    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

     SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, CENTRAL ASIA, AND NONPROLIFERATION

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                October 20, 2021

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 117-84

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                                docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                              ______

                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     46-225 PDF             WASHINGTON : 2022

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                      GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
    KAREN BASS, California               SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts       DARRELL ISSA, California
    DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island        ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    AMI BERA, California                 LEE ZELDIN, New York
    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   BRIAN MAST, Florida
    TED LIEU, California                 BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania             KEN BUCK, Colorado
    DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota             TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota                MARK GREEN, Tennessee
    COLIN ALLRED, Texas                  ANDY BARR, Kentucky
    ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                 GREG STEUBE, Florida
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey           PETER MEIJER, Michigan
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
    SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
    KATHY MANNING, North Carolina        YOUNG KIM, California
    JIM COSTA, California                MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
    JUAN VARGAS, California              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
    BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

                        Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

                   Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                     ------

     Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation

                        AMI BERA, California, Chairman,

    BRAD SHERMAN, California             STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Ranking Member
    DINA TITUS, Nevada                   SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    ANDY LEVIN. Michigan                 ANN WAGNER, Missouri
    CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       KEN BUCK, Colorado
    ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia            MARK GREEN, Tennessee
    TED LIEU, California                 ANDY BARR, Kentucky
    ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia         YOUNG KIM, California
    KATHY MANNING, North Carolina

                          Jamie Morgan, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Cefkin, the Honorable Judith Beth, Former U.S. Ambassador to the
      Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of
      Nauru, the Kingdom of Tonga,and Tuvalu.........................     8
    Loi, James, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
      Asian & Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State..............    18
    Dayant, Alexandre, Research Fellow, Pacific Islands Program, Lowy
      Institute......................................................    25
    Paskal, Cleo, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense
      of Democracies.................................................    29

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    72
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    73
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    74

                ADDITIONAL TESTIMONIES SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Testimony of Ambassador Akillino Susaia..........................    75
    Testimony of Ambassador Hersey Kyota.............................    83
    Testimony of Ambassador Gerald Zackios...........................    86

                 ADDITIONAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Vanuata statement submitted for the record.......................    94

                THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

                          Wednesday, October 20, 2021

                              House of Representatives,
                     Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific,
                      Central Asia and Nonproliferation
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:28 a.m.,
    via Webex, Hon. Ami Bera (chairman of the subcommittee)
    presiding.
        Mr. Bera. The Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific,
    Nonproliferation will come to order.
        Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
    recess of the committee at any point and all members will have
    5 days to submit statements, extraneous materials, and
    questions for the record, subject to the length limitation in
    the rules.
        To insert something into the record, please have your staff
    email the previously mentioned address or contact full
    committee staff.
        Please keep your function on at all times, even when you're
    not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting
    and unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute yourself
    after you've finished speaking.
        Consistent with remote committee proceedings of H. Res. 8,
    staff will only mute members and witnesses as appropriate when
    they are not under recognition to eliminate background noise.
        I see we have a quorum and will now recognize myself for 5
    minutes of opening remarks.
        I want to thank our witnesses and the public for joining us
    today and for their patience as we work through a few technical
    difficulties to get this hearing started.
        This is important hearing focused on the strategic
    importance of the Pacific Islands. In advance of today's
    hearing, the Ambassadors from the Federated States of
    Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic
    of Palau and Vanuatu submitted statements for the record.
        I ask for unanimous consent to enter their statements into
    the record. Hearing no objections, so stated.
        The United States has a long history of friendship and
    intertwined fate with the Pacific Islands, making us both
    natural partners and friends.
        Indeed, the Pacific Islands are the first stop along the
    maritime path to the Indo-Pacific, one of the most economically
    and culturally vibrant regions in the world.
        Our special relationship with the Freely Associated States
    of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau have defined our
    security and economic presence in the Pacific, serving as an
    anchor for our engagement in Oceania.
        In addition, our people-to-people ties have only deepened
    over time as Pacific Island communities and the United States
    have continued to grow and have elevated attention to this
    important part of the world.
        The unique part of the world has incredible ecological and
    cultural diversity. Made up of some 2.3 million people spread
    across hundreds of islands, the Pacific Islands comprises an
    expanse of land that covers some 15 percent of the Earth's
    surface and its people were some of the first seafarers in the
    world demonstrating an unrivaled ability to conduct long
    distance sea travel on open ocean for trade and major
    migration.
        The Pacific Islands also boasts one of the largest
    ecosystems in the world, making home to vibrant tourism and
    fishing industries that offer unique contributions to our
    global economy.
        Given all this part of the world has to offer, I was
    particularly pleased when President Biden addressed the 51st
    session to the Pacific Islands Forum in August, the first time
    a U.S. president has addressed the Pacific Islands Forum's
    leadership meeting.
        His presence itself underscores the importance of our
    logstanding friendship. Amid these high points, I would be
    remiss not to note the Pacific Islands nations also face
    several acute challenges today, which we must support them in
    addressing.
        First and foremost is the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The
    region has been hit hard by the coronavirus, resulting in
    strained healthcare resources and an economic downturn through
    the impacts on the tourism industry.
        Pacific Islands countries also continue to bear the brunt
    of the impacts of global warming. With half of the small
    Pacific Islands population living within one kilometer the
    coast, of rising sea levels cause an existential threat to the
    region and its people.
        The region has also seen increasingly frequent tropical
    cyclones, floods, and other climate-related disasters, which
    have only further devastated communities and the economy. These
    challenges are an opportunity for the United States to
    demonstrate the strength of our friendship.
        I am glad that the United States has delivered vaccines and
    humanitarian aid to the Pacific Islands. But we must continue
    to help during these challenging times.
        We must also support the region in its response to climate
    change, and we need to move boldly toward our 2050 net zero
    carbon emissions pledge and toward investing in climate
    adaptation for Pacific Islands countries.
        While the Pacific Islands are at the forefront of
    confronting the existential threat of climate change, we must
    stand with them in the response as it is a global challenge
    that affects us all.
        Finally, promptly renewing the Compact of Free Association
    must be a central part of our engagement with Oceania. The
    compacts are currently scheduled to lapse for Micronesia and
    the Marshall Islands in 2023 and for Palau in 2023.
        I urge the Biden administration to prioritize these
    negotiations and to listen to our partners' needs.
        I'm also proud to say that we have taken significant steps
    in Congress toward turning several of these goals into reality.
    Earlier this year, I introduced the Honoring Oceania Act with
    Representative Don Young, which elevates the Pacific Islands in
    U.S. foreign policymaking by delivering a more robust
    diplomatic and development commitment to the region.
        I'm also an original co-sponsor of Rep. Ed Case's Blue
    Pacific Act. Ed is my good friend, fellow co-chair of the
    Pacific Islands Caucus and one of Congress' most vocal
    champions of the Pacific Islands.
        Together, our bills will expand sustainable development and
    infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands as well as U.S.
    diplomatic and peaceful presence in the region.
        With today's hearing, I hope our friends in the Pacific
    Islands hear loud and clear that the United States remains
    committed now more than ever to this crucial part of the world
    and our panel of expert witnesses will spotlight areas of
    opportunities and challenges as we continue to work with our
    friends in the Pacific Islands.
        With that, I now yield 5 minutes to my good friend from
    Ohio, our ranking member, Representative Steve Chabot, for any
    opening comments he may have.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Chairman Bera, and thank you to the
    panel who will be joining us here shortly.
        While it goes without saying that the Pacific Islands are
    strategically important, it's critical that Congress and the
    administration maintain focus on the interests that we share
    with this region and work to make sure that the U.S. is a
    reliable partner.
        This starts with fully appreciating that the United States
    is a Pacific power or, as Ms. Paskal's testimony will
    eloquently put it, that the United States itself is a Pacific
    Island nation.
        These statements are more than just empty platitudes or
    reminders that Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern
    Marianas Islands are part of the United States.
        They point to the fact that our Exclusive Economic Zone
    directly touches Japan's, and if we include the EEZs of the
    Freely Associated States of Palau, the Federated States of
    Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the
    United States is responsible for maritime territory bordering
    that of the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia as
    well.
        We're not separated from Asia by the Pacific Ocean. We're
    connected by it, and the Indo-Pacific isn't on the other side
    of the world. It's right next door.
        The United States' stake in the Indo-Pacific isn't just
    that of a global steward of freedom, democracy, and security,
    but also that of a neighbor. Nowhere is this more true than
    among the Pacific Island States.
        The foundation of our partnership was established really
    during the Second World War when the United States and the
    Allied power sacrificed so much to free the region from the
    brutal hegemony of an expansionist imperial power.
        Now, 70 years later, the United States is once again
    seeking to protect our neighbors from a dangerous imperialist
    state that would prefer to deal with the Pacific Islands as
    subjects rather than equals.
        Of course, nations justifiably resist being treated as
    pawns in a competition between great powers or basing their
    status and their relationships on opposition to a third party.
        That's not how the United States approaches its
    relationships with the Pacific Islands and it will not be our
    policy in the years to come.
        U.S. foreign policy toward the Pacific Islands will
    continue to be rooted in our shared interest, shared values,
    our people-to-people contacts, and our religious ties in our
    history of fighting together for freedom.
        But we must also acknowledge that the primary threat to
    these interests comes from the Chinese Communist Party and its
    ambitions targeting the Pacific.
        From infrastructure-related corruption to massive illegal,
    unregulated, and unreported fishing to the exploitation of
    unsustainable extractive industries such as logging, the
    People's Republic of China's engagement in the Pacific Islands
    all drives toward the same end.
        The PRC is trying, and all too often succeeding, at co-
    opting elected officials for its own ends, enriching its
    cronies at the expense of local populations, exploiting,
    extracting material resources, and aggressively expanding its
    military footprint as part of a larger strategy to regain what
    the CCP feels is China's rightful historical status as Asia's
    regional hegemony.
        It's essential that the United States gets our policies
    right. Tens of thousands of Americans gave their lives to free
    this region because it's vital for U.S. security and
    prosperity, and while the world has, fortunately, changed a
    great deal since the Second World War, the strategic importance
    of the Pacific has only grown.
        Fortunately, the United States has plenty of tools
    available to forge stronger relationships with Pacific Island
    States. We simply need to take concerted action. For example,
    that we complete negotiations for a renewed Compact of Free
    Association with the Freely Associated States.
        As the Defense Department works to build a more resilient
    and distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific, we should
    make full use of the compacts as well as Palau's invitation to
    host an expanded U.S. presence.
        Diplomatically, the United States needs to be present in
    the Pacific Islands and the state Department should continue
    its efforts to establish a permanent presence in countries like
    the Solomon Islands.
        Economically, the United States needs to ensure that we
    respond to the needs the Pacific Islands have identified for
    themselves. The newly associated strategic pilot begun by the
    state Department and USAID is an encouraging sign.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing these
    priorities and hearing what other recommendations that this
    panel might have, and I yield back.
        Ms. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
        Let me now go ahead and introduce our panel and the
    witnesses.
        First, we have Ambassador Judith Beth Cefkin, former U.S.
    Ambassador to Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu.
    Ambassador Cefkin served in the Pacific Islands after a long
    and decorated career in the Foreign Service, including posts as
    Deputy Chief of Mission in Thailand and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
        Second, we have Mr. Jim Loi, former Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of state in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
    Affairs responsible for the Pacific Islands. Prior to that, he
    was director of East Asian Affairs at the National Security
    Council in addition to many other roles in Asia and Pacific
    affairs in government. Mr. Loi is also a former enlisted U.S.
    naval officer and he left naval service with the rank of
    commander.
        Third, we have Mr. Alexandre Dayant, research fellow on the
    Pacific Islands program at the Lowy Institute, where his
    research focuses on the Pacific Islands, which is--with a focus
    on economic challenges in the region.
        Mr. Dayant also manages the Pacific Aid Map project, which
    is a premier data-driven project tracing investment flows into
    the region. We are grateful to him for braving the harsh time
    difference from Sydney to Washington.
        Fourth, we have Ms. Cleo Paskal, nonresident at the
    Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Ms. Paskal is widely
    published and regularly engaged by governments globally on
    issues in the Indo-Pacific.
        She is also the author of an award-winning book on the
    impact environmental and economic changes will have on our
    global system.
        We thank our witnesses for joining us today, and with that,
    let me call--first call on Ambassador Cefkin for her testimony.

