[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                  WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND: 
                          20 YEARS AFTER 9/11

=======================================================================


                                HEARING

                               before the

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 22, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-29

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

		[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov


	        	       __________

 		      U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

46-377 			    WASHINGTON : 2021


                               

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California           Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri            Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas                      Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Eric Swalwell, California            Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Kathleen M. Rice, New York           Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Val Butler Demings, Florida          Peter Meijer, Michigan
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California    Kat Cammack, Florida
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          August Pfluger, Texas
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
                       Hope Goins, Staff Director
                 Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
                          Natalie Nixon, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     2
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     4

                               Witnesses

Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     7
  Prepared Statement.............................................     9
Mr. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of 
  Investigation:
  Oral Statement.................................................    16
  Prepared Statement.............................................    18
Ms. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism 
  Center, Office of Director of National Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................    25
  Prepared Statement.............................................    27

                             For the Record

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Letter From the Jewish Federations of North America............    83
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Letter From Rodney S. Scott, Chief, US. Border Patrol-Retired..    34
The Honorable Michael Guest, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Mississippi:
  Chart..........................................................    45
The Honorable Andrew S. Clyde, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Georgia:
  Article, Fox News, Published August 4..........................    74

                                Appendix

Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas..    89
Questions From Hon. Clay Higgins for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas..    89
Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas.    89
Questions From Hon. Mariannette Miller-Meeks for Hon. Alejandro 
  N. Mayorkas....................................................    90
Questions From Hon. Carlos Gimenez for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas    90
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas..    90
Questions From Hon. August Pfluger for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas    91
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christopher A. Wray.........    92
Question From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for Christopher A. Wray.....    92
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christopher A. Wray.........    92
Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christine Abizaid...........    93
Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christine Abizaid...........    93

 
         WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND: 20 YEARS AFTER 9/11

                              ----------                              


                     Wednesday, September 22, 2021

                     U.S. House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] 
presiding.
    Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin, 
Correa, Slotkin, Cleaver, Green, Clarke, Swalwell, Titus, 
Watson Coleman, Rice, Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Luria, 
Katko, McCaul, Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Miller-Meeks, 
Harshbarger, Clyde, Gimenez, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack, 
Pfluger, and Garbarino.
    Chairman Thompson. The Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order. The committee is meeting today to receive 
testimony on world-wide threats to the homeland 20 years after 
9/11.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the 
committee in recess at any point.
    Good morning. I want to thank Secretary of Homeland 
Security Alejandro Mayorkas, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and 
National Counterterrorism Center Director Christine Abizaid, 
for coming before the committee today and for your service to 
the country.
    This month Americans observed the 20th anniversary of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We will never forget 
the heroic first responders who ran into the Twin Towers to 
save others, the brave flight 93 passengers who fought back 
against the hijackers, or the service members killed at their 
posts in the Pentagon. We remember all of those who lost their 
life or their loved ones on 9/11 and those who have suffered 
Ground Zero-related health effects in the days since.
    This committee was created in the aftermath of the attacks. 
Earlier this month we met on hallowed ground in New York to 
mark the 20th anniversary. We visited the 9/11 memorial and 
museum and laid a wreath in remembrance. We met in 1 World 
Trade Center with first responders to discuss how far we have 
come in the last two decades and what more remains to be done 
to secure our Nation for upholding our American values.
    Today the committee is meeting to examine world-wide 
threats to the homeland 20 years after 9/11. It is the 
committee's long-standing practice to meet annually with 
National security leaders to discuss the global threat 
landscape and the U.S. response. This year especially we 
reflect on the incredible transformation of our National 
security apparatus, an expansion of the homeland security 
enterprise over the last two decades. We recognize the success 
we have had in preventing another 9/11-style attack, but are 
sobered by the challenges posed by long-standing and emerging 
homeland security threats.
    Some of these threats include the recent riots and domestic 
terrorism, more frequent cyber attacks from increasingly 
sophisticated actors, and the security implications of the 
Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan.
    With respect to domestic terrorism, our witnesses have 
testified before this committee previously about the grave 
nature of the threat. Secretary Mayorkas called it the greatest 
threat in the homeland.
    I hope to hear from the panel today about their current 
domestic terrorism threat assessment in the wake of the January 
6 attack on the United States Capitol.
    Regarding cybersecurity, over the past year we have seen 
our adversaries burrow into Federal networks through a 
sophisticated supply chain attack, exploit 1-day 
vulnerabilities in Microsoft and chain servers, and refuse to 
reign in cyber criminals working to extort millions of dollars 
from U.S. critical infrastructure owners and operators through 
ransomware attacks. I commend the administration for its 
sustained commitment to securing Federal networks and making 
the Federal Government a more valuable, secure department in 
the private sector. We still have a long way to go. I am 
interested to learn today about how DHS and FBI coordinate as 
they execute their shared cybersecurity missions.
    Regarding Afghanistan, this committee has been, and will 
continue to, engage on threats to the homeland emanating from 
Afghanistan while recognizing that the terror threat has 
metastasized across the world in the last two decades. We are 
conducting careful oversight of U.S. efforts to screen and 
resettle our Afghan allies in this country and will continue to 
do so.
    Finally, I want to address the situation at the Southern 
Border. The Biden administration inherited an immigration 
system badly broken by the previous administration. Trump's 
cruel policies led to families being separated and children 
dying in custody. Those immoral policies did not represent who 
we are as a people and the Biden administration was right to 
reject them. I have spoken with Secretary Mayorkas on a regular 
basis about the border and even more frequently in recent days 
as events unfolded in Del Rio, Texas. The administration has 
committed to enforce the laws in processing migrants in a safe, 
orderly, and humane manner. This committee will hold the 
administration to its commitment.
    Finally, I want to say a word to the men and women working 
to secure the homeland. Their jobs have never been easy and 
they are particularly difficult right now with the COVID-19 
pandemic and worsening natural disasters caused by climate 
change, threatening their health, disrupting travel, and 
diverting homeland security resources. Please know that this 
committee greatly appreciates those working on the front lines 
and behind the scenes to secure the homeland on behalf of the 
American people.
    As we learned in 9/11, nothing short of a well-coordinated 
whole-of-Government effort will protect the Nation against 
urgent evolving threats. Twenty years on, the Committee on 
Homeland Security remains committed to working with Federal, 
State, and local partners on that critical effort.
    Again, I thank our witnesses for joining us today and the 
Members for their participation.
    With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman 
from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening statement.
    [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
                           September 22, 2021
    This month Americans observed the 20th anniversary of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. We will never forget the heroic first 
responders who ran into the Twin Towers to save others, the brave 
Flight 93 passengers who fought back against the hijackers, or the 
service members killed at their posts in the Pentagon. We remember all 
those who lost their lives or their loved ones on 9/11, and those who 
have suffered Ground Zero-related health effects in the days since.
    Stood up in the aftermath of the attacks, this committee met 
earlier this month on hallowed ground in New York to mark the 20th 
anniversary. We visited the 
9/11 Memorial & Museum and laid a wreath in remembrance. We met in One 
World Trade Center with first responders to discuss how far we have 
come in the last two decades and what more remains to be done to secure 
our Nation while upholding our American values.
    Today, the committee is meeting to examine ``Worldwide Threats to 
the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11.'' It is the committee's long-
standing practice to meet annually with National security leaders to 
discuss the global threat landscape and the U.S. response. This year 
especially, we reflect on the incredible transformation of our National 
security apparatus and expansion of the Homeland Security Enterprise 
over the last two decades.
    We recognize the success we have had in preventing another 9/11-
style attack, but are sobered by the challenges posed by long-standing 
and emerging homeland security threats. Some of these threats include 
the recent rise domestic terrorism; more frequent cyber attacks from 
increasingly sophisticated actors; and the security implications of the 
Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan.
    With respect to domestic terrorism, our witnesses have testified 
before this committee previously about the grave nature of the threat--
Secretary Mayorkas called it ``the greatest threat in the homeland.'' I 
hope to hear from the panel today about their current domestic 
terrorism threat assessment in the wake of the January 6 attack on the 
United States Capitol.
    Regarding cybersecurity, over the past year we have seen our 
adversaries burrow into Federal networks through a sophisticated supply 
chain attack, exploit 1 day vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange 
Servers, and refuse to rein in cyber criminals working to extort 
millions of dollars from U.S. critical infrastructure owners and 
operators through ransomware attacks. I commend the administration for 
its sustained commitment to securing Federal networks and making the 
Federal Government a more valuable security partner to the private 
sector. We still have a long way to go, and I am interested to learn 
today about how DHS and FBI coordinate as they execute their shared 
cybersecurity missions.
    Regarding Afghanistan, this committee has been and will continue to 
be engaged on threats to the homeland emanating from Afghanistan, while 
recognizing that the terror threat has metastasized across the world in 
the last two decades. We are conducting careful oversight of U.S. 
efforts to screen and resettle our Afghan allies in this country and 
will continue to do so.
    Finally, I want to address the situation at the Southern Border. 
The Biden administration inherited an immigration system badly broken 
by the previous administration. Trump's cruel policies led to families 
being separated and children dying in custody. Those immoral policies 
did not represent who we are as a people, and the Biden administration 
was right to reject them. I have spoken to Secretary Mayorkas on a 
regular basis about the border, and even more frequently in recent days 
as events unfolded in Del Rio, Texas. The administration has committed 
to enforcing the law and processing migrants in a safe, orderly, and 
humane manner, and this committee will hold the administration to its 
commitment.
    Finally, I want to say a word to the men and women working to 
secure the homeland. Their jobs have never been easy, and they are 
particularly difficult right now, with the COVID-19 pandemic and 
worsening natural disasters caused by climate change threatening their 
health, disrupting travel, and diverting homeland security resources. 
Please know that this committee greatly appreciates those working on 
the front lines and behind the scenes to secure the homeland on behalf 
of the American people.
    As we learned on 9/11, nothing short of a well-coordinated, whole-
of-Government effort will protect the Nation against urgent, evolving 
threats. Twenty years on, the Committee on Homeland Security remains 
committed to working with Federal, State, and local partners on that 
critical effort.

    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 
witnesses for being here today. I am pleased that the committee 
is holding this very important hearing. As you know, the United 
States finds itself facing increasingly dire threats on a 
number of fronts impacting our homeland security.
    From the Biden administration's chaotic and deadly 
withdrawal process in Afghanistan, to the on-going humanitarian 
and security crisis along our Southwest Border, to the 
unprecedented cyber threats facing the American way of life, 
the American people are deeply troubled by what they are 
seeing. These threats are of course all happening in the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic, in which clarity from the 
administration related to vaccine boosters has been absent, 
similar to the Department of Homeland Security's mitigation of 
the pandemic at the Southwest Border, as was recently confirmed 
by the DHS Inspector General's Office.
    What is most troubling to me is overwhelming lack of 
accountability this administration is willing to accept. Nearly 
10 months after President Biden's inauguration the prevailing 
narrative coming from the administration's political class 
continues to be one that blames the last administration for the 
current administration's shortcomings. This is just tired. It 
is inaccurate. These talking points have been repeated 
consistently alongside scenes of Americans and Afghan allies 
being left under Taliban rule, and all while known terrorist 
operatives were inaugurated into the Taliban's cabinet on the 
20th anniversary of 9/11. Let me repeat that. Known terrorist 
operatives were inaugurated into the Taliban's cabinet on the 
20th anniversary of 9/11. That is significant.
    But that is not the only crisis where the Biden 
administration's blame game shows up, what we also hear when 
officials blame the last administration for the deadly and 
increasingly untenable crisis along our Southern Border. Last 
month we saw the sixth straight month of more than 170,000 
encounters along the Southwest Border, a trend that has never 
been recorded before. These numbers are part of the overall 1.5 
million illegal border encounters that have occurred just this 
fiscal year. While the recently-departed border chief is on 
record stating that known or suspected terrorists are crossing 
the border at ``a level we have never seen before,'' this 
administration continues to avoid the American people's demand 
for transparency.
    This issue hits home for me. This year in my district in 
central New York has seen a very big increase in opioid-related 
deaths. This trend is repeated in communities across the 
country, proving that in 2021 every State truly is a border 
State. Customs and Border Protection has seized more than twice 
the amount of lethal fentanyl this year compared to last year, 
and that is just what we seized, and more than 3 times than in 
2019. We all know that for everything we intercept more is 
flowing undetected into American communities as the drug 
cartels exploit the administration's failings.
    On the issue of cybersecurity, the American people have 
faced an unprecedented threat to their livelihood, their 
privacy, and their overall way of life. In this year alone we 
have seen a number of high-profile attacks aimed at America's 
critical infrastructure, leading to important conversations in 
Congress around the merits of incident reporting and 
identifying systemically important critical infrastructure. Two 
issues I would like to hear the panel's thoughts on today.
    Last, but certainly not least, is the rapidly-increasing 
challenges facing the homeland from adversarial nation-states 
overseas, namely China. As the Chinese Communist Party aims to 
undermine the United States at every turn, I see aggressive 
moves on Beijing's part to increase its investments in the 
Western Hemisphere. Threats posed by China underpin supply 
chain security challenges that are leading this country into 
new economic security oversight efforts.
    I recently traveled to New York City with a number of my 
colleagues to observe the 20th anniversary of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, and I thank the Chairman once again for making 
that happen. As we spoke with individuals at NYPD and the FDNY, 
two things became clear. First, that our first responders in 
law enforcement are true heroes on the front lines of our 
homeland security, risking their lives every day to protect 
American people. Second, that these same first responders are 
troubled by what they see; I heard many accounts concerning how 
troubled our front-line law enforcement is about the homeland 
security implications of al-Qaeda and ISIS having a safe haven 
in Afghanistan once again, along with consequences to their 
communities stemming from the porous Southern Border.
    These threats, combined with low morale and retention 
caused by the shameful defund the police movement is putting 
American communities at greater risk at a time when we can 
least afford it.
    Today I hope to hear solutions rather than talking points 
from our panelists, who each play a truly critical role in 
securing the U.S. homeland. I am grateful to each one of them 
for their service to this country in these trying times and I 
look forward to working with them in our efforts on behalf of 
the American people. But make no mistake about it, it is very, 
very frustrating right now, especially with respect to the 
Southern Border. I will pull no punches, and neither will my 
colleagues when it comes to that. I am looking forward to 
having this discussion today.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the committee is holding 
this important hearing today, as the United States finds itself facing 
increasingly dire threats on a number of fronts impacting our homeland 
security.
    From the Biden administration's chaotic and deadly withdrawal 
process in Afghanistan; to the on-going humanitarian and security 
crisis along our Southwest Border; to the unprecedented cyber threats 
facing our American way of life; the American people are deeply 
troubled by what they are seeing.
    These threats, are, of course, all happening in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in which clarity from the administration related to 
vaccine boosters has been absent, similar to the Department of Homeland 
Security's mitigation of the pandemic at the Southern Border, as was 
recently confirmed by the DHS Inspector General's Office.
    What is most troubling to me is the overwhelming lack of 
accountability this administration is willing to accept. Nearly 10 
months after President Biden's inauguration the prevailing narrative 
coming from the administration's political class continues to be one 
which blames the last administration for the current administration's 
shortcomings. This tired, inaccurate talking point has been repeated 
consistently alongside scenes of Americans and Afghan allies being left 
under Taliban rule, and while known terrorist operatives were 
inaugurated into the Taliban's cabinet on the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
    But that is not the only crisis where the Biden administration's 
blame game shows up. We also hear it when officials blame the last 
administration for the deadly and untenable crisis along our Southern 
Border. Last month, we saw the 6th straight month of more than 170,000 
encounters along the Southwest Border--a trend never before recorded. 
These numbers are part of the overall 1.5 million illegal border 
encounters that have occurred just this fiscal year. While the 
recently-departed border chief is on record stating that known or 
suspected terrorists are crossing the border ``at a level we have never 
seen before,'' this administration continues to avoid the American 
people's demands for transparency.
    This issue hits home for me. This year, my home district in Central 
New York has seen marked increases in opioid-related deaths--up 15 
percent in Syracuse alone. This trend is repeated in communities across 
the country, proving that, in 2021, every State truly is a border 
State. CBP has seized more than twice the amount of lethal fentanyl 
this year compared to last year, and more than 3 times more than in 
2019. We all know that for everything we interdict, more is flowing 
undetected into American communities as the drug cartels exploit this 
administration's failings.
    On the issue of cybersecurity, the American people are facing 
unprecedented threats to their livelihood, privacy, and overall way of 
life. This year alone we have seen a number of high-profile attacks 
aimed at America's critical infrastructure, leading to important 
conversations in Congress around the merits of incident reporting and 
identifying systemically important critical infrastructure--two issues 
I would like to hear the panel's thoughts on today.
    Last, but most certainly not least, is the rapidly increasing 
challenges facing the homeland from adversarial nation-states 
overseas--namely China. As the Chinese Communist Party aims to 
undermine the United States at every turn, I see aggressive moves on 
Beijing's part to increase its investments in the Western Hemisphere. 
If we are unable to counter China's malign influence in our own 
backyard, I worry to think how successful we will be elsewhere. Threats 
posed by China underpin supply chain security challenges that are 
leading this committee into new economic security oversight efforts.
    I recently traveled to New York City with a number of my colleagues 
to observe the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. As we spoke with individuals at NYPD and FDNY two things 
became clear: First, that our first responders and law enforcement are 
true heroes on the front lines of our homeland security--risking their 
lives every day to protect the American people. And second, that these 
same first responders are troubled by what they see. I heard many 
accounts concerning how troubled our front-line law enforcement is 
about the homeland security implications of al-Qaeda and ISIS having a 
safe haven in Afghanistan, along with consequences in their communities 
stemming from the porous Southern Border. These threats, combined with 
low morale and retention caused by the left's shameful defund-the-
police movement, is putting American communities at greater risk at a 
time when we can least afford it.
    Today, I hope to hear solutions rather than talking points from our 
panelists, who each play a truly critical role in securing the U.S. 
homeland. I am grateful to each one of them for their service in these 
trying times, and I look forward to working with them in our efforts on 
behalf of the American people.
    Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

    Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are 
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be 
submitted for the record. Members are also reminded that the 
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by 
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3 colloquy 
regarding remote procedures.
    I welcome our panel of witnesses.
    Our first witnesses is the Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security. Our next witness is the 
Honorable Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. Our third and final witness is the Honorable 
Christine Abizaid, the director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center in the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
    Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be 
inserted in the record.
    I now ask Secretary Mayorkas to summarize his statement for 
5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                      OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member 
Katko, and distinguished Members of this committee, good 
morning and thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the 
threat landscape facing our homeland 20 years after 9/11, 
alongside my colleagues from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center.
    Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I may ask for a minute 
more of time. I do want to address the images that emanated 
from Del Rio, Texas over the last several days and correctly 
and necessarily were met with our Nation's horror. Because they 
do not reflect who we are as a country nor do they reflect who 
the United States Customs and Border Protection is.
    I want to share with you, with Ranking Member Katko and 
this entire committee the fact that we are addressing this with 
tremendous speed and with tremendous force. I have ordered an 
investigation to be conducted of the events that are captured 
in those images. The Office of Professional Responsibility's 
leaders are conducting the investigation.
    We have ensured that the individuals during the pendency of 
the investigation are not conducting law enforcement duties to 
interact with migrants, but rather are conducting only 
administrative duties. I have informed through the appropriate 
channels our Office of Inspector General.
    The facts will drive the actions that we take. We ourselves 
will pull no punches and we need to conduct this investigation 
thoroughly, but very quickly. It will be completed in days and 
not weeks. I wanted to ensure this committee, and you, Mr. 
Chairman, and Mr. Ranking Member, of that fact.
    During the past few weeks I have attended numerous events 
to remember the tragic assault on our democracy that occurred 
on 
9/11. Each commemoration was a powerful reminder of why we 
served, in memory of those whom we lost and in pursuit of our 
noble mission to protect the homeland.
    Today we face a diverse evolving threat landscape that 
includes domestic and international terrorism, malicious cyber 
activities, an on-going global pandemic, transnational climate 
change, and more. Through the extraordinary talent and 
dedication of the more than 250,000 individuals who comprise 
our Department, we are meeting the challenge to protect our 
homeland and keep our communities safe. Every day our 
Department's personnel make tremendous sacrifices to achieve 
this mission.
    I would like to take a moment to describe the major threats 
facing our country today and the work we are doing to combat 
them.
    First, we have built a multi-layered security and screening 
and vetting architecture to combat the evolving terrorist 
threat. We remain ever-vigilant to protecting the homeland from 
foreign terrorists seeking to do us harm, the very reason for 
the Department's creation, while combatting the most 
significant and persistent terrorism related threat facing our 
country today, which stems from both home-grown and domestic 
violent extremists who are inspired by a broad range of 
ideological motivations.
    To meet this challenge DHS has established a dedicated 
domestic terrorism branch within our Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, launched the Center for Prevention Programs and 
Partnerships to provide communities with evidence-based tools 
and resources to address early risk factors, and redoubled our 
efforts to share timely and actionable information and 
intelligence with our partners across every level of 
Government.
    This year, for the first time, we designated combatting 
domestic violent extremism as a National priority area in FEMA 
grant programs, resulting in at least $77 million being spent 
on capabilities to detect and protect against these threats in 
communities Nation-wide.
    Second, as cyber threats have grown so have our efforts to 
increase our Nation's cybersecurity resilience and protect our 
critical infrastructure. Ransomware incidents are on the rise. 
Last year victims paid an estimated $350 million in ransoms, a 
311 percent increase over the prior year, with the average 
payment exceeding $300,000. In July DHS launched 
Stopransomware.gov to help private and public organization of 
all sizes combat ransomware and adopt cybersecurity best 
practices.
    Our experts at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security agency, or CISA, stood up the Joint Cyber Defense 
Collaborative to bring together partners from every level of 
Government and the private sector to reduce cyber risks. To 
better protect our critical infrastructure, TSA recently issued 
two new security directives to strengthen the cybersecurity and 
resilience of our Nation's pipelines.
    CISA and our Office of Intelligence and Analysis are also 
working with all 50 States, local jurisdictions, and election 
technology experts to keep our elections secure.
    To further lead the way, we are building a top-tier 
cybersecurity work force by investing in the development of 
diverse talent pipelines and building the expertise to keep 
addressing changing threats.
    Third, we continue making risk-based investments to keep 
our borders secure, including from threats posed by 
transnational criminal organizations. We are collaborating with 
our international partners to disrupt these groups, combat 
their illicit activities, like drug trafficking and human 
smuggling, and hold accountable those with ties to their 
logistical operations while streamlining multinational 
cooperation on investigations and prosecutions.
    Fourth, DHS continues to support Nation-wide efforts to 
combat the on-going COVID-19 pandemic. FEMA has helped stand up 
more than 800 community vaccination centers, including almost 
200 mobile sites to more equitably increase access to COVID-19 
vaccines across vulnerable and rural populations.
    The Transportation Security Administration acted to protect 
the health of the traveling public and transportation personnel 
by implementing a Federal mask mandate at airports on 
commercial aircraft and in various modes of surface 
transportation. Meanwhile, the U.S. Secret Service and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement have partnered with other 
Federal agencies to protect Americans from COVID-19-related 
fraud and criminal activity, including by preventing more than 
$3 billion of much-needed COVID-19 relief from fraudulently 
ending up in the pockets of criminals.
    Finally, we are countering the current and growing 
existential threat posed by climate change. Hurricane Ida was 
just the latest manifestation of a devastating reality: Natural 
disasters, rising in intensity and destructive reach. However, 
this threat is not new, nor is it unique to any region. To help 
communities recover and remain resilient, President Biden 
doubled the size of the Building Resilient Infrastructure and 
Communities Program, pouring $1 billion into wildfire 
resilience efforts, flood control initiatives, and much more.
    DHS also authorized nearly $3.5 billion in hazard 
mitigation grant program funding to help States, Tribes, and 
territories adapt and prepare for the impacts of the climate 
crisis. FEMA revised its policies to overcome historic 
inequities in its aid programs and ensure a fairer and more 
equitable distribution of assistance to minority, low-income, 
and other disenfranchised communities.
    Two decades after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security 
remains focused on protecting our country from evolving 
threats. We can execute this critical mission because of our 
incredible work force and because of our key partners, the 
Members of this committee, our counterparts abroad, the private 
sector, non-governmental organizations, and local communities. 
We will remain vigilant, resilient, and agile. We will do so to 
continue countering the threats of today and of the next 20 
years.
    Thank you for your leadership and continued support. I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Mayorkas follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Alejandro N. Mayorkas
                           September 22, 2021
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members 
of the committee, thank you for inviting me to join you today.
    This month, we remember the 20th anniversary of the September 11 
terrorist attacks that took thousands of American lives. Following that 
tragic day, Congress passed significant reforms to reorganize our 
Government's National security agencies. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was created and charged with safeguarding the American 
people, our homeland, and our values.
    Today, our country faces a threat landscape that has evolved 
significantly over the past 20 years. DHS confronts complex challenges, 
including international and domestic terrorism, a global pandemic, 
malicious cyber activity, transnational organized crime, and the 
catastrophic impacts of climate change, among others. Our Department is 
able to confront these challenges because of the extraordinary talent 
and dedication of the more than 250,000 individuals who comprise our 
workforce and serve our Nation.
                               terrorism
    In the years immediately following 9/11, we focused on foreign 
terrorists who sought to harm us within our borders and threaten our 
interests and assets abroad. In partnership with Federal agencies 
spanning the law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence 
communities, DHS built a multi-layered screening and vetting 
architecture to prevent certain individuals from traveling to or 
entering our country by air, land, or sea. We also issued a call for 
vigilance on the part of local communities and individuals alike.
    The first major evolution of the terrorist threat emerged in the 
form of the home-grown violent extremist (HVE)--the individual in 
America who is radicalized by a foreign terrorist organization's 
ideology. HVEs became the most prominent terrorism-related threat to 
the homeland. In response, we partnered with law enforcement, first 
responders, social workers, mental health experts, and local 
communities to identify signs of radicalization and prevent violence 
before it occurred.
    That threat has continued to evolve. Today, U.S.-based lone actors 
and small groups, including HVEs and domestic violent extremists (DVEs) 
who are inspired by a broad range of ideological motivations, pose the 
most significant and persistent terrorism-related threat to our 
country. DVEs are motivated by various factors, including racial bias, 
perceived Government overreach, conspiracy theories promoting violence, 
and false narratives about unsubstantiated fraud in the 2020 
Presidential election. Among DVEs, racially or ethnically motivated 
violent extremists, including White supremacists (RMVE-WS), will likely 
remain the most lethal DVE movement in the homeland. Since 2020, 
however, we have also seen a significant increase in anti-Government 
and anti-authority violent extremism, particularly from militia violent 
extremists (MVEs), which typically target law enforcement, elected 
officials, and Government personnel and facilities.
    In June, the White House released the first-ever National Strategy 
for Countering Domestic Terrorism to improve Federal response efforts. 
In executing this strategy, DHS will:
    (1) Focus on preventing terrorism and targeted violence, including 
        through threat assessments, grants, and community-based 
        prevention programs, as well as efforts to enhance public 
        awareness;
    (2) Assess, evaluate, and mitigate the risk of violence inspired by 
        violent extremist narratives, including those narratives shared 
        via on-line platforms; and,
    (3) Establish partnerships with non-Governmental organizations 
        (NGO's), including academia, and private-sector entities, 
        including technology and social media companies.
    The National Strategy recognizes that on-line narratives espousing 
attacks on our fellow citizens, institutions, and critical 
infrastructure are a key factor in driving the radicalization and 
mobilization to violence by some recent lone offenders. DHS has shared 
analyses of this threat with our law enforcement partners at every 
level of Government through formal information-sharing channels, and 
with the American public through the National Terrorism Advisory System 
(NTAS). This year, I have issued 3 NTAS bulletins to contextualize the 
evolving threat landscape for the American people and provide 
information about how to stay safe.
    Our Department is redoubling its efforts to provide timely and 
actionable intelligence and information to the broadest audience at the 
lowest classification level possible. As a result, DHS is augmenting 
its intelligence and information-sharing capabilities in collaboration 
with other Government agencies; State, local, Tribal, territorial, and 
campus law enforcement partners; and private-sector partners. This 
includes publishing and disseminating intelligence bulletins that 
provide our partners with greater insight into evolving threats, and 
situational awareness notifications that inform public safety and 
security planning efforts to prevent terrorism and targeted violence.
    We are also reviewing how we can better access and use publicly-
available information to inform our analysis. DHS's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has enhanced its ability to analyze, 
produce, and disseminate products that address DVE threats, including 
violent extremist narratives shared via social media and other on-line 
platforms. This year, I&A also established a dedicated domestic 
terrorism branch that is leading our efforts to combat this threat.
    Further, the newly-formed DHS Center for Prevention Programs and 
Partnerships (CP3) is expanding our Department's ability to prevent 
terrorism and targeted violence through the development of local 
prevention frameworks. Through CP3, we are leveraging community-based 
partnerships and evidence-based tools to address early risk factors and 
ensure individuals receive help before they radicalize to violence.
    As it relates to our continued focus on combatting international 
terrorism, we are actively assessing the counterterrorism-related and 
other threats that could develop over the coming months and years, 
including those related to the fall of the government of Afghanistan, 
and ensuring we have the resources and operational infrastructure 
required to protect the homeland. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq 
and ash-Sham, and other terrorist groups continue operating world-wide, 
and the threat of these groups exploiting permissive environments to 
plan and launch attacks against the United States will continue posing 
challenges.
    As I have said before, DHS is fundamentally a department of 
partnerships. Our ability to execute our mission depends on strong 
partnerships across every level of government, the private sector, and 
local communities. DHS works closely with Homeland Security Advisors in 
every State and territory to increase resiliency and preparedness 
across our communities. Additionally, through our partnership with the 
National Network of Fusion Centers, DHS deploys personnel to the field 
to share information on a broad range of threats, including 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity. DHS also 
partners with FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to detect, 
disrupt and dismantle, and prosecute terrorists.
    Further, this year, and for the first time, I designated combating 
domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' for the 
fiscal year 2021 State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) grant programs. Recipients of these grants 
will be required to spend at least 7.5 percent of their awards on 
combating DVE, meaning that States and local governments across our 
Nation will spend at least $77 million in grant funding on capabilities 
to detect and protect against these threats.
                           economic security
    The United States continues to face counterintelligence and malign 
threats by nation-state adversaries intent on gaining military and 
economic dominance over our country. Of note, the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) represents a critical threat to U.S. economic 
competitiveness via its intellectual property theft, exploitation of 
vulnerable supply chains, engagement in illicit trade, and use of 
economic coercion. The PRC has mobilized vast resources to support its 
industrial development and defense goals and will continue exploiting 
U.S. academic institutions and our visa system to transfer valuable 
research and intellectual property that Beijing calculates will provide 
a military or economic advantage over the United States and other 
nations.
    DHS is uniquely positioned to support Federal Government efforts to 
identify and counter these threats, from identifying instances of visa 
fraud to discovering and preventing the illicit transfer of user-
collected data and/or proprietary research and technology. For example, 
DHS has targeted illicit PRC-based manufacturers who have exploited the 
COVID-19 pandemic by producing fraudulent or prohibited personal 
protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies that especially 
endanger our front-line workers, prohibited the use of certain 
passenger and cargo screening equipment at airports from companies that 
pose a significant risk to the National security or foreign policy 
interests of the United States, leveraged technology to target and 
interdict deadly fentanyl and fentanyl-like substances originating in 
the PRC at our ports of entry, and prevented goods produced by forced 
labor from entering our markets. DHS also continues to work closely 
with the Department of State to prevent the exploitation of our 
academic system to further the PRC's military and economic goals.
               securing cyber space and emerging threats
    Cyber threats from nation-states and state-sponsored and criminal 
actors remain one of the most prominent threats facing our Nation. We 
have recently seen numerous cybersecurity incidents impacting 
organizations of all sizes and disrupting critical services, from the 
SolarWinds supply chain compromise to the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities found in Microsoft Exchange Servers and Pulse Connect 
Secure devices, to ransomware affecting entities from Colonial Pipeline 
to JBS Foods to Kaseya. The assaults on these companies, not to mention 
interference in our elections, have reinforced the importance of 
cybersecurity and how we preserve and defend an open, interoperable, 
free, secure, and reliable internet, and stable cyber space.
    Ransomware incidents continue to rise. Like most malicious cyber 
activities, ransomware exploits the weakest link. In 2020, nearly 2,400 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, health care 
facilities, and schools across our country were victims of ransomware. 
That same year, victims paid an estimated $350 million in ransoms, a 
311 percent increase over the prior year, with the average payment 
exceeding $300,000. The Federal Government and our private-sector 
partners must be prepared to respond to and recover from a cyber 
incident, sustain critical functions even under degraded conditions, 
and, in some cases, quickly restart critical functionality after 
disruption.
    This year, DHS has taken the following steps, among others, to 
increase our Nation's cybersecurity resilience:
   In February, I issued a call to action to tackle ransomware 
        more effectively, including by increasing National adoption of 
        the 9 cybersecurity steps CISA recommends taking to protect 
        against this threat. In July, together with the Department of 
        Justice and other Federal partners, DHS launched the first 
        whole-of-Government website that pools together Federal 
        resources to combat ransomware to help private and public 
        organizations mitigate their related risk. This website, called 
        StopRansomware.gov, is a one-stop hub to help individuals, 
        businesses, and other organizations better protect their 
        networks and know what to do if they become a victim of 
        malicious cyber activities.
   As it relates to on-going cybersecurity threats to our 
        critical infrastructure, TSA issued 2 new security directives 
        after soliciting industry feedback to strengthen the 
        cybersecurity and resilience of our Nation's pipelines. The 
        first security directive required owners and operators of 
        critical pipelines to report confirmed and potential 
        cybersecurity incidents to CISA, designate a cybersecurity 
        coordinator to be available 24/7, review current practices, and 
        identify any gaps and related remediation measures to address 
        cyber-related risks and report the results to TSA and CISA 
        within 30 days. The second security directive required 
        implementation of specific mitigation measures to protect 
        against ransomware attack, develop and implement a 
        cybersecurity contingency and recovery plan, and conduct a 
        cybersecurity review.
   In March, I announced a series of 60-day cybersecurity 
        sprints to elevate existing work, remove roadblocks, and launch 
        new initiatives. We are currently undertaking our fourth sprint 
        dedicated to the cybersecurity of transportation systems, 
        building on lessons learned from the Colonial Pipeline 
        ransomware attack and the TSA security directives to advance 
        greater cybersecurity and resilience across transportation 
        subsectors.
   In August, the Coast Guard released its new Cyber Strategic 
        Outlook, the first update to this outlook since 2015. The 
        strategy focuses on mitigating cyber risks to critical maritime 
        systems essential to the Nation's economy and security, 
        defending the Coast Guard's networks, as well as leveraging the 
        Coast Guard's capabilities to protect the maritime 
        transportation system.
   Also in August, CISA announced the creation of the Joint 
        Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) to lead the development and 
        execution of joint cyber defense planning with partners from 
        all levels of government and the private sector to reduce risk 
        before an incident and unify defensive actions when one occurs. 
        This initiative underscores the whole-of-society approach 
        needed to increase cybersecurity resilience.
   The U.S. Secret Service has continued expanding its cyber 
        crime enforcement programs through the National Computer 
        Forensics Institute (NCFI), the Nation's premiere Federally-
        funded training institute for State, local, Tribal, and 
        territorial law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges 
        in cyber crime investigations. The NCFI provides hands-on 
        training in ransomware response, digital evidence processing, 
        and applicable law for high-tech criminal prosecution and 
        adjudication.
   DHS also continues leveraging its authorities to deliver 
        timely cyber threat-focused information to State, local, 
        Tribal, and territorial partners and the private sector at the 
        lowest possible classification level. To scale these efforts, 
        we are leveraging CISA, the U.S. Secret Service, and I&A to 
        increase access to this information among our partners and 
        stakeholders.
   Further, DHS increased the required minimum spend on 
        cybersecurity via FEMA grant awards from 5 percent to 7.5 
        percent this year, representing an increase of $25 million. We 
        are also optimizing existing grant programs to improve the 
        cybersecurity capacity and capabilities of State, local, 
        Tribal, and territorial governments.
             election security and malign foreign influence
    DHS continues working closely with State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial partners to ensure their election systems are protected 
against interference. The Biden-Harris administration has continually 
called out malign actors, such as the PRC, Russia, and Iran, that seek 
to interfere in our elections and threaten our democratic institutions.
    Since 2016, Russia has continued to amplify mis- and disinformation 
about U.S. candidates for political office and the security of U.S. 
election systems, with the goal of sowing divisiveness and confusion, 
and weakening our democratic institutions. Iran continues to amplify 
narratives about perceived sociopolitical divisions to exacerbate 
domestic tensions. The PRC has consistently pushed conspiracy theories 
about the COVID-19 pandemic, including about its origin. Russia, Iran, 
and PRC, as well as other malign influence actors, also continue to 
disseminate and amplify inaccurate information to international and 
U.S. audiences about topics such as racial justice, false claims about 
the 2020 Presidential election, the efficacy of U.S. COVID-19 vaccines 
in comparison with Russian and Chinese vaccines, and our withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.
    Further, Iran, the PRC, and other authoritarian regimes continue to 
target dissidents and human rights activists on U.S. soil. Known as 
``transnational repression,'' these governments are increasingly 
silencing exiles and members of diasporas--including activists, 
dissidents, defectors, journalists, and other critics--living outside 
their territorial borders. The Biden-Harris administration is committed 
to addressing this challenge as part of our broader commitment to stem 
rising authoritarianism and prevent foreign influence and interference 
in our society.
    Through CISA and I&A, DHS works with our Federal partners, all 50 
States, local jurisdictions, and election technology partners to ensure 
they have the resources they need to keep our elections secure and 
resilient. For example, CISA has provided more than 600 cybersecurity 
services to the election community, including cyber hygiene scans, risk 
and vulnerability assessments, phishing assessments, and other 
services. In the last year, CISA's informational products have reached 
over 3,500 election officials, offering scalable and customizable tools 
to improve infrastructure security and build awareness of CISA's 
resources and services. Further, CISA, through the Elections 
Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), has 
deployed intrusion detection devices to all 50 States and over 400 
local jurisdictions and territories. All 50 States and over 3,000 local 
and territorial officials also receive threat alerts from the EI-ISAC.
                    immigration and border security
    The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding a fair, 
orderly, and humane immigration system. DHS continues enforcing our 
immigration laws and responsibly managing our border, while restoring 
fairness and efficiency in our immigration system. We are safer when we 
take a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to border management 
and ensure that policies and procedures at our borders are consistent 
with our immigration laws and our values.
    We currently face 3 linked and significant challenges along our 
Southwest Border. First, the surge of migrants, including unaccompanied 
children, encountered at and between ports of entry. Second, 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) seeking to profit from a 
range of illicit activity. Third, the on-going impacts of COVID-19 on 
the DHS personnel responding to these challenges.
    To address these challenges, DHS has leveraged FEMA's coordination 
capabilities, activated our volunteer workforce, and expanded 
processing capacity. We are also helping the Department of Health and 
Human Services increase its capacity to accept transfers and manage the 
care and custody of unaccompanied children efficiently and 
expeditiously, as required by the Flores Settlement Agreement, Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, and Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008. DHS also continues to enforce the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Title 42 public health order. 
At the same time, the Department must continue to address increased 
levels of irregular migration, much of which has been exacerbated by 
TCOs activity. In consultation with the CDC, DHS has developed, 
implemented, and continuously evaluates a multi-layered approach for 
COVID-19 testing among noncitizens encountered along the Southwest 
Border where practical.
    The Biden-Harris administration is committed to stemming the flow 
of irregular migration and comprehensively addressing the long-standing 
challenges that drive this migration. Although there is no quick, easy, 
or single solution that will adequately address these challenges, we 
are taking the following steps:
   First, the most sustainable solution is to address the root 
        causes that drive people to migrate in the first place. To this 
        end, we are engaging with foreign governments and other 
        partners to address the insecurity, violence, corruption, and 
        systemic poverty that drive people from their homes.
   Second, we are working with foreign governments and 
        international humanitarian organizations to provide potential 
        migrants with meaningful opportunities to seek humanitarian 
        protections as close to home as possible. These opportunities 
        should include refugee resettlement and family reunification 
        programs to the United States and other countries in the 
        region, and regional relocation and integration programs. We 
        must also expand seasonal and temporary employment-based non-
        immigrant visa programs to provide alternative pathways for 
        those migrating primarily for economic reasons.
   Third, we are ensuring shared responsibility with other 
        countries in the region by supporting their efforts to improve 
        their asylum capacities.
   Fourth, we are seeking to dramatically improve our system 
        for processing migrants at the border and adjudicating their 
        asylum claims in a fair and timely way.
   Finally, we are marshaling our enforcement resources to 
        deliver accountability in a fair and effective way.
    While these efforts will dramatically improve migration management 
in the region and help restore safe and orderly processing at the 
border, they will take time. Addressing long-standing challenges cannot 
be accomplished overnight.
              transnational criminal organizations (tcos)
    TCOs and their smuggling operations present a clear and present 
threat to the homeland. These organizations--which profit from illicit 
activities that include fraud and large-scale theft, drug trafficking, 
wildlife and timber trafficking, extortion, sex trafficking, child 
exploitation, and human smuggling--are agile and adept at adjusting 
their operations. DHS continues making risk-based investments in our 
border security mission to combat TCOs and related threats.
    For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
leverages its Border Enforcement Security Task Force to bring together 
officers from more than 100 different law enforcement agencies to 
combat TCOs. This Task Force employs a broad range of Federal, State, 
local, Tribal, and international law enforcement authorities and 
resources to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle these 
organizations at every level. This model has closed the gap between 
international partners in multinational criminal investigations.
    Further, in collaboration with Federal and international partners, 
DHS announced Operational Sentinel, a counter-network targeting 
operation to hold accountable those with ties to TCO logistical 
operations. The Operation leverages law enforcement authorities to 
identify TCO targets and their foreign and domestic associates and 
assets, and it employs a series of targeted enforcement actions and 
sanctions against them. Such actions include, for example, denying 
access to travel through the revocation of travel documents, the 
suspension and debarment of trade entities, and the freezing of bank 
accounts and other financial assets tied to TCO logistical networks.
    ICE also administers mobile, biometric data collection programs to 
disrupt and dismantle TCOs by strengthening international partners' law 
enforcement investigations, border security, and counterterrorism 
efforts. Further, ICE leads Transnational Criminal Investigative Units 
(TCIUs) in more than a dozen countries to facilitate rapid bilateral 
cooperation on investigations and prosecutions related to weapons 
trafficking and counter-proliferation, money laundering and bulk cash 
smuggling, human and narcotics trafficking, other customs-related 
fraud, child exploitation, and cyber crime.
          extreme weather events and climate change resilience
    DHS is committed to combatting the climate crisis and mitigating 
climate change-related risks, which impact our National and economic 
security. This year, we are once again facing an historic hurricane 
season while simultaneously fighting unprecedented wildfires. Hurricane 
Ida recently caused death and destruction from the Gulf Coast to the 
Northeast. At the same time, the Dixie and Caldor Fires, two of the 
largest wildfires in the history of the State, burned in California. So 
far, President Biden has declared major disasters in 4 States for 
Hurricane Ida and 2 major disasters in California for the fires, making 
much-needed Federal assistance available through FEMA and other Federal 
agencies. FEMA is committed to working with affected States and 
communities to respond and rebuild in a resilient manner.
    Sea-level rise, extreme weather events, drought, and other direct, 
indirect, and cumulative consequences of climate change will continue 
to threaten lives, essential functions, and infrastructure across the 
United States. Simply put, we are facing an existential climate crisis 
that poses a current and growing threat to our way of life. Under the 
Biden-Harris administration, DHS is taking urgent action to address 
these increasing threats. The steps taken include the following:
   President Biden authorized $3.46 billion in Hazard 
        Mitigation Grant Program funding, which States, Tribes, and 
        territories will utilize on mitigation projects to reduce the 
        impacts of climate change.
   In April, DHS launched a Climate Change Action Group 
        comprised of senior officials from across the Department to 
        focus on promoting resilience and addressing multiple risks, 
        including flooding, extreme heat, drought, and wildfires.
   DHS has leveraged the Building Resilient Infrastructure and 
        Communities (BRIC) program--the funding for which President 
        Biden doubled to $1 billion--to create incentives and funding 
        to help our Nation address these threats. Our initial BRIC 
        selections include wildfire resilience programs, flood control 
        programs, small town coastal hazard mitigation plans, and more.
   We have upgraded our National Risk Index, which provides 
        communities unprecedented clarity about the risks they face and 
        thus helps equip them to act to reduce those risks.
   DHS has released new guidance on cost-effective methods for 
        increasing local resilience.
   FEMA revised its policies governing individual assistance to 
        overcome historic inequities adversely impacting minority, low-
        income, and other disenfranchised communities, to ensure a more 
        equitable distribution of funds.
   FEMA also authorized the funding of mitigation measures 
        through individual assistance to allow homeowners affected by 
        disasters to repair their homes in a way that will protect 
        against future damage.
    Much more is on the way.
                           covid-19 response
    On his first day in office, President Biden challenged FEMA to 
stand up 100 Federally-supported Community Vaccination Centers (CVCs) 
within 30 days. Before the end of February, FEMA was supporting over 
400 CVCs. Today, there are almost 800 active sites, including almost 
200 mobile sites still receiving Federal support. President Biden also 
challenged DHS to deliver 100 million vaccinations Nation-wide in 100 
days, a goal we surpassed. We are particularly focused on ensuring 
vaccine equity. To this end, FEMA worked with partners in 39 sites 
across the country to provide a supplemental allocation of vaccines 
above and beyond State, Tribal, and territorial allocations and 
utilized mobile vaccination sites to increase access to COVID-19 
vaccines among vulnerable and rural populations.
    To protect the traveling public and transportation personnel, and 
pursuant to President Biden's Executive Order on Promoting COVID-19 
Safety in Domestic and International Travel, TSA issued on February 2, 
2021 a Federal mask mandate at airports, on commercial aircraft, and in 
various modes of surface transportation, including passenger railroads 
and other public transportation. On September 9, 2021, TSA increased 
the range of civil penalties that can be imposed on individuals who 
violate this Federal mask mandate, to reinforce its importance to 
public health and safety.
    Further, CISA developed voluntary guidance for the Essential 
Critical Infrastructure Workforce that has helped officials and 
organizations identify essential work functions during the COVID-19 
pandemic.
    ICE launched Operation Stolen Promise to protect American consumers 
and first responders by combatting COVID-19-related fraud and criminal 
activity. Through this operation, ICE and its partners have seized over 
$54 million in illicit proceeds, made 359 arrests, served 356 criminal 
search warrants, opened over 1,250 criminal investigations, and seized 
more than 2,200 mislabeled, fraudulent, unauthorized, or prohibited 
COVID-19 vaccines, test kits, PPE, and other medical items. Further, 
the U.S. Secret Service--through its network of Cyber Fraud Task Forces 
and in partnership with law enforcement agencies across every level of 
government, State-employment agencies, and financial institutions--has 
prevented more than $3 billion of much-needed COVID-19 relief from 
fraudulently ending up in the pockets of criminals.
                               conclusion
    Twenty years after the tragic day of 9/11, the threats facing our 
country have significantly evolved and the global threat landscape is 
no less daunting. Those who wish to do us harm now have social media, 
encrypted apps, and other modern tools that enhance their ability to 
carry out attacks, sow discord, undermine our democracy and 
institutions, and erode our way of life.
    At the same time, DHS continues to evolve to remain nimble enough 
to address the dynamism of not only the threat landscape confronting 
our Nation today, but also the threats, both seen and unseen, of 
tomorrow and of the next 20 years. We will do so with the commitment to 
protecting the security of both our homeland and our values. We will do 
so through the incredible dedication and talent of the public servants 
in the Department of Homeland Security.
    Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    I now ask Director Wray to summarize his statement. I know 
it might be a little more than 5 minutes, but just we look 
forward to your testimony.

 STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                         INVESTIGATION

    Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to you and 
to Ranking Member Katko and to Members of the committee. I am 
honored to be here today to discuss the many threats facing our 
homeland.
    A week-and-a-half ago we marked a somber, really sacred 
anniversary in this country: The 20th anniversary of the 
September 11 attacks. September 11 reminds us of evil and loss 
and nearly 3,000 victims taken from us that day and from their 
families. It also though reminds us of sacrifice and 
selflessness, of common purpose, it reminds us of the first 
responders and everyday heroes we lost that day and all those 
who suffered illness as a result of their selfless work after 
the attacks, including members of our FBI family. Still, two 
decades later our response to September 11 and the lessons 
learned from those attacks drive our approach to combatting all 
the many threats Americans face today.
    It was 9/11 after all that turned the FBI into an agency 
focused on disrupting threats and to building deeper and even 
more effective partnerships, both here at home and around the 
world.
    Good thing we made those changes because as we will discuss 
this morning, there is no shortage of dangers to defend 
against. Just a flavor before we even get to terrorism, on the 
cyber front we are now investigating over 100 different types 
of ransomware, each of them with scores of victims. That is on 
top of hundreds of other criminal and National security cyber 
threats that we are working against every day.
    In our violent crime work, we recently arrested over 600 
gang members in a single month. That is just 1 month.
    Protecting our Nation's innovation, we are opening a new 
China counterintelligence investigation every 12 hours. Every 
day we receive thousands of tips to our National Threat 
Operations Center, many of which require imminent action 
against threats to life.
    That list goes on and one and I am not going to have time 
to discuss most of them before we get started, but I do want to 
spend a few minutes on terrorism and the challenges facing 
those protecting us against it.
    Preventing terrorist attacks remains our top priority, both 
now and for the foreseeable future. Today the greatest 
terrorist threat we face here in the United States is from what 
are in effect lone actors. Because they act alone and move 
quickly from radicalization to action, often using easily 
obtainable weapons against soft targets, these attackers don't 
leave a lot of dots for investigators to connect or time in 
which to connect them.
    We continue to see individuals here at home inspired by 
Jihadist ideologies, espoused by foreign terrorist 
organizations, like ISIS and al-Qaeda, what we would call 
``home-grown violent extremists''. But we are also countering 
lone domestic violent extremists, radicalized by personalized 
grievances, ranging from racial or ethnic bias to anti-
authority or anti-Government sentiment to conspiracy theories. 
There is no doubt about it, today's threat is different from 
what it was 20 years ago and it will most certainly continue to 
change.
    So to stay in front of it, we have got to adapt too. That 
is why over the last year-and-a-half the FBI has pushed even 
more resources to our domestic terrorism investigations. Since 
the spring of 2020, so about 16-17 months ago, we have more 
than doubled our domestic terrorism caseload, from about 1,000 
to around 2,700 investigations. We have surged personnel to 
match, more than doubling the number of people working the 
threat from a year before.
    But we are also surging against threats by terrorist 
organizations like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-Shabaab. Their 
operatives continue to search for vulnerabilities and have not 
stopped trying to carry out large-scale attacks against us. We 
are certainly watching the evolving situation in Afghanistan.
    Now, 9/11 was 20 years ago, but for us at the FBI, as I 
know it does for my colleagues testifying here with me today, 
it represents a danger that we focus on every single day. Make 
no mistake, the danger is real. Our adversaries are committed 
and they are working to succeed just once where we are working 
to bat 1,000. so we are working side-by-side with our partners 
to identify and stop would-be attackers before they act.
    Just within the past couple of years we thwarted potential 
terrorist attacks in areas like Las Vegas, Tampa, New York, 
Cleveland, Kansas City, Miami, Pittsburgh, and elsewhere. Now, 
we are proud of our successes, but we need to stay on the balls 
of our feet, relentlessly vigilant against the next plot of our 
adversaries and their next attempts to attack us.
    Our work force has been battling the threat of terrorism 
and every other threat we face right through the teeth of a 
pandemic and rising danger to their own safety. I add that last 
part because over the past year we have seen a sharp and deeply 
disturbing uptick in violence against the law enforcement 
community.
    In just the first 8 months of this year, 52 law enforcement 
officers have been feloniously killed on the job. To put that 
into context, that is an officer murdered every 5 days, and 
that is more than all of 2020. Of course that doesn't even 
count all those who died in the line of duty facing the many 
other inherent dangers of this job, much less the scores of 
officers, agents, analysts, and other dedicated professionals 
who lost their lives to COVID-19.
    We will be forever indebted for their bravery and their 
sacrifice and are determined to honor them all through the way 
we do our work while we remain focused on our ultimate mission, 
protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.
    Thank you for taking the time to hear from me today and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray
                           September 22, 2021
    Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members 
of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the 
threats facing our homeland.
    A week-and-a-half ago, we marked a somber anniversary in this 
country--20 years since the September 11 attacks.
    September 11 represents evil and loss. But it also represents 
sacrifice and selflessness. It represents grit and resilience and 
strength in the face of great adversity. And 2 decades later, it has 
come to represent the FBI's continued ability to adapt to a changing 
world, and to stay laser-focused on keeping our country safe from 
another attack like that one.
    About 2 years after the 9/11 attacks, when I was the assistant 
attorney general overseeing the Justice Department's terrorism 
portfolio, I had the chance to meet with members of the victims' 
families. Those families and their stories left an impression that I'll 
never forget. The kind of knee-buckling grief those families 
experienced--that sense that something you held most precious was 
stolen from you--never goes away.
    Of course, we can't think of 9/11 without recalling the sacrifices 
made on that day and the days after. We continue to honor members of 
the FBI family who died that day; our FBI brothers and sisters who have 
since lost their lives to illnesses resulting from their work after the 
attacks; and those fighting grave illnesses today. These selfless men 
and women thought of others first and answered the call of duty, no 
matter the cost.
    I would like to talk a bit about how the FBI has transformed in the 
past 2 decades, and how the threats we face today have evolved during 
that time.
                           fbi transformation
    Twenty years ago, I was working in senior leadership at the 
Department of Justice. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, I was at 
FBI Headquarters, in the Strategic Information and Operations Center, 
with Director Mueller and Attorney General Ashcroft.
    Although it was a chaotic, horrifying time, it was also a time of 
incredible solidarity. Everyone there that day had one purpose, and 
that was to make sure that what we had just experienced as a Nation 
would never, ever happen again.
    For a long time, we lived in a haze that seemed like September 12, 
day after day after day. Every lead, every tip, every threat seemed 
like it could be the next one. We kept asking ourselves, ``What could 
we have done better? What should we have done better?'' And now every 
day, we wake up asking ourselves, ``What do we need to do to keep 
people safe today . . . and tomorrow . . . and the day after that?''
    Under Director Mueller's leadership, the FBI made a paradigm shift, 
dramatically expanding National security operations, and changing the 
way we did business: Shifting to focus intently on disrupting attacks 
before they occur and on working with and through our partners around 
the world and at every level of government here at home. When I left 
the Department of Justice in 2005, those changes were still in their 
infancy. When I take stock of where things stand now, all these years 
later, I am astounded by the progress.
    It is incredible to see first-hand the capabilities we have built 
with our partners here and around the world. Today we are all stronger, 
smarter, and better able to confront the threats we face.
    Preventing terrorist attacks, from any place, by any actor, remains 
the FBI's top priority. The nature of the threat posed by terrorism--
both international terrorism (``IT'') and domestic terrorism (``DT'')--
continues to evolve.
    To meet that evolving threat, the FBI has surged resources to our 
domestic terrorism investigations in the last year, increasing 
personnel by 260 percent. Importantly, however, our increased focus on 
domestic terrorism is not at the expense of our work on other terrorism 
threats. We continue to monitor potential threats by foreign terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS, which have never stopped 
expressing their intent to carry out large-scale attacks like 9/11 here 
in the United States. We are also monitoring other dangerous groups 
like Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
    Of course, in addition to terrorism threats, we also face a wide 
array of cyber threats from nation-state and criminal actors alike; 
persistent counterintelligence threats from the People's Republic of 
China (``P.R.C.''), Russia, Iran, and North Korea; and the full 
spectrum of criminal threats, from hate crimes and other civil rights 
abuses to violent crime spikes in cities across this country, to human 
trafficking and crimes against children, just to name a few.
    But no matter which threats have dominated the landscape over the 
last 20 years, the FBI has remained focused on prevention and 
disruption--sharing intelligence and making arrests before criminals 
and terrorists can act. And we have remained focused on our ultimate 
mission: Protecting the American people and upholding the Constitution.
                            capitol violence
    First and foremost, I want to assure you, your staff, and the 
American people that the FBI has deployed our full investigative 
resources and is working closely with our Federal, State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial partners to aggressively pursue those involved 
in criminal activity during the events of January 6, 2021. We are 
working hard to identify those responsible for the violence and 
destruction of property at the U.S. Capitol building.
    FBI Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and professional staff 
have been hard at work gathering evidence, sharing intelligence, and 
working with Federal prosecutors to bring charges against the 
individuals involved. As we have said consistently, we do not and will 
not tolerate violent extremists who use the guise of First Amendment-
protected activity to engage in violent criminal activity. Thus far, 
the FBI has arrested hundreds of individuals with regards to rioting, 
assault on a Federal officer, property crimes violations, and 
conspiracy charges, and the work continues. Overall, the FBI assesses 
that the January 6 siege of the Capitol Complex demonstrates a 
willingness by some to use violence against the Government in 
furtherance of their political and social goals. This ideologically-
motivated violence--domestic terrorism--underscores the symbolic nature 
of the National Capital Region and the willingness of some Domestic 
Violent Extremists to travel to events in this area and violently 
engage law enforcement and their perceived adversaries. The American 
people should rest assured that we will continue to work to hold 
accountable those individuals who participated in the violent breach of 
the Capitol on January 6 and any others who attempt to use violence to 
intimidate, coerce, or influence the American people or affect the 
conduct of our Government.
                         top terrorism threats
    There are some commonalities between the IT and DT threats, most 
importantly the danger posed by lone actors or small cells who 
typically radicalize on-line and look to attack soft targets with 
easily accessible weapons. Individuals who commit violent criminal acts 
in furtherance of social or political goals stemming from domestic 
influences--some of which include racial or ethnic bias, or anti-
Government or anti-authority sentiments--are described as Domestic 
Violent Extremists (``DVEs''), whereas individuals who are inspired 
primarily by global jihad but are not receiving individualized 
direction from Foreign Terrorist Organizations (``FTOs'') are known as 
Homegrown Violent Extremists (``HVEs''). Both of these threats, which 
together form the most significant terrorism danger to our country, are 
located primarily in the United States and typically radicalize and 
mobilize to violence on their own.
    DVEs and HVEs are often motivated and inspired by a mix of socio-
political, ideological, and personal grievances against their targets, 
and more recently have focused on accessible targets including 
civilians, houses of worship, retail locations, and mass public 
gatherings. Selecting these types of soft targets, in addition to the 
insular nature of their radicalization and mobilization to violence and 
limited discussions with others regarding their plans, increases the 
challenge faced by law enforcement to detect and disrupt the activities 
of lone actors before they occur. Some violent extremists have also 
continued to target law enforcement and the military as well as symbols 
or members of the U.S. Government.
    The top threats we face from DVEs are from those we categorize as 
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (``RMVEs'') and 
Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists. While RMVEs who 
advocate for the superiority of the White race were the primary source 
of lethal attacks perpetrated by DVEs in 2018 and 2019, Anti-Government 
or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists--specifically, Militia Violent 
Extremists and Anarchist Violent Extremists--were responsible for 3 of 
the 4 lethal DVE attacks in 2020. Notably, this included the first 
lethal attack committed by an Anarchist Violent Extremist in over 20 
years.
    Consistent with our mission, the FBI holds sacred the rights of 
individuals to peacefully exercise their First Amendment freedoms. 
Regardless of their specific ideology, the FBI will aggressively pursue 
those who seek to hijack legitimate First Amendment-protected activity 
by engaging in violent criminal activity such as the destruction of 
property and violent assaults on law enforcement officers that we 
witnessed on January 6 and during protests throughout the United States 
during the summer of 2020. The FBI will actively pursue the opening of 
FBI investigations when an individual uses--or threatens the use of--
force, violence, or coercion, in violation of Federal law and in the 
furtherance of social or political goals.
    The FBI assesses that HVEs pose the greatest, most immediate IT 
threat to the homeland. They typically are not receiving individualized 
direction from global jihad-inspired FTOs but are inspired largely by 
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (``ISIS'') and al-Qaeda to 
commit violence. HVEs' lack of a direct connection to an FTO, their 
ability to rapidly mobilize without detection, and their use of 
encrypted communications pose significant challenges to our ability to 
proactively identify and disrupt them.
    The FBI remains concerned that FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, 
intend to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United 
States. As we saw in the murder in Kabul last month of 13 brave 
American service men and women and nearly 200 Afghans, ISIS remains 
relentless in its campaign of violence against the United States and 
our partners--both here at home and overseas. To this day, ISIS 
continues to aggressively promote its hate-fueled rhetoric and attract 
like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to conduct attacks 
against the United States and our interests abroad. ISIS' successful 
use of social media and messaging applications to attract individuals 
seeking a sense of belonging is of continued concern to us. Like other 
foreign terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone offender attacks in 
the United States and Western countries via videos and other English 
language propaganda that have at times specifically advocated for 
attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and other 
Government personnel.
    Al-Qaeda maintains its desire to both conduct and inspire large-
scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded 
some of the group's senior leadership, in the near term, we assess that 
al-Qaeda is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its 
international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable 
attacks, including attacks against the interests of the United States 
and other Western nations, in regions such as East and West Africa. 
Over the past year, propaganda from al-Qaeda leaders continued to seek 
to inspire individuals to conduct attacks in the United States and 
other Western nations. We expect those attempts to continue.
    Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia 
militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States 
and our allies throughout the Middle East in response to U.S. pressure. 
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'') 
continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and 
terrorist organizations. Lebanese Hizballah, Iran's primary strategic 
partner, has sent operatives to build terrorist infrastructures world-
wide. Hizballah also continues to conduct intelligence collection, 
financial activities, and procurement efforts world-wide to support its 
terrorist capabilities. FBI arrests in recent years of alleged Iranian 
and Hizballah operatives in the United States suggest the government of 
Iran and Hizballah each seek to establish infrastructure here, 
potentially for the purpose of conducting operational or contingency 
planning. IRGC-QF Commander Esmail Ghani and Hizballah Secretary 
General Hasan Nasrallah have each threatened retaliation for the death 
of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani.
    As an organization, we continually adapt and rely heavily on the 
strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and 
international partnerships to combat all terrorist threats to the 
United States and our interests. To that end, we use all available 
lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats 
while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence concerning 
the threat posed by violent extremists, in all their forms, who desire 
to harm Americans and U.S. interests. We will continue to share 
information and encourage the sharing of information among our numerous 
partners via our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and 
our Legal Attache offices around the world.
                                 cyber
    In the last decade, while professionals toiled against a steady 
drumbeat of malicious cyber activities, typically only one or two major 
cyber incidents captured the Nation's attention each year: The Sony 
Pictures hack in 2014, the announcement of the OPM data breach incident 
in 2015, Russian election interference in 2016, and the WannaCry 
ransomware and NotPetya attacks of 2017. This past year, a steady 
stream of high-profile cyber incidents has garnered world-wide 
attention, beginning with the SolarWinds incident at the very end of 
2020; followed by the Microsoft Exchange Server intrusions revealed in 
March; significant exploitation of Pulse Secure vulnerabilities in 
April; and then ransomware attacks against Colonial Pipeline, JBS USA, 
and customers of Kaseya between May and July, among thousands of other 
incidents targeting victims in the United States and world-wide.
    Throughout the last year, the FBI has seen a wider-than-ever range 
of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and confidence in 
our digitally-connected world. Cyber-criminal syndicates and nation-
states keep innovating to compromise our networks and maximize the 
reach and impact of their operations, such as by selling malware as a 
service or by targeting vendors to access scores of victims by hacking 
just one provider.
    With each significant cyber incident, our surge to the affected 
victim serves a host of purposes at once. The evidence and intelligence 
we develop helps that victim effectively detect and remediate the 
intrusion; identifies other victims and potential future targets of the 
same actors that we can notify and work with our partners to assist; 
and develops the attribution to and knowledge of the adversary that we 
as a Government need to effectively respond. When other incident 
responders leave the scene, our work to analyze the evidence, identify 
those responsible, and hold them accountable can continue for months, 
even years. In the SolarWinds investigation, just one field office 
collected more than 170 terabytes of data--that's 17 times the content 
housed within the Library of Congress in one office for one 
investigation. We bought tens of thousands of dollars of new servers 
just to house the data, but that doesn't begin to take into account the 
time and talent it takes to exploit it, share it, and act upon it.
    The situation is not sustainable, and it's not acceptable. Cyber 
criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise our 
networks, steal our property, and hold our critical infrastructure at 
risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the last year alone, we 
have seen--and have publicly called out--the P.R.C., North Korea, and 
Russia for using cyber operations to target U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and 
research. We have seen the far-reaching disruptive impact a serious 
supply chain compromise can have through the SolarWinds intrusions, 
conducted by the Russian SVR. We have seen the P.R.C. working to obtain 
controlled defense technology and developing the ability to use cyber 
means to complement any future real-world conflict. We also recently 
unsealed an indictment against four P.R.C. Nationals working with the 
Ministry of State Security. The 4 individuals were charged with a 
campaign to hack into the computer systems of dozens of victims while 
trying to obtain information with significant economic benefit to the 
P.R.C. Iran used cyber means to try to sow divisions and undermine our 
elections, targeting voters before the November election, and 
threatening election officials after. North Korea's cyber capabilities 
have increased in recent years, posing a particular threat to financial 
institutions and a growing cyber espionage threat.
    As dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of 
focusing on them alone. Ransomware has always been treated by the FBI 
as a serious cyber-criminal threat. But as the President has observed, 
ransomware has evolved into a National security issue, affecting the 
critical infrastructure we can least afford to be without. Last year, 
there was a 20 percent increase in the number of ransomware incidents 
reported to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center and a 225 percent 
increase in ransom amounts. Unfortunately, ransomware incidents are not 
only becoming more common, but also more dangerous. Ransomware 
incidents in the past year have hit victims in nearly every critical 
infrastructure sector. While attacks against Colonial Pipeline and JBS 
USA made National headlines, ransomware actors have also targeted 
hospitals and medical centers, putting patients' lives at an increased 
risk at a time when America faces its most dire public health crisis in 
generations. While we are bringing our unique dual criminal and 
National security authorities to the fight, we recognize that we cannot 
fully combat this threat without international cooperation. We have 
been working with our partners in the State Department and the National 
Security Council to increase pressure on countries that consistently 
fail to take action to stop ransomware actors in their territory, 
particularly Russia. We will continue to tackle the ransomware threat 
through a whole-of-Government approach, but we also need foreign 
nations to do their part to keep cyber criminals from acting with 
impunity within their borders.
    Dark web vendors who sell capabilities in exchange for 
cryptocurrency are making it more difficult for us to stop what would 
once have been less dangerous offenders. Although once a ring of 
relatively unsophisticated criminals, these actors are now armed with 
the tools to paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, and 
businesses with ransomware. It is not that individual hackers alone 
have necessarily become much more sophisticated, but--unlike 
previously--they are able to rent sophisticated capabilities.
    We have to make it harder and more painful for hackers to steal our 
intellectual property and hold our networks at risk. That is why I 
announced a new FBI cyber strategy last year, using the FBI's role as 
the lead Federal agency with law enforcement and intelligence 
responsibilities to not only pursue our own disruptive actions, but to 
work seamlessly with our domestic and international partners to defend 
networks, attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take 
the fight to our adversaries overseas.
    FBI's strategy of using our information to enable our partners has 
been successful in taking down cyber criminal enterprises. Each success 
has this in common: Multiple U.S. agencies working--often with multiple 
international partners--to bring our information and tools together to 
achieve the most significant, durable impact. One example of this 
approach is the international takedown in January 2021 of the Emotet 
botnet, which enabled a network of cyber criminals to cause hundreds of 
millions of dollars in damages to Government, educational, and 
corporate networks. The FBI used sophisticated techniques, our unique 
legal authorities, and, most importantly, our world-wide partnerships 
to significantly disrupt the malware, working with an unprecedented 
number of international law enforcement agencies.
    Also this January, we worked with Canada and Bulgaria to disrupt 
NetWalker, a ransomware variant that paralyzed companies, 
municipalities, hospitals, law enforcement agencies, emergency 
services, school districts, colleges, and universities. We obtained 
Federal charges, seized more than $450,000 in cryptocurrency, and the 
United States requested Canada's arrest of a subject who is facing 
extradition proceedings.
    Our joint efforts extend to our partners in private industry, 
especially those providers that have unique visibility into how 
adversaries are exploiting U.S. networks. In March, cybersecurity 
companies including Microsoft disclosed that hackers--who have since 
been identified as affiliated with the P.R.C.'s Ministry of State 
Security--were using previously-unknown Microsoft Exchange 
vulnerabilities to access email servers that companies physically keep 
on their premises rather than in the cloud. These ``zero day'' 
vulnerabilities allowed the P.R.C. actors to potentially exploit victim 
networks such as by grabbing login credentials, stealing email messages 
in bulk, and installing malicious programs (``web shells'') allowing 
the hackers to send commands to the victim network. First, the FBI put 
out a joint advisory with the Department of Homeland Security's 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (``CISA'') to give 
network defenders the technical information they needed to mitigate the 
vulnerability. However, while many infected system owners successfully 
removed the web shells, others were not able to do so. That left many 
systems vulnerable to Chinese cyber actors who could continue to steal 
information, or potentially even execute a destructive attack.
    We thought that risk was unacceptable, especially when it was 
within our authorities to do something about it. So, we used those 
authorities, through a court-authorized operation in partnership with 
the private sector, to remove malicious web shells from hundreds of 
vulnerable computers in the United States running Microsoft Exchange 
Server software. The P.R.C. propped open back doors throughout U.S. 
networks. We slammed them shut.
    These are the incidents that garner the most attention, but behind 
the scenes the FBI took upwards of 1,100 actions against cyber 
adversaries last year, including arrests, criminal charges, 
convictions, dismantlements, and disruptions; and enabled many more 
actions through our dedicated partnerships with the private sector, 
foreign partners, and at the Federal, State, and local level. In some 
instances, we were also able to seize cyber criminals' ill-gotten 
gains, with the most publicized example being the seizure of $2.3 
million in cryptocurrency paid to the DarkSide ransomware group that 
targeted Colonial Pipeline.
    We have been putting a lot of energy and resources into all of 
those partnerships, especially with the private sector. We are working 
hard to push important threat information to network defenders, while 
also been making it as easy as possible for the private sector to share 
important information with us. We emphasize how we keep our presence 
unobtrusive in the wake of a breach, how we protect information that 
the private sector shares with us and commit to providing useful 
information back, and how we coordinate with our Government partners so 
that we are speaking with one voice.
    But we need the private sector to do its part, too. We need the 
private sector to come forward to warn us quickly when they see 
malicious cyber activity. We also need the private sector to work with 
us when we warn them that they are being targeted. The recent examples 
of significant cyber incidents only emphasize what I have been saying 
for a long time: The Government cannot protect against cyber threats on 
its own. We need a whole-of-society approach that matches the scope of 
the danger. We wholeheartedly support the administration's view that 
legislation is needed to require reporting of significant cyber 
incidents, including ransomware attacks, cyber incidents that affect 
critical infrastructure entities, and other incidents that implicate 
heightened risks to the Government, the public, or third parties. There 
is really no other option for defending a country where the vast 
majority of our critical infrastructure, personal data, intellectual 
property, and network infrastructure sits in private hands.
                        foreign malign influence
    Our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking to 
both influence our National policies and public opinion, and cause harm 
to our National dialog. The FBI and our interagency partners remain 
concerned about, and focused on, malign influence measures used by 
certain adversaries in their attempts to sway U.S. voters' preferences 
and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase discord in the United 
States, and undermine the American people's confidence in our 
democratic processes.
    Foreign malign influence operations--which include subversive, 
undeclared, coercive, and criminal actions by foreign governments to 
influence U.S. political sentiment or public discourse or interfere in 
our democratic processes themselves--are not a new problem. But the 
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of 
the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and 
its partners must address it. Foreign malign influence operations have 
taken many forms and used many tactics over the years. Most widely 
reported these days are attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide 
swath of Americans covertly from outside the United States--to use 
false personas and fabricated stories on social media platforms to 
discredit U.S. individuals and institutions.
    The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating 
foreign malign influence operations. In the fall of 2017, we 
established the Foreign Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and 
counteract malign foreign influence operations targeting the United 
States. The FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and is 
comprised of agents, analysts, and professional staff from the 
Counterintelligence, Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Criminal 
Investigative Divisions. It is specifically charged with identifying 
and combating foreign malign influence operations targeting democratic 
institutions and values inside the United States. In all instances, the 
FITF strives to protect democratic institutions; develop a common 
understanding of threats with our interagency partners; raise 
adversaries' costs; and disrupt foreign malign influence operations and 
enablers in the United States and world-wide.
    While we are keenly focused on threats to elections, those events 
are not the only aspects of our democracy that are being threatened. 
Our adversaries are also targeting the very fabric of our civil 
discourse and are targeting policy processes at every level of 
government--State, local, and Federal. The FITF brings the FBI's 
National security and traditional criminal investigative expertise 
under one umbrella to better understand and combat these complex and 
nuanced threats. This cross-programmatic approach allows the FBI to 
identify connections across programs, to aggressively investigate as 
appropriate, and--importantly--to be more agile. Coordinating closely 
with our partners and leveraging relationships we have developed in the 
technology sector, we regularly relay threat indicators that those 
companies use to take swift action, blocking budding abuse of their 
platforms.
    Following the 2018 mid-term elections, we reviewed the threat and 
the effectiveness of our coordination and outreach. As a result of this 
review, we further expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our 
efforts to combat foreign malign influence focused solely on the threat 
posed by Russia. Using lessons learned from the 2018 mid-term 
elections, the FITF widened its aperture to confront foreign malign 
operations of the P.R.C., Iran, and other global adversaries. To 
address this expanding focus and wider set of adversaries and influence 
efforts, we have also added resources to maintain permanent coverage of 
foreign malign influence threats, including threats to our elections.
    These additional resources were also devoted to working with U.S. 
Government partners on two documents regarding the U.S. Government's 
analysis of foreign efforts to influence or interfere with the 2020 
Election. The reports are separate but complementary and were published 
earlier this year. The first report--referred to as the 1a report and 
authored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--
outlines the intentions of foreign adversaries with regard to 
influencing and interfering with the election but does not evaluate 
impact. The second report--referred to as the 1b report and authored by 
the Department of Justice, including the FBI, and Department of 
Homeland Security, including CISA--evaluates the impact of foreign 
government activity on the security or integrity of election 
infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining to political organizations, 
candidates, or campaigns.
    The main takeaway from both reports is that there is no evidence--
not through intelligence collection on the foreign actors themselves, 
not through physical security and cybersecurity monitoring of voting 
systems across the country, not through post-election audits, and not 
through any other means--that a foreign government or other actors 
compromised election infrastructure to manipulate election results.
    Another way in which foreign governments reach across borders to 
influence and target diaspora communities in the United States is 
through ``transnational repression,'' which is the growing practice of 
governments silencing exiles and members of diasporas--including 
activists, dissidents, defectors, journalists, and other critics--
living outside of their territorial borders. Iran, the P.R.C., and 
other authoritarian regimes continue to target dissidents and human 
rights activists on U.S. soil. The administration is committed to 
addressing this challenge as part of our broader commitment to stem 
rising authoritarianism.
    We remain vigilant in understanding and combating foreign malign 
influence in the homeland and look across the U.S. Government--in our 
intelligence community partners and beyond--as we work to effectively 
protect our elections, democratic processes, and the American people.
                             lawful access
    The problems caused by law enforcement agencies' inability to 
access electronic evidence continue to grow. Increasingly, commercial 
device manufacturers have employed encryption in such a manner that 
only the device users can access the content of the devices. This is 
commonly referred to as ``user-only access'' device encryption. 
Similarly, more and more communications service providers are designing 
their platforms and apps such that only the parties to the 
communication can access the content. This is generally known as ``end-
to-end'' encryption. The proliferation of end-to-end and user-only 
access encryption is a serious issue that increasingly limits law 
enforcement's ability, even after obtaining a lawful warrant or court 
order, to access critical evidence and information needed to disrupt 
threats, protect the public, and bring perpetrators to justice.
    The FBI remains a strong advocate for the wide and consistent use 
of responsibly managed encryption--encryption that providers can 
decrypt and provide to law enforcement when served with a legal order. 
Protecting data and privacy in a digitally-connected world is a top 
priority for the FBI and we believe that promoting encryption is a 
vital part of that mission. It does have a negative effect on law 
enforcement's ability to protect the public. What we mean when we talk 
about lawful access is putting providers who manage encrypted data in a 
position to decrypt it and provide it to us in response to legal 
process. We are not asking for, and do not want, any ``back door,'' 
that is, for encryption to be weakened or compromised so that it can be 
defeated from the outside by law enforcement or anyone else. 
Unfortunately, too much of the debate over lawful access has revolved 
around discussions of this ``back door'' straw man instead of what we 
really want and need.
    For example, even with our substantial resources, accessing the 
content of known or suspected terrorists' data pursuant to court-
authorized legal process is increasingly difficult. The often-on-line 
nature of the terrorist radicalization process, along with the insular 
nature of most of today's attack plotters, leaves fewer dots for 
investigators to connect in time to stop an attack, and end-to-end and 
user-only access encryption increasingly hide even those often precious 
few and fleeting dots.
    In one instance, while planning--and right up until the eve of--the 
December 6, 2019, shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed 3 
U.S. sailors and severely wounded 8 other Americans, deceased terrorist 
Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani communicated undetected with overseas al-
Qaeda terrorists using an end-to-end encrypted app. Then, after the 
attack, user-only access encryption prevented the FBI from accessing 
information contained in his phones for several months. As a result, 
during the critical time period immediately following the shooting and 
despite obtaining search warrants for the deceased killer's devices, 
the FBI could not access the information on those phones to identify 
co-conspirators or determine whether they may have been plotting 
additional attacks.
    This problem spans international and domestic terrorism threats. 
Like al-Shamrani, the plotters who sought to kidnap the Governor of 
Michigan late last year used end-to-end encrypted apps to hide their 
communications from law enforcement. Their plot was disrupted only by 
well-timed human source reporting and the resulting undercover 
operation. Subjects of our investigation into the January 6 Capitol 
siege used end-to-end encrypted communications as well.
    We face the same problem in protecting children against violent 
sexual exploitation. End-to-end and user-only access encryption 
frequently prevent us from discovering and searching for victims, since 
the vital tips we receive from providers only arrive when those 
providers themselves are able to detect and report child exploitation 
being facilitated on their platforms and services. They cannot do that 
when their platforms are end-to-end encrypted.
    When we are able to open investigations, end-to-end and user-only 
access encryption makes it much more difficult to bring perpetrators to 
justice. Much evidence of crimes against children, just like the 
evidence of many other kinds of crime today, exists primarily in 
electronic form. If we cannot obtain that critical electronic evidence, 
our efforts are frequently hamstrung.
    This problem is not just limited to Federal investigations. Our 
State and local law enforcement partners have been consistently 
advising the FBI that they, too, are experiencing similar end-to-end 
and user-only access encryption challenges, which are now being felt 
across the full range of State and local criminal law enforcement. Many 
report that even relatively unsophisticated criminal groups, like 
street gangs, are frequently using user-only access encrypted 
smartphones and end-to-end encrypted communications apps to shield 
their activities from detection or disruption. As this problem becomes 
more and more acute for State and local law enforcement, the advanced 
technical resources needed to address even a single investigation 
involving end-to-end and user-only access encryption will continue to 
diminish and ultimately the capacity of State and local law enforcement 
to investigate even common crimes will be overwhelmed.
                               conclusion
    The threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more 
diverse, and the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. 
Our fellow citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from 
all of those threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet 
and exceed those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for 
their dedicated service.
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy 
to answer any questions you might have.

    Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Director.
    Now I ask Director Abizaid to summarize her statement for 5 
minutes, or whatever you are required, Director.

      STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE ABIZAID, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
    COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                          INTELLIGENCE

    Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much, Chairman Thompson, 
Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members of this 
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today to discuss the global counterterrorism environment and to 
highlight the tireless work of NCTC professionals and IC 
professionals across the board who are working to protect our 
homeland.
    As noted in my statement for the record, 20 years after 9/
11 the United States faces a changed threat from foreign 
terrorist organizations. The threat today is less acute to the 
homeland, but it continues to become more ideologically diffuse 
and geographically diverse. The United States continues to have 
success at degrading foreign terrorist operations, including 
those directed at the homeland, though these terrorists have 
also proven adaptive over years of CT pressure.
    Their presence has spread to countries that are often 
under-governed and which offer a permissive operating 
environment that can be easily exploited, requiring constant 
vigilance on the part of the intelligence community as we 
monitor for threats.
    Turning first to the international counterterrorism 
landscape, the 26 August suicide bombing by ISIS-Khorasan at 
the international airport in Kabul, which tragically killed 13 
U.S. service members and scores of Afghans, illustrates that 
these groups continue to place a premium on attacks against the 
United States. ISIS-Khorasan in Iraq and Syria maintains a 
strategic interest in attacks in the West, even as it remains 
committed to the long-term goal of establishing an Islamic 
caliphate. It is fomenting sectarian discord and exploiting 
security gaps in Iraq and Syria to create conditions favorable 
for seizing territory again.
    For its part, al-Qaeda has changed significantly since 9/
11. The group and its affiliates and allies have repeatedly 
demonstrated their ability to adapt to changing CT 
environments. Part of this adaptation has included shifting 
from its core leadership in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, to 
a more geographically dispersed network of affiliates and 
veteran leaders across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
    While years of CT pressure has degraded the al-Qaeda 
network, the group and its affiliates remain intent on using 
individuals with access to the United States to conduct 
attacks. This was most recently demonstrated by al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula's probable approval of a 2019 attack in 
Pensacola, Florida where a Saudi Air Force officer killed 3 and 
wounded 8 U.S. service members.
    Here in the United States, the primary threat in the 
homeland comes from individuals inspired to violence either by 
foreign terrorists or by motivations more domestic in nature. 
U.S.-based home-grown violent extremists, HVEs, are largely 
inspired by al-Qaeda or ISIS and will likely continue to 
attempt attacks because of their personal and ideological 
grievances, their attraction to foreign terrorist messaging, 
and their access to weapons and targets.
    One of the most pressing terrorist threats to the homeland 
also comes from domestic violent extremists, DVEs. In 
particular, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists 
or militia violent extremists, who often mobile to violent 
independent of direction from a formal organization.
    Since 2015 the threat from these individuals has increased 
and since 2018 DVEs have posed the most lethal threat inside 
the homeland. We assess that that DVEs will continue to pose a 
heightened threat in the coming years.
    We also remain vigilant against Iran, its MOIS and Quds 
Force agents, and its proxies, principally Lebanese Hezbollah, 
but also the Iraqi Shia militants it is aligned with in the 
region.
    We remain concerned about plotting against the United 
States for the January 2020 killing of former IRGC Quds Force 
commander, Qasem Soleimani, and we face an increasing number of 
indirect fire and unmanned aerial attacks against U.S. 
facilities in Iraq, especially over the last several months.
    Now, looking ahead, we will continue to face a diverse 
range of threats that play out against the backdrop of complex 
global trends, including the on-going effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic, great power competition, the disruptive effects of a 
changing climate and rapidly-evolving technology.
    More than 17 years after its establishment, the National 
Counterterrorism Center is uniquely positioned to lead in this 
moment alongside our partners in the FBI and DHS as we move 
into the next phase of the counterterrorism fight. We will 
continue to discover, analyze, and warn about on-going and 
future threats as part of a broader set of foreign policy 
challenges that the United States will face in the 21st 
Century. We will continue finding innovative ways to 
synthesize, manage, and exploit our unique access to terrorism 
data across a spectrum of sources to identify threats that 
might otherwise go unnoticed.
    We mark the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, 
recognizing the remarkable CT successes of the last two decades 
and with great gratitude to the military, law enforcement, 
diplomatic and intelligence professionals who have made them 
possible. Working together we have succeeded in preventing 
another major 9/11-style attack on the homeland. But we must 
not be complacent. NCTC and the larger intelligence community 
must continue to collaborate and maintain the inability to 
innovate to stay ahead of the next evolution of the threat.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Christine Abizaid
                           September 22, 2021
    Thank you, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of 
the committee for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will 
focus the balance of my time on an overview of the terrorism landscape 
as it stands 2 decades after 9/11, then go into details regarding the 
threat to both the U.S. homeland and our interests overseas.
                       terrorism threat overview
    Twenty years after September 11, the United States faces a changed 
threat from foreign terrorist organizations, or FTOs, that is less 
acute to the homeland but which continues to become more ideologically 
diffuse and geographically diverse. Even as we end America's longest 
war in Afghanistan and absorb a broader array of National security 
priorities, NCTC remains clear-eyed about, and committed to, our 
mission to detect, disrupt, and deter terrorist efforts to harm the 
United States, both at home and abroad. The ISIS-Khorasan attack on 
Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 26 that claimed the lives 
of 13 heroic U.S. service members and nearly 200 Afghan civilians is a 
somber reminder that terrorists remain committed to harming the United 
States.
   The United States has continued to make significant progress 
        in the fight against the terrorist organizations that seek to 
        attack us or otherwise undermine our interests. We have 
        degraded the threat to the homeland from terrorist groups over 
        the past 20 years--by removing key leaders and sustaining 
        pressure against the ability of groups to plot attacks outside 
        their operating areas, move money, and communicate. Even as the 
        threat to the United States is changed, those organizations 
        seeking to do us harm continue to adapt, establishing a 
        presence in more countries around the world with a permissive 
        operating environment--especially in the Middle East and 
        Africa.
   Today, the most pressing terrorist threats to the homeland 
        come from individuals who are inspired to conduct acts of 
        violence, whether by FTOs or by ideologies that are more 
        domestic in nature. The threat from domestic violent extremists 
        (DVEs)--in particular, racially or ethnically motivated violent 
        extremists, or RMVEs, and militia violent extremists, or 
        MVEs,--has increased since 2015 and will most likely persist, 
        in part because the factors that underpin and aggravate their 
        motivations--like social polarization, negative perceptions 
        about immigration, conspiracy theories promoting violence, and 
        distrust of Government institutions--will probably endure. The 
        threat from home-grown violent extremists (HVEs) inspired by 
        groups like al-Qaeda or ISIS also remain a significant concern.
    More than 15 years after its establishment, NCTC is positioned to 
lead as we move into this next phase of the counterterrorism fight. We 
will continue to discover, analyze, and warn about on-going and future 
terrorist threats as part of a broader set of foreign policy challenges 
that the United States will face in this century. We will continue 
finding innovative ways to synthesize, manage, and exploit our unique 
access to terrorism data across a spectrum of sources to identify 
threats that otherwise might go unnoticed. Finally, we will continue 
investing in leading-edge technology to stay ahead of our ever-adapting 
adversaries that power more comprehensive data-informed insights to 
enhance collaboration.
                  the terrorist threat to the homeland
    As described above, the primary threat in the homeland comes from 
individuals inspired to violence, either by FTOs or by other grievances 
and ideologies.
    US-based HVEs, who are mostly inspired by al-Qaeda or ISIS, will 
most likely continue to attempt attacks because of their personal and 
ideological grievances, their attraction to FTO messaging, and their 
ready access to weapons and targets. HVEs mobilize without specific 
direction from FTOs and act independently or with few associates, 
making it extremely difficult to disrupt such attacks. While it is 
possible that some individuals may draw additional inspiration from 
developments in Afghanistan, HVEs generally do not conduct attacks in 
response to singular events.
    Despite the degraded threat from FTOs to the homeland, al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates remain intent on using individuals with access to the 
United States to conduct attacks, as demonstrated by al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula's probable approval of the 2019 Pensacola, Florida, 
attack where a Saudi Air Force officer killed 3 and wounded 8 U.S. 
service members. ISIS also seeks to advance attacks in the homeland, 
and NCTC continues to monitor for any threats to the United States that 
might emanate from ISIS core in Iraq and Syria or its branches, 
including those in South Asia and Africa. Since 2019, there have been 6 
possible attacks by individuals inspired or enabled by an FTO in the 
United States, and 2 of those--including the aforementioned Pensacola 
attack--resulted in the loss of life.
    During the past year, NCTC has continued to support FBI and DHS in 
better understanding the threats from DVEs. Since 2018, DVEs--who are 
driven by a range of ideologies--have been the most lethal terrorist 
threat within the homeland and will most likely pose an elevated threat 
during the next few years. Racially or ethnically motivated violent 
extremists--RMVEs--and militia violent extremists--MVEs--present the 
most lethal DVE threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct attacks 
against civilians and MVEs typically targeting law enforcement and 
Government personnel and facilities. U.S. RMVEs who promote the 
superiority of the White race are almost certainly the DVE actors with 
the most persistent and concerning transnational connections because 
individuals with similar ideological beliefs exist outside the United 
States, and these RMVEs frequently communicate with and seek to 
influence each other.
    We also remain vigilant regarding Iran's efforts to build 
operational capability against U.S.-based organizations and people. 
Several people, including U.S. citizens and Iranians, have been 
arrested or indicted in the past 5 years for seeking to build 
operational capability against U.S.-based organizations and people. 
Protecting against such threats is even more important now, as Iran, 
its agents, and proxies plan ways to retaliate against the United 
States for the January 2020 killing of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem 
Soleimani. For its part, we assess that Lebanese Hizballah maintains a 
high threshold for conducting attacks in the homeland. Secretary 
General Hassan Nasrallah balances his organization's view of the United 
States as one of its primary adversaries against the likelihood of U.S. 
retaliation if the group decided to conduct an attack.
                     the terrorist threat overseas
    Over the past 20 years, our multi-faceted offensive and defensive 
CT operations, along with those of our international partners, have 
significantly hampered terrorists' ability to strike the homeland and 
targets outside their main operating areas, although these groups 
continue to plot against U.S. interests abroad. However, the underlying 
drivers of terrorism--such as instability and weak Government 
institutions--continue to present conditions that terrorists exploit, 
allowing them to spread across a broader swath of territory than we 
have witnessed in the past two decades. We assess that ISIS and al-
Qaeda remain the greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests 
overseas. The elements of these groups with at least some capability to 
threaten the West include especially ISIS core in Iraq and Syria, al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and al-Shabaab in Somalia.
ISIS
    Moving to ISIS in Iraq and Syria: ISIS remains an intact, 
centrally-led organization that will most likely continue to pose a 
global threat to U.S. and Western interests. The group remains 
committed to its long-term goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate 
and is working toward that goal in the aftermath of territorial losses, 
waiting until conditions are favorable to begin operating more openly. 
The core group continues to pursue the same basic strategy that it has 
followed since its founding as al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004: Fomenting 
sectarian discord, eroding confidence in governments, and exploiting 
security gaps to create conditions favorable for seizing and 
administering territory. Despite on-going CT pressure and enduring a 
number of senior leadership losses during the past year, the structure 
and cohesion of the group has allowed ISIS to sustain its influence--
and, in some areas around the globe, expand on it. ISIS leaders have 
also prioritized the freeing of thousands of detained members in 
prisons and internally displaced persons camps across Iraq and Syria, 
and while not yet successful at scale, any future reintegration would 
significantly augment the group's operations.
    Additionally, ISIS probably maintains the intent to conduct 
external attacks through a variety of means, including by deploying 
attackers from the conflict zone, sending operational suggestions 
virtually to individuals in target countries, and inspiring supporters 
through their propaganda. Inspired attacks by ISIS supporters will most 
likely remain the primary ISIS threat to the United States and other 
Western countries. The group will almost certainly continue using its 
media to encourage supporters to carry out attacks without direction 
from ISIS leadership, but its degraded propaganda arm will likely 
hinder its ability to inspire its previous high pace of attacks and 
bring in new recruits. While we have seen a decline in the number of 
ISIS-inspired attacks in the West since peaking in 2017, such 
operations remain a priority for the organization.
    Outside Iraq and Syria, ISIS will most likely continue to grow its 
already robust global enterprise, which includes approximately 20 
branches and networks. Although these loyal outposts have varying 
levels of capability, they provide ISIS with launch points to plan and 
conduct attacks, recruit, and galvanize supporters and are a source of 
propaganda that helps sustain the movement. Many of the group's 
branches and networks continue to conduct local operations, which ISIS 
claims in media to dispel the narrative of its defeat. In particular, 
during the past year, ISIS has had success in growing its presence 
across large swaths of Africa, as demonstrated by ISIS-Mozambique's 
temporary seizure in March of a coastal town where foreign workers on 
the country's largest liquefied natural gas project resided. Notably, 
we have seen no sign of fissures or splintering by the branches and 
networks despite the fact that ISIS has not held territory in Iraq or 
Syria in more than 2 years.
Al-Qaeda
    Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and its affiliates around the world remain 
committed to attacking the homeland and U.S. interests abroad, although 
like ISIS, these affiliates have varying degrees of capability and 
access to Western targets. In the past 2 years, al-Qaeda has endured a 
number of senior leadership losses--including its deputy amir and the 
heads of 3 affiliates--that have deprived the organization of 
charismatic, experienced figures. Despite years of international CT 
cooperation that has constrained the group's external plotting and 
helped prevent another attack on the scale of 9/11, the organization 
has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to evolve, adapt, and 
capitalize on changing security environments and geopolitical realities 
to expand its reach.
    In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula--is intent on 
conducting operations in the West and against U.S. and allied interests 
regionally. In June, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula published 
English- and Arabic-language versions of its sixth issue of Inspire 
Guide--its first Inspire product since 2017--to provide English-
language operational guidance to would-be attackers in the homeland. We 
also are concerned that al-Qaeda elements in northern Syria could use 
their safe haven in opposition-controlled territory for external attack 
efforts. In West Africa, we have seen Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-
Muslimin work to expand its operational reach and conduct large-scale, 
lethal attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, suggesting the group 
will most likely pose an increasing threat in the region during the 
next year. For example, in August, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin 
conducted an exceptionally deadly attack in which 84 military personnel 
and civilians were killed in Burkina Faso. On the eastern part of the 
continent, al-Shabaab poses a persistent threat to U.S. citizens and 
Western interests, as demonstrated by the group's attack last year on a 
U.S. military base in Kenya that tragically killed 3 U.S. personnel and 
the late 2020 Federal indictment of a suspected al-Shabaab operative 
who was part of a plot to hijack a commercial aircraft. Also, in March, 
the group's amir publicly called for attacks on American and French 
citizens in Djibouti.
Afghanistan
    ISIS and al-Qaeda both have branches and affiliates in Afghanistan 
that will require CT vigilance, especially in light of recent 
developments there. Both groups are intent on attacking U.S. interests 
both in the region and overseas, although years of sustained CT 
pressure has degraded their capabilities to project a major external 
threat to the West. Since the U.S. withdrawal, we have continued to 
closely monitor for any signs of terrorist plotting that targets the 
United States or our interests abroad. Over the longer term, we suspect 
these groups could try to take advantage of reduced counterterrorism 
pressure and a relatively more permissive operating environment to 
rebuild their capacity to carry out attacks against Western targets. 
ISIS-Khorasan maintains a steady operational tempo in Afghanistan and 
retains the ability to execute attacks in cities like Kabul--as we saw 
tragically on 26 August. While focused against the Taliban, the group's 
external intentions bear monitoring. Similarly, we continue to closely 
watch the activities of al-Qaeda elements in the region because of the 
group's close ties to the Taliban and its propaganda against the West. 
After the withdrawal, the group released an official statement 
congratulating the Taliban for what it called a defeat of the United 
States. On September 11 this year, al-Qaeda released a video of group 
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praising the Pensacola attacker and claiming 
that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan proved that the United States 
was defeated.
    Of note, NCTC collaborated closely with our military, diplomatic, 
and intelligence partners in the weeks before the final U.S. forces 
left Afghanistan, fulfilling our critical role of screening Afghans 
seeking to relocate to the United States. As of early this month, NCTC 
and IC partners had screened more than 60,000 individuals evacuated 
from Afghanistan. Immediately following the fall of Kabul, analysts 
throughout the Center worked around the clock to screen individuals, 
monitor reporting, and provide warning of threats during and after 
evacuation operations.
Iran and Hizballah
    Moving to Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, in concert with their 
terrorist partners and proxies, Iran and Hizballah continue to pose a 
significant threat to the United States and our allies abroad. Iran 
views terrorism as a tool to support its core objectives, including 
projecting power in the Middle East, defending Shia Islam, and 
deterring its strategic rivals, like the United States and Israel. Iran 
and aligned groups probably carry out asymmetric and covert attacks to 
reduce U.S. influence and the U.S. presence in the region, advising 
both its state allies and proxies. In Iraq, Shia militant groups pose 
the most immediate threat to U.S. interests. We have seen these 
militants conduct an increasing number of indirect fire and, in the 
past several months, unmanned aerial systems attacks against U.S. 
facilities with the objective of expelling U.S. forces from the 
country. In Yemen, Iran has maintained its years-long effort to support 
Huthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and other targets located in the 
Gulf, including those involving long-range missiles and UAVs.
                 the ct enterprise and the way forward
    We mark the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks recognizing the 
remarkable CT successes of the past 2 decades and with gratitude to the 
military and to law enforcement, diplomatic, and intelligence 
professionals, as well as the international partners who made them 
possible. Working together, we have succeeded in preventing another 
major, 9/11-style attack on the homeland.
    However, we must not become complacent; the terrorist threat and 
National security landscape have evolved, and the CT enterprise must 
evolve as well. NCTC will continue its mission to prevent, detect, and 
deter threats to the United States and its interests, just as those who 
founded the Center intended. We will do this as our primary, no-fail 
mission, enabling other departments and agencies to prioritize 
resources where necessary to address other challenges, including great 
power competition and cybersecurity. Going forward, we must consider 
our CT investments in the context of our broader set of foreign policy 
objectives and focus our CT enterprise to meet the most immediate 
terrorism threats of today, all while maintaining an agile, 
intelligence-driven indications and warning framework that keeps pace 
with the next evolution of the threat and investing in a homeland 
resilience support structure that buttresses our defenses at home.
    NCTC and the larger CT enterprise also stayed focused on innovating 
in an era of rapid technological change. Terrorists, in particular, 
continue to make technological advances in fields such as encrypted 
communications and in the use of social media that make detecting 
threats and discerning significant trends more difficult. We will need 
to ensure that our data management and exploitation practices; 
standardization and integration processes for large IC data sets; 
support for watchlisting and screening efforts; and technical 
capabilities evolve so we can quickly share information and continue to 
make sophisticated judgments on the terrorist threat.

