in mind, I ask if you would respectfully consider 
a commonsense appropriations request to support the men and 
women of the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol by providing them 
adequate resources to accomplish the mission that we have 
tasked them with. Because of the surge of migrants, a 
significant number of our agents on the border have been forced 
to divert their attention from law enforcement activities to 
mundane administrative tasks and processing immigrants. I mean, 
they are changing diapers and things of that nature.
    We are talking hundreds of thousands of folks every month, 
and it is the right and humane thing to do, and also we don't 
want the drug cartels to win. And they are very powerful, and 
they are very dangerous.
    This has compounded the effects of the surge that our 
Border Patrol are doing so many other things, and the 
immigrants, as we know, there is fewer agents covering the 
border for security purposes, what we have actually hired them 
to do.
    And the migrants themselves are at risk, and the drug 
smugglers and the human traffickers are the ones that are 
profiting. Previously, this committee has recognized the issue 
of diverting the BPAs from law enforcement activities by 
providing funding for Border Patrol processing coordinators.
    These coordinators seek to alleviate the administrative 
burdens put on our agents so that they may, you know, instead, 
focus on law enforcement duties.
    Last Congress, this committee increased funding for these 
positions by $7 million. I want to thank you; it was the right 
thing to do, and I appreciate that.
    This year, we are at a critical juncture, even more so than 
last year, and there seems to be, unfortunately, little hope 
that the tide of migration is going to slow anytime soon. As 
such, we must use every tool that we have to prevent the 
migrants from entering illegally and also being harmed in any 
way by the evil drug smugglers.
    And we still have a chance and want to work to fix the root 
causes of the problem. Hopefully we can do that in a bipartisan 
fashion.
    Ensuring that the Border Patrol agents are able to do their 
jobs, that is nonpartisan and that is apolitical. And with this 
in mind, I ask respectfully if you would continue to invest in 
the critical roles of our Border Patrol agents and our 
processing coordinators by supporting the highest level of 
funding possible for the Border Patrol operations and their 
support staff.
    Thank you very much for allowing me to share my thoughts 
and my request, and I stand ready to answer any questions, and 
I yield back.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fallon, thank you so very much for 
your comments. And as you noted, the Processing Coordinator 
Program is one that we have supported for several years. So we 
were very excited to see that the first class graduated this 
past year, and in June, we understand that CBP will be 
graduating the second class from the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina.
    So, as you know, this is something that is very important 
and that we will, you know, continue to support. So, again, I 
just want to say thank you for your comments and for your 
support of this program.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann, do you have any 
questions or comments?
    Mr. Fleischmann. Just want to reiterate and affirm what you 
have said, Madam Chair, and to the gentleman from Texas, thank 
you again for again a well-articulated, well-reasoned 
presentation. I am so glad that you have come before us today, 
but I could not agree more with the chair's comments in that 
regard.
    And, with that, I will yield back.
    Mr. Fallon. Thanks.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you.
    Is Congresswoman Jackson Lee here yet?
    Chuck, if it is okay with you, I am going to maybe just 
recess for about maybe 5 minutes to see if she is coming, and 
then, if not, then we will just adjourn.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, ma'am, whatever you wish. We will be 
here. So, either way, you can stay open or adjourn, I will be 
here. It would be my pleasure.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. For a few minutes.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann? Apparently Ms. Jackson 
Lee has been detained, and we don't know exactly how long. So I 
am going to conclude today's hearing, and she can submit her 
testimony to the subcommittee.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Mr. Fleischmann. Yes, ma'am, and please convey to Ms. 
Jackson Lee, who is a friend, that I will be more than glad to 
look at that with you, in whatever way she decides to submit 
that, and we understand.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Fleischmann. It is a pleasure.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. The Subcommittee on Homeland 
Security then stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:24 a.m., the subcommittee was 
adjourned.]RPTR BRYANTEDTR SECKMANDEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITYAPPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, May 26, 
2021DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RESOURCEMANAGEMENT AND 
OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2022Wednesday, May 26, 2021DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY RESOURCEMANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL 
PRIORITIESWITNESSTHE HONORABLE ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
will come to order.
    During today's virtual hearing, members are responsible for 
muting and unmuting themselves. When you are recognized to 
speak, if I notice that you have not unmuted yourself, I will 
ask you if you would like the staff to unmute you. If you 
indicate approval by nodding, staff will unmute your 
microphone. To avoid inadvertent background noise, the chair or 
staff designated by the chair may mute participant microphones 
when they are not recognized to speak.
    If there is a technology issue during the member's speaking 
time, we will move to the next member until the issue is 
resolved, and you will retain the balance of your time.
    We will be following the 5-minute rule. With 1 minute 
remaining in your time, the clock on your screen will turn 
yellow. When your time is expired, the clock will turn red, and 
it will be time to recognize the next member.
    We will follow the speaking order set forth in the House 
rules, beginning with the chair and ranking member and followed 
by members present at the time that the hearing is called to 
order in order of seniority, and we will alternate by party. 
Next, we will go to members who were not present when the 
hearing was called to order until every member present has had 
a first round.
    Members can submit information in writing at any of our 
hearings or markups, using the email address provided in 
advance to your staff.
    Now, let's begin. I am going to keep my opening remarks 
brief to allow maximum time for questions.
    I welcome the Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security, who is here to discuss the 
Department's operations and resource requirements.
    Mr. Secretary, this is your first appearance before this 
subcommittee in your current role, but you are certainly not 
new to the Department and its diverse set of missions. I can 
think of no one more qualified to lead the Department at this 
very challenging time.
    We scheduled this hearing with you late in the month, 
hoping that we could discuss the details of the Department's 
fiscal year 2022 budget request. Unfortunately, we will not be 
getting the full budget request until Friday, which means you 
are limited in what you can say about it. Nevertheless, I hope 
to have a good discussion this morning, not only about the 
current operations of the Department and the use of its 
appropriated resources but also about what it will take to 
continue addressing the many challenges you face in the coming 
fiscal year.
    Mr. Secretary, I recently visited the border with you, and 
I want to commend all the DHS personnel who have been working 
so hard over the last few months to manage an incredibly 
difficult challenge.
    Working closely with the Department of Health and Human 
Services, you were able to reduce the number of unaccompanied 
children in CBP custody from over 5,000 to now around 500. And 
I understand that CBP and ICE recently established a 
coordination cell to help prevent overcrowding of families at 
CBP facilities. We look forward to seeing progress on this as 
quickly as possible.
    Your Department is also facing a significant challenge in 
the cybersecurity area, with several breaches of government and 
private sector systems over the past several months. The 
Colonial Pipeline breach in particular was a wake-up call to 
many Americans about how malicious cyber actors, often backed 
by foreign states, can disrupt the U.S. economy and all of our 
lives.
    I was pleased to hear yesterday about the impending TSA 
directive on pipeline cybersecurity reporting. I was surprised, 
however, to have found out about it in the press, particularly 
given our engagement with TSA and CISA on the Colonial Pipeline 
issue over the past few weeks.
    Mr. Secretary, since January 2020, the Department has seen 
51 line of duty deaths, 43 of which were reported as related to 
COVID-19. On behalf of the subcommittee, I convey our most 
sincere condolences to the families and colleagues of the 
members of the DHS family who have lost their lives over the 
last year.
    Mr. Secretary, the Department has a varied and challenging 
mission set that is not always fully appreciated, and I want 
you to know this subcommittee does appreciate what you and the 
240,000 men and women who work for you do every day to help 
keep our Nation safe.
    Please convey to the men and women of the Department that 
they have our continued support during this very challenging 
time, that we will continue to do our best to provide the 
resources necessary to protect their health and well-being, and 
that they have our deep gratitude for their service to our 
country.
    I now turn to the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, for his opening remarks.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your presence here today 
and for stepping up to serve at a most difficult and 
challenging time in our Nation's history, sir.
    I welcome you to the subcommittee, and I thank you for 
reaching out to me the other week. I very much enjoyed our 
conversation, and I look forward to meeting with you in person 
as soon as possible.
    I know we were all hoping that we would have had a chance 
to talk about the fiscal year 2022 budget for the Department of 
Homeland Security, but timing is not on our side. I am sure 
your people have briefed you up and up and down on all the 
facts and figures, so please feel free to share any budget 
information with us today that you can that you would deem 
helpful.
    We have had some very positive oversight and readiness 
hearings with the components of this Department: Coast Guard, 
Secret Service, TSA, CISA, FEMA, CBP, and ICE. And it is good 
to know that you have some very capable leaders and people in 
the components working to keep our country safe. I wish we 
could have discussed the budget proposal, but we covered a lot 
of ground in our earlier hearings.
    Mr. Secretary, though, there are some difficult issues that 
this administration needs to address about the security at our 
borders and our infrastructure and how laws are upheld. As the 
Secretary, we are looking to you to provide answers. I fear we 
are at a crisis point. Border apprehensions are at an all-time 
high, but ICE apprehensions are at an all-time low. We have 
lost balance.
    I have been to the southwest border this year, as well as 
in the past, to meet with agents and officers on the front 
lines. We have hundreds of youths coming through an airport in 
Chattanooga on the way to HHS facilities across the region. 
What we are seeing today is not sustainable, and I am not 
seeing any actions from the administration that progress is 
being made to address these problems. Instead, we are just 
seeing more problems.
    I told Mr. Johnson with ICE when he was with us about 2 
weeks ago that ICE is a crucial component in our ability to 
enforce immigration, customs, and trade laws in this country.
    The Washington Post last night published an article about 
how ICE is basically doing nothing because they have been 
basically told not to do their jobs. Now, this was a Washington 
Post article.
    I worry that, without operational law enforcement, we will 
lose the battle against bad actors coming into our country 
unvetted, cartels, smugglers, and traffickers. If the 
administration continues to send the signal that people who 
enter the country illegally face no consequence for breaking 
the law, the cartels are emboldened to continue victimizing 
people and raising their profits by exploiting a lax system.
    I do look forward to your testimony today and everyone's 
questions. As appropriators, we must come to an agreement for 
the annual spending bill. I am sure we are all up to the task, 
and I am optimistic we can return some balance to the system.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Madam Chair, I yield back the remainder of my time.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Secretary, we will submit the full 
text of your official statement for the hearing record. Please 
begin your oral summary, which I would ask that you keep to 5 
minutes.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Roybal-
Allard, Ranking Member Fleischmann, and distinguished members 
of the subcommittee.
    Good morning. I very much appreciate the opportunity to be 
with you today. The Department of Homeland Security is 
confronting serious, complex, and dynamic threats to the 
security of our Nation on a daily basis. Under the Biden-Harris 
administration, we are aggressively pursuing efforts to address 
our most pressing security concerns, from cybersecurity to 
domestic violent extremism to the COVID-19 pandemic and more.
    This is hard work, but that is what 240,000 colleagues in 
the Department of Homeland Security do every day. Their 
dedicated efforts keep our communities safe and secure. And the 
resources afforded by this Congress help ensure we can 
effectively meet our mission and recruit and retain our 
Nation's most talented professionals.
    The President's proposed budget will invest in our broad 
mission set, including preventing terrorism, securing and 
managing our borders, repairing the broken immigration system, 
safeguarding cyber and critical infrastructure, and 
strengthening national preparedness and resilience. It will 
provide DHS with the resources we need to keep our country 
safe, strong, and prosperous.
    While I am unable to address specific details of the 
President's budget until it is officially released later this 
week, I welcome this opportunity to discuss several key agency 
priorities for fiscal year 2022 laid out in the President's 
$52.2 billion discretionary request for DHS.
    This request includes approximately $1.2 billion for border 
infrastructure improvements to fund modernization of our land 
ports of entry and border security technology, and to ensure 
the safe and humane treatment of migrants in Customs and Border 
Protection custody. It would also support our enhanced efforts 
to combat the smuggling and trafficking of people, illicit 
drugs and weapons, while providing for more efficient travel, 
trade, and commerce.
    We are working tirelessly to rebuild our immigration system 
into one that upholds our Nation's laws and is fair, equitable, 
and reflects our values. To achieve this, the fiscal year 2022 
request includes $345 million to U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services to address naturalization, asylum, and 
other program backlogs. The budget request also supports up to 
125,000 refuge admissions for fiscal year 2022.