    STATEMENT OF JUDITH BETH CEFKIN, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE
      REPUBLIC OF FIJI, THE REPUBLIC OF KIRIBATI, THE REPUBLIC OF
                NAURU, THE KINGDOM OF TONGA, AND TUVALU

        Ms. Cefkin. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chabot, members of
    the committee, I'm honored to appear before you today and I
    thank you for shining a light on the Pacific Island region.
        The Pacific Island nations are our friends, our partners,
    and our neighbors. The U.S. state of Hawaii is geographically
    and culturally part of the region, as are U.S. territories
    American Samoa, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Mariana
    Islands, and U.S. Exclusive Economic Zones, as has been
    mentioned, border those of several Pacific Island countries.
        The countries of Oceania may be small in land mass but they
    are vast in ocean space. The U.S. and the Pacific Island
    countries share an important history, particularly from the
    bonds forged through our collective sacrifices in World War
    Two.
        But whereas the threat then came from invading armed
    forces, if you ask Pacific Islanders to name their top security
    peril now, the overwhelming response you will hear is climate
    change.
        The region is especially vulnerable to the impacts of
    global warming, including sea level rise, increasingly violent
    storms, flooding, drought, and saltwater intrusion.
        The Atoll Island countries of Kiribati, the Marshall
    Islands, and Tuvalu, which exist on narrow low-lying slivers of
    land, face particularly precarious futures.
        To cite just one example of the climate impacts I witnessed
    in the South Pacific, in 2016, category five cyclone Winston
    devastated large swaths of Fiji.
        Tens of thousands of homes and hundreds of schools were
    destroyed. Forty-four people were killed, including several
    children who were literally sucked out of their parents' arms
    by storm surge.
        Given this reality, Pacific Island countries played a key
    role in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement and attach
    immense importance to implementation of that agreement. They
    will be looking for several things from the U.S. and Congress'
    role will be critical.
        One priority is achieving U.S. mitigation goals. The
    Pacific Island countries are the lowest carbon emitters, yet
    suffer the biggest impacts. So passing legislation that enables
    us to meet our emission reduction targets will be important to
    demonstrating U.S. credibility.
        A second priority is climate finance. To avoid catastrophe,
    the Pacific Islands are looking for robust financing to support
    mitigation and climate adaptation. Pacific Islanders welcomed
    President Biden's recent climate finance pledge and will now be
    watching to see whether Congress delivers.
        The Pacific Islands also hope for U.S. support adapting
    international legal frameworks to better address the
    consequences of climate change. This includes the question of
    how to handle climate refugees and how to secure their maritime
    resource entitlements under the Law of the Sea as they lose
    land from sea level rise.
        The degradation of the marine environment caused by ocean
    warming and acidification, green pollution, and illegal,
    unreported, and unregulated fishing--IUU--is another
    existential threat and one that jeopardizes global commerce and
    food security.
        This gives the U.S. a major stake in helping the Pacific
    Islands sustainably manage their marine resources. One very
    important tool in this regard is the U.S. ship rider program
    that partners the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy with Pacific Island
    enforcement officials to crack down on IUU fishing. Expanding
    this effort would be highly advantageous.
        Military cooperation has been and remains an important
    dimension of U.S.-Pacific relations. Appropriately, much of
    that cooperation focuses on building humanitarian assistance
    and disaster relief capacity and maritime domain awareness.
        This brings me to a discussion of competition with China in
    the Indo-Pacific. China's expanding presence in the region does
    raise important questions. But in deciding how we navigate this
    competition, I would emphasize two points.
        One, increased U.S.-China tensions make Pacific Island
    countries very nervous, observing that when elephants fight,
    the grass gets trampled. Pacific leaders often stress they do
    not want to be put in the middle.
        This underscores the importance of articulating an
    affirmative agenda that responds to our island partners'
    concerns.
        Two, the allocation of U.S. military resources to the
    region must be matched by robust allocation of soft power
    resources. This should include increased USAID programming and
    further strengthening our people-to-people ties.
        Peace Corps is our biggest asset in that regard. With its
    low operating costs, Peace Corps is great bang for the buck and
    should be further expanded in the Pacific.
        U.S. educational exchanges such as Fulbright are equally
    valuable. But while China provides reportedly some 100 training
    slots per year to Pacific Islanders, we currently fund only a
    handful. Surely we can do better.
        Finally, I will close by emphasizing the importance of
    senior level engagement. I, too, was very encouraged by
    President Biden's recent participation in a virtual Pacific
    Island Forum leaders meeting and I hope this presages more
    high-level engagement, and I hope that members of this
    committee will consider adding Pacific Islands to your travel
    schedule.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
    for this opportunity to offer this testimony. I am happy to
    take your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Cefkin follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ambassador Cefkin.
        I will now call on Mr. Loi for his testimony.

      STATEMENT OF JAMES LOI, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
      BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Mr. Loi. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to offer my perspectives on the strategic
    importance of the Pacific Islands.
        Let me also extend greetings to those from the Pacific who
    may be observing this hearing.
        Before I begin my oral remarks, I would like to state that
    the views I offer today are mine and mine alone, and not of my
    employer or any other organization with which I'm affiliated.
        I commend the committee for holding this hearing. There are
    any number of pressing matters in the Indo-Pacific that you
    could have elected to hold a hearing on. That the Pacific
    Islands made it onto the short list indicates a recognition
    that as the United States embarks on a range of efforts to up
    its game in the Indo-Pacific region that our allies, partners,
    and friends in the Pacific must be an integral part of that
    approach.
        As I noted in my prepared statement, it is, to me,
    indisputable that the Pacific Ocean is strategically important
    to the United States. Six of our top 15 goods trading partners,
    representing over one-third of total U.S. trade, are with Indo-
    Pacific countries. Those goods must transit through the Pacific
    to get to and from the United States.
        The U.S. military, through Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii,
    our forces in Guam, and forces stationed in Japan and South
    Korea transit on, over, and under the Pacific as do the supply
    lines on which they depend.
        So on their own, freedom of navigation, secure sea lines of
    communication, and unimpeded access to the Pacific in the air
    and on, under the water render the Pacific critical to U.S.
    national and economic security.
        By extension then, the Pacific island nations we are here
    to discuss today are just as critical to U.S. national
    interests. They comprise the land features that form the first,
    second, and third Island chains that serve as defensive buffers
    to threats from our west.
        They are Exclusive Economic Zones, as has been mentioned,
    covering vast swathes of the Pacific and include fishery and
    other resources that support U.S. industry and American
    livelihoods.
        They provide key support in international fora like the
    United Nations, and for those Pacific Island States eligible to
    do so, their population serve in the U.S. military at
    disproportionately high levels on a per capita basis.
        We live in a world where governments have options and in
    which we face competition for engagement, support, and access.
    The Pacific Islands are no different, and if we want to compete
    and succeed, then we must employ all the tools in our toolkit,
    not just the American toolkit but by also working with and
    leveraging the toolkits of the many allies and partners with
    whom we share interests in the Pacific.
        Now, we Americans have a tendency to see our competitors as
    being 10 feet tall and able to dunk over our heads. So I think
    it's important to recognize, while not overstating, of course,
    that we operate from a position of strength in the Pacific.
        We are a Pacific nation, not just due to the 50th state of
    Hawaii, but Americans of Pacific Islander ethnicity numbers
    some one and a half million, and this subset of our population
    has grown in every single U.S. state in between 2010 and 1920.
        These cultural ties and bonds with the Pacific Islands are
    unique and not easily replicated by our competitors. Our
    Compacts of Free Association with Palau, the Marshall Islands,
    and Federated States of Micronesia, and the territories of
    American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Marianas, if fully embraced,
    provide the United States with unmatched opportunities to
    showcase the benefits of a special relationship with the United
    States, and that, certainly, has been displayed to great degree
    during the COVID pandemic where our provision of over $90
    million in PPE, vaccines, and other health support to the U.S.
    Freely Associated States made a big difference.
        Our over $5 billion in official assistance to the Pacific
    over the past 20 years has also created depth and breadth to
    critical relationships that underpin mutual respect and
    credibility. And, of course, our military presence is unmatched
    and augmented by allied resources.
        And then, finally, of course, we share the unbreakable
    bonds of history forged during the Second World War, which also
    serve as a reminder of the mutual importance that we offer to
    each other.
        The challenge, of course, of having a strong foundation,
    however, is that can breed complacency and overconfidence.
    That, in turn, can promote a more transactional approach to
    partnership, a development that comes with added danger in an
    era of major power competition.
        The way we prevent and counteract that is through
    engagement, presence, dialog, consistency, and value added
    partnership, particularly in areas of priority interests of the
    Pacific Island governments such as climate change.
        We must declare that our relations with the Pacific Islands
    are a top U.S. priority, offer a forward-looking vision and
    roadmap that is driven not by a reflexive and reactionary
    approach to China but by our own deep-seated interests.
        I offered some suggestions in my written testimony on how
    we might do that, and I look forward to further discussion with
    the committee and happy to answer questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Loi follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Loi.
        I will now call on Mr. Dayant for his testimony.

