[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND:
20 YEARS AFTER 9/11
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-29
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-377 WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Ms. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of Director of National Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Letter From the Jewish Federations of North America............ 83
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Letter From Rodney S. Scott, Chief, US. Border Patrol-Retired.. 34
The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi:
Chart.......................................................... 45
The Honorable Andrew S. Clyde, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Georgia:
Article, Fox News, Published August 4.......................... 74
Appendix
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas.. 89
Questions From Hon. Clay Higgins for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas.. 89
Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas. 89
Questions From Hon. Mariannette Miller-Meeks for Hon. Alejandro
N. Mayorkas.................................................... 90
Questions From Hon. Carlos Gimenez for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas 90
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas.. 90
Questions From Hon. August Pfluger for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas 91
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christopher A. Wray......... 92
Question From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for Christopher A. Wray..... 92
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christopher A. Wray......... 92
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christine Abizaid........... 93
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christine Abizaid........... 93
WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND: 20 YEARS AFTER 9/11
----------
Wednesday, September 22, 2021
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., via
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Correa, Slotkin, Cleaver, Green, Clarke, Swalwell, Titus,
Watson Coleman, Rice, Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Luria,
Katko, McCaul, Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Miller-Meeks,
Harshbarger, Clyde, Gimenez, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack,
Pfluger, and Garbarino.
Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive
testimony on world-wide threats to the homeland 20 years after
9/11.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
committee in recess at any point.
Good morning. I want to thank Secretary of Homeland
Security Alejandro Mayorkas, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and
National Counterterrorism Center Director Christine Abizaid,
for coming before the committee today and for your service to
the country.
This month Americans observed the 20th anniversary of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We will never forget
the heroic first responders who ran into the Twin Towers to
save others, the brave flight 93 passengers who fought back
against the hijackers, or the service members killed at their
posts in the Pentagon. We remember all of those who lost their
life or their loved ones on 9/11 and those who have suffered
Ground Zero-related health effects in the days since.
This committee was created in the aftermath of the attacks.
Earlier this month we met on hallowed ground in New York to
mark the 20th anniversary. We visited the 9/11 memorial and
museum and laid a wreath in remembrance. We met in 1 World
Trade Center with first responders to discuss how far we have
come in the last two decades and what more remains to be done
to secure our Nation for upholding our American values.
Today the committee is meeting to examine world-wide
threats to the homeland 20 years after 9/11. It is the
committee's long-standing practice to meet annually with
National security leaders to discuss the global threat
landscape and the U.S. response. This year especially we
reflect on the incredible transformation of our National
security apparatus, an expansion of the homeland security
enterprise over the last two decades. We recognize the success
we have had in preventing another 9/11-style attack, but are
sobered by the challenges posed by long-standing and emerging
homeland security threats.
Some of these threats include the recent riots and domestic
terrorism, more frequent cyber attacks from increasingly
sophisticated actors, and the security implications of the
Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan.
With respect to domestic terrorism, our witnesses have
testified before this committee previously about the grave
nature of the threat. Secretary Mayorkas called it the greatest
threat in the homeland.
I hope to hear from the panel today about their current
domestic terrorism threat assessment in the wake of the January
6 attack on the United States Capitol.
Regarding cybersecurity, over the past year we have seen
our adversaries burrow into Federal networks through a
sophisticated supply chain attack, exploit 1-day
vulnerabilities in Microsoft and chain servers, and refuse to
reign in cyber criminals working to extort millions of dollars
from U.S. critical infrastructure owners and operators through
ransomware attacks. I commend the administration for its
sustained commitment to securing Federal networks and making
the Federal Government a more valuable, secure department in
the private sector. We still have a long way to go. I am
interested to learn today about how DHS and FBI coordinate as
they execute their shared cybersecurity missions.
Regarding Afghanistan, this committee has been, and will
continue to, engage on threats to the homeland emanating from
Afghanistan while recognizing that the terror threat has
metastasized across the world in the last two decades. We are
conducting careful oversight of U.S. efforts to screen and
resettle our Afghan allies in this country and will continue to
do so.
Finally, I want to address the situation at the Southern
Border. The Biden administration inherited an immigration
system badly broken by the previous administration. Trump's
cruel policies led to families being separated and children
dying in custody. Those immoral policies did not represent who
we are as a people and the Biden administration was right to
reject them. I have spoken with Secretary Mayorkas on a regular
basis about the border and even more frequently in recent days
as events unfolded in Del Rio, Texas. The administration has
committed to enforce the laws in processing migrants in a safe,
orderly, and humane manner. This committee will hold the
administration to its commitment.
Finally, I want to say a word to the men and women working
to secure the homeland. Their jobs have never been easy and
they are particularly difficult right now with the COVID-19
pandemic and worsening natural disasters caused by climate
change, threatening their health, disrupting travel, and
diverting homeland security resources. Please know that this
committee greatly appreciates those working on the front lines
and behind the scenes to secure the homeland on behalf of the
American people.
As we learned in 9/11, nothing short of a well-coordinated
whole-of-Government effort will protect the Nation against
urgent evolving threats. Twenty years on, the Committee on
Homeland Security remains committed to working with Federal,
State, and local partners on that critical effort.
Again, I thank our witnesses for joining us today and the
Members for their participation.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
September 22, 2021
This month Americans observed the 20th anniversary of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. We will never forget the heroic first
responders who ran into the Twin Towers to save others, the brave
Flight 93 passengers who fought back against the hijackers, or the
service members killed at their posts in the Pentagon. We remember all
those who lost their lives or their loved ones on 9/11, and those who
have suffered Ground Zero-related health effects in the days since.
Stood up in the aftermath of the attacks, this committee met
earlier this month on hallowed ground in New York to mark the 20th
anniversary. We visited the
9/11 Memorial & Museum and laid a wreath in remembrance. We met in One
World Trade Center with first responders to discuss how far we have
come in the last two decades and what more remains to be done to secure
our Nation while upholding our American values.
Today, the committee is meeting to examine ``Worldwide Threats to
the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11.'' It is the committee's long-
standing practice to meet annually with National security leaders to
discuss the global threat landscape and the U.S. response. This year
especially, we reflect on the incredible transformation of our National
security apparatus and expansion of the Homeland Security Enterprise
over the last two decades.
We recognize the success we have had in preventing another 9/11-
style attack, but are sobered by the challenges posed by long-standing
and emerging homeland security threats. Some of these threats include
the recent rise domestic terrorism; more frequent cyber attacks from
increasingly sophisticated actors; and the security implications of the
Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan.
With respect to domestic terrorism, our witnesses have testified
before this committee previously about the grave nature of the threat--
Secretary Mayorkas called it ``the greatest threat in the homeland.'' I
hope to hear from the panel today about their current domestic
terrorism threat assessment in the wake of the January 6 attack on the
United States Capitol.
Regarding cybersecurity, over the past year we have seen our
adversaries burrow into Federal networks through a sophisticated supply
chain attack, exploit 1 day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange
Servers, and refuse to rein in cyber criminals working to extort
millions of dollars from U.S. critical infrastructure owners and
operators through ransomware attacks. I commend the administration for
its sustained commitment to securing Federal networks and making the
Federal Government a more valuable security partner to the private
sector. We still have a long way to go, and I am interested to learn
today about how DHS and FBI coordinate as they execute their shared
cybersecurity missions.
Regarding Afghanistan, this committee has been and will continue to
be engaged on threats to the homeland emanating from Afghanistan, while
recognizing that the terror threat has metastasized across the world in
the last two decades. We are conducting careful oversight of U.S.
efforts to screen and resettle our Afghan allies in this country and
will continue to do so.
Finally, I want to address the situation at the Southern Border.
The Biden administration inherited an immigration system badly broken
by the previous administration. Trump's cruel policies led to families
being separated and children dying in custody. Those immoral policies
did not represent who we are as a people, and the Biden administration
was right to reject them. I have spoken to Secretary Mayorkas on a
regular basis about the border, and even more frequently in recent days
as events unfolded in Del Rio, Texas. The administration has committed
to enforcing the law and processing migrants in a safe, orderly, and
humane manner, and this committee will hold the administration to its
commitment.
Finally, I want to say a word to the men and women working to
secure the homeland. Their jobs have never been easy, and they are
particularly difficult right now, with the COVID-19 pandemic and
worsening natural disasters caused by climate change threatening their
health, disrupting travel, and diverting homeland security resources.
Please know that this committee greatly appreciates those working on
the front lines and behind the scenes to secure the homeland on behalf
of the American people.
As we learned on 9/11, nothing short of a well-coordinated, whole-
of-Government effort will protect the Nation against urgent, evolving
threats. Twenty years on, the Committee on Homeland Security remains
committed to working with Federal, State, and local partners on that
critical effort.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
witnesses for being here today. I am pleased that the committee
is holding this very important hearing. As you know, the United
States finds itself facing increasingly dire threats on a
number of fronts impacting our homeland security.
From the Biden administration's chaotic and deadly
withdrawal process in Afghanistan, to the on-going humanitarian
and security crisis along our Southwest Border, to the
unprecedented cyber threats facing the American way of life,
the American people are deeply troubled by what they are
seeing. These threats are of course all happening in the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in which clarity from the
administration related to vaccine boosters has been absent,
similar to the Department of Homeland Security's mitigation of
the pandemic at the Southwest Border, as was recently confirmed
by the DHS Inspector General's Office.
What is most troubling to me is overwhelming lack of
accountability this administration is willing to accept. Nearly
10 months after President Biden's inauguration the prevailing
narrative coming from the administration's political class
continues to be one that blames the last administration for the
current administration's shortcomings. This is just tired. It
is inaccurate. These talking points have been repeated
consistently alongside scenes of Americans and Afghan allies
being left under Taliban rule, and all while known terrorist
operatives were inaugurated into the Taliban's cabinet on the
20th anniversary of 9/11. Let me repeat that. Known terrorist
operatives were inaugurated into the Taliban's cabinet on the
20th anniversary of 9/11. That is significant.
But that is not the only crisis where the Biden
administration's blame game shows up, what we also hear when
officials blame the last administration for the deadly and
increasingly untenable crisis along our Southern Border. Last
month we saw the sixth straight month of more than 170,000
encounters along the Southwest Border, a trend that has never
been recorded before. These numbers are part of the overall 1.5
million illegal border encounters that have occurred just this
fiscal year. While the recently-departed border chief is on
record stating that known or suspected terrorists are crossing
the border at ``a level we have never seen before,'' this
administration continues to avoid the American people's demand
for transparency.
This issue hits home for me. This year in my district in
central New York has seen a very big increase in opioid-related
deaths. This trend is repeated in communities across the
country, proving that in 2021 every State truly is a border
State. Customs and Border Protection has seized more than twice
the amount of lethal fentanyl this year compared to last year,
and that is just what we seized, and more than 3 times than in
2019. We all know that for everything we intercept more is
flowing undetected into American communities as the drug
cartels exploit the administration's failings.
On the issue of cybersecurity, the American people have
faced an unprecedented threat to their livelihood, their
privacy, and their overall way of life. In this year alone we
have seen a number of high-profile attacks aimed at America's
critical infrastructure, leading to important conversations in
Congress around the merits of incident reporting and
identifying systemically important critical infrastructure. Two
issues I would like to hear the panel's thoughts on today.
Last, but certainly not least, is the rapidly-increasing
challenges facing the homeland from adversarial nation-states
overseas, namely China. As the Chinese Communist Party aims to
undermine the United States at every turn, I see aggressive
moves on Beijing's part to increase its investments in the
Western Hemisphere. Threats posed by China underpin supply
chain security challenges that are leading this country into
new economic security oversight efforts.
I recently traveled to New York City with a number of my
colleagues to observe the 20th anniversary of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11, and I thank the Chairman once again for making
that happen. As we spoke with individuals at NYPD and the FDNY,
two things became clear. First, that our first responders in
law enforcement are true heroes on the front lines of our
homeland security, risking their lives every day to protect
American people. Second, that these same first responders are
troubled by what they see; I heard many accounts concerning how
troubled our front-line law enforcement is about the homeland
security implications of al-Qaeda and ISIS having a safe haven
in Afghanistan once again, along with consequences to their
communities stemming from the porous Southern Border.
These threats, combined with low morale and retention
caused by the shameful defund the police movement is putting
American communities at greater risk at a time when we can
least afford it.
Today I hope to hear solutions rather than talking points
from our panelists, who each play a truly critical role in
securing the U.S. homeland. I am grateful to each one of them
for their service to this country in these trying times and I
look forward to working with them in our efforts on behalf of
the American people. But make no mistake about it, it is very,
very frustrating right now, especially with respect to the
Southern Border. I will pull no punches, and neither will my
colleagues when it comes to that. I am looking forward to
having this discussion today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the committee is holding
this important hearing today, as the United States finds itself facing
increasingly dire threats on a number of fronts impacting our homeland
security.
From the Biden administration's chaotic and deadly withdrawal
process in Afghanistan; to the on-going humanitarian and security
crisis along our Southwest Border; to the unprecedented cyber threats
facing our American way of life; the American people are deeply
troubled by what they are seeing.
These threats, are, of course, all happening in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic in which clarity from the administration related to
vaccine boosters has been absent, similar to the Department of Homeland
Security's mitigation of the pandemic at the Southern Border, as was
recently confirmed by the DHS Inspector General's Office.
What is most troubling to me is the overwhelming lack of
accountability this administration is willing to accept. Nearly 10
months after President Biden's inauguration the prevailing narrative
coming from the administration's political class continues to be one
which blames the last administration for the current administration's
shortcomings. This tired, inaccurate talking point has been repeated
consistently alongside scenes of Americans and Afghan allies being left
under Taliban rule, and while known terrorist operatives were
inaugurated into the Taliban's cabinet on the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
But that is not the only crisis where the Biden administration's
blame game shows up. We also hear it when officials blame the last
administration for the deadly and untenable crisis along our Southern
Border. Last month, we saw the 6th straight month of more than 170,000
encounters along the Southwest Border--a trend never before recorded.
These numbers are part of the overall 1.5 million illegal border
encounters that have occurred just this fiscal year. While the
recently-departed border chief is on record stating that known or
suspected terrorists are crossing the border ``at a level we have never
seen before,'' this administration continues to avoid the American
people's demands for transparency.
This issue hits home for me. This year, my home district in Central
New York has seen marked increases in opioid-related deaths--up 15
percent in Syracuse alone. This trend is repeated in communities across
the country, proving that, in 2021, every State truly is a border
State. CBP has seized more than twice the amount of lethal fentanyl
this year compared to last year, and more than 3 times more than in
2019. We all know that for everything we interdict, more is flowing
undetected into American communities as the drug cartels exploit this
administration's failings.
On the issue of cybersecurity, the American people are facing
unprecedented threats to their livelihood, privacy, and overall way of
life. This year alone we have seen a number of high-profile attacks
aimed at America's critical infrastructure, leading to important
conversations in Congress around the merits of incident reporting and
identifying systemically important critical infrastructure--two issues
I would like to hear the panel's thoughts on today.
Last, but most certainly not least, is the rapidly increasing
challenges facing the homeland from adversarial nation-states
overseas--namely China. As the Chinese Communist Party aims to
undermine the United States at every turn, I see aggressive moves on
Beijing's part to increase its investments in the Western Hemisphere.
If we are unable to counter China's malign influence in our own
backyard, I worry to think how successful we will be elsewhere. Threats
posed by China underpin supply chain security challenges that are
leading this committee into new economic security oversight efforts.
I recently traveled to New York City with a number of my colleagues
to observe the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. As we spoke with individuals at NYPD and FDNY two things
became clear: First, that our first responders and law enforcement are
true heroes on the front lines of our homeland security--risking their
lives every day to protect the American people. And second, that these
same first responders are troubled by what they see. I heard many
accounts concerning how troubled our front-line law enforcement is
about the homeland security implications of al-Qaeda and ISIS having a
safe haven in Afghanistan, along with consequences in their communities
stemming from the porous Southern Border. These threats, combined with
low morale and retention caused by the left's shameful defund-the-
police movement, is putting American communities at greater risk at a
time when we can least afford it.
Today, I hope to hear solutions rather than talking points from our
panelists, who each play a truly critical role in securing the U.S.
homeland. I am grateful to each one of them for their service in these
trying times, and I look forward to working with them in our efforts on
behalf of the American people.
Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be
submitted for the record. Members are also reminded that the
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy
regarding remote procedures.
I welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witnesses is the Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas,
the Secretary of Homeland Security. Our next witness is the
Honorable Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Our third and final witness is the Honorable
Christine Abizaid, the director of the National
Counterterrorism Center in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask Secretary Mayorkas to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Katko, and distinguished Members of this committee, good
morning and thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the
threat landscape facing our homeland 20 years after 9/11,
alongside my colleagues from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center.
Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I may ask for a minute
more of time. I do want to address the images that emanated
from Del Rio, Texas over the last several days and correctly
and necessarily were met with our Nation's horror. Because they
do not reflect who we are as a country nor do they reflect who
the United States Customs and Border Protection is.
I want to share with you, with Ranking Member Katko and
this entire committee the fact that we are addressing this with
tremendous speed and with tremendous force. I have ordered an
investigation to be conducted of the events that are captured
in those images. The Office of Professional Responsibility's
leaders are conducting the investigation.
We have ensured that the individuals during the pendency of
the investigation are not conducting law enforcement duties to
interact with migrants, but rather are conducting only
administrative duties. I have informed through the appropriate
channels our Office of Inspector General.
The facts will drive the actions that we take. We ourselves
will pull no punches and we need to conduct this investigation
thoroughly, but very quickly. It will be completed in days and
not weeks. I wanted to ensure this committee, and you, Mr.
Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member, of that fact.
During the past few weeks I have attended numerous events
to remember the tragic assault on our democracy that occurred
on
9/11. Each commemoration was a powerful reminder of why we
served, in memory of those whom we lost and in pursuit of our
noble mission to protect the homeland.
Today we face a diverse evolving threat landscape that
includes domestic and international terrorism, malicious cyber
activities, an on-going global pandemic, transnational climate
change, and more. Through the extraordinary talent and
dedication of the more than 250,000 individuals who comprise
our Department, we are meeting the challenge to protect our
homeland and keep our communities safe. Every day our
Department's personnel make tremendous sacrifices to achieve
this mission.
I would like to take a moment to describe the major threats
facing our country today and the work we are doing to combat
them.
First, we have built a multi-layered security and screening
and vetting architecture to combat the evolving terrorist
threat. We remain ever-vigilant to protecting the homeland from
foreign terrorists seeking to do us harm, the very reason for
the Department's creation, while combatting the most
significant and persistent terrorism related threat facing our
country today, which stems from both home-grown and domestic
violent extremists who are inspired by a broad range of
ideological motivations.
To meet this challenge DHS has established a dedicated
domestic terrorism branch within our Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, launched the Center for Prevention Programs and
Partnerships to provide communities with evidence-based tools
and resources to address early risk factors, and redoubled our
efforts to share timely and actionable information and
intelligence with our partners across every level of
Government.
This year, for the first time, we designated combatting
domestic violent extremism as a National priority area in FEMA
grant programs, resulting in at least $77 million being spent
on capabilities to detect and protect against these threats in
communities Nation-wide.
Second, as cyber threats have grown so have our efforts to
increase our Nation's cybersecurity resilience and protect our
critical infrastructure. Ransomware incidents are on the rise.
Last year victims paid an estimated $350 million in ransoms, a
311 percent increase over the prior year, with the average
payment exceeding $300,000. In July DHS launched
Stopransomware.gov to help private and public organization of
all sizes combat ransomware and adopt cybersecurity best
practices.
Our experts at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security agency, or CISA, stood up the Joint Cyber Defense
Collaborative to bring together partners from every level of
Government and the private sector to reduce cyber risks. To
better protect our critical infrastructure, TSA recently issued
two new security directives to strengthen the cybersecurity and
resilience of our Nation's pipelines.
CISA and our Office of Intelligence and Analysis are also
working with all 50 States, local jurisdictions, and election
technology experts to keep our elections secure.
To further lead the way, we are building a top-tier
cybersecurity work force by investing in the development of
diverse talent pipelines and building the expertise to keep
addressing changing threats.
Third, we continue making risk-based investments to keep
our borders secure, including from threats posed by
transnational criminal organizations. We are collaborating with
our international partners to disrupt these groups, combat
their illicit activities, like drug trafficking and human
smuggling, and hold accountable those with ties to their
logistical operations while streamlining multinational
cooperation on investigations and prosecutions.
Fourth, DHS continues to support Nation-wide efforts to
combat the on-going COVID-19 pandemic. FEMA has helped stand up
more than 800 community vaccination centers, including almost
200 mobile sites to more equitably increase access to COVID-19
vaccines across vulnerable and rural populations.
The Transportation Security Administration acted to protect
the health of the traveling public and transportation personnel
by implementing a Federal mask mandate at airports on
commercial aircraft and in various modes of surface
transportation. Meanwhile, the U.S. Secret Service and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement have partnered with other
Federal agencies to protect Americans from COVID-19-related
fraud and criminal activity, including by preventing more than
$3 billion of much-needed COVID-19 relief from fraudulently
ending up in the pockets of criminals.
Finally, we are countering the current and growing
existential threat posed by climate change. Hurricane Ida was
just the latest manifestation of a devastating reality: Natural
disasters, rising in intensity and destructive reach. However,
this threat is not new, nor is it unique to any region. To help
communities recover and remain resilient, President Biden
doubled the size of the Building Resilient Infrastructure and
Communities Program, pouring $1 billion into wildfire
resilience efforts, flood control initiatives, and much more.
DHS also authorized nearly $3.5 billion in hazard
mitigation grant program funding to help States, Tribes, and
territories adapt and prepare for the impacts of the climate
crisis. FEMA revised its policies to overcome historic
inequities in its aid programs and ensure a fairer and more
equitable distribution of assistance to minority, low-income,
and other disenfranchised communities.
Two decades after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security
remains focused on protecting our country from evolving
threats. We can execute this critical mission because of our
incredible work force and because of our key partners, the
Members of this committee, our counterparts abroad, the private
sector, non-governmental organizations, and local communities.
We will remain vigilant, resilient, and agile. We will do so to
continue countering the threats of today and of the next 20
years.
Thank you for your leadership and continued support. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mayorkas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alejandro N. Mayorkas
September 22, 2021
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members
of the committee, thank you for inviting me to join you today.
This month, we remember the 20th anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attacks that took thousands of American lives. Following that
tragic day, Congress passed significant reforms to reorganize our
Government's National security agencies. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) was created and charged with safeguarding the American
people, our homeland, and our values.
Today, our country faces a threat landscape that has evolved
significantly over the past 20 years. DHS confronts complex challenges,
including international and domestic terrorism, a global pandemic,
malicious cyber activity, transnational organized crime, and the
catastrophic impacts of climate change, among others. Our Department is
able to confront these challenges because of the extraordinary talent
and dedication of the more than 250,000 individuals who comprise our
workforce and serve our Nation.
terrorism
In the years immediately following 9/11, we focused on foreign
terrorists who sought to harm us within our borders and threaten our
interests and assets abroad. In partnership with Federal agencies
spanning the law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence
communities, DHS built a multi-layered screening and vetting
architecture to prevent certain individuals from traveling to or
entering our country by air, land, or sea. We also issued a call for
vigilance on the part of local communities and individuals alike.
The first major evolution of the terrorist threat emerged in the
form of the home-grown violent extremist (HVE)--the individual in
America who is radicalized by a foreign terrorist organization's
ideology. HVEs became the most prominent terrorism-related threat to
the homeland. In response, we partnered with law enforcement, first
responders, social workers, mental health experts, and local
communities to identify signs of radicalization and prevent violence
before it occurred.
That threat has continued to evolve. Today, U.S.-based lone actors
and small groups, including HVEs and domestic violent extremists (DVEs)
who are inspired by a broad range of ideological motivations, pose the
most significant and persistent terrorism-related threat to our
country. DVEs are motivated by various factors, including racial bias,
perceived Government overreach, conspiracy theories promoting violence,
and false narratives about unsubstantiated fraud in the 2020
Presidential election. Among DVEs, racially or ethnically motivated
violent extremists, including White supremacists (RMVE-WS), will likely
remain the most lethal DVE movement in the homeland. Since 2020,
however, we have also seen a significant increase in anti-Government
and anti-authority violent extremism, particularly from militia violent
extremists (MVEs), which typically target law enforcement, elected
officials, and Government personnel and facilities.
In June, the White House released the first-ever National Strategy
for Countering Domestic Terrorism to improve Federal response efforts.
In executing this strategy, DHS will:
(1) Focus on preventing terrorism and targeted violence, including
through threat assessments, grants, and community-based
prevention programs, as well as efforts to enhance public
awareness;
(2) Assess, evaluate, and mitigate the risk of violence inspired by
violent extremist narratives, including those narratives shared
via on-line platforms; and,
(3) Establish partnerships with non-Governmental organizations
(NGO's), including academia, and private-sector entities,
including technology and social media companies.
The National Strategy recognizes that on-line narratives espousing
attacks on our fellow citizens, institutions, and critical
infrastructure are a key factor in driving the radicalization and
mobilization to violence by some recent lone offenders. DHS has shared
analyses of this threat with our law enforcement partners at every
level of Government through formal information-sharing channels, and
with the American public through the National Terrorism Advisory System
(NTAS). This year, I have issued 3 NTAS bulletins to contextualize the
evolving threat landscape for the American people and provide
information about how to stay safe.
Our Department is redoubling its efforts to provide timely and
actionable intelligence and information to the broadest audience at the
lowest classification level possible. As a result, DHS is augmenting
its intelligence and information-sharing capabilities in collaboration
with other Government agencies; State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
campus law enforcement partners; and private-sector partners. This
includes publishing and disseminating intelligence bulletins that
provide our partners with greater insight into evolving threats, and
situational awareness notifications that inform public safety and
security planning efforts to prevent terrorism and targeted violence.
We are also reviewing how we can better access and use publicly-
available information to inform our analysis. DHS's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has enhanced its ability to analyze,
produce, and disseminate products that address DVE threats, including
violent extremist narratives shared via social media and other on-line
platforms. This year, I&A also established a dedicated domestic
terrorism branch that is leading our efforts to combat this threat.
Further, the newly-formed DHS Center for Prevention Programs and
Partnerships (CP3) is expanding our Department's ability to prevent
terrorism and targeted violence through the development of local
prevention frameworks. Through CP3, we are leveraging community-based
partnerships and evidence-based tools to address early risk factors and
ensure individuals receive help before they radicalize to violence.
As it relates to our continued focus on combatting international
terrorism, we are actively assessing the counterterrorism-related and
other threats that could develop over the coming months and years,
including those related to the fall of the government of Afghanistan,
and ensuring we have the resources and operational infrastructure
required to protect the homeland. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq
and ash-Sham, and other terrorist groups continue operating world-wide,
and the threat of these groups exploiting permissive environments to
plan and launch attacks against the United States will continue posing
challenges.
As I have said before, DHS is fundamentally a department of
partnerships. Our ability to execute our mission depends on strong
partnerships across every level of government, the private sector, and
local communities. DHS works closely with Homeland Security Advisors in
every State and territory to increase resiliency and preparedness
across our communities. Additionally, through our partnership with the
National Network of Fusion Centers, DHS deploys personnel to the field
to share information on a broad range of threats, including
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity. DHS also
partners with FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to detect,
disrupt and dismantle, and prosecute terrorists.
Further, this year, and for the first time, I designated combating
domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' for the
fiscal year 2021 State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) grant programs. Recipients of these grants
will be required to spend at least 7.5 percent of their awards on
combating DVE, meaning that States and local governments across our
Nation will spend at least $77 million in grant funding on capabilities
to detect and protect against these threats.
economic security
The United States continues to face counterintelligence and malign
threats by nation-state adversaries intent on gaining military and
economic dominance over our country. Of note, the People's Republic of
China (PRC) represents a critical threat to U.S. economic
competitiveness via its intellectual property theft, exploitation of
vulnerable supply chains, engagement in illicit trade, and use of
economic coercion. The PRC has mobilized vast resources to support its
industrial development and defense goals and will continue exploiting
U.S. academic institutions and our visa system to transfer valuable
research and intellectual property that Beijing calculates will provide
a military or economic advantage over the United States and other
nations.
DHS is uniquely positioned to support Federal Government efforts to
identify and counter these threats, from identifying instances of visa
fraud to discovering and preventing the illicit transfer of user-
collected data and/or proprietary research and technology. For example,
DHS has targeted illicit PRC-based manufacturers who have exploited the
COVID-19 pandemic by producing fraudulent or prohibited personal
protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies that especially
endanger our front-line workers, prohibited the use of certain
passenger and cargo screening equipment at airports from companies that
pose a significant risk to the National security or foreign policy
interests of the United States, leveraged technology to target and
interdict deadly fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances originating in
the PRC at our ports of entry, and prevented goods produced by forced
labor from entering our markets. DHS also continues to work closely
with the Department of State to prevent the exploitation of our
academic system to further the PRC's military and economic goals.
securing cyber space and emerging threats
Cyber threats from nation-states and state-sponsored and criminal
actors remain one of the most prominent threats facing our Nation. We
have recently seen numerous cybersecurity incidents impacting
organizations of all sizes and disrupting critical services, from the
SolarWinds supply chain compromise to the exploitation of
vulnerabilities found in Microsoft Exchange Servers and Pulse Connect
Secure devices, to ransomware affecting entities from Colonial Pipeline
to JBS Foods to Kaseya. The assaults on these companies, not to mention
interference in our elections, have reinforced the importance of
cybersecurity and how we preserve and defend an open, interoperable,
free, secure, and reliable internet, and stable cyber space.
Ransomware incidents continue to rise. Like most malicious cyber
activities, ransomware exploits the weakest link. In 2020, nearly 2,400
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, health care
facilities, and schools across our country were victims of ransomware.
That same year, victims paid an estimated $350 million in ransoms, a
311 percent increase over the prior year, with the average payment
exceeding $300,000. The Federal Government and our private-sector
partners must be prepared to respond to and recover from a cyber
incident, sustain critical functions even under degraded conditions,
and, in some cases, quickly restart critical functionality after
disruption.
This year, DHS has taken the following steps, among others, to
increase our Nation's cybersecurity resilience:
In February, I issued a call to action to tackle ransomware
more effectively, including by increasing National adoption of
the 9 cybersecurity steps CISA recommends taking to protect
against this threat. In July, together with the Department of
Justice and other Federal partners, DHS launched the first
whole-of-Government website that pools together Federal
resources to combat ransomware to help private and public
organizations mitigate their related risk. This website, called
StopRansomware.gov, is a one-stop hub to help individuals,
businesses, and other organizations better protect their
networks and know what to do if they become a victim of
malicious cyber activities.