    Chairman Thompson. I thank the witnesses for their 
testimony. I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5 
minutes to question the witnesses.
    I will now recognize myself for questions.
    Director Wray, you testified before this committee 2 years 
ago that domestic terrorism threats were the most concerning 
terrorism threats in terms of lethality. More recently you 
testified that the threats of domestic terrorism has 
metastasized.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you testified before us earlier this 
year that domestic violence extremism represents the greatest 
threat in the homeland right now.
    Despite these acknowledgments, it appears that warning 
signs was disregarded or the domestic terrorism threat was not 
prioritized appropriately in the lead up to the January 6 
attack on the Capitol.
    Directory Wray and Secretary Mayorkas, what is your current 
assessment of threats posed by domestic terrorist to the 
homeland?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would be very pleased, Mr. Chairman, 
to answer that at the outset.
    We in the Department of Homeland Security, of course with 
our partners across the Federal Government and State and local 
law enforcement, consider domestic violent extremism to be the 
most prominent terrorism-related threat to the homeland right 
now. I think our response in anticipation of what could have 
materialized on September 18 demonstrates the lessons learned 
from the January 6 insurrection. We gathered a great deal of 
intelligence and information from public-facing sources, as 
well as leveraging academic and other third-party institutions. 
We disseminated that information and intelligence to State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial partners. We focused on the 
National capitol region, and we were far more prepared should 
anything have materialized on September 18 than was previously 
the case, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So I guess I would say a few things. First, starting back 
in June 2019 I elevated racially and ethically motivated 
extremism to a National threat priority, which is our highest 
threat priority level. I think that has already shown fruits in 
the fact that we have effectively doubled the amount of 
domestic terrorism investigations and arrests since that time. 
We had about 180 domestic terrorism arrests last year, we have 
had over 600 now in connection with January 6 alone.
    I would say that we have also created a domestic terrorism 
hate crimes fusion cell to help increase the level of 
intelligence and information flow that goes out. Certainly, 
from a lethality perspective, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, we 
have seen those kind of domestic violent extremists responsible 
for the most lethal activity over recent years, although I 
would add that in 2020 we saw a significant uptick in lethal 
action and violence by anti-Government and anti-authority 
violent extremists to go along with the racially motivated 
violent extremists.
    From a perspective of pushing out intelligence, as we did 
before January 6, we have been pushing out dozens of 
intelligence products to our Federal, State, and local partners 
to highlight the threat.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    Director Wray, Congress passed the Data Act. As you know, 
we have been trying to make sure that FBI produces information 
on domestic terrorism in a manner that not just Members of 
Congress, but the public at large can understand what is going 
on.
    We finally got a report, subject to the NDAA legislation, 
but there are still some gaps in terms of data missing from 
2009 to 2019. Can you commit to helping close those data gaps 
in that report so that Members of Congress and the public at 
large can have the understanding necessary about the growing 
problem with domestic terrorism in this country?
    Mr. Wray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Yes, you can count on us to work with you and your staff 
and the committee staff to try to produce more information, to 
be more responsive to those requests. Certainly, as I 
understand it, some of the information requested, and this gets 
overly involved for this setting, involves information that at 
least wasn't maintained in earlier years in the form that would 
be I think most useful. So we are trying to work through that 
with your staff.
    Certainly I recognize that the earlier report took longer 
to get to you than it should have. Some of that, in all 
fairness, was in part due to the pandemic and the fact that the 
people that we really need to rely on for that work were both 
strained by the pandemic, but also working on the significant 
domestic terrorism caseload, that as I testified a few minutes 
ago, mushroomed last year.
    So we are going to work with you and we will try to see if 
we can get you more complete information.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of the full 
committee, the gentleman from New York.
    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 
being here.
    Director Wray, it is nice to see you again. I appreciate 
your service to your country and your candor.
    Just a very brief question, because I have got a lot of 
questions for Secretary Mayorkas. Does the situation in 
Afghanistan give you a concern about the possibility of 
terrorist networks reconstituting there and in effect trying to 
incite violence in the homeland?
    Mr. Wray. Yes, actually there are a number of reasons why 
we are concerned. Recognizing the time I will just tick them 
off real quickly.
    One, we are of course concerned that there will be an 
opportunity for a safe haven to be recreated there, which is 
certainly something that we have seen in the past, and allowing 
foreign terrorist organizations to operate more freely in the 
region. We are concerned that ISIS-K can take advantage of a 
significantly weakened security environment to operate more 
freely. We are also concerned that the events there can serve 
as a catalyst or an inspiration for terrorists, whether they be 
members of FTOs, foreign terrorist organizations or home-grown 
violent extremists, to conduct attacks. Then, most importantly, 
we are concerned that foreign terrorist organizations will have 
an opportunity to reconstitute, plot, inspire, in a space that 
is much harder for us to collect intelligence and operate 
against than was the case previously.
    Mr. Katko. Well, thank you very much. I wish I had more 
time to spend with you on this, but perhaps a cup of coffee or 
breakfast soon is in order so I can talk to you more about 
that.
    Secretary Mayorkas, I want to commend you on many of the 
things that you have done at Homeland Security since you have 
been there, particularly in the cybersecurity area. The people 
that are appointed to leadership positions are doing a 
tremendous job and we have a very difficult task ahead of us.
    As you know and as Chairman Thompson knows, I pride myself 
on being one of the most bipartisan Members of Congress and one 
who is hopefully seen as a gentleman, but I have got to tell 
you, Secretary Mayorkas, there is one major problem that I have 
that I have just got to unburden myself of it. That is the 
Southern Border.
    I started my career as a Federal organized crime prosecutor 
at the Southern Border and I spent my adult life trying to keep 
this country safe. What is happening at the Southern Border is 
absolutely out of control. You and the administration have 
repeatedly referred to this border situation as a ``rebuild,'' 
you need to rebuild the border. Well, let me--you know, some 
things I am just wondering about. Is rebuilding the border 
having an unprecedented level of aliens seized at the border 
over the last 6 months? More than 170,000 a month over the last 
6 months. Is rebuilding the border releasing many individuals, 
tens of thousands, into our communities without vaccinations 
for Covid? Is rebuilding our border not testing people in 
Customs and Border Protection custody for Covid because you 
don't have the facilities to keep them there? Is rebuilding our 
border allowing more aliens to die in custody this year that at 
any time in recent memory? As a matter of fact, in 2018 6 
people died in custody, 2019, 11, 2020, 13, this year that 
number has quadrupled to 51. Is that rebuilding our immigration 
system?
    Let me ask you, is rebuilding our immigration system 
allowing cartels to get fentanyl across our border in record 
numbers? There has been more fentanyl seized this year than all 
of last year, and last year was a record number. The fentanyl 
seized this year is enough to kill every man, woman, and child 
in the United States six times over. Many of those deaths have 
reached my doorstep in Onondaga County, where 45 people in the 
first half of this year died of heroin overdoses laced with 
fentanyl. That is just my one county, and what is going on 
across the country.
    I guess the other thing too is the number of known and 
suspected terrorists seized at the border this year. Caught, 
not the ones that got away, caught at the border this year, 
is--obviously is unprecedented numbers. You know that and I 
know that. Is that rebuilding our immigration system? Is it?
    So you come to the inescapable conclusion from a letter 
from September 11 from a career Customs and Border Patrol agent 
who as running Customs and Border Patrol, Rodney Scott, who 
said ``In my professional assessment, the U.S. Border Patrol is 
rapidly losing the situational awareness required to know who 
and what is entering our homeland.'' He goes on to say, amongst 
many other things, it is important to remember that the border 
is not the destination, but only a transit port en route to 
cities and towns through the United States and that these gaps 
in the border are exploited to easily smuggle contraband, 
criminals, or even potential terrorists in the United States.
    Now, this is not from some political hack that is an 
appointee by the Trump administration, this is from somebody 
who served 29 years under 5 different Presidents.
    So to me it is unbelievable what is going on at the border 
and now we have the deflection about Haitians and the border is 
closed, and now we know the border is not closed because the 
Hiatans aren't--some Haitians are being sent home, some are 
being sent here, and we don't know what the distinction is. 
That goes for every type of person coming across the border as 
well.
    So, Mr. Chairman, before I ask one simple question of 
Secretary Mayorkas, I ask unanimous consent to enter this 
letter into the record, September 11, 2021 letter from Rodney 
Scott.
    I am sorry, sir?
    Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]
    Letter From Rodney S. Scott, Chief, U.S. Border Patrol--Retired
                                September 11, 2021.
The Honorable Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 
        20515.
The Honorable Kevin McCarthy,
House Minority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 
        20515.
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Homeland Security Committee, 2428 Rayburn House Office 
        Building, Washington DC 20515.
The Honorable John Katko,
Ranking Member, Homeland Security Committee, 2428 Rayburn House Office 
        Building, Washington, DC 20515.
    Dear Speaker of the House Pelosi, Minority Leader McCarthy, 
Congressman Thompson, and Congressman Katko: I am writing to you today 
in consideration of your oversight role for the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). I served as a U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agent and 
Federal law enforcement agent for over 29 years. I served under five 
different Presidential administrations. I began my career in 1992. I 
competitively progressed through the ranks and earned key leadership 
roles to include Deputy Executive Director of U.S Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP), Office of Anti-terrorism; Director of CBP, Office of 
Incident Management and Operations Coordination; Patrol Agent in 
Charge, Brown Field Station; Chief Patrol Agent, El Centro Sector; and, 
Chief Patrol Agent, San Diego Sector. Ultimately, I earned the rank of 
Chief, USBP in February 2020. I served as President Biden's Chief of 
USBP for the first 7 months of his presidency until I chose to retire 
on August 14, 2021. I can assure you that for my entire career, I 
worked diligently to secure our international borders as a nonpartisan 
civil servant. I respectfully ask that you consider this as you reflect 
on the concerns outlined below.
    The position of Chief, USBP is a career civil service position and 
not a political appointment. As Chief, I was the most senior official 
responsible for border security between the ports of entry. I witnessed 
the unprecedent seismic shift in border security and immigration policy 
that was initiated on January 20, 2021. I believe this policy shift and 
the associated public statements created the current border crisis. Of 
greater concern, I also witnessed a lack of any meaningful effort to 
secure our borders. Contrary to the current rhetoric, this is not 
simply another illegal immigration surge. This is a national security 
threat.
    Today, on the 20th anniversary of the horrific 9/11 terrorist 
attack, as I reflect on the significant border security advances that 
we had made, I am sickened by the avoidable and rapid disintegration of 
what was arguably the most effective border security in our Nation's 
history. Common sense border security recommendations from experienced 
career professionals are being ignored and stymied by inexperienced 
political appointees. The Biden administration's team at DHS is laser-
focused on expediting the flow of migrants into the U.S. and 
downplaying the significant vulnerability this creates for terrorists, 
narcotics smugglers, human traffickers, and even hostile nations to 
gain access to our homeland.
    In my professional assessment, the U.S. Border Patrol is rapidly 
losing the situational awareness required to know who and what is 
entering our Homeland. The ability of USBP to detect and interdict 
those that want to evade apprehension is being degraded daily. Low 
level, unsophisticated and uneducated smugglers are illegally crossing 
the border and increasingly evading apprehension daily. To think that 
well-resourced terrorist networks, criminal organization, and hostile 
nations are not doing the same is naive. The current situation is 
unsustainable and must be mitigated.
    The experienced civil service staff within CBP, ICE and DHS have 
provided multiple options to reduce the illegal entries and reestablish 
some semblance of border security through proven programs and 
consequences, yet every recommendation has been summarily rejected. 
Secretary Mayorkas is choosing to ignore the sound recommendations of 
career government leadership despite his own admissions that he agrees 
with them. Of grave concern, is the fact that the Secretary and other 
political appointees within DHS have provided factually incorrect 
information to congressional Representatives and to the American 
public. Furthermore, they have directed USBP personnel to allow 
otherwise ineligible aliens to remain in the U.S. inconsistent with the 
CDC Title 42 Order, established legal processes and law. The 
professional staff within DHS is left perplexed, wondering who is 
really in charge and what the objective is.
    As a direct result of these decisions, control of our borders has 
disintegrated overnight. While the sheer volume of aliens is 
overwhelming, it is critical that policymakers understand that these 
mass incursions are not simply an immigration issue. These illegal 
entries are being scripted and controlled by Plaza Bosses that work 
directly for the transnational criminal organizations (TCO) to create 
controllable gaps in border security. These gaps are then exploited to 
easily smuggle contraband, criminals, or even potential terrorists into 
the U.S. at will. Even when USBP detects the illegal entry, agents are 
spread so thin that they often lack the capability to make a timely 
interdiction. It is important to remember that the border is not the 
destination, but only a transit point en route to cities and towns 
throughout the United States.
    This is not hyperbole. I urge you to request detailed information 
from DHS/CBP on the number of individuals with Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB) alerts that USBP has arrested this fiscal year. To 
ensure that you are not misled, please specifically ask for comparative 
data from previous years broken down by method of apprehension/
encounter and immigration status at the time of the encounter. I 
believe you will find this data troubling. The current DHS leadership 
will no doubt attempt to downplay these numbers. I would like to remind 
you that 9/11 was carried out by 19 terrorists and that countless 
terrorist attacks around the world have been carried out by a single 
person.
    I also encourage you to ask questions about the surge in USBP 
personnel assigned to the border in Texas. What national security and 
public health risks are we knowingly accepting in the areas these 
agents were pulled from? How many miles of border are now going 
unpatrolled daily to facilitate expedited processing and ultimately the 
release of these illegal aliens into the U.S.? What threats are we 
allowing into the U.S. by continuing to accept over 1,000 documented 
got-a-ways each day? What programs and or IT system developments have 
been shut down or significantly delayed due to limited resources being 
redirected to the mass migration crisis? What impact has the current 
crisis had on the ability of USBP to conduct thorough debriefings of 
individuals to determine intentions, threat and to document 
transnational criminal activity?
    For context, just prior to my retirement, this fiscal year USBP had 
encountered over 1,277,094 aliens illegally entering the U.S. and 
documented over 308,000 known got-a-ways. At 0800 hrs on 08/01/21, 
there were over 18,000 aliens in USBP custody which equated to more 
than three times USBP's capacity of 5,118. Only about 5,100 aliens were 
fully processed with over 13,000 individuals unprocessed. Over 7,000 
aliens had been in custody for over 72 hours. For contrast, on 08/01/
2019, USBP had 4,946 in custody. On 08/01/2020, USBP had 408 in 
Custody. On 02/01/2021, USBP had 2,375 subjects in custody.
    In a 24-hour period on 08/01/21, USBP documented over 5,900 
encounters of individuals illegal entering the U.S. from 33 different 
countries. This included over 560 unaccompanied children. Agents also 
documented over 1,100 got-a-ways. Of note, this is at a time when 
hundreds of miles of border went unpatrolled due to manpower and 
capability limitations. Despite the above, the CBP Chief Operating 
Officer continued to assert that USBP agents must simply process aliens 
faster. Any discussions about consequence to illegal entry or securing 
the border were immediately stymied.
    In addition to the clear national security implications of an 
uncontrolled border, it is unconscionable that as COVID-19 continues to 
spread, DHS would choose to voluntary carve out policy exceptions to 
Title 42 (T42) authority. These carve outs do not appear to comport 
with any medical assessments that I have read. These policy carve outs 
are unquestionably placing the lives of CBP personnel, U.S. citizens 
and the migrants themselves at increased risk. In October 2020, over 91 
percent of total encounters by USBP were processed under T42 and 
expelled in an average of 90 minutes. A report I received on August 1, 
2021, indicated that nearly 53 percent were being granted exemptions 
from T42 with the majority ultimately being released into the United 
States. CBP lacks the adequate facilities and resources to conduct 
Covid testing without significantly increasing the risk to exposure and 
further degrading border security. Therefore, any Covid testing is 
conducted on a voluntary basis by private non-governmental 
organizations. There is no mandated vaccine prior to release.
    Processing an alien that illegally enters the United States under 
T42 authority can be accomplished in approximately 10 minutes while 
avoiding congregate settings where COVID-19 exposure would be 
increased. Consequently, processing an individual under Title 8 (T8), 
to include a Notice to Appear (NTA) takes approximately 2 hours and is 
completed inside an enclosed processing center. If the alien will be 
transferred to ICE, vice released immediately on their own recognizance 
(OR), the time in custody will increase even further and routinely 
exceeds 72 hours.
    Increased processing time has direct border security implications. 
For example, processing 500 aliens under T42, or even with a Notice to 
Report equates to approximately 93 additional Border Patrol agents 
remaining on patrol duties when compared to the time required to 
process an equal number of aliens under T8 for Notice to Appear/Release 
on Own Recognizance (NTA/OR). Every agent back on patrol increases 
situational awareness and reduces the ability of adversaries to further 
exploit our borders.
    The number of encounters/arrests recorded by USBP is only part of 
the story. As of Aug 1, 2021, USBP agents had responded to and resolved 
well over 1.805M events. Infrastructure and technology are key 
components of USBP's strategic plan and staffing model. Unfortunately, 
DHS has intentionally slow rolled the implementation of Presidential 
Proclamation 10142 creating significant new vulnerabilities that are 
getting worse every day. Even though the proclamation directed that all 
wall construction be paused for 60 days, over 7 months has passed with 
little progress toward any resolution. Border security beyond the 
physical barrier is also being degraded as political appointees 
expanded the pause to include technology deployments that were separate 
from the barrier construction.
    Career CBP and USBP personnel have provided multiple in-depth 
briefings to the Biden administration on each individual project. This 
included when and who identified the original operational requirement 
for the barrier. In most cases the requirement originated prior to the 
Obama Administration. As a direct result of these delays USBP has been 
forced to reduce patrol areas to address gaps in barrier, non-
functional gates and grates and inoperable technology. I am extremely 
confident that the Biden administration to include Secretary Mayorkas 
are fully aware of the significant operational risk and the monetary 
costs associated with the construction pause, which at times reportedly 
exceeded $5M a day. I was briefed by USBP and CBP personnel with direct 
knowledge that leadership within the Biden administration openly 
discussed ways to slow roll any decisions as well as options to do the 
least action possible to avoid an Impoundment Act violation without 
doing any construction as required by law.
    Something as simple as re-connecting shore power to the Calexico 
Port of Entry to reduce the environmental impact of diesel-powered 
generators took months simply because the work was being conducted 
under the border wall contracts. Even connecting electrical power to an 
existing security gate to reduce manpower requirements was unfathomable 
to the current leadership. I believe this equates to waste, fraud, and 
abuse.
    As I stated upfront, it is my professional assessment that 
transnational criminal organizations (TCO), and other more dangerous 
actors are increasingly exploiting identified border security 
vulnerabilities. The threats are real, and the situation is 
unsustainable, yet the current administration refuses to take any 
meaningful action.
    It is important to note that I have only addressed issues directly 
associated with the Border Patrol's mission. As a senior executive 
leader within CBP, I was also privy to decisions that negatively 
affected security and legitimate trade and travel operations at our 
Ports of Entry.
    Please ensure that Americans get the border security that we 
already paid for and deserve. I respectfully request that you exercise 
your oversight responsibility and convene hearings to ensure that 
Congress and the American people have access to the truth. To help 
ensure that accurate information is provided, I am willing to appear 
and testify under oath as well.
            Sincerely,
                                              Rodney Scott,
                                 Retired--Chief U.S. Border Patrol.
Honor First!

    Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
    Now, one very simple question----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired, but we 
would be happy to let the Secretary answer some of the 
questions you presented.
    Mr. Katko. Well, that was one of the questions he can 
answer, Mr. Chairman, also that I was going to ask, is why the 
actual number of known suspected terrorists seized at the 
border is considered law enforcement sensitive. We are not 
asking about the details, just that simple number. We asked for 
that information August 10 and we still haven't got it.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Katko, you and I have 
discussed the Southern Border and I respectfully disagree with 
a number of statements that precede your question.
    I should also say that I have tremendous confidence not 
only in the United States Border Patrol, but in its new leader, 
Raul Ortiz, who is a three-decade veteran of law enforcement in 
the United States Border Patrol.
    So I look forward to discussing more with you some of the 
statements that precede your question.
    We are indeed addressing security at the border. We are 
exercising and enforcing both the laws of enforcement, the laws 
of accountability, and the humanitarian laws that this country 
and this Congress have enacted and recognized.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair will now recognize other 
Members for questions they may wish to ask the witnesses. I 
will recognize Members in the order of seniority, alternating 
between Majority and Minority.
    Members are reminded unmute themselves when recognized for 
questioning and to then mute themselves once they have finished 
speaking, and to leave their cameras on so they may be visible 
to the Chair.
    The Chair now recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlelady from 
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Mr. 
Ranking Member. Let me express my appreciation very quickly to 
all of the men and women represented before us and all of your 
teams and the entire team that have provided us with a safe 
journey post-9/11 as it relates to international threats coming 
to the United States. We have not had that kind of attack.
    My time is short and I would appreciate your quick 
response.
    To Director Abizaid, can you provide me with the 
interaction and the potential of a new ally or friend or an 
expanded ally and friend with Pakistan in light of the 
circumstances with Afghanistan and the potential rise of ISIS? 
Are we looking to use assets and collaborate as relates to 
domestic security?
    My time is short. Would you give me a brief answer please?
    Ms. Abizaid. Yes. Thank you very much for the question.
    Pakistan has been a long time CT partner. It is a 
complicated partner given some of the dynamics in the region, 
but we will absolutely look to collaborate with them on CT, 
whether emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere in 
the region, consistent with our shared interests.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    You have been eloquent, Director Wray, on advising us about 
domestic terrorism. I would like to get in writing again the 
protocols that you have put in place post-January 6 very 
devastating insurrection attack against democracy. I would 
prefer to have that in writing to the committee and directed to 
me as well.
    Let me indicate that many of us know that your 
responsibility for National security is large and so as I think 
of Ali Raisman, Simone Biles, McKayla Maroney, and Maggie 
Nichols, they deserve the protection of the United States and 
the attention of the FBI. I know that you provided an apology, 
but as well I also noted in the testimony of these young women, 
Simone Biles from Texas, all of them contributing the National 
pride, if you will, throughout their lives, indicated that they 
had seen no prosecutions, no extensive investigations.
    My time is short and I have questions for the Secretary. 
What is your singular comment on moving forward on further 
investigations of agents who ignored these young women and 
caused additional harm and violence against them and other 
athletes?
    Mr. Wray. So thank you for the question.
    As I said last week, I consider what happened, or what more 
importantly did not happen back in 2015 at the FBI to be 
totally unacceptable and I am deeply sorry on behalf of the 
entire FBI for what happened there. We have fired the one 
individual featured prominently in the report that we could 
fire.
    As far as prosecutions go----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I just----
    Mr. Wray. I am sorry, it is just a second please. As far as 
prosecutions go, as you may know, that is really the 
responsibility of the Department of Justice, not the FBI. We 
have done what we have the power to do. So I would refer you 
really to the Department on the latter part.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. Will you be presenting the case 
or information to the DoJ for them to go further?
    Mr. Wray. Well, on that issue the Inspector General, as you 
may know, took over the investigation, so it is really a 
conversation between the Inspector General and the Justice 
Department. If we can be helpful in that regard and that is 
appropriate, we would be happy to do that.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you so very much. I will pursue 
that.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your heart and as 
well your commitment to serving the United States.
    I think the narrative about immigration is so wrong. First 
of all, the Southern Border is 1,954 miles, it is not out of 
control. Thank you to those who are protecting it. I have many 
people who acknowledge that.
    Let me quickly raise the point that we should refrain from 
these kinds of accusatory attacks against migrants. We are a 
nation of laws and immigrants.
    So let me first of all raise the question of the terrible 
scenes that are all over the internet now and also the mockery 
of Haitians who are taking water--washing the water. First of 
all, how much did race play a part in these actions? Are you 
looking into that as well? Also have you considered this Trump 
relic of Title 42, not eliminating but a suspension of it in 
light of the fact that Haitians have been determined to be no 
National security threat. There are Haitians in my district 
right now, migrants who have come from NGO's on the border. We 
welcome them. I will be visiting them over the weekend.
    But I want to know how we can do better in this particular 
instance. You have answered all the other questions of asylum, 
opportunities, the opportunities for them to be taken by 
sponsors or family members, which they have. We can do better, 
I know you want to do better. Can you give me those answers?
    Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you very much.
    The investigation is going to be all-encompassing. We are 
not going to cut a single corner or compromise any element of 
thoroughness. It will be a sweeping investigation. No. 1.
    No. 2, with respect to Title 42 and its exercise, that is 
an authority of the Centers for Disease Control, it is not a 
matter of immigration policy, it is a matter of public health 
policy driven by the situation of COVID-19 and where the 
trajectory of that pandemic is. It is based on the data that 
CDC analyzes and it is a CDC order that determines the 
applicability of the Title 42 authority.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 
Higgins, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank 
the Chairman and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing 
today to discuss worldwide threats to the homeland as we move 
beyond the 20th anniversary of 9/11.
    Americans watching this hearing today are wondering why the 
focus of our narrative is not on the obvious threats as we look 
at the immediate future of our Nation and the security of our 
homeland being the threat of Jihadist terrorists coming into 
our country due to the abhorrent failure in Afghanistan and the 
disintegration of our Southern Border. Our national sovereignty 
has been lost at the Southern Border. We have been invaded. My 
colleagues refer to scenes on the internet. You don't have to 
look very far to see imagery that none of us have ever seen in 
our lives. I am 60 years old, I have never seen anything like 
this in America. You know, we have witnesses before us, with 
all due respect, good Lord, step away from your talking points 
and let us share truth as Americans.
    After the Biden administration's disgraceful retreat from 
Afghanistan the Pentagon is actively warning Congress of the 
increased likelihood of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. That's 
a fact. Regardless, this committee's recent mark-up of the 
Democrats' $3.5 trillion reconciliation monstrosity bill did 
not include a single dime for counterterrorism efforts despite 
these warnings, and Republican amendments to attempt to correct 
that were voted down by party line vote by Democrats with the 
Majority control.
    Further, during this time the security crisis at our own 
Southern Border has gotten worse and worse. We didn't think it 
could get worse, but it has. We have witnesses that 
consistently stick to these talking points, like Baghdad Bob, 
saying there is nothing wrong here, move along. America is 
wondering exactly when will Congress embrace the truth and have 
honest discussion of the actual threats to our homeland on the 
homeland security committee.
    We have had 170,000 documented interactions. Now, based 
upon known formulas of estimated--what are referred to as 
gotaways, which means you have a quarter of a million illegal 
crossings or attempted illegal crossings a month. We have never 
seen numbers like this and yet we keep getting told oh, it is 
all cool, the border is under control. I don't know how you 
would define failure of securing our Southern Border if it is 
not what we are witnessing right now. But to no one's surprise 
in the Republican Party there was zero funding in the 
majority's $3.5 trillion bill for border security.
    We face significant National security threats that have 
been made worse by this administration's own policies. There is 
no shame in admitting that, but we are responsible to deal with 
it. That begins with honest communications, which we seem--we 
are avoiding this right now. With all due respect to my 
colleagues across the aisle, in a very disciplined matter of 
sticking to their talking points.
    Director Wray, I am going to ask you yes or no, did 19 
terrorists execute the 9/11 Jihadist terror attacks on America? 
Not the planning, the execution.
    Mr. Wray. There were 19 hijackers, yes.
    Mr. Higgins. OK. There you go. There you go. That is a 
number I am referring to.
    Now, you won't tell us, although we are Members of 
Congress--we have the very highest security clearance, we have 
confidential briefings all the time--but we can't get an answer 
how many known or suspected terrorists have been detected 
crossing our Southern Border. But my sources tell me a 
conservative estimate is 200.
    Now, with a percentage of undetected being 20-25 percent, 
that means 40-50 known terrorists have very likely entered our 
country through the Southern Border. Yet my colleagues across 
the aisle want to talk about, you know, Americans wearing Trump 
shirts. It is unbelievable.
    Secretary Mayorkas, good sir, all of us----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from Louisiana has 
expired.
    Mr. Higgins. I will have a question. I will submit in 
writing to the Secretary, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having 
the courage to convene this hearing today.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for their testimony today and everything they are 
doing to keep the country safe.
    I would like to start with you, Director Wray. Yesterday 
you testified before the U.S. Senate about a Washington Post 
story that the FBI did not distribute a key to help victims of 
the Kaseya ransomware attack for 3 weeks. In your response you 
emphasized the need to, ``maximize impact against an 
adversary.''
    So, you know, I appreciate that as the lead agency for 
threat response, the FBI is responsible for going after the bad 
guys. However, I have to say I am deeply concerned that your 
response to Chairman Peters did not reflect the harm 
withholding a decryption key could do to victims. I would like 
you to just kind-of consider this analogy if you would, 
Director: A business is on fire, there is a strong reason to 
suspect arson. The police argue that letting the firefighters 
in to put out the fire risks damaging forensics that could be 
used to catch the arsonist. So certainly, that argument is 
valid, but I don't think anyone here would suggest we should 
not put out the fire or even if it does not maximize your 
impact against an adversary.
    So I understand these decisions are difficult and complex 
and that you may not be at liberty to discuss the specifics of 
the Kaseya case, however I would like to give you the 
opportunity now to correct the record and affirm that asset 
response is a critically important factor when responding to a 
significant cyber incident.
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question, 
especially knowing your long-standing interest in this subject.
    Again, I am somewhat constrained about what I can say about 
an on-going investigation, but what I would say is that 
speaking in general, that encryption keys are something that it 
is just one of many kinds of technical information we provide 
to the private sector, and turning those things into decryption 
tools that could actually be used and not have unintended 
consequences is a lot more complicated than a lot of people 
realize, and that itself takes time.
    So part of what I refer to when I talk about maximizing 
impact is making sure that, to use your analogy of the house, 
that what we would be supplying is actually just water and not 
water that might have some trace of say gasoline or some 
accelerant in it that would actually have all kinds of 
unintended consequences.
    So that is one of many considerations that goes into it, 
but absolutely, we recognize that asset response has to go 
hand-in-hand with threat response. That is why we have such a 
close partnership with DHS and CISA and these kinds of 
decisions are made in consultation with a host of inter-agency 
partners.
    Mr. Langevin. Well, Director, I would just push back and 
say that I think that asset response has to be higher on the 
priority list. So much could have been prevented had those 
decryption keys been given to businesses that were impacted. I 
understand you can't comment specifically on Kaseya, but I 
think there has got to be a greater emphasis on asset response 
and not just preserving the crime scene so you gather 
forensics.
    Secretary Mayorkas, I want to commend you for your 
leadership and for the success of DHS on its cyber hiring 
initiatives. I do have to say, however, I remain concerned 
about the significant vacancies that remain the cybersecurity 
work force, particularly at CISA.
    So I am hopeful about the cybersecurity talent management 
system set to start in November. However, given that these 
authorities have existed since 2014 and have not been used, I 
am concerned about how effectively they will be used. So I 
would appreciate an update on the status of the cybersecurity 
talent management system and how the DHS headquarters plans to 
coordinate its activity with CISA to amass the cyber talent 
that it needs.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you so much for your 
support of CISA. I actually had a meeting yesterday on staffing 
and the prioritization of staffing for our cybersecurity 
portfolio. Specifically, I look forward to speaking with 
Director Easterly. I very well know that she has prioritized 
the staffing of the directorate and the talent initiative to 
which you refer. We are incredibly proud of our cybersecurity 
hiring initiative, which is, frankly, the biggest in the 
Department's history. This is assuredly a priority of ours and 
I would be very, very pleased to update you on it regularly 
because I know how important it is to you in light of your 
tremendous support of CISA and the criticality of our Nation's 
cybersecurity writ large.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I know my time----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Langevin [continuing]. Has expired, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi for 5 minutes, Mr. 
Guest.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for the dedication that they have provided in service 
to our country, particularly to make sure that they are keeping 
our homeland safe each and every day. Before I begin, I would 
like to ask the Clerk if she would pull, please pull the chart 
from Customs and Border Patrol that outlines the encounters on 
the Southwest Border that we have currently seen.
    My concerns today are many. My time is limited so I will 
focus those on the current situation that we have seen along 
our Southwest Border. In front of each of our witnesses should 
be statistics put forth by Customs and Border Patrol that shows 
recent encounters along the Southwest Border. Secretary 
Mayorkas, I know that you have recently visited the Southwest 
Border in response to the surge that we have seen and the 
number of Haitians immigrants that have recently crossed. I 
know Congressman Sheila Jackson Lee recently said in her 
questioning a few minutes ago, that she felt that the border is 
not out of control. I will tell you that I completely disagree 
with her statement. I think the figures that are before the 
witnesses here today clearly show that the situation along our 
Southwest Border is a situation that has continued to 
deteriorate month after month after month. Taking out from 
those figures the month of October, November, December, and 
January, just starting from the numbers February going forward 
when this administration has been completely in control of 
Customs and Border Patrol, those numbers are 1.25 million 
encounters along the Southwest Border. Looking at that and 
comparing that to the population of our States, that number is 
greater than the population of Montana. Greater than the 
population of Rhode Island. Greater than the population of 
Delaware. Greater than the population of both North and South 
Dakota. Greater than the population of Alaska. Though not a 
State, greater than the population of the District of Columbia. 
It is greater than the population of Vermont. It is greater 
than the population of Wyoming. Soon, when figures become 
available for this month, I believe that we will quickly 
surpass the population of Maine, New Hampshire, and Hawaii.
    I think clearly these figures show that what we are doing 
along our Southwest Border, what the current administration has 
done, that that is not working. Not only do I believe that, but 
I believe that that is clearly the sentiment of the American 
public. Politico, an article that was actually published 
yesterday, they cited recent polling that said 38 percent of 
the United States adults approve of President Biden's handling 
of immigration.
    So, Secretary Mayorkas, I wanted to kind of now turn to 
that to you. It was reported in August that you met with a 
group of Border Patrol agents and in a closed-door meeting, you 
stated, ``if our borders are the first line of defense, we are 
going to lose and this is unsustainable''. My question is, No. 
1, did you make that statement? Then, No. 2, do you still stand 
by that statement? Do you believe that what currently is 
happening on our borders today is unsustainable?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much for 
your question. In fact, I did make the statement. A very 
important fact underlying it is that our border is not our 
first line of defense. We have a multi-layered strategy that 
includes our partners to the south, not only Mexico, but the 
countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. So, in fact, 
our border is not our first line of defense. It is a statement 
that I made and I stand by it. In fact, it does not reflect the 
strategy that we have been employing and executing.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Mayorkas, you see those figures there in 
front of you, I believe. Hopefully, those are visible to you. I 
think that you see that month after month we continued to see a 
rise. We saw a recent small dip from July to August. But those 
figures are extremely troubling, particularly when you look at 
year-to-date figures. When you compare the numbers from fiscal 
year 2021 to fiscal year 2020, comparing them to fiscal year 
2019, fiscal year 2018. You know, when you are looking at a 
total of--when you look at a physical year, it is 1.5 million. 
Again, giving the administration the benefit of the doubt, the 
fact that October, November, December, and just credit all of 
January to the prior administration, the numbers month after 
month continue to grow. So, I guess my question to you, Mr. 
Mayorkas, is how would you rate the administration? How would 
you rate the job that has been done to secure our border since 
the President was sworn into office? Would that be A, B, C, D, 
F? Just if you could give me a grade and then I would be happy 
to let you explain your answer from there.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is interesting you 
mention what you described as a small dip in the latest month's 
data. I cannot see the visuals that you presented. That dip is 
actually a decrease and it is a decrease because of some of the 
enforcement tools that we have employed in execution of our 
plan. I have been quite clear that we do have a plan to address 
migration at the Southern Border. We are executing it. It takes 
time and we are starting to see the results.
    I would be very pleased to meet with you and discuss with 
you some of the tools that we have employed to actually drive 
the results that we saw this past month, and we expect to see 
in the ongoing months. Those tools are not met with unanimous 
approval, but we are using those enforcement tools to help 
secure our border, which we are doing.
    Mr. Guest. Could you answer----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. The question----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. As giving a grade----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. Of A, B, C----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. D, or F?
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Chairman,----
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes----
    Mr. Guest [continuing]. I would ask unanimous consent to 
enter the chart that was previously published into the record.
    Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]
    