    To meet the President's bold vision for combating climate 
change, the discretionary request includes an additional 
investment of $540 million above the fiscal year 2021 enacted 
level to increase resilience efforts and enhance predisaster 
planning.
    It will support resiliency in infrastructure, particularly 
for vulnerable and historically underserved communities, and it 
would resource the Federal Emergency Management Agency with the 
ability to hire additional staff to prepare and respond to the 
increasing number of emergencies and disasters our Nation has 
experienced.
    In recent months, DHS has made it a top priority to address 
domestic violent extremism, which I believe to be the most 
lethal and persistent terrorism-related threat to the United 
States today.
    The fiscal year 2022 request includes $131 million to 
support innovative methods to prevent domestic violent 
extremism while reflecting and respecting privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties. It also supports critical research 
of the root causes of radicalization, enhanced community 
outreach, and funding for locally driven efforts.
    Finally, in the face of increasing cyber threats, it is 
critical that we promote resilience not only within the Federal 
Government but across the public and private sectors in our 
critical infrastructure systems. The recent ransomware attack 
on the Colonial Pipeline serves as a stark example of this 
ever-present threat.
    Our discretionary request includes $2.1 billion for our 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, which leads 
DHS and interagency efforts to defend against today's threats 
and build a more secure and resilient future.
    We will also further strengthen the cyber capabilities of 
the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Secret 
Service, Homeland Security Investigations, and the U.S. Coast 
Guard.
    The budget also proposes $618 million for needed 
investments in research and development and innovation across 
DHS, laying out a strong foundation to not just respond to the 
threats of today but prepare for and defend against the threats 
of tomorrow.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am 
grateful for your continued support for the dedicated public 
servants of the Department of Homeland Security and for the 
work they do each and every day.
    I look forward to discussing the President's proposed 
fiscal year 2022 budget in greater detail when officially 
released, and I welcome your questions today. Thank you very 
much.
    [The information follows:]******** COMMITTEE INSERT 
********
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    I want to commend you and the DHS personnel who have been 
working so hard over the last few months to manage an 
incredibly difficult situation on our southern border. 
Significant challenges remain, of course, but you and your team 
have been able to impose order on what otherwise could have 
spiraled into an unmanageable situation.
    Can you update us on the current status of the border, what 
trends you are seeing, and how they may be different from what 
we saw during the last major influx of migrants in 2019?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 
I must echo your commendation of our frontline personnel, of 
course, the United States Border Patrol, also the men and women 
of FEMA and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, whom we 
have deployed to address the influx of unaccompanied children 
at our border.
    You correctly noted that we have reduced the number of 
unaccompanied children in Border Patrol custody from almost 
5,000 children a little bit more than 30 days ago to less than 
600 today.
    We continue to see the migration, the irregular migration 
of unaccompanied children, but we continue in our success of 
managing that flow, moving those children more rapidly to HHS 
shelters that are properly equipped to address the needs of 
unaccompanied children. And we are reengineering the process 
from beginning to end, not only to achieve the more facile and 
expeditious movement of the children from Border Patrol 
facilities to Health and Human Services facilities but, 
importantly, to more expeditiously move those children from the 
HHS facilities to the parents and legal guardians who are 
responsible for their care here in the United States.
    So we continue with our success. The challenge is not 
behind us, but nor is the progress in reengineering to better 
improve the system. And so I appreciate that opportunity.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Now, DHS continues to use the title 42 
authority granted by CDC in March 2020 to rapidly expel most 
migrants. When do you think the title 42 authority will be 
lifted, and are there specific metrics that the CDC will use to 
make this decision?
    Secretary Mayorkas. The title 42 authority that we employ 
to expel individuals and family members at the border is the 
authority of CDC, and it is based upon a public health 
imperative. And we use it based upon the CDC's assessment of 
the public health conditions and what is needed to protect the 
health and safety of the American public and the migrants 
themselves.
    We are watching the data. We are watching the science, led 
by the CDC, and we will no longer rely upon title 42 when there 
is no longer a public health imperative basis to do so. We do 
not have metrics, we in the Department of Homeland Security. It 
is not necessarily based on the flows that we see but, rather, 
the public health details and facts that underlie our actions. 
And we are in close touch on a daily basis with the CDC to 
understand the public health conditions that serve as a 
predicate for our use of that authority.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. Once title 42 does go away, CBP 
will begin giving migrants their full due process, as required 
by law, such as the right to claim asylum. How are you 
preparing for this change, and what additional resources will 
be needed to effectively manage it?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, we in the Department 
of Homeland Security, our personnel have dealt with surges many 
times before. These surges occur periodically and, more 
specifically, seasonally.
    We are not only looking at the tools that we have 
historically used under our different authorities, under title 
8 of the United States Code, but, once again, we are looking at 
the processes that we have and how we can build upon them and 
improve them.
    And so we are looking at, for example, the asylum system 
and the duration, the length of time it takes to achieve a 
final adjudication and how we can use our regulatory 
authorities to bring far greater efficiency to that system.
    So we are looking not only at the tools that we 
historically have had but also how we can improve the processes 
that have existed. And it is our sincere hope and our urge that 
Congress pass legislation to reform a system that we all 
understand to be so fundamentally broken.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us 
today. As you know, sir, I want to thank you again. And my 
colleagues know that when I deal with administration officials 
in any administration, such as yourself, I want to deal with 
you with the utmost humility and respect, but today, sir, I 
have got to ask some very pointed questions, and I do that with 
the utmost respect towards you and towards your office. But I 
am deeply troubled, sir.
    In my opening statement, I mentioned the recent article 
from The Washington Post about the near shutdown of the agency 
charged with enforcing our Nation's immigration laws. The 
Washington Post states: The agency's 6,000 officers currently 
average one arrest every 2 months--one arrest every 2 months.
    My first question, sir, is that an accurate statistic, and 
is that the intended outcome of the various orders and 
directives, a near stop of all immigration violation arrests, 
sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Ranking Member, I have a few things 
to say, if I may. And let me answer your question at the top 
and then address, if I may, a few of your preliminary remarks. 
That is a data point with which I am completely unfamiliar. I 
do not believe it is accurate, and we will provide your office 
with accurate data.
    I think there are a few important things to say in addition 
to that. Number one, I very much appreciated our conversation a 
few weeks ago and the respect that you have for this office and 
for our Department and the support that you provide to the men 
and women of our Department. And I welcome the pointed 
questions. I well understand it is our shared responsibility to 
both ask pointed questions and to deliver answers for them.
    Law enforcement effectiveness is not a quantitative issue; 
it is a qualitative one. The question is, as to whom are we 
dedicating our resources, what will deliver the greatest public 
safety results for the American public? And that is what I am 
focused on.
    And I have a tremendous amount of experience in this realm, 
not only because of my service in the Department of Homeland 
Security but my 12 years of service in the United States 
Department of Justice as a Federal prosecutor, investigating 
and prosecuting criminals for 9 years on the front lines, in 
the trenches, in the Federal courtroom, as well as serving as a 
United States Attorney for 3 years.
    So I am very well aware of what is needed to deliver for 
the American public the public safety that we all deserve and 
to which we aspire.
    Mr. Fleischmann. And I do acknowledge and honor your 
experience, sir. But another quote from this article: One of 
the priority groups, recent border crossers, are effectively no 
longer subject to arrest once they reach the U.S. interior.
    I have two questions, sir--well, two separate sets of 
questions. Is this true? Has President Biden already abandoned 
the directive that recent border crossers would be held to 
basic immigration laws?
    And then, as a followup, are there no consequences for 
illegally crossing the border at this point? Because, frankly, 
sir, it appears that President Biden's message to one and all 
is that the U.S. has no limits to whom can come because the 
administration will not enforce any of its immigration laws. Is 
that the message, this country will not enforce its immigration 
laws? And I will let you respond, sir.
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, it is not. And the President could 
not have been clearer in his articulation of this 
administration's position, nor could I have been clearer and 
continue to be, which is the border is closed.
    And this administration administers and enforces the laws 
of the United States of America. And that is not only the laws 
of accountability but also the humanitarian laws that Congress 
passed many years ago.
    And there are three priority areas specifically and 
explicitly articulated in both the January 20th memorandum of 
then-Acting Secretary Pekoske and the February 8th guidance of 
Acting ICE Director Tae Johnson. And those three priority areas 
are: national security, public safety, and border security. And 
border security is specifically defined as recent border 
crossers.
    And I think that those documents and our actions speak 
powerfully to the fact that the border is closed and that we 
enforce the laws that Congress has passed. But we will do so 
effectively to ensure the greatest impact and outcome from the 
resources that we have.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Mr. Secretary, my time has expired. I 
thank you for your responses, and I will reserve for round two.
    Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much, Madam Chair, Ranking 
Member.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for what you do. Some of 
us have dealt with the Homeland Secretaries since the Bush 
administration, and everybody comes in with their own thoughts 
and philosophies, and I understand that. And no matter what you 
do, some people think you are doing too little, some people 
think you are doing too much. So I know you have a very 
complicated job, and we want to be as supportive as we can to 
help you succeed.
    My question is: I need for you to help me give a message to 
my border communities. What would you tell my border 
communities when we talk about reopening the southwest border 
to nonessential travel?
    In Laredo, for example, downtown Laredo, in bridge number 
one, there have been about 150 businesses that have closed, 
people that got their--earned savings, they lost their 
businesses, they lost their savings, because, one, you had the 
COVID-19 situation, the pandemic, and on top of that, some of 
those businesses depend 30, 40, 50 percent on the Mexican 
shoppers.
    Some of them are asking me, you know, why is it that the 
Mexicans can fly in or the undocumented people can come in 
through either a bridge in Laredo through the metering system 
or at the bus stations we see them or at the airports in 
Laredo, and I see them every time I fly to D.C., families going 
into the interior.
    So we have done everything, talked to the Mexicans. I 
talked to your health adviser, Gary. He is an excellent person. 
I talked to CDC. In fact, this Friday I have a call with DHS, 
CDC, and NIH on border openings. I have talked to the Mexicans. 
Everybody says we are ready to open up this month.
    I am hoping that we can get some good news, Mr. Secretary, 
because when we said it was temporary restrictions, you know, 
it has been over a year. And that word "temporary" to me was 
going to be a little earlier. I know it is health-driven. I 
understand that. I am with you.
    But what message could you give us of some hope and 
optimism to my border communities from Laredo down to the 
valley and up and down the border from California, New Mexico, 
Arizona? And, of course, I know it affects the northern border. 
But gives us some news that hopefully this month will be the 
last time, that at least we can open up in a phased-in way. And 
I understand it is health-driven. I understand. I just want to 
be very helpful to you to help you open up the border.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman. I had 
the privilege of visiting the border with you when I served as 
Deputy Secretary, and I know how much of a champion you are for 
those border communities.
    And thank you also for mentioning Gary. That is Gary 
Rasicot, who is a fantastic public servant. I am going to take 
the luxury of 30 seconds since we did give a shout-out. I must 
give a shout-out to the budget team of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, which is just as good as it gets, I must 
say.
    Congressman, we are watching not only the public health 
situation on a daily basis, but also the economic situation on 
a daily basis. And we very well understand the economic 
consequences of our use of title 42 on the one hand and, more 
importantly, the public health situation that it reflects and 
its impact on the border communities and how much the flow of 
people and goods, its criticality to the prosperity of those 
border communities.
    We confer every single day on that. And the assurance that 
I can give the people whom you represent and throughout the 
border communities on our southern border and on the northern 
border is that we will not restrict travel one day more than 
the public health imperative requires. That is the assurance I 
can give.
    Mr. Cuellar. All right, thank you. I know I have got about 
20 seconds left, so we are going to have this conversation. 
And, hopefully, you will allow your Under Secretary, Gary, to 
join us so we can talk to CDC, because the last time I talked 
to the CDC they said it was Homeland's decision, and then you 
are telling me that it is CDC's. So, hopefully, you are 
allowing to be part of this conversation on Friday morning on 
that.