As it relates to on-going cybersecurity threats to our
critical infrastructure, TSA issued 2 new security directives
after soliciting industry feedback to strengthen the
cybersecurity and resilience of our Nation's pipelines. The
first security directive required owners and operators of
critical pipelines to report confirmed and potential
cybersecurity incidents to CISA, designate a cybersecurity
coordinator to be available 24/7, review current practices, and
identify any gaps and related remediation measures to address
cyber-related risks and report the results to TSA and CISA
within 30 days. The second security directive required
implementation of specific mitigation measures to protect
against ransomware attack, develop and implement a
cybersecurity contingency and recovery plan, and conduct a
cybersecurity review.
In March, I announced a series of 60-day cybersecurity
sprints to elevate existing work, remove roadblocks, and launch
new initiatives. We are currently undertaking our fourth sprint
dedicated to the cybersecurity of transportation systems,
building on lessons learned from the Colonial Pipeline
ransomware attack and the TSA security directives to advance
greater cybersecurity and resilience across transportation
subsectors.
In August, the Coast Guard released its new Cyber Strategic
Outlook, the first update to this outlook since 2015. The
strategy focuses on mitigating cyber risks to critical maritime
systems essential to the Nation's economy and security,
defending the Coast Guard's networks, as well as leveraging the
Coast Guard's capabilities to protect the maritime
transportation system.
Also in August, CISA announced the creation of the Joint
Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) to lead the development and
execution of joint cyber defense planning with partners from
all levels of government and the private sector to reduce risk
before an incident and unify defensive actions when one occurs.
This initiative underscores the whole-of-society approach
needed to increase cybersecurity resilience.
The U.S. Secret Service has continued expanding its cyber
crime enforcement programs through the National Computer
Forensics Institute (NCFI), the Nation's premiere Federally-
funded training institute for State, local, Tribal, and
territorial law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges
in cyber crime investigations. The NCFI provides hands-on
training in ransomware response, digital evidence processing,
and applicable law for high-tech criminal prosecution and
adjudication.
DHS also continues leveraging its authorities to deliver
timely cyber threat-focused information to State, local,
Tribal, and territorial partners and the private sector at the
lowest possible classification level. To scale these efforts,
we are leveraging CISA, the U.S. Secret Service, and I&A to
increase access to this information among our partners and
stakeholders.
Further, DHS increased the required minimum spend on
cybersecurity via FEMA grant awards from 5 percent to 7.5
percent this year, representing an increase of $25 million. We
are also optimizing existing grant programs to improve the
cybersecurity capacity and capabilities of State, local,
Tribal, and territorial governments.
election security and malign foreign influence
DHS continues working closely with State, local, Tribal, and
territorial partners to ensure their election systems are protected
against interference. The Biden-Harris administration has continually
called out malign actors, such as the PRC, Russia, and Iran, that seek
to interfere in our elections and threaten our democratic institutions.
Since 2016, Russia has continued to amplify mis- and disinformation
about U.S. candidates for political office and the security of U.S.
election systems, with the goal of sowing divisiveness and confusion,
and weakening our democratic institutions. Iran continues to amplify
narratives about perceived sociopolitical divisions to exacerbate
domestic tensions. The PRC has consistently pushed conspiracy theories
about the COVID-19 pandemic, including about its origin. Russia, Iran,
and PRC, as well as other malign influence actors, also continue to
disseminate and amplify inaccurate information to international and
U.S. audiences about topics such as racial justice, false claims about
the 2020 Presidential election, the efficacy of U.S. COVID-19 vaccines
in comparison with Russian and Chinese vaccines, and our withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
Further, Iran, the PRC, and other authoritarian regimes continue to
target dissidents and human rights activists on U.S. soil. Known as
``transnational repression,'' these governments are increasingly
silencing exiles and members of diasporas--including activists,
dissidents, defectors, journalists, and other critics--living outside
their territorial borders. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to addressing this challenge as part of our broader commitment to stem
rising authoritarianism and prevent foreign influence and interference
in our society.
Through CISA and I&A, DHS works with our Federal partners, all 50
States, local jurisdictions, and election technology partners to ensure
they have the resources they need to keep our elections secure and
resilient. For example, CISA has provided more than 600 cybersecurity
services to the election community, including cyber hygiene scans, risk
and vulnerability assessments, phishing assessments, and other
services. In the last year, CISA's informational products have reached
over 3,500 election officials, offering scalable and customizable tools
to improve infrastructure security and build awareness of CISA's
resources and services. Further, CISA, through the Elections
Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), has
deployed intrusion detection devices to all 50 States and over 400
local jurisdictions and territories. All 50 States and over 3,000 local
and territorial officials also receive threat alerts from the EI-ISAC.
immigration and border security
The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding a fair,
orderly, and humane immigration system. DHS continues enforcing our
immigration laws and responsibly managing our border, while restoring
fairness and efficiency in our immigration system. We are safer when we
take a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to border management
and ensure that policies and procedures at our borders are consistent
with our immigration laws and our values.
We currently face 3 linked and significant challenges along our
Southwest Border. First, the surge of migrants, including unaccompanied
children, encountered at and between ports of entry. Second,
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) seeking to profit from a
range of illicit activity. Third, the on-going impacts of COVID-19 on
the DHS personnel responding to these challenges.
To address these challenges, DHS has leveraged FEMA's coordination
capabilities, activated our volunteer workforce, and expanded
processing capacity. We are also helping the Department of Health and
Human Services increase its capacity to accept transfers and manage the
care and custody of unaccompanied children efficiently and
expeditiously, as required by the Flores Settlement Agreement, Homeland
Security Act of 2002, and Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008. DHS also continues to enforce the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Title 42 public health order.
At the same time, the Department must continue to address increased
levels of irregular migration, much of which has been exacerbated by
TCOs activity. In consultation with the CDC, DHS has developed,
implemented, and continuously evaluates a multi-layered approach for
COVID-19 testing among noncitizens encountered along the Southwest
Border where practical.
The Biden-Harris administration is committed to stemming the flow
of irregular migration and comprehensively addressing the long-standing
challenges that drive this migration. Although there is no quick, easy,
or single solution that will adequately address these challenges, we
are taking the following steps:
First, the most sustainable solution is to address the root
causes that drive people to migrate in the first place. To this
end, we are engaging with foreign governments and other
partners to address the insecurity, violence, corruption, and
systemic poverty that drive people from their homes.
Second, we are working with foreign governments and
international humanitarian organizations to provide potential
migrants with meaningful opportunities to seek humanitarian
protections as close to home as possible. These opportunities
should include refugee resettlement and family reunification
programs to the United States and other countries in the
region, and regional relocation and integration programs. We
must also expand seasonal and temporary employment-based non-
immigrant visa programs to provide alternative pathways for
those migrating primarily for economic reasons.
Third, we are ensuring shared responsibility with other
countries in the region by supporting their efforts to improve
their asylum capacities.
Fourth, we are seeking to dramatically improve our system
for processing migrants at the border and adjudicating their
asylum claims in a fair and timely way.
Finally, we are marshaling our enforcement resources to
deliver accountability in a fair and effective way.
While these efforts will dramatically improve migration management
in the region and help restore safe and orderly processing at the
border, they will take time. Addressing long-standing challenges cannot
be accomplished overnight.
transnational criminal organizations (tcos)
TCOs and their smuggling operations present a clear and present
threat to the homeland. These organizations--which profit from illicit
activities that include fraud and large-scale theft, drug trafficking,
wildlife and timber trafficking, extortion, sex trafficking, child
exploitation, and human smuggling--are agile and adept at adjusting
their operations. DHS continues making risk-based investments in our
border security mission to combat TCOs and related threats.
For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
leverages its Border Enforcement Security Task Force to bring together
officers from more than 100 different law enforcement agencies to
combat TCOs. This Task Force employs a broad range of Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and international law enforcement authorities and
resources to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle these
organizations at every level. This model has closed the gap between
international partners in multinational criminal investigations.
Further, in collaboration with Federal and international partners,
DHS announced Operational Sentinel, a counter-network targeting
operation to hold accountable those with ties to TCO logistical
operations. The Operation leverages law enforcement authorities to
identify TCO targets and their foreign and domestic associates and
assets, and it employs a series of targeted enforcement actions and
sanctions against them. Such actions include, for example, denying
access to travel through the revocation of travel documents, the
suspension and debarment of trade entities, and the freezing of bank
accounts and other financial assets tied to TCO logistical networks.
ICE also administers mobile, biometric data collection programs to
disrupt and dismantle TCOs by strengthening international partners' law
enforcement investigations, border security, and counterterrorism
efforts. Further, ICE leads Transnational Criminal Investigative Units
(TCIUs) in more than a dozen countries to facilitate rapid bilateral
cooperation on investigations and prosecutions related to weapons
trafficking and counter-proliferation, money laundering and bulk cash
smuggling, human and narcotics trafficking, other customs-related
fraud, child exploitation, and cyber crime.
extreme weather events and climate change resilience
DHS is committed to combatting the climate crisis and mitigating
climate change-related risks, which impact our National and economic
security. This year, we are once again facing an historic hurricane
season while simultaneously fighting unprecedented wildfires. Hurricane
Ida recently caused death and destruction from the Gulf Coast to the
Northeast. At the same time, the Dixie and Caldor Fires, two of the
largest wildfires in the history of the State, burned in California. So
far, President Biden has declared major disasters in 4 States for
Hurricane Ida and 2 major disasters in California for the fires, making
much-needed Federal assistance available through FEMA and other Federal
agencies. FEMA is committed to working with affected States and
communities to respond and rebuild in a resilient manner.
Sea-level rise, extreme weather events, drought, and other direct,
indirect, and cumulative consequences of climate change will continue
to threaten lives, essential functions, and infrastructure across the
United States. Simply put, we are facing an existential climate crisis
that poses a current and growing threat to our way of life. Under the
Biden-Harris administration, DHS is taking urgent action to address
these increasing threats. The steps taken include the following:
President Biden authorized $3.46 billion in Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program funding, which States, Tribes, and
territories will utilize on mitigation projects to reduce the
impacts of climate change.
In April, DHS launched a Climate Change Action Group
comprised of senior officials from across the Department to
focus on promoting resilience and addressing multiple risks,
including flooding, extreme heat, drought, and wildfires.
DHS has leveraged the Building Resilient Infrastructure and
Communities (BRIC) program--the funding for which President
Biden doubled to $1 billion--to create incentives and funding
to help our Nation address these threats. Our initial BRIC
selections include wildfire resilience programs, flood control
programs, small town coastal hazard mitigation plans, and more.
We have upgraded our National Risk Index, which provides
communities unprecedented clarity about the risks they face and
thus helps equip them to act to reduce those risks.
DHS has released new guidance on cost-effective methods for
increasing local resilience.
FEMA revised its policies governing individual assistance to
overcome historic inequities adversely impacting minority, low-
income, and other disenfranchised communities, to ensure a more
equitable distribution of funds.
FEMA also authorized the funding of mitigation measures
through individual assistance to allow homeowners affected by
disasters to repair their homes in a way that will protect
against future damage.
Much more is on the way.
covid-19 response
On his first day in office, President Biden challenged FEMA to
stand up 100 Federally-supported Community Vaccination Centers (CVCs)
within 30 days. Before the end of February, FEMA was supporting over
400 CVCs. Today, there are almost 800 active sites, including almost
200 mobile sites still receiving Federal support. President Biden also
challenged DHS to deliver 100 million vaccinations Nation-wide in 100
days, a goal we surpassed. We are particularly focused on ensuring
vaccine equity. To this end, FEMA worked with partners in 39 sites
across the country to provide a supplemental allocation of vaccines
above and beyond State, Tribal, and territorial allocations and
utilized mobile vaccination sites to increase access to COVID-19
vaccines among vulnerable and rural populations.
To protect the traveling public and transportation personnel, and
pursuant to President Biden's Executive Order on Promoting COVID-19
Safety in Domestic and International Travel, TSA issued on February 2,
2021 a Federal mask mandate at airports, on commercial aircraft, and in
various modes of surface transportation, including passenger railroads
and other public transportation. On September 9, 2021, TSA increased
the range of civil penalties that can be imposed on individuals who
violate this Federal mask mandate, to reinforce its importance to
public health and safety.
Further, CISA developed voluntary guidance for the Essential
Critical Infrastructure Workforce that has helped officials and
organizations identify essential work functions during the COVID-19
pandemic.
ICE launched Operation Stolen Promise to protect American consumers
and first responders by combatting COVID-19-related fraud and criminal
activity. Through this operation, ICE and its partners have seized over
$54 million in illicit proceeds, made 359 arrests, served 356 criminal
search warrants, opened over 1,250 criminal investigations, and seized
more than 2,200 mislabeled, fraudulent, unauthorized, or prohibited
COVID-19 vaccines, test kits, PPE, and other medical items. Further,
the U.S. Secret Service--through its network of Cyber Fraud Task Forces
and in partnership with law enforcement agencies across every level of
government, State-employment agencies, and financial institutions--has
prevented more than $3 billion of much-needed COVID-19 relief from
fraudulently ending up in the pockets of criminals.
conclusion
Twenty years after the tragic day of 9/11, the threats facing our
country have significantly evolved and the global threat landscape is
no less daunting. Those who wish to do us harm now have social media,
encrypted apps, and other modern tools that enhance their ability to
carry out attacks, sow discord, undermine our democracy and
institutions, and erode our way of life.
At the same time, DHS continues to evolve to remain nimble enough
to address the dynamism of not only the threat landscape confronting
our Nation today, but also the threats, both seen and unseen, of
tomorrow and of the next 20 years. We will do so with the commitment to
protecting the security of both our homeland and our values. We will do
so through the incredible dedication and talent of the public servants
in the Department of Homeland Security.
Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
I now ask Director Wray to summarize his statement. I know
it might be a little more than 5 minutes, but just we look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to you and
to Ranking Member Katko and to Members of the committee. I am
honored to be here today to discuss the many threats facing our
homeland.
A week-and-a-half ago we marked a somber, really sacred
anniversary in this country: The 20th anniversary of the
September 11 attacks. September 11 reminds us of evil and loss
and nearly 3,000 victims taken from us that day and from their
families. It also though reminds us of sacrifice and
selflessness, of common purpose, it reminds us of the first
responders and everyday heroes we lost that day and all those
who suffered illness as a result of their selfless work after
the attacks, including members of our FBI family. Still, two
decades later our response to September 11 and the lessons
learned from those attacks drive our approach to combatting all
the many threats Americans face today.
It was 9/11 after all that turned the FBI into an agency
focused on disrupting threats and to building deeper and even
more effective partnerships, both here at home and around the
world.
Good thing we made those changes because as we will discuss
this morning, there is no shortage of dangers to defend
against. Just a flavor before we even get to terrorism, on the
cyber front we are now investigating over 100 different types
of ransomware, each of them with scores of victims. That is on
top of hundreds of other criminal and National security cyber
threats that we are working against every day.
In our violent crime work, we recently arrested over 600
gang members in a single month. That is just 1 month.
Protecting our Nation's innovation, we are opening a new
China counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours. Every
day we receive thousands of tips to our National Threat
Operations Center, many of which require imminent action
against threats to life.
That list goes on and one and I am not going to have time
to discuss most of them before we get started, but I do want to
spend a few minutes on terrorism and the challenges facing
those protecting us against it.
Preventing terrorist attacks remains our top priority, both
now and for the foreseeable future. Today the greatest
terrorist threat we face here in the United States is from what
are in effect lone actors. Because they act alone and move
quickly from radicalization to action, often using easily
obtainable weapons against soft targets, these attackers don't
leave a lot of dots for investigators to connect or time in
which to connect them.
We continue to see individuals here at home inspired by
Jihadist ideologies, espoused by foreign terrorist
organizations, like ISIS and al-Qaeda, what we would call
``home-grown violent extremists''. But we are also countering
lone domestic violent extremists, radicalized by personalized
grievances, ranging from racial or ethnic bias to anti-
authority or anti-Government sentiment to conspiracy theories.
There is no doubt about it, today's threat is different from
what it was 20 years ago and it will most certainly continue to
change.
So to stay in front of it, we have got to adapt too. That
is why over the last year-and-a-half the FBI has pushed even
more resources to our domestic terrorism investigations. Since
the spring of 2020, so about 16-17 months ago, we have more
than doubled our domestic terrorism caseload, from about 1,000
to around 2,700 investigations. We have surged personnel to
match, more than doubling the number of people working the
threat from a year before.
But we are also surging against threats by terrorist
organizations like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab. Their
operatives continue to search for vulnerabilities and have not
stopped trying to carry out large-scale attacks against us. We
are certainly watching the evolving situation in Afghanistan.
Now, 9/11 was 20 years ago, but for us at the FBI, as I
know it does for my colleagues testifying here with me today,
it represents a danger that we focus on every single day. Make
no mistake, the danger is real. Our adversaries are committed
and they are working to succeed just once where we are working
to bat 1,000. so we are working side-by-side with our partners
to identify and stop would-be attackers before they act.
Just within the past couple of years we thwarted potential
terrorist attacks in areas like Las Vegas, Tampa, New York,
Cleveland, Kansas City, Miami, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. Now,
we are proud of our successes, but we need to stay on the balls
of our feet, relentlessly vigilant against the next plot of our
adversaries and their next attempts to attack us.
Our work force has been battling the threat of terrorism
and every other threat we face right through the teeth of a
pandemic and rising danger to their own safety. I add that last
part because over the past year we have seen a sharp and deeply
disturbing uptick in violence against the law enforcement
community.
In just the first 8 months of this year, 52 law enforcement
officers have been feloniously killed on the job. To put that
into context, that is an officer murdered every 5 days, and
that is more than all of 2020. Of course that doesn't even
count all those who died in the line of duty facing the many
other inherent dangers of this job, much less the scores of
officers, agents, analysts, and other dedicated professionals
who lost their lives to COVID-19.
We will be forever indebted for their bravery and their
sacrifice and are determined to honor them all through the way
we do our work while we remain focused on our ultimate mission,
protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.
Thank you for taking the time to hear from me today and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray
September 22, 2021
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members
of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the
threats facing our homeland.
A week-and-a-half ago, we marked a somber anniversary in this
country--20 years since the September 11 attacks.
September 11 represents evil and loss. But it also represents
sacrifice and selflessness. It represents grit and resilience and
strength in the face of great adversity. And 2 decades later, it has
come to represent the FBI's continued ability to adapt to a changing
world, and to stay laser-focused on keeping our country safe from
another attack like that one.
About 2 years after the 9/11 attacks, when I was the assistant
attorney general overseeing the Justice Department's terrorism
portfolio, I had the chance to meet with members of the victims'
families. Those families and their stories left an impression that I'll
never forget. The kind of knee-buckling grief those families
experienced--that sense that something you held most precious was
stolen from you--never goes away.
Of course, we can't think of 9/11 without recalling the sacrifices
made on that day and the days after. We continue to honor members of
the FBI family who died that day; our FBI brothers and sisters who have
since lost their lives to illnesses resulting from their work after the
attacks; and those fighting grave illnesses today. These selfless men
and women thought of others first and answered the call of duty, no
matter the cost.
I would like to talk a bit about how the FBI has transformed in the
past 2 decades, and how the threats we face today have evolved during
that time.
fbi transformation
Twenty years ago, I was working in senior leadership at the
Department of Justice. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, I was at
FBI Headquarters, in the Strategic Information and Operations Center,
with Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashcroft.
Although it was a chaotic, horrifying time, it was also a time of
incredible solidarity. Everyone there that day had one purpose, and
that was to make sure that what we had just experienced as a Nation
would never, ever happen again.
For a long time, we lived in a haze that seemed like September 12,
day after day after day. Every lead, every tip, every threat seemed
like it could be the next one. We kept asking ourselves, ``What could
we have done better? What should we have done better?'' And now every
day, we wake up asking ourselves, ``What do we need to do to keep
people safe today . . . and tomorrow . . . and the day after that?''
Under Director Mueller's leadership, the FBI made a paradigm shift,
dramatically expanding National security operations, and changing the
way we did business: Shifting to focus intently on disrupting attacks
before they occur and on working with and through our partners around
the world and at every level of government here at home. When I left
the Department of Justice in 2005, those changes were still in their
infancy. When I take stock of where things stand now, all these years
later, I am astounded by the progress.
It is incredible to see first-hand the capabilities we have built
with our partners here and around the world. Today we are all stronger,
smarter, and better able to confront the threats we face.
Preventing terrorist attacks, from any place, by any actor, remains
the FBI's top priority. The nature of the threat posed by terrorism--
both international terrorism (``IT'') and domestic terrorism (``DT'')--
continues to evolve.
To meet that evolving threat, the FBI has surged resources to our
domestic terrorism investigations in the last year, increasing
personnel by 260 percent. Importantly, however, our increased focus on
domestic terrorism is not at the expense of our work on other terrorism
threats. We continue to monitor potential threats by foreign terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS, which have never stopped
expressing their intent to carry out large-scale attacks like 9/11 here
in the United States. We are also monitoring other dangerous groups
like Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Of course, in addition to terrorism threats, we also face a wide
array of cyber threats from nation-state and criminal actors alike;
persistent counterintelligence threats from the People's Republic of
China (``P.R.C.''), Russia, Iran, and North Korea; and the full
spectrum of criminal threats, from hate crimes and other civil rights
abuses to violent crime spikes in cities across this country, to human
trafficking and crimes against children, just to name a few.
But no matter which threats have dominated the landscape over the
last 20 years, the FBI has remained focused on prevention and
disruption--sharing intelligence and making arrests before criminals
and terrorists can act. And we have remained focused on our ultimate
mission: Protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.
capitol violence
First and foremost, I want to assure you, your staff, and the
American people that the FBI has deployed our full investigative
resources and is working closely with our Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and territorial partners to aggressively pursue those involved
in criminal activity during the events of January 6, 2021. We are
working hard to identify those responsible for the violence and
destruction of property at the U.S. Capitol building.
FBI Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and professional staff
have been hard at work gathering evidence, sharing intelligence, and
working with Federal prosecutors to bring charges against the
individuals involved. As we have said consistently, we do not and will
not tolerate violent extremists who use the guise of First Amendment-
protected activity to engage in violent criminal activity. Thus far,
the FBI has arrested hundreds of individuals with regards to rioting,
assault on a Federal officer, property crimes violations, and
conspiracy charges, and the work continues. Overall, the FBI assesses
that the January 6 siege of the Capitol Complex demonstrates a
willingness by some to use violence against the Government in
furtherance of their political and social goals. This ideologically-
motivated violence--domestic terrorism--underscores the symbolic nature
of the National Capital Region and the willingness of some Domestic
Violent Extremists to travel to events in this area and violently
engage law enforcement and their perceived adversaries. The American
people should rest assured that we will continue to work to hold
accountable those individuals who participated in the violent breach of
the Capitol on January 6 and any others who attempt to use violence to
intimidate, coerce, or influence the American people or affect the
conduct of our Government.
top terrorism threats
There are some commonalities between the IT and DT threats, most
importantly the danger posed by lone actors or small cells who
typically radicalize on-line and look to attack soft targets with
easily accessible weapons. Individuals who commit violent criminal acts
in furtherance of social or political goals stemming from domestic
influences--some of which include racial or ethnic bias, or anti-
Government or anti-authority sentiments--are described as Domestic
Violent Extremists (``DVEs''), whereas individuals who are inspired
primarily by global jihad but are not receiving individualized
direction from Foreign Terrorist Organizations (``FTOs'') are known as
Homegrown Violent Extremists (``HVEs''). Both of these threats, which
together form the most significant terrorism danger to our country, are
located primarily in the United States and typically radicalize and
mobilize to violence on their own.
DVEs and HVEs are often motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-
political, ideological, and personal grievances against their targets,
and more recently have focused on accessible targets including
civilians, houses of worship, retail locations, and mass public
gatherings. Selecting these types of soft targets, in addition to the
insular nature of their radicalization and mobilization to violence and
limited discussions with others regarding their plans, increases the
challenge faced by law enforcement to detect and disrupt the activities
of lone actors before they occur. Some violent extremists have also
continued to target law enforcement and the military as well as symbols
or members of the U.S. Government.
The top threats we face from DVEs are from those we categorize as
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (``RMVEs'') and
Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists. While RMVEs who
advocate for the superiority of the White race were the primary source
of lethal attacks perpetrated by DVEs in 2018 and 2019, Anti-Government
or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists--specifically, Militia Violent
Extremists and Anarchist Violent Extremists--were responsible for 3 of
the 4 lethal DVE attacks in 2020. Notably, this included the first
lethal attack committed by an Anarchist Violent Extremist in over 20
years.
Consistent with our mission, the FBI holds sacred the rights of
individuals to peacefully exercise their First Amendment freedoms.
Regardless of their specific ideology, the FBI will aggressively pursue
those who seek to hijack legitimate First Amendment-protected activity
by engaging in violent criminal activity such as the destruction of
property and violent assaults on law enforcement officers that we
witnessed on January 6 and during protests throughout the United States
during the summer of 2020. The FBI will actively pursue the opening of
FBI investigations when an individual uses--or threatens the use of--
force, violence, or coercion, in violation of Federal law and in the
furtherance of social or political goals.
The FBI assesses that HVEs pose the greatest, most immediate IT
threat to the homeland. They typically are not receiving individualized
direction from global jihad-inspired FTOs but are inspired largely by
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (``ISIS'') and al-Qaeda to
commit violence. HVEs' lack of a direct connection to an FTO, their
ability to rapidly mobilize without detection, and their use of
encrypted communications pose significant challenges to our ability to
proactively identify and disrupt them.
The FBI remains concerned that FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda,
intend to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United
States. As we saw in the murder in Kabul last month of 13 brave
American service men and women and nearly 200 Afghans, ISIS remains
relentless in its campaign of violence against the United States and
our partners--both here at home and overseas. To this day, ISIS
continues to aggressively promote its hate-fueled rhetoric and attract
like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to conduct attacks
against the United States and our interests abroad. ISIS' successful
use of social media and messaging applications to attract individuals
seeking a sense of belonging is of continued concern to us. Like other
foreign terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone offender attacks in
the United States and Western countries via videos and other English
language propaganda that have at times specifically advocated for
attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and other
Government personnel.
Al-Qaeda maintains its desire to both conduct and inspire large-
scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded
some of the group's senior leadership, in the near term, we assess that
al-Qaeda is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its
international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable
attacks, including attacks against the interests of the United States
and other Western nations, in regions such as East and West Africa.
Over the past year, propaganda from al-Qaeda leaders continued to seek
to inspire individuals to conduct attacks in the United States and
other Western nations. We expect those attempts to continue.
Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia
militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States
and our allies throughout the Middle East in response to U.S. pressure.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'')
continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and
terrorist organizations. Lebanese Hizballah, Iran's primary strategic
partner, has sent operatives to build terrorist infrastructures world-
wide. Hizballah also continues to conduct intelligence collection,
financial activities, and procurement efforts world-wide to support its
terrorist capabilities. FBI arrests in recent years of alleged Iranian
and Hizballah operatives in the United States suggest the government of
Iran and Hizballah each seek to establish infrastructure here,
potentially for the purpose of conducting operational or contingency
planning. IRGC-QF Commander Esmail Ghani and Hizballah Secretary
General Hasan Nasrallah have each threatened retaliation for the death
of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani.
As an organization, we continually adapt and rely heavily on the
strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
international partnerships to combat all terrorist threats to the
United States and our interests. To that end, we use all available
lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats
while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence concerning
the threat posed by violent extremists, in all their forms, who desire
to harm Americans and U.S. interests. We will continue to share
information and encourage the sharing of information among our numerous
partners via our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and
our Legal Attache offices around the world.
cyber
In the last decade, while professionals toiled against a steady
drumbeat of malicious cyber activities, typically only one or two major
cyber incidents captured the Nation's attention each year: The Sony
Pictures hack in 2014, the announcement of the OPM data breach incident
in 2015, Russian election interference in 2016, and the WannaCry
ransomware and NotPetya attacks of 2017. This past year, a steady
stream of high-profile cyber incidents has garnered world-wide
attention, beginning with the SolarWinds incident at the very end of
2020; followed by the Microsoft Exchange Server intrusions revealed in
March; significant exploitation of Pulse Secure vulnerabilities in
April; and then ransomware attacks against Colonial Pipeline, JBS USA,
and customers of Kaseya between May and July, among thousands of other
incidents targeting victims in the United States and world-wide.
Throughout the last year, the FBI has seen a wider-than-ever range
of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and confidence in
our digitally-connected world. Cyber-criminal syndicates and nation-
states keep innovating to compromise our networks and maximize the
reach and impact of their operations, such as by selling malware as a
service or by targeting vendors to access scores of victims by hacking
just one provider.
With each significant cyber incident, our surge to the affected
victim serves a host of purposes at once. The evidence and intelligence
we develop helps that victim effectively detect and remediate the
intrusion; identifies other victims and potential future targets of the
same actors that we can notify and work with our partners to assist;
and develops the attribution to and knowledge of the adversary that we
as a Government need to effectively respond. When other incident
responders leave the scene, our work to analyze the evidence, identify
those responsible, and hold them accountable can continue for months,
even years. In the SolarWinds investigation, just one field office
collected more than 170 terabytes of data--that's 17 times the content
housed within the Library of Congress in one office for one
investigation. We bought tens of thousands of dollars of new servers
just to house the data, but that doesn't begin to take into account the
time and talent it takes to exploit it, share it, and act upon it.
The situation is not sustainable, and it's not acceptable. Cyber
criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise our
networks, steal our property, and hold our critical infrastructure at
risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the last year alone, we
have seen--and have publicly called out--the P.R.C., North Korea, and
Russia for using cyber operations to target U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and
research. We have seen the far-reaching disruptive impact a serious
supply chain compromise can have through the SolarWinds intrusions,
conducted by the Russian SVR. We have seen the P.R.C. working to obtain
controlled defense technology and developing the ability to use cyber
means to complement any future real-world conflict. We also recently
unsealed an indictment against four P.R.C. Nationals working with the
Ministry of State Security. The 4 individuals were charged with a
campaign to hack into the computer systems of dozens of victims while
trying to obtain information with significant economic benefit to the
P.R.C. Iran used cyber means to try to sow divisions and undermine our
elections, targeting voters before the November election, and
threatening election officials after. North Korea's cyber capabilities
have increased in recent years, posing a particular threat to financial
institutions and a growing cyber espionage threat.
As dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of
focusing on them alone. Ransomware has always been treated by the FBI
as a serious cyber-criminal threat. But as the President has observed,
ransomware has evolved into a National security issue, affecting the
critical infrastructure we can least afford to be without. Last year,
there was a 20 percent increase in the number of ransomware incidents
reported to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center and a 225 percent
increase in ransom amounts. Unfortunately, ransomware incidents are not
only becoming more common, but also more dangerous. Ransomware
incidents in the past year have hit victims in nearly every critical
infrastructure sector. While attacks against Colonial Pipeline and JBS
USA made National headlines, ransomware actors have also targeted
hospitals and medical centers, putting patients' lives at an increased
risk at a time when America faces its most dire public health crisis in
generations. While we are bringing our unique dual criminal and
National security authorities to the fight, we recognize that we cannot
fully combat this threat without international cooperation. We have
been working with our partners in the State Department and the National
Security Council to increase pressure on countries that consistently
fail to take action to stop ransomware actors in their territory,
particularly Russia. We will continue to tackle the ransomware threat
through a whole-of-Government approach, but we also need foreign
nations to do their part to keep cyber criminals from acting with
impunity within their borders.
Dark web vendors who sell capabilities in exchange for
cryptocurrency are making it more difficult for us to stop what would
once have been less dangerous offenders. Although once a ring of
relatively unsophisticated criminals, these actors are now armed with
the tools to paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, and
businesses with ransomware. It is not that individual hackers alone
have necessarily become much more sophisticated, but--unlike
previously--they are able to rent sophisticated capabilities.
We have to make it harder and more painful for hackers to steal our
intellectual property and hold our networks at risk. That is why I
announced a new FBI cyber strategy last year, using the FBI's role as
the lead Federal agency with law enforcement and intelligence
responsibilities to not only pursue our own disruptive actions, but to
work seamlessly with our domestic and international partners to defend
networks, attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take
the fight to our adversaries overseas.
FBI's strategy of using our information to enable our partners has
been successful in taking down cyber criminal enterprises. Each success
has this in common: Multiple U.S. agencies working--often with multiple
international partners--to bring our information and tools together to
achieve the most significant, durable impact. One example of this
approach is the international takedown in January 2021 of the Emotet
botnet, which enabled a network of cyber criminals to cause hundreds of
millions of dollars in damages to Government, educational, and
corporate networks. The FBI used sophisticated techniques, our unique
legal authorities, and, most importantly, our world-wide partnerships
to significantly disrupt the malware, working with an unprecedented
number of international law enforcement agencies.
Also this January, we worked with Canada and Bulgaria to disrupt
NetWalker, a ransomware variant that paralyzed companies,
municipalities, hospitals, law enforcement agencies, emergency
services, school districts, colleges, and universities. We obtained
Federal charges, seized more than $450,000 in cryptocurrency, and the
United States requested Canada's arrest of a subject who is facing
extradition proceedings.
Our joint efforts extend to our partners in private industry,
especially those providers that have unique visibility into how
adversaries are exploiting U.S. networks. In March, cybersecurity
companies including Microsoft disclosed that hackers--who have since
been identified as affiliated with the P.R.C.'s Ministry of State
Security--were using previously-unknown Microsoft Exchange
vulnerabilities to access email servers that companies physically keep
on their premises rather than in the cloud. These ``zero day''
vulnerabilities allowed the P.R.C. actors to potentially exploit victim
networks such as by grabbing login credentials, stealing email messages
in bulk, and installing malicious programs (``web shells'') allowing
the hackers to send commands to the victim network. First, the FBI put
out a joint advisory with the Department of Homeland Security's
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (``CISA'') to give
network defenders the technical information they needed to mitigate the
vulnerability. However, while many infected system owners successfully
removed the web shells, others were not able to do so. That left many
systems vulnerable to Chinese cyber actors who could continue to steal
information, or potentially even execute a destructive attack.
We thought that risk was unacceptable, especially when it was
within our authorities to do something about it. So, we used those
authorities, through a court-authorized operation in partnership with
the private sector, to remove malicious web shells from hundreds of
vulnerable computers in the United States running Microsoft Exchange
Server software. The P.R.C. propped open back doors throughout U.S.
networks. We slammed them shut.
These are the incidents that garner the most attention, but behind
the scenes the FBI took upwards of 1,100 actions against cyber
adversaries last year, including arrests, criminal charges,
convictions, dismantlements, and disruptions; and enabled many more
actions through our dedicated partnerships with the private sector,
foreign partners, and at the Federal, State, and local level. In some
instances, we were also able to seize cyber criminals' ill-gotten
gains, with the most publicized example being the seizure of $2.3
million in cryptocurrency paid to the DarkSide ransomware group that
targeted Colonial Pipeline.
We have been putting a lot of energy and resources into all of
those partnerships, especially with the private sector. We are working
hard to push important threat information to network defenders, while
also been making it as easy as possible for the private sector to share
important information with us. We emphasize how we keep our presence
unobtrusive in the wake of a breach, how we protect information that
the private sector shares with us and commit to providing useful
information back, and how we coordinate with our Government partners so
that we are speaking with one voice.
But we need the private sector to do its part, too. We need the
private sector to come forward to warn us quickly when they see
malicious cyber activity. We also need the private sector to work with
us when we warn them that they are being targeted. The recent examples
of significant cyber incidents only emphasize what I have been saying
for a long time: The Government cannot protect against cyber threats on
its own. We need a whole-of-society approach that matches the scope of
the danger. We wholeheartedly support the administration's view that
legislation is needed to require reporting of significant cyber
incidents, including ransomware attacks, cyber incidents that affect
critical infrastructure entities, and other incidents that implicate
heightened risks to the Government, the public, or third parties. There
is really no other option for defending a country where the vast
majority of our critical infrastructure, personal data, intellectual
property, and network infrastructure sits in private hands.
foreign malign influence
Our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking to
both influence our National policies and public opinion, and cause harm
to our National dialog. The FBI and our interagency partners remain
concerned about, and focused on, malign influence measures used by
certain adversaries in their attempts to sway U.S. voters' preferences
and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United
States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our
democratic processes.
Foreign malign influence operations--which include subversive,
undeclared, coercive, and criminal actions by foreign governments to
influence U.S. political sentiment or public discourse or interfere in
our democratic processes themselves--are not a new problem. But the
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of
the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and
its partners must address it. Foreign malign influence operations have
taken many forms and used many tactics over the years. Most widely
reported these days are attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide
swath of Americans covertly from outside the United States--to use
false personas and fabricated stories on social media platforms to
discredit U.S. individuals and institutions.
The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating
foreign malign influence operations. In the fall of 2017, we
established the Foreign Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and
counteract malign foreign influence operations targeting the United
States. The FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and is
comprised of agents, analysts, and professional staff from the
Counterintelligence, Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Criminal
Investigative Divisions. It is specifically charged with identifying
and combating foreign malign influence operations targeting democratic
institutions and values inside the United States. In all instances, the
FITF strives to protect democratic institutions; develop a common
understanding of threats with our interagency partners; raise
adversaries' costs; and disrupt foreign malign influence operations and
enablers in the United States and world-wide.
While we are keenly focused on threats to elections, those events
are not the only aspects of our democracy that are being threatened.
Our adversaries are also targeting the very fabric of our civil
discourse and are targeting policy processes at every level of
government--State, local, and Federal. The FITF brings the FBI's
National security and traditional criminal investigative expertise
under one umbrella to better understand and combat these complex and
nuanced threats. This cross-programmatic approach allows the FBI to
identify connections across programs, to aggressively investigate as
appropriate, and--importantly--to be more agile. Coordinating closely
with our partners and leveraging relationships we have developed in the
technology sector, we regularly relay threat indicators that those
companies use to take swift action, blocking budding abuse of their
platforms.
Following the 2018 mid-term elections, we reviewed the threat and
the effectiveness of our coordination and outreach. As a result of this
review, we further expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our
efforts to combat foreign malign influence focused solely on the threat
posed by Russia. Using lessons learned from the 2018 mid-term
elections, the FITF widened its aperture to confront foreign malign
operations of the P.R.C., Iran, and other global adversaries. To
address this expanding focus and wider set of adversaries and influence
efforts, we have also added resources to maintain permanent coverage of
foreign malign influence threats, including threats to our elections.
These additional resources were also devoted to working with U.S.
Government partners on two documents regarding the U.S. Government's
analysis of foreign efforts to influence or interfere with the 2020
Election. The reports are separate but complementary and were published
earlier this year. The first report--referred to as the 1a report and
authored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--
outlines the intentions of foreign adversaries with regard to
influencing and interfering with the election but does not evaluate
impact. The second report--referred to as the 1b report and authored by
the Department of Justice, including the FBI, and Department of
Homeland Security, including CISA--evaluates the impact of foreign
government activity on the security or integrity of election
infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining to political organizations,
candidates, or campaigns.
The main takeaway from both reports is that there is no evidence--
not through intelligence collection on the foreign actors themselves,
not through physical security and cybersecurity monitoring of voting
systems across the country, not through post-election audits, and not
through any other means--that a foreign government or other actors
compromised election infrastructure to manipulate election results.
Another way in which foreign governments reach across borders to
influence and target diaspora communities in the United States is
through ``transnational repression,'' which is the growing practice of
governments silencing exiles and members of diasporas--including
activists, dissidents, defectors, journalists, and other critics--
living outside of their territorial borders. Iran, the P.R.C., and
other authoritarian regimes continue to target dissidents and human
rights activists on U.S. soil. The administration is committed to
addressing this challenge as part of our broader commitment to stem
rising authoritarianism.
We remain vigilant in understanding and combating foreign malign
influence in the homeland and look across the U.S. Government--in our
intelligence community partners and beyond--as we work to effectively
protect our elections, democratic processes, and the American people.
lawful access
The problems caused by law enforcement agencies' inability to
access electronic evidence continue to grow. Increasingly, commercial
device manufacturers have employed encryption in such a manner that
only the device users can access the content of the devices. This is
commonly referred to as ``user-only access'' device encryption.
Similarly, more and more communications service providers are designing
their platforms and apps such that only the parties to the
communication can access the content. This is generally known as ``end-
to-end'' encryption. The proliferation of end-to-end and user-only
access encryption is a serious issue that increasingly limits law
enforcement's ability, even after obtaining a lawful warrant or court
order, to access critical evidence and information needed to disrupt
threats, protect the public, and bring perpetrators to justice.
The FBI remains a strong advocate for the wide and consistent use
of responsibly managed encryption--encryption that providers can
decrypt and provide to law enforcement when served with a legal order.
Protecting data and privacy in a digitally-connected world is a top
priority for the FBI and we believe that promoting encryption is a
vital part of that mission. It does have a negative effect on law
enforcement's ability to protect the public. What we mean when we talk
about lawful access is putting providers who manage encrypted data in a
position to decrypt it and provide it to us in response to legal
process. We are not asking for, and do not want, any ``back door,''
that is, for encryption to be weakened or compromised so that it can be
defeated from the outside by law enforcement or anyone else.
Unfortunately, too much of the debate over lawful access has revolved
around discussions of this ``back door'' straw man instead of what we
really want and need.
For example, even with our substantial resources, accessing the
content of known or suspected terrorists' data pursuant to court-
authorized legal process is increasingly difficult. The often-on-line
nature of the terrorist radicalization process, along with the insular
nature of most of today's attack plotters, leaves fewer dots for
investigators to connect in time to stop an attack, and end-to-end and
user-only access encryption increasingly hide even those often precious
few and fleeting dots.
In one instance, while planning--and right up until the eve of--the
December 6, 2019, shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed 3
U.S. sailors and severely wounded 8 other Americans, deceased terrorist
Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani communicated undetected with overseas al-
Qaeda terrorists using an end-to-end encrypted app. Then, after the
attack, user-only access encryption prevented the FBI from accessing
information contained in his phones for several months. As a result,
during the critical time period immediately following the shooting and
despite obtaining search warrants for the deceased killer's devices,
the FBI could not access the information on those phones to identify
co-conspirators or determine whether they may have been plotting
additional attacks.
This problem spans international and domestic terrorism threats.
Like al-Shamrani, the plotters who sought to kidnap the Governor of
Michigan late last year used end-to-end encrypted apps to hide their
communications from law enforcement. Their plot was disrupted only by
well-timed human source reporting and the resulting undercover
operation. Subjects of our investigation into the January 6 Capitol
siege used end-to-end encrypted communications as well.
We face the same problem in protecting children against violent
sexual exploitation. End-to-end and user-only access encryption
frequently prevent us from discovering and searching for victims, since
the vital tips we receive from providers only arrive when those
providers themselves are able to detect and report child exploitation
being facilitated on their platforms and services. They cannot do that
when their platforms are end-to-end encrypted.
When we are able to open investigations, end-to-end and user-only
access encryption makes it much more difficult to bring perpetrators to
justice. Much evidence of crimes against children, just like the
evidence of many other kinds of crime today, exists primarily in
electronic form. If we cannot obtain that critical electronic evidence,
our efforts are frequently hamstrung.
This problem is not just limited to Federal investigations. Our
State and local law enforcement partners have been consistently
advising the FBI that they, too, are experiencing similar end-to-end
and user-only access encryption challenges, which are now being felt
across the full range of State and local criminal law enforcement. Many
report that even relatively unsophisticated criminal groups, like
street gangs, are frequently using user-only access encrypted
smartphones and end-to-end encrypted communications apps to shield
their activities from detection or disruption. As this problem becomes
more and more acute for State and local law enforcement, the advanced
technical resources needed to address even a single investigation
involving end-to-end and user-only access encryption will continue to
diminish and ultimately the capacity of State and local law enforcement
to investigate even common crimes will be overwhelmed.
conclusion
The threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more
diverse, and the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher.
Our fellow citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from
all of those threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet
and exceed those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for
their dedicated service.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy
to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Director.
Now I ask Director Abizaid to summarize her statement for 5
minutes, or whatever you are required, Director.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE ABIZAID, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much, Chairman Thompson,
Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members of this
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the global counterterrorism environment and to
highlight the tireless work of NCTC professionals and IC
professionals across the board who are working to protect our
homeland.
As noted in my statement for the record, 20 years after 9/
11 the United States faces a changed threat from foreign
terrorist organizations. The threat today is less acute to the
homeland, but it continues to become more ideologically diffuse
and geographically diverse. The United States continues to have
success at degrading foreign terrorist operations, including
those directed at the homeland, though these terrorists have
also proven adaptive over years of CT pressure.
Their presence has spread to countries that are often
under-governed and which offer a permissive operating
environment that can be easily exploited, requiring constant
vigilance on the part of the intelligence community as we
monitor for threats.
Turning first to the international counterterrorism
landscape, the 26 August suicide bombing by ISIS-Khorasan at
the international airport in Kabul, which tragically killed 13
U.S. service members and scores of Afghans, illustrates that
these groups continue to place a premium on attacks against the
United States. ISIS-Khorasan in Iraq and Syria maintains a
strategic interest in attacks in the West, even as it remains
committed to the long-term goal of establishing an Islamic
caliphate. It is fomenting sectarian discord and exploiting
security gaps in Iraq and Syria to create conditions favorable
for seizing territory again.
For its part, al-Qaeda has changed significantly since 9/
11. The group and its affiliates and allies have repeatedly
demonstrated their ability to adapt to changing CT
environments. Part of this adaptation has included shifting
from its core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, to
a more geographically dispersed network of affiliates and
veteran leaders across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
While years of CT pressure has degraded the al-Qaeda
network, the group and its affiliates remain intent on using
individuals with access to the United States to conduct
attacks. This was most recently demonstrated by al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula's probable approval of a 2019 attack in
Pensacola, Florida where a Saudi Air Force officer killed 3 and
wounded 8 U.S. service members.
Here in the United States, the primary threat in the
homeland comes from individuals inspired to violence either by
foreign terrorists or by motivations more domestic in nature.
U.S.-based home-grown violent extremists, HVEs, are largely
inspired by al-Qaeda or ISIS and will likely continue to
attempt attacks because of their personal and ideological
grievances, their attraction to foreign terrorist messaging,
and their access to weapons and targets.
One of the most pressing terrorist threats to the homeland
also comes from domestic violent extremists, DVEs. In
particular, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists
or militia violent extremists, who often mobile to violent
independent of direction from a formal organization.
Since 2015 the threat from these individuals has increased
and since 2018 DVEs have posed the most lethal threat inside
the homeland. We assess that that DVEs will continue to pose a
heightened threat in the coming years.
We also remain vigilant against Iran, its MOIS and Quds
Force agents, and its proxies, principally Lebanese Hezbollah,
but also the Iraqi Shia militants it is aligned with in the
region.
We remain concerned about plotting against the United
States for the January 2020 killing of former IRGC Quds Force
commander, Qasem Soleimani, and we face an increasing number of
indirect fire and unmanned aerial attacks against U.S.
facilities in Iraq, especially over the last several months.
Now, looking ahead, we will continue to face a diverse
range of threats that play out against the backdrop of complex
global trends, including the on-going effects of the COVID-19
pandemic, great power competition, the disruptive effects of a
changing climate and rapidly-evolving technology.
More than 17 years after its establishment, the National
Counterterrorism Center is uniquely positioned to lead in this
moment alongside our partners in the FBI and DHS as we move
into the next phase of the counterterrorism fight. We will
continue to discover, analyze, and warn about on-going and
future threats as part of a broader set of foreign policy
challenges that the United States will face in the 21st
Century. We will continue finding innovative ways to
synthesize, manage, and exploit our unique access to terrorism
data across a spectrum of sources to identify threats that
might otherwise go unnoticed.
We mark the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks,
recognizing the remarkable CT successes of the last two decades
and with great gratitude to the military, law enforcement,
diplomatic and intelligence professionals who have made them
possible. Working together we have succeeded in preventing
another major 9/11-style attack on the homeland. But we must
not be complacent. NCTC and the larger intelligence community
must continue to collaborate and maintain the inability to
innovate to stay ahead of the next evolution of the threat.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christine Abizaid
September 22, 2021
Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of
the committee for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
focus the balance of my time on an overview of the terrorism landscape
as it stands 2 decades after 9/11, then go into details regarding the
threat to both the U.S. homeland and our interests overseas.
terrorism threat overview
Twenty years after September 11, the United States faces a changed
threat from foreign terrorist organizations, or FTOs, that is less
acute to the homeland but which continues to become more ideologically
diffuse and geographically diverse. Even as we end America's longest
war in Afghanistan and absorb a broader array of National security
priorities, NCTC remains clear-eyed about, and committed to, our
mission to detect, disrupt, and deter terrorist efforts to harm the
United States, both at home and abroad. The ISIS-Khorasan attack on
Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 26 that claimed the lives
of 13 heroic U.S. service members and nearly 200 Afghan civilians is a
somber reminder that terrorists remain committed to harming the United
States.
The United States has continued to make significant progress
in the fight against the terrorist organizations that seek to
attack us or otherwise undermine our interests. We have
degraded the threat to the homeland from terrorist groups over
the past 20 years--by removing key leaders and sustaining
pressure against the ability of groups to plot attacks outside
their operating areas, move money, and communicate. Even as the
threat to the United States is changed, those organizations
seeking to do us harm continue to adapt, establishing a
presence in more countries around the world with a permissive
operating environment--especially in the Middle East and
Africa.
Today, the most pressing terrorist threats to the homeland
come from individuals who are inspired to conduct acts of
violence, whether by FTOs or by ideologies that are more
domestic in nature. The threat from domestic violent extremists
(DVEs)--in particular, racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremists, or RMVEs, and militia violent extremists, or
MVEs,--has increased since 2015 and will most likely persist,
in part because the factors that underpin and aggravate their
motivations--like social polarization, negative perceptions
about immigration, conspiracy theories promoting violence, and
distrust of Government institutions--will probably endure. The
threat from home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by
groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS also remain a significant concern.
More than 15 years after its establishment, NCTC is positioned to
lead as we move into this next phase of the counterterrorism fight. We
will continue to discover, analyze, and warn about on-going and future
terrorist threats as part of a broader set of foreign policy challenges
that the United States will face in this century. We will continue
finding innovative ways to synthesize, manage, and exploit our unique
access to terrorism data across a spectrum of sources to identify
threats that otherwise might go unnoticed. Finally, we will continue
investing in leading-edge technology to stay ahead of our ever-adapting
adversaries that power more comprehensive data-informed insights to
enhance collaboration.
the terrorist threat to the homeland
As described above, the primary threat in the homeland comes from
individuals inspired to violence, either by FTOs or by other grievances
and ideologies.
US-based HVEs, who are mostly inspired by al-Qaeda or ISIS, will
most likely continue to attempt attacks because of their personal and
ideological grievances, their attraction to FTO messaging, and their
ready access to weapons and targets. HVEs mobilize without specific
direction from FTOs and act independently or with few associates,
making it extremely difficult to disrupt such attacks. While it is
possible that some individuals may draw additional inspiration from
developments in Afghanistan, HVEs generally do not conduct attacks in
response to singular events.
Despite the degraded threat from FTOs to the homeland, al-Qaeda and
its affiliates remain intent on using individuals with access to the
United States to conduct attacks, as demonstrated by al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula's probable approval of the 2019 Pensacola, Florida,
attack where a Saudi Air Force officer killed 3 and wounded 8 U.S.
service members. ISIS also seeks to advance attacks in the homeland,
and NCTC continues to monitor for any threats to the United States that
might emanate from ISIS core in Iraq and Syria or its branches,
including those in South Asia and Africa. Since 2019, there have been 6
possible attacks by individuals inspired or enabled by an FTO in the
United States, and 2 of those--including the aforementioned Pensacola
attack--resulted in the loss of life.
During the past year, NCTC has continued to support FBI and DHS in
better understanding the threats from DVEs. Since 2018, DVEs--who are
driven by a range of ideologies--have been the most lethal terrorist
threat within the homeland and will most likely pose an elevated threat
during the next few years. Racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremists--RMVEs--and militia violent extremists--MVEs--present the
most lethal DVE threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct attacks
against civilians and MVEs typically targeting law enforcement and
Government personnel and facilities. U.S. RMVEs who promote the
superiority of the White race are almost certainly the DVE actors with
the most persistent and concerning transnational connections because
individuals with similar ideological beliefs exist outside the United
States, and these RMVEs frequently communicate with and seek to
influence each other.
We also remain vigilant regarding Iran's efforts to build
operational capability against U.S.-based organizations and people.
Several people, including U.S. citizens and Iranians, have been
arrested or indicted in the past 5 years for seeking to build
operational capability against U.S.-based organizations and people.
Protecting against such threats is even more important now, as Iran,
its agents, and proxies plan ways to retaliate against the United
States for the January 2020 killing of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem
Soleimani. For its part, we assess that Lebanese Hizballah maintains a
high threshold for conducting attacks in the homeland. Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah balances his organization's view of the United
States as one of its primary adversaries against the likelihood of U.S.
retaliation if the group decided to conduct an attack.
the terrorist threat overseas
Over the past 20 years, our multi-faceted offensive and defensive
CT operations, along with those of our international partners, have
significantly hampered terrorists' ability to strike the homeland and
targets outside their main operating areas, although these groups
continue to plot against U.S. interests abroad. However, the underlying
drivers of terrorism--such as instability and weak Government
institutions--continue to present conditions that terrorists exploit,
allowing them to spread across a broader swath of territory than we
have witnessed in the past two decades. We assess that ISIS and al-
Qaeda remain the greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests
overseas. The elements of these groups with at least some capability to
threaten the West include especially ISIS core in Iraq and Syria, al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and al-Shabaab in Somalia.
ISIS
Moving to ISIS in Iraq and Syria: ISIS remains an intact,
centrally-led organization that will most likely continue to pose a
global threat to U.S. and Western interests. The group remains
committed to its long-term goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate
and is working toward that goal in the aftermath of territorial losses,
waiting until conditions are favorable to begin operating more openly.
The core group continues to pursue the same basic strategy that it has
followed since its founding as al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004: Fomenting
sectarian discord, eroding confidence in governments, and exploiting
security gaps to create conditions favorable for seizing and
administering territory. Despite on-going CT pressure and enduring a
number of senior leadership losses during the past year, the structure
and cohesion of the group has allowed ISIS to sustain its influence--
and, in some areas around the globe, expand on it. ISIS leaders have
also prioritized the freeing of thousands of detained members in
prisons and internally displaced persons camps across Iraq and Syria,
and while not yet successful at scale, any future reintegration would
significantly augment the group's operations.
Additionally, ISIS probably maintains the intent to conduct
external attacks through a variety of means, including by deploying
attackers from the conflict zone, sending operational suggestions
virtually to individuals in target countries, and inspiring supporters
through their propaganda. Inspired attacks by ISIS supporters will most
likely remain the primary ISIS threat to the United States and other
Western countries. The group will almost certainly continue using its
media to encourage supporters to carry out attacks without direction
from ISIS leadership, but its degraded propaganda arm will likely
hinder its ability to inspire its previous high pace of attacks and
bring in new recruits. While we have seen a decline in the number of
ISIS-inspired attacks in the West since peaking in 2017, such
operations remain a priority for the organization.
Outside Iraq and Syria, ISIS will most likely continue to grow its
already robust global enterprise, which includes approximately 20
branches and networks. Although these loyal outposts have varying
levels of capability, they provide ISIS with launch points to plan and
conduct attacks, recruit, and galvanize supporters and are a source of
propaganda that helps sustain the movement. Many of the group's
branches and networks continue to conduct local operations, which ISIS
claims in media to dispel the narrative of its defeat. In particular,
during the past year, ISIS has had success in growing its presence
across large swaths of Africa, as demonstrated by ISIS-Mozambique's
temporary seizure in March of a coastal town where foreign workers on
the country's largest liquefied natural gas project resided. Notably,
we have seen no sign of fissures or splintering by the branches and
networks despite the fact that ISIS has not held territory in Iraq or
Syria in more than 2 years.
Al-Qaeda
Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and its affiliates around the world remain
committed to attacking the homeland and U.S. interests abroad, although
like ISIS, these affiliates have varying degrees of capability and
access to Western targets. In the past 2 years, al-Qaeda has endured a
number of senior leadership losses--including its deputy amir and the
heads of 3 affiliates--that have deprived the organization of
charismatic, experienced figures. Despite years of international CT
cooperation that has constrained the group's external plotting and
helped prevent another attack on the scale of 9/11, the organization
has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to evolve, adapt, and
capitalize on changing security environments and geopolitical realities
to expand its reach.
In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula--is intent on
conducting operations in the West and against U.S. and allied interests
regionally. In June, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula published
English- and Arabic-language versions of its sixth issue of Inspire
Guide--its first Inspire product since 2017--to provide English-
language operational guidance to would-be attackers in the homeland. We
also are concerned that al-Qaeda elements in northern Syria could use
their safe haven in opposition-controlled territory for external attack
efforts. In West Africa, we have seen Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-
Muslimin work to expand its operational reach and conduct large-scale,
lethal attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, suggesting the group
will most likely pose an increasing threat in the region during the
next year. For example, in August, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin
conducted an exceptionally deadly attack in which 84 military personnel
and civilians were killed in Burkina Faso. On the eastern part of the
continent, al-Shabaab poses a persistent threat to U.S. citizens and
Western interests, as demonstrated by the group's attack last year on a
U.S. military base in Kenya that tragically killed 3 U.S. personnel and
the late 2020 Federal indictment of a suspected al-Shabaab operative
who was part of a plot to hijack a commercial aircraft. Also, in March,
the group's amir publicly called for attacks on American and French
citizens in Djibouti.
Afghanistan
ISIS and al-Qaeda both have branches and affiliates in Afghanistan
that will require CT vigilance, especially in light of recent
developments there. Both groups are intent on attacking U.S. interests
both in the region and overseas, although years of sustained CT
pressure has degraded their capabilities to project a major external
threat to the West. Since the U.S. withdrawal, we have continued to
closely monitor for any signs of terrorist plotting that targets the
United States or our interests abroad. Over the longer term, we suspect
these groups could try to take advantage of reduced counterterrorism
pressure and a relatively more permissive operating environment to
rebuild their capacity to carry out attacks against Western targets.
ISIS-Khorasan maintains a steady operational tempo in Afghanistan and
retains the ability to execute attacks in cities like Kabul--as we saw
tragically on 26 August. While focused against the Taliban, the group's
external intentions bear monitoring. Similarly, we continue to closely
watch the activities of al-Qaeda elements in the region because of the
group's close ties to the Taliban and its propaganda against the West.
After the withdrawal, the group released an official statement
congratulating the Taliban for what it called a defeat of the United
States. On September 11 this year, al-Qaeda released a video of group
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praising the Pensacola attacker and claiming
that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan proved that the United States
was defeated.
Of note, NCTC collaborated closely with our military, diplomatic,
and intelligence partners in the weeks before the final U.S. forces
left Afghanistan, fulfilling our critical role of screening Afghans
seeking to relocate to the United States. As of early this month, NCTC
and IC partners had screened more than 60,000 individuals evacuated
from Afghanistan. Immediately following the fall of Kabul, analysts
throughout the Center worked around the clock to screen individuals,
monitor reporting, and provide warning of threats during and after
evacuation operations.
Iran and Hizballah
Moving to Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, in concert with their
terrorist partners and proxies, Iran and Hizballah continue to pose a
significant threat to the United States and our allies abroad. Iran
views terrorism as a tool to support its core objectives, including
projecting power in the Middle East, defending Shia Islam, and
deterring its strategic rivals, like the United States and Israel. Iran
and aligned groups probably carry out asymmetric and covert attacks to
reduce U.S. influence and the U.S. presence in the region, advising
both its state allies and proxies. In Iraq, Shia militant groups pose
the most immediate threat to U.S. interests. We have seen these
militants conduct an increasing number of indirect fire and, in the
past several months, unmanned aerial systems attacks against U.S.
facilities with the objective of expelling U.S. forces from the
country. In Yemen, Iran has maintained its years-long effort to support
Huthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and other targets located in the
Gulf, including those involving long-range missiles and UAVs.
the ct enterprise and the way forward
We mark the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks recognizing the
remarkable CT successes of the past 2 decades and with gratitude to the
military and to law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence
professionals, as well as the international partners who made them
possible. Working together, we have succeeded in preventing another
major, 9/11-style attack on the homeland.
However, we must not become complacent; the terrorist threat and
National security landscape have evolved, and the CT enterprise must
evolve as well. NCTC will continue its mission to prevent, detect, and
deter threats to the United States and its interests, just as those who
founded the Center intended. We will do this as our primary, no-fail
mission, enabling other departments and agencies to prioritize
resources where necessary to address other challenges, including great
power competition and cybersecurity. Going forward, we must consider
our CT investments in the context of our broader set of foreign policy
objectives and focus our CT enterprise to meet the most immediate
terrorism threats of today, all while maintaining an agile,
intelligence-driven indications and warning framework that keeps pace
with the next evolution of the threat and investing in a homeland
resilience support structure that buttresses our defenses at home.