    
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    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California for 5 minutes, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear 
me OK?
    Chairman Thompson. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Correa. Yes, I just want to thank you and the Ranking 
Member for this hearing this morning. I want to thank our 
guests also for your time. I was also in New York to remember 
9/11. We met with our first responders, our heroes. I remember 
back 20 years ago watching those images on TV as those first 
responders ran into the burning buildings knowing they were 
probably going to lose their lives while civilians ran away. We 
will not forget.
    Gentlemen, your witnesses, your testimony, thank you very 
much. As I hear my colleagues on this committee talk, it kind-
of brings out a universal truth that I have learned in 
Congress, which is we are always in management crisis. We 
manage by crisis. We never seem to move beyond yesterday or 
today to the big issue. I agree with my colleagues that 
fentanyl is a major issue. But I would propose to all of you 
that if you seal off the Southern Border, you seal off the 
Northern Border, you seal off the ports of entry, we are still 
going to have that major issue, which is a medical issue called 
drug addiction in our country. As long as people want to do 
fentanyl, they are going to do it.
    Forty years ago, I saw my neighbors dying from heroin 
overdoses. The challenge that we have that it is not going 
away. Mr. Mayorkas, I would ask you, are you prepared to deal 
with the social issue of drug addiction in our country? Yes or 
no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, I am in collaboration with our 
partners across the Federal enterprise and across the country.
    Mr. Correa. You can deal with a medical issue called drug 
addition in the United States? That's not really a homeland 
security issue. That's a societal issue. But we are going to 
expect you to stop drug addiction at the border. Thank you very 
much.
    Mr. Wray, thank you very much for the good job you are 
doing. You know, defending our country like you, Mr. Mayorkas, 
y'all have to hit 100 percent. You can't let anything happen in 
this Nation. Yet, the universe of threats keeps multiplying. 
Terrorists, domestic terrorism, I hear experts now telling me 
that it's no longer is essential for the bad guys to import the 
bad guys, to import terrorists, but rather the home-grown 
terrorists that keep being inspired by these radical ideas are 
the big issue now.
    So, you know, trying to figure out how to protect our 
Nation against domestic terrorists, is a major challenge. I 
think the big issue here becomes intelligence. How do you 
figure out, how do you stop something from happening before it 
stops? My question would be, do you gentlemen get enough 
support coordination from our foreign partners? Mr. Mayorkas, 
when you talk to Mexico, are you able to get enough 
intelligence, coordination cooperation from them to do your 
job? I would ask the same question to our FBI director, do we 
have enough intel internationally to be able to coordinate your 
intelligence services? You are trying to find a needle in a 
haystack. Mr. Mayorkas?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Information sharing, Congressman, is 
one of our highest priorities in the international domain. We 
have a very significant footprint in many countries around the 
world. We have information sharing agreements that a number of 
our component agencies and offices lead. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, our Office 
of Policy, Strategy, and Plans, our international operations, 
which is a part of that last office I mentioned.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Mayorkas,----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Information sharing and----
    Mr. Correa [continuing]. Is there anything we can do to 
make sure that your job is more effective? Meaning, is there 
anything we can do to talk to address our foreign partners to 
make sure that they have a--you have a better level of 
cooperation with folks overseas?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thank you very much for 
the question. We would greatly appreciate and have greatly 
appreciated the support that this committee has provided to us 
in funding the Department of Homeland Security's requests for 
support to execute our mission. We greatly appreciate it.
    Mr. Correa. FBI Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman. Certainly, we 
benefit a lot from information sharing from our foreign 
partners. You mentioned Mexico. Of course, our legat office in 
Mexico City is, I think, our biggest and oldest overseas 
office. We can always use more and certainly, with the kind of 
terrorist threats we are facing right now, both home-grown 
Jihadist inspired and domestic violent extremists, each 
benefit, unfortunately, from being--there fewer dots to 
connect. So, if there are fewer dots to connect and less time 
in which to connect them, it puts a real premium on making sure 
that we are able to find the few dots that are out there as 
quickly as possible. That's why we appreciate this committee's 
support for more agents, more analysts, more data analytics, 
and other tools which we desperately need to stay ahead of the 
threat.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from California has 
expired.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Florida for 5 minutes, Mr. Gimenez.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate 
it. I am going to read some excerpt from Chief Scott's letter 
that is dated 9/11/2021. The Biden administration's team at DHS 
is laser-focused on expediting the flow of migrants into the 
United States and downplaying the significant vulnerability 
this creates for terrorists, narcotics smugglers, human 
traffickers, and even hostile nations to gain access to our 
homeland. Later on, he says, the experienced civil service 
staff within CBP, ICE, and DHS have provided multiple options 
to reduce the illegal entries and re-establish some semblance 
of border security through proven programs and consequences, 
yet, every recommendation has been summarily rejected. 
Secretary Mayorkas is choosing to ignore the sound 
recommendations of career Government leadership, despite his 
own admissions that he agrees with them. A grave concern is the 
fact that the Secretary and other political appointees within 
DHS have provided factually inaccurate or incorrect information 
to Congressional representatives and to the American public. 
Furthermore, they have directed USBP personnel to allow 
otherwise ineligible aliens to remain in the United States 
consistent with CDC Title 42 order, establish legal processes 
and law. The professional staff within DHS is left perplexed 
wondering who is really in charge and what the objective is.
    This is a scathing indictment on you, Secretary, and the 
administration's handling of the border. So, I have a couple of 
questions though. Secretary Mayorkas, how many immigrants have 
we apprehended at the border this year?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, Congressman, I respectfully 
disagree with Mr. Scott, of course. Let me pull if I can, the 
data from August, which I think will shed light----
    Mr. Gimenez. That is not--well, sir, that is not the 
question. The question is how many immigrants have we 
apprehended this year? Not August, this year?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I believe thus far this fiscal year, 
Congressman, it is approximately 1.2 or 1.5 million. But I 
think the data that I would cite from August reflects the 
enforcement measures that we are taking, our use of our Title 
42 authority, which is not an immigration enforcement 
authority, but is a public health authority, which belies some 
of the statements that you just made. Also, our use of Title 8 
authority, which is, indeed, an immigration enforcement 
measure. I think the data from August would suggest the 
fulsomeness of our enforcement measures, which are not as I 
mentioned a full year----
    Mr. Gimenez. With all due respect, I have only got 5 
minutes. I got a couple of other questions I need to ask you. I 
am not really that worried about August. I understand that 
August you all now put a focus on it because you found that the 
American public really doesn't like what you are doing. So, let 
me keep going. Let me ask you, Secretary----
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is not accurate.
    Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. Of the 1.----
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is not accurate.
    Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. Of the 1.5 million people that we 
have apprehended, how many people have been returned? How many 
people are being detained? How many people have been disbursed?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would be pleased to provide you with 
specific data subsequent to this hearing, Congressman. Your 
prior statement was inaccurate. But I would look forward and, 
in fact, meeting with you----
    Mr. Gimenez. Sir, that is my opinion. Sir, that is my 
opinion, OK? So, I am entitled to my opinion, OK?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, no, no, I----
    Mr. Gimenez. So,----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Respect--I respect that, 
Congressman. I would be very pleased to provide you with the 
specific data you have requested.
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, sir, yesterday, you were asked exactly 
the same question and you gave exactly the same answer. You 
would think you would be a little bit better prepared now that 
you have been asked that question, that now maybe somebody else 
is going to ask you the same question. You don't have that 
information?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, Congressman, let me share something 
with you, quite clearly. I work 18 hours a day, OK? So, when I 
returned from yesterday's hearing, I actually focused on 
mission. We will get that data both to the Senator who posed it 
yesterday and to you, Congressman, today.
    Mr. Gimenez. So, you don't have any estimation of all--the 
numbers that I am asking for at all? You don't know how many--
--
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. Gimenez [continuing]. Have been returned. You don't 
know how many have been released into the United States. You 
don't have any estimation at all of what those numbers are.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I want to be precise in my 
communication of data to the U.S. Congress and to you, 
specifically having posed the question. I will be----
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, thank you very much.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Precise in the provision 
of my data to you. Thank you.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you very much. I yield my--I yield back, 
thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the 
gentlelady from Michigan for 5 minutes, Ms. Slotkin.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 
this hearing and thanks for our witnesses for being here. You 
know, I think a lot of us are struggling to understand with the 
withdrawal in Afghanistan sort of what era are we in? You know, 
now that we have had the 20th anniversary of 9/11, how are we 
to think differently about the threats facing the country? We, 
of course, have foreign terrorist organizations. We have home-
grown folks who are inspired by groups abroad. We have our 
problem with domestic terrorism and domestic extremism. We have 
border issues. We have cyber issues. So, I think at least my 
constituents are just trying to understand like where are we 
and what are sort-of the biggest threats that we are facing?
    Director Wray, you have also always been a really straight 
shooter about numbers, right? About just being clear about data 
and cases, since that is the bread and butter of the FBI. So, 
if you could just help me understand order of magnitude when it 
comes to open investigations that you have of foreign terrorist 
organizations--people connected to an actual foreign terrorist 
group versus a home-grown guy or gal who is inspired by someone 
abroad versus a domestic terrorist, or domestic violent 
extremist. Can you just tell me order of magnitude, where do 
you have the most open cases?
    Mr. Wray. So, thank you, Congresswoman. On domestic violent 
extremists, we currently have, as I said in my opening 
statement, now up to about 2,700 open investigations, which is 
up from about say 1,400 last year, which was itself up 
significantly from where it was when I started in this job. On 
home-grown violent extremists, which is a reference to, as you 
know, Jihadist-inspired or foreign terrorist organization 
inspired, but not necessarily directed terrorism, we have 
consistently hovered at around 1,000. I think we are a little 
under that right now. But it sometimes has been more than 
1,000, sometimes it has been less than 1,000. But it has 
hovered kind-of up and down around that range.
    As far as the third category, true foreign terrorist 
organization cases, I don't have that number at my fingertips. 
The last time I looked, I think that is probably around 2,000, 
maybe. So, between the foreign terrorist organization cases and 
the home-grown violent extremist cases, I think that gets you 
to, give or take, around 3,000 investigations total.
    Ms. Slotkin. Gotcha.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Plus the 2,700 domestic violent 
extremists.
    Ms. Slotkin. Right, OK. So, it just helps to get a sense of 
what your, you know, level of hovers on and kind-of understand 
this era.
    Representative Abizaid--I am sorry--Director Abizaid, you 
know, there are a few people in the world that I trust more 
than you on Afghanistan. You are an expert on the country. You 
have spent a lot of time there. You were a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary on Afghanistan. I think what I am getting from 
constituents is this question of are we safer now than we were 
on 9/11? Are, you know, the ability of these terrorist groups 
to reconstitute something that I should worry about at the same 
level of worry that I had on September 12? So, help me 
understand where we are? Are we safer now? Are we the same 
level of safety? With all the investment we have made in 20 
years, where are we?
    Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much for the question. You 
know, as I had mentioned yesterday, years of CT pressure in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan had really relegated both al-Qaeda and 
ISIS-K to more regional threats. As I testified today, you 
know, you look at how the threat has changed over time since 9/
11. The al-Qaeda network operates in a very different way than 
it did on that fateful day. You have a broader array of 
terrorist groups that are operating across a broader swath of 
territory, not just Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Africa, 
Middle East, other parts of South Asia.
    In general, this kind of broader diffuse terrorist network 
exemplified by the al-Qaeda network and the ISIS, the expanding 
ISIS network, does appear more regionally focused. That said, 
that regional focus is something that we in the intelligence 
community are monitoring very closely to understand at what 
point it presents a threat to the homeland. When does that 
regional ambition turn back into a transnational ambition that 
they are actually pursuing and executing a plan against?
    With respect to reconstitution in Afghanistan, in 
particular, this is exactly what we are focused on as a top 
priority today. Which is how do we understand how the changed 
circumstances in Afghanistan will affect the trajectory of two 
groups that had sustained significant losses over the last 
couple of years? In the case of al-Qaeda, over the last 20 
years. What does that mean for their plans and intentions going 
forward?
    My own concern is very specifically around ISIS-K and the 
degree to which ISIS-K, you know, building off of the notoriety 
it received after the attack on August 26, will it become more 
focused on the West, more focused on the homeland than it was 
previously? As we look at the kind of dynamism of what is 
happening in the region, that is what our analysts are going to 
be focused on going forward.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time from Michigan has 
expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee for 
5 minutes, Mrs. Harshbarger.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Chairman Thompson. I have a 
couple of questions, just yes or no questions for Senator--I 
mean, for Secretary Mayorkas. Sir, we know what happened in 
Afghanistan with the Taliban being in control with the 
assumption that al-Qaeda can now operate as they did leading up 
to 9/11. These are some yes-or-no questions. Do you know how 
many terrorists have been apprehended at our Southern Border, 
sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do know how--known or suspected 
terrorists, how many.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I would be pleased to provide that----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To you in a Classified 
context.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. That would be awesome. Honestly, do you 
think there is a ripe opportunity for more terrorists, al-
Qaeda, Taliban, whomever, to come across the Southern Border 
since it is wide open? That is a yes or no.
    Secretary Mayorkas. No.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. All right. Is the Remain in Mexico policy 
being implemented and enforced?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is. It is being implemented. We are 
developing the implementation plan as we are required to----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. At the border. I would 
like to mention,----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, sir.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Congresswoman, that that 
requires a bilateral agreement. The Remain in Mexico program--
--
    Mrs. Harshbarger. We just need to know----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Of course, arise----
    Mrs. Harshbarger [continuing]. Yes or no since the Supreme 
Court, sir, has said that it needed to be implemented. So, if 
you could give us proof of that. Do you think if we continued 
to build the wall that that would stop over 208,000 people 
coming across the border illegally, sir? Yes or no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do not agree with the continuation of 
the construction of the wall.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Since you don't want to build the 
wall, are we still paying the contractors not to build the 
wall, sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are meeting our 
contractual obligations as we are required----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. So, that is yes.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To do.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK, thank you, sir. Director Wray, can 
you give us, as a committee, an update on the people who have 
been arrested from the January 6?
    Chairman Thompson. I am not sure that the Secretary 
understood you. You were going in and out. Try it again with 
your question.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
    Mr. Wray. Can you hear me now?
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Can you give us an update on the 
people who have been held from the January 6?
    Mr. Wray. Well, what I can tell you is that we have now 
made a little over 600 arrests. The status of each of those 
cases varies. We have had some cases that have been resolved by 
guilty pleas already. But a number of them are still pending 
and that is probably all I could really contribute in this kind 
of setting.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. So, has every one of them been charged, 
sir?
    Mr. Wray. Well, the 600, give or take, are all people who 
have been charged. Obviously, we have other on-going 
investigations and there may be more charges there. Then the 
ones who have been charged, I think you could expect to see in 
some instances, superseding indictments that would add 
additional charges.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Can you classify briefly and tell us 
where they are being held?
    Mr. Wray. I am not sure whether that is a Classified issue. 
I think it varies from person to person. I would have to see 
what information was appropriate. But if there is information 
we can provide, we are happy to share it with you. I am mindful 
of the fact that with those 600 cases, that is quite a number 
of Federal judges who have very strong opinions about what we 
say about pending criminal cases. I learned a long time ago as 
both a prosecutor and a defense attorney, to respect the views 
of the judges who are responsible for those cases.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Do you agree that China is one of the 
biggest threats to our National security, sir?
    Mr. Wray. I believe that the--that China, and by that, I 
mean, the People's Republic of China Government, the Chinese 
Communist Party, not the Chinese people,----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Right.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Is that there is no country that 
represents a more significant counterintelligence threat or a 
more significant threat to our innovation, our economic 
security, and our ideas. That is why as you heard me say in my 
opening statement, we are opening a new China 
counterintelligence investigation about every 12 hours. I can 
assure this committee that is not because our agents are 
looking around for something to do. It is because there is a 
need. That is why we have about 2,000-plus, open investigations 
of that sort leading back to different parts of the Chinese 
Government or people acting on behalf of the Chinese Government 
even as we speak.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. I believe that too. I agree with 
Representative Correa. These illegal drugs, the fentanyl, the 
meth, that is coming across the border, we need to hold these 
cartels accountable and are we doing that? Do you know, all HSI 
told us when we went to the border, to the Rio Grande Valley, 
is let us do our job. Are we letting them do their job?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We certainly are, Congresswoman. We 
most certainly are, Congresswoman. We are developing new 
strategies all the time to meet the threat of the TCOs, the 
Transnational Criminal Organizations.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time from Tennessee has 
expired.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. You believe that is the biggest criminal 
threat to our country. Thank you, sir. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Missouri, Mr. Cleaver, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cleaver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all the 
witnesses. Director Wray, I want to again, I said this the last 
time you were here, we just express appreciation for how you 
play your job straight. Let me go a little bit further and say 
that I am, you know, very much concerned about people crossing 
our borders, but I am more concerned about the fact that we are 
a Nation that is simply cross. It is very disturbing and I can 
speak experientially here, there was one gentleman who 
firebombed my office in Kansas City. His name is Eric King. He 
is in the Colorado supermax prison. Then there is a gentleman 
who was just indicted for his little plan to kill me. His name 
is Kenneth Hubert. Then you spoke earlier about a guy, Timothy 
Wilson, who was shot and killed by law enforcement because he 
had a plan in our community to blow up a hospital with a 
vehicle-borne explosive.
    I am very, very much--and I mentioned all of this to the 
Chairman last night, Chairman Thompson, last night. I am very 
concerned about where our Nation is and what we are doing in 
our Nation. Frankly, some of it is coming up here in our 
hearing today. But, Director Wray, is there something that we 
can do as Members of Congress? I am not asking you to say 
anything political. I, you know, but if there are things that 
we can do to arrest or reduce the domestic terrorism threat, I 
am all in. If you or any of our--any of our witnesses today can 
suggest something that this body can do, I am ready to try to 
do it before lunch. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question 
and for your kind words of support. Certainly, as I had 
mentioned earlier, we need more agents, more analysts, more 
tools for data analytics and so forth because the volume of 
threats, as you--your own experience illustrates, is 
significant. I would also say that more and more across every 
threat area we contend with including in the terrorism arena in 
particular, the issues of end-to-end encryption and user-
controlled encryption both on messaging and on devices is 
something that is making us in law enforcement increasingly 
blind to the threats and our ability to protect all of you and 
your constituents. That is a real problem and it needs to be 
addressed.
    I think a lot of Americans don't understand that we are 
moving rapidly in a direction where no matter how ironclad your 
support for a search warrant is, no matter how much the judge 
vigorously enforces its order, and no matter how heartbreaking 
or horrifying the criminal activity we are investigating, we 
are moving in a direction where no matter what that is, we will 
not be able to see the information and therefore, we would be 
significantly hobbled in our ability to protect Americans. So, 
that is an issue coming to a place where we have lawful access, 
lawful access to encrypted information, it has got to be 
addressed somehow or we are all going to wake up in a much more 
dangerous spot than we already are. So, that would be one 
thing.
    Then the last point, of course, is the more everyone, 
including prominent members of the public, our politicians, our 
corporate officials, et cetera, can----
    Mr. Cleaver. I think my time must be running out. I 
apologize, Mr. Chairman, if I went over.
    Chairman Thompson. You actually have a little time, but I 
will take it if you want to give it up. The Chair recognizes 
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
Ranking Member for hosting this hearing today. Director Wray, 
my first question is for you. Last week FBI Deputy Director 
Paul Abbate said there has been no indication that the Russian 
Government through President Putin have taken steps to stop the 
activities of cyber criminals engaging in ransomware attacks 
against U.S. entities. In fact, just yesterday, there was an 
attack on the New Cooperative, an Iowa-based farm service 
provider, who was hit with a ransomware attack with a--and with 
think a Russian-linked criminal group Black Matter is demanding 
$5.9 million ransom. This is the exact attack that President 
Biden had messaged to President Putin against. That this is a 
critical infrastructure. It is a sector and this is off limits. 
So, I understand from your testimony that the FBI is working 
with the State Department and the National Security Council to 
increase pressure on countries that fail to stop ransomware 
actors in their territory, like Russia. What specific steps is 
the FBI taking to pressure these groups? What more should the 
administration be doing to hold these foreign adversarial-
linked criminal groups accountable?
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you, Congressman, for the question. 
Certainly, it is a topic that is the subject of quite a bit of 
discussion and planning and operational activity these days. 
There may be more that we could share in a more Classified 
setting. But what I would tell you in this setting is that 
Russia, the reality is that Russia has a long history of being 
a safe haven for cyber criminals where the implicit 
understanding has been that if they avoid going after Russian 
targets for victims, they can operate with near-impunity. The 
Russian Government has long refused to extradite Russians for 
cyber crimes against American victims. Worse, their Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has long been warning its citizens, publicly 
been warning its citizens which other countries, which third-
party countries to avoid because those countries they say will 
arrest or extradite those Russians back to the United States to 
face justice for cyber crimes.
    So, it is too soon to tell whether any of the things that 
are under way are having an impact. But in my experience, there 
is a lot of room, a lot of room for them to show some 
meaningful progress if they want to on this topic.
    Mr. Garbarino. So, are you saying you can't talk about the 
specific procedures you are putting on Russia because it is 
Classified? Is that why we can't talk about it right now?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I think I can provide you a potentially a 
more descriptive answer if I don't have the concerns about what 
I can say publicly, that is all.
    Mr. Garbarino. I understand. I would hope that you do that 
because this is a huge issue that does not seem to be stopping. 
It is just getting worse. Every month we hear about another, 
maybe every week now we hear about another ransomware attack 
from a Russian-backed or if not Russian-backed they are 
operating freely in Russia, you know, these groups. So, I would 
very much appreciate if we could have that meeting, Mr. Wray.
    Mr. Secretary, I have a question following up on--actually, 
I don't know if it was brought up already, but it is dealing 
with cyber and which is, I think, a huge threat to our National 
security. I understand that their reports have indicated that 
the Secret Service purchased 8 drones from a Chinese company 
called DJI on July 26, 2021. Just 3 days earlier on July 23, 
the Department of Defense released a statement saying that 
DJI's products posed threats to National security. Plus, in 
2017, DHS itself stated with moderate confidence that DJI was 
providing U.S. critical infrastructure and law enforcement data 
to the Chinese Government.
    This fact that the Secret Service purchased 8 drones, this 
seems absolutely unacceptable. Why would they purchase 
equipment from a known foreign adversary, especially in the 
light of well-documented cybersecurity vulnerabilities? How can 
we--how can the American people trust DHS to protect us from 
cyber crimes and attacks, ransomware attacks, when the Federal 
Government is leaving itself open to security risks by buying 
these--buying equipment from companies like DJI?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, my answer is two-fold. No. 
1, cybersecurity is one of our top priorities in the Department 
of Homeland Security. We have an extraordinarily talented and 
dedicated work force on that critical mission set. I will look 
into the Secret Service purchase that you reference and I will 
get back to you and your staff as soon as possible.
    Mr. Garbarino. I appreciate that because this is--I hope it 
is very soon because I don't think we should be using these 
equipment if our DHS and the Department of Defense have already 
said that DJI and their equipment cannot be trusted. So, I hope 
we look into this right away before the drones are actually 
delivered. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses 
for appearing. I must say that I have great respect for both of 
the witnesses having observed them over some time now. I have 
found them to be persons who seem to genuinely want to do the 
right thing. To me, doing the right thing is important. Almost 
as important as doing the righteous thing. So, today, I would 
like to have a friendly more of a colloquy than a Q&A.
    I am just curious about something because we know that 
Title 42 allows persons to be quickly moved literally without 
giving them an opportunity to seek asylum. I supposed you can 
make your efforts, but Title 42 is for quick removal, as I 
understand it. Then we also know that TPS allows persons to 
stay because of conditions in the country that they would 
ordinarily be returned to. Haitians are in a very unique 
position. Title 42 allows them to be removed. TPS, for those 
who are already here, says that because of conditions in Haiti, 
we shouldn't send them back there.
    So, if we shouldn't send them back because of conditions 
and we find that we have persons who should be removed under 
Title 42, I am asking is there some way to reconcile this so 
that we don't give the appearance of contradicting ourselves. 
So that we show that there is some rationale for Haitians 
remaining here. Now, we had testimony just yesterday, I 
believe, indicating that when the Haitians are expelled, they 
are sent back, they get a phone, some amount of money. Many of 
them, over 95 percent according to the testimony, haven't been 
to Haiti in years. So, we are sending people back to a country 
that they haven't been to in years and there are others who are 
going to be allowed to stay because they happened to have been 
in the country at a certain time. We are doing this under Title 
42. TPS allows for staying.
    So, isn't there some way, I am just making an appeal for 
the Haitians. Isn't there some way for us to reexamine this? I 
am just, this is an appeal, Mr. Secretary, for us to reexamine 
this. Maybe there is something we missed. Can you give me some 
hope, please?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I very much appreciate 
what you have said, the question you posed, and the spirit of 
your question. I don't think that we can overstate the 
heartbreak with respect to the vulnerability of the Haitian 
people whom we are encountering, specifically in Del Rio, 
Texas, over the last week, and their vulnerability.
    There are a number of things I would like to say. No. 1, we 
did grant temporary protected status to Haitian nationals who 
were resident in the United States prior to July 29 of this 
year. We, in collaboration with the Department of State, 
studied the country conditions there and made that 
determination. Then we looked--we have looked at the country 
conditions and made a determination that, in fact, we can 
return individuals who have arrived subsequent to July 29 to 
Haiti. We are working with countries in South American, Chile, 
Brazil, for example, to see whether they would accept the 
return of Haitians who have traveled from those countries. It 
is complicated for reasons I can explain at a later time when 
we have more time.
    The Tile 42 authority, as I had mentioned earlier, is not a 
matter of immigration policy. It is a matter of public health 
policy as determined by the Centers for Disease Control's 
assessment of, in this case specifically, over last year and 
this year, the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic and most 
recently, of course, the Delta variant.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I do appreciate what 
you have said. What would you need for us to reconcile this 
such that the Haitians would be able to--would get a different 
result? Because I am just so concerned about having made a 
decision that the country is not such that we can send some 
back, but if you got here at a later time, country conditions 
have changed. Now, I have been to Haiti. I was there after the 
last earthquake. Not the most recent one, but the one before 
that. Haiti on a good day can be a place that can be difficult 
to negotiate. I am trying to be very kind because I have got a 
lot of constituents from Haiti. They love their country. I love 
it too. So, my question is that there just seems to me that 
there must be something that we can do. If it requires 
something from Congress, I am willing to be the guy to take the 
risk and ask that we do it. Can you give me some help on this, 
please?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman. I would welcome 
the chance to discuss that further with you. I know that the 
State Department, PRM, one office within the State Department, 
as well as USAID is very focused on resourcing Haiti and 
specifically providing greater sustenance to the individuals 
who are returned there. This is a very complicated and very 
heartbreaking situation. I really embrace the spirit with which 
you posed the questions to me. I would welcome the opportunity 
to sit down with you and talk it through.
    Mr. Green. Thank you. How do I contact you? Will you 
contact me?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We will reach out, Congressman.
    Mr. Green. Thank you. Thank you, very much. On behalf of 
the Haitians that are----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas, 
when Jay Johnson was Secretary, you were Deputy, and I was 
Chairman of Homeland, we had the rise of ISIS and the 
caliphate. I commend your Department and the FBI and NCTC for 
stopping probably 99 percent of those threats. I worry with the 
fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and Bagram Air Base being 
taken over, we have no eyes and ears on the ground. We have no 
ISR capability. We can't see or hear anymore the threats. We 
can't see Russia, China, and Iran as well as we could before 
the fall of Bagram.
    But I want to go back to the border as Mr. Green was 
talking about because in my State of Texas, these Haitians, 
14,000 of them, in addition to the over a million that have 
come in this year, has caused a crisis. I think in your words, 
you said it is unsustainable and told Border Patrol agents that 
we are going to lose. I agree with you with that.
    I have also obtained emails from CBP agents stationed in 
Del Rio warning and asking for more resources in early June. 
Then the Foreign Minister of Panama warned on June 3 about this 
influx that was coming up to the Southwest Border. Did you see 
this threat coming? If so, what if anything, did you do?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, if I may, Congressman, thank you 
and it is good to see you again. I know we worked closely for a 
number of years. I did not say that we are going to lose. That 
is unequivocally false, No. 1. And No. 2, we have not seen 
before such a rapid migration, irregular migration of 
individuals as we have observed and experienced with respect to 
the Haitians who have crossed the border in Del Rio, Texas. 
That has been an unprecedented speed.
    Mr. McCaul. But did you have any warning signs? You know, 
when the sector chief is being warned about this, when the 
Panama foreign minister is warning on June 3, and, you know, 
here we are and it is September, and, you know, months later. 
Did you see this coming?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Well, so, we watch the flow of 
individuals who are seeking to migrate irregularly through 
Mexico from the Northern Triangle countries and further south 
we do, indeed, track it. Nevertheless, Congressman, as I 
previously articulated, the speed with which this materialized, 
is unprecedented. That is why we surged as many resources as we 
have. We have deployed as many----
    Mr. McCaul. If I can just, one last question, and that is 
you have said this is the worst in 21 years, and I agree with 
you. The speed has been very fast-paced. The Migrant Protection 
Protocols, the asylum agreements negotiated by the prior 
administration, I believe, were effective. Unfortunately, this 
President on Day 1 rescinded those agreements, opening up this 
border. The traffickers know that. They know that if they touch 
base in the United States, they can stay now. I think--and I 
respect you, sir. I think you have been a Federal prosecutor, 
deputy secretary, now, you understand this concept of 
deterrence, but also the fact that these were working. My 
question is this has now been taken up to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. They have held, upheld the decision that the 
Migrant Protection Protocols need to be reinstated. I believe 
that you can call it whatever you want, sir, but it will 
greatly help in securing this border that is out of control 
right now. What are you doing to comply with the Supreme Court 
order?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, as you know, both of us 
served as Federal prosecutors, we have an obligation to abide 
by the orders of a court. The district court ordered us to 
implement the MPP program and that is, indeed, what we are 
doing. We are in on-going negotiations with Mexico with respect 
to that implementation. We rely upon Mexico's agreement to do 
so. We are moving with deliberate speed. I recognize and 
respect and will abide by a court order.
    Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that. I think it will help 
tremendously. Any assistance you need with dealing with Mexico, 
I have chaired the U.S.-Mexico IPG for, you know, 15 years. I 
hope they will be willing to take the agreement back, to 
reinstate it. Because I do think it will make a difference in 
this crisis that we have at our border.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time from Texas----
    Mr. McCaul. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 minutes, Mr. 
Swalwell.
    Mr. Swallwell. Thank you, Chairman. My first question is 
directed to Director Wray. I have been tracking the public 
reports of Anonymous--Anonymous lists health attacks world-wide 
including public reporting that there may have been attacks 
domestically in the United States. So, director, what are you 
doing at the FBI with your agents to determine who is 
responsible for these attacks? What message do you have to 
those conducting these attacks as to what you will do if you 
find out who they are?
    Mr. Wray. Thank you for the question. Thank you, 
Congressman. Certainly, there is nothing more important to us 
than the health and safety of our own work force and the 
intelligence community's work force. We at the FBI are working 
very aggressively in a very concerted way together with our 
intelligence community partners who also have a huge role to 
play on this issue. Our role is doing interviews of victims and 
pursuing the investigation from both a potential criminal, but 
also National security-type perspective. But again, it is a 
victim-focused effort at the moment. We are going to make sure 
that if we can figure out who is responsible, that we leave no 
stone unturned in holding them very firmly on accountable. 
Because if this is an attack, it is totally, totally 
unacceptable.
    Mr. Swallwell. All right, thank you, Director. Moving to 
ransomware attacks, also something that has affected America's 
businesses and John Chambers, former CEO at Cisco predicts that 
there will be 60,000 ransomware attacks. The Bureau has worked 
to try and help America's businesses, but what additional 
resources do you need to one, reach out and work with 
businesses who have been affected? Reach out, provide, perhaps 
a cyber hygiene tools that they may need. Of course, to try and 
claw back any keys that have been stolen from them. I would 
also welcome Secretary Mayorkas if he had any insights on this.
    Mr. Wray. Well, thank you for the question. Certainly, 
ransomware has mushroomed significantly over the last year and 
is on pace to mushroom again this year. We, in terms of what we 
need, we have significant budget requests that have come before 
the Congress that are pending as part of a 5-year cyber 
strategy that I unveiled last September, a year ago. Part of 
that is designed to make sure that in every field office, we 
have a true model cyber squad capable of handling a Colonial 
Pipeline, a JBS, a Kaseya, whatever it happens to be, in every 
field office.
    We also have the need to be able to improve our training. 
We need more technical tools. I would also say I know there 
have been various legislative proposals swirling around about 
potential pay system, paygrade modifications for computer-
trained cyber expert personnel in a number of agencies. If 
something like that were to go into effect, obviously, we would 
want it to apply to the FBI as well. A lot of what those 
personnel are going to do is not just investigate, respond, and 
disrupt treats, but engage, to your point, with the private 
sector, with victims. That is one of the strengths, one of the 
things that the FBI can provide to the fight is with 56 field 
offices and 250-something RAs, we can put agents on the 
doorstep of a victim often within an hour or two no matter 
where they are or when they get hit. That is why we need the 
footprint to be able to make sure that we are doing right by 
all the victims.
    Mr. Swallwell. Thank you, Director. Director Mayorkas, 
actually, I will follow up with you separately on ransomware. 
But I do have a question about the Reimbursable Services 
Program for airports. You know, all politics is local and I 
have a local airport in Livermore, California that would like 
to use this service, pay for it itself so that as international 
flights come in, they can have border agents or CBP custom 
agents to receive the flights. Is that still a program that DHS 
supports if local airports want to do that?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is and it is a--Congressman, thank 
you. It is a program that is implemented on a fact-specific 
circumstance, a specific basis. We look forward to speaking 
with you about it in the jurisdiction that you identified.
    Mr. Swallwell. Great, thank you. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes, Mr. Pfluger.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas, 
good to see you. We have a letter that I know has been 
referenced from out-going Border Patrol Chief Rodney Scott that 
basically claimed of great concern that he has witnessed a lack 
of meaningful effort to secure the Southern Border. I would 
like to ask you, this person was 29 years in the Department, a 
non-partisan actor, somebody that served 5 administrations with 
the only goal of securing this country. Is the border more 
secure under your leadership than when you started?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the border is secure. We 
are executing our plan. I have been very clear and unequivocal 
in that regard. I focus----
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, the question is, is the border 
more secure now under your leadership?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is no less secure than 
it was previously.
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, I want to look at something in 
his letter. Out-going Border Patrol Chief Rodney Scott said, 
that suspected terrorists are entering this country at a level 
we have never seen before. I want to know, I know it has been 
asked, how many known or suspected terrorists have entered this 
country this year?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I respectfully disagree with Mr. 
Scott's assertion and the information that you have requested 
we would be pleased to share with you in a Classified context.
    Mr. Pfluger. He said, in my professional assessment, the 
U.S. Border Patrol is rapidly losing situational awareness 
required to know who and what is entering our homeland. The 
ability of U.S. Border Patrol to detect and interdict those 
that want to evade apprehension is being degraded daily. Low-
level, unsophisticated, and uneducated smugglers are illegally 
crossing the border and increasingly evading apprehension 
daily. To think that well-resourced terrorist networks, 
criminal organizations, and hostile nations are not doing the 
same is naive. The current situation is unsustainable and must 
be mitigated.
    So, I have received the brief. I went to Del Rio. In less 
than 1 week, I was actually there on Saturday at the peak, 
15,000 people, in what your Department said yesterday, bum-
rushed the border, and there is, by the way, 40 to 60,000 on 
the way. So, is the quote true, at a level we have never seen 
before? That terrorists, suspected terrorists are entering this 
country at a level that we have never seen before?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, as I have previously 
articulated, I respectfully disagree with Mr. Scott's 
assertions. I should say that that assertion has no 
relationship to a reference to Del Rio and the fact that 
vulnerable Haitians have crossed the border there have been 
encountered and are being repatriated. Those are two very 
different happenings.
    Mr. Pfluger. It ties in because I talked to these Haitians. 
They got the word that Del Rio was open. They came. In fact, I 
talked to several. I talked to 2 Cuban couples, 4 people total, 
from Cuba to Panama to the Southern Border in Del Rio, 40 
hours. It took them 40 hours get to our Southern Border because 
what they heard through social media, what they heard through 
their networks, was that it was open. They paid thousands of 
dollars to trafficking organizations to get there. So, to 
think, like Rodney Scott says, outgoing Border Patrol Chief for 
29 years, 5 administrations, to think that well-resourced 
terrorist networks, criminal organizations, and hostile nations 
are not doing the same, is naive. Mr. Secretary, why--the 
American public deserves to know what the threat is to our 
country. Why will we not release numbers? Why are you not 
releasing the number of known or suspected terrorists that have 
entered this country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I have been--Congressman, 
I have been very clear that I would be very pleased to share 
that information with you in a Classified context. No. 1, I 
don't think, I don't think that the vulnerable Haitians who are 
in Del Rio, Texas now, could say that the border in Del Rio, 
Texas is open. Quite frankly, we have seen the heartbreaking 
pictures----
    Mr. Pfluger. It is heartbreaking. I was there. I saw it.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Congressman, that 
reflect--that reflect that fact.
    Mr. Pfluger. In fact, there is--there is all sorts of bad 
things going on. But it is a drain on resources. We had to 
repurpose Border Patrol agents from their National security 
mission all along the Southern Border to Del Rio. The Governor 
of Texas has had to step in because the Federal Government has 
abdicated the duty to protect our country. So,----
    Secretary Mayorkas. I respectfully--I respectfully 
disagree. We have never abdicated our duty to protect our 
country. As a matter of fact, the 250,000 men and women of this 
Department work day and night----
    Mr. Pfluger. And they are doing a phenomenal job.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To protect this country.
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, we are calling it as Texans and 
as Americans, we want to know how many known or suspected 
terrorists have entered this country. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Titus, for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I would 
like to start by thanking you too for your work to extend the 
TPS for citizens for several countries. This was something I 
asked you about the last time you were here. We looked at El 
Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. This is a large part of my 
district, which is the most diverse in Nevada, and one of the 
most diverse in the country. So, we certainly appreciate your 
recognizing the importance of that TPS and thank you for that 
extension.
    Well, you have heard a lot about the concern about the 
Haitians at the border and I would like to expand on that. But 
I would like to go back to where they came from. We know that 
the cartels and some of these people who prey on the immigrants 
have taken their money. They have sold their possessions. They 
have come up here. Could you describe how your Department in 
this kind-of all-of-Government approach is working with the 
State Department and maybe with NGO's in some of the countries 
of origin to counter this false information or to deal with 
these people who are preying on folks who just want a better 
life?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you so much. Your 
point goes directly to something the Congressman who preceded 
your question addressed, which is these individuals, vulnerable 
individuals, are being exploited by smuggling organizations and 
are receiving false information with respect to the border. We 
are in collaboration with the Department of State and other 
agencies within the Government countering that false 
information, that false messaging both from the United States 
and in the countries of origin themselves.
    You know, this past Sunday I spoke to journalists, Haitian 
journalists, and the messages that I communicated were blasted 
throughout social media and in Creole as well as Spanish to 
make sure that we reach the depth of the desired and needed 
populations. This is an all-of-Government effort and it is a 
multilateral effort because we are working with other countries 
in ensuring that vulnerable populations receive accurate 
information and do not take the perilous journey north that 
will not succeed.
    Ms. Titus. Well, I know that we can take advantage of 
social media. Everybody, even those in the most direst of 
straits, seems to have a cell phone in which they can read this 
kind of information. So, I appreciate that you all are working 
across agencies to get this information out and encourage you 
to use some of the NGO's in country as well.
    My second question has to do with tourism. You know I 
represent Las Vegas. We are now starting to see foreign 
tourists come back. This is a large part of our business. 
Foreign tourists stay longer and they spend more. We saw where 
this is opening up. The President announced this within the 
last few days. Can you talk about some of the things that we 
are kind-of doing in advance to accommodate foreign tourists? 
We saw the problems after 9/11, but now we have got a little 
bit more time to get ready and people are anxious to travel. 
When those borders open up, they are going to come to Las Vegas 
because where better to go for a holiday after a year of 
frustration? Would you outline some of those things you are 
doing for customs and helping with that issue?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, Congresswoman, thank you very much. 
The President did, indeed, announce in the last few days the 
fact that travel restrictions would be lifted with respect to 
international travel, travel to the United States upon certain 
conditions. Our Office of Field Operations within Customs and 
Border Protection located at the airports will be ready to 
receive and process an increasing number of travelers. We are 
also working at Transportation Security Administration, TSA, to 
make the travel from the United States as facile and orderly 
and secure as possible. We are planning for what we hope to be 
a resumption of international travel and the influx of tourism, 
the tourism economy here in the United States.
    Ms. Titus. Well, that is great because we have the 
philosophy that a person's holiday begins the minute they leave 
home and that includes all that experience through the airport. 
We have heard some horror stories about waiting hours on the 
tarmac or in line to get through customs. So, we want to be 
ready this time and we appreciate any effort you can make for 
that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. Pursuant to 
today's order, the Chair declares the committee in recess for 5 
minutes.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Thompson. The committee will be in order. The 
Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Bishop, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary, Mayorkas, 
first I would like to ask you, Congressman Pfluger asked you a 
moment ago how many suspected terrorists have crossed the 
border and you said you would be glad to answer in a Classified 
context. Why can't you answer that question in public?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the information is, 
indeed, Classified and some of it is also Law Enforcement 
Sensitive. On a more general basis, these are determinations 
that are made across the agency and I should note, if I may, 
Congressman, that I believe it was in late July that we 
provided a briefing to this committee with respect to the 
requested data. So, it is information that we already have 
provided.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir. Let me ask you this. Many have 
commented and sometimes it devolves into a debate over numbers 
whether it is a 1.3 million illegal crossings, who is 
recidivist, and how many really come in, whether it--who has 
really been released into the country, and, of course, we have 
now the latest thing with the Haitians in the last week or so, 
is all this--is all this the plan?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am not sure I understand your 
question but let me say the following. The plan that we have is 
a multipart plan. No. 1, is to address the root causes of 
irregular migration. No. 2, is to ensure that there are safe, 
orderly, and humane pathways so people do not have to take the 
dangerous, perilous journey to make a claim of asylum that our 
laws that Congress passed are recognized. Third, is to rebuild 
our asylum system here in the United States. At the same time, 
Congressman, we do enforce our immigration laws. Those are not 
only the laws of humanitarian relief, but the laws of 
accountability for those who seek to enter illegally and do not 
have a claim for relief under law.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, sir. I guess what maybe I am getting 
at is just that. Now that I look back at some of your testimony 
when you were before us back in March, you went through 
something very similar. You talked about your plan to address. 
You always use the term address migrants at the border. That 
you said you were executing on all fronts to address the 
situation at the border. When you spoke before a Senate 
Appropriations Committee in May, you said something very 
similar. We have a three-part plan, or three pillars to our 
plan. You gave that again, more or less, in--you have done that 
repeatedly in testimony before Congress that you have a plan 
under way to address the surge of migrants at the border. That 
comment was before the Senate Homeland Security Committee just 
in July, July 27. So, I guess what I want to understand is, are 
the results that we are seeing, are they the results of your 
plan? They are the plan results. Is that correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me give you a very 
important example of the execution----
    Mr. Bishop. Before you go off into an example, sir, could 
you give me a yes or no? Are these the results of your plan?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the plan is under way and 
is being executed. As one of your colleagues mentioned, over 
the last month, we did see a decrease because we were 
implementing tools that are part of that plan. Back to my 
example of a measure that we have taken that is very 
significant and that quite frankly is unprecedented. What is 
not unprecedented is recognition of the problem in our asylum 
system that it takes years and years----
    Mr. Bishop. I am not looking to debate----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Between the time of 
encounter----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Your plan.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. And the time of ultimate 
resolution.
    Mr. Bishop. Yes, at this point,----
    Secretary Mayorkas. One of the things that we----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Secretary Mayorkas----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Have done----
    Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Let me ask you to sort-of just not 
just--I am sorry, I just have limited time. I just want, I 
don't want to get into a sort-of down to the granular level of 
detail. You have made the point to these committees repeatedly 
that you have a plan and you are executing the plan. Sometimes 
I think we are talking past each other. I would just like your 
confirmation, sir, that the results we are seeing at the border 
are the results of the execution of your plan. Is that a fair 
understanding?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, it is not. It is a 
mischaracterization. Congressman,----
    Mr. Bishop. Then is your plan failing?
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. As I mentioned----
    Mr. Bishop. Is your plan failing?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, it is not. As I mentioned, every 
time I have spoken of my plan and I would welcome the 
opportunity if not in today's testimony, but separately with 
you, to actually complete the answer that I was providing 
earlier because it is--it involves very important information 
with respect to that plan. The plan takes time and we continue 
to exercise it thanks to the dedicated men and women of this 
Department.
    Mr. Bishop. Do the results that you are seeing and their 
magnitude suggest to you that your plan is wrong? That your 
plan is ill conceived and is plunging the Nation into a crisis?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No.
    Mr. Bishop. All right. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Chairman, for holding this 
hearing and I want to thank each and every of the witnesses for 
sharing your perspectives, your work, and your commitment. I am 
so touched by something that as a child I embraced and believed 
and that is: Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses 
yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming 
shore. Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tossed to me. I 
lift my lamp beside the golden door.
    This country's greatness and true genius lies in its 
diversity and I believe that I am motivated by that. That is 
American to me. So, the conversations we have with regard to 
what happens at the border, what happens with refugees trying 
to get here, what is happening right now on the Southern Border 
with the Haitian communities, it concerns me tremendously, Mr. 
Mayorkas, that we would be sending them back to Haiti. Some of 
them sending them for the first time in over 20 or 30 years. 
Sending them to a country that has been just ravaged by 
earthquakes, ravaged by instability in its political and 
governmental realm, and dangerous with gangs. So, I just need 
to share that I believe our responsibility is to treat them 
humanely, to process them in a way that gives them the freedom 
and the opportunity to live in a healthy environment. Now, that 
may not just be the United States of America. We need to enlist 
our friends, our allies all around the world.
    Mr. Mayorkas, I just need to say I believe everything you 
say about your intentions with regard to doing our business 
humanely and respectfully on the borders and anywhere to keep 
our homeland free. But the images that I saw with regard to 
what was happening with our Border Patrol employees whipping, I 
don't care if it were your belt or your reins or your what, but 
whipping Haitians is unconscionable, unacceptable, un-American. 
I know that you are investigating it, but I tell there is under 
no circumstances that those individuals are to be able to 
interact with other human beings ever again. They need to be 
released and they need to be held accountable.
    For all three of you, I want to just ask a question which 
is really maybe a kind-of a bizarre question. Is there a 
hierarchy of concern with regard to the vulnerability of this 
country? Is it cybersecurity interfering with our business and 
our supply lines and the things that we need? Is it foreign 
attacks coming from places that we know we have had folks 
attacking us before? Is it domestic terrorism? Is it domestic 
terrorism that represents ethnic and racial motivation? Is it 
domestic terrorism that is influenced by foreign terrorists? 
What are the--is there a hierarchy of concern? I want to hear 
that yes or no from all three of you. Then I need you to tell 
me do you have the resources, all of the resources that you 
need to make us safe, as safe as we could humanly be with the 
work that is under your jurisdiction?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, maybe I will answer 
first. We do have priorities, if you will. I think you have 
accurately identified many of the priorities that we have in 
terms of protecting the homeland. I am sure those priorities 
are echoed by my colleagues in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center. I also 
just want to remark that I well understand and appreciate the 
pain with which you made your initial remarks, Congresswoman.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, sir. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Thank you. I apologize, I missed probably the 
beginning of the question with the technical hiccup that we 
had. But picking up on what I think the question was, I would 
tell you that we have elevated racially and ethically motivated 
violent extremism to our highest threat priority level 
commensurate with ISIS and HVEs, Homegrown Violent Extremists. 
We did that back in June 2019. The fact that we have now 2,700 
domestic terrorism investigations accumulated over the last 
year and a half, should speak volumes.
    As far as whether we have sufficient resources, there is, I 
think, in the budget pending before Congress, a much-needed 
request for more resources because at the same time that we are 
having to increase and surge to domestic terrorism, the reality 
is the home-grown violent extremist threat has not subsided. 
Now especially in the wake of events in Afghanistan, we need to 
be even more vigilant about foreign terrorist organizations. 
Last, I would add a category that hasn't gotten a lot of 
discussion at today's hearing, but a point that Director 
Abizaid had made in her opening, which is we can't take our eye 
off the threat from Iran as well, Hezbollah, Quds Force, et 
cetera. So, we have a full plate and we need all the help we 
can get and we appreciate the committee's support.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Director Abizaid, I want to ask you 
one question.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time----
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. May I just----
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired, but she needs 
the answer to the other question.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. It is a 10-second question. I am 
sorry, Chair.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady has 10 seconds.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady has 10 seconds.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Can you tell me what the 
motivation was for ISIS-K to perpetrate that attack on those 
leaving? We were evacuating. What was their point? Was their 
point just to show us that they exist and that they want to be 
a pain in our behind or what? Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that 
consideration.
    Chairman Thompson. Thirty seconds.
    Ms. Abizaid. Thank you for the question. One, I think ISIS-
K targeting our evacuation operations at H. Kya in part because 
of the notoriety they would receive because of how high-profile 
it would be. But they also sought to embarrass the Taliban. 
ISIS-K is very focused on the Taliban and given the Taliban's 
assertions of its own ability to provide security, they wanted 
to demonstrate that that was not in fact the case. That is our 
assessment as it stands now.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired. The 
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa for 5 minutes, Mrs. 
Miller-Meeks.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 
you testified before this committee back in March. At that 
time, several Members including myself asked you about COVID-19 
testing protocols at the Southern Border. You said, and I 
quote: We do support the testing of individuals and that in 
indeed our policy and we have implemented practices to execute 
on that policy. However, on September 10, the DHS Office of 
Inspector General came out with a report that stated, CBP does 
not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP 
custody. Indeed, that is what I found at the two trips I made 
to the border. Instead, CBP relies on local public health 
systems to test symptomatic individuals. According to CBP 
officials, as a front-line law enforcement agency, it does not 
have the necessary resources to conduct such testing.
    I don't have to tell you that we are in a pandemic, Mr. 
Secretary. I believe that testing of people coming across our 
Southern Border is one of the many keys to controlling the 
spread of COVID-19. That is why back in March I introduced my 
first bill, the React Act, to require COVID-19 testing for all 
migrants. The OIG recommendation coming out of this September 
10 report said DHS should reassess its COVID-19 response 
framework to identify areas for improvement to mitigate the 
spread of COVID-19. The report went on to say, DHS leadership 
must commit to strengthening these COVID-19 preventive 
measures. Without stronger measures in place, DHS is putting 
its work force, support staff, communities, and migrants at 
greater risk for contracting the virus. Additionally, with the 
predictable surge of Haitian migrants from South America, they 
may bring with them the Lambda variant, which is in South 
America at this time. These are certainly strong words coming 
out of the OIG. Additionally, the report makes observations 
regarding lack of social distancing, lack of mask wearing, and 
general overcrowding in facilities at the Southern Border, 
which would all combine to facilitate the spread of COVID-19. 
Not only COVID-19, I understand there is a measles outbreak at 
Fort Bliss.
    This is a huge problem and one that the committee has been 
trying to get answers during this entire year. Every time we 
ask the question, I feel like we get a different response. So, 
I have got a number of questions and because time is limited, I 
am going to run through them so that you can answer them. If we 
are requiring air travelers to have a negative COVID-19 test 
before entry, why aren't we requiring the same of land 
travelers? If we are able to test Afghan people for COVID and 
vaccinate them not only for COVID, but measles, mumps, rubella, 
and polio, and other age-appropriate vaccinations, which are 
required by the CDC, why is there a double standard along our 
Southwest Border? Do you agree with the IG's report? The DHS 
did concur with two recommendations in that report, I believe. 
Do you agree that it is your responsibility to ensure that 
there are strong protocols at the border to mitigate the spread 
of COVID-19? Do you commit to implementing the IG's 
recommendations and identify ways to mitigate the spread of 
COVID-19? Do you commit to report back to this committee within 
a month on the progress the Department has made at the border 
on testing for COVID-19? Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, may I seek your 
indulgence to obtain a transcript of all the questions that you 
have asked and answer them rapidly? I did not catch them all 
now. I will say, Congresswoman, that I do appreciate your focus 
on the communicable diseases with respect to migration, whether 
it is by air or by land, and, in fact, by sea. We have 
concurred in the Inspector General's recommendations. We have 
made changes to some of our COVID-19 protocols and I will 
provide the requested information to you as rapidly as 
possible.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Well, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your 
respect for the questions I asked, but I have been asking these 
questions since March and we have seen no policy or protocol 
changes and yet, we see a totally different response for Afghan 
refugees coming to this country than we do for those along at 
our Southern Border. To include which this massive spending 
bill that is coming out and we are expected to vote on doesn't 
have adequate resources for CBP to do its job.
    So, I thank you so much for your testimony. I expect that 
we will see changes in protocol and policy and I will 
reintroduce what legislation I can to force those changes. 
Thank you so much. Mr. Chair, I yield back my time.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice, for 5 
minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. 
Demings, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to 
all three of our witnesses for being here today. Thank you for 
the job that you do every day to keep us safe. No, you are not 
perfect as you are frequently reminded. You have big jobs and 
awesome responsibility. But as Members of Congress, so do we. 
We are the lawmakers. So, I just would say to you that we all 
can work a little harder to be better partners and realize that 
we are all in the same boat, like it or not. That boat, 
especially with this committee, is to lead in keeping our 
Nation safe. We are a Nation of laws at the border. We are a 
Nation of laws on January 6. Those were criminals and not 
tourists. Doggone it, we are a Nation of laws regarding foreign 
entities. If we would remember that, I think we all could be 
better partners and never risk our Nation being attacked by 
anyone in such a cruel and vicious way. I want to just 
acknowledge the victims of 9/11 and the brave first responders 
on that day.
    With that, Secretary Mayorkas, as many of my colleagues 
have noted today, DHS was created in response to 9/11. I 
remember it well. Over the last several months, we have held, 
as you are constantly being reminded today, hearings on the 
mission and structure of the Department and its ability to meet 
the threats of today and tomorrow. One concern raised on many 
occasions is that the Department's mission has grown 
incredibly. Indeed, in just 2021, the Department has led the 
Federal Government's response to the pandemic, every place, 
every place, natural disasters all over our Nation, stunning 
cybersecurity attacks, immigration enforcement, and 
resettlement of our Afghan allies. This is, of course, because 
as one previous witness noted, DHS is an unmatched connector 
between Federal resources and State and local authorities. 
Secretary, understanding that information and resource sharing 
to prevent attacks against our homeland is such an important 
function of the Department, has the mission of the Department 
of Homeland Security and the responsibilities of its 
components, grown too vast for one department, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I thank you so much for 
your question. I don't think so. We are fundamentally a 
department of partnerships. I think we are working now very 
cohesively across the Department, across our different agencies 
and offices. I think that we are working more collaboratively 
and closely with our State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
partners than ever before.
    We have, for example, through the Office of Information--I 
am sorry--the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, been 
disseminating critical products in partnership with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation to our local first responder community 
so that they are very equipped and empowered to address the 
threats that they face in their communities. I know you know 
this very, very well given your life-long dedication to the law 
enforcement and public safety mission.
    I think we are working very cohesively. We have a lot more 
to accomplish in that regard and we are very focused on it.
    Mrs. Demings. Mr. Secretary, you know information sharing 
certainly was one of the major focuses or I think recognized 
vulnerabilities 20 years ago. How would you say as the 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary we are doing along 
the local, State, and Federal level with information sharing?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I think, Congresswoman, if you would 
ask the State, local, Tribal, territorial partners that we 
have, they would echo my assertion that we are doing better 
than ever before. We have not only issued an NTAS Bulletin and 
renewed it several times, we have sent out multiple products in 
different forms. We are focused on real-time actionable 
information in the hands of our partners to strengthen our 
homeland security. I think we are doing better than ever 
before. We will do better tomorrow than we are today.
    Mrs. Demings. Again, to all three of our witnesses, thank 
you for what you do to keep us safe every day. We are committed 
to joining you as effective partners in that effort. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van Drew, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mayorkas, 
in your written testimony, you stated that DHS confronts 
complex challenges including international and domestic 
terrorism, a global pandemic, malicious cyber activity, 
organized crime, catastrophic impacts of climate change, among 
others. I understand that. They all are. I had to notice 
immediately that you didn't mention the crisis at our Southern 
Border as a challenge facing the Department. Let me say to you 
I understand your intentions, but you say that we are doing 
better today than we were. It seems to be we are doing worse 
today than we did yesterday. I almost expect us to do even 
worse tomorrow than we are today. I don't agree with you. I 
think there are a lot of people using straight common sense 
that look at videos, that read reports, that look at 
information, that have spoken to law enforcement there, and we 
know that so far in 2021, there is over 1.3 million migrants 
have been apprehended at the American Southern Border, which is 
a 386 percent increase from this time last year. Let's call it 
what it is. This is a disaster.
    Additionally, August was the sixth straight month where we 
had 170,000 encounters at the border. That is unbelievable. It 
has been reported now and we have seen all the pictures that we 
have got 9,000 migrants, give or take thousands, that may have 
entered the United States without being tested for COVID-19, 
with only being issued a notice to appear at an immigration 
hearing.
    Look what we see under the bridge in Del Rio. People 
bathing in the water, people obviously lacking hygienic, you 
know, necessities. People who are sick. People who are involved 
with drugs. This is all there. This is nothing, you know, I sit 
back and again, as I said to you last time when we had this, it 
is like I'm in bizarro world. I see it in front of me. You see 
it in front of you, but some people pretend not to see it. I 
don't mean to be disrespectful to you, sir, but sometimes it 
seems like you don't want to see it.
    The reality is we talk about the underlying causes. So, 
really, let's talk about this. What we are saying is other 
countries have severe problems with poverty, education, 
nutrition, a host of areas. We understand that. But it is naive 
and arrogant of us to believe that we are going to fix all of 
that and make that all better, which throughout history we 
haven't even been able to do. Then that is going to stop the 
big push into the United States of illegal immigration in a 
timely way. That's nonsensical.
    The way that you do this is through the rule of law. The 
way that you do it is that you have a border. When you have a 
border, you also have a border fence or a border wall. You have 
what you need. You have the proper amount of law enforcement to 
ensure that things don't get out of control. You ensure that 
you are reducing the amount of drugs that are coming into this 
country. Don't tell me that we are not getting more drugs 
because of this, we are. There is so much fentanyl now in our 
country. The numbers keep going up. It used to be you could 
kill every man, woman, and child 2 times over, then 3 times 
over, then 5 times over. I think the latest number is 7 times 
over, but we really don't know because it is just pouring in. 
We are using kids as drug mules.
    So, we have sick people. We have drug-infested situations. 
We have a lack of hygiene. We have no rule of law at the 
border. We do the best we can and certainly our men and women 
who work down there are. Then you say to me it is better than 
it was when you were here last time. No, it is not better than 
it was last time. It is scarier and it is worse than it was 
last time. Texas can't absorb all these people. American can't 
absorb all these people. We don't even know if they are 
healthy. We don't even know what problems we have. We haven't, 
you know, really haven't really taken enough care with 
evaluating each individual that is coming over. We just can't--
undocumented migration is not appropriate. It is not how we 
work in America. We should change the immigration laws. I agree 
with that. But nevertheless, this is absolutely not the answer.
    So, I respectfully again, I am trying to be nice, but I am 
angry, and I am tired. Americans are angry and they are tired. 
We want to hear real answers. Don't, please don't tell me we 
are going to make the whole world better in 6 months by 
addressing climate change and all their social problems that 
they have and all the military problems that they have. It has 
always been that people came to America because almost 
everywhere else is much worse and America is much better. But 
we have to have control of the situation. This is nonsensical 
and it is damaging and it is disturbing and it is hurting our 
people and it is hurting our country and it should be one of 
our No. 1 priorities. So, tell me, do you really believe that 
it is better now? Do you personally take any responsibility for 
this crisis?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I think you know you have 
said quite a number of things. I would really like to speak 
with you fulsomely about everything you have said. You 
mentioned something that I think deserves particular emphasis 
and that is you referenced our broken immigration system and 
the need to fix it. That has been an enduring problem. The one 
thing that there is unanimity about is the fact that we have a 
broken immigration system. It is most unfortunate that we have 
not fixed it over many, many years. I hope we do because that 
would be----
    Mr. Van Drew. Mr. Secretary, I understand----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. The fundamental----
    Mr. Van Drew. Forgive me for interrupting. I agree with 
you, but right now we have an immediate crisis. We have an 
immediate situation. So, you know, it is like saying, if a war 
breaks out, well, we really go to work on human nature and 
ensure that we work together more as human beings. I agree. But 
the reality is----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has----
    Mr. Van Drew [continuing]. We have a crisis now.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Expired. The gentleman's 
time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from 
California----
    Mr. Van Drew. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Ms. Barragan.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
panelists and Mr. Secretary for being with us today. I want to 
follow up with the Title 42 questions. Everyday hundreds of 
thousands of people cross the border, whether it is students, 
whether it is business people, whether it is folks seeing 
doctors, but hundreds of thousands are crossing the border. Mr. 
Secretary, what is the difference between those people crossing 
the border and asylum seekers crossing the border, which we are 
now citing to Title 42 to deport?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I am not exactly sure 
what particular differences you are focused upon, but as you 
know we are----
    Ms. Barragan. Well, I would----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Exercising in between the 
ports of entry the CDC's public health authority under Title 
42.
    Ms. Barragan. OK. So, is there any difference between 
people that are crossing--the hundreds of people crossing the 
border every day, students, business people, and asylum 
seekers, other than they are just asylum seekers?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am sorry, Congresswoman, I don't 
quite understand your question. Yes, I mean, there are many 
differences between migration, the movement of people through a 
port of entry and the encountering of an individual in between 
the ports of entry. There are numerous differences between 
those two phenomena in a number of respects. Legally, from a 
public health perspective, a whole host, operationally. I am 
not just quite sure what you are focused upon. I apologize.
    Ms. Barragan. Well, I focus on the fact that this is a 
discriminatory policy that it is implemented because people are 
asylum seekers--because the public health crisis does not 
discriminate whether you are an asylum seeker or whether you 
are not an asylum seeker. So, I just think it is a 
discriminatory practice. I just to continue to encourage the 
administration to end the use of Title 42 in a day and age 
where we have vaccines and we have requirements we can put in 
place for people to get vaccines.
    Mr. Secretary, moving on, how does the CB--how does CBP 
choose which Haitians will be expelled via repatriation flights 
and which individuals will be processed into the United States?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, our policy is to employ 
Title 42, the CDC's public health authority, to the fullest 
extent possible in light of the CDC's public health assessment 
and the public health imperative. It is a matter of, for 
example, our operational capacity, the willingness of a partner 
country and its capacity to receive individuals. There are a 
host of factors. In addition, there are very limited exceptions 
to our Title 42 authority. For example, as I think you 
recognize, we do not enforce it with respect to unaccompanied 
children. That was a policy that was implemented very early on. 
There is a convention against torture exception. There are 
individuals who have severe and acute vulnerabilities that we 
recognize. I would be pleased to provide more information in 
that regard.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would like to 
talk a little bit now about seaports. Nation-wide, seaports are 
seeing record high levels of cargo volumes and increases of 
container ships resulting in port congestion. Ships with 
containerized cargo are stalled in marine terminals and vessels 
spend days at anchor weighting to load or unload at port of 
terminals. In fact, the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los 
Angeles in my district this week had 65 ships at anchor waiting 
to unload cargo. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was uncommon 
for more than one ship to wait to unload. Unfortunately, port 
congestion is expected to be an on-going challenge. Can you 
describe the challenges that port congestion might pose to 
maritime port security?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, if I may, Congresswoman, the 
greatest challenge with respect to port congestion is the 
obstacle to the very facile movement of goods through those 
ports and serving the economic engine. This is a consequence as 
we know all too well of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Office of 
Field Operations, the United States Coast Guard, all our 
services are very focused on maritime security on the one hand, 
and, of course, the facile movement of lawfully imported goods 
to the United States. We are very focused on this.
    Ms. Barragan. Mr. Secretary, I have to say I am a little 
disappointed. The question was very specific about what 
challenges that congestion might pose to maritime port 
security. I hope you will follow up given that I represent a 
port and ports are very important that I get an answer to that 
specific. I want to know what the security issue is from 
congestion. What you stated to me was just restating the 
problem. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To follow up on 
Representative Miller-Meeks' line of questioning, these are for 
Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Secretary, the last time you testified 
before the committee, you admitted to this committee that your 
agency, had released migrants who have tested positive for 
COVID-19. Since then, multiple reports have indicated that 
thousands of COVID positive migrants have been released from 
DHS custody. In addition, the DHS Office of Inspector General 
released a report highlighting that your Department has failed 
to take sufficient COVID-19 preventative measures at the 
border, which puts the DHS work force and communities at 
unnecessary risk of being exposed to COVID-19. So, to me, it is 
clear that your Department either does not have a strategy or 
it is not effectively executing a strategy that will 
effectively mitigate the risks of COVID-19 at the border. Why 
is that?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we do have a strategy. We 
concurred in the recommendations of the Inspector General's 
office. We are implementing those recommendations. We have made 
changes and I can walk through the processes that we employ 
currently with respect to the different populations of migrants 
whom we are encountering at the border.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Well, then let me ask you this.
    Secretary Mayorkas. With unaccompanied children----
    Mr. Clyde. You say you have a strategy and you are 
implementing it. When will final implementation of the strategy 
be complete because----
    Secretary Mayorkas. We----
    Mr. Clyde. Go ahead.
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are working as quickly as possible 
to implement the recommendations of the Office of Inspector 
General.
    Mr. Clyde. So,----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Let me give you----
    Mr. Clyde. So,----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. One example----
    Mr. Clyde [continuing]. What is the time frame? When will 
it be complete?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I will speak with our chief medical 
officer and I will report back to you, Congressman.
    Mr. Clyde. So, you don't know.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I will speak with our chief medical 
officer, Congressman, and I will get----
    Mr. Clyde. OK. OK, so----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. I will report back to you.
    Mr. Clyde. So, there is a very--it is having a plan and 
executing the plan, all right? Effectively executing the plan 
is very different--it is pretty clear to me that the 
administration is not truly serious in addressing this matter. 
I would like to remind the Secretary that according to your 
website, 11,125 CBP employees have tested positive for COVID-19 
and 43 CBP agents have died from the virus so far.
    So, I would urge my Democrat colleagues to join me in 
cosponsoring my bill, H.R. 2076, the COVID-19 Border Protection 
Act. This bill would require DHS in consultation with HHS to 
develop and submit a comprehensive plan of action to test and 
quarantine every migrant at the Southern Border and execute on 
that plan. I would also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit 
for the record, an article dated August 4 that highlights the 
number of COVID-positive--the number of positive COVID-19 
cases. It is titled, ``Texas border city says more than 7,000 
COVID-positive migrants released since February, 1,500 in the 
last week alone.'' Mr. Chairman, I request unanimous----
    Chairman Thompson. Without objection.
    Mr. Clyde [continuing]. Consent for that to be added.
    [The information follows:]
Texas Border City Says More Than 7,000 Covid-Positive Migrants Released 
                   Since February, 1,500 in Last Week
 more than 188,000 migrants were encountered at the southern border in 
                                  june
By Adam Shaw, Bill Melugin/Fox News, Published August 4
    The Texas border city of McAllen says more than 7,000 COVID-
positive migrants have been released into the city since February, and 
more than 1,500 in the past week--the latest example of growing concern 
about the potential impact of the border crisis on efforts to control 
COVID-19 in the U.S.
    In a statement announcing the building of new temporary shelters to 
deal with a ``rapidly escalating'' surge of immigrants being released 
into the border city, McAllen warned of the release of thousands of 
migrants with COVID-19.
  texas border city puts up temporary shelters to cope with `rapidly 
                       escalating' migrant surge
    ``Since mid-February of 2021 there have been over 7,000 confirmed 
COVID-19 positive immigrants released into the city of McAllen by 
[Customs and Border Protection], including over 1,500 new cases in the 
past 7 days,'' the statement said.
    Immigrants released by CBP are dropped off with Catholic Charities 
and tested for COVID by a third party. If they test positive, they are 
asked to quarantine and offered a room at a quarantine site.
    The stunning numbers come amid increasing concerns from Texas and 
elsewhere about the potential impact of the massive numbers of migrants 
coming to the border on the efforts to control the COVID-19 pandemic 
within the United States.
    Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, cited the numbers announced by McAllen as 
he tore into the Biden administration for its handling of the crisis at 
the southern border.
    ``That is unacceptable and they keep doing it,'' Cruz said on 
``America Reports'' on Wednesday. ``Joe Biden likes to talk about this 
pandemic, well I'll tell you what, the election of Joe Biden and Kamala 
Harris was a super spreader event because their open border is 
endangering not just the people of Texas but people all across the 
country.''
    There were more than 188,000 migrant encounters in June, and that 
number is expected to rise above 200,000 in July--the highest number in 
decades. While single adults and some migrant family units are being 
expelled by Title 42 public health protections, unaccompanied children 
and migrant families with young children are being processed and 
released into the U.S.
   biden administration reportedly planning to vaccinate migrants at 
                     border to prevent covid spread
    In June, while there were more than 55,000 family units encountered 
at the border, less than 9,000 were expelled by Title 42. However, 
despite pressure from left-wing groups to end Title 42 altogether, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) extended the order 
this week.
    An effort by Texas Gov. Greg Abbott to order law enforcement to 
pull over vehicles carrying migrants to stop COVID-19 spread was 
blocked temporarily by a judge on Tuesday in response to a Justice 
Department lawsuit.
    The Biden administration has blamed ``root causes'' like poverty 
and violence for the surge, has resumed some limited return flights for 
those ineligible for asylum and is reportedly planning on vaccinating 
migrants coming across the border or being deported.
    But as new restrictions pop up across the country, particularly in 
response to the rise of the delta variant, and the numbers of migrants 
encountered at the border keeps spiking, Republicans are likely to keep 
putting pressure on the Biden administration over the contrast between 
its COVID-19 efforts and its border policy.
    Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis on Wednesday cited the border as he 
responded to what he saw as Biden ``singling out'' Florida.
    ``Why don't you do your job? Why don't you get this border secure? 
And until you do that, I don't want to hear a blip about COVID from 
you,'' the Republican Governor said.