    STATEMENT OF ALEXANDRE DAYANT, RESEARCH FELLOW, PACIFIC ISLANDS
                        PROGRAM, LOWY INSTITUTE

        Mr. Dayant. Thank you, Mr. Bera.
        So, Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, in Australia, it is a common
    practice to start an event with a welcome to country to
    highlight the cultural significance of the surrounding area to
    a particular Aboriginal clan or language group who are
    recognized as traditional owners of the land.
        So let me begin by acknowledging the Gadigal people of the
    Eora nation, the traditional custodian of the land, where I sit
    and pay my respects to the elders past and present.
        I also would like to thank the House Foreign Affairs
    Committee for taking an interest in the Pacific and for
    inviting me to discuss the strategic importance of the Pacific
    Islands.
        First, I want to touch on how COVID-19 is affecting the
    Pacific people. The current global pandemic is impacting
    everyone in every region of the world, and trying to think
    about what's next after COVID-19 is difficult enough and
    unrealistic.
        There are some things, however, that are clear. As the
    world is coming out of COVID-19, the Pacific region faces a
    potential lost decade of economic development. Pacific Islands
    have, by and large, done a tremendous job dealing with the
    COVID-19 pandemic by walling themselves off early from the
    outside world through a bit of luck and a lot of foresight.
        Many Pacific countries are COVID-free today, and
    considering the acute vulnerabilities of stretched and, in some
    cases, broken health systems, this will be looked back on as a
    remarkable achievement.
        Unfortunately, not all countries have shared the same luck.
    In Fiji, after the deadly Delta strain entered the country via
    quarantine 10 55 12 per capita infection rates became the
    highest in the world in the middle of the year.
        Deadly infections reached more than 1,900 in mid-July, a
    huge number for a country of only 900,000 people. In the U.S.,
    this would have equaled to 659,000 cases per day, almost three
    times more than during the peak of the contamination last year.
        Papua New Guinea that shares a border with Indonesia and
    that did well at the beginning of the crisis is currently
    experiencing a significant surge of COVID-19 cases and deaths,
    overwhelming the country's fragile health system.
        Today, however, Fiji's brilliant vaccination campaign has
    helped control the virus while it is still rampant in Papua New
    Guinea. So while some countries continue to deal with the
    domestic health crisis linked to COVID-19, all face severe
    economic fallout.
        All the main threads of economic reliance that connects the
    Pacific to the outside world through the migration, remittances
    made have been affected.
        On the very edge, the International Monetary Fund expects
    the economies of the region to contract as much as 10 percent.
    By the end of 2021, Fiji's gross domestic products would have
    had contracted by 23 percent, Cook Islands by 60 percent, and
    Vanuatu expects to lose 40 percent of its formal sector jobs.
        Considering how challenging it is for Pacific economies to
    grow, the region is on track to make the slowest economic
    rebound of any region in the world coming out of the pandemic.
        A report I co-wrote shows it will take almost a decade for
    the region to get back to where it was in 2019. In the
    meantime, all the other challenges the Pacific was facing
    before--demographics, climate change, service delivery,
    noncommunicable disease, transational crime, illegal fishing,
    gender-based violence, geopolitical competition, you name it--
    all are set to get worse.
        The resilience of the Pacific peoples, the region's
    greatest strength, will be severely tested.
        Now, Pacific nations are not sitting idle. They are
    employing every available resources to mitigate the economic
    fallout. Donors like Australia, the IMF, the World Bank, the
    IDB, are all jumping into the fray.
        On this side, the United States has done a tremendous job
    supporting the nations of the North Pacific. But despite this,
    on current trends none of this report will come anywhere close
    to filling the void or keeping these economies on the kind of
    life support the United States has been able to provide
    domestically since March this year.
        I say all of this for two reasons. The first one is to
    instill on you all the gravity of the situation Pacific nations
    are now in, and second, to highlight the timeliness of this
    subcommittee hearing.
        The United States is an important player in the Pacific and
    a key partner to many nations in the region. The current crisis
    the Pacific faces represents an opportunity for the United
    States to reshape its position in the region and strengthen
    Washington's free and open Indo-Pacific strategy.
        With this in mind, I would be happy to take your question.
    Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dayant follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Dayant.
        I will now call on Ms. Paskal for her testimony.

    STATEMENT OF CLEO PASKAL, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION
                       FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