    But thank you again for your service. I have some other 
questions, but I will save it for the second round. Thank you, 
Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman. And let me be 
clear, and I apologize if I wasn't. This is an all-of-
government effort, and we are working across the Federal 
Government enterprise to make these decisions.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Palazzo.
    I will then go to Mr. Rutherford.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Ranking 
Member.
    And, Mr. Secretary, it is great to be with you.
    Listen, I first want to ask you a question about--I know I 
read with actually great delight the support from your 
administration and the President concerning the Jones Act. And 
I think that is critical to our national security that we have 
a strong maritime organization in this country, and I think the 
Jones Act helps in that regard.
    But I do have to ask you a question because I see, when the 
Colonial Pipeline shutdown occurred, there were two waivers, 
two Jones Act waivers granted. We see them being granted during 
hurricanes oftentimes, but it is my understanding that during 
these two requests for waivers, one vessel never arrived until 
the weekend, when things were actually back up and running, and 
the second waiver might never be used.
    So my question is, Mr. Secretary, are we getting to a point 
where these Jones Act waivers almost become, you know, a box 
that is checked when we have any kind of national disaster? 
Because I don't know that that is helpful for our maritime 
industry.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much. The 
Jones Act is a very important statutory framework to protect 
American-flag vessels. The Colonial Pipeline cyber attack that 
emanated from a very pernicious use of ransomware, with which 
we are all too familiar, posed a very significant threat to the 
flow of materials that are much needed in a particular region 
of the United States.
    And we by no means addressed the waiver requests in a 
check-the-box approach. Far from that, we worked around the 
clock, methodically and thoroughly assessing the statutory 
requirements, addressing the question whether, in fact, 
American-flag vessels were sufficient to deliver product on an 
emergency basis, and we made the decision that, in fact, they 
were not.
    And if, in fact, the region needed a supplemental supply, 
because Colonial Pipeline could not come through in time and 
bring its system back up, that we would permit foreign-flag 
vessels to bring the much needed supply to the American people.
    Whether or not those waiver requests were used speak of 
Colonial Pipeline's ability to bring its systems back up and 
deliver in a timely fashion. But we felt, as a matter of law 
and as a matter of the market, the assessment was that we 
needed to have that facility available should, in fact, 
Colonial Pipeline not be able to come through. That was a very 
measured, scientific, and legal analysis under the law.
    Mr. Rutherford. Okay. Thank you very much for that. You 
know, the administration is facing several crises at one time 
here. We have got an economic crisis, with the inflation that 
is creeping in, the energy crisis.
    I want to talk to you a minute about the national security 
crisis also, and looking at domestic violence intervention--I 
am sorry--domestic violent extremists. And I notice your 
national priority area, one of them for the UASI was for DVEs. 
And, as a former police officer, I really do appreciate that 
focus.
    Can you talk a little bit about the $20 million that you 
just directed toward targeting violence prevention and 
terrorist prevention?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman. And, 
also, thank you very much for your prior service as a police 
officer. I had the privilege of bringing police officer work to 
bear in a Federal courtroom and vindicate the tremendous work 
that law enforcement performed.
    The $20 million grant program is to equip communities, our 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners, to develop 
innovative programs to address the rise of domestic violent 
extremism and the serious threat that it poses.
    And that grant program is designed to equip local 
communities because, as you well know, it is the local 
communities, the neighborhoods, the people, the family, loved 
ones, friends, who can identify individuals who are beginning 
to exhibit traits of concern and intervene so that we can 
prevent the further development of violent tendencies born of 
hateful ideologies and extreme ideologies.
    It is the front lines that are our best defense to 
preventing this type of violence. And so that grant program is 
designed to resource and equip our local authorities and our 
nongovernmental institutions in that fight.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    And I will have a followup in a second round on that.
    Madam Chair, I see my time has expired. I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to see you here today. 
The chairwoman and I are both concerned about shortcomings in 
the way medical services are managed across the Department, 
both for DHS personnel and for individuals in custody. Mr. 
Secretary, I understand that you and the chairwoman have 
discussed this issue and that you share our concerns as well.
    The Department's Chief Medical Office is currently 
isolated, confusingly, within the Countering Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Office. Rather than reporting directly to you, the 
CMO instead reports to the Assistant Secretary in charge of 
that Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office. At the same 
time, each DHS component has its own medical officer overseeing 
its own medical contracts, leading to disparate guidelines and 
little to no meaningful coordination across the Department.
    Mr. Secretary, what is your view on how the current 
organizational structure hinders coordination and effectiveness 
of medical services across DHS?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you very much for 
your question. This is an issue that, indeed, I did discuss 
with the chairwoman and an issue that I am studying very 
closely with our team here in the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    We have an extraordinary Chief Medical Officer in Dr. 
Pritesh Gandhi. And I am concerned that our organization is too 
fractured in this area, both with respect to ensuring the 
health and safety of our personnel but also in addressing 
medical issues that arise in the course of our day-to-day work 
across the Department of Homeland Security enterprise.
    I am studying this, based on materials that I have been 
provided. I have been speaking with a number of people. My 
intention, so that I can assure you that this is receiving the 
utmost focus, is to actually speak with people across the 
Department.
    I owe it to the experts who work in this area on a day-to-
day basis to speak with them to receive their assessments, to 
understand the arguments for and against the current structure, 
and to reform it accordingly, which I intend to do.
    Ms. Underwood. Great. What kind of organizational changes 
would you like to see to address the problem? I am sure in your 
assessment and conversations you have already begun to gain 
some information.
    And with those organizational changes, could you use your 
existing authorities or would it require congressional action?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, it is my understanding 
that congressional action will be required because the 
placement of a Chief Medical Officer in the office that is 
known by its acronym CWMD was, in fact, a legislative change, 
the separation of the Chief Medical Officer and the office that 
now resides in our management directorate. But that is not to 
say that reforms cannot be implemented outside of the 
legislative construct, but it is something that I am looking at 
very carefully.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. And when can you provide us with a 
path forward, you know, how much time?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would expect to be able to do so in 
just several weeks, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you. Well, I look forward to working 
with you, sir, and my colleagues on the authorizing committee 
to strengthen medical coordination and oversight across the 
Department and ensure that your entire workforce as well as 
everybody in DHS custody has consistent access to high-quality 
care.
    Now, Mr. Secretary, we all know that vaccination remains a 
critical part of ending the COVID-19 pandemic and saving lives. 
For DHS, vaccinating both your workforce and your detainees is 
essential, both for their own well-being and for the health and 
safety of communities across the country.
    And I want to start by talking about your workforce. I know 
you have worked hard to stand up Operation Vaccinate Our 
Workforce, or VOW, to rapidly increase access to vaccines. And 
you testified that 77 percent of your frontline workforce who 
elected to receive the vaccine have been vaccinated. Can you 
clarify what percentage of the entire DHS workforce is fully 
vaccinated?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, two things: Number one, 
by my response to your earlier question that I will have an 
assessment to you within several weeks, by your expression of 
surprise, I clearly imposed upon myself too aggressive a 
timeline.
    Ms. Underwood. No way.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we have focused so 
intensely on Operation VOW, Vaccinate Our Workforce, for the 
well-being of our frontline personnel. I don't have an answer 
to your specific question, and I will get that information to 
you as soon as I can.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Excellent.
    And, with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Yes, Madam Chair. Can you hear me this time?
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Palazzo. All right. Well, Madam Chair, thank you. 
Ranking Member Fleischmann, thank you.
    And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today.
    Listen, I just got back from the border late last night. I 
was down there with 12 of my colleagues. And, you know, what we 
are seeing and what we are hearing on the border isn't what we 
are really hearing from the administration or the mainstream 
media.
    There is absolutely an invasion taking place on our 
southern border. Single adult men by the hundreds every night 
trying to break into our border. Unaccompanied children, family 
units are just walking up and turning themselves in. And, I 
mean, you know, there is one winner in all this, and right now 
it is the cartel, and the one loser is the American people.
    And, you know, just my understanding is families will pay 
thousands of dollars to have one person smuggled into America 
or smuggled across the Northern Triangle, through Mexico. 
Sometimes it costs several thousand dollars per state to pass. 
But the cartels bring them in. And just as we have seen a 
couple weeks ago, they will dump children even over the border 
fence. And if it wasn't for our brave and committed CBP 
officers, those children's, you know, lives could have been in 
danger.
    But it is not just children. On my flight back last night, 
there was a lady who also paid smugglers to get into our 
country, and she had a full body cast on. They pushed her over 
the fence, and she broke her back, where then the American 
people took care of her and provided for her medical services, 
and now she is off to whoever knows where, to her sponsors. But 
she wasn't alone on that flight. I mean, there were several 
illegals who came in our country, minors, that are flying all 
across the United States.
    So, effectively, Mr. Cellular is not the only person that 
is practically living on the border because we are turning all 
of our States into border States with our policy.
    So, I guess, real quick, what is the administration doing 
to stop this? Because it doesn't look like what they are doing 
is working. It looks like you rolled out a big welcome mat to 
say: Send us your kids. And that is criminal, because, you 
know, as long as they know if they get to our border, that we 
are going to take them and we are going to turn them into 
American citizens and let them, you know, roam free around the 
country, these people desperate in these countries are going to 
continue to take that risk, unnecessary risk I might add. And 
so please tell me what this administration is doing.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, a few things. First of 
all, I appreciate your recognition of the bravery of the men 
and women of the United States Border Patrol.
    Secondly, I appreciate your articulation of the cruelty of 
the human smuggling networks and the cartels. That is precisely 
why we have enhanced our efforts to tackle the activities of 
the smugglers, the traffickers, the cartels. We have operated, 
for example, we have launched Operation Sentinel in the last 
few weeks to build upon the work that preceded this 
administration.
    Your characterization, however, with respect to how we are 
addressing individuals apprehended at the border, I must 
respectfully disagree with from beginning to end. Individuals 
are expelled under title 42 of the United States Code. Those 
who are not expelled are placed into immigration proceedings, 
where they are able to make claims for relief under the laws 
that Congress passed. And if their claims for relief do not 
prevail, then they are removed from the United States.
    And so we continue to enforce the immigration laws. And I 
should say that we are improving the administrative processes 
in a way that has not been done before, not by the prior 
administration nor administrations before then. Most notably I 
should comment are to ensure that the asylum system, while 
making sure that it follows due process requirements, is more 
expeditious and delivers justice with greater speed for the 
American public and for the migrants who are claiming 
humanitarian relief.
    And so it is not an invasion. People are not coming in 
without regular order. They are being placed in immigration 
proceedings. They have the ability to make a claim, as the law 
provides, to an asylum officer, to an immigration judge, and 
the courts of the United States.
    Mr. Palazzo. I look forward to our second round of 
questions.
    Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Quigley.
    Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. Mr. Rutherford 
touched on a little bit the UASI grants. And for those 
watching, those are Urban Area Security Initiative grants that 
assist high-threat, high-density urban areas like Chicago, to 
help us build and sustain the capabilities necessary to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of 
terrorism, all threats, foreign and domestic.
    Let me ask broadly, what is your vision for UASI? I guess 
before I say that, I should thank you as well. I was pleased to 
hear that DHS, under your leadership, prevented some of the 
quick changes to the formula that were proposed previously. So 
I appreciate that.
    But as we go forward and as we always see evolving threats, 
what is your vision for this, and can you talk about some of 
the challenges the UASI program currently faces?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman. 
Indeed, I did put a halt to changes in the grant formula that 
would have redirected Urban Area Security Initiative grants in 
a way that, in my view and in the view of fellow experts, would 
not have delivered public safety and security in the most 
effective way to the urban areas across the United States.
    Those grants we have calibrated to address the most urgent 
priorities affecting our Homeland. And so two important changes 
that I made was to require a certain percentage of the grant 
funds, 7.5 percent to be precise, dedicated to combating 
domestic violent extremism. That equates to approximately $77 
million. In addition, again, to address the most urgent threats 
facing our Homeland, I increased the minimum amount that must 
be dedicated to cybersecurity from 5 percent to 7.5 percent.