    Secretary Mayorkas. May I say something, Congressman, 
because you touch upon a very important subject that we have 
focused upon? That is the health and well-being of our work 
force. We launched Operation Vaccinate our Workforce to make 
sure that vaccinations are accessible to our front-line 
personnel. That yielded----
    Mr. Clyde. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. A tremendous increase in 
the percentage of our work force that was, indeed, vaccinated.
    Mr. Clyde. OK, well----
    Secretary Mayorkas. The President----
    Mr. Clyde [continuing]. Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Of the United States 
mandated----
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I appreciate that information. So, 
let me ask you this. How long will it take you to fully 
implement the MPP, Migrant Protection Protocol program? Can you 
give me a time frame on that?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I cannot because we are reliant on our 
partner, Mexico, to implement that program. That is a bilateral 
agreement. We are working with Mexico to implement that 
program.
    Mr. Clyde. So, until----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Now, if I may----
    Mr. Clyde. So, what I am gathering then is that you have no 
idea when that program will be fully implemented.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me be unequivocally 
clear----
    Mr. Clyde. No, no,----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. On this,----
    Mr. Clyde [continuing]. No, just tell me yes or no, you do 
or not?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We are seeking to implement that 
program and working to implement it in----
    Mr. Clyde. OK, thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Good faith----
    Mr. Clyde. Then I am reclaiming----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. As we are required to do 
so, sir.
    Mr. Clyde. I am reclaiming my time. I have a question for 
Director Wray and Director Abizaid. Do we know the identity of 
the Kabul airport bomber? Do we have any information that this 
person was previously incarcerated at Bagram Air Base? If I 
could get each one of you, Director Wray and Director Abizaid, 
to comment on that, please.
    Mr. Wray. I know we have identified certain individuals who 
we believe to be associated with the bombing. I am not sure as 
I sit here right now, whether that is information that is 
sufficiently developed to be able to share in a public hearing. 
So, let me see if there is more information we can supply to 
you as a follow-up because it may require a Classified setting. 
Then the second part is there may be an on-going investigation 
that might be impacted. So, let me look into that and we will 
circle back to you.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Director Abizaid.
    Ms. Abizaid. Yes, I would associate myself with Director 
Wray's comments. We do have an assessment along those lines. 
The ability to share in this forum is something that I don't 
have information, but I absolutely will follow up and work with 
our colleagues in the FBI to provide the information whether in 
a Classified setting or if it is de-Classified after this 
hearing.
    Mr. Clyde. OK. Thank you very much. I appreciate your 
commitment in that.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, for 
5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you 
to our witnesses for appearing before us here today. My 
colleagues have discussed a number of U.S. National security 
concerns and I share those same concerns. There is no doubt 
that our homeland faces more threats than in any time since 9/
11. The list of threats is long and far-reaching. But today, I 
would like to focus on the crisis on our Southwest Border.
    Now, Secretary Mayorkas, seeing as how this is our third 
time meeting to discuss this issue, I would like you to answer 
my questions with a simple yes or no as to not waste time. I 
would also caution you to refrain from making promises about 
providing us Members of Congress with additional information in 
a timely manner because we have just recently received 
information from a March 17 hearing. In fact, I received the 
answers to that March 17 hearing on August 24, 161 days after 
we requested that information. You can imagine how frustrating 
that probably is as a Member of Congress tasked with oversight 
of the Executive branch.
    So, with that in mind, I would like to jump right into a 
series of questions. Can you please provide me with the name of 
the individual who suspended, made the decision to suspend 
flights to Haiti the first week of September?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, that was a collective 
decision.
    Mrs. Cammack. By whom?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It was a temporary, if I may say not 
canceled, but postponed temporarily, the flights. Those were 
few----
    Mrs. Cammack. Did you make the recommendation?
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. And those were--I am 
sorry. Those were few in number.
    Mrs. Cammack. Did you, yourself, make the recommendation to 
suspend the flights?
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is my responsibility as the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. I own that.
    Mrs. Cammack. So, yes, OK. Thank you. Yes or no, you have 
committed to briefing my colleagues in a Classified setting on 
a number of known terrorists that have crossed into the United 
States or attempted to. Now, I think we can all agree that 
terrorists on the known watch list crossing into the United 
States is an immediate threat. So, will you commit to that 
briefing for this committee before the end of this month?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we will provide another 
briefing to this committee. I understand that we provided that 
briefing previously in July. If I may say----
    Mrs. Cammack. By the end of this month?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I will not myself be able to do that, 
but I am sure my team would be, Congresswoman. May I say 
something with respect to----
    Mrs. Cammack. Actually, I have a very limited amount of 
time, so I need to get through this because there is just a 
litany of issues. Now, how many DHS personnel, including CBP 
and USBP personnel have been pulled from their duties related 
to the Southwest Border in order to manage the processing of 
Afghans into the United States?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, we I believe that over 20 
individuals from the United States Border Patrol have been 
directed to the transit countries to assist.
    Mrs. Cammack. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I can get you a complete breakdown of 
the population of DHS personnel----
    Mrs. Cammack. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. That have been dedicated 
to the screening and vetting of Afghan nationals before they 
arrive here in the United States.
    Mrs. Cammack. I appreciate that. With regard to the agents 
that have been pulled off the line to process and essentially 
babysit, can you give me a percentage of how many of your 
agents are now engaging in that activity?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Oh, I disagree with that 
characterization, Congresswoman.
    Mrs. Cammack. I didn't ask if you disagreed. I asked for 
the percentage of how many, given a percentage of your agents 
have been pulled off of their primary law enforcement duties.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I just disagree with the 
question. I am sorry you are assuming thoughts. We have 
multiple areas of responsibility----
    Mrs. Cammack. Secretary Mayorkas, I am going to have to 
reclaim my time. I can answer that question for you. In one of 
your busiest sectors, the RGD sector, 75 percent of your Border 
Patrol agents have been pulled off the line to babysit and 
process. That is a disgrace.
    I also want to make mention that as we are sitting here, 
several of your agents are watching this hearing, hearing your 
commentary. You were exceptionally quick to judge one of your 
own agents and the mounted patrol, yet you have given zero time 
to the number of suicides and agents who have passed away 
because of contact and contracting COVID with their day-to-day 
operations. That, to me, is shameful.
    Now, I want to go to my colleague Representative Pfluger's 
comments. He asked you if you thought that the border was 
secure. In your own words, you stated that the border is no 
less secure than the previous administration. Mr. Guest 
previously provided data earlier in the hearing that your 
agency shows that it is, in fact, a historic level. We have 
308,000 ``gotaways''--75 percent of your agents are processing 
and babysitting in one of your busiest sectors. We have a 
record number of retirements. Historic level of narcotics that 
have come across the border and you still stand by your 
statement, yes or no, that the border is secure?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes. If I may, your initial assertion, 
Congresswoman, was profoundly offensive and wrong.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, this is now the second time that you 
have--or basically called me disrespectful. I believe in our 
first meeting you did. But I would just----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Secretary Mayorkas, for being here today. Mrs. Cammack touched 
upon something that I just want to ask briefly about, follow-up 
to information. Representative Correa and I sent a letter to 
DHS addressed to you on September 16. So, this is from both the 
Chairman of Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, 
Management, and Accountability, Mr. Correa, and also myself as 
Ranking Member, asking for specific information on how many of 
the Afghan evacuees that we have brought to the United States 
right now, how many of them are special immigrant visa holders 
or dependents? How many are permanent residents or dependents? 
American citizens or dependents? ANSF personnel who assisted in 
the evacuation or dependents? The local embassy staff at Kabul 
or dependents? How many are other Afghans? Because I know we 
have seen some figures floating around that suggest that over 
85 percent of those who were evacuated were neither SIVs, 
American citizens, or permanent residents. Obviously, it is a 
very fluid picture. Are you prepared to answer the questions we 
posed in that letter? Are you prepared to answer that today, 
Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, if I may, I will provide the 
answer in percentage form, Congressman. So, we have admitted 
into the United States over 60,000 Afghan nationals. 
Approximately 7 percent of that population are United States 
citizens. Approximately 6 percent are lawful permanent 
residents. Approximately 3 percent are special immigrant visa 
holders. The balance is a combination, if I may, Congressman, a 
combination of special immigrant visa applicants whose 
applications have not been finalized for approval, locally-
employed staff, individuals who would qualify under, for 
example, P-1, P-2 refugee status. Then other vulnerable Afghans 
as you have identified, journalists, human rights activists, et 
cetera.
    Mr. Meijer. If we could get--I appreciate the specificity 
in the 7 percent, 6 percent, 3 percent. Is my understanding 
that those numbers also accompany the dependents of the 
principal holder?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, Congressman, and we do not have a 
breakdown of the balance of that population, if you will. We do 
not yet have that breakdown, that data.
    Mr. Meijer. If you could get that to us by October 1 as 
requested in the letter, that would be really appreciated, Mr. 
Secretary. Also touching on the border real quickly, I mean, 
looking at the numbers we have, you are no longer--the 
administration's line is no longer that this is seasonal, you 
know, increases, right? I mean, we are--we are at structurally 
different numbers coming across, correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Meijer. OK. Is that something that you are satisfied 
by? Is this a tolerable situation? I was appreciative of the 
emotion and enthusiasm you talked about the investigation you 
will be doing into the photos that we saw. Will there be an 
appropriate attempt to try to close the border or to try to 
reduce that flow or get us down from, again, I mean, just 
incredibly high numbers? I am looking at the fiscal year 
southwest land border encounters by month, I mean, it was that 
ramp up in February and it has just stayed above that, you 
know, 175 level consistently. Are we doing anything to try to 
get that number back down to try to really control the border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We most certainly are, Congressman. We 
are doing a number of different things to address irregular 
migration and the number of individuals who are traveling north 
to our Southern Border ill-advisedly, perilously, and 
unsuccessfully. We are doing a number of things and I have 
spoken about this with respect to the root causes, the safe, 
orderly, and humane pathways, rebuilding processes here in the 
United States.
    Mr. Meijer. Has any of that had an demonstrable----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Humanitarian----
    Mr. Meijer [continuing]. Impact on being able to reduce 
those numbers, sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Well, we actually have recently seen a 
reduction in numbers. We hope that trend continues. We are 
employing tools and we are also fundamentally hopeful that the 
broken immigration system will be fixed through legislation.
    Mr. Meijer. Just, I think, that reduction was from July was 
213,000, August was 208,000. So, still quadruple what it was in 
prior years. But, I guess, a reduction of, you know, a few 
percent is something. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Gottheimer, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and 
Ranking Member Katko for holding this important hearing. Thank 
you, Mr. Secretary and Director Wray and Director Abizaid. 
Welcome so much. Thank you for your service. I really look 
forward to our work together to help protect our great country.
    As we sit here today 20 years after 9/11, it is clear that 
we face a much different threat landscape today than the one 
that presented itself two decades ago. We have seen the rise of 
a diffuse domestic and home-grown terrorist movement, 
especially White supremacists and other racially or ethnically 
motivated violent extremists. As of last year, the FBI had more 
than 1,000 pending domestic terrorism investigations in all 50 
States across 56 field offices. Earlier this year in 
recognition of these threats, the Department of Homeland 
Security, FBI, and the National Counterterrorism Center, 
agencies our witnesses today represent, were each charged with 
fulfilling specific goals under the first-ever National 
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism.
    Given these pending threats, it is critical that Congress 
enacts reforms to prevent the rising threat of domestic 
terrorism. Mr. Secretary, in July, this committee approved my 
bill, the Darren Drake Act. It is named in memory of a resident 
from my district, Darren Drake, of New Milford, a victim of 
October 2017 New York City Westside Highway terrorist truck 
attack. The bipartisan bill would direct the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to develop and disseminate best practices for 
rental companies and dealers to report suspicious behavior to 
law enforcement agencies at the point-of-sale of rental 
vehicles to prevent and mitigate acts of terrorism using motor 
vehicles. Mr. Secretary, how will these provisions help protect 
communities, in your opinion, from future terrorist attacks and 
what other reforms are most needed to prevent domestic terror 
incidents like those we have seen in recent years?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, your bill is--your bill is 
extremely important because it speaks of a fundamental need. 
Not only the dissemination of information to State, local, 
Tribal, territorial law enforcement, but the dissemination to 
the private sector and in the sharing of best practices. We are 
working to implement that very thoroughly. I think it is a very 
important measure and we have designed the Center for 
Prevention programs and partnership precisely to accomplish 
that mission to equip and empower all of society to work within 
the communities to address this increased threat.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you so much. I really appreciate 
that. Dr. Abizaid, in February along with Representatives Brian 
Fitzpatrick, Andre Carson, and Chris Smith, I introduced the 
bipartisan Saracini Enhanced Aviation Act of 2021 to require 
the installation of secondary cockpit barriers on all 
commercial passenger aircraft to prevent terrorist attacks 
similar to 9/11. The bill mandates the installation of 
inexpensive lightweight wire-mesh gates between the passenger 
cabin and cockpit door blocking access to flight decks whenever 
the cockpit door is open during flight on all existing 
aircrafts. Director, looking back on the 20 years since 
9/11, how can we prevent measures like this one help--and 
further protect American citizens? In your view, what more is 
needed?
    Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much for the question. In 
general, the threats to aviation security are from foreign 
terrorist organizations in particular, remain of concern even 
here 20 years later. The enhancements that have happened in the 
intervening time have certainly protected us and the 
establishment of organizations like TSA, like DHS, like NCTC, 
have all contributed to that. That said, every additional step 
that would further improve security, is something that we think 
will deter terrorist capability with regard to aviation 
security or other tactics they may use or other tactics they 
may use, and so, we appreciate the effort that you have gone 
through to do that.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Director, do you think we need that 
secondary barrier on all planes, not just the new commercial 
ones, but existing flights?
    Ms. Abizaid. I am not intimately familiar with the 
legislation or specifically, the assessment that would lead us 
to say that that is absolutely necessary. I would just say as a 
general matter, it sounds reasonable. I am happy to look at it 
and run it against what we know of terrorist tactics and 
capabilities and come back to you on that.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Thanks. It was in the--it is the only 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report that has yet to be 
implemented. It is right now we use drink carts on many planes 
and the flight attendants have to stand there. When the cockpit 
door is open there has been several--there has been plenty of 
research at the FAA on this and other areas about the threat to 
our cockpits and to our airplanes about this. So, yes, I would 
love to follow up with you on this because I think it is 
critically important based on the research and the evidence and 
the 9/11 Commission Report that we get this done. There is 
absolutely no reason why we would leave this vulnerability 
open. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. LaTurner, for 5 
minutes. The gentleman needs to unmute himself. I think we are 
having some technical difficulties with you. We are still not 
able to hear you, Mr. LaTurner. Stand by, we are trying to 
correct it.
    Mr. LaTurner. Can you hear me now, Mr. Chairman?
    Chairman Thompson. Yes, I can. Go ahead.
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Chairman? OK.
    Chairman Thompson. You are on. Go ahead.
    Mr. LaTurner. Secretary Mayorkas, as has been cited 
throughout this hearing today, Customs and Border Patrol has 
encountered 208,887 migrants on the Southwest Border this past 
August. A 317 percent increase compared to the prior year. CBP 
is currently encountering over 5,000 more individuals per day 
than in August 2020. We have seen 6 straight months with over 
170,000 encounters. Your Inspector General also just released a 
report highlighting the fact that your agency has failed to 
ensure sufficient COVID-preventative measures at the border. 
After nearly 3 decades of service at CBP, former Border Chief 
Rodney Scott stated that DHS is seeing terrorists cross our 
border ``at a level we have never seen before.'' This is 
absolutely unacceptable. This disaster must be addressed 
immediately. What specifically are you doing at DHS to ensure 
that our borders are secure and that Americans are kept safe 
amidst all of this chaos?
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Congressman, I can spell out 
quite a number of measures that we are taking. Let me focus, if 
I may, on August the number of encounters that you identify 
are--does not reflect the number of individuals encountered, as 
we do have a level of recidivism there. You cited 208,000 
figure. In fact, the unique encounters, the number of different 
individuals encountered in August was 156,641. So, we have 
taken a number of measures, enforcement measures.
    For example, we have increased the number of lateral 
flights from one area of the border to another and then we have 
the removal flights leave from that second processing area into 
the interior of Mexico to make recidivism more difficult and to 
ease the processing line and facilitate it. That is one example 
of a measure that we have taken. We have, in fact, instituted a 
policy to criminally prosecute recidivists, individuals who 
have been removed previously. We are working with the Northern 
Triangle countries to receive more individuals more rapidly so 
that we can effect removals more. Those are some examples of 
the measures that we are taking from an enforcement 
perspective.
    We also have an obligation, albeit in a COVID-19 
environment, because we are employing the CDC's Title 42 public 
health authority, we do have an obligation to enforce all laws 
that is also not only the laws of accountability, but the laws 
of humanitarian relief. Those are equally on the books as well. 
Many of the individuals whom we encounter claim asylum and have 
a right to have those asylum claims heard as our laws provide.
    Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Could you provide--
what percentage of migrants have been processed through Title 
42 as opposed to Title 8?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, let's take a look, if I may, 
Congressman, at the August numbers. So, of the numbers that I 
have indicated, the 93,414 have been processed for expulsion 
under Title 42 and 115,473 have been processed for expulsion 
under Title 8.
    Mr. LaTurner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I yield 
back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. The Secretary 
has reiterated during this hearing his willingness to provide 
requested updates to Members in an appropriate setting. We will 
work and coordinate that with the Secretary and if at all 
possible, Mr. Director, we might try to get you there too given 
some of the information you were not able to provide at this 
hearing so that the Members can have as full a view of what the 
landscape looks like in a Classified and un-Classified setting. 
We will try to work everybody as well as our third witness who 
perhaps can help us on the international front to tie some of 
the areas together too. For sure, we will get FBI and DHS and 
obviously, if we need to include others, we will.
    I thank the witnesses for their testimony and Members for 
their questions. The Members of the committee may have 
additional questions for the witnesses and we ask you to 
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
    Without objection I also include in the record a letter 
from the Jewish Federations on the subject of today's hearing.
    [The information follows:]
          Letter From the Jewish Federations of North America
                                September 20, 2021.
The Honorable Bennie Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable John Katko,
Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
    Dear Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko: The Jewish 
Federations of North America commends you for holding a timely hearing 
on Worldwide Threats to the Homeland: 20 Years After 9/11.
    In the 20 years since the 9/11 attacks, the charitable sector, and 
the Jewish community in particular, has been a high-value target of 
violent extremists and the threats have metastasized from foreign 
terrorist organizations and home-grown violent extremists to include 
domestic violent extremists, and especially racially or ethnically 
motivated violent extremists, such as white supremacists. While these 
bad actors may have divergent ideological underpinnings, they share a 
common thread that unites them--their hatred for the Jewish people. And 
as the threat actors and their motivations have expanded, so have their 
targets within the charitable sector.
    We have witnessed terrorists and violent extremists target African-
American parishioners engaged in religious worship (mass shooting) and 
Somali immigrants attending their community mosque (bombing), as well 
as Jewish congregants participating in Chanukah holiday celebrations 
(machete attack).\1\ As the threats have morphed and grown, we are 
tremendously grateful for the strong bi-partisan response from the 
House Homeland Security Committee to grow and expand the reach of the 
Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) and to advance other best 
practices and resources to secure the charitable sector and houses of 
worship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
Science, ``Violent Extremism and Domestic Terrorism in America: The 
Role and Response of DOJ,'' April 29, 2021; Link: https://
appropriations.house.gov/events/hearings/violent-extremism-and-
domestic-terrorism-in-america-the-role-and-response-of-doj.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three years ago, with your support, Congress broadened eligibility 
to the NSGP program from approximately 30 high-risk urban areas to 
communities throughout the United States, large and small. Last year, 
through your leadership, Congress passed a 5-year authorization of the 
NSGP program, elevating its stature as a meaningful part of the 
preparedness grant programs. This year, also with your support, the 
program doubled in funding to $180 million.
    In only a few years, NSGP has grown into the third-largest program 
in FEMA's grant programs portfolio in terms of volume and work, behind 
only the Urban Area Security Initiative and the Homeland Security Grant 
Program. And we believe that further growth in the program is both 
justified and inevitable. It is justified because only a very small 
portion of faith-based and nonprofit organizations have participated in 
the program to date (about 6,500 over the past 17 years), even as the 
charitable sector, made up of nearly 1.7 million houses of worship and 
charitable institutions, faces a heightened and more expansive threat 
environment. It is inevitable because the more the charitable sector 
becomes aware of the NSGP funding opportunity and current barriers to 
the program are addressed, participation rates will certainly increase 
as they have over the last 7 consecutive fiscal years.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, there are a number of challenges nonprofits face to 
accessing vital security resources, including NSGP. First, neither the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) nor the State Administrative 
Agencies (SAAs) receive any specific resources to manage and administer 
the NSGP program, which has grown exponentially in recent funding 
cycles. Despite rapid growth in the program, the administering bodies 
have not been provided the needed resources to support stakeholder 
outreach and technical assistance or to conduct fulsome application 
review and vetting processes.
    To ensure the integrity of the program, including the quality of 
program oversight and technical assistance to its stakeholders, we 
recommend providing FEMA Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) and the SAAs 
with additional and specified resources to address their management and 
administrative costs.
    Second, with respect to stakeholders navigating the application 
process, one of the greatest challenges to accessing, understanding, 
and successfully applying for the NSGP funding opportunity is the 
archaic and static Excel-based application form and format FEMA's GPD 
is required to use. Presently, navigating the current process is overly 
complex, inconsistent, and faulty. Many stakeholders' technical 
assistance questions pertain to glitches in the application.
    Information important to the SAAs and GPD review process are not 
permitted to be asked. An efficient and streamlined web-based format is 
long overdue that would infuse equity and a level playing field for all 
stakeholders and continuity and relevance in the review process. For 
this to happen, FEMA GPD requires authority (a waiver to the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995) to update the content and format of the 
application.
    The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) governs how Federal agencies 
collect information from the public. Its purpose, in significant part, 
is to ``Ensure the greatest possible public benefit from and maximize 
the utility of information created, collected, maintained, used, 
shared, and disseminated by or for the Federal Government'' and to 
``improve the quality and use of Federal information to strengthen 
decision making, accountability, and openness in Government and 
society.''\3\ The current NSGP application is not meeting these central 
purposes of the PRA. A waiver to the PRA would fast track a several 
years-long approval process to secure needed changes to reduce barriers 
to successfully applying for and administering the NSGP application 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ US Office of Personnel Management, ``Paperwork Reduction Act 
Guide Version 2,0,'' April 27, 2011; Link: https://www.opm.gov/about-
us/open-government/digital-government-strategy/fitara/paperwork-
reduction-act-guide.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To hasten new technology capabilities and a redesign of the NSGP 
application content and format, we recommend providing FEMA's GPD with 
the necessary expedited waiver authority.
    Third, as the interest in the NSGP program has increased, the 
limitation on available resources remains a challenge. The number of 
applications submitted by the State Administrative Agencies to FEMA 
grew from 963 in fiscal year 2018 to more than 3,300 this year (fiscal 
year 2021). The program in fiscal year 2018 funded about 54 percent of 
the applicants reviewed by FEMA (up from an average of about 36 percent 
between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2017). Yet even with a 
threefold increase in funding in fiscal year 2021, only about 45 
percent of the applicants reviewed by FEMA were approved. In fact, a 
total of 3,361 applicants submitted project requests totaling 
$399,763,916, more than twice the $180 million in available funds 
appropriated by Congress.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ DHS/FEMA/Grant Programs Directorate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To meet the demands of the charitable sector on the NSGP program, 
we recommend doubling the current appropriation of $180 million to $360 
million in fiscal year 2022, and for Congress to stabilize the annual 
NSGP funding level in line with the elevated threat level.
    Fourth, we have witnessed threats and attacks against faith-based 
and communal institutions that have occurred in communities with 
populations as large as 2.5 million and as small as 600.
    While current threat assessments warn of the increased opportunity 
for violence against faith-based and communal institutions they do not 
pinpoint credible or imminent threats. This is common because law 
enforcement and counterterrorism agencies are hard pressed to deter, 
detect, and disrupt violent extremists before they attack. What is 
clear is that this is a threat of Nation-wide proportions affecting 
urban, suburban, and rural communities, and no one can predict where 
the next attack will occur.
    When the NSGP program was first created in fiscal year 2004, the 
country lacked coordinated, centralized programs to promote and ensure 
at-risk nonprofit institutions meaningfully participated in and 
benefited from Federal, State, or local homeland security efforts. 
Despite legitimate and growing nonprofit threats and concerns, the 
charitable sector lacked a seat at the table to effectively compete for 
planning, training, target hardening, and other Federal preparedness 
resources. The charitable sector lacked a reliable and broad conduit to 
the Nation's law enforcement and counterterrorism establishments, 
Federal, State, and local.
    In its 17 years, the NSGP program has made critical inroads for a 
small percentage of the Nation's houses of worship and charitable 
institutions. Unfortunately, today's threat environment provides a 
compelling public interest in furthering protections against attacks 
that would disrupt the vital health, human, social, cultural, 
religious, and other humanitarian services and practices the charitable 
sector provides, and which threaten the lives and well-being of 
millions of Americans who operate, utilize, live, and work in proximity 
to them.
    To meet this task, we recommended the Department of Homeland 
Security designate the charitable sector as an addition to the Nation's 
critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks are 
considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating effect on National security, 
economic security, public health, or public safety.\5\ As DHS's 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency describes, ``these 
partnerships create an environment to share critical threat 
information, risk mitigation, and other vital information and 
resources.''\6\ The charitable sector should also be afforded the full 
extent of these partnerships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Government Accountability Office Report, ``Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and Private 
Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors,'' October 16, 2006 (GAO-07-39); Link: 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-39/html/
GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-39.htm.
    \6\ Cybersecurity and Infrastructures Security Agency; Link: 
https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the 20th anniversary of 9/11, there is much to consider about 
the world-wide threats to the homeland, including those pertaining to 
the charitable sector. For these reasons, we respectfully urge you to 
call on Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Director Wray, and National Counterterrorism Center 
Director Abizaid to address the safety and security issues of the 
charitable sector in their testimony, including responding to the 
concerns and recommendations outlined in this letter.
    Thank you for your consideration.
            Sincerely,
                                        Robert B. Goldberg,
   Senior Director, Legislative Affairs, The Jewish Federations of 
                                                     North America.
                                 ______
                                 