        Ms. Paskal. Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot, members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify
    today.
        I'm going to start with the strategic importance of the
    Pacific Islands to China. We have a pretty good idea why
    Beijing wants influence and more possible control in the
    Pacific Islands. It has to do with China's concept of
    comprehensive national power, or CNP.
        Adopted by Beijing in the 1990's, the CNP concept is
    embedded in Chinese think tanks and is key for understanding
    Beijing's global strategy. For the Chinese Communist Party, CNP
    is an actual number. Its researchers obsessively calculate
    every country's CNP.
        Things that add to a country's CNP, according to them,
    include access to resources, R&D, human capital, financial
    capital, influence over global rules, strategic positioning,
    and much more.
        CNP is the concept that connects the dots between Confucius
    Institutes, the artificial islands, the Belt and Road
    Initiative, and getting Americans teenagers to install TikTok
    on their phones.
        In the Pacific Islands, things that score CNP points for
    China include big items like getting a country to switch
    diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China, as well as
    seemingly little ones, such as a Huawei data center and PNG, a
    Chinese police liaison officer in Fiji, or a legislation that
    allows online gambling in Palau.
        Coordination is facilitated by China's large embassies
    across the region with staffers who speak the local language
    and have seemingly limitless slush funds.
        Given this massive effort, the question is why does Beijing
    think Oceania is so important for its CNP, and a key reason is
    geography. A core part of China's CNP strategy is developing a
    world-class military spearheaded by the navy that's capable of
    challenging and eventually displacing America as the world's
    preeminent naval power.
        Between 2016 and 2020, the Chinese navy added the
    equivalent of Japan's entire current surface fleet and is on
    track to having nearly twice as many surface ships as the U.S.
    Navy before the end of the decade.
        The problem for China is that to use its navy it needs
    access out of its ports and into the Pacific. But looking out
    from the east coast of China, there are a series of island
    chains that can be used to block that access.
        The first island chain, roughly, stretches down Japan
    including Okinawa through Taiwan and the Philippines and is
    known as the first island chain. The second and third chains
    include Guam, the Marianas, FSM, Midway and more.
        This area saw some of the most desperate battles of World
    War Two. The chains are a problem for Chinese strategists. This
    is one reason why China is so serious about capturing Taiwan.
    They need it to break the first island chain.
        At the same time, Beijing is also trying to burrow itself
    into the second and third island chains to disrupt American
    planning and potentially attack first island chains from
    behind.
        Understanding how important breaking the chain is for the
    PLA is fundamental for understanding how the Pacific Islands
    fit into China's CNP calculations and grand strategy.
        On the U.S. side, after decades of, largely, benign
    neglect, some are realizing the importance of the region in
    large part through the efforts of many on this subcommittee and
    Representative Case.
        Bipartisan initiatives and leaderships on the Pacific
    Islands have been exemplary, including the establishment of the
    Pacific Island Caucus, the proposed Blue Pacific Act, the
    Honoring OCEANIA Act, and elements in the PDI.
        However, momentum can be easily dissipated when dealing
    with such a vast and complex area. So what should the U.S.
    prioritize? The region that is most in need of attention is
    Micronesia, which includes Guam, the Marianas, Nauru, Kiribati,
    and three U.S. Freely Associated States.
        The reasons include many of the countries have close ties
    with the U.S. Indeed, Guam is the U.S. Being closer to China,
    they're on the strategic front line. Three of the countries
    recognize Taiwan, making them major targets for Beijing. The
    recent fragmentation of the Pacific Island Forum means they're
    rethinking their regional structures and the COFAs need urgent
    resolution.
        In that context, it would make sense to work with the area
    to create a Micronesian zone of security, prosperity, and
    freedom that would knit the region together, letting its
    countries and territories reinforce each other.
        There are a series of recommendations on how to do that in
    my written testimony, including making the area a priority for
    the Quad activities including increased space for Japan and
    India, expanding bases including in Palau, and I suggested by a
    letter sent to President Biden and signed by many on the
    subcommittee to appoint a Special Envoy based out of the White
    House to coordinate interagency efforts to renew the SOFAS.
        In 1943, two Solomon Islanders helped save the life of
    future President Kennedy after his patrol boat was sunk by the
    Japanese. Benjamin Gilman, longtime chairman of the House
    Foreign Affairs Committee, flew 35 missions over Japan as a
    side gunner in a B-29 Super Fortress. Twice his plane was so
    badly damaged he would never have made it back except he could
    land it in Iwo Jima. The blood of Americans is mixed with the
    blood of Pacific Islanders in the soil and seas of Oceania.
        Ambassador Kabua, the representative of the Marshall
    Islands to the United Nations, said that when her country's
    COFA was originally concluded with the U.S., quote, ``Many in
    the U.S. Congress and government had fought in the Pacific
    during World War Two. They knew who we were, where we were, and
    why we were important,'' end quote.
        To avoid the next war, we'll have to learn that again.
        Chairman Bera, Ranking Member Chabot, members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for all of your work toward
    accomplishing this goal and for inviting me to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Paskal follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Paskal, and thank all the
    witnesses for their testimony. I will now recognize members for
    5 minutes each, pursuant to House rules. All time yielded is
    for the purposes of questioning our witnesses.
        Because of the virtual format of this hearing, I will
    recognize members by committee seniority, alternating between
    Democrats and Republicans. If you miss your turn, please let
    our staff know and we will circle back to you.
        If you seek recognition, you must unmute your microphone
    and address the chair verbally. And before I start recognizing
    myself, I'm going to ask for unanimous consent for
    Representative Ed Case to participate in this hearing and that
    he will be yielded 5 minutes for the purposes of questioning
    our witnesses after committee members have their opportunity to
    question any witnesses.
        Hearing no objection, so let it be stated.
        Let me start my questions and maybe I'll ask Mr. Loi
    initially. You touched on having a forward-looking agenda, and
    I couldn't agree with you more.
        You know, certainly, recognizing the Pacific Islands and
    islands of Oceania for their assets and the challenges that
    their people face and making sure they're not caught between
    what I think Ambassador Cefkin said, two elephants, two big
    nations--that this is not the United States or China, but it is
    about the people in the region, about them getting COFA
    completed and so forth.
        If you were to prioritize some of those agenda items, you
    know, where should our focus as the subcommittee but also
    Congress be?
        Mr. Loi. Thank you, Chairman.
        Well, you know, first off, you know, I think there
    definitely does need to be more resources. Diplomacy and
    engagement is a contact sport. We have to be present.
        We have to have missions and diplomatic presence in the
    countries that we do not, and Ambassador Cefkin, you know,
    represented, I think, five of them from Fiji, and COVID has
    prevented us from really representing ourselves in those States
    as well as Solomon Islands, which is covered under Papua New
    Guinea.
        So I think presence is important, which, obviously,
    requires resources and staffing. Consistency is really
    important. And yes, it was notable that President Biden
    participated virtually in the in the PIF Leaders meeting.
        Had the meeting been in person, though, I'm not sure who
    would have made it, and part of our challenge is that we're not
    consistent. Our participation varies. When I was working at the
    state Department, we were able to get Secretary Clinton to go.
        I know the Secretary of Interior went during the Trump
    administration. But it tends to vary and that has follow-on
    effects in terms of the ability to follow through.
        And then, you know, I guess, last, we have to have a
    multifaceted approach. It cannot just be security. It has to be
    economic. It has to be people to people. It has to leverage the
    many strengths that we possess that, frankly, China does not
    possess.
        And we frequently give short shrift to some of those soft
    power initiatives. I think Ambassador Cefkin mentioned the
    Peace Corps. These are things that are not easily replicated,
    but they're typically the first things that are cut.
        And then last, I would say, you know, while climate change
    is a politically divisive issue, it's not an issue that is
    debated in the Pacific Islands because they see it and feel it
    every day, and if we're not able to address their number-one
    concern, we lose credibility.
        And so we have to find a way to short circuit kind of the
    debates that we know are going to continue to happen in the
    United States but somehow ensure that we are assisting our
    Pacific Island friends and partners in ways that are meaningful
    to them.
        And, you know, that will take, obviously, you know,
    political courage and discipline, and maybe I'll just leave it
    at that.
        Mr. Bera. Great. And I know, playing on that, that we have
    some great champions in Congress, starting with Congressman
    Case, who was going to lead us on a CODEL prepandemic, which,
    you know, as we come out of this pandemic, I know he's
    certainly thinking about it. I'm thinking about it.
        And he's got champions like Congresswoman Katie Porter, who
    also I believe is having a hearing on resolving some of the
    issues with COFA and, you know, remnant nuclear testing issues
    in the region and has been a champion there.
        Maybe, Ambassador Cefkin, you'd like to play off of that a
    little bit and maybe contrast with how China's approaching the
    region and how we should approach it.
        [Audio malfunction.]
        Mr. Bera. I'm not sure we have got a great connection.
        Ms. Cefkin. I, certainly, would----
        Mr. Bera. Actually, I do not think we have got a great
    connection so maybe we'll move on.
        Ms. Cefkin [continuing]. And I would note that China has--
    their other forms of engagement really been----
        [Audio malfunction.]
        Mr. Bera. I think we're losing her.
        Mr. Dayant, do you want to----
        Mr. Dayant. Yes, Chairman Bera, very rapidly. So I think,
    look, what China does in the Pacific focuses a lot on big
    infrastructure projects, big-ticket projects, and those are the
    ones that are making the headlines in the news and, clearly,
    you know, like, the Pacific needs development support and needs
    infrastructure.
        So, like, the U.S. could actually focus on other things
    like, you know, they could try--could try to complement
    Australia's support, complement other like-minded countries--
    like-minded development partners in the region such as, at the
    moment, for instance, vaccine diplomacy is something.
        You know, helping the countries to get enough stocks of
    vaccines but also, like, in helping Pacific countries and the
    population of the Pacific to get the jabs in their hand--in
    their arms, because at the moment, there's a huge vaccine
    hesitancy in the region, especially in Malaysia, and having a
    proper information campaign could be something that would be
    helpful.
        Mr. Bera. Great. I notice I'm out of time. So let me go and
    recognize my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. Chabot from
    Ohio, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ms. Paskal, I'll
    begin with you.
        There's no question, and I think you pointed this out in
    your opening statement, that China has designs on the Pacific
    Island and we need to be very concerned about that, as well as
    a whole lot of other things with respect to China.
        Could you discuss the likely consequences if we do not
    engage more effectively with the region, particularly the
    islands that are under discussion today, and give the PRC,
    essentially, a free hand in the region? Could you--could you
    discuss that?
        Ms. Paskal. Yes. Thank you for the question.
        So there's several different ways of looking at it. One is
    strategic. Of course, strategically, it would be disastrous.
        Any military confrontation that is going to happen in Asia
    would require the U.S. to have access through the region, and
    that's not just sort of ships, but it's subs, it's the
    underwater cables, it's satellites, all that stuff, and China
    knows that.
        And as it positions itself throughout the Pacific, it's
    positioning itself to be able to cutoff all of those abilities,
    to cutoff the logistics, supplies, and the infrastructure
    needed for the U.S. to be a force for security and stability in
    the region.
        At the same time, the consequences for the people of the
    Pacific shouldn't be underestimated. There are different sorts
    of ways that China interacts. Infrastructure is one of them.
        But there's also once China gets a hold of a government, it
    tends to use its influence to try to lower visa restrictions
    for Chinese to arrive in the country, and they tend to arrive
    in and stay a very short period of time, and in the process
    they bring in often drugs, prostitution, and gambling that's
    very, very destructive for the local population.
        So the first case of human trafficking in Tonga was a
    Chinese woman who brought in other Chinese women to serve as
    prostitutes in Tonga. Very disruptive for the local population
    and it, of course, uses those prostitutes to gain influence
    over the customers through various other means as well.
        So this is totally socially corrosive at the same time as
    being strategically detrimental to the U.S. position. In every
    single way this is bad for the people of the region and for
    anybody who cares about a free and open Indo-Pacific.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. And talking about our engagement,
    the United States engagement in the region, when the Solomon
    Islands switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the United
    States did not even have an embassy in the Solomon Islands and
    I think this really does exemplify a far too lackadaisical
    approach over the years to the region. Could you discuss that
    and how should the U.S. engage more effectively and in a
    sustained way in the Pacific Island region?
        Ms. Paskal. Mr. Loi is absolutely correct and his written
    recommendations are excellent about having to be there. You
    need to show up. And there is this issue of--that's going to
    have to be reconsidered about partners.
        We can't--the Solomon Islands situation and the Kiribati
    situation showed, unfortunately, that Australia and New Zealand
    are perhaps not as on top of the situation as we had hoped and
    perhaps could use a little bit more collaboration with some
    other partners in order to make sure that things like that do
    not happen.
        I think the U.S. was taken by surprise by how far down the
    road the Solomons was and, in fact, I heard that the Solomons
    before had even considered offering basing rates to the U.S.