    One of the things that I am looking at very closely, 
Congressman, in partnership with the law enforcement community 
and the emergency and first responder community writ large, is 
whether the formulas do need to be redesigned to better deliver 
for the urban areas that the grant program is designed to 
serve.
    And so we are going to be engaging with stakeholders across 
the country to better understand their concerns with the 
existing formula and see what changes, if any, are suitable to 
meet more effectively the moment.
    Mr. Quigley. And you would come back to us before 
implementing those, I would assume, at least for some thoughts 
and consultation.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Most certainly, Congressman.
    Mr. Quigley. No, and part of this is, as the threats grow--
and, obviously, we have seen it in what you had to address with 
cyber and your talk about increasing that, others asking for 
this, which in the formula changes would have diluted the 
effort, right?--is there a need not just to reassess who needs 
what, but just how much we need and perhaps an overall 
increase, given the enhanced threats, again, not just foreign 
as we were focused on, but clearly domestic now?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would welcome that conversation, 
Congressman. I think that is a very, very important one to 
have.
    Mr. Quigley. Finally, any new tools that you are talking 
about with State and local leaders? And the example I hear 
about is updating integrated information-sharing networks to 
improve analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating info to 
prevent such attacks.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you so much, Congressman. Indeed, 
we are engaged in discussions with our State, local, Tribal, 
and territorial partners.
    One of the things which you mentioned is the provision of 
information to them, not only in real time but to make sure 
that the information we provide is actionable for them.
    One of the things that we discussed, I discussed with our 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis is whether that office, 
I&A--everything seems to be known by an acronym in the Federal 
enterprise--
    Mr. Quigley. Yes.
    Secretary Mayorkas. --the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis has the infrastructure to deliver real-time actionable 
information on both a secure environment and an unclassified 
environment. And we, with the support of this subcommittee and 
Congress, are building a better infrastructure for that.
    Mr. Quigley. We appreciate that. And my time is up, but I 
look forward to those communications and working with you and 
giving you the resources you need. Thanks again for your help.
    I yield back.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us today. I 
appreciate this hearing.
    And I do wish to echo some concerns that I know several 
members have talked about, that we had been given more complete 
information on the Department's budget plans in its entirety so 
we could look at those details more closely.
    But my line of questioning actually centers today on an 
experience we have right here in the district, Mr. Secretary. 
In August of 2020, a derecho storm descended on eastern Iowa 
and much of the Midwest. It took hours to work its way through. 
Weeklong blackouts. Some people didn't have power or internet 
for over a month. Damage from which our communities will take 
literally years to recover from. Accord to NOAA, the August 
derecho is considered one of the top 10 most expensive 
disasters in the past 5 years, at a price tag of $11 billion.
    One of the primary concerns that I hear from my 
constituents is about their interaction with FEMA's Individuals 
and Households Program specifically when seeking Federal 
disaster assistance.
    I am grateful for all the work that FEMA has done for 
Iowans through several disasters, including this one, providing 
more than $11 million in individual assistance grants in 
response to the derecho specifically. However, I believe there 
is significant room for improvement in IHP, particularly when 
it comes to clarity and transparency with the average American 
who is going through this process.
    And so I recently wrote a letter to Administrator Criswell, 
requesting some data on the IHP program, the acceptance rates, 
the appeals process to a FEMA ruling denying assistance. And in 
September, the GAO issued a report on the effectiveness of IHP, 
citing that of the 4.4 million people who applied for that 
assistance, only 2 million were actually found eligible and 
received that aid.
    Specifically, GAO found that FEMA needs to increase its 
clarity in the application process for those who need to supply 
more information in their applications. We saw that happening 
with our constituents. And in this report, GAO recommended 14 
actions directly to FEMA on how to improve this program.
    So, Mr. Secretary, my question to you today is, can you 
provide a status update on the Department's work to implement 
those recommendations from GAO? RPTR MERTENSEDTR SECKMAN[10:57 
a.m.]
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you very much. I 
am familiar with the program. I am familiar with the GAO 
report, and I will circle back with your office to provide you 
with the status of our actions in response to the 14 
recommendations.
    I know that one of the primary reasons why the assistance 
rate is what it is, is because one of the thresholds that must 
be met is the inadequacy or the lack of insurance coverage. 
And, in fact, people who do have insurance and who recover 
insurance proceeds in response to a disaster may not be 
eligible for the individual assistance under the FEMA grant 
program.
    I am also very well aware of the concerns with respect to 
clarity and transparency in terms of the eligibility criteria 
and making sure the public understands what the assistance 
program is for and when its resources can be triggered. It is 
something we are very focused upon because this impacts real 
people in real ways. And so I would welcome the opportunity to 
circle back with you personally, and, of course, with our 
respective teams so that I can deliver the specificity in 
response to your question that you deserve.
    Ms. Hinson. Yeah. And I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, 
because if there is one thing that we have heard, it is that 
there is some challenging going through this process. And when 
you think about constituents during their greatest time of 
need, it is when they don't have a roof over their head or they 
don't have that power. So we need to find a meaningful path 
forward here so we can best serve the people who are going 
through the process, you know.
    You know, a lack of clarity in the application process, 
obviously, is contributing, I think, to lower acceptance rates. 
Do you think that, if that is the case, that the agency should 
be working to prevent this?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Well, we have an obligation to be clear 
and transparent and to communicate things appropriately to the 
American people, and so we are taking a very serious look at 
this. And, of course, we have an obligation to remedy any 
infirmities.
    I do want to say, though, I must champion the men and women 
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. They are just 
extraordinary in what they do. We all have room for 
improvement, and that does not diminish their excellence. But 
the room for improvement we will use as an opportunity to be 
better, rest assured.
    Ms. Hinson. All right. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Secretary, and I will reserve some followup questions 
for round two, but we appreciate FEMA's work. They helped us 
through a major flood in 2008 and obviously this derecho in 
August. So thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    And, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I understand that the chairwoman of the 
full Appropriations Committee is with us, and so I will now 
yield to her.
    The Chair. Thank you so much. Thank you very much, Madam 
Chair, and I apologize to you and to Secretary Mayorkas. I am 
chairing another hearing, but I did want to have the 
opportunity to really greet the Secretary, thank him for his 
great work, and his years of great work in public service. And, 
if I can, I just want to get a question asked here of Mr. 
Secretary.
    As chair of the Labor, Health and Human Services 
Appropriations Committee, and we have had conversations before, 
I spend a significant amount of time on the unaccompanied 
children program. And I know the Department of Health and Human 
Services has been in contact with you and advocates as to how 
we could potentially divert children from entering the 
unaccompanied children program; in particular, discharging 
children to the non-parental relatives they enter the United 
States with. So I have heard from advocates that the number of 
children in the UC program who came with a nonparental relative 
could number in the thousands. So, look. I would also note I am 
not advocating for family detention, but I am looking at how we 
are able to discharge a grandmother and a granddaughter 
together as quickly as possible.
    So, with that, can you tell me what the status is of these 
conversations with HHS? And are there barriers on your end to 
delaying the removal of these relatives so that they can serve 
as sponsors while the children go through their immigration 
court proceedings?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, thank you so much for 
this important question, and I know that we discussed this 
previously a number of weeks ago. One of the things that we are 
very, very focused on is expediting, moving more efficiently in 
the union of the unaccompanied child with a parent, legal 
guardian, or qualified sponsor here in the United States. We 
are reengineering that process.
    When a child arrives in the custody of a relative who is 
not a parent or legal guardian, then that child is, in fact, 
defined as an unaccompanied child. And to change that would 
require legislative action, I believe, to change the terms of 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, the 
TVPRA. But we are looking at processes in the meantime with 
respect to how we can more effectively unite an unaccompanied 
child with a qualified sponsor here in the United States. That 
is where our current focus is.
    The Chair. I appreciate that, and I will look into it along 
with my colleague, the chair of the Homeland Subcommittee. Both 
of us are particularly interested in these areas and to look at 
what may be required in terms of legislative language.
    Your goal, as well as our goal, is to see that the 
children, when they are in our custody, for the lowest length 
of time in custody and that they can move to be discharged as 
quickly as possible. And we want look for the ways in which 
with keeping the child safe and in good hands be able to 
expedite this process.
    We are also very, very much aware that we have had to cut 
back on the licensed shelters that children are in because of 
COVID, and we will revisit that to see--with some of the new 
guidance and the science behind that guidance to see whether or 
not those--at least some of those licensed beds can be used. 
But the issue is--and I appreciate what you said about 
reimagining. I mean, I think that is the right word here, of 
what we can do to expedite discharge. We know, you know, that 
the longer these children are held in an emergency intake 
shelter, that it is so disruptive of their lives. It has, you 
know, physical, you know, repercussions. It has very serious 
mental and traumatic repercussions. And I know what you want to 
do, and what we want to do is to try to work with you to see if 
we can't reimagine with you ways in which we move to discharge 
as quickly as possible and, at the same time, protect the child 
and continue to try to protect that child with the services 
that he or she may need while they are in the custody of the 
United States, which is what we are charged with by law.
    I thank you for, you know, your work, and I thank you for 
understanding this issue and the compassion that you and the 
professionalism that you bring to this issue. So thank you 
very, very much.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I think congratulations are still 
in order for your early appointment and confirmation. Happy to 
work with you, and I appreciate your appearance here today.
    I want to pursue a line of questioning I began with the 
acting ICE Administrator a few weeks ago. It has to do with the 
Department's philosophy, the Department's approach with respect 
to enforcement actions, particularly the targeting of those 
actions and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. You are 
probably aware that this has been a difficult issue over many 
administrations in many years.
    With this subcommittee, there was a particular effort 14 
years ago to push for more precise and more targeted ICE 
enforcement, to focus on dangerous individuals who shouldn't be 
in the country when it came to detention and deportation. We 
directed funding back then with the assumption that most 
deportations would be of such people and that they would link 
up with the penal system as people emerged, actually, from the 
criminal system. It does raise the question of direction to 
local law enforcement, which I will get to later or maybe in 
the next round.
    But the result was eventually the Secure Communities 
Program in the Bush administration. And as you, I am sure, also 
know, that program turned out to be controversial, pretty 
difficult, mainly because it was much less targeted, much less 
discriminating, as we had hoped, much less focused on dangerous 
individuals.
    So, during the Obama administration, there was discussion, 
agitation about the blanket policy of secure communities and 
the establishment of the Priority Enforcement Program, PEP, 
during the Obama administration. That program came a way of 
achieving greater targeting, greater prioritization of 
individuals for immigration enforcement.
    Unfortunately, the Secure Communities Program was brought 
back with a vengeance by the Trump administration, bringing 
back a much more capricious targeting strategy that swept up 
nonthreatening individuals along with those who posed a threat. 
I quoted some figures from the Syracuse University program that 
tracks these things. The number of people in ICE detention rose 
from 41,163 in 2016 to 49,319. At the same time, the number of 
individuals who had serious level 1 criminal records declined 
from 7475 in 2016 to 2019. The percentage of those detained 
with no criminal record at all rose 57 to 64 percent.
    In other words, ICE raids became both more frequent and 
less discriminating. I saw this in my direct, the impact of 
more raids and a more random quality to those raids and a lot 
of anxiety and fear in the community as a result.
    Given this framework, can you tell us where this 
administration intends to go?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    When I was a Federal prosecutor in the United States 
Attorney's Office, we had 186, approximately 186 assistant 
United States attorneys who enforced Federal criminal law. And 
we dealt with drug trafficking, business crimes, public 
corruption, Federal Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, cybercrime, 
the whole panoply of crimes. And 186 criminal prosecutors could 
not address every single Federal crime that occurred in a 
jurisdiction that was populated by 18 million people. And, 
therefore, we set forth guidelines that guided our use of 
resources are to bring to bear the greatest impact for the 
safety of the people in the Central District of California. 
That approach is mirrored across prosecution offices from coast 
to coast and border to border.
    That is no different than what we are endeavoring to do 
here in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. How can our 
resources be dedicated in the enforcement of Federal 
immigration law to deliver in the enforcement arena the 
greatest public safety impact.