          Report From the Jewish Federations of North America
Nonprofit Security Grant Program.--Threat Incident Report: September 1, 
                            2021 to Present
Prepared By: Rob Goldberg, Senior Director, Legislative Affairs, 
        [email protected]
recent risk reports and assessments of national significance/chronology 
                      of threat incidents reported
    Union Vale, New York, September 20, 2021 (Jerusalem Post/New York 
State Police/Mid Hudson News).--An off-duty New York City police 
officer has been arrested after he allegedly broke into Camp Young 
Judea on the second day of Rosh Hashanah, September 8. Matthew McGrath, 
37, was arrested and charged with felony burglary and criminal mischief 
after he allegedly smashed windows, destroyed the camp director's 
residence, and extensively damaged the property.
    San Diego, California, September 17, 2021 (DoJ/US Attorney's Office 
for the Southern District of California).--John T. Earnest of Rancho 
Penasquitos pleaded guilty in Federal court today to a 113-count hate 
crimes indictment, admitting that he set fire to an Escondido mosque 
and opened fire in a Poway synagogue because he wanted to kill Muslims 
and Jews. The religiously and racially motivated attacks resulted in 
the murder of 1 person and the attempted murders of 53 others. 
According to the plea agreement and other court documents, after 
several weeks of planning, Earnest drove to the Chabad of Poway 
synagogue, where members of the congregation were gathered for 
religious worship. Earnest entered the building armed with a Smith and 
Wesson M&P 15 assault rifle that was fully loaded with a 10-round 
magazine. He wore a chest rig which contained 5 additional magazines, 
each loaded with 10 rounds of ammunition. Earnest opened fire, killing 
1 person (Lori Gilbert Kaye) and injuring 3 other members of the 
congregation, including a then-8-year-old child. After Earnest emptied 
his initial magazine, several congregants rushed at Earnest. Earnest 
fled in his car and, shortly after, called 9-1-1 and confessed that he 
had ``just shot up a synagogue.'' Earnest was apprehended by local law 
enforcement who found the rifle and additional ammunition in his car. 
Investigators found a manifesto written by Earnest and posted on the 
internet shortly before the attack. In the manifesto, Earnest made many 
anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim statements, including ``I can only kill so 
many Jews'' and ``I only wish I killed more.'' Earnest wrote that he 
was inspired by the Tree of Life synagogue shooting in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, and the shootings at two mosques in New Zealand. Earnest 
also admitted that he attempted to set fire to the Dar-ul-Arqam mosque 
in Escondido, California because of his hatred of Muslims and the 
religious character of the building. Seven missionaries were asleep in 
the mosque at the time of the attack, but no one was injured.
    Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, September 16, 2021 (DoJ/US Attorney's 
Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania).--Mustafa Mousab 
Alowemer, 23, of Pittsburgh pleaded guilty to one count of attempting 
to provide material support to ISIS in relation to his plan to attack a 
church. According to court documents, Alowemer plotted to bomb a church 
located on the north side of Pittsburgh using an explosive device. His 
stated motivation to conduct such an attack was to support the cause of 
ISIS and to inspire other ISIS supporters in the United States to join 
together and commit similar acts in the name of ISIS. Alowemer also 
targeted the church to ``take revenge for our [ISIS] brothers in 
Nigeria.'' Alowemer was aware that numerous people in the proximity of 
the church could be killed by the explosion. In his planning, Alowemer 
purchased several items, including nails and acetone (nail polish 
remover) with the belief that they were necessary to assemble a 
destructive device and with the intention they be used to construct the 
explosives that would be detonated in the vicinity of the church. He 
also printed Google satellite maps, which included hand-written 
markings identifying the church and routes of arrival and escape. 
Alowemer also wrote and provided a 10-point handwritten plan outlining 
details related to his plot to personally deliver explosives in a 
backpack.
    Nation-wide, September 16, 2021 (Department of Homeland Security 
\1\).--The Department of Homeland Security assesses that some 
individuals involved in or opposed to the ``Justice for J6'' rally 
planned for 18 September at Union Square in Washington, DC may seek to 
engage in violence. In early September, social media users discussed 
using the rally to target local Jewish institutions and ``liberal 
churches,'' while law enforcement is distracted that day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Intelligence in Brief, 
``Prospects for Violence at `Justice for J6' Rally in Washington, DC,'' 
16 September 2021 (IA-54468-21)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hagen, Germany, September 16, 2021 (13 ABC WHAM/Associated Press/
Der Spiegel news magazine/DPA news agency).--German security officials 
detained 4 people in connection with a suspected plan to attack a 
synagogue in the western city of Hagen. The detentions took place on 
Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, and 2 years after a deadly 
attack targeting a synagogue in the German city of Halle the Yom Kippur 
holiday. (In the Halle attack, an armed right-wing extremist tried, but 
failed, to force his way into the synagogue with 52 worshippers inside. 
When the door held, he shot dead 2 people nearby and injured 2 others 
as he fled.) According to news reports, a foreign intelligence service 
tipped off German security officials about the threat based on an on-
line chat where one of the suspects discussed planning an attack with 
explosives on a Hagen synagogue. The interior minister of the state of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, where Hagen is located, confirmed that there 
was an attack threat. Dozens of police officers secured the building 
and a service planned to mark Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, 
was canceled at short notice.
    Toledo, Ohio, September 13, 2021 (Department of Justice/Office of 
Public Affairs).--Damon M. Joseph, aka Abdullah Ali Yusuf, 23, of 
Holland, Ohio, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for attempting to 
provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
(ISIS) and for planning to attack 2 synagogues in the Toledo area. 
According to Acting Assistant Attorney General Mark J. Lesko of the 
Justice Department's National Security Division, ``Inspired by ISIS, 
Damon Joseph planned to conduct a deadly terrorist attack at a 
synagogue in Ohio. He hoped to cause mass casualties by selecting a 
time when numerous innocent victims would be present.'' According to 
the Department of Justice release, Joseph attempted to support ISIS 
through violent attacks on Jewish congregants, including children, and 
any first responders who sought to protect and assist them. According 
to statements Joseph made to undercover FBI personnel, he wanted to use 
AR 15s, AK 47, Glock handguns and ammunition to inflict mass 
casualties, he specifically wanted to kill a rabbi, and wanted to 
conduct the attack on the Jewish sabbath so that more people would be 
present.
    Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, September 13, 2021 (JTA).--Two 
separate threat incidents proximate to the Jewish high holy days have 
led to increased security measures and communal disruptions. Beth El 
Synagogue in St. Louis Park (Minneapolis) closed its doors and moved 
Shabbat services on-line after the regional offices of ADL Midwest in 
Chicago notified the congregation of a ``a specific threat of 
violence'' it received against the synagogue via its on-line incidence-
report system. Specific details of the threat are not being released, 
with authorities citing an on-going investigation. This synagogue 
threat occurred one day after 32 headstones were knocked down at the 
Chesed Shei Emes cemetery in St. Paul. As the high holy days continue, 
area synagogues and Jewish organizations are increasing security at 
their institutions in light of the threat.
    Bloomington, Minnesota, September 13, 2021 (DoJ/U.S. Attorney's 
Office for the District of Minnesota).--Emily Claire Hari, 50, f/k/a 
Michael Hari, was sentenced to 53 years in prison for the August 5, 
2017, bombing of the Dar al-Farooq (DAF) Islamic Center. Hari was 
convicted by a Federal jury on all 5 counts of the indictment, 
including intentionally defacing, damaging, and destroying religious 
property because of the religious character of that property; 
intentionally obstructing, and attempting to obstruct, by force and the 
threat of force, the free exercise of religious beliefs; conspiracy to 
commit Federal felonies by means of fire and explosives; carrying and 
using a destructive device during and in relation to crimes of 
violence; and possession of an unregistered destructive device. As 
proven at trial, during the summer of 2017, Hari established a 
terrorist militia group called ``The White Rabbits'' in Clarence, 
Illinois. Hari recruited co-defendants Michael McWhorter and Joe Morris 
to join the militia, which Hari outfitted with paramilitary equipment 
and assault rifles. On August 4 and 5, 2017, Hari, McWhorter, and 
Morris drove in a rented pickup truck from Illinois to Bloomington, 
Minnesota, to bomb the DAF Islamic Center, using a 20-pound black 
powder pipe bomb together with a plastic container filled with a 
mixture of diesel fuel and gasoline. When the pipe bomb exploded, the 
blast caused extensive damage to the Imam's office. It also ignited the 
gasoline and diesel mixture, causing extensive fire and smoke damage. 
At the time of the bombing, several worshipers were gathered in the 
mosque for morning prayers. Hari targeted DAF specifically to terrorize 
Muslims into believing they are not welcome in the United States and 
should leave the country. In handing down a 53-year sentence, United 
States District Judge Donovan W. Frank described the attack 
orchestrated by Hari as a highly sophisticated and premeditated act of 
domestic terrorism.
    Buxton, Maine/Nation-wide, September 13, 2021 (Bangor Daily 
News).--Brian Dennison, 24, allegedly threatened in his Twitter feed 
``to kill Jews with my AR-15'' during the High Holy Days, has been 
charged in Federal court in Portland with transmitting threatening 
interstate communication. He also said he was building a pipe bomb, 
according to documents filed in U.S. District Court in Portland. 
Dennison posted the threat on September 8, the second day of Rosh 
Hashanah, the Jewish New Year. According to Dennison's parents, their 
son owns ``a few pistols and rifles, including an AR-15-style rifle.'' 
They also said that Dennison ``had been obsessed with Jews for about 3 
years, and that he believed Jews were responsible for all of his 
problems,'' and that ``They said they had many concerning conversations 
with Brian regarding Jews,'' according to a court affidavit.
    Framingham, Massachusetts, September 9, 2021 (MetroWest Daily 
News).--Two hand-sized swastikas were found carved into a wooden sign 
at the Temple Beth Sholom synagogue in the midst of the high holiday 
season. The Jewish New Year, Rosh Hashanah, began on September 8.
    Nation-wide, September 7, 2021 (Department of Homeland Security 
\2\).--The relocation of Afghan nationals to the United States likely 
exacerbates Domestic Violent Extremist grievances associated with 
Muslim communities and could lead some to commit violence. Some 
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremist-White Supremacists 
are posting content blaming the Jewish community for the relocation of 
Afghan nationals. A suspected RMVE-WS has called for an arson attack on 
a Jacksonville, Florida-based nonprofit organization involved in Afghan 
resettlement, according to non-Government organization reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Intelligence in Focus, 
``Possible Domestic Violent Extremist Responses to the Relocation of 
Afghan Nationals to the United States,'' 7 September 2021 (IA-51281-
21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Germany, September 3, 2021 (The Algemeiner).--Germany's president 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier delivered a Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) 
message to Germany's Jewish community filled with concern for the 
community's safety and security. Steinmeier remarked that 2 years after 
the Halle atrocity, ``Jews in Germany continue to be ridiculed, 
belittled, violently attacked.'' On October 9, 2019, neo-Nazi Stephan 
Balliet drove to the Halle synagogue as more than 50 worshipers inside 
the sanctuary held services to mark Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the 
Jewish calendar. Balliet was equipped with eight firearms, several 
explosive devices, a helmet, and a protective vest for the attack. 
After failing to break through the synagogue's locked entrance despite 
exploding a grenade, Balliet shot dead a 40-year-old female passerby. 
After additional violent attempts to force his way inside the temple, 
Balliet drove to a Muslim-owned restaurant and shot dead a 20-year-old 
man he believed to be a Muslim. According to German Federal Government 
figures released in February, at least 2,275 crimes with an anti-
Semitic background were logged over a 12-month period ending in January 
2021. Steinmeier asserted that anti-Semitic conspiracy theories fueled 
by the COVID-19 pandemic were gaining momentum. ``It pains me and makes 
me angry that anti-Semitic hatred and anti-Jewish agitation are showing 
themselves so openly--in Germany, of all places,'' the president said.
    Nation-wide, September 2, 2021 (CTV News Canada/CNN).--As the 
United States-backed Government in Afghanistan fell to the Taliban and 
U.S. troops raced to leave the country, White supremacist extremists 
expressed admiration for what the Taliban accomplished, a worrying 
development for U.S. officials who have been grappling with the threat 
of domestic violent extremism. Several concerning trends have emerged 
in recent weeks on on-line platforms commonly used by White supremacist 
and other domestic violent extremist groups, including ``framing the 
activities of the Taliban as a success,'' and a model for those who 
believe in the need for a civil war in the United States, according to 
the head of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, John Cohen. Cohen expressed concerns that 
these narratives may incite violent activities directed at immigrant 
communities and certain faith communities. Neo-Nazi and violent 
accelerationists--who hope to provoke what they see as an inevitable 
race war, which would lead to a Whites-only state--in North America and 
Europe are praising the Taliban for its anti-Semitism, homophobia, and 
severe restrictions on women's freedom, the SITE Intelligence Group 
found. For example, a quote taken from the Proud Boy to Fascist 
Pipeline Telegram channel, said: ``These farmers and minimally trained 
men fought to take back their nation back from globohomo. They took 
back their government, installed their national religion as law, and 
executed dissenters . . . If White men in the west had the same courage 
as the Taliban, we would not be ruled by Jews currently,'' SITE found.
    Nation-wide, September 1, 2021 (NTIC Homeland Security Intelligence 
Digest--September 10, 2021/San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination 
Center Intelligence Bulletin (21-18)).--A review of 17 disrupted 
domestic violent extremist (DVE) plots in the United States from June 
2016 through July 2021 found that DVEs interested in plotting violent 
action using IEDs are more likely to construct simple devices from 
readily available supplies, rather than seeking to purchase a fully-
built device. The cases reviewed included many targeting faith-based 
communities: Mosque (Garden City, Kansas--October 2016); Religious 
Facilities (Oklee, Minnesota--October 2017); Muslim Community 
(Islamberg, New York--January 2019); Synagogue and Mosque (Brownsville, 
Texas--June 2019); Synagogue (Las Vegas, Nevada--August 2019); 
Synagogue (Pueblo, Colorado--November 2019); and Jewish Populations 
(Campbell, California--July 2021). Outlook: DVEs will likely continue 
to attempt to acquire commercially available explosive precursors and 
seek to build simple IEDs.