    and that opportunity was lost as well.
        So we need to be there. The U.S. needs to be there. It
    needs to be listening very carefully and it needs to be making
    decisions based on its own interests and not necessarily, in
    some cases, the economic interests as some of its partners,
    unfortunately.
        New Zealand, in particular, is very problematic in
    Polynesia, where some of its economic interest--short-term
    economic interests--seem to be undermining the security
    interests of the entire region.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Ms. Paskal. So there is there--yes, there's no substitute
    for being there.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. I've got about a minute left and I
    wanted to get one more area in to you here. Could you discuss
    the threats posed by potential Chinese military bases or dual-
    use facilities in the Pacific Islands and what such facilities
    would mean for U.S. national security?
        And also could you discuss Palau's request to host a U.S.
    military base and the advantages that that would bring to U.S.
    force posture in the region?
        Ms. Paskal. Yes. The Palau base would be very important for
    the people of Palau. First of all, it would bring in important
    revenue, but it would also make them feel much more secure.
        They're one of the few countries that still recognizes
    Taiwan and there's enormous pressure on them to try to shift.
    So it would be a statement that the current president of Palau,
    President Whipps, could use to show, look, the U.S. is with us.
    They're behind us. It would also--given its location, it's
    very, very strategic and very helpfully located. I'm not quite
    sure why that offer hasn't been taken up.
        As the Chinese goes out with these dual-use facilities that
    are built in part through the Belt and Road, they're enabling
    an ability not just to position themselves but also to deny
    access. So these are--again, these go through satellites,
    underwater cables, surface, air, subsea.
        They are looking at what happened in World War Two and
    they're not making the same mistakes Japan made. They're
    grabbing the islands while they can in a political warfare way
    before they shift to kinetic warfare, if needed.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. Let me now
    recognize my good friend, the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
    Titus.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know, a
    lot of the emphasis has been on our relationship with this area
    and these islands along the defense lines and security lines.
        I'd like to shift just a little bit over to the nuclear
    legacy--you know, our testing in Bikini and Enewetakwe. Some of
    the damage that was done back in the late 1940's or 1950's
    still remains a problem.
        Would this not help our relations with that part of the
    world if we included in some of our negotiations or some of our
    assistance funding to help with the radiation and the problems
    that remain as a result of that.
        Anybody?
        Ms. Paskal. Yes, it would help.
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Titus. Well, how should we do that? I agree, I think
    it's yes. That's why I asked the question. But how can we
    pursue that or what will be the response to it? Maybe you all
    could give me a little help here as I make this case.
        Mr. Dayant. If I may.
        Ms. Titus. Please.
        Mr. Dayant. So yes, I went to the Marshall Islands 2 years
    ago, actually, and I remember that the Dome--so, like, the
    Runit Dome where the United States has put some of, like, its
    nuclear--not waste, but, like, you know, like, the tools that
    were used to, like, do the nuclear testing and, like,
    completely, you know, did it underground, this is a big legacy
    for the United States.
        It is, like, very negatively seen in the Marshall Islands.
    The U.S. says that, and sends every year, like, a controller
    that goes and checks the dome to see the, like, how sustainable
    it is.
        Unfortunately, it is cracking. The population is a bit
    worried. But these experts say that the radioactivity is
    actually not--we shouldn't be so fearful of it.
        Now, I know that if the local population asked for one
    thing and one thing only, it would be, like, to get rid of this
    dome that is, actually, you know, that is hanging over their
    head, really. And so, like, if the United States could do
    something more--you know, something that would show that, you
    know, you want to clear this area, that would be actually
    something very, very welcome in the region.
        Ms. Titus. I know we have moved the islanders off. We moved
    them back. We had to move them off again. I represent Nevada so
    I'm kind of familiar with some of those same issues in our
    state that you're experiencing double time there. So I think we
    ought to always keep that on our agenda as we look at our
    relations.
        Mr. Dayant. Oh, look, you're completely right. I mean, I
    am--I'm French and living in Australia, about to become an
    Australian as well. And so, like, as a Frenchman, you know,
    like, my country has done a lot of nuclear testing in the
    Pacific, especially in Polynesia, and this has been, you know--
    like, this has been an ongoing process.
        Like, the healing process with the French Polynesian people
    between--and the French government is, like, a very complex
    one. Not that long ago, President Macron apologized for the
    testing and there's, like, a compensation scheme that covers,
    you know, like, the health treatment that people who are
    victims of cancer or leukemia are facing.
        And the French government as kind of--you know, we tried
    for a long time to get rid of this issue by not talking about
    it, but really now it's coming back on the surface. And so this
    is something that the French government is trying to deal with
    and I think actually having a look at what the French
    government is doing now would be a good first thing to look at
    in the U.S.
        You know, like maybe trying, you know, like doing, trying
    to establish a conversation with the French government to see
    how they dealt with the situation to see if you could do
    something similar and in Runit.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you. Let's look at that, Mr. Chairman.
        Just briefly before I go, another area I think we can work
    on is the rising sea levels and climate change, and how we
    collaborate with maybe Japan and Australia to help with that
    issue of climate change.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time is up. I yield
    back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Ms. Titus.
        Let me now recognize my good friend, the gentlelady from
    Missouri, Mrs. Wagner, for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you to
    our witnesses for their time and, certainly, their service. For
    decades, the Pacific Islands have played a central role in
    developing U.S. capabilities and extending our ability to
    protect rule of law and freedom of navigation.
        Strong relations with Pacific Island nations remain the
    backbone of U.S. security in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly,
    the Pacific Islands are on the front lines of a Sino-U.S.
    rivalry as China attempts to erode support for Taiwan and
    pushed the borders of its spheres of influence out to the so-
    called second island chain, a line that passes through the
    Marshall Islands, Guam, and Palau.
        China does not share our vision for a free and open Indo-
    Pacific. It seeks to intimidate and entrap and coerce these
    countries into increasing China's prestige and furthering its
    agenda.
        As one of the co-chairs of the Pacific Island Caucus, I am
    very proud to support the special relationship that the United
    States shares with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
        The United States must continue to stand together with the
    Freely Associated States in defense of our common interests.
    I'm extremely concerned about China's investment plans for
    Kiribati.
        Two years ago, the PRC used its economic clout to induce
    Kiribati to cut ties with Taiwan and instead to recognize
    Beijing. And today, China plans to use its influence to revive
    a World War Two era airstrip on a Kiribati island that would
    threaten critical sea lanes between Hawaii and Australia and
    New Zealand.
        Ms. Paskal, what are the implications of this development
    for U.S. and allied security and how should the United States
    proceed in order to prevent China from militarizing these
    important islands?
        Ms. Paskal. Thank you, Representative Wagner. That's a very
    good question, and that island, Canton, is a critical location,
    as you mentioned.
        The U.S. actually has a treaty with Kiribati that is
    supposed to prevent the militarization of that island by any
    country other than the U.S. The U.S. has a sort of--can go back
    to it but Kiribati is, technically, supposed to ask the U.S. if
    anybody else is going to use it as a military airstrip.
        Mrs. Wagner. Have they done so? Have they done so?
        Ms. Paskal. Well----
        Mrs. Wagner. Because their association with Beijing and the
    revival of this new World War Two airstrip would say that
    treaty is not being followed.
        Ms. Paskal. So as often happens in these cases, apparently,
    the Chinese just want to build it for, you know, tourism or
    something.
        Mrs. Wagner. Oh, right.
        Ms. Paskal. I do not know. Scuba diving off the coast of
    Canton. But it's a very good example of how there are a lot of
    arrows in the U.S.' quiver that aren't being used, and if
    there--if there was a larger team that could look at these
    entry points into the Pacific treaties, old treaties, and
    through these relationships and things, then we--you'd have a
    better idea of what could be done. But that's a very good clear
    example of that.
        Mrs. Wagner. Well, it is, and more has got to be done. More
    generally, China is seeking to build military--what I'll call
    dual-use infrastructure throughout the Pacific Island region
    such as piers that can accommodate Chinese navy ships.
        Ms. Paskal, what are China's dual-use infrastructure plans
    for the region and what would these facilities mean for our
    defense?
        Ms. Paskal. So there's--because of China's comprehensive
    national power approach, there are very few pieces of major
    investments by China that they do not think has a strategic
    element for their benefit.
        So it's--you can't disaggregate. It's all combined into
    this comprehensive national push, this ability to be able to
    control the other country, and it may not be as overt as a
    port. It may be funding the scholarship of one of----
        Mrs. Wagner. Right.
        Ms. Paskal [continuing]. Children of one of the leaders and
    then, you know, taping them when they're on, you know, having a
    good time in Beijing.
        Mrs. Wagner. I'm running out of time.
        Ms. Paskal. Sorry.
        Mrs. Wagner. I'm running out of time. Let me just say,
    Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the
    Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau set out the terms of
    our unique relationship with these States.
        The agreements prevent our adversaries from exploiting a
    huge swath of the Pacific Ocean and guarantee the U.S. foothold
    from which to protect its interests.
        You probably will not have time, but Ambassador Cefkin, to
    what degree does China seek to undermine relations between the
    U.S. and the Freely Associated States and do PRC influence
    operations in the Pacific Islands region threaten renegotiation
    of compacts?
        Mr. Bera. I know the gentlelady's time has expired a little
    bit. But, Dr. Cefkin, if you can give a brief answer that would
    be great.
        Ms. Cefkin. Very briefly, I will say that, first and
    foremost, what motivates the Pacific Island nations in their
    relations is their need for, really, the infrastructure
    support--the development support.
        And in the case of Kiribati, that is my, you know, firm
    belief, and I've heard Kiribati's officials say the same, that
    they're really looking for infrastructure development on the
    Outer Islands and economic development.
        And so we want to match China. That, really, is an area we
    have to put more resources, and I think there's some very
    promising models that we have, you know, embarked on in joint
    partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan.
        We're doing underwater cable in Palau and an electric grid
    in Papua New Guinea, and those are the kind of projects that, I
    think, can, you know, start to elevate our partnership.
        Mrs. Wagner. I appreciate that. I appreciate that. I
    appreciate the chair's indulgence. But these are all things
    that we have got to really engage in in a more comprehensive
    and strategic manner.
        So I thank you all, and I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner.
        Let me now recognize my good friend, the gentleman from
    Michigan, Mr. Levin, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for the great
    job you're doing covering so many important issues on this
    subcommittee and your partnership with Mr. Chabot.
        Sea levels continue to rise due to climate change and,
    unfortunately, even if we move to a carbon-free economy
    radically faster, this phenomenon will accelerate for years to
    come, possibly submerging parts of or even entire Pacific
    Island nations.
        In addition to the threat of sea level rise poses to people
    and their livelihoods, it can shrink the maritime claims of
    Pacific nations when certain land features become
    uninhabitable.
        Ambassador Cefkin, as the former Ambassador to the Republic
    of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Narau, the
    Kingdom of Tonga and Tuvalu, can you describe in more detail
    exactly what rising sea levels mean practically for people
    living on these islands, and how can the U.S. support Pacific
    Island nations in safeguarding their livelihoods and national
    infrastructure from the threats of rising sea levels?
        Ms. Cefkin. Thank you, Congressman. I'm very happy to
    address that issue, and I saw it firsthand in all my travels.
    I'd say that it's very important.
        As I mentioned, that the effects include one very
    destructive impact is saltwater intrusion, which makes already
    scarce arable land less able to support growth of any crops and
    also threatens water supplies.
        So what is really important and one thing that we really
    emphasized in my time in the South Pacific was what we were
    doing to help them build resilience, adaptation. Our AID
    programs were focused, really, almost entirely on that issue.
        And we did a lot and we leveraged it, you know, for our
    public diplomacy very effectively, but there really is, you
    know, a very great need, you know, for more funding, more
    financing, I think, through USAID, through international
    instruments such as the Adaptation Fund and Green Climate Fund
    that really is going to help them develop more resilience.
        I mean, examples of some of the projects were building
    storm shelters, very strong medical clinics that could
    withstand storms that were also--could double as shelters,
    helping them alleviate flooding coming from tidal flooding and
    even inland in some of these countries so that they could
    continue to grow their crops and have their livelihoods and be
    safe.
        One project we had was in cooperation with Habitat. It was
    in a village called Vunisavisavi in the village--the island of
    Vanua Levu and Fiji where we worked with Habitat to build
    strong homes further away from the coastline, and those homes
    sheltered those villagers during Cyclone Winston.
        But there are a lot of villages that are facing relocation
    in Fiji and the other Pacific Island nations, and that is a
    very, very emotional issue for them, having to move their
    homes--not just their homes, but their ties to their ancestors
    who are buried there. And I heard one woman say she would die