NCTC and the larger CT enterprise also stayed focused on innovating
in an era of rapid technological change. Terrorists, in particular,
continue to make technological advances in fields such as encrypted
communications and in the use of social media that make detecting
threats and discerning significant trends more difficult. We will need
to ensure that our data management and exploitation practices;
standardization and integration processes for large IC data sets;
support for watchlisting and screening efforts; and technical
capabilities evolve so we can quickly share information and continue to
make sophisticated judgments on the terrorist threat.
Chairman Thompson. I thank the witnesses for their
testimony. I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witnesses.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
Director Wray, you testified before this committee 2 years
ago that domestic terrorism threats were the most concerning
terrorism threats in terms of lethality. More recently you
testified that the threats of domestic terrorism has
metastasized.
Secretary Mayorkas, you testified before us earlier this
year that domestic violence extremism represents the greatest
threat in the homeland right now.
Despite these acknowledgments, it appears that warning
signs was disregarded or the domestic terrorism threat was not
prioritized appropriately in the lead up to the January 6
attack on the Capitol.
Directory Wray and Secretary Mayorkas, what is your current
assessment of threats posed by domestic terrorist to the
homeland?
Secretary Mayorkas. I would be very pleased, Mr. Chairman,
to answer that at the outset.
We in the Department of Homeland Security, of course with
our partners across the Federal Government and State and local
law enforcement, consider domestic violent extremism to be the
most prominent terrorism-related threat to the homeland right
now. I think our response in anticipation of what could have
materialized on September 18 demonstrates the lessons learned
from the January 6 insurrection. We gathered a great deal of
intelligence and information from public-facing sources, as
well as leveraging academic and other third-party institutions.
We disseminated that information and intelligence to State,
local, Tribal, and territorial partners. We focused on the
National capitol region, and we were far more prepared should
anything have materialized on September 18 than was previously
the case, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So I guess I would say a few things. First, starting back
in June 2019 I elevated racially and ethically motivated
extremism to a National threat priority, which is our highest
threat priority level. I think that has already shown fruits in
the fact that we have effectively doubled the amount of
domestic terrorism investigations and arrests since that time.
We had about 180 domestic terrorism arrests last year, we have
had over 600 now in connection with January 6 alone.
I would say that we have also created a domestic terrorism
hate crimes fusion cell to help increase the level of
intelligence and information flow that goes out. Certainly,
from a lethality perspective, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we
have seen those kind of domestic violent extremists responsible
for the most lethal activity over recent years, although I
would add that in 2020 we saw a significant uptick in lethal
action and violence by anti-Government and anti-authority
violent extremists to go along with the racially motivated
violent extremists.
From a perspective of pushing out intelligence, as we did
before January 6, we have been pushing out dozens of
intelligence products to our Federal, State, and local partners
to highlight the threat.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Director Wray, Congress passed the Data Act. As you know,
we have been trying to make sure that FBI produces information
on domestic terrorism in a manner that not just Members of
Congress, but the public at large can understand what is going
on.
We finally got a report, subject to the NDAA legislation,
but there are still some gaps in terms of data missing from
2009 to 2019. Can you commit to helping close those data gaps
in that report so that Members of Congress and the public at
large can have the understanding necessary about the growing
problem with domestic terrorism in this country?
Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, you can count on us to work with you and your staff
and the committee staff to try to produce more information, to
be more responsive to those requests. Certainly, as I
understand it, some of the information requested, and this gets
overly involved for this setting, involves information that at
least wasn't maintained in earlier years in the form that would
be I think most useful. So we are trying to work through that
with your staff.
Certainly I recognize that the earlier report took longer
to get to you than it should have. Some of that, in all
fairness, was in part due to the pandemic and the fact that the
people that we really need to rely on for that work were both
strained by the pandemic, but also working on the significant
domestic terrorism caseload, that as I testified a few minutes
ago, mushroomed last year.
So we are going to work with you and we will try to see if
we can get you more complete information.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being here.
Director Wray, it is nice to see you again. I appreciate
your service to your country and your candor.
Just a very brief question, because I have got a lot of
questions for Secretary Mayorkas. Does the situation in
Afghanistan give you a concern about the possibility of
terrorist networks reconstituting there and in effect trying to
incite violence in the homeland?
Mr. Wray. Yes, actually there are a number of reasons why
we are concerned. Recognizing the time I will just tick them
off real quickly.
One, we are of course concerned that there will be an
opportunity for a safe haven to be recreated there, which is
certainly something that we have seen in the past, and allowing
foreign terrorist organizations to operate more freely in the
region. We are concerned that ISIS-K can take advantage of a
significantly weakened security environment to operate more
freely. We are also concerned that the events there can serve
as a catalyst or an inspiration for terrorists, whether they be
members of FTOs, foreign terrorist organizations or home-grown
violent extremists, to conduct attacks. Then, most importantly,
we are concerned that foreign terrorist organizations will have
an opportunity to reconstitute, plot, inspire, in a space that
is much harder for us to collect intelligence and operate
against than was the case previously.
Mr. Katko. Well, thank you very much. I wish I had more
time to spend with you on this, but perhaps a cup of coffee or
breakfast soon is in order so I can talk to you more about
that.
Secretary Mayorkas, I want to commend you on many of the
things that you have done at Homeland Security since you have
been there, particularly in the cybersecurity area. The people
that are appointed to leadership positions are doing a
tremendous job and we have a very difficult task ahead of us.
As you know and as Chairman Thompson knows, I pride myself
on being one of the most bipartisan Members of Congress and one
who is hopefully seen as a gentleman, but I have got to tell
you, Secretary Mayorkas, there is one major problem that I have
that I have just got to unburden myself of it. That is the
Southern Border.
I started my career as a Federal organized crime prosecutor
at the Southern Border and I spent my adult life trying to keep
this country safe. What is happening at the Southern Border is
absolutely out of control. You and the administration have
repeatedly referred to this border situation as a ``rebuild,''
you need to rebuild the border. Well, let me--you know, some
things I am just wondering about. Is rebuilding the border
having an unprecedented level of aliens seized at the border
over the last 6 months? More than 170,000 a month over the last
6 months. Is rebuilding the border releasing many individuals,
tens of thousands, into our communities without vaccinations
for Covid? Is rebuilding our border not testing people in
Customs and Border Protection custody for Covid because you
don't have the facilities to keep them there? Is rebuilding our
border allowing more aliens to die in custody this year that at
any time in recent memory? As a matter of fact, in 2018 6
people died in custody, 2019, 11, 2020, 13, this year that
number has quadrupled to 51. Is that rebuilding our immigration
system?
Let me ask you, is rebuilding our immigration system
allowing cartels to get fentanyl across our border in record
numbers? There has been more fentanyl seized this year than all
of last year, and last year was a record number. The fentanyl
seized this year is enough to kill every man, woman, and child
in the United States six times over. Many of those deaths have
reached my doorstep in Onondaga County, where 45 people in the
first half of this year died of heroin overdoses laced with
fentanyl. That is just my one county, and what is going on
across the country.
I guess the other thing too is the number of known and
suspected terrorists seized at the border this year. Caught,
not the ones that got away, caught at the border this year,
is--obviously is unprecedented numbers. You know that and I
know that. Is that rebuilding our immigration system? Is it?
So you come to the inescapable conclusion from a letter
from September 11 from a career Customs and Border Patrol agent
who as running Customs and Border Patrol, Rodney Scott, who
said ``In my professional assessment, the U.S. Border Patrol is
rapidly losing the situational awareness required to know who
and what is entering our homeland.'' He goes on to say, amongst
many other things, it is important to remember that the border
is not the destination, but only a transit port en route to
cities and towns through the United States and that these gaps
in the border are exploited to easily smuggle contraband,
criminals, or even potential terrorists in the United States.
Now, this is not from some political hack that is an
appointee by the Trump administration, this is from somebody
who served 29 years under 5 different Presidents.
So to me it is unbelievable what is going on at the border
and now we have the deflection about Haitians and the border is
closed, and now we know the border is not closed because the
Hiatans aren't--some Haitians are being sent home, some are
being sent here, and we don't know what the distinction is.
That goes for every type of person coming across the border as
well.
So, Mr. Chairman, before I ask one simple question of
Secretary Mayorkas, I ask unanimous consent to enter this
letter into the record, September 11, 2021 letter from Rodney
Scott.
I am sorry, sir?
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Rodney S. Scott, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol--Retired
September 11, 2021.
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
The Honorable Kevin McCarthy,
House Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC
20515.
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Homeland Security Committee, 2428 Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington DC 20515.
The Honorable John Katko,
Ranking Member, Homeland Security Committee, 2428 Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Speaker of the House Pelosi, Minority Leader McCarthy,
Congressman Thompson, and Congressman Katko: I am writing to you today
in consideration of your oversight role for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). I served as a U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agent and
Federal law enforcement agent for over 29 years. I served under five
different Presidential administrations. I began my career in 1992. I
competitively progressed through the ranks and earned key leadership
roles to include Deputy Executive Director of U.S Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), Office of Anti-terrorism; Director of CBP, Office of
Incident Management and Operations Coordination; Patrol Agent in
Charge, Brown Field Station; Chief Patrol Agent, El Centro Sector; and,
Chief Patrol Agent, San Diego Sector. Ultimately, I earned the rank of
Chief, USBP in February 2020. I served as President Biden's Chief of
USBP for the first 7 months of his presidency until I chose to retire
on August 14, 2021. I can assure you that for my entire career, I
worked diligently to secure our international borders as a nonpartisan
civil servant. I respectfully ask that you consider this as you reflect
on the concerns outlined below.
The position of Chief, USBP is a career civil service position and
not a political appointment. As Chief, I was the most senior official
responsible for border security between the ports of entry. I witnessed
the unprecedent seismic shift in border security and immigration policy
that was initiated on January 20, 2021. I believe this policy shift and
the associated public statements created the current border crisis. Of
greater concern, I also witnessed a lack of any meaningful effort to
secure our borders. Contrary to the current rhetoric, this is not
simply another illegal immigration surge. This is a national security
threat.
Today, on the 20th anniversary of the horrific 9/11 terrorist
attack, as I reflect on the significant border security advances that
we had made, I am sickened by the avoidable and rapid disintegration of
what was arguably the most effective border security in our Nation's
history. Common sense border security recommendations from experienced
career professionals are being ignored and stymied by inexperienced
political appointees. The Biden administration's team at DHS is laser-
focused on expediting the flow of migrants into the U.S. and
downplaying the significant vulnerability this creates for terrorists,
narcotics smugglers, human traffickers, and even hostile nations to
gain access to our homeland.
In my professional assessment, the U.S. Border Patrol is rapidly
losing the situational awareness required to know who and what is
entering our Homeland. The ability of USBP to detect and interdict
those that want to evade apprehension is being degraded daily. Low
level, unsophisticated and uneducated smugglers are illegally crossing
the border and increasingly evading apprehension daily. To think that
well-resourced terrorist networks, criminal organization, and hostile
nations are not doing the same is naive. The current situation is
unsustainable and must be mitigated.
The experienced civil service staff within CBP, ICE and DHS have
provided multiple options to reduce the illegal entries and reestablish
some semblance of border security through proven programs and
consequences, yet every recommendation has been summarily rejected.
Secretary Mayorkas is choosing to ignore the sound recommendations of
career government leadership despite his own admissions that he agrees
with them. Of grave concern, is the fact that the Secretary and other
political appointees within DHS have provided factually incorrect
information to congressional Representatives and to the American
public. Furthermore, they have directed USBP personnel to allow
otherwise ineligible aliens to remain in the U.S. inconsistent with the
CDC Title 42 Order, established legal processes and law. The
professional staff within DHS is left perplexed, wondering who is
really in charge and what the objective is.
As a direct result of these decisions, control of our borders has
disintegrated overnight. While the sheer volume of aliens is
overwhelming, it is critical that policymakers understand that these
mass incursions are not simply an immigration issue. These illegal
entries are being scripted and controlled by Plaza Bosses that work
directly for the transnational criminal organizations (TCO) to create
controllable gaps in border security. These gaps are then exploited to
easily smuggle contraband, criminals, or even potential terrorists into
the U.S. at will. Even when USBP detects the illegal entry, agents are
spread so thin that they often lack the capability to make a timely
interdiction. It is important to remember that the border is not the
destination, but only a transit point en route to cities and towns
throughout the United States.
This is not hyperbole. I urge you to request detailed information
from DHS/CBP on the number of individuals with Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB) alerts that USBP has arrested this fiscal year. To
ensure that you are not misled, please specifically ask for comparative
data from previous years broken down by method of apprehension/
encounter and immigration status at the time of the encounter. I
believe you will find this data troubling. The current DHS leadership
will no doubt attempt to downplay these numbers. I would like to remind
you that 9/11 was carried out by 19 terrorists and that countless
terrorist attacks around the world have been carried out by a single
person.
I also encourage you to ask questions about the surge in USBP
personnel assigned to the border in Texas. What national security and
public health risks are we knowingly accepting in the areas these
agents were pulled from? How many miles of border are now going
unpatrolled daily to facilitate expedited processing and ultimately the
release of these illegal aliens into the U.S.? What threats are we
allowing into the U.S. by continuing to accept over 1,000 documented
got-a-ways each day? What programs and or IT system developments have
been shut down or significantly delayed due to limited resources being
redirected to the mass migration crisis? What impact has the current
crisis had on the ability of USBP to conduct thorough debriefings of
individuals to determine intentions, threat and to document
transnational criminal activity?
For context, just prior to my retirement, this fiscal year USBP had
encountered over 1,277,094 aliens illegally entering the U.S. and
documented over 308,000 known got-a-ways. At 0800 hrs on 08/01/21,
there were over 18,000 aliens in USBP custody which equated to more
than three times USBP's capacity of 5,118. Only about 5,100 aliens were
fully processed with over 13,000 individuals unprocessed. Over 7,000
aliens had been in custody for over 72 hours. For contrast, on 08/01/
2019, USBP had 4,946 in custody. On 08/01/2020, USBP had 408 in
Custody. On 02/01/2021, USBP had 2,375 subjects in custody.
In a 24-hour period on 08/01/21, USBP documented over 5,900
encounters of individuals illegal entering the U.S. from 33 different
countries. This included over 560 unaccompanied children. Agents also
documented over 1,100 got-a-ways. Of note, this is at a time when
hundreds of miles of border went unpatrolled due to manpower and
capability limitations. Despite the above, the CBP Chief Operating
Officer continued to assert that USBP agents must simply process aliens
faster. Any discussions about consequence to illegal entry or securing
the border were immediately stymied.
In addition to the clear national security implications of an
uncontrolled border, it is unconscionable that as COVID-19 continues to
spread, DHS would choose to voluntary carve out policy exceptions to
Title 42 (T42) authority. These carve outs do not appear to comport
with any medical assessments that I have read. These policy carve outs
are unquestionably placing the lives of CBP personnel, U.S. citizens
and the migrants themselves at increased risk. In October 2020, over 91
percent of total encounters by USBP were processed under T42 and
expelled in an average of 90 minutes. A report I received on August 1,
2021, indicated that nearly 53 percent were being granted exemptions
from T42 with the majority ultimately being released into the United
States. CBP lacks the adequate facilities and resources to conduct
Covid testing without significantly increasing the risk to exposure and
further degrading border security. Therefore, any Covid testing is
conducted on a voluntary basis by private non-governmental
organizations. There is no mandated vaccine prior to release.
Processing an alien that illegally enters the United States under
T42 authority can be accomplished in approximately 10 minutes while
avoiding congregate settings where COVID-19 exposure would be
increased. Consequently, processing an individual under Title 8 (T8),
to include a Notice to Appear (NTA) takes approximately 2 hours and is
completed inside an enclosed processing center. If the alien will be
transferred to ICE, vice released immediately on their own recognizance
(OR), the time in custody will increase even further and routinely
exceeds 72 hours.
Increased processing time has direct border security implications.
For example, processing 500 aliens under T42, or even with a Notice to
Report equates to approximately 93 additional Border Patrol agents
remaining on patrol duties when compared to the time required to
process an equal number of aliens under T8 for Notice to Appear/Release
on Own Recognizance (NTA/OR). Every agent back on patrol increases
situational awareness and reduces the ability of adversaries to further
exploit our borders.
The number of encounters/arrests recorded by USBP is only part of
the story. As of Aug 1, 2021, USBP agents had responded to and resolved
well over 1.805M events. Infrastructure and technology are key
components of USBP's strategic plan and staffing model. Unfortunately,
DHS has intentionally slow rolled the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 10142 creating significant new vulnerabilities that are
getting worse every day. Even though the proclamation directed that all
wall construction be paused for 60 days, over 7 months has passed with
little progress toward any resolution. Border security beyond the
physical barrier is also being degraded as political appointees
expanded the pause to include technology deployments that were separate
from the barrier construction.
Career CBP and USBP personnel have provided multiple in-depth
briefings to the Biden administration on each individual project. This
included when and who identified the original operational requirement
for the barrier. In most cases the requirement originated prior to the
Obama Administration. As a direct result of these delays USBP has been
forced to reduce patrol areas to address gaps in barrier, non-
functional gates and grates and inoperable technology. I am extremely
confident that the Biden administration to include Secretary Mayorkas
are fully aware of the significant operational risk and the monetary
costs associated with the construction pause, which at times reportedly
exceeded $5M a day. I was briefed by USBP and CBP personnel with direct
knowledge that leadership within the Biden administration openly
discussed ways to slow roll any decisions as well as options to do the
least action possible to avoid an Impoundment Act violation without
doing any construction as required by law.
Something as simple as re-connecting shore power to the Calexico
Port of Entry to reduce the environmental impact of diesel-powered
generators took months simply because the work was being conducted
under the border wall contracts. Even connecting electrical power to an
existing security gate to reduce manpower requirements was unfathomable
to the current leadership. I believe this equates to waste, fraud, and
abuse.
As I stated upfront, it is my professional assessment that
transnational criminal organizations (TCO), and other more dangerous
actors are increasingly exploiting identified border security
vulnerabilities. The threats are real, and the situation is
unsustainable, yet the current administration refuses to take any
meaningful action.
It is important to note that I have only addressed issues directly
associated with the Border Patrol's mission. As a senior executive
leader within CBP, I was also privy to decisions that negatively
affected security and legitimate trade and travel operations at our
Ports of Entry.
Please ensure that Americans get the border security that we
already paid for and deserve. I respectfully request that you exercise
your oversight responsibility and convene hearings to ensure that
Congress and the American people have access to the truth. To help
ensure that accurate information is provided, I am willing to appear
and testify under oath as well.
Sincerely,
Rodney Scott,
Retired--Chief U.S. Border Patrol.
Honor First!
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
Now, one very simple question----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired, but we
would be happy to let the Secretary answer some of the
questions you presented.
Mr. Katko. Well, that was one of the questions he can
answer, Mr. Chairman, also that I was going to ask, is why the
actual number of known suspected terrorists seized at the
border is considered law enforcement sensitive. We are not
asking about the details, just that simple number. We asked for
that information August 10 and we still haven't got it.
Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Katko, you and I have
discussed the Southern Border and I respectfully disagree with
a number of statements that precede your question.
I should also say that I have tremendous confidence not
only in the United States Border Patrol, but in its new leader,
Raul Ortiz, who is a three-decade veteran of law enforcement in
the United States Border Patrol.
So I look forward to discussing more with you some of the
statements that precede your question.
We are indeed addressing security at the border. We are
exercising and enforcing both the laws of enforcement, the laws
of accountability, and the humanitarian laws that this country
and this Congress have enacted and recognized.
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair will now recognize other
Members for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. I
will recognize Members in the order of seniority, alternating
between Majority and Minority.
Members are reminded unmute themselves when recognized for
questioning and to then mute themselves once they have finished
speaking, and to leave their cameras on so they may be visible
to the Chair.
The Chair now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Mr.
Ranking Member. Let me express my appreciation very quickly to
all of the men and women represented before us and all of your
teams and the entire team that have provided us with a safe
journey post-9/11 as it relates to international threats coming
to the United States. We have not had that kind of attack.
My time is short and I would appreciate your quick
response.
To Director Abizaid, can you provide me with the
interaction and the potential of a new ally or friend or an
expanded ally and friend with Pakistan in light of the
circumstances with Afghanistan and the potential rise of ISIS?
Are we looking to use assets and collaborate as relates to
domestic security?
My time is short. Would you give me a brief answer please?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes. Thank you very much for the question.
Pakistan has been a long time CT partner. It is a
complicated partner given some of the dynamics in the region,
but we will absolutely look to collaborate with them on CT,
whether emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere in
the region, consistent with our shared interests.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
You have been eloquent, Director Wray, on advising us about
domestic terrorism. I would like to get in writing again the
protocols that you have put in place post-January 6 very
devastating insurrection attack against democracy. I would
prefer to have that in writing to the committee and directed to
me as well.
Let me indicate that many of us know that your
responsibility for National security is large and so as I think
of Ali Raisman, Simone Biles, McKayla Maroney, and Maggie
Nichols, they deserve the protection of the United States and
the attention of the FBI. I know that you provided an apology,
but as well I also noted in the testimony of these young women,
Simone Biles from Texas, all of them contributing the National
pride, if you will, throughout their lives, indicated that they
had seen no prosecutions, no extensive investigations.
My time is short and I have questions for the Secretary.
What is your singular comment on moving forward on further
investigations of agents who ignored these young women and
caused additional harm and violence against them and other
athletes?
Mr. Wray. So thank you for the question.
As I said last week, I consider what happened, or what more
importantly did not happen back in 2015 at the FBI to be
totally unacceptable and I am deeply sorry on behalf of the
entire FBI for what happened there. We have fired the one
individual featured prominently in the report that we could
fire.
As far as prosecutions go----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I just----
Mr. Wray. I am sorry, it is just a second please. As far as
prosecutions go, as you may know, that is really the
responsibility of the Department of Justice, not the FBI. We
have done what we have the power to do. So I would refer you
really to the Department on the latter part.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Will you be presenting the case
or information to the DoJ for them to go further?
Mr. Wray. Well, on that issue the Inspector General, as you
may know, took over the investigation, so it is really a
conversation between the Inspector General and the Justice
Department. If we can be helpful in that regard and that is
appropriate, we would be happy to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much. I will pursue
that.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your heart and as
well your commitment to serving the United States.
I think the narrative about immigration is so wrong. First
of all, the Southern Border is 1,954 miles, it is not out of
control. Thank you to those who are protecting it. I have many
people who acknowledge that.
Let me quickly raise the point that we should refrain from
these kinds of accusatory attacks against migrants. We are a
nation of laws and immigrants.
So let me first of all raise the question of the terrible
scenes that are all over the internet now and also the mockery
of Haitians who are taking water--washing the water. First of
all, how much did race play a part in these actions? Are you
looking into that as well? Also have you considered this Trump
relic of Title 42, not eliminating but a suspension of it in
light of the fact that Haitians have been determined to be no
National security threat. There are Haitians in my district
right now, migrants who have come from NGO's on the border. We
welcome them. I will be visiting them over the weekend.
But I want to know how we can do better in this particular
instance. You have answered all the other questions of asylum,
opportunities, the opportunities for them to be taken by
sponsors or family members, which they have. We can do better,
I know you want to do better. Can you give me those answers?
Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you very much.
The investigation is going to be all-encompassing. We are
not going to cut a single corner or compromise any element of
thoroughness. It will be a sweeping investigation. No. 1.
No. 2, with respect to Title 42 and its exercise, that is
an authority of the Centers for Disease Control, it is not a
matter of immigration policy, it is a matter of public health
policy driven by the situation of COVID-19 and where the
trajectory of that pandemic is. It is based on the data that
CDC analyzes and it is a CDC order that determines the
applicability of the Title 42 authority.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Higgins, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing
today to discuss worldwide threats to the homeland as we move
beyond the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
Americans watching this hearing today are wondering why the
focus of our narrative is not on the obvious threats as we look
at the immediate future of our Nation and the security of our
homeland being the threat of Jihadist terrorists coming into
our country due to the abhorrent failure in Afghanistan and the
disintegration of our Southern Border. Our national sovereignty
has been lost at the Southern Border. We have been invaded. My
colleagues refer to scenes on the internet. You don't have to
look very far to see imagery that none of us have ever seen in
our lives. I am 60 years old, I have never seen anything like
this in America. You know, we have witnesses before us, with
all due respect, good Lord, step away from your talking points
and let us share truth as Americans.
After the Biden administration's disgraceful retreat from
Afghanistan the Pentagon is actively warning Congress of the
increased likelihood of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. That's
a fact. Regardless, this committee's recent mark-up of the
Democrats' $3.5 trillion reconciliation monstrosity bill did
not include a single dime for counterterrorism efforts despite
these warnings, and Republican amendments to attempt to correct
that were voted down by party line vote by Democrats with the
Majority control.
Further, during this time the security crisis at our own
Southern Border has gotten worse and worse. We didn't think it
could get worse, but it has. We have witnesses that
consistently stick to these talking points, like Baghdad Bob,
saying there is nothing wrong here, move along. America is
wondering exactly when will Congress embrace the truth and have
honest discussion of the actual threats to our homeland on the
homeland security committee.
We have had 170,000 documented interactions. Now, based
upon known formulas of estimated--what are referred to as
gotaways, which means you have a quarter of a million illegal
crossings or attempted illegal crossings a month. We have never
seen numbers like this and yet we keep getting told oh, it is
all cool, the border is under control. I don't know how you
would define failure of securing our Southern Border if it is
not what we are witnessing right now. But to no one's surprise
in the Republican Party there was zero funding in the
majority's $3.5 trillion bill for border security.
We face significant National security threats that have
been made worse by this administration's own policies. There is
no shame in admitting that, but we are responsible to deal with
it. That begins with honest communications, which we seem--we
are avoiding this right now. With all due respect to my
colleagues across the aisle, in a very disciplined matter of
sticking to their talking points.
Director Wray, I am going to ask you yes or no, did 19
terrorists execute the 9/11 Jihadist terror attacks on America?
Not the planning, the execution.
Mr. Wray. There were 19 hijackers, yes.
Mr. Higgins. OK. There you go. There you go. That is a
number I am referring to.
Now, you won't tell us, although we are Members of
Congress--we have the very highest security clearance, we have
confidential briefings all the time--but we can't get an answer
how many known or suspected terrorists have been detected
crossing our Southern Border. But my sources tell me a
conservative estimate is 200.
Now, with a percentage of undetected being 20-25 percent,
that means 40-50 known terrorists have very likely entered our
country through the Southern Border. Yet my colleagues across
the aisle want to talk about, you know, Americans wearing Trump
shirts. It is unbelievable.
Secretary Mayorkas, good sir, all of us----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from Louisiana has
expired.
Mr. Higgins. I will have a question. I will submit in
writing to the Secretary, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
the courage to convene this hearing today.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for their testimony today and everything they are
doing to keep the country safe.
I would like to start with you, Director Wray. Yesterday
you testified before the U.S. Senate about a Washington Post
story that the FBI did not distribute a key to help victims of
the Kaseya ransomware attack for 3 weeks. In your response you
emphasized the need to, ``maximize impact against an
adversary.''
So, you know, I appreciate that as the lead agency for
threat response, the FBI is responsible for going after the bad
guys. However, I have to say I am deeply concerned that your
response to Chairman Peters did not reflect the harm
withholding a decryption key could do to victims. I would like
you to just kind-of consider this analogy if you would,
Director: A business is on fire, there is a strong reason to
suspect arson. The police argue that letting the firefighters
in to put out the fire risks damaging forensics that could be
used to catch the arsonist. So certainly, that argument is
valid, but I don't think anyone here would suggest we should
not put out the fire or even if it does not maximize your
impact against an adversary.
So I understand these decisions are difficult and complex
and that you may not be at liberty to discuss the specifics of
the Kaseya case, however I would like to give you the
opportunity now to correct the record and affirm that asset
response is a critically important factor when responding to a
significant cyber incident.
Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question,
especially knowing your long-standing interest in this subject.
Again, I am somewhat constrained about what I can say about
an on-going investigation, but what I would say is that
speaking in general, that encryption keys are something that it
is just one of many kinds of technical information we provide
to the private sector, and turning those things into decryption
tools that could actually be used and not have unintended
consequences is a lot more complicated than a lot of people
realize, and that itself takes time.
So part of what I refer to when I talk about maximizing
impact is making sure that, to use your analogy of the house,
that what we would be supplying is actually just water and not
water that might have some trace of say gasoline or some
accelerant in it that would actually have all kinds of
unintended consequences.
So that is one of many considerations that goes into it,
but absolutely, we recognize that asset response has to go
hand-in-hand with threat response. That is why we have such a
close partnership with DHS and CISA and these kinds of
decisions are made in consultation with a host of inter-agency
partners.
Mr. Langevin. Well, Director, I would just push back and
say that I think that asset response has to be higher on the
priority list. So much could have been prevented had those
decryption keys been given to businesses that were impacted. I
understand you can't comment specifically on Kaseya, but I
think there has got to be a greater emphasis on asset response
and not just preserving the crime scene so you gather
forensics.
Secretary Mayorkas, I want to commend you for your
leadership and for the success of DHS on its cyber hiring
initiatives. I do have to say, however, I remain concerned
about the significant vacancies that remain the cybersecurity
work force, particularly at CISA.
So I am hopeful about the cybersecurity talent management
system set to start in November. However, given that these
authorities have existed since 2014 and have not been used, I
am concerned about how effectively they will be used. So I
would appreciate an update on the status of the cybersecurity
talent management system and how the DHS headquarters plans to
coordinate its activity with CISA to amass the cyber talent
that it needs.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you so much for your
support of CISA. I actually had a meeting yesterday on staffing
and the prioritization of staffing for our cybersecurity
portfolio. Specifically, I look forward to speaking with
Director Easterly. I very well know that she has prioritized
the staffing of the directorate and the talent initiative to
which you refer. We are incredibly proud of our cybersecurity
hiring initiative, which is, frankly, the biggest in the
Department's history. This is assuredly a priority of ours and
I would be very, very pleased to update you on it regularly
because I know how important it is to you in light of your
tremendous support of CISA and the criticality of our Nation's
cybersecurity writ large.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I know my time----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Langevin [continuing]. Has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi for 5 minutes, Mr.
Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for the dedication that they have provided in service
to our country, particularly to make sure that they are keeping
our homeland safe each and every day. Before I begin, I would
like to ask the Clerk if she would pull, please pull the chart
from Customs and Border Patrol that outlines the encounters on
the Southwest Border that we have currently seen.