    Chairman Thompson. The Chair reminds that the committee's 
record will remain open for 10 business days. Without 
objection, the committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

    Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1. Secretary Mayorkas, can you speak to climate change as 
a threat multiplier? Is this crisis contributing to the other threats 
you highlighted in your written testimony such as terrorism, economic 
security, immigration, and transnational organized crime?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Secretary Mayorkas, our Nation has more than 300 land, 
air, and seaports of entry that require the screening of foreign 
visitors and cargo. Can you provide an update on the on-going threats 
facing those ports of entry? What are the challenges that your 
department, and more specifically Customs and Border Protection, 
continue to face, and what efforts have you taken to mitigate those 
challenges?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. For all three witnesses, from an information-gathering 
and -sharing standpoint, what blind spots or challenges are you 
continuing to experience in addressing the threat from domestic violent 
extremists? Are there authorities or other areas that this committee 
should be looking at to address those blind spots?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Hon. Clay Higgins for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1. Secretary Mayorkas, last month you were recorded 
saying, ``if our borders are the first line of defense, we're going to 
lose and this is unsustainable,'' as well as ``We can't continue like 
this, our people in the field can't continue and our system isn't built 
for it'' and the current border situation ``cannot continue.''
    With a simple YES or NO, do you still believe that the situation at 
the Southern Border is unsustainable and cannot continue?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Did you advise President Biden that the border 
situation is unsustainable and cannot continue?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Given that the border is still open, is the President 
ignoring your advice?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. Why has the administration not acted to secure the 
border?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. Do you plan on requesting additional resources in 
today's hearing to counter this surge in illegal crossings?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. Does the current crisis at the Southern Border, along 
with the deterioration of U.S. intel assets in the Middle East as a 
result of the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan cause additional 
concerns for DHS, similar to those expressed by the Pentagon?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. What incentive does the Biden administration have to 
keep the border open even though, according to you, its unsustainable?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Hon. Michael Guest for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1. Secretary Mayorkas, according to a letter from 
recently-departed chief of the U.S. Border Patrol Rodney Scott, you 
have chosen to ignore the recommendations of career Government 
leadership despite your own admission that you agree with them.
    In August, you admitted to a group of border agents in a closed-
door meeting, ``if our borders are the first line of defense, we're 
going to lose and this is unsustainable'' and that the current border 
situation ``cannot continue.'' The above statements are gravely 
concerning and indicate that you know there is an issue but are 
unwilling to take the necessary steps to fix it.
    Do you still believe the above statements that you made to a group 
of Border Patrol agents?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Have you agreed with career Government leadership on 
proven programs and consequences to help secure our border but not 
acted on them? If so, why?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
  Questions From Hon. Mariannette Miller-Meeks for Hon. Alejandro N. 
                                Mayorkas
    Question 1. If we're requiring air travelers to have a negative 
COVID test before entry, why aren't we requiring the same of land 
travelers?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. If we are able to test Afghan Paroles for COVID and 
vaccinate them for not only COVID, but Measles, Mumps, Rubella, and 
Polio, and any other age-appropriate vaccinations are required by the 
CDC, why is there a double standard along our Southwest Border?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Do you agree with the IGs report entitled ``DHS Needs 
to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border''?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. Do you agree that it is your responsibility to ensure 
that there are strong protocols in place at the border to mitigate the 
spread of COVID-19?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. Do you commit to implementing the IGs recommendation 
and identify ways to mitigate the spread of COVID-19?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. Do you commit to report back to this committee within a 
month on progress the Department has made at the border regarding 
COVID?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
   Questions From Hon. Carlos Gimenez for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1. What is the number of illegal migrants that have been 
encountered along the U.S. border since Jan 20, 2021?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. What is the number of illegal migrants that have been 
detained attempting to cross the U.S. border since Jan 20, 2021?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. What is the number of illegal migrants that have been 
released into the United States since Jan 20, 2021?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1. Can you commit to responding to the letter that 
Representative Correa and I sent to you on September 16, 2021, with the 
requested information regarding Operation Allies Welcome, by the 
requested deadline of October 1, 2021?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. One of the main questions we have asked about the 
Afghan resettlement efforts, and that we have yet to receive a 
sufficient answer from the administration on, is a breakdown of 
evacuees coming to the United States by status (SIV holders, SIV 
applicants, P1/P2 applicants, other at-risk Afghans, dependents of all 
categories of individuals, etc.).
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Why has it taken so long to get an answer on this?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. At what stage of the resettlement process is an 
individual's status determined?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. If individuals are going through screening and vetting 
procedures prior to coming to the United States, shouldn't we at least 
have a breakdown by status for individuals that have already entered 
the United States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. With DHS as the Federal Government's lead on Operation 
Allies Welcome, does DHS have any role in continuing evacuation 
operations out of Afghanistan? Or does this remain solely under the 
State Department's jurisdiction?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. Amid surges of migrants at different locations along 
the Southwest Border, in addition to DHS personnel being reassigned to 
assist with the Operation Allies Welcome resettlement effort for Afghan 
evacuees coming to the United States, it would be helpful to get some 
clarity on how DHS is currently allocating its resources.
    Where did the DHS personnel that were surged to Del Rio come from? 
Where did the DHS personnel reassigned to Operation Allies Welcome come 
from?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 9. Do these locations that personnel were reassigned away 
from now lack sufficient resources to conduct their homeland security 
missions?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 10. Do Northern Border States like Michigan now have less 
CBP personnel than usual?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 11. Does DHS need more resources overall to conduct its 
mission?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 12. The administration appears to have been surprised by 
the speed with which large groups of migrants recently arrived at the 
Southern Border, specifically in the Del Rio sector, and there is 
reporting that other large groups in Central and South America may also 
be heading toward the U.S. border soon.
    Is this lack of preparation the result of an intelligence issue?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 13. How does DHS and the broader U.S. intelligence 
community engage in and gather intelligence in the region?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 14. How would each of you characterize intelligence 
coordination and visibility in Central and South America compared to 
other regions around the world?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 15. Secretary Mayorkas has cited misinformation as the 
reason for why these groups are now attempting to come to the United 
States.
    What groups are responsible for this misinformation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 16. What is the administration doing to combat these 
misinformation campaigns?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
   Questions From Hon. August Pfluger for Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
    Question 1. Last month the U.S. Government evacuated approximately 
124,000 people from Afghanistan. There are reports that this included 
several thousand U.S. citizens and approximately 705 SIV holders.
    We have continuously requested a breakdown of the remainder of 
these evacuees and have received no official report. Could you please 
provide a breakdown on who these non-citizen non-SIV evacuees--
approximately 120,000 individuals--are?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. How many of these individuals do you expect to be 
eligible for P-1 or P-2 visas?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. How many of these individuals will not be eligible for 
SIV, P-1, or P-2 visas?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. Will you commit to providing information regarding 
these individuals' visa status and other pertinent information 
concerning their movement, vetting, and resettlement on a monthly 
basis, comparable to the border numbers?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. Understanding that we were aiming to evacuate 
approximately 20,000 SIVs and their families, and hearing the reports 
that we only evacuated approximately 705, are you concerned about the 
fact that we have left behind tens of thousands of young men who are 
uniquely positioned for combat, have first-hand experience with the 
U.S. military, and who are currently becoming angered and resentful of 
the United States because they feel abandoned by the U.S. Government?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. Do you believe this may provide a ripe recruitment pool 
for extremist groups?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. Do you see this as a National security threat?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8. Please explain how you have and continue to process, 
including with biometrics and biographical, the tens of thousands of 
people who had no visa, and in most cases had not even filed for one, 
but who were relocated to the United States.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 9. Could you provide an exact number of those relocated to 
the United States who still had their visas in process and the number 
of those who had not even filed for a visa?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 10. Please provide a breakdown of the Afghan evacuees 
according to location.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 11. How many Afghans are currently in third-party ``lily 
pad'' countries?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 12. How many are currently at military bases within the 
interior?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 13. How many Afghan citizens have you paroled into the 
United States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 14. How many individuals present on the TSDB, No-Fly List, 
or other watch lists have been transported by the United States out of 
Afghanistan?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 15. How many, if any, have been transported into the 
United States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 16. Where have these individuals been apprehended?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 17. What is being done with them once apprehended?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 18. How many DHS personnel, including CBP and USBP 
personnel, have been pulled from duties related to the Southwest Border 
in order to help manage the processing of Afghans into the United 
States?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1. Director Wray, you have previously noted the criminal 
code includes a definition of domestic terrorism (18 U.S.C.  2331(5)) 
and that there is no Federal domestic terrorism statute. Do you feel, 
given the events of January 6, and the heightened threat from domestic 
violent extremists, that such a statute is warranted? If so, why? If 
not, why not?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. Director Wray, in your testimony to this committee last 
year, you mentioned end-to-end encryption as a technological challenge 
that is significantly impacting your law enforcement efforts. Can you 
update us on that as well other technological challenges you and other 
domestic law enforcement agencies are running into? What tools do you 
need to meet these challenges?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. For all three witnesses, from an information-gathering 
and -sharing standpoint, what blind spots or challenges are you 
continuing to experience in addressing the threat from domestic violent 
extremists? Are there authorities or other areas that this committee 
should be looking at to address those blind spots?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Question From Hon. Diana Harshbarger for Christopher A. Wray
    Question. Could you please provide an update on the people who have 
been arrested in relation to the January 6 incident at the U.S. Capitol 
including where and how they are being held?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
        Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1. At what stage of the vetting and screening process that 
Afghan evacuees are undergoing do your agencies get involved?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. What kind of security checks do each of your agencies 
conduct?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. During these stages of vetting, are you aware of an 
individual's immigration or refugee status?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. The administration appears to have been surprised by 
the speed with which large groups of migrants recently arrived at the 
Southern Border, specifically in the Del Rio sector, and there is 
reporting that other large groups in Central and South America may also 
be heading toward the U.S. border soon.
    Is this lack of preparation the result of an intelligence issue?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. How does DHS and the broader U.S. intelligence 
community engage in and gather intelligence in the region?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. How would each of you characterize intelligence 
coordination and visibility in Central and South America compared to 
other regions around the world?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. Secretary Mayorkas has cited misinformation as the 
reason for why these groups are now attempting to come to the United 
States.
    What groups are responsible for this misinformation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8. What is the administration doing to combat these 
misinformation campaigns?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
         Questions From Hon. Elaine Luria for Christine Abizaid
    Question 1. Director Abizaid, you mentioned in your written 
testimony that racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, who 
promote the superiority of the White race, have the most persistent and 
concerning transnational connections because individuals with similar 
ideological beliefs exist outside the United States. Countries such as 
Australia, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom who consider 
racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, to be the fastest-
growing terrorist threat they face. Can you expand on these connections 
and what if any additional connections are you seeing between these 
extremists and organized criminal groups, cyber groups, etc.?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. For all three witnesses, from an information-gathering 
and -sharing standpoint, what blind spots or challenges are you 
continuing to experience in addressing the threat from domestic violent 
extremists? Are there authorities or other areas that this committee 
should be looking at to address those blind spots?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
         Questions From Hon. Peter Meijer for Christine Abizaid
    Question 1. Without U.S. personnel on the ground in Afghanistan, 
everyone's expectation is that conducting counterterrorism operations 
will be more difficult than it was before.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. What are the obstacles to intelligence gathering and 
sharing that the intelligence community is anticipating, or already 
experiencing, in the region?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. How does NCTC intend to overcome those obstacles?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. In light of the August 29 drone strike that killed 10 
innocent civilians in Afghanistan, many Americans are concerned that 
the administration's ``over-the-horizon'' capabilities are not enough 
on their own to obtain good intelligence to combat terrorism.
    How specifically do you define ``over-the-horizon'' capabilities?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. What would you say to Americans who are concerned about 
this strategy's effectiveness going forward?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. At what stage of the vetting and screening process that 
Afghan evacuees are undergoing do your agencies get involved?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. What kind of security checks do each of your agencies 
conduct?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8. During these stages of vetting, are you aware of an 
individual's immigration or refugee status?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 9. The administration appears to have been surprised by 
the speed with which large groups of migrants recently arrived at the 
Southern Border, specifically in the Del Rio sector, and there is 
reporting that other large groups in Central and South America may also 
be heading toward the U.S. border soon.
    Is this lack of preparation the result of an intelligence issue?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 10. How does DHS and the broader U.S. intelligence 
community engage in and gather intelligence in the region?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 11. How would each of you characterize intelligence 
coordination and visibility in Central and South America compared to 
other regions around the world?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 12. Secretary Mayorkas has cited misinformation as the 
reason for why these groups are now attempting to come to the United 
States.
    What groups are responsible for this misinformation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 13. What is the administration doing to combat these 
misinformation campaigns?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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