    before she would move from that location.
        So it's a very emotional issue. But the more we can do in
    terms of our funding and our work together in policy fora to
    help them address that issue, the stronger our ties and our
    friendship and our partnership will be.
        Mr. Levin. Well, thank you. And I think you can tell from
    this panel that there's really bipartisan support for us to do
    more, and so I look forward personally to working with you on
    that.
        Let me try to get one more question in. We touched on it a
    little bit earlier. But, you know, the Freely Associated States
    and in particular the Marshall Islands still experience
    radiation exposure from our cold war nuclear tests and
    continued storage of nuclear materials.
        What should the U.S. do to prevent future harm to the
    Marshallese from our nuclear materials stored on these islands
    and what solutions are there to protect people from radiation
    exposure? And, of course, this interacts with my previous
    question, and I'll open this up to any of the panelists who
    want to try to give a quick answer.
        Mr. Loi. Congressman, the short of it is it's a critical--
    an issue of critical importance to the Marshallese and we can't
    ignore it, right.
        I mean, I think one of my favorite sayings from Colin
    Powell was, you know, bad news doesn't get better with time.
    And so this is not an issue that's just going to disappear on
    its own.
        Whether we can match the expectations of what the
    Marshallese expect is a different question. But much like we're
    dealing with dioxin in Vietnam, we do need to, you know, kind
    of address the issue up front, get the experts talking and
    figure out what we can do. So it does need to be an issue on
    the agenda.
        Mr. Levin. All right. With that, I guess my time is
    expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Mr. Levin.
        Let me now recognize my good friend, the gentleman from
    Kentucky, Mr. Barr, for 5 minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Barr. Great. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I
    appreciate your leadership in holding this hearing. I
    appreciate the testimony from our witnesses.
        And I also applaud our chairman for his engagement in a
    bipartisan way on the Blue Pacific Act and the Honoring OCEANIA
    Act, and I'd love to talk to the chairman about those pieces of
    legislation, see if I can be helpful to you on those and I want
    to turn to Ms. Paskal and her testimony.
        And you do a great job, Ms. Paskal, in your written
    testimony toward the end where you get into granular detail on
    specific recommendations.
        And so in reference to the Blue Pacific Act and the
    Honoring OCEANIA Act and the previous administration's more
    active engagement of the Pacific Islands, can you give us a
    little bit more detail on the top priorities?
        So if we were to pass legislation on Oceania and the
    Pacific Islands, what would be the absolute top key priorities
    for us to further engage those islands?
        I appreciate your testimony that we need to be
    comprehensive in our approach and not be, you know, focused
    exclusively on China. But let's face it, that's the big issue.
        So how can we--what would you say are the top three, four,
    or five pieces of engagement that we need to be focused on?
        Ms. Paskal. Thank you, Representative Barr. That's the key
    question, and the legislation is in place and it's there and
    the money seems to be floating around. The problem is that it
    isn't being targeted in a very specific way.
        And one element is what Mr. Loi brought up, which is that
    there isn't a comprehensive team within the U.S. that's looking
    at how to engage. So if you've got a pool of money for
    infrastructure, it may go into a whole bunch of different
    things that do not aggregate into something that actually helps
    the people of the region and create those bonds.
        So one is, as he said, you put people there. But the other
    is, and this hasn't really been brought up before, a lot of
    these countries have very small ministries of foreign affairs.
    So they might have five or six people dealing with everything
    from cop to defense to everything else, and they do not know
    how the U.S. works.
        So Palau tried to get around this recently by putting in
    place a national security coordinator so they would have a
    designated person to talk to the security establishment in the
    U.S. and create those bonds.
        Similar initiatives would be very helpful across the
    countries of the Pacific where you help them understand--you
    have how the U.S. works, how the U.S. systems work, and how to
    put in place individuals that can be that consistent point of
    contact for the U.S. going in so that the lines of
    communication are very entrenched.
        I would also, as we're building out the Quad, make sure
    that India is included in a lot of these issues, including with
    the funding for some of these projects because, as mentioned,
    for infrastructure, we're looking mostly now at Japan,
    Australia, and New Zealand.
        They're very expensive infrastructures. So what you end up
    with, for example, is Japan will build a hospital in Tonga and
    it'll be staffed by Chinese doctors. Through the Quad, you can
    bring in the lower cost Indian components that can help bolster
    that on-the-ground engagement that reinforce the Quad and
    reenforce the free Indo-Pacific as a whole.
        So those would be kind of two of the things that I would
    prioritize. One is making sure they know how to understand and
    talk to the U.S., and the second is bring in this other element
    of India, which can go into the sectors of the economy where
    China is currently filling in order to give them another viable
    option.
        Mr. Barr. OK. Any other--just the same question briefly to
    any of our other witnesses. What would be the top
    recommendation in any kind of Oceania engagement legislation?
        I mean, I like the Peace Corps idea, you know, but--and
    soft power. But what about DFC? Where can DFC counter Chinese
    economic influence?
        Mr. Loi. I mean, Congressman, absolutely anything on
    infrastructure, I think, is important. I mean, we do need to be
    able to offer an alternative to what China is offering. Other
    pieces of engagement that have been really popular beyond this
    Peace Corps are the Coast Guard ship rider program that
    Ambassador Cefkin mentioned.
        You know, most of the Pacific Islands do not have
    militaries, right, so the military-to-military piece can be a
    bit more difficult. And then I think the other piece of it is
    ensuring that there is a stream of funding that can't be
    disrupted on a year-to-year basis.
        Mr. Dayant. Yes. I'm sorry. If I could add to this.
        So yes, I agree completely with Mr. Loi on any type of, you
    know, Pacific Island maritime patrol that the U.S. would lead.
        But also I think it's important for the U.S. to look beyond
    the COFA States. I mean, when you look at the aid that the U.S.
    gives to the Pacific, 85 percent is directed to the Compacts--
    the COFA States and I think it's----
        Ms. Cefkin. And if I may just also mention one other
    program that's very promising is the state Partnership Program.
    When I was in the Pacific we had a state partnership with the
    Nevada National Guard with Tonga and that was hugely beneficial
    to our relationship and to both our countries.
        It's now, I'm happy to say, been expanded to Fiji and
    Wisconsin Guard has taken on a partnership with PNG. But that's
    another place where you can have sustained engagement that is
    really advantageous. So that's another area, I think, to
    explore expanding.
        Mr. Barr. Well, I'm proud to represent the Kentucky
    National Guard, and I would say that the our guardsmen would
    not object to going to the South Pacific for a few--for a tour.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Barr. Thank you all for your testimony. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
        Let me now recognize my good friend, the gentlelady from
    Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I second that from
    the great Commonwealth of Pennsylvania an interest definitely
    in our National Guard and a state partnership.
        My questions today are a follow-on to questions that I
    asked in a 2019 HVAC hearing on a similar subject of the
    Pacific Islands, and maybe I could see if a couple years later
    if we get some additional insight.
        For Ms. Paskal, I want--there were questions that I have.
    We have had a lot of conversation about China and the influence
    of China in the region.
        What is the United States doing to promote regional
    partnerships that would counter Chinese influence? If you could
    help us with that.
        And also, how are our trade investment and relationships in
    the Freely Associated States compared with China at this point
    in time?
        Ms. Paskal. Thank you very much. There's not a lot going
    on, especially now since the Pacific Island Forum kind of
    fragmented, which is why it may be a very nice opportunity
    actually to create a new regional structure especially within
    Micronesia, and that can be done in part right now.
        As the Ambassador knows, Kiribati and Nauru, which are
    Micronesian States, are affiliated to Fiji but if they were
    shifted up to Majuro, then that would really help consolidate
    the region and enable the people of Micronesia to become a much
    more cohesive whole in terms of access to education and health
    care and those sorts of things.
        So there's a lot of work to be done on that first part of
    your question.
        Apart from that, I would--I do not actually know how many
    of the mechanisms within the U.S. Government work. I know that
    on the ground what you're seeing is because China completely
    distorts economics for--because it is part of comprehensive
    national power and so it uses a completely different
    calculation for what is a good investment or not, it is very
    difficult to compete with them unless you educate the local
    population about what's happening and expose corruption.
        So if you create a level playing field where American
    companies can compete with Chinese companies, then it would
    involve working with the local press. In fact, as has happened
    in Australia, where a lot of dodgy dealings were uncovered and
    it really affected China's position in Australia, to help in
    the Pacific Island countries.
        So they target through the three warfares. They target the
    media. They target lawfare and they target psychological, and
    that gives a lot less room for the U.S. to operate.
        So there would need to be push back in those three areas
    first in order to create the space for the U.S. to be able to
    come in and compete and give them a viable option economically
    in the face of these distorted Chinese economics.
        Ms. Houlahan. That's really actually fascinating. I'd love
    to followup offline with you on some ideas in that area.
        My second question is somewhat related and it has to do
    with the fact that several of you all have brought up the Peace
    Corps and other sorts of educational partnerships, as well for
    the Ambassador.
        How can we advance our U.S. educational exchanges and how
    can we further our relationships with our allies? Do we need
    more funding for this or perhaps specific programming for this
    maybe in the STEM field? I'm particularly passionate about
    STEM.
        And you've noted in your testimony that China has a hundred
    training grants per year to the Pacific Islanders. Obviously,
    we, as you said, have a handful. What should we do to remain
    competitive in this space besides adding more grants? And,
    first, would start with the Ambassador, but I know many of you
    might have something to add to that.
        Ms. Cefkin. Congresswoman, yes, indeed, it is a question of
    funding. We really have excellent programs. In addition to
    Fulbright, there's the Humphrey Fellowship. Let me also mention
    the International Visitor Program, which brings aspiring
    leaders from these countries to the United States for
    exchanges.
        And to give you one concrete example, a former, now, sadly,
    deceased Prime Minister of Tonga Pohiva, he was actually
    transformed by doing one of these study grants and really rose
    to the very top levels of his government.
        So it is a question of funding and the resources, the
    people, to implement it.
        If I could maybe just add one very brief comment to your
    last question, which is to note that the U.S. has long
    supported Pacific regionalism, and I do think we need to be a
    little bit cautious that we have more to gain from Pacific
    solidarity than from encouraging fragmentation.
        We are a founding member of the Pacific community, and I
    know that even those countries that have the relations with
    Taiwan, as I say, you know, are nervous about the growing
    tensions between us and China.
        So I do think that it's in our interest to, you know, view
    the Pacific as a whole and work with the Pacific as a whole,
    notwithstanding the fact we, of course, have a special
    responsibility with the Compact countries.
        Ms. Houlahan. And I have run out of time, unfortunately,
    but would love if you all have anything to add to the record on
    either of those questions to ask that you submit that for the
    record.
        And with that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thanks, Ms. Houlahan.
        And I notice we have been joined by Congresswoman Katie
    Porter. So let me ask unanimous consent for Representative
    Porter to participate in this hearing and that she'll be
    yielded 5 minutes for the purposes of questioning our witnesses
    after committee members have had the opportunity to question
    any witnesses.
        And not hearing any objections, let it be stated.
        Let me now recognize my good friend from the great state of
    California, the gentlelady, Ms. Kim.
        Ms. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman Bera, from the
    great state of California.
        I'd also like to thank Ranking Members Chabot.
        The Pacific Islands are incredibly important to the U.S.
    economic and strategic interest in promoting security and
    prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. The Freely Associated States
    are particularly important for the United States, including
    Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia and serve as
    crucial forward operating bases for U.S. military assets to
    balance against threats in the Pacific.
        The Compacts of Free Association is crucial to maintain
    this competitive edge in the region. But renegotiations to
    renew this critical compact ahead of its expiration in 2024
    have stalled under the Biden administration.
        In June, I joined the letter to President Biden urging the
    immediate renegotiation of COFA to support the Freely
    Associated States and I would urge him again today to make this
    compact renewal a priority for his Indo-Pacific agenda.
        With China leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative and
    malign influence through the economic pressure, the United
    States is rapidly falling behind on maintaining a presence in
    Pacific Island nations.
        Ms. Paskal, can you provide insight on how the United
    States is countering the Belt and Road Initiative and other CCP
    influence operations in the Pacific Islands, especially through
    agencies like the Development Finance Corporation?
        Ms. Paskal. Thank you very much for your question,
    Representative Kim.
        There have been a lot of things announced and a few things
    have showed up on the ground, and there have been some
    collaborative projects--as mentioned, the undersea cable
    project.
        But there hasn't really been anything transformational. And
    also, as was mentioned, you know, that is how China lures a
    government into flipping. That is what happened with Kiribati.
        They came to Kiribatis with, you know, we're going to give
    you the planes that you want and all that sort of stuff,