    And so we are not pursuing cases indiscriminately. We are 
not pursuing them devoid of factors that educate and inform the 
administration of criminal justice or civil immigration 
justice, but we are doing so by looking at what poses the 
greatest threat, what resources do we have, and what delivers 
the best outcome for the American people, and that is what we 
are doing.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, sir.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you, Mr. Secretary for being here.
    I wanted to follow up briefly on the line of questioning 
that my colleague, Ms. Underwood, talked about. You know, given 
kind of the Byzantine nature of the DHS, you know, medical 
officer perspective, I wanted to ask what role that individual, 
DHS' Chief Medical Officer, will play in establishing 
guidelines to safely process individuals at the southern border 
as we lead into or as we look toward a post-title 42 world.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman. The Chief 
Medical Officer, Dr. Pritesh Gandhi, and one of his colleagues, 
Dr. Alex Eastman, and their team have done extraordinary work 
not only on the border but, quite frankly, with the workforce 
in tandem with other colleagues in delivering on Operation VOW 
that was referenced earlier, Vaccinate our Workforce. They have 
built--they have designed and built an architecture across the 
southern border to ensure in partnership with State and local 
authorities and community-based organizations with the Mexican 
Government the testing, isolation, and quarantine, as needed, 
of individuals who are apprehended and placed in immigration 
proceedings. They have done an extraordinary job, and I would 
be quite privileged to provide the details to you and your 
team.
    Mr. Aguilar. Sure. But I guess the question is what will--
specific to title 42, will they continue to--will you continue 
to follow their guidance and follow their lead when it comes to 
the conditions and the processing of individuals in a post-
title 42 world, in establishing those guidelines to process 
individuals who present themselves for lawful asylum?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So we, our Chief Medical Officer, our 
experts elsewhere in the Department, are connected with the 
CDC, and we communicate with respect to the data, the science, 
what the public health imperative requires, both with respect 
to the situation now in a title 42 environment as well as 
planning for what will occur when the use of title 42 is no 
longer needed because the public health imperative no longer 
requires it. I hope I am answering your question, but they are 
integrally involved in the planning and execution of those 
plans to ensure, on the one hand, the public health of the 
American people and, on the other hand, the health of the 
migrants themselves.
    Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate that. I wanted to talk briefly 
about detention facilities. Since I have been in Congress, I 
have heard from immigrants and individuals in detention, 
advocates about the mistreatment within detention centers 
across the country. And I was pleased to see DHS chose to close 
the Carreiro Immigration Detention Center and is preparing to 
close the Irwin County Detention Center. These closures are one 
step closer to ensuring that we treat individuals in our 
custody with the dignity and respect. Now, as DHS continues a 
review of the detention facilities across the country, can we 
expect to see the closure of additional detention facilities, 
including family detention facilities?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are studying the issue 
very carefully. My direction could not have been clearer, which 
is that we will not tolerate the mistreatment of individuals in 
detention or substandard conditions, and we will take whatever 
actions are needed to ensure that that directive is honored 
across the board.
    Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate that. And specific to the budget, 
ahead of this week's budget release, can we expect to see 
decreased immigration detention funding in exchange for support 
of safer ATD programs?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, one of the things that I 
have observed is the detention of individuals that do not pose 
a threat to public safety or do not pose a risk of flight such 
that we are not confident in their appearance in future 
immigration proceedings. I am concerned about the overuse of 
detention where alternatives to detention, ATD, would suffice 
in ensuring the integrity of the immigration system. And we 
will, indeed, be looking at that and executing accordingly.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. That completes the first round, so we 
will be going into a second round.
    Mr. Secretary, before I go on to my questions with regards 
to the detention, I just want to point out one other thing. 
With regards to the article that was referenced in The 
Washington Post, it also states that ICE agents arrested 645 
people who matched the administration's new priorities in March 
and then more than doubled that number in April to 1,552 and 
that the data shows that it is the individuals with the highest 
level of criminality that are now being targeted, which is 
really the intent in terms of being sure that the American 
people are safe by targeting those with the highest criminal 
and the most dangerous in our country. So I just wanted to 
reference the other part of the article that talked about who 
exactly was being targeted.
    Mr. Secretary, to help free up space in overcrowded CBP 
holding facilities, ICE recently began using its two large 
family detention centers as family staging centers or FSCs 
where migrant families are held for up to 72 hours while being 
processed. ICE has also begun using several hotels as emergency 
family staging centers or EFSCs. How are decisions made about 
whether to release families directly from CBP custody or to 
transfer them to ICE FSCs or EFSCs for processing?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, if I can make one 
comment. I appreciate your citation to other data captured in 
The Washington Post article. The one data that your colleague, 
the Congressman, cited is a data point with which I am 
unfamiliar, and I will drill down on that. The article makes a 
very, very important point, and it is that article's 
foundational point, which is that the resources of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement are going to be dedicated to the 
greatest impact on behalf of the American people. We will not 
be enforcing law indiscriminately, misusing resources that 
don't deliver quality for the investment of resources.
    With respect to the ICE facilities, the reason that we are 
employing those facilities in the way that we are is because of 
the fact that we are, indeed, still addressing the COVID-19 
pandemic imperative, and we need facilities to test and, 
importantly, isolate and quarantine family unit members as the 
science requires. And so we have transformed those facilities, 
and we are using the hotels for that purpose if and when, for 
example, local facilities or community-based organizations that 
could provide similar services are inadequate. So what we have 
done is built an architecture to ensure the appropriate and 
required testing, isolation, and quarantine of family unit 
members whom we are unable to expel under title 42.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. The use of hotels has received some 
criticism. What was the process for awarding this contract for 
managing the EFSCs? And what are your plans for that contract 
going forward? And what are your plans, more broadly, for 
family detention in the future?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, I am not familiar 
with the particulars of the contract and how that was arranged. 
It is not appropriate for me to be involved in the specific 
advertising and selection of contractors, but I know that that 
has received questions and is the subject of a review by the 
Office of Inspector General.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Our understanding is that these 
facilities have not been used to their full capacity even 
though the Border Patrol has continued to release families 
directly from their custody to prevent overcrowding. Can you 
describe what changes will be made as a result of the CBP ICE 
coordination cell that was recently established?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, that coordination 
cell is but one coordination cell because we also have a 
transportation coordination cell that speaks to the partnership 
not only across the Department of Homeland Security enterprise 
but across the all of government enterprise that is addressing 
the migration of unaccompanied children to our southern border 
and both bringing greater efficiency to the processes that we 
currently have as well as reengineering the processes.
    So that coordination cell of which you speak specifically 
is designed to take a look at the influx of unaccompanied 
children and family members whom we are able to expel under 
title 42 because of limited capacity in Mexico to receive them 
to understand the available resources we have here along the 
border for the testing, isolation, and quarantine as needed of 
the individuals and to make sure that those resources are being 
utilized efficiently and effectively, and including most cost-
effectively.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Just one quick final question on this. 
When migrants are being released from either ICE or CBP 
custody, are they being enrolled into alternatives to detention 
and offered ICE-funded case management services, such as legal 
orientation programs and trauma counseling?
    Secretary Mayorkas. They are, and that is our objective, 
Madam Chairwoman. They are in immigration proceedings. They 
receive a notice to appear either at the border or at an ICE 
facility. They are placed in immigration proceedings, and we 
are working to build a better infrastructure in partnership 
with community-based organizations to provide them with legal 
process and guidance along the way. The data demonstrates, 
quite powerfully, that individuals who are guided in the 
process who receive information and access to counsel have a 
far higher appearance rate in immigration proceedings than 
those who don't.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Fleischmann.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Mr. Secretary.
    I appreciate the questions of folks on both sides of the 
dais.
    Let me just say this: While I applaud ICE for going after 
some very dangerous criminals in this country that are posing 
threats, the Biden administration--and I am adamant about 
this--is doing nothing to disincentivize the wave of migrants 
coming in, that are just pouring in and overwhelming the entire 
system, including ICE, so you are forced to pick and choose. If 
we kept illegal immigration at a minimum, we would not have the 
system overrun at all levels.
    And, with that, Mr. Secretary, you were once the head of 
USCIS, so you know what is involved in applying for citizenship 
and asylum, sir. It is a commitment, and there is a defined 
process spelled out in statute. Do you think it is fair that 
migrants who cease participating in the legal processes related 
to their immigration status be allowed to remain in this 
country? I am talking about people who knowingly fail to show 
up for their court hearings and are no longer checking in with 
their local ICE offices. If so, why, sir? And a followup to 
that, do you think that migrants who have been issued final 
orders of removal by courts in this Nation should be allowed to 
stay in this country? If so, why, sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Ranking Member, let me first 
express my disagreement with your statement that this 
administration and this Department is doing nothing to 
disincentivize people from irregular migration, and let me just 
cite two examples, if I may.
    First, we have engaged in robust communication, not only 
along the migratory path, but in the countries of origins in 
the Northern Triangle, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, to 
seek to persuade individuals from taking the perilous journey 
north. Secondly, we are investing in addressing the root causes 
of migration so that individuals do not feel compelled to leave 
their homes out of desperation, combating extraordinary 
violence and poverty. And, thirdly, we are building legal 
pathways so that individuals do not need to take the perilous 
journey and can, in the countries of origin, avail themselves 
of refugee processing, Central American Minors Program, and 
other pathways that apply the laws of the United States to 
their claims of eligibility so that they can avail themselves 
of a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system that was the 
intent of Congress.
    We, as I articulated at the very outset of this hearing and 
throughout the questioning, Mr. Ranking Member, do apply the 
laws of the United States, will continue to apply the laws of 
the United States, and we will do so to maximum effect for the 
benefit of the American public as Congress intended. The fact 
of the matter is that we cannot, with the resources that we 
have, address the fact that we have over 11 million 
undocumented individuals in the United States. And we all are 
in agreement, although there is so much disagreement about 
immigration policy, and it is so polarizing, there is unanimity 
that the system is broken and is in need of reform. And it is 
my sincere hope and I am working very hard to achieve 
legislative immigration reform. That is fundamentally the 
answer. And until that is achieved, and I hope that is very, 
very soon, we will enforce the laws to ensure the best outcome 
and most effective outcome for the American people.
    Mr. Fleischmann. Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your 
articulate and thorough answers to this. Obviously, there are 
some broad areas of disagreements between us on these key 
issues, but I do agree that the system is broken, is 
overwhelmed, and these issues need to be addressed. And I do 
commit to work on behalf of my constituents and the American 
people, as I know you will, to come to some type of a solution 
in this regard. But thank you for your service. Thank you for 
your testimony today.
    And, Madam Chair, I will yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, last time we spoke, we left off that we were 
supposed to get together, so hopefully sometime soon we can 
catch up.
    Last night, Mr. Secretary, the EMC Guillermo heard from the 
city of Laredo, and the Laredo Health Director, Richard 
Chamberlain, told me that the city of Laredo has been aiding 
NGOs throughout the past couple of months. But they noted that 
their initial volume that they are getting from the valley has 
now increased from 50 persons a day; now they are getting 250 
to 350 people a day from the valley or from the Del Rio area. 
Laredo has two shelters, NGOs, that have been helping with food 
and shelter and health assessments, but this is a--the 
directors from Laredo, they are getting a little concerned 
because what they are saying is that about 6 out of 100 people 
that are coming in every day are testing COVID-19 positive, 
that is, the migrants or the asylum seekers.
    And then the other issues that when the shelters are full 
because there are only two shelters in Laredo, Border Patrol is 
self-loading them directly at bus stations or at the airport. 
And as I mentioned, every time I fly from Laredo to D.C. to do 
my work, I see folks there. So this is not my words; this is 
the health directors in Laredo. They are saying that they are 
worried about U.S. citizens being exposed to infectious disease 
threats. And keep in mind the frustration that the border 
nonessential are closed, but they are seeing literally 
thousands of people every week being brought down from the 
valley where I am at right now.
    So my question is, what can you do to help, number one, and 
what do I tell the city of Laredo? And the second part has to 
do is what do I tell the Starr County Sheriff, Rene Fuentes? 