My concerns today are many. My time is limited so I will
focus those on the current situation that we have seen along
our Southwest Border. In front of each of our witnesses should
be statistics put forth by Customs and Border Patrol that shows
recent encounters along the Southwest Border. Secretary
Mayorkas, I know that you have recently visited the Southwest
Border in response to the surge that we have seen and the
number of Haitians immigrants that have recently crossed. I
know Congressman Sheila Jackson Lee recently said in her
questioning a few minutes ago, that she felt that the border is
not out of control. I will tell you that I completely disagree
with her statement. I think the figures that are before the
witnesses here today clearly show that the situation along our
Southwest Border is a situation that has continued to
deteriorate month after month after month. Taking out from
those figures the month of October, November, December, and
January, just starting from the numbers February going forward
when this administration has been completely in control of
Customs and Border Patrol, those numbers are 1.25 million
encounters along the Southwest Border. Looking at that and
comparing that to the population of our States, that number is
greater than the population of Montana. Greater than the
population of Rhode Island. Greater than the population of
Delaware. Greater than the population of both North and South
Dakota. Greater than the population of Alaska. Though not a
State, greater than the population of the District of Columbia.
It is greater than the population of Vermont. It is greater
than the population of Wyoming. Soon, when figures become
available for this month, I believe that we will quickly
surpass the population of Maine, New Hampshire, and Hawaii.
I think clearly these figures show that what we are doing
along our Southwest Border, what the current administration has
done, that that is not working. Not only do I believe that, but
I believe that that is clearly the sentiment of the American
public. Politico, an article that was actually published
yesterday, they cited recent polling that said 38 percent of
the United States adults approve of President Biden's handling
of immigration.
So, Secretary Mayorkas, I wanted to kind of now turn to
that to you. It was reported in August that you met with a
group of Border Patrol agents and in a closed-door meeting, you
stated, ``if our borders are the first line of defense, we are
going to lose and this is unsustainable''. My question is, No.
1, did you make that statement? Then, No. 2, do you still stand
by that statement? Do you believe that what currently is
happening on our borders today is unsustainable?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much for
your question. In fact, I did make the statement. A very
important fact underlying it is that our border is not our
first line of defense. We have a multi-layered strategy that
includes our partners to the south, not only Mexico, but the
countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. So, in fact,
our border is not our first line of defense. It is a statement
that I made and I stand by it. In fact, it does not reflect the
strategy that we have been employing and executing.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Mayorkas, you see those figures there in
front of you, I believe. Hopefully, those are visible to you. I
think that you see that month after month we continued to see a
rise. We saw a recent small dip from July to August. But those
figures are extremely troubling, particularly when you look at
year-to-date figures. When you compare the numbers from fiscal
year 2021 to fiscal year 2020, comparing them to fiscal year
2019, fiscal year 2018. You know, when you are looking at a
total of--when you look at a physical year, it is 1.5 million.
Again, giving the administration the benefit of the doubt, the
fact that October, November, December, and just credit all of
January to the prior administration, the numbers month after
month continue to grow. So, I guess my question to you, Mr.
Mayorkas, is how would you rate the administration? How would
you rate the job that has been done to secure our border since
the President was sworn into office? Would that be A, B, C, D,
F? Just if you could give me a grade and then I would be happy
to let you explain your answer from there.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is interesting you
mention what you described as a small dip in the latest month's
data. I cannot see the visuals that you presented. That dip is
actually a decrease and it is a decrease because of some of the
enforcement tools that we have employed in execution of our
plan. I have been quite clear that we do have a plan to address
migration at the Southern Border. We are executing it. It takes
time and we are starting to see the results.
I would be very pleased to meet with you and discuss with
you some of the tools that we have employed to actually drive
the results that we saw this past month, and we expect to see
in the ongoing months. Those tools are not met with unanimous
approval, but we are using those enforcement tools to help
secure our border, which we are doing.
Mr. Guest. Could you answer----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's----
Mr. Guest [continuing]. The question----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's----
Mr. Guest [continuing]. As giving a grade----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Guest [continuing]. Of A, B, C----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
Mr. Guest [continuing]. D, or F?
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Chairman,----
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes----
Mr. Guest [continuing]. I would ask unanimous consent to
enter the chart that was previously published into the record.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California for 5 minutes, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear
me OK?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. Yes, I just want to thank you and the Ranking
Member for this hearing this morning. I want to thank our
guests also for your time. I was also in New York to remember
9/11. We met with our first responders, our heroes. I remember
back 20 years ago watching those images on TV as those first
responders ran into the burning buildings knowing they were
probably going to lose their lives while civilians ran away. We
will not forget.
Gentlemen, your witnesses, your testimony, thank you very
much. As I hear my colleagues on this committee talk, it kind-
of brings out a universal truth that I have learned in
Congress, which is we are always in management crisis. We
manage by crisis. We never seem to move beyond yesterday or
today to the big issue. I agree with my colleagues that
fentanyl is a major issue. But I would propose to all of you
that if you seal off the Southern Border, you seal off the
Northern Border, you seal off the ports of entry, we are still
going to have that major issue, which is a medical issue called
drug addiction in our country. As long as people want to do
fentanyl, they are going to do it.
Forty years ago, I saw my neighbors dying from heroin
overdoses. The challenge that we have that it is not going
away. Mr. Mayorkas, I would ask you, are you prepared to deal
with the social issue of drug addiction in our country? Yes or
no?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, I am in collaboration with our
partners across the Federal enterprise and across the country.
Mr. Correa. You can deal with a medical issue called drug
addition in the United States? That's not really a homeland
security issue. That's a societal issue. But we are going to
expect you to stop drug addiction at the border. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Wray, thank you very much for the good job you are
doing. You know, defending our country like you, Mr. Mayorkas,
y'all have to hit 100 percent. You can't let anything happen in
this Nation. Yet, the universe of threats keeps multiplying.
Terrorists, domestic terrorism, I hear experts now telling me
that it's no longer is essential for the bad guys to import the
bad guys, to import terrorists, but rather the home-grown
terrorists that keep being inspired by these radical ideas are
the big issue now.
So, you know, trying to figure out how to protect our
Nation against domestic terrorists, is a major challenge. I
think the big issue here becomes intelligence. How do you
figure out, how do you stop something from happening before it
stops? My question would be, do you gentlemen get enough
support coordination from our foreign partners? Mr. Mayorkas,
when you talk to Mexico, are you able to get enough
intelligence, coordination cooperation from them to do your
job? I would ask the same question to our FBI director, do we
have enough intel internationally to be able to coordinate your
intelligence services? You are trying to find a needle in a
haystack. Mr. Mayorkas?
Secretary Mayorkas. Information sharing, Congressman, is
one of our highest priorities in the international domain. We
have a very significant footprint in many countries around the
world. We have information sharing agreements that a number of
our component agencies and offices lead. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, our Office
of Policy, Strategy, and Plans, our international operations,
which is a part of that last office I mentioned.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Mayorkas,----
Secretary Mayorkas. Information sharing and----
Mr. Correa [continuing]. Is there anything we can do to
make sure that your job is more effective? Meaning, is there
anything we can do to talk to address our foreign partners to
make sure that they have a--you have a better level of
cooperation with folks overseas?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much for
the question. We would greatly appreciate and have greatly
appreciated the support that this committee has provided to us
in funding the Department of Homeland Security's requests for
support to execute our mission. We greatly appreciate it.
Mr. Correa. FBI Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman. Certainly, we
benefit a lot from information sharing from our foreign
partners. You mentioned Mexico. Of course, our legat office in
Mexico City is, I think, our biggest and oldest overseas
office. We can always use more and certainly, with the kind of
terrorist threats we are facing right now, both home-grown
Jihadist inspired and domestic violent extremists, each
benefit, unfortunately, from being--there fewer dots to
connect. So, if there are fewer dots to connect and less time
in which to connect them, it puts a real premium on making sure
that we are able to find the few dots that are out there as
quickly as possible. That's why we appreciate this committee's
support for more agents, more analysts, more data analytics,
and other tools which we desperately need to stay ahead of the
threat.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from California has
expired.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Florida for 5 minutes, Mr. Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate
it. I am going to read some excerpt from Chief Scott's letter
that is dated 9/11/2021. The Biden administration's team at DHS
is laser-focused on expediting the flow of migrants into the
United States and downplaying the significant vulnerability
this creates for terrorists, narcotics smugglers, human
traffickers, and even hostile nations to gain access to our
homeland. Later on, he says, the experienced civil service
staff within CBP, ICE, and DHS have provided multiple options
to reduce the illegal entries and re-establish some semblance
of border security through proven programs and consequences,
yet, every recommendation has been summarily rejected.
Secretary Mayorkas is choosing to ignore the sound
recommendations of career Government leadership, despite his
own admissions that he agrees with them. A grave concern is the
fact that the Secretary and other political appointees within
DHS have provided factually inaccurate or incorrect information
to Congressional representatives and to the American public.
Furthermore, they have directed USBP personnel to allow
otherwise ineligible aliens to remain in the United States
consistent with CDC Title 42 order, establish legal processes
and law. The professional staff within DHS is left perplexed
wondering who is really in charge and what the objective is.
This is a scathing indictment on you, Secretary, and the
administration's handling of the border. So, I have a couple of
questions though. Secretary Mayorkas, how many immigrants have
we apprehended at the border this year?
Secretary Mayorkas. So, Congressman, I respectfully
disagree with Mr. Scott, of course. Let me pull if I can, the
data from August, which I think will shed light----
Mr. Gimenez. That is not--well, sir, that is not the
question. The question is how many immigrants have we
apprehended this year? Not August, this year?
Secretary Mayorkas. I believe thus far this fiscal year,
Congressman, it is approximately 1.2 or 1.5 million. But I
think the data that I would cite from August reflects the
enforcement measures that we are taking, our use of our Title
42 authority, which is not an immigration enforcement
authority, but is a public health authority, which belies some
of the statements that you just made. Also, our use of Title 8
authority, which is, indeed, an immigration enforcement
measure. I think the data from August would suggest the
fulsomeness of our enforcement measures, which are not as I
mentioned a full year----
Mr. Gimenez. With all due respect, I have only got 5
minutes. I got a couple of other questions I need to ask you. I
am not really that worried about August. I understand that
August you all now put a focus on it because you found that the
American public really doesn't like what you are doing. So, let
me keep going. Let me ask you, Secretary----
Secretary Mayorkas. That is not accurate.
Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. Of the 1.----
Secretary Mayorkas. That is not accurate.
Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. Of the 1.5 million people that we
have apprehended, how many people have been returned? How many
people are being detained? How many people have been disbursed?
Secretary Mayorkas. I would be pleased to provide you with
specific data subsequent to this hearing, Congressman. Your
prior statement was inaccurate. But I would look forward and,
in fact, meeting with you----
Mr. Gimenez. Sir, that is my opinion. Sir, that is my
opinion, OK? So, I am entitled to my opinion, OK?
Secretary Mayorkas. No, no, no, I----
Mr. Gimenez. So,----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Respect--I respect that,
Congressman. I would be very pleased to provide you with the
specific data you have requested.
Mr. Gimenez. Well, sir, yesterday, you were asked exactly
the same question and you gave exactly the same answer. You
would think you would be a little bit better prepared now that
you have been asked that question, that now maybe somebody else
is going to ask you the same question. You don't have that
information?
Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, Congressman, let me share something
with you, quite clearly. I work 18 hours a day, OK? So, when I
returned from yesterday's hearing, I actually focused on
mission. We will get that data both to the Senator who posed it
yesterday and to you, Congressman, today.
Mr. Gimenez. So, you don't have any estimation of all--the
numbers that I am asking for at all? You don't know how many--
--
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. Have been returned. You don't
know how many have been released into the United States. You
don't have any estimation at all of what those numbers are.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I want to be precise in my
communication of data to the U.S. Congress and to you,
specifically having posed the question. I will be----
Mr. Gimenez. Well, thank you very much.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Precise in the provision
of my data to you. Thank you.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much. I yield my--I yield back,
thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentlelady from Michigan for 5 minutes, Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing and thanks for our witnesses for being here. You
know, I think a lot of us are struggling to understand with the
withdrawal in Afghanistan sort of what era are we in? You know,
now that we have had the 20th anniversary of 9/11, how are we
to think differently about the threats facing the country? We,
of course, have foreign terrorist organizations. We have home-
grown folks who are inspired by groups abroad. We have our
problem with domestic terrorism and domestic extremism. We have
border issues. We have cyber issues. So, I think at least my
constituents are just trying to understand like where are we
and what are sort-of the biggest threats that we are facing?
Director Wray, you have also always been a really straight
shooter about numbers, right? About just being clear about data
and cases, since that is the bread and butter of the FBI. So,
if you could just help me understand order of magnitude when it
comes to open investigations that you have of foreign terrorist
organizations--people connected to an actual foreign terrorist
group versus a home-grown guy or gal who is inspired by someone
abroad versus a domestic terrorist, or domestic violent
extremist. Can you just tell me order of magnitude, where do
you have the most open cases?
Mr. Wray. So, thank you, Congresswoman. On domestic violent
extremists, we currently have, as I said in my opening
statement, now up to about 2,700 open investigations, which is
up from about say 1,400 last year, which was itself up
significantly from where it was when I started in this job. On
home-grown violent extremists, which is a reference to, as you
know, Jihadist-inspired or foreign terrorist organization
inspired, but not necessarily directed terrorism, we have
consistently hovered at around 1,000. I think we are a little
under that right now. But it sometimes has been more than
1,000, sometimes it has been less than 1,000. But it has
hovered kind-of up and down around that range.
As far as the third category, true foreign terrorist
organization cases, I don't have that number at my fingertips.
The last time I looked, I think that is probably around 2,000,
maybe. So, between the foreign terrorist organization cases and
the home-grown violent extremist cases, I think that gets you
to, give or take, around 3,000 investigations total.
Ms. Slotkin. Gotcha.
Secretary Mayorkas. Plus the 2,700 domestic violent
extremists.
Ms. Slotkin. Right, OK. So, it just helps to get a sense of
what your, you know, level of hovers on and kind-of understand
this era.
Representative Abizaid--I am sorry--Director Abizaid, you
know, there are a few people in the world that I trust more
than you on Afghanistan. You are an expert on the country. You
have spent a lot of time there. You were a Deputy Assistant
Secretary on Afghanistan. I think what I am getting from
constituents is this question of are we safer now than we were
on 9/11? Are, you know, the ability of these terrorist groups
to reconstitute something that I should worry about at the same
level of worry that I had on September 12? So, help me
understand where we are? Are we safer now? Are we the same
level of safety? With all the investment we have made in 20
years, where are we?
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much for the question. You
know, as I had mentioned yesterday, years of CT pressure in
Afghanistan and Pakistan had really relegated both al-Qaeda and
ISIS-K to more regional threats. As I testified today, you
know, you look at how the threat has changed over time since 9/
11. The al-Qaeda network operates in a very different way than
it did on that fateful day. You have a broader array of
terrorist groups that are operating across a broader swath of
territory, not just Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Africa,
Middle East, other parts of South Asia.
In general, this kind of broader diffuse terrorist network
exemplified by the al-Qaeda network and the ISIS, the expanding
ISIS network, does appear more regionally focused. That said,
that regional focus is something that we in the intelligence
community are monitoring very closely to understand at what
point it presents a threat to the homeland. When does that
regional ambition turn back into a transnational ambition that
they are actually pursuing and executing a plan against?
With respect to reconstitution in Afghanistan, in
particular, this is exactly what we are focused on as a top
priority today. Which is how do we understand how the changed
circumstances in Afghanistan will affect the trajectory of two
groups that had sustained significant losses over the last
couple of years? In the case of al-Qaeda, over the last 20
years. What does that mean for their plans and intentions going
forward?
My own concern is very specifically around ISIS-K and the
degree to which ISIS-K, you know, building off of the notoriety
it received after the attack on August 26, will it become more
focused on the West, more focused on the homeland than it was
previously? As we look at the kind of dynamism of what is
happening in the region, that is what our analysts are going to
be focused on going forward.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time from Michigan has
expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee for
5 minutes, Mrs. Harshbarger.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. I have a
couple of questions, just yes or no questions for Senator--I
mean, for Secretary Mayorkas. Sir, we know what happened in
Afghanistan with the Taliban being in control with the
assumption that al-Qaeda can now operate as they did leading up
to 9/11. These are some yes-or-no questions. Do you know how
many terrorists have been apprehended at our Southern Border,
sir?
Secretary Mayorkas. I do know how--known or suspected
terrorists, how many.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas. I would be pleased to provide that----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To you in a Classified
context.
Mrs. Harshbarger. That would be awesome. Honestly, do you
think there is a ripe opportunity for more terrorists, al-
Qaeda, Taliban, whomever, to come across the Southern Border
since it is wide open? That is a yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. No.
Mrs. Harshbarger. All right. Is the Remain in Mexico policy
being implemented and enforced?
Secretary Mayorkas. It is. It is being implemented. We are
developing the implementation plan as we are required to----
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. At the border. I would
like to mention,----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, sir.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Congresswoman, that that
requires a bilateral agreement. The Remain in Mexico program--
--
Mrs. Harshbarger. We just need to know----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Of course, arise----
Mrs. Harshbarger [continuing]. Yes or no since the Supreme
Court, sir, has said that it needed to be implemented. So, if
you could give us proof of that. Do you think if we continued
to build the wall that that would stop over 208,000 people
coming across the border illegally, sir? Yes or no?
Secretary Mayorkas. I do not agree with the continuation of
the construction of the wall.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Since you don't want to build the
wall, are we still paying the contractors not to build the
wall, sir?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are meeting our
contractual obligations as we are required----
Mrs. Harshbarger. So, that is yes.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To do.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK, thank you, sir. Director Wray, can
you give us, as a committee, an update on the people who have
been arrested from the January 6?
Chairman Thompson. I am not sure that the Secretary
understood you. You were going in and out. Try it again with
your question.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Wray. Can you hear me now?
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Can you give us an update on the
people who have been held from the January 6?
Mr. Wray. Well, what I can tell you is that we have now
made a little over 600 arrests. The status of each of those
cases varies. We have had some cases that have been resolved by
guilty pleas already. But a number of them are still pending
and that is probably all I could really contribute in this kind
of setting.
Mrs. Harshbarger. So, has every one of them been charged,
sir?
Mr. Wray. Well, the 600, give or take, are all people who
have been charged. Obviously, we have other on-going
investigations and there may be more charges there. Then the
ones who have been charged, I think you could expect to see in
some instances, superseding indictments that would add
additional charges.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Can you classify briefly and tell us
where they are being held?
Mr. Wray. I am not sure whether that is a Classified issue.
I think it varies from person to person. I would have to see
what information was appropriate. But if there is information
we can provide, we are happy to share it with you. I am mindful
of the fact that with those 600 cases, that is quite a number
of Federal judges who have very strong opinions about what we
say about pending criminal cases. I learned a long time ago as
both a prosecutor and a defense attorney, to respect the views
of the judges who are responsible for those cases.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Do you agree that China is one of the
biggest threats to our National security, sir?
Mr. Wray. I believe that the--that China, and by that, I
mean, the People's Republic of China Government, the Chinese
Communist Party, not the Chinese people,----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Right.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. Is that there is no country that
represents a more significant counterintelligence threat or a
more significant threat to our innovation, our economic
security, and our ideas. That is why as you heard me say in my
opening statement, we are opening a new China
counterintelligence investigation about every 12 hours. I can
assure this committee that is not because our agents are
looking around for something to do. It is because there is a
need. That is why we have about 2,000-plus, open investigations
of that sort leading back to different parts of the Chinese
Government or people acting on behalf of the Chinese Government
even as we speak.
Mrs. Harshbarger. I believe that too. I agree with
Representative Correa. These illegal drugs, the fentanyl, the
meth, that is coming across the border, we need to hold these
cartels accountable and are we doing that? Do you know, all HSI
told us when we went to the border, to the Rio Grande Valley,
is let us do our job. Are we letting them do their job?
Secretary Mayorkas. We certainly are, Congresswoman. We
most certainly are, Congresswoman. We are developing new
strategies all the time to meet the threat of the TCOs, the
Transnational Criminal Organizations.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time from Tennessee has
expired.
Mrs. Harshbarger. You believe that is the biggest criminal
threat to our country. Thank you, sir. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all the
witnesses. Director Wray, I want to again, I said this the last
time you were here, we just express appreciation for how you
play your job straight. Let me go a little bit further and say
that I am, you know, very much concerned about people crossing
our borders, but I am more concerned about the fact that we are
a Nation that is simply cross. It is very disturbing and I can
speak experientially here, there was one gentleman who
firebombed my office in Kansas City. His name is Eric King. He
is in the Colorado supermax prison. Then there is a gentleman
who was just indicted for his little plan to kill me. His name
is Kenneth Hubert. Then you spoke earlier about a guy, Timothy
Wilson, who was shot and killed by law enforcement because he
had a plan in our community to blow up a hospital with a
vehicle-borne explosive.
I am very, very much--and I mentioned all of this to the
Chairman last night, Chairman Thompson, last night. I am very
concerned about where our Nation is and what we are doing in
our Nation. Frankly, some of it is coming up here in our
hearing today. But, Director Wray, is there something that we
can do as Members of Congress? I am not asking you to say
anything political. I, you know, but if there are things that
we can do to arrest or reduce the domestic terrorism threat, I
am all in. If you or any of our--any of our witnesses today can
suggest something that this body can do, I am ready to try to
do it before lunch. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question
and for your kind words of support. Certainly, as I had
mentioned earlier, we need more agents, more analysts, more
tools for data analytics and so forth because the volume of
threats, as you--your own experience illustrates, is
significant. I would also say that more and more across every
threat area we contend with including in the terrorism arena in
particular, the issues of end-to-end encryption and user-
controlled encryption both on messaging and on devices is
something that is making us in law enforcement increasingly
blind to the threats and our ability to protect all of you and
your constituents. That is a real problem and it needs to be
addressed.
I think a lot of Americans don't understand that we are
moving rapidly in a direction where no matter how ironclad your
support for a search warrant is, no matter how much the judge
vigorously enforces its order, and no matter how heartbreaking
or horrifying the criminal activity we are investigating, we
are moving in a direction where no matter what that is, we will
not be able to see the information and therefore, we would be
significantly hobbled in our ability to protect Americans. So,
that is an issue coming to a place where we have lawful access,
lawful access to encrypted information, it has got to be
addressed somehow or we are all going to wake up in a much more
dangerous spot than we already are. So, that would be one
thing.
Then the last point, of course, is the more everyone,
including prominent members of the public, our politicians, our
corporate officials, et cetera, can----
Mr. Cleaver. I think my time must be running out. I
apologize, Mr. Chairman, if I went over.
Chairman Thompson. You actually have a little time, but I
will take it if you want to give it up. The Chair recognizes
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
Ranking Member for hosting this hearing today. Director Wray,
my first question is for you. Last week FBI Deputy Director
Paul Abbate said there has been no indication that the Russian
Government through President Putin have taken steps to stop the
activities of cyber criminals engaging in ransomware attacks
against U.S. entities. In fact, just yesterday, there was an
attack on the New Cooperative, an Iowa-based farm service
provider, who was hit with a ransomware attack with a--and with
think a Russian-linked criminal group Black Matter is demanding
$5.9 million ransom. This is the exact attack that President
Biden had messaged to President Putin against. That this is a
critical infrastructure. It is a sector and this is off limits.
So, I understand from your testimony that the FBI is working
with the State Department and the National Security Council to
increase pressure on countries that fail to stop ransomware
actors in their territory, like Russia. What specific steps is
the FBI taking to pressure these groups? What more should the
administration be doing to hold these foreign adversarial-
linked criminal groups accountable?
Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question.
Certainly, it is a topic that is the subject of quite a bit of
discussion and planning and operational activity these days.
There may be more that we could share in a more Classified
setting. But what I would tell you in this setting is that
Russia, the reality is that Russia has a long history of being
a safe haven for cyber criminals where the implicit
understanding has been that if they avoid going after Russian
targets for victims, they can operate with near-impunity. The
Russian Government has long refused to extradite Russians for
cyber crimes against American victims. Worse, their Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has long been warning its citizens, publicly
been warning its citizens which other countries, which third-
party countries to avoid because those countries they say will
arrest or extradite those Russians back to the United States to
face justice for cyber crimes.
So, it is too soon to tell whether any of the things that
are under way are having an impact. But in my experience, there
is a lot of room, a lot of room for them to show some
meaningful progress if they want to on this topic.
Mr. Garbarino. So, are you saying you can't talk about the
specific procedures you are putting on Russia because it is
Classified? Is that why we can't talk about it right now?
Mr. Wray. Well, I think I can provide you a potentially a
more descriptive answer if I don't have the concerns about what
I can say publicly, that is all.
Mr. Garbarino. I understand. I would hope that you do that
because this is a huge issue that does not seem to be stopping.
It is just getting worse. Every month we hear about another,
maybe every week now we hear about another ransomware attack
from a Russian-backed or if not Russian-backed they are
operating freely in Russia, you know, these groups. So, I would
very much appreciate if we could have that meeting, Mr. Wray.
Mr. Secretary, I have a question following up on--actually,
I don't know if it was brought up already, but it is dealing
with cyber and which is, I think, a huge threat to our National
security. I understand that their reports have indicated that
the Secret Service purchased 8 drones from a Chinese company
called DJI on July 26, 2021. Just 3 days earlier on July 23,
the Department of Defense released a statement saying that
DJI's products posed threats to National security. Plus, in
2017, DHS itself stated with moderate confidence that DJI was
providing U.S. critical infrastructure and law enforcement data
to the Chinese Government.
This fact that the Secret Service purchased 8 drones, this
seems absolutely unacceptable. Why would they purchase
equipment from a known foreign adversary, especially in the
light of well-documented cybersecurity vulnerabilities? How can
we--how can the American people trust DHS to protect us from
cyber crimes and attacks, ransomware attacks, when the Federal
Government is leaving itself open to security risks by buying
these--buying equipment from companies like DJI?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, my answer is two-fold. No.
1, cybersecurity is one of our top priorities in the Department
of Homeland Security. We have an extraordinarily talented and
dedicated work force on that critical mission set. I will look
into the Secret Service purchase that you reference and I will
get back to you and your staff as soon as possible.
Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that because this is--I hope it
is very soon because I don't think we should be using these
equipment if our DHS and the Department of Defense have already
said that DJI and their equipment cannot be trusted. So, I hope
we look into this right away before the drones are actually
delivered. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses
for appearing. I must say that I have great respect for both of
the witnesses having observed them over some time now. I have
found them to be persons who seem to genuinely want to do the
right thing. To me, doing the right thing is important. Almost
as important as doing the righteous thing. So, today, I would
like to have a friendly more of a colloquy than a Q&A.
I am just curious about something because we know that
Title 42 allows persons to be quickly moved literally without
giving them an opportunity to seek asylum. I supposed you can
make your efforts, but Title 42 is for quick removal, as I
understand it. Then we also know that TPS allows persons to
stay because of conditions in the country that they would
ordinarily be returned to. Haitians are in a very unique
position. Title 42 allows them to be removed. TPS, for those
who are already here, says that because of conditions in Haiti,
we shouldn't send them back there.
So, if we shouldn't send them back because of conditions
and we find that we have persons who should be removed under
Title 42, I am asking is there some way to reconcile this so
that we don't give the appearance of contradicting ourselves.
So that we show that there is some rationale for Haitians
remaining here. Now, we had testimony just yesterday, I
believe, indicating that when the Haitians are expelled, they
are sent back, they get a phone, some amount of money. Many of
them, over 95 percent according to the testimony, haven't been
to Haiti in years. So, we are sending people back to a country
that they haven't been to in years and there are others who are
going to be allowed to stay because they happened to have been
in the country at a certain time. We are doing this under Title
42. TPS allows for staying.
So, isn't there some way, I am just making an appeal for
the Haitians. Isn't there some way for us to reexamine this? I
am just, this is an appeal, Mr. Secretary, for us to reexamine
this. Maybe there is something we missed. Can you give me some
hope, please?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I very much appreciate
what you have said, the question you posed, and the spirit of
your question. I don't think that we can overstate the
heartbreak with respect to the vulnerability of the Haitian
people whom we are encountering, specifically in Del Rio,
Texas, over the last week, and their vulnerability.
There are a number of things I would like to say. No. 1, we
did grant temporary protected status to Haitian nationals who
were resident in the United States prior to July 29 of this
year. We, in collaboration with the Department of State,
studied the country conditions there and made that
determination. Then we looked--we have looked at the country
conditions and made a determination that, in fact, we can
return individuals who have arrived subsequent to July 29 to
Haiti. We are working with countries in South American, Chile,
Brazil, for example, to see whether they would accept the
return of Haitians who have traveled from those countries. It
is complicated for reasons I can explain at a later time when
we have more time.
The Tile 42 authority, as I had mentioned earlier, is not a
matter of immigration policy. It is a matter of public health
policy as determined by the Centers for Disease Control's
assessment of, in this case specifically, over last year and
this year, the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic and most
recently, of course, the Delta variant.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I do appreciate what
you have said. What would you need for us to reconcile this
such that the Haitians would be able to--would get a different
result? Because I am just so concerned about having made a
decision that the country is not such that we can send some
back, but if you got here at a later time, country conditions
have changed. Now, I have been to Haiti. I was there after the
last earthquake. Not the most recent one, but the one before
that. Haiti on a good day can be a place that can be difficult
to negotiate. I am trying to be very kind because I have got a
lot of constituents from Haiti. They love their country. I love
it too. So, my question is that there just seems to me that
there must be something that we can do. If it requires
something from Congress, I am willing to be the guy to take the
risk and ask that we do it. Can you give me some help on this,
please?
Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman. I would welcome
the chance to discuss that further with you. I know that the
State Department, PRM, one office within the State Department,
as well as USAID is very focused on resourcing Haiti and
specifically providing greater sustenance to the individuals
who are returned there. This is a very complicated and very
heartbreaking situation. I really embrace the spirit with which
you posed the questions to me. I would welcome the opportunity
to sit down with you and talk it through.
Mr. Green. Thank you. How do I contact you? Will you
contact me?
Secretary Mayorkas. We will reach out, Congressman.
Mr. Green. Thank you. Thank you, very much. On behalf of
the Haitians that are----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas,
when Jay Johnson was Secretary, you were Deputy, and I was
Chairman of Homeland, we had the rise of ISIS and the
caliphate. I commend your Department and the FBI and NCTC for
stopping probably 99 percent of those threats. I worry with the
fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and Bagram Air Base being
taken over, we have no eyes and ears on the ground. We have no
ISR capability. We can't see or hear anymore the threats. We
can't see Russia, China, and Iran as well as we could before
the fall of Bagram.