    instead of what has been happening a lot in terms of social
    reengineering.
        So you'd get consultants coming from Australia or New
    Zealand wanting to talk about very important issues like gender
    rights, and the Chinese would say, we're going to give you
    planes instead. And then the government would say, well, planes
    are going to get me reelected but gender rights are going to
    cause me some problems domestically so I'm going to take the
    planes.
        So the scale of the way that China has comprehended the
    political dynamics of the people in the region, and I would say
    these are very smart leaders. If you look at FSM, for example,
    FSM, in the last 130 years, belonged to Spain, then Germany,
    then Japan, then the United States, and finally became
    independent.
        They've seen a lot of political disruptions, and they know
    how to play big countries off of each other. So they know what
    they need to do to try to get themselves reelected. So we need
    to really listen to them and work with them as equals in terms
    of what they need in order to, as politicians, get themselves
    reelected and so far, that really isn't happening.
        Ms. Kim of California. Thank you, Ms. Paskal.
        You know, I would like to ask you about the instability in
    the Pacific Islands Forum. Could you briefly explain how the
    United States has attempted to stabilize the situation and
    whether any outside actors have tried to exploit the situation
    for their own gain?
        Ms. Paskal. OK. So I would say that the biggest actor
    actually has been New Zealand with support from Australia and
    from France via French Polynesia. For those who do not know,
    what happened there was a leadership contest in--for the
    Pacific Island Forum, and there were two contestants.
        One was from the Marshall Islands, Ambassador Zackios, an
    excellent candidate who is current Ambassador in D.C., and from
    a country that recognizes Taiwan, and the other, Henry Puna,
    who is from the Cook Islands, affiliated to New Zealand.
        And the vote--the choice came down to one vote difference,
    and we know that New Zealand, Australia, and French Polynesia
    all voted for Puna. And the Micronesians had said, if you do
    not let us run this for once, we're going to leave, and they've
    slowly been leaving.
        So they were very clear for over a year that they felt
    marginalized in the organization, and as a result of the vote,
    they felt like they had no choice but to leave because they
    weren't being represented within the organization.
        And there are a lot--you know, if Australia or New Zealand
    or French Polynesia had flipped their vote, there would be no
    problem now in the Pacific Island Forum. They all knew what
    they were doing when they made that vote, or else they have
    very bad intelligence.
        In both cases, that's a real problem for the U.S. The
    result was five countries, including three that are in free
    association with the U.S., were cut free. So that is why the
    Micronesian countries are now thinking, OK, we're going to go
    back to the way it was before.
        There will be a South Pacific bloc and there'll be a
    Micronesia bloc, and the Micronesian bloc can become more
    cohesive and we can deal with our challenges more directly
    instead of via Canberra or Wellington as an intermediary with
    Washington.
        Which is why this is actually now an interesting opening
    for Washington to interact directly with the countries of
    Micronesia.
        Mr. Bera. Great. The gentlelady's time has expired. Thank
    you, Ms. Kim.
        Ms. Kim of California. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bera. I do not see Congressman Sherman on camera so let
    me go ahead and recognize my good friend, the Congresswoman
    from North Carolina, Ms. Manning.
        Mr. Sherman. I'm on camera, am I not, Mr. Chairman? Can you
    hear me and see me? I have indicated video.
        Mr. Bera. We can hear you but we can't see you.
        Mr. Sherman. I'm on camera but please wait for a second
    here.
        Mr. Bera. OK.
        Mr. Sherman. There we go.
        Mr. Bera. Mr. Sherman, we'll come back to you after Ms.
    Manning.
        Ms. Manning. Thank you, Chairman Bera, and Ranking Member
    Chabot, for holding this important hearing. Thank you to our
    witnesses for being with us today. I look forward to working
    with members of the committee on ways we can reinvigorate our
    presence and key alliances in the region.
        My first question is for Mr. Loi. You noted the need to
    renew our ties to the region as memory of World War Two fades
    among the younger generations of Pacific Islanders and, most
    importantly, among Americans.
        In light of that as well as all the critical issues facing
    our country and the countries around the world whose crises
    grab the headlines every day, how can we convince the American
    public that this area requires attention and how can we improve
    the level of understanding and strategic thinking about this
    region?
        Mr. Loi. It's a great question, Congresswoman.
        I mean, look, my written statement wasn't meant to,
    certainly, diminish the history and the ties. I mean, I'm a
    Navy veteran. I've been to many of these islands when I was in
    government service. It's incredibly important.
        But we can't allow that to be kind of the foundation of our
    relationship and take it for granted in ways that we believe
    it's going to kind of just automatically sell the value and
    importance of relationship with the United States. And so, you
    know, we have to be able to work hard to win over the next
    generation.
        And I think, you know, that's part of it, but, you know, as
    I said, you know, earlier, it is about presence. It's about,
    you know, as Ms. Paskal said, we're not going to learn and
    we're not going to listen unless we're there and we're hearing
    it and we have relationships.
        And then that feeds back into the United States. Look, we
    have a fairly large population of Pacific Islanders in the
    United States. I mean, I would say to them as fellow citizens,
    right, you need to also voice your concerns and interests and
    you have to participate in our system and you have to what you
    can to make sure that those issues are elevated.
        But, look, the average American citizen is very distracted,
    understandably so. You know, whether or not they're going to be
    able to appreciate the importance in the broader strategic and
    security, you know, aspects of relations in the Pacific, it's
    difficult, right.
        I mean, I think that's something that all of us can do.
    Hopefully, that's something that you raise with your
    constituents when you get questions about why are we giving aid
    to places like this.
        Certainly, the arguments are pretty clear if you pay--even
    if you're following the issues. But it is difficult. It's
    always been difficult to explain to, you know, the average
    American why it's important for us to spend resources here. And
    I do not have a magic bullet for that other than we have to
    communicate both as leaders but then also, I think, the
    communities in question and those who have interests in the
    region can't take it for granted and they, too, have to be
    vocal.
        Ms. Manning. Thank you.
        Ms. Paskal, do you want to comment on that?
        Ms. Paskal. Yes. I think that, you know, we're thinking
    about it a lot in terms of aid. There is a lot of economic
    potential in the region and the countries in the region would
    like to--would like to just earn a living, like everybody else.
        And so there's some things that actually can be done in
    terms of trade facilitation that would make their economies a
    lot more stable, and part of that would involve protecting them
    from predatory Chinese practices that make entire sectors of
    their economy unviable.
        Like what's happening, potentially, with online gambling in
    Palau could potentially turn Palau into a major Chinese
    criminal organization hub.
        So with participation of FBI or DEA or other organizations
    like that it might be a lot easier to give them the space they
    need to develop to become more stable so that we do not
    actually have to, you know, turn to constituents and say we
    need to send them tons of money all the time.
        We can help them to become more economically stable on
    their own, which is fundamentally what they want and that goes
    back to the other question about training.
        Just very quickly, in order to give them an option that
    isn't China, it does have to be the U.S. So for training, for
    example, it might make a lot of sense to facilitate training,
    again, in India. So training a doctor in India is a lot less
    expensive than training a doctor in the U.S.
        So as part of the Quad structure bringing India in where
    appropriate for supporting these economies.
        Sorry. Thank you.
        Ms. Manning. Thank you very much.
        Very quickly, Mr. Dayant, you talked about the economic
    followup from COVID-19 including gender-based violence. How can
    the U.S. help these countries address the regions' high rates
    of violence against women?
        Mr. Dayant. Thank you very much, Madam Manning.
        I think, look, the United States can't absorb all the
    problems the Pacific has. But like as Mr. Loi said, like, you
    know, showing up and kind of interacting with people, creating
    a people-to-people connection and then, like, trying to educate
    and, like, share, like, the practices that the United States
    have, like, across the Pacific would be one way of, like, you
    know, showing the way. And I think Mr. Loi has just, like,
    mentioned it very, very clearly.
        Like, if the United States was to have, like, a big air
    base in the Pacific, of showing up, developing your own
    Ambassador to the Solomon Islands and in some other places we
    actually have a great step and responsive step----
        Ms. Manning. Thank you. My time has expired. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Let me know--I can see my good friend from
    the great state of California, the gentleman, Mr. Sherman, for
    5 minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Whether being visible
    is an improvement or not, I'll leave to the in the eye of the
    beholder. Being from Los Angeles, I understand that ``Game of
    Thrones'' was perhaps the most entertaining video and that's
    why we're all looking forward to the prequel.
        I think for many people watching this hearing, this is the
    most exciting hearing ever and people do not have to look
    forward to the prequel. I want to alert those who are watching
    that the prequel has already been made.
        It was on September 26th, 2019, when our subcommittee had a
    hearing that when I was chair and Chairman Bera was there we
    had a hearing along with the House Natural Resources
    Subcommittee on sustaining the U.S. Pacific insular relations.
        So for those who are watching, after you're done with this,
    just as you ended ``Game of Thrones,'' the prequel is awaiting
    you online.
        I would like our witnesses to go through the list of the
    independent States of the--that we're concerned with here and
    just, very quickly, give--a grade may be too flippant but just
    an indication of where each stands in terms of transparency,
    rule of law, democracy, and free press.
        I'll ask just one witness, whoever speaks up most quickly
    to go through the list and see how confident we are on those
    issues.
        Don't all speak at once.
        Mr. Dayant. Right. Well, I'll start.
        Look, I'm not going to--that's a very good question, Mr.
    Sherman. Thank you very much. I thank you for, like, this
    little information on, you know, the feature you were
    mentioning.
        So, yes. Look, freedom of press, you're right, is an issue
    in some nations of the Pacific. Actually, some journalists in
    the Pacific or, like, the people in the Pacific sometimes rely
    on the information that we have in Australia to actually get to
    know what's happening in the Pacific.
        I would not--you know, like, I can't give you a ranking of
    what is the most in France and what is the most----
        Mr. Sherman. Excuse me. I mean, there could be some
    reliance on out of area publications just because these
    countries are very small and they may not have a robust and
    sophisticated news operation. When I say freedom of the press,
    I do not mean in terms of, you know, do they have a New York
    Times.
        I'm sure, occasionally, the New York Times on any
    particular day may have the best article on what's happening in
    the Pacific. They do a very good job when they do cover it.
        But in terms of freedom of the press and human rights, what
    would you say is the biggest issue in--among the Pacific
    Islands?
        Mr. Dayant. I think--for what I understand, like, Fiji is a
    complicated place sometimes to talk about what's happening in
    government. Papua New Guinea difficult for, like, a lack of
    resources. Like, all the Pacific nations have actually
    different reasons fueling this lack of transparency in
    someplace or another.
        I do not know if my fellow commentators want to talk about
    this issue.
        Ms. Paskal. Representative, you bring up a very helpful
    point, which is that metrics that we tend to use in the rest of
    the world tend to fall apart when you look at the Pacific
    Islands because the populations are so small.
        So I could probably name all of the journalists in Tonga,
    for example. And if one of them decides to go out to lunch with
    the Chinese Ambassador then the situation has changed
    dramatically overnight.
        Mr. Sherman. That's--I've gone to lunch with the Chinese
    Ambassador as have quite a number of American journalists. If
    you told me that one-sixth of the journalists in the country
    was in jail, that would be--that would be a problem.
        Let me go on to another issue. A couple years ago, it came
    to my attention that the Marshall Islands was considering a
    crypto currency. Is that still the case?
        Mr. Loi. Congressman, I'm sorry. I do not know the answer
    that question. I'm not able to answer.
        Mr. Sherman. Well, if they had gone through it within a
    robust way, you would probably know.
        Ms. Paskal. Representative Sherman, another issue, which is
    also about the freedom of the press, in the Pacific Islands
    what's tended to happen is social media has tended to take over
    for information transfer.
        So it's very heavily used. Many people do not--they will
    not get a newspaper. They might get the radio. But they'll
    definitely use Facebook, which has been heavily used by China
    for influence operations.
        So the entire media environment----
        Mr. Sherman. The other side of freedom of the press. When
    the information is free some of it is false.
        What about democracy following the rule of law holding
    elections and what do you see----
        Ms. Paskal. So I would be very concerned at the moment
    about the Solomon Islands. There's a case--because of the
    switch to China, there's the--Premier of Malaita Province,
    Daniel Suidani, who is recently quite ill, and the central
    government essentially tried to block his access to medical
    care outside of the country and, eventually, Taiwan stepped in
    and provided medical care for him.
        And then there were rumors they were going to try him for
    treason for going--just for going to Taiwan for medical care,
    and now they're trying to get rid of him.
        So I would, personally, be very concerned about the Solomon
    Island. At the moment, the people of Malaita back him quite
    strongly.
        It's a country that has had civil unrest in the past. In
    the past, the Australians went in with a peacekeeping force.
    This time, given the current trajectory of the current
    government, I wouldn't be surprised if they asked--if something
    happened if they asked Chinese peacekeepers to come in instead.
        So the Solomon Islands is something I'd keep on your radar.
        Mr. Sherman. And so we do have a conflict between Australia
    and China if, God forbid, something like that were to happen. I