What do I tell the Zapata Sheriff, Raymundo Del Bosque, or the 
Webb County Sheriff, Martin Cuellar, which is my brother, or 
Claudio Trevino, the Laredo Police Chief, or the La Salle 
Sheriff, Anthony Zertuche, or the McMullen, Emmett Shelton, 
where they are now seeing increases of criminal activity? And 
this is from the sheriffs. This is not me saying this, and they 
are seeing stash houses growing. They are seeing this illegal 
activity. So, instead of the regular work that they are doing, 
they are now focusing on this immigration-related activity.
    I know that we increased Stone Garden, and I was hoping 
with that money that I fought to increase, it would go down to 
south Texas, but President Trump sent a lot of it to Florida, 
and I hope it comes back to the southwest border. And I also 
would like to follow up with you on the $1.3 billion that was 
appropriated for the border wall in the Laredo sector, which I 
fought against President Trump. And now that that money is 
there, you know, and we will wait for the budget, now they want 
to take it out when there were security requirements in the 
Laredo sector. Now they want to take that money out. And I am 
glad that the wall is not going to be done, but my question is, 
what do I tell the city of Laredo? What do I tell the border 
communities in Roma, Texas, where I am at? What do I tell all 
the sheriffs about the facts that I just mentioned. These are 
not my words. These are words directly from them. So we need 
your help on this.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, that is quite a number of 
questions, and I have quite a number of answers. Perhaps it 
would be best for me to speak with you directly so I don't 
consume the remaining time, but let me just answer as 
succinctly as I can. In 1989--I started as a Federal prosecutor 
on September 25, 1989. In 1989, 1990, 1991, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 2000, and 2001, I left in April of 2001. On the border, 
there were the challenges of stash houses. And so the work on 
the border is dynamic, evolving, and there are threads of 
consistency for years and years. And so I want to make sure 
that the American public understands that the challenges that 
our noble and brave law enforcement officers face on the border 
are by no means new. And the threat of trafficking and the 
threat that the cartels pose and the threat of criminality is 
nothing new or specific to the border, quite frankly, as we 
know all too well, and when we look at the homicide rates 
across the country, over the all too many years.
    I look forward to engaging with the border sheriffs and the 
border chiefs. I have a periodic meeting with law enforcement 
on precisely this issue, and I would look forward to hearing 
from them and addressing their needs and the solutions that we 
can deliver. Operation Sentinel is one of them, and enhanced 
law enforcement in a task force model is a stark example.
    I also would be very pleased to speak with the officials in 
Laredo because we do have an architecture for the movement of 
individuals, which also is not specific to this particular time 
but is something that we have employed over the many years of 
addressing irregular migration at our southern border and the 
architecture that we have for the testing, isolation, and 
quarantine of individuals. And so I would welcome the 
opportunity to speak directly with the officials whom you 
reference and, of course, with you in a one-on-one to delve 
further into these important issues.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, listen. You have got a huge job and a huge 
responsibility. The Department of Homeland Security, you are 
over a huge amount of agencies, but the number one priority 
that you have and that we have as Members of Congress is to 
keep America safe. And so although we may disagree on some 
adjectives and some language, I do still think that we do 
have--it is not an invasion. We definitely have a huge crisis 
on our southern border. Just ask the people under your command, 
and I think they would agree with me.
    But, you know, we also want to work with you. Like, this 
committee wants to work for the common good of the American 
people, and we have got to strive towards more bipartisan 
legislation and not--by bipartisan, I don't mean just having 
one Democrat sign on to Republicans or one Republican sign on a 
Democrat, but we need to try to get more to a super majority. 
Because we pass legislation, whether it is your immigration 
reform, which people want to talk about, but it needs to be 
bipartisan because if it is not partisan in a true fashion, it 
will be good for the majority of Americans.
    You mentioned you used title 42 to expel, you know, those 
who are here illegally and should not be in our country, but 
you also said, you know, once the pandemic is over, you are 
going to get rid of title 42. What are you going to use then to 
expel immigrants that are coming over to America? Please keep 
your remarks brief.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you for your remarks 
before your question, and thank you for the question. Title 42 
is a public health authority of the CDC, and it requires a 
public health determination of need, and it is not a tool of 
immigration enforcement by law. It is not a tool to monitor or 
to control flows of people as a matter of immigration policy. 
It is a public health law. So the data from a public health 
perspective, the public health data, has to support its use. 
And when--
    Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Secretary, thank you--
    Secretary Mayorkas. --that title 42 authority is no longer 
available, we will use immigration law, continue to use 
immigration law and the other resources that we have available 
to address irregular migration just as we have in the past.
    Mr. Palazzo. Mr. Secretary, I do appreciate that. I do 
appreciate that. I just know that the Border Patrol agents, 
they really want to keep some form of title 42 in place or the 
migrant, you know, protection protocols that were working. 
Their fear is they are going to become overwhelmed once again.
    Also, listen. We are fair people. We believe that, you 
know, there are several things. We have been to the border, you 
know. You need more resources on the border, right. You need 
more boots because, you know, they are stretched to the max. We 
need technology. Technology works, and we need the best 
technology ever, but we also need barriers. Barriers work. You 
cannot deny barriers don't work. We wrapped ourselves in the 
Capitol with two barriers to keep people out. And so is there 
any intention on finishing the fence? And, also, there was, and 
you know, steps that was actually destroyed that was already 
there to be replaced with the new bollard fencing. Can we at 
least not replace the fence that we tore down because it is 
requiring much more resources to patrol and secure our southern 
border.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are studying the issues 
of parts of the wall that has been there for years that is no 
longer sustainable and whether that can be or should be 
rebuilt. We are looking at some of the very issues that you 
have identified, and I look forward to circling back with you 
to discuss our assessments.
    Mr. Palazzo. And so using the immigration laws that you 
just mentioned and once title 42 goes away, wouldn't it be 
better if we could adjudicate these claims on our border faster 
instead of releasing them into our interior? For many of them, 
if they don't have a credible asylum claim, they are not going 
to show up. They are going to disappear and add to that 
undocumented number. Judges would help, right? If we could 
adjudicate on the spot, on the border, we need more judges or 
other resources. Can you please tell us what you need to do 
your job, and we want to help you to do that.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you so much. Thank you so much, 
Congressman. This is an area where I too will circle back with 
you because we are, indeed, taking a look at the fact that it 
is multiple years between the time of apprehension and final 
adjudication of an asylum claim that is too long a period of 
time. What can we do to improve the process to deliver an 
outcome more rapidly, which speaks to the efficiency and 
orderly immigration system and, quite frankly, delivers justice 
for the applicants themselves more rapidly. This is something 
that has not been tackled successfully in the past, and we will 
tackle it now it is something that we are looking at both with 
respect to the administration of the asylum laws, the credible 
fear determinations, who can make them, how quickly can we 
reach a final adjudication, and what are the needs of the 
immigration court system. We are taking a very close look at 
that in partnership with the Department of Justice.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, when you shared the percentage of your 
workforce that has been vaccinated, can you break that down by 
component?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would be very happy to provide that 
data to you, Congresswoman. I don't have it at my fingertips.
    Ms. Underwood. No problem.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I apologize.
    Ms. Underwood. Yeah. No problem.
    So now that we have successfully gotten the vaccine supply 
up, we have to focus on vaccinating every frontline worker, 
increasing vaccine confidence, and combating disinformation. 
How has vaccine hesitancy impacted your efforts to vaccinate 
DHS personnel? And what proactive steps are you taking to 
increase vaccine confidence and ensure your employees have 
accurate information about not only the safety and efficacy of 
the COVID-19 vaccine but also the critical importance of 
vaccination to America's national security?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We have invested so mightily not just 
resources but individual energy in Operation VOW, Vaccinate our 
Workforce. Not only to ensure that those who are willing to be 
vaccinated have the vaccine available and accessible and can 
receive it--and, indeed, the number of personnel has increased 
dramatically as a part of Operation VOW--but to also inform and 
educate and persuade those personnel who are hesitant to 
receive the vaccine to, in fact, be vaccinated. That is an 
ongoing effort. It is an effort of education, information, 
persuasion, and accommodation.
    Ms. Underwood. Great. Thank you.
    Turning to detainees, I understand that DHS is currently 
reevaluating its vaccination strategy for migrants in custody. 
What can you tell us about your plans to improve access to 
vaccination for your detainees? And how soon do you expect to 
be able to offer the COVID-19 vaccines for every individual in 
your custody?
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is something that we are looking 
at very carefully, Congresswoman. I spoke with our Chief 
Medical Officer earlier this week about this very subject. That 
is under review, and I will provide your office with a 
timetable.
    Ms. Underwood. And do you believe that better coordination 
of medical care across the Department would facilitate further 
improvements in this kind of vaccination effort and medical 
operations in general?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I have not found 
coordination of resources in our Department to be an obstacle 
with respect to this particular issue.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
    Vaccination for both DHS staff and detainees is essential, 
not only for the health of both groups but also for preventing 
community spread and protecting Americans. Please do keep our 
office updated on your efforts to accelerate this process.
    Now I would like to switch gears and talk about a major 
threat to our homeland and a top concern for many of my 
constituents: domestic terrorism and domestic violent 
extremism. In fact, I would like to read part of a message that 
I received last summer from a mother in my district, quote: 
There is a malicious cell in Antioch that is becoming more and 
more emboldened to take the law into their own hands. I am 
becoming fearful to send my children to the same schools as 
White supremacist militia members, end quote.
    Unfortunately, the Federal agencies whose job it is to 
track and respond to threats of violent extremism were caught 
flatfooted when a horde of White supremacists and other 
domestic extremists invaded the Capitol. ABC News reported 
that, in the months leading up to the January 6 insurrection, 
the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis had been 
practically dismantled after it was revealed that, under the 
Trump administration, it had inappropriately targeted 
journalists reporting on the excessive use of force by Federal 
agents in Oregon.
    Mr. Secretary, I know that you weren't in charge during 
these events, but since being confirmed, what steps have you 
taken and what future plans do you have to repair the 
department's operations so that it can provide essential 
intelligence on real threats like the Capitol insurrection?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am, Congresswoman, very proud of the 
men and women of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. We 
have prioritized the dissemination of real-time, actionable 
information to our State, local, Tribal, territorial partners. 
We are committed to doing so in an apolitical way, guided only 
by the Homeland Security imperative. And, in fact, I penned 
earlier this week a message to the men and women of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis, underscoring the apolitical 
nature of our work and expressing my gratitude for their 
commitment to our values and principles as well as our 
underlying mission.
    Ms. Underwood. Now, Mr. Secretary, that is a policy change 
that I appreciate, but my question was about operational 
changes. Can you detail any operational changes over at 
Intelligence and Analysis?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So we are looking--I am sorry if I 
didn't answer your question fulsomely at first. We are looking 
at the very different products that we can disseminate to our 
partners in the community. We issued a National Terrorism 
Advisory System Bulletin in January. We renewed it, but within 
the past 2 weeks, we have issued information bulletins. We very 
well may issue an additional information bulletin based on the 
threat landscape today. We are invested in the infrastructure 
to more effectively disseminate information to local 
communities to deliver the technological changes that are 
needed to more effectively accomplish that. We also have 
renamed an office, the Center for Prevention Programs and 
Partnerships, to more ably equip local communities, to more 
effectively work in partnership with them to address the threat 
of domestic terrorism. And we are looking at our grant programs 
and how we can both strengthen them and develop innovative 
communication tools to inform the American public on how to 
detect the evolving threat, how to report concerns, and how to 
prevent, respond, and be resilient to them.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Hinson.
    Ms. Hinson. And thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you 
again, Mr. Secretary, for sticking around for round two of 
questions. I actually wanted to call your attention to another 
communication issue within your Department, and I hope we can 
work together to resolve this specifically.
    This subcommittee has already heard from ICE and Customs 
and Border Patrol this year, and there was a common thread that 
stuck out to me in those conversations that the agencies didn't 
seem to be effectively communicating on immigration issues. And 
while they share, obviously, this common goal of keeping 
Americans safe and protecting our border, they don't seem to be 
sharing the information, and it is vitally important when we 
are trying to manage this crisis at the border, track illegal 
immigrants who have been caught and then released into the 
homeland, and then arrest and deport those who have chosen not 
to follow our laws or pose a risk to public safety, as we were 
discussing earlier in this hearing. So, do you agree, Mr. 