But I want to go back to the border as Mr. Green was
talking about because in my State of Texas, these Haitians,
14,000 of them, in addition to the over a million that have
come in this year, has caused a crisis. I think in your words,
you said it is unsustainable and told Border Patrol agents that
we are going to lose. I agree with you with that.
I have also obtained emails from CBP agents stationed in
Del Rio warning and asking for more resources in early June.
Then the Foreign Minister of Panama warned on June 3 about this
influx that was coming up to the Southwest Border. Did you see
this threat coming? If so, what if anything, did you do?
Secretary Mayorkas. So, if I may, Congressman, thank you
and it is good to see you again. I know we worked closely for a
number of years. I did not say that we are going to lose. That
is unequivocally false, No. 1. And No. 2, we have not seen
before such a rapid migration, irregular migration of
individuals as we have observed and experienced with respect to
the Haitians who have crossed the border in Del Rio, Texas.
That has been an unprecedented speed.
Mr. McCaul. But did you have any warning signs? You know,
when the sector chief is being warned about this, when the
Panama foreign minister is warning on June 3, and, you know,
here we are and it is September, and, you know, months later.
Did you see this coming?
Secretary Mayorkas. Well, so, we watch the flow of
individuals who are seeking to migrate irregularly through
Mexico from the Northern Triangle countries and further south
we do, indeed, track it. Nevertheless, Congressman, as I
previously articulated, the speed with which this materialized,
is unprecedented. That is why we surged as many resources as we
have. We have deployed as many----
Mr. McCaul. If I can just, one last question, and that is
you have said this is the worst in 21 years, and I agree with
you. The speed has been very fast-paced. The Migrant Protection
Protocols, the asylum agreements negotiated by the prior
administration, I believe, were effective. Unfortunately, this
President on Day 1 rescinded those agreements, opening up this
border. The traffickers know that. They know that if they touch
base in the United States, they can stay now. I think--and I
respect you, sir. I think you have been a Federal prosecutor,
deputy secretary, now, you understand this concept of
deterrence, but also the fact that these were working. My
question is this has now been taken up to the Supreme Court of
the United States. They have held, upheld the decision that the
Migrant Protection Protocols need to be reinstated. I believe
that you can call it whatever you want, sir, but it will
greatly help in securing this border that is out of control
right now. What are you doing to comply with the Supreme Court
order?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, as you know, both of us
served as Federal prosecutors, we have an obligation to abide
by the orders of a court. The district court ordered us to
implement the MPP program and that is, indeed, what we are
doing. We are in on-going negotiations with Mexico with respect
to that implementation. We rely upon Mexico's agreement to do
so. We are moving with deliberate speed. I recognize and
respect and will abide by a court order.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that. I think it will help
tremendously. Any assistance you need with dealing with Mexico,
I have chaired the U.S.-Mexico IPG for, you know, 15 years. I
hope they will be willing to take the agreement back, to
reinstate it. Because I do think it will make a difference in
this crisis that we have at our border.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from Texas----
Mr. McCaul. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 minutes, Mr.
Swalwell.
Mr. Swallwell. Thank you, Chairman. My first question is
directed to Director Wray. I have been tracking the public
reports of Anonymous--Anonymous lists health attacks world-wide
including public reporting that there may have been attacks
domestically in the United States. So, director, what are you
doing at the FBI with your agents to determine who is
responsible for these attacks? What message do you have to
those conducting these attacks as to what you will do if you
find out who they are?
Mr. Wray. Thank you for the question. Thank you,
Congressman. Certainly, there is nothing more important to us
than the health and safety of our own work force and the
intelligence community's work force. We at the FBI are working
very aggressively in a very concerted way together with our
intelligence community partners who also have a huge role to
play on this issue. Our role is doing interviews of victims and
pursuing the investigation from both a potential criminal, but
also National security-type perspective. But again, it is a
victim-focused effort at the moment. We are going to make sure
that if we can figure out who is responsible, that we leave no
stone unturned in holding them very firmly on accountable.
Because if this is an attack, it is totally, totally
unacceptable.
Mr. Swallwell. All right, thank you, Director. Moving to
ransomware attacks, also something that has affected America's
businesses and John Chambers, former CEO at Cisco predicts that
there will be 60,000 ransomware attacks. The Bureau has worked
to try and help America's businesses, but what additional
resources do you need to one, reach out and work with
businesses who have been affected? Reach out, provide, perhaps
a cyber hygiene tools that they may need. Of course, to try and
claw back any keys that have been stolen from them. I would
also welcome Secretary Mayorkas if he had any insights on this.
Mr. Wray. Well, thank you for the question. Certainly,
ransomware has mushroomed significantly over the last year and
is on pace to mushroom again this year. We, in terms of what we
need, we have significant budget requests that have come before
the Congress that are pending as part of a 5-year cyber
strategy that I unveiled last September, a year ago. Part of
that is designed to make sure that in every field office, we
have a true model cyber squad capable of handling a Colonial
Pipeline, a JBS, a Kaseya, whatever it happens to be, in every
field office.
We also have the need to be able to improve our training.
We need more technical tools. I would also say I know there
have been various legislative proposals swirling around about
potential pay system, paygrade modifications for computer-
trained cyber expert personnel in a number of agencies. If
something like that were to go into effect, obviously, we would
want it to apply to the FBI as well. A lot of what those
personnel are going to do is not just investigate, respond, and
disrupt treats, but engage, to your point, with the private
sector, with victims. That is one of the strengths, one of the
things that the FBI can provide to the fight is with 56 field
offices and 250-something RAs, we can put agents on the
doorstep of a victim often within an hour or two no matter
where they are or when they get hit. That is why we need the
footprint to be able to make sure that we are doing right by
all the victims.
Mr. Swallwell. Thank you, Director. Director Mayorkas,
actually, I will follow up with you separately on ransomware.
But I do have a question about the Reimbursable Services
Program for airports. You know, all politics is local and I
have a local airport in Livermore, California that would like
to use this service, pay for it itself so that as international
flights come in, they can have border agents or CBP custom
agents to receive the flights. Is that still a program that DHS
supports if local airports want to do that?
Secretary Mayorkas. It is and it is a--Congressman, thank
you. It is a program that is implemented on a fact-specific
circumstance, a specific basis. We look forward to speaking
with you about it in the jurisdiction that you identified.
Mr. Swallwell. Great, thank you. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. Pfluger.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas,
good to see you. We have a letter that I know has been
referenced from out-going Border Patrol Chief Rodney Scott that
basically claimed of great concern that he has witnessed a lack
of meaningful effort to secure the Southern Border. I would
like to ask you, this person was 29 years in the Department, a
non-partisan actor, somebody that served 5 administrations with
the only goal of securing this country. Is the border more
secure under your leadership than when you started?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the border is secure. We
are executing our plan. I have been very clear and unequivocal
in that regard. I focus----
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, the question is, is the border
more secure now under your leadership?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is no less secure than
it was previously.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, I want to look at something in
his letter. Out-going Border Patrol Chief Rodney Scott said,
that suspected terrorists are entering this country at a level
we have never seen before. I want to know, I know it has been
asked, how many known or suspected terrorists have entered this
country this year?
Secretary Mayorkas. I respectfully disagree with Mr.
Scott's assertion and the information that you have requested
we would be pleased to share with you in a Classified context.
Mr. Pfluger. He said, in my professional assessment, the
U.S. Border Patrol is rapidly losing situational awareness
required to know who and what is entering our homeland. The
ability of U.S. Border Patrol to detect and interdict those
that want to evade apprehension is being degraded daily. Low-
level, unsophisticated, and uneducated smugglers are illegally
crossing the border and increasingly evading apprehension
daily. To think that well-resourced terrorist networks,
criminal organizations, and hostile nations are not doing the
same is naive. The current situation is unsustainable and must
be mitigated.
So, I have received the brief. I went to Del Rio. In less
than 1 week, I was actually there on Saturday at the peak,
15,000 people, in what your Department said yesterday, bum-
rushed the border, and there is, by the way, 40 to 60,000 on
the way. So, is the quote true, at a level we have never seen
before? That terrorists, suspected terrorists are entering this
country at a level that we have never seen before?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, as I have previously
articulated, I respectfully disagree with Mr. Scott's
assertions. I should say that that assertion has no
relationship to a reference to Del Rio and the fact that
vulnerable Haitians have crossed the border there have been
encountered and are being repatriated. Those are two very
different happenings.
Mr. Pfluger. It ties in because I talked to these Haitians.
They got the word that Del Rio was open. They came. In fact, I
talked to several. I talked to 2 Cuban couples, 4 people total,
from Cuba to Panama to the Southern Border in Del Rio, 40
hours. It took them 40 hours get to our Southern Border because
what they heard through social media, what they heard through
their networks, was that it was open. They paid thousands of
dollars to trafficking organizations to get there. So, to
think, like Rodney Scott says, outgoing Border Patrol Chief for
29 years, 5 administrations, to think that well-resourced
terrorist networks, criminal organizations, and hostile nations
are not doing the same, is naive. Mr. Secretary, why--the
American public deserves to know what the threat is to our
country. Why will we not release numbers? Why are you not
releasing the number of known or suspected terrorists that have
entered this country?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I have been--Congressman,
I have been very clear that I would be very pleased to share
that information with you in a Classified context. No. 1, I
don't think, I don't think that the vulnerable Haitians who are
in Del Rio, Texas now, could say that the border in Del Rio,
Texas is open. Quite frankly, we have seen the heartbreaking
pictures----
Mr. Pfluger. It is heartbreaking. I was there. I saw it.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Congressman, that
reflect--that reflect that fact.
Mr. Pfluger. In fact, there is--there is all sorts of bad
things going on. But it is a drain on resources. We had to
repurpose Border Patrol agents from their National security
mission all along the Southern Border to Del Rio. The Governor
of Texas has had to step in because the Federal Government has
abdicated the duty to protect our country. So,----
Secretary Mayorkas. I respectfully--I respectfully
disagree. We have never abdicated our duty to protect our
country. As a matter of fact, the 250,000 men and women of this
Department work day and night----
Mr. Pfluger. And they are doing a phenomenal job.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To protect this country.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, we are calling it as Texans and
as Americans, we want to know how many known or suspected
terrorists have entered this country. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5
minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would
like to start by thanking you too for your work to extend the
TPS for citizens for several countries. This was something I
asked you about the last time you were here. We looked at El
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. This is a large part of my
district, which is the most diverse in Nevada, and one of the
most diverse in the country. So, we certainly appreciate your
recognizing the importance of that TPS and thank you for that
extension.
Well, you have heard a lot about the concern about the
Haitians at the border and I would like to expand on that. But
I would like to go back to where they came from. We know that
the cartels and some of these people who prey on the immigrants
have taken their money. They have sold their possessions. They
have come up here. Could you describe how your Department in
this kind-of all-of-Government approach is working with the
State Department and maybe with NGO's in some of the countries
of origin to counter this false information or to deal with
these people who are preying on folks who just want a better
life?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you so much. Your
point goes directly to something the Congressman who preceded
your question addressed, which is these individuals, vulnerable
individuals, are being exploited by smuggling organizations and
are receiving false information with respect to the border. We
are in collaboration with the Department of State and other
agencies within the Government countering that false
information, that false messaging both from the United States
and in the countries of origin themselves.
You know, this past Sunday I spoke to journalists, Haitian
journalists, and the messages that I communicated were blasted
throughout social media and in Creole as well as Spanish to
make sure that we reach the depth of the desired and needed
populations. This is an all-of-Government effort and it is a
multilateral effort because we are working with other countries
in ensuring that vulnerable populations receive accurate
information and do not take the perilous journey north that
will not succeed.
Ms. Titus. Well, I know that we can take advantage of
social media. Everybody, even those in the most direst of
straits, seems to have a cell phone in which they can read this
kind of information. So, I appreciate that you all are working
across agencies to get this information out and encourage you
to use some of the NGO's in country as well.
My second question has to do with tourism. You know I
represent Las Vegas. We are now starting to see foreign
tourists come back. This is a large part of our business.
Foreign tourists stay longer and they spend more. We saw where
this is opening up. The President announced this within the
last few days. Can you talk about some of the things that we
are kind-of doing in advance to accommodate foreign tourists?
We saw the problems after 9/11, but now we have got a little
bit more time to get ready and people are anxious to travel.
When those borders open up, they are going to come to Las Vegas
because where better to go for a holiday after a year of
frustration? Would you outline some of those things you are
doing for customs and helping with that issue?
Secretary Mayorkas. So, Congresswoman, thank you very much.
The President did, indeed, announce in the last few days the
fact that travel restrictions would be lifted with respect to
international travel, travel to the United States upon certain
conditions. Our Office of Field Operations within Customs and
Border Protection located at the airports will be ready to
receive and process an increasing number of travelers. We are
also working at Transportation Security Administration, TSA, to
make the travel from the United States as facile and orderly
and secure as possible. We are planning for what we hope to be
a resumption of international travel and the influx of tourism,
the tourism economy here in the United States.
Ms. Titus. Well, that is great because we have the
philosophy that a person's holiday begins the minute they leave
home and that includes all that experience through the airport.
We have heard some horror stories about waiting hours on the
tarmac or in line to get through customs. So, we want to be
ready this time and we appreciate any effort you can make for
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. Pursuant to
today's order, the Chair declares the committee in recess for 5
minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. The committee will be in order. The
Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Bishop,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, Mayorkas,
first I would like to ask you, Congressman Pfluger asked you a
moment ago how many suspected terrorists have crossed the
border and you said you would be glad to answer in a Classified
context. Why can't you answer that question in public?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the information is,
indeed, Classified and some of it is also Law Enforcement
Sensitive. On a more general basis, these are determinations
that are made across the agency and I should note, if I may,
Congressman, that I believe it was in late July that we
provided a briefing to this committee with respect to the
requested data. So, it is information that we already have
provided.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir. Let me ask you this. Many have
commented and sometimes it devolves into a debate over numbers
whether it is a 1.3 million illegal crossings, who is
recidivist, and how many really come in, whether it--who has
really been released into the country, and, of course, we have
now the latest thing with the Haitians in the last week or so,
is all this--is all this the plan?
Secretary Mayorkas. I am not sure I understand your
question but let me say the following. The plan that we have is
a multipart plan. No. 1, is to address the root causes of
irregular migration. No. 2, is to ensure that there are safe,
orderly, and humane pathways so people do not have to take the
dangerous, perilous journey to make a claim of asylum that our
laws that Congress passed are recognized. Third, is to rebuild
our asylum system here in the United States. At the same time,
Congressman, we do enforce our immigration laws. Those are not
only the laws of humanitarian relief, but the laws of
accountability for those who seek to enter illegally and do not
have a claim for relief under law.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir. I guess what maybe I am getting
at is just that. Now that I look back at some of your testimony
when you were before us back in March, you went through
something very similar. You talked about your plan to address.
You always use the term address migrants at the border. That
you said you were executing on all fronts to address the
situation at the border. When you spoke before a Senate
Appropriations Committee in May, you said something very
similar. We have a three-part plan, or three pillars to our
plan. You gave that again, more or less, in--you have done that
repeatedly in testimony before Congress that you have a plan
under way to address the surge of migrants at the border. That
comment was before the Senate Homeland Security Committee just
in July, July 27. So, I guess what I want to understand is, are
the results that we are seeing, are they the results of your
plan? They are the plan results. Is that correct?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me give you a very
important example of the execution----
Mr. Bishop. Before you go off into an example, sir, could
you give me a yes or no? Are these the results of your plan?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the plan is under way and
is being executed. As one of your colleagues mentioned, over
the last month, we did see a decrease because we were
implementing tools that are part of that plan. Back to my
example of a measure that we have taken that is very
significant and that quite frankly is unprecedented. What is
not unprecedented is recognition of the problem in our asylum
system that it takes years and years----
Mr. Bishop. I am not looking to debate----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Between the time of
encounter----
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Your plan.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. And the time of ultimate
resolution.
Mr. Bishop. Yes, at this point,----
Secretary Mayorkas. One of the things that we----
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Secretary Mayorkas----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Have done----
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Let me ask you to sort-of just not
just--I am sorry, I just have limited time. I just want, I
don't want to get into a sort-of down to the granular level of
detail. You have made the point to these committees repeatedly
that you have a plan and you are executing the plan. Sometimes
I think we are talking past each other. I would just like your
confirmation, sir, that the results we are seeing at the border
are the results of the execution of your plan. Is that a fair
understanding?
Secretary Mayorkas. No, it is not. It is a
mischaracterization. Congressman,----
Mr. Bishop. Then is your plan failing?
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. As I mentioned----
Mr. Bishop. Is your plan failing?
Secretary Mayorkas. No, it is not. As I mentioned, every
time I have spoken of my plan and I would welcome the
opportunity if not in today's testimony, but separately with
you, to actually complete the answer that I was providing
earlier because it is--it involves very important information
with respect to that plan. The plan takes time and we continue
to exercise it thanks to the dedicated men and women of this
Department.
Mr. Bishop. Do the results that you are seeing and their
magnitude suggest to you that your plan is wrong? That your
plan is ill conceived and is plunging the Nation into a crisis?
Secretary Mayorkas. No.
Mr. Bishop. All right. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman,
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Chairman, for holding this
hearing and I want to thank each and every of the witnesses for
sharing your perspectives, your work, and your commitment. I am
so touched by something that as a child I embraced and believed
and that is: Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming
shore. Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tossed to me. I
lift my lamp beside the golden door.
This country's greatness and true genius lies in its
diversity and I believe that I am motivated by that. That is
American to me. So, the conversations we have with regard to
what happens at the border, what happens with refugees trying
to get here, what is happening right now on the Southern Border
with the Haitian communities, it concerns me tremendously, Mr.
Mayorkas, that we would be sending them back to Haiti. Some of
them sending them for the first time in over 20 or 30 years.
Sending them to a country that has been just ravaged by
earthquakes, ravaged by instability in its political and
governmental realm, and dangerous with gangs. So, I just need
to share that I believe our responsibility is to treat them
humanely, to process them in a way that gives them the freedom
and the opportunity to live in a healthy environment. Now, that
may not just be the United States of America. We need to enlist
our friends, our allies all around the world.
Mr. Mayorkas, I just need to say I believe everything you
say about your intentions with regard to doing our business
humanely and respectfully on the borders and anywhere to keep
our homeland free. But the images that I saw with regard to
what was happening with our Border Patrol employees whipping, I
don't care if it were your belt or your reins or your what, but
whipping Haitians is unconscionable, unacceptable, un-American.
I know that you are investigating it, but I tell there is under
no circumstances that those individuals are to be able to
interact with other human beings ever again. They need to be
released and they need to be held accountable.
For all three of you, I want to just ask a question which
is really maybe a kind-of a bizarre question. Is there a
hierarchy of concern with regard to the vulnerability of this
country? Is it cybersecurity interfering with our business and
our supply lines and the things that we need? Is it foreign
attacks coming from places that we know we have had folks
attacking us before? Is it domestic terrorism? Is it domestic
terrorism that represents ethnic and racial motivation? Is it
domestic terrorism that is influenced by foreign terrorists?
What are the--is there a hierarchy of concern? I want to hear
that yes or no from all three of you. Then I need you to tell
me do you have the resources, all of the resources that you
need to make us safe, as safe as we could humanly be with the
work that is under your jurisdiction?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, maybe I will answer
first. We do have priorities, if you will. I think you have
accurately identified many of the priorities that we have in
terms of protecting the homeland. I am sure those priorities
are echoed by my colleagues in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center. I also
just want to remark that I well understand and appreciate the
pain with which you made your initial remarks, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, sir. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Thank you. I apologize, I missed probably the
beginning of the question with the technical hiccup that we
had. But picking up on what I think the question was, I would
tell you that we have elevated racially and ethically motivated
violent extremism to our highest threat priority level
commensurate with ISIS and HVEs, Homegrown Violent Extremists.
We did that back in June 2019. The fact that we have now 2,700
domestic terrorism investigations accumulated over the last
year and a half, should speak volumes.
As far as whether we have sufficient resources, there is, I
think, in the budget pending before Congress, a much-needed
request for more resources because at the same time that we are
having to increase and surge to domestic terrorism, the reality
is the home-grown violent extremist threat has not subsided.
Now especially in the wake of events in Afghanistan, we need to
be even more vigilant about foreign terrorist organizations.
Last, I would add a category that hasn't gotten a lot of
discussion at today's hearing, but a point that Director
Abizaid had made in her opening, which is we can't take our eye
off the threat from Iran as well, Hezbollah, Quds Force, et
cetera. So, we have a full plate and we need all the help we
can get and we appreciate the committee's support.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Director Abizaid, I want to ask you
one question.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. May I just----
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired, but she needs
the answer to the other question.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. It is a 10-second question. I am
sorry, Chair.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady has 10 seconds.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady has 10 seconds.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Can you tell me what the
motivation was for ISIS-K to perpetrate that attack on those
leaving? We were evacuating. What was their point? Was their
point just to show us that they exist and that they want to be
a pain in our behind or what? Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that
consideration.
Chairman Thompson. Thirty seconds.
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you for the question. One, I think ISIS-
K targeting our evacuation operations at H. Kya in part because
of the notoriety they would receive because of how high-profile
it would be. But they also sought to embarrass the Taliban.
ISIS-K is very focused on the Taliban and given the Taliban's
assertions of its own ability to provide security, they wanted
to demonstrate that that was not in fact the case. That is our
assessment as it stands now.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa for 5 minutes, Mrs.
Miller-Meeks.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
you testified before this committee back in March. At that
time, several Members including myself asked you about COVID-19
testing protocols at the Southern Border. You said, and I
quote: We do support the testing of individuals and that in
indeed our policy and we have implemented practices to execute
on that policy. However, on September 10, the DHS Office of
Inspector General came out with a report that stated, CBP does
not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP
custody. Indeed, that is what I found at the two trips I made
to the border. Instead, CBP relies on local public health
systems to test symptomatic individuals. According to CBP
officials, as a front-line law enforcement agency, it does not
have the necessary resources to conduct such testing.
I don't have to tell you that we are in a pandemic, Mr.
Secretary. I believe that testing of people coming across our
Southern Border is one of the many keys to controlling the
spread of COVID-19. That is why back in March I introduced my
first bill, the React Act, to require COVID-19 testing for all
migrants. The OIG recommendation coming out of this September
10 report said DHS should reassess its COVID-19 response
framework to identify areas for improvement to mitigate the
spread of COVID-19. The report went on to say, DHS leadership
must commit to strengthening these COVID-19 preventive
measures. Without stronger measures in place, DHS is putting
its work force, support staff, communities, and migrants at
greater risk for contracting the virus. Additionally, with the
predictable surge of Haitian migrants from South America, they
may bring with them the Lambda variant, which is in South
America at this time. These are certainly strong words coming
out of the OIG. Additionally, the report makes observations
regarding lack of social distancing, lack of mask wearing, and
general overcrowding in facilities at the Southern Border,
which would all combine to facilitate the spread of COVID-19.
Not only COVID-19, I understand there is a measles outbreak at
Fort Bliss.
This is a huge problem and one that the committee has been
trying to get answers during this entire year. Every time we
ask the question, I feel like we get a different response. So,
I have got a number of questions and because time is limited, I
am going to run through them so that you can answer them. If we
are requiring air travelers to have a negative COVID-19 test
before entry, why aren't we requiring the same of land
travelers? If we are able to test Afghan people for COVID and
vaccinate them not only for COVID, but measles, mumps, rubella,
and polio, and other age-appropriate vaccinations, which are
required by the CDC, why is there a double standard along our
Southwest Border? Do you agree with the IG's report? The DHS
did concur with two recommendations in that report, I believe.
Do you agree that it is your responsibility to ensure that
there are strong protocols at the border to mitigate the spread
of COVID-19? Do you commit to implementing the IG's
recommendations and identify ways to mitigate the spread of
COVID-19? Do you commit to report back to this committee within
a month on the progress the Department has made at the border
on testing for COVID-19? Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, may I seek your
indulgence to obtain a transcript of all the questions that you
have asked and answer them rapidly? I did not catch them all
now. I will say, Congresswoman, that I do appreciate your focus
on the communicable diseases with respect to migration, whether
it is by air or by land, and, in fact, by sea. We have
concurred in the Inspector General's recommendations. We have
made changes to some of our COVID-19 protocols and I will
provide the requested information to you as rapidly as
possible.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Well, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your
respect for the questions I asked, but I have been asking these
questions since March and we have seen no policy or protocol
changes and yet, we see a totally different response for Afghan
refugees coming to this country than we do for those along at
our Southern Border. To include which this massive spending
bill that is coming out and we are expected to vote on doesn't
have adequate resources for CBP to do its job.
So, I thank you so much for your testimony. I expect that
we will see changes in protocol and policy and I will
reintroduce what legislation I can to force those changes.
Thank you so much. Mr. Chair, I yield back my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice, for 5
minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs.
Demings, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
all three of our witnesses for being here today. Thank you for
the job that you do every day to keep us safe. No, you are not
perfect as you are frequently reminded. You have big jobs and
awesome responsibility. But as Members of Congress, so do we.
We are the lawmakers. So, I just would say to you that we all
can work a little harder to be better partners and realize that
we are all in the same boat, like it or not. That boat,
especially with this committee, is to lead in keeping our
Nation safe. We are a Nation of laws at the border. We are a
Nation of laws on January 6. Those were criminals and not
tourists. Doggone it, we are a Nation of laws regarding foreign
entities. If we would remember that, I think we all could be
better partners and never risk our Nation being attacked by
anyone in such a cruel and vicious way. I want to just
acknowledge the victims of 9/11 and the brave first responders
on that day.
With that, Secretary Mayorkas, as many of my colleagues
have noted today, DHS was created in response to 9/11. I
remember it well. Over the last several months, we have held,
as you are constantly being reminded today, hearings on the
mission and structure of the Department and its ability to meet
the threats of today and tomorrow. One concern raised on many
occasions is that the Department's mission has grown
incredibly. Indeed, in just 2021, the Department has led the
Federal Government's response to the pandemic, every place,
every place, natural disasters all over our Nation, stunning
cybersecurity attacks, immigration enforcement, and
resettlement of our Afghan allies. This is, of course, because
as one previous witness noted, DHS is an unmatched connector
between Federal resources and State and local authorities.
Secretary, understanding that information and resource sharing
to prevent attacks against our homeland is such an important
function of the Department, has the mission of the Department
of Homeland Security and the responsibilities of its
components, grown too vast for one department, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I thank you so much for
your question. I don't think so. We are fundamentally a
department of partnerships. I think we are working now very
cohesively across the Department, across our different agencies
and offices. I think that we are working more collaboratively
and closely with our State, local, Tribal, and territorial
partners than ever before.
We have, for example, through the Office of Information--I
am sorry--the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, been
disseminating critical products in partnership with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to our local first responder community
so that they are very equipped and empowered to address the
threats that they face in their communities. I know you know
this very, very well given your life-long dedication to the law
enforcement and public safety mission.
I think we are working very cohesively. We have a lot more
to accomplish in that regard and we are very focused on it.
Mrs. Demings. Mr. Secretary, you know information sharing
certainly was one of the major focuses or I think recognized
vulnerabilities 20 years ago. How would you say as the
Department of Homeland Security Secretary we are doing along
the local, State, and Federal level with information sharing?
Secretary Mayorkas. I think, Congresswoman, if you would
ask the State, local, Tribal, territorial partners that we
have, they would echo my assertion that we are doing better
than ever before. We have not only issued an NTAS Bulletin and
renewed it several times, we have sent out multiple products in
different forms. We are focused on real-time actionable
information in the hands of our partners to strengthen our
homeland security. I think we are doing better than ever
before. We will do better tomorrow than we are today.
Mrs. Demings. Again, to all three of our witnesses, thank
you for what you do to keep us safe every day. We are committed
to joining you as effective partners in that effort. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van Drew, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas,
in your written testimony, you stated that DHS confronts
complex challenges including international and domestic
terrorism, a global pandemic, malicious cyber activity,
organized crime, catastrophic impacts of climate change, among
others. I understand that. They all are. I had to notice
immediately that you didn't mention the crisis at our Southern
Border as a challenge facing the Department. Let me say to you
I understand your intentions, but you say that we are doing
better today than we were. It seems to be we are doing worse
today than we did yesterday. I almost expect us to do even
worse tomorrow than we are today. I don't agree with you. I
think there are a lot of people using straight common sense
that look at videos, that read reports, that look at
information, that have spoken to law enforcement there, and we
know that so far in 2021, there is over 1.3 million migrants
have been apprehended at the American Southern Border, which is
a 386 percent increase from this time last year. Let's call it
what it is. This is a disaster.
Additionally, August was the sixth straight month where we
had 170,000 encounters at the border. That is unbelievable. It
has been reported now and we have seen all the pictures that we
have got 9,000 migrants, give or take thousands, that may have
entered the United States without being tested for COVID-19,
with only being issued a notice to appear at an immigration
hearing.
Look what we see under the bridge in Del Rio. People
bathing in the water, people obviously lacking hygienic, you
know, necessities. People who are sick. People who are involved
with drugs. This is all there. This is nothing, you know, I sit
back and again, as I said to you last time when we had this, it
is like I'm in bizarro world. I see it in front of me. You see
it in front of you, but some people pretend not to see it. I
don't mean to be disrespectful to you, sir, but sometimes it
seems like you don't want to see it.
The reality is we talk about the underlying causes. So,
really, let's talk about this. What we are saying is other
countries have severe problems with poverty, education,
nutrition, a host of areas. We understand that. But it is naive
and arrogant of us to believe that we are going to fix all of
that and make that all better, which throughout history we
haven't even been able to do. Then that is going to stop the
big push into the United States of illegal immigration in a
timely way. That's nonsensical.
The way that you do this is through the rule of law. The
way that you do it is that you have a border. When you have a
border, you also have a border fence or a border wall. You have
what you need. You have the proper amount of law enforcement to
ensure that things don't get out of control. You ensure that
you are reducing the amount of drugs that are coming into this
country. Don't tell me that we are not getting more drugs
because of this, we are. There is so much fentanyl now in our
country. The numbers keep going up. It used to be you could
kill every man, woman, and child 2 times over, then 3 times
over, then 5 times over. I think the latest number is 7 times
over, but we really don't know because it is just pouring in.
We are using kids as drug mules.
So, we have sick people. We have drug-infested situations.
We have a lack of hygiene. We have no rule of law at the
border. We do the best we can and certainly our men and women
who work down there are. Then you say to me it is better than
it was when you were here last time. No, it is not better than
it was last time. It is scarier and it is worse than it was
last time. Texas can't absorb all these people. American can't
absorb all these people. We don't even know if they are
healthy. We don't even know what problems we have. We haven't,
you know, really haven't really taken enough care with
evaluating each individual that is coming over. We just can't--
undocumented migration is not appropriate. It is not how we
work in America. We should change the immigration laws. I agree
with that. But nevertheless, this is absolutely not the answer.