    believe my time has expired. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
        Let me now have recognize my good friend--he's really been
    a champion on issues with the Pacific Islands, the Congressman
    from Hawaii, Mr. Ed Case.
        Mr. Case. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member. I
    really appreciate your allowing me to be a part of this
    critical hearing.
        I think as we have all recognized, just recognizing the
    Pacific Islands and showing up even in a virtual hearing like
    this is critical to our presence in the Pacific Islands, and I
    really am grateful for your partnership and founding and
    maintaining the congressional Pacific Islands Caucus, which
    you--both of you are co-chairs of and as well as in introducing
    and forwarding the major bills that we're pursuing from
    honoring Oceania to the Blue Pacific Act, which are both moving
    at this point and I think are responsive to many of the
    concerns that our witnesses have raised here.
        So all of that is a good solid start. But a lot of work
    still to be done, obviously.
        I want to go back to the Pacific Islands Forum, because I
    guess my big question is, are we just going to just let it go?
    We, collectively, by the way. I mean, not our country. But all
    of us that care about the Pacific Islands and care about the
    future of the Pacific Islands.
        Of course, I think and believe we would all agree that the
    regional cooperation and coordination and, as we say in Hawaii,
    ohana, family, the regional family of the Pacific Islands is
    forwarded by an organization. The Pacific Island Forum has
    served that purpose.
        And so I hope we would all agree that the risk to the forum
    posed right now is not a good thing and would be taken
    advantage of by adversaries. And yet, I think I hear a little
    bit of a disagreement among our panelists as to whether we
    should just let it go or continue to work to try to hold it
    together.
        So, Ambassador, are you still able to comment on that? Is
    it too late for the four or do we need to consider alternative
    approaches with the forum?
        And I agree with your comments, by the way. I do not
    personally want to see it replaced by, you know, three
    subregional forums, kind of subforums, although I guess they
    might have some advantages, but not in replacement for an
    overall forum style approach. Ambassador Cefkin, are you
    available? Otherwise, I will go to Ms. Paskal. What's your view
    of it?
        Ms. Paskal. Thank you. I----
        Mr. Case. I think your view--you seem to have a little bit
    more pessimistic view and I want to flesh that out a little
    bit.
        Ms. Paskal. Yes, and I should be clear. I'm not saying
    abandon the forum. I'm saying that, you know, it's looking like
    the forum is becoming what it was essentially, originally,
    which was the South Pacific Forum. So it would be the countries
    of Melanesia and Polynesia, and then Micronesia and separate.
        So it's not saying get rid of the forum. But there are pan-
    regional organizations like the SPC or SPREP, for example, that
    do knit the countries together.
        What we're talking about mostly is kind of a political
    cohesion in terms of things like, for example, China. And I
    think that the operational realities of Micronesia are very,
    very different than those in the South Pacific.
        So there is an argument to be made that you can strengthen
    the family by giving different members of the family more
    control over their own say.
        The voice, as we saw with the vote in the Marshall Islands,
    we speak to anybody who's sitting in one of those embassies in
    Washington.
        They feel like they never got their voice heard and if they
    do not get their voice heard, we do not know what their
    problems are, if we do not know what their problems are we
    can't help them resolve it.
        Australia and New Zealand were acting as an intermediary
    for that messaging. So I think that, you know, that might make
    sense for Melanesia and Polynesia, but in terms of Micronesia,
    where there are the Freely Associated States and Guam and
    Saipan, I mean, you know, they let New Caledonia and French
    Polynesia in but they did not let, you know, American Samoa in.
        You know, so I think that there is an argument to be made
    that actually the region becomes stronger if you've got that
    political grouping division. But then with things like training
    and collaboration and stuff that goes through SPC or it goes
    through SPREET.
        Mr. Case. OK. Mr. Loi, do you have a view on this?
        Mr. Loi. Well, I do not think we should let it sit. But,
    you know, it would take some nuance in terms of how we engage.
        And, you know, part of it is we're not a member in the way
    that we can influence from within in a direct fashion. So it's
    indirect. And what it would take for us is to work closely
    with, you know, other parts of the region to try to help them
    realize that when they're divided like this that they all lower
    the their volume of their voice and that they should work
    together.
        This would take a process and it would take a lot of face
    to face. That's very difficult with COVID right now. But I
    agree with you, we should not just set aside. We should try to
    actively get back together.
        Mr. Case. Well, we're not a member, but it seems to me we
    have been awfully passive about it and that's the distinction.
        I mean, we cannot be a member. We can respect the decisions
    of the Pacific Islands on how to work through the forum-related
    issues.
        But we, obviously, have an interest in a regional
    organization that works and my concern is that sometimes we
    have been too passive on trying to get--trying to work with
    everybody to see whether there's a way out of this as opposed
    to just letting the forum fall apart.
        So that's, perhaps, my concern there. Anyway, my time has
    expired. I really appreciate it. Again, Chairman, Ranking
    Member, and all of our witnesses that I've worked with very
    well already in terms of the guidance, this has been a great
    hearing.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Case.
        Let me now recognize my good friend, who's also been a
    champion on, you know, asking for a special envoy, getting
    issues with COFA resolved as well as legacy issues from nuclear
    testing, the gentlelady from the great state of California, Ms.
    Porter, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Porter. Thank you very much. Thank you, Chair Bera, and
    other members of the committee, for allowing me to participate
    today. I'm very grateful.
        Mr. Loi, as you know, the Compacts of Free Association with
    Palau, Marshall Islands, and Micronesia are going to expire in
    the next few years, and those agreements are the foundation of
    a special relationship between our countries and they give the
    U.S. military control over a huge area of the Pacific.
        In your testimony, you say, quote, ``The U.S. Government
    engages most effectively when it does so with a clear strategic
    policy implemented through a broad, coordinated interagency
    approach and guided by focused coordination from the National
    Security Council,'' end quote.
        By my count, there are 14 different agencies that have
    important programs in the Freely Associated States. Is there an
    administration appointee on the National Security Council whose
    job is to coordinate these agencies for talks to extend the
    Compacts of Free Association?
        Mr. Loi. There is. I mean, it falls under the East Asia
    Directorate. As I also mentioned in my written testimony, there
    had been a director with Pacific Islands responsibilities in
    the Trump administration. Those responsibilities have been
    folded in under a director who has other geographic
    responsibilities.
        Ms. Porter. So there's not a dedicated person specifically
    for the Pacific Islands and COFA?
        Mr. Loi. That's my understanding, correct.
        Ms. Porter. Do you think it would help to have a specific
    person?
        Mr. Loi. I think it could help, yes. I think any time you
    have somebody whose singular focus is a particular area it's--
    you know, it's harder for them to get distracted by what's
    happening, say, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
        And you do need that coordination. As you said, you've got
    14 agencies that have equities in the Pacific. You know, you do
    not go to a negotiating session prepared unless you have
    somebody that's coordinated all that in advance.
        And I'm not close enough now to know, you know, whether
    that is or is not the case, but it can be difficult.
        Ms. Cefkin. But I would also like to endorse that view that
    it is in our interest.
        Ms. Porter. To have someone. I mean, I think the Compact
    talks are not progressing very well. To take just one example,
    a few weeks ago, the speaker of the Marshallese legislature
    said that they will not approve a new compact that doesn't
    address the remaining outstanding issues related to U.S.
    nuclear tests. To your knowledge, Mr. Loi, is the state
    Department discussing the nuclear issue with the Marshallese?
        Mr. Loi. I'm afraid I do not know.
        Ms. Porter. You do not know. And so what I've seen from my
    end is the state Department continues to suggest that these
    issues relating to the nuclear legacy are off the table.
        And I'm chairing the hearing tomorrow on the U.S. nuclear
    legacy in my role on oversight and investigations on the
    Natural Resources Committee exactly because it's not clear to
    me that this is not holding up the negotiation, rather than
    moving it forward despite the incredible importance of COFA.
        You know, the Biden administration's priorities--you know,
    countering China, yes, rebuilding alliances, yes, by funding
    climate change, yes, racial justice, yes, restoring the U.S.
    global standing around the world, yes--those are the Biden
    administration's priorities.
        Are those priorities, in your opinion, represented in the
    Freely Associated States and extending the Compact?
        Mr. Loi. You know, I hope they are. You know, I mean, I've
    been away from these issues of government now for 5 years. So a
    lot of my information is anecdotal and secondhand.
        So I can't tell you with any degree of specificity, I'm
    afraid, Congresswoman.
        Ms. Porter. It just seems to me that when we look at those
    priorities I just listed, there are very, very few
    opportunities that the Biden-Harris administration has to
    address that many priorities in a kind of singular negotiation
    and moment, and that they ought to be appointing.
        You know, follow through and appointing a designated person
    with responsibility just for this, and they ought to take your
    advice, Mr. Loi, and run this process through the National
    Security Council so that it has the full attention of all of
    the relevant parties so we can make real progress in the COFA
    negotiations.
        Thank you for allowing me to testify, and I yield back to
    questions. Sorry. I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Congresswoman. And, again, thank you
    for your leadership on these issues and having an important
    hearing on the issue of COFA and legacy issues tomorrow.
        With that, it looks like everyone's had a chance to ask
    questions. I'll go ahead and make a few closing comments, and
    then turn to to my colleague, Mr. Chabot, if he has any closing
    comments.
        But I do think there are some really important takeaways
    from this hearing. Obviously, the importance of the
    relationship between the United States as well as our like-
    valued allies in the region, recognizing the unique challenges
    that I think each of the witnesses really highlighted.
        But the first step is showing up, being present, engaging
    in dialog and listening to the unique issues in the region and
    addressing those issues not as part of some great power
    competition but as the unique issues of the people that live
    there, and working with the countries.
        You know, my conversations with some of the leaders of the
    Pacific Islands is that they want us there but they also--they
    want us physically there as well.
        And we do not have to do this alone. You know, we should
    work with our like-valued allies and other Pacific nations like
    New Zealand, Australia, Japan. You know, elevate the Quad, as
    one of the witnesses said. Engaging India to help address some
    of these needs.
        I think there's huge opportunities for us and, you know, I
    look forward to working with my colleagues in Congress in a
    bipartisan way as well as the administration, and I do look
    forward to that long overdue CODEL for Members of Congress to
    go visit some of the island nations and, you know, hopefully,
    with the--hopefully the last phase of this pandemic we can
    start to travel to the region again and visit those nations.
        And with that, let me recognize my good friend, the ranking
    member, Mr. Chabot, for any closing comments you might have.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief.
        I think this has really been an excellent hearing on a very
    important issue, and I think it's been brought up a number of
    times that the U.S. really does have deep ties to the Pacific
    Islands.
        And as the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly important,
    those islands, the Pacific Islands, will continue to be
    critical to U.S. interests in the broader region.
        In listening to the testimony and the questions, one thing
    stands out even more clearly in my mind, and that's that the
    U.S. needs to become much more engaged with this region.
        In many ways, China is way, way more engaged with a number
    of these island nations than we are and we really need to step
    up our game and we need to do it fast because this is all
    happening very quickly.
        And so I look forward to working with you, Chairman Bera
    and Mr. Case, and all the other members, and this panel, I
    thought, was really superb. I thought Ms. Paskal was
    particularly persuasive here.
        Now, she was our witness but even if that wasn't the case,
    I really thought she did a tremendous job in setting up why the
    islands are so important, you know, the first set of islands,
    the second, the third.
        And it goes both ways. It's critical for us countering
    China. I do not want to say keeping them in a box, but keeping
    them for what is their ultimate goal, which is to be the
    hegemon in that region and then throughout the Pacific and
    probably the world.
        But it's also for countering them. It's important, because
    they want to come out and Taiwan, as we all know, is right up
    there, No. 1 in their eyes.
        So in many ways, this is a great hearing. Kind of scary,
    especially when you consider Taiwan. But it's very important
    that we pay a lot more attention to the Pacific Islands than we
    traditionally have.
        And I want to thank you for raising the awareness of that,
    Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Mr. Bera. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
        As all the witnesses and folks that are watching this
    hearing can tell, this is not a partisan issue. I think
    Democrats and Republicans, all of us as Members of Congress,
    view the issue in the same way and view the importance of the
    region.
        So with that, I want to thank our witnesses and the members
    who participated in this very important virtual hearing.
        And with that, the hearing is adjourned and a virtual gavel
    is banged. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                    APPENDIX

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                              TESTIMONY OF SUSAIA

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                               TESTIMONY OF KYOTA
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                              TESTIMONY OF ZACKIOS

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                               VANUATA STATEMENT

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