Secretary, that ICE and CBP should be sharing that data and 
information specifically when it comes to tracking illegal 
immigrants?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, absolutely. And I speak regularly 
together with Troy Miller of Customs and Border Protection, 
Dave Johnson of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, multiple 
times a week. And so I would be very eager to and interested in 
receiving the details with respect to the communication 
concerns that you reference, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Hinson. Yes. And, Mr. Secretary, the CBP should be 
conveying that information to ICE. ICE should be in some way 
tracking that individual or family unit, and whether or not the 
NTA is met. And what Director Johnson told us just a few weeks 
ago is that that is not happening once they are out of CBP 
custody. So do you believe that your Department at any time 
should be able to actually identify an illegal immigrant in 
this country who the Department has processed and released into 
this country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am not sure I understand your 
question. Congresswoman--
    Ms. Hinson. Do you think that, once they are in the country 
and we have issued--we have gone through this process, that we 
should be able to know where they are? We should be able to 
track them if they are in this country illegally?
    Secretary Mayorkas. To know and track more than 11 million 
undocumented individuals in the United States?
    Ms. Hinson. We have no idea, Mr. Secretary, and this is a 
direct response to one of our earlier questions; how many are 
specifically in Iowa? Once they come across that border and 
they are out of CBP custody, we have been informed there is no 
way to track these individuals unless they actually show up for 
that NTA hearing, which, as we know, sometimes they do not. So 
do you believe that we should be able to?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am not sure I agree with the premise 
of your question, Congresswoman. When an individual is placed 
into immigration proceedings, they are done--they are placed 
into immigration proceedings through a Notice to Appear. When 
they are properly informed of the hearing date, time, and 
location, they have appropriate information. They have 
assistance of counsel. The appearance rate is extraordinarily 
high.
    I am not aware of the fact that we have the tools, 
resources, and capabilities to track the more than 11 million 
unlawfully present individuals in the United States, which 
speaks to the fundamental broken system and the need for 
immigration reform. So many--
    Ms. Hinson. And I am speaking, Mr. Secretary, specifically 
to the people who have been through CBP and processed and then 
released into the homeland, not the ones who made it across the 
border and are in this country illegally that we maybe didn't 
go through that process. I think the point I would like to 
make, Mr. Secretary, is I would ask the administration to 
seriously look at this. I stand ready to look at the resources 
necessary to make sure these departments can actually talk to 
each other and communicate to each other. This is a safety and 
security issue if we can't exactly know how many immigrants are 
coming to a State like Iowa. When we are looking at over a 
million, possibly, as we have heard this number keep going up 
this year, that is highly concerning to me, and I would ask you 
to seriously look at policies that we can make sure these 
departments can track these individuals once they are in the 
country illegally even if they do have that NTA. We know that 
sometimes they don't appear, and that is a safety and security 
issue.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Let me, if I can, Congresswoman. I 
really welcome the opportunity to speak with you about this 
because I am not sure we have a common understanding of the 
problem that you have identified because if we have a common 
understanding of the problem, I assure you that we have a 
solution. Because what we do is we place individuals in 
immigration proceedings, and an individual who is a recent 
border crosser who does not appear in immigration proceedings 
is a priority for enforcement action under the guidelines that 
were issued on January 20 and revised on February 8.
    Ms. Hinson. All right. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I will 
have some questions for followup as well.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Price.
    Mr. Price. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to acknowledge your forthright 
response earlier on the question of the targeting of ICE 
enforcement actions. Of course, the question of enforcement 
discretion, the discretion that you exercise, that also raises 
the question about how well targeted is the work you do with 
other law enforcement agencies. So that is what I want to turn 
to now.
    As you know, the 287(g) program in particular greatly was 
increased by the last administration from 30 to 150 
participating jurisdictions. The way the 287(g) program works 
or doesn't work has been at the center of these discussions 
about discretion. Are you talking about dangerous people at the 
point they are released for the penal system, or are you 
talking about people picked up for minor offenses, or are you 
talking even about local law enforcement being commandeered to 
take proactive actions, which often, it is argued, compromises 
their local community policing role?
    Then there is the weaponizing of 287(g). This was of great 
concern. For example, the Atlanta Director of ICE at one point 
in the last administration acknowledged that the targeting of 
immigration raids, of ICE raids was--it was targeted at 
jurisdictions where the local sheriffs had chosen to withdraw 
from these voluntary 287(g) agreements. There were provocative 
billboards, even, purchased by ICE across the State in areas 
where 287(g) agreements were being ended.
    So I want to register my hope and my expectation that in 
this new administration, we are going to see some serious 
changes, we are going to see a renewed focus on targeted 
enforcement, and we are going to see the reform, if not the 
elimination, of 287(g).
    And that leads to my question. Would you describe where the 
administration is in the process of the 287(g) program, if the 
administration will be ending some of the agreements possibly 
made in the last 4 years, or has the program, perhaps, outlived 
its usefulness? What do you see as the future of that program? 
And then that does raise the further question of what is the 
appropriate relationship to local law enforcement? ]RPTR 
BRYANTEDTR SECKMAN[11:59 a.m.]
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman--
    Mr. Price. Identifying people who are truly dangerous 
clearly could be a matter of working with local law 
enforcement. And so, if not some of these flawed programs, then 
what would you look for in those relationships?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am certainly aware of 
the abuses of the 287(g) program, and I believe that I brought 
an example of that abuse to an end recently.
    We are focused on smart and effective law enforcement. And 
in that regard, I am engaging with the men and women of ICE in 
the development of Secretary's enforcement guidelines. And once 
we have done that, I do intend to continue my dialogue with 
sheriffs and chiefs of police across the country to see how we 
can most effectively partner in the service of the new 
architecture of smart and effective law enforcement.
    And I do believe that they have a vital role to play, such 
that when an individual who, indeed, poses a very significant 
public safety threat is in local custody and is about to be 
released, that that individual is not released into the 
immigrant community, whom that individual will victimize, but 
that we can bring our resources to bear for the protection of 
the public.
    And so I do think that we can achieve a valuable 
partnership that addresses and ends the pernicious practices of 
the past and serves a more intelligent and effective law 
enforcement goal.
    Mr. Price. I do think that is an important enterprise, and 
I am glad to hear you are engaged in it. There is a good deal 
of confusion I think and uncertainty about what that 
relationship would look like, and so it is important I think to 
firm that up and make these expectations clear.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Aguilar.
    Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to continue down the line of 
detention and specifically talk about the Office of the 
Detention Ombudsman, which was a product of the chairwoman's 
leadership and the work of this committee. This office reports 
directly to you and has access to inspect and conduct oversight 
of all detention facilities and can assist individuals who 
report mistreatment or abuse in DHS detention facilities.
    What is the status of the office and its operations, and 
can you describe your interaction with this office since you 
have been Secretary?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much. And I very much 
appreciate Congress' support in creating the Office of the 
Detention Ombudsman. I have met with the leadership of that 
office. I know that the office leaders have traveled to the 
border and have visited facilities in the interior. We have 
discussed the focus of their work and how to most effectively 
prioritize that work.
    And, right now, our thinking is to really address casework 
to, in fact, address complaints and concerns about mistreatment 
and conditions brought by individuals in detention, community-
based organizations, and tackling the challenges that those 
complaints surface.
    So we have been in touch. And, of course, I have also been 
in close touch with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties that has jurisdiction and responsibilities itself 
that are intertwined with those of the Office of the Detention 
Ombudsman, to make sure that we can most cohesively bring the 
different resources to bear.
    Mr. Aguilar. So, if Members of Congress understand one 
thing, it is casework. And so, you know, given that fact, will 
there be metrics associated with it? Will you be, you know, 
making public number of cases open, number of cases closed, you 
know, open cases, you know, average length of a case? You know, 
will you be making those metrics available?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I have not actually looked 
at what metrics we will develop and publish. It is a very 
important question, and I will act on that immediately.
    Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate it, Mr. Secretary.
    And I will just go briefly to USCIS. I am concerned about 
the ongoing and growing backlog, which has ballooned to over 3 
million cases. I understand that the pandemic has obviously 
made it more difficult for caseworkers to process, as offices 
were closed and unable to conduct interviews.
    Given your background with your previous role as Director 
of USCIS, can you share your plans in reducing the backlog in 
the upcoming fiscal year?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, this is something that we 
have studied very carefully. You will see in the President's 
fiscal year 2022 budget a request for an appropriation of 
approximately $345 million to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services for a number of objectives, one of which is, indeed, 
to address the backlog.
    It is also that time when U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services is considering a new fee rule to address the cost 
structure that guides its adjudications, the fees it receives. 
We are in dialogue about that. We are very, very focused on the 
backlog and know the obstacle it creates for those who are 
seeking access to our legal immigration system.
    Mr. Aguilar. I appreciate it.
    I will yield back, Madam Chair.
    Thanks, Mr. Secretary.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. I believe that completes the second 
round. And I have had a request from some members for a third 
round, so we will go into a third round. The request, Mrs. 
Hinson, Mr. Palazzo, Ms. Underwood have made that request. Are 
there any other members who would like to participate in the 
third round at this time? Please let us know. And Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Secretary, TSA Administrator Pekoske has talked about 
the relatively low level of compensation for Transportation 
Security Officers. He believes it is not commensurate with the 
training, technical skill, and responsibilities of the job and 
that it contributes to chronic recruitment and retention 
challenges.
    Do you believe that migrating the TSA workforce to a GS pay 
system would alleviate some of those hiring/retention 
challenges?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, I do, and that is 
something that we are studying right now.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Since the creation of DHS, employee 
morale has consistently ranked among the worst in Federal 
Government. And this is based on the Federal Employee Viewpoint 
Survey conducted yearly by the Office of Personnel Management.
    Each administration has tried to address this issue, but 
the problem persists. What are your plans for improving morale 
within the Department?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Chairwoman, I am incredibly proud 
of the men and women of the Department of Homeland Security. I 
am very invested in their well-being, their sense of 
fulfillment, their dedication to mission and the opportunities 
that they have before them to realize their greatest hopes and 
highest aspirations.
    I have collected information with respect to all of the 
efforts across the Department to invest in our workforce. I 
have studied those efforts, and I am developing plans to 
enhance and strengthen them.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Palazzo.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for hanging out with us to 
answer our questions for a third round. So, during my trip to 
El Paso, we went by Fort Bliss, and we actually visited the 
emergency intake site. Very impressive how it was, you know, 
built so fast.
    I think it is going to help, you know, provide some of that 
compassion that we expect to address the humanitarian crisis at 
the border. But the one thing they could not answer is they 
could not answer what is it costing the American taxpayers. 
And, as appropriators, I thought--there were two appropriators 
on the border trip. They couldn't answer it.
    So, if you could, could you please provide to myself and 
perhaps the committee, if they are interested, the actual 
daily/monthly cost of the emergency intake site.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I most certainly will. That information 
is in the possession of the Department of Health and Human 
Services. The emergency intake sites are operated by HHS. But I 
certainly will--we work in an all-of-government effort to 
address the needs at the southern border, so I will speak with 
our partners and get that information to you, Congressman.
    Mr. Palazzo. Thank you. And, yes, it is under Health and 
Human Services. I appreciate that.
    Also, this isn't really under your jurisdiction, but I 
think, for the committee's benefit, they should know that we 
also tried to visit the El Paso Intelligence Center. It is so 
important to see what is going on to get a good idea of what is 
really taking place at the border, from the smuggling--listen, 
we know the drugs are off the charts. The Fentanyl, there is 
already 6,000 pounds of Fentanyl in the first 5 months of the 
year. Cocaine, hard narcotics.
    I mean, as our Border Patrol agents in the awesome job that 
they are doing, as they are misdirected and redirected to meet 
this crisis at the border, the humanitarian crisis, that we are 
just allowing who knows what.
    Like someone mentioned, like, I mean, the got-aways, the 
people that are coming across, we don't know their nationality. 
We don't know what their intent is, and we don't know how much 
drugs. I mean, there are sex offenders. Already 265sex 
offenders have been apprehended this year alone that we know 
of. Murderers, criminals.