So, I respectfully again, I am trying to be nice, but I am
angry, and I am tired. Americans are angry and they are tired.
We want to hear real answers. Don't, please don't tell me we
are going to make the whole world better in 6 months by
addressing climate change and all their social problems that
they have and all the military problems that they have. It has
always been that people came to America because almost
everywhere else is much worse and America is much better. But
we have to have control of the situation. This is nonsensical
and it is damaging and it is disturbing and it is hurting our
people and it is hurting our country and it should be one of
our No. 1 priorities. So, tell me, do you really believe that
it is better now? Do you personally take any responsibility for
this crisis?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I think you know you have
said quite a number of things. I would really like to speak
with you fulsomely about everything you have said. You
mentioned something that I think deserves particular emphasis
and that is you referenced our broken immigration system and
the need to fix it. That has been an enduring problem. The one
thing that there is unanimity about is the fact that we have a
broken immigration system. It is most unfortunate that we have
not fixed it over many, many years. I hope we do because that
would be----
Mr. Van Drew. Mr. Secretary, I understand----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. The fundamental----
Mr. Van Drew. Forgive me for interrupting. I agree with
you, but right now we have an immediate crisis. We have an
immediate situation. So, you know, it is like saying, if a war
breaks out, well, we really go to work on human nature and
ensure that we work together more as human beings. I agree. But
the reality is----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has----
Mr. Van Drew [continuing]. We have a crisis now.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Expired. The gentleman's
time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
California----
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Ms. Barragan.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
panelists and Mr. Secretary for being with us today. I want to
follow up with the Title 42 questions. Everyday hundreds of
thousands of people cross the border, whether it is students,
whether it is business people, whether it is folks seeing
doctors, but hundreds of thousands are crossing the border. Mr.
Secretary, what is the difference between those people crossing
the border and asylum seekers crossing the border, which we are
now citing to Title 42 to deport?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I am not exactly sure
what particular differences you are focused upon, but as you
know we are----
Ms. Barragan. Well, I would----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Exercising in between the
ports of entry the CDC's public health authority under Title
42.
Ms. Barragan. OK. So, is there any difference between
people that are crossing--the hundreds of people crossing the
border every day, students, business people, and asylum
seekers, other than they are just asylum seekers?
Secretary Mayorkas. I am sorry, Congresswoman, I don't
quite understand your question. Yes, I mean, there are many
differences between migration, the movement of people through a
port of entry and the encountering of an individual in between
the ports of entry. There are numerous differences between
those two phenomena in a number of respects. Legally, from a
public health perspective, a whole host, operationally. I am
not just quite sure what you are focused upon. I apologize.
Ms. Barragan. Well, I focus on the fact that this is a
discriminatory policy that it is implemented because people are
asylum seekers--because the public health crisis does not
discriminate whether you are an asylum seeker or whether you
are not an asylum seeker. So, I just think it is a
discriminatory practice. I just to continue to encourage the
administration to end the use of Title 42 in a day and age
where we have vaccines and we have requirements we can put in
place for people to get vaccines.
Mr. Secretary, moving on, how does the CB--how does CBP
choose which Haitians will be expelled via repatriation flights
and which individuals will be processed into the United States?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, our policy is to employ
Title 42, the CDC's public health authority, to the fullest
extent possible in light of the CDC's public health assessment
and the public health imperative. It is a matter of, for
example, our operational capacity, the willingness of a partner
country and its capacity to receive individuals. There are a
host of factors. In addition, there are very limited exceptions
to our Title 42 authority. For example, as I think you
recognize, we do not enforce it with respect to unaccompanied
children. That was a policy that was implemented very early on.
There is a convention against torture exception. There are
individuals who have severe and acute vulnerabilities that we
recognize. I would be pleased to provide more information in
that regard.
Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to
talk a little bit now about seaports. Nation-wide, seaports are
seeing record high levels of cargo volumes and increases of
container ships resulting in port congestion. Ships with
containerized cargo are stalled in marine terminals and vessels
spend days at anchor weighting to load or unload at port of
terminals. In fact, the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los
Angeles in my district this week had 65 ships at anchor waiting
to unload cargo. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was uncommon
for more than one ship to wait to unload. Unfortunately, port
congestion is expected to be an on-going challenge. Can you
describe the challenges that port congestion might pose to
maritime port security?
Secretary Mayorkas. So, if I may, Congresswoman, the
greatest challenge with respect to port congestion is the
obstacle to the very facile movement of goods through those
ports and serving the economic engine. This is a consequence as
we know all too well of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Office of
Field Operations, the United States Coast Guard, all our
services are very focused on maritime security on the one hand,
and, of course, the facile movement of lawfully imported goods
to the United States. We are very focused on this.
Ms. Barragan. Mr. Secretary, I have to say I am a little
disappointed. The question was very specific about what
challenges that congestion might pose to maritime port
security. I hope you will follow up given that I represent a
port and ports are very important that I get an answer to that
specific. I want to know what the security issue is from
congestion. What you stated to me was just restating the
problem. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To follow up on
Representative Miller-Meeks' line of questioning, these are for
Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Secretary, the last time you testified
before the committee, you admitted to this committee that your
agency, had released migrants who have tested positive for
COVID-19. Since then, multiple reports have indicated that
thousands of COVID positive migrants have been released from
DHS custody. In addition, the DHS Office of Inspector General
released a report highlighting that your Department has failed
to take sufficient COVID-19 preventative measures at the
border, which puts the DHS work force and communities at
unnecessary risk of being exposed to COVID-19. So, to me, it is
clear that your Department either does not have a strategy or
it is not effectively executing a strategy that will
effectively mitigate the risks of COVID-19 at the border. Why
is that?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we do have a strategy. We
concurred in the recommendations of the Inspector General's
office. We are implementing those recommendations. We have made
changes and I can walk through the processes that we employ
currently with respect to the different populations of migrants
whom we are encountering at the border.
Mr. Clyde. OK. Well, then let me ask you this.
Secretary Mayorkas. With unaccompanied children----
Mr. Clyde. You say you have a strategy and you are
implementing it. When will final implementation of the strategy
be complete because----
Secretary Mayorkas. We----
Mr. Clyde. Go ahead.
Secretary Mayorkas. We are working as quickly as possible
to implement the recommendations of the Office of Inspector
General.
Mr. Clyde. So,----
Secretary Mayorkas. Let me give you----
Mr. Clyde. So,----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. One example----
Mr. Clyde [continuing]. What is the time frame? When will
it be complete?
Secretary Mayorkas. I will speak with our chief medical
officer and I will report back to you, Congressman.
Mr. Clyde. So, you don't know.
Secretary Mayorkas. I will speak with our chief medical
officer, Congressman, and I will get----
Mr. Clyde. OK. OK, so----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. I will report back to you.
Mr. Clyde. So, there is a very--it is having a plan and
executing the plan, all right? Effectively executing the plan
is very different--it is pretty clear to me that the
administration is not truly serious in addressing this matter.
I would like to remind the Secretary that according to your
website, 11,125 CBP employees have tested positive for COVID-19
and 43 CBP agents have died from the virus so far.
So, I would urge my Democrat colleagues to join me in
cosponsoring my bill, H.R. 2076, the COVID-19 Border Protection
Act. This bill would require DHS in consultation with HHS to
develop and submit a comprehensive plan of action to test and
quarantine every migrant at the Southern Border and execute on
that plan. I would also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit
for the record, an article dated August 4 that highlights the
number of COVID-positive--the number of positive COVID-19
cases. It is titled, ``Texas border city says more than 7,000
COVID-positive migrants released since February, 1,500 in the
last week alone.'' Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous----
Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
Mr. Clyde [continuing]. Consent for that to be added.
[The information follows:]
Texas Border City Says More Than 7,000 Covid-Positive Migrants Released
Since February, 1,500 in Last Week
more than 188,000 migrants were encountered at the southern border in
june
By Adam Shaw, Bill Melugin/Fox News, Published August 4
The Texas border city of McAllen says more than 7,000 COVID-
positive migrants have been released into the city since February, and
more than 1,500 in the past week--the latest example of growing concern
about the potential impact of the border crisis on efforts to control
COVID-19 in the U.S.
In a statement announcing the building of new temporary shelters to
deal with a ``rapidly escalating'' surge of immigrants being released
into the border city, McAllen warned of the release of thousands of
migrants with COVID-19.
texas border city puts up temporary shelters to cope with `rapidly
escalating' migrant surge
``Since mid-February of 2021 there have been over 7,000 confirmed
COVID-19 positive immigrants released into the city of McAllen by
[Customs and Border Protection], including over 1,500 new cases in the
past 7 days,'' the statement said.
Immigrants released by CBP are dropped off with Catholic Charities
and tested for COVID by a third party. If they test positive, they are
asked to quarantine and offered a room at a quarantine site.
The stunning numbers come amid increasing concerns from Texas and
elsewhere about the potential impact of the massive numbers of migrants
coming to the border on the efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic
within the United States.
Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, cited the numbers announced by McAllen as
he tore into the Biden administration for its handling of the crisis at
the southern border.
``That is unacceptable and they keep doing it,'' Cruz said on
``America Reports'' on Wednesday. ``Joe Biden likes to talk about this
pandemic, well I'll tell you what, the election of Joe Biden and Kamala
Harris was a super spreader event because their open border is
endangering not just the people of Texas but people all across the
country.''
There were more than 188,000 migrant encounters in June, and that
number is expected to rise above 200,000 in July--the highest number in
decades. While single adults and some migrant family units are being
expelled by Title 42 public health protections, unaccompanied children
and migrant families with young children are being processed and
released into the U.S.
biden administration reportedly planning to vaccinate migrants at
border to prevent covid spread
In June, while there were more than 55,000 family units encountered
at the border, less than 9,000 were expelled by Title 42. However,
despite pressure from left-wing groups to end Title 42 altogether, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) extended the order
this week.
An effort by Texas Gov. Greg Abbott to order law enforcement to
pull over vehicles carrying migrants to stop COVID-19 spread was
blocked temporarily by a judge on Tuesday in response to a Justice
Department lawsuit.
The Biden administration has blamed ``root causes'' like poverty
and violence for the surge, has resumed some limited return flights for
those ineligible for asylum and is reportedly planning on vaccinating
migrants coming across the border or being deported.
But as new restrictions pop up across the country, particularly in
response to the rise of the delta variant, and the numbers of migrants
encountered at the border keeps spiking, Republicans are likely to keep
putting pressure on the Biden administration over the contrast between
its COVID-19 efforts and its border policy.
Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis on Wednesday cited the border as he
responded to what he saw as Biden ``singling out'' Florida.
``Why don't you do your job? Why don't you get this border secure?
And until you do that, I don't want to hear a blip about COVID from
you,'' the Republican Governor said.
Secretary Mayorkas. May I say something, Congressman,
because you touch upon a very important subject that we have
focused upon? That is the health and well-being of our work
force. We launched Operation Vaccinate our Workforce to make
sure that vaccinations are accessible to our front-line
personnel. That yielded----
Mr. Clyde. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. A tremendous increase in
the percentage of our work force that was, indeed, vaccinated.
Mr. Clyde. OK, well----
Secretary Mayorkas. The President----
Mr. Clyde [continuing]. Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Of the United States
mandated----
Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I appreciate that information. So,
let me ask you this. How long will it take you to fully
implement the MPP, Migrant Protection Protocol program? Can you
give me a time frame on that?
Secretary Mayorkas. I cannot because we are reliant on our
partner, Mexico, to implement that program. That is a bilateral
agreement. We are working with Mexico to implement that
program.
Mr. Clyde. So, until----
Secretary Mayorkas. Now, if I may----
Mr. Clyde. So, what I am gathering then is that you have no
idea when that program will be fully implemented.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me be unequivocally
clear----
Mr. Clyde. No, no,----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. On this,----
Mr. Clyde [continuing]. No, just tell me yes or no, you do
or not?
Secretary Mayorkas. We are seeking to implement that
program and working to implement it in----
Mr. Clyde. OK, thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Good faith----
Mr. Clyde. Then I am reclaiming----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. As we are required to do
so, sir.
Mr. Clyde. I am reclaiming my time. I have a question for
Director Wray and Director Abizaid. Do we know the identity of
the Kabul airport bomber? Do we have any information that this
person was previously incarcerated at Bagram Air Base? If I
could get each one of you, Director Wray and Director Abizaid,
to comment on that, please.
Mr. Wray. I know we have identified certain individuals who
we believe to be associated with the bombing. I am not sure as
I sit here right now, whether that is information that is
sufficiently developed to be able to share in a public hearing.
So, let me see if there is more information we can supply to
you as a follow-up because it may require a Classified setting.
Then the second part is there may be an on-going investigation
that might be impacted. So, let me look into that and we will
circle back to you.
Mr. Clyde. OK. Director Abizaid.
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, I would associate myself with Director
Wray's comments. We do have an assessment along those lines.
The ability to share in this forum is something that I don't
have information, but I absolutely will follow up and work with
our colleagues in the FBI to provide the information whether in
a Classified setting or if it is de-Classified after this
hearing.
Mr. Clyde. OK. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
commitment in that.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, for
5 minutes.
Mrs. Cammack. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you
to our witnesses for appearing before us here today. My
colleagues have discussed a number of U.S. National security
concerns and I share those same concerns. There is no doubt
that our homeland faces more threats than in any time since 9/
11. The list of threats is long and far-reaching. But today, I
would like to focus on the crisis on our Southwest Border.
Now, Secretary Mayorkas, seeing as how this is our third
time meeting to discuss this issue, I would like you to answer
my questions with a simple yes or no as to not waste time. I
would also caution you to refrain from making promises about
providing us Members of Congress with additional information in
a timely manner because we have just recently received
information from a March 17 hearing. In fact, I received the
answers to that March 17 hearing on August 24, 161 days after
we requested that information. You can imagine how frustrating
that probably is as a Member of Congress tasked with oversight
of the Executive branch.
So, with that in mind, I would like to jump right into a
series of questions. Can you please provide me with the name of
the individual who suspended, made the decision to suspend
flights to Haiti the first week of September?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, that was a collective
decision.
Mrs. Cammack. By whom?
Secretary Mayorkas. It was a temporary, if I may say not
canceled, but postponed temporarily, the flights. Those were
few----
Mrs. Cammack. Did you make the recommendation?
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. And those were--I am
sorry. Those were few in number.
Mrs. Cammack. Did you, yourself, make the recommendation to
suspend the flights?
Secretary Mayorkas. It is my responsibility as the
Secretary of Homeland Security. I own that.
Mrs. Cammack. So, yes, OK. Thank you. Yes or no, you have
committed to briefing my colleagues in a Classified setting on
a number of known terrorists that have crossed into the United
States or attempted to. Now, I think we can all agree that
terrorists on the known watch list crossing into the United
States is an immediate threat. So, will you commit to that
briefing for this committee before the end of this month?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we will provide another
briefing to this committee. I understand that we provided that
briefing previously in July. If I may say----
Mrs. Cammack. By the end of this month?
Secretary Mayorkas. I will not myself be able to do that,
but I am sure my team would be, Congresswoman. May I say
something with respect to----
Mrs. Cammack. Actually, I have a very limited amount of
time, so I need to get through this because there is just a
litany of issues. Now, how many DHS personnel, including CBP
and USBP personnel have been pulled from their duties related
to the Southwest Border in order to manage the processing of
Afghans into the United States?
Secretary Mayorkas. So, we I believe that over 20
individuals from the United States Border Patrol have been
directed to the transit countries to assist.
Mrs. Cammack. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas. I can get you a complete breakdown of
the population of DHS personnel----
Mrs. Cammack. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. That have been dedicated
to the screening and vetting of Afghan nationals before they
arrive here in the United States.
Mrs. Cammack. I appreciate that. With regard to the agents
that have been pulled off the line to process and essentially
babysit, can you give me a percentage of how many of your
agents are now engaging in that activity?
Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, I disagree with that
characterization, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Cammack. I didn't ask if you disagreed. I asked for
the percentage of how many, given a percentage of your agents
have been pulled off of their primary law enforcement duties.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I just disagree with the
question. I am sorry you are assuming thoughts. We have
multiple areas of responsibility----
Mrs. Cammack. Secretary Mayorkas, I am going to have to
reclaim my time. I can answer that question for you. In one of
your busiest sectors, the RGD sector, 75 percent of your Border
Patrol agents have been pulled off the line to babysit and
process. That is a disgrace.
I also want to make mention that as we are sitting here,
several of your agents are watching this hearing, hearing your
commentary. You were exceptionally quick to judge one of your
own agents and the mounted patrol, yet you have given zero time
to the number of suicides and agents who have passed away
because of contact and contracting COVID with their day-to-day
operations. That, to me, is shameful.
Now, I want to go to my colleague Representative Pfluger's
comments. He asked you if you thought that the border was
secure. In your own words, you stated that the border is no
less secure than the previous administration. Mr. Guest
previously provided data earlier in the hearing that your
agency shows that it is, in fact, a historic level. We have
308,000 ``gotaways''--75 percent of your agents are processing
and babysitting in one of your busiest sectors. We have a
record number of retirements. Historic level of narcotics that
have come across the border and you still stand by your
statement, yes or no, that the border is secure?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes. If I may, your initial assertion,
Congresswoman, was profoundly offensive and wrong.
Mrs. Cammack. Well, this is now the second time that you
have--or basically called me disrespectful. I believe in our
first meeting you did. But I would just----
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Secretary Mayorkas, for being here today. Mrs. Cammack touched
upon something that I just want to ask briefly about, follow-up
to information. Representative Correa and I sent a letter to
DHS addressed to you on September 16. So, this is from both the
Chairman of Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight,
Management, and Accountability, Mr. Correa, and also myself as
Ranking Member, asking for specific information on how many of
the Afghan evacuees that we have brought to the United States
right now, how many of them are special immigrant visa holders
or dependents? How many are permanent residents or dependents?
American citizens or dependents? ANSF personnel who assisted in
the evacuation or dependents? The local embassy staff at Kabul
or dependents? How many are other Afghans? Because I know we
have seen some figures floating around that suggest that over
85 percent of those who were evacuated were neither SIVs,
American citizens, or permanent residents. Obviously, it is a
very fluid picture. Are you prepared to answer the questions we
posed in that letter? Are you prepared to answer that today,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, if I may, I will provide the
answer in percentage form, Congressman. So, we have admitted
into the United States over 60,000 Afghan nationals.
Approximately 7 percent of that population are United States
citizens. Approximately 6 percent are lawful permanent
residents. Approximately 3 percent are special immigrant visa
holders. The balance is a combination, if I may, Congressman, a
combination of special immigrant visa applicants whose
applications have not been finalized for approval, locally-
employed staff, individuals who would qualify under, for
example, P-1, P-2 refugee status. Then other vulnerable Afghans
as you have identified, journalists, human rights activists, et
cetera.
Mr. Meijer. If we could get--I appreciate the specificity
in the 7 percent, 6 percent, 3 percent. Is my understanding
that those numbers also accompany the dependents of the
principal holder?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, Congressman, and we do not have a
breakdown of the balance of that population, if you will. We do
not yet have that breakdown, that data.
Mr. Meijer. If you could get that to us by October 1 as
requested in the letter, that would be really appreciated, Mr.
Secretary. Also touching on the border real quickly, I mean,
looking at the numbers we have, you are no longer--the
administration's line is no longer that this is seasonal, you
know, increases, right? I mean, we are--we are at structurally
different numbers coming across, correct?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, sir.
Mr. Meijer. OK. Is that something that you are satisfied
by? Is this a tolerable situation? I was appreciative of the
emotion and enthusiasm you talked about the investigation you
will be doing into the photos that we saw. Will there be an
appropriate attempt to try to close the border or to try to
reduce that flow or get us down from, again, I mean, just
incredibly high numbers? I am looking at the fiscal year
southwest land border encounters by month, I mean, it was that
ramp up in February and it has just stayed above that, you
know, 175 level consistently. Are we doing anything to try to
get that number back down to try to really control the border?
Secretary Mayorkas. We most certainly are, Congressman. We
are doing a number of different things to address irregular
migration and the number of individuals who are traveling north
to our Southern Border ill-advisedly, perilously, and
unsuccessfully. We are doing a number of things and I have
spoken about this with respect to the root causes, the safe,
orderly, and humane pathways, rebuilding processes here in the
United States.
Mr. Meijer. Has any of that had an demonstrable----
Secretary Mayorkas. Humanitarian----
Mr. Meijer [continuing]. Impact on being able to reduce
those numbers, sir?
Secretary Mayorkas. Well, we actually have recently seen a
reduction in numbers. We hope that trend continues. We are
employing tools and we are also fundamentally hopeful that the
broken immigration system will be fixed through legislation.
Mr. Meijer. Just, I think, that reduction was from July was
213,000, August was 208,000. So, still quadruple what it was in
prior years. But, I guess, a reduction of, you know, a few
percent is something. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Gottheimer, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and
Ranking Member Katko for holding this important hearing. Thank
you, Mr. Secretary and Director Wray and Director Abizaid.
Welcome so much. Thank you for your service. I really look
forward to our work together to help protect our great country.
As we sit here today 20 years after 9/11, it is clear that
we face a much different threat landscape today than the one
that presented itself two decades ago. We have seen the rise of
a diffuse domestic and home-grown terrorist movement,
especially White supremacists and other racially or ethnically
motivated violent extremists. As of last year, the FBI had more
than 1,000 pending domestic terrorism investigations in all 50
States across 56 field offices. Earlier this year in
recognition of these threats, the Department of Homeland
Security, FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center,
agencies our witnesses today represent, were each charged with
fulfilling specific goals under the first-ever National
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism.
Given these pending threats, it is critical that Congress
enacts reforms to prevent the rising threat of domestic
terrorism. Mr. Secretary, in July, this committee approved my
bill, the Darren Drake Act. It is named in memory of a resident
from my district, Darren Drake, of New Milford, a victim of
October 2017 New York City Westside Highway terrorist truck
attack. The bipartisan bill would direct the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop and disseminate best practices for
rental companies and dealers to report suspicious behavior to
law enforcement agencies at the point-of-sale of rental
vehicles to prevent and mitigate acts of terrorism using motor
vehicles. Mr. Secretary, how will these provisions help protect
communities, in your opinion, from future terrorist attacks and
what other reforms are most needed to prevent domestic terror
incidents like those we have seen in recent years?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, your bill is--your bill is
extremely important because it speaks of a fundamental need.
Not only the dissemination of information to State, local,
Tribal, territorial law enforcement, but the dissemination to
the private sector and in the sharing of best practices. We are
working to implement that very thoroughly. I think it is a very
important measure and we have designed the Center for
Prevention programs and partnership precisely to accomplish
that mission to equip and empower all of society to work within
the communities to address this increased threat.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you so much. I really appreciate
that. Dr. Abizaid, in February along with Representatives Brian
Fitzpatrick, Andre Carson, and Chris Smith, I introduced the
bipartisan Saracini Enhanced Aviation Act of 2021 to require
the installation of secondary cockpit barriers on all
commercial passenger aircraft to prevent terrorist attacks
similar to 9/11. The bill mandates the installation of
inexpensive lightweight wire-mesh gates between the passenger
cabin and cockpit door blocking access to flight decks whenever
the cockpit door is open during flight on all existing
aircrafts. Director, looking back on the 20 years since
9/11, how can we prevent measures like this one help--and
further protect American citizens? In your view, what more is
needed?
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much for the question. In
general, the threats to aviation security are from foreign
terrorist organizations in particular, remain of concern even
here 20 years later. The enhancements that have happened in the
intervening time have certainly protected us and the
establishment of organizations like TSA, like DHS, like NCTC,
have all contributed to that. That said, every additional step
that would further improve security, is something that we think
will deter terrorist capability with regard to aviation
security or other tactics they may use or other tactics they
may use, and so, we appreciate the effort that you have gone
through to do that.
Mr. Gottheimer. Director, do you think we need that
secondary barrier on all planes, not just the new commercial
ones, but existing flights?
Ms. Abizaid. I am not intimately familiar with the
legislation or specifically, the assessment that would lead us
to say that that is absolutely necessary. I would just say as a
general matter, it sounds reasonable. I am happy to look at it
and run it against what we know of terrorist tactics and
capabilities and come back to you on that.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thanks. It was in the--it is the only
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report that has yet to be
implemented. It is right now we use drink carts on many planes
and the flight attendants have to stand there. When the cockpit
door is open there has been several--there has been plenty of
research at the FAA on this and other areas about the threat to
our cockpits and to our airplanes about this. So, yes, I would
love to follow up with you on this because I think it is
critically important based on the research and the evidence and
the 9/11 Commission Report that we get this done. There is
absolutely no reason why we would leave this vulnerability
open. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. LaTurner, for 5
minutes. The gentleman needs to unmute himself. I think we are
having some technical difficulties with you. We are still not
able to hear you, Mr. LaTurner. Stand by, we are trying to
correct it.
Mr. LaTurner. Can you hear me now, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Thompson. Yes, I can. Go ahead.
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Chairman? OK.
Chairman Thompson. You are on. Go ahead.
Mr. LaTurner. Secretary Mayorkas, as has been cited
throughout this hearing today, Customs and Border Patrol has
encountered 208,887 migrants on the Southwest Border this past
August. A 317 percent increase compared to the prior year. CBP
is currently encountering over 5,000 more individuals per day
than in August 2020. We have seen 6 straight months with over
170,000 encounters. Your Inspector General also just released a
report highlighting the fact that your agency has failed to
ensure sufficient COVID-preventative measures at the border.
After nearly 3 decades of service at CBP, former Border Chief
Rodney Scott stated that DHS is seeing terrorists cross our
border ``at a level we have never seen before.'' This is
absolutely unacceptable. This disaster must be addressed
immediately. What specifically are you doing at DHS to ensure
that our borders are secure and that Americans are kept safe
amidst all of this chaos?
Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Congressman, I can spell out
quite a number of measures that we are taking. Let me focus, if
I may, on August the number of encounters that you identify
are--does not reflect the number of individuals encountered, as
we do have a level of recidivism there. You cited 208,000
figure. In fact, the unique encounters, the number of different
individuals encountered in August was 156,641. So, we have
taken a number of measures, enforcement measures.
For example, we have increased the number of lateral
flights from one area of the border to another and then we have
the removal flights leave from that second processing area into
the interior of Mexico to make recidivism more difficult and to
ease the processing line and facilitate it. That is one example
of a measure that we have taken. We have, in fact, instituted a
policy to criminally prosecute recidivists, individuals who
have been removed previously. We are working with the Northern
Triangle countries to receive more individuals more rapidly so
that we can effect removals more. Those are some examples of
the measures that we are taking from an enforcement
perspective.
We also have an obligation, albeit in a COVID-19
environment, because we are employing the CDC's Title 42 public
health authority, we do have an obligation to enforce all laws
that is also not only the laws of accountability, but the laws
of humanitarian relief. Those are equally on the books as well.
Many of the individuals whom we encounter claim asylum and have
a right to have those asylum claims heard as our laws provide.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Could you provide--
what percentage of migrants have been processed through Title
42 as opposed to Title 8?
Secretary Mayorkas. So, let's take a look, if I may,
Congressman, at the August numbers. So, of the numbers that I
have indicated, the 93,414 have been processed for expulsion
under Title 42 and 115,473 have been processed for expulsion
under Title 8.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I yield
back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Secretary
has reiterated during this hearing his willingness to provide
requested updates to Members in an appropriate setting. We will
work and coordinate that with the Secretary and if at all
possible, Mr. Director, we might try to get you there too given
some of the information you were not able to provide at this
hearing so that the Members can have as full a view of what the
landscape looks like in a Classified and un-Classified setting.
We will try to work everybody as well as our third witness who
perhaps can help us on the international front to tie some of
the areas together too. For sure, we will get FBI and DHS and
obviously, if we need to include others, we will.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony and Members for
their questions. The Members of the committee may have
additional questions for the witnesses and we ask you to
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Without objection I also include in the record a letter
from the Jewish Federations on the subject of today's hearing.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the Jewish Federations of North America
September 20, 2021.
The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable John Katko,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko: The Jewish
Federations of North America commends you for holding a timely hearing
on Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11.
In the 20 years since the 9/11 attacks, the charitable sector, and
the Jewish community in particular, has been a high-value target of
violent extremists and the threats have metastasized from foreign
terrorist organizations and home-grown violent extremists to include
domestic violent extremists, and especially racially or ethnically
motivated violent extremists, such as white supremacists. While these
bad actors may have divergent ideological underpinnings, they share a
common thread that unites them--their hatred for the Jewish people. And
as the threat actors and their motivations have expanded, so have their
targets within the charitable sector.
We have witnessed terrorists and violent extremists target African-
American parishioners engaged in religious worship (mass shooting) and
Somali immigrants attending their community mosque (bombing), as well
as Jewish congregants participating in Chanukah holiday celebrations
(machete attack).\1\ As the threats have morphed and grown, we are
tremendously grateful for the strong bi-partisan response from the
House Homeland Security Committee to grow and expand the reach of the
Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) and to advance other best
practices and resources to secure the charitable sector and houses of
worship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science, ``Violent Extremism and Domestic Terrorism in America: The
Role and Response of DOJ,'' April 29, 2021; Link: https://
appropriations.house.gov/events/hearings/violent-extremism-and-
domestic-terrorism-in-america-the-role-and-response-of-doj.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three years ago, with your support, Congress broadened eligibility
to the NSGP program from approximately 30 high-risk urban areas to
communities throughout the United States, large and small. Last year,
through your leadership, Congress passed a 5-year authorization of the
NSGP program, elevating its stature as a meaningful part of the
preparedness grant programs. This year, also with your support, the
program doubled in funding to $180 million.
In only a few years, NSGP has grown into the third-largest program
in FEMA's grant programs portfolio in terms of volume and work, behind
only the Urban Area Security Initiative and the Homeland Security Grant
Program. And we believe that further growth in the program is both
justified and inevitable. It is justified because only a very small
portion of faith-based and nonprofit organizations have participated in
the program to date (about 6,500 over the past 17 years), even as the
charitable sector, made up of nearly 1.7 million houses of worship and
charitable institutions, faces a heightened and more expansive threat
environment. It is inevitable because the more the charitable sector
becomes aware of the NSGP funding opportunity and current barriers to
the program are addressed, participation rates will certainly increase
as they have over the last 7 consecutive fiscal years.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, there are a number of challenges nonprofits face to
accessing vital security resources, including NSGP. First, neither the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) nor the State Administrative
Agencies (SAAs) receive any specific resources to manage and administer
the NSGP program, which has grown exponentially in recent funding
cycles. Despite rapid growth in the program, the administering bodies
have not been provided the needed resources to support stakeholder
outreach and technical assistance or to conduct fulsome application
review and vetting processes.
To ensure the integrity of the program, including the quality of
program oversight and technical assistance to its stakeholders, we
recommend providing FEMA Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) and the SAAs
with additional and specified resources to address their management and
administrative costs.
Second, with respect to stakeholders navigating the application
process, one of the greatest challenges to accessing, understanding,
and successfully applying for the NSGP funding opportunity is the
archaic and static Excel-based application form and format FEMA's GPD
is required to use. Presently, navigating the current process is overly
complex, inconsistent, and faulty. Many stakeholders' technical
assistance questions pertain to glitches in the application.
Information important to the SAAs and GPD review process are not
permitted to be asked. An efficient and streamlined web-based format is
long overdue that would infuse equity and a level playing field for all
stakeholders and continuity and relevance in the review process. For
this to happen, FEMA GPD requires authority (a waiver to the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995) to update the content and format of the
application.
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) governs how Federal agencies
collect information from the public. Its purpose, in significant part,
is to ``Ensure the greatest possible public benefit from and maximize
the utility of information created, collected, maintained, used,
shared, and disseminated by or for the Federal Government'' and to
``improve the quality and use of Federal information to strengthen
decision making, accountability, and openness in Government and
society.''\3\ The current NSGP application is not meeting these central
purposes of the PRA. A waiver to the PRA would fast track a several
years-long approval process to secure needed changes to reduce barriers
to successfully applying for and administering the NSGP application
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ US Office of Personnel Management, ``Paperwork Reduction Act
Guide Version 2,0,'' April 27, 2011; Link: https://www.opm.gov/about-
us/open-government/digital-government-strategy/fitara/paperwork-
reduction-act-guide.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To hasten new technology capabilities and a redesign of the NSGP
application content and format, we recommend providing FEMA's GPD with
the necessary expedited waiver authority.
Third, as the interest in the NSGP program has increased, the
limitation on available resources remains a challenge. The number of
applications submitted by the State Administrative Agencies to FEMA
grew from 963 in fiscal year 2018 to more than 3,300 this year (fiscal
year 2021). The program in fiscal year 2018 funded about 54 percent of
the applicants reviewed by FEMA (up from an average of about 36 percent
between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2017). Yet even with a
threefold increase in funding in fiscal year 2021, only about 45
percent of the applicants reviewed by FEMA were approved. In fact, a
total of 3,361 applicants submitted project requests totaling
$399,763,916, more than twice the $180 million in available funds
appropriated by Congress.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ DHS/FEMA/Grant Programs Directorate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To meet the demands of the charitable sector on the NSGP program,
we recommend doubling the current appropriation of $180 million to $360
million in fiscal year 2022, and for Congress to stabilize the annual
NSGP funding level in line with the elevated threat level.
Fourth, we have witnessed threats and attacks against faith-based
and communal institutions that have occurred in communities with
populations as large as 2.5 million and as small as 600.
While current threat assessments warn of the increased opportunity
for violence against faith-based and communal institutions they do not
pinpoint credible or imminent threats. This is common because law
enforcement and counterterrorism agencies are hard pressed to deter,
detect, and disrupt violent extremists before they attack. What is
clear is that this is a threat of Nation-wide proportions affecting
urban, suburban, and rural communities, and no one can predict where
the next attack will occur.
When the NSGP program was first created in fiscal year 2004, the
country lacked coordinated, centralized programs to promote and ensure
at-risk nonprofit institutions meaningfully participated in and
benefited from Federal, State, or local homeland security efforts.
Despite legitimate and growing nonprofit threats and concerns, the
charitable sector lacked a seat at the table to effectively compete for
planning, training, target hardening, and other Federal preparedness
resources. The charitable sector lacked a reliable and broad conduit to
the Nation's law enforcement and counterterrorism establishments,
Federal, State, and local.
In its 17 years, the NSGP program has made critical inroads for a
small percentage of the Nation's houses of worship and charitable
institutions. Unfortunately, today's threat environment provides a
compelling public interest in furthering protections against attacks
that would disrupt the vital health, human, social, cultural,
religious, and other humanitarian services and practices the charitable
sector provides, and which threaten the lives and well-being of
millions of Americans who operate, utilize, live, and work in proximity
to them.
To meet this task, we recommended the Department of Homeland
Security designate the charitable sector as an addition to the Nation's
critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks are
considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or
destruction would have a debilitating effect on National security,
economic security, public health, or public safety.\5\ As DHS's
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency describes, ``these
partnerships create an environment to share critical threat
information, risk mitigation, and other vital information and
resources.''\6\ The charitable sector should also be afforded the full
extent of these partnerships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Government Accountability Office Report, ``Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and Private
Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors,'' October 16, 2006 (GAO-07-39); Link:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-39/html/
GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-39.htm.
\6\ Cybersecurity and Infrastructures Security Agency; Link:
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the 20th anniversary of 9/11, there is much to consider about
the world-wide threats to the homeland, including those pertaining to
the charitable sector. For these reasons, we respectfully urge you to
call on Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Director Wray, and National Counterterrorism Center
Director Abizaid to address the safety and security issues of the
charitable sector in their testimony, including responding to the
concerns and recommendations outlined in this letter.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Robert B. Goldberg,
Senior Director, Legislative Affairs, The Jewish Federations of
North America.
______
Report From the Jewish Federations of North America
Nonprofit Security Grant Program.--Threat Incident Report: September 1,
2021 to Present
Prepared By: Rob Goldberg, Senior Director, Legislative Affairs,
[email protected]
recent risk reports and assessments of national significance/chronology
of threat incidents reported
Union Vale, New York, September 20, 2021 (Jerusalem Post/New York
State Police/Mid Hudson News).--An off-duty New York City police
officer has been arrested after he allegedly broke into Camp Young
Judea on the second day of Rosh Hashanah, September 8. Matthew McGrath,
37, was arrested and charged with felony burglary and criminal mischief
after he allegedly smashed windows, destroyed the camp director's
residence, and extensively damaged the property.
San Diego, California, September 17, 2021 (DoJ/US Attorney's Office
for the Southern District of California).--John T. Earnest of Rancho
Penasquitos pleaded guilty in Federal court today to a 113-count hate
crimes indictment, admitting that he set fire to an Escondido mosque
and opened fire in a Poway synagogue because he wanted to kill Muslims
and Jews. The religiously and racially motivated attacks resulted in
the murder of 1 person and the attempted murders of 53 others.
According to the plea agreement and other court documents, after
several weeks of planning, Earnest drove to the Chabad of Poway
synagogue, where members of the congregation were gathered for
religious worship. Earnest entered the building armed with a Smith and
Wesson M&P 15 assault rifle that was fully loaded with a 10-round
magazine. He wore a chest rig which contained 5 additional magazines,
each loaded with 10 rounds of ammunition. Earnest opened fire, killing
1 person (Lori Gilbert Kaye) and injuring 3 other members of the
congregation, including a then-8-year-old child. After Earnest emptied
his initial magazine, several congregants rushed at Earnest. Earnest
fled in his car and, shortly after, called 9-1-1 and confessed that he
had ``just shot up a synagogue.'' Earnest was apprehended by local law
enforcement who found the rifle and additional ammunition in his car.
Investigators found a manifesto written by Earnest and posted on the
internet shortly before the attack. In the manifesto, Earnest made many
anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim statements, including ``I can only kill so
many Jews'' and ``I only wish I killed more.'' Earnest wrote that he
was inspired by the Tree of Life synagogue shooting in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, and the shootings at two mosques in New Zealand. Earnest
also admitted that he attempted to set fire to the Dar-ul-Arqam mosque
in Escondido, California because of his hatred of Muslims and the
religious character of the building. Seven missionaries were asleep in
the mosque at the time of the attack, but no one was injured.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, September 16, 2021 (DoJ/US Attorney's
Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania).--Mustafa Mousab
Alowemer, 23, of Pittsburgh pleaded guilty to one count of attempting
to provide material support to ISIS in relation to his plan to attack a
church. According to court documents, Alowemer plotted to bomb a church
located on the north side of Pittsburgh using an explosive device. His
stated motivation to conduct such an attack was to support the cause of
ISIS and to inspire other ISIS supporters in the United States to join
together and commit similar acts in the name of ISIS. Alowemer also
targeted the church to ``take revenge for our [ISIS] brothers in
Nigeria.'' Alowemer was aware that numerous people in the proximity of
the church could be killed by the explosion. In his planning, Alowemer
purchased several items, including nails and acetone (nail polish
remover) with the belief that they were necessary to assemble a
destructive device and with the intention they be used to construct the
explosives that would be detonated in the vicinity of the church. He
also printed Google satellite maps, which included hand-written
markings identifying the church and routes of arrival and escape.
Alowemer also wrote and provided a 10-point handwritten plan outlining
details related to his plot to personally deliver explosives in a
backpack.
Nation-wide, September 16, 2021 (Department of Homeland Security
\1\).--The Department of Homeland Security assesses that some
individuals involved in or opposed to the ``Justice for J6'' rally
planned for 18 September at Union Square in Washington, DC may seek to
engage in violence. In early September, social media users discussed
using the rally to target local Jewish institutions and ``liberal
churches,'' while law enforcement is distracted that day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Intelligence in Brief,
``Prospects for Violence at `Justice for J6' Rally in Washington, DC,''
16 September 2021 (IA-54468-21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hagen, Germany, September 16, 2021 (13 ABC WHAM/Associated Press/
Der Spiegel news magazine/DPA news agency).--German security officials
detained 4 people in connection with a suspected plan to attack a
synagogue in the western city of Hagen. The detentions took place on
Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, and 2 years after a deadly
attack targeting a synagogue in the German city of Halle the Yom Kippur
holiday. (In the Halle attack, an armed right-wing extremist tried, but
failed, to force his way into the synagogue with 52 worshippers inside.
When the door held, he shot dead 2 people nearby and injured 2 others
as he fled.) According to news reports, a foreign intelligence service
tipped off German security officials about the threat based on an on-
line chat where one of the suspects discussed planning an attack with
explosives on a Hagen synagogue. The interior minister of the state of
North Rhine-Westphalia, where Hagen is located, confirmed that there
was an attack threat. Dozens of police officers secured the building
and a service planned to mark Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday,
was canceled at short notice.
Toledo, Ohio, September 13, 2021 (Department of Justice/Office of
Public Affairs).--Damon M. Joseph, aka Abdullah Ali Yusuf, 23, of
Holland, Ohio, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempting to
provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS) and for planning to attack 2 synagogues in the Toledo area.
According to Acting Assistant Attorney General Mark J. Lesko of the
Justice Department's National Security Division, ``Inspired by ISIS,
Damon Joseph planned to conduct a deadly terrorist attack at a
synagogue in Ohio. He hoped to cause mass casualties by selecting a
time when numerous innocent victims would be present.'' According to
the Department of Justice release, Joseph attempted to support ISIS
through violent attacks on Jewish congregants, including children, and
any first responders who sought to protect and assist them. According
to statements Joseph made to undercover FBI personnel, he wanted to use
AR 15s, AK 47, Glock handguns and ammunition to inflict mass
casualties, he specifically wanted to kill a rabbi, and wanted to
conduct the attack on the Jewish sabbath so that more people would be
present.
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, September 13, 2021 (JTA).--Two
separate threat incidents proximate to the Jewish high holy days have
led to increased security measures and communal disruptions. Beth El
Synagogue in St. Louis Park (Minneapolis) closed its doors and moved
Shabbat services on-line after the regional offices of ADL Midwest in
Chicago notified the congregation of a ``a specific threat of
violence'' it received against the synagogue via its on-line incidence-
report system. Specific details of the threat are not being released,
with authorities citing an on-going investigation. This synagogue
threat occurred one day after 32 headstones were knocked down at the
Chesed Shei Emes cemetery in St. Paul. As the high holy days continue,
area synagogues and Jewish organizations are increasing security at
their institutions in light of the threat.
Bloomington, Minnesota, September 13, 2021 (DoJ/U.S. Attorney's
Office for the District of Minnesota).--Emily Claire Hari, 50, f/k/a
Michael Hari, was sentenced to 53 years in prison for the August 5,
2017, bombing of the Dar al-Farooq (DAF) Islamic Center. Hari was
convicted by a Federal jury on all 5 counts of the indictment,
including intentionally defacing, damaging, and destroying religious
property because of the religious character of that property;
intentionally obstructing, and attempting to obstruct, by force and the
threat of force, the free exercise of religious beliefs; conspiracy to
commit Federal felonies by means of fire and explosives; carrying and
using a destructive device during and in relation to crimes of
violence; and possession of an unregistered destructive device. As
proven at trial, during the summer of 2017, Hari established a
terrorist militia group called ``The White Rabbits'' in Clarence,
Illinois. Hari recruited co-defendants Michael McWhorter and Joe Morris
to join the militia, which Hari outfitted with paramilitary equipment
and assault rifles. On August 4 and 5, 2017, Hari, McWhorter, and
Morris drove in a rented pickup truck from Illinois to Bloomington,
Minnesota, to bomb the DAF Islamic Center, using a 20-pound black
powder pipe bomb together with a plastic container filled with a
mixture of diesel fuel and gasoline. When the pipe bomb exploded, the
blast caused extensive damage to the Imam's office. It also ignited the
gasoline and diesel mixture, causing extensive fire and smoke damage.
At the time of the bombing, several worshipers were gathered in the
mosque for morning prayers. Hari targeted DAF specifically to terrorize
Muslims into believing they are not welcome in the United States and
should leave the country. In handing down a 53-year sentence, United
States District Judge Donovan W. Frank described the attack
orchestrated by Hari as a highly sophisticated and premeditated act of
domestic terrorism.
Buxton, Maine/Nation-wide, September 13, 2021 (Bangor Daily
News).--Brian Dennison, 24, allegedly threatened in his Twitter feed
``to kill Jews with my AR-15'' during the High Holy Days, has been
charged in Federal court in Portland with transmitting threatening
interstate communication. He also said he was building a pipe bomb,
according to documents filed in U.S. District Court in Portland.
Dennison posted the threat on September 8, the second day of Rosh
Hashanah, the Jewish New Year. According to Dennison's parents, their
son owns ``a few pistols and rifles, including an AR-15-style rifle.''
They also said that Dennison ``had been obsessed with Jews for about 3
years, and that he believed Jews were responsible for all of his
problems,'' and that ``They said they had many concerning conversations
with Brian regarding Jews,'' according to a court affidavit.
Framingham, Massachusetts, September 9, 2021 (MetroWest Daily
News).--Two hand-sized swastikas were found carved into a wooden sign
at the Temple Beth Sholom synagogue in the midst of the high holiday
season. The Jewish New Year, Rosh Hashanah, began on September 8.
Nation-wide, September 7, 2021 (Department of Homeland Security
\2\).--The relocation of Afghan nationals to the United States likely
exacerbates Domestic Violent Extremist grievances associated with
Muslim communities and could lead some to commit violence. Some
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremist-White Supremacists
are posting content blaming the Jewish community for the relocation of
Afghan nationals. A suspected RMVE-WS has called for an arson attack on
a Jacksonville, Florida-based nonprofit organization involved in Afghan
resettlement, according to non-Government organization reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Intelligence in Focus,
``Possible Domestic Violent Extremist Responses to the Relocation of
Afghan Nationals to the United States,'' 7 September 2021 (IA-51281-
21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germany, September 3, 2021 (The Algemeiner).--Germany's president
Frank-Walter Steinmeier delivered a Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year)
message to Germany's Jewish community filled with concern for the
community's safety and security. Steinmeier remarked that 2 years after
the Halle atrocity, ``Jews in Germany continue to be ridiculed,
belittled, violently attacked.'' On October 9, 2019, neo-Nazi Stephan
Balliet drove to the Halle synagogue as more than 50 worshipers inside
the sanctuary held services to mark Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the
Jewish calendar. Balliet was equipped with eight firearms, several
explosive devices, a helmet, and a protective vest for the attack.
After failing to break through the synagogue's locked entrance despite
exploding a grenade, Balliet shot dead a 40-year-old female passerby.
After additional violent attempts to force his way inside the temple,
Balliet drove to a Muslim-owned restaurant and shot dead a 20-year-old
man he believed to be a Muslim. According to German Federal Government
figures released in February, at least 2,275 crimes with an anti-
Semitic background were logged over a 12-month period ending in January
2021. Steinmeier asserted that anti-Semitic conspiracy theories fueled
by the COVID-19 pandemic were gaining momentum. ``It pains me and makes
me angry that anti-Semitic hatred and anti-Jewish agitation are showing
themselves so openly--in Germany, of all places,'' the president said.
Nation-wide, September 2, 2021 (CTV News Canada/CNN).--As the
United States-backed Government in Afghanistan fell to the Taliban and
U.S. troops raced to leave the country, White supremacist extremists
expressed admiration for what the Taliban accomplished, a worrying
development for U.S. officials who have been grappling with the threat
of domestic violent extremism. Several concerning trends have emerged
in recent weeks on on-line platforms commonly used by White supremacist
and other domestic violent extremist groups, including ``framing the
activities of the Taliban as a success,'' and a model for those who
believe in the need for a civil war in the United States, according to
the head of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, John Cohen. Cohen expressed concerns that
these narratives may incite violent activities directed at immigrant
communities and certain faith communities. Neo-Nazi and violent
accelerationists--who hope to provoke what they see as an inevitable
race war, which would lead to a Whites-only state--in North America and
Europe are praising the Taliban for its anti-Semitism, homophobia, and
severe restrictions on women's freedom, the SITE Intelligence Group
found. For example, a quote taken from the Proud Boy to Fascist
Pipeline Telegram channel, said: ``These farmers and minimally trained
men fought to take back their nation back from globohomo. They took
back their government, installed their national religion as law, and
executed dissenters . . . If White men in the west had the same courage
as the Taliban, we would not be ruled by Jews currently,'' SITE found.
Nation-wide, September 1, 2021 (NTIC Homeland Security Intelligence
Digest--September 10, 2021/San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination
Center Intelligence Bulletin (21-18)).--A review of 17 disrupted
domestic violent extremist (DVE) plots in the United States from June
2016 through July 2021 found that DVEs interested in plotting violent
action using IEDs are more likely to construct simple devices from
readily available supplies, rather than seeking to purchase a fully-
built device. The cases reviewed included many targeting faith-based
communities: Mosque (Garden City, Kansas--October 2016); Religious
Facilities (Oklee, Minnesota--October 2017); Muslim Community
(Islamberg, New York--January 2019); Synagogue and Mosque (Brownsville,
Texas--June 2019); Synagogue (Las Vegas, Nevada--August 2019);
Synagogue (Pueblo, Colorado--November 2019); and Jewish Populations
(Campbell, California--July 2021). Outlook: DVEs will likely continue
to attempt to acquire commercially available explosive precursors and
seek to build simple IEDs.
Chairman Thompson. The Chair reminds that the committee's
record will remain open for 10 business days. Without
objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Question 1. Secretary Mayorkas, can you speak to climate change as
a threat multiplier? Is this crisis contributing to the other threats
you highlighted in your written testimony such as terrorism, economic
security, immigration, and transnational organized crime?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Secretary Mayorkas, our Nation has more than 300 land,
air, and seaports of entry that require the screening of foreign
visitors and cargo. Can you provide an update on the on-going threats
facing those ports of entry? What are the challenges that your
department, and more specifically Customs and Border Protection,
continue to face, and what efforts have you taken to mitigate those
challenges?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. For all three witnesses, from an information-gathering
and -sharing standpoint, what blind spots or challenges are you
continuing to experience in addressing the threat from domestic violent
extremists? Are there authorities or other areas that this committee
should be looking at to address those blind spots?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Clay Higgins for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Question 1. Secretary Mayorkas, last month you were recorded
saying, ``if our borders are the first line of defense, we're going to
lose and this is unsustainable,'' as well as ``We can't continue like
this, our people in the field can't continue and our system isn't built
for it'' and the current border situation ``cannot continue.''
With a simple YES or NO, do you still believe that the situation at
the Southern Border is unsustainable and cannot continue?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Did you advise President Biden that the border
situation is unsustainable and cannot continue?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Given that the border is still open, is the President
ignoring your advice?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Why has the administration not acted to secure the
border?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Do you plan on requesting additional resources in
today's hearing to counter this surge in illegal crossings?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Does the current crisis at the Southern Border, along
with the deterioration of U.S. intel assets in the Middle East as a
result of the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan cause additional
concerns for DHS, similar to those expressed by the Pentagon?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. What incentive does the Biden administration have to
keep the border open even though, according to you, its unsustainable?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Question 1. Secretary Mayorkas, according to a letter from
recently-departed chief of the U.S. Border Patrol Rodney Scott, you
have chosen to ignore the recommendations of career Government
leadership despite your own admission that you agree with them.
In August, you admitted to a group of border agents in a closed-
door meeting, ``if our borders are the first line of defense, we're
going to lose and this is unsustainable'' and that the current border
situation ``cannot continue.'' The above statements are gravely
concerning and indicate that you know there is an issue but are
unwilling to take the necessary steps to fix it.
Do you still believe the above statements that you made to a group
of Border Patrol agents?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Have you agreed with career Government leadership on
proven programs and consequences to help secure our border but not
acted on them? If so, why?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Mariannette Miller-Meeks for Hon. Alejandro N.
Mayorkas
Question 1. If we're requiring air travelers to have a negative
COVID test before entry, why aren't we requiring the same of land
travelers?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. If we are able to test Afghan Paroles for COVID and
vaccinate them for not only COVID, but Measles, Mumps, Rubella, and
Polio, and any other age-appropriate vaccinations are required by the
CDC, why is there a double standard along our Southwest Border?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Do you agree with the IGs report entitled ``DHS Needs
to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border''?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Do you agree that it is your responsibility to ensure
that there are strong protocols in place at the border to mitigate the
spread of COVID-19?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Do you commit to implementing the IGs recommendation
and identify ways to mitigate the spread of COVID-19?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Do you commit to report back to this committee within a
month on progress the Department has made at the border regarding
COVID?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Carlos Gimenez for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Question 1. What is the number of illegal migrants that have been
encountered along the U.S. border since Jan 20, 2021?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What is the number of illegal migrants that have been
detained attempting to cross the U.S. border since Jan 20, 2021?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. What is the number of illegal migrants that have been
released into the United States since Jan 20, 2021?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Question 1. Can you commit to responding to the letter that
Representative Correa and I sent to you on September 16, 2021, with the
requested information regarding Operation Allies Welcome, by the
requested deadline of October 1, 2021?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. One of the main questions we have asked about the
Afghan resettlement efforts, and that we have yet to receive a
sufficient answer from the administration on, is a breakdown of
evacuees coming to the United States by status (SIV holders, SIV
applicants, P1/P2 applicants, other at-risk Afghans, dependents of all
categories of individuals, etc.).
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Why has it taken so long to get an answer on this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. At what stage of the resettlement process is an
individual's status determined?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. If individuals are going through screening and vetting
procedures prior to coming to the United States, shouldn't we at least
have a breakdown by status for individuals that have already entered
the United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. With DHS as the Federal Government's lead on Operation
Allies Welcome, does DHS have any role in continuing evacuation
operations out of Afghanistan? Or does this remain solely under the
State Department's jurisdiction?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. Amid surges of migrants at different locations along
the Southwest Border, in addition to DHS personnel being reassigned to
assist with the Operation Allies Welcome resettlement effort for Afghan
evacuees coming to the United States, it would be helpful to get some
clarity on how DHS is currently allocating its resources.
Where did the DHS personnel that were surged to Del Rio come from?
Where did the DHS personnel reassigned to Operation Allies Welcome come
from?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. Do these locations that personnel were reassigned away
from now lack sufficient resources to conduct their homeland security
missions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. Do Northern Border States like Michigan now have less
CBP personnel than usual?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. Does DHS need more resources overall to conduct its
mission?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. The administration appears to have been surprised by
the speed with which large groups of migrants recently arrived at the
Southern Border, specifically in the Del Rio sector, and there is
reporting that other large groups in Central and South America may also
be heading toward the U.S. border soon.
Is this lack of preparation the result of an intelligence issue?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. How does DHS and the broader U.S. intelligence
community engage in and gather intelligence in the region?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. How would each of you characterize intelligence
coordination and visibility in Central and South America compared to
other regions around the world?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15. Secretary Mayorkas has cited misinformation as the
reason for why these groups are now attempting to come to the United
States.
What groups are responsible for this misinformation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 16. What is the administration doing to combat these
misinformation campaigns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. August Pfluger for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Question 1. Last month the U.S. Government evacuated approximately
124,000 people from Afghanistan. There are reports that this included
several thousand U.S. citizens and approximately 705 SIV holders.
We have continuously requested a breakdown of the remainder of
these evacuees and have received no official report. Could you please
provide a breakdown on who these non-citizen non-SIV evacuees--
approximately 120,000 individuals--are?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How many of these individuals do you expect to be
eligible for P-1 or P-2 visas?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. How many of these individuals will not be eligible for
SIV, P-1, or P-2 visas?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Will you commit to providing information regarding
these individuals' visa status and other pertinent information
concerning their movement, vetting, and resettlement on a monthly
basis, comparable to the border numbers?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Understanding that we were aiming to evacuate
approximately 20,000 SIVs and their families, and hearing the reports
that we only evacuated approximately 705, are you concerned about the
fact that we have left behind tens of thousands of young men who are
uniquely positioned for combat, have first-hand experience with the
U.S. military, and who are currently becoming angered and resentful of
the United States because they feel abandoned by the U.S. Government?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Do you believe this may provide a ripe recruitment pool
for extremist groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. Do you see this as a National security threat?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. Please explain how you have and continue to process,
including with biometrics and biographical, the tens of thousands of
people who had no visa, and in most cases had not even filed for one,
but who were relocated to the United States.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. Could you provide an exact number of those relocated to
the United States who still had their visas in process and the number
of those who had not even filed for a visa?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. Please provide a breakdown of the Afghan evacuees
according to location.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. How many Afghans are currently in third-party ``lily
pad'' countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. How many are currently at military bases within the
interior?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. How many Afghan citizens have you paroled into the
United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. How many individuals present on the TSDB, No-Fly List,
or other watch lists have been transported by the United States out of
Afghanistan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15. How many, if any, have been transported into the
United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 16. Where have these individuals been apprehended?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 17. What is being done with them once apprehended?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 18. How many DHS personnel, including CBP and USBP
personnel, have been pulled from duties related to the Southwest Border
in order to help manage the processing of Afghans into the United
States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christopher A. Wray
Question 1. Director Wray, you have previously noted the criminal
code includes a definition of domestic terrorism (18 U.S.C. 2331(5))
and that there is no Federal domestic terrorism statute. Do you feel,
given the events of January 6, and the heightened threat from domestic
violent extremists, that such a statute is warranted? If so, why? If
not, why not?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Director Wray, in your testimony to this committee last
year, you mentioned end-to-end encryption as a technological challenge
that is significantly impacting your law enforcement efforts. Can you
update us on that as well other technological challenges you and other
domestic law enforcement agencies are running into? What tools do you
need to meet these challenges?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. For all three witnesses, from an information-gathering
and -sharing standpoint, what blind spots or challenges are you
continuing to experience in addressing the threat from domestic violent
extremists? Are there authorities or other areas that this committee
should be looking at to address those blind spots?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for Christopher A. Wray
Question. Could you please provide an update on the people who have
been arrested in relation to the January 6 incident at the U.S. Capitol
including where and how they are being held?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christopher A. Wray
Question 1. At what stage of the vetting and screening process that
Afghan evacuees are undergoing do your agencies get involved?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What kind of security checks do each of your agencies
conduct?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. During these stages of vetting, are you aware of an
individual's immigration or refugee status?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The administration appears to have been surprised by
the speed with which large groups of migrants recently arrived at the
Southern Border, specifically in the Del Rio sector, and there is
reporting that other large groups in Central and South America may also
be heading toward the U.S. border soon.
Is this lack of preparation the result of an intelligence issue?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. How does DHS and the broader U.S. intelligence
community engage in and gather intelligence in the region?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. How would each of you characterize intelligence
coordination and visibility in Central and South America compared to
other regions around the world?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. Secretary Mayorkas has cited misinformation as the
reason for why these groups are now attempting to come to the United
States.
What groups are responsible for this misinformation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. What is the administration doing to combat these
misinformation campaigns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christine Abizaid
Question 1. Director Abizaid, you mentioned in your written
testimony that racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, who
promote the superiority of the White race, have the most persistent and
concerning transnational connections because individuals with similar
ideological beliefs exist outside the United States. Countries such as
Australia, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom who consider
racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, to be the fastest-
growing terrorist threat they face. Can you expand on these connections
and what if any additional connections are you seeing between these
extremists and organized criminal groups, cyber groups, etc.?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. For all three witnesses, from an information-gathering
and -sharing standpoint, what blind spots or challenges are you
continuing to experience in addressing the threat from domestic violent
extremists? Are there authorities or other areas that this committee
should be looking at to address those blind spots?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christine Abizaid
Question 1. Without U.S. personnel on the ground in Afghanistan,
everyone's expectation is that conducting counterterrorism operations
will be more difficult than it was before.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are the obstacles to intelligence gathering and
sharing that the intelligence community is anticipating, or already
experiencing, in the region?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. How does NCTC intend to overcome those obstacles?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. In light of the August 29 drone strike that killed 10
innocent civilians in Afghanistan, many Americans are concerned that
the administration's ``over-the-horizon'' capabilities are not enough
on their own to obtain good intelligence to combat terrorism.
How specifically do you define ``over-the-horizon'' capabilities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. What would you say to Americans who are concerned about
this strategy's effectiveness going forward?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. At what stage of the vetting and screening process that
Afghan evacuees are undergoing do your agencies get involved?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. What kind of security checks do each of your agencies
conduct?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. During these stages of vetting, are you aware of an
individual's immigration or refugee status?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. The administration appears to have been surprised by
the speed with which large groups of migrants recently arrived at the
Southern Border, specifically in the Del Rio sector, and there is
reporting that other large groups in Central and South America may also
be heading toward the U.S. border soon.
Is this lack of preparation the result of an intelligence issue?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. How does DHS and the broader U.S. intelligence
community engage in and gather intelligence in the region?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. How would each of you characterize intelligence
coordination and visibility in Central and South America compared to
other regions around the world?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. Secretary Mayorkas has cited misinformation as the
reason for why these groups are now attempting to come to the United
States.
What groups are responsible for this misinformation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. What is the administration doing to combat these
misinformation campaigns?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]