    And so that is why, you know, I support the boots on the 
ground, the technology. And they really need technology. With 
the limited resources that they have, they can redirect their 
precious resources to the criminal activity if they have better 
technology and more technology.
    And, of course, barriers work. I just cannot understand why 
we don't have more fencing or at least replace the fencing that 
we have.
    Real quick, listen, I know, again, you have a big agency. 
There are so many things we want to talk about. There are other 
borders as well. There is the maritime border, which is so 
important to me and many of us who live amongst the coastal 
regions of our Nation.
    And I have just got to tell you, the Coast Guard is under 
your purview, and they do an awesome job. You know, the 
National Security Cutters. You know, they are smuggling drugs 
across our border, we understand that, but your men and women 
in the Coast Guard, or America's men and women in the Coast 
Guard, they are doing a heck of a job, you know.
    And they have multimissions, but I just want to let you 
know we think it is a great investment, you know, with the 
limited resources that we have, to support the Coast Guard's 
cutter replacement program. It is desperately needed.
    And I know that someone mentioned the Jones Act earlier. 
That is extremely important, protecting America's industrial 
maritime base. And I hope you will continue to support that 
with the administration, maybe be a voice when others truly 
don't understand how important the Jones Act is.
    And I know I have a lot more stuff to talk about. If we 
could do--Madam Chair, we need to start doing congressional 
oversight and going on codels. And I would love to, you know, 
make them more bipartisan. I know we weren't able to get any of 
our colleagues across the aisle to join us on that 12-member 
border trip. But I think it is really important for not one 
party or the other to do it on their own, but to do it 
together.
    So, with that, I will be respectful of the Secretary's time 
and my colleagues, and I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. As soon as restrictions are lifted, we 
will be doing some traveling.
    Mr. Palazzo. I understand.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Cuellar.
    Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Mr. Secretary, you have been more than generous on 
your time on a third round with us. First of all, I want to say 
thank you for filling up those gaps at that border levy in 
south Texas in my district. And thank you so much for working 
with the Army Corps on doing that, especially with hurricane 
season around the corner, number one.
    Number two, I would like to follow up with you when we get 
together on what you plan to do on some of those gaps here on 
the fence. I would like to talk to you about that.
    But the other thing I want to talk to you about is, you 
know, when the President--and I want to thank President Biden 
for putting that order to stop the building of the fence 
itself. You know, the Army Corps did its job, you did your job, 
but the Department of Justice still has some lawsuits that are 
going on. And I would like to see if there is any way you can 
talk to the Attorney General because, I mean, there are some 
people that are still afraid that they are going to be losing 
their lands. They still have lawsuits, several of them down 
here in the valley. So I would like to follow up with you on 
those lawsuits because pretty much everything has stopped 
except some of those lawsuits, and I would like to get your 
assistance on that part.
    And, with that, I just want to say thank you. You have been 
more than generous with your time, and I look forward to 
sitting down with you again in person when we open up on that.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman.
    Mr. Cuellar. Madam Chair--she is not there. So I will 
just--well, I am the last chair, so I guess if she is okay with 
that, I will yield back the balance of the time.
    Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of the time and thank 
you so much.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mrs. Hinson.
    Mrs. Hinson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you again, Mr. Secretary.
    I wanted to go back to some comments that you made about 
the immigration process being broken, and that is something 
that I think we can all agree on. I did three public townhalls 
yesterday in my district, and I want to echo that I heard that 
from many people as we were having discussions about the border 
that we need to talk about immigration reform as well.
    Our process is onerous, it is expensive for people to go 
through, and it incentivizes illegal immigration as a result. 
So it is broken, and we need to fix it. But I think one of the 
ways we start to tackle this problem to fix it is to ensure 
that we can effectively manage what is happening at the border.
    And as I learned--I went down to the Del Rio Sector and 
visited with the CBP down there at Eagle Pass. And the local 
sheriffs and the law enforcement there are fighting those 
cartels every day. We heard it direct out of the mouth of one 
of my constituents yesterday: The cartels are evil people, and 
we can't let them win.
    So I just want to go back really quickly to what you said 
in response to the ranking member's question about your 
administration, the administration's work on disincentives to 
illegal immigration. But at the most basic level, wouldn't the 
best disincentive be that it won't work, it won't be successful 
when you come across the border. It won't be profitable for the 
cartels and the coyotes and the human traffickers. Wouldn't the 
best way to stop illegal immigration be to stop illegal 
immigrants from being successful in entering into the country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, the law that Congress 
passed, the law of the United States indicates that if an 
individual arrives and is apprehended in between the ports of 
entry and makes a claim of credible fear of persecution in the 
country of origin by reason of their membership in a particular 
social group, they have a right to make that claim of credible 
fear and pursue their claim of asylum. That is the law of the 
United States, and we are obligated to honor it.
    We do not condone illegal immigration. We combat illegal 
immigration. We enforce the laws of accountability, and we also 
enforce the laws of humanitarian relief.
    Mrs. Hinson. But, Mr. Secretary, there are many people who 
do not have credible claims. So, if they are successful in 
going through this process, then doesn't that send the wrong 
message in the first place? I agree we need to make some policy 
changes here, and that is very clear from our discussion and 
our discussions with CBP and ICE as well.
    But I think the point I am trying to make, Mr. Secretary, 
is that, you know, we say the border is closed or you said the 
border is closed, but we are seeing people be successful, and 
that is incentivizing this process to continue.
    And so my question is specifically, shouldn't we try to 
send a clear message that it is not going to be successful? We 
need to stop these cartels from being successful.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, individuals who do not 
make a claim of credible fear are removed. I just respectfully 
disagree with the premise of your question.
    Mrs. Hinson. Well, I will be following up with some 
additional questions for the record.
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are enforcing--
    Mrs. Hinson. And I will be following up with some 
additional questions for the record. Again, this goes back to 
the question I asked a little bit ago about specifically not 
only disincentivizing illegal immigration, but being able to 
effectively communicate between departments and track as well. 
I think there are a lot of parts of this conversation that we 
need some additional answers to, and I will follow up with 
questions for the record.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Ms. Underwood.
    Ms. Underwood. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to pick back up on the domestic 
violent extremism. I think you referenced this to the response 
to my operational changes question. But earlier this month, a 
DHS National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin warned, quote: 
Violent extremists may seek to exploit the easing of COVID-19-
related restrictions across the United States to conduct 
attacks against a broader range of targets, end quote.
    Mr. Secretary, what does that broader range of targets 
encompass, and what do local leaders need to be doing to 
prepare for this high risk as they implement reopening plans?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Regrettably, Congresswoman, some of 
those may include, for example, houses of worship, regardless 
of denomination.
    And what we need to do and what we are doing is 
disseminating information to faith leaders across the country 
with respect to the detection of threats, the information that 
we ourselves have in our possession that we are disseminating 
to them, and best practices with respect to the hardening of 
their facilities for the security of their followers.
    Ms. Underwood. Okay. Counterterrorism researchers have 
identified social media as a powerful propellant, fueling the 
rise of violent extremism. So I was heartened by the State 
Department's announcement this month that the United States had 
finally joined the Christ Church call to action and 
international pledge by dozens of countries and tech companies 
to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.
    Secretary Blinken stated that at the Christ Church Call 
Summit that countering violent extremism is one of our highest 
counterterrorism priorities.
    Mr. Secretary, given that counterterrorism falls within the 
DHS mission, what is DHS' role, if any, in coordinating with 
the State Department to fulfill our commitment to the Christ 
Church call?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I am engaging with our 
international partners, both in a bilateral context as well as 
a multilateral context, in a unified and coordinated, I should 
say, battle against domestic violent extremism.
    I will say, though, that there was a very important 
principle articulated by the Secretary of State and one that we 
have articulated here domestically, of course, as well, which 
is that we will battle the domestic violent extremism, we will 
battle domestic terrorism, but we will also do so upholding our 
constitutional principles, the constitutional rights, the 
privacy rights, and the civil rights, and liberties of the 
American public. We are not tackling the freedom of speech but, 
rather, the connectivity between speech and violence.
    Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir. So, while the pledge to eliminate 
terrorist content online is a major step forward, our current 
reality is that social media is a major platform for extremist 
group organizing.
    The Capitol attack was largely planned online in public 
forums. And I was disturbed to read reports that hundreds of 
extremist militias were still openly organizing on Facebook 
months after the insurrection. We need to be identifying these 
threats before they turn violent.
    Now, 2 weeks ago, you testified to the Senate 
Appropriations Committee that DHS now has analysts dedicated to 
identifying linkages between extremist narratives on social 
media and indicators of intention to commit violent acts. How 
many DHS analysts are working on this full time?
    And since you stated that domestic violent extremism is the 
number one terrorist threat facing our country, do you need 
additional resources to track publicly available online 
extremist content and identify actionable threats of violence?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I will need to get back to you with 
respect to the precise number of analysts that we have 
dedicated to this. I should say that not only do we rely on the 
excellence of our own analysts, but we also harness the 
resources in the private sector. Academic institutions have 
conducted studies, and we utilize those, and we do so in open 
source, through open sources as well as through contract 
vehicles.
    And we have also, you will see in the President's fiscal 
year 2022 budget request, an augmentation of funds to best 
address the fight against domestic terrorism and domestic 
violent extremism. I believe the request will approximate $130 
million for a variety of needs and utilities.
    Ms. Underwood. Yes, sir. Well, I certainly look forward to 
reviewing that request and working with you to keep our country 
safe.
    Madam Chair, I yield back. Thank you so much for the 
additional time.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Secretary, I know you have a hard 
stop at 12:30, because you have to go over to the Senate for 
another hearing.
    So, Mr. Rutherford, you [inaudible.]
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I will keep this very short. Mr. Secretary, I want to talk 
a little bit about a program that is very important to law 
enforcement, and I want to talk about it in a context of the 
expansion of alternatives to detention that are being discussed 
now for these illegal aliens, whether you call it a notice to 
appear, notice to return. And everyone knows that the 
compliance of those folks who are released with those notices 
is pretty small.
    But one of the--which is why I think--and I want to speak 
for and in support of 287(g). Now, particularly the JEM model, 
the Jail Enforcement Model, not the Task Force Model on the 
street, because, quite frankly, I never used that in my 
community because I thought it drove people into a subculture 
that made them less accessible to services.
    But the Jail Model, importantly, the Jail Model only 
addresses those illegal immigrants who have actually already 
broken some other law in my community, whether it is robbery or 
aggravated battery, whatever it might be. And I know with your 
experiences as a U.S. attorney, you know the numbers of crimes 
that these individuals can be involved in.
    And I guess my quick question is: I am hearing that 287(g) 
may be eliminated by this administration, by the Biden 
administration, your administration. And so my question is, is 
that true, and is that true for both models? Is it true for the 
Task Force Model only, or are we talking about the Jail 
Enforcement Model also?
    Because I can tell you, in Jacksonville, Florida, we had 
tremendous, tremendous success with that program. I was able to 
remove so many criminals from our community as a result of 
that. And, as you know, Mr. Secretary, I probably removed, you 
know, a couple hundred of them two or more times over the 
period of years.
    And so can you just give me your insight on where 287(g) is 
going, both the JEM and the Task Force?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I think, if I may, Congressman, 
articulate what I mentioned in response to a question by 
Congressman Price, which is I am very focused on smart and 
effective enforcement, executing our responsibilities, 
utilizing our resources to achieve the greatest public safety 
impact, and I intend to do so in partnership with our State and 
local law enforcement personnel across the country.
    I don't intend to divorce our agency from that. I recognize 
the importance and effectiveness of community policing. I 
understand that different jurisdictions have different 
dynamics, and I intend to work closely with State and local law 
enforcement across the country, in partnership, to achieve the 
greatest public safety impact on behalf of the American public. 
That would be my response to your question.
    Mr. Rutherford. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    And I see I am almost out of time, Madam Chair, so I am 
going to go ahead and yield back and let the Secretary get to 
his next meeting.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for 
your time. You have been very generous with it.
    And, with that, the subcommittee on Homeland Security 
stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
